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
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SOVIET DISSENT
AND THE
AMERICAN NATIONAL INTEREST

by

Michael Hall Maggard

June 1986

Thesis Advisor:

Frank M. Teti

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Soviet Dissent and the American National Interest

by

Michael Hall Maggard
Captain, United States Army
A.B., Wheaton College, 1976

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS IN NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

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
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ABSTRACT

Soviet dissent is not a homogeneous movement; it is composed of a myriad of individuals and groups, seeking a variety of goals and objectives. Nevertheless, the phenomenon can be described relative to three basic interests: national self-determination, a desire for religious liberty, and guarantees of civil and political freedoms. Despite a host of aggressive campaigns by the state to eliminate the phenomenon, dissent continues to persist. Thus dissent poses the greatest long-term threat to the Soviet regime since it represents the primary mechanism by which all other factors of regime instability are both enunciated and perpetuated.

American foreign-policy support to Soviet dissidents provides the United States with strategic advantages relative to the Soviet Union. For this reason, as well as for moral and legal considerations, it is in the American national interest to continue support to the various dissident movements in the USSR. Such assistance is in keeping with American values regarding a respect for human rights and is consistent with U. S. diplomatic history.

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I. INTRODUCTION

Ours was the first society openly to define itself in terms of both spirituality and human liberty. It is that unique self-definition which has given us an exceptional appeal--but it also imposes on us a special obligation, to take on those moral duties which, when assumed, seem invariably to be in our own best interests. . . . Because we are free we can never be indifferent to the fate of freedom elsewhere.

Jimmy Carter

The United States is a state founded upon ideas. It is somewhat unique in the family of nations because it is not, per se, a *national* entity. It is not a particular people that make up this country, but rather a variety of peoples with a multitude of national origins that have bonded together to pursue an ideal: the actualization of the freedom and dignity of each individual. The laws, customs, practices and policies, in short, the entire political, social and economic culture are based on this idea. To be sure, many, if not the majority of citizens, rarely consider this fact as they go about their normal day-to-day existence. The majority of citizens are born "Americans" and do not question their national origin. The majority complacently accept the freedoms and guarantees of democracy without a second thought. But that the majority rarely contemplate the great freedoms that America offers is testimony to the effectiveness of the system at guaranteeing these same freedoms. For it is in those countries that lack such guarantees that the deprived people's clamor for them is the loudest. Such is the state of the citizens of the Soviet Union, and of such is the origin of Soviet dissent.

This study examines the phenomenon of dissent in the Soviet Union. It asks from whence dissent arises, how significant it is, and what the regime is doing about it. The study analyses the role of the United States in encouraging Soviet dissidence and the effectiveness of this encouragement. It explores the prospects for dissent in the USSR as a phenomenon and as a mechanism for changing the nature of the Soviet system. Structurally, the paper is divided into four parts: a rationale for American interest in Soviet dissent (chapters two and three), an examination of the Soviet dissidence movement (chapters four through seven), a discussion of the Soviet regime's response to dissent (chapter eight), and an exploration of some prospects for the movement's future (chapters nine and ten).

Chapter two examines U.S. foreign policy regarding support for human rights from a theoretical and historical basis. It examines the unique political and social nature of the United States and the role human rights play in defining this nature. Next it contrasts the definitions of human rights in the American and Soviet contexts. The chapter then traces the human rights policies of American leaders from the era of the Founding Fathers through the Reagan administration. Finally, it focuses on the varying interpretations of U.S. responsibilities toward human rights under the Nixon, Carter, and Reagan administrations.

Chapter three examines the concept of the national interest and then applies this concept to the issue of human rights in the international environment. A theoretical rationale for American support of human rights as a component of foreign policy is proposed, focusing on moral, legal and strategic justifications for such a policy. Finally some of the costs of such a policy are examined, especially as they relate to relations with the Soviet Union.

The second part of the study switches the focus to the Soviet Union. Chapter four examines the concept of dissidence within the context of Soviet society, focusing on how the phenomenon started and why it continues. Following a general description of dissidence as a factor of regime instability, is

an analysis of the extent and scope of the movement. Next is a review of the literature concerning how best to categorize the phenomenon. Three categories are offered: national, religious and political. These three categories serve as the organization for the discussion of Soviet dissent in the remainder of the study.

Chapter five examines the first category of dissent--groups that desire national self-determination. The chapter discusses the regime's objectives regarding the development of a "new Soviet people" and its attitude toward the more than one hundred different nationality groups in the USSR. Following this general discussion, is an historical description of the goals and objectives of the more important nationally-oriented dissident groups: the Crimean Tatars, Soviet Germans and Jews, the Ukrainians, Lithuanians, and Central Asian Muslims.

An examination of religious dissent is the subject of chapter six. First, the regime's attitude toward religion is explored along with an historical discussion of the primary decrees and programs that have shaped the modern regime-religion relationship. Then three of the most numerically important Christian religions are examined--the Russian Orthodox Church, the Evangelical Christian Baptists and the Pentecostalists--to discover the status of religion in this haven of "scientific atheism".

The human rights movement has become almost synonymous with Soviet dissent due to its activities in the 1970s. This movement is the subject of chapter seven. The various organizations that emerged in the wake of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe are examined, as is the regime's reaction to dissidence during the era of *détente*. The chapter explores the goals of this movement and the development of what may be its greatest contribution--*samizdat*. Finally, groups advocating social and economic reforms, which largely grew out of the human rights movement, are described.

The next section, chapter eight, examines the various responses of the Soviet regime in attempting to eliminate or at the least manage the phenomenon

of dissent in the USSR. The chapter considers the necessity for repression, as well as the various mechanisms employed by the regime to eliminate dissidence. An analysis is conducted of both the passive mechanisms of control, such as the political culture of the USSR and Russia before it, and active mechanisms of control, for example imprisonment and official terror. The chapter concludes with an examination of the various periods of repression in the past twenty years in order to determine patterns and see whether foreign or domestic pressure has influenced the regime's policies.

The final two chapters ask whether dissent in the Soviet Union has made any impact on Soviet society. It examines the current status of the three categories of dissent and then provides short- and long-term predictions about the future of the various movements. Finally, the future of the Soviet regime is considered. The role of dissent in contributing to prospects for revolutionary change in the current regime are explored. This brings the discussion full circle back to American objectives. Soviet dissidence is thus seen within its context of American-Soviet relations; as a key element in an ongoing ideological struggle for influence and position in the international system.

This paper employs a largely normative approach to the subject of Soviet dissent and the American national interest. I do not apologize for this method--the aspirations of the dissidents as well as the goals of the United States and the Soviet Union relative to human rights issues demand a consideration of normative aspects. The purpose of the study is not only to describe the what and how of the Soviet dissident phenomenon but also to attempt to provide an answer to the why. Attempting such an answer requires an attention to certain values and goals that do not easily lend themselves to an empirical-analytic approach. Normative theory also seems especially relevant to this subject given the particular political cultures of the two countries. Even a cursory examination of official U.S. and Soviet pronouncements and policies on the subject of human rights and dissidence reveals the highly developed and

prevalent ideological justifications for the two states' respective positions. Nevertheless, the prime danger in such a normative approach is a tendency to overstate the contrasts between the two political systems and minimize the very real discrepancies between what ought to be and what presently is. These dangers having been acknowledged, the author asks the indulgence of those who might favor a more empirical approach to the subject of Soviet studies.¹

The study attempts to explore as many facets of Soviet dissidence as are possible in a work of such length. The breadth of analysis, however, precludes a detailed description of each component part of the phenomenon. Thus, the notes and bibliography are intended to supplement the lack of detail in some of the descriptions. There is currently a wealth of reliable data available to the Western scholar on most aspects of Soviet dissent. This is largely due to the efforts of the dissidents themselves but also results from the increased attention Soviet authorities have shown in public literature to various facets of the phenomenon.

Hopefully a balance between the macro and the micro view comes through in the following study. Soviet dissent is not solely an amalgamation of groups and structures and organizations and processes; although this study will tend to explain the phenomenon in such terms. Included are a number of anecdotes about the people involved in the movement. The purpose for these stories is to convey the reality that dissidence is fundamentally a phenomenon of people--people who affirm by their words and actions that the dignity and worth of each individual takes precedence over the rules of the state.

¹ Normative theory in international studies became unfashionable in the late 1950s and 1960s, being largely replaced by empirical-analytic theories. Recently, however, many scholars, if not precisely embracing normative theories again, are at least attempting to integrate values, goals and preferences in behavioral theories. For a discussion of this trend, see David Easton, "The New Revolution in Political Science," American Political Science Review 63 (December 1969): 1051-1061, and James E. Dougherty and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., Contending Theories of International Relations (New York: Harper & Row, 1981), especially chapter 13.

II. HUMAN RIGHTS IN AMERICAN DIPLOMACY

America is the only nation in the world that is founded on a creed. That creed is set forth with dogmatic theological lucidity in the Declaration of Independence, perhaps the only piece of practical politics which is also theoretical politics and also great literature.

G.K. Chesterton

A. THE AMERICAN CREED

Former Ambassador to the United Nations, Jeane Kirkpatrick, has rightly stated, that a lack of homogeneity in American "history, race, language, [and] religion gives added centrality to American values, beliefs, and goals, making them the key element of our national identity".¹ This unique national identity distinguishes the United States from the great majority of actors in the international system and greatly shapes America's approach to foreign-policy decision-making. The embodiment of America's political values and ideals that compose her national identity have been termed the "American creed".² The origin of the creed is found in the foundational documents of the American state, especially in the Declaration of Independence, Federalist Papers and the Constitution.

In the American experience, the origin of the American creed predates the formation of its political system. Since the creed predates the state, the use of the creed as the foundation for state policy is fully justified, in fact, the legitimacy of the state rests on its adherence to this creed. This differs

¹ Remarks by Jeane Kirkpatrick in a symposium conducted by Commentary magazine, "Human Rights And American Foreign Policy: A Symposium", Commentary (November 1981): 42.

² The terminology of "American creed" has been employed by a variety of writers, including such scholars, politicians and journalists as Peter Berger, Jeane Kirkpatrick, Samuel Huntington, Eugene McCarthy and Gunnar Myrdal.

significantly from the experience of the European and most other modern nation-states, whose multitudes of ideologies emerge within the context of existing state entities. Ideology, therefore, plays a relatively minor role in providing legitimacy for these states and hence also plays a minor role as a determinant or constraint on the formulation of foreign policy. In these states the primary means of legitimacy is national identity.

The modern American creed is far from a static, rigidly codified, or homogeneous body of values. Despite its specific origin, the creed has been supplemented over time by the inclusion of ideals that originated outside of America's northern European ideological birthplace, and as a result of the changes brought about by the experiences of the American people. Nevertheless, the core values upon which later values were added, remain relatively intact and continue to serve as both the basis of current U.S. policy and as the constraints upon that policy.

This is not to say that all American foreign policy in practice completely conforms to the standards of this creed.³ Nevertheless, in order to be successful, i.e. in order to be acceptable to the American people, U.S. foreign policy must strive toward the ideals of the American creed and be clearly linked to that creed in the perceptions of the American polity. As Peter Berger says, "as long as the United States remains a democracy, this linkage will always reassert itself, for the simple reason that the American people will insist on it even if an American administration should be tempted to set it aside."⁴

³ Samuel Huntington traces the historical gap between American ideals and institutions and the reasons for this gap in Samuel P. Huntington, "American Ideals Versus American Institutions", Political Science Quarterly 97 (Spring 1982): 1-37.

⁴ Remarks by Peter Berger in "Human Rights And American Foreign Policy: A Symposium", p. 27.

B. HUMAN RIGHTS

A central feature of the American creed is a belief in the inherent dignity and worth of the individual. In the American experience human rights are the expression of human dignity and are derived from this concept of the intrinsic worth of each person. Thus, human rights find their origin not in benefits granted by the state nor by any particular political system but rather are entitlements due each individual simply by virtue of his humanity. As explained by the Declaration of Independence, all men are "endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights".

While the state is not the grantor of rights, as Jack Donnelly wisely points out the institutionalization of rights "is crucial to their effective enjoyment".⁵ Thus, while Americans are inherently entitled to such rights as the freedom of speech, assembly and religion, the Bill of Rights (itself a product of the state) serves not to grant these rights, but rather to guarantee the observance of these rights by the state. Jack Donnelly asserts that:

Human rights are conceived as being held primarily in relation to *society and particularly to society in the form of the state. As the natural rights of persons, they are seen as logically and morally to take precedence over the rights of the state and society, which are viewed as major contributors to the realization of these rights but also the *greatest potential violators* of basic human rights.*⁶ [emphasis mine]

This concept of the origin of human rights is important as it is one of the major differences between American and Soviet definitions of these rights. In the Soviet context human rights are neither the endowments of God nor the inherent entitlements of humanity, rather they are the benefits provided by the

⁵ Jack Donnelly, "Human Rights And Human Dignity: An Analytic Critique Of Non-Western Conceptions Of Human Rights", The American Political Science Review 76 (June 1982): 305.

⁶ Jack Donnelly, p. 306.

state. As benefits they are subject to the pleasure of the state, or to be more specific in the case of the Soviet state, the ruling elite. The implications of this distinction are clear. First, the "rights" of the Soviet people are conferred upon them "by the same sovereign power that presides over the Gulag Archipelago."⁷ Thus, their application is dependent upon the benevolence of the ruling elite. Second, the scope of rights granted by the state is limited to those rights that are perceived to be in the best interest of the ruling elite. The scope of rights is thus potentially arbitrary. With such an origin, these state-granted benefits can scarcely be termed *human* rights since their universal manifestation would be purely accidental.

In the Soviet conception of rights there is no external standard by which state compliance with these state-granted benefits can be measured. Naturally, there is no recourse for the individual who perceives his rights to be violated by the state. This potential arbitrariness is further exacerbated in a political system like that of the Soviet Union, which lacks both responsiveness and accountability to its subjects.

Closely linked to this third implication is a curious but expected practical result: "rights" are conferred upon those who enjoy the regime's favor and denied those outside it. The Soviet regime makes no secret of this distinction:

The political freedoms--freedom of the press, of expression, of assembly--are interpreted from class positions as conditions of the consolidation of the working people and the spread of socialist ideology which rules out the 'freedom' of anti-socialist propaganda, the freedom to organize counterrevolutionary forces against the fundamentals of socialism.⁸

Or as another Soviet writer put it:

⁷ Remarks by Robert Nisbet in "Human Rights And American Foreign Policy: A Symposium", p. 54.

⁸ Vladimir Kartashkin, "The Socialist Countries and Human Rights", in Karel Vasak, ed., The International Dimensions of Human Rights, vols. 1-2 (Paris: UNESCO, 1982), p. 633. Quoted in David P. Forsythe, "The United Nations and Human Rights, 1945-1985", Political Science Quarterly 100 (Summer 1985): 260.

Any citizen of the Soviet Union whose interests coincide with the interests of society feels the entire magnitude of our democratic freedoms. But the matter is quite different if and when, in certain cases, those interests do not coincide. In this respect, our attitude is straightforward, namely, priority should be accorded to the interests of the whole society, of all the working people, and we consider this principle quite fair.⁹

This conflict between rights proceeding from the state vice being the inherent entitlement of each individual is also revealed in the Soviet linkage of rights and obligations. The preamble to the Soviet Constitution makes this linkage clear: the USSR "is a society of genuine democracy, whose political system ensures . . . the combination of real citizen's rights and liberties with their duties and responsibilities to society". Both Articles 59 and 130 contain the phraseology: "the exercise of rights and liberties is inseparable from the performance by citizens of their duties". This linkage is not restricted solely to legal documents but is a frequent theme of Soviet writers writing on the subject of human rights and is also a feature of the latest Party program: "The Soviet citizen's exercise of his rights and freedoms is inseparable from his fulfillment of his constitutional duties. There are no rights without duties and no duties without rights--this is the immutable political principle of socialist society".¹⁰

This linkage of rights and duties is so close that in some instances there is no practical distinction in the use of the two concepts. For example, Article 40 of the 1977 Constitution states that "USSR citizens have the right to labor . . . including the right to choice of occupation, type of employment and work. . ." On the other hand, labor is also the duty of each Soviet citizen. Article 60 states that "conscientious labor in one's chosen field of socially useful activity and the

⁹ S. Rozhkov, "Humanitarian Problems in Interstate Relations", International Affairs (April 1984): 38.

¹⁰ "The Draft Party Program (New Version)", The Current Digest of the Soviet Press (CDSR), 37 (November 27, 1985): 15.

observance of labor discipline are the duty of, and a matter of honor for, every able-bodied USSR citizen."¹¹

To be fair, in American society there is also a correspondence between rights and obligations, but there is a fundamental difference. In America one's obligation is a result of another's rights, not one's own rights. For example, my obligation to not murder another human being does not result from my right to life, rather it results from another's right to life. The implication of the Soviet's linkage of rights with obligations makes one's own rights contingent upon the correct discharge of obligations. As Donnelly explains,

despite the apparently unqualified character of the right to work mentioned in Article 40, jobs in their fields are regularly denied dissidents and Jewish activists, in accordance with Soviet law and administrative practice, on the grounds of the individuals having failed to discharge their social duties. The right to education, according to Article 45, 'is ensured by the free nature of all types of education'. Nonetheless, emigres may be required to buy back this 'free' education as a legal condition of exit.¹²

A final distinction between American and Soviet concepts of human rights pertains to political versus social or economic rights. From the preceding discussion of the origins of human rights and the relationship of these rights to the state it should be clear why Americans have generally framed the discussion of human rights in terms of individual and political freedoms whereas Soviets have tended to stress social and economic benefits. It is difficult for the American to conceive of such rights as, for example, "the right to work" as an inherent entitlement since the realization of that "right" is dependent upon an

¹¹ Jack Donnelly, p. 309.

¹² Jack Donnelly, p. 310.

external entity providing the employment.¹³ In the Soviet system, since rights are by definition benefits of the state, the right to work is easily accommodated within the Soviet understanding of the nature of human rights. On the other hand, the exercise of a political right, such as "freedom of speech", frequently finds itself abridged because such exercise questions the origin of rights as the benefit of the state rather than the entitlement of individuals.¹⁴ The quest by Soviet citizens for political rights as defined in the American system is what I believe to be at the root of the dissidence phenomenon and will be addressed in subsequent chapters. At this point it is sufficient to call attention to the significant differences between the two political system's respective approaches to defining human rights and underscore the importance of human rights within the American creed.

G. HISTORICAL PRECEDENTS

The present U.S. administration has affirmed the centrality of support for human rights as a component of American foreign policy. Jeane Kirkpatrick has stated that "not only should human rights play a central role in U.S. foreign policy, no U.S. foreign policy can possibly succeed that does not accord them a central role. The nature of politics and the character of the United States alike guarantee that this should be the case."¹⁵ But how does this modern

¹³ This is not altogether clear, however, as one of the three enumerated inalienable rights in the Declaration of Independence is "the pursuit of happiness". This has usually, but not always, been interpreted as an individual right to pursue happiness with minimal interference by the state rather than a mandate for the state to provide a means to achieve "happiness". Nonetheless, President Carter included social and economic rights in his definition of the primary human rights objectives for U.S. foreign policy as will be shown below.

¹⁴ There are, of course, other reasons for the abridgment of political rights in the Soviet Union that have little to do with the theoretical justifications for human rights. These reasons will be examined below.

¹⁵ Remarks by Jeane Kirkpatrick in "Human Rights And American Foreign Policy: A Symposium", p. 42.

interpretation of the centrality of human rights support conform to historical understandings of the role of human rights in American foreign policy?

In fact, America has a long history of support for human rights, both foreign and domestic. From its earliest days--from its very inception as a nation--America's statesmen have extended the core ideals of individual freedom and dignity to the rest of the world.¹⁶ The universality of these concepts is embodied in the very document that declared America's emergence as a state in the international system. The opening words of the Declaration of Independence affirm "... that *all* men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights, that among these are life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness. That to secure these rights, governments are instituted among men . . . "[emphasis mine] The governmental procedures enacted to secure these rights are described in the Constitution, while many of the rights themselves are articulated in the amendments to this Constitution--the Bill of Rights. Not many years after the founding of the nation, the chief architect of the language and procedures of American democracy reemphasized the universality of these notions of individual freedom and dignity. In a letter to James Madison in 1783 Thomas Jefferson wrote: "A bill of rights is what the people are entitled to against every government on earth".¹⁷

It is one thing to articulate the universality of these concepts of democracy and human rights, it is quite another to attempt to modify the domestic policies of another nation to conform to these rights. Despite Jefferson's call for universal applicability of these rights, neither he nor any of the other founding fathers advocated U.S. policy initiatives to impose these concepts on the rest of the world. From the foundations of the country in the late 1700s through the

¹⁶ See Henry Steele Commager, The Empire of Reason (Garden City, NY: Anchor Press/Doubleday, 1978) for a discussion of how early American applications of renaissance ideas were proclaimed as universally relevant.

¹⁷ quoted in Nicolai N. Petro, The Predicament of Human Rights (New York: University Press of America), p. 5.

bulk of the nineteenth century, the U.S. was characterized by general nonparticipation--to say nothing of non-intervention--in the affairs of the rest of the world. The advice of George Washington in his farewell address to avoid participation in "European politics, friendships, or wars", was generally heeded by his successors, and American support for human rights abroad was primarily restricted to pronouncements and rhetoric. As John Quincy Adams stated:

Wherever the standard of freedom and independence has been or shall be unfurled, here shall be America's heart, her benedictions, and her prayers. But she goes not abroad in search of monsters to destroy. She is the well-wisher to the freedom and independence of all. She is the champion and vindicator of her own. she will recommend the general cause by the countenance of her voice, and by the benignant sympathy of her example [if she did more] she might become the dictatress of the world. She would no longer be the ruler of her own spirit".¹⁸

It was not until the twentieth century that the United States began to add policy substance to her vocal support of the universality of human rights. Woodrow Wilson was the first president to seriously challenge the concept of non-interventionism in the domestic affairs of other states. He unabashedly called upon other states to adjust their domestic practices to conform to what he claimed were universal truths concerning the freedom and dignity of each individual. He reaffirmed the role of human rights as the cornerstone of the national interest and stressed the transcendent nature of this concept: "America will come into the full light of day when all shall know that she puts human rights above all other rights, and that her flag is the flag not only of America but of humanity".¹⁹ However, the optimism of Wilson and others that believed human rights were realizable through peaceful processes and democratic institutions suffered a severe setback by the revolution in Russia, the Nazi seizure of power in Germany and finally the Second World War.

¹⁸ Quoted in Nicolai N. Petro, p. 6.

¹⁹ Quoted in Nicolai N. Petro, p. 7.

The optimism suffered a setback, but was not extinguished. Franklin Delano Roosevelt expanded Wilson's definition of human rights by claiming that these rights rested on certain universal freedoms. As he declared in his 1941 State of the Union address, an enduring peace for America could only be realized by the freedom of other people: "... the world order which we seek is the cooperation of free countries, working together in a friendly, civilized way." He went on to say that "we look forward to a world founded upon four essential freedoms": freedom of speech and expression, freedom to worship as one chooses, freedom from want, and freedom from fear of aggression.²⁰ President Roosevelt realized that support for human rights abroad was a major component of national security when he stated, "we ourselves shall never be wholly safe at home unless other governments recognize such freedoms."²¹ These principles were soon codified in a variety of international agreements, among which were the Atlantic Charter and the founding documents of the United Nations.

Roosevelt's support for human rights through the United Nations reflected what A. Glenn Mower calls "the uncertainties and hesitations which have so frequently marked the American approach to human rights in their international context."²² On the one hand, the United States proposed that human rights pronouncements be included in the organization's purpose statement, in the definitions of the U.N.'s economic and social goals, and in the call for the creation of a human rights commission. On the other hand, the U.S. opposed changing the organization's mandate from "promoting and encouraging" human rights to "promoting and protecting" these rights. The United States objected that for the United Nations to involve itself in *protection* would "raise the question of whether the Organization should actively impose human rights and fundamental freedoms within individual countries and would lead many people of

²⁰ Quoted in A. Glenn Mower Jr., The United States, the United Nations and Human Rights (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1979), p. 3.

²¹ Quoted in Nicolai N. Petro, p. 7.

²² A. Glenn Mower Jr., pp. 6-7.

the world to expect more of the Organization than it could successfully accomplish."²³

Harry S. Truman continued Roosevelt's linkage of U.S. support for international human rights and American national security. In a speech to the United Nations Conference on International Organization, Truman supported the inclusion of an international bill of rights in the charter of the U.N.:

We have good reason to expect the framing of an international bill of rights, acceptable to all the nations involved. That bill of rights will be as much a part of international life as our own Bill of Rights is a part of our Constitution. The Charter is dedicated to the achievement and observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms. Unless we can attain those objectives for all men and women everywhere, without regard to race, language, or religion, we cannot have permanent peace and security.²⁴

In addition to the rhetoric, the Truman administration initiated practical efforts to support human rights in Eastern Europe within the larger context of American efforts to contain and rollback the Soviet Union's world influence. As John Gaddis has observed, despite evidence that the USSR was attempting to expand its control over Eastern Europe, "the administration devoted much time and thought during 1949 to ways of encouraging further dissidence in the satellites, ranging from Voice of America broadcasts and human rights campaigns in the United Nations to economic pressures and covert action".²⁵

The claim has been made that the Eisenhower administration's domination by the cold war and efforts to combat communism superseded all other interests, including that of human rights.²⁶ This is not precisely the case. As early as 1948, prior to becoming Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles encouraged the

²³ A. Glenn Mower Jr., p. 7.

²⁴ A. Glenn Mower Jr., pp. 9-10.

²⁵ John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982), p. 68.

²⁶ Such is the argument, for example, of Townsend Hoopes, author of The Devil and John Foster Dulles.

General Assembly of the United Nations to endorse the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. He stated:

We must go on with the drafting of a Covenant which will seek to translate human rights into law. It does not minimize our own Declaration of Independence to recognize that the Constitution and its Bill of Rights were required to establish the body of law necessary to achieve practical results. So with the Declaration before the Assembly.²⁷

Despite this appeal to codify concepts of human rights in international law in 1948, as Secretary of State, Dulles later retreated from this stance. In 1953, Dulles announced that the United States would not sign or ratify any United Nations' covenant on human rights; that it would not sign the Convention on the Political Rights of Women; and that it would refuse to press for Senate approval of the Genocide Convention.²⁸ Much of the reason for this retreat was caused by congressional pressure, especially the efforts of Senator John W. Bricker.

Senator Bricker's objections to United States involvement in international conventions on human rights was not a renunciation of the basic concepts of individual freedom and dignity nor the principles of universality of these notions. Bricker claimed he "unqualifiedly supports the position of the United States" in promoting human rights "in every country" through the United Nations and that he "favors recommendations by the United Nations on all human rights and fundamental freedoms."²⁹ Rather, his objections were to the proposed mechanisms to be employed by the U.N. to support these concepts and the fear that once the U.S. joined into binding international agreements, it would forfeit

²⁷ John Foster Dulles, "The Future of the United Nations", International Conciliation No. 445 (November 1948): 585.

²⁸ Vernon Van Dyke, Human Rights, the United States and World Community (New York: Oxford University Press, 1970), p. 130.

²⁹ Committee on Foreign Relations, Senate, U.S. Congress, Human Rights Conventions, 90th Congress, 1st Session, 1967, pp. 64-65. Quoted in Vernon Van Dyke, p. 133.

its sovereignty to an international body. In a speech to Congress, Senator Bricker claimed that "the United Nations . . . is setting up a form of government that is directly imperiling the basic fundamental freedoms of the citizens of the United States."³⁰ He stated that he did not want "any of the international groups . . . to betray the fundamental, inalienable, and God-given rights of American citizens enjoyed under the Constitution."³¹ This reluctance to bind foreign policy concerning human rights to international agreements continued to influence U.S. policy makers until the Nixon era.

D. MODERN RESPONSES

What is clear from the review of the historical precedents of American foreign policy, is that America has always, either consciously or unconsciously, pursued some sort of human rights policy. The difference in each administration's approach has been the relative importance or priority of human rights issues and the particular mechanisms for operationalizing support. These historical differences are underscored by the distinctions among the goals and policies of the three presidents of the past eighteen years: Nixon, Carter, and Reagan.³²

The primary foreign-policy goal of the Nixon administration was the achievement of international stability. The quest for stability so dominated all other considerations of foreign policy, that many accused Richard Nixon--and especially his foreign-policy czar, Henry Kissinger--of amorality in foreign relations. As John Gaddis has asserted, "there was a widespread sense", that Nixon and Kissinger "had neglected the proper alignment between policy and principle that any nation must have in order to maintain self-confidence".³³

³⁰ Vernon Van Dyke, p. 134.

³¹ Vernon Van Dyke, p. 134.

³² Gerald Ford, of course, also had a term of office during this period, but I have included his human rights policies under Nixon/Kissinger.

³³ John Lewis Gaddis, p. 337.

It is not that Kissinger lacked a moral view of America. As he stated in his memoirs: "I believed . . . that no nation could face or even define its choices without a moral compass that set a course through the ambiguities of reality and thus made sacrifices meaningful."³⁴ But in Kissinger's view, as well as Nixon's, it is not the active expression of morality and human rights values in the international milieu that guarantees these freedoms for Americans, rather it is the achievement of international stability that allows the U.S. to secure domestic freedoms. The achievement of similar freedoms in other countries may be desirable in a moral sense, but should not be a concern of U.S. foreign policy, especially if it detracts from the achievement of this stability goal. Thus, Nixon and Kissinger often viewed an active support of human rights issues as detrimental to America's primary interests, and ignored human rights issues as much as possible.³⁵

The United States was not devoid, however, of support for international human rights during the Nixon era, but this support did not originate within the administration. To Congress must go the credit for maintaining the historical linkages with America's declaratory support of human rights. In 1973, Senator Kennedy sponsored an amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act that encouraged the administration to take a more serious approach to securing human rights compliance in states seeking U.S. trade: "It is the sense of Congress that the President should deny any economic or military assistance to the government of any foreign country which practices the internment or imprisonment of that country's citizens for political purposes."³⁶ As this statement of the sense of Congress was not strong enough to achieve significant changes in the administration's foreign-policy behavior, it was

³⁴ Henry Kissinger, White House Years (Boston: 1978), p. 65. Quoted in John Lewis Gaddis, p. 342.

³⁵ Nicolai N. Petro, p. 10.

³⁶ Quoted in Peter G. Brown and Douglas Maclean, eds., Human Rights and U.S. Foreign Policy (Lexington, Mass: Lexington Books, 1979), p. 7.

followed the next year by an amendment by Senator Harkin. The Harkin amendment to the International Development and Food Assistance Act of 1974 specifically prohibited the use of U.S. funds to aid any government "which engages in a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights . . . unless such assistance will directly benefit the needy".³⁷

James Earl Carter's approach to human rights was fundamentally different from that of Richard Nixon's. He desired to forge a linkage between America's historical declaratory support for the universality of human rights concepts with clear and uncompromising operational support. Carter was interested in resurrecting the era of the first half of the 20th century when "ideals and interest *did* coincide, when American diplomacy created the Marshall Plan and NATO and discovered that it served not only interest but conscience."³⁸ President Carter outlined his foreign-policy goals in his first speech to the United Nations on March 17, 1977: "First, to maintain peace and to reduce the arms race; second, to build a better and more cooperative international economic system; and third, [to] work with potential adversaries as well as our close friends to advance the cause of human rights."³⁹

In a speech delivered at the University of Georgia, Carter's Secretary of State, Cyrus Vance, described which human rights the United States believed were both universally applicable and worthy of the attention of American foreign-policy initiatives:

First, there is the right to be free from governmental violation of the integrity of the person. Such violations include torture; cruel, inhumane or degrading treatment or punishment; and arbitrary arrest or imprisonment. And they include denial of fair public trial, and invasion of the home.

³⁷ Nicolai N. Petro, p. 12.

³⁸ Theodore H. White, America in Search of Itself (New York: Harper & Row, 1982), pp. 219-220.

³⁹ Judith F. Buncher, ed., Human Rights & American Diplomacy: 1975-1977 (New York: Facts On File, 1977), p. 179.

Second, there is the right to the fulfillment of such vital needs as food, shelter, health care and education. We recognize that the fulfillment of this right will depend, in part, upon the stage of a nation's economic development. But we also know that this right can be violated by a government's action or inaction

Third, there is the right to enjoy civil and political liberties-- freedom of thought; of religion; of assembly; freedom of speech; freedom of the press; freedom of movement both within and outside one's own country; freedom to take part in government.

Our policy is to promote all these rights.⁴⁰

The fundamental difference between Carter's view of human rights and Nixon's was Carter's belief that international stability is only possible as all countries subscribe to and implement basic guarantees of human freedoms. The promotion of individual, social and political freedom in other countries, by means of U.S. foreign policy, thus, was viewed as a prime component of American national security. American national security "need not depend on our inherent military force, or economic power or political persuasion", Carter asserted, but rather, "it should derive from the fact we try to be right and honest and truthful and decent".⁴¹

In many respects, Ronald Reagan's declaratory policy regarding human rights continues the redirection begun by Jimmy Carter. Like Carter, Reagan sees American support for human rights as based upon moral considerations and historical precedents: "This Administration believes that human rights is an issue of central importance both to relieve suffering and injustice and to link foreign policy with the traditions of the American people"⁴² The linkage between national security and support for human rights has been repeatedly reaffirmed:

⁴⁰ Cyrus R. Vance, "Human Rights and Foreign Policy", Address delivered at the University of Georgia, April 30, 1977. Quoted in Judith F. Buncher, ed., p. 181.

⁴¹ Quoted in Nicolai N. Petro, p. 16.

⁴² Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1981, Department of State report to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives, and the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, 97th Congress, 2nd Session (2 February 1982), p. 3.

"We believe that human rights are not only compatible with our national interest; they are an indispensable element of the American approach--at home and abroad. Our objective is to make our security interests and our human rights concerns mutually reinforcing so that they can be pursued in tandem."⁴³

As Secretary of State George Shultz has stated:

In our world, our ideals and our interests . . . are intimately connected. In the long run, the survival of America and American democracy is essential if freedom is to survive We are the strongest free nation on earth. Our closest allies are democracies and depend on us for their security. And our security and well-being are enhanced in a world where democracy flourishes and where the global economic system is open and free. We could not hope to survive long if our fellow democracies succumbed to totalitarianism. Thus, we have a vital stake in the direction the world takes--whether it be toward greater freedom or toward dictatorship.⁴⁴

While at the same time embracing a strong declaratory stand, the Reagan administration has attempted to enunciate the limits of foreign-policy effectiveness towards achieving changes in the world's compliance with human rights principles. In testimony before the Congressional subcommittee on International Development Institutions and Finance, the administration recognized that U.S. sovereignty ended at its own borders. That although the U.S. would continue to strive to improve both its own compliance and that of the rest of the world, the administration conceded that the country could only mitigate suffering, not eradicate it.⁴⁵

In fact, the Reagan administration has acknowledged that sometimes an active support of human rights is counterproductive to achieving human rights

⁴³ Human Rights and U.S. Policy in the Multilateral Development Banks, hearings before the Subcommittee on International Development Institutions and Finance of the Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, House of Representatives, 97th Congress, 1st Session (21,23 July 1981), p. 35.

⁴⁴ George Shultz, "Morality and Realism in American Foreign Policy", Current Policy no. 748 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of State, 1985), p. 2.

⁴⁵ Human Rights and U.S. Policy in the Multilateral Development Banks, p. 35.

goals. Elliott Abrams cites the experience of post-World War I Germany as an example of this: "The founders of the Weimar Republic, by aiming at a democracy stripped of all the authoritarian features of Imperial Germany, created a system so fragile that it was overwhelmed by something wholly barbaric in only fourteen years."⁴⁶

Because of the limitations of U.S. policy in effecting change and the danger of encouraging processes that are in reality counterproductive, the Reagan administration has been forced to grapple with some difficult moral choices. Secretary Shultz has expressed the dilemma:

We have friends and allies who do not always live up to our standards of freedom and democratic government, yet we cannot abandon them. Our adversaries are the worst offenders of the principles we cherish, yet in the nuclear age, we have no choice but to seek solutions by political means. We are vulnerable to terrorism because we are a free and law-abiding society, yet we must find a way to respond that is consistent with our ideals as a free and law-abiding society.⁴⁷

Unlike Nixon and Kissinger, Shultz has not viewed the dilemma as leading to the rejection of the principles of support for human rights nor a complete subjugation of these principles to national security considerations. While acknowledging the difficult moral choices, Shultz also acknowledges (as did Carter) the value of ideology in effecting changes in the world situation: "We have learned that our moral convictions must be tempered and tested in daily grappling with the realities of the modern world. But we have also learned that our ideals have value and relevance, that the idea of freedom is a powerful force."⁴⁸

The Reagan administration has adopted a pragmatic approach to supporting human rights abroad in an effort to resolve the dilemma of morality and realism.

⁴⁶ Quoted in Nicolai N. Petro, p. 45.

⁴⁷ George Shultz, p. 2.

⁴⁸ George Shultz, p. 3.

The target country of the specific foreign policy has tended to enjoin the type of response the administration has taken; i.e., the existing bilateral relationships between a human rights offending country and the United States dictates the level of U.S. foreign-policy response. In those countries with which the United States has developed political or economic relationships, the administration adopts quiet diplomacy to effect changes. On the other hand, those countries with which the U.S. has little or no political or economic clout are dealt with more visibly, since public criticism is viewed as the only viable resort. As Elliot Abrams acknowledges, the government is guided primarily by

the criterion of effectiveness [; i.e.,] choosing the response that is most likely to actually improve human rights. The most effective means, generally, is traditional diplomacy, which maximizes the limited leverage we do possess, while minimizing counterproductive reactions, damage to bilateral relations and international tension. Traditional diplomacy has the drawback of being least visible precisely where it is most successful. But this Administration is pledged to employ traditional diplomacy vigorously on behalf of human rights.⁴⁹

The preceding review of U.S. diplomatic history demonstrates the central role human rights support has played in the policies of American leaders. This again demonstrates the unique character of the American nation. This character is eloquently summarized by a Yugoslavian dissident, Mihajlo Mihajlov:

The United States is not a state like France, China, England, etc., and it would be a great tragedy if someday the United States became such a state. What is the difference? First of all, the United States is not a national state, but a multinational state. Second, the United States was founded by people who valued individual freedom more highly than their own country.

And so the United States is primarily a state of freedom. . . . Whole peoples from other countries can say, Our homeland is

⁴⁹ Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1981, p. 11.

Germany, Russia, or whatever; only Americans can say, My homeland is freedom.⁵⁰

⁵⁰ Mihajlo Mihajlov, "Prospects for the Post -Tito Era", New America 17 (January 1980): 7.

III. THE AMERICAN NATIONAL INTEREST

The United States is largely a romantic country. It has encountered little opposition and does not think in terms of moves and countermoves in a never-ending game. It sees no reason that it can't accomplish its presumably formidable objectives. Its history is marked by a belief in Manifest Destiny--abetted by a Puritan past in which the American nation was foreordained to be a Beacon unto the World. In order, therefore, to understand American policy, one should not simply go through a careful calculation of the national interest. However important such a calculation may be to officials of the Department of State, it would acquire little visceral support among the American people.

James R. Schlesinger

A. ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK

Several trends should be apparent throughout the preceding discussion of American diplomatic history. The first is that American statesmen have unanimously espoused the universality of the same freedoms that serve as the basis for the American nation. From Washington to Reagan, presidents, congressmen and government administrators have viewed these rights as the foundation for democracy both at home and abroad. A second trend is the support of these freedoms as a component of U.S. *declaratory* foreign policy. Even leaders who refused to include support for international human rights compliance in their operational policies affirmed the centrality of such rights in the domestic environment and the desire for such rights to be embraced throughout the world. Finally, those who have espoused support of these freedoms as a component of *operational* policy, have done so on moral, legal, and strategic criteria. It is to this third trend that I now turn in an effort to

summarize the historical arguments for supporting an operational human rights policy, especially as it relates to support of dissidence in the Soviet Union.

Donald E. Nuechterlein defines the national interest as "the perceived needs and desires of one sovereign state in relation to the sovereign states comprising its external environment".¹ He explains that the aggregate national interest has four component parts, which he terms "basic" interests: defense interests, economic interests, world order interests, and ideological interests.² The order of presentation does not necessarily imply a priority of interests, neither are the categories closed, i.e., particular interests may and frequently do cross over category boundaries. Neuchterlein also categorizes intensity of concern for each of these categories of basic interests as follows:

1. Survival: threatening the very existence of the nation.
2. Vital: threatens serious harm to the state.
3. Major: corrective action is required to redress dangerous trends and events and preclude their escalation to the vital level.
4. Peripheral: state not effected directly but interest groups within state are adversely effected.³

Applying Neuchterlein's framework of analysis to the concept of human rights reveals the United States' national interest is served by support of human rights primarily in the two components of ideological and world order interests; to a minor degree in the defense component; and to a negligible degree in the economic component. The historical review demonstrates that the intensity of support for international human rights vis-à-vis other interests has varied significantly throughout America's two hundred years, ranging from a low intensity during the 1800s to a high under the administrations of Woodrow Wilson and Jimmy Carter. Support for human rights has never been at a survival level, seldom achieves a vital level, but is usually treated at the major

¹ Donald E. Nuechterlein, National Interests and Presidential Leadership: The Setting of Priorities (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1978), p.3.

² Donald E. Nuechterlein, p. 4-5.

³ Donald E. Nuechterlein, pp. 9-10.

level of intensity. This is an important point; likewise, it should be kept in mind that while I will argue for an operational policy of support for Soviet dissidence, this policy may conflict with national security interests that occupy a higher level of intensity--a prime example of this potential conflict is the threat of general nuclear warfare between the United States and the Soviet Union. When and if policies conflict, the more intense interest, naturally, takes precedence.

Because support for human rights does not fit neatly into any single one of Neuchterlein's basic interest categories, I have chosen to discuss the theoretical rationale for support in different terms than Neuchterlein employs. However, Neuchterlein's analysis of the components of the aggregate national interest remain an important backdrop to the following discussion. U.S. support for human rights is an important component of U.S. foreign policy; but it is not the sole goal of policy nor even the most important goal of policy. I will not attempt to enunciate the priorities of U.S. foreign policy because: (1) that would be beyond the scope of this paper; and (2) priorities change depending on the world and domestic situations. Nevertheless, I will address some of the costs of pursuing human rights and try to place support of human rights within the context of other defense, economic, world order, and ideological interests.

B. HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE NATIONAL INTEREST

The historical analysis of U.S. foreign policy reveals that American leaders have justified worldwide support for human rights on the basis of moral, legal and strategic considerations. The arguments within these three considerations will now be summarized in order to provide a rationale for an operational support of human rights as a component of U.S. foreign policy.

The United States has a moral obligation to support international human rights. America is obliged to support human rights because it is the "right thing to do". Such an obligation flows out of the unique character of the United

States as being founded upon moral absolutes. Despite the indigenous emergence of pragmatism in the nineteenth century and its widespread acceptance in the twentieth, America remains a country whose laws, customs, political structure and foreign policy conform by and large to its original moral foundations. The constant appeal by contemporary American leaders to moral principles as embodied in the Constitution and in the practice of American history affirms that morality is as relevant today as an explanation for policy formulation as it was in the days of our Founding Fathers. Although addressing himself to a different issue than that of the present discussion, James Schlesinger captured the essence of the moral basis of American foreign policy in an address to European leaders:

American support for Europe does not reflect any precise calculation of the national interest.⁴ Otherwise why would we spend 7 percent of GNP to help those whose own estimate of the value of their security was only, say, 3 percent of their GNP? Americans support Europe out of a sense of moral obligation In the American democracy, no expert opinion, no government bureaucracy, no East Coast establishment would be able to maintain forces in Europe--unless the American public believes that *it is right*⁵ [emphasis in original]

Since American political culture has such a moral basis, a failure to embrace the same freedoms for all humanity calls into question the very foundations of our own system. Samuel Huntington asserts that "for Americans not to believe in the universal validity of American values could, indeed, lead to a moral relativism . . . , [which] runs counter to the strong elements of moral absolutism and messianism that are part of American history and culture. . . ."⁶ A failure to extend American freedoms to the rest of the world raises many of the same

⁴ Schlesinger's use of the term *national interest* is used here in the limited sense of national security interest.

⁵ James R. Schlesinger, "An American Perspective", in Robert E. Hunter, ed. NATO: The Next Generation (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1984), pp. 44-45.

⁶ Samuel P. Huntington, pp. 21-22.

legitimacy questions that were raised in America's domestic history when significant parts of the population were denied the full entitlements of citizenship. Failure to make foreign-policy actions conform to declaratory stands sets America up for charges of hypocrisy and relegates public statements in support of human rights to little more than propaganda.

Having claimed that morality rather than pragmatism is the foundation of American foreign policy is not to deny the practical utility of specific foreign policies. The United States is not the only country that is constrained and/or driven by ideological considerations. America's chief adversary in the international sphere is also motivated by ideology. Adoption of a morally based foreign policy is an effective weapon in the current war the U.S. is waging against the USSR--the war of ideas. Alexandr Solzhenitsyn captured the essence of this conflict in his remarks at Harvard University in 1978:

Very well known representatives of your society, such as George Kennan, say: 'We cannot apply moral criteria to politics.' Thus we mix good and evil, right and wrong, and make space for the absolute triumph of absolute evil in the world. Only moral criteria can help the West against communism's well-planned world strategy. After a certain level of the problem has been reached, legalistic thinking induces paralysis; it prevents one from seeing the scale and the meaning of events.⁷

Solzhenitsyn's sentiment is shared by Thomas Buergenthal, another noted spokesman for human rights:

In today's world, ideology is as much a weapon as is sophisticated weaponry. A sound human rights policy provides the United States with an ideology that distinguishes us most clearly from the Soviet Union and seriously undercuts the ideological appeal of communism. It is the only ideology, the only dream, if you will, that the people of

⁷ Alexandr I. Solzhenitsyn, A World Split Apart (New York: Harper & Row, 1978), p. 33.

the United States share with the majority of people of the Second and Third Worlds.⁸

A strong moral stand allows the United States to be proactive rather than reactive in foreign policy; to seize the moral "high ground" in our struggle in the international environment. As Warren Christopher wrote, "... our human rights policy ... identifies the United States with leaders around the world who are trying to improve the lot of their people ... It gives us a way of taking the ideological initiative, instead of merely reacting".⁹

In addition to moral considerations, by virtue of being a signatory to a variety of international agreements concerning human rights, the United States has a legal obligation to support international human rights. I use obligation in a very loose sense here because obligation toward international law has never been embraced by American leadership as superior to domestic law. Nevertheless, as a country that actively espouses the rule of law as universally normative, voluntary abidance by that law lends credence to this concept. Conversely, failure to abide by the provisions of any specific international agreement undermines the utility of all international agreements and returns the international environment to a chaotic state where "might makes right". As President Carter said in an address to the United Nations:

All the signatories of the U.N. Charter have pledged themselves to observe and to respect basic human rights. Thus, no member of the United Nations can claim that mistreatment of its citizens is solely its own business. Equally, no member can avoid its responsibilities to review and to speak when torture or unwarranted deprivation occurs in any part of the world ... The solemn commitments of the U.N. Charter, of the U.N.'s Universal Declaration of Human Rights, of the Helsinki accords and of many

⁸ "Nomination of Ernest W. Lefever", hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, 97th Congress, 1st Session (18,19 May, 4, 5 June 1981), p. 2.

⁹ Warren Christopher, "For the Record", Washington Post, August 14, 1980.

other international instruments must be taken just as seriously as commercial or security agreements.¹⁰

In fact, it is the creation of legal institutions within the domestic systems of other nations to ensure compliance with human rights that is one of America's goals in pursuing human rights oriented policies. It is not public pronouncements by leaders of the world in support of human rights principles that is the goal of U.S. human rights policies, rather it is the development of institutions and structures within a society to protect the inherent rights of the individual against capriciousness and arbitrariness by the state and other power centers. As Jeane Kirkpatrick rightly observes,

the freedom of the American people was based not on the marvelous and inspiring slogans of Thomas Paine but on the careful web of restraint and permission and interests and traditions which was woven by our Founding fathers into the Constitution and explained in the Federalist Papers--and rooted, of course, ultimately in our rights as Englishmen.¹¹

A final reason for advocating U.S. support of international human rights is for strategic considerations. I have already stated that the war currently waged between the Soviet Union and the United States is a war of ideas. But this war of ideas is not solely confined to the international sphere. Both the U.S. and the USSR seek to influence the ideas of each other's respective populace. American support for human rights and human rights activists within the Soviet Union attacks the legitimacy of Soviet regime. As with any totalitarian regime, domestic legitimacy is the weakest spot in Moscow's armor. The Soviet Union is susceptible to toppling due to its top-heavy pyramidal structure that lacks alternative sources of authority. By encouraging the development of alternative power centers within the Soviet political system, the United States can encourage the ultimate collapse of the system.

¹⁰ Address to United Nations, New York, NY, March 17, 1977. Quoted in Judith F. Buncher, ed., p. 180.

¹¹ Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, "Establishing A Viable Human Rights Policy", World Affairs 143 (Spring 1981): 333-334.

Michael Novak claims, however, that the United States has been losing the war of ideas with the Soviet Union and precisely on the human rights issue:

Human-rights issues have become the very center of the cold war, particularly in the war of ideas and in public opinion. In this ideological assault, the USSR has been particularly astute. By an aggressive assault on other nations, it has been able to divert international attention from the abuses of human rights within its own empire.¹²

Such an approach is a clear acknowledgment by the Soviet leaders of the force of world opinion both on their own actions and the actions of the United States. Soviet leaders are not immune to the effects of world opinion, especially as a factor of state legitimacy. Lacking a popular domestic legitimacy, the USSR seeks acceptance by the world community and especially recognition as both a world power and the premier progressive nation. Challenges to Soviet compliance with human rights obligations have an effect on Soviet leaders as is demonstrated by their reactions in public statements and counterchallenges.¹³

What is ultimately at stake in the war of ideas between the United States and the Soviet Union is the continued existence of the two opposed political systems. There can be no "peaceful coexistence" between these two systems, at least not in the terms that these words connote in the English language. Both the U.S. and the USSR have messianic visions for the rest of the world; and these visions are mutually exclusive. The ultimate survival of each state in both its present form and its desired form depends on the degree to which the rest of the world embraces one or the other's world view. Both the United States

¹² Remarks in "Human Rights And American Foreign Policy: A Symposium", p. 57.

¹³ For examples of recent Soviet reactions to continued Western pressure on human rights see "On Human Rights, Real and Illusory", Pravda, July 18, 1983, translated in International Affairs (Moscow) (October 1983): 82-91 and S. Rozhkov, "Humanitarian Problems in Interstate Relations", International Affairs (Moscow) (April 1984): 36-44. For a Western analysis of the reaction see "Countering America's Crusade", Time, November 25, 1985.

and the Soviet Union, therefore, have a strategic interest in the victory of their respective systems and the defeat of their opponent's.

The Soviet leadership clearly understands this conflict. In both rhetoric and actions the Soviet ruling elite demonstrate a conscious strategy to achieve victory. American leaders are loath to frame the struggle between the two systems in such terms. This of course derives from the American political culture, which by its very nature is reluctant to impose its values and institutions on others. But this is precisely the reason American leaders should embrace a strong operational support for international human rights. Support for this issue (unlike, for example, support for capitalism) avoids charges of cultural imperialism because it supports the intrinsic right of people to shape their own destiny by shaping the political institutions necessary to obtain and sustain personal freedoms. It exposes the Soviet myth of the need for a temporary "dictatorship of the proletariat" in order to construct a future utopia where human rights are possible. It replaces this chimera with its own example of a presently functioning democratic state--warts and all.

Human rights are therefore at the core of this conflict. American-style democracy and Soviet-style socialism each pose a question to the rest of the world. The question is whether rights are inherent to individuals and thus to be protected against state interference--the basis of American democracy--or whether individual rights are the benefits of the state and thus subordinate to collective interests--the basis of Soviet socialism. Curiously, American politicians often avoid acknowledging the either-or choice involved in the answer to this question. Administration officials often seem to lack an appreciation for the Soviet elite's denial of human rights to their subjects. For example, Ambassador Richard Schifter, U.S. representative to the United Nations Human Rights Commission, appears naively unaware of the reason the Soviet totalitarian state refuses to grant human rights to significant segments of

its population. In a review of Soviet violations of fundamental political and personal freedoms, Schifter muses:

The Soviet system would not be at risk if it allowed full freedom of conscience by permitting the Ukrainian Catholic church and the Lithuanian Catholic church, as well as Baptists, Jehovah's Witnesses, Seventh Day Adventists, and Pentecostals to exercise their religion in peace Are [Russification policies] truly needed to maintain the Soviet state? . . . Can't the Soviet system survive without resorting to [abuses of psychiatry]?¹⁴

The answer is clearly that the Soviet system would not survive without such practices. The reasons for this will be explored further in subsequent chapters.

Finally, it must be stressed that human rights policies must be a component of a larger strategic policy of strength if they are to have any effect at changing the behavior of other states. Samuel Huntington has demonstrated through an analysis of U.S. diplomacy during the twentieth century, that human rights advocacy and the support of libertarian values abroad has been effective only when U.S. power has been strong relative to other nation-states. While "the expansion of American power is not synonymous with the expansion of liberty," Huntington claims, ". . . a significant correlation exists between the rise and fall of American power in the world and the rise and fall of liberty and democracy in the world."¹⁵ To prove his hypothesis, Huntington offers the examples of the post-World War II establishment of democratic regimes in Western Europe and Japan--where American power was high--vis-à-vis the Soviet imposition of socialism in Eastern Europe--where American power was negligible. Huntington also discusses the rise and in some cases fall of democracy in Greece, Turkey, the Philippines, South Korea, Nicaragua, Haiti, the

¹⁴ Richard Schifter, "U.S. Statements Before The United Nations Commission On Human Rights", World Affairs 147 (Winter 1984/85): 231.

¹⁵ Samuel P. Huntington, pp. 26-27.

Dominican Republic, Peru and Chili. His conclusion is: "the future of liberty in the world is . . . intimately linked to the future of American power."¹⁶

This was the major criticism of the Carter administration's approach to human rights: that it failed to link the moral strength of its human rights position with political, economic and military strength. This linkage is the declaratory approach of the Reagan administration. The record of American diplomatic history of such a linkage indicates that it should be more successful. Whether it has or not in the specific case of Soviet treatment of dissidence is addressed in later chapters.

C. COSTS

Admittedly support for human rights is not risk free. There are a number of costs associated with such an approach and any human rights policy to be effective must consider these costs. Colin Gray has termed the 1980s "the most dangerous decade". He says that "the 1980s will be uniquely dangerous to the United States not so much because of the strength of the Soviet Union but, rather, because of its weaknesses." He contends that the "correlation of forces" which had steadily been increasing in favor of the Soviet Union since the mid-1950s, began to reverse in the 1980s such that Soviet leaders may now perceive the correlation to have shifted in favor of the United States by the 1990s. Such a reversal might call into question the very legitimacy and stability of the Soviet regime and move it on a course of irreversible decline. Since this would clearly not be in the interest of the current Soviet leadership, Gray argues they may be tempted to take uncharacteristically drastic action while a "window of opportunity" exists in the mid-1980s.¹⁷

¹⁶ Samuel P. Huntington, p. 33.

¹⁷ See Colin S. Gray, "The Most Dangerous Decade: Historic Mission, Legitimacy, and Dynamics Of The Soviet Empire In The 1980s", Orbis 25 (Spring 1981): 13-28.

While the scope of Gray's argument is much broader than the effect of U.S. human rights policies and their impact on regime instability the same arguments can and have been made about the costs of such a U.S. policy. No less an authority on diplomacy than Henry Kissinger certainly felt support for international human rights was destabilizing, as has already been noted. But one must seriously question the Soviet options in this regard. It is far from clear that the Soviets could presently achieve a victory in a military confrontation with the United States and certainly not in a nuclear exchange. Do proponents of this argument seriously believe that if the Soviets perceive they are going to ultimately lose in the correlation of forces that they might as well take out their main adversary in the spirit of "if I don't win then everybody loses"? Are there not a variety of other options to the Soviets short of a preemptive war? I think it much more likely that the Soviet ruling elite, if threatened internally, would tend to retreat from external confrontations and devote more energy to consolidating internal power. It is not inconceivable that the regime might even attempt some movement toward liberalization in order to achieve a domestic legitimacy. In other words, it is far from clear that U.S. support for a policy that is admittedly a challenge to Soviet regime stability would cause the Soviets to exercise their military options. This theme will be addressed further in subsequent chapters' discussions of the destabilizing nature of Soviet dissent.

Even if one accepts the argument that the risk of destabilization of the world order is greater than the potential gain in undermining the Soviet system, what are the options left to the United States? The USSR is obviously not constrained in its ideological war with "capitalist imperialism" and its desire to undermine the American system, in fact such a goal is a long-standing Soviet declaratory policy. The ideological war continues whether the U.S. actively participates in it or not. If America refuses to respond to the Soviet ideological challenge, she is left in much the same position as were France and Great

Britain in the pre-war era of appeasement: seeing the boundaries of freedom draw ever tighter due to a fear of unilaterally destabilizing the world order.

Another potential risk for the United States in pursuing a policy of support for universal human rights is the effect such a policy might have on the achievement of other more important foreign-policy goals. For example, such an attempt to challenge the institutions and values of other societies may antagonize and irritate American allies thus frustrating American national security and economic goals. This is the problem that Secretary of State Shultz addressed in his aforementioned comments on the conflicts between morality and realism in foreign policy. The answer to this risk would again appear to be an integration of human rights concerns within a comprehensive approach to foreign-policy objectives and a clear establishment of priorities. This is the value of the use of an analytical framework such as that designed by Neuchterlein to insure that as many goals and objectives of the American national interest as possible are included in policy decisions and that the intensity of interest is identified. But Americans must also understand that the American agenda is not always the agenda of its allies. Because this is a given in the international system, the pursuit of any foreign-policy objective is bound to carry with it certain costs. American leaders must weigh the competing goals and objectives and adjust policies accordingly.

A final cost is the potential expansion of American military and economic power in order to achieve substantive results in human rights. As Samuel Huntington has shown, liberal democracies and a respect for human rights have flourished in those places in which American strength has been projected. But an expansion of American power carries with it significant risks--both at home and abroad. The potential for an uncontrolled war or unrestrained escalation of a conflict can be increased if force is not applied cautiously and by means of well-conceived and well-executed plans. There is the heightened risk of alienating world opinion through a perception that America is bent on global

imperialism. There are the costs to the domestic economy of diverting resources from social, economic and other requirements to meet military demands. Finally, an unrestricted expansion of military strength might even pose "dangers to the operation of democratic government within the United States".¹⁸

Thus, the pursuit of human rights as a component of American foreign policy is not without its inherent costs. But neither is this pursuit without its benefits. A desire to extend American concepts of human rights to the rest of the world has been shown to be the product of the American creed and is consistent with contemporary American values and American diplomatic history. Our focus now shifts to the Soviet Union. In the next chapters the dissident movement will be examined to determine if support of this movement is consistent with U.S. objectives regarding human rights.

¹⁸ Samuel P. Huntington, p. 21.

IV. THE PHENOMENON OF SOVIET DISSENT

Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers.

Article XIX, U.N. Universal Declaration of Human Rights

A. DEFINITIONS AND ORIGINS

Is support for Soviet dissidence as a component of American support of international human rights in the U.S. national interest? In order to adequately answer this question it is necessary to examine the Soviet dissident movement to see whether the movement conforms to American expectations for human rights. This chapter will define the phenomenon of dissent within the Soviet context, examine dissidence as a factor of regime instability, and explore the extent of the phenomenon within Soviet society. Finally, the various dissident groups will be categorized in order to examine each group in detail; the subject of the next chapter.

Political dissent, by definition, is an expression of dissatisfaction with political goals, realities and processes in a given regime. It is a phenomenon existing in all modern states because, as Robert Dahl notes, "no government receives indefinitely the total support of the people over whom it asserts its jurisdiction".¹ A Soviet dissident "is an ideological heretic who expresses disagreement either with the system's rules of the game or with its policies or who questions aspects both of official ideology and of the practices of political

¹ Robert A. Dahl, Regimes and Oppositions (New Haven, Conn: 1973), p. 1. Quoted in Susan Gross Solomon, Pluralism in the Soviet Union (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1983), p. 131.

culture".² There are several renderings of the English words "dissenter" and "dissident" in Russian, the most common in Soviet uses being *inokomysliashchi*, which is defined as a "differently minded" person or as one "of a different trend of thought".³ The various terms are almost always used by Soviet officials in a pejorative sense. For example, in an article printed in Pravda in 1972, dissenters were divided into two categories: those who are "ideologically unstable" and those who want to "restore capitalism" and are therefore "counterrevolutionaries".⁴ On the other hand, as might be expected, dissenters use the terminology in a more positive sense.

The modern Soviet dissident movement has its origins in the "reactions of both the people and the party elite to the Communist Party's philosophy and methods of dictatorship and terror in the years of the Russian civil war."⁵ Thus, Soviet dissidence is a long-standing phenomenon in the USSR, dating back even to the very beginnings of the Bolshevik seizure of power. Early governmental attempts to eliminate dissidence were largely effective. Through a combination of fear, violence and terror, Joseph Stalin both sought and achieved the elimination of open dissent as well as active opposition.

² V. Stanley Vardys, "Lithuania's Catholic Movement Reappraised", Survey 25 (Summer 1980): 51.

³ A. I. Smirnitsky, Russian-English Dictionary (New York: E. P. Dutton, 1981). Other terms are *dissident*, *raskolnik*, and *sektant*, which, like *inokomysliashchi*, all originally had religious connotations (See Frederick C. Barghoorn, "The Post-Khrushchev Campaign to Suppress Dissent: Perspectives, Strategies, and Techniques of Repression", in Rudolf L. Tökés, ed. Dissent in the USSR [Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1975], p. 47).

⁴ V. Bolshakov, "The Subversive Strategy of the War of Nerves", Pravda, January 13, 1972.

⁵ Rudolf L. Tökés, ed., Dissent in the USSR (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1975), p. 11.

The costs to the regime resulting from the Stalinist era of repression are not only measured in the twenty-nine to sixty-five million Russian lives lost⁶ but also in the memory of terror that continues to plague the current political elites. This Stalinist legacy acts as a restraint upon present leaders on the one hand⁷, but provides a corresponding impetus to modern dissidents who are able to raise the specter of terror to elicit popular support. Bohdan Bociurkiw, a professor at Carleton University in Ottawa, observes that the "emancipation from the paralysis of fear has been especially noticeable among the younger members of the Soviet intelligentsia who are not inhibited by the memories of Stalinist terror and do not share a sense of guilt with their elders."⁸

Due to the very nature of the Soviet socialist system, manifestations of dissent have proven to be and give every evidence of continuing to be a persistent phenomenon. As long as the system denies itself adequate processes for acknowledging and responding positively to the needs and desires of its people, dissatisfaction will continue to find expression through dissident activity. Dissidence, thus, reflects a feeling of estrangement from the regime and a perception that there are no alternative legitimate and viable means to effect change within the system. Yet in the modern era Soviet political and sociological dissent has not developed into political opposition--although the potential for

⁶ The precise number of dead resulting from Stalin's reign of terror is the subject of debate; authoritative Soviet records are not available. For more information see Robert Conquest, The Human Cost of Soviet Communism, (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1971) and Eugene H. Methvin, "Twentieth Century Superkillers", National Review, May 31, 1985.

⁷ Alexandr Solzhenitsyn writes about an interview he had with the Military Collegium in 1963, at which time those in attendance "admitted that the picture I painted [of forced labor camps in the novel One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovitch] was decidedly on the bright side, that every one of them knew of camps worse than that....They were eager for reform." (Gulag Archipelago, [Philadelphia: Harper & Row, 1973], p. 11. Quoted in George T. Colman Jr., "Soviet Sociological Dissent: An Irritating Political Constraint", Professional Study No. 5558, Air War College, Maxwell AFB, AL, Apr 1975, pp. 38-9.)

⁸ Michel Glenny and Bohdan R. Bociurkiw, "Dissent in the USSR", Studies in Comparative Communism 3 (April 1970): 74.

such a development may become more likely in the next few decades.⁹ It is precisely this possibility that compels the regime actively to monitor and repress expressions of dissent whenever and wherever they occur.

The persistence of dissent offers the Soviet leadership a dilemma. For in trying to avoid the rampant terror of the Stalinist era, the governing elite runs the distinct risk of harboring a long-term ideological threat to the regime. Dissidence calls into question the very basis of legitimacy of the Soviet regime because it challenges the monolithic nature of the regime's ideological framework. Legitimacy, in the Soviet lexicon, is not a contract between rulers and ruled but rather is based on what Svetozar Stojanovic calls "the statist myth of socialism". In the Soviet system, "the truth of authority replaces the authority of truth".¹⁰ Legitimacy and stability are thus inexorably linked, the one being the foundation of the other and vice versa.

Dissidence is, of course, a factor that faces all modern nation-states. This fact is frequently used by the Soviet Union in countering Western objections to the Soviet's treatment of their dissidents. The fundamental difference between dissidence in the West and in the East is the opportunity and legality of articulating dissenting views. In the Western pluralistic democracies, the expression of dissenting views is not only a legally sanctioned activity, but also an essential component of the democratic process. For in these countries, the political culture believes that social progress occurs as the individual citizens of the country actively participate in the political process. This is not the case in

⁹ The distinction between dissent and opposition is a matter of degree. In the sense in which I am using the terms, to dissent is to hold a different opinion or idea and give expression to that idea; to oppose is to offer resistance. This distinction is a bit problematic, as there is considerable controversy among scholars about the meaning of these two terms. See, for example, Robert M. Cutler, "Soviet Dissent Under Khrushchev: An Analytical Study", Comparative Politics 13 (October 1980) for a discussion of the various points of view.

¹⁰ Svetozar Stojanovic, Between Ideals and Reality, translated by Gerson S. Sher (New York, 1973), pp. 37,87. Quoted in Rudolf L. Tökés, p. 89.

the Soviet Union, where progress is seen as the responsibility of the "vanguard of the proletariat", a political elite that has exclusive understanding the laws of Marxist-Leninism. Therefore, dissidence cannot be tolerated in the Soviet Union, as it questions this monopoly of understanding enjoyed by the political elite.

Dissent is but one of a variety of components of political instability in the USSR today. Dissent, however, is both a separate component of instability and also a means of articulating all the other forms of sociological instability. To properly understand the significance of the modern dissidence movement, it is necessary to view it within the broader context of current sociological problems. A brief discussion of other destabilizing sociological factors is therefore in order.

B. COMPONENTS OF REGIME INSTABILITY

A key component of instability is the demographic trend within the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union is a multiethnic, multilinguistic, and multicultural state comprised of more than one hundred separate national groups. While this in itself provides a myriad of challenges to achieving national unity, the problem of regime instability is exacerbated by demographics that vary widely along national, linguistic and cultural lines. Put simply, the Slavic nationalities have declining birth rates and the non-Slavic nationalities have increasing rates. The net effect is that by the year 2000 the population of the non-Slavic national groups will outnumber the Slavic.¹¹ The effect of this national diversity as it

¹¹ Hélène Carrère d'Encausse, Decline of an Empire (New York: Harper Colophon, 1981), p. 90. In addition to this very excellent treatment of the implications of Soviet demographics see also Stephen Papawzy and Godfrey Baldwin, "Demographic Trends in the Soviet Union: 1950-2000", Report to the U.S. Congress, Joint Economic Committee; Warren W. Eason, "Demographic Trends and Soviet Foreign Policy: The Underlying Imperatives of Labor Supply", in Seweryn Bialer, ed., The Domestic Context of Soviet Foreign Policy (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1981); and M. B. Tatimov, Razvitie narodonaseleniya i demograficheskaya politika (Nauka, Alma Ata, 1978).

relates to dissident movements will be addressed later. At this point it is sufficient to note that to the extent the non-Slavic peoples become conscious that "they hold the key to the overall progress of Soviet society [this consciousness] may lead them to demand that their role be expressed in terms of new political responsibilities."¹²

Another destabilizing sociological factor is what has been termed the "ideological bankruptcy of the regime".¹³ The lack of ideological freedom and the maintenance of a monolithic philosophical framework, according to some scholars, fosters a stagnation of thought and desensitization of people to *any* ideology. As Erik de Mauny says, ". . . the Soviet leaders are offering a perpetual insult to the intelligence of many of their compatriots"¹⁴ This factor may help to explain the phenomenon of low labor productivity as well as to chronic absenteeism, rampant alcoholism, and high rates of job turnover in the USSR. Former General Party Secretary Andropov once characterized the labor productivity problem as "working with your sleeves rolled down".¹⁵ The ideological desensitization is especially worrisome because of its effect on youth and scientists, whom Sovietologist Cornelia Gerstenmaier claims are now "immune to ideology".¹⁶

Of course, there are a variety of non-sociological factors that are components of instability and provide the basis for expressions of dissent. For example, a command economy's inflexibility and unresponsiveness to consumer interests, waste, shortages, and agricultural unproductivity on the domestic side--and loss of political and ideological hegemony over the socialist world,

¹² Hélène Carrère d'Encausse, p. 90.

¹³ George T. Colman Jr., p. 36.

¹⁴ Erik de Mauny, Russian Prospect (New York: W.W.Norton & Co., 1969), p. 47.

¹⁵ US News and World Report, 18 July 1983, p. 68.

¹⁶ Quoted in George T. Colman Jr., p. 36. Also see Stephen White, "Propagating Communist Values in the USSR, Problems of Communism 34 (November-December 1985): 1-17.

restiveness of Eastern Europe, and perceived threats from China and the United States on the foreign side--provide a picture of the Soviet Union that is far from glossy. When viewed in this context of general instability within the Soviet regime, dissent takes on increasing importance both as a unifying aspect of these diverse threats and as a catalyst for mobilizing opposition to the status quo.

All of these factors of instability raise the question of the relationship between general popular dissatisfaction with the regime and the phenomenon of dissent. As I have defined the term, dissent refers to the articulation of this dissatisfaction, thus the perceptions of estrangement by the general population are the seedbed from which dissent grows. As we examine the dissident phenomenon it is necessary to keep this fact in mind, for the failure of the regime to deal with the source of dissent--the aforementioned factors of instability--and deal only with the symptoms--the expression through dissident activity--serves to perpetuate the dissident phenomenon.

C. EXTENT OF MOVEMENT

If dissent poses such a potentially destabilizing role in the Soviet Union, it is fair to ask how broad the movement is at the present time. Robert Sharlet, a noted Western expert on Soviet law and political justice, characterizes dissidence as a "steadily emerging 'contra-system' in the U.S.S.R." He claims this contra-system is

comprised of a flourishing 'second economy' in competition with the state's planned economy, a vast subterranean system of religious belief and practice contradicting the regime's policy of atheism, and a widespread tendency toward privatization antithetical to the party's advocacy of patriotism and participation of 'developed socialism'.¹⁷

¹⁷ Robert Sharlet, "Growing Soviet Dissidence", Current History (October 1980): 96. For more on this "second economy" see Gregory Grossman, "The 'Secondary Economy' of the USSR", Problems of Communism 26 (September-October 1977): 25-40.

The breadth of dissent claimed by Sharlet might lead one to conclude that great numbers of Soviet people are involved, and yet most analysts conclude that there are relatively few Soviet citizens who are *active* dissenters. There may, however, be a large number of latent dissidents. An indication of this is an unofficial survey conducted by sociologists in Moscow in 1981 which indicated as many as 20 percent of the sample had favorable opinions toward dissident issues and another 60 percent were ambivalent.¹⁸ The real issue, of course, is not the numerical size of the phenomenon at any given point in time, but rather its ability to effect changes. The CPSU itself only accounts for a small proportion of the population of the USSR and yet who would question its control over the regime?

D. CATEGORIES

When speaking of dissent it is tempting to speak in terms of a dissident movement, but movement implies organization and direction. To be sure, there are organizations of dissenters in the Soviet Union, but these organizations are far from the norm and are transitory at best. Dissent is varied and diverse; it covers all socio-economic groups, the entire political spectrum and exists throughout the Soviet territory and even beyond it. There are various ways to categorize dissent in the Soviet Union. One of the earliest Western typologies was developed by Rudolf L. Tökés. His framework is based on a combination of characteristics, stated goals and behaviors vis-à-vis the political authorities. He identifies three basic ideological positions: the moral-absolutist, the instrumental-pragmatic, and the anomic-militant.

The moral-absolutist attempts to reshape the beliefs of Soviet society along non-Leninist ethical, religious, intellectual and/or cultural ground. He is not interested in reaching an accommodation with the regime, rather he desires to

¹⁸ Ludmilla Alexeyeva, Soviet Dissent (Middletown, Connecticut: Wesleyan University Press, 1985), pp. 455-6.

confront and combat existing social, economic, and political realities. The moral-absolutist's goal is "to obtain the benefits of first-class citizenship and, with it, the totality of rights and privileges that the *letter* of the USSR constitution confers on all Soviet citizens" (emphasis in original).¹⁹ His appeal is not to the masses, rather it is directed to the intelligentsia--including those within the political elite. Examples of this kind of ideology include religious thinkers, moral philosophers, most writers, poets, and humanistic social critics.

Instrumental-pragmatic ideologies represent competing interpretations of Marxism, alternative methods of regime modernization and scientific progress, a commitment to free experimentation in all fields of human thought, and intellectual autonomy in scientific matters. The primary method of influence tends to be communications with political elites whom they hope to both criticize and persuade. The ultimate aim of this communication is to convince these elites to create conditions in the Soviet Union that would favor a purely scientific approach to societal development. Ironically, the instrumental-pragmatist merely calls the regime to practice the scientific approach to problem-solving that Marxist-Leninism theoretically espouses but is unable to conduct due to its philosophical presuppositions. Major advocates of the instrumental-pragmatist school of dissidence are, naturally enough, scientists--the most well-known being Andrey Sakharov and Zhores Medvedev.²⁰

The last of Tökés' categories is the anomic-militant. This ideological classification represents "affirmations of national identity or spiritual autonomy or expressions of extreme alienation from the political philosophies, institutions, laws, and governing practices of the Soviet system".²¹ Advocates of these ideologies see little or no hope for the achievement of their aims within the existing regime since they view themselves as alienated from the system and

¹⁹ Rudolf L. Tökés, p. 13.

²⁰ Rudolf L. Tökés, p. 14.

²¹ Rudolf L. Tökés, p. 14.

relegated to second-class citizenship. They seek to confront and combat the existing political, social and economic realities, such as religious, ethnic and racial discrimination, Russification and "neo-Stalinism". Their appeal is often to political elites, imploring them to fulfill the letter of the Soviet Constitution as it pertains to human and civil rights guaranteed to all Soviet citizens. Included in this group are the persecuted religious believers (e.g. Evangelical Christian Baptists, Pentecostals, True and Free Seventh-Day Adventists), the national self-determinationists (e.g. Ukrainian, Lithuanian, Georgian, and Crimean Tartar nationalists), and those seeking emigration (e.g. German and Jewish groups). Tökés also includes in this category those politically estranged groups on the extreme right of the ideological spectrum, such as neo-Slavophiles, Stalinists, Fascists, and anti-Semites who desire to overthrow the existing regime and restore a more traditionally Russian form of government.

Robert Sharlet simplifies Tökés typology somewhat by dividing the spectrum of dissent into two broad categories based again upon the means of societal change. The first category includes those advocating instrumental or pragmatic changes, such as those scientific and literary dissidents frequently labeled as human rights advocates. The second category refers to those dissidents that seek "humanistic concessions of an absolutist nature", such as the various religious dissenters whose basic belief systems are antithetical to the Party's official ideology and who reject the Party's "scientific atheism".²²

Whereas Tökés and Sharlet categorize dissident groups primarily by their advocacy of the means for societal restructuring and their relationship to the regime power structure, a more common categorization is by the specific issues raised by the various groups. Ludmilla Alexeyeva, a leader in the human rights movement in Moscow in the 1960s and early 1970s, provides seven categories in her very informative book on contemporary dissidence in the Soviet Union: self-

²² Robert Sharlet, "Dissent and Repression in the Soviet Union", Current History (October 1977):112.

determination, deported nations, emigration, religious liberty, human rights, social and economic justice, and Russian national.²³ Peter Reddaway, the noted British analyst of Soviet dissent, divides the field into four groups: national, emigration, religious, and political,²⁴ and George T. Colman, a U.S. government analyst, divides it into three: national, religious and cultural.²⁵

While the typologies provided by Tökés and Sharlet are compelling because of their attempts to categorize by the instrumental means used by the various groups, this paper will follow the more traditional form of categorization by objectives and issues. I will use three categories: national, religious, and political. This categorization is more in line with that used by the dissident writers themselves and therefore aids in comparing and contrasting the various groups without having to redefine terminology. The category names reveal much about the general goals of the various dissident groups, but it remains to examine the groups themselves. This is the task of the next three chapters.

²³ Ludmilla Alexeyeva, Soviet Dissent.

²⁴ Peter Reddaway, "Dissent in the Soviet Union", Problems of Communism 32 (November-December 1983): 1-15.

²⁵ George T. Colman Jr., "Soviet Sociological Dissent: An Irritating Political Constraint".

II. NATIONAL DISSENT

The victory of October put an end once and for all to national oppression and the inequality of nations. The voluntary unification of free and equal peoples into a single multinational state--the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics--played an enormous role Discord among nationalities became a thing of the past, and fraternal friendship, close cooperation and mutual assistance among all the peoples of the USSR became a norm of life.

Program of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, 1986

A. THE NATIONALITY PROGRAM

Nationally-oriented dissent must be understood in the context of the regime's nationality program for in large part it is a reaction to that program. From the beginnings of the Bolshevik reign, Party leaders have differed on the question of national self-determination. Ultimately communists desired the development of a "new man", unbound by traditional nationalistic distinctives.

The process by which this new man is developed has been envisioned as occurring in three dialectic phases. The first phase--the "flourishing" (*razvvet*) of nations--refers to progress and cultural development within each distinctive Soviet nationality. It asserts that national cultures have existed at differing levels of maturity within the Soviet federation and that in order for future progress toward consolidation to occur, each culture had to be developed individually. This process of individual flourishing was largely accomplished, assert Soviet theorists, in the early periods of the Soviet regime when written languages and other cultural distinctives were created and/or legitimized by the central Soviet government.

The second phase, in which the USSR currently resides, envisions the rapprochement or "drawing together" (*sblizhenie*) of the various national

cultures. This phase emphasises cultural traits common to all the Soviet groups, however, it admits that certain cultural distinctives will continue to be maintained and even continue to flourish. As this phase runs contemporaneously with the construction of socialism, the various nationalities are expected to become more similar as the processes and realities of socialism begin to overcome the vestiges of the capitalist and preceding periods.

The final phase is the complete unity (*edinstvo*) of the nations. This unity is the product of the fusion (*slivanie*) of the disparate national cultures into a new Soviet culture. Precisely what the components of this new culture will be has not been made particularly clear. Soviet theorists usually couch their discussions of this final stage in much the same sort of utopian language as is employed for other aspects of the future communist stage of development. Although ideologues frequently claim that this new culture will be composed of the best attributes of the hundred-plus current Soviet nationalities, exactly what attributes and from which groups is not clearly enunciated. And as will be seen shortly, there is little doubt among the minority nationalities that the "new" culture will continue to strongly resemble the old Russian one.

Exactly what programs are required in order to achieve the desired unity and fusion of national cultures given the realities of national sentiment posed a problem for the original Bolsheviks and has continued to be problematic for the modern leaders of the Soviet state. For largely pragmatic considerations, Lenin supported the inclusion of large national republics under a federal system. Each of these republics had and still has the theoretical right to secede as well as many other institutional structures to guarantee the cultural distinctiveness of the region. But Lenin did not develop a detailed ideological justification for his national policies and it was left to Stalin to establish the ideological framework that continues to guide the present regime.

Stalin defined a nation as an "historically evolved, stable community of people, formed on the basis of a common language, territory, economic life, and

psychological make-up manifested in a common culture".¹ Rather than being the result of racial or tribal background, he believed that a nation was an "historical category belonging to a definite epoch, the epoch of rising capitalism". Despite the belief that nationalism had its origin in capitalism, Stalin did not believe that socialism would do away with nationalism, although he allowed that the nature of nationalism would change:

The victory of socialism in one country does not create the necessary conditions for the merging of nations and national languages, . . . on the contrary, this period creates favorable conditions for the renaissance and flourishing of the nations that were formerly oppressed by tsarist imperialism The socialist nations of the Soviet Union . . . radically differ from the corresponding old bourgeois nations of old Russia both in class composition and spiritual complexion and in social and political interests and aspirations.²

Although there was little ambiguity in Stalin's actual policies--he strongly favored the Russian culture and mercilessly persecuted several minority groups³--his ideological methodology for eliminating national differences was somewhat ambiguous. Khrushchev attempted to rectify this situation. In 1961, at the Twenty-second Party Congress, Khrushchev advocated an "Internationalist" strategy for the "formation of a future unitary culture of communist society, common to all mankind":

In our country there is a process of rapprochement (*sblizhenie*) of nations, that strengthens their social homogeneity. In the course of the full-scale construction of communism complete unity

¹ Josef Stalin, Marxism and the National Question (Moscow: Foreign Language Publishing House, 1950), p. 16. Quoted in Grey Hodnett, "What's in a Nation?" Problems of Communism 16 (September-October 1967): 15.

² Josef Stalin, The National Question and Leninism (Moscow: Foreign Language Publishing House, 1950), p. 16, 23. Quoted in Grey Hodnett, p. 5.

³ At a Kremlin banquet for Red Army commanders after the victory in Europe, Stalin toasted: "I drink first of all to the health of the Russian people because it is the most outstanding nation of all the nations forming a part of the Soviet Union." Pravda, 25 May 1945. Quoted in Vernon V. Aspaturian, Process and Power, p. 20.

(*edinstvo*) will be achieved. But even after communism is basically constructed, it would still be early to declare the fusion (*slivanie*) of nations as accomplished. Lenin, as is well known, declared that state and national differences will exist long after the victory of socialism in all countries.⁴

Thus began a debate between assimilationists and those favoring the continuation of national differences. Assimilationists argued that nationalism was a product of class conflicts during the capitalist period and thus with the victory of socialism in the Soviet Union and the destruction of class conflicts no objective obstacles existed to prevent the various nationalities from now merging. The state was therefore legitimate in forging ahead with programs to eliminate the remaining vestiges of nationalism. The non-assimilationists argued, on the other hand, that nationalism was older than the capitalist era and would last longer than the socialist period, and therefore the regime should not attempt to force the end of national sentiments artificially.⁵

Whereas Khrushchev appears to have leaned more toward the assimilationist school, Brezhnev appears to have been more moderate. He vetoed moves by drafters of the 1977 Constitution to change the Soviet Union's institutional structure to do away with the national republics. His ideological pronouncements increasingly departed from Khrushchev's "internationalist" language and stressed present problems:

Speaking about the historical community of people, we absolutely do not have in mind that national differences have already vanished, or more so that the fusion of nationalities has already occurred. All nations and nationalities that live in the Soviet Union preserve their national peculiarities, traits of national character and their best traditions.

At this time . . . our people have, independent of their national affiliation, many common traits which unite them in one monolithic

⁴ Quoted in Martha B. Olcott, "Yuri Andropov And The 'National Question'," Soviet Studies 36 (January 1985): 103-4.

⁵ See Grey Hodnett, "What's in a Nation?" for a discussion of these two arguments.

whole. This is a community of ideology, a community of historical fates, . . . of socio-economic life, of basic interests and goals. This is the developing community of Soviet socialist culture, which subsumes all that is valuable from each national culture.⁶

The three leaders since Brezhnev have continued to espouse a more moderate national program than that of Khrushchev. While Andropov, in a speech on the anniversary of the formation of the USSR, used the same term, fusion (*slivanie*), as had Khrushchev, the rest of the speech indicated that he was not embarking on a change in national policies from that of Brezhnev.⁷ The Party program adopted at the twenty-seventh Party Congress in February 1986 continues to emphasize the remote nature of the "complete unity of nations" and the impermissibility of "artificially prodding" the process of "convergence".⁸

Despite the rhetoric about the "new Soviet man" and the debate between the assimilationists and the non-assimilationists, in the view of many national minorities the Soviet state has consistently pursued a policy of "internationalism"--although in their view it has amounted to little more than "Russification". This is most apparent in the regime's language policy, in which Russian has been institutionalized as the official language of the state. Vernon Aspaturian identifies several areas in which Russian has taken precedence over the other indigenous languages: (1) Russian is the official language of the state, diplomacy and international contact; (2) Russian is a mandatory official language in all non-Russian areas alongside the local language; (3) Russian is the single language of command in the armed forces; (4) Russian is the only language inscribed on all official awards, decorations, medals, postage stamps, and

⁶ Quoted in Martha Brill Olcott, pp. 104-5.

⁷ Martha Brill Olcott, p. 113.

⁸ "The Draft Party Program (New Version)", p. 14.

money; and (5) all public institutions and localities in non-Russian areas are identified in Russian along with the local language.⁹

But in addition to the significant effect of the institutional imposition of the Russian language on the non-Russian republics, there are other evidences of the linkage of traditional Russian culture with the future socialist culture. First, except for the Baltic, Armenian and Georgian languages, all non-Russian languages use a form of the Cyrillic alphabet, including many of the Moslem nationalities which had traditionally employed Arabic alphabets. The practical effect of this policy is "to facilitate the learning of Russian, to erect artificial barriers to communication with related peoples outside the Soviet Union, . . . and finally to psychoculturally condition non-Russians to think that similarity of alphabets indicates general cultural kinship to the Russians".¹⁰ Secondly, non-Russians have almost universally adopted the Russian patronymic and russianized their family names by putting Russian endings on them. Finally, Russian art, literature and music is labeled and disseminated as Soviet to a much greater extent than any other nationality's.¹¹ In fact, it has been contended that the "Moscow headquarters of the Society for the Preservation of Historical and Cultural Monuments is colloquially known as the Russian Club and provides a forum for blatantly Russocentric propaganda and agitation".¹²

Although each of the various national dissident movements has its own particular complaint against the regime and its own national goals, all share a subordinate position to the Great Russians. This is not solely a *perceived*

⁹ Vernon V. Aspaturian, Process and Power in Soviet Foreign Policy (Boston: Little, Brown, & Co., 1971) p. 17.

¹⁰ Vernon V. Aspaturian, p. 18.

¹¹ Vernon V. Aspaturian, p. 18.

¹² Jeremy Azrael, "The 'Nationality Problem' in the USSR: Domestic Pressures and Foreign Policy Constraints", in Seweryn Bialer, ed., The Domestic Context of Soviet Foreign Policy (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1981), p. 141. See also Alexander Yanov, The Russian New Right (Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, University of California, 1978), pp. 13, 113, 141.

subordinate position as might occur as a result of the "psychocultural" conditioning that Aspaturian refers to, but is also the result of political, economic, and social institutions that continue to promote the dominance of the Russians at the expense of all other national groups. A study by John Echols has demonstrated the continued racial discrimination carried out by Russians against Central Asians, despite the express policies of the Soviet regime and the expected ability of a totalitarian regime to eliminate institutional discrimination. Using political control at the local level and positions of importance at the highest levels as indicators of political power, Echols has shown that Central Asians rarely achieve positions at the top of the Soviet government or Party hierarchy and while frequently holding political office at the local level, Central Asians are invariably "backed up" by Russians in the number two position. Echols also demonstrated that Central Asians have incomes significantly lower than Russians and hold occupational positions of a much lower socio-economic standing--and the trend is for the situation to worsen.¹³

National dissent therefore stems from both perceived and actual disparities between the Russian majority and the hundred plus ethnic minorities. The diversity of complaints and objectives within national dissent is as varied as the number of national groups in this the world's largest multinational state. The remainder of this chapter will examine the evolution and goals of the more

¹³ John M. Echols, "Racial And Ethnic Inequality: the Comparative Impact Of Socialism", Comparative Political Studies 13 (January 1981): 403-444. For other studies on national problems see Hélène Carrère d'Encausse, Decline of an Empire, and Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone, "The Dialectics of Nationalism in the USSR", Problems of Communism 23 (May-June 1974): 1-22. For an analysis of a rare Soviet publication of data on the distribution of ethnic groups by social class see Darrell Slider, "A Note On The Class Structure Of Soviet Nationalities", Soviet Studies 37 (October 1985): 535-540.

important dissident groups: the Crimean Tartars, Soviet Germans, Jews, Ukrainians, Lithuanians and Central Asians.¹⁴

B. CRIMEAN TARTARS

The first groups to organize themselves in the modern era in response to the regime's nationality policies were the "outcasts of the outcasts", the national groups that had been deported from their national homelands and resettled in eastern regions of the USSR following the Second World War. Several national groups were allowed to emigrate back to their homelands after Stalin's death, but the Crimean Tartars, who had been deported from the Crimea, the Meskhi, who had been deported from South Georgia, and the Volga Germans, who had been deported from the Volga river valley area, were refused.

The Crimean Tartars had lived in the Crimea from the thirteenth century until 1944. After "liberating" the region from the German army, Stalin charged the entire Tartar nation with "betraying their country" through collaboration with the German occupiers. The bulk of the Crimean people, more than 200,000 men, women and children, were forcibly deported to special settlements in the Urals and Central Asia. They were released from restrictions to live in these special settlements by an edict issued by the Presidium in 1956, but the charge of treason was not removed nor were they allowed to return to the Crimea. This differed from the five other nations Stalin had charged with collaboration, who were "rehabilitated", regained their territory and their national status.¹⁵

Following this decree, former Party and government figures and war veterans began to organize petition campaigns to press the central authorities to rescind the charge of treason and allow a return of the Tartars to the

¹⁴ Much of the following descriptive information about the various dissidence groups in this and the following two chapters is based on data provided by Ludmilla Alexeyeva in Soviet Dissent.

¹⁵ Hélène Carrère d'Encausse, p. 193. The five other nations are the Chechen, Ingush, Karachais, Balkars and Kalmyks.

Crimea. During the 1960s, more than three million signatures were affixed to Crimean Tartar petitions. This is all the more surprising since the Crimean Tartar population is only about 800,000. The movement was and remains the only movement in the USSR that can be labeled an all-national movement.¹⁶

In 1967, in response to these petitions, the Presidium issued two edicts: the first removed the charge of treason against the nation, the second affirmed the right of Tartars who had previously lived in the Crimea to settle in any territory of the USSR provided it were done "in compliance with existing legislation on labor and passport policies". While these decrees seemingly restored civil rights denied the Tartars since 1944, in actuality the Tartars gained little in substance. As individuals they were permitted to resettle anywhere in the USSR, but they were not recognized as a collective nationality; i.e., they were not referred to as the Tartar nation but rather as "Tatars who formerly resided in the Crimea". Thus the Tartars were denied the right to restore a national state in their traditional homeland.

Even as individuals, the Tartars have remained excluded from returning to the Crimea primarily through the bureaucratic processes. Immediately following the decrees of 1967 some 1,200 families returned to the Crimea. But only two families and three bachelors met the local registration criteria and were permitted to stay.¹⁷ Various mechanisms were employed by the regime to frustrate Tartar efforts to return: (1) inhabitants of rural areas were issued passports and required to register--a practice unique to the Crimea and intended to prevent unregistered settlers, (2) "notary publics" refused to legalize the purchase of homes by Tartars, (3) resettlers to the Crimea from any nationality had to be specifically recruited by the regime, and (4) Tartars with any known involvement with dissident organizations were refused permits for resettlement. As a result of these bureaucratic restrictions, in the ten years

¹⁶ Ludmilla Alexeyeva, p. 7.

¹⁷ Ludmilla Alexeyeva, p. 144.

following the 1967 decrees only 15,000 Tartars had successfully registered to live in the Crimea.¹⁸

In reaction to these bureaucratic roadblocks to emigration, Tartars have continued to illegally resettle in the Crimea. These illegal resettlers live as isolated families or small groups and are frequently deported when discovered. While some petitions continue to be forwarded to government officials, the regime's harassment over some twenty years has had its effect. Numbers of signatures on petitions have declined significantly, mass protests are infrequent at best, and the movement lacks the organization and leadership it enjoyed in the 1960s.

C. SOVIET GERMANS

The Soviet Germans, with a population in 1979 of almost two million, first emigrated to Russia in 1764 under Catherine the Great and continued to do so during the Napoleonic Wars. Most settled in the Volga area or in the southern Ukraine and the Caucasus. From 1924 to 1944 the majority of Germans lived in a German autonomous republic located on the Volga.

From the beginning of their immigration, the bulk of the Russian people--along with the authorities--have mistrusted the Germans and have continually questioned their loyalty. During the Second World War, the Volga Germans, like the Crimean Tartars were forcibly deported to Siberia and Central Asia. They were not charged with collaboration per se, rather the deportations were conducted "as a safety measure, 'transferring' a people who might otherwise have been tempted to collaborate".¹⁹ The restriction to live on special settlements was cancelled in 1955, and the Volga Germans were "rehabilitated" in 1964, but they were not allowed to return to their previous homeland along the Volga.

¹⁸ Ludmilla Alexeyeva, p. 150.

¹⁹ Hélène Carrère d'Encausse, p. 139.

The paper rehabilitation was not able to eliminate the legacy of discrimination and mistrust the Soviet Germans have experienced at the hands of the general Soviet population. Much of this discrimination is tolerated if not encouraged by the authorities. For example, the newspaper Chelyabinsky Rabochy published an article on 2 April 1980 with strong anti-German sentiments. Aleksandr Bous, a German resident of Chelyabinsk, was described by another resident as having:

a high forehead, thin reddish hair and bright blue eyes. . . . All of a sudden my war days came back. . . . I can still remember those dark, venomously green helmets . . . with swastikas. . . . And the eyes under the helmets. . . . Cold blue eyes as if touched with ice went particularly well with those helmets. . . . Nordic eyes--the sign of belonging to the 'higher race',²⁰

A failure to adequately assimilate drove many Germans to apply for emigration to Germany in the 1950s, but a mass emigration movement began in the mid-1960s "after all hope for the restoration of the Volga German Republic had vanished". In 1971, the Soviet authorities began allowing emigration and 1,145 people emigrated. The number of emigrés rose by about 1,500 people a year to a high of 9,704 in 1976. In 1977, the rate began to fall steadily and in 1982 only 1,958 Germans managed to leave.²¹ The authorities are currently only allowing a trickle of Germans to leave, and the discrimination continues.


The problem German emigration poses to the regime is the implied admission that an ethnic group in the Soviet Union that has been in the regime since before the revolution finds its traditional national ties greater than its ties with the Soviet system. As Hélène Carrère d'Encausse says, the phenomenon of German emigration "amounts to admitting the total failure of the Soviet nationalities policy, recognizing the permanence of ethnic bonds to the detriment of bonds created by a life in common, and thus implicitly acknowledging that any ethnic group which does not identify with the USSR has the right to leave".²²

²⁰ Quoted in Ludmilla Alexeyeva, p. 171.

²¹ Ludmilla Alexeyeva, p. 174.

²² Hélène Carrère d'Encausse, p. 202.

Figure 1: German Emigration from the USSR, 1970-84



Source: based on emigration figures appearing in Geoffrey Edwards, "Human Rights And Basket III Issues: Areas Of Change And Continuity", International Affairs, 61 (Autumn 1985): 634.


For the regime, the answer to this predicament has for the time been provided by the end of détente. No longer encouraged by the prospects of economic gains from the West in response to token human rights concessions, the Soviets have effectively halted the emigration of Germans.

D. SOVIET JEWS

Jews represent another group that has concluded that improvement of its position within the Soviet Union is not possible and therefore desires to emigrate. As in most of Eastern Europe, anti-Semitism has almost "always been

a feature in the everyday life of the Soviet Union".²³ Juridically, the USSR considers Judaism to be a nationality rather than a religion and it is so stated on individual identification papers. Despite this, since the revolution Jews have been almost completely deprived of their cultural distinctives, e.g., Yiddish schools, art, literature, and synagogues.²⁴ Widespread discrimination is practiced, most notably in attempts to restrict Jews from higher education and white-collar employment.²⁵

Figure 2: Jewish Emigration from the USSR, 1970-84



Source: based on emigration figures appearing in Geoffrey Edwards, p. 634.

²³ Ludmilla Alexeyeva, p. 179.

²⁴ For an excellent summary of how the regime has systematically attempted to eliminate Jewish cultural distinctives see Zvi Gitelman, "Moscow and the Soviet Jews: A Parting of the Ways", Problems of Communism 29 (January-February 1980): 20-24.

²⁵ Despite these restrictions, as a group, Jews have had and continue to have the highest percentage of white-collar workers (Darrell Slider, p. 537).

Escape from this discrimination by means of emigration to anywhere out of the USSR was the ultimate goal of the Jewish dissidents who began to organize in the 1960s, but the movement began to be labeled the "Jewish Movement for Emigration to Israel". As with other groups, petitions and open letters, began to be sent to the authorities requesting emigration visas. The Six Day War in 1967 provided a catalyst for an increase in petitions, as more and more Jews began to identify Israel as a national homeland. In 1970, an event took place that drew international attention to the movement. Twelve people were arrested and charged with the attempted hijacking of a Soviet airplane; most of the hijackers had unsuccessfully applied for exit visas to Israel. The twelve were convicted and two were sentenced to be executed. The cruelty of the punishments "shook the world". Under foreign and internal pressure, the Soviet authorities commuted the death sentences, but conducted an especially aggressive campaign against those within the Soviet Union who had drawn attention to the trials.

The authorities had apparently hoped to frighten the Jewish movement activists but the trials had the opposite effect. After these incidents, support from the West increased and the movement became more active. While continuing arrests, imprisonment and other forms of repression against the more active Jewish dissidents, the regime began to approve exit visas. In 1976, when German emigration reached its peak and started its decline, the number of Jewish emigrés began to rise dramatically. The rate went from 14,000 in 1976 to a high of 51,300 in 1979. However, in 1980, with the end of the détente era with the West (and other factors that will be examined below), this improvement was reversed, resulting in the number of emigrants falling sharply to 21,470; by

1983, only 1,315 Jews were permitted to leave.²⁶ Those refused exit visas, called "refuseniks", were estimated at 40,000 in 1981.²⁷ In addition to being refused permission to emigrate, most have lost their previous jobs and either have no work or are employed at menial tasks with little prospect of improvement.

E. UKRAINIANS

While the Crimean Tartars, Germans and Jews desire a return of their nationalities to traditional homelands, other national groups which have not been displaced simply desire national self-determination within their existing homelands. Most of the 100 or so national groups in the USSR fall into this category to some extent. Groups with notable organization include Georgians, Armenians, Ukrainians, Lithuanians, Latvians, Estonians, and some of the central Asian Moslem groups. The groups with the most developed dissident movements, however, are the Ukrainians and the Lithuanians.

With a land area slightly larger and a population roughly equal to France, the Ukrainian Republic represents "the largest European national ethnic group

²⁶ Based on figures published in A Chronicle of Current Events as quoted by Ludmilla Alexeyeva, p. 196. Emigration figures differ widely depending on the source; nevertheless, the same general pattern exists. Carrère d'Encausse, in Decline of an Empire, provides the following figures based on data from the Israeli Ministry for the Integration of Immigrants of Jews emigrating from the USSR to Israel during the preceding time period: 1968: 231; 1969: 3019; 1970: 999; 1971: 12,832; 1972: 31,652; 1973: 33,477; 1974: 17,373; 1975: 8,531; 1976: 7,274. The final figure shows the great disparity between the dissident provided figures and the figures of the Israeli government, although, the latter only include those Jews who successfully immigrated to Israel. Along this line, Carrère d'Encausse states (without reference to source) that "in 1975 nearly 50% of the applicants for emigration chose not to go to Israel" (p. 208). If that percentage is representative for the entire period, then the disparity between emigration figures is not as great as it appears.

²⁷ Ludmilla Alexeyeva, p. 197.

without an independent government."²⁸ Of a total population of more than 46 million, 35.4 million are native Ukrainians. Dominated by the Russians for centuries, the Ukraine enjoyed independence for only a short period during 1918 before being integrated into the USSR as a Union Republic in 1922.

It might be expected that assimilation of Ukrainians into a new "Soviet" culture would be relatively easy as they represent a nationality with similar historical, political and social patterns to the Great Russians. But this has not been the case. While many of the key leaders of the Soviet regime have come out of the Ukraine, including Khrushchev, Brezhnev, Podgorny and a host of others, Ukrainians have frequently balked at the prospect of complete assimilation.

Following integration, Moscow has repeatedly attempted a program of Russification in the Ukraine. This has been done primarily through the displacement of the Ukrainian language by Russian, the forced dispersal of Ukrainians to other regions of the Soviet Union, and the placement of Russians or Russified urban Ukrainians in positions of political power. But this program of Russification has not been consistent. In fact there have been several periods when an opposite program of "Ukrainization" has been pursued.²⁹

Resistance movements against Soviet domination have been prevalent throughout the Ukrainian Republic's experience, but they were especially noticeable during World War II. In the post-war, post-Stalin era underground resistance continued in the rural countryside but it was confined in numbers and dealt with vehemently by Soviet authorities when uncovered. In the 1960s, the locus of the Ukrainian dissidence movement shifted from the rural peasants to the urban intelligentsia, became more open, and focused primarily upon maintaining the Ukrainian culture within the Soviet political structure. Calls for

²⁸ Luomilla Alexeyeva, p. 24.

²⁹ See Robert S. Sullivant, "The Ukrainians", Problems of Communism 16 (September-October 1967): 47-53 for a discussion of these shifts from Russification to Ukrainization and back.

independence were rarely made. In 1965, the Soviet government increased its pressure on Ukrainian dissidents. The Soviet authorities arrested more than twenty intellectuals throughout the Republic, and forced them to recant in widely publicized trials. While dissident activity continued, the movement went underground again and shifted its major effort toward the production of *samvydov*.³⁰

In the 1970s, Ukrainian dissidents surfaced again and became heavily involved in the human rights effort throughout the USSR, forming one of the first "Helsinki Watch Groups". While national self-determination continued to be a goal, many in the movement believed that this could be obtained within the existing federal structure of the USSR if the regime would only comply with the letter of the Soviet Constitution and existing laws. One of the more fascinating incidents to occur during the heightened dissent of the early 1970s was the removal of Petro Shelest from his position as head of the Ukrainian communist party. His removal was precipitated by his alleged attempt to "re-Ukrainize his motherland's political apparatus".³¹ A powerful and influential leader both in the Ukraine and in Moscow--who was assumed to be completely assimilated--Shelest surprised many by publishing a book about the Ukraine in which he praised Ukrainian history, culture and development with almost no mention of Russian contributions.

Because of the urbanization pattern in the Ukraine, the intellectual based dissent of the 1960s and 1970s had little mass support. Ukrainian national sentiments have traditionally been located in the rural countryside. The cities of the Ukraine have historically been considered suspect by the Ukrainian rural

³⁰ Literally, *samvydov* means "self-published" and is the Ukrainian counterpart to the Russian term *samizdat*. The term refers to written material produced unofficially and usually illegally. As Vladimir Bukovsky puts it: "I write it myself, censor it myself, print and disseminate it myself, and then I do time in prison for it myself." (Vladimir Bukovsky, To Build a Castle: My Life as a Dissenter, [New York: Viking Press, 1979], p. 141.)

³¹ Hélène Carrère d'Encausse, p. 215.

population as centers of foreign influence. Ukrainians living in these cities have been largely assimilated, more often than not considering themselves to be Russians.³² Thus, the intellectual based dissent, arising as it did in urban areas, found little support in the Ukrainian countryside.

In the face of increased repression in the late 1970s and early 1980s, and with the failure of the movement to make significant gains during the 1970s, Ukrainian dissidents were forced back underground. Ukrainian dissent today is far from dead, but it has certainly been reduced from previous levels.

F. LITHUANIANS

The modern dissident movement in Lithuania is a unique combination of national self-determination and religious self-determination. It is also a popularly based movement that "accounts for a disproportionately high percentage of dissident activities in the Soviet Union".³³ Lithuania, with a long history of independence and resistance to foreign domination, was annexed to the Soviet Union in 1940 as a result of the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact of 1939. From annexation until the mid-1950s, the Lithuanians conducted armed resistance to the Soviet regime. Thousands of Lithuanians were killed during this period, over 50,000 were sent to forced-labor camps, and as many as 350,000 were deported without trial to the eastern regions of the USSR.³⁴ By 1956, this active resistance had been crushed and the Soviet occupation became a way of life. Many Lithuanians concluded that dissidence had become counterproductive, and awaited the time when the Soviet system would fall "by the internal laws of its own development". They felt that the most important goal was to maintain a national identity, which could not be accomplished if the

³² Robert S. Sullivant, p. 47.

³³ V. Stanley Vardys, p. 49.

³⁴ Ludmilla Alexeyeva, pp. 60-61.

Lithuanian people continued to conduct violent or underground resistance.³⁵ Organized dissidence was therefore suspended for almost fifteen years.

The contemporary Lithuanian dissident movement emerged in 1968, under the auspices of the Lithuanian Catholic Church. Lithuanian priests organized pro-Lithuanian demonstrations to celebrate historical accomplishments, and organized petition campaigns to pressure the Soviet regime for liberalization of religious practices. The first of these petitions involved a request to the Kremlin for freedom of religious instruction, for independent religious publications, for a return of deposed bishops, and for the cessation of discrimination against church-attending Catholics.³⁶ About eighty-five percent of the diocesan priests and thousands of parishioners signed the petitions. In addition to these petitions, anti-Soviet graffiti began to appear and regular *samizdat* journals were published. While the aims of the Lithuanian dissident movement remained the same--i.e., national and religious self-determination--there appeared to be a recognition that the previously adopted method of armed resistance was ineffective under the Soviet regime.

The petitioning of Moscow for religious and national liberalization proved to be as ineffective as the earlier armed resistance. The petitioners did not receive any response to the substance of the petitions. Rather, the regime reacted by arresting several of the movement's more influential priests and laymen. In 1972, the tactic changed to that of appeals to world opinion. A petition signed by 17,054 people was sent to Brezhnev by way of the United Nations. Petitions continued along with the publication of the *samizdat* newspaper Chronicle of the Catholic Church of Lithuania, whose purpose was to "gather and publicize information on discrimination against Catholics and on violations of human rights as guaranteed by the United Nations Declaration of

³⁵ Ludmilla Alexeyeva, p. 65.

³⁶ V. Stanley Vardys, p. 56.

Human Rights and by other international agreements."³⁷ Information represented power and dissidents concentrated their efforts on reporting events so that the Western press would pick them up and rebroadcast them back into the Soviet Union.

Another technique of directing attention to their plight was the practice of self-immolation. In 1972, twelve Lithuanians, in separate events, killed themselves in this manner. This appeal to world opinion may have been effective, as from 1972 to 1983 no priest was arrested, although laypersons continued to be sentenced to prison terms for "organizing religious processions" and other religious activities. While the intensification of persecution against Lithuanian dissidents has begun to increase in the last three years, the number of arrests and sentences imposed there have been moderate in relation to those in the Ukraine and elsewhere in the USSR³⁸

G. CENTRAL ASIANS

I have previously defined Soviet dissent as an expression of dissatisfaction with political goals, realities and processes in the Soviet Union. Under this definition, the phenomenon of religious nationalism in Central Asia is not strictly speaking national dissent. There has been little of the protests, petitions or appeals that have characterized dissent in the other regions of the Soviet Union. The Muslims of Central Asia represent more a counterculture than a dissident movement. Nevertheless, the regime's response to the cultural traditions of the peoples of Central Asia has taken a similar form to its response to dissidents and dissident movements in the rest of the empire, and it is the potential for the emergence of national opposition in this region that warrants a discussion of the phenomenon.

³⁷ V. Stanley Vardys, p. 57.

³⁸ Ludmilla Alexeyeva, p. 85.

The Muslim population of the Soviet Union is the sixth largest in the world. At over forty-five million people, this population represents over forty national groups located largely along the Soviet Union's southern border. Soviet Muslims primarily live in the four union republics of Central Asia proper--Kirghizia, Tadzhikistan, Turkmenia, and Uzbekistan--the Azerbaidzhan SSR, the autonomous republics of the northern Caucasus, and the Kazakhstan SSR. The titular nationalities of the six union republics mentioned also reflect the six largest Muslim nationalities in the USSR.

The Soviet regime inherited the Muslim lands occupied by the Tsars, and in many respects has attempted to continue the previous regime's assimilationist and colonial policies. The task of assimilation has been more difficult in Central Asia because, as Geoffrey Wheeler says, the Muslim culture "confronted the Russians with a far greater problem than did the other non-Russian peoples of the Empire, the vast majority of whom were Christian and followed a way of life not greatly different from that of the Russians themselves".³⁹ Despite the very real differences, for example, between the Lithuanians and Russians, both cultures are more Western than Eastern and the cultural differences are minimal compared to differences between the Russians and the Central Asians.

Soviet measures in Central Asia have, therefore, tended to be more intense and revolutionary than in other regions--and ultimately less effective. The goal has been the replacement of traditional cultures with a new Soviet/Russian culture. Mechanisms to achieve this end have included: (1) a somewhat arbitrary political division of the region, (2) an assault on the Moslem family structure, (3) a policy of colonization employing Russians and other non-Muslim groups, (4) the elimination of nomadic migrations, (5) collectivization of agriculture, (6) industrialization, (7) linguistic reforms, (8) an assault on the Islamic religion, and (9) attempts to replace traditional Islamic rites with new Soviet ceremonies.

³⁹ Geoffrey Wheeler, "The Muslims of Central Asia", Problems of Communism 16 (September-October 1967): 72.

Despite these measures, much of the traditional Muslim culture of the region remains. The Central Asian nationalities continue to resist industrialization and urbanization,⁴⁰ the former interfering with the rhythm of daily religious prayers and fasting. Pilgrimages to the traditional Islamic holy places are prohibited for the vast majority of Soviet Muslims, but these have been replaced by pilgrimages to local holy places: tombs of indigenous holy men. So-called "life-cycle" customs such as circumcision and religious ceremonies at birth, weddings and burials continue almost universally. Although arranged marriages, polygamy, infant marriage and the bride price (*Kolyum*) have been made illegal, some of these practices may still continue.⁴¹ Central Asian Moslems are the most endogamous group in the USSR; a survey conducted in 1969 of marriage patterns among Soviet nationalities revealed that the major Central Asian groups marry almost completely within their respective ethnic groups.⁴² Finally, there is a continued widespread commitment to traditional ethnic food, dress and related customs.

⁴⁰ In 1970, the last year for which data on urban/rural distribution by nationality was available, the Soviet Muslim population was approximately seventy-two percent rural (Rosemarie Crisostomo, "The Muslims Of The Soviet Union", *Current History* [October 1982]: 327).

⁴¹ Wheeler claims "polygamy, though illegal, is still practiced through the device of registering children of illegal marriages solemnized before a mulla as the offspring of the first legal marriage" (pp. 75-76). Carrère d'Encausse claims the *Kolyum* is still fairly popular and is even covered by rules and established rates (Hélène Carrère d'Encausse, p. 256). Bennigsen disagrees on both points, claiming these practices have largely been eliminated (Alexandre Bennigsen, *The Islamic Threat to the Soviet State* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1983, p. 49).

⁴² The following percentages of marriage within ethnic groups were reported by official Soviet sources: (I. Tchuiko, *Braki i razvody* [Moscow, 1975], p. 76. Quoted in Hélène Carrère d'Encausse, p. 251)

Kirghiz	95.4%	Estonians	78.8%	Belorussians	39%
Kozakhs	93.6%	Lithuanians	68.2%	Ukrainians	34.3%
Turkmen	90.7%	Latvians	61.4%	Armenians	33.4%
Azeris	89.8%				
Uzbeks	86.2%				

Like the Lithuanians, the Central Asians also have an historical experience of armed opposition to the Soviet regime. Between 1918 and 1933 a popularly based resistance movement, known as the *Rasmachi*, attempted to establish independent Muslim states in the Caucasus and Central Asia during these formative years of the Soviet regime. Not an homogenous movement, the *Rasmachi* had its origins within a variety of bandit gangs under various leaders, which only in its later stages evolved into a true national-liberation movement. When this national-liberation movement was finally suppressed by a combination of direct actions by the Red Army and a political relaxation in Soviet anti-Muslim policies, the *Rasmachi* reverted back to isolated bandit gangs which were crushed by 1933.⁴³ The various rebel leaders were never able to consolidate their internal differences, which contributed greatly to their defeat. The significance of the *Rasmachi* revolt was the widespread grass roots support the rebel forces obtained and the identification of the struggle as being between Russian colonization and the indigenous Muslims rather than being a struggle between communism and anti-communism.

Organized dissent since the 1930s has been infrequent. It has been centered in the growing movement of "parallel Islam" or the Sufi brotherhoods. Located primarily in the northern Caucasus and the southern portions of Central Asia, the Sufi brotherhoods are "secret societies with initiatory rites, extraordinary discipline, and a regular chain of command". Soviet sources have estimated the size of movement as including at least half of all Muslim believers in the Caucasus--more than five hundred thousand in this Soviet region alone.⁴⁴ The significance of this Islamic movement is the degree of influence it claims upon the daily life of its adherents. Soviet writers admit this influence in their

⁴³ Michael Rywkin, Moscow's Muslim Challenge (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharp Inc., 1982), p. 43.

⁴⁴ Hélène Carrère d'Encausse, p. 261.

propaganda attacks on the movements.⁴⁵ Alexandre Bennigsen claims that the survival of Islam throughout the Muslim areas of the Soviet Union is mainly due to these brotherhoods.⁴⁶

So far there is little evidence of opposition by the Sufi brotherhoods to the Soviet regime. Bennigsen does, however, quote the case of the assassination of Sultan Ibrahimov, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Kirghiz SSR on 4 December 1980, as a possible act by the Sufi Brotherhood of the Hairy Ishans. While the direct evidence linking this particular group or any other with the assassination is weak, this schismatic sect has a long history of opposition to the Soviet Union and the previous Tsarist Empire. Members of the brotherhood have consistently refused to pay taxes, evaded military conscription, withheld their children from the regime's schools and indulged in "violent anti-Soviet propaganda".⁴⁷ Soviet authorities have repeatedly arrested the sect's leaders when they have been uncovered and tried to eliminate the sect--but the brotherhood continues to resurface.

Although petitions and letters by Muslim dissidents are infrequent, they have occasionally appeared. A group of eighty-eight villagers in the Kirghiz Republic sent a letter to the Soviet authorities, subsequently published in Izvestia, complaining about the lack of attention by local authorities to elements of traditional culture. The villagers argued that "the population's national traditions ought to be considered in housing construction". Specifically, the villagers declare, two-story houses should be built to accommodate the Kirghiz family which traditionally consists of the youngest son's family remaining in the home with his parents. The letter writers complain that Soviet authorities lack a

⁴⁵ See Alexandre Bennigsen, "Soviet Islam Since the Invasion of Afghanistan", Central Asian Survey 1 (July 1982): 66-67.

⁴⁶ Alexandre Bennigsen, "Sufism in the USSR: A Bibliography of Soviet Sources", Central Asian Survey 2 (December 1983): 82.

⁴⁷ Alexandre Bennigsen, "Soviet Islam Since the Invasion of Afghanistan", p. 71-72.

sensitivity to the long-term impact of local decisions and a feeling for the needs of the local residents: "Why are problems solved so hastily, sometimes with a stroke of the pen on a whim, when they will affect not only us, but our children, grandchildren and great-grandchildren as well?"⁴⁸

There is also evidence of *samizdat* in the Muslim areas of the Soviet Union. While little has surfaced in the West, Soviet authors are mentioning its existence more frequently.⁴⁹ Muslim *samizdat* is far less political than that produced in the non-Muslim areas and is generally concerned with the spread of Islamic religious ideas. An interesting related development is the growing emergence of religious literature smuggled into Central Asia and the Caucasus from neighboring Islamic states. This material is also primarily religious in nature, although this is not always the case and some anti-Soviet material has been circulating according to official Soviet comments on the phenomenon.⁵⁰ There is a certain ironical twist to the Soviet language Russification program in relation to Central Asian *samizdat*: "Soviet power has provided Central Asian Muslims with a common language to read these uncommon publications".⁵¹

The current level of overt dissent should not be overstated, however. As Carrère d'Encausse says about the continued existence of the counterculture of the Central Asian Muslims:

Homo Islamicus is not an adversary. . . . But simply by his existence, by his presence in the whole area where the Moslem civilization has existed, he bears witness that the Soviet people

⁴⁸ "What Should Our Village Be Like?--It's Worth Consulting the Residents on This", *Izvestia*, 7 July 1983. Translated in *ODSP* 35 (3 August 1983): 21.

⁴⁹ See H. B. Paksoy, "The Deceivers", *Central Asian Survey* 3 (1984): 123-131, and Alexander Bennigsen, "Sufism in the USSR: A Bibliography of Soviet Sources", pp. 88-92 for discussions of Soviet writings on Muslim *samizdat*.

⁵⁰ Alexandre Bennigsen, "Mullahs, Mujahidin, and Soviet Muslims", *Problems of Communism* 33 (November-December 1984): 36.

⁵¹ "Soviets Step Up the Propaganda War", *Arabia* (London) 36 (July 1984): 37. Quoted in Alexandre Bennigsen, "Mullahs, Mujahidin, and Soviet Muslims", p. 37.

has at least two components: the Soviets and the Soviet Moslems.⁵²

⁵² Hélène Carrère d'Encausse, p. 264.

VI. RELIGIOUS DISSENT

Religion is the opium of the people . . . Religion is a kind of spiritual gin in which the slaves of capital drown their human shape and their claims to any decent life . . . All modern religions and Churches, all religious organizations, Marxism always regards as organs of *bourgeois* reaction serving to defend exploitation and to stupefy the working class.

V. I. Lenin

A. THE POLICIES OF SCIENTIFIC ATHEISM

"Every religious idea", wrote Lenin, "every idea of God, even of flirting with the idea of God, is unutterable vileness".¹ Lenin and the other early Bolsheviks believed religion would wither away like the state once the economic exploitation of man by man was eliminated. Nevertheless, in contrast to their approach to the institutions of the state, they felt it necessary to assist this withering away process. Thus, they removed those institutional and social structures that had supported religious practice under the Tsarist regime and embarked on an aggressive atheistic campaign to discredit the religious world view. These two principles--restricting the practice of religion and countering its ideology--have continued to be the basis of the regime's approach to religion to the present day.

On January 22, 1918, the regime published its first decree to regulate the role of religion in the new Bolshevik state. The main provisions of this decree, entitled "The Separation of Church and State", continue to be in force: (1) separation of church from state, (2) individual freedom of conscience with emphasis on the rights of atheists, (3) secularization of schools, (4) religion

¹ quoted in Christel Lane, Christian Religion in the Soviet Union (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1978), p. 26.

completely private and not to interfere with the rights of others or with any citizen's state obligations, (5) no church property ownership.² The severity of this decree was somewhat mitigated in practice by the demands of other more pressing concerns of the young regime.³

Ten years later, Stalin amended the 1918 decree, and ended any ambiguity about the severity of the earlier laws. Ludmilla Alexeyeva claims that with the publication of this resolution, "the Soviet government embarked on a policy of eradication of religion in the Soviet Union".⁴ The major provisions of this new decree, "On Religious Cults", were: (1) the registration of all religious organizations, (2) the empowering of the government to emplace and remove persons from executive positions in religious organizations, (3) prohibition of the involvement of children in religious organizations, (4) restriction of religious groups from social, cultural, and welfare activities, and (5) restriction of religious leaders to specific geographical locations.⁵

The Second World War brought a brief respite to the persecution of religion in the USSR but in 1959, a new anti-religious campaign was initiated by Khrushchev. This campaign lasted until 1964 and, while directed at all religion in the Soviet Union, affected the Russian Orthodox and Baptist churches the most severely. An intensive atheistic propaganda campaign was conducted and scores of churches were closed. Some relaxation of repression occurred in the early Brezhnev era but the state maintained "a tight rein on church appointments in all denominations, so that there was a good cadre of church leaders developed which could speak for Soviet policies . . .".⁶

² Christel Lane, p. 27.

³ However, this varied with respect to the particular religious groups, as we shall examine shortly.

⁴ Ludmilla Alexeyeva, p. 201.

⁵ Christel Lane, pp. 27-28.

⁶ Remarks by Michael Bourdeaux in "The State of Religious Freedom", World Affairs 147 (Spring 1985): 249.

New repressions began in the waning years of Brezhnev's reign and were continued during Yuri Andropov's short year at the helm. On 13 September 1983, the Russian Republic Criminal Code was changed to allow officials to extend a prisoner's term for "malicious disobedience of the lawful demands of the administration of a corrective-labor institution".⁷ The practical effect of this policy has been the resentencing of religious prisoners for continuing religious practices while behind bars, even for such seemingly minor offenses such as "saying prayers in prison".⁸ The number of Christians in prison has also increased at least fourfold in the first half of the 1980s--from an estimated one hundred in 1979 to over four hundred in 1985.⁹ Thus, Gorbachev has apparently continued this war on religion initiated by Lenin almost seventy years ago.

Despite the claim that "the exploitation of man by man . . . [has been] ended once and for all" in the Soviet state, religion has failed to wither away. The soviet state continues to find it necessary to pursue policies designed to eradicate "cu toms that are at variance with the socialist way of life."¹⁰ Since the original ideological explanation for the prevalence of religion in Russia--the existence of classes--no longer exists in the "developed socialist society" of the Soviet Union, regime ideologues must invent alternate explanations. Andropov explained that the existence of religious extremism was due to abnormalities in the individual, subjective deficiencies such as "political or ideological errors, religious fanaticism, nationalistic aberrations, moral degradation or simply an unwillingness to work". But Soviet officials are also quick to blame Western influences, such as "the imperialist special services",

⁷ Vedomosti Verhovnogo Soveta RSFSR, No. 37 (September 15, 1983): 796. Quoted in CDSP 35 (21 December 1983): 9.

⁸ Michael Bourdeaux, p. 250.

⁹ Michael Bourdeaux, p. 250.

¹⁰ "The Draft Party Program (New Version)", pp. 3,17.

foreign visitors, and "Israeli propaganda centers", as well as blaming "overzealous" local administrators.¹¹

The modern regime continues to deal with the different religious groups and religious dissenters in the Soviet Union in varying manners. Bohdan Bociurkiw describes five considerations that guide the regime in its approach to relations with religion in the Soviet Union:

1. Marxist-Leninist ideology with its militant atheism together with an exploitation of traditional Russian nationalism
2. Intolerance of alternative belief systems that cannot be totally co-opted by the state
3. The sociological effect of modernization which breeds toleration for religion
4. The utility of religious organizations in support of pragmatic political policies, eg. influence of foreign publics
5. The attitudes of individual religious groups to the system¹²

The variations in religious dissent have arisen as a response to the regime's attitudes toward religion. Several religious groups have been mentioned already because of their close association with national dissent: Lithuanian and Ukrainian Catholics, Jews and Central Asian Moslems. I have restricted the discussion of religious dissidence groups in this section to those Christian groups in the Soviet Union without distinctive non-Russian national associations. The most notable groups in this category are the Evangelical Christian Baptists, the Pentecostalists, and the Russian Orthodox Church.

¹¹ E. G. Filimonov, "The Social and Ideological Essence of Religious Extremism", Scientific Atheism, (August 1983). Translated in "Dealing with 'Religious Extremists'", QDSP 35 (26 October 1983): 11.

¹² Remarks by Bohdan Bociurkiw in "Support of Religious Witness in Eastern Europe", World Affairs 147 (Spring 1985): 282-83.

B. RUSSIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH

During the Tsarist reign, the Russian Orthodox Church was the official state church of the regime. It enjoyed special political, social, and economic rights and privileges; e.g., state financial support, a monopoly over religious propaganda, and representatives in the Council of Ministers. However, these rights and privileges were not without costs. Under the reign of Peter the Great, Orthodoxy became institutionally subordinate to the state; a Tsarist official presided over the Holy Synod, the governing body of the Church. Institutional subordination limited the Church's flexibility in both religious and secular affairs and conditioned the Church toward accommodation rather than confrontation.

This legacy of accommodation has continued to the present day. Unfortunately for the Church, the nature of the Russian state changed in 1917. The Tsarist regime had enjoyed a symbiotic relationship with the Church; the Church legitimized the rule of the Tsar and, in return, Orthodoxy was interwoven into all aspects of public life. The Bolshevik regime required no such traditional religious legitimization and the symbiotic relationship was broken.

The 1918 decree and subsequent Soviet laws were particularly damaging to Orthodoxy. Church and state were legally separated, thus ending a two hundred year relationship. The nationalization of land deprived the Church of its chief source of revenue. Education, which had been a major purview of the Church, was removed from the Church's responsibility and secularized. Similarly, the registration of births, deaths and marriages was removed from the Church and placed under the civil administration. The Russian Orthodox Church was prohibited from providing religious instruction to those under the age of eighteen. Finally, the clergy, considered members of the propertied class and hence bourgeoisie, were greatly discriminated against, losing the right to vote, ration cards, and education for their children, as well as being forced to pay higher taxes.¹³

¹³ David Lane, pp. 243-44.

The Church did not immediately accept these restrictions, and neither was it powerless to resist. During the Civil War, Orthodoxy generally sided with the White Armies and paid for this opposition by imprisonment and death for many of its clergy who gained a reputation for "counterrevolutionary" behavior. While the bulk of Orthodoxy resisted the new regime, there did emerge during this period a reformation movement known as the "Living Church". The aim of this movement was to bring the Church into alignment with the broader political and social reforms in Russia introduced by the Bolsheviks. It sought to accomplish this by establishing "a relation between state and church which cast the church into the same supportive and acclamatory role that it had held vis-à-vis the Tsarist regime".¹⁴ Proposed reforms were quite drastic in comparison to traditional Orthodoxy. They included the destruction of the Church's hierarchical structure, greater participation of the lower clergy and laity in Church affairs, and other changes in dogma and ritual. The regime recognized a tactical opportunity to weaken the strength of Orthodoxy and supported this reformation movement.

Estimates of the strength of the "Living Church" at the apex of its influence vary from one third to one half of all Orthodox parishes, yet the movement's reforms were too radical for the majority of the clergy and peasant laity.¹⁵ As the authorities realized the reformers would not replace the traditional Orthodox Church, they shifted tactics to gain control of the weakened Orthodox hierarchy. In 1927, a move for reconciliation was offered the state by Metropolitan Sergei, who claimed loyalty to the regime in an official statement: "We wish to be Orthodox and at the same time to recognize the Soviet Union as our native country, whose joys and successes are our joys and successes and whose failures are our failures".¹⁶ At the same time Sergei accepted the

¹⁴ Christel Lane, p. 31.

¹⁵ Christel Lane, p. 32.

¹⁶ Ludmilla Alexeyeva, p. 246.

regime's demand for registration of churches. This accommodation was at least publicly accepted by the vast majority of clergy, but several schismatic Orthodox groups date their birth from this rapprochement of church and state.

The accommodation with the regime did not provide the Church with the freedom it had expected in regards to its religious teaching and practice. Thousands of churches were closed, purges of clergy were conducted and thousands of believers were imprisoned and killed during the height of Stalin's dictatorship. However, the repressiveness of the 1930s was lessened during the Second World War when Stalin, needing the support of all rival power centers, came to a further accommodation with the Russian Orthodox Church. The fundament of this bargain, which, according to William Fletcher, "provided the basis for all subsequent religious activity", was that "the State granted certain minimal concessions to the Church, marginally sufficient to ensure its continued survival in the country, in return for the Church's unwavering support in political activities, primarily on the international scene".¹⁷

This rapprochement between church and state continued in the immediate postwar years. But in 1959 the period of relative calm between regime and church was ended when "a new wave of legal restrictions and persecution threw church life once more into jeopardy".¹⁸ Khrushchev began with an intensive anti-religious propaganda campaign and the widespread closings of church facilities. In 1917, the Russian Orthodox Church had over 54,000 churches, at the end of World War Two, this number had been reduced to approximately 20,000 and Khrushchev further reduced the number to less than 7,500 in active use.¹⁹ But church closures only tell part of the story. In 1961 parish priests were denied both vote and voice in the administration of their parishes through the promulgation of new Church regulations. These new

¹⁷ William C. Fletcher, Religion and Soviet Foreign Policy 1945-1970 (London: Oxford University Press, 1973), p. 5.

¹⁸ Christel Lane, p. 33.

¹⁹ Michael Bourdeaux, pp. 247, 251.

regulations not only removed the local priest from leadership of his parish, but also prohibited the conduct of visits and religious rites with parishioners outside of the confines of the church facility, prohibited children participating in Church rites, and obligated priests to report information of interest to the government on their parishioners.²⁰

Despite these actions by the state and the acquiescence of the Church hierarchy, there was little public dissent by the lower clergy. Part of the explanation for this silence may be due to the fact that although over one hundred dissident Baptist leaders were imprisoned during the period of Khrushchev's repression, not one Orthodox leader was arrested.²¹ In any case, the Orthodox hierarchy demonstrated and continues to demonstrate unswerving support for the Soviet regime. This has been especially notable in international affairs where the Church has consistently supported Soviet positions since the early 1960s. Examples of this support include support for the Soviet world peace campaign, "the abolition of race and class difference as well as of the economic exploitation entailed by the colonial system", the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia, condemnation of the US involvement in Vietnam, and, ironically, the denunciation of Alexandr Solzhenitsyn, whose public support and defense of Orthodoxy upheld it during especially troublesome times.²²

There have been voices of dissent in the Orthodox Church in the past twenty-five years--but they have been few and far between. In 1965, Frs. Nikolai Eshliman and Gleb Yakunin wrote a letter to Nikolay Podgorny, then President of the Presidium, in which they demanded that the government's Council on Religious Affairs and Cults "cease interfering in internal church affairs". At the same time they sent letters to the Orthodox patriarchy and all bishops calling for repeal of the 1961 regulations due to their violation of

²⁰ Ludmilla Alexeyeva, p. 248.

²¹ David Lane, p. 247.

²² Christel Lane, p. 35.

canonical law and destructiveness to the Church. However, theirs were lone voices and they were dismissed from the priesthood.²³ A layman, Boris Talantov, along with eleven others from the region of Kirov also sent a letter criticising the regime's actions against Orthodoxy that later appeared in the West and was broadcast into the Soviet Union over the BBC. The substance of the charges was publicly refuted by the Church patriarchy and Talantov was convicted in 1969 of "slandering the Soviet state". He subsequently died in a prison hospital.²⁴

In 1976, the "Christian Committee for the Defense of the Rights of Religious Believers in the USSR" was formed by Yakunin. Believing that the Orthodox hierarchy had abdicated its responsibilities to defend the religious rights of believers in the Soviet Union, this committee organized itself to undertake legal defense of persecuted believers. Although the committee was composed of Orthodox believers, it offered its assistance to any individual persecuted for his or her religious beliefs. For almost three years, the committee amassed documentation on the status of religious persecution in the USSR and provided information to Soviet citizens, religious leaders, the state bureaucracy and international human rights organizations. In 1979 Gleb Yakunin was arrested, convicted of "slander" and imprisoned, but the committee continued to function.

Another dissident group to emerge from within Orthodoxy was a group of young intellectuals who formed a group called the "Christian Seminar". Less interested in political issues than in a need for vitality within Orthodoxy, the members of this group wrote widely disseminated letters about the lack of freedom to develop their religious practices within the restrictive conditions imposed by both church and state. Aleksandr Ogorodnikov, founder of the group, once wrote about the condition of Orthodoxy in its accommodation to the modern Soviet state:

²³ Ludmilla Alexeyeva, p. 250.

²⁴ Peter Reddaway, Uncensored Russia, pp. 326-28.

In the Russian Church, the parish is not like a brotherly community, where Christian love of one's neighbor becomes a reality. The state persecutes every manifestation of church life, except for the performance of the religious cult. Our thirst for spiritual communion, for religious education, and for missionary service runs up against all the might of the state's repressive machinery.²⁵

And Ogorodnikov discovered the "might of the state's repressive machinery" first-hand when he was arrested and sentenced to eleven years of imprisonment.

It is the emergence of young Orthodox dissidents that is especially troublesome to Soviet authorities because it demonstrates the failures of the system to "win the battle for the minds of the young". The pervasiveness of interest by Soviet young people in religion is a frequent theme of Soviet writers in addressing problems with youth.²⁶ While reliable figures on the age composition of Soviet believers is not readily available, according to Michael Bourdeaux, "it seems that the number of young or middle-age people coming into the church at least equals the number of old who are dying".²⁷

Despite these indications of dissent or potential dissent in the ranks of Orthodoxy, the Church remains a publicly loyal tool of the regime. Unable to totally eliminate the influence of the traditional church, the regime has at least co-opted its leadership and minimized its influence as a rival source of power. Orthodoxy today is generally restricted to the perpetuation of a liturgical practice rather than offering an alternative world view or a religion that influences a significant portion of an individual's daily beliefs or practices. It is

²⁵ quoted in Michael Bourdeaux, p. 252.

²⁶ For example, see V. Vasekha, "To the Sounds of an Organ", Uchitelskaya Gazeta (24 December 1983), in GDSP 35 (18 January 1984): 22; Maj. G. Ostrieko, "Even If There's Only One", Krasnaya Zvezda, (21 March 1984), in GDSP 36 (27 June 1984): 14; and A. Kamenev, "Between the Chorale and the Hit Song", Sovetskaya Rossiya, (14 December 1983), in GDSP 36 (16 May 1984): 19.

²⁷ Michael Bourdeaux, p. 251.

to the Protestant denominations that one must look for evidence of any genuine religious dissent.

C. EVANGELICAL CHRISTIAN BAPTISTS

The government initiated campaign against the religion in 1918 was directed mostly against the Russian Orthodox Church and Muslims; the Protestant denominations, including the Baptists, were generally ignored. This was undoubtedly due to the relatively small numbers of Protestant adherents at the time--Baptists accounted for only about 100,000 Russians prior to the October revolution--and also because the Protestant denominations had not been associated with the *ancien régime*, rather, they had been persecuted by it.²⁸ In this period of relative neglect, lasting until 1928, the Baptists grew in strength to about 500,000 members.²⁹

When Stalin began his anti-religious program in 1928, the Baptists were included in government repression. As directed against the Baptists, this repression was justified on three grounds, according to David Lane: First, "they were charged with being connected with, and agents of, religious groups abroad." Secondly, "they were regarded as *kulak* elements". Finally, their religious beliefs were "at odds with historical materialism" and opposed to the the government's goals regarding the education and upbringing of the youth.³⁰

During the Second World War, Stalin modified his repressive anti-religious policies in an attempt to exert internal control over the various religions--in other words, to "tame" the churches and "undermine them from within".³¹ Those Baptist ministers who were inclined toward collaboration were encouraged by the regime and those who were not were denied licensing and

²⁸ David Lane, p. 250.

²⁹ Christel Lane, p. 139.

³⁰ David Lane, p. 251.

³¹ Ludmilla Alexeyeva, p. 201.

frequently imprisoned. The government created the All-Union Council of Evangelical Christian Baptists (ACECB) as its primary mechanism of control over the Baptists.³²

In 1960, the ACECB published two documents to regulate Baptist church life. Both conformed to the government's position on religion and violated Baptist doctrine in several ways; for example, while one of the fundamental doctrinal responsibilities of Baptists is the proclamation of the Gospel and evangelization, the documents condemned as "unhealthy" any such missionary activity. These documents aroused indignation among believers and provided a catalyst for dissent. The goal of the dissenters, called *initsiativniki*, was to purify church doctrine and practice from the distortions imposed by the government. In 1962, a counter-organization to the officially endorsed ACECB was established, the Council of Churches of Evangelical Christian Baptists (CCECB). This group continued missionary activity, but it did not escape persecution by the authorities. From 1960 to 1963 about two hundred *initsiativniki* were arrested and the persecution of this splinter Baptist group continues to the present.³³

Despite this persecution, the Evangelical Christian Baptists have the largest following of any Protestant denomination in the USSR. According to figures of the World Council of Evangelical Baptists, in 1975 there were over 535,000 *registered* Baptists in the Soviet Union. Some dissident sources have claimed that registered Baptists account for only a third of the total number but all sources, including many Soviet officials, conclude that the number continues to grow.³⁴

³² This union represented the merger of a variety of Protestant denominations; eg., most Evangelical Christians, Baptists, Pentecostalists and Mennonite Brethren.

³³ Ludmilla Alexeyeva, p. 204.

³⁴ See Christel Lane, pp. 140-141, for a detailed description of sources and figures on membership in the Baptist denomination.

Member churches of the CCECB are not strictly speaking underground; they do not hide from the government but they do refuse to register or submit to other forms of governmental reform. An interesting relationship has developed between the CCECB and the ACECB, according to Gleb Yakunin, an Orthodox priest. As official pressure is exerted upon the ACECB to compromise further to the regime, members of the registered ACECB churches transfer to the unregistered CCECB. The government is thus constrained from exerting too excessive pressure in order to preclude these transfers. Father Yakunin considers this phenomenon to be an "ideal form of existence for churches" under Soviet rule as it "enables them to sustain the heavy repressions inflicted by an aggressively atheistic government."³⁵

As have the Lithuanian Catholics, Evangelical Christian Baptists have appealed to the West for support. The Western World Council of Baptists maintains official relations with the ACECB and official visits by representatives of Western Baptists are conducted with regularity. Tourists also visit with the rival CCECB, which receives literature, correspondence, and financial and prayer support from fellow Baptists in the West. Petitions signed by tens of thousands of Western Baptists have been sent to the Soviet leadership appealing for the release of Baptist prisoners. In the spring of 1979, Georgy Vins, one of the original leaders of the CCECB was released from prison and was allowed to emigrate to the United States in exchange for Soviet spies. After arriving in the U. S., Georgy Vins met with President Carter and now continues the program of aiding the CCECB from the West by acting as the foreign coordinator for Western support.³⁶ The right "to organize freely, to teach their religious beliefs to children and to proselytize" remain the major unmet demands of the Baptists dissidents.³⁷

³⁵ Ludmilla Alexeyeva, p. 207.

³⁶ Ludmilla Alexeyeva, p. 212.

³⁷ David Lane, p. 254.

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
SOVIET DISSENT AND THE AMERICAN NATIONAL INTEREST(U)
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
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D. PENTECOSTALISTS

While the Evangelical Christian Baptists have achieved a semblance of a *modus vivendi* with the regime, such an accommodation has not been possible for the Pentecostals. This Protestant sect first emerged in Russia just prior to the turn of the century. Like the Baptists, the Pentecostals escaped the initial persecutions of the post-revolution years. According to official figures, there were 200,000 members in the Soviet Union by 1928.³⁸ Along with the other Protestant denominations, the Pentecostals were forced to register their communities with the Council on Religious Affairs and Cults in August 1945. However, the Pentecostals were not registered as a separate religion; they were included under the All-Union Council of Evangelical Christian Baptists.

The primary cause of the almost constant persecution of the sect is the Pentecostal's emphasis on evangelism and a lifestyle in strict conformity with doctrinal principles. Unlike the Baptists, who with the exception of the *initsiativniki* are often described as politically loyal and hardworking citizens, Pentecostals are frequently described as "politically hostile, anti-Soviet and are charged with more extreme and consistent withdrawal from general social life".³⁹ For example, E. G. Filimonov, Deputy Director of the Institute of Scientific Atheism, says the "extreme" Pentecostals "evade registration . . . refuse to serve in the Soviet Army and to vote, and many forbid their children to join the Young Pioneers or the YCL, to watch movies or television, and to read fiction".⁴⁰

Pentecostals rarely condemn the Soviet regime outright, but neither do they vocally support the communist state. This silence is in stark contrast to most other faiths which at least occasionally provide some rhetorical acclaim to

³⁸ David Lane, p. 216.

³⁹ Christel Lane, p. 183.

⁴⁰ E. G. Filimonov, p. 10.

the regime.⁴¹ Some anti-Soviet feelings are expressed during religious services in connection with the interpretations of "unknown tongues", charismatic gifts being a prime focus of the Pentecostalist's services. These interpretations frequently denounce the Soviet system yet usually in moral rather than political terms. As Christel Lane points out, "such denunciations of Soviet moral standards, endowed with supernatural authority, must make a deep impact on believers".⁴²

Repression by the regime is generally directed against unregistered communities in the form of fines for conducting services, confiscation or destruction of private homes used for services, and job discrimination. The form of protest taken by the Pentecostalists is requests for *en masse* emigration. This provides a dilemma for the regime. Since the majority of the Pentecostalists belong to the indigenous Slavic populations, their request to emigrate cannot be justified as a desire to join family or return to an historic homeland. The reason given by the Pentecostalists for requesting emigration is a desire to escape religious persecution; a reason that is unfortunately unacceptable to the leaders of the "socialist paradise". The regime has declared that they "do not and never will acknowledge emigration on religious grounds". This impasse with the regime has resulted in thousands of "refuseniks". A recent example of a group of these refuseniks is the "Siberian 70"; a group of Pentecostal Christians in the town of Chuguyevka. According to information from Keston College, many of the adults in this group lost their jobs when it became known they desired to emigrate. Since early 1985, they reportedly have subsisted on ten rubles a month and have been forced to slaughter all of their farm livestock to feed themselves. Although concerned Westerners have sent parcels of food, the group has been unable to claim these packages due to high

⁴¹ Christel Lane, p. 183.

⁴² Christel Lane, p. 184.

import duties. They have been harassed by the KGB, local militia, and even other townspeople and there appears to be little prospect for change.⁴³

The Pentecostals' sole recourse has been a steady appeal to the West for assistance. Some of the appeals are pathetic in their plea for assistance.⁴⁴ Probably the most famous Pentecostal protest to reach the West was the case of the Vashchenkos and the Chmykhalovs, the two Pentecostal families who forced their way into the American embassy in Moscow and who lived in the embassy for five years. The Soviet press repeatedly discredited the two families, referring to the senior Vashchenko, Pyotr, as an embittered, alienated, lawbreaker with a "fourth-grade education and no particular occupation."⁴⁵ Even though the two families managed to eventually emigrate, and then only after a hunger strike, the remainder of Pentecostals remain prisoners in the USSR to the present time.

⁴³ "Siberian 70' Face Hunger, Assault", NewsWire, (Wheaton, IL: Slavic Gospel Association, Inc., April/May 1986).

⁴⁴ A letter to President Reagan in 1981 is illustrative: "The government of the Soviet Union responds to all our lawful requests either with silence or with the curt response: 'You are not going anywhere and you are needed by no one.' Our appeals to international organizations have only succeeded in bringing the wrath of our own government down on our heads. . . . We have no one we can rely on. May God inspire you to act on our behalf, Mr. President! Accept us into your country! . . . We beg of you, Mr. President, to make a public statement on our behalf and to appeal to Brezhnev to allow us to leave. . . . Please, Mr. President, answer us." (quoted in Ludmilla Alexeyeva, pp. 230-231).

⁴⁵ E. G. Filimonov, p. 10.

IV. POLITICAL DISSENT

The human rights movement was born out of the experience of people who lived their lives under conditions of lawlessness, cruelty, and assault on the personality 'in the interests of the collective' or for the sake of 'the bright future of humankind'.

Ludmilla Alexeyeva

The final category of dissidence is political dissent. Included in this group are Soviet dissidents who seek changes in the political and economic system of the communist regime, as opposed to the social changes desired by the national and religious groups. The human rights movement has been variously characterized in the West as the "democratic movement", the "liberal movement" and the "civic protest movement". Often this movement has been considered synonymous with dissent in the USSR although as we have seen Soviet dissidence is quite diverse. This confusion results from two factors. The first is the exposure this category of dissent received in the West especially in the 1970s during the trials and subsequent imprisonments of the leaders of the movement--primarily intellectuals of some world notoriety prior to their involvement in the movement. The second is the role the human rights movement began to assume as the unofficial but widely accepted "central clearing house" for information about the other dissident movements.

A. THE HUMAN RIGHTS MOVEMENT

Ludmilla Alexeyeva, who was herself a key figure in the unfolding events, considers December 5, 1965, as the birthday of the human rights movement, for on this day the "first demonstration using human rights slogans took place in

Moscow's Pushkin Square".¹ The reason for this demonstration was the beginning of the trial of two popular *samizdat* authors, Andrey Singavsky and Yuly Daniel, who were accused of disseminating "libelous works . . . with subversive intent" to the West since 1959.² Friends of the two authors organized a rally in front of the courtroom on the opening day of the trial and called for open proceedings. Approximately two hundred demonstrators appeared as did a number of foreign correspondents who were intrigued by this unique event on the streets of Moscow. News of the trial and the harsh sentences (Singavsky received seven years in a strict-regimen labor camp and Daniel, five) was broadcast internationally and also back into the Soviet Union by means of foreign radio stations. Instead of stopping the growth of *samizdat* the trials inspired its production, exposed an ignorant public to the concepts of human rights, and led to the coordination and integration of diverse human rights groups into an organized movement.

The first consequence of the trial was the appearance of The White Book in *samizdat* literature. This publication provided a transcript of the trial and a collection of protest letters written in behalf of Singavsky and Daniel. Soon after its appearance the authorities arrested four more Soviet citizens--Galanskov, Ginzburg, Dobrovolsky and Lashkova--on charges of publishing The White Book and sending it to the West. The resulting "Trial of the Four" in January 1968, and their subsequent convictions and sentences, continued to spark the growth of the movement. A human rights *samizdat* journal, Chronicle of Current Events, first appeared on April 30, 1968. This journal continues to the present (under constantly changing editors due to their arrest as soon as they are uncovered) as the primary communication mechanism of not only the human rights movement but of many national and religious dissidence groups as well.

¹ Ludmilla Alexeyeva, p. 269.

² Peter Reddaway, ed., Uncensored Russia, p. 61.

Communication was and remains the main interest of the human rights movement with *samizdat* the primary mechanism. Especially important are contacts with the West. By these contacts, *samizdat* is transformed into *tomizdat*³ and can be reproduced in larger quantities and reach a broader and more diverse audience. What little organization and coordination exists within the movement is primarily directed toward the accomplishment of this communication function. The first specifically identified human rights organization had as its sole reason for existence the support of this communication effort. On May 28, 1969, fifteen human rights activists sent a letter complaining of civil rights violations in the USSR to the United Nations. The activists called themselves the Initiative Group for the Defense of Human Rights in the USSR. They justified this appeal to an international organization on the basis of frustrations in communicating with the Soviet government. The openness of the group's protest had two immediate effects. The first was the arrest of most of the signatories. The second was the identification of the group as a focal point for other widely dispersed human rights activists and sympathizers.

The following year, the Committee for Human Rights in the USSR was formed in Moscow by three Soviet physicists of international notoriety--Valery Chalidze, Andrey Tverdokhlebov, and Andrey Sakharov. This group quickly attracted additional leading academicians, scientists, literary figures, lawyers and other intellectuals, who believed their international eminence and legal knowledge would protect them from repression by the regime. The group adopted parliamentary procedures and rules of membership and became the "first independent association in the Soviet Union to receive membership in an

³ Literally "published over there", can refer to both material originating in USSR, sent to the West and then returned to the Soviet Union for distribution, or material originating in the West for distribution in the Soviet Union. There is also *radizdat*, unauthorized material disseminated by foreign radio broadcasts; *magnitizdat*, tape recordings of foreign broadcasts or internally produced material; and *samokina*, "self-produced" movies.

international organization" when in 1971 it became an affiliate of the International League of Human Rights, a consultive agency under the United Nations.⁴

What of the goals of the movement? In May 1970, the Initiative Group outlined its goals in an open letter subsequently published in the Chronicle of Current Events. It explained that although the group had "no program, no staff, and no organizational structure", it was united "by the conviction that the basis for any normal life of society lies in the recognition of the unconditional value of the individual". It went on to state that its "attempts to defend human rights spring from this belief. We understand social progress to mean, above all, an increase in freedom. We are also united in our desire to act openly and in the spirit of the law, whatever our personal attitude to particular laws."⁵ This insistence upon the universality of a concept stood in sharp contrast to the political culture of the Soviets, with its emphasis on the materialism of Marxist-Leninism. "Rights" conjures the specter of the absolute, the spiritual, the transcendent--all of which are denied by the regime's dialectic determinism. Respect for law as ultimate guarantor of human rights seems in such direct opposition to traditional Russian culture and Soviet political practice.

The goals of the Committee for Human Rights were less theoretical and more pragmatic than those of the Initiative Group. As stated in its founding statement, the Committee was to conduct "joint consultations with government organizations in the creation and application of human rights guarantees; [to study] the theoretical aspects of [the human rights] issue and its specific manifestations in Soviet society; [and to provide] legal education of the public, including the publication of international and Soviet documents on human

⁴ Ludmilla Alexeyeva, p. 294.

⁵ "Initsiativnaya gruppa po zashchite prav cheloveka v SSSR", Sbornik dokumentov (New York: Khronika Press, 1976), p. 21. Quoted in Ludmilla Alexeyeva, p. 292.

rights."⁶ This generous offer to join in a dialogue with the regime on human rights and assist the regime in defining and implementing laws and procedures to guarantee these rights was unfortunately (but predictably) not accepted by the Soviet authorities. To be sure, members of the group were provided the opportunity to study and comment on the conformity of the regime to the principles of civil rights in the criminal law system, but this opportunity was to take place as they became defendants in criminal law proceedings.

The next significant event in the growth of the human rights movement was the agreement by the Soviet Union to "Basket Three" of the so-called Helsinki accords. The full text of the Final Act of this international agreement, including the human rights provisions, were published in Soviet newspapers. On May 12, 1976, Yury Orlov announced the creation of the Moscow Helsinki Watch Group, an organization that would monitor and report on Soviet compliance with Basket Three. The group announced it would serve as a central clearing house for reports by Soviet citizens on noncompliance, compile appropriate documents, and educate the public on the humanitarian provisions of the Helsinki accords as well as other international agreements on human rights to which the Soviet Union was a signatory. The Moscow group called upon other countries to form similar groups, but the first new groups to be formed were in four of the non-Russian republics: the Ukraine, Lithuania, Georgia and Armenia.⁷ Shortly afterwards, groups appeared in Poland and Czechoslovakia, and then in the United States.

The significance of the Moscow Helsinki Watch Group and the other watch groups in the Soviet Union was their conscious efforts to integrate and coordinate the diverse dissidence throughout the USSR. Never before had such an attempt been made in the Soviet Union. What had previously been a

⁶ Ludmilla Alexeyeva, p. 293.

⁷ The Ukrainian Helsinki Group was formed 9 November 1976; the Lithuanian Helsinki Group, on 1 December 1976; the Georgian Helsinki Group, on 14 January 1977; and the Armenian Helsinki Group, on 1 April 1977.

phenomenon of isolated voices briefly crying out and then as quickly being silenced by the full force of the totalitarian regime, now began to take shape as an organized opposition movement. National and religious groups began to provide information to the watch groups and Chronicle of Current Events, which became an unofficial organ of dissemination for the Moscow group, began to carry regular sections on religious and national issues. Coordination among the watch groups both within the USSR and beyond its borders spread information to a wider audience than had previously been possible.

Naturally the authorities did not allow the groups *carte blanche* to espouse their condemnation of the regime's violations of the accords. No arrests, however, occurred for almost a year following the formation of the Moscow group. Persecution of such a group with such visibility in the West could undermine the substantial gains the Soviet Union obtained by the other provisions of the Helsinki procedures. Nevertheless, the threat of unification of the disparate elements of dissent ultimately forced the authorities to take action. In February 1977, Yuri Orlov, Mykola Rudenko, Aleksandr Ginzburg, and Aleksa Tykhy, all leaders or prominent members of the group, were arrested, and in March, so was Anatoly Shcharansky. The West protested, but in the view of many in the Moscow group, not forcefully enough.⁸

Like previous persecution efforts by the government, the arrests of the five focused public interest on the goals of the group and added more substance to the charges of the human rights dissidents. The evidence that the movement had deeper roots than the regime expected is that despite the continuous lopping off of the top leadership, the movement continued to grow with direction and purpose. The effect of the regime's campaign of repression in 1979-1980⁹, did, however, transform the movement. According to Ludmilla Alexeyeva, "dissent lost its liberal homogeneity and in all the movements spokespersons of

⁸ Ludmilla Alexeyeva, p. 344.

⁹ Further described below.

extreme points of view grew stronger".¹⁰ The movement returned to the underground and also returned to a pre-Helsinki level of protest.

One of the problems of the human rights movement was its restriction to intellectuals. The movement was never able to create a viable relationship with workers as did the intellectuals and workers in Poland in the early 1980s. Alexeyeva tries to explain this failure by means of ideological principles of the intellectual leadership: "The majority of Moscow activists were ill suited to effect this [union between intellectuals and workers]. Their pluralism and concept of free will did not allow them to propagandize their ideas; they were only disseminators".¹¹ Again this emphasizes that the human rights movement was less an organized opposition movement that sought to transform Soviet society into a democratic state, than it was a mechanism for the dissemination of ideas counter to communist orthodoxy. What may be taking place since the imprisonment of the original leaders of the movement is a shift to a more politically oriented agenda to achieve human rights in the USSR.

B. SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC MOVEMENTS

A final dissident grouping that bears some mentioning is social and economic dissent. This type of dissent, which has received so much attention in the West through its manifestations in Eastern Europe and especially Poland, is much less prevalent in the Soviet Union than the other forms of dissent. This is ironic since the factors that has encouraged its growth in Eastern Europe are much more intense in the USSR than in the Soviet satellites.

It is not as if workers as a socio-economic class are not involved in dissent. Dissidence in the Soviet Union is scarcely the sole pursuit of the intelligentsia, in fact, only the human rights movement in its initial stages was primarily a phenomenon of the intellectuals. Since 1976, even the human rights movement

¹⁰ Ludmilla Alexeyeva, p. 369.

¹¹ Ludmilla Alexeyeva, p. 352

expanded its participation so that "more than 40 percent of those sentenced for human rights activities were workers".¹² In the national and religious dissent movements, workers have always comprised a large proportion of the membership often even a majority.¹³

The first public group to advocate social and economic reforms in the Soviet Union was the Free Trade Union, which was founded in February 1978.¹⁴ The group stated in an open letter printed in the Chronicle of Current Events that it represented "the vast army of the Soviet unemployed, thrown out of the gates of factories for demanding the right to complain, the right to criticise, the right to free speech."¹⁵ Vladimir Klebanov, the founder of the group, claimed to be neither a dissident nor to be associated with the human rights movement; his goal was rather "to help in the successful construction of communism and to combat bureaucracy and red tape".¹⁶ Klebanov's disclaimer was not accepted by the KGB, however, who confined him to a mental hospital and later prison.

Other groups sprang up in the late 1970s, among which were the Independent Trade Union of Workers in the USSR; the Working Group for the Defense of Labor and Socioeconomic Rights in the USSR; and the Free Interprofessional Association of Workers. The latter, known as SMOT, had the most impact. Its goal was to give its members legal, moral and financial help through the organization of "cooperatives" such as mutual aid funds, house-hunting groups, childcare, barter groups, and the publication of an informational bulletin.¹⁷ Only the last mechanism, the informational bulletin, survived

¹² Ludmilla Alexeyeva, p. 401.

¹³ See Ludmilla Alexeyeva, "Quantitative and Qualitative Characteristics of Soviet Dissent", Russia, (New York: Foundation for Soviet Studies, 1983), no. 718, pp. 114-35.

¹⁴ Ludmilla Alexeyeva, Soviet Dissent, p. 406.

¹⁵ Chronicle of Current Events, no. 48, pp. 164-165.

¹⁶ Gleb Vysotin and Sereda Valentin, "Independent Trade Unions", Chronicle of Current Events, no. 39, p. 28.

¹⁷ Ludmilla Alexeyeva, Soviet Dissent, p. 409.

repression. The movement never achieved the degree of organization of the other categories of dissent, but the emergence of such groups indicates the underlying interest within the working class.

VIII. THE REGIME'S RESPONSE

In England, everything that is not prohibited is permitted.

In Germany, everything that is not permitted is prohibited.

In France, everything that is prohibited is permitted.

In the Soviet Union, everything that is permitted is prohibited.

Russian joke

A. REASONS

Considering the great diversity of dissident issues and the lack of organization, coordination, and communication among the various groups, one might wonder at the concern of the regime about this relatively small proportion of the Soviet population actively involved in dissent activity. There are, however, some compelling reasons for the persistent and intense campaign of the regime against dissidence. First, dissidence "violates the regime's monopoly over the 'word'." ¹ The communist system, by its very nature, must remain intolerant of ideological challenges in order to maintain control. There can be but one interpretation of reality. This requirement compels a complete control over information. The dissident movements challenge this hegemony over information by disseminating alternative views of reality. And this challenge takes place not only within the borders of the Soviet Union, but increasingly beyond them through contacts between dissident groups and supporters in the West.

A second reason for repression is the Soviet leadership's fear that both the precedent and content of what is now primarily an elite-based dissent will spillover into the blue-collar working population. ² Dissent is seen as having the

¹ Robert Sharlet, "Growing Soviet Dissidence", p. 97.

² Robert Sharlet, "Growing Soviet Dissidence", p. 97.

potential of acting as a catalyst to unify the widespread sociological, economic, and political resentment in the Soviet Union and incite the masses. This danger is all the more real following the Polish crisis of 1980-81. The linkage in Poland between intellectual dissidents and the working people resulted in a situation that had to be contained by the imposition of martial law. Soviet leaders hope to preclude such an eventuality in the USSR by eliminating at least one of the two components, the intellectual dissidents.

Finally, the regime continues to attempt to eliminate dissent because its resiliency and longevity has taken on "the appearance, if not the actuality of an organized opposition in a one-party authoritarian system." Especially since 1975 and the emergence of the "Helsinki Watch Groups", the dissident movements have sought to increase cooperation and integration. The watch groups have consistently called attention to the regime's noncompliance with its own laws as well as with international treaties and law. There is some indication that these groups have acted as "independent ombudsmen" within Soviet society, in that they have received complaints and grievances from a broad spectrum of Soviet citizens.³

B. MECHANISMS

The regime attempts to deal with dissent by a variety of active and passive means. In order to avoid the danger of "mirror-imaging", it is first necessary to view the phenomenon of dissent and the regime's counter-dissent efforts within the particular political and social culture of the Soviet Union. The culture that we recognize today as that of the USSR is a synthesis of traditional Russian culture, Marxist-Leninist philosophy, and the experiences of the Soviet state. For our purposes it will be sufficient to speak about three manifestations of this culture: community, authority, and nationalism. The first manifestation, that of community, implies that within the Soviet state the notion of communal values

³ Robert Sharlet, "Growing Soviet Dissidence", p. 97.

takes precedence over individual values. This is reflected in Soviet law and practice which continually define such civil rights as speech, press, association and demonstration in relation to their "conformity with the working people's interests" and which exist "for the purpose of strengthening the socialist system".⁴ Individual rights in the Soviet Union are always defined in relationship to responsibilities to the community. An example of this is Article 130 of the Soviet Constitution, which states, "the exercise of rights and liberties is inseparable from the performance by citizens of their duties."⁵

One major effect of this preeminence of community is the general attitude of the Soviet masses toward dissidents, an attitude which is ambivalent at best. Dissidents are often viewed as antisocial, under the malign influence of foreigners, or mentally ill.⁶ This characterization is of course fostered by Soviet propaganda. For example, E. G. Filimonov characterizes religious dissidents as "an insignificant minority of all believers. Among them are a good many people with shady pasts, adventurers who are dissatisfied with the Soviet way of life and Soviet laws, who may be in a protracted conflict with the Soviet authorities and who often hide their true antisocial visages behind the mask of religion".⁷

A related cultural distinctive is the characteristic of subservience to authority. The Soviet people have no political tradition of democracy or participation by the masses in the political process. This again works against the dissidents, who cannot appeal to domestic tradition but rather are forced to appeal to the experiences of foreign nations. Despite the fact that democratic processes are guaranteed by the letter of the Soviet law, the appeal to this

⁴ Articles 50-51 of the Soviet Constitution. Quoted in Robert Sharlet, "The New Soviet Constitution", Problems of Communism 26 (September-October 1977): 9.

⁵ Robert Sharlet, "The New Soviet Constitution", p. 9,10.

⁶ Peter Reddaway, "Dissent in the Soviet Union", p. 14.

⁷ E. G. Filimonov, p. 3.

letter carries little weight within the borders of the Soviet Union.⁸ The effect of this subservience is a lack of restraint upon the leaders to employ violence and terror against dissidents, which is in fact what is done. The police control mechanisms, which are exerted throughout the Soviet society, remain overwhelmingly strong despite the end of the Stalinist era.

A third and final phenomenon within the Soviet culture is what might be termed "Russian chauvinism". Chauvinism is a characteristic that, to a greater or lesser extent, is prevalent within all countries. However, because of the authoritarian nature of the Soviet system and the predominant role of the Russians within this system, chauvinism is especially troublesome for the spread of dissidence in the USSR. The Russian population often perceives the dissident's assault upon a specific issue to be an assault upon the society itself. For the most part, the Russians (as well as many of the other Soviet peoples) are proud of their emergence as a world power. They are proud of their scientific achievements and satisfied with the apparent improvement in their general economic well-being. The criticism by non-Orthodox religious groups or by the non-Russian national dissidents is often viewed as an attack by the non-Russian minorities upon the Russian culture itself. This results in a polarization between dissidents and the masses, which limits the effect that dissidence has upon the political structure.

In addition to these somewhat passive limitations upon dissidence that result from the political and social culture, the regime takes a variety of active measures to restrain the spread and eliminate the loci of dissidence. These measures can be divided into judicial and nonjudicial. Arrest and imprisonment of dissidents is the prime means of judicial action against dissidents and is a normal occurrence in Soviet society. Peter Reddaway claims that in 1980, for example,

⁸ It does, however, carry weight beyond these borders, and is a frequently used tactic which is discussed later in this paper.

arrests of dissidents averaged five to ten per week.⁹ While it is true that the rate of arrests varies depending on the climate of repression (as will be seen below), dissidents, or what would be termed "political prisoners" in the West, make up a not insignificant number of those incarcerated at the present time. Of the estimated three million or so prisoners in the USSR in 1979, at least ten thousand were incarcerated specifically for political crimes.¹⁰

The whole phenomenon of prisons and prisoners in the Soviet Union bears some examination, as the small percentage of those charged with political crimes may be misleading. Yuri Orlov, a prominent Soviet dissident, points out, the sheer number of prisoners and forced laborers in the Soviet Union--about two percent of the total population--demonstrates the failures of the economic, social and political features of the socialist system. He asserts that "if the regular army of the unemployed is the characteristic evil of the capitalist system, then by the same token, the regular, and similarly large, army of those engaged in forced labor is the characteristic evil of 'applied socialism'".¹¹ He further points out that the absence of diversionary activities, the lack of opportunity to strive for a higher standard of living, the economic and social disparities, the loss of faith in moral principles among youth--in short, all of the aspects that we examined earlier as factors of social instability--are the root causes of such high numbers of prisoners. Specifically-identified dissident prisoners only reflect that element of the general population that has articulated the various social and political failures of the system. The breakdown by

⁹ Peter Reddaway, The Times (London), May 7, 1980. Quoted in Robert Sharlet, "Growing Soviet Dissidence", p. 96.

¹⁰ Reliable figures of both prisoners in general and dissidents in prison are hard to come by. I have used the figures provided by Yurii Orlov, a prominent dissident who, along with others, prepared a documentation of the Soviet prison system that appeared as *samizdat* smuggled out of prison and eventually published in English as "On Prisoners in Soviet Camps", in Survey 24 (Spring 1979): 67-91.

¹¹ Yurii Orlov, "On Prisoners in Soviet Camps", p. 68.

nationalities would tend to reinforce this interpretation. In the Mordovian and Ural labor camps from which Orlov and his collaborators gleaned their data, 30-40 percent of the population of the camps were Ukrainian, 30 percent were from the Baltic areas, and less than 30 percent were Russians or other nationalities.¹²

The purpose of the labor camps and prisons is neither punitive nor rehabilitative, at least in the Western sense. The purpose is rather "the destruction of the personality",¹³ i.e., the reintegration of what are perceived by the authorities as cultural deviants back into the prevalent cultural imperative of community. As Valeri Marchenko puts it, "the relationship between the administration and the prisoners is based on a single goal-- 'the re-education and correction of the convicts'. This means getting them to renounce their beliefs." He goes on to say that this goal is served by "exhausting work, an inadequate low-calorie diet, a string of punishments doled out for the slightest offence and the strictest isolation from the outside world"¹⁴ Yuri Galanskov and Alexander Ginzburg use even stronger language to stress the same point:

Russia is still criss-crossed by a network of camps where-- despite all the international conventions signed by the Soviet government--forced labor and cruel exploitation are the norm, where people are systematically kept hungry and constantly humiliated, where their human dignity is debased. Through these camps passes an uninterrupted human flow, millions strong, which gives back to society physically and morally crippled people. This is the result of a deliberate penal policy, worked out by experts and presented by them in special handbooks with a cynicism worthy of the concentration-camp experts of the Third Reich.¹⁵

But this violation of Western concepts of law and civil rights is not just limited to the treatment of dissidents while in prison. The gross violations of

¹² Yurii Orlov, p. 70.

¹³ Yurii Orlov, p. 70.

¹⁴ Yurii Orlov, p. 75.

¹⁵ Quoted in Peter Reddaway, ed., Uncensored Russia, p. 203.

safeguards to protect the individual against indiscriminate and arbitrary actions by the state take place throughout the entire judicial process. Despite the fact that the Soviet Constitution provides for these safeguards, "the dissident defendant routinely finds his due process rights violated both in the preliminary investigation and during the subsequent trial. In fact, the constitutional due process clauses in [the Soviet Constitution] are frequently inverted to the disadvantage of the dissenter." For example, instead of protecting the defendant against official capriciousness, the Procurator frequently is a part of it. The defendant's right to defense counsel is subject to KGB interference and frequently denied. Instead of receiving a fair and impartial trial, the result is almost always prearranged.¹⁶ As one wag has put it "in political cases 'socialist legality' breaks down into its constituent parts--socialism versus legality".¹⁷

Ironically, dissidents often employ a "legalist defense", that is they call attention to the violations of the letter of the Soviet law by the authorities during their trials. These dissident defendants will provide the judge and prosecutors a detailed account of the violations of their due process rights. While the "legalist defense" has not "won any cases for dissenters, . . . in using it, political defendants have succeeded repeatedly in indicting the regime and putting it 'on trial' in the court of Western public opinion."¹⁸ Accounts of trials and the counter-charges levelled by accused dissidents against the regime are frequently published in *samizdat* for distribution within the Soviet Union, but more importantly published abroad for Western audiences.¹⁹

¹⁶ Robert Sharlet, "The New Soviet Constitution", p. 12.

¹⁷ Harold J. Berman, "The Educational Role of Soviet Criminal Law and Civil Procedure", in Barry, et al., Contemporary Soviet Law, p. 14.

¹⁸ Robert Sharlet, "The New Soviet Constitution", p. 13.

¹⁹ See Peter Reddaway, ed., Uncensored Russia, for a collection of translated accounts of dissident trials that originally appeared in the *samizdat* journal: Chronicle of Current Events.

The regime also employs a variety of nonjudicial means to deal with dissidents, in fact the nonjudicial methods comprise the bulk of the government's effort. The primary means is that of "bureaucratic harassment". This harassment includes dismissal from a job, limitations on employment opportunities, evictions from residences and/or withdrawal of residence permits, forced internal or external exile and the like. Bureaucratic harassment frequently is the prelude to judicial action. For example, in the Soviet Union it is a crime to be unemployed; the crime is called "parasitism" and is often charged against dissidents who have been fired or forced off a job and are unable to find other employment.

In the late 1970s the use of psychiatric terror to deal with dissidents gained widespread exposure in the Western press.²⁰ An engineer who criticised the unfair distribution of work bonuses was diagnosed as having "tendencies to litigation" and committed to a psychiatric hospital. A woman was diagnosed as "suffering from nervous exhaustion due to her search for justice". And Vasily Shipilov has been incarcerated in psychiatric hospitals since 1949 for participation in a religious seminar.²¹

Official "hooliganism" is yet another form of nonjudicial action against dissidents. As a means of intimidation and reprisal, police forces and parapolice forces employ a variety of techniques ranging from "anonymous letters, threatening phone calls, open beatings, crypto-muggings and occasionally, murder."²² Sergei Kourdakov, a Soviet seaman who jumped ship and sought asylum in the U. S. in 1971, claims he was in charge of an "anti-Christian attack

²⁰ See Sidney Bloch and Peter Reddaway, Psychiatric Terror (New York: Basic Books, 1977) and Harvey Fineside, Soviet Psychoprisons (New York: Norton, 1979).

²¹ Robert Sharlet, "Growing Soviet Dissidence", p. 99.

²² Robert Sharlet, "Growing Soviet Dissidence", p. 100.

squad" who routinely infiltrated underground church services and beat the participants.²³

C. CAMPAIGNS

Official reactions to the dissident movement, whether they are judicial or nonjudicial, are not applied at a constant level over time. There appear to be periods in the past twenty years when the degree and extent of repression has varied. Three especially severe campaigns have been identified in recent times: in 1972, in 1976-77, and again in 1979-80.

The 1972 campaign was a wave of arrests targetted at human rights dissidents and Ukrainian nationalists. The purpose of this campaign may have been to "convey the message that the incipient détente with the West, and the forthcoming visit to the USSR of President Richard Nixon, did not portend any relaxation of political or ideological controls."²⁴ Key human rights activists were arrested and tried both before and after President Nixon's visit in May 1972, among which were Vladimir Bukovsky on 5 January and Viktor Krasin and Peter Yakir on 21 June. The latter's trial elicited strong public support from a variety of activists, but significantly also from Andrey Sakharov and Alexandr Solzhenitsyn, something the authorities had evidently not expected. Consequently, Western interest in the proceedings was aroused to an unprecedented level. Apparently the realities of détente overcame the need for a crackdown on dissent and the campaign against the dissidents gradually tapered off. During the two years of 1974 and 1975, human rights advocates and other dissidents enjoyed a respite from severe repression and managed to regain some of the lost ground of 1972-1973.²⁵

²³ See Sergei Kourdakov, The Persecutor (Old Tappan, NJ: Fleming H. Revell, 1973).

²⁴ Peter Reddaway, "Dissent in the Soviet Union", p. 7.

²⁵ Peter Reddaway, "Dissent in the Soviet Union", p. 7.

The second campaign began in 1976, a year after the Soviet Union signed the "Final Act" of the 35-nation European Conference on Security and Cooperation held in Helsinki. The reason for this campaign was the emergence of the "Helsinki Watch Groups" and their ability to capture Western attention by their exposure of Soviet violations of "Basket Three". With the imminent arrival of follow-up meetings in June and October 1977 in Belgrade on the compliance of all signatories to the Helsinki accords, the Soviets recognized that they would have to silence these watch groups. According to a report allegedly obtained from a high-level party meeting and subsequently published in Chronicle of Current Affairs, Soviet authorities decided to "imprison the fifty most active dissidents and deal severely with their associates." This was to be accomplished in order to "show strength and not pay attention to the West".²⁶ In February, Yuri Orlov and others were arrested (as discussed above). Predictably, world condemnation was immediate and intense. The pressure exerted by this condemnation was apparently effective as the Soviet leaders stopped the campaign after arresting only twenty of the "most active dissidents". The net effect was that almost all the Helsinki groups survived.²⁷

Robert Sharlet notes that there were two differences between the "Belgrade Campaign" of 1976-77 and the "Nixon Campaign" of 1972-73 in regards to the regime's response.²⁸ First, in the earlier campaign, the regime had refrained from acknowledging publicly that there was any dissidence in the USSR. In March 1977, Brezhnev not only acknowledged their existence but also promised to take firm action against them:

Our opponents would like to find forces of some sort opposed to socialism inside our countries. Since there are no such forces, because in socialist society there are no oppressed or exploited classes or opposed or exploited nationalities, some sort of

²⁶ Chronicle of Current Events No. 44 (1977), p. 185. Quoted in Peter Reddaway, "Dissent in the Soviet Union", p. 8.

²⁷ Peter Reddaway, "Dissent in the Soviet Union", p. 9.

²⁸ Robert Sharlet, "Dissent and Repression in the Soviet Union", p. 116.

substitute has been invented and an ostensible 'internal opposition' in socialist countries is being fabricated by means of false publicity. That is the reason for the organized clamor about the so-called 'dissidents' and why a worldwide hullabaloo is being raised about 'violations of human rights' in socialist countries.

It is a different matter when a few individuals, who have estranged themselves from our society, actively oppose the socialist system, embark on the road of anti-Soviet activity, violate the laws, and, finding no support inside the country, turn for support abroad. . . . Our people demand that such so-called public figures be treated as opponents of socialism, as persons acting against their own motherland, as accomplices, if not agents, of imperialism. Naturally, we take and will continue to take measures against them under Soviet law.²⁹

In the Belgrade campaign dissidents were charged on criminal counts as opposed to the earlier technique of political indictments. According to Sharlet, some of the Helsinki watch group members were tried on ordinary criminal charges based on planted or doctored evidence in order to de-politicize their activity and defame their characters to the Soviet public. On the other hand, especially with respect to Jewish emigration dissidents, the government sought to "over-politicize" their activities by implicating Jewish activists in alleged CIA activities or, as in the case of Anatoly Shcharansky, to actually accuse a Jewish dissident of CIA employment.³⁰

A third campaign of intense repression against dissidence was initiated in 1979. This era of repression, called the "Olympic Campaign", was precipitated by the upcoming Summer Olympic Games to be held in Moscow in 1980. The aim was to "intimidate, imprison, or force abroad as many as possible of the dissidents or malcontents who might spoil the image of a universally popular regime." The campaign began with a widespread and non-stop imprisonment of

²⁹ Speech at the 16th Congress of Trade Unions of the USSR, 21 March 1977. Translated in Leonid I. Brezhnev, Socialism, Democracy and Human Rights (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1980), pp. 151-152.

³⁰ Robert Sharlet, "Dissent and Repression in the Soviet Union", p. 116.

dissidents of all movements. Beginning in the autumn of 1979 the rate of arrest more than doubled and since then continued at a known rate of 200 dissidents a year at least until 1983. Key individuals, no matter what their status had been, were removed from the scene--the most illustrious example being Andrey Sakharov. Prison sentences for dissidents increased to an average of ten years, while those who were fortunate to avoid the labor camps or psychiatric wards experienced an increase in "official hooliganism", i.e., beatings and in some cases murders. Finally, emigration was practically halted.³¹

The difference in the regime's conduct of this campaign was that the one factor that had restrained and ultimately turned around the previous campaigns--world opinion and pressure from the West--was effectively neutralized by the Politburo decision to invade Afghanistan. The attention of the world was diverted from the domestic abuses of the regime toward this supreme violation of human rights. Just as the West recovered from the shock of Afghanistan, the events in Poland captured attention, and following that the KAL 007 incident. The West grew somewhat immune to the excesses of this state that continued seemingly without scruple to violate the most basic rights of individuals and sovereign states. The end of détente was seemingly the end of restraint upon the Soviet's war on internal deviance.

³¹ Peter Reddaway, "Dissent in the Soviet Union", p. 3.

IX. THE PROSPECTS

The currents of dissent . . . will not just fade away as ideology prescribes and the leadership often seems to expect. They derive from real injustices which the regime is not addressing. They express, by-and-large, the powerful emotions of responsible people. They are bound to make themselves felt in various ways until the injustices are taken seriously. In many cases they are also, of course, the seedbeds of future political opposition.

Peter Reddaway

A. CURRENT IMPACT

Having examined the goals of the various groups and the regime's attempts to manage the dissident phenomenon, what, if any, impact have the various dissident movements made on Soviet society, and what are the prospects for the future? In order to evaluate the impact it is necessary to reemphasize a point made earlier: the dissident phenomenon is only incidentally a political movement. Almost all of the various groups desire an accommodation of their respective needs *within* the existing socialist system (notable exceptions are Jewish, German and other emigration movements). Dissidence in the Soviet Union is above all a communication phenomenon. All of the respective groups have attempted a dialogue with the authorities to achieve their desired ends. It is in the evolution of this dialogue that the movement has made one of its more important contributions: drawing external pressure upon the regime.

Dissidents attempt to communicate to three audiences: the general population, the authorities, and foreigners. The general population includes all those citizens of the Soviet Union who are not directly connected with the dissenter's group. By appealing to the general population, the dissident hopes to gain sympathy for his cause and gain recruits to his movement. Historically

speaking, however, dissidents have had the least impact among this audience. This lack of impact can be explained by three factors: the parochialism of the dissent phenomenon, the lack of widespread communication mechanisms, and the constraints of Russian culture. All of these factors have been discussed previously. Suffice it to say that the general ineffectiveness of appeals to this audience has encouraged the movement to deemphasize it and concentrate efforts towards the other two audiences. While appeals to the general population will undoubtedly continue to a minor extent, as long as dissidence continues to be apolitical in method and parochial in manifestation, this pattern of deemphasis will be continued.

The second audience is the leadership of the regime. This audience has historically ignored appeals from dissidents "despite the explicit desire of almost all groups to be treated as partners in a dialogue, as loyal citizens critical only of particular policies".¹ Peter Reddaway points out three exceptions to this pattern, however. The first was the decision by the Politburo in 1971 to open up the restrictions on Jewish emigration and allow significant numbers of Jews to leave the USSR for Israel. The second concession to pressure was the regime's acceptance in 1973 of the appeal by Jewish dissidents for abolition of the heavy education tax on emigrants that had been imposed in 1972. Reddaway notes, however, that the regime's acceptance of the emigrés' demand was greatly influenced by pressure from the U.S. Congress. The third concession was made in 1967 when the Crimean Tatars were "exonerated from the charge of having committed mass treason during World War II" in response to their petitions and demonstrations.² But in comparison with the more important demand of the Tatars, return to their homeland, which was flatly denied, this concession pales in significance.

¹ Peter Reddaway, "Dissent in the Soviet Union, p. 3.

² Peter Reddaway, "Dissent in the Soviet Union, p. 2.

For reasons we have already examined, the regime is not particularly interested in offering dissidents or any other non-CPSU group a chance for significant participation in the political decision-making process. While participation at the local and regional levels by non-party elements occasionally occurs, participation in core policy issues by others than the Party elite is perceived by this elite as a loss of control. As Frederick Barghoorn explains, the Soviet leaders are "apparently afraid that if they do not hold the line against any and all challenges, as they see them, to such basic principles of 'Leninism' as the Communist Party's monopoly over policy formation and implementation . . . disintegration will set in".³ Dissidents have begun to realize this basic reality of Soviet political culture and direct their appeals to another audience. This realization came slowly and with great pain. As the Initiative Group for the Defense of Human Rights in the USSR concluded in their first appeal to the United Nations:

We appeal to the United Nations because we have received no reply to the protests and complaints which we have been sending for a number of years to the top political and legal bodies in the Soviet Union. The hope that our voice may be heard, that the authorities will stop the lawless acts which we have continually pointed out--this hope has expired.⁴

While appeals to governmental authorities are now viewed as generally ineffective in achieving significant changes in policy, they continue to be made as a means of reassuring the regime that demands are not political in nature but rather restricted to the resolution of particular unfair policies. This is perceived by the dissenters to serve an important function in and of itself, unfortunately, the regime has not always been reassured. In so far as providing

³ Frederick C. Barghoorn, "Regime-Dissenter Relations after Khrushchev: Some Observations", in Susan Gross Solomon, ed., Pluralism in the Soviet Union (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1983), p. 160.

⁴ quoted in Peter Reddaway, ed., Uncensored Russia, p. 150.

a serious possibility of achieving particular aims, dissident communication has thus evolved toward concentration upon the last audience--foreigners.

Appeals to foreigners have quite frequently made an impact on moderating regime policies if not resolving the specific interests involved. Again, according to Peter Reddaway, "most helpful of all have been nongovernmental bodies with professional, political, or religious concerns directly related to those of the Soviet group or individual".⁵ Obviously the primary beneficiaries of this are the members of the Jewish emigration movement, the Protestant dissenters, and the human rights activists, as previous examples have shown. But other dissidents have been helped by these appeals, if only indirectly. In the World Psychiatric Association, Soviet psychiatrists were accused for almost ten years of the use of psychiatric terror against dissidents. Data used in these accusations was provided by dissidents, especially the human rights activists. In 1983, the Soviet society of psychiatrists responded to this pressure and resigned from the international body to avoid expulsion.⁶

While appeals to non-governmental agencies have certainly been effective, appeals to Western governments should not be minimized. The interest by Western governments and direct responses to appeals by dissidents have in certain cases modified Soviet action. On 8 January 1977, several citizens were killed when an explosion occurred in the Moscow subway. Ordinarily catastrophes and disasters are not mentioned in the Soviet press, but in this instance the press and media coverage was extensive. Human rights dissidents were implicated by innuendo in the official reports and the police began rounding up known activists throughout Moscow. The Moscow Helsinki Group held a press conference with foreign correspondents at which it stated that dissidents "absolutely reject violence or calls for violence as a means to their goals."⁷

⁵ Peter Reddaway, "Dissent in the Soviet Union", pp. 3-4.

⁶ Peter Reddaway, "Dissent in the Soviet Union", p. 4.

⁷ Sbornik dokumentov obshchestvennoy gruppy sodeystviya, vol. 4, pp. 42-43. Quoted in Ludmilla Alexeyeva, Soviet Dissent, p. 343.

Andrey Sakharov wrote a letter in which he speculated about the KGB's role in the incident: "I cannot rid myself of the notion that the Moscow subway explosion and the tragic loss of life it caused are the latest and most dangerous in a series of provocations perpetuated in recent years by the organs of repression".⁸ The U.S. State Department "reacted with an expression of admiration for and full confidence in Sakharov".⁹ This was apparently enough for the regime which dropped any further reference to the event as being conducted by human rights or any other dissidents.

However, appeals to certain Western and/or international audiences have had absolutely no effect--often despite the seeming appropriateness of the audience. The United Nations is a prime example of a completely unresponsive body when faced with appeals by Soviet dissidents, and yet Soviet dissidents often make their appeals on the basis of United Nations' human rights agreements and the provisions of international treaties. The Initiative Group made five separate appeals to the United Nations between 1969 and 1972 to which the United Nations failed to even acknowledge much less respond. The third of these letters reminded U Thant, the Secretary-General of the UN at the time, that the "silence of an organization of international law unties the hands of those who will be inspired to further persecutions."¹⁰ The prediction proved to be accurate as eight of the fifteen leaders were arrested and the Initiative Group stopped sending letters to the West.

Some groups--despite their expressed and often impassioned desire--unfortunately receive almost no support from the West. This is especially pitiable since in attempting contact with the West leaders of these groups subject themselves to more severe repression. Groups such as the Crimean Tatars and the Muslim Meskhetians find little Western interest in their

⁸ Chronicle of Current Events, No. 44. Quoted in Ludmilla Alexeyeva, Soviet Dissent, p. 343.

⁹ Ludmilla Alexeyeva, Soviet Dissent, p. 343.

¹⁰ Ludmilla Alexeyeva, Soviet Dissent, pp. 291-292.

respective causes, or, in the case of the Russian nationalists, their goals are incompatible with Western political philosophy. Many of these ignored dissidents continue to make these futile appeals right up to moment of their arrest.

While communication mechanisms and the evolution of communication are the major impacts the dissent movements in general have achieved to date, there are some other current effects. The national movements have been instrumental in maintaining a sense of ethnic distinctiveness despite the long-standing attempts by the regime to mold a "New Soviet Man". Though cultural and linguistic Russification has been widespread, it has by no means eliminated national differences and the national dissidents must be afforded much of the credit for this.

The religious movements have maintained the connections of the various Soviet peoples with their historical religious roots. Despite the aggressive atheism of the regime, Christianity, Judaism and Islam continue to be viable religions in the Soviet Union, and particular groups within these three religions have indeed grown. George Colman has said that religion offers a "spiritual alternative for those who feel deeply the bankruptcy of the communist ideology".¹¹ This is undoubtedly true and is especially testified to by the situation of the Lithuanian Catholic movement which blends genuine religious feelings with nationalist desires. But as one with strong religious beliefs myself, I am reluctant to accept a purely psychological motivation for the appeal and growth of religion in the Soviet Union.

Closely allied with this maintenance of historical religious roots is the maintenance of universal ideas of political culture--for example, accountability of political leaders, the rule of law, and respect for human rights. Some would argue that these ideas are not universal, that they are in fact counter to the political culture of the Soviet Union and Russia before it, that they have

¹¹ George T. Colman Jr., p. 30.

somehow been imported from the West. Yet how to explain the prevalence of such ideas throughout the history of the Soviet Union, the use of such ideas and symbols even by the very political leaders who routinely violate the same concepts? On the rule of law and the conformity to universal standards, Leonid Brezhnev said in a speech to the World Congress of Peace Forces:

Soviet laws afford our citizens broad political freedoms. At the same time, they protect our system and the interests of the Soviet people from any attempts to abuse these freedoms. And this in full conformity with the International Covenants on Human Rights ratified by the Soviet Union, which say that the rights they enumerate 'shall not be subject to any restrictions except those which are provided by law, are necessary to protect national security, public order, public health or morals or the rights and freedoms of others . . .' We subscribed to this.¹²

Dissidents maintain these notions by reminding Soviet society and the regime of these concepts and attempting to persuade compliance with them.

All of the above factors of influence are well and good as restraints on domestic behavior and hold out the prospect for domestic change, but are there any practical effects of dissidence on Soviet behavior in the international sphere? George Colman argues that there are: dissidence restrains Soviet expansionism, and repression of dissidence is constrained by Soviet needs for Western resources.¹³ Unfortunately, the historical record is rather ambiguous. The Politburo's actions in the 1970s regarding emigration of Jews is especially illustrative of conflicting evidence. In 1972-1973, the Soviet Union began to open the gates to Jewish emigration, primarily in response to dissident pressures. As soon as these gates were ajar, a flood of prospective emigres pressed against them, a flood well in excess of that anticipated by the regime.

¹² Speech given at Kremlin, 26 October 1973. Translated in Leonid I. Brezhnev, p. 83.

¹³ George T. Colman Jr., pp. 31-32. His example of restraint on expansionism, as it was given in 1975, has been unfortunately overtaken by events; i.e., central Asian and Moslem nationalists being a restraint on historical Soviet and Russian desires for expansion toward Afghanistan, Iran and Iraq.

Exacerbating this were large numbers of Germans and Armenians that desired to be carried along in the Jewish wake. Congress, taking advantage of the situation launched the Jackson-Vanik amendment that linked emigration with one of the key prizes of détente: most-favored-nation status for the Soviet Union. The USSR did not respond favorably to this initiative. In January 1975, following passage of the amendment, Moscow broke off the 1972 trade agreement with the United States citing attempts by the U.S. to "interfere in the internal affairs" of the USSR, and cut back on emigration. Nevertheless, emigration was not reduced to its pre-1970 levels, and, after this moderate decline that lasted until 1976, increased steadily until 1979--the end of the era of détente.

B. SHORT-TERM OUTLOOK

Having examined the current effects of the dissent movements it is fair to ask about future prospects. I believe these can be divided into short-term and long-term predictions. In the short-term, I think one can conclude along with Peter Reddaway that the "Politburo is not--anyway as yet--especially alarmed by the dissenting groups and movements, because they have made little or no headway among the mass of ordinary people in the Russian heartland."¹⁴ Of course while this is true in the most general of terms, it is not true when considering the popular makeup of the particular groups. As we have seen, the national and religious dissidence movements are made up of "ordinary people" and thus have the potential for evolving into mass movements. This mass movement phenomenon has already occurred with the Lithuanian and Crimean Tatar movements. But most analysts and the majority of human rights dissidents continue to conclude that fundamental changes in the political, economic and social structure of regime will only be realizable as the various groups can minimize differences and unite efforts. This is not a short-term prospect.

¹⁴ Peter Reddaway, "Dissent in the Soviet Union", p.14

One might expect the dissenters in the short-term to develop a multiplicity of single-issue groups similar to Western special-interest groups. Already there has been the appearance of feminist *samizdat* journals and the emergence of groups with such revealing names as the Christian Committee for the Defense of the Rights of Religious Believers, the Working Commission against Psychiatric Abuses, the Initiative Group for the Defense of the Rights of Invalids, and Right to Emigrate. The appearance of such groups demonstrates on the one hand the fragmentation of the umbrella movements of the human rights activists, but on the other hand, the consolidation of other groups across national and/or religious lines. George Colman appears to be on the right track when he claims, "despite the lack, except in a few instances, of [coordination among dissident elements], they do appear to have some accumulative effect on Soviet society merely because their targets are essentially the same--the abuses of the oppressive regime and the hierarchy that dominates it".¹⁵ The short-term realization that the regime is either unable or unwilling to "provide for the multiplying needs of its citizens in a changing society," will force, in the words of Robert Sharlet, "unofficial groups [to] emerge to fill the vacuum and meet their needs."¹⁶

On the part of the regime, there would appear to be two fears regarding dissidence in the short-term. The first would be the development of underground groups that the KGB cannot easily monitor. Herein lies another dilemma: on the one hand a desire to repress dissent to preclude its ideas being transferred to the general population, and on the other hand a desire to keep dissent out in the open in order to monitor and control it. Some analysts have even gone so far as to argue that the toleration of a certain level of public dissent has a positive use as a "safety-valve for pent-up emotions", a source of information about grievances, and as evidence for external audiences of the end

¹⁵ George T. Colman Jr., p. 30.

¹⁶ Robert Sharlet, "Growing Soviet Dissidence", p. 100.

of Stalin-like terror.¹⁷ A second short-term fear for the regime would be a shift by dissidents to the use of violence as a mechanism of change. Acts of violence have hitherto been rare, yet "Russian traditions of the 19th century, the contagious violence of the modern world, and the extreme rigidity of the Soviet system" all forebode the possibility of a change in dissident technique, especially if communication fails to achieve substantive results.¹⁸

C. LONG-TERM OUTLOOK

I have already alluded to the prime factor required for dissent to achieve any fundamental changes in the Soviet system: consolidation of the various groups into an organized political opposition. This is of course the great dilemma of the movement for it is precisely this that the regime is attempting to prevent through its pattern of repression. On the part of the dissidents, the key to achieving any consolidation would be to overcome the traditional worker-intelligentsia gap, as has occurred in Poland. George Colman offers a strategy to achieve this goal:

What would seem essential is for the intelligentsia to break cleanly with their messianic tradition and emphasis, to take advantage of the workers' distrust of technology as an enslaver rather than the road to happiness, to reflect mass anxieties in their protests, and above all, to find further common ground with the aspirations of the non-Russian nationalities and the religious believers in order to exploit their intrinsic involvement with, and inbred attachment to, the worker/peasant masses.¹⁹

While consolidation of the various movements is one possible long-term development, another possible course is continued fragmentation among the three broad categories. If this is the direction of the movements, it is fair to examine how each might develop separately. In relation to one another, national groups have the widest base of popular support, religious groups the second,

¹⁷ Peter Reddaway, "Dissent in the Soviet Union", pp. 6-7.

¹⁸ Peter Reddaway, "Dissent in the Soviet Union", p.15.

¹⁹ George T. Colman Jr., p. 52.

and political a distant third. The strength of nationalist groups can only be enhanced in the long-term by the demographics of the USSR; i.e., the growth of the non-Russian ethnic groups and the relative decline of the Russian population. This "time bomb" of the nationalities has been well described by V. Stanley Vardys:

Despite the assimilationist gains the Russians are still making among the Slav and non-Slav groups, Soviet nationalities are bound to become more involved in the country's development and gain more influence in determining the direction of its life both positively and negatively. Non-Russian nationalities played a crucial role in the success of the Bolshevik revolution in 1917-20, and while history does not necessarily repeat itself, forces that moved Russia's social development in the past have not disappeared; on the contrary they are gaining in strength.²⁰

Under the current situations, the strength of national dissent has depended in many cases on the degree of integration with religious dissident movements. This is especially notable in Lithuania, where the integration has almost achieved "Polish" levels, and where national dissent is, therefore, "endemic and ineradicable".²¹ It is potentially true in the Ukraine as well. But in the Ukraine, the Soviet authorities have taken steps to insure that such an integration does not happen. The Uniate Catholic Church, which historically has been the dominant church in the western Ukraine,²² was outlawed in the mid-1940s primarily to preclude this integration. The church continued to exist "in the catacombs", and in 1982 the Initiative Group for the Defense of Religious Believer's Rights and the Church emerged, having as its express purpose legalization of the church. Its chairman, Iosif Terelya, was immediately arrested. In both western and eastern Ukraine, national dissidence has been forced underground since 1983, but nationalism remains a powerful force in this second largest Republic of the USSR.

²⁰ V. Stanley Vardys, p. 49.

²¹ Peter Reddaway, "Dissent in the Soviet Union", p.11.

²² The church had fourteen million followers at the end of World War II.

Prospects for the growth of religious dissent over the long-term are good due to "its intensity, its appeal to ordinary people and its potential for taking on a mass character."²³ Although religion was just spoken of in terms of nationalistic relationships, the essence of religion is its ability to transcend national lines and appeal to the entire Soviet population. Increasingly Soviet believers are recognizing that the demands of their faiths are wholistic demands and cannot be satisfied by being restricted to the occasional practice of a religious ritual. This recognition necessarily brings the Soviet believer into direct conflict with his state. As has been shown, many traditional Islamic religious practices have not been appreciably curtailed despite the government's attempts at reeducation and even show evidence of growth.

The Christian groups, according to Peter Reddaway, continue to be divided into two categories: the Russian Orthodox and the other denominations, e.g., Baptist, Catholics, Adventists and Pentecostals. The brunt of the regime's persecution in recent years has been borne by the non-Orthodox denominations. This may be because, as we have already examined, the regime has attempted to develop a less tense relationship with Orthodoxy in order to "harness Russian nationalism more decisively to Marxism-Leninism, and also to try to use the Church's influence to combat the erosion of moral values in society".²⁴

As we have seen, dissidents within Orthodoxy have been few in recent years. Notable exceptions have been Fathers Eshliman, Yakunin and Dudko and the dissident group, the Christian Seminar. The priests linked Orthodoxy with the human rights movement in contrast to the Christian Seminar, which desired to merge Orthodoxy with Russian nationalism and anti-communism in the vein of Solzhenitsyn. There is currently little evidence that either of these two strands of dissent are still present in any great force within Orthodoxy. Therefore, while it would be tempting to argue that Orthodoxy and Russian nationalism are

²³ Robert Sharlet, "Dissent and Repression in the Soviet Union", p. 114.

²⁴ Peter Reddaway, "Dissent in the Soviet Union", p.11.

the key to unleashing evolutionary change within the system, the proof at the present time is insufficient.

Prospects for the non-Orthodox religions are better. Rather than submit to an accommodation, *most* have a long history of resistance and underground existence. They have a strong social base in the working classes and offer an attractive alternative to rampant ideological disillusionment amongst these classes. This identification and provision can only increase, considering the sociological factors of instability discussed in the first chapter. In addition to the domestic support base of these religions there is also the very powerful assistance of foreigners. Non-Orthodox religious denominations receive extensive moral and material support from abroad. The combination of strong domestic and international ties make these groups potentially very dangerous to the stability of the existing regime.

Religious pressures, while seldom being the sole cause of political change, are frequently a major contributing element in social and political instability. This is especially notable in those cases in which religious and national differences are combined; e.g., Croats in Yugoslavia, Basques in Spain, Armenians in Turkey, Kurds in Iraq, and Muslims in the Philippines. What must be extremely troublesome to Moscow is the recent example in Iran, where Islamic fundamentalism was able to galvanize opposition to an extremely authoritarian regime, and--despite the extensive mechanisms of control enjoyed by that regime--overthrow it. The potential power of religious groups, especially in light of events in Iran and Lebanon, may partially explain the Politburo's continued repressive campaigns against the Baptists, Pentecostals, Sufi brotherhoods and others.

Long-term prospects for the third category, political dissent, and especially the human rights movement, are not as favorable as with national and religious dissent. As Peter Reddaway says, "The democratic movement . . . has been virtually destroyed. Surviving remnants have fallen silent, emigrated, or been

driven underground, from where they still circulate individual or group writings on an anonymous or pseudonymous basis."²⁵ Nevertheless, the primary contribution of the movement has always been communication. This function continues and the mechanisms of *samizdat* are still in place and functioning. The regime, despite its continuous efforts has been unsuccessful in eliminating the mechanisms. Thus, for both the short and long-term, communication mechanisms should continue to provide all categories of dissent contact with the three audiences that can effect needed changes.

What of the prospects for fundamental changes in the political structure of the Soviet Union? I believe these are inevitable; the factors of instability outlined in the chapter four show no sign of responding to policy initiatives by the existing regime. In fact, on the few occasions the regime even admits their existence, ideological rhetoric is applied rather than any concrete or physical remedies.²⁶ This institutional cognitive dissonance is not surprising considering that the contradictions imposed by these factors of instability threaten the very linchpin of regime legitimacy--the ideological framework upon which the regime resides.

Assuming change is inevitable, it remains to ask by what means this change will occur. Will it be through an evolutionary process or through the forces of revolution? Will the change be the result of a recognition by the regime elites that change is needed or a result of pressures from the population at large? Will the process require some precipitating crisis, either domestic, international, or a combination of both? Would revolution, if it were the mechanism of change, follow the "Western" or "Eastern" pattern, i.e., a collapse of the political institutions of the regime followed by the mobilization of new groups and creation of new institutions, or the mobilization of new groups and creation of

²⁵ Peter Reddaway, "Dissent in the Soviet Union", p. 13.

²⁶ For example, on the national self-determination issue, see the opening quote for chapter five.

shadow political institutions followed by an overthrow of the existing regime?²⁷ All these choices have their own advocates and convincing proofs; however, it is beyond the scope of this study to explore the myriad of options to effect the ultimate demise of the Soviet empire. Thus, I intend to sidestep this debate and outline what I believe would be the role of dissent in the most likely scenario--a revolution from below.

In choosing the option of revolution from below, I do not want to imply that this is the option that Soviet dissidents themselves have in the past favored. When dissidents have discussed the matter--which, as we have seen, is a rare event--it has usually been done in the context of an evolutionary process with the impetus for change resting with the political elites. This was the thrust of the leadership-directed communication campaigns used by almost all the dissident groups during the 1960s and 1970s. The goal of these campaigns was to convince the political elites of the reasonableness and necessity of initiating structural changes. My selection of the revolution from below as the most likely scenario of change is based on the categorical failure of these appeals to political elites over the past twenty or so years.

Samuel Huntington provides two basic prerequisites for revolution in any society: (1) the existence of political institutions that are incapable of providing participation channels for new social forces, and (2) the desire by these social forces to participate in the political process.²⁸ Both of these conditions are met in the Soviet Union; the political elites do not offer the general population opportunities for participation in the political process, and, increasingly, segments of this population are demanding this participation. While these are

²⁷ See Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), pp. 264-343, for a more thorough explanation of these two models of revolution.

²⁸ Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, p. 274.

the two basic prerequisites, they are by no means sufficient in and of themselves to effect a revolution.

The additional factors that are necessary to effect a revolution depend on the particular revolutionary model adopted; i.e., the "Western" model or the "Eastern" model. Huntington's Eastern model (the mobilization of new groups and creation of shadow political institutions followed by an overthrow of the existing regime) appears to be inappropriate for the Soviet situation. The Soviet regime has proven itself quite adept at controlling organized armed opposition, as the Lithuanian experience of the 1940s and 1950s demonstrated. It is unlikely in the foreseeable future that the regime will not be able to contain any such obvious threat to its power.

On the other hand, the application of Huntington's Western model of revolution to the Soviet system seems not only possible, but entirely likely. Huntington describes the necessary prerevolutionary conditions leading to the collapse of a government as:

1. a "highly traditional regime" headed by an absolute monarch or by a land-owning aristocracy
2. a crisis, such as "severe financial straits"
3. a failure to assimilate the intelligentsia and other urban elites
4. a loss of "moral self-confidence" and the "will to rule" by the political elites²⁹

The first three conditions, seemingly, already exist within the Soviet Union and should continue to exist. What would appear to be lacking is the loss of a "will to rule" on the part of the Party elite. Such a loss is not likely in the short-term, as the political socialization process for the CPSU appears to be quite effective. Perhaps the numbing effect of Marxist-Leninist ideology and its apparent desensitization of youth and scientists spoken of earlier may eventually spillover into the political elite. This spillover might then deemphasize

²⁹ Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, p. 273.

the messianic nature of the regime and decrease its reliance on ideology. However, as the latest Party program and Gorbachov's speech to the Party Congress show, the political elites obviously still realize the necessity for maintaining the communist mythology as the basis for their legitimacy and stability. Therefore, it is difficult to foresee about how this loss of a "will to rule" will eventually work itself out.

Of course, it is not as if this is all so much speculation and wishful thinking; there is the experience of the Russian revolution. It was precisely Huntington's Western model of revolution that was played out in 1917. Nicholas II was no less an ideologue than the current Soviet leaders. He, like they, concentrated political power in a small group, refused participation to emerging social groups, and was faced by repeated economic crises. The difference between the Tzar's situation and that faced by the present regime, was the external crisis of the war. It is important to remember that the collapse of the Tzar was not brought about by the Bolsheviks or any other organized opposition. Rather, these groups emerged in force in the aftermath of the collapse. This is not to minimize the role of dissidence and opposition prior to 1917--it was indeed present and a constant irritation to the Romanov regime--but, it was not the cause of the regime's collapse.

Thus, the implication for modern Soviet dissidence in the process of revolutionary change in the USSR is to act as an irritatating factor of instability in the short-term, but more importantly, to address itself to political organization of the country in the aftermath of an eventual and inevitable political collapse. This is the lesson to be learned from the Polish experience of 1980-1981. The workers, intellectuals and Church were instrumental in encouraging the economic crisis to occur, were effective in exploiting the crisis as it occurred, but were unable to adopt an effective political agenda as the crisis developed. This was also Alexander Kerensky's experience in 1917, and proved to be the difference between the large number of "dissidents" who

eventually lost and the small group of revolutionaries who eventually won in the aftermath of the Tzar's collapse.

X. CONCLUSIONS

The time has come for the party to look people in the eye and revise its ways. If, however, all our methods of struggle give no positive result, then time will present the task of creating a new party, which, after a prolonged ideological struggle, will lead a socialist society to the triumph of Reason, Justice and Humanism, and enable Intellectual Freedom to flourish in our country . . .

Russia is waiting for new people.

Grennady Gavrilov

I have tried to show in this study that support of international rights in general and the Soviet dissidence movement in specific is in the national interest of the United States. I have argued that American leaders are obliged by moral, legal and strategic considerations to support Soviet dissent through U.S. declaratory foreign policies, and where possible, through operational policies. Such support has been shown to be consistent with American diplomatic history and tradition.

I have examined the Soviet dissidence phenomenon in detail and discovered that it is far from a homogeneous movement; that the term dissent is an umbrella for the multitude of individuals and groups that perceive themselves as aliens within a hostile social system lacking legitimate mechanisms to influence the situation. I have noted that dissidence lacks organization, institutions for recruitment and coordination, and above all a political agenda. But I have tried to stress that the movement is far from powerless; its power, however, cannot be defined in terms of political structures but rather in the embodiment and perpetuation of ideologies that run counter to the monolithic ideology of the socialist regime.

This desire to maintain a differing world view is perceived as a threat to the regime and thus an impetus for repression. I have examined the mechanisms employed by the Soviet state to conduct this repression and its effectiveness in dealing with dissent. We have seen that these mechanisms are effective in limiting the organization of the various groups and coordination among themselves but ineffective in ultimately eliminating dissent as a factor of regime instability. In fact, I have examined the dialectic relationship between repression and dissent and concluded that repression plays a key role in perpetuating the very phenomenon it attempts to eliminate.

Finally, I examined the future of dissent in the USSR and concluded that national and religious dissent have the most likely chances of eventually achieving their goals. This conclusion was reached due to their potential mass appeal and the intensity of their adherents. As far as changing the nature of the Soviet system itself, in the foreseeable future dissent will continue to offer only a mechanism for articulating and maintaining ideologies counter to that of the regime. The ability to effect fundamental changes to the political structure of the Soviet Union will thus be quite limited until such time as dissidents adopt a more forceful political agenda. While it remains possible that the articulation of counter-ideologies may have a positive effect on the political elites--thus resulting in an eventual revolution from above--I find this prospect unlikely. The more likely scenario would appear to be a revolution from below, precipitated by the convergence of the aforementioned factors of instability within a context of domestic or international crisis.

As Ludmilla Alexeyeva notes, the predictions of George Orwell's 1984 have been neither completely fulfilled nor completely refuted as regards the nature of the Soviet system or the nature of dissent. The regime has not progressed to the stage of Big Brother's thought control, in fact it has regressed; the height of repression and terror being the Stalin years. The dissidents have awakened many in the Soviet Union to the dangers of "double-think", but by no means a

majority. On their own part, the dissidents are submerged, but not destroyed, and *samizdat* has become the reality of Orwell's fictional "Book".

It is somewhat dangerous to appear more optimistic than the dissidents within the country, for it is they who must daily fight the battle. Nevertheless, history repeatedly demonstrates the power of ideas to shape events and political institutions. To be optimistic about the future of dissent in the Soviet Union one need only examine the role of other dissenters in other times. Men and women who challenged the existing ideas and institutions of their day and by doing so brought about fundamental changes in their worlds--men like Luther, Locke, Rousseau, and Marx. Or perhaps the greatest example in history: the ideas of one itinerant philosopher, who never ventured further than thirty or so miles from his hometown. Who took on the ideas and values of the most authoritarian and expansive empire in Western history and in so doing changed the course of Western history. Whose ideas continue to revolutionize and liberalize the world nearly two thousand years later--even, I dare say, the world of the Soviet Union.

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