


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OPERATIONAL FUNCTIONS OF U.S. ARMY CONTINGENCY HEADQUARTERS--
DO THEY MEET THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE OPERATIONAL LEVEL OF WAR?

by

Lieutenant Colonel Archibald Galloway
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(1) Higher Headquarters define the aim for the entire operational side of the war and determine the series of actions intended to achieve it.

(2) Operational Headquarters develop an operational process emersed in "education and thinking." Performance measurement of this process is achieved by analyzing the operational functions of responsiveness, effectiveness, and efficiency within the headquarters.

(3) In order to align themselves with current doctrine and the battlefield, higher headquarters should press for the development of echelon above corps doctrine, significant changes in headquarters resourcing, and the elimination of the requirement to dual-hat commanders between logistical and operational functions.

The ultimate purpose of the operational level headquarters is to efficiently, effectively, and responsively structure the operational level of war so that engegements, battles, and campaigns achieve strategic significance. This study supports the proposition that contemporary headquarters must therefore be purposefully structured to produce victory. As a result, the U.S. Army's primary contingency corps (XVIII Airborne Corps) and contingency Army (Third U.S. Army) are due reassessment in light of the present demands for victory established by the rapid, frequent changes of the contemporary battlefield.

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ABSTRACT

OPERATIONAL FUNCTIONS OF U.S. ARMY CONTINGENCY HEADQUARTERS--DO THEY MEET THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE OPERATIONAL LEVEL OF WAR? BY LIEUTENANT COLONEL ARCHIBALD GALLOWAY, II, USA, 50 PAGES

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The study concludes that U.S. Army contingency headquarters currently fall short of fully satisfying either the requirements or a process for the adequate prosecution of the operational level of war. However, the conclusions drawn from this investigation suggest that the problem is correctable provided:

- (1) Higher headquarters define the aim for the entire operational side of the war and determine the series of actions intended to achieve it.
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SECTION I. INTRODUCTION

"While no one can prove beforehand that a situation will develop in such-and-such a way, the only successful military commander is the one who can think ahead."--Von Manstein¹

OPERATIONAL ART

Among the many notable changes which have occurred in U.S. Army doctrine in recent years, none has had a greater impact than the reintroduction of the operational art. While stimulating an active debate of modern warfighting methods on the one hand, it has caused, on the other, a return to historical analysis as a means of understanding warfare at the operational level.

According to Major (P) Stephen T. Rippe, the operational level of war "encompasses the movement, support, and sequential employment of large military forces (usually corps and above) in the conduct of military campaigns to accomplish goals directed by theater or higher military authority."² As an art, it requires broad vision, an understanding of the relationship of ends, ways, and means, and the ability, as noted above by Von Manstein, to anticipate. It is the link between tactical action and strategic goals.

Historically, American forces have substituted firepower and the ability to mass behind it for operational art. Often referred to as attrition warfare, this "doctrine," according to Colonel (Ret) Wallace P. Franz, relied largely on firepower rather than maneuver. This style of warfare flourished in World War II, Korea, and Vietnam in light of America's vast superiority in equipment, resources, and men. Currently, however, the superiority in equipment, resources, and men lies with the Soviets and their Warsaw Pact allies. With the loss of U.S. superiority comes the realization that United States forces can ill-afford to conduct attrition warfare again. In their search for a remedy, the U.S. Army's leadership realized that one solution to Soviet superiority was to be found by resurrecting operational art, the essence of which, states Colonel Franz, "...is a maneuver doctrine that will help counter the enemy's superiority

in mass--that is, tanks, artillery, troops, and aircraft."³ Hence, we are confronted with the fact that if U.S. forces are to overcome a numerically superior enemy, then the commanders and headquarters of those forces must effectively apply both the principles of war and maneuver warfare, capitalizing on the latter's inherent qualities of speed, surprise, and deception.

PROBLEM

While the 1982 version of Field Manual 100-5, Operations, was the first piece of doctrinal literature fully to develop and explain the operational level of war, it was also the first to attempt to adjust to the changing nature of war visualized for the 1980's and beyond. Prior to the advent of Operational Art, U.S. Army commanders were convinced they would be unable to defeat the Soviets because our theoretical and doctrinal thinking about war via the active defense was faulty. In correcting these faults, the new FM 100-5 not only addressed the basics of modern nonlinear warfare such as mobility, combat power, the moral dimension, friction, and initiative, but also provided a logic for analyzing operational problems. Operational problems, the manual implies, must be constantly evaluated in light of political and military aims, resources, restrictions, and constraints. Operational planning, after taking into consideration the ends, ways, and means of the theater campaign plan, must focus on the various branches and sequels of critical sub-plans. Finally, operational execution, the essence of which is the "when and where" to fight, must balance the various principles of war, the combat imperatives, and the Airland Battle tenets in a high-risk, high-payoff atmosphere. It is within this context that operational maneuver warfare is planned and executed. Yet, it is also within this context that we find a major problem--the operational functions of our contingency headquarters, particularly command and control as presently configured, fail to keep pace with the rapid, frequent changes required both by the new doctrine and by the changing nature of contingency operations at the

operational level.

The primary intent of this paper is to analyze the nature of that failure, determine the requirements for an operational headquarters in the conduct of the operational level of war, and suggest changes needed in current contingency headquarters. To do so, it is first necessary to examine why it is so important to have a headquarters structured adequately to conduct the operational level of war and furnish criteria for evaluating that structure.

First, our doctrine, as described in the October 1985 draft of FM 100-5, establishes new requirements for the application of the operational art. These requirements dictate how the Army should be structured to fight in the future. Therefore, we must have headquarters which can adequately satisfy these new doctrinal requirements. Second, history has shown us, particularly in the examples of campaigns conducted by Von Manstein, Rommel, and Patton, that only in streamlined, well-structured, and properly oriented headquarters which allow the commander the liberty to think ahead and the ability to react quickly to changing battlefield conditions can success be achieved in a timely manner. Chance presents tactical and operational opportunities only for a fleeting moment; only an unburdened operational commander in an effective headquarters with an effective operational process can seize that moment. Third, the key to operational success on a dynamic, technology filled battlefield is a higher headquarters designed for effective, efficient, and responsive structuring of the operational level of war. Headquarters designed for their own internal management or misoriented to the needs of the battlefield have not only lost their value within the current doctrinal framework, but their edge over modern, progressive adversaries as well. Therefore, headquarters must employ performance criteria which continually evaluate organizational functions, processes, and outputs in terms of the headquarter's ability to conduct missions successfully at the operational level.

HYPOTHESIS

The following analysis supports the hypothesis that without change, no higher level contingency headquarters in the U.S. Army today can adequately meet the requirements for the operational level of war as described in FM 100-5.

METHODOLOGY

With an understanding of the operational level of war, operational art, and the issues provided, this paper will first examine higher headquarters in relation to the need for an operational process* and the need for analyzing the performance of that process. This examination, using the three performance criteria of effectiveness, responsiveness, and efficiency, will then analyze the operational characteristics of headquarters in WWII, Korea, and Vietnam. Lastly, an examination of the nature of contemporary U.S. Army higher headquarters will be conducted using the same criteria to determine what changes are needed. For reasons of brevity, the contemporary examination will focus on the function, process, and performance of two contingency headquarters with orientations outside of the NATO environment--the XVIII Airborne Corps and the Third U.S. Army. Discussion of the organization of these headquarters or of their detailed command relationships in a contingency theater are beyond the scope of this monograph.

*This paper does not provide a prescriptive operational process or set of procedures. Instead, the reader is provided numerous "considerations" upon which a reflective process, unique to the needs of his particular headquarters, should be founded. Such a process, I believe, consists primarily of the actions, decisions, procedures, structures, and relationships that make up the intellectual content of the headquarters.

SECTION II. HIGHER HEADQUARTERS AND THE OPERATIONAL LEVEL OF WAR

WARGAMING REVEALS THE NATURE OF THE PROBLEM

The acid test of a good wargame, many agree, is not to be found in the numerous observations of the game, but in the complex, thought provoking issues and problems surfaced by the game. The School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS) recently conducted two such computer-assisted wargames. NATOEX 86, a Central European driven scenario, focused on NATO Army Group headquarters and combined operations. The theater campaign consisted of three phases sequenced to contain 100 Warsaw Pact divisions, concentrate NATO forces, and counterattack at the earliest feasible opportunity. SWAEX 86, a Southwest Asian (SWA) driven scenario, focused on a U.S. Field Army headquarters and joint operations in a U.S. unilateral contingency setting. In this scenario, the theater campaign consisted of four phases sequenced to secure air and sea lines of communication, key installations, adjacent land areas, and reestablishment of a pro-U.S. government in Iran.

These SAMS wargames raised serious questions regarding warfighting at the operational level. Of particular interest was that the NATO Army Group headquarters functioned successfully, while the U.S. Field Army headquarters, on the other hand, met with only marginal success. While we can speculate that one student commander might have had a higher quality student staff than the other, or that one headquarters was not as busy as the other because of levels of responsibility, these speculations are insufficient in unraveling the overall NATO army group advantage. Plausible explanations can be found, however, in architecture and doctrinal principles.

Upon close examination, these two explanations revealed the following insights. First, in the NATO army group headquarters logistical/administrative structures and functions are a national responsibility which relieve the army group commander and staff of two major responsibilities. Conversely, the U.S.

Field Army headquarters from an architectural point of view was deeply involved with logistics and administration. Furthermore, as the army component commander and having operational control of his service maneuver units, the field army commander quickly found his span of control severely taxed by an under-resourced staff and numerous operational concerns which compounded an already burdensome administrative and logistical workload. Together, these structural combinations were instrumental in distracting the commander and his staff from the primary business of facilitating the conduct of the operational art.

Second, from purely a doctrinal view, while the NATO headquarters was not required to apply Airland Battle doctrine, the U.S. Field Army headquarters was both required and professionally obligated to do so. In the process, the army commander and his staff were nearly overwhelmed by their combined enthusiasm for integrating the many tenets of the doctrine, and subsequently barely managed to stay abreast of enemy actions much less think far enough ahead to plan for a decisive moment or a critical point. In essence, the commander and staff knew what the manual said the doctrine was, but they failed to develop a process for implementing the doctrine thus impeding development of the operational art.

In sum, successful prosecution of contingency operations at the operational level of war suggests that functionally a higher contingency headquarters should orient on either combat operations or logistical operations but not a combination of both, that the headquarters have a doctrine it understands, that the headquarters have a process to internalize that doctrine, and that the headquarters have some criteria for measuring its performance in relation to its responsibilities and doctrine.

THE OPERATIONAL PROCESS

As stated, the conduct of large unit operations is the essence of the operational level of war. By its very nature, the operational level "moves in dimensions of mass, space, and time that are greater than those of tactics. The

operational level is a product of education and reflective thinking...."⁴ The aforementioned wargames were, if nothing else, clear attempts to push reflective thinking and the operational level to their extremes. There was a concerted effort to determine the strengths and weaknesses of the art as well as an attempt to inculcate the characteristics of initiative, depth, agility, and synchronization into student thinking and operations. Moreover, these wargames made it evident that operational level headquarters must have or develop a process (i.e. a series of intellectual actions or operations conducing to an end--not procedures per se, but an extended thinking process through the commander and members of the staff) whereby operational art can be applied in a functioning headquarters actively prosecuting a war. Central Army Group's (CENTAG) 24 hour decision-cycle process, for example, is the principal means for development within that headquarters of near and long term assessments, recommendations, and operational projections.

While such a process may involve normal military decision methods, practical management methods, or some sort of analytical approach, for the wargamer and commander of large headquarters this operational process must allow for the following:

- Thinking big
- Using battles to attain the purposes of the campaign
- Practicing the art of war rather than the skill of fighting
- Visualizing new situations and using imagination
- Directing the movement of superior forces to the decisive point
- Maneuvering units in the theater of operations and in the presence of the enemy, but not necessarily in contact with the enemy (a concept of operational movement).⁵

Given the complexity of higher headquarters and the organizations they control, it is also important to understand that historical and current doctrinal requirements validate (and complicate) both the need for and the latitude required by an operational process.

Historically, both the 1944 FM 100-5, Operations, and the 1950 FM 100-15, Large Units, in their broad discussion of command and higher headquarters

suggested that higher headquarters success (i.e. implementation of the doctrine) depended on the existence of a process if the commander was going to be able to understand the mission, enemy situation, key terrain, local resources and routes of communication; properly execute his responsibilities for either tactical operations, administrative operations, or both; and, plan and coordinate responsibly. Furthermore, a sense of latitude was expressed in a statement to the effect that the commander must possess an ability (means) to select objectives (ends) whose attainment contributes most decisively and quickly to the defeat of a hostile armed force. The methods (ways) employed should include, but are not limited to the elements of: unity of command, surprise, speed, initiative, concentration, security, and a spirit of the offensive.⁶

The current editions of FM 100-5 and FM 100-16, Support Operations: Echelons Above Corps, support the above fundamental historical concepts and the notion of an operational process adding several operational concepts developed in the revival of the operational art in general and contingency operations in particular. A synthesis of these two manuals tying battlefield success to operational process suggest that understanding the mission, the environment, and the support requirements implies that the commander has some means at his disposal by which he can achieve broad vision, an understanding of ends, ways, and means, and an ability to anticipate the battlefield; commanders must be knowledgeable of and usefully employ the key operating imperatives to include ensuring unity of effort and anticipating events on the battlefield; lastly, commanders must be knowledgeable of and masterful in the employment of the tenets of Airland Battle (again suggesting a process of some sort is involved).

Further complicating the development or functioning of this process, is the requirement for the operational commander and staff to understand, and interface with, the strategic and tactical levels as well as function at the operational level. Lieutenant Colonel L. D. Holder adds to this argument the point that

"since operational art lies between and to a degree overlaps the other levels of war...senior commanders, who must understand operational art, must also understand the nature of strategy and tactics. Officers trained in operational level skills must be able to understand strategic priorities, requirements, and limitations...."⁷ Yet, the operational commander and staff must not let strategic or tactical matters interfere with the operational process. This is particularly difficult for a contingency headquarters, like Third U.S. Army, which must wrestle with strategic-level issues (such as bringing in out-of-theater support), control tactical-level formations and battles, successfully establish a functioning operational process, and based upon wargame contingency experiences, adjust to and think about the theoretical side of the operational art while managing large forces. These are events which can pin unsuspecting commanders or headquarters between requirements of acting as either commanders (or headquarters) of maneuver in some instances, or commanders (or headquarters) of concentration in others.⁸ Within this framework, the greatest dilemma for either a commander or headquarters occurs in those situations which require large-scale, simultaneous applications of both maneuver and concentration. In such instances, the operational commander or his headquarters may find overall command relationships strained as they strive to meet the "maneuver" orders of the theater commander and the "logistical" requirements of subordinates.

This raises the question then--what type of higher headquarters is required between corps and the theater army in a contingency area? In the NATO environment, though not a contingency area but having a potential for expansion, NATO army group headquarters adequately perform the role. For contingency areas Third U.S. Army (TUSA), acting in the capacity mentioned above, has been designated with fulfilling the responsibility. In those situations where only a contingency corps-level headquarters is required, XVIII Airborne Corps has the

responsibility. Just how well these headquarters meet U.S. Army expectations and the command and control for contingency operations at the operational level will be discussed in Section IV.

ESTABLISHING CRITERIA FOR MEASURING THE PERFORMANCE OF A HEADQUARTERS

The underlying emphasis of Section II has been initially to question the quality of a headquarters in light of the warfighting functions it must perform at the operational level. Specifically, this task ultimately seeks a determination of whether contingency headquarters have sufficient capability to cope with their environment while satisfying the demands and expectations of higher and lower headquarters. The intent is not to analyze contingency headquarters at the operational level for their own sake, but in terms of their performance and ability to accomplish high quality functions via high quality processes that win battles and campaigns. Therefore, a method is needed for analyzing a headquarters to determine how well it performs its operational process.

According to Robert Fried, in his book Performance in American Bureaucracy, "traditional bureaucracies seem to absorb ever more scarce resources without giving their money's worth to the public or even responding very much to public preferences or to changes in those preferences."⁹ This is a perception with which U.S. Army organizations can ill-afford to be associated; everyone knows the performance and existence of the Army depends on how well the higher headquarters system works. "Poor performance [resulting from faulty structure, doctrine, or functions] can mean today, as it could not one hundred years ago, annihilation or reduction to a brutish existence."¹⁰

There is wide agreement among scholars, and among military professionals as well, that the standards for analyzing organizational performance generally lie in personal or cultural perceptions and not in scientific criteria (though we must recognize that there are adequate scientific methods available for this

purpose). Fried argues that observers judging a system's performance, for instance, may find their conclusions about that system different from the perceptions of someone subject to its performance. Continuing his line of reasoning, Fried provides three criteria for measuring performance: effectiveness, responsiveness, and efficiency. Primarily, he states, these particular functional standards are widely held standards throughout the United States. "The three [functions] are broad; [and] each refers to distinct though related criteria for judging how systems and organizations perform. They question how systems achieve [through inputs and outputs] their goals [efficiency]; whose goals [i.e. those objectives set by higher headquarters] they attempt to achieve [responsiveness]; and how well they manage to achieve them [effectiveness]."¹¹

The value of these criteria in directing the focus of this analysis is obvious. While they may be different analytical tools than some in the military are accustomed to, they are easily understood, generally acceptable, and provide a satisfactory theoretical vehicle for discussing the link between operational headquarters and the changing nature of doctrine and the battlefield. Overall, these criteria allow us to think of higher headquarters as systems which take inputs of resources and demands from their environment and convert them into acceptable outputs or activities. Furthermore, they allow us to analyze how successful a headquarters operational process is (effectiveness); how the headquarters uses its operational process and how well it responds to higher and lower headquarters (responsiveness); and, how well resources are used for the successful functioning of the operational process (efficiency).

In sum, using these three performance criteria it will now be possible to examine three historical examples of operational headquarters to determine how effective, responsive, and efficient their operational processes were. A similar assessment will be made thereafter of the two previously mentioned contemporary contingency headquarters.

As we proceed through the historical models into the contemporary models, the reader is asked to consider three questions. First, has the Army lost sight of what it means (and takes) to control large unit operations? Second, are contemporary higher headquarters different tools or is the Army just using them differently? Third, are the contingency headquarters the U.S. Army intends to use in Southwest Asia properly aligned in view of their historical antecedents and current missions? Furthermore, do the functions of those headquarters meet the requirements imposed by doctrine and the need for an operational process? The hypothesis of this paper is based on the perception that negative answers exist for all of these questions.

SECTION III. OPERATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS OF HISTORICAL U.S. HEADQUARTERS

BACKGROUND

Although allied experience, and to a lesser degree the experiences of the American Army, provide some background for an analysis of higher headquarters functions in World War I, the real starting point occurred on 9 August 1932. On that day, General Douglas MacArthur, then Army Chief of Staff, formed four field armies for the purpose of "providing a force sufficient to handle all emergencies...."¹² MacArthur subsequently maintained "that up until the World War the U.S. Army was conceived of and administered as a collection of infantry, cavalry and artillery regiments...except in a theoretical and most limited degree [preparations had not] gone beyond the development of separate divisions....[therefore] the organization of the four field armies furnished the machinery for decentralized control...."¹³

Over the next decade, the Army continued to test and evaluate the less-than-satisfactory machinery of the field armies. Major General Hugh A. Drum, participating in First Army maneuvers in late 1939, concluded that "an urgent requirement existed for the organization of an adequate field army having a high degree of training and imbued with that morale and unity of purpose which was essential in combat."¹⁴ By late 1941, despite momentous improvements, maneuvers still revealed shortcomings in coordination, control, structure, and doctrine.

Three months after Pearl Harbor, Lieutenant General Lesley J. McNair, Chief, Army Ground Forces, building upon the foundation set in motion by MacArthur, and improved upon by Drum, overcame most deficiencies and established the following organizational characteristics for higher headquarters:

- The purpose of the type army and type corps was, like the division, to combine dissimilar elements into balanced wholes.
- Armies and corps should consist of whatever troops were necessary for the mission so as to maximize flexibility and economy.
- The Army is both a combat and an administrative agency, the corps a combat agency only.

- The final test of a military organization is combat.¹⁵

What MacArthur, Drum, and McNair understood was the need for streamlined, flexible organizations (directing elements of maneuver) which, acting in a decentralized manner, could turn all of its attention upon those vital functions which win battles and campaigns.

Keeping in mind the organizing principles of MacArthur, Drum, and McNair, we will now look at three historical examples to see how higher headquarters fulfilled their requirements and functions. First, we will analyze the headquarters of Lieutenant General George Patton which had little problem focusing on those functions of the operational art. Second, in Korea, General Douglas MacArthur with great battlefield clarity resolved the difficulties of operating in a multifaceted environment by creating the X Corps. Lastly, in Vietnam the nature of the political environment created circumstances which diluted the operational art. Flexible organizations were replaced with static ones, and decentralized command was replaced by centralized MACV authority. II Field Force was a victim of those hectic changes and left us with a command and control inheritance which has not entirely faded from contemporary view.

Historical Examples - Larger Units

1. World War II - Patton and Third Army

According to FM 100-15, Field Service Regulations, Larger Units, June 1942, a field army, aside from being a ground unit of maneuver, was also tasked as the principal theater unit responsible for executing strategic and tactical ground operations. The field army commander, charged with conducting bold, daring, and thoroughly planned offensive operations, actively sought "the employment of a decisive mass in a decisive direction at the decisive time."¹⁶

The redeployment and multi-axis advance of Third Army from Saarbrücken to Arlon-Bastogne, 19-25 December 1944, is without question a military example of the operational art. Covering on the average distances of 75 miles over icy

roads, the movement of General Patton's Third Army embodied both (the then) current doctrinal imperatives and Patton's personal brand of leadership; exhibiting inordinate speed, initiative, and daring. Leaving subordinates the latitude to decide tactical issues, Patton and his overworked, yet typical, Third Army staff focused on anticipating requirements generated by the evolving operational strategy and the enemy situation in the Ardennes.

The many actions of Third Army in this campaign are too lengthy to permit detailed discussion here, however, it is illustrative to examine that headquarters in terms of the key functions of responsiveness, effectiveness, and efficiency and to a lesser degree the application of key doctrinal requirements.

Despite the aggravations he caused in England and North Africa, Patton enjoyed at this point in the war the confidence of his superiors and a healthy operating climate in which to execute his mission. The responsiveness of both Patton and his 319 member primary staff is therefore noteworthy, for within 48 hours of receiving Eisenhower's orders at Verdun to attack northward to the Ardennes, the bulk of Third Army was disengaging on the Saar River and moving. This event was followed within a week by the remainder of his nearly half-million-man army and 130,000 plus vehicles. While this rapid response pleasantly surprised the command from Eisenhower on down, within Third Army the act was never considered beforehand as being outside the realm of possibility as Patton gave subordinates freedom of action while he attended to their operational welfare by providing more self-propelled artillery, tank destroyer units, hospitals, and infantrymen from cannibalized units.

Just as he was responsive in attending to the "ends" of his mission, Patton's effectiveness in his management of the "ways" was also significant. First, he served Eisenhower a full measure of Third Army's combat power (via the principle of maneuver) by counterattacking initially with III Corps (3 divisions), followed by VIII Corps (3 divisions) a few days later. Second, he

obtained and maintained a first-hand picture of the battle by visiting first with VIII Corps Commander, General Drew Middleton, then in turn with each of his Corps and Division commanders. Finally, according to biographer H. Essame, Patton "improvised from day to day, to stretch the capacity of the available roads and to exploit the individual initiative and offensive eagerness of his officers and men...."17

The efficient use of the Third Army headquarters in accomplishing what had never before been accomplished by a large American unit is no less important than the previous two functions of ends and ways. At the core of Third Army's efficiency, lay the principles of unity of command and span of control upon which Patton built a staff that anticipated needs and maintained a constant feel for the changing situation. Through visits and the "directed telescope" of his household cavalry, Patton's sole desire was (according to him) to "defeat the unforgiving minute."

There are unquestionably other important examples which portray the capability of the Third Army headquarters and its commander. What is important, however, is that this headquarters and this commander fully understood the doctrine, the battle, and the relationship of the headquarters to its total environment. This perspective was equally shared six years later by MacArthur, fighting half-a-world away at Inch'on Korea.

2. Korea - MacArthur and X Corps

Field Service Regulations, Large Units (FM 100-15), which served Patton so well, changed little in the six years between the Ardennes and Inch'on. Audacity, initiative, and risk were still critical components of a commander's repertoire.

Not unlike Patton's classic redeployment of Third Army, General Douglas MacArthur's amphibious assault at Inch'on, Korea, in September 1950, "is considered generally to have been skillfully executed and extremely successful"

within the framework of the operational art. "Yet, among those who concede the brilliance of the operation and regard the landing as an 'exemplification' of bold strategy, others called it a gamble that should not have been accepted."¹⁸

My discussion is not intended to debate the merits of the landing. Rather, the emphasis is on General MacArthur and the X U.S. Corps. This headquarters, in its successful planning and executing of MacArthur's amphibious operation, exemplifies the doctrinal requirements and functions under examination.

In mid-July 1950, Eighth Army Commander, Lieutenant General Walton H. Walker faced 80,000 North Koreans with three hard pressed U.S. divisions. In Japan, MacArthur, commanding United States Army Forces Korea (USAFK), having pondered an amphibious landing even prior to U.S. involvement in the war, realized and then insisted "that the only hope of an early U.N. decision lay in an amphibious assault. Building up strength in front of the North Koreans would [otherwise] be a slow and costly campaign."¹⁹ MacArthur, with his ability to see the battlefield and anticipate its ends, realized that the real opportunity for victory resided in the doctrinal approach of striking deep, cutting supply lines, enveloping, and finally annihilating the North Koreans from two directions. MacArthur's Joint Strategic Plans and Operations Group (JSPOG), the forerunner of X Corps, was to be the catalyst for action from one direction while Eighth Army, given additional critical resources and required initially to hold against the Korean onslaught, was to attack from the other direction.

As operational planning continued under JSPOG's G3, Brigadier General Edwin Wright, several crucial conferences were held in Tokyo in July to convince the Army Chief of Staff, General J. Lawton Collins, that more combat power was needed in the theater, that amphibious assault was the only way to turn the tide of battle, and that a new headquarters was required to direct the forces ashore after the landing. Collins and JCS approved all three requests.

Enjoying the confidence of the JCS and U.N., MacArthur and his Chief of

Staff, Major General Edward M. Almond, took immediate and efficient action to implement conference results, first by tackling the headquarters command and control dilemma. Recognizing that "General Walker had his hands full in Korea and therefore could not be expected to divide his efforts or those of his staff,"²⁰ MacArthur, after evaluating three alternatives, directed the formation of a provisional staff (out of JSPOG's officers) which in turn became Headquarters, X Corps under MG Almond. Hence, General MacArthur, recognizing the demands and the limitations of the existing U.S. Army command structure to deal with the complexities of the landing, cut the red tape and created a streamlined, flexible, and responsive organization to carry out that task. Moreover, in order to enable MG Almond to operate effectively in an independent manner, MacArthur heavily resourced him (at the expense of Eighth Army) to ensure success. There was to be no question that Inch'on would not or could not succeed. Neither Navy nor Marine commanders could persuade MacArthur, Almond, or the X Corps staff to alter the task at hand. Similarly, Eighth Army was to redirect its logistical support to X Corps despite ongoing difficulties. "Speed," MacArthur maintained, "was the key to victory," and that is precisely what X Corps delivered.

In summary, the JCS acquiesced to MacArthur's views after realizing that he was the one man who could best judge the situation. This realization was certainly not granted on the force of MacArthur's personality alone. The unity of the command, the flexibility of the operational plan, and the resourcefulness of MG Almond and X Corps headquarters provided a persuasive combination. That MacArthur was a premier risk taker there is no doubt; that he and Almond understood that victory resided in the efficient, responsive, and effective use of a large unit to meet the requirements of the operational level of war is likewise doubtless.

3. Vietnam - Palmer and II Field Force

"Limited war," according to General (Ret) Bruce Palmer, "that is, war fought

with limited objectives, or within limited territorial boundaries, or with the commitment of only limited resources--is in many ways more difficult to conduct than an all out effort...although important interests are involved, they do not warrant the employment of all available military force."²¹ It is easy to see how these circumstances aggravated by the lack of "an effective and integrated military chain of command, all the way from the President through the JSC to the unified commands and the operational forces,"²² created an environment in Vietnam wherein anticipation, broad vision, and an understanding of the relationship to ends, ways, and means were atypical. Under General Palmer, II Field Force tried to overcome this negative environment.

The major buildup of U.S. Army ground combat forces was imminent in mid-1965, when General William Westmoreland recommended the establishment of several Army corps-level headquarters known as Field-Force headquarters in Vietnam. Intending these headquarters to be evolutionary, General Westmoreland, with his sights settled on command relationships which resembled those of World War II, became immediately embroiled in a concept argument with the JCS over whether the field force should be joint or combined. On 1 August 1965, Westmoreland's proposal of an evolutionary headquarters was reluctantly accepted. The field forces would command only U.S. Army elements. Joint or combined forces would fall under their control only during selected operations. The concept of all ground forces within a tactical zone serving under one tactical corps-level command therefore was irrevocably lost along with the broader understanding, I believe, of what it meant and took to control large units within an area of operations (AO). This then, was the environment General Bruce Palmer found himself in in March 1967.

Though restrained by a less-than-perfect command and control structure, General Palmer immediately began assessing the doctrinal requirements and functions of his headquarters. This was an assessment not normally accomplished

by many of his contemporaries.

An analysis of the vague goals set for his organization and his area of operations was first priority. Palmer quickly realized that only by defining the role of his forces could he achieve the "ends" required. In his opinion "the most suitable tactical role...seemed to be one of taking on regular, so-called main force units...[therefore] the rub was bringing the enemy forces to battle...."²³ Operation Junction City, involving the 1st Infantry Division and the 25th Infantry Division, not only succeeded in providing the large scale responsiveness he demanded, but finally seized the initiative in his area of operations as well. The overall outcome, however, was disputed by Westmoreland since II Field Force failed to conduct a requisite, all-out pursuit afterwards.

The efficiency of II Field Force was every bit as important to Palmer as the goals set for it. First, to facilitate command and control during Operation Junction City for instance, II Field Force established a TAC CP at Dau Tieng. It was the first time the headquarters had ever displaced to the field. Second, Palmer questioned the deficiencies of maneuver and unity of command within his AO. "Allied command arrangements," he said, "left much to be desired. We should have developed a better system than the separate, parallel lash-up we used with the South Vietnamese and [we] should have given senior commander operational control of all forces involved in situations requiring close coordination."²⁴ Like MacArthur, General Palmer seized every opportunity to challenge strategic and tactical demands and to correct the deficiencies of the troubled command and control system.

Unfortunately for Palmer, General Westmoreland gave him barely three months as II Field Force commander to achieve any effective or long term results.*

*In conversation, General Palmer stated that his replacement as Commander was ill-timed and destabilizing for his command.

Nonetheless, General Palmer succeeded in ensuring II Field Force properly resourced and supported its subordinate units, recognized the limitations of their Vietnamese counterparts and responded accordingly, acting the part of a combat-oriented headquarters. Setting the example was certainly not one of his easier tasks given the overall theater command and control architecture, MACV's constant meddling, and the divisive competition Westmoreland encouraged among his subordinates.

Suffice it to say, the circumstances surrounding the early development of the command and control architecture in Vietnam virtually eliminated any hope that a higher headquarters like II Field Force could meet the requirements for the operational art. General Palmer, aside from citing shortcomings produced by the limited nature of the war, also pointed to a lack of depth and the apparent small unit nature of the war as contributing factors. Moreover, we see for the first time evidence, based on the dual-hatting of corps and army commanders as advisors, that operational-level headquarters were not only evolving into a different command tool (static vice dynamic), but also were likewise being used for purposes other than their true design (funnels for military assistance). The creation of a seemingly omnipotent theater headquarters like MACV, which tried to run every aspect of the war from a "rearward" location, is also, in retrospect, not only dangerous but contrary to a war-winning attitude. These observations, then, are part of a Vietnam inheritance the U.S. Army must be careful not to emulate in the future.

RESULTS OF RESEARCH

In an earlier portion of this paper, I provided a proposition taken from the writings of Robert Fried--that analyzing performance lies in personal perceptions and not in scientific criteria. This proposition applies to the historical examples just discussed, and even from this limited historical review, the author has gained a set of personal perceptions to establish the following set of

subjective characteristics, strengths, and weaknesses which assist in determining the effectiveness of higher headquarters formations at the operational level.

The characteristics illustrated in figure 1 compare these headquarters as a function of their battlefield orientation, political/military climate, and flexibility in dealing with battlefield changes. Where those categories are the most positive, the headquarters under scrutiny is generally described as successful in dealing with the operational level of war unless outside circumstances later changed the orientation of the headquarters (e.g., X Corps failure to become OPCON to Eighth Army after Inch'on).

Headquarters/ Category	Third Army	X Corps	II Field Force
HQ Type	Traditional	Traditional (event-driven)	Provisional (politically driven)
Orientation	War winner	War winner	War stabilizer
Political/ Military Climate	Supportive	Supportive	Disruptive
Kept pace w/ changing battlefield	Flexible	Flexible-inflexible	Inflexible
Successful at the Operational level	Conducted highly successful CATK	Conducted highly successful amphibious opn	Marginally successful operations

General Comparisons of Performance
Figure 1

While the above characteristics suggest that success may be a product of, and determined by, a headquarters relationship to its environment, organizational strengths and weaknesses, on the other hand, appear to be more a product of internal, inter-headquarters relationship. In summarizing this personal perception, and using the performance criteria earlier described, the following strengths and weaknesses were the most evident in the historical examples.

Responsiveness. In each of the three headquarters, the most significant aspect of responsiveness was found in those instances where the headquarters and

the commander may have shared a common vision of the battlefield. Moreover, as it was in Patton's Third Army, where this vision was founded in an internal headquarters climate of flexibility and coordination, the commander and staff were generally better able to quickly translate that vision into an anticipation of the needs and requirements of both higher and lower headquarters. Major weaknesses occurred when the commander allowed intuition to override sound judgment or battlefield information as presented by the staff.

Efficiency. Maintaining a feel for the battle (present or upcoming), aside from creating opportunities for anticipating battlefield events, also permitted commanders and their headquarters the opportunity to exercise a great deal of initiative and sound judgment (as in the case of MacArthur and Almond forming X Corps). In this regard, how well a headquarters performed its problem-solving functions (within a sound process framework) in relation to initiative and judgment ultimately decided how efficient that headquarters was overall. Major weakness generally occurred only when the commander, and to a lesser degree the staff, crowded their strategic and tactical vision with too many details; or, where higher headquarters interfered with mission development or execution of subordinate headquarters (e.g. II Field Force).

Effectiveness. History best answers the question of effectiveness simply by showing how successful each of the headquarters completed their assigned missions. Both Third Army and X Corps appear to have exceeded all expectations. II Field Force, conversely, had problems. Nonetheless, the commanders of all three organizations shared a commonality. Each used improvisation to get the job done. Each recognized limitations within their headquarters and created systems to overcome deficiencies. And, each stayed with their plans despite difficulties. Weaknesses in effectiveness (i.e., weakness in getting the job done) more often arose from either higher authority interfering with decisions or not understanding operational doctrine or principles of war as they related to

the changing nature of the battlefield than the headquarters itself not understanding internal or inter-headquarters relationships.

In addition to the subjective criteria above, there are several other points which are valuable in determining higher headquarters effectiveness. The first point deals with headquarters capability. While specific manning levels were not available for all three headquarters, other historical comparisons of headquarters suggest that those organizations which had fewer staff officers led by a dynamic commander achieved greater efficiency. Moreover, headquarters success is inexorably tied to a commander's understanding and appreciation for the entire battlefield. Where an understanding of scope or goals was limited so was success. Conversely, where an understanding of the units proper role on the battlefield was clear and well defined, success was complete.

A second point requiring mention is that of perception. The degree to which the key functions of efficiency, effectiveness, and responsiveness improved in the headquarters can be directly attributed to the importance of the operation and its outcome in the minds of headquarters personnel. In the case of the corps-level headquarters in Vietnam, for instance, having perceived their efforts as being less than significant we might conclude that eventually an internal lethargy and defeatist attitude materialized which, in a cumulative fashion, contributed to overall defeat. Essentially, the headquarters and its personnel had difficulty reacting to battlefield change and hence became less and less flexible.

Finally, a critical measure of effectiveness in the three headquarters discussed can be, in the final analysis, attributed primarily to one element--the commander. The strength of his commitment to doctrine and the principles of war, his broad vision, his willingness to accept risk, his ability to anticipate, and his understanding of ends, ways, and means in each case meant the difference between success or failure for that headquarters. Where the operational climate

was clear and guided by an operational process, effectiveness soared. Where the climate was clouded, either by design or circumstance, effectiveness waned. The changing face of the contemporary battlefield demands that commanders understand and appreciate the needs and differences involved in achieving effectiveness.

SECTION IV. CHANGES NEEDED IN CURRENT CONTINGENCY HEADQUARTERS TO MEET THE REQUIREMENTS OF OPERATIONAL ART

THE GENERAL NATURE OF CONTEMPORARY CONTINGENCY HEADQUARTERS

For over 100 years, the Army has recognized the utility of higher headquarters. Though there have been innumerable squabbles over composition, there was usually general agreement that headquarters at various levels performed different functions. According to FM 100-5, those different tactical and operational functions "vary with the type of unit and, particularly at echelons above corps (EAC), with the organization of the theater, the nature of the conflict, and number of friendly forces committed to the effort."²⁵

Following the Vietnam War, the Army began seriously to study the nature of future conflict and the force structure required to fight it. In spite of concepts and organizations that were relevant principally to forces in Europe, and in spite of decisions to keep the number of headquarters to a minimum so that EAC doctrine could be "affordable",²⁶ the Army finally recognized the changing nature of the worldwide battlefield and the need for contingency headquarters designed specifically to fight those battles. Thus, in response to the significant numbers of Soviet forces which could be deployed to the various areas of the Middle East/Southwest Asia, the United States established US Central Command (USCENTCOM) to coordinate all military forces that might be deployed there. Currently, there are two U.S. Army contingency headquarters supporting CENTCOM each charged with the responsibility for rapid deployment. Those headquarters are XVIII Airborne Corp (contingency corps) and Third U.S. Army (contingency "army"). The following discussion provides an overview of the way these headquarters work, some of their shortcomings, and suggestions for changing their operational focus.

Contingency Corps. Similar to a forward-deployed corps in that it does not have a standard organization, the contingency corps is dissimilar in that it is sufficiently light to allow rapid strategic deployment. Though capable of

deployment into a mature theater, the contingency corps was primarily developed for deployment into "short-duration, limited-objective conflicts...where no U.S. bases exist."²⁷ This orientation requires a force capable of executing rapid changes in mission, organization, and support, and adaptable to a wide variety of threats and environments. Succinctly, a contingency corps must be able to deploy rapidly to any area of the world, establish a lodgment, and defeat Soviet or non-Soviet forces armed with Warsaw Pact weapons in a short but violent conflict while sustaining itself with minimum combat service support.²⁸

The corps is perceived capable of controlling up to five subordinate divisions fighting in a series of simultaneous and sequential battles and engagements designed to achieve operational success and strategic victory. Within the framework of the operational art, a contingency corps is "the link [for the unified or JTF commander] between operational and tactical levels of war because it creates and maintains the conditions for [the] success of current battles and sets up conditions for success of future battles."²⁹

Contingency Army. Among the three theater armies (Third, Eighth, and USAREUR) in the force structure, Third U.S. Army (TUSA) is unique. Aside from having a major deployability requirement, it exercises operational and logistical responsibilities for the land-force component of U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM).

A relatively new headquarters activated in December 1982, TUSA is a subordinate command of FORSCOM and is still in the process of structuring its overall role and nonstandard organization. Unlike the other EAC headquarters, TUSA, as the Army component under CENTCOM, "would have operational control of all (or most) Army forces in the area of active operations in time of war."³⁰ It would operate, therefore, both like a World War II army group, becoming the theater commander's primary unit of concentration, and like a World War II theater army, (e.g. European Theater of Operations U.S. Army [ETOUSA]) on the other hand, responsible for the performance of intelligence and logistical

operations for assigned U.S. Army, allied, or joint forces. Because of the newness of the headquarters and its austere manning levels, TUSA is still developing its plan. "It also has unusual problems in that the local infrastructure in this primary area [of operations] is relatively undeveloped, host nation support is quite limited, many of its EAC-type units are in the National Guard and Reserves, units and facilities must be forward deployed by air and sea over great distances, and the area of operations itself is quite extensive."³¹ Despite these massive problems, the Third Army, acting as CENTCOM's army component command, does possess the power within its organization to assist successfully CENTCOM in the prosecution of a limited war.

MEASURING A CONTINGENCY HEADQUARTER'S PERFORMANCE

Given the amount of available literature discussing the efficacy of these two contingency headquarters, it is natural to assume that the Army is comfortable with the notion that both meet the requirements for conducting the operational level of war. But do they? And which of these formations comes closer to the type headquarters required by the operational doctrine? Which headquarters, given an independent scenario, can successfully wrestle with strategic-level issues (bringing in logistics or grappling with guidance from a joint task force (JTF) or unified commander or even the far-removed JCS), efficiently control tactical-level formations, and successfully establish an operational process (whereby doctrine and operational art can be applied in a headquarters prosecuting a war)? The answer, in my opinion, is that both headquarters suffer shortcomings and neither can to the full measure required.

While a forward-deployed corps normally fights as part of a larger force, the contingency corps may fight either as a ground force under a unified or JTF headquarters or as the land component command of a JTF when only one corps is assigned to the JTF. Furthermore, while acting in the latter capacity, the corps commander will probably be charged with the responsibility for the planning and

execution of all combat operations that support the campaign objectives set by the JTF. Given these circumstances it is probable that the corps commander can meet the doctrinal requirements of the operational level of war having been placed at the very center of all operational activity. However, in view of the pressure the commander receives from the demands of doctrine, the nature of the contingency battlefield, and the limitations of his own force structure, how responsive, effective, and efficient is the corps in meeting operational requirements?

The principal task facing the contingency corps commander in planning for and conducting tactical operations in support of the theater campaign "is to concentrate superior strength against enemy vulnerabilities at the decisive time and place to achieve strategic and policy aims."³² Given the high probability of a mechanized threat in SWA the difficulties in accomplishing this by a non-mechanized contingency corps are immense. While the corps commander can certainly plan for favorable battle terms through the application of Airland Battle tenets, his effectiveness in execution is limited by a primarily foot-mobile task organization (see Appendix 1) which precludes large scale ground maneuvers--an essential doctrinal ingredient for success.

The nature of the Southwest Asian battlefield is a second inhibitor for the corps commander. Specifically, the corps' ability to respond to the demands of higher and lower headquarters is affected by the great depth and width of his area of operations, the broad distances between units and supply points, and the climatic conditions of his environment (which create excessive demands for water and fuel). These problems, coupled with a lack of host nation support and infrastructure, reduce markedly any hope of speedy responsiveness.

Finally, the contingency corps structure itself plays a major role in reducing the corps' efficiency. First, the corps lacks sufficient ground maneuver elements (armor, mechanized) which really raise the question whether the

corps can "defeat" a hostile force or even "contain, delay or attrit" one. Second, while command and control and logistics are always difficult under combat conditions, those problems grow exponentially if the corps commander inherits additional army units, if he is designated the land component commander by the JTF commander, or if he is required to assume control of other service or allied forces.

In assessing these three operational functions and hence the operational performance of the contingency corps, the effects of the above theater pressures suggest a significant reduction in the corps' capability to meet the requirements of the operational level of war. We must concede, however, that because of its flexibility, capacity for independent action, and relationship to the unified or JTF commander the corps can deal rather easily with strategic-level issues and it can, because of its affiliation with its divisions, focus clearly on tactical-level formations and events. Therefore it does come close to being the type of headquarters required by doctrine and contingency operations at the operational level.

After the Chief of Staff of the Army's 1973 decision to eliminate U.S. Army operational echelons above corps and combined their functions into one echelon--the corps--the army seemed satisfied with the notion that the next echelon above the corps in the operational chain would be a unified or combined headquarters. If, however, circumstances required a U.S. Army echelon above corps the creation of a numbered Army headquarters, tailored to the situation, provided a plausible solution.

The corps, it was understood, would report (operationally) directly to a unified or combined command. The theater army, remaining outside of the operational chain of command, would exercise command less operational control over all U.S. Army units in the theater, interface with Department of the Army on all support matters involving army forces in theater, and would provide the

combat service support for the corps. As late as 1980, the TRADOC position still maintained that echelons above corps were to be logistically oriented not operationally oriented. It was not envisioned that national EAC headquarters would ever be required to direct combat operations as did World War II field armies and army groups.

With the advent of Third U.S. Army, however, the EAC pendulum regrettably began moving in the opposite direction. The unified command (CENTCOM) needed an army component command (ACC) it could rely upon because XVIII Airborne Corps (its initial ACC) was involved in such a diverse set of contingencies that it could not focus on Southwest Asia. In the absence of an EAC doctrine which directed otherwise (albiet FM 100-16 and FM 100-16-1 came out three years later), and with the support of CENTCOM's senior leadership, TUSA became a hybrid organization having evolved from a purely theater army role to a theater army (not a field army) with the army component commander now having operational as well as logistical responsibilities. Given that the U.S. Army had done away with many of the old EAC combat service support organizations in an effort to reduce duplication, to meet budget constraints, and to permit smoother command and control, the new hybrid organization operates with a "do-more-with-less" rationale. Over time it has become an accepted part of TUSA's character. Now, the question is--can TUSA's performance match the U.S. Army's expectations for a major contingency headquarters?

For the Third Army commander attainment of the basic doctrinal requirements of the operational level of war, which include setting aims and the movement, support, and sequential (or simultaneous) employment of large forces is critical, particularly given that TUSA's span of control is greater than the contingency corps. TUSA's current command environment, like that of the corps, provides both the means and the latitude to act. Likewise, TUSA's command effectiveness, responsiveness, and efficiency are affected by the same pressures generated by

doctrine, force structure, and battlefield circumstances as is the corps.

TUSA's principal task at any given moment is doctrinally tied to a given stage of the theater campaign. If the campaign is in the build-up stage, TUSA (acting as the theater army logistician) is most concerned with the logistical doctrine found in FM 100-16 and associated documents. If, conversely, the campaign is in an operations stage then the headquarters (acting as a unit of concentration) must try and adhere to the applicable dictates of FM 100-5 and FM 100-16-1. In all stages the army commander is responsible to the unified commander for recommending how assigned U.S. Army forces should be allocated, employed, and supported to achieve a concentration of superior strength at the decisive time and place. TUSA's effectiveness in achieving that aim is suspect given its austere organization (see Appendix 2), the lack of operational EAC doctrine (a manual is being prepared), and the requirement to split the commander's attention between combat operations and logistical operations.

The nature of the battlefield in the SWA contingency area inhibits TUSA's responsiveness just as it did for the contingency corps, only more so. Distances between maneuvering corps, arguably could exceed 300 to 400 kilometers over very rugged terrain, stretch austere logistical and transportation networks and capabilities. In addition, communications are taxed, if not overwhelmed, by both distance and system austerity, causing reliance upon systems belonging to the unified commander. Finally, the lack of HNS, ports, and a local infrastructure cause critical assets, which could be used elsewhere, to be diverted to accomplish mundane logistical chores in the theater rear.

The last measure of performance is efficiency and it is best analyzed in the context of TUSA's force structure. As noted earlier, TUSA is "an amalgam of the organization for a World War II Field Army (fully operational), USAREUR, and FM 100-16 EAC support doctrine."³³ Its austere organization, made up of 20% active component and 80% reserve component soldiers, is potentially insufficient (given

that many of the reserve component units may be used to support other Capstone missions), and may force the headquarters to task out critical responsibilities. For instance, the operations element, for lack of a sufficient structure, may be inadequate for comprehensive planning and directing sizeable operations and more than likely will be required to relegate such activity to subordinate corps commanders. In the logistical arena, there are similar problems. Although TUSA has a Theater Army Area Command (TAACOM) and Material Management Center (MMC), a Combined Arms Combat Development Activity (CACDA) study suggests they are inadequate requiring the corps COSCOM to shoulder most of the logistics responsibility, and as such forcing the COSCOM to go directly to National Inventory Control Points (NICPs) thereby only reporting key matters to TUSA's MMC. Under immature theater conditions, despite such resource shortfalls, there is hope that TUSA can succeed in meeting its current operational and logistical responsibilities. It is within the context of a mature theater, however, that TUSA's efficiency is most doubtful particularly in light of its already austere organization, and the increased burden of responsibility that will be shouldered by its commander.

In assessing the more specific operational functions and the operational performance of the contingency army, however, the above noted theater pressures suggest a significant shortfall in TUSA's capability to meet the requirements of the operational level of war and the army's expectations for a contingency headquarters. While TUSA is in a good position to deal with strategic-level issues, its ability to conduct contingency combat operations is questionable because it is so under-resourced, yet so overloaded and stacked with logistical responsibilities. Simply put, it is wrong, in view of the corps current capability, to have TUSA running both operations and logistics in the communication zone and in the combat zone. While the theater army may (according to FC 100-16-1) have operational responsibilities concerning the combat

employment of its assigned forces, the magnitude of its involvement needs to be minimized in light of the clean command and control relationships currently available to unified or JTF commanders and their assigned army corps. In sum, becoming the type of formation required by the demands of the operational art requires a change in TUSA's contingency battlefield organization.

CHANGES NEEDED IN CURRENT CONTINGENCY HEADQUARTERS

The intent of this paper has been to analyze higher headquarters in general (and contingency headquarters in particular) in relationship to their shortcomings generated by changing doctrine, the changing battlefield, and the changing requirements and functions needed by an operational headquarters for the proper prosecution of the operational level of war. A subset of the functions analysis has been indirectly to validate the necessity for a sound operational process whereby the elements of doctrine and the operational art can be applied and analyzed in a headquarters. Both headquarters, as structured, fall short of completely satisfying either the requirements or the process mentioned. Changes in operational focus are therefore warranted.

THE CONTINGENCY CORPS

As stated earlier, of the two headquarters, the contingency corps comes closer to having the right balance of operational functions, and therefore comes closer to the type of operational headquarters required by doctrine. The following changes are suggested to enhance its capabilities.

(1) Mission. While the contingency corps is both an administrative and tactical headquarters (reporting administratively to theater army and operationally to a unified or JTF commander) the corps is designed to conduct operations in a variety of contingencies. Force mixing, a product of strategic planning, provides the tailoring necessary for mission accomplishment. Nonetheless, as a ground force exercising primarily tactical (though occasionally operational) responsibilities, the contingency corps must recognize that "defeat"

that "defeat" missions of highly mechanized enemy forces are outside of the organization's ability unless significant changes are made to force mix. In light of deployment trade-offs for heavier units which nullify the corps' ability for rapid deployment, corps planners and operations personnel should not assign a "defeat" mission except in the most extraordinary circumstances.

(2) Doctrine. The contingency corps and its subordinate elements must recognize that every aspect of Airland Battle doctrine may not be totally applicable to its scenario. The doctrine espoused in FM 100-5, Operations, is not dogma, but a gateway for the education of commanders and staffs in their pursuit of an understanding of the operational art. Furthermore, the paucity of contingency corps doctrine demands that a separate field circular or, at a minimum, extensive expansion of those paragraphs in FM 100-5 and FC 100-15 commence immediately.

(3) Historical relationship. The contingency corps and its commander must take the time to conduct functional assessments of historical campaigns, battles, and engagements if for no other reason than to preclude a repeat of past mistakes. More importantly, history provides the best rationale for redesignating the contingency corps as the primary contingency headquarters under CENTCOM. Specifically, history assists in acknowledging that the modern corps is the historical equivalent of the WWII field army. Transferring this idea to SWA, the modern contingency corps literally does everything the historical field army did in Europe. The corps is a powerful, relatively self-contained force which virtually eliminates the need for a higher army headquarters through which guidance and logistical support must pass. Moreover, modern firepower, improved communications, and the demand for efficiency, responsiveness, and effectiveness all suggest that command and control in contingency operations be handled by the principal war fighters--the unified or JTF commander and the corps commander. Further, using history again for support, if there is a requirement for

controlling two or more contingency corps (the equivalent of WWII field armies) the logical step is to form an army group not a theater army. (FC 100-16-1 discusses in detail the formation and responsibilities of an army group.) In sum, history provides the contingency corps commander a rare opportunity for broad vision and broad action which few officers ever enjoy.

(4) Operational assessment. The contingency corps' success ultimately depends on the strength of its operational process. The structure of XVIII Airborne Corps provides the perfect environment for the development of operational education and thinking wherein doctrine and operational art can be applied. The challenge for the corps is to institute a simplified means of assessing organizational performance by the commander based upon the performance criteria of efficiency, responsiveness, and effectiveness.

THE CONTINGENCY ARMY

The contingency army (TUSA), while certainly exhibiting a blend of operational level functions, falls short in its present configuration, of being a respectable operational headquarters capable of prosecuting contingency operations at the operational level. While the recent creation of TUSA may be a significant factor for permitting change, the fact remains that much needs to be done to create a proper operational focus within the headquarters. The following changes are suggested as a way of assisting the alignment of TUSA to the requirements and functions of the operational art.

(1) Mission. Foremost among TUSA's problems is its dual orientation between operations and logistics. Simply, it is asking too much of a commander and his organization to simultaneously run both combat operations and logistical operations in the communications zone and the combat zone. Historically, European Theater of Operations U.S. Army (ETOUSA--WWII) had responsibility solely for theater logistical support from the communications zone. ETOUSA had little operational responsibility in the combat zone although General Dwight D.

Eisenhower, before becoming Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force, did conduct strategic and operational discussions with army group and field army commanders. The basic issue at hand is that TUSA, to achieve the U.S. Army's expectations for a contingency headquarters and to come closer to the type of functional headquarters required by the doctrine, needs to revert to a traditional theater army with principally logistical responsibilities and forgo the hybrid theater army status it has today.

(2) Doctrine. The absence of a credible operational EAC doctrine for such a long period is indeed pernicious. In 1981, Lieutenant General Howard F. Stone, writing to General Glenn K. Otis, stated "If we were to develop such concepts and doctrine, it would not mean that operational headquarters above corps would necessarily have to exist in peacetime. It would provide, however, a doctrinal basis for educating our officer corps so that, should such an operational situation arise, we would have a doctrinal basis which to organize, equip, and fight."³⁵ Such EAC doctrine as has recently been developed is somewhat contradictory (FM 100-16 vs FMf 100-16-1); and insufficient for the eventual evolution of the SWA theater into a mature environment.

(3) Force Design. The importance of this headquarters raises questions concerning the rationale for placing so many reserve elements in its structure. Moreover, critical shortfalls in communications resources (personnel and equipment) and other CSS elements severely limit its ability to fulfill all assigned tasks, to include, for instance, echeloning the vital TAC and Main command posts. Lastly, both the MMC and MCC need to be full-time (even redundant if affordable) organizations with full-time staffs, the rationale being that they are the central pillars of TUSA's capability without which the organization would come to a standstill. The heavy reliance CENTCOM must place on TUSA's logistical functions in view of the lack of HNS or logistical infrastructure in SWA dictates that mission and force structure are two areas which must be properly resourced

and focused.

(4) Historical Relationship. Generally, the same historical perspective which is invaluable to the contingency corps applies moreso to TUSA. Without an appreciation of the strengths and weaknesses of previous Theater Army commanders, and without an appreciation of the characteristics of the operational art, the headquarters of Third U.S. Army is certainly doomed to repeat the mistakes of the past. In some respects, the overburdening and underresourcing of the headquarters already shows evidence of historical oversight.

(5) Operational assessment. Like the corps, TUSA's success, I believe, rests on the strength of an operational process. In a headquarters with as high a percentage of reserve elements as TUSA has, it would seem mandatory that the commander have some means of measuring or assessing organizational performance. The performance criteria of efficiency, responsiveness, and effectiveness provide at least one means to do so.

SECTION V. CONCLUSION

In his discussion of the nature of a future war, Mikhail Tukhachevskiy stated that "we can predict and envisage the forms of a future war during its initial period on the basis of the nature of development of the armed forces...we can make inferences on the basis of continuous investigations...and offer an approximate picture [of the outcome of the initial battles]...."³⁶

The nature of battle, not its outcome, has been the essence of the SAMS wargaming process. Similar to those views espoused by Tukhachevskiy above, the process required students to envisage the various forms of the conflict. Subsequently, the duration of each game provided time to ponder optimum task organizations, the need for coordination, enemy capabilities (or weaknesses), centers of gravity, and the nature of victory. This author's investigation into contingency headquarters was a result of concerns raised by this process, specifically, the concern that the operational functions of our contingency headquarters, particularly command and control as presently configured, fail to satisfy the U.S. Army's need for rapid, necessary changes required both by the doctrine espoused in FM 100-5 and by the changing nature of contingency operations at the operational level. Three steps could be taken to counter this failure:

(1) The modern battlefield is changing the ways we wage war. The requirements for boldness, vision, and imagination have replaced conservatism, linear set-piece battles, and attrition warfare. The first rule of the operational art now requires contemporary commanders to assess the aims of battle before they engage in battle. Clausewitz, in verifying this view, states "The strategist must therefore define an aim for the entire operational side of the war that will be in accordance with its purpose. In other words, he will draft the plan of the war, and the aim will determine the series of actions intended to achieve it."³⁷ Essentially, this is the first requirement for an operational

headquarters in the conduct of the operational level of war.

(2) The doctrinal requirements for higher headquarters have historical antecedents dating to World War I. However, until the new echelons above corps manual (FM 100-16) is published, the contemporary headquarters should consider paying particular attention to World War II doctrine (most notably FM 100-15) and include those aspects valid to modern warfare and the current operational art. Furthermore, as in the case of the historical headquarters discussed, the characteristics of the art demand that the higher headquarters develop a functioning operational process whereby the doctrine of operational art can be applied through a higher headquarters prosecuting a war. The second requirement for an operational headquarters is therefore to use history as a vehicle for the development of an operational process emerged in "education and thinking." The process must force forward thinking, it cannot be an end unto itself. A measurement of the performance of this process can be achieved by analyzing the headquarter's operational functions of responsiveness, effectiveness, and efficiency.

(3) The third requirement for an operational headquarters is to recognize and accept change. Historical examples provide one element of analysis, measurement of performance another. To achieve closer alignment to the type of headquarters required by doctrine and by the nature of the battlefield, the following key improvements are recommended for the contingency corps and army.

(a) The contingency army must reconcile the problems created by dual-hatting the commander with both operational and logistical responsibilities.

(b) Contingency headquarters need a viable operational EAC and improved contingency doctrine--NOW.


(c) The contingency headquarters commander and staff must take the time to assess the strengths and weaknesses of historical campaigns, battles, and engagements. The efforts taken to gain an assessment has significant battlefield

value.

(d) If a headquarters has a significant mission, then it should be properly resourced. It is unconscionable that a contingency headquarters (corps or army level) should have to contend with shortfalls in personnel or equipment as the standard for business. Contingency operations are often quick and dirty affairs (e.g. Grenada). Our experience shows that public opinion is decidedly in favor of victory at a small price. Therefore, improperly resourced headquarters are disasters waiting to happen.


For many reasons this study of higher level contingency headquarters can only be suggestive, selective, and partial. It is bound to raise even more questions and issues. "It will," to quote an anonymous writer, "have performed its function, perhaps, if it convinces the reader that the issues raised are the significant ones and worth pursuing further."

APPENDIX A. CONTINGENCY CORPS COMMAND RELATIONSHIP



* TAKEN FROM PAGE 1-10, CORPS OPERATIONS, MARCH 1984

APPENDIX B.(U) U.S. THIRD ARMY (FULLY DEPLOYED) COMMAND RELATIONSHIP



- CMD
- (X)- OPCON
- (X-)- CMD Less OPCON
- (X-)- OPCON Less Specific Functions

UNCLASSIFIED

* TAKEN FROM PAGE 4-67, ARMY COMMAND AND CONTROL MASTER PLAN, FEBRUARY 1984

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1. Erich Von Manstein, Lost Victories, trans. by Anthony G. Powell. (Novato, California: Presidio Press, 1982), p. 409.
2. Major Stephen T. Rippe, "Leadership, Firepower and Maneuver: The British and the Germans," Military Review (October 1985), p. 31.
3. Colonel (Ret) Wallace P. Franz, "Grand Tactics," Military Review (December 1981), pp. 36-37.
4. Colonel (Ret) Wallace P. Franz, "Maneuver, The Dynamic Element of Combat," Military Review (May 1983), p.4.
5. Ibid. p. 4.
6. Department of the Army, Field Service Regulations-Large Units, FM 100-15 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, June 1950), pp. 14-15, 50-71; Department of the Army, Field Service Regulations-Operations, FM 100-5 (Washington, DC: War Department, 15 June 1944), pp. 32-47.
7. LTC(P) L. D. Holder, "Training for the Operational Level," Parameters (Spring 1986), p. 9.
8. Generally, a unit of maneuver is one which is self-sustaining. The commander of such a force keys in on anticipating battlefield events by concentrating his forces in critical areas to gain and to use the advantage of surprise, shock, position, and momentum. It is generally the employment of forces through movement supported by fire. COL W. Franz felt that "in order to understand maneuver it must be related to the concepts of initiative and freedom of action." ("Maneuver, The Dynamic Element of Combat," p. 7). A unit of concentration, conversely, is not a self-contained unit and cannot do anything without unit plugs. Nonetheless, the commander is still capable of "concentrating superior combat forces in a large unit (corps, army, army group) area of operations under conditions which will favor the defeat or destruction of the enemy's armed forces in battle." (Franz, "Grand Tactics," p. 38).
9. Robert C. Fried, Performance in American Bureaucracies (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1976), p. 6.
10. Ibid. p.7.
11. Ibid. p. 43. As discussed, the standards for performance are many; therefore, a theory of performance must be based on criteria stipulating what good performance is. Fried officially defined his three performance ethics as:
 1. Effectiveness: how well the organization or system achieves its goals. (p. 15)
 2. Responsiveness: the congruence between the goals the organization or administrative system pursues and the goals desired by the people to whom the organization is responsible and under whose authority it operates. (p. 15)
 3. Efficiency: doing the job at lowest cost. Because we must start with limited resources, we must know how much action will cost, including the benefits or opportunities that have to be set aside to achieve the goal. (p. 67)
12. Francis C. Smith, History of the Third Army--Study Number 17. (Washington, DC: Historical Section, Army Ground Forces, 1946), p. 1.

13. Ibid. p. 2.
14. Jean R. Moenk, A History of Large-Scale Army Maneuvers in the United States, 1935-1964. (Fort Monroe, Virginia: Historical Branch, HQs, U.S. Continental Army Command, 1969), p. 6.
15. Kent R. Greenfield, Robert R. Palmer, et al. The Army Ground Forces: The Organization of Ground Combat Troops (Washington, DC: Historical Division, U.S. Army, 1947), pp. 265-280, 351-371.
16. U.S. Department of the Army, Field Service Regulations, Large Units, FM 100-15 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, June 1950), p. 57.
17. H. Essame, Patton: A Study in Command (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1974), p. 225.
18. James F. Schnable, Command Decisions--The Inch'on Landing (Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Military History, September 1957), p. 2.
19. Ibid. p. 6.
20. Ibid. p. 13.
21. Bruce Palmer, The 25-Year War: America's Military Role in Vietnam (Lexington, Kentucky: The University Press of Kentucky, 1984), p. 192.
22. General William E. DePuy (Ret), "Vietnam: What We Might Have Done and Why We Didn't Do It," Army (February 1986), p. 40.
23. Palmer. The 25-Year War: America's Military Role in Vietnam, p. 57.
24. Ibid. p. 194.
25. Department of the Army Operations, FM 100-5 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 28 October 1985), p. D-1.
26. LTG Howard F. Stone, "Letter to General Glenn K. Otis: Operational Echelon at EAC," Combined Arms Combat Development Activity, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 10 December 1981, p. 1.
27. FC 100-15, Corps Operations, (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: USACGSC, March 1984), p. 1-10.
28. Contingency Corps 86 - A Force Planning Exercise. (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: Combined Arms Combat Development Activity, April 1983), p. D-3.
29. FC 100-11, Corps Deep Battle, (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: USACGSC, 20 June 1985), p. 1-1.
30. Army Command and Control Master Plan (U): Analysis Report Volume 1. (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: Combined Arms Combat Development Activity, February 1984), p. 4-4.
31. Ibid. p. 4-4.

32. FM 100-5, Operations, p. 3-2.
33. Army Command and Control Master Plan (U): Analysis Report Volume 1, p. 4-66.
34. LTG Julian J. Ewell and MG Ira A. Hunt, Sharpening the Combat Edge: The Use of Analysis to Reinforce Military Judgement, (Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1974), pp. 191-196.
35. Stone, "Letter to General Glenn K. Otis: Operational Echelon at EAC," p. 3.
36. Mikhail Tukhachevskiy, New Problems in Warfare. (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, Art of War Colloquium, November 1983), p. 54.
37. Carl Von Clausewitz, On War. trans by Michael Howard and Peter Paret, 1976. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), p. 177.

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