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CYPRUS: THE KEY TO STABILITY ON THE SOUTHEASTERN FLANK
OF NATO(U) ARMY WAR COLL CARLISLE BARRACKS PA
R J DAVIS 09 APR 86


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CYPRUS:
THE KEY TO STABILITY ON THE
SOUTHEASTERN FLANK OF NATO

BY
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86 5 27 198

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SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE (When Data Entered)

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE		READ INSTRUCTIONS BEFORE COMPLETING FORM
1. REPORT NUMBER	2. GOVT ACCESSION NO.	3. RECIPIENT'S CATALOG NUMBER
AD-A168060		
4. TITLE (and Subtitle)		5. TYPE OF REPORT & PERIOD COVERED
Cyprus: The Key of Stability on the Southeastern Flank of NATO		STUDENT ESSAY
		6. PERFORMING ORG. REPORT NUMBER
7. AUTHOR(s)		8. CONTRACT OR GRANT NUMBER(s)
COL Robert J. Davis		
9. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME AND ADDRESS		10. PROGRAM ELEMENT, PROJECT, TASK AREA & WORK UNIT NUMBERS
U.S. Army War College Carlisle Barracks, PA 17013		
11. CONTROLLING OFFICE NAME AND ADDRESS		12. REPORT DATE
SAME		9 April 1986
		13. NUMBER OF PAGES
		27
14. MONITORING AGENCY NAME & ADDRESS (If different from Controlling Office)		15. SECURITY CLASS. (of this report)
		UNCLASSIFIED
		15a. DECLASSIFICATION/DOWNGRADING SCHEDULE
16. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of this Report)		
DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.		
17. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of the abstract entered in Block 20, if different from Report)		
18. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES		
19. KEY WORDS (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number)		
20. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number)		
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SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE(When Data Entered)

ABSTRACT

AUTHOR: Robert J. Davis, COL, FA

TITLE: The Key to Stability on the
Southeastern Flank of NATO

FORMAT: Individual Essay

DATE: 7 April 1986 PAGES: 23 CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

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USAWC MILITARY STUDIES PROGRAM PAPER

CYPRUS:
THE KEY TO STABILITY ON THE
SOUTHEASTERN FLANK OF NATO

AN INDIVIDUAL ESSAY

by

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9 April 1986

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CYPRUS:
THE KEY TO STABILITY ON THE
SOUTHEASTERN FLANK OF NATO

This summer will mark the twelfth anniversary of the Turkish occupation of Northern Cyprus. On 20 July 1974, Turkish soldiers conducted air and naval landings on the northern beaches of Cyprus in the biggest military operation in the Mediterranean since World War II. The occupation shocked the world and created military and political stresses which remain unsettled to this day. The island inhabitants, first having been subjected to a military coup by the leaders of Greece and then subsequently to military intervention by the Army of Turkey, were summarily torn into two distinct sections. The aftermath of this turmoil included mass killings, deportations and the partition of the island. The lingering legacy for the United States over the years has been one of frustration in trying to mediate and resolve the political dilemma between the two protagonists, Greece and Turkey. Compounding this explosive situation is the fact that these countries not only share a common border but are also allies in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

Caught in the middle between these "goliathes" is tiny Cyprus which is powerless to resolve the conflict without outside help. The endless charges and countercharges between Greece and Turkey over the Cyprus issue as well as on other sensitive regional issues have created an impasse with little expectation for peaceful resolution in the foreseeable future. From a military viewpoint, there is much concern about the viability and credibility of the critical southeastern flank of NATO and the ability of Greece and Turkey to perform their vital



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roles in a confrontation with the Warsaw Pact. Of increased importance is the growing military presence and influence of the Soviet Union and its impact on the fragile political stability in the Middle East and the countries bordering on the Mediterranean.

Turkey, Greece and Cyprus also have had long-term strategic importance for the United States and the NATO Alliance in the region. By providing locations for United States airbases, Turkey and Greece accommodate United States storage, maintenance, communications and reconnaissance facilities. Cyprus has aided United States access into Middle East trouble spots by permitting use of its communications and transportation facilities. Cyprus and Greece played a role in the evacuation of Palestine Liberation Organization fighters from Beirut in August 1983 while Turkey has frequently functioned as a diplomatic mediator.

The Cyprus related tensions have kept alive the possibility of a disastrous war between the two NATO allies. Indeed, early in 1985, the Greek government endorsed a military doctrine that identified Turkey as its principal adversary. Each country has wasted enormous amounts of energy and resources to defend against the other. Such a situation cannot continue indefinitely and demands resolution. It appears that the resolution of the Cyprus deadlock cannot occur without a simultaneous move toward detente by both Greece and Turkey. The Cyprus problem presents a unique challenge for a United States foreign policy that must deftly walk between bitter historical adversaries.

The purpose of this paper is to analyze the Cyprus situation and highlight the importance of its resolution to NATO's interests. This paper will examine the issues from four general perspectives: (1) The

importance of the Eastern Mediterranean area to NATO and the potential military threat from the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact (2) A brief review of the military posture of Greece and Turkey and their military resources to control the flank of NATO (3) A historical review of the Cyprus problem, focusing on events from 1960 to the present and (4) A discussion of the sensitive issues that divide Cyprus.

The intent is to clarify the issues that confront the political and military planners who must resolve this dilemma. The continuing feud between Greece and Turkey has had a destabilizing influence on the reliability of NATO's southern flank. Resolution of the Cyprus issue appears to be the "linchpin" that must occur prior to any improvement in the cooperation and military credibility of these key countries.

THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN

NATO strategy has always recognized that the Turkish straits were vital to western security because they controlled access to the Middle East as well to as NATO's southern flank. When Greece and Turkey joined NATO in 1952, the southern flank of the alliance was theoretically secured through control of the historic Black Sea gate to the Mediterranean. The southern flank is also highly dependent on the Mediterranean for its economic and military lifeline, since Greece and Turkey are physically separated from Central Europe by either Warsaw Pact or neutral countries. The strategic significance of the Eastern Mediterranean region still remains vital to the defense of Europe today.

The Mediterranean has always loomed large in Soviet interests, and their desire for access to the Mediterranean has played a major factor in their naval growth over the last two decades. The Soviet Union

has placed top priority, both directly and indirectly, on improving their capabilities to react militarily within the Mediterranean Basin. Their direct approach has been to develop a naval presence large enough to challenge the United States Sixth Fleet. These two navies are now jointly located in the Mediterranean Sea and have created an environment for instability that could threaten NATO's ability to effectively control the sea lanes and protect the land flanks of the region nations. Indirectly, the Soviet Union has focused on Mediterranean states that are either friendly to it or neutral or hostile to the West. Establishment of air and naval bases is one of the primary goals of the Soviets and although they have made significant progress it is not as much as they would like. However, they are persistent and continue to strive to expand their influence over key strategic areas in the Mediterranean.

Militarily, the Warsaw Pact threat to the eastern flank of NATO is large and growing. Intelligence estimates show that the equivalent of 34 Soviet, Romanian and Bulgarian divisions are available for deployment north of Greece and Turkish Thrace. These forces are largely mechanized and situated on terrain suitable for armored offensive operations and could be readily reinforced by amphibious, airborne and air mobile forces. Of these 34 divisions, the equivalent of just over 22 divisions are either deployed forward or are maintained at high levels of readiness. To counter this force, NATO's 25 Greek and Turkish divisions in the area are mainly infantry oriented with questionable modern antiarmor capability for defensive operations. Their task is rendered difficult by the lack of depth and the narrowness of the area between the borders and the Aegean Sea. There are also 20 Soviet divisions

which could be committed against Eastern Turkey where the Turkish Army retains about 8 divisions. Overall, Greece and Turkey together have about 4,000 tanks and 4,600 artillery pieces, in comparison with 11,000 tanks and 11,300 artillery pieces opposing them.¹

The geographical separation of Greek and Turkish Thrace from mainland Turkey could make reinforcement and resupply of the respective theaters extremely difficult, particularly if the lines of communication are under attack. The superiority and range of many of their aircraft provide the Warsaw Pact forces the potential to operate effectively anywhere in the Mediterranean. They can endanger the sea lines of communication which are the key to the security of the southern flank. Although ground and air reinforcements from the Alliance would be of crucial importance, the likelihood of reinforcement is not assured. United States assistance would probably be limited in the early stages to some tactical air power and material support, at best. Greece and Turkey would have to depend primarily on their own resources early on in any confrontation with the Warsaw Pact. Coordination between these two countries would be of paramount importance against a numerically superior foe, but current political reality makes the coordination and combat effectiveness of these allies a moot subject.

TURKEY

The Republic of Turkey is a muslim country with a population of more than 50 million people. Strategically located between Europe and the Middle East, Turkey has had a colorful history and has made great strides in westernization efforts during the 20th Century. It was one

of the 51 original members of the United Nations in 1945. Under the Truman Doctrine, the United States provided millions of dollars in economic and military assistance to Turkey. Consequently, the United States was allowed to construct and operate military bases on Turkish soil. This arrangement has continued to this day.

Turkey joined the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in February 1952, largely at the prompting of the United States. Geopolitically, Turkey is in a strategically important location and is a valuable element to the balance of power in that part of the world. It shares borders with six countries (Greece, communist Bulgaria, pro-Soviet Syria, expansionist Iraq and revolutionary Iran - not to mention the Soviet Union) and has approximately 5,000 miles of seacoast along its borders. The country has many European qualities, but remains tied to Asia by its long history. Accordingly, it performs an important role in both continents.

Turkey also has some of the worlds most strategic real estate in its common border with the Soviet Union. The Black Sea coastline where Soviet naval and merchant ships traverse daily and the choke points of the Bosphorous and Dardanelles Straits make this egress into the Mediterranean very critical for military planners. Were it not for these sea passages, the Black Sea would be land locked.

Once called "the sick man of Europe" during the age of the Ottoman Empire, Turkey is slowly but steadily growing in economic and military strength throughout the Islamic world. From a historical perspective, Turkey's 600,000 man armed force, the second largest force in NATO, may be short on sophisticated weapons and technology but its fighting

ability is widely acknowledged. A contingent of 5,000 Turkish soldiers gained a superb reputation fighting under the United Nations Command during the Korean War. Recently, the Army successfully monitored the Iraqi-Turkish oil pipeline and eliminated Kurdish insurgents on their common border. The Turkish military establishment is now considered to be not only the best organized part of the nation but also fully committed to NATO.

The Turkish Armed Forces are primarily a conscript force with every healthy Turkish male between the ages of 20 to 46 responsible for active and reserve military service. This compulsory military service requirement provides the Turkish Armed Forces with a large pool of reserve manpower. Since Turkish forces are earmarked for a major role by NATO in time of war, one of the primary concerns for military planners has been the modernization of its aging equipment. Turkey's Armed Force is severely underequipped for the strategic role it would play against the Warsaw Pact. The weapons and equipment of the Turkish forces are adequate in quantity to equip existing units. Although well maintained, the problem is outmoded equipment that dates back to World War II. With over 3,000 tanks, more than 2,000 APC's, thousands of guns and antitank weapons, and over 250 aircraft and helicopters, the Turkish Land Force possesses a formidable arsenal.² However, the age of the weapons makes spare parts next to impossible to obtain. (See Enclosure 1 for specifics on size of the Turkish Armed Force)

To correct this imbalance, Turkey is substantially upgrading its forces through a multibillion dollar acquisition program that is scheduled to last for at least 10 years. With NATO aid, primarily from

the United States, West Germany and Great Britain, as well as through financial assistance from Arab friends such as Saudia Arabia and Egypt, Turkey's ambitious modernization program is welcomed news to NATO military planners. For example, with its armor and artillery forces mostly of Korean War vintage, the Turkish antiarmor capability is considered inadequate for a country that faces approximately 4,000 thousand Soviet tanks on the Soviet side of the border and 3,500 additional tanks across the border with Syria. In addition, Turkey has purchased or is planning to purchase West German Leopard tanks, the British Rapier air defense system, advanced United States multiple rocket launchers, and naval frigates and submarines.³

Turkey, physically linking three continents, is only a relatively short distance from the Suez Canal, the Straits of Aden and Hormuz which, to a large extent, control the world maritime transportation. As the Middle East has become one of the most sensitive regions of the world, Turkey is the closest NATO member to this region. The destabilizing events of the last few years - the invasion of Afghanistan, the Iraq-Iran War, unstable conditions in Lebanon - have only added to the importance of Turkey to the Western Alliance. Turkey has been able to maintain friendly and cordial relations with Iraq and Iran, and has made several efforts to end that conflict albeit with little success.

Turkey's role today is vital to the security of NATO's southern flank. As the major force of the Alliance in the area, Turkey may be called upon to blunt a Soviet move south - on land or by sea - until assistance arrives. Without Turkey's support, the NATO defense lines have a gaping hole with no realistic alternative force. NATO indeed

attaches great importance to Turkey, the southern most guardian of its undermanned and exposed flank.

GREECE

With a population of almost 10 million people, Greece sits at the proverbial crossroads between three continents. One of the most homogeneous nations in Europe, over 98 percent of the people are ethnic Greeks. Today, she is the only Balkan State to be a member of the European Community and NATO. A relatively small country, the mainland is surrounded by more than 2,000 islands, only 200 of which are permanently inhabited. Because only 28 percent of the land is arable, demographic pressures have forced many poor farmers throughout the ages to turn to commerce or to emigrate. Nearly half of the country's people live in the ports on the Aegean Sea and are employed to a large extent in trades tied to the sea. The economy is based on trade throughout the Mediterranean Sea.

When Greece became a member of NATO in 1952, the Greek Armed Forces were entrusted with the defense of a frontier of over 600 miles with three communist countries to the north. Because of their numerical inferiority, the Greek forces have strived to achieve high standards of quality. Defense expenditures are heavy and require about 25 percent of the annual budget. This corresponds to 6.5 percent of the gross national product (GNP). As a result, Greece has committed a higher percentage of her GNP to defense expenditures than any other country in NATO.

Although a formidable and well respected force, the most distinctive feature of the Greek military in the 20th Century has been

its inclination to become embroiled in politics. During this century, the military has staged 10 major coups d'etat, usually at times when there was political divisiveness and uncertainty in the country. The latest military takeover in 1967 ended badly for the military and directly contributed to the Turkish invasion of Cyprus.

The Armed Forces consists of approximately 185,000 soldiers. Over three-quarters of the force consists of conscripts who must serve for at least 22 months. These conscripts are then eligible for call-up until the age of 50. The Greek Army is mainly an infantry force with half of the Army stationed along the northern and eastern borders with Bulgaria and Turkey. Although the size of the country is relatively small, the ruggedness of the terrain makes defense against superior forces possible. Greece's defense disadvantage is on the northeastern front where there is little depth. This is compensated somewhat by the 2,000 islands in the Aegean Sea where seaports and airports have been organized to form a defense in depth.⁴ Soldiers are deployed on selected islands. This has led to bitter disputes between Greece and Turkey for at least the last decade.

Greece also has a modern and well-equipped Navy. The location and strength of the Navy suggests that the Aegean Sea would be the logical battleground in any future war with Turkey. The Air Force could also be expected to play a major role in any confrontation, particularly in view of the distances between the Aegean Islands and the Greek mainland. (See Enclosure 2 for specifics on size of Greek Armed Forces.)

In 1981 Andreas Papandreou became prime minister of the first socialist government in Greek history. Greece under Papandreou has repeatedly tried the patience of its Western Allies by, on the one

hand, criticizing the United States on a variety of topics while, on the other hand, referring favorably to the Soviet Union. The government has disassociated itself from NATO's criticism of the Soviets on such issues as Poland, Afghanistan, deployment of medium range missiles and human rights.⁵ Although Papandreou has generated anger and frustration in the White House, Congress and the State Department, links with the United States have remained fairly stable and have been kept under control by a strong Greek lobby in Congress.

Several military installations in Greece are very important to the United States and NATO. However, it is Greece's strategic location which provides the key advantage to the alliance. The most obvious advantage is the link Greece provides between Italy and Turkey which ensures the cohesion of the Southern Region. From a NATO perspective, Greece is the link between Turkey and Europe. If Turkey is lost, then only one nation is lost. But if Greece is lost, then two nations are lost - Greece and Turkey. Turkey would be isolated completely.⁶

Greece and Turkey have fought three wars in the early part of the 20th Century which ended in territorial adjustments that were largely favorable to Greece. During the Turkish invasion of Cyprus, war was averted primarily because Greece perceived that it was relatively inferior in military strength to Turkey.⁷ The current force structure for Greece and Turkey suggests that any confrontation between the two countries would most likely end in a costly stalemate. The diplomatic key is to maintain a relative balance of power in the region with both Greece and Turkey focused on the potential external threat from the Warsaw Pact and not on the perceived threat from each other.

CYPRUS

Cyprus is the third largest island in the Mediterranean and has a long recorded history dating back some 4,000 years. Strategically situated in the eastern Mediterranean, it is about 65 miles west of Syria, 40 miles south of Turkey and 650 miles southeast from Greece. Its population of almost 700,000 is split between Greek and Turkish nationalities with approximately 78 percent being Greek and the remainder Turkish. The warm Mediterranean climate favors agriculture and more than half the island's total area is cultivated. The favorable climate has also made Cyprus an ideal environment for tourism to flourish and this is in fact one of the largest industries on the island.

In simplistic terms, the roots of the Cyprus conflict can be traced to the struggle of the Greek Cypriots to achieve union with Greece. This idea of union (or Enosis) emerged from the 19th Century and was publicized and nurtured during the British colonial rule which lasted for 150 years. The Greek Cypriot's desire for union with Greece was anathema to the Turkish Cypriot minority who regarded Turkey as their motherland and protector. Becoming a small minority within the Greek nation was unthinkable.⁸ Consequently, the Turkish Cypriots proclaimed their own vision of union with Turkey. The end result was a definitive partition along national lines with the Turkish Cypriots located primarily in the north and the Greek Cypriots concentrated in the south.

The struggle for independence, a long and bitter conflict was finally achieved when Great Britain proclaimed the nation's independence

in August 1960. Great Britain, Greece, Turkey and representatives of the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities reached a compromise settlement that outlined the framework for an independent Republic of Cyprus. Cyprus was to have separate independence under a constitution containing safeguards for the Turkish minority.

Even though Turkey and Greece had a long history of international rivalry, the two communities on Cyprus had been able to live in peace, if not always in a harmony of interests, for over 300 years. The violence which precipitated the independence of Cyprus in 1960 implanted a bitterness in both ethnic communities which has continued to tear the young nation asunder for the last 25 years.

Between independence in 1960 and the events of 1974, Cyprus was constantly confronted with internal strife which threatened the peace and stability of the region. As specified by the constitution, the President was a Greek Cypriot, Archbishop Makarios, and the Vice President was a Turkish Cypriot, Dr. Fazıl Küçük. For 3 years the Turkish minority used their constitutional veto power to prevent the Greek Cypriot leadership from implementing programs that were perceived by the Turkish Cypriots as being only favorable to the Greeks. By 1964, relations had degenerated to such an extent that fighting broke out between the two communities. A United Nations (UNFICYP) peacekeeping force arrived in 1964 to monitor and stop the intercommunal fighting. This force (which was originally authorized for 6 months, is still there and now numbers approximately 2,400 soldiers) was effective in certain situations but the "seeds of discontent" were ever present. Although general peace was maintained, there was little cooperation between the two communities. In fact, each community had and continues to have its

own system of education conducted in its own language and there is no intermarriage between the two communities. Both sides have maintained and jealously guarded their respective cultural and national heritages for over 4 centuries of coexistence on the island. In 1968, after considerable prodding by the United Nations, the two communities began exploratory talks which continued until the Turkish occupation.

During the late 1960's and early 1970's, the Greek Cypriots were prospering economically and the future looked bright. Although the official policy still advocated union with Greece, little was done to implement it. Conversely, the Turkish Cypriots were not making equal economic advances and politically they were growing weaker.⁹ The United States even had to use intense diplomatic pressure to prevent a Turkish military move when the Greek Government under the "Colonels in Athens" tried to infiltrate Cyprus with mainland troops in 1967. The United States, always concerned with the fate of NATO's southern flank, strived to improve the situation but had little success.

The event that finally triggered the Turkish invasion was the military coup and assassination attempt which took place in mid-July 1974 against the island's Greek Cypriot President, Archbishop Makarios. The coup was arranged and directed by the military junta which ruled Greece at that time. Although the Archbishop survived and was able to flee the island, the naming of a new, strongly pro-Greek Cyprus government was intolerable to Turkey. Turkey was also motivated by issues and feelings that had continued to plague the island since its independence in 1960. The principle concerns were the insecurity of the Turkish minority of barely 18 percent who felt they had little opportunity for success and Turkey's grave concern of having a pro-Greek

island off its coast. Already enclosed by Greek islands along the western coast of Asia Minor, Turkey did not want to have a large Greek island barely 40 miles from her southern coast. Turkey decided it could not allow that to happen and subsequently seized the northern portion of Cyprus with the Turkish Cypriot minority under its control.

The Turkish occupation had enormous political and economic repercussions on the Cypriot community. The "Attila Line" was established that formally divided the island into two distinct zones. Approximately 200,000 Greek refugees from the newly established Turkish zone were relocated to the less productive southern zone. Conversely, a much smaller number of Turkish Cypriots who fled from the southern part of the island were welcomed in the north. Overall the primary result of the Turkish occupation was that about 40 percent of the island was placed under the control of the Turkish Army - ostensibly to protect the rights of less than 20 percent the island's population.¹⁰ Since the occupation, Turkey has further changed the demographic structure in the north by implanting some 40,000 immigrants from the mainland in the villages abandoned by the Greek Cypriots. These mainlanders have become citizens of the north but have remained distant from the Turkish Cypriots.

THE DIVIDED ISLAND

The first 10 years after the Turkish occupation of Cyprus appear to have been a wasted decade for all involved parties. The tragedy that engulfed the people of Cyprus was the legacy of short-sighted and unsuccessful diplomacy. Since 1974, efforts to reach a solution have not failed for lack of effort. Intercommunal talks, United Nations

mediation, international pressure, a United States arms embargo, and more than 35 United Nation Security Council and General Assembly resolutions have been tried. Nothing has worked and the accumulation of events seems to have weakened rather than strengthened any hope of future agreement. The seriousness of the situation can be simply illustrated by the fact that in the Greek area of the island a person can use the telephone and call any one of 64 foreign countries without delay, but cannot talk to anyone in the Turkish controlled part of the country.¹¹ The island seems to have been caught up in an inexorable drift toward permanent partition. The primary exception has been the concerted efforts by the United Nations to break the stalemate between the divided communities. This slow and frustrating process has had several "glimmers of hope" but the impasse remains to this day.

The United States has been interested in helping to solve the Cyprus dispute between the quarreling Cypriots as a mechanism to remove the main friction between Greece and Turkey. In early 1975, Congress imposed an arms embargo on Turkey. The justification for the embargo was that Turkey had used NATO arms supplied by the United States during the occupation. The embargo resulted in grave implications from a political and military perspective. The embargo only alienated the Turkish government and resulted in the weakening of the NATO defense system without bringing the Cyprus problem any nearer to a solution. The embargo became an obstacle to settlement and it made the Turkish leadership more intransigent than ever to American persuasion. The embargo was eventually viewed as counterproductive to American foreign policy interests and was finally lifted in September 1978.

In late 1984, President Reagan sent a letter to his Turkish

counterpart, General Kenan Evren, that convinced Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots to relax key demands at the United Nations sponsored talks with the Greek Cypriots.¹² This facilitated the lengthy negotiations and resulted in a draft agreement on Cyprus which contained significant concessions from the two sides. It laid out the framework for a two-zone federal republic. However, when the Cypriot leaders met in New York in January 1985, Cypriot President Spyros Kyprianou and Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Denktash were unable to overcome the final hurdle that would have resulted in an agreement. The golden opportunity passed and the impasse has remained.

The quandry for the United States is that it has been virtually impossible for Washington to choose between Greece and Turkey. American foreign policy has not been able to focus on Greece or Turkey. Instead United States policy has to consider Greece and Turkey equally. The loss of either one of these defense anchors would be disastrous to the Alliance. The constant squabbling between the two protagonists has been a strain on United States foreign policy where alternatives for resolution are extremely difficult to find.

The essence of the Cyprus problem includes the sticky subjects of power sharing within the proposed federal structure, territorial concessions that would be required by the Turkish side and the delicate question of the freedom of movement between the two zones. The Turkish Cypriots fear that they would be overrun if they did not control movement between the zones. Conversely, the Greeks claim that the island should be considered as one country. The intercommunal squabble and disputes that have marked the last quarter century of Cyprus history would have even a patient and understanding person giving up in

frustration. However, the choices are few. Listed below within the framework of military, economic and political considerations, are some salient factors that would have to be a part of any workable solution:

Military - A key requirement for a lasting solution must be the withdrawal of all Turkish soldiers from the island. A unified Cyprus would have to require international guarantees of demilitarization and neither country would have the right of unilateral intervention in Cyprus. The only external force allowed in the country would be a United Nations Peacekeeping Force or a similar type security force that would have to be retained for a specified period of time while the Cypriots established their new government.

Economic - The Turkish Cypriots are definitely economically inferior to the Greek Cypriots yet they control just over 40 percent of the island which has the most prosperous and fertile land. The economy of Cyprus, with its distribution of water resources and agriculture, makes permanent partition an economic absurdity. Many of the former owners in the Turkish sector of Cyprus are Greeks who now live in the Greek Cypriot territory. Concessions on territory, on refugee control, on the right of free movement on the island and on the right to own property must be included in any agreement.

Political - A unified Cyprus must be secular in politics and law. The Greek Orthodox Church occupies a special place in Greek Cypriot life which is normal and acceptable since it has played a significant role in the development of strong Greek national feelings for centuries. The concern is to not underestimate the Turkish Cypriots and their strong muslim religious links. Separating Church and State would help ease this potential yet unnecessary friction. As a minority people, the

Turkish Cypriots have a very distinct national identity with their Turkish Motherland. It is apparent that the Turkish Cypriots, whatever their disillusionment with Turkey policy, will not voluntarily revert to the position they occupied before 1974.

From a realistic viewpoint, the Cypriots have had a tendency to overestimate their importance when considered on an international scale. They have failed to understand that they have never occupied the center of the world stage. However, they are important as a strategic outpost.¹³ The goal is to bring peace to Cyprus, relieve tensions between Greece and Turkey and repair the damage to NATO's southern flank. The process of diplomacy must ensure that Cyprus remains on the path to a peaceful settlement that will facilitate the improvement of Greek and Turkish relations.

It will take years of good faith and hard work to untangle the maze of webs that entraps Cyprus. It appears that perhaps only the United States possesses the economic and political leverage with Greece and Turkey to give this effort a solid chance for success. In 1947 the United States provided economic and military aid under the Truman Doctrine to defeat a communist led insurrection in Greece and to support Turkey against Soviet pressure to gain bases on the Bosphorus and Dardanelles Straits. These massive infusions of aid were critical to the stability in the region and the containment of Soviet influence. A similar economic program but probably on a smaller scale may yet provide the proper incentive to create that "linchpin" that will remove many of the frictions that confront Greece and Turkey. In the midst of Congress's struggle to pare the Federal budget and close the deficit, it appears likely that approximately \$250 million will be spent over the

next 5 years for economic assistance to Northern Ireland. The money will go into an international economic support fund specifically focused on ending the violence that has plagued that area. The same approach in the eastern Mediterranean area where Greece, Turkey and Cyprus have vital interests makes good economic and political sense. The economic stimulus to Cyprus, the reduced burden on Turkey's support of Northern Cyprus and the international stability in the region could produce the cohesiveness that has been lacking in the past.

Overall, both Greece and Turkey share the blame for delaying a Cyprus solution by insisting on strong links with their Cypriot brethren. With Greece and Turkey concurrence, a concentrated effort could be undertaken in Cyprus to start rebuilding the bonds that were shattered by intercommunal strife and separation. The Turkish side could reciprocate by allowing small groups of Greek Cypriots to visit their former towns and villages. The Greeks could do likewise. This may be only a small step, but it would have the potential for further development between the Cypriots, the people that must ultimately solve their differences.

CONCLUSION

An island country situated outside of NATO, Cyprus is obviously one of the most dangerous points of friction between Greece and Turkey. The NATO Alliance will probably have to continue to live with the Cyprus problem and with the current irreconcilable Cypriot leaders for a long time. The primary concern is the long-term hardening of positions which will make the Art of Diplomacy and negotiation even more difficult to

execute with the passage of time. Compounding the foreign policy strategy concerning Cyprus have been recent proposals by the Soviet Union. These proposals include stipulations for withdrawals of all foreign soldiers and the removal of all foreign military bases to include the two British sovereign bases on Cyprus. The Soviet initiatives have been officially discounted by western powers but they have been taken seriously by the Greek government.

Since the Turkish Cypriots formally declared their independence in 1975, the issues have become even more complex. Their right to an equality of status in the negotiations is undeniable. However, equality of status does not mean equality in the distribution of power within the central government. If a genuine Federal constitution is adopted, any settlement will have to take into account the fact that the Greeks make up almost four-fifths of the island's population. To avoid that fact is to plant the seeds for a quick return to strife.

In simplistic terms, the Greeks regard the Turks as bullies and the Turks regard the Greeks as cheats.¹⁴ These historical images are difficult to eliminate. One can ask Greeks and Turks to coexist in their own countries, but one cannot forge a federated state in Cyprus unless the islanders decide they are Cypriots and not Greeks and Turks. Any concept of a Greek and Turkish federation in Cyprus is doomed to failure. It can only work as a federation of Cypriots.

Greek and Turkish negotiators must work together with sincerity, tolerance, patience and sensitivity (along with United States and NATO Alliance assistance). If they do, they may someday resolve the apparent

unresolvable. Only then will the Cypriots be able to work together to form a workable and peaceful government. Once that occurs, the strengthening of the southern flank of NATO may finally become a reality.

ENDNOTES

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7. R. R. Denktash, "The Cyprus Triangle," 1982. pp. 63.
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9. Christopher Hitchens, "Cyprus," 1984. p. 113.
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11. Andrew Borowiec, "The Mediterranean Feud," p. 101.
12. Leigh H. Bruce, "Cyprus: A Last Chance," Foreign Policy, Spring 1985, p. 115.
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TURKISH ARMED FORCES

ARMY

Manpower: 470,000 Regular (420,000 conscripts)
Reserves: 700,000
Compulsory Service: 20 months
Organization: 17 Divisions; ARTY, ADA BNS, etc.
Deployment: 2 Divisions in Cyprus
Equipment:
 Tanks: 77 Leopards, 500 M-47s, 3,000 M-48s
 APCs : 2,000 M113s
 ARTY : M114s, M115s, M109, M110s
 Mortars: 60mm, 81mm, 4.2in, 120mm
 RCLS: 1,200 57mm, 390 75mm, 800 106mm

NAVAL

Manpower: 45,000 (includes 34,000 conscripts)
Reserves: 25,000
Fleet: Destroyers, Frigates, Submarines, Patrol Craft Minesweepers,
 Amphibious Forces, Support Transports.

AIR FORCE

Manpower: 53,000 (includes 33,000 conscripts)
Organization:
 *Fighter/ground attack: F-4E Phantom, F-100s, F-5A
 Interceptors: F-104 Starfighters
 Reconnaissance: RF-4E Phatoms
 Transports: C-130E Hercules, C-47, C-54
 *F-16 purchases are planned.

NOTES

1. Source: Defense and Foreign Affairs Handbook 1985.
2. Compulsory Service (draft) is required in all services.

ENCLOSURE 1

GREECE ARMED FORCES

ARMY

Manpower: 142,000 (includes 110,000 Conscripts)

Reserves: 350,000

Conscripts Service Period: 22 months

Organization: 1 Mechanized, 1 Armored and 11 Infantry Divisions. ARTY, ADA Brigades and BNS, etc.

Equipment:

Tanks: 350 M-47, 800 M-48, 285 AMX-30 Medium, 10 Leopards,
190 M-24 Light

APCs : 832 M113s, etc

ARTY : M114s, M115s, M109, M110s

RCLS : 57mm, 106mm.

SAM : 18 Improved Hawk, Redeye

NAVAL

Manpower: 19,500 (includes 12,000 conscripts)

Reserves: About 20,000

Fleet: Destroyers, Frigates, Submarines, Coastal patrol craft,
Minesweepers, Amphibious Forces, Support Transports.

AIR FORCE

Manpower: 23,000 (includes 15,000 conscripts)

Reserves: 20,000

Organization: *Fighter ground Attack Squadrons: F104Gs.

Interceptors: F-4E, Mirage F-1CGs.

Reconnaissance: RF-4Es.

Transports: C130H Hercules, C-47s.

*F-16 purchases are planned.

NOTES

1. Source - Defense and Foreign Affairs Handbook 1985.
2. Compulsory Service (draft) is required in all services.

ENCLOSURE 2

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