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
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WHERE WAS THE SHAH'S ARMY

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U. S. Army
Command and General Staff College in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

by

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B.S., Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University, 1974

Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas
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This study attempts to determine why the Shah of Iran, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, was successfully overthrown by a religion, Shiite Islam. The investigation is focused on the large and powerful Imperial Iranian Armed Forces, the Shah's political authority for over thirty-seven years, who had been trained and equipped by the US Department of Defense since the early fifties.

In 1978, the Islamic clergy led the opposition movement against the Shah of Iran's repressive regime and political rule in the form of mass demonstrations, and during 1978, riots reached into hundreds of cities, towns, and remote villages with fatalities estimated in excess of 5,000. Americans, and westerners in general, know surprisingly little about Iran or its culture; perhaps causing internal problems without ever knowing it. Furthermore, the unprecedented, enormous, and totally indiscriminate military sales to Iran gave the Shah, or his armed forces, a sense of omnipotence. Iran requires a new and probing look based on the events since February 12, 1979, and may force the US to reconsider its position as a major arms merchant; it may further require an assessment of our foreign policy towards the third world.

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
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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U. S. Army, Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency.

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PREFACE

This thesis is intended to examine the mission given to the large and powerful Imperial Iranian Armed Forces during its campaign to neutralize the revolution, a revolution generated under the banner of Islam and led by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. Furthermore, the thesis will attempt to isolate the main reason for lack of success experienced by the Imperial Iranian Armed Force by examining the numerous events leading up to the fall of the Pahlavi regime and the end to yet another dynasty in the history of Persia.

The opposition to the government of the Shahanshah (king of kings) can be traced back to the initiation of the White Revolution by the Shah in 1963. In an attempt to limit this thesis, only the overt revolution will be examined and this can be traced back to late 1977. Initially, the Islamic clergy commenced to speak out against the Shah in the Mosques. This protest was readily supported by the college students in Tehran and other cities across Iran. A friendly government and close ally to the Shah, the United States, was exerting some pressure on the Shah to observe human rights throughout his government. Apparently, the Shah found himself in a position that required relaxation of his repressive government toward his people. He did in fact become somewhat tolerant of demonstrations and verbal attacks made against his regime. The Shah could have easily ignored the warnings issued by the United States; however, he would have surely lost his

ability to purchase military hardware and consumers goods that he was able to initiate under President Nixon and the Nixon Doctrine. Furthermore, the Shah may have found all United States contracts for defense purchases cancelled, involving military hardware valued into the millions of dollars.


The Shah, with some exceptions, was indeed tolerant of vocal abuse, critical press reviews, and open demonstrations on the streets. The Iranian people perceived an open ear within the United States and the man, President Carter, who could correct the conditions in Iran. A major blow to this view was struck when President Carter stopped over in Iran on New Years Eve of 1977 to meet with the Shah while en-route to Egypt. After dining with the Royal Family in the Niavaran Palace, President Carter gave a short speech in front of the press. The President briefly mentioned human rights; however, he openly praised the Shah for his leadership in Iran and the Middle-East. The text of his speech was in the morning headlines of all Iranian newspapers and alienated the masses in Iran. The Iranian people felt the United States policy on human rights was simply a political issue to be spoken, but never enforced in the international arena.

During January of 1978, the spark was ignited and the Islamic People's Revolution began overtly. Significant events and actions will be examined up to February 12, 1979, when the government of Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi was erased from existence and kings would rule Persia no more.

Since the entire Iranian crisis is current and still in the news, there has not been adequate time for comprehensive works on the sub-

ject to surface and provide the base for academic research. The author was assigned to Iran in August of 1977 and served with the Imperial Iranian Armed Forces until forced to evacuate in February of 1979. Therefore, the author has incorporated numerous personal observations experienced during his tour of duty. This should reinforce the thesis and support available research data to achieve a scholarly product.

The author was assigned as the Foreign Military Sales Training Officer within the United States Army Mission and Military Assistance Advisory Group to Iran. He worked with top military leaders of Iran on off-shore training programs, monitored in-country English language training, performed official escort duty for the Secretary of the United States Army during his visit of Iran in May of 1978, and was the action/escort officer for the visit of nineteen Iranian military leaders to REFORGER in the Federal Republic of Germany during September of 1978. This thesis will hopefully promote an interest among students of the Middle-East to conduct further research on Iran and expand the limits of this initial effort.


JOHN M. SMITH

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I wish to express my gratitude to a trusted and loyal friend in a troubled country. Mr. Esfandiar Shahmardian served as my foreign military training executive during my tour of duty in Iran with the Imperial Iranian Ground Forces. Mr. Shahmardian had served the United States Embassy in Tehran, Iran for nearly twenty-five years as a foreign service training executive with duty to the ARMISH-MAAG, Iran. He was my interpreter, Iranian military expert, Iranian cultural advisor, business associate, and most important, my close friend. This man personally knew each general officer in the active forces since he had assisted each one of them during their preparation for off-shore training and enjoyed their complete confidence. Mr. Shahmardian's contacts within the military made my job easier and saved countless man-hours of frustration in developing rapport with my counterparts. Without his assistance, I could never be sure that I would have been able to reach the American Embassy on the day I was directed to evacuate. Mr. Shahmardian risked personal safety by driving his car to my house on the economy and after picking me up, drove the five, long miles to the American Embassy grounds to safety and ultimate freedom. He was able to effectively pass me through five revolutionary road-blocks on that unforgettable day in my life. I will always cherish his friendship and pray for his safety. God willing, he will soon be able to flee the chaos of his homeland and retire in peace in the

United States of America.

I would be remiss if I failed to remember another close friend who stood close at hand during my final days in Iran. Mr. Rasoul Nakaie, an executive with the National Iranian Oil Company, shared a common love of hunting and fishing with me and we had planned a big hunt in the Elburz mountains for Ibex, a magnificent mountain goat, until the intensity of the revolution required us to cancel. After leaving my office on February 10, 1979, I was never outside of my residence until the evacuation of Americans began. After expending all of my supplies of food, he made daily trips to my home to bring me supplies from the market. He spent numerous hours visiting me and updating me on the current situation. Since it was not safe for an American to be out on the streets, Rasoul was instrumental in the maintenance of my sanity during those long days and nights alone. I hope that Allah will secure his safety and his Moslem family and home.



JOHN M. SMITH

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CHAPTER I

THE IMPERIAL IRANIAN ARMED FORCES: AN OVERVIEW

INTRODUCTION

As an introduction to this thesis, it is paramount to understand the basic structure and true purpose for the existence of a large military establishment in Iran. The Imperial Iranian Armed Forces were the foundation of the Shah's regime. The Shah, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, could not have stood as the monarch without a strong and dedicated military force. The regime was historically a government that existed by military coups, one in 1921 which established the Pahlavi Dynasty and another in 1953 that returned the Shah to the throne from his exile. Both Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi and his father, Reza Shah the Great, were brought to power by the military and each relied on the military to enforce his rule in Iran. Iran was not a military dictatorship due to the position of the monarch; the Shah was the king and not simply a military officer. Although both the Shah and his father crowned themselves, they did not rule as military officers. Therefore, it should be understandable why the Shah sought to continue his efforts to add strength to the military forces and pampered the officer corps with high wages and benefits to retain their loyalty.

The Shah may have led the outside world to believe his military

machine was required to maintain regional stability or counter an outside threat; however, the real threat to his regime was internal. The Shah's royal lineage started with his father and could not be traced back through 2500 years of Persian history. Nevertheless, he declared himself the Shahandshah, king of kings, and was determined to see his son, Crown Prince Reza, ascend to the Peacock Throne.

The Shah built his regime on a military force that possessed the latest state-of-the-art military hardware and the best military training his petroleum dollars could purchase. A conservative estimate of twelve billion dollars in defense expenditures were used for purchases from the United States alone in the last decade. Prior to the Islamic Revolution, the Imperial Iranian Armed Forces numbered close to 500,000 and was the strongest military force in the region. The complete military modernization program continued up to the collapse of the Pahlavi Dynasty.

The Imperial Iranian Armed Forces were commanded directly by the Shah through the Supreme Commander's Staff. This staff headquarters was located in the Northern section of Tehran and the chief of this staff was a full general officer. The function of the Supreme Commander's Staff (SCS) was to operate as a planning and control center for the Shah. The Chief, SCS appeared to have command responsibility over the service sections according to organization charts; however, the control was limited to plans, programs, and budgets. During an actual war or crisis, the SCS would function as the Shah's tactical operations staff. The commanding general of each respective service section received direction from and answered directly to the Shah.

This method of control was utilized for even the most routine activities. Furthermore, this highly centralized span of control provided the Shah with current information on each of his services and discouraged any commander from gaining the influence and power required to stage a military takeover.¹

General Ashari, who had been Chief, SCS for some time was appointed the military Prime Minister by the Shah on November 6, 1978. General Qharabaghi followed him as chief, SCS and was in this position when the government fell. General Qharabaghi is one of the two top general officers that were not arrested and executed by the Islamic Revolutionary Council.² He is still living in Tehran and does not appear to be threatened; a situation that is hard to comprehend.

IMPERIAL IRANIAN GROUND FORCES

The Imperial Iranian Gound Forces (IIGF) consisted of four Infantry and three Armor Divisions, two separate Infantry Brigades, one Special Forces Brigade, one Airborne Brigade, and supporting artillery units. An Army Aviation Command consisting of over 350 combat helicopters was under the control of the IIGF commander; however, the commanding general of the Aviation Command, Major General Manochehr Khosrowdad, also had direct access to the Shah on all matters. One of the infantry divisions, commonly known as the Imperial Guards Division, was given the mission of protecting the Royal Family. This command answered only to the Royal Family in daily operations and would revert to IIGF control during a declared war. The IIGF headquarters was located in the capital

city with supporting commands such as the logistics command, five individual training centers, six service and technical school centers, and numerous support activities located in various locations throughout Iran.

The IIGF was the largest and the oldest service section in Iran with 300,000 troops. It possessed a vast arsenal of modern equipment coupled with an extensive off-shore training program. The United States Army provided the bulk of this training to enable the IIGF personnel gain the capability to absorb the large amounts of equipment purchases such as the TOW and Dragon weapon systems.

General Oveisi, who graduated from the United States Army Command and General Staff School as a Brigadier General in 1959, commanded the IIGF until the Shah departed from Iran. General Oveisi was a hard-line commander and staunch supporter of the Shah and apparently could not support the direction of the government under Prime Minister Bakhtiar. If we consider that Bakhtiar had openly opposed the Shah and was placed in prison for his actions in earlier years, it is easy to understand the opposition General Oveisi would generate among the military leaders towards the leadership of an overt enemy of the Shah. To complicate General Oveisi's opposition to the new center of power in the government, Bakhtiar chose a general officer subordinate to Oveisi, General Qharabaghi, to be the top military commander in Iran, the position of Chief, Supreme Commander's Staff. General Oveisi was able to slip out of Iran on January 3, 1979, and may be residing in the United States today; this fact cannot be verified due to the risk of Oveisi's personal safety. General Abdol-Ali Badrai was appointed

the commander of the IIGF by Bakhtiar.

IMPERIAL IRANIAN AIR FORCE

The Imperial Iranian Air Force was visibly the favorite service section of the Shah due to his personal love of flying. The Shah was a highly proficient pilot and had flown nearly all of the varied types of aircraft organic to the Imperial Iranian Air Force (IIAF). The IIAF was also located in Tehran with its headquarters at Doshen Tappeh Air Force Base.

The IIAF was organized with eleven subordinate commands: Air Defense Command, Air Transport Command, Air Training Command, Logistics Command, Communications-Electronics-Meteorology Command, Support Command, and five Tactical Fighter Commands. The Air Defense Command operated remote radar sites and anti-aircraft Air Defense Squadrons throughout Iran. The main weapon for air defense was the Improved Hawk Missile (I-Hawk) purchased from the United States.

The Air Training Command was organized with five training centers for basic military, technical, and English language training. The majority of all aviator training was conducted off shore in the United States under the United States Air Force. Each Tactical Fighter Command had operational fighter wings with subordinate squadrons and related support activities. These wings operated sophisticated and modern aircraft such as F-4's, F-5's, F-14's, and a substantial number of F-16's were on order from the United States. The first increment of F-16 fighter aircraft were ready for delivery when the revolution

started to intensify.

The logistics Command was organized with depots and ground support units to provide material logistics and technical repair services. The Transport Command was organized with several squadrons equipped with C-130's, KC707's, and SF747's. The KC707 and SF747 aircraft were equipped to handle air-to-air refueling or standard cargo lift. This air force was extremely strong, well trained, and the largest within all third-world countries. The commander of the IIAF was General Rabii who was arrested and executed by the Islamic Revolutionary Council shortly after the fall of the Pahlavi regime.

IMPERIAL IRANIAN NAVY

The Imperial Iranian Navy (IIN) was the smallest service section in the armed forces; however, it was growing rapidly. The Shah wanted the capability to police the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz. To achieve this capability, he was purchasing large naval material acquisitions accompanied with a substantial expansion and total modernization effort of all naval facilities. The IIN maintained headquarters in Tehran while the Persian Gulf Fleet was located in Bandar Abbas near the Strait of Hormoz. The main training base for the IIN was located on the Caspian Sea at Bandar Pahlavi. A major helicopter and hovercraft base was located on Kharg Island near the Western end of the Persian Gulf, which was also the location of the primary oil tanker loading facility for exporting crude oil. The IIN maintained a floating drydock and repair facility in the Persian Gulf at the port of

Bushehr. Although the IIN had not come close to reaching the Shah's goal, it operated a respectable fleet for a developing nation. The IIN possessed close to sixty combat vessels including destroyers, frigates, and hovercraft. The IIN also had naval air capabilities with fifty aircraft and an amphibious force of three marine battalions. United States contractors were building two spruance class destroyers under contract to the government of Iran; however, the revolution caused this order to be subsequently cancelled. Rear Admiral Habibollahi was the commander of the IIN and due to the mission of his forces, the IIN was never active in opposing the revolution. He was still in command when the Pahlavi regime fell and factual information on his fate is still unknown.

IMPERIAL IRANIAN GENDARMERIE

The Imperial Iranian Gendarmerie (IIG) was a large police organization that answered to the Minister of the Interior. It performed typical police functions throughout the country in law enforcement and government security. This organization should be described as a paramilitary unit because personnel assigned to the IIG wore uniforms identical to the IIGF and the addition of a colored tab was the only distinguishable feature. It was also common practice for officers to rotate between the IIG and IIGF to fill critical positions such as command. They received off-shore training at United States Army installations in military courses as opposed to military police training. The IIG was highly trained and could function in a military or

combat role in a manner equal to the units in the IIGF. During some crisis or declared war, the IIG could fall under the SCS for command and combat operations. The commanding general of the IIG answered directly to the Shah under all conditions in a similiar manner to the other military service section commanders. Typical missions performed routinely by the IIG were control of villages, internal security, border patrol, traffic control, and administration of the National Conscription Program. The IIG headquarters was located in the capital city with district posts located at each of the fourteen provincial capitals located in Iran. General Qharabaghi had been the commander of the IIG until he was called upon to replace the Chief, SCS who had suffered heart problems in the late fall. This man was considered by outsiders to be a skillful leader and was even considered a moderate by the Iranians. He was trusted completely by the Shah and was thought to be the youngest full general in the military establishment. His former deputy, General Biglari, assumed the command of the IIG; however, Biglari was killed in a hail of bullets on February 11, 1979, supposedly by one of his own men.

IMPERIAL GUARD DIVISION

The Imperial Guard was an infantry division with two missions. During peacetime, this unit was charged with providing security to the Royal Family, and in a declared war, it would revert to the control of the IIGF. This division was organized with above average personnel and received intensive training in infantry and security type roles.

One brigade of this division was hand picked and called the Javidon (The Immortals). It was an elite unit wherein each soldier was screened extremely closely and required to swear an oath to protect the Shah and Royal Family to the last drop of his blood. It was obvious to all observers that each member of the Javidon guards were devoted to the Shah and was proud to serve in this manner. Although each member of the armed forces swore allegiance to the Shah, the Javidon believed their sole purpose on earth was insuring the safety of their king. This distinct unit wore a standard military uniform and insignia, but also wore distinctive colored markings to identify them from the IIGF or IIG. They performed guard duty at the Shah's primary residence, the Niavaran Palace in Northern Tehran and were always in full dress uniform. Each soldier displayed superb military bearing and strict discipline in any situation.

This unit was the last combat force facing the revolutionaries in street fighting when the regime fell. The losses in their number were extremely high and yet they continued fighting after ordered back to their garrison. The Javidon never did surrender their compound and were quite simply overrun by the masses on February 12, 1979. The Imperial Guard commander, General Abdol-Ali Badrai, was killed on the same day. He was also serving as the commander of the IIGF and reported killed by his assigned IIGF driver.

NATIONAL INFORMATION AND SECURITY ORGANIZATION

There were numerous organizations which made up the Shah's intel-

ligence network throughout Iran; however, only one of these need to be addressed here. The organization most feared by the military and civilian populace was the Sazman-i Etelaat va Amjniaat-t Keshvar (SAVAK), also called the National Information and Security Organization. The SAVAK was established in the early 1950's but did not perform well in their mission as an intelligence gathering organization.

In 1953, the SAVAK leadership joined forces with Mohammad Mossadeq in his attempt to take over government leadership. When the loyal military forces returned the Shah to his throne from exile, the Shah purged the commander and ranking leaders of SAVAK and replaced them with trusted and proven members of the military.

The SAVAK was much more effective in their mission of internal security. Despite this, the Shah became disenchanted because the new leadership was found to be lacking when the riots broke out in the capital in 1963. The Shah appointed his old military academy classmate, General Nemetollah Nassiri, as commander of SAVAK and the organization became extremely effective, in fact, too effective. The position held by the chief of SAVAK in the Shah's regime gave this organization substantial power and influence from 1963 forward. The main mission of the SAVAK became centered on the identification and destruction of all people or parties that opposed the Shah in any form. The execution of the SAVAK's mission went far beyond confined limits normally associated with secret police or intelligence work. SAVAK was a "secret organization" with a highly visible face to let everyone know that such an entity did exist. It was justified in the government to counter threats facing Iran. Afterall, each major government

in the world utilized such an organization and the Shah felt it was absolutely necessary for Iran's security. The Internal Security Section of the SAVAK was the element responsible for domestic repression and its methods of operations were feared by all. This is the section that is blamed for the extreme torture and secret executions of thousands of Iranians over the past twenty years. Elements of this section also operated abroad, including the United States to spy on Iranian citizens such as university students. The fear of the SAVAK was so strong that most Iranians on the street could point out SAVAK office buildings and yet could not point out directions to the tourists to places of interest.

When the SAVAK became a central theme in the revolution, the Shah replaced General Nassiri with his deputy, General Moqaddem. General Moqaddem did not have the reputation for cruel punishment that had become Nassiri's label in Iran; however, the damage had already been done and Moqaddem could not change the image in the time that was to remain. General Moqaddem was arrested after the Pahlavi regime fell and was executed. His old boss, General Nassiri drew the same fate and was one of the first four general officers to experience Islamic courts and "Islamic Justice" under Ayatollah Khomeini.

The Imperial Iranian Armed Forces will be further examined in a later chapter; however, it was necessary to examine the military under the Shah and understand the highly centralized span of control and the size of the force. The foregoing information must be understood to realize why the Imperial Iranian Armed Forces were employed against their own people and how their actions or failure to act had

a direct impact on the destruction of the Pahlavi regime and the end of another dynasty in the 2500 year history of Persia.

Notes

¹
Fred Halliday, Iran: Dictatorship and Development (Middlesex:
Penguin Books Ltd, 1979), 69-76.

²
Interview with Esfandiar Shahmardian, Executive Training
Assistant, United States Embassy, Tehran, Iran, 19 October 1979.

CHAPTER II

THE BIRTH OF THE ISLAMIC PEOPLE'S REVOLUTION

INTRODUCTION

With the inauguration of a new President of the United States and his emphasis on human rights in Iran, the Iranian middle class apparently sensed a major policy change by the United States toward their country. They mistakenly perceived an American protective umbrella was spread over them and possibly due to this false sense of security, the opposition began openly demonstrating against the Shah and his government.

The Iranian people waited patiently for President Carter's visit on January 31, 1977. Carter was enroute to Egypt and decided to spend New Years Eve in Tehran with the Royal Family. The Shah entertained his close ally in the Niavaran Palace and during the course of the evening, President Carter overshadowed past presidents in his praise for the Shah. Highly visible was the prepared speech: "Iran under the great leadership of the Shah is an island of stability in one of the more troubled areas of the world. This is a great tribute to you, Your Majesty, and to your leadership, and to the respect, admiration and love which your people give to you."¹

The text was in all the major newspapers of Iran the next morning

and the opposition groups which had previously been moderate, turned sharply away from the United States. The New Year came in with a flame of rebellion that would ultimately draw world attention to Iran and see the Shah's thirty-seven year old Pahlavi regime crumble. The violence that would occur during 1978 could not logically be blamed on Carter; however, it is doubtful that recorded history would show that Carter provided any positive steps to avert it.

THE ISLAMIC REVOLUTION IS BORN IN QOM

The population of Iran in 1978 was estimated to be over thirty-four million and ninety-eight percent were followers of the Shiite branch of Islam, which is predominant in Iran and has been the state religion since the sixteenth century. It is worthy of note here that the opposition towards the government had been present since the last open challenge in 1963; however, January of 1978 was the start of the revolution in an organized, active, and overt manner.

The revolution under the banner of Islam was born in the holy city of Qom on January 7, 1978. Religious followers in Qom started to riot on this date in protest of the fifteenth anniversary of the Shah's land reform and women's emancipation decrees. A military officer stated the White Revolution initiated by the Shah was probably the most hated program that the 180,000 Moslem Mullahs were confronted with in this century. It was land reform that had stripped the ownership of large estates away from the rich landlords and powerful Mullahs. The mosque was central in community life for Moslems and the

Mullahs had previously used the income from the large landholdings to support the Mosque and assist the peasants.

In addition to the loss of their lands, the Mullahs lost control of their influence over law and education to the Pahlavi regime. Education and administration of law in accordance with the Koran had been practiced in Iran since the introduction of Islam. The clergy were now faced with drastic changes in administering to the faithful. The vast funds required to support the numerous programs of the church became the burden of the wealthy followers, primarily, the bazaar merchants. There were literally thousands employed by the Mullahs to attend to the religious shrines and lead religious processions. The main Islamic seminary in Qom alone had over 10,000 students attending religious training during 1978 with an annual budget of five million² dollars.

Another issue which incited the rioting in Qom was a letter published in a Tehran newspaper challenging Ayatollah Komeini's piety. It was not known who had written the letter; however, the opposition charged a high government official, Court Minister Hoveida. This act fueled a tense situation and provided additional opposition support in Qom.

STUDENTS STRUGGLE WITH THE ARMED FORCES

During the course of the demonstration in Qom, tempers quickly guided the actions of the participants. Some of the students started to struggle with the armed troops. In confusion that ensued, one of

the demonstrators was able to grab a weapon from the hands of a soldier and fired into the other soldiers. Of course, the troops returned the fire as the instigator and other students fled from the area. The troops gave chase and cornered the suspects in the home of a religious leader. The troops were confronted by the Ayatollah as he pleaded with the soldiers to show restraint. The angry soldiers entered the Ayatollah's home and shot the suspects in the presence of the clergyman. The number killed on this day was put at seven and although provoked by the death of their comrade, it was evident the troops did not show proper restraint in dealing with the students.

The next day, Ayatollah Shariat-Madari issued a statement to the press in which he gave an account of the Shah's troops killing faithful followers before his own eyes and in his own home. The shooting was bad enough, whether justified or not, but to do so in an Ayatollah's home was an act that set the stage for increased anti-Shah demonstrations all across Iran.

The Shiite Moslem mourns his dead for a long period of time; however, the fortieth day after the death is the most critical and repeated in forty day increments forever. The cycle of mourning had commenced that would eventually turn each day into a period of deep mourning for a new soul martyred by the troops. During deep mourning periods, the population would be extremely irritable and take to the streets to march in opposition to the Shah and his government that perpetuated
3
"corruption on earth".

OPEN OPPOSITION ESCALATES TOWARD THE SHAH

During the spring season, the demonstrators became defiant of the restrictions placed on their activities by the government. To march or openly speak out against the Shah was illegal and was not tolerated. Confrontations were still a daily occurrence in Tehran and other major cities and each became substantially larger than the last. The demonstrators would attack the police stations, burn out banks, break liquor store windows, destroy cinemas, and any other activity that represented the Shah or Western influence.

The Mosques became the focal point for opposition activities since it was the only place the government did not control or enter. The Iranian college students picked up the religious motive and actively supported the movement by the Mullahs to oppose the Shah in the name of Islam.

Death was not a threat to any of the Iranian people since their Islamic teachings from the Koran convinced them they would surely enter heaven if they were martyred while serving Islam. It became common place to observe demonstrators protesting in the streets dressed in white which was the traditional burial garment or walk up to the barrel of a soldier's weapon and bare their chest which signified their willingness to die on the spot.

As one would suspect, the action would upset the common soldier who was himself a Moslem and a brother in Islam. Some of the troops would even break formation, remove their uniform, and disappear into the large crowds. It was also becoming commonplace for the officer in

command to draw his sidearm and shoot at defectors. The complex situation suggested to the government that they would have to change their overall approach in containing the demonstrators on the streets. After all, the military was the foundation under the Shah and he could not let the military structure weaken or even worse, disintegrate while facing the opposition who were armed at this point with no more than words and selected quotes from the Koran.

THE SHAH PERMITS ORGANIZED POLITICAL PARTIES

The Shah made some drastic changes which permitted demonstrators to march after receiving a permit; the permit would be issued to a march leader who was then responsible to insure the march was peaceful, and verbal abuse against the government would be tolerated if it was not directed to the Shah himself. Censorship was relaxed on the press and political organizations were permitted to function if they did not profess violence towards the government and its armed forces. The one exception to organized parties was the Tudeh, the Iranian Communist Party, which was still not tolerated in any form.

The Tudeh party had been put down in the early 1960's and the Shah did not want his Northern neighbor to gain a foothold in Iran as they had during and after World War II. Followers of Islam did not want or support any move by the Tudeh to surface since they were in fact, nonbelievers.

The policy changes directed by the Shah worked for a short period of time while numerous marches and demonstrations took place

without incident. However, it only took a small number of agitators to infiltrate the ranks of the demonstrators and ignite the violence once again. No matter how hard the march organizers tried, one or two radicals would enter their masses and fire upon the troops placed along the route. This would lead to direct confrontation with the military and the end result would always be death to one or more innocent participants and on some occasions these were children. The opposition would charge that it was the government, in the form of SAVAK agents who would infiltrate their ranks to promote violence and prove once again the government could not be trusted. Whether or not this method was employed by the government, it served to strengthen the opposition. Organized opposition parties were gaining rapid support and so were the Mullahs.

OPPOSITION: NATIONAL FRONT, MAJAHEDIN, AND FEDAYEN PARTIES

During the summer months, one of the largest parties to surface was the National Front, a rebirth of the late Mohammad Mossadeq's party led by his close associate, Doctor Karim Sanjaby. Other notables in the party were Mehdi Barzagan and Shapour Bakhtiar, both of whom would surface at different points in time as Prime Ministers. All three of these men had two things in common; they had all opposed the Shah during the last two decades and each had spent one or more terms in the Shah's notorious prison system.

Sanjaby made demands to the Shah to have open elections and his approach was effective in bringing numerous smaller parties under his

somewhat loose National Front party organization. At about the same time frame, two extremist groups surfaced. They were the Organization of Iranian People's Fedayen Guerrillas and the Organization of Majahedin. Neither of these were new to Iran and were simply given the opportunity to surface once again.

The Majahedin, organization of the people's combatants, was developed around a core of Iranian youth. They were a fragment of the National Front that broke away during the mid-sixties and their ideology appeared to center around Islamic thinking. Although it was hard to determine their ultimate goal, they were fighting against all "tyranny and falsehood" for some degree or level of freedom. They would justify their terrorist acts based on the Koran by fighting in the name of Islam for the benefit of Allah. This organization found it easy to recruit membership for its cause from the numerous universities around the country, to promote Islam, and assist in destroying the government. The college age youth of Iran who followed the Koran as their central theme in life could relate to the party cause and would readily die to promote an Islamic Republic and push out the "evil" Shah. It was only natural that the Majahedin would profess to be Khomeini's Islamic army and support his revolution in the name of Islam.

The organization of Iranian People's Fedayen Guerrillas known simply as the Fedayen is a group which evolved around 1963 from the Tudeh party. This group had always claimed it espouses Marxism. There has been wide speculation that this group is closely tied to the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and receives training and

weapons from them. This idea is hard to follow since the PLO is recognized by Khomeini and the Majahedin, who hate the communists and Marxist theory. The approach promoted by the Fedayen was not passive and they applied terrorism against all forms of the government in Iran. They readily accepted credit for their acts. Since this group was opposed by Khomeini and the Majahedin, it was not as successful in recruiting as it would have desired to be. The Fedayen was roughly one-third the size of the Majahedin and remained about the same size throughout the revolution period.

DEMANDS OF THE ISLAMIC PEOPLE'S REVOLUTION

There were as many goals involved in the Iranian revolution as there were opposition groups identified. Each and every Iranian on the street appeared to have some conception which when implemented would improve their position or way of life in a troubled land. The central goal of all parties, groups, and individuals collectively could be stated as complete freedom from the repression imposed by the Shah through the SAVAK. Therefore, the SAVAK would have to be abolished prior to any other positive action taken by the Shah's government. The following listing from the "March Manifesto" will contribute to understanding the varied reasons for supporting a revolutionary action against the Pahlavi dynasty:

1. The demands of Ayatollah Khomeini are the demands of the Iranian nation. The people of this nation have deep and heartfelt confidence for the valuable leader of the religious authority.

2. The complete fall and elimination of the tyrant regime and the removal of all indications and effects of the foreign colonization which has an essential relationship with the internal despotism and the transfer of power to the Moslem and fighting people of Iran.

3. Establishment of the Government of Islamic Justice based on the foundation of the people's vote.

4. Preservation of protection, independence, and the territorial integrity of the whole country.

5. Safeguard of individual and social freedom based on the Islamic standards and criterion.

6. The safeguard of the natural human rights of each Iranian and Islam itself has been the actual and regular initiator of human rights.

7. Elimination of the attachment towards Western and Eastern Imperialism.

8. Establish reciprocal relations with countries which do not seek to transgress or betray the Iranian territory or its people.

9. Social, civil, and political rights of all the people in Iran must be protected in accordance with humane and Islamic aspects. This action should apply to religious minorities and foreign residents who are living in Iran and serving its national interests.

10. Insure that true freedom, respect, and prestige be given to women which Islam provided. This will insure the growth and progress of their talent.

11. Implement social justice and security for all laborers including farmers to give them the potential to fully utilize the

results of their labor and hardship.

12. Eliminate all social and legal discrimination or exploitation of one man by another, tyrannical profiteering and economic influence which will result in the accumulation of wealth on one side and deprivation on the other.

13. Establish a true economic independence of agriculture to the extent that Iran will become self-sufficient and therefore rid itself of the foreign dependence that currently exists.

14. Practice austerity and avoid the accumulation of consumer goods by the people; insure cooperation with each other in supplying the necessities of life.

15. Removal of the troops from the streets and stop their confrontation with the people which is considered by us to be malice towards the people and the army. The Iranian army must recognize that its Islamic and humane duty is to defend this nation. It must shoot its enemies and not its own people.

16. Stop the groundless publicity by the present regime that the Islamic and national movement in Iran is influenced by international support of communist countries.

17. The objectives of this struggle by the people have always been the Koran and Islamic patriotism which will ultimately be victorious and we will continue to salute the honorable souls of those who sacrificed their lives for the Islamic movement, and in particular those who were martyred in the past years. They were inspired by the school of Hossein and gave their blood in the name of Allah.

18. All political prisoners who fought for the freedom of their country or their rights under Islam must be released to include the return of those who were exiled to their legitimate homes.

19. All manners of lies, conspiracy, intrigue, or attack against the people by the tyrant government will not stop the nation from continuing its struggle. In order to achieve the above goals, the struggle of the people of Iran will continue in one way or another until success is achieved.

The above goals must be considered as the collective effort of all major parties, groups, and individuals since these issues were prevalent in all major organized marches against the Shah. There were a few relating to Islam that the Fedayen could not condone with their Marxist ideology; however, it was convenient to the Fedayen as a tactic for joining the masses at critical points in time. Prior to each large demonstration or march, the march organizers would print leaflets with similiar goals as their manifesto and place them on all automobiles or the doors of private homes throughout Tehran.

Islam was the central theme of the revolution and an obscure Ayatollah, Ruhollah Khomeini, was the man who had surfaced to be the catalyst. The next chapter will examine Khomeini's presence in Iran and his activities from his exile in 1963 forward to his return to his homeland.

Notes

- ¹
James A. Bill, Iran and the Crisis of '78 (Foreign Affairs Quarterly, 1979), pp. 338-42.
- ²
Fred Halliday, Iran: Dictatorship and Development (Middlesex: Penguin Books Ltd, 1979), p. 19.
- ³
Seyyed Hossein Nasr, Ithna Ashari Shiism and Iranian Islam (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969), pp. 96-118.
- ⁴
Fred Halliday, Iran: Dictatorship and Development (Middlesex: Penguin Books Ltd, 1979), pp. 236-38.
- ⁵
March Manifesto: Committee for the Organization of the March (Tehran: Distributed in Farsi Language, translated by Esfandiar Sharmardian, 10 December 1978), pp. 1-3.

CHAPTER III

THE CATALYST: AYATOLLAH RUHOLLAH KHOMEINI

In order to examine, with understanding, the events that shaped Iran's modern history, it will first be necessary to provide background information on the Ayatollah Khomeini. The intent is not to be biographical in content; however, this information will show how Khomeini gained the close attention of the Shah in 1963 and his unique ability to become the spiritual leader of Iran in the Islamic revolution.

Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini surfaced as the catalyst for the Islamic revolution during 1978. Prior to this time, numerous Iranians and nearly all of the foreign community in Iran had not heard of Khomeini. Why then did an obscure religious teacher, exiled in Iraq, manage to assemble such an enormous following in his homeland of Iran where two-way communication was not at all possible? To answer this question, we must view Iran's past record regarding opposition to the government, at least from 1963 forward.

THE IRANIAN CONSTITUTION OF 1906

During the entire reign of Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, he had chosen to ignore the Iranian Constitution of 1906 which was in fact the blueprint for the country. The constitution declares that

sovereignty rests with the people, and the executive, legislative, and judicial powers be separate, and that individual rights be protected. In accordance with Article 39 of the fundamental laws, the Shah was required in his oath as king "to be the guardian of the constitutional law of Iran, to reign in conformity with the established laws, and to promote and protect Shiism". The Shah had nevertheless ruled as an absolute rather than a constitutional monarch exercising complete control over the government in all facets of operation.¹ The protection of Shiism was not only neglected by the Shah, he appeared to completely ignore this responsibility as well as other parts of the constitution. Apparently, the Shah was intent on removing all Islamic influence from his regime.

SHIITE ISLAM, THE STATE RELIGION

The twelver Shiism (Shiite) is an Islamic minority in the Middle-East but is rigidly followed by the Iranian people and has been the official state religion since the early 1600's. Shiism traces its heritage back to Ali, the son-in-law and cousin of the Prophet Mohammed. The Iranians claim to be the descendants of Ali and represent a chain of leaders (Imams) of which the twelfth went into occultation in A.D. 940.

The Shiite leaders today are known as Mujtahids and representatives of the last Imam. The Mujtahids are men of great learning, popularity, and integrity. They, by their position, wield great spiritual power as well as economic and political power. They are

known for their simplicity in their standard of living. They eat only the basic food products to sustain life and dress in very common garments. Furthermore, they do not personally own fine villas or the large, luxury automobiles found in Iran. Literally millions of dollars pass through the hands of the Mujtahids each year because they serve as the social welfare agents all across the country. They accept the religious dues of the faithful and through a distribution plan, pass the money to the needy.

It should be noted that all Mujtahids, commonly known as Ayatollahs, gain this position based upon their knowledge of the Koran and the following they each gain. Discussions with numerous Moslems revealed that Ayatollahs are completely different from the majority of Shiite clerics or Mullahs, many of whom actively support socially regressive policies and are known to be corrupt by massing large amounts of money that was given to them to promote Islamic teaching. The Ayatollahs were the powers of authority, although in the shadows of the secular Shahs since the Shiite religion became recognized as the state religion. Since the early 1500's, there has been a lot of tension between the religious and the secular leaders.²

THE "WHITE REVOLUTION" IMPACTS ON ISLAM

One policy imposed by the Shah was the White (Bloodless) Revolution in 1963 which took away all church owned lands for his land redistribution program. This, coupled with increased freedom for women and the loss of the Ayatollahs' power to influence politics

and education, was actively opposed. A group of religious leaders led by Khomeini, then a Mullah, opposed the Shah openly in 1963. Their action turned into riots in the streets and the Shah ordered his troops to fire upon these rebels.

The powerful military was successful and Khomeini was arrested. He was held in prison for a short time and then the Shah ordered him into exile. Khomeini entered exile in Iraq during 1963; Iraq and Iran were then at odds over boundary disputes and a community of Shiite Moslems there welcomed him. He lived in Iraq until the Shah became uneasy about his ability to circulate cassette tapes into Iran with recorded messages designed to be broadcast in the Mosques. The Shah had long since settled most of his differences with the Iraqi government, and it was widely speculated that the Shah directly influenced the decision reached by Iraq to expel Khomeini on October 6, 1978.

WHO IS THE OBSCURE MAN CALLED KHOMEINI

Now that Khomeini had been recognized as a threat to the Shah, we find that Khomeini's cause in Iran became evident to the Islamic faithful because of his external location and freedom to speak. His number of supporters grew rapidly; however, it was not clear where this new champion of the Iranian people would re-locate. Although there are a substantial number of countries where Islam is the dominant religion, no Islamic country would offer this Shiite a home. Even the radical government of Libya was reluctant to accept him. It would appear that most Moslem countries viewed this religious man as

a rebel who had personal reasons to attack the Shah. Afterall, there were rumors during Khomeini's stay in Iraq that he and the Shah had traded assassination attempts as many as fifteen times.

The Shah's father, Reza Shah, had been blamed for the death of Khomeini's father and the SAVAK was blamed by Khomeini for the death of one of his sons in a freak automobile accident near Qom. There was also the fact that all other Moslem states feared retaliation by the powerful Shah, the self-professed and possibly the true power in the Middle-East.

The government of France finally offered the religious leader a temporary residence in the city of Paris on a tourist visa. Conditions of the offer stipulated that Khomeini would not use Paris as a base for promoting revolution in Iran and he would have to remain in close proximity to the urban villa provided to him. Although Khomeini was refused entry into a Moslem country, his stay in Paris proved extremely beneficial to him and was a major blunder on the part of the Shah for forcing his move.

In Iraq, Khomeini did not have a telephone, much less radio, television, and newspapers. His sole source of contact with his following in Iran was with his recorded tapes smuggled into the country and distributed covertly throughout Iran. Occasionally, he was able to mail a letter to other spiritual leaders within Iran and a few letters would somehow make their way back to him. One religious leader received a two year prison sentence for corresponding with Khomeini.³

From the time of his arrival in Paris until his return to Iran in January of 1978, Khomeini was able to manipulate the full spectrum of

the news media in his behalf. The credit for his use of the news media must surely be given to the few trusted followers surrounding him. Most of those men were educated in America such as Ibrahim Yazsdi and Sadeh Ghobetzedeh who were keenly aware of the power of the press. Khomeini's every move around the villa or garden received television coverage or newspaper space. Ironically, this elaborate coverage did not cost him anything and surprisingly, the French did nothing to stop it. This was a strange approach for the French government since they had trade agreements with the Shah and were involved in major contracts within Iran on industrial projects.

Every spoken word made by Khomeini or his spokesmen was available to the Iranian public either openly or in the form of tapes when the Shah clamped down on the press. Khomeini was preaching revolution in the name of Islam and the Iranian public was more than eager to listen. He often stated "the people will not rest until the Pahlavi rule⁴ has been swept away and all traces of tyranny have disappeared". He was now in a position to speak out freely and at will in denouncing the "satanic power" of the Shah. It was nearly impossible for the Shah's assassins, the SAVAK, to reach him without drawing international attention. One Iranian was quoted at the time as saying "if Khomeini dies of natural causes now, the Shah will still be blamed and Khomeini will⁵ become a martyred saint of Islam".

Two major reasons can now be identified for the response given to the Ayatollah Khomeini as the top spiritual leader of Shiite Moslems and the man who has the "power of Allah" behind him in his battle against the Shah. Even during his earlier days as a religious teacher

in Qom, Khomeini was known for his radical interpretations of the Koran. He did not receive the support of the Ayatollahs at the time, yet he was always the one man to stir up trouble against the Shah. Perhaps this is the reason he eventually surfaced as the leader of the Mullahs on that bloody day in 1963 when over two hundred people were killed.

With his experience in Qom, Khomeini knew firsthand the wide communication systems built into religious activities. No political parties could exist and free newspaper articles would never reach the press. However, the religious leaders could easily reach the masses through their weekly sermons in the Mosques and the large network of Mullahs throughout Iran readily passed the message. Khomeini in exile in Paris attacked the Shah regularly by all means available in the free press. He was the only man available who was in a position to challenge the Shah and live through it.

All faithful Moslems attend the Mosque at least once each week and many of them attend the Mosque daily for prayers. This did not apply to just a specific strata of Iranian people but to each Moslem, no matter what his station was in life. The message from Khomeini was in the Mosques and it spread rapidly. With each passing week, the support strengthened behind Khomeini and his message was welcome to a people suffering from long repression.

SERMONS FROM KHOMEINI

The recordings of the Ayatollah became one of the few successful ideas in Iran's torn economy. Although the messages were surely re-

corded in Paris, they were somehow shipped into Iran. Some were probably even dubbed in Iran, and they became big business in the bazaar and on the street corners from the numerous vendors. Khomeini held a captive audience within Iran, each person listening to Khomeini's thoughts. A few of these follow:

If the Islamic leaders had been in power, Iran would not be captive to the Americans or British.

They would not have permitted the Iranian economy to be degraded with foreign goods imported without custom charges.

They would not have allowed the parliament to be degraded to its present state.

They would not permit embarrassment between boys and girls called dancing by the evil ones.

They would not permit boys and girls to attend school together.

They would never allow innocent girls to be placed in the hands of the male teachers in the schools.

They would have prevented the American experts from taking advantage of the Iranians.

They would have punched the illegal government in the mouth.

Khomeini knew how to reach the heart and souls of his Moslem brethren as shown when he proclaimed; "the people of Iran have reached a state where they have attracted the attention of the world. We have gained prestige in the world, from America to the Arabic countries. This is a miracle. I think it is a spiritual one. The hands of Allah are with you. If it wasn't the hand of God, the nation, from the children to the elderly, would not have joined our campaign.

Victory is near. Don't be afraid. The Prophet Muhammad spent most of his life struggling. Learn from the Prophet and be patient. He fought all his life to overcome oppression. And we have been doing it only a short time. But what are we afraid of? If we are killed, we will go to heaven. And if we kill we will go to heaven. This is the logic of Islam because we are in the right." ⁶ With statements like this, it is not surprising that even the Fedayen would join Khomeini to negotiate the obstacles that would have to overcome before the Shah would fall. And after the Shah was gone, in the Fedayen's view, there would be a power vacuum that these religious fanatics could not fill and the Fedayen could then step in and the country would be theirs.

Khomeini's rise as the spiritual hope of Iran can be further understood if we consider that while there were no other leaders available at the time, Khomeini could speak freely from a position of security. Even the street mobs (many were poor peasants who moved to Tehran seeking jobs) were far more interested in finding a job with decent pay and the hope of securing an appropriate standard of living than participating in a revolution. But jobs were not there because thousands of villagers had preceded them in hopes of finding the same solutions to their needs. The poor, lower class was available and possibly vulnerable to the leftist slogans and the Moslem extremists like Khomeini simply because they had no other hope. They also had no desire to align themselves with communists and desperately wanted to step out of the 12th century which is where they were while in the villages. Even the younger Mullahs would accept a somewhat liberal government that would avoid constant interference in their

religion. All classes of Iranian people clustered around Khomeini because quite simply, there was no other choice for leadership.

KHOMEINI AND THE SHAH'S SECRET POLICE

SAVAK can take a fair share of the "blame" for Khomeini becoming a public hero and the ever present possibility of becoming a martyr.⁷ The error was theirs because he could speak safely from his position in exile. If most of the previous accounts of SAVAK hold any truth, it must have been a big blunder on SAVAK's part for this man to be alive today. Khomeini had been suspected to be the front for terrorist groups during his stay in Iraq. Numerous assassination attempts planned against the Shah over the past decade, possibly originated in Iraq and were staged when the chance presented itself in Iran.

It is simply incredible to see a man, who under different circumstances would have been labeled an aged spokesman for a distant past, be given an open door to strike out at the Shah. That he succeeded in bringing down the Pahlavi regime while the SAVAK attempted to take photographs of students demonstrating in the United States with heads covered in grocery bags is a great irony. SAVAK may not have been the problem that the Iranian people had perceived and feared for the last two decades.

Notes

- ¹ Richard F. Nyrop, et al., Iran, A Country Study (Washington: The American University, 1978), pp. 181-86.
- ² Nyrop, p. 467.
- ³ "The Shah's Divided Land," Time, European Edition, 18 September 1978, pp. 32-39.
- ⁴ "Keep up the Struggle," Kayhan International Edition, Tehran, Iran, 31 January 1979, p. 1.
- ⁵ Abul Kasim Mansur, "The Crisis in Iran", Armed Forces Journal International, 78 (January 1979).
- ⁶ "The Khomeini Era Begins", Time, 12 February 1979, p. 331
- ⁷ Mansur, p. 31.

CHAPTER IV

AN EXAMINATION OF CRITICAL EVENTS IN IRAN

INTRODUCTION

In the first three chapters of this paper we have examined the structure of the Shah's governmental foundation, the powerful Imperial Iranian Armed Forces; the birth of the overt revolution, the starting point in Qom; and the catalyst, the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. To gain an understanding of the insurgent challenge to the royal government of Iran, it is now necessary to examine the events that ultimately destroyed the thirty-seven year regime of Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi.

The Shah had been a weak leader during the first two decades of his reign according to most publications, and it is known by those who study the Middle-East that the Shah required outside help more than once to survive. After a serious challenge by the Mullahs in the early sixties, the Shah apparently decided it was time to run his country and steered away from the carefree, playboy image that he had been displaying. He became a powerful monarch that ruled with force, rarely hesitating in his application of a totally repressive government upon his people and known as an authoritarian ruler demanding complete obedience. To focus on critical events that occurred between

January 7, 1978, up to the fall of the Pahlavi regime on February 12, 1979, and to examine the Shah's response, it will be useful to study each significant event in chronological order.

CHRONOLOGICAL LISTING OF EVENTS FROM JANUARY 7, 1978 TO JANUARY 16, 1979

January 7, 1978: During a religious gathering in the holy city of Qom, over zealous religious leaders and students changed a peaceful meeting into a large and extremely vocal demonstration against the Shah's government. The central issue for their behavior was clearly the 15th anniversary of the program initiated by the Shah known as the White (for bloodless) Revolution which fell on the same day. The White Revolution had caused severe hatred towards the government by the majority of the Shiite leaders since this program stripped away religious ownership of vast land holdings and saw the same lands distributed through land reform to peasants in the rural sector under conditions that might suggest poor planning and questionable tactics on behalf of the government since the large and wealthy Pahlavi Foundation retained title to nearly forty per cent of the entire block.

Another point of contention was the women's emancipation decrees which elevated the Iranian women out of their traditional Moslem mold of subserviency. Equality for women was unheard of throughout the history of Iran and this act was viewed as an assault on fundamental Islamic law.

The religious demonstration turned into a full scale riot which attracted the military forces in the area. Accounts of action taken by

the military forces on that day vary; however, after peace was restored, seven demonstrators had been killed and numerous others were beaten or wounded.¹ It was possible on this occasion that the Shah's power had been applied in an unrestrained manner to force obedience. Surely this band of unarmed religious zealots could have been restrained without the use of firearms. Unfortunately, Iranian soldiers had not been exposed to civil disturbance training as we know it. This event was the start of open defiance toward the Shah and was also the start of a cycle of violence on each successive fortieth day of mourning; a traditional pattern of the Shiites in honoring their dead.

May 5, 1978: Nearly four months went by with numerous small and isolated demonstrations taking place and then on this date, another significant encounter occurred between rioters and the military. In the city of Qom a demonstration evolved into rioting with numerous direct confrontations with Iranian soldiers; a religious student managed to grab a weapon from one of the troops and then shot another soldier, an event that was quite similar to the one in early January.

It was never clear whether the soldier was killed or wounded and it did not really matter because the incident enraged the rest of the troops and they immediately gave chase to catch the guilty student. The student ran into the headquarters of a religious leader seeking refuge; however, the troops followed him in and shot him in front of the clergyman. Reports of the incident varied depending on the source and yet it would seem logical to a casual observer that he could have and indeed should have been taken alive.

This particular student, if he had been arrested and tried in a

legal manner, could have lent support to the royal government and demonstrated restraint on the part of the military. Instead, the opposition were able to use the incident as propaganda for their own cause and set the stage for increased anti-Shah demonstrations throughout Iran.² Each harsh reaction by the government simply reduced its position with the growing number of dissidents.

The Shah again neglected to recognize the issue upon which religious values were based; one religious student studying theology was not important to him. On the same day, the Prime Minister, Jamshid Amouzegar, issued a statement which warned the Shah's opponents that the government would no longer tolerate complete disregard of the law or any type of demonstration by a "few thousand agitators comprising a small minority".³ The Prime Minister's perception of key issues were as cloudy as the Shah's or the Shah could have directed such a statement be issued.

August 18, 1978: The Shah was still displaying a cool and aloof image when he appeared on National Iranian Radio and Television (NIRT) on this date to address his countrymen. He mentioned the unrest throughout Iran and also stated the demonstrations in Tabriz, Isfahan, Mashad, and Kermanshah had been the acts of communist representatives conducting sabotage in his country. "Communists disrupt the hard work of Iranian brothers and place the blame on the government." In defense of the mass arrest taking place around the country, the Shah indicated those arrested were "Islamic Marxists" who seek to destroy a great nation, a nation that can trace its heritage and tradition back twenty-five hundred years; a proud nation led by kings such as

Cyrus and supported by the will of the people as stated in the great constitution of 1906.⁴

Why the term Islamic Marxist had come into play by the government cannot be explained. The view held by Islam is diametrically opposed to the view espoused by Marx and still this label was applied to opposition members throughout the Iranian revolution. By his own speeches and statements, we could observe the Shah as he continued his neglect of the real issues at hand: some method of political participation, advances in social status for the lower class verses a status quo, and the importance of religious values held sacred by the clergy and the people.

August 19, 1978: A cinema house was intentionally set on fire and the fatalities were counted at three-hundred and seventy-seven. Numerous accounts were offered for the blaze including one account blaming the SAVAK for this action. Others, to include the government, claim it was the work of religious fanatics showing their opposition to western influence.⁵ Any attempt to show this action as a tactic of the government would be fruitless since the government could not hope to gain support by employing such methods. Evidence surfaced the next day that showed the exits of the theater were barred or chained from the outside and benzine (gasoline) containers were strawn around the area. Therefore, it was no accident or act of God that destroyed this theater and those who were responsible for this heinous crime planned this act of terrorism for some purpose.

It was not unusual for banks, theaters, night clubs, and liquor stores to be prime targets for the religious zealots because those

business establishments were representative of the "moral decay" brought into Iran by western influence and were the "works of the devil". Reflecting on the cinema fire, it was evident that it had been inspired by followers of Islam; however, it was surely not a strategy of the masses.

August 23, 1978: A professor of law at Tehran University, Dr. Karim Sanjaby, announced the reactivation of the National Front Party. Sanjaby was a close associate of the late Mohammad Mossadeq who had taken over the Iranian government during the fifties while serving as Prime Minister to the Shah. During that time frame, the Shah was forced to flee Iran for security purposes and history has revealed he was placed back in power through external help from the United States. Sanjaby was placed in an Iranian prison for his support at the time as well as numerous other times over the years. Two other prominent names surfaced with the National Front. They were Shapour Bakhtiar and Mehdi Barzargan, both of whom would play a role in Iranian affairs early in 1979.

The reactivation of the National Front Party along with several other parties was a direct challenge on the Shah. He had made all political parties illegal after Mossadeq's arrest in 1953 but it was evident that the parties had never really dissolved; they simply continued to operate over the years in a covert manner.⁶ The Shah made a wise decision at this point and declared it would be legal for political parties to operate as long as they did not attack the throne directly. An exception to this liberalization move was the Tudeh Party, which was a purely communist entity, and it was forbidden to

operate in any form. The opposition did not protest this action against the Tudeh party since the membership was communist and did not believe in Allah.

This liberalization was significant in an Iran which earlier had been under a two party system of parliament where the Shah himself approved the party leadership and was quick to remove anyone who dared oppose or criticize him. The Shah had even abolished the two party system in 1978 in favor of a single entity known as the Rastakhiz. Even the image of a two party system had been removed, and the Shah still appointed the senior official of this single political party thus making it clear that he would not accept any opposition or criticism outside of narrowly imposed bounds.

The Shah's erratic leadership had continued to move closer toward total authoritarianism since his vast oil revenue had given him new found freedom from restraints previously held over him by his main ally, the United States. Therefore, it was significant that the Shah would permit additional political parties to operate, regardless of the specified or implied limits he had placed on their operation. Whether or not the Shah realized the fact, his approval had provided the masses a long desired opportunity to actively participate in their governmental and political functions. The Shah did not intend for any political party to affect his form of government, but the populace did not perceive it that way.

August 23, 1978: Prime Minister Amouzegar resigned as the head of the government after three-hundred and eighty-five days in office. The Shah appointed the chairman of the Senate, Jaafar Sharif-Emami, to fill

the vacancy. Emami had served as Iran's Prime Minister earlier and had been successful in most of his duties. The Shah must have felt⁷ Emami could be useful again. A change such as this during active civil unrest might seem awkward to an outsider; however, the Shah never hesitated to replace government leaders who were failing to maintain his pace.

It was hardly worthy of comment by the typical Iranian on the streets of Tehran. In an attempt to possibly appease his religious opponents, the Shah also relieved a substantial number of high-ranking government officials disliked by the opposition including at least three general officers and his personal physician. Furthermore, he ordered the closure of all gambling casinos located throughout Iran. The clergy believed the casinos were prime examples of corruption on earth and could not be permitted under Koranic laws. This order by the Shah displayed a leader who was not sure what actions should be taken and who was still ignorant of all the major issues at hand. At any rate, the Shah was providing too little, much too late to solve the major problems at hand.

September 7, 1978: The Shah declared martial law in Tehran and eleven other major cities after nearly one-hundred thousand demonstrators marched in protest on the streets of Tehran. This was the first time in nearly a quarter of a century that the Iranian people had been under the complete rule of the troops. The Shah's generals had argued that continued, open demonstrations on the streets would erode his authority and also that of the military; therefore, such demonstrations be stopped. The Shah and his top leadership held

meetings late into the night and he may have lost his option for any other decision since his main foundation of government, the military, were tired of trying to deal with the opposition and feared complete loss of control. The next morning, Emami announced over NIRT that martial law was in effect for a period of six months.

September 8, 1978: The demonstrations started again and this time would climax in fiery and fatal riots. Evidently a substantial number of the marchers had not yet heard the announcement of martial law on the NIRT stations or possibly, they had heard the proclamation and chose to completely disregard it in defiance. Whatever the case, thousands of demonstrators were packed into Jaleh Square located in downtown Tehran actively protesting the government. One of the local religious leaders appealed to the masses to disperse and they refused. Shortly thereafter, men on motorcycles followed by women and small children started to move towards the platoons of armed soldiers who repeatedly issued warnings to the huge gathering to stop. After the warnings failed, the troops lobbed tear gas canisters into the front ranks of the crowd. The marchers continued to advance and the troops then commenced to fire their weapons into the air as another warning to stop. The throngs continued to advance forward towards the line of soldiers who then lowered their weapons and fired into the crowd.

At the end of the day, after the dead and wounded had been carried away by army trucks, the government announced that eighty-six people, mainly women and children, had died. Another two-hundred and five people were reported as wounded and receiving treatment in the various army and civilian hospitals located in Tehran. This was not

a pleasant moment for the Shah or the distressed people involved; however, it was an event that could not be avoided by the government. The demonstrators had been given numerous warnings by their clergy and the Shah's troops and yet, chose to ignore them. The results were the victims own responsibility and the blame could not be placed on the government or the troops who reacted to personal threat by the mobs.

This event was, however, labeled "Black Sunday" by the local press since it occurred on Jome (Friday), the day observed by the Moslems as their religious day or Sabbath. This day would trouble the government throughout the revolution since the Iranian people would mourn their dead on each successive fortieth day and in doing so, ignite further demonstrations and confrontations with the troops. ⁹

September 11, 1978: The Shah received a call from President Carter, stating the United States was still behind the Shah and to reaffirm that a "close, friendly relationship" existed between Iran and the United States. ¹⁰ This action received attention in the news and it did not help the image of the United States with the opposition in Iran. At this point in time, it should have been considered proper for a head of state to encourage an ally under stress; yet the message should have been personal rather than publicized.

September 26, 1978: The Shah declared all members of the Royal Family are prohibited from further financial dealings with the government or exerting any form of control over charitable organizations. ¹¹ Apparently a move by the Shah to remove the taint of corruption leveled against the Royal Family by the opposition. The charge of corrup-

tion against members of the Pahlavi family were indeed valid. The Pahlavi Foundation was a means of securing wealth for the Shah's family. Although the immediate Royal Family, the Shah, Shahbanou, and their children, were part of this foundation, they were never criticized for their holdings, it was the Shah's brothers, sisters, nephews, and nieces that infuriated the opposition on the issue of corruption. The Shah's family were not the only "criminals" charged with corruption by the opposition; senior military officials, senior officials in the government, and arms merchants from the west were all included.

The sheer scale of corruption was so great that bank employees of Iran's central bank were able to create a list of one-hundred forty-four key Iranians involved in extortion of Iranian funds. This list was published and distributed by the opposition throughout Tehran and the Shah's government took the listing seriously. The individuals named on the list were shown to have transferred over two billion dollars to foreign bank accounts in their names. After the list appeared on the streets, those implicated used a low profile to move about and many of them slipped out of the country before the government took any positive action. The list carried the names of three of the Shah's relatives which surely reinforced his decision to restrict family dealings.

The Shah could have emphasised his statement at this time by taking positive action against those involved and yet he chose not to. The Iranian middle class were even prompted to take up the opposition cause after reviewing the list of corrupt individuals

because they now experienced a perceived relative deprivation.¹² The middle class had lived quite comfortable and knew it even though inflation was eroding their real income. If the Shah had arrested those charged with corruption, withdrew all assets of family members and sent them abroad, and returned the assets of the Pahlavi Foundation to use in public projects, the Shah may have gained strength and increased admiration from his people.¹³ In any case, his lack of action was a point of reinforcement to the opposition that the Shah condoned this type of behavior from top officials, whether the fact was true or not.

October 2, 1978: A wave of civil service strikes spread throughout Iran that would subsequently paralyze the entire nation. The primary target was the rich oil fields in the south which were in fact the life-line of the country. Production dropped from close to six million barrels per day down to slightly over one million barrels by the new year. This action effectively stopped oil revenue from petroleum exports and it also impacted heavily on the internal operations of the nation.

In Tehran, a city of over five million people and one million automobiles, everyone felt the impact. Long queuing was common around the scarce two-hundred plus gasoline stations operated by the government and the bulk fuel oil dealers. Ironically, Iran had received emergency shipments of kerosene from the United States before the Pahlavi government was overthrown.¹⁴ Kerosene was the main fuel used to heat business establishments and residential structures throughout Iran. This situation surely caused embarrassment to the Shah and his government since Iran had been the second largest oil producing nation

in the world a short time earlier.

October 6, 1978: On this date, the spiritual leader of Iran's¹⁵ thirty plus million Shiite Moslems was forced to leave Najaf, Iraq. Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini was forced to leave his sanctuary in the religious city of Najaf, Iraq where he had lived in exile since forced out of Iran by the Shah in 1963 after leading a host of Mullahs in an unsuccessful challenge to the Shah's White Revolution. Exactly why the Iraqi government chose this time frame to expell the holy man can not be answered factually. The Shah and the Iraqi government had long since settled their active border dispute and the Shah had stopped supporting Kurdish tribesman, which lends support to the viewpoint that the Shah brought pressure to bear. It was no secret that the Iranian government was displeased by Khomeini's ability to pass recorded messages across the border into Iran for use in the Mosques.

Khomeini's sermons were broadcast throughout Iran by the Mullahs and such action was unacceptable to the Shah. Therefore, until the facts are recorded sometime in the future, we must assume the Shah felt threatened from this "pest" residing in a bordering country and¹⁶ influenced Iraq to remove Khomeini from close proximity. This decision proved to be bad judgement by the Shah after Khomeini was accepted in a temporary status by the French government. In Paris, Khomeini commenced a full scale propaganda campaign against the Pahlavi dynasty and regime. The French had warned Khomeini that Paris would not be used as his headquarters for revolution and yet the French government never enforced this issue after the news media scrambled to Khomeini's door and gave that obscure man international

coverage. The momentum of the opposition factions increased rapidly with a spokesman who was secure in a foreign country and given the freedom and facilities to plead the Iranian cause throughout the world.

November 5, 1978: Students organized on the campuses of the major universities in Tehran moved onto the streets and in a rampage, set fires to soft drink plants, banks, foreign car showrooms, hotels, liquor stores, restaurants, buses, and hundreds of other small shops. This same group attempted to enter the embassies of the United States and Britain. At the US embassy, the US Marine guards fired tear gas into the crowd and the students did not press the issue there; however, they were successful in storming the walls of the British embassy and managed to set fires in many of the embassy buildings before the Iranian military troops arrived to drive them out. Ten demonstrators were killed and numerous wounded were reported by the government radio NIRT.

The military did little to intervene initially except to provide forces outside the US embassy for security, an act that was not provided to the British. Spokesman for the British embassy claimed the government could have prevented the entry into their grounds and failed to make any effort to do so. ¹⁷ One can only speculate why the government did not provide additional security to the British embassy; the British Broadcasting Company (BBC) had regular broadcast transmissions into Iran that were questionable in their support of the Shah.

November 6, 1978: Prime Minister Enami, who had earlier received some support from religious leaders, was not making progress towards

solving the opposition movement. He and his cabinet resigned and were replaced by a military government headed by the Chief, SCS, General Gholam-Reza Ashari. The new government acted aggressively by arresting close to forty individuals. Among them were several newspaper editors who dared to challenge the Shah in print; the former Chief of SAVAK, General Nematollah Nassiri, who had just been recalled from his post as the Iranian Ambassador to Pakistan; and several former ministers, one of whom was the former Court Minister, Amir Abbas Hoveida. The government imposed censorship once again on the Iranian press which resulted in a newspaper strike. The Shah pledged that the "past mistakes of unlawfulness, cruelty, and corruption¹⁸ (under his regime) would not be repeated".

November 11, 1978: The leader of the National Front Party returned to Tehran after meeting privately with Khomeini in Paris. He was about to hold a press conference covering his negotiations between the National Front and the spiritual leader when he was arrested and delivered to a local prison. Sanjaby had planned to demand the Shah's departure from Iran and name a provisional government during the news conference. Sanjaby would subsequently be released by the government¹⁹ forty days later.

Again the Shah had shown how he vacillated from one form of strategy, providing liberalization, back to his strategy of reinforcement, rule with the iron fist. He appeared to sense the need of the people to receive some freedom and liberalization within the government and yet he was still extremely sensitive to all challenges or criticism leveled toward him. After all, the Iranian Constitution of

1906 clearly states the king can do no wrong. However, the Shah himself publicly admitted error in his pledge to the people on November 6, 1978, over NIRT. The Shah had ruled for thirty-seven years and to give up any power in Iran must have been repulsive to him and would not permit attaining his personal goal of building Iran back into the mighty Persia of old.

November 25, 1978: From his secure position in Paris, Khomeini called out for maximum resistance to the "illegal" military government forced upon the Iranian people. They should resist at all costs and continue to defy those who would not accept an Islamic Republic, including complete disregard for the communiques of the martial law administrators. Demonstrations continued to intensify with westerners, primarily the American community, becoming the targets. Private American residences became targets for the common terrorist weapon, the Molotov cocktail.

Each day brought an new fire bombing somewhere in the country with the heaviest concentration falling in Tehran and Isfahan. In addition to private homes and automobiles, the opposition struck out at Iranian companies operated or assisted by western companies such as Bell Helicopter, Grumman Aircraft, Boeing Aircraft, Telecommunications (Bell Telephone International), and Pan American Airlines. Numerous American business buildings were gutted by fire; however, there were no deaths at this point. The terrorist activity did threaten personal safety however, and a mass exodus commenced that reduced the American population throughout Iran from estimates upward of forty-five thousand down to twelve thousand by the first of the

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year. The international airport in Tehran was packed with Americans and other foreigners seeking flights out of Iran on any carrier for just about any destination.

December 8, 1978: Iran was observing a deep mourning period known as "Moharram" which started on December 1, 1978, and would run through December 10, 1978. During this deep mourning period, which was held in memory of the third Imam, Hossein the son of Ali, Mohammed's successor, curfew violations and widespread protests were the norm. Chanting from the roof tops "Allah Akbar" (God is great) could be heard nightly as well as sporadic gunfire across the city of Tehran. Numerous crude leaflets were placed on front doors of American residences and one of them posted at the door of an US Army advisor read; "Occursed Yonky, you know about the Shahmonarkism and his general massacres, but while all liberal people condemn the executioner you and your damned President support him. This is the reason that all the Iranian people hate you. Viva Islam." ²¹

Although the leaflets were not correct grammatically, the meaning of the message was quite clear to anyone who received them. To lessen the danger from the huge riots that were expected to occur on the ninth and tenth of December, the dependents of all US Department of Defense personnel were evacuated from Iran to a safe haven location in Europe or the United States. The exodus was initiated aboard military aircraft sent to Iran from the United States; the international airport in Tehran had been closed to civilian traffic by the military government.

It was obvious to the US embassy staff that the safety and

security of Department of Defense sponsored personnel could not be provided by the host government. There was no fuel oil available on the market to heat homes and provide hot water. The civil strikes were affecting the power generation plants and electrical power would be shut off without advance warning for twelve hours or more. The strikes could possibly affect the health of the US military community in the cold months of December and January. This situation did nothing to help the Shah since it emphasised his steady loss of power and influence over his people; even his military could not protect the foreigners he still required to attain self-sufficiency.

December 9-31, 1978: In an attempt to prevent additional bloodshed on the ninth, Tashua, General Ashari convinced the Shah to let the people march in downtown religious processions which was the traditional custom on the day of mourning. The Shah approved the march as long as it remained peaceful. Ashari promised to withdraw his troops up to the northern part of the city and requested that the march organizers maintain order in their ranks, insure riots did not start, and no burning be permitted. Both parties agreed to the conditions and Ashari moved his troops out of the heart of the city.

The march to the Shahyad Memorial Square drew crowds estimated by observers at close to one million people. Many participated in their customary Shiite observance of self-flagellation, a custom practiced to experience the pain that Hossein had experienced at the hands of his murderers. Both sides kept their word and the day ended peacefully. The following day, Ashura, the marchers were hostile and chanted "Death to the Shah" and the participants numbered as many as

the previous day. There were isolated incidents but full scale riots did not occur.

The most significant event of the day was the renaming of the Shahyad Memorial as the Khomeini Tower by the demonstrators. Isfahan had not been so fortunate and numerous demonstrators died during open challenges to the military forces there.

The decision to permit the religious procession in Tehran was a wise one which permitted the religious leaders to carry on a tradition observed for thirteen hundred years in Iran. If the government had taken a hard stand on this issue, there would have been direct confrontation involving thousands of demonstrators resulting in huge numbers of fatalities on the streets.

As December ended, the first American fatality of the Iranian revolution was recorded. Paul Grimm, the managing director of operations for the Oil Service Company of Iran, was assassinated in Ahwaz while driving to work on the twenty-third. His driver was also killed as well as his Iranian counterpart in another part of the city. It was a well planned strike by terrorists who knew Paul Grimm's daily habits of movement around the city. Why this man was targeted is not known other than his presence was a symbol of western influence.

Shortly after these murders, on the thirtieth, General Ashari suffered a slight heart attack and was placed in a cardiac unit at a local hospital. Although the prognosis was good, Ashari requested the Shah relieve him as Prime Minister of the military government. The Shah then asked Shahpour Bakhtiar, the number two man in the National Front Party, to form a civilian government. The Shah was vacillating

again in his search for a solution to the crisis.

January 1, 1979: For the first time in over two months, the Shah came out of seclusion and met with two reporters. He conceded he was tired and needed to get away for awhile with his family to rest. Shortly after this meeting, the Shah retreated back to the isolation of the Niavaran Palace. Later in the day, Bakhtiar revealed he had accepted the premiership offered by the Shah based on the conditions that the Shah leave the country; Bakhtiar was to be given full control of the government and the military. The Shah had agreed to Bakhtiar's conditions and also agreed to depart on vacation in the immediate future.

This change of government was a blessing to the opposition even though the top man, Khomeini, had not suggested or approved of this move. Khomeini had demanded nothing short of abdication by the Shah and somehow this transition did not meet that requirement.

January 11, 1979: Bakhtiar was appointed Prime Minister and formed his cabinet from trusted associates within the National Front and conservative Mullahs. Bakhtiar announced the Shah would remain in the government as constitutional monarch with limited powers. Bakhtiar's cabinet received a vote of confidence from the Parliament and he addressed the lower house promising to shut off oil exports to Israel and South Africa, dissolve the SAVAK, free all political prisoners, fire unrequired foreign workers, and cooperate closely with the religious leaders. He then lifted the military censorship placed on the newspapers and the presses rolled again.

Bakhtiar was now at the helm of this crippled nation and would

have to perform miracles to stabilize the conditions that existed. Khomeini had not yet commented on this new government which appeared on the surface to be some sort of extension of the Shah, even though Bakhtiar had been an opponent of the Shah. He had also been a resident in the Shah's prison system more than once during the last two decades.

January 13, 1979: The Shah made preparations to depart Iran on a much needed vacation and appointed a regency council to represent the crown while he was out of the country. Word reached the streets of the city that General Oveisi, the military governor of Tehran and martial law administrator for the Shah had managed to slip out of the country. This was taken as a bad omen by loyal supporters of the Shah. Bakhtiar appointed General Rahimi as Oveisi's replacement and would lift martial law as soon as the city returned to normal. He eased the curfew as a gesture to the people who had opposed the many
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restrictions placed upon them.

There were rumors circulating on the streets that a military coup would take place. General Qharabaghi was appointed as the Chief, Supreme Commander's Staff (SCS) under Bakhtiar and many people sighed in relief. Qharabaghi was known as a moderate military leader and a fair man; he was respected for his leadership as the Commander of the Imperial Iranian Gendarmerie. He faced a tough job controlling some of the fiery generals who led the various military units throughout the country.

THE IMPACT OF THE SHAH'S DEPARTURE

January 16, 1979: The Shah and his immediate family said their goodbyes through tearful eyes to the large gathering of supporters who had come to see the Royal Family depart. After loading their large cargo of luggage, a casket filled with Iranian soil was placed aboard the aircraft. The Shah was the pilot at the controls of the jetliner as it departed the airport, circled low around the city one time, and then disappeared over the horizon. This had been a sad moment for a few but a joyful day for thousands when the word reached the streets reporting the Shah had left Iran. There were huge demonstrations once again in the streets; however, the atmosphere was one of elation and dancing in the streets.

Almost in the same instance, the crowds busily removed the Shah's pictures from all shops and office buildings and replaced them with pictures of Khomeini. The huge bronze statues of the Shah and his father, Reza the Great, which had been dotting the major streets, squares, and parks were toppled by the joyful crowds. No one expected to see the Shah return to Iran in any capacity and maybe the Shah had not expected to return when he departed. There might have been some purpose for his aircraft's slow circle around the city, a last look at the country he loved and had planned to build into a major industrial power in the coming decade; there was also the casket of Iranian soil stored in the cargo hold of his official aircraft short-

ly before departure. This day could become a new page in the long
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history of Persia.

The United States Army doctrine for Internal Defense and Development (IDAD) discusses two strategies that can be applied by the
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legal or existing government in countering insurgency internally. These strategies are labeled preemptive; a strategy which entails changing an existing distribution of value systems in order for additional segments of the population to be included in the category of those who benefit and the second is reinforcement; a strategy which entails strengthening the forces that benefit from the existing distribution of values in order to defend the system, a method of maintaining the status quo. Let us now examine the actions taken by the Shah during the heavy opposition he faced during the year of 1978 and attempt to determine which strategy he applied.

It would appear that the Shah's defeat can be attributed, not to failure to use a preemptive type of strategy, but probably, to his failure to correctly identify the key issues and primary population segments. The White Revolution was intended to be preemptive by the Shah.

Most of those familiar with the case in Iran would probably agree that economic issues contributed to the revolution but, were not of primary importance. In fact, the Shah had been very conscious of mal-distribution in the economy. He did initiate agrarian reform back in 1963 with re-distribution of land held by private ownership and continued this project of deeding land to the poor up to the revolution. The land reform program was probably good for the country;

however, the action was late in coming to the rural peasants and the Shah did not follow up with a good agriculture plan or availability of markets.

The Shah had done a lot to improve the education and health services through the pseudo-military education corp. He built hundreds of schools and medical treatment facilities throughout the rural areas of Iran to improve living conditions. When the Shah came to power, the illiteracy rate was ninety-five per cent; but today it falls somewhere in the vicinity of fifty per cent.²⁸ However, most of this improvement was experienced in the last decade of his regime. Most of the projects were directed toward the rural population who were not the principal perpetrators of the insurgency or revolution. It seems to be ironic that the government failed to capitalize on Iran's progress under the Shah by promotion in the news media. This failure may have been a major error by the government.

What the Shah neglected were the issues of political participation, status, and religious values. The insurgent leaders were a coalition of religious hierarchy, bazaar merchants, university students, and leftist intellectuals. The policies imposed by the Shah undermined both their social standing and their ability to participate in decision making. He should have preempted some of them by bringing them into the decision making process of the government. If the merchants and intellectuals had been on his side, he could have probably defeated the Ayatollahs and Mullahs, without significant violence.

The issue of religion is a highly emotional one, yet possibly an issue invented by the Ayatollahs to expend their own frustration to-

ward larger segments of the population. The Shah ultimately gave the religious leaders the weapons they needed by some of his decisions, such as abandoning the calendar based upon the "Hijra" of the prophet Mohammed and cutting out government subsidies to the mosques. These actions were petty and unimportant to the Shah; however, they were extremely important and relevant to the clergy and the people.

During the course of the year of revolution, the Shah continually vacillated from one extreme to another. He claimed to have initiated a new program of democratization nearly two years earlier and even in September of 1978, the Shah stated he was certain that the main programs, those being liberalization and democratization of the country would continue and then real, free elections would be held.²⁹ The Shah may have believed that to speak in terms of new programs permitting political participation would reap preemptive benefits for the government, but there was never any positive action toward realizing additional freedom by the people.

Each time the Shah would loosen governmental control, the people who were eager to participate, seemed to threaten him, and he would revert back to reinforcement type action. Throughout 1978, we had observed the Shah promise reform in the government and within a matter of days, he would move in his troops and apply the same old pressures, a reinforcement type strategy.

The Shah's real problems were rooted in the urban areas where a sound program of preemptive strategy would have paid massive dividends. What preemptive strategy was applied, was always directed towards the rural areas where his authority was not challenged. Even the applica-

tion to the rural population came too late because most of the poor peasants were moving to or living in the urban areas where the economy was booming. Iran had transitioned from a rural state to an urban state.

The departure of the Shah left a large vacuum in Iran that had not been experienced in many years, and it is necessary to examine and analyze who was able to grasp the power and successfully direct Iran out of its paralysis. The very existence of the Shah had always been supported by the strong foundation of his Imperial Iranian Armed Forces and likewise, the military had always been dependent upon the Shah to maintain their power and position of status in the country. The following chapter will attempt to examine why the military forces
30
were neutralized and what followed.

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Lewis, pp. 59-62.

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Strobe Talbott, Dean Brelis, and Parviz Raein, "An Interview with the Shah," Time, September 18, 1978, p. 42.

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Interview with Esfandiar Shahmardian, Executive Training Assistant, United States Embassy, Tehran, Iran, 17 January 1979. This interview was conducted in the office of Major John M. Smith, the author, at the Imperial Iranian Ground Forces headquarters building in Tehran. Mr. Shahmardian was as assistant to the author in the management and administration of Foreign Military Sales Training.

Notes

Mr. Shahmardian was a native Iranian who had insisted throughout the revolutionary period of 1978 that the Shah could not be overthrown and on the day the Shah departed Iran, we talked for nearly two hours on the events that had occurred since January of 1978. Although he was firmly planted in the educated middle class of Iran, this man was intelligent and enjoyed personal friends among the elite and upper class.

CHAPTER V

THE IMPERIAL IRANIAN ARMED FORCES: THE SHAH'S AUTHORITY

This chapter will provide additional insight into the Shah's actual foundation of government, the Imperial Iranian Armed Forces. The author was responsible for all Foreign Military Sales Training supported by the United States Army to the government of Iran. He also provided advisory assistance to the Imperial Iranian Air Force (IIAF), Imperial Iranian Navy (IIN), Imperial Iranian Gendarmerie (IIG), and the Imperial Guards (IG). Each service section purchased US Army training of various types in their attempt to reach self-sufficiency. The period of personal observation commenced on August 7, 1977, and continued up to his evacuation on February 20, 1979.

ORGANIZATION OF THE ARMED FORCES

The organization of the Imperial Iranian Armed Forces was simple on the surface; yet, extremely complex when examined in depth. The Shah was commander-in-chief of all the armed forces as provided by the constitution and the absolute commander in practice. He demanded and received total obedience from his commanders, each of whom were hand picked by him based upon past service, deeds performed, and trust. To insure that a commanding general of a service section

would not attempt a coup, he did not observe the traditional chain of command found in the military forces of other countries. Each commanding general of the IIGF, IIAF, IIN, IIG, and IG received detailed daily guidance from the Shah and answered directly to him in all matters, no matter how minute or routine. The Shah retained a general officer, General Azimi, in a minister level post as the Minister of War who was responsible for budgetary and legislative matters. The Vice Minister of War, General Toufanian, was the sole individual responsible to the Shah for implementation of the complex arms procurement programs and was in a position of high visibility in Iran.

Documents reviewed within the IIGF headquarters state the Shah maintains operational control of the Imperial Iranian Armed Forces through the Supreme Commander's Staff (SCS). This statement is not fact and was probably written to pacify the Iranian people. The typical Iranian believed, and rightly so, that the military played an important role in the political arena as the Shah's absolute authority and power base. In fact, the SCS under their Chief, General Ashari, performed administrative staff functions directed toward plans, programs, and budgets. General Ashari answered directly to the Shah as did his "subordinates". The Shah did appoint General Ashari as the prime minister of the military government on November 6, 1978, after the Pahlavi regime had been seriously challenged.

Each separate service section in the Imperial Iranian Armed forces was organized and staffed almost identically to United States military services and each was provided full (four star) general

officer billets for the commanding general; however, only the IIGF and the IIG had a full general commanding. The IIG is normally addressed as a security force under the Minister of Interior; however, as discussed in chapter one, they received the same training and equipment as the other services and must be considered part of the total force instead of paramilitary in nature.

Actual force structure and size could not be accurately fixed by internal reports, the Shah boasted of 500,000 active duty troops in mid-1978. The IIGF strength was estimated at 300,000, the IIAF at 100,000, the IIN at 50,000, and the remaining forces spread throughout the IIG and IG. Military and civilian intelligence units were sizable; however, it is doubtful that they were included in the total force of 500,000. The secret police organizations such as the SAVAK were substantially large in numbers and it was obvious through discussions with counter-parts that the SAVAK agents were also in military uniforms; no doubt the SAVAK performed as a tool for checks and balance throughout all governmental agencies.

THE OFFICER CORPS

The majority of the general officers in the armed forces were the sons of former general officers and were also graduates of the Iranian Military Academy. To serve the Shah in a position of military leadership had been a tradition for many years in Iran; however, there was evidence of change even prior to the Islamic Revolution. One family in particular, the Jahanbani's, had three brothers serving

on active duty as general officers; two were in the IIGF and one was in the IIAF. Their father had been a general officer under Reza Shah after the Pahlavi Dynasty had been formed. LTG Jahanbani had visited the author in the summer of 1978 to inquire on academic and visa requirements for his eldest son to study in the United States. During the visit, he lamented the decision made by his son to choose another profession over the military. He did state that the military service no longer offered the social standing and the prestige once enjoyed by the military hierarchy and even better wages could be found elsewhere.

This same situation was also found in other prominent military families and implied a drastic change of traditional military leadership would have taken place even if the Shah had retained power. This could help explain the Shah's policy of promotion selection above the grade of major in all services. He personally selected all majors and higher for promotion and closely monitored all others. This method of control surely demanded considerable time and effort on the Shah's part in the highly centralized decision making process he exercised.

All officers and non-commissioned officers of the armed forces were volunteers and considered regular army by our standards. The bulk of the troops were conscripts. The military academy was the prime source for officers in Iran while large numbers in IIAF and IIN were commissioned by attendance at foreign academies.

Within the armed forces, class differences had been traditionally well defined; commissioned officers came from the upper-class

families, the career non-commissioned officers and warrant officers out of the urban middle class, and conscripts from the rural areas and lower class family backgrounds. The incidence of officers evolving out of the educated middle class was becoming increasingly pronounced in the late 1970's, which was another major trend influencing the military establishment.

THE NATIONAL CONSCRIPTION PROGRAM

Iran's population of thirty-four million plus provided a large manpower pool of male personnel in the conscript bracket of fifteen to forty-nine years of age. Of about eight million males eligible in 1977, only four million were considered to be qualified mentally and physically for conscription if the need arose. The requirements by mental and physical category were not released to advisors; however, illiteracy was not a disqualification. Every year, the government called to duty about 300,000 and less than half of those were retained in the force.

Conscription laws had been in effect since 1925 and each male was required to register upon reaching the age of nineteen and if selected, would come on active duty at the age of twenty-one. The conscription program was administered by the IIG throughout the country and draft evaders were arrested and tried before military tribunals, then imprisoned in military prisons. If an eligible male was not called up by three consecutive drafts, he was permanently exempt. He could be called up for declared war; however, this rule

applied to all males without regard to age or physical condition.

Since the majority of all service personnel were conscripts and over half of them were considered illiterate in 1977, this posed a serious manpower problem for Iran in its ability to absorb the vast amounts of advanced military hardware it continued to purchase. The conscripts were only required to serve for two years and most of this time was spent in learning the basic soldier skills and spending half of each duty day in literacy training programs.

Many of the conscripts could not speak the national language, Farsi, since they had come from tribal areas. The average conscript served in combat units while the educated conscript that could not get a government exemption served in noncombat units. Conscripts were never trusted by the leadership since they had to be drafted and did not choose to serve their country as volunteers. They were riflemen who performed menial tasks for their superiors such as gardeners and janitors or other types of servile positions.

All things considered, the conscript never reached a point where he could be considered a well-trained soldier prepared to enter combat in the defense of his country and through no fault of his own, spent two years of servitude under the regular army. Although each conscript left the service with more education and knowledge than when he entered, there was no place for him in the already crowded civilian sector. This was a drastic waste of manpower that could have been trained and retained on active duty; however, the government did not make any attempt to recruit them into the regular force. Although required to daily swear their allegiance to the Shah in the morning

formation, there can be no doubt that true loyalty and dedication to the Shah did not exist.

IRAN'S MILITARY TRAINING

The initial entry military training for all enlisted personnel, regulars and conscripts, had been tailored after United States Army basic and advanced military occupational speciality (MOS) producing schools. The basic training was thirteen weeks in length followed by selection for MOS producing schools. As stated earlier, because of illiteracy, some of the conscripts never advanced beyond basic training and were then sent out to serve Chayi (tea) to staff officers, police grounds, work in general officer households, etc. Those who were selected for advanced training were assigned to one of four different service schools.

The four schools taught additional specialized training in armor, infantry, artillery, and combat service support. The schools were highly structured and discipline oriented. The class commenced daily with a bugle call and all scheduled breaks, including lunch, were announced in the same manner. A tour of selected schools revealed that the instructors were prepared in their subject areas and tolerated nothing short of strict discipline in the classrooms.

Although taught in Farsi, it was evident that the method of instruction was based on rote memory and the students were proficient in hands-on training. The end of course testing was suspect since recycling was not evident and the final product, the soldier, did not

retain a level of competence that would be expected.

Field training was not impressive due to the scenarios employed by the commanders and staff. A division command post exercise (CPX) or a field training exercise (FTX) would not vary from one year to another. Several US advisors commented on writing after-action reports by noting all major problem areas only to find that the report filed on the previous exercise by a previous advisor was nearly identical to the current one. This was a depressing situation for an advisor who knew the Iranian military unit was indeed capable of performing well.

During briefings made to counterparts after an exercise, the Iranian commander would always agree with the critique of noted shortcomings and assure the advisors that the problems would be corrected prior to the next exercise. Of course, the corrective action never was implemented and if an advisor went above the counterpart in his chain of command, he might find himself assigned to a new unit or if chose to push the issue, he might find himself in a position of persona non grata and shipped out of Iran immediately. Therefore, US Army advisors found themselves in a position where they taught by US Army standards to a force that may or may not chose to exercise that standard. One mistake made by the typical westerner is his lack of tolerance to the reluctance of Iranians to observe change in a daily routine that is comfortable and acceptable to them. This major shortcoming is due to the failure of the western guest in the country to fully understand the culture of Iran and of course the entire Middle-East. This mistake is made by advisors and Department of State per-

sonnel alike. The typical Iranian will not say no to a suggestion out of courtesy. They are proud people who may not agree with a proposal or suggestion; however, they would never place the other party in a position of embarrassment. Therefore, you can readily find agreement on most matters and yet never initiate a positive change.

STRICT FORMALITY IN THE RANKS

The Shah was the commander of all forces and yet rank was extremely important all the way down the line. No one in uniform would dare address another soldier by his first name even if he outranked him. Each officer was aware of his peer's dates of rank and rigidly followed the formality expected from seniors and subordinates alike. One day of seniority in time in grade placed the junior in a humble position. When a junior addressed or approached a senior, he came to a position of attention and saluted. He held the salute until the senior had completely passed from view or had finished the discussion and returned the salute.

The formality applied to all situations whether indoors or out and included reporting in an office area. The hat was worn at all times when out of an office area to include hallways inside a headquarters building. A full uniform was worn at all times no matter where the individual may be working and applied to all ranks. It was humorous to observe a group of officers approach an entry way or elevator in a group. Each one would make a courteous attempt to have one of the other officers enter first even though the other was the

junior; however, the senior always went first and the junior knew better than to accept the courtesy of the offer.

This application of formality was evidence of the position held by members of the military and especially the position of officers. Furthermore, it amplifies the obedience rendered to a superior in each and every circumstance. A soldier did not question the judgement of his superior in any case and would never consider providing advice on any matter. This emphasis on structure in the Iranian military establishment certainly did not promote individual ability or recognize an individual's potential. A simple proposal to the commanding general of the Imperial Iranian Ground Forces on nearly all matters would require a considerable delay in receiving a response, either negative or positive. Typically, the commanding general would need time to consider the action, in fact, he was avoiding a decision until he could provide the information to His Imperial Majesty for guidance or a decision.

This method of conducting business was universal throughout the services and did not promote judgement or leadership growth in the military forces. The Shah made all decisions in his highly centralized structure of government and no action would be taken until the Shah had been informed. Of course, no Iranian general officer would ever admit to such restrictions even though everyone knew he was not free to make decisions of judgement. Only if the decision was routine and applied to internal operations such as guard duty, daily office routine, or normal maintenance and did not involve interface with external advisors, did he have the freedom to act on his own.

The Shah had to be a brilliant leader to handle the massive volume of decisions required each day and provide insight into the problems encountered by him and his military leadership during a crisis, when time was critical such as the latter days of the revolution. The military was severely limited by the highly centralized control exercised by the Shah and one ponders how decisions were reached in his absence.

THE SHAH'S GOALS FOR HIS ARMED FORCES

The Shah never hesitated in his effort to build a powerful military force that would be second only to the Soviet Union in the region. He wanted Iran to become an industrialized giant in the decade of the eighties, and he wanted to see his country become powerful once again as old Persia had been in its long and colorful history. Although his agreements with the United States regarding military arms purchases were based upon the defense of Iran as specified under the DOD Military Articles and Services Manual (MASM), it was evident by the equipment the Shah was able to introduce that he had the capability to initiate offensive actions in the region if he desired.

It was simply ridiculous for an outside observer to consider the need for F-14's with Phoenix missiles as a defensive weapon, let alone the contract for the introduction of advanced aircraft such as the F-16. It is doubtful that anyone other than the Shah knew what his true intentions might have been. Since self-sufficiency was not reached prior to the collapse of the Pahlavi regime, the intended

course for Iran under the Shah may never be known.

Most studies of the Iranian economy will support the fact that nearly thirty per cent of Iran's gross national product was directed toward the purchase of military equipment in recent years. Defense expenditures were not however limited to hardware since the Shah was known to provide substantial benefits to his military personnel. On the one hand, the Shah closely scrutinized his officers by observing their public and private lives through the eyes of the SAVAK and military intelligence.

On the other hand, most of the senior officers were well rewarded for their dedication and loyalty by receiving salaries and other monetary benefits that placed them in an income bracket second only to the nation's elite class. They received benefits in the form of free housing, free meals at military dining facilities, conscript soldiers to serve at their quarters, and if traveling abroad, they were allowed to import goods with little or no import tax. The import tax for a Mercedes 450 sedan for others was close to thirty thousand dollars which provided a substantial savings to an officer bringing a car back from Germany.

The efforts to maintain loyalty also extended down to the regular army enlisted ranks where they prayed each morning for the welfare of the Shah. He provided monetary benefits to them through free medical and dental care for their family members and high-rise housing facilities. Some in-country observers suggested that the continued purchase of the latest state-of-the-art military hardware was a tactic employed by the Shah to maintain prestige among the

military leadership.

The acquisition of items not found in most developing countries made the general officers proud in their relations with neighboring countries. This may have been a futile attempt by the Shah to retain loyalty in his officer corps, who were then feeling the impact of inflation in the economy and observing large segments of the civilian work force draw salaries far superior to theirs.

This method was not productive since the military did not have the technical manpower base to absorb the influx of military equipment and literally millions of dollars in new equipment stood idle in the various ports. The government must have taken delivery on thousands of items and could not trace the locations on most of them including spare parts. The IIGF logistics command had modern computer equipment and this command was supplemented by civilian logisticians; however, the system could not support the force. This was due to a lack of communications between commands.

Although the military forces appeared loyal to the Shah and had stood behind him throughout the reign of the Pahlavi's, they were not disloyal to Islam. Since approximately ninety per cent of the population was Moslem, it should follow that the same statistics applied within the military establishment.

During the first formation of the day, the troops swore their allegiance to the Shah, the Koran, and Iran. They prayed during this formation for the Shah's welfare among other things. They also observed the Islamic tradition and requirement for prayer. They would face Mecca and prostrate themselves in prayer a minimum of five times

daily. They were never restricted from prayer and in most cases, the military enforced this devotion to Islam. They observed fasting when required except in situations where fatigue might be experienced due to loss of body fluids and the clergy provided exceptions in such cases.

The majority of the military followed the teachings of a particular Mullah or Ayatollah in their community and supported the Mosque. Therefore, we must assume that contradictions between the military and obedience to Islam surfaced during the revolution. As the intensity of the Islamic revolution grew, there could not be a middle of the road position between the two.

The military personnel concerned with physical needs remained loyal to the Shah since there would be no military force or pay and retirement without him. An Islamic Republic would treat everyone equal and their status would be lost. Furthermore, those who had supported the Shah vigorously in the past against the people could not hope to receive compassion from the clergy if the Shah's regime disintegrated. Those who sought spiritual satisfaction through Islam and the promise of eternal life with Allah, could not support the Shah and remain loyal to the government. The Islamic Revolution and its promise of an Islamic Republic caused a dichotomy within the structure of the military establishment under the Shah.

THE REVOLUTION AND THE CONSCRIPTS

The conscripts became a severe problem as the revolution progressed due to their dedication to Islam and lack of loyalty to the

Shah. The majority of them were illiterate, but they were aware of the Koran and its teaching. They probably never set foot in a formal school institution but they had grown up attending the Mosque and listening to the Mullahs, learning the Koran through rote memory practices, and continuous exposure to the religious chants and prayers.

The conscripts were moved vast distances from their homes when drafted by design of the government and could not assimilate in the areas where they served except the Mosque, and they obeyed the military rules out of fear. However, they also feared Allah and believed they would be condemned to damnation in hell if they failed to obey his teachings as expressed in the Koran.

Military tours in strange areas of the country were designed and planned by the government in case the military was required to face a threat to the Shah by the Iranian people. The conscript would not hesitate to shoot a stranger if he feared for his own safety, but he might refuse to shoot down members of his own family or village community.

There was a new ingredient in the Islamic Revolution that each conscript had to face, the threat to the Shah was not the Tudeh party or other radicals, it was faithful Moslems led by a man who had come to be recognized as the spiritual leader of Shiite Islam, the Ayatollah Khomeini. The faithful Moslems opposing the Shah were not blood relatives, yet they were his brothers and sisters in Islam. In nearly all confrontations with the masses, the soldiers were faced with Moslems who asked them to lay down their weapons and stop shoot-

ing their faithful brethren.

The Shah had not sought the loyalty of the conscripts and in most cases, the Shah and the military in general had forced them into a subservient position in life. They were treated like animals without rights and no possibility for any type of advancement in the society. If they chose to break ranks and desert, they would be faced with two possibilities: if they were caught they would be shot on the spot as military deserters; if not caught, they had their freedom to serve the cause of Islam as defined by Khomeini.

The Shiite Moslem believes that death in the service of Islam places them in a martyred status under the Koran and they will go to heaven, regardless of their previous failures in the service of Allah. The desertion rate climbed steadily from late 1978 forward and since the majority of the IIGF troops were conscript, this posed a serious threat to the military forces, especially in the IIGF.

Towards the end of the Pahlavi regime it was becoming routine for conscripts to shoot their superiors and then remove their own uniform and disappear into the crowds. This problem was acute in the remote areas throughout Iran among the combat units of divisional size and smaller. Desertion rates impacted on manpower; however, it placed commanders in a position where their leadership abilities were suspect. Commanders were forced to direct their attention to the maintenance of loyalty in the ranks in order to satisfy their own commanders and at the same time focus attention towards the threat to the government and the Shah.

The conscripts placed the junior commanders in an untenable posi-

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
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tion where victory as the junior commanders had perceived it, could not be reached. Although the Shah had retreated from public view during the last three months of the revolution, we can assume that he was deeply troubled by the disintegration within his armed forces and brought extreme pressure to bear on his top general officers and service section commanders. This pressure was observed in the staff officers of the IIGF. Ironically, the Shah demanded leadership qualities from commanders that he had effectively stifled during most of their careers.

SELF-SUFFICIENCY VIS-A-VIS ISLAM

The Imperial Iranian Armed Forces were a long way from attaining the Shah's goal of self-sufficiency. The technical base of trained personnel could not keep up the pace with material acquisition and dependence on the skilled labor force from the western world continued to grow. Prior to the evacuation of the United States citizens, there were close to 40,000 Americans working in Iran. With the exception of Bell Helicopter International, the salaries were extremely high which brought into Iran hundreds of retired military personnel from the United States to manage and maintain the expensive military hardware purchased from the US.

The Shah believed American equipment was the best available in the world and purchased the majority of his military hardware from us. He paid premium prices for the equipment and personnel to support it; however, if the United States would not sell a particular item,

the Shah could and would purchase something similar from Britain, France, or Germany. The Shah realized that Iran's oil reserves would not last beyond some twenty years and was intent on building Iran into a major industrial power with a strong defense prior to exhausting Iran's petroleum wealth.

The Shah had made significant advances toward his goals and yet progress had come at the expense of his people. The rapid influx of western technicians into the urban areas also brought in western influence such as movie theaters, imported food products, western clothing, and abundant nightclubs and casinos to entertain them.

The rapid inflation rates generated by the high salaries had impacted upon the populace and the local economy. Housing shortages became prevalent and a three-bedroom villa in central or North Tehran would command a monthly rent of fifteen-hundred dollars. High rental rates forced the lower class of Tehran further South in the city into the slum areas.

Since the majority of the foreign work force resided in the major cities of Tehran, Tabriz, Isfahan, and Shiraz, and the Shah's major projects were directed toward the urban areas, the villagers migrated from remote locations to the cities where jobs might be found. In addition to increasing the population of already crowded cities, most of the unskilled villagers could not find work. Those who did secure work received extremely low pay and could not afford the high cost of food and housing.

An important factor should be mentioned here regarding the lower classes of the Iranian society. They had moved from the villages with

the hope of finding work and improved living conditions and found themselves in worse conditions than they had left; however, they had been exposed to the educated middle class, foreigners, and the elite of Iran who were living in comfort with money to purchase anything they might desire. For the first time in many of the peasants lives, they experienced deprivation on a large scale. These people were ready to follow anyone who could shift the scale in their favor and were eager to join the Islamic march to equality.

Rapid industrial growth, high inflation rates, increased defense spending, and the influx of foreign workers impacted on another segment of the population, the Islamic clergy. The Ayatollahs and the Mullahs found it increasingly difficult to assimilate the changes taking place in Iran, and especially the increased demands on the Mosques to care for the needs of the poor Moslems, and the numbers grew daily as villagers migrated into the urban areas.

The influx of foreigners brought additional problems; a severe challenge to Islamic tradition from the western influence; an increase in minority religions; an increased crime rate in major cities; and increased pressures from the royal government to conform, with the SAVAK acting as the governmental agent. As the foreign population grew, their western influence on the Iranian society grew. It was the west and primarily the United States that sold and maintained military equipment for the Shah and this same equipment could be directed toward the Iranian populace whenever the Shah felt the need to do so. Recent history had shown the Shah's willingness to employ his forces against his own people as experienced in 1953, 1963, 1970,

1975, and again in 1978.

Just about every immoral condition prevalent in Iran and also despised by the clergy was blamed on the west. Some of these were: increased prostitution, pornographic movies and literature, nightclubs with striptease dancers, abundance of alcoholic beverages, gambling casinos, venereal disease, bastard children, western clothing that exposed Iranian women, immoral dancing between the sexes, immoral displays of affection in public, and marriages outside of Islam. The very foundation of Islam was severely challenged by the influence of the west. Even worse, the Shah had condoned it although he was clearly charged under the constitution to promote Islam as the state religion and protect Islam against all enemies. The Shah and his western friends were guilty in the eyes of the clergy for crimes lumped together under one charge, "corruption on earth."

LOYALTY WITHIN THE ARMED FORCES

The title of the Shah is synonymous with all who support him in his government when addressed by his opponents. Foremost in this grouping of loyalists to the Shah were the top general officers who in most cases were also commanders of the service sections in the Imperial Iranian Armed Forces. As stated earlier, the Shah bought the dedication and loyalty of his top officers either directly or indirectly. By the time an officer reached the grade of full colonel or general officer, he was committed to the Shah for his very existence in Iranian society.

From the initial organization of the armed forces under Reza Shah in 1921 until the early seventies, an Iranian military officer occupied a position of prestige and ranked high in status in the social arena. Despite problems with inflation, the officer corp as a whole supported the Shah. Even after retirement, officers suffered little, if any, diminution of pay.

Regular officers could retire after twenty years of military service if their retirement did not adversely impact on ability of the military to perform its mission. Most officers served between twenty-five and thirty years before requesting retirement. The retired pay was based on a fraction of the last active duty pay per month multiplied by each year of service. In most cases, the retired monthly pay rate exceeded their active duty monthly pay; however, they were no longer entitled to most of the additional benefits enjoyed on active duty such as housing, servants, official cars, and monetary bonuses. Retirement pay was more than sufficient to retain their accustomed standard of living and status in society.

If the Shah were killed or forced to flee from Iran, and his son could not ascend to the throne, all was lost for the military hierarchy. Most military officers believed this was the case. Any new government, whether religious inspired or not, would surely change the regulations in force and the military would lose everything.

The Shah could not exist without the armed forces exercising an essential role in upholding his political authority and likewise, the military could not exist in its customary position without the Shah. There could be no doubt that the officer corp held a considerable

stake in the Shah's government and political system; furthermore, there would be little chance that the officer corp would actively take a stand in any political activity that would even hint of contradiction to the Shah or oppose his expressed desires. Most of the officer corp, ten per cent of the total force, remained more or less loyal to the Shah; however, it was the top generals that the opposition elements hated and also feared.

The total officer corp was not hated by the opposition because of their specific deeds, but were generally disliked due to their association with the Shah and his government. Many of the officers in service during the Islamic Revolution were kind and understanding towards the populace. Many of them were also sincere and devoted Moslems who did not desire to strike down Iranians in the street and yet they were in no position to assert their personal opinions. Even some of the general officers were considered moderates and respected by the community and the clergy alike. However, they were in a position where no options were available, although some were never forced to make a choice between loyalty to the Shah or joining the opposition.

One of the moderates was General Abbas Qharabaghi. He had served in both the Imperial Iranian Ground Forces and the Imperial Iranian Gendarmerie. He was serving as the commander of the gendarmerie when the revolution started, then took over as the Minister of Interior, and at the end was serving under Prime Minister Shapour Bakhtiar as the Chief of the Supreme Commander's Staff.

This man was a graduate of the Iranian Military Academy who had

served the Shah faithfully for many years and he had the leadership ability and personality to deal with the populace without employing extreme military pressure. He was considered by observers within and outside of Iran as the Shah's best military leader and performed in a professional manner at all times.

General Qharabaghi was one of only two full generals to be spared from the Islamic execution squad after the government fell. He was also the top military commander who gave the order that neutralized the armed forces on February 12, 1979 and thereby provided the Islamic Revolution with victory. An interesting fact of interest, General Qharabaghi is the son-in-law of Ayatollah Shariat Maderi, a prominent Moslem leader in Qom. Other major commanders and general officers hated by the clergy and the majority of the opposition were:

General Ashari: Chief of the Supreme Commander's Staff and the military prime minister of the military government.

General Oveisi: Commander, Imperial Iranian Ground Forces and the military governor and martial law administrator for Tehran.

General Rabii: Commander, Imperial Iranian Air Force and a minister in the military government.

General Biglari: Commander, Imperial Iranian Gendarmerie.

General Badrai: Commander of the Shah's Imperial Guards.

General Nassiri: Commander of the SAVAK and Ambassador to Pakistan.

General Moqaddem: Commander of the SAVAK, a deputy of General Nassiri.

General Asimi: Minister of War.

General Toufanian: Vice-Minister of War in charge of weapons procurement for all service sections.

General Naji: Commander, Imperial Iranian Artillery Center and martial law governor in Isfahan.

General Rahimi: Replaced General Oveisi as military governor of Tehran after the latter fled Iran.

General Khosrowdad: Commander, Imperial Army Aviation Center in Isfahan and the elite brigades, 55th Airborne and 23rd Special Forces.

General Jahanbani: Deputy Commander, Imperial Iranian Air Force.

The Foregoing list is not exhaustive; however, it does serve as a key roster of the major commanders in positions of influence during the revolution and all but three were executed. Generals Toufanian and Oveisi fled the country prior to arrest and General Ashari's fate is unknown.

THE SHAH'S FINAL NINETY DAYS IN IRAN

The Shah's last three months in Tehran were spent in seclusion at his Niavaran Palace in the north part of the city. The palace grounds were surrounded by tanks and air defense weapons for protection. Army helicopters entered and departed the grounds during all hours of the day and night, probably transporting key military leaders in and out for high level meetings. There was speculation that the Shah had been the victim of an attempted assassination and was wounded severely. Although there was no evidence to support this line of reasoning, the Shah did not look well upon his departure from Iran and may have been

ill. Current events surrounding his medical condition lend support to a condition of failing health.

The Shah had continually vacillated in his policies during the entire revolution and in the closing days, he seemed to be indecisive in reaching operational decisions. It was not the same Shah observed during the previous opposition movements he had faced in thirty-seven years as Iran's monarch. It is possible his top commanders were not executing his directives in a timely manner. Whatever the case, the Shah was not sure of his position with the United States or how its leader, President Carter might react to the application of total military force if the Shah had employed this tactic in the streets of his cities. The Shah must have had doubts about some of his commanders since they were constantly reporting increased desertion rates in the ranks. Only those close to him during the last days of the revolution really knew what his motives may have been.

After his appointment of Bakhtiar to head the government, it was easy to understand why his military commanders would not work well with Bakhtiar. Their reasoning was that the Shah was still in the country initially and he should have given the orders as he had done in the past. After the Shah's departure, it was equally easy to see why the commanders were reluctant to follow Bakhtiar.

Bakhtiar did not have experience in military matters and he had anticipated his military commanders would be able to take charge and handle the problems at hand. All of the commanders, with the possible exception of General Qharabaghi, had been military puppets for too long however, and it was not the time to learn how to be decisive.

They may have experienced feelings of abandonment by the Shah and their personal goals had been completely shattered. There was probably a vast amount of bickering among the generals concerning who was in charge and what actions should be taken. Furthermore, the generals did not trust Bakhtiar, a former enemy of the Shah, and possibly even feared for their lives since they were no longer standing in the shadow of the Shahanshah.

The cohesion of the armed forces dissolved rapidly without the Shah's guidance and only the Imperial Guards continued to function as a combat unit up to the end. After the confrontation between the Imperial Guards and the Imperial Iranian Air Force on the tenth and eleventh of February, General Qharabaghi ordered all military units back to their garrisons and the Islamic Revolution achieved success during the morning hours of February 12, 1979. This date marked the end of the Pahlavi regime and possibly the Pahlavi dynasty itself. However, the Shah had never abdicated his crown as Iran's monarch.

More than a year has passed since the Islamic Revolution forced the Shah and his regime from the pinnacle of power in Iran and the entire country is still in a state of anarchy. Ayatollah Khomeini and his close advisors have not been able to get an Islamic Republic functioning to this day and may never reach success in attaining this goal. No one knows what the future may hold for Iran; however, it is increasingly clear that the religious leaders were not capable of setting up a democracy and we may see civil war rise out of the stagnant revolution. It is not beyond comprehension to see the Shah return to power, with defined limits, or see his son, Crown Prince Reza be re-

quested to return if the Shah should succumb to cancer.

Notes

¹
John M. Smith, "Unpublished Notes," recorded in an informal journal, initiated in Tehran on September 20, 1977 with entries posted up through February 27, 1979. The recorded data was used for the text of chapter five and were drawn from daily activities, local publications, business conversations, and unclassified Imperial Iranian Armed Forces publications in Iran.

CHAPTER VI

AN ANALYSIS OF THE MAJOR ISSUES THAT CONTRIBUTED
TO THE DESTRUCTION OF THE PAHLAVI REGIME

In this chapter, we will analyze the research data presented in the first five chapters to determine if the thesis is valid in the study of military art and science. Key statements will be offered for analysis that impacted directly on the Iranian Islamic Revolution from January 1978 up to the fall of the Shah's regime on February 12, 1979. Each statement will have a relationship to the Imperial Iranian Armed Forces as it attempted to support the government of Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi during the revolutionary period. Ultimately, a conclusion can be reached that will answer the thesis problem statement: "Why did the Imperial Iranian Armed Forces fail to maintain martial law and quell the revolution"?

THE HIGH COST OF MILITARY POWER

As stated in chapter one, the Imperial Iranian Armed Forces were organized in separate service sections comparable to the separate military departments under the United States Department of Defense. Iran had also been the single largest customer in purchases of military hardware and training from the Department of Defense (DOD). The

United States had provided military advisory service to the government of Iran since 1950 with a major upgrading of the armed forces commencing in 1972 under the "Nixon Doctrine."

By the mid-seventies, there were more DOD advisors working in Iran than anywhere else in the world. We could see the eagerness displayed by the Shah in purchasing the latest state-of-the-art military hardware made available to him under DOD's Foreign Military Sales (FMS) programs. Iran's annual defense expenditures accounted for nearly thirty per cent of the gross national product. The United States had made FMS sales estimated at nearly twelve billion dollars to Iran over the last decade.

Also in chapter five, observations were provided that indicated the Shah continued his unobstructed military hardware purchases to pacify his military commanders and add prestige to the armed forces in general. The absorbability of the vast quantities of technologically advanced military equipment exceeded the capabilities of the available technicians within the armed forces of Iran and forced the Shah to import large numbers of skilled personnel from the West. The Imperial Iranian Air Force, as a case in point, had not been able to assimilate the complex F-14 into full service without continued external support. The Shah had made enormous expenditures for equipment that could not be absorbed into the service sections and substantial quantities of new equipment sat at the major ports of Iran and could not be moved onward for the same reasons.

The opposition could not accept such flagrant waste of resources while thousands of poor Iranians were still lacking the basic needs

for existence. In fact, many of the Shah's people were starving or receiving support from the Mosques while new military equipment rusted in place. Defense expenditures had denied adequate funding for development in the civil sector and vividly displayed an imbalance in Iran's economy.

THE IMPACT OF RELIGION ON LOYALTY

Religion has always been important in the lives of the majority of the Iranians. Islam, and particularly the Shiite branch of Islam is the state religion in Iran and dates back to the sixteenth century. When we consider that conservative estimates show close to ninety per cent of the total Iranian population of thirty-four million practice Shiite Islam, there can be little doubt of the major role this religion commands in the Iranian society. Furthermore, if Islam can enjoy such an overwhelming following with the Iranian populace, it should follow that religion will impact in all facets of daily activities, from the small, remote villages to the central government and its political structure.

Faith, worship, and prayers in Islam come first in the life of a Moslem. It is not really significant if an individual is Shiite or Sunni, he is totally dedicated to Islam. His desire is to serve the master, Allah, and live his life according to the Koran. Each faithful Moslem will follow the guidance of an Ayatollah and his interpretation of Islamic law. Herein was the big conflict between Islam and the government of the Shah.

The clergy in Iran had always played an important role in past governments of Iran under the secular Shahs; however, their representation started a major decline when Reza Shah the Great set up the Pahlavi Dynasty in 1921. The clergy were stripped of their authority to administer Islamic law and control education throughout Iran. Reza Shah established a state controlled judicial system and a state controlled educational system. As stated in the text, Reza Shah also forced Iranian women to discard their chadors (veils) and wear clothing of western design, an extreme shock to faithful Moslems. When Reza Shah was forced to abdicate in 1941, his son, Mohammad Reza was placed on the throne and became Shah.

In 1963, the Shah formally initiated the White Revolution, which the clergy perceived as the coup de grace to Islam's position in Iran. The conflict generated under the White Revolution was discussed in detail in chapter two. The Islamic clergy and faithful followers had protested the issues continuously from 1963 forward. The central issue in all confrontations was the failure of the Shah's government to recognize Islamic law and the Shah's failure to protect Islam, his mandate under the Iranian Constitution of 1906.

The Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, who was in exile in Iraq, surfaced as the catalyst for the Islamic cause. Khomeini had suffered humiliation from the Shah and was in a position of safety where he could preach at will against the corrupt government of Iran. Once Khomeini had accepted the yoke of leadership, the opposition grew in strength from all strata of Iranian society and reached a position where the Islamic Peoples Revolution could effectively challenge the

Shah. The Shah in this analysis should be viewed as the absolute monarch, the only political authority, the political party, and the military force.

LEVEL OF DEDICATION WITHIN THE ARMED FORCES

The Imperial Iranian Armed Forces were the political authority for the Shah. This force was also authorized under the constitution of 1906. The armed forces in reality existed because of the Shah and to serve the Shah. It was obvious, that dedication to the Shah varied and was based on family background, position held, rank, and of course, personal ambition. The officers from the elite or upper class were loyal and dedicated to the Shah. Their very station in life existed by the will of the Shah.

The conscripts were another matter in that they had been forced to serve. During the initial stages of the revolution the conscripts were probably dedicated out of fear of their superiors. When they became aware of alternatives to serving the Shah, dedication was no longer evident.

It should be considered reasonable to state that many of the men in uniform were loyal to the Shah based on a belief of his ideologies and would have served without personal gain. The Shah had been a successful monarch for thirty-seven years and the military members had made a bad error in judgement, they had believed they were on the winning team.

RELATIONS BETWEEN THE MILITARY SERVICES

The overview of the Imperial Iranian Armed Forces in chapter one would appear similiar in organization to many armies of the world. On the contrary, the chain of command established by the Shah and his highly centralized span of control for decision making prevented any semblance of interaction between the services. This situation did not envolve because of inept commanders or staff at the top levels, it was by design of the Shah. The Shah had learned the hard way about loyalty in the early fifties when he was forced to flee Iran for his life. After returning to the throne following Mohammad Mossadeq's arrest, the Shah did not trust anyone explicitly. By forcing each major commander to report directly to him on all matters, he knew precisely how each service section stood and information would not be filtered or blocked. Although cumbersome at times, this system provided equal status to five major commanders and it would be difficult for a single commander to gain the support required to challenge the Shah or initiate a coup. Furthermore, a commander or member of the Imperial Iranian Ground Forces could not enter an Iranian Air Force Base without first receiving approval from the Supreme Commander's Staff.

Although the Shah had an effective method for checks and balances, his system also created discord between the services. No major commander could appreciate the benefits to be gained through interaction of the total force due to required "tunnel vision". The

commanders continually struggled to gain the Shah's attention and therefore, receive his support on programs directed to their respective service sections.

Another problem that existed was the lack of training support between two services such as close air support sorties flown in support of a ground force exercise. The time required to clear a multi-service operation was prohibitive and therefore, seldom requested. The failure to maintain effective two way communications between services did not strengthen the armed forces position when they were faced with the Islamic movement to end the Shah's regime.

INTERNAL CONFRONTATION WITHIN THE MILITARY

During most of 1978, the military services managed to operate without assistance from each other. In most of the large cities of Iran, the ground forces were given the responsibility for maintaining discipline and crowd control. The air force was required to secure their own installations and in remote areas, they also maintained control of the populace. The gendarmerie maintained border security and policed the smaller villages and tribal regions.

During the evening of February 9, 1979, the Homafars (warrant officers) at Doshan Tappeh Air Force Base in Tehran started demonstrating over a video tape of Khomeini's return. Although not discussed earlier, the ground force patrols around the base could not contain the large demonstration and requested assistance. Elements of the Imperial Guard, the Shah's elite unit, were sent in and fought for two

days. The Imperial Guard became trapped between personnel on the base and the civilian opposition on the outside. They received attack helicopters to reinforce them and they were shot down. Finally, during the night of the eleventh of February, the Imperial Guard, with heavy casualties, withdrew out of the base.

Apparently the arrival of the Shah's personal guard elements, a strong symbol of the crown, escalated a tense situation. Considering the Homafars were educated technicians and unhappy about the government's attitude toward their spiritual leader, they capitalized on this moment of confusion to break from the air force. Most had volunteered for service due to job shortages on the economy and did not support the Shah's government as soldiers. They did not condone Moslems killing Moslems for the survival of the Shah's regime. The government had tried to prevent a major military force from breaking ranks and joining Khomeini and it had failed in a miserable manner.

ABSENCE OF THE DECISION MAKER

The Shah, and only the Shah, made decisions on major issues and in most cases, on all issues. The highly centralized method of control imposed by the Shah did not permit his commanders an opportunity to exercise. The Shah trusted a few senior commanders and provided limited authority to them. It was never clear where that authority started or ended. The Shah, as would be expected, had an elaborate communications system available and established for all modes of travel; therefore, he was available to direct his government on all

matters. Of course, when he departed Iran on "vacation" in January of 1978, the chain of command was broken.

Prime Minister Bakhtiar and his regency council were "in command" until the Islamic Revolution achieved success. Some observers claim the Shah continued to communicate with General Qharabaghi from Egypt, but research does not support their claim. Without the Shah, the military leaders were in a state of limbo. The Shah's generals did not work with Bakhtiar and did not initiate any plans of their own.

President Carter ordered General Robert E. Huyser to Iran as his envoy to meet with the senior military commanders and convince them to support Bakhtiar. He arrived prior to the Shah's departure and stayed in Tehran for nearly one month. General Huyser's exact mission and dialog is not known. Obviously, the commanders did not support Bakhtiar and on the twelfth of February, General Qharabaghi gave the order that neutralized the armed force.

Apparently, General Qharabaghi felt the government was finished since the Shah had left without much hope of returning and it would be senseless to waste additional lives for a government that could not stand. He may have reached some agreement with Ayatollah Khomeini and the Revolutionary Council to stop the bloodshed. Remember, this general officer was the son-in-law of Ayatollah Shariat Maderi which suggests a compromise was conceivable.

The author is convinced that General Qharabaghi betrayed Bakhtiar and the military on the advice of his father-in-law. The Shah was gone and it was each man for himself, at least it appeared that way in Tehran. General Qharabaghi was not executed and lives as a free

man in Tehran today.

STRESS ON THE MILITARY FORCES

Although behavior scientists and medical doctors have studied the impact of stress, it would be difficult to describe in general terms with universal applications. The two major forms of stress, mental and physical, apply to soldiers in a time of crisis such as combat operations. Physical stress can be measured by maximum heart rate, lung capacity, muscle tone, and so forth. On the other hand, mental stress is extremely difficult to quantify and will vary between individuals.

Obviously the Shah's army was physically conditioned and they received adequate nourishment to perform military missions. Mental stress, however, started to take its toll of the soldiers, mainly among the conscripts, during large confrontations where weapons were fired into the demonstrations. The common Iranian who died in the street was an enemy of the Shah and not the soldiers. As we have discovered in this research, the majority of the conscripts were illiterate and did not understand the reasons for killing or beating faithful Moslem brothers. If the opposition had been members of the Tudeh Party, the soldiers could have related to fighting atheists as enemies of Islam. The conscripts fired their weapons into the crowds because they were ordered to do so and even the common soldier could not rationalize this act. Initially they obeyed, then hesitated while someone else did the dirty work, and finally they broke and ran.

When facing demonstrators, the conscripts were asked by the opposition why they served the Shah instead of Islam, why they killed their Islamic brethren, and why they did not serve Allah as their master. Those questions could not be answered since service to Islam was their only true purpose in life as Moslems. Also, the conscripts identified with the people in the streets more than with the army. Therefore, the fear of eternal damnation weighed heavily on their minds, and when mental stress could not be endured any longer, they deserted their units.

LEADERSHIP FOR A COUP

There were two general officers within the armed forces who could have been successful based on the observation of the author. One was General Qharabaghi who enjoyed the respect of a majority of the officer corp. He was considered to be brilliant, admired, moderate, and most important, he was trusted by most Iranians. The other officer who was capable of pulling off a coup was General Khosrowdad.

General Khosrowdad was a fiery leader who demanded action out of subordinates. He was a devoted supporter of the Shah and was responsible for the defeat of Khomeini in 1963. His 23rd Special Forces had offered no mercy to the opposition against the Shah during the 1963 confrontation. He was trusted by the Shah and yet, the Shah experienced difficulty in restraining General Khosrowdad. This man could have rallied support from the elite units in Iran, a force more than adequate.

The central problem with a coup led by anyone would have been support by the lower enlisted ranks, most of whom were conscripts. General Qharabaghi might have generated such support; however, General Khosrowdad would have had to use force and instill fear. Prior to the Shah's departure, a coup had a chance of success if he had given the word. General Khosrowdad would have stopped the opposition, but the streets of Iran would have been red with blood. After the Shah's departure, cohesion in the military vanished and a successful coup would have been doubtful.

The author contends a plan for a coup might have existed in case Bakhtiar's government failed. However, the confrontation between the military services at Doshen Tappeh probably preempted such an action. This observation would certainly explain the hasty trials and executions of the Shah's top military leadership. Furthermore, General Khosrowdad was among the first four general officers executed. Once again, attention focuses on General Qharabaghi who escaped death and prison.

CONCLUSION

The Shah was Iran's monarch and also the commander in chief of the Imperial Iranian Armed Forces. Students of military history realize that the commander is ultimately responsible for the forces under his command and control; that responsibility was certainly inherent with the Shah of Iran. Although the Shah was an absolute monarch and he did not rule as an uniformed commander of a military government, he did exercise complete control and authority over the armed forces. His regime rigidly enforced a highly centralized form of control and he made all decisions. The central issues which were revealed through research are:

The Shah's failure to trust anyone in his regime after his experience with Mohammad Mossadeq in 1953.

The Shah's reluctance to delegate authority to his senior commanders, in particular, his service section commanders.

The concept that trust, loyalty, devotion, and dedication could be purchased in his military ranks.

Failure by the Shah to provide options to his commanders in the event his government did not stand.

Failure to consider the impact his departure would represent regarding the safety of his command group if the Islamic Revolution achieved success and he had not abdicated the throne.

His failure to establish an environment with the enlisted ranks, primarily for conscripts, that would promote their acceptance as human beings vis-a-vis dumb animals.

Permitting corruption within the political leadership and the officer corp.

The Shah's failure to place restraints on the SAVAK and the National Police who had general officers in command.

Failure to believe or realize that the troops would serve the promotion of Islam instead of dedicated service to the crown.

Use of brute force against his people instead of safe, modern civil control methods, and well defined rules of engagement.

Issuance of martial law regulations and then his failure to enforce them universally in Tehran and other major cities, especially curfew time tables and public gatherings.

Failure to counter Khomeini's propaganda within his armed forces.

No effort to discredit Khomeini in the news media and in his television appeals to the public.

His complete withdrawal from public view which prevented his personal assessment of actual conditions and removed his presence when needed by loyal supporters of his regime.

The Shah's tendency to vacillate on important issues.

His failure to issue sound guidance and timely decisions to his armed forces.

Expecting General Qharabaghi to assimilate command and control over the Imperial Iranian Armed Forces under Shapour Bakhtiar.

Therefore, a thorough review and analysis of this study has led to one conclusion that provides the answer to the question addressed in the thesis statement. Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi was responsible for his Imperial Iranian Armed Forces failure to maintain martial law and quell the revolution.

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