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STUDENT REPORT

FREDERICK THE GREAT:
Strategy in the Early Years

Major Kenneth A. Cornelius 84-0585

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

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

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Uses the Air Command and Staff College strategy process model to analyze the actions of Frederick the Great during the Silesian Wars (1740-1745). Includes Frederick's use of the Principles of War. Discusses the historical development of Eighteenth Century Europe, and Prussia, in order to view Frederick's policies in the context of his times. Reviews his biography up to his assumption of the Prussian throne in 1740 in a search for insights to his subsequent actions.

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PREFACE

King Frederick II of Prussia, who became known to the world as Frederick the Great, is one of history's greatest warriors. Almost single-handedly he thrust Prussia into the major-power league of continental European states. He did so by taking actions at the outset of his reign which cast Europe into a generation of bloody strife. His eventual legacy was a united, Prussianized and aggressive Germany which waged World War I. Hitler's Germany also glorified Frederick's military conquests. The Nazi's even used the reconquest of former Prussian land, which had been given to Poland by the Versailles Peace Conference, as one of their excuses for beginning World War II in 1939. The state of Prussia, which Frederick had made great, was formally abolished by the Allies in 1947. This paper analyzes the strategies of the man who led Prussia onto the world stage a little more than two centuries before it ended in this ignominy.

The first two chapters place Frederick, and the Prussia which he inherited, in the context of the times. The historical trends and forces which had formed Europe and Prussia are developed in Chapter One while Chapter Two emphasizes the young Frederick's personal development and personality. The writer firmly believes that to adequately understand the actions of a leader it is first necessary to appreciate the leader's personal makeup and the broad political environment in which he acts. These chapters address this requirement.

The succeeding two chapters sequentially consider Frederick's first two wars, the First and Second Silesian Wars. These conflicts were wars of conquest which he waged against Austria for one of the richest provinces in Eastern Europe. One thing

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about the history revealed in these chapters is the striking realization that although we live in a completely different world today, it is not necessarily a more complicated world. The complex relationships and competing political and military goals with which Frederick dealt were extraordinary. There is truly very little new under the sun.

The last chapter analyzes Frederick's policies by imposing the framework of the Air Command and Staff College's strategy process model. This discussion considers all parts of the strategy process except battlefield strategy, i.e., tactics. Doctrine, the principles of strategy and Frederick's use and views on some of the Principles of War are also included. A study of Frederick holds many lessons for modern military leaders. It is left for the reader to determine how well this chapter conveys some of them.

Frederick the Great was a towering figure on the stage of Eighteenth Century Europe. This complex and talented man was the cause of practically endless effects, some of which have reached into the modern era. To study and attempt to explain such a giant is a precarious task at best. But if the risks are great, so too are the potential rewards. For as someone has said, the past is simply the present unrolled for understanding. If this paper adds understanding to the great and continuing potential for war, and its conduct, it will have been successful.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Major Cornelius, a Lt. Colonel selectee, enlisted in the Air Force in 1964 and was commissioned in 1970. He holds a Bachelor of Science in Civil Engineering from Oklahoma State University and a Master of Science in Environmental Engineering from the University of Colorado. He completed Squadron Officers' School and the Air Command and Staff College by correspondence. He has served in a variety of base level and staff civil engineering positions. Significant assignments include duty as commander of a heavy repair and construction (RED HORSE) detachment, assistant professor of civil engineering at the Air Force Academy and Commander of a base civil engineering squadron.

Major Cornelius is a member of several professional societies and is a registered professional engineer. He has written two research reports on solar energy which were published by the Air Force Engineering and Services Center and has also co-authored a paper which was published by the American Society of Mechanical Engineers.

He and his wife Judy have two children, Laura and Douglas. They are looking forward to their next assignment in Washington, D.C.



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Chapter One

PRUSSIA: DEVELOPMENT AND SETTING

INTRODUCTION

A story of Frederick the Great and his times, in a very real sense, is a story of the whole of Europe. One can not begin to understand Frederick's policies apart from an understanding of the larger European context in which they were applied. This chapter, therefore, traces European and Prussian history by discussing both religious and political developments. It concludes with a description of the complex state of affairs in which Prussia found itself during the early Eighteenth Century.

RELIGIOUS DEVELOPMENT

Religious forces and influences were a major determinant in the course of European events prior to Frederick's arrival on the stage. For nearly a thousand years after the fall of the Roman Empire, the Church of Rome held a supreme position in the temporal, as well as the spiritual, affairs of Europe. The Church, during this time, was the center of culture and later, was a framework that either united, or separated, various political entities in Europe. Central to this framework was the Papacy.

The Pope's power reached its zenith at the beginning of the Thirteenth Century; all European rulers accepted the Papacy as a sovereign during this period. As an example of their power, popes had been crowning, i.e., legitimizing, the Holy Roman Emperor since the end of the Tenth Century. The Church's power began to decline, however, in the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Centuries due to internal abuses, and the beginnings of nationalism. By the late Fifteenth and early Sixteenth Century the Holy

Roman Emperors (who had been the leading Christian princes during the Middle Ages) were quarrelling with Rome. The Church was thus threatened by temporal rulers and soon found itself spiritually attacked as well.

In 1517, Martin Luther, a priest in the German Duchy of Saxony, gave a formal theological foundation to the forces which were challenging the Church. The ensuing religious strife in Germany led to unsuccessful settlement attempts (e.g., the Treaty of Augsburg in 1555 which allowed only Lutheranism in principalities where rulers wished it) and eventually led to the Thirty Years War in 1618.

The Thirty Years War was fundamentally caused by hostility between German Protestants and Catholics. The Catholic Holy Roman Emperor proceeded to quell Protestant rebellions in Northern Germany but Protestant Denmark became fearful of the Emperor's intentions and opposed him in the German Duchy of Saxony in 1625. Denmark was finally defeated and forced to withdraw in 1629. Gustavus Adolphus of Sweden, a devout Protestant, also began to fear the power of the Holy Roman Emperor, and entered Germany with his army in 1630. Although he won many battles, he was killed and his forces withdrew in 1634. The religious war had become politicized.

Politicization of the war intensified in 1635 when Cardinal Richilieu, the power behind the throne of France, a Catholic of course, surprisingly decided to aid the German Protestants in an effort to curb the Holy Roman Emperor's growing power. The war thus became a struggle between the Catholic Bourbons of France and the Catholic Hapsburgs of the Holy Roman Empire. The French, with German and Swedish help, won many victories in a long and vicious struggle which lasted for the next thirteen years.

In 1648 the Treaty of Westphalia finally ended the war which had ravaged the Germanies. France obtained Alsace-Lorraine from the Holy Roman Empire and other Protestant sects (e.g., Calvinists) were put on an equal footing with Lutherans and

Catholics throughout the Empire. Other equally significant results of the war were as follows:

(1) It represented France's first intrusion into German politics; it would not be the last.

(2) It clearly established France as the dominant power in the Seventeenth Century.

(3) It marked the beginning of the "modern" nation-state system in Europe.

(4) It weakened the power of the Holy Roman Empire in Germany. In reality, many member princes became sovereign -- the Holy Roman Emperor was still the "Emperor" but he retained sovereignty only over his personal domain. Frederick himself said that the Treaty of Westphalia ". . . became the basis of Germanic liberties and restraint to the ambitions of the Empire" (8:152).

(5) It left the German Duchies in terrible condition. One half of the people were killed and two thirds of the property destroyed. The area became a patchwork of weakened principalities, some Protestant, some Catholic. In today's terminology it would no doubt be called a "regional power vacuum".

(6) The Duchy of Prussia gained territory. The war had planted the seeds for the future aggrandizement of this nation-state. Its political history had been long but relatively undistinguished up to this point.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT

The political history of Prussia was inextricably linked to the development of nations and empires in Europe. It was particularly related to the Holy Roman Empire. As the Roman Empire declined, various tribes from Germania (which had never been conquered by Rome) swept into Western Europe. The Franks became the dominant tribal power with their base in Gaul (France). The great Frankish king Charlemagne expanded his empire eastward to the Elbe and Pope Leo crowned him as the "Emperor

of Rome" in 800 AD. Charlemagne's personal dominance was the glue that held this tremendous empire together.

Charlemagne's death led to a tri-partition of the empire. The western 'Frankland' eventually grew into the kingdom of France. The eastern 'Frankland' was situated in the German-speaking territory of Europe. The central kingdom was a very narrow strip of land which ran from the North Sea to northern Italy. The partition agreement of Charlemagne's grandsons made up in title for what this middle kingdom lacked in territory by bestowing the title of emperor upon its king. The unnatural geographic character of this middle kingdom virtually insured its demise; the eastern and mostly German kingdom was destined to have the most interesting future.

The Frankish royalty of this eastern kingdom died out in the Tenth Century and the power of several German Duchies became dominant (Bavaria, Saxony, etc.). The princes of these duchies then began to "elect" a "king" of the duchies -- generally a Saxon prince. One of these kings, Otto of Saxony, swept south into Hungary and west into the middle kingdom. Since the control of this kingdom brought the title of emperor with it, he assumed this role. The Pope officially crowned him emperor in 962; this was the beginning of the Holy Roman Empire.

The Holy Roman Empire gradually declined, along with the Papacy, during the next three centuries. By the end of the Thirteenth Century, the Empire had lost many of its Italian and German territories. In the Fourteenth Century, German princes began "electing" the Emperor. Known as electors, their number varied from seven to nine. In 1438 an Austrian Hapsburg was elected Emperor. The Hapsburgs maintained control of the Empire until their defeat by Napoleon in 1806. During the Hapsburg Reign, another important family emerged from the hodgepodge of northern German principalities.

The relatively minor principality of Brandenburg was ruled by the Hohenzollern family beginning in 1415. Although not a powerful family, they did serve as one of the

electors of the Emperor. At the beginning of the Thirty Years War, the Holy Roman Emperor allowed the Duchy of Prussia to be added to the Hohenzollern's holdings. The Hohenzollern's were Protestant and during the later, political phase of the conflict they played off the major Catholic antagonists (i.e. France and the Empire) against each other. Thus began the Prussian habit of gaining power by manipulating historical enemies. The Westphalia peace settlement granted several parcels of land to the Hohenzollerns. Although Prussia was now larger and had dabbled in power politics with much larger states, it was physically wrecked by the war. Prussia was desperately in need of a strong ruler.

Frederick William, who came to be known as the Great Elector, came to power in Prussia in 1640. He was a strong ruler who consolidated his internal power, created a well-trained standing army and governed, by the standards of the times, in an enlightened manner. At the end of his forty-eight year reign in 1688 Prussia was the strongest northern German state. Next to Austria it was the strongest in all of Germany (5:12). He also began the practice of accepting French Protestants (Huegenots) who were fleeing the persecution of the Catholic Bourbon royalty. This migration created a continuing French influence in Prussia.

The Great Elector's son, Frederick I, was enamoured of all things French. This extreme admiration however, did not translate into policies favorable to France; he remained loyal to the Holy Roman Empire. For example, he sent Prussian troops to assist the Empire in the War of Spanish Succession; in return he was granted the title of "King of Prussia " by the Emperor in 1701. Prussia was now a kingdom, not a mere duchy. Her growing power, primarily military, was thus recognized. It was also significant that Frederick I was the first king in Christendom not to be crowned by ecclesiastic hands (5:12). Thus the power of the clergy was also declining in Prussia. Perhaps most significant of all, however, was that the title of "king" stimulated the

ambitions of dynasty and created an increased hunger for Hohenzollern power. Frederick the Great wrote that his grandfather (Frederick I) ". . . seemed to say, 'I have procured you a title. . . I have laid the foundation of greatness, it is up to you to complete the work'" (5:20).

THE STATE OF AFFAIRS

At the beginning of the Eighteenth Century, France was the dominant power in Europe. France was still concerned, however, with the power of the Holy Roman Empire even though it was apparent that the Empire had declined. These two powers, though both Catholic, were historical enemies and possessed lingering bitterness toward one another as a result of the Thirty Years War. The gradual rise of Prussian power had been recognized and legitimized by the Holy Roman Emperor's grant of kingship to the Hohenzollerns. Prussia was still part of the Empire though, and served as a powerful elector of the Emperor. The primary basis of its power was the army. Prussia's militarization was already becoming noticed; a contemporary observer said that Prussia was not a state which possessed an army but an army which possessed a state (5:97). It was this army that made Prussia the strongest state in northern Germany. As the Protestant champion in Europe, it was able to absorb persecuted Protestant sects from other states. This contributed to both the Prussian image and economy since the immigrants were mostly skilled artisans. Prussia was not, however, without weaknesses.

The Prussian weaknesses were primarily geographic. The Hohenzollern dominions were badly separated. The old Brandenburg heartland in the center was near another powerful, but Catholic, and therefore potentially antagonistic state — Saxony. East Prussia, along the Baltic coast, was vulnerable to the growing power of Russia from the east. The western lands (Westphalia) were also detached and isolated and could not be defended from a strong France. All of these lands were essentially sandy and

forested; their industrial and agricultural productivity potential was thus limited. All of the territories had been ravaged during the Thirty Years War. Although Prussia had recovered faster than other states due to the determined leadership of the Great Elector, it was still backward and unenlightened as compared with France. The Thirty Years War, whose effects were still present, had also led to a Prussia which had grown tired and angry of foreign armies, mostly Catholic, fighting back and forth across its territories. And so it seemed that military power was the only way to forestall such events. Its weaknesses had thus led to its primary strength.

In summary, Prussia was on the upswing but possessed weaknesses. The possibilities of statecraft, or of military action, to correct these weaknesses were definitely present in the early Eighteenth Century. The times and trends were right -- it was only necessary for strong and purposeful leadership to take command of events.

Chapter Two

FREDERICK THE GREAT - INFLUENCES AND EARLY DEVELOPMENT

INTRODUCTION

Prussia was to be blessed with strong and effective leadership for nearly all of the Eighteenth Century. Frederick the Great's reign accounted for 46 years of the century (12:411). He followed in the footsteps of his father, King Frederick William I, who also added great strength to the kingdom during his rule (1713-1740). This chapter sketches the personal development of the young crown prince up to his accession to power in 1740. It also briefly outlines the personality and policies of Frederick William I in order to permit his son's strategy and objectives to be subsequently viewed and analyzed in the continuum of the times.

THE POLICIES OF THE FATHER

King Frederick William I inherited the crown in 1713 upon the death of his father, Frederick I. Frederick I had done little for Prussia other than to obtain the title of king from the Austrian Hapsburgs. His idolatry of French court manners and his penchant for squandering public funds in order to practice them had weakened Prussia considerably over the course of his relatively short reign. Frederick William I was cut from different cloth and he proved to be a strong and beneficial ruler. His major accomplishment was to pull Prussia out of the effects of the Thirty Years War which had ended nearly a full century earlier (3:438). This accomplishment was a natural result of his attention to domestic affairs.

Frederick William's domestic improvements were many. He developed the

Prussian primary and secondary school system into the finest in Europe (3:438). He began judicial reform and developed an efficient and highly disciplined bureaucracy; he was a great economizer which resulted in an overflowing treasury; in short, he was an energetic ruler who knew how to obtain maximum efforts from an obedient people (8:8). Even though domestically oriented, he was the ruler of a kingdom growing in power and thus sometimes found himself unwillingly drawn into foreign affairs.

Frederick William's major contribution to Prussia's growing capability in foreign relations was his development of the army. His overriding goal was to create a disciplined, standing army of 100,000 men. At the time of his death the Prussian Army was the fourth largest in all of Europe (behind France, Russia and Austria, in that order) and was first in efficiency and discipline. Frederick William I was thus in large measure the real father of the army and of the militarization of Prussian society (5:61).

Conscription was necessary to maintain a large army in a nation of only three million people; it was applied to commoners and aristocracy alike. Every physically fit person of nobility had to serve as an officer and undergo special training. Military officers came to be honored as a ruling class and began to look down on all other classes (clergy, teachers, etc) as inferiors. The officers constantly trained the soldiers as no army before, or perhaps since, had been (3:439). The real power of an army however, lies not only in its existence, but in the perceived willingness of a state to use it.

Even though Prussia possessed strong forces, her European neighbors generally assumed that Frederick William would not use them independently for his own gain. It was said that he loved his soldiers so much that he could not ever bring himself to risk them in war (8:9). His predisposition towards domestic affairs reinforced this belief. In general, his foreign views revolved around loyalty to the Holy Roman Empire.

Frederick William I believed that the Emperor was necessary to present a

common front against the English and French. He also believed that no foreign benefit could be obtained without the acquiescence of the Emperor (8:9). There did come a time, however, when he departed from this general policy -- it is instructive to review this occurrence.

In 1725 the King of Spain (Phillip V) and the Holy Roman Emperor (Charles VI) concluded an arrangement that provided for mutual defense in case of war. This development caused great consternation in France and England since Spain and the Empire had been enemies for some time and had only been at peace for twelve years. (The War of the Spanish Succession had ended in 1713). France and England thereupon formed an unheard of, and therefore uneasy, alliance against the Empire and Spain. Recognizing Prussia's power, the King of England (George II) asked his brother-in-law Frederick William to join with them in this arrangement. Believing that the old balance of power was in danger and also distressed at the plight of Protestantism in various parts of the Empire, Frederick William signed the Tripartite Treaty with France and England in October 1725 (5:196). The Austrian Hapsburgs moved hastily to undo this alliance. One year later they signed an agreement with Prussia in which she renounced the Tripartite Treaty in return for the promise of future territories near the western Hohenzollern holdings. As it turned out, the Empire never lived up to these promises. Frederick William grew angry and frustrated at the Empire's treatment of him. He expressed his emotions one day when, while pointing towards the young crown prince, he exclaimed, "Here is one who will avenge me!" (5:209). The son was to fulfill the father's prediction.

In conclusion, Frederick William I added greatly to Prussian power. Although not active in foreign affairs, he also demonstrated the possibilities of statecraft to add even more power to the state. It can truly be said that he was a great king; it can also be said that his policies were worthy of greater admiration than his personality.

THE PERSONALITY OF THE FATHER

Frederick William I was a man who possessed many ideosyncrasies. There is little question that his strong willed and domineering personality affected his son much more than could have a typical father. He was extremely ill-tempered and was prone to readily display his anger openly, even to the point of physically abusing members of his own family while holding court (3:441).

Frederick William I detested most things French (3:440). He also hated higher learning, which he considered to be a waste of valuable time that could more profitably be spent on practical matters (5:28). He loved everything military; the only passion in his life which overcame his frugality was the collection of tall soldiers (5:48). His "giant grenadiers" were obtained from all over the continent by any way he could get them, including outright impressment (3:439). This strange habit, combined with his personal crudeness, made him the laughing stock of all European royalty, and resulted in Prussia not being accorded the respect it deserved (5:84). This would anger Frederick William's son greatly when he matured (8:10).

It was previously intimated that Frederick William I was a devoted ruler and this was undoubtedly true (3:437). He had no taste for war and few sovereigns were less aggressive or more peaceful (8:9). He was a sincere and devoted Protestant Calvinist who, although believing sincerely, seemed unable to fully practice his beliefs (5:34). Consideration need only be given to his public displays of drunkenness and anger to appreciate his inability to practice his precepts. Though a staunch Protestant, he was, nevertheless, tolerant of Catholics in his kingdom in an age rife with religious intolerance. He was a devoted father of fourteen children (ten survived infancy) who took his child-rearing responsibilities seriously (5:214). One of these children was to become great and would change the face of Europe.

FREDERICK THE GREAT - EARLY YEARS

Frederick the Great, the eldest surviving son, was born January 24, 1712, one year before his father was crowned king. His father insured that he was subjected to a constant and sometimes harsh discipline from a very early age. The King chose his tutors carefully and specified precise rules for his education. The father's objectives for young Frederick's training were threefold: (1) to make him a good Christian but to insure he received a ". . . distaste for Catholicism", (2) to make him a good administrator, and (3) to make him a good soldier (5:217,218). The King failed in his first objective for Frederick wrote in his later years that ". . . all religions. . . rest on a system of fable more or less absurd" (8:294). He succeeded eminently however, in the other objectives -- particularly in the last. It is certain that his father would not have predicted this success during Frederick's youth.

Frederick's training was turned over to two senior army officers at age five; it was at this time that he also began to wear a uniform (5:217). The child was intelligent, slightly built and sensitive. Despite all efforts, he came under the influence of his mother and older sister and by adolescence was quite effeminant. His interests turned to the arts, language and poetry of France; his dislike of the mother tongue became so ingrained that even in adulthood he couldn't understand a scientific or philosophical treatise written in German (5:221). This behavior deeply angered his father.

The King did his best to rid his son of these tendencies; he forced him to ride, hunt, to fire a cannon and a myriad of other masculine pursuits (3:440). Frederick, though he complied with these orders, continued to resist. He curled his hair as the French did rather than obtaining a Prussian soldier's haircut; he learned to play the flute; he wrote poems in French and practiced other similar habits (3:441). The King's anger became so violent that it was reported he nearly killed Frederick in a fit of rage

(3:441). This event helped convince the eighteen year old prince to try to escape from Prussia and his domineering father.

In 1730, Frederick plotted his flight with two other young officers in the army with whom he had developed a strong friendship (12:28). One of these officers made good his escape but Frederick and a Captain von Katte were captured and court-martialled for desertion. Both were condemned to death. The accomplice was beheaded while Frederick was forced to watch. After a short period during which he suffered recurring fainting spells, he professed contrition to the prison chaplain so convincingly that the King pardoned him. He also took an oath of obedience to the King. From this moment on, Frederick began a slow return to his father's good graces (5:232).

The King soon gave Frederick his own regiment which was stationed away from the capitol (5:235). It was here that he began to enjoy command and during formal drills his regiment performed so well that it received grudging praise from his father (5:238). There was considerable speculation that the prince was feigning and that he had begun to treat everyone with suspicion and deception. The Austrian representative to the Hohenzollerns wrote that Frederick's chief defect ". . . is falseness. . . one can only trust him after the greatest precautions" (5:233). There is little doubt that these developmental years and family events could have failed to harden his character (3:442). Regardless of his true feelings, Frederick continued to take a more responsible approach toward his future duties (5:234).

In recognition of Frederick's new seriousness, the King allowed him his own court at Rheinsburg (again separated from his father's capitol) in 1736 (12:48). Here he studied science and philosophy, wrote poetry, became an accomplished musician and gathered the leading personalities of his times around him in conversation (3:442). He still practiced the military arts constantly in order to satisfy his father but it seems

probable that he truly came to enjoy this duty (12:43). It was also here that he began his lifelong correspondence with the leading writer and thinker in Europe -- Voltaire (3:442). The volume of his writing was prodigious and was not confined to letters (3:446).

Frederick worked feverishly on a treatise which attempted to refute Machiavelli's political precepts of naked power and "might makes right" philosophy. Typical sentiments from this apparently idealistic work was his professed belief that a sovereign was not the master of his people but rather their first servant and that a ruler should never aggrandize himself through the misery and destruction of other men. Listen to the young Frederick's words at this period in his life:

> I hope that Prussia will. . . cause the Protestant religion to flourish in Europe and . . . that it may be the resource of the afflicted. . . the friend of the poor, the enemy of the unjust (8:284).
>
> The passions of kings are far worse than flood, pestilence, and fire, for their consequences are more lasting (8:287).
>
> Do not be wicked with the wicked, then, but be virtuous and intrepid with them. You will make your people virtuous like yourself, your neighbors will imitate you, and the wicked will tremble (8:289).

In view of his activities and words during his years at Rheinsburg, it is little wonder that Frederick developed a reputation as a cultured, intellectual man who would become a true philosopher-king (3:446). The world had not long to wait, for his father, ill and worn out at fifty-one, died on May 31, 1740 (3:447). Young Frederick, aged twenty-eight, was now king (5:176).

Chapter Three

FREDERICK THE KING AND THE FIRST SILESIAN WAR

THE REIGN BEGINS

Frederick began his reign joyfully and his initial actions lived up to Europe's expectations. He was intoxicated with his power and felt that the days were ". . . twenty-four hours too short" (7:177). In the first month he issued edicts which abolished torture from judicial proceedings, opened granaries to prevent an expected rise in bread prices due to a bad growing season, declared that every Prussian was free to choose his own way to salvation and took a myriad of other actions which delighted Europe's philosophers (3:445,446). He toured his entire Kingdom and refused to accept any special treatment or ceremonial fetes (7:180). This fairy tale beginning lasted until the unexpected death of the Holy Roman Emperor, Charles VI, on October 20, 1740 (7:191).

FOREIGN ADVENTURES BEGIN

Background

Frederick was ill when he received the news of the Emperor's death on the twenty-sixth. He immediately sent for his first minister, von Podewils, and his senior general, Marshall von Schwerin (7:192). He wrote to Voltaire that the emperor's ". . . death upsets my peaceful notions. . . the old political system is in the melting pot. . . . I am going to cure my fever for I need my body to take advantage of these circumstances" (10:89). The young king did will himself to health and on the same day wrote another letter to a friend which said that it was now ". . . only a question of

executing designs i have long had in mind" (8:4).

These ominous pronouncements were the result of Emperor Charles not leaving any male heirs to his throne. (It was against law and custom for daughters to succeed to a throne.) The Emperor had foreseen this possibility years earlier and had devoted much of his reign in attempting to convince European royalty to recognize the succession of his eldest daughter, Maria Theresa, to the emperorship (7:193). This plan came to be known as the Pragmatic Sanction.

The Pragmatic Sanction

Emperor Charles was generally successful in his efforts to obtain ratification for the accession of his daughter. The kings of France, England and other major powers approved and all of the German Electors, except Bavaria, also sanctioned the plan.

Internal Austrian succession rules called for Archduchess Maria Theresa to become Queen of Hungary. If the electors lived up to their previous commitments she would also become Holy Roman Empress and her husband Francis of Lorraine (a Frenchman), the Grand Duke of Tuscany, would become the Emperor. The Pragmatic Sanction would have thus led to a supreme irony -- a French, Catholic, Bourbon ruling the only continental power which had ever rivaled France. The Archduchess, a very inexperienced young lady of twenty-three years, was thought to be unequal to the task of defending Austrian and Imperial interests, particularly since she had such a suspect husband and the situation was so critical (10:90,91; 1:159).

The Austrian senior ministers saw the empire severely threatened by the Turks in the south, growing dissension among the Hungarian nobles, rising sovereignty in the north German states and a powerful, antagonistic France. The empire was racked by provincialism as never before and its military had been weakened by fighting the Turks. In short, these ministers and the rest of Europe, felt that Maria Theresa would contribute to a continuing decline in continental stability.

War Clouds Gather

Maria Theresa was a strong-willed and intelligent woman however, and she soon won over her domestic doubters. Though the Pragmatic Sanction was not backed by great Austrian strength it looked as though the German Electors would still ratify it. She feared no negative reaction whatever from the new Prussian king. In her eyes, Frederick owed his life to her father (Emperor Charles had interceded with Frederick William when Frederick was under the death sentence as a result of his escape attempt). Frederick had also maintained a friendly correspondence with her husband, the Grand Duke Francis. The young couple felt that Frederick was ". . . like a father to us" (10:91).

More unsettling news for the continent was not long in coming for Empress Anne, the Tsarina of Russia, died only eight days after Emperor Charles (10:92). Frederick, in a prescient memo written just before the ill Empress died, had foretold that the Russians would become so preoccupied with domestic problems that they would have no time for foreign affairs (8:5). Empress Anne had been a strong friend of the Hapsburg Austrians and probably would have aided them in any struggle with one of their German principalities. Frederick rejoiced at her death; history would prove the accuracy of his prediction (10:92).

Frederick then began a flurry of wild activity in Berlin (10:92). He spent nearly all his time with his generals, troops from all over Prussia were recalled, and arms and provisions were dispatched to the south. These actions made Europe's crowned heads anxious and they dispatched ministers to observe and inquire. The minister sent by George II, the King of England (and Frederick's uncle), frankly asked the reasons behind the evident war preparations. Frederick replied by stating that "I do not ask what you intend to do with your navy" (10:93). When the English mentioned the possibility of assistance in eventually obtaining two Austrian duchies which Prussia had

long claimed, Julich and Berg, (located near the North Sea), Frederick candidly told them that he wasn't interested in them ". . . but [rather] on the other frontier where the maritime powers would not interfere" (10:93).

Maria Theresa, though not worried, sent a representative to investigate. He came to the conclusion that Frederick intended to seize Silesia, Austria's northernmost, and one of her wealthiest possessions. He reported as much to his disbelieving queen and also warned Frederick that although Prussian troops looked splendid that Austria's were battle-hardened (10:92).

Frederick's Motivations

Despite Austrian warnings and the concern demonstrated by nearly all the major powers, Frederick continued his military buildup. His motivations for looking towards Silesia were related both to his analysis of Prussian state interests and to his personal desire for recognition and glory. While at Rheinsburg, before his father's death, Frederick had studied much -- including statecraft and the map of Europe. As early as October 28 Frederick had told Podewils and Schwerin that he intended to take advantage of a weakened and confused Austria by seizing Silesia (7:193). Durant (3:450,451) has presented Frederick's political reasoning well: He possessed a powerful army and an overflowing treasury -- Austria was weak in both categories; Silesia was separated from Austria by Bohemia and was therefore much closer to Berlin than it was to Vienna; Prussia had ancient claims to many of the Silesian provinces -- all of which had been taken or refused by Austria. The leadership of Austria was now in the midst of a succession crisis, Maria Theresa was perceived as young and weak and an infant Tsar was on the Russian throne. France and England were natural enemies and if one should choose to enter the fray then the other would most certainly be an ally (8:5). Now therefore, Frederick argued, was the time to right those old wrongs inflicted on a weaker Prussia by a then dominant Austria. Now was the time also to begin a

badly needed program of territorial consolidation for he saw clearly that his territories were ". . . not well situated. . . . They are dispersed [so] they cannot mutually assist each other" (6:x,xi). And besides, Silesia was mostly Protestant, and Prussia, in her role as Europe's "Protestant champion", could be seen as further diminishing the influence of Catholicism. It seems possible that Frederick would have precipitated this, or another similar conflict, even in the absence of such imposing strategic arguments. He confided to a friend in a later letter that "My youth, the fire of passions, the desire for glory. . . the satisfaction of seeing my name in the papers. . ." had all conspired to convince him to make war (8:12). He was also aware that other states treated Prussia as a mere pawn. This angered him deeply; unlike his brutish father he was sensitive and yearned for respect from his contemporaries. In summary, Frederick's reasons for the Silesian War were many.

The arguments and protestations of Frederick's counselors against his decision were mostly moral -- Frederick dismissed them by asking when kings had ever been deterred by morality or the Ten Commandments (3:451). And so, he ordered Podewils to draw up the necessary announcements in secret, for the troops were already preparing for invasion. Frederick accepted the proposed formal public declaration with these words: "Bravo! That is the work of a good charlatan" (7:194). By mid-December, 1740, all preparations were complete and the campaign to conquer Silesia was opened.

THE FIRST SILESIAN WAR

Opening Moves

The trumped-up public announcement released at Berlin read, "Having, as is well known, interests in Silesia, I propose to take charge of it and keep it for the rightful owner" (10:94). Frederick then gave a masked ball on December 14. When it was over, he called for his aides-de-camp and set out south for Silesia at the head of his army (7:197). A campaign beginning in the winter was very unusual in those times and Austria, even though warned, was caught completely surprised. Silesia was nearly undefended when Frederick's army of approximately 25,000 entered its northern border on December 16 (12:87). He wrote to Podewils that "I have crossed the Rubicon. . . . All goes as we wish" (7:198).

Remembering international etiquette, Frederick sent an emissary to Vienna. He arrived on December 17 and had an audience with Grand Duke Francis on the 20th. "I bring the salvation of the House of Austria on one hand and in the other the imperial crown for her Highness. . . in return [the King of Prussia] asks for the whole of Silesia but for nothing less" (7:197). Francis asked if Prussian troops were already in Silesia. The envoy stated that they were, whereupon Maria Theresa, who had been listening behind a door, burst out and told him that "We will die rather than treat with your King" (7:197, 10:97). The invasion, meanwhile, was going well.

In large measure, the people of Silesia seemed to welcome the Prussians; even the Catholics weren't antagonistic. He entered the capitol of Breslau and gave a well attended ball (7:97). He wrote to his brother that ". . . the whole land rejoices at our arrival and is only afraid that we shall leave" (6:15). At the end of January, 1741, Frederick was back in Berlin having captured Silesia in seven weeks. He had lost twenty soldiers and two officers.

Horror and indignation spread throughout Europe. Vienna was paralyzed -- except for Maria Theresa. She began a frenzy of activity. Although in late stages of pregnancy she took riding lessons as though preparing herself to lead the army. She brought Marshal Neipperg out of jail (Emperor Charles had imprisoned him for losing Belgrade to the Turks) and placed him in charge of all her troops in Moravia, another northern province. She raised money to equip these forces and spirits began to rise in her subjects. Maria Theresa was unable however, to obtain assistance from any other continental power; their indignation did not translate to aid (10:97).

Frederick returned to Breslau in February to consolidate his power and to begin Prussian administration over his new territory. His occupying army was increased in size and busied itself capturing some small villages where a few Austrian soldiers had wintered (7:204, 205). By April, Neipperg had entered southern Silesia in secret and began to march towards Frederick. Following the military customs of the time, his plan was to avoid battle and to cut off Frederick's supply and communication link to Prussia (7:206). Frederick began to march towards Prussia with Neipperg trying to get ahead of him. After a week of marching through the mud and snow Frederick realized he could not escape and so he resigned to a battle (7:206).

First Blood

The two armies faced each other at midday, on April 10, near the small village of Mollwitz. The preceding day had seen heavy snowfall and so the battlefield was covered with dense, packed snow. Frederick had 4,000 cavalry, 16,000 infantry and 60 guns; Neipperg had 8,600 cavalry, 11,400 infantry and only 18 guns (3:452). Frederick was nervous and apprehensive; he had been unable to sleep for two nights (10:98). The Prussian decision to attack initially caught the Austrians off guard (their artillery had not yet arrived) but Frederick did not press the advantage. He instead wasted time by carefully arranging his army in battle order. The superior Austrian cavalry wasted no

time in attacking the Prussian right and drove their horse from the field. The charging Austrians even broke through to the Prussian infantry on the second charge and caused great confusion. Frederick himself was caught up in the melee and either on his own, or at Schwerin's suggestion, fled the battlefield to ostensibly prevent his capture. All seemed lost by four in the afternoon (7:206, 10:100, 3:452).

All was not lost, von Schwerin stayed on the field and reformed his infantry to meet the attack of the Austrian infantry. The highly disciplined and better equipped Prussians, supported by their artillery, beat off the Austrians (12:97). Schwerin soon ordered a counter-attack and the Austrians could provide no effective resistance; Neipperg ordered a retreat at seven in the evening and Schwerin dispatched several officers to search for his departed King (12:97,98).

Frederick, and a few of his chosen aides and friends, had beaten a hasty retreat and were nearly captured at a small village which had been recently occupied by the Austrians. It was two in the morning before Frederick was found and notified of the victory; cursing, he immediately rode to rejoin the army (7:207). Reaching them at daybreak, he had thus spent a third sleepless night and had ridden over fifty miles in his flight (10:100). It had been a very inauspicious beginning for a warrior and it gave rise to many humorous stories -- all told at Frederick's expense (Voltaire wrote in later years that Frederick never felt gratitude to any living creature except the horse that carried him from Mollwitz) (10:100).

Frederick's recognition of his shortcomings, and of his army's deficiencies, was admirable. He freely admitted, though much later when his reputation had been solidified, that he had been ". . . culpable. . . and I reflected deeply on my mistakes to my subsequent profit" (7:207). He immediately set to work rebuilding his army, which had suffered more casualties than the Austrians (4,850 vs 4,500) (12:97). He changed the cavalry's tactics and taught them to charge, he tried to make the artillery more mobile

and he increased the disciplinary regimen -- especially for his officers (1:161). Frederick set the example by rising in the camp at four and personally drilling regiments. The French army's commander-in-chief, Marshal Belle-Isle, visited the encampment not long after the battle and was amazed at the Prussian obedience. He wrote that he ". . . had some inkling. . . of the exactitude, but I must say that they were driven to such a degree that I was ill-prepared for the reality" (1:161). One of his biographers summed it up best by saying that Frederick's genius was built little by little through study and obstinate improvement efforts (7:207). Though this first victory was not due to his genius, it had far-reaching results.

Fruits of Prussian Victory

When news of Mollwitz reached Vienna and the other capitols, all of Europe was cast into ferment. Though all had pledged to recognize Maria Theresa's right to the Emperor's throne, many did not hesitate to join in a scramble for territories she seemed unable to defend (12:100). Charles Albert, the Elector of Bavaria, which had been the only German principality to reject the Pragmatic Sanction years earlier, claimed the title of Holy Roman Emperor (3:436). The Pope claimed two principalities in Italy. Philip V, the Bourbon King of Spain, claimed Milan, which had been lost to Austria by force of arms during Charles VI reign (3:453, 435). Most disturbing of all however, was the portentous activities of the Empire's ancient enemy, France.

France sought to reduce Austria's power by separating the German principalities from her influence. To this end, France recognized Charles Albert's claim to become emperor and set about trying to completely remove Bavaria (her best German friend),Saxony, and Prussia, from the Holy Roman Empire's fold. France felt that it could then effectively control all of these separate kingdoms, as well as Austria (10:101). If not "divide and conquer", it was certainly a "divide and control" strategy. Bavaria allied with the French on May 18 (3:453). France recognized however, that the

young King Frederick was the key to this master design and opened talks with him immediately.

The French emissary (Marshal Belle-Isle) pressed Frederick hard to join the alliance against Austria (7:208). Frederick was enamoured with the idea of humbling Austria but was fearful that bringing down the Hapsburgs would result in too much influence for the French Bourbons and his neighboring German electors (12:100). He also still had hopes of coming to a direct agreement with Maria Theresa, i.e., guaranteeing her succession in return for Silesia (3:453). In the end, he consented and concluded an alliance on June 5, 1741, with France, Spain and Bavaria. Saxony later joined the alliance also (8:17). All pledged to make no separate peace with Austria; Prussia was guaranteed Silesia, Charles Albert the Emperor's throne and France agreed to protect Prussia from England's Hanoverian forces as well as to help Frederick in future fighting with the Austrians (3:453, 8:17). Thus did Frederick, King of "Protestant-champion" Prussia, unite forces with Catholic France in order to humble the Catholic Hapsburgs.

England had been approached for support (as had all the major powers) by Maria Theresa immediately after Mollwitz. The English had come to look on the Holy Roman Empire as a continental balance against France. The dissolution of the Empire or the weakening of Austria was thus viewed with alarm by King George II. In the current circumstance, however, George II feared that if he made war against Frederick that his beloved principality of Hanover, which bordered Prussia, would be threatened. England therefore wished for peace between Frederick and Maria Theresa and urged both parties to come to an agreement (3:452). Frederick was listening to English envoys plead for peace while simultaneously negotiating warfighting alliances with the French. He was willing to cease hostilities as long as he obtained Silesia and so told the English. They encouraged Austria to follow this course. Maria Theresa, however, was

incensed and angrily told England's ambassador that she wished ". . . your cursed ditch did not exist and then you might understand the danger of upsetting the Empire -- to touch one part is to undermine the whole, Silesia is essential for its defense" (10:194). In the end, England stood by their previous ratification of the Pragmatic Sanction by agreeing to provide Maria Theresa with financial aid but they refused to directly enter the war in her behalf (8:17).

So what had sprung from Frederick's desire for glory and territorial consolidation had now developed into a complete and total European conflagration. The "Anti-Machiavel" had precipitated a conflict in which the realities of naked, power politics, completely unencumbered by cultural or religious influences, were to dominate subsequent events (3:451). Maria Theresa, except for English moral and financial support, was completely isolated. Her downfall appeared imminent and Frederick, in the company of other greedy states, was ready to pick up the pieces.

The Fog of War. . . and Politics

Maria Theresa proved to be a stubborn and resourceful leader. Abandoned by everyone, she turned to the lords of Hungary for assistance. Moved by her appeal and her agreement to remove many of the controls which Austria had imposed on them, they agreed to provide armed assistance (3:453). Meanwhile, combined French and Bavarian forces, had already begun to march on Vienna. Led by the Bavarian, Charles Albert, they made slow progress. It was during their nearly two month march that trouble began to appear in this alliance of states who were fighting the same enemy, but for different reasons.

At the end of October, Charles Albert, against the strong advice of Frederick decided to forego the capture of Vienna and to take Bohemia instead (7:209). Charles feared that his ally, Augustus of Saxony, would seize this prize from Austria himself while he (Charles) was engaged in the more difficult task of fighting Maria Theresa on

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her home territory. This development did not please Frederick; he saw France's growing influence in Bavaria and Bohemia as a threat to Prussia's security. Maria Theresa, having lost Silesia for the present, and about to lose another rich province (Bohemia), recognized that she could not defend both simultaneously (3:454). Frederick and Maria Theresa thus sought to conduct secret negotiations -- the British assisted in this development (10:108).

On October 9, Frederick and Neipperg met, not to do battle but to talk. Frederick shamelessly violated the terms of his previous alliance and gave the Austrians the details of the French-Bavarian positions in Bohemia. In return, Austria provisionally ceded Silesia and also agreed to participate in a "sham siege" of the city of Niesse in Silesia (8:17). The city, still held by the Austrians, was to be turned over to the Prussians after a mock battle. Frederick insisted on this subterfuge in an attempt to keep his treachery secret from his "allies". The "siege" took place and Niesse "fell". Meanwhile the French, Bavarians and Saxons were laying real siege to Prague, the capitol of Bohemia.

Prague fell on November 25, 1741 (3:454). This success brought the German Electors to Charles Albert's side; even King George II, in his capacity as Hanoverian Elector, agreed to support him in return for guarantees of neutrality for Hanover. In due course therefore, Charles Albert was elected Holy Roman Emperor (as Charles VII) on January 24, 1742. French grand strategy had triumphed (10:110).

Maria Theresa had not been inactive during these events. After the Prussian truce freed her Silesian army, and with the Hungarians at her side, she demonstrated great audacity by invading Charles' home province of Bavaria. Since Charles was busy taking Bohemia, the Austrians found Bavaria relatively undefended. On February 12, 1742, the Austrians captured Charles' capitol of Munich -- this on the very day of his coronation as Holy Roman Emperor in Frankfurt (3:454)! Bouyed by the progress in

Bavaria, Maria Theresa had revealed Frederick's duplicitous secret truce to the French. Thus exposed, and also realizing that the Austrian victories in Bavaria were threatening to place the Silesian acquisition in jeopardy, Frederick hastily re-entered the war (7:210; 3:454).

In concert with his "found again" allies, Frederick planned a campaign through Austrian-owned Moravia with the object of linking up with French, Bavarian and Saxon forces. The combined armies were then to march on Vienna. The Moravian march became disastrous. Hungarian cavalry raided at every turn and he was amid a hostile, Catholic population. Even though his advance cavalry could see Vienna's towers, Frederick found his communications and provisioning in such dire straits that he was compelled to retreat towards Bohemia (1:161). During his retreat a newly formed Austrian army led by Maria Theresa's brother-in-law, Charles of Lorraine, pursued him. The armies met near Chotusitz (Bohemia) on May 17, 1742.

Both armies numbered approximately 28,000 men with Prussia possessing superiority in artillery and a slight edge in infantry. Though Frederick had strengthened his cavalry greatly since Mollwitz the Austrians were still slightly superior (12:118). The Austrians, after an all night march, nearly succeeded in surprising Frederick by descending upon his army in early morning (7:213). The Prussians reacted quickly however, and managed to form up and prepare for the imminent attack. Frederick's location permitted him to force the Austrian cavalry to charge into boggy ground and thus forestalled their advantage. After a four-hour pitched battle, Frederick's superior artillery and infantry insured his second victory (10:115). This victory, unlike Mollwitz, was his complete responsibility. He had made significant changes in his army and he had directed his forces with coolness and courage (8:19; 10:115). This victory forced Maria Theresa to rethink her strategy (3:454).

Under extreme pressure from England, Austria was forced to recognize the

futility of trying to simultaneously war with all her enemies. Maria Theresa, though detesting Frederick more than the rest of her foes, decided to seek peace with him in order to concentrate on France and the other allies (3:454). For his part, Frederick was satisfied as long as he obtained Silesia. He saw as an added benefit that Austria and the other combatants seemed to be locked in a war with no one power having a clear advantage. Negotiations were opened, and notwithstanding urgent appeals from France for Prussian aid in Bohemia (Austria was besieging the French army in Prague), they proceeded rapidly. On June 11, 1742, the Treaty of Breslau was finalized and Frederick began to evacuate Bohemia on June 19 (7:214; 10:116). The French therefore, had once more been abandoned, this time publicly, by Frederick.

PEACE

The formal peace treaty was signed at Berlin on July 28, 1742. Frederick obtained nearly all of Silesia. Austria retained parts of Upper Silesia (i.e., some southern territories) but Frederick consoled himself about this by saying that it was a ruined country whose inhabitants would never be loyal (8:19). Frederick also agreed to protect the Catholic religion in Silesia (7:215). In summary, at the price of two battles and fewer than 20,000 total casualties, Frederick had obtained a rich province, one-third the size of England, with a skilled population (7:218). He wrote in later times that they were his best subjects (10:116). And so, the First Silesian War was concluded.

Chapter Four

THE SECOND SILESIAN WAR

PROLOGUE

At the conclusion of the First Silesian War Frederick returned to Berlin with his army. His initial objective, Silesia, had been acquired. Austria had been weakened considerably by the loss of this wealthy and fertile province and had also been thwarted in its traditional retention of the Holy Roman throne. The French, with Frederick now out of the fray, were soon bottled up in Prague by the Austrians. They were eventually forced into a disastrous winter escape and retreat back to France. Frederick reasoned that they had been taught a lesson and would reflect more seriously before meddling in German affairs again. The new Holy Roman Emperor, Charles VII of Bavaria, had been proven weak unless he was propped up by France or Prussia. England had also been embarrassed; although providing financial aid to Maria Theresa as a balance against France, King George II had voted for Charles Albert as Emperor in order to assure neutrality for Hanover. He was thus viewed with suspicion by all. In short, Frederick alone had come out a clear winner. He had changed his policies frequently and had earned a reputation for duplicity but his objective, Silesia, had always remained uppermost in his mind. He wrote that ". . . one must be able to stop in time. . . to be always wanting more is never to be happy" (10:116; 7:218, 219).

Now that peace had been obtained, Frederick felt that prudence demanded a cautious policy in which Prussia would maintain the balance between the Hapsburgs and the French Bourbons. Continuation of the war with his allies would probably have pushed the Hapsburgs over the brink but this may not have been in the long-term

Prussian interest. The peace, at worst, provided an interlude for Frederick to restore his weakened army and treasury. "Thus, far from profiting by this tranquillity to grow soft, peace became a school of war for Prussian troops" (8:328, 329). So spoke Frederick, who never forgot the true source of his power.

AUSTRIA ASCENDANT

With Frederick at peace and England's continuing aid, Maria Theresa now began to achieve political and military victories everywhere (3:455). She first directed all energies against the French and Bavarians in Bohemia. After removing the invaders, she was crowned its queen in May 1742. Austria began to do well in Italy (against the Spanish Bourbons) and was soon also in firm control of Bavaria, as well as Bohemia. Control of Bavaria enabled Maria Theresa to force Emperor Charles VII to renounce his claims on all Hapsburg territories. Charles refused however, to give up the title of Emperor (10:133). England, no longer fearing a Prussian threat to Hanover, directly entered the war on the continent against France. Austria next sought to retake Alsace and Lorraine from France; these territories had been lost a century before during the Thirty Years War. Hard pressed, France decided to forget Frederick's previous perfidies and tried to induce him to rejoin the war against Austria. If Frederick had violated treaties with France, might he not also violate his current peace with Austria? When Maria Theresa, encouraged by her successes, began to talk publicly about retaking Silesia, Frederick relented and signed a new agreement with France in June 1744 (8:330). He went on campaign, thereby beginning the Second Silesian War, on August 15, 1744 (3:455).

THE OPENING CAMPAIGN

As Parisians were crowding their cathedrals to pray for France, Frederick, at the head of an 80,000 man army, began to march on Bohemia (3:455). By the beginning of September he had reached Prague; it fell on September 16. Prague had now been captured three times (by the combined French, Saxon and Bavarians, retaken by the Austrians, and now by the Prussians) in the course of three years (10:134). Leaving a garrison force, Frederick now turned south and threatened Vienna. These actions forced Austria to break off its attack on the French in Alsace; Prince Charles of Lorraine, loser to Frederick at Chotusitz, rushed his army eastward to intercept Frederick (3:456). Maria Theresa had also been able to raise another effective army of Hungarians, eventually numbering over 70,000, which was enroute to Bohemia.

Frederick had expected the French army in Alsace to pursue Prince Charles but they did not do so. Perhaps they remembered the results of their last foray into Bohemia when Frederick had abandoned them to make a separate peace. With an early winter setting in, and again amid a hostile, Catholic population, Frederick's fortunes began to wane. He soon wanted for provisions and the Hungarian cavalry began to harass his communications. Realizing that the Prussians were in trouble, Prince Charles wisely refused to do battle with Frederick and instead engaged in a war of maneuver. This tactic, carried out in a hostile, barren and mountainous terrain, further weakened the Prussians (10:135).

Frederick recognized reality and began to retreat back to Prague and on to Silesia. This campaign, which had started so well, turned into a disaster. With the Austrians and Hungarians continuing to harass them, the Prussians reached Silesia in December 1744. Frederick had lost nearly half his army, mainly by desertion, and much of his ammunition and artillery (7:224; 10:135). Frederick admitted serious errors in this campaign and called it "his schooling" (8:331). The vision which terrified Frederick the

most was the realization of how fragile his army had been once the yoke of discipline began to dissipate. The strict disciplinarian became even more rigid (1:163).

The Prussian army had been so decimated that Frederick abandoned it and went to Berlin to supervise the raising of men and money. The royal silver was even delivered to the mint to help replenish the treasury (10:135). Maria Theresa was jubilant and spread the word in Silesia that the Prussian tyrants would soon be gone.

PRUSSIA AT LOW TIDE

On January 8, 1745 England, Austria, Poland and Saxony entered into an agreement which pledged mutual efforts to restore all possessions according to conditions in 1739. (Note that Saxony had now come over to Austria's side.) In short, Austria was to receive help in retaking Silesia (3:456). To make matters worse for Frederick, the Bavarian Holy Roman Emperor, Charles VII, died unexpectedly on January 20. On his deathbed, Charles had exorted his seventeen year old son to renounce the Emperor's throne and to seek an agreement with Maria Theresa for the return of Bavaria (10:136). The Germanies were thus plunged into another succession crisis.

Frederick wrote to King Louis XV of France that Maria Theresa ". . . already perceives the Imperial crown on her husband's head. The Emperor's d upsets all our plans" (8:27). Despite French pressure the young prince carried ou. s father's wishes and agreed to support Grand Duke Francis as emperor in return for restoration of Bavaria (3:456). Thus aided by Frederick's strategic and logistical errors in the Bohemian campaign, and the reaper, Maria Theresa was able to concentrate her forces in Bohemia and Bavaria for a move into Silesia. She began to think not only in terms of retaking Silesia but also of absorbing part of Prussia (3:456). The Saxons also agreed to send troops to assist in this Silesian campaign. The spring of 1745 bode ill for Frederick.

FREDERICK RECOVERS

In May the Austrian-Saxon army entered Silesia. It was under orders from Maria Theresa to seek battle(3:456). Frederick had rebuilt his army and he devised numerous deceptions to conceal his location and deployment from the invaders (7:226). The armies, both numbering about 60,000 men, met near Hohenfriedberg on June 4 (12:132). Frederick massed his army and in a quiet, night march, attacked the Saxons, who formed the left flank of the invading army, at three in the morning (7:226). These unusual tactics surprised and routed the Saxons. The succeeding capture of a commanding hill by cavalry permitted Frederick's artillery to decimate the Austrian infantry (3:456). This battle was the first which saw the Prussian cavalry outperform the Austrians; Frederick's attention and hard work on this part of his army had paid off (1:164). The Austrians suffered twenty-five percent casualties in this great defeat (12:135). Hohenfriedberg was the most decisive battle of either Silesian War since it had rescued Frederick from potential disaster (3:456).

The French, relieved of the Austrian threat by Frederick's reentry to the war, quickly turned the tide against England's continental army. The Scottish rebellion, led by "Bonnie Prince Charlie", also gave England other worries. The English began to fear for Hanover, and hearing of Hohenfriedburg, began to pressure Maria Theresa to pursue peace with Prussia. Combined English and Austrian forces could then check France. Maria Theresa adamantly refused (3:457). England thus negotiated a separate peace with Frederick on August 26, 1745. This agreement again violated prior arrangements with France. Prussian ownership of Silesia was recognized by this treaty and Frederick, for his part, agreed to support the Grand Duke Francis (Maria Theresa's husband) for the imperial throne.

After Hohenfriedburg, Frederick leisurely pursued the Austrians into Bohemia (7:226). Once there however, Frederick's tactics became tentative; the memory of

operations amid a hostile population was too recent (7:227). After having rebuilt his army, Prince Charles of Lorraine surprised the main body of Prussians at their encampment near Soor on September 30. Frederick, although outnumbered 40,000 to 20,000, directed his army to an immediate attack on the well defended Austrian artillery batteries which were located on high ground. The Austrians made the mistake of coming out to meet the Prussian infantry where they were defeated in the open. Frederick's tactics that day consisted primarily of "cold steel" at close quarters; he wrote afterwards that a ". . . bold front defeats the enemy, not fire. . . you decide the battle more quickly by marching straight at the enemy than. . . with muskets, and the more quickly the action is decided the less men you lose" (1:90). He would completely renounce this doctrine later in favor of firepower, but it was effective that day in the rough terrain at Soor. The Prussian cavalry again contributed greatly to the victory (7:227). Although he experienced upwards of 4,000 casualties Frederick had again forced the Austrians to retreat (12:139).

In reality, Frederick had been out-generaled. Prince Charles, without the Prussians knowing it, had maneuvered his superior (in numbers) army into a strong tactical position which commanded the primary route of retreat. Charles' senior generals, after the practice of the time, dissuaded him from attacking since the standard wisdom of the times predicted a Prussian retreat. After all, in those days a battle accepted was tantamount to defeat. Prince Charles perhaps sensed that the times were changing. He wrote to his brother two days earlier that he could not ". . . find a single one who desires a battle. . . this makes me furious" (12:137). Frederick, either through his developing tactical intuition or a belief that retreat was impossible, forced the battle with the subsequent astounding results. He later wrote that he ". . . deserved to be beaten [but] the bravery of my troops. . . preserved me from such misfortune" (12:140). Frederick developed the understandable belief at this time that he

could now defeat the Austrians anywhere (10:139).

FINAL THROES

On October 4, 1745, Francis was crowned Holy Roman Emperor at Frankfurt; Maria Theresa herself placed the crown on his head. With this moral and political victory, the Hapsburgs fought on against Frederick despite continuous pressure from England to conclude a peace with him. In November, Maria Theresa and Augustus of Saxony conspired a plan for a joint offensive against Prussia. Saxon and Austrian armies were to unite at Dresden (the Saxon capitol) and march directly on Berlin (12:140). Learning of this plan, Frederick developed a defensive strategy which proposed that each invader must be defeated before they could concentrate their forces. He dispatched the 'Old Dessauer', Prince Leopold of Anhalt-Dessau (a Prussian province), directly west to seek out the Saxons while he was to deal with Prince Charles who was coming up from the south (7:228). The Austrians, and the pursuing Frederick, were one day's march from Dresden when Prince Leopold attacked the Saxons at nearby Kesseldorf on December 15. A simple frontal assault by the now renowned Prussian infantry defeated the Saxons after stubborn fighting and high casualties on both sides (12:142).

Frederick entered Dresden unresisted on December 18; the discouraged Austrians returned to Bohemia without challenging the Prussians (10:165). Augustus was forced to renounce any future aid for Maria Theresa in exchange for the return of his capitol. Abandoned now by Saxony, as well as England, Austria had no alternative but to seek peace with Frederick.

PEACE

On Christmas Day 1745, the Austrians and Prussians signed the Treaty of Dresden which ended the Second Silesian War (3:457). The agreement made Prussia the

legitimate owner of Silesia in return for Frederick's recognition of Francis as Emperor. This was a hollow recognition since Prussia had already done so in the separate peace with England in August. Frederick had even cast his vote for Francis in his September election.

Thus the year of 1745, which had begun so badly for Frederick (his disastrous winter retreat from Bohemia, Emperor Charles VII's death, etc.) had ended with a peace of agreeable terms. Prussia had no rival for power in north Germany and was firmly in control of Silesia. France, England and Austria were still embroiled in war with no clear advantage apparent for any power. The balance of power was therefore relatively stable and Frederick could play the role as the major determinant in the equation if he so chose. Last but not least, Frederick had achieved glory; his people received him with praise as he returned to Berlin on December 28, 1745. It was then that they, and Voltaire, began to attach 'Great' to his name (9:143). His succeeding career would justify that approbation.

EPILOGUE

Frederick regarded the Silesian Wars simply. The first conflict had been to acquire that rich territory and the second had been fought to retain it. A positive by-product of the wars had also been Prussia's acquisition of a reputation in arms but this had been gained at the expense of arousing fear and envy in all her neighbors (8:332,333). Frederick vowed, "Peace to the end of my life!" at war's end, but it was not to be (3:458).

The major powers continued to war for three more years; France against England and Austria in Flanders; France and Spain against Austria in Italy. The War of the Austrian Succession, which had been started by Frederick's first Silesian adventure, finally ended in 1748, more from exhaustion than from a satisfactory conclusion. Frederick, who viewed human nature in a cold realistic way, wrote to Voltaire that he

had read a book which proposed how to retain peace in Europe forever and all that was necessary to make it a success was ". . . the consent of Europe and a few other similar trifles" (3:458). The consent was lacking for the peace was not long.

The peace of 1748 was unsatisfactory. Austria felt insecure in Bohemia and Italy, Prussia in Silesia, England in Hanover and France in America and on the Rhine. The power balance which existed before 1740 had been disturbed by the rising might of Prussia on land and England on sea (in 1756 France possessed 45 fighting ships to England's 130) (4:38,40). The two hundred year struggle between Protestantism and Catholicism, and the rising tide of nationalism, also tore at the fabric of European stability.

The Seven Years War began in 1756 when Frederick invaded Saxony as an indirect, preemptory attack on Austria. Though Frederick was therefore the immediate cause of the war, in reality it was a struggle for world supremacy between France and England. This war saw a dramatic reversal of alliances; Frederick and England were now allied against the combined forces of the rest of Europe. France and Austria, antagonists for centuries, now were allied with Russia and other lesser states. In England, William Pitt the Elder boasted that his strategy would use Prussian might on the continent to occupy France while he won colonial empires in America and India. Though gaining no territory, Frederick, against seemingly impossible odds, survived through dogged determination and military superiority. It was this war of survival that earned him accolades as 'Great' from the rest of the world.

From 1763 onwards, Frederick was always on the alert to increase and maintain Prussia's power. The army and the treasury received equal attention. Frederick, in cooperation with Maria Theresa and Tsar Catherine, and to their mutual benefit, partitioned portions of Poland in 1772. When the Bavarian Elector died in 1777 Austria threatened to annex Bavaria. The next spring, at the age of sixty six years, Frederick

led a 100,000 man army into Bohemia in a strong show of force and forced Austria to abandon these expansionist plans.

His last political action was the establishment of the Confederation of German Princes in 1785. This led directly to Bismarck's Prussian-dominated and unified Germany a century later (a Germany led by Hohenzollern Kaisers). The old King died on August 17, 1786 at the age of seventy four years. He left a supremely strong Prussia but it weakened considerably over the next twenty years. Prussia was then temporarily conquered by the world's next great military genius. Napoleon paid Frederick his greatest compliment when, standing by his tomb in French occupied Berlin, he told his officers, "Hats off gentlemen -- if he were still alive we should not be here" (10:291).

Chapter Five

FREDERICK'S STRATEGY ANALYZED

INTRODUCTION

This chapter uses the Air Command and Staff College's strategy process model (13:Chap I) to analyze Frederick the Great's strategy. It includes a discussion of the parts and principles of strategy which are proposed by the model. The chapter emphasizes military strategy but deletes the fourth and last part of the process, battlefield strategy (i.e., tactics). The analysis of Frederican tactics holds few lessons for modern warriors. The discussion on military strategy includes general observations on military doctrine and the use which Frederick made of selected Principles of War (14:3). The chapter concludes with a short discussion of Frederick's legacy to the profession of arms -- both in his own time and in ours.

THE COMPONENTS OF STRATEGY ANALYZED

National Objectives

The first step of the strategy process is determining state objectives. As with most Eighteenth Century monarchs, Frederick the Great embodied the state. In a very real sense therefore, his personal objectives were the national objectives of Prussia. Frederick believed the first principle of politics was self-preservation and ". . . aggrandizement, according to circumstances" (6:66). There can be little doubt that when the Holy Roman Emperor (Charles VI) died in 1740, that Frederick saw circumstances he could exploit for the aggrandizement of Prussia. After considering the ways in which he could accomplish this general objective he seized upon the

acquisition of Silesia as having the most likely chance of success. Recall that he discarded other territories from active consideration for conquest due to their geographical proximity to the interests of England or Sweden (see page 18). Prussia had no navy but it did possess a large and efficient army; early in his deliberations he posed the following question to his first minister, von Podewils.

> When one has the advantage, should one make use of it or not? I am ready with my troops. . . . If I do not use them now I keep in my hands a powerful but useless instrument (3:451).

The decision was made therefore to take Silesia.

Once the Silesia objective was decided upon, at no time during the next five years of conflict and political maneuverings did it change. This seemed to be true regardless of changing situations; even when it seemed that Prussia itself was direly threatened, Frederick refused to consider relinquishing his prize. Similarly, when the vagaries of war presented what seemed to be even greater opportunities for other territories, Frederick held back. When he concluded the first Silesian War, and abandoned his allies in the process, he said that ". . . always to be wanting more is never to be happy" (8:19). In short, the objective was simple: take Silesia and hold it.

A Digression on Principles. The above discussion can also be viewed in terms of two principles of strategy: the principle of reality and the principle of the future. Frederick's objective was realistic; the likelihood of attaining the objective was based on a reasoned analysis of the situation as it existed. His army and treasury were large; Austria was becoming weaker in both these measures of power and was led by a weak, inexperienced (or so he thought) woman. He also calculated, correctly, that no other power would come directly to Maria Theresa's assistance. He did miscalculate, however, about the determined resistance which Austria was able to muster (1:20). Even in view of this unanticipated consequence, Frederick held firm but showed flexibility by his willingness to enter helpful alliances. He maintained these alliances only as long

as they were in his interests. At the first signs of an alliance becoming a burden to his own self-interests, he immediately terminated it. He was not oblivious to the dangers that abandonment of allies held; his actions on this score can be best viewed in relation to the principle of the future.

Frederick was criticized greatly for breaking treaties and alliances. These criticisms were based mostly on moral arguments but some suggested that he also made grave strategic errors by doing so (7:211). For example, during the First Silesian War he made a secret truce with Austria and abandoned what could have been an opportunity to totally destroy Hapsburg power if he had continued to cooperate with France and Bavaria. But Frederick looked past such a result. He always suspected French motives; to him, France's desire for cooperation with north German electorates just to remove the emperor's crown from Vienna seemed foolish. This seemed particularly true since by doing so, France ran the risk of conflict with England (England was aiding Maria Theresa) (12:100). In short, if the Hapsburgs were subjugated it wasn't too difficult for Frederick to see central and eastern Europe as a competing jumble of German states in which France would be the arbiter. (In fact, history shows that French policy aimed precisely for that result). Would it not be preferable to have a continental Europe with two major powers (France and the Empire) and Frederick as the arbiter? Perhaps another way of interpreting his actions would be to say that the destruction of the Hapsburgs wasn't his objective; Silesia was the objective. In Frederick's words:

> In my first war with the Queen of Hungary, I abandoned France at Prague, because I got Silesia by the bargain. If I had escorted the French safely to Vienna, they would never have given me so much (6:70).

A final comment on the principle of reality from the perspective of Frederick's enemies is necessary. Prussia was not regarded as a major power when Frederick inherited the throne, yet, he used only existing forces to make war a scant seven months after his coronation. Prussia's neighbors, therefore, did not recognize reality

(or what the future could bring) but preferred to believe that the extremely large and capable Prussian forces were simply for show. This had been the case under Frederick William and they expected it to remain so when Frederick came to power. After all, Crown Prince Frederick had written widely and professed every intention of being an idealistic and peace-loving king. Once in power, however, he found the use of his forces to achieve limited conquests to be irresistible. To ignore this frequently forgotten lesson of history is to run the risk of indirectly causing, and perhaps losing, a war.

Grand Strategy

Grand strategy is coordinating instruments of state power to achieve objectives (13:9). The traditionally recognized instruments of power are diplomatic, military and economic. Frederick was definite about the source of Prussia's strength.

> On my ascending the throne, I visited the coffers of my father. His great economy. . . [permitted me] great projects. Soon afterwards I made a review of my troops, and fine ones they appeared to me. . . (6:66).

Frederick depended therefore, on his treasury,i.e., economic power, and military power to accomplish the conquest of Silesia.

No evidence could be found to suggest that Frederick used economic influence for anything other than the domestic support of his own army. The practice of the times was to continue normal trade even when hostilities were present (1:19). Neither do the campaigns of Frederick reviewed in this study reveal a tendency to plunder and destroy enemy property; he was more likely to give a ball in an occupied capitol than he was to pillage the city. In contrast to the violent struggles of the previous century, this was the "Age of Enlightenment". Frederick, the philosopher-king, did not violate these customs. Destruction and mayhem was therefore confined solely to the opposing armies. If economic warfare was not present, economic influences were definite factors however, in the Silesian Wars.

The origin and the conduct of the Silesian Wars were greatly affected by economic considerations. It seems certain that Frederick's basic reasons for the conquest were centered on the economic benefits which Silesia would provide. Silesia added greatly to his population base and therefore would allow for a larger army. The land, in contrast to much of Prussia, was rich and fertile. The people were skilled and added a significant capability to Frederick's "industrial base" (the manufacture of artillery and other war supplies was beginning to become important during this time). Even though Frederick's army and treasury were large, the nation wasn't. The Prussian resource base was much smaller than that which France and the Hapsburgs could call on. Prussia's strength was out of all proportion to the other major powers when compared in terms of their respective economies. Prussia, though possessing the fourth largest European army, ranked tenth in size and thirteenth in population (1:17). Prussia's military power resulted from the large and sustained expenditures which Frederick William made throughout his long reign. When Frederick took this army to war, however, the tasks of reinforcing and replenishing it from a limited resource base became problematic. Therefore, Prussia's economic power, or lack of it, became more of a constraint to Frederick's strategy than an instrument of power. A succeeding section will discuss how this limitation influenced his military strategy.

Diplomacy was an instrument of power which Frederick used continuously. He was constantly negotiating with all states, friend and foe alike, regardless whether or not hostilities existed. These diplomatic efforts were often at odds with his military actions in the field (e.g. engaging in intrigues with his battlefield enemies to the detriment of his allies, etc.). It may prove instructive to imagine the questioning that Frederick could have received from today's observers in the fall of 1744.

> Sire, you said four years ago that Silesia was our aim. We now have Silesia and are at peace with Austria. But yet you announce that we will now make war in Bohemia with the only intention of relieving the French who are defending their province in Alsace from the Austrians. What are

> our interests there? Isn't the most powerful kingdom on the continent perfectly able to defend its own territories? Aren't we still part of the Empire? Sources in your ministry also state that you, in reality, don't believe the French are our friends. If this is so, why sacrific Prussian boys and treasure to help someone who is really working against us? We also hear that you have recently conducted negotiations with the English, who as everyone knows are mortal enemies of France. Just what is our objective in all this? Do we have a policy? And by the way, just who is running things anyway? Isn't anyone coordinating anything?

The foregoing hypothetical "Prussian press conference" suggests that Frederick the Great's strategy would have been severely criticized on the grounds that it was disjointed, conflicting and, as a result, doomed to failure. A discussion of the third principle of strategy is now in order.

Another Digression on Principles. The final principle of strategy is linkage (13:16). The concept of linkage proposes that to insure the best chance of success, all instruments of power and all parts of strategy must be coordinated and complementary. Frederick the Great combined in his own person the capability to do all of these things. Frederick established state objectives, coordinated instruments of power, formulated military strategy and commanded battlefield tactics. It seems reasonably safe to say therefore, that Frederick would have insured Prussian strategy was "linked" had he thought it to be in his best interest. But yet, the "press conference" suggested that Prussian actions appeared to be conflicting and in significant disarray. Does an explanation exist to refute this apparent contradiction?

This writer contends that Frederick's strategy was not linked in the sense that the model prescribes. Frederick consciously pursued differing and disjointed strategies (sometimes simultaneously) in order to create circumstances that would allow him to achieve his objective. In his own words, ". . . everything depends on the circumstances of the times, and on the courage of him [who rules]" (6:69). To seek the imposition of linkage on all facets and types of strategy implies a mechanical, heuristic approach which is subject to management techniques (e.g., we've completed steps one and two

"this way"and therefore we have to accomplish step three "that way"). As Frederick said, "You cannot. . . conceive how important it is for a . . . state to go often out of the common road; it is only by the marvellous that one can strike awe. . ." (6:68,69).

This author proposes that the principles of strategy are often, if not always, in opposition to each other. If too much emphasis is placed on achieving linkage, or perhaps more importantly, on the semblance of linkage, then another principle, along with its potential benefits, is being foregone. When strategy, any strategy, and at whatever level, is formulated, the principles of reality, the future and of linkage, are in a state of dynamic (i.e., constantly changing) equilibrium. For policy makers to concentrate or insist on "full linkage" (i.e., insuring that all means and actions are directly matched to a specific strategy) may be to run great peril. Attempting to insure that all components of strategy are linked in some kind of direct cause and effect relationship is to risk ignoring changing realities and future possibilities. In summary, for strategists to insist on linkage will not necessarily provide the best opportunity for achievement of objectives.

Military Strategy

The next step of the strategy process is the formulation of military strategy which will help accomplish national objectives. This section discusses the strategy which Frederick employed in the context of the military doctrine of the period and includes comments on his application of some of the Principles of War which are recognized by the United States Air Force today.

Introduction. Frederick the Great has been called one of the world's seven or eight greatest military genuises (2:13). Yet, most scholars agree that he changed the Prussian army relatively little during his forty-eight year command (2:15). As an example, one of the fundamental changes which the Napoleonic Era would bring to war was the large army motivated by nationalistic fervor. Frederick's armies were

approximately one half foreign mercenaries but during the extremely dark days of the Seven Years War he was reduced to fighting with only his patriotically-inspired native Prussians (I:20). They fought better and were partially accountable for Frederick's superior performance during that conflict, yet, at the end of the war, he immediately began to use foreigners again. As Duffy has noted, Frederick was a man of his times (I:20); he was thus greatly influenced by the military doctrine of the period.

Eighteenth Century Military Doctrine. The term "limited war" has been frequently used to characterize conflicts of this period. Warfare, as previously intimated in the section on grand strategy, did not include destruction of the enemy's economic capability to wage war. It was additionally typified by the maneuver of forces rather than a search for battle (I:18,10). A statement from Saxon doctrine in 1752 shows this distaste for battle clearly.

> A battle is at once the most important and most dangerous operation of war. . . . A great general shows his mastery by attaining the object of his campaign by sagacious and sure maneuvers, without incurring any risk (I:20).

There were no doubt several reasons for this thinking but the primary factor was probably the monarchical system of government. The reigning monarchs of Europe almost considered themselves as 'brothers and sisters' and were thus ready to 'pull their punches' (I:19) during war. They recognized that this policy ultimately safeguarded the system which continued their own power. A complete and total war, in the modern sense, would have upset the aristocratic harmony of the continent. As Frederick said of Maria Theresa, "She did honor to her throne. . .; I made war upon her, but I was never her enemy" (12:417). Medieval chivalry was thus alive and well and professional warriors passed from the service of one monarch to another with no repercussions on their reputation. This also helped to insure that all powers played the game of war according to the same rules. Frederick didn't radically change these rules but he greatly expanded their interpretation. Before considering Frederick's practice of

warfare, it is beneficial to discuss warfare in terms of the strategy process model.

Doctrine and the Components of Military Strategy. The strategy process model identifies three parts of military strategy: development, deployment and employment of forces (13:69). Theories on the employment of forces have in turn led to the development of various "schools" of military strategy such as the continental (land warfare) school, maritime school, etc. (13:70). Development of military strategy is a complex process which recognizes that its components are not distinct but rather are synergistic and interrelated (13:85). Many things influence its development (geographical and political constraints, etc.) but one of the primary factors is military doctrine (13:86). There are also three types, or components, of military doctrine: fundamental, environmental, and organizational (13:95). Fundamental doctrine can speak to all three parts of military strategy (i.e., deployment, employment, etc.) and is generally thought to be of a timeless nature (13:96). Environmental doctrine has been developed to meet the particular needs of warfare in different elements (land, sea, air, etc.) (13:97). Organizational doctrine is much more narrowly defined and is subject to rapid change; it is tailored to guide a particular organization (a specific army, etc.) at a particular time and is often of an administrative or tactical nature (13:99). That which follows categorizes Frederick's military strategy in the context of the foregoing ideas and definitions.

Frederick's Place Defined. It was stated earlier that Frederick did not radically alter the nature of his army as compared to other states. For example, no great technological innovations or change in the way the Prussian army was constituted occurred during his reign. The author therefore postulates that Frederick did not emphasize the "development" portion of military strategy; his major contributions were rather in the deployment and employment of forces. Eighteenth century Prussia was a practitioner of land warfare and thus must be classified in the continental school of

military strategy. Similarly, his environmental doctrinal contributions were restricted to land warfare. Frederick also contributed greatly to fundamental and organizational doctrine. It could even be argued that what made his army so formidable was its overwhelming superiority in organizational doctrine and techniques (discipline, administrative organization, etc.). However, unless this organizational doctrine can be interpreted as having lasting value (i.e., organizational doctrine with fundamental significance) to military operations it will not be analyzed further in this study. The remaining analysis is thus confined to Frederick's contributions concerning the deployment and employment of forces through effective use of fundamental doctrine.

Frederick's Deployment and Employment of Forces. Frederick's early military strategy was determined by his objective of seizing Silesia. This objective dictated an offensive military operation. Since Frederick was aware of his kingdom's resource limitations (vis-a-vis Austria and its potential allies) he was, in general, more disposed to seeking battle than were his opponents (I:20). He could not afford to fight a protracted war of attrition in which his weaker logistic base could have led to defeat. The strategy of maneuver thus became less useful to Frederick than to his enemies. It was necessary for him to seek out the enemy and defeat him in battle before their superior resources could be brought to bear. He became legendary for marching his armies harder than anyone and for extending his campaigns into winter (or beginning them early, before winter's end). Selected United States Air Force Principles of War provide a structure for conveying and developing the tenets of Frederican military strategy.

The Principle of the Objective. Frederick, once having established his political and military objective, never departed from it. This led to a constancy of effort and made for relatively straight forward military planning (e.g., remove Austrian forces from Silesia).

The Principle of the Offensive. The political objective of conquest naturally led to offensive military operations. Frederick also believed that the superior training of his troops dictated offensive strategies. This is demonstrated clearly in his instructions to his generals before the Second Silesian War:

> The whole strength of our troops lies in attack, and we act foolishly if we renounce it without good cause. . . . The one aim of their drill is to enable them to . . . form up more quickly than the enemy, to attack him with energy. . . and to settle the affair. . . more speedily than has hitherto been the custom (11:386).

It should be recalled that even though the Second Silesian War was fought, from Frederick's viewpoint, to hold (i.e., defend) Silesia that he went on the offensive by invading another Austrian possession (Bohemia). In the author's view, this strategy is strikingly similar to Lee's strategy a century later in the American Civil War. (Note too, that Lee's logistical base was inferior to the enemy, as was Frederick's.)

Though Frederick was offensively minded, he gained his greatest military fame in Prussia's defensive struggle against the combined forces of Europe in the Seven Years War (2:13). It was here that Frederick survived primarily by preventing his opponents' armies from concentrating their forces. He practiced an "interior line" strategy (9:89) which always recognized that opposing armies were the real enemy. He was thus perfectly willing to give up territory (e.g., the Russians held portions of Brandenburg for a time and Berlin itself was forced to pay a ransom) in order that he could engage other more threatening armies (6:88). As Frederick said:

> When I saw that France, Maria Theresa and Russia were against me, I abandoned half my dominions in order to concentrate. . . . This maneuver was universally attributed to a fine stroke of politics. It was really due to necessity, because I should none the less have lost all my dominions if I had been crushed in defending them (6:83).

This same strategy was employed by Napoleon, with less ultimate success, during the latter phases of his wars.

The Principles of Surprise and Maneuver. Frederick attempted to achieve

political and strategical military surprise at every opportunity. He seemed less successful and perhaps less concerned with gaining tactical surprise, although the battle of Hohenfriedburg was an exception. In general, when he was faced with a nearby opposing army he was more willing to revert to the familiar maneuver warfare of the times. He thus seemed to rely more on his army's better discipline and artillery on the battlefield than on achieving tactical surprise.

The Principle of Logistics. Frederick was perfectly willing to risk a degradation of logistics support in order to achieve the strategic surprise referred to above. Logistics was of supreme importance to armies of this period. Duffy (1:137) has described in detail the massive efforts and organization which was required to support an army on campaign (convoys of 1000 wagons at a time were very commonplace). No commander dared to ignore this vital component of warfare and Frederick gave it much attention. His views are best expressed in his own words:

> Provisioning [logistics] is so. . . necessary for an army, that it is impossible for the latter to exist without the former, [the great question is] how far one ought to occupy oneself with it. After mature reflection . . . I have made the following system. I have accustomed my soldiers to do without. . . and I have made no commissariat except when I could not do otherwise. . . . When the soldier is properly broken in. . . the general is much less harrassed in his operations. You would not believe. . . the advantage which you have when an army is accustomed to this uncertainty [i.e., lack of logistics]. I do not say, however, . . . that provisioning [is not essential] but you ought to know how to profit by the moment for treating it with a sort of indifference (6:89,90).

Our current commanders could perhaps profit greatly by pondering those words.

The Principle of Security. Frederick took great pains to practice all forms of this principle. He took care not to divulge his plans till absolutely necessary and sometimes went to great lengths to deceive the enemy. This principle was also applied to battlefield tactics. Before his great victory at Hohenfriedburg, for example, he engaged in road repair work which made the Austrians think he was preparing to retreat (1:146). He used double-agents to

give false information and spies to obtain enemy plans (10:148). In sum, though not overly cautious with his forces in battle, he took all precautions possible to conserve them for battle.

The Principle of Cohesion. Frederick was very aware of the effect which discipline and morale provide to an army. He said that a leader should ". . . persuade troops that they are superior to those they oppose, [mere nothings] will make them believe this but these nothings make the glory or disgrace of a general" (6:74). Generals, he said, should strive to create enthusiasm for ". . . once you can confer it on your army, you can count on victory" (6:74). Prussian discipline is legendary and Frederick himself said that this quality was the greatest force his army possessed (2:15). He recognized however, that too much could be made of its benefits. In a letter to his successor he advised not to confuse this word, discipline:

> It is a word which can only draw its significance from. . . the situation in the state [nation] of which you employ it. It means that each state ought to have its special discipline, and it is mad for it to wish to adopt that of its neighbor (6:77).

Frederick no doubt thought it humorous that the rest of Europe attempted to copy Prussian methods. His army had to be run tightly partly because of its mercenary character; he was afraid, for example, to encamp in forests for fear of desertion (1:209; 10:147). Frederick would have admitted that the best "disciplined" army was not necessarily the best army. It bears noting here that the Prussian army which Napoleon smashed at Jena and Auerstadt was just as regimented as those Frederick had led (2:18).

CONCLUSION

In the final analysis, the outward trappings of Frederick the Great's military doctrine had relatively short-lived application. English armies copied his drill and formations even though, as a result of their experience in the American Revolution,

they had the most reason not to do so (10:210). The Frederican, Baron von Steuben, also influenced the American Continental Army by instilling the rudiments of Prussian military discipline. His famous "Blue Book" of regulations influenced the American army greatly for the next thirty to forty years (10:211). The Russians, however, carried their impersonation of Frederick to ridiculous extremes (10:211). It was not long, however, before Napoleon was to permanently change everything for all of Europe. Frederick's more profound policies, however, do have modern utility.

An important Frederican concept which endures to this day is his political use of military preparedness. His doctrine of 'always on guard' (8:376) perhaps presaged modern deterrence theory. Frederick placed great value on readiness and exercises: "A general laxness would set in if the regiments were not assembled and exercised frequently in the presence of the master" (1:21). His famous autumn maneuvers, which involved his whole army, established a European precedent which continues to this day (1:149). Frederick recognized that these spectacles gave him great political leverage:

> I exercised my troops and used my maneuvers. . . to draw the eyes of Europe; I reviewed them every year, in order to appear more and more master of the art of war; and at length I obtained my wish of procuring a general. . . [respect] (6:67).

The most important lesson which Frederick the Great left to the modern era, however, may well be in the recognition of the supreme power of an individual will. As Frederick stated, ". . . it is my obstinancy which has worn everyone out" (6:85). He also recognized however, that "Events have made me great, more than my talents or my forces" (6:91). It may therefore be leadership, combined with circumstance, rather than superior strategy, that proved decisive for Frederick the Great. It could always be thus.

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APPENDIX

Biographical Data Sheet

Key Events

1712	Born in Berlin, the capitol of Brandenburg (which was the main province of Prussia), on January 24.
1730	Attempted to escape from Prussia due to his father's cruel treatment; caught and sentenced to death for desertion - subsequently pardoned.
1733	Married; the couple remained childless.
1736-1739	The "Rheinsburg Philosopher" Years; surrounded by writers, scientists and musicians he became known throughout Europe as a cultured, sensitive Crown Prince.
1740	Became King of Prussia on June 1.
	Invaded Silesia (Austrian province located in present day Czechoslovakia) on December 16 thereby precipitating the War of the Austrian Succession.
1742	Peace with Austria on July 28, ending the First Silesian War. Frederick had obtained most of Silesia.
1744	Second Silesian War began on August 15 with Frederick's preemptory attack on Austria's ally-Bohemia. This war was to retain Silesia.
1745	Second Silesian War ended on Christmas Day with Austria's recognition of Prussian ownership of Silesia.
1756	Frederick began Seven Years War by preemptorily attacking Austria via an invasion of Saxony. Frederick's only ally against the combined forces of continental Europe was England. Became known as 'Great' for his military genius during this war of survival.
1763	Peace for Prussia on February 15. No territories gained but none lost.
1772	Frederick, in combination with Austria and Russia annexes part of Poland-the First Partition of Poland.
1777	Frederick led a 100,000 man Prussian Army in a show of force to prevent his lifelong foe, Austria, from annexing Bavaria.

1785 Formed 'Confederation of German Princes' as a defensive alliance against Austria. Forerunner to a united, and Prussian dominated, Germany.

1786 Died on August 17.