The United States Military Academy's Committee on Ethics and Professionalism welcomes you to the first publication of *Ethics and the Military Profession*. The Committee, charged by the Superintendent with "integrating ethics and professionalism courses with the cadets' other training and experience," will publish a periodic newsletter to stimulate dialogue and research among West Point staff and faculty in a variety of areas impinging on ethics and professionalism. Ethics is not an esoteric, intellectual pastime, but a branch of philosophy dealing with issues that are vital to both the professional and personal growth of army officers. One recommendation of the 1977 West Point Study Group was to "establish a comprehensive and progressive program in ethics and professionalism to prepare cadets for the ethical, personal, and other leadership problems that confront commissioned officers." If *Ethics and the Military Profession* provides a forum for continuing discussion of professional ethics, it will assist in discharging this important responsibility. At midpoint in Plato's *Republic*, Glaucón queries: "Who then are the true philosophers?" Socrates replies: "Those... are the lovers of the vision of truth." If Socrates is correct, to the extent that the military professional is concerned with knowing truth, he must also be a philosopher.

Recognizing the proliferation of scholarship and research in all areas of ethics and professionalism, the Committee on Ethics and Professionalism has decided to dedicate each periodical publication to a specific topic relating to the military profession. Each publication will normally include three sections: Upcoming Events, Feature Article, and Bibliography. Should you be aware of activities in the West Point vicinity that relate to the philosophical exploration of Ethics and Professionalism, have ideas for future feature articles, wish to contribute annotated bibliographies, or want to suggest additions or changes in the format of this publication, contact the editor, CPT William C. Jeffries, Department of English (4337/4338).

**FOCUS**

Hermann Goering's sentiment, "Shoot first and inquire afterwards, and if you make mistakes, I will protect you," generally rings discordant to the American sensibility. Yet even mainstream America has currents as diverse as the New Testament injunction to turn the other cheek and General Patton's pronouncement that "War is the supreme test to man, in which he rises to heights never approached in any other activity." How does a
nation reverencing individual freedoms and humane actions justify the mass destruction of humanity? "To war and arms I fly" has been the all too frequent clarion call of civilized man, but is not war a state of existence inalterably in conflict with fundamental notions of morality? Because of the interest that such questions naturally hold for the professional military officer, "War and Morality" is the topic for this initial publication of Ethics and the Military Profession. To assist you in your future study, the editor has provided a historical overview of Bellum Justum and an extensive, annotated bibliography on war and morality.

"Is There a Professional Ethic for the Military?" is the question that will be addressed in the first publication of AY 1978-79. Thereafter proposed topics include:

1. Can Ethics or Morality be Taught?
2. Terrorism.
4. Law and Ethics.
5. Norms vs. Values (Does "is" imply "ought"?).
6. Civil Disobedience.
7. Morality and Society.

If you are aware of specific books or articles relating to the subject of a "Professional Ethic," please forward data on them to CPT Jeffries, Department of English, or a member of the Ethics and Professionalism Committee.

FUTURE EVENTS

Interest in ethics and professionalism is burgeoning, and much of the activity involves interdisciplinary study. As a result, it is virtually impossible to stay current with meetings, lectures, workshops, programs, seminars, and other programs designed to foster interest and encourage participation in questions of moral and ethical inquiry. We seek your active assistance in notifying us of any information you have on related activities. With your help we will undertake to keep the West Point community informed, as far in advance as possible, of philosophically oriented programs in the West Point vicinity and throughout the scholarly community. Because the present academic year is coming to a close, there are few scheduled activities.

A workshop for evaluating the Military Academy's concept for Furthering Cadet Moral Development will be held in the West Point Room of the Cadet Library, 29 April 1978 (0830-1200, 1400-1700).
Staff and Faculty meetings on Philosophy and Ethics will be conducted at West Point during August 1978 for USMA staff and faculty. Times and locations have not yet been determined.

FEATURE ARTICLE: JUST WAR THEORY

Regardless how one assesses the merit of Michael Walzer's book, *Just and Unjust Wars*, its recent publication underscores the fact that concern over the Christian formulation of *bellum justum* is not dormant. Twentieth-century scholarship has illuminated "just war" theory after an eclipse of perhaps two centuries of interest. A necessary first step toward serious study of war and morality is understanding the various versions of the "just war" theory, which began in Christian moral theology.

What makes such understanding difficult is that each age has redefined "just war" to suit its need. Whatever the definition, however, it is, as Frederick H. Russell points out, "really an ethical and religious doctrine, surfaced with an often thick veneer of legality" (*The Just War in the Middle Ages*, p. 306). Certainly, throughout its long history, the theory has exerted a powerful influence on international law, especially the distinction made between combatants and noncombatants.

Until the beginning of the twentieth century, Catholic theologians dominated the writings on *bellum justum*. Perhaps the clearest statement of twentieth-century "just war" theory comes from Joseph C. McKenna, S.J. and John Eppstein (see bibliography). From the writings of these two contemporary Catholic scholars, one can deduce the following requisites for a "just war."

1. The war must be declared by a legitimate authority.

2. The state must have suffered a substantial injury.

3. The quality and quantity of damage likely to be incurred in war may not be disproportionate to the injury suffered.

4. There must be a reasonable hope of success.

5. There must be a "right intention" in the minds of those prosecuting the war.

6. All possible means of peaceful settlement must have failed.

7. Only moral methods may be employed to prosecute the war.

A person contemplating a different definition of just war probably has in mind the viewpoint of St. Augustine, St. Thomas Aquinas, or Hugo Grotius. The essential concept of just war derives from their Christian thought, though the serious student needs to begin with Plato's *Republic* (4th century B.C.) and Aristotle's *Politics* (336–332 B.C.). These two works propose a
moral justification for the state, a justification implicit in "just war" theory. The other major pre-Christian contribution to the theory was made by the stoic writer, Cicero, in his De Officiis, (44 B.C.). This work, On Duties, adds a system of practical ethics, based on stoic principles, to the concept of the state.

Important though these writings by Plato, Aristotle, and Cicero are, the Christian soldier seeking relief from responsibility of moral guilt for killing his own kind in war will find it first in the fifth-century arguments of St. Augustine. St. Augustine, while providing the fundamental theology of Christendom, demonstrated his repulsion, but not surprise, at the moral degeneracy of Rome. Therefore, in his City of God (413-426) he divided all history into two cities differentiated by the direction of love: the City of Man and the City of God. With this concept Augustine gave morality a Christian basis. The City of God cast perspective on how man lived in the City of Man. Thus the totalitarian nature of the state was diminished by the consideration of its temporal nature vis-a-vis man's eternal soul. The teleological nature of the dictates of the City of Man (based on love of self) had to be weighed against the absolute prohibitions of the City of God (based on love for God). Whereas St. Augustine maintained proscriptions against killing—even in self defense—for the individual, he confirmed the morality of killing in a "just war." His requirements for a "just war"—the necessity to regain which is taken unjustly, the avenging of a real injury, and a proper declaration by lawful authority—are based on the consideration that God created the City of Man and thus underwrites the temporal sanctity of the state. The key consideration for Augustine's "just war" is that justice is determined by the ruler, not the individual.

Drawing on the base laid by Augustine, as well as knowledge of Roman law and the scholastics, St. Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae, 1265-1273) focused and redefined the theory. In his systematic reappraisal of "just war" Aquinas modified Augustine's definition. War was "just" for Aquinas when declared by a properly constituted authority, provoked by a just cause, and governed by right intention. His primary addition to the theory, however, was to formulate the principle of "double effect" (see Alonso, Anscombe, Hartigan, and Nagel in bibliography), vital in future determinations of morally permissible actions in war.

Following changes in the theory inspired by the "Peace of God" (eleventh-century campaign to supplement the rules of just war by a series of canonical decrees increasing the categories of those exempt from aggression), the "Truce of God" (eleventh-century Church decree limiting times of the year available for war), and the codes of medieval chivalry, John Calvin's Institutes of the Christian Religion (1536), which treats the magistrate as having authority from God and being guided by the law of nature, provided the last addition to the theory prior to Hugo Grotius' De Jure Belli ac Pacis (1620-1625), which laid the foundation of international law and "just war" theory. Calvin declared that modern moral law promulgates the rule of God's righteousness, despite man's blurred vision as a result of the Fall.
Man is a member of two realms: the Church insures the conduct of the inner man, but the state insures justice in the world. It follows that the state has a moral obligation to sanction "just war" if necessary to establish justice.

Hugo Grotius' attempts to replace man's arbitrary law by decree with principles of "natural law" were a response to his belief that men "rush to war without restraint and once there have no respect for any law, human or divine." He sought, through study of Greek, Roman, and biblical literature, for a body of natural laws pertaining to war and its conduct. By his emphasis on reason, he separated the notion of "just war" from theological concerns. Grotius' empiricism codified three types of just war:

1. To defend against actual or immediately threatening injury.
2. To recover what is legally due.
3. To inflict punishment for wrong done.

It is upon this base of Aristotelian thinking, natural law, and social contract that many tenets of international law rest.

Bellum justum is implanted firmly in the bedrock of history and is still discussed by twentieth-century theorists concerned with international legal sanctions. It presupposes the existence of laws governing relations between states and assumes that such laws have their origin in natural laws and treaties (Encyclopedia of Philosophy). The section on "just war" in the bibliography provides the basis for a much fuller discussion than can be given here. Of greatest value will be Robert Tucker, The Just War; F. H. Russell, Just War in the Middle Ages; Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars; Paul Ramsey, War and the Christian Conscience; Gordon Zahn, War, Conscience, and Dissent; and Joseph C. McKenna, S.J., "Ethics and War: A Catholic View." This brief discussion also relies greatly on R. S. Hartigan and Lynn H. Miller (see bibliography).

BIBLIOGRAPHY

The scholarship on war and morality is almost as extensive as the subject is complex. At least ten bibliographies have been prepared which range in quality from excellent to poor; however, only three carry any annotations, and none is current. This bibliography attempts to bring the scholarship up to date and includes annotations for 172 of the 191 entries in the hope of nurturing interest in the subject. Works containing bibliographies have been so annotated. Not appearing in the bibliography are classic works on war, unless they specifically pertain to its moral nature. Thus, works by major theorists such as Jomini and Schlieffen and more modern studies such as War in the Modern World by Theodore Ropp have been excluded, while On War by Clausewitz is included. Also, with few exceptions, those works already cited in one of the major bibliographies do not appear here. The bibliography, supplemental, not exhaustive, attempts to avoid straying from the issue, with one noticeable exception. Since man's
conception of morality is so dependent upon his view of human nature, the bibliography includes basic works dealing with theories of aggression.

For a more complete study of that issue consult Erich Fromm's The Anatomy of Human Destructiveness which has an excellent (484 entries) bibliography on aggression and theories of human behavior. Many of the works listed below span more than one of the topical areas and appear in the area most suitable to the overall focus.


__________. The Hunting Hypothesis. New York: Atheneum, 1976. Ardrey attempts to answer the question "Why is man man?" He maintains that we have small hope of comprehending ourselves and our world unless we understand that man still, in his inmost being, remains a hunter.

__________. The Territorial Imperative. New York: Atheneum, 1966. Ardrey refines his thesis that human behavior is genetically determined, arguing that wars are a product of man's innate tendency to control and defend territory.


Bandura, Albert. Aggression: A Social Learning Analysis. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1973. Bandura provides an analysis and a theory based on empirical research which suggest that aggression may be, to a large extent, learned. This study is a useful counter to others such as Freud, Ardrey, and Lorenz.

Bohannan, Paul, ed. Law and Warfare: Studies in the Anthropology of Conflict. Garden City: Natural History Press, 1967. A collection of readings concerned with examining, from an anthropological point of view (i.e., comparatively), the various ways in which conflict is evaluated and handled.


James, William. "The Moral Equivalent of War." In War and Morality, ed. Richard A. Wasserstrom. Belmont: Wadsworth, 1970. 4-14. Committed to the view that "Pugnacity is inbred" in human nature, James tries to capture the virtue of both the militarist and the pacifist points of view. We must rechannel the martial spirit into action which is morally acceptable.


Nietzsche, Friedrich. Thus Spake Zarathustra. New York: Modern Library, 1966. Written in 1892, the book glorifies the active, dangerous life: "a good war hallows every cause." War is a naturally occurring event for the Ubermensch.

Perry, Charner. "Violence--Visible and Invisible." Ethics, 81, No. 1 (October 1970), 1-23. Perry examines the various ways in which violence operates within social contexts. He warns that we must watch how we talk for the degradation of language erodes respect, and the erosion of respect weakens the restraints against violence.


Wertham, Fredric. A Sign for Cain: An Exploration of Human Violence. New York: Paperback Library, 1969. Wertham argues that human violence is not rooted in instinct but in fact represents a solvable scientific problem; he argues that it can be greatly reduced and, in the very long range view, abolished.
2. Christian Conscience and War.


Buxton, Cleo W. "Morality in Combat." *Command*, 17, No. 1 (Spring 1975), 37-40. Argues for the moral necessity of the Christian soldier's loving "his battlefield enemies, in spite of the grave demands duty may impose upon him."

Calvin, John. *Institutes of the Christian Religion*. Philadelphia: Presbyterian Board of Christian Education, 1936. Although man's fall from grace through sin blurs his proper vision of how he ought to act (according to God's will), his established moral laws nonetheless promulgate the rule of God's righteousness.


Geisler, Norman L. "Love and War." *Command*, 17, No. 1 (Spring 1975), 8-11, 36. Evangelical Protestant views attempting to answer: "Does the ethic of Jesus demand, permit or prohibit participation in warfare?"


McKenna, Joseph C. "Ethics and War: A Catholic View." American Political Science Review, 54 (September 1960), 647-658. Defines the Catholic or Scholastic moral theory in contrast with the Protestant or humanistic conception. The Catholic methodology is the intellectual "application of logic to premises drawn from two sources: Revelation and Reason" (implicit in their view is that "first premises of ethical reasoning can be validated").

Ramsey, Paul. War and the Christian Conscience. Durham: Duke U. Press, 1961. Attempts to demonstrate that just war theory is applicable to the nuclear age. Argues for the morality of limited war "fought within the bounds of the traditional just war doctrine." Highly critical of the decision by the World Council of Churches to abandon the "just war" theory when considering thermonuclear warfare. Distinguishes between combatants and non-combatants by discussing "counter-force" and "counter-people" war.

Tokatloglou, C. N. "A Word Study: 'Thou shalt not murder.'" Command, 17, No. 1 (Spring 1975), 14-17, 31. While accepting biblical prescriptions as absolute, Tokatloglou applies linguistic analysis to Hebrew texts of the Old Testament to develop the distinction between "murder" and "kill," with an end to "comforting" Christians in the Armed Forces.

"War, War, War." Command, 17, No. 1 (Spring 1975), 1-3, 17. Implicit condonation of war by evangelical analogy of individual Christian as an allegorical battlefield of the forces of good and evil.


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Feinberg, Joel. "Collective Responsibility." *Journal of Philosophy*, 65, No. 7 (1968), 674-688. Feinberg tries to show that all primitive legal systems and our own common law abound with examples of liability without contributory fault and that notions such as vicarious liability and collective liability are not vacuous. Also in *Doing and Deserving*, ed. Joel Feinberg.


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Lewis, H. D. "The Non-Moral Notion of Collective Responsibility." In *Individual and Collective Responsibility*, ed. Peter M. French. Cambridge: Schenkman, 1972. 121-144. Argues against collective responsibility since "where all are responsible no one is responsible, thus we tend to lapse into a state of moral indifference or acquiescence which can be one of the greatest ills to afflict a society."


Wasserstrom, Richard. "The Relevance of Nuremberg." In *War and Moral Responsibility*, ed. Marshall Cohen, Thomas Nagel, and Thomas Scanlon. Princeton: Princeton U. Press, 1974. 134-158. Argues that the fact "something is illegal, is only one relevant consideration in the determination of its immorality... In the last analysis, the responsibilities that matter are an individual's moral responsibilities."
4. Combatants and Noncombatants.

Alexander, Lawrence A. "Self-Defense and the Killing of Noncombatants: A Reply to Fullinwider." *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, 5, No. 4 (Summer 1976), 408-415. Alexander responds to Fullinwider's article by arguing that the permissibility of killing innocents in self-defense does not, as Fullinwider maintains, justify the moral distinction between combatants and noncombatants.


Cousins, N. "The Non-Obliterators." *Saturday Review*, April 8, 1944, pp. 14, 26. Editorial arguing against those (particularly Vera Brittain) who declare "obliteration bombing" immoral. The following excerpt sets the tone: "Make no mistake about it. The bombing of Berlin and Hamberg and Schweinfurt and Leipzig and Bremen was not ordered by the American people or the British people or our military leaders. It was ordered by the Nazis themselves." Retaliation, for Cousins, is moral.


Ford, J. C. "The Morality of Obliteration Bombing." *Theological Studies*, 5 (September 1944), 261-309. Argues the immorality of obliteration bombing in an otherwise just war. Finds the principle of "double effect" too prone to sophistical abuse to be a convincing argument. Good concluding remarks on national considerations of "double effect." Also collected in Richard Wasserstrom's *War and Morality*, pp. 15-41.

Fullinwider, Robert K. "War and Innocence." *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, 5, No. 1 (Fall 1975), 90-97. Fullinwider sketches an argument which supports the claim that in warfare there is a morally relevant distinction between combatants and non-combatants which prohibits the intentional killing of the latter at the same time as it justifies the intentional killing of the former.


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Mavrodes, George I. "Conventions and the Morality of War." *Philosophy and Public Affairs,* 4, No. 2 (Winter 1975), 117-131. Mavrodes develops criteria for distinguishing wars from certain other international combat as he believes that this distinction is morally significant vis-a-vis the problem concerned with the intentional killing of noncombatants.


Alighieri, Dante. *De Monarchia.* New York: Gordon Press, n.d. Man should seek peace as an earthly goal, but he may use force to secure international world order.


Aristotle. *Politics.* New York: Random House, 1950. Needs to be read prior to Augustine's *City of God* to lay the foundation for "Just War" doctrine. Important in that it provides moral justification for the existence and power of the state.


Erasmus, Desiderius. *Anti-polemus, or the Plea of Reason, Religion and Humanity Against War.* New York: Gordon Press, n.d. Written 1510, argues that man's nature is contrary to the martial spirit. Man is created for love. Thus man has a moral duty to put an end to war.


Grotius, Hugo. *De Jure Belli ac Pacis Libri Tres.* Paris, 1625. Translated by F. W. Kelsey and others from the 1946 edition. A seminal work on international law. The book patterns a quasi-legal system of international relations by "blending certain general principles of political and moral philosophy with state practice." War should be fought only to enforce rights and then must be "waged within the bounds of law and good faith."


Hobbes, Thomas. *Leviathan.* New York: Routledge and Sons, 1894. See particularly Chap. 13. Written in 1651, argues that "war is not the art of fighting but the disposition to fight which exists where there is no common superior to ensure that violence shall not be permitted"—hence the need for the creation of a "common superior."


Miller, Lynn H. "Contemporary Significance of the Doctrine of Just War." World Politics, 16 (1964), 254-286. A brief historical review of the doctrine of bellum justum, followed by a discussion of the relevance of the "just war" doctrine to the twentieth century, in light of two conditions Miller finds to be unique in the present age: (1) a new international system replacing European balance-of-power and (2) modern weapons of unprecedented destructive capability.

More, Sir Thomas. Utopia, ed. and trans. Robert Adams. New York: Norton, 1975. Written 1518, Utopia proffers a pragmatic approach to declaring and waging war. War is to be fought only when "one's lands are invaded or one's allies are oppressed." When fighting one should do so "as economically and safely as possible."


Ryan, John K. Modern War and Basic Ethics. Milwaukee: Bruce, 1940. Studies the relationship between "Just War" theory and methods of warfare in 1930's.

Vann, Gerald. Morality and War. London: UNK, 1939. Applies "just war theory directly to the problem of appeasement (and specifically to the Czech crisis of 1938)."


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Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations. New York: Basic Books, 1978. Walzer treats "fighting well" (that is, morally) as the soldier's chief concern. The author sets high standards of morality for those involved in wars--wars which are "just" only if they are waged to protect territorial integrity or defend political independence. A unique, historical, empirical discussion of an important issue.

Assesses the concept of "Just War" from the point of view of proper justification. As a pacifist, Wells finds "Just War" theory vexing and worthy of examination since it is virtually the only area of ethical speculation which defends "immoral acts under the extenuating circumstance of prudential risk." Finds little basis for justice in "Just War."

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Zahn, Gordon Charles. War, Conscience, and Dissent. New York: Hawthorne Books, 1967. Explores the problem of "Just War" from a protestant point of view. Gives historical overview of the movement from just war theory to pacifism with a goal of answering the question: "How shall modern war be conducted justly?"


Benjamin, Martin. "Pacifism for Pragmatists," Ethics, 83, No. 3 (April 1973), 196-213. Benjamin attempts to argue that pacifism is not a "hopelessly soft-headed doctrine" but rather a realistic, hard-headed option, and that the abandonment of military, and especially nuclear, means of national defense represents a rational alternative.


Malament, David. "Selective Conscientious Objection and the Gillette Decision,* *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, 1, No. 4 (Summer 1972), 363-386. Offers utilitarian arguments that the Vietnam era system of deciding conscientious objector deferments is unconstitutional. The author challenges the Supreme Court decision on the Gillette case. Using this decision he discusses the difference between universal and selective conscientious objection, arguing that the former, not the latter, provides legitimate grounds for deferment. Also in *War and Moral Responsibility*, ed. Marshall Cohen.


Murray, John Courtney. *Morality and Modern War.* New York: Council on Religion and International Affairs, 1959. Murray sets forth a four-fold Catholic moral theory: (1) All wars of aggression are proscribed, (2) a defensive war to repress injustice is moral, (3) conscientious objection to just war is not a valid claim, and (4) a state has a duty to wage war if its sovereignty is threatened.


Narveson, Jan. "Pacifism: A Philosophical Analysis." *Ethics*, 75 (1965), 259-271. Narveson argues that the pacifist position is riddled with confusion. He holds that the pacifistic attitude is a matter of degree, a fact which can be better understood when considering the following questions: how much violence should not be resisted, and what degree of force is one not entitled to use in resisting, punishing, or preventing it? Also in *War and Morality*, ed. Richard A. Wasserstrom.


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Struckmeyer, Frederick R. "Just War and the Right of Self Defense." Ethics, 82, No. 1 (October 1971), 48-55. Although disposed to pacifism, Struckmeyer refuses to accept the thesis that there is no third position between the extremes of pacifism and jingoistic militarism. It is simply not the case, in his view, that one is either for war or against it. Also in Morality in the Modern World, ed. Lawrence Habermehl.

Visscher, Maurice B. "Modern Weapons, Peace, and the Humanistic Ethic." In Morality in the Modern World, ed. Lawrence Habermehl. Encino: Dickerson, 1976. 78-86. Granting that war is not obsolete, Visscher tries to point his readers toward such an Eldorado. Education and a broad-based humanistic ethic are the keys.

Walzer, Michael. Obligations: Essays on Disobedience, War, and Citizenship. Cambridge: Harvard U. Press, 1970. Walzer applies consent theory to an analysis and discussion of obligation and citizenship. As a result of his probings he suggests that when a democratic state goes to war, those who take no part in the decision do not have to fight.


Whitman, M. J. "Is Pacifism Self-Contradictory?" Ethics, 76, No. 4 (July 1966), 307-308. The author is responding to Jan Narveson's "Pacifism: A Philosophical Analysis." Whitman argues that the pacifist position is not self-contradictory.

Zahn, Gordon Charles. An Alternative to War. New York: Council on Religion and International Affairs, 1963. Zahn's alternative is a by-product of John XXIII's statement, "individual human beings are and should be the foundation, the end and the subjects of all the institutions in which social life is carried on." Fitting this resolution to a state's defense organization, however, proves tricky at best.


8. Miscellaneous Considerations.


Edwards, Paul, ed. "Peace, War and Philosophy." *The Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, 1967, 6, 63-67. Excellent historical overview of philosophic approaches to the consideration of war. Writers are treated as conservative (war is a permanent part of human existence) and abolitionist (war is not inevitable). Brief basic bibliography.


Falls, Cyril. *The Nature of Modern Warfare.* New York: Oxford University Press, 1941. Of the five sections (four of which were delivered at Oxford in the Winter of 1941) the ethicist will find the first lecture, "The Doctrine of Total War" most pertinent. The rest of the book contains dry articles on strategy and tactics.

Feinberg, Joel. *Doing and Deserving.* Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970. Feinberg presents a series of essays in the theory of responsibility. Each essay deals with some aspect of the complex situation in which persons intentionally, negligently, or faultlessly cause harm or benefit to others and are said to deserve such responses from others as praise or blame, punishment, and legal pressure to make compensation.

Fred, M., M. Harris, and R. Murphy, ed. *War: The Anthropology of Armed Conflict and Aggression.* Garden City: The Natural History Press, 1968. A collection of essays dealing with the biological effects of war, war and disease, primitive and modern war, alternatives to war, war and recruitment for a war system, the psychological dimensions of war, and the effects of war on social structure.


Irmscher, William F., ed. *Man and Warfare.* Boston: Little, Brown, 1964. An anthology which presents a literary, journalistic, and philosophical smorgasbord offering a variety of tidbits concerned with man and the thoughts on warfare. Ruskin, W. James, Orwell, Machiavelli, G. B. Shaw, Jung, Toynbee, and others are represented in the selections.


Shaffer, Jerome A., ed. *Violence*. Award-Winning Essays in the Council for Philosophical Studies Competition. McKay, 1971. Four essays discussing violence as distinguished from coercion, force, and war. Man must decide from an ethical perspective when violence must be resisted and when violence is justified.


Wright, Quincy. *A Study of War*. Chicago. U. of Chicago Press, 1942. A most complete study of all aspects of war. Very little of concern to the ethicist, however, causes of war and war's relationship to international law are of interest.


Allen, J. L. "The Relation of Strategy and Morality." *Ethics*, 73, No. 3 (April 1963), 167-178. A very sensible approach to the relationship between strategy and morality. The author disagrees with absolutist positions of Batchelder and Ramsey in finding no inherent conflict between the goals of the strategist and the moralist. He argues that morality must not be a veneer tacked over strategy but must be embedded in the nature of strategy itself.


Michener, James A. The Quality of Life. Greenwich: Fawcett, 1970. See particularly the last chapter, "What We Must Do." Michener cites Vietnam as a war which lost its moral justification due to arbitrary draft laws, favoritism of businesses making war goods, and the reluctance of Congress to call the war a war.


Ramsey, Paul. "Ethics of Intervention." Review of Politics, 27 (1965), 287-310. Neither for nor against "interventionary political and military action," Ramsey seeks to clarify the ethical grounds for making the decisions. He feels the churches have become too legalistic in arguing positions on particular policy decisions.

Toner, James H. "Sisyphus As a Soldier: Ethics, Exigencies, and the American Military." Parameters, 7, No. 4 (1977), 2-12. Seminal study on the apparent conflicts between liberties and duties, and rights and obligations, for both the individual soldier and the American nation.

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Walzer, Michael. "Moral Judgment in Time of War." In War and Morality, ed. Richard A. Wasserstrom. Belmont: Wadsworth, 1970. 54-62. Argues against the view that "once war begins, there are no moral limits, only practical ones." A rule-utilitarian, Walzer protests that "there come moments when the sheer criminality of the means adopted by one side or another overpowers and annuls all righteous intentions."


10. War Crimes.


Calvocoressi, P. Nuremberg: The Facts, the Law, and the Consequences. New York: Macmillan, 1948. Calvocoressi, a member of the British prosecution at Nuremberg, explains the trial from the three standpoints promised. A faithful and important book marred only by partisanship.


Hammer, Richard. One Morning in the War--The Tragedy at Son My. New York: Coward-McCann, 1970. Concerned with investigating the alleged atrocity at Son My (March 16, 1968), Hammer spends much time probing the powerful psychological forces working to transform young soldiers into indiscriminate haters of all Vietnamese.

Hersh, Seymour. My Lai Four--A Report on the Massacre and Its Aftermath. New York: Random House, 1970. Based mostly on interviews of men in C Company, 16 March 1968, this account is well written and well documented. Probes the facts, situation, coverup, and uncovering of the My Lai massacre. As Hersch says: "The people didn't know what they were dying for and the guys didn't know why they were shooting them."

Knoll, Erwin and Judith Nies McFadden, ed. War Crimes and the American Conscience. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1970. Edited transcript of Congressional conference on war and national responsibility. Conference was held with a panel of jurists, scholars, and public figures. Consensus view of conference is that attempts to punish a few individuals cloud the larger issue of collective guilt for an unjust war.


Wasserstrom, Richard. "The Responsibility of the Individual for War Crimes." In Philosophy, Morality, and International Affairs, ed. Virginia Held, Sidney Morgenbesser, and Thomas Nagel. New York: Oxford University Press, 1974. 47-70. The author suggests the need for different criteria in assessing moral culpability for ordering actions later judged as war crimes. He argues that intent should be supplanted by reasonably expected knowledge. If the leader "ought to have known" that such an action constituted a war crime, he is culpable.