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


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FORCE INTEGRATION DOCTRINE AND DIVISION STAFF ORGANIZATION

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

by

DOUGLAS R. JORREY, MAJOR, USA
B.S., United States Military Academy, 1971

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
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Over the past several years the Army has experienced difficulty in managing the introduction, incorporation and sustainment of new doctrine, organizations and equipment. Especially hard pressed were the Army's divisions, faced with assimilating these changes without disrupting day-to-day training and sustainment operations. In 1985, guidelines were published in FC 100-11: Corps/Division Force Integration to assist division commanders and their staffs in accomplishing this difficult task. Force integration is a comprehensive, logical way to view, plan for, implement and sustain change. It allows a division to gain control of, and efficiently implement change with minimal disruption to current operations and capabilities.

The division staff plays a crucial role in the force integration process by synchronizing the broad range of agencies and actions that are involved. Many of the problems experienced by divisions early on were a result of poor staff performance due in part to structural shortcomings. Because of this, most divisions have made adjustments to the general staff organization to facilitate staff efforts in managing and integrating change. This study examines those shortcomings and remedies.

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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

ABSTRACT

FORCE INTEGRATION DOCTRINE AND DIVISION STAFF ORGANIZATION, by Major Douglas R. Jorrey, USA, 140 pages.

Over the past several years the Army has experienced difficulty in managing the introduction, incorporation and sustainment of new doctrine, organizations and equipment. Especially hard pressed were the Army's divisions, faced with assimilating these changes without disrupting day-to-day training and sustainment operations. In 1985, guidelines were published in FC 100-11: Corps/Division Force Integration to assist division commanders and their staffs in accomplishing this difficult task. Force integration is a comprehensive, logical way to view, plan for, implement and sustain change. It allows a division to gain control of, and efficiently implement change with minimal disruption to current operations and capabilities.

The division staff plays a crucial role in the force integration process by synchronizing the broad range of agencies and actions that are involved. Many of the problems experienced by divisions early on were a result of poor staff performance due in part to structural shortcomings. Because of this, most divisions have made adjustments to the general staff organization to facilitate staff efforts in managing and integrating change. This study examines those shortcomings and remedies.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

> . . . the way in which we go about managing change over the next decade or two will determine whether or not we arrive on the 31st of December 1999 with our national values intact.
>
> Gen E.C. Meyer[1]

A. Background.

Over the past several years the Army has experienced difficulty in managing the simultaneous introduction, incorporation, and sustainment of new doctrine, organizations, and equipment. This problem was highlighted as a result of the Army Inspector General's (TIG) 1982 force modernization inspection and continues today.[2] The Army's command and management structures are being overwhelmed by the changes associated with force modernization. The Army has always been accustomed to moderate change; however, the recent pace and volume of change has been the greatest ever experienced by the peacetime Army, and there is no relief in sight.

> Not since World War II has the US Army embarked on a modernization program as intense and diversified as the one now under way. The fielding in this decade of approximately 400 new tactical and support systems, as well as new doctrine and organizations, requires that exceptional management procedures and concepts be developed and used.[3]

Faced with an increasingly hostile world environment and rapid advancements in technology, the Army has to keep pace to remain capable of fulfilling its national security responsibilities. Change can not be stopped or slowed, but it can be better managed to eliminate its disadvantages and enhance its advantages.

Two important actions were begun in 1983 to assist the Army in improving its ability to better deal with change. The first was educational. It was acknowledged at the highest levels of the Army that the educational system had not properly prepared the Army's leadership to meet its force modernization responsibility. That responsibility, articulated by General Maxwell R. Thurman, Vice Chief of Staff of the Army (VCSA), is:

> . . .to ensure that good soldiers get the good equipment they deserve; that they are trained in its use and that we can sustain them in the field.4

Courses were established throughout the Army to teach commanders and staffs at all levels for the first time "how the Army runs."5 Up to that point the educational system had consistently focused on how to fight the Army. Subjects about how to properly run the Army so it would be prepared to fight, were not taught. The objective of this effort was, and still is, to produce a new generation of leaders

who can get the most from the Army's established management structures and systems or if needed, make changes.

The second action was doctrinal. The Army had no corporate approach to managing change.

> . . .while there is a doctrine for fighting a battle, there is no doctrine for managing the changes that are associated with [that fighting doctrine]6

This situation had also helped to create the problems identified by TIG in 1982. Force modernization was being accomplished through trial and error. In 1984, the Commander of the Combined Arms Center (CAC) directed that guidelines be developed to assist commanders and staffs at corps and division level in the management of change. The method by which organizations assimilated change was broadly defined as force integration. Force integration doctrine for corps/division organizations was published in August 1985 as Field Circular (FC) 100-11: Corps/Division Force Integration.

FC 100-11 provided much needed guidance and information to corps/division commanders and staffs. On the subject of staff organization the FC offered several techniques for consideration, but recommended none. This approach avoided controversy, but also highlighted how poorly the traditional

general staff organization had performed in the management and integration of change over the past decade.

> Some form of ad hoc staff organization has been established at most installations to oversee the modernization process. These "Force Mod" offices range from a single individual on the G3 staff. . .all the way to complete transition teams working directly for the chief of staff. . . The size, source, and duties of these offices are different at each installation.7

These ad hoc adjustments have primarily been made to facilitate the sychronization of staff efforts in managing and integrating change. These are presumably peacetime arrangements which would disappear with the onset of hostilities. The question generated by this contingency is why should they be only peacetime arrangements? If these adjustments were made to facilitate sychronization, should they be eliminated before the division goes off to fight on tomorrow's battlefield where sychronization is expected to be a critical factor? The division general staff structure introduced during World War I and used essentially unchanged today, may have outlived its usefulness. Perhaps peacetime problems with the current general staff structure are warnings of organizational deficiencies which will not survive the demands of the tomorrow's battlefield. This thesis will attempt to address only the utility of the traditional division general staff organization in meeting the challenges of peacetime modernization. Due to the time limits involved, the further task of relating these findings

to battlefield staff adjustments must be left to other individuals and later studies.

The second question generated by these division general staff adjustments is which organizational option is best? Is there an organizational option best suited to facilitate change at the division or installation level? This thesis will attempt to explore the options in use today and make some judgements about them.

B. Statement of the Problem.

To determine the adequacy of the current division staff organization in effectively integrating new doctrine, organizations, and equipment into the divisional force structure.

C. Objectives.

1. Define the force integration process. Before exploring how well or poorly the division staff organization has responded to the demands of force integration, it is necessary to first establish a clear understanding of the process. This includes understanding the current scope of change, why it is necessary and how it has been managed in the past. The Army has dealt with change throughout its history, yet never before has it been so challenged by such

rapid and massive change with so limited resources. All indicators point to a continuation of this situation.

> . . .Modern warfare is more complex at all levels. Comparing World War II and present formations, we see that present division operations compare more to World War II corps operations in range, scope and complexity and that today's decisions, coordination, movements and execution must be accomplished in less time. Moreover, all indications are that this complexity will increase exponentially and not linearly. We must learn how to deal with these higher levels of complexity both in a theoretical and pragmatic sense.8

It is for this reason that the Army, for the first time in its history, established a doctrine for implementing change. This doctrine and its associated process, collectively referred to as force integration and outlined in FC 100-11, is vital to ensuring the effective and efficient assimilation of the promise offered the Army by force modernization.

2. Establish the crucial role played by the division staff in force integration and explain its relationship to unit level actions. As the art of war has progressed from the individualistic combat of primitive man to the clashes of large organized masses of men, the need for a staff has evolved. The staff, viewed today as the nerve center of a division, is crucial to the effectiveness of that division.9 In today's complex, fast paced world, no senior commander can hope to accomplish assigned missions without the aid of his staff. The staff assists the commander in decision

making by acquiring, analyzing and coordinating information; once the decision is made, the staff facilitates its accomplishment by detailed planning and coordination.10 Force integration is one of the staff's most challenging peacetime missions. Without effective, efficient staff work, no division can expect to meet the force integration demands placed on it.

3. Identify and describe staff functions that are critical to the success of force integration. In order to evaluate the effectiveness of the division staff organization in force integration, it is necessary to highlight those staff functions which are essential in planning and managing a division force integration.

4. Identify and describe organizational and systemic weaknesses which inhibit the traditional division staff's ability to effectively plan and manage a division force integration program. Throughout the Army, traditional division staff organizations have been adjusted in various ways to cope with the demands of force integration. This implys that the traditional division staff structure has not performed well in this area. The reasons for this poor performance must be identified.

5. Identify and describe the organizational approaches and management techniques commonly used by division staffs

to cope with the demands of force integration. Having identified what the division staff must do to successfully plan and manage a force integration program; and having identified weaknesses that preclude a traditionally structured staff from doing that successfully, it is important to show what is being done on division staffs throughout the Army to overcome those weaknesses and successfully accomplish force integration. Currently, there is no universally accepted solution to this challenge.

D. Assumptions.

The following postulates are assumed:

1. Change is a normal state for the Army. Change is not something that will go away. The turbulence being experienced now may dampen somewhat in the future, but change will continue. The Army will, and must change if it wishes to retain the initiative with respect to the threat.11

2. Doctrine is the standard against which change is measured. How the Army intends to fight must guide all efforts when changing the Army, if a focus is to be maintained on the ultimate reason for change. Using doctrine in this role gives direction to normally diverse actions in an efficient, effective manner.12

3. Training is the carrier wave for change.[13] Change always demands an increased commitment to training. No change is complete unless it has been internalized and sustained through training. New doctrine, organizations, and equipment are useless until tactical leaders and their units have received training designed to produce the required high standards of performance in their operation and employment.[14]

E. Definition of Terms.

1. Doctrine-- Fundamental principles by which the military forces or elements thereof guide their actions in support of national objectives. It is authoritative, but requires judgement in application.[15]

2. Force Modernization-- The upgrade of force capability through the introduction of new doctrine, organizations, and equipment.

NOTE: This is the author's definition. The official definition is found in the DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms. In that document, modernization is noted to be a component of military capability and described as the "technical sophistication of forces, units, weapon systems, and equipment."[16] This appears to be an outdated view of force modernization in light of today's

multi-faceted improvement effort.[17] Early in the 1980's force modernization was linked almost solely to the upgrade of equipment, mainly because of the noteriety and money associated with that effort. As the years have progressed however, this view has been determined to be narrow and shortsighted with the advent of new doctrine and organizations to complement the new equipment.

3. Force Integration-- The introduction, incorporation, and sustainment of new doctrine, organizations, and equipment into an existing force structure.[18]

NOTE: There are several definitions of force integration in use at this time. The Army War College (AWC) in its 1984 Army Command and Management text refers to force integration as the "military application of behavioral, management and system sciences to manage the process of complex change."[19] The Combined Arms Center (CAC) at Ft Leavenworth refers to force integration in FC 25-100: Training the Force as "the routine integration of new doctrine, force structure and equipment into an [existing] multiechelon, combined arms sustainment training program."[20] General Maxwell R. Thurman, VCSA, describes force integration as "the multi-faceted process by which we swap in new skills, equipment, logistics and training for the old they replace."[21] Each of these definitions is essentially

correct, but each also has a narrow focus. If possible, a doctrinal definition should satisfy a broad Army audience and tie together all the diverse command levels involved in the process under a single umbrella. For this reason it is the author's opinion that the force integration definition shown above from FC 100-11 best serves that purpose and will be used exclusively in this study.

4. Force Structure-- The composition, by numbers and types of units, of the current, planned, or programmed force for the Total Army.22

5. Force Development-- The process of translating projected Department of the Army resources--manpower, fiscal, and materiel-- into time-phased programs and structure (expressed in dollars,equipment, and units) necessary to accomplish assigned missions and functions.23

The terms force integration and force modernization are often used interchangeably even though they are not the same. Force modernization is an improvement program and force integration is the process by which that program is successfully implemented. The author has attempted to maintain this distinction throughout this study, however quoted works will often not do the same. To avoid confusion, the reader should keep this distinction in mind.

F. Delimitations.

1. Research is focused on the traditional division staff organization and its peacetime role in the management of change. Staff and management organizations at other command levels are discussed only as they relate to the division staff in the force integration process.

2. Most of the research effort for this thesis was confined to references published between 1 January 1979 and the present. This time period generally encompasses the current modernization effort in terms of field implementation, not research and development. Some historical research was required, but limited due to the principal focus of the thesis.

3. The author of this study was a primary author of FC 100-11: Corps/Division Force Integration. Much of his research for that field circular has been incorporated in this study.

G. Limitations.

Only a sampling of published division force modernization/force integration standard operating procedures (SOPs) were available for this study. This sampling of SOPs included the 1st Infantry Division, 8th Infantry Division, 24th Infantry Division, 2d Armored

Division and 1st Cavalry Division. However, these SOPs, along with published articles provided sufficient information for detailed study.

H. Significance of the Study

This study provides information on the relative utility of differing staff solutions in effectively accomplishing force integration tasks. The information will be a valuable asset in updating FC 100-11: Corps/Division Force Integration to provide more definitive guidance on how best to organize a division staff to manage change. The study will also provide an excellent start point for further investigations into the overall usefulness of the current division general staff organization. FM 100-5: Operations stresses the importance of synchronization in achieving success on the modern battlefield. The division general staff, as the nerve center of the division, is crucial to achieving this coordinated action and unity of effort among divisional elements on the battlefield. The general staff must also orchestrate a similiar coordination of effort and time sequencing to be successful in force integration. How the staff is organized to accomplish synchronization, both on and off the battlefield, is critical to its effectiveness. The information that is available in this thesis regarding how the staff organizes to achieve

synchronization in its force integration effort may also have some utility in studying its organization for battlefield synchronization.

I. Review of Literature

There is a great deal of published information on the management of change. The most extensive works available were written by civilian organizational experts. No substantial military writing on the subject existed much before 1980. At that time most members of the Army were just becoming aware of the enormous difficulties associated with force modernization. All that had been seen prior to that was the tip of the iceberg. After 1980 as more and more of the Army began to experience the difficulties of modernization the commentary increased significantly in professional military journals.

The first official Army publication to deal with the management of change was Reference Book (RB) 26-16: Commander's Guide to Force Integration published in 1984 by the US Army Organizational Effectiveness Center and School (USAOECS) at Fort Ord, California. It was an excellent guide for managing change at the small unit level but its utility was hampered by too many generalizations and a failure to deal with the specific problems being experienced

in the field; however, many of its recommendations were included and expanded upon in FC 100-11: Corps/Division Force Integration. This latter publication dealt with change in a much more detailed manner. More importantly, it also stressed the importance of training as an agent of change and sustainment. A more extensive review of literature is contained in Chapter 2.

J. Methods and Procedures

The principal research methodology combined a review of existing literature and discussions with subject-matter-experts (SME's). The review of existing literature provided the bulk of information used in the study. The most substantial amount of published information was found in professional journals. Most of that information dealt with the what and how of change, and not the why. The SME interviews provided good insight into the reality of how divisions are dealing with change in the Army today. They also provided a means to get some expert judgements on the utility of emerging force integration doctrine.

CHAPTER 1

END NOTES

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2. U.S. Army War College. Army Command and Management: Theory and Practice, 1984-1985. (Carlisle Barracks: Army War College, 1984), pp.3-10 to 3-11.

3. Rourke, John E., LTC. "Force Modernization: Total System Concept," Military Review 63 (April 1983), p.18.

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5. As of the submission of this thesis, there are three "How the Army Runs" courses available in the Army school system. Each teaches "How the Army Runs" according to a common base program of instruction with added emphasis on a designated functional area. The courses are (1) Force Integration-Developing the Force: taught at Fort Leavenworth, focuses on force development, (2) Force Integration-Manning the Force: taught at Fort Benjamin Harrison, focuses on manpower and personnel management, (3) Force Integration-Equipping the Force: taught at Fort Lee, focuses on materiel acquisition and sustainment.

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14. Cope, John A. Jr., LTC. "Doctrinal Credibility: A Problem of Focus With FM 100-5," Military Review 64 (August 1984), p.72.

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17. Borgman and Wojcicki, op. cit., p.30.

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21. Thurman, op. cit., p.42.

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CHAPTER 2

REVIEW OF LITERATURE

> Whatsoever things were written aforetime were written for our learning.
>
> Romans 15:4

A. General

An extensive literature survey was conducted in order to compile all available information associated with force integration. At first the search concentrated literally on the subject of force integration, however the term itself proved to be too confining. The term, "force integration" only began to appear in professional Army literature in early 1984. For this reason the search was expanded into the general subject area chiefly associated with force integration-- change. This was a logical expansion of the survey, for change is the condition which generates the need for force integration action.

In order to constrain such an obviously broad subject area, the search initially concentrated on change in the Army-- what the changes were, what caused them, and how they were being managed. This effort produced an abundance of literature, most of it written since 1982 and published in

professional journals throughout the Army. This outpouring was most likely a response to the concerns generated by TIG's 1982 force modernization inspection and the emerging problems highlighted by that inspection. Even though there was much information available in those articles there was a lack of any substantial in-depth scholarly work on the management of change in the Army. The Army had, up until the 1980's, dealt with change on an ad hoc basis. Never before had it been faced with such substantial change while being so constrained by available resources. Never before was there a need to address and document the continuing, efficient assimilation of change.

At this point the scope of the search was again expanded to look at what was available outside of the Army community. The focus of this research was on change in large and complex organizations. It was suspected that there might be a fairly common bond between various large organizations, whether or not they were civilian or military. This inquiry proved most profitable and yielded numerous references written by civilian management science experts.

B. Literature Summary

1. General. This section contains brief reviews of some of the more important references used in this thesis. They are arranged under several generic subject areas according to the central thrust of each work. It is important to note however, that the scope of the information in these works is not confined to these subject areas alone.

2. Literature Reviews.

What is Changing

Probably the most dramatic change that can occur in an army is a change in doctrine. It is upon the foundation of doctrine that an army is organized, equipped, and trained to fight. A change in doctrine can therefore have wide ranging impacts throughout an army. In 1982, the Army's doctrine, as outlined in FM 100-5: Operations, was changed significantly. Through the revision of FM 100-5, the Army adopted a more maneuver oriented doctrine, designated AirLand Battle. FM 100-5, as revised in 1982, was the primary source for information on AirLand Battle doctrine used in this thesis.1 An additional source of valuable information was an article published in Military Review in July 1982 just prior to the publication of the revised version of FM 100-5. This article, "The New FM 100-5," was

written by two officers, Lieutenant Colonels L.D. Holder and Huba Wass de Czege, who were closely involved in the development of AirLand Battle doctrine and the 1982 revision of FM 100-5. This article was important because it provided a look beyond what was written in the field manual, into the minds of those who wrote it. It provided much of the "why" behind the concepts expressed in that key manual.2

The most visible aspect of change within the Army has been new and displaced equipment. The October 1985 issue of the Army Green Book was the primary source of new equipment information used in this thesis. Each year's edition, published by the Association of the United States Army (AUSA), contains a current catalog of Army weapons and equipment compiled by the Army Materiel Command (AMC). Technical information is provided on each piece of equipment as well as information on its current utilization and production status.[3] What is not made clear however, are the manifold ramifications and cumulative effect that the introduction of this equipment is having on the Army.

With this thought in mind, Army magazine published a series of six articles on modernization beginning in July 1983 to explain the way in which modernization was changing the basic "building-block" units of the Army, the combat arms battalions.[4] These articles were written by experts

within the Army's Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC). They described how new equipment and heavy division organizations were changing the tank, mechanized infantry, artillery, and air defense battalions; and how these revamped units would fit into the scheme of operations at brigade, division and corps level under the Army's new AirLand Battle doctrine.[5] These articles provided an excellent quick reference on the impact of new doctrine, organizations and equipment on a significant piece of the Army, however they did not tell the whole story. An in-depth report on the entire heavy division design, labeled Division 86, was available in a pamphlet titled Division 86 Final Report published in 1981 by the Combined Arms Combat Development Activity (CACDA) at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.[6] This document provided a detailed description of the entire heavy division design but did not explain the amalgam of doctrine, organizations and equipment for the division as the force modernization series had done for the combat arms battalions.

A reference which did use this approach was an article published in Military Review in late 1982 titled "Force Modernization-- Doctrine, Organization and Equipment." In the article the author, Lieutenant Colonel Lawrence Jackson II, explained how the complementary aspects of new doctrine, organizations and equipment were improving the ability of

the heavy division to fight and win on tomorrow's battlefield. He emphasized the crucial role played by doctrine in establishing a framework within which new equipment and organizational capabilities might be best integrated to achieve maximum effectiveness. He also addressed an issue which would take on increasing importance as modernization progressed-- how to maintain unit effectiveness with a mix of old and new organizations and equipment.7

The modernization series and the Division 86 Final Report were excellent sources of information on the heavy division changes initiated in 1982, however they did not address the Army's latest and most comprehensive force design effort-- Army of Excellence (AOE). That information was found in FC 100-1: The Army of Excellence, published in 1984 by CACDA. This field circular was an excellent overview of AOE. It summarized the reasons for AOE, the key points in its development, and described its primary force designs which included heavy division design revisions as well as a new light infantry division design.8

The sheer size of the modernization effort has tended to intimidate any who attempted to describe its total impact on the Army. Indeed, very few attempts were made to look beyond anything more than functional pieces of the Army.

This is an understandable problem, for few people in the Army occupy a position that would allow them to view and understand the entire modernization effort. One person who is in such a position, the VCSA, provided an excellent report on the subject in the 1984 Army Green Book. The article, titled "Moving Out From Grenada to Kwajalein" reviewed the status of the Army's modernization effort as of 1984. The article was broad in scope, covering subjects as diverse as ballistic missile defenses and small-unit tactics, however it was an excellent description of the magnitude and complexity of force modernization.[9]

The source material used in this thesis to define the changes associated with force modernization was neither extensive nor detailed. Most of it was overview or survey type articles. However, it is the view of the author that these sources were adequate. Depth was not essential to the purpose of the study. It was only necessary to establish the magnitude and scope of change rather than the fine details of it.

Why Change

Whenever there is talk about change, especially change that is traumatic and turbulent, questions arise about why the change is necessary at all. Even when the need for change is understood, often people question the pace of change. To understand change in the Army, it is not enough to understand what is changing, but to also understand why the change is necessary. Several sources were discovered which provided insight into this subject. The most useful of these was a pamphlet written by AUSA's Expanding Education Fund in the early 1980's titled Force Modernization-- The Army's Greatest Need. In this report the educational arm of AUSA explained why extensive modernization was necessary for the Army to meet its national security responsibilities in the coming decades. Its conclusions were based on the irrefutable evidence of a continuing Soviet military buildup and two decades of military neglect in the U.S. As well as documenting the need for improvement, the report also indicated where improvements were needed.[10] The report was well written but very poorly documented.

Another AUSA report, published in 1984 and titled Landpower: The Decisive Element, provided further evidence of the need for improvement in the Army's capabilities.

The theme behind the Landpower report was that the land forces of a country are the decisive element in its ability to deter or if necessary win a war. While this point may be debated, it was the large quantity of backup data accompanying the report that had the most value. What the earlier AUSA report, Force Modernization-- The Army's Greatest Need, lacked in backup documentation, the subsequent Landpower report contained in abundance. It contained information documenting the increasingly hostile world situation, the growing technological revolution, US resource dependence, and the Soviet-US military imbalance; all good reasons why Army modernization is necessary.11

In 1983, Military Review published an article which stressed the necessity for using technology to maintain the battlefield edge. Titled "Technology Implications: The Need for Change," and written by Lieutenant Colonel William McLarty, the article asserted that the US can only offset the Soviet's quantitative military advantage by qualitative actions such as technological innovation. To guide this effort he suggested 14 postulates which apply to the battlefield of the future and have implications in the design of future weapons systems.12

Historical Perspective on Change

When studying the present, it is always necessary to keep a sense of proportion. History provides that type of perspective, for it acts as a 'yardstick' against which scholarly statements can be measured. Under some circumstances history can even offer useful lessons. The literature search identified several references which gave a good historical perspective on change in the Army; even one which offered some enduring lessons regarding how change is accomplished in the military.

An excellent start point for developing such a perspective was American Military History, a volume in the Army Historical Series published in 1969.13 It was a good, basic overview of the Army's history since its birth in 1775, and allowed a quick, but accurate survey of that history to identify periods characterized by great change. These specific periods could then be looked at in further detail through other more focused works. The most profitable period for such further research, was 1940-1945, because of its close historical proximity in both time and technology. During these five years, the Army underwent probably the greatest transformation in its history. The extent of this transformation was ably captured by Russell Weigley in his 1981 account of the Army's World War II

European campaign, Eisenhower's Lieutenants.[14] For the purposes of this thesis, the first section of the book titled "The Armies," provided the most valuable information. In this section Mr. Weigley described the birth of the modern mechanized Army as we know it today. He included in this description specific discussions of doctrinal, organizational, and equipment changes during the period. He also commented on the difficulties encountered in transforming what had essentially been a small constabulary force into one of the most powerful armies in history.

To remain in that position since 1945 the Army has had to continually adapt and change. The turbulence of this post-World War II period for the Army, in terms of doctrine, organizations, and equipment was described by Major Robert A. Doughty in Leavenworth Papers No 1: The Evolution of US Army Tactical Doctrine 1946-1976.[15] The theme of the paper is doctrinal change, however the complementary nature of doctrine, organizations, and equipment make it almost impossible to talk about one without mentioning the others. His conclusions provided excellent information about the increasingly complex nature of change and how that change has been accepted by the Army since World War II.

An interesting historical reference which was not about the US Army, but still offered important insights into

accomplishing change within the Army was Captain Timothy T. Lupfer's Leavenworth Papers No 4: The Dynamics of Doctrine--The Changes in German Tactical Doctrine During the First World War.[16] Of all the references used in this thesis, Captain Lupfer's paper was the one most often quoted in current writings regarding the Army and change. His research described the manner in which the German Army succeeded in changing and implementing tactical doctrine during war. By doing so, he identified the essence of a dynamic process so important to the US Army as it begins to implement AirLand Battle doctrine.

The Challenge of Change

Periods of great change are tumultuous times for any large-scale, complex organization. The Army's current modernization effort is no exception. The future promise offered by new doctrine, organizations and equipment is often overshadowed by the here-and-now problems of transition. Some problems are predictable, like conscious or unconscious resistance to change; some are unique, one-time occurrences. In order to understand how to manage change it is necessary to first understand the problems involved. The literature review produced numerous articles dealing with the difficulties and disconnects associated with modernization throughout the Army.

Major Robert A. Fitton addressed one of these problems when he wrote "A Perspective on Doctrine: Dispelling the Mystery."[17] Appearing in the February 1985 Military Review, this article noted that doctrine was not well understood by members of the Army. He further postulated that unless it was corrected, this misunderstanding would have a serious impact on the Army's efforts to prepare itself for tomorrow's battlefield. Following that was a superb description of the purpose of doctrine, how it is developed, disseminated and applied. In "A Critique of the Doctrine-Training Fit"[18] in the June 1985 Military Review, Major Wayne M. Hall criticized the Army education system for obstructing full understanding and acceptance of AirLand Battle doctrine. He argued that the Army's doctrine-training bureaucracy, satisfied with the status quo, was failing to adequately prepare the officer corps for the intellectual demands of the AirLand battlefield. Lieutenant Colonel John A. Cope looked at doctrine and training also, but addressed a much different problem. In an August 1984 Military Review article titled "Doctrinal Credibility: A Problem of Focus With FM 100-5,"[19] he contended that while FM 100-5 was a step in the right direction, much remained to be done at the division level and below to implement published doctrine. In his opinion, officers and noncommissioned officers working at the tactical level of war had been largely ignored since the

publication of FM 100-5. This had resulted in a strong skepticism at that level, about the Army's ability to implement its doctrine. He subsequently recommended several initiatives aimed at building a strong doctrinal foundation for the Army at the unit level.

It was interesting to note that these articles had no argument with the Army's new operational doctrine. Their concerns focused on how AirLand Battle doctrine was being integrated into the force. Such was not the case with the Army's structural redesign, Army of Excellence (AOE). Most of the articles that were reviewed questioned various aspects of the design such as the new cavalry squadron (where did the tanks go?)[20] or utility of the light infantry division in mid-intensity warfare (where did the TOWs go?).[21] The best of the lot however, was Brigadier General John C. Bahnsen's critical analysis of the entire AOE design in Armed Forces Journal International's November 1985 issue. Titled "The Kaleidescopic US Army,"[22] it questioned whether the AOE design thrust was consistent with the demands of AirLand Battle doctrine. His analysis reached several provacative conclusions; some of which were, to form combined arms battalions, retain the division base as a tactical echelon only, and to stop fielding the light infantry division design until it has been validated. More important to this thesis was the background information he

also provided on the evolution of the Army force structure since 1962. It was an excellent example of the Army's continuous cycle of change.

An important element in the changing Army is the soldier himself. Often times he is ignored as the spotlight falls on high technology equipment and futuristic organizations, but he remains the ultimate weapon. General George Patton's statement that "Wars are fought with weapons, but they are won by men"[23] remains true today; probably even more so as future demographics constrain the Army's ability to acquire and retain quality soldiers.[24] The necessity to put the soldier back into the modernization equation was expressed by Lieutenant Colonel Theodore R. Blasche in "Human Factors and Force Integration."[25] Published in 1985 in The Army Organizational Effectiveness Journal(hereafter referred to as the Army OE Journal), the article warned that to ignore the human element as we modernize is to court failure. Beyond the warning, the article offered little more in useful information about the personnel side of force integration. In fact, there were no sources that focused on this crucial element. What information there was about the "soldier" side of change was spread throughout numerous other source documents as peripheral information. A good example of this was an

article titled "Gearing Training to Modernization: A New Ball Game."[26] Written by two members of the Seventh Army Training Command at Grafenwohr, Germany, Major Joseph R. Finch and Ms. Colleen K. Holmes, it was published in the April 1983 issue of Army. The article provided an excellent account of the trials and tribulations associated with fielding new equipment in an overseas command. It addressed the problem not from some ethereal plane, but detailed specific problems and solutions.

The "soldier" side of change was also addressed in two articles whose central theme was new equipment. The first, "Uneasiness About Technological Progress in the Armed Forces"[27] written by two officers from the Federal Republic of Germany, was first published in the March-April 1981 edition of Wehrwissenschaftliche Rundschau and later reprinted in the October 1982 issue of Military Review. In the article, Colonel Ruprecht Haasler and Lieutenant Colonel Hans Goebel expressed concern that the proliferation of new technology on the battlefield was placing too much reliance on equipment, and too little on other battlefield factors. They proposed a much broader view whereby technology would be used in concert with those other factors

and not as an end unto itself. Lieutenant Colonel Raymond J. Zugel explored another side of the same question in "A Management Challenge: The Introduction of Technology into the Workplace."[28] Published in an 1985 issue of the Army OE Journal, the article discussed how to integrate new technology into an organization in a manner which enhances job performance. A critical part of the process was to properly match the technology with the people who would use it.

How to Change

In accomplishing any new task it is always important to first develop a concept of how that task should be addressed. With a well thought out concept in hand, one can then fill in the blanks with detailed planning to suit the specific situation. When another similiar task presents itself, accomplishing it is made easier, because a proven operational concept is already available to guide necessary action. This is essentially how doctrine works in the Army. Doctrine provides conceptual guidelines which govern how certain missions or tasks are to be accomplished. It is not authoritative, but requires judgement in application because each situation is unique. To develop a doctrine requires close, detailed and reflective study by imaginative people trained to think logically about tough problems.[29] It is

appropriate then, that in researching the subject of changing the Army, a student should look to find where such serious, reflective thinking has been done. In this case it was done by two distinguished soldiers-- General Donn A. Starry and Colonel Huba Wass de Czege. Their thoughts on how to change the Army, published in Military Review, serve as an excellent conceptual foundation for the development of a doctrine on managing change in the Army.

General Starry's March 1983 article, "To Change An Army,"[30] reviewed military history in order to develop a set of guidelines on how to effect change. He accomplished this by examining the development of mobile warfare between 1933 and 1939, contrasting German successes with American and British failures. He concluded that the German Army had succeeded because of an institutionalized framework for examining change, an officer training system which produced leaders able to think logically about tough problems, and proponents of change who remained in positions related to its implementation for years. He finished the article with an assessment of Army reform since 1973 to the present. His assessment showed improvement, but also identified deficiencies. Colonel Wass de Czege in "How To Change An Army,"[31] published in November 1984, built upon General Starry's conclusions and addressed ways to eliminate some of the deficiencies that General Starry had identified. He

concentrated on improvements to the officer education system, concluding that more time and manpower must be invested by the Army in preparing its officers for the intellectual demands of future warfare. It is important to note that the central theme in both of these articles was the criticality of intellectual change to legitimatize doctrinal, organizational or equipment changes.

Managing Change

A substantial body of literature was available concerning the tactics of managing change in a large organization. The majority of this information was written by civilian management experts about commercial organizations; however, because it was general in nature, the information was applicable to management of change in the Army. Mr. Bob Goodfellow, an organizational effectiveness expert, analyzed the change process in an article titled "The Evolution and Management of Change in Large Organizations."[32] In this article, published in the Army OE Journal in 1985, Mr. Goodfellow focused on the leader's role in the transition of an organization. He described how an executive decides upon a change, legitimizes it, achieves consensus and then makes it happen. His comments on overcoming resistance to change were

especially valuable. He also commented on the importance of information in making the process work.

Mr. Jay R. Galbraith in a 1984 issue of the Army OE Journal wrote about organizational design strategies to enhance information processing capabilities. The article was titled "Organization Design: An Information Processing View."[33] Mr. Galbraith's design strategies were based on the premise that organizations changing at a rapid pace require decision-makers to process an increasing volume of information to maintain the organization's level of performance. He proposed that the way an organization is structured can either hinder or enhance its ability to process information, and provided a range of possibilities. The strategy that was most relevant to this study was "lateral relationships." Its approach was to move the decision making authority down to a level where the information exists. At that level the decision making is accomplished by cutting across lines of authority--integration in its broadest sense.

Integration was the primary focus of an article published in the November-December 1967, Harvard Business Review, titled "New Management Job: The Integrator."[34] It was written by Mr. Paul R. Lawrence and Mr. Jay W. Lorsch, members of the Harvard Business School faculty, and

organizational behavior experts. Reporting on a study they had conducted, they stated that the rise of specialists in business was creating the need for a new member of the management team-- the integrator. The purpose of the position was to facilitate unity of effort among the functional specialists of a business by handling nonroutine problems and resolving interdepartmental conflicts. The article went on to address how integrators should be oriented, what patterns of conflict resolution they should employ, and how much authority they should have. It was an excellent article with a great degree of relevance to the needs of today's Army as it also tries to reconcile the needs of its specialists with the needs of the whole organization. Major Robert Siepeilski recommended use of a systems methodology to facilitate integration efforts in a changing organization. Titled "Systems Approach to Force Modernization,"[35] and published in a 1984 Army OE Journal, the article addressed the change process from a systemic viewpoint. Change was described as a series of actions and reactions that occur as a unit transitions from old to new, not just new organizational structures or equipment. Leaders who understand these complex relationships are better able to steer their unit through a transition with minimal disruption.

All the articles discussed here were useful up to a point. They offered good generic ideas about managing change in a large organization, however none ventured out of the theoretical realm to deal with the day-to-day realities of planning and executing change in a division. The following articles went farther.

Managing Change in a Division

The Army is slowly learning how to effectively and efficiently manage change. A great deal of that learning has occurred at the division level, due to the efforts of many unheralded and unnamed force modernization and force integration staff officers. Through their efforts, and those of their units, force modernization has been made to work. The impetus for establishing a management of change doctrine is also a result of their efforts. Before there was a doctrine, as well as a course to teach that doctrine[36], much of what was learned remained at division level in the hands of these experts. Fortunately for the Army, some of these experts found time to record what they had learned, and had it published in various professional journals.

The first such article, aptly titled "Life at the Bottom of the Totem Pole,"[37] was written by Lieutenant Colonel Bruce T. Caine, a force modernization officer in the

1st Infantry Division. Published in the January 1983 issue of Military Review, the article described how force modernization was perceived at the division level, and how it was accomplished. Lieutenant Colonel Caine explained the salient features of the division's force modernization effort by relating them to the principles of war. He also described how the division staff was adjusted to handle the demands of the force modernization effort. Even more important was the fact that he recognized the crucial role played by the division in the process. A division cannot sit idly by and expect that higher echelons have solved all the problems and answered all the questions; it must be proactive.

The depth of vision that Lieutenant Colonel Caine displayed in his article, was not present in Lieutenant Colonel John E. Rourke's contribution to the April 1983 Military Review. This not to say that the effort was not worthwhile. The article, titled "Force Modernization: Total System Concept"[38] was an excellent detailed account of how to field a new item of equipment using the "total system concept." The problem with this account was, that it didn't get beyond the tasks needed just to introduce a new tank in a division. How to incorporate and sustain the system and its improved capabilities was not mentioned. It was a classic equipment oriented force modernization article.

That was not the case with Lieutenant Colonel Jack A. LeCuyer's February 1984 offering in Military Review, simply titled "Force Integration."39

In this article, Lieutenant Colonel LeCuyer, a force modernization officer from the 8th Infantry Division, went beyond the mechanical aspects of introducing new organizations and equipment, to address how such changes are effectively assimilated and sustained for the duration. He described how the division staff was adjusted to do this as well as the specifics on how it was done. Unlike previous articles on this same subject, Lieutenant Colonel LeCuyer's article recognized the important linkage between training and force integration. He even noted that the "Force Integration" article was a companion to a training article published previously in Military Review by the Division G3, titled "Training in the 8th Infantry Division (Mechanized)."40

Two other division-level articles bear mentioning at this point. The first is "The Challenge of Force Modernization,"[41] published in the September-October 1983 issue of Armor magazine. The authors are Colonel John D. Borgman, then the III Corps G3, and Major Alexander F. Wojcicki, then a III Corps force modernization staff officer. The article is a good primer on the various

aspects of force modernization, though it never makes the quantum leap to force integration. It makes an excellent case for the use of automated data processing resources to meet the demanding information needs of force modernization. The second article, written by two former members of the 7th Infantry Division's light division task force, Lieutenant Colonel John E. Sullivan and Major Randy Bussert, was titled "Reorganizing a Division."[42] It was published in the 1985 issue of the Army OE Journal. The article provides a good description of the work accomplished by an ad hoc staff or task force, planning and executing a major division reorganization.

CHAPTER 2

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CHAPTER 3

THE ARMY AND CHANGE

> The world hates change, yet it is the only thing that has brought progress.
>
> Charles F. Kettering[1]

A. The Necessity For Change.

In battle, a second best army is a losing army. Armies must be organized, trained, and equipped to deter, and if necessary, fight and win.[2] To be the best, and remain the best, requires an army to change and adapt to the world in which it exists and serves. Change is essential to maintaining an army's effectiveness over time.[3] This seems to be an obvious truth, however, in practice it is a difficult one to achieve. History is replete with examples of armies that failed to change and subsequently failed on the battlefield-- the Russians at Port Arthur in 1905, the British at the Somme in 1917, and the French at Sedan in 1940, to mention a few.[4] These failures were the result of not knowing when to change, not knowing what to change, as well as an outright refusal to change.

Military undertakings are so costly in human and materiel resources that once success is achieved, it tends

to generate inertia both in those who provide the resources and those who use them. Both are satisfied with the past, which makes no demands, and uncomfortable with the future, which demands continued sacrifice. Lieutenant Colonel Huba Wass de Czege called this inertia 'wishful thinking' when he wrote--

> Sometimes . . . soldiers fail to realize that conditions have changed. This results from a kind of wishful thinking we soldiers are all prone to fall into which compounds the problem of adapting to change. A good example of this phenomenon was the slow and agonizing death of the horse cavalry long after the conditions on the battlefield made it obsolete.[5]

Even if this inertia can be overcome, another difficulty remains-- that of identifying what needs to be changed. Coming to grips with the exact dimensions of change is a risky, complex task, for the ultimate goal of the change remains illusive. It is measured against an ever-changing array of variables such as economics, politics and technology. A decision to make the wrong change is as dangerous as the decision to make no change at all.[6] The US Army has been no stranger to this dilemma, especially in the past 20 years.

B. The Army In Neutral.

Emerging from World War II and Korea, the Army was the foundation of undoubtedly the strongest military establishment on the earth; however, since then the world changed drastically and the Army failed to keep pace. Fighting an unpopular war in Vietnam, the Army consumed more than a decade's worth of military resources that effectively curtailed most modernization efforts. Improvements in doctrine, organizations and equipment came to a virtual halt while the Army fought the war at hand.[7] General William E. DePuy, the TRADOC commander in 1978, commented that:

> Because of the cost of and preoccupation with the Vietnam War, the Army lost a generation of modernization.[8]

Even in the decade that followed the Vietnam War, modernization remained stalled as the nation reduced its investment in defense.9



Figure 1. US vs USSR Defense Outlays[10]

The Army thus began the 1980s with doctrine, organizations and equipment designed for the world and battlefield of the 1960s. During those two decades however, the world and the threat did not stand still.

C. The Changing World.

As a result of expanding commerce and rapid advancements in technology, nations around the globe had become more interdependent than ever before. By the 1980s, multinational corporations, world monetary crises and international terrorism had become familiar terms. This growing interdependence provided a new security problem for the US. The US economy, including its vital defense industry, had become increasingly dependent on overseas sources to satisfy its raw material needs; and these foreign sources were located in some of the most turbulent regions of the world.



Figure 2. US/USSR Imports of Strategic Minerals11

The loss of access to these resources, especially critical strategic materials, would have a catastrophic effect on the US economy, defense industry, and ultimately national security.[12] This was amply demonstrated by the 1973 Arab oil embargo and the following rise in oil prices which resulted in widespread economic disruption throughout the world.

The technology that had helped to foster this dangerous economic environment had also made warfare more deadly. Lasers, microprocessors, computers and other new technologies had significantly increased the lethality and tempo of battle.[13] The 1973 Yom Kippur War vividly demonstrated this fact. In a war that lasted only 18 days, men and materiel were expended at a staggering rate. The rival Arab and Israeli armies were armed with the latest weapon systems available and provided a proving ground for the new "high tech" mode of warfare.[14] That fact also illuminated how the military balance had changed. Since World War II the world had armed itself so extensively, that significant military forces were no longer the sole preserve of the superpowers. The armed forces of many third world nations had been equipped with highly sophisticated weapon systems made possible by the sale of oil or other valuable

natural resources. Small countries no more populous than a US or Soviet city were capable of immense defense effort.15

D. The Changing Threat

While Army modernization efforts stalled during and just after the Vietnam War, the threat grew more powerful and deadly.

> During the period from 1965 to 1972 . . . the USSR had substantially modernized and strengthened its forces while the United States was involved in Southeast Asia. Although the size of the Soviet Union's forces had remained relatively stable . . . qualitative improvements in force structuring and weapons had substantially improved their combat capability.16

The Soviet military buildup had been relentless in comparison to US efforts.



Figure 3. NATO/Warsaw Pact Force Comparisons- 198317

From 1960 to 1980, the only US main battle tank fielded was the M60-series tank. During the same period the Soviets fielded the T54-, T55-, T-62-, T-64 and T-72 tanks in great numbers. Each of these tanks included increased levels of sophistication in firepower, protection and mobility. The realities of this buildup were demonstrated during the Soviet invasion and occupation of Afghanistan with four

well-equipped divisions. It was accomplished within a few days with a barely visible tactical buildup. Simultaneously with the invasion of Afghanistan, the Soviets fully manned the NATO and Sino-Soviet borders.18

E. Army Modernization

By 1973 the Army clearly realized that it faced a completely new world situation. With its role in Vietnam rapidly diminishing the Army's leadership began to redirect their efforts by examining roles and requirements for the future. Because war in Central Europe or the Middle East represented the greatest threat to national security, the examination focused on high intensity, mechanized warfare. The results were predictable, and a concerted effort was begun to improve the Army's capability to fight and win tomorrow's war. This modernization effort, which continues today, involves the adoption of a new maneuver-based doctrine, the redesign and reorganization of virtually all the Table of Organization and Equipment (TOE) units from squads to echelons above corps, and the introduction of over 400 major new materiel systems. Within the next 10 years the Army will have completely transformed itself from the force that emerged from Vietnam in the mid-70's.

F. New Doctrine

The new doctrine, adopted in 1982, represents a significant departure from the attrition approach to warfare that characterized Army operations during the Korean and Vietnam Wars.[19] Designated AirLand Battle, the new doctrine is based on the lessons of history, but projected onto tomorrow's battlefield. On that battlefield, the Army is expected to face a determined enemy who is willing to use every weapon at his disposal to sustain rapid movement during the offense. Breaking or restraining the enemy's initial ground attacks will not end hostilities. Campaigns of considerable movement and lethality will be commonplace, resulting in a highly fluid, nonlinear series of rapid violent battles. Small units may often find themselves bypassed or encircled by enemy forces.[20] AirLand Battle doctrine describes conceptually how the Army expects to fight and win on such a battlefield:

> Army units will fight in all types of operations to preserve and exploit the initiative. They will attack the enemy in depth with fire and maneuver and synchronize all efforts to attain the objective. They will maintain the agility necessary to shift forces and fires to the points of enemy weakness . . . Success on the modern battlefield will depend on the basic tenents of AirLand Battle doctrine: initiative, depth, agility and synchronization.[21]

G. New Organizations

The structural reorganization of the Army is generally identified by the label Army of Excellence (AOE). AOE is, in reality, the culmination of a series of design initiatives begun as early as 1978. The most notable of these was the heavy division redesign known as Division 86 (DIV 86). The DIV 86 redesign was undertaken to produce a new heavy division organization suited to the demands of new doctrine, the Active Defense, and a new generation of weapons and equipment.[22] It made significant changes to the old "H-series" or Reorganization Objectives Army Division (ROAD) design which had been in effect since 1962.[23] Those changes included:

1. Consolidation of aviation assets and the cavalry squadron into a combat aviation brigade.

2. Restructure of the cavalry squadron.

3. Addition of one maneuver company to each tank and mechanized infantry battalion with the corresponding elimination of combat support companies.

4. Restructure of the division support command which included the creation of three forward support battalions.[24]

The DIV 86 changes were approved by the Army for programming into the force structure in 1980. Before many of these changes had actually taken effect, they were overtaken by the much larger design initiative-- AOE.

The AOE design group was charged with a more comprehensive task than just the heavy division, i.e. to look at the entire Army structure and reconcile Airland Battle doctrine with force design and manpower constraints. The results included:

1. Down sizing of the heavy division (DIV 86) to achieve a smaller, more agile and affordable force.

2. Improvement of the corps combat potential with the addition of artillery, aviation and air defense assets.

3. Design of a deployable light division optimized for low intensity conflict.[25]

H. New Equipment

All of these organizations are designed to fight with the newest and most modern equipment in the world. Much of this equipment, designed in the 1970s, began arriving in the 1980s. The most significant systems include:

1. M1 Abrams Main Battle Tank-- The Army's primary ground combat weapon system. Special armor, compartmentalization of fuel and ammunition, and an automatic fire detection and suppression system make it more survivable on the battlefield. Improved day-night fire control and shoot-on-the-move capability assure its ability to deliver highly accurate direct fire.

2. M2/3 Bradley Fighting Vehicle-- The Bradley provides the mechanized infantry a lightly armored fighting vehicle with mobility comparable to that of the M1 tank. It carries a nine-man squad that can fight mounted or dismounted. In addition to six 5.56mm firing port weapons positioned along the side and rear of the vehicle, the Bradley has a two-man turret which mounts a 25mm automatic stabilized cannon, a TOW anti-tank missile system and a 7.62mm coaxial machinegun.

3. Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS)-- The MLRS was developed to fill a counterfire and suppression void in conventional fire support. It is a free-flight, area fire, artillery rocket system that supplements cannon artillery fires by delivering large volumes of firepower in a short time against critical, time-sensitive targets. The basic warhead carries improved conventional submunitions.

4. AH-64 Attack Helicopter-- The Apache Helicopter is a quick-reacting, airborne antitank weapon system. To accomplish this mission the Apache is armed with the laser homing Hellfire missile system. It is also equipped with a Target Acquisition Designation Sight and Pilot Night Vision Sensor which permits its two-man crew to navigate and attack in darkness and in adverse weather conditions.26

The Army has committed itself to providing its soldiers with the finest equipment in the world; and it is making good on that commitment. These new materiel systems represent just a few of the over 400 that will be fielded in the next decade. In most cases this new equipment sits astride the leading edge of technology. As such its cumulative impact on the Army will be substantial; changing how the Army fights, trains, maintains and sustains. For example, the three-man MLRS crew can equal the firepower of an eight-inch field artillery battalion. The M2-equipped mechanized infantry battalion has six times the long-range tank killing capability of its predecessor.

I. The Challenge

The cumulative effects of all this change is a formidable challenge for the Army and especially for its divisions. It is of such magnitude and scope that it

demands much of the individual soldier who must frequently adapt to new and unfamiliar command structures, working environments, procedures, and skill requirements. It is especially demanding of leaders because they must facilitate the change process in their units while simultaneously maintaining the capability of those units to deploy, fight, and win on short notice. They must also dampen the turmoil often associated with change that is in direct conflict with the stability needed to form cohesive, combat-effective units. To overcome these challenges requires leaders and soldiers alike who understand change and possess the management and leadership skills needed to plan for, control, and make it happen.

J. A Historical Perspective-- The German Army

A short history lesson is essential in beginning to develop such skills and understanding. Change is a condition that armies have always had to deal with, and there is much to be learned from those experiences that is useful today. A good example of this is provided by Captain Timothy T. Lupfer's superb study of changes in the German Army between 1916 and 1918 titled, The Dynamics of Doctrine-- The Changes in German Tactical Doctrine During the First World War. It is especially valuable because the

compressed timeframe involved serves to accentuate important lessons.

Faced by a tactical stalemate on the Western Front, Allied Forces had sought for ways to break the deadlock. They tried strategic solutions (Gallipoli), technological solutions (the tank), and finally in 1916-1917, an operational solution. Using vast quantities of munitions concentrated in a small area, they attempted to create a penetration in the front that could be exploited. The German Army responded to this Allied use of mass firepower by developing and implementing, prior to the Allied 1917 spring offensive, an elastic defense-in-depth doctrine. It was designed to exploit Allied weaknesses in mobility by allowing them to expend energy for subsequent counterattacks. The entire process, to include reorganization, introduction of new equipment and the training according to these new defensive principles, was accomplished in only seven months despite severe economic and manpower constraints. At the close of their 1917 offensive, the Allies had gained little ground but expended much blood and materiel while the Germans had conserved enough strength to continue the war into 1918.27

While the German tactical success was short lived, the factors that contributed to it are crucial to understanding

how change is implemented in a military organization. First, the leaders of the German Army understood the important role played by doctrine in giving direction to the efforts of any army.

> . . . doctrine exists to give order to these efforts. . .German doctrine achieved the balance between the demands of precision for unity of effort and the demands of flexibility for decentralized application. . .28

Second, they understood the complementary nature of doctrine, organizations, equipment and the soldiers who employ them.

> The Germans treated change with caution and respect. Once they decided that a tactical change was necessary, they pursued it with the knowledge that several factors had to be changed in order for the doctrinal change to have the desired effect.[29]

Success on the battlefield results from an enlightened amalgam of these critical elements by aggressive, imaginative leadership. No change can have the desired effect when addressed in isolation. Even the best weapon can be rendered useless by improper employment as demonstrated by the Allied use of tanks in 1916. Finally, they understood that new doctrine, organizations and equipment were useless unless training could instill in soldiers and their leaders the required standards of performance in employing them.

> [General] Ludendorff [the defacto Chief of the German General Staff] knew the effort required to transform published doctrine into applied doctrine, for he recognized that "orders on paper were of themselves useless, they had to be ground into the flesh and blood of officers and men."[30]

How to fight had to be taught and reinforced at every tactical level until that knowledge had been accepted and internalized.

Three important lessons about change and military organizations can be distilled from this study. They are generalizations, but as such they remain as true today as they were in 1917.[31]

1. Change is normal. Change is not an abnormal occurrence in military organizations, though it is often treated that way. To remain effective in a changing world, military organizations must change. Not even combat stems the tide of change. Lieutenant Colonel Henry C. Thompson writing about staff performance recently noted

> . . . The only constant factor on the battlefield is change . . . Those that cannot adapt rapidly enough will not survive.[32]

Today's modernization effort is not an aberration, or something the Army will soon get over.

2. Doctrine is the standard. Efforts to change a military organization will be misdirected unless there is a doctrinal framework to provide guidelines.

> In the process of bringing about change, there must be a conceptual notion of what must be done to fight successfully in the battle environments of today and tomorrow.33

Doctrine provides a military organization with a common language and purpose that serves to unite the many diverse elements into a team effort. Doctrine is essential to the Army's preparation for and conduct of war.[34]

3. Training is the carrier wave. Changes can only be translated into reality through training and understanding. Training is the method by which the full combined combat potential of new doctrine, organizations and equipment can be realized and sustained. Lieutenant Colonel John A. Cope emphasized this relationship in the August 1984 Military Review

> . . . A change in tactical doctrine [organizations and equipment] always demands an increased commitment to training.[35]

K. A Historical Perspective-- The US Army

The US Army has been no stranger to extensive change, especially since 1940. As the German mechanized Blitzkrieg raced across France in that year, the Army was conducting maneuvers at home that included two horse cavalry divisions.

At that time, the Army was a shell of what it would be by 1945. It had a total strength of only 190,000 officers and men, organized into 11 understrength divisions. Its soldiers were armed with M-1903 bolt-action rifles and light tanks mounting nothing larger than a .50 caliber machinegun. By 1945, the US boasted a world-class Army with a total strength of 2,502,000 officers and men organized into 90 divisions. The standard infantry rifle was the .30 caliber semiautomatic Garand-- the best infantry shoulder arm of World War II. Armored forces were equipped with a variety of tanks, some like the new Pershing mounting a high velocity 90mm gun. This transformation, which took place between 1940 and 1945, was as impressive an achievement as any in military history.36

Yet much of what was accomplished was done through a hit-or-miss process. The overall success of the Army's World War II effort should not conceal the failures which also occurred. The tank destroyer is an excellent example of one such failure.[37] This hit-or-miss approach for initiating and incorporating change had worked adequately in the past for the Army, during more slow, change-resistant times. The industrial revolution had put such an approach on notice but World War II put it to rest. The economic and human risk involved in using a hit-or-miss approach to

change in terms of new doctrine, organizations and equipment was too great to accept.38

Ways to reduce the risk of failure and improve efficiency were studied. As a result, significant changes were implemented, such as the establishment of a standard materiel acquisition process. However, no great thought was given to an overall strategy of how to manage the continuous cycle of change. Writing about organizational change in the 1st Infantry Division, Lieutenant Colonel Bruce T. Caine noted some reasons for this lapse.

> . . . Change management is a neophyte academic discipline which is hampered by a paradox. To study change scientifically requires well-controlled, comparative experimentation, but, in most [changing organizations], resource constraints prevent this form of investigation. [Also] the organization must reorganize before it can experience the effects of the changes in any total sense. Once redesign is accomplished, the new structure gains a life of its own and returning to a previous structure may appear more difficult than living with the new design regardless of the newly discovered problems.39

When the Army began to modernize in the 1970s not much thought was given to how the changes would occur. To most people, modernization was new equipment. The change was simply to swap "old tools" for "new tools", however, as the modernization program matured, complexity increased. Rapid changes requiring the introduction, incorporation and sustainment of a new doctrine, and numerous new

organizations and items of equipment were causing unexpected problems. Throughout the Army soldiers at all levels of responsibility began to realize that the management of change, not just the introduction of equipment should be the focus of modernization. Without a method to deal with change systematically, the chances for a smooth transition would be diminished.[40] By the early 1980s necessity forced the Army to establish a guiding strategy, or doctrine, for change. There was a need, once and for all, to capture the emerging lessons and publish doctrinal guidelines to help commanders, staffs, and soldiers at all levels to gain control of the change process. A force modernization officer in the 7th Infantry Division noted

> . . . Information concerning the learning that occurs as new organizations are formed must not be discarded nor forgotten, but must be assimilated into a larger body of knowledge to shape our military units into high performing organizations.[41]

In 1985, with guidance from Lieutenant General Carl E. Vuono, commander of the Combined Arms Center, Fort Leavenworth, a group of officers at the Command and General Staff College developed the Army's first management of change doctrine. The doctrine, published in FC 100-11, was called FORCE INTEGRATION.

CHAPTER 3

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CHAPTER 4

MANAGING CHANGE

> We are not passive bystanders in an unfolding cinema where we are condemned to watch the future unfold.
>
> Joseph Coates[1]

A. Force Integration.

Force integration is the Army's management of change doctrine. It provides unit commanders and staffs in a division with a guide for action in the face of change. The application of force integration principles allows a division to gain control of, and efficiently implement doctrinal, organizational and equipment changes with minimal disruption to current operations and capabilities.[2] Commanders and staffs need not be so inundated with the day-to-day turbulence caused by change that they can no longer see what is around them, understand what is coming, or plan for the future.

Force integration is a comprehensive, logical way to view, plan for, implement and sustain change. The approach is multidimensional and deals with doctrine, organizations, equipment and people in an interrelated manner, from the

introduction of a change through "ownership." Ownership is that state when a change has been fully accepted by the soldiers and leaders of an organization; when new becomes routine.[3] Force integration is a new way for divisions to approach modernization, but it is based on three familiar concepts:

1. A total system approach to change.

2. Concern for the human dimension in change.

3. Importance of training in the change process.

B. The Total System Approach.

The need to establish and maintain a credible force creates a serious dilemma for the Army. The US does not have the resources to match the threat soldier-for-soldier and tank-for-tank. While some quantitative improvements are possible, most are not. The limits on manpower and dollars are real. The preferred course of action has become a qualitative approach. Beat the enemy, not with a bigger force, but with a better force.[4]

> . . . the United States and its allies will not be capable of achieving numerical parity with Soviet and Warsaw Pact forces. Any significantly increased force effectiveness will, consequently, be due to superiority in other areas contributing to combat power.5

To build and maintain a quality force requires that all the elements that influence its combat effectiveness be addressed. This is the "total system" approach. By addressing each element as part of a whole system, the overall effect is magnified with the desired result being a force that is more capable than the sum of its parts.[6]

> . . . weapons, organizations and tactics are interdependent and if properly combined, synergistic . . . we cannot attempt to create the most effective fighting forces by concentrating soley on improved weapons systems. We must simultaneously consider weapons, tactics and organizations if maximum potential is to be realized.[7]

This should not come as a revelation to most soldiers; however, the fact remains that the Army has long been facinated with technology and hardware to achieve battlefield success at the expense of doctrinal and organizational solutions. Major Robert A. Doughty, writing about the evolution of US Army doctrine, noted in 1979 that

> Over the long term, the Army has placed a greater emphasis on the development of new weapons than on the development of how the new weapons should be employed.[8]

The force modernization effort underway in the Army today began solely as the introduction of new equipment, and only slowly broadened to include doctrinal and organizational improvements.[9] Budget limitations and political realities dictating the Army's strategic role, its

size and equipment available forced this change to a more balanced approach.[10] This change benefited the Army, especially in its force modernization effort.

> Force modernization changes are designed to improve organizational effectiveness. But implementing force modernization without regard to an organization's system relationships could swamp our units with overwhelming, although well-intentioned, change.[11]

A division is a complex system, often attempting to achieve conflicting goals as modernization proceeds. Trying to sustain current capabilities while incorporating newer, more potent capabilities is a difficult balancing act. If careful thought is not given to how this is to be done the balance can quickly collapse. For example, the reorganization of the division cavalry squadron to a DIV 86 or J-series configuration[12] is more than just a limited reshuffle of people and equipment. It is an action which impacts on the entire organization. Without tanks, the new J-series cavalry squadron can no longer perform guard and covering force missions for the division. Unless other units are trained to assume this mission, or the cavalry squadron trains with cross-attached tanks, a significant capability will disappear with reorganization. This, and other cause-effect, systemic relationships must be considered as a division plans its transition. Using a systems approach, planners are able to view the division as

a dynamic structure of interrelated parts, and plan for all aspects of change, stated or unstated.[13]

C. The Human Dimension.

The human dimension is, without a doubt, the most demanding aspect of implementing a change. Recent history bears this judgement out.

> . . . In each of the three periods of major [doctrinal] change, one of the most difficult tasks has been the changing of the Army officers' and soldiers' thinking.
>
> One would suppose such changes can occur with ease in a hierarchical system. The experience of the past three decades, however, amply demonstrates that one cannot simply erect a new doctrine, organize new formations and procure new equipment without an intense effort to redirect the thinking of individuals in the Army.[14]

Change is not a desired state for most people. Soldiers who are especially fond of routine and regimen, detest the uncertainties involved in change. This is because the old way of doing things is well known, and the new way of doing things has not been established. They are confident and clear about the old but apprehensive about the new. A soldier who is considered an "expert" on a piece of equipment may resist the change to a newer version because he can no longer be viewed as the expert.[15] Knowledge is power and without it he is no longer in control.

> . . . Loss of control results in a feeling of powerlessness which in turn leads to a need to hold on. Holding on to what we have is accompanied by strong resistance to new ideas proposed by others.16

The same soldier may also be apprehensive about organizational changes that dismantle smoothly functioning work teams and reestablish new work teams. When such new teams and groups are formed, the potential increases for disagreements and conflicts over the way work is to be done.17

> Frequently . . . managers [or commanders] will attempt to introduce new policies or activities which conflict with "the way things are." Many who will be affected by the change may have been instrumental in designing the current state and thus receive the message that what they have been doing is wrong. Embarrassment and loss of face lead to resistance . . .18

The degree to which soldiers and their leaders have accepted and understood the changes taking place in the Army today will ultimately be tested on the battlefield. On that battlefield, new tactics, organizations and equipment will be of little value if they are employed improperly. The key to winning is a complete understanding, at every level, of how to fight. The extent to which this understanding can be instilled in soldiers and their leaders will determine the confidence they will have in themselves, each other, their weapons systems, and their units.19 It is for this reason

that the human dimension is such a significant part of force integration doctrine as well as AirLand Battle doctrine.

> . . . The human element-- the soldier's training, courage and leadership --figures more heavily than any other single element in the picture of battle in the new operations manual [the 1982 version of FM 100-5].[20]

If this understanding is to be achieved, those who plan and implement force modernization programs must be attentive to the human dimension. Leaders have always been charged to care for their soldiers. This duty should not be forgotten during force modernization.

> . . . transition from old to new requires careful timing and planning. It is a time of extra effort, frustration, and stress. During this time managers [and leaders] need to remain attentive to individuals and to provide reinforcement and support.[21]

Acceptance and understanding can only be achieved through learning. And learning comes from education and training.

D. Training.

Training is the most critical element of force integration doctrine, though it is often overlooked. The detailed planning involved up front in the introduction of new equipment and organizations tends to obscure the concurrent need to plan for training in order to assimilate the new capabilities that modernization offers to an entire organization. Commanders at all levels should never forget

that the best weapon or organizational structure can be rendered useless by improper employment.[22] Success on the battlefield is not a matter of things, but men. History bears this out. FM 100-5 echoes the same theme.

> . . . Training is the cornerstone of success[23]

The broad scope of training necessary to truly make the changes associated with modernization both useful and permanent was not well understood as the Army began to modernize. Force modernization training was essentially new equipment training. The primary purpose of new equipment training was to transfer knowledge from the materiel developer to the receiving unit. It addressed how to operate and maintain the equipment, and to a much lesser degree, how to employ it.[24] There the official training effort stopped. It appears no consideration was given to other necessary, but less obvious training requirements. Lieutenant Colonel Jack A. LeCuyer expressed dissatisfaction with this approach when he wrote

> . . . if the focus is simply to ensure that all goes well in the fielding unit, then the attempt to integrate a new combat capability will fail. The level of proficiency a unit has achieved will make little difference if the maneuver commander and his staff do not fully integrate the improved capability in brigade slice training . . .[25]

Consideration must be given to training brigade and division staff members who are responsible for planning the employment of modernized units as part of a combined arms team. Consideration must be given to training the other members of the combined arms team who have to integrate their organizational and equipment capabilities with those of the modernized units.[26] For example, a division which fields the Blackhawk utility helicopter has significant training responsibilities outside of the aviation battalion. Infantry and artillery commanders who rely on aerial transport and resupply must understand the new capabilities of the Blackhawk and integrate such considerations into their training and warplanning.

If such training was conducted early in the modernization effort, it was done outside the official scope of modernization training. This was done and documented in the 8th Infantry Division. Lieutenant Colonel Jack A. LeCuyer, the division's Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, explained the division's force integration philosophy in the February 1984 Military Review

> . . . Force development [or force modernization] actions and a division's training program should not be viewed as an "either/or" proposition of mutually exclusive actions. Rather they are complementary aspects of the same process that move toward a common goal. They stimulate leadership at every echelon to revalidate or update critical battle tasks as new doctrine, force structure and equipment are fielded.[27]

This philosophy has now become a part of training doctrine.

> . . . force integration must be viewed as an inseparable part of combined arms training . . . for every force integration action, there is a requirement for all units to review their METL [mission essential task list] and make adjustments as necessary in training . . .
>
> FC 25-100: Training the Force[28]

That does not mean that critics of the force integration approach to training do not exist. Lieutenant Colonel John A. Cope, in a thought-provoking Military Review article, disagreed with the integrated training approach. He felt that the many changes associated with force modernization were overloading the ability of units to train properly.

> . . . When viewed from the bottom, tactical units must be trained to implement FM 100-5 today, and the introduction of new materiel only complicates an already significant training requirement. It competes with doctrine related training by increasing the demands on a relatively fixed amount of training time to develop technical competence with new equipment.
>
> The Army cannot meet two different training demands and still realize high standards in both.[29]

The force integration approach to training says the Army can meet those training demands and more, if they are approached as an interdependent series of training tasks and multi-echelon, combined arms training is utilized. Such an approach worked in the 8th Infantry Division[30], however, like any doctrine, force integration must prove its utility

in practice throughout the Army. Time will be its ultimate judge.

E. The Process.

The successful integration of new capabilities into a division, is described in Chapter 6 of FC 100-11.[31] It follows the same track as the cycle for developing a training program outlined in FC 25-100.[32]



Figure 4. Force Integration Process[33]

The division must first identify coming changes in doctrine, organizations and equipment which will in any way influence its battlefield capabilities. This requires the mastery of

numerous information sources and coordination with higher headquarters.

> . . . The key factor here [in the force integration process] is information-- readily available, timely, complete, and confirmed and stabilized at the critical point in time. This allows planning at lower levels to be conducted in an environment of relative certainty. The unit training environment is turbulent enough . . .34

The impacts of new doctrine, organizations and equipment are expressed in terms of "what we need to fight" (organizational structures, people, and equipment) and "how we intend to fight" (doctrine, tactics, and techniques). How and where these changes are to be incorporated is determined by guidance from the division commander. The guidance is, to a great extent, based on his concept of how the division combined arms team will fight on the AirLand Battlefield, as influenced by doctrine and the factors of mission, enemy, terrain, troops and time available (METT-T). The division commander's concept must be incremental and evolutionary.

> . . . The application of AirLand Battle doctrine must be such that a division can fight today, six months from now, three years from now or 10 years from now. Developing a ["Army of Excellence"] doctrine and a "Today's Division" doctrine will not satisfy that requirement. Very few serving soldiers will ever see the complete [Army of Excellence]. Future technological breakthroughs, the production base capabilities and yearly purchases of equipment all contribute to an evolving organization rather tha a fixed goal to be achieved by a specified date. Soldiers in the field must be prepared to employ combined arms regardless of the status of transition.[35]

The concept is then translated into a division Battle Focus. A Battle Focus is the commander's vision for his unit, further clarified by purpose, mission and goals.[36] Prerequisites for winning the AirLand Battle are a clarity of purpose and a widespread understanding of how the division commander uses the doctrinal concepts of FM 100-5.[37] A Battle Focus provides this clarity of purpose. It translates a unit's requirements into the essence of its purpose.

> In the European theater, the key to narrowing the vast body of individual and collective tasks to a manageable quantity is to concentrate all training on the unit's GDP [general defense plan] mission. This enables a leader to . . . train his unit for a real, tangible, easily understood mission.[38]

These requirements include training objectives and individual and collective battle tasks at every level within the division. Also included are technical tasks that must be accomplished in order to make resources available to

AD-A172 845 FORCE INTEGRATION DOCTRINE AND DIVISION STAFF ORGANIZATION(U) ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLL FORT LEAVENWORTH KS D R JORREY 06 JUN 86 2/2

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


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support the integration effort. These technical tasks might be requisitioning additional resources, or even redistributing on-hand assets.

Following this, a strategy is developed that combines the training and technical requirements in a mutually supportive manner. It considers resource constraints and systemic interrelationships. The strategy serves as a road map for force integration actions and is then integrated into the division's combined arms training and sustainment program. The training program enables leaders to train individuals and units to required levels of proficiency on those critical force integration battle tasks. This is complemented by a transition program that provides guidance for the mechanical actions involved in new equipment fielding or unit reorganization actions that support, not disrupt, the training program. Once implemented these programs are evaluated periodically. The evaluation provides a feedback mechanism to adjust or validate the Battle Focus, training or transition strategies, or recommend doctrinal, organizational or equipment improvements.

F. Critical Staff Functions.

Force integration is an ambitious undertaking for any division, especially when added to the daily demands of training and readiness. To make it work requires substantial effort from the division staff. The staff is the nerve center of the division. Only the staff is positioned and resourced to pull together the diverse aspects of force modernization into a synchronized force integration program. Lieutenant Colonel Bruce T. Caine, a force modernization officer with the 1st Infantry Division, explained the importance of the division staff in an analogy. In the analogy he described force modernization as a totem pole-- a hierarchy of figures representing the command levels involved in force modernization. The figure at the base of the totem pole, which bore the weighty responsibility of anchoring the entire structure, represented the division staff.39

> . . . The farseeing eagles at the top [HQDA] and the anchor figure at the base [the division] are linked together by a series of interdependent commands that, unfortunately, like the figures on some totem poles, each appear to have a separate focus and unique perception of the world.
>
> To make things more difficult, the middle of the force modernization totem pole appears to be multishafted rather than a single, integrated, well coordinated whole. New equipment, new organizations, new personnel management policies and doctrine, originating from a unified vision at the top, have been managed as distinct activities or, at best, as marginally related subjects. While this may be functional at certain levels, for the bottom of the totem pole . . . these modernization efforts are intimately interrelated and mutually dependent.40

For a staff to fulfill its responsiblilities in such a difficult and complex environment, certain functions are critical. These functions are:[41]

1. Long-range planning.

2. Horizontal coordination.

3. Information management.

4. Cueing.

5. Oversight (monitoring execution and sustainment).

G. Long-range Planning.

Successful force integration requires charting a known course and begins with long-range planning. This is

necessary if the division is to gain control of its transition rather than letting events control it. Lieutenant Colonel John E. Rourke, a force modernization officer from the 24th Infantry Division, wrote:

> . . . Everything takes longer than you think-- so plan ahead.[42]

Unlike any other peacetime activity for which the division must plan, force modernization is unique. The nature of force modernization is such that most of the decisions which obligate funds, dictate training or forecast spare parts and ammunition requirements five years or more down the road are made early on.[43] The long lead times involved tend to diminish or even eliminate staff planning efforts. Given the magnitude of change taking place, all on different timelines, staff planners tend to focus on near term actions.

> A short term perspective and an excessive concern for near term requirements are possibly the greatest threats to the force modernization process. We must teach ourselves and our fellow soldiers to be "practical futurists" if we are to achieve optimum combat effectiveness. Guided and encouraged by our commanders, we must visualize the integration of numerous new systems and units and evaluate the capabilities and limitations of these innovations before they are fielded. We must take time to study the future.[44]

Long-range planning lapses can often lead to sizeable problems. For example, major facility construction requires a four year lead time.[45] A division staff which waits until

the last minute to become involved in planning for the introduction of a new piece of equipment may discover special facility requirements which cannot be met in time. A serious disconnect such as this, can disrupt training and detract from a division's warfighting capability.

The division staff must ensure that long-range planning is given ample attention on a continuing basis despite the overwhelming demands of current and short-term requirements. Force integration, like combat demands that the staff fight the present battle, plan tomorrow's actions, and project future operations simultaneously.46

H. Horizontal Coordination.

Force integration planning requires a staff to look across the spectrum of change. Only from a horizontal viewpoint can the staff consider and serve the needs of the entire division. This is extremely difficult to do when force modernization actions are fragmented among primary staff sections according to their vertical/functional orientation.



Figure 5. Horizontal Coordination Required for Force Integration

An example of this would be to assign the responsibility for introducing a new piece of equipment to the G4 (Assistant Chief of Staff for Logistics). Fielding a new piece of equipment often involves more than logistics however. There may be organizational changes required, which is the responsibility of the G3 (Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations). There may also be a need for new personnel to operate and maintain the new equipment, which is the responsibility of the G1 (Assistant Chief of Staff for Personnel).[47] Unless extensive horizontal coordination

occurs each staff section would probably place the fielding action within its own set of priorities. Planning and execution would be disjointed because of varying degrees of emphasis among the staff sections. Disconnects may occur, resulting in failure.48

On a division staff it is always possible, indeed probable, that a staff specialist (vertical/functional expert) will develop a plan, in all good faith, which he believes will benefit the entire division. Before the plan is adopted however, it is necessary for someone, usually the Chief of Staff, to evaluate the plan from a much broader, horizontal viewpoint. He must ask questions about interface and coordination with other staff elements and organizations within the division to determine the impacts of such a plan across the division. Focused on their own areas of expertise, staff specialists are not normally interested in lateral and related functions.[49] Planning and executing the integration of new doctrine, organizations, and equipment into a division requires extreme sensitivity to horizontal coordination. When dealing with multidimensional change, the cumulative impact is not simply additive, but the product of a complex multiplicative function. Changes in one dimension, prompts adjustments in others. These in turn influence further facets in an ever-increasing web of interdependencies.[50] Planning in such an enviroment can

only succeed if all aspects of the problem are considered and accounted for.

I. Information Management.

> The dominant commodity in American society is information . . . what we've essentially done is build a society in the last six or seven decades based on and industrial model . . . we got that all in place, and its instantly obsolescent because now what's important is knowledge, information, handling it, preserving it, storing it, packaging it, using it.[51]

The ability of a division staff to plan for and execute force integration is based upon its ability to manage information. That ability is severly constrained by the fragmented nature of the information involved, and the varying organizational structures and communication methodologies employed. Much of the key information associated with force modernization is spread among numerous documents, publications and automated information systems. The information that a staff needs for force integration planning is buried throughout these documents and systems. Also it doesn't arrive in a neat package. It enters the division through numerous points at different times. Information can be disregarded by one staff section that is valuable to another. The vertical/functional orientation that was mentioned previously can cause this.

Information must be managed to overcome these deficiencies. It must be quickly provided to those who need it, both in the chain of command and across functional boundaries. There is no place in the force integration business for surprises. Open and continuous communications both horizontally and vertically at all levels is the best insurance against that unwelcome possibility.[52] The information should be organized so as to provide only that which is necessary to those who need it. Care must be taken to avoid information overload. The overload condition occurs whenever an individual or staff receives more information than it can effectively process. The ability to process information is affected by the intensity, relevance and meaning of the information. It is important to note that it takes longer to process non-relevant information than relevant information.[53]

The means by which information is transmitted is also important. Reliance on face-to-face meetings with their significant costs in time, slow automatic data information network messages, and telephone calls to conduct most business has perpetrated an inefficient, compartmented information exchange mechanism on most divisions. Industry has been quick to adopt more productive information management practices. Given the present cost of managing

modernization it would seem appropriate to investigate and adopt methods that offered utility.54

J. Cueing.

Cueing is a necessary staff function, especially in a resource constrained environment. It is addressed in FC 100-11 and mentioned by Lieutenant Colonel Jack A. LeCuyer in his Military Review article, "Force Integration".[55] It is also alluded to in several unit force modernization SOPs. Cueing is essentially a milestone methodology used to orchestrate and monitor the accomplishment of critical tasks.

MONTHS	ACTIVITY	ACTION/	COORD
N-18	PREPARE AND SUBMIT MINOR CONSTRUCTION REQUEST	G4	DFAE
N-16	PROGRAM FUNDS INTO FOLLOWING YEAR FUNDS	COMPT	
N-12	FORECAST AMMO FOR NET	G3	
N-12	REVIEW NEW MTOE	G3	
N-11	DETERMINE SECURITY/PHYSICAL SECURITY REQUIREMENTS	G2	
N-9	REQUEST SLAC DECK	DMMC	G4
N-7	APPOINT UNIT PROJECT OFFICER	UNITS	FM
N-6	REQUISITION PUBLICATIONS	G1	
N-6	REQUISITION SPECIAL TOOLS AND TMDE	DMMC	
	SELECT OS MAINT PERSONNEL	G3	DISCOM

Figure 6. New Equipment Fielding Milestones

Many of the technical tasks which must be accomplished in support of force integration are time dependent. One misstep can create problems for all the steps that follow. To ensure that these tasks are done in time, milestones are established and enforced. Units, and even other staff sections must know and then be reminded of when actions are to be accomplished. These milestones should be integrated into the division's training/activity calendar so that conflicts may be resolved and the entire process synchronized.[56]

> Unless commanders and staffs down to company level are constantly reminded of force modernization actions through their training plans and calendars, the pressures of normal unit activities will tend to obscure the need for advanced planning at the unit level where. . .[57]

K. Oversight.

The oversight function provides a method for making follow-up checks. The rapidity and volume of changes associated with modernization can easily cause incremental and/or selective forgetting.[58] One of the most significant aspects of force integration doctrine is that it recognizes that change must be sustained. To simply introduce a new doctrine or item of equipment to a division does not ensure that it will be properly used, or used at all, after the initial introductory period is over.

> However the change is conceived and implemented, it will fall by the wayside unless it is embodied into the organization's policies, procedures, and reward systems.[59]

A routine oversight program can provide feedback to determine if the intended change was accomplished, and then if it is being sustained.

CHAPTER 4

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8. Doughty, Robert A., MAJ. Leavenworth Papers No 1: The Evolution of US Army Tactical Doctrine, 1946-1976. (Fort Leavenworth: Command and General Staff College, 1979), p.47.

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12. The term "J-series" refers to an organization which will meet the design requirements of the DIV 86 or AOE study. The original division cavalry squadron design had 3 armored cavalry troops (with tanks) and 1 air cavalry troop. The J-series design cavalry squadron has 2 cavalry troops (less tanks) and 2 air cavalry troops.

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14. Doughty, op. cit., p.47.

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20. Holder, L.D., LTC and Wass de Czege, Huba, LTC. "The New FM 100-5," Military Review 62 (July 1982), p.55.

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23. U.S. Department of the Army. FM 100-5: Operations. (Washington D.C.: US Army, 1982), p.1-4.

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32. FC 100-11, op. cit., pp.6-2 to 6-5.

33. Ibid., p.6-3.

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38. Lynch, William R. III, LTC and Bloxham, Garth T., CPT. "Training in the 8th Infantry Division (Mechanized)," Military Review 63 (September 1983), p.34.

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40. Ibid., p.18.

41. FC 100-11, op. cit., pp.5-4 to 5-11. The FC identifies the horizontal coordination function as 'recommending priorities'; and the oversight function as 'monitoring execution and sustainment.'

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45. U.S. Army War College. Army Command and Management: Theory and Practice, 1985-1986. (Carlisle Barracks: Army War College, 1985), p.24-3.

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48. Conversations with LTC Hairston, Force Modernization Officer, III Corps and Fort Hood, June 1984. Conducted during a fact finding trip to Fort Hood when the author was a force development/integration instructor on the CGSC faculty.

49. Divers, V.L. "Some Thoughts On The Management Process And Systems Integration," Army Organizational Effectiveness Journal 8 (No 2, 1984), pp.17-18.

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51. Coates, op. cit., p.19.

52. Caine, op. cit., p.33.

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56. FC 100-11, op. cit., pp.5-6 to 5-7.

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58. LeCuyer, op. cit., p.32.

59. Goodfellow, op. cit., p.28.

CHAPTER 5

ORGANIZING FOR CHANGE

> And let it be noted that there is no more delicate matter to take in hand, nor more dangerous to conduct, nor more doubtful in its success, than to set up as a leader in the introduction of changes. For he who innovates will have for his enemies all those who were well off under the existing order of things, and only lukewarm supporters in those who might be better off under the new.
>
> Machiavelli[1]

A. General.

When any complex organization undergoes change, especially change as extensive and far-reaching as the current modernization effort, management of the process becomes a critical factor. To the greatest degree possible, an organization must control its transition and not let events control it. Lieutenant Colonel Bruce T. Caine, writing about force modernization in the January 1983 Military Review, stated emphatically:

> We must master change and make it our ally.[2]

This is as true at HQDA as it is at divisions, brigades and battalions throughout the Army. Uncontrolled, haphazard

change is inefficient and wasteful of limited resources. For a division, just maintaining acceptable readiness levels is resource intensive. The added requirement of integrating new doctrine, organizations and equipment, makes available resources even more precious. A division that does not carefully manage its resources can quickly become overwhelmed.[3] It is therefore vital that a division plan for and control change.

B. The Organizational Challenge.

General Donn A. Starry, writing in Military Review, identified a set of generalized requirements for effecting change. Principal among these was the requirement for "an institution or mechanism to identify the need for change, draw up parameters for change and to describe what is to be done and how that differs from what has been done before."[4] At division level this mechanism translates into an in-place management structure to plan for and control change. However, no matter what the structure may be, there is universal agreement that the additional demands of force integration cannot be adequately dealt with by the traditional division general staff.

> . . . it is not clear that a division staff organized along the traditional, stovepiped functional lines can deal with both the near-term execution of a combined arms training and sustainment program and the long-term planning required to integrate changes into [that program].5

For the most part, divisions are organized and staffed to deal with the present. However, during periods of great change, division staffs are faced with the complex task of planning and executing plans for three divisions simultaneously-- the present division, the division in transition, and the future division.[6] Organized as it is, the traditional division staff simply cannot cope with these demands. Two members of the 7th Infantry Division's light infantry division task force, charged with reorganizing the division in November 1983, wrote:

> The perception that [modernization] of the of the magnitude described [reorganization of the 7th Infantry Division] can be managed in a "business as usual" manner must, by necessity, undergo radical surgery. Division and installation staff planners were and are consumed by the day-to-day and week-to-week actions leading up to that next field training exercise . . . Long-range planning ultimately plays second fiddle. If time is not taken to plan in the necessary detail, then complete implementation/execution of that plan will never occur . . .[7]

Organizations throughout the Army have recognized this problem and have taken steps to diminish its impact. Most divisions, and even HQDA, have established some form of ad

hoc staff organization to meet the demands of force integration.

> . . . we have created a special team to monitor this force integration process. The organization integration team (OIT) is a group of staff officers who manage the fielding and sustainment of organizations as integrated packages.
>
> HQDA[8]

> . . . A single agency, responsive to the commanders, must be established to serve the integrative function for total force modernization efforts.
>
> 1st Infantry Division[9]

> . . . A multidisciplined general staff section was needed for long-range planning, to monitor execution and, most importantly, to identify problems, resolve conflicts and provide resources for solutions.
>
> 8th Infantry Division[10]

> . . . A central coordinator at installation or division level. This is an absolute necessity for the fielding of major weapons systems.
>
> 24th Infantry Division[11]

The need for an integration element in addition to the present staff structure is not unique to the Army. A 1967 study by two scholars in the field of organizational behavior, Mr. Paul Lawrence and Mr. Jay Lorsch, predicted an increasing need for just such a department in research and development intensive industries.[12] Their study of ten business organizations in three distinct industries provided dramatic evidence of the importance of the integrative function. In the increasingly turbulent industrial environment, where boundaries between industries were

becoming blurred and markets were becoming unpredictable, they found the regular line hierarchy at the top of the organization overwhelmed. There were just too many crucial decisions to be resolved at the top of the organization. Company after company was commiting more and more manpower in an attempt to achieve collaboration between specialist functions within their organizations. Ultimately the research revealed a close correlation between the effectiveness of integration among functional departments (production, sales, research, etc.) and company growth and profits.13

Mr. Jay R. Galbraith, an organizational design consultant, arrived at a similiar conclusion in a working paper published in 1969. In that paper he said:

> . . . [Consider a] hypothetical organization . . . it is large and employs a number of specialist groups and resources in providing the output. After the task has been divided into specialist subtasks the problem is to integrate the subtasks around the completion of the global task. This is the problem of organization design . . . to create mechanisms that permit coordinated action across large numbers of interdependent roles . . .14

These civilian organizational design experts also agree that the form and substance of an integration department/staff is contingent upon certain environmental aspects such as task uncertainty[15] or degree of specialization.[16] Whatever the reason, a variety of solutions are possible. The structure

may be part-time, where action officers from each major staff element form a "shadow staff" and devote some time each day to planning and managing the integration process; or the structure may be full-time with selected personnel solely responsible for the integration process.[17]

C. Force Integration Roles.

Before exploring the structural design options for an integration staff element, it is appropriate to identify where on the division staff it should be located. The most important factor in such a decision is who on the staff, if anyone, should direct the integration effort.

1. Division Commander. When considering various force integration staff structures, there is one thing that is not situation dependent-- the role of the division commander. The division commander is responsible for the success or failure of the division in integrating the improved capabilities offered by force modernization. No matter what staff section has proponent responsibility for force integration, the division commander remains the chief force integrator. Lieutenant Colonel John E. Rourke summed up the commander's importance in one sentence:

> No fielding will be successful unless the commander at each level is personally involved.[18]

The division commander sets the stage for the entire process by defining the Battle Focus. In this role it is important that he understand the concept of long-term change in a complex system and the investment it requires in time and effort.[19] It is equally important that he provide visible support for that change. A mark of such commitment is direct access to the commander as well as access to the resources needed to implement the change.[20] Such backing is vital to the force integration staff, especially when it is part-time or informal; it is often their only authority when orchestrating the actions of numerous staff elements and units. Force integration plans must carry the same authority and weight as the more traditional tactical and training plans published by the G3.[21]

Determining which division staff officer should direct the division's force integration effort is not as clear cut as it was determining that the division commander had overall responsibility. There are generally three solutions to this dilemma.

2. Chief of Staff. The Chief of Staff is responsible for insuring that coordination occurs within the staff and that work is complete, timely and provides the commander with accurate information.[22] With this charter, the Chief of Staff is in an excellent position to

orchestrate the staff in planning and executing a division's force integration program. He can assign long-range planning tasks, facilitate horizontal communication and oversee near-term execution. Equally important is the fact that this can be done without drastic staff adjustments, and routine work relationships remain the same. However, this solution tends to break down as the pace of modernization quickens. Lawrence and Lorsch noted this problem when they wrote:

> . . . the traditional method of using the "shared boss" as the integrator is rapidly breaking down . . . The increasingly dynamic nature of many organizational environments is making the integrating job so important and so complex that it cannot be handled by a single general manager, no matter how capable he may be.[23]

This solution might be preferrable because it does not upset the traditional staff organization; but in fact, none of the divisions studied used this status quo approach. Those divisions that did use the Chief of Staff as the force integration proponent, provided him a small staff, often under the G3, to help manage the the program.[24] The manpower resources for this staff had to come from within the division prior to FY 84. HQDA acted in FY 84 to ease that burden somewhat by authorizing additional manpower to corps, divisions, separate brigades and cavalry regiments to manage modernization. Each division received two officer, two enlisted and one civilian manpower space.[25]

3. Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations, G3. The G3 is the next logical staff member to be assigned force integration proponency. This is because he has at his disposal manpower already devoted to two essential elements of the force integration process-- training and force development.[26] He can also be given the additional force modernization manpower mentioned above. However, under this arrangement force integration may still be perceived as an additional duty. Unless it is closely monitored, the G3's operations/training focus may skew the "total system" approach that is critical to successful force integration. Detailed support planning, personnel, materiel and facilities, may not receive sufficient emphasis. This problem can be overcome if the G3 is well educated on all facets of force integration and understands the importance of the "total system" approach.[27] The G3 as force integration proponent is the current approach at Fort Hood, Texas, for both tenant divisions, the 1st Cavalry and 2d Armored. These divisional force integration staffs are relatively small, however they receive a great deal of assistance from the III Corps force integration staff which is relatively well staffed.[28]

4. Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Integration, G6. The final solution is to create a new primary staff element charged with planning and monitoring

the integration of new doctrine, organizations and equipment into the division. The chief of this new staff element, sometimes designated the G6, is accorded co-equal status with the G1, G2, G3 and G4. This may seem to be a radical step to many traditionalists, however some divisions, such as the 7th Infantry Division, have felt compelled to do so to gain control of modernization.[29] In support of such an approach, Lawrence and Lorsch wrote that:

> . . . if an organization needs integrators at all, it is preferrable to legitimize these roles by formal titles and missions rather than to leave them in an informal status . . .[30]

He becomes the central focus for force integration actions in the division. With the G6 solely responsible for force integration, he is able to devote his energy to that single mission, unlike the other two arrangements already mentioned, which only added more work to an already full schedule. An excellent example of this approach can be found at Fort Stewart, Georgia.[31]

D. Organizational Approaches.

Once it has been determined which member of the division staff has responsibility for the force integration program, a management structure must be established to make it happen. Various staff structures are in use today throughout the Army. Regardless of where these structures

are situated, they fall into two general categories--central and matrix.32

1. Central. This approach, used to some degree by the 8th and 24th Infantry Divisions[33], brings together all necessary resources to manage the entire scope of force integration under one staff element. The expertise normally spread throughout the general staff (personnel, force structure, equipment, fiscal, facilities, etc.), is brought together in this staff element as individual functional experts.



Figure 7. Centralized Management Structure

To save on manpower, some of these experts may have dual responsibilities. The staff may also have positions dedicated to overseeing the fielding of certain major

weapons systems, i.e., AH-64 system manager. By centralizing such expertise in a single staff element the division improves its long-range planning and information management capabilities. In the words of Lieutenant Colonel Jack A. LeCuyer, it becomes "the division's corporate long-range planner."[34] It is very effective in centralized planning. At the same time it is also resource intensive, often at a cost to other staff elements. This is a difficult tradeoff for a division commander to make. Should he commit substantial manpower resources to long-range planning for events he will never see, at the expense of manpower dedicated to the near-term execution of events which effect the division current readiness posture? The 7th Infantry Division commander was faced with this problem when the division began planning for its reorganization to the AOE 10,000-man light infantry division structure. He chose to establish a small transition task force to accomplish the long-range planning. In the aftermath of the reorganization a staff officer in the transition task force wrote:

> In retrospect, it may have been better for the division to have bitten the bullet in January 1984 and have staffed the transition office with the requisite number of personnel who could have been in both the detailed planning and execution . . . Continuity in the transition management office was essential . . .[35]

The size of this type of force integration staff element also invites units and other staff elements to abdicate their force integration responsibilities. This can be overcome by instituting a milestone/cueing system, described earlier, which controls the handoff between long-range planning and near-term execution. The force integration staff, like any staff large or small, facilitates rather than executes.[36] Some manpower can be saved through the use of automation. Fort Hood, with its long history of involvement in Army modernization initiatives, considers automation to be a necessary part of its modernization management effort.

> . . . The speed with which change has been occurring has made the traditional means of communication less than adequate. Reliance on face-to-face meeting with their significant costs in temporary duty funds and time, slow automatic data information network messages and letters, and telephone calls to conduct much of our business has perpetrated an inefficient, compartmented information exchange mechanism.[37]

The automation resources currently in use at Fort Hood allows the III Corps and Fort Hood Modernization Office to screen and evaluate the vast amounts of conflicting information and guidance received from higher headquarters.[38]

2. Matrix. The matrix approach, used by the 1st Cavalry and 2d Armored Divisions at Fort Hood and the 1st Infantry Division at Fort Riley[39], functions with a small

central management cell supported by a network or matrix of staff officers throughout the staff. The primary purpose of the management cell is to orchestrate the force integration process and facilitate interstaff communication. With matrix management this is not done through direct command channels but rather through formal or informal action coordination channels. Most of the staff officers in the network are working for two bosses at once; hence the use of the descriptive term matrix. The matrix approach is a very efficient use of scarce manpower resources, especially when used in conjunction with an efficient automation system.



Figure 8. Matrix Management Structure

It is very dependent, however, on how well the management cell can maintain interest and exact effort early in the

process from units and other staff elements. At Fort Hood interest is maintained through command group emphasis.40 Also, there is the problem that staff action officers must balance the demands of two bosses-- the force integration chief and his regular organizational chief. Lieutenant Colonel Bruce T. Caine writing about these difficulties in the 1st Infantry Division noted:

> As conflicts will inevitably arise in such an arrangement, conflict resolution procedures must be established that encourage coordination between [the force integration chief] and the affected agency chief or unit commander . . .41

A way to overcome these conflicts before they occur is a continuing command review program. This and other management techniques are important additives to the efficiency and effectiveness of any organizational approach.

E. Management Techniques.

No matter what organizational approach is used, there are several management techniques which, when used in conjunction with a given approach, can improve overall staff performance. Employed selectively, these techniques can maximize the the strengths of a given approach or minimize its weaknesses. Neither are the techniques mutually exclusive. They may be used alone, but more often than not they are used in combination.

1. Functional Expert. A functional expert is an acknowledged authority on a broad range of related actions, such as personnel, training or logistics. They may be assigned directly to the force integration staff or simply work on a regular basis with the force integration staff while assigned to another staff element. When manpower is scarce, the use of functional experts is very cost effective. Functional experts can deal with any problem in their area of expertise across a broad range of organizations. For example, a personnel expert can address the requirements associated with skill reclassification in an infantry unit as well as the stabilization criteria for pilots in an aviation unit. As a team, functional experts are an excellent resource for detailed long-range planning. This is the technique used at HQDA to monitor the force integration program. Teams of functional experts, called organization integration teams (OITs) manage the fielding and sustainment of similiar type organizations (infantry, armor, artillery, etc.) as integrated packages. A single team consists of:

> . . . the officer who heads the OIT; a force structure officer; a personnel specialist; an equipment acquisition officer; a maintenance and sustainment specialist; a training officer; a facilities manager; and a resource management specialist. Other people with expertise in special areas are added to the team as required in order to manage the organizations assigned to the team.[42]

2. System Manager. A system manager is an action officer in a unit or on the staff who performs specified tasks and coordinates actions associated with the fielding of a new tactical system.[44] Taken in isolation, this can seem to be an impossible task. However, by working in conjunction with a team of functional experts a system manager can succeed if he is properly educated. This can become a problem if the staff has no educational system to prepare the system manager for his duties. In contrast to the care and attention given to the other aspects of fielding a new system, the people who are assigned to make it happen are often given a quick briefing and plugged into the management structure. A poorly prepared system manager can cause serious planning lapses if his actions are not closely monitored.[45] This technique is most effective when the system manager is chosen from the fielding unit. He maintains a close working relationship with the force integration staff but remains assigned to the fielding unit. His presence maintains visibility and interest in the fielding unit. It also provides a quick, direct link to the division staff for any and all issues connected with the fielding that are of concern to the fielding unit commander and his staff.[46]

A variation on the system manager is the organizational expert. An organizational expert is an acknowledged

authority on all aspects of a "type" unit. They are practical managers whose mission is to translate theoretical force designs into functional organizations.[43]

3. Special/Standing Committee. This technique provides an excellent means to keep commanders and the primary staff informed and involved in the force integration process.

> . . . If anyone believes that the fielding of a major system [or a new organization] can be accomplished without frequent coordination meetings . . . they should not participate in the fielding of new equipment [or organizations].[47]

These committees meet on a regular basis to discuss and review future and on-going force integration initiatives. At Fort Riley this is a three-tiered system. An action officer level Force Modernization Council (FMC) meets monthly for coordination, planning and information sharing. An executive committee, the Force Modernization Standing Committee (FMSC), meets as required to receive, research and analyze missions, and to draft policy options and action guidance. Finally, a Force Modernization Command Review (FMCR) is conducted on a quarterly basis to provide an information and decision making forum for the Commanding General. During these review sessions force modernization policy and strategies are established.[48]

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29. Bussert and Sullivan, op. cit., p.

30. Lawrence and Lorsch, "New Management Job," op. cit., p.29.

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CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

> To profit from good advice requires more wisdom than to give it.
>
> John Churton Collins1

A. Conclusions.

Change is a condition that will always face the Army. In the past it has washed over the Army in waves, often dependent upon the wax and wane of national political and economic moods. These fluctuations have caused some soldiers to reason that change could be survived or even ignored, rather than squarely dealt with. Sometimes these individuals, wrongfully called traditionalists, even resist change, believing that the old ways were best. To some extent this is true. There are certain soldierly values and principles which have remained inviolate through the ages. These should not be confused with the mechanisms of warfighting-- doctrine, tactics, weapons and organizations --that must change as the battlefield environment changes. These changes cannot be ignored. If most futurists are to be believed, the past ebb and flow of change is giving way to an increasingly rapid continuum of change, driven principally by technological advances. Accordingly, the

Army must be prepared to deal with change on a regular basis if it is to remain a viable member of the national defense establishment. It must develop methods and mechanisms that allow change to occur quickly, without disrupting the day-to-day business of sustaining the Army's ability to deploy, fight and win on short notice.

This study looked at methods and mechanisms being used by division staffs to facilitate the change process. As a result of the research that was conducted, the following conclusions were arrived at:

1. <u>The division general staff, as currently organized, is ill suited for the demands of integrating new doctrine, organizations and equipment</u>. The most significant deficiencies noted were the failure to accomplish long-range planning requirements and horizontal coordination lapses during planning and execution. No element on the staff is solely responsible for long-range planning. The long-range planning requirement is fragmented among the various staff sections and receives uneven emphasis at best; often being ignored due to the press of "here-and-now" requirements. With the advent of AirLand Battle doctrine, the division staff has the wartime mission to plan and control the close fight as well as a new, long-range, "deep battle." The responsibility for planning and controlling the deep battle

is not fragmented among the staff sections. It is positioned in an ad hoc "deep planning cell" recommended by FC 101-55: Corps and Division Command and Control.[2] Why ignore deep, or long-range planning during peacetime? Most divisions are not ignoring it and have created ad hoc staff cells, called force integration or force modernization elements, to localize and enhance peacetime long-range planning. The structural design of the division staff also hampers horizontal coordination between staff elements. The vertical "stovepipe" orientation of each of the staff elements tends to inhibit effective lateral communication. FM 101-5: Staff Organization and Operations encourages staff officers to routinely coordinate actions laterally[3]; however, good intentions aside, if horizontal coordination between functional staff specialists is to become reality, some structural adjustments must be made. The peacetime problem is also of concern during wartime. The use of liaison officers and the establishment of cellular staff elements are adjustments to accomodate better lateral communication and coordination. During peacetime the division staff must also make adjustments if it is to successfully accomplish one of its most demanding and important missions-- force integration.

2. Ad hoc staff adjustments made to facilitate force integration should vary, dependent on the complexity

of the problem and the organizational environment. There is no standard answer as to how to organize for force integration. At installations where resources are already available to assist the division, investing in a large division force integration staff may not be the best use of valuable manpower. Rather, a division in that situation might be better served using a small staff employing matrix management. At installations where such resources are not available or the force integration problems are more intense and complex, a larger staff may be needed using techniques such as centralized management.

3. No permanent doctrinal changes should be made to the general staff organization based on peacetime requirements. The division general staff organization was designed for a wartime mission. That basic design, reflected in TOEs, should not be altered on the basis of the peacetime deficiencies noted in this study; however, adjustments can be made at the margin. Most divisions and installations operate with a relatively significant augmentation to meet peacetime mission requirements. These augmentation designs, reflected in Tables of Distribution and Allowance (TDAs), can be adjusted to enhance their ability to perform the force integration mission.

B. Recommendations.

1. Force integration education ongoing at this time should be continued. Though the study concentrated on the structural aspects of the staff, it quickly became apparent that informed staff officers were also an important issue. From the start of this era of Army modernization, effective integration of new doctrine, organizations and equipment has been hampered by a lack of understanding of how change is assimilated into a large organization. A few years ago many people within the Army would have believed that publishing a new doctrinal manual or organizational table, represented the completion of a change. They did not understand that the job was only half done. The soldiers receiving the new doctrine or organization would ultimately have to accept, understand and properly use them for the change to be completed. Fortunately, this lack of understanding is slowly evaporating due to several years of harsh reality. This trend is clearly evidenced in a progression of articles on the subject in professional journals. The Army should eliminate this wasteful on-the-job training through its educational system.

2. Where possible, adjustments to the division staff organization should be made to overcome the deficiencies noted in this study. No division is well

served by a staff operating at less than full efficiency, especially when the remedy can be found internally. Each division must decide on the form and extent of the adjustment to be made, however, it should be done to correct actual shortcomings. The adage, "if it isn't broken, don't fix it" applies here.

3. Permanent adjustments to installation TDA organizations should consider the deficiencies noted in this study. There is an effort underway at this time to standardize installation staff organizations. Any standard installation design recommendation should consider the results of this study.

C. Additional Considerations.

1. For the Army to develop methods and mechanisms to deal with change on a regular basis, a comprehensive doctrine must first be established which translates the vision of how this should occur into realistic, workable guidelines. The publication of FC 100-11: Corps/Division Force Integration was a start in the right direction, but only a start. Unfortunately, by addressing only the division-level view of change, FC 100-11 touched only one segment of the spectrum of change in the Army. For the management of change to be successful at division level, major commands and HQDA must make a complementary effort.

Until such a comprehensive doctrine or system is implemented, success at division level will be limited at best.

2. Many of the garrison general staff deficiencies noted in this study could also effect the staff's wartime performance. The current staff organization, overwhelmed by the demands of planning, coordinating and controlling force integration, could also be overwhelmed in planning, coordinating and controlling the complex aspects of the AirLand battlefield. Lieutenant Colonel Bruce T. Caine compared the force integration planning environment to combat:

> Planning in such a turbulent environment has much in common with operational planning in an active combat environment.4

Almost nowhere in the Army today can one find a truly TOE, by-the-book division staff. It is modified to meet peacetime requirements and then adjusted again to meet warfighting requirements during training exercises. The Army should seriously consider relooking the usefulness of the current general staff organization for future wartime service.5

3. Finally, no matter how smart the Army gets about change and the change process, the challenges will

remain. General Donn Starry noted this truth in "To Change An Army" when he wrote:

> The need to change will ever be with us. We may have analyzed the process, framed its essential parameters, and made some considerable progress toward arming ourselves with systematic mechanisms to permit change to take place. But that in no way ensures either that change will occur or that it will be an easy, orderly process.[6]

CHAPTER 6

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