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



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

THESIS

SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY
TOWARDS GREECE AND TURKEY:
CONTRAST WITHIN COHERENCE

by

Albert Clinton Myers

June, 1982

Thesis Advisor: David S. Yost

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SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE (When Data Entered)

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE		READ INSTRUCTIONS BEFORE COMPLETING FORM
1. REPORT NUMBER	2. GOVT ACCESSION NO. AD-A122 302	3. RECIPIENT'S CATALOG NUMBER
4. TITLE (and Subtitle) Soviet Foreign Policy Towards Greece and Turkey: Contrast Within Coherence		5. TYPE OF REPORT & PERIOD COVERED Master's Thesis June, 1982
		6. PERFORMING ORG. REPORT NUMBER
7. AUTHOR(s) Albert Clinton Myers		8. CONTRACT OR GRANT NUMBER(s)
9. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME AND ADDRESS Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, California 93940		10. PROGRAM ELEMENT, PROJECT, TASK AREA & WORK UNIT NUMBERS
11. CONTROLLING OFFICE NAME AND ADDRESS Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, California 93940		12. REPORT DATE June, 1982
		13. NUMBER OF PAGES 131
14. MONITORING AGENCY NAME & ADDRESS(if different from Controlling Office)		15. SECURITY CLASS. (of this report) Unclassified
		15a. DECLASSIFICATION/DOWNGRADING SCHEDULE

16. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of this Report)

Approved for public release; distribution unlimited

17. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of the abstract entered in Block 20, if different from Report)

18. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES

19. KEY WORDS (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number)

Soviet foreign policy towards Greece and Turkey; Soviet attempt to impair Greek/Turkish ties to NATO and U.S.; Key political, economic, propagandistic events in Soviet-Greek and Soviet-Turkish post-war relations.

20. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number)

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S/N 0102-014-6601

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE (When Data Entered)

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Soviet Foreign Policy Towards Greece and Turkey:

Contrast Within Coherence

by

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Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS IN NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

from the

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL

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ABSTRACT

This thesis analyzes the evolution of post-1945 Soviet foreign policy towards Greece and Turkey. The Soviet Union has sought to impair and eliminate Greek and Turkish security ties to NATO and to the United States. Key political, diplomatic, economic, and propagandistic events in Soviet-Greek and Soviet-Turkish relations suggest patterns of Soviet objectives and successes in each country.

The Soviet Union has pursued unobtrusive approaches towards Greece, while making more concerted efforts through diplomatic, economic, and perhaps clandestine means to increase Soviet influence in Turkey. In 1978-1979, Turkey's foreign policy seemed to be moderately influenced by Soviet preferences, while a new situation has existed since 1980. The anti-American orientation of Andreas Papandreou's government may offer unprecedented opportunities to Soviet diplomacy in Greece. U.S. blunders made on an ad hoc short-term basis, with respect to the national sensitivities of both countries have facilitated the successes of Soviet foreign policy. The Greek and Turkish cases suggest that the Soviets have profited from U.S. errors in their implementation of a long-term and consistent policy to reduce U.S. influence in Western Europe.

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I. INTRODUCTION

For too many Western observers, Greece and Turkey are two secondary, obscure and distant members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). When they are mentioned in the context of West European political trends, it is almost invariably in light of the complex issues which have so often given rise to acute tension between Athens and Ankara. With the exception of a handful of West European and American analysts, little attention has focused until recently on the geopolitical importance of Greece and Turkey to NATO and the West.

Explanations of this state of affairs are obvious. First, both Greece and Turkey have been and remain far less developed industrially than almost all of their Western allies with the possible exception of Portugal. That perception of poverty, highlighted by the quest of thousands of Greeks and Turks for work in wealthier countries of Western Europe, lends an aura of "differentness" to these two Balkan states. Second, Greece and Turkey have many cultural predispositions and affinities for the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East which are quite distinct from the predominant West European milieu Though many Greeks would not associate themselves with this observation, it is fair to note that in a great number of respects their

country has more in common with Turkey than with most of the Central and Northern countries of Western Europe. Third, Greece and Turkey are physically separated from the rest of Western Europe by a tier of socialist states, including Bulgaria, Albania, and Yugoslavia. Somewhat paradoxically, the essential remoteness of Greece and Turkey from the European central regions, while contributing to their isolation from the European mainstream, has enhanced the relevance of their continued membership in the Western alliance. The importance of Greece and Turkey to NATO in large measure rests upon the almost transparently obvious strategic considerations which flow from their pivotal geographic locations, from a distinctive set of Greek and Turkish national characteristics (including the documented prowess of their soldiers in battle), and from the existerce of several vital NATO and allied bases in both countries.

The unsettling events in Southwest Asia during the past three years have awakened an uneasy sense in NATO circles of the palpable vulnerability of their two Eastern-most allies to Soviet military duress. Yet the implications of Soviet foreign policy towards Greece and Turkey may in the long run prove more damaging to the interests of the Alliance. For that policy is an unremitting and persistent process. In contrast, the imposing military strength of the USSR, though it must continue to exact wary consideration, may never be operationally employed against the West.

It is, then, the hypothesis of this thesis that if Soviet foreign policy towards both these Balkan states should succeed, these states will no longer be effectively linked to NATO and to the United States. Soviet post-1945 diplomatic, political, propagandistic, and economic overtures to Greece and Turkey will be analyzed in an effort to sift through the most likely indicators of a Soviet program to permanently enfeeble Athens' and Ankara's ties to the West.

Such an objective would seem fitting from Moscow's perspective. It would enhance the Soviets' curious sense of "security," which is firmly regulated by the proposition that Soviet security is attained at the expense of everyone's else, and particularly at the expense of those nations near its frontiers or its surrogates. Further, if and when detached from the NATO sphere, it would not be unreasonable to expect Greece and Turkey to gradually become increasingly responsive to Soviet preferences for the shape of their foreign and domestic policies, and more accomodating to Soviet interests in trade exchanges and military cooperation. Such an arrangement could essentially conform to Moscow's relations with its Warsaw Pact allies, without the often vexing responsibilities occasioned by those more formal links.

Recent expressions of Soviet satisfaction with trends in European rela[illegible]s suggest hopes for a new European "arrangement" to be shaped, if not regulated, by Moscow:

> It is thanks to the Soviet Union and its Leninist foreign policy that a whole range of vital issues, including European relations, have found an equitable solution. It was the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries that initiated the policy of détente, which considerably improved the political climate in the world. Their practical actions have provided added proof to the whole world that socialism and peace are inseparable and that the socialist states are a bulwark of peace and international security . . .
>
> The results of those efforts are vast and tangible. The conclusion of a series of treaties between the socialist and capitalist states and the development of mutually beneficial cooperation among them, as well as the convocation of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and its successful conclusion have extended international détente. [Ref. 1: pp. 6]

The kind of "arrangement" Moscow evidently has in mind for Europe is also being somewhat elliptically conveyed in Soviet scholarly and analytical literature:

> The new style of international relations that have taken shape and are developing among the socialist countries provide a convincing model of relations among nations and represent a major factor in influencing the development of the present-day world. [Ref. 2: pp.7]

Whether the foregoing objectives can be judged to have shaped Soviet foreign policy towards Greece and Turkey remains to be demonstrated conclusively. This study includes two individual, but somewhat interrelated case studies: Chapter two studies Soviet foreign policy towards Greece since World War II, and chapter three analyzes Soviet-Turkish relations during the same period. Chapter four compares and contrasts Soviet foreign policy towards Greece with that towards Turkey, and the final chapter presents conclusions.

II. SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS GREECE

The nature of Soviet foreign policy towards Greece ought first to be evaluated in terms of Soviet regional and global objectives, rather than in narrow bilateral terms. Greece is virtually unique as a Balkan power, as an Eastern Mediterranean littoral state, and as a member of NATO. Only Turkey shares those characteristics owing to her small outcropping into Europe on the Western shores of the Turkish straits, which accords her nominal Balkan status. Soviet strategies in the Balkans and in the Mediterranean have taken Greece into account with respect to her position in the hierarchy of Soviet objectives in each of those two areas. Such strategies have not been rigid, nor has their overt component - Soviet foreign policy - been unvarying towards Greece. Changes in Greece's relations with other countries - notably the United States and Turkey - and changes in the Greek domestic political milieu have influenced and mediated Soviet policies towards Greece.

The purpose of this chapter will be to review in turn the following themes considered central to an understanding of Soviet foreign policy towards Greece:

1. Greece's Role in Soviet Strategy in the Balkans;

2. The Place of Greece in Soviet Strategy in the Mediterranean;

3. The Development of Post-World War II Soviet Policies Towards Greece.

A. GREECE'S ROLE IN SOVIET STRATEGY IN THE BALKANS

The Balkans are conventionally defined as encompassing Romania, Yugoslavia, Albania, Greece, Bulgaria, and Turkey (to a lesser degree). Of the four socialist countries in the foregoing list, only one - Bulgaria - has been a steadfast and loyal ally of the Soviet Union. Romania, Yugoslavia and Albania have each posed challenges of various degrees to Moscow's self-proclaimed position as the leader of the socialist camp. Greece and Turkey, on the other hand, have been members of NATO since 1952, when they joined the alliance owing to strong feelings of insecurity occasioned by Joseph Stalin's maladroit post-World War II probing in the Eastern Mediterranean. In short, the Balkans has not been an area noted for Soviet successes. As John Campbell has noted:

> . . . While awe of Soviet military power remained undeniably strong, Soviet political influence in the area had reached an extraordinarily low point by the end of the 1960's . . . The consolidation of Soviet power in Central Europe, where the USSR had sizable military forces stationed in East Germany, Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia (after 1968), contrasted with the situation in the Balkans, where there were no Soviet forces at all. [Ref. 3: pp. 2]

The Soviet Union's reluctance to forcefully impose its will on the three errant socialist countries of the Balkans -

Romania, Yugoslavia, and Albania - probably is reflective of complex calculations of strategic costs and benefits. It should not be considered as demonstrating Soviet indifference and resignation in the face of socialist deviance. One must assume that the Soviets prefer deference over antagonism, and thus that it is a long-term Soviet goal to encourage the accession to leadership roles in those countries of individuals more willing to conform to Soviet policies and positions.[1] Similar hopes, tempered by an awareness of the attendant political difficulties, likely help shape Soviet objectives vis-à-vis non-socialist Greece and Turkey.

Greece and Turkey are the only Balkan states possessing any U.S. installations and military personnel. Greece shares borders with three socialist countries along her entire mountainous Northern frontier, and with her nominal NATO ally, Turkey, to the east. A relatively small country in both population and size, Greece's military vulnerability in the north - particularly along the frontier with Bulgaria - is presumably easily discernible by both NATO and Warsaw Pact contingency planners. The marked deterioration in Greek-Turkish relations which occurred in the 1970's because of the Cyprus conflict (and subsequent stalemate) and the disputes

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[1]For a similar assessment see John C. Campbell; "Soviet Strategy in the Balkans," Problems of Communism, XXIII, (July-August 1974), pp. 1-5.

in the Aegean, has likely caused some redeployment of Greek air and ground forces from the Northern part of the country to the Eastern part. One can assume that such a redeployment of Greek forces (if verifiable) would be so clearly in Soviet interests, that it would result in Soviet efforts to exploit and exacerbate the Greek-Turkish disputes. There is some evidence of Soviet exploitation of the disputes in terms of Soviet efforts to improve bilateral relations with those two countries during periods of significant anti-American sentiment, and/or heightened Greek-Turkish antagonism. Soviet attempts to exacerbate the disputes, though they cannot be ruled out, have not been demonstrated.

As a NATO outpost in the predominantly socialist Balkans, Greece no doubt figures in Soviet calculations regarding the global competition of the two superpowers. In military terms, Greece as presently allied would pose a threat (albeit of nominal magnitude) to the interests of the Soviet Union in the Balkans during a military conflict with the United States. The reverse side of the coin for the Soviets would be the significant political and military advantages they would gain were Greece's political orientation to shift to some form of hapless "neutrality" vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, or even to a quasi-alliance with the Warsaw Pact. Among other things, the small outcropping of Turkey into Europe would be bracketed by states likely to

be deferential to Soviet wishes, making a Warsaw Pact ground strike to gain the critical Turkish straits even more likely to succeed during time of war.

Greece, as a Balkan state of considerable geostrategic significance, therefore seems likely to command Soviet efforts to attenuate her commitment to NATO and to adopt policies deemed helpful to the interests of the Soviet Union.

B. THE PLACE OF GREECE IN SOVIET STRATEGY IN THE MEDITERRANEAN

Numerous Western observers have attempted to characterize Soviet designs, goals, and strategies in the Mediterranean, as well as in other regions. The more cogent discussions attempt to link Soviet actions in both the political and military sphere to stated (or discernible) Soviet goals and objectives.[2] A careful review of the literature does enable one to make several broad observations with respect to Soviet strategic conceptions of the Mediterranean:

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[2]See especially: Thomas W. Wolfe, "Soviet Military Capabilities and Intentions in Europe" in Soviet Strategy in Europe, Richard Pipes ed. (New York: Crane, Russak and Co., Inc.), 1976; John C. Campbell "Communist Strategies in the Mediterranean," Problems of Communism, XXVIII, (May-June 1979); John C. Campbell, "The Mediterranean Crisis," Foreign Affairs, LIII, 4, (July 1975); and Michael McGwire, Ken Booth, and John McDonnel eds., Soviet Naval Policy: Objectives and Constraints, (New York: Praeger), 1975, passim.

1. The Soviets perceive the Mediterranean as a critical water basin connecting Europe, the Balkans, the Middle East, and Northern Africa, which affords the dominant sea power the ability to project power in a diverse yet relatively small area of great political and economic importance.

2. The basic instrument of Soviet policy in the region resides in the Soviet Mediterranean "Eskadra" (Squadron) as the most visible, powerful, and credible Soviet presence. Soviet strategy in the Mediterranean, therefore, can to a significant degree be discussed in terms of regional Soviet naval policy. Curt Gasteyger has perceptively outlined the principal raison d'être of the Soviet Mediterranean "Eskadra":

> [its main purpose] lies in neutralizing U.S. naval predominance, in denying or preventing unilateral Western (U.S.) actions, and in securing permanent access to strategically important areas within, as well as outside, the region. Taken together, the missions increase the number of options for Soviet political and military actions. They provide the framework within which the projection of Soviet military power over long distances becomes feasible and possible. It would therefore seem that, besides its more regional objectives, Soviet naval policy in the Mediterranean has to be appraised more and more as part of its global mission and objectives. Such an appraisal lends additional importance to what the Soviet Union is doing in the Mediterranean and along its shores. [Ref. 4: pp. 185]

An intermediate, yet nevertheless important mission of the Soviet Mediterranean "Eskadra" in peacetime is that of showing the flag in harbors of nations deemed potentially tractable to Soviet suasion. Michael MccGwire has characterized that practice as promoting the general objective of "Increasing Soviet Prestige and Influence." [Ref. 5: pp. 179]

3. Despite improvements in the size and quality of the Soviet Mediterranean "Eskadra," the Soviets remain uneasy with the present correlation of forces between their forces and those of NATO (primarily the United States Sixth Fleet) in the Mediterranean. That uneasiness has translated into a reluctance to bring about circumstances thought to make likely a direct confrontation with the United States or with NATO. Nonetheless, despite the present asymmetry of the naval balance in the Mediterranean, Soviet planners are likely fully aware that the United States no longer can exercise unchallenged control of the sea. [Ref. 6: pp. 151]

4. The Soviets are acutely aware that the acquisition of permanent air and naval bases on the Mediterranean, if linked by dependable land routes through friendly (or "neutral") states to the Soviet Union, would dramatically improve the "Eskadra's" striking and defensive capabilities. NATO naval forces would then be confronted with a more flexible and accurately targetable cruise missile threat owing to the capabilities of Soviet land-based aircraft to provide downrange guidance commands to cruise missiles launched by ships of the Soviet "Eskadra." [Ref. 7: pp. 113-114] Dependable naval facilities (in contrast with Soviet experiences in Egypt and uncertainty over their Syrian/Libyan arrangements), would considerably ease the Soviet's troublesome logistics difficulties in the Mediterranean.

The purpose of the foregoing discussion has been to provide a strategic paradigm for understanding Greece's significance as a Mediterranean state, and to suggest that Soviet approaches to many Mediterranean nations may be as influenced by those nations' perceived potential for enhancing Soviet naval power, as by other strategic and political criteria.

Greece offers both tangible and potential benefits to the major power she is now allied with - the United States. First, Greece has some of the finest deep water anchorages and natural harbors found in the Mediterranean; for more than two decades the U.S. Sixth Fleet has used Souda Bay, Crete as a major anchorage and has made frequent port visits to Piraeus near Athens. Second, Greece's world-renowned shipyards can repair and rework almost any type of vessel - including warships. Third, her huge merchant marine of 49 million gross registered tons - many of whose vessels are manned by experienced Greek sailors and officers - could be assigned significant logistical tasks in support of NATO strategy during time of war. [Ref. 8] By way of comparison, Turkey with a population more than four times that of Greece has a merchant marine of but 1.3 million gross registered tons. [Ref. 8] Fifth, Greece's array of islands in the Northern and Eastern Aegean Sea commands the approaches to the Dardanelles and Bosphorous. One can imagine the unease Soviet naval strategists must feel when

hypothesizing sorties of the Soviet Black Sea Fleet, during time of war, through a hostile and constricted Aegean, even assuming it were first able to transit unimpeded through the Turkish straits. Finally, Greece possesses several vital airfields from which U.S. and allied tactical aircraft are capable of operating in added protection of the Sixth Fleet. [Ref. 6: pp. 151]

In short, Greece has many characteristics relating to her historic affinity with the Mediterranean which would clearly serve the aims of broader Soviet naval policy in the region, should a Greek political regime either remove Greece from the alliance with NATO and/or become affiliated with the Warsaw Pact.

C. THE DEVELOPMENT OF POST-WORLD WAR II SOVIET POLICIES TOWARDS GREECE

The preceding two sections have made a case for viewing Greece as a likely object of Soviet efforts to profoundly alter her present NATO loyalties by any reasonable means (according to Soviet standards) short of those which might provoke a confrontation with the United States. Evidence of Soviet overture is available, though not always as definitive as one might have envisaged. At first, one knowledgeable in the realm of Soviet-Turkish affairs might infer that the Soviets have been so preoccupied by their more visible exertions to wean Turkey away from the NATO alliance, that they have overlooked some transient opportunities to

increase their influence in Greece. An alternative explanation might be that their policies have been so subtle and sophisticated that rather than generating vigorous initiatives of their own, they have been content to "wait-out" Greece's series of domestic identity crises in anticipation of improved opportunities for success. The truth probably lies somewhere between those two poles. An integrated assessment of the Soviet role in Greece (and in Turkey) is provided by the CSIA European Security Working Group: "Moscow has been a residual factor, responding to and benefitting from a disarray which it has neither created nor been able to harness." [Ref. 6: pp. 152] While this observer would not associate himself with that characterization of Soviet policy towards Turkey, it does seem pertinent in the case of Greece.

Following a brief discussion of immediate Post-World War II Soviet policy towards Greece, key diplomatic, political, and economic developments in Soviet-Greek relations from the mid 1960's until the present will be analyzed.

1. Post War Antecedents

Soviet policy towards Greece under Stalin was to prove less subtle than that pursued by his successors. During World War II Stalin had accepted Churchill's claims that Greece should remain firmly in Great Britain's sphere of influence. [Ref. 9: pp. 429] His perceptions of the

Balkans probably included the realization that, for the present, Greece was beyond the scope of Soviet military power.

By late 1944, a civil war developed in Greece which was characterized by a strong Communist led insurgency in conflict with the British supported national government. Stalin kept a hands-off attitude towards the premature Greek Communists' attempt to seize power in Athens in December 1944-January 1945. [Ref. 10: pp. 49] However, when the Communist insurgency renewed operations as a guerrilla movement in 1946, it could count on sanctuaries in Yugoslavia, Albania, and Bulgaria. Stalin perhaps hoped that Greece, supported apparently by only the declining power of Great Britain, would eventually succumb to the Communist uprising. [Ref. 9: pp. 430] Moscow, nonetheless seems to have provided little tangible material support to the insurgency, although slogans, guidelines, and aphorisms abounded. [Ref. 11: pp. 116]

Stalin's aspirations for Greece were likely somewhat dimmed following the United States' assumption of Great Britain's role as principal benefactor of both Greece and Turkey in 1947. On March 12 of that year, President Truman proclaimed what became known as the Truman Doctrine while addressing a joint session of the Congress. [Ref. 9: pp. 431] Truman's statement that "it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are

resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures" probably seemed a direct challenge to Stalin's concept of the inevitable expansion of Soviet dominions. [Ref. 9: pp. 430] Stalin's apprehensions in that regard have been disclosed by Milovan Djilas who recorded that Stalin was alarmed lest the guerrilla uprising in Greece "endanger his already - won positions." [Ref. 12] Thus, the Truman Doctrine, and its tangible application in Greece in the form of substantial American military and economic aid, may have given sufficient pause to Stalin that he felt compelled to work against an uprising he had but nominally supported anyway. As Adam Ulum notes:

> Stalin [was] to decimate the Greek Communist leadership, charging them as tainted with Titoism and demanding that the rebels make cession of Greek Macedonia to Bulgaria one of their postulates. Thus the civil war in Greece came to an end. [Ref. 10: pp. 126]

Greece formally acceded to NATO on February 18, 1952 and thereby became a willing associate of a group of states viewed with considerable hostility and mistrust by the Soviets. The following observation is typical of early Soviet pronouncements on NATO:

> . . . with the erection of the military political mechanism of NATO and with the development of its strategic doctrine, there was completed the first stage in the policy of consolidation of aggressive military blocs begun by the United States and other imperialist states soon after World War II. [Ref. 9: pp. 499]

Greece in Stalin's view was now in the camp of his adversaries, and, as a consequence, was to be viewed as one. Soviet-Greek relations were at a low ebb. The post of Soviet Ambassador to Greece, vacated in 1948, remained empty until July of 1953, when it was filled during the restless period in Soviet leadership following Stalin's death.

2. Diplomatic and Political Trends Since the Mid 1960's

Relations between Greece and the Soviet Union gradually assumed correct but somewhat stilted dimensions throughout most of the Khrushchev era. Yet near the end of Khrushchev's tenure, the Cyprus crisis of 1964 seemed to portend a Soviet tilt towards Greece away from her historic rival Turkey.

Greek sensitivities with respect to Turkey - particularly when issues of dispute such as Cyprus are at stake - are well known. In many respects Greek attitudes towards other countries are defined by those countries' perceived policies towards Turkey; favoritism for Turkey translates into Greek aversion for the states alleged to display such partiality. By the same token, criticism of Turkey is usually viewed as a positive development in Greece. Greek perceptions of the Soviet Union, therefore, may have been favorably influenced by Soviet pronouncements during the Cyprus crisis of 1964. In July of that year,

Khrushchev warned the Turks against invading the island, which could cause "a dangerous chain reaction." [Ref. 13: pp. 12] When the crisis worsened, Khrushchev adopted a stronger line:

> . . . [he] told the Turks their use of force would intensify the threat of war; warned that the Soviet Union could not remain indifferent to the threat of armed conflict near to its southern border because the security of the country was at stake; condemned the Turkish bombing of Cyprus; and asked what the Turkish government would think if other countries used the same or more serious means against its territory and people. [Ref. 13: pp. 13]

The tough Soviet stance against Turkey during that crisis probably evoked approval in Athens, but it is unlikely that hopes of securing Greek good will were what prompted Khrushchev's posturing. Moscow had real interests in keeping Cyprus independent (in Soviet terms that means not associated with NATO), and probably hoped to dissuade the most imminent threat to that independence - Turkey - from taking action which might alter Cyprus' status.

Later, when Foreign Minister Gromyko in a statement to Izvestiia, January 21, 1965, endorsed a federal solution for Cyprus such as had long been advocated by Ankara, Athens protested. [Ref. 13: pp. 13] That apparent shift towards the Turkish position reflected continuing Soviet ambivalence on the Cyprus issue. The Soviets have long urged a peaceful settlement, yet their frequent policy

shifts suggest Soviet desires that the dispute continue to be sufficiently contentious so as to preoccupy Greek and Turkish policy makers.

Between 1967 and the Cyprus crisis of 1974, Greece was ruled by a dictatorial clique of army officers whose heavy-handed policies resulted not only in setbacks for Greece, but also in the growth of profound resentment directed against the United States. The latter developed principally because of the popular perception in Greece that were it not for American assistance, the junta could neither have come into being nor continued to exist. In point of fact, the United States pursued a two-pronged foreign policy with respect to Greece; its public expressions stressed the need to restore constitutional government in Athens, while bureaucratically it supported the Athens regime with arms, money, and tacit gestures of approval. [Ref. 14: pp. 7]

It is interesting to note that the Soviet Union pursued a policy not unlike that of the United States, but with seemingly far more advantageous results. As John Campbell observes:

> While their propaganda throughout the world condemned the brutality of the Athens regime, the Soviet government made a point of being correct and even cordial in its official relations with that regime. For its part, the junta smarting under the West's scorn, broadened its ties with the Communist states, not only with its immediate neighbors but, pointedly, with Moscow as well. [Ref. 3: pp. 6]

The Soviet Ambassador to Greece is alleged to have welcomed the developing relations between Greece and the Soviet Union and expressed sincere hopes for more independent Greek policies, in a statement in January 1973. [Ref. 15] When such a statement is viewed within the strategic context of the Balkans and the Mediterranean, one can reasonably conclude that a barely concealed solicitation to consider leaving NATO is what actually was conveyed - although ignored - in this case.

During the October 1973 Middle East War Greece mirrored almost identically the actions taken by her rival Turkey. U.S. aircraft were prohibited from using Greek bases to resupply Israel, yet the Soviet Union was allowed to use Greek airspace for supply aircraft destined for her Arab clients. [Ref. 16] That episode more likely sprang from a complex mix of motives, including sensitivities vis-à-vis the Arab states coupled with a growing disdain for the United States, than it did from friendly impulses towards the Soviet Union. As Pierre Hassner has trenchantly noted:

> . . . relations with, and even perceptions of the Soviet Union are determined above all by relations with the United States and intraregional and domestic politics . . . In Greece, both the anti-American and the regional (in this case anti-Turkish) or domestic dimension are more pronounced [than is the case for Turkey] . . . The legacy of the Nixon administration's links with the colonels seems to make Greek public opinion infinitely more anti-American than anti-Soviet . . . [Ref. 17: pp. 127-128]

How serious the current dimension of anti-American feelings is in Greece can be partly gauged by assessing the strength of anti-NATO sentiment. Those who favor a stronger and more durable southeastern flank for NATO, this observer included, would be dismayed by the results of a recent opinion poll published in the Athens weekly Tachydromos which concluded that only 12 percent of Greeks want their country to rejoin NATO (a process that had been underway prior to Mr. Papandreou's election victory), 58 percent desire neutrality, 27 percent have no opinion, and 3 percent want Greece to join the Warsaw Pact. [Ref. 18] Andreas Papandreou, the popular leader of the Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK; the new majority party), has repeatedly called for Greece to remove itself "from the cold war bloc of NATO" terming it not even a guarantee "against a wholly hypothetical threat from the North." [Ref. 19] His statements in foreign affairs prior to the recent parliamentary election frankly resembled those found in such Soviet academic and literary journals as International Affairs (Moscow), and World Marxist Review. Many NATO analysts assert that Papandreou as Prime Minister can be expected to pursue policies which could prove exceptionally adverse to the alliance. Although there are signs that as Prime Minister he may be easing some of his more extreme positions on alliance matters, his recent conduct at the 1981 NATO defense ministers' year-end review was not

encouraging. At the conclusion of the meeting on December 8, 1981 he announced a "partial suspension" of Greece's participation in NATO's military structure, though he declined to elaborate on what such a suspension would entail. [Ref. 20]

Much of the anti-American sentiment in Greece (which Mr. Papandreou was able to capitalize on so well during the fall 1981 campaign) has its origins in the perceived inability of the United States to prevent Turkey from launching its 1974 invasion of Cyprus.

The complex series of events which preceded the Cyprus crisis of that year, and subsequently led to the collapse of the colonels' regime, posed difficult choices for both the Soviet Union and the United States alike. Moscow reacted in a more sophisticated and evenhanded manner towards the two antagonists - Turkey and Greece - than it had in 1964, when Khrushchev had singled Turkey out for exclusive admonishment. Variations in the declaratory Soviet position since 1974 have seemed to slightly favor Greece at times and Turkey at others. Yet generally the Soviets have appeared reluctant to apply leverage to either party (or to both) in hopes of achieving a settlement; instead Cyprus has served as a useful focus for anti-NATO blandishments and posturing. The journal International Affairs (Moscow) has been a frequent anti-NATO instrument

regarding the Cyprus affair. In 1974, for example, an article entitled "The Tragedy and Hopes of Cyprus," asserted that:

> Failing in their efforts to bring about direct occupation of the island [in 1964] by NATO troops, the leaders of the bloc sought to undertake new maneuvers to achieve their goals. [Ref. 21: pp. 68]

Commenting on the 1974 Cyprus crisis, the authors made clear who, in the Soviet view, has been behind Cyprus' troubles:

> However, having failed [in 1974] to abolish the sovereign Cypriot state by direct military interference, the NATO strategists now switched to behind-the-scenes maneuvers, expecting to solve the problem of Cyprus in the narrow circle of NATO member states . . . Although hostilities on Cyprus have ceased, the situation is still fraught with complications, for their main cause - the interference of NATO in the affairs of the country - has not been removed. [Ref. 21: pp. 72 and 75]

Soviet condemnations, shrewdly designed to single out neither Greece nor Turkey for special criticism - have likely helped contribute to a growth in general anti-NATO feelings in both countries, more discernible in Greece than in Turkey. In the wake of the 1974 Cyprus crisis, Greece decided to withdraw from the NATO integrated military structure. That move seems to have been principally motivated by the great frustration Greece felt with the alliance owing to NATO's inability to prevent one of its members from moving to the brink of war with another member. Soviet anti-NATO

pronouncements likely played only a marginal role in the Greek decision, but Soviet commentators, reacted with ill-disguised delight:

> The decision to withdraw from NATO's military organization was widely and warmly greeted by the Greek people, who learned the sad experiences of "cooperation" with that aggressive bloc. A mighty wave of demonstrations swept the country against participation in NATO, against the military presence of the United States, and urging Greece to pursue an independent foreign policy. [Ref. 21: pp. 74]

Moscow's policy with respect to the Cyprus dispute therefore seems to have been inspired by cautious and unstated hopes for promoting discord between the two nations and their NATO allies by denigrating the common alliance. Prudently, Moscow has been careful to avoid overly belligerent pronouncements on the Cyprus matter which could induce renewed wariness of the Soviet Union, such as that which prompted the two antagonists to join NATO in the early 1950's. [Ref. 13: pp. 13-14]

In September 1978, then Greek Foreign Minister George Rallis (until recently the Prime Minister) visited the Soviet Union, the first such visit since the establishment of relations between the two countries in 1924. [Ref. 6: pp. 161] The visit probably had more symbolic than substantive significance, but the Soviets were able to make some diplomatic gains. A Soviet consulate in Thessaloniki (Salonika) was established, as was a Greek consulate in the Black Sea port of Odessa. [Ref. 6: pp. 161]

More importantly, two Greek destroyers made a port call in Odessa later that month which was reciprocated by the visit of Soviet warships to Athens' port city of Piraeus. [Ref. 22]

Following by only three months the historic visit of Turkish Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit to the Soviet Union, the Rallis visit may have been motivated on the Greek side by wariness of the apparent courtship of the Soviet Union being undertaken by Greece's traditional rival Turkey. Greece likely reasoned that if Turkey could flirt with the Soviet Union and thereby gain greater attention from the United States (the Turkish arms embargo was revoked by the U.S. Congress two months after the Ecevit visit to the Soviet Union), then Greece might find such an approach advantageous as well. In terms of their impact on Soviet-Greek relations, the Rallis visit in 1978 and a visit by Greek Prime Minister Karamanlis in 1979 to the Soviet Union, were far more modest in scope than those carried out by their Turkish counterparts - reflective, in part, of the more conservative nature of the Greek politicians. No agreements such as the Soviet-Turkish Political Document on the Principles of Good Neighborly and Friendly Co-operation were entered into by the Greeks, yet Soviet objectives may have been partially achieved in that those trips were made at all. By supplementing essentially low-key propaganda themes such as "the ever peaceful intentions of the Soviet

Union," and "the myth of the Soviet threat" with friendly personal contact at the highest governmental levels, Moscow might have hoped for second thoughts on the parts of Rallis and Karamanlis about the Soviet menace NATO is meant to hold in check.[3] Subsequent statements and policies of both leaders, each of whom has been Prime Minister, have been generally pro-NATO whatever changes, if any, may have occurred in their perceptions of the threat posed by the Soviet Union.

Transient rifts in Greek-American relations have not gone unnoticed nor unexploited (albeit with inconclusive results) by the Soviet Union. The recent "March through Drama" incident and the relevation of the Mills-Chrisospathis note provide a telling example of Soviet alertness.

The "March through Drama" incident came about because a young U.S. Army Officer apparently ordered his detail of 20 men to conduct a march through the Greek town of that name in mid-February 1981. His men were wearing chemical warfare protective clothing, which apparently alarmed the townspeople. [Ref. 23] Subsequent to that incident, local Greek photographers discovered a heretofore unknown American installation in the vicinity, whose

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[3]For a classis presentation of Soviet views on the nature of NATO and the Warsaw Pact see Boris Ponomarev, "A Pact for Peace and a Pact for Aggression," World Marxist Review, XXIII, 8, (August 1980), pp. 3-10.

structures seemed to suggest the presence of nuclear warheads - already the subject of strenuous debate in the the Greek parliament. [Ref. 23] Profoundly embarrassed, the U.S. ambassador offered a public apology in response to a formal Greek protest, complaining about the unusual march.

Less than a week later, the New York Times and the New Statesman published reports which revealed the existence of a previously secret note which excluded Greek control over U.S. nuclear warheads stored in the country. [Ref. 24] Signed by the deputy chief of the U.S. Mission in Athens, Hawthorn Mills and the Greek government representative, Spiros Chrisospathis, the two sides agreed in the memorandum that the U.S.-Greek defense cooperation agreement of 28 July 1977 'does not apply to the United States nuclear custodial units stationed in Greece.' [Ref. 25] Although the thrust of the note was certainly consistent with American practices elsewhere, its revelation caused a storm of protest in the Greek parliament and in the country as well. On February 28, 1981, Andreas Papandreou, the then principal opposition leader and now Prime Minister, said the disclosures proved that the government has "surrendered Greece to the United States as its private property," and he declared that "The least demanded today in the resignation of the entire government." [Ref. 24]

In early April, less than two months after those two controversies surfaced, Soviet President Brezhnev made a pointed offer to Greece during an interview with an Athens newspaper editor. Brezhnev stated that Greece would be guaranteed immunity from a Soviet nuclear attack in exchange for an undertaking by Greece not to store nuclear weapons on its territory. [Ref. 26] The Brezhnev offer was rejected by the Greek government almost immediately, but it may have looked appealing to many in Greece - particularly to those politically to the left of center such as Andreas Papandreou. This Soviet overture has been a standard line since the 1950's, but it is often repeated when thought potentially advantageous to do so by the Soviets.

3. Economic Relations

Greece and the Soviet Union have recently begun to expand trade relations and cooperation, partially owing to the impetus provided by the aforementioned trip of Greek Foreign Minister Rallis to the Soviet Union in September 1978. Among economic matters on his agenda were proposals to (a) establish an alumina plant in Greece with Soviet equipment, (b) purchase Soviet natural gas and electric power for Greece, and (c) make Greek shipyards outside Athens available for the repair of Soviet merchant ships. [Ref. 27] Since that trip, subsequent agreements made in 1979 and in 1981 resulted in: (a) substantial purchases of Soviet crude oil by Greece, now at a level of two million tons per annum;

(b) provisions for the supply of between 1 and 2 million cubic meters of Soviet natural gas per annum; (c) significant purchases of Soviet electrical power; and (d) pledges to expand Soviet imports of Greek citrus, tobacco, clothing, and footwear. [Ref. 28]

The only "economic" agreement between Greece and the Soviet Union which aroused concerned interest in NATO circles was a Greek offer in 1979 to make the Neorion Shipyards available for repair of Soviet naval auxiliary vessels as well as Soviet merchant ships. That arrangement was viewed with misgivings by the alliance since in theory it enabled the Soviet Union to extend the tour of duty of naval auxiliaries in the Mediterranean, which otherwise would have been forced to go to Soviet Black Sea shipyards for repairs. [Ref. 29] However, following the rejoining of Greece to the military arm of the NATO alliance in October 1980, it was decided to cancel that arrangement with the Soviets. [Ref. 29] Such a decision is thought to have been unlikely had the leftist, then opposition leader, Andreas Papandreou been Prime Minister instead of the conservative George Rallis.

Notwithstanding that contretemps, the Greeks and Soviets seem intent on gradually increasing economic cooperation between their two countries. Greek motivations are very likely apolitical; the Greeks are simply trying to

diversify their sources of critical fuel and electricity requirements and simultaneously to improve their balance of payments position through an expansion of exports.

Soviet motivations, though more difficult to gauge assuredly contain political components as well as economic ones. In keeping with Soviet efforts to achieve credibility as a trustworthy and reliable partner, economic agreements with countries outside the Warsaw Pact provide opportunities to demonstrate Soviet "good faith" on matters unlikely to result in challenges to that "good faith." There is, moreover, always the possibility that the political influence of the Soviet Union will increase in countries such as Greece which have become modestly dependent on Soviet deliveries of crude oil, natural gas, and electricity. As a Soviet commentator candidly noted when writing about expanding Soviet trade with Greece's neighbor, Turkey:

> Political tendencies are greatly influenced by economic factors whose effect intensifies as various propaganda-induced prejudices disappear [and new ones are encouraged, one might add]. [Ref. 30: pp. 37]

D. A SUMMING UP: SOVIET CONDUCT TOWARDS GREECE

The Soviet Union is not insensitive to Greece's strategic significance as a Balkan power and Mediterranean state partially filling the critical void between European Turkey and Italy. To achieve a substantial reorientation of Greece's present pro-NATO alignment to some sort of

accommodation with the Soviet Union would so plainly be in Soviet interests that it must be considered an important potential Soviet objective. In order to achieve that aim, the evidence suggests that the Soviets have adopted a sophisticated and unobtrusive approach to Greece encompassing the following dimensions: (a) diplomatic efforts to continue improvements in Greek-Soviet state relations and to encourage Greek perceptions of growing Soviet reliability and respectability; (b) encouragement of Greek-Soviet trade agreements, with emphasis on increasing sales of critical fuels and electricity to Greece; (c) a readiness to exploit to the Soviet advantage issues arising from strains in Greek-American relations; and (d) misrepresentation of various features of the Cyprus issue as a means of expressing condemnation and derision of NATO.

To date, the Soviets have had limited success in enhancing their influence in Greece. Yet they remain keenly aware of the near mathematical precision with which increases in anti-American sentiment are linked to decreases in the perceived seriousness of the threat which they pose to Greece. The Soviet Union can, as a consequence, be expected to continue its efforts to exaggerate the effects of American errors or insensitivity, real or imagined, in the course of Greek-American bilateral relations.

Similarly the Soviets perceive that the accession to the post of Prime Minister by the charismatic Andreas Papandreou could bring about what heretofore has been most unlikely of success - the withdrawal of Greece from NATO. The kind of hopes the Soviets entertain in that respect are only transparently concealed in their commentaries:

> The people persistently demand that the dangerous aggressive plans be scrapped and that a constructive answer be given to the peaceful initiatives of the socialist states. Calls are sounding in a number of countries to part company with NATO's aggressive policy by withdrawing from the bloc . . . Broad democratic circles in Greece are also demanding their country's withdrawal from the North Atlantic alliance, instead of its return to the bloc's military organization. [Ref. 31: pp. 36]

If the "self-Finlandization" of Greece is one goal Mr. Papandreou hopes to achieve (although he would not use that term), then the strategic implications of his victory may prove to be graver than many in the West now realize. Since assuming office as Prime Minister in late October 1981, he has refrained from precipitous implementation of his party's principal foreign policy campaign pledges to (a) withdraw Greece from NATO, and (b) cancel American base rights in Greece. His recent comments during an interview with ABC News would seem to indicate that Mr. Papandreou is attempting to affect a more moderate image now that he must contend with the realities of managing Greece's affairs. For example, in responding to a query concerning Greece's relations with NATO he said "We have no desire to take our country into any

adventure." [Ref. 32] In commenting on the question of American base rights, Mr. Papandreou said, "We are not prepared to move unilaterally. And this really means that we shall start negotiations both on the question of the participation in the military branch of the Atlantic alliance and on the question of American bases." [Ref. 32] The manner in which Greece, at Mr. Papandreou's behest, carries out those negotiations will provide her NATO allies a sound indication of long term Greek intentions and reliability in the context of the alliance. As noted earlier, Mr. Papandreou's declaration in Brussels on December 8, 1981 that Greece would put into effect a "partial suspension" of its participation in NATO's military structure was not a reassuring sign. [Ref. 20]

The Soviet Union, of course, would be only too ready to expand upon and complete its long-term ambitions for Greece through close association with a leader whose foreign policy views appear generally harmonious with its own, and whose prominent anti-American biases have been a defining characteristic New Soviet overtures have already been conveyed; reacting with impressive but not unexpected alacrity to the election results, the Soviets on October 19, 1981 reaffirmed their offer to certify Greek immunity from Soviet nuclear attack in exchange for removal of nuclear weapons from NATO storage facilities in Greece. [Ref. 33]

III. SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS TURKEY

To a great extent - perhaps more than is the case with any West European country save the Federal Republic of Germany - Soviet policy towards Turkey has been defined, shaped, and tempered by Soviet conceptions of Turkey's essential strategic worth. Turkey is simultaneously a Balkan state, an Eastern Mediterranean littoral state, a country of the Middle East, and the manager and sentinel of the vital Turkish Straits. The significance of Turkey's pivotal location has been reinforced by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and by the implications of persistent turmoil in Iran.

As a consequence, an appraisal of Soviet foreign policy towards Turkey should begin with an attempt to bring into focus Turkey's position in the context of Soviet regional aspirations and strategies. As with the Greek case, public expression of these Soviet aspirations and strategies has been periodically adjusted (though not always very effectively) to respond to both Turkish domestic political change and to variations in Turkey's relations with other countries. These strategies have furthermore been conditioned by two important factors applying not only to Turkey, but to Soviet conduct towards many other West European countries as well.

The first factor has been the strong Soviet impulse to increase political leverage over the formulation of both the foreign and domestic policy within countries near Soviet borders or domains in Eastern Europe. Termed by many Western observers the Soviet quest for "Finlandization," this Soviet objective envisions, as trenchantly noted by Alvan L. Rubinstein:

> A process whereby the Soviet Union influences the domestic and foreign policy behavior of non-communist countries in a way that leads them to follow policies congenial to or approved by the Soviet Union. [Ref. 34: pp. 103]

The second factor (which has, to the present, helped hold the first in check) has been Soviet reluctance to bring about circumstances which could likely result in direct military confrontation with the United States. This latter factor may not be a completely reliable indicator of future Soviet conduct in that it originally stemmed from Soviet uneasiness over the uncertain consequences of military confrontation with a strategically superior United States. Now that the United States has difficulty even laying claim to strategic sufficiency, much less superiority, this dimension of Soviet conduct may give way to less inhibited and bolder Soviet advances.[4]

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[4]This interpretation has been developed by observers such as Henry Kissinger and Uwe Nerlich and is endorsed by this writer. It is disputed by McGeorge Bundy and others. See, for example, Henry N. Kissinger, "The Future of NATO." The Washington Quarterly, II, (Autumn 1979); Uwe Nerlich "Theatre Nuclear Forces in Europe: Is NATO Running Out of Options?", The Washington Quarterly, III, (Winter 1980); and McGeorge Bundy, "The Future of Strategic Deterrence," Survival, XXI (November/December 1979).

The following three themes are central to understanding Soviet foreign policy towards Turkey:

1. The Place of the Turkish Straits in Soviet Strategy;

2. Turkey's Role in Soviet Strategies in the Mediterranean and the Middle East; and

3. The Development of Post-World War II Soviet Policies Towards Turkey.

A. THE PLACE OF THE TURKISH STRAITS IN SOVIET STRATEGY

Turkey's status as a Balkan power is derived from her modest outcropping into Europe known as European Thrace. Half of her Thracian border - the western portion - is shared with Greece, while the northern edge of Turkish Thrace separates her from Bulgaria. Despite this region's small size, it provides Turkey decisive command of the three critical bodies of water separating the Black Sea from the Mediterranean which are known collectively as the Turkish Straits: the Bosphorous in the northeast, the sea of Marmara in the center, and the Dardanelles in the southwest. Additionally, Turkey's largest city and most important commercial center - Istanbul - brackets the Bosphorous.

Historically, the Straits have served as the principal channel for Russia's trade with southern Europe, Asia, and Africa. [Ref. 35: pp. 695] The Straits also provide the Soviets - assuming unimpeded transit - the most convenient

and speediest method of reinforcing their naval presence in the Mediterranean in time of crisis (or anticipated crisis), their only other options being time-consuming movement of ships from the Baltic, Northern or Pacific fleets.

Given Turkey's status as a member of NATO, the Straits could enable the U.S. Sixth Fleet and allied units in certain scenarios to project naval power northeastward through the Straits into the Black Sea, and as a consequence, to threaten significant Soviet forces and installations. Although such an eventuality might appear extremely unlikely to Western observers, one should not underestimate the Soviet penchant to prepare to hinder and frustrate in advance exercise of such Western military options. Turkish possession of the Straits poses a further obstacle to Soviet contingency planning because of the ease with which its key choke points could be effectively mined by the Turks - even assuming the rapid success of a Warsaw Pact ground strike originating in Bulgaria which had as its aim the capture of the Straits.

Presently all merchant and naval traffic through the Straits is subject to the terms of the Montreux Convention which has been in effect since July 20, 1936. While the main purpose of the Convention was to limit the freedom of nonriparian states to enter the Black Sea, significant

discretionary powers were awarded Turkey which had not been hers under the previous arrangement, the Lausanne Convention. [Ref. 35: pp. 700]

The Soviets have for the most part been careful to adhere to the Convention's requirements (with the possible exception of the transit of the Kiev in July 1976). Given the increasingly greater prominence that they attach to naval power, one can nonetheless assume that the Soviets do not view indefinite administration of the Straits by a NATO state with favor. The Turks, for their part, have generally been vigilant and meticulous in exercising their responsibilities:

> . . . Turkish authorities have consistently held up passage [of Soviet warships] until the specific hour and date requested, as required, eight days in advance for all foreign warships. [Ref. 36: pp. 60]

The previously mentioned transit of the Soviet capital ship Kiev perhaps marked the one major lapse in Turkish stringency vis-à-vis naval movement through the Straits.

In addition to the peacetime inconveniences which Turkish ownership of the Straits poses the Soviet Union, Soviet planners face dismaying prospects of: (1) uncertain or impeded Soviet naval movement southwestward during time of war, and (2) potential wartime U.S. naval strikes through the Straits to the northeast against Soviet territory. Change in political orientation on the part of the Turks, to one of habitual conformance to Soviet wishes, would yield the Soviets an impressive strategic advantage.

By virtue of possessing the Straits, Turkey therefore seems likely to be an important focal point of Soviet efforts: (a) to gradually bring her policies into general alignment with those of the Soviet Union, and, (b) in the long run, to entice her away from the NATO alliance.

B. TURKEY'S ROLE IN SOVIET STRATEGIES IN THE MEDITERRANEAN AND THE MIDDLE EAST

Soviet hopes, goals, and strategies in the Mediterranean and the Middle East have been characterized by a general similarity in both political and military dimensions. This is not surprising, since two parameters tend to shape Soviet approaches toward both areas. The first is the obvious geopolitical overlap of the littoral nations bordering the Eastern and Southern Mediterranean with much of the Middle East. Only the northern tier state of Afghanistan and the nations of the Arabian Peninsula and the Persian Gulf do not border the Mediterranean; and even the latter group in many respects has been affected by periodic political and military strife occurring in the Eastern Mediterranean. Second, the most visible and important instruments of Soviet policy in both regions reside in the Soviet Mediterranean "Eskadra" (Squadron) and, to a lesser degree, in the Soviet Navy's Indian Ocean contingent. Despite massive efforts to acquire permanent air and ground force base right and installations in what once appeared to be

pliant candidates (i.e. Egypt of the early 1970's, Syria, Iraq, and most recently Libya), the Soviets have generally been thwarted from achieving such gains.[5]

The continuing paramountcy of the "Eskadra" as the Soviet Union's most credible and effective military presence in the Mediterranean suggests, as pointed out in an earlier chapter, that Soviet strategies in that region, and in the Middle Eastern nations bordering the Mediterranean, can be discussed to a significant degree in terms of regional naval policy.[6]

Nevertheless, these are a number of features and conditions unique to the Middle East which serve to define

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[5]Some observers might suggest that the large number of Soviet advisors in Libya provides the Soviet Union de facto base rights, though the nature of Soviet access to Libyan facilities remains open to question. Additionally, the level of military cooperation between the Soviets and their clients in Ethiopia and the Peoples Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDYR) is growing.

[6]Please refer to chapter two for an overview of Soviet strategic conceptions regarding the Mediterranean. Turkey's lengthy Aegean and Mediterranean coasts probably figure in Soviet appraisals of Turkey's value as a maritime state. There are three Turkish ports on those coasts which currently support the Turkish Navy: Izmir, Mersin, and Iskenderun. A NATO fuel facility at Iskenderun stores about twenty percent of the estimated needs of the U.S. Sixth Fleet. [Ref. 43: pp.8]

a more distinctive set of Soviet strategic considerations than a simple linkage of the Mediterranean and Middle Eastern theatres might imply. The more significant of these follow:

1. The Soviets perceive that the state of Arab-Israeli relations has a profound impact on their ability to ingratiate themselves with local Arab regimes and to widen their influence in the Middle East. By sustaining whenever possible a low to moderate level of Arab-Israeli tension, the Soviets can portray, as Galia Golan notes, " . . . the Arabs' need for Soviet assistance" against the backdrop of "the polarization of the superpowers' positions and America's commitment to the enemy side, Israel." [Ref. 37: pp. 113]

2. The Soviets are well aware of the continuing dependence of almost all of the major Western industrial societies on unhindered importation of oil from the Middle East and Persian Gulf. Additionally, the wide range of energy dependence in the Western camp, the general European ambivalence towards Israel (which contrasts with the consistent support accorded by the United States), and differing domestic political constraints, have made it clear to the Soviets that the West is chronically divided concerning Middle Eastern energy policy. [Ref. 38: pp. 213]

The Soviets, it must be presumed, might attempt to exploit this Western vulnerability at an opportune moment. [Ref. 38: pp. 213]

A countervailing and emerging concern for the Soviets has been noted by Geoffrey Kemp:

> The Soviet Union . . . is only beginning to face the realities of its own energy crisis and the constraining effect that will have on its own economic growth, which is abysmally low, expecially in agriculture and consumer goods. [Ref. 38: pp. 211]

As that concern intensifies in the Soviet Union - a country whose leadership is well aware that their nation could never hope to sustain an economic competition with the West for increasingly scarce Middle Eastern and Persian Gulf oil - the temptation to attempt riskier political gambles, or even to exert military ventures to secure access to portions of the region's oil-producing territory will probably also grow.

3. On the whole, the Soviet Union has benefited from the fall of the Shah, and from the chronic political instability and deterioration in military readiness which have ensued in Iran over the last three years. Moreover, as Alvin Rubinstein notes, "Moscow . . . is well positioned to exploit any revolutionary surge to the left or possibly internal disintegration." [Ref. 39: pp. 325] And, unlike the Soviet thrust into Afghanistan, a Soviet military move into Iran could cloak itself (for propaganda purposes) with the vestiges of international vindication by invoking

the Soviet - Persian treaty of February 26, 1921. The key provisions of that treaty permit the Soviet Union to move onto Iranian territory should forces "hostile" to the USSR enter that country. [Ref. 40: pp. 54]

The foregoing three-tiered framework of Soviet Middle Eastern strategic considerations can be briefly summarized in terms of broader Soviet objectives and/or desired capabilities as follows: (a) to sustain a low to moderate level of Arab-Israeli discord; (b) to keep the West divided on the Middle East energy question, and, if necessary, to be able to quickly acquire control of key Middle East oil-producing territories; and (c) to maintain vigilance over developments in Iran, with a view towards possible exploitation of any ensuing political dissolution in that country.

This is not to suggest that the Soviets now are seriously contemplating overt military moves in the region. The point is that implementation of Soviet regional contingency plans under crisis or near-crisis conditions would require commitments of considerable air and ground forces working in concert with the Soviet Mediterranean "Eskadra" and with the Soviet Indian Ocean contingent.

It is in the context of these regional Soviet military and naval strategic considerations that the significance and value of Turkey can be appropriately addressed. Much

of Turkey's value to NATO and to the United States stems, of course, from her unique geopolitical position in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East. Possessing some 308 miles of mutual border with the Soviet Union (only one other NATO state - Norway - has a frontier with the Soviet Union) and the greatest extent of Black Sea coastline of any country save the USSR, Turkey is a "confrontation" state by definition. Her long and desolate Southern border directly abuts two of the Middle East's most frequently volatile actors: Syria and Iraq. Further east, Turkey shares a long and ruggedly mountainous frontier with Iran. Thus, Turkey physically separates the Soviet Union from all her past and present Arab client states and, owing to her continued membership in the NATO alliance, has served as a major barrier to bolder projections of Soviet power in both the Eastern Mediterranean and in the Middle East. Contemplation by the Soviet leadership of military options to sway events, for example, in a Lebanese or Iraqi internal crisis, or during a future Israeli-Syrian war, is made more difficult by their awareness that any forcible projection across Turkish territory could immediately raise the stakes and risks from the context of a regional calculus, to that of a global and strategic one, even before Soviet forces join the fray.

Turkey's geographic position and NATO membership have also served to complicate Soviet defensive considerations; for, as Lothar Ruehl has noted:

> . . . [Turkey] has put large parts of the Soviet Union within relatively easy reach of Western arms and, at times, has allowed NATO and the U.S. to deploy operational dual-purpose counter-options against Soviet targets of considerable significance for the defense of Southern as well as of Central Europe. Turkey, as an active NATO ally, puts Russia into the two-front situation in Europe. [Ref. 41]

Turkey offers the NATO alliance and the United States other tangible benefits besides those accruing from her key location. First, Turkey maintains, along with the Federal Republic of Germany, one of the two largest NATO military forces in the European theater. [Ref. 42: pp. 610] Estimates vary, but of approximately 566,000 men under arms in the Turkish Armed Forces 425,000 are assigned to her impressive and spirited army, the second largest in NATO after the United States. [Ref. 43: pp. 15] Few doubt that the Soviets have a wary respect for the Turkish soldier's fighting capabilities, convincingly displayed during the Korean conflict. NATO's Secretary General Joseph Luns has referred to the Turks as "the last of the Prussians," an observation with which the Soviet military would probably grudgingly agree. [Ref. 44]

Second, the still impressive array of U.S. installations throughout Turkey provides the United States timely

intelligence about Soviet military activities. Among the most important of these have been: (a) Diyarbakir, a long-range radar and communications station in east-central Turkey, (b) Belbasi, a U.S. seismographic detection base near Ankara, and (c) the electronic-intelligence gathering facilities at Sinop, on the Black Sea coast, and at Karamürsel, on the Sea of Marmara. [Ref: 45] Collectively they have proved vital in monitoring Soviet missile tests, troop movements, and nuclear explosions. [Ref. 46: pp. 367] Moreover, it must be assumed that these installations have assumed much greater importance in both Western and Soviet eyes following the loss of American monitoring sites in Iran in 1979.

Finally, the interceptor and fighter aircraft assigned to the NATO air base at Incirlik, and to several other vital Turkish air bases, working in concert with the fourteen NADGE (NATO Air Defense Ground Environment) early warning sites located in Turkey, could provide substantial assistance in the anti-air warfare defense of the Sixth Fleet in the Eastern Mediterranean. As a consequence, the Soviet Mediterranean "Eskadra's" sea denial mission against the U.S. Sixth Fleet would be rendered even less certain of success in time of war, owing to unavoidable attrition of many supporting Soviet-based aircraft attempting passage through Turkish air space.

In sum, the Soviets surely sense that were a Turkish political regime to withdraw from NATO and attempt to pursue some form of "neutrality," the Soviet ability to achieve strategic aims in the Middle East, the Eastern Mediterranean, and even in the Persian Gulf would measurably improve. Not only would NATO lose a physical and psychological barrier of paramount geopolitical importance, but a major source of crucial intelligence on Soviet military activities would disappear as well.

C. THE DEVELOPMENT OF POST-WORLD WAR II SOVIET POLICIES TOWARDS TURKEY

The preceding two sections furnish a basis for judging Soviet efforts to alter Turkey's present NATO loyalties to some form of accommodation, either explicit or tacit, with the policies of the Soviet Union are likely. Evidence of Soviet overtures to Turkey is, in fact, considerable. In comparison with the Soviet Union's muted efforts in the case of Greece, an analysis of its policies towards Turkey since the end of the Second World War - and in particular during the last two decades - reveals a more substantive Soviet effort to separate Turkey politically from her Western allies, and to isolate her militarily.

The following section traces the development of post-World War II Soviet policy towards Turkey with particular

emphasis on the key diplomatic, political, and economic developments in Soviet-Turkish relations of the last two decades.

1. Post War Antecedents

Prior to the onset of World War II, Soviet-Turkish relations were markedly good. Both nations had undergone wrenching social revolutions, and both pursued foreign policies largely isolated from the Western-dominated international community. In the 1925 Treaty of Neutrality and Nonaggression, the Soviet Union and Turkey vowed not to interfere in each other's internal affairs. As Nuri Eren perceptively notes:

> It [the treaty] . . . provided the official frame of their new and close relationship. With no ambition beyond their borders, the two revolutionary regimes found themselves natural allies in a semihostile world. [Ref. 47: pp. 15]

Indications that that period of mutual trust was to come to a sudden end occurred concomitant with the outbreak of the Second World War. In Moscow, in October 1939 Stalin had his Foreign Commissar Molotov submit two strongly worded proposals to the visiting Turkish Foreign Minister Şükrü Saraçoğlu: (1) to prohibit French and British warships from passage through the Turkish Straits, and (2) to conclude a mutual assistance pact with the Soviet Union, thus drawing Turkey away from an alliance she had been contemplating with Britain and France. [Ref. 55: pp. 128]

Although Turkey resolutely refused to accede to these demands, no doubt they added to a general sense of foreboding Turkey had with respect to her vulnerabilities as a relatively weak power during that dangerous and fast-moving period.

Turkey remained a neutral throughout most of the war, but some modest assistance provided the Allied powers - particularly Great Britain and France - revealed her preferences, in principle, for an Allied victory. Nontheless, Stalin seems to have felt little but disdain and resentment for Russia's historic enemy, which stemmed not only from Turkey's studied neutrality, but also from her previous rejection of his proposals of 1939 - when Stalin had been struggling to mollify his nominal ally Nazi Germany.

As the fighting drew to a close in 1945, Stalin again turned his attention to Turkey, perhaps hopeful that the emerging domination of the Red Army in Eastern and Central Europe could be influential in attaining gains for the Soviet Union at Turkey's expense. On March 21, 1945 the Soviets denounced the Soviet-Turkish pact of 1925 and declined to renew it. [Ref. 35: pp. 135] Later, in June of that year, the Soviets made clear that four conditions would have to be fulfilled by Turkey if she wished to have

the nonaggression treaty renewed. As summarized by George Lenczowski, the Soviet demands included:

1. the return to Russia of Kars and Ardahan [provinces in Eastern Turkey];

2. the granting of military bases in the Bosphorous and the Dardanelles;

3. a revision of the Montreux Straits Convention; and,

4. a revision of the Thracian boundary in favor of Communist-dominated Bulgaria. [Ref. 35: pp. 135]

Those demands were rejected by the deeply worried Turks, who commenced a campaign to enlist American support for their refusal to yield to the increasing Soviet pressures. That campaign, though slow to develop, proved most successful from the Turkish perspective during that period when Stalin's demands were at their peak - in August 1946.

On August 7, the Kremlin sent a brusque note to Turkey containing complaints over Turkey's administration of the Turkish Straits during the war and repeating demands for shared control of the waterway; ominously, the demarche was accompanied by Soviet military activity in the Black Sea and in the Caucasus. [Ref. 48: pp. 21] The Turks rejected the Soviet note, and elicited a U.S. repudiation of it as well. In the U.S. note to the Soviets of August 19, 1946, the United States strongly backed the

Turkish stand and asserted that attacks on or threats of attack against the Straits would be matters for action by the United Nations Security Council. [Ref. 48: pp. 22]

The firm American stand was very likely a powerful factor influencing Moscow's decision to ease the pressure on Turkey in late 1946. Soviet pronouncements with respect to claims on Turkish territory became less frequent and rather perfunctory. Stalin's aspirations no doubt were further dampened following President Truman's proclamation of the Truman Doctrine on March 12, 1947. The Truman Doctrine - just as had been the case with previous declarations of American support - was welcomed with considerable relief and satisfaction by the Turks. Moreover, it had the additional consequences of: (a) associating Turkey, in Stalin's eyes, more closely with his feared and powerful rival, the United States, and (b) encouraging the foreign policy elite in Turkey to realize that their country's chief hopes lay in continued affiliation with the West, and in particular with the United States.

Just as had been the case with Greece, Turkey's accession to the North Atlantic Alliance on February 18, 1952 formalized her growing turn to the West, which - particularly in the case of Turkey - had been to a significant extent prompted by fears of Soviet belligerence. Moscow's reaction

was predictable in the context of the growing rigidity of the Cold War, declaring that it "could not remain indifferent" to the inclusion of Turkey in the pact and terming it a "provocative act." [Ref. 49: pp. 33]

Stalin's death in March 1953 ushered in a restless period for the top echelons of the Soviet leadership, which was characterized not only by a struggle for the key positions in the hierarchy, but also by uncertainty over the prudence of Stalin's adversarial approach to the West. That uncertainty presaged a period during which some of the more immoderate Soviet claims and foreign policy stances were visibly attenuated. As George S. Harris notes:

> Turkey was one of the first areas where the new spirit was expressed. On May 30, 1953, the Soviet Union officially renounced its territorial claims on Turkey, stating in a note to Ankara that Moscow had also changed its mind about the need to share in control of the Straits. [Ref. 49: pp. 34]

The Turks for their part were suspicious about this sudden Soviet about-face. Their instinctive distrust of the Russians, forged during thirteen Russo-Turkish wars, had been revived by Stalin's intimidating maneuvers; new Soviet expressions of hope for friendship and better relations between the two countries were therefore suspect in the eyes of Ankara.

In fact, in February 1955, two years <u>after</u> the Soviet renunciation of territorial claims on Turkey, the Baghdad Pact was formed, completing one more geographical

link in the American-inspired "containment" barrier around the Soviet Union. At the urging of John Foster Dulles, Turkey's Prime Minister Adnan Menderes had been instrumental in coordinating Iranian, Iraqi, and Pakistani agreement to join Turkey and Great Britain in the alliance. [Ref. 48: pp. 62]

Soviet policy towards Turkey during the Khrushchev era reflected both Khrushchev's capricious personal style and the difficult problems which confronted Soviet foreign policy in the post-Stalin period. On one hand, Turkey's membership in the Western-inspired NATO and CENTO pacts prompted a Soviet propaganda litany deriding this aspect of Turkish policy, typified in remarks by Khrushchev himself:

> The governments of Iran and Turkey can hardly be said to be acting wisely in casting their lot with the aggressive Baghdad pact and refusing to establish good-neighbor, friendly relations with the Soviet Union. [Ref. 50: pp. 30]

Yet on the other hand, Khrushchev seems to have felt compelled to adjust for a while, at any rate, to the realities of the Western alliance system and to the loyalties required of its membership. The Soviet journal International Affairs was an early vehicle for this more moderate Soviet view:

> While advocating normal relations with Turkey, the Soviet Union by no means seeks to impair Turkey's relations with the United States, Britain, or any other Western country. In fact, acting

> on the principle of peaceful co-existence, it favors broader co-operation between all countries of the world . . .
>
> The Soviet people are convinced that a revival of the old Soviet-Turkish friendship is vital to the peoples of Turkey and the Soviet Union and that both countries stand to gain by better relations. [Ref. 51: pp. 62]

The Turks maintained a practice of ignoring both Soviet verbal hostility and Soviet pleas for a "normalization." Their disdain for Soviet policies was motivated by latent anti-Russian impulses, and it also found reassurance in the Cold War stance of Turkey's principal mentor - the United States. But Turkey's developing ties to the United States were to be shaken in the 1960's.

2. Diplomatic and Political Trends of the 1960's

The state of American-Turkish relations to some extent has acted, over the past twenty years, as a crude but effective determinant of that of Soviet-Turkish relations. In other words when relations between the United States and Turkey have been markedly cordial, Turkey has generally deemed it imprudent and unnecessary to seek improved relations with the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union has been careful to avoid appearing overly eager to woo Turkey during such periods. Yet the Soviets have been acutely sensitive to periodic strains in the American-Turkish relationship. In the aftermath of such strained periods, the Soviets have most skillfully encouraged and cultivated

the mild overtures to the East which Turkey has undertaken, inspired by an impulse to demonstrate a more independent and noncommittal foreign policy, and by feelings of resentment at what she has considered ill treatment by the United States.

Two such cyclical variations in American-Turkish and Soviet-Turkish relations can be traced from the aftermaths of the Cyprus crises of 1964 and 1974.

Signs that American-Turkish relations were not what they had been throughout the 1950's appeared as early as the Cuban missile crisis of 1962. Despite the strenous denials of Turkish Prime Minister Inönü, many Turks believed that President Kennedy had bartered away the Jupiter missiles stationed in Turkey without consulting the Turkish government, in exchange for removal of the Soviet missiles from Cuba. The mild mistrust of the United States evoked by that incident paled in comparison to the feelings aroused in Turkey against the United States during the Cyprus crisis of 1964.

Frequent intercommunal armed clashes between Cypriot Greeks and Cypriot Turks had broken out on Cyprus late in 1963, and Turkey was considering armed intervention to aid the Turkish minority. Ankara feared that the much larger Greek community would completely subdue the Turkish

minority, and that a union of Cyprus with Greece (enosis) would pose a security threat to Turkey's South.
[Ref. 52: pp. 776]

Anxious to prevent a war between two NATO allies - Greece and Turkey - and unsure of Soviet action in such circumstances under the mercurial Khrushchev, President Lyndon B. Johnson issued a strong warning in the form of a personal letter to Prime Minister İnönü in June 1964 to not intervene in Cyprus. Although the letter did cause the Turks to reconsider and ultimately to cancel their planned invasion, it had a profoundly adverse effect on relations between the two countries. Now referred to by most Turks as the infamous "Johnson letter," its most troubling portion from the Turkish perspective was contained in one sentence, "I hope you will understand that your NATO allies have not had a chance to consider whether they have an obligation to protect Turkey against the Soviet Union if Turkey takes a step which results in Soviet intervention without the full consent and understanding of its NATO allies."
[Ref. 53: pp. 145]

Stripped of its diplomatic understatement, that sentence implied decoupling of the American NATO commitment to Turkey if the Soviet Union were provoked into military action against her by Turkish intervention in Cyprus.

Two of the Johnson letter's most significant results were a dramatic surge in anti-Americanism among

the deeply offended Turks, and a conscious decision on the part of the Inönü government to attempt a mild rapprochement with the Soviet Union.

The Soviets were likely somewhat surprised at the initial Turkish overtures, which included visits to Moscow in 1964 by Turkish parliamentarians, and by Foreign Minister Feridun Erkin in October-November 1964, the first such visit since 1939. As noted in chapter two, Khrushchev had taken a tough stance against Turkey during the Cyprus crisis in hopes of dissuading her from intervention and from causing absorption of Cyprus into the NATO alliance. And his benignly worded overtures to Turkey for "normalization" of Soviet-Turkish relations had heretofore fallen on deaf ears.

Nevertheless, the Soviets - now under new leadership - quickly adjusted to this apparent shift in Turkish policy, and reciprocated with visits by several high-ranking officials to Turkey: Presidium member Nikolai Podgorny in January 1965, and Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko in May 1965. [Ref. 52: pp. 779] The visit by Premier Alexei Kosygin to Turkey in December 1966, the first by a Soviet premier since Turkey's founding as a republic in 1923, underscored the importance with which the Soviets viewed changing their image among the wary Turks.

Typically, Soviet commentary on this early and rather tentative improvement in relations with Turkey was characterized by pugnacious allusions to Turkey's Western allies, and by a generally self-righteous tone:

> The early 1960's marked a turning point in Soviet-Turkish political relations, which acquired a new character and entered a new period. The Soviet Union has always sought to establish friendly good neighborly relations with Turkey. At that time Ankara also set about overcoming the results of the past policies, the cold war prejudicies and the covert and, sometimes, direct opposition of certain domestic and foreign forces that were eager to turn the fact that the two countries belonged to different military political alliances to their own advantage. [Ref. 54: pp. 75]

Perhaps in recognition of Turkey's greater strategic significance in comparison to Greece, and because of a growing sense that the Cyprus issue could be subtly played to Soviet advantage, Foreign Minister Gromyko endorsed a federated solution in 1965 similar to that long advocated by the Turks. Greece protested, as Gromyko's statement reflected an apparent reversal of prior Soviet support for Archbishop Makarios' attempt to merge the island politically with Greece.

Turkish disenchantment with the United States because of the Johnson letter and a growing Turkish desire to strike a more noncommittal stance between the two superpowers were likewise reflected in the Turkish decision to withdraw support for the Multilateral Force (MLF) in January 1965 (during the Podgorny visit), and in the

refusal of the Demiral government in 1966 to dispatch Turkish troops to Vietnam at the reported request of U.S. Under Secretary of Defense McNaughton. [Ref. 52: pp. 780]

A particularly important dimension of this early Soviet-Turkish rapprochement was the economic one, which will be addressed in a later section.

3. Diplomatic and Political Trends Since the 1970's

Soviet objectives vis-à-vis Turkey during the period of Soviet-Turkish rapprochement in the 1960's appear to have been: (a) to encourage Turkish perceptions of growing Soviet respectability and international restraint, and (b) to subtly widen the fissures appearing in American-Turkish relations. Those objectives and the foreign policy emanating from them continued during the next decade as well. The Czechoslovakian crisis of 1968 caused a minor set back when, following the Soviet invasion of that country, the Turkish government postponed the visit to the Soviet Union of Senate President Atasagun. [Ref. 49: pp. 53] Nevertheless, the improvement in Soviet-Turkish relations was accruing a momentum of its own which could easily overcome the slight distraction of socialist "fraternal assistance" - in the form of tanks and troops - to one of the Soviet dominions in Eastern Europe.

In the early 1970's a gradual improvement in relations with the Soviet Union seemed, furthermore, a

reasonable policy to Turkey's two principal political parties: the Justice Party (JP) under Süleyman Demirel - generally conservative in orientation - and the Republican People's Party (RPP) led by Bülent Ecevit, a movement comparable to West European social democracy. Three chief factors appear to have been behind the surprising level of bipartisan agreement on continuing Turkey's mild form of Ostpolitik. First, the Turkish political elite was influenced to a considerable degree by anxiety, lest Turkey be left behind by the general trend of East-West détente. Second, constant Soviet declarations of "friendship" and wishes for "good-neighborly relations" with Turkey, though always somewhat suspect among the Russophobe Turks, were being purveyed in the absence of East-West conflict and against the backdrop of growing Soviet economic assistance to Turkey. And, third, the Turkish political elite had a growing sense that the United States, still mired in Vietnam and moving towards a rapprochement of its own with the Soviet Union, might in the future prove to be a less reliable and concerned ally; unpleasant memories of the Johnson letter were still quite vivid.

The Soviets were thus in an ideal position to benefit from the emerging respectability in Turkey of seeking accommodation with the Soviet Union, which was graphically demonstrated by Turkish willingness to enter into a

Declaration of Principles of Good Neighborliness with the Soviet Union on April 17, 1972. [Ref. 47: pp. 17] Although short on specifics, the document's importance should not be underestimated. (Please refer to Appendix A for the text.) First, the Soviets have always attached great importance to codifying their arrangements and relations with other countries. Countries which enter into such arrangements, it is hoped by Moscow, will subsequently take greater note of Soviet inclinations on important policy matters. By the same token, such countries can always be later remonstrated in pious Soviet commentaries alleging violations of the agreement, if the policies implemented by them are not to Moscow's liking. Second, as Michael Binyon has noted, the words "Good neighborliness" constitute "high praise in the Soviet official vocabulary:" [Ref. 55] they denote satisfaction with trends in Soviet relations with countries allegedly displaying that quality, and they signify hopes for additional Soviet gains.

During the October 1973 Arab-Israeli War, Turkey (in coincidental emulation of her rival Greece) did not challenge Soviet use of Turkish airspace to resupply Egypt and Syria, yet she refused to allow the United States refueling or reconnaissance facilities during the American

airlift to Israel.[7] [Ref. 46: pp. 372] The Turkish position seems to have stemmed more from an appraisal of Turkey's developing ties with the Arab world than it did from a conscious policy choice to conform to Soviet wishes. In the context of the superpower rivalry, however, Turkey had acted in a way which benefited Moscow and inconvenienced Washington; both capitals recognized the significance of Turkey's choice.

Less than a year later, Turkey and Greece found themselves at odds again over Cyprus. The ill-fated coup d'etat against the government of Archbishop Makarios which occurred on July 15, 1974 had been led by the ex-EOKA-B Greek Cypriot terrorist Nicos Sampson. Ankara viewed this as a perilous development for the Cypriot Turkish minority. Despite the frantic efforts of American and British diplomacy to resolve the crisis peacefully, Turkey invaded the Northern part of the island in force on July 20, 1974. The remaining chronology of those distressing events has been well-documented elsewhere and will not be presented here.[8] Its significance for this discussion is to be

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[7]Uwe Nerlich has informed the author that the Turks did not challenge the Soviet claim that their resupply planes were civilian cargo planes.

[8]See especially: Stanley Karnow, "America's Mediterranean Bungle." The Atlantic, CCXXXV, 2, (February 1975) and Laurence Stern, "Bitter Lessons: How We Failed in Cyprus," Foreign Policy, XIX, (Summer 1975), for detailed (though somewhat opinionated) accounts.

found in the more notable American and Soviet reactions in the aftermath of the crisis.

The most visible and important U.S. action was the Congressional suspension of all military aid and sales to Turkey effective February 5, 1975. Adopted over the objections of President Ford, the embargo was allegedly inspired by prima facie evidence that the Turks had used American-supplied weapons in violation of the agreements under which they had been provided. Other observers, not all of whom were Turks, suggested that the embargo was the result of the so-called "Greek lobby's" successful effort to instill in Congressional and American public opinion a decidely negative impression of Turkey and a favorable one of Greece.

The embargo was in effect (despite a partial lifting in October 1975) until August 4, 1978. It proved to be a singular watershed in U.S.-Turkish relations, for it added indisputable substance to the belief of many Turkish policy makers that Turkey could no longer exclusively rely on the West (as symbolized by the U.S. and NATO) for its national security, but would have to seek a modus vivendi with not only the Soviet Union but also with its Balkan and Middle Eastern neighbors. Thus, to a very significant degree the arms embargo can be viewed as the 1975 iteration of the Johnson letter of 1964, for it became

an additional and powerful source of Turkish disillusionment with the United States, and to a considerable degree, with the North Atlantic Alliance as well.

The Soviet reaction to the Cyprus crisis of 1974 was more evenhanded and far less bellicose in tone than that carried out by Khrushchev a decade earlier. As discussed at some length in chapter two, the Soviets by 1974 were attempting to use the Cyprus issue to their advantage by (a) treading a narrow path between the Greek and Turkish positions and by (b) attempting to generate anti-NATO (and thereby anti-U.S.) sentiment in both countries through a constant drumbeat of heavy-handed rhetoric which assigned blame for the crisis to American and or "NATO circles."

The journal World Marxist Review has often served as a forum for Soviet-orchestrated characterizations of NATO's "ominous" objectives for Cyprus:

> The U.S. imperialists and the NATO countries' ruling circles seek to sabotage the international détente and provoke and whip up the arms race. By means of the NATO bloc they seek to involve Turkey in their adventurist policy. Fanning the strife between the two communities in Cyprus, Washington has been stepping up tensions in the area. The purpose of the policy pursued by Washington and its allies is to provoke the ruling circles of Turkey and Greece into taking reckless action aimed at partitioning Cyprus and turning it into a NATO base. [Ref. 56: pp. 41]

However, this observer largely shares the views of John C. Campbell in discussing the 1974 crisis:

> . . . Moscow's declared policy was at times loud, but its conduct was cautious. The USSR said little about Turkish aggression and made no move to supply arms to the Republic of Cyprus. Soviet leaders knew that they could not really affect what was done about Cyprus, but that was not so important to them. The Western powers could not settle the problem, and the result was to keep Greece and Turkey at loggerheads. [Ref. 13: pp. 13]

Taking due note of the deep disappointment Turkey felt with the United States because of the arms embargo, and perhaps judging that the ever security-conscious Turks might soon consider new sources of armaments, Moscow carried out an effort to enhance military relations with Turkey between 1976 and 1978. Turkey was but one of two Western countries (the other was Greece) invited to observe the "Kavkaz" military maneuvers which took place in the Georgian and Armenian Union Republics in January 1976. [Ref. 57: pp. 204] Close on the heels of "Kavkaz," the Deputy Chief of Staff of the Turkish Army Kenan Evren, who has since become the Turkish head of state in the military government which assumed power in September 1980, toured Soviet installations in the Moscow, Leningrad, and Volgograd Military Districts. [Ref. 42: pp. 617]

On July 18, 1976, less than two months after General Evren's visit, the new Soviet naval vessel Kiev passed through the Turkish Straits from the Black Sea into the Mediterranean. Although the Kiev is configured to carry 30-36 "Yak" vertical/short take-off and landing

(V/STOL) jet aircraft, the Soviets classify the ship as an "anti-submarine strike cruiser" rather than as an aircraft carrier. Turkey declined to challenge that designation and therefore saw no breach of the Montreux Convention, which bans the passage of aircraft carriers under any circumstance.

Coming as it did at the height of Turkish distress over the American reaction to the 1974 Cyprus crisis, the Turkish decision to not challenge passage of the Kiev may have been designed to: (a) signal Turkey's displeasure at the American arms embargo to the United States; and (b) convey to the Soviet Union a tacit message of Turkish readiness to be more accommodating about Soviet interests.

The Turkish position on the Kiev may have strengthened Soviet hopes of capitalizing on Turkey's growing estrangement from the West. Soviet Chief of Staff Marshal Ogarkov was sent to Turkey in April 1978 to demonstrate, among other things, Soviet seriousness about establishing some sort of Soviet-Turkish military linkage. Accompanied by Soviet officers of unusually high rank - Air Marshal Yefimov, Admiral Amelko, General Zotov, and General Borisov - the visit coincided with the committee level debate in the U.S. Congress of a motion to lift the three-year ban on arms supplies to Turkey. [Ref. 58] While in Turkey, Marshal Ogarkov commented on the trip to the Soviet Union

planned by then-Turkish Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit for June 1978, declaring that the visit would be "a strong and important factor for the improvement of Turkish-Soviet relations. When I say relations . . . I mean military relations as well." [Ref. 59] Upon the completion of Marshal Ogarkov's visit, the Turkish Defense Minister Hasan Esat Işik said that the Soviet Union had informed Turkey that it would examine the means at its disposal for supplying Turkey with arms, should a request be made by Ankara. [Ref. 60] Although, as near as can be determined, no such request was forwarded by the Turks, the evidence strongly suggests that had the American arms embargo not been lifted, the Soviets would have willingly assumed the role of chief arms supplier to Turkey.

The height of Soviet-Turkish political rapproachement in the post-war era likely occurred during the period bracketing Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit's trip to the Soviet Union in 1978. In an interview with The New York Times just before the visit, Ecevit revealed that he planned to sign a political document in Moscow that would stress the "friendship" between the two countries. [Ref. 61] Turkey, he said, felt "no threat" from Russia and there had been "no indications in recent years of Soviet ambitions on Turkey or Soviet intent to interfere in Turkey." [Ref. 61]. It is interesting to note, in retrospect, the striking similarities

between Ecevit's views on East-West relations and those more recently expressed by leftist Andreas Papandreou, the current Prime Minister of Greece. (Please see chapter two, for samples of those views.) Both statesmen seem to share comparably benign attitides toward the Soviet Union and somewhat skeptical views of the United States. The policies of Prime Minister Papandreou of Greece should, perhaps, therefore be observed carefully for signs of a shift to the East such as that carried out by Ecevit in Turkey some four years ago.

During Ecevit's trip to the Soviet Union in June 1978, Turkey and the Soviet Union signed the Political Document on the Principles of Good Neighborly and Friendly Co-operation. The June 23 agreement bound the two countries to develop good-neighborly relations and cooperation "on the basis of respect for one another's sovereignty, equality, way of life, public order and territorial integrity, non-interference in internal affairs, mutual security, and mutual benefit." [Ref. 62] (Please see Appendix B for the text.) Although the accord fell short of a non-aggression pact, significantly it called on both parties to "observe fully . . . refraining from the use of or threat of force, and also of refraining from the granting of their territory for the carrying out of aggression and subversive actions against other states." [Ref. 63] Obviously, a narrow

interpretation of that particular provision would not onl, very likely cause a suspension in U.S. surveillance activity of the USSR from Turkish territory, but would probably also preclude use of Turkish bases for contingency staging of Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (RDJTF) assets prior to their employment in an acute Middle Eastern or Persian Gulf crisis.

Soviet Premier Alexei Kosygin, at a state dinner given in honor of Prime Minister Ecevit, deftly outlined Soviet hopes for enhancing ties with Turkey as a result of the Political Document:

> The agreed-upon draft of the political document on the principles of good-neighborly and friendly co-operation between the Soviet Union and the Turkish Republic opens up new possibilities, in the light of this, for co-operation between our countries both in the field of bilateral relations and in the international scene. [Ref. 64]

No less tactful, but perhaps more candid expressions of Soviet satisfaction with Turkish entry into the accord appeared in the Soviet journal International Affiars:

> . . . the Political Document does not only follow in the footsteps of the Declaration of 1972 but enriches and develops it in keeping with the latest tendencies in the world and in Soviet-Turkish relations, raising them to a new level.
>
> The negotiations in Moscow showed in fact that Soviet-Turkish relations are independent of the parties' relations with other countries and . . . that Turkey, while giving priority to its own national requirements and adopting a sober approach to the existing realities, is persistently seeking ways of ensuring its genuine security, reassessing to this end the foreign political concepts of the cold war period. [Ref. 54: pp. 76]

And, following the signing of the pact, Ecevit revealed the extent to which he judged Turkey to now be on good terms with the Soviet Union when he declared that the Soviet leadership had acted "in consciousness of the fact that though we are close friends, we are both members of different alliances." [Ref. 62]

Thus, the signing of the Political Document was an extraordinarily important development in Soviet-Turkish relations and in the history of the North Atlantic Alliance. First, it reflected the depth of profound resentment and disappointment Turkey felt for the United States, and for NATO as a collective Western entity, which had their origins in American miscalculation of Turkish sensitivities during the 1964 Cyprus crisis and in the aftermath of the 1974 Cyprus crisis. Second, it graphically demonstrated the extent to which the Soviets had been able to temper the historically Russophobe Turks' mistrust of the Soviet Union through patient, careful diplomacy and restrained international conduct. Third, and of great concern for NATO (one hopes) is the apparent conflict between the provision of the pact prohibiting Turkey from granting "territory for the carrying out of aggression and subversive actions . . ." and Turkish adherence to Articles Three (dealing with collective capacity, joint action, etc. . .) and Eight

(prohibiting entry into commitments which may conflict with the NATO Treaty) of the North Atlantic Alliance.

Signs of a closer Soviet-Turkish relationship soon followed. In November 1978, some five months after the Soviet-Turkish accord was signed, two Soviet warships arrived in Istanbul for the first naval courtesy visit to Turkey in almost 40 years. [Ref. 65] Highlighting the importance of the visit was the fact that the Commander in Chief of the Soviet Union's Black Sea Fleet, Vice Admiral Nikolai I. Khovrin was embarked on one of the ships - the cruiser Dzerzhinsky. [Ref. 65] This was reciprocated by the visit of two Turkish destroyers under the command of Vide Admiral Toktamis, to the Black Sea port of Odessa in December 1978.

Prime Minister Ecevit's declaration in 1979 that Soviet permission would have to be secured in advance of American U-2 flights over Turkey for SALT II verification purposes, also suggested that Soviet sensitivities would play an increasingly important role in the desiderata of Turkish national security policy formulation. The flights were considered by the United States after the loss of two electronic listening posts in Iran earlier that year. [Ref. 66] A high-ranking Soviet official said in May 1979 that Moscow, not surprisingly, would "receive positively any Turkish decision not to allow the U-2 flights." [Ref. 66]

Although by that time the American arms embargo had been lifted for almost a year, American-Turkish relations were still strained by Congressional refusal to approve a sizeable military aid commitment to Ankara. [Ref. 42: pp. 630]

On the other hand, Prime Minister Ecevit did permit the reopening in late 1978 of four U.S. intelligence-monitoring installations in Turkey when the arms embargo was officially lifted - notwithstanding the June 1978 Soviet-Turkish Political Document. An extremely shrewd politician, Ecevit seems to have been confident of his ability to discern which Turkish actions could be expected to provoke Soviet anger and which might evoke Soviet displeasure - U-2 flights presumably having the former characteristic.

Soviet unhappiness with Turkey's willingness to continue close military relations with the United States was subsequently expressed by a Soviet political commentator in July 1980:

> . . . the U.S. administration is using the Afghan and Iranian events as a pretext for stepping up aggressive military preparations in the Middle East, including Turkey. It is from these positions that one should view the new U.S.-Turkish military agreement that was signed in late March this year and which boils down to the retention of U.S. military bases with U.S. military personnel on Turkish territory. It is no secret to anyone that these bases are aimed, first and foremost, against the Soviet Union and Turkey's other neighbors. [Ref. 67: pp. 120]

The same author was not bashful about providing a candid Soviet prescription for a more "realistic" Turkish approach to Soviet-Turkish relations:

> Realistically-minded people in Turkey, regardless of their social status, are well aware that the course toward détente, toward strengthening and developing good-neighborly relations with the Soviet Union, and not toward confrontation with its northern neighbor, is best suited to their country's national interests. [Ref. 67: pp. 120]

The accession to power in Ankara of a military regime led by Army Chief of Staff General Kenan Evren on September 12, 1980 was quite likely viewed as a negative development by the Soviets. Several reasons for such a judgement can be cited. First, the Turkish military made no secret of its pro-NATO orientation and preference for American military equipment over Soviet arms. Second, both the previous post-World War II military regimes which briefly held power in Turkey had suppressed leftist political activities; probably the Soviets felt this one would do so as well - and it has. Third, the military coup may have been an unintended by-product of indirect Soviet efforts to destabilize the Turkish body politic. Suspicions had been deepening among many well-informed Turks that the Soviet Union was providing covert support to many of the leftists elements responsible for the chronic political violence and terrorism that dominated Turkish life from the late 1970's until quite recently.

4. Economic Relations and Trends Since the 1960's

Economic agreement, focusing on aid, industrial construction projects, and loans comprised a major component of the Soviet-Turkish rapprochement which started in the mid-1960's. Spurred by the eight-day visit of Soviet Premier Kosygin to Turkey in late December 1966, a Soviet-Turkish economic agreement was effected in March 1967 in which the Soviet Union pledged to help finance six indistrial projects: an aluminum factory at Seydişehir, an oil refinery near Izmir, a sulphuric acid factory at Bandirma, the Seyit Omer transmission line, an iron and steel factory at Iskenderün, and a fiber-sheet factory at Artvin. [Ref. 68: pp. 32] Between 1967 and 1975 Soviet loans to Turkey totalled nearly $700 million.

During Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit's watershed visit to Moscow in June 1978, significant agreements were reached in the economic as well as political spheres. The two countries signed agreements which resulted in: (a) Soviet pledges to sell Turkey three million tons of crude oil a year starting in 1979 (payment to be made in Turkish wheat); (b) a three-year trade accord which envisioned increasing the Soviet-Turkish commercial exchange by 250 percent per year; and (c) a Soviet offer to provide technical assistance to Turkey for indigenous oil prospecting. [Ref. 69]

A year later, an even more elaborate economic arrangement was concluded. The June 5, 1979 accord called for the Soviets to build a nuclear power plant in Turkey, to guarantee fuel supplies for its operation and to provide financing for one half of the reactor's cost. [Ref. 70] An additional $400 million in project credits were promised by the Soviets for a doubling of the Iskenderün iron and steel complex to an annual capacity of 2 billion tons, and for the building of a new hydrogen peroxide plant and thermal plant. The agreement also called for an increase in Soviet electricity supplies to Turkey's Eastern and Black Sea provinces to 2.4 billion KWH a year, by means of erecting an additional power transmission line between the two countries. [Ref. 70]

The politically ambivalent nature of Soviet-Turkish economic agreements has aroused little interest in NATO circles, particularly as such agreements could be construed, until recently, as occurring in the general context of East-West détente, and against the backdrop of even more substantial economic exchanges between the Soviet Union and certain West European governments, especially West Germany. Additionally, perhaps some Western observers were glad to see any government besides their own, profferring assistance to the feeble Turkish economy.

Turkey has sought closer economic ties with the Soviet Union principally for three main purposes: (a) to obtain large capital loans on liberal terms for heavy industrial projects; (b) to expand her volume of foreign trade; and (c) to obtain an additional source of critical fuel and electricity. In light of her economic circumstances in the late 1970's, which were characterized by rampant inflation and a weak balance of payments position, Turkey's willingness to accept aid from whatever source can be understood. Soviet terms were generous, and the Soviets wisely did not openly make Turkish political concessions part of the price for Soviet assistance.

Nevertheless, Soviet motives for offering economic packages of such impressive magnitude to the Turks were probably inspired by more than hopes of accruing Turkish friendship. If Turkey could be made gradually dependent on continued Soviet assistance and somewhat reliant on imports of Soviet oil and electricity, then it would not be unreasonable to expect Turkey to hesitate before opposing Soviet interests on key issues of political or military concern. Furthermore, displays of economic generosity and largesse were fully in keeping with Soviet efforts to achieve convincing credibility as a trustworthy and sober neighbor.

Premier Alexei Kosygin candidly expressed the Soviet view of the benefits stemming from improved economic relations between his country and Turkey, during the state banquet given in honor of Prime Minister Ecevit in 1978:

> . . . political relations usually become stronger and more stable with the expansion of practical, business ties and contacts and, in their turn, exert a stimulating influence on the course of economic and other co-operation between states. [Ref. 64]

Turkey, of course, had and still has legitimate economic concerns and difficulties which lead her to seek such assistance with less concern for its source than for its nature and the generosity of relevant terms.

Even the conservative military government which came to power in Ankara in September 1980 has exchanged trade and industry delegations with the Soviets, despite its conscious cooling of other Turkish ties with the USSR. [Ref. 71] Thus, in March 1981, the Soviet Union agreed to provide Turkey $200 million in credits, repayable over ten years at five percent annual interest, to help pay for an expansion program at the Seydişehir aluminum smelter. [Ref. 72] The agreement followed a three-day visit to Turkey by the chairman of the Soviet state committee for foreign economic relations, Semyon Skachkov, leading a trade delegation. [Ref. 72]

5. Soviet Links to Turkish Terrorism: A Twisted Trail

There has been much speculation among Western analysts about Soviet involvement in the political violence which gripped Turkey from 1976 until just recently. The evidence available in open sources tends to be circumstantial and indirect, but also suggestive of a major Soviet role in sponsoring such violence.

Politically related killings in Turkey became a major problem in 1976 when 104 such deaths were reported. [Ref. 73: pp. 36] The level of violence increased dramatically during the 1978-1979 period, while more than 800 killings occurred in the first five months of 1980 alone. [Ref. 74]

According to George S. Harris, there were three somewhat distinct patterns to the violence. First, a large number of deaths resulted from sociological causes such as the importation of ethnic or religious feuds from the countryside to the rapidly growing Turkish cities of the late 1970's. Second, violent clashes between members of opposing political factions accounted for a substantial portion of the unrest - particularly during commemorative occasions (such as May Day rallies). Well-organized leftist groups appear to have initiated this aspect of the upheaval, and the rightists soon reciprocated in kind, starting a seemingly never-ending cycle of attack and

reprisal. Attacks against security forces in Turkey's unstable East, frequently carried out by leftist groups advocating autonomy rule for Kurdish peoples, comprised the third pattern of the violence. [Ref. 73: pp. 37-38]

The latter two patterns of political violence have been associated primarily with the Soviet Union. Evidence unearthed thus far by Turkish officials has revealed two dimensions of support for the violence in which Soviet sponsorship was probable - arms and funding - and one in which Soviet sponsorship was certain - propaganda.

When Turkey's military government started strictly enforcing martial law in late 1980, it launched a vigorous campaign to confiscate illegally acquired firearms. By October 1981 the government had seized more than 730,000 weapons. [Ref. 75] Most of those are believed to have entered Turkey through what Turkish journalist Oktay Eski satirically called "our good neighbor policy " in allusion to shipments by truck across the Bulgarian frontier and to large-scale smuggling across a "wide-open Syrian frontier." [Ref. 76] Neither Bulgaria nor Syria appear to have had the political incentive or wherewithal to have effected the massive gun running which took place, and clearly both governments had been induced by some other party to look the other way.

Turkish security officials estimated the cost of carrying out the terrorism in Turkey between 1978 and 1981 to be approximately $1 billion. According to Admiral Işik Beren, who ordered a study done of terrorist bank robberies in Turkey during the past three years:

> The money taken during all these robberies adds up to no more than 2 percent of the real cost of terrorism during the period. We were surprised to find that bank robberies netted the terrorists so little. Links between terrorism and drug trafficking are being uncovered, but this is not credible as the major source of funds. [Ref. 77]

In view of the foregoing circumstances, most Turkish officials have concluded that the political terrorism was supported as part of a covert destabilization scheme underwritten by the Soviet Union. [Ref. 77] One cabinet minister in Süleyman Demirel's pre-coup government of 1979-1980 even went so far as to assert that the Soviets had aspirations to capture the country "from inside." [Ref. 78] In fact, of the likely sources of outside support, only the Soviet Union would seem to have had the resources, organizational competence, and experience to have manipulated such a program of profound destabilization. According to Soviet KGB defector Victor Sakharov, the KGB's VIII department had the objective of mounting a "brutal campaign of urban terrorism, kidnapping, and assassination against Turkey." [Ref. 79: pp. 234]

Remarks made by the Tass correspondent in Turkey, Aleksiyev Erocenkov, to the German magazine Stern in January 1980 may have inadvertently hinted at the Soviet role in promoting political instability. Erocenkov had said Turkey would be turned into a socialist state. [Ref. 76] Shortly thereafter Turkey requested that he depart Turkey because he had been "involved with Turkish internal affairs." [Ref. 80]

With regard to the role of Soviet-inspired propaganda in promoting turmoil in Turkey, this observer agrees to a large extent with Paul B. Henze's observation that:

> . . . there is one solid body of evidence that cannot be contradicted: the two Soviet-supported radio stations broadcasting to Turkey from Eastern Europe. "Bizim Radyo" (Our Radio) and the Voice of the Turkish Communist Party have encouraged extremism in the same way the Baku-based National Voice of Iran fomented unrest in that country. [Ref. 77]

Paralleling the broadcast campaigns during the increasing unrest of the late 1970's, the emigré Turkish Communist Party (TCP) kept up a constant drumbeat of Marxist exhortation in Soviet-sponsored publications encouraging leftist participation in the unrest:

> The Turkish people are mounting an active struggle for their vital interests. Here are some of the most important mass actions of the past several years: the May Day demonstrations and rallies in 1976, 1977, and 1978, the 1976 general strike with the demand to eliminate the State Security Courts, the eight-month long strike by

> metal workers against local and foreign monopolies in 1977 and 1978, and the general strike against the fascist terror in March last year . . .
>
> Alongside the anti-imperialist and anti-fascist slogans, the working people put forward this demand: 'Freedom for the CPT!' All of this is the result of the Turkish communists' well-considered and painstaking preparatory work with the use of legal and illegal methods. [Ref. 56: pp. 37]

Likewise, promoting unrest among the Kurdish peoples of Eastern Turkey was evidently a particularly important objective for the TCP:

> Class battles are becoming increasingly acute in the Kurdish areas. The Kurdish peasants are stepping up their struggle against survivals of feudalism and the landowners. The mounting national movement of the Kurds is acquiring a distinct social hue. By resisting national oppression and discrimination the Kurds are contributing to the fight against enemy number one of the whole Turkish people, namely international imperialism and the Turkish monopoly bourgeoisie cooperating with it. [Ref. 81: pp. 14]

On balance, Soviet support of the Turkish political unrest can be said to have probably encompassed indirect funding and arming of violent factions, and to certainly have included a Soviet-encouraged propaganda campaign to foment turmoil.

Nevertheless, two vexing questions are raised by these judgments. First, why would the Soviets have provided substantial support and encouragement to movements whose goals were the downfall of Turkish regimes with which the USSR had painstakingly improved relations - regimes which,

moreover, often apparently assigned weight to Soviet foreign policy concerns and interests before acting? Second, when it became grossly apparent to knowledgeable observers of the Turkish political scene in 1979 and in 1980 that the Turkish military was becoming increasingly discontented with the paralysis of civilian governments in the face of chronic political unrest, why would the Soviets have persisted in supporting actions which surely would invite a military accession to power?

The following supposition may provide a partial answer: Soviet policy towards Turkey could well have been derived from two or more competitive and powerful bureaucratic claimants for the responsibility for its formulation. One claimant, presumably the Foreign Ministry, may have been urging continued improvement of state to state relations as the best way to achieve Soviet aims in Turkey. A rival claimant, probably the KGB, may have insisted on pursuing an aggressive effort of political destabilization as a means of attaining a faster and more complete pay-off. The resulting bureaucratic compromise consequently retained strands of both claimants' wishes. If this analysis is accurate, then it suggests that domestic bureaucratic considerations in the USSR may well have contributed to a Soviet foreign policy failure of some magnitude, by fostering circumstances which brought to power in Turkey a decidedly conservative military government.

D. A SUMMING UP: SOVIET POLICY TOWARDS TURKEY

Analysis of Soviet policies toward Turkey since World War II suggests that a defining characteristic of Soviet perceptions of Turkey has been an abiding appreciation of her essential strategic worth as simultanously the possessor of the Dardanelles and Bosphorous, and as a rugged land barrier separating the Soviet Union from Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and points south. That appreciation has translated into a program of Soviet efforts to shift Turkish alignment with the West to a closer and more accommodative affiliation with the Soviet Union.

Under Stalin, the Soviets hoped to gain by intimidation and ultimatum territorial concessions and revisions to the Montreux Convention which would have been decisively favorable to the USSR. Stalin's brusque probing proved extremely counterproductive to Soviet interests; for it helped lead to the Truman Doctrine, and inspired the Turks to seek permanent security arrangements with the West.

Soviet-Turkish relations reached a turning point in 1965 in the aftermath of the first major post-war strain in the American-Turkish relationship. It was during that period that the essential outline of modern Soviet approaches to Turkey came to be distinguished by the following features: (a) diplomatic and political efforts to improve Soviet-Turkish state relations and to cultivate an image of

credibility and "good neighborliness;" (b) a readiness to offer financial assistance and trade considerations on the most favorable terms; and (c) a wary alertness for signs of tension in Turkey's relations with the United States, or with the West, which might be turned to the Soviet advantage.

During the mid to late 1960's the Soviets' restrained and careful policy towards Turkey brought about a mild improvement in state-to-state relations, and Turkey acted somewhat more independently of the United States. But it was between 1972 and 1979 that the Soviets clearly achieved notable success in imposing several of their concerns, wishes, and anxieties onto the framework of Turkish national security considerations. Carefully mixing patient diplomacy and attractive economic overtures, the Soviets availed themselves of the opportunities furnished by East-West détente and the openings rendered irresistible by the American arms embargo. The principal examples of Soviet success in inducing some convergence of Turkish policies and diplomatic behavior with Soviet objectives can be summarized chronologically as follows:

April 1972:	Signing of Soviet-Turkish accord entitled The Declaration of the Principles of Good Neighborliness.
October 1973:	Turkish willingness to grant the Soviet Union overflight rights to resupply Syria and Egypt during the Yom Kippur War; Turkish denial of refueling

facilities to American aircraft during that war.[9]

July 1976: Turkish acceptance of the Soviet designation of the Kiev as an "anti-submarine strike cruiser," thereby permitting its passage through the Turkish Straits.

May 1978: Prime Minister Ecevit's declaration that Turkey felt "no threat" from the Soviet Union.

June 1978: Signing of Soviet-Turkish accord entitled the Political Document on the Principles of Good Neighborly and Friendly Cooperation.

June 1979: Turkish denial of permission to United States to conduct U-2 flights over Turkey for SALT II verification purposes, unless Soviet permission obtained in advance.

If the years from 1972 to 1979 may be viewed as a period in which Soviet influence in Turkey was an upward arching curve, since the installation of a military government in Ankara in September 1980 that curve has started to visibly descend. The perception on the part of Turkey's leadership that the Soviet Union actively supported political extremists and terrorists during the volatile 1976-1980 period, has dampened the Generals' enthusiasm for maintaining a Soviet-Turkish rapprochement. Trade relations and economic arrangements may still be sustained, but even in this realm

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[9]As noted in an earlier section this decision by Turkey probably resulted more out of concern for Arab-Turkish harmony than out of concern for Soviet sensitivities. However, because the Turkish action resulted in a demonstrable gain for the Soviet Union, it warrants inclusion in this list.

there are indications that Turkey's economic planners are unhappy with some of the barter contracts signed with the Soviets in the 1970's.

The Soviets have taken a somewhat cautious approach since the military took power. Only recently have there been signs of criticism in the official Soviet media, such as that contained in a recent article in Trud, the Soviets' official trade union newspaper:

> Disquieting reports are coming from Turkey. The life of the leaders and activists [of the main leftist union groupings] is in danger. [Ref. 82]

Probably the Soviets are hopeful that the military will eventually step down and be replaced by a civilian political regime more responsive to Soviet pressure and concerns. The Soviets, of course, remain keenly alert for signs of strain in American-Turkish relations and/or increases in anti-American sentiment; it is a matter of historical record that such circumstances have tended to cause Turkey to seek improved relations with the Soviet Union.

In January 1982 American defense sources revealed that Turkey has asked the United States for permission to purchase 291 advanced American fighter-bombers - either the F-16 or the land version of the F-18 [Ref. 83]; the proposed sale must be approved by the Congress as well as the administration. If Ankara finds the American reply wanting, the Kremlin, just as it has done for the past twenty-nine

years, will patiently and skillfully try to channel Ankara's disappointment onto paths deemed beneficial to Soviet interests, and inauspicious for those of the Western Alliance.

IV. A COMPARISON OF SOVIET POLICY TOWARDS GREECE WITH SOVIET POLICY TOWARDS TURKEY

A. INTRODUCTION: THE GRECO-TURKISH RIVALRY

More than a third of a century has passed since the end of World War II, and in that relatively brief span Greece and Turkey have been on the brink of open warfare three times. Twice, in fact, they have committed elements of their regular armed forces to directly support their respective proxies in Cyprus. Potentially more serious contentions have been raised owing to conflicting claims of sovereignty in the Aegean Sea, where underground oil deposits are suspected. Because of recent political change in Greece, arbitration of these disputes has become less likely. Unless both parties can be encouraged to resolve their differences through patient, albeit frustrating diplomacy, the West ought not to be surprised by an outbreak of hostilities, relatively soon, over the acrimonious Aegean Sea disputes.

This is not a very original state of affairs; the Greco-Turkish rivalry is one of the oldest and most notorious in the West. Divided by religion and language, and by memories of old grudges and slights, the two countries nevertheless share a wide range of cultural and sociological affinities. In fact, it is hard not to conceive of Greece without also

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



thinking of Turkey and vice versa. Talk to a Greek and invariably, even involuntarily, the subject will gradually shift to Turkey, or to Greco-Turkish disputes, or to Cyprus. Talk to a Turk and the same process will transpire, though in reverse.

An appreciation of the foregoing historical and cultural dynamic is essential in forging prescriptions for any state's foreign policy towards either Balkan nation. All states which presume to conduct diplomatic relations with both Greece and Turkey find themselves occasionally forced to pursue a wary balancing act in which their interests in Greece must be appraised, measured, and even offset by their interests in Turkey, and vice versa. The more widespread and significant those interests the greater the caution, it would seem, with which approaches to both countries have to be gauged.

The Soviet Union has not been exempt from having to face the realities of the Ankara-Athens rivalry, particularly during periods of improving relations with one, or the other, or with both. The Soviets have not, however, felt constrained to give the appearance of a relatively impartial dual-track approach to Greece and Turkey. Since the end of the Second World War, and particularly since the death of Stalin, no state has practiced the venerable art of Real-politik with more sangfroid and with greater shrewdness than has the Soviet Union in Western Europe. Hence the Soviets

have not been reluctant to appear to favor one party over the other when they thought it more opportune to do so. In Soviet eyes, Turkey has always been the greater strategic prize, and Moscow's policies have correspondingly reflected such an asymmetry.

This chapter compares, contrasts, and notes interactions of Soviet policy towards Greece and Turkey. The analysis and evidence contained in preceeding chapters is synthesized from a broad policy perspective. The concluding section of the thesis, which follows this chapter, examines Soviet approaches towards Greece and Turkey in the context of Soviet policy towards Western Europe.

B. THE TWO CASES COMPARED: RECURRING THEMES IN SOVIET-GREEK AND SOVIET-TURKISH RELATIONS

Stalin's approaches to Greece and Turkey in the period following World War II were not tempered by any of the sophistication which characterized his successors. Soviet prospects in countries judged to be within the sphere of potential Soviet influence, were weighed dispassionately, and in the absence of even superficial regard for those countries' political preferences.

Given the sequence of Soviet disassociation from the Greek Communist insurgency in 1946, it seems clear that Stalin considered a Communist victory there to be of minor importance in comparison to the perils of Western (U.S.) opposition that might well arise in such a circumstance.

Stalin was clearly not concerned about seeking some sort of balance in his Greek and Turkish policies, nor did he apparently consider that they should be two sides of the same coin. From his perspective it was important to make gains quickly - if they were to be made at all - prior to an awakening on the part of the West (particularly the Americans) as to just what the Soviet Union was attempting to achieve in Central and Southeastern Europe. Because he judged Turkey to be of great strategic significance and largely bereft of sympathetic allies, Stalin prodded for Turkish weaknesses which could be turned to Soviet advantage. Greece, on the other hand, could count on complete (though insufficient) British support in her struggle against Communist insurgency. The Truman Doctrine, announced in March 1947, of course changed the level of risk Stalin perceived as impinging on his aspirations for Turkey. And it convinced him of the wisdom of withdrawing even propaganda support for the Greek Communist rebellion.

Soviet policy towards Greece and Turkey, as practiced by Stalin, was thus shaped by the immediate post-war objective of enhancing Soviet security through an expansion of Moscow's dominions in quarters thought unlikely to provoke Western challenge. Thus, in looking towards Athens, Stalin saw not the Greek government, but an image of British and perhaps American strength which served to underscore his misgivings about supporting the Communist uprising. And in

looking towards Ankara, he at first had seen nothing but a rather isolated Turkish government which he deemed potentially tractable to forceful Soviet demands.

The accession to NATO by both Greece and Turkey on the same day (February 18, 1952) probably served notice to Moscow that resistance to Communist pressures had worked against Soviet interests by encouraging them to join the Western Alliance. Once in the alliance Greece and Turkey had dramatically changed their status from rather weak and solitary states, potentially susceptible to Soviet duress, to formal allies of Moscow's principal antagonist, the United States. Greece and Turkey had voluntarily joined a grouping of states viewed with considerable suspicion by Moscow, and whose long-term goals have always been depicted by the Soviets in the most stark and bellicose phraseology. Thus Greece and Turkey had become participants in a security arrangement which seems to have aroused Soviet apprehension from its inception. Correspondingly, future Soviet policy towards both nations would have to consider their NATO membership. No longer could they routinely be judged candidates for overt Soviet military encroachment, but, rather, targets for indirect approaches designed to weaken their allegiance to the West.

With the changes in Soviet leadership after Stalin's death in 1953, variations in Soviet policy towards Western Europe (including Greece and Turkey) manifested themselves

as well. Some of the apparently new Soviet positions may well have been inevitable, no matter who led the Politburo. Nevertheless, the dramatic contrast between Stalin's dour and somewhat outdated Bolshevik world view and Khrushchev's ebulliently purveyed theme of "peaceful coexistence" caused such changes as did occur to appear as sharp distinctions. A Soviet effort to improve state-to-state relations with many West European governments was one such policy shift which had implications for Greece and Turkey. Soviet goals, though always somewhat obscure, very likely included hopes that Greek and Turkish perceptions of Soviet respectability would make possible more sympathetic considerations of Soviet positions and interests.

Starting in 1953, the Soviets began a rather well-organized campaign to convince Turkey of the prudence of improving relations with Moscow. As discussed in the preceeding chapter, this campaign included a Soviet withdrawal of Stalin's peremptory territorial claims, and pleas for "normalization" of relations from Khrushchev as well as from authoritative spokesmen in Soviet sponsored publications such as International Affairs and Soviet News.

Greece, on the other hand, seemed to command less attention from the Kremlin than did Turkey. Apart from the July 23, 1953 announcement that Soviet diplomatic representation in Greece was to be upgraded to ambassadorial status from the chargé d'affaires level, not much else of

note could be observed in the evolution of Soviet-Greek relations during the early 1950's. Perhaps, then, it was not coincidental that Khrushchev failed to mention Greece even once in a December 1955 foreign policy speech before the Supreme Soviet, while devoting more than 100 words to Soviet-Turkish matters.[10]

Yet, to a significant extent, the differences that existed in Moscow's approaches to Greece and Turkey during the 1950's were more differences of degree, and not of policy orientation. Khrushchev seemed committed to improving the image of the Soviet Union in both Balkans, as well as elsewhere, by combining overtures for improved relations with his now routine theme of peaceful coexistence. That more attention was apparently being focused an Ankara rather than on Athens no doubt reflected a less than entirely cynical appraisal of the relative importance of the two countries, and of the prospects for Soviet gains in each. This general Soviet quest to improve relations with Greece and Turkey became an important and almost monotonously unvarying feature of Moscow's policies towards these two nations that has persisted to the present day.

As the 1960's unfolded, Soviet approaches to Turkey in particular came to be characterized by an additional

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[10]The speech appeared in Pravda on December 30, 1955 and was later reprinted in New Times, 2, January 5, 1956.

important feature - the readiness to channel dissatisfaction with American policy into routes judged beneficial to Moscow's interests. This particular aspect of Soviet policy did not become noticeably decipherable in Moscow's approaches to Greece until the 1970's simply because American-Greek relations remained superficially cordial throughout the 1960's.

Khrushchev's successors were quick to respond to the initially hesitant shift to the east undertaken by Turkish leaders in the aftermath of several American-Turkish rifts. Soviet-Turkish relations thus expanded during this period to include symbolically important visits by the Turkish Foreign Minister to the USSR and by Soviet Premier Kosygin to Turkey. Such events were noticeably absent from the Soviet-Greek scene until well into the 1970's.

Interestingly, Soviet trade initiatives with Greece in the 1960's yielded some modest gains and seemed to mirror both in timing and in scope similar initiatives undertaken with Turkey. One such example of apparent economic duality occurred in October 1964. On October 8, the Western press reported that Turkey and the Soviet Union would jointly build a $15 million dam and irrigation project on the Arpa River, which forms the frontier between them. [Ref. 84] Less than a week later, on October 14, 1964, Greece and the Soviet Union signed a five-year trade agreement which pledged, among other things, to double the value of their trade by

1969. [Ref. 85] Though one cannot discount the possibility of coincidental timing, the essential overlap of the two events seemed calculated to convey a net impression of Soviet evenhandedness.

The seemingly generous and reasonable economic linkages being proffered by the Soviets also underscored Moscow's presistent efforts to demonstrate Soviet respectability to Athens and Ankara, and may have been partially designed to sow seeds of uncertainty in the heretofore reflexively pro-American orientation of both capitals. Certainly the Soviets had fertile ground to work with in Turkey, where national sensibilities had been deeply offended by President Johnson's letter during the 1964 Cyprus crisis.[11]

Soviet economic overtures to Greece and Turkey became more visible in the 1970's owing to the growing momentum of détente-encouraged East-West exchanges, and to Moscow's correct belief that both governments were seeking to become more independent economic and political actors. Soviet-Greek relations gradually acquired some of the hues of Soviet-

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[11]The Cyprus issue appears to have been an intriguing intersection of Soviet policy towards Greece with that towards Turkey. Conceptually, it would appear likely that the Soviets have been compelled to chose between one side of the other despite an ingrained Soviet preference for making very general statements which can be construed as support for all sides in disputes involving countries with whom they seek to ingratiate themselves. These issues should be explored further.

Turkish relations, although, particularly in the first part of the decade, it appeared that the former were addressed by Moscow almost as afterthoughts to more concerted efforts to influence the latter.

The Soviets had reasons apart from obvious strategic considerations for putting greater stress on Soviet-Turkish relations in the early 1970's. First, the military junta which ruled Greece from 1967 until 1974 was probably believed less tractable to Soviet influence over its foreign and domestic policies than the democratic governments in Ankara. Second, anti-Americanism in Greece lagged behind the rise of the same phenomenom in Turkey by several years, although at its peak it exceeded in vehemence the Turkish variety. With the fall of the junta in Athens in late July 1974, new opportunities for advancing Soviet interests in Greece may have seemed imminent, for the new government in Athens withdrew from NATO's military infrastructure. That action, when viewed alongside the Turkish reaction to the American arms embargo, presaged a period in both countries when a precondition for domestic political success was a professed anti-Americanism.

The Soviets, moving cautiously to take advantage of Greek and Turkish distress with the United States, seemed to act from two key propositions. First was the perception that this unusual convergence of anti-American (and anti-NATO) sentiment in Greece and Turkey presented Moscow a

singular and perhaps not to be repeated occasion to expand Soviet ties with, and ultimately influence in the two countries, at American expense. Second, the Kremlin was quite aware of the fact that a series of American mis-judgements, not the effectiveness of Soviet propaganda, had created this set of circumstances. The lessons of the American example were evidently discerned by Moscow, for the Soviets acted as if they understood the perils of becoming perceived by either party as too closely associated with the rival across the Aegean. Thus, more than at any prior stage in the development of post-war Soviet policy towards these two states, an interactive effect seemed to link Soviet-Greek relations with Soviet-Turkish relations.

Indications of that interactive effect are discernible in the following chronological summary of several key events in Soviet-Greek and Soviet-Turkish relations of the late 1970's:

Soviet-Greek Events	Soviet-Turkish Events
January 1976:	
Greek observer invited to view Soviet "Kavkaz" military maneuvers, in Armenia and Georgia SSR's.	Turkish observer invited to view Soviet "Kavkaz" military maneuvers, in Armenia and Georgia SSR's.
June 1978:	
	Turkish Prime Minister Ecevit visits Moscow; signs "Political Document of Principles of Good Neighborly and Friendly Co-operation;" signs trade pledge.

Soviet-Greek Events	Soviet-Turkish Events
September 1978:	
Greek Foreign Minister Rallis visits Moscow; signs trade pledge.	
September 1978:	
Two Greek Destroyers pay port visit to Odessa.	
October 1978:	
Two Soviet Warships call in Athens.	
November 1978:	
	Two Soviet Warships call in Istanbul.
December 1978:	
	Two Turkish Warships pay port visit to Odessa.
May 1979:	
	Prime Minister Ecevit declares Soviet permission would have to be obtained in advance of American U-2 flights over Turkish territory for SALT-II verification purposes.[12]

[12]These latter two listings are arguably closer to the category of "results" of Soviet policy endeavors than they are to the category of official bilateral "events." They have been delineated above to depict their curiously similar timing; both announcements were made almost exactly one year after important state visits to Moscow by the Foreign Minister, in the case of Greece, and the Prime Minister in the case of Turkey.

Soviet-Greek Events	Soviet-Turkish Events
September 1979:	
Greek government announces it will repair Soviet Naval auxiliary vessels at Greek shipyards.[12]	

The timing of the high level Greek and Turkish visits to Moscow in 1978 and the subsequent series of warship visits seemed indicative of a Soviet program designed to balance, whenever possible, efforts vis-à-vis Greece with those with regard to Turkey.

Of course, achieving such a balance may not always have seemed possible, or perhaps even necessary from the Soviet perspective as long as a general perception of Soviet-Turkish and Soviet-Greek proportionality was maintained. Moscow seemed to consider Soviet prospects for success more promising in Turkey, which fortuitously was the more strategically significant of the two countries. As a result, the visit by Soviet Chief of Staff Marshal Ogarkov to Ankara in April 1978 had no analogue in the Soviet-Greek milieu, and neither was Athens the recipient of Soviet offers of military assistance as had been Ankara following the Ogarkov visit.

Both Greece and Turkey found themselves objects of a concerted Soviet campaign to increase trade with Moscow during the late 1970's. Invariably each trip to the USSR by a high-ranking Greek or Turkish official resulted, among

other things, in either a new trade agreement or a pledge to discuss increased economic cooperation. Soviet economic policy towards Turkey was distinguished from that towards Greece by encompassing a far wider program of large, inexpensive loans and major industrial projects. Significantly, both countries at the end of the decade found themselves more dependent on Soviet and or Warsaw Pact imports of crude oil, natural gas, and electricity than they had been in 1970.

Soviet initiatives to encourage energy accords were no doubt inspired by more than economic motivations. By adding substance through such transactions to an artfully conveyed image of growing Soviet maturity and respectability, Moscow was setting itself off as a counterweight and possible future alternative to Washington. Further, the growth in Greek and Turkish imports of Soviet bloc fuels and electricity could not help but widen Moscow's options for dealing with Athens and Ankara during future East-West crises.

C. CONCLUSIONS AND PROSPECTS

The foregoing analysis suggests that although there have been divergencies in the Soviets' approaches towards both countries, there have been some clear-cut similarities as well.

In the main, the dimensions in common between these two approaches, as regulated by Moscow, came to include the

following features: (a) diplomatic efforts to improve state-to-state relations and to build up an image of Soviet credibility; (b) a watchfulness for Greek and Turkish dissatisfaction over relations with the United States which might be turned to Moscow's advantage; and (c) encouragement of widened Greek and Turkish trade, economic, and energy linkages with Warsaw Pact nations. In the late 1970's, Soviet policies vis-à-vis Athens and Ankara seemed further conditioned by a desire to convey a net impression of proportionality although, as had been the case throughout the previous two decades, a more concerted and obvious effort was made to advance the Kremlin's interests in Turkey. Soviet anxiety to avoid repeating the mistakes of the seemingly disjointed mid-decade policies of the United States may be one possible explanation for that apparent dual-track approach.

As the 1980's get underway the Greek and Turkish domestic political landscape of the early 1970's has been greatly transformed with somewhat paradoxical implications for the net effectiveness and quality of long-range Soviet foreign policy.

In Athens, where the Soviets had been seemingly content to carry out somewhat pro forma efforts to improve their image and influence (at least when compared to their efforts vis-à-vis Turkey), an anti-American Socialist, Andreas Papandreou, has become Prime Minister. Papandreou appears

determined to gradually ease Greece out of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization - if not the North Atlantic Treaty itself - and to seriously restrict U.S. operations at four major facilities.[13] If Papandreou were to accomplish such objectives without suffering domestic political defeat, Soviet interests would be demonstrably and decisively advanced. In the short term, the Soviets without doubt are pleased with the general anti-American/anti-NATO predilections of the Papandreou government, and by gestures such as the recent Greek restoration of a lapsed agreement to repair Soviet naval auxiliary vessels in Greek shipyards. [Ref. 86: pp. 76]

In Ankara, on the other hand, the accession to power of a military regime has put the Soviets in an uneasy position. For Moscow had been at not inconsiderable diplomatic, economic, and propagandistic pains from 1953 onward to widen its influence in Turkey. Having come rather close to success in 1978 and 1979 with the Ecevit government, the Soviets currently appear to be suffering withdrawal symptoms. Although the military has been in power for almost two years, Soviet criticism of the strongly anti-leftist and pro-NATO regime has been remarkably muted, and stands in graphic contrast with Moscow's self-righteous posturing against the Greek junta in the early 1970's.

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[13]These include: The Souda Bay naval anchorage and fleet support facilities; the air station at Iraklion, Crete; the Hellenikon Air Base; and the Nea Makri Fleet Communication Center.

Given the great weight the Kremlin has historically attached to improving its image and indeed to increasing its authority to whatever extent possible in Ankara, a pronounced long-range shift in favor of Athens seems unlikely. The Soviets will accept with pleasure any advances that result from the volatile political tides at work in Greece, partially because their investments have been relatively slight. But the Soviets have expended far too many tangible and intangible resources in Turkey to permit any but the most grudging of policy retreats.

V. CONCLUSIONS

> In the interpretation of the NATO strategists "détente" signifies the immutability of the political postures and spheres of influence of the imperialist powers; for them it spells out the immutability of the basic postulates of the "Atlantic" policy of strength and building up military capability. The specious theory that "the stronger the NATO bloc, the more dependable détente becomes" is now being dished up. Boris Ponomarev, (Alternate member of the Political Bureau, Secretary of Central Committee, CPSU) August, 1980. [Ref. 87]

A. SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY AND THE WEST EUROPEAN CHALLENGE

Since the end of the Second World War, the Soviet Union has viewed Western Europe as a security challenge to Moscow's political control over Eastern Europe. The challenge, as the Kremlin appears to perceive it, resides in the political and societal features that differentiate the quality of life in Western Europe from that in Eastern Europe.

The economic and political characteristics that distinguish the West from the Socialist East flow in the main from the greater wealth and resiliency of the free-market orientation of the West, and from the undeniable commitment on the part of almost all the Western governments to sustaining relatively open, tolerant, and politically competitive democracies.[14] The people of the Eastern

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[14]Notable Western exceptions include: Salazar's Portugal, Spain under Franco, Greece under the junta (1967-1974), and perhaps Turkey when under military rule (1960-1961 and 1980 to present).

socialist camp have been aware for some time of the economic and political contrasts between their societies and the West. And on numerous occasions (e.g., East Germany, 1953; Hungary and Poland, 1956; Czechoslovakia, 1968; Poland 1980-1982) popular movements that hoped to effect political reforms along Western lines have sprung up in Warsaw Pact countries. Thus Western Europe probably acts as an alternative model of organizing political, social, and economic affairs - an appealing lodestone in the minds of many Eastern Europeans. Correspondingly, Western Europe's way of life threatens the perceived legitimacy of the Communist Party-controlled governments comprising the Warsaw Pact, and hence indirectly challenges those governments' rather brittle ties to Moscow.

The military dimension of the West European security challenge, as Moscow sees it, stems from NATO and from the leading role played by the United States in alliance matters. The presence of American forces in Western Europe has probably served as the ultimate check on overt Soviet military action, though many observers now consider the credibility of the American nuclear guarantee to have been weakened.[15] Further, it is this military factor that protects the West Europeans' privilege to pursue democracy

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[15]An analysis of changing West European views of European security matters with an illuminating discussion of the strategic context is David S. Yost, "European Security and the SALT Process." The Washington Papers, IX, 85 (Beverly Hills and London: Sage Publications) 1981.

and capitalism - the very practices which could in the long run weaken Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe.

Soviet concern to weaken the foundation of the West European challenge has been simultaneously complemented by an expansionist ideology and exaggerated by the lingering trauma caused by the last World War. Soviet foreign policy towards the countries of Western Europe has been therefore governed by these and other factors - including, one assumes, a dispassionate appraisal of each West European nation's strategic usefulness.

In appraising Moscow's foreign policy in all its many aspects towards the West European countries stretching from Norway to Turkey, a common (admittedly long term) Soviet objective is strongly suggested by the implications of this analysis. Simply put, it is to secure the disengagement of the American presence from Europe, to cause the dissolution of the Western Alliance, and to preside over and supervise a new pan-European security arrangement.

Achieving that would be no trivial process and indeed may never be achieved at all. Nevertheless, documented Soviet policies towards West European countries would tend to confirm the existence of such aspirations; at the least, such goals are strongly implied by the character of Moscow's policies and by many authoritative Soviet commentaries, some of which have been cited in preceding chapters.

B. GREECE AND TURKEY IN THE CONTEXT OF SOVIET WEST EUROPEAN POLICY

It is against that backdrop that Soviet post-war policies towards Greece and Turkey have been analyzed in this thesis.

Greece and Turkey may have been unique cases for the Soviet Union, for their rivalry is not matched elsewhere in Western Europe, and is particularly absent from NATO's Scandinavian Northern Flank. Moscow has thus felt periodically constrained to pursue somewhat balanced approaches towards both countries, lest either Greece or Turkey start viewing Moscow as too friendly towards the other party. Further, the substantial strategic value of the two countries may have exerted more influence on the formation of Soviet approaches than have their economic and societal contribution to the West European challenge.

The hypothesis of this thesis has been that success for Soviet foreign policy towards Greece and Turkey would mean reduced links between those states and NATO and the United States. Therefore, key Soviet post-war diplomatic, political, propagandistic, and economic overtures towards both countries were analyzed to determine if compelling and convincing indicators of such a Soviet program could be delineated.

In the case of Greece, demonstrated Soviet behavior has been more reactive than assertive, and on balance, the

hypothesis has not been demonstrated to as complete a degree as this observer had thought it would be. This is not to say that the Soviets do not harbor the long term aim of promoting Greek withdrawal from NATO, or that they have not been delightfully surprised by the dramatic rise to power of Papandreou. Yet for most of the post-war era Moscow was apparently content to take a largely indirect and low key approach towards Greece.

Once Joseph Stalin's policies were put to rest, the contours of the Kremlin's unobtrusive approach towards Greece gradually became visible, and came to include the following features: (a) diplomatic efforts to continue improvements in Greek-Soviet state relations, and to encourage Greek perceptions of growing Soviet reliability and respect; (b) encouragement of Greek-Soviet trade agreements, with emphasis on increasing sales of critical fuels and electricity to Greece; (c) a readiness to exploit to the Soviet advantage issues arising from strains in Greek-American relations; and (d) misrepresentation of various features of the Cyprus issue as a means of cultivating Greek antipathy for NATO.

Prior to the elevation of Andreas Papandreou to the premiership, the Soviets had had somewhat limited success in enhancing their influence in Greece. Since his victory, however, Moscow's prospects in Greece have improved. Papandreou appears likely to withdraw Greece from

NATO (on the French model, perhaps) and to drastically limit U.S. military operations at four key bases. It is ironic that the Soviet Union has witnessed such a turn-about in its apparent fortunes in Greece, while experiencing setbacks in its relationship with Turkey, where Moscow had exerted a demonstrably greater effort to increase its influence.

In contract with the situation in Greece, the findings of the analysis tend to support the hypothesis in the case of Soviet foreign policy towards Turkey. That policy on balance has been initiatory and assertive throughout the post-war era.

Turkey, like Greece, has experienced a moderation in Soviet pressures following the Stalin era. Unlike Greece, anti-American sentiment had been significantly aroused as early as 1965, and Soviet policies were consequently adjusted. A series of high level visits between Ankara and Moscow registered the apparent depth of dissatisfaction on the Turks' part with the United States, although until the very late 1970's Turkish willingness to conform to Soviet policy predilections was rare. During the mid 1960's the essential outline of modern Soviet approaches to Turkey came to be distinguished by the following features: (a) energetic diplomatic and political efforts to improve Soviet-Turkish state relations and to cultivate an image of credibility, "good-neighborliness" and respectability; (b) a readiness to

offer financial assistance and trade considerations on the most favorable terms; and (c) a wary alertness for signs of tension in Turkey's relations with the United States, or with the West, which might be turned to Soviet advantage.

In the late 1970's the Soviets seemed to achieve success in imposing some of their concerns, wishes, and anxieties onto the framework of Turkish national security desiderata. Evidence of that success has been discussed at some length in chapter three and will not be repeated here.

Paradoxically, the Soviets may now be paying the price for having prodded Turkey too abruptly by their use of an indirect and clandestine strategy that many knowledgeable Turks now associate with the recent endemic political violence. Ankara's military leaders apparently share that view, which tends to reinforce their strong anti-Soviet instincts.

The apparent clandestine feature of Soviet policy towards Turkey during the late 1970's was not a part of Soviet approaches towards Greece at the time. Nevertheless, in so far as one can infer from the scheduling of high level diplomatic visits, from the announcements of trade agreements, and from the timing of warship visits, the Kremlin seemed to be making an obvious effort to convey an impression of proportionality in its conduct of relations

with Athens and Ankara during the late 1970's. That effort apparently sprang from Moscow's awareness that Washington's misjudgements vis-à-vis Greek and Turkish sensitivities during the 1974 Cyprus crisis had impaired American credibility and influence in Athens and Ankara. The Kremlin had no intention of adhering to the American precedent, although Soviet miscalculations of Turkish vulnerabilities to an internal political collapse may have paved the way for the September 1980 military takeover in Ankara.

The interactive effect between Soviet policy towards Greece and Turkey appears to be waning now, as discussed in chapter four. The Turks have signally diminished their willingness to be identified with Moscow be lessening various diplomatic and economic exchanges. Correspondingly, the Soviet Union has recently (although circumspectly) begun to criticize certain aspects of military rule in Ankara.

Past approaches and assumed Soviet awareness of Turkey's considerable strategic value would suggest that this may be but a tactical revision in the conduct of long-range Soviet foreign policy. Moscow has probably expended far too much diplomatic and economic capital to permit any but the most grudging of policy disengagements from Turkey.

U.S. policy makers should realize that further American blunders in the course of U.S.-Turkish relations could well prompt even a military regime in Ankara to edge towards Moscow. One has only to cite the examples afforded by the

Turkish reactions to the 1964 Johnson letter and to the American arms embargo imposed between 1975 and 1978, to apprehend the catalytic effect those actions had on the foreign policy elite in Turkey.

More unsettling inferences can be drawn regarding Greece, where strong anti-American sentiments - the product of U.S. support for the "colonels" regime - were exploited by Papandreou during his victorious election campaign, and thus can be cited as having advanced Soviet interests in Greece. Moscow played an essentially reactive role in the aggrandizement of Soviet objectives in Greece prior to Papandreou's victory, seemingly preferring to avail itself of periodic fissures in the Greek-American relationship. American policy makers should be cognizant that with Papandreou in office the Soviet Union would be only too glad to associate itself more closely with a leader whose foreign policy aims appear in numerous ways compatible with its own. The following TASS commentary of October 19, 1981 smugly reveals the thinly disguised hopes Moscow entertains for Greece, and the comcomitant perils for the West:

> The attention of political observers all over Europe is drawn to the foreign policy plans of the future government of Papandreou. On the eve of the elections the leaders of PASOK declared for the revision of the conditions of Greece's participation in NATO that have so far been determined by the so-called "Rogers plan," for Greece's leaving the military organization of the North Atlantic bloc, for the removal of U.S. nuclear weapons from the Greek territory and the establishment of Greece's control over the U.S. military bases situated on Greek soil and their gradual dismantling.

> Andreas Papandreou in his statements supported the idea of creating a nuclear-free zone in the Balkans that is important for consolidating Greece's security. As the Greek press notes, the implementation of these plans would largely promote the consolidation of Greece's national sovereignty, would lead to the country's exclusion from a possible nuclear conflict and would create the conditions for further easing international tensions in the region. [Ref. 88: pp. 6]

Perhaps little can be done for Greece, from the American perspective, other than adroitly attempting to hold the line in pursuit of U.S. interests in such a manner that Papandreou's domestic political support does not become unduly strengthened by fears of American interference. At a minimum, the United States must seek to discourage Greece's withdrawal from NATO, and try to postpone, diminish, and reverse Greek restraints on U.S. military operations at key bases.

The U.S. should also improve its ability to carry out long-term policies, based on an understanding of the permanent aims of Soviet foreign policy in Western Europe. Soviet successes in both Turkey and Greece have been facilitated by U.S. blunders in a series of ad hoc decisions lacking long-term vision. The Soviet long-term vision of Western Europe's future - subjugation to Soviet influence, if not conquest - is demonstrable in the pattern of Soviet behavior in Soviet-Greek and Soviet-Turkish relations.

APPENDIX A

THE SOVIET-TURKISH DECLARATION ON GOOD NEIGHBORLY RELATIONS

The Soviet-Turkish declaration on good-neighborly relations declared that the two countries would be guided in their bilateral and international relations by the following principles:

1. Development of relations between the two countries in line with the traditions of peace, friendship and good-neighborly relations which were laid down by Vladimir Lenin and Kemal Atatürk.

2. Respect for the sovereignty and equality of States.

3. Respect for the territorial integrity and inviolability of State frontiers.

4. Non-interference in the internal affairs of States.

5. Respect for the inalienable right of every country to choose and develop its own political, social, economic and cultural systems.

6. The non-use of force or the threat of force and refusal to allow their territories to be used for staging aggression and subversive actions against other States.

7. Respect for commitments stemming from treaties and other sources of international law.

8. Settlement of international disputes by peaceful means.

Source: Keesing's Contemporary Archives, May 13-20, 1972

APPENDIX B

THE POLITICAL DOCUMENT ON THE PRINCIPLES OF GOOD NEIGHBORLY AND FRIENDLY CO-OPERATION BETWEEN THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS AND THE TURKISH REPUBLIC

The following is the text of the Political Document on the Principles of Good-Neighbourly and Friendly Co-operation between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Turkish Republic, which was signed in Moscow on June 23 by Alexei Kosygin, Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, and Mr. Bulent Ecevit, the Turkish Prime Minister:

THE Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Turkish Republic,

Taking into consideration the aims and wishes of the two countries further to strengthen relations of good-neighbourliness and friendly co-operation, developing in accordance with the principles of equality, mutual respect, non-interference in one another's internal affairs, and mutual benefit,

Being convinced that the preservation—in accordance with the aims and principles of the United Nations Charter and the principles and accords of the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe—of the spirit of the mutual trust and co-operation that were established in the relations between the two states already in the period of their formation by Vladimir Ilyich Lenin and Kemal Ataturk, will be in the interests of the two countries,

Expressing confidence that the strengthening of these relations within the framework of these aims and principles will make a contribution to the process of détente in the area concerned, in Europe and throughout the world, and, consequently, to the attainment of genuine peace,

Noting that the 1972 Declaration on the Principles of Good-Neighbourly Relations between the Soviet Union and Turkey constituted an important stage along the road of improving the atmosphere of mutual good will and is helping to develop co-operation between the two countries,

Declaring that the practical implementation of the provisions of the Final Act and observance, in a balanced form, of the aims of this document, will make an important contribution to turning détente into a permanent, stable and all-embracing process,

And reaffirming their adherence to the aims and principles of the United Nations Charter,

State that with the aim of further strengthening relations of good-neighbourliness and friendly co-operation, they will be guided in their actions by the following:

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Turkish Republic declare their determination:

To apply in relations between each other and in the cause of strengthening these relations the declarations of principles of the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe;

To develop in accordance with this, in a balanced form, relations of good-neighbourliness and co-operation on the basis of respect for one another's sovereignty, equality, way of life, public order and territorial integrity, and for non-interference in internal affairs, mutual security and mutual benefit;

To preserve the borders of the two countries as borders of good-neighbourliness and friendly co-operation;

And to observe fully in their mutual relations the principles of refraining from the use or threat of force, and also of refraining from the granting of their territory for the carrying out of aggression and subversive actions against other states, thus being envisaged under the provisions of the Final Act concerning security in Europe.

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Turkish Republic declare their mutual resolve:

To co-operate within the framework of international organizations and conferences in those instances when this is useful and accords with their mutual interests;

To expand—taking into consideration the contribution which this will make to the strengthening of détente and to the development of bilateral relations—the mutual exchanges of views between their official representatives through contacts to be implemented through diplomatic channels;

To attach importance to the integrity and equivalence of the principles of the Final Act;

To press consistently for a further deepening of the process of détente in international relations and for extending it to all parts of the world by developing the political, military, economic and humanitarian aspects of this process;

To support, and to strive to make a positive contribution to, all efforts aimed at achieving general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control, taking note considering that the fact that the race in the sphere of nuclear and conventional arms is not only threatening peace and the process of détente but is also leading to negative consequences both in the economic field and from the point of view of security on the national and international planes, and in hindering the development of international co-operation and the effective study and solution of the problem of backwardness in the world;

To display, within the framework, respect in determinant initiatives for the complete observance of the security interests of their own countries and also of all other states as well;

And to support the efforts of developing countries in strengthening their national sovereignty and economic independence, and to come out against all forms of imperialism, colonialism and racial discrimination.

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Turkish Republic express their determination:

To exert the necessary efforts to develop economic and technical co-operation in various fields and also trade relations on a balanced and long-term basis, ensuring benefit for both countries, and to make more extensive use of the existing possibilities;

Jointly to facilitate the development of co-operation and exchanges in the fields of culture, art, science, tourism and sport with the aim of strengthening the atmosphere of mutual respect and trust between the peoples of the Soviet Union and the Turkish nation;

And to develop between them scientific and technical co-operation and, with these aims in view, to study the possibility of conducting joint research in the fields of industry, agriculture, energy, transport and public health, on which agreement will be reached between the two countries.

The provisions and principles of this Political Document, which does not pursue any aims other than to contribute to the cause of peace, security and mutually-beneficial co-operation and is not directed against any state, comprise a single whole and do not affect the rights or obligations of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Turkish Republic under any agreements.

Source: Soviet News, June 27, 1978.

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
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