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
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STRATEGY: A PHILOSOPHY OF DOCTRINE

by

Gerard David Roncolato

June 1983

Thesis Advisor:

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The paper contains four recommendations: 1.) To increase the historical and philosophical training of military officers, and to emphasize the study of the art of war; 2.) To train and assign a dedicated group of strategic planners who rotate between field and staff, but whose principle job is planning; 3.) To centralize the chain of command in the Department of Defense; and 4.) To decentralize authority in the Department of Defense to the greatest extent feasible.

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Strategy: A Philosophy of Doctrine

by

Gerard David Roncolato
Lieutenant, United States Navy
B.S., United States Naval Academy, 1978

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS IN NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS


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
Author:



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 Thesis Advisor

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Chairman, Department of National Security Affairs


Dean of Information and Policy Sciences

ABSTRACT

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The paper contains four recommendations: 1.) To increase the historical and philosophical training of military officers, and to emphasize the study of the art of war; 2.) To train and assign a dedicated group of strategic planners who rotate between field and staff, but whose principle job is planning; 3.) To centralize the chain of command in the Department of Defense; and 4.) To decentralize authority in the Department of Defense to the greatest extent feasible.

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"When one has reached an understanding of what materials are furnished by the world around about him, and what resources he can hope for inside himself, it still remains for him to appraise the past as it is left to operate in the present, to understand it, to appropriate it, and to become its master."

John Herman Randall, Jr., 1940

I. INTRODUCTION

"There is no organization in the United States whose mission is to prepare a strategic analysis. This is a serious defect in our national security policy machinery, but it is not likely to be observed by the average civilian official because strategic appreciation has nearly become a lost art; and one does not feel the need for something he has never seen or known about."

Stefan T. Possony & J.E. Pournelle¹

This paper defines strategy as a method thought that proposes a framework for the realistic evaluation of national security needs and consequently, for the development of strategic doctrine. It does not offer a specific strategy for the United States, nor does it prescribe an organization designed to develop a specific strategy. Instead, it provides the conceptual foundation that is essential to such tasks. It develops the perspective from which reform must be viewed.²

As will be seen, the key element within which strategy must operate is chance, which yields an uncertainty that cannot

¹The Strategy of Technology: Winning the Decisive War (Cambridge, Mass.: Dunellen, 1970), p. 64.

²The principal theoretical background for this framework is largely derived from Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. by Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976); General d'Armee Andre Beaufre, An Introduction to Strategy (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965); and Beaufre, Deterrence and Strategy (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966).

be predicted or eliminated. Hence, in an anarchic and hostile world, where each nation must look after itself, flexibility and timeliness are essential for survival; flexibility in adapting to rapidly changing circumstances, and timeliness in doing so quickly and correctly. Too often in the past, doctrinal rigidity or dogma has destroyed this flexibility. The result, except in the most extraordinary of circumstances, has been disaster.

Examples of this abound. For instance, in 1494, Charles VIII of France invaded an Italy unprepared for his new style of warfare, and destroyed its political system. Italy's castles, suitable defense against the slow paced inter-city-state warfare of the peninsula, were no match against the French artillery. And, Italian mounted troops were no match for the Swiss infantry employed by Charles.³

The cause of this unpreparedness has disturbing parallels with American society today. Italy in the 15th Century was a commercial empire that relied primarily on the disorganization of its neighbors for security. Wars were expensive, and hence not fought. The unpreparedness for invasion stemmed from a lack of concern for the art of war which was "... the result of a preoccupation with personal well-being, inextricably

³Felix Gilbert, "Machiavelli: The Renaissance of the Art of War," in Makers of Modern Strategy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1943), pp. 8-9.

connected with a society dominated by finance and commercial interest."⁴ The result of the French invasion was that

"To their dismay, the Italians were forced to become mere onlookers as their country became the battlefield of Europe and the center of attraction for all foreigners in search of military renown.... Those who speculated about the fate of Italy arrived necessarily at the conclusion that the Italians had to reform their military institutions if they wanted to equal the foreign barbarians and become master in their own house."⁵

Other examples of this failure to adapt include the Prussian defeat at Jena in 1806. There the army--and tactics--of Frederick the Great could not withstand Napoleon and his revolutionary army.⁶ The French and their Maginot Line in 1940 follow this pattern, as does the American reluctance to accept the aircraft carrier for the weapon it was until after the Pearl Harbor attack on 7 December, 1941.⁷

⁴Ibid., p. 15.

⁵Ibid., p. 9.

⁶See Brig. Gen. Vincent J. Esposito, USA (Ret.), and Col. John R. Elting, USA, A Military History and Atlas of the Napoleonic Wars (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1964), plates 57-68.

⁷For an excellent discussion of the Maginot Line and the mentality it generated, see Irving M. Gibson, "Maginot and Liddell Hart: The Doctrine of Defense," in Makers of Modern Strategy, ed. E.M. Earle, pp. 371-375. On America's obsession with the battleship see Russell F. Weigley, The American Way of War (New York: Macmillan, 1973), Chap. 12. See G.H. Liddell Hart, Strategy, 2nd revised ed. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1967) for a general discussion of military history from the Greek wars (5th Century B.C.) to the Arab-Israeli wars. Richard K. Betts, Surprise Attack: Lessons for Defense Planning (Wash., D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1982) provides an analysis of the impact of doctrinal rigidity on the effectiveness of strategic surprise.

Why, one must ask, is this the case? The answer is rather simple: The failure to anticipate changes in warfare before the opening of hostilities is primarily due to a failure in the study of the art of war. What this means is that, while professional military officers may study the techniques and hardware of war, they tend not to look into its meaning, uses, and socio-political contexts. In short, there is a tendency to ignore the conceptual for the practical, to discard the philosophic for the pragmatic. This tendency allows one to master the techniques of the age, but, as has been argued, all too often those techniques have been overtaken by events.

Despite the professionalization of the military since World War II, this tendency prevails in the United States. The "nuclear revolution" has been seen as revolutionizing warfare, changing its fundamental nature, largely eliminating the impact of its moral factors.⁸ In the late 1940s it was believed that nuclear weapons had put an end to war.⁹ That this was not so was demonstrated by the Korean War. Yet, it was not until nearly ten years after that war that the United States abandoned its massive retaliation doctrine and began to consider the reality of conventional and limited wars.¹⁰

⁸ Michael Howard, "The Forgotten Dimensions of Strategy," Foreign Affairs, Summer 1979, p. 982.

⁹ Liddell Hart, Strategy, p. 15.

¹⁰ This change was, among other factors, driven by the writings of Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor, USA, especially The Uncertain Trumpet (New York: Harper & Row, 1959).

Vietnam taught America that even a superpower could be defeated. Some would argue that North Vietnam won because of political interference in military matters, others because of the incompetency of the military. Colonel Harry Summers, however, posits that the United States was defeated because it lacked a strategy and because the military lacked the ability to communicate to the political leaders the danger toward which they were heading.¹¹ Furthermore, America ignored one of the three essential elements of war defined by Carl von Clausewitz nearly 150 years before: the people.¹² By not declaring war, indeed, by failing to make any effort to elicit the public's support for the war, the government, with the military's implicit consent, sought in fact to fight an 18th Century war; a war of, by, and for the government, instead of the people.¹³

A major reason public support was not sought was that it was thought unnecessary, and was thought to be beyond the American nature. How could America declare war on little North Vietnam? Was there truly an *evil* out there to destroy?

¹¹Col. Harry G. Summers, Jr., USA, On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War (Novato, Ca.: Presidio Press, (1982), pp. 2, 15.

¹²The three elements were the people, the army, and the government. Carl von Clausewitz, On War. Specifically on the need to gain the support of the people in war, see Col. Harry Summers, Jr., USA, "Clausewitz and Strategy Today," U.S. Naval War College, Mar.-Apr., 1983, pp. 40-46.

¹³Summers, On Strategy, Ch. 1, especially pp. 12-16.

The cause of this situation is that America has traditionally not so much fought wars as it has embarked on crusades.¹⁴ Concerned mainly with domestic affairs and westward expansion, little thought has been given to foreign relations. War is seen separate from day to day political intercourse:

"We have learned to make a nearly absolute distinction between the states of war and peace as *conditions* in human affairs, rather than recognizing them as poles on the continuum of international relations which, like flowers and seeds, contain each other's genes."¹⁵

No less notable a general than Douglas MacArthur epitomized this distinction in saying "... when all of the political means failed, we then go to force."¹⁶ Thus, the tendency in the United States has been to artificially separate peace from war, as if war put an end to the political discourse of nations. The benefit of this lies in the fact that the American politician, largely oriented toward domestic issues, can divorce himself from the realities of the world power struggle. He can approach peace and international relations with the same skills and perspective he would approach labor relations or social reform. He need not concern himself with the messy business of war, which is left to the generals and admirals.

¹⁴Colin S. Gray, "National Style in Strategy: The American Example," International Security, Fall 1981, p. 30.

¹⁵Chaplain (Col.) Charles F. Kriete, USA, "The Moral Dimension of Strategy," Parameters: Journal of the U.S. Army War College, VII:2, 1977, p. 72.

¹⁶82nd Congress, 1st Session, Military Situation in the Far East, Vol. 1, p. 45. Quoted in Summers, On Strategy, p. 95.

Likewise, the military in this case need not concern itself with policy. Their job becomes merely managers of violence in war, and of the bureaucracy in peace.¹⁷

Under these conditions, the study of strategy falls between the cracks, for the military's purpose is to implement the strategy of the political superiors, while the politicians concern themselves mainly with domestic issues.¹⁸ Strategy therefore plays a minor role in the education of military officers. Instead, their education serves to ensure a firm grasp on the technical aspects of war--tactics, command and control, logistics and maintenance.¹⁹

Thus, in America, the artificial separation of war and peace, and the means of each, inhibits the growth of a holistic perspective which encompasses both. This perspective is absolutely essential if the nation is to ensure peace, and failing that, to prevail in war. The implication of this is that the political leaders must learn more about the art of war, and the soldiers more about the art of diplomacy. But more

¹⁷Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations (Cambridge, Mass.: The Belknap Press, 1957), p. 11.

¹⁸Summers, On Strategy, pp. 2-3; and Gray, "National Style in Strategy," p. 46.

¹⁹See for example, Cdr. Thomas B. Buell, USN (Ret.), "The Education of a Warrior," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, Jan. 1981, pp. 41-45; and RAdm. James A. Winnefeld, USN (Ret.), "The Quality of the Officer Corps," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, Sept. 1981, pp. 33-34.

important, they must all learn more about strategy, for strategy, in this era of nuclear deterrence, wars of national liberation, and high technology must pertain equally to all phases of the relations between nations, and must efficiently organize the entire resources of a nation for its long term security.

Strategy must therefore address all levels of the government, and must seek to optimize the application of the nation's resources in pursuit of the aims of policy which in turn respond to the nature of the international environment. For this kind of planning, the United States government is ill-prepared. Congress is ruled by committees, each jealously guarding its own power, with no single one in a position to consider the overall impact and coordination of the policies decided upon.²⁰ The Executive branch, from which should originate long range planning proposals for consideration by Congress, is almost myopically concerned with the annual budget and with crisis management.²¹ Very little long range planning is done, and what is is too vague and "watered down" to be

²⁰Roger H. Davidson and Walter J. Oleszek, Congress and Its Members (Wash., D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1981), p. 227.

²¹Philip S. Kronenberg, "Planning and Defense in the Eighties," in Planning U.S. Security: Defense Policies in the Eighties, ed. P. Kronenberg (New York: Pergamon, 1982), p. 148. On the government's long range planning ability, see John M. Collins, U.S. Defense Planning: A Critique (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1982), especially Part III; Possony and Pournelle, Strategy of Technology, pp. 77-78; Lawrence J. Korb, The Joint Chiefs of Staff: The First Twenty-Five Years (Bloomington, Ind.: The Indiana University Press, 1976), pp. 6-16; and Summers, On Strategy, pp. 1-7.

able to effectively direct operational or logistical planning.²²

For example, consider this passage:

"No American administration in recent memory has committed substantial time, thought, or political muscle to the formulation and implementation of a coherent industrial and trade policy..."²³

Much the same can be said for the Executive branch's approach to diplomacy, as Smith Simpson points out:

"Every company of any importance has a management action planning system to enable it to operate by plan and anticipation rather than by simply responding to situations. The absence of such a system in the State Department and in each office, such as Soviet Affairs, and proper officer attitudes explain much of the casual, relaxed, reactive way in which all too much of our diplomacy is conducted."²⁴

What is true of the Executive as a whole, is also true of the military. As suggested above, little worth is attached to the study of military art and strategy. Technology is in vogue today, and it is this that military officers study. Unfortunately, as has been seen, there are very few within the government who study the broad questions of the utility of the forces the military buys. With each level of government concerned about the technical aspects of administration, little

²²Collins, U.S. Defense Planning, p. 155.

²³Hunter Lewis and Donald Allison, The Real World War: The Coming Battle for the New Global Economy and Why We Are Losing. (New York: Coward, McCann & Geoghegan, 1982), p. 235.

²⁴Smith Simpson, The Crisis in American Diplomacy: Shots Across the Bow of the State Department (North Quincy, Mass.: The Christopher Publishing House, 1980), p. 296.

linkage exists between the goals set by high level policy makers and military planners. In fact the main commonality is the defense budget. It is the language all can understand, and it is the language that military officers have been taught to speak.²⁵ Dr. Edward Luttwak, a Senior Fellow at the Georgetown Center for Strategic and International Studies, writes:

"In the officer corps there are plenty of engineers, economists, and political scientists--but where are the tacticians? There are many skilled personnel managers, logistical managers, and technical managers--but where are the students of the operational level of war? And at the top, there are many competent (and politically sensitive bureaucrats--but where are the strategists?"²⁶

In addition to the general disregard of the art of war, military assignment policies, both as a result of personnel management decisions and legislated constraints, do not prepare those planners who are employed for the job they must do.²⁷ Taken from the operating forces for short, one-time-only tours, military planners are provided with little preparation short of on the job training. As Russell Murray, a former Assistant Secretary of Defense, argues:

²⁵Edward N. Luttwak, "The American Style of Warfare and the Military Balance," Survival, Mar.-Apr., 1979, p. 60.

²⁶Edward N. Luttwak, "Towards Rearming America," Survival, Jan/Feb, 1981, p. 34.

²⁷Collins, U.S. Defense Planning, pp. 59-60.

"The sad fact of the matter is that, while we would not dream of letting an officer fly an F-15 without years of highly specialized and immensely expensive training, we are perfectly willing to let him, without a trace of preparation, tackle matters demanding the most complex professional military skills."²⁸

The American military, as well as the rest of the government, is chained to the present. The day to day burdens of administration are staggering enough without adding the need for long range concept formulation. But, much of that day to day administration is due precisely to the fact that no overall, long range guidance is available, hence decisions must be pushed upstairs.²⁹

Concentration on operations, the budget and crisis management, has forced America to stumble blindly through the past forty years of its world leadership. Lacking the personnel and the organization for long term concept formulation, the nation has jumped from one crisis to the next, and from one year to the next. Each event is seen only in relation to that which has occurred most recently. In an era of technological explosion, America has become enthralled with the means of conflict, but has largely ignored the reasons and purposes of that interaction between states. Our technological success has deprived us the means by which that success can be

²⁸Russell Murray II, "Policies, Prices, and Presidents: The Need to Enlighten the Great Choices in National Security," Armed Forces Journal International, June 1982, p. 59.

²⁹Possony and Pournelle, Strategy of Technology, p. 72. On this, see also Col. William J. Taylor, USA (Ret.), "Leading the Army," The Washington Quarterly, Winter 1983, pp. 42-43.

controlled: strategy. F. H. Hinsley underscores the irony of this:

"That a civilisation which has broken through immense barriers in almost every other direction, and which has surpassed all its predecessors on innumerable fronts, should still hold views and pursue programmes in international politics that it held and pursued when it was young--this is the outstanding failure of recent times. Only one thing is more surprising: we do not yet recognize this failure."³⁰

One reason such a failure is not recognized is the near historical illiteracy of American society. History has never held much fascination for Americans, except to confirm what they had already suspected of their past:

"...a vindication of the principles of democracy and liberty and order, a demonstration of the triumph of right over wrong."³¹

But even this self-fulfilling concern for history disappeared with the advent of nuclear weapons. Military history, once the absolute minimum, the bare essential of a study of strategy became irrelevant:

"Our own generation is unique, but sadly so, in producing a school of thinkers who are allegedly experts in military strategy and who are certainly specialists in military studies but who know virtually nothing of military history, including the history of our most

³⁰F. H. Hinsley, Power and the Pursuit of Peace: Theory and Practice in the History of Relations Between States (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1963), p. 3.

³¹Henry Steele Commager, The American Mind: An Interpretation of American Thought and Character Since the 1880s (New Haven, Ct.: Yale University Press, 1950), p. 278.

recent wars, and who seem not to care about their ignorance."³² (Emphasis added)

Historical perspective is essential in order to develop strategy and have a degree of confidence in the planning product. Luttwak provides an example of this in *The Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire*. How, he asks, were the Romans able to secure their borders against barbarian invasions with only twenty-nine legions? His answer: deterrence.

"Having learned in the earlier republican period how to defeat neighbors in battle by sheer tactical strength, having later mastered the strategic complexities of large-scale warfare in fighting the Carthaginians, the Romans finally learned that the most desirable use of military power was not military at all, but political; and indeed they conquered the entire Hellenistic world with few battles and much coercive diplomacy."³³

Luttwak goes on to argue that it was the knowledge by Rome's enemies that any offense against the Empire would result in retaliation by the infamous legions that in fact played a large part in maintaining Pax Romana. Indeed it was only when the legions turned to civil war in the Third Century, and thus removed their deterrent effect, that massive, and nearly uncontrollable invasions developed.³⁴

³²Bernard Brodie, "The Continuing Relevance of On War," introductory essay to Clausewitz, On War, p. 53.

³³Edward N. Luttwak, The Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976), p. 2. A legion then consisted of about 6000 men.

³⁴Ibid., p. 139. Another classic work that provides interesting historical parallels is Barbara W. Tuchman, A Distant Mirror: The Calamitous 14th Century (New York: Ballantine, 1978).

If strategy is not to be enslaved by the present then, it must rely on the past. A study of the past reveals the full range of characteristics that strategy can assume. It is this full range that must be comprehended if the correct strategy is to be chosen. *Strategy thus becomes not a single strategy, but a distillation of all past strategies, and in this way forms a framework for planning.* It addresses the nature of conflict and of the means available for its prevention or resolution. In this context, strategy becomes a theory, or even more, a philosophy by which to structure a specific strategy for a specific set of circumstances. To clarify the distinction between the two "strategies", the specific strategies, which represent the latter condition, will be called doctrine, and are the result of the planning process. Therefore, strategy, in distilling the lessons of the multitude of doctrines of the past, becomes a philosophy of those doctrines. Strategy, in short, is the philosophy of doctrine. Only in this way is it cut loose from the bonds of the present and given the flexibility required.

Strategy, therefore, is a method of thought, and is applicable to the entire spectrum of relations between states. It promotes flexibility, efficiency, and realism in planning for national security. The first step in further defining this concept will be to describe the environment of strategy. This environment derives its substance from the interaction between nations. Strategy, in seeking to attain the ends

set out by policy, must operate in this environment, and hence must conform to it. The environment of strategy then, is that set of conditions that exist in international relations which govern the success with which any plan is executed. If strategy is planned without due consideration for its environment, it will not reflect reality, and hence will in all probability fail.

The second step will then be to define and elaborate on strategy. Strategy on its own, just like war on its own, makes no sense.³⁵ It must be firmly subordinated to the dictates of policy. But, the key in subordinating means to ends is, in the broad perspective, to tie strategy to the core values of a nation. This is especially true in the United States. The nation is built upon ideals, not territory or cultural homogeneity, therefore its strategy must defend ideals as much as, if not more than, the tangible elements of sovereignty.³⁶ It is through policy that this is done.

The final step in the process of defining strategy as a method of thought, is to discuss the planning function that must accompany it. This discussion will not address organization or procedure so much as perspective. The concern here is to develop a concept of planning that can in turn be used

³⁵ Clausewitz, On War, VIII:6:607.

³⁶ George Santayana, Character and Opinion in the United States (New York, 1920; Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor paperback, 1954), p. 104.

to design an organization and procedures for the development of doctrine. Therefore, the environment of planning is defined, an environment that suggests the importance of the opponent as an actively thinking participant in the international arena, and underscores the pervasiveness of chance. Under these conditions, which derive their substance from the interaction between strategy and the international system, uncertainty is unavoidable, and hence flexibility essential. Planning must therefore be able to adapt to sudden changes, ones that cannot be predicted. It must be built upon a concept of flexibility and timeliness, and must therefore have the people and organizational structure necessary to provide rapid and accurate responses.

In the final chapter of the thesis some recommendations are offered that should bring such conditions about. The recommendations deal primarily with the military, and, more specifically, with the training of military officers. It is felt that until the perspective from which the military officer corps views its role in national security is changed, changes in the organization will have only minimal effect.

The United States is desperately in need of doctrine based on a firm understanding of the nature of strategy. In a period of increasingly sophisticated and varied threats, of skyrocketing costs for military equipment, and of America's declining *relative* power in the world, greater coordination, planning, and efficiency are essential. Since the birth of

the nation, Americans have relied on the seas and on the future to account for the errors of the present and to allow for a virtually non-existent military defense capability. That situation no longer obtains, and to continue to do business as it was done in those days invites disaster.³⁷

In the next war, America will not have the luxury of sitting behind its ramparts while it mobilizes and builds its strength. All effort must therefore be directed to the prevention of that war, and by a multitude of means. Failing this, the United States must have the leaders, planners, and organization in hand that will allow it to fight and win that war from day one. This paper goes far in defining a framework for the development of such a system. It will link the core values of the nation to the means at hand, and it will develop a flexibility that will allow it to adapt to any threat. Finally, it will foster long range planning which in turn will allow the country to escape from the captivity of crisis management and give it the chance to shape the future to its own ends.

This paper is an urgent recommendation to look realistically at the world and our role in it; to realize that we must pass from the innocence of childhood to the responsibility of adulthood. And it is an urgent request to once again tie the

³⁷This is discussed in some detail in Gray, "National Style in Strategy."

hardware and tactics of our forces, military and diplomatic, to the core values of our nation, to re-discover our identity, and to achieve our goals within the context of our ideals. In the Nineteenth Century we were able to do this because of Pax Britannica. In this and the following century, we must turn to our own devices. A failure to connect our values to our means will in the end destroy those values. And without those values, we cease to be America.

II. THE ENVIRONMENT OF STRATEGY

"Nothing is more important in life than finding the right standpoint for seeing and judging events and then adhering to it. One point and one only yields an integrated view of all phenomena; and only by holding to that point can one avoid inconsistency."

Carl von Clausewitz³⁷

The purpose of this chapter is to describe the fundamental conditions under which strategy must operate; that is to say, to describe its environment. The environment remains the same over time and applies equally along the entire spectrum of international relations. This is possible because the conditions that constrain strategy rely only on the existence of the nation state system for their substance. Thus, until that system significantly changes its character, the environment of strategy will not change.

This environment is not to be considered a theory of international relations, nor is it based on such a concept. A sizable literature has developed since World War II which attempts to fit the international system into various models in an effort to understand and predict the foreign policy

³⁷On War, VIII:6:606.

behavior of nations.³⁸ The environment of strategy, however, rests on a more general plane than these theories, and posits that, whatever the nature of the international system, as long as it is composed of nation states, strategy will operate against chance and violence (or passion).

³⁸Among the better works that develop theories which assume power to be the decisive element in international relations, are Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, 4th ed. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1967); Morton A. Kaplan, System and Process in International Politics (New York: Wiley, 1956); Kenneth J. Holsti, International Politics: A Framework for Analysis, 3rd ed. (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1977); and Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1979). For theories of international relations that espouse the interdependence concept, see Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1977); and Klaus Knorr and Frank N. Trager, eds., Economic Issues and National Security (Lawrence, Kansas: Allen Press, 1977). A somewhat dated, but otherwise excellent overview of the field is presented in Robert J. Lieber, Theory and World Politics (Cambridge, Mass.: Winthrop, 1972). For the evolution of the international system see F. H. Hinsley, Power and the Pursuit of Peace (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1963); and most recently, providing a combination of historian and political scientist, Gordon A. Craig and Alexander L. George, Force and Statecraft: Diplomatic Problems in Our Time (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983). For a statement on where the international system is headed, see Harold and Margaret Sprout, Toward a Politics of the Planet Earth (New York: D. Van Nostrand, 1971). Finally, the following three works provide an excellent statement of the decisionmaking process that accompanies international relations: Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976); Glenn H. Snyder and Paul Diesing, Conflict Among Nations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977); and Alexander L. George, Presidential Decisionmaking in Foreign Policy: The Effective Use of Information and Advice (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1980).

Two principal benefits are gained from the unchanging nature of these conditions. First, if the environment is constant, then the experiences of past cultures may be analyzed for possible lessons of relevance to today; the wheel need not be re-invented. Second, it aids the security planning process by providing some sort of foundation upon which to build strategy. Failure to understand this environment and use it as the framework for one's plans, significantly increases the likelihood that those plans will not account for the uncertainties that may arise. In short, the plans will not conform to reality, and thus, will not function in it. Since this paper proposes a concept of strategy, the first task must then be to comprehend this environment of strategy.

In *On War*, Clausewitz provides the major source of this concept of the environment. By extending his idea of the fundamental nature of war to encompass the whole spectrum of international relations, the environment of strategy may be described as *the fundamental environment of international relations*. But, how can one justify such an extension when, in his work, Clausewitz talks only of war? It is clear that today this tool of policy is much more hazardous and expensive than it was in his time. The existence of nuclear weapons and the risk of escalation colors all deliberations on whether or not to go to war. Under these conditions, can such an approach be of value? To illustrate that it can, we

must first briefly discuss exactly what he says, and then see how his concepts apply.

The primary contribution Clausewitz has made to the study of conflict is his discussion of the fundamental nature of war. War, he argues, is unquestionably subordinated to the political goals and mechanisms which cause it. In fact war, far from being an autonomous activity, is merely one extreme of the spectrum of international relations. The fundamental nature of war is composed of three elements: passion, chance and policy:

"The first...mainly concerns the people; the second the commander and his army; the third the government. The passions that are to be kindled in war must already be inherent in the people; the scope which the play of courage and talent will enjoy in the realm of probability and chance depends on the particular character of the commander and the army; but the political aims are the business of government alone."³⁹

Of the three elements, only one, policy, involves the rational planning, calculation, and contemplation that enter into the conduct of war. The other two are in the main beyond analysis and quantification. Indeed, it is chance and passion that separate actual war from wargames and simulations. This has been echoed by many of the great strategists of history. Machiavelli felt that in considering war a science, chance and passion are ignored, resulting in the erroneous belief that "...war can be decided quite as well on paper as on the

³⁹Clausewitz, On War, I:1:89.

battlefield."⁴⁰ Clausewitz argues that friction, which is the product of chance, "...is the only concept that more or less corresponds to the factors that distinguish real war from war on paper."⁴¹ Most recently, Col. Harry Summers has argued that the "rationalistic economic approach" to war plays down the intangible elements inherent in conflict between men. As a result, we find ourselves materially well prepared for war, but less than ready to conduct it.⁴²

Because of passion and chance, nothing is certain in war, even the simplest of plans is subject to failure at the hands of uncertainty. Only the courage, resourcefulness, and strength of character which reside in the commander and his troops can ameliorate their impact. The development of these two elements of war, combined with the third, policy, underscore Clausewitz's profound insight; a vision that enables him to cut through the fog which surrounds an issue, and uncover its core, its essential truth. In this case, the truth is that war, by its nature, is non-rational, and consequently, that the moral factors predominantly, but not exclusively, outweigh the material ones. This conclusion is echoed by Beaufre:

⁴⁰Felix Gilbert, "Machiavelli: The Renaissance of the Art of War," p. 25.

⁴¹On War, I:7:119.

⁴²On Strategy, pp. 44-45.

"More therefore than all plans and schemes based on material factors, the art of battle consists in maintaining and strengthening the psychological cohesion of one's own troops while at the same time disrupting that of the enemy's. *The psychological factor is therefore all-important.*"⁴³

With sufficient strength, of course, one can rely mainly on the material factors of war. Such has been our practice throughout much of our history.⁴⁴ This form of warfare follows an essentially logistical strategy and places emphasis on firepower and technology. Its advantages lie mainly in the reduction of uncertainty (mainly by ignoring it) and the lack of a need for elaborate operational plans.⁴⁵ Instead, battlefield operations come to depend mainly on logistics. It is in logistical planning, not operational, where the complexity lies; and reliance on it overshadows other strategic concepts. For example, the initial strategy of Operation Overlord, rather than envisioning a disruptive, penetrating thrust into the Low Countries, was keyed to a broad frontal advance to "...gain, at the earliest possible date, use of the enormously important ports of Belgium."⁴⁶

⁴³Beaufre, Introduction to Strategy, p. 57.

⁴⁴Edward Luttwak addresses the material superiority necessary for this type of war, and American reliance on it throughout its history in "The American Style of Warfare," pp. 57-58.

⁴⁵Edward N. Luttwak, "The Operational Level of War," International Security, Winter, 1980/81, p. 65.

⁴⁶Dwight D. Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1948), p. 226. This reliance on logistical strategy is addressed more recently by Col. Harry Summers in On Strategy, p. 1.

As Luttwak writes of American efforts in Europe in 1944, strategy:

"...was characterized by the broad-front advance of units which engaged in tactical combat *seriatim*. Above the purely tactical level, the important decisions were primarily of a logistic character."⁴⁷

The benefit of such a strategy is that a nation can rely on relatively untrained citizen soldiers, reducing the need for standing armies. Furthermore, with a large degree of certainty, victory becomes only a matter of time. Perhaps the most attractive aspect of logistical war to Americans is the savings in lives that it entails:

"We believe in using 'things'--artillery, bombs, massive firepower--in order to conserve our soldiers' lives."⁴⁸

There are however, two major conditions to the successful employment of this form of warfare. First, the enemy you choose must be either materially inferior or near exhaustion when you engage him.⁴⁹ Second, one must be able to mobilize rapidly, and in relative security, to build up the quantitative edge needed.⁵⁰ It can be argued that both of these

⁴⁷"The Operational Level of War," p. 62. Of the Americans, German General Hermann Balck said: "Within my zone, the Americans never once exploited a success." Quoted in Battelle Columbus Labs, "Translation of Taped Conversation with General Hermann Balck, 13 April, 1979," (Columbus, Ohio, Jul. 1979), p. 24.

⁴⁸General Fred C. Weyand, CDRS CALL, Jul.-Aug., 1976, pp. 3-4. Cited in Harry Summers, On Strategy, p. 40.

⁴⁹Colin Gray, "National Style in Strategy," p. 26.

⁵⁰Luttwak, "The Operational Level of War," p. 77.

conditions are lacking today in our confrontation with the Soviet Union.

By relying on logistical strategy only, the tendency is to downplay the role of the opponent. He is seen as merely a collection of hardware that must be destroyed.⁵¹ In reality, however, the opponent is an intelligent and actively thinking player, seeking always to thwart one's intentions.⁵² If the role of chance and passion in war is acknowledged, if it is realized that the moral factors far outweigh the material, then it will become apparent that one's efforts must be aimed at the enemy's will to fight, as well as his ability to fight.

A further consideration that must be entered into when dealing with a thinking opponent is that every action can produce an unanticipated reaction on the part of the enemy, which will in turn tend to disrupt one's plans. The solution to this is either to be so materially superior that the factors of uncertainty are reduced to insignificance, or to have the flexibility necessary to adapt.

To adopt the former course in this era of high technology and against an opponent such as the Soviets is unwise and, in likelihood, beyond our means.⁵³ Therefore, only a strategy

⁵¹Edward Luttwak, "The American Style of Warfare," p. 57.

⁵²Clausewitz, On War, I:1:77.

⁵³Steven L. Canby, "Military Reform and the Art of War," International Security Review, Fall 82, p. 249.

of flexibility remains a viable option. Because of the fundamental nature of war then, reliance on a logistical strategy and rigid doctrines is extremely dangerous, and ill-advised.

An adjunct to this concept of the nature of war is the idea that all plans must have combat as their distant focus:

"...it is inherent in the very concept of war that everything that occurs *must originally derive from combat.*"⁵⁴

To qualify this concept, Clausewitz later adds that combat actually need never take place, for it is not so much combat that is of importance as is the ever-present threat of it.⁵⁵ This threat does not operate against the opponent's forces, but instead it attacks his will to resist.⁵⁶ It is the moral factor that dominates, and that will later permit the application of this concept to peacetime diplomacy. Thus, even though the forces and plans we develop may not be used in actual war, they must be designed with that in mind if they are to be credible. And, credibility is the key to deterrence.

Indeed, the idea of the threat is one of the fundamental concepts of deterrence: if one is to know peace, then prepare for war. In works on deterrence theory, there has generally been an artificial separation between combat and

⁵⁴Clausewitz, On War, I:2:95.

⁵⁵H. Rothfels, "Clausewitz," in Makers of Modern Strategy, ed. E.M.Earle, p. 104.

⁵⁶Liddell Hart, Strategy, p. 341.

threat.⁵⁷ Europe, for example, seeks deterrence but abhors plans for successful warfighting.⁵⁸ The United States has followed much the same logic. Colin Gray writes that the aim over the past two decades has not been toward

"...developing and deploying weapons so as to ensure American freedom of action in crisis and war, thus assuring, insofar as possible, a meaningful pre- and intra-war deterrence. Instead it was developing and deploying weapons above all else for their negotiability, or utility as bargaining tools, for the better management of a (U.S.-style) stable strategic balance."⁵⁹

From the relation between combat and threat discussed above, it can be seen that such a separation is false.

War deals with combat, and therefore plans for war must also consider combat. Furthermore, deterrence strategies, if they are to remain effective, must consider their ability to prevail in combat. By thus increasing the credibility of threat, combat capability strengthens deterrence; and it gives

⁵⁷This is addressed in Michael Howard, "The Forgotten Dimensions of Strategy," p. 107. Recent work in this area appear to recognize the false separation of combat and threat. See, for example, Joseph D. Douglass, "U.S. Strategy for General Nuclear War," International Security Review, Fall 1980, pp. 287-316; Donald M. Snow, "Current Nuclear Deterrence Thinking," International Studies Quarterly, Sept. 1979, pp. 445-486; Colin S. Gray, "Nuclear Strategy: The Case for a Theory of Victory," International Security, Summer 1979, pp. 54-87; and Desmond Ball, "U.S. Strategic Forces: How Would They be Used?" International Security, Winter 1982/83, pp. 31-60.

⁵⁸Canby, "Military Reform and the Art of War," p. 248.

⁵⁹"National Style in Strategy," pp. 42-43.

us confidence in our abilities should open hostilities break out. Combat and threat form a continuum, and thus both are within the environment of strategy. Liddell Hart, though theorizing on a tactical level, supports this hypothesis. Speaking of the commander:

*"...his true aim is not so much to seek battle as to seek a strategic situation so advantageous that if it does not of itself produce the decision, its continuation by battle is sure to achieve this."*⁶⁰

Strategies must be geared toward the capability in the future to fight and win an engagement, whether that engagement is ever actually fought or not, and plans must be drafted with such a focus continuously in mind.

*"The whole of military activity must therefore relate directly or indirectly to the engagement. The end for which a soldier is recruited, clothed, armed, and trained, the whole object of his sleeping, eating, drinking, and marching is simply that he should fight at the right place and the right time."*⁶¹

Another drawback of a rigid, pre-defined strategy in this environment of uncertainty is that it assumes only one type of war. Under such conditions a state may seek only to "terminate" the war, which ignores the requirements that policy may lay on strategy.⁶² In fact, a fundamental

⁶⁰Strategy, p. 339.

⁶¹Clausewitz, On War, I:2:95.

⁶²Harry Summers discusses the concept of "conflict termination" in the concluding chapter to the U.S. Army War College version of On Strategy. He argues the value of such a construct in separating war and peace, but, by suggesting that it is the Army's duty to secure a certain peace, he comes

distinction of the types of war exists, a distinction which clearly acknowledges the dominant role of policy. This distinction was first developed by Clausewitz, and was labeled by him the dual nature of war. The duality deals with the political object of the endeavor, whether it be limited or total. As war moves from its limited nature toward its total nature, the effect of policy diminishes. This continues until the theoretical ideal which Clausewitz describes as "absolute war" is attained. At this logical extreme, policy has no role, and war is completely autonomous.⁶³ In reality, this ideal can never be reached, for the reason that friction inhibits the smooth conduct of war.⁶⁴

dangerously close to separating military action from policy. On Strategy (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 1981), p. 112. The danger of such a concept of mission is superbly highlighted in Peter Paret, French Revolutionary Warfare From Indochina to Algeria (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1964).

⁶³Clausewitz, On War, I:1:78.

⁶⁴Friction refers to those elements of war such as danger, exhaustion, lack of information on the enemy, and spacial and temporal constraints, which all act to reduce its tempo and destructiveness. On War, I:7. The use of theoretical extremes and dialectical pairs is one of the trademarks of Clausewitz. For example, as Bernard Brodie illustrates: "...he first insists that the use of force is theoretically without limits and then goes on to explain why it must in fact be limited." War and Politics (New York: Macmillan, 1973), p. 11.

We are thus left with two types of war: total and limited. In a note written several years before his death, Clausewitz expressed his intention to rework the text of *On War* to better highlight this concept of duality. The note provides a concise statement of the distinction between total and limited war:

"War can be of two kinds, in the sense that either the objective is to *overthrow the enemy*--to render him politically helpless or militarily impotent, thus forcing him to sign whatever peace we please; or *merely to occupy some of his frontier-districts* so that we can annex them or use them for bargaining at the peace negotiations."⁶⁵

Therefore, in total war, one seeks the complete destruction of the enemy, including occupation of his territory and the dismantling of his government. In order to accomplish this aim, the enemy's armed forces must first be defeated.⁶⁶ Total war thus involves higher risks and prizes, and relies heavily on the employment of military force to reduce the enemy. Because of its total nature, the political and military aims will tend to be the same, and "...the more military and less political will war appear to be."⁶⁷

Limited war, in contrast, has as its objective the exacting of certain concessions from the enemy. As Clausewitz argues, these concessions can range from

⁶⁵"Two Notes by the Author on His Plans for Revising *On War*: Note of 10 July 1827," in *On War*, p. 69.

⁶⁶Eisenhower, *Crusade in Europe*, p. 225.

⁶⁷*On War*, I:1:88.

"...the conquest of his territory, to a temporary occupation or invasion, to projects with an immediate political purpose, and finally to passively awaiting the enemy's attacks. Any one of these may be used to overcome the enemy's will: the choice depends on circumstances."⁶⁸

Under these conditions, the political and military aims diverse,"...the less will the military element's natural tendency to violence coincide with political directives."⁶⁹ Since war is but a tool of policy, it must, in this case, submit totally to the dictates of the master. Otherwise the danger exists that the armed forces may go too far, causing an undesired political affect, such as escalation or over-extension.⁷⁰

While in both total and limited war, the enemy's will to fight must be broken, in the latter, this objective is attained with less military force. The lower costs of surrender and the lower level of commitment of both sides inherent in a limited war means that less coercion is necessary to bend the enemy's will:

"The smaller the penalty you demand from your opponent the less you can expect him to try and deny it to you; the smaller the effort he makes, the less you need make yourself. Moreover, the more modest your own

⁶⁸ Ibid., I:2:94.

⁶⁹ Ibid., I:1:88

⁷⁰ The prime example of the loss of political control over the military in a limited war may be found in the French experience in Algeria. Here the army felt it knew, better than the government, what was good for France, and forced the downfall of the Fourth Republic. Paret, French Revolutionary Warfare, p. 111.

political aim, the less importance you attach to it and the less reluctantly you will abandon it if you must."⁷¹

Furthermore, as Liddell Hart argues:

"It should, equally, be a principle of policy, especially in war, to provide your opponent with a ladder by which he can climb down."⁷²

Policy must maintain control, and must continue to provide the overall purpose for, and aim of the conflict.

This leads to two very important conclusions for the strategist. The first is that before entering into a conflict, whether it be as the aggressor or as the defender, the choice of the type of war must be made:

"The first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgment that the statesman and commander have to make is to establish...the kind of war on which they are embarking; neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into, something that is alien to its nature."⁷³

The second conclusion derives directly from the first, and it is that

"...war is not a mere act of policy but a true political instrument, a continuation of political activity by other means."⁷⁴

In the distinction between war as an "act of policy" and war as a "political instrument," lies the most fundamental of Clausewitz's arguments: *War is subordinated to policy, and*

⁷¹Clausewitz, On War, I:1:81.

⁷²Strategy, p. 371.

⁷³On War, I:1:88. Our failure to do this in Vietnam forms one of the major themes of Col. Summers' On Strategy, see especially pp. 185-187.

⁷⁴Clausewitz, On War, I:1:87.

therefore is not its equal; war is not policy itself, but is instead its tool. Thus, war is a continuous spectrum--from limited to total--and it is itself only a part of the larger spectrum of international relations. This spectrum is represented at one end by unification, such as was accomplished in America in 1787, or in Germany in 1871; at the other end is war, the most extreme of which is total war; and in between lie the myriad of forms which the relations between states assume.

While these conclusions may seem basic, they are not commonly accepted in America. It is part of the American character that war is considered as an autonomous activity, separate from politics. As Harry Summers points out:

"World Wars I and II had been not so much wars as crusades to punish evil. Even so astute a military professional as General of the Army Douglas MacArthur saw war in this light. As he told the Senate, 'the general definition which for many decades has been acceptable was that war was an ultimate process of politics; that when all of the political means failed, we then go to force.'"⁷⁵

Such a misconception was with America in Vietnam, and was among the causes of the ignorance of both the political nature of the conflict, and the fact that war is a tool of policy and is not independent.⁷⁶

⁷⁵On Strategy, p. 95.

⁷⁶Clausewitz, On War, VIII:6:605.

Since war is a political instrument and in no way breaks the discourse between nations, its beginning and end are in reality part of a continuous stream of events. This leads to the final Clausewitzian concept of import here. Concerning war termination, Clausewitz writes that,

"...even the ultimate outcome of a war is not always to be regarded as final. The defeated state often considers the outcome merely as a transitory evil..."⁷⁷

If the war is fought for purely military reasons, such as was World War I, then the tendency is to exact revenge through the peace treaty.⁷⁸ If, however, the war is fought "...in constant regard to the peace you desire" (that is for a political purpose), then revenge loses its importance, and a just and hopefully lasting peace may be obtained.⁷⁹ Only in such a case does one stand to win both the war and the peace.

The environment of strategy, then, is one of chance and passion; of rational policy planning; and of continuity. It is continuity which allows its application to circumstances and events short of war. The environment is continuous in two respects. First, strategy is the tool of policy in war,

⁷⁷Ibid., I:1:80.

⁷⁸As Brodie writes: "...if we seek historical examples of failure to match military design with political purpose, with measureless unhappy consequences, World War I is exhibit number one." War and Politics, p. 15. See also p. 270 for a discussion of the revengeful nature of the Versailles peace treaty.

⁷⁹Hart, Strategy, p. 351.

and must act along a spectrum from limited to total war. Since limited war involves as much threat as combat, the connection with cold war is easily made. Cold war is nothing more than an intense interaction, a powerplay, between rival states. In short, strategy must operate along the entire spectrum of international relations; the environment is therefore continuous in this aspect. Secondly, the environment is continuous with respect to time. Since no act occurs that is not a response to some previous act; and since no act is final, the environment pertains equally throughout time.⁸⁰ Consequently, through continuity, the environment of strategy is seen to apply at all times and in all interactions between sovereign states.

To reinforce this point, consider the definition of limited war offered above. It was argued that this type of war is one of limited concessions. These concessions can be won, in fact, without resort to actual combat when the opponent perceives that the cost of resistance will be higher than that of conceding. In an era of nuclear deterrence, this concept has taken the form of "coercive diplomacy" or the "diplomacy of force."⁸¹ In fact, the Soviets consider themselves to be in

⁸⁰ Clausewitz, On War, I:1:78.

⁸¹ Bradford Dismukes and James McConnel, eds., Soviet Naval Diplomacy (New York: Pergamon Press, 1979), p. 2.

a protracted struggle; not necessarily an armed one, but a struggle nonetheless. In the truest tradition of Clausewitz, they emphasize the subordination of strategy and force to policy, and, more importantly, stress the use of force for coercion:

"Moscow views the struggle as political in essence, but taking numerous forms--ideological, economic, and diplomatic, with the diplomatic definitely comprehending the military-diplomatic."⁸²

Possony and Pournelle, with their argument that America is at war now, echo this diverse and essentially psychological concept of the use of military force:

"The United States is at war. Whether we consider this to be the Protracted Conflict initiated in 1917 by the Bolsheviks or something new brought about by the march of technology in this century, the war is taking place and it cannot be escaped. The field of engagement is not everywhere bloody. Except for financial sacrifices, many citizens of the West and subjects of Communism may be unaware that the conflict has been going on until the decisive moment, if it ever comes, is upon them."⁸³

Yet, war is generally defined as a state of open, armed, and often prolonged conflict carried on between nations. Instead of war, Possony and Pournelle, and the Soviets are in fact addressing peaceful, though tense, relations between rival powers; relations that have existed for ages, from Athens and Sparta to England and Germany. There is indeed a struggle taking place, but it is not a war. It is in reality lower in the scale of international relations.

⁸²Ibid., p. 3.

⁸³Strategy of Technology, p. 1.

That both the American authors and the Soviet leadership consider the relations between the two nations to be "war," or a life and death struggle, suggests that the difference between peace and war is ill-defined. Andre Beaufre argues that this is in fact the case, a result of nuclear deterrence:

"But peace has no longer the absolute character it had in the last century: today it is possible to hurl insults at a nation, burn down its embassy, arrest its ships, send hired assassins into its country or give almost open support to political parties without war breaking out; formerly all this would have been unthinkable. Peace between contending nations has become 'war in peacetime' of cold war."⁸⁴

That both Americans and Soviets argue for the application of classical strategic principles in the pursuit of "victory" suggests that the environment of strategy applies to these cases as well as outright conflict. In fact, there is nothing in logic which opposes the conclusion that the environment of strategy exists along the entire spectrum of international relations.⁸⁵

As Clausewitz would do, let us turn to the real world for evidence to support this conclusion. The first question must be whether passion is present in all levels of international relations. In answer, one must merely consider the response to the seizure of American embassy personnel by Iranian

⁸⁴Deterrence and Strategy, pp. 29-30.

⁸⁵Edward M. Earle, Makers of Modern Strategy, Introduction, p. viii.

militants. There was no war, yet there was certainly passion and violence. Just as the stakes involved change over the range of the spectrum, so too does the level of passion. In total war passion is extremely high, while in the day to day relations between allies, it is low. Nevertheless, it is always there. Indeed, Clausewitz does not qualify passion except to state that the proper level must be present in the people before embarking on an endeavor. Thus, before signing a treaty or granting funds to a nation, as well as before committing forces to battle, the support of the people must be present.

The second issue is whether or not the full spectrum of international relations permits the play of chance. Again, one need only consider history for an answer. With what degree of certainty should we have built up a "Twin Pillar" policy in the Persian Gulf, depending on Iran and Saudi Arabia to defend the region? That we did so with a high degree of confidence only serves to the discredit of our statesmanship.⁸⁶ Since international relations involves the interaction of individuals and institutions from widely divergent cultural and historical backgrounds, chance cannot be ruled out. As Americans, no matter how hard the Russian culture and institutions are studied, we cannot hope to be able to predict their actions. Indeed, it is when we feel certain of their

⁸⁶James H. Noyes, The Clouded Lens: Persian Gulf Security and U.S. Policy, 2 ed. (Stanford, Ca.: Hoover Institution Press, 1982), pp. 120-121.

behavior that we should become concerned, for it is then that we become overconfident and run the risk of missing important signals.

Finally, the role of policy and of rational policy planning are unquestionable. Indeed, since control over passion is weak, and is non-existent over chance, if there is to be any control over events for one's own ends, the importance of streamlining and improving the planning process becomes essential. Policy, and the planning process which accompanies it, are the only elements of the environment over which men may exert some control.

The environment of strategy is one of uncertainty, temporal continuity, and one that pertains to the whole of international relations. Its elements, as described in this chapter, affect the implementation of strategy. Strategy cannot operate outside of its bounds; and plans which develop the specific chain of events of an endeavor cannot succeed unless they are fabricated with this environment as a guide. The environment of strategy, the fundamental environment of international relations, is the milieu which constrains and animates the whole of security planning. It is this standpoint, as Clausewitz suggests, which will allow the formation of an integrated view of world events, and that will in turn allow a degree of consistency in planning and behavior. It is the foundation upon which to build a concept of strategy.

III. STRATEGY: A METHOD OF THOUGHT

"Strategy cannot be a single defined doctrine, it is a method of thought, the object of which is to codify events, set them in order of priority and then choose the most effective course of action. There will be a special strategy to fit each situation; any given strategy may be the best possible in certain situations and the worst conceivable in others."

Andre Beaufre⁸⁷

Strategy is a complex subject. It has no answers; only informed opinion and judgment, based on a study of history. In an era of positivism, materialism, and quantitative analysis, such indeterminacy is discomfoting. Yet, because of the uncertain environment of strategy, planners and decision-makers must accept indeterminacy and must accommodate themselves to it if the plans they develop are to know success.⁸⁸ There are no answers; nothing is final; nothing is certain. The only hope for success under these conditions is to develop

⁸⁷Introduction to Strategy, p. 13.

⁸⁸For a discussion of the acceptance of indeterminacy see Morton White, Social Thought in America: The Revolt Against Formalism, 3rd ed., (Boston: Beacon Press, 1957). Nineteenth Century Philosophers such as Charles Saunders Pierce, William James and John Dewey develop the theoretical foundation for such pragmatism, while William J. Meyer, in Public Good and Political Authority: A Pragmatic Proposal (Port Washington, N.Y.: Kennikat Press, 1975), provides a more recent treatment of the subject. For a discussion of the intellectual antecedents of modernity, see Albert N. Levi, Philosophy and the Modern World (Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 1959).

an approach to strategy that is flexible; one that acknowledges its true environment. As Beaufre posits, "strategy cannot be a single defined doctrine," but must be instead a "method of thought."⁸⁹ It is the purpose of this chapter to suggest such an approach.

The environment of strategy is continuous with respect to time as long as the nation state system continues to be the predominant political and sociological unit. Because of this, use may be made of history, which "...gives perspective to the problems of the present and drives home the point that there is really very little new under the sun."⁹⁰ Without history, strategy would be forced to rely solely on current events and present day analytical techniques, which, though essential, would alone drive it to a form of relativism. But, with the aid of history, a broad conceptual framework of strategy may be defined. It will provide a stable reference point from which the course of society may be plotted.

Thus, it is history that provides a firm foundation in an otherwise fluid environment. This foundation applies not only to the political and military fields, but also to social and

⁸⁹This concept is supported by numerous strategists. See especially, Clausewitz, On War; Liddell Hart, Strategy; and Possony and Pournelle, The Strategy of Technology.

⁹⁰James B. Stockdale, "Educating Leaders," The Washington Quarterly, Winter 83, p. 50.

cultural. That is to say, culture is the product of history. In that this is so, if strategy is based on the values and ideals of the national culture, it develops a relatively firm base from which to fulfill its task. On the other hand, any strategy that fails to build on its cultural foundation--one that is in fact detached from it--will be cast adrift in the sea of change, will lose perspective, will be relegated to merely reacting to the present and will therefore be unable to guide a nation toward its long term goals.

The task at hand is to first discuss those cultural ideals--the national values--and then to develop a framework which connects strategy to them. The result will be a concept that links the values of a nation, through interests and policy, to strategy, and provides those responsible for the development of plans of action with some form of guidance in the solution of day to day events. Strategy becomes a guide that frees them from a sole reliance on the present, and allows them to shape and pursue a course into the future.

A. NATIONAL VALUES AND INTERESTS

National values are those general principles of philosophy and ideology which give a nation its unique character. They are the product of a combination of inheritance, history, and environment (both physical and political). In America, the national values include liberalism, federalism, republicanism,

individualism, and optimism.⁹¹ As Henry Steel Commager writes:

"The forces that create a national character are as obscure as those that create an individual character, but that both are formed early and change relatively little is almost certain."⁹²

The national values in turn form the relatively solid anchor upon which a concept of strategy may be built. More than just providing a starting point in this framework though,

⁹¹The exact identify of these values is subject to debate and will not be addressed in detail here. The following select list of works on the subject that are key to any study of the national character, is provided in lieu of an actual discussion: Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America (Garden City, N.Y.: Harper & Row, 1966); George Santayana, Character and Opinion in the United States; Vernon L. Parrington, Main Currents in American Thought, 2 vols. (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1926); Charles and Mary Beard, America in Midpassage, 2 vols. (New York: Macmillan, 1939); Ralph H. Gabriel, The Course of American Democratic Thought (New York: Ronald Press, 1940); Richard Hofstadter, The American Political Tradition and the Men Who Made It (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1948); Harold J. Laski, The American Democracy: A Commentary and An Interpretation (New York: The Viking Press, 1948); Morton White, Social Thought in America; Henry Steel Commager, The American Mind; Frederick L. Allen, The Big Change: America Transforms Itself, 1900-1950 (New York: Harper & Row, 1952); Louis Hartz, The Liberal Tradition in America (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1955); Richard Hofstadter, The Age of Reform: From Bryan to F.D.R. (New York: Vintage, 1955); Walter Lippmann, Essays in the Public Philosophy (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1955); Dennis W. Brogan, The American Character (New York: Time, 1962); Daniel J. Boorstin, The Americans: The Democratic Experience (New York: Random House, 1973); Godfrey Hodgson, America in Our Time (New York: Doubleday, 1976); and finally, Theodore H. White, America in Search of Itself: Making of the President, 1956-1980 (New York: Harper & Row, 1982).

⁹²The American Mind, p. 409.

values also play a role in the practical world. They represent the nation, but they are also reflected on the individuals within that nation. Each person operates under these values to a greater or lesser degree. In this way, the national values form a set of vague constraints on the types of strategies a nation employs. The Soviet planner, for example, would tend to preempt rather than be surprised, while the American would tend to rule out preemption in the hope of negotiation.⁹³ Thus, national values are seen to have a dual role, one in formulating the background for the national interests and the other in constraining the means that may be used to further those interests.

These values derive their substance from the nation state system operative in the world today. In such a system, states take on identities of their own which cannot be represented by any individual or group within that state:

"The state provides the legal continuity of the national society. It thus enables the individual to experience the nation as a continuum in time and space, as a personality in whose name men act, who demands and receives services and bestows benefits, to whom one can feel personal loyalties that are felt toward few other social groups except the family and the church."⁹⁴

⁹³ Fritz W. Ermath, "Contrasts in American and Soviet Strategic Thought," in Soviet Military Thinking, ed. Derek Leebaert (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1981), pp. 62-66.

⁹⁴ Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, 4th ed. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1967), p. 489.

Governments, in turn, exist to defend these broad concepts. Since governments are run by individuals, complex institutional arrangements have been developed to ensure that the interests of the nation and not of its individual members are projected.

What this suggests is that the state is composed of more than just the sum of its parts, the relations between these parts and between the outside world, and the members who both precede and follow the current generation, must also be included. Consequently, the national values and interests are in fact the values and interests of the sum, not the sum of the values and interests of the various groups within the state.

Walter Lippmann argues:

"...this corporate being, though so insubstantial to our senses, binds, in Burke's words, a man to his country with 'ties which though light as air, are as strong as links of iron.' That is why young men die in battle for their country's sake and why old men plant trees they will never sit under."⁹⁵

For Americans, this concept is all the more important, since we are an amalgamation of various cultures, a melting pot for the world. The national identity lies in its values and ideals, not in its territory or anthropological identity.⁹⁶ Because America lacks an identity firmly set either in history

⁹⁵ Essays in the Public Philosophy (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1955; Mentor paperback, 1955), p. 35.

⁹⁶ For a contemporary analysis of the heterogeneity of the United States, its thus fragile cohesion and the links that bond it together, see Joel Garreau, The Nine Nations of North America (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1981).

or in a single culture, its reason for being is idealistic. The nation represents not a given territory or people, but a concept: *liberty*. A concept, though is not tangible, not practical, and not quantifiable, which runs counter to the expectations of today's society. Yet ideas are important, as Lippmann suggests:

"The airy nothings in the realm of essence are efficacious in the existential world when a man, believing it to be true or good, treats the idea as if it were the reality. In this way faith in an idea can quite literally remove a mountain."⁹⁷

America the dream, America the ideal, and America the concept are best described by George Santayana:

"As it happens, the symbolic American can be made largely adequate to the facts; because, if there are immense differences between individual Americans--for some Americans are black--yet there is a great uniformity in their environment, customs, temper, and thoughts. They have all been uprooted from their several soils and ancestries and plunged together into one vortex, whirling irresistibly in a space otherwise quite empty. *To be an American is of itself almost a moral condition, an education, and a career.* Hence a single ideal figment can cover a large part of what each American is in his character, and almost the whole of what Americans are in their social outlook and political judgments."⁹⁸ (Emphasis added)

America is a young nation, a mere infant when compared to the older powers of the world such as England, Russia and China. For the major part of its history, it has basked in warmth of innocence, protected by our insular position. Not

⁹⁷ Public Philosophy, p. 73.

⁹⁸ Character and Opinion in the United States, p. 104.

Not for America the harsh realities of war and devastation, realities that other nations took for granted. There were no invasions, no plagues, no famines, and few threats, to burst the bubble of youth. America was a country of endless opportunity, with nothing on the horizon but wealth, posterity and peace.⁹⁹

In such an environment, the national interests favored excessively the side of liberty and economic expansion, to the neglect of security.¹⁰⁰ Not until World War II thrust it into the role of a world power did security become a serious concern.¹⁰¹ Although it was not appreciated at the time, this turn of events gave rise to an identity crisis, as America the prosperous, the peace loving, the isolationist, was forced to play the power game with the world.¹⁰² It might be said

⁹⁹Henry A. Kissinger, White House Years (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1979), pp. 55-61.

¹⁰⁰For a discussion of this concept see George F. Kennan, American Diplomacy, 1900-1950 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951). On the youthfulness of America, its lack of a feudal tradition and the consequent differences between European and American Liberalism, see Louis Hartz, The Liberal Tradition in America. Finally, on the moderate nature of the American political culture, see Richard Hofstadter, The American Political Tradition (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1948).

¹⁰¹Huntington, Soldier and State, p. 345.

¹⁰²Writing in 1950, Commager states that far from causing an identity crisis, W.W.II confirmed the myths of the limitless power, uniqueness and superiority of America, American Mind, p. 431. But, writing in 1968 he highlights their "anachronistic quality," and their true nature as myths. The Defeat of America: Presidential Power and the National Character (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1974), p. 42.

that this identity crisis is in a way our adolescence as a nation. The growing pains have been significant, compounded by the "acne" of such events as Vietnam and Watergate.

Now, at last, as America's relative economic power declines and as the quantity and quality of the threat increases, it is beginning to see the need to get serious about national security, that it is not a temporary thing, and that it is not for the untrained.¹⁰³ As a world power in the nuclear

¹⁰³The relative decline of America is discussed by Kissinger, who argues that, as of the late 1960's, we had come to realize limits on our national power. White House Years, Chap. 3. A discussion of the swing of the economic pendulum is contained in Godfrey Hodgson, America In Our Time, Chap. 12. For a forceful statement of an absolute decline in American power, see Andrew Hacker, The End of The American Era (New York: Antheneum, 1970). A different view of the "decline" is posed by Lippmann, who, though writing before the late 1960's, suggests that a new agenda is in order, that "we have fulfilled and outlived most of what we used to regard as the program of our national purpose." The National Purpose. A symposium (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1960), p. 126. Numerous works have appeared recently that urge a review of our national security apparatus. For an overview of the system and its shortcomings, see John Collins, U.S. Defense Planning: A Critique (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1982). Harry G. Summers' On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War (Novato, Ca.: Presidio Press, 1982) contains a superb analysis of the problems encountered during Vietnam, viewed from a Clausewitzian perspective. For a comprehensive study of how the system *should* be, see Stefan T. Possony and J.E. Pournelle, The Strategy of Technology: Winning the Decisive War (Cambridge, Mass.: Dunellen, 1970); and for a recommendation in the form of historical analogy, see Edward N. Luttwak, The Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire (Baltimore, Md.: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976). Many works have been produced on military reform. See, for example, Philip S. Kronenberg, ed., Planning U.S. Security: Defense Policy in the Eighties (New York: Pergamon, 1982); James Fallows, National Defense (New York: Random House, 1981); Thomas E. Etzold, Defense or Delusion? America's Military in the 1980s (New York: Harper & Row, 1982); Gen. David C. Jones, USAF (Ret.),

age, foreign relations as a whole, and defense in particular have become full time affairs:

"In fact, since the total strategy of deterrence is constantly in action, the defence function has also become a continuous operation instead of being restricted as in the old days to periods of serious crisis."¹⁰⁴

As was mentioned above, there are no answers and nothing is final. A concept of strategy must be developed which is based on the relatively unchanging national values, not just for the sake of sound strategic planning, but also to foster an understanding of what America is. As Americans, we must come to understand our position in the world, and our role in shaping the future. Only in this way may we presume to be a "world leader."

"What's Wrong With Our Defense Establishment," The New York Times Magazine, Nov. 1982); Steven L. Canby, "Military Reform and the Art of War," International Security Review, Fall 1982, pp. 245-268; VAdm James B. Stockdale, USN (Ret.), "Educating Leaders," The Washington Quarterly, Winter 1983, pp. 49-52; Col. William J. Taylor, Jr., USA (Ret.) "Leading the Army," The Washington Quarterly, Winter 1983, pp. 40-45; and Gen. Edward C. Meyer, USA, "The JCS: How Much Reform is Needed?" Armed Forces Journal International, Apr. 1982, pp. 82-90. For the military establishment's side of the debate, see Jeffrey S. McKittrick, "A Military Look at Military Reform," Comparative Strategy, Vol. 4 No. 1, 1983, pp. 51-64; and Lt. Col. Walter Kross, USAF, "Military Reform: Past and Present," Air University Review, Jul.-Aug. 1981, pp. 101-108. Finally, for reform arguments tied to specific examples or operational concepts, see Jeffrey Record, The Rapid Deployment Force and U.S. Military Intervention in the Persian Gulf (Washington, D.C.: Corporate Press, 1981); and Richard K. Betts, Surprise Attack: Lessons for Defense Planning (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1982).

¹⁰⁴Beaufre, Deterrence and Strategy, p. 173.

In gaining this understanding, the importance of values cannot be overstated, and they should not be taken for granted. As Walter Lippmann warns:

"The acquired culture is not transmitted in our genes, and so the issue is always in doubt. The good life in the good society, though attainable, is never attained and possessed once and for all. So what has been attained will again be lost if the wisdom of the good life in a good society is not transmitted."¹⁰⁵

He goes on to argue that if these values are forgotten, institutions lose their meaning and become hollow.¹⁰⁶ The stage is then set for demagogues and fanatics "...either to divide the nation to the point of paralysis or to gather unto themselves sufficient power in order to rip the society away from its democratic moorings."¹⁰⁷ The significance of values increases exponentially when one takes into consideration that this era is one of indirect strategy (discussed in detail below), which places far greater emphasis on non-military tools of power, of which the more significant is psychological

¹⁰⁵ Public Philosophy, p. 75. For a study of Walter Lippmann, his life and his philosophy, the definitive work is Ronald Steel, Walter Lippmann and the American Century (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1980).

¹⁰⁶ Ibid., p. 80.

¹⁰⁷ Paul A.C. Koistinen, The Military-Industrial Complex: A Historical Perspective (New York: Praeger, 1980), pp. 18-19. In light of the arguments of both Lippmann and Koistinen, it might be inferred that perhaps a greater threat to our way of life lies in the historical and political shallowness of our officer training programs. This argument is echoed explicitly by Bernard Brodie in War and Politics, ch. 10; and implicitly by Harry Summers in On Strategy, p. 28.

power.¹⁰⁸ Thus, values, if they are taught and well known by the people (and the military), can be a great source of strength. On the other hand, if they are lost, America, a nation built on a concept of values, is also lost.

Even before addressing the national interests then, there develops a threat to the nation that arises from within; a sort of cancer. This threat may in fact be more serious than any other. While Rome fell due to a love of luxury, it is generally accepted that that love had as its antecedent a loss of those values that had made it strong. Part of strategy then, must be devoted to the articulation of those values, perhaps in the field of political strategy.¹⁰⁹

As was suggested above, the national interests are formed by a synthesis of the national values and the nation state system. Likewise, it is the purpose of the national interests to safeguard and preserve the national values. Because of this, it becomes apparent that the national interests are not to be found in Israel or El Salvador but within this nation itself. In a more general construct, the national interests is that set of concerns which is designed to ensure the sovereignty of a nation in an inherently hostile and anarchic

¹⁰⁸Beaufre, Introduction to Strategy, p. 111

¹⁰⁹Such a concept is disliked in this nation because it hints at "indoctrination." But, should we, as a result foster ignorance? That condition, as has been argued, is just as dangerous.

world; and sovereignty is taken to mean the right and the ability to independently pursue and support ones own national values.¹¹⁰

¹¹⁰The literature on the national interests is extensive. Some of the more noteworthy pieces are cited here: Hans J. Morgenthau, "The Mainspring of American Foreign Policy: National Interest vs Moral Abstractions," American Political Science Review, Dec. 1950, pp. 833-854; and "Another Great Debate: The National Interests of the United States," American Political Science Review, Dec. 1952, pp. 961-988; Walter Lippmann, Essays In the Public Philosophy; Warner Schilling, "The Clarification of Ends or Which Interest is the National?" World Politics, 8, 1956, pp. 566-578; Glendon A. Schubert, Jr., "The Public Interest in Administrative Decision Making," American Political Science Review, June 1957, pp. 346-368; Arthur S. Miller, "Foreword: The Public Interest Undefined," Journal of Public Law, vol. 10, 1961 symposium, pp. 184-202; Carl Friedrich, ed., The Public Interest (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press) 1962; Paul Seabury, Power, Freedom and Diplomacy (New York: Random House, 1963); Richard Flathman, The Public Interest (New Random House, 1963); Richard Flathman, The Public Interest (New York: Wiley, 1966); Virginia Held, The Public Interest and Individual Interests (New York: Basic Books, 1970); Bruce M. Russett and Elizabeth C. Hanson, Interest and Ideology: The Foreign Policy Beliefs of American Businessmen (San Francisco: W.H. Freeman and Co., 1975); Paul Seabury, "The Moral and Philosophical Bases of American Foreign Policy," Orbis, Spring 1976, pp. 3-14; Hans Morgenthau, "The Founding Fathers and Foreign Policy: Implication for the Late Twentieth Century," Orbis, Spring 1976, pp. 15-26; Kenneth W. Thompson, "American Foreign Policy: Values Renewed or Discovered," Orbis, Spring 1976, pp. 123-136; William Kintner, "A Program For America: Freedom and Foreign Policy," Orbis, Spring 1977, pp. 139-156; Donald E. Nuechterlein, National Interest and Presidential Leadership: The Setting of Priorities (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1978); and finally, Alexander L. George and Robert O. Keohane, "The Concept of National Interests: Uses and Limitations," in Presidential Decisionmaking in Foreign Policy by A.L. George (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1980). For a short summary of the interest literature, see Fred A. Sanderann, "The Concept of the National Interest," Orbis, Spring 1977, pp. 121-128. Indictments of the utility of the national interest concept are contained in Stanley Hoffmann, Primacy of World Order: American Foreign Policy Since the Cold War (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1978); and Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1977).

In seeking to identify national interests then, one must look, not for the interests of any group or individual within the nation, but for those of the nation itself. In other words, the nation is an entity onto itself, and it thus has its own interests. As such, the national interests are above debate. They are the product of the environment, not of politics.

The national interests are the result of the cultural heritage of a people as well as the nation state system means that each nation will at once have its own unique interests, while at the same time, will share interests in common with other nations. For example, the United States and the Soviet Union both share the common interest of security; but, the Soviet Union, because of its history and environment, values security above personal liberty, while the United States, because of its history and environment, places greater emphasis on liberty than on security.¹¹¹

Following the logic described above, the national interests of the United States find their origin within the nation. In Federalist 23, Alexander Hamilton discusses the purposes of the Union, from which can be derived our national interests:

¹¹¹In fact, it has been argued that Americans see their armed forces less as protectors of their security than as threats to their liberty. Colin Gray, "National Style in Strategy," p. 39.

"The principal purposes to be answered by union are these--the common defense of the members; the preservation of the public peace, as well against internal convulsions as external attacks; the regulation of commerce with other nations and between the States; the superintendence of our intercourse, political and commercial, with foreign countries,"¹¹²

The national interests which can be developed from this statement are security, liberty, and economic well being.

Security is the first interest which is essential. George and Keohane call it physical survival (of our population) which in our era is "...always in jeopardy."¹¹³ What must also be included in this definition is the maintenance of sovereignty, of territorial integrity, and, though often taken for granted, of the Union.

The second interest is liberty: the maintenance of the American form of government, its institutions, and its freedoms. This interest refers not only to external threats, but also to those which arise from within. It is this interest that most directly represents America's values, and that distinguishes it from other nations in the world. In turn, however, this concept combines with that of security to create a dilemma: the demands of security conflict directly with those of liberty. A nation run mainly in the interest of

¹¹²The Federalist Papers (New York: Mentor paperback, 1961), p. 153.

¹¹³Alexander L. George and Robert O. Keohane, "The Concept of National Interests: Uses and Limitations," in Presidential Decisionmaking in Foreign Policy, by A.L. George (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1980), p. 224.

security, such as the Soviet Union, invariably destroys the liberty of its people. In contrast, a nation which values too much its liberty, risks conquest, as was visited on the city-states of ancient Greece. This dialectical tension must be mastered if the United States is to provide security and the blessings of liberty.

The final interest is economic well being. In the Constitution, one finds that the Union is dedicated to promoting "...the general Welfare." While the term is broad and can be included within the interest of liberty, it also connotes something more. That something extra is the economy and the way it supports the American standard of living. Again, this interest is not necessarily subordinate or less important than the two previous ones. Without its standard of living, or in the worst case, without economic subsistence, either the nation or its liberty would not survive.

These are the national interests. They take account of the values of the nation and the Constitution. In the end, they serve as guidelines for national policy. The national interests are the mainsprings of any action the government should take. Adherence to them, while not guaranteeing public support, at least ensures us that the core values are being upheld. Ignorance of them, or substitution of them with lesser interests risks disaster.

B. NATIONAL POLICY

National policy represents a synthesis of the national interests and the international environment. Whereas national interests respond to internal demands, policy responds to external, thereby linking the core values to the international system. It reacts to fundamental changes in the international structure to protect the interests of the nation. Taken this way, national policy is created by the milieu within which the nation exists, and not by the desires of its leaders or the political process. National policy is in fact a broad consensus objective of the nation, such as world peace or national self-determination.

In so defining national policy, the national interests are divorced even farther from the commonly accepted idea. This is to say that the national interests are more a product of national identity and environment than narrow objectives in various geographical regions throughout the world.¹¹⁴ They are thus of an internal nature vice an external one. Because of this, foreign relations cannot be based directly on the national interests. What is needed is a function that synthesizes the requirements of the national interests and the realities of the international system. This is the role of national policy.

¹¹⁴K.J. Holsti separates the "immutable national interests: such as security from lesser goals, to which he ascribes the concept of the "objective." International Politics: A Framework for Analysis, 3rd ed. (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1977), p. 139.

By thus separating the metaphysical concept of the national interest from foreign relations, the rigidity of dogma and ideology is lessened. Policy, by definition is more able to adapt to the fluid international environment, whereas the national interests are largely ignorant of it. To call policy 'national interests,' as many do, detaches it from the core values of a nation because it disregards the true national interests. It is cast adrift, able to react only to the international system and the pressures of special interest groups. Policy then ceases to provide direction and guidance for strategy. By contrast, if the relationship between policy and the national interest is maintained, policy acquires a measure against which it may evaluate changes in the international arena. It is provided a firm foundation based, in the end, on the core values of the nation, which gives it the flexibility needed to adapt to the fluid international environment. This in turn allows policy to provide the firm foundation necessary for the development of sound strategy.

Policy provides the broad goal which strategy must strive to achieve; it sets forth what must be attained if the national interests are to be upheld in the given international arena. Thus, where values and interests determine why a nation does what it does, policy defines what it must do, and strategy how to do it. In this way, policy determines the character of strategy; whether it is to be aggressive or defensive. In short, the primary purpose of policy is to form the link

between the values of the nation and the means at hand; a purpose that is echoed by Clausewitz:

"It can be taken as agreed that the aim of policy is to unify and reconcile all aspects of internal administration as well as of spiritual values, and whatever else the moral philosopher may care to add. Policy, of course, is nothing in itself; *it is simply the trustee for all these interests against the outside world....* In no sense can the art of war ever be regarded as the preceptor of policy, and here we can only treat policy as representative of all interests of the community."¹¹⁵ (Emphasis added)

C. STRATEGY

As was argued at the beginning of this chapter, strategy is a complex subject. This would be the case even if the strategy under consideration were only military in nature; but it is much more so when strategy is that, as well as economic, diplomatic, and political:

"Everyone knows that war today is total; that is an acknowledged fact; in other words it will be carried on in all fields, political, economic, diplomatic and military. Such, with all its varying shades of emphasis, is the pattern of the cold war....Equally therefore strategy must be total. This requirement raises in an acute form the problem of the relationship between policy and strategy; at the same time it will help us to understand what is the true field of activity of each."¹¹⁶

Considering policy in light of the preceding discussion, the "problem of the relationship between policy and strategy" is resolved. Policy becomes a broad, general guideline for

¹¹⁵On War, VIII:6:606-7.

¹¹⁶Beaufre, Introduction to Strategy, pp. 13-14.

action, while strategy assumes the role of foreign policy, trade policy, domestic policy and military strategy. In this situation, policy continues to guide strategy, but in a broader sense.

When all of this is combined with the nature of the environment, the complexity of strategy becomes apparent. It involves the synthesis of the environment, values, capabilities, resources and politics in an effort to achieve the object of policy. Strategy is thus the first level of the framework in which individuals, special interest groups, technology, and, especially, resource constraints enter the formula. Until now only requirements have mattered, now these other factors must be accounted for as well, and a balance struck.

Later, in order to expand on these ideas and to provide a framework for strategic planning, it will be convenient to break strategy down into various levels, but first the concept in general must be addressed in order to understand its nature, and such a discussion must begin with a definition of strategy.

In a much simpler age, Clausewitz, concerned with the application of a nation's army to the conduct of war, defined strategy as "...the use of engagements for the object of war."¹¹⁷ Clearly, this is much too limited a definition for

¹¹⁷On War, II:1:128.

the present era. Liddell Hart provides a broader definition of strategy, one that reflects war's increasing scopes:

"...the art of distributing and applying military means to fulfill the ends of policy."¹¹⁸ Notice that this definition implies that, while military means are being used, the engagement is no longer essential. But this definition, by relying on "military" means, is also too limited.

The better definition of strategy, one which can be applied to the entire spectrum of strategy and policy in both peace and war, is provided by Andre Beaufre:

*"It is the art which enables a man, no matter what the techniques employed, to master the problems set by any clash of wills and as a result to employ the techniques available with maximum efficiency. It is therefore the art of the dialectic of force, or, more precisely, the art of the dialectic of two opposing wills using force to resolve their dispute."*¹¹⁹

The importance of the dialectic cannot be overstated:

Every issue is a two-headed coin. There are no absolutes, and to every problem, there are at least two aspects; to concentrate for example, one must disperse. For every action there is an intelligent reaction. Sun Tzu counsels:

*"All warfare is based on deception. Therefore, when capable, feign incapacity; when active, inactivity
When near, make it appear that you are far away; when*

¹¹⁸ Strategy, p. 335.

¹¹⁹ "Force" in this sense pertains equally to politics, economics, diplomacy and psychology, as well as military. Introduction to Strategy, p. 22.

far away, that you are near. Offer the enemy a bait to lure him; feign disorder and strike him....Attack where he is unprepared; sally out when he does not expect you."¹²⁰ (Emphasis added)

This dialectic allows for the manipulation of the events and circumstances of international affairs to the degree that nothing is necessarily as it appears. Every advantage also has its disadvantage; every victory its costs; every defeat its gains. For every thesis then, there is an antithesis. *Strategy is the process by which this dialectic is resolved.*

Within its environment, strategy must seek to determine the path, indeed the paths, that are to be followed if the object of policy is to be attained. The nature of the environment determines the number of paths; the opponent their nature; and policy their terminus. A point made earlier must now be re-emphasized: *Strategy exists to serve the ends of policy.* It must be firmly subordinated to that higher goal. Strategy on its own makes no sense, it is cut off from the firm foundation of values and interests, and in such a case is forced to react only to the environment, without guidance. Strategy thus becomes blind. Only in subordination to policy, which is in turn subordinate to the national interests and values, does strategy gain meaning and purpose. This is the case whether in peace or war. In addressing the relationship

¹²⁰The Art of War, translated by Samuel B. Griffith (New York: Oxford University Press, 1963), pp. 66-69.

between war and policy, Clausewitz sheds light on the overall relationship between *strategy* and policy:

"Subordinating the political point of view to the military would be absurd, for it is policy that creates war. Policy is the guiding intelligence and war only the instrument, not vice versa. No other possibility exists, then, than to subordinate the military point of view to the political."¹²¹

Consider, for example, World War I, which is the prime illustration of the artificial subordination of political purpose to military aim. Though entered into with the expectations of a short war, it soon sank into the "blood test" described by Churchill.¹²² Instead of submitting to the control of policy, which might possibly have resulted in compromise, the war came to be ruled by emotion and narrow military aims.¹²³ The result of this distortion was total war, "the pure element of enmity unleashed."¹²⁴ In *War and Politics*, Bernard Brodie eloquently discusses the barriers to war termination under these conditions:

¹²¹On War, VIII:6:607.

¹²²Winston S. Churchill, The World Crisis, 4 vols. (New York: Charles Scribners, 1929).

¹²³Lippmann argues that because of the continuing slaughter the Western Democracies were forced to "democratize" the war by enfranchizing the masses in order to gain continuing public support. By thus shifting the power to govern to the people, any chance of subordinating the war to the goals of policy was lost. Public Philosophy, p. 18.

¹²⁴Clausewitz, On War, VIII:6:605.

"We are, in short, confronted not with simple greed but with some deep psychological need expressed on the national rather than the personal level. The obsession from first to last was with winning, with vanquishing the foe, with showing that one's own strength and will were greater than his--or at least not less. The obverse of this obsession, and indeed the stronger motivation, was the fear of losing, of being defeated, and thus of paying consequences that were in a very real sense unimaginable. Feeding the latter fear was the need, growing rapidly more intense as the losses mounted, for the governments to prove to their peoples that the sacrifices had not been in vain. It was this need on each side that was the insuperable one, for it made compromise impossible. Compromise would represent for each side a significant absence of gain, and hence admission of failure."¹²⁵

The war thus became self-perpetuating; a war of attrition the sole object of which was to outlast the enemy, for only his total defeat was an acceptable recompense for the appalling losses incurred.

World War I is an extreme example. It clearly illustrates the danger of allowing strategy to operate independent of policy. But one must also guard against the over-control of policy. Communication between policy and strategy must be two-way; policy provides guidance to strategy, while at the same time responding to the realities created by it. Once again, the dialectic emerges, and indeterminacy rises to the fore. As events unfold, policy must adapt its goals to reality. Just as strategy must be flexible in order to adapt to a fluid environment, so too must policy:

¹²⁵War and Politics, p. 25.

"If we keep in mind that war springs from some political purpose, it is natural that the prime cause of its existence will remain the supreme consideration in conducting it. That, however, does not imply that the political aim is a tyrant. It must adapt itself to its chosen means, a process which can radically change it; yet the political aim remains the first consideration. Policy, then, will permeate all military operations, and, in so far as their violent nature will admit, it will have a continuous influence on them."¹²⁶

This two-way communication is repeated at each level of strategy. As the subordinate level acts on the goal assigned it, it changes the environment which in turn affects the higher level. Thus each dictates to its subordinate, but also reacts to it. Therefore, in the dialectic of things, while strategy drives tactics, it must also respond to the capabilities they present; and likewise, while policy drives strategy, it must react to it.

At last the true value of sound strategy begins to unfold: A process is developed which not only coordinates application of the resources of the nation to the aims of policy, but also retains the flexibility to adapt to the fluid nature of international relations. Without the linkages described here, adaptability loses its meaning. Instead of responding to the environment under the guidance of policy, strategy is forced to react only to events as they occur. Each is taken on its own merits, and not distant objective is sought. Often, lacking guidance, strategy does what it knows best. Choices

¹²⁶On War, I:1:87.

are "made out of habit or following the fashion of the moment."¹²⁷ Hence the tendency to fight the last war, to embrace rigid dogma, or, in the words of Henry Kissinger, to offer "no more than marginal adjustments of the status quo."¹²⁸

If the linkages are firm however, strategy becomes the course to the future and to the attainment of the objectives of policy. The method by which the process is manipulated, by which the course is defined, is planning; which will be discussed in detail in the following chapter. Without these linkages, there is no direction; with them, the way becomes clear. By thus providing a criterion anchored in long term goals, strategy frees decision-making from the bonds of crisis management, allowing it to swing with the tide of events, always remaining true to the goal. No longer is it necessary to take each crisis as it comes, deciding on only the merits of the given situation. It becomes possible to base decisions on what one hopes to achieve in the long term.

Having now described the nature of strategy, one more step must be taken before the discussion may proceed to strategic planning. That step is to break strategy down into functional levels. This will provide a link between the very general nature of the discussion on strategy thus

¹²⁷Beaufre, Introduction to Strategy, p. 29.

¹²⁸White House Years, p. 35.

far and the more concrete discussion of planning which follows; and it will provide the framework within which that discussion may be developed.

While the hierarchy that will be described shortly has been titled differently by different authors and is fairly common, this paper primarily uses the labels and definitions accorded it by Andre Beaufre. He describes three levels of strategy, total, overall and operational.¹²⁹ These three levels correspond fairly closely to the functional divisions of government, such as, for example, the National Security Council, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the individual service staffs.

The first level, which Beaufre terms "total" strategy, will be labeled national strategy here in deference to American literature. It refers to that level of strategy which governs the utilization of all of the nation's resources. Because it is so broad in nature, it must of necessity be a long term strategy; longer than those levels below it, but shorter than policy. Of course, national strategy is also applied in crisis situations and in war, but even then it must take a longer and broader perspective than the lower level strategies.

It is this level of strategy which addresses the broad foreign and economic policies, and military strategy. The

¹²⁹ Introduction to Strategy, pp. 30-33.

relations with specific countries and organizations, for example, come under the heading of overall strategy, which is the next level. Thus, national strategy is the first link between policy and means; it is the first, and the major, level where fiscal constraints and public debate enter the calculations. It, like all of the levels, must be adaptable even though in most instances it has a fairly broad and long term perspective. It is the means of policy and the ends of overall strategy.

Overall strategy takes the goal assigned it by national strategy and governs the utilization of resources within the given fields of power (military, diplomatic, economic, and political.)¹³⁰ Because it is at this level that strategy really begins to branch out, overall strategies will also govern the cooperation of the various fields. As an example, the diplomatic field, by securing basing rights assists the military field in its job of containment and deterrence. Finally, overall strategies deal with specific, more time dependent strategies, such as our foreign relations with Israel, or the means of containment. Overall strategy is the means of national strategy and the ends of operational strategy.

¹³⁰Beaufre divides the organizations which correspond to the levels of strategy into fields and branches. For example, the military field will have several branches; Army, Navy, Air Force, etc.

Operational strategy governs the utilization of resources within a specific branch of a field to attain the ends of its overall strategy. Those resources include hardware, personnel, tactics, and logistics (procurement). It is within this level of strategy that what Beaufre terms logistics strategy is developed.¹³¹ This strategy refers to the coordinated development of hardware to support present and future requirements. It is impossible for this strategy to exist without the firm linkages emphasized throughout this paper, for without them, a branch can have no idea of future requirements.¹³²

Operational strategy is the final level of strategy before tactics. It provides the guidance and the framework within which operations are conducted, whether those operations are military, diplomatic, economic or political in nature. Operational strategy is guided in turn by overall strategy, which is itself the tool of national strategy. National strategy is the means of policy which, being very broad and long term, is able to account for the overall structure of the international environment and the national interests. The interests in turn are derived from the nation state concept and the

¹³¹Beaufre, Introduction to Strategy, p. 32.

¹³²In which case that branch will more often than not assume the worst case and request all of the hardware it could need. The result is a sharp escalation in the costs of procurement.

the peculiar experiences of a country which determine its values.

Thus, the hardware and tactics a nation uses are irrevocably linked to the very core values of that nation. Each level reacts both vertically and, in the case of the lower levels of strategy, horizontally with those around it. And every level is subject to the influences of the values of the nation, both in terms of the goals set to it and the means available to achieve those goals. Finally, every level of strategy (from national to operational), as well as policy itself, is affected by and in turn affects the international system.

The net result is a dynamic concept of strategy that responds and adapts to the conditions around it while at the same time remaining firmly rooted to the long term goals of the nation. Such a concept, if properly implemented, can only result in maximizing efficiency and effectiveness; applying the minimum resources necessary in a stable manner over time, while still accounting for the uncertainty that the environment dictates. If nothing else, such a concept will ultimately improve public support for the policies of government.

The implementation of this concept, can, as Beaufre counsels, allow us to build the future:

"Strategy will then be seen to be a *prospectus for action*, continuous action at the present time taken within the framework of a forecast concept of overall future evolution; its object is to contribute to certain possible situations rather than others, the

choice being a political one. I would even go so far as to say that according to this concept strategy is the only practicable 'prospectus' for it seeks not to *guess* what the future will be but to *build* the future methodically taking as its starting point that which one wishes to achieve and that which appears to be feasible."¹³³

Strategy is the process, the method of thought that will allow a nation to react successfully to the fluid environment of international relations, in pursuit of the goals of policy and the national interests. The method of this process is planning, to which the discussion now proceeds.

¹³³Deterrence and Strategy, p. 167.

IV. PLANNING: THE METHOD OF STRATEGY

"Strategic thought must continuously take the facts of change into account, not only those of the foreseeable future but probably changes many years ahead. Strategy can no longer proceed by a process of firmly based objective deduction; it must work on hypotheses and produce solutions by truly original thought."

Andre Beaufre¹³⁴

While strategy is the philosophy of doctrine, it is planning that is its architect. Planning must synthesize the requirements of policy, the resources available, and the nature of the opponent to be defeated within the context of strategy to devise doctrine. The process is complex, dealing as it does not only with awesome weapons and power, sophisticated technology, and rapidly evolving circumstances, but also with the pervasive unpredictability of the human mind, which colors all of international relations.

This chapter will discuss the general nature of planning, its evolution in America and its general environment. As with the rest of this paper, the discussion in general, not specific; conceptual, not prescriptive. This chapter links the previous two very general discussions to the more practical coverage of the planning process in the following chapter. To provide a

¹³⁴ Introduction to Strategy, pp. 44-45.

sense of perspective, the discussion first turns to the history of planning in the United States.

A. HISTORICAL REVIEW OF PLANNING

Historically, planning in America has been oriented toward administration and execution rather than long term development and concept formulation.¹³⁵ A society with no desire for philosophy is unlikely to dwell on strategic theory and the perspective that that adds to planning. As this implies, the reasons for such a practical view of planning were historical and cultural in origin.

It was suggested in the previous chapter that liberalism, fostered and shielded by America's insular position and Pax Britannica, gave rise to an inward looking culture. Ignorant of the outside world, indeed, as some would argue, incapable of understanding it, America grew up in a vacuum:

"Liberalism never questioned the existence of the state. Instead it presupposed the state's self-sufficiency and external security....[The liberal state] was presumed to exist *in vacuo*....The assumption of a state in a vacuum was particularly relevant to American liberalism because for almost a century American reality approximated the liberal image."¹³⁶

¹³⁵ Among the numerous histories of American strategic thought, a few of the more noteworthy are Russell F. Weigley, The American Way of War; Walter Millis, ed., American Military Thought (New York: Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1966); Maj. C. Joseph Bernardo, USA, and Eugene H. Bacon, American Military Policy: Its Development Since 1775 (Harrisburg, Pa.: The Military Service Publishing Co., 1955; and Robert Leckie, The Wars of America, 2 vols. (New York: Harper & Row, 1968).

¹³⁶ Huntington, Soldier and State, p. 149.

Faced with a boundless frontier and seemingly unlimited prosperity, a philosophy of materialism emerged, combined with optimism and a belief in superiority. These factors added together to produce, by the end of the 19th Century, the concept of Manifest Destiny. John Louis O'Sullivan, who coined the term in 1845, clearly extols the intense nationalism and optimism that fostered it:

"We have no interest in the scenes of antiquity, only as lessons of avoidance of nearly all their examples. The expansive future is our arena and for our history. We are entering on its untrodden space with the truth of God in our minds, beneficent objects in our hearts, and with a clear conscience unsullied by the past. We are the nation of human progress, and who will, what can, set limits on our onward march?...The far-reaching, the boundless future will be the era of American greatness."¹³⁷

Believing itself to be beyond the reach of history, and seeing Darwinian evolutionism as its true banner, America saw no limits to its power, and no possibility of failure. In these circumstances, why plan for the future? Far from holding any threats, the future was in fact the panacea for the failures of the present.

Nowhere was the combination of environment and liberalism more evident than in the military. In fact, not until the Civil War was the need for a separate, professional military acknowledged. Until that time, it was assumed that any "man

¹³⁷ John Louis O'Sullivan, "The Great Nation of Futurity," United States Magazine and Democratic Review, Nov. 1839. Quoted in Henry Steele Commager, The Search for a Usable Past (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1967), pp. 8-9.

of affairs" was sufficiently qualified to command and to plan strategy. For example, though formed in 1798, it was not until 1815 that the Navy Department had assigned to it any active duty officers.¹³⁸ These officers were three Navy captains, and it was they that composed the Board of Navy Commissioners. The three captains, however, were responsible for administrative matters such as procurement and design, while the Secretary, a civilian dealt with questions of strategy and operations.¹³⁹

"The American officer of the pre-Civil War years was frequently highly trained and scientifically educated but his training was not in a military skill shared with all his fellow officers and distinguishing them from the rest of society. Instead, the officer was expert in one of several technical specialities, competence in which separated him from other officers trained in different specialities and at the same time fostered close bonds with civilians practicing his speciality outside the military forces....The Army officer was frequently more engineering-minded than military-minded, and the naval officer more seamanship-minded than naval-minded."¹⁴⁰

When war came he was more often than not pushed aside, replaced by the citizen-soldier. It was the Civil War that began the change in this state of affairs. Abraham Lincoln was the primary catalyst (besides the war itself) in the transformation of the military profession. Much to his dismay, he found upon the commencement of hostilities that:

¹³⁸ Bernardo and Bacon, American Military Policy, p. 144.

¹³⁹ Huntington, Soldier and State, p. 201.

¹⁴⁰ Ibid., p. 195.

"In no section of the staff organization was there any person or division charged with the function of studying strategy or formulating war plans for even a theoretical war. The work of the staff was completely technical and routine. Scott, the general in chief, had done no thinking before the war about what strategy should be adopted if war came."¹⁴¹

Planning of strategy therefore devolved upon the President, that is until he found Grant. By continuous prodding and searching, and by refusing to bow to the will of the incompetent generals that surrounded him, Lincoln thus inspired the development of a professional military.¹⁴²

After the Civil War, the Army reverted to its pre-war character, though certain officers, such as Sherman and Upton, labored to continue laying the foundation for a more thoroughly professional officer corps.¹⁴³ It was not until the trauma of the Spanish-American War of 1898 that reformers such as Elihu Root were able to implement changes designed to institutionalize strategic planning. Because of heavy bureaucratic resistance, these reforms--which subordinated the Army to the Secretary of

¹⁴¹T. Harry Williams, Lincoln and His Generals (New York: Vintage paperback, 1952), p. 6. Such a lack of concern for what should be done if hostilities break out is evident in today's literature on strategic nuclear deterrence. For a review of the subject, see Richard A. Brody, "Deterrence Strategies: An Annotated Bibliography," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Dec. 1960, pp. 443-457; and more recently, Donald M. Snow, "Current Nuclear Deterrence Thinking." See also Michael Howard, "The Forgotten Dimensions of Strategy."

¹⁴²Williams, Lincoln and His Generals, p. 14.

¹⁴³Huntington, Soldier and State, pp. 230-233.

War rather than the General in Chief and the independent bureau chiefs, and which created the General Staff--were not completed until 1912.¹⁴⁴ Nevertheless, sufficient time was allowed for the General Staff to prepare plans for war in Europe. Had those plans and the infrastructure needed to develop them been lacking, it is doubtful whether America could have so rapidly deployed an army of two million men. Not only was that army supported in the field, but so too those of our allies.

World War I was the first American war to require substantial mobilization of the economy. For the first time in American history, war plans entailed more than just what military planners were equipped to handle. Mobilizing the economy required planners who were familiar with industry. This necessitated the use of industrialists as planners; civilians, not military officers. Today this is an accepted fact of 20th Century warfare, but during the First World War, it was something that the War Department neither understood nor accepted.¹⁴⁵ Though the development of mobilization planning

¹⁴⁴Charles J. Hitch, "Decision Making in the Defense Department." (Address presented at the Gaither Memorial Lecture Series, University of California, 5-9 April, 1965), pp. 10-11.

¹⁴⁵Paul Koistinen provides an excellent discussion of the difficulties of mobilization and economy planning during W.W. I. The problem was to reconcile demand with supply while maintaining economic equilibrium. The chief culprit of the difficulties was the War Department, whose bureaus were *still* not under the full control of the Secretary and the General Staff. Under these conditions, a longer war could have proven fatal to the economy. The Military-Industrial Complex: A Historical Perspective (New York: Praeger, 1980), Chap. 2, especially pp. 30-31.

and coordination was by trial and error, and by war's end hardly satisfactory, it provided the foundation for our mobilization in World War II.

That war witnessed the ultimate in wars of industrial power and mobilization.¹⁴⁶ It was, for America, an essentially economic war. Victory was guaranteed by the superb management of logistics and mobilization, as well as the tactical proficiency of American forces. America had finally mastered planning in these areas. Two elements remained lacking, however. One was strategic planning, which was largely carried out by the British. Indeed, Kent Roberts Greenfield implies that the lack of planning on the part of the American Joint Chiefs of Staff placed the United States at a disadvantage after the war:

"Both presidents consistently gave the green light to their military chiefs, and these consistently rejected decisions on grounds other than military effect. General Marshall, surely was one of the most statesmanlike of them, wrote to General Eisenhower when Mr. Churchill, in late April, 1945, was urging the political advantages to be gained by liberating Prague, and as much of Czechoslovakia as possible, before the Russians arrived on the scene: 'Personally and aside from all the logistical, tactical or strategical implications I would be loath to hazard American lives for purely political purposes.'"¹⁴⁷

¹⁴⁶ Possony and Pournelle, Strategy of Technology, p. 4.

¹⁴⁷ Kent Roberts Greenfield, American Strategy in World War II: A Reconsideration (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1963), p. 19. Quoted in Brodie, War and Politics, pp. 43-44.

As Bernard Brodie rightly argues, if not for political purpose, which is the reason for war in the first place, then for what reason could Marshall have justified the loss of American lives?¹⁴⁸ This passage serves to highlight the essentially logistical, and still technical nature of the American officer corps in World War II.

In its field of expertise, as Huntington argues, America was unsurpassed: "[E]conomic mobilization was a brilliant success while the strategic government of the war left something to be desired." This in turn "...led the American people to trade military security for military victory."¹⁴⁹ Or, as Hart argues of the peace:

"...the anxious state of the peoples of the free world today is a manifestation that the directing minds failed to think *through* the problem of attaining peace through such a [military] victory."¹⁵⁰

Not only was strategic planning lacking, but what strategy was developed was done so more as the result of compromise than of sound military consideration. The military lacked the means necessary to overcome parochial interests and to coordinate planning between the various services.¹⁵¹

¹⁴⁸War and Politics, p. 44.

¹⁴⁹Huntington, Soldier and State, p. 344.

¹⁵⁰Strategy, p. 15.

¹⁵¹General David Jones, USAF (Ret.), "Why the Joint Chiefs of Staff Must Change," Armed Forces Journal International, Mar. 1982, p. 64.

The second element that remained absent was the ability of the nation to plan and prepare for war before it actually begins. Our military history is one of crusades. The citizen-soldier ethic, as a product of an internally oriented liberalism, has considered war a temporary evil. Once it is over, the soldier must return to his peaceful ways. "'Feast or Famine' is the American way of defense preparation."¹⁵² General Jones summarizes this tendency of unpreparedness:

"History books for the most part glorify our military accomplishments, but a closer examination reveals a disconcerting pattern: Unpreparedness at the onset of each new crisis of war; Initial failures; Reorganizing while fighting; Building our defenses as we cranked up our industrial base; Prevailing by wearing down the enemy--by being bigger, not smarter."¹⁵³

The National Security Act of 1947 was designed to correct these shortcomings.¹⁵⁴ By subordinating all of the services

¹⁵²Colin Gray, "National Style in Strategy," p. 43.

¹⁵³"What's Wrong With Our Defense Establishment," The New York Times Magazine, 7 Nov., 1982, p. 41.

¹⁵⁴For a discussion of the events surrounding the military unification battles after the war see Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State; and Demetrios Caraley, The Politics of Military Unification: A Study of Conflict and the Policy Process (New York: Columbia University Press, 1966). A military viewpoint that develops the theoretical underpinnings of the conflict is contained in Maj. Gen. Otto L. Nelson, Jr., USA, National Security and the General Staff (Washington, D.C.: Infantry Journal Press, 1946). For a review of the act itself, see Frank N. Trager, "The National Security Act of 1947," Air University Review, Nov.-Dec., 1977, pp. 2-15. A vast literature on defense organization has accumulated since the end of W.W.II. The following is a select list of the more noteworthy works: Paul Y. Hammond, Organizing for Defense: The American Military Establishment in the Twentieth Century

under the Secretary of Defense and by creating a formal Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Act was to have fostered long term strategic planning, cooperation between services and consequently, realistic pre-war planning. With the amendments of 1949, 1953, and 1958, it succeeded, but only to a limited degree. The success was in the sense that joint long range plans were developed, as well as joint operating plans. Unfortunately, those plans were largely the result of compromise, and even then merely reinforced each service's independence.¹⁵⁵ As General Jones argues, the current system of defense planning "...in effect represents arrangements developed in a patchwork way during World War II."¹⁵⁶

(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1961) provides a superb historical review, while Samuel P. Huntington, The Common Defense: Strategic Programs in National Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1961) gives a detailed description of post-war planning and budgeting. For an analysis of strategy in the 1950s, see Warner R. Schilling, et. al., Strategy, Politics, and Defense Budgets (New York: Columbia University Press, 1962). Alain C. Enthoven and K. Wayne Smith provide the inside story of the McNamara reforms, especially the introduction of the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting system in How Much is Enough?: Shaping the Defense Program, 1961-1969 (New York: Harper & Row, 1971). More recent analyses include Morton H. Halperin, "The President and the Military," Foreign Affairs, January 1972, pp. 310-324; and considerably broader in scope, Amos A. Jordan and William J. Taylor, American National Security: Policy and Process (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981). The most recent and critical review of the defense organization is contained in John Collins, U.S. Defense Planning.

¹⁵⁵ Leonard Wainstein, "The Problem of the Joint Chiefs of Staff," International Security Review, Fall 1982, p. 238.

¹⁵⁶ "Why the Joint Chiefs of Staff Must Change," p. 65.

Because of service interests and power, the joint organizations are ineffective in guiding the planning and procurement in the military:

"The two primary functions of the joint system, military advice and employment of forces in the field, are compromised. Military advice, the principal function of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), is flawed by the inability of the chiefs, also imbued with service responsibilities, to address a broad range of contentious issues as a corporate entity. The JCS acts as a forum for arriving at conjoint service positions through negotiations in which each service seeks to maximize its position through bargaining at multiple levels."¹⁵⁷

As is suggested in this passage, the chiefs of staff, in serving two roles, one as their own service's chief and the other as a member of the JCS, face conflicting responsibility. The result of this tension between parochial and joint allegiance has in the past resulted in the major portion of their time being spent on budgetary matters, and precious little on long range planning and concept formulation.¹⁵⁸

The separation between long range planning and the budgetary process was one of the major reasons behind the reforms instituted by Robert McNamara in the Defense Department in the early 1960s. The Planning Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS), which formed the core of these reforms, sought to base

¹⁵⁷ Archie D. Barrett, "Department of Defense Organization: Planning for Planning," in Planning U.S. Security, ed. Philip S. Kronenberg, p. 65.

¹⁵⁸ Lawrence Korb, The Joint Chiefs of Staff, p. 95.

weapons selection on reasoned, scientific, and economic analysis: the biggest bang for the buck. Systems Analysis was the primary tool used in this process. Though greatly resented by the military, PPBS and systems analysis has on the whole improved the procurement process. Nevertheless, significant weaknesses have developed since the concept has been applied. One such fault is the ability to "lie" with statistics, which largely defeats the purpose of rigorous quantitative analysis. Another weakness lies in the tendency of decision makers to accept the recommendations of the systems analysts as the decision instead of weighing them against informed judgment and experience. A third shortcoming is that while PPBS has gone far in solving the "in house" problems of procurement, it has left unaddressed its major problems, such as the contracting system. Finally, and perhaps most significant, PPBS and systems analysis, because of the focus on economics and the budget, have failed in their initial purpose of improving long range planning and in linking it to the budgetary process.¹⁵⁹ Despite the revolution in budgetary

¹⁵⁹ Within the vast literature on the subject, the definitive works on Systems Analysis, PPBS, and the economic approach to defense planning include Charles J. Hitch and Roland N. McKean, The Economics of Defense in the Nuclear Age (Harvard University Press, 1960; New York: Antheneum paperback, 1978); Alain C. Enthoven and K. Wayne Smith, How Much is Enough? (New York: Harper & Row, 1971); and E.S. Quade, Analysis for Public Decisions (New York: Elsevier, 1975). The definitive source on the procurement process is J. Ronald Fox, Arming America: How the U.S. Buys Weapons (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1974). An excellent inside story on the reforms is

planning, and perhaps because it was not balanced by a similar revolution in operational planning, the Joint Chiefs of Staff remain inadequate in long range planning; planning that can direct procurement rather than reacting to it.

Perhaps the reform spirit kindled by Generals Jones and Meyer will continue through the current set of Joint Chiefs to produce real progress toward high quality and truly joint strategic planning. According to General Vessey, the incoming Chairman of the JCS, it has:

"Our first priority is war plans or military planning. We need to be sure our military plans support our national strategy....And after all, war plans are the things that drive all other requirements--equipment, people, and eventually the budget. Getting these connected helps!"¹⁶⁰

provided in James M. Roherty, Decisions of Robert S. McNamara: A Study of the Role of the Secretary of Defense (Coral Gables, Fla.: University of Miami Press, 1970); and on the impact of McNamara and PPBS on warfighting, see Gregory Palmer, The McNamara Strategy and the Vietnam War: Program Budgeting in the Pentagon, 1960-1968 (Westport, Ct.: Greenwood Press, 1978). For two case studies which provide an in-depth analysis of the workings of the procurement system, see Col. Richard C. Head, USAF, "Decision Making on the A-7 Attack Aircraft Program," (Ph.D. dissertation, Syracuse University, 1971); and Robert J. Art, The TFX Decision: McNamara and the Military (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1968). Critiques of the system and its impact on the military abound; some of the more noteworthy works are listed here: Douglas Kinnard, "McNamara at the Pentagon," Parameters: Journal of the U.S. Army War College, Sept. 1980, pp. 22-31; Eliot Cohen, "Systems Paralysis," The American Spectator, Nov. 1980, pp. 23-27; Brodie, War and Politics, Chap. 10; Summers, On Strategy; and Collins, U.S. Defense Planning.

¹⁶⁰ Interview with General John W. Vessey, Jr., Chairman, JCS, Armed Forces Journal International, May 1983, p. 46.

The evolution of planning in America has been uneven, marked by numerous setbacks, political infighting and a generally slow pace by comparison with that of the European powers. Unfortunately too, almost all periods of reform have followed near military disasters, "near" only because of the inferiority or distance of the enemy. That evolution is continuing today as the reform spirit in Congress and the Pentagon suggests.¹⁶¹ The important factor however, one that has largely been found lacking in the evolution to date, is a general concept of where that evolution must go. To provide a framework for that

¹⁶¹The issue of JCS reform is once again gaining momentum, with the House passing a moderate reform package in 1982--the Joint Chiefs of Staff Reorganization Act of 1982. As with previous attempts to change this system, the Army and Air Force support reorganization, while the Navy and Marine Corps (as a whole) do not. For discussions of the bill and the testimony surrounding it see the Armed Forces Journal International, June through Sept. issues. Brian Dickson provides a more rigorous analysis of the proposed act, in the context of previous attempts and the history of reorganization as a whole, in "The JCS: Impressionistic Reform," The Washington Quarterly, Winter 1983, pp. 78-85. The following is a list of the more important and recent JCS reform literature: Lawrence J. Korb, The Joint Chiefs of Staff; John Charles Daly, et. al., The Role of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in National Policy (Wash., D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1978); Gen. Edward C. Meyer, USA, "The JCS: How Much Reform is Needed?" Armed Forces Journal International, April 1982, pp. 82-90; for both sides of the debate, see John G. Kester and James L. Holloway, III, "The Joint Chiefs of Staff: A Better System?" American Enterprise Institute Foreign Policy and Defense Review, vol. 2:1, 1980; and finally, a plan that goes farther than most of the above articles is proposed by Col. William G. Hanne, USA, "An Armed Forces Staff," Parameters, Journal of the U.S. Army War College, Sept. 1982, pp. 53-62. These works are in addition to those previously cited by General Jones, as well as the sizeable literature on military reform in general.

concept, this chapter applies the ideas of the previous two chapters to the development of a foundation for planning.

B. THE ENVIRONMENT OF PLANNING

As the chapter title states, planning is the method of strategy. It is not itself strategy, but is merely its tool. This distinction between strategy and planning is vague, but if we are to understand the mechanism by which the plans that implement strategy are developed, it must be made. Strategy is the philosophy of doctrine and planning is its architect. Planning takes the general framework provided by strategy and produces doctrine. Because of the interdependence of planning and strategy, if strategy is to be a method of thought, then planning must be designed along such lines. The concepts by which plans are laid must be fundamental, not dogmatic, and they must be able to adapt to the requirements of strategy and of the international environment.

The purpose of planning is to develop a course of action within the framework of strategy which will, in the end, achieve the ends dictated by policy. But, planning is a means employed in an environment of conflict consisting of passion, chance and policy. It operates not against an inanimate object, but against an actively opposed will. To achieve our aims we must carefully lay out a plan that allows for uncertainty in the results of our actions, while at the same time focusing on the elimination of the enemy's willingness to

resist. As Beaufre so eloquently describes it, the aim of strategy is to force a decision which

*"...is obtained by creating and then exploiting a situation resulting in sufficient moral disintegration of the enemy to cause him to accept the conditions it is desired to impose on him."*¹⁶²

Planning must synthesize the framework of strategy and the nature of the opponent. It is against the opponent, the intelligent actor, that the plan must succeed. His will can be affected by the perceived costs he will incur as a result of continued resistance combined with what he can expect as an outcome of his surrender. In World War II, the Allied demand for unconditional surrender played a large part in preventing the Axis powers from seeking an end to the war short of total destruction of their homelands.¹⁶³ In contrast, the Soviets considered the potential costs of continued opposition to the United States during the Cuban Missile Crisis to be higher than the rewards of having missiles on the island,

¹⁶² Introduction to Strategy, p. 24.

¹⁶³ On prolonging the European war, see Robert Murphy, Diplomat Among Warriors (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1964), p. 239. The end of the Pacific War is presented in Edwin P. Hoyt, Closing the Circle: War in the Pacific 1945, (New York: Van Nostrand and Reinhold, 1982), p. 47. For a view of the unconditional surrender requirement from the Japanese perspective, see Leonard Mosley, Hirohito Emperor of Japan (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1966).

and thus retreated.¹⁶⁴ Of importance here is the need to leave the opponent "an out":

"It is an elementary principle of strategy that, if you find your opponent in a strong position costly to force, you should leave him a line of retreat--as the quickest way of loosening his resistance."¹⁶⁵

The task of strategic planning is to develop the path by which the objective is to be realized and the enemy's will broken. Consequently, the whole of strategic planning and its product, strategic doctrine, must be animated by the understanding that it will operate in a dialectical environment, against an intelligent opponent seeking to thwart our intentions in favor of his own. The planner must take inputs from various fields; intelligence, systems analysis, hardware management, etc. From these he must make choices as to the probable results of any actions taken, determine those courses which will most likely allow for uncertainties, and end up

¹⁶⁴ Adam B. Ulam, Expansion and Coexistence: Soviet Foreign Policy, 1917-73, 2nd ed. (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1974), p. 674. Graham T. Allison continuously emphasizes Kennedy's desire to give Khrushchev time to back down. Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1971), pp. 210-230. The President is quoted as saying of Khrushchev, "...give him time to consider. I don't want to push him in a corner from which he cannot escape." Quoted in Robert F. Kennedy, Thirteen Days: A Memoir of the Cuban Missile Crisis (New York: W.W. Norton, 1969),

¹⁶⁵ Hart, Strategy, p. 371. This reflects Sun Tzu who wrote: "Wild beasts, when at bay, fight desperately. How much more is this true of men! If they know there is no alternative they will fight to the death." The Art of War, p. 110.

with a plan that will stand a chance of success in the real world. Possony and Pournelle, in their description of the "strategic analyst" further refine the role of the strategic planner:

"The strategic analyst must trade off the demands of the several services. He must implement the basic policies set by the top political decision maker, and do so within the constraints of the budget....He must understand that there are real uncertainties in this world in contrast with probabilistic or statistical uncertainties which can at least be quantified. He must understand that since an intelligent enemy opposes him, probabilities may not apply at all. Game theory cannot always guide him, for some real world games can be played but once. He must constantly strive to be the surpriser and not the surprised."¹⁶⁶

In striving to maintain the freedom of action necessary to surprise and to keep from being surprised, the planner must not rely solely on what possible avenues exist, but must also look to what avenues are necessary. In this sense time enters the analysis, time that is, to develop the necessary capabilities to achieve an objective. This is how planning begins to plot a course designed to shape the future to our desires, not merely to react to the present.

In his description of the development of a strategic plan, Andre Beaufre provides an interesting summary of the concepts described in the last few paragraphs. It may be argued that, because of its generality, the process obtains as well in long range planning as it does in war:

¹⁶⁶Strategy of Technology, p. 88.

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STRATEGY: A PHILOSOPHY OF DOCTRINE(U) NAVAL
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
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MICROCOPY RESOLUTION TEST CHART
NATIONAL BUREAU OF STANDARDS-1963-A

"We are dealing with a problem of dialectics; for every action proposed, therefore, the possible enemy reactions must be calculated and provision made to guard against them. His reaction may be international or national, psychological, political, economic or military. Each successive action planned, together with the counter to the corresponding enemy reaction, must be built up into a coherent whole, the object being to retain the ability to pursue the plan in spite of the resistance of the enemy....The result will be a 'risk-proof' strategy, the object of which will be to preserve our own liberty of action."¹⁶⁷

As can be seen by the preceding discussion, to plan on contingencies is not only ill-advised, but it is also dangerous. Without the ability to know the future, we cannot accurately predict it. Any plan that is drawn up well in advance will introduce a form of rigidity into the planning process during a crisis by assuming a given set of circumstances. While logistical plans may, to a degree, be developed ahead of time, those dealing with operations should not. If instead the process, people, and organization are developed that yield swift and accurate decision making, then planners and doctrine will be able to react to events on their own merits, with one eye still on the distant object that is sought. In this way, strategy and planning work to provide a course of action in consonance with the desired ultimate ends in a flexible and timely manner.

Such a concept of planning differs widely from that which is prevalent in the United States today. Personnel assignment

¹⁶⁷ Introduction to Strategy, p. 25.

policies fail to produce planners who have the ability and imagination to respond quickly and correctly to events because of short, one-time tours. Lacking skilled planners who can respond rapidly, the system comes to rely on contingency plans, which tends to enhance strategic rigidity. This reliance requires only a proficiency at their execution, rather than an innovative and rapid approach to their formulation.¹⁶⁸

With an increasingly varied threat and with the real uncertainty that exists in the international environment, this flexibility becomes essential.¹⁶⁹ As Beaufre wrote in 1965:

"Dogmatism in any form has now become impossible: there can be no more comforting but ossifying regulations: today we are forced to be *ready to adapt ourselves* practically instantaneously to the most varied and perhaps least foreseeable situations."¹⁷⁰

¹⁶⁸As John Collins notes: "Major U.S. defense plans commonly take two or more years to reach completion and approval..." U.S. Defense Planning, p. 197.

¹⁶⁹For a critique of the current system of planning, see John Collins, U.S. Defense Planning: A Critique; Lawrence J. Korb, The Joint Chiefs of Staff; Possony and Pournelle, Strategy of Technology, specifically chap. 2; Colin Gray, "National Style in Strategy"; Philip S. Kronenberg, Planning U.S. Security, especially chapters 2 and 6; General David C. Jones, "What's Wrong With Our Defense Establishment"; and General E.C. Meyer, The JCS: How Much Reform is Needed. For an interesting argument on the tendency of planners toward misperception and mirror imaging, and its impact on strategy and tactics, see Robert B. Bathurst, "On Creating an Enemy," U.S. Naval War College Review, Nov-Dec 1981, pp. 14-26. The classic work in the area of misperception and planning is Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1976).

¹⁷⁰Deterrence and Strategy, p. 126.

This is not to suggest that plans are no longer appropriate, for if they were there would be little reason for this chapter. Plans are necessary, but they must conform to the temporal horizon they hope to affect. For example, a long term plan should be sufficiently broad to allow for flexibility as time passes and events occur, and should provide a framework for the resolution of crises. On the other hand, a crisis plan should be developed with the crisis, not before, and should utilize the guidance of strategy, doctrine (the long term plan), and the planner's knowledge of strategic thought and the art and science of war to arrive quickly at a course of action.¹⁷¹

The main thrust of the argument here is that in order to respond both correctly and swiftly to a crisis in this age of high speed missiles and rapidly developing international events, the planning process can no longer rely on pre-arranged plans which, in guaranteeing timeliness, risk the surrender of accuracy by not attuning themselves to the specific event. To devise a plan in the abstract, separated from the actual circumstances under which it must operate was realized as absurd by Clausewitz over a century ago.¹⁷² It is just as much so today.

¹⁷¹For a brief discussion on the danger inherent in reliance on contingency plans, see Philip A. Odeen, "Organizing for National Security," International Security, Summer 1980, pp. 117-121.

¹⁷²Rothfels, "Clausewitz," p. 106.

The primary reason that plans must be developed only in response to some specific policy directive requiring action on the part of the nation lies with the uncertainty of the future. We cannot predict the circumstances that will require us to act, and we cannot predict the political demands that might constrain our actions. It is of value to have plans that, rather than defining the response to make, merely ensure that the mechanisms exist by which that response may be developed. Such plans, as mentioned above, might ensure a list of options to the crisis planners in terms of logistics and forces available. It would nevertheless be up to them to decide both the quantity and the nature of the employment of forces, subject, of course, to the demands and control of policy.

The final aspect of the environment of planning is the nature of the means which will best yield favorable results when applied. This nature can take on two faces, direct or indirect. Such a concept was articulated by Liddell Hart who applied it to the operational level of war, and especially armor tactics.¹⁷³ The most recent extension of his arguments may be found in the debate over "attrition" style warfare versus "maneuver" style; the latter more closely approaching Hart's.¹⁷⁴

¹⁷³Gibson, "Maginot and Liddell Hart: The Doctrine of Defense," pp. 376-377.

Both the earlier thesis of Hart's and the more recent writings on "maneuver" warfare are limited in the sense that they deal more with tactics than strategy. If these concepts are taken and applied at the level of strategy, some truly revealing results are observed. This is exactly what Beaufre achieved with *Introduction to Strategy*. He describes two types of strategy, direct and indirect. The two are not mutually exclusive, but rather, are interdependent. For example, if some set of circumstances prohibits the use of

¹⁷⁴The literature on this subject is rapidly growing. Maneuver warfare has become one of the few agreed upon points of the Military Reform Caucus, and has as its proponents such defense specialists as Jeffrey Record, Edward Luttwak and William Lind. For a brief discussion of the Reform Caucus, its purposes, its conceptual foundation, and its problems, see Jeffrey Record, "The Military Reform Caucus," The Washington Quarterly, Spring 1983, pp. 125-129. For thorough discussions of the maneuver warfare concept, see the following: William S. Lind, "Defining Maneuver Warfare for the Marine Corps," Marine Corps Gazette, March 1980, pp. 55-58; Edward Luttwak, "The American Style of Warfare"; and "The Operational Level of War"; Jeffrey Record, The Rapid Deployment Force (Wash., D.C.: Corporate Press, 1981); William Lind, "Why the German Example?" Marine Corps Gazette, June 82, pp. 59-63; and Record, "The Falklands War," The Washington Quarterly, Autumn 1982, pp. 43-51. As cited previously, Jeffrey McKittrick ("A Military Look at Military Reform," Comparative Strategy, 4:1, 1983) and Lt. Col. W. Kross ("Military Reform: Past and Present," Air University Review, Jul-Aug, 81) provide counter arguments to the maneuver warfare school. Perhaps the most lucid argument against pure maneuver warfare, though one tied specifically to Central Europe, is provided by Col. Trevor N. Dupuy, USA (Ret.), "The Nondebate Over How Army Should Fight," Army, Jun. 1982, pp. 35-45. In this article, Dupuy puts forth a very persuasive argument for a defense in depth, based partly on maneuver warfare concepts, but largely on history. For a description of the Army's efforts to reform its fighting doctrine, see Deborah Shapley, "The Army's New Fighting Doctrine," The New York Times Magazine, Nov. 28, 1982.

direct strategy, indirect strategy will have free play. If on the other hand, direct strategy is relatively unhindered, indirect strategy will be less decisive. An understanding of this is essential to the planner because he must choose the proper strategy for the given situation or even the best of plans is doomed to failure.

Direct strategy is defined by Beaufre as that form of strategy in which

"...military force is the principal weapon and that victory or deterrence will be achieved by its use or maintenance."¹⁷⁵

It is the strategy of total war, to use Clausewitz's term. Because the open clash of military force is the result, the most important field is the military, and all others are subordinated to it.

In direct strategy, any freedom of action, which is always the key to success in the game of strategy, will be found in the theater of operation. In other words, the enemy must be forced to acquiesce, either as the result of defeat in battle, or of surrender for fear of defeat in battle. In this type of strategy, the concepts of Liddell Hart and "maneuver" warfare can be useful, and, if your force is the weaker, essential.

Because direct strategy is that which emphasizes primarily the use of military force, it places a greater reliance on

¹⁷⁵ Introduction to Strategy, p. 43.

material factors than does indirect strategy. In essence, to play the game of *direct* strategy and win, one must have sufficient muscle, no matter how brilliant the tactical moves.

This brings out an important point, and one which must be understood. Direct and indirect *strategy* may both use direct and/or indirect *tactics*, or any combination of the two. The important distinction lies in the fact that direct strategy emphasizes the use of military force, so military means will dominate; while indirect strategy stresses the use of various forces, such as diplomatic or economic, and it is their means which will dominate. The planner must choose the means which are appropriate, he must not, for example, choose direct strategy means in an indirect strategy situation.

Indirect strategy, in contrast with direct strategy, is defined by Beaufre as that strategy which is used when decisions are to be sought by other than purely military means. He goes on to illustrate this definition:

"These may be political or economic in nature (e.g. a revolutionary war) or they may use military force but proceed in a series of bounds interspersed with political negotiations (e.g. Hitler's strategy from 1936 to 1939)."¹⁷⁶

The most recent uses of this form of strategy have been the wars of de-colonialization and "liberation." It was also used extensively in another time, when the actual use of an army

¹⁷⁶ Introduction to Strategy, p. 44.

was prohibitively expensive, but its existence provided the deterrent umbrella for lesser forms of conflict. The period referred to here is the 18th Century. Its style of warfare was destroyed by the French Revolution and the Napoleonic Wars.¹⁷⁷

Because it relies on other than military means, indirect strategy can only be effective if those military means are somehow cancelled out. The most obvious example of this is the way in which nuclear deterrence (a direct strategy) inhibits the superpower's use of military means to resolve confrontations. With the swiftest and most decisive of the giants' power thus muzzled, other forms become more decisive; forms such as psychological or political warfare. Thus, while the nuclear umbrella tends to eliminate total war, it also eliminates total peace because indirect strategy has greater freedom of action.

Of more practical importance to the planner however, is the implication that in this era of nuclear deterrence, one must be prepared to oppose indirect strategy with indirect strategy. The major difference here is that the freedom of action to pursue one's objectives is gained outside the theater of operations rather than within it, as in direct strategy.¹⁷⁸

¹⁷⁷For a contemporaneous discussion of this revolution in warfare, see Clausewitz, On War, VIII:3:588-592.

¹⁷⁸Beaufre, Introduction to Strategy, p. 110.

It thus becomes clear that when facing an opponent who is able to use an indirect strategy, such as North Vietnam, the strategy chosen must not consider the theater of operations in isolation from the rest of the world. It is in the wider environment that the decisive battle must be fought, the battle for world opinion and for the support of the people. Under these circumstances, a purely military solution is impossible. Instead all forms of power must be brought to bear, and all possible avenues of exploitation must be closed to the enemy.¹⁷⁹

The final implication of this era of indirect strategy is that much more emphasis must be placed on the moral aspect of war, since more often than not, the outcome of a conflict is to be decided by psychological rather than physical means. A corollary to this is that the greater role of the moral factors increases the uncertain nature of any conflict; for who can predict when a people will loose the will to resist? This, in turn, goes back to the idea of a flexible and

¹⁷⁹Beaufre is not the first to develop this idea of indirect strategy, it has a long history in French strategy. A significant portion of his theory, especially that part which expounds the use of other than military force, may be found in the writings of the great French colonial warriors, Bugeaud (1840), and Gallieni and his student Lyautey (1900). For a concise, yet thorough discussion of these three men and their theories, see Jean Gottman, "Bugeaud, Gallieni, Lyautey: The Development of French Colonial Warfare," in Makers of Modern Strategy, ed. E.M. Earle, pp. 234-259.

responsive planning process that relies not on contingency plans and dogma, but on the ability of its planners to see through the events of the present, and to formulate operational plans to suit the circumstances. In short the process must rely on the ability of its planners to think fast and to think right.

V. THE PLANNING PROCESS

"Everything in war is very simple, but the simplest thing is difficult. The difficulties accumulate and end by producing a kind of friction that is inconceivable unless one has experienced war.... The good general must know friction in order to overcome it whenever possible, and in order not to expect a standard of achievement in his operations which this very friction makes impossible."

Carl von Clausewitz¹⁸⁰

In this chapter the same topic of strategic planning is continued, but moves from a theoretical to an institutional context. The general environment and historical context developed in the previous chapter is applied to the actual planning process. The first point in the discussion of this planning process is the idea of the levels of planning, which correspond to the levels of strategy addressed in Chapter 3. The next section will then deal with the guidelines which serve as aids in planning, guidelines that, as will be discussed in detail, derive their meaning from the fundamental environment of international relations. The analysis then turns to a brief discussion of the general characteristics required of the planners involved in this process. Finally

¹⁸⁰On War, I:7:119-120.

the chapter closes with a brief description of the nature of the plans developed by each level.¹⁸¹

A. THE LEVELS OF PLANNING

The environment within which planning must operate has been described, and it is seen as merely an extension of the environment of strategy: the international environment. But, just as was done with strategy in Chapter III, the discussion has treated planning as a whole, when in fact is made up of many separate parts and levels. This section addresses these levels and parts. For ease of analysis, planning is broken down into three levels: national, overall and operational. The reader will note that these levels correspond to the levels of strategy discussed above.

The purpose of national strategic planning is to coordinate the various fields of government into a single unified doctrine in pursuit of the ends set by policy. It must develop those plans which allocate the resources of a nation in the most efficient and effective manner among the fields. But, this forms only part of the role of national strategic planning. It must also provide guidance to the fields,

¹⁸¹One should bear in mind that what is under consideration in this chapter is the process of planning, not the organization which must support that process. Because it addresses no single organization, the chapter is of a general enough nature to be applicable to all levels of planning which deal with international relations.

setting goals for them to play by and defining the degree and nature of cooperation between the fields.

So that the apparatus of national strategic planning should not become overloaded by the immensity of its task, it should take a broad, long term perspective. It should state the purposes of the nation in general terms which can be used as guidance by the fields. National strategic planning should provide the direction for the nation as a whole, and should not concern itself with how that direction is realized except in an oversight function.

In the United States, the function of national strategic planning is not to be found in one organization of the government. Part of the planning is nominally done by the National Security Council (NSC), which is tasked "...to integrate all aspects of national policy relating to security affairs."¹⁸² But the NSC is the tool of the president, and tends to take on the nature he assigns it. Thus, under Truman, it was little used, while under Eisenhower, the former general, it knew a formal structure that yielded some noteworthy products. Kennedy preferred a more ad hoc advisory system, and hence had his Executive Committee of the NSC. Carter initially used a very formal structure, similar to that used

¹⁸² John E. Endicott, "The National Security Council," in American Defense Policy, 5th ed. Ed. John F. Reichart and Steven R. Sturm (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982), p. 521.

by Nixon and Kissinger, but eventually came to rely on more informal means, such as luncheons.¹⁸³

Even if the NSC could be made to function in a consistent manner, it lacks the authority necessary to be an overall national security planning staff. The sources of this dilemma are two. First, within the executive branch, the "chain of command" for planning is not clearly articulated. Seldom has there been a time when the State Department bowed to the will of the NSC. The animosity between Carter's Secretary of State, Cyrus Vance, and his National Security Advisor, Zbigniew Brezezinski, serves as a prime example.¹⁸⁴ Measures to alleviate this situation would most likely require significant reorganization of the executive branch. One solution, less drastic and thus more possible than reorganization is suggested by Philip Odeen. He argues for the establishment of a

¹⁸³For a discussion of the NSC under the first three presidents mentioned above, see Stanley Falk, "The National Security Council Under Truman, Eisenhower, and Kennedy," Political Science Quarterly, Sept. 1964, pp. 403-434. A discussion of the Carter NSC is contained in Lawrence J. Korb, "National Security Organization and Process in the Carter Administration," in Defense Politics and the Presidency: Carter's Frost Years, ed. Sam C. Sarkesian (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1979). General discussions of the subject are contained in I.M. Destler, "National Security Advise to U.S. Presidents: Some Lessons from Thirty Years," World Politics, Jan. 1977, pp. 143-175; and Philip Odeen, "Organizing for National Security." See also John Collins, U.S. Defense Planning and Jordan and Taylor, American National Security: Policy and Process.

¹⁸⁴James A. Nathan and James K. Oliver, United States Foreign Policy and World Order, 2nd ed. (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1981), pp. 413-419.

"Department of State-headed interagency contingency planning committee....Such a committee could make substantial contributions to the consistency, thoroughness, and effectiveness of planning in anticipation of crises."¹⁸⁵

The second source of the national strategic planning dilemma lies in the nature of the American form of government. In their desire to develop internal checks to the usurpation of political power, the framers of the Constitution dispersed that power within the government. As a result of this dispersal, Congress received "...a breathtaking array of powers."¹⁸⁶ It was assumed that these protective devices would allow the government to proceed about its business concerned with the national good, not that of individual pressure groups. It was to be a republic; at once both democratic and representative, national and federal.¹⁸⁷

By the end of the 19th Century, it became apparent that the system was no longer functioning as it had been designed. Large business interests had undue influence on the electorally chosen Senate, and massive social inequities had developed.¹⁸⁸ Since that time, over successive administrations, the national element has gained strength over the federal, and the

¹⁸⁵"Organizing for National Security," p. 127.

¹⁸⁶Davidson and Oleszek, Congress and Its Members, p. 22.

¹⁸⁷James Madison, Federalist Papers 39, p. 246.

¹⁸⁸Richard Hofstadter, The American Political Tradition, pp. 329-337.

democratic over the representative. Congress is the body that most clearly reflects these changes.

Because of the increasing work load of big federal government, Congress has been forced to divide its labor among committees. While these committees have allowed it to perform its representative role by ensuring that the mass of issues Congress must now decide upon get a hearing, they have, by the same token, lessened its ability to coordinate policy:

"To be sure, committees enable Congress to address a growing array of complex, interrelated issues and process its crushing workload. Yet outmoded and proliferating committees inhibit Congress's ability to advance comprehensive responses to problems."¹⁸⁹

The detrimental effect of the committee system is thus the elimination of a detached, body of legislators who can see the "big picture" and direct the law-making process to the benefit of the nation as a whole.

The failure to have a coordinating function in Congress is a direct result of the committee system. Each committee must guard its own power base if it is to be effective. This leads to compromises and stalemates, which in turn make Congress more susceptible to private interest groups. The overall effect is a Congress more at the mercy of constituents than in the service of the nation. Richard Haass highlights the impact of this on American foreign relations:

¹⁸⁹ Davidson and Oleszek, Congress and Its Members, p. 227.

"Indeed, it is impossible to avoid wondering (and worrying) about the compatibility of the new Congress, with its decentralization of authority, its vulnerability to special interests and its tendency to legislate severe but separate norms, with the demands of a world-order policy that could satisfy allies and contain adversaries."¹⁹⁰

The legislative power then comes to rest with the people, who cannot see beyond their own limited interests. In effect, the system of internal checks is transformed into a system of external checks, with the prospect of an increasing paralysis of the government.¹⁹¹

The most significant power granted Congress by the Founding Fathers was control over the raising and spending of money.

¹⁹⁰"Congressional Power: Implications for American Security Policy," in Adelphi Papers 153, Summer 1979, p. 33.

¹⁹¹The literature covering the government, its organization, actions, and deficiencies is surpassed in size only by the government itself. On Congress see Davidson and Oleszek, Congress and Its Members; Richard Haass, "Congressional Power," Adelphi Papers 153, Summer 1979, pp. 1-39; and R.L. Bledsoe and R. Handberg, "Changing Times: Congress and Defense," Armed Forces and Society, Spring 1980, pp. 415-429. On the budgetary interface between Congress and the Executive, see Samuel P. Huntington, The Common Defense; Dennis S. Ippolito, The Budget and National Politics (San Francisco: W.H. Freeman, 1978); and Arnold Kanter, Defense Politics: A Budgetary Perspective (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979). On the Presidency itself, see Henry Kissinger, White House Years; Alexander L. George, Presidential Decisionmaking in Foreign Policy: The Effective Use of Information and Advice (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1980); and Larry Berman, The Office of Management and Budget and the Presidency, 1921-1979 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1979). For a study of the nature of the bureaucracy see Morton H. Halperin, Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy (Wash., D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1974); I.M. Destler, Presidents, Bureaucrats, and Foreign Policy: The Politics of Organizational Reform (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1974); and specifically a critique of the State Department, Smith Simpson, The Crisis in American Diplomacy.

This factor, combined with the increase in the size of Congressional staffs--a result of the reforms of the 1970s--has enabled Congress to formulate its own strategy, or at least to seriously question that of the Executive.¹⁹² The result of this duality of strategic planning, while enhancing the representative nature of our government has effectively eliminated a national strategy. Lower levels first of all lack specific guidance in their planning. More importantly, however, these same lower levels can play Congress and the NSC against one another to gain their own ends. This is clearly detrimental to the development of a coherent national strategy.

Unable to prioritize, plagued with "lowest common denominator" solutions, and vulnerable to the machinations of bureaucratic politics, it becomes near impossible for the government to produce a coherent and long range national strategy. While specific recommendations are not offered here, serious study should be undertaken in this field. Samuel Huntington cautions that these shortcomings are part of the price "...the American people will have to pay for the other benefits of their constitutional system."¹⁹³ Nevertheless, it would appear that some changes could be made

¹⁹²Davidson and Oleszek, Congress and Its Members, p. 311.

¹⁹³Soldier and State, p. 192.

within the framework of the Constitution that would improve the efficiency of the planning function. Haass, for example, reviews the various types of reforms that are practical, but concludes that the main problem lies with the ability of the Legislative and Executive branches to work together. Alleviating this situation is the only realistic solution he sees, and suggests that the key is a strong President and a united administration.¹⁹⁴

The failure of planning at the national level is serious, for it gives rise to the first major break in the link between values and hardware. If America is to proceed in an efficient and effective manner into the future, these problems must be corrected.

National strategic planning, in theory at least, is responsible for translating national policy into a coordinated effort by the fields of government. It takes into account the goals of that policy and the conditions presented by the international environment in the development of plans of action. It has also been argued, however, that in the United States, both the planning and decisionmaking functions at this level are fractured, preventing coherent long range and crisis planning. This pattern, as will be seen in the next chapter, repeats itself at the overall level, especially in the military field.

¹⁹⁴Haass, "Congressional Power," pp. 29-34.

Planning at the overall level has two main purposes. First, it seeks to coordinate the efforts of the branches within the field toward the achievement of the goal set by the national strategic doctrine. The second major purpose of overall strategic planning is to communicate with the other fields in government in order to coordinate efforts as set forth by the national strategic doctrine.

Because overall strategic planning has a narrower perspective, being concerned with only one field rather than the government as a whole, its time horizon should also be narrower. With a shorter time horizon, overall planning must place a greater emphasis on the current and mid-term international environment, and must have the capability to react even more rapidly to crises. In the same sense, though, overall strategy is in a position to pay greater attention to detail. Thus, the effect of a reduced scope is more than offset by the need for increased speed and attention to detail.

The final level of planning is the operational level. Its purpose is:

"...not only to harmonize the objectives laid down by overall strategy with the capabilities of the tactics and techniques in use in the branch concerned, but also to ensure that those tactics and techniques are developed in the directions which will best fit them to meet future strategic requirements."¹⁹⁵

¹⁹⁵Beaufre, Introduction to Strategy, p. 31.

The consequences of a breakdown in the strategic planning process at any one of these levels now becomes apparent. If the plans and goals are not developed in a sufficiently rigorous manner at each and every level, those levels below are cut loose from the reins of policy. Lacking the necessary direction from above, each must interpret its own role in achieving the objects of policy, each must develop its own criteria for the measure of success, and each operates independently of the others. The higher the level at which the break occurs, the more costly the consequences.

Thus, the failure of strategic planning results in a breakdown in the coordinated efforts of the government, initiating an exponential growth in the cost of meeting objectives.

"Without strategy, there is no mechanism for integrating goals, tasks, and priorities, and there is no criterion for the weighing of risks and costs."¹⁹⁶

In short, the various organs of government are incapable of prioritizing, and must therefore seek the maximum resources attainable.

B. THE GUIDELINES OF PLANNING

Traditionally, the guidelines used by strategists have been called "principles." But such a label carries with it a connotation of rigidity, of cookbook rules, and of dogma.

¹⁹⁶Possony and Pournelle, Strategy of Technology, p. 51.

Too often in the past blind adherence to "principles" of strategy has led to defeat and useless slaughter. Keeping in mind that each plan must be developed out of the specific circumstances which obtain, and that the role of theory is to provide a framework for analysis, not a checklist, the term "principles" of strategy is clearly inappropriate.

Clausewitz tells us that the purpose of strategic theory is to

"...shed light on the components of war and their interrelationships, stressing those few principles or rules that can be demonstrated."¹⁹⁷

Those "few principles" were described in the chapter on the environment of strategy: that strategy is subordinated to politics, and that the environment within which these are played out is made up of passion, chance and policy.

What, then is the purpose of strategic "guidelines," and how do they differ from the use of strategic "principles?" First of all, the guidelines do not differ in substance from the principles, it is merely a desire to emphasize flexibility in planning that has led to a change in the designation. Secondly, one purpose of the guidelines is to aid in organizing thought and prioritizing events; they act as a structured framework to guide the planner's thought. A second purpose is to provide planners with the criteria necessary to analyze

¹⁹⁷ Clausewitz, On War, III:1:177.

present plans and past uses of strategy. In other words, they ensure

"...that one need not start afresh each time sorting out the material and plowing through it, but will find it ready to hand and in good order."¹⁹⁸

Thus, the strategic guidelines provide the tools for analyzing the past and learning from it, for understanding the present, and for plotting a course into the future.

A final reason the guidelines have been named as such, is that principles, being more or less 'the law', are perceived as originating from some great writer or general, and are thus susceptible to obsolescence. On the other hand, the impression that is sought here is that these concepts derive their substance from the very nature of conflict, from chance, passion, and rational policy making, and hence are independent of time. As the discussion proceeds, keep in mind their origin. It will clarify what will undoubtedly be brief and less than optimum definitions and will underscore the interdependent nature of the guidelines. Each one is not so much defined as described, the intent being to operationalize the concepts, and to make the reader familiar with their usage in as brief a space as possible.

The guidelines have both a tactical and a strategic nature. As the Army's *Field Manual 100-1* states:

¹⁹⁸ Ibid., II:2:141

"For the strategist, the principles of war provide a set of military planning interrogatives--a set of questions that should be considered if military strategy is to best serve the national interest. For the tactician, these principles provide an operational framework for the military actions he has been trained to carry out. They are neither intended nor designed to be prescriptive; the principles of war, if understood and applied properly, should stimulate thought and enhance flexibility of action."¹⁹⁹

The following discussion will largely ignore the tactical level, but it will still seek to "stimulate thought."

The Object: This guideline has been described above, and refers to the goal a plan is to achieve. Explicit definition of the object is absolutely essential in every level of planning, for it guides the entire process and provides the necessary foundation for the next level in the hierarchy. "If we don't know where we are going, it is impossible to determine when we get there."²⁰⁰ This guideline has deliberately been labeled the "object" rather than the "objective." The purpose in this distinction is found in Liddell Hart's *Strategy*:

"The term 'objective', although common usage, is not really a good one. It has physical and geographical sense--and thus tends to confuse thought. It would be better to speak of the 'object' when dealing with purpose of policy, and of '*the military aim*' when

¹⁹⁹Chapter 3, Field Manual 100-1, *The Army*, 14 Aug., 1981. Chapter 3 forms the Appendix to Summers *On Strategy*, and it was from that source that this quote was taken, pp. 196-197.

²⁰⁰Summers, *On Strategy*, p. 186.

dealing with the way that forces are directed in the service of policy."²⁰¹

When considering the strategic aspect of this guideline, the distinction becomes important because of the more general nature of the term 'object'.

Freedom of Action/Initiative:

"The essence of strategy, in fact, is the struggle for freedom of action. The basis of the game of strategy, therefore, is the preservation of one's own freedom of action...and the ability to deprive the enemy of his..."²⁰²

Freedom of action is essential if plans are to be successfully implemented, and in order to reduce the ability of the enemy to counter our moves in unexpected ways. The object is to force him to alter his plans, while ours remain intact.

Flexibility: This refers to the ability of a plan to adapt to the rapidly changing tide of events, and of its ability to maintain the initiative under changing conditions.

Liddell Hart sums up the importance of flexibility:

"To be practical, any plan must take account of the enemy's power to frustrate it; the best chance of overcoming such obstruction is to have a plan that can be easily varied to fit the circumstances met; to keep such adaptability, while still keeping the initiative, the best way is to operate along a line which offers alternative objectives."²⁰³

²⁰¹Liddell Hart, Strategy, p. 351.

²⁰²Beaufre, Introduction to Strategy, p. 135.

²⁰³Strategy, p. 344.

In this era, two of the more significant elements of strategic flexibility are strategic mobility and readiness. In the form of a general recommendation, Richard Betts writes:

"U.S. programs should sacrifice some incremental additions of combat striking power to an emphasis on strategic lift, in-theater mobility, better maintenance for higher readiness, and tactical flexibility."²⁰⁴

Economy of Force: This refers to the judicious use of the resources at hand, and as with the other guidelines, pertains to the entire realm of strategy and policy. It is not to mean the withholding of forces, but on the contrary it is "...always to make sure that all forces are involved--always to ensure that no part of the whole force is idle."²⁰⁵ In other words, do not fritter away your resources needlessly, be efficient.

Maneuver: Maneuver is designed to throw the opponent off balance, even if momentarily, for the purpose of seizing the initiative or of making a bold advance. It can exist in two planes, the physical and the psychological. To operate successfully, the maneuver must take the physical "*line of least resistance*," and the psychological "*line of least expectation*." The purpose of this 'distraction' is to deprive the enemy of his freedom of action and it should operate in

²⁰⁴ Betts, Surprise Attack, p. 296.

²⁰⁵ Clausewitz, On War, III:14:213.

both the physical and psychological spheres."²⁰⁶ At the level of national strategy, maneuver is now done with industry and technology, as well as diplomacy and military force.²⁰⁷

Concentration: Again, this concept refers to more than just the numerical concentration of forces. It also addresses the concentration of effort and of resources in general. Liddell Hart gives perhaps the most lucid statement of concentration, one which also highlights the dialectical nature of war:

"...war is a two-party affair, so imposing the need that while hitting one must guard. Its corollary is that, in order to hit with effect, the enemy must be taken off his guard. Effective concentration can only be obtained when the opposing forces are dispersed; and, usually, in order to ensure this, one's own forces must be widely distributed. Thus, by an outward paradox, true concentration is the product of dispersion."²⁰⁸

In other words, by forcing your opponent to spread his forces to cover multiple areas of threat, you are faced with less opposition at the point of your choosing. Concentration is relative, not absolute.

Unity of Command: That this guideline is pertinent should by now be beyond doubt. How else is there to be a firm definition of objective? How else are the interests of the branches to be subordinated to those of the field; and those

²⁰⁶Hart, Strategy, p. 341.

²⁰⁷Beaufre suggests this in Introduction to Strategy, p. 100. It in turn forms the foundation for Possony and Pournelle, The Strategy of Technology, who draw heavily upon the French strategist.

²⁰⁸Strategy, p. 343.

of the field to the nation? "Unity of command obtains unity of effort by the coordinated action of all forces toward a common goal."²⁰⁹ Jeffrey Record provides another clear definition of unity of command, a definition that pertains to more than just the limited case he is discussing, the Rapid Deployment Force:

"A successful combined operation requires a single centralized command possessing unchallenged authority over pre-operation planning and forces earmarked for the operation, as well as authority over the execution of the operation itself."²¹⁰

Simplicity:

"Everything in strategy is very simple, but that does not mean that everything is very easy....It is easy to chart a course. But great strength of character, as well as great lucidity and firmness of mind, is required in order to follow through steadily, to carry out the plan and not to be thrown off course by thousands of diversions."²¹¹

With that introduction, keeping plans, techniques and hardware as simple as possible seems appropriate. If chance in war will thwart even the simplest plan, consider what it will do to the complex one. Regarding the disastrous failure of the Iranian hostage rescue attempt:

²⁰⁹Army field manual, FM 100-5, 19 Feb., 62. Cited in Summers, On Strategy, p. 141.

²¹⁰The Rapid Deployment Force (The Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, Washington, D.C.: Corporate Press, 1981), pp. 66-67.

²¹¹Clausewitz, On War, III:1:178.

"It may well have been the most complex amphibious raid in military history. The principle of simplicity was obviously violated."²¹²

Simplicity is ignored at great risk to the success of a plan.

Morale: In war morale is the decisive factor: "Naturally moral strength must not be excluded, for psychological forces exert a decisive influence on the elements involved in war."²¹³ In an era of indirect strategy and long term defense, the moral factors take on an even larger role. With the limitations on the use of force, the importance of psychological warfare grows. We must protect our psychological flank from attack by enemy propaganda, and we must maintain the morale of our people from the protracted conflict: long term defense. By the same token, morale must not be overplayed as it was by such French strategists as DuPicq and Foch.²¹⁴ High morale can accomplish amazing feats, but without good equipment, it is useless.

Security: This refers to the ability to ensure the safety of one's forces. One way to security is the secrecy of plans, but this can only be carried so far; those in the field must know what they are to do. A better way to security is to maintain the initiative. Then, the enemy is too busy

²¹²Maj. Robert L. Earl, USMC, "A Matter of Principle," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, Feb. 83, p. 34.

²¹³Clausewitz, On War, II:1:127.

²¹⁴See Stefan T. Possony and Etienne Mantoux, "Du Picq and Foch: The French School," in Makers of Modern Strategy, ed. E.M. Earle, pp. 206-233.

reacting to your moves to be able to attack from an unexpected direction.

Surprise: This, according to Clausewitz, is a much overrated concept. While he argues that surprise "...lies at the root of all operations without exception," he cautions against building your plans around it. "The principle is highly attractive in theory, but in practice, it is often held up by the friction of the whole machine."²¹⁵ Summers agrees with Clausewitz by arguing that strategic surprise is a rarity.²¹⁶ In a strict military sense, this is so. Nevertheless, knowledge of an impending attack, especially at the opening of hostilities, is not the equivalent of taking action to absorb that attack. In other words, surprise is more often the result of a failure of will on the part of a government than of a failure of intelligence.²¹⁷

In the context of NATO doctrine in general and American in particular, surprise is a crucial element. The West can expect to be surprised (politically if not militarily), and as such should design its plans, tactics, and forces around this. In support of this, Betts argues that the means to overcoming political surprise is possession of "...the capacity to cope with unanticipated tactics and doctrinal surprise."

²¹⁵ Clausewitz, On War, III:9:198.

²¹⁶ On Strategy, p. 152.

²¹⁷ Betts, Surprise Attack, p. 4.

Such a capability is found only in a "...military bureaucracy and strategic community capable of sensitivity, creativity, and quickly adaptive innovation."²¹⁸ Again, strategy must be a method of thought.

One other hedge against surprise lies in a flexibility of the size of forces available. What is needed is a significant "surge" capability which allows rapid response to an attack, while, in periods of lesser tension, obviates the economic strain that large standing forces create. Such concepts have been tried in the past, some have failed, some have not. With sufficient study, a satisfactory means could be found to implement this, especially in Europe.²¹⁹

Speed: Speed is an ingredient of success for many of the concepts that have been described above. It improves one's chances for freedom of action, aids in economy of force, is the secret to successful concentration, and is a key element of surprise. Speed needs to be taken into consideration at all levels of planning, for the quicker you act, the less time the element of chance has to ruin your plan, and the less time your opponent has to react. But, a word of caution. This is not a principle. There may be times when

²¹⁸Surprise Attack, p. 299.

²¹⁹Such a concept is supported by Betts, Surprise Attack, p. 297; Beaufre, Deterrence and Strategy, p. 130; Edward N. Luttwak, "On the Meaning of Victory," The Washington Quarterly, Autumn 1982, p. 23; and Canby, "Military Reform and the Art of War," p. 250.

you would desire to go slowly. Perhaps a better term for speed would be *timeliness*.

These then are the strategic guidelines. They are useful to the strategist as guides in the planning process, and to the student as aids in the analytical/learning process. The investigation into strategy now turns to the strategist and the organization which allows him to function.

C. THE PLANNERS

By now it is apparent that planners must be developed who can utilize the flexible process that has been set forth. In this section, a general discussion of their qualities will be undertaken so as to provide a rough idea of the changes that will be required. As preview to those qualities that are necessary of a planner, Beaufre provides an interesting analogy:

"The strategist is like a surgeon called upon to operate upon a sick person who is growing continuously and with extreme rapidity and of whose detailed anatomy he is not sure; his operating-table is in a state of perpetual motion and he must have ordered the instruments he is to use five years beforehand."²²⁰

Possony and Pournelle define the military strategist's role as one of synthesizing the conflicting information from politicians, engineers, scientists, systems analysts and military commanders into a cohesive whole that provides the optimum equipment for a reasonable price that will be

²²⁰ Introduction to Strategy, p. 46.

effective in combat. To accomplish such a task, which is "...almost beyond human talents..." requires that the planner

"...have courage; that is, moral courage, the courage to make decisions that may be adverse to his career. He must be willing to give unpopular advice. He must have the courage to say 'no,' emphatically....He must also have the courage to understand that he may be wrong, and to make the appropriate investment of resources in a hedge against this contingency."²²¹

They go on to add that the planner must also know the art of war, indeed if he is to have a specialty, let it be that. Finally, the planner must understand the needs of the operators, and he must be familiar with technology. In short, the planner must be a renaissance man, specializing in no field, but knowledgeable in many.

America, like the Roman Empire, must seek ways to "...provide security for the civilization without prejudicing the vitality of its economic base and without compromising the stability of an evolving political order."²²² To do so in this era requires strategists trained as such. The suggestion of a dedicated group of planners in the military, perhaps under the control of, and rewarded by, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, whose "stated intent [is] to institutionalize strategic excellence," appears to offer promise.²²³

²²¹ Strategy of Technology, pp. 88-89. Indeed, Huntington argues that the task is "beyond human talents": it has become "...impossible to be an expert in the management of violence for external defense and at the same time to be skilled in ...politics and statecraft..." Soldier and State, p. 32.

²²² Luttwak, Grand Strategy, p. 1.

²²³ Collins, Defense Planning, p. 54.

In any case they must be fully indoctrinated into the

"traditions of civility in which the good society, the liberal, democratic way of life at its best, originated and developed."²²⁴

The current U.S. military procedure of assigning whoever is available as planners, and then for only a short tenure, is absurd in light of the concepts expounded above. However, the purpose of such planners, at the overall level especially, is not to direct the planning of the branches and develop original plans, but to safeguard the interests of their parent branch.²²⁵ The result is a reluctance to change, because such change might negatively impact on the branch. Concern for bureaucratic power also reduces the ability to innovate. This defect was noted as far back as the late 1950's by Samuel Huntington, among others:

"...more than anything else, one is struck by the tendency of the military to embrace the broad policy *status quo*."²²⁶

Furthermore, Collins argues, that similar shortcomings exist in the NSC, State Department and OSD.²²⁷

²²⁴Lippmann, Public Philosophy, p. 75.

²²⁵Col. William G. Hanne, USA, "An Armed Forces Staff," Parameters: Journal of the U.S. Army War College, Sept. 1982, p. 53. See also Korb, The Joint Chiefs of Staff, pp. 21-25.

²²⁶Huntington, The Common Defense (New York: Columbia University Press, 1961), p. 114.

²²⁷See Defense Planning, Part III.

Planners should cycle between staffs and field. In this way they gain experience as planners which sharpens their skills, while at the same time remaining in contact with the forces their plans will control. The separation of the French general staff from the main part of the army in 1833 demonstrates the danger of a cloistered elite.²²⁸ By the 1870 war against the Prussians, which ended in total defeat of France, this inbreeding yielded a staff system whose selection criteria was based on "...purely practical abilities like horsemanship...while learning and a knowledge of military theory had been ignored."²²⁹

Concomitant with this rotation, their tours should be longer than the two to three years common in the American military today. The planner must develop fully the skills of the job he is currently in, and must see the results of his actions. The current assignment practices in the American military, for example, prevent this growth.²³⁰

The role that a planner must play in the security of his country, whether he is a military planner or diplomatic or economic, is a heavy responsibility. To meet the challenge,

²²⁸Brig. Gen. James D. Hittle, USA (Ret.), The Military Staff: Its History and Development (Harrisburg, Pa.: The Stackpole Co., 1961), p. 117.

²²⁹Possony and Mantoux, "Du Picq and Foch: The French School," p. 217.

²³⁰Jones, "What's Wrong With Our Defense Establishment," p. 83.

his training must be rigorous and never ending. He must have a firm base in history and the culture of his people; to a degree he must even be a philosopher. As Clausewitz so succinctly states, because strategy is simple does not mean that it is easy:

"It sounds odd, but everyone who is familiar with this aspect of warfare will agree that it takes more strength of will to make an important decision in strategy than in tactics. In strategy...there is ample room for apprehensions, one's own and those of others; for objections and remonstrations and, in consequence, for premature regrets."²³¹

A planner not sufficiently grounded in the basics of history, culture, and strategy, will have little chance when put to the test. History provides perspectives; culture and philosophy develop purpose; and knowledge of the art of war yields conviction.

"The test of our future leaders' merit may well not lie in perseverance when the light at the end of the tunnel is expected but rather in their persistence and continued performance of duty when there is no possibility that the light will ever show up."²³²

It is under these circumstances that the planner and the leader must function. To do so he must know his business. But, even then, the special qualities of what Clausewitz calls "military genius" will also be necessary:

"If we then ask what sort of mind is likeliest to display the qualities of military genius, experience and observation will both tell us that it is the inquiring rather than the creative mind, the

²³¹Clausewitz, On War, III:1:178.

²³²Stockdale, "Educating Leaders," p. 52.

comprehensive rather than the specialized approach, the calm rather than the excitable head to which in war we would choose to entrust the fate of our brothers and children, and the safety and honor of our country."²³³

D. DOCTRINE: THE PRODUCT

The product of the process that has been developed in this chapter is the doctrine. It is this which guides the actual disposition and employment of the resources of the nation; it is this which is the tangible result of a synthesis between the environment, values, strategy and planning. Because so much of the process is flexible in nature, more of a method of thinking than a rigid checklist, the product too is flexible. Each level of strategy produces its own doctrine, each is coordinated with the others, but each is only as specific as is necessary to convey objectives to the levels below and as is allowable considering the temporal perspective which pertains.

John Collins names five types of plans which "...interlock and overlap but remain distinct." These five types are concept formulation, requirement plans, capability plans, mobilization plans, and crisis plans. Concept formulation deals with "...how to satisfy aims and missions," or in short, what objectives need be laid out for subordinate levels and the interrelations between them. The remaining four types of

²³³On War, I:3:112.

plans can be combined into a category labeled as operational plans. They deal with what means are necessary, and short of that, how to accomplish ends with what is currently available.²³⁴

Over the evolution of American planning, the elements of logistics and mobilization have been mastered. Yet, in an age of long lead items and high technology, the question must once again be raised as to whether or not current mobilization plans are realistic. Some have gone so far as to suggest a limited mobilization in peacetime, while others argue that mobilization is irrelevant since the United States is all ready engaged in a protracted conflict.²³⁵ Betts has argued, in support of his "surge" thesis, that certain industries, such as ammunition and small arms, be capable of relatively instantaneous conversion to wartime production.²³⁶ This appears reasonable, but by itself will not solve the crucial questions of strategic mineral availability and a surge

²³⁴U.S. Defense Planning, p. 155.

²³⁵For the former, see Richard B. Foster and Francis P. Hoerber, "Limited Mobilization: A Strategy for Preparedness and Deterrence in the Eighties," Orbis, Fall 1980, pp. 439-457. The latter argument forms the main theme of Possony and Pournelle, Strategy of Technology. On the subject of mobilization see also Fred Charles Ikle, "Preparing for Industrial Mobilization: The First Step Toward Full Strength," in National Security in the 1980s: From Weakness to Strength, ed. W. Scott Thompson (San Francisco: Institute for Contemporary Studies, 1980), pp. 55-68.

²³⁶Surprise Attack, p. 297.

capability in large items such as tactical aircraft, tanks, and, perhaps of greatest significance, strategic sealift.²³⁷

In general then, the planning process yields two basic types of doctrine. The first is the long range, conceptual plan which provides guidance and long term objectives. This doctrine, while general in nature, forms the stable mooring upon which the shorter term plans are based. Short term doctrine is the second type that arises out of the process just described. It deals with current capabilities and objectives and with crisis situations. Again, every level of strategic planning must produce both long range and short term, but by far the more important are the former.²³⁸ If the system is developed properly, the short term, crisis plans can be developed with each period of tension. But, this can only be done under the guidance of a long range concept. While each level must do both, the long range

²³⁷These issues are receiving increasing attention in the open literature. Canby, "Military Reform and the Art of War," and Record, The Rapid Deployment Force, both suggest ways of dealing with current shortcomings. See also Thomas E. Etzold, Defense or Delusion? Americas Military in the 1980s (New York: Harper and Row, 1982), especially Ch. VI. For a discussion of the sensitivity to Soviet naval activities of American response to a Central Front war, see Paul H. Nitze, et.al., Securing the Seas: The Soviet Naval Challenge and Western Alliance Options (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1979), Ch. 13. The current degree of American reliance on a large logistical tail, which in turn increases demands on mobilization requirements, is one of the more persuasive arguments of the maneuver warfare advocates. See William Lind, "Defining Maneuver Warfare for the Marine Corps."

²³⁸Collins, U.S. Defense Planning, p. 32.

doctrine at the national strategy level is not of the same scope nor time horizon as is that of the overall level.

The tendency of the United States to concentrate on the short range crisis plans rather than on the longer range conceptual plans deprives the nation of its beacon. Instead, it is forced to lurch along, surrounded by the fog of the present, subject to the vicissitudes of current events. Samuel Huntington provides an accurate analogy to this condition:

"A republic, however, is like a raft: slow, ungainly, impossible to steer, no place from which to control events, and yet endurable and safe. It will not sink, but one's feet are always wet."²³⁹

The raft will not sink due to the ravages of nature, but it can be destroyed when run over by the sleek clipper of the totalitarian state. Unless America can somehow gain control over its direction, it will be unable to prevent this collision, a failure which would, as Alexander Hamilton writes, "...deserve to be considered as the general misfortune of mankind."²⁴⁰

E. CONCLUSION

Within the environment of international relations, subordinated to national values through national interests,

²³⁹Common Defense, p. 447.

²⁴⁰Federalist Papers 1, p. 33.

strategic planners devise doctrine. The goal of the doctrine is to further the security interests of the nation in the most effective and efficient manner.

The evolution of planning in America continues. As the environment becomes increasingly threatening, the impetus for reform strengthens. This chapter has laid out a framework which can aid in the development of goals and objectives in the reform process. Strategy is a method of thought, so too must planning be. In any event, the key elements remain flexibility and timeliness.

The case is put forth, not just here but in many of the works cited above. Change is essential if America is to meet its commitments and if it is to know security. The one remaining question, put forth by General Jones,

"...is whether we will show the wisdom to do as the British did, or whether we will muddle along as we have in the past until some crisis or disaster awakens us to the need for change."²⁴¹

²⁴¹"What's Wrong With Our Defense Establishment," p. 83. In writing of the British, he is referring to the dispatch with which they reformed their military organization. On this subject see Neville Trotter, "A British View of the Incentives for JCS Reform," Armed Forces Journal International, May 1982, p. 70. On the need to reform, see also Russell F. Weigley, "To the Crossing of the Rhine: American Strategic Thought to World War II," Armed Forces and Society, Winter 1979, pp. 302-320.

VI. CONCLUSION

"The crucial element of hope amid the current drift lies in the recollection of what the American spirit of activist optimism has so often accomplished--when it was rallied by its leaders and philosophers to a vision of shared goals."

Adm. H.G. Rickover, USN²⁴²

What is strategy? Why is it so neglected in the United States? How can strategic planning be improved? These are a few of the questions that have been addressed in this paper. Not all have been answered, nor was that to be expected. Strategy is an exceedingly complex subject; one that requires a substantial amount of study, contemplation and experience to comprehend. Indeed, even those answers developed on the previous pages require further study in order to fully understand their implications and to ensure their validity and cohesiveness. Nevertheless, a beginning has been made, and there are some results to show for it. By way of a short summary allow me to emphasize the main points of the paper, and to set the stage for the recommendations that will follow.

The paper began with a discussion of what was termed the fundamental environment of international relations. This concept was developed from the writings of Carl von Clausewitz,

²⁴²"Thoughts on Man's Purpose in Life...and Other Matters," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, Dec. 1974, p. 69.

and suggested a framework for the analysis of events and the planning of strategy. In no way was it meant to represent a "theory" of international relations. That task is amply addressed by others, as was noted in Chapter II. Instead, the chapter sought to explicate some of the more obvious characteristics of interaction in the international arena; concepts which for all their simplicity are more often ignored than not. Because of this, it is essential to understand the fundamental point of that chapter: *any plan, any organization, any concept that hopes to deal with foreign relations must account for the uncertainty and emotion inherent in the international environment.* To ignore this, to reject uncertainty, to plan only according to the more tangible, "concrete" factors, is to ignore reality.

The major topic of the next chapter was strategy. It is defined as a method of thought, not a specific plan of action. The reason for such a definition is to underscore the need for flexibility and responsiveness. These qualities are essential in any process which hopes to remain ahead of events in this age of rapid communications, high speed transport, and inter-continental missiles. It was argued that, because events move at such a rapid pace, and because the ally of today may be the enemy of tomorrow (especially in the Third World), it is ill-advised to rely on preconceived plans. Rather, the process of strategy as a method of thought allows the formulation of specific responses to specific events in a timely manner.

Strategy thus became a conceptual framework within which plans could be developed that would seek to guide events of today toward the realization of the goals of tomorrow. Indeed, it is strategy that forms the link between the broad policy objectives of the nation--as derived from the national interests and the international environment--and the means available to realize those objectives. Strategy, as taken from Clausewitz, could serve only policy, though policy was at the same time seen to be constrained by the realities offered by strategy. In this sense, the "communication" between them is two way, with policy remaining supreme. Such a communication flow, it was shown, also existed between the various levels of strategy. Thus, for example, strategy would drive technology, but at the same time, it would be forced to respond to the realities technology presents.

The chapter on strategy dealt with the conceptual framework within which planning could take place. In the final two chapters, the function of planning was considered. The purpose of the process of planning, as developed in those chapters, is essentially to institutionalize flexibility and responsiveness. It was shown that planning must consider the nature of the environment in which doctrine must operate. It must also consider the opponent, for the destruction of his will to oppose ours is the objective of planning. Finally, planning must consider the impact that the plan which is developed will have on subsequent events.

When these requirements are taken into account, the process by which strategy is to be implemented must also be flexible. Because of the nature of the international environment, it is far better to strive to adapt to uncertainty than it is to attempt to eliminate it. The goal then must be to devise a system that allows the absorption of the uncertainties of events while maintaining a focus on the distant goals of the future. Again, to emphasize the importance of flexibility and to underscore the driving principal of this work, allow a repeat of the quote found at the beginning of Chapter 3:

"Strategy cannot be a single defined doctrine; it is a *method of thought*, the object of which is to codify events, set them in order of priority and then choose the most effective course of action. There will be a strategy to fit each situation; any given strategy may be the best possible in certain situations and the worst conceivable in others. That is the basic truth."²⁴³

A. RECOMMENDATIONS

The primary purpose of this thesis has been to outline a method of thought; a framework of planning which in turn would serve to guide its continuing evolution. The framework is intended to be general and conceptual rather than prescriptive. As such, it is designed to structure thinking on organizational reform, rather than to submit a blueprint

²⁴³Beaufre, Introduction to Strategy, p. 13.

for that reform. Nevertheless, certain general recommendations are warranted as a result of this study.

The points outlined below are limited to the military field. To address these questions to the whole of strategy and planning would require several volumes. It is here that the need for strategy is the clearest and, quite frankly, it is here that the author's experience lies. The following is a list of the recommendations offered; a discussion and justification of each will follow:

- a. Increase the philosophical and historical training of officers, especially strategic planners.
- b. Train and assign planners as such. They should periodically rotate to field and fleet units from staffs, but their primary job, and longest tours, should be as planners.
- c. Centralize the chain of command in the Defense Department by placing the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff directly under the Secretary of Defense, and by providing him with a staff.
- d. Decentralize authority in the Defense Department to the greatest extent possible.

This section will first establish the criteria for these recommendations, then will analyze them in detail. Finally, the proposals will be measured against the criteria to determine their likely effectiveness.

1. Criteria of Reform

There are four criteria of reform:

- a. The need to improve long range planning.
- b. The need to increase initiative, innovation, and boldness among planners and officers.

- c. The need to improve the organizational self-criticism.
- d. The need to increase public support.

These criteria, which reflect the need for reform, arise from the traditional American neglect of the art of war. The progress of strategic thinking in America over its history has at best been slow. The significant improvements in planning since the Civil War have not carried with them improvements in strategic thought. The American military, even after Vietnam, largely ignores the study of the art of war.²⁴⁴ In a form of retrenchment from the trauma of that war, the military has closed ranks against the outside world and withdrawn in upon itself. Far from seeking to understand the fundamental questions that the Vietnam War uncovered, the military has chosen to ignore them, turning once again to the pursuit of technical and tactical perfection. Lacking an overall philosophy, each symptom of failure in that war has been addressed on its own merits. The military busily set to correcting these symptoms without striving to critically assess their fundamental causes.

Colonel Harry Summers is one of the first military authors who has refused to participate in this retrenchment,

²⁴⁴ Lt.Col. Dennis M. Drew, "Military Art and the American Tradition: The Vietnam Paradox Revisited," Air University Review, Jan.-Feb. 1983, p. 33. On the increasing interest in the lessons of the Vietnam War, in both the academic world and the military, see Fox Butterfield, "The New Vietnam Scholarship," The New York Times Magazine, 13 Feb., 1983.

and who has sought to place the war in perspective. His work hopefully marks the beginning of a truly critical analysis of the war, and the beginning of a strategic frame of mind in American military officers.²⁴⁵ On the whole, however, the military remains tied to a discussion of strategy in terms of the defense budget, vice addressing the defense budget in terms of strategy. The level of defense spending is merely a proxy measure of the ability of the military to do its job, and an arguably poor one at that. The military however, continues to insist on its use, a convention all too welcomed by civilians who know not the art of war and the difficulties inherent in combat. The military has in short surrendered its strong suit--expertise in the art of war. Writing of the failure of strategy in Vietnam, Summers argues:

²⁴⁵On Strategy. Several works by military officers have recently appeared that urge an increased emphasis on the study of military art. Most recent are those of Lt. Col. Drew, "Military Art and the American Traiditon"; and RAdm. Stockdale, "Educating Leaders". The Naval Institute has presented some excellent articles on the subject over the past several years. Among the more noteworthy are RAdm. Winnefeld, "The Quality of The Officer Corps," pp. 32-38; Cdr. Buell, "The Education of A Warrior," pp. 40-45; and Cdr. Robert C. Powers, USN, "Escalation Control," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings. Col. William Staudenmaier, USA, provides an excellent review of strategy and the art of war in "Strategic Concepts for the 1980s," Military Review, Mar. and Apr., 1982.

"Without a foundation in military art we could not compete with the rationalistic proposals of the defense analysts, and the effect was a failure in our responsibilities to present alternative strategies to our civilian leaders."²⁴⁶

Because the military chooses to argue its case on the plane of defense budgets rather than strategy, the debate is focused on inputs such as forces and relative capabilities. The perspective is technical rather than conceptual. Because of this perspective, what plans are developed *respond* to techniques and technology rather than *guiding* them.

An excellent example of this case is to be found in Jeffrey S. McKittrick's article "A Military Look at Military Reform." In a critique of the maneuver warfare concept suggested by the military reformers, he argues that the American army cannot think of using such a doctrine because of its large logistics tail. This tail is caused by requirements for fuel, in both large quantities and high quality. He fails to address the substance of maneuver warfare; and he does not provide the slightest hope that these essentially technical difficulties can be overcome. Not, it is far better, from his vantage point, to continue to develop the very high technology equipment which has given rise to the "tail" in the first place, rather than change.²⁴⁷

²⁴⁶On Strategy, p. 44. He also notes here that "this problem lingers on." See Edward Luttwak, "The Decline of American Military Leadership," Parameters: Journal of the US Army War College, Dec. 1980, pp. 82-88.

²⁴⁷"A Military Look at Military Reform," pp. 60-61. Professor McKittrick is a member of the Department of Social Sciences, U.S. Military Academy.

Such an inversion of the roles of ends and means is, unfortunately, a trait of the American military. It leads not to innovation and adaptability, which are so sorely needed, but to an obsession with the status quo. Without a concept of strategy, the military is forced to act and plan out of habit, for there is no guidance for the direction which change must follow.²⁴⁸ Under such conditions, it must continue to do things as it has in the past until presented, usually in the form of a military setback, with the evidence of necessary change. An excellent example is the tendency with which the Navy clung to the concept of the battle line up to 7 December, 1941.²⁴⁹

Out of this tendency toward the status quo, several requirements demand attention. These requirements in turn become the criteria of reform. The first is the need to improve strategic planning, both short and long range; to utilize the long range perspective properly; and to coordinate the efforts of the various organizations within the Department of Defense (and without it). The second requirement is to foster an environment of initiative, innovation and boldness, that will encourage flexibility and responsiveness, and will allow a delegation of authority to lower levels. This is essential if the threat posed by the international system is

²⁴⁸Beaufre, Introduction to Strategy, p. 29.

²⁴⁹Weigley, The American Way of War, p. 253.

to be met. The third necessity is to encourage self-criticism.²⁵⁰ Only in this way may the process be improved from within in response to developments from without. Self-criticism fosters a continuous evolution of ideas. If such creativeness is stifled in preference to conformity, the implication arises that the existing doctrine cannot stand the test of new ideas. Indeed, it could go so far as to mean there is in fact no doctrine.²⁵¹ The final requirement is to improve public awareness and support, and this can only be accomplished by articulating a strategy that is tied to the national values; values the people can understand and appreciate.

2. Training of Officers

Sam Sarkesian has stated:

"I am...convinced that the problems facing the military profession are more philosophical and political than organizational or administrative."²⁵²

His concluding chapter, of which this passage is a part, emphasizes the argument that tinkering with organization and force structure, without altering the philosophical foundations

²⁵⁰ Clausewitz discusses this in the context of "Critical Analysis." On War, II:5. See also Summers On Strategy, Chapter 8, pp. 83-92.

²⁵¹ Lippmann, The Public Philosophy, p. 89.

²⁵² Beyond the Battlefield: The New Military Professionalism (New York: Pergamon Press, 1981), p. 266.

of the officer corps, amounts to "...putting old wine into new bottles--nothing really changes."²⁵³ A review of the literature of strategy reveals one single common thread, one that is emphasized repeatedly, and just as often forgotten: the moral factors in war dominate. These are the factors which reform must address if it is to succeed, and these are the factors that planners must understand:

"What battles have in common is human: the behavior of men struggling to reconcile their instinct for self-preservation, their sense of honour and the achievement of some aim over which other men are ready to kill them. The study of battle is therefore always a study of fear and usually of courage; always of leadership, usually of obedience;... always of uncertainty and doubt, misinformation and misapprehension, usually also of faith and sometimes of vision; always of violence, sometimes also of cruelty, self-sacrifice, compassion..."²⁵⁴

This quote is no more than a restatement Clausewitz and Napoleon, and it has been echoed time and again since their era.

Reflecting both Keegan's conclusion and the theme of Sarkesian's critique, David Abshire, in the opening sentence of "The Leadership Debate" argues that:

"None of the challenges that face the United States in the 1980's and beyond is more serious than the decline of leadership throughout American society."²⁵⁵

²⁵³ Ibid., p. 268.

²⁵⁴ John Keegan, The Face of Battle (New York: The Viking Press, 1976), pp. 297-298.

²⁵⁵ "The Leadership Debate," The Washington Quarterly, Winter 1983, p. 29.

It is clear that one of the most pressing needs is to reform the training of officers, and to change their perspective from that of adherers to the status quo to leaders of change. While this adjustment must, in time, affect the whole of the officer corps, it is of the utmost urgency to begin now with the strategic planners who will develop the plans by which the military will march into the future.

In what direction must this change proceed? Basically there are two essential ingredients to the education of a strategic planner, both of which are presently lacking. The first is a firm foundation in philosophy. That this field of study has long been regarded as superfluous by the action-minded and technically-oriented military is no reason that it should continue to be so. The value of this type of background lies not in the realm of application of the principles learned, but more in the development of a firm foundation upon which an officer, planner, or commander, can base his decisions. While a lack of philosophical foundation may cause no serious problems in a time of "business-as-usual," it can precipitate collapse, as Admiral Stockdale argues, in time of crisis. He goes on to argue that philosophy, by fostering integrity, can "...give a person something to rely on when perspective seems to blur, when rules and principles seem to waver, and when faced with a hard choice of right and wrong."²⁵⁶

²⁵⁶Stockdale, "Educating Leaders," pp. 50-51.

Clausewitz, in his chapter on military genius in war, provides a glimpse of the pressures the combat leader must withstand, pressures that exist today as well as in his time, and that pertains equally to land, sea and air warfare:

"It is the impact of the ebbing of moral and physical strength, of the heart-rending spectacle of the dead and wounded, that the commander has to withstand-- first in himself, and then in all those who, directly or indirectly, have entrusted him with their thoughts and feelings, hopes and fears. As each man's strength gives out, as it no longer responds to his will, *the inertia of the whole gradually comes to rest on the commander's will alone.* The ardor of his spirit must rekindle the flame of purpose in all others; his inward fire must revive their hope."²⁵⁷ (Emphasis added)

Where in the training of an engineer, manager, or analyst, is there found the necessary background to support such an awesome responsibility? It is not. Only with a firm foundation in philosophy and in the ideals of his nation can an officer hope to meet the challenge set for him. The strategic planner, though he may not be the commander, must understand these pressures if he is to provide the commander with appropriate options; therefore he too must have a firm foundation in philosophy.

The main impediment to such education is the rapid pace of officer assignment patterns today. One proceeds from

²⁵⁷ On War, I:3:104. Also, for a classic analysis of the individual in battle, especially junior officers, see John Keegan, The Face of Battle, particularly Chapter 5.

school to field (or sea), the schools preparing for the field. Nowhere does one gain the respite necessary for the deep contemplation required to assimilate the principles of philosophy. Indeed, as John Collins suggests, those schools which provide a basic foundation (in mid-career), adhere to the "Scattergun" approach:

"Military strategy courses in the National War College core curriculum during the period 1960-1981 averaged 20 topics in 17 duty days. Some of the topics were worth a semester or more. That approach allows minimum opportunity to study the strengths and weaknesses of present concepts, much less compare them with options."²⁵⁸

Or as Bernard Brodie argues:

"...it has to be added that in the training of the modern officer such study and rumination are not allowed for either at the staff college level or the war college."²⁵⁹

Philosophy requires contemplation and study, it cannot be batch fed. Likewise, the second basic area of study also requires time. History, according to Stockdale, "...gives perspective to the problems of the present and drives home the point that there is really very little new under the sun."²⁶⁰ In the field of military art, such a study of history, especially military history, provides the only substitute for combat experience; experience which is becoming increasingly costly and rare today. For confirmation of the

²⁵⁸ John Collins, Defense Planning, p. 142.

²⁵⁹ War and Politics, p. 448.

²⁶⁰ "Educating Leaders," p. 50.

value of the study of history to an army, one need only refer to the superb performance of the relatively inexperienced Prussian army against the Austrians at the battle of Sadowa in 1866.²⁶¹

Without a study of history, the commander and the planner are forced to rely on their own narrow experience in the formulation of plans. In that one's own experience seldom exceeds thirty years and is subject to select recall, it is history that must form the core of the planner's tools. Through it he may see how plans have worked and how they have failed in the past; he can come to understand the true nature of friction in war, and the overriding concern he must have for simplicity. Perhaps of greatest import, the study of history will lend to the planner a sense of confidence in his decisions, which will enable him to withstand counter opinions as well as the vicissitudes of battle.

"If we are to regain some of the uncertainties of our life, we must understand and incorporate the most universal and worthy ideas of the past into our present existence."²⁶²

Without such training, the planner is likely to base his conclusions on some criterion other than friction or the

²⁶¹"The superiority of the Prussian army in the [eighteen-] sixties was made possible only by its organization, by its peacetime training, and by the theoretical study of war." Hajo Holborn, "Moltke and Schlieffen: The Prussian-German School," in Makers of Modern Strategy, ed. E.M. Earle, p. 172.

²⁶²Rickover, "Thoughts on Man's Purpose in Life," p. 72.

nature of war. This criterion can take the form of economic efficiency or probabilities of success. These, however, do not conform to the nature of conflict, and therefore will be unlikely to succeed, except in the most favorable of circumstances.²⁶³

Thus, the education of commanders and planners alike must be based on philosophy and history, not just in passing, but in great depth. For only in this way can the officer learn the art of war, and only by learning the art of war can he hope to prevail in the fluid and fast paced environment of today. Such training provides the officer with the tools necessary to *think*, not just to *know*; and these are the tools essential to the concept of strategy as a method of thought. As Rodger argues in his indictment of the Royal Navy of the 19th Century:

"The gap in their experience made it all the more important that they should have been trained to think clearly....[However], no education was given which tended to broaden the mind or develop the powers of informed judgment....If naval officers had been trained not only to know, but to think, they might have realized that the circumstances in which they had grown up, far from being inevitable and immutable, were the accidental consequences of circumstances which were, by the 1830s, already passing away....As it was, they were knowledgeable and enthusiastic proponents of technical change and material development, who had lost sight of the objects for which the Navy existed; *highly trained, and wholly uneducated.*"²⁶⁴ (Emphasis added)

²⁶³Possony and Pournelle, Strategy of Technology, p. 88.

²⁶⁴N.A.M. Rodger, "British Naval Thought and Naval Policy, 1820-1890: Strategic Thought in an Era of Technological Change," in New Aspects of Naval History, ed. Craig L. Symonds (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1981), pp. 148-149.

The British obsession with technology stemmed from the combination of a century of naval warfare that pitted the mighty Royal Navy against the tribes of Africa and the pirates of the South China Sea, and the rapid pace of technological change in that period. From the fall of Napoleon to the First World War, no serious *naval* threat was faced.

The U.S. Navy is in much the same situation today, not having fought a major naval force in battle since 1945. The uses of the fleet since World War II have been markedly similar to those of the Royal Navy in the 19th Century. The emphasis on technology and training is also similar. Without a strategy to give perspective to this recent trend, the military thus risks falling into the same trap that the British did. To guard against this, to maintain a "fighting edge," requires a study of the art of war based on philosophy and history. In the words of Marshal Maurice de Saxe:

"...very few men occupy themselves with the higher problems of war. They pass their lives drilling troops and believe that this is the only branch of the military act. When they arrive at the command of armies they are totally ignorant, and, in default of knowing what should be done, they do what they know."²⁶⁵

3. Assignment Policies

Training however, is only half the problem with personnel. The other half lies with assignment policies.

²⁶⁵ "My Reveries Upon the Art of War," (1757), in Roots of Strategy, ed. Brig. Gen. Thomas R. Phillips, USA (Harrisburg, Pa.: The Military Service Publishing Co., 1940), pp. 296-297.

Officers are rotated too fast in the interest of developing well rounded products.²⁶⁶ With such transience, the only stability is to be found in organizations. Therefore, officers receive a well-rounded, but superficial education, which fits the concept of managers whose purpose is to fill a slot and maintain the organization for the short duration of their tenure.²⁶⁷ Under these conditions, initiative, innovation, and development become stifled. Instead, conformist and not-rocking-the-boat attitudes prevail.

In order to pursue a concept of strategy as a method of thought, the qualities necessary for flexibility and rapid response must be fostered. These qualities include:

"...imagination, boldness, inventiveness, ability to see the options inherent in a battlefield situation, willingness to take high risks, and eagerness to accept responsibility."²⁶⁸

Such qualities are not inherited, and it is too risky to rely on fate in the hope that, as in the past, officers who have them will "bubble up" to the top. Instead, we must instill them now, not just in training, but also in experience. According to General Donn Starry, USA, one of the major

²⁶⁶Winnefeld, "The Quality of the Officer Corps," p. 38.

²⁶⁷Abraham Zaleznik, "The Leadership Gap," The Washington Quarterly, Winter 1983, p. 36.

²⁶⁸William Lind, "Why the German Example," Marine Corps Gazette, June 1982, p. 61.

reasons for German tactical proficiency and adaptability in World War II was their "...enormously demanding and rigorous officer selection and training system."²⁶⁹

What sort of career path is necessary to cultivate such qualities? In answer, the need, at least in the realm of strategic planning, is for a dedicated group of planners. This is not to suggest that we adopt the system of the German General Staff, for it had its defects, most notably in the area of its ability to adapt to a changing social environment and its affect on warfare.²⁷⁰ Instead, officers are needed who have been trained in the art of war, in history and in philosophy. These individuals will then proceed to gain experience in the field as every junior does now. The difference is that they will serve in much more widely differing positions. The longer tours would be as planners, while "field" tours would be shorter. This would keep planners in touch with the fleet, while at the same time emphasizing their planning experience.

The primary duty of such officers would be strategic planning, both long range and operational. By thus providing them with experience in all fields of military operations, and by indoctrinating them into the complexities of military art,

²⁶⁹"To Change an Army," Military Review, March 1983, p. 22.

²⁷⁰See Hans Speier, "Ludendorff: The German Concept of Total War," in Makers of Modern Strategy, ed. E.M. Earle, p. 313.

these officers will be capable of responding to the ever-changing international environment rapidly, and subsequently, will reduce the need for contingency plans and bulky staffs. By a continuous rotation from field to staff, they will keep in touch with the realities of operations and will be afforded the opportunity to witness at first hand the consequences of their plans. By serving longer tours, perhaps three to four years each as planners, they will be in a position to follow up their plans, to ensure their proper implementation, and to see the mistakes they contain. By thus institutionalizing strategic planning, proper attention will be given to long range plans and the development of goals and objectives. In addition, if the products and opinions of systems analysts, engineers, operators and scientists are incorporated into the planning staffs, there will be greater assurance that decisions are made with the full advice of these various fields. Strategic planners, however, must be the final arbiters, for their opinions are based on the environment of international relations, and will thus correspond to the laws of nature as a whole, rather than of the narrower perspectives of economics or science. Finally, by making these officers dedicated planners, a corporate knowledge is developed that at last permits an accumulation of corporate knowledge, fosters an ability to learn from past mistakes, and hence, generates continuous improvement.

John Collins best captures the nature of such career paths in his description of the Prussian General Staff:

"The stated intent was to institutionalize strategic excellence. Supervisors hand-picked officers, steeped them in professional skills, kept the most competent, and orchestrated their efforts. The resultant apparatus reduced needs to depend on one man for success in bartering or battle, no matter how brilliant he might be."²⁷¹

That the system failed in war was due more to the lack of dissent and political mistakes. Furthermore, because the system was used by the Germans for aggression in several wars does not diminish the value of it in producing strategists and planners of high quality. As was illustrated in the historical review of planning in Chapter IV, America has in general been faced with increasingly serious and complex threats over its history. The gradual development of a professional military officer corps from the "man of affairs" concept in the early 19th Century through the reforms of the early 20th, to the National Security Act of 1947 represents a continuing evolution of American defense doctrine. As the nation's role in world affairs has increased, so too has the complexity and sophistication of the defense establishment. The creation of the Secretary of Defense in 1947, as weak a position as it was, could not have been accomplished a century earlier.

²⁷¹U.S. Defense Planning, pp. 54-55.

As the evolution of war has blurred the distinction between land and naval forces, the defense establishment has developed toward greater cross-service cooperation. That trend must continue. With a decreasing relative power, America's margin for error also shrinks, requiring greater efficiency and coordination of effort. Hence, while a dedicated group of planners may not have been necessary (and certainly not feasible) in 1947, such a need exists today.

History is a chronicle of evolution. The concepts articulated in this paper must be understood and applied if this is to be mastered. The point in America's evolution has been reached when this is both necessary and possible. In the military field, such a transition is possible without endangering American democracy, and without endangering civilian control. In fact, officers trained heavily in philosophy and history, and thus commanding a clear understanding of American culture and the military need to subordinate strategy to policy, are likely to understand the importance of civilian control better than those trained primarily in technical subjects. As Huntington argues, true civilian control of the military requires a truly professional officer corps.²⁷²

²⁷²Soldier and State, p. 85. On civil-military relations, see also Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier (New York: The Free Press, 1960). For an excellent review of the theory of civil-military relations and some new concepts as well, see Sam C. Sarkesian, Beyond the Battlefield.

4. Organization

The intention here is not to delve into the organization which the above recommendations suggest, however, some discussion is necessary. In order to foster the environment conducive to the formulation of effective and efficient plans, it is essential to develop a greater centralization in the chain of command, but at the same time, to delegate authority to a greater extent than is done currently. There is also a need to further centralize the planning function, not just in the military, but in the government as a whole.

In the military field, it is essential to place a senior officer, such as the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, directly in the chain of command, subordinate to the Secretary of Defense.²⁷³ In such a position, he would be able to coordinate the efforts of the various unified commands to achieve the aims of policy and national strategy. This would shift the balance between maintenance and operations in the direction of operations, a necessary recognized by several writers including General David C. Jones and Archie D. Barrett.²⁷⁴ To quote from General Jones:

²⁷³Recently (April 1983) such a recommendation was contained in the reorganization plan submitted to Congress by the Secretary of Defense. See Deborah M. Kyle, "DoD's JCS Reorganization Plan," Armed Forces Journal International, May 1983, p. 14.

²⁷⁴Jones, "What's Wrong With Our Defense Establishment," p. 81; and Archie D. Barrett, "Department of Defense Organization: Planning for Planning," p. 113.

"So long as the leadership of the operational side remains within the control of the four services, individual service interests--which are oriented to independent capabilities--will continue to dominate the military advice offered to the Secretary of Defense."²⁷⁵

Centralization of the chain of command would thus allow for truly combined arms warfare.

The Joint Staff, transfigured by the changes in training and assignment recommended above, would provide the Chairman with the necessary planning support, and at the same time, because of an operational vice maintenance perspective, would tend more toward the long range planning necessary for successful operations. It must be emphasized that until changes are first made in the nature of the officers assigned to the Joint Staff, a change in the organization will have little effect. The planners will have little previous knowledge of planning, will be there too short a period of time, and will be too dependent on their parent services to provide for the sound joint planning that is essential if the United States is to meet its obligations.

Coincident with restructuring of the chain of command, the planning function must be centralized. This means that the individual service staffs and the field staffs must in some way be brought under the direction of the Joint Staff.²⁷⁶

²⁷⁵"What's Wrong With Our Defense Establishment," p. 81.

²⁷⁶Col. Hanne, proposes two separate staffs, an Armed Forces staff charged with short-term operational planning and directly subordinate to the President, and a Defense Staff,

The consequences of this shift will be truly subordinate the services to the national interest, or at least to the interests of the Defense Department as a whole. Such an organization is necessary if the link between national strategy, operational strategy and tactics is to be formed. For example, without this subordination, the services are free to pursue their own procurement functions irrespective of the dictates of strategy. Such autonomy gives rise to inflated budget requests, not because the services intentionally inflate their estimates, but because, lacking firm guidance from above, they must assume that they must be prepared to do everything within their area of responsibility in the defense of the country.²⁷⁷

5. Impact of Recommendations

Four requirements were listed above as criteria for reform. A review of them will draw together the preceding recommendations and will demonstrate that if implemented, the changes will satisfy the criteria. The first requirement was

headed by the Secretary of Defense and tasked with long range procurement planning. The current service staffs would come under the Defense Staff. Although it runs the risk of excessively separating procurement and operation, this concept represents a marked improvement over the current system. "An Armed Forces Staff," pp. 59-63.

²⁷⁷ Other reasons also exist, one of the more realistic ones being the tendency to ask for more than you feel you need, knowing full well it will be cut. This practice, from personal experience, begins at the very lowest levels. A snowball effect is thus created. See Possony and Pournelle, Strategy of Technology, pp. 77-78.

to improve long and short range planning. By developing a dedicated group of properly trained planners, by centralizing, to an extent, the planning process, and by making slight adjustments in the organization, the quality of planning as well as its flexibility, perspective, timeliness and efficiency also improve; and thus, the first requirement is met.

The second requirement was to foster initiative, which grows out of an organization that places a higher emphasis on the individual leader than on the organization. Initiative requires longer tenures in each job to allow the member to gain knowledge of it and to come to identify with it, seeking not just to support the organizational requirements, but also to improve the system. It is the special nature of the leader that, if allowed to flourish, will go far in "...eliciting a response from followers in order to extend their energies and attitudes toward larger goals and values."²⁷⁸ It is hoped that through more rigorous training, specialization and longer tours, an environment conducive to the growth of these qualities will develop.

The third requirement was to instill an improved capacity for self-criticism. Such a capacity cannot rely on the current system to develop. Officers who are rewarded more for "zero defects" than for putting themselves on report, cannot be expected, honesty aside, to follow the latter

²⁷⁸Zaleznik, "The Leadership Gap," p. 37.

course.²⁷⁹ Again, the improved training recommended above and the encouragement of initiative should go far to meet this requirement. Officers who have the moral and philosophical background on which to base their actions, who have the historical perspective to realize the danger of reporting falsely or in a distorted manner, and who are rewarded for improvements, not zero defects will develop the capability to self-criticize.

An additional benefit to increased frankness in introspection, is that the requirements for reporting are likely to diminish, mainly because officers will have a much higher degree of trust for their subordinates. The supreme example, and the goal to strive for, is the German self-criticism after the Poland invasion of 1939. The following, rather lengthy quote from an article by Williamson Murray portrays this capacity:

"In every sense this campaign was an outstanding operational success....Yet the OKH [German army high command] judged the operational success as insufficient and inadequate. In fact, the after-action reports...of the German army for the whole period of 1938-1940 reflected a very different tone than the author's experience in the U.S. Air Force in the 1960s. In the latter case, reports on combat capabilities and performance consistently became more and more optimistic, the higher the headquarters. The opposite was the case with the German after-action reports: The higher the headquarters, the more demanding and dissatisfied were commanders with operational performance. Moreover, the entire German system during this period seems to have involved a

²⁷⁹Taylor, "Leading the Army," p. 43.

greater degree of trust and honesty between the levels of command. German officers in command positions were not afraid to express their belief that their units were deficient when circumstances justified such comments....*This willingness to be self-critical was one of the major factors that enabled the German army to perform at such a high level throughout World War II....*There appears to have been little fear on the part of German commanders that critical comments and evaluations of their units' performance would be unwelcomed by superiors."²⁸⁰ (Emphasis added)

Self-criticism is the key to the continual evolution and growth of an organization. If the members of that organization fear that their honest criticism will be detrimental to their own careers, then either by intentional falsification, or more probably by omission, their reports will not be true. Once this state of affairs develops within an organization, information flow is effectively shut off. Without this, upper level commanders and the planners they employ loose touch with the forces they purport to control. The danger of this, severe though it is during peacetime, becomes crucial, and potentially decisive in war. The measures suggested above can be of use in alleviating such a situation.

The final requirement was to improve public support for defense. While military officers and most well informed civilians recognize the need for defenses, much of the public does not. The analogy of not being able to see over the ramparts which surround them, aptly describes the situation.

²⁸⁰"The German Response to Victory in Poland," Armed Forces and Society, Winter 1981, pp. 286-287, 289.

In order to improve the support of this public, the military and the government as a whole must first demonstrate to them that the forces that the country has are the most efficient and effective their money can buy. While this may never be completely possible, the continuous bombardment of the people with media coverage of cost overruns and leaks ensures that it probably never will. If, however, the recommendations suggested in this paper are implemented, not only will the military be able to utilize resources more efficiently (the equivalent of "leaner and meaner" forces), but it will be able to "sell" itself much more convincingly. The main reason for this will be the all too clear link between the national values, which the people hold dear, and the means at hand. In short, the people will begin to get the impression that the military, and hopefully the government as a whole, knows its business.

B. SOME UNANSWERED QUESTIONS

The reforms proposed above address the military field. They are not specific, being instead conceptual in nature. They are also not exhaustive. Other reforms are necessary, reforms in other parts of the government and, though beyond the capability of the law, reforms in the way Americans view their role in the world and in history. The ideas developed in this work form the conceptual framework for these reforms, without prescribing their content. Even so, some questions

have surfaced as a result of this effort; questions which remain to be studied and to which there may in fact be no answers.

First, what will the nature of the system that develops out of this framework, and how will it be implemented? A key point here is that this paper has developed the point of view from which the proper system is to be designed. It has not attempted to design that system. Much less has the thesis addressed reform of the government writ large. Civilian, indeed, popular control of the reins of power remains one of the key issues, specifically in military reform, but also in that of the government.²⁸¹

The issue of implementation begs some additional questions: What will be the nature and duration of a transition period? What will be the impetus for reform; internal military initiatives, Congressional drives, or external trauma, such as a military defeat? Will military officers trained in management and engineering even be able to understand the need for change and the direction it must take? And, finally, how, if at all, will a consensus about the nature of change be formulated?

The next question delves further into the idea of American values. How will this system, especially if implemented

²⁸¹General Vessey, in a recent interview, stated that one criterion for deciding on any reorganization would be the maintenance of civilian control. "An Exclusive AFJ Interview With General John W. Vessey, Jr., Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff," p. 51.

throughout the government as a whole, impact traditional American ideals? If it will result in, or require, a significant alteration in them, should it be rejected; or is our situation in the world serious enough to warrant some changes? Is the following statement by Godfrey Hodgson valid, or dangerous?:

"To adjust to a future of limited, though magnificent, resources will demand a historic shift in American values."²⁸²

In fact one could even go so far as to ask, as Walter Lippmann did in the mid-1950s, whether or not our people are being indoctrinated into those values; and whether or not, because of this, they have the wherewithall to resist the charm of any demagogue that may care to excite their passion?²⁸³

Turning to more specific questions, how will the budgetary process need to be changed if at all? It can be argued that with the increased proficiency of military planners, a mutual trust and respect would gradually develop between the Defense Department and Congress. Again, however, the nature of the transition phase is beyond this study. In fact, one must ask, how can the budgetary process remain as it is when the operational level of strategy is to be responsible for the development of hardware, and should have the freedom of action

²⁸²Godfrey Hodgson, America in Our Time (New York: Doubleday, 1976), p. 498.

²⁸³Public Philosophy, p. 75. See also Paul A.C. Koistinen, The Military-Industrial Complex, p. 18.

necessary for rapid response and adaptability in the selection of equipment?²⁸⁴

The final major question which this study has prompted is the old issue of security versus liberty. For the major part of American history, the issue was ignored, security being taken for granted.²⁸⁵ Indeed, it was the British who protected American trade and who planned its strategy; the United States was merely the tool. The two world wars of this century destroyed the power of this protector and thrust America into the role of world leader, a role for which it was ill prepared. The initial wave of confidence borne of victory in World War II, was shown to be "...in vital respects a fool's paradise" by the events of the 1960s. Those events, for all their value in pointing out to America that it could not simply buy peace and prosperity or enforce it with military power, failed to generate an answer to the question of the balance between security and the Bill of Rights.²⁸⁸ Will

²⁸⁴Possony and Pournelle argue that, in the technological war, maneuver is accomplished with industries and technology. Strategy of Technology, pp. 4-8. As a result, some form of increased freedom of action is required if operational strategy is to have the requisite flexibility to deal with Soviet technological advances.

²⁸⁵Herbert J. Storing, What the Anti-Federalists Were For (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981), p. 37.

²⁸⁶See Colin Gray, "National Style in Strategy," p. 28.

²⁸⁷Hodgson, America in Our Time, p. 16.

²⁸⁸Henry Steele Commager, The Defeat of America, p. 161.

the system proposed here, by providing strong links between national values and strategy and the international environment answer this question? Will the answer allow America to remain America? If not, what options remain?

These then are some of the questions which this study has fostered. They deal not so much with the substance of the paper, as with its implications. The goal of any system of defense must be to provide for the long term survival of the nation; long enough term so as to allow the nation to play a part in the formulation of the world state. Thus, like the Romans:

"The elusive goal of strategic statecraft [is] to provide security for the civilization without prejudicing the vitality of its economic base and without compromising the stability of an evolving political order."²⁸⁹

America will never be able to do this until its policy and strategy is firmly subordinated and attuned to the national values; and this cannot be done without further study of the substance and implications of this thesis.

C. CONCLUDING REMARKS

The study of doctrine throughout history yields a composite of its various forms. Knowing these forms allows the development of a general concept of strategic doctrine. This is

²⁸⁹ Luttwak, The Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire, p. 1.

strategy; a philosophy of doctrine. It is this that Clausewitz accomplished in *On War*, an accomplishment that he alone has achieved. This is also what is meant by Beaufre when he argues that strategy must be a method of thought, not a single defined doctrine. Such a concept allows the strategist to see national security critically and as a whole, and to therefore develop plans that fit the circumstances rather than fitting circumstances to the plan. It is this which allows a nation to face defeat "...without succumbing to emotional paralysis and withdrawal, and without lashing out at scapegoats or inventing escapist solutions."²⁹¹

In closing the paper, three broad conclusions are offered. First, as a nation, and as a military, America must change the way it does business. Reform is essential. The situation has evolved to the point where the United States can no longer have inexperienced and untrained personnel in the positions that will determine capabilities for years to come. The nature of the American must be changed, for he tends to ignore the past as irrelevant and the future as too uncertain, thereby living only for the present.²⁹² The choice is there, either America changes from within, or someone, either foreign or domestic, will produce the traumatic event that will do it for us. The former course is preferable.

²⁹¹Stockdale, "Educating Leaders," p. 52.

²⁹²Michael Mandelbaum, "The Bomb, Dread, and Eternity," International Security, Fall 1980, p. 4.

In order to reform, the course which such a reform is to follow must be laid. This leads to the second conclusion: Strategy is essential. Lacking it forces a nation to do things as it has in the past out of habit, and condemns it to reacting to events as they occur. If the United States is to be able in any way to shape the nature of the future in a manner conducive to its own purposes, if Americans are to be able to understand that which is happening around them and put it into perspective, and if the country is to be able in the near and distant future to respond to the fluid nature of the international environment, then it must develop strategy. As General Beaufre writes in the final paragraph to *An Introduction to Strategy*:

"It is this that I have tried to demonstrate, for I am convinced that in strategy, as in all human affairs, it is ideas which must be the dominant and the guiding force. But that brings us into the realm of philosophy."²⁹³

And indeed it is to philosophy that the final conclusion is addressed. The American nation, and the military in particular, have never had much need of a philosophy. Why should it when the horizon promised nothing but prosperity and growth, and no clouds of war cluttered the sky? Times have changed, however. The United States is now supposedly the "leader" of the Free World. But, how can a nation be so presumptuous as to assume such a role without some overall guiding philosophy? Worse yet, how can the nation be so audacious to believe that

²⁹³ Introduction to Strategy, p. 138.

the world would welcome its dominance? And how could it become convinced that the world would be so congenial to America's desire to purchase the future it only dimly perceived? America must somehow develop or adopt an overriding philosophy, one which can bond its people to an ideal, one which can give the nation perspective, and one which can serve as a torch, guiding the nation into the future. Philosophy is essential if America is to sustain the will to survive, and if it is to know the direction the nation must follow.

"But strategy is no more than a means to an end. It is for policy to lay down the aims to be achieved by strategy, and policy is governed basically by the philosophy which we wish to see prevail. The destiny of the human race depends upon the philosophy which it chooses and upon the strategy by which it tries to ensure that that philosophy shall prevail."²⁹⁴

America is a successful land. When challenged, it rises to the occasion. It is this, as Adm. Rickover suggested, which should engender hope that the challenge that lies before the nation will be met. The challenge is there; America may have finally come to see it; now is the time to meet it. The idea of strategy as a method of thought, a philosophy of doctrine is designed to provide the framework to accomplish this. In short, reform has no direction without strategy, and strategy has no purpose without philosophy.

²⁹⁴Beaufre, Introduction to Strategy, p. 50.

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
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