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20. <del>ABSTRACT</del> (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number) The purpose of the paper was to determine how the study of military history has fared at the Army War College and to assess trends in AWC student attitudes toward military history since an original Army study of military history in 1971. A questionnaire was distributed to assess the interest and background in military history of current AWC students and attempted to measure their collective attitude toward its value and uses. The author's overriding general conclusion is that military history in the AWC curriculum has been inadequate. The students stated a much greater		

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## I. INTRODUCTION: THE PROBLEM.

"What is past is prologue"  
(National Archives)

A great deal has been written during the past decade on the subject of military history, its nature, its uses and especially its role in the professional development of military officers. While the approaches and facets of the problem vary, the general theme decries the loss of historical awareness, perspective and judgment within the military. Characterizations of the United States Army officer corps in such terms as "historically illiterate," "ignorant of military history" and "historically naive," tend to get attention.<sup>1</sup>

Not surprisingly some of the shrillest voices so raised are those of avowed critics of the military. Others, notably many members of the so-called "military reform movement," seem truly concerned with what they view as a problem of institutional fixation on science and management, at the expense of leadership and the art of warfare. But many of those also lamenting this inattention to military history are from within the services, both officers and civilian professionals.

Symptomatic of this lack of serious study of warfare and military history, they contend, is the Army's failure to produce strategists, planners, tacticians and, especially theorists. The art of war cannot be learned through the study of management, engineering or political science; great

generalship is not a product of an Officer Personnel Management System (OPMS) specialty. Most consternating of this line of criticism is the implication that such American military failures as Vietnam, the Mayaguez affair and the abortive Iranian rescue attempt are direct consequences of a lack of seriousness toward the study of war and its history. The latter fiasco, for example, defense analyst Edward N. Luttwak attributes directly to the planners having been "quite ignorant of the history of commando operations."<sup>2</sup>

Whole volumes exploring the Army's failings in Vietnam have focused on our apparent lack of historical perspective in understanding the nature of the war and its problems. Moreover, this argument goes, fascinated with hardware, imbued with a system management approach and motivated by selfish careerism, the officer corps has lost touch with the theory and operational art of war. So serious does Representative Newt Gingrich see this problem that he advocates a "revolution" in our approach to strategy and doctrine and urges us to replace our "bureaucratic/administrative" Army with a "professional, soldierly" one.<sup>3</sup>

An influential member of the Senate Armed Services Committee, Senator Gary Hart, in answering his own question "What's Wrong with the Military?" insists that the services have become mired in a "bureaucratic behavior" mold which the officer education system and promotion process have institutionalized. To ask how all this came about, the Senator asserts, partially answers itself: "If the military

schools do not provide an education in the art of war, and if those who educate themselves and act on their knowledge are not promoted, there will be few at the top to see the need."<sup>4</sup> Similarly, writing in Harper's, Jeffery Record sees a lack of serious study of warfare and its nature having led to a mindset which inevitably seeks technological, administrative, or managerial solutions to problems of the battlefield.<sup>5</sup> In words certainly calculated to get the military's attention, an academican and frequent defense consultant writes that "the distinguishing characteristic of American officers is their lack of interest in the art of war."<sup>6</sup>

All three critics just discussed place the blame squarely on the paucity of historical study. "Inattention to the history of warfare," notes Jeffrey Record, "is perhaps the greatest weakness in the training of American military officers."<sup>7</sup> After berating the officer corps severely for its "ignorance of the military art," Edward Luttwak echos the theme that the root cause lies in the staff and war colleges treating military history as "a marginal embellishment instead of... the very core of military education."<sup>8</sup> Likewise, Senator Hart expressed dismay in finding greater interest in the services in aerobics and running than in military history. He cites as evidence a recent Command and General Staff College reduction of a military history reading requirement from ten books to four to allow for an expanded physical training program.<sup>9</sup>

The overall argument of the "military reformers" seems

flawed in two principal ways: first, by stretching evidence of inattention to history into causes of institutional failings and, secondly, by ignoring numerous initiatives within the Army to correct what has long been recognized by some officers as a serious problem. Their criticisms however, that Army schools have failed to give adequate attention to military history and of a resultant historical ignorance among Army officers were essentially valid.

That this situation was recognized within the Army is evidenced by Department of the Army in 1971 directing a review of the Army's need for the study of military history.<sup>10</sup> An ad hoc committee formed under the chairmanship of the eminently qualified Head of the History Department, United States Military Academy, Colonel Thomas E. Griess, and in just three months produced a four volume report with some 61 conclusions and 40 recommendations. Although the findings were rather mild and conservative, they left little doubt of the Army's need for the study of military history or of the committee's view of the inadequacy of military history instruction in the officer education system. Perhaps most important though, was the committee's reaffirmation of the need to develop "historical mindedness" in the officer corps at large.<sup>11</sup>

Unfortunately, this unique study seems not to have received the attention it deserved at the Army's highest levels. Nevertheless, although a complete turn-around cannot be cited, some important steps have occurred to resurrect

military history to its former place as a vital element of the Army officer's education. Enough steps have been taken, says LTC Reg Shrader in a short but excellent review of the subject, that "the issue now is not the quantity of the corrective effort but its quality."<sup>12</sup>

Still, all of the criticisms noted above were written since April 1980 showing that many people remain unconvinced. Accordingly, the purpose of this paper is to determine how the study of military history has fared at just one component of the Army school system--albeit the capstone course, the War College--and to assess trends in War College student attitudes toward military history since the original 1971 study.

## II. MILITARY HISTORY: ITS MEANING, VALUE, AND USES

"To be a successful soldier, you must know history."  
(George Patton)

For the purpose of this paper, the definition of "military history" provided by Army Regulation 870-5 as "a record of military and related activities in peace and war" --though all encompassing--seems too broad.<sup>13</sup> Perhaps a more exact statement is impossible; it has been said that history has nearly as many definitions as there are historians. However, since much of the controversy already discussed lies in this very vagueness, an attempt will be made. While recognizing the usefulness of studying the totality of past



human endeavors, here we will focus on those aspects contributing directly to illuminating the nature of warfare in its tactical, operational and strategic dimensions--proper realm for senior military thinkers. Again in this context, the categories enumerated by the Ad Hoc Committee--operational, administrative/technical, and civil/military relationships --take in more ground than we need include in a basic conception of military history.<sup>14</sup> Hence, herein the meaning intended is the history of those operational activities involved directly in the preparation for and actual conduct of war.

Value.

Like any discipline, history has its advocates and critics. Even professional academic historians who make their living by it cannot agree on its value; some, in fact, insist history should not be studied for any utilitarian reason. Soldiers though, have traditionally sought a special relationship to history which has emphasized its utility.<sup>15</sup> Rarely does one see mention of the study of "military" history in context of any intrinsic value--such as an exercise for intellectual improvement, enhancing critical analysis skills, etc.

Although still couched in utilitarian terms, the latest Army regulation on military history does acknowledge a number of inherent values, such as: "enhances individual perception;" "complements experience;" and "sharpens the individual's awareness of principles, ideas, concepts, and priorities."<sup>16</sup>

One would think the Army's recognition of such educational benefits in an academic discipline would be sufficient to place on it a very high priority, any other utility aside. Indeed, "Leaders,...are encouraged to broaden their professional knowledge and skills through individual study of military history and participation in formal education programs that include military history," says Army regulation.<sup>17</sup> Yet as we shall see, acceptance in principle is not always translated into practice.

If, in another sense, human nature and human character are immutable and, as noted military historian Michael Howard observes, war is "a distinct and repetitive form of human behavior," one would think it worthy of study for its own right.<sup>18</sup> And if, after all, one considers war the most important of all human endeavors, so much greater should be our efforts to understand it. Yet, as Peter Paret laments, "few enterprising minds are interested in war and in military institutions for their own sake."<sup>19</sup> Unfortunately, we might add that too many of the few are civilian scholars and analysts. Finally, historical study can give one perspective --an anchor in time, yet a liberation from the captive present.

#### Uses

Little still exists of the utter skepticism displayed by Walter Millis in 1956, when he concluded that "The advent of nuclear arsenals has at least seemed to render most military history... outdated and inapplicable."<sup>20</sup> But thirty

years of living with knowledge and information explosions, tremendous technological advances and potential nuclear holocaust led to this type of thinking in many circles. The military was particularly effected. As Bernard Brodie aptly noted, not only had the soldier's profession become vastly more complex but his whole raison d'etre seemed to have flip-flopped, from war-fighting to war-prevention.<sup>21</sup> If the past seemed to offer little of use in such a dramatically changed and rapidly changing world, one should little wonder that military history seemed meaningless to soldiers.

In this light, what might otherwise seem a very strange first objective for the Army's new military history program, makes more sense. It is:

To gain acceptance within the Army that military history is a basic source of knowledge for solving military problems, advancing the theory and practice of military science, and managing resources.<sup>22</sup>

Then, presumably after having gained the aforesaid acceptance, the Army's further objective is to "use" military history to achieve:

- (1) Sound strategic and mobilization planning.
- (2) Doctrine appropriate to the demands of modern war.
- (3) Effective training and professional proficiency.
- (4) Management knowledge and proficiency tempered by experience.
- (5) High individual morale and organizational esprit.<sup>23</sup>

If it can do all this, one is amazed--unless the Army writes regulations tongue-in-cheek--that resistance still exists to greater incorporation of military history in Army schools.

Finally, of a more general nature, three classic ways

stand out in which history is uniquely useful to the soldier. First, to use a phrase I coined elsewhere, history is the "Soldier's laboratory."<sup>24</sup> It is the milieu to which we must take our questions, hypotheses and theories for testing. Granted it is imperfect in not providing the precisely controlled conditions we would like; but it remains--as we cannot stage actual combat--the only "empirical basis" for the study of war we have.<sup>25</sup>

Secondly, as so admirably stated by Bernard Brodie, "Military history provides vicarious experience, broader in scope and cheaper to acquire than that available to one individual in his lifetime."<sup>26</sup> Even a combat seasoned officer is limited by time and space from complete knowledge of the relatively few battles he may get to experience directly. Besides, only if one has developed the needed critical skills is he likely to learn the correct lessons.

Thirdly, it must be from history, as Clausewitz observed, that general truths of cause and effect relationships are discerned. But one need not emulate the great Prussian's quest of theory to gain from history more modest insights into the nature of war or to improve understanding of its imperatives.

### III. THE ARMY WAR COLLEGE: PURPOSE, SCOPE, CURRICULUM.

"Military History...is indeed the true school of war."  
(Jomini)

From the previous discussion, the mission of the Army

War College "to provide professional military education in land warfare" should sufficiently justify instruction in military history. In fact, the list of functions prescribed for the War College by the governing Army Regulation would seem to demand it.<sup>27</sup> So, what has caused the problems discussed earlier and where has the Army War College fit in both the problems and solutions? This is a much bigger question than can be fully explored here; but certain aspects of the War College's role must be touched upon.

Before World War II, authorities acknowledge that military subjects were the sine qua non of the War College curriculum and military history was at the core of most instruction.<sup>28</sup> In fact, like the German General Staff and War College, an Historical Section constituted a significant portion of the staff and faculty up to 1940. History, in this pre-war period was used openly and directly observed the Ad Hoc Committee, in contrast to what it calls "less obvious or 'soft sell' use of history" in recent years. The differences between the curricula of the two periods is so drastic, the committee concluded, that they must be considered as distinct eras.<sup>29</sup>

After the ten year lapse in the Army War College functioning as a consequence of World War II, its reestablishment on short notice in 1950 necessitated use of a curriculum very similar to that of the last class in 1940. In the 1950- 51 academic year, approximately 32½ of the 36 weeks (90.3%) were devoted to military subjects; and, although more difficult to

measure, historical study was clearly the dominant method.<sup>30</sup>

Rapidly however, as soon as deliberate curriculum formulation could occur and with the arrival of LTG Edward L. Almond as Commandant, the number of purely military subjects compared to non-military began to wane. By the second academic year the ratio was 70% to 30% and by the third year 65% to 35%. Moreover, better than one-third of the "studies" that comprised the various subcourses in 1951 were totally historical; this proportion dropped to 27% in 1952 and a mere 3% in 1955 (2 of 61).<sup>31</sup>

This trend did indeed continue as shown in table 1 below, but might have been even more drastic had General Almond been able to implement all the recommendations of a civilian advisory group he invited to Carlisle Barracks. Among other things, this group urged study of international politics, American government, civil-military relations, position of the United States in world affairs, American foreign policy and national economics.<sup>32</sup> Apparently, only the disapproval of the Commanding General, Army Field Forces, saying "time in the Army War College course cannot be spared in which to dwell excessively long on matters that are not primarily United States Army affairs," prevented further civilianization.<sup>33</sup>

TABLE 1 - Military/Non-military Content.<sup>34</sup>

	MIL	NON-MIL
1951	90%	10%
1952	70%	30%
1953-56	66%	34%
1957-60	53%	47%
1960-64	50%	50%
1981	31%	69%

Instruction in military history fared even worse, to the extent that a 1957 study by Masland and Radway observed:

None of the [Senior Service] colleges, with the exception of the Air War College, attempt to provide the student with a sense of historical perspective... The consequence of this is an absence of concern for the historical and theoretical aspects of security problems. <sup>35</sup>

Around the mid-1960's, a number of observers started to suggest that with the bathwater had gone the baby. Edward Katzenbach, a former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, for example, believed that in "the war colleges ... the sense of military professionalism has been on the wane." Moreover, he asserted, "the curriculums ... of the War Colleges are not designed to alleviate this decline in professionalism, for they are not military service-oriented."<sup>36</sup> Largely in response to such criticism, the influential Haines Board (LTG Ralph E. Haines, Chairman), met in 1966 and recommended: 1) continued military-oriented curriculum, 2) limiting individual research to military subjects, and 3) establishment of an elective program. It also recommended addition of instruction in operations research, systems analysis and automatic data processing; but it took little note of the paucity of military history taught.

The elective program which commenced in 1967-68 with ten offerings also reflected the War College's lack of interest in history. Despite its growth over four successive years to 21 choices by 1971, the program still offered no military history. Finally, in 1972, largely resulting from the Ad Hoc Committee Report, the college offered the course

New Dimensions in Military History (representing 4.3% of the total).

Table 2 - Military History Electives<sup>37</sup>

	TOTAL (Range)	MIL.HIST. (Range)	% (AVG)
68-71	10-21	0	0
72-76	23-52	1-2	4.5%
77-81	40-63	4-5	7.9%
1982	56	8	14.3%

Although the number of military history electives has increased and may be sufficient, it should be noted that disincentives to an individual taking them apparently exist. Officers opting for the eight courses with substantial history content this year, for instance, average only 7.5 per course compared to 13.1 for the other 48 electives. The reason for this is not clear, especially in light of data reflecting the tremendous interest in military history discussed in section IV. But the comment of one 1982 class member--that, despite his belief in the value of history, he felt compelled to take courses contributing more directly to his CPMS specialty--may be instructive. In any case, history courses should improve competitively as realization of their importance to professionalism increases.

Along with improvement in history elective offerings, the college also acted on Ad Hoc Committee recommendations by filling three chairs in military history (one a visiting professor in MHI) with prominent historians, by adding uniformed historians to the faculty, and by encouraging student exploitation of Military History Institute (MHI)



resources--although the success of this latter effort is mixed (see figure 21-23, Appendix A).

While this discussion has certainly been critical of the Army War College curriculum, it has not intended to imply culpability or even myopia by any person, group or institution. After all, many smart people--educators, historians and Army officers--believed as Walter Millis that nuclear weapons had so drastically altered the nature of warfare that combat had become one of the soldier's lesser functions and military history nearly meaningless. They just happened to be wrong.

#### IV. THE WAR COLLEGE STUDENT: BACKGROUND AND ATTITUDES

"We cannot escape history. We will be remembered in spite of ourselves."

(Abraham Lincoln)

The section following assesses the interest and background in military history of current US Army War College students and attempts to measure their collective attitude toward its value and uses. This is accomplished by analysis of responses to a questionnaire (appendix B) to which 178 members of the 1982 class replied during the month of March. Moreover, these data are compared to the results of a similar survey conducted in 1971 by an ad hoc committee created by Department of the Army.<sup>38</sup> Although this earlier effort surveyed the whole Army, the responses of Army War College students could be separated for comparison. Thus, even such highly subjective indicators as attitudes and

beliefs are valuable in their reflection of trends when compared with like data of eleven years earlier. Results are portrayed graphically in Appendix A, figures 1 thru 24. The questionnaire was developed to provide data directly comparable with the 1971 results in determining the following:

- A. The extent War College students have studied military history. (see figures 5-7).
- B. Perceptions of the value and usefulness of military history. (see figures 9-13).
- C. How military history should be taught in the Army school system. (see figures 9-13).
- D. Whether a military history specialty should be established. (see figures 14-16).

In addition a number of new questions sought to measure the extent to which the 1982 class:

- A. Perceived the need for the study of military history as an element of professional officer education (see figures 17-20).
- B. Involved themselves with military history resources available at the Army War College. (see figures 21-24).

In general, the survey appears to have been quite successful. Of the 214 questionnaires distributed, 187, or a surprising 88%, responded; although nine were too late for inclusion in the computer assembled data. This provided a data population of 178, comparable to the 186 responses (72%) of the somewhat larger 1971 class. Although unsolicited, numerous narrative comments from participants reflected favorably on the need for such a study and showed genuine interest in the results. Most importantly, all indications are that respondents answered honestly and openly.

### Survey population background

In light of the mention earlier of the Army War College mission to teach "land warfare," it is astonishing to note the trend in class make-up by branch; presently only 40% are combat arms officers compared with 58% just 11 years ago. (see figure 1). This decrease is accompanied by significant increases in combat service support branches and "other" which includes civilians and other services. The percentage of combat support branches changed little. How "branch" or service correlated with answers to other questions is an important variable discussed later.

Although less of a surprise, another dramatic change in class background is source of commission (see figure 2). The percentage of Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) graduates rose from 30 to 56, with corresponding decreases in United States Military Academy (USMA) (28% to 18%) and Officer Candidate School (OCS) (23% to 14%) graduates. A sizeable number of battlefield commissions in the 1971 class probably explains the drop in "other;" this is suggested by combat experience in World War II and Korea when such commissions were more common (see figure 4).

Interesting trends also appear in the education level and combat experience although these do not appear to be significant variables in the way respondents answered other questions. Over four-fifths of the present class have advanced degrees compared with three-fifths in 1971. Few today (1%) have combat experience in other than the Vietnam

war and a sizeable increase in those with no experience stems from more civilians attending (see figures 3 & 4). The same two percent represents the number with graduate degrees in history--a very small percentage indeed for a profession that must derive much of its corporate knowledge from this discipline (see figure 5).

#### Extent of military history studied

Except for degree producing courses in history, this is a difficult area to quantify. The paucity of graduate degrees in history just noted, holds true also for undergraduate study--eight percent (15 individuals) inclusive of the four with graduate degrees. (Whether one had an undergraduate degree in history was not asked in 1971--see figure 5). The two additional means used to measure extent of historical study, while ingenious in concept, are somewhat flawed in methodology. Officers were asked to indicate:

- A. The extent they had studied military history (occasional reading, intensive home study, college-undergraduate, college-graduate, service school, or other) (see figure 6).
- B. Which books, from a selected list of thirty, they had read (see figure 7).

Phrasing of the first question proved deficient in the 1971 survey by allowing participants to select multiple responses rather than the most appropriate, thus prohibiting determination of a true percentage or which exposure to military history was most important (221 responses by 186 participants were redistributed as a percentage). As the 1982 question sought the most appropriate response, direct

comparison is suspect. Still, exposure to military history in undergraduate school or service school was at least meaningful (or memorable) enough to be listed in 53% of the responses. These were undergraduates of the late 40's/early 50's and attendees of some service schools before the large decline of military history in course content. This year, the proportion noting undergraduate and service schools totaled only 39% (figure 5).

When analyzed by branch and service, two significant trends appear. Combat service support officers had a substantially lower exposure to military history through the four more "serious" means (38%) compared to the remainder of the population (55%). The other category, occasional reading, accounted for 62% of the combat service support answers vice 45% for the rest. Secondly, rather surprisingly, Navy and Air Force respondents proved twice as likely as Army classmates to indicate service school as their main exposure.

Analysis using source of commission as a variable also produced some minor surprises. Although as expected, Military Academy graduates were the most likely to have studied military history as undergraduates (and OCS graduates the least), only 28% indicated this as the most appropriate response despite all having taken the history of military art course at West Point. Similarly, in spite of military history having generally been a required course in the ROTC curriculum, only 11% of the ROTC graduates answered "undergraduate school" as their main exposure. Apparently the more

or less formal courses in military history that most officers have received in undergraduate or service schools were not particularly memorable.

The second measure of the extent of military history studied also yielded some interesting results. Although the thirty books selected by the 1971 Ad Hoc Committee leave much to be desired, duplication of the same list for this study allowed for a direct comparison (see questions 14 thru 43 of questionnaire at appendix B).<sup>39</sup> The most significant finding is that considerably fewer books from the list have been read by the 1982 Army War College class compared to the 1971 class (See figure 7). Those indicating they had read ten books or more, for example, decreased from 44% in 1971 to only 29% this year. The percentage having read less than five books almost doubled from 17 to 30.<sup>40</sup> The reason for this overall decline in books read cannot be determined and is indeed puzzling in light of other data (discussed later) reflecting a greater appreciation of the value of military history by the present class than in 1971.

On the average this year's class claimed to have read 7.1 books from the list. (Median = 6, mode = 5). When analyzed by branch and service another interesting picture emerges. Combat arms and combat support officers read an average of 8.0 and 9.0 books respectively; these far-exceeded the 5.0 for combat service support, 5.9 for Air Force, 6.4 for Navy/Coast Guard and 4.7 for civilians in the class. Significantly, the Marines in the class--who indicated else-

where less exposure to formal courses in military history-- were the most well-read group with 10.3. Thus, except for slightly more books read by combat support officers, the 1971 Ad Hoc Committee conclusion that the extent of military history studied decreased with distance from the "sound of the guns," appears to remain valid.<sup>41</sup> Average number of books read by branch and service is summarized:

TABLE 3

C/A	CS	CSS	AF	NAVY/CG	WAR	CIV	CLASS
8.0	9.0	5.0	5.9	6.4	10.3	4.7	7.1

Contrary to the Ad Hoc Committee finding that USMA graduates (Army-wide) had read a significantly greater number of books, this year's survey of just War College students showed source of commission not to be an important variable. In fact, although West Point graduates read an average of 7.7 books compared to the class average of 7.1, OCS officers read 7.9 books.

Although there are some timeless classics on the list of 30 books and all are still worth reading, the fact that all are 11 years older than when used in the 1971 survey could admittedly skew the results some. In anticipation of this possibility, ten important works of a similar nature and published since 1971 were added to the original list (see Appendix B). That the average rate of these newer works having been read of 25.0% is comparable to the original 30 book rate of 23.6%, supports the validity of comparing the 1982 and 1971 results.

Some "best-sellers" emerged from the survey; not too surprisingly, serious works generally took a back seat to more "popular" histories and political science oriented books. Eight of the ten most popular books were also among the top ten with War College students in 1971. These top ten and the percentage of the class having read the book along with its 1971 ranking are shown below:

61.3%	Shirer, <u>Rise and Fall of the Third Reich</u>	---5 tie
60.1%	Clausewitz, <u>On War</u>	-----1 tie
57.2%	Liddell Hart, <u>Strategy</u>	-----7
51.4%	Fall, <u>Street without Joy</u>	-----4
45.7%	Kissinger, <u>Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy</u>	-----15
41.0%	Tuchman, <u>The Guns of August</u>	-----3
34.1%	Freeman, <u>Lee's Lieutenants</u>	-----5 tie
32.4%	Ridgway, <u>The Korean War</u>	-----10
32.1%	Hitler, <u>Mein Kampf</u>	-----13
31.2%	Marx, <u>Communist Manifesto</u>	-----1 tie

#### Value and usefulness of military history

Perhaps the most decisive and unequivocal finding of the whole survey was the way in which Army War College students assessed the value of studying military history. An astonishing 90% acknowledged it as valuable--41% saying highly valuable--against only 6% seeing it as less valuable than other disciplines and 4% with no opinion (see figure 13). Compared with the 1971 data, this represents a significant 11 percentage points increase in those judging military history "highly" valuable and 10% decrease in the number of those believing it less valuable than other disciplines. Not reflected in any chart yet probably the most important factor



of all is the absence of a single participant selecting the response "of no value at all; a waste of time," in either survey. Army War College students obviously do not share the doubts Walter Millis expressed in the 1950's.

Combat arms officers were most likely to view military history as highly valuable (47.9%), followed by combat support (41.9%), and combat service support (only 33.3%). Although the sample was small, 100% of the Marines surveyed answered highly valuable, compared to 25% of the Air Force and none of the Navy officers. Again it appears that the closer one's branch might be expected to bring him to combat, the higher one's interest in and perception of the value of military history. Moreover, those considering its study to be highly valuable tended to put their belief into practice, reading an average of 8.5 books, compared to the group answering only valuable, who read 6.4 books.

An additional series of four questions asked this year (not in 1971) also sought to measure the class' attitude toward the study of military history. These were questions 10 through 13 at Appendix B; the results are portrayed graphically in figures 17 through 20 and are summarized below:

A. With Clausewitz's belief that "empirical" study is essential to knowledge of the art of war and that such knowledge comes best from "Historical examples:" 90% of the class agreed (41% strongly) while only 2% disagreed (figure 17).

B. With Bernard Brodie's assertion that our generation has sadly produced alleged military strategists who are ignorant of military history: 78% agreed (31% strongly), while only 10% disagreed and 9% felt ambivalent (figure 18).

C. Of the so-called "military reformers" criticism that

the officer corps has suffered a loss of historical mindedness, awareness and perspective: 81% agreed (30% strongly), while only 10% disagreed (figure 19).

D. Of the "military reformers" frequent attribution of the Army's success in World War II to the almost exclusive use of military history as the method of study: 49% agreed (10% strongly), compared to 23% disagreeing; 18% expressed ambivalence and 9% no opinion (figure 20).

Taken collectively the dramatically affirmative responses to these four questions appear not only to substantiate a basic premise of the military reformers, but also to reflect a recognition among senior officers of the need for further corrective action. A sensitivity to the problem and awareness of the value of historical study to our profession has even been reflected in recent remarks by both the Secretary of the Army and the Chief of Staff.<sup>42</sup>

When the responses to these four questions are cross-tabulated by branch a trend similar to the degree of interest in military history emerges: the extent of agreement was invariably higher for combat and combat support over combat service support officers.

TABLE 4 - Agreement % in questions:

	CA	CS	CSS	AF	WAR
#10	93%	90%	83%	93%	100%
#11	76%	87%	71%	75%	100%
#12	82%	90%	74%	69%	100%
#13	51%	52%	45%	38%	100%

Again, though a rather small sample, the Marines came in strongest on the need for study of military history while Air Force officers answered most like combat service support officers.

Finally, a question on the utility of military history

produced results very similar to the 1971 study (see figure 8). The 20% versus 16% selecting "My study of military history has actually benefited me very little" is not particularly significant but might be due to the lower inclination of this year's class to read military history despite their higher appreciation of its value. The other responses indicate no significant trend.

#### Military history in Army schools.

A third crucial area for which Army War College student opinion was sought--how military history should be taught in the Army school system--also revealed some interesting trends. Although the 1971 survey was formatted for multiple responses (which unfortunately could not be repeated) and considered only mandatory and elective courses (ignoring the possibility of integrating in other courses), the data have been tabulated for comparison (See figures 9 thru 12). Even if one combines the other responses, it is evident that a substantially increased number of officers believe in required courses at most levels: USMA/RCTC - 90%, Advance Courses-74%, C&GSC - 67%, and War College - 53%. When combined with those selecting the "integrate" responses, the vast majority of War College officers apparently see military history as too important to leave to electives only. (One does not have to be too clever to realize that adding elective offerings to a curriculum is meaningless if no one takes them.) The technique of integrating history with other courses, at least as done this year at the War College, received mixed reviews.

Although 32% thought it effective, 39% labeled it ineffective or a failure, suggesting that something gets lost in the integrating process (see figure 24). In addition, this technique suffers immensely by leading in practice to non-historians teaching history--a fallacy worse than ignoring history altogether.

Dramatically, though the 1982 survey allowed for the response that military history be "not taught" at each level of Army schools, this appears only once in regard to advanced courses; not a single participant said it should not be taught at the War College, C&GSC or USMA/ROTC levels. Branch did not appear as a major variable in how officers responded, with two exceptions. Navy officers and civilians were less inclined to favor required courses at any level. And, combat service support and Air Force officers, who were less enthusiastic toward military history in other areas, were substantially more inclined to favor mandatory courses at the War College (62% and 69%, versus 48% for the rest).

As might be expected a cross-tabulation showed those responding "highly valuable" to the study of military history question were much more likely to desire required history courses at all levels--for the War College, for example, 73% versus 39% for the rest of the sample.

#### Military history specialty

As in 1971, Army War College students remain overwhelmingly opposed to the establishment of a military history specialty. Additionally, a graphic portrayal of results in figure 14 shows practically no shift in opinion. A second

question on this subject in attempting to identify the number of officers interested personally in assignment to such a specialty, does show a heightened interest (6% versus 2%) among those few who consider themselves qualified (figure 15).

Finally, a significantly increased awareness of the Army's lack of attention to military history and less than effective use of the resources it does have is evident in the responses at figure 16. The number of officers considering the Army's use of its military history resources optimum or "OK" dropped by 12% while those thinking it is poor rose from 24% to 57%. Such a dramatic shift certainly suggests that all is not yet well with the Army's military history program; this seems to reflect a rising expectation that remains largely unfulfilled.

#### V. CONCLUSIONS

An overriding general conclusion of this study is that military history in the Army War College curriculum has indeed been inadequate, at the detriment of historical mindedness in the officer corps; however, there has been an increased recognition of this problem since the 1971 Ad Hoc Committee Report and some progress has been made.

The three specific recommendations of the Ad Hoc Committee regarding the Army War College have been substantially implemented.

Critics of the service's education systems discussed in section I, particularly the so-called "military reformers,"

are essentially correct in their premise regarding inattention to military history; but seem unaware of a resurgence of interest in the subject and internal Army initiatives to improve its acceptance and use.

The Army's recognition, as an institution, of the value and usefulness of military history seems adequately and firmly established by the objectives of its latest AK 870-5. Yet there is little evidence of any effort or even willingness to implement measures to achieve those objectives.

While the inattention to military history at the Army War College probably resulted partially from skepticism in the inherent value of history generally, its demise as an instructional vehicle was also a consequence of the civilianization of the curriculum in the 1950's and 60's

Along with rather dramatic changes in makeup of the War College class, there was a significant decrease in the extent to which members have studied military history seriously (based on both individual acknowledgement and number of books read). Furthermore, the degree of serious study decreased with distance from the sound of the guns.

Curiously, in light of the above, this year's War College student harbored a much greater appreciation of the value and usefulness of studying military history. Accordingly, participants substantially agreed with the critics who allege loss of historical mindedness in the military.

While this dichotomous situation of lower exposure to history despite higher interest is unexplained by the data--

motive being always difficult to assess--two suggestions are offered: 1) Career demands for performance (not thoughtfulness) and competition by the demands for proficiency in CPMS specialties, 2) Today's officers simply lack the formal training to go about the study of history properly. In addition to mandatory formal courses, this suggests a need at all levels to develop in officers a concept or "theory" of history as well as the proper background for self-study, such as could be accomplished by a specially-designed course in historiography.

Such increased attention to military history in Army schools, to the extent of being required, is heavily supported by War College students.

Creation of an CPMS specialty in military history continues to be opposed by most officers.

NCTES

<sup>1</sup>Jeffery Record, "The Fortunes of War," Harper's, (April 1980), 23; Gary Hart, "What's Wrong with the Military?" New York Times Magazine, (14 February 1982), 41; Edward N. Luttwak, "A New Arms Race?" Commentary, 70 (September 1980), 33.

<sup>2</sup>Luttwak, "New Arms Race," p. 33.

<sup>3</sup>Newt Gingrich, "Military Preparedness," An address to the Army Mutual Aid Association, 14 April 1981.

<sup>4</sup>Hart, p. 41.

<sup>5</sup>Record, p. 19.

<sup>6</sup>Luttwak, "New Arms Race," p. 33.

<sup>7</sup>Record, p. 19.

<sup>8</sup>Luttwak, "New Arms Race," p32-33.

<sup>9</sup>Hart, p. 41.

<sup>10</sup>Department of the Army, Ad Hoc Committee Report on the Army Need for the Study of Military History, 4 Vols. West Point, NY, 1971; here after referred to as the Ad Hoc Committee Report.

<sup>11</sup>Ibid, Vol 1, p. 51.

<sup>12</sup>Reg Shrader, LTC, "The Army and Military History," A paper dated 29 September 1981 and distributed to US Army War College students. This paper lists a number of the more important Army initiatives.

<sup>13</sup>Department of the Army, Army Regulation 870-5, 22 January 1977.

<sup>14</sup>Ad Hoc Committee Report, p. 9.



<sup>15</sup>John E. Jessup, Jr. and Robert W. Coakley, A Guide to the Study and Use of Military History (Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1978), p. 31.

<sup>16</sup>AR 870-5, p. 3-1.

<sup>17</sup>Ibid, p. 2-1.

<sup>18</sup>Michael E. Howard, "The Use and Abuse of Military History" Parameters, 11 (March 1981), 12.

<sup>19</sup>Benjamin F. Cooling, "Military History for the Military Professional," Parameters, 1 (Winter 1972), 28.

<sup>20</sup>Quoted in Russell F. Weigley, ed. New Dimensions in Military History (San Rafael, CA: Presidio Press, 1975), p.5.

<sup>21</sup>Bernard Brodie, Strategy in the Missile Age (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1959), p 393.

<sup>22</sup>AR870-5, p. 1-1.

<sup>23</sup>Ibid.

<sup>24</sup>David W. Hazen, "The Nature of History," unpublished seminar paper, Univ. of North Carolina, 1977.

<sup>25</sup>Trevor Dupuy, "Military History: The Laboratory of the Soldier." Lectures at the US Army War College (Spring 1982).

<sup>26</sup>Brodie, p. 39.

<sup>27</sup>Department of the Army, Army Regulation 870-5 (22 January 1977), p. 3-1.

<sup>28</sup>Ad Hoc Committee Report, Vol 3, p. I-1ff; Jessup, p. 369-70; George S. Pappas, Prudens Futuri: The US Army War College, 1901-1967 (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Walsworth Publishing Co., 1967), pp. 94-95, passim.

<sup>29</sup>Ad Hoc Committee Report, Vol 3, p. I-1.

<sup>30</sup>These percentages of military versus non-military subjects (and those that follow) are derived from a chart

of unknown origin filed under curriculum (1964) in the Military History Institute War College - Archives section. They appear valid and conform generally with data used by Pappas (cited above) and by LTC Michael E. Ekman and LTC Charles S. Nobles "The Need for a Balanced Curriculum at the Army War College" (USAWC Student Study Project, May 1981), p. 81.

<sup>31</sup>Ibid

<sup>32</sup>Pappas, p. 164.

<sup>33</sup>Ibid, p. 168.

<sup>34</sup>See note 30 above; the 1981 figure is from the Ekman study, p. 81.

<sup>35</sup>John W. Masland and Laurence I. Radway, Soldiers and Scholars: Military Education and National Policy (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1957) p. 381.

<sup>36</sup>Quoted in Ekman, p. 77.

<sup>37</sup>Compiled from the US Army War College, Curriculum Pamphlet for each year 1951 to 1982.

<sup>38</sup>All references to the 1971 Ad Hoc Committee survey are to Volume IV of the Ad Hoc Committee Report which contains the survey analysis and results charts.

<sup>39</sup>Rationale for the selection of these particular books is contained in the Ad Hoc Committee Report, Vol IV, p. c-15.

<sup>40</sup>Since anonymity protects the nine individuals who had not read a single book, it seems safe to recall Robin Higham's pungent observation that "unread officers are like the unwed mothers of their profession.

<sup>41</sup>Ad Hoc Committee Report, Vol IV, p. c-15.

<sup>42</sup>Evidence includes the former calling himself a student of the American Revolution and citing numerous historical examples and of the latter launching studies based on historical precedence and lessons.

APPENDIX A

TABULATED SURVEY RESULTS -

Figures 1 thru 24

FIG. 1




FIG. 2






FIG. 3

FIG. 4

FIG. 5




FIG. 6





FIG. 7




FIG. 8

# HOW SHOULD MILITARY HISTORY BE TAUGHT?

FIG. 9




FIG. 10






FIG. 11

FIG. 12

\* "INTEGRATE" IN OTHER COURSES WAS NOT AN OPTION IN THE 1971 SURVEY

\*\* IN NO INSTANCE IN THE 1982 SURVEY WAS THE RESPONSE THAT MILITARY HISTORY BE "NOT TAUGHT" SELECTED

FIG. 13





FIG. 14



VALUE OF STUDYING MIL. HISTORY

ESTABLISH MIL. HISTORY SPECIALTY





FIG. 15

FIG. 16


FIG.17

FIG.18

FIG.19

FIG.20

MEASURES OF NEED FOR STUDY-MILITARY HISTORY




AGREE WITH CLAUSEWITZ

AGREE WITH BRODIE

AGREE WITH REFORMERS - HISTORICAL IGNORANCE

AGREE WITH REFORMERS - HISTORICAL STUDY

EXTENT OF MILITARY HISTORY INVOLVEMENT



CONTACT WITH MHI

ATTENDANCE OF "PERSPECTIVES"

ELECTIVES WITH MILITARY HISTORY

OPINION OF ATTEMPTS TO INTEGRATE MILITARY HISTORY

FIG.21

FIG.22

FIG.23

FIG.24



APPENDIX B

MILITARY HISTORY QUESTIONNAIRE

9 March 1982

Dear Classmate:

I suspect you have received a number of questionnaires recently; I know they can become a pain. However, as you--collectively--are the only source of the information I need to complete a study (course requirement), I am compelled to ask your cooperation in one more.

I have tried to limit the length and complexity of the questionnaire. There are a couple aspects, however, that may seem awkward and deserve some explanation. First, as my data will be compared to the findings of a 1970 DA study, many of the questions were retained from that earlier effort which surveyed various levels of the Army (not just SSC). Secondly, although many questions assume the background of an active duty US Army officer, I definitely seek the varied perspectives of other components and services.

Hopefully you will not find this too time-consuming and will be able to return it promptly--just drop this questionnaire with the answer sheet attached into the distribution slot in the mail room.

Thanks, in advance, for your time and cooperation.

  
Dave Hazen

Return to:

LTC Dave Hazen  
Box 79

\* Name and other identification are not required--leave blank.

1) SERVICE (STATUS):

1. Army - Combat Arms
2. Army - Combat Support
3. Army - Combat Service Support
4. Air Force
5. Navy/Coast Guard
6. USMC
7. Civilian
8. International Fellow
9. Other

2) SOURCE OF COMMISSION:

1. ROTC
2. USMA
3. OCS
4. Other
5. NA

3) HIGHEST CIVILIAN EDUCATION:

1. Bachelor's Degree
2. Masters's Degree
3. Doctorate

4) COMBAT EXPERIENCE:

1. Korean War
2. Vietnam
3. Other
4. None

5) UNDERGRADUATE DEGREE IN HISTORY:

1. Yes
2. No

6) GRADUATE DEGREE IN HISTORY:

1. Yes
2. No

7) To what extent have you studied military History?  
(Mark most appropriate response)

1. Occasional reading
2. Self-designed home study program (intensive)
3. College level (undergraduate)
4. College level (graduate)
5. Military Service School
6. Other (Please explain on the last page)

8) In what way has your study of military history proved most beneficial to your effectiveness as an Army officer?  
(Mark most appropriate response)

1. Lessons learned from studying success and failure
2. Insights gained from studying problems similar to problems faced today
3. Inspiration of great deeds performed by others
4. Improved decision making ability
5. Enhanced understanding of behavioral problems
6. My study of military history has actually benefited me very little
7. NA

9) How valuable do you feel the study of military history (as defined above) can be in enhancing the professional Army officer's ability to perform his mission?

1. Highly valuable
2. Of some value
3. Not as valuable as the study of other disciplines
4. Of no value at all; a waste of time
5. No strong opinion

10) From his statements that "the knowledge which is basic to the art of war is empirical" and that "Historical examples...provide the best kind of proof in the empirical sciences," Clausewitz seems to view historical study as essential to the profession of arms. Do you?

1. Agree strongly
2. Agree slightly
3. Feel ambivalent
4. Disagree slightly
5. Disagree strongly
6. Have no opinion

11) Bernard Brodie in his introductory essay to On War (which we, the "Clausewitz class," presumably all read) seemed to include the military profession in his observation that: "Our own generation is unique, but sadly so, in producing a school of thinkers who are allegedly experts in military strategy and who are certainly specialists in military studies but who know virtually nothing of military history, including the history of our most recent wars, and who seem not to care about their ignorance." Of his statement do you?

1. Agree strongly
2. Agree slightly
3. Feel ambivalent
4. Disagree slightly
5. Disagree strongly
6. Have no opinion

12) One of the criticisms of the military by the so-called "military reformers"--along with technology, possessing a "firepower-attrition" mentality, substituting management for leadership, etc --has been a loss of historical mindedness, awareness and perspective. Do you?

1. Agree strongly
2. Agree slightly
3. Feel ambivalent
4. Disagree slightly
5. Disagree strongly
6. Have no opinion

13) Some of this same group (12 above) attribute the Army's success in developing effective combat leadership in former years (particularly before WW II) to an almost exclusive use of military history as the method of study in higher Army schools. Do you?

1. Agree strongly
2. Agree slightly
3. Feel ambivalent
4. Disagree slightly
5. Disagree strongly
6. Have no opinion

The following series of questions seek to assess the type and number of books read by Army officers. Please mark 1 on the answer sheet if you have read the book; mark 2 if you have not.

- 14) Weigley, R., History of the United States Army
- 15) Machiavelli, The Art of War
- 16) Ropp, T.R., War in the Modern World
- 17) Earle, E.M., Makers of Modern Strategy
- 18) Clausewitz, C., On War (Prior to AWC)
  
- 19) Liddell Hart, B.H., Strategy
- 20) Chandler, D.G., The Campaigns of Napoleon
- 21) Freeman, D.S., Lee's Lieutenants
- 22) Barnett, C., The Swordbearers
- 23) Graig, G., The Politics of the Prussian Army
  
- 24) Taylor, T., The March of Conquest
- 25) Ridgway, M.B., The Korean War
- 26) Fall, B., Street Without Joy
- 27) Giap, V.V., People's War, People's Army
- 28) Lawrence, T.E., The Seven Pillars of Wisdom
  
- 29) Greenfield, K. (ed.), Command Decisions (OCMH)
- 30) Albright, J. et al, Seven Fire Fights (OCMH)
- 31) Hemingway, E., Men at War
- 32) Tuchman, B., The Guns of August
- 33) Pike, D., Viet Cong
  
- 34) Kissinger, H., Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy
- 35) Marshall, S.L.A., The River and the Gauntlet
- 36) MacDonald, C., Company Commander
- 37) Marx, K., Communist Manifesto
- 38) Hitler, A., Mein Kampf
  
- 39) Shirer, W.L., The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich
- 40) Manstein, E., Lost Victories
- 41) Pogue, F.C., George C. Marshall
- 42) Matloff, M. and Snell, E., Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare
- 43) Thompson, R., Revolutionary War in World Strategy 1945-1969
  
- 44) Lewy, G., America In Vietnam
- 45) Weigley, R., The American Way of War
- 46) Huntington, S.P., The Common Defense
- 47) Ryan, C., A Bridge Too Far
- 48) Brodie, B., War and Politics

- 49) Matloff, M. ed. American Military History (OCMH)
- 50) Blumenson, M. The Patton Papers
- 51) Scott, H. and W. Scott. The Armed Forces of the USSR
- 52) Kohn, R. Eagle and Sword
- 53) Westmoreland, W. A Soldier Reports

The following 4 questions seek to assess at what levels military history should be taught in the Army's officer education system. Please indicate how it should be taught at each level:

54) USMA/ROTC

1. Required courses
2. Elective courses
3. Integrated in other courses
4. Not taught

55) ADVANCED COURSES:

1. Required courses
2. Elective courses
3. Integrated in other courses
4. Not taught

56) CGSC

1. Required courses
2. Elective courses
3. Integrated in other courses
4. Not taught

57) WAR COLLEGE

1. Required courses
2. Elective courses
3. Integrated in other courses
4. Not taught

58) Please indicate the extent of contact you have had with the Military History Institute (MHI).

1. None
2. I know its there
3. Am familiar with its purpose and facilities
4. Am quite knowledgeable of its purpose and facilities
5. Have worked with the Institute

59) Please indicate the number of "Perspectives in Military History" seminars sponsored by MHI that you have attended to date.

1. 0
2. 1
3. 2
4. 3
5. 4
6. 5 or more

60) Please indicate the number of advanced courses you will take for credit or audit.

1. 1 or 0
2. 2
3. 3
4. 4
5. 5
6. 6 or more

61) Please indicate the number of the following advanced courses with extensive historical content that you will take:

Military History and Theory of War  
The American Civil War  
History of US Military Strategy  
Strategic Issues of World War II  
Molders of 20<sup>th</sup> Century Strategy  
Changing Nature of Modern Warfare  
Men in Battle: The Human Dimension of War  
Studies in Peace and War  
Contrasts in Command

1. 0
2. 1
3. 2
4. 3
5. 4 or more

62) How do you rate attempts thus far in the course to "integrate" military history into other material? (Consider, for example, the lecture on the "Great War," or the student report on US forces in Russia during WW I).

1. Highly effective
2. Effective
3. Neutral
4. Ineffective
5. A failure
6. Can't remember



63) CPMS utilization of officers in relatively narrow fields has suggested the possibility of a specialty in military history. What is your reaction to such a proposal?

1. Favor
2. Oppose
3. No feelings

64) Considering the present-day career development objective of your particular branch, would you consider assignment to such a program?

1. I would not be qualified for such a program
2. I may be qualified and would be interested
3. I may be qualified and would not be interested
4. Not Applicable to my status

65) If the present-day career development objectives were changed to allow for more specialization in fields such as Military History, without the concurrent danger of being "sidetracked" or "left behind," would then be interested?

1. Yes
2. No
3. Not Applicable

66) In your opinion, how effective is the Army's use of its Military History resources? (Mark only one response)

1. I do not know what the Military History resources are
2. Optimum
3. Adequate
4. Poor

APPENDIX C

SURVEY STATISTICAL DATA

04-26-82

FILE - NO NAME - CREATED 04-26-82

001 SERVICE "STATUS"

CATEGORY LABEL	CODE	ABSOLUTE FREQUENCY	RELATIVE FREQUENCY (PERCENT)	ADJUSTED FREQUENCY (PERCENT)	CUMULATIVE ADJ FREQ (PERCENT)
ARMY-COMBAT ARMS	1	71	39.9	39.9	39.9
ARMY-COMBAT SUPPORT	2	31	17.4	17.4	57.3
ARMY-SERVICE SPT	3	42	23.6	23.6	80.9
AIR FORCE	4	16	9.0	9.0	89.9
NAVY-COAST GUARD	5	5	2.8	2.8	92.7
USMC	6	4	2.2	2.2	94.9
CIVILIAN	7	7	3.9	3.9	98.9
OTHER	9	2	1.1	1.1	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
	TOTAL	173	100.0	100.0	

MEAN	2.466	STD ERR	0.129	MEDIAN	2.781
MODE	1.000	STD DEV	1.715	VARIANCE	2.940
KURTOSIS	2.260	SKEWNESS	1.480	RANGE	8.000
MINIMUM	1.000	MAXIMUM	9.000		
VALID CASES	173	MISSING CASES	0		

04-26-82 FILE - NO NAME - CREATED 04-26-82

002 SOURCE OF COMMISSION

CATEGORY LABEL	CODE	ABSOLUTE FREQUENCY	RELATIVE FREQUENCY (PERCENT)	ADJUSTED FREQUENCY (PERCENT)	CUMULATIVE ADJ FREQ (PERCENT)
ROTC	1	100	56.2	56.2	56.2
USMA	2	32	18.0	18.0	74.2
OCS	3	25	14.0	14.0	88.2
OTHER	4	14	7.9	7.9	96.1
NA	5	7	3.9	3.9	100.0
	TOTAL	178	100.0	100.0	

MEAN	1.854	STD. ERR	0.087	MEDIAN	1.390
MODE	1.000	STD. DEV	1.165	VARIANCE	1.357
KURTOSIS	0.373	SKEWNESS	1.199	RANGE	4.000
MINIMUM	1.000	MAXIMUM	5.000		

VALID CASES 178 MISSING CASES 0

04-26-82 FILE - NOHAME - CREATED 04-26-82

003 HIGHEST CIVILIAN EDUCATION

CATEGORY LABEL	CODE	ABSOLUTE FREQUENCY	RELATIVE FREQUENCY (PERCENT)	ADJUSTED FREQUENCY (PERCENT)	CUMULATIVE ADJ FREQ (PERCENT)
BACHELOR DEGREE	1	29	16.7	16.3	16.3
MASTER'S DEGREE	2	135	75.2	75.8	92.1
DOCTORATE	3	14	7.9	7.9	100.0
	TOTAL	178	100.0	100.0	

MEAN	1.916	STD ERR	0.036	MEDIAN	1.944
MODE	2.000	STD DEV	0.486	VARIANCE	0.236
KURTOSIS	1.127	SKEWNESS	-0.217	RANGE	2.000
MINIMUM	1.000	MAXIMUM	3.000		
VALID CASES	178	MISSING CASES	0		

04-26-82

FILE - NO.NAME - CREATED 04-26-82

004 COMBAT EXPERIENCE

CATEGORY LABEL	CODE	ABSOLUTE FREQUENCY	RELATIVE FREQUENCY (PERCENT)	ADJUSTED FREQUENCY (PERCENT)	CUMULATIVE ADJ FREQ (PERCENT)
KOREAN WAR	1	1	0.6	0.6	0.6
VIETNAM	2	152	85.4	85.4	86.0
OTHER	3	1	0.6	0.6	86.5
NONE	4	24	13.5	13.5	100.0
TOTAL		178	100.0	100.0	

MEAN	2.270	STD ERR	0.052	MEDIAN	2.079
MODE	2.000	STD DEV	0.693	VARIANCE	0.481
KURTOSIS	2.487	SKEWNESS	2.053	RANGE	3.000
MINIMUM	1.000	MAXIMUM	4.000		
VALID CASES	178	MISSING CASES	0		

04-26-82

FILE - NONAME - CREATED 04-26-82

005 UNDERGRADUATE DEGREE IN HISTORY

CATEGORY LABEL	CODE	ABSOLUTE FREQUENCY	RELATIVE FREQUENCY (PERCENT)	ADJUSTED FREQUENCY (PERCENT)	CUMULATIVE ADJ FREQ (PERCENT)
YES	1	15	8.4	8.4	8.4
NO	2	163	91.6	91.6	100.0
	TOTAL	178	100.0	100.0	

MEAN	1.916	STD ERR	0.021	MEDIAN	1.950
MODE	2.000	STD DEV	0.279	VARIANCE	0.078
KURTOSIS	7.193	SKWNESS	-3.019	RANGE	1.000
MINIMUM	1.000	MAXIMUM	2.000		
VALID CASES	178	MISSING CASES	0		

04-26-82

FILE - N0NAME - CREATED 04-26-82

006 GRADUATE DEGREE IN HISTORY

CATEGORY LABEL	CODE	ABSOLUTE FREQUENCY	RELATIVE FREQUENCY (PERCENT)	ADJUSTED FREQUENCY (PERCENT)	CUMULATIVE ADJ FREQ (PERCENT)
YES	1	4	2.2	2.2	2.2
NO	2	174	97.8	97.8	100.0
	TOTAL	178	100.0	100.0	

MEAN	1.978	STD. ERD	0.011	MEDIAN	1.000
MODE	2.000	STD. DEV	0.140	VARIANCE	0.022
KURTOSIS	40.691	SKEWNESS	-6.499	RANGE	1.000
MINIMUM	1.000	MAXIMUM	2.000		
VALID CASES	178	MISSING CASES	0		



007 STUDIED MILITARY HISTORY

CATEGORY LABEL	CODE	ABSOLUTE FREQUENCY	RELATIVE FREQUENCY (PERCENT)	ADJUSTED FREQUENCY (PERCENT)	CUMULATIVE ADJ FREQ (PERCENT)
OCCASIONAL READING	1	88	49.4	49.4	49.4
SELF-DESIGNED STUDY	2	13	7.3	7.3	56.7
COLLEGE "UNDERGRAD"	3	23	12.9	12.9	69.7
COLLEGE "GRADUATE"	4	1	0.6	0.6	70.2
MILITARY SVC SCHOOL	5	46	25.8	25.8	96.1
OTHER	6	7	3.9	3.9	100.0
	TOTAL	178	100.0	100.0	

MEAN	2.579	STD ERR	0.136	MEDIAN	1.577
MODE	1.000	STD DEV	1.812	VARIANCE	3.285
KURTOSIS	-1.376	SKEWNESS	0.566	RANGE	5.000
MINIMUM	1.000	MAXIMUM	6.000		
VALID CASES	178	MISSING CASES	0		

04-26-82

FILE - NONAME - CREATED 04-26-82

008 WAY STUDY OF HISTORY MOST BENEFITED

CATEGORY LABEL	CODE	ABSOLUTE FREQUENCY	RELATIVE FREQUENCY (PERCENT)	ADJUSTED FREQUENCY (PERCENT)	CUMULATIVE ADJ FREQ (PERCENT)
LESSONS LEARNED	1	43	24.2	24.2	24.2
INSIGHTS GAINED	2	58	32.6	32.6	56.7
INSPIRE GREAT DEEDS	3	12	6.7	6.7	63.5
IMPROVE DECISIONS	4	13	7.3	7.3	70.8
MORE UNDERSTANDING	5	9	5.1	5.1	75.8
BENEFITED ME LITTLE	6	36	20.2	20.2	96.1
RA	7	7	3.9	3.9	100.0
	TOTAL	178	100.0	100.0	

MEAN	3.129	STD ERR	0.150	MEDIAN	2.293
MODE	2.000	STD DEV	2.006	VARIANCE	4.023
KURTOSIS	-1.205	SKEWNESS	0.585	RANGE	6.000
MINIMUM	1.000	MAXIMUM	7.000		
VALID CASES	178	MISSING CASES	0		

04-26-82

FILE - NONAME - CREATED 04-26-82

009 STUDY OF MILITARY HISTORY VALUABLE

CATEGORY LABEL	CODE	ABSOLUTE FREQUENCY	RELATIVE FREQUENCY (PERCENT)	ADJUSTED FREQUENCY (PERCENT)	CUMULATIVE ADJ FREQ (PERCENT)
HIGHLY VALUABLE	1	73	41.0	41.0	41.0
OF SOME VALUE	2	80	49.4	49.4	90.4
NOT AS VALUABLE	3	10	5.6	5.6	96.1
NO OPINION	5	7	3.9	3.9	100.0
	TOTAL	170	100.0	100.0	

MEAN	1.764	STD ERR	0.066	MEDIAN	1.682
MODE	2.000	STD DEV	0.877	VARIANCE	0.769
KURTOSIS	5.016	SKEWNESS	1.904	RANGE	4.000
MINIMUM	1.000	MAXIMUM	5.000		

VALID CASES 178 MISSING CASES 0

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FILE - NO:AME - CREATED 04-26-82

010 CLAUSEWITZ VIEWS HISTORY STUDY ESSENTIAL

CATEGORY LABEL	CODE	ABSOLUTE FREQUENCY	RELATIVE FREQUENCY (PERCENT)	ADJUSTED FREQUENCY (PERCENT)	CUMULATIVE ADJ FREQ (PERCENT)
AGREE STRONGLY	1	73	41.0	41.0	41.0
AGREE SLIGHTLY	2	82	49.4	49.4	90.4
FEEL AMBIVALENT	3	13	7.3	7.3	97.8
DISAGREE SLIGHTLY	4	1	0.6	0.6	98.3
DISAGREE STRONGLY	5	1	0.6	0.6	98.9
HAVE NO OPINION	6	2	1.1	1.1	100.0
	TOTAL	178	100.0	100.0	

MEAN	1.736	STD ERR	0.061	MEDIAN	1.682
MODE	2.000	STD DEV	0.819	VARIANCE	0.670
KURTOSIS	8.093	SKEWNESS	2.086	RANGE	5.000
MINIMUM	1.000	MAXIMUM	6.000		
VALID CASES	178	MISSING CASES	0		

011 BRODIE'S VIEW - HISTORICAL IGIORANCE

CATEGORY LABEL	CODE	ABSOLUTE FREQUENCY	RELATIVE FREQUENCY (PERCENT)	ADJUSTED FREQUENCY (PERCENT)	CUMULATIVE ADJ FRQD (PERCENT)
AGREE STRONGLY	1	55	30.9	30.9	30.9
AGREE SLIGHTLY	2	84	47.2	47.2	78.1
FEEL AMBIVALENT	3	16	9.0	9.0	87.1
DISAGREE SLIGHTLY	4	15	8.4	8.4	95.5
DISAGREE STRONGLY	5	4	2.2	2.2	97.8
HAVE NO OPINION	6	4	2.2	2.2	100.0
	TOTAL	178	100.0	100.0	

MEAN	2.107	STD ERR	0.085	MEDIAN	1.905
MODE	2.000	STD DEV	1.137	VARIANCE	1.294
KURTOSIS	2.134	SKEWNESS	1.445	RANGE	5.000
MINIMUM	1.000	MAXIMUM	6.000		
VALID CASES	178	MISSING CASES	0		

04-26-82 FILE - NONAME - CREATED 04-26-82

012 MILITARY REFORMER - HISTORICAL IGNORANCE

CATEGORY LABEL	CODE	ABSOLUTE FREQUENCY	RELATIVE FREQUENCY (PERCENT)	ADJUSTED FREQUENCY (PERCENT)	CUMULATIVE ADJ FREQ (PERCENT)
AGREE STRONGLY	1	53	29.8	29.8	29.8
AGREE SLIGHTLY	2	91	51.1	51.1	80.9
FEEL AMBIVALENT	3	10	5.6	5.6	86.5
DISAGREE SLIGHTLY	4	14	7.9	7.9	94.4
DISAGREE STRONGLY	5	4	2.2	2.2	96.6
HAVE NO OPINION	6	6	3.4	3.4	100.0
	TOTAL	178	100.0	100.0	

MEAN	2.118	STD ERR	0.089	MEDIAN	1.896
MODE	2.000	STD DEV	1.185	VARIANCE	1.404
KURTOSIS	2.590	SKEWNESS	1.624	RANGE	5.000
MINIMUM	1.000	MAXIMUM	6.000		
VALID CASES	178	MISSING CASES	0		

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FILE - NONAME - CREATED 04-26-82

013 MILITARY REFORMERS - HISTORICAL STUDY

CATEGORY LABEL	CODE	ABSOLUTE FREQUENCY	RELATIVE FREQUENCY (PERCENT)	ADJUSTED FREQUENCY (PERCENT)	CUMULATIVE ADJ FREQ (PERCENT)
AGREE STRONGLY	1	17	9.6	9.6	9.6
AGREE SLIGHTLY	2	70	39.3	39.3	48.9
FEEL AMBIVALENT	3	33	18.5	18.5	67.4
DISAGREE SLIGHTLY	4	31	17.4	17.4	84.8
DISAGREE STRONGLY	5	11	6.2	6.2	91.0
HAVE NO OPINION	6	16	9.0	9.0	100.0
	TOTAL	178	100.0	100.0	

MEAN	2.983	STD ERR	0.106	MEDIAN	2.561
MODE	2.000	STD DEV	1.420	VARIANCE	2.017
KURTOSIS	-0.366	SKEWNESS	0.724	RANGE	5.000
MINIMUM	1.000	MAXIMUM	6.000		
VALID CASES	178	MISSING CASES	0		

04-26-82

FILE - NONAME - CREATED 04-26-82

014 WFIGLEY: HISTORY OF THE U.S. ARMY

CATEGORY LABEL	CODE	ABSOLUTE FREQUENCY	RELATIVE FREQUENCY (PERCENT)	ADJUSTED FREQUENCY (PERCENT)	CUMULATIVE ADJ FREQ (PERCENT)
YES	1	49	27.5	27.8	27.8
NO	2	127	71.3	72.2	100.0
OUT OF RANGE		2	1.1	MISSING	100.0
	TOTAL	178	100.0	100.0	

MEAN	1.722	STD ERR	0.034	MEDIAN	1.807
MODE	2.000	STD DEV	0.449	VARIANCE	0.202
KURTOSIS	-1.017	SKEWNESS	-0.997	RANGE	1.000
MINIMUM	1.000	MAXIMUM	2.000		
VALID CASES	176	MISSING CASES	2		



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FILE - NOHAME - CREATED 04-26-82

015 MACHIAVELLI: THE ART OF WAR

CATEGORY LABEL	CODE	ABSOLUTE FREQUENCY	RELATIVE FREQUENCY (PERCENT)	ADJUSTED FREQUENCY (PERCENT)	CUMULATIVE ADJ FREQ (PERCENT)
YES	1	47	26.4	26.4	26.4
NO	2	131	73.6	73.6	100.0
	TOTAL	178	100.0	100.0	

MEAN	1.736	STD ERR	0.033	MEDIAN	1.821
MODE	2.000	STD DEV	0.442	VARIANCE	0.195
KURTOSIS	-0.844	SKEWNESS	-1.080	RANGE	1.000
MINIMUM	1.000	MAXIMUM	2.000		
VALID CASES	178	MISSING CASES	0		

04-26-82

FILE - NDNAM6 - CREATED 04-26-82

016 ROPP: WAR IN THE MODERN WORLD

CATEGORY LABEL	CODE	ABSOLUTE FREQUENCY	RELATIVE FREQUENCY (PERCENT)	ADJUSTED FREQUENCY (PERCENT)	CUMULATIVE ADJ FREQ (PERCENT)
YES	1	10	5.6	5.6	5.6
NO	2	167	93.8	94.4	100.0
OUT OF RANGE		1	0.6	MISSING	100.0
	TOTAL	178	100.0	100.0	

MEAN	1.944	STD ERR	0.017	MEDIAN	1.970
MODE	2.000	STD DEV	0.232	VARIANCE	0.054
KURTOSIS	13.162	SKEWNESS	-3.875	RANGE	1.000
MINIMUM	1.000	MAXIMUM	2.000		
VALID CASES	177	MISSING CASES	1		

04-26-82 FILE - NO NAME - CREATED 04-26-82

017 TABLE: MAKERS OF MODERN STRATEGY

CATEGORY LABEL	CODE	ABSOLUTE FREQUENCY	RELATIVE FREQUENCY (PERCENT)	ADJUSTED FREQUENCY (PERCENT)	CUMULATIVE ADJ FREQ (PERCENT)
YES	1	39	21.9	22.0	22.0
NO	2	137	77.5	78.0	100.0
OUT OF RANGE		1	0.6	MISSING	100.0
	TOTAL	177	100.0	100.0	

MEAN	1.780	STD ERR	0.031	MEDIAN	1.859
MODE	2.000	STD DEV	0.416	VARIANCE	0.173
KURTOSIS	-0.149	SKEWNESS	-1.361	RANGE	1.000
MINIMUM	1.000	MAXIMUM	2.000		
VALID CASES	177	MISSING CASES	1		

04-26-82

FILE - NONAME - CREATED 04-26-82

018 CLAUSEWITZ: ON WAR

CATEGORY LABEL	CODE	ABSOLUTE FREQUENCY	RELATIVE FREQUENCY (PERCENT)	ADJUSTED FREQUENCY (PERCENT)	CUMULATIVE ADJ FREQ (PERCENT)
YES	1	107	60.1	60.5	60.5
NO	2	70	39.3	39.5	100.0
OUT OF RANGE		1	0.6	MISSING	100.0
	TOTAL	178	100.0	100.0	
MEAN	1.395	STD ERR	0.037	MEDIAN	1.327
MODE	1.000	STD DEV	0.490	VARIANCE	0.240
KURTOSIS	-1.635	SKEWNESS	0.431	RANGE	1.000
MINIMUM	1.000	MAXIMUM	2.000		
VALID CASES	177	MISSING CASES	1		

019                      LIDDELL HART: STRATEGY

CATEGORY LABEL	CODE	ABSOLUTE FREQUENCY	RELATIVE FREQUENCY (PERCENT)	ADJUSTED FREQUENCY (PERCENT)	CUMULATIVE ADJ FREQ (PERCENT)
YES	1	101	56.7	57.1	57.1
NO	2	76	42.7	42.9	100.0
OUT OF RANGE		1	0.6	MISSING	100.0
	TOTAL	178	100.0	100.0	

MEAN	1.429	STD ERR	0.037	MEDIAN	1.376
MODE	1.000	STD DEV	0.496	VARIANCE	0.246
KURTOSIS	-1.939	SKEWNESS	0.288	RANGE	1.000
MINIMUM	1.000	MAXIMUM	2.000		
VALID CASES	177	MISSING CASES	1		

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FILE - NONAME - CREATED 04-26-82

020 CHANDLER: THE CAMPAINS OF NEPOLEON

CATEGORY LABEL	CODE	ABSOLUTE FREQUENCY	RELATIVE FREQUENCY (PERCENT)	ADJUSTED FREQUENCY (PERCENT)	CUMULATIVE ADJ FREQ (PERCENT)
YES	1	20	11.2	11.4	11.4
NO	2	156	87.6	88.6	100.0
OUT OF RANGE		2	1.1	MISSING	100.0
	TOTAL	176	100.0	100.0	

MEAN	1.886	STD ERR	0.024	MEDIAN	1.936
MODE	2.000	STD DEV	0.316	VARIANCE	0.101
KURTOSIS	4.077	SKEWNESS	-2.456	RANGE	1.000
MINIMUM	1.000	MAXIMUM	2.000		

VALID CASES 176 MISSING CASES 2

04-26-82

FILE - NO NAME - CREATED 04-26-82

Q21 FREEMAN; LEE'S LIEUTENANTS

CATEGORY LABEL	CODE	ABSOLUTE FREQUENCY	RELATIVE FREQUENCY (PERCENT)	ADJUSTED FREQUENCY (PERCENT)	CUMULATIVE ADJ FREQ (PERCENT)
YES	1	61	34.3	34.3	34.3
NO	2	117	65.7	65.7	100.0
	TOTAL	178	100.0	100.0	

MEAN	1.657	STD ERR	0.036	MEDIAN	1.739
MODE	2.000	STD DEV	0.476	VARIANCE	0.227
KURTOSIS	-1.571	SKEWNESS	-0.669	RANGE	1.000
MINIMUM	1.000	MAXIMUM	2.000		
VALID CASES	178	MISSING CASES	0		

04-26-82

FILE - NONAME - CREATED 04-26-82

Q22 BARNETT: THE SWORDBEARERS

CATEGORY LABEL	CODE	ABSOLUTE FREQUENCY	RELATIVE FREQUENCY (PERCENT)	ADJUSTED FREQUENCY (PERCENT)	CUMULATIVE ADJ FREQ (PERCENT)
YES	1	8	4.5	4.5	4.5
NO	2	170	95.5	95.5	100.0
	TOTAL	178	100.0	100.0	

MEAN	1.955	STD ERR	0.016	MEDIAN	1.976
MODE	2.000	STD DEV	0.208	VARIANCE	0.043
KURTOSIS	17.827	SKEWNESS	-4.430	RANGE	1.000
MINIMUM	1.000	MAXIMUM	2.000		
VALID CASES	178	MISSING CASES	0		



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FILE - NONAME - CREATED 04-26-82

023 GRAIGI POLITICS OF THE PRUSSIAN ARMY

CATEGORY LABEL	CODE	ABSOLUTE FREQUENCY	RELATIVE FREQUENCY (PERCENT)	ADJUSTED FREQUENCY (PERCENT)	CUMULATIVE ADJ FREQ (PERCENT)
YES	1	6	3.4	3.4	3.4
NO	2	171	96.1	96.6	100.0
OUT OF RANGE		1	0.6	MISSING	100.0
	TOTAL	178	100.0	100.0	

MEAN	1.966	STD ERR	0.014	MEDIAN	1.982
MODE	2.000	STD DEV	0.181	VARIANCE	0.033
KURTOSIS	25.277	SKEWNESS	-5.195	RANGE	1.000
MINIMUM	1.000	MAXIMUM	2.000		

VALID CASES 177 MISSING CASES 1

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FILE - NONAME - CREATED 04-26-82

024 TAYLOR: THE MARCH OF CONQUEST

CATEGORY LABEL	CODE	ABSOLUTE FREQUENCY	RELATIVE FREQUENCY (PERCENT)	ADJUSTED FREQUENCY (PERCENT)	CUMULATIVE ADJ FREQ (PERCENT)
YES	1	8	4.5	4.5	4.5
NO	2	170	95.5	95.5	100.0
	TOTAL	178	100.0	100.0	

MEAN	1.955	STD ERR	0.016	MEDIAN	1.976
MODE	2.000	STD DEV	0.208	VARIANCE	0.043
KURTOSIS	17.827	SKEWNESS	-4.430	RANGE	1.000
MINIMUM	1.000	MAXIMUM	2.000		

VALID CASES 178 MISSING CASES 0

04-26-82

FILE - NONAME - CREATED 04-26-82

Q25

RIDGWAY: THE KOREAN WAR

CATEGORY LABEL	CODE	ABSOLUTE FREQUENCY	RELATIVE FREQUENCY (PERCENT)	ADJUSTED FREQUENCY (PERCENT)	CUMULATIVE ADJ FREQ (PERCENT)
YES	1	60	33.7	33.7	33.7
NO	2	118	66.3	66.3	100.0
	TOTAL	178	100.0	100.0	

MEAN	1.663	STD ERR	0.036	MEDIAN	1.746
MODE	2.000	STD DEV	0.474	VARIANCE	0.225
KURTOSIS	-1.534	SKEWNESS	-0.695	RANGE	1.000
MINIMUM	1.000	MAXIMUM	2.000		
VALID CASES	178	MISSING CASES	0		

04-26-82

FILE - NOIAME - CREATED 04-26-82

Q26 FALL: STREET WITHOUT JOY

CATEGORY LABEL	CODE	ABSOLUTE FREQUENCY	RELATIVE FREQUENCY (PERCENT)	ADJUSTED FREQUENCY (PERCENT)	CUMULATIVE ADJ FREQ (PERCENT)
YES	1	92	51.7	51.7	51.7
NO	2	86	48.3	48.3	100.0
	TOTAL	178	100.0	100.0	

MEAN	1.483	STD ERR	0.038	MEDIAN	1.467
MODE	1.000	STD DEV	0.501	VARIANCE	0.251
KURTOSIS	-2.018	SKEWNESS	0.066	RANGE	1.000
MINIMUM	1.000	MAXIMUM	2.000		
VALID CASES	178	MISSING CASES	0		

04-26-82

FILE - NONAME - CREATED 04-26-82

027 STAF: PEOPLE'S WAR, PEOPLE'S ARMY

CATEGORY LABEL	CODE	ABSOLUTE FREQUENCY	RELATIVE FREQUENCY (PERCENT)	ADJUSTED FREQUENCY (PERCENT)	CUMULATIVE ADJ FREQ (PERCENT)
YES	1	46	25.8	25.8	25.8
NO	2	132	74.2	74.2	100.0
	TOTAL	178	100.0	100.0	

MEAN	1.742	STD ERR	0.033	MEDIAN	1.826
MODE	2.000	STD DEV	0.439	VARIANCE	0.193
KURTOSIS	-0.770	SKEWNESS	-1.113	RANGE	1.000
MINIMUM	1.000	MAXIMUM	2.000		
VALID CASES	178	MISSING CASES	0		

04-26-82

FILE - N0NAME - CREATED 04-26-82

028 LAWRENCE: THE SEVEN PILLARS OF WISDOM

CATEGORY LABEL	CODE	ABSOLUTE FREQUENCY	RELATIVE FREQUENCY (PERCENT)	ADJUSTED FREQUENCY (PERCENT)	CUMULATIVE ADJ FREQ (PERCENT)
YES	1	19	10.7	10.7	10.7
NO	2	159	89.3	89.3	100.0
	TOTAL	178	100.0	100.0	

MEAN	1.693	STD ERR	0.023	MEDIAN	1.340
MODE	2.000	STD DEV	0.310	VARIANCE	0.096
KURTOSIS	4.651	SKEWNESS	-2.569	RANGE	1.000
MINIMUM	1.000	MAXIMUM	2.000		
VALID CASES	178	MISSING CASES	0		

04-26-82 FILE - NO NAME - CREATED 04-26-82

029 GREENFIELD: COMMAND DECISIONS

CATEGORY LABEL	CODE	ABSOLUTE FREQUENCY	RELATIVE FREQUENCY (PERCENT)	ADJUSTED FREQUENCY (PERCENT)	CUMULATIVE ADJ FREQ (PERCENT)
YES	1	12	6.7	6.7	6.7
NO	2	166	93.3	93.3	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
	TOTAL	178	100.0	100.0	

MEAN	1.933	STD ERR	0.019	MEDIAN	1.964
MODE	2.000	STD DEV	0.251	VARIANCE	0.063
KURTOSIS	10.224	SKEWNESS	-3.480	RANGE	1.000
MINIMUM	1.000	MAXIMUM	2.000		
VALID CASES	178	MISSING CASES	0		

030 ALBRIGHT: SEVEN FIRE FIGHTS

CATEGORY LABEL	CODE	ABSOLUTE FREQUENCY	RELATIVE FREQUENCY (PERCENT)	ADJUSTED FREQUENCY (PERCENT)	CUMULATIVE ADJ FREQ (PERCENT)
YES	1	12	6.7	6.7	6.7
NO	2	166	93.3	93.3	100.0
	TOTAL	178	100.0	100.0	

MEAN	1.933	STD ERR	0.019	MEDIAN	1.964
MODE	2.000	STD DEV	0.251	VARIANCE	0.063
KURTOSIS	10.224	SKEWNESS	-3.480	RANGE	1.000
MINIMUM	1.000	MAXIMUM	2.000		
VALID CASES	178	MISSING CASES	0		



04-26-82

FILE - NCRAME - CREATED 04-26-82

031 HEMINGWAY: MEI. AT WAR

CATEGORY LABEL	CODE	ABSOLUTE FREQUENCY	RELATIVE FREQUENCY (PERCENT)	ADJUSTED FREQUENCY (PERCENT)	CUMULATIVE ADJ FREQ (PERCENT)
YES	1	47	26.4	26.4	26.4
NO	2	131	73.6	73.6	100.0
	TOTAL	178	100.0	100.0	

MEAN	1.736	STD ERR	0.033	MEDIAN	1.821
MODE	2.000	STD DEV	0.442	VARIANCE	0.195
KURTOSIS	-0.844	SKEWNESS	-1.080	RANGE	1.000
MINIMUM	1.000	MAXIMUM	2.000		
VALID CASES	178	MISSING CASES	0		

04-26-82

FILE - NONAME - CREATED 04-26-82

032 TUCHMAN: THE GUNS OF AUGUST

CATEGORY LABEL	CODE	ABSOLUTE FREQUENCY	RELATIVE FREQUENCY (PERCENT)	ADJUSTED FREQUENCY (PERCENT)	CUMULATIVE ADJ FREQ (PERCENT)
YES	1	74	41.6	41.6	41.6
NO	2	104	58.4	58.4	100.0
	TOTAL	178	100.0	100.0	
MEAN	1.584	STD ERR	0.037	MEDIAN	1.644
MODE	2.000	STD DEV	0.494	VARIANCE	0.244
KURTOSIS	-1.903	SKEWNESS	-0.345	RANGE	1.000
MINIMUM	1.000	MAXIMUM	2.000		
VALID CASES	178	MISSING CASES	0		

04-26-82

FILE - NONAME - CREATED 04-26-82

033

PIKE: VIET CONG

CATEGORY LABEL	CODE	ABSOLUTE FREQUENCY	RELATIVE FREQUENCY (PERCENT)	ADJUSTED FREQUENCY (PERCENT)	CUMULATIVE ADJ FREQ (PERCENT)
YES	1	25	14.0	14.0	14.0
NO	2	153	86.0	86.0	100.0
	TOTAL	178	100.0	100.0	

MEAN	1.860	STD ERR	0.026	MEDIAN	1.918
MODE	2.000	STD DEV	0.348	VARIANCE	0.121
KURTOSIS	2.383	SKEWNESS	-2.087	RANGE	1.000
MINIMUM	1.000	MAXIMUM	2.000		
VALID CASES	178	MISSING CASES	0		

04-26-82

FILE - N0NAME - CREATED 04-26-82

034 KISSINGER: NUCLEAR WEAPONS&FOPEIN POLICY

CATEGORY LABEL	CODE	ABSOLUTE FREQUENCY	RELATIVE FREQUENCY (PERCENT)	ADJUSTED FREQUENCY (PERCENT)	CUMULATIVE ADJ FREQ (PERCENT)
YES	1	82	46.1	46.1	46.1
NO	2	96	53.9	53.9	100.0
	TOTAL	178	100.0	100.0	

MEAN	1.539	STD ERR	0.037	MEDIAN	1.573
MODE	2.000	STD DEV	0.500	VARIANCE	0.250
KURTOSIS	-1.997	SKEWNESS	-0.159	RANGE	1.000
MINIMUM	1.000	MAXIMUM	2.000		

VALID CASES 178 MISSING CASES 0

04-26-82

FILE - NONAME - CREATED 04-26-82

035 MARSHALL: THE RIVER AND THE GAUNTLET

CATEGORY LABEL	CODE	ABSOLUTE FREQUENCY	RELATIVE FREQUENCY (PERCENT)	ADJUSTED FREQUENCY (PERCENT)	CUMULATIVE ADJ FREQ (PERCENT)
YES	1	32	18.0	18.0	18.0
NO	2	146	82.0	82.0	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
	TOTAL	178	100.0	100.0	

MEAN	1.820	STD ERR	0.029	MEDIAN	1.890
MODE	2.000	STD DEV	0.385	VARIANCE	0.148
KURTOSIS	0.839	SKEWNESS	-1.682	RANGE	1.000
MINIMUM	1.000	MAXIMUM	2.000		
VALID CASES	178	MISSING CASES	0		

04-26-82 FILE - NONAME - CREATED 04-26-82

036 MACDONALD: COMPANY COMMANDER

CATEGORY LABEL	CODE	ABSOLUTE FREQUENCY	RELATIVE FREQUENCY (PERCENT)	ADJUSTED FREQUENCY (PERCENT)	CUMULATIVE ADJ FREQ (PERCENT)
YES	1	27	15.2	15.2	15.2
NO	2	151	84.8	84.8	100.0
	TOTAL	178	100.0	100.0	

MEAN	1.848	STD ERR	0.027	MEDIAN	1.911
MODE	2.000	STD DEV	0.360	VARIANCE	0.129
KURTOSIS	1.857	SKEWNESS	-1.959	RANGE	1.000
MINIMUM	1.000	MAXIMUM	2.000		
VALID CASES	178	MISSING CASES	0		

04-26-82

FILE - NOJANE - CREATED 04-26-82

037 MARX: COMMUNIST MANIFESTO

CATEGORY LABEL	CODE	ABSOLUTE FREQUENCY	RELATIVE FREQUENCY (PERCENT)	ADJUSTED FREQUENCY (PERCENT)	CUMULATIVE ADJ FREQ (PERCENT)
YES	1	56	31.5	31.5	31.5
NO	2	127	68.5	68.5	100.0
	TOTAL	178	100.0	100.0	

MEAN	1.665	STD ERR	0.035	MEDIAN	1.770
MODE	2.000	STD DEV	0.466	VARIANCE	0.217
KURTOSIS	-1.367	SKEWNESS	-0.805	RANGE	1.000
MINIMUM	1.000	MAXIMUM	2.000		
VALID CASES	178	MISSING CASES	0		

04-26-82

FILE - NO NAME - CREATED 04-26-82

038 HITLER: MIEN KAMPF

CATEGORY LABEL	CODE	ABSOLUTE FREQUENCY	RELATIVE FREQUENCY (PERCENT)	ADJUSTED FREQUENCY (PERCENT)	CUMULATIVE ADJ FREQ (PERCENT)
YES	1	58	32.6	32.6	32.6
NO	2	120	67.4	67.4	100.0
	TOTAL	178	100.0	100.0	

MEAN	1.674	STD ERR	0.035	MEDIAN	1.758
MODE	2.000	STD DEV	0.470	VARIANCE	0.221
KURTOSIS	-1.455	SKEWNESS	-0.749	RANGE	1.000
MINIMUM	1.000	MAXIMUM	2.000		
VALID CASES	178	MISSING CASES	0		



039                      SHIRER: RISE & FALL OF THE THIRD REICH

CATEGORY LABEL	CODE	ABSOLUTE FREQUENCY	RELATIVE FREQUENCY (PERCENT)	ADJUSTED FREQUENCY (PERCENT)	CUMULATIVE ADJ FREQ (PERCENT)
YES	1	109	61.2	61.2	61.2
NO	2	69	38.8	38.8	100.0
	TOTAL	178	100.0	100.0	

MEAN	1.388	STD ERR	0.037	MEDIAN	1.317
MODE	1.000	STD DEV	0.489	VARIANCE	0.239
KURTOSIS	-1.804	SKEWNESS	0.465	RANGE	1.000
MINIMUM	1.000	MAXIMUM	2.000		
VALID CASES	178	MISSING CASES	0		

04-26-82

FILE - NONAME - CREATED 04-26-82

040 MANSTEIN: LOST VICTORIES

CATEGORY LABEL	CODE	ABSOLUTE FREQUENCY	RELATIVE FREQUENCY (PERCENT)	ADJUSTED FREQUENCY (PERCENT)	CUMULATIVE ADJ FRFQ (PERCENT)
YES	1	6	4.5	4.5	4.5
NO	2	172	95.5	95.5	100.0
	TOTAL	178	100.0	100.0	

MEAN	1.955	STD ERR	0.016	MEDIAN	1.976
MODE	2.000	STD DEV	0.206	VARIANCE	0.043
KURTOSIS	17.827	SKEWNESS	-4.430	RANGE	1.000
MINIMUM	1.000	MAXIMUM	2.000		
VALID CASES	178	MISSING CASES	0		

04-26-82 FILE - NONAME - CREATED 04-26-82

041 POGUE: GEORGE C: MARSHALL

CATEGORY LABEL	CODE	ABSOLUTE FREQUENCY	RELATIVE FREQUENCY (PERCENT)	ADJUSTED FREQUENCY (PERCENT)	CUMULATIVE ADJ FREQ (PERCENT)
YES	1	28	15.7	15.7	15.7
NO	2	150	84.3	84.3	100.0
	TOTAL	178	100.0	100.0	

MEAN	1.643	STD ERR	0.027	MEDIAN	1.907
MODE	2.000	STD DEV	0.365	VARIANCE	0.133
KURTOSIS	1.623	SKEWNESS	-1.899	RANGE	1.000
MINIMUM	1.000	MAXIMUM	2.000		
VALID CASES	178	MISSING CASES	0		

04-26-82

FILE - NO NAME - CREATED 04-26-82

042 MATLOFF: PLANNING FOR COALITION WARFARE

CATEGORY LABEL	CODE	ABSOLUTE FREQUENCY	RELATIVE FREQUENCY (PERCENT)	ADJUSTED FREQUENCY (PERCENT)	CUMULATIVE ADJ FRQ (PERCENT)
YES	1	9	5.1	5.1	5.1
NO	2	169	94.9	94.9	100.0
	TOTAL	178	100.0	100.0	

MEAN	1.949	STD ERR	0.016	MEDIAN	1.973
MODE	2.000	STD DEV	0.220	VARIANCE	0.049
KURTOSIS	15.291	SKEWNESS	-4.138	RANGE	1.000
MINIMUM	1.000	MAXIMUM	2.000		
VALID CASES	178	MISSING CASES	0		

04-26-82

FILE - NO NAME - CREATED 04-26-82

043 THOMPSON: REVOLUTIONARY WAR IN WORLD ...

CATEGORY LABEL	CODE	ABSOLUTE FREQUENCY	RELATIVE FREQUENCY (PERCENT)	ADJUSTED FREQUENCY (PERCENT)	CUMULATIVE ADJ FREQ (PERCENT)
YES	1	10	5.6	5.6	5.6
NO	2	167	93.8	94.4	100.0
OUT OF RANGE		1	0.6	MISSING	100.0
	TOTAL	178	100.0	100.0	

MEAN	1.944	STD ERR	0.017	MEDIAN	1.970
MODE	2.000	STD DEV	0.232	VARIANCE	0.054
KURTOSIS	13.162	SKEWNESS	-3.875	RANGE	1.000
MINIMUM	1.000	MAXIMUM	2.000		

VALID CASES 177 MISSING CASES 1

04-26-82

FILE - NO:NAME - CREATED 04-26-82

Q44 LEWY: AMERICA IN VIETNAM

CATEGORY LABEL	CODE	ABSOLUTE FREQUENCY	RELATIVE FREQUENCY (PERCENT)	ADJUSTED FREQUENCY (PERCENT)	CUMULATIVE ADJ FREQ (PERCENT)
YES	1	75	42.1	42.1	42.1
NO	2	103	57.9	57.9	100.0
	TOTAL	178	100.0	100.0	

MEAN	1.579	STD ERR	0.037	MEDIAN	1.636
MODE	2.000	STD DEV	0.495	VARIANCE	0.245
KURTOSIS	-1.918	SKEWNESS	-0.321	RANGE	1.000
MINIMUM	1.000	MAXIMUM	2.000		
VALID CASES	178	MISSING CASES	0		

04-26-82

FILE - NO NAME - CREATED 04-26-82

045

WEIGLEY: THE AMERICAN WAY OF WAR

CATEGORY LABEL	CODE	ABSOLUTE FREQUENCY	RELATIVE FREQUENCY (PERCENT)	ADJUSTED FREQUENCY (PERCENT)	CUMULATIVE ADJ FREQ (PERCENT)
YES	1	59	33.1	33.1	33.1
NO	2	119	66.9	66.9	100.0
	TOTAL	178	100.0	100.0	

MEAN	1.669	STD ERR	0.035	MEDIAN	1.752
MODE	2.000	STD DEV	0.472	VARIANCE	0.223
KURTOSIS	-1.495	SKEWNESS	-0.722	RANGE	1.000
MINIMUM	1.000	MAXIMUM	2.000		
VALID CASES	178	MISSING CASES	0		

04-26-82

FILE - NO:NAME - CREATED 04-26-82

046 HUNTINGTON: THE COMMON DEFENSE

CATEGORY LABEL	CODE	ABSOLUTE FREQUENCY	RELATIVE FREQUENCY (PERCENT)	ADJUSTED FREQUENCY (PERCENT)	CUMULATIVE ADJ FREQ (PERCENT)
YES	1	40	22.5	22.6	22.6
NO	2	137	77.0	77.4	100.0
OUT OF RANGE		1	0.6	MISSING	100.0
	TOTAL	178	100.0	100.0	

MEAN	1.774	STD ERR	0.032	MEDIAN	1.954
MODE	2.000	STD DEV	0.419	VARIANCE	0.176
KURTOSIS	-0.257	SKEWNESS	-1.322	RANGE	1.000
MINIMUM	1.000	MAXIMUM	2.000		
VALID CASES	177	MISSING CASES	1		



04-26-82

FILE - NOHAME - CREATED 04-26-82

047 RYAN: A BRIDGE TOO FAR

CATEGORY LABEL	CODE	ABSOLUTE FREQUENCY	RELATIVE FREQUENCY (PERCENT)	ADJUSTED FREQUENCY (PERCENT)	CUMULATIVE ADJ FREQ (PERCENT)
YES	1	111	62.4	62.4	62.4
NO	2	67	37.6	37.6	100.0
	TOTAL	178	100.0	100.0	

MEAN	1.376	STD ERR	0.036	MEDIAN	1.302
MODE	1.000	STD DEV	0.486	VARIANCE	0.236
KURTOSIS	-1.755	SKEWNESS	0.515	RANGE	1.000
MINIMUM	1.000	MAXIMUM	2.000		

VALID CASES 178 MISSING CASES 0

04-26-82

FILE - NONAME - CREATED 04-26-82

048 BRODIE: WAR AND POLITICS

CATEGORY LABEL	CODE	ABSOLUTE FREQUENCY	RELATIVE FREQUENCY (PERCENT)	ADJUSTED FREQUENCY (PERCENT)	CUMULATIVE ADJ FREQ (PERCENT)
YES	1	85	47.8	48.0	48.0
NO	2	92	51.7	52.0	100.0
OUT OF RANGE		1	0.6	MISSING	100.0
	TOTAL	178	100.0	100.0	

MEAN	1.520	STD ERR	0.038	MEDIAN	1.538
MODE	2.000	STD DEV	0.501	VARIANCE	0.251
KURTOSIS	-2.017	SKEWNESS	-0.080	RANGE	1.000
MINIMUM	1.000	MAXIMUM	2.000		
VALID CASES	177	MISSING CASES	1		

04-26-82

FILE - NONAME - CREATED 04-26-82

049

MATLOFF: AMERICA MILITARY HISTORY

CATEGORY LABEL	CODE	ABSOLUTE FREQUENCY	RELATIVE FREQUENCY (PERCENT)	ADJUSTED FREQUENCY (PERCENT)	CUMULATIVE ADJ FREQ (PERCENT)
YES	1	9	5.1	5.1	5.1
NO	2	169	94.9	94.9	100.0
	TOTAL	178	100.0	100.0	

MEAN	1.949	STD. ERR.	0.016	MEDIAN	1.973
MODE	2.000	STD. DEV.	0.220	VARIANCE	0.048
KURTOSIS	15.291	SKEWNESS	-4.138	RANGE	1.000
MINIMUM	1.000	MAXIMUM	2.000		
VALID CASES	178	MISSING CASES	0		

04-26-82

FILE - NONAME - CREATED 04-26-82

050 RIUMENSON: THE PATTON PAPERS

CATEGORY LABEL	CODE	ABSOLUTE FREQUENCY	RELATIVE FREQUENCY (PERCENT)	ADJUSTED FREQUENCY (PERCENT)	CUMULATIVE ADJ FREQ (PERCENT)
YES	1	40	22.5	22.5	22.5
NO	2	132	77.5	77.5	100.0
	TOTAL	176	100.0	100.0	

MEAN	1.775	STD ERR	0.031	MEDIAN	1.855
MODE	2.000	STD DEV	0.419	VARIANCE	0.175
KURTOSIS	-0.233	SKEWNESS	-1.330	RANGE	1.000
MINIMUM	1.000	MAXIMUM	2.000		
VALID CASES	178	MISSING CASES	0		

04-26-82

FILE - NONAME - CREATED 04-26-82

051 SCOTT: THE ARMED FORCES OF THE USSR

CATEGORY LABEL	CODE	ABSOLUTE FREQUENCY	RELATIVE FREQUENCY (PERCENT)	ADJUSTED FREQUENCY (PERCENT)	CUMULATIVE ADJ FREQ (PERCENT)
YES	1	18	10.1	10.1	10.1
NO	2	160	89.9	89.9	100.0
	TOTAL	178	100.0	100.0	

MEAN	1.899	STD ERR	0.023	MEDIAN	1.944
MODE	2.000	STD DEV	0.302	VARIANCE	0.091
KURTOSIS	5.179	SKEWNESS	-2.669	RANGE	1.000
MINIMUM	1.000	MAXIMUM	2.000		

VALID CASES 178 MISSING CASES 0

04-26-82

FILE - NONAME - CREATED 04-26-82

052

KOHN: EAGLE AND SWORD

CATEGORY LABEL	CODE	ABSOLUTE FREQUENCY	RELATIVE FREQUENCY (PERCENT)	ADJUSTED FREQUENCY (PERCENT)	CUMULATIVE ADJ FREQ (PERCENT)
YES	1	9	5.1	5.1	5.1
NO	2	169	94.9	94.9	100.0
	TOTAL	178	100.0	100.0	

MEAN	1.949	STD ERR	0.016	MEDIAN	1.973
MODE	2.000	STD DEV	0.220	VARIANCE	0.048
KURTOSIS	15.291	SKEWNESS	-4.138	RANGE	1.000
MINIMUM	1.000	MAXIMUM	2.000		

VALID CASES 178 MISSING CASES 0

24-26-82

FILE - NONAME - CREATED 04-26-82

053

WESTMORELAND: A SOLDIERS REPORT

CATEGORY LABEL	CODE	ABSOLUTE FREQUENCY	RELATIVE FREQUENCY (PERCENT)	ADJUSTED FREQUENCY (PERCENT)	CUMULATIVE ADJ FREQ (PERCENT)
YES	1	74	41.6	42.3	42.3
NO	2	101	56.7	57.7	100.0
OUT OF RANGE		3	1.7	MISSING	100.0
	TOTAL	172	100.0	100.0	

MEAN	1.577	STD ERR	0.037	MEDIAN	1.634
MODE	2.000	STD DEV	0.495	VARIANCE	0.245
KURTOSIS	-1.923	SKEWNESS	-0.315	RANGE	1.000
MINIMUM	1.000	MAXIMUM	2.000		
VALID CASES	175	MISSING CASES	3		

04-26-82

FILE - NONAME - CREATED 04-26-82

054 HISTORY TAUGHT: USMA-DOTC

CATEGORY LABEL	CODE	ABSOLUTE FREQUENCY	RELATIVE FREQUENCY (PERCENT)	ADJUSTED FREQUENCY (PERCENT)	CUMULATIVE ADJ FREQ (PERCENT)
REQUIRED COURSES	1	160	89.9	89.9	89.9
ELECTIVE COURSES	2	2	1.1	1.1	91.0
INTEGREATE IN OTHERS	3	16	9.0	9.0	100.0
	TOTAL	178	100.0	100.0	

MEAN	1.191	STD ERR	0.043	MEDIAN	1.056
MODE	1.000	STD DEV	0.580	VARIANCE	0.336
KURTOSIS	5.864	SKEWNESS	2.775	RANGE	2.000
MINIMUM	1.000	MAXIMUM	3.000		
VALID CASES	178	MISSING CASES	0		



04-26-82

FILE - HQNAME - CREATED 04-26-82

055 HISTORY TAUGHT: ADVANCE COURSES

CATEGORY LABEL	CODE	ABSOLUTE FREQUENCY	RELATIVE FREQUENCY (PERCENT)	ADJUSTED FREQUENCY (PERCENT)	CUMULATIVE ADJ FREQ (PERCENT)
REQUIRED COURSES	1	132	74.2	74.2	74.2
ELECTIVE COURSES	2	20	11.2	11.2	85.4
INTEGREATE IN OTHERS	3	25	14.0	14.0	99.4
NOT TAUGHT	4	1	0.6	0.6	100.0
	TOTAL	176	100.0	100.0	

MEAN	1.410	STD ERR	0.056	MEDIAN	1.174
MODE	1.000	STD DEV	0.740	VARIANCE	0.560
KURTOSIS	0.883	SKEWNESS	1.540	RANGE	3.000
MINIMUM	1.000	MAXIMUM	4.000		
VALID CASES	178	MISSING CASES	0		

04-26-82

FILE - NO NAME - CREATED 04-26-82

056 HISTORY TAUGHT: CGSC

CATEGORY LABEL	CODE	ABSOLUTE FREQUENCY	RELATIVE FREQUENCY (PERCENT)	ADJUSTED FREQUENCY (PERCENT)	CUMULATIVE ADJ FREQ (PERCENT)
REQUIRED COURSES	1	119	66.9	66.9	66.9
ELECTIVE COURSES	2	26	15.7	15.7	82.6
INTEGREATE IN OTHERS	3	31	17.4	17.4	100.0
	TOTAL	176	100.0	100.0	

MEAN	1.506	STD ERR	0.058	MEDIAN	1.248
MODE	1.000	STD DEV	0.776	VARIANCE	0.602
KURTOSIS	-0.403	SKEWNESS	1.120	RANGE	2.000
MINIMUM	1.000	MAXIMUM	3.000		
VALID CASES	176	MISSING CASES	0		

04-26-82

FILE - NDNAME - CREATED 04-26-82

057 HISTORY TAUGHT: WAR COLLEGE

CATEGORY LABEL	CODE	ABSOLUTE FREQUENCY	RELATIVE FREQUENCY (PERCENT)	ADJUSTED FREQUENCY (PERCENT)	CUMULATIVE ADJ FREQ (PERCENT)
REQUIRED COURSES	1	94	52.8	52.8	52.8
ELECTIVE COURSES	2	51	28.7	28.7	81.5
INTEGREATE IN OTHERS	3	33	18.5	18.5	100.0
	TOTAL	178	100.0	100.0	

MEAN	1.657	STD ERR	0.058	MEDIAN	1.447
MODE	1.000	STD DEV	0.774	VARIANCE	0.599
KURTOSIS	-1.010	SKEWNESS	0.680	RANGE	2.000
MINIMUM	1.000	MAXIMUM	3.000		
VALID CASES	178	MISSING CASES	0		

04-26-82

FILE - NONAME - CREATED 04-26-82

058 EXTENT OF CONTACT WITH MHI

CATEGORY LABEL	CODE	ABSOLUTE FREQUENCY	RELATIVE FREQUENCY (PERCENT)	ADJUSTED FREQUENCY (PERCENT)	CUMULATIVE ADJ FREQ (PERCENT)
NONE	1	9	5.1	5.1	5.1
I KNOW ITS THERE	2	30	16.9	16.9	21.9
FAMILIAR WITH	3	105	59.0	59.0	80.9
DUITE KNOWLEDGEABLE	4	16	9.0	9.0	89.9
WORKED WITH	5	13	10.1	10.1	100.0
	TOTAL	178	100.0	100.0	

MEAN	3.022	STD ERR	0.070	MEDIAN	2.976
MODE	3.000	STD DEV	0.932	VARIANCE	0.870
KURTOSIS	0.607	SKEWNESS	0.336	RANGE	4.000
MINIMUM	1.000	MAXIMUM	5.000		
VALID CASES	178	MISSING CASES	0		

04-26-82

FILE - NONAME - CREATED 04-26-82

Q59

ATTENDED: PERSPECTIVES MILITARY HISTORY

CATEGORY LABEL	CODE	ABSOLUTE FREQUENCY	RELATIVE FREQUENCY (PERCENT)	ADJUSTED FREQUENCY (PERCENT)	CUMULATIVE ADJ FREQ (PERCENT)
0	1	57	32.0	32.0	32.0
1	2	34	19.1	19.1	51.1
2	3	39	21.9	21.9	73.0
3	4	20	11.2	11.2	84.3
4	5	13	7.3	7.3	91.6
5 OR MORE	6	15	8.4	8.4	100.0
	TOTAL	178	100.0	100.0	

MEAN	2.680	STD ERR	0.120	MEDIAN	2.441
MODE	1.000	STD DEV	1.596	VARIANCE	2.547
KURTOSIS	-0.599	SKEWNESS	0.672	RANGE	5.000
MINIMUM	1.000	MAXIMUM	6.000		
VALID CASES	178	MISSING CASES	0		

04-26-82

FILE - NONAME - CREATED 04-26-82

060 NUMBER OF ADVANCE COURSES TAKEN

CATEGORY LABEL	CODE	ABSOLUTE FREQUENCY	RELATIVE FREQUENCY (PERCENT)	ADJUSTED FREQUENCY (PERCENT)	CUMULATIVE ADJ FREQ (PERCENT)
1 OR 0	1	19	10.7	10.7	10.7
2	2	11	6.2	6.2	16.9
3	3	60	33.7	33.7	50.6
4	4	63	35.4	35.4	86.0
5	5	19	10.7	10.7	96.6
6 OR MORE	6	6	3.4	3.4	100.0
	TOTAL	178	100.0	100.0	

MEAN	3.393	STD ERR	0.090	MEDIAN	3.483
MODE	4.000	STD DEV	1.194	VARIANCE	1.426
KURTOSIS	0.046	SKEWNESS	-0.316	RANGE	5.000
MINIMUM	1.000	MAXIMUM	6.000		
VALID CASES	178	MISSING CASES	0		

04-26-82

FILE - NONAME - CREATED 04-26-82

061 NUMBER OF ADVANCE COURSES WITH HISTORY

CATEGORY LABEL	CODE	ABSOLUTE FREQUENCY	RELATIVE FREQUENCY (PERCENT)	ADJUSTED FREQUENCY (PERCENT)	CUMULATIVE ADJ FREQ (PERCENT)
0	1	127	71.3	71.3	71.3
1	2	42	23.6	23.6	94.9
2	3	9	5.1	5.1	100.0
TOTAL		178	100.0	100.0	

MEAN	1.337	STD ERR	0.043	MEDIAN	1.201
MODE	1.000	STD DEV	0.571	VARIANCE	0.326
KURTOSIS	1.259	SKEWNESS	1.494	RANGE	2.000
MINIMUM	1.000	MAXIMUM	3.000		

VALID CASES 178 MISSING CASES 0

04-26-82

FILE - NONAME - CREATED 04-26-82

062 INTEGRATION OF MILITARY HISTORY MATERIAL

CATEGORY LABEL	CODE	ABSOLUTE FREQUENCY	RELATIVE FREQUENCY (PERCENT)	ADJUSTED FREQUENCY (PERCENT)	CUMULATIVE ADJ FREQ (PERCENT)
HIGHLY EFFECTIVE	1	5	2.8	2.8	2.8
EFFECTIVE	2	51	28.7	28.7	31.5
NEUTRAL	3	47	26.4	26.4	57.9
INEFFECTIVE	4	52	29.2	29.2	87.1
& FAILURE	5	13	10.1	10.1	97.2
CAN'T REMEMBER	6	5	2.8	2.8	100.0
	TOTAL	178	100.0	100.0	

MEAN	3.236	STD ERR	0.085	MEDIAN	3.202
MODE	4.000	STD DEV	1.140	VARIANCE	1.300
KURTOSIS	-0.534	SKEWNESS	0.286	RANGE	5.000
MINIMUM	1.000	MAXIMUM	6.000		
VALID CASES	178	MISSING CASES	0		



04-26-82

FILE - NONAME - CREATED 04-26-82

063 CREATE OPNS MILITARY HISTORY SPECIALTY

CATEGORY LABEL	CODE	ABSOLUTE FREQUENCY	RELATIVE FREQUENCY (PERCENT)	ADJUSTED FREQUENCY (PERCENT)	CUMULATIVE ADJ FREQ (PERCENT)
FAVOR	1	24	13.5	13.6	13.6
OPPOSE	2	110	61.2	62.1	75.7
NO FEELINGS	3	43	24.2	24.3	100.0
OUT OF RANGE		1	0.6	MISSING	100.0
	TOTAL	178	100.0	100.0	
MEAN	2.107	STD ERR	0.046	MEDIAN	2.086
MODE	2.000	STD DEV	0.608	VARIANCE	0.369
KURTOSIS	-0.316	SKEWNESS	-0.055	RANGE	2.000
MINIMUM	1.000	MAXIMUM	3.000		
VALID CASES	177	MISSING CASES	1		

064                      INTEREST IN MILITARY HISTORY SPECIALTY

CATEGORY LABEL	CODE	ABSOLUTE FREQUENCY	RELATIVE FREQUENCY (PERCENT)	ADJUSTED FREQUENCY (PERCENT)	CUMULATIVE ADJ FREQ (PERCENT)
NOT QUALIFIED	1	75	42.1	42.4	42.4
QUALIFIED-INTERESTED	2	10	5.6	5.6	48.0
QUALIFIED-NO INTERST	3	38	21.3	21.5	69.5
NOT APPLICABLE	4	54	30.3	30.5	100.0
OUT OF RANGE		1	0.6	MISSING	100.0
	TOTAL	178	100.0	100.0	

MEAN	2.401	STD ERR	0.098	MEDIAN	2.592
MODE	1.000	STD DEV	1.307	VARIANCE	1.707
KURTOSIS	-1.747	SKEWNESS	0.056	RANGE	3.000
MINIMUM	1.000	MAXIMUM	4.000		

VALID CASES              177                      MISSING CASES              1

04-26-82

FILE - NONAME - CREATED 04-26-82

065 INTEREST IN MIL HIST SPEC "PROTECTED"

CATEGORY LABEL	CODE	ABSOLUTE FREQUENCY	RELATIVE FREQUENCY (PERCENT)	ADJUSTED FREQUENCY (PERCENT)	CUMULATIVE ADJ FREQ (PERCENT)
YES	1	24	13.5	13.6	13.6
NO	2	113	63.5	63.8	77.4
NOT APPLIABLE	3	40	22.5	22.6	100.0
OUT OF RANGE		1	0.6	MISSING	100.0
	TOTAL	178	100.0	100.0	

MEAN	2.090	STD ERR	0.045	MEDIAN	2.071
MODE	2.000	STD DEV	0.596	VARIANCE	0.355
KURTOSIS	-0.198	SKEWNESS	-0.030	RANGE	2.000
MINIMUM	1.000	MAXIMUM	3.000		

VALID CASES 177 MISSING CASES 1

04-26-82

FILE - NONAME - CREATED 04-26-82

066 EFFECTIVENESS OF MIL HIST RESOURCES

CATEGORY LABEL	CODE	ABSOLUTE FREQUENCY	RELATIVE FREQUENCY (PERCENT)	ADJUSTED FREQUENCY (PERCENT)	CUMULATIVE ADJ FREQ (PERCENT)
DO NOT KNOW	1	46	27.0	27.1	27.1
OPTIMUM	2	2	1.1	1.1	28.2
ADEQUATE	3	26	14.6	14.7	42.9
POOR	4	101	56.7	57.1	100.0
OUT OF RANGE		1	0.6	MISSING	100.0
	TOTAL	178	100.0	100.0	

MEAN	3.017	STD ERR	0.097	MEDIAN	3.624
MODE	4.000	STD DEV	1.295	VARIANCE	1.676
KURTOSIS	-1.187	SKEWNESS	-0.795	RANGE	3.000
MINIMUM	1.000	MAXIMUM	4.000		
VALID CASES	177	MISSING CASES	1		

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