

AIR COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE

STUDENT REPORT

THE RIMLAND OF NORTHEAST ASIA: A STUDY OF SOVIET POWER PROJECTION

MAJ. CHARLES D. HILLEBRAND 84-1260

"insights into tomorrow"



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Presents an outline and discussion of the geopolitical concept developed by N.J. Spykman as it relates to Soviet militarism. It emphasizes the importance to world stability of the "rimlands" of Europe, the Middle East, Africa, South Asia, and the Far East. For the purpose of this paper, the rimland of Northeast Asia is specifically examined and serves as a model of the entire geopolitical concept. The purpose of the study is to determine whether or not Soviet power projection in Northeast Asia conforms to Spykman's theory of geopolitics.

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PREFACE

To answer, or at least gain an understanding, of the impact of geopolitical thought on Soviet strategy, this paper will examine five distinct factors that are evident today in Northeast Asia. The approach taken will be a "building-block" process from general geopolitical theories, as a background, through considerations that the West must make in countering Soviet power and influence.

The study will compare the geopolitical views of two of the most prominent theoreticians, Sir Halford Mackinder and Nicholas J. Spykman. It is Spykman's theory of heartland versus rimlands that will form the basis of our view of Soviet strategy. Following the theoretical foundation, we will examine the Soviet threat to Northeast Asia. From the earliest eastward push into Siberia to the final push to the Pacific Coast, Russian and Soviet power will be examined in a historical context. The fourth chapter is devoted to the recent building of Soviet military forces in Northeast Asia. Here, we examine the preponderence of ground, sea, and air forces that have been built mainly within the last ten years. Chapter five ties the previous four together in that it will correlate the Soviet force increase with Spykman's geopolitical theory of control of the rimlands. The final chapter will discuss the implications of Soviet strategy as they apply both to Northeast Asia and the United States.

Since world politics are no longer simply bi-polar, only concerned with super-power relations, it is mandatory for us to maintain regional interests that include states other than simply the Soviet Union. American security policy cannot only consider events as they occur in Moscow, but must consider regional, or more specifically, "rimland", events as they evolve in the geopolitical arena.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Major Charles Hillebrand is a graduate of the University of the Pacific (BA 1967), and Texas Christian University (MA 1976). He enlisted in the Air Force in 1967 and served as a flight-line mechanic until acceptance into Officer Training School in 1969. After commissioning, he was assigned to the Ogden Air Logistics Center as a logistics officer. In 1971, Maj. Hillebrand was selected for Undergraduate Pilot Training at Williams Air Force Base, Arizona. After completion of training, he was assigned to Carswell AFB, Texas, to fly the B-52. He completed two Arc Light tours in Southeast Asia while assigned to Carswell. Subsequent assignments include Headquarters, 15th Air Force (SAC) as exercise planner in the Current Operations Branch and Duty Director of Operations, at the United Nations Command, Combined Forces Command, US Forces Korea, Eighth US Army, headquarters in Seoul Korea. Major Hillebrand is a graduate of Squadron Officers School and Air Command and Staff College.

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

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REPORT NUMBER: 84-1260

AUTHOR(S): MAJOR CHARLES D. HILLEBRAND, USAF

TITLE: THE RIMLAND OF NORTHEAST ASIA: A STUDY OF SOVIET POWER PROJECTION

I. Purpose: To determine if the increase in Soviet ability to project military power in Northeast Asia follows a geopolitical theory.

II. Problem: Soviet military power has increased dramatically in the last ten years in Northeast Asia. The capability for force projection is out of proportion with purely defensive needs. The West must determine why the build-up has taken place and if there is a fundamental reason for it. If the Soviets are following some regional blueprint for their actions, then it is imperative for the United States to recognize and constructively confront the problem.

III. Data: American Nicholas J. Spykman, argued persuasively in his 1944 book, The Geography of the Peace, the concept of geopolitical rimlands. He saw, as did Sir Halford Mackinder, the British geopolitician, the heartland Soviet Union at the center of any geopolitical conflict. Spykman differed from Mackinder, however, in that he believed that world stability depended on the rimlands and their relationships with the heartland. Rimlands surround the Soviet Union; they are Europe, the Middle East, Africa, South Asia, and the Far East. If any of these exterior regions were

CONTINUED

to join the central power of the Soviet Union, they could control the destinies of the world. This paper extracts historical data and presents current information to develop a logical view that supports Spykman's dictum that: "Who controls the rimland rules Eurasia; who rules Eurasia controls the destinies of the world." Earlier geopolitical proponents saw a rimland power, such as Nazi Germany, conquering the heartland to form an irrepressible force. They did not see the emergence of a powerful Soviet Union after World War II. Based on historical fact, however, the Soviet Union has evidenced a geopolitical strategy by seeking to dominate the rimlands. They are attempting, it would appear, to mirror Spykman's theories by gaining control of the rimlands and consolidating them with the heartland to gain control of Eurasia and thus the destinies of the world. The hypothesis developed in this paper is substantiated by examining five areas. The first area outlines the concept that Spykman developed to emphasize the importance of the rimlands to world stability. The second provides evidence to indicate that the security of Northeast Asia is jeopardized by the Soviets. As a follow-up to the second area, the third quantitatively shows how the Soviet Union, since 1974, has increased its military power in Northeast Asia. The fourth area provides evidence to support the contention that Soviet power projection in the region conforms to Spykman's theory of geopolitics. Finally, the paper discusses the implications to the United States and its allies of Soviet power projection in Northeast Asia.

IV. Conclusions: The Soviet Union is attempting to gain control, in time, of Northeast Asia through its constant building of military might. If the Soviets do not follow Spykman's dictum concerning control of the rimlands, they follow a similar variant of it; the correlation is too close to differentiate.

V. Recommendations: Soviet power has inexorably pushed out from its heartland center with the idea of fomenting at best, unrest, and at worst, anarchy. The Soviets of today are no different from the Czars of past centuries. Their goal has always been total security. Total security dictates domination, and domination is the ultimate security. If we conclude that the Soviets use a form of "amoebic diplomacy", then it is in our best interest to view all Soviet activity in a geopolitical context. Our geopolitical views cannot be country specific; they must be regional, and ultimately, global.

CHAPTER ONE

THE GEOPOLITICAL BASIS OF SOVIET POWER

THE PROBLEM IN CONTEXT

> States are always engaged in curbing the force of some other state. The truth of the matter is that states are interested only in a balance which is in their favor. Not an equilibrium, but a generous margin is their objective. There is no real security in being just as strong as a potential enemy; there is security only in being a little stronger. There is no possibility of action if one's strength is fully checked, there is a chance for a positive foreign policy only if there is a margin of force which can be freely used (7:21).

The use of force in the pursuit of one nation's relations with others is certainly not a new phenomenon. Force, or national power, has many dimensions; military, economic, political, psychosocial, and scientific-technological (11:9). These elements can and do change over time so it is difficult to focus on one aspect to determine a single, driving force in any international relationship. This fact is no more evident today than in the East-West confrontation and in the magnitude of Soviet military increases.

There has always been much diverse speculation about the "true" purposes of the Soviet Union. What are they after? Do they have a "grand strategy"? Has the country's massive military capability been developed solely in response to a national paranoia to defend against possible future invasions? Or has it been developed to ultimately project a Soviet conception of a world social order? These questions are undoubtedly difficult to answer from a Western perspective and will never be definitively resolved.

One fact, however, concerning the Soviet Union can be firmly stated; it has been engaged, for a number of years, in an extraordinary buildup of military forces (23:1-2). What is to be gained from such a costly increase of military power by a country that has acute internal problems, and a history of appalling losses in war? (19.1). The Soviet Union is a large and strong country with substantial resources and firm boundaries but still it does not seem content to adhere to the status quo.

The answer to this question, and the basis of this paper, is perhaps founded in the geopolitical theories postulated by Nicholas J. Spykman. If one is to assume that a state, the Soviet Union, is seeking a balance of power in its favor, then one might determine a method or plan by which that favorable balance could be obtained. Does the Soviet Union follow a guideline in its actions and is there evidence to show that the military force buildup is the backbone of this guideline?

Regardless of what area of the globe one cares to examine, there is Soviet involvement and often agitation. The facts of large force increases are evident from the Warsaw Pact areas to the Soviet Far East. It would be a mistake, however, to attempt to deduce an underlying framework or pattern of Soviet behavior from a broad global context. Rather, a specific geographical area should be scrutinized to attempt to correlate Soviet military power increases and concurrent projection with a specific motive. To do this, Northeast Asia will be examined in light of Soviet military increases in an attempt to determine if that power projection conforms to any specific geopolitical plan to gain not equilibrium, but a margin of force.

HISTORICAL MILITARISM

Recent Soviet power projection in Northeast Asia cannot be viewed as a distinct and separate occurrence. A historical context is necessary for background development and as a basis for future postulation. Geopolitics and the desire or "need" for territory has been, for centuries, a fixture of Russian psychology. Further, Russian military forces have always been at the apex of this territorial development. Shortly before World War I, a retired Russian Prime Minister boldly explained:

> In truth, what is it that has essentially upheld Russian statehood? Not only primarily, but exclusively the army. Who created the Russian Empire, transforming the semi-Asiatic Muscovite tsardom into the most influential, most dominant, grandest European power? Only the power of the army's bayonet. The world bowed not to our culture, not to our bureaucratized church, not to our wealth and prosperity. It bowed to our might (19:1).

There are those who would see Russian territorial imperatives based on a collective national fear of invasion. It is true that throughout history, the Russians have been invaded and dominated by foreign powers. Three invasions were particularly devastating, but one should not use these as an apologia for current militarism. The thirteenth century Tartar and Mongol invasion, the French and Prussian invasion of 1812 and finally, the Nazi invasion of 1941, cannot be balanced against, nor be a rationalization for, the numerous Russian invasions and conquests. As Richard Pipes said,

"After all, a country does not become the largest state in the world, as Russia has been since the seventeenth century, merely by absorbing or repelling foreign invasions" (19:2). In fact, between the middle of the sixteenth century and the end of the seventeenth, Russia conquered territory the size of the modern Netherlands every year for 150 years running (2:35).

Historical Russian expansionism and the inclusion of various geographical entities into the empire was driven by economic needs. The military was developed as a means of enforcing and solidifying the territorial gains. The early Russian empire consisted of an area (taiga) of forest and land not conducive to a great agricultural output. This factor, the lack of suitable farmland, fueled the initial expansion and colonization to the southwest during the sixteenth to eighteenth centuries. By the end of the eighteenth century, the Crimea had been conquered and attention given to obtaining land in the Balkans and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth (19:3). These lands helped provide an agricultural economy that was impossible in the harsher northern latitudes of the original Soviet state.

Historically, the Russians have by necessity been involved in geopolitics. The feeding of a people requires good land, and good land had to be acquired. Concurrent with this land acquisition, a means of enforcement had to be developed. The Russians had to devote a large percentage of their wealth to a military force to protect and defend their acquisitions. Peter the Great, one of the founders of modern Russia, required the nation to maintain three professional soldiers per one hundred inhabitants which was a ratio three times higher, at that time, than the richer countries of the West (19:3). Thus, this process, the land acquisition and the need to protect it, came early in the development of modern Russia and set the stage for which Pipes sees as a tragic vicious circle: The lack of an economic base requires conquest; conquests demand a large military; the large military saps the productive forces of the country which in turn creates the need for more economic conquests (19:3).

It would be simplistic to view the Soviet intentions or strategies of today as based only on some dim historic need for land in order to feed its people. While certainly not totally self-sufficient in food production today, the Soviet Union does not determine its policies on which areas might be added to increase agricultural production. This history must be understood in its geographical context, because it did set the stage and does form the basis of a contemporary outlook. That view is of an empire surrounded by forces determined to disrupt Russian security - paranoid perhaps, but whatever the "psychological" implication, a geopolitical fact, nevertheless, and as has been discussed, an implication that breeds militarism and the requirement for, what many consider, excessive forces.

The Russian Revolution and the ascent of the Marxist-Leninist state in no way ameliorated the Russian view of the world. In fact, the Bolsheviks probably refined and clarified the confrontational "vicious cycle". The dialectics of Marx viewed the world in terms of an irreconcilable conflict; conflict between socialism and capitalism and therefore between East and West. The Czarist foundations have changed in no way. The need for secure territory and the force required to maintain that territory is no less mandatory under Andropov than it was under Peter the Great.

This brief historical overview has not attempted to explain or justify Soviet foreign policy. Nor does it attempt to explore a communist point of view. It is included only to highlight the interplay of forces that may be involved in contemporary actions. Those forces are geopolitical. The territorial imperatives that gave birth to early Russian expansion are alive today in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Soviet territory must be protected, and protected by a strong military instrument of power. The ominous factor of the drive for security, including the underlying principle of the Socialist-Capitalist struggle, is that geography is of paramount importance. Because it is so important, it follows that territory can and will be taken in order to achieve or enhance that security. Russian foreign and defense policy can be viewed as "substantially determined by policital culture, and political culture is very largely the product of national historical experience, which, in turn, reflects evolving national geographical circumstances" (2:36).

CONTEMPORARY VIEWS OF EAST-WEST TENSION

Many strategies have been advanced by the West to contain Soviet expansion and, for the most part, they have been successful if one considers that nuclear war has not occurred. However, given the assumption that the Soviet Union is a power driven, by necessity, to territorial expansion, a more fundamental view of stabilizing that drive will be examined.

The policy of containment, enunciated in 1947 by the Truman Doctrine, has worked and is still a viable tenet of foreign policy. The concept of detente, however, seemingly ran aground in light of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. No matter what policy the United States and her allies develop, they seem to be either defensive, or at best, reactive to Soviet action. If we are to effectively counter the Soviets, we must develop a more positive and more concrete viewpoint. The reaction to Soviet action can only result in the gradual, if very imperceptable, erosion of Western influence.

We can stem this seemingly inexorable involvement in some respect by viewing the world as do the Soviets. This view is geopolitical and is the basis of an argument that sees Soviet power

projection in terms of geopolitical theory. The factors to be explored only consider one area of Soviet interests, Northeast Asia, but hopefully they will shed some light on whether or not there is a theme apparent in Soviet action. Does current Soviet power projection and concomitant military buildup conform to any underlying strategy or is it a haphazard accumulation of action and reaction? Specifically, is it an extension of Spykman's theory of geopolitics which, simply stated says, "who controls the rimlands rules Eurasia; who rules Eurasia controls the destinies of the world" (8:43)?

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CHAPTER TWO

HISTORICAL PROCESSES IN GEOPOLITICAL THOUGHT: MACKINDER TO SPYKMAN

INTRODUCTION

To gain an understanding of the precepts that will guide the arguments of this study, the geopolitical groundwork must be examined. If the Soviet Union's activities do follow some geopolitical format, then the forms, or philosophies, should be understood. To begin this discussion, the work of the founder of modern geopolitical thought, Sir Halford Mackinder will be discussed. Finally, to set the stage and framework for the comparison of Soviet action, the thinking of Nicholas Spykman will be examined.

THE WORLD ISLAND

An Englishman, Sir Halford Mackinder, is generally considered the most influential of geopolitical theoreticians. His writings, which spanned the periods from 1904 to 1943, basically recognized the necessity to think of politics in a global context rather than actions of individual states or even continents. His main focus espoused the view of world politics as opposed to individual politics. The root of world politics lay in the development of ocean navigation and the discovery of sea routes to India and the Americas. This maritime mobility then formed the basis of a new geopolitical structure which was the overseas empire. The great empires of history, China, Rome, and Russia, were replaced by the sea empires of the British, French, Spanish and finally the United States. It was sea power that made possible a conception of the Eurasian continent and which governed the relationships between the Old and New Worlds. Mackinder, in 1904, was the first to study in detail the relations between land and sea power on a truly global scale (48:35). Mackinder used as his frame of reference a map centered on Siberia. His analysis treated Europe as one of the many peninsulas of the Eurasian land mass rather than the center of the world. His basic idea was an evolution from the sea-oriented thinking of the previous generations. Eurasia was for centuries of secondary importance to world politics as a consequence of the greater efficiency of the seas as opposed

to overland communication and the impenetrability of the Arctic Ocean. The coming of the railroads in the 19th century previewed a forthcoming advantage of land over sea communication. Consequently, Mackinder felt that Eurasia-Africa should be thought of as a vast two-continent "world-island" in which the comparative ease of land transport as opposed to sea transport was of fundamental importance to geopolitical thought (2:21). In his 1904 writings, Mackinder saw a "pivot area" in Eurasia that was inaccessible to sea power. This area was, originally, thought of as the Siberian expanse where all rivers either drained into the Arctic Ocean or the rimland, Aral and Caspian Seas, at which no point touched the open oceans. This central area was geopolitically important because it was one of constant pressure from the indigenous tribes against the various states occupying the coastal regions surrounding it. Mackinder termed these coastal regions the "inner crescent" which included those continental states which had direct access to the sea and thus exercised both land and maritime power (2:36). He also defined an "outer crescent" consisting of islands and off-shore continents, including North America, whose power was solely based on oceanic interaction. Mackinder, then, saw power relationships defined through a land-sea contrast; one was invulnerable to the other. But he predicted that the coming of railroads, and eventually air routes, within the pivot areas of the world-island would significantly change the balance of power between land and sea, with the advantage tilting to the land. Above all else, Mackinder feared that one or a combination of powers (Russia-Germany in particular) would use the new means of rapid overland communication, first, to create a vast imbalance of power in Eurasia, then to conquer the Eurasian world island. Then the resources of the world island would be used in a bid for world conquest which would be successful because of the greater resource base of the world island as opposed to the outer crescent (2:21).

Later, in refining his thesis, Mackinder used the term "heartland" to identify the earlier pivot area. His basic thinking was the same, however, and that was the conflict of sea versus land power. He never claimed that a land power occupying the heartlands would eventually conquer the world island and subsequently the world. He did claim that "the grouping of lands and seas, and of fertility and natural pathways, is such as to lend itself to the growth of empires, and in the end a simple world empire" (2:23).

Thus far, in the discussion of Mackinder's theories, little, except for the land-locked pivot area, has been said about geography specifically. Central to Mackinder's thought, as we have seen, was the Siberian plain which he called the pivot area. He coined the other terms, inner and outer crescents, for a reason; they physically represented crescents centered around the pivot area. And as will be discussed later, these "crescents" play a

significant part in later theories. Mackinder viewed the plains of Siberia surrounded by a crescent of mountain ranges, the Scandanavian mountains to the west, the European Alps to the south and west, the Himalyas to the south and east and the mountains of the Chuckchi Peninsula to the east. These mountain ranges effectively buffered the pivot area from the inner crescent of those lands that were a mixture of land and sea power. The inner crescent consisted of the European coastal lowlands, the lowlands of the Middle East around to the lowlands of India and China. The outer crescent, then, consisted of those countries and continents that were separated from the inner by the world's oceans.

Mackinder's main concern, naturally, was defense of his British homeland. The conclusion could be drawn that because of this tendency, his main contentions consisted of inner crescent, and island Britain, versus heartland power conflicts. He foresaw the danger, that unless the powers of the outer crescent, in support of those of the inner, sought to insure that no single power or alliance should ever gain control of the world island.

Mackinder's thesis underwent transition and change as the two world wars were fought. As the power of Germany rose, the thought of a powerfully aggressive Eurasian heartland was left behind. The vulnerability of the heartland to conquest from an inner crescent power became the main concern. In fact, in 1919, Mackinder, urged the construction of a tier of states in Eastern Europe that could serve as a strong buffer zone for the protection of heartland Russia against a German attempt to control the heartland (2:26). With this line of thinking evident, the famous Mackinder dictum:

> Who rules East Europe commands the Heatland: Who rules the Heartland commands the World Island; Who rules the World Island commands the world (2:25).

In 1943, Mackinder's ideas had evolved further when he discarded the idea that the heartland should be defined in terms of the Arctic Ocean and continental river drainage. In its place, instead of the Siberian plain, he equated the heartland simply with the territory of the U.S.S.R. As one of his last observations, he warned:

> All things considered, the conclusion is unavoidable that if the Soviet Union emerges from this war as conqueror of Germany, she must rank as the greatest power on the globe. Moreover, she will be the power in the strategically strongest defensive position. The heartland is the greatest natural fortress on earth. For the first time in history, it is manned by a garrison sufficient both in number and quality (2:23).

MACKINDER'S WORLD

PARENTHETICAL NAMES REPRESENT EARLIEST TERMINOLOGY

Fig. 1
10

THE RIMLANDS

> The principle lesson is clear. The most important single fact in the American security situation is the question of who controls the rimlands of Europe and Asia (8:x).

This statement, by the American geopolitician Nicholas J. Spykman, offers a counterproposal to the theories of Mackinder and forms the basis of the study of Soviet power projection.

Writing in the early 1940's, Spykman built on Mackinder's geographical elements of power and proposed a counter-theory based on the historical facts of the first half of the 20th century. Spykman promoted the concept that geopolitics recognizes that the problem of peace inevitably involves the territorial relations of states in a geographical sense (8:6). To him, the field of geopolitics was also the field of foreign policy, whose particular type of analysis used geographic factors to help in the formulation of adequate policies for the achievement of justifiable political ends (8:6).

The early thinking of Spykman could be said to be a continuation or refinement of Mackinder's concept of sea versus land power. Spykman carried this basically black and white dichotomy further because he saw that World Wars I and II were not simple land-sea power struggles (2:27).

> In other words, there has never really been a simple land power-sea power opposition. The historical alignment has always been in terms of some members of the rimland with Great Britain against some members of the rimland with Russia; or Great Britain and Russia together against a dominating rimland power (8:43).

He was not convinced that Mackinder's heartland, which both agreed to be Russia, had the potential to make the predicted bid for control of the world island (2:27). With this in mind he stated his counterdictum to Mackinder:

> Who controls the rimland rules Eurasia;
> Who rules Eurasia controls the destinies of the world (8:43).

To this point, then, it would appear that little had been developed in geopolitical thought other than two somewhat contradictory but related theories of the evolution of national power and the possible consequences of that power based on

geography. But Spykman's discussion did not stop merely with the postulation of a counter-proposal. He developed his thinking further to provide cogent ideas for American defense based on a geopolitical context. Spykman, it would appear, never intended to identify the Soviet Union as a major threat to the rimlands. He saw it as simply the heartland, with the rimland nations (a term synonymous to Mackinder's inner crescent nation) pulsing against and around it. If any of those nations were to conquer the heartland, the combination of rimland power and heartland resources could very well be irresistable.

What Spykman did not foresee was the rise of the heartland power, Russia, subsequent to World War II. It is in this context that his further writings should be viewed. Specifically, are his views pertinent to the Soviet Union and have they, in one form or another, been adopted by heartland Russia as a geopolitical outlook on the world?

Spykman saw American distance from the European struggles of the 19th century guaranteed primarily by British seapower. However, World War II, in his view, introduced a totally new problem, the airplane, which greatly changed the relationships between the great powers. The north held the greatest attraction for Spykman, because he saw it as the shortest route between the Old and New Worlds. He felt that since the northern front "is the one which brings us closest in terms of air power to the Eurasian center of power, it is inevitable, so the argument goes, that any accurate map for war strategy must concentrate on that front" (8:16). This northern front concept, developed by Spykman during World War II, must be seen as an example of his foresight in geopolitical thinking. Although the importance of the north polar regions has been lessened politically, (it is not one of the rimlands) it did provide the basis of later intercontinental missile strategies.

Spykman's dispute with Mackinder arose mainly from their differing views of the relative geographical strength of the Russian heartland. Primarily, he thought that, "in the absence of revolutionary developments in agricultural techniques the center of agrarian productivity will remain in western Russia rather than central Siberia" (8:38). This statement coincides with one of the theoretical elements of national power being agricultural (grain) production and the importance of a temperate climate for adequate production. Further, Spykman pointed out that the difficulty of mineral extraction from Siberia, even if large reserves were substantiated, was of such magnitude to keep the center of the heartland west of the Urals (8:34). Thus, Spykman felt that the heartland power was more centered or oriented to only one, the European, rimland and was not a force

as great as imagined by Mackinder. In refuting the Mackinder dictum, Spykman stated:

> The fallacy of this blanket application of a theory of history is seen when we realize that the opposition between these two states has never been inevitable. In three great world wars of the 19th and 20th centuries--Napoleonic Wars, World War I and World War II-the British and Russian empires lined up together against an intervening rimland power (8:43).

Spykman saw the relative power of the rimland as being more important than the heartland. Of course, his main thrust was developed from a World War II perspective. This is true when we consider that he was attempting to refute Mackinder during a global war that involved rimland Germany. He detailed this thinking by stating that "...predominant importance of the rimland and the necessity of British-Russian-U.S. collaboration to prevent the growth of German power in this area" (8:44). The heartland, he felt, became less important than the rimland because the wartime allies and their land and sea power would control the European rimland and thereby the essential power relations of the world.

If Spykman felt that Mackinder did not go far enough by espousing a land power-sea power struggle, it could be said that Spykman did not go quite far enough by only basing his arguments in terms of the German attempt for hegemony. This is hindsight, of course, since it would have been difficult to foresee the emergence of Soviet power after World War II. Regardless of that fact, Spykman's theories can be seen as valid if the central power is simply shifted from the rimland to the heartland, in other words, from Germany to the Soviet Union.

To understand and determine the timelessness of Spykman's thinking, his fundamental postulations will be discussed. From this thinking, the relevance to today may be realized.

The physical size and topography, along with national resources, were to Spykman important aspects of a state's actual or potential power. Along with these determinants, he felt that location was all important in a nation's international relations (8:22).

> In attempting to achieve security the statesman must consider this situation and act so that whatever possibilities exist of minimizing or preventing the completion of encirclement, they will be utilized (8:22).

This idea of encirclement can be applied to Russian thinking also. The fear of invasion from the plains to the east and west of the heartland can both historically and presently be ascribed to Soviet thinking. If one were to consider a country "surrounded by others whose national resources and general power potential are larger than his own and he has no topographical features to protect him, encirclement will become a real threat" (8:22). Did Spykman intend to describe the popular theory of Russian paranoia in this passage or was he simply stating a generalized thought? The richer and more temperate rimlands of Europe, the Middle East and Asia, could be seen as being potentially harmful to the heartland if such a theory were taken literally. Spykman, in 1944, when his major work, The Geography of the Peace, was published, was primarily concerned with the possibility of the rimland, in conjunction with a conquered heartland, forming an irresistable power. Throughout history, and up until World War II,it had been the maritime rimlands who had contested for power. Mackinder had seen the importance of the heartland in a new equation because of its potential land power. Spykman, however, saw the vital geopolitical importance of the rimlands and their potential in the power equation.

If we are to consider the center of geopolitical power to be heartland Russia, as did both Mackinder and Spykman, then we can see the importance of the statement that:

> The territorial encirclement of a state will have little meaning, however, for its security position unless the economic condition of the surrounding state is strong enough to overbalance the power potential of the encircled unit. It is thus necessary to examine carefully the national resources and industrial development of the areas under consideration and compare their availability and strength (8:22).

The question that must be asked then is, does the Soviet Union consider that a group of rimland powers surrounds her? And more importantly, do the Soviets see a geopolicial necessity in trying to overcome these rimland powers, one by one, in order to prevent encirclement or in order to take control of them to finally rule Eurasia and control the destinies of the world?

The answer to both of these questions may be discerned in one final quotation from Spykman:

> Finally, the situation will be completely defined only if the relative political integration of the two regions is taken into

> account. It will make a great difference whether the surrounding territory is organized under one unified government, or whether it consists of a political alliance of two or more powers. The seriousness of the situation will be easily gauged by the nature and extent of alliances concluded between the states that territorially make up the encirclement. In other words, geographic, economic, and political factors are all part of the analysis and it is only when all three are examined that the real meaning of such a position can be grasped (8:22).

Do the Soviets see any validity in Spykman's theory of global politics? Do they see NATO as a threat to be liquidated? Do they see China and its rapprochement with the United States and Japan as a potentially devastating triumverate? Do they see these rimlands as enemies to be conquered to insure the final ascendency of the Communist state over Eurasia? An answer may be found by closely examining the enormous military buildup in Northeast Asia directly facing the East Asian rimlands.



SPYKMAN'S WORLD

Fig. 2
16

CHAPTER THREE

THE SOVIET THREAT IN ASIA

INTRODUCTION

The Russian drive for territory began, as we have seen, when the Dukes of Muskovy acquired land to the south and west in order to feed their people. The heartland pushed out, either by military conquest or by the filling of political vacuums. The Russian drive across Asia to the Pacific was no different. The vast expanses of Siberia were nothing more than empty areas to be filled and controlled by St. Peterburg's and then Moscow's power. The only unique factor in this push was that it took so long.

Approximately three centuries were devoted to Russia's expansion to the Pacific, primarily because it was involved in its struggle to become,first and foremost, a European power (1:97). The Siberian plains offered no real resistance geographically to the Russians. The Ural mountains are not a great barrier to eastward expansion. They are relatively low and easy to traverse. But the sheer distances involved and the extremes of temperature delayed the first Russian settlements in the Far East until the seventeenth century. The first Russian settlement was founded by an explorer, Kharbarov, who built a fort at the junction of the Amur and Ussuri rivers in 1651 (1:98). For many years thereafter, there were constant clashes in the Amur region between Russian explorers and adventurers and the indigenous Chinese.

The Russian expansion to the east has been compared to the American expansion to the west: a painful push through vast territory facing harsh elements and hostile natives (1:98). Although late to realize the value of its eastern possessions, the Soviets were always interested in expansion. The historic desire for warm-water ports was certainly one reason for Russian eastward expansion. The Korean coast, the Yellow Sea and to the south, the Persian Gulf, were always seen as possible routes to the sea (1:97). Since no Asian power was strong enough to block Russian growth, the continued drift to the east was inevitable. As Buss states in his history of the Far East, "The nationalist and dynamic policies of Russia sought to expand the grandeur of

Russia and the glamour of the Czar into the political vacuum with which the country was fringed" (1:97).

Although very slow to develop, the Russian claim for political and territorial strength in Asia is not new. The Czars of earlier times left an Asian inheritance to their followers, the Bolsheviks. Today, the Asian population of Russia is approximately 20% of the total,and the proportion is increasing more rapidly than the Slavs, Balts, and Moldavians (17:313). The eastward expansion also has accounted for an Asian land area of 75% of the total Soviet Union mass of 8.6 million square miles (17:313). Therefore, the heartland's claim to Asia is not new nor is it historically unfounded. The Soviet history in Siberia and the Far East has a basis hundreds of years old. But as before, it is a history founded on military expansion and on a drive to secure borders from hostile invasion. The eastward drive of Russia can be viewed as a push outward to the rimlands. The whole of modern Northeast Asian history can be viewed as a synthesis of Russian/Soviet involvement.

To assess this view, the remainder of this chapter will be devoted to an examination of historical Soviet conflict in Northeast Asia. It will examine more closely the expansion through Siberia to the Pacific and discuss the historic aspects of relations with the three major rimland nations of the region, China, Japan and Korea.

RUSSIAN EXPANSION: THE IMPORTANCE OF SIBERIA AND THE FAR EAST

"Siberia has outgrown the older view as a stepchild of European Russia and has gained recognition as a political stronghold and economic storehouse of the Soviet Union" (1:12). If this statement is valid, then there are obvious geopolitical relationships that can be derived from Soviet interests in the area. This geopolitical link consists of two distinct entities: economic interests and the necessity of ensuring border integrity and hence a need for military power.

Soviet Asia is important economically because of its diversity. Although a harsh climate is indigenous to most of the vast territory, agriculture is important. Grain crops can be produced in some areas;and there has been enough development to produce some exportable quantities of wheat, rye, barley, and soy beans (1:12). Although the harsh climate of Siberia will probably never allow an agricultural development to rival the "bread baskets" of the world, the timber resources of East Siberia are virtually untapped. The reserves there, though difficult to develop and extract, are of substantial enough amount to rival the United States west coast as an exporter of lumber to Asia (1:13). The economic resources of agriculture and timber pale, however, to the mineral

reserves of Soviet Siberia. The mineral wealth has barely begun to be realized. There are known oil reserves in Sakhalin and in Central Asia which are being exploited. Coal reserves, estimated to be as great as one-fifth of the world's reserves, have been found (1:13). Also, many varieties of other minerals have been found. These strategic minerals include iron, tungsten, chromium, uranium, manganese, vanadium, magnesite, cobalt and bismuth. Deposits of precious metals are also present in the area, including gold, silver, and platinum (1:13). The economic potential of the Soviet Far East is, as far as we are able to determine in the West, virtually unlimited. The problem for the Soviets, however, is how to tap the economic storehouse. The extraction of these resources requires technology -- a technology that the Soviets have not yet developed. The vast distances, the harsh climate, and the sparse population of the region combine to make the economic reserves only a potential wealth. Since the main industrial centers of Russia are situated west of the Urals, the problem of extraction and transportation are magnified since there are no major processing areas outside of European Russia. Further, these resources are becoming much more important because the exhaustion of basic natural resources such as oil, coal, and iron ore in European Russia makes it imperative that the resources of Siberia, Central Asia, and the Far East be exploited (9:60). This economic factor is important geopolitically because it will, by necessity, increase Soviet pressure to the east and hence pressure on the rimland of Northeast Asia.

Border security has always been a dominant theme in Russian political dealings. Historically, in its search for collective security, the Soviet Union has signed non-aggression pacts with every neighbor that could be talked into one (9:92). Soviet actions in the Far East have been no different. In Central Asia, Outer Mongolia has become a "client", or buffer, between the Soviets and Chinese. The Chinese themselves, were once thought to be a reliable ally of the Russians. With the increasing economic value of the Soviet Far East, the Russian proclivity for secure borders and docile neighbors will become more and more of a necessity. The early eastward expansion gained useable Pacific ports and these ports have become a strategic necessity. They not only serve as a focus of eastward power projection but also form a basis or outpost that can be turned westward and brought to bear on the central Asian and Far Eastern borderlands. As will be discussed later, the buildup of Soviet power has been increasing rapidly in this region and it is perhaps because the focus of Soviet policy has shifted. Siberia and the East are no longer "step-children". They are economically valuable, serve as a point of power projection, and also as a wedge or "foot-in-the-door" for collective security systems (hegemony) throughout Northeast Asia.

SINO-RUSSIAN RELATIONS

In many respects, Russian culture can be said to have been derived from Asian influence. The long Mongol domination of Russia, from the early thirteenth to the late fifteenth century, was devastating to the national psyche but it did teach them how to deal with Orientals and brought them their first contacts with China and the Chinese. Shortly after Mongol yoke was cast off, the Russians began their push across Siberia (1:98).

After Russian exploration across Siberia into Manchuria and to the Pacific coast, came the first Sino-Russian Treaty. In 1689, the treaty of Nerchinsk was signed. The borders between China and Russia were fixed in the region of the Amur River watershed and further formalized trade between the two countries and ended a half century of warfare in the region. This first treaty was only the beginning of a long series of Sino-Russian "push-pull" relationships in the Far East that lasted for two hundred years. By the middle of the 19th century, however, Russia had been frustrated in other attempts at expansion, particularly in the Near East (Crimea), and desired a means of re-establishing prestige and self-confidence. The means by which to restore prestige was Northeast Asia. As Buss states:

> The Czardom...needed to protect the Russian coastline in Siberia and the worth of the Amur River against a possible attack from a combined Anglo-French fleet. The Russians proceeded to solidify their holdings in Northeast Asia, participate in unequal treaties with the other Western powers in China, acquire for themselves all the privileges available in Japan, and push their penetration into Central Asia and toward the frontiers of China (1:100).

Through various diplomatic dealings and sometimes overt hostility, the Russians managed to solidify their holdings in Eastern Siberia. With the Chinese as partners, they took joint control of the Amur Basin, later to be called the Maritime Provinces. In 1860, the entire territory was ceded to Russia in the Treaty of Peking. Through long and devious machinations, a weak China had been coerced into legitimizing Russian expansion to the Pacific. Through the Treaty of Peking, Russia added 600 miles to its coastline and founded the naval base and city of Vladivostok, which in Russian means "master of the East" (1:100).

Additional treaties were signed during the 19th century concerning other Sino-Russian border areas to the west. For example,

the Treaty of St. Petersberg, in 1881, dealt with the Central Asian Chinese provinces. At any rate, the history of Chinese and Russian political dealings up to the end of the Chinese empire, were usually one-sided and "entirely adequate for Russia to push its political schemes to the limit of its power in Central (and East) Asia (1:103).

RUSSO - JAPANESE RELATIONS

Russia's relations with Japan are similar in many respects to those with China. Throughout the years after the first Russian settlements in the Far East there was a constant "push-pull" relationship with Japan. For several hundred years, the Russians and Japanese were major contestants for control and domination of Northeast Asia, particularly Korea and Manchuria (4:1).

The earliest relations between these two powers concerned the Sakhalin Island and the Kurile Islands. After Russia established the first permanent settlements in Kamchatka in the seventeenth century, there was a constant probing southward. The Russians were ostensively interested in fishing and trading rights in the area. The first formal document signed between the two nations was the Treaty of Shimoda in 1855. The agreement divided the Kurile Islands into Russian and Japanese territory and provided for a joint control of Sakhalin. This division was changed soon after by the Treaty of St. Petersberg in 1875 which gave all of the Kuriles to Japan and all of Sakhalin Island to Russia (4:1).

These early dealings were little more than opening sparring matches in diplomatic relations. The Russians did gain some territory (Sakhalin), but there was no overt action until later in the nineteenth century. As stated earlier, Russia had been preoccupied with her European problems, and it wasn't until she shifted her emphasis to the East, to regain her self-respect, that the relationship with Japan became more heated.

Jain sees the building of the Trans-Siberian Railway as the beginning of actual Russo-Japanese conflict. The Japanese saw the railway as a threat to their own security and expansionsim because it impeded their designs on Manchuria and Korea (4:2). The military buildup in Siberia, due to the construction of the railroad, placed the two imperialistic powers at odds.

Further exacerbation in Russo-Japanese relations occurred when the Chinese ceded to Japan the Liaotung Peninsula of Southern Manchuria. This area contained the strategically important Yellow Sea ports of Port Arthur and Darien. The Russians viewed the Japanese intervention as a menace. As a result, in 1895, Russia allied with France and Germany and compelled Japan to renounce its right to the peninsula. The Russians, not satisfied with simple Japanese expulsion, occupied the peninsula themselves in

1898 giving a blow to Japanese expansionist tendencies and prestige (4:3).

Russia was rapidly gaining influence in the region. She had made inroads in Manchuria, controlled warm water ports on the Yellow Sea, and had established an influence in Korea. Other nations beside Japan also were worried about the Russian territorial increases. Britain saw this expansion as posing a potential danger to its commercial interests in China and also as a threat to the security of its colonies (4:4). For this reason Japan and Britain concluded an alliance in 1902 to contain the Russian threat to the Asian mainland.

The Japanese, in 1905, in an effort to secure their territorial conquests and ensure a sphere of influence in the area, decided to go to war with Russia. As a result of the peace treaty signed in Portsmouth, New Hampshire in 1905, Japan gained absolute control of Korea and in Manchuria established "special interest" along with Russia.

The Russians were bloodied in the Russo-Japanese War, but they did not pull back for long to lick their wounds. In the "push-pull" relationship with Japan, they had been pulled just a bit too hard. They just had not been pulled hard enough to retreat totally. Shortly after the war the two became virtual allies in the area. Four treaties were signed by the Russians and Japanese from 1907 to 1916 which recognized each others spheres of influence in Northeast Asia. Jain feels:

> The objective apparently was to restrain the ally by limiting its political options and deflecting it from any hostile alliance. The alliance did not signify elimination of strategic disharmony. It was an alliance of expansion and conquest...based on the premise of eventual conflict between the two (4:11).

The relationship with Japan continued on much this same idea until the end of World War II. Russia realized that Japanese power was a distinct threat and consciously sought to avoid direct confrontation. Circumstances might change in time and the Russians decided to wait. Russian pragmatism played a very prominent role up to the beginning of World War II. Confronted with the serious German threat to the west and not wanting to fight a two-front war, the Russians entered into a neutrality pact with Japan. The Japanese probably did not desire a northern war against the Russians since they were heavily involved in the remainder of the Pacific. There was probably pragmatism on both sides, with each waiting for a more opportune time to resume territorial ambitions.

The final days of World War II saw the almost predictable

change in the Russian viewpoint. When Japan showed the first signs of defeat, they reversed their neutrality role and agreed at Yalta, in 1945, to declare war against Japan. The primary reason for the shift from neutrality to war was that they realized that continued neutrality in the Pacific War would restrict their future role in the Far East (4:12).

Jain sums up Russo-Japanese relations very succinctly by stating that the disharmony between the two was because of a basic conflict of interests-economic, military, and security.

> In doing what it did, Russia seems to have been guided by the sheer geopolitical necessity of protecting from foreign penetration and domination those areas of Asia-Manchuria, Outer Mongolia, and Sinkiang- which lie adjacent to its borders. Initially, it was the divergent materialistic designs on Korea which fostered disharmony. Subsequently, for several decades, it was the question of control of the strategic routes and potential resources of Manchuria-the strategic key to the whole of East Asia-which embittered relations between the two neighbors. At no stage was the feeling of mutual distrust and suspicion absent though it was often played down for tactical reasons or obscured by apparently parallel interests or similarities of approach (4:12).

RUSSO - KOREAN RELATIONS

Korea, the "dagger pointed at the heart of Japan", has always been a pawn in international power struggles. Russia, in its never-ceasing quest for warm water ports and strategic territorial acquisitions, saw in weak Korea a foothold to be exploited.

The first shots of the Russo-Japanese war signaled the end of Japanese patience with Russia and its territorial probing in Manchuria and Korea. Time after time, Russia had tried to move its naval bases to the south. A port on the northeast Korean peninsula had been surveyed and named as early as 1854 and by 1861, Russian ships had anchored at Tsushima Island between Korea and Japan (1:109).

Constant diplomatic tugs-of-war were the standard in Korea until final Japanese occupation of the peninsula in 1910. The Russians continued to probe into the region in order to put the country within their sphere of influence. The history of Russian involvement in Korea is interesting in that it was more tentative than with the Chinese and Japanese. With China, the Russians gained and then gave up territory. In Korea, the Russian involvement,

historically, seems to be one of putting in a toe to test the water and then immediately withdrawing. When confronted by another power, in 1855, for example, to ply an old Chinese-Japanese emnity, the Russians agreed to supply military advisors to train the Korean military forces. Once invited by the Koreans, they occupied a port on the east coast. However, when the British sailed into a southern Korean port in protest, the Russians quickly left. The remainder of the nineteenth century was nothing but another of the continual "push-pull" of Russian relations. In 1899 the Russians surveyed another port and were ready to purchase it when they found out the Japanese were already there (1:111). Further inroads were attempted, such as sending military forces to extract timber from the Yalu River Valley, but the Russians were generally stymied in their attempts to gain a Korean foothold primarily because of the strength of the Japanese. The Russo-Japanese War put to an end the Russian probing in Korea until after World War II.

With the impending defeat of the Japanese, the Soviets entered the war against Japan. They did so to be able to gain a share of the Pacific "pie" after the Japanese defeat. The "pie" was no more attractive than in Korea. In 1943, the allies agreed that in time, Korea was to become free and independent. The Russians agreed to this principle seeing, perhaps, the door to Korea opened once again for them. By agreement, after the Japanese surrender, the Russians were to control Korea above the Thirty-Eighth parallel and the U.S., below. The line served an immediate military purpose in administering post-war Korea, but it destroyed the economic viability and potential unity of the nation (1:653). North Korea had a sparse population but the majority of the natural resources. South Korea, a direct opposite, had the majority of the people, the most agriculture and the best ports. The arrangement suited the Russians, at least for the time being, since it gained with North Korea a common border and its economic resources to provide a link in a strong chain which Russia, with Siberia, and China, with Manchuria, proposed to forge in Northeast Asia (1:653).

After the Korean War, the Russian "toe" was once again removed from Korea. With both the U.S. and Russia unwilling to risk world war over Korea, overt Russian presence was withdrawn and has remained withdrawn for the last thirty years. But, based on historical precedent, when the time is ripe for testing the water, a Russian presence will probably be seen again.

CONCLUSION

This brief look at historic Russian involvement in Northeast Asia reveals that it seems to have made little difference whether Russian geopolitics were guided by the Czars or by the Politburo: the results have been the same. Since the earliest exploration of

Siberia, the Russians have seemed intent on acquiring more territory in the region. From the Arctic north, their route has been eastward and southward. To the south, in Central Asia, client or buffer states were acquired to fend off the Chinese threat. Russian territorial security was enhanced by adding Mongolia into the Russian sphere. From the Kamchatka peninsula, the last 125 years have seen a constant probing for territory and power. Manchuria was for a time Russian and the Maritime Provinces are now Russian. They have managed to wrest from Japan islands that were historically part of the Japanese island chain. And finally, they attempted the domination of the Korean peninsula.

So from this historical perspective, one can discern an ever constant Russian theme: movement outward. China has been effectively contained on its north and east, and Soviet power is poised on the Pacific pointing both eastward to the north Pacific and southward to Japan. In the broad geopolitical context of Spykman, the heartland has pushed out to the rimland of Northeast Asia. It has made tentative attempts to control parts of the rimland but so far has been rebuffed. But what of the future? As far back as the eighteenth century when Peter was expanding his empire, the Russians have exploited weak neighbors to gain territory. And, as has been shown, the last century has been no different. If the Northeast Asian rimland has been relatively calm for the last decade, what are the Soviet designs for the future? Are they content with their domain thus far? Have they the absolute security they seek? The answer can be found in the Soviet buildup of forces that has been occurring in Northeast Asia. The power is there and poised for use against the rimland. Only the time must be propitious.

CHAPTER FOUR

SOVIET MILITARY POWER IN NORTHEAST ASIA

INTRODUCTION

The Russe trusteth rather to his number (14:26).

The truth of this statement, made by an Englishman, Giles Fletcher, in a sixteenth century manuscript on Russia, has not changed. He was speaking of the Russian propensity for mass; the ability to mount great forces of men and equipment on the field of battle. Whether these forces are sometimes technologically inferior is irrelevent, since a "nation-in-arms" is a historical Russian perspective. The main thinking behind Giles statement is as apparent today in Soviet Russia as it was then. The power of mass is a focal point of Soviet geopolitical strategy, and a clear example of this power is nowhere more evident than in the buildup of Soviet forces in Northeast Asia.

The first two chapters of this paper have served as a foundation for understanding possible Soviet motives and their impetus in any particular geopolitical rimland. Chapter three focused on Russian/Soviet activities in Asia. This chapter moves to a more specific examination of Soviet activity in Northeast Asia to attempt to discern a geopolitical strategy. To gain this view, two aspects of Soviet policies will be examined. The first aspect is military power and how it functions in overall Soviet strategy. Basically, is there a distinction between Soviet military force and Soviet political force? The main determinent of this question is the so-called Soviet concept of the "correllation of forces" and is this concept evident in the Soviet Far East and Northeast Asia? Following this basic overview of Soviet power, the discussion will move to a specific examination of military increases in Northeast Asia and whether or not buildup fits within a framework of overall policy. The most notable increases have been during the last ten years and it is in that context that a comparison will be made. Air, land, and sea force levels of today will be compared with levels present in the mid 1970's to determine if the buildup is actual or perceived. The Chinese border areas, as well as the Pacific coast region, will be examined to determine the

extent of the force buildup.

> Soviet policy over the last decade, particularly with respect to the forging of a nascent "security system", is beginning to change a (geographers) conceit into a possible, even probably reality. Soviet real-time control over the policies of all states in Eurasia-Africa is a very distant prospect indeed. On the other hand, the Soviet Union does not need to accomplish such a difficult task in order to secure for itself predominance over the World Island and the ability to deny American access (2:32).

MILITARY POWER AS A FUNCTION OF SOVIET POLICY

Christopher N. Donnelly identifies four main factors that have contributed to the establishment of modern Soviet military doctrine (14:19). The four factors are the Marxist-Leninist Ideology; the effects of the Russian environment and the Tsarist tradition; the experience of the Revolutionary War and of the 1941-45 War; and the impact of modern technology. For the purpose of this discussion on military power, the ideological basis of Marxism-Leninism is considered the most important factor. The historical roots of Russian imperialism from Czarist times through World War II have been mentioned previously so it is important now to discuss the impact of the ideological considerations of the massive military that the Soviet Union has built.

Soviet military power and its more scientific underpinning doctrine, embodies the entire spectrum of Soviet preparation for war. It includes the population's psychological preparation, the nature and organization of the economy and the ease in which it can be mobilized for war. And finally, military doctrine guides the Soviet principles of foreign policy and the type of war in which the state might become involved or start (14:18). The concept of a "nation-at-arms" has been a basic tenet of Marxism-Leninism since the 1917 revolution and the whole population must take up arms to defend that revolution and the socialist state (14:18). This total commitment of the state to a military or war-fighting complex has been frankly stated even in Soviet official policy statements:

> With the outbreak of war, all means of policy making are directed toward victory, toward achieving the political aims of the war. They are not achieved by the armed forces alone.

> Economic and ideological struggle, open and secret diplomacy, and other forms of struggle are used not only to further the armed struggle but also to supplement it, and in combination they are able to break the will of the enemy to resist and thus secure victory (22:35).

The main thrust of Soviet military power and doctrine seems to be to create a state with an unparalleled capacity for waging war to defend the precepts of the revolution from the expected Western onslaught and then to export that revolution by war when circumstances are appropriate (14:19). The Soviet populace is constantly reminded of their duty to defend their homeland. From constant military parades, to pilgramages to war memorials, the conditioning to accept military involvement in society is natural and desirable (14:19). The Soviet Union, from this point of view, can be seen as a nation pervaded by a war atmosphere. The threat is seen everywhere and the people constantly harangued about that threat. But to view the Soviet people only as the objects of a sort of psychological warfare is erroneous. The examples of the constant state of war that pervades Soviet society are only brought forth to demonstrate the fact that there appears to be no distinct delineation between the number of forces that the country requires for defense and the numbers they actually have in being and are continuing to build. The whole fabric of Soviet society is based on that militaristic doctrine and that doctrine can in no way be thought of as being distinct and separate from an economic doctrine or a foreign policy doctrine. In the Soviet view they are one-in-the-same. If the economy is inefficient, in Western terms, for producing consumer goods, then it is exceedingly efficient in terms of its capacity to gear for war. If the foreign policy is heavy handed, it is because it is driven by a militaristic point of view, not with a "balance" of force as the desired outcome, but with an advantage to the Soviets as the only acceptable end-point.

A brief comparison between Soviet and U.S. viewpoints might be beneficial at this point in order to better understand the Soviet need for military might. The United States pursues a multi-faceted outlook in both its domestic and foreign policies. This is evident simply because the U.S. has an "economic" policy along with a "foreign" policy. U.S. goals and objectives are driven by divergent interests and policies while Soviet goals and objectives are not. As stated earlier, the primary Soviet goal is to defend the Revolution from the expected capitalist onslaught. Luttwak gives an excellent example of this difference in thinking when talking about U.S. defense procurement policies. Every

American military program must mirror a response to some Soviet "threat". If that threat were to diminish, the defense budget would decline also. This fact would be "consistent with the implicit national strategy of the U.S. in which the foreign policy instruments of choice are economic, technological and cultural, while military power is merely the instrument of necessity" (6:29). The Soviet view is decidedly different because there are no separate and distinct forces, such as economic or technological, because of the all-encompassing belief in a constant struggle to maintain and further the Revolution. From this view comes the Soviet "correlation of forces" principle in which all aspects of society are placed directly into that struggle. All instruments of power, the military being foremost, are communally grouped or "correllated" to fight the battle. If the American military is a force of reaction, the Soviet is one of action. Within this context then, one must view the building of military forces in Northeast Asia. The build-up is part of an overall doctrine to create an irresistable force to swing the geopolitical balance to the Soviet side. It is not reactive to foreign impingement on Soviet security. It is molded for the express purpose of continuing the struggle against capitalism and the West and giving it superiority over, in this particular case, the rimland of Northeast Asia. Edgar Ulsamer sums up this point succinctly by stating that "geopolitical struggle, waged under the guise of the 'correlation of forces' principle, is seemingly seen by the Soviets as a permanent condition" (22:35).

MILITARY POWER INCREASES IN NORTHEAST ASIA

Our contention is that there has been a dramatic increase of Soviet military power in the last ten years in Northeast Asia. Further, that increase has been undertaken for the express purpose of attaining military superiority over that region. Admittedly, the Soviets have been engaged in an overall military expansion for the past twenty years so that today the military balance of power has: "slowly but steadily moved in favor of the East" (20:69). However, nowhere is that expansion as pronounced as it is in Northeast Asia.

The largest increase in military power in the region has been in the naval fleet. The Soviet Union now bases close to 40 percent of its nuclear fleet ballistic missile submarines (SSBN's) in the Pacific and has built up large naval and air forces to protect them (23:51). In 1975, the Soviet Pacific Fleet had assigned 105 submarines about 40 of which were nuclear (21:51). By 1980, 23 were SSBN's (15:147). At that time, eight of the SSBN's based at Petropavlosk-Kanchatskiz on the Kamchatka Peninsula, were the advanced Delta-class models, carrying the longer range SS-N-8 or 18 missiles able to operate in the enclosed Sea of Okhotsk (15:147). The most recent compilation shows now a total of 28

SSBN's operating with the Pacific fleet from the Kamchatka Peninsula (20:78). Further, the total number of submarines, both nuclear and conventional, has increased to a total of 120 or roughly a 15 percent increase in the submarine force in ten years (20:78). The newer Delta-class SSBN's with their longer range (4,000 to 5,000 miles) missiles, are not required to operate outside of the Sea of Okhotsk, while the remainder, mostly Yanka-class, must pass through the Sea of Japan to their operating locations further to the east (14:947).

The remainder of the Pacific Ocean Fleet, which is the largest of the four Soviet fleets, has also grown steadily. In 1975 there were approximately 60 principle surface combatants while today that number is near 90 (20:78). The aircraft carrier Minsk was added to the fleet in 1979 and carries Forger vertical takeoff and landing attack aircraft and Hormone antisubmarine warfare (ASW) helicopters. The U.S. defense department forecasts that an additional carrier will join the fleet during the 1980's (23:53). Along with the carrier, there are over ten cruisers and destroyers each, and more than 50 frigates. All carry air defense and anti-ship missiles and are equipped with ASW equipment. Several of the newer Kara and Kresta class cruisers and Krivak class destroyers are armed with anti-ship cruise missiles (18:88). In addition to these forces, there are over 225 minor surface combatants, such as auxiliary support craft, present in the Pacific Fleet (20:78). The fleet also includes the largest contingent of naval infantry in the Soviet Navy in an 8,000 man division based near Vladivostok (23:55). Elements of this force are apparently a quick-reaction type group that can respond to local contingencies.

The Soviet naval fleet has steadily increased its operating radius in the Pacific throughout the last ten years, but the bulk of the submarines and surface fleet remains committed to the inner geographical zone of the Sea of Japan, Sea of Okhotsk, and the waters extending 400 miles out from the Kamchatka Peninsula (18:88). The primary mission appears to be the defense of the nuclear missile submarine force that operates primarily in the Sea of Okhotsk. In summary, before we turn to a discussion of the aviation build-up in Northeast Asia, the increase in Soviet naval assets has been significant. Since 1975, there has been a total increase of about 25 submarines and some 20 major surface combatants to the Soviet Pacific fleet (13:237).

Soviet air forces in East Asia have also increased dramatically in the last decade. In 1975 there were an estimated 900 aircraft deployed while today, that number has almost doubled, to approximately 1,700. One estimate places the total number at 1,715 combat aircraft deployed in Siberia, from central Asia to the Pacific (18:88). There are about 285 bombers in the region

including 120 attached to the Pacific Fleet (18:88). The long-range Bear and Bison bombers have a nuclear attack role in wartime but could also be used in a theater-conventional role. Since 1980, the Soviets have deployed about 70 Backfire bombers, close to one third of their total, in Eastern Siberia (18:88). Combined with the older intermediate range bomber the TU-16 Badger, the modern Backfire poses a substantial threat to targets in China, Japan, Korea and the Philippines (23:53). The Backfire is a high-speed (mach 2.5) aircraft with a combat radius estimated at 3,400 miles unrefueled and can deliver either nuclear or conventional weapons. This radius would allow the Backfire to operate out to Midway Island and as far south as the South China Sea (18:88).

Even though great quantitative increases have been made in the region, the primary impetus appears to be force modernization. Over 90 percent of the tactical aircraft are third-generation, compared to about 50 percent in 1978(23:53). According to U.S. and Japanese estimates, these newer generation aircraft include 220 MIG-23's, 90 MIG-27's, 120 SU-17's and 40 SU-24's (18:89). All of these aircraft have longer ranges and significantly increased weapon payloads. All have greatly contributed to the airborne threat arrayed against Northeast Asia.

Soviet ground forces have not been left out of the picture and have been significantly increased. From 20 divisions deployed to the Far East in 1965, the numbers increased to 43 by 1975, and by 1983, to 52 divisions (AF 21:50, 20:77). These forces are arrayed primarily in the four military districts bordering China, namely the Central Asian, Siberian, Transbaikal, and the Far East (23:52). In 1979, the USSR solidified these forces by establishing a wartime theater-level command. This Far Eastern Command gives its Asian regions, including the Pacific Ocean area, a degree of operational autonomy that will facilitate command and control in wartime (13:237). As in the air arena, the Soviets have also been improving their ground forces qualitatively. In 1982, the T-72, one of the most modern Soviet tanks was introduced into the region. The total number of tanks in the Far East stands now at about 13,000 (13:237). Most armored personnel carriers in the region are newer and more modern and some divisions have surface-to-air missile regiments in place of anti-aircraft artillery (23:52). The U.S. defense department also states that:

> A significant portion of the inventory of 130 mm field guns has been replaced by nuclear capable 152 mm guns which constitute an important upgrading of conventional and nuclear delivery systems in this region. Additionally, attack

helicopter regiments were deployed to the Far East in the mid 1970's to provide fire support to ground maneuver formations (23:52).

One final aspect of the ground forces build-up, and about which more will be said later, is that since 1978, the Soviets have increased their troop strength on the Kurile Islands, to the north of Japan, to about 10,000 men (17:340).

This discussion of the USSR's military increases in Northeast Asia could not be complete without a fourth aspect: the introduction of mobile intermediate range nuclear missiles. The Soviets have always maintained both intercontinental and medium range nuclear missiles in Asia east of the Urals. However, it was not until 1977, that they began deployment of their new, mobile SS-20 missiles into the region. This portion of the Soviet Strategic Rocket Forces poses a major threat to Northeast Asia because it can strike targets throughout the region. The missile has three warheads, is highly mobile and is an important qualitative improvement in the Soviet missile force. Of the more than 330 SS-20 launchers possessed by the USSR, about one third (108) are deployed in the Far East (33:52).

This summary of Soviet military increases in Northeast Asia has shown that not only has there been a significant numerical increase of forces but also one of incresed quality. A force modernization program as well as a force increase program has taken place in Northeast Asia. These programs have been carried out simultaneously, not for defensive reasons, but as a show of force in the region with the intent of power projecion. As we have seen, the basic doctrine of the USSR does not make a distinction between military and other instruments of power. The military power of the Soviet Union is also its diplomatic and political power. That power is now overwhelmingly strong and poised against the rimland of Northeast Asia and makes its coercive and intimidative effects keenly felt. Soviet military power in Northeast Asia is geopolitical power and fits precisely within overall Soviet policy.

CHAPTER FIVE

GEOPOLITICAL CONTROL OF THE RIMLAND

INTRODUCTION

The Soviet influence in Northeast Asia has its roots firmly embedded in history. As the previous chapters have shown, however, there has been an incessant push to the east from the heartland of European Russia across Siberia to the Pacific. Most of the activity has involved military pressure of some sort and the increase of military forces presently underway is in consonance with that history. The question to be asked, then, is to what purpose is this drive committed? The historic evidence has been examined. Now we examine the political purpose. This chapter presents evidence to show that the Soviet Union is attempting to gain geopolitical control of the Northeast Asian rimland.

Four areas of discussion will delineate the Soviet drive for geopolitical control. First, a recapitulation will be made of Soviet pressure on Northeast Asia. This will examine the evidence available in the Soviet Far East itself and then move to the rimlands of Japan and Korea. Following this, an examination will be made of the geopolitical necessities that drive Soviet activity. Included in this arena is the push-pull of Soviet and U.S. power relations. From regional geopolitical necessities, we will move to a discussion of the evidence available to indicate a Soviet drive for hegemony over the region. Specifically, what indications are there that Soviet power influences the rimland nations? The fourth and final area that this chapter will investigate is the possible correlation between Soviet influence and the geopolitical theory of Spykman. The rimland "crescent" of Northeast Asia will be viewed in relation to that of other rimlands and then move to a global perspective of the heartland USSR pushing out for the rimlands of Spykman.

RECAPITULATION: SOVIET PRESSURE

Soviet control of Far Eastern territory places the Soviet Union in a vitally important strategic position. Power is

projected along the entire length of the northern Chinese border. The Pacific bases afford a focal point for power projection against coastal China, Japan, and across the Bering Sea to the U.S. But the area is remote from the Soviet seat of government and is sparsely populated. The Pacific seaboard, as seen from Moscow,"is a distant and vulnerable possession flanked by hostile states" (13:234).

If this view, in the eyes of Soviet leadership, is correct then it is simple to understand the Soviet rationale for increasing power and instability in Northeast Asia. If the Asian regions adjacent to Soviet territory are seen as threatening, then there can be little doubt as to why military forces are being continually enhanced. They are there to counter a perceived threat, and there is no better way, in the Soviet mind, to counter that threat than by military force. But by increasing that force continually there are benefits to be gained other than simple protection. Increased power brings an increased possibility of intimidation and coercion. Increased intimidation and coercion can bring about control of neighbors and, eventually, domination. This could happen to the rimland of Northeast Asia.

Soviet land forces poised against the Chinese border have increased over one hundred percent in the past twenty years. They constitute a serious threat to China and represent a distinctly coercive factor. Coupled with the sheer mass of Soviet manpower, is the recently added threat of SS-20 intermediate range nuclear missiles aimed at China as well as the rest of Northern Asia. Chinese and Soviet forces clashed along this border in 1969, and there is little reason to believe that overall relations have improved significantly since the thirty-year old Sino-Soviet alliance was discarded as "just a scrap of paper" and not renewed in 1980 (12:247). China has been effectively neutralized by Soviet power. It confronts clear Soviet superiority along its Northern border and must worry about a militant, Soviet-supplied Vietnam to the south (17:314).

Soviet pressure also impinges on Japan, as we have seen. There have been marked military increases in the Kurile Islands. These disputed islands, the "Northern Territories" to Japan, have become a boundary surrounding the passages into the Sea of Okhotsk that the Soviets use as a haven for their ballistic missile submarine fleet. The Soviet naval increase in the Far East generally enhances Soviet coercive power against Japan in that its forces continually transit the Sea of Japan on their way to and from the South China Sea. Current estimates indicate that about 165 Soviet naval ships now pass through the Tsushima Strait annually (18:87). The intimidative effects of Soviet naval power in the Sea of Japan and surrounding waters are evident when Japan's almost total reliance on imported oil is considered.

Although North Korea has pursued a policy of keeping both its communist neighbors, China and the Soviet Union, at arms length for many years, it is conceivable that Soviet power could tilt that balance. The Soviets would probably welcome any possibility that North Korea would come firmly into their camp because it would provide a power base further to the south, thus more solidly encircling China. The possibility exists that North Korea would move closer to the Soviet Union, especially if China continues to develop its contacts with the U.S. and Japan (13:247). If this were to happen, the threat that faces our ally, South Korea, would be dramatically increased.

With these Soviet threats in mind then, the discussion of rimland control should logically move to an examination of the geopolitical implications apparent in Northeast Asia and how the Soviet Union might view them.

GEOPOLITICAL NECESSITIES

Soviet power has a purpose and that purpose has a geopolitical underpinning. The case is made very succinctly when one considers that:

> In the future, Siberia will account for almost the entire increase in Soviet production of energy, of many metals and chemical products, and of timber. As the Soviet Union becomes more dependent on Siberia's resources, Soviet concern over maintaining a strong presence in Siberia will have a fundamental impact on the Soviet perspective on East Asia (13:236).

With the necessity of increasing an Asian pressure for merely economic purposes, the Soviet Union is therefore faced with the geopolitical reality of defending and solidifying its position. They worry about the long-term security of their distant eastern flank, and the foremost of their worries is the prospect of a growing trade relationship between China, Japan, and the United States (13:236).

If one assumes that Chinese-U.S. relations moved from rapprochement in the early 1970's to normalization in 1979, in large part due to the Soviet increase of power in Asia, the reason for Soviet worry becomes clearer. The military build-up, for purely "defensive" reasons in the Soviet view, caused a reaction from their Asian neighbors. That reaction was to move into a decidedly different relationship with a one-time enemy, the United States. The same can be said for Sino-Japanese relations. Two historic enemies have also dropped trade barriers and in 1978, signed a friendship treaty with an "antihegemony" clause

stating that neither would seek additional power in Northeast Asia.

So, in simplistic terms, the Soviets are caught in a vicious circle of international policy. The more military might they build in Asia, the more their neighbors are polarized against them, thus amplifying the necessity for increased forces. The most likely Soviet response to events in Northeast Asia is to continue doing business as always and that business is ominous. They are forced, in their thinking, to continue the relentless build-up of military power in the region in "order to demonstrate that they have vital security concerns at stake and to improve their ability to protect their valuable territory" (13:236).

From this brief view of Soviet geopolitical necessities and the ominous prediction for more military increases, examples of expanding Soviet activity should be examined. Northeast Asia, in particular, and all of Asia in general, are a target of Soviet power projection.

THE CASE FOR SOVIET HEGEMONY

Three examples of Soviet power projection and influence serve as the basis of the contention that their major intent is to control activity in Northeast Asia. The examples are recent events in China, Japan,and although displaced in distance rather than purpose, Southeast Asia. The Soviet Union was placed in an awkward position because of thawing Chinese relations with the West. Once an ally, and dependent on the USSR, China had become an enemy, critic, and in Soviet eyes, a strategic partner of the U.S. (17:315). Historic Soviet fear of the invading Chinese hordes caused the increased force structure along the border but it has also caused recent attempts to improve relations. Perhaps this change was made possible by strains in U.S.-Chinese relations, or perhaps it was a simple Soviet reaction to a perceived threat. At any rate, since late 1981, there have been signs of an attempt to reduce tensions. Leonid Brezhnev mentioned the necessity of pursuing "confidence-building measures" in the Far East (13:242). The Chinese rejected these proposals as "nothing more than a decoy thrust under the nose of the West, especially, Western Europe" (13:243). In any case, there has been some mutual willingness to exchange students and athletes and sign trade agreements (17:315). Regardless of superficial attempts to placate China there is an underlying motive to their actions. A deteriorating relationship with China is not desirable since it would push Beijing toward further strategic cooperation with the U.S. and increase the likelihood that a future border conflict would escalate (17:315). So it would appear that the Soviets are interested in a pacification policy with respect to China. A docile China, in the

Soviet view, is a contained China, not reacting to U.S. or Western influence.

Southeast Asian developments are a clear example of Soviet attempts to surround and thus neutralize China. In 1978, when the Soviet Union placed military outposts in Vietnam, they realized a very important strategic dream; China had been surrounded by overt military power. China is now encircled by Soviet Siberia to the north, and a militant Vietnam to the south. These two land bases form a pincer on China and, when combined with a naval fleet plying the seas between Vladivostok and Cam Ranh Bay in Vietnam, and Soviet operations in Afghanistan, Soviet power effectively surrounds China on all sides.

A possible and more ominous outcome of Soviet policy has been recently formulated by a prominent western scholar, Edward Luttwak. In his view of Soviet grand strategy, he states that:

> Any Soviet War scheme must start from two premises: that China is not destroyable, and that it cannot be occupied in its totality to be made to order, a la Afghanistan or for that matter 1968 Czechoslovakia. This leaves only one feasible goal for a Soviet war: if an independent China of growing power can be neither tolerated nor destroyed, then it must be divided (6:102).

Whether or not this particular view is feasible is not necessarily important. What is important is that there is always the possibility of the Soviet Union "chipping" away at China to further its geopolitical ends. This factor is also present in Soviet policy towards China's neighbor, Japan.

If a poor and technologically backward China is feared by the Soviet Union, then an advanced and rich Japan must be viewed with alarm. As we have seen, Soviet military increases in Northeast Asia have resulted in increased cooperation between China, Japan, and the U.S. This cooperation has also included increases in Japanese military strength that has been dormant since the end of World War II. The Soviets are disturbed by the possibility of Japanese rearmament for several reasons (7:339). The primary reason for Soviet fear is the possibiity of U.S., Japanese, South Korean, and Chinese military power poised against them in a type of "second front" in Asia. When Japanese prime minister Nakasone spoke of Japan as an "unsinkable aircraft carrier" that would ward off the Soviet northern threat, the Soviets retorted by saying that "to keep afloat, it is essential for Japan not to build up its military strength" (17:340). If the Japanese are to become more assertive, the Soviets also fear a renewed Japanese claim on Northern Territories or Kurile Islands. To this end, they have increased their manpower there and reiterated that the Japanese claims to the islands are "intrinsically hopeless demands" (17:340).

Soviet hopes for increased economic relationships with Japan have also been a sore point recently. The Soviets had hoped for Japanese aid and technology in Siberia. This would have helped them develop materials. However, as before in China, the vicious circle of military increases has increased the suspicion of neighbors and resulted in a reduced tendency for the Japanese to enter into any agreement with the Soviets.

With these examples of recent Soviet influence and activity in Asia, combined wth the geopolitical necessities that are inherent in the Soviet view, a correlation between them and Spykman's geopolitical "grand design" should now be made.

THE SPYKMAN CONNECTION

At the conclusion of the second chapter in this study, several questions were raised concerning possible Soviet views of geopolitics and how those views might be translated into a coherent policy. As we traced the growth of Soviet military power in Northeast Asia to its present overpowering magnitude, a logical thread was apparent. That thread was, and is, that the predominant form of national power that the Soviet Union evidences is military power. The answers to our earlier questions lie in this use of military power and conform to the geopolitical writings of Spykman as they apply to the concept of rimlands and the heartland.

The problem was to determine whether or not the Soviet Union sees a geopolitical necessity in trying to overcome, through power or coercion, the rimland powers, one by one. The second part of the problem was to determine if that geopolitical concept was used to prevent encirclement or to ultimately gain control of the rimlands and thus Eurasia and the destinies of the world. Events in Northeast Asia give us a justification for answering these questions concerning Soviet motives and, at the same time, provide a background or method for understanding what Soviet intentions are, and if necessary,how to counter them.

The heartland is surrounded by various rimlands. These were the various "crescents" of Mackinder and became the rimlands of Spykman. In effect, these rimlands are: Northeast Asia (China, Japan, Korea), Southeast Asia (Vietnam, Thailand, Burma, Malaysia), Southwest Asia (India, Afghanistan, Iran and the entire Middle East), and Europe. Soviet power has been in evidence in all of these areas, from the virtual enslavement of Eastern Europe and the Warsaw Pact, to the invasion of Afghanistan and emplacement of an outpost in Vietnam. The rimland of Northeast Asia has not been physically penetrated yet; but there are signs that it could happen, and that fact is manifested in the growth of Soviet Far Eastern forces.

The Soviet Union has effectively surrounded a China which has historically struck fear into the Russian heart. They are posturing against Japan and Korea with their naval forces threatening the sea lines of communication in the Western Pacific Ocean. Perhaps another confirmation of the geopolitical views held by the Soviet Union is their documented fear of any possible military alliance between China, Japan and the United States. If their geopolitical views coincide with Spykman, then an alliance of rimland powers in Northeast Asia such as that would constitute a very distinct threat to the heartland.

It is apparent that the Soviets do adhere to some form of geopolitical philosophy. It is not germane to this study to determine the desired evolutionary outcome, whether it be for world domination or simply for defense reasons. What is germane, however, is to see a pattern in their policies. The Soviets have taken, or have attempted to take, for whatever reason, one rimland after another. They took Eastern Europe, and they are taking Afghanistan in Southwest Asia. They are possibly taking Vietnam in Southeast Asia and they are increasingly confronting the most valuable of all rimlands, Northeast Asia. The process is orderly and only those rimlands adjacent to the heartland have been involved thus far.

Soviet policy seems to conform to Spykman's dictum that "Who controls the rimland rules Eurasia. Who rules Eurasia controls the destinies of the world" (8:43). Soviet logic does not seem content with ruling a gigantic land mass. They have repeatedly thrust outward to the rimlands in an attempt for hegemony in those areas. They give no reason to think that this will not always be the case; the historical data is too strong. If the Soviet leadership has not taken Spykman's dictum as their own, then they have developed an exact duplicate geopolitical plan of their own. The case for their being other than "hotel thieves" however, is very weak (5:238). If they have taken Spykman's ideas literally then, the implications are obvious: the second phase of the dictum includes world control. It is sufficient from this point of view however, only to conclude that the rimlands of Spykman's geopolitical theory do play an important role in the policies of the USSR.

CONCLUSION

This chapter has traced the evolution of Soviet geopolitical aspirations and tied them with Nicholas Spykman's theory of the rimlands. The historic Soviet drive for territory in Northeast Asia was considered along with various geopolitical necessities from the Soviet point of view. The final area of investigation was the evidence for Soviet hegemony in the region. These factors

were brought together in a reiteration of Spykman's theory and a correlation of his theory with Soviet action. From this point, then, the next and final step in our consideration of Soviet power in Northeast Asia, will be a discussion of that power and how the West might react to it.

CHAPTER SIX

GEOPOLITICAL IMPLICATIONS

INTRODUCTION

> Global war, as well as global peace, means that all fronts and all areas are interrelated. No matter how remote they are from each other, success or failure in one will have an immediate and determining effect on the other... Her [the United States] main potential objective, both in peace and war, must therefore be to prevent the unification of the old world centers of power in a coalition hostile to her own interests (8:45).

Spykman's views on geopolitical implications for the United States serve as an apt introduction for the final area of this investigation. Evidence has been presented that shows the historic purpose of the Soviet Union in Northeast Asia not how military power is the determining factor in that purpose. The logical conclusion of our argument, then, must be to present alternatives that are available to prevent Soviet heartland from gaining control of the rimlands. To do this, three factors will be discussed. First, we will propose what Soviet power means to Northeast Asia and the threat inherent in that power. Second, we will highlight the possible consequences of the Soviet power projection, and finally, as a conclusion to this study, the commitments that the West must make to blunt or contain Soviet power. With these objectives in mind, the discussion will consider the implications of Soviet power in Northeast Asia.

IMPLICATIONS OF SOVIET POWER

Although many strategies and their concomitant goals have been put forth for the Soviet Union's activity in Asia, two seem to stand out. They were developed in a study on the evolution of Soviet strategy by Avigdor Haselkorn (3:4). He divides Soviet thinking into long and short term goals in the region. First, the Soviets have an immediate political aim and that is the containment of China and the end of the American presence in one area. The second goal is the longer range military aim of laying the infrastructure for confronting possible U.S. nuclear deployments in the Indian Ocean, combined with the development of a Soviet-sponsored second front against China (3:4).

The Soviets view the rimland of Northeast Asia as a vital link to their security system and have given top priority to the gradual establishment of a collective security system designed to cope with a perceived multithreat environment through a multi-optional belt of allies, air and naval bases, improved lines of communication, and forward force deployments (3:5). This supposition is entirely valid when one considers that the Soviet buildup has done a great deal to further these ends in the region. The increased forces in Vladivostok and Sovietskaya Gavan protect Soviet interests in the Sea of Okhotsk. Large forces are stationed there to guarantee Soviet transit of the strategicially vital Tartar and La Perouse Straits which lead into the Soviet sea used as a haven for thir nuclear missile submarine forces. Colin Grey views the importance of the area to the Soviets in this manner:

> The physical geography of its Siberian littoral, with its offshore island chains, explains very clearly why the Soviet Union will never cede the Kurile Islands back to Japan...and thus render the Okhotsk Sea a 'closed sea' to the USSR (2:43).

Another manifestation of this increased power projection is seen in the newly developed Soviet air and sea base at Cam Ranh Bay in Vietnam which is used as a stopover point for forces plying between the Soviet Pacific fleet at Vladivostok and the Indian Ocean. This base affords the Soviets:

> ...a forward naval base approximately two thousand miles, or five full steaming days closer to the Indian Ocean than the nearest Soviet naval bases in Petropavlosk and Vladivostok-improving Soviet access and ability to logistically support naval forces that continuously operate along the vital sea lanes that lead from the Arabian Gulf (16:8).

There are five general Soviet strategies that could be possible based on the short and long term goals of their military buildup (18:89). The first, and most obvious, is the use of the Western Pacific area in an all-out nuclear attack strategy against the United States. The second strategy is a deterrent or defensive strategy that defends bases and forces in Siberia from attack by the United States. Concurrent with these nuclear strategies is the possible domination of Northeast Asia in a post-war scenario. In it, Moscow would establish as a primary war objective, the prohibition of U.S. re-entry into the region, the isolation of China, and provide Soviet access to Japan's technological resources (18:89). A fourth strategy would involve blocking American forces that try to move from the Pacific to the Indian Ocean in the event of a major war in Western Europe or South-

west Asia. A final strategy, as seen by Niksch, is the North Korean proxy strategy wherein the Soviets would encourage the North to invade South Korea, while avoiding a direct hand in the conflict themselves. The benefits of a North Korean victory in such a war would be to:

> strengthen the Soviet post-war position in Korea, further isolate China in Asia, and conceivably cause Japan to reassess its ties with the United States and adopt policies more favorable to the USSR (18:91).

The United States, along with the forces of Japan and the Republic of Korea, pose a considerable deterrent force against Soviet adventurism in Northeast Asia. However, American defense strategy in the Western Pacific is increasingly influenced by commitments to the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf. Any deterrent strength in the Pacific is proportionally diluted when forces are stretched out in the defense of both regions at the same time. The U.S. Pacific Command now has responsibility for the Indian Ocean and the support of operations in the Persian Gulf. One of the two aircraft carriers of the Seventh Fleet has been committed to defacto permanent duty in the Indian Ocean (18:92). Allied rimland forces are maintained with four guiding strategies in mind. The first, similar to Soviet strategy, is to deter the opening of a second front in the Western Pacific. If deterrence fails, then these forces should be able to blunt a Soviet first strike. Thirdly, allied forces should maintain the security of vital air and sea transport routes in the area. Finally, the allies must block Soviet forces moving from Eastern Siberia southward to attack U.S. bases and the forces that would traverse the sea routes to all of East Asia (18:92).

In Northeast Asia, only the U.S. forces are deployed in respect to the defense of the entire region. The military capabilities of both the Japanese Self-Defense Forces and the Republic of Korea military are designed for the defense of their homeland rather than for regional defense. The Korean Army, consists of approximately fifty-three divisions, but the force is more directly concerned with the defense against a North Korean invasion than a Soviet threat(23:56). Japanese military forces are also designed with respect to defending only their own territory. After World War II, the forces were required to remain small and today only amount to a total of thirteen army divisions, some sixty naval combatants and a four-hundred aircraft air force (23:56). An historic wariness of Japanese military increases has kept this force small, but there is increasing pressure in both the U.S. and Japan to increase defense spending and provide a more active role in the defense of the region. Three distinct missions will come

under Japanese repsonsibility if the proposed increases take place. First, the Japanese forces would be responsible for sea control up to a thousand miles out from the home islands. The defense would be aimed primarily at Soviet submarines and Backfire bombers (18:93). The second Japanese responsibility would be the blockade and mining of the Tsushima, Tsugaru, and Soya Straits which connect the Sea of Japan to the Pacific thus preventing Soviet access from eastern Siberia to the Pacific (18:94). The final responsibility that would fall to Japan would be the establishment of an air defense screen that would threaten Soviet incursions into Japanese air space. This build-up of Japanese forces will not be quick nor will it be without considerable debate. It is necessary, however, in light of the Soviet military threat present in the region.

The implications of Soviet power in Northeast Asia are sufficiently obvious to be of great concern to rimland Northeast Asia. The Soviet forces have definite objectives in the region and they have specific strategies to carry out those objectives. Formidable military forces oppose the Soviets and there are signs of an impetus to improve those forces. Hopefully, the improvements will be made quickly. In any case, the Soviet buildup and modernization of forces has given them an option to "adopt a strategy aimed at military domination of Northeast Asia" (18:94). They are nearing a wartime capacity in their ability to wage air, sea, and land operations that could isolate Japan and South Korea from outside support. Niksch feels that:

> Japan would represent a lucrative strategic prize for the Soviets in a global conflict. Domination of Japan would give the Soviet Union access to Japanese technology and material wealth, and Soviet hegemony over Japan. (Further) a 'special relationship' with a Communist Korea would give the Soviets access to warm water ports for the Soviet navy and a position of greater influence throughout East Asia. Such success would also isolate China (18:91).

FUTURE CONSEQUENCES OF SOVIET POWER

In comparison with other regions of the world today, events in Northeast Asia are not as volatile as those in the Middle East, Latin America or Afghanistan. The region is relatively quiet with no real overt action or conflict. Perhaps, in one view, that is what makes the Soviet military buildup that much more ominous

in the region; "quiet" control of the rimland as opposed to an obvious takeover attempt.

This paper has made the case for eventual Soviet control of the region through its constant building of military might. Problems do confront the Soviet Union, however, in its quest. The major problem faced is political rather than military. Soviet military power has led, much to Moscow's consternation, to a greater political cooperation among Asian states and it has increased their cooperation with the United States (17:343). This is so for several reasons.

China fears and distrusts the Soviet Union. Even though both are communist powers, the Chinese are wary of Soviet interactions and clearly dislike the thought of so many Soviet divisions poised on their border. When Sino-American relations began their upturn in the 1970's, the Soviets began to worry more than usual because any "rapprochement" between the two would strengthen a large, populous China and give them access to increased weapons and technology (17:315). A China united with another power causes fear in Moscow and they can be expected to hinder Chinese relationships with the West. Soviet power also bothers the Chinese in that they have linked any possibility of lessening tensions between the two with a solution of the border dispute with Moscow, reduction of Soviet military deployments in Mongolia and a cessation of Soviet military aid to Vietnam, and a solution to the Afghanistan problem (17:316).

The second problem in the region fueled by Soviet military increases, is the fear of a second front in the Pacific made up of China, Japan, South Korea, and the United States. The United States, for the last decade, has been encouraging a Japanese military increase. In more circumspect tones, so too, have the Chinese. If these countries were to form a firm military agreement or even the hint of an alliance, the Soviets, from their perspective, would be placed in a precarious position. When Japanese prime minister Nakasone spoke of Japan as an "unsinkable aircraft carrier" that would ward off the Soviet Backfire bomber, the Soviets countered that there were "no unsinkable aircraft carriers" and that "to keep afloat, it was essential for Japan not to build up its military strength" (17:340).

From these two examples, then,we can see that Soviet military power in Northeast Asia is not without its problems. The danger posed by their increases has brought about a sharper view of the threat in the minds of many Asians who for the first time, appear willing to contribute more substantially to countering that power. In effect, the geopolitical ideas of Spykman can be said to influence the Soviets when they recognize the threat if there were to be an alliance of rimland powers arrayed against them.

The future consequences of Soviet military power in Northeast Asia will be to maintain the status quo. Soviet force structure will continue to be increased in an attempt to drive wedges between the various nations. The Soviets will attempt to lessen U.S. influence in the region because it represents the stabilizing factor in the region. The Soviet Union will also continue to strengthen its position in the hopes of forcing one or more countries in the region to finally capitulate to its influence and enter into "mutual security" agreements. There will probably not be open conflict in the near future, nor will there be any decrease in Soviet military might. The Soviet Union is very conscious of its geopolitical role in Northeast Asia and will probably be content to continue the push outward to gain hegemony of the Northeast Asian rimland. With this view of Soviet power and the probability for its continued use in Asia, we should now examine what paths are available to prevent or contain this seemingly inexorable drive.

WESTERN CONSIDERATIONS

"The strength of geopolitical grand theory is that it places local action, or inaction, within a global framework" (2:65). This passage brings us to the conclusion of the study of Soviet power projection in Northeast Asia because it emphasizes the options available to the United States and her allies. We, along with Japan, Korea, and China, must realize that the fundamental goal of the Soviet Union is to control the action of, first, the rimlands, and ultimately the world. It is their destiny to seek domination. This paper has shown that there is no reason to believe that there is a fundamental difference between the Czarist Russia of past centuries and the Soviet Union of today in terms of geopolitical power. Their goal has always been total security. Total security dictates domination and domination is the ultimate security.

Northeast Asia was chosen as the focal point of this study because it represented the opportunity for a somewhat more detached view of Soviet activity than would have been afforded by examining, for example, the tumultuous Middle East. But, in whatever context, the evidence is clear; Soviet power has inexorably pushed out from its heartland center with the idea of fomenting at best, unrest, and at worst, anarchy. We have shown that the Soviet:

> ...modus operandi is to advance into areas where there is little or no resistance and to withdraw from areas where there is. Some observers have labeled the Russians "hotel thieves" for their propensity to take advantage of what is not guarded (5:238).

If we assume that this Soviet "amoebic diplomacy" is true, then it is in our best interest to one; realize it, and two; to combat it. Although this line of reasoning suggests two options, there is only one available and that is to view all Soviet activity in a geopolitical context. We cannot view it from one which is "country specific" and therefore narrow.

Spykman said that all fronts and all areas were interrelated. He was correct. Vacuums were created in Eastern Europe after World War II - and filled by the Soviets. A vacuum was created in Southeast Asia after our involvement in Vietnam and subsequently filled by the Soviets. The lesson should be obvious; if there were ever to be a vacuum created in Northeast Asia, either by ignorance or apathy, the Soviets would fill it. Thus far a vacuum has not been created. There are comforting indications that Soviet intentions have been realized in the region, and steps are being taken to bolster the "rimland dikes" there. China has taken steps to open relations with its Asian neighbors as well as the U.S. Japan is starting to realize that an avowedly weak "self defense force" is not a guarantee against Soviet power projection and Korea, while preoccupied with defending against thier northern brothers, is making overtures for an increased security role in the Western Pacific (15:185).

The United States is caught somewhere in the middle geopolitically. Charged with spreading its defensive resources throughout the vast Pacific regions, it now is forced to spread those resources even more thinly into the Indian Ocean. We are trying to alleviate the problems, to be certain. Our defense budgets are increasing, but we dare not satisfy ourselves too quickly. The Soviets will never be totally satisfied.

As we have stated before, if the Soviets do not follow Spykman's dictum concerning control of the rimlands they follow a similar variant of it. The correllation is too close to differentiate. Colin Gray, in his book, The Geopolitics of the Nuclear Era, gave a very cogent summation of the options open to the United States when he said:

> Geopolitically, Soviet leaders probably believe that time is on their side; the Soviet heartland power is permanently a Eurasian power, while the U.S., neglecting Mackinder and Spykman and others, may come to forget that the Eurasian Rimlands are forever the American security dike. For reasons of preoccupation, anger at "ungrateful" allies, or simply psychological distance, Americans might lose interest in balancing power in and around Eurasia. The Soviet Union, by virtue of geopolitical location (not to mention political inclination), cannot lose interest (2:46).


SOVIET
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YELLOW
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TAIWAN
HONG KONG
NORTH
EAST
ASIA

Fig. 3

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