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POLITICAL CHANGE IN MOROCCO:
ITS EFFECT ON THE TRADITIONAL MONARCHY

by

Charles Frank Odom

June 1984

Thesis Advisor: M. W. Clough

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Political Change in Morocco:
Its Effect on the Traditional Monarchy

by

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Captain, United States Army
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Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

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ABSTRACT

This thesis examines the effect of pressures for political change on the stability of monarchical rule in Morocco. Part One traces the origins of monarchical rule and outlines its guiding principles and dominant institutions. Part Two examines the present day monarchy with emphasis given to several incidents that occurred after 1940 that created pressures for political change in the country. The effects of modernization, nationalism, and decolonization on the stability of the monarchy will be analyzed. The nature of the post-independence Moroccan political system and the relationship of the monarchy to other political forces that developed as a result of the Nationalist movement will also be discussed. The final part of this study focuses on the nature of current political pressures on the monarch of Morocco. The author's conclusion is that despite the changes that led to the emergence of other political forces in Morocco, the prospects for significant future change in the system is slim and the monarchy will remain the dominant political force in the country.

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I. INTRODUCTION

As 1983 approaches its conclusion, King Hassan II in Morocco appears firmly implanted as that nation's dominant political institution. However, many of Hassan's critics argue that the monarchy's traditional hold on the country is weakening. As evidence, they point to the severe social, economic, and political upheavals that have confronted Hassan since his accession to power following the death of his father, Mohammed V in 1961.

Hassan narrowly escaped assassination in attempted Coups d'etat in 1971 and 1972; and for several years now pundits have been speculating on how much longer he will be able to hold on to his throne. These same critics argue that the assassination attempts do not point to stability or indicate a great love by Moroccans for its monarch.

Other skeptics point out that Morocco is beset by an increasing deficit, terrible poverty, high unemployment, a huge gap between rich and poor, an out-of-control birth rate, and blatant corruption, certainly not the sort of problems one man can handle alone.

Finally, opponents of Hassan's regime contend that monarchical rule is too obsolete and inefficient form of government to survive in the world. Educational barriers are being torn down and communication networks developed to the

extent that no nation need accept domination by a single ruler simply because 'it does not know better!' His critics point out that Hassan has realized this and, in response, has sought to adapt his regime to meet these pressures by allowing a controlled constitutional system with competing political parties to develop.

However, Hassan's rule continues despite these prophecies of doom. In fact his supporters contend that Hassan and the monarchy have never been more powerful or popular in Morocco. Morocco's growing ties with the west, evidenced by the massive military and economic aid he is receiving from the French and more importantly the United States, provides the government with a means of meeting the demands of the poor and unemployed. These ties have served to legitimize the monarchy and boost its popular support. In an area of the world where violence and political unrest is a way of life, Morocco, is relatively secure from external threats. This is due in part to its geographic location, but mainly to its possession of the most modern military equipment the world has to offer. Consequently, the average Moroccan citizen feels relatively secure; and attributes his security to the monarchy.

Other supporters of the monarchy argue that Hassan will survive because of the historical centrality of the monarchy. There has been a monarch in Morocco for over twelve centuries. As the seventeenth in a line of Alawite (family name) Moslems who have ruled over Morocco since 1666, but more importantly,

the most current in a line of monarchs that have ruled there since the eighth century, Hassan's historical and traditional right to rule has been firmly established in the hearts and minds of the Moroccan people. For this reason, the monarchy is not likely to be supplanted by another form of rule overnight.

And What of Islam? As in other devout Muslim countries this religion has a firm grasp on the economic, social, and political activities of the Moroccan people. To Moroccans, the prime symbol of Islamic values and tradition is the monarch, who claims to be a direct descendent of the Prophet. This gives Hassan a strong base from which to maintain his rule.

Both critics and supporters alike then, appear to have considerable basis for arguments as to the effects that pressures, brought about by political change, have had on the institution and stability of the monarch. While political change, either forced or freely instituted, has been a reality of Moroccan politics for as long as there has been a monarchy itself, it has had a varied effect. The purpose of this study is to determine the effects of political change on the monarchy by addressing three broad questions: What is the essence of the traditional monarchy to include its dominant institutions and guiding principles; how have modern pressures affected the stability of the monarchy; and how do current challenges to the monarch affect prospects for future change? This endeavor will be undertaken in three parts.

Part One will examine the traditional monarchy prior to the rise of the Moroccan nationalist movement which had beginnings as early as 1920 but saw its actual cohesion after the fall of France in 1940. This movement was a watershed for political change in Morocco. The purpose of focusing on the pre-nationalist Moroccan state is to examine a system that went virtually unchanged for over a thousand years. Its origins, guiding principles, and dominant institutions will be analyzed as a means to better understanding the foundations of the thinking process and actions of the monarchy today. Part Two will focus on the post-1940 monarchy with emphasis given to the occurrences that created pressures for change in the traditional political system. Modernization, the nationalist movement- and decolonization each created pressures for change, and the effects of these pressures on the post-independence Moroccan political system to include a brief account of each political party and its relationship to the monarchy will be discussed with the purpose of showing relative strengths and weakness of each organization as compared to those of the monarchy. This is a particularly important part of the study in that it will hopefully provide the information necessary to determine political and socio-economic changes that have occurred and their resultant effects on the station of the monarchy, and along with an analysis of the nature of current challenges to the monarchy in Morocco, to include the key issues and monarchical response to those

issues, will make a determination as to the actual level of influence the monarchy maintains in the politics of Morocco. Finally, speculation on its likelihood of continuance will conclude the essay.

II. THE MONARCHIAL TRADITION IN MOROCCO: PRE-1940

Morocco is both an ancient kingdom and an emerging country. It is one of the world's oldest states, by virtue of its continuous 1200-year history of controlling its own political affairs. Now, as an emerging nation whose interests have become global, Moroccans are proud of their country's history and in its role as the center of a political force that at various times controlled much of North African and Spain. Morocco was able to avoid falling under the domination of the Ottoman Empire, unlike the rest of the Maghrib (Arabic meaning "the west," and which includes Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia and sometimes Libya). In perspective, the relatively brief period of the French and Spanish protectorate (1912-56), during which resistance of separate tribes to this outside intervention was followed by the Moroccan Nationalist movement, should be viewed as only a brief occurrence in Morocco's actually long history.

In similar fashion, the institution of the monarchy was affected only slightly by the French protectorate, and in actuality increased the popularity of the Alawite dynasty that had ruled Morocco since the seventeenth century. It is the world's oldest reigning royal house. In mid 1983, Hassan II, the current monarch, ruled in a fashion apparently as traditional and authoritarian as that of his predecessors, although

in a modernized style, and he continued to command the loyalty and apparent veneration of a decisive majority of the population. This will be developed in greater detail in later portions of this paper.

The purpose of this section of the study is to determine the essence of the traditional monarchical rule in Morocco prior to 1940. First, by tracing its origins, and then outlining his dominant institutions and guiding principles. This will serve as a backdrop for the succeeding parts of the paper which will examine the political changes that have occurred since 1940 and their effects on the position of the monarchy. 1940 has been chosen as the watershed year for political change in Morocco for two reasons. One, the French fell to Germany during that year in World War II and second, 1940 marked the beginnings of a rapid rise of political parties in the country causing ultimately, the demise of the French Protectorate in 1956.

A. ORIGINS

1. Pre-dynastic Rule

Prior to the rise of the three Berber and two Sharifan dynasties that ruled over Morocco from early in the eleventh century until the present, Morocco as a nation; a unified state; was non-existent. The borders of the country were relatively defined but the populace was not grouped into any large community espousing a theme of a united Morocco and as such, enjoyed no central authority. The Berber, the primary

race to inhabit Morocco at that time had no concept of Nationhood despite their habitation of the area for over 2,000 years [Ref. 1]. They referred to themselves simply as 'imazighan,' to which has been attributed the meaning "free men" [Ref. 2]. But the Berbers identified themselves entirely with their separate tribes, and Berbers from other tribes were as much foreigners to them as were the Arabs who came later. As such, a better understanding of the Berber peoples is necessary before continuing with the analysis of the system of pre-dynastic rule in Morocco.

The origin of the Berbers is a mystery. Investigation has produced an abundance of educated speculation, but evidence is not sufficient to support a definitive solution. Some pieces of the puzzle can be fitted together, however. Archaeological and linguistic evidence indicates southwestern Asia, a great breeding ground of tribes and nations, as the point from which the ancestors of the Berbers began their movement into North Africa. Berber tradition told that they were descended from two unrelated families; and scholars believe that the Berbers crossed North Africa in two simultaneous waves, one from the southwest that entered the region after a long sojourn in black Africa, the other from the northeast. Affinities verified by place-names, also appear to link the Berbers and the Iberians of ancient Spain.

The Berbers entered Moroccan history toward the end of the second millennium B.C. when the neolithic invaders made contact with the Bafats, dark-skinned Oasis dwellers on the

steppe, who were remnants of the earlier savannah people and possibly the ancestors of the Harratines. Berbers compose the basic genetic stock of the people of ancient and modern Morocco; however, as Barbour points out, "no one racial type can be identified as Berber; the term is simply used conveniently for all those peoples who speak a dialect of a certain language which we call Berber" [Ref. 3]. Classified as Caucasians of Mediterranean stock (from their Western European appearance), the Berbers are a composite people of anthropologically varied sources, speaking dialects related to the Hamitic language group. The language has no written format and even with this apparent handicap to its survivability is still widely spoken in Morocco and more so in Algeria where more than a million people use it as their daily language. In reality, language becomes the only criterion by which to distinguish them, as the difference of various Berber tribes appear to be solely linguistic. In Morocco, Berber is spoken by three distinct groups of tribes each in a specific portion of the country (Rifians, Middle/Central Atlas and Anti-Atlas or Sousis Berbers) [Ref. 4].

Berbers, who thus considered themselves the "free men," have behaved as such since recorded history, and ironically not only in classical Moroccan history, but in contemporary as well, Berbers have little conception of national unity in a political sense. It was not until the coming of the Arabs in the seventh century and its resulting

intertwining of separate races with distinct ideologies, that the basis of a unified political force, resulting in the monarchical type rule that exists in Morocco today was laid. Historically a defiant breed however, pure Berbers in the outlining areas of contemporary Morocco still rely on the system of government that was utilized by their ancestors since recorded time. It is not until the input of Arab institutions into the traditional political system of government, primarily the rule by Sheiks, drawing their right to rule from Islam, did dynastic rule emerge.

Prior to this occurrence, however, the basic unity of social and political organization among the Berbers was the extended family, usually identified with a particular village of the sedentary or the traditional grazing grounds of the nomadic Berbers. Families in turn were bound together in the clan; and an alliance of clans often tracing their origins to a common ancestor, formed a tribe. Courts and representative assemblies guided by customs peculiar to the group functioned at each level of organization. Berber folk law and government, like Berber religion were highly personalized and therefore most effective at the lowest levels of their application. Ultimately each household or tent was its own republic.

For mutual defense kindred tribes joined in confederations, which, because war was a permanent feature of tribal life, were in time somewhat institutionalized. Some Chieftans

who were successful in battle established rudimentary territorial states by imposing their rule on defeated tribes and allies alike; but their kingdoms were easily fragmented, and the dynasties that they sought to found rarely survived a generation [Ref. 5]. By the second century B.C., however, several large although loosely administered Berber kingdoms had emerged each with a 'monarch' supported by the farmers of the plains who looked to these kings to protect them from the raids of the pastoralists of the plateau and the mountains. The Berber kings of Mauritania and neighboring Numidia ruled in the shadow of Rome and Carthage, often as satellites, hiring out troops and forming alliances with one or another of the great powers contending for domination of the western Mediterranean. After the fall of Carthage in 146 B.C., Berber kings threw in their lots with factions vying for power in the Roman civil wars of the first century B.C.

These frequent 'alliances' were to occur again and again over proceeding centuries in which countless waves of invaders came and went in Morocco. Through the centuries the Berbers have been subjected to eight principal foreign influences: the Phoenicians, Carthaginians, Romans, Vandals, Byzantines, Arabs, Turks, and French have all arrived and then departed; each leaving some trace of its past presence on Berber society. As a means of adjustment and survival to these unwanted intrusions, Berber kings throughout history have allied themselves in one way or another to their

uninvited guests. King Hassan II, today, is no exception to this.

Under the Romans, the pre-dynastic political system in Morocco consisted of a series of alliances between various Berber Kingdoms, and the Romans. Rome divided Morocco (which at that time included present day Mauritania) at the Moulouya River (near Morocco's present-day border with Algeria) into two provinces, Mauritania Caesariensis to the east (in present-day Algeria) and Mauritania Tingitana to the west with its capitol at Tingis (Tangier). But because the Berbers, whose fierce independence kept them from being subjugated (though the Romans had conquered them), were uncontrollable through direct domination, Rome continued to control this vast, ill-defined territory through alliance with the tribes rather than through military occupation. Autonomous client Chieftans policed the frontier and kept the wilder mountain tribes from the towns and farms. Rome expanded its authority only to those areas that were economically useful or that could be defended without additional manpower. Hence Roman administration never really applied outside the restricted areas of the coastal plain and valleys.

The influence of Roman civilization, like Roman political control, was restricted to the towns and neighboring countryside, and it did not filter down beyond a small Romanized urban elite. Cities were few but each shared the amenities of urban life characteristic of their Roman intruders.

These were the forum, town council, and baths. The baths still exist as an integral part of Moroccan urban society. The 'mehari,' or riding camel, was first introduced to Morocco late in the Roman period and they revolutionalized transportation and made possible the trip across the desert for Sudanese gold. The adoption of the camel also gave devastating mobility to the marauding Berber tribes that had been driven beyond the Roman frontier into the desert.

Christianity was introduced also during Roman rule in the second century and gained converts in the towns and among slaves and Berber farmers. By the end of the fourth century, the Romanized areas had been Christianized and Christianity was officially recognized. However, Christianity flourished in relatively few large centers and after the influx of Islamic Moslems in the seventh century never really recovered as a dominant institution in Morocco. Today only eight percent of the population professes the Christian faith, while ninety percent follow Islam, and a mere two percent are Jew.

After the Romans, a quick succession of would-be conquerors and rulers entered the confines of Morocco's borders. The Baltic Vandals, who followed Rome into Morocco, had relatively little influence on the established political systems that the Romans had founded in Morocco and none on the traditional tribal system. In 533 the Byzantine General Belosarius began the reconquest of Morocco and North Africa for the Roman Empire aided by some Berber tribes, but in

Western Morocco effective Byzantine control was limited to a few heavily fortified outposts. The Berbers there had never really relinquished their autonomy and resisted any reassimilation attempts into the imperial system.

The fifth to seventh centuries witnessed the progressive deurbanization of Morocco where the Roman imprint was rapidly effaced. The social solidarity (a term coined by Durkein, but much earlier by Ibn Khaldun's 'Asabiyah'), of the settled areas broke down with the departure of Roman authority. No coherent form of political organization took its place as tribal principalities once again rose, were subdivided, and fell; reaffirming the cycle that began before the coming of the Romans and continued afterwards.

Ibn Khaldun, the first philosopher of history and the last intellectual giant of Islam, prophetically portrayed this cycle of cultural political evolution in his monumental work, The Muqaddimah: An Introduction to History, Princeton, 1974. Khaldun believed history repeated itself in cycles and that these cycles were observable. He felt that the natural result of the human species interaction was the emergence of a leader figure. "Human civilization requires political leadership for its organization...politics requires that only one person exercise control" [Ref. 6]. The cycle of political rule began with an 'acceptance' period, where the rule established his support base, then led to succeeding phases of growth, complacency, corruption, and finally dissolution.

This cycle, according to Khaldun took approximately 120 years to begin and end. After one cycle ended, another began. It can now be seen that the accuracy of Khaldun's assumption in regards to the cyclical rise and fall of dynasties in North Africa were absolutely astonishing.

By the beginning of the seventh century, pre-dynastic rule in Morocco was basically the same as it had always been, scattered confederations of tribes, each fiercely independent and subservient to no one. What was about to take place however, would have the most severe and lasting impact on traditional Berber society and its system of government; the coming of the Arabs and Islam. While the extremely important institution of Islam will be discussed in more detail later, it is important here to trace its early origins and initial effect on the Berbers system of pre-dynastic rule.

When the Prophet Mohammed died in A.D. 632, he and his followers had brought most of the tribes and towns of the Arabian Peninsula under the banner of the new monotheistic religion of Islam (Arabic for 'submission'). Islam was conceived of as uniting the individual believer, the state, and the society under the omnipotent will of God. Islamic rulers therefore exercised both temporal as well as religious authority. Adherents of Islam, called Muslims (those who submit to the will of God), collectively formed the House of Islam (Dar al Islam). All others were considered infidels who lay outside the house awaiting the opportunity to be converted.

By the mid-7th century, Arab armies had carried Islam north and east from Arabia in the wake of their rapid conquests and westward across North Africa as far as Tripoli. There, stubborn Berber resistance and their own restraint had for a time deterred the Arabs from advancing farther west toward present-day Morocco. The first Arab raid into Morocco was led by Akbar ben Nafi through the Taza Gap to the coastal plains in 683, but Arab efforts at political control and missionary activity did not commence until 710 when an Arab army under Musa ibn Nusayr, the governor of Ifriquiya (present-day Tunisia), invaded Morocco and set about converting the plains Berbers to Islam. These new converts formed the bulk of the forces taken by Tariq ibn Tiyad, the Berber governor of Tangier, to Spain in 711 to intervene in a Visigoth feud. Tariq returned to Morocco, but the next year Musa led the best of his Arab troops to Spain and in three years had subdued all but the mountainous regions in the extreme north. Berbers were settled strategically throughout Muslim Spain, called Andalusia, which like Morocco was organized under the political and religious leadership of the Umayyad caliph of Damascus [Ref. 7].

Pre-dynastic Arab rule in Morocco as elsewhere in the Islamic world in the eighth century had as its chief goal the establishment of political and religious unity under a caliphate (the office of the Prophet's successor as supreme earthly leader of Islam) governed in accord with a legal system

(sharia) administered by religious judges (cadis) to which all other considerations, including tribal loyalties, were subordinated. The sharia was based primarily on the Quaran and on extra-Quranic 'Sayings of the Prophet' (Hadith) and derived in part from Arab tribal and market law [Ref. 8].

In practice Arab rule was a tyranny whose severity was mitigated by its inefficiency. It was easily imposed on the towns, which grew under Arab patronage, and in the farming areas. Sedentary Berbers turned to the Arabs, just as they had centuries before to the Romans, for protection against their nomadic kinsmen. But the Berbers differed essentially from the Arabs in their political culture and their communal and representative institutions contrasted sharply with the personal and authoritarian government that the Arab conquerors had adopted under Byzantine influence. Even after their conversion to Islam, Berber tribes retained the customary laws in preference to the sharia. While the Arabs abhorred the Berbers as barbarians, the Berbers often saw the Arabs only as an arrogant and brutal military dictatorship bent on collecting taxes; contrary to the tenants of the Quran, which prescribed preferential treatment of all Muslims [Ref. 9]. Arab rulers continued to levy heavy taxes on Berber converts under their control. Berber women were prized in Arab harems, and whole areas might be evacuated to escape the slave traders [Ref. 10].

The Arabs formed an urban elite in Morocco, but they had come as conquerors and missionaries, not as colonists.

Their armies had traveled without women and, after occupying Morocco, they married among the sedentary Berbers, transmitting Arab culture to the townspeople and farmers. These Berbers quickly became Muslims, but conversion was also rapid even among the tribes of the hinterland that stoutly resisted Arab political domination. Through actual integration with the Berbers as opposed to the almost clinical manner in which Christianity was introduced during Roman domination centuries before, Islam was able to endure. However, many Berbers were opportunists rather than sincere Muslims, and several tribes that accepted Islam under Arab pressure abandoned it once the Arab troops, tax collectors, and slave traders had moved on. The toughest resistance to Islamization came from the desert tribes: and although Christianity had virtually disappeared from the settled areas of Morocco within fifty years of the Arab conquest, paganism and Judaism persisted among the nomads [Ref. 11].

Once established as Muslims, the Berbers with their characteristic love of independence and impassioned religious temperament, shaped Islam in their own image. They embraced schismatic Muslim sects--often traditional folk religion barely disguised as Islam--as a way of breaking from Arab control with the same enthusiasm that their Christian forebearers had accepted Donatism in opposition to Rome.

As Islam was struggling to make its way in North Africa and Morocco in the seventh century, a conflict had already

developed between supporters of rival claimants to the caliphate that would split Islam into two branches--the Orthodox Sunni and the Shia (literally, party)--which continued thereafter as the basic division among Muslims. The Shia supported the claim of the direct descendents of Ali, son-in-law of Mohammed and the fourth Caliph, whereas the Sunni favored that of Ali's rival Muawuja, leader of a collateral branch of Mohammed's tribe, the Quaraysh of Mecca, and the principle of election of the fittest from the ranks of the shurfa (tribal elites). In addition, the Sunni accepted literal interpretations of the Quran and Hadith and adhered to the sunna (customs of the Prophet accepted by a consensus within the Muslim community, hence Sunni). The Shia, besides insisting that the caliphate pass in a direct line from Mohammad, refused to acknowledge the sunna. For them the Quran was not a closed body of revelation but was open to further elaboration by inspired imams, and a power that the Sunni denied even to the caliph. The Shia had their greatest appeal among non-Arab Muslims, who were scorned like the Berbers by the desert Arabs [Ref. 12].

The greatest challenge to the Arabs and Islams came during the Kharidjite movement, of distinctly Berber origin, which surfaced in a revolt against the Arabs led by Maysara, a water bearer from Tangier in 735. Although they had affinities with the Shia, the Berber Kharidjites (seceders; literally, those who emerge from impropriety) proclaimed in

opposition both to them and the Sunni that any suitable Muslim candidate could be elected caliph without regard to his race, station, or descent from the Prophet [Ref. 13]. They also deviated from the mainstream of Islamic theology by rejecting the idea of justification of faith. Taking a position directly paralleling that of the Berber Christian Donatists, the Kharidjites maintained that a sinner could no longer be a believer since faith was not possible without purity.

The attack on the Arab monopoly of the religious leadership of Islam was explicit in Kharidjite teaching; and, during a period of dynastic upheaval in the Arab world, Berbers across the Maghrib rose in revolt in the name of religion against the restraints of foreign domination. A number of small Berber kingdoms were established by Kharidjite sectarians, but they were unable to sustain their fragile tribal states, so once again, the Berbers now without foreigners to fight, fell to fighting among themselves. Although the religious heresy was eventually suppressed, the Arab caliphate was unable to restore its temporal authority in Morocco.

At this point in the study it is important to refocus on the original purpose of Part One, and that is the essence of the monarchial tradition in Morocco. Up until the coming of the Arabs, pre-dynastic centralic rule in Morocco was non-existent. Contracts between countless waves of invaders and

Berber tribal chieftans was the norm. There was no central rule. As one group of invaders penetrated the interior and stayed for different periods of time, but none permanent, another group followed in its footsteps. Only minimal subjugation of the Berber race was achieved.

With the arrival of the Arabs in the seventh century, however, this situation changed, but not immediately, and by no means completely. While the past narrative may appear to be rather drawn out in regards to the effects of Islam on pre-dynastic rule and the formulation of a monarchical state, it is in reality only a surface skim at best and many more details need to be examined as a means to understanding the far-reaching effects of this religion. However, that endeavor will have to be undertaken in other studies that allow more space than the confines of this intentionally narrow overview.

A discussion of one other group of personalities, then, the Idrisids, will close out this portion of the paper pertaining to pre-dynastic rule in Morocco.

The continuing struggle for the caliphate had other important consequences for Morocco. In 750 the Umayyad caliphs of Damascus were overthrown by the Abbasids, who moved the caliphate to Baghdad. A surviving Umayyad prince fled to Morocco and thence, with Berber support, to Spain, where as Abdel Rahman I, he founded a politically independent emirate with its capital at Cordova; later known as the Analusian dynasty which lasted for 250 years.

In 786 a rebellion by the descendents of Ali in Arabia against the Abbasids occurred. Many of the followers of Ali (Alids) were massacred and others fled to the west. Among these was Mulay Idris ibn Abdallah, who after settling in among the Awraba--conjectured to have been a Romanized Berber tribe recently converted to Islam by the Kharidjites--became their chieftan primarily because of his descendency to the prophet and partly because of his learning and piety. From this base, Idris brought together under his rule a confederation of western Berber tribes that became the nucleus of the first Moroccan state. Idris died in 792, poisoned by agents of Harun al Rashid, an Abbasidian, but left behind a Berber concubine pregnant with his successor, Mulay Idris II (792-828).

Idris II founded two adjacent cities--one Arab, the other Berber at Fès (Fez) Volubilis in the Taza Gap, which later symbolically served as the uniting of the Berber and Arab peoples under an Idrisid king. Fez later became the educational center in Morocco with the establishment of Al-Quarawiyyan University in 859.

The Idrisids established in Morocco the ideal of sharifian rule, the tradition that descent from the prophet was qualification for political power. But Idris II followed the Berber tradition of parcelling out his kingdom among his sons, destroying the Idrisids's immediate political achievement of uniting Morocco under a single ruler.

Morocco returned then to what it had always been, a country divided into small communities under local rule. The Arab influence was the most evident of any conqueror to come before and today it still is. However, prior to the rise of the Berber Dynasties which will be the focus of the next section of Part One, the Arabs only laid the seeds for a centralized monarchial type political rule in Morocco. They came a long way from establishing it.

At this point in history the Berbers had no concept in reality of nationhood. Barbour puts it nicely when he writes,

One remarkable fact about them (Berbers) is that the possession of a common language and of a common residence in a given area for over two thousand years appears never to have given them any conception of national unity in a political sense. [Ref. 14]

Collectively the Berbers referred to themselves as Imazighan and by their allowance nothing was going to change this. Feuding between tribes resumed when outside Arab intervention declined. Again, the point is made here that when the Berbers did not have an outside enemy to satisfy their inherent hostile nature they brought hostility upon each other. Subsequently, three great confederations came into being to which most tribes had ties. The Masmonda were quiet farmers from the Atlantic coastal plains or the high plains of the Atlas. The Sanhaja incorporated the fiercely brave, camel-riding nomads of the steppe and desert. Their traditional enemy became the third confederation, the Zenata, a tough resourceful horsemen from the cold plateau of the northern interior.

In conclusion, the aspects of pre-dynastic rule in Morocco have many unclarities, but one dominant theme stands out; the individualistic nature of the Moroccan native. The irony of the situation is that from the time of the Phoenician's, some two thousand years previous, to the arrival of the Arabs in the seventh century, a country so divided in political beliefs among the natives, due to their individualistic ideals, could withstand these intrusions and remain a relatively autonomous society, existing in the confines of a definable state. No other country in the world has faced the challenges to its survival as successfully as that of Morocco.

In the next section of this portion of the paper, the rise of dynastic rule and subsequent birth of the monarchial system will be discussed, with primary emphasis given to the Alawite dynasty which has ruled Morocco since 1666 and is the family of the current monarch, King Hassan II.

2. The Rise of Dynasties and the Monarchy

With the exception of the Idrisids in the eighth through tenth centuries (and even their influence was limited), Morocco continued as it had for centuries; a country divided into kingdoms of tribal confederations. Berber chieftans ruled over these elements as autonomously as their larger counterpart, the monarch, today rules. Slowly however, as situations necessitated a more united state, Morocco moved closer and closer to a country with one dominant political force. The purpose then, of this section, is to continue

the examination of the evolution of Monarchical rule in Morocco by focusing on the rise of family dynasties; those groups that maintained their positions for several years. No other factor in Moroccan political history contributed to the institutionalization of the monarchy as much as families that, over time, were able to strengthen their political position to the point where they became the dominant political force in the society. The head of that family thus reaped the benefits of this timely struggle and became the monarch.

The necessary factor for the monarch to emerge became time; time for it to adapt, to become more complex, more coherent, and finally, autonomous. These four variables, given to us by Samuel P. Huntington in his epic work, Political Order in Changing Societies, Yale, 1968, are what Huntington describes as those most necessary in institution building. For now it is sufficient to state that the longer a family was able to exist as a political force, the more powerful its head became. Equally, early rulers immediately saw the necessity to unit the independent tribes of Morocco. Successful unity under one leader meant longevity for their family. It is this struggle for unity and longevity by elite families that is the focus here.

The eleventh and twelfth centuries witnessed the founding of great Berber dynasties, led by religious reformers, that were to dominate the Maghrib for more than 200 years. It is important to note that all political movements in the

country after the introduction of Islam by the Arabs had religious rather than secular underpinnings. Islam had quickly become the single unifying thread among the Berbers and through Islam, families made their move for power.

The first of these families to seek a dominant political entity through Islam were the Almoravids. Early in the eleventh century Lemtuna Sanbaja Chieftans from northern Mauritania (now the southern tip of Morocco) returning from a pilgrimage to Mecca, one of the five requirements of those professing Islam, invited a Moroccan teacher, Ibn Yasin, to preach to their isolated desert tribes. Under his direction a strict religious brotherhood was founded at a fortified retreat (ribat), placed by early sources on an island off the coast on the Niger and Senegal Rivers. Initiates in the brotherhood were called "the men of the ribat" (al murabitun, transliterated as Almoravid). Modern historians have discounted the existence of a single stronghold of these "warrior monks" [Ref. 15], but by the middle of the century the Sanhajas had gathered in the western Sahara under the Almoravid banner to sweep into Morocco and reform Islam by force of arms.

The Sanhajas controlled a triangular piece of the Sahara that stretched from the Sous in the north to southern Mauritania in the west and Timbuktu in the east. They were "men of the veil"--protected from the elements and the evil eye by the cloth they wrapped around their faces in the

fashion still followed by the Tuaregs--who despised unveiled Berbers as "fly eaters" [Ref. 16]. Although the religious intent of the Almoravids is clear, their Islam crusade was also motivated by their desire to break the power of the Zenatas, who competed with them for control of the trade routes. They moved into Morocco through the Tafilalt region and in 1062 founded the city of Marrakech, which would be the capital of the dynasty established by their leader, Ibn Tashfin (d. 1103). Sweeping northward toward the Mediterranean, the Almoravids attacked the Umayyads, Fatimids, Kharidjites, and Zenatas and forcibly converted pagan tribes along the way. By 1082 they had conquered the whole of the Maghrib as far east as present-day Algiers, and by the end of the century they had built an empire that reached from Ghana to the Ebro River in Spain.

The Almoravid sultans brought nominal political unity to all of present-day Morocco and left their successors with territorial claims in the western Sahara. This continues to be one of the major political disputes in the country today. They also imposed the conservative Sunni Malahite rite that endured as the official form of Islam in Morocco. During their time however, the Almoravids, could conceive of no structure of government beyond that of the tribal confederation. Dominion over Morocco depended on continued Sanhaja allegiance and their dominance over the other confederations. Islam remained the single thread holding things

together. While the Sanhajas were "Islamized," they were never "Arabized" [Ref. 17]. The Zenata were never totally subdued and a basic division between the bilad al makhzan (government territory) and bilad al siba (so-called dissident territory was formed). The essential difference between the two was that the former recognized the political authority of the sultan and paid taxes while the latter did not. The government functioning in the bilad al makhzan was autocratic and hierarchial. Life in the bilad al siba was communal and egalitarian, and it was usually organized at no higher level than that of the tribe. These dissident tribes, always on the defensive might venerate the sultan as Imam but steadfastly oppose the expansion of the makhzan in their territory.

Under the Almoravids, Morocco as well as Spain, acknowledged the spiritual authority of the Abbasid caliphate in Baghdad, reuniting them temporarily with the Islam in the Middle East. Disturbed by the lassitude that they found in Spain, the Almoravids attempted to stimulate a religious revival there based on their own brand of Islam; but their leaders, who had established themselves comfortably at Seville, soon conformed to the tolerant attitudes of Andalusian life-style. This led to their attributed corruption and lost the Almoravids the respect of the Sanhaja Chieftans, thereby dissipating the military power on which their authority rested, and eventually led to the downfall of the first great Berber dynasty.

The second great Berber dynasty was that of the Almohads which began with the discontent of the peoples of the anti-Atlas (Masmondas) for Almoravid rule. A new religious reform movement whose followers, known as Unitarians (al muahhid; literally, one who claims the oneness of God, transliterated as Almohad), sprang up and preached a doctrine of moral regeneration through reaffirmation of monotheism.

The founder of the Almohad movement was a member of the Sunni ulama, Ibn Tumart (d. 1133), who returned from his pilgrimage to Mecca to denounce the Almoravids for their decadence. Recognized as al Mahdi--a "sinless one" sent from God to redeem his people--by his followers in 1121, Ibn Tumart condemned the humanistic rather than spiritual beliefs found in Berber folk religion and was allowed to continue unchecked by the sultan.

As judge and political leader as well as spiritual director, Ibn Tumart gave the Masmonda Almohads, the formal governmental structure that the Sanhaja Almoravids had lacked. It was based on a hierarchial and theoretic centralized government, but one that recognized Berber traditions of representative government and provided for a consultative assembly composed of tribal leaders, which is not dissimilar to the policy of the current monarch. Ibn Tumart tried unsuccessfully to bridge the gap that divided the tribes. Before his death he handpicked as his successor, Abdel Mumin (reigned 1130-63), a Zenata. Abdel Mumin assumed the title

Commander of the Faithful, which would thereafter remain the property of Morocco's monarchs.

By 1140 the Almohad monarch occupied most of Morocco and in 1146 he took Marrakech, massacred its inhabitants, and put an end to the Almoravid dynasty. But Marrakech remained as the capital of the new Berber dynasty, which under Sultan Yacub Al Mansur, the new monarch (reigned 1184-90), stretched from Tripoli to Spain and achieved its zenith under Sultan Mohammed al Nasir (reigned 1199-1214).

Almohad rule was characterized initially by theology but gave way gradually to dynastic politics. Blood ties replaced moral qualities as a qualification for high office in the makhzan. Already by 1156 a distinction was made between leaders drawn from the sultan's family and the Almohad tribal leaders; and, as its empire grew, the dynasty became more removed from the Berber support that had launched it.

The Almohads shifted their power base to Granada, Spain and after the epic battle of Las Navos de Tolosa (1212), a watershed in the history of the Reconquest where Muslim strength ebbed thereafter, their demise rapidly occurred. Andalusia was reduced to the emirate of Granada, which had bought its safety by betraying the Almohads' Spanish Capital. The Hafsids wanted control of Ifriquiya from the empire, and the Almohad position in Morocco was compromised by factional strife and a renewal of tribal warfare.

But the monarchical institution was growing. The Almoravid sultans had shown the advantages of political unity and now, the Almohads had given Morocco its first formal governmental structure recognizing Berber tradition, all under a single ruler who served as judge, political, and spiritual leader. Rapid growth in the institution of the monarchy continued from this point as one political dynasty followed another.

The last great Berber dynasty to rule Morocco was the Beni Merin (Merinids), a partially Arabized Zenata tribe of pastoralists of the high plains who had remained the enemies of the Masmonda even after the Zenata confederation submitted to the Almohads. They rose to power in 1212--the same year as the battle of Las Navas de Tolosa--when they defeated an Almohad army sent to subdue them and initiated nearly sixty years of warfare of Marrakech, the last Almohad bastion in 1271. The new Merinid dynasty established its capital at Fabat, the site of an Almohad fortress.

The Merinids' contribution to the institutionalization of the monarchy was limited. They presided over Morocco during a period of steady political and economic decline and despite the best efforts of Abu al Hassan (reigned 1331-51), the Merinids were unable to restore the frontiers of the Almohads' Maghribi empire. Primarily because they did not base their power on a program of religious reform as their predecessors had done. Of necessity they compromised with

the folk cults, which had survived the intrusion of Almoravid and Almohad orthodoxy. Islam had little appeal outside the mosques and schools of the cities. In the countryside, the members of the Ulama were replaced by wandering holy men called Marabouts, who were mystics and seers; miracle workers endowed with baraka ('gift of grace'), whose tradition antedated Islam and was as old as religion itself among the Berbers. Moroccan Islam thus took shape as a coexisting blend of the scrupulous intellectualism of the Ulama and the sometimes frenzied emotionalism of the masses.

By the middle of the fifteenth century the Merinids had spent their strength. In 1465 the last of them were ritually slaughtered by a mob of religious fanatics in Fes, leaving a Wattasid as heir to what was left of the bilad al makhzan (since 1420 actual political power had been in the hands of grand viziers drawn from the Beni Wattas, a related Zenata tribe). Wattasids ruled Morocco for more than a century as sultans without really controlling it.

In concluding this narrative on the rise of Berber dynasties and their influence on the institutionalization of the monarchy, certain facts stand out. The Berber dynasties gave native Moroccans some measure of collective identity and political unity under a native regime for the first time in their history, and they created the idea of an imperial maghrib under Berber control that survived in some form from dynasty to dynasty. They revived Islam and defeated

Kharidjism and repulsed Shiism, assuring the victory in Morocco of Sunni Malihite orthodoxy as the official Islam. The Berber dynasties did so, however, without affecting the popular Islam--the folk religion--of the countryside. Finally the Berber dynasties brought the brilliant urban civilization of the Andalusians to Morocco.

The Berber dynasties failed because succeeding ruling castes were established that soon isolated themselves from their supporters. In each case a breach opened between the military and the political administration, with the tribes alienated from both. None of the dynasties managed to create an integrated society out of a group dominated by tribes jealous of their autonomy and individual identity. Dynasties were simply expressions of triumphant Berber tribalism. They were Sanhajas (Almoravid), Massmondas (Almohads), or Zenatas (Merinids), first, Moroccan second. When tribal support failed or when supporting tribes lost their warlike spirit, the dynasty fell. To a great extent tribalism, rather than foreign intervention, frustrated the amalgamation of Berber Morocco.

During the long period of turmoil that accompanied the steady decay of the last Berber dynasties the seeds were planted that would see the rise of the final group of dynasties to rule Morocco; the Sharifian. It is within the framework of the ideologies and political practices of the two families that represented Sharifian rule, the Saads and the

Alawis, that monarchical rule in Morocco reached the point at which it exists today.

The 'shurfa' were those families or tribes claiming direct descent from the Prophet, and their lineage was usually acknowledged by an edict (dahir) from the sultan. Older Arab families, the Idrisids among them and even some Berber Class laid claim to the title, but at the beginning of the sixteenth century, the shurfa were particularly identified with the Arab tribes that had settled in southern Morocco in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. They constituted a religious aristocracy, respected throughout Morocco, for the baraka they had inherited as Mohammed's children, and were sought out to act as mediators in tribal disputes. Their prestige was greatest in the bilad al siba where they exercised a stabilizing influence in the absence of any authority above the tribal level. It was the shurfa who took the lead in a popular reaction to the European penetration of Morocco by the Portuguese in 1511.

In that year, the marabouts of the Sous proclaimed mulay Ahmed as shaykh (tribal leader) of the sharifian Saadi tribe, as a mahdi to lead a jihad (holy war) against the Portuguese. Initially unsuccessful, Ahmed and his successors turned on the Beni Wattas and led the southern Arab tribes against the imperial city of Marrakech, where they set up a rival government. The capture of Fes by the people of the Sous (Saads), later in 1559 marked the downfall of the last

Berber dynasty and the establishment of sharifian control over the entire bilad al makhzan [Ref. 18].

The Saad dynasty was marked, however, with much internal strife and bloodshed among its members, each attempting to rest control over the other. The most notable of this dynasty was Ahmed al Mansur (reigned 1578-1603), a contemporary of Elizabeth I of England. His contribution to a united Morocco and a monarch as its head was significant. His military prowess and wealth earned him respect in the royal courts of Europe and his capacity for cruelty engendered awe and obedience in his subjects, loyalty in his servants, and restraint in potential rivals. He tamed dissident tribes, curbed the influence of the marabouts, and halted the westward advance of the Ottoman Turks into territory claimed by Morocco.

Al Mansur, who surrounded himself with skilled bureaucrats, gave new life to the forms of government developed under the Berber dynasties. He also added elements borrowed from Ottoman practice, particularly in the introduction of pashas to govern newly acquired provinces distant from the makhzan. His caids, adequately backed by jaysh (warlike) troops, became effective tax collectors among the growing number of tribes that submitted to his authority.

The Saad dynasty lasted about one hundred years. Eight of the twelve Saadi monarchs died by assassination. After al Mansur's death--by natural causes--disputed

successions again divided the country. Although the Saads retained title to the sultanate until 1659, their writ eventually extended no further than the area around Marrakech. Tribes withdrew their allegiance to the makhzan and the marabout republics suppressed by al Mansur, reasserted their autonomy.

During the relatively short tenure of the Saad dynasty important contributions to the establishment of a united Morocco and of a central monarchy were made. With Islam as its guide and more importantly, its authorization, the establishment of sharafian rule in Morocco had been achieved for all time. While it met its demise like so many other rulerships that went before, through internal strife, the station of the monarch itself continued to grow. The spread of the Arabs and Islam by this time was significant, not only in the urban areas, but many of the tribes, heretofore pure Berber stock, now included Arabs all espousing the preaching of the prophet. One of these preachings was the obligation of all true Muslims to accept the existence of God's representative on Earth, the sultan.

The final dynasty to be established in Morocco was the Alawites. This dynasty has for the exception of the exile of Mohammed V in 1953-1955, been continuous since 1666. It is during the time of the Alawites that the monarchy was once and for all established as a dominant political force in Morocco.

There have been seventeen Alawis sultans ("Kings," after 1957 when Mohammad V proclaimed such) that have ruled in succession since the first, Mulay Rashid, established himself as monarch in 1666. This study by no means can trace the history of each leader up to and include the current monarch, King Hassan II. What it will do, however, is look at the most important ones and attempt to determine significant contributions made by them to the permanent establishment of monarchial rule in the country.

Amid the chaos that characterized the decline of the Saad dynasty another sharifian Arab tribe, the Alawis (or Filalis) gained a commanding position in the oasis of the Tafilalt region (Western Sahara, east of Marrakech) to which they had migrated from the Yemen in the Merinid times. They expanded their influence across Morocco at the expense of the marabout republics which had reemerged during the same period, attacking them in the name of Islam. Mulay Rashid emerged from competition with several of his kinsmen as leaders of the Alawite movement, and in 1666 he was proclaimed sultan at Fès after driving out its marabout rulers.

It was Rashid's brother and successor, Mulay Ismail (1672-1727), however, that made the earliest significant contribution to the permanent establishment of the monarchy. He spent the first twenty years of his long reign consolidating his hold on the makhzan and winning the recognition of dissident tribes. He renewed the holy war against a

weakened Spain, reducing its holdings in Morocco to a few modest enclaves along the coast, reoccupied Tangier when it was abandoned by the English in 1684, and took the offensive against the Ottoman Turks in Algiers.

To accomplish all of this, Ismail built a professional army estimated to have numbered 150,000 troops. Rif Berbers and European and Turkish mercenaries supplemented units from the jaysh tribes, but more than half of Ismail's army was composed of slave troops (abid) imported from the western Sudan. As Barbour further explains,

Black boys and girls were carefully brought up, the boys being trained in military pursuits and the girls in domestic arts, and later married. [Ref. 19]

From them a corps of black preatorians, the Bukhariyin, was picked to serve as the sultan's personal guard. When not involved in war, the abid were employed in constructing the many casbahs (fortresses) from which they maintained peace in the countryside.

Ismail sent envoys to Louis XIV of France, whose court he admired, and sought to be recognized on an equal footing with his rival, the Ottoman Sultan of Constantinople. Embassies were exchanged with other European powers as well, but Morocco, traditionally viewed with suspicion in Europe, failed to win their acceptance as a partner in the community of nations.

Ismail made his capital at Meknes. There he erected palaces in emulation of Versailles and mosques, threw up a

line of fortifications that were the most awesome in North Africa, and dug deep dungeons for his enemies, using the labor of convicts and prisoners of war. Ismail was an archetypal ruler, but he extended the bilad a makhzan as no other before him had. "Your King Louis commands men while I command brutes," Ismail is supposed to have told the French ambassador, justifying the ruthless nature of his rule; and indeed the edifice of state, which Ismail labored to construct during his fifty-five year reign, crumbled at his death as a result of thirty years of anarchy caused by the competition between his sons [Ref. 20].

This state of anarchy was caused in part by the fact that primogeniture had never taken root in Morocco, and the laws of succession remained vague. In theory it would be determined that one of the shurfa, usually a brother or favorite son of the sultan, had succeeded to his baraka and was singled out to follow him to the throne. A proclamation by the ulama would confirm the selection. This was monarchy by consensus. But in practice there was no fundamental principle to guide the ulama in determining who among the royal family had been bestowed with the charisma that enabled him to rule, except the ability of a candidate to enforce his claim to it and exclude his rivals. Interestingly, the same situation existed 250 years later at the beginning of King Hassan II's monarchial takeover. This will be discussed in greater detail in the next section of the study.

Civil War raged for thirty years after Ismail's death until his grandson, Sidi Mohammad III (reigned 1757-90), succeeded in ending conflict within the dynasty and gained acceptance by the tribes in a much diminished bilad al makhzan. Unlike his grandfather, a pious and patient sultan, Mohammed enforced his authority when he could afford to, but contented himself within nominal sovereignty and recognition of his religious leadership in those areas where he could not. The military establishment, less reliable than before, was reduced to the minimum required to defend the cities but more importantly eliminate a potential rival to his throne.

Because of Mohammed's efforts to reform official Islam, Morocco stagnated culturally in the eighteenth century. The arts were discouraged and intellectual inquiry in the schools was stifled by a sultan whose religious fundamentalism expressed itself in book burning.

To help cure Morocco's ailing social, economic, and political culture, France received a most-favored-nation status in 1767 in return for economic aid and unfortunately for Moroccans, by the end of the eighteenth century largely controlled Morocco's economy. This was the beginning of the yoke that it would take nearly two hundred years for the monarchy to break.

Also during Mohammed's reign, a treaty of (later) great significance was signed with a country that one day would insure Morocco's continuance as an independent state,

but more importantly, the institution of the monarch itself. This was the Treaty of Marrakech, signed in 1787 between the newly independent United States and Morocco. Morocco was among the first nations to recognize the independent United States and the Marrakech treaty remains the longest unbroken agreement of its kind in American diplomatic history. It also settled outstanding difficulties resulting from the seizure of American ships and seamen by Barbory pirates, the United States agreeing to pay an annual tribute of \$10,000 (U.S.) to assure protection of American interests in Morocco. Following a suggestion made by George Washington, an American consulate was opened at Tangier in 1791. The building acquired as the consul's residence in Tangier is the oldest piece of United States property abroad.

In 1836 a second treaty, the Treaty of Meknes, was signed between the two countries which formalized the most-favored-nation-status conferred on the United States by Morocco in 1824. It also accorded extraterritorial privileges to American citizens, granting them capitulatory rights to be tried only by courts established at United States Consulates in Morocco.

Unlike the French, the United States made no attempt to exploit their favored position with Morocco. This, as history has shown, accounts for the closely tied political relationship that the two countries enjoy today as opposed to the often strained friendship between the French and Morocco.

The reign of Alawite sultans following Mohammed according to Barbour, was "the least interesting 150 years in Moroccan history" [Ref. 21]. No new monuments were built, the sultans devoted most of their time to military expedition around the country as a show of force in order to retain respect and to collect taxes. It was a period of decadence in the eyes of European observers, yet Morocco kept its independence, while other Maghribi states and Egypt were under French, British, or Turkish domination. Its unique political order survived, and the Alawite dynasty remained on the throne. The Sultan enjoyed absolute rights in theory, but in practice he had only limited means of enforcing them.

The Alawite dynasty had survived longer than any before it up to this time probably because it had recognized its limitations and made the necessary adjustments, its sultans preferring to reign even if they could not always rule.

At times, these adjustments took the form of compromise. The sultans deferred authority to their supporters and the government officials on whom they could depend for protection, but loyalty had to be purchased. Certain tribal areas were abandoned altogether to the bilad al siba. Of greatest significance, however, was the compromise made between the sultans and the marabouts, between official Islam and Maraboutism.

It was accepted throughout Morocco that baraka conferred authority. In the bilad al makhzan this authority

belonged to the sultan by right, and it extended to both political and religious matters. In the bilad al siba, however, it conferred only religious matter. Cooperation between the sultans and the marabouts entailed an essential compromise: the sultan moderated his claims, and the marabouts used their considerable influence to restrain their followers from attacking the makhzan. The Alawites also allowed that baraka was not indivisible in the sultan but was a multiple gift that came in a special way to many of the faithful. The marabouts recognized that the shurfa ruled by divine grace, and the shurfa in turn recognized that the same grace fell on hundreds of marabouts as well. These compromises established the pattern of communication between the sultan and the wandering holy men that still exist to this day.

During the nineteenth century the only strong Alawite figure to emerge was Sultan Mulay Hassan I (reigned 1873-94). His government was remarkably stable, and he tried, with some success to reduce corruption and introduce modern reforms. Hassan I reorganized and equipped the Moroccan army and led it in continuous campaigns, subduing dissident tribes and collecting taxes, in a manner that impressed European observers.

Hassan I fell ill and died while on a tax-collecting expedition and was succeeded by his son, Abdel Aziz (reigned 1894-1908). During this time, however, he was only a

figurehead because the real ruler was Bu Ahmed, a chamberlain for Hassan I that, at the time of Hassan's death, had the youngest son of Hassan named sultan by the ulama and then proceeded to imprison Aziz's older brothers. Until his death in 1900, Bu Ahmed manipulated Aziz and pulled the strings of government.

From 1900-1908, Aziz attempted to rule the country but was totally inept. Morocco economically deteriorated during this time and became virtually mortgaged to European interests.

In 1906 the murder of a French citizen in Marrakech was the pretext for the occupation of Oujda by French forces sent there in 1904 to help patrol the border. Further violence against the French ensued at Rabat and Casablanca and by the end of Aziz's reign in 1908, French presence in Morocco was significant.

Aziz was followed by his brother Mulay Hafid (reigned 1908-1912), and Hafid's youngest brother, Mulay Usif (reigned 1912-1927), who was a puppet of the French. During this time the makhzan had no real powers and the caids and pashas became merely the executive assistants of the French regional administrators.

Characteristics of the French Protectorate period will be examined in more detail in Part Two of this study, but for the present it is sufficient to state that from 1912 (its beginning) to 1956 (its demise), the French government firmly

implanted itself and controlled the destiny of the country. The monarchy became the vehicle for legitimate and, as peaceful as possible, French rule. However, like so many times before, the 'imazighan' temperament of the Berber people, forced the reestablishment of its own kind as the dominant political force in the country by the middle of the twentieth century.

Many occurrences in a rapidly changing international system took the focus off of internal problems to some extent and helped allow the Alawites to continue their rule. The position of the monarchy became less and less important as did that of Berbers as a whole, as two world wars erupted and other French excursions into Algeria and Indo-China occurred during the relatively brief period of the protectorate. While the French kept themselves busy with domination and survival at the same time. Berbers and Arabs alike in Morocco quietly united under the only native leadership they had, the monarchy, and began an authentic Nationalist movement that was to repulse foreign domination of the country once and for all and firmly establish the institution of monarchical rule. Again, this will be the primary subject matter of the next part of the paper.

The last two Alawite monarchs, Mohammed V and his son Hassan II, will receive special attention during the remainder of this thesis. It was these two leaders who, more than any who had come before them, that established the monarchy as

the most dominant political force in the country today. Mohammad V was the nucleus of the nationalist movement and Hassan II, through his inherited traits of manipulation and ruthless control, has kept not only the Alawite family in control of the monarchy, but the monarchy itself in a dominant position.

In conclusion of this discussion on the rise of dynastic rule in Morocco, certain points need to be reiterated. Berber dynasties established the idea of a united Moroccan state but did not achieve it. One Berber family after another achieved a relatively autonomous position yet was unable to maintain it. The argument here is that because of the lack of continuous rule by a single family who could, over time, establish not only itself but the position of the monarchy as well, political unity under one leader was never achieved.

Under Sharifian rule, primarily the Alawites, monarchical rule in Morocco evolved to the level of institutionalization it now enjoys. This was accomplished through continuous and methodical efforts by ruler after ruler to maintain the existence of his rule and more importantly, that of his family heir. Concession and compromise coupled with the traditional right to rule established by Islam insured the solvency of the monarchy. While not always powerful in practice, it was so in theory. The 'idea' of a monarch had finally been entrenched into the Berber mind, a feat never achieved by the Sharifian's Berber predecessors.

Up until this point, the analysis of the evolution of monarchical rule in Morocco has centered upon a chronological examination of the rise of dynasties in the country for the purpose of explaining how monarchical rule evolved. While this is a critical endeavor, in that background explanations in the form of historical occurrences are necessary to set the tone for further study, it is by no means all inclusive. Other important factors must enter into the study as well. Certain institutions and guiding principles characterize the essence of traditional monarchical rule besides the rise of family dynasties. It is a focus on these factors that will comprise the remainder of this section of the thesis.

B. THE TRADITIONAL MONARCHY--ITS ESSENCE

Aside from the study of the evolution of dynasties in Morocco as cause for the establishment of monarchical rule, certain other contributions to what Huntington and many others have termed "the traditional monarchy," require explanation if a clear picture of how traditional monarchical rule of Morocco developed.

Huntington describes four forces or institutions that are usually at work in a traditional monarch. These are the monarch himself, the Church, the landowning aristocracy, and the Army [Ref. 22]. While these four institutions have certainly played a major part in the political activities of the Moroccan state, a modification to this 'model' is necessary

before using it as a vehicle to describe the essence of the traditional monarchy in Morocco.

As sultan, the monarch theoretically 'owns' the lands that comprise the Moroccan state. In practice, however, land ownership in Morocco in the pre-1940 era was, as it is today, piecemeal. There is makhzan (central government) land, jaysh (army) land, and that land owned by tribes and clans. Different amounts of land are owned by each of these elements but the primary ownership of land holdings in Morocco besides the monarch, belongs to the makhzan. Makhzan land comprises much of the public domain, most forestland, all unused land and wasteland and a considerable amount of usable land. Jaysh and tribal land on the other hand, is of a relatively smaller proportion.

In regard to this explanation, the "landowning aristocracy" variable of Huntington's model will be represented by the makhzan; the members of the early central government in Morocco, because they are essentially one and the same.

It is through Huntington's model that the remainder of this analysis of the essence of traditional monarchical rule in Morocco will be made. While Huntington's use of the model is different from that here (his being aimed at the effects of modernization on the four variables), it accurately defines the four basic institutions that characterized the essence of the traditional monarchy.

1. The Monarch

To some degree there has always been a monarch, or at least the makings of one, in Morocco. Initially, the 'monarch' was the Berber people themselves as they rallied time and again to repulse countless waves of invaders in the country. If monarchical rule is seen as Webster states, "someone or something holding preeminent position or power," then the Berber race with its 'imazighan' attitude was the only major natural political force in the country in the early years.

The monarchy as a single entity began to slowly appear through the evolvement of the Berber tribe as families bound together in clans, which in turn formed tribes that ultimately joined into confederations. Some chieftans who were successful in battle, established rudimentary territorial states but their kingdoms were easily fragmented and these 'dynasties' rarely survived a generation.

The coming of the Arabs and Islam however, first established in Morocco the ideal of a single monarch. This required the acceptance of Islam and its precepts, often by force. The forceful leader, usually Arab, drawing upon his individual charisma (which the Berbers respected) and military strength, began slowly to establish territorial control over large areas. The important feature of this movement however, is that the would-be monarch was allowed to expand his control because many Berbers, now ingested with Islam, felt he had

the right to do so. The first of these great ruling families, the Idrisids, were discussed fully earlier. One of their important contributions however requires reiteration.

The Idrisids established in Morocco the ideal of sharifian rule, the tradition that descent from the Prophet was a qualification for political power. This, in turn, established the basic guiding principle determining the representative for all monarchical rule that was to follow in the country.

It was during the rise of Sharifian dynastic rule, and primarily the Alawites, that traditional monarchical characteristics became evident. These were kinship, religion, and custom on the one hand, and balancing, juggling and orchestration of quasi-feudal interests on the other.

Because of his kinship in a family that claimed direct descent from the Prophet (Shurfa) the monarch claimed the right to rule. By careful appointment of the local ulama (religious leader of the tribes) the monarch insured this right would be legitimized and unchallenged. In the case of all the Alawite sultans up to the present one, this traditional characteristic remains.

Religiously, the monarch's position was established in the Quran and became a principle source of the monarch's power. He was designated as imam, or spiritual leader, and as the Commander of the Faithful [Ref. 23]. The Hadith (words of the Prophet) spells it out explicitly,

Verily the sultan is a shadow of God on Earth. Every oppressed man out of His servants takes shelter with him. When he administers justice, there is gratitude on the part of the subjects. [Ref. 24]

The custom of monarchical rule developed slowly over time but by the nineteenth century a historical acceptance of the monarches temporal authority among the Moroccan peoples had been achieved and included a broad patronage and appointment powers. As shall be seen in Part Two of this thesis, the customary privileges of the sultan have manifested themselves to an unprecedented degree in the current monarch.

All three of the above characteristics were closely tied to Islam and in fact dependend upon it for their existence. Speaking contemporarily, but with a voice just as suitable for the past, Hermassi states that the "Moroccan monarchy has been the alpha and omega of the entire society; in the contemporary situation, it has been impossible for the emerging elites to undertake any political change in the absence of the primordial context and obliged reference of the monarchy" [Ref. 25].

The traditional characteristics of religious legitimacy marked the early monarchs but so did those of balancing, juggling and orchestration. Each of these characteristics originated from the earliest Berber chieftan and later manifested itself in the Alawite monarch of the nineteenth century. As will be seen in Part Two, they have also become the dominant characteristics of the monarch of present-day Morocco.

Early Berber chieftans contracted their tribes out to various outside invaders in exchange for recognition from these temporary rulers of the chief's position in the tribe or confederacy, but more importantly for protection from rival tribes. Survival of the tribe and the chief as its leader was the primary goal in all instances. By carefully balancing his own goals as well as those of the invaders against the capabilities of each, the Berber chieftan was, in some cases, able to achieve a relatively secure and somewhat powerful position. Some were better at the game than others and it was not until the Alawites that evidence of a consistent ability to balance and juggle alliances is found. Early Alawites, however, who tried aggressive domination rather than the orchestration of interests of not only the monarch but the rest of the society as well, realized only limited success. Sultan Mulay Hassan I (reigned 1783-94), was the only strong figure to emerge in Morocco in the nineteenth century. His government was remarkably stable, and he was able to, with some success, to reduce corruption and introduce modern reforms by a careful system of orchestrating the activities of the elite (to include himself) and of the Berber people themselves (from whom he realized that his recognition must come). Other monarchs that simply attempted to meet their own needs and achieve their singular ambitions did not fair well in the survival game. In conclusion, the Alawite monarch did however, according to Clifford Geertz.

He was able to "put together what, in most other parts of the Muslim world, were directly antithetical principles of political and religious organization: the principle that the ruler is ruler because he is supernaturally qualified to be so; and the principle that the ruler is ruler because the competent spokesman of the community have collectively agreed that he is" [Ref. 26]. The careful monarch assured himself of the latter principle through the appointment of friends and family to those positions that were recognized as the competent spokesmen for the communities. This characteristic, again, remains today in the monarchy.

2. The Church

Huntington's second variable, the Church, has been discussed adequately and only reiteration of some important points are appropriate here.

The Church = Islam and Islam = the monarch was the formula that became appropriate for explaining traditional monarchical rule in Morocco not only in pre-1940 Morocco but currently as well.

The individualistic characteristic of the Berber native naturally refuted religion in the early stages. Christianity was repulsed along with Judaism. It was not until the Arabs brought Islam by force and through several revivals by various monarchs over the years (because they felt it was the popular thing to do and because more of the natives followed Islam than did not) did religion become the

dominant political force in the country. The monarch, by reasons discussed previously, became its representative spokesman.

Islam established the monarchy as much as the monarchy helped Islam gain its permanent foothold in the society. Both forces working together, instituted a team that has not been beaten yet.

Many references to Islam and its influence on the workings of the monarchy will be made throughout the remainder of this thesis, but for now it is sufficient to state that it is the singular thread that holds the entire political society together. Early on, Islam provided the direction for Moroccan social and political behavior to take. Today it is referred to in all aspects of social, political and economic decisions that the monarchy makes, simply because it is the only absolutely accepted rationale for these decisions.

3. The Makhzan

Huntington's third variable, the "landowning aristocracy," as explained previously, was represented in Moroccan society of the pre-1940 era by the bilad al makhzan (centralized authority) of whom the monarch was the head. Similar to the relationship between Islam and the monarch, so was that of the monarch to the makhzan. In itself it became institutional and still exists today in the society but to a less important degree, giving away its original significant position to that of the monarchy itself.

The makhzan existed at the root of a fundamental dichotomy that lay at the center of Moroccan society and politics: the urban areas under the makhzan versus the dissident bilad al siba (rural countryside).

The diversity of Moroccan society was held together by what Waterbury called "a stable system of violence" [Ref. 27], or a competitive tension, balanced conflict, type of situation. Shared interests (basically the desire to preserve one's socio-politico economic position) generally overrode pluralistic difference. Both the elites and the masses were subject to the interaction of competitive animosity and shared interdependence, and interaction that provided a certain equilibrium, generally stable at any given time but always in a state of flux.

Morocco's government in the nineteenth century was little different in form from what the country had known previously. The monarch himself was a recognized entity but his power base, the makhzan, was not. The influence of the makhzan over the tribes varied in relation to the strength of its army and the forces that any given tribe might assemble against it. To finance his government, the monarch had to each year call out troops from the jaysh (military) tribes and travel with them to some part of the bilad al makhzan, extracting levies from the tribes there. Force was often necessary. While many of the tribes recognized the sultan's spiritual right to rule over them, they denied his right to

tax them and resented having to support his entourage in their territory.

However, by the nineteenth century the makhzan had become a highly inefficient machine. With absolute power vested theoretically in the monarch, all legislation was embodied in his dahris (laws). Government was conducted by five ministries--interior, justice, finance, war, and foreign affairs. The grand vizier, as the sultan's highest executive official, was in effect equivalent to the prime minister of today's Moroccan Parliament. He had the responsibility for tax collection and internal security. Under the grand vizier the pashas (governors of the cities) exercised their authority. These offices were often hereditary and were reserved for families who were powerful in a given locality. As long as the revenues continued to come in and relative order prevailed, the sultan placed no restriction on their actions.

The monarch's makhzan relied on personal relationships rather than rigid procedures, and was organized on the basis of tribal rather than territorial divisions. The traditional struggle between the bilad al makhzan and the bilad al siba did not alter the existing social and political structure. Most Moroccans in the countryside continued to live within the traditional framework of family, village, and tribe.

The contributions that the makhzan gave to the establishment of the monarchy as a dominant political force were significant, as they tended to reinforce the inherent

monarchical characteristics of orchestrating and balancing not only self interest, but that of the society as a whole. The makhzan became the means by which the monarch achieved his goals through more or less deceit. He controlled the overall political situation; but rather than aggressively dominate, he orchestrated the participation in that system by the other political actors. His position became one of supreme arbiter above the special interests of particular groups and factions. This position was traditionally accepted because for centuries, saints and saintly tribes were used as judges and arbiters. The monarch was simply carrying on tradition. However, the voice of the makhzan was in reality the voice of the monarch, but members of the siba often failed to realize this and the monarch appeared to them to be their only spokesman against the dominant ambitions of their rivals, the makhzan.

For such a role to have remained viable, the multiplicity of competing interests had equally to be maintained. The unification of several interests into a single force--even one that supported the crown--was not in the interest of the monarch. Not only would this have minimized competition, but it would also have created a base for eventual unified opposition and thereby jeopardize the royal control of the political system. Consequently, the monarch's rule remained one of balancing, manipulation and orchestration; all in the guise of the makhzan: an institution.

4. The Army

Huntington's last variable in the model is "the Army" and its analysis will conclude this discussion on those institutions that characterize the essence of monarchical rule in Morocco.

Of the four institutions listed, the Army, while important to an extent, was the least contributor to the formulation of the early monarchy. However, its existence helped enforce the activities of whatever ruler was in charge.

In early times armies were raised from Berber tribes that had inherent warlike tendencies, i.e., the Sanhajas (Tuaregs), for the purpose of protecting the tribe or forcing another into a confederation. Contractual arrangements were made between the early 'monarchs' (Berber chieftans) and the various groups of invaders that entered the country over the centuries. These contracts, usually agreed upon for self protection of the tribe and expansionist reasons by the invaders, often were broken when the conqueror departed the region and normal inter-tribal warfare resumed.

In later times, monarch after monarch recruited jaysh military contingents to help in collecting taxes from dissident tribes. In exchange for their services the jaysh were granted special land and tax concessions. In doing so, the jaysh quickly became associated with the members of the Sultan's elite group of followers, the makhzan which caused more than one Sultan to lose his favor with the average Berber citizen.

Religiously, the monarch raised armies at various times to support Islamic revival through the use of force (jihads), because it was the traditional duty of the head of state to enforce the laws of God--as laid down in the Quran and the Hadith--among a less enlightened population. As a result, the armies helped to strengthen the sultan's religious legitimacy.

Beyond that mentioned above, the institution of the military did not reach a significant level until much later in Moroccan history, primarily after decolonization and the rise of the current monarch. The Army has never been a national institution serving as part of the apparatus of government. It has continued to be one of monarchical origin aimed at protecting and at times expanding the interests of the king. In the next part of the thesis, it will be seen as an organization that was allowed to grow beyond that level traditionally required and as a result, almost succeeded in eliminating the institution that begot it; the monarchy.

The preceding four variables from Huntington's model thus depict four critical institutions that characterize the essence of traditional monarchical rule in Morocco. The dominant of the four is the monarch and he represents the second (the Church). Helping him to continue his existence are the third and fourth variables of the model; the makhzan and the Army. Both have traditionally been simply extensions of the monarch's will.

In concluding the first section of the study, certain aspects of traditional monarchial rule in Morocco stand out. Its origins were begun through the throwing off of countless waves of invaders by native Berber chieftans who cherished individual liberty. These chieftans became 'monarchs' in their own right and as later situations prevailed, their status grew appreciably during the rise of the three great Berber dynasties. After the coming of Islam with its goal of uniting the individual state, and society, under the all-powerful will of God (Allah), the Muslim tradition of one-man rule, a combined religious and political leadership orthodoxy, was born.

From this point on in the development of the monarchy, certain institutions and guiding principles emerged. The monarch himself came to be the dominant institution in the society because he represented the other critical one, Islam. He was ruler because he was supernaturally qualified to be so; the guiding principle being the requirement of descent from the prophet. The king's elite following began to emerge in the form of the makhzan; the central government of the state, which allowed for the monarchy to achieve his will without being perceived as directly doing so. It played the scapegoat for the monarch's ambitions, and ironically, gave him much popularity with the siba, the natural opponents of the makhzan.

Pre-1940 monarchial rule is best characterized as an evolutionary stage that began from earliest recorded history.

In the second part of the thesis that follows, the post-1940 monarchy will be examined, keeping in mind those historical and traditional contributions that were critical to its establishment.

III. THE MODERN MOROCCAN MONARCHY: POST-1940

To a certain extent, Morocco has always exhibited elements of modernity. While traditionalism and traditional rule have served as the dominant unifying forces in Morocco throughout its history, there have been other societal forces at work as well. One example of such incipient modernizing forces is the imazighan nature of Moroccans.

Traditional rule in Morocco gained new strength after 1940 and continues to be the main force behind social, political and economic activity in the country. Increasingly, however, traditional influences are being challenged by the reality of modernization.

This part of the study deals with the effects of modernization, primarily social and economic, on the traditional monarchy of Morocco. It also examines the pressures that were unleashed by the rise of Moroccan nationalism and the end of French colonial rule. In 1940, France fell to Germany and her grasp on this North African colony began to slip. At that time, an authentic nationalist movement sprang up with the monarchy as its unifying symbol and culminated in the achievement of independence in 1956. During the period 1940-1956, the strength of the Moroccan monarchy increased substantially. Before examining those developments in detail, we need to briefly review modernization theory.

A. MODERN PRESSURES

1. Implications of Modernization

While there are many theories of modernization, I have chosen to use the works of David Apter and Samuel Huntington as the reference points for this study. Both Apter and Huntington agree that "modernization is a process of increasing complexity in human affairs within which the polity must act" [Ref. 28]. As the world moves forward, pushed and pulled by technological, social, political, and economic development, a states' survival increasingly depends upon interaction with and between groups. These interactions generate increasing complexities. Complexity is both a consequence and a cause of modernization. To survive, men have been led to organize other men into groups that ultimately become states. The emergence of social and political groups creates a need for leadership. As Ibn Khaldun theorized, natural leaders emerge because groups can only function effectively through the emergence of an authority figure. In modern societies, politics and politicians take on this leadership role. Social and economic groups permit; indeed encourage the emergence of political leaders who can act on behalf of larger collective interests.

The task of politics and politicians becomes, in Apter's words, "the business of coping with role differentiation while integrating organization structures" [Ref. 29]. In Morocco, political leadership, and all the rights and responsibilities that it entails, has been assumed by the monarchy.

To govern successfully, however, political leaders require economic resources and, most importantly, legitimacy, which in the broadest sense involves both cultural and political support from within society. The problems associated with maintaining its resource base and legitimacy remain the two major challenges that the monarchy must face on a daily basis. Modernization and implications it imposes has made these hurdles much higher than they were when the monarchy was developing during the rise of dynasties. During those times, the monarch was the symbol of modernization itself, but after the nationalist movement and decolonization it has, according to many, become the obstacle. The nationalist movement and decolonization are discussed below. It is important at this point to note here that during the years 1940-1956, these two political and social movements coincided with the most rapid change in the Moroccan society experienced in over a thousand years. This was because of modernization; both social and to a lesser extent, economic.

Between the years 1940-1956, the traditional monarchy reoriented itself for survival. As was discussed in the last section, prior to 1940, politics in Morocco was the concern of only a narrow elite. The makhzan headed by the monarch, in addition to whatever foreign presence was in the country at the time (most notably the French after 1912), controlled the direction of the country in toto. After the fall of France to Germany in 1940, however, changes began to occur.

Political parties sprang up, initially heralding the monarch as their symbol (but concerned more with the legitimacy and strength increased, these same political parties would come to consider him their major source of opposition. The major political party that rose to power on the shoulders of the monarch was the Istiqlal and it will be discussed in more detail in a later portion of the paper.

According to Huntington, "broadening political participation is a hallmark of modernization" [Ref. 30]. In Morocco this began to occur only after the Istiqlal party started to grow and gain strength. As will be seen later, Morocco has completed a cycle of sorts in respect to changing national leadership roles that began in ancient times in the person of the Berber Chieftans and changed back and forth over the centuries between outside forces and native monarchs. The monarchy has traditionally symbolized not only the religious spirit of the country, but more importantly, its cultural unity. Nowhere was this more evident than during the rise of Mohammed V during the independence movement which resulted in the establishment of the most powerful monarchy Morocco had witnessed to that time.

As the world 'modernized' Morocco followed suit. Social and economic modernization rapidly occurred which produced broadened participation by members of the Bilad al Siba in Morocco's affairs. Social modernization in the form of better education was greatly responsible for the awakening of Morocco's

masses. Prior to 1940, during their protectorate period, France made efforts to 'Frenchify' Moroccans in similar fashion to what they were doing in other North African countries. French schools were built and children of elites were sent to learn French and the French way of life. Members of the makhzan themselves received indoctrination on the advantages of converting to what France considered then (as it still does), to be the most advanced culture on earth. Later, and just prior to her overthrow by Germany, France began a program designed to totally educate Morocco to French ways, but partly because of the war, and also because of the imazighan nature of the Moroccan native, the success of France in respect to this effort was only marginal when compared to similar efforts in Algeria, which was to become considered more French than African. However, the effects of the French presence are glaringly visible in Morocco today with the 'unofficial' language of the government being French rather than the native Arabic/Berber dialect.

After the fall of France in 1940, education saw a downturn until independence in 1956. According to Hermassi, "access to modern education was extremely limited, between 1912 and 1955, scarcely over 1,000 Moroccan youths pursued secondary schooling and obtained a baccalaureat degree" [Ref. 31]. Moreover, most of these 1,000 included elites or children of elites, reinforcing the argument hence that the traditional monarch saw in modern education a means to his demise

and hence intentionally limited educational opportunities. That the current literacy rate is only 20% in a supposedly 'modernizing' state, is a fact that speaks for itself [Ref. 32]. The effects of social modernization caused by expanding access to education on the Moroccan monarchial rule are not clear-cut. No formal education, outside of sporadic schooling of some members of the elite circle around the monarch, existed prior to the French coming in 1912. Hence modernity, in terms of social mobilization, characterized in this sense by an educated mass moving from little or no knowledge of the workings of the country (or care either) to a position where new knowledge caused a concern for their country and how it was run, had not begun. During this period the monarch was firmly in control because he was the most educated. Traditionally, the sharifs and other wandering holymen (marabouts) had been held in high esteem for their knowledge. Knowledge, to native Berbers, translated into power, which they understood. A sharif was powerful because he knew more than anyone else. This belief was further nurtured by the monarch until the French arrived in 1912 and, as has been stated, it continued to be supported during the protectorate period but to a lessening degree than it was previously. French schooling and indoctrination did open the eyes of many Moroccans, but to the monarch's credit, only to those he chose. Thus, during this period the leadership of Morocco continued, as far as Moroccans were concerned, with the monarch, but with French

supervision and influence. The French had made the mistake of giving the monarch approval authority on all actions of state to include educational activities in its treaty with Morocco in 1912. This of course was initially to legitimize their presence in the country, but it was later to hamper solidification of their control and further limit their influence on the natives in the country.

As the French demise began after 1940, some educated Moroccans, once the staunchest supporter of their monarch, began to let individual thought replace traditional loyalty. This will be discussed to some extent in the next portion of the paper, but presently it is important to note the initial effects that an educated elite began to have on the entrenched position of the monarch. At first, the educated makhzan buttressed the position of the monarch because they needed him to legitimize their nationalist activities which ultimately saw the formulation of political parties. However, as their position strengthened and outside opposition faded they became a formidable opponent to the monarch himself. This opposition reached its peak during the early years (1961-1972) of the present monarch's reign. During this period King Hassan II saw the status of the monarch repeatedly challenged by Army officers educated at French and other western universities. Many of these officers were children of the educated elite that had risen to power during 1940-1956. How Hassan handled this problem is the subject matter

of a later portion of this paper. What can be presently said, however, is that the Hassan monarchy, though severely weakened in comparison to its 1956 position, did turn the cycle around that ultimately would have led to the demise of the monarchy itself. After certain reorganizations and firm responses to challenges that the educated elite presented, the monarchy reestablished itself and once again took over direct control of educational activities of the country thus ending the increasing influence of the educated elite and returned it to a level almost comparable to pre-protectorate days.

In concluding this analysis of the effects of education on the modernization of Morocco, certain points need to be reiterated. New governmental and economic systems, introduced by the French into Moroccan society, opened expansive new opportunities for the minority equipped with French education. Although Europeans (French mostly) staffed the majority of the governmental institutions before independence, the demand for trained Moroccans became insatiable for a few years after 1956. Those able to assume important posts in the modern economic, governmental, and cultural structure immediately constituted a powerful new bourgeois elite which ultimately aimed its sights on the downfall of the monarchy itself.

The introduction of modern educational and other institutions drastically increased opportunities for social

mobility through education and technical expertise which the relatively static traditional system had provided few possibilities for. Because of these changes, many of the older traditional elite now find themselves stripped of the influence, and often, of the income they formerly enjoyed. Once, a class of religious dignitaries and families claiming descent from the prophet formerly occupied the social pinnacle, along with the wealthy landowning and merchant families of the Bilad al Makhzan. Now, however, this is not the case. Although devotion to Islam remains strong, some traditional religious teachings and institutions have lost prestige with the advance of European culture and education. The monarch has continually had to fend for his existence since 1912 in regard to the challenges that educational modernization has confronted him with.

Another example of pressures that the modernization brought to bear on the stability of the traditional monarchy in Morocco was the increased social mobilization, due in great part to education, that took place in Morocco during the protectorate period, and which expanded even more rapidly after independence.

Both Apter and Huntington see the process of social mobilization in terms of its effects on politics. Huntington sees the relationship between social mobilization (or urbanization) as being "reasonably direct" [Ref. 33]. He theorizes that urbanization, caused by increased capabilities in literacy, education, and media exposure, cause an increase

in expectations of the educated mass which, if unsatisfied, leads to the formulation of political parties. As the educated native moves to urban areas and joins with other educated natives, political notions are bound to emerge, especially if the native is out of work or is facing some other economic or social hardship. These political aspirations often, according to Apter, lead to the promotion of "unrealistic industrialization goals which rely heavily on coercion" [Ref. 34], causing not only problems for the urban mass but equal problems for the ruling monarch.

The effects of urbanization on Morocco in terms of its impact on the social, economic, and political institutions of the country is a study in itself. For the purpose of this paper, only a brief narrative will be given on the effects of urbanization on Moroccan society and most importantly, the monarchy itself.

The cities of Morocco have grown explosively during the course of the twentieth century, the process resulting in a collection of urban centers populated largely by country folk or at best by people very recently acclimated to city ways by way of education in large Moroccan or European cities. Each year Casablanca absorbs thousands of rural dwellers and transforms them into city people. For this, Casablanca is often called an "urbanizing machine" [Ref. 35]. Coming from many regions and social environments, the migrants have little shared culture or consciousness, and the new

centers such as Casablanca, Kenitra, and Agadir are cities without tradition.

Urban growth in Morocco was the result of the widespread adoption of European culture began during the protectorate period. Because of this, the growth of the cities has been more than a new accretion of population. The various sections of many of the cities were built before, during, and after the protectorate period; and most are inhabited by groups with widely differing values and ways.

The traditional city, the medina, was made up of several derbs, or quarters. Each of these units housed a number of families who had resided in that place for several generations and who were bound by a feeling of solidarity and common identification. Ibn Khaldun called this "Asabyjah" [Ref. 36]. Families of every economic standing lived in the same quarter, with the wealthy and the notable assuming leadership; who were more often than not, a member of the makhzan.

The arrival of the French disturbed the equilibrium of urban life. Unaccustomed to the ways of traditional Morocco, they built their suburban new cities along European lines. A growing number of Moroccan began to copy Europeans in dress and in other ways of life. European mass-produced products came into increasingly general use, and local artisans were either driven out of business or forced into reduced circumstances. Many of the elite moved to the new suburbs, and the old city gradually turned into neighborhoods for the

poor, while residential segregation by class and income became important for the first time. An excellent account of this can be found in Elizabeth Fernea's study of medina life in her book, A Street in Marrakech: New York, Anchor Press, 1980. In place of the old residential divisions, based principally on ethnic background, the distinctions between residential neighborhoods became those of class.

As mentioned earlier, the new political and economic system introduced by the French into Moroccan society, opened expansive new opportunities for the minority equipped with a French education. This minority later emerged as a powerful new bourgeois elite that was recruited both from prominent families and from ambitious youths of modest social origin. A new middle class was thus produced which "legitimized its attained social position by conspicuous consumption of expensive European-style consumer goods, such as swimming pools, lavish modern villas, fashionable clothing, and contemporary furniture" [Ref. 37].

The introduction of modern institutions drastically increased opportunities for social mobility through education and technical expertise; the relatively static traditional system had provided few possibilities for social movement. Nevertheless, by the time the current monarch assumed the throne in 1961, the job market had become glutted with a far greater surplus of university graduates than it could absorb into acceptable white-collar work. Liberal arts graduates

were abundant, but technical skills such as engineering and other sciences were lacking owing in part to the elites' disdain for 'working with one's hands.' Consequently, although French and other European technicians held important technical posts for which trained Moroccans could not be found, the schools continued to produce applicants for white-collar positions that did not exist. In the 1970's, many young people feared that the status for which their education was to prepare them would prove illusory along with the opportunities for social mobility to which they believed independence entitled them. They saw further obstacles in their path in the form of the monarchy itself which resulted in one instance in mass student rioting in Casablanca during which fourteen students were killed on a 'shoot to kill' order by the monarch himself.

Other problems for the monarch that social mobilization and urbanization brought about were equally significant. Although industrial technology provided enviable opportunities for some, it did not offer them to all. As mass production replaced handicrafts, many skilled artisans, who formerly occupied respectable positions in the community, were reduced to being factory workers. Others managed to stay in business by changing their style or producing for the growing tourist trade. Related changes occurred in the rural areas cultivated by the French settlers, where tribesmen became laborers for commercial farms.

Although some rural migrants had lost all roots in the traditional culture, others exploited their tribal connections to help in adjusting to city life. The serious shortage of jobs prevented most new arrivals from finding work on their own. In most cases those who succeeded in getting an industrial position did so through a network of tribesmen or relatives already employed in industry. "Often whole sections or departments of factories were staffed by men of the same tribe, village, or region, who are hired by an employed kinsman or friend" [Ref. 38].

Many new arrivals who were unable to find any settled work swelled the ranks of underemployed, performing tasks of little economic value. Large numbers of peddlers crowded the sidewalks of cities selling snacks, trinkets, and other objects for little profit. These individuals, although scarcely supporting themselves, avoided the demeaning admission that they had no trade. Unknowingly they provided a much greater service to the educated dissidents who used them as examples of the impotency of the traditional values of the country as represented by the monarchy.

Instability and violence often developed during the protectorate period but after independence they increased markedly. The initial target of educated dissidents were the French themselves but when independence came new sights were set on the monarch himself, thus exemplifying, once again, the imazighan nature of the Moroccan native. As was seen in

Part One, when Berbers were not rising against outside invaders, they were actively involved in fighting amongst themselves. The colonial experience and subsequent independence was simply another revolution of the cycle that has repeated itself countless times over three thousand years. What is important to understand is that the monarchy survived then and continues to do so now. How this was accomplished will be discussed later.

Economically, modernization has been far slower than that of education and the social 'imobilization' it has caused today, and remains the chief obstacle in Morocco's achievement of a modern society. In 1983 Morocco continues to have a centralized, dualistic, underdeveloped economy, somewhat modestly endowed with natural resources and faced with a number of difficult economic problems that were inherited along with independence in 1956. Economic modernization since independence has been commendable considering the difficulties in which it has had to cope. Economic decision making and other broad powers have been centralized in the person of the king, which has made for unusual consistency and continuity of the country's economic policy. This centralization has probably been the single source of progress since independence and may be expected to continue to be so, although it has posed some related political problems. Ironically, modernization being considered the enemy of traditionalism economically speaking, has seen its advancement in a traditional-type system.

On this issue, Waterbury has suggested that the monarchy was unwilling to sponsor dynamic programs of economic development that would have as one of their results a certain amount of social and economic upheaval" [Ref. 39]. This was probably the case immediately after independence when Mohammed V struggled to solidify his control of the country. However, as the ecstasy of liberation from French domination died down, unemployed educated Moroccans, through a variety of disruptions, caused the monarch to centralize the economic decision making in his person.

While it is not the scope of this paper to present a detailed economic history of the country, certain points in regard to the economic modernization of the country and its effect on the stability of the monarchy are important.

Morocco's economy has traditionally been an agrarian one. With the continuing growth of the cities and town, however, agricultural employment has suffered a relative decline, but by 1983 the bulk of the population was still dependent on farming for its livelihood. Waterbury stated that in 1968, "over 65 percent of active Moroccans were dependent upon agriculture for a living and about 45 percent of Morocco's foreign earnings come through the export of agricultural produce and from products" [Ref. 40]. Owing partly to rural migration to urban centers, by 1981 census records reflected a drop to 50 percent of the active population being engaged in the agricultural sector. Foreign earnings from agricultural

exports dropped slightly to 40 percent due in most part to the severe drought that hit Morocco in 1979 [Ref. 41].

The relative decline in agricultural employment occurred as more and more young people left the farms in search of the better employment opportunities believed available in the cities and towns. Many turned to mine-working in Morocco's phosphate mines which now account for about 25 percent of its export earnings [Ref. 42]. All other sectors of economic activity have enjoyed marginal gains from 1961 to the present. Major gains were to be found in sales and in personnel and other service activities. Manufacturing employment increased moderately, but industry was not able to absorb the bulk of the urban migrants. Unemployment of the modern educated, and those not so well equipped inhabitants, continues to be a thorn in the side of the current monarchy. What Hassan is doing about this will be discussed later.

The effects of slow economic growth on the planned modernization of the country after independence is not clear-cut. What is evident is that it certainly hampered it, but Waterbury's assumption that the failure for Morocco to modernize economically only aided the continuance of the monarchy itself, might well be the case in retrospect. Also apparent is the fact that mounting economic pressures, caused by unemployment, which has grown from 9 percent to 25 percent from 1956 to 1983, has caused the monarchy to face the issues and seek solutions to this and other economic problems. No

longer can these problems be simply ignored. Too many dissatisfied citizens, many important, and often members of the king's own court, have demanded relief from the burdens that a hungry and out of work mass bring. Unemployment and economic deprivation are only two of the many social problems that have developed into political ones for the current monarch. His efforts at handling these pressures will be examined in the next portion of the paper.

In conclusion on the topic on the implications of modernization on the monarchy, certain points require reiteration. Education of elites by the French resulted in an increased awareness of their surroundings. Education allowed for social mobility in the form of physical movement from rural areas to large urban centers and also in societal movement for many, up the ladder of politics into positions of increasing importance. Each advancement by the native created new pressures for the monarch to contend with. His situation is characterized best, by Apter, when he describes the contemporary monarch of Morocco as being one of a "modernizing autocracy; where the king tends to have a traditionalist ideology associated with his rule and he attempts to retain the power at the top" [Ref. 43]. As a 'modernizing autocratic,' Hassan has had to redefine traditional roles in order to face mounting pressures for change. His new means of asserting authority, according to Apter, is to use his traditional position as the legitimization for change rather than the opponent of it [Ref. 44]. This is a curious twist but it

has substantial merit in that it currently appears that this is exactly what Hassan is doing. His reliance on his religious position of authority as a means of remaining the dominant force of the country is increasing and with new economic and social programs aimed at bettering the life of the native (a totally uncharacteristic monarchial act prior to Hassan), and with each one being declared in keeping with Islam, Hassan is only furthering the legitimization of his office.

Huntington, on the other hand, who also agrees with Apter's modernizing monarchy concept, gives three alternatives in long-range strategy that a traditional king may employ in facing the challenge of modernization. First, the role of the monarchy may be reduced and replaced by a truly constitutional monarchy or ended altogether, resulting in a system where authority rests with the people through political parties and representative institutions. Secondly, the attempt may be made to develop a new system that combines monarchial and popular authority. Finally, the attempt may be made to preserve the traditional monarchy, minimizing the disruptive effects on it that will be caused by economic development and general modernization [Ref. 45].

The first alternative can be eliminated in the case of Morocco, but whether Hassan subscribes to either of the remaining two alternatives is unclear. It would appear at the present time that the monarchy has chosen the third alternative of maintaining the traditional system while

minimizing modernization's disfunctional effects upon it. In this vein the massive foreign borrowing for economic development purposes that Morocco has undertaken to help feed its unemployed and put them back to work could be seen as an attempt to purchase a 'ready made' economic development plan from external sources, rather than attempting to achieve the same end through internal reforms and fundamental modification of the existing domestic socio-politico-economic system.

Finally, modernization is a relatively contemporary concept as far as Morocco is concerned. While other nations were industrializing a hundred years before, Morocco did not begin to actually see a basic advancement in its society until the protectorate period and even more so after independence in 1956. The events leading up to independence were combined in the Moroccan Nationalist movement which is the scope of the next portion of the study.

2. The Nationalist Movement

The Nationalist movement in Morocco had its beginnings in the French attempts to modernize Morocco which resulted in the social, economic and political pressures that were brought to bear on the monarchy. More importantly, this movement brought about the establishment of Moroccan political forces and ultimately lead to decolonization in 1956. The purpose of this section is to examine the Nationalist movement with emphasis given to its causes of occurrence and ultimate effects on the stability of the monarchy.

Due to the increasing urbanization of Morocco, the so-called new towns (villes nouvelles)--mushroomed during the 1920's and 1930's. Modern sanitation, hygiene, and medical facilities were introduced for the French population and gradually reached out to the Moroccan population as well. As previously discussed, this development was hastened by the growth of suburban slums (bidonvilles) around the cities where rural Moroccans had migrated in search of work.

Also during this time the French educational system was introduced intact for the children of the French colonialists (colons). As the educational facilities expanded, the number of Moroccan children attending the French-Administered school steadily increased, but a parallel, modernized school system using Arabic was not developed. Arabic was thereby confined to the study of classical literature and religion in Moroccan schools. The operation of the government, the economy and the educational system all demanded the use of French (and this is still occurring today). Although relatively few Moroccans achieved university educations, a small Western-educated elite, oriented toward French culture, came into existence. It was against this backdrop, that the nationalist movement first took root in the mid 1920's.

Moroccan nationalism stemmed from the merger of two reform movements that had appeared in the early 1920's and whose aims, originally unrelated, later became intertwined. The first was a religious reform movement, the Salafiya, which

grew up among the ulama and students associated with the ancient Karaouine University at Fès. Its members advocated the fundamentalist ideals originally preached by Islamic reformers in the late nineteenth century. While retaining the essential spiritual and moral values of Islam, the Salafiya also sought to adapt Moroccan society to the requirements of the modern world by using the tools of Western technology. By 1925 Salafiya schools had opened in several cities to spread knowledge of Arabic and Islamic culture, which had been ignored in the French schools [Ref. 46].

The first truly nationalist political movement arose in 1925 among French-educated students in Rabat who founded secret societies to spread opposition to the growing intervention of the French administration. By 1927 societies combining the aims of religious reform and the assertion of Morocco's political independence were being formed throughout the country, and by 1930 the future leaders of the nationalist movement had already become well known through their activities in these groups. Allal al Fassi assumed leadership of the Salafiya movement, while Ahmed Balafrej, one of the founders of the Rabat group, went to Paris to gain the support of the French socialists. Mohammed Hassan Wazzini was a university student in Paris at the time and in contact with Shakib Arslan, the Lebanese apostle of the pan-Islamic movement, who was the mentor of nationalists throughout North Africa and the Middle East [Ref. 47]. According to Waterbury,

during this time, "religion and nationalism found common ground within Morocco, and because much the same phenomenon was taking place in the rest of the Arab world, Moroccan nationalists received a certain measure of international support at strategic moments" [Ref. 48].

According to Waterbury, the prime example of this was the promulgation in 1930 of the so-called Berber dahir (law) that got the Nationalist movement off the ground. The promulgation of the Berber law converted what had been an isolated elite-based movement into a popular force aggressively opposed to continued French rule. The French administration claimed that the dahir was intended to modernize the complex Moroccan legal system by ending the judicial powers formerly exercised over the Berber tribes by the caids appointed by the makhzan. These powers were shifted to the traditional representative Berber community councils. The effect of this step, however, would have been to further reduce the authority of the makhzan and to strengthen the autonomy of the Berber tribes. Nationalists saw in it another attempt by the French to divide the Berber and Arab elements of the population in order to more easily impose French control by deliberately revising the old divisions between the bilad al makhzan and bilad al siba under overall French authority. The supporters of Islamic orthodoxy were incensed by what they took to be a threat to Islam in the strengthening of Berber customary law at the expense of the sharia. Public demonstration against the dahir spread

rapidly to all Moroccan cities and led to the arrest of nationalist leaders.

The French had managed to bring together all the diverse strands of Moroccan politics at the time in opposition to the Berber dahir. Protests against the measure were made all over the Muslim world in response to the publicity given the dahir by Arslan and the Moroccan nationalists in Paris, influencing the French government to instruct the resident general not to enforce it. Although the protest movement quickly subsided, the proof it had given of the depth of Moroccan opposition to the French encouraged the nationalists to organize on a more ambitious scale [Ref. 49].

In December 1934, a small group of nationalists--members of the newly formed Moroccan Action Committee (Comitèe Action Marocaine--CAM)--proposed the long, detailed plan of Reforms, which they submitted simultaneously to the sultan, the resident general, and the French foreign ministry. The plan called for a return to indirect rule as envisaged by the Treaty of Fès, unification of the judicial systems of Morocco, elimination of the judicial functions of caids and pashas, admission of Moroccans to government positions, and the establishment of representative councils. The signatories included the recognized leaders of Moroccan Nationalism: Fassi, Balafrej, Mohammed Lyazidi, Wazzini, Mekki Nacerf, Mohammad Douiri, Abdilaziz ben Driss, Ahmed Cherkaoui and Ahmed Mekouor [Ref. 50].

The success of CAM was shortlived, however, due to a split in its organization caused by the failure of its 'Plan for Reform.' Wazzini withdrew from the movement and took with him most of the traditionalists. The remainder of the organization reorganized behind Fasi into a more radical nationalist political party and in 1937 caused several violent incidents to occur that forced the French to intervene and suppress the party. Fassi was arrested and exiled to Gabon, where he remained until 1946. Wazzini, whose splinter group was proscribed, was also sent into exile.

According to Waterbury, "the founders of the nationalist movement had no fixed methods, and until 1944, independence was not one of their declared objectives" [Ref. 51]. Early attempts to organize and to politic were sporadic. Until CAM, the nationalist movement in Morocco was in name only.

During World War II the badly split Moroccan nationalist movement became more cohesive. The French defeat in 1940, the enunciation of the Atlantic Charter the next year, and the subsequent promise of independence held out to Syria and Lebanon encouraged educated Moroccans to consider the real possibility of political change in the postwar era. At the outbreak of war, Mohammed V had pledged Moroccan support to France and its allies. After the fall of France, he continued to give his personal loyalty to the allies and he refused to receive German representatives in Morocco. He also declined

to issue a Vichy-initiated decree aimed at persecution of Jews and withheld support for the pro-Vichy resident general in his attempted resistance to the allied landings in Morocco in November 1942. During the Casablanca Conference in January 1943, President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill met with the sultan separately from French authorities. Waterbury comments that Roosevelt also met privately with Mohammed V and "led the sultan to believe that he would use his good offices to promote Moroccan independence following the war" [Ref. 52]. Nationalist leaders, most notably Omar Abdjellil, Ahmad Balafrej, and Muhammed Lyazidi, took this as a signal for the time being appropriate to demand complete independence from France. Secret meetings between them and the monarchy began to regularly take place, with not only independence as a subject, but the nature of the future political regime of Morocco as well. Mohammed agreed with the nationalists that further interaction with the French was fruitless, but he also emphasized that he could not come out openly and support statements to this effect. He felt that this would lead to his deposition and that if this occurred, the symbol that he represented (and in fact, the primary one) to the nationalist movement itself, would be lost. He did promise to shield the nationalists from any form of prosecution by the Vichy government officials through his continuing right to deny French government activities by way of the required signature approval granted to his office in the 1912

treaty. Once again, that treaty had come back to haunt the French.

Also discussed privately by the monarchy and the nationalists was the nature of the future Moroccan government. A constitutional monarchy was discussed during this time and the monarch agreed to the principle of a democratic monarch but felt that the talk of an actual 'constitution' would be premature and that the most important job at hand was the uniting of all Moroccans behind his throne in order to successfully meet the certain future challenges that the end of the war would bring. He felt that the notion of a constitution would be too radical for the traditional members of the makhzan to comprehend and accept [Ref. 53].


The tentative understandings and agreements between the Nationalist leaders and the monarch that were reached during these secret discussions led to the establishment of the Istiqlal (Independence) Party. This party initially headed by Balafrej and Lyazidi, led a group of veteran nationalists who were joined by young urban intellectuals and middle-class Moroccans. At its first conference in Rabat in January 1944, the Istiqlal issued a manifesto demanding full independence, national reunification and a democratic constitution. The sultan had received and approved the manifesto before its submission to the French resident general who answered that, while political and social reforms would be granted, no basic change in the protectorate status was being

considered. The general principles of reform that he voiced were categorically rejected by the Istiqlal. When, a few days later, eighteen Istiqlal leaders including Balafrej and Lyazidi were arrested on trumped-up charges of having collaborated with the Germans, resulting violent demonstrations were directed against the French administration.

Other nationalist parties were formed during this period and immediately after the end of the war. On his return from exile, Wazzini formed the Democratic Party of Independence (Parti Democratique de l'Independence--PDI), thus preserving the split in the nationalist movement created in the mid 1930's [Ref. 54].

What had become evident by this time was the general sympathy of the sultan with the nationalists although he still hoped to see complete independence achieved gradually; partly for his own gain and also because he knew Morocco was not stable enough to survive immediate withdrawal of French and organization. This is an appropriate juncture to more closely examine the interaction between the monarch and the nationalists up until this time.

During the 1920's, the sultan was not considered a necessity by young intellectuals having nationalist thoughts. He was, in fact, seen as an impotent figurehead and a tool of the French. French leaders had in fact handpicked Mohammed who was a third son, for his seemingly docile nature. They felt that he would be easily manipulated and controlled as



long as he remained as the monarch and the monarchy remained under the French thumb. When Mohammed signed the Berber dahir in 1930, which in essence split the country into several sections and was aimed at disunity of Morocco, the nationalists gave this as further evidence of the weakness of the monarchy. As the nationalists grew in strength and caused alarm in the French, the monarch was asked (by the French) to condemn the nationalist movement as a danger to the traditional rule of the country. In actuality it was the French rule, and traditionalism played little part in the political running of the country during this time. Nationalist leaders began a series of propaganda to refute the French accusations of their disloyalty to the monarch which resulted in Mohammed V changing his mind about their intentions but more importantly, those of the French. On Throne Day, 18 November 1933, loyalty to the sultan was demonstrated by nationalists in peaceful gatherings in his honor. In Fes in 1934, a large demonstration was held on the occasion of the sultan's visit there, to glorify him and to further show their support of his office. Many see this as the critical juncture where the monarchy and the nationalists joined hands and from this point on, the struggle for independence which ended victoriously in 1956, was a combined effort [Ref. 55].

But the benefits of this alliance were far greater to the sultan. Up until this time the sultan was physically isolated from his subjects and had no way in which to curb the erosion of his authority, by the French. He saw in the

nationalists new strength and willingness to support the integrity of the throne. On the other hand, the nationalists found, in the monarch, a cause for their movement. The monarchy was a symbol of Morocco's threatened sovereignty and the mass public response that his personage evoked could not be generated by the nationalists themselves. Both depended on each other early on, but unwittingly, while the nationalists were "successfully building the image of the sultan as the most prominent symbol of the struggle for independence, they were at the same time, giving him the ability to act autonomously, and to rise above what would later be termed 'partial interests' (i.e., the Istiqlal) and 'political factions'" [Ref. 56]. This quote from Waterbury accurately summarizes the effects the nationalist movement had on the monarch.

Other occurrences that characterized the nationalist movement was the actual struggle for independence that began in earnest in 1945. In that year the French residency, supported by French economic concerns and most of the colons, adamantly refused to consider even those reforms the nationalists demanded, short of independence.

This game of hardball on the part of France, by 1946, had widened the split between the nationalists and the colons and gradually between the sultan and the resident general. In 1946 a liberal resident general proposed a series of reforms aimed at improving living conditions and giving Moroccans a greater voice in their government. But by then nothing short

of independence would satisfy the nationalists. In deference to them, the sultan withheld his signature from the dahirs that would have implemented the reforms.

Another important event was the sultan's trip to Tangier, during which a riot broke out in Casablanca and several Moroccans were killed by French soldiers. Because of this, while in Tangier, the sultan made his first public plea for national unity and eventual self government, instead of the planned speech on the benefits of French rule. In response to this speech, the French appointed a more conservative resident general, General Alphonse Juin.

Juin quickly decreed a governmental reorganization aimed at further weakening the makhzan and made statements intended to discredit the sultan. He refused to promulgate a decree issued by the sultan as imam, limiting the activities of the religious brotherhoods. The sultan in turn refused to sign most of the decrees presented to him by Juin, nearly all of them designed to limit his authority. This veto power, established by the 1912 Treaty of Fès, once again proved to be the nationalists', now represented by the monarch, major weapon as the Istiqlal intensified its public condemnation of the oppressive French rule.

Between 1950 and 1953, mounting tension between the monarch and the French was evidenced in several ways. The sultan doggedly refused to sign measures that would have further reduced his power. In 1952 riots in Casablanca, arising from proletarian nationalist reaction to the murder of a

Tunisian labor leader, sparked the start of a new era in Moroccan politics. In clashes between Moroccan rioters and police, an estimated 400 people were killed. In the aftermath of the riots, the PCM, the new Moroccan Communist Party (Parti Communiste Marocain) which had recently formed, and the Istiqlal were outlawed by the residency. In 1953 the most significant event in recent Moroccan history occurred-- the exile of Mohammed V and his family to Madagascar. Mohammed V had refused to sign away his powers to the French and he was therefore deposed, arrested and sent into exile by the resident general. The French summoned the ulama to approve in the traditional fashion the nomination of a new sultan, Mohammed Mulay Ben Arafa, an aged member of the Alawi house.

The results of Mohammed's deposition were profound. It enraged not only the nationalists but all those who recognized the sultan as the religious leader of the country. Never had the country been so solidly united behind the monarchy or national sentiment so aroused. French attempts to bolster Ben Arafa failed and their status as political leaders in Morocco began to rapidly erode at this point.

By the end of 1952, when it was banned, the Istiqlal had an active membership of over 80,000 and a mass organization of several hundred thousand more. After Mohammed V's exile, incidents of terrorism occurred with increasing frequency. By 1955, Moroccan guerrillas had been organized by

a kinsman of Istiqlal leader Allal al Fassi into the Army of National Liberation (Armée de Liberation Nationale--ALN), numbering several thousand, and were openly engaging in combat against French troops and were attacking the colons. As the French negotiated with various Moroccan leaders in the hope of finding a solution to the problems, Berber attacks continued, persuading the resident general to notify France of his intent to allow Mohammed to return to Morocco from exile. Considering the level of hostility at the time, it was his only hope at continuance of French authority in the country [Ref. 57]. Thus, the Nationalist movement in Morocco had seen its ultimate goal achieved. Independence occurred shortly thereafter, and the process of de-colonization began which is discussed in the next portion of this study.

The nationalist movement in Morocco united the country behind the monarch. The original goal of nationalist leaders (a totally democratic and constitutional system of government) was not achieved. This was due in part, as Waterbury explained, to the emphasis placed on the monarchy as a means of legitimizing the nationalist movement. Nevertheless, the movement's contribution to a united Morocco was significant and cannot be understated. The nationalist movement made the monarch what he is today and established the beginnings of an alternative form of government that is reaching new levels of strength at a rapidly increasing rate. While the attempt of this paper is to determine the effects of political

change on the traditional monarchy, primarily through a study of the pressures brought to bear on the throne and its subsequent response to these pressures, it is important to conclude here that the nationalist movement in Morocco did help change the political structure of the country from colonial rule to independent rule. But more importantly, the pressures brought to bear on the monarch were those of assuming rule and not those of struggling to achieve it. The nationalists did that for him.

3. Decolonization

Independence from French rule brought about the physical process of decolonization as well as other implications that were to be of significant impact on the workings of the monarchy. How the monarchy survived pressures brought about by independence is the subject matter of the next part of the study. This section deals briefly with the decolonization process itself that the French, and also Moroccan nationalists, underwent upon the return of Mohammed V to Morocco.

In October 1955, a policy of Moroccan 'independence with interdependence' was adopted by the French National Assembly. At the same time the French legislature affirmed that the Treaty of Fes should remain the basis of French-Moroccan relations. Restating the principle of Moroccan sovereignty it was agreed that Morocco should exercise fully all the powers and authority stipulated by the treaty that had been held in obedience. It was insisted, however, that

France should continue its responsibility for Moroccan defense and foreign policy and that the French presence in Morocco should be permanent and acknowledged by the full representation of French settlers in Moroccan affairs [Ref. 57].

Mohammed V was received in Paris with full honors on October 31, 1955. There he rejected the French position out of hand but continued negotiations until agreement was reached on November 6. Although the Treaty of Fes was not formally abrogated, provision was made for a gradual restoration of Moroccan independence within the framework of a guarantee of mutual rights and permanent ties of French-Moroccan interdependence. The sultan agreed to institute reforms to change Morocco into a democratic state under a constitutional monarch. He returned to Morocco in triumph and, after consultation with spokesmen of the several political parties and labor movement (both of which grew in size and strength during his absence), entrusted a nonparty politician, Embarek Bekkai, with the task of forming a cabinet. The old ministerial system of the makhzan was abandoned and the Council of Ministers was formed on the basis of the administrative structure created by the French. The new cabinet was sworn in, and government functions were transferred gradually from the French residency. A system that had its beginnings in 1912 was finally ended.

The French system, which saw its origin in the Treaty of Fes in 1912 was in reality a rather efficient one, but

was limited, as evidenced before, in the veto power it gave the monarch. Under the terms of the Treaty of Fès, the resident general acted in a dual role. He was the supreme representative of the French Republic, but he was also the sultan's minister of war and foreign affairs and was responsible for all government operations [Ref. 58]. The first resident general, General Marshal Lyautey's policy was to preserve traditional institutions and provide guidance for Morocco in the economic and political spheres. But even during Lyautey's time, official French circles were beginning to favor the policy of direct control rather than advisory. This trend was later evidenced in other North African French colonies; the most obvious in Algeria. Lyautey came under much attack from French politicians favoring colonization of Morocco because of the dual civilian and military type system of rule he had established. After Lyautey's dismissal, Moroccan traditionalists had lost their staunchest supporter and subsequent resident generals reduced Morocco for all practical purposes to the status of a French colony.

Lyautey's successors progressively introduced direct French administration and although care was taken to preserve the paraphernalia of his authority, the sultan became a mere figurehead. The makhzan had no real powers, and the caids and pashas became merely the executive assistants of the French regional administrations [Ref. 59]. The Moroccan central government did, however, have a structure.

The central government was composed of the grand vizier, who was nominally the sultan's premier and minister of the interior insofar as he had supervision over pashas and caids, the minister of Muslim justice (who supervised the sharia courts), and the minister of religious endowments. The French-staffed residency services were divided into the directorates of sharifian affairs, the interior and public security. In addition the residency had a number of other regulatory and supervisory agencies: political, economic, administrative, and military [Ref. 60].

For administrative purposes Morocco, under the French, was divided into civil regions under appointees of the French foreign ministry and military regions under military officers from the French Army. Cities were administered by French chiefs of municipal services. The pashas and caids, once powerful members of the makhzan, were now reduced to tax collectors. Similar procedures were followed in the Spanish Zone and Tangiers; the other two zones that Morocco had been divided into just prior to 1912. While a study of the division of Morocco into the French, Spanish and Tangier regions could provide subject matter for a large study in itself, it will not be undertaken here. It is sufficient to say that activities in both the Spanish Zone, controlled by the Spanish high commissioner in Tetouan, and the Tangier region, controlled by the consular representatives of the signatory powers of the Algeiras Conference, mirrored those in the much larger French

Zone. As such, outside influence had taken away the traditional authority of the makhzan and made the monarch only a figurehead. It was this system that continued until Moroccan independence in 1956.

In February 1956, to continue the discussions on the process of decolonization begun earlier, limited home rule was restored to Morocco in a protocol implementing the November 6 declaration. Further negotiations for full independence culminated in the French-Moroccan agreement signed in Paris on March 2. As of this date, Morocco again became an independent state and later that year was admitted to the United Nations. This agreement abrogated the 1912 Treaty of Fes, and France would henceforth recognize the independence and territorial integrity of Morocco. The full exercise of legislative power was returned to the sultan, and he was also empowered to create a national army with French assistance. Further, the French resident general was replaced by a high commissioner, who two months later became an ambassador. Interestingly, the author will be attending the Moroccan Command and Staff College (their highest level military school) this summer and it is instructed entirely by French officers. Therefore, the obvious continuing influence of France on the military of Morocco is evident.

Reunification of the three zones that Morocco had been divided into, did not occur automatically. There was some problem with the Spanish recognizing the French action

but it was more of a political problem between France and Spain than between Spain and Morocco. Recognition of Moroccan independence was negotiated separately in Madrid between the sultan and Generalissimo Franco and made final in the Joint Declaration of April 1956. This agreement, however, did not include the Tarfaya area south of the Draa River and the presidios which were under exclusive Spanish sovereignty, resulting in an armed Spanish-Moroccan clash over Ifni (a presidio on the coast) in late 1957. Later though, Spain agreed to return Tarfaya to Morocco (April 1958), and Ifni was finally ceded to Morocco in 1969.

In Tangier, the sultan's sovereignty was restored at the Conference of Fedala in October 1956 and the international status of the city was ended. Except for the case of Ifni, decolonization in Morocco was complete by mid-1958.

B. THE MONARCHY AND INDEPENDENCE: HOW DID IT SURVIVE?

One of the best sources on immediate problems that independence posed for the Moroccan monarchy is Lorna Hahn's book, North Africa: Nationalism to Nationhood, Washington, D.C., 1960. In the introduction written by (then) Senator John F. Kennedy, the importance of the fledgling nation of Morocco and the rest of North Africa was explicitly implied. Equally, other authors stressed the growing importance of Morocco and the rest of North Africa in their works published just after independence. This book, as well as several others pertaining to the subject of pressures brought to bear on the

traditional monarchy as a result of Morocco gaining independence is readily available to the interested reader. A general summation of several of these studies rather than the emphasis on any one in particular, is the effort of this portion of the paper.

In his first major speech after his restoration in November 1955, Mohammed V announced a policy for independent Morocco predicated on liberty and democracy for his people and recognition of the country's continued interdependence with France in terms of its needs for economic and technical support, while its own citizens were being trained to assume administrative and technical positions formerly occupied by the French. The Bekkai government installed in December 1956 included nine members of the most powerful nationalist party, the Istiqlal; six from the more conservative PDI; and six non-party independents loyal to the sultan, including Prime Minister Bekkai himself. According to Ashford, this effort was little different from that of the protectorate organization and "in the early months of independence Morocco continued to use almost the identical central organization; as it had previously" [Ref. 61]. This caused the Istiqlal leaders to resent the sultan's failure to name a clearly predominant Istiqlal government with a new organization. They felt he was merely dragging his feet and delaying total independence, now interpreted by many as independence from the monarchy itself. But because of the sultan's (now king; Mohammed

renamed his office this in 1957 as an effort "to symbolize the intention to introduce a more modern type of government" [Ref. 62]), great popularity, the Istiqlal had to settle for the role of 'loyal opposition;' one it has only recently emerged from.

As stated, Mohammed's general popularity was high. He enjoyed the unusual position of being a royal figure who was the hero of an independence struggle. Under him, the sultan's dual role as head of state and religious leader was strengthened as it had not been for many centuries. Because he was the object of popular veneration, he was able to control the balance of power and parcel out responsibility among the country's competing institutions, factions and parties, a trait he bequeathed to his son and heir, King Hassan II. This permitted him to consolidate political power in the crown rather than being dependent upon any particular party including the Istiqlal, which in essence, needed him more than he needed it.

In the months after independence, Mohammed V moved with deliberation to develop a modern governmental structure under a constitutional monarchy in which the king would have the active political role. His aim was to proceed cautiously in order to avoid problems that changing too fast would pose. Social and economic reforms were part of his program for independent Morocco but as will be seen later, these did not actually materialize until well into the reign of his son,

Hassan. Mohammed was equally intent on preventing radical young nationalists from overthrowing him and establishing a single-party state. Most of these programs were not carried out, however, due to his untimely death during a minor operation in February 1961, after which his son Hassan assumed the monarchy.

In retrospect, the problems confronting the new Mohammed regime were imposing and caused the monarchy to use every bit of his influence, status, and inherent diplomatic skills (which were great according to most) to handle the pressures they produced. The monarchy was faced with the need to train people to head the ministries; fill the ranks of the civil service; assume judicial functions; establish central government control over localized and often recalcitrant tribes and rural localities; and form an independent foreign service, police force, and national army. These were monumental undertakings at best and the success of Mohammed and later his son Hassan in accomplishing all of them in a relatively short time 1956-1977 (Independence to the final formation of the Moroccan Parliament) speaks highly of their abilities as leaders and statesmen.

Other problems were equally evident. Because of the 1955 treaty with France, the French Army remained at stations in Morocco in a protection mode under the terms of the treaty. In response to this the ALN, determined to rid Morocco and North Africa of French presence in toto, continued to grow

in strength and also in its irresponsibility, conducting terrorist campaigns against French forces regularly. After Mohammed V named his son, Crown Prince Mulay Hassan, as chief of staff of the new Royal Armed Forces (Forces Armies Royales--FAR), the bulk of the ALN gradually incorporated into the FAR, however, some dissident elements continued to terrorize along the Algerian border and even supported the Algeria Liberation Front (Front de Liberation Nationale--FLN) [Ref. 63].

Another trouble spot for the new Mohammed regime was in the resistance to the new government by Berber tribes in the Rif and Middle Atlas and in Tafilalt. With colonial rule abolished and direct French control gone, ancient internal quarrels, once again were resumed; a never ending cycle. However, by 1960, the Berber uprisings were put down by a superior Royal army and the central government had successfully asserted its control throughout the state [Ref. 64].

Political upheavals in the early stages of the Mohammed regime also created pressure on the new independent monarchy. New political parties quickly formed to assert interests not directly served by the Istiqlal or the other nationalist parties. The first of these was the Popular Movement (Movement Populaire--MP) formed originally as a clandestine group in the Rif mountains among dissident Berber groups, but by 1959, established as a political party claiming to represent the Berber rural population against the mainly Arab urban

nationalist parties. The Istiqlal itself split into radical and conservative wings and in 1959 the radical wing broke away from the party, forming a separate political group, the National Union of Popular Forces (Union Nationale des Forces Populaires--UNFP) under a second-generation nationalist leader, Mehdi Ben Barka. All of this caused it to be very difficult for a workable coalition government to emerge which ultimately led Mohammed V to assume direct leadership of the government in 1960 [Ref. 65].

In order to assure the people that he was not instituting a dictatorial regime, Mohammed V promised to promulgate a written constitution by the end of 1962. Early efforts at representative government failed, however, largely because the appointed consultive assembly was given no real authority by the monarchy to legislate, and the parties had little experience in parliamentary politics. The monarchy, in spite of its democratic rhetoric had virtually assured itself the position as the only viable political force in the country at that time. Hahn puts it nicely when she writes, "can a country be truly independent so long as it must depend upon outsiders to supply most of the manufactured goods which are virtually essential to life in the twentieth century" [Ref. 66]. Early on, Morocco was dependent economically in almost total fashion to the French. French weapons supplied the FAR; French school books supplied the schools; oil and gas from French-supplied sources ran the vehicles of commerce, military

and industry. Mohammed's first Five Year Economic Plan aimed itself directly at improving means of self production and at finding alternative suppliers of industrial materials. It was during this time that U.S.-Moroccan relationships began to grow. However, because the feeling at the time was a nationalist one, Mohammed V insisted on renegotiating the 1950 treaty under which France had given to the United States the right to maintain air bases in Morocco for the defense of Europe. The year 1963 saw the removal of these bases from Morocco but not the loss of growing Moroccan-U.S. relations. The U.S. understood the sentiment in Morocco against the basing facilities and supported the decisions by the Moroccan regime on the matter, fully; with probable thoughts of greater gains that could be realized later.

One problem which Mohammed brought on himself rather than it being caused by independence, was his approval of the irredentist claims of the Istiqlal party to Mauritania, the Spanish Sahara as well as parts of Mali and Algeria. In January 1961, Mohammed V called a conference in Casablanca of several of the more radical independent African states of the period, including Ghana, Guinea, the United Arab Republic (UAR) and the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic in exile. At this conference he negotiated support for Morocco's claims in Mauritania in return for his backing of the neutralist and anticolonialist policies of the other states. The so-called Casablanca Group failed to attain its goal of close coordination in foreign policy, however, and

gradually died out. Morocco's stand on Mauritania isolated the country from most of the newly independent countries of Africa, most of which had recognized Mauritania when it became independent of France in 1960 [Ref. 67].

Gaining independence from France, in reality, had given Moroccans and the monarchy more problems than it had while under colonial rule. Under French control, Moroccan life was planned, coordinated and controlled. While this in itself was distasteful and unacceptable to the imazhigan nature of Moroccan natives, the problems and pressures associated with decolonization and independence were even more severe. It is to Mohammed V's credit, in retrospect, that no other political force was allowed to rise in authority to a level above that of the monarch during his relatively short reign. The monarchy survived independence and its associated pressures through a variety of techniques; some cooperative, but more often than not, coercive. The point is, that it survived. A better understanding of the effects that becoming an independent nation had on the stability of the monarchy can best be achieved, however, by a closer examination of the nature of the organization and function of post-independence Moroccan politics in relationship to their influence on monarchical decision making. A closer look at the early years of Mohammed's successor and son, King Hassan II's reign and the multitude of political problems that he encountered is best suited for this undertaking. This part of the study

will then be expanded on in the next and concluding portion of the thesis where the nature of current challenges to the monarchy in Morocco provides the subject matter.

C. POST-INDEPENDENCE MOROCCAN POLITICS

1. Hassan's Early Problems

Politically, the current monarch of Morocco ran into opposition from the very beginning. When Mohammed V died suddenly in February 1961, some initial doubts were expressed as to the ability of his son, the thirty-two year old Hassan II to hold the country together. But, Hassan acted decisively to assure his people that he would follow the domestic policies set by his father. In foreign policy, however, Hassan did not show the same interest in militant neutralism as had Mohammed V but turned increasingly toward the West.

The new king took personal control of the government as prime minister and named a new cabinet. He also drew up his own constitution which gave the monarchy even more authority. Under its provisions the king remained the central figure in the executive branch of the government, but legislative power was vested in a two-house parliament, and an independent judiciary was guaranteed. In 1963 elections to the parliament were held by universal suffrage, which secured substantial majorities for the royalist coalitions, the Front for the Defense of Constitutional Institutions (Front pour la Defense des Institutions Constitutionnelles--FDIC), formed that year.

As 1963 advanced, problems for Hassan's government began. First, relations between Morocco and Algeria began to worsen due to a border dispute over the desert region south of Bechar. In October, Moroccan and Algerian forces fought a series of small-scale but sharp engagements in the disputed area. It took the efforts of Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia and President Modibo Keita of Mali to arrange a cease fire. Hassan was unable to do this himself.

In 1963, Hassan opened the first session of the parliament but its proceedings were marred by the discovery of a plot against him allegedly backed by Algeria, in which a number of radical opposition leaders were implicated, among them, Ben Barka [Ref. 68].

In 1964, Hassan reorganized the government with Ahmed Bahnim, head of the Democratic Socialist Party (Parti Socialiste Democratique--PSD), as prime minister and a cabinet drawn mostly from the FDIC group of loyalist parties.

By the mid-1960's Morocco had established diplomatic relations with most communist countries and had accepted military and economic aid from the Soviet Union, thus lending credence to its official policy of nonalignment. Morocco's primary political and economic links abroad, however, continued to be with the West, particularly with France. During a visit to the United States in 1963, Hassan was reportedly to have commented, "Because I have relations with the Soviet Union does not mean I am a Communist, any more than my relations with France mean I am a Catholic" [Ref. 69].

Political pressures on the monarchy reasserted themselves during the first half of 1965, as students, later joined by disgruntled unemployed workers (many educated) rioted in Casablanca. The royal police, reinforced by the Army, restored order, but at a high cost. Reliable observers placed the death toll at over 400 people killed.

Also that year, fourteen Moroccans convicted earlier of gunrunning in connection with the 1963 conspiracy that was linked to Algeria, were executed as evidence of Hassan's determination to maintain order. Hassan later told the public that Morocco's problems were not caused by the Monarchy but by the bickering political factions that made up the government and he promised to form a government of national union.

During the years 1965-1970, political activity in Morocco ceased after Hassan, making use of his constitutional prerogative, proclaimed a "state of exception," or national emergency, assumed full legislative and executive powers. This was caused by the resignation of Prime Minister Bahnini in June 1965 due to his decision that he could not hold his government together. After assuming control, Hassan appointed a nonparty cabinet--composed of technocrats rather than politicians, with himself as prime minister--and indicated that elections would be held at some unspecified future date after a new constitution had been drawn up. Promised reforms were shelved, but political disintegration appeared for the time being, to be arrested.

During 1966, Moroccan-Algerian relations deteriorated again as a result of what became known by many as the 'North Africa arms race.' Alarmed by the mounting flow of Soviet arms to Algeria, Hassan secured a number of new military aircraft from the United States. In addition, he visited Moscow in the fall of 1966 and the United States in February 1967. New military and economic aid agreements resulted from both of these visits.

Hassan stepped down as prime minister in 1967 due to relaxed tensions and by 1970 he was able to end the "state of exception." In July 1970 he announced that the new constitution had been prepared and it was accepted the next month by 98.7 percent of participating voters. Elections for a new unicameral legislature followed in August, and the five year long emergency period was brought to a close.

The next two years were to see the greatest challenges the Hassan Monarchy has had to face at any time. In 1971 political opposition members were beginning to uncover and report evidence of broad corruption and malfeasance in Hassan's government. They continued to oppose any social or economic measures that were in progress at that time, no matter how successful, and stated these programs were either too slow, corrupt or nonexistent.

On July 10, 1971, approximately 400 guests were assembled at Hassan's royal seaside palace at Akhirat, fifteen miles southwest of Rabat, to celebrate Hassan's birthday.

At about 2:00 P.M. the garden party came under attack by troops employing small arms and grenades. King Hassan withdrew, unharmed, to the private apartments of the palace and the premature radio reports issued by the coup leaders, primarily Colonel Mohammed Ababau, stating that Hassan and the monarchy were dead, were unfortunately for the rebels, incorrect.

About two-and-one-half hours after the attack commenced, Hassan reemerged from the royal apartments accompanied by a sergeant and several young soldiers. The troops present shouted, "long live Hassan the second!" and the revolt began its precipitous collapse [Ref. 70]. Three days following the coup attempt, four generals, five colonels, and a major accused of leading the conspiracy were executed by firing squad at the direction of a ministerial war council headed by the king.

On August 16, 1972, a second military coup on the monarchy was attempted. As he was returning from a visit to France, the king's Boeing 727 was fired on over Tetouan by an unscheduled escort of six Moroccan Air Force F-5 jet fighters led by the commandant of the Kenitra air base. The king's jet was badly damaged and lost altitude, but it was able to land. Hassan escaped from the plane before another strafing run was launched on the grounded plane. Hassan, again unharmed escaped unharmed, by automobile to Skhirat.

The Minister of Defense, General Oufhir, was implicated as the mastermind of this coup attempt and his connection

to the earlier attempt was also established. Libyan connections were also speculated but never proven. Oufhir later was said to have committed suicide prior to his trial, but a French reporter counted four bullet holes in his head when the body was discovered. Other members of the Air Force who participated in the coup were executed by firing squad and Hassan rewarded the major who safely piloted his damaged plane to ground, with the Moroccan Air Force Chief of Staff job.

The pressures encountered by the monarchy during Hassan's early years of rule were enormous. Each one was handled with much diplomacy and at times firmness; a much respected trait to the Berber native. Hassan carried on in the footsteps of his father far better than originally speculated. How he handled political situations in Morocco after the 1972 coup attempt, which is considered by many to be the watershed year in the firm establishment of the Moroccan traditional monarchy, will be taken up in the concluding part of this thesis. Before this is accomplished, however, a closer look will be taken at the organization and function of the political activities in Morocco that were established after independence.

2. Present Function and Organization

Structurally, Morocco is administratively divided into thirty-five provinces and six urban prefectures. The provinces are further divided into 72 administrative areas

and communes. Each administrative region is headed by a governor, appointed by and directly responsible to the king. These governors and other leaders are usually relatives of the monarch. Under the provisions of the third of Morocco's constitutions produced since Hassan took control in 1961 (and which he personally wrote), Morocco is a (Hassan) proclaimed constitutional and democratic monarchy with Islam as the official religion and daily guide for all activities, though its precepts are not adhered to as rigidly in Morocco as in other Muslim countries. The constitution provides for equality before the law and guarantees freedom of movement, speech, opinion, and assembly. The constitution may be amended by initiative of the king or the legislature, but the amendment must be approved by popular referendum.

Article Thirty-Five of the constitution puts the position of the monarch in its proper perspective. It describes Hassan as,

Commander of the Faithful, the supreme representative of the nation, the symbol of its unity, the guarantor of the existence and continuity of the state. He watches over respect for Islam and the Constitution. He is the protection of the rights and liberties of citizens, social groups, and communities. [Ref. 71]

Other powers and authority of the monarchy are extensive. He is the Commander in Chief of the armed forces. He appoints all important officials, promulgates legislation passed by the legislature, and signs and ratifies treaties. He presides over the Cabinet, the Council for National Development and Planning, and the Supreme Judicial Council,

and possesses the power to dissolve the legislature and rule by decree by declaring a state of emergency as he did in 1965.

The 1972 constitution calls for a unicameral House of Representatives elected for a four year term. The king may request the legislature to reconsider legislation before giving his assent. He may also dissolve the House by decree.

The judicial system is headed by a supreme court that consists of four chambers (civil, criminal, administrative and social), all headed by judges appointed by the King. To say that Hassan has his finger in all the political pies in the country would certainly be an understatement. He is the politics of the country.

On the other side of the political fence resides the lesser important factionally split Moroccan parliament, headed by a Prime Minister who is appointed by the King (and his cousin also) to watch over their activities. Its composition presently includes the following political parties; the Istiqlal, Popular Movement (MP), Socialist Union of Popular Forces (USFP), Constitutional and Democratic Popular Movement (MPCD), National Union of Popular Forces (UNFP), National Group of Independents (RNI), Party of Progress and Socialism (PPS--Communist), and the Democratic Independents (ID). These members all work off a central government budget of about seven billion (U.S.) dollars. Defense spending accounts for about 40 percent of the central budget.

The RNI is the most powerful group with 84 of the 264 parliamentary seats and was founded in 1977 by former

Prime Minister Ahmed Osman. And in 1981 when Hassan named a new cabinet, the RNI became the designated opposition (loyal opposition) party in the parliament. A splinter group of the RNI, the Democratic Independents (ID), is the second most powerful with 57 seats.

The Istiqlal Party which led the country to independence, is the third largest political group in parliament with 53 seats. The party's strength is primarily urban, and Fès and Meknes are its traditional strongholds.

Fourth on the list of most powerful parties is the popular movement (MP) which is based primarily on rural Berber support. It has 41 seats in parliament and holds five cabinet positions.

The fifth most powerful group is the Socialist Union of Popular Forces (USFP) which emerged in 1974 after a split from the original major left-of-center party, the National Union of Popular Forces (UNFP). It holds 13 seats in the parliament and is very popular with Moroccan youths and intellectuals.

Sixth is the Party for Progress and Socialism (PPS) and it is the latest label for the small Moroccan Communist Party. Though currently tolerated, it has at various times been officially illegal; most recently from 1969 to late 1974. It appeals to the younger, disaffected elements of society. It has one seat in parliament.

Seventh is the National Union of Popular Forces (UNFP) which rose out of a schism between radical and

conservative wings of the Istiqlal in 1959 and is the third oldest political party in Morocco behind the Istiqlal and the MP. It is a relatively weak organization currently, beset by internal strife and it holds no seats in the current parliament as it chose not to participate in the last election.

The final group, the Constitutional and Democratic Popular Movement, a small faction of the MP, has one seat in the parliament. The parliament currently has fourteen unattended seats [Ref. 72].

Any ratings on strengths of individual parties in the parliament are relative only to that body and not to their actual impact on the monarchy or their influence on the Moroccan society as a whole. However, in the parliament itself, the members constitute one branch of the political elite of the country. The other branch, of course, being the monarchy itself. Among the parliamentary elite, fierce competition takes place for power, but more importantly, for patronage. None, however, come near to achieving the patronage that Hassan controls.

The diverseness of the parliament as well as of Moroccan society as a whole has allowed Hassan (and his father) before him, to capitalize on this situation by acting in the politically rewarding role of arbiter between conflicting groups with great success. This is hauntingly characteristic of the role Berber chieftans portrayed in the rise of the three great Berber dynasties which were discussed in the

first section of this study. On the one hand, the monarch recognizes and encourages the allegiance shown him by various parties, and on the other, develops ways of strengthening his own support at the expense of the very same parties. If the parties became too strong, Hassan has the ability to weaken them through his dismissal and appointment prerogative. He would never destroy one completely, however. By way of balancing popular support and his ability to play the King's majority membership of Parliament against rival power seeking organizations, Hassan is able to maintain a strategy of intergroup rivalry. In this manner he can claim the role of power broker and utilize the throne as the symbol of political continuity among discontinuous political leadership.

The king's power and prestige are further enhanced by the fact that he is the prime dispenser of patronage and the ultimate source of spoils in the system. His control of the patronage system and command of the Moroccan economic system are his most effective tools of elite control.

The king's position is further protected by his own ruling apparatus which consists of an executive staff, the intelligence and security branches of the Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of National Defense, and a basically loyal army and officer corps of which he is the Chief of Staff. These personnel, in addition to the countless family members and close personal friends, he has at all levels of government, assist in the maintenance of royal authority.

In conclusion, the monarchy's position relative to other political forces in Morocco is clear. It is by far the dominant institution of the Moroccan society, drawing its legitimacy from another dominant force, Islam. The monarchy's personal charisma is another source of legitimacy for the monarchy. By surviving the political turmoil that marked Moroccan Politics immediately following independence, both Hassan and his father, Mohammed, came to be respected by friends and foe alike.

Hassan's greatest source of popular support has come, however, from a contemporary monarchial action; that involving the Western Sahara, and this will be discussed in the last portion of the study.

The eight political parties that make up the Moroccan Parliament do not possess much in the way of structural legitimacy but they do provide an effective instrument of control for the monarch. Through the parliament, the king can control the country without being openly perceived as doing so. To the uneducated Moroccan mass (about 75-80%), the parliament is a symbol of free government and a modern state. In actuality it is far from it.

The problem of modernization will continue to be the most dangerous to the monarchy. While this one point could provide endless conjecture for analysis, Hassan has in short, done two things to confront this dilemma. He has adapted his policies to both short and long-term tactics. In the

short-term he has avoided the problem by focusing on popular issues. The promulgation of constitutions, implementation of nationalization and land redistribution, and the expansion into the Western Sahara have won much popular support for the monarchy. Long-range strategies are more complicated and are aimed at the continuance of the monarchy itself. Hassan has apparently chosen to preserve the traditional monarchy by minimizing the disruptive effects on it that modernization will bring. This is the third recourse that Huntington gives to the modernizing autocrat mentioned earlier in the study. In this attempt, the massive foreign borrowing of money to help alleviate poor social and economic conditions that the monarch has currently undertaken could be seen as the monarch's effort to eliminate future problems before they occur.

The nature of current political and socio-economic pressures on the monarchy in Morocco is the subject matter for the next and final portion of the study. A conclusion will then be drawn on the overall effects that these pressures have had on the institution of the monarchy.

IV. THE CURRENT CHALLENGES TO THE MONARCHY

By the early 1980's, the Moroccan monarchy had attained a high degree of relative stability. Two factors account for this situation. First, Hassan has been able to use the monarchy's religious prestige and patronage powers to balance quasi-feudalistic interests and keep potential societal challenges in check. This is most evident in Hassan's manipulation of the monarchy's greatest potential rival for political preeminence and control, the eight party Moroccan parliament. Aside from Hassan's personal political skills, the main reason the modern political sector, i.e., the multi-party, parliamentary system--has not fared better in its competition with the traditional monarchy for power and authority, is its inability to achieve a high level of institutionalization. By the standard outlined above, the parliament is not a developed institution. Its most serious flaw is the deep divisions which exist between its members. In contrast, the institutional base of the Moroccan monarchy is quite well developed.

The second reason for the stability of the Moroccan monarchy is its ability to maintain its popular base. Many theorists argue that traditional monarchs are, by their very nature, prone to stagnation and instability [Ref. 74]. However, these arguments usually assume that the traditional monarch views modernization as a threat to his power and authority and that, consequently, he will seek to retard social, economic,

and political advances. In Morocco however, Hassan appears to regard modernization as a reality that cannot be halted. Instead of fighting this process, he has sought to control and manage it. In this respect he has adopted the course proposed by Huntington [Ref. 75].

This section examines the major domestic and diplomatic challenges facing the monarchy today. While this is usually accomplished through an examination of separate social, political and economic situations in a country, in the case of Morocco they are not easily separated. In this study, they will be considered as interrelated factors, contributing as a whole to the disruptive nature of the society. The development of social unrest as a result of the emergence of an increasingly educated, urbanizing mass has already been elaborated on in the section on modernization. As a result of recent economic and social reforms instituted by Hassan, mass discontent is relatively minimal. In fact, the last major incident of social unrest occurred in 1981 when Morocco's restive young population rioted in Casablanca. The riots were quelled after Moroccan security forces--on orders from the monarchy--killed about 500 of the rioters [Ref. 76]. Although the proximate cause of these riots was protest over reduced food subsidies, the real problem was much deeper. Food subsidies had reduced on orders from the International Monetary Fund as part of an overall economic austerity measure implemented by the monarch.

Social unrest due to economic and other related problems is present but currently, it does not pose as large a threat to the stability of the monarchy as do two other more greatly proportional problems. The first is the domestic challenge, growing out of steadily worsening economic conditions which not only gives rise to social unrest but more importantly, limits the country's overall development. The second problem is the diplomatic cum domestic challenge presented by the Western Sahara issue. By examining Hassan's handling of these two problem areas, I hope to be able to offer some conclusions concerning the prospects for the continued stability of the monarchy.

A. DOMESTIC ECONOMIC PROBLEMS

The Hassan monarchy currently faces two critical domestic economic challenges. The first is rising unemployment and the second is the failing national economy of the country. These problems as well as the monarchy's responses to them is the focus of this section of the study.

1. The Unemployment Challenge

In all countries, unemployment almost inevitably gives rise to social and political discord. Especially if they are educated, out-of-work, hungry, and idle people, it creates a potentially explosive situation that, if not successfully checked, can ultimately threaten the state's power and authority.

Unemployment figures for Morocco since 1956 are sporadic at best. According to the London-based Economist,

best estimates are that unemployment in Morocco at independence was 9 percent and rose gradually through 1982 to as high as 25 percent in the major urban sectors, primarily Casablanca. The reasons for this are numerous but most are related to those aspects of social mobilization--e.g., education and urbanization discussed above.

Social mobilization and urbanization created employment problems at both ends of the economic spectrum. Morocco's economy remains an agrarian one with at least 45 percent of the GDP coming from this sector. However, the advent of social mobilization caused by increased education which led to the urbanization of the country has caused a movement of a majority of the country's qualified agricultural workers to move to the city. This has left the agricultural sector dependent upon unqualified workers for its operation. This is significant, again, when one considers that agriculture remains the chief source of revenue for the country. By 1982 the lack of qualified agricultural workers in Morocco's primary economic sector caused an abundance of problems. The Economist stated that rural areas--those most affected by a lack of qualified workers--at times suffered more from underemployment than from unemployment. This, according to the source, was evident when "at harvest time there were actually local labor shortages, and farmers who had planted late-maturing crops, frequently migrated to areas of early-maturing crops to take advantage of temporarily high wages.

At harvest time it was possible for daily wages to jump to four or five times the normal rural wage rate" [Ref. 77].

Likewise, the move from rural to urban centers caused unemployment problems in the cities. According to one source, Morocco's demographic structure has changed significantly. The urban component of the population rose from 14 percent in 1956 to 46 percent by 1982 with Casablanca alone accounting for 3.2 million of Morocco's 20 million inhabitants [Ref. 78]. As farmers moved to the cities, shantytowns ("medinas"), sprang up, providing a breeding ground for discontent. Rural peasants lacked the skills necessary for jobs in the industrial sector which were scarce to begin with. These circumstances and others have caused significant problems that the monarchy has had to face.

In regard to unemployment in the country since 1956, two main problems have emerged. The first is the unemployment in the rural farming sectors caused more from a shortage of qualified farm hands than from actual numbers of people available to work. This is significant due to the majority role that agriculture plays in the economy of the country.

The second problem is the unemployment in the urbanizing sectors caused by its inability to absorb unskilled migrants from the rural areas. Educated Moroccans have an aversion to manual labor and the migrants do not have the skills to perform industrial tasks. True unemployment rather than underemployment is the situation in the industrial areas.

In order to combat the shortage of trained and experienced Moroccan management and administrative personnel, the monarchy created in 1976 a center for the study of human resources in order to ascertain the full extent of the country's technical and scientific talent. A one percent tax on sales was paid by manufacturers to help support vocational training centers, though some of the better employees emigrated to Western Europe after they had acquired sufficient skills. In certain areas, however, the government continues to rely, by necessity, on foreign technicians, particularly French citizens. The official policy of replacing foreigners with Moroccans (or "Moroccanization" as Hassan terms it) has been implemented cautiously despite pressure from political opposition and trade union groups. By 1982 an estimated 9,000 French technicians and teachers were still employed in Morocco.

Other recent domestic problems, namely the Casablanca riots of 1981, has caused the monarchy to speed up its efforts at curbing the urban unemployed. Due to that disturbance, Hassan promised a complete review of the country's domestic economic problems, primarily unemployment, and already by 1982, government authorities have taken steps in order to help alleviate the misery of the urban unemployed. An additional Dh 200 mn (5.5 Dirham--Dh = \$1 U.S.) has been added to its Dh 1.3 bn job creation scheme (part of Hassan's current 5 year economic plan to be discussed later) which

aims to establish workshops to employ between 400,000 and 450,000 people [Ref. 79].

In the rural sector the king has also called for studies concerning the development of several rural towns, each housing 30,000-50,000 people, to try to stem the tide of rural depopulation. Hopefully, by stepping up the pace of rural development while at the same time increasing food production from the agricultural sector, the rural agricultural sector, which remains the lifeblood of the Moroccan economy, can cease its downward spiral and become productive once again [Ref. 80].

According to the economic journal, Meed, Morocco's first attempt at resettlement into a rural area will occur sometime this year or early 1984, with the movement from the North of almost 100,000 rural dwellers, to a new settlement across the bay from Dakhla in the Western Sahara region. According to the source, the designs for the new town were completed in mid-1982 by Venezuelan architect, Jose Miguel Menedez. The development when completed would, like Dakhla, be based on fishing and agriculture. It is also intended to be energy self-sufficient, using wind and solar power. Cost of the project is estimated at \$1,720 million U.S. over a 15 year period [Ref. 81]. Speculation over Morocco's future plans for the Western Sahara region should certainly take into consideration these resettlement possibilities.

In regard to overall unemployment, the Hassan administration hopes to create almost a million jobs over the

1981-1985 five year period and this is a large part of his current five year plan. During this period, the GDP is expected to average a yearly growth rate of 6.5 percent a year. When combined with an 8 percent growth in investment, the improvement in the rate of consumption should reach 5.7 percent and create over 950,000 jobs.

Hassan is accused by many of his opponents--primarily the loyal opposition members of the Moroccan Parliament, the RNI--of attempting to divert attention away from the monarchy's inability to handle the economic situation by focusing on the Western Sahara and a "greater Morocco," as the Hassan regime terms the movement. In doing this, his critics say, Hassan is attempting to unite the country behind a very popular cause rather than deal directly with the economic problems--primarily unemployment--that divide the country.

Unemployment remains a challenge to the Hassan monarchy, but in difference to those prognosticators mentioned earlier, who would accuse the monarchy of skirting the issue by dwelling on the Western Sahara campaign, King Hassan and his government appear to be attacking the problem head on, evidenced by the reform measures just listed. Only time will tell if he has been successful or not.

2. The Failing National Economy

Unemployment is only one aspect of the overall economic challenge that currently confronts the monarchy. This portion of the study looks at some of the other economic

problem areas that Hassan faces today; as well as his responses in dealing with these challenges.

In 1981, Hassan proposed a new five year economic plan to curb rapidly deteriorating economic conditions of which unemployment was a large but not the singular contributing factor. The idea of five year plans was begun in 1956 by Mohammed V. Originally the current plan called for a total investment of \$21.4 billion U.S. in these major areas of concentration:

- Defense and related expenditures to consolidate Morocco's position in the Western Sahara;
- Improved productivity in dryland farming areas;
- Development of the fisheries industry as well as the energy and tourism sectors;
- Reducing socioeconomic disparities by creating 950,000 new jobs through labor-intensive projects and by expanding facilities such as hospitals, rural schools, and housing; and
- Economic decentralization and regional development by providing investment incentives for industries that locate away from the Coastal Casablanca-Kenitra axis to rural and inland areas and by channeling government resources to local authorities for regional development priorities [Ref. 82].

In addition to the above, the government plan had hoped that tax reforms and a new investment code would stimulate private and foreign investment, which together

would have provided two-thirds of the plan's financing. Among the major projects envisioned by the plan were:

- A 970-kilometer (582 mile) railroad from Marrakech to El Ayoune in the Western Sahara expected to cost \$2 billion U.S. toward the end of the decade;
- Increasing phosphate rock production from 20.7 million metric tons (MT) in 1980 to 27 million in 1985;
- Construction of three more phosphoric acid plants and adding sulfuric acid to plant capacity;
- Development of small-scale mining-cobalt, coal, silver, lead, and copper;
- A new fishing port at Dakhla in the Western Sahara and expansion of fishing port areas at Agadir and Tan Tan;
- Three large sugar refineries;
- Development of nuclear energy and oil shale resources; and
- Construction of 25 new industrial parks away from the Casablanca-Kenitra areas. [Ref. 83]

From the onset, Hassan's planners understood that without sizable foreign and domestic capital investments, financing for the new plan would fall short of requirements. A new investment code was implemented permitting 100 percent foreign participation in various sectors, and government price controls and import restrictions were relaxed and other government measures were taken to give the investment easier access to credit.

However, by mid-1983, a Meed study indicated that the plan was stalled in many areas due to world and domestic economic conditions that had direct impact on the new plan. First, there was a drastic fall, within a few months, in the price of raw phosphate rock to about \$30-32 U.S. a ton, down from \$40 U.S. a ton, because of world oversupply. Second, exports fell in value by 10 percent in 1982 to MD 3,445 million (\$500 million U.S.)--more than one-quarter of total exports. Third, a disastrous drought in 1981 in the South destroyed half the cereal crop and led to the premature slaughter of one-third of the national herd of sheep, goats and cattle. Finally, a 11 percent rise in the dollar against the dirham between end-December 1982 and end-June 1983 has increased the cost of oil imports [Ref. 84].

When the above problems are connected with the enormous cost of financing the war in the Western Sahara (by some estimates \$5-6 million monthly), the economic challenges facing Hassan appear insurmountable.

In response to these economic problems the Hassan administration has begun to tighten its belt and reconsider many of the original goals mapped out in the 1981-1985 economic plan. While it has not shelved the original plans, many programs that have not attracted foreign investment have been put on the back burner. These have included the plans to build the three sugar refineries, energy projects involving hydroelectric dams, and the construction of several planned industrial parks away from the Casablanca-Kenitra area.

The World Bank has been advising Morocco's financial authority since 1980, and in fact made the recommendation on import subsidies that led to the Casablanca riots in 1981. However, IMF predictions of a worsening economic crisis were not taken seriously until mid-1983. At that time, rigorous import controls were introduced, several major projects were shelved (mentioned) and the budget was revised downward. The budget revision was generally seen as a preparation for IMF assistance, now being negotiated. In addition, overseas borrowing which had reached a high point in 1982 with the approval of over \$50 million U.S. in military sales credits by the United States to Morocco, largely used to support the war in the Western Sahara, was reduced [Ref. 85].

Despite the substantial economic problems facing the country, according to the IMF, Morocco's return to the commercial market in the foreseeable future is not ruled out. Hassan has seen the need for an economic change-in-habit and has acted accordingly, thus stopping a downward spiral that ultimately would have spelled Morocco's financial doom.

Additionally, the need to refer budget cuts to the king underlines the political sensitivity of the government's decision. As the central decision maker in the country, Hassan is recognized by the parliament as being the only one that could sell budget cuts to the public. His personal charisma and religious status make this unpleasant task far easier for him to accomplish than for the fractionalized parliament to do so. However, in keeping with his program

of governing without appearing to govern, the king has referred approval of the budget cuts to a specifically convened session of the parliament in response to their calls for debate on such sweeping cuts. Hassan's prior approval of the cuts, however, makes the job easy for the parliament and their 'approval' is only a matter of conjecture so far as the significance of their endorsement is concerned [Ref. 86].

Economically, Morocco is in a bad situation. But Hassan appears to have taken control of the problem. By cooperating with the IMF, Morocco has a good chance of economic recovery in the near future. Budget cuts appear to be the only solution, and the only political force in the country capable of selling this news to an already overburdened people is the monarchy. In the next section, the Western Sahara issue, which is the major challenge facing the monarch today, will be discussed. This will then be followed by a summation of the study.

B. DIPLOMATIC UNREST--THE WESTERN SAHARA ISSUE

According to John Damis, "there is little question that the leading regional issue in North Africa since 1975 has been the ongoing conflict over the decolonization and final disposition of the Western Sahara" [Ref. 87]. Other analysts tend to agree with Damis and the general contention among all of them is that if there were no Western Sahara dispute, relations between the states in the North African Maghrab would be much improved. Of the major states in the area--Morocco,

Algeria, Mauritania, Tunisia and Libya--only Tunisia has stayed out of the conflict.

The Western Sahara comprises 267,027.8 square kilometers (102,703 sq. mi.) of wasteland--an area about the size of Colorado [Ref. 88]. Since 1975 it has been the focus of intense military and diplomatic activity, involving a wide variety of actors, the most important of which are Morocco and Algeria. Mauritania occupied the southern third of the region in late 1975 and fought with limited success against the Polisario forces (the Popular Front for the Liberation of Saqiat al-Hamra and Rio de Oro, the northern and southern portions of the region) until July 1978, when a military coup overthrew the civilian government of Mauritania and led to a ceasefire. In August 1979, Mauritania signed a peace treaty with the Polisario front and withdrew from the war. Libya has given important military and financial backing to the Polisario.

The actual combatants in the struggle are Morocco, Algeria and the Polisario front itself. In Damis's view, the Western Saharan conflict has three dimensions. First, and beyond the issues of Saharan decolonization and self-determination, the conflict "is part of a broader set of problems between Morocco and Algeria that is not limited to the regimes now in power in Rabat and Algiers" [Ref. 89]. He contends that a settlement of the Saharan issue would not change the basic animosity, deriving from ideological differences, that exists

between the two states. Second, Polisario depends on this existing animosity between Algeria and Morocco for legitimization of its long term nationalist goal of an independent Saharan state. Finally, Damis argues that outside powers have only marginal influence or interest in the Western Sahara conflict. He states that "neither the United States nor the Soviet Union has anything to gain from a continuing or escalation of the military struggle in Northwest Africa" [Ref. 90].

From Damis's standpoint then, the Western Sahara issue is regional in nature and not, as some others have postulated, an extension of the East-West conflict. Statements by Hassan that the large numbers of soviet weapons Moroccan forces are encountering in the war with the Polisario proves they are fighting the Soviet Union are, according to Damis, simply another example of Hassan's efforts to manipulate outside actors to get additional arms. In that respect, they are a diplomatic analogue to his skill at balancing and juggling pressures from potential domestic rivals.

Although the Western Saharan conflict does appear to be only a regional dispute at present, it has the potential to become an international dispute. Already, it has contributed significantly to divisions in the OAU.

1. The Background of the Saharan Issue

The origins of the Saharan dispute can be traced back as far as 1886 when Hassan I, the namesake of the current

monarch, seized control of the region from Spain. Before then, tribes in the region had looked to the sultan as their spiritual guide and offered their political allegiance to him whenever he sent emissaries to the region to collect material tributes. However, the onset of colonial domination in Morocco by France ended the relationship between Morocco and its Western Saharan ally as it also ended the glory and strength of the monarchy itself [Ref. 91].

After World War II, the colonial situation in Morocco began to change. As discussed above, at that time various nationalist groups led by Sultan Sidi Mohammed Ben Youssef V began to contest Spanish and, more predominantly, French dominion. Because of his role in the activities of the nationalists, Mohammed V was deposed by his French "protectors" on August 20, 1953, and forced into exile in Madagascar. This action resulted in a true nationalist uprising that ultimately led France--hard pressed by the revolutionary struggle for independence in neighboring Algeria--to bring Mohammed back to Morocco and return him to his throne. Later on March 2, 1956, independence was granted to Morocco [Ref. 92].

At independence the new government in Rabat decided to reunify the old Sherifien Empire. This meant reclaiming 'lost' territories. The initial stage of this campaign included pressure on the international community to end all protectorate agreements. In 1957, the Spanish relinquished their control over northern Morocco (the Rif Mountain region)

and over the southern zone bordering on the Sahara [Ref. 93].

The Western Saharan conflict is frequently referred to as "Hassan's war." This characterization is an oversimplification as it ignores the fact that Morocco's war effort has broad-based national support. One of the sources of Hassan's legitimacy--both secular and spiritual--is his role as defender of Morocco's territorial integrity. For this reason, restoring a portion of the national patrimony, the annexation of the Western Sahara enhanced the King's legitimacy [Ref. 94]. However, Hassan did not actually start the war. The Moroccan claim to the Western Sahara was first raised seriously not by the monarchy but by the Istiqlal Party at the time of independence in 1956 and was championed by party leader, Allal Al-Fassi, who later died in 1974. This claim formed part of a larger irredentist claim to a "greater Morocco" which also included Mauritania, western Algeria, and a northern portion of Mali. Not until 1958 did the monarchy, under Mohammed V, join in the call for annexation; even then it was more for political gain than actual interest in fulfilling any "greater Morocco" dream. Many scholars have argued that at that time, the monarchy was merely one of several competing forces within the country. By choosing to champion the Saharan claim, which was then regarded as a popular cause, the monarchy prevented the Istiqlal Party from using the issue to outflank the monarchy

and bolster its claim to be the leading force of Moroccan nationalism [Ref. 95].

By the early 1960's it was evident that Morocco's historical claims were a source of potentially serious disagreements with its neighbors. The 1963 discovery of large phosphate reserves in the Saharan territory renewed interest in the area. In addition to Morocco, Spain, Mauritania and Algeria began to show increasing concern about the territory's future. So long as the issue was seen as one of decolonization, the three African states presented a common front in their demands for Spanish evacuation. However, their plans for the post-colonial Saharan territory differed. Morocco wanted to annex the territory. Mauritania also had historical claims to parts of the territory but it supported self-determination for the area into the early 1970's, perhaps hoping the territory might form a buffer between it and Morocco. Algeria made no territorial claims for itself, but did not want the area's mineral deposits to come under Moroccan control. For that reason, it consistently supported self-determination for the Saharan people [Ref. 96].

During the 1960's, the UN passed several resolutions calling for self-determination for the Sahara area. By 1973, a number of guerrilla organizations were operating in the territory, some supporting independence and others favoring associations with one or another of the involved sovereign states. The Polisario became the dominant guerrilla force.

It advocated Saharan independence and was strongly backed by Algeria. According to Damis, the composition of Polisario is not clear but it includes a combination of a "genuine core of Sahrawi Nationalists (some of whom spent time in Morocco or Mauritania), highly dedicated and committed to a long and difficult struggle for an independent Saharan state, some Algerian mercenaries, and other young Moroccan and Mauritanian dissidents" [Ref. 97].

By the summer of 1974 mounting pressures on Spain to end its rule in the Sahara caused it to announce that it would hold a referendum under UN auspices to decide the future of the territory. In May 1975, however, Spain changed its position and decided to withdraw from the Saharan territory as soon as possible. The withdrawal process was hastened on 6 November of that year when 350,000 unarmed Moroccan citizens engaged in the "Green March," into the Western Sahara with the design of intimidating Spanish authorities [Ref. 98].

According to Damis, the term "Green March" had special connotations for Moroccan citizens. Green was closely associated with the Prophet Mohammed, and according to Islam, is the color of peace. In addition, the number of marchers, 350,000, was selected because it represented the annual number of births in Morocco [Ref. 99].

After the march, on 15 November 1975, Spain agreed to withdraw from the Sahara and ceded its former territory to Morocco and Mauritania in a tripartite agreement insisting,

however, that the Saharan population should have the right of self-determination. With the final withdrawal of Spanish troops in February 1976, Hassan's forces entered the territory, as did those of Ould Daddah, the President of Mauritania at that time. Mauritanian occupation was immediately contested by the Polisario, which, relying on classic hit-and-run guerrilla tactics, kept the Moroccans and Mauritians off balance while the majority of the native Saharan population fled to Algeria and established refugee camps. From these camps came the main recruits and reinforcements for the Polisario's war effort. During 1978-1979, Polisario forces proved to be a formidable foe for the Moroccan Army. Morocco was forced to increase the size of its Saharan Army to nearly 50,000 soldiers. The Polisario countered this buildup by sending raiding parties deep into southern Morocco, raising the political and economic costs to the country [Ref. 100].

In 1978, the most dramatic consequence of the war was the withdrawal of Mauritania from the southern third of Spanish Sahara. The growing success of Polisario in Mauritania, including their capacity to virtually paralyze that nation's economic sector, led to the overthrow of the Daddah regime that same year. Subsequently, on 5 August 1979, Mauritania signed a peace initiative with the Polisario at Algiers and renounced its territorial claims and withdrew all its occupation forces. This left only Morocco to carry on the war.

The next portion of the study will examine Morocco's activities in the Western Sahara region since the withdrawal of Mauritania in 1979. Special attention will be focussed on the pressures that this long, protracted war has placed on the institutional stability of the monarchy, and Hassan's responses to those pressures.

2. The Saharan Issue--A Major Source of Current Problems for the Monarchy

Following the withdrawal of Mauritania from the Sahara in 1979, the Moroccan government came under increasing pressure to continue the struggle alone. Members of the parliament and the higher ranks of the military pushed for the use of greater force to bring the long and costly war to an end. However, this idea was rejected by Hassan. He feared that such an action would increase international opposition to the Moroccan cause. Most foreign leaders saw the Moroccan effort as an act of colonization that disregarded the Saharan peoples' right of self-determination, as mandated earlier by the UN. As an alternative to military escalation, Hassan instituted a war of defense in 1980-1981. Major fortifications, in the form of rock walls, were built around the major economic and population centers in the territory including the phosphate mine at Bu Crasa. The war of conquest had turned into one of hanging-on.

Hassan found his diplomatic position increasingly isolated and vulnerable in the Third World. After the formation of a self-proclaimed Saharoui Democratic Arab

Republic (SADR) by Polisario in 1980, 26 OAU member states proposed to extend recognition to SADR representatives at OAU meetings. When these states endorsed the SADR for full membership, Morocco threatened to withdraw from the OAU. This threat was repeated when it was announced that the Algerian and Libyan Governments were planning to make another determined effort to obtain recognition for the SADR at the 1981 OAU summit in Nairobi. Hassan warned that "if the OAU did so this time, and infringed the fundamental principles upon which it is based, it would break the organization up and a number of other member countries would follow Morocco in leaving the OAU" [Ref. 101].

At the same time, the domestic impact of the war was beginning to pose an even bigger threat to the Hassan regime. Support for the Saharan campaign which had reached its zenith at the time of the Green March in 1975 was now faltering badly. Moroccans had not counted on a long and costly war that would increasingly isolate Morocco diplomatically. In addition, the war began to have a negative effect on the Moroccan economy, which had continued to stagnate despite Saudi infusions of funds. Damis contends that the direct impact on Moroccan society of the military and administrative expenses in conducting the war was initially cushioned by generous financial aid from Saudi Arabia and, to a lesser extent, Kuwait, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates--conservative Arab monarchies that did not want to see socialist

Algeria increase its influence. From 1975 on, according to Damis, Saudi aid mounted to between \$500 million U.S. and \$1 billion U.S. dollars a year. It is generally believed that Morocco's economic problems in 1980-81 were primarily the result of depressed world phosphate prices, a severe drought, and underlying structural problems in the economy [Ref. 102]. The IMF summary of Morocco's economic problems discussed earlier, would seem to support this contention. However, the fact remains that at the time the Moroccan populace believed the Saharan campaign was a major cause of the country's economic problems and, in believing such, pressured the monarchy to bring the Saharan conflict to an early conclusion.

In response the combination of growing socio-economic pressures at home and diplomatic problems with neighboring states, Hassan adopted a new fact. His decision to appear personally at the OAU summit meeting in June 1981 led to widespread speculation that he intended to present the assembled heads of state with a hardline position. Instead, Hassan disarmed most of his critics by proposing a "controlled referendum" on the future of the Western Sahara. Caught off-balance by this announcement, the Polisario leadership charged the monarch with suggesting a "pernicious formula." But Algeria's president, Cahdli Bendjedid, welcomed the Moroccan proposal as a "step forward toward peace" [Ref. 103].

After some debate, the OAU endorsed a resolution that established an Implementation Committee to work out modalities

for the referendum. The committee consisted of nine African states, including Sudan, Tanzania, Mali, Guinea, Nigeria, Kenya, Mauritania, Morocco and Algeria. In the interim, the OAU resolution asked all parties in the dispute to observe an immediate ceasefire and asked the United Nations to provide a peacekeeping force and assist in the conduct of a "fair and free" referendum [Ref. 104].

After reviewing Hassan's proposal, the Polisario published a list of its own demands which included, but were not limited to, the complete withdrawal of Moroccan forces from the Western Sahara. Meeting in Nairobi late in August, the OAU Implementation Committee attempted to meet some of the Polisario's demands but was unable to agree on offices in the region. Nor were all in agreement on the necessity for Morocco's complete withdrawal from an area to that which some members of the committee felt Morocco held legitimate claims.

The result of the failure of the OAU to bring about the referendum and a ceasefire led to continued fighting in the region during the remainder of 1981. By 1982 the Sahara issue had engulfed the OAU itself in one of the gravest crises since its founding in 1963.

In late February 1982, the SADR was officially admitted to an OAU meeting for the first time. This prompted a walk-out by the Moroccan delegation. By 24 February the number of delegates joining Morocco in the walk-out grew to seventeen [Ref. 105]. By April 1982, the OAU was at a virtual standstill.

The OAU's Implementation Committee met in an attempt to end the impasse. President Daniel Arap Moi, of Kenya, the OAU Chairman, opened the meeting by stating that the SADR issue was "the most serious challenge yet to the survival of the 19-year-old organization" [Ref. 106]. The meeting ended on 24 April with the deadlock over the Sahara issue still in effect [Ref. 107]. The general agreement which later came to be accepted (through default and the lack of a better one), was Polisario's and Algeria's joint position which reasoned that since the SADR had become a full member of the OAU, bilateral negotiations between the Polisario and Morocco was the obvious next step. In the Polisario's view, no further special OAU meetings to deal with the Sahara issue were necessary. This decision effectively ruled out further cooperation with the OAU Implementation Committee [Ref. 108].

On 2 August 1982, OAU member nations began to gather in Tripoli, Libya for the purpose of convening the OAU meeting which had stalled at Nairobi in April. However, by 9 August, the OAU heads of government were forced to reschedule the summit due to the failure to form a quorum of 34 member states as stipulated by the OAU Charter. Despite the appeals of 31 member states present at the meeting, no other states had arrived to participate. Libyan leader, Omar Qadhafi, who had hoped to be elected chairman of the OAU, replacing President Daniel Moi of Kenya, was forced to wait until the so-called Tripoli II OAU summit in November, later that year.

This signaled to other African leaders that the OAU as a whole was not necessarily certain that the Libyan leader was the best choice to represent an organization based on the rights of self-determination and non-intervention. Due to Qadhdhafi's backing of rebel forces in Chad as well as those of the Polisario in the Western Sahara, his election could have widened rather than mend the split in the Organization. While this was not one of the expressed reasons for the failure of the summit, it was certainly an underlying one. The principle reason for the failure of the conference was the continued deadlock over the Western Saharan issue; primarily the admission of the SADR as the OAU's 51st member in February 1982. At least one-half of the member states continued to refuse to recognize the SADR as a full member.

Following this boycott of the OAU Summit in Tripoli during August of 1982, Morocco reaffirmed the irrevocable decisions taken by the Nairobi Summit in June 1981 and declared that the admission of the SADR to the OAU was null and void. AS a result, the OAU itself continued to go through the worst crisis in its history, with its members evenly split over the issue of the SADR's admission [Ref. 109].

In November of that same year, the Col. Muamnan al-Qadhdhafi regime in Tripoli tried a second time to convene the 19th OAU Summit. Qadhdhafi had hoped to be seated as the Chairman of the OAU. However, Libyan intervention in Chad which had escalated during the period between the two

attempted summits had created a basic split in the Chadian government. When delegates began the pre-summit meetings in mid-November, talks stalled over the question of Chad representation. Moderate states supported Mr. Habre's delegation while progressives wanted to seat the Libyan-backed "national salvation" government of Goukouni Queddei, which was installed in northern Chad [Ref. 110]. This debate was never solved and the second attempt of convening the OAU Summit in Tripoli failed [Ref. 111].

The OAU's second failure to convene a summit caused many observers to speculate that it was about to self-destruct. Given the divisions that existed; the Western Sahara and Chad, the prospects for an agreement between member states that would allow for a quorum to be reached seemed slim to none. However, by June of 1983, tensions had died down enough for a third attempt at convening an OAU summit. Because of the previous failures at Tripoli, Libya, caused mostly by the unsettled nature of Libyan politics, the third attempt was scheduled to be held in Addis Abba, Ethiopia, the location of the OAU's permanent headquarters.

Initially, the meeting was hosted by chairman Daniel Moi of Kenya. Delegates began arriving on 6 June and immediately the issue of the Western Sahar arose again. Moi, in a statement made at the opening of talks, said that "African leaders will need to act decisively over the Western Sahara issue in order to overcome the stalemate" [Ref. 112]. Other

problems were also pressing on the attempts at convening the summit. Chad, South Africa, and the serious economic problems facing many of the countries, as well as who was to be seated as the new chairman, all presented challenges to the representatives, but none were as pressing as the Western Sahara issue, which still divided the organization in half.

From the sixth through the ninth of June, the delegates met and debated the Western Sahara issue. The key to an agreement, both sides felt, was the withdrawal of the SADR contingent whose earlier presence at the two attempted meetings in Tripoli had instigated the boycotts by Morocco and its allies. Progressive states, who supported seating the SADR contingent in the OAU, now believed the future of the OAU was more important than the Western Saharan issue.

On 9 June 1983 the SADR contingent, led by Foreign Minister Ibrahim Hakin, motivated, it's said, "by a desire to contribute to African unity," agreed to withdraw from the proceedings. This allowed the OAU to convene for the first time in almost two years. In protest, Qadhafi walked out. However, no other state followed him out the door. Qadhafi had lost two political battles by this time. The first was his failure to be seated as the Chairman of the OAU for which he had been lobbying for several years. Several of the African delegations were in fact, "concerned that the Libyan leader, who failed on three separate occasions to preside over the OAU, would seek revenge, particularly concerning

Chad, especially since he must feel betrayed by some progressive countries" [Ref. 113]. A random examination of Foreign Broadcast Information Service reports during the time right after Qadhdhafi's departure from the Addis Abba OAU Summit did reveal increased Libyan activity in Chad. Secondly, Qadhdhafi had supported a losing cause in regard to his support of the Polisario in Western Sahara. His failure to force Morocco and other states to accept the SADR as a full OAU member once again highlighted his earlier failures at Tripoli. Qadhdhafi by this time had learned a lesson that many politicians have been forced to absorb, that being that one must sometimes sacrifice short term personal goals, at least vocally, in order to achieve even greater objectives.

The 19th OAU Summit finally got under way on 9 June 1983, electing a previously close ally to Libya, President Mengistu Halle Mariam, Chairman. Recent indications are, however, that this once close relationship is now strained. It may be that Qadhdhafi is now envious of Mengistu and his ability to capture the position he tried so hard, but unsuccessfully to obtain. By 12 June 1983, delegates had once again adopted a plan to end the Western Sahara dispute [Ref. 114].

The plan, much like the one drawn up by Morocco previously, called for the arrangement of a ceasefire and a referendum with six months to vote on the issue. The resolution also envisaged direct negotiations between Morocco and

the Polisario, and the creation of a peacekeeping force formed by the United Nations in conjunction with the OAU. The resolution, however, made no reference to Polisario's demand for a withdrawal of Moroccan troops before the referendum was to be held. This omission and the absence of any mention of the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic, were seen as victories for Morocco and defeat for the Polisario and their staunchest supporter, Libya [Ref. 115].

Moroccan officials stated that Rabat welcomed the resolution in broad terms and would work toward the proposed referendum in the former Spanish territory [Ref. 116]. By August 1983, Morocco had set an implied timetable for the OAU sponsored referendum on the territory's future by postponing parliamentary elections until after the poll was taken [Ref. 117]. In a 20 August televised speech, King Hassan reaffirmed Morocco's commitment to holding the referendum, and claimed that "anyone seeking to obstruct it was afraid of the results" [Ref. 118].

Moroccan confidence in achieving its goals in the Western Sahara was further bolstered in mid-August when Qadhafi said that the solution to the Western Sahara problem should be reached "within the Moroccan framework" [Ref. 119]. This statement followed a visit Qadhafi made to Morocco a week earlier and it marked a fundamental change in Libya's attitude to the Saharan question. Currently, it appears that Morocco is strengthening its hold on the Sahara;

the referendum has yet to be held; and the Polisario continues its struggle against Moroccan presence.

Damis and others believe that a controlled referendum may actually be implemented as a means of settling the issue. Hassan has made it very clear in his public statements that he views the referendum as the only solution to the problem, but he refuses to withdraw his army and administration from the Western Sahara prior to any referendum and has ruled out discussion with the Polisario Front on any topic. His current plan to go ahead with the planned resettlement of the Dakhla region is firm evidence of his continued interest in the region [Ref. 120].

In light of what British journalist, Tony Hodges describes as "The Endless War" [Ref. 121], the Western Sahara Campaign continues, but not without certain international interest in the struggle.

3. The Strengthening of Moroccan-U.S. Ties: Its Implications to the Monarchy

Morocco's decision to press its longstanding claim to the Western Sahara in 1975 has complicated not only its relations with neighboring African states but those with its major Western ally, the United States, as well. From 1976 to 1978, Morocco's use of American-supplied arms in the Western Saharan War brought official U.S. protests and a partial arms embargo. This injected much tension into bilateral relations, aggravated by congressional criticism of Morocco. However, when the Polisario launched attacks into Morocco in

1979, President Carter reviewed U.S. arms sales policy and a decision was reached to permit the sale of arms that would later be used in the Western Sahara.

Under the Reagan administration, however, Hassan has achieved the highest level of support and recognition by the U.S. of Morocco to date. In May of 1980, Hassan flew to Washington for talks with Reagan on May 18-21. He was met with warmth and appreciation and Reagan's determination to stand by traditional U.S. allies in the Third World--to lessen the risks that the more endangered among them, like King Hassan II, end up suffering the fate of the Shah of Iran or Anastasio Somoza. On 5 November of 1980, a new ambassador to Morocco, Joseph Verner Reed, was appointed. After handing his credentials to Hassan he promised that "my country will do its best to be helpful in every way possible. Count on us. We are with you" [Ref. 122].

So far, the promises have been kept as evidenced by U.S. military sales credits to Morocco rising each year since the Reagan administration assumed office. In 1980, credits to Morocco were \$25.9 million. In 1981 they were \$34.4 and by 1982 they had risen to \$35.6 million. The proposed 1983 credits almost doubled the 1982 commitments to over \$100 million. However, this proposal has already run aground due in part to U.S. domestic problems themselves, but more because, according to Representative Howard Wolpe, the head of the House Subcommittee on African Affairs, of its chances

for "harming U.S. economic interests in Algeria, causing U.S. diplomatic embarrassment in Africa, endangering the OAU, and finally, increasing the opportunities for the USSR and Cuba to assist Polisario in a widening conflict." Furthermore, the Committee warned, "by encouraging Morocco to sustain indefinitely an unwinnable war (in which the U.S. has great experience), U.S. policy may well be contributing to the possibility for sudden radical change in Morocco itself" [Ref. 123].

The proposed credit was reduced to \$50 million of FMS credits in FY 1983 due to these arguments. Still, they allowed for Hassan to purchase the most up-to-date missiles and weapons Western technology can produce and he remains, due in part to their availability, the force to be reconed with in the Western Sahara.

U.S. interest in Morocco is not without a strong strategic rationale. Morocco lies astride the entrance to the Mediterranean, one of the most strategic waterways in the world. It provides port facilities to the U.S. Sixth Fleet. It also provides transit facilities to the U.S. Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (RDJTF) at Moroccan air bases, aimed at possible problems in the Middle East. An agreement on providing \$250 million in upgrading of these air bases was also made between the U.S. and Morocco. This amount was in addition to the FMS credits.

Strategic reasons are not the only ones considered by Washington in its decision to support Morocco. Hassan

is viewed as an Arab moderate. He helped initiate the Egyptian-Israeli contact that culminated in Camp David, and only reluctantly broke relations with Cairo. Now, after the return of the Sinai to Egypt, he is trying to bring President Mubarak's regime out of the basement of the Arab world. Additionally, Hassan has been a representative of Western interests in Africa, as shown by his dispatch of Moroccan troops to Zaire in 1977 and 1978 to help quell revolts in the Shaba province.

For these reasons, the Reagan administration has been responsive to Hassan's requests for military aid. The U.S. may very well fear that Hassan could not survive politically the erosion of his prestige and following that, would result in a major reversal in the Saharan dispute. It has therefore redoubled U.S. military support to Morocco and backed Hassan's rejection of bilateral talks with the Polisario, while formally declaring its backing for the OAU's efforts to bring about a ceasefire and a referendum.

This currently is an acceptable situation for Hassan. Growing U.S. support in the form of military credits has enabled him to divert much needed domestic monies to the job of restabilizing the failing Moroccan economy by spending U.S. money in the form of advanced military armaments to fight a still very popular war. As long as Moroccans are employed and have a full stomach, then thoughts of a "greater Morocco" are acceptable. Through U.S. support in conjunction

with other assistance given by the French and Saudi Arabia, the Hassan regime is still a long way from a total collapse. For the time being, the prolongment of the Western Saharan War will ensure continued military and economic aid to Hassan while continuing the buildup of popular support for the monarchy. Future excess borrowing, overspending of loans, and miscalculation of foreign and domestic support for his Saharan efforts could well spell the end of the dynasty. Fortunately, for himself and Morocco, Hassan is well aware of this and has reprogrammed his initiatives to further limit the future possibility of this occurrence.

V. CONCLUSION

Due to the nature of the current political situation in Morocco as it has been described in this essay, it is the author's conclusion that the prospects for significant future change in the system is slim. The Moroccan monarchy has established itself as the dominant political force in the country and will continue to determine the dominant goals of the society.

This statement is made in lieu of certain situations that have seen a cyclical reoccurrence in regard to the monarchy, or the idea of a monarchy, throughout Moroccan history. In pre-dynastic days monarchs emerged in the form of Berber Chieftans who ultimately rose up to repulse wave after wave of countless invaders. The coming of the Arabs and Islam at first lessened the importance of the monarch. But as time elapsed, the monarch emerged in the Muslim tradition of one-man rule, and thereafter ruled by both secular and religious authority. It was his right to rule because Islam pronounced it.

The institution of the monarchy continued to grow as did the elite membership of its following; the makhzan. By 1912, the monarchy had achieved a relatively autonomous status owing tribute to no one and facing only limited opposition to its rule from traditionally tempermental, and imazighan

natured Berber natives. The coming of the French and colonization of the country saw the monarchy turn once again to the role of ruled rather than ruler. The period 1912 to 1953 marked a low point in the status of the monarchy.

As the imazigan nature of the Berber took hold, as did the teachings of Islam, a true nationalist movement sprang up in Morocco with the only viable symbol available, the monarch, as its leader. After decolonization in 1956, the monarch began once again to establish his supreme right to rule. Due in part to the prestige that it had achieved as the symbol of the nationalist movement, the monarchy regained the status it had lost during the protectorate period and rose above all the modern political forces that had developed during the nationalist movement.

Since 1956 the monarchy has continued to survive by careful balancing, juggling and manipulating political parties, members of the parliament, and state interests; playing one group off the other, all the while appearing to be the ally of all. The effects of social and economic modernization have certainly affected the stability of the monarchy. However, unlike other monarchies who were undermined by modernization, the Moroccan monarchy has sought to accommodate and manage rather than resist modernization. In short, Hassan has accepted modernization as a reality and adjusted accordingly.

The monarchy today finds itself in economic trouble and involved in a border dispute that is not only taxing Morocco

domestically but diplomatically as well. Once again, however, the monarchy has risen to the challenge and readdressed itself to both problems and for the time being, maintained its dominant status. Speculation on its impending demise is abundant, and certain aspects of its social, political and economic situation would tend to support this speculation, but the fact remains that over the centuries, the Moroccan monarchy has risen time and again against seemingly impossible odds and came out the winner.

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