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
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
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The Slavs Introduction Russia The Ukraine Belorussia

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
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ATTITUDES OF MAJOR SOVIET NATIONALITIES

Volume I

THE SLAVS

INTRODUCTION

RUSSIA

THE UKRAINE

BELORUSSIA

Contract No. IA-16666

Center for International Studies
Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Cambridge, Massachusetts

June 1973

This volume includes the following chapters:

INTRODUCTION: THE NATIONALITY PROBLEM - Richard Pipes
RUSSIA AND THE RUSSIANS - Dina Spechler
THE UKRAINE AND THE UKRAINIANS - Roman Szporluk
BELORUSSIA AND THE BELORUSSIANS - Jan Zaprudnik

The chapters are based on papers contributed by the above-named specialists. However, the chapters as presented here have been edited by the project staff and some of the data, tables, and other materials have been added. Responsibility for the final versions therefore rests with the project.

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PREFACE

This volume is a part of the five-volume study, "Attitudes of Major Soviet Nationalities," produced at the Center for International Studies, MIT. The study deals with seventeen Soviet nationalities--the fifteen which have their own Union Republics, plus the Tatars and the Jews. Each nationality is the subject of one chapter. The nationalities are grouped by geographical and/or cultural affinity in four of the volumes: The Slavs, The Baltics, The Transcaucasus, and Central Asia. The fifth volume, Other Nationalities, includes chapters on the Moldavians, the Tatars, and the Jews, as well as a set of comparative tables for all nationalities.

As the first of the series, this volume on the Slavs includes the Introduction to the series, by Prof. Richard Pipes, which sets the nationality problem in the USSR in perspective and discusses some of the crucial issues related to this problem. The volume also includes the chapters on the Russians, Ukrainians, and Belorussians. Each chapter deals both with the nationality as an ethnic group and with the republic as a political-territorial unit.

The Ukrainian and Belorussian chapters are full-length presentations covering all topics listed in the chapter outline on page vi. The Russian chapter departs from this format, concentrating on the relationship of the Russians, as the dominant Soviet nationality, with the many minority nationalities in the USSR. The three nationalities covered in this volume belong to the East-Slav group. There is much affinity among them in language, religion, history, and way of life. They are often regarded by outsiders as one. Yet, there are major differences and cleavages among them, especially between the Ukrainians

and the Russians. Recently, this has been manifested by such phenomena as the struggle of the Ukrainians for their national language and the harsh suppression of the national movement in the Ukraine. (See relevant sections of the chapter.)

Except for the Russian chapter, as noted above, the chapters are written to a uniform outline. The note on references on page vii applies to all three chapters.

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Acknowledgements are gratefully expressed to the specialists who have written chapters on each nationality and to all at the Center for International Studies, MIT, who have contributed to the completion of this study.

CHAPTER OUTLINE FOR LACE NATIONALITY

Part A. General Information

- I. Territory
- II. Economy
- III. History
- IV. Demography
- V. Culture
- VI. External Relations

Part B. Media

- I. Language Data
- II. Local Media
- III. Educational Institutions
- IV. Cultural and Scientific Institutions

Part C. National Attitudes

- I. Review of Factors Forming National Attitudes
- II. Basic Views of Scholars on National Attitudes
- III. Recent Manifestations of Nationalism

NOTES ON REFERENCES

Where several quotations are taken from a single source, reference is provided at the end of the last quotation. Similarly, where information in a paragraph is from one source, the source is cited at the end of the paragraph.

Sources used more than once in a chapter are cited in abbreviated form in the footnotes. Full citations are given in the list of references at the end of each chapter. Sources containing only one page are cited without page numbers.

Except where noted, emphasis in quotations has been added.

INTRODUCTION:
THE NATIONALITY PROBLEM

by
Richard Pipes

A basic difficulty in the study of the ethnic problems of the Soviet Union derives from the peculiar circumstances under which the Soviet Union and its predecessor, Tsarist Russia, became multi-national states. The classic empires of the West came into existence after the construction of national states had been completed. As a rule, the building of empires represented a spilling over of those surplus energies and resources of a national state that could no longer be accommodated within its own borders. Because of the peculiar geographic location of Europe as an appendage of the Eurasian continent, European imperial expansion directed itself across the seas and into other continents; hence there was never any doubt about the spatial separation between colony and metropolis. In sum, Western empire-building, i.e., the acquisition of masses of other ethnic groups, was always chronologically and territorially distinct from the process involved in the building of the national state. The West European model, of course, is not of universal validity: the first great empire in world history, the Persian, was put together not by conquest of overseas territories but by expansion along land frontiers. The importance of the West European model, however, lies in the fact that until recently it has served as the raw material for the construction of theories of nationalism and of ethnic conflict, and that this model still dominated in the thinking of Russian leaders.

The expansion of Russia had a very different character from that known in Western experience. Because it is a continental power lacking in natural frontiers and easy access to the seas, Russia has traditionally expanded along its territorial frontiers. Historically, the process of nation-building, which began in the 15th and 16th centuries, led immediately to the conquest and absorption of other ethnic groups, beginning with various Finnic and Turkic

nationalities and eventually including groups representing many Asian and some European populations. The chronological and geographic contiguity, as it were, of the processes leading to the building of both the nation-state and the empire has had the effect of blurring the two phenomena and has tended to make Russians remarkably insensitive to ethnic problems. Characteristically, even liberal and social democratic groups in pre-Revolutionary Russia were inclined to ignore ethnic problems and to treat the demands of the nationalities for a greater role in self-government as reactionary and inspired by Russia's enemies.

The basic tendency of all Russian leaders, past and present, in dealing with ethnic problems has been to follow (unconsciously, of course) what may be called the French type of colonialism. In contrast to the British model, the French one has striven to extend to the ethnic (i.e., colonial) minorities the full rights and privileges of Frenchmen, hoping by this device, over the long run, to assimilate them. Muscovite and Imperial Russia did this by opening the ranks of the privileged elite -- the dворянство -- to the land-owning and educated elements of conquered nationalities.¹ The Soviet regime followed suit by allowing the minority elites access to the Communist Party apparatus and all the benefits and privileges which membership in it entails. However, this time-tested policy, which enabled Tsarist Russia in large measure to siphon off potential national resistance, no longer works quite as well. The problem is that whereas until the 20th century primary allegiance in Eastern Europe tended to be directed towards one's social estate, more recently, as a result of the breakdown of the estate structure and the spread of egalitarianism, society's primary allegiance has shifted towards the nation. Thus, the Tatar prince or Georgian landowner who in Tsarist Russia may have felt greater affinity for his Russian equivalent than for the peasant of his own culture no longer exists; his democratized descendant has no choice but to identify with the Tatar or Georgian nation -- its traditions, needs, and aspirations. Here we have a clear example

¹The Tsarist policy was most successful in regard to the nations whose nobility did not enjoy the same privileges as did the Russian equivalent. It was a complete failure when applied to the extremely privileged and proud nobility of the Western provinces of the empire, e.g., Poland and the Baltic areas.

of how democratization leads to the increase of national sensitivities and brings with it a rise in ethnic tensions -- a fact unforeseen by 19th century liberal theorists.

It is customary to think of the Soviet Union as a veritable ethnic museum inhabited by over one hundred exotic national groups. Now, while it is indeed true that the USSR has a very large number of ethnic groups within its borders, a very large majority of these are so small as to be of interest primarily to the anthropologist, linguist, and demographer. Furthermore, it must be borne in mind that the Soviet government in pursuing the traditional divide et impera policy deliberately exaggerates ethnic differences among its minorities. From the political point of view the student of the ethnic problem in the USSR confronts only a dozen or so groups, namely, (1) the Ukrainians and belorussians who, as Slavs professing the Orthodox faith, are closely related to the Great Russians; (2) Moslems, nearly all of them Sunni by religion and Turkic by racial and linguistic background; (3) the two major Caucasian groups -- Georgians and Armenians -- who are close to the Moslems in culture and economy but separated from them by their Christian religion; (4) the Jews; (5) the three Baltic nationalities; and (6) a number of West European and East Asian groups, among whom the Germans are perhaps the most important. According to the 1970 census, the groups enumerated above under rubrics 1-5 represent about 85 percent of all the non-Russians inhabiting the Soviet Union. The problem, thus, is less complicated than Soviet policy would like to make it appear.

Clearly, the sense of national cohesion and of common destiny differs from nationality to nationality. There are many ways of testing the intensity of nationalism, but the most reliable of these are probably criteria based on the objective evidence provided by the censuses. These are: the level of education, especially higher and specialized education; linguistic attachment, as measured by the proportion of people who regard their national language as their mother

tongue; territorial concentration i.e., the percentage of a given nationality residing in that nationality's republic; and intermarriage (for which statistical data unfortunately are exceedingly scarce). Of itself, none of these factors can tell us how viable a given nationality is.¹ The papers which follow provide very good clues which help the attentive observer to gauge, as it were, the temperature of the national sentiment of the various national groups. Using these clues, it is quite clear, for example, that the nationalism of Georgians is much stronger than that of the Belorussians -- a fact which can be demonstrated by non-statistical evidence as well.

If we follow demographic statistics from 1897 to 1970, we discover an interesting phenomenon bearing on the number of ethnic groups and on the intensity of their nationalisms. Census statistics indicate that over the seven decades separating the first Russian census from the most recent one the number of nationalities has tended to diminish as the smaller ethnic groups lose out to those major ones which are culturally and territorially closest to them. Thus, for example, the Bashkirs have been steadily yielding to the Tatars, the Abkhazians to the Georgians, the Kara-kalpaks to the Kazakhs, and so on. The result has been that the nationalities structure of the Soviet Union is becoming streamlined, the minor Soviet nationalities growing leaner and the major ones fatter. In political terms this has meant that the Great Russian majority is confronting an increasingly difficult situation; it has to deal with fewer ethnic groups, but they are stronger. These facts should be borne in mind by anyone who assumes that all de-nationalization of ethnic minorities automatically means Russification. In some respects, the contrary proposition is closer to the truth: de-nationalization of minor ethnic groups reduces the likelihood of Russification.²

Why does national sentiment among the Soviet nationalities survive? Why

¹The Jews for example score very low on all the above criteria except the first which, in their case, happens to be of decisive importance. See Table 19 of the Comparative Tables in Volume V of this series, which indicates that proportionally there are almost twice as many Jews attending higher educational institutions as there are of the second group, the Georgians.

²Ukrainians, Belorussians, Jews, and the West European groups, when they break off from their own ethnic groups, do tend to Russify. It is probably true to say that the majority of Russified minorities come from these groups.

do the Soviet authorities have to stress continuously the desirability of the ethnic minorities "drawing together" [sblizheniye]? To this question there are many answers, the most obvious of which is that under conditions prevailing in the USSR where one nationality comprises more than half of the population and controls, to boot, the state and its economy, "drawing together" means nothing else but Russification. The language of a single "Soviet nationality" would have to be Russian and so would be its historic traditions and in time its customs. But this negative consideration which obviously must dissuade any but the most career-minded or obtuse non-Russian from following his government's directives is only part of the answer. National sentiment is more than a "thing in itself" which either exists or is gotten rid of. Historical experiences indicate that it represents a sum total of most diverse social and cultural forces, many of which have nothing whatever to do with ethnicity. One of the reasons nationalism has proven to possess such extraordinary tenacity, why it has refused to dissolve in the acid bath of modernity, as 19th century liberals and socialists had expected it to do, it is that it constitutes more a result than a cause. One way to illustrate what we have in mind is to cite the complaint voiced recently by a West German official about the unforeseen difficulties which this country is experiencing with its hordes of foreign Gastarbeiter: "We asked for workers and got human beings."

Perhaps the most important single element which keeps ethnic feelings alive in multi-national states is competition for resources and services. This is true in every multi-national society, but it is a particularly potent factor in the USSR where the government enjoys a monopoly of national wealth and doles products and services out to society no more than it needs to. If we consider the nationality problem in the Soviet Union from this point of view we can perceive immediately why phenomena which in themselves are ethnically neutral can nevertheless produce ethnic tension and conflict.

One of the basic facts of Russian history over the past thousand years has been colonization. V. O. Kliuchevsky once said that "the history of Russia is

the history of a country which colonizes itself," and the statement is as correct today as it was when he made it nearly a century ago. Russians are a people forever on the move. They move because the land on which they live is on the whole ill-adapted to agriculture and yields them little beyond bare subsistence and sometimes not even that. They migrate in search of virgin soil and easier conditions of life. The movement outward from the central forest zone -- the homeland of the Great Russian people -- which began to assume intensive forms in the mid-16th century shows no signs of abating. The 1970 census indicates the continued outflow of Great Russians to the borderlands. It is a centrifugal movement of an elemental force.

In their migrations the Russians encroach upon territories inhabited by non-Russians and thus inevitably enter into direct competition with them over jobs, housing, schooling, and commodities. It is a curious fact that while the proportion of Great Russians in the population of the USSR as a whole tends steadily to diminish, the proportion of Russians residing in many of the border republics tends to go up. Between 1959 and 1970 the proportion of Great Russians living in the RFSFR has declined by 2.3 percentage points -- the highest decline of any of the major nationalities -- a figure indicative of the unique intensity of Russian migration. The friction resulting from a migration of such persistence would be serious under any circumstances. What aggravates it is the fact that in the past several decades the borderland populations (especially on the eastern periphery) have been growing more rapidly than the Russian. This means that the pressure on resources and services created by the influx of Russians is intensified by a very high rate of local population growth. The recent decision to create large economic planning regions, in some cases encompassing more than one republic, was probably motivated by the desire to attenuate these conflicts. It marks an important step toward the administrative amalgamation of the national republics

¹Kurs russkoi istorii (Moscow, 1937): I: 20.

into a unified state structure.

There was a time when, basing their position on what turned out to be an unrealistically idealized view of the American "melting pot," many scholars believed that the nationality problem in the Soviet Union was on its way to "solution." Today this view is not held by any serious Western scholar. The persistence of strong national sentiments is generally recognized, and disputes among specialists no longer concern the fact of minority nationalism, but its character and orientation. Our own view of the matter can be stated succinctly in a series of propositions as follows:

1. The nationality question in the Soviet Union has attained a decisive state of development. The Great Russian population can no longer expand outwardly into the borderland areas without running into stiff resistance. Where in the past Russians have confronted isolated and scattered ethnic groups, they now confront solid national entities with all the trappings of national self-government. Demographically speaking, the Russians are declining vis-a-vis the ethnic minorities. It is probable that in the future the Russian population will not be able to penetrate in any significant numbers outside the confines of the RFSFR and Kazakhstan. Russian colonists elsewhere will be increasingly regarded as outsiders. In short, we may well be witnessing a permanent crystallization of ethnic frontiers separating Russians from the minorities.

2. The coming conflicts involving the nationalities and the Great Russians are likely to center over control of jobs, housing, schooling, and commodities. In order to overcome minority resistance, the Soviet government is likely to have recourse to basic administrative measures which will aim at lowering the barriers separating the republics. In other words, we may see a slow and cautious dismantling of the pseudo-federal structure created in 1922-1924. The recently announced regional economic plans may represent a step in this direction.

3. There can be very little doubt that such measures, should they be

initiated, will produce the staunchest kind of resistance from the minorities. There exists at the present time a modus vivendi between the Russians and their subject peoples which any major moves of the kind described above can easily upset. The minority intelligentsia is well aware of the so-called "anti-imperialist struggle" in other parts of the world and it is not likely to suffer passively measures intended to Russify it.

4. On the Great Russians themselves, the situation is likely to produce an increased sense of frustration and to intensify chauvanism and xenophobia. The identification of the Soviet regime with the Russian people and Russian history, initiated by Stalin, has lately recurred with increasing frequency. One of the most important by-products of the nationality problem, therefore, is likely to be the growth of national sentiments not only among the minorities but also, and above all, among the Great Russians themselves.

Project: Attitudes of Major Soviet Nationalities

RUSSIA AND THE RUSSIANS

prepared by

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This chapter is based on a paper contributed by the above-named specialist. However, the chapter as presented here has been edited by the project staff, and some of the data, tables, and other materials have been added. Responsibility for the final version therefore rests with the project.

Center for International Studies
Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Cambridge, Massachusetts

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Introduction

The focus of the present study is primarily on the non-Russian or "minority" nationalities of the USSR. The history and culture of the dominant Russian nationality and the economic and historical development of the RSFSR are covered in many competent and easily available studies, and a comprehensive treatment of these subjects is beyond the scope of this survey.

The following discussion is therefore limited to factors particularly relevant to the position of the Russians and of the RSFSR in relation to the other Soviet nationalities. The Comparative Tables in the fifth volume of this series provide comparative data on all the nationalities studied, and further comments on the position of the Russians appear in the chapters on the other individual nationalities. A reader interested in a more detailed treatment of some of the topics related to the Russians may want to consult the studies listed in the references and supplementary bibliography at the end of this chapter.

1. Demographic Patterns and Trends

The Russians are the largest national group in the USSR. According to the latest census, taken in 1970, they comprise slightly more than half (53.37%) of the total population. However, their weight in the population has been declining in recent years, since their rate of natural increase is one of the lowest of all the national groups. Among the major nationalities, only Latvians, Estonians, and Jews increased by a smaller percentage than the Russians in the period between the last two censuses (1959-1970). (See Table 2 in the Comparative Tables, Volume V.)

The republic in which most Russians live, the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic (RSFSR), is the largest of the union republics. It extends from the Baltic to the Pacific and covers 6.5 million square miles, or 76% of the total area of the USSR, and includes 53.8% of the USSR's population.¹

Although the vast majority--83.5%--of all Russians live in the RSFSR, their concentration there is declining. The percentage point decline in the share of the Russian population living in its own republic was 2.3 between 1959 and 1970, the largest decline experienced by any Soviet nationality except the Tatars. The preponderance of Russians in the population of the RSFSR is also declining; Russians made up 83.3% of that population in 1959 and 82.8% in 1970.²

The main component of Russian outmigration is movement away from rural areas. At first this process was internal to Russia. It began in the nineteenth century, but accelerated noticeably after the late 1920s, when job opportunities in the cities became more plentiful. The Russian

¹ Soviet Union, 1969: 24.

² See Comparative Table 7 (in Volume V) and Census Data: 17.

regions of the USSR possessed poor land resources and a surplus agricultural population and until recently sustained a high birth rate. Also, after collectivization conditions in the village became very difficult; people moved to town in search of better living conditions.¹

The reasons for Russian expansion into non-Russian areas in the last decade differ depending on the areas into which immigration occurred. In some regions, such as the Baltic Republics of Latvia and Estonia, the influx probably has been due to the attractiveness of these highly developed areas to the Russians and the inability of the indigenous population, with even lower rates of natural increase than the Russians, to supply sufficient manpower for expanding industry. Movement of Russians to Central Asia and Kazakhstan has been the consequence of intensive industrial development in these regions, combined with the reluctance or inability of the native population to move to the cities. The modern mechanized agriculture developed in new areas such as the Virgin Lands was also manned by non-local labor, mainly Slavs.

Apart from these ethnic and economic reasons for Russian expansion, there are reasons which stem from the Soviet system itself. The introduction of the Soviet system to many of the non-Russian areas has meant the bureaucratization of many spheres of social life and the infusion into the non-Russian areas of the political and security apparatus of Soviet power. The specialist personnel in these apparatuses consist mainly of Slavs, and the language of business is Russian. The central Soviet authorities regard the "intermingling" of nationalities as a positive development; they promote it utilizing the many levers of control and influence available to them (see Sections II and III below).

One result of these migrations is that Russians have settled in significant numbers everywhere in the Soviet Union. (See Table I on the next page.) Only in Lithuania and the Caucasus do they make up less than

¹Lewis, 1971: 159-160.

Table 1
Dispersion of Russians in the Republics of the USSR

	Number of Russians	Rank by % of total Russians in USSR	% of total Russians in USSR	Rank by % of republic populations	Russians as % of republic population
USSR total	129,015,140		100	-	53.37
RSFSR	107,747,630	1	83.5	1	82.8
Ukrainian SSR	9,126,331	2	7.1	6	19.4
Kazakh SSR	5,521,917	3	4.3	2	42.4
Uzbek SSR	1,473,465	4	1.1	8	12.5
Belorussian SSR	938,161	5	0.7	12	10.4
Kirgiz SSR	855,935	6	0.7	4	29.2
Latvian SSR	704,599	7	0.5	3	29.8
Azerbaijani SSR	510,059	8	0.4	11	10.10
Moldavian SSR	414,444	9	0.3	10	11.6
Georgian SSR	396,694	10	0.3	14	8.5
Tadzhik SSR	344,109	11	0.3	9	11.9
Estonian SSR	334,620	12	0.3	5	24.7
Turkmen SSR	313,079	13	0.2	7	14.5
Lithuanian SSR	267,989	14	0.2	13	8.6
Armenian SSR	66,108	15	0.1	15	2.7

Sources: Itogi 1970: IV: 321; Nar. khoz. 1972: 516-631.

10% of the population. In Latvia and Kirgizistan they are almost 30% and in Kazakhstan 42.4%, outnumbering the Kazakhs themselves. The Russian component of the population is also large in rural areas outside the RSFSR which were recently opened up to agricultural and industrial development, and in cities, where a significant minority, if not a majority of the inhabitants are Russians. Kiev, Vilnius, and Tallinn, where Russians comprise 23%, 25%, and 40% of the population, respectively, are not unusual examples.¹ In Alma Ata, the capital of Kazakhstan, 70.3% of the population is Russian, while only 12.1% is Kazakh.²

This urbanization is characteristic of Russians at home as well as "abroad"; 68% of all Russians in the RSFSR are urban dwellers. Russians rank second only to Jews in degree of urbanization and comprise nearly two-thirds of the entire urban population of the USSR. (See Comparative Table 9 in Volume V.)

¹Nar. khoz. 1972: 516-581; Lewis, 1971: 155; Szporluk, 1971: 83,90; New York Times (July 31), 1972.

²Itogi 1970: 233.

II. Position in Soviet Society

Officially, the USSR is presented as being composed of 15 equal union republics and many equal nationalities. Actually, the RSFSR alone accounts for three-quarters of the territory, more than half of the population, and almost two-thirds of the Communist Party membership of the USSR as a whole. Moscow, the capital of the RSFSR, is also the capital of the USSR. On any of a series of vital indicators the RSFSR and the Russians predominate over all other republics and nationalities of the USSR taken together, as shown in Tables II and III.

With respect to political position, Russians make up 62.5% of the USSR Party leadership (Politburo members) and 61% of all Party members (1972 figures). While Georgians, Armenians, and possibly Jews also enjoy a more than proportional representation in the Party, all other national groups are underrepresented. (See Comparative Table 11 in Volume V.) Moreover, the Russian presence in the Party organizations of the non-Russian republics is considerable, while non-Slavs do not generally participate in Party work in republics other than their own. The first secretaryship of the republic parties is usually held by a native, but the second secretary is almost always a Slav and usually a Russian. The chairmen of the republic councils of ministers and their deputies are generally indigenous, but the critical position of the republican KGB chief is usually held by a Russian.¹

Russians also hold a disproportionate number of important posts in the non-Russian republics outside the political hierarchies: in higher

¹Forwood, 1970: 203-204.

education, large-scale agriculture (the virgin lands of Kazakhstan), the new industries in traditionally rural areas (e.g., Moldavia), and key industries such as Azerbaïdzhanï oil, Kazakh iron and steel, and the Yakut oil fields. The heads of enterprises and construction projects in non-Russian areas tend typically to be Russian. Many Russians have been able to escape rural poverty by taking advantage of the numerous employment opportunities which have opened up in the cities of Central Asia in the last decade. Most of the jobs requiring education or skills have been given to Russians, as have many non-skilled positions as well.¹

The relative ease with which Russians gain access to the more responsible and desirable jobs in government and industry, even in non-Russian areas, reflects two other respects in which Russians occupy a favored or dominant position in Soviet society. One is the special status of their language; the other is the greater ease with which they can obtain a higher education. Unlike the other Soviet languages, which are used in the official institutions of only one republic or region, Russian is the language of business everywhere in governmental and economic organizations. Most Russians speak Russian and only Russian, whether they live in the RSFSR or outside it. When they occupy administrative or supervisory posts, they assume that their colleagues and subordinates will speak Russian with them, and they tend to hire only those who do; throughout the USSR natives are often refused employment if they do not know Russian well enough. Knowledge of Russian is thus a necessity for political and economic advancement. As a result of this pressure, 49% or nearly half of all non-Russians are fluent in Russian (while only 3% of all Russians have found it important to learn another Soviet language well enough to claim fluency).² Because of their greater facility in the majority tongue, Russians enter higher educational institutions in larger percentages than do most other national groups.

¹Ibid.; Lewis, 1971: 161-163; Szporluk, 1971: 91.

²Forwood, 1970: 203-204; Lewis, 1971: 161-163; Szporluk, 1971: 91; New York Times (February 27), 1972. Computations based on Census Data: 14,16-17.

Table II
Indicators of the Position of the RSFSR
within the USSR

	<u>RSFSR as percent of USSR total</u>
Population (1970) ^a	53.81
Territory ^b	76
Delegates to 22nd Party Congress (1961) ^c	63.1
RSFSR Party members as % total CPSU membership (1971) ^d	64.0
RSFSR residents with secondary & higher education as % of total population with secondary and higher education (1970) ^e	55.8
Students in higher educational institutions (RSFSR as % of total, 1971) ^f	58
Number of scientific workers in RSFSR as % of total scientific workers (1971) ^g	69
Number of books published in RSFSR as % of total books published (1971) ^h	80
RSFSR production of oil as % of USSR total ⁱ	80.6
RSFSR production of electricity as % of USSR total ^j	63.5

Sources: ^aComparative Table 4 in Volume V.

^bSoviet Union, 1969: 24.

^cRigby, 1968: 375.

^dComputed from Comparative Table 13.

^eComputed from Nar. khoz. 1972: 36 and Nar. khoz. RSFSR, 1970: 24.

^{f,g,h}Nar. khoz. RSFSR, 1971: 29.

^{i,j}Nar. khoz. 1970: 70.

Table III
Indicators of the Position of the Russian
People and Language in the USSR

	<u>Russian(s) as</u> <u>% of total</u>	<u>Index</u>
Russians as % of total population of USSR (1970) ^a	53.4	1.00
Russians as % of total urban dwellers (1970) ^b	64.5	1.21
Russians as % of total rural population (1970) ^c	39.1	0.73
Russians as % of total CPSU members (1972) ^d	61.0	1.14
Russians as % of total Secretaries of the CC/CPSU (1973) ^e	100.0	1.87
Russians as % of total Politburo members (1973) ^f	62.5	1.17
Russians as % of total students in higher educational institutions (1970-1971) ^g	59.6	1.12
Russians as % of total scientific workers (1971) ^h	66.4	1.24
Fluent Russian speakers in total population (as native and second language - 1970) ⁱ	75.9	1.42
Teachers of Russian language and literature as % of teachers of all Soviet languages and literatures in elementary and secondary schools of USSR (1971-1972) ^j	71.6	1.34
Copies of works of Russian literature as % of copies of works of literature of all Soviet languages (1971) ^k	78	1.46
Titles published in Russian as % of all titles in Soviet languages (1971) ^l	80	1.50
Copies of books published in Russian as % of all books published in Soviet languages (1971) ^m	84	1.57
Magazines in Russian language as % of magazines in all Soviet languages (1971) ⁿ	74	1.39
Newspapers in Russian as % of all newspapers in Soviet languages (1971) ^o	82.7	1.55

$$\text{Index} = \frac{\text{indicator}}{\text{Russians as \% of USSR population}}$$

Note: Because of the high percentage of the Russians in the USSR population (53.4%), even when the Russians reach 100% of the indicator, the index can show only 1.87 (as in the case of Secretaries of the CC/CPSU in this table).

Table III (Continued)

- SOURCES: ^aComparative Table 2.
- ^bComputed from Itogi 1970: 27.
- ^cComputed from Itogi 1970: 35.
- ^dComparative Table 11.
- ^eComputed from data in Edward L. Crowley et al. eds., Prominent Personalities in the USSR (New Jersey: Scarecrow Press, 1968).
- ^fComputed from data in Ibid.; also New York Times (April 27), 1973.
- ^gComparative Table 19.
- ^hComparative Table 20.
- ⁱComputed from Census Data: 14, 16-17.
- ^jComputed from Nar. khoz. 1972: 429.
- ^kComputed from Pechat' 1971: 52.
- ^{l,m}Computed from Pechat' 1971: 10.
- ⁿComputed from Pechat' 1971: 59.
- ^oComputed from Pechat' 1971: 68.

Also, Soviet establishments in science and higher education are heavily concentrated in the big cities of the Russian Republic (Moscow, Leningrad, Novosibirsk, Sverdlovsk). The Russians rank fourth in the USSR, behind Jews, Georgians, and Armenians, in terms of the number of students for every 1000 people of their nationality, and they comprise 60% of the total enrollment in higher education. (See Comparative Table 19.) In fields requiring higher education, such as scientific work, Russian predominance is even stronger (66% of all scientific workers), and the overrepresentation of Russians in this educational elite (in comparison with their weight in the population) has been increasing in the last decade. (See Comparative Table 20.)

III. Russian Influence and Official Policy

Russian influence in Soviet society is even greater than that revealed by the political, economic, linguistic, and educational position of Russians. This is the result of many years of official support for Russification and encouragement of Russian nationalism.

Russification as an official policy has a long history. During the reign of Nicholas I (1825-1855), a deliberate process of inculcating Russian culture was initiated in the educational systems of parts of Poland, Belorussia, and Lithuania. At the same time the Russian Orthodox Church increased its proselytizing activities. Manifestations of local nationalism by subject peoples were crushed, and individuals thought to have led or inspired them, like the Ukrainian poet Taras Shevchenko, were arrested and exiled. The policy of Russification was given new impetus under Alexander III (1881-1894), when even peoples who had shown complete loyalty to the Russian throne were harassed. The Jews were subjected to violent pogroms, often instigated by the Black Hundreds, proto-fascist groups given official encouragement. The last Tsar, Nicholas II, was an honorary member of one such group.¹

For reasons of both policy and principle, the Soviet leaders initially repudiated this approach to the minority peoples of the Empire. On seizing power the Bolsheviks initially sought to distinguish themselves in this respect from the nationalistic Whites. They issued a declaration guaranteeing the right of the "peoples of Russia" to self-determination--including secession if they wished it--and promising the abolition of all national privileges and restrictions.

¹Schopflin, 1970: 191-198.

At the same time (November 1917), they addressed an appeal to the Moslem inhabitants of the Empire.

Moslems of Russia [it read], Tatars of the Volga and Crimea, Kirghiz and Sarts of Siberia and Turkestan, Turks and Tatars of Transcaucasia, Chechens and mountaineers of the Caucasus and all you whose mosques and oratories have been destroyed, whose beliefs and customs have been trampled underfoot by the Tsars....Your beliefs and usages, your national and cultural institutions are henceforth free and inviolable. Organize your national life freely and without hindrance. You have a right to this.

These declarations were followed by a series of gestures calculated to win the sympathy of nationalist rebels in the border regions. Historic and sacred relics were returned to the Ukrainians and to several Moslem peoples. The Bolsheviks even banned further Russian settlement in areas inhabited by certain minorities (Kazakhs, Kalmyks, Chechen and Ingush).²

During the first years after the Bolshevik revolution, the leaders looked with favor on national autonomy--political, cultural, or economic--as long as it did not conflict with "democratic centralism." All of them opposed Great Russian chauvinism in principle, and some actually fought against it in practice. As believers in the imminence of a world proletarian revolution, prominent figures in the Party favored a military supranational state in which all national distinctions of any kind would cease to exist. They were contemptuous, and perhaps even ashamed, of the history of Great Russian domination and oppression in the Empire. Lenin, for example, personally detested Russian chauvinism and declared that he would fight a "war to the death against it." He opposed the enforced use of Russian in Soviet schools and supported education in local languages. His instructions on relations with the minorities demonstrate his concern that non-Russian traditions and pride should be respected and that Russians or Russified bureaucrats should administer minority peoples tactfully.³

¹Quoted in Conquest, 1967: 22.

²Ibid.

³Schopflin, 1970: 191-198.

For some time during the twenties, Lenin's attitude continued to prevail in official policy. The Twelfth Party Congress, which met in April 1923, condemned "survivals of great power chauvinism" in the outlook of Russian officials and the "contemptuous and soulless" attitudes of the latter toward the national republics. A resolution at the end of the Congress declared that the Party's most urgent task was the struggle against Great Russian chauvinism in its own ranks. Minority loyalty to Soviet rule would be won, the Party leaders hoped, by allowing native leaders to administer the governments and economies of their areas. Native languages were encouraged and alphabets for peoples without written languages were devised: these were media for the communication of socialist ideas. Even some national military formations were created to assist in the defense of Soviet territory.¹

All this changed, however, under Stalin, who apparently believed that in order to mobilize the population, the majority of which was Russian, for industrialization and defense, it was necessary publicly to identify the regime with the Russian people and Russian history. Step by step, he made the promotion of Russian nationalism and national symbols a matter of official policy. The Russian people and culture were glorified, their language extolled. The heroes of Russian history were celebrated--even those who had previously been denounced by the Communists as tyrants and reactionaries. Russians were elevated to a position of primacy among the nationalities of the country. Official publications declared that they stood "at the head of the peoples of the USSR" and were "lead[ing] the struggle of all the peoples of the Soviet land for the happiness of mankind."²

Stalin greatly feared the development of distinct national identities and the rise of nationalist sentiments among the non-Russian peoples, for these could become the basis of secessionist or collaborationist movements

¹Schopflin, 1970: 191-198; Conquest, 1956: 29-30.

²Goldhagen, 1968: x; B. Volin, "Velikii russkii narod," Bol'shevik 9:36(1938), and Malaya sovetskaya entsiklopediya (Moscow, 1949) IX, cols. 319-326, quoted in Conquest, 1956: 38-39.

in wartime. The republics, which were potential foci of minority loyalty, were therefore deprived of all vestiges of political autonomy in the late 1930s. Most of the national cadres which had risen during 1917-1920 and in the twenties were destroyed in the purges of 1937-1939. The practice of placing Russians as secretaries in non-Russian Party organizations was intensified. The foremost representatives of minority cultures were arrested, and Russification became the order of the day. Cyrillic script was imposed on the Moslem minorities, and Russian was made a compulsory subject in all non-Russian schools.¹

Stalin's suspicion of the minority nationalities and his encouragement of Great Russian nationalism reached a peak during the war--the Great Fatherland War in the Stalinist lexicon. Whole national groups were deported on the allegation they had aided the enemy or that they could potentially do so. In a famous speech, Stalin invoked the symbols not of the "Soviet Union" but of "the Great Russian nation, the nation of Plekhanov and Lenin, of Belinsky and Chernyshevsky, of Pushkin and Tolstoi, of Glinka and Chaikovsky, of Gorky and Chekhov, of Sechenov and Pavlov, of Repin and Surikov, of Suvorov and Kutuzov." This passage, with its long enumeration of exclusively Great Russian personages, was the new essence of the Stalinist system.²

When Stalin died, the strident promotion of the Russian people abated and draconic measures against minority nationalities were repudiated, but the essential attitudes of the leadership regarding the proper role of Russians and Russian culture did not change. Russians were still officially regarded as the most important ethnic group, although now instead of the "leading people" they were presented as the "elder brother"

¹Schopflin, 1970: 191-198.

²J. Stalin, O velikoi otechestvennoi voine Sovetskogo Soyuza (Moscow, 1944): 11, 28, quoted in Conquest, 1956: 40.

of the technologically less advanced and culturally inferior non-Russians. The political and cultural autonomy of the minority nationalities was still seen as a threat to the power of the regime, and manifestations of national tradition--particularly in its religious form--were severely persecuted. Khrushchev declared that the Russian language would become the basis for a "fusion of the nations" of the USSR--a vision which suggested elimination both of the separate identities of the national minorities and of their corresponding political entities.¹

Brezhnev and Kosygin have avoided Khrushchev's rhetorical flights and utopian projections, but they are quietly taking steps which seem intended to make his vision a reality. Russian language and culture are being brought to non-Russian areas in numerous ways, while expression of minority identity is carefully contained and kept to modest proportions. The policy stressed by Khrushchev of promoting an "inter-republic exchange of cadres" continues to be implemented on a very large scale. Many thousands of new graduates and workers are sent or transferred each year to work in republics other than their own. Minority nationals are thereby cut off from nearly all contact with their native culture and for practical reasons absorb the elements of Russian culture available to them. Russians, by contrast, are amply supplied with schools, books, and periodicals to assist them in retaining and spreading their own culture. Mixed marriages between Russians and other nationals are encouraged in many areas, the expectation being that the non-Russian partner will assimilate.¹

Russian is energetically promoted in every republic as a "second native tongue," although reciprocal efforts to induce Russians to learn other Soviet languages are usually ineffective. Journals devoted to the improvement of Russian teaching in non-Russian areas have proliferated in recent years, and numerous regional and inter-republic conferences have been devoted to that object. There are more than twice as many teachers of

¹ Bilinsky, 1968: 153-156; Szporluk, 1971: 91-92; New York Times (February 27 and July 20), 1972.

Russian language and literature in elementary and secondary schools as there are teachers of all other Soviet languages and literatures together (336,000 as compared to 133,000). Schools in which instruction is conducted in minority languages (mostly through the first eight grades) tend to be small, ill-equipped, and poorly staffed, while the Russian schools are large, well-equipped, and competently staffed. Lavish praise is heaped on parents who send their children to Russian schools despite the censure of their friends and neighbors. This, moreover, is frequently the most convenient thing to do, especially in the cities. Once the Russians begin moving into an area, it is only a matter of time before the Russian language schools far outnumber the schools providing instruction in the indigenous language. Even in the latter schools Russian is a required subject, whereas the local language is optional in the Russian schools.¹

Soviet media policy is also designed to promote Russification. Traditional native themes are discouraged. Russian literature is published in much greater volume than the literature of all the other nationalities together. Seventy-eight percent of all copies of literary works published in the USSR in 1971 were of Russian literature. The Russian language is similarly favored: of all titles published in Soviet languages in 1971, 80% were in Russian, as were 84% of all copies of all books published. Even within the non-Russian republics, it is not uncommon for more books to be published in Russian than in the indigenous language, and native writers often find it more difficult to get their work published than Russian authors. The emphasis in magazine and newspaper publishing is the same: almost three times as many magazines and more than four times as many newspapers are published in Russian than in all other Soviet languages. Throughout the country the great bulk of radio and television broadcasting is also in Russian.² At the same time, publication and

¹Forwood, 1970: 204; Ornstein, 1968: 135; Nar. khoz. 1972: 429; Bilinsky, 1968: 160; New York Times (May 4 and July 20), 1972.

²New York Times (February 27, May 4, and July 20), 1972; Pechat' 1971: 10, 52, 59, 68, 95-97.

broadcasting in the national languages is continued, at a considerable cost to the state.¹ This represents a tacit recognition by the central authorities that years of Russification have had only a limited effect.

No less important an instrument of Russification are the Russified natives appointed to high Party and state posts in the republics. Some of these individuals, like the Party leaders in Estonia, are Russian in everything but birth: their education was Russian, as was their place of residence and work for many years. Others, like the recently appointed head of the Ukrainian Party, while not Russian in background, are nonetheless willing to work for the creation of a single Soviet culture based primarily on Russian language, art, and traditions. They see it as their function to quash local resistance to this long-range goal. It is by installing men like this and dismissing them if they waver that the central authorities continue to maintain and further encourage Russian political, cultural, and economic dominance over Soviet society.²

¹See the discussions of media in the remaining chapters in this series, as well as Comparative Tables 22 and 23 in Volume V.

²For examples of reliance on Russified republic leaders and dismissals for inadequate Russifying, see The New York Times (March 13 and October 1), 1972 and (April 23 and July 14) 1973. See also the chapters on the Ukraine, Latvia and Georgia in this study.

Revived Russian Nationalism and the Soviet Leadership

The pride in Russia and things Russian which underlies official policy is not confined to the leadership alone. Nor is it to be found solely among the peasant and worker masses, so often assumed to be a nation's chief repository of patriotism. Perhaps because the denunciation of Stalin created an intellectual and emotional void in Soviet life, which ideology, regarded with acute skepticism by an over-propagandized generation, cannot fill, perhaps because national ferment among the intelligencies has aroused resentment or admiration--whatever the reason, recent years have witnessed a great upsurge of interest in the Russian past and a striking outburst of Russian nationalism among the Russian intelligentsia. This new trend has moderate-liberal, Slavophile-conservative, and extremist-chauvinist adherents. The aim of the first of these is primarily to rehabilitate elements of Russian tradition which have been neglected or denigrated by successive Soviet rulers. The moderates engage in studies of Russian folk culture and language, icon painting and church architecture; they write letters to the press concerning the destruction of churches and other historical monuments; and they give lectures on these topics in rural areas and workers' clubs. Many of them are members of one of the few spontaneously formed (though subsequently approved by the authorities) organizations in the USSR today, the Rodina (Motherland) Club.¹ Some in this liberal category are established writers and officials.

The other two groups are sometimes referred to colloquially as ruscity [Russites]. The extremist wing of the Russites consists of Great Russian nationalists, who believe in the messianic role of Russia--a Russia which is preserved from further "disorderly hybridization" of nations and in which "the traditional Russian religion [occupies] an honorable position."

¹"Word to the Nation" 1971: 191-199; Pospelovsky, 1973: 51-74; Amalrik, 1971: 100; Palmer, 1970: 164; Amalrik, 1969: 64-65. See also Lev Katz, "Soviet Dissenters and Social Structure in the USSR" (Cambridge, Mass.: Center for International Studies, MIT, April 1972, C/72-3).

Racist, chauvinist, anti-intellectual, and reactionary, the extremist Russites have published a manifesto in samizdat (Slovo natsii). Less extreme are the Slavophile conservatives, contributors to the underground journal Veche. These people are similarly convinced of the importance of preserving the religion, culture, traditions and distinct identity of the Russian nation. But they are not chauvinists, and, unlike the authors of Slovo natsii, they do not seek to make the Russians the "dominating nation" in the USSR. Calling on all "Russian patriots" to join and support them, they urge the cultivation of the unique qualities of the Russians and every other nation. Writings of Russite authors appear not only in samizdat but also sometimes in the official press and in books.¹

The regime is not united in its opinion of the nationalists. Some Party leaders evidently fear the the extremist Russites might exacerbate national tensions and genuinely dislike their Russian supremacism and religiosity. But other powerful persons in the KGB, the Party, and the military are believed to be highly sympathetic to the Russites and determined to promote and protect them. An intense struggle seems to have been underway between these two groups for some time. For a while it seemed as though the faction which disliked the Russites would be victorious. The Party journal Kommunist condemned the line taken by both samizdat publications, and the editor of Veche was warned of his impending arrest.² However, a recent incident suggests that the supporters of the Russites are gaining the upper hand. In November 1972, the acting chief of the Central Committee's Ideological Section, Alexander P. Yakovlev, published a lengthy attack on excessive Russian nationalism and over-glorification of the Russian past.³ Despite the endorsement this article received from

¹Pospielovsky, 1973: 51-74; Scammel, 1971: 100; Amalrik, 1969: 64-65. See also V. Kochetov, What Do You Want? (1969); Yury Ivanov, Caution, Zionism! (1969); Ivan Shevtsov, In the Name of the Father and the Son (1970).

²Pospielovsky, 1973: 51-74. Kommunist, 1971: 15: 105-107, quoted in Pospielovsky, 1973: New York Times (July 19), 1971.

³Lit. gaz. (November 15), 1972.

the Party's highest ranking ideologist, Mikhail Suslov, its author was removed from his post in April 1973 amidst charges that he had been too critical of works on Russian nationalism.¹ Yakovlev was one of the most outspoken of the opponents of the Russites, and his removal was seen as a sign that they henceforth can write and publish more freely.

Official Russian nationalism seems to have joined forces with its unofficial variant in a rare alliance of state and society in the USSR.

¹New York Times (May 7), 1973.

V. Minority Attitudes Toward the Russians

The assessment of attitudes of the "minority" nationals toward the Russians is a very difficult--if not impossible--task. Nevertheless, certain currents are discernable.

The Russifying policies of the regime and its tolerance of Great Russian chauvinism are keenly resented in minority areas. They are not made more palatable by the behavior of the Russians themselves, as perceived by other nationalities when Russians emigrate or are sent to these areas. As individuals they are sometimes portrayed as arrogant, as groups exclusive; they are reputed to treat indigenous peoples as less than equal and to segregate assiduously their places of residence and recreation. The feelings they arouse by these practices find many outlets--in samizdat, in public protests, and most frequently in humor. Anti-Russian jokes are circulated in abundance among the intelligentsia of some national minorities. These stress the alleged slowness, stupidity, lack of irony or sense of humor, lack of initiative, and general passivity of the russak.¹

Anti-Russian sentiment of the minority nationalities is sometimes expressed in anti-Russian activities, which find multiple forms and are sometimes supported by people from the local elite. The Tbilisi riots of 1956 in Georgia were a case in point, as were the violent clashes between Russians and Uzbeks during the Tashkent football matches in 1969, or the 1972-1973 events in Lithuania.² Roi Medvedev, himself a Russian and a dissident, writes that in the Ukraine, Georgia, and Latvia the local cultural institutions appoint only persons of local nationalities to positions of importance. The edge is directed as much against the Russians

¹See, for example, the chapter on Latvia in Volume II.

²See the chapters on these nationalities.

as against other nationalities. Medvedev also proposes a change in the constitution of the USSR providing for a periodical referendum in each republic as to its desire to remain part of the USSR.¹ The samizdat Program of the Democratic Movement of the Soviet Union stipulated that the national republics should have the right to fix quotas for the settlement of non-local nationals within their borders; such a measure would primarily be directed against the Russians.² Evidence from recent emigres suggests that the local elites in the national areas make efforts to settle their own nationals in the Russianized cities and to stem the further infusion of Russians into their territory.³

It must be stressed that the relationship between the non-Russian nationalities and the Russians is complex; it is not uniformly hostile. Some segments of the minority populations and of their elite groups willingly accept the Soviet-Russian culture, feel at home with the Russian language, and have very high regard for Russians as individuals and as a group. Still, anti-Russian sentiment is obviously strong among some non-Russian nationals. This in turn evokes the resentment of the Russians and intensifies their own national feelings. A vicious circle is created: Russian ascendancy breeds nationalism among minority nationalities which then intensifies the nationalism of the Russians and their drive for predominance.

¹Roi Medvedev, Kniga o sotsialisticheskoi demokratii (Amsterdam/Paris: A. Herzen Foundation, 1972):75-111, 319-328.

²Programma Demokraticeskogo dvizheniya Sovetskogo Soyuza, (Amsterdam: A. Herzen Foundation, 1970), *passim*.

³Zev Katz, "The New Nationalism in the USSR," Midstream (Feb. 1973): 3-13. See also the chapter on the Tatars in Volume V of this series.

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Project: Attitudes of Major Soviet Nationalities

THE UKRAINE AND THE UKRAINIANS

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This chapter is based on a paper contributed by the above-named specialist. However, the chapter as presented here has been edited by the project staff, and some of the data, tables, and other materials have been added. Responsibility for the final version therefore rests with the project.

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THE UKRAINE AND THE UKRAINIANS

PART A

General Information

1. Territory

The Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic occupies an area of 233,089 square miles, larger than France or any European country (excluding the RSFSR). It is divided into 25 provinces [oblasty], which vary in size from 11,857 square miles (Odessa region) to 3127 square miles (Chernovtsy).¹ The Ukraine's borders are 4018 miles long, of which 2574 miles are with the Soviet republics of Russia, Belorussia and Moldavia, and 789.5 with Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Rumania. 654 miles is seashore. The Ukraine extends 818 miles from west to east and 555 miles from north to south.² Most of the Ukraine is plains, with mountains in the west and extreme south (Crimea).

The Ukraine is rich in minerals, including iron, manganese, chromite, titanium, lead-zinc, aluminum, mercury, and nickel. It has large reserves of hard coal, brown coal, petroleum, and natural gas. Potassium, rock salt, solar salt, and sulfur also abound, as well as kaolin and other clays, cement raw materials, flux limestones, graphites, and building stone.³

The climate of most of the Ukraine is moderately continental. On the south coast of the Crimea, however, it approaches subtropical. Rainfall varies from 59 inches per year in the mountainous areas of the Carpathians to 11 to 13 inches on the coasts of the Black and Azov seas. The largest river in the Ukraine is the Dnieper which flows for 749 miles through the republic. Almost all rivers in the Ukraine feed into the Black and Azov seas. Other major rivers are the Dniester, Desna, Siversky Donets, Southern Bug, Pripyat, and Seym. The Ukraine has more than 3000 natural lakes, of which 30 have an area of 4 square miles or more, and 13 more than 20 square miles. There are also artificial reservoirs, the largest of which are on the Dnieper: the Kakhovka (832 square miles), the Kremenchug (985) and the Kiev (356 square miles).⁴

¹ Narodne hospodarstvo 1970: 9.

² Soviet Ukraine, 1970: 9.

³ Ibid.: 29-32.

⁴ Ibid.: 32-40.

The Ukraine lies within three physico-geographic zones: the Mixed Forest, Forest-Steppe, and the Steppe. The Mixed-Forest belt is covered by soddy podzolic soils, the Forest-Steppe belt has a variety of subtypes of black earth [chernozem], and the Steppe belt is itself subdivided into three zones with different types of soils.¹ The growing season in the Mixed Forest belt (which embraces the northern part of the Ukraine) lasts 190-205 days; in the Forest-Steppe belt, 200-210 days; and in the Steppe belt, 210-245 days.²

The territory of the Ukraine has been divided, within the all-Union regional scheme, into three economic regions. The Donetsk-Dnieper Region occupies an area of 85,290 square miles, or 36.7% of the Ukrainian territory, and includes the provinces [oblasty] of Voroshilovgrad, Dnepropetrovsk, Donetsk, Zaporozhe, Kirovograd, Poltava, Sumy, and Kharkov. The Southwestern Region, encompassing almost half of the Ukraine, includes the Vinnitsa, Volyn, Zhitomir, Transcarpathia, Ivano-Frankovsk, Kiev, Lvov, Rovno, Ternopol, Khmelnytsky, Cherkasy, Chernovtsy, and Chernogov oblasty. The Southern Region, of 43,745 square miles, includes the oblasty of the Crimea, Nikolaev, Kherson, and Odessa.³

¹ Soviet Ukraine, 1970: 41-43.

² Ibid.: 55-58.

³ Voloboi and Popovkin, 1972: 52.

11. Economy

The Ukraine has been one of the most important economic areas of pre-revolutionary Russia and the USSR. In 1912 it provided 18.3% of the total Russian output of manufactures by value and employed 16.8% of the labor force.¹ According to another estimate, the Ukraine produced 24% of the entire industrial output of Russia before World War I.² In 1913 the Ukraine produced over 20% of the output of large-scale industry, 78.2% of the coal, 57.7% of the steel, and over two-thirds of the iron ore.³ Ukrainian agriculture was more advanced than that of Russia proper, although backward in comparison with the West. Wooden ploughs were still used in some localities in 1917, and about one-half of the peasant farmers had no draft animals or implements of their own.⁴

In 1970, with 3% of the area and 19% of the population of the USSR, the Ukraine produced one-third of the total USSR coal output, 48% of the pig iron, 40% of the steel, and 57% of the iron ore. The Ukraine was particularly advanced in extractive industries and in heavy machine industry, but markedly weaker in other respects, such as light industry and production of consumer durables.⁵ Agriculture remains very important. In 1970 the Ukraine produced 19% of all Soviet grain, 59% of the sugar beets, and 28% of the vegetables. The rail and road network of the Ukraine is relatively dense: with 3% of the area of the Soviet Union, its share in the railway network was 16%, in automobile roads, 18%.

There are considerable differences in the level of economic development among the different parts of the Ukraine. At the end of the 1960s industrial output per capita in the Donetsk-Dnieper Region was one-third higher than in

¹ Seton-Watson, 1967: 658. The area considered here does not coincide exactly with the present Ukraine, which includes parts not in Russia in 1912.

² Soviet Ukraine, 1970: 244.

³ Ibid.: 252.

⁴ Ukraine, A Concise Encyclopaedia, 1971: I:845.

⁵ Narodne hospodarstvo 1970: 56-57.

the South and over twice as high as in the Southwestern Region, the least developed area.¹ There is surplus rural population in the Ukraine, especially in the Southwestern Region. In 1959, an average able-bodied collective farm peasant worked (and was paid for) 198 days in a year (as compared to 255 in the Leningrad area and 249 in Siberia). By 1965 this had declined to 188.² Productivity of labor in agriculture is low, and much working time is wasted owing to shortcomings in management and organization.³

In 1970, 35.5% of the Ukrainian labor force was employed in industry and construction (28.9% in 1960), 31.7% in agriculture and forestry (46.5%), 7.5% in transport and communication (5.9%), 6.8% in trade, supplies and public catering (4.9%), and 13.4% in education, medicine and public health (9.7%).⁴ In comparison, in Poland in 1969, 35% of the labor force was employed in industry and construction and 37% in agriculture and forestry. In Czechoslovakia, the former constituted 46%, the latter 19%.⁵

The average monthly wage for Ukrainian workers and officials (excluding kolkhoz members but including employees of state farms) in 1970 was 115.2 rubles. Wages in construction averaged 135.0 rubles per month, in industry 130.1, in science 121.9, in transport 120.9, and in government service 111.8. In education the average wage was 102.2 rubles, in communication 92.3, in commerce and public catering 88.0, and in health 85.0. On state farms and auxiliary agricultural enterprises the average was 95.7 rubles per month.⁶ No data are available on the income of collective farmers, but it is known to be lower than that of state farm workers.

¹Ukraina, Teraźniejszość i przeszłość, 1970: 128-129; Naseleniye, trudovye resursy, 1971: 171.

²Ibid.: 148, 150.

³Ibid.: 204.

⁴Narodne gospodarstvo 1970: 375.

⁵Pivovarov, 1972: 24.

⁶Narodne gospodarstvo 1970: 381.

III. History

The first historical state on the present territory of the Ukraine was Kievan Rus (9th to 11th centuries). It eventually disintegrated into a number of principalities, of which Galicia and Volynia survived as independent states until the 14th century. The former became Polish in 1387, while the latter was subdued by Lithuania, which also conquered Kiev itself. In 1569 all the Ukrainian lands were united under Poland, which thereafter exerted a strong influence on the language, culture, politics, and society in the Ukraine. In 1648 the Ukrainians revolted against Poland, because of peasant opposition to serfdom, Orthodox religious protest against Polish Catholic expansionism, and Cossack resentment of their treatment in the Polish Army. The Ukrainians defeated the Poles at first, but Polish counter-attacks led them to turn to Moscow for help.

In 1654 the Ukraine entered into a relationship with Moscow, the precise nature of which has been disputed ever since. In 1667 the Ukraine was partitioned between Poland and the Grand Duchy of Muscovy. A truncated Ukraine (on the left bank of the Dnieper River) survived as an autonomous structure under Russia until 1764 when the elective office of hetman was abolished. The second and third partitions of Poland in 1793 and 1795 brought the rest of the Ukraine under Russian rule, with the exception of Galicia, which had come under Austrian control in 1772 and remained under Vienna until 1918. The Russian expansion to the south, which led to the conquest of the northern Black Sea coast and the Crimea from the Tatars, opened these areas to Ukrainian settlers in the late 18th century.

Although the Ukrainian landed nobility generally accepted Russian rule, Ukrainian nationalist sentiments were never totally extinguished. They revived in strength during the Ukrainian literary and cultural awakening of the 19th century. The Tsarist regime responded with a prohibition on printing in Ukrainian (1876-1905). Ukrainians were able to develop their culture more freely in Austrian Galicia, where their language was recognized in schools, civil administration, and courts of justice. By 1914 Lvov, the Galician capital, had three Ukrainian language dailies and a number of weekly and monthly periodicals.

¹Material in this section is from Ukraine: A Concise Encyclopedia, 1963; Pipes, 1964; Rudnytsky, 1972; Seton-Watson, 1967; Soviet Ukraine, 1970.

Ukrainian political parties, first formed in the 1890s, were represented in the Galician provincial assembly and the Austrian parliament in Vienna.

The outbreak of World War I in 1914 came when the Ukrainian national movement in Russia was still in its initial stages. The Ukrainian press, although no longer totally banned, suffered from systematic persecution by the Tsarist administration. Cultural and educational organizations were usually allowed to exist only for very brief periods. The vast majority of the peasantry was illiterate. Ukrainian was not allowed to be used or taught in public schools, the political and national consciousness of the masses was low, and Russians were predominant in the cities. The weakness of the Ukrainian nationalists became apparent in 1917, when they managed to get the Russian Provisional Government to recognize the autonomy of the Ukraine but failed to establish an effective administration or an army. On January 22, 1918, shortly after the Bolshevik takeover and the beginning of fighting between Ukrainian forces and those of the Russian Soviet government, the Ukrainian Central Council [Rada] proclaimed the independence of the Ukraine.

In February 1918 the Ukraine signed a peace treaty with Germany, Austria-Hungary, Turkey, and Bulgaria. German and Austrian troops entered the Ukraine and expelled the Red Army. The Rada soon clashed with the German occupation authorities--it was moderately socialist and favored land reforms while the Germans wanted to requisition grain. It was subsequently overthrown in a military coup led by General Skoropadsky ("the Ukrainian Mannerheim"). The Skoropadsky regime, which was conservative in outlook and employed many former Tsarist officials, was opposed by the peasantry and by the Ukrainian nationalist intelligentsia. When Imperial Germany surrendered and German troops began to leave the Ukraine, a popular uprising forced Skoropadsky to resign. His successor was the Directory, composed of former leaders of the Rada. The new government tried to compete with the Bolsheviks for support of the masses and promised radical reforms, labor legislation, and land reform. It did not manage to establish an effective administration, and its armies melted away as soon as the Skoropadsky forces

had been defeated. The Soviet armies, coming from the north and east, expelled the Directory from Kiev. The Ukraine was then plunged into a bloody civil war. Peasant anarchist bands roamed the countryside, while the regular troops of the Directory faced enemies on all sides: the Bolsheviks, the anticommunist Russians, the Poles, and the Allied troops in the south. In 1920 the nationalist government, by then in exile in Poland, agreed to cede the western Ukraine to Poland in exchange for Polish help in expelling the Bolsheviks from Kiev. But this attempt failed disastrously, and Poland concluded peace with Russia and the Soviet Ukraine at Riga in 1921.

The Ukrainians in Austria did not participate in the events of 1917-1918 in the Russian Ukraine, but after the defeat of Austria they proclaimed a West Ukrainian Republic in November 1918. They were unable to join the war against the Russians because the area of this republic was claimed by Poland, and Polish-Ukrainian hostilities began on November 1, 1918. The war lasted until June 1919, and ended with Poland in occupation of all of the Western Ukraine. In 1923 the Allies officially granted Poland sovereignty over this area. Unlike the eastern part of the Ukraine, the West Ukrainian Republic had succeeded in establishing an efficient and disciplined administration and army. Its fall was due to the lack of international support and the superior military power of the Allied-equipped Polish forces.

The Ukrainian lands under Soviet rule were constituted as the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. (The first Soviet Ukrainian government had been set up in Kharkov as early as December 1917, but a Soviet regime throughout the Ukraine was established only in 1919). Formally, the Soviet Ukraine was tied to Russia by an alliance, but this was a fiction, since the Communist Party of the Ukraine was in fact a regional subdivision of the Russian Party. In December 1922, the Ukraine concluded a "treaty" forming the USSR, together with Russia, Transcaucasia, and Belorussia.

During the 1920s Soviet policies toward language and culture in the Ukraine were generally quite liberal; the Ukrainian Communist Party enjoyed a measure of

control over its affairs, and the peasantry remained in possession of its land. The 1930s, however, brought collectivization of agriculture, mass famine (in 1933 several million peasants died because of the imposition of excessive delivery quotas on the Ukraine, despite the protests of the Soviet Ukrainian government), and mass extermination of Party and government cadres, as well as both Party and non-Party intelligentsia. By 1938 a new Party elite dominated the Ukraine, headed by N. S. Khrushchev, previously secretary of the Moscow Party organization, as First Secretary of the Communist Party of the Ukraine. Also during the 1930s, industries were built and towns grew in population. Many Ukrainians moved from the country to such cities as Kiev, Kharkov, Donetsk, Dnepropetrovsk, Voroshilovgrad, and Zaporozhe.

In the west, Poland never granted autonomy to its Ukrainian provinces; its policies essentially aimed at assimilation. Ukrainian liberal and democratic parties tried to function within the Polish system; UNDO, the Ukrainian National Democratic Union, became the most influential and representative political force. There were also two clandestine political organizations. The Communist Party of the West Ukraine was on the extreme left wing. It was de facto a territorial subdivision of the Polish Communist Party. It shared the fate of the latter when it was purged, and most of its members in exile in the USSR were killed or imprisoned by Stalin.

On the right, the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN), founded in 1929, owed its ideological inspiration to Mussolini. OUN carried on sabotage against the Poles and assassinated many Polish officials and Ukrainian "collaborators." It stressed the primacy of "will" over "reason" and advocated a one-party regime for the future Ukraine, with a single ideology and a single leader. It hoped for an independent, OUN-ruled Ukraine in Hitler's promised territorial reorganization of Europe.

The August 1939 Stalin-Hitler pact was a blow to the OUN. After the Soviet Army occupied Eastern Poland in September and formally incorporated its Ukrainian area into the Ukrainian SSR, the organization continued its underground

activities. During 1939-1940 it split into two wings, the radical Bandera faction and the more moderate Melnyk faction. The Nazi invasion of June 1941 brought further disillusionment when the Nazis refused to cooperate in any manner with the Ukrainian nationalists, even to the extent that they did with the Slovak and Croat satellite states. When the Bandera faction of the OUN proclaimed an independent Ukrainian state in Lvov on June 30, 1941, its members were arrested and sent to concentration camps. The Nazis planned to transform the Ukraine into a colony for Germans, not into a satellite, and least of all into a truly independent state.

Thus, during the war, organized Ukrainian nationalism was in conflict with both the Nazis and the Soviet partisans. Its zone of operation was basically limited to the former Polish territories, although attempts were made to broaden the base of the nationalist underground. The nationalist movement itself underwent an ideological and political evolution toward moderation in the underground, and in 1943-1944 officially renounced its totalitarian program in favor of a multiparty state, social reforms, and ideological pluralism. The OUN was instrumental in organizing a partisan army, the UPA, which engaged in armed struggle against the Germans and then against the Soviet troops until the early 1950s.

The war considerably extended the territory of the Ukrainian SSR. In addition to the former Polish territory (Western Ukraine), the following areas were added as a result of the war: Northern Bukovina and the Izmail district of Bessarabia (formerly part of Rumania), Transcarpathian Ruthenia (formerly part of Czechoslovakia). The Crimea (formerly part of the RSFSR) was transferred to the Ukraine in February 1954.¹

Ukrainian human losses in the war were enormous, among the highest in Europe, and were compounded by the effects of the terror of the 1930s and the post-1945 arrests and deportations. In 1959, the first postwar census,

¹See Section A-VI, p. 1.

the ratio of imbalance between men and women (4.7 million more women than men; 44.4% men, 55.6% women) indicated the magnitude of these losses.

In 1944, while his police and army were battling the UPA in the West Ukraine, Stalin granted all Soviet republics, including the Ukraine, the right to establish direct relations with foreign countries and to maintain their own military formations. However, these turned out to be essentially paper concessions. In 1945 the Ukraine joined the UN, but it never established diplomatic relations with foreign countries (British attempts in 1947 and 1950 to exchange ambassadors with Kiev were rebuffed) or a separate military force. In fact, after 1945, Stalin tightened Moscow's control over the Ukraine still further. In 1946 the Uniate Church in the Ukraine was dissolved,¹ thus removing a strongly nationalist religious organization and a link with the West. Writers and historians were accused of nationalist deviations (1946-1947, 1950-1951), but no executions of artists or scholars took place. Khrushchev claimed in the 1950s that he had restrained Stalin in his struggle against the Ukrainian intelligentsia during the 1940s. He also attributed to Stalin hostility toward all Ukrainians and a desire to deport them all from the Ukraine.

In 1946 there was another famine in the Ukraine. However, it was less severe than that of 1933.

The death of Stalin in 1953 was immediately followed by a change in the top Party post in the Ukraine; A.P. Kirichenko became the first Ukrainian First Secretary of the Ukrainian Communist Party. He was promoted to the CPSU secretariat in Moscow in 1957 but soon dismissed. He was succeeded by N.V. Podgorny, another Ukrainian, who in his turn was promoted to Moscow in 1963. Podgorny's successor in Kiev, P. Shelest, was demoted in 1972. He was succeeded by Shcherbitsky. Unlike the practice under Stalin, the leaders of the Ukrainian republic since 1953 have been elected in Kiev, rather than formally appointed by Moscow and sent to the republic from the center, in the way in which Kaganovich (1926, and again in 1947), Postyshev (1932), and Krushchkev (1938) had been.

¹ See Part C of this chapter.

IV. Demography

The population of the Ukraine on January 1, 1973 was 48,200,000,¹ an increase of more than 13% over 1959. In 1970 the Donetsk-Dnieper Region had 20,057,000 people, an increase of 13% over 1959; the Southwestern Region had 20,689,000, an increase of 9%, and the Southern Region had 6,380,000, an increase of 26%.² Ethnic Ukrainians made up 76.8% of the Ukraine's population in 1959 and 74.9% in 1970. The Russian population increased from 16.9% to 19.4% in the same period. Ethnic Ukrainians constituted 87.8% of the population in the Southwestern Region, two-thirds in the Donetsk-Dnieper Region, and 55% in the Southern Region. From 1959 to 1970, the percentage of Russians in the South increased from 30.9% to 34.0%, in the Donetsk-Dnieper Region from 24.8% to 27.9%, and in the Southwestern Region, from 5.8% to 6.6%.³

The seven administrative oblasty of the so-called West Ukraine (administratively, they do not form a separate unit but belong to the Southwestern Region), which were not part of the USSR until World War II, displayed a different demographic and ethnic evolution in the inter-census period. While their population grew by about 12.2% between 1959 and 1970, from 7,800,000 to 8,755,000, their Ukrainian ethnic population grew by 13.6%, as compared with 9.7% for the Ukraine as a whole and 8.7% for the whole Southwestern Region. Ukrainians made up 87.2% of the West Ukraine's population in 1959 and 88.7% in 1970. The Russian population in the West Ukraine increased by 10.7%, less than the all-Union average, and a third of their Ukrainian increase, and the Russian share of the area's population dropped from 5.2% to 5.1%.⁴ Thus, the western part of the republic became less russified and the eastern part more so.⁵

¹ Rabochaya gazeta (February 1), 1973.

² Narodne hospodarstvo 1970: 18.

³ Calculated from Radianska Ukrayina (April 25), 1971.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ The 446,000 Russians in the West Ukraine still represent a marked increase over pre-War times, when the few Russians in the area were primarily refugees from the Soviet Union.

In 1970 about 5.5 million Soviet Ukrainians lived in republics other than the Ukraine. The Russian Republic had a Ukrainian population of 3,344,000 in 1970 (a decline from 3,359,000 in 1959), and the Ukrainian population of Moscow was 185,000. There were also 930,000 Ukrainians in Kazakhstan (an increase of 22%), 507,000 in Moldavia (an increase of 20%), and 191,000 in Belorussia (an increase of 44%). In the Baltic republics of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, the Ukrainians increased 68% from 63,000 in 1959 to 106,000 in 1970.¹ Ukrainians are thus apparently emigrating to a majority of the republics except for the RSFSR. In the period between the censuses of 1959 and 1970 approximately 2.5 to 3 million Russians migrated from the Russian republic to other parts of the USSR; about one million of these moved to the Ukraine.² The Ukraine is one of the republics where immigration is higher than emigration.

In 1970, 55% of the population of the Ukraine lived in urban areas, up from 46% in 1959. The Donetsk-Dnieper Region had the highest percentage of urban population with 70%, followed by the Southern Region with 57%, while in the Southwestern Region, which was predominantly Ukrainian and included the areas that had been non-Soviet before World War II, the urban share of the population was only 38%.³

Kiev, the capital of the republic, is its largest city and the third largest in the USSR. Its population in 1970 was 1,632,000, an increase of 47% over 11 years. Between 1959 and 1970 the proportion of Ukrainians in the capital rose from 60.2% to 64.8%.⁴ Kharkov is second largest with 1,223,000 inhabitants in 1970 (a 28% increase over 1959), followed by Odessa, 892,000; Donetsk, 879,000; and Dnepropetrovsk, 862,000.⁵

¹ Calculated from Izvestia (April 17), 1971. The figures for Ukrainians in Moscow are in Soviet Geography, Vol. XII, No. 7 (September 1971), 455.

² Bruk, 1972: 49.

³ Narodne hospodarstvo 1970: 18.

⁴ Radianska Ukrayina (April 25), 1971.

⁵ Narodne hospodarstvo 1970: 19-24.

The Ukraine's birth rate in 1970 was 15.2 per thousand; the death rate 8.9, and the natural growth rate 6.3.¹ On January 15, 1970, the Ukraine's population under 20 years of age was 15,588,900, while that of age 60 and above was 6,563,800.²

The ethnic composition of the Communist party in the Ukraine as of January 1, 1968, was as follows:³

	Number and % Communist Party, 1968		Number and % in Total Population, 1970 ⁴	
Total Membership	2,138,800			
Ukrainians	1,391,682	65.1%	35,284,000	74.9
Russian	569,131	26.6%	9,126,000	19.4
Jewish	99,940	4.7%	777,000	1.6
Belorussian	27,382	1.3%	386,000	0.8
Polish	8,969	0.4%	295,000	0.6

¹ Ibid.: 10.

² Narodne hospodarstvo 1970: 30.

³ Soviet Ukraine, 1970: 190.

⁴ Narodne hospodarstvo 1970: 39.

V. Culture

The Ukrainians possess a distinct folk culture, including songs, music, oral literary tradition, architecture, and dress.¹ Over the ages the churches in the Ukraine, both Orthodox and Catholic, assimilated a variety of pre-Christian popular customs and this blend of Christian beliefs and local usages has given to Ukrainian religious practices an individual style and flavor.

The first formative influence on Ukrainian culture came from Byzantium, with the adoption of Christianity in the 10th century in the Greek Orthodox rather than the Roman Catholic version. The Eastern Slavs, including the future Ukrainians, received their Cyrillic script and written language, Church Slavonic, from the Orthodox peoples of the Balkans, who had developed them under the influence of Constantinople. Church Slavonic remained the literary language of the Ukraine until the end of the 18th century and was used in some parts well into the 19th. It was also used in scholarly, especially theological, writings of the 16th and 17th centuries, and was the language of instruction in the Kievan Academy (est. 1632), the first institution of higher learning among the East Slavs. Not only language and literature, but also architecture, music, theater, and painting in the Ukraine were influenced over the centuries by Byzantium, the West (especially Poland), Russia, and the East (Turkey, Tatars). Samples of Renaissance architecture survive to this day in Galicia, as do palaces and churches built in various parts of the Ukraine in the style of "Ukrainian Baroque," a blend of foreign and native styles.

Modern Ukrainian literature in the vernacular developed in the 19th century. Its leading representatives included Taras Shevchenko, Marko Vovchok (Maria Vilinska), P. Kulish, Ivan Franko, M. Kotsiubynsky, and Lesia Ukrainka (Larisa Kosach). During 1876-1905, when Ukrainian publications were banned

¹See Ukraine: A Concise Encyclopaedia, 1971: 524-668, for a detailed survey of architecture, sculpture, painting, music, theater, and cinema in the Ukraine.

in the Russian Empire, writers from the Russian Ukraine published their works in Austria. Lvov became the center of Ukrainian culture. Lvov University had several Ukrainian chairs. Lvov was home to several major libraries in Ukrainian studies, as well as the Shevchenko Scientific Society. An important role in the formation of modern Ukrainian culture, especially historiography, belonged to the universities of Kharkov and Kiev; Ukrainian scholars from those universities produced fundamental editions of historical documents and many monographs.

While in the 19th century Ukrainian themes and motifs found their way into Russian culture (Gogol in literature, Glinka in music, Repin in painting), the tsarist regime tried to forestall the transformation of Ukrainian folklore into a separate, modern, urban-based culture. Ukrainian professional theater developed in the 19th century but performances in Ukrainian were banned in 1876; in the 1880s the ban was somewhat modified, but Ukrainian traveling companies were as a rule forbidden to perform in major Ukrainian cities (they were highly successful in St. Petersburg and Moscow), and they were also forbidden to stage translated plays and original plays depicting the life of the educated classes.

One of the most lasting achievements of the brief period of an independent Ukraine (1917-1918) was the establishment of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences (since 1936: Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR) by Hetman Skoropadsky. Its first president (V. Vernadsky) and other members had been Ukrainian members of the Imperial Academy of Sciences in St. Petersburg. Also at that time, new Ukrainian universities were established in Kiev and Kamenets and the Ukrainian Academy of Fine Arts in Kiev. Kiev acquired its first regular repertory theater in Ukrainian. The beginnings made in 1917-1918 were continued on a much larger scale under the Soviet regime despite periodic efforts to quell them.

The 1920s are considered by Ukrainians in the West to have been a golden age of Ukrainian literature, theater, and painting. In the 1920s and early 1930s, Ukrainian films won international renown for the work of

Dovzhenko, but Dovzhenko was forbidden to work in the Ukraine from the middle 1930s until his death in 1956. In 1933-1934 a number of writers, painters, theater producers, etc., were arrested and executed, and socialist realism replaced modern experimentation. In the late 1950s and early 1960s, a new wave, the generation born in the thirties, made its mark in Ukrainian letters. Many of its representatives were arrested either in 1965-1966 or in 1971-1972. Many works which could not be published at home found publishers in the West, thus reestablishing the direct cultural relations between Ukrainians in the USSR and those outside that had not existed since the 1920s. Soviet cultural policies have been more severe in the Ukraine than in Moscow or Leningrad; various Ukrainian composers of the younger generation have had their work performed in Russia, but not in the Ukraine.

Similarly, young theater producers and actors have rebelled against the rigid cultural standards upheld in Kiev and been forced to seek work outside the republic. One of these was Les' Tanyuk, a producer and actor who, having failed to get work in the Ukraine, became chief director of a Moscow theater. In an article entitled "Lethargy of Ukrainian Theater," published in Ukrainian in Czechoslovakia in 1968, Tanyuk complained that the Ukraine had proportionately fewer theaters than many other Soviet republics, while Kiev ranked far behind Moscow and Leningrad in this respect. (According to Tanyuk, Kiev had one Ukrainian theater of drama, in which modern plays can be performed, per more than one million inhabitants, while in Moscow there was one theater for every 315,000 and in Leningrad one for every 165,000 inhabitants). Tanyuk particularly objected to the absence of experimental theaters in the Ukraine and contrasted this situation with conditions in Russia, Georgia, and Estonia.¹ Ukrainian intellectuals have been demanding the establishment of a new Ukrainian theater in Kiev for well over 15 years, unsuccessfully so far. Tanyuk was among those

¹Narodnyi kalendar na 1969 rik," Presov, 1968, reprinted as "Letarhiya ukrayinskoho teatru," Sucasnist, 1969:8:86-92, and Shiliakh peremohy (March 23 and 30), 1969. Tanyuk was named as one of the young men for whom no work was available in the Ukraine in Literaturna Ukrayina (March 26), 1968: 2.

to propose a new theater, and several speakers at an earlier congress of Ukrainian writers had done the same, including the playwright V. Sobko, and the then chairman of the Ukrainian Writers Union, Oles Honchar.¹

Some Ukrainian dissenters have interpreted these restrictions as an indication that the regime wishes to maintain Ukrainian culture on a definitely provincial level so that it will be unattractive to more talented artists and will not appeal to the intelligent public. It is certainly true that as soon as a Ukrainian literary or cultural journal becomes independent-minded and wins a wide readership, a purge in its editorial board swiftly follows. (This point was made by the Ukrainian literary critic, Ivan Dzyuba, in his Internationalism or Russification?, published in the West in 1968.² Dzyuba is currently serving a 5 year prison term). On the other hand, the Soviet government appears to be more tolerant of Ukrainian music and ballet, and such Ukrainian groups as the Virsky Dance Company or the Veryovka National Choir have performed successfully all over the USSR and abroad.

Until the end of the 16th century, Ukrainians were Orthodox in religion. Since that time the Orthodox and Uniate (i.e., united with Rome) have become the two principal churches. In 1946 the Uniate Church was dissolved after all its bishops and numerous lower clergy had been arrested. Like the Jehovah's Witnesses, Uniate religious activities are forbidden in the USSR. The Orthodox Church is headed by the Metropolitan of Kiev and Galicia, "Exarch of All Ukraine," and is under the Moscow Patriarchate. The Metropolitanate publishes a Ukrainian language periodical, Pravoslavnyi visnyk, and has also recently issued calendars and a prayer book. Most of its bishops are reported to be Ukrainians.³

¹ Z'yizd pys'mennyki, 1967: 57, 168.

² Dzyuba, 1968.

³ Bociurkiw, 1972: 209.

VI. External Relations

The Ukraine has common borders with Rumania, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Poland. Of all the European republics of the USSR, it is the one with the most direct contacts with Eastern Europe. Until World War II the western provinces of the Ukraine belonged at various times to these countries. Particularly long and important are the historical and cultural links between the Ukraine and Poland: the Polish provinces of Kraków and Rzeszów and the Ukrainian provinces of Lvov, Ivanfrankovsk, and Ternopol share six centuries of history, first within Poland, then in Austria, then again in Poland. Polish is generally understood in the West Ukraine, and the Polish press is available at the newsstands in Lvov. Radio broadcasts from Warsaw and Kraków can be received in the West Ukraine. The province of Transcarpathia belonged to Hungary until 1918 and from 1939 to 1944, and to Czechoslovakia from 1919 to 1939. There is a Hungarian minority there with its own schools and periodical press. The province of Chernovtsy has a Rumanian minority; it belonged to Rumania from 1918 to 1940 and from 1941 to 1944.

Despite post-war population exchanges, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Rumania, and Yugoslavia each have a Ukrainian minority. In each of these countries a Ukrainian language press and Ukrainian language elementary and secondary school systems exist. The University of Warsaw and the University of Prague each have a chair in Ukrainian philology and literature.

The Soviet authorities do not encourage cultural contacts between the Ukraine and the Ukrainians in the East European Communist countries. Although the press from Poland or Czechoslovakia is available to Soviet citizens by subscription, the Ukrainian language periodicals published in those countries are not included in the official subscription catalog. They are delivered by mail, however, when a subscription is paid for by an individual in an East European country.

The official institutions of the Ukrainian SSR display much interest in the activities of the Ukrainians in the West. The society "Ukrayina," known also as Society for Cultural Relations with Ukrainians Abroad, maintains contacts with West Europeans, Canadians, and American Ukrainians. It publishes two weekly newspapers (News from Ukraine and Visti z Ukrayiny) and acts as host to delegations and excursions of "progressive" Ukrainian groups from Canada and the United States. The Ukrainian Society for Friendship and Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries maintains contacts with foreign organizations and individuals of non-Ukrainian background.

Judging by their press, the Soviets pay much attention to the activities of Ukrainian emigres in the West. The daily press and various periodicals abound with articles criticizing such institutions as the Free University at Munich, the Shevchenko Society (Paris, New York, Winnipeg), the Ukrainian Congress Committee of America, and the Ukrainian Committee of Canada, and the publications and leaders of these organizations. In more recent times the alleged contacts between Ukrainian emigres and the "Maoists" in Peking have been the subject of comments in Kiev newspapers.¹

The Ukrainian SSR is a member of the UN and maintains a permanent delegation to the UN in New York. It is also a member of UNESCO, ILO, and various other international organizations. Seven states have Consulates-General in Kiev: Poland, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia. Cuba, India, and Egypt have consulates in Odessa. The Ukraine has not taken advantage of its constitutional prerogative to establish diplomatic relations with foreign countries, and foreign consuls in Kiev are there through arrangement with the USSR government. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Ukraine has been reported to have its officers on the staffs of Soviet embassies in countries such as Canada where considerable numbers of Ukrainians live.²

¹Radio Liberty Research (March 10), 1972. "Kiev Attacks Ukrainian 'Pro-Chinese' Group," and "Peking Orientation of Ukrainian Nationalists Exposed," DSUP (August) 1972: 21-25.

²Personal communication of an officer of the Ukrainian UN delegation.

In recent years the Ukrainian Ministry of Trade has concluded several agreements with the ministries of trade of Poland, Rumania, and Hungary on the exchange of articles of mass consumption and food products.¹ These exchanges appear to be of rather limited importance, and regular foreign trade relations are conducted by the USSR Ministry of Foreign Trade.

Little scholarly attention in the West has been given to the relations of the Ukraine with foreign countries or to Kiev's role in the formulation of Soviet foreign policy, although two works exist, dealing, respectively, with the role of the Ukrainian and Belorussian republics in Soviet foreign policy immediately after World War II² and with the Ukrainian aspect of the Czechoslovak crisis of 1968.³ In 1967 the Communist Party of Canada sent an official delegation to the Ukraine, with the specific task of exploring the Soviet handling of the nationality question. It published a report upon its return to Canada, containing along with words of praise a number of criticisms.⁴ This report was at first accepted by the Central Committee of the Canadian Communist Party and then, after protests from Kiev, withdrawn.

There were unconfirmed reports that the then First Secretary of the Ukrainian Communist Party took a specific stand urging the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 and later opposing President Nixon's visit to Moscow after the U.S. mining of Haiphong. In any case, Shelest was subsequently removed as First Secretary. Whatever the truth about these reports, the Ukrainian leaders have probably had little influence on the external relations of the USSR.

¹Visti z Ukrayiny (June 10), 1971: 4, and Radianska Ukrayina (August 21), 1971: 3.

²Aspaturian, 1960.

³Hodnett, 1970.

⁴"Report of Delegation to Ukraine," Viewpoint, Discussion Bulletin issued by the Central Committee, Communist Party of Canada, Vol. V, No. 1 (January 1968): 1-13.

THE UKRAINE AND THE UKRAINIANS

PART B

Media

1. Language Data

The Ukrainian language belongs to the Eastern group of Slavic languages, together with Russian and Belorussian. "The distinctive phonetic, grammatical and lexical features of the Ukrainian language have been discerned in written documents of the 12th century."¹ The Ukrainian script is based on Cyrillic, which is also used in Russian, Bulgarian, Serbian, Belorussian, and other languages of the USSR. Modern Ukrainian script has incorporated the orthographic reforms introduced by M. Kulish in the 19th century.² Literary Ukrainian grew out of Church Slavonic and linguistic forms specific to the region. Polish and Latin influences dating from the 16th - 18th centuries also affected its development. Modern Ukrainian is based on popular, peasant speech, which was introduced to literature in the 19th century. Taras Shevchenko (1814-1861), who originated standard literary Ukrainian (as Pushkin did for Russian), employed a variety of Ukrainian dialects as well as old Church Slavonic elements.³

The Ukrainian language (See Table B.1) is the second most widespread language in the USSR. Its native speakers include 35 million Ukrainians (of whom 2.6 million live outside the borders of the Ukraine) and 400,000 non-Ukrainian inhabitants of the Ukraine (Russians, Poles, Jews). In 1959, 73% of the population of the Ukrainian SSR, including 490,000 non-Ukrainians, said Ukrainian was their native language. In 1970, the proportion was down to 69%. Ukrainian was declared as a second language by 4.4 million people in the Ukraine in 1970. One and a half million of this group were Ukrainians who considered Russian their first language.

Other speakers of Ukrainian as a second language included more than a quarter of the Russians and more than a third of the Jews in the Ukraine. Altogether 37.1 million people in the Ukraine regarded Ukrainian as either their first or second language.⁴

¹ Soviet Ukraine, 1970:474.

² Ukraine: A Concise Encyclopaedia, 1963:511-515.

³ Ibid., 485-504. See also Section A-V of this chapter.

⁴ Radianska Ukrayina (April 25), 1971.

It is estimated that about 40 million Soviet citizens in the Ukraine and outside its borders are familiar with the Ukrainian language. According to Soviet estimates, Ukrainian speakers abroad number 300,000 in Poland, over 70,000 in Czechoslovakia, 62,000 in Rumania, 40,000 in Yugoslavia, over 700,000 in Canada, over 1 million in the United States, and smaller numbers in Australia, Brazil, and other countries.¹

¹Soviet Ukraine, 1970: 474.

Table B.1.
Native and Second Languages Spoken by Ukrainians
(in thousands)

Number of Ukrainians residing:	Speaking as their Native Language				Speaking as a Second Language ^a		
	1959	1970	1959	1970	Percentage point change 1959-1970	Percentage point change 1959-1970	Other languages of the USSR, 1970
in the Ukrainian SSR	32,158.5 (100%)	35,284.0 (100%)	30,072.3 (93.5%)	32,300.0 (91.4%)	-2.1	+2.1	1575 (4.5%)
in other Soviet Republics	5,094.4 (100%)	5,469.0 (100%)	2,602.2 (51%)	2,625.0 (48%)	-3.0	+2.2	878 (16.1%)
Total	37,252.9 (100%)	40,753.0 (100%)	32,680.6 (87.7%)	34,925.0 (85.7%)	-2.0	+1.9	2453 (6.0%)

The Ukraine - Language Data - 3

Sources: Itogi 1970: IV: 20:152-3.
Itogi SSSR 1959 and Itogi Ukrainskoi SSR 1959, Tables 53 and 54.

^aNo data are available for 1959, since no questions regarding command of a second language were asked in the 1959 census.

^bIncluding Ukrainian, if not native language.

II. Local Media

a. Soviet Print Media

Kiev is the principal center of Ukrainian newspaper and journal publishing, and the second largest publishing center in the USSR. Out of a total of 103 journals published in the Ukraine in 1971, 99 appeared in Kiev, and one in each of the following: Lvov, Kharkov, Donetsk, and Dnepropetrovsk. All the newspapers of republican rank (i.e., those distributed throughout the Ukraine and offering subscriptions to the other republics and abroad) are published in Kiev.

Kiev has more diversified republican newspapers than any other union-republic capital. They include the Party-government daily Radianska Ukrayina [Soviet Ukraine] (which had a circulation of 520,000 in 1971) and two dailies for specialized audiences, Robitnycha gazeta [Workers' Gazette] and Silski visti [Village News]. The Workers' Gazette also appears in Russian with identical text; the combined circulation is 320,000 (1971). The Village News appears only in Ukrainian (circulation 390,000 in 1968). Pravda Ukrainy (circulation over 500,000 in 1971), the Russian counterpart to Radianska Ukrayina, devotes more attention to urban, economic, industrial, and managerial problems, while Radianska Ukrayina has much more material on ideological topics, as well as attacks on Ukrainian emigres and their foreign friends. It also serves as a watchdog over the rest of the Ukrainian press, reacting promptly to ideological errors.

Molod' Ukrayiny [The Youth of the Ukraine] is the Young Communist League newspaper and appears five times per week. It had a circulation of 875,000 in 1971. It devotes a great deal of space to sports and feature articles on modern science and family problems. Its Russian counterpart, Komsomolskoye znamya has a much smaller circulation (131,500 in 1970), perhaps due to competition from the Moscow Komsomolskaya pravda, which is printed from matrices in a number of cities in the Ukraine (as are Pravda and other Moscow dailies).

Table B.2.

Publications in the Ukrainian SSR

Language of Publication	Year	Newspapers			Magazines			Books and Brochures		
		No.	Per Issue Circulation (1000)	Copies/100 in Language Group	No.	Per Issue Circulation (1000)	Copies/100 in Language Group	No. of Titles	Total Volume (1000)	Copies & Brochures /100 in Language Group
Russian	1959	381	2,430	23.9	N.A.	N.A.	--	2,628	21,998	216.3
	1970	400	6,083	45.7	39	1,318	9.9	4,682	25,564	192.2
	1971	357	6,417	N.A.	39	1,334	N.A.	4,613	28,541	N.A.
Ukrainian	1959	919	5,458	17.8	N.A.	N.A.	--	4,048	75,272	246
	1970	936	13,455	41.1	63	7,162	21.9	3,105	91,994	281
	1971	863	13,973	N.A.	63	7,884	N.A.	3,106	93,379	N.A.
Minority Languages	1959	15	39	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	--	N.A.	N.A.	--
	1970	5	48	N.A.	0	0	0	17	301	N.A.
	1971	5	44	N.A.	0	0	0	15	194	N.A.
Foreign Languages	1959	0	0	0	N.A.	N.A.	--	N.A.	N.A.	--
	1970	6*	67*	N.A.	1	15	N.A.	329*	3,647*	N.A.
	1971	6*	N.A.	--	1	15	N.A.	334*	4,584*	N.A.
All Languages	1959	1,315	7,927	18.9	63	1,231	2.9	6,817**	99,426**	237.3
	1970	1,347	19,653	41.7	103	8,495	18.0	8,133	121,506	258.0
	1971	1,231	20,504	42.8	103	9,233	19.3	8,068	126,698	264.6

Note: Totals for publications in language categories given in the sources do not always equal the totals for publications in all languages. Where the category "Other languages of the peoples of the USSR" is given in the source, the remainder are presumed to be in foreign languages and marked with an asterisk (*); otherwise, the total figure "All Languages" is marked with two asterisks (**) to indicate an unresolvable discrepancy.

Sources: Pechat' 1959: 54, 128, 164; 1970: 95, 158, 188; 1971: 95, 158, 188.

The Ukrainian branch of DOSAAF, the paramilitary organization, publishes a weekly newspaper in Ukrainian, Patriot batkivshchyny [Patriot of the Fatherland] (128,000 in 1966), which may be the only non-Russian language publication in the USSR even remotely related to military affairs. Literaturna Ukrayina, a semi-weekly paper of the Ukrainian Writers Union, was the most liberal paper in the Ukraine in the early 1960s but in recent years it has been closely controlled.

Other Ukrainian newspapers include the organ of the Ministry of Culture, Kultura i zhyttia [Culture and Life], the teachers' newspaper Radianska osvita [Soviet Education], and Druh chytacha [The Reader's Friend], which is not available outside the USSR. There are two children's weeklies, the Ukrainian Zirka [Star] (2,500,000 per issue) and the Russian Iunyi Leninese [Young Leninist] (1,600,000 per issue). Two weeklies appear for foreign readers: Visti z Ukrayiny and News from the Ukraine. The latter had a circulation of 18,000 in 1971.

In addition to the republican papers, Kiev has three city and oblast newspapers which appear only in Ukrainian. The evening paper, Vechirniy Kyiv, had a circulation of 307,500 in 1972. The other regional Kiev papers are the Party Kyivska pravda (134,000 in 1972) and the Komsomol Moloda hvardiya (132,000 in 1966). As of 1972, the Ukraine had two other evening city papers which belong to a special "lighter" category of Soviet dailies, because they print more about the problems of everyday city life and publish a relatively large amount of advertisement; politics, on the other hand, takes up much less space. These papers are Vechirniy Kharkiv in Kharkov (130,000 in 1972) and Dnipro vechirniy in Dnepropetrovsk (est. 1972, 80,000 copies).

The Ukraine and Armenia are the only union republics with evening newspapers appearing only in the local language. Since a majority of the population in both Kharkov and Dnepropetrovsk speaks Russian and probably is Russian,¹ and since Russian is the most influential language in Kiev

¹The 1970 Census data give figures for these provinces but not separately for the cities. Itogi 1970: 172, 187.

despite its clear Ukrainian majority, the fact that the evening city papers are published only in Ukrainian in those cities demonstrates that these can be distributed in predominantly Russian environments. This phenomenon seems to confirm those Soviet statements which claim that while Ukrainians in the Ukraine are generally bilingual, so are Russians, and that the latter do use Ukrainian language media.¹

There are significant variations in the language pattern of the provincial press. All oblasty carry Ukrainian Party-Soviet papers, but some also carry Russian provincial papers. This is true in Donetsk and the Crimea, where in addition the Komsomol papers come out exclusively in Russian. Also, local, district, and city newspapers in the Crimea are exclusively Russian, while in Donetsk they are predominantly Russian. Voroshilovgrad, the easternmost oblast of the Ukraine, has a Komsomol paper in Ukrainian (its Party papers are in both Russian and Ukrainian), and Ukrainian is used in the local press. In general, these three oblasty constitute the most Russified area of the Ukraine in terms of press. Zaporozhe, Kharkov, and Odessa also have oblast papers in Russian, and some of their districts have local newspapers in the Russian language. Russian-language oblast papers exist in only two out of a total of 13 provinces of the Southwestern Region, in Lvov and Transcarpathia. They have lower circulations than their Ukrainian counterparts. Transcarpathia also has Hungarian newspapers. Elsewhere in the republic the oblast newspapers are only in Ukrainian.

Two Ukrainian journals print over a million copies per issue. Perets [Pepper], a journal of humor and satire (the Ukrainian counterpart of Moscow's Krokodil) printed 2,620,000 copies per issue in 1973. The monthly Radianska zhinka [Soviet Woman] had a circulation of 1,755,000 during the same period. Novyny kinoekranu [Screen News], with a circulation of 500,000 was the third most popular journal for adults in Ukrainian; the weekly illustrated magazine Ukrayina, the fourth (355,000 per week).

¹Kurman and Lebedinskiy, 1968: 125; Yizhakevych, 1966: 170; Chizhikova, 1968: 24-25. And cf. Itogi, 1970: 152-153.

Strictly political periodicals are Komunist Ukrayiny, the theoretical and political monthly journal of the CP of the Ukraine appearing in both Russian (1973 circulation 59,000) and Ukrainian (112,500) and Pid praporom leninizmu (Russian version: Pod znamenem leninizma [Under the Banner of Leninism]), a more popular biweekly publication addressed to Party activists and agitators. In 1972 the Ukrainian edition of the latter had a circulation of 262,000; the Russian, about 280,000.

Publications addressed to professional groups include Radianske pravo [Soviet Law] and Ekonomika Radians'koyi Ukrayiny (in Ukrainian and Russian versions) each with a circulation of 10,000. The popular anti-religious magazine Liudyna i svit [Man and the World] has a circulation over 150,000 and the much more sophisticated popular science (including social science) review, Nauka i suspil'stvo [Science and Society], about 60,000.

The Union of Writers of the Ukraine published three monthly journals in Ukrainian: Vitchyzna [Fatherland] (published in Kiev with a circulation of 25,000) which specializes in attacking Ukrainian nationalists past and present), Zhovten' [October] (published in Lvov; circulation, 20,000) Prapor [Banner] (Kharkov; circulation, 14,000). The journal Vsesvit publishes foreign literature in Ukrainian translation and is jointly sponsored by the Writers Union and the Ukrainian Society for Friendship and Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries; its circulation was 54,000 in 1972. Art journals include Muzyka (20,000 per issue), Ukrayinskyi teatr (ca. 8,000), and Obrazotvorche mystetstvo (fine arts; ca. 15,000).

The Russian Orthodox Church in the Ukraine publishes a Ukrainian language journal, Provoslavnyi visnyk [Orthodox Herald]; its circulation is not known, but several thousand copies per issue have reportedly been distributed among Ukrainian religious communities in Canada and the U.S. (It originally appeared in Lvov, but has been published in Kiev since 1971.)

b. Soviet Electronic Media

Kiev broadcasts three radio programs, two of which can be heard throughout the republic, while the third is local. The republic-wide programs are on the air from 6:00 a.m. to 1:00 a.m. The total volume of Ukrainian-language broadcasting amounts to 130 hours a day (including the republic, regional, and district broadcasts). There are no figures on the ratio of Ukrainian-language broadcasts to those in Russian. However, a major portion of the republic's scheduled listings consists of programs relayed from Moscow, and Ukrainian television also broadcasts partly in Russian. All Ukrainian radio stations carry Moscow news several times a day, and the popular program "Mayak" ["Beacon"] is also relayed into the Ukraine. A Ukrainian counterpart to "Mayak," the radio program "Promin" ["Ray"] has existed since 1965. It includes music, short news bulletins and commentaries, and special broadcasts for young people.

Until 1972 Kiev and other Ukrainian TV stations had only a single program each, in which they alternated Moscow telecasts with those produced locally. The Kiev TV Center was reorganized early in 1972, and two parallel channels, Central (from Moscow) and Ukrainian, may now be viewed in the Ukraine. Moscow TV, however, reaches a larger audience in the republic than does Ukrainian TV, and its broadcast time, 12 hours daily, is longer than that of the UTV (7 hours per day, of which part is made up of local broadcasts originating outside Kiev, and part includes the Moscow broadcast, "Vremya").

The quality of Ukrainian TV is much poorer than that of the Central station, and its technical equipment is not as modern. Among provincial TV stations contributing to the Ukrainian channel, the Lvov station most frequently includes programs with a distinctly Ukrainian flavor; the station promotes not only traditional Ukrainian folk music and singing, but also works by more modern composers.

Table B.3.

Electronic Media and Films in the Ukrainian SSR

Year	Radio				Television			Movies	
	No. of Stations	No. of Wired Sets (1000)	Sets /100 population	No. of wireless sets (1000)	Sets /100 population	No. of Stations	Of which relay points	No. of sets (1000)	Sets /100 population
1960	N.A.	7,203 ^a	17.2 ^d	4,431 ^a	10.3 ^c	*	*	745 ^a	2,502 ^b 5.0 ^d
1970	N.A.	10,267 ^a	21.6 ^d	8,157 ^a	17.2 ^c	*	*	7,167 ^a	5,157 ^b 10.9 ^d
1971	N.A.	10,825 ^a	22.6 ^d	8,288 ^d	17.3 ^c	*	*	8,116 ^c	N.A. N.A.

^aTransport i svyaz', 1972: 296-298.^bNar. obraz., 1971: 325.^cNar. khoz. 1972: 520, 528.^dComputed.

*Precise data not available. Televedeniye i Radio veskchanlye, 1972: 12:13 list 14 TV "program centers" in the Ukraine in 1972.

c. Foreign Media

Newspapers and journals published in East European Communist countries are generally available in the Ukraine in major cities, especially Kiev and Lvov. The only exceptions to this are the Ukrainian language publications from abroad.

Soviet Ukrainian media regularly mention foreign radio broadcasts in Ukrainian from the West, especially Radio Liberty and the Voice of America. Radio Canada, Madrid, Rome, and Vatican are also mentioned. Recent doubling of the VOA broadcast time in Ukrainian has been noted in the press.

Foreign radio programs in Ukrainian are jammed, but the jamming is less effective in the countryside. The Soviet press and radio have been replying to criticism expressed in these programs, and it may be due to these foreign broadcasts that such names as Karavansky, Chornovil, or Moroz¹ have appeared in the newspapers; their arrests and trials had not originally been reported in the Soviet media. The press also responds to criticism in foreign publications printed in Ukrainian. Polemics at Ukrainian emigre journals such as Suchasnist, Ukrayinskyi samostiynyk or Ukrayinske slovo are a regular feature of Zhovten', Radianska Ukrayina, Literaturna Ukrayina, and the Lvov Vilna Ukrayina.

¹See Section C-III of this chapter.

III. Educational Institutions

In the school year 1971-1972 there were over 27,500 general education schools in the Ukraine. In 4700 of these Russian was the language of instruction; in 122, Rumanian or Moldavian; in 68, Hungarian; and in a few others, Polish. In 427 schools, classes were taught in more than one language.¹ This leaves a balance of about 22,200 Ukrainian-language schools. Twenty years earlier, in 1950-1951, there were 2836 Russian-language schools and close to 28,000 Ukrainian.² Swoboda, a British scholar of Ukrainian descent, has written that in 1958 73% of pupils in the Ukraine attended Ukrainian-language schools, while in 1965 only 66% did.³ An official Soviet publication stated that in 1966-1967 Ukrainian was the language of instruction in about 82% of schools under the Ministry of Education of the Ukrainian SSR.⁴ This percentage does not conflict with that given by Swoboda because schools differ vastly in size; a village four-year school may have less than a hundred students while an urban ten-year school may have a thousand.

Relatively complete data exist for the schools in the three oblasty of the former Austrian Galicia, which indicates that the Russian language schools tend to be considerably larger than their Ukrainian counterparts, reflecting either consolidation into 10-year schools or urban locations.⁵ In Transcarpathia in 1969-1970 there

¹Malanchuk, 1972: 115,117. Malanchuk clearly was not including in the total the evening schools for young adults and correspondence school for adults, of which the Ukraine had 2300 in 1970. Narodne hospodarstvo, 1970, lists for 1970, 27,558 regular schools (p.476) and, separately, 2344 schools for adults, (p.481).

²Zuban', 1967: 87, 90.

³Swoboda, 1971: 214.

⁴Soviet Ukraine, 1970: 364.

⁵Oleksiuk, 1968: 742. In 1965-66, the 1056 Ukrainian schools in the Ternopol province averaged 165 pupils apiece; the 8 Russian schools, 576. In the Ivano-Frankovsk province, the corresponding averages were 241 and 872 pupils per school.

Table B.4.

Selected Data on Education in the Ukrainian SSR 1970-1971

Population: 47,878,000 (p.10)

			Per 1000 population	
(p. 529)	<u>All schools^a</u>			
	- number of schools	-	29,900	.06
	- number of students	-	8,404,000	175.5
(p. 527)	<u>Newly opened elementary, incomplete secondary, and secondary schools</u>			
	- number of schools	-	571	
	- number of student places	-	261,900	5.47
(p. 529)	<u>Secondary special schools</u>			
	- number of schools	-	755	
	- number of students	-	797,200	11.65
(p. 529)	<u>Institutions of higher education</u>			
	- number of institutions	-	138	
	- number of students	-	802,900	16.77
(pp. 436-7)	<u>Universities</u>			
	- number of universities	-	8	
	- number of students			% of Total
	Total	-	101,046	2.11
	day students	-	43,012	0.9
	evening students	-	17,938	0.37
	correspondence students	-	40,096	0.84
	- newly admitted			
	Total	-	18,700	0.4
	day students	-	9,193	0.2
	evening students	-	3,256	0.07
	correspondence students	-	6,251	0.13

Table B.4.

Selected Data on Education in the Ukrainian SSR 1970-1971 (continued)

<u>Universities (continued)</u>		<u>Per 1000</u> <u>population</u>	<u>% of</u> <u>Total</u>
- graduated			
Total	- 16,172	0.34	100.00%
day students	- 8,009	0.17	49.5
evening students	- 2,321	0.05	14.4
correspondence students	- 5,842	0.12	36.1
<u>Graduate students</u>			
- total number of	- 13,503	0.28	
- in scientific research institutions	- 4,684	0.1	
- in universities	- 8,819	0.18	
<u>Number of persons with (in 1970) higher or secondary (complete and incomplete) education</u>			
- per 1000 individuals, 10 years and older	- 494		
- per 1000 individuals employed in national economy	- 668		
<u>Number of workers graduated from professional-technical schools</u>			
-	- 286,200	5.98	

^aRegular schools and schools for adults as reported in Narodne hospodarstvo, 1970: 476, 481.

Source: Nar. khoz. 1972. (Page references given above.)

were 614 Ukrainian schools with over 163,000 pupils (average 265 pupils), 15 Russian schools with 11,500 pupils (average 767), 70 Hungarian schools with 21,500 pupils (average 302), 12 Rumanian schools with 4300 pupils (average 358), and finally, 32 mixed schools.¹ In the highly urbanized and industrialized Dnepropetrovsk region, out of a total of 1529 general education schools, 1255 taught in Ukrainian in 1970, but enrollment in Ukrainian schools was only one-half of the total student enrollment. In the city of Dnepropetrovsk itself there were 35 Ukrainian schools.² A samizdat source, The Ukrainian Herald, reported in 1972 that in 1966 in the city of Kiev, in 150 Russian schools there were 128,112 pupils, and in 57 Ukrainian schools, 38,299. Among the Russian schools identified by the source, was school No. 57, with 1600 pupils, in which were enrolled the children and grandchildren of Shelest, Shcherbitsky, Drozdenko, Paton, "and other elite."³

In 1967 Ukrainians constituted 61% of students in higher educational establishments of the Ukraine, Russians 32%, Jews 3.8%, and others 3.2%.⁴ In the West Ukraine, Ukrainians made up 83% of the total of students in vocational and secondary specialized schools (out of a total 96,464), and 76% of students in higher educational establishments (of a total of 111,100). The faculty of Lvov University included 479 Ukrainians, among whom 259 were born in the West Ukraine. (The total number of faculty was not given.)⁵ An earlier source asserted that in Lvov University, 293 of 600 academic personnel were Ukrainians, of whom 114 had been born in the West Ukraine.⁶ (The area had about a 90% Ukrainian population in 1970.)

¹Radians'ka shkola, 1970: 6: 45.

²Zoria (Dnepropetrovsk) February 7, 1970 (reporting a trial of nationalist students), translated in DSUP (October), 1970: 4.

³Ukrayinskyi visnyk, 1972: 60, 67.

⁴"Delegation to Ukraine": 5.

⁵Oleksiuk, 1968: 739-740.

⁶Malanchuk, 1963: 598, 668.

IV. Cultural and Scientific Institutions

No recent data are available on the nationality mix of scientific personnel in the Ukraine, but the share of Ukrainians among all scientific personnel in the USSR is known. In 1970, out of 927,709 Soviet scholars, 100,215 were Ukrainian. Of total Soviet scholars, 224,490 held the advanced degree of Candidate of Sciences and 25,521 of them were Ukrainian. Among the even more advanced Doctors of Science, 23,616 in the USSR, Ukrainians numbered 2235. These figures show some increase in the proportion of Ukrainians from 1950, when 14,692 of 162,508 scientific workers, 3731 of 45,530 Candidates of Science, and 415 of the 8277 holding the doctorate degree were Ukrainians (there were 4948 Russians, 301 Georgians, and 246 Armenians among those holding this degree).¹

In 1960, the latest year for which data are available for the Ukraine itself, there were 22,523 scientific workers of Ukrainian nationality in the republic, who constituted 48.3% of all scientists employed there. (In 1947 the percentage was 41.2.)² This represented almost two-thirds of the total number of Ukrainian scientists working in the USSR. Thirty-six percent worked in other republics (in 1959 13.7% of Ukrainians lived outside the Ukraine).³

¹Nar. obraz., 1971: 270-271; and cf. Istoriya SSSR, 1972: 5:110.

²Vyssheye obrazovaniye v SSSR, Statisticheskii sbornik, Moscow, 1971: 215, cited in Solovey, 1963: 258.

³Solovey, 1963: 79.

Table B.5.

Selected Data on Scientific and Cultural Facilities and Personnel in
the Ukrainian SSR (1971)

Population: 47,878,000

<u>Academy of Science</u>		(p. 106)
- number of members	262	
- number of scientific institutions affiliated with the Academy	76	
- total number of scientific workers in these	10,712	
<u>Museums</u>		(p. 451)
- number of museums	144	
- attendance	17,402,000	
- attendance per 1000 population	363	
<u>Theaters</u>		(p. 451)
- number of theaters	71	
- attendance	18,139,000	
- attendance per 1000 population	379	
<u>Number of persons working in education and culture</u>		(p. 525)
- total	1,464,000	
- no. per 1000 population	30.6	
<u>Number of persons working in science and scientific services</u>		(p. 525)
- total	448,000	
- number per 1000 population	9	
<u>Number of public libraries</u>	27,500	(p. 529)
- number of books and magazines in public libraries	289,800,000	
<u>Number of clubs</u>	25,700	(p. 529)

THE UKRAINE AND THE UKRAINIANS

PART C

National Attitudes

I. Review of Factors Forming National Attitudes

In his 1972 address marking the 50th anniversary of the USSR, L.I. Brezhnev attributed the survival of the nationality question in the USSR to "nationalistic prejudices, exaggerated or distorted national feelings," and to "objective problems" that arise "in a multinational state which seeks to establish the most correct balance between the interests of each nation...and the common interests of the Soviet people as a whole."¹ Both sets of factors contribute to attitudes in the Ukraine today. Perhaps the most important "prejudice" is the very concept that the Ukraine is a nation, and not merely a subdivision of the Soviet people. National identity in East Europe has been centered around language, and the Ukrainians claim to be a nation because they speak and write--or would like to speak and write--Ukrainian. The Soviet stress on language assimilation and on the progressiveness of the Russian language, and the implication that those who refuse to become assimilated are thereby somehow less progressive--even if they accept Marxism-Leninism and the current leadership of the CPSU--are sources of national dissatisfaction in the Ukraine.

Language by itself, isolated from other factors, does not necessarily lead to the formation of national attitudes. However, Ukrainian has become a language of modern culture, has established its capacity to serve as a tool of communication, and is supported by the Ukrainian intelligentsia, who have a vested interest in its maintenance and development. Attempts to return it to the position of a dialect spoken by the uneducated, or even to assign to it a secondary position, are resented by educated Ukrainians.

¹Brezhnev, 1973: 11. Nationalist survivals, Brezhnev noted, are being encouraged by bourgeois propagandists and politicians.

Another factor to be taken into consideration in the formation of national attitudes is Ukrainian history. Soviet policy has been to eradicate all knowledge of past conflicts between Ukrainians and Russians or to present them in a distorted light. Pre-Soviet nationalists are portrayed as enemies of the Ukrainian people. Those achievements of the Ukraine not attributed to Russia, such as the status of the Ukrainian language and culture in Austria, are passed over silently in textbooks, popular literature, and even scholarly works. Thus, because the Soviet regime has chosen to identify communism with Russia and to consider hostility to, or independence from, tsarist Russia to be anti-Soviet, a familiarity with the past of the Ukraine may provide a source of national attitudes that are not only anti-Russian but also anti-Soviet.

The sense of national identity among ethnic Ukrainians is strongest in the western areas which were the last to be incorporated into the Soviet Ukraine. It is less evident in the south and east. However, the Ukraine has also developed a sense of territorial identity which is shared by Ukrainians and non-Ukrainians alike. Thus, without regard to their ethnic origins, the inhabitants of the Ukraine may oppose such Soviet economic policies as the promotion of growth in Siberia and the Far East as being at the expense of their republic and detrimental to their interests. Brezhnev's "objective problems" are at work here. Although this territorial nationalism may be reinforced by language consciousness or a non-Russian or anti-Russian historical identity, it does not depend on them. It is just as natural for the officials of the Ukrainian Gosplan or of the various ministries to advocate their own region's interests on the grounds of economic rationality as it is for a convinced nationalist to interpret any Soviet action in favor of a non-Ukrainian region to be motivated by an anti-Ukrainian bias. The Ukrainian first secretaries, whether ethnically Ukrainian or not, have shown that

they enjoy those attributes of political statehood the Ukraine possesses, and top Party and state officials in the Ukraine, whatever their origins, tend to take their power more seriously than is intended by Moscow. The future of Ukrainian nationalism in its territorial sense depends on the ability of leaders to balance "nationalistic prejudices" with "objective problems."

Since so much of the history of the Ukraine has been tied up with Poland, and to a smaller extent with Czechoslovakia and Hungary, the political status of these countries under communism is of great interest to Ukrainians. They may well be comparing their own lot with that of their western neighbors. Such a comparison is likely to produce critical attitudes toward present Soviet policy, especially if it is combined with a knowledge that in the past the history of the Ukraine has been similar to that of Slovakia or Poland. This fact again raises the question of the historical factor in the formation of national attitudes. A Ukrainian who knows nothing about the past will not see a contradiction in the fact that West Ukrainian peasants have been forced to collectivize while Polish peasants have not. Anyone ignorant of the decimation of the Ukrainian Party apparatus and cultural intelligentsia in the 1930s is likely to be less concerned by the arrests of 1972. The same applies to such events as the famine of 1933 or the armed struggles of the 1940-1950s. As Karl Deutsch has said, "...autonomy in the long run depends on memory. Where all memory is lost, where all past information and preferences have ceased to be effective, we are no longer dealing with a self-determining individual or social group...."¹

¹Deutsch, 1966: 128-129.

II. Basic Views of Scholars on National Attitudes

The Ukrainian national movement in the period of the Russian revolution and civil war (1917-1921), according to Richard Pipes, was rooted in a specific Ukrainian culture (language and folklore), a historic tradition, and an identity of interests among the well-to-do peasants of the Dnieper region. It was "a political expression of genuine interests and loyalties." While it enjoyed the support of a small but active group of intellectuals, it lacked sufficient strength outside what Pipes calls "the politically disorganized, ineffective and unreliable village." The fate of the Ukraine "...was decided in the towns, where the population was almost entirely Russian in its culture, and hostile to Ukrainian nationalism."¹

Both Western and Soviet writers on the contemporary Ukraine note that the village has given way to the city. The Soviet regime has transformed the Ukraine into an urban and industrial area. An American political scientist of Ukrainian descent, Yaroslav Bilinsky, concluded in 1964 that by the 1960s the Ukraine had "matured into a sociologically balanced nation" and was capable of self-rule despite the Soviet policy of "scattering educated Ukrainians into all corners" of the Soviet Union.²

V.V. Pokshishevsky, a professor of geography in Moscow, noted in 1972 that the city, not the village, is now the "carrier of the ethnos" in the USSR. While the city produces an assimilationist tendency it also stimulates "a sharpening of ethnic awareness."

¹Pipes, 1968: 149.

²Bilinsky, 1964: 83.

Specifically, Pokshishevsky cited the increase of the Ukrainian element in Kiev, which he explained by the city's attraction of Ukrainians from all over the Ukraine and by "further consolidation of the Ukrainian nation and a strengthening of ethnic consciousness ...It may be supposed that some Kievans, after some hesitation whether to consider themselves Ukrainian, later did so with absolute conviction; more children of mixed marriages have also declared themselves Ukrainian."¹

On the other hand, John A. Armstrong of the University of Wisconsin, author of Ukrainian Nationalism, 1939-1945 (New York: Columbia, 1955, 2nd ed. 1963), in another work classified Ukrainians among the "younger brothers" of the Russians, considering them as still relatively low in social mobilization, and also close to Russians in major cultural respects. Armstrong expected Ukrainians to become the object of particularly intensive assimilationist efforts by the Soviet regime. The success of the regime, Armstrong thought, would depend on its improving the position of "submerged social strata, particularly the peasantry."² Armstrong evidently took the view that the peasantry is the principal group maintaining a separate Ukrainian identity and that improvement of its economic and social position would facilitate its assimilation to Russian nationality.

Various Western writers have connected the emergence of national dissent in the Ukraine during the 1960s with the republic's socioeconomic transformation. Tibor Szamuely, a former Hungarian Communist scholar who emigrated to England in the early 1960s, wrote that the "old, romantic, peasant style and anti-Semitic" nationalism in the Ukraine "has been replaced by the modern, ideological

¹ Pokshishevsky, 1972: 116, 118-119.

² Armstrong, 1968: 14-15, 18, 32.

nationalism of an industrialized, urbanized and literate society."¹ In a later article, Szamuely expressed the view that nationalism in the Ukraine (unlike the civil rights movement in Russia) fused "intellectual and peasant together." The resistance movement that has been rapidly growing in the Ukraine in the last 10 years and which has been subject to "far harsher repression than the Russian civil rightists," is "an openly nationalist movement, aiming at national independence for their country and therefore enjoying support that far transcends the ranks of the intelligentsia."²

Following the long tradition of the Ukrainian liberal intelligentsia, Ivan L. Rudnytsky, an intellectual historian from the University of Alberta (and a member of a prominent Ukrainian-Polish-Jewish family from Galicia), has stressed historical factors forming political attitudes of the Ukrainians. In a study published in 1963, Rudnytsky approvingly quoted two earlier Ukrainian figures, M. Drahomanov (1841-1895) and V. Lypynsky (1882-1931), who explained the national differences between Russia and the Ukraine by their different political experiences in the past, especially the Ukraine's association with the West (Poland).³ In a 1972 article, Rudnytsky again argued that contemporary Ukrainian national identity heavily depends on historical tradition. In particular, he argues that the annexation of the West Ukraine as a result of World War II has strengthened Ukrainian nationalism in the USSR. The West Ukrainians, whose cultural and religious ties had been with Central Europe, helped bring about a "psychological mutation" of the East Ukrainian population. The Ukrainian dissent of the 1960s, he said, cannot be explained without taking into account this West Ukrainian factor. The Ukrainians are no longer engaged in a conflict with Poland,

¹Szamuely, 1968: 16-17. Similarly, a prominent Soviet writer of liberal persuasion, the late Ilya Ehrenburg, had reportedly told Werth: "these people (it's never happened in the Ukraine before) deplore the old Ukrainian anti-Semitism, and those new Ukrainian nationalists are liberals...their sympathies lie with Western culture...." Werth, 1969: 200-201.

²Szamuely, 1972: 3-4.

³Rudnytsky, 1963: 207.

while the existence of a Soviet sphere of influence in Eastern Europe has added to Russian concerns, thereby easing the Russian pressure on the Ukraine. Communist Eastern Europe, especially the Ukrainian minorities in it, provides a previously nonexistent link with the outside world for the Ukrainian intelligentsia. Finally, Rudnytsky believes that the emergence of the Communist bloc had deprived the USSR of its ideological legitimacy (thus indirectly reinforcing Ukrainian nationalism), because there is nothing in Marxism-Leninism which requires the Ukraine to be inferior in status to the independent states of Eastern Europe.¹

Vernon V. Aspaturian,² an American political scientist, and Robert Conquest,³ a British author, have similarly argued that the retention of separate political identity of the East European communist countries has subverted the legitimacy of the USSR as a multinational state. Such an effect may have been partly encouraged by some features of the Soviet constitution. As Pipes noted, "by placing the national territorial principle [national republics] at the base of the state's political administration," the Communists gave "constitutional recognition to the multinational structure of the Soviet population." "This purely formal feature of the Soviet Constitution may well prove to have been one of the most consequential aspects of the formation of the Soviet Union."⁴

Language as an attitudinal factor, and the linguistic assimilation allegedly practised by the Soviet regime and bitterly resented by Ukrainian dissenters, has been prominently featured in samizdat materials coming out of the Soviet Union. However, Walker Connor, a scholar of nationalism, considers the essence of the nation to be "psychological, a matter of attitude rather than a fact," and argues that language is a symbol, not the real issue, in

¹ Rydnytsky, 1972: 244-248.

² Aspaturian, 1966.

³ Conquest, 1970.

⁴ Pipes, 1968: 296-297.

contemporary Ukrainian unrest. As a method of asserting their non-Russian identity the Ukrainians wage their campaign for national survival in terms of their right to employ Ukrainian in speech and writing. Connor thinks that the Ukrainian nation would exist even if Ukrainian were replaced by Russian, just as the Irish nation has survived despite the virtual disappearance of Gaelic.¹ Similarly, Alexander Worth wrote in 1969 that nationalism in the Ukraine was rising and might one day loosen the Ukraine's bonds with Moscow, but he also doubted that the Ukrainian language would ever become the language of the Ukraine.²

In one of the few empirical studies of factors forming national attitudes in the Ukraine, L.M. Drobizheva, a Soviet Russian scholar, reported higher incidence of "nationalist" attitudes among those Ukrainians who read periodicals and books only in Ukrainian than among those who read in Russian only or in Russian and Ukrainian. Among the former, 80.7% approved of people of different nationalities working together and 77.1% approved of mixed marriages. Among the latter, corresponding figures were 90.9% and 87.1%.³ Drobizheva seems to have concluded that "nationalist attitudes" are modified by inducing non-Russians to read more in Russian rather than in their own language; she recommended that more Russian language publications and broadcasts should be made available.

Soviet writers on national attitudes in the Ukraine argue that the sources of national antagonisms have been completely eradicated in the USSR and that tensions which occasionally may develop are essentially due to tenacity of bourgeois survivals.

¹Connor, 1972: 338.

²Worth, 1969: 202.

³Drobizheva, 1969: 77-78.

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Ukrainians, like all other Soviet nationalities, they assert, are Soviet patriots first of all, and their attitudes derive from and reflect the socialist system in the country and the triumph of the ideology of Marxism-Leninism. However, as discussed earlier (Section C-I of this chapter), Brezhnev recently admitted that certain "objective problems" arise from the need to reconcile the interests of individual nations with those of the country as a whole.¹ As if to illustrate Brezhnev's points, Petr Shelest, First Secretary of the Ukrainian C.P. from 1963 to 1972, was recently criticised for treating the Soviet Ukraine's economic achievements in isolation from those of the entire Soviet Union and for attributing them to the Ukrainians alone rather than to all Soviet people, in his book. Ukrayino nasha Radians'ka [O, our Soviet Ukraine] published in 1970 in 100,000 copies.²

¹ Brezhnev, 1973: 11.

² "Pro seriozni nedoliky ta pomylyky odniet knyhy [unsigned editorial]," Komunist Ukrainy, 1973, 4: 77-82; specific reference is on p. 80. Shelest's other errors were said to include his failure to see the benefits for the Ukraine of the area's annexation by tsarist Russia and his excessive stress on the originality and peculiar features of Ukrainian culture and history. Ibid.: 78, 80.

III. Recent Manifestations of Nationalism

Since Stalin's death one of the major controversies in the history of Ukrainian nationalism and dissent has centered around its connection with earlier Ukrainian nationalism. Armed guerilla struggle against Soviet rule ceased in the Western Ukraine in the early 1950s, but at the end of the decade the KGB was still arresting members of what it considered secret nationalist organizations.¹ Although it is impossible to establish direct links between those arrested in 1958-1961 and members of the OUN underground, there are indications that some at least were familiar with the literature of the latter. A group established in 1964, the "Ukrainian National Front," regarded itself as a continuation of the OUN, and in 1965-1966 it "published" an underground journal, Fatherland and Freedom.²

The second phase in the history of Ukrainian dissent that required the attention of the KGB came in 1965-1966, when several members of the Soviet Ukrainian literary and academic intelligentsia were arrested and tried in Lvov and Kiev.³ The arrests of intellectuals in 1965 prompted the distinguished literary critic Ivan Dzyuba to write a long memorandum to P. Shelest, Ukrainian CP First Secretary, and V. Shcherbitsky, Prime Minister of the Ukraine, protesting the arrests and the Soviet treatment of the Ukrainian

¹Three such organizations were uncovered in 1958-1961 in the Western Ukraine: the United Party for the Liberation of the Ukraine in 1958; the Ukrainian Workers and Peasants Party, known also as the Jurists Group, allegedly active in 1959-1960 and its members tried in 1961; and the Ukrainian National Committee, whose 20 members were tried in Lvov in 1961. Two of them were executed and the rest received sentences of ten or more years in prison.

²See Browne, 1971: 227-234. For a brief analysis see Szamuely, 1968.

³Browne, 1971: 97-171 and The Chornovil Papers, passim.

problem.¹ Vyacheslav Chornovil, a young TV journalist, compiled a collection of documents, testimonies, letters, and trial accounts which then found their way to the West, where they were first published in Ukrainian and then in English.² Chornovil himself was soon arrested and tried, while Dzyuba managed to remain free, although he was able to publish very little.

Between 1966 and 1972 numerous arrests and trials became known abroad. Valentyn Moroz, an instructor in history, jailed from 1965 to 1969, was rearrested in 1970, after nine months of freedom and sentenced to a total of 14 years of prison, camp, and exile for writing nationalist essays, including "The Chronicle of Resistance" and "Amid the Snows." (His earlier work, "A Report from the Beria Reservation," was published in English by Browne, 1971.) Moroz was tried for the second time in late 1970.³

In 1969 the KGB arrested a group of students and instructors in Dnepropetrovsk. They were accused of disseminating nationalist propaganda and slandering the nationality policy of the CPSU in a letter addressed to Kiev officials. They were tried in 1970 and all three Dnepropetrovsk papers published long articles against them.⁴

¹Dzyuba, 1968. A second English edition exists, and the work has recently been published in Italy. Dzyuba was born in 1931 in the Donbass.

²Lykho z rozumu, 1968, and The Chornovil Papers, 1968. Chornovil was born in 1938 in the Cherkasy province of the eastern Ukraine.

³See Svoboda (August 21) 1971 and (January 12) 1972. Moroz was attacked by name in the Kiev paper Radians'ka Osvita (August 14), 1971. For a review of his ideas see Radio Liberty Dispatch (October 22), 1970, and Luckyj, 1972. The Moroz affair caused a variety of protests, as shown by Ukr. Visnyk, No. 6.

⁴The letter signed by "Creative Youth of Dnepropetrovsk" and containing a critique of conditions in Dnepropetrovsk, was published together with the newspaper accounts of the trial in Molod' Dnipropetrovska v borot'bi proty rusyfikatsii (Munich: Suchasnist, 1971).

A new wave of arrests came in January 1972. Several of those arrested have been sentenced to long prison terms. One, Zinovia Franko (granddaughter of the great Ukrainian writer, Ivan Franko, 1856-1916) recanted and was released. With these arrests, the KGB attempted to associate the arrested intellectuals with emigre Ukrainian nationalist organizations, whose emissary Yaroslav Dobosh, a Belgian student of Ukrainian origin, had allegedly contacted them during his journey to the Ukraine in December 1971.¹

No systematic analysis of the demands and programs of Ukrainian dissenters exists, but a British scholar, J. Birch of the University of Sheffield, has reviewed some of the best-known documents. The early organizations of 1958-1961 desired the "national liberation and establishment of an independent, sovereign Ukraine," and the secession of the Ukraine from the USSR. They advocated democratic methods to accomplish these goals and declared they would dissolve themselves if the Ukrainian people rejected their program. Other authors demanded a transformation of the USSR in accord with the principles of Marxism-Leninism, the abandonment of such methods of Russification as (1) resettlement, (2) discrimination against Ukrainian in the educational system, and (3) relegating Ukrainian culture to a provincial role. There have also been various proposals for political reforms including abolition of the KGB and of censorship, the release of all political prisoners, and the right to establish political parties. National discrimination against other ethnic groups, specifically anti-Semitism, has been condemned, and a demand presented for "equal rights for minorities inside the Ukraine."²

¹Dobosh was arrested at a border station but released after several months in prison and an act of public repentance which was broadcast over the Ukrainian TV network. See Radio Free Europe Research, 1331, 14 March 1972; Radianska Ukrayina, 3 June 1972; Visti z Ukrayiny, 4 May 1972 and CDSP, XXIV: 22: 6. There is much on the arrests of 1972 in the Chronicle of Current Events, No. 26, Oct. 15, 1972. See also Index 1:3-4: 120-123, 160, 166, 1972.

²Birch, 1971: 20-34.

Ivan Dzyuba's program has best been summarized by himself: "I propose...one thing only: freedom--freedom for the honest, public discussion of national matters, freedom of national choice, freedom for national self-knowledge, self-awareness, and self-development. But first and last comes freedom for discussions and disagreements."¹

Whether or not there is a connection between old and new nationalism in the Ukraine is still unresolved. The relationship between dissenters such as Dzyuba and the Party leadership under Shelest is another puzzling problem. Commentators have noted that Ukrainian nationalism was treated relatively leniently in the later years of Shelest's rule. Dzyuba, for example, had been able to work in a publishing house even after his critique of Soviet nationality policy had been published in the West. Indeed, it was reported that the Dzyuba memorandum had been circulated among provincial Party secretaries, by the Ukrainian Central Committee, for comment. Shelest's fall came two months after Dzyuba's expulsion from the Writers Union (and shortly after his arrest), and Shelest's proteges in the Party have suffered demotions.² During his tenure in Kiev Shelest identified himself with at least one proposal originally presented by Dzyuba. In 1968 he demanded that new college textbooks should be prepared by Ukrainian publishers, "first of all, in the Ukrainian language."³ A special publishing house for college textbooks was established soon thereafter and has been issuing both Ukrainian and Russian university texts in science, engineering, and the humanities.⁴ (Yet it also seemed likely that Shelest opposed Brezhnev's reception of Nixon after the U.S. mining of Haiphong.)

¹Dzyuba, 1968: 213.

²"Struggle in the Kremlin," Soviet Analyst (June 8), 1972: 2-6; Radio Liberty dispatch, November 29, 1972; Radianska Ukrayina (January 27), 1973 (on the dismissal of the first secretary at Poltava).

³Literaturna Ukrayina (September 6), 1968.

⁴Molod' Ukrayiny (October 24), 1969, and Radianska Ukrayina (September 6), 1970.

The chairman of the Ukrainian Writers Union, Oles' Honchar, who had begun his career in the 1940s as an Orthodox writer, said that in Ukrainian schools the native, i.e., Ukrainian language, was receiving less attention than foreign languages (he did not compare its status with that of Russian.) In 1968 he published a novel, Sobor, which criticized the neglect of Ukrainian historical monuments and traditions. He depicted as a particularly "negative hero" a local Party official who totally lacked any respect for, or understanding of, the national past, and was ready to order the destruction of an old Cossack church. The Honchar novel was at first favorably reviewed; the line soon changed, and it was condemned. Honchar himself lost his position several years later, but has continued to write in his more customary, Orthodox vein.¹

It is not easy to distinguish between the dissent that is punishable by the KGB and that which is tolerated and expressed in the official media. Many of those arrested in 1965 and 1972 had been writing for the press, and in this sense their activities were not illegal. Official dissent has expressed itself in the matter of language, its purity from foreign terms, the protection of specifically Ukrainian linguistic features from Russian forms, etc. Related to this was the educational reform question in 1958-1959, when Khrushchev proposed making Ukrainian and other republican languages elective subjects in Russian schools.²

¹"Sobor," Vitchyzna, 1968, no. 1.

²There was a great deal of debate and opposition to this proposal. The status of Ukrainian has been of particular concern to the Writers Union, which debated the problem at its Congress of 1966. Bilinsky, 1968: 147-184 reviews Ukrainian assertiveness in the post-Stalin era.

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Project: Attitudes of Major Soviet Nationalities

BEORUSSIA AND THE BEORUSSIAN

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This chapter is based on a paper contributed by the above-named specialist. However, the chapter as presented here has been edited by the project staff, and some of the data, tables, and other materials have been added. Responsibility for the final version therefore rests with the project.

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BELORUSSIA AND THE BELORUSSIANS

PART A

General Information

1. Territory

The territory of Soviet Belorussia¹ encompasses 80,134 square miles, nearly 1% of the entire USSR. It is the sixth largest Soviet republic. Bordering on Poland in the west, Lithuania and Latvia in the northwest, the Russian SFSR in the north and east, and the Ukraine in the south, its territory stretches 350 miles from south to north and about 400 miles from west to east. Belorussia's main administrative centers are Minsk (the capital, 1972 population 1,000,000), Brest, Grodno, Vitebsk, Mabilev, and Gomel. Since the establishment of the Belorussian SSR on January 1, 1919, its territory has changed dramatically as a result of historical claims, military conflict, and political manipulations, and also as a result of the expressed desires of Belorussians to be included in the republic. Large territories including the cities of Vitebsk, Mogilev, and Gomel were ceded to the BSSR by the RSFSR during the 1920s. The greatest changes came as a result of the Soviet Union's participation in the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact which divided Poland in 1939. Much of the formerly Polish territory was incorporated into the BSSR, nearly doubling its size. The Bialystok region was returned to Poland in 1945, but the rest has remained a part of Belorussia.

The latest territorial change occurred in 1964 when 8.7 square miles in the Manastyrshchyna raion of the Smolensk oblast were transferred from the Russian Federation to Soviet Belorussia at the request of the local population.²

Belorussia lies in the western part of the East European plain. Its highest elevation is 1,135 feet above sea level and its lowest 279 feet

¹ The English spelling of this name was derived from the transliteration rules of the Government Printing Office (GPO) Style Manual (1967). The first syllable is pronounced to rhyme with "yell."

² Zviazda (Minsk), Dec. 25, 1964.

above sea level. Three-fifths of its territory lie between 325 and 550 feet above sea level.¹ A chain of hills from the southwest to the northeast constitutes a watershed separating the rivers flowing north into the Baltic Sea (Western Dvina, Nieman) from those flowing south into the Black Sea (Pripiet, Dnieper).

Most of the republic is covered by the deposits of ancient glaciers--clay, sands, gravels, and boulders. The soil is relatively poor and needs fertilizing. A large part of the territory is covered by marshes and bogs. One-third is covered by forests, which play an important part in the republic's economy.² Belorussia has 3000 rivers with a total length of over 31,000 miles, of which about 5000 miles are navigable. 4000 of the republic's 10,000 lakes are of considerable size.³

The climate is moderately continental and relatively wet because of the proximity of the Baltic Sea and the influence of Atlantic winds. The average yearly precipitation is 20 to 26 inches (in wet years up to 40 inches). Temperatures vary from an absolute low of -40° F (January) to 95° F (July). The growing season lasts 176 to 205 days.

Belorussia is rich in peat, rock salt, potassium salts, oil, coal, shale, dolomites, limestone, marl, kaolin, all sorts of clays, sands and gravels, and other building materials. Even diamonds have been found.⁴ Many of these resources have been surveyed only in recent decades, dispelling the time-honored myth about the poverty of the Belorussian land.

¹For details, see Astashkin, 1970:12-15.

²Astashkin, 1970:281, 317.

³Ibid.: 347, 372.

⁴Sovetskaya Belorussiya, July 1, 1967.

II. Economy

Belorussia specializes in agriculture and light industries. The structure of the republic's GNP in 1969 was as follows: industry, 45.7%; construction, 9.9%; agriculture, 29.8%; transportation, 4.0%; commerce, supply, and other forms of material production, 11.3%.¹

Occupying nearly one per cent of the Soviet Union's territory and having 3.7% of the total population, Belorussia in 1970 produced 18% of the USSR's tractors, 18% of its motorcycles and scooters, 14% of its metal-cutting lathes, 15% of its bearings, 11% of its mineral fertilizers, 11% of its pianos, and 19% of its wrist watches, chemical fibers, and television sets.²

The main stress in the development of the non-metallic branches of the republic's machine-building industry is put on instrument making, radio and electric equipment, and electronics as well as chemical and oil refining industries (in 1972 5.8 million tons of oil were extracted in Belorussia).³

In per capita electricity production Belorussia stands tenth among the Soviet republics with 1669 kw/hrs against an average of 3052 for the entire Union.⁴ The production of electricity in 1970 represented an increase of 1.8 times that of 1965.⁵

The Belorussian SSR, with 2.9% of the Union's arable land, produced 13.7% of the potatoes, 22.4% of the flax fibre, 6.3% of the milk, and 5.6% of the meat in the Soviet Union in 1970. The BSSR has 6.2% of the USSR's cows and 5.9% of its hogs. Out of the 186,800,000 tons of grain produced in the USSR in 1970, 4,200,000 were grown in Belorussia (mainly rye, wheat, barley, buckwheat, and oats).⁶

¹Marcinkievič, 1972:25.

²Nar. khoz. 1970: 70, 72; Marcinkievič, 1972:23.

³Planovoye khozyaistvo (Moscow), 1972:7:72. For oil production, see Zviazda (Minsk), Nov. 10, 1972.

⁴Nar. khoz. 1970: 105.

⁵Vestnik statistiki, 1972:8:76.

⁶Nar. khoz. 1970: 155.

III. History

The name Belorussia in its present application is of relatively recent origin. During the second half of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th, western parts of Belorussia and even the region of Minsk were referred to as "Litva" [Lithuania]. The Belorussian city of Brest is known to history as Brest-Litovsk. This is a terminological reflection of the historic fact that between the 13th and the second half of the 18th century, Belorussia was at the center of the huge medieval empire known as the Grand Duchy of Lithuania (since 1569 in political union with the Kingdom of Poland).

When in 1891 the Russian Brockhaus-Yefron encyclopedia, Entsiklopedicheski Slovar, had to explain the term Belorussiya, it stated vaguely: "Formerly, Belorussiya mainly embraced the principalities of Polotsk, Vitebsk, and Smolensk. Presently, Belorussiya includes mainly the Minsk, Mogilev, and the western part of the Smolensk gubernias."¹

The origin and meaning of the name Belorussia have been variously explained as referring to the fair complexion of the people, their predominantly white attire, or their freedom from the Mongol domination in the 13th century. "From various explanations of the term," states the BSSR Academy's History of the BSSR, "the most plausible, we think, is the one interpreting Belaja Rus as a Sovereign and Free Rus."²

The forebears of the Belorussians, the East Slavic tribes of Krivichy, Dryhavichy (Dregoviches), and Radzimichy, moved into the area from the west and southwest around the sixth century A.D. They either displaced or gradually assimilated the local East Baltic tribes.³

¹ Entsiklopedicheski slovar, 1891:5:231. See more of this in Zaprudnik, 1969:7-19. Gubernias were Tsarist administrative units roughly comparable to oblasts today.

² Historyja, 1972:I:175-176. See also Vakar, 1949:VIII:3.

³ Sedov, 1970:191-192. The role of the Baltic substratum in the formation of the Belorussian people is a lively issue in present historiography. A concise review of various approaches to the question are given by M. Ya. Grinblat (1968:20-39).

The beginnings of political organization in the Belorussian lands go back to the 9th century when, according to an ancient chronicle, one of Prince Riurik's men received the principality of Polotsk. This town, situated along the "Road from the Varangians to the Greeks," and connected by the West Dvina River with the Baltic Sea, soon became a major political and cultural center. "The main content of the political history of the Polotsk principality in the second half of the 11th and the first half of the 12th centuries was the struggle of the feudal nobility for political separation from Kiev."¹ During the 13th and 14th centuries all the Belorussian lands along with the larger part of the Ukraine and some Russian territories were incorporated into the Grand Duchy of Lithuania.

In 1385, because of military pressures by the German Knights in the northwest and the Tatars in the south, Lithuania concluded a dynastic union with Poland. The independence of the Grand Duchy, however, was preserved. In 1569, in the face of expanding Muscovy, the Duchy entered into a political federation with Poland, ceding the Ukrainian territories to it. The Duchy now consisted of Belorussian and Lithuanian lands. Sharing with Poland a common king and parliament, it retained, however, its name, own government, finances, military forces, and legislation.² The Belorussian nobility, attracted by the privileges of the Polish szlachta, largely embraced Catholicism and the Polish language. The process of Polonization was accelerated by the establishment of the Uniate Church in 1596. In 1697 Belorussian ceased to be the official language of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and was replaced by Polish.³

By three consecutive partitions of the Polish Commonwealth, in 1772, 1793, and 1795, Belorussia was incorporated into the Russian Empire. The annexation of Belorussia (or "re-unification" as Soviet historians would have it), did not change its basic social structure of large landed estates and serf labor.

¹Historyia, 1972:I:110.

²BielSE, 1971:3:234; Historyia, 1972:229,289.

³Historyia litaratury, 1968:I:411.

As late as 1834, 90% of the total population were peasants, two-thirds of them belonging to landlords of predominantly Catholic belief and Polish culture.¹

Throughout the 19th century and during the first two decades of the 20th, Belorussia--viewed by tsarist officialdom as an inalienable part of Russia--remained, in the words of Premier Stolypin, an area of "economically weak Russian majority and economically strong Polish minority."²

The "economically strong Polish minority" was undermined somewhat after the anti-Russian uprisings of 1830 and 1863 which had strong repercussions in Belorussia. The clash between Orthodox Russian and Catholic Polish nationalism over Belorussia during the 19th century precipitated a vast number of historical, ethnographic, and linguistic publications which contributed considerably to the development of Belorussian literature, national awareness, and political aspirations.

The roots of the modern political revival of Belorussia lie in the 1863 uprising led by Kastus Kalinouski (1838-64),³ and the activities of Belorussian Narodniks in the 1870s-80s. It was the Narodniks who "most fully defined the essential traits of nationhood and on the basis of these proved the existence of an independent Belorussian nation."⁴

Through the efforts of the Belorussian Socialist Hramada, founded in 1903, and other Belorussian political parties, a Belorussian National Convention was convened in December 1917.⁵ This led to the proclamation on March 25, 1918, of the independent Belorussian Democratic Republic [Biełaruskaja Narodnaja Respublika]. These developments, combined with promptings

¹ Historyja, 1972:I:478.

² Zapрудnik, 1969:195. See also Historyja, 1972:I:583ff.

³ Smirnov, 1963:331-332.

⁴ Sambuk, 1972:176.

⁵ Malashko, 1969:90-91; Zapрудnik, 1966:4:218,222ff.

of the Belorussian sections of the Russian Communist Party for Belorussian statehood, resulted in the establishment of the Belorussian SSR.¹

The Treaty of Riga, which concluded the Russo-Polish war of 1919-1920, divided Belorussia between the USSR and Poland. Belorussians were allowed a certain measure of political and cultural freedom until 1927 by the Poles and until 1929 in the USSR. In September 1939 the USSR re-annexed Western Belorussia along with the Western Ukraine.

The country was heavily devastated by World War II. It lost 25% of its population and immeasurable material wealth. According to the agreements arrived at at the Yalta conference, the republic became a founding member of the United Nations and began the task of rebuilding itself.

¹Mienski, 1955:5-33; V. Krutalevič, 1968:9:168-210.

IV. Demography

In 1970 there were approximately 9,000,000 people in Soviet Belorussia with the following breakdown according to nationality and in comparison with the 1959 census:¹

	1970 (in thousands)	Percentage of total	1959 (in thousands)	Percentage of total
BELORUSSIAN SSR	9,002	100.0%	8,056	100.0%
Belorussians	7,290	81.0	6,532	81.1
Russians	938	10.4	660	8.2
Poles	383	4.3	539	6.7
Ukrainians	191	2.1	133	1.7
Jews	148	1.6	150	1.9
Other Nationalities	52	0.6	42	0.4

While the percentage of Belorussians has remained constant with respect to the rest of the population, the number of Russians, Ukrainians, and "Others" in the republic has increased. The number of Jews in the republic has decreased slightly; Poles even more substantially. The latter phenomenon is probably best explained by the progress of reassimilation among Belorussian Catholics. "The larger part of the Polish national group in the republic is of native (i.e. Belorussian) origin."²

Approximately two million Belorussians in the Soviet Union live outside their republic.³ Their numbers have increased since 1959:⁴

¹ Izvestiya, April 7, 1971 and Sovetskaya Belorussiya, May 19, 1971.

² Rakov, 1969:130.

³ Ibid.: 127.

⁴ Nar. khoz. 1970: 18-21.

<u>Republic</u>	1970 (in thousands)	Percentage of total	1959 (in thousands)	Percentage of total
Russian SFSR	964	0.7	844	0.7
Ukrainian SSR	386	0.8	291	0.7
Kazakh SSR	198	1.5	106	1.2
Lithuanian SSR	45	1.5	30	1.1
Latvian SSR	95	4.0	62	2.9
Estonian SSR	19	1.4	11	0.9

In 1970 the 9,100,000 Belorussians were the fourth largest group in the Soviet Union, after the Russians, Ukrainians, and Uzbeks. In 1959 they occupied third place, but then dropped behind the Uzbeks, who have had a higher birth rate.

In 1970, out of 9 million Belorussians in the Soviet Union, 7,290,000 (80.9%) lived in their own republic. Unlike in the Baltic Republics, where the percentage of those living in their own republic increased between 1959 and 1970, the percentage of Belorussians in the BSSR dropped since 1959 when it was 82.7% (when 6,532,000 of the 7,913,000 Belorussians living in the Soviet Union lived in Belorussia).¹

The total population of the Belorussian SSR slipped from third place in the USSR in 1940 to fifth in 1970. This was due to (1) World War II losses (2,200,000 killed, 380,000 deported to Germany or emigrating to Western Europe);² (2) a negative balance of migration—both internal to Kazakhstan and Siberia, and external to Poland—with a loss between 1950 and 1964 of 1,200,000 people, or 60% of the country's natural increase;³ (3) a lower rate of natural increase in recent years (13.7 per 1000 in 1940 vs. 8.6 per 1000 in 1970 with corresponding figures for the USSR, 13.2 and 9.2).⁴ In spite of a reversal of the trend toward emigration

¹See Nar. khoz. 1970: 15 and Sovetskaya Belorussiya, May 19, 1971.

²Rakov, 1969: 16.

³Rakau, 1968: 186.

⁴Nar. khoz. 1970: 50-51. According to Andrej Bahrovič, a Belorussian-American scholar, the total demographic loss for the BSSR between 1939 and 1959 was in the vicinity of 6,000,000 people killed, deported, or unborn. See Bahrovič, 1962: 34.

since 1965, due to the intensified economic development of the country,¹ it was not until 1971 that Belorussia regained its pre-World War II level of population.²

Traditionally an agricultural country, Belorussia still has a predominantly rural character:³

	<u>1970</u>		<u>1959</u>	
	% Urban popula- tion	% Rural popula- tion	% Urban popula- tion	% Rural Popula- tion
USSR	56%	44%	48%	52%
BSSR	43%	57%	31%	69%
Difference for BSSR	-13%	+13%	-17%	+17%

In March 1971 the Communist Party of Belorussia had a membership of 434,527 which constituted 3% (up from 2% in 1956) of the total membership of the CPSU.⁴ The latest available nationality breakdown of the CPB (379,221 members) is dated January 1968: Belorussians, 70%, Russians, 18.5%, Ukrainians, 4.4%, Others, 7.1%.⁵ There were 27,382 Belorussians in the Ukrainian CP in 1968.⁶ The total number of Belorussians in the CPSU in 1969 was given as 464,400.⁷ The Belorussians were clearly underrepresented in the CPB whereas the Russian representation was almost double their weight in the population.

¹ Rakau, 1968: 86.

² Zviazda, Nov. 26, 1972.

³ Sovetskaya Belorussiya, May 19, 1971.

⁴ Duevel, 1971. See Tables II, III, and IV.

⁵ Kommunist Belorussii, 1968:8:36.

⁶ Radianska Ukraina (Kiev), June 30, 1968.

⁷ Problems of Communism, July-August, 1971: 20.

Of 425 deputies elected in June 1971 to the Supreme Soviet of the BSSR, 296 (70%) were Party members.¹ In the local Soviets of the BSSR, 35,373 of 80,652 deputies (44%) were Communists.² The Belorussian SSR is represented in the CPSU Central Committee and the Central Auditing Commission (totaling 254 members) by 11 delegates (including one member of the military).³

Kirill T. Mazurov, a Belorussian, has been a full member of the Politburo of the CPSU since 1965. He is also First Deputy Premier of the Soviet Union. The Belorussian Piotr M. Masherov has been the First Secretary of the CPB since 1965 and an Alternate Member of the CPSU Politburo.⁴ Mikhail V. Zimyanin, Pravda's editor, is also a Belorussian.⁵

¹Cyrvonaja zmiena (Minsk), June 17, 1971.

²Sovetskoye gosudarstvo i pravo (Moscow), 1972:12:163.

³Duevel, 1971: Table IV.

⁴Radio Liberty, CRD 334/69, Oct. 10, 1969, "Spravka o chlenakh Politburo i Sekretariata TsK KPSS."

⁵Who's Who in the USSR, 1966: 993. See also Duevel, 1965.

V. Culture

The basic features of Belorussian culture developed along with the process of consolidation of the Belorussian nationality. The Byzantine tradition of Christianity was an early and powerful external factor in the shaping of Belorussian spiritual and material culture. The great cathedral of St. Sophia in Polotsk was built almost simultaneously with the ones in Kiev and Novgorod¹ in the mid-eleventh century. The cities of Polotsk, Turau, Vitebsk, Pinsk with their churches and monasteries became centers of literacy, education, and artistic creativity. The activities and writings of St. Euphrosyne of Polotsk,² St. Cyril of Turau,³ the highly developed and original architecture stand as best evidence of the achievements of medieval Belorussia.

In the 16th century "in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania Belorussian was the language of official business and legal procedures, as well as literary works and religious polemics."⁴ The great Belorussian humanist Franciŭsak Skaryna from Polotsk (1485?-1540) translated the Bible into Belorussian and published lavish editions in Prague (1517-1519) and Vilna (1522-1525).⁵ The Reformation and Counter-Reformation evoked intense polemics in Belorussia, producing a flood of publications and keeping numerous printing houses busy. Education was spread throughout the country via a network of church schools. The Vilna Academy, founded in 1579, became an important center of scholarship for the entire area.

Until the end of the 16th century Belorussians maintained their Orthodox faith. But the growth of Polish influence in the 17th and 18th

¹ Alekseyev, 1966:194-196; Historyja, 1972:1:138.

² Nadson, 1969:3-24.

³ Nadson, 1965:4-15.

⁴ BielSE, III:237.

⁵ See Biełaraskaha knihadrukavannia, 1968; Zapisy, 1970:5, entirely devoted to F. Skaryna.

centuries and the proselytism of the Jesuits changed the picture. By the end of the 19th century 25% of Belorussians were Catholics. However, the advance of Christianity and the many religious battles left intact many ancient pagan elements in the spiritual outlook of the Belorussian masses. "Byelaya Rus'," observed the Russian ethnographer P. Bessonov in 1871, "preserved in its ceremonies, and in the songs accompanying them, echoes of the most ancient times as nowhere else among the Slavs."¹

Folklore, social injustices, national oppression (the Belorussian language was prohibited between 1859 and 1905), and memories of a glorious past became the basic ingredients of the national revival toward the end of the 19th century. The names of Francisak Bahusevic (1840-1900), Janka Kupała (1882-1942), Jakub Kołas (1882-1957) and Maksim Bahdanovič (1891-1917) and the newspaper Naša Niva [Our Soil] (1906-1915),² to which three of them contributed, are milestones in the development of Belorussian culture and national consciousness.³ The monumental work of the academician Jaufim Karski (1861-1931), Belorusy, laid the scientific foundation for the study of Belorussian.⁴

Great strides were made in the development of Belorussian culture during the 1920s.⁵ The terror of the 1930s, however, sharply reduced creative activities.⁶

Since the end of World War II Belorussian culture has steadily been developing in spite of many difficulties and restrictions, building to a very large extent on the achievements of the past centuries.

¹Grinblat, 1968:248,252.

²Nadson, 1967:184-206.

³Historyja literatury, 1968:V.

⁴McMillin, 1967:207-214.

⁵Niamiha, 1955:34-66.

⁶Adamovich, 1958:145-172; Kzushinsky, 1953; Kabysh, 1958:77-88.

VI. External Relations

External relations of the Belorussian SSR are mainly concerned with Belorussia's membership in the U.N. and UNESCO, and the approximately two million Belorussians living in the West.¹

During the post-war decades delegates from Soviet Belorussia took part in over 300 international conferences.² As of 1969 the BSSR had been signatory to more than 100 international treaties, agreements, conventions, and protocols.³ Belorussia, however, has no diplomatic representation of its own abroad with the exception of a permanent mission at the U.N., thus lending credence to the U.S. Secretary of State William P. Rogers' statement before the U.N. General Assembly that "Belorussia and the Ukraine are not separate states."⁴

In 1964 the Belorussian Section of the All-Union Committee for the Return to the Homeland (established in 1955) was transformed into the Belorussian Society for Cultural Ties with Countryment Abroad.⁵ Since 1955 a Belorussian-language weekly, Hołas Radzimy [Voice of the Homeland] has been published in Minsk (circulation, 6750; with some texts in Russian, English, French, and German) and distributed abroad together with brochures and booklets in the Voice of the Homeland series.⁶ In 1970 the Belorussian Society for Friendship and Cultural Ties with Foreign Countries maintained contacts with 271 "progressive organizations" in 53 countries.⁷

¹ BielSE, II:215.

² Sovetskoye gosudarstvo i pravo, 1970:14:41.

³ BielSE, I:415.

⁴ New York Times, Oct. 5, 1971.

⁵ BielSE, II:215.

⁶ BielSE, III:528.

⁷ BielSE, II:215.

Belorussian-language radio broadcasts are conducted by "Radio Soviet Belorussia" and "Radio Moscow" and are beamed to Western Europe, North America, and Latin America.¹ Radio Liberty and Radio Vatican broadcast in Belorussian.

In Poland there are about 200,000 Belorussians. They have their own schools and a social-cultural society headquartered in Bialystok with a network of branches. Since 1956 they have published the weekly Niva, a magazine for children called Zorka, and yearly almanacs.

¹East-West Digest, 1972: 622-623.

BELORUSSIA AND THE BELORUSSIANS

PART B

Media

1. Language Data

The Belorussian language came into use before the 13th century.¹ "In the Grand Duchy of Lithuania [14th-17th centuries] the Belorussian language was long used in official, diplomatic, and private correspondence, in municipal, regional and feudal courts...."² During the course of the 18th and 19th centuries it was replaced first by Polish and then in some areas by Russian. Scholarly studies of Belorussian began in the early 19th century.³ The development of modern orthographic and grammatical norms occurred with late 19th century publications, especially with the weekly Naša Niva [Our Soil], published from 1906 to 1915.⁴

The first important modern grammar appeared in 1918.⁵ Before the Soviet era, and outside of the USSR after 1917, both Latin and Cyrillic alphabets were used. However, the latter gained predominance.

Traditionally, language has played an important role in the development and maintaining of national consciousness. "Belorussia, my brothers, is where our language lives," Francišak Bahusevič, the "father" of modern Belorussian literature, declared in 1891.⁶ This attitude is typical of current efforts in Belorussia to maintain the native language as a condition sine qua non for national survival.

According to the 1970 census, out of 7,290,000 Belorussians in the BSSR, 6,571,000 (90.1%) indicated Belorussian as their native language (in 1959, the percentage was 93.2). Belorussian was also named as their native language by 328,000 members of other nationalities of the republic.

¹ Filin, 1972:3.

² BielSE, II:226. See also Žurauski, 1967.

³ Biełaruskaje, 1967:5.

⁴ Žurauski, 1968:2:118ff.

⁵ Ibid.:160ff.

⁶ Aleksandrovič, et al., 1971:221.

In addition, 606,000 people indicated Belorussian as a second language which they spoke fluently. The total number of Belorussian speakers in the republic in 1970 was 7,505,000, or 83.4% of the entire population.¹

In 1970 80.6% of all Belorussians in the USSR considered Belorussian their native language² (down from 84.2% in 1959; cf. Table B.1).

The ability to speak Russian fluently as a second language was claimed by 49% of the Belorussians in the USSR. How many of these live outside their republic is unknown. A. Rakov, discussing the results of the 1959 census, observed, however: "By finding themselves among natives of other republics which have distinctly specific conditions of life--social, economic, cultural, linguistic, and other differences--the Belorussians as well as any other national minority in the given republic will feel an especially strong Russian influence in respect to language and other aspects of culture. Among the Belorussians living outside of their republic only 30% consider Belorussian as their native language."³

¹Sovetskaya Belorussiya, May 19, 1971. For details of the 1959 census, see Rakov, 1969:124-136.

²Izvestiya, April 17, 1971.

³Rakov, 1969:128-129. Calculations based on the 1970 census indicate this figure to be 41.1% for Belorussians living in other republics of the USSR, and this is the figure given in Table B.1.

Table 8.1.

Native and Second Languages Spoken by Belorussians
(in thousands)

Number of Belorussians Residing:	Speaking as their Native Language					Speaking as a Second Language		
	1959		1970		Percentage point change 1959-1970	Russian		Other language ages of the peoples of USSR, 1970 ^b
	1959	1970	1959	1970		1959	1970	
In the Belorussian SSR	6,532 (100%)	7,290 (100%)	6,086 (93.2%)	6,571 (90.1%)	-3.1	442 (6.8%)	717 (9.8%)	3,809 (52.2%) 326 (4.5%)
In other Soviet Republics	1,381 (100%)	1,762 (100%)	578 (41.8%)	724 (41.1%)	-7	770 (55.8%)	1001 (56.8%)	623 (35.4%) 331 (18.8%)
Total	7,913 (100%)	9,052 (100%)	6,665 (84.2%)	7,291 (80.2%)	-4.0	1,212 (15.3%)	1,718 (19.0%)	4,432 (49.0%) 657 (7.3%)

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Sources: For 1959 census, Itogi SSSR, 1959, Table 53; Itogi, Belorusskaya SSR, 1959, Table 53.
For 1970 census, Itogi 1970: IV:20, 192.

^a Including Belorussian, if not the native language.

^b No data are available for 1959, since no questions regarding command of a second language were asked in the 1959 census.

II. Local Media

Literacy, in Belorussia, among those aged between 9 and 49 years, has progressed as follows: 1897, 32%; 1926, 57.7%; 1939, 80.8%; 1959, 99.0%; and 1970, 99.8%.¹

In 1971, 168 newspapers appeared in Soviet Belorussia (128 in Belorussian) as well as 111 periodical publications such as magazines, "note-books" (containing mainly material for propagandists), bulletins, collections of scholarly articles, proceedings of learned societies, etc. Out of the 111 periodical publications, 27 were printed in Belorussian. The category of "periodical publications" comprises 29 magazines of which 17 were printed in Belorussian.²

Since some of the newspapers as well as periodicals are of limited circulation, a better perspective is obtained when the total year's circulations for Belorussian and Russian are compared. (See Table B.2)

Thus, the total circulation of Belorussian-language newspapers in 1971 was 255,127,000 copies, while in Russian 444,982,000 copies were printed.³ In the same year, the total circulation of all other periodicals in the Belorussian language was 22,650,000; in Russian, 5,263,000.⁴

Belorussian is more widely used in local media. On the all-republic level, however, preference is given to Russian as could be seen from the following single-issue circulation figures for a set of parallel newspapers:⁵

¹Nar. obraz., 1971: 21.

²Rechat' 1970: 158, 188.

³Ibid.: 188.

⁴Ibid.: 158.

⁵Letapis, 1972: 1: 43.

Table B.2.

Publications in the Belorussian SSR

Language of Publication	Year	Newspapers ^a			Magazines			Books and Brochures		
		No.	Per Issue Circulation (1000)	Copies/100 in Language Group	No.	Per Issue Circulation (1000)	Copies/100 in Language Group	No. of Titles	Total Volume (1000)	Copies/100 in Language Group
Russian	1959	46	820	62.6	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	744	7,601	580.4
	1971	40	2,576	135.0	12	145	7.6	2,135	15,882	832.6
Belorussian	1959	167	950	14.9	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	571	9,499	149.3
	1971	128	1,598	23.2	17	819	11.9	419	9,814	142.3
Minority Languages	1959	0	0	--	N.A.	N.A.	--	N.A.	N.A.	--
	1971	0	0	--	0	0	--	1	7	--
Foreign Languages	1959	0	0	--	N.A.	N.A.	--	M.A.	N.A.	--
	1971	0	0	--	0	0	--	N.A.	N.A.	--
All Languages	1959	213	1,770	22.0	19	365	4.5	1,317 ^b	17,101 ^b	212.3
	1971	168	4,174	46.4	29	964	10.7	2,598	26,212	291.5

Belorussia - Local Media -

^a 1970 figures do not include kolkhoz newspapers.^b Book totals given in Pechat' sometimes differ from totals in language categories. The indication is that books are published in other languages, but no data is given.Sources: Pechat' 1959: 54, 128, 164; 1971: 95, 178, 188.

	<u>In Belorussian</u>	<u>In Russian</u>
Organs of the CC of the CPB, the Supreme Soviet and the Council of Ministers of the BSSR, daily, Minsk	<u>Zviazda</u> (97,500)	<u>Sovetskaya Belorussiia</u> (276,900)
Organs of the CC of the Komsomol of the BSSR appearing five times a week, in Minsk	<u>Cyrvonaja zmiena</u> (69,150)	<u>Znamya yunosti</u> (408,300)
Organs of the CC of the Komsomol of the BSSR and republic's Council of Pioneer Organization, weekly, in Minsk	<u>Pijanier Biełarusi</u> (366,050)	<u>Zor'ka</u> (1,090,100)

The two all-republic Belorussian newspapers, addressed especially to members of the intelligentsia and educators, have no Russian-language counterparts in the BSSR. They are Litaratura i mastactva [Literature and Art], a 16-page weekly illustrated tabloid (circulation, 12,950) and Nastaŭnickaja hazieta [Teachers' Newspaper], a full-size four-page semi-weekly (circulation, 68,507). Indicative of the drive toward Russification in rural areas is the publication of the Russian-language daily Selskaya gazeta [Rural Newspaper] (circulation, 147,850) without any Belorussian-language counterpart.¹

A vast majority of scientific periodical publications in the BSSR are published in Russian exclusively.² The relationship between Belorussian and Russian publishing in Minsk is illustrated by the circulation of Vecherni Minsk [The Evening Minsk] of 1450 in Belorussian and 185,300 in Russian.³

In the realm of book publishing the republic has shown a steady progress, both in the number of titles and in the total copies printed:

¹ Letapis, 1972:1:43.

² Ibid.: 32-43.

³ Ibid.: 51.

<u>Year</u>	<u>Number of Titles</u>	<u>Number of Copies</u>
1960	1,602	14,231,000
1965	1,931	23,016,000
1970	2,174	25,170,000

Following is the breakdown of Belorussian and Russian-language titles for the same years:

<u>Year</u>	<u>Belorussian Titles</u>	<u>Russian Titles</u>
1960	425	1,177
1965	295	1,636
1970	428	1,746
1971	419	2,179

In the field of book publishing the Belorussian language has been losing ground to Russian since 1956. In that year 285 titles were printed in Belorussian vs. 461 in Russian, as compared with 428 vs. 305 in 1954.¹ In 1971 the total number of Belorussian books and brochures printed in the BSSR constituted 37.4% of the entire book production in the republic.²

In 1968 Belorussia's population had for personal use 1,200,000 radio receivers and 826,000 television sets in addition to those owned by institutions and collective farms for public use. In the same year, there were 136 television sets per thousand urban population, 195 radio receivers per 1000, and 169 loudspeakers per 1000. Among the rural population there were only 28 television sets per 1000 and 284 radio receivers and radio loudspeakers per 1000 (see Table B.3. for summary totals for a later date).

By 1968 the entire territory of the republic was covered by radio networks and 77% (inhabited by 84% of the population) by TV networks. Plans were

¹See Pechat' 1954: 38 and 1957: 44-45.

²See Nar. obraz., 1971: 362; Pechat' 1970: 95.

³Yeshin, 1970: 148-149.

Table B.3.

Electronic Media and Films in the Belorussian SSR

Year	Radio				Television			Movies	
	No. of Stations	No. of Wired Sets (1000)	Sets /100 population	No. of wireless sets (1000)	Sets /100 population	No. of Stations	Of which relay points	No. of sets (1000)	Sets /100 population
1960	N.A.	1,258 ^d	15.3 ^d	633 ^a	7.7 ^c	*	*	62 ^a	0.8 ^c
1970	N.A.	1,996 ^a	21.9 ^d	1,400 ^a	15.4 ^c	*	*	1,111 ^a	12.2 ^c
1971	N.A.	2,148 ^d	23.5 ^d	1,545 ^d	16.9 ^c	*	*	1,265 ^c	13.8 ^c
								287 ^b	3.4 ^d
								638 ^b	7.0 ^d
								N.A.	N.A.

^aSource: Transport i svyaz' SSR, 1972: 296-298.^bSource: Nar. obraz., 1971: 225^cSource: Nar. khoz. 1972: 572, 578.^dComputed from data cited above (b and c).*Precise data unavailable. Problemy teledeniya i radio (1971) lists four TV studios in Belorussia in 1965; Teledeniye i radioveshchaniye, 1972: 12:13 lists 5 in 1972.

adopted to complete television coverage for the republic by 1970. The foundation was being laid for color TV.¹

In 1968 Belorussian Radio had three programs totaling 18 hours of broadcasting.² Besides Radio "Soviet Belorussia," two daily half-hour programs were broadcast for countrymen abroad.³ In 1967 a Moscow-based half-hour radio program "Rodina" was broadcast in Belorussian weekly for Western Europe and the Americas.⁴

Belorussian television is currently working on three channels totaling 11 hours of programming a day.⁵ However, only one channel carries most of the programs of local origin. The other two are predominantly relay stations for Moscow programming. No data are available either for locally originated TV programs or for the place of the Belorussian language in them. According to some recent sources coming from Belorussia, about 70% of radio programs are in Belorussian, and about 20% to 25% of TV broadcasts use Belorussian. A Belorussian-language weekly, Belorussian Television and Radio, has a circulation of 150,000.⁶

¹ Kokhonov, 1968: 42, 50.

² Litaratura i mastactva, Nov. 15, 1968.

³ See Hoias radzimy, 1968: 18 and 1969: 12.

⁴ Hoias radzimy, 1967: 25.

⁵ Touscik, 1973: 1:60.

⁶ Letapis, 1972:1:32.

III. Educational Institutions

On June 23, 1972, a law was passed by the Supreme Soviet of the BSSR, "On the Complete Switch to General Secondary Education of the Youth of the Belorussian SSR."¹ In February 1972, The Teachers' Newspaper reported that 91.4% of former eighth graders were continuing their education in the 9th grade.² Over 90% of Belorussia's teachers in 1971 had received a higher education.³

There are no data on how many of the 10,783 schools in the BSSR use Belorussian or Russian as the language of instruction. This is a closely guarded secret of Soviet nationality policy. There is, however, evidence that urban schools use the Russian language exclusively. The Canadian-Ukrainian author, John Kolasky, who studied in the Ukraine in 1963-65 reported upon his return to Canada that "there are no schools in Minsk with Belorussian as the language of instruction."⁴ This report was confirmed in the United States in 1972 by a highly placed Soviet Belorussian official. On the other hand, statements asserting that Belorussian has been totally eliminated from secondary education are false. The Annals of Printing in the BSSR contain the titles of textbooks for all subjects for all the secondary school grades, and include Belorussian titles.⁵

Since the latter half of the 1960s, instruction in the schools of the BSSR has been conducted according to revised programs. Following are the hours assigned for teaching the Belorussian and Russian languages and literatures:

¹ Narodnaja asvieta (Minsk), 1972:7:6ff.

² Nastaunickaja hazieta, Feb. 3, 1972. This indicates a large number of incomplete secondary school graduates continuing in complete secondary schools.

³ Nar. obraz., 1972:7:76.

⁴ Kolasky, 1968:72.

⁵ See, for example, Letapis, 1971:11:22; 12:36; 1972:4:29; 5:27.

SCHOOLS WITH BELORUSSIAN AS THE LANGUAGE OF INSTRUCTION

Grades	Number of hours per week									
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Belorussian Language	12	7	7-6	5	3	3-2	2-1	2-1	-	--
Russian Language	--	4-5	5-6	5	4-5	4	3	2	-	--
Belorussian Literature	--	-	-	2-1	2-1	1-2	1-2	1-2	2	2
Russian Literature	--	-	-	2	2	2	2	3	4	3

SCHOOLS WITH RUSSIAN AS THE LANGUAGE OF INSTRUCTION

Grades	Number of hours per week									
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Russian Language	12	11	9	7	6	5	3	2	-	1
Belorussian Language	--	--	3	3-4	2	2	2	2-1	-	-
Russian Literature	--	--	-	2	2	2	2	3	4	3
Belorussian Literature	--	--	-	1	1	1	1	1-2	2	2

Source: Nastaunickaja hazieta, April 8, 1970.

In its ratio of specialized secondary school students (161 students per 10,000 population), the Belorussian SSR is eighth among the union republics (the average for the USSR is 180 per 10,000 population).¹ The republic ranks eleventh in its ratio of college students (154 per 10,000 population; the USSR average is 188).²

Of the 28 higher schools [vuzy] in the BSSR in 1970-1971, six prepared specialists in industrial engineering and construction (42,313 students), one in transportation and communication (4,973 students), four in agriculture (19,160), two in economics and law (9,557), nine in education (51,045), four in medical

¹Nar. obraz., 1971:167. and see the Composite Tables section of this study.

²Ibid.:158.

studies and physical education (11,272), and two in arts and cinematography (1714).¹

Russian is used throughout the higher educational institutions of the USSR with exception of certain courses in philology and literature.

Of the approximately 140,000 students of higher education in the BSSR in 1971, 63.5% (88,942) were Belorussians (with Belorussians constituting 81% of the BSSR's population). At the same time, of the 130,200 Belorussian students in the entire Soviet Union, 40,560 men and women were studying in other republics of the Union, mainly in the RSFSR (29,053) and Ukraine (6705).²

¹Nar. obraz. 1971:170.

²Computed from Nar. obraz., 1971: 197-204.

Table B.4.

Selected Data on Education in the Belorussian SSR (1971)

Population: 9,142,000

			<u>Per 1000</u> <u>Population</u>
(p.542) <u>All schools</u>			
- number of schools	-	10,783	1.18
- number of students	-	1,863,000	203.8
(p.540) <u>Newly opened elementary, incomplete secondary, and secondary schools</u>			
- number of schools	-	120	
- number of student places	-	53,100	5.8
(p.542) <u>Secondary special schools</u>			
- number of schools	-	130	
- number of students	-	149,000	16.29
(p.542) <u>Institutions of higher education</u>			
- number of institutions	-	28	
- number of students	-	142,800	15.62
(p.437) <u>Universities</u>			
- number of universities	-	2	
- number of students			<u>% of</u> <u>Total</u>
total	-	22,412	2.45
day students	-	12,434	55.4%
evening students	-	3,174	14.1%
correspondence students	-	6,804	30.3
- newly admitted			
total	-	4,708	0.5
day students	-	2,880	61.1%
evening students	-	643	13.6%
correspondence students	-	1,185	25.1%
- graduated			
total	-	3,444	0.38
day students	-	2,063	59.9%
evening students	-	405	11.7%
correspondence students	-	976	28.3%

Selected Data on Education in the Belorussian SSR (1971) (continued)

1.108) <u>Graduate students</u>			<u>Per 1000</u> <u>Population</u>
- total number of	-	2,793	0.03
- in scientific research institutions	-	1,369	
- in universities	-	1,424	
1.531) <u>Number of persons with (in 1970) higher or secondary (complete and incomplete) education</u>			
- per 1000 individuals, 10 years and older	-	440	
- per 1000 individuals employed in national economy	-	594	
1.534) <u>Number of workers graduated from professional-technical schools</u>	-	58,600	6.41

Source: Nar. khoz. 1972. (Page references given above.)

IV. Cultural and Scientific Institutions

In 1970 the 173 scientific institutions of the BSSR employed 21,863 scientific workers (425 doctors of science and 5564 candidates of science).¹ No data are available as to their national composition. However, an idea can be obtained from the following breakdown of the 18,618 pedagogical and scientific workers the BSSR had at the beginning of 1969: 48% Belorussians, 35.5% Russians, 7.8% Jews, 6.2% Ukrainians, 2.7% other nationalities.²

The high proportion of scientists of other nationalities can be accounted for by recent developmental trends in science and industry for which the republic had to invite specialists from other Soviet centers. In recent years, it has been noted, "a tendency has become evident toward a growth in the number of Belorussian scientists both in proportion to their total as well as among the category of the most qualified who have scientific degrees."³ In 1960 among the doctors of science in the republic Belorussians constituted 33%; in 1969, 41.3%. Among the candidates of science the figures were 44% and 46.2% respectively.⁴

As to the total number of scientists of Belorussian nationality in the USSR, their ranks grew from 2713 in 1950 to 6358 in 1960, 12,814 in 1965, and 18,968 in 1970.⁵

Belorussia has a high proportion of specialists in the humanities - over 29% of the entire number of scientific workers.⁶ The fastest growing group of scientists are those in engineering, chemistry, physics, mathematics, and economics.⁷

¹Viesci AN BSSR, 1972: 6: 36. See also Nar. obraz., 1971: 257.

²Polymia, 1969: 9: 178.

³Ibid.

⁴Ibid.

⁵Nar. obraz., 1971: 270.

⁶Polymia, 1969: 9: 177.

⁷Ibid.

In 1970 the Academy of Sciences of the BSSR employed 123 doctors and 888 candidates of science who constituted 33.5% of the total number of scientific workers of the Academy. This represents an increase over the previous year of 16 doctors and 74 candidates. The total number of Academy employees increased by 998 from 1969 to 1970.

Of the 14 professional theaters in Belorussia only three perform in the Belorussian language, the rest in Russian. There are, however, numerous "people's theaters" where Belorussian is used widely. Attendance at the professional theaters was 297.2 per 1,000 population in 1971.²

In 1970 the Belorussian Film Studio Biełarus'film produced 58 films of which 12 were full-length.³ The Belorussian language occupies, however, an insignificant place in the film industry--a situation which Belorussian writers and critics have been urgently trying to change in recent years.

In 1971 there were 49 museums in the republic. Total attendance for the year amounted to 3,421,000, or 374 per 1000 of the population.⁴ There were 7199 public libraries in the republic in 1971 with a total of 59,100,000 books and magazines in circulation. 6139 clubs were reported for the same year.⁵

¹Viesci AN BSSR, 1971: 3:142.

²Nar. khoz. 1972: 451.

³Nar. obraz., 1971: 330.

⁴Nar. khoz. 1972: 451.

⁵Ibid.: 542.

BELORUSSIA AND THE BELORUSSIANS

PART C

National Attitudes

I. Review of Factors Forming National Attitudes

Until recently, many Western authorities agreed that the Belorussian language, culture, and even national identity were weak and probably open to being successfully Russified. Recently, however, new studies and evidence from Belorussia indicate that the process of Russification, though going on, is paralleled by a revival of Belorussian national consciousness.

Like other Soviet minorities, Belorussians seek to consolidate and strengthen their national identity within the Soviet system. The "scientific-technological revolution" has acted as a catalyst in the formation of national attitudes. It has been accompanied by a growth in the intelligentsia, urbanization, and the influx of non-Belorussian specialists from other areas of the Soviet Union. The national psychology which had been nurtured by traditional literary images of Belorussia as a country of poor soil, sands, and marshes, was jolted by the progress of science and technology and the discovery in recent years of numerous natural resources, especially oil. Advances in the chemical industry, for example, have been particularly strong.

Although the Belorussian language and culture have been subtly or even sometimes overtly discriminated against by the Party and by the government of the Soviet Union, official vilification and derision have never been in evidence as they were in Western Belorussia, under Poland, before 1939 or in pre-1917 Tsarist Belorussia. In this context there is an effort by official Soviet theoreticians to explain that "it would be a great mistake to think that the rapprochement of nations under socialism means a process of 'denationalization' leading to the disappearance of nations."¹ On the contrary, "the existence of national differences is an inviolable fact," and it will remain so for a long time. This requires a "careful attitude toward [national] languages and cultures."²

¹Karluk, 1972.

²Ibid.

Since the level of urbanization is one indicator of modernization in general, it is clear that Belorussia, with her 43% of the population living in the cities, is in many respects lagging behind the RSFSR and Latvia, both with an urban population of 62%, as well as the USSR as a whole (with an average of 57%). On the other hand, urbanization also means Russification. In 1959, for example, 79% of Russian speakers in Belorussia lived in cities.¹ Thus, slowness to modernize may help to preserve national identity.

Belorussian writers have made a constant effort to maintain that the road to humanity lies "through one's own people."² The road to universal international culture," wrote Maryna Barstok, a literary critic, "lies through a full and thorough development of one's own national and unique values. . . . There is no need to hasten artificially the slow, centuries-long process of the unification of national cultures and languages or to favor any one single language. The native language is the basis of a national culture. Only in his native language can a person fully reveal himself and express his most intimate feelings."³ "When a work of art is saturated with national values," a Belorussian spokeswoman explained at the All-Union Symposium on Children's Literature held in Minsk, "it reflects general human characteristics."⁴

This concern is not limited to writers. For example, in January 1968 U. Stalmašonak, the chairman of the Artists Union of Belorussia, said in his report to the Union's congress: "Mutual international influences should be organically coupled with the application of the traditions of a national culture. . . . Each art should have its own distinctions related to the particularities of national character and to the history and traditions of a people."⁵

¹ Rakov, 1969: 133.

² Dziubajla, 1972: 243.

³ Poŭmnia, 1968: 4:203.

⁴ Litaratura i mastactva, April 7, 1972 (speech by Esfir Hurevič, "For National Particularity").

⁵ Litaratura i mastactva, Jan. 12 and 16 (speech by the art critic, V. Šmataŭ).

However, Belorussian literature has been the most pronounced on the subject of national values and consciousness. One of its essential characteristics has been described as an "active patriotic pathos--a singing love for Belorussia, her native language, and an interest in the history of the people."¹

The idea of the preservation and cultivation of national values is especially popular with young writers. One of their representatives, Ženia Janiščyc, spoke for many of them when she wrote, "We should not only listen to our times but also look more attentively into specific features of our national life and always feel our responsibility to literature and to our readers."²

What Janka Špakouski wrote of the poetry of Piatus Makal (b. 1932) could be said of many Belorussian writers and artists: "His national-political consciousness is growing sharper as well as his blood ties with the culture of his people." Špakouski quoted Makal:

Our children and grandchildren will recapitulate us--
Nations are not written off on pension.
You shall resound, my native language
As the word which cannot be thrown out of a song!³

An important factor in the maintenance and development of socialist Belorussia's "national consciousness" has been the territorial principle of Soviet cultural autonomy which associates cultural values and achievements with a given territory and, through a Marxian philosophical prism, connects them with the working masses.

¹Litaratura i mastactva, Nov. 22, 1968.

²Litaratura i mastactva, Feb. 26, 1971.

³Neman, 1969: 2:173.

In the case of Belorussia, whose upper strata had been either Polonized or Russified during most of the 18th and 19th centuries, cultural, scholarly, and scientific achievements are treated as an organic part of the Belorussian people's past, for those achievements "were possible only as a result of interchange between the physical and the intellectual work."¹

The same territorial principle works not only in respect to the past, but to the present (and the future). It imparts Belorussian national attributes to persons and undertakings associated with the territory of the republic. Because they live and work in Belorussia, members of the Academy of Sciences of the BSSR of non-Belorussian nationality - I.N. Akhverdov, an Armenian, P.A. Alsmik, a Latvian, N.P. Bulygin, a Russian, I.S. Kravchenko, a Ukrainian, etc.² - are considered "Belorussian scientists."³

Belorussia's membership in the United Nations and the success of Belorussian athletes in international competitions, epitomized by Alexander Medved and Olga Korbut, have been used widely by the republic's media--both Belorussian and Russian--to emphasize the achievements of the Belorussian socialist nation.

¹ Biralò, 1971: 13.

² Neman, 1972: 12:16.

³ See in BSE, I:274; II:10; II:464; VI:109.

II. Basic Views of Scholars on National Attitudes

Although Belorussia has been aptly described as "the Western Gate" to the Soviet Union¹--which was proven to be correct both by Napoleon and Hitler--there is a pronounced dearth of studies of her past and present in Western languages. One of the earliest attempts at a more or less systematic presentation of Belorussia for the English-speaking world was the "Subcontractor's Monograph," Belorussia, printed in 1955 by the Human Relations Area Files, Inc.² Despite the good intentions of its editors, it is an inadequate compendium of miscellaneous data.

A principal source of information on Belorussia has been Nicholas P. Vakar's book Belorussia: The Making of a Nation which is accompanied by A Bibliographical Guide to Belorussia.³ Covering the entire history of Belorussia, the author places his emphasis on the last one hundred years, specifically on the role of Belorussian nationalism in the shaping of political history. He arrived at the conclusion that Belorussian nationalism was heading "at home, toward complete dissolution in the Soviet sea; abroad, toward further crystallization of the nationalist doctrine."⁴ Some years after the publication of his book, Vakar, in an attempt "to sum up the ambiguities and uncertainties of the Belorussian situation" wrote: "We cannot speak of either nationhood or extinction. The people have their special ethnic characteristics, but the trend is to preserve them merely for their historical and sentimental value."⁵ Readable as they are and including much interesting information, Vakar's writings are, however, interspersed with factual errors and present a very personal point of view contested by recent evidence and other scholars.

A valuable study has been written by Anthony Adamovich, one of the participants in the Belorussian literary life of the 1920s and a survivor of the Stalinist purges. His book, Opposition to Sovietization in

¹See, for example, Poivmia, 1970: 8:162.

²Subcontractor's Monograph, HRAF-19, Chicago-10, Belorussia (New Haven: Human Relations Area Files, Inc. 1955).

³Vakar, 1956.

⁴Vakar, 1956: 225.

⁵Vakar, 1968: 226.

Belorussian Literature (1917-1957), describes the intense efforts during the years of the NEP to create a national literature "that will be seen by centuries and nations."¹ After the tragedies of the 1930s and World War II, efforts were launched in the mid-1950s to return to the national values and goals of the 1920s. In January 1957, however, the Communist Party of Belorussia condemned any "'revision' of the dirty linen of the Belorussian nationalists with the purpose of finding something 'positive, valuable, or progressive' there."²

By the 1970s, however, many of the 1957 restrictions had been lifted, and the rehabilitation of the past made considerable headway. The literary organization Excelsior [Uzvyssa], which figured prominently in Adamovich's Opposition as the leading core of the Belorussian national front, was recently described in the following words.

Excelsior was set up basically as a reaction to the creative and organizational structure of Maladniak [an organization inspired by the Komsomol]. In spite of some mistakes of an ideational-esthetic nature which, by the way, were typical of all literary organizations, it is necessary to indicate rectitude and justification of the establishment of this union. The Excelsiorists addressed themselves to the classical national heritage, actively adopted achievements of foreign literatures, and generously drew on the treasury of Belorussian folklore. They endeavored to get rid of provincial confinement to create an art which would 'be seen by centuries and nations.'³

In conjunction with the above, it is interesting to note the very last sentence of Adamovich's book: "When sooner or later the brakes no longer hold, the regeneration of 'people's progress' in Belorussia will surely begin from where it left off--from the Excelsior movement, from the heights once won by the Belorussian national literary opposition against Sovietization."

¹ Adamovich, 1958:86.

² Adamovich, 1958:73. Reference is made to an article in Zviazda, Jan. 12, 1957, entitled "For the Ideological Purity of our Literary Positions."

³ Viesci AN BSSR, 1972:6:56.

A new monograph has recently been added to the scant literature on Belorussia in Western languages: Ivan S. Lubachko's book, Belorussia Under Soviet Rule, 1917-1957.¹ The principal conclusion of the author runs contrary to Vakar's thesis about "complete dissolution" of Belorussian nationalism "in the Soviet sea." Lubachko states that in the post-Stalin era "national feeling became more intense than ever." Valuable details corroborating this view are contained in an article by A. Adamovich, "The Non-Russians," which reviewed the Soviet literary scene with an emphasis on Belorussian literature.²

Two main currents in Belorussian literature during the early 1960s are described in Stanislau Stankevich's monograph, Belorussian Literature Under the Soviets. With "at least 300 creatively active writers," Belorussian literature was characterized by the prevalence of humanitarian themes as a natural reaction to Stalinist suppression and with an emphasis on national values and allegiance as self-defense against the slogan (1961) about the inevitability of the "merger of all languages into one language of the future Communist society."³

These two tendencies remain very much alive. A recent survey of young Belorussian poets, noting "an unceasing influx of new forces into literature," acknowledged that "patriotic themes, as well as the theme of love, friendship, and nature have always been very attractive for young writers."⁴ At the same time the reviewer chided the young for their major shortcoming, the "lowering of civic and moral standards" (another term for partiinost).⁵

Soviet literature on the subject of the Belorussian socialist nation is quite extensive. It is uniform in its basic theses, and in many cases, written collectively. Belorussia is pictured as a prosperous and highly

¹ (Lexington, Ky.: Univ. of Kentucky Press, 1972)

² Adamovich, 1964:100-129.

³ Stankevich, 1967:12-14, 167.

⁴ Maľadosc, 1973:1:131.

⁵ Ibid.:133.

industrialized nation, equal to the other members of the Soviet family, and marching merrily toward Communism.¹ Under the surface, however, there is a significant amount of revisionism concerning the national past which reflects both attitudinal shifts and the progress of historical scholarship and provides ideological nutrients for the national consciousness.

¹In 1972 the entire 6th issue of Viesci AN BSSR (Social Sciences Series) was devoted to achievements by Belorussia in major areas of national life.

III. Recent Manifestations of Nationalism

Evidence of overt dissent or samizdat activity in Belorussia has been scarce. Only recently it has been reported that "in Belorussia there appears irregularly and with long intervals a periodical Listok [Newsletter] in Belorussian (this is known only from information brought by Jewish emigrants to Israel)." ¹ In 1970, the Chronicle of Current Events published a report of a demonstration in Minsk about students demanding "freedom of speech and of the press." ² In 1972, oral reports reached the United States about a trial held in Minsk behind closed doors of members of the Kim circle, a group disenchanted with the Soviet political and economic system, who were caught on a plane to Moscow with some unidentified manuscripts. There is even less information about the specific goals and the national views of the dissidents.

Much more evident are indirect indications of nationalist sentiments. M. Mašerau (Masherov), first Secretary of the CPB, speaking to a conference of instructors of social science in February 1972 explained: "Special attention should be paid to the question of the struggle against relapse into nationalism and nationalistic views." ³ The main theoretical journal of the CPB, Kommunist Belorussii, directed at the beginning of the new 1972/73 school year: "In the courses of the Party and the Komsomol education system it is necessary to unmask in detail the anti-Communist and anti-Soviet essence of bourgeois and revisionist views on the nationality question, to decisively debunk those who, while in the morass of nationalist superstitions, are attempting to poison the atmosphere of friendship..." ⁴

Such rhetoric has certainly much of a prophylactic purpose. There are, however, clear indications of the Belorussian intelligentsia resisting

¹ Homin Ukrainy (Toronto), Oct. 21, 1972; reprinted in Facts on Byelorussia (New York), I:40.

² Facts on Byelorussia, I:40.

³ Ibid.:6.

⁴ Kommunist Belorussii, 1972:9:13.

the Russification drive and even enjoying some limited success in their endeavors.

B. Frejtkin, a teacher of Belorussian in the city of Polotsk, recalled in 1965 how two years earlier his school had been "engulfed by the so-called 'epidemics of liberation' from the Belorussian language." However, as a result of a concerted effort by teachers, writers, and parents, supported by enthusiastic students, the tide, Frejtkin believed, had been turned back. The parents involved decided to make the teaching of Belorussian compulsory for all students.¹

Similar efforts have been undertaken in other regions. V. Dajlida, the principal of a high school in the Sluck district, suggested in the pages of the writers' journal, Poĺymia, that "the Belorussian language should be compulsory throughout the whole of Belorussia."² The language battle became a rallying cry for the Belorussian intelligentsia, especially writers and teachers. Attacked by official criticism for his war novels, the embattled Belorussian author Vasil Bykau was defended by a petition containing 65 signatures of his colleagues which was presented to the Central Committee of CPB. In his speech to the Fifth Congress of Belorussian writers, Bykau assured his audience that "so long as the writers were united on such vital matters [referring to the solidarity of the 65 in defense of his creative freedom] and were prepared to declare themselves openly, the Belorussian people may rest assured about the future destiny of their literature."³

Much effort has been put into the defense of the national language in the educational system. The curriculum has been revised and new textbooks have been introduced. An English-language booklet, Byelorussia, published in Moscow in 1972, tells the reader that in the BSSR, "in schools, where the teaching is in Russian, Belorussian is a compulsory subject."⁴

¹Litaratura i mastactva, May 18, 1965; reprinted in Naviny z Biełarusi (N.Y.: Radio Liberty), May 31, 1965.

²Poĺymia, 1966:4:163.

³Facts on Byelorussia, I:46.

⁴Byelorussia, 1972:7.

The battle for the national language has gone beyond the secondary school curricula, however. A case was reported in a literary newspaper (probably to provide an example) of how a certain M. Lazar of the Maladečna district refused to accept his passport because it was written only in Russian. The passport was duly exchanged.¹ The law says that passports be written in two languages, Belorussian and Russian.

At the Second Congress of Belorussia's Union of Cinematographers held in Minsk in February 1967, the opinion was expressed that "the Belorussian cinema should be created by efforts of Belorussian actors."² The same idea was supported by several spokesmen and editorially by the newspaper Literature and Art.³ However, the representative of the government and the Party, B. Paulonak, Chairman of the State Committee for Cinematography, "categorically" rejected pleas for national characteristics in the cinema: "Raising the question of creating a Belorussian cinema by Belorussian hands," he declared, "is not the solution to the problem of national art; this is, pardon me, something that smells of nationalism."⁴

One of the major campaigns that Belorussians have been waging in recent years is to launch new periodicals and increase the circulation of existing ones. There have been attempts to use legal arguments to increase circulation. Kastus Cvirka, senior inspector of the State Administration for Dissemination of Printed Material, complained of "criminal attitudes" in the matter of institutional subscriptions to the Belorussian literary-artistic magazines, Polymia, Maładosć, and Biełarusi. "It is self-evident that our Republic's literary-artistic magazines are destined for hundreds of thousands of readers. But, strange as it may seem,

¹ Litaratura i mastactva, Aug. 23, 1966; reprinted in Naviny z Biełarusi, Sept. 15, 1966.

² Litaratura i mastactva, Feb. 21, 1967.

³ Litaratura i mastactva, Feb. 14, 1967.

⁴ Litaratura i mastactva, Feb. 21, 1967; reprinted in Naviny z Biełarusi, March 15, 1967.

their circulation is still very small--a few thousand copies."¹ Cvirka suggested that in order to overcome existing obstacles "lists of publications not be considered as recommendations but compulsory and have the force of law."

Belorussia now has over 620,000 specialists with higher or secondary education; a little more than two-thirds (68%) of them are Belorussians.² This percentage is somewhat low, for their weight in the total population of the republic is more than four-fifths (81%).³ Nevertheless, the continual proportional growth of Belorussians intelligentsia might be an additional reason for the heavy concentration of Party propaganda on the dangers of bourgeois nationalism.

Religion as well as language has strong roots among the Belorussian population,⁴ but it is difficult to ascertain without additional research the relationship between Belorussian national and religious values.

As seen from the evidence above there is a resurgence of Belorussian national culture and consciousness in Belorussia. This is somewhat parallel to the continuing process of Russification. This apparent contradiction can perhaps be resolved by substituting the present notions about single monolithic identification of a person with a language, a culture, and nationality with a more flexible concept of multiple adherence (bilingualism, multiculture, and binationalism--applying to the same person). The Belorussian situation may well be an outstanding case of such multiple identity patterns.

¹The circulation of Polymia, Maładosc, and Biełarus in July 1966 was, respectively 5812 (Jan. 1973: 10,112), 7833 (Jan. 1973: 17,251), 11,394 (Jan. 1973: 21,535). Litaratura i mastactva, July 8, 1966.

²Nastaŭnickaja hazieta (Minsk), Feb. 17, 1973: see also Planovoye khozyaystvo (Moscow), 1972: 7:41.

³BSE, V: 123.

⁴See Facts on Byelorussia, I:7:35-36.

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