


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
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ATTITUDES OF MAJOR SOVIET NATIONALITIES

Volume III THE TRANSCAUCASUS

Armenia
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ATTITUDES OF MAJOR SOVIET NATIONALITIES

Volume III

THE TRANSCAUCASUS

ARMENIA
GEORGIA
AZERBAIDZHAN

Contract No. IA-16666

Center for International Studies
Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Cambridge, Massachusetts

June 1973

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This volume includes the following chapters:

ARMENIA AND THE ARMENIANS - Mary Kilbourne Matossian

GEORGIA AND THE GEORGIANS - Richard Dobson

AZERBAIDZHAN AND THE AZERBAIDZHANIS - Frank Huddle, Jr.

The chapters are based on papers contributed by the above-named specialists. However, the chapters as presented here have been edited by the project staff and some of the data, tables, and other materials have been added. Responsibility for the final versions therefore rests with the project.

The work reported in this document was conducted under contract between the U.S. Information Agency and the Center for International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology. The distribution of this paper does not indicate endorsement by the United States Information Agency, nor should the contents be construed as reflecting the official opinion of that Agency.

PREFACE

This volume is a part of the five-volume study, "Attitudes of Major Soviet Nationalities," produced at the Center for International Studies, MIT. The study deals with seventeen Soviet nationalities--the fifteen which have their own Union Republics, plus the Tatars and the Jews. Each nationality is the subject of one chapter. The nationalities are grouped by geographical and/or cultural affinity in four of the volumes: The Slavs, The Baltics, The Transcaucasus, and Central Asia. The fifth volume, Other Nationalities, includes chapters on the Moldavians, the Tatars, and the Jews, as well as a set of comparative tables for all nationalities.

The Transcaucasus is a relatively small but populous area consisting of the republics of Armenia, Georgia, and Azerbaidzhan. Located at the crossroads of Europe and Asia, between the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea, the area has historically been subject to expansionist pressures from Iran, Turkey, and Russia. After the 1917 Revolution in Russia the three republics experienced a brief period of independence, terminated by a victory of the Red Army. With the formation of the USSR in the early 1920s, the three republics were combined in a single Transcaucasian Soviet Federation of Socialist Republics. In 1936 they became separate union republics.

Despite their geographical similarities and some shared historical experiences, there are great differences among the three republics, and attitudes of enmity and mistrust have often prevailed among them. Azerbaidzhan differs from both of the other republics in its Moslem population and in its closeness to Turkey, which has a similar language and culture, and to Iran, which has a large Azeri population. It has a fragmented political history and a lower level of development than the other republics. (For indicators of development, see the Comparative Tables in Volume V.)

Armenia and Georgia, by contrast, pride themselves on an ancient Christian culture and a long history of independent statehood. They are among the most highly developed nations in the USSR. However, they too are very different from each other. Their churches, languages, and cultures differ, and their relationship has often been one of rivalry. There is no major Georgian diaspora comparable to the world-wide dispersion of Armenians, and nothing in Georgian history parallels the Turkish persecution of Armenians.

Since all chapters are written according to a uniform pattern, the chapter outline and note on references given at the beginning of the volume apply to all of them.

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Acknowledgements are gratefully expressed to the specialists who have written chapters on each nationality and to all at the Center for International Studies, MIT, who have contributed to the completion of this study.

CHAPTER OUTLINE FOR EACH NATIONALITY

Part A. General Information

- I. Territory
- II. Economy
- III. History
- IV. Demography
- V. Culture
- VI. External Relations

Part B. Media

- I. Language Data
- II. Local Media
- III. Educational Institutions
- IV. Cultural and Scientific Institutions

Part C. National Attitudes

- I. Review of Factors Forming National Attitudes
- II. Basic Views of Scholars on National Attitudes
- III. Recent Manifestations of Nationalism

NOTES ON REFERENCES

Where several quotations are taken from a single source, reference is provided at the end of the last quotation. Similarly, where information in a paragraph is from one source, the source is cited at the end of the paragraph.

Sources used more than once in a chapter are cited in abbreviated form in the footnotes. Full citations are given in the list of references at the end of each chapter. Sources containing only one page are cited without page numbers.

Except where noted, emphasis in quotations has been added.

Project: Attitudes of Major Soviet Nationalities

ARMENIA AND THE ARMENIANS

prepared by

Mary Kilbourne Matossian

University of Maryland

This chapter is based on a paper contributed by the above-named specialist. However, the chapter as presented here has been edited by the project staff, and some of the data, tables, and other materials have been added. Responsibility for the final version therefore rests with the project.

**Center for International Studies
Massachusetts Institute of Technology**

Cambridge, Massachusetts

June 1973

ARMENIA AND THE ARMENIANS

PART A

General Information

I. Territory

Historic Armenia is an upland, or "mountain island," wedged between the mountain structures of Anatolia and Iran, and higher than either of them. It does not quite extend to the Black Sea on the west or the Caspian Sea on the east; to the north are the Pontus and Lesser Caucasus Mountains; to the south are the Eastern Taurus Mountains out of which flow the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers. The approximate area of the Armenian upland is 100,000 square miles, and its average height, 5,000 feet above sea level. Today, Soviet Armenia occupies only 11,175 square miles on the northern rim of the historic Armenian homeland, in one of the most mountainous parts of the region. The lowest point in Soviet Armenia is 1,279 feet above sea level; and over 70% of the republic is over 4,921 feet high.¹ The land is studded with extinct volcanos, volcanic rock, and volcanic soils.

The highest peak in the Armenian upland is Mount Ararat (according to the Bible, the site of the landing of Noah's Ark), which is 16,945 feet high. It is located in Turkish territory but clearly visible from Yerevan, capital of Soviet Armenia. Mount Ararat is called by the Armenians "Mother of the World" and is the most important geographic symbol of their identity. The highest peak within the territory of Soviet Armenia is Mount Aragats (Alagüz), which is 13,410 feet.

Lake Van, which is 1,460 square miles in area, is the largest lake in the Armenian upland. In Soviet Armenia the largest lake is Sevan, 497 square miles, home of a famous salmon-trout, the ishkhan, and currently being developed as a summer resort.

The climate of Soviet Armenia varies according to altitude, but is generally hot and dry in summer and cold in winter. The weather is mildest

¹ Armeniya, 1966: 314-315.

in the Araxes Valley around Erevan, where the best season is autumn (mild, warm, and sunny). In the highlands winter lasts for six months and the temperature may fall to -40°; many peaks remain snow-covered all year around. Annual rainfall ranges from 10 to 35 inches per year in different parts of the republic.¹

Only 12% of the territory of Soviet Armenia is covered with trees and shrubs. This deforestation has been an important cause of soil erosion. Many believe that the Armenian upland was the original home of the grapevine, and viticulture is an important activity in Soviet Armenia. There are many rich soils in Armenia, but cultivation is hindered by the presence of surface stones and by lack of water.

The principal known energy resource of Soviet Armenia is hydroelectric power. The country is also rich in metals (copper, molybdenum, aluminum, lead, zinc, mercury, gold, silver, iron, chrome) and minerals, especially building stone (tufa, marble) and limestone (for cement).

¹Ibid.: 318.

II. Economy

Industry accounted for over two thirds of the ruble value of production in the economy of Armenia in 1969.¹ From 1913 to 1969, the value of industrial production in Armenia grew by some 162 times, the second highest growth rate in the Soviet Union. Much of this growth occurred in the 1930s; since then, the rate has slowed considerably. Between 1950 and 1960, industry in eight other republics grew faster than in Armenia. In 1960-1969, Armenian industry grew by 238%, well above the USSR average (209%) but below that of six other republics.²

Non-ferrous metallurgy is one of the most important branches of industrial production in Armenia. The republic is a major source of molybdenum, aluminum, and rare metals such as selenium and tellurium, and also has significant deposits of gold and silver.³ The chemical industry developed markedly during the 1960s and has become a major branch. Machine-building and metalworking employed over one-third of the industrial labor force and accounted for one-fifth of the total industrial production in 1969.⁴ A new automobile plant

¹According to Sovetskaya Armeniya (1970: 46), the "gross social product" of the republic was as follows: industry 67.9%, agriculture 11.9%, construction 12.7%, transport and communication 1.8%, and trade, supply, and "other categories," 5.7%.

²Lithuania, Belorussia, Moldavia, Kirgizia, and Kazakhstan all had higher rates of industrial growth. Ekonomika Litvy, 1970: 421.

³Armeniya, 1966: 119-123.

⁴Sovetskaya Armeniya, 1970: 132. This source omits data on the role of chemistry and light metals in the overall industrial picture, although other sources attest to their significance.

was built in Yerevan in that year.¹

Armenia is one of the Soviet Union's most important centers of scientific research and the production of calculators, computers, and measuring instruments employing semiconductor electronics. The food industry is also significant through its production of wines, cognac, fruit preserves, and juices.²

The products of Soviet Armenia are exported to the United States, England, France, West Germany, and other developed countries. The republic's specialized economy is heavily dependent on exports to other Soviet republics or abroad. Over 95% of the products of machine-building industries are exported, as are 90% of the fruit and vegetable products and 70% of the wines and liqueurs.³ Armenian cognac is prized throughout the USSR.

While under Ottoman and Persian rule, the energies of the Armenian people could not be channeled into political or military activity, and the best lands were in the hands of the Moslems. Consequently, Armenians became merchants and artisans and came to excel in these activities. They grew richer than their Moslem neighbors. Armenians have always admired hard work and business acumen, while the Moslems had more aristocratic, less bourgeois values.

Although Soviet rule has brought major changes in the structure of Armenian economic activity, indicators of the standard of living in the republic suggest that it is still better off than most of its Caucasian and Central Asian neighbors, and approaches the higher standards of the European Soviet republics. In 1970 Armenia ranked second among Soviet republics in savings per capita and eighth in trade turnover (among the non-European republics, only Kazakhstan had a higher per capita turnover).⁴ Only Georgia and

¹ BSE, 1970: 229; Armeniya za 50 let, 1970: 96, 106.

² Armeniya, 1966: 128-139.

³ Ibid.: 128, 139.

⁴ Nar. khoz. 1970: 563-564, 579.

Armenia - Economy - 3

three European republics exceeded Armenia in the ratio of doctors to population.¹

¹Nar. khoz. 1972: 515, *passim*.

III. History

The Armenian upland had its first period of prosperity in the third millenium B.C. before the arrival of the Armenians. The inhabitants, who worshipped the Mother Goddess, may have been among the first to use bronze, viticulture, and the wheel. This flourishing culture was broken up by invaders, probably Indo-Europeans, at the end of the third millenium.¹

Urartu (cf. Ararat) was the first state in the Armenian upland; it lasted from 880 to 590 B.C. The people spoke Hurrian, a language akin to the Japhetic languages of the Caucasus (e.g., Georgian), and used a cuneiform script. Well-planned citadel towns and irrigation systems were features of this state. It eventually fell to the Medes and the Armenians, who arrived in the area in the sixth century B.C. or perhaps earlier.

The first united Armenian state was organized by the Artaxid Dynasty, which ruled from 190 to 1 B.C., and was followed by the Arsacid Dynasty, which lasted until 428 A.D. Under the Artaxids Armenian became the language of all social classes in the area. However, the state records were kept in Greek and Iranian, and the religion was a mixture of Greek and Iranian pagan elements. Under Tigranes the Great (95-55 B.C.), Armenian power reached its height, extending over most of modern Syria and Lebanon. By 55 B.C., the Romans had brought the Armenians under their control.

In 301 A.D. the Arsacid king Tiridates III adopted Christianity as the state religion under the inspiration of the nobleman St. Gregory the Illuminator. To this day the Armenians refer to their church as "Gregorian," and regard their church as apostolic. Since the sixth century A.D. they have been separate from both the Roman and Eastern (Byzantine Greek) Churches. Although Armenian political power has been evanescent, the Armenian Church

¹Lang, 1970: 67-70.

has been a strong and independent institution, able to preserve the ethnic identity of the Armenians under foreign domination. Furthermore, the Armenians' Christian culture has made it easy for them to identify with Western civilization and to import Western ideas and practices.

The Armenian people played an important role in the Byzantine Empire as fighters, administrators, and scholars. Many Byzantine emperors were Armenian. Meanwhile, the Armenian Upland itself became a disputed border area between the Byzantines and, in succession, Arabs, Persians, and Turks. The Armenian Bagratid Dynasty established a prosperous state, with Ani as its capital, in the upland in the tenth century but it fell to the Seljuk Turks in the mid-eleventh century.

Another Armenian principality arose in the southeastern corner of Anatolia—Cilicia—which is a fertile land adjoining northern Syria. After it was retaken from the Arabs by the Byzantines, Armenians colonized it (late 10th and early 11th centuries). The Armenian rulers of Cilicia cooperated with the Crusaders. The area became known as "Lesser Armenia" and had a large Armenian population until the Massacres of 1915 by the Turks. But a succession of Mongol, Mamluk, and Ottoman Turk invasions brought down the state of Cilicia by the end of the fourteenth century.

The Armenian upland became the scene of struggle between Ottoman Turks and Persians, and was finally divided between them in 1639, with the Turks getting the larger share. Present day Soviet Armenia was constituted from the Persian share of the Upland. For the Armenians the period of the twelfth to the eighteenth centuries was a time of cultural darkness under the shadow of Islam, and especially of the newly-converted Central Asian nomads.¹

¹Lang, 1970: 67-70, passim.

The Russians conquered Persian Armenia in 1828. Little was done to develop the economy of this backward area, and the more enterprising Armenians moved to Tiflis (Tbilisi) in Georgia where many prospered. Many Armenians profited from the educational and cultural institutions of Tsarist Russia. They were glad to be under the protection of a Christian ruler, but they vigorously resisted the Russification campaign of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. They also had to cope with secular Turkish nationalism, both within the Caucasus (in Azerbaijan) and in the Ottoman Empire.

When Eastern Armenia passed from Persian to Russian rule in 1828, there was no immediate change in Armenian political attitudes; they had just exchanged one master for another. For Western Armenians, however, the decline of Ottoman power in the nineteenth century was an opportunity to improve their political status, and there was a revival of assertive attitudes among them. Armenian political resistance was first organized in Erzurum in 1880. In 1890 the Armenian Revolutionary Federation (Dashnaktsutiun) was founded in order to unify the growing revolutionary nationalist movement in both Western and Eastern Armenia.¹

The Ottoman government could count on the support of the Turks and Kurds in the Empire to help suppress the Armenians, for the Armenians were richer than they and therefore were envied and resented. In 1894-1896, an estimated several hundred thousand Armenians were massacred in Eastern Turkey. There was worse to come. During World War I, when the Ottoman and Tsarist armies were fighting on the Caucasian Front, the Ottoman government feared a "stab in the back" from its resident Armenian population. Consequently, in 1915 it adopted a policy of "deportation" of Armenians to remote areas—a euphemism for genocide. About 1 1/2 million Armenians perished from the enforced hardship or were killed by Turks and Kurds.

¹Gidney, 1967: 24-40.

²Ibid.: 56-57.

At the end of the nineteenth century secular Armenian nationalist parties appeared, all with a left-wing flavor on socio-economic issues. Of these, the Dashnaksutjun was the most important. Today this party is the center of anti-Soviet activity in the Armenian diaspora.

During 1918-1920 there was an interregnum between Taarist government control and effective control by the Bolshevik government in Transcaucasia. The Eastern Armenians enjoyed a brief period of national independence; a republic was formed led by the Dashnaksutjun. During this period Turkish power was resurgent, and the Georgians and Azerbaijani Turks abandoned their alliance with the Armenians in the spring of 1918. But, although American relief supplies saved many who were starving in 1919, no effective Allied military aid was available. In December 1920, the Russians reappeared, this time wearing helmets with a red star. In view of the Turkish threat, this was not an entirely unwelcome event. The principal Dashnak leaders who did not flee Eastern Armenia were arrested or killed.¹

An Armenian Soviet Republic was proclaimed in November 1920. It became part of the Transcaucasian Soviet Federation which joined the Soviet Union in December 1922. In 1936 the Federation was dissolved and Armenia became a separate Union Republic.² During the 1920's Soviet authority was extended to every remote corner of Eastern Armenia. The Communist Party of Armenia recruited a sufficient membership, mostly from young males of the better educated urban population. The policy of korenizatsiya ('rooting' the new institutions through recruitment of native cadres) was followed systematically, so that the personnel, high and low, of all institutions were Armenians. The Armenian SSR attracted able Armenians from other parts of the USSR who had left when Eastern Armenia appeared to be too remote and unpromising an area. The work of economic reconstruction began, but new development was limited. A network of state schools was extended throughout the country, and enrollment grew fast. The Erevan State University was

¹ Hovhannisian, 1967 and 1971; and Kazemzadeh, 1951.

² BSE, 1947: 1914-1971.

reorganized in 1923; the language of instruction was Armenian.

Collectivization was forcibly resisted in Armenia. Guerrilla forces were able to retreat to the mountains and, ultimately, to Persia. The climax of resistance came in the summer of 1931, but its end came early in 1932. Famine prevailed in Armenia from 1931 to 1934.

The leader of Soviet Armenia from May, 1930 to July, 1936 was an outstanding young Armenian named Aghasi Khanchian. He had been born in Van in Turkish Armenia in 1901 and took refuge with his family in Eastern Armenia in 1915. In the Great Purge of 1936-1938 he, and a whole generation of able young Armenian Communist leaders, were executed.

The 1930s was a period of rapid industrial growth in Armenia, and there were many opportunities for advancement. Many acquired a college education and a good job, but the people who profited most in Armenia were the offspring of the intelligentsia. Women in larger numbers enrolled in higher education and entered the skilled labor market. Armenia escaped the devastation of World War II and these trends continued during the post-war period.

The post-Stalin thaw in Soviet Armenia permitted the expression not so much of resistance to violations of individual rights as resistance to the denial of the rights of the Armenian nation. Since 1965 nationalist sentiment has been openly expressed, but it has been directed more against Turks than Russians. (See Section C-I.)¹

¹Matossian, 1962.

IV. Demography

Although the Armenians speak an Indo-European language, physically they resemble more the pre-Indo-European population of the Armenian upland depicted on Hittite and Urartian friezes. The typical Armenian is of medium height and is distinguished by a round head with a broad forehead, dark hair and dark eyes with thick dark eyebrows and eyelashes.¹

As of January 1970, the total population of the Armenian SSR was 2,491,873 persons. Of the total, 88.6% were Armenians. This represents a three-fold increase under Soviet rule. The rate of average natural increase in Armenia is 19.5 per thousand compared to 9.8 per thousand in the USSR generally. Soviet Armenia is the most ethnically homogeneous of all the Soviet republics; however, only 56% of the Armenians in the USSR live there. This figure is smaller than that for any other republican nationality. The majority of Soviet Armenians outside of the Armenian SSR are in Soviet Georgia and Azerbaïdzhan.²

In Soviet Armenia the mean density of the population is 281 persons per square mile, seven times the mean density of the USSR. But 45% of the population lives in the Ararat Valley, which constitutes only 6.5% of the territory of the republic.

From 1959 to 1970 the urban population grew 68% and the rural, 15%. In 1970, 60% of the population was urban, as opposed to 50% in 1959. Yerevan, the capital, had 767,000 inhabitants; Leninakan had 164,000; and Kirovakan, 107,000.

¹Lang, 1970: 37 and Aslanyan, 1971: 81.

²Of the total 3,559,000 Armenians in the USSR, 1,351,000 live in other Soviet republics. Of these, 484,000 (35%) live in Azerbaïdzhan, 452,000 (33%) in Georgia, and 299,000 (22%) in the RSFSR. Nar. Khoz. 1972: 500, 569, 581.

Most Armenians prefer to live in Yerevan where the climate is relatively mild and where life is more dynamic. The rapid economic development in the 1960's has increased the number of jobs in Yerevan and its population is 95.3% Armenian.

As of January 1, 1969, blue- or white-collar employees and their families constituted 76% of the republic's population (compared with 12.7% in 1926 and 31.2% in 1939). In 1926, independent peasants and artisans were in a majority (76.2%); by 1939 collective farmers and collectivized artisans held the majority (63.4%).

Of the total number of persons in blue- and white-collar jobs in 1971 (870,000), the distribution among branches of the economy was as follows:¹

Industry	182,000	or	32%
Construction	106,000		12%
Agriculture	96,000		11%
Transport	56,000		6%
Communication	12,000		0.013%
Health	42,000		0.05%
Education	100,000		11%
Science	35,000		0.04%

Women constituted about 40% of the total labor force in 1968.

In January 1971 the Communist Party of Armenia had a total of 130,353 members and candidates and ranked fifth among Soviet republics in the ratio of Party size to population. No recent data on the percentage of Armenians in the republic Party are available, but it may be presumed to be high, since there were a total of 223,372 Armenians in the CPSU in January 1972. Armenians trailed only the Georgians and Russians in terms of the relative size of their Party representation.²

¹"Rabochiye i sluzhashchiye zanyatye v narodnom khozyaistve" ["Workers and Employees in the Economy"]. This figure does not include collective farmers who numbered 105,000 in 1971. Nar. khoz. 1972: 662-663.

²See the comparative tables in the fifth volume of this series.

V. Culture

At the beginning of the fifth century A.D. St. Mesrop Mashtots invented the unique Armenian alphabet, which uses the Greek alphabet as a base, and Armenian literature began. The Armenian Church was responsible for the organization and conservation of this literature, which was comparable to Byzantine Greek literature. In addition Armenian folk singers kept alive a strong oral tradition. Of particular interest is the epic of David of Sasun, which probably originated in the eighth or ninth centuries A.D. in the same period and region as the Byzantine epic of Digenis Akrites. Gradually the language of written literature and of the Armenian Church, Grabar, became more and more divergent from colloquial speech, the language of oral traditions. In the nineteenth century a written literary language closer to colloquial Armenian, Ashkharabar, was developed by the Armenian secular intelligentsia.¹

The arts in which Armenians have excelled are architecture and music. In the sixth and seventh centuries A.D. they played a major role in the solution of the problem of building a dome over a square building (involving the use of pendentives). Their folk music was little appreciated until collected by Komitas (Solomon Solomonian, 1869-1935) and developed by Aram Khachaturian (b. 1903) and Alan Hovhannes (b. 1911).

The Armenian family is traditionally patriarchal and patrilocal. Extended family households have always been common, and even today extended family ties appear to be strong. In rural areas of Soviet Armenia brides are still expected to be virgins; in Yevran, women usually do not go to restaurants. And, as elsewhere in most of the Middle East, presentable foreign female visitors are the object of considerable male

¹Armeniya, 1966: 65.

attention in Yerevan, where machismo is prized. Family control over the behavior of its members is strong, particularly in the case of Armenian women. In general the traditional wedding ritual has been maintained and parental consent for a marriage is considered necessary. Only the intelligentsia of Yerevan depart from these age-old patterns.¹

Traditional Armenian dress has disappeared from all but a few remote localities and Yerevan theatrical productions. Traditional housing is being rapidly replaced by modern, Soviet-style apartments and village settlements.² But traditional Armenian foods predominate everywhere in Soviet Armenia. These include shish kebab, rice, yogurt, bulghour, stuffed vegetables, pastries, and local wines. (These are also traditional in Georgia, Azerbaijan and most of the Middle East.)

The Armenian Apostolic Church has long been a central element in Armenian culture. By tradition, every child born of Armenian parents is considered a member of the Armenian Church. Some subsequently join the Roman or Protestant Churches. There is little reliable data on the number of adherents of the Armenian Church in Soviet Armenia.³ In the diaspora the social life of the various Armenian communities centers around the Church.

Prior to the 1930s the Soviet regime had merely seized most of the property (including the parish schools) of the Armenian Church, but in the 1930s a campaign of active persecution was conducted. The clergy has been molested in various ways and atheist propaganda is widely distributed. Today the younger generation shows little interest in the activities of the Church, although it is widely regarded as a symbol of Armenian nationalism. Echmiadzin, the world center of the Armenian Church near Yerevan, is allowed to hold religious services and train a few clergymen under close

¹Matossian, 1968: 185-197. See also Ter-Sarkisants, 1972.

²Armeniya 1966: 96-98.

³Vazgen I, Patriarch of the Soviet Armenian church, has estimated that half of the Armenians in the republic are believers, but there is no hard evidence to corroborate this figure. See the New York Times, December 18, 1971: 6.

surveillance. The Catholicos [head of the Church] was allowed to visit his flock in the diaspora; but a visit to the U.S. scheduled for the spring of 1973 was cancelled. Echmiadzin is supported financially largely from contributions from the diaspora; support from within Soviet Armenia appears to be slight.

A 1971 article from the New York Times suggests that Soviet authorities have allowed the Soviet branch of the Armenian church to flourish under the leadership of Catholicos Vazgen as a means of increasing the moral authority of Echmiadzin among the more than 1.5 million Armenians abroad. In return, the church makes concessions to the government, at times, including pro-Soviet material in its services.¹

¹See the New York Times (December 8, 1971: 6), which reports a sermon honoring the establishment of Soviet power in Armenia on November 29, 1920.

VI. External Relations

The Turks and the Armenians still regard each other with deep animosity even among widely scattered Armenian émigré populations. The Armenians regard the Georgians as rivals, unduly favored by Stalin and the Soviet authorities. The history, fine arts, and customs of Georgians and Armenians are remarkably similar, but neither ethnic group will admit to this. The Armenians respect the bravery and fighting spirit of the Russians but like to think of themselves as more clever. (The above judgements are impressionistic and there are no reliable studies of the subject.)

The most important ties of Soviet Armenians abroad are with the Armenian diaspora. Consequently, in international politics, the Armenians are growing more optimistic. This is apparent in the efforts of Soviet Armenians to reach out to Armenians in the diaspora, and vice versa. There are about 1.7 million Armenians outside the Soviet Union.¹ The largest single group is in the United States (400,000); there are 200,000 in Iran, 180,000 in Lebanon, 120,000 in Syria, 120,000 in Turkey (still!), and 170,000 in France, to mention only the major concentrations.

Because of the emphasis on business skill in Armenian culture, many Armenians in the diaspora have become wealthy, and a few are multi-millionaires. (Calouste Gulbenkian, Kirk Kerkorian, for example). With the revival of ethnicity in the United States, the Armenian community has made vigorous efforts to keep alive knowledge of the Armenian language, Armenian literature, music, dance, and other customs. Even the most vigorously anti-Soviet Armenian party in the diaspora, the Dashnaksutiun, does not condemn the constructive work going on in Soviet Armenia. For many Armenians are once

¹
Armeniya za 50 let, 1970: 290.

again thinking in continents and feeling in centuries: They wonder, if Israel can defend its independence with the help of the Jewish diaspora, why not Armenia?¹

Armenia is the only Soviet area which has actively sought the immigration of its nationality from outside the USSR.² According to some estimates, the country has attracted several tens of thousands, mainly from the Middle East, but also from the U.S. and Europe.

¹Personal observation of N. Matossian from talks with Armenian activists in the U.S.

²The only similar case in Soviet history is the effort of Birobidzhan to attract Jewish immigrants. See Goldberg, 1961, passim.

ARMENIA AND THE ARMENIANS

PART B

Media

I. Language Data

Armenian is an independent branch of the Indo-European language family. It is a satem¹ language as are the Baltic, Slavic, Albanian, and Indo-Iranian languages. However, the consonant system of Armenian resembles that of Georgian and the other languages of the Kartvelian group. This may be the result of the original merging of the Armenians with the Hurrian-speaking people of Urartu. Armenian is written in a unique script which was invented in 406 A.D. Soviet authorities have made changes in its orthography but have not attempted to replace its alphabet. Almost all of the 1.7 million Armenians outside the USSR speak Armenian.

In the USSR some 3.25 million Armenians regard Armenian as their native tongue (see Table B.1.). Within the Soviet Union the proportion of Armenians giving Armenian as their native language increased from 99.2% in 1959 to 99.8% in 1970. In 1970 only 23.3% of all Armenians claimed to be fluent in Russian, although, almost necessarily, they must have had some knowledge of the language (see Table B.1.).

There is no evidence of Russification in Soviet Armenia according to 1970 census data. An American scholar visiting Armenia in 1957 found that an Armenian family of scientists habitually spoke Russian at home. In 1971 a Soviet Armenian scholar asserted that this was not unusual in 1957, but was currently disappearing. He also stated that the more educated families used Armenian as their native tongue.² Among Armenians in the USSR outside of Soviet Armenia there has been a negligible drop in the use of Armenian as a first language: from 78.3% in 1959 to 77.6% in 1970.

¹An Indo-European language family in which the palatal stops became in prehistoric times palatal or alveolar fricatives.

²Personal observations by M. Matossian.

Table B.1.
Native and Second Languages Spoken by Armenians
(in thousands)

Number of Armenians residing:	Speaking as their Native Language						Speaking as a Second Language ^a	
	1959		1970		Percentage point change 1959-1970		Russian	
	1959	1970	1959	1970	1959-1970	1970	1959	1970
in the Armenian SSR	1,552 (100%)	2,208 (100%)	1,540 (99.2%)	2,204 (99.8%)	+0.6	11 (0.72%)	5 (0.2%)	514 (23.3%)
								26 (1.2%)
in other Soviet republics	1,235 (100%)	1,351 (100%)	965 (78.3%)	1,049 (77.6%)	-0.7	222 (17.9%)	265 (19.6%)	357 (41.2%)
								187 (13.8%)
Total	2,787 (100%)	3,559 (100%)	2,505 (90%)	3,253 (91.4%)	+1.4	233 (8.3%)	270 (7.6%)	1,071 (30.1%)
								214 (6.0%)

Sources: for 1959 census, Itoqi SSSR, 1959, Table 53; Itoqi Armanyskoi SSR, 1959, Table 53.
for 1970 census, Itoqi 1970: IV, 20, 303.

^aNo data are available for 1959, since no questions regarding command of a second language were asked in the 1959 census.
^bIncluding Armenian, if not the native tongue.

II. Local Media

The largest collection of Armenian manuscripts in the world (25,000) is housed in the famous Matenadaran in Yerevan. It is open to accredited scholars. Armenia is third in the USSR (after Estonia and Latvia) in the number of library books per capita.¹

There are 96 newspapers published in the Armenian SSR, (including 81 published in Armenian). The daily circulation is 1,057,000 copies, about one million in Armenian. Eighty-seven periodicals are published, including 71 in Armenian, with a total circulation of 9,992,000 copies (over 8 million in Armenian).

The two major Armenian newspapers are Sovietakan Hayastan [Soviet Armenia], an organ of the Armenian Communist Party, which appears six times weekly and Avangard, an organ of the Komsomol which appears three times weekly. The two major Russian newspapers are Kommunist, an organ of the Armenian Communist Party, which appears six times weekly and Komsomolets, an organ of the Central Committee of the Leninist Young Communist League of Armenia, which appears three times weekly.

Among the principal periodicals in the Armenian SSR are:

Hayastani Ashkhatavorui [Working Women of Armenia], a journal of the Central Committee of the Armenian Communist Party, which is published in Armenian and popular among women;

Hayastani Gyukhtntesutyun [Armenian Agriculture], a journal of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, published in Armenian;

Garun [Spring], the combined journal of the Komsomol and the Union

¹Aslanyan, 1971: 93.

of Writers of the Armenian SSR, which publishes fiction, moral problems for the younger generation, and translations, in Armenian;

Leninyan Ugiov [Along Lenin's Way], a politically oriented journal of the Central Committee of the Armenian Communist Party, in Armenian;

Literaturnaya Armeniya [Literature of Armenia], the journal of the Armenian SSR union of writers, which publishes fiction, in Russian;

Pioneer, the journal of the Komsomol and Pioneers of the Armenian SSR, which publishes fiction for 10-15 year-olds, in Armenian;

Sovetaken Arvest [Soviet Art], published jointly by the Ministry of Culture of the Armenian SSR and the State Committee for Cinematography of the Armenian SSR, in Armenian;

Sovetaken Hayastan [Soviet Armenia], published in Armenian by the Armenian Committee of Cultural Relations with Compatriots Abroad;

Sovetaken Grakanutyun [Soviet Literature], a journal of the Armenian SSR Union of Writers, published in Armenian; and

Vozni [Hedgehog], a satirical journal published fortnightly in Armenian.¹

The first radio station was opened in Yerevan in 1926, and the first TV station in 1956. In 1968 Soviet Armenia had one TV and two radio stations broadcasting in Armenian, Russian, Azerbaidzhani, Turkish, and Kurdish for domestic audiences, and a radio station broadcasting in Armenian and Arabic to Near Eastern audiences outside the USSR.¹ Armenian-language publications brought in from abroad to Soviet Armenia enjoy some attention.

¹Europe Yearbook, 1972: 1281.

²BSE, 1970: 238.

Table B.2. Publications in the Armenian SSR

Language of Publication	Year	Newspapers ^a			Magazines			Books & Brochures		
		No.	Per Issue Circulation (1000)	Copies/100 in Language Group	No.	Per Issue Circulation (1000)	Copies/100 in Language Group	No. of Titles	Total Volume (1000)	Books & Brochures /100 in Language Group
Russian	1959	2	30	40.4	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	142	800	107.8
	1971	3	56	72.8	12	17	22.1	218	1,613	2,098.1
Armenian ^b	1959	57	303	19.6	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	997	6,069	393.4
	1971	61	1,132	51.3	17	496	22.5	840	8,663	392.4
Minority Languages	1959	5 ^c	14	9.5	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	19	32	21.9
	1971	7	33	15.9	0	0	0	23	57	27.5
Foreign Languages	1959	0	0	--	N.A.	N.A.	--	(10) ^d	(174)	--
	1971	0	0	--	0	0	--	(28) ^d	(205)	--
All Languages	1959	64	347	19.6	22	984	56	1,168 ^d	7,075	400.2
	1971	71	1,221	490	29	513	20.6	1,109 ^d	10,538	422.9

See notes on following page.

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Continuation of Table B.2.

^a1971 figures do not include kolkhoz newspapers.

^bSome of these are published in both Russian and Armenian languages.

^cThis figure may include publications in non-Soviet languages.

^dBook totals as given in Pechat' sometimes differ from totals in language categories. The indication is that books are published in other languages, but no data is given. Figures in parentheses are the presumed production of books in other languages based on this discrepancy.

Note:

The 1971 Russian language group data was obtained from 1970 census data by:

1. Aggregating the number of minority people whose native language is not that of their minority,
2. Subtracting the number of non-Armenian native speakers of Armenian, and
3. Adding the number of non-Armenian-speaking Armenians and the number of Russian-speaking Russians to the result.

The result is a maximum limit of the number of native speakers of Russian, 76,879 people. The 1970 census data indicates that 537,825 inhabitants of Armenia are fluent in Russian as a second language. If the total of both native speakers and those fluent in Russian as a second language is considered as the Russian language group in 1971, then newspaper copies per hundred equals 9.1; magazines, 2.8; and books, 262.4.

The minority language group equals the sum of minority peoples whose native language is that of their minority. Armenians and Russians were not considered.

Source: Pechat' 1959: 58, 130, 165.
Pechat' 1971: 96, 160, 189.

(NOTE: N.A. - not available.)

Table B.3.

Electronic Media and Films in the Armenian SSR

Year	Radio			Television			Movies
	No. of Stations	No. of Wired Sets (1000)	/100 population	No. of wireless sets (1000)	/100 population	No. of Stations	
1960	*	139 ^a	7.3 ^d	204 ^a	10.7 ^c	*	61 ^b 3.2 ^d
1970	*	228 ^a	9.0 ^d	374 ^a	14.7 ^c	*	131 ^b 5.1 ^d
1971	*	267 ^d	10.2 ^d	388 ^d	14.9 ^c	*	** **

^aSource: Transport i svyaz' SSR, 1972: 296-298.^bSource: Narodnoye obrazovaniye, kul'tura i nauka v SSSR, 1971: 325.^cSource: Nar. khoz, 1972: 572, 578.^dComputed from data cited above (b and c).^eTelevizeniye i Radioveshchaniye 1972: 12: 13.^aPrecise data not available. See text.^{**}Data not available.

III. Educational Institutions

In the nineteenth century Armenians had little opportunity for higher education. In Ottoman territory the principal opportunities were in the American missionary schools. By 1914 these schools had enrolled 2,500 college students and 4,500 high school students, the majority of whom were Armenians.¹ In the Russian Empire the main places for advanced education for Armenians were the Lazarevskii [Lazarian] Institute in Moscow (opened in 1815); the Echmiadzin Seminary (opened in 1837); and the Nersesian School in Tiflis (opened in 1824).

In the latter part of the nineteenth century the Russian government began to organize a network of state schools in Eastern Armenia, while the Armenian Church developed its network of parish schools in both Western and Eastern Armenia. The Armenians were quicker to seize educational opportunities than their Moslem neighbors, for the Armenians, as Christians, identified with the "advanced" civilization of Western Europe and welcomed Western learning as their own. The cumulative effect of this in the Soviet Union is that Armenians have an extraordinarily high proportion of college students per capita. Among the 17 major nationalities of the USSR, they ranked third after the Jews and Georgians, with 23 college students per 1000 population.²

In 1938 the study of the Russian language became obligatory in Armenian secondary schools and in the higher educational institutions of Armenia. In 1946 Russian became mandatory in the second grade, and in 1957, in the first grade of all Armenian schools. Soviet Armenians appear to have a reading knowledge of Russian, but in 1971, very little Russian was spoken in Yerevan.³

It should be remembered that the overwhelming majority of the educated are Armenians taught in Armenian-language schools. In the city of Yerevan,

¹Matossian, 1962.

²Refer to the all-union comparative tables in the fifth volume of this series.

³Personal observation by M. Matossian.

among employed persons only, 810 men and 815 women out of 1000 have at least an incomplete secondary education.

Among the union republics, Armenia holds first place for the number of students per 10,000 population.¹ Armenians living in Georgia and Azerbaidzhan come to Yerevan to study.² In 1969-1970 there were 53,355 students in the higher educational institutions of Soviet Armenia, of which 96% were Armenians, 2.5% Russians and less than one percent each Azerbaidzhanis, Kurds and other nationalities.³ 62.8% of the Armenians in all Soviet higher educational institutions were studying in Armenia, (a figure slightly higher than the percentage of Soviet Armenians living in Armenia).⁴

¹ Aslanyan, 1971: 667;

² Armeniya 1966: 101.

³ Sovetskaya Armeniya 1970: 352.

⁴ Ibid.; Nar. obraz. 1971: 196.

Table B.4.
Selected Data on Education in Armenia (1971)

(p. 667) <u>All Schools</u>		Per 1000 Population
number of schools	--- 1,542	0.59
number of students	--- 667,000	255.9
(p. 665) <u>Newly Opened Elementary, Incomplete Secondary, and Secondary Schools</u>		
number of schools	--- 68	
number of student places	--- 39,400	15.1
(p. 667) <u>Secondary Special Schools</u>		
number of schools	--- 63	
number of students	48,600	18.6
(p. 667) <u>Institutions of Higher Education</u>		
number of institutions	-- 12	
number of students	--- 54,900	21.1
(p. 439) <u>Universities</u>		
number of universities	-- 1	
number of students		<u>% of Total</u>
Total	--- 11,912	
Day Students	--- 7,193	60%
Evening Students	--- 2,713	23%
Correspondence Students	--- 2,006	17%
newly admitted		
Total	--- 2,192	
Day Students	--- 1,542	70%
Evening Students	--- 324	15%
Correspondence Students	--- 326	15%
graduated		
Total	--- 1,876	
Day Students	--- 1,121	60%
Evening Students	--- 414	22%
Correspondence Students	--- 341	18%

Continued...

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(p. 108) <u>Graduate Students</u>	<u>Per 1000 Population</u>	
total number of	---	1,135
in scientific research institutions	---	554
in universities	---	581
(p. 656) <u>Number of Persons with (in 1970) Higher or Secondary (Complete and Incomplete) Education</u>		
per 1000 individuals, 10 years and older	---	516
per 1000 individuals, employed in national economy	---	697
(p. 664) <u>Number of Workers Graduated from Professional-Technical Schools</u>		
	---	16,200
		6.22

Source: Nar. khoz. 1972 (page references are given above). 1972 (January) population for the Armenian SSR was given as 2,606,000 (p. 12).

IV. Cultural and Scientific Institutions

A branch of the All-Union Academy of Sciences was founded in Armenia in 1935. Eight years later, in 1943, it was converted into the Armenian SSR Academy of Sciences. The work of the academy, especially in the fields of astrophysics, stellar astronomy, the physics of elementary particles, and in the chemistry of silicates and polymers has made Yerevan, where the large majority of Armenian research institutes are located, into a major scientific center. One of the largest and most important archives of ancient Middle-Eastern manuscripts, both Armenian and non-Armenian, is also located in the city.

Of the 17 major Soviet nationalities, only the Jews have a higher ratio of scientific workers to population than the Armenians.¹ Nearly one half of the Armenian scientific workers are employed outside the republic, but they still dominate the local scientific establishment. Of the 11,577 scientific workers in Armenia in 1969, 94% were Armenians, 3.6% were Russians, and 0.6% were Jewish, with other nationalities making up smaller fractions of the total.

Theaters for drama exist in Leninakan, Goris, Kirovakan, Artashat and other regional centers. Yerevan has the largest number of theaters, including one for opera and ballet, a state drama theater, a Russian drama theater, and a puppet theater.

Armenians are prominent in Soviet scientific and artistic elites, and constitute a particularly skilled work force. Aram Khachaturyan is among the greatest living composers. Less familiar but still significant names include Arno Babadzhanyan and Alexandr Arutyunyan in music, Ovanes Abelyan in theater, and Stepan Zoryan in literature.² In science, Victor Hambartzumian has been president of the International Society of Astrophysicists. Tigran Petrosian preceded Boris Spassky as World Chess Champion.

¹ See the comparative tables in the fifth volume of this series.

² Sovetskaya Armeniya, 1970: 364; Europa Yearbook, 1972: 1281.

Table B.5.

Selected Data on Scientific and Cultural Facilities and Personnel in Armenia
(1971)

1972 Population: 2,606,000

Academy of Science

- number of members	89
- number of scientific institutions affiliated with the Academy	35
- total number of scientific workers in these	2,286

Museums

- number of museums	34
- attendance	1,495,000
- attendance per 1000 population	573.7

Theaters

- number of theaters	14
- attendance	1,714,000
- attendance per 1000 population	657.7

Number of persons working in education and culture

- total	100,000
- no. per 1000 population	38

Number of persons working in science and scientific services

- total	35,000
- number per 1000 population	13.4

Number of public libraries

- number of books and magazines in public libraries	1,266
	11,193,000

Number of clubs

1,146

Source: Nar. khoz. 1972: 106, 451, 663.

ARMENIA AND THE ARMENIANS

PART C

National Attitudes

I. Review of Factors Forming National Attitudes

The Armenians first emerged as a historical group in the middle of the sixth century B.C. They played an active role in Near Eastern politics until the end of the fourteenth century A.D. During this period they were not remarkably distinguishable from their neighbors. Although officially Christian in religion, they were as warlike as other contemporary Christian peoples; indeed they constituted the backbone of the Byzantine military forces. Their written literature, which began in the early fifth century A.D., and their scientific work, were on a par with that of the Byzantine Greek.¹

A decisive change in national attitudes came about as a result of the conquest of the area by nomadic peoples from Central Asia: the Seljuk Turks, Mongols, and Ottoman Turks. From the fifteenth to the eighteenth centuries the Armenians were a subject people under Moslem domination,² excluded from membership in the ruling class, and hence from military and administrative activities. Although Armenian monks preserved manuscripts of Armenian culture, there was little creativity during these centuries. By necessity the Armenians learned to practice the defensive tactics of a subject people: outward humility and simplicity, combined with shrewdness. They lost the assertive attitudes of conquerors and rulers.

Ever since the massacres of the Armenians by the Turks during World War I (see the section on history), the Armenians have been a "captive ally" of the Russians--captive not only by the overwhelming fact of Soviet power, but by the presence of that third involved party, the Turks. There are Turks in Turkey at the border of the Soviet Union; there are Turks within

¹Personal observations of M. Matossian.

²See Section A-III.

the Soviet Union (79,000 in 1970); there is a Turkish and Azeri (a people close to the Turks) minority within Soviet Armenia itself.¹

This is still the most decisive event in the shaping of Armenian national attitudes today. In the summer of 1971 an Armenian taxi driver in Yerevan told an American visitor, "If the Red Army wanted men to fight the Turks, I would volunteer." This is a relatively mild statement of Armenian feeling.²

Another distinctive characteristic of Armenian attitudes has been the prohibition against polygamy, and relatively strict disapproval of sexual promiscuity in general. Of course it has been Armenian girls, rather than boys, and Armenian women, rather than men, who have been zealously guarded as a matter of family honor. Nor have Armenian husbands and wives had an equal status in the family. The husband has had the strong position, by custom, as in Turkish families. The main difference between the Armenian and Turkish family has been the interaction between husband and wife in the Armenian family. They have not lived in entirely separate spheres, nor dwelt in segregated apartments. The typical Armenian family has probably been a more intense "emotional system," and more supportive of its members, than the Turkish family. Perhaps for this reason Armenians have had a higher energy output, and thus been more successful, in those occupations open to them.³

Whereas 2.2 million Armenians live in Armenia, some 3 million Armenians live outside its borders—1.35 million in the USSR and 1.7 million outside the USSR.⁴ Contact with this diaspora, which is larger by one third than

¹ See Section A-IV.

² Personal observations by M. Matossian.

³ Cf. Armeniya, 1966: 86-108. This is a tentative hypothesis of M. Matossian.

⁴ See Table B.1. and Sections A-IV and A-VI.

the population in Armenia itself, is a powerful factor influencing Armenian attitudes. Armenia is the only union republic with such a large proportion of its nationality in the diaspora. The education of the young Armenians outside the Republic in the language and culture of their people is a natural concern of the national minded Armenian intelligentsia.

II. Basic Views of Scholars on Armenian National Attitudes

Almost all Western scholarship dealing with the Armenians has been concerned with their ancient and medieval history and culture. Authors who have analyzed the Armenian nationalist movement, the massacres, and the crisis of 1915-1920 have treated the Armenians as victims of other peoples' national attitudes, not their own. There is no study by any Western scholar of Armenian national attitudes which would meet contemporary tests of validity and reliability. In a book by M. Matossian, The Impact of Soviet Policies in Armenia, tenuous conclusions were drawn which aroused no great controversy. Politically active Armenians know each others' attitudes well and apparently see no particular reason to subject them to scientific analysis for the benefit of odars (non-Armenians).

Soviet scholars argue that the Armenians are grateful to the Russians for "saving" them from the Terrible Turk, the Corrupt Persian, and from Poverty and Backwardness. The amount of credit they give to the Armenians themselves for the progress made in Soviet Armenia depends on the shifting political winds. In a recent authoritative work dealing with Armenian-Russian relations,¹ it has been asserted that Tsarist Russia's chief contribution to the Armenians was to put them in contact with creative Russian culture and with those currents from advanced Western culture coming into Russia. It cites the many Eastern Armenian writers, scholars, scientists, artist, and military leaders who benefited from these contacts. The book does not portray Russian rule before 1917 as generally liberating, but as better than that of Turks and Persians. This can be considered a plausible position.

John Armstrong's thesis on "mobilised diaspora" nationalities can only be partly applied to the Armenians, since, paradoxically, they have both

¹ Armeniya za 50 let, 1970: 21-31.

a very homogeneous republic of their own and a large population outside their borders. However, the Armenian diaspora displays some of the characteristics outlined by Armstrong, such as concentration in certain sections of the economy and high levels of education and skill.¹ The Armenians have contributed a number of prominent Soviet political leaders, e.g., Anastas Mikoyan, as well as inventors and scientists (e.g., Arsen Mikoyan, the brothers L. A. and I. A. Orbeli, N. M. Sisakyan, A. A. Arzumanyan, Yu. Arutyunyan).²

¹ Armstrong, 1968: 8-9, 12-14.

² Armeniya, 1966: 102, and see J. Turkevich, Soviet Men of Science (Princeton: Van Nostrand, 1963), passim.

III. Recent Manifestations of Nationalism

There are indications that Armenian nationalist feeling has grown stronger in recent years. There was a violent outbreak of nationalist feeling on April 24, 1965 in Yerevan on the fiftieth anniversary of the Turkish massacres of 1915. Planned public memorials became the occasion for spontaneous demonstrations.¹ Part of the fallout from this was the replacement of the then-secretary of the Communist Party of Armenia, Y. N. Zarobian, by A. E. Kochinian. In 1966 a collection of documents dealing with the 1915 massacres was published in Yerevan.² A monument to the victims of the massacres was also erected in the capital. In the summer of 1971 a major exhibit on Armenian Turkish relations, including the massacres, was prominently displayed in the State Historical Museum.

Another manifestation of Armenian nationalism has been the interest shown in Yerevan in the Karabakh region, an autonomous region under Azerbaïdzhan administration which possesses a concentration of Armenian population. In 1971 two scholarly articles, one on Karabakh folklore and another on "Soviet construction in Karabakh, 1920-1925" appeared in the Lraper [Vestnik] of the Social Sciences Division of the Academy of Sciences of the Armenian SSR.¹ The eventual incorporation of Karabakh into Soviet Armenia may very well be a short-term goal of the leadership in Yerevan.

The principal new development in Armenian nationalist expressions is a more active Soviet courtship of the Armenian diaspora. In 1970, a Soviet Armenian anniversary volume devoted a special chapter to the diaspora.² It gave a detailed account of Armenian cultural organizations, the press, and creative individuals in the various diaspora communities. Most interesting was the conciliatory attitude taken to the various Armenian political parties abroad. The book criticized the Hunchak Party for its "petty bourgeois and nationalist" character, but cited its services in rallying support in the diaspora for Soviet Armenia and for fighting the Dashnak

¹ Lraper (May) 1971:5:20-25; (August) 1971:8.

² Armeniya za 50 let, 1970: 282-334.

Party. The Ramgavars¹ were characterized as "big merchants, millionaires" with "bourgeois-nationalist ideology" but were congratulated for their efforts to preserve Armenian culture abroad, for their support of the repatriation of Armenians to Soviet Armenia, and for their struggle against the Dashnaks. The Armenian compatriotic (fellow townsmen) societies, The Armenian General Benevolent Union, and the Gulbenkian Foundation were also cited for their generous financial support of activities in Soviet Armenia. In return, it was noted that Soviet Armenia continues to accept repatriates from the diaspora as well as grant scholarships to Armenians from the diaspora (360 in 1968-1969) to study in the higher educational institutions in Yerevan.

This courtship of the diaspora was exemplified in the publication, by a Soviet Armenian scholarly journal, of an article about Armenian Studies in the U.S.A. The article was written by a respected Armenian-American scholar, Professor Nina Garsoyan of Columbia University and translated into Russian.² A year later, 1972, an attack on Western scholarship on Soviet ethnic minorities appeared in the same journal.³ Pipes, Kolarz, and others were taken to task, but the work on Soviet Armenia by M. Matossian was not mentioned.

The assertive nationalist attitudes of the Armenians have remained much the same throughout the twentieth century, but only in the last eight years have they been openly expressed in Soviet Armenia. The active campaign to develop ties between Soviet Armenia and the diaspora amounts to a new level of nationalist activity.

Trying to discern the workings of the mind of the "typical" patriotic Armenian, both inside and outside the Soviet Union,

¹The Ramgavar (democratic) party originated as a coalition of several revolutionary parties in Turkish Armenia. According to a personal communication, it conducts cultural, charitable and informational activities among Armenians in the diaspora and "keeps an open mind" about Soviet Armenia.

²Lraper (October) 1971: 10.

³M. M. Hakopian, "Against the falsification of the national politics of the Communist Party of Soviet Union," Lraper (July) 1972: 7.

it appears that he would prefer an independent Armenian State; but he accepts Armenian membership in the Soviet Union as an unavoidable necessity at present. He will not be content until the Western Armenian provinces have been reclaimed from the Turks. In a euphoric mood he may dream, "Today Yerevan, tomorrow Van."¹

According to some recent Armenian émigrés and émigré Armenian organizations in the U.S., recently there has been a heightened awareness of the national problems among the intelligentsia in the Armenian republic. Special concern was aroused as the result of an incursion of the Azeris into Armenian territory. The Azeris, a Turkic agricultural people, sustain a high fertility ratio and migrate into areas from which the more ambitious Armenians are leaving for better opportunity, usually in the cities. An Armenian planner related that special efforts were being undertaken by the Armenian authorities to locate new sophisticated industries in such areas in order to reverse the outflow of young Armenians and create an inflow.

In the first months of 1973, the central Soviet leadership manifested its concern about nationalism and economic slackness in Armenia by appointing Russians to two major positions in the republic and removing the Armenians who had occupied them. In January Arkady R. Rakosin replaced General Kevork Badamiant as head of the State Security Agency; and in March Pavel B. Anisimov was appointed second Secretary of the Armenian CP

¹Van is a former major Armenian city, located in northeast Turkey.

replacing A. Ter-Gazaryants. Mr. Anisimov had had no previous connection with Armenia whatever and had been appointed by the Armenian Central Committee in the presence of a special emissary from Moscow.¹ In an analysis of the speeches of Party leaders during the December 1972 Jubilee celebrations, a Western writer concluded that seven of the First Secretaries of republican Parties had "deviated" from the Brezhnev line on national policy. One of them was the Armenian First Secretary.²

¹The Armenian Reporter (Flushing, N.Y.), April 12, 1973.

²Paul Whol, Christian Science Monitor, February 6, 1973.

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Project: Attitudes of Major Soviet Nationalities

21

GEORGIA AND THE GEORGIANS

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This chapter is based on a paper contributed by the above-named specialist. However, the chapter as presented here has been edited by the project staff, and some of the data, tables, and other materials have been added. Responsibility for the final version therefore rests with the project.

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GEORGIA AND THE GEORGIANS

PART A

General Information

I. Territory

The Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic occupies an area of 26,757 square miles in Transcaucasia. It borders on the Russian SPSR to the north, the Azerbaïdzhan SSR to the east, the Armenian SSR and Turkey to the south, and the Black Sea to the west. Within its borders are the Abkhazian Autonomous Republic (capital: Sukhumi), the Adzhar Autonomous Republic (capital: Batumi), and the South Ossetian Autonomous District (capital: Tskhinvali).

Georgia is divided into three principal geographic regions: the Greater Caucasus mountains, which stretch from the Black Sea to the Caspian and form remarkable ridges of longitudinal and traverse ranges; the South Georgian Highlands, a high plateau extending into Turkey and Armenia; and the central region of intermountain basins, which extends latitudinally and is distinguished by a gentle relief. Several of the peaks of the central part of the Greater Caucasus Range are taller than Mont Blanc, the highest peak of the Alps.

This diversity is reflected in the climate, which is warm and humid in the western region, where the annual rainfall is the heaviest in the USSR (40-98 inches) and warmer and drier in the inland regions. In the Caucasian uplands cool subalpine conditions prevail, while above the timberline there is a cold, alpine climate. Georgia has some rich mineral reserves, including coal at Tkibuli and Tkvarchili and manganese at Chiatura, as well as much water power from its mountain rivers.

¹Narody Kavkaza, 1962:II: 207-11; Javakhishvili and Gvelesiani, 1964:; Davitaya, 1972.

II. Economy

The abolition of serfdom in Georgia (1864-1871) and the completion of the railway lines linking Baku, Tbilisi, and the Black Sea ports of Batumi and Poti in the 1870s and 1880s spurred the development of industry and trade. Baku oil began to pass through Batumi to the world market, and exploitation of the Tkivbul coal deposits began. Manganese mining, begun in Chiatura in 1879, provided one-third to one-half of the world export of this mineral early in this century and is a major source today. But despite this industrial development, Georgia remained mainly an agrarian region. Whereas before the First World War industry accounted for 41% of the value of total production in the Russian Empire, its share in Georgia amounted to only 13%.¹

The present structure of the Georgian economy is shown in the following table (based on actual prices, 1970)²:

<u>Branch of the Economy</u>	<u>"Total Social Product"³</u>	<u>National Income</u>
Industry	59.4%	39.0%
Construction	10.6%	10.9%
Agriculture	20.6%	34.7%
Transportation and Communications	2.6%	3.1%
Commerce, material- technical supplying	6.8%	12.3%
Total economy	100.0%	100.0%

¹Javakhishvili and Gvelesiani, 1964:52-53; Davitaya, 1972:48-50.

²"Gruzinskaya," BSE, 1972:VII:372.

³This is a Soviet unit for measuring the performance of the Soviet economy, which is not identical to any Western measure. For further information on this subject, see R.W. Campbell, M.M. Earle, Jr., H.S. Levine and F.W. Dresch, "Methodological Problems Comparing the U.S. and USSR Economies," Soviet Economic Prospects for the Seventies (Washington, D.C. Govt. Printing Office, 1973): 122-146.

Industrial production accounts for nearly 3/5ths of the "total social product" and 2/5ths of the national income. In 1970, 34% of the work force were employed in industry, construction, transportation and communications, while 38% were employed in agriculture and lumbering. An additional 24% were engaged in non-material production.¹

Notwithstanding the dearth of tillable land, the Georgian economy continues to be strongly dependent on its agricultural production and the industrial processing of its produce. Subtropical crops requiring a good deal of heat and moisture, notably tea and citrus, are grown on large plantations in the western region near the Black Sea. Grapes and a wide variety of fruits are produced for the most part in the eastern regions: Kakheti, Kartli, and Upper Imereti. Tea is Georgia's most important crop, accounting for 94-95% of all high-quality tea grown in the USSR. Almost 45% of the value of the republic's total industrial production is produced by the food-processing branch. Aromatic Georgian tea, high-grade tobacco, citrus and canned fruit, wines and brandies, tung and other vegetable oils, cheeses and mineral waters are among the many products of Georgia's food industry.²

Georgia also has major heavy industrial facilities. Indeed, among the union republics it ranks third in metallurgical production. It produced 783,000 tons of pig iron, 1,411,000 tons of steel, and 1,205,000 tons of rolled metal in 1970. The center of this production is the gigantic Rustavi Steel Mill complex, not far from Tbilisi, which was built following the Second World War. Dashkesan iron ore is the main raw material for these mills, while coal from the greatly expanded

¹"Gruzinskaya," BSE, 1972:VII:372.

²Davitaya, 1972:81,86-87; Gugushvili, Gruzinskaya SSR: Kratkii istoriko-ekonomicheskii ocherk, 1971:143-58. See also Gugushvili, Gruzinskaya SSR: Sel'skoye khozyaystvo, 1971. Almost all citrus fruit produced in the USSR is grown in Georgia.

mining complex in Tkibuli and Tkvarcheli serves as the principal source of fuel. Along with the metallurgical industry, the chemical and machine-tool industries have also been developing. The latter, centered in Tbilisi, produces metal-cutting lathes, motor vehicles, tractors, electric locomotives, agricultural machinery, and many other products.¹

Georgia has a well-developed, unified power system whose many hydro-electric plants produce more than 8,000 million kilowatt hours of power annually. Its light industry, specializing in the production of fabrics, clothes, and leather footwear, and its mountain and coastal health resorts, which attract people from all over the Soviet Union, are also economically significant.

There is a sizeable private sector in Georgian agriculture, and judging by press reports, Party decisions, and eye-witness accounts, illegal or semilegal dealings have been prevalent, too. Small garden plots, though accounting for a small fraction of farm acreage, produce about 40% of Georgia's \$1.2 billion agricultural output, according to Western estimates.² A recent Soviet press account states that only 68% of the grapes produced in Georgia are sold to state procurement agencies, as compared with 88% in Azerbaidzhan and 97% in Armenia.³ Widespread speculation and illegal trade have been the subject of much public discussion and the object of First Secretary E. Shevardnadze's extensive clean-up campaign, but it is impossible to ascertain the value of commerce involved in illegal operations.

¹ Davitaya, 1972:79-81, and Gugushvili, Gruzinskaya SSR: Industriya, 1971.

² Henrick Smith, "Soviet Georgia Goes Own Way, Does Well," The New York Times (December 16), 1971:10. "Western economists estimate," Smith observes, "that from such lucrative crops as grapes for Georgian wines and cognacs and citrus and other fruits, or flowers that can fetch a ruble apiece...when flown to Moscow in winter, Georgian farmers earn more than \$400 million a year on their private plots alone."

³ S. Davitaya, "Reflections Engendered by Meetings in the Mountains: Paradoxes of Orchards and Vegetable Gardens," Izvestia (March 23), 1973, in CDSP (April 18), 1973:25:12:9-10.

Indices of Georgia's standard of living for 1970 give an impression of highly uneven development. The republic ranks first in the world in the ratio of doctors to population, 36.8 for every 10,000 inhabitants.¹ The supply of useful urban living space per urban resident places Georgia third among the USSR republics. Per capita trade turnover, however, is relatively low, exceeding only the figures for Moldavia, Azerbaidzhan, and four of the five Central Asian republics. The republic's produced national income has grown by only 102% between 1960 and 1971, the third lowest rate in the USSR.²

Soviet 1970 data on savings accounts give a very interesting picture. Every fourth inhabitant of Georgia has such an account, whereas the USSR average is every third. The average size of an account, at 1,016 rubles, is the largest in the Union, far outstripping the average (581 rubles). As a result, Georgia trails only Estonia and Armenia, among the Soviet republics, in savings per capita, although these are considerably less evenly distributed among the population than in Estonia and somewhat less so than in Armenia.³

¹ Nar. khoz. 1972:515ff. Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1971:799-800.

² Nar. khoz. 1970:579,546; Nar. khoz. 1972:360. The seemingly low rate of trade turnover may be a result of extensive private dealings, which are not reflected in the official statistics.

³ Nar. khoz. 1970:563-564.

III. History

The national identity and culture of the Georgians, one of the oldest national groups in the Soviet Union, has been shaped by a long and turbulent history. Between the 12th and the 7th centuries B.C., the various Georgian tribes settled in the Caucasus began to unite.¹ The first state to come into being in western Georgia was the kingdom of Colchis (6th century B.C.) on the Black Sea coast, whose rise coincided approximately with that of the Achaemenid Persian Empire and the establishment of Greek colonies on the east coast of the Black Sea. In the third century B.C. the kingdom of Kartli (or Iberia), which was established in eastern Georgia with its capital in Mtskheta, succeeded in uniting the main provinces of eastern, western, and southern Georgia into a single state.²

In the second half of the first century A.D. the kingdoms of Colchis and Kartli were conquered by the Romans, who dominated the coastal area for some time. Not long after Emperor Constantine proclaimed Christianity the official religion of the Roman Empire (then centered in Constantinople), Christianity was established as the official religion in eastern Georgia (c. 330) and later (c. 520) in western Georgia.³ The Georgians, like the Armenians, henceforth became an outpost of Christianity in the East, affiliated with the great centers of Orthodox Christianity and distinguished from the cultures of Zoroastrian Iran and of the later Islamic world.

In the early sixth century (523) the Persian Sassanids extended their domination into the Kartlian kingdom. Though it regained its independence toward the end of the century, first eastern and then western Georgia were soon overrun by the Arabs. By the end of the ninth century, with the termina-

¹ The Georgians call themselves Kartveli and their homeland Sakartvelo, land of the Georgians. Both of these names are derived from karti, as the kindred Georgian tribes were called.

² On these early kingdoms and their culture, see Lang, 1966.

³ On the adoption of Christianity, see ibid.:91-95.

tion of Arab domination, the Georgians entered a period of economic, cultural, and political progress. King Bagrat, the adoptive son of David III, managed to break the resistance of feudal lords and independent princes and bring nearly all Georgian lands under his control. In 1080 the kingdom fell to the Seljuk Turks. King David IV (1089-1125), who bears the epithet "the Restorer," carried out a successful campaign against the Turks between 1120 and 1122 and reunited the lands.

Georgia attained its greatest heights during the reign of Queen Tamara (1184-1213), the great granddaughter of David the Restorer. By the end of her reign it had become the strongest state in the Transcaucasus and included all of Armenia in addition to Georgia proper. This was a period of economic advance and cultural flowering. Georgian towns were thriving centers of handicraft manufacture and trade, and the population of Tbilisi, including its suburbs, exceeded 100,000. A caravan route linking Europe with India passed through the country. Science and philosophy flourished, and high standards were achieved in Georgian art, jewelry, church architecture, and literature, including Shota Rustaveli's classic poem, The Knight in the Tiger's Skin, which was dedicated to Queen Tamara.¹

Soon thereafter the main force of the army of Genghis Khan invaded the country (1235). Mongol hegemony over most of the country lasted until the 14th century. For a short time thereafter, liberated and reunified, Georgia recovered its international standing and began a brisk trade with the city-states of Northern Italy. But the eight invasions of Tamerlane's hordes between 1386 and 1403 reduced the country to ruins. The capture of Constantinople by the Ottoman Turks in 1453 prevented Georgia from maintaining direct relations with Western Europe, and feuding between the king and his powerful vassals led to the disintegration of the unified Georgian state by the end of the 15th century.

¹Javakhishvili and Gvelesiani, 1964:40-41. See also Lang, 1966.

Early in the sixteenth century Georgia found itself a battlefield between its two neighboring powers, Turkey and Safavi Iran. After long struggles, the Georgians, led by Irakli II and Solomon I, managed to re-establish independent states in the middle of the eighteenth century. Seeking allies in order to bolster Georgia's position vis-à-vis Turkey and Iran, Irakli II at the end of 1782 asked Catherine II of Russia, whose borders now extended almost as far south as the Great Caucasian Range, to place the kingdom of Kartli-Kakhetia under Russian protection. The following year a treaty of friendship was signed between the two states. In 1795 Georgia sustained yet another disastrous invasion by Iranian troops, when Shah Agha Mohammed attacked the kingdom of Kartli-Kakhetia and burned Tbilisi. For a variety of reasons, Emperor Paul I decided to annex the kingdom. Under a decree issued by his successor, Alexander I, on September 12, 1801, the kingdom of Kartli-Kakhetia was joined to the Russian Empire. The other Georgian lands were incorporated as a result of the Russo-Turkish wars later in the century.¹

With the incorporation of the Georgian lands within the Russian Empire, internal and external commerce increased, and Russian and European intellectual currents began to penetrate the Georgian intelligentsia which was then taking shape. The first Georgian newspaper, Sakartvelos gazeti [The Georgian Gazette] was published between 1819 and 1822, and a Russian paper, Tiflisskiye vedomosti [Tiflis News], appeared in 1828, with a supplement in Georgian.² In the 1860s the Tergdaleuli socio-literary movement manifested itself.³ Ilya Chavchavadze (1837-1907), a Georgian poet and essayist, was in the forefront of this movement, which united many young Georgian intellectuals influenced by the critical thought of the Russian intelligentsia (in particular, Belinsky, Herzen, Chernyshevsky, and Dobrolyubov).

¹ Almost the whole of western Georgia was gained by Russia by 1811; Poti, Akhaltsikhe, Akhalkalaki and ten districts of Samtskhe-Saatabago were incorporated in 1828-29; and Ajaria, including Batumi and the Artvini District, was joined to Russia in 1878. On the initial treaty and the Tsars' decisions to annex Georgia, see Lang, 1962:37-41, and his more ample account in The Last Years of the Georgian Monarchy, 1658-1832.

² Lang, 1962:63.

³ Tergdaleuli means literally "one who has drunk from the Terek water" in reference to those who passed through the gorge of the Terek River on the way to and from Russia universities.

The Mesame Dasi (so-called "Third Group" organized by young radicals in 1892 became the first Marxist political group in Georgia.¹ Among its leaders were Nikolai Chkheidze, who was to become the Menshevik President of the Petrograd Soviet in 1917, and Noe Zhordaniya, the future President of independent Georgia. In 1898 the militant wing of the Mesame Dasi gained the adherence of a former student of the Tbilisi Theological Seminary--Josef Dzhughashvili, the future Stalin.²

Unlike many of the other national movements, as Pipes observes, "the Georgian movement became from its very inception closely identified if not completely fused with Marxian socialism."³ In the First Duma six of the seven Georgian deputies were Social Democrats, and in the more conservative Second Duma, two out of three. Social Democrats--overwhelmingly Menshevik in their affiliation--played an active role in the political life of Georgia; following the abdication of Nicholas II, they emerged as the leading political force and predominated in the newly established local soviets. After the Bolshevik coup in October, 1917, the Georgian Menshevik leaders still avowed their allegiance to the Russian Provisional Government. Only after the Bolsheviks' signing of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk in which the Transcaucasian territories were ceded to the Axis powers did the Georgian leaders declare Georgia's independence, enter into a short-lived Transcaucasian Federation, and then establish a sovereign Georgian republic in May, 1918. The Georgian leaders entered into alliances with European powers (in turn, Germany and Great Britain) and carried out a socialistic reform program. Independent Georgia was recognized by 22 countries.

¹Chavchavadze and his confreres later became known as the Pirveli Dasi [First Group] to distinguish them from the more radical Meore Dasi [Second Group] founded in 1869 by Giorgi Tsereteli (1840-1915), a prolific and versatile poet and publicist, and Niko Nikoladze. Both of these circles were more moderate than the Mesame Dasi. Lang, 1962:109-11,122-29.

²On Stalin's childhood and youth, see Bertram Wolfe, Three Who Made a Revolution (New York: Dial Press, 1961), and Adam Ulam, Stalin (forthcoming). A valuable source on Mesame Dasi and the politics of the young radicals of this period is Noe Zhordaniya, Moya zhizn' (Stanford, Calif.: The Hoover Institute, 1968).

³Pipes, 1964:17.

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In May 1920 Soviet Russia signed a treaty with Georgia recognizing her independence and renouncing all interference in her affairs.¹ However, on February 16, 1921, the 11th Red Army, headed by Sergo Ordzhonikidze, invaded Georgia from Azerbaïdzhan (ostensibly to aid the Bolsheviks who were leading a popular revolt) and placed Georgia under Communist rule. A Soviet-Turkish treaty was signed in March, 1921, establishing the present borders between the two countries. The policy favored by Stalin -- the merging of Georgia into a Transcaucasian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic -- provoked strong opposition among the Georgian Communist leaders themselves, who feared excessive centralization and Great Russian domination. In this, Stalin emerged triumphant.² The Transcaucasian SFSR (which included Armenia, Azerbaïdzhan and Georgia) was formed in 1922 and entered into the USSR. It lasted until December 5, 1936, at which time the Georgian SSR was formally established as a constituent unit of the USSR.

During the years of Stalin's rule and Beria's administration of the secret police, both men had close ties with their compatriots in key positions of the Georgian Communist Party (GCP). Following Stalin's death, the Georgian apparatus appeared to be an important source of support for Beria. For that reason, an extensive purge of the apparatus was carried out by some of his rivals (with some of the Georgian officials being executed, including Beria himself). Vasily Mzhavanadze was then appointed First Secretary of the GCP. He remained in power for 19 years.

¹For background and the Constitution of Georgia see Kandelaki, 1953: 191-209.

²Before his final stroke, Lenin was giving much attention to the "Georgian question" and was reconsidering his national policy in view of the highhanded methods which had been used by Stalin and Ordzhonikidze. See Pipes, 1964:266-293.

In 1972, Eduard Shevardnadze, who had served as Minister of Internal Security in the GSSR for seven years, was appointed First Secretary of the party organization in Tbilisi and two months later (September 30) of the GCP as a whole. Having been deposed, Mzhavanadze was also removed from his position as a Candidate Member of the Politburo. The 44-year old Shevardnadze immediately began a wide-ranging purge of his predecessor's administration, which was accused of a tolerant disposition toward corruption, private trade and speculation, as well as bureaucratic inefficiency. Some prominent private dealers were arrested, and the easy-going atmosphere appeared to have changed.¹

¹Pravda, September 30, 1972; New York Times (December 9), 1972:9; Soviet Analyst, 1:17:2-3 and 2:2:2.

IV. Demography

The population of the Georgian republic was 4,686,000 in 1970, as compared with 4,044,000 in 1959, 3,540,000 in 1939, and 2,601,000 in 1913.¹ The percentage increase between 1959 and 1970 (15.9%) was almost identical to the rate for the USSR as a whole during this period.² In 1940 the birthrate exceeded the deathrate by slightly more than 18 per 1,000. Although the birthrate declined sharply during the war, by 1945 it began to rise again. Between 1950 and 1963 the rate of natural increase averaged about 16 per 1,000, which was approximately the same as the all-Union mean.³ As of 1969 the birthrate in Georgia was 18.7 per 1,000, while the rate of mortality was a low 7.5. The resultant rate of increase (11.2 per 1,000) was only slightly higher than the USSR average (8.9 per 1,000).⁴

Georgia is among the most densely populated regions of the USSR. In 1926 there were, on the average, 98 persons per square mile in the republic, whereas by 1969 the number had increased to 176. The great majority of the population is concentrated in the low-lying regions where the good agricultural lands are to be found and the industrial centers are located; about 9/10ths of the population live at less than 3,280 feet above sea level on an area which is less than half of the territory of the republic. In 1959 the mean population density of this area was 290 persons per square mile.⁵

During the Soviet period the urban population of Georgia has increased more than threefold (from 666,000 in 1913 to 2,241,000 in 1970), while the rural population has grown by only 27% (from 1,935,000 to 2,447,000). At the present time slightly more than half of the population is living on the land or residing in small settlements.⁶

¹ Davitaya, 1972:58; Dzhaoshvili, 1968:8.

² Bruk, 1972:334, Table 1.

³ Davitaya, 1972:58; Dzhaoshvili, 1968:19.

⁴ In recent years, the rate of natural increase in Georgia has been higher than that of the European republics (except Moldavia), but lower than that of the Central Asian republics, Kazakhstan, and neighboring Azerbaidzhan, where the rate of increase was 22.3 per 1,000 in 1969. Bruk, 1972:345-46.

⁵ Davitaya, 1972:65.

⁶ Davitaya, 1972:58. See also Dzhaoshvili, 1968.

Simultaneously, great changes in the occupational structure have occurred. As a result of planned industrialization, the number of people working in industry increased about 20-fold between 1926 and 1959, and the proportion of industrial and state farm workers (including members of their families) rose from 6.9% to 31.7% of the population during the same period. Meanwhile, the share of office workers (including members of their families) grew appreciably also, rising from 7.6% to almost a quarter of the population.¹

Nonetheless, collective farmers are still more numerous than either workers or employees in the Georgian SSR. Along with members of their families, they comprised 44% of the population in 1959.² The fact that this figure is so high reflects the importance of labor-intensive branches of agriculture in the economy (especially tea, viticulture, citrus fruits and other sub-tropical crops).

Along with the expansion of educational facilities, the number of specialists employed in the economy has risen sharply (from 67,100 in 1941, to 324,900 by 1970). Those with higher education numbered 185,400 in 1970, as compared with 33,900 in 1941.³

¹Close to 65% of all of Georgia's industrial workers and office employees are concentrated in three major industrial centers: the Tbilisi-Rustavi industrial complex (specializing in ferrous metallurgy, chemicals, engineering, building materials, food-processing, and light industries), the Zestafoni-Chiatura complex (a center of electro-metallurgical and mining industries), and the Kutaisi-Tkibuli complex (important for coal mining, engineering, and light industries). Davitaya, 1972: 64, 82.

²Ibid.: 64.

³Sovet. Gruzija po leninskomu puti, 1970: 123; Nar. obraz., 1971: 234. More than half (52%) of the total number of specialists were women in 1970. In 1968, 78% were of Georgian nationality.

Indeed, on a number of indices—including the number of individuals with complete or incomplete secondary education per 1,000, with specialized secondary or higher education, or simply with higher education—Georgia ranks in first place among the constituent republics of the USSR.¹

Georgians have continued to maintain numerical pre-dominance in the population (see Table A.1). Between 1926 and 1939 their share of the population declined from 66.8% to 61.4%, mainly as a consequence of the massive influx of Russians, whose share correspondingly increased from 3.6% to 8.7%. Subsequently, the Georgians have increased in relative as well as absolute numbers. In 1959, they made up 64.3% of the population, whereas at the time of the latest census, they numbered 3,131,000 and constituted 66.8%. In 1970, 9.7% of the population were Armenian and 8.5% were Russian (for other nationalities, see Table A.1). Although Armenians and Russians have decreased in relative terms, Azerbaidzhani increased their percentage from 3.8% in 1959 to 4.6% in 1970.

Many of the minorities are associated with specific regions. The Abkhazians and Ossets are concentrated principally in the administrative units which bear their names. The Abkhazians, who are related to the ancient Heniochi, belong to the North-Western or Adyghe-Circassian group of Caucasian peoples, while the Ossets are descendants of the medieval Alans, an Indo-Iranian people connected with the Samatians.² Armenians reside principally in the southeast areas of the republic, while the Azerbaidzhanians tend to live in the plateau regions of eastern Georgia.³

¹The number of people in Georgia possessing a complete or incomplete secondary education per 1,000 (over age 10) rose sharply from 165 to 554 between 1939 and 1970. The latter figure puts Georgia in first place on this index, and well ahead of the all-union average (483). (In last place, according to the latest census, was Lithuania, with 382.) As of 1970, 58 per 1,000 in the Georgian republic have a higher education. Bruk, 1972:353; Davitaya, 1972:68.

²Lang, 1966:20.

³Narody Kavkaza, 1962:11:213.

Rank by size
1970Table A.1.
Population of the Georgian Republic, by Nationality

Nationality	1897		1926		1939		1959		1970	
	Absolute Number	Percent	Absolute Number	Percent	Absolute Number	Percent	Absolute Number	Percent	Absolute Number	Percent
1 Georgians	1,310,307	68.3	1,783,186	66.8	2,173,574	61.4	2,600,588	64.3	3,131,000	66.8
7 Abkhazians	59,481	3.1	56,847	2.1	56,640	1.6	62,878	1.5	79,000	1.7
5 Ossets	71,502	3.7	113,298	4.2	148,680	4.2	141,178	3.5	150,000	3.2
2 Armenians	177,012	9.2	307,018	11.5	414,182	11.7	442,916	11.0	452,000	9.7
3 Russians			96,085	3.6	307,988	8.7	407,886	10.1	397,000	8.5
9 Ukrainians	101,044	5.3	14,356	0.5	46,020	1.3	52,236	1.3	50,000	1.1
- Belorussians			540	---	N.A.	---	5,152	0.1	N.A.	(0.1)
4 Azerbaiddzhanians	109,529	5.7	143,951	5.4	187,621	5.3	153,600	3.8	218,000	4.6
6 Greeks	38,540	2.0	54,054	2.0	84,960	2.4	72,938	1.8	89,000	1.9
7 Jews	12,182	0.6	30,159	1.1	42,480	1.2	51,582	1.3	55,000	1.2
- Others	39,827	2.1	72,739	2.8	77,878	2.2	53,091	1.3	N.A.	(1.3)
TOTAL	1,919,423	100.0	2,677,233	100.0	3,340,023	100.0	4,044,043	100.0	4,686,000	100.0

Source: V.Sh. Dzhaoshvili, Naseleniye Gruzii: Ekonomiko-geograficheskoe issledovaniye (Tbilisi: Metanieraba, 1968), 48.

F.F. Davitaya, ed., Soviet Georgia (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1972), 59.
Yezhegodnik, 1971: 128; "Gruzinskaya," BSE, 1972: 5: 362-363. Census, 1970: 17-18.

Another minority group, the Adzhars, a people of Georgian stock who adopted Islam during the centuries of Ottoman rule and consequently differ in some aspects of culture from the Georgians proper, are found mainly in the Adjara Autonomous Republic.¹

As of January 1, 1971, the Communist Party of Georgia had 286,084 members and 10,291 candidate members.² It is worthwhile to examine the social characteristics of the members to draw some inferences about which groups are most involved in the political system and to see what types of people the leaders have considered most desirable for inclusion in the Party. With respect to age, it is striking that whereas in 1940 more than 4/5ths of the membership was under 40 years of age (and slightly more than 40% was 30 or under), in 1970 the membership was predominantly composed of older persons--60% were 41 years of age or older.³ The leadership, in particular, has aged: whereas in 1958 more than 78% of the secretaries of province, city, and district party committees were under 40 years of age, by 1973 this index had dropped to 24%.⁴

Statistics on the educational attainment of Party members reveal that the Party has had much success in recruiting highly trained personnel, whose share of the membership far exceeds their representation in the population as a whole. In 1940, nearly 12% of the membership had complete or incomplete higher education; in 1970, this group accounted for slightly more than 30% of the

¹Lang, 1966: 20.

²"Gruzinskaya," Yezhegodnik, 1971: 128.

³Komm. partiya Gruzii v tsifrakh, 1971: 96,267. In 1970, only 14% of the membership was 30 or under.

⁴Report of the Plenary Session of the GCP CC, "Party Leadership Should Measure Up To Today's Tasks," Zarya vostoka (February 28), 1973, translated in CDSP (April 25) 1973: 25:13:6.

entire membership.¹ The strength of the Party among highly trained academic and research personnel is reflected in the fact that of the 942 Doctors of Science in Georgia in 1970, 406 were Party members.² Almost all (99%) of the Party officials in 1973 are reported to have obtained a higher education.³ A large, yet gradually declining proportion of the members (47.6% in 1970) are employed in non-manual occupations.⁴ The Party draws very heavily on the titular nationality: at the present time, about 3/4ths of the membership is composed of Georgians, who have increased their share over the years (see Table A.2). Armenian representation has been decreasing relative to other nationalities, while the Azerbaiddzhanians have been consistently underrepresented.

¹ Komm. partiya Gruzii v tsifrakh, 1971:96,267.

² Ibid., 267; Komsomol Gruzii v tsifrakh i faktakh, 1971:77.

³ Report of the Plenary Session of the GCP, "Party Leadership Should Measure Up To Today's Tasks," in CDSP (April 25) 1973:25:13::6.

⁴ Komm. partiya Gruzii v tsifrakh, 1971:93,221,242,264. 52% of the Party members were employees in 1940, whereas only 17.2% of the population as a whole were so classified in 1939. In 1960, 48.1% of the members were employees, whereas at the time of the census in 1959, 24% of the population was placed in this category. Dshaoshvili, 1968:44.

Table A.2.

Membership of the Communist Party of the USSR, by Nationality
(as of 1 January)

Nationality	Absolute Numbers				Percentage				Percentage of the Population, 1970
	1940	1960	1965	1970	1940	1960	1965	1970	
Georgians	62,842	153,391	184,725	220,868	70.7	73.5	74.5	76.1	66.8
Abkhazians	1,042	2,778	3,500	4,230	1.2	1.3	1.4	1.4	1.5
Ossets	4,080	7,214	8,340	9,606	4.6	3.5	3.4	3.3	3.2
Armenians	11,256	20,070	22,448	23,352	12.6	9.6	9.0	8.0	9.7
Azerbaijani	1,973	3,689	4,981	6,268	2.2	1.3	2.0	2.2	4.6
Russians	4,789	13,715	15,371	16,044	5.4	6.6	6.2	5.5	8.5
Ukrainians	579	2,412	2,565	2,707	.6	1.1	1.0	1.0	1.1
Others	2,390 ^a	5,315 ^b	6,445 ^c	7,036 ^d	2.7	2.6	2.5	2.5	4.6
TOTAL	88,951	208,584	248,375	290,191	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

a) Including 877 Greeks, 644 Jews, and 869 others.

b) Including 2,126 Greeks, 1,830 Jews, and 1,359 others.

c) Including 2,314 Greeks, 2,076 Jews, and 1,555 others.

d) Including 3,234 Greeks, 2,128 Jews, and 1,674 others.

Sources:

Party membership figures are derived from Ya.G. Kurtsikidze, et al., comps., Kommunisticheskaya partiya Gruzii v tsifrakh (1921-1970gg.): Sbornik statisticheskikh materialov (Tbilisi: Central Committee of the Communist Party of Georgia, 1971) : 94, 221, 243, 265.

Percentage figures from the 1970 census of the population are from F.F. Davitaya, ed., Soviet Georgia (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1972): 59.

7. Culture

Although through the ages no institution has been more central to the cultural life of the Georgians than the Georgian Orthodox Church, it is difficult to determine from published sources the place of the Church and Orthodox creed in Georgian culture today. Incorporated into the Russian Holy Synod in 1811, the Georgian Church declared its renewed independent status in 1917 following the abdication of the Russian emperor.¹ It was not recognized by the Russian Orthodox Church until 1943. The incorporation of Georgia within the Soviet Union resulted in the confiscation of church property, the closing of churches, and a strident atheistic campaign. Georgia's communist-supported "Militant Godless" organization reported 101,586 members, forming 1,478 cells in 1931; by 1938, the membership had increased to 145,413, representing 4% of the population, an all-Union record.² How many Georgians remain devoted to the Church is not known. In the early 1960s, it was reported that the Georgian church had seven bishops, 105 priests, eighty parishes, three monasteries and one convent, as well as a publishing house whose only regular publication is an annual liturgical calendar.³

Georgian literature goes back many centuries, though no works of the pre-Christian period have survived.⁴ A brilliant and widely renowned example of the classical culture of the 12th and 13th centuries is Shota Rustaveli's epic The Knight in the Tiger's Skin.⁵ The 13th century writer Sul Khan Saba Orbeliani is known for his collection of parables and fables, The Wisdom of

¹Lang, 1962:177-79, 195.

²Kolarz, 1961:100-104.

³Elie Melia, "The Georgian Orthodox Church," in Marshall, ed., Aspects of Religion, 1971:235-36.

⁴For a review of scholarly work which has been done on Georgian folklore, see Barnov, 1972. Unless otherwise noted, the review of culture given here is based on material in the following: Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic, 1968: 63-70; Gurushvili, Gruzinskaya SSR: Kul'tura, 1971; and Davitaya, 1972: 67-73.

⁵According to one source, "not only during the feudal period, but also down to our century, at first handwritten, and since the 18th century, printed copies of this poem were considered the most important part of a Georgian bride's dowry." Davitaya, 1972: 68.

Fiction, as well as his book Travel in Europe, which represents the first important example of Georgian documentary prose. Outstanding among the more recent 19th century writers are Ilia Chavchavadze (1837-1907), Akaky Tsereteli (1840-1915), Alexander Kazbeghi (1848-93), and Vazha Pshavela (1861-1915). Major contributions to Georgian literature in this century were made by Niko Lordkipanidze and Leo Kiacheli, prominent writers who began writing before the Revolution. Well known poets include Galaktion Tabidze, a "People's Poet of Georgia," Georgi Leonidze, Irakly Abashidze, Alexander Gomiashvili, Grigol Abashidze, Alexander Abasheli, Sandro Shanshiashvili, and Simon Chikovani. The author of historical novels Konstantin Gamsakhurdia has won acclaim, as have the writers Mikhail Javakhishvili and Shalva Dadiani. Not a few Georgian writers--including the highly talented poets Paolo Yashvili and Titsian Tabidze--perished in the purges of 1937-38.¹ In the estimation of some scholars the quality of literary work has suffered greatly from the imposition of political controls.² Though socialist realism continues to be the ideologically prescribed literary style, Georgian literature at its best continues to display much creativity and verve, as well as stylistic features of the national literary tradition.

The Georgian dramatic heritage also stretches back through the ages. A revival of the Georgian theater, in which Georgi Eristavi played a prominent role, occurred in the 19th century, and early in this century there were several theaters in Georgia. Now there are more than twenty regular theaters and about 30 amateur folk theaters, as well as the Rustaveli Theatrical Institute in Tbilisi for the training of actors, stage directors and other specialists. Kote Marjanishvili is considered an outstanding director of the Soviet period. Together with Sandro Akhmeteli, he is largely responsible for the techniques used in the theater today. Vakhtang Chabukiani, a preeminent master of classical dance is also well known.

¹"Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic," McGraw-Hill Encyclopedia of Russia and the Soviet Union, 1961:195.

²Lang, 1962:257.

Extant psalms of the 8th, 9th, and 10th centuries testify to a long tradition of musical composition and reveal that even at that time Georgians had their own system of musical transcription. Georgian folk songs have been appreciated by leading Russian composers (including Glinka, Tchaikovsky, and Ippolitov-Ivanov). Drawing on this folk tradition, the composer Zakhari Paliashvili wrote the operas Abesalom and Eteri, Daisi, and Latavra which are highly regarded. Georgian music owes much to the operatic and symphonic works of Dmitri Arakishvili, the comic opera of Viktor Koidze, Etoe and Eote, the choral compositions of Niko Sul Khanishvili, and the scores of Meliton Balanchivadze. Today musicians are trained in the Tbilisi Conservatory, and various groups, including the Quartet of Georgia, the Vocal Ensemble Shvidkatsa, the State Song and Dance Ensemble, the State Symphony Orchestra, and the State Folk Dance Ensemble, have gained wide recognition.

One of the forms of the fine arts having a long tradition in Georgia is metal-chasing, which dates back to the 2nd millennium B.C. and reached its highest form in the 10th-12th centuries. Closely associated with metal-chasing is gold enamelling. Especially noteworthy are the works of the brothers Bek and Beshken Opizari done during the reign of Queen Tamara. Extant gold icon covers and book bindings, massive crosses and vessels and enamelled decorations reveal the consummate skill of the artists of that era. Work of this kind is still being carried on by such artists as Irakly Ochauri, Dmitry Kipshidze, Koba Guruli, and Guram Gabashvili.

Professional easel painting, graphic arts and sculpture developed much later, in the nineteenth century. In this century paintings by Niko Pirosmanishvili have gained much fame. Realistic artists of the older generation include Grigory Maisuradze, Gigo Gabashvili, Alexander Mrevlishvili, Mose Toidze, and the sculptor Yakov Nikoladze. Lado Gudishvili has been granted the honorific title of People's Artist of Georgia for his paintings.

The large group of gifted Georgian film-makers includes Mikhail Chiaureli, Nikoloz Shengelaya, Siko Dolidze, Leo Esakiya, David Rondeli,

Revaz Chkheidze and Tengiz Abuladze. Among the films which have gained renown outside of Georgia are Lurja Magdany (produced by T. Abuladze and R. Chkheidze) which won prizes at Cannes and Edinburgh in 1956, Foster Children and Supplication (produced by T. Abuladze), and Revaz Chkheidze's film A Soldier's Father. The latter owes its great international success in part to the acting of the late Sergo Zakariadze, who was awarded the first prize for the best male role at the 4th International Film Festival in Moscow in 1965. The Wedding by the young director Mikhail Kobakhidze won three prizes at the International Film Festival in Oberhausen in 1965 and the Grand Prix for the best short film at Cannes in 1966.

VI. External Relations

Linguistically, the Georgian people are distinguished from the major neighboring nationalities (see the section on Language). Outside of the Georgian SSR, there are somewhat more than 90,000 Georgians scattered throughout the USSR, and groups of Georgians have settled in Turkey and Iran. Along the shores of the Black Sea in Turkey live one of the Kartvelian tribes which are related to the Georgians--the Lazes. Although there are no reliable data on the number of Georgians living in these neighboring countries, it has been estimated that more than 330,000 Georgians and Lazes live in Turkey, and probably some tens of thousands of Georgians inhabit the regions of northern Iran. Moreover, a Georgian colony was established by emigres in Paris in 1921, and other small groups of Georgians are found in other countries of Western Europe and in the Western hemisphere. Georgians in Paris and Munich have played leading roles in publicizing Georgian culture and political aims. The overwhelming majority of Georgians are, of course, concentrated within the Georgian SSR.¹

Historically, Georgians have been in contact with European countries via the Black Sea and the Mediterranean, although such contact was interrupted by various invasions, especially those of the Tatars, and by the capture of Constantinople by the Turks. Because of their shared Christian faith, the Georgian leaders have naturally tended to look to the Christian kingdoms of Europe and, later, the Russian tsar for support against the hostile Islamic powers, Turkey and Iran. Since the incorporation of Georgia within the Soviet Union, contacts with the Western world have been impeded, while those with other peoples within the USSR have been encouraged and strengthened.

In 1946, a Georgian society was established to make connections with other "friendship societies," receive delegations from abroad, and dispatch informational material on Georgia. Since then, the number of foreigners visiting the country has greatly increased, especially during

¹ Dzhaoshvili, 1968:49-50.

Georgia - External Relations - 2

the 1960s. In 1969, about 50,000 foreign tourists and a large number of official delegations visited the republic.¹ Meetings between Georgian and foreign scientists have become more frequent, and some cooperative ventures have been undertaken.

¹Gugushvili, Gruzinskaya SSR: Kul'tura, 1971:182. Most of the tourists were from other Communist countries. Evidently, only a small fraction of these visitors are received by the Georgian Society of Friendship and Cultural Ties (abbreviated GODUKS), since the same source states (p.185) that in 1969 this organization received more than 3,000 visitors.

GEORGIA AND THE GEORGIANS

PART B

Media

I. Language

The Georgian language belongs to the Ibero-Caucasian group of the Caucasian family of languages, which, despite some linguistic borrowings, is distinct and separate from the Indo-European, Turkish, and Semitic families. Although its origin continues to be a subject of controversy, it is reasonably well established that the modern Georgian, Svanian, and Mingrelo-Laz languages all trace their descent from Old Kartvelian. None of these related languages is currently used by more than a few thousand individuals. Old Georgian and Classical Armenian, which developed in proximity, have certain structural similarities and may share a common Anatolian, possibly Hurrian origin. Georgians have two kinds of written language--an ancient ecclesiastical (khutsuri) script and a modern form derived from the latter. Ancient literary sources attribute the creation of the Georgian alphabet to the time of Alexander the Great.¹

In 1970, almost all of the Georgians resident in the GSSR claimed Georgian as their native tongue, as compared with only 62% of those living outside of the republic (see Table B.1). Naturally, a knowledge of Russian is much more common among the latter (54.4%) than among the former (20.1%). Nevertheless, the Georgians do not face the same danger of losing a large part of their national group through Russification as do some other Soviet nationalities (e.g. the Ukrainians), since less than 2.5% of their ethnic group live outside the republic.

¹Lang, 1966:22-27, 76-78; Narody Kavkaza, 1962:II:212. It is likely that Svanian split off from Old Kartvelian in the second millenium B.C., becoming the language of the Svans, inhabitants of the Caucasian highlands; Laz and Mingrelian are subdivisions of the ancient Colchian or Tzanic tongue which was once spoken extensively around the eastern end of the Black Sea. Lang estimates that Svanian speakers now number no more than 25,000 (p. 23).

Table B.1.1.

Native and Second Languages Spoken by Georgians
(in thousands)

Number of Georgians residing:	Speaking as their Native Language						Speaking as a Second Language ^a		
	1959	1970	Georgian		Percentage point change 1959-1970	Russian		Percentage point change 1959-1970	Other languages of the peoples of USSR, 1970 ^b
			1959	1970		1959	1970		
in the Georgian SSR	2,601 (100%)	3,131 (100%)	2,588 (99.5%)	3,122 (99.4%)	-1	12 (0.4%)	13 (0.4%)	0	629 (20.1%) 21 (0.7%)
in other Soviet republics	91 (100%)	114 (100%)	67 (73.4%)	71 (62.3%)	-11.1	23 (25.3%)	32 (28.1%)	+2.8	62 (54.4%) 11 (9.6%)
TOTAL	2,692 (100%)	3,245 (100%)	2,655 (98.6%)	3,193 (98.4%)	-2	35 (1.3%)	45 (1.4%)	+1	691 (21.3%) 32 (1.0%)

Sources: for 1959 census, Itogi SSSR, 1959, Table 53; Itogi Gruzinskaya SSR, 1959, Table 53; for 1970 census, Itogi 1970, IV:20, 253.

^a No data are available for 1959, since no questions regarding command of a second language were asked in the 1959 census.

^b Including Georgian, if not the native language.

Further information can be gleaned from 1970 census data. In Table B.1.b., the nationalities are rank-ordered according to the quantitative strength of their attachment to their own native languages. Almost all Georgians, Russians, Azerbaidzhans, and Abkhazians in the USSR regard their own nationality's language as their native tongue, as compared with 70% to 85% of the Armenians, Jews, Ossetians, Kurds, and Tatars and decidedly fewer (65% to 40%) of the Assyrians, Ukrainians, Belorussians, and Greeks. Knowledge of Russian is prevalent among the nationalities, except for the Georgians and Azerbaidzhans. Other languages (notably, Georgian) are not so widely known by those who are not native speakers, but appear to have been mastered by considerable numbers of the smaller peoples of the Caucasus (Greeks, Assyrians, Ossetians, Kurds). In the census, nearly 114,000 individuals of non-Georgian nationality gave Georgian as their native language, and an additional 164,000 non-Georgians reported mastery of Georgian as a second language.¹ It should be noted, however, that if linguistic assimilation (into the Russian and Georgian groups) is occurring, the process is far from uniform. Thus, while some nationalities (Greek, Kurds, Ossetians) experienced further linguistic assimilation between 1959 and 1970, Armenians, Ukrainians, and Jews, in contrast, gave evidence of increasing attachment to their native languages.

¹ Zarya vostoka (May 8), 1971: 1.

Table B.1.2.

Languages of the Population of the Georgian SSR, by Nationality^a
Census data, 1970

Nationality ^b	Number, in thousands (1970)	Percentage among them who consider their nationality's language as their native tongue			In addition, per- centage with a fluent knowledge of a second language (of Soviet peoples)	
		1959	1970	difference	Russian	Other
Georgian	3,131	99.5	99.4	- 0.1	20.1	0.7
Russian	397	99.5	99.4	- 0.1	—	12.6
Azerbaïdzhanî	218	98.3	97.6	- 0.7	16.5	6.2
Abkhazian	79	95.8	97.2	+ 1.4	59.3	2.4
Armenian	452	82.3	84.8	+ 2.5	35.5	13.7
Jewish	55	72.3	80.9	+ 8.6	26.1	7.7
Ossetian	150	86.3	79.1	- 7.2	25.3	28.2
Kurd	21	85.4	79.0	- 6.4	28.2	31.0
Tatar	6	70.9	71.2	+ 0.3	51.3	14.5
Assyrian	6	63.4	64.6	+ 1.2	34.5	26.3
Ukrainian	50	56.4	59.0	+ 3.6	47.9	13.8
Belorussian	6	49.6	50.2	+ 0.6	41.1	13.4
Greek	89	44.8	40.2	- 4.6	36.9	23.5
Others	26	—	—	—	—	—
Entire Population	4,686	94.7	94.3	- 0.4	21.5	5.0

^a Nationality and languages were determined in the census by the personal declaration of the respondents. Children's nationality was determined by the parents' declaration.

^b Nationalities are ranked in this table according to the strength of the nationalities' attachment to their native language (i.e., percentage considering their own nationality's language as their native tongue).

Source: Zarya vostoka (May 8), 1971: 1.

II. Local Media

In 1970, 127 newspapers (excluding kolkhoz editions) with an average circulation of 3,051,000 per issue were published regularly in the Georgian republic (see Table B.2).¹ Of these papers, 107 were in Georgian, 12 in Russian, and 8 in the languages of other minorities. More than 80% of the newspapers in circulation appeared in the Georgian language. Their 1970 average circulation (2,571,000) resulted in a high saturation rate: 79.7 copies per 100 inhabitants of the GSSR who consider Georgian their native language. The most important newspapers are Zarya vostoka [Eastern Dawn] which appears six times weekly in Russian and the Georgian-language Akhalgazdra Komunisti [Young Communist] and Komunist, which are published three and six times weekly, respectively, in Tbilisi.

According to one source, 95 journals and periodicals, including 80 in Georgian, were published in the Georgian republic in 1968. The yearly printing ran to 12,199,000, of which 11,587,000 were in Georgian.² The data presented in Table B.2 evidently are based upon a more restrictive definition of what constitutes a magazine, and consequently, the figures are much lower: 22 journals, having a combined circulation of 787,000, are published; of these, 18 appear in Georgian. Magazines dealing with literature and the arts include two publications of the Georgian SSR Union of Writers: Mnatobi [Luminary] in Georgian and Literaturnaya Gruzija [Literature of Georgia] in Russian; Ziskari [Dawn], a joint publication of the Writers Union and the Komsomol; Drosha [Banner], published under the auspices of the Central Committee of the Georgian Communist Party; and Sabochota khelovneba [Soviet Art], a journal of the Ministry of Culture of the GSSR. More specialized periodicals in the same area include Dila [Morning], an illustrated magazine directed to children between the ages of 5 and 10, and Pioneri [Pioneer], a similar magazine for

¹ According to another source, 145 newspapers, including 125 in Georgian, were printed in the GSSR in 1968. The annual circulation was about 518 million, of which 430 million were in Georgian. Gugushvili, Gruzinskaya SSR: Kul'tura, 1971:75.

² Ibid.

children 10 to 13, both of which are joint publications of the Georgian Komsomol and Pioneer organizations, as well as Niangi [Crocodile], a satirical magazine published fortnightly under the auspices of the Central Committee of the Georgian Communist Party. Matsniereba da tekhnika [Science and Technology] is a popular science monthly published under the auspices of the Georgian Academy of Sciences. Sakartvelos kali [Georgian Woman] is a women's magazine which is put out by the Central Committee of the Party, as is the more strictly political journal Sakartvelos kommunisti [Communist of Georgia].¹

Recent data indicate that there are 910,000 wireless radio receivers and 513,000 television sets in the Georgian republic, constituting, respectively, 19.0 and 10.7 broadcast receivers per 100 persons (see Table B.3.). On the average, about 40 hours of central broadcasting occur each day. Central radio broadcasting averages 30 hours daily, divided into three programmes; the languages used are Georgian, Russian, and Azerbaizdhanian. Since 1971, two TV programmes (in Russian and Georgian) have been transmitted each day. TV shows in color are transmitted from Tbilisi three times a week, and relay facilities make it possible for viewers to pick up TV broadcasts from Moscow and, by means of the "Intervidyeniye" and "Evrovidyeniye" systems, from the countries of Europe and other continents. Radio programs are also broadcast locally outside of the capital.²

¹Information on periodicals from Europa Yearbook 1972, I: 1293. All are monthlies, published in Georgian, unless otherwise noted.

²Gugushvili, Gruzinskaya SSR: kul'tura, 1971: 174-175; "Gruzinskaya," BSE, 1972: VII: 381.

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Table B.2.

Publications in Georgia

Language of Publication	Year	Newspapers ^a			Magazines			Books and Brochures		
		No.	Per Issue Circulation (1000)	Copies/100 in Language Group	No.	Per Issue Circulation (1000)	Copies/100 in Language Group	No. of Titles	Total Volume (1000)	Per 100 in Language Group
Russian	1959	17	200	38.8	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	455	2,415	468.8
	1971	11	330	63.3	1	4	0.8	656	2,982	572.2
Georgian	1959	9 ^c	741	27.5	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	1,593	9,832	364.9
	1971	107 ^b	2,532	78.7	18 ^b	800	24.9	1,666	13,995	435.3
Minority Languages	1959	16 ^c	56	6.4	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	104	231	26.6
	1971	8	122	12.8	3	19	2.0	103	153	16.1
Foreign Languages	1959	0	0	---	N.A.	N.A.	---	(39) ^d	(332) ^d	---
	1971	0	0	---	0	0	---	(61) ^d	(459) ^d	---
All Languages	1959	123	997	24.7	23	221	5.5	2,191 ^d	12,810	316.8
	1971	126	2,984	63.7	22	823	17.6	2,486 ^d	17,589	375.3

^a1971 figures do not include kolkhoz newspapers.

Sources: Pechat' 1959: 56, 129, 164.

Pechat' 1971: 96, 159, 188.

^bSome of these publications appeared in both Russian and Georgian languages.

^cThis figure may include publications in non-Soviet languages.

^dBook totals as given in Pechat' sometimes differ from totals in language categories. The indication is that books are published in other languages, but no data is given.

Georgia - Local Media

Table B.3.
Electronic Media and Films in Georgia

Year	Radio			Television			Movies /100 Seats popula- (1000) tion
	No. of Wired Sets (1000)	/100 popula- tion	No. of wireless sets (1000)	No. of Stations	Of Which Stations Originating Programming (1000)	No. of sets popula- tion	
1960	N.A.	320 ^a	7.6 ^d	526 ^a	1 ^e	52 ^a	179 ^b 4.2 ^d
1970	N.A.	393 ^a	8.3 ^d	891 ^a	1 ^e	464 ^a	312 ^b 6.5 ^d
1971	N.A.	406 ^d	8.4 ^d	910 ^d	1 ^e	513 ^c	N.A. N.A.

^aSource: Transport i svyaz' SSR, 1972: 296-298.

^bSource: Narodnoye obrazovaniye, kul'tura i nauka v SSR, 1971: 325.

^cSource: Mar. khoz., 1972: 572, 578.

^dComputed from data cited above (b and c).

^eSource: Televideniye i radioveshchaniye, 1972: 12: 13.

III. Educational Institutions

In the academic year 1962-1963, universal eight-year education was achieved in the Georgian republic.¹ In 1971, Georgia had 4,521 general education schools with a total enrollment of somewhat more than one million students. Of the 4,258 general education schools in use in 1965-1966, 2,962 used Georgian as the language of instruction, while 287 used Russian, 242 Armenian, 194 Ossetian, 162 Azerbaidzhani, 39 Abkhaz, and an additional 372 were bilingual.² In 1971 there were 100 specialized secondary schools in which 52,000 students were enrolled, as well as 18 institutions of higher education with a combined student body of 89,000. Tbilisi State University, founded in 1918, is the largest of these institutions with an enrollment of 16,000.⁴ The Lenin Polytechnical Institute is the largest academic institution for the training of engineers and technicians in the republic. The academic center of the country is the Vake District of Tbilisi where seven institutions of higher education are located and some 4,000 students reside.

Georgians are especially heavily represented among the students enrolled in specialized secondary schools and institutions of higher education. In the academic year 1969-70, they made up 4/5ths of the students of the specialized secondary schools in the GSSR (see Table B.4.). In the same year, Georgians constituted 82.6% of the college students, while Russians made up 6.8%, Armenians 3.6%, Ossets 2.3%, Abkhazians 1.6%, Azerbaidzhani 0.5%, and other nationalities 2.6%.⁴ Twenty-seven out of every 1,000 Georgians aged ten or older in the Soviet Union were enrolled in institutions of higher education in 1969-70, whereas the all-union average was 19.⁵

¹ Gugushvili, Gruzinskaya SSR: kul'tura, 1971: 19-20.

² Ibid.: 20.

³ Nar. obraz., 1971: 164.

⁴ Gugushvili, Gruzinskaya SSR: kul'tura, 1971: 29.

⁵ Thus, among the union-republic nationalities Georgians had the strongest relative representation in institutions of higher education. However, there was no doubt a great proportion of Jews among the college students. At the other extreme, only 11 Moldavians out of every 1,000 were attending a higher school.
Burk, 1972: 354.

The Georgian language is reported to be dominant at higher schools in Georgia even at technological colleges. Russian is used less than in almost any other republic. Graduates of Georgian universities are mostly assigned to work in the republic to provide national cadres of the intelligentsia. Yet, some of the prominent scientists and academicians in the main Soviet centers outside Georgia are of Georgian origin (e.g., D. Gvishiani, Chairman of the Committee for Science and Technology at the USSR Council of Ministers and Prof. V. Chkhikvadze, until recently Director of the Institute of State and Law at the USSR Academy of Sciences).¹

¹See Nauchno-tekhnicheskaya revolyutsiya i sotsial'nyi progress (Moscow: Izd. Polit. Lit., 1972):49-69; V. Chkhikvadze et al., eds. The Soviet State and Law (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1969). Also from Zev Katz' interviews with Georgian emigrés.

Table B.4.1.

Selected Data on Education in Georgia (1971)

Population: 4,189,000

Per 1000 Population(p. 579) All Schools

number of schools	---	4,521	1.1
number of students	---	1,045,000	249.5

(p. 577) Newly Opened Elementary, Incomplete Secondary, and Secondary Schools

number of schools	---	102	
number of student places	---	41,100	9.8

(p. 579) Secondary Special Schools

number of schools	---	100	
number of students	---	52,700	12.6

(p. 579) Institutions of Higher Education

number of institutions	---	18	
number of students	---	89,200	21.3

(p. 438) Universities

number of universities	---	1	
number of students			<u>% of Total</u>
Total	---	16,331	
day students	---	8,665	53%
evening students	---	5,370	32.8%
correspondence students	---	2,296	14%
newly admitted			
Total	---	2,666	
day students	---	1,586	59.4%
evening students	---	915	34.3%
correspondence students	---	165	6.1%
graduated			
Total	---	2,460	
day students	---	1,413	57.4%
evening students	---	610	24.7%
correspondence students	---	437	17.7%

(Continued)

Selected Data on Education in Georgia (1971) (continued)

		<u>Per 1000 Population</u>
(p. 108) <u>Graduate Students</u>		
total number	— 1,376	0.33
in scientific research institutions	— 717	
in universities	— 659	
(p. 569) <u>Number of Persons with (in 1970) Higher or Secondary (Complete and In-Complete) Education</u>		
per 1000 individuals, 10 years and older	— 554	
per 1000 individuals employed in national economy	— 711	
(p. 576) <u>Number of Workers Graduated from Professional-Technical School-</u>		
	— 22,000	.3

Source: Nar. khoz. 1972 (specific page references are given above).

Table B.4.2.

National Composition of Students Enrolled in Specialized Secondary Schools and
Institutions of Higher Education of the Georgian Republic

Academic Year	Specialized Secondary Schools		Institutions of Higher Education	
	1960-1961	1969-1970	1960-1961	1969-1970
Total Number Of Students	26,252	50,649	56,322	90,121
<u>Nationality:</u>				
Georgians	21,175	40,829	43,237	74,473
Russians	1,749	3,787	5,390	6,061
Armenians	1,250	2,420	3,596	3,285
Azerbaijanis	188	320	448	412
Abkhazians	353	676	799	1,447
Ossets	608	886	967	2,109
Ukrainians	290	430	419	466
Others	639	1,301	1,466	1,868

Source: I.B. Gamrekeli, ed., Komsomol Gruzii v tsifrakh i faktakh (Tbilisi: Central Committee of the Komsomol of Georgia, 1971): 71.

IV. Cultural and Scientific Institutions

The Academy of Sciences of the Georgian SSR, founded in 1941, soon became one of the largest centers of scientific research in the Soviet Union. Its six branches encompass 44 scientific institutions, including 38 research institutes. Altogether in Georgia there are some 200 scientific research institutes, plus 18 institutions of higher education.¹ The number of academic research cadres [nauchnyye rabotniki] has grown rapidly, increasing from 3,513 in 1940 to 1,137 in 1960 and 20,160 in 1970.² Although data on the national composition of this are not available, it may be estimated that about four-fifths are Georgians.

Among the most important scientific institutes are the A.M. Razmadze Mathematical Institute, the Georgian Institute of Physics, the Institute of Earth Mechanics, the Institute of Cybernetics (first of its kind in the USSR), the P.G. Melikishvili Institute of Physical and Organic Chemistry, the Vakhushti Institute of Geography, Institute of the Biochemistry of Vegetation, and numerous others.³

Historical studies are pursued in the I.A. Dzhevakhishvili Institute of History, Archeology and Ethnography, and the Institute of Eastern Studies, while economic research is largely done by the Academy's Institute of Economics and Law and the Institute of Economics and Economic Planning under the Georgian Gosplan. The principal serial publications on economics and

¹ Gugushvili, Gruzinskaya SSR: kul'tura, 1971: 41-42; Nar. obraz., 1971: 249.

² Ibid.: 247. Throughout the USSR, there were 18,433 "scientific workers" of Georgian nationality in 1970. No doubt the great majority of these were in the GSSR. See ibid.: 270-271.

³ A concise overview of the research activities of these and other scientific institutions is given in "Gruzinskaya," 1972: 375-378.

law, respectively, are the monthly journals Sakartvelos sakhalkho meurneoba and Sabochota samartali.¹ Regular publications of the Georgian Academy of Sciences are Soobshcheniya AN GSSR (in Georgian and Russian); Matsne (or Vestnik), the organ of the Division of Social Sciences, appearing in Russian and Georgian; and Metsniyereba da takhnika (in Georgian only).² In addition, there are numerous Georgian scholarly societies and professional unions.³

As of 1971, Georgia had 3,640 public libraries, which housed more than 23 million copies of books and magazines. The major libraries include the Karl Marx State Library, the Tbilisi University Library, the Central Library of the Academy of Sciences, and the Ya. Gogebashvili Republic Library for Public Education in Tbilisi, as well as the republic libraries of the Adzhar and Abkhaz ASSR.

In the same year, there were more than 2,000 officially-sponsored clubs in the republic and 75 museums. The most famous of these is the S. Dzhnashia State Museum of Georgia, located in the capital, which is renowned for its collection of Georgian art.

¹Ibid.: 308-381.

²Ibid.: 381.

³Names and addresses of some are given in Khutsishvili (1969: 42-43).

Table B.5.

Selected Data on Scientific and Cultural Facilities and Personnel
in Georgia (1971)

Population: 4,189,000

Academy of Science

- number of members	108
- number of scientific institutions affiliated with the Academy	41
- total number of scientific workers in these	4,438

Museums

- number of museums	75
- attendance	2,886,000
- attendance per 1000 population	603

Theaters

- number of theaters	22
- attendance	3,248,000
- attendance per 1000 population	678

Number of persons working
in education and culture

- total	182,000
- no. per 1000 population	38

Number of persons working
in science and scientific
services

- total	50,000
- number per 1000 population	10

Number of public libraries

3,640

- number of books and magazines in public libraries	23,010,000
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Number of clubs

2,122

Source: Nar. khaz. 1972: 106, 451, 575.

GEORGIA AND THE GEORGIANS

PART C

National Attitudes

1. Review of Factors Forming National Attitudes

In the face of repeated threats to their national survival, the Georgians have managed to preserve and develop their culture through the ages. This strong cultural tradition, the awareness of a long and turbulent history, and continued geographical concentration all contribute to the Georgians' sense of collective identity in modern times. Moreover, because of their devotion to Christianity, they have traditionally felt a sense of affinity with Christians in Europe, as well as with Russians. For the same reason, they have sharply distinguished themselves from the neighboring Islamic peoples--Iranians, Ottoman Turks, and Azeri Turks--who have traditionally been regarded as enemies. Their perception of themselves as being surrounded by hostile and culturally alien Moslem peoples may explain in some measure the absence of a strongly anti-Russian separatist movement during the nineteenth and early twentieth century.

To understand the Georgians, one cannot overlook the fact that the most famous Georgian in this century was Josef Dzhugashvili, known as Stalin. It seems strange, as a historian of the Stalinist period Roy Medvedev observes, that in Georgia and Azerbaidzhan, where the mass repression of 1937-1938 was probably worse than in the other republics, the most persistent efforts are being made to restore the cult of Stalin.¹ Yet, Stalin may be seen both as a particular example of the kind of response which some Georgians make to the Soviet system and as a national symbol of Georgian achievements. It is perhaps not fortuitous that Stalin, a representative of a small, non-Slavic people, should have been so obsessed with power and the virtues of Russian culture, and eventually become a Great Russian chauvinist.² Though an active proponent of the dominant Russian culture, Stalin was nonetheless regarded as a great Georgian by many of his countrymen.³ The riots which erupted in Tbilisi in 1956 appear to have been, in

¹ Medvedev, 1972: 344.

² Lenin called attention to this fact when he was examining the behavior of Stalin, Ordzhonikidze, and Dzerzhinsky in relation to the leading Georgian Communists who were being branded as nationalists for their resistance to central control. See Pipes, 1964: 282-287.

³ A number of Georgians have expressed this sentiment to the author.

part, a Georgian nationalist response to the initiation of destalinization. So closely were the Georgian people identified with Stalin that an attack upon Stalin was regarded as an attack upon themselves.¹ The Stalin museum is still maintained at his birthplace in Gori, a factory continues to bear his name, and a traveller north of Tbilisi on the Georgian-Military Road is likely to see painted (in Russian) on the bare rock "Glory to the Great Stalin!"²

During the Stalinist era Georgian nationals attained great prominence and power. Sergo Ordzhonikidze, Stalin's right-hand man until his death in 1937, served on the Politburo and occupied the post of People's Commissar for Heavy Industry. Abel Yenukidze was Secretary-General of the Central Executive Committee (before 1937, the supreme legislative body of the USSR) and Lavrenti P. Beria (a member of the Mingrelian minority in Georgia) became the head of the Soviet secret police after serving as President of the Georgian GPU. From his own experience in Russia between 1943 and 1947 as well as interviews with emigres, F. Barghoorn concludes that "there was considerable resentment among Russians against Stalin, Beria, and other Georgians in high places and that this animosity was probably shared by many non-Russians, particularly Armenians."³ In the post-Stalin period the influence of Georgians at the center of the Party subsided, and there is now no prominent Georgian figure in the Soviet leadership. Taken as a group they are relatively highly educated and have always been over-represented within the Communist Party of the USSR.⁴ Indeed, at the present time, Georgians are more heavily represented in the CPSU than any of the other union-republic nationalities, including the Russians.

¹On the 1956 riots, see Lang, 1962: 264-266. During the disorders, 106 persons are said to have been killed, and 200 wounded. Several hundred more were subsequently deported to labor camps in Siberia.

²Personal observation in 1969. Others have told me that, though not "officially" sanctioned, this slogan is a regular feature on the road.

³Barghoorn, 1956: 49-50.

⁴See the comparative table # // at the end of the fifth volume of this series.

Although Georgians have played an active role in the official political system, they are also reported to engage heavily in illicit activity. They have a reputation as clever businessmen and have frequently come under attack for such socialistically unprincipled initiative. E.A. Shevardnadze, now First Secretary of the Georgian Communist Party, has repeatedly scored this well-known phenomenon. As he declared on one occasion, "One is literally consumed with shame upon seeing persons who were born in Rustaveli's homeland, which poets have compared with paradise, wandering about, literally for months at a time, in the markets of Vladivostok, Khabarovsk, Moscow, Leningrad, Kharkov, and Kiev, selling fruit from the soil of Georgia, fruit they never raised."¹

References to such commercial dealings have often appeared in the Soviet press, especially during the past year, since there has been a concerted effort to crackdown on such malfactors.² For instance, a recent decision of the Central Committee of the GCP stated that during 1972 "administrative organs registered more than 1,200 cases of motor transport being used for personal gains." In some cases, vehicles were used for weeks at a time for the illegal transport of produce to far-off regions; in other cases, it was discovered that an ostensibly empty railway car was, in fact, loaded with a thousand tons of produce for sale in a distant market.³ The amount of power and wealth which some private businessmen may acquire is seen in the case of one Lazishvili, reputedly a millionaire, who created and "owned" an extensive network of underground factories which manufactured various consumer goods. He was also reportedly a "ring-maker," who exercised great influence over such leading Georgian Communists as Gegeshidze and Mzhavandze.⁴

The February 1973 plenary session of the GCP brought to light "serious violations of the Leninist principles of the selection and placement of cadres

¹ CDSP (July 26) 1972: 24: 26: 10.

² See, for instance, "Widespread Speculation in Agricultural Products in Georgian SSR," JPRS: Translations on USSR Political and Sociological Affairs (December 7), 1972: 308: 27-31.

³ "Georgian Party Denounces Illegal Use of Motor Vehicles," JPRS (same series as above) (January 11), 1973: 318: 14-16.

⁴ Chianurov, 1972: 3-4. Soon after being appointed First Secretary of the Georgian Communist Party, E.A. Shevardnadze had Lazishvili arrested. "Soviets Find Underground Factory Net," Christian Science Monitor, Eastern ed. (3/14), 1973: 3.

in the past, when officials were appointed to executive positions not on the basis of their business and moral qualities but through wire-pulling, acquaintances and family ties and according to the principles of personal loyalty." Consequently, "schemers, bribetakers and extortionists managed by dishonest means to make their way even into executive positions. It was in that [recent] period [under Mzhavanadze] that it was possible to 'order' a Minister's chair for the notorious schemer Babunashvili, when it seemed that his chair as director of the Tbilisi Worsteds Combine was cramping his style." "As is known," the report continued, "private-ownership has become widespread in the republic in recent years. This applies, for instance, to the illegal construction of dachas and individual homes. Flagrant, outrageous violations have been discovered in the Abkhaz Autonomous Republic, in Mtskheta, Gardabani, Telavi, Khashuri, and Makharadze Districts and in other districts."¹

In view of available evidence, it appears that such illegal businessmen

¹Party Leadership Should Measure Up To Today's Tasks," Zarya vostoka (February 28), 1973; translated in CDSP (May 16) 1973: 25: 13: 6. The report suggested that such corruption was very extensive: "In an atmosphere of lack of principle, nepotism, mutual backscratching and toadyism, as well as the complete absence of control on the part of the Party agencies, primary Party organizations and economic executives, bribetakers ruled the roost in the Tbilisi Municipal Telephone Network Administration, the Tbilisi State Medical Institute, the inspection group of the Ministry of Everyday Services to the Population, the medical commissions of the Ministry of Social Security, Tbilisi Passenger Station No. 3, the Borzhomi and Akhaltsikhe Trucking enterprises, the Adzhar Supply Administration, the Adigeni District and Khashuri Railroad Hospitals, the Batumi Motor Vehicle School, the Kutaisi Food Trade Organization, the Rustavi Metal Structural Plant and the Tbilisi Synthetic Goods Factory, in the systems of the Georgian republic Grape and Fruit State Farms and Winemaking Industry Trust, the Ministry of Agriculture, the Ministry of State Farms, etc. The Party organizations and executives of the higher departments involved supposedly failed to notice that these people were living beyond their means, had acquired houses and dachas, had bought automobiles and were leading an idle existence. Furthermore, these people were encouraged in every way and received job promotions. For example, in Telavi and a number of other districts in the republic, there was an 'active competition' as to who would build the best-looking house with the greatest number of extravagances."

are neither few, nor without influence. Since it is presumably in their interest to escape central state control, they may contribute to the pressure for national autonomy.

II. Basic Views of Scholars on Georgian National Attitudes

"Compared with their Russian and Moslem neighbors," D.M. Lang notes, "the Georgians stand out by their proud, often flamboyant bearing, which is based on a conviction of the superiority of their own culture and achievements. It has been said, in fact, that in Georgia every peasant is a prince, or behaves like one."¹

Many have called attention to these traits. Though commonly seen as a free and uninhibited, but hospitable, people, the Georgians are believed to be proud defenders of their code of honor with a keen sense of the importance of family and kinship ties and deeply engrained natural consciousness. W.E.D. Allen, who has written extensively on the Georgians, sees in them an "aesthetic irresponsibility"--an indomitable love of life joined with a strong devotion to a code of honor which has enabled them to fight fiercely and heedlessly against foreign invaders without succumbing to the sense of inferiority which domination may induce.²

In the eyes of Laurens van der Post, the Georgians evince a "largeness of gesture and personality," personal warmth and impulsiveness--in short, a characteristically "Mediterranean" nature. Their sense of nobility is combined with a love of style--a concern with the fine gesture, a certain courtliness of manner, and individualistic elegance in dress.³ Yet, others perceive in the Georgians certain "Eastern" traits--for example, a patriarchal and protective regard for their women, perhaps fostered by centuries of Arab and Persian rule.⁴

¹Lang, 1966:27-28.

²Cited in Van der Post, 1964:105.

³Ibid.

⁴E.g., Barghoorn, 1956: 50.

Some of the Georgians' typical behavioral and cultural traits are looked upon with disfavor by the authorities. Official sources have portrayed them as "clearly determined to preserve as much of their own way of doing things as possible--which includes a notorious addiction to private enterprise of all kinds."¹ Discussion in the GCP plenary session in December 1972, called attention to evidence of considerable corruption and "a tolerant attitude toward vestiges of the past, toward remnants of private-ownership psychology, personal enrichment, and money-grubbing."² At a meeting of the GCP akriv (April, 1973), speakers "condemned the distortion of the fine folk traditions of Georgian hospitality as displayed in the holding of lavish weddings, nameday celebrations and funeral feasts, all frequently accompanied by drinking bouts. It was noted that instances in which the arrival of inspection commissions and brigades 'from above' is accompanied by interminable welcoming feasts should be combatted."³

A Western commentator (H. Smith, New York Times) recently reflected on traits such as these and concluded, "Georgia's easy style of commerce is matched by the lively temperament of its people, with their love of song, drink and poetry, their limitless hospitality, their immense cultural pride." "In the Soviet system," Smith observed, "Georgians are mavericks. Their movie industry indulges in experimental pantomimes and caricatures. Their museums dare to show abstract

¹"Dissidents Among the National Minorities in the USSR," Radio Liberty Research Bulletin 16 (August 30), 1972 CRD 224/72,16:4-5.

²Report of Plenary Session of GCP CC, "On the Tasks of the Republic's Party Organization....," "Zarya vostoka (November 4), 1972, as abstracted in CDSP (December 20) 1972:24.

³"Intensify Ideological-Political Work," Zarya vostoka, April 27, 1973, in CDSP (May 16) 1973:25:16:6.

paintings, frowned upon elsewhere, along with national treasures... [and] also pictures of Stalin in the early stages of his career." Having been repeatedly conquered by foreigners through the ages, they "have learned to romanticize their defeats and find ultimate defense in preserving their culture and their language."

"Toward outsiders," he also noted, "Georgians display a sense of superiority. When a foreigner observed to a Georgian that Georgians seemed to live better than people in Russia, he readily agreed. 'The Russians have no taste,' he said."¹

¹Hedrick Smith, "Soviet Georgia Goes Own Way, Does Well," The New York Times (December 16), 1971:10.

III. Recent Manifestations of Nationalism

Little information on nationalist sentiments and behavior in Georgia is available in the West. Samizdat documents revealing nationalist tendencies, such as those written by Ukrainians, Jews, Tatars, and Russians, have not surfaced, if they are circulated at all. Yet, not infrequently discussions of national deviations appear in the official press. For instance, a report on the February, 1973 plenary session of the GCP stressed that with a weakening of Party control in recent years, "ideological-political work suffered considerably. A half-baked nationalism raised its head in some places in the republic; things came to such a pass that attempts were made to rehabilitate émigré writers who are hostile to us."¹

Another example is the official censure which followed the April 1972 publication of the book A Historiography of the Bourgeois-Democratic Movement and the Victory of the Socialist Revolution in Georgia (1917-1921) by U.I. Sidamonidze, a senior staff member of the Institute of History, Archeology and Ethnography of the Georgian Academy of Sciences. The book was severely criticized in a decree of the Bureau of the Tbilisi City Party Committee for "white-washing" Georgian Menshevik leaders, an anti-Leninist appraisal of the period of Georgian independence, and general nationalist tendencies. The author represented the Georgian declaration of independence as a "progressive act."² Sanctions were taken against not only Sidamonidze, who was reprimanded and may be deprived of his doctor's degree, but a wide number of individuals, including the book's editor, director and Party secretary of the publishing house Metseyereba, director and Party secretary of the Institute, officials in the Institute of Party History of the Georgian CP Central Committee, and others who

¹ Zarya vostoka (February 28), 1973: translated in CDSP (April 25) 1973:25:13:6.

² See Zarya vostoka (April 27), 1972; "A Georgian Historian's Ideological Errors," in CDSP (May 31), 1972:24:18:5,30.

were also involved. Yet, as Duevel points out in his analysis of the "Sidamonidze affair," the measures of punishment meted out were quite lenient--everyone implicated incurred only a reprimand or a public rebuke. In view of the gravity of the charges leveled, and the fact that more than once in recent years the Party had called for greater control over "distortions" in historical writings, he suggests that "the growth of nationalist sentiments has gone so far as to permeate the republic's ruling elite, which has tried to shield the national-minded Georgian scholars from Moscow's wrath."¹ Though such an inference is speculative, there is no doubt that the Party is having difficulty in controlling various scholars who are inclined to "revise" Georgian history.²

At an April 1973 meeting of the GCP aktiv, numerous manifestations of the nationalism were brought to light. It was asserted that "in Abkhazia a half-baked 'theory' according to which responsible posts should be filled only by representatives of the indigenous nationality had gained a certain currency" while elsewhere certain executives "urged the Adzhar Party organization to reject proposals to set up a Georgian Steamship Line, to build new factories and plants and to develop resorts and tourism, basing their advice on the premise that this would lead to the migration of people from other republics." Literary works by certain Ossetian writers were criticized, because they purportedly "still betray elements of the idealization of out-moded traditions and the glorification of moribund attributes of antiquity." Evidently alluding to the Georgians themselves, the official report also stated that "in the union republics there may be not only local nationalism but also local chauvinism with respect to the smaller nations and nationalities." It was stressed that those "comrades who waste their time and energy on investigating

¹ Duevel, 1972:2,6.

² The need for increased ideological vigilance and the resolute combating of any manifestations of nationalist and chauvinist tendencies has been stressed repeatedly. See, for instance, "Tbilisi Party Body Reacts to Criticism," CDSP (April 12), 1972:24:11:8-10. Another historical work which was attacked for revisionism about the same time was A. Menabde, Nekotorye voprosy razvitiya Gruzinskoi natsional'noi gosudarstvennosti (Tbilisi: Metsiyereba, 1970).

such problems as whose civilization is older or how many sentences mention Azerbaidzhan or Georgia in, let us say, 'The History of Soviet Mathematics.' are stirring up trouble and acting against the traditional friendship of peoples and their mutual understanding and mutual respect."¹

The continued sensitivity and significance of national relations is also stressed in discussions of social research. At a conference on concrete sociological research organized by the Higher Komsomol School near Moscow in early 1970, it was recommended that a Georgian not interview an Armenian because the individual's ethnic sentiments would influence the validity of the inquiry.² At the same conference one lecturer compared the "Russification" [obruseniye] of northern peoples such as the Kalmyks and Chukchi with the process of "consolidation" [ukrupneniye] of the Georgians who exercise cultural influence on the Adzhar, Abkhaz, Ossetian, and other minority peoples within the Georgian republic. Several participants of the seminar protested that what may be regarded as "consolidation" from the point of view of the Georgians was "assimilation" for the smaller peoples in Georgia.³

Although little empirical research on ethnic relations has been published, there appeared a report of a study of the interpersonal relations of the ethnically mixed work force of a machine-tool manufacturing plant in Tbilisi (surveyed in early 1967). It was found that "about 24% of the informants have interpersonal contacts only with members of their own nation. Interpersonal associations with members of the same nations were marked by a higher level of

¹"Intensify Ideological-Political Work...", Zarya vostoka (April 27), 1973: translated in CDSP (May 16), 1973:25:16:5.

²Radio Liberty Audience Research, Background Report #8-73:3.

³Ibid.:4.

intensity" (i.e., a greater number of activities shared with friends).¹ Nearly three-quarters of the informants had close friends outside their own national group, though such relations were less "intense." Although the researchers did not give a detailed breakdown showing to what extent members of specific nationalities associate with those of their own nationality or others, they do note that the intensity of interpersonal relations is highest among Georgians and lowest among Russians. The researchers conclude that ethnic identity continues to be a significant determinant of one's interpersonal relations, but suggest that multinational work groups contribute to the fostering of cross-national personal ties.

One clear example of growing nationalism in the Georgian SSR is presented by the Georgian Jews who have preserved much of their heritage in spite of Soviet rule. They attach great importance to family ties, and even the young are religious. Their national aspirations appear to be expressed clearly in the desire to emigrate to Israel, and in the last few years, thousands of them have been permitted to do so. Indeed, it is estimated that about one-third of the Soviet Jews who have left for Israel are from Georgia.² The strong devotion of these Jews to their community is evidenced by their insistence on living in the same neighborhood in Israel (a phenomenon which makes their absorption into the Israeli culture more difficult). The emigrants report that local Georgians, unlike the Russians, do not regard their desire to leave the country with hostility. Rather, since they themselves are nationalistic and proud of their own traditions, the Georgians understand the Jews' aspiration to live in a country of their own.³

¹Vacheishvili and Menabdishvili, "Ethnic Relations," 1972:27 and Table 2 on p. 21. The national composition of the work force was 50.8% Georgians, 27.5% Russians, 10.4% Armenians, 4.9% Ossets, 3.7% Ukrainians (Table 1, p.20).

²If this estimate is correct, then around 40% of the Georgian Jews have already left the country. At the time of the 1970 census, there were 55,000 Jews in Georgia; see Igori, 1970:17.

³From Zev Katz' personal reports and talks with émigrés.

According to Jewish émigrés from Georgia there has been a considerable national resurgence among the Georgians in recent years. The ideological crisis which followed the anti-Stalin campaign was especially severe and strengthened the trend toward a keener national consciousness. The Georgians, proud of their 3000-year-old history and culture, are also better educated, better dressed and better fed than the Russians. They adhere to a way of life in which honor, chivalry, and ancient tradition are of great importance, and they regard the Russians and their materialistic philosophy as inferior. Yet regarding the future of their republic, opinions are divided. Some argue for independence, pointing to the period of independent Georgia in 1918-1921; others think that their country is doing well within the Soviet system and argue for more autonomy. Altogether, discussions about such matters are reported to be confined to small groups of the nationally conscious.¹

¹Ibid.

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The books listed below were published under the auspices of the Institute of Economics and Law of the Georgian SSR Academy of Sciences and the editorship of P. V. Gugushvili on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the establishment of Soviet power in Georgia.

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Project: Attitudes of Major Soviet Nationalities

AZERBAIDZHAN AND THE AZERBAIDZHANIS

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This chapter is based on a paper contributed by the above-named specialist. However, the chapter as presented here has been edited by the project staff, and some of the data, tables, and other materials have been added. Responsibility for the final version therefore rests with the project.

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AZERBAIDZHAN AND THE AZERBAIDZHANIS

PART A

General Information

1. Territory

Although the area populated by Azerbaidzhanis has not historically been one political unit, it is geographically compact. Outside the USSR the Iranian Azerbaidzhanis occupy the provinces [ustan] of East and West Azerbaidzhan, an area the size of Maine. The Soviet Republic of Azerbaidzhan has an almost equal area, 33,425 square miles. In addition, two small autonomous territorial units, the Nakhichevan ASSR and the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Region, lie within the administrative purview of the Azerbaidzhan SSR.

Soviet Azerbaidzhan is bordered on the north by the mountainous Daghestan ASSR, on the northwest by Georgia, the southwest by Armenia and a small piece of Turkey, the south by Iran, and on the east by the Caspian Sea. In relief the republic roughly resembles an amphitheater, with mountains on all but the eastern side. Numerous rivers wind their way down from the mountain regions creating valleys which gradually flatten out into the Kura Araksian Depression. This below-sea level region, roughly 100 by 50 miles in size, constitutes the core of the amphitheater and is itself cut in half by the Dura, the republic's principal river.

The climate reflects the principal features of Azerbaidzhan's relief. The plains generally have a dry, subtropical climate--hot and dry in the summer with a warm, drizzly fall, a chilly winter, and an unpredictable spring. For the seaside towns of Baku, the capital, and Lenkoran, the January and August average temperatures are 39°F and 78-79°F. The average yearly mountain temperatures fall about 1°F per 300 feet of elevation. Thus, Istisu, at roughly 6600 feet elevation, has a January average of 21°F and an August average of 56°F.

Lowland rainfall varies from five to fifteen inches except near Lenkoran on the Southern Caspian coast where the rainfall, thirty-eight inches yearly, equals or surpasses that of the high mountains.¹

The republic's substantial natural resources include much-depleted oil supplies, gas deposits, and the largest iron deposits in the Caucasus at Dashkesan. There are also commercially useful deposits of alumina, copper, lead, zinc, sulfur, pyrites, molybdenum, cobalt, and building materials (cement, marble, and tufa).

¹Azerbaidzhan, 1971: 28-35, 281-286.

II. Economy

Oil and oil-related industries have dominated the Azerbaïdzhani economy since about 1871 when oil--hitherto collected from fifty-foot deep, hand-dug pits-- was first extracted by modern methods. In the 1870s the drilling spread rapidly and by 1883 Baku oil could be shipped to foreign markets on the new Transcaucasus railroad. At the turn of the century the Baku oil fields enabled Russia to produce nearly 50% of the world's oil output.

Foreign enterprises profited heavily from the oil boom. Nobel, the principal force behind the early drilling, developed the Russian market and supplied it with oil from Azerbaïdzhan while the Rothschilds handled the sale and transport of kerosene to Europe. The labor supply also had a foreign tinge, with Russians performing skilled labor, Iranians the unskilled, and Armenians handling services.

From 1903 on the oil industry suffered from labor unrest, which peaked in 1905 with Armenian-Russian-Azerbaïdzhani conflicts and the general turmoil of revolution. After 1905, despite the ongoing construction of the Baku-Batum pipeline the decline continued as foreign competition and world production of oil sharply increased. The 1906 decree fixing royalties at 35% hurt the Azerbaïdzhani industry further as did the allocation of scarce tank cars to refineries in proportion to their output - a policy which forced refineries to produce at a financial loss in order to ensure themselves cars.¹ The end of the oil boom unquestionably aggravated labor difficulties and encouraged rural Azerbaïdzhan to remain largely agricultural.²

¹U.S. Department of Commerce, Trade Information Bulletin, #1263: 2.

²For accounts of the 1900-1910 period, see Akhundov, 1959, and Larin, 1909.

From before World War I to the 1940s oil production grew steadily but slowly.¹ In the 1930s the Baku fields still pumped 57-80% of Soviet oil. But between 1950 and 1960, Azerbaidzhan's republic percentage of Soviet oil production plummeted from roughly one-half to one-seventh while the vast Ural-Volga region's percentage rose to seventy. Azerbaidzhan's production remains steady today at just 7% of the USSR total.

With the republic's dominant industry stagnant, there have been numerous recriminations in recent years. In 1969, upon taking office, Aliyev, the First Secretary of the party, made a very free-wheeling attack upon the economy. "Even the oil industry was failing to meet its delivery quotas...and some factories are barely operating at one-third efficiency."² Three years later Aliyev pointed out that "the desired results in the discovery and exploitation of new oil...have not been achieved."³ Attempts to expand marine drilling, modernize the entire industry, and increase more rapidly the production of oil-industry equipment have encountered similar delays. The plethora of complaints raised by Aliyev and others includes a shortage of specialists in geology and engineering, employee turnover, the disinterest of youth, poor labor discipline, lags in drilling, poor work by builders of drilling platforms, and the failure of industrial suppliers.⁴

Today diminishing reserves, the high expenses and technological problems of off-shore drilling, and the need for more pipelines prevent expansion of the oil industry despite the generally high quality of Baku oil. The Soviet response has been diversification, especially into oil-related industries. Thus, in 1967 Azerbaidzhan manufactured

¹1913: 7.7 million tons; 1940: 22.2 million tons; 1971: 19.2 million tons. SSSR i soyuznye respubliky, 1972: 146.

²Bak. rab. (August 7), 1969.

³Bak. rab. (March 14), 1972: 2-4. Translated in JPRS (April 20), 1972: #235.

⁴See New York Times (August 12), 1969; Bak. rab. (October 20), 1970 and (March 11) 1971; and Pravda (January 2), 1973: 2ff.

46% of the USSR's oil equipment,¹ and natural gas exploitation has increased to 19 billion cubic feet per year.² Mining and ferrous metallurgy have also grown. 1971 steel output amounted to 730,500 tons, of which steel pipe production was 459,100 tons.³

Mining is concentrated in the Dashkesan district, which has the largest iron mines in the Caucasus, rich deposits of alunite, and other minerals. Other mining products include: molybdenum, lead, zinc, sulfur and precious metals. Another major export of Azerbaidzhan is cement which is now exported to thirty countries. 1971 production was 1,455,000 tons.⁴

During the 1950s and 1960s the Sumgait chemical complex mushroomed, and the 1971-1975 plan expects the industry to double.

Power production, not nearly so impressive as Georgia's, nonetheless amounted to 11, 063 million kwt-hours in 1970.⁵

Although the agricultural output has more than tripled since 1913 (the official all-union average increase is 312%), agricultural cash crops cannot substitute for the oil industry's sluggishness. Cotton leads the way and represents 40-50% of the agricultural income,⁶

¹BSE, 1970: I:258.

²SSSR i soyuznye respubliki, 1972: 146.

³Ibid.

⁴Ibid.: 146.

⁵Azerbaidzhan, 1971: 295.

⁶The 1962-1963 bumper crop of 431,000 tons exceeded the plan by 20%, but climatic conditions were very favorable. The 1966-1970 average was 328,000 tons.

but the unspoken assumption is that its future is limited in Azerbaidzhan by the following factors: (1) the limited area of the flat Kura basin, which has a suitable climate; (2) competition from long-fibered Central Asian cotton; and (3) lack of mechanization in the industry. As of 1971, "only 13% of cotton harvesting jobs are done by mechanization."¹

The value of 1972's agricultural products exceeded the 1966-1970 average by 23%,² but Aliyev, in November 1972, labeled grain cultivation, vegetable growing, viticulture, and stock-breeding as lagging. Production figures for 1971 were 608,000 tons of grain, 420,700 of vegetables, and 316,200 of wine, and 4,477,900 sheep and goats.³

Nearly all economic indicators suggest that Azerbaidzhan leads only the Moslem republics (and sometimes Moldavia) in standard of living and level of industrialization. The republic ranks last in tempo of growth and per capita trade turnover.⁴

As mentioned earlier these difficulties were acknowledged in 1969-1970 and attributed to problems of labor discipline and low technological levels. The problems continue, however. "The majority of our enterprises work erratically: in the first 10 days they produce 10-15% of ([the month's] products, but in the last 10 days more than 50%."⁵

¹Bak. rab. (March 11), 1971.

²Bak. rab. (December 29), 1972.

³SSSR i soyuznye respubliki, 1972: 151. There are 1,574,800 cattle, and only 121,000 pigs. Georgia, for example, has six times as many pigs and this hints that Moslem prohibitions are lingering on (though not so strongly as in Central Asia).

⁴See Nar. khoz. 1970: 534,579. For Azerbaidzhan, 1970 economic output was 164% of 1960. USSR average was 197.7%. Trade turnover per capita was 397 rubles in 1970. USSR average was 639 rubles.

⁵Bak. rab. (March 11), 1971: 13.

1972 production plans for leading industries--oil, steel, cement--were not fulfilled.¹

Other indicators confirm this story. In the ratio of doctors to population Azerbaidzhan ranks 10th with 25.1/10,000, but some rural areas have 4 to 5 per 10,000.² The republic ranks next to last in the ratio of savings accounts to population and 11th in the amount of savings per capita (102.4 rubles).³

In view of the decline of oil reserves, the limited amount of arable land, and the low level of technology, Azerbaidzhan will probably continue to fall behind, although the 1971-1975 five-year plan calls for a 46% increase in industrial production and a 33% rise in real income.⁴

¹Vyshka (November 26), 1972: 1-2.

²Nar. khoz. 1972: 515ff.

³Ibid.

⁴Soviet Life (September), 1972: 8.

III. History

The territory of Azerbaïdzhân, ancient Media, has suffered many invasions: Cyrus' in the sixth century B.C., Alexander's in 330 B.C., and that of the Sassanids in 226 A.D. Four and a half centuries later, powerful Moslem invaders subjugated and converted much of Azerbaïdzhân, while from the tenth to the twelfth centuries, many Turkic tribes migrated into Azerbaïdzhân, mixing with the indigenous population and thus creating a new Turkic language, Azerbaïdzhani.¹ During the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, Azerbaïdzhân escaped relatively untouched by the Mongol invasions.

The Turkish element grew steadily. By the fifteenth century, "Azerbaïdzhân was inhabited by a people of Irano-Turkish origin, speaking a mixture of the two languages."² The region's Shiite sect of Islam linked the Azerbaïdzhânis more closely with Iran, however, than with their Turkish kin.

Two centuries later Peter the Great defeated Persia, annexing the Derbent and Baku regions by the Treaty of 1724. Though Nadir Shah regained these territories for Persia a dozen years afterwards, they were lost once and for all in the early nineteenth century when Russia's drive into the Caucasus wheeled east. The 1813 Treaty of Gulistan ceded the Azerbaïdzhân Khanate to Russia, a decision confirmed by the 1826 war in which, notwithstanding the early defeats of Ermolov, the Russians conquered Yerevan, Nakhichevan, and Tabriz. Tabriz was retained by the Persians, but the 1828 Treaty of Turkmanchai confirmed the other conquests.

Throughout the nineteenth century, Russian influence in rural domestic policy was that of an outsider, allowing the mullahs sway over the masses.³

¹ Also referred to as "Azeri."

² Kazemzadeh, 1951: 5.

³ Baku and the oil fields were "in many respects treated as a semi-colonial area. Here, the government's main concern was keeping order and exploiting the oil reserves." Suny, 1972: 8.

Until the 1870s few documented economic or social changes took place in Azerbaidzhan. The country remained Islamic, agrarian, and isolated from the West.

In the late nineteenth century, the conjunction of several factors encouraged Azerbaidzhani national consciousness: the Turkish revival of national feeling; the rise of anticlericalism in the Islamic world; the Sunni-oriented Jadidism; the political and cultural weakness of Persia, Azerbaidzhan's traditional cultural mentor; and the first real presence of foreign enterprises. These developments prompted those with education and some political sophistication to compete with the mullahs and Begs for political and cultural control. Though the newly arisen oil industry employed comparatively few Azerbaidzhanis,¹ this became, with the Azerbaidzhani publishing industry in Baku, a prime breeding ground in Russia for the Moslem Left. Members of the intelligentsia drawn from landed and industrialist groups began to print literature in the Azerbaidzhani language in 1875. For the period 1875-1917, 60 of the 172 periodicals put out by Russian Moslems came from Baku.²

The revolution of 1905, the continued influx of foreigners, and especially the 1905 race riots³ embittered many Azerbaidzhanis. Hümmet, a Moslem Marxist organization founded in 1904 during the labor unrest, gained membership in this atmosphere.⁴ By 1907, however, Russian agents had destroyed it. But four years later, under the leadership of Mehmed Emin Rasulzade, the hardier Musavat Party crystallized from the right-wing remnants of Hümmet and found encouraging models in the 1908 Constitution Movement in Iran, the Young Turks, and the 1909-1911 Tabriz revolts. At first

¹ Azerbaidzhanis made up 11.1% of the office workers, 16.1% of the skilled workers and 54% of the unskilled. See Aliyarov, 1967: 35.

² Among the Russian-Moslem centers of this period, Baku was first and Kazan second in publishing journals.

³ Between the Armenians, Azerbaidzhanis, and the Russians.

⁴ Its membership was limited, however, to the urban intellectual elite.

socialist, the party soon became an Islamic/modernist party with little ideology and a program of Moslem unity, independence of Moslem states, and promotion of Moslem trade.

World War I hit Azerbaïdzhan hard, especially in those urbanized areas, like Baku, which depended on food imports.¹ By 1917 the split had further widened between Baku, with its large, active, dissatisfied, and somewhat alien proletariat sympathetic to a revolutionary ideology, and the hinterland populated by Azerbaïdzhani farmers and favorably inclined towards the Musavat.

In the October 1917 elections the Musavat drew the largest vote but withdrew soon after, allowing the Bolshevik, Shaumian, to become chairman of the Baku Soviet government. Between November 1917 and March 1918 the Musavat moved right and began, perhaps with good reason, to regard the Bolsheviks as anti-Azerbaïdzhani. A harsh winter, famine, and bread riots exacerbated these feelings, and on March 30, 1918, full-scale ethnic riots broke out.

In April 1918 the Transcaucasian republics separated themselves from the Soviets, but this unstable alliance of convenience fell apart almost immediately, and by May an independent Azerbaïdzhan existed. With the Ottoman troops advancing and the hinterland under Musavat control, the Bolsheviks, though isolated, held Baku until September when the Turkish troops entered the city.² The Turks' brief but unpopular control ended with the November 1918 Armistice and the British occupation of Baku.

From this moment on the Azerbaïdzhan national state faced problems surmountable only with Allied help. Agrarian production

¹Food prices rose 100% or more in 1917 while wages rose perhaps 60%. Kazemzadeh, 1951: 32. Another estimate says that between 1913 and 1918 real wages fell 80%. Dubner, 1931: 52.

²Soon after, the 26 Bolshevik commissars were executed after being captured in an attempt to escape from Baku. Shaumian and his compatriots remain Azerbaïdzhan's most celebrated martyrs of the revolution.

had fallen to one-fourth of the prewar level, the oil "could be pumped but not marketed," the question of land reform split the countryside along class lines, and an obvious and well-organized Bolshevik "fifth column" remained in Baku.¹

While the Azerbaidzhan delegation to Versailles got short shrift from an unsympathetic Wilson, the Azerbaidzhan government passed from one crisis to another as the Bolsheviks gained in strength both internally and externally. On April 28, 1920, Baku fell without a shot as the Azerbaidzhan government, riven by dissention between those conciliatory and those non-conciliatory to the Bolsheviks, capitulated to the Baku communists and the arrival of the 11th Red Army.

"The introduction of Soviet rule into Baku was accompanied by severe repressive measures."² Ordzhonikidze, foreshadowing his future political style, executed Prime Minister Khan Khoiskii, breaking with the lenient policy shown elsewhere to nationalist leaders in the border regions.

"Actual power in Azerbaidzhan was wielded by the Kavburo³ and by the local Communist party organs run by Ordzhonikidze and his appointees."⁴ Under his guidance the Azerbaidzhan Communist Party approved the new constitution for the Transcaucasian SFSR, and in 1922 this federation, composed of Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaidzhan, entered the USSR. In December 1936 this arrangement was liquidated and each of the republics entered separately into the USSR.

With political control a dead issue after March 1920,⁵ the Soviets

¹This is drawn from Pipes' excellent account (1964: 207). See also Kazemzadeh, 1951, and Kharmandarian, 1969, a significant Soviet contribution.

²Pipes, 1954: 228.

³The Caucasian Bureau of the Bolshevik Party.

⁴Ibid.: 229.

⁵The Allies were busy elsewhere and Russia's neighbors, Turkey and Persia, were weaker than ever. See The Diplomats, 1953: 172-209.

concentrated more of their concern on the economic and cultural transformation of the Azerbaidzhan SSR. Agricultural growth was steady, and collectivization followed the pattern of other republics, with 1929 a key year. Literacy, perhaps the key to steady technological development, rose considerably. In Baku, in 1927, 68.1% of the deputies elected to the Soviets were illiterate, but by 1959, 97% literacy had been achieved.¹

This rise in Soviet-taught literacy coincided with the decline of Islam, hitherto the dominant force in the traditional, rural life of Azerbaidzhan. Up to 1928 the Soviets fought the religion principally by co-opting the Islamic-modernists who preached a modernization of Islam and by directing the attack against the Ashara, a non-orthodox flagellation ceremony condemned by the reformists. Islam was discouraged from 1924 to 1928 with gradually increasing success.² The frontal assault began in 1928 and waxed in the early 1930s as the League of Militant Godless' membership rolls suggest--3000 in 1930, 67,000 in 1931.

As Islam withered away, parallel problems with nationalism declined. Sultan Galiyevism,³ never the strong force here that it was among the Bashkirs and Tatars, continued into the 1930s. "Former zealots of the Hummet who had turned communist, headed by Khanbudagov, splintered into a faction which demanded the expulsion of the Russian colonists and workmen settled in Moslem Transcaucasia and the replacement of 'Europeans' by Turkic nationals."⁴ A first purge swept away the followers of Khanbudagov who were strongly nationalist, a second removed most of the old Hummet members, and

¹ Nar. obraz., 1971: 22.

² See Hadjibeyli, 1959: 20ff for very lucid account.

³ See the chapter on the Tatars in the fifth volume of this series.

⁴ Bennigsen and Lemercier-Quelquejay, 1967: 157.

the third purge, directed by Bagirov in 1937-1938, swept away many of the top officials including G.M. Musabekov, former chairman of the Council of Commissars of Transcaucasia, and Gusein Rakhmanov, secretary of the Central Committee and Chairman of the Council of Ministers of Azerbaidzhan.¹

Since the war, the republic's life has been relatively tranquil with steady, slow economic growth and diversification and a steady erosion of traditional Islamic life.²

¹See Medvedev, 1971: 205,344; Conquest, 1968: 245-246 and Bak. rab. (May 27), 1956 for accounts of the purges and rehabilitation.

²See Section V, below, for more details and Part C for recent developments.

IV. Demography

In the 1960s the population of Azerbaïdzhan rose dramatically, from 3,697,700 in 1959 to 5,117,100 in 1970. Earlier censuses in 1913 and 1939 found 2,339,200 and 3,205,200 respectively.¹ The percentage increase between 1959 and 1970 was 38.4%, about 2.5 times that of the USSR as a whole. Broken down by nationalities the data show that--within the republic--Azerbaïdzhani increased by 51.4% while the Russians grew by 1.8%.²

In 1970 the urban population, which has risen steadily since the 19th century, barely overtook the rural, although the population in the countryside grew by 32.1% during 1959-1970. Continuing rural growth will create tensions "since the natives of Transcaucasia are reluctant to go farming in Kazakhstan or Siberia,"³ and it is questionable whether industry and urban enterprises will absorb these new labor reserves.

Demographic data for Azerbaïdzhan, as for the other Moslem republics, suggest that the high birth rate/low death rate situation will continue. The percentage of women aged 16-19 who are married is roughly double the USSR average,⁴ and 46.2% of the population is 15 or under.

Population density varies greatly within the republic with about one half of the urban dwellers in Baku alone.⁵ By region, the density ranges

¹The census enumerators do not seem to have undercounted women, which is always a problem in Moslem areas (F. Huddle).

²National growth rate was 25.6/1000 in 1960, while for the entire USSR it was 9.6/1000. Before 1940 the growth rate for the republic was 14.7/1000. Azerbaïdzhan, 1971: 77.

³Survey (Autumn), 1971: 22.

⁴See Itogi, 1970: II: 263,265.

⁵The proportion of Azerbaïdzhani in Baku rose from 36.8% (1959) to 46.3% (1970). 1970 percentages for other nationalities in Baku were: Russians 27.7%, Armenians 16.4%, Jews 2.4%, Tatars 2.1%. Bak. rab. (May 21), 1971.

from 60.6 per square mile in Lenkoran to 3 per square mile on the Apsheron peninsula, with higher regions being less densely populated.¹

Data on the occupational structure are fragmentary. Of course, the numbers employed who have technical training is increasing. From 1959-1968 the absolute number of workers and white collar employees almost doubled. The most complete breakdown is given for 1959: 80% were employed in the sector of material wealth.² Of these 26.3% were employed in industry, building and transport, 49.6% in agriculture.³ It is significant that women constitute 40% of the occupational force though the statistics do not necessarily imply that all jobs are equally open to both men and women.

Available data on the Communist Party of Azerbaïdzhan show a constant rise in membership, in the percentage of women members, and in the percentage of those with higher and secondary education.⁴

Some efforts appear to have been made to increase the role of the titular nationality in the Party. In 1959 the 137,533 Party members were 54% Azerbaïdzhani, 19% Armenian, and 17% Russian. The population percentages were 67.5%, 12% and 13.6% respectively. This imbalance can in part be explained by the large, well-educated Armenian and Russian minorities living in Baku.⁵ 1970 figures show

¹80% of the population lives at less than 1640 feet above sea level. The density there is 27 per square mile while overall, it is 22.8 per square mile. Azerbaïdzhan, 1971: 81.

²In Soviet sources, this phrase is apparently used to refer to the production and handling of goods as opposed to services.

³In 1967 there were 1,139,000 workers and white collar employees, 292,000 in industry, 90,000 in construction, 128,000 in transport and related industries, and 156,000 in agriculture. BSE, 1970:I:249.

⁴This and the following data are from Kompartiya Azerbaïdzhana, 1970.

⁵133,405 of 236,674 Party members lived in cities (January 1970 enumeration), and 49,625 had completed higher education. See BSE, 1970:I:249.

1 a smaller imbalance; Azerbaidzhanis constituted 66.5% of the Party, Armenians 13.4%, and Russians 12.4%.

An examination of the Party membership by occupation shows that since 1956 there has been a steady rise in the percentage of workers and a corresponding drop in the number of "employees and others." This is not surprising since the 20th Congress of the Communist Party (1956) directed the Party to induct more workers.

The Party membership is aging slightly, but there has been a rapid increase in the under-20 category.¹ In 1967 those 40 and under made up 53.7% of the Party; in 1970 they constituted 52%.

Women are badly underrepresented in the Party, especially when one considers that they are 40% of the labor force. Nonetheless, Moslem Azerbaidzhan had 48,758 female Party members (19.5%) in 1970 while the USSR had 20.9%. Female membership in the Azerbaidzhani Party has fluctuated considerably from a low of 4.1% in 1921 to a wartime peak of 30.1%.²

3. ¹Kompartiya Azerbaidzhana, 1970: 47-48. In 1965 there were 177 members 20 and under, in 1970, 1363. This increase has had little statistical impact since this category remains small compared to the Party as a whole.

²Ibid.

V. Culture

Azerbaidzhan presents two cultural worlds, one urban in which Islam and its traditional customs, art, and literature have largely died, and one rural and isolated in which women still wear black shawls and Moslem values have more than historical significance.¹ But in sum, Islam lingers on more as a source of tradition than as an actively worshipped religion.² While such Moslem customs persist as the naming of children with Allah's attributes, circumcision, religious proverbs,³ and early marriage for women, the five pillars of faith are no longer observed. Zakat [alms] is forbidden,⁴ public prayer is quite rare, Ramadan (the month of fasting) conflicts with work schedules and is effectively discouraged; and Hajj is limited to a handful of token pilgrims who are allowed to visit Mecca. Shahada, the profession of belief in Allah and his prophet Mohammad, "is made by the believer in his heart, and thus eludes the control of the authorities."⁵

Links with the Shiite cultural centers in Iran have been totally severed since 1918, and the Soviets assert that "only old people still note [the Shiite festivals of] Kurban-Bairam and Muharran."⁶ Yet,

¹ See Vyshka (July 17), 1972 and the Syracuse Herald-American (December 6), 1970: 11.

² New York Times (December 13), 1972.

³ Soviet sources frequently quote the proverb "first it is necessary to build up the inside of the mosque and then the outside" to show that Islam is hostile to cooperative enterprise.

⁴ However, begging does exist both here and in Central Asia. Personal observation of F. Huddle.

⁵ Bennigsen & Lemercier-Quelquejay, 1967: 179.

⁶ Azerbaidzhan, 1971: 89.

though the Koran is not available in bookstores, several conditions suggest that both the specific Shiite practices and general Moslem ones are still followed. The press has made numerous references to youth clinging to the outdated traditions and religious customs, and as recently as 1963 "500 Azeri Shi'is assembled in Ashkhabad for the penitential festival of Ashura."¹ Nonetheless, "formal Islam has withered under the pressure of militant atheism."² In 1970 Azerbaidzhan had only 16 mosques, with just two in Baku.

Accompanying the decline of Islam is the disappearance of many traditional customs. European "franji" fashions reached Baku in the late 19th century and now dominate the urban and more accessible rural areas. The veil [chaudar] is illegal and its replacement, the head scarf, is not universal. Non-Islamic holidays, such as Nohroz, the Persian festival of the new year, and harvest festivals are still celebrated, and the official stance seems to be to regard these as substitutes for the Moslem holidays. Traditional food is still eaten by most, and such Turkish specialities as pilau, dolma, and flat cakes are widely popular.

The role of women is a conglomerate of Soviet-encouraged employment equality and the remnants of many Moslem customs. In rural areas girls often abandon school for arranged marriages, women are usually left at home, and many "have the status of a servant while the men engage in wild drinking bouts."³

Traditional art and literature have been largely replaced by Socialist Realism and somewhat out-of-date Western artistic movements.

¹Bennigsen & Lemerrier-Quelquejay, 1967: 179.

²New York Times (December 13), 1971. Also Hadjibeyli, 1959.

³Vyshka (July 17), 1972.

Pictorial artists have to thread a narrow course and it is not always clear what is acceptable. For example, Makhmud Tagiyev's much praised "My Baku" looks like a 1906 Fauvist work with an industrial touch.¹ Some of the frequent complaints are that "the Union of Artists is still exercising poor control over artists in the applied genre,"² that there are painters (not Tagiyev) who copy the worst Western models of modern art, and that art does not combat the vestiges of the past which linger in the minds of the people.

A number of works by Azerbaidzhani composers have been performed abroad. Amirov's symphonic "mugams" are well-received, and Hadjibekov's opera "Leila and Madzhnun" is frequently performed. In sum, however, "the music of Azerbaidzhani composers is less strongly original and less professional than that of Armenian and Georgian composers."³ Today, Stalinist criticism and demands for "something I can whistle" are muted, and music, especially traditional music, has been praised in recent years.

The most impressive artistic tradition is in literature. Nizami (1141-1209) and Fizuli (1498-1558), two Azerbaidzhanis who wrote in Persian, are still deeply revered. In the 19th century the satirists Mirza Vazekh, Kasumbek Zabir, and Sayid Shirva were widely read in Turkey,⁴ as was the playwright Fath 'Ali Akhundzade (1812-1878), whose work has been translated into many languages.

¹Soviet Life (September), 1972: 12-13 has a nice reproduction.

²Bak. rab. (April 28), 1972: 2ff. Translated in JPRS Translations on USSR Political and Sociological Affairs, (May 25), 1972: #250.

³Olkhovsky, 1948: 264.

⁴The early 20th century satirical journal Molla Nasreddin was highly praised in Turkey and is remembered today.

His skillful plays are highly acceptable to the establishment today, especially, for example, such productions as "The Alchemist"¹ where the big losers are those who believe in the old ways and "The Attorneys" which depicts the venal Moslem courts. Of the 20th century writers, perhaps the most significant are the versatile poet and playwright Samed Vurgun (1906-1956), the epic novelist Mirza Ibragimov, and the playwright Dzhafar Dzhafardi.

¹This play has interesting similarities with Ben Jonson's masterpiece of the same name, although there is no clear evidence of a direct relationship. A translation by Guy le Strange is in the Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society (1886: 103-123).

VI. External Relations

The Azerbaidzhan Republic has had significant historical ties with Iran and Turkey. Since 1920 Turkey's relationship with Azerbaidzhan has been confined largely to serving as a haven for a small number of exiles.¹ During World War II "Turkish army officers, many of them born and raised in the Caucasus or Azerbaidzhan, were denied permission by the Turkish government to volunteer for the German armed forces."² In the postwar period there has been little direct contact, although Turkish Prime Minister Demirel visited Baku in 1966, "receiving a rousing welcome which amounted to a political demonstration."³ Turkish-Soviet relations have improved since 1953 and are correctly cordial now.

From 1909 to 1914 and from 1941 to 1946 Iranian Azerbaidzhan was controlled by Russia. The World War II occupation was prolonged by one year when a separatist movement supported by Soviet troops (Azerbaidzhanis for the most part) controlled the region.⁴ U.S. diplomatic pressure and the lack of grass roots support spelled failure for the separatists, despite considerable popular animosity to the Teheran government.⁵ Since 1946 all has been quiet with little contact and the "Iranian frontier has been reinforced by a complicated system of electric wires and barbed wires..."⁶

¹ Mostly former Pan-Turanists and intellectuals from Central Asia and the Caucasus. Munich also has a contingent.

² Vali, 1971: 172 and Hostler, 1957: 171-177.

³ Vali, 1971: 179.

⁴ "Soviet writers treat this as a spontaneous movement on the part of the people in which the Soviet Government played no part whatever." Historians of the Middle East, 1962: 385. See Ivanov, 1952. The best Western and Persian accounts are Avery, 1965; Lenczowski, 1949; Rostow, Middle East Journal (Winter), 1956; and Pasyan, 1948.

⁵ The government has always discouraged the Azerbaidzhani language and often has neglected the area's economic needs. Perhaps the most specific grievance is that Iranian Azerbaidzhan gets little return on the taxes that it pays to Teheran.

⁶ Medvedev, 1971: 247. Several informants have reported that the Iranian border with Central Asia is less tightly guarded and that the Turkmen wander back and forth in certain areas.

Azerbaidzhan is used by the Soviets as a showpiece in their dealings with the Middle East and Third World, and occasional delegations visit Baku.¹

Azerbaidzhan's tie with its co-religionists in the Central Asian Republics is aided by the increasing use of Russian, but the historical and economic links are not strong.

¹For a typical example see Bak. rab. (May 5), 1972. See also JPRES (June 6), 1972: #254, which describes Aliyev's reception of a delegation of the Syrian Committee of Afro-Asian solidarity. Survey (January 1968) has an article by Geoffrey Wheeler which in part analyzes the Third World/Moslem-Russian contacts.

AZERBAIDZHAN AND THE AZERBAIDZHANIS

PART B

Media

I. Language Data

Azerbaïdzhani, Osman, and Turkmen belong to the southern branch of the Altaic languages. Since the relationship of Azerbaïdzhani to Osman Turkish is about as close as Danish to Norwegian, the Turks and Azerbaïdzhanis can communicate with careful speech. Azerbaïdzhanis and Turks can read each other's prose without much difficulty other than the different alphabets (Cyrillic and Latin respectively) and twentieth-century divergences in lexical borrowings.

Among Turkish languages, Azerbaïdzhani is next to Osman and Uzbek in the number of native speakers, with roughly 4.3 million in the USSR, 100,000 in Iraq, and 4 million in Iran.¹ All dialects of Azerbaïdzhani are mutually intelligible, though the heavy Russianization of the technical vocabulary of Soviet Azerbaïdzhani would not be well understood in Iran.

Russian Azerbaïdzhanis enjoy a well-adapted Cyrillic alphabet which is much more suitable than Arabic for this vowel-harmony language.² In 1922 the USSR dropped the Arabic script for Azerbaïdzhani, and then after fifteen years of Latin script switched to Cyrillic in 1937. As far as the phonetic fit is concerned, the present alphabet is one of the most successful for a Turkic language.³ Within the USSR the Academy of the Azerbaïdzhani language has

¹The published volumes for Iran's most recent census (1966) do not include ethnic background or native language materials. Iran, in general, discourages Azerbaïdzhani. See the Iran Census of 1966. See also Cottam, 1964; Avery, 1965; and Lenczowski, 1949 on Azeris.

²Arabic script is not well equipped to indicate short vowels and rounded vowels, both plentiful in Azerbaïdzhani.

³Perhaps the principal graphemic shortcoming is that "the Azeri language has acquired a form in which it is wholly impossible to incorporate many Russian and international terms in their Russian form. Sometimes cases of overcompensation for Russian changing of h to g in foreign names occurs. Thus we get Holan Heights and Hunnar Jarring." See Nissman, RLD (Feb. 11), 1971; and Gadzhieva, 1966: 66.

handled technical language problems and "issued normative rulings to preserve the purity of the language."¹ Of course, Russian loan words (e.g., pivo [beer], poyezd [train]) are numerous, while the Arabo-Persianized form of the language, spoken in Iran and written everywhere before 1920, has faded away.

Azerbaidzhani has been gaining strength. From 1959 to 1970 the percentage of Azerbaidzhanis speaking their native language rose from 97.6% to 98.2%² and of these in 1970 only 16.6% spoke Russian as a second language.³ In recent years various measures have been taken to ensure the use of Russian. In 1970 the teaching of Russian was introduced everywhere in the republic from the first grade on, and various measures have been taken to improve language teaching⁴ and make language learning more popular.

The resilience of Azerbaidzhani is all the more surprising when one considers that "the language of commerce, politics, and advancement is Russian,"⁵ that Russian is continually promoted and that pupils who go on to secondary education often move to Russian schools. Between the 5th to 8th years and 9th to 11th years, the drop in attendance at schools in Azerbaidzhan is from 319,000 to

¹See Householder, 1965, and Manges, 1968.

²Including 98.9% of the Azerbaidzhanis living in Azerbaidzhan SSR.

³See Table B.1 for details. Note especially that only 27.2% of the Azerbaidzhanis living outside their titular republic claim Russian as a second language.

⁴Uchitelskaya gazeta (July 18), 1972, criticizes the poor language laboratory facilities and says that "at present there are only two people in the entire republic with an academic degree in the methodology of teaching Russian." See Bak. rab. (Dec. 8), 1972: 4, and (Jan. 6) 1973 for articles documenting the positive response to feedback on language education techniques.

⁵New York Times (Dec. 13), 1972. The article also notes that major public speeches are delivered in Russian.

72,000. Those who do not continue are less exposed to the Russian language, which may help to account for the persistence of Azerbaidzhani.

Table B.1.
Native and Second Languages Spoken by Azerbaidzhanis
(in thousands)

Number of Azerbaidzhanis residing:	Speaking as their Native Language					Speaking as a Second Language		
	1959		1970		Change 1959- 1970	Russian		Change 1959- 1970
	1959	1970	1959	1970		1959	1970	
in the Azerbaidzhan SSR	2,494 (100%)	3,777 (100%)	2,446 (98.05%)	3,741 (98.9%)	+0.85	20 (0.79%)	28 (.75%)	-0.04
								564 (14.9%)
in other Soviet Republic	445 (100%)	603 (100%)	424 (95.1%)	567 (94.1%)	-1.0	16 ^a (3.7%)	29 (4.8%)	+1.1
								164 (27.2%)
Total	2,940 (100%)	4,380 (100%)	2,870 (97.6%)	4,301 (98.2%)	+0.6	36 (1.2%)	57 (1.3%)	+0.1
								727 (16.6%)
								109 (2.5%)

Azerbaidzhan - Language Data - 4

Sources: Itogi 1959, Tables 53 and 54; Itogi 1970; IV:20, 263.

^a No data are available for 1959, since no questions regarding command of a second language were asked in the 1959 census.

^b Including Azerbaidzhanis, if not the native language.

II. Local Media

In 1970 the Azerbaidzhan SSR published 125 newspapers with a total circulation of 2,059,000. Ninety-three of these newspapers were in Azerbaidzhani (Azeri) though by far the most important party organ, Bakinskii rabochii, is in Russian. The average circulation of Azerbaidzhani newspapers was 1,678,000, which yields the low saturation figure of 44.9 copies per 1000 native speakers.¹ Other than Bakinskii rabochii, the most significant newspapers are Azerbaichan Kanchlari [Youth of Azerbaidzhan], which appears thrice weekly and Kommunist, which comes out six times weekly. Both are Azerbaidzhani.

The republic prints 29 magazines including 23 in Azerbaidzhani which comprise 97% of the total circulation of 950,000.² Azerbaidzhan, devoted to both local and international literature, has expanded rapidly in recent years³ and printed 66,323 copies per month in early 1973. Typical recent issues include the works of foreign writers such as Robert Burns, a selection of contemporary Third-World literature, some Russian pieces, and dozens of short compositions by Azerbaidzhanis. All the material is in Azerbaidzhani, and the tone is quite sophisticated. Considerably smaller is Literaturnyi Azerbaidzhan, the Journal of the Azerbaidzhan SSR Union of Writers, which is entirely in Russian.⁴ While there are numerous technical journals, especially ones relating to the oil industry, the most widespread science magazine is Elm ve Khayat [Science and Life], the Azerbaidzhani version of Popular Science. Kend Khayat [Country Life] is a technical journal

¹These figures are from Pechat' 1971 :96,159,188. For other data see Europa Yearbook, 1972: I: 1284, or Nar. obraz., 1971: 370.

²Much larger figures are given in other sources than Pechat', but these seem to define magazine/journal differently.

³1964 circulation was 14,3000; 1968 was 25,300; 1970, 50,000 and 1973, 66,323. In addition, the price was recently lowered from 50 to 25 kopecks. Data taken from individual issues.

⁴Circulation is only 1820 though many of the writers are Azerbaidzhanis. This suggests that only a small number of Azerbaidzhani native speakers read Azerbaidzhani and Russian literature in Russian.

devoted to advanced agricultural techniques. Other well-known journals include Azerbaichan Gadyi (Women of Azerbaidzhan), a popular illustrated; Azerbaichan Kommunisti (Communists of Azerbaidzhan), political; Kirpi (Hedgehog), a satirical fortnightly published by the Kommunist newspaper; and Pioner, the youth magazine.¹

Since, in terms of circulation, 81% of the newspapers and 97% of the magazines are in Azerbaidzhani, one might tentatively conclude that news, especially international news,² is less available to Azerbaidzhani readers than non-news subjects.

In 1971, the lagging book industry put out 430 Russian and 802 Azerbaidzhani titles, with the number of copies printed amounting to 1,971,000 and 9,889,000 respectively.³ These totals are small relative to those of other republics; Azerbaidzhan's 2.38 books printed per capita surpasses only Tadzhikistan and Belorussia. Libraries, however, are adequately stocked, with 21,164,000 books.

Electronic media enjoy relatively greater popularity, and while the number of sets per capita (14.8 radios per 100; 10.1 television sets per 100)⁴ is lower than Georgia's, the electronic media have great impact. Azerbaidzhan's high birth rate and low median age mean that adults have a higher number of radios per capita than the figures imply. Also, Azerbaidzhan does not have to cope with Georgia's diversity of languages. Sitting at home and listening to

¹All of these are in Azerbaidzhani and published monthly unless otherwise noted.

²Bakinskii rabochii has most of the international news.

³Pechat' 1971: 96. In 1963, 976 Azerbaidzhani titles were published and 8,357,000 copies were printed. SSSR v tsifrakh, 1968: 375.

⁴Nar. khoz. 1972: 585,591.

als

the radio in the evenings is a national pastime.¹ Two radio programs are broadcast from approximately 7:30 a.m. to midnight in Russian, Azerbaidzhani, and Armenian, featuring a mix of popular Azerbaidzhani melodies and classical music. In addition, the USSR has not jammed the Iranian and Turkish State Radios since 1964, and Azerbaidzhanis receive their programs well.

Since 1956 Azerbaidzhani TV viewers have had two programs. The first, televised from 9:55 a.m. to 12:00 or 1:00 p.m. and from 5:30 p.m. to midnight, is mostly in Azerbaidzhani with, occasionally, sizeable amounts in Russian.² Favored subjects are news, films, and concerts. The second program, relayed from Moscow and entirely in Russian, operates from 10 a.m. to 1:00 p.m. (sometimes through the afternoons) and from late afternoon to about 1:00 a.m. No foreign programs can be received; the nearest Turkish relay station, in Erzurum, is much too far away.

The cinema lags behind, with Azerbaidzhan ranking last among Soviet republics in movie attendance per person and last in the number of seats in movie theaters per capita.³ The 2004 stationary and mobile theaters have 215,000 places, 140,000 of these in cities and 75,000 in rural areas. In 1971 attendance was 57,000,000.⁴

¹The legacy of an illiterate past often lingers on after literacy. Oral expression is still preferred, especially among elder people, and Azerbaidzhan does not have the great literary tradition of its neighbors. Throughout the Near East, printed media are weaker than audio-visual.

²See Bak. rab. for sample schedules. With a special adapter it is now possible to listen in two languages. This could be important in promoting future bilingualism.

³Azerbaidzhanis see 11 movies per capita per year; the USSR average is 19 per year. Nar. obraz., 1971: 327.

⁴BSE, Yezhegodnik, 1972: 102.

Table B.2. Publications in the Azerbaidzhan SSR

Language of Publication	Year	Newspapers ^a			Magazines			Books & Brochures		
		No.	Per Issue Circulation (1000)	Copies/100 in Language Group	No.	Per Issue Circulation (1000)	Copies/100 in Language Group	No. of Titles	Total Volume (1000)	Books & Brochures /100 in Language Group
Russian	1959	19	213	33.0	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	283	2,243	347.7
	1971	13	339	56.5	4	18	3.0	430	1,971	328.5
Azeri	1959	87	466	18.9	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	837	7,890	320.8
	1971	91 ^b	1,781	47.7	23 ^b	921	24.7	802	9,889	264.8
Minority Languages	1959	10 ^c	41	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	9	38	N.A.
	1971	11	72	10.6	2	11	1.6	12	73	10.7
Foreign Languages	1959	0	0	0	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	(15) ^d	(115)	N.A.
	1971	0	0	0	0	0	0	(28) ^d	(283)	N.A.
All Languages	1959	116	720	19.5	18	157	4.2	1,144 ^d	10,286	278.2
	1971	115	2,192	42.8	29	950	18.6	1,269 ^d	12,216	238.7

^a 1970 figures do not include kolkhoz newspapers.^b Figure includes periodicals published in both Azerbaidzhani and Russian editions.^c This figure may include publication in non-Soviet languages.^d Book totals as given in Pechat' usually differ from totals in language categories. The indication is that books are published in other languages, but no data is given.

1970 Language groups:

Azerbaidzhani - No. of Azerbaidzhani speaking Azerbaidzhani natively - 3,736,100

Russian - Total no. speaking Russian fluently (estimate 600,000)

Source: Pechat' 1971: 160,189

Azerbaidzhan - Local Media - 4

Table B.3.

Electronic Media and Films in the Azerbaidzhan SSR

Year	Radio			Television			Movies		
	No. of stations (1000)	No. of wired sets (1000)	Sets/100 population	No. of wireless sets (1000)	Sets/100 population	Total no. of stations	of which number originations programs	No. of sets (1000)	Sets/100 population
1960	N.A.	330 ^a	8.3 ^d	482 ^a	12.1 ^c	*	*	68 ^a	1.7 ^c
1970	N.A.	450 ^a	8.6 ^d	758 ^a	14.5 ^c	8	8	493 ^a	9.4 ^c
1971	N.A.	464 ^d	8.7 ^d	786 ^d	14.8 ^c	*	2 ^e	539 ^c	10.1 ^c
								126 ^b	3.1 ^d
								215 ^b	4.1 ^d
								N.A.	N.A.

^aSource: Transport i svyaz' SSR, 1972: 296-298.^bSource: Nar. obraz., 1971, p. 325.^cSource: Nar. khoz., 1972: 572, 578.^dComputed from data cited above (b and c).^eTelevdeniye i radioveshchaniye, No. 12, 1972: 13.

*Data not available. Two TV stations originating programming existed in Azerbaidzhan in 1972.

III. Educational Institutions

Since 1959 the republic has had obligatory eight-year education, and in 1966 educational policy makers felt confident enough to shift the emphasis to universal secondary education.

Still, in 1972, 23% of those enrolled in the eight-year schools left without completing their studies, and some 60% of the girls in the Akhsuiansk Dzhaililabadsk, Kelbadzharsk, Lachinsk, and Leriksk districts received no secondary education at all.¹ A sharp drop in enrollment still occurs between the 5th and 8th year and between the 9th and 11th year, with only 21.6% of the rural students continuing.² These difficulties notwithstanding, the 1970 literacy rate in the republic was 99.8 for men and 99.5 for women.

In 1970-1971 the school facilities were used by some 1,503,000 students, with 71,000 in 79 special secondary establishments and 100,000 in higher institutions (see Table B.4.).³ Recent breakdowns by nationality or language are not available,⁴ but figures for women show that they constitute 33% of Azerbaidzhani students and 37% of the republic's students.⁵

¹Bak. rab. (Nov. 5), 1972.

²Nar. obraz., 1971: 82-83.

³Nar. khoz. 1972: 592. See also Bak. rab. (Nov. 5) 1972, for a later estimate. The figures given in Nar. obraz., 1971: 38 are somewhat lower, but those on p. 27 are more inclusive and higher.

⁴See Nar. obraz., 1971: 196 for the total number of Azerbaidzhanis in higher education and special secondary schools (listed by nationality but not by republic).

⁵In 1960 the figures were 28% and 34% respectively. In the Azerbaidzhan SSR, Russian women were 51% of the Russian school population. For the Armenian community in Azerbaidzhan the figure is 49%. Nar. obraz., 1971: 200. See also New York Times (Dec. 13), 1971; Bak. rab. (March 14); 1972 and Aliiev's speech of March 1971.

Though there are complaints about teacher shortages and unfulfilled construction plans,¹ the number of students in higher institutions has increased rapidly, from 36,000 in 1960 to 100,000 in 1970.

In 1971 Kirov University, the Azerbaidzhan state university, had 11,530 students at its 12 faculties.² Besides an observatory and thirty laboratories, the university has a library of 1,500,000 books and since 1955 has published Uchenye Zapiski [Scholarly Notes] in many subjects. Its faculty has included such eminent scholars as the philologist Ya. Marr, the Orientalist V.V. Barthold, and the chemist Mamedaliev.

Among the other more respected higher institutions in the republic are the Azizbekov Institute of Oil and Chemistry, which has students from the oil-producing regions of Russia as well as from the Middle East; the Akhundov Institute of Languages; the Lenin Pedagogical Institute, the Hadjibekov Conservatory, and the N. Narimanov Medical Institute. About 1000 foreign students study at Azerbaidzhan's higher institutions.

¹There also have been charges of nepotism, indifference, poor language training, and widespread cheating on entrance exams.

²It had about 600 graduate students. For a full breakdown consult Nar. obraz., 1971: 164. See Also Table B.4.

Table B.4.

Selected Data on Education in the Azerbaïdzhan SSR (1971)

		<u>Per 1000 Population</u>	
(p.592)	<u>All Schools</u>		
	-number of schools	- 4,775	
	-number of students	- 1,503,000	28.2
(p.590)	<u>Newly Opened Elementary, Incomplete Secondary, and Secondary Schools</u>		
	-number of schools	- 106	
	-number of student places	- 35,300	6.6
(p.592)	<u>Secondary Special Schools</u>		
	-number of schools	- 78	
	-number of students	- 70,600	13.2
(p.592)	<u>Institutions of Higher Education</u>		
	-number of institutions	- 13	
	-number of students	- 100,000	18.8
(p.438)	<u>Universities</u>		
	-number of universities	- 1	
	-number of students		<u>% of Total</u>
	Total	- 11,530	
	day students	- 4,835	41.9%
	evening students	- 2,930	25.4%
	correspondence students	- 3,765	32.66%
	-newly admitted		
	Total	- 2,316	
	day students	- 1,062	45.8%
	evening students	- 553	23.8%
	correspondence students	- 701	30.2%

Selected Data on Education in the Azerbaidzhan SSR (1971) (continued)

<u>Universities (continued)</u>		<u>Per 1000</u>	<u>% of</u>
		<u>Population</u>	<u>Total</u>
-graduated			
Total	-	1,878	
day students	-	911	48.5
evening students	-	456	24.2
correspondence students	-	511	27.2
(p.108) <u>Graduate Students</u>			
-total number of	-	1,885	.4
-in scientific research institutions	-	1,235	
-in universities	-	650	
(p.581) <u>Number of Persons with (in 1970) Higher or Secondary (Complete and Incomplete) Education</u>			
-per 1000 individuals, 10 years or older	-	471	
-per 1000 individuals employed in national economy	-	674	
(p.589) <u>Number of Workers Graduated from Professional-Technical Schools</u>			
	-	32,300	6

Source: Nar. khoz. 1972; specific page references are given above.

rued)

% of
Total

48.5%
24.2%
27.2%

IV. Cultural and Scientific Institutions

The Azerbaidzhan Academy of Science, founded in 1945, now embraces 31 affiliated institutions with 3691 workers.¹ Its publications include Izvestia (in Russian and Azerbaidzhani), Doklady and Azerbaidzhanskii khimicheskii zhurnal.

Overall, Azerbaidzhan now has more than 130 scientific-research institutions manned by 16,600 scientific workers.² Primary concerns are geologic mapping and physical geography, such petrochemical problems as oil composition analysis and extraction techniques, synthetic rubber technology, and semiconductor work in physics. Perhaps the best known and most respected institution is the Institut Nefti i Khimii [Oil and Chemistry Institute] in Baku,³ which has a library of 100,000 books, seven facilities, and a branch in Sumgait.

Still, Azerbaidzhan's scientific establishment lags behind that of neighboring Georgia which has 25% more doctors of science and scientific workers.⁴ First Secretary Aliyev criticized the scientific establishment in March 1971, calling for the "elimination of the obscurity characteristic of their plans" and citing "shortcomings in the training of scientific cadres."

Azerbaidzhan's cultural facilities—38 museums, 12 theaters, and 2004 public libraries—are concentrated in Baku. This is hardly surprising since Baku is the home of at least nine higher educational facilities, most of the republic's intelligentsia, and half of its urban population.

¹Its most recent creation, in 1971, was a Social Science Center.

²Azerbaidzhan, 1971: 94.

³American experts, however, have been critical of Baku's applied technology. See Ebel, 1961: 31, 54ff.

⁴Nar. obraz., 1971: 245. For a 1963 breakdown of scientific workers and doctors by nationality, see Nadzhafov, 1970: 173.

Azerbaijan - Cultural and Scientific Institutions - 2
Table B.5.

Selected Data on Scientific and Cultural Facilities and Personnel In The
Azerbaijan SSR (1971)

Population: 5,326,000

Academy of Science

-number of members	93
-number of scientific institutions affiliated with the Academy	31
-total number of scientific workers in these	3,691

Museums

-number of museums	38
-attendance	1,053,000
-attendance per 1000 population	197.7

Theaters

-number of theaters	12
-attendance	1,367,000
-attendance per 1000 population	256.7

Number of persons working
in education and culture

-total	163,000
-no. per 1000 population	30.6

Number of persons working in
science and scientific services

-total	39,000
-number per 1000 population	7

Number of public libraries

-number of books and magazines in public libraries	3,015 23,590,000
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Number of clubs

2,214

Source: Nar. khoz. 1972: 106, 451, 589.

AZERRAIDZHAN AND THE AZERBAIDZHANIS

PART C

National Attitudes

I. Review of Factors Forming National Attitudes

Perhaps the most important factor in the formation of Azerbaiddzhani national attitudes is the fact that Azerbaiddzhan was traditionally Moslem and was tied to the Near East, especially Persia, until the twentieth century. Azerbaiddzhani national identity was dependent on a Persian cultural tradition and a Persian (Shiite) sect of Islam. Even the traditional pilgrimages were more often made to Iran (to Ardabile or Meshad) than to Mecca. Literate Azerbaiddzhanis read and wrote in Persian until late in the nineteenth century and foreign travelers continually referred to the Azerbaiddzhanis as Persians (or occasionally Tatars).¹

From 1875 to 1920 Turkish influence grew, but it was cut off before it was able to establish deep roots. Russia, not previously linked to Azerbaiddzhan, has been the most powerful source of influence ever since. The result is that Azerbaiddzhan has a truncated Near Eastern history with a Russian/Soviet capstone. Party-oriented intellectuals are very aware of this unstable combination and compensate by overemphasizing the cultural tradition of the past 100 years and by treating the earlier national history as independent of Iran. Turkishness is stressed, but an independent Azerbaiddzhani Turkishness, distinct from that of Turkey or Central Asia. In fact, however, the Azerbaiddzhanis, in sharp contrast to the Georgians and Armenians, do not have a single national, historical and cultural tradition that is clearly their own.

¹Kazemzadeh, 1951: 329.

In the early twentieth century, Islam was still the dominant political and social force outside of Baku; for the previous ten centuries it had an overwhelming influence on all Azerbaidzhanis. Today, it lingers in many lesser forms--the limited role of women, the positive attitude toward individual enterprise, early marriage of women, preference for sons, resistance to change, low inter-marriage with Christians, choice of names, and many other customs.

As Islam disappears, Azerbaidzhan's external orientation may be more and more toward Turkey, her linguistic and ethnic relative. The Azerbaidzhanis of Iran are firmly separate and the Iranian government has as little interest as the Soviets in the formation of a national Azerbaidzhani state. Educated Azerbaidzhanis are once again adrift, cut off politically from the Iranian Azerbaidzhanis, separated from Turkey by a different history and religious denomination, and not yet prepared to be a totally cooperative part of the USSR.¹

Economics has changed the national attitude significantly. Azerbaidzhanis now have a true urban proletariat, a large number of workers with specialized training, and an industrialized, diversified economy. Half of the country is urbanized; its capital city Baku constitutes one-quarter of the republic's population. Women are a significant factor in the labor force, and at least some education is universal. The steady rise of real income and a moderate increase of consumer goods have kept abreast of rising expectation. This economic progress has probably defused nationalism to some degree. Language has also affected attitudes. The use of the Cyrillic alphabet, the importation of Russian vocabulary, and the mandatory use of Russian in certain situations have slowly directed Azerbaidzhan toward a bilingualism and have encouraged the Azerbaidzhanis to identify modernization with Russian culture and values. In view of the weak literary/historical tradition it was not unreasonable to expect that the

¹Personal observation.

Azerbaidzhani language would lose strength; yet, startlingly, it gained between 1959 and 1970.¹

Demographic influences will also be increasingly important in the future. If the rapid rural growth continues, the squeeze will raise tensions and underemployment problems and force large-scale migrations to the city.

¹See Section B-1.

II. Basic Views of Scholars on National Attitudes

Unlike their "cunning" Armenian and "flamboyant" Georgian neighbors, Azerbaidzhan's have been little stereotyped or even described by travelers and scholars. Rather, a diffuse, generalized picture emerges of a stolid Turk with a patina of Russian/Soviet values rather than Ataturk's. Writers like W. E. D. Allen who have much to say about the Georgians, talk of Baku and the hinterland without commenting on the people.¹ Perhaps this testifies indirectly to the Azerbaidzhanis' lack of a dynamic national tradition in the eyes of Western observers.

Soviet publications and modern Western journalists provide us with a sketchy picture of the Azerbaidzhanis. They appear a taciturn people, with strong family ties who react neither negatively nor positively to change.

Like other Transcaucasians, Azerbaidzhanis have been accused of evading the financial ukases (decrees) of the state. In recent years there have been numerous citations of bribery² (to get jobs and university admission), violation of price listings, and the "absence of order in the farmers' markets where marketeers and speculators operate freely."³

A taxi driver interviewed by the New York Times boasted that "as a taxi driver he collects a minimum of 20 rubles to meet the State quota for a State owned taxi, and pockets the rest." A bribe or a friend was

¹ Allen and Muratoff, 1953. See also Marvin, 1888.

² See New York Times (August 12), 1969 and (December 13) 1971. Also Bak. rab. (November 5) and (February 11), 1972, and (August 7) 1969 for examples.

³ Bak. rab. (August 7), 1969.

needed to get the job. Bribery for better medical service is also documented.¹ Nonetheless, taken all in all, Azerbaidzhani wheeling and dealing cannot match that of the Georgians."²

Especially in the countryside traditionalism persists, for example, in the continuance of private enterprise, limited roles and early marriages for women, reluctance to migrate, and passive resistance to state employment.³ Above all, the customs of Islam color rural activities, and even the urban Azerbaidzhanis who are firm atheists still often discuss the effects of Islam on their society.

R.N. Frye observes that Azerbaidzhanis enjoy listening to Istanbul Turkish and being reminded of their Turkishness.⁴ Numerous foreign observers have also noted the Azerbaidzhani (male) penchant for backgammon, coffee houses, and the radio--all suggestive of Turkey or of Iranian Azerbaidzhan.⁵

Such fragmentary evidence does suggest that many Azerbaidzhanis might prefer a regional autonomy that would permit more individual enterprise, certain Islamic customs, and a degree of Turkish fraternity.

¹New York Times (December 8), 1971.

²See the chapter on Georgia in this volume.

³Pravda (June 26), 1972 had a particularly illustrative article on this passive resistance. See JPRS (August 22), 1972: 276:14-17.

⁴Personal interview, May 12, 1973. Frye is Aga Khan Professor of Persian Studies at Harvard University.

⁵Numerous personal interviews.

III. Recent Manifestations of Nationalism

In recent years no outbreaks of Azerbaidzhani nationalism have been documented by Western sources, Russian official media, or samizdat. Nationalist feelings have expressed themselves only in the continuing passive resistance to religious and social change on the Soviet mode. The evidence suggests that the Azerbaidzhanis' historical and cultural legacy is mildly conducive to future nationalistic activity. This heritage is most visible in the Azerbaidzhanis' negative attitude toward cooperative enterprise, full equality for women, atheism, and the multi-national state. Some nationalistic trends in the next decade are likely, but not inevitable.

To the extent that Azerbaidzhani nationalism may be an active force, the question arises why it has not surfaced. The Azerbaidzhanis live in a heavily controlled border area, cut off from their Iranian and Turkish compatriots and distant from the rest of the USSR. One break in this isolation was the 1966 visit of Turkish Prime Minister Demirel, who received something like a popular ovation; there is a strong sense of Turkishness; the citizenry, particularly the rural folk, label themselves as "Turkis" and respond well to foreigners who speak Osman Turkish.

An indirect reflection of nationalism appeared when Aliyev, the first secretary of the Communist Party and former chief of the Security Police, found it necessary to remove more than 50 senior government/party officials upon taking office and has sharply criticized the republic's lack of educational, economic, and cultural progress.

A case can be made for the view that Azerbaidzhani nationalism is historically weak and likely to dwindle or even disappear in an era of stability, economic progress, and skillfully controlled education. The following points support this view:

- (1) Azerbaidzhani were passive during the long religious crises of the early 1950s while a Moslem people like the Kirgiz vigorously defended their national tradition.¹
- (2) The Shamil question never meant much in Azerbaidzhan.²
- (3) The refugee movements that existed in the 1950s had little influence.

Azerbaychan, the monthly review which served as the organ of the Azerbaidzhan National Association, faded away after its manager, Fatalibeili, was murdered in 1954. The noted writer Mehmet Rasulzade, who broadcast for the VOA, died in 1955 and could not be replaced with a man of similar stature. And United Caucasus, organ of the Committee for Caucasian Independence, was defunct by the early 1960s.

Discouraging nationalism may be the fact that there is no outside "model" for the Azerbaidzhani since Iranian Azerbaidzhan is firmly controlled by Teheran. Soviet Azerbaidzhani are dimly aware that their brethren in Iran have not prospered economically. In addition, there is little contact between Azerbaidzhan exiles in Turkey, Western Europe, and the U.S. and their relatives and friends in the USSR.

Azerbaidzhan has not historically been unified. Its culture and religion were imported from Iran; its language and ethnic background are Turkish. 20th century influences on Azerbaidzhan have been overwhelmingly Russian. 20th century Azerbaidzhan might

¹See Bennigsen and Lemercier-Quelquejay, 1967: 215, 216.

²For a full account of the Shamil question consult Tillett, 1969. The author does not, however, try to evaluate the impact that the controversy had on Daghestan and Azerbaidzhan. Also see Laqueur, 1958: 415-444.

have joined the Third World's nationalistic movements, but it has been cut off from the sources of its cultural and national feeling, passively pressured to conform to an anti-Islamic anti-Near Eastern model, economically transformed and improved, and skillfully guided.

Nationalism, if it exists, is expressed through a distinctive lifestyle and national pride rather than by political agitation.¹

¹See Section I, above, on the formation of national attitudes.

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