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# AIR COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE

## STUDENT REPORT

A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE UNITED  
STATES MILITARY RELATIONSHIPS WITH THE  
REPUBLIC OF KOREA AND THE PHILIPPINES

MAJOR JUDY A. MOSBEY

85-1935

*"insights into tomorrow"*

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**TITLE** A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE UNITED STATES  
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KOREA AND THE PHILIPPINES

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Submitted to the faculty in partial fulfillment of  
requirements for graduation.

**AIR COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE  
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## PREFACE

This paper analyzes the military relationship between the United States and two of its Asian-Pacific allies: the Republic of the Philippines and the Republic of Korea. The purpose of this paper is to determine the stability of that military relationship and how it impacts on the United States. An analysis and comparison is done of each country's geography, history, and social development prior to World War II. The post World War II evolution of each nation's economy, polity, national security policies, and U.S. involvement is examined and compared in order to comprehend trends and characteristics of each society.

The conclusion of this paper is that the two allies have differences in geographic, cultural, and economic development; however, there are strong similarities in the treatment of politics and civil liberties. National security policies and perceptions of security threats are also incongruous, and have dictated American involvement with each country.

After living in the Philippines for two years and visiting South Korea frequently, the task of researching this paper was a personal challenge and interest. I would like to personally thank Dr. Lawrence E. Grinter, my advisor, for patience, professional guidance, and never-faltering encouragement. My personal thanks also extend to Colonel Barry Howard and Mr. David Rosmer for their time and candor during personal interviews at Clark Air Base, Republic of the Philippines. Hopefully this paper will not be a disappointment to the knowledgeable individuals who contributed so much to its completion.

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Prior to ACSC, Major Mosbey was attached to the Regional Medical Center at Clark Air Base, Republic of the Philippines, as an Air Force Reserve Individual Mobilization Augmentee. Preceding assignments include ten years as a Flight Nurse with the 68th Aeromedical Evacuation Squadron at Norton AFB, CA. Airevac missions have taken her all over the globe. She participated in the Vietnamese Refugee relocation flights staged out of Clark Air Base in 1975. She holds a Bachelors degree in Education and has experience as a classroom teacher as well as a nurse.

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## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

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REPORT NUMBER 85-1935

AUTHOR(S) MAJOR JUDY A. MOSBEY, USAFR

TITLE A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE UNITED STATES  
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Today the United States has extensive use of military facilities in both the Philippines and South Korea as provided by mutual defense treaties, but U.S. military involvement with each country is different. The Republic of Korea sees the United States military presence in their country as a deterrent to external communist aggression from the North. The Republic of the Philippines, however, depends on the United States military for protection from external threats and views the growing movement of internal communist insurgents as "the threat" to national security. The present regime in the Philippines is also feeling the pressure of increasing political unrest and a deteriorating economy. Of the two military partners, the Republic of the Philippines appears to be the more unstable and unreliable.

A comparison was done of the geography, culture, and economic development of each country. The conclusion of the comparison suggests that the Philippines is a melting-pot of cultural blends with many languages based on a Malay people of scattered village societies located on many islands. The Korean people share a similar heritage with one language and one culture. Both countries were occupied by Japan during World War II. There is quite a contrast between the national economy of

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## CONTINUED

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the two countries since World War II. South Korea has a growing economy, while the economy of the Philippines is struggling to stay alive.

The second chapter looks at the political evolution and the national security policies of the Philippines and South Korea since World War II. The political systems of the two allies were based on Western-style democracy introduced by the United States, but over a period of time the South Korean government evolved toward a strong authoritarian rule. The Philippines maintained a democratic government until President Marcos declared martial law in 1972 and governed by decree. The national security policy of each country varies according to the perceived threat, but each country sees communism as the major threat to its region.

The U.S. military involvement since World War II included mutual defense treaties, military assistance and aid, and the use of military facilities in each country in order to deter communist expansion and to maintain stability in the Asia-Pacific area.

The U.S.-South Korean military alliance is strong as a result of the United States commitment to the security of the Republic of Korea. The U.S.-Philippine relationship is based on a mutual defense treaty and a relationship that dates back to the tutelage period. Of the two allies, the external threat to Korea is the more immediate. The Philippines, with the uncertainty of the political and economic state of the country, has the greater potential for instability.

## Chapter One

### INTRODUCTION

At present the United States is an ally, friend, and military partner to both the Philippines and South Korea, but the relationship with each country is different. As the world community becomes more interdependent, relationships will alter and change. If the United States is to maintain and protect its national interests in the world, it has to understand the societies with which it deals. This paper places a great deal of emphasis on the cultural evolution and national development of both the Republic of the Philippines and the Republic of Korea as they affect U.S. military relations. This background material is essential to understanding and identifying trends and perceptions that have evolved as a result of historical events and geographical conditions unique to each nation.

### CULTURAL DEVELOPMENT

#### Korea

A resilient society, "The Korean people have a long historical continuity and a unique heritage as a nation of one race, one language, one culture, and a proud past."(4:7) In recent history, the Korean people have endured annexation by the Japanese in 1910; liberation at the end of World War II (only to be divided by occupying powers of opposing ideology); and devastation in the Korean Conflict in 1950-53 with Korean fighting Korean. However, by the mid-1960s the assiduous South Koreans were on their way to economic stability and a better life under the support and protection of the United States-South Korean military partnership.

The overwhelming determination of the Korean people to triumph patiently over hardships and challenges is rooted in their history, beliefs, and geography. The Korean Peninsula projects southeast from China (Manchuria), separating the Sea of Japan from the Yellow Sea. Japan lies approximately 120 miles from Korea's southern coast, while the Shantung Peninsula on the mainland of China is about the same distance to the west. (67:47a-49a)(10:Ch 1)



Currently the peninsula is divided administratively by the Military Demarcation Line (MDL). This line of separation was established in June 1953 at the end of the Korean War. The Republic of Korea (South Korea) occupies the 38,000 square mile southern half, while the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea) absorbs a slightly larger portion of the land mass to the north. Seoul, the capital city of South Korea, is located only 30 kilometers from the MDL. (11:12-13)

The cultural history of the Korean Peninsula covers a time span of 4,000 years. The area was believed populated by the Ural-Altaic tribes that migrated from the northwestern region of Asia. This migratory theory is reinforced by the Korean language which is different from other languages spoken in East Asia. (5:278)

Korean legend has it that the Korean state was founded in 2333 B.C. by the god (King) Tangun. (67:50a) However, by the first century B.C., the Chinese-controlled state of Choson was established with its capital at Pyongyang (the modern capital of North Korea). The Chinese colonization of Korea lasted until the Three Kingdom Period (around 500 A.D.). At that time, three tribal kingdoms divided the Korean Peninsula; Koguryo to the north; Paekje occupying the central Han River basin; and Silla to the south. (Recorded Korean history begins with the Three Kingdom Period.) (21:Ch 4)(3:Ch 1)

These competing kingdoms sought relations with China and openly accepted the Chinese culture and Buddhism. Paekje also established trade with Japanese merchants during this period and expanded the Chinese influence to the island empire. (11:33-34)

By the seventh century, Silla had successfully defeated Koguryo and Paekje, thus unifying the Korean Peninsula under one political rule with Buddhism as the official religion. The adoption of China's political and economic systems was necessitated by the decline of the old tribal society and loss of political cohesiveness. However, the tribal sense of hereditary privilege was retained and incorporated into the political system. Eventually, the rivalry between the nobility weakened the political structure causing the fall of Silla. (3:Ch 2)

After long years of rebellion and warfare, the Koryo dynasty (origin for the name "Korea") emerged as a stable government. A social and political structure existed that reflected a strong class system. The structure began with the aristocrats who monopolized the civil bureaucracy, followed by a middle class of military officers, followed by the commoners, followed by the peasants followed by "base people" (slaves). (5:294) The state

economy was based on feudalism which began with the Koryo period and continued until the annexation of Korea by Japan in 1910. (3:Ch 3)


Over a period of time, the Koryo dynasty also experienced deterioration of central government. Palace coups and peasant revolts were prevalent until 1196, when a military system of rule brought the kingdom under control. (5:296) The military feudal system of Korea was different from that of Japan. The Korean warrior-aristocrats owned great estates, but they did not manage these estates or recruit their military forces from them. They remained a centralized military force instead of a fragmented feudal system like that of Japan. (5:297)

After several invasions from the north, Korea fell victim to the Great Khan in 1213. As history saw the collapse of the Mongol Empire, it also saw the collapse of the Koryo dynasty and the beginning of the Yi period which covered Korean history to the twentieth century. From the very beginning the Yi dynasty aligned itself with China. Confucianism was adopted by the ruling class. Great emphasis was placed on formal education and intellectual endeavors, such as the creation of the Korean phonetic alphabet (hangul). Korean society still retained the ruling class divisions in the civil and military portion of the bureaucracy, and the economy remained poorly developed. (3:60)

During the sixteenth century, the Japanese warlord, Hideyoshi, launched two destructive invasions of Korea with desires of conquering China. (5:316) However, a combined effort from China and Korea pushed the Japanese back to the southern part of the peninsula. In 1598 Hideyoshi died, and Japanese troops returned to Japan. (5:Ch 12)

The Japanese invasion inflicted great damage on Korea, and a Manchurian invasion in 1627 dealt another crippling blow to an already weakened nation. This declining strength in the government, mixed with domestic rebellion in 1862 and the threat of a foreign religion (Catholic Christianity), caused the rulers of Korea to adopt a policy of seclusion. The title "Hermit Kingdom" aptly applied to Korea during this period. (11:39)

In 1875 Japan, determined to open Korean ports to trade, forced a treaty on Korea that opened three ports and declared Korea to be an independent state. Korea became the center of political rivalry between Russia, China, and Japan. Japan eventually went to war with both China and Russia over the Korean Peninsula. Having defeated its competition, Japan established control over Korea, annexing it in 1910. Japan governed Korea as a colony, brutally suppressing nationhood. Nonetheless, a strong sentiment of Korean nationalism was developing. (24:2-3) (1:2-3)





Korea remained a possession of Japan until after World War II. On September 12, 1945, the Japanese Governor-General formally surrendered Japan's colonial rule of Korea. At the same time the United States proclaimed the establishment of its military government in the southern half of Korea. (22:11)

This review of Korean history reflects a homogeneous society of one race, one language and one culture that has evolved over a period of 4,000 years. Since its unification, Korea has been greatly influenced and educated by outside powers. The foundation for the Korean political, educational, and economic system was based on Buddhist and Confucianist philosophies adopted from the Chinese. The political structure of the Korean culture was based on an authoritarian society of ruling elite composed of warring factions that governed oppressed masses. Corruption in government was common and often lead to outbreaks of rebellion by the oppressed populace.

### Philippines

As Ambassador to the Philippines, Charles E. Bohlen, explained in 1959,

The friendship of the United States and the Philippines is based on many factors: the historic ties which have bound our nations, the many warm individual contacts between our peoples, our common interest in a thriving trade and commerce between us, the shared hardships and experiences of Americans and Filipinos as comrades in arms and our profound mutuality of interest in the maintenance of world peace and the security of the Pacific Area. (25:19)

The U.S. view of the strategic value of the Philippines has varied during recent history. In 1898 a coaling station and a naval base were all that were needed in the Islands for "prestige and power in the Orient." (8:7) During and after World War II, the attitude of the United States toward the Philippines changed dramatically. Filipinos fought side by side with Americans in World War II and Korea. With the agreement of the Philippine government, U.S. military bases were kept to protect a struggling young Republic and to insure the security of the Pacific and East Asia. (8:7)

A review of Philippine history, beliefs, and geography should give a clear understanding of attitudes and frustrations in the special American-Filipino relationship. Cut off from the mainland of Southeast Asia by the South China Sea, the Philippine Archipelago stretches over 1,000 miles north to south forming a land chain of over 7,100 islands reaching north toward Taiwan and west toward Malaysia and Indonesia. Eleven of these islands

comprise about 95 percent of the total land area and population. The islands of Luzon and Mindanao form the northern and southern "anchors" of the Archipelago and are the largest with the Visayas group in between. The common terrain of the larger islands is mountainous jungles with narrow coastal lowlands. (15:Ch 1)

Luzon is the largest land mass and food producing area as well as the center of government and industry. The Philippine population is over 51 million people with some 6 million living in the metropolitan area of Manila which is situated on the western coast of Luzon. The U.S. maintains troops at two major military facilities located on this island. (66:41)(7:36)

The Republic of the Philippines is a fragmented country of many islands, many languages, and many ethnic blendings and extreme racial types. Anthropologist H. Otley Beyer believed the Philippine Islands were inhabited by "waves" of migrating cultures that first came by land bridge from Central Asia through Indonesia over 250,000 years ago. As each migrating group came, it pushed its predecessor deeper into the highlands and mountains of the islands. (13:Ch2)(15:15)

"A seafaring man and a farmer, in earlier times the Filipino was often a pirate" (13:41) using his acquired skills to support his family. As the islands were populated, a social order evolved. Communities developed, and leaders and councils were established. Over a period of time, coastal trade produced a community interdependence and a more settled, self-supporting society. However, these communities were isolated and scattered. This Malay culture was the basis for Philippine life until altered by external pressures from distant lands. (15:15)

Because of the fragmented nature of its communities, cultural evolution was slow in the Philippines compared to its other neighbors. While greatly influenced by other external societies and cultures, there was limited cultural exchange between the indigenous groups that populated the Archipelago. The Chinese had explored the South China Sea long before the birth of Christ, but a permanent Chinese settlement was not established until the eleventh century. East Indian merchants from Borneo had visited the southwest islands and left their influence as well. By the fourteenth century the evangelistic-traders, Gugarat Muslims, introduced Islam to the Philippines. (26:Ch3)(13:Ch2)

The Muslims came from Borneo to conquer and settle the Sulu Islands and western Mindanao. They brought with them the Arabic culture and teachings including Arabic law, architecture, and polygamy. These communities became centers of instability with a transition from agrarian to militarism and violence in the name of faith. Piracy increased and prospered. Non-Muslim towns were pillaged and their inhabitants were taken as slaves. (26:20)

The lowlander communities outside of the Muslim settlements were moderately evolved by the time the Spaniards arrived, reflecting Indian, Chinese, and Arab influence. (15:Ch2) The social organization was based on the family unit (as it is today) with men and women equal, but women sometimes assuming more responsibility. Families were graded according to class: ruling, free, and slave. However, the system allowed freemen to rise to the highest rank and slaves to obtain their freedom. Families formed villages (barangays), ruled by a chief (datu) with the aid of an elder's council. Two or more villages could merge to form a federal unit led by an overlord. Keith Lightfoot, in his book The Philippines, addresses two important factors of this social system:

(1) The scattered communities lacked the cohesion necessary to resist the Spanish forces.

(2) The land-tenure system at that time was similar to that which exists today. A landowning class composed of the families of council elders became the elite, and sharecropping became common practice. (13:49)

In 1521, Ferdinand Magellan became the first European to set foot in the Philippines. He landed in the Visayas with three ships after a long voyage from Spain; he was given a warm welcome by Chief (Raja) Humabun in Cebu but was later killed by a rebellious chief named Lapu Lapu. Forty-four years passed before the Spanish returned and gained control of the islands. (66:6-8)

Miguel Lopez de Legazpi headed a successful expedition which left Mexico on November 21, 1564, and reached Cebu on April 27, 1565. His competent navigator was Father Andres de Urdaneta, a former soldier and sea captain turned priest. The first Spanish settlement and fort was built in Cebu in 1565. The next year Legazpi headed north to Luzon and founded the city of Manila. Legazpi named the islands after King Philip of Spain. This began the 400-year Westernization of the Philippines - first by Spain; then by the United States. (16:Ch2)

The Spanish colonization of the Philippines over the next 400 years was not without challenge, both internally and externally. The Portugese, Dutch, British, and Chinese, as well as the Filipinos themselves, all sought to challenge Spain. All Portugese and Dutch attempts to secure a foothold in the islands failed. The British occupied Manila in 1762 before being forced out by the Spanish. The Spanish faced an internal threat from the Chinese who had established trading posts, married into the Malay societies, and settled into permanent residences within the coastal communities. (15:15)

In 1574 a Chinese pirate, Limahong, attempted to capture Manila with an army of men that was repulsed by a joint Filipino-Spanish effort. This threat led the Spanish to segregate the Chinese and impose heavy taxes on the economically successful merchants. (16:44-45)

With the Spanish rule came some important achievements. A central government was established under the control of Spain, but supervised by the Spanish government in Mexico. Santo Tomas University was founded in 1611. Roman Catholicism became the common religion and unifying force; however, during the three centuries of colonization, the Spanish never completely controlled the Sulu Islands and Mindanao due to Filipino Muslim retaliation. Commerce and communication were controlled from Mexico and closed to foreign trade until 1834. Despite Spanish paranoid reaction to the growing Chinese and Japanese communities in the Philippines, Chinese goods were aboard the galleons that sailed to Mexico and Spain. (8:10)

Once the conquest of the Philippines was established, the pioneering spirit was replaced by a "laissez-faire" policy. During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, a bitter conflict between the powers of the church and state developed. Spanish officials and traders were making small fortunes at the expense of the people and government. Priests were accused of violating their vows and leading a life of comfort. Because most communities were dominated by the local priest, an accusing official was often the victim of local violence encouraged by the church.

It was a time for the decay for the...Spanish empire. ...both the civil authorities and the church became more self-seeking.... As the Spanish civilian and military authorities sought to eliminate the priests from participation in provincial administration, the religious orders became increasingly occupied with managing their landed estates.... (16:46)

The church owned over 400,000 acres of valuable land acquired from Spain as partial compensation for governmental services and as assistance in financing educational and charitable work. (8:12) The church was also reluctant to train and promote Filipinos as priests. Under Spanish rule, the rights of the peasant were not considered important, "...In contrast to their early...benevolent contributions...the church by the nineteenth century had infrequently become reactionary and venal in practice if not in avowed policy. All suggestions of political, economic, or religious reforms were rigorously opposed." (8:12)

The greatest area of good land was still owned by the "land owning class" of Filipinos or Mestizos (mixed race) established

before Spanish rule. In 1837 when Spain opened Manila to world trade, the large "landed estates" and merchants prospered. The planter families that grew coffee, sugar, and hemp also grew richer creating an "embryonic oligarchy" that could afford to send its sons to Europe to be educated. An exposure to liberalism and European ideas sparked a curiosity that created an educated elite in the Islands. (19:10-11)(13:Ch10)

A member of this educated elite was Dr. Jose Rizal, a fifth generation Mestizo. While studying abroad, Rizal came to realize the need for reform in his own country. His novels of social protest identified the social and political backwardness of the Philippines and the oppression the Filipino suffered under the existing regime. He advocated reform through education: "He sought victory for his cause through publicity." (8:12-13) Rizal returned to the Philippines, where the Spanish authorities considered his reform movement dangerous. He was placed in exile at Dapitan, Mindanao. In 1892, he organized the La Liga Filipinas (the Philippine League), a moderate group that shared his concern for the economic development and social reforms for the Philippine people. (13:99)

During his exile a new political movement, the Katipunan (Sons of the People), was organized by Andres Bonifacio as a nationalist and revolutionary society. The Katipunan was betrayed by one of its members before a revolution could be formed, forcing Bonifacio to flee to the countryside. But Bonifacio reorganized his group and called for open revolt. (8:13-14)(13:Ch10)

Rizal did not support the idea of armed resistance. He had volunteered to go to Cuba as a doctor, but he was returned to Manila by Spanish authorities and executed on December 30, 1896, for treason. Rizal's death escalated the nationalist movement, making him an instant martyr and a national hero. (16:Ch2)

As the revolutionary Katipunan gained momentum, there developed a split in leadership. Emilio Aquinaldo emerged the dominant leader, forcing Bonifacio to retire. Later, Bonifacio attempted to form a government in opposition to the general movement, but he and his brother were captured, tried, and executed by Aquinaldo's men. (13:100)

The revolution continued with less impetus and more resistance from the Spanish. By the summer of 1897, the rebels were talking independence. In November, the revolutionaries declared the Philippines a republic. Due to the Spanish War in Cuba and the declining momentum of the movement, a peace agreement was negotiated at Biaknabato. The rebel leaders were

promised 800,000 pesos if they would surrender their arms and accept voluntary exile to Hong Kong. Aquinaldo accepted exile. (15:20)

Then in 1898, the United States went to war with Spain. The United States Asiatic Squadron, commanded by Commodore George Dewey, received orders to proceed from Hong Kong to Manila to destroy the Spanish fleet. On May 1, 1898, Dewey defeated the Spanish at the Battle of Manila Bay in a conflict which lasted only seven hours. Later, while waiting for American land forces to arrive, Dewey met with Aquinaldo who agreed to assist the Americans. Aquinaldo reorganized his revolutionary forces and armed them with weapons purchased in Hong Kong. On 13 August, Manila was captured by American and Philippine forces. By the Treaty of Paris, signed on 10 December 1898, Spain ceded the Philippines, Guam, and Puerto Rico to the United States for the sum of \$20 million. (8:8-10)

The political future of the Philippines was to be decided by Congress, but the United States first had to deal with Aquinaldo and the revolutionary movement. Aquinaldo wanted immediate national independence. But President McKinley concluded that the Philippines was not ready for independence, and a U.S. Military Government was established. Aquinaldo started a war of insurrection against the United States (Philippine-American War) that took the lives of 4,000 Americans and 100,000 Filipinos and cost the United States \$185 million. (26:40) After two years of fighting, Aquinaldo was captured by the American Army and the resistance collapsed.

The outbreak of World War II in the Pacific brought Filipinos another kind of foreign domination that challenged the viability and the loyalty of the new self-governing Commonwealth. The occupation by Japan brought uncertainties and new proposals. The Filipinos thought the United States would protect them. The American-Filipino force withdrawal to Corregidor and General Wainwright's surrender order to all American-Filipino troops signalled the end of hope for an American victory. Some Filipinos felt that the Americans would return as General Douglas MacArthur had said. Some collaborated with the Japanese and joined the Japanese Executive Commission with the promise of a Japanese-sponsored Philippine Republic. Others took to the jungles as guerrillas to fight the Japanese occupation. (19:Ch4&5)

The Japanese saw themselves as liberators of the Philippine people from the Western influence of the United States. The Death March, where allied survivors of Bataan were marched north to the concentration camps at Capas and O'Donnell, signalled a final humiliation aimed at demeaning Americans before Filipinos. (16:67)

The collaboration of the pre-war elite with the Japanese was justified by such men as Congressman Benigno Aquino, who said, "I believe the time has come for every Filipino to stop and ponder... why our Supreme Creator... made us Malays-Orientals and not Europeans or Anglo-Saxons.... In essence and spirit, We Are Orientals." (19:36)

But political economist Stephen R. Shalom sees the issue of collaboration as a pattern that exists even today. (65:13)

Contrary to what some U.S. officials maintained, the Philippine elite did not undergo a sudden conversion to treason. What was involved was rather a continuation of the policy that the elite had been following for at least four decades, namely, collaborating with the colonial power in return for political office and other rewards. An elite which had placed its interests and the interests of a foreign country above those of its own people had no trouble when the Japanese replaced the Americans. (17:10)

Collaboration was an explosive issue after the war. General MacArthur arrested suspected collaborators, but few were tried or convicted by the civil powers. Many others were never even arrested. President Osmena returned to the Philippines with General MacArthur and attempted to reconstruct the civil government. His attempts were constrained by hostile groups of collaborators within the Philippine Congress. The issue of collaboration was soon replaced by the more pressing task of rebuilding a war-torn nation. (7:35) (8:247)

Keith Lightfoot, in his book The Philippines, summarized the Philippines in 1970 as the following:

A predominantly Roman Catholic nation, her people are markedly Malay in ethnic origin. Of an earlier East Indian character, tempered by over three hundred years of Spanish colonial rule, then forty-eight years of United States tutelage, the population is at once strikingly mature in its political institutions and evolving rapidly in its practical approach to the world as a whole. The Philippines can be seen at present as a nation in search of her real place--both politically and characteristically and encountering many fundamental difficulties in doing so. (13:18)

#### ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT SINCE WORLD WAR II

The Philippines and South Korea have depended on the United States economically since World War II. The role of the United

States was one of economic provider as well as tutor during the early years of reconstruction. Since that time, each country has sought its own strength in an unpredictable world market, while struggling with national and domestic problems. A study of each country's economic development since World War II will help explain the fiscal relationship that exists between the United States and the Republics of Korea and the Philippines.

"What happens in the Philippines, Japan, and Korea has a greater impact on us and is of more immediate interest to us than most events in Massachusetts," said former California Senator S.I. Hayakawa. (14:246-247)

### South Korea

"During the past 30 years, Korea has been at the center of U.S. military strategy in [East] Asia. In the years ahead, Korea will become the center of U.S. economic strategy in the region as well." (39:289)

The surrender directive to the Japanese Armed Forces did not contemplate a political division of Korea, for it named the 38th parallel only as a line to separate American and Soviet forces accepting the surrender of Japanese troops stationed there. The interpretation which the Soviet Commander in the northern zone gave to the directive... converted the 38th parallel into a frontier between north and south.... The normal social and political relationships in the country were disrupted, and the predominantly agricultural south was separated from the industrial north, with adverse effects on the nation's economy. (22:12)

In September 1945, an American Military Government was established in Korea, south of the 38th parallel, until the United States and the Soviet Union could come to terms over the future of the Korean Peninsula. This issue resulted in a stalemate between the two powers after much rhetoric and discussion. (24:4-10)

Despite the unresolved question of Korean independence and unity, the United States made available to South Korea \$210.5 million in relief supplies from 1945 through 1948. By the end of 1948, an economic aid agreement had been concluded between the United States and the independent Republic of Korea which included provisions for financial, material, and technical assistance to advance the nation's recovery. By the end of the first quarter of 1950, the outlook for the Korean economy appeared favorable. Industrial activity was estimated to be 80 percent above the 1947 average, and the Republic was self supporting in food production. Industries such as textile



manufactures, railroad construction, coal mining, and electric power production were reported as gains. But, the progress made by the Republic of Korea was soon halted by the surprise attack of the Communist military forces from the north in June 1950.

The Korean Conflict ended with the signing of the Armistice Agreement on July 27, 1953. During the period of the conflict, the United States had continued to provide economic aid to South Korea as the result of an agreement signed in May 1952. On August 8, 1953, President Syngman Rhee and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles initiated a mutual defense treaty and announced a one billion dollar rehabilitation program effective over the next four years to boost the shattered Korean economy. (22:29-30)

After the Korean War, the United States poured large sums of military and economic aid into the Republic of Korea. "Under U.S. protection and with U.S. support, South Korea was able to devote the lion's share of its efforts to economic development." (12:17) There was a feeling in Washington that associated economic assistance with national security, resulting in the passage of the Mutual Security Acts of 1953 and 1957 and the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. "Coupled with the benefits accruing from the transfer of technology, U.S. economic assistance enabled South Korea to rehabilitate its economy following a devastating war and to create the industrial foundations necessary for the rapid, export-led growth that was to follow." (12:18)

In 1956 a treaty of friendship, commerce, and navigation was signed at Seoul promoting an "economic relationship...developed along mutually beneficial lines." (22:35) The treaty agreed to give most-favored-nation treatment to citizens and corporations as well as respect the principles of non-discriminatory treatment of trade and shipping. (22:35)

In 1961, Major General Chung Hee Park came to power in South Korea as the result of a military coup. During his regime, the Republic of Korea experienced rapid industrialization, economic growth, and modernization. The government formulated policies designed to stimulate exports and increase domestic savings. Flexible economic planning was introduced and rural development was strongly promoted. The GNP (gross national product) grew at an annual rate of nearly 10 percent, while the annual population growth declined to the current 1.6 percent. This resulted in a "20-fold" increase in per capita GNP over a twenty-year period. (34:79)(67:52a)

The year 1979 saw the assassination of President Park, political and social instability, and world recession. A nation that had enjoyed a thriving economy was faced with economic

decline. By 1983 South Korea's economy began to climb upward again. The GNP grew by an inflation-adjusted 9.6 percent in the first half compared with a year earlier. The rise was stronger than most economists had expected and in sharp contrast to a 4.9 percent growth rate in the first half of 1982. Korea's economy has grown while prices have remained stable. South Korea's per capita income has increased from \$80 to over \$1800 over the past twenty years. (6:201-203)(28:119)

The Republic of Korea allocates a third of its national budget to defense due to the continuing military threat from North Korea. "In the face of the North Korean military buildup, South Korea must continue these large defense expenditures while maintaining economic growth." (67:52a)

South Korea buys more abroad than it sells. It is heavily dependent upon imports of raw materials and crude oil. This produced a trade deficit in 1983 of \$1.7 billion and \$40 million in foreign debt, the fourth largest in the world. But debt has not limited Korea's access to loans. South Korea's 1983 debt service ratio was 15.4 percent, down from 15.9 percent in 1982. (44:43)(6:202-203)

The United States provided economic and military aid to South Korea after each war. This allowed the Republic of Korea the opportunity to rebuild a war-torn nation which had limited natural resources and limited industrial base. Today, the economy of South Korea appears to be on solid ground and growing, not withstanding the need for a strong national defense strengthened by a continuing military partnership with the United States.

### Philippines

The Philippine government's spending for defense and for public order and security in 1982 was approximately \$937.2 million, about 13 percent of the government's budget. In the mid 1970s military spending was up, but declined sharply by the 1980s due to inflation and budget cuts. "Since gaining independence in 1946, the Philippines has received more than \$3.5 billion from the U.S. in economic and military assistance. Economic assistance of \$2.3 billion includes about \$257 million in postwar relief. Military aid totaled \$1.2 billion through September 30, 1982." (66:46)

The Philippines was devastated by World War II. Manila was destroyed, and much productive land lay in ruins. "Wartime shortages of food, medicine, and clothing generated...theft and fast dealing." (17:69) This prompted the United States Congress to pass the Philippine Rehabilitation Act of 1946 which provided

large sums of economic aid for reconstruction of the war-torn nation. (8:265)

During the rehabilitation period, Filipinos developed a penchant for consumer goods and a craving for luxuries. The U.S. payments provided the Philippines with means to import goods in disturbing quantities. When the United States spending declined, and the Philippine exports were not sufficient to maintain the living standards to which the people had become accustomed, an economic crisis ensued. The cost of living rose faster than wages, producing a rapidly increasing budgetary deficit. (23:6)

In 1950 a U.S. Economic Survey Mission was sent to the Philippines at the request of President Quirino to evaluate the economic situation and make recommendations. The Mission found low production and very low incomes to be the basis for the economic problems. These problems were largely due to failure to increase productivity, failure to open new lands and improve methods of cultivation, excessive imports for consumption, poor living standards of the masses, inflation, corruption in government services, and apathy on the part of agricultural and business leaders to improve the economic status of the lower social groups. (13:178-179)

Even though the economy improved between 1955 and 1965, the GNP rose only 5.3 percent. There were continuing economic problems. The economic growth depended on limited types of agricultural products such as sugar, copra, abaca (hemp), coconut products and lumber, which were subject to price fluctuation on the world commodity market. The land reform program had been slowed by lack of funds. The plight of the tenant and small farmer remained unchanged, with little or no incentive to increase production. (25:9)

During the period of U.S. administration, the trade relationship between the United States and the Philippines was based on "reciprocal free trade." In 1955, the Laurel-Langley Agreement proposed a schedule of declining tariff preferences which allowed duties to be increased on U.S. goods entering the Philippines quicker than on Philippine goods entering the United States. In the Agreement, all special tariff preferences were to be terminated by 1974. (15:36-37)(16:192)

In the late 1960s trade was unbalanced, resulting in a deficit of \$300 million. This deficit caused the Philippine government to turn to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for a standby agreement. In 1973 the balance of trade reached a substantial surplus, but by the late 1970s the Philippine economy was progressing rapidly toward deterioration. (66:45a)

William Feeney, an expert on Asian affairs, describes the situation in the Philippines:

By the late 1970s a series of external political and economic events, including the Iranian Revolution, the four-fold increase in oil prices, and global recession, prompted a serious price decline for the major Philippine commodity exports...and a dramatic escalation in the cost of imported energy supplies. The situation was compounded by a high population growth rate (2.8 percent), substantial increases in unemployment and underemployment, inflation and foreign debt, and a falling GNP rate. This economic deterioration tended to accelerate the already sizable disparities in the distribution of wealth, especially between urban and rural areas. (32:72)

It is impossible to discuss economic matters without discussing politics. Each impacts significantly on the other. This is even more apparent in the Philippines. Since he was elected President of the Philippines in November 1965 and re-elected in 1969, Ferdinand Marcos has been a controversial figure. He declared martial law in 1972, governing largely by decree and popular referenda under authoritarian rule. (7:Ch3)(66:43a)

During the years of martial law (1972-81), plans for a vast increase in economic infrastructure were initiated based on "project loans" from the government to individual companies. The 1974-75 oil crisis identified the need for an alternate energy source to supply the infrastructure that was being developed. Attention was turned toward developing hydroelectric, geothermal, coal, and nuclear power at a great expense. Export-processing zones were set up to move away from traditional raw commodity into textile and semi-conductor manufactured exports. During this economic development phase, "friends and close associates of President Marcos built economic empires through 'crony capitalism.'" (6:250)(50:68)

"Most of these companies grew too fast with their government loans, were inefficient in their operations, and earned huge individual sums off the top." (6:250) A world recession, the 1979 oil crisis, a sharp decline in export prices, and extensive domestic borrowing resulted in the collapse of most of these "crony" companies that had liabilities far exceeding their assets. (59:151)

The Philippine economy continued to deteriorate at a rapid rate. The balance of payments position increased from \$587 million deficit in 1981 to well over \$2 billion in 1983. (32:73)

A drought in 1983 had a significant impact on an already declining export market.

The government turned to the IMF for assistance in financing the deficit. The IMF approved a \$548 million package, with the stipulation of policy changes on the part of the Philippine government. This program was accepted by the Manila technocrats but was opposed by the opposition as well as President Marcos' Kilusang Bagong Lipunan (KBL) party. Nevertheless, President Marcos accepted the austerity policies. Projects were cut and the peso was devalued. (59:153)

On August 21, 1983, opposition leader, Benigno Aquino, Jr., returning to the Philippines, was murdered at the Manila airport. This triggered an outcry of anti-Marcos sentiment and a loss of confidence in the Marcos regime. This loss of confidence drained the reserves and initiated a capital flight that left the country broke by November 1983. (6:251)(47:26)

In 1984 and early 1985, signs of change were evident. The fact-finding Agrava board concluded that Aquino was murdered by a military conspiracy and indicted Armed Forces Chief of Staff, General Fabian Ver and 24 other military personnel for the assassination. A May National Assembly election gave one-third of the contested seats to the opposition. In September 1984, "President Marcos granted virtually all the IMF demands for increased taxes, reduced spending, and tight money. He allowed for foreign-exchange trading to start again and held wage hikes to a minimum." (38:35)(53:7A)

According to Robert Manning, a writer on international affairs, the Philippines is economically lagging behind its neighbors. "No matter what government runs the Philippines, no one here expects the country to turn around in less than five or six years.... Observers across the political spectrum agree... the country has lost all hope of competing with the economic powers of the region -- Taiwan, South Korea, and Singapore." (43:23)

The original 1947 Military Bases Agreement (MBA) between the United States and the Philippines granted U.S. access to specific bases "rent-free" for a period of 99 years. Since 1947, the bases agreement has been amended several times. The United States compensated for use of the "rent-free" bases through the Military Assistance Agreement of 1947. In early 1970, the Philippines received only \$50 million in grant aid, while Thailand received over \$400 million in military assistance and South Korea received over \$600 million. But, by late 1970s President Carter agreed to a proposed \$500 million in military and economic grants and aid over a five-year span. President Reagan has also agreed to try to procure \$900 million in security

and economic aid as compensation for the use of the bases. The U.S. military also pumps over \$300 million into the Philippine economy annually for base maintenance and employs over 40,000 Filipinos. (33:2-8)

Since World War II, the United States has economically and militarily supported the Republic of the Philippines. But, today the Philippine economy is struggling for survival under the Marcos regime. The Philippine government only spends 1.7 percent of the GNP on defense, one of the lowest amounts in Asia. (33:7) Focusing mainly on internal security, the Philippine government leaves the external security of the nation to the protection of the United States.

### COMPARISONS AND IMPLICATIONS

1. The histories of both the Philippines and Korea reflect strong differences with mild similarities. The Korean people are a homogeneous society of one people, one language, and one culture that settled in the Korean Peninsula beginning over 4,000 years ago. The Filipinos, on the other hand, are a mixed Malay-Polynesian society of many dialects, cultural emphases, and ethnic blends who settled in the many islands of the Philippine Archipelago sometime prior to the tenth century A.D.

2. The ancient Korean social, political, and educational structure was based on Buddhist and Confucian philosophies, teachings, and practices borrowed from China. The socio-political structure was based on a class system with the ruling nobility at the top and the peasant and slave classes at the bottom. By contrast, Philippine socio-political structure consisted of fragmented tribal societies ruled by community chiefs and tribal councils (prior to Spanish rule). Both cultures had landowning elite and poor struggling peasants or farmers. However, of the two societies, the Philippines had the least central organization, cohesion, and political tradition.

3. During the span of Korean history, the country has been the subject of foreign penetration and periodic domination by the Chinese, the Mongols, and the Japanese, but long interim periods of sovereignty also occurred. Philippine village society was exposed to the Chinese, Malay Moslems, Japanese, and Indian merchants, but did not actually suffer domination until Spanish rule in the sixteenth century. American tutelage followed Spanish rule in the 1900s. Then came a brutal Japanese occupation in World War II. Unlike Korea, which had a long pre-foreign history and sense of identity, written Philippine history really begins with the arrival of foreigners to the islands. As such, there is an identity problem in the Philippines.

4. The United States played the role of economic provider and tutor to both the Philippines and South Korea during the rehabilitation period after World War II. Great sums of economic and military aid were pumped into each nation. South Korea's efforts to rebuild were put on hold until after the Korean Conflict ended in 1953. The United States, through favorable trade agreements and foreign aid, supported each country's struggle to gain economic independence. Nevertheless, today the economic status of each nation is conspicuously different. The South Korean economy is a modern, dynamic success story, while the Philippine economy is stagnant and possibly bankrupt. The United States remains a major trading partner to both nations, but the two country's amazing contrasts in economic development suggest that internal differences, rather than external assistance, are the critical variables.

5. Defense spending is perceived differently in each country as well. South Korea devotes up to one-third of its national budget to defense. It is also a producer and exporter of weapons, depending on the U.S. only for more sophisticated and technologically advanced systems. The Philippines, on the other hand, spends approximately 13 percent (1980) of its national budget on defense and has sought to link the Military Bases Agreement with the U.S. to its economic development. Each country faces a different kind of threat. A heavily armed North Korea is just 30 kilometers from Seoul. In the Philippines the threat is internal; Muslim and Communist insurgents tie down over 75 percent of the Philippine constabulary's efforts. (20:108)

## Chapter Two

### POLITICAL EVOLUTION SINCE WORLD WAR II

Since World War II, the United States has had a fundamental interest in the development of stable democratic societies in the Philippines and South Korea. U.S. tutelage was directed toward the establishment of stable governments based on democratic philosophy while supported by U.S. economic and military assistance. The United States provided training programs, supplies, and major equipment as well as installations to promote defense capability within each nation. "...Crisis...may threaten the existence of a democratic nation, both as a nation and a democracy.... A nation must produce a cohesive nation and a military force that is capable of defeating the attack and preserving the sovereignty of the nation." (2:23)

#### South Korea

There appeared to be a lack of preparation and planning on the part of the United States for the rebuilding and structuring of Korea as an independent nation. "The United States assumed this position [as sponsor and political arbiter] with only the most minimum of preparation. This was reflected in the paucity of wartime planning for Korea's post war disposition." (12:2) "In the United States Government there was a general lack of awareness concerning the nature, magnitude, and complexities of the problems facing Korea. Indeed, in hindsight, there was an appalling lack of knowledge about most things Korean." (2:22) During the post-war period, the U.S. also seemed to lose sight of Korea's strategic importance in East Asia. This attitude changed sharply with the military invasion of North Korean armed forces in 1950. The United States deployed military forces to the Korean Peninsula in support of the young Republic in 1950, and today, the U.S. remains committed as a military partner to the security and political survival of the Republic of Korea.

During the Potsdam Conference in 1945, the four powers, China, the United Kingdom, the United States, and the Soviet Union, publicly agreed to the ultimate independence of Korea. The plan was to organize a joint commission tasked with the establishment of a provisional Korean government under a four-power trusteeship for a period of not more than five years. The Korean people strongly opposed a trusteeship after forty years of ruthless Japanese annexation. (2:22)



The United States and the Soviet Union could not agree on the issue of Korean unification. Frustrated by the intransigent Soviet position, the United States took the question to the Nations (U.N.). The U.N. General Assembly adopted two resolutions which called for

(1) free elections under the observation of a U.N. Temporary Commission on Korea, and

(2) the formation of a National Government, and the establishment of its own national security force, and dissolution of all military or semi-military formation not included.

The resolution also called for the National Government to assume the function of government from the military commands in North and South Korea, as well as the complete withdrawal of the armed forces of the occupying powers. (24:8-9)

The Soviet Union refused to cooperate. U.N. observers were only allowed to monitor the elections held in South Korea in May of 1948. On August 15, 1948, the Republic of Korea was established with Syngman Rhee, the recognized leader, as the first Korean President. (22:17-18)

In September 1948, the Soviet Union established the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) in the North under Kim Il Sung, a former guerrilla, who had served as a Russian army major during World War II. Kim claimed authority over the entire Korean Peninsula, but the U.N. declared South Korea (ROK) the only lawful government in Korea. (67:50a)

The last contingent of U.S. troops departed Korea in June, 1949 in accordance with the U.N. resolution. On June 25, 1950, North Korean forces invaded the Republic of Korea. U.N. forces, under the operational direction of U.S. commanders, came to South Korea's aid during the conflict which lasted until June 1953. (24:14-23)

Syngman Rhee served as President of the Republic of Korea from 1948 until April of 1960. To some, Rhee was perceived as a great patriot, a symbol of Korean freedom and independence; however, many others saw him as a self-seeking dictator. Rhee's government became authoritarian, and corruption of officials became a national disgrace. He declared martial law to curb Communist guerrilla movements and arrested political opposition members on charges of conspiracy. President Rhee abolished the office of Premier as well as the two-term presidential limit. "Rhee left a serious vacuum in the internal situation in South Korea, because he did little to develop leaders for the future service of the country." (4:17)(41:69)

During Rhee's regime, a Mutual Defense Treaty was signed by the U.S. and South Korea. Both parties agreed to "strengthen their efforts for collective defense" and to consult whenever either party thought its "political independence or security was threatened by external armed attack." (22:114)

In 1960 President Rhee was re-elected to a fourth term in "an election so fraudulent that the United States publicly protested." (42:120) Rioting by university students and discontented politicians over the elections forced Rhee to step down. A caretaker government was established; the constitution was amended; and national elections were held. Rhee's Liberal Party was defeated by the Democratic Party, and Chang Myon was elected Prime Minister. Chang's politically democratic but administratively inept government, the Second Republic, lasted until May of 1961, when it was overthrown in an army coup led by Major General Park Chung Hee. (67:50a)

A declassified summary of U.S. policy documents viewed Korean politics from 1945 until 1965 with the following parental patience:

From the beginning of its military occupation of Korea in 1945, the United States sought to make the country democratic as well as independent, united, and economically viable... The principal change in Korea [South] over the 20 year period was the clear evidence, by 1965, that for the first time in the Republic's postwar history it had achieved a sustained rapid rate of economic progress.... Democracy and human rights, according to American standards, had made slow and fluctuating progress at best. Yet, there was reason to hope that, just as economists as late as 1960 had regarded the Republic as hopeless...so too the pessimism of political observers might eventually be disproved. (42:121)

During the military take over in May 1961, General Park declared a strong anti-Communist government was being formed to eliminate corruption and to strengthen the nation's economy. The military government further promised to return the authority back to civilian control once the objective had been accomplished. After 2 years and considerable pressure from the United States, the military government produced a constitution, held elections and established a new representative democracy, the Third Republic. General Park, who had retired from the army, was elected President. (67:50a)(41:69)

Just as President Rhee had pushed through a constitutional amendment to allow his continuation in office, so did President

Park. He was re-elected in 1967, 1971, and 1978. In 1972, the executive branch powers were greatly strengthened by the Yushin Constitution. It provided indirect election of the President, presidential appointment of one-third of the National Assembly, and presidential authority to issue decrees restricting civil liberties in times of national emergency. The decrees included criticism of the constitution, banned discussion of false rumors, and political demonstrations by students. (67:50a) "In 1971 Kim [Dae Jung] came surprisingly close to winning over Park [Chung Hee] ... So the Park administration proclaimed martial law in 1972, rewrote the constitution, tightened political controls, and kidnapped and imprisoned Kim [Dae Jung].... Park [Chung Hee's] tactics brought six more years of authoritarian rule." (41:69-70)(55:36)

Under President Park, South Korea experienced a period of political stability and rapid economic growth. Both the rural and the urban populations advanced toward a better standard of living. "President Park succeeded in creating a substantial economic class whose members now had a stake in social stability and political continuity. A government... committed to providing continued economic growth, social stability, and security from external threats." (34:79)

In October 1979 President Park Chung Hee was assassinated by the chief of his own Central Intelligence Agency (41:65), and Prime Minister Choi Kyu Ha assumed the presidency of the Fourth Republic of Korea. Due to the confusion and uncertainty produced by the murder of President Park, limited martial law was declared. At this time the United States quickly warned the North Koreans of U.S. commitment to the national security of South Korea. (67:50a)

President Choi's civilian government repealed Park's emergency decrees, releasing thousands of political prisoners and restoring civil liberties. Choi promised early presidential elections and a new constitution. By late spring of 1980, demonstrations threatened the stability of the country.

Political and intellectual activists, given the opportunity to organize and to speak, heated up the political atmosphere in their drive to win political control in the reformed constitutional order which had been promised. Student demonstrations spilled into the streets. Labor unrest grew, and... increased the danger of Korean economic stagnation and recession already threatened by the international oil crisis. (41:66)

The political and social unrest after the assassination of Park became the concern of a group of military officers led by Major General Chun Doo Hwan. General Chun removed the Army Chief

of Staff and took control of the Martial Law Command. By April 1980, he expanded his power to include directorship of the Korean Central Intelligence Agency. In May absolute martial law was declared; universities were closed; many political leaders, including Kim Dae Jung, were arrested; and political activity was prohibited. (41:66)

A day after Kim's arrest, May 18th, student demonstrators in the city of Kwangju sparked a clash between army special forces and civilians which resulted in over 170 deaths. Kim was tried and sentenced to death for sedition in conjunction with the Kwangju incident. Excessive political activism plus excessive military reaction was responsible for the deaths at Kwangju. (41:67)

According to James Schiffman, a reporter for The Wall Street Journal, A U.S. appeal resulted in Kim's death sentence being reduced to life in prison. He was finally released and allowed to go to the United States for medical treatment with the promise that he would not engage in politics. Kim advocated a Western-style democracy including free elections, free press, and an economy based on diverse company ownership instead of family owned conglomerates. He also wanted the military out of politics. (55:36)

During the summer of 1980, General Chun retired from the army. In September of that year he was named President by a unanimous vote of the national electoral college, and October brought the adoption of a new constitution and the beginning of the Fifth Republic. (67:51a)

The new constitution continued to emphasize a strong executive and indirect election of the President, while limiting the President to a single 7-year term. Any change in the clause restricting the presidency to one term cannot apply to the incumbent at the time of the constitutional amendment. presidential emergency measures are to be taken only when the nation is in a state of war or a situation similar to it, and then, only with the consent of the National Assembly. (34:81-82)

In early 1981 elections were held under the new constitution; President Chun was elected to a 7-year term beginning in March of that year. Martial law was terminated and political stability restored. Since taking office, President Chun has been confronted with many domestic and foreign problems. An active and verbal minority of students, intellectuals, clergy, and opposition continue to express their discontent over the lack of Western-style democracy in South Korea. However, in 1983 two national tragedies appeared to unite the South Korean people and relieved the domestic tension toward the Chun government. (28:112)(62:35)

A South Korean airliner was shot down in September by a Soviet aircraft, killing all 269 persons on board. This tragedy was followed a month later by a North Korean terrorist bombing that killed 17 visiting South Korean officials in Rangoon, Burma. "The Rangoon bombing and the airline incident silenced those who had claimed that Chun exaggerated the Communist threat for his political purposes," said a Western diplomat." (62:35)

President Chun faced a severe economic recession when he took office in 1980, but by the spring of 1983, the South Korean economy was headed toward recovery based on the strength of the U.S. economy. The Rangoon bombing had eliminated more than a fifth of the Chun cabinet which he replaced largely with "technocrats." He continued to place major importance on economic stabilization and growth. (6:199)

Chun also approached the issue of Korean reunification by suggesting a summit meeting with President Kim Il Sung of North Korea to establish a dialogue and cultural exchange between the two Koreas. However, North Korea continues to demand preconditions to any dialogue, mainly the withdrawal of the 40,000 U.S. troops in South Korea.(56:36)(64:75-77)

Despite the bright economic prospects for South Korea's future, President Chun is constantly confronted with two nagging problems. The first is the ever-present uncertainty of North Korea's threat to the peace of the peninsula. The second problem is the political unrest from students and dissidents calling for democracy and Chun's removal. Kim Dae Jung, sometimes called the "Benigno Aquino of South Korea," (6:200) returned to Korea in February (1985) from political exile in the United States. The author viewed his return as a media event surrounded by controversy and confusion. President Chun had warned the nation prior to Kim's return that anyone who tried to provoke political chaos would be severely dealt with. (6:200) However, Kim's one month old New Democratic Party obtained 30 percent of the votes in the recent National Assembly election, second only to President Chun's Democratic Justice Party. (63:1)(27:26)

Some see this as a signal from the Korean people that a change in the political process of South Korea is in order. Korea has a new constitution that limits the President's term in office to seven years. Given Korea's history of seven constitutional revisions since independence, however, it is not surprising that the Korean people are irresolute toward their constitutions. "Time, effort, and even luck will be required for the new constitution to become institutionalized." (34:83)

The history of Korean political development is one of foreign ideology, but with a Korean overlay of tradition. Kyung

Cho Chung , in his book New Korea, attempts to explain Korean political behavior.

The Koreans have had no political experience and little administrative knowledge with which to build a stable government. Unfortunately, with the example of a notorious Japanese police force during the long Japanese rule, many Koreans learned to rely upon brute strength to control their fellow men.... Factional groups sprang up among them intent only on protecting their own selfish interests. Korean stubbornness and inability to compromise or cooperate has its roots in the past... long years of domination by hated rulers. (4:5)

Donald McDonald, an academic specialist on Korea, views the military-political involvement in Korea as the result of a more rapid development of the military organization over the other elements of society: political, social, and economic. Due to the challenge of the Korean War and threat from North Korea, "Korean soldiers were not abashed to profit from American weapons, training, organizational techniques, logistic support, and combat experience. They developed faster than other areas of Korean society.... It was inevitable that they should wield their power in politics." (41:71)

The United States believes that the peace of the Korean Peninsula is greatly dependent on political development, economic progress, security, and sound international relations. Each impacts on the other and together they affect regional and global security as well. Although the United States has shown ambivalence in the past in recognizing the strategic value of the Korean Peninsula, that is not the case today. The Reagan administration is firmly committed to the South Korean-American military partnership. (68:17)

### Philippines

The United States had an interest in the Philippines as a product of democratic tutelage, an American protege of Western ideology. During World War II, the Filipinos proved to be staunch allies, and the Philippine Archipelago proved to be an important link in the U. S. military defense network. After World War II, the military bases used by the U.S. Armed Forces in the Philippines took on new strategic importance with the Communist expansion in Southeast Asia, but over the decades, the bases have also become a topic of political controversy in both the United States and the Philippines.

The Philippine political system developed its roots during the nationalist movement of the nineteenth century. A national awareness evolved as a series of events took place:

(1) Philippine ports were opened to foreign trade resulting in economic prosperity and rise of the Filipino middle class.

(2) The unjust execution of three Filipino secular priests Gomez, Burgos, and Zamora by the Spanish authorities led to rioting by the Filipino community.

(3) Education of the middle class Filipinos abroad resulted in the establishment of an elite group (the propagandists) in Spain who focused attention to the repressive conditions in the Philippines.

(4) Cuba revolted against Spanish colonialism.

(5) The public execution of Jose Rizal, a reformist and propagandist, resulted in his martyrdom as a national hero.

(6) Andres Bonifacio and later General Emilio Aguinaldo led the revolutionary Katipunan society in open rebellion against the Spanish government.

This feeling of nationalism and a desire for independence remained alive, even after the Treaty of Paris in 1898 ceded the Philippines to the United States at the close of the Spanish-American War. An American Military Government was established in the new colony while grooming the country for democratic self-government. From 1901 until 1946, the United States set about preparing the Philippines for independence through a series of U.S. Congressional enactments geared toward the development of institutions that would encourage the eventual establishment of a free and democratic government. In 1935, the Philippines became a self-governing commonwealth with a constitution that contained the principles of checks and balance and separation of power by means of the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government. Manuel Quezon was elected President of the commonwealth government. Independence was to be granted after a 10-year transition period as provided by the Tydings-McDuffie Act. (67:42a)

Until December 1941, the transitional period of Commonwealth to Republic ran smoothly without serious internal crises. Then World War II brought three years of Japanese occupation and overwhelming problems to the Philippines.

Serious as the material damages were, the effects of the Japanese occupation upon the moral fiber of the people were more serious. Throughout the occupation it had been patriotic to defy government authority, to harass the enemy and to seek self-preservation by any means. What was criminal in the peace time world became justifiable and even admirable behavior in the occupied Philippines. The return to peace could not effect an overnight resumption of prewar standards and attitudes. With many people lawlessness had become a habit not easily erased. (23:5)

After World War II, the commonwealth government (in exile in the United States) returned to the Philippines with Sergio Osmena as President. In 1946, Osmena was defeated by Manuel Roxas who became the first President of the new Republic of the Philippines. The island nation gained full independence on July 4, 1946. (7:35-36) President Roxas died while in office, leaving the presidency to Vice President Elpidio Quirino who retained the presidency by controversial means in 1949 but was overwhelmingly defeated during the 1953 elections by Ramon Magsaysay. (16:Ch 4)

During the Japanese occupation of the Philippines, Socialist and Communist guerrillas joined forces in creating the Hukbalahap (Huk). This highly organized and dedicated group had two aims: promoting social reforms and resisting the Japanese and their collaborators in Manila. After the capitulation of Japan, the Huks refused to surrender their weapons. Their rebellious activities were directed against landlords and the Philippine government. Their terrorist tactics included extortion, intimidation, and murder of civilians. By 1950 the Huks claimed 10,000 armed Communist members. (16:79)

That same year Ramon Magsaysay was appointed Secretary of Defense. Magsaysay, a wartime guerrilla leader, instituted aggressive measures against the Huks by reorganizing the demoralized Philippine armed forces with U.S. assistance. He also used tactics such as enticements of amnesty, relocation of surrendering Huks on homesteads on Mindanao, and money for surrendered weapons. By the end of 1951, Magsaysay had significantly reduced the military threat of the Huks. "Magsaysay's flair, his humble background, his wartime record, his U.S. backing, and his success as Secretary of Defense made him an easy victor in the 1953 presidential election." (20:111) President Magsaysay was killed in a plane accident in 1957. (23:10-11)

Ferdinand Marcos, also a guerrilla fighter during the Japanese occupation, was elected President of the Republic of the Philippines in 1965 and again in 1969. Citing Communist rebellion and lawlessness as threats to the national security,



President Marcos declared martial law on September 21, 1972. "... martial law was declared in the Philippines, and the democratic structure that had been created over seventy years was abruptly ended." (20:99)(65:33)

Under martial law President Marcos instituted rule by decree. Dissidents and political critics were arrested; civil liberties were restricted; and law and order improved. A new political party, the New Society Movement (KBL), was formed; and a new constitution was written giving the President full executive authority and unlimited terms in office (the President was bound to two terms under the 1935 constitution). (66:43-44)

The motive behind President Marcos' decision to declare martial law can be argued by both his critics and his supporters. David J. Steinberg, an expert on Philippine affairs, describes Marcos as a President who saw his serious efforts to reform and improve the social structure "aborted" by the political process and spiteful opposition of his opponents. "Marcos saw democracy as not only wasteful but licentious, not only corrupt but paralyzing. Thus, although he had been produced by the democratic system and manipulated it with great skill, he appointed himself the redeemer...who could free the Philippines from a politics of cronyism and anomaly, from corruption and oligarchy." (20:100)

Robert Manning saw President Marcos' "constitutional authoritarianism" as a vehicle to transform Filipino politics, to replace the old oligarchies with a new elite.

... a brilliant lawyer and a shrewd operator who, over the course of twelve years of martial law, has transformed Filipino politics. Since 1972 he has destroyed the provincial fiefdom of local officials and the landholding classes, stripping the politicians of their offices and the oligarch of their assets. He has installed a network of people who owe their positions directly to him and who have profited...from their personal ties. Thus an elite of generals, business cronies, and loyal technocrats came to replace the old oligarchy. (43:21)

The Philippine political practice of nepotism, cronyism, and patron-client relationships goes back to the "barangay" communities and the basic Malay family unit. "Political allegiance has remained reciprocal and personal in large measure because familial polity has retained a dominant position.... political loyalty has continued to be tendered to the individual rather than the office." (19:7-8) The idea of political loyalty is further broken down into a basic social order with great emphasis on the personal character of loyalty in relationships.

relationships. According to Dr. Steinberg, the Filipino prioritizes allegiances in the following order:

The individual should be more loyal to the close family than to the extended family, to close friends than to acquaintances, to the local community than to the distant province, to the personal political leader than to the distant impersonal government agency, to the Philippines than to the metropolitan countries of Spain and the United States, and to Spain and the United States than to the rest of the world. (19:4)

President Marcos lifted martial law in January 1981, but retained the right to issue laws by decree. However, some restrictions on civil liberties were eased. This brought new vitality to the legitimate opposition parties after years of political dormancy under martial law. President Marcos was re-elected to a six-year term in June of 1981, despite opposition boycotts. (66:43)(65:33)

Marcos' critics became more vocal as the Philippine economy declined. When the opposition picked up momentum at home, former opposition leader, Benigno Aquino, Jr., prepared to return to the Philippines from self-imposed exile in the United States. Shortly after stepping off the plane at the Manila Airport, Aquino was assassinated. This resulted in demonstrations and protest against Marcos and the United States by opposition groups, the business community, and leftist students. (6:246-249)

The Aquino assassination had a grave impact on how the world perceived the political and economic stability of the Marcos government. The May 1984 assembly election gave the political opposition one-third of the contested seats. Some saw this as a clear dissatisfaction with the Marcos regime, while others viewed the elections as a test of individual candidate popularity. "The big turnout showed that Filipinos simply like elections...and they largely ignored the calls for a boycott by one opposition faction." (37:32) Despite the election results, the legal opposition parties are divided. They have failed to present credible alternative policies. "...the opposition...has been rightly caricatured as a group of toothless individuals who posture for the foreign press instead of getting down to what should be their domestic chore of drawing up a blueprint for an alternative government." (54:29)(47:22)

Since martial law, the military has increased from 60,000 troops in 1972 to 146,000 in 1983, making it a powerful national institution. Much of the increase has come about due to the need to counteract Muslim and Communist insurgencies. President Marcos reorganized the military to include the local police under the

command of the constabulary which consist of both combat infantry battalions and law-enforcement personnel. In recent years the military has received much criticism for behavior and corruption "...reportedly controlling much of the country's black market. And except for a few elite units, the Filipino military is far better at self-aggrandizement than counter-insurgency."(43:22) The Philippine Constabulary troops have been accused of illegal arrests, alleged murder of suspects, and other human-rights violations. (20:113)

The Agrava Commission of Inquiry into the Aquino assassination brought about the indictment of Armed Forces Chief of Staff, General Fabian Ver, and 24 other military members. (38:35) This linkage between the military and the Aquino assassination has further tainted the credibility of the Philippine Armed Forces. This is not to say that all military personnel are seen as corrupt. Lieutenant General Fidel Ramos, the Philippine Armed Forces acting Chief of Staff, is a West Point graduate who is respected for his integrity and professionalism. Gen. Ramos has made an attempt to revive military morale and strengthen community relations in order to regain public support. The Reagan administration is in favor of Gen. Ramos, but the decision of a permanent appointment is left up to President Marcos. (38:35)

With cautious world bankers and Americans watching the political situations in the Philippines, President Marcos has been forced to relax his autocratic rule. In order to demonstrate his willingness to move towards a more democratic and politically stable Philippines, Marcos has made concessions. The sphere of press freedom has been expanded; the vice presidency will be restored in the next presidential election; and austerity measures, recommended by the I.M.F., will be implemented. "For all his problems that defy quick and easy solutions, Marcos has shown that he is an adept political survivor." (37:32)(45:37-38)

Western-style democracy was introduced to the Filipinos during the American tutelage period. For seventy years Filipino-style democracy was the political institution of the island nation until abruptly altered by martial law in 1972. President Marcos has controlled the Philippine government for nineteen years as elected President, then as ruler by decree. The sixty-six year old President is rumored to be in poor health, but Marcos denies this and has stated that he will run for President in 1987.

The United States has a vested interest in the stability of the Republic of the Philippines as a friend and ally. However, economic and political instability could also affect the continued U.S. use of Clark Air Base and Subic Bay Naval Base,

both strategically vital to U.S. interests in the Pacific and Indian Oceans. (29:28-30)

## NATIONAL SECURITY POLICIES SINCE WORLD WAR II

### South Korea

Due to the opposing ideology of the occupying powers on the Korean Peninsula, strong anti-communist sentiment was created in South Korea as the Russians developed a strong communist state in the north. "The resolve of the South to resist communism became more deep-seated,...and a fundamental credo of the South Korean's political philosophy was born." (2:23) This was reinforced by repeated North Korean threats to reunify the country by force. South Korean Communists had also attempted to gain control of the government. Fear of communist aggression caused the government of South Korea to question the wisdom of American troops withdrawals. South Korean security forces were not capable of maintaining order. The last American troops left Korea in June of 1949, but a U.S. Military Advisory Group remained to continue the defense training of South Korean forces at the request of the South Korean government. On June 25, 1950, the North Koreans sent divisions of well-armed, well-trained troops across the 38th parallel against an unprepared nation. (22:19)

Communism was seen as a threat to national survival. "Anti-communist ideology facilitated the passage of the National Security Law which outlawed the Communist Party, its members, and fellow travelers .... harsh measures were deemed necessary for dealing with the enemies of the Republic." (2:26) This law was enacted while President Rhee was in office. Rhee and other political leaders used the law to arrest critics and opposition in the name of "national security." (4:37-39)

The abuse of the National Security Law did not make the uncertain threat from North Korea any less a reality. North-South Korea relations from the end of the Korean War have been hostile, and little or no progress has been made toward reunification.

For most Koreans in the South, the North's invasion of the South in 1950, its 30-man commando attack on the Blue House in 1968 and the three tunnels discovered in the demilitarized zone (DMZ) in the 1970s and... the recent killing of 17 South Korean elites in Burma are more than enough basis for outright fear and distrust of Pyongyang's motives for the 'unification at any cost' approach. (64:78)

In 1983 South Korea let Washington and Tokyo know that any decision to expand the military role of Japan in the Northeast Asia-Northwest Pacific region should include South Korea. "Korea should play an adequate part in mapping any formula, either by Washington or Tokyo, that will affect its security and destiny, too." (48:85) This would mean a joint South Korean-Japanese blockade operation of the Tsushima Straits in a time of national emergency. (35:7)

The Reagan administration has assured the South Korean government that American troops are going to stay in Korea as long as the Communist North holds the military edge. As co-signers of a mutual defense treaty in 1954, the combined strength of the South Korean-American military relationship has presented a credible deterrent to aggression since the Korean War. (68:17)

### Philippines

After World War II, the United States and the Republic of the Philippines signed a mutual defense treaty and the multilateral Manila Pact. In the Manila Pact, the members agreed to cooperate to improve security against armed aggression and internal subversion. In the event of aggression against any of the parties, each would take action to meet the common danger in accordance with its own constitutional processes. At the time the mutual defense treaty and Manila Pact were signed, the United States already maintained four large bases in the Philippines under the terms of a Military Bases Agreement. The bases were considered necessary in providing adequate defense for the Philippines and the Pacific region. (32:66)(25:17)

"As an island nation with a formal defense treaty with the United States, the Philippines enjoys a high degree of security against unprovoked external conventional attack by regional adversaries." (32:70) This security has left the Philippines free to focus on internal insurgency which has been on the increase since President Marcos took office. Marcos recently referred to "subversive terrorists" as "our true enemies." (54:29)

A serious threat to the security of the island nation has come in the form of the Muslim secessionist or the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF). The Muslim rebellion began before martial law and continues today. The conflict is based on historical difficulties that arose between the militant Filipino Muslims and Spanish Catholic authority. The MNLF was established in 1968 with the objective of gaining independence for the Muslim population in the southern islands of the Philippines. With arms supplied by sympathetic Islamic nations, the Moro movement reached its peak in 1974 claiming 30,000 armed men. The Tripoli Agreement in Libya in 1979 resulted in a temporary cease-fire

between the MNLF and the Marcos government. The government was able to lure insurgents away with offers of amnesty, money, land, and jobs (Magsaysay strategy). However, fighting broke out again with new campaigns for secession and independence. New insurgencies have kept government forces tied up fighting both the MNLF and the communist New People's Army on the island of Mindanao. (65:31-32)(6:246)

The New People's Army (NPA) is the armed wing of the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) (formally outlawed by the Anti-Subversion Act of 1957). (25:9) Marcos has used the communist insurgents as the reason for declaring martial law and doubling the strength of the Philippine Armed Forces over the past twelve years. The NPA has been encouraging poor tenant farmers to join their organization not by preaching ideology but by demanding lower interest rates and better crop prices. The increased accusations of military brutality and intimidation of the local populace have also helped the NPA gain support. "But as a 'people's movement', the NPA has a long way to go. While 'Red areas' do involve large tracts of the countryside in the region where the NPA is present, urban and suburban areas remain for the most part under the control of the military."(51:41)(45:37)

As long as the Philippines remains under the protection of resident U.S. military forces, there will be controversy. Some see the bases as targets for Soviet retaliation while others see the bases as powerful deterrents. In a country where defense spending is less affordable due to an economic crisis, the bases serve two purposes. First, they provide employment for the Filipino work force as well as grants and aid, and second, they free the Marcos government to concentrate on other areas besides external defense such as NPA aggression. (52:14)

#### COMPARISONS AND IMPLICATIONS

1. Where the United States perceives the threat of Soviet expansion as global, the Republic of Korea and the Republic of the Philippines perceive the threat as regional and local. The Republic of Korea sees the threat to their national survival in the form of Soviet-backed North Korea. However, the Republic of the Philippines views the NPA and MNLF insurgencies as direct threats to national security. Both the Republic of Korea and the Republic of the Philippines have politically banned communism, and each has suffered the effects of communist aggression at some point since World War II.

2. The U.S. relationship with both the Philippines and South Korea began with the establishment of transient American military governments to be eventually replaced with sovereignty. In the

case of the Philippines, the transition from a colony to an independent nation transcended forty-six years of American tutelage in preparation for a Western-style democracy. The Philippines was a fragmented society legally identified as one nation. Korea was the opposite. Koreans were a homogeneous people legally and physically divided by super powers of opposing political ideology. The United States wanted independence for the Korean people, but was unprepared for the turbulent transition that was necessary for independence at the expense of national unity.

3. The United States demonstrated great naivete as a sponsor to both South Korea and the Philippines. There was a general lack of knowledge of or concern for either society by the American government and the American people prior to sponsorship.

4. The Western-style democratic system of government originally adopted after independence soon gave way to traditional and cultural modifications. Political corruption was common in both the Philippines and South Korea as reflected throughout the history of each nation. Elections were fraudulent and violent. Political opposition was suppressed, harassed, arrested, and imprisoned. Politicians came from the elite of society. The military supported the ruling political leaders in the Philippines, but in South Korea the military became active in coups that transitioned into authoritarian civilian rule. The constitution was constantly rewritten to suit the personal ambitions of the incumbent political leaders in South Korea. This practice was also used by President Marcos in the Philippines. Martial law was used as an instrument of control under the guise of national security in both countries. Both nations are Republics with power centralized in a strong executive. Neither country has learned to deal honestly with its political opposition parties, however South Korea appears to be in a transition period leaning more toward a Western-style democracy. The Philippine government remains under President Marcos' firm control for the present, with an uncertain future.

## Chapter Three

### UNITED STATES MILITARY INVOLVEMENT SINCE WORLD WAR II

Since World War II, the U.S. military has played a decisive role either directly or indirectly in the United States relationship with both the Republic of Korea and the Republic of the Philippines. The U.S. has a military commitment to both countries through individual mutual defense treaties. The United States and the Philippines are also co-signers of the multinational Manila Pact. The recent Soviet military build-up in East Asia has caused the United States increased concern for the security of its national interests in the Western Pacific region.

#### South Korea

The U.S. military involvement in Korea began in 1945 and has remained committed to maintaining peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula. At the end of World War II, the U.S. military encouraged the development of a Korean defense force. This force was needed in preparation for American troop withdrawal required by the U.N. resolution of November 14, 1947. By providing training but limiting weapons to light arms, the U.S. restrained the South Koreans from invading the North. The last contingent of American troops left South Korea in June 1949. (24:14)

Between 1945 and 1949 there was a change of view in Washington toward the strategic importance of Korea and China.

Faced with a growing gap between missions and resources, U.S. military planners increasingly inclined toward a 'maritime strategy' that downplayed the salience of the U.S. position in Korea.... By the end of 1946, U.S. strategic thinking had moved perceptibly away from American military involvement on the Asian continent. (12:5)

The Truman Doctrine in March 1947 and the Marshall Plan changed the U.S. focus to Europe as the region of strategic importance. Korea was reduced to a peripheral security status in the global overview. Secretary of Defense Forrestal argued, "Korea would be at best irrelevant in the event of hostilities in



the Far East and at worst 'a military liability.'"(12:6) This ambivalence toward Korea was encouraged by the U.N. resolution recommending troop withdrawal of American and Soviet forces. When American forces left the Korean Peninsula, North Korea took advantage of the situation.

A little before dawn on June 25, 1950, Premier Kim Il Sung of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea sent seven infantry divisions, an armored brigade, and additional support units across the 38th parallel into the territory of the Republic of Korea. The South Korean Army was unable to defend itself against the Communist forces. President Syngman Rhee requested American aid and forced upon President Truman one of the most momentous decisions of the post war period. (9:3)

President Truman's broadcast to the American people delivered the following message:

In Korea the government forces, which were armed to prevent border raids and to preserve internal security, were attacked by invading forces from North Korea....In these circumstances I have ordered United States air and sea forces to give the Korean Government troops cover and support.... I have also directed... United States forces in the Philippines be strengthened and the military assistance to the Philippine Government be accelerated. (9:3-4)

The U.N. Command (UNC) was established with sixteen member nations sending troops and assistance. U.S. Army General Douglas MacArthur was designated the Supreme Commander of the United Nations forces, with the United States sending the largest contingent. On September 15, 1950, U.N. forces mounted a counteroffensive at Inchon in a successful amphibious assault that turned the tide of the war. Seoul was recaptured. U.N. forces pushed northward to the Yalu River and Manchuria. At this point the Chinese Communists entered the war. The new assault by China forced the U.N. troops to withdraw to the 38th parallel. The battle remained in that area of Korea until armistice negotiations began in July 1951. After much disagreement, the military commanders from North Korea and the UNC finally signed an armistice agreement on July 27, 1953. (67:50a)

The United States signed a Mutual Defense Treaty with South Korea in October 1953. Article IV of the treaty gave the United States the right to dispose of its military forces in and around the territory of the Republic of Korea. (24:151)

U.S. strategic interest in South Korea changed sharply as a result of the Communist aggression during the Korean War. Korea

became more valuable as a forward defense zone in the U.S. containment policy. This led the United States to assume a larger role as overseer of South Korea's development both politically and militarily. Large sums of military aid and equipment were made available. "This was designed to strengthen South Korean forces to the point where, backed by the United States, they could effectively deter North Korean aggression." (12:14)

U.S. policy on military aid to South Korea has vacillated with each new U.S. administration. During the 1960s, there was a change in threat perception. The "communist threat" was perceived as internal subversion. U.S. intervention in Viet Nam also placed constraints on the total U.S. commitment to South Korea and a reduction in arms. (18:417)

President Nixon's policy of reducing ally dependence on the U.S. and President Carter's plan to reduce the number of American troops in Korea created doubt in the minds of many South Koreans as to the sincerity of the U.S.-South Korea commitment. During this time of decreased U.S. military assistance, South Korea began to look to her own industrial base as a source of armament. This trend toward self-sufficiency in South Korea has resulted in a stronger industrial society as well as a better defended nation. (68:19)(31:14)(57:28)

Today, South Korea has become an exporter of military weapons, depending on the United States for high-tech equipment only. Modernization of South Korea's military could tip the scale in favor of South Korea with respect to the balance of power on the peninsula. This could lead to an eventual reduction in U.S. force commitment. But for the time being, the U.S. is committed to come to the aid of South Korea in the event of a North Korean invasion. Such support is seen each year by exercise TEAM SPIRIT where U.S. forces from outside Korea join with American and Korean Armed Forces stationed on the peninsula for a two-week field training exercise. The Reagan administration is strongly committed to the protection of our allies in the region. Deterrence and Soviet containment are still U.S. national objectives. (58:39)(65:75)(30:32-33)

### Phillipines

"Eighty years ago, United States General Arthur MacArthur described the strategic value of the Philippines as 'unexcelled by that of any other position on the globe.'... General MacArthur American defense strategy. He succeeded by establishing two huge military bases that remain today as vital links in the U.S. military defense network." (36:1)

U.S. views concerning the strategic value of the Philippines have vacillated over this 80-year U.S.-Philippine relationship. U.S. military presence in the Philippines began with the U.S. defeat of the Spanish at Manila. A temporary military government was established to protect U.S. sovereignty over the insular country. To maintain sovereignty, the United States military had to suppress a major insurrection by Filipino insurgents. Once the peace was established, the military was then tasked with the development of a Filipino constabulary. "Organized bands of thieves, living in the mountains and usually posing as patriots preyed on the Filipinos. Their suppression was a matter for the civil government." (8:67)

After the Filipino insurrection was over, the U.S. Army engineers set about improving the living conditions on the islands. A U.S. military presence remained in the Philippines after the military government was replaced by a civilian authority in 1907.

...in the mid-30's before the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War external threats seemed remote.... Japanese occupation shocked Filipinos and convinced most that they alone could not guarantee future security for their Archipelago. The result was negotiation of an agreement in 1947 whereby the United States was awarded military bases in return for assuming the magic burden of external defense. (16:191)

The United States' primary interest in the U.S.-Philippine national security relationship was to provide the umbrella of protection needed to repel external threats. However, the United States has provided military aid and assistance to the Philippines since World War II. During the Huk rebellion, the U.S. provided assistance and training in order to suppress the insurrection. This communist threat was seen as an extension of the larger Soviet threat.

The orientation of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) is toward domestic insurgency, although control of territorial waters is becoming a major concern....The navy, which operates very old equipment, is looking for modern arms.... The money for such modernization is currently tied up in countering insurgencies and only American military aid could make substantial modernization possible.... The Philippine Air Force's (PAF) procurement of the... long ranged F-8H over additional F-5 aircraft is indicative of the desire of the Philippine Government to be able to defend the Spratly Islands. (65:81)

"The Philippine Congress is clearly reluctant to appropriate funds for military purposes. The United States in 1965 attempted to transfer to the Philippine government some of the operating costs of equipment which it provided.... by the end of the second quarter of FY 1965, activities of the Philippine Armed Forces were virtually at a standstill." (18:459)

The military facilities used by the U.S. Air Force at Clark Air Base and the Navy facilities at Subic Bay are vital to the strategic policy of the United States. These bases are critical staging points between the Pacific and Indian Oceans. From a regional and global perspective, the loss of these bases would be an immeasurable setback for the U.S. The bases allow the Philippine Armed Forces to concentrate on internal insurgency rather than external threats. (36:6) (31:146-147)

Despite the advantages of the bases which are under full Philippine sovereignty, there are factions and opposition leaders who see the bases as a link between President Marcos' authoritarian government and the United States. Some base opponents express a fear of Soviet retaliation in the event of a nuclear war. So far these are voices from a small minority, but given the right political climate, they could grow in volume. (49:4)(33:2)

Other concerns for the United States in its relationship with the Philippines, are the issues of the Spratly Islands group and Sabah, Borneo. The Philippines claim these territories as do several other nations in the Asia-Pacific region. This has caused tension between the Philippines and several of her neighbors, creating the potential for external problems. The United States policy toward the NPA and the Moro Muslim insurgents has been to leave the problem to the Philippine Government. These issues have the attention of the United States but so far have not escalated into U.S. military involvement. The U.S.-Philippine bases agreement seems to be solid for the time being as long as President Marcos is in power but will become an issue again with the next presidential election. (32:68)

#### COMPARISONS AND IMPLICATIONS

1. The United States military presence in South Korea is integrated into the South Korean defense posture as demonstrated yearly by the combined U.S.-South Korean military exercise, TEAM SPIRIT. This is not the case in the Philippines. The U.S. military exchange with the Philippine Armed Forces is limited, usually, to the Philippine-United States Mutual Defense Board (MDB) which is a forum for direct liaison and consultation on

military matters of mutual concern plus an occasional joint exercise such as BALIKATAN/TANGENT FLASH 83. (65:30-31)

2. The U.S. military relationship with the Philippines is directly linked to the Military Bases Agreement of 1947. The bases have been a continuing issue of controversy since the agreement was signed granting the United States "rent-free" access to the bases for a period of ninety-nine years. This agreement has been amended several times "to reduce the irritants to Filipino nationalist sentiment." (33:2) The United States has returned full sovereignty over the bases back to the Philippines as well as increased the amount of grant aid given as compensation for the U.S. use of the bases. The U.S.-South Korean military relationship has not been strained by U.S. military presence in that country since the Korean War. U.S. troop withdrawal has been an issue, not base facilities. The South Koreans perceive an immediate threat from the North and welcome (desire) American assistance in a collective defense posture.

3. The United States provides large amounts of Foreign Military Sales (FMS) credits to South Korea in order to modernize South Korea's military forces. The balance of military power on the Korean Peninsula is critical to South Korea's survival. However, in the Philippines, economic aid takes precedence over military assistance. Defense spending in each country is dictated by the perceived threat to national security and the nation's economy.

## Chapter Four

### CONCLUSIONS AND PROJECTIONS

Comparing the Republic of Korea to the Republic of the Philippines is like comparing two friends who have different personalities, different attitudes, and different needs. The relationship that exists between the United States and her allies is greatly dependent on how the U.S. is perceived as an influential world power and how she can best serve the needs of the individual allied nation. Although U.S. military presence is a visible instrument of potential power, it is, nonetheless, an instrument controlled and constrained by U.S. national policy.

The U.S. military relationship with the Republic of Korea is solid. The U.S. military in partnership with the South forms the bulwark against the secretive government of Kim Il Sung's Communist North. South Korea with U.S. protection is secure in a growing economy that is inspired by national ambition, determination, and hard work. Despite a large national debt, South Korea's credit is good with international banks. The authoritarian government under President Chun is very much in control although challenged by political opposition. Today, South Korea's political attitude toward opposition appears to be in a state of transition, leaning more toward a Western style of political tolerance and away from traditional political suppression. This more liberalized approach to politics may be South Korea's message to the world community that the Republic of Korea is an emerging, mature nation that is capable of hosting an apolitical international Summer Olympics in Seoul in 1988. (44:51) The 1988 Olympics will place South Korea under a lot of pressure to maintain tight security with a hostile North Korea only 30 kilometers away.

The year 1987 will also be of great political significance for South Korea. President Chun's term in office will expire in accordance with the new constitution which limits the President to one seven-year term. Chun has said that he will not seek a second term. A strong political candidate may be Kim Dae Jung if given enough encouragement and backing by his party. However, Kim is in poor health and has also said that he will not run. The United States will watch the outcome of the elections closely as will the North Koreans.

The reunification of Korea is an ongoing issue that has met with little positive response from North Korea. A realistic dialogue may surface around the time of the 1988 Olympics, if not sooner. North Korea's economy is reported to be declining due to military spending while South Korea's economy is thriving and continues to grow even with increased arms spending and military production. North Korea may feel pressed to react to South Korea's prosperity with either positive dialogue or hostile action.

To preclude a hostile North Korean reaction, U.S. Armed Forces should remain in South Korea until the time that the Republic of Korea can stand alone against the North or peaceful negotiations for reunification of the peninsula are a reality. At present North Koreans are presenting a picture of impending aggression with a weapons build-up that appears more offensive than defensive.

The U.S.-Philippine military relationship is very different from the U.S. relationship with South Korea. The Philippines does not have a massive arms build-up taking place on its borders like South Korea, but it does have limited arms in the hands of communist and Muslim insurgents within its borders. The Philippine Armed Forces' struggle with the insurgents has been an independent effort without U.S. intervention. The U.S. has provided moderate amounts of military aid for the Philippine Armed Forces, but continues to concentrate on its role as protector of the islands from external aggression. The degree of external threat projected toward the Philippines is argued through different points of view. However, the United States sees its presence in the Philippines as vital to its interests in the Pacific and Indian Oceans. The U.S.-Philippine military relationship is loosely connected and is more closely related to the political element of the Philippine government than to the military. Large sums of economic aid are paid for the American use of the military facilities at Clark Air Base and Subic Naval Base.

The future of U.S. presence in the insular nation is questionable at best. Factors that will influence the continuation of U.S. military forces in the Philippines depend on the political climate after President Marcos leaves office. As long as President Marcos is in control of the Philippine government, the chances are good that things will remain the same. Marcos is in poor health with no clear contender in the foreground as his successor. Mrs. Marcos is ambitious, has a history of being uncooperative, and promotes expensive programs when belt-tightening is recommended. General Ver's future is uncertain pending the outcome of his trial for the Aquino assassination. If he survives the trial, he may run for the presidency. Edurado Cojuangco, the "coconut king" and friend of

President Marcos, is also a possibility. Other opposition leaders such as members of the Aquino family appear divided on issues and unorganized in their efforts. The Communist Party and leftist groups add to the fragmentation of the political arena. (46:121-123)

The Philippine military may join the competition if chaos becomes the rule of the day. Lt. Gen. Ramos is popular and trusted by both the civilian and military sectors. He would have the backing of the institution of the military.

So far the U.S. has been welcomed by the Filipino people, but a small segment of the population has voiced nationalistic and anti-American sentiment which could increase pending the stability of the nation's economy and political leadership post-Marcos. The Philippine economy has declined rapidly while the population continues to increase. The successor to President Marcos will have to be some one with charisma and an understanding of economics to get the country back on its feet. The Filipinos are a positive people who like to have a good time and tolerate most things beyond their control. The base facilities will always be a political pawn given the history of U.S. presence in the Philippines since World War II. But life goes on in the fragmented country that David Steinberg so aptly coined "a singular and a plural place." (40:E4)(60:150)(61:28)



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