


AD-A076 926

ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLL FORT LEAVENWORTH KS F/G 5/4
THE U.S. ARMY, PUBLIC OPINION, AND PRESIDENT GRANT'S INDIAN PEA--ETC(U)
JUN 79 R C KEY

UNCLASSIFIED

NL

1 OF 2
AD-
A076926





NATIONAL BUREAU OF STANDARDS
MICROCOPY RESOLUTION TEST CHART

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE		READ INSTRUCTIONS BEFORE COMPLETING FORM
1. REPORT NUMBER	2. GOVT ACCESSION NO.	3. RECIPIENT'S CATALOG NUMBER
4. TITLE (and Subtitle)		5. TYPE OF REPORT & PERIOD COVERED
The U. S. Army, Public Opinion, and President Grant's Indian Peace Policy		9 Final Report 8 June 1979
7. AUTHOR(s)		6. PERFORMING ORG. REPORT NUMBER
Key, Robert C., LTC, USA		8. CONTRACT OR GRANT NUMBER(s)
10 Robert C. / Key		
9. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME AND ADDRESS		10. PROGRAM ELEMENT, PROJECT, TASK AREA & WORK UNIT NUMBERS
Student at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027		
11. CONTROLLING OFFICE NAME AND ADDRESS		11. REPORT DATE
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College ATTN: ATSW-SE		8 Jun 1979
12. MONITORING AGENCY NAME & ADDRESS (if different from Controlling Office)		12. NUMBER OF PAGES
12 136		117
13. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of this Report)		15. SECURITY CLASS. (of this report)
Approved for public release; distribution unlimited		
14. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of the abstract entered in Block 20, if different from Report)		15. DECLASSIFICATION/DOWNGRADING SCHEDULE
16. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES		
Master of Military Art and Science (MMAS) thesis prepared at CGSC in partial fulfillment of the Masters Program requirements, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027		
17. KEY WORDS (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number)		
Indian affairs, Grant administration, 1869-1876, Effects of public opinion.		
18. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number)		
See reverse.		

AD A 076926

DDC FILE COPY

DD FORM 1473
1 JAN 73

EDITION OF 1 NOV 65 IS OBSOLETE

4c-3685

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE (When Data Entered)

This thesis describes the evolution of United States Indian policy with emphasis on the effects of public opinion during the Grant administration from 1869 to 1876. It begins with a brief description of Indian affairs from 1825 to 1867 followed by a detailed analysis of Indian policy and public opinion for each year from 1868 to 1876. Indian policy documents, reports of military operations, and newspaper reports are examined to determine the cause and effect relationships of the historical events portrayed.

Much of the research for this thesis was effected through the assistance of the interlibrary loan of microfilm copies of major newspapers across the nation. It was assumed that the contents of these newspapers reflected or formed public opinion. Newspapers were compared with reports from government agencies, such as the War Department and the Department of the Interior, to ascertain the divergent views known to exist during the period.

It is concluded from this study that public opinion was generally divided into four divergent views: the Eastern humanitarian, the Western pragmatist, the military and the general public; and that the American public had strong influences on the formulation of Indian policy. Specifically:

1. Contemporary public opinion rather than later historical analysis determined whether military actions against the Indians were considered heroic events or massacres.
2. The public supported the removal of Indians from the path of westward expansion at all costs throughout the period.
3. Politically potent humanitarian groups, collectively known as the "Indian Ring," controlled the making of Indian policy from 1869 to 1873.
4. Public opinion supported the humanitarian approach as exemplified by the Grant Peace Policy until 1873 when it became generally accepted that the use of military force as a tool of the peace effort was necessary.

The U.S. Army, Public Opinion, and President Grant's Indian Peace Policy

Robert C. Key, LTC, USA
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027

Final report 8 June 1979

Approved for public release; distribution unlimited.

A Master of Military Art and Science thesis presented to the faculty
of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth,
Kansas 66027

THE U.S. ARMY, PUBLIC OPINION, AND PRESIDENT GRANT'S INDIAN PEACE POLICY

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army
Command and General Staff College in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

by

ROBERT C. KEY, LTC, USA

B.A., Wichita State University 1960

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
1979

AD BELLUM

PACE PARATI

90-CGSC-3039

79 11 05 014

MASTER OF MILITARY ARTS AND SCIENCE

THESIS APPROVAL PAGE

Name of Candidate Lieutenant Colonel Robert Chandler Key

Title of thesis The U.S. Army, Public Opinion, and President Grant's
Indian Peace Policy

Approved by:

Charles R. Shul

Research Advisor

[Signature]

, Member, Graduate Faculty

Allen W. Jones

, Member, Consulting Faculty

Accepted this 8th day of June by Philip H. Brookes,
Director, Master of Military Arts and Science.

The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the individual student author and do not necessarily represent the views of either the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any governmental agency. References to this study should include the foregoing statement.

Accession For	
NTIS GRA&I	☒
DOC TAB	☐
Unannounced	☐
Justification	
By _____	
Distribution/	
Availability Codes	
Dist.	Avail and/or special
A	

THE U.S. ARMY, PUBLIC OPINION AND PRESIDENT GRANT'S INDIAN PEACE POLICY,
by Lieutenant Colonel Robert C. Key, USA, 117 pages.

This thesis describes the evolution of United States Indian policy with emphasis on the effects of public opinion during the Grant administration, from 1869 to 1876. It begins with a brief description of Indian affairs from 1825 to 1867, followed by a detailed analysis of Indian policy and public opinion for each year from 1868 to 1876. Indian policy documents, reports of military operations, and newspaper reports are examined to determine the cause and effect relationships of the historical events portrayed. *The author concludes*

Much of the research for this thesis was effected through the assistance of the interlibrary loan of microfilm copies of major newspapers across the nation. It was assumed that the contents of these newspapers reflected or formed public opinion. Newspapers were compared with reports from government agencies, such as the War Department and the Department of the Interior, to ascertain the divergent views known to exist during the period.

It is concluded from this study that public opinion was generally divided into four divergent views: the Eastern humanitarian, the Western pragmatist, the military and the general public; and that the American public had strong influences on the formulation of Indian policy. Specifically:

1. Contemporary public opinion rather than later historical analysis determined whether military actions against the Indians were considered heroic events or massacres.
2. The public supported the removal of the Indians from the path of westward expansion at all costs throughout the period;
3. Politically potent humanitarian groups, collectively known as the "Indian Ring," controlled the making of Indian policy from 1869 to 1873.
4. Public opinion supported the humanitarian approach as exemplified by the Grant Peace Policy until 1873 when it became generally accepted that the use of military force as a tool of the peace effort was necessary.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to say thank you to those who gave generously of their time and talent to make this thesis possible. Major C. R. Shrader provided outstanding guidance and support throughout the year. Doctor D. T. Cornish found those errors that got by me, and Doctor A. W. Jones provided his knowledge of the politics of the Grant years. Major Gordon Carmichael assisted with good suggestions to improve my writing, and Mrs. Carole J. Klopp provided expert typing support. Finally, I want to thank my loving wife, Dot, without whose support and encouragement this paper could not have been written.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
APPROVAL PAGE.....	ii
ABSTRACT.....	iii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS.....	iv
LIST OF FIGURES.....	vi
CHAPTER	
I. INTRODUCTION.....	1
PURPOSE OF THE STUDY.....	1
THE ARMY LED THE WAY WESTWARD.....	1
TREATY OF GUADALUPE HILDALGO.....	2
TRANSFER OF THE INDIAN BUREAU.....	2
1851 INDIAN TREATIES.....	2
EFFECTS OF THE CIVIL WAR.....	3
1866 PEACE CONFERENCES.....	3
FETTERMAN DISASTER.....	4
TREATY OF MEDICINE LODGE.....	4
INDIAN DEPREDACTIONS OF 1867.....	5
ARMY OPERATIONS OF 1868.....	6
GRANT PEACE POLICY.....	7
INDIAN POLICY OF 1870-1872.....	8
BAKER AFFAIR.....	9
MODOC UPRISING.....	9
OPERATIONS OF 1876.....	10

II. ADVENT OF AN AGGRESSION POLICY

REPORT OF THE INDIAN PEACE COMMISSION.....	13
THE ARMY PREPARES TO ABANDON FORTS.....	14
PROPOSED TRANSFER OF THE INDIAN BUREAU.....	14
LANDS FOR THE INDIANS.....	15
FORT LARAMIE PEACE TALKS.....	15
INDIAN DEPREDACTIONS OF 1868.....	16
RATIFICATION OF PEACE TREATIES.....	17
ESTABLISHMENT OF NEW MILITARY DISTRICTS.....	17
RAIDS OF THE KIWAS AND COMANCHES.....	18
RAIDS OF THE CHEYENNES AND ARAPAHOS.....	19
GENERALS SHERMAN AND SHERIDAN PLAN MILITARY OPERATIONS..	20
MOVEMENT OF ARMY UNITS IN THE SUMMER OF 1868.....	22
BATTLE OF BEECHER'S ISLAND.....	23
INDIAN PEACE COMMISSION MEETS IN CHICAGO.....	24
WINTER CAMPAIGN 1868.....	24
AGENT WYNKOOP RESIGNS.....	28

III. THE GRANT PEACE POLICY

ULYSSES S. GRANT INAUGURATED.....	34
GRANT PEACE POLICY ANNOUNCED.....	35
ELY PARKER FOR COMMISSIONER OF INDIAN AFFAIRS.....	36
BOARD OF INDIAN COMMISSIONERS ESTABLISHED.....	38
INDIAN DEPREDACTIONS OF THE SUMMER OF 1869.....	39

IV. POLICY IN TRANSITION

PRESIDENT COMMENTS ON THE PROGRESS OF THE PEACE POLICY..	47
THE BAKER AFFAIR.....	48

RED CLOUD VISITS WASHINGTON, D.C.....	51
INDIAN DEPREDACTIONS DURING THE SUMMER 1870.....	56
V. THE GRANT PEACE POLICY IN ARIZONA	
MORE RELIGIOUS GROUPS FOR INDIAN AFFAIRS.....	59
SEPARATE DEPARTMENTS FOR ARIZONA.....	60
CAMP GRANT MASSACRE.....	61
PRESIDENT GRANT'S DEMAND.....	63
SHERMAN'S VISIT.....	64
TRIAL OF SATANTA AND BIG TREE.....	65
VINCENT COLYER'S MISSION.....	66
INDIAN DEPREDACTIONS OF 1871.....	67
VI. CROOK'S CAMPAIGN 1872-1873	
GENERAL O.O. HOWARD'S MISSION.....	77
HOWARD'S VISIT WITH COCHISE.....	79
CROOK'S CAMPAIGN.....	81
VII. CAPTAIN JACK AND THE MODOCS	
MODOCS RETURN TO THEIR HOMELAND.....	87
ARMY ATTEMPTS TO MOVE THE MODOCS.....	88
MODOCS ESCAPE TO LAVA BEDS.....	88
GENERAL CANBY MURDERED.....	90
GENERAL SHERMAN TAKES ACTION TO PUNISH THE MODOCS.....	91
CAPTAIN JACK CAPTURED.....	94
CAPTAIN JACK TRIED BY MILITARY.....	94
VIII. THE RED RIVER WARS	
CHIEFS BROUGHT TO WASHINGTON.....	98
HARRASSMENT OF TEXAS SETTLERS.....	99

NEW RAIDS IN KANSAS AND INDIAN TERRITORY.....	101
SHERMAN AND SHERIDAN PLAN FOR CAMPAIGN.....	102
ARMY AUTHORIZED ON INDIAN RESERVATIONS.....	103
INDIANS REPORT TO RESERVATIONS TO AVOID ARMY ACTION....	104
SUMMER CAMPAIGN.....	104
FIGHTING THROUGH THE WINTER.....	107
TRIAL OF THE HOSTILE INDIANS.....	107
RED RIVER WARS WERE A SUCCESS.....	108

IX. CONCLUSIONS

LIST OF MAPS

Map	Page
1. AREA MAP OF THE CENTRAL AND SOUTHERN PLAINS.....	124
2. AREA MAP OF SOUTHWEST.....	125
3. MAP OF THE RED RIVER WARS.....	126

*Idea for maps came from Robert M. Utley, Frontier Regulars: The United States Army and the Indian, 1866-1891.

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

A tragic series of clashes between the white man and the Indian began soon after the first European arrived on the new continent and continued into the twentieth century. Neither Indian nor white man wasted much energy in understanding the other. Each thought himself superior. Antagonisms and armed conflict marked the lives of generations of white settlers as they carried their civilization across the Great Plains and eventually destroyed the red men's way of life.

This historical study examines military operations and Indian affairs during the Grant Administration, 1869-1876, to determine the effects of public opinion on the formulation and execution of Indian policy. The moral issue of right or wrong with regard to the Indian is not within the scope of this study. What happened and what caused it to happen are the central issues.

The army led the way westward. Exploration was followed by trade with the Indians. The presence of frontiersmen in Indian country led to demands for protection followed by the construction of forts. Towns and cities grew up around the forts and eventually replaced them. With the movement of people came the demand for roads to provide access to the new areas. Then the cycle repeated itself again and again. As more and more settlers moved west, using water holes, cutting the

timber and killing the game, the Indians became hostile and the white man came to perceive the red man as a major threat. A plan to solve the Indian problem was introduced by John C. Calhoun, President James Monroe's Secretary of War. Calhoun's plan called for removal of all troublesome Indians west of the Rocky Mountains and east of the Missouri River to the area between the Rockies and the Missouri. This area was designated for the Indians to use as they saw fit without hinderance from the white man. Treaty arrangements and control of the Indians were left to the army. Teachers of industrial arts were sent to aid the Indians in their new home. This was the beginning of the reservation system that was adopted by Congress in 1825.¹

The Treaty of Guadalupe Hildalgo ended the Mexican War in 1848 and gave the United States vast new lands from Texas to California. With this expansion came new Indian problems associated with those tribes, such as the Apache, that moved freely between Mexico and the United States.

In 1849 the Bureau of Indian Affairs was transferred from the War Department to the Department of Interior, a move that was contested by the army for the next fifty years. The division of responsibility for the Indians between the two departments was significant in preventing the federal government from finding a final solution to the Indian problem.

In 1851 the Sioux, Cheyenne, and the Arapahoe made a treaty with the United States promising peace and recognizing the right of the United States to maintain roads and military posts in their territories. This was the first treaty to establish the boundaries of the

tribes.² The decade of the 1850's was an era of treaty-making with the Indians to move them from the path of the white settlers. Discovery of gold in the Rocky Mountains in 1859 increased the number of travelers that crossed the Great Plains and the Indian lands that had been set aside in the Calhoun plan. This particular scurry of miners and speculators resulted in the creation of the Territory of Colorado in 1860.³

From 1861 through 1865 the energies of the nation were absorbed by the Civil War. However, this disastrous conflict did not reduce or eliminate the Indian problem. Some Indians, such as the Cherokees, joined the side of the Confederacy after Federal troops were withdrawn from their regions. In Texas alone, twenty-five installations were evacuated by Union forces when the war broke out.⁴ The number of frontier forts actually increased towards the end of the war as a result of the Indian hostilities of 1864-1865. While the Confederacy was responsible for encouraging their Indian allies against the Union army, it was not responsible for all the Indian raids that occurred during the war.

After the war, the Comanches, Kiowas, and Cheyennes agreed to move south of Kansas and east of New Mexico and the Sioux consented to stop raiding in Kansas and Colorado. After the treaties were made, however, these tribes renewed hostilities again, making it necessary to hold another peace conference in 1866.⁵

As the Indian Peace Commissioners met with the Powder River chiefs at Fort Laramie in an attempt to secure peace, Colonel Henry B. Carrington's troops prepared to take up positions along the Bozeman Trail to secure this route from further Indian depredations. When the Indians were informed of Colonel Carrington's mission, they broke off further talks at

Fort Laramie. On 21 December 1866 Captain William J. Fetterman and forty-nine infantrymen of Carrington's force were massacred on the Bozeman Trail by the Indians. The citizens of the United States thought this to be the greatest disaster to befall the frontier army in recent history. Reaction was immediate. Colonel Carrington was relieved, and Congress appointed a new Peace Commission with instructions to move the Indians out of the way of westward migration.⁶

By the summer of 1867, the Indian obstacle to the movement of the white man across the Great Plains involved three areas: the Cheyennes and Sioux were between Canada and the Platte River; the Arapahoes and Southern Cheyennes were between the Platte and the Arkansas River; and the Comanches and Kiowas were between the Arkansas and the Mexican border.⁷ The Peace Commission met with the Plains Indians in 1867 and again in 1868 to determine their complaints and to eliminate the causes of those complaints. The Commission was instructed by President Andrew Johnson to secure the Central Plains for the white man by establishing reservations for the Indians north and south of the area bounded by the Platte and the Arkansas Rivers.⁸ The Treaty of Medicine Lodge was the result of the Commission's work. This treaty established the four western reservations, identified which Indian tribes were to reside on these reservations, and was the first treaty stipulating that the Indians had to farm the land to receive the benefits of the treaty.⁹

The Treaty of Medicine Lodge did not establish peace with all of the Indians in the Plains region. Indian depredations continued, and the Sioux still controlled the Powder River country and the Bozeman Trail. Raids on the Union Pacific railroad caused construction delays.

The situation was complicated by the attitude of the Western settlers who became impatient with the army about the depredations and started taking matters into their own hands. In Colorado, for example, the settlers placed a twenty-five dollar bounty on the Indians.¹⁰ Throughout the West, white men took up arms and organized punitive actions when they felt that the army was not acting fast enough.

The confidence in the army after the Civil War dropped. Over a million men were mustered out of the service, dropping the strength of the army to a mere eighteen thousand men.¹¹ A third of these were required for Reconstruction duty in the southern states and the remainder spread across the West at a series of outposts. The mission of the troops in the West was to secure the routes of migration and protect western settlements. This was an impossible task for such a small number of troops. In addition, army officers considered frontier duty as second rate, and opted instead for duty in Washington, D.C. whenever possible. Enlistments in the army declined. Because incentives were practically nonexistent for highly qualified recruits, the Regular Army, between 1865 and 1874, was composed of more than fifty percent foreign born soldiers. Most of these looked upon the army only as a way to learn English and to become familiar with the United States and then moved on to other occupations.¹²

On 1 August 1867, a band of 450 Cheyennes and Arapahoes attacked soldiers on a haying detail near Fort C. F. Smith on the Bozeman Trail. The Indians were driven off. The next day, Oglala Sioux attacked a force under the command of Captain James Powell at a wagon box corral. The Indians were defeated. In both cases the army was greatly outnumbered.

The news of these military successes pleased the western settlers and generated a new confidence in the United States Army.¹³

Although raiding continued throughout the summer of 1868 with the Cheyennes terrorizing western Kansas and eastern Colorado, the army began to take the offensive. General William T. Sherman and General Phillip H. Sheridan planned to move all the Indians south of the Kansas line. On 27 November 1868 Black Kettle, victim of the Sand Creek Massacre in 1864, was attacked again. This time, Lieutenant Colonel George A. Custer killed Black Kettle. On Christmas Day 1868, another column struck the Comanches at Soldier Spring in Indian Territory.¹⁴ These two battles made the Indians realize that they were no longer safe from attack in the winter.

As the army became more aggressive toward the Indians, Easterners began to demand more humane treatment of the Indians, accusing the army of barbarism. Western ranchers, miners and farmers, on the other hand, demanded more protection for themselves against the Indians. The western settlers and the eastern humanitarians were disturbed over the failure of the 1868 Peace Commission to stop the Indian depredations. Charges and countercharges were made by the army and the Indian Bureau. The army and its supporters wanted the Indian Bureau returned to the control of the War Department in order to give the responsibility of treaty-making to the arm of government that had the means to enforce policy. The politically potent civil faction in the East wanted the army commanders in the field subordinated to the Indian Superintendents and agents. Congress rejected both views and compounded the problem by maintaining civilian control of the Indian Bureau and designating General Sherman to handle

the funds used by the Indians.¹⁵

In the midst of this maelstrom of frustration, indecision, bickering governmental agencies and warring Indians, Ulysses S. Grant was elected President of the United States in 1868. During the next eight years such scandals as the "Gold Conspiracy," the "Credit Mobilier," the "Salary Grab," and the "Whiskey Ring" dominated the headlines and suggested that Grant the politician was not the same as Grant the soldier.

When Grant entered office as President in 1869, he had first hand knowledge of the Indians. While serving as a general after the Civil War, he had supported the army position on Indian affairs and had recommended to President Andrew Johnson that the Indian Bureau be under the control of the War Department. But after he became President, Grant shocked his old friend General Sherman with an Indian policy more restrictive on the army than that of the past.¹⁶

Supporting continued civilian supremacy over Indian affairs, the Grant "Peace Policy," as it was known, called for the establishment of a Board of Indian Commissioners to oversee Indian affairs and to control the funds, the discontinuation of the treaty system which viewed the Indians as "domestic dependent nations," and movement of all Indians onto reservations where they were to be educated and Christianized.¹⁷

During Grant's two terms as President the army was forced to operate in the West with decreasing manpower. They had to extend their influence over a larger geographic area and in an environment of untried Indian policy developed by ill-informed people with visionary rather than pragmatic solutions to every day problems. The desire to provide better treatment for the Indians and to avoid war at all costs, whether

prompted by Christian charity or a deep sense of guilt, was shared by most Easterners and was integrated into the government's thinking about the execution of the Grant Peace Policy. In addition, President Grant made an effort to improve the quality of the Indian service by cleaning out the corruption and mismanagement which had pervaded the Indian Bureau both in Washington and in the field. By appointing army officers and church representatives as superintendents and agents, the President hoped to reduce the chances of further scandal. Public opinion throughout the country supported this cause, but it was particularly favored by the Easterner whose viewpoint was represented in the New York Times:

The high character of the gentlemen who propounded the new solution for the Indian problem in itself inspires success . . .¹⁸

Narrowed down to its actual limits, the Indian question no longer remains a grave one . . . We believe that the Quakers who have been appointed as Indian Agents will accomplish this, and that, consequently we will have a peaceful and cheap administration of Indian affairs.¹⁹

Under Grant's new peace policy the Bureau of Indian Affairs was responsible for the Indians while they were on the reservation and the army had jurisdiction over Indians found off the reservation. This dual responsibility proved difficult to administer in the field. If all the Indians found off the reservation were considered hostile, then what of those tribes that did not have reservations, such as the Apaches in Arizona? And what about those Indians exercising their treaty rights to hunting grounds not on the reservation? These questions perplexed those who had to enforce the policy.

During the period from 1870 through 1872, the policy of the Indian Bureau was to avoid open warfare. Feeding the Indians was

considered cheaper than fighting them; a precept with which the army agreed. However, the army contended that the Indians had to be subjugated first, and then the survivors would be placed on reservations and fed.²⁰ Officially, the army wished to cooperate with the Indian Bureau; however, many army officers in the West shared the settlers' impatience and reverted to the military solution when given the opportunity.²¹

Throughout the Grant administration the public was divided over what should be done with the Indians. On 23 January 1870 two squadrons of the Second Cavalry, under the command of Major Eugene M. Baker, attacked and destroyed a Piegan village on the banks of the Marias River in Montana. Baker was hailed as a hero in Montana and branded a barbarian in the East. On 30 April 1871 a force of Tucson citizens massacred a group of Apaches at Camp Grant. Again, the action was applauded in Arizona where the Apaches had burned and pillaged so many times. President Grant threatened to declare martial law unless the perpetrators were brought to trial.²²

In 1872 and 1873 the country listened for news of the Modoc uprising. The East and West took opposite sides in the Modoc situation until the Modoc leader, Captain Jack, made the mistake of killing General E. S. Canby as he attempted to make peace.

By 1874 the humanitarian viewpoint began to lose support as Indian raids became more numerous. Western settlers were extremely unhappy with the federal government. By this time they had gained a large number of supporters in the East as well. Commercial ventures were stunted, the railroads were slowed again in their expansion, and

new mining areas in Indian territory were being probed.

By the spring of 1874, miners were trying to get permission to prospect in the Black Hills. Although the government officially upheld the laws to keep the white man out, a steady flow of miners entered the forbidden region.²³ In July 1874 General George Crook, Commander of the Department of the Platte, ordered over twelve hundred miners out of the area.²⁴ There was a public uproar over the General's action.

In February 1876 the army dispatched troops to round up the Sioux who had failed to report to the reservation, but Sitting Bull had already made his move to unite the Indians for war.²⁵ The Indian Bureau became concerned. While General Sheridan organized a punitive expedition, General Crook engaged Crazy Horse on the Rosebud River on 17 June 1876. The climax came 25 June 1876 when General George A. Custer was defeated at the Little Big Horn. By August 1876 Congress had enacted legislation to move the Indians out of the Black Hills. This whole sequence of events disclosed one plain fact: if the public wanted something, such as the gold in the Black Hills, they eventually managed to get it.

Open warfare between the Indians and the white men in the West continued until after the turn of the century. Public opinion about the Indian problem was reflected in the newspapers of the time, and special interest groups applied pressure on the government to influence Indian policy. A review of public opinion and military operations and their relation to shifts in Indian policy make up the core of this thesis.

CHAPTER I

ENDNOTES

¹Flora Warren Seymour, The Story of the Red Man (New York: Longmans, Green and Company, 1929), 137.

²Ibid., 147-149.

³Ibid., 278.

⁴Helen H. Jackson, A Century of Dishonor (Minneapolis: Ross and Haines, 1880), 278.

⁵Robert M. Utley, Frontier Regulars: The United States Army and the Indian 1866-1891 (New York: Macmillan, 1973), 164.

⁶Ibid., 103; James C. Olson, Red Cloud and the Sioux Problem (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1956), 41.

⁷Douglas C. Jones, The Treaty of Medicine Lodge (Norman, Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma Press, 1966), 6.

⁸Annual Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs to the Secretary of the Interior for the Year 1868 (Washington, D.C., Government Printing Office, 1869), 26-27; Evelin M. Alexander, Cavalry Wife: The Diary of Evelin M. Alexander 1866-1867 (College Station: Texas A&M Press, 1977), 5.

⁹Jones, Treaty of Medicine Lodge, 117-118.

¹⁰New York Times, 23 June 1867.

¹¹Utley, Frontier Regulars, 12-17; U.S. Department of War, Annual Report of the Secretary of War on the Operations of the Department for the Fiscal Year Ending June 30, 1869 (Washington, D.C., Government Printing Office, 1869), 26-28. The Act of 1866 set the size of the army at 18,000 men. This was changed in 1867 to 54,815 and further reduced to 37,313 in 1869.

¹²Utley, Frontier Regulars, 22-23.

¹³Olson, Red Cloud and the Sioux Problem, 63.

¹⁴William Thomas Hagan, United States-Comanche Relations: The Reservation Years (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1976), 44.

¹⁵Hagan, United States-Comanche Relations, 51.

¹⁶Utley, Frontier Regulars, 188-189.

¹⁷Ibid., 190.

¹⁸New York Times, 30 March 1869.

¹⁹Ibid., 25 April 1869.

²⁰U.S. Department of the Interior, Annual Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs to the Secretary of the Interior for the Year 1872 (Washington, D.C.; Government Printing Office, 1872), 46.

²¹Olson, Red Cloud and the Sioux Problem, 144.

²²Utley, Frontier Regulars, 193.

²³Olson, Red Cloud and the Sioux Problem, 199.

²⁴Ibid., 200-201.

²⁵Seymour, The Story of the Red Man, 319.

CHAPTER II

ADVENT OF AN AGGRESSION POLICY

The great Indian peace councils of Medicine Lodge Creek and Fort Laramie occupied the Indian Peace Commission throughout 1867. However, the events of the following year were to have a more lasting impact on Indian policy. The year 1868 saw the army join with the western settlers to recommend greater protective measures while the Indian Bureau supported by the eastern humanitarians sought to placate the Indians.

Eastern humanitarians, looking forward to the day when Indians would settle down on their assigned reservations and turn to the civilized ways of the white man, argued that military pressure on the Indians aggravated rather than eased hostilities and that no permanent peace could be realized until the Indians themselves saw the advantages of accepting the white man's civilization.¹ The Indian Peace Commission, reporting on the events of Medicine Lodge Creek and reflecting the humanitarian view, believed that public and government apathy, uncertainty, and lack of cooperation had much to do with the failure of Indian policy and the adverse impression the Indians had of the white man's ways.² The Commission further suggested that the Indian wars were caused by the white man's violation of treaties with the Indians. In particular, the Commission cited the building of military roads through the Powder River country, ordering the southern tribes from their historic hunting grounds, and

the burning of the Cheyenne village by General Winfield Hancock. The Commission also condemned the Overland Express Company for ordering its employees to shoot all Indians near their stations and the action of the governor of Montana in waging war against the Crows.³

In December 1867, President Andrew Johnson had been deceived by the glowing reports from Medicine Lodge Creek and had assured the nation that the Indians were under control and wanted to cooperate with the white man.⁴ Yet, as the new year of 1868 began, the Powder River country was under the control of the Sioux and the Bozeman Road was closed. Red Cloud, the Sioux leader, had sent word to Fort Laramie in November 1867 that he would call the war off only if the army was removed from Fort Phil Kearny and Fort C. F. Smith on the Bozeman Road. The government accepted this condition and ordered the army to make the necessary arrangements. On 2 March 1868 General Grant told General William T. Sherman to prepare to abandon Fort Phil Kearney, Reno, and Fetterman. The next day he added Fort C. F. Smith to the list.⁵ This action was upsetting to the army. The closing of these forts after so much blood had been spilled was a humiliation for the soldiers and was seen as a lack of support by the western settlers. The gap between the citizens of the East and West was widened considerably by this decision on the part of the government.

While preparing his report for Congress on the events of 1867, General Sherman expressed to the news media his view that the Indian Bureau should be transferred back to the War Department. The citizens of the West agreed wholeheartedly with this idea. The Atchison Daily Champion, 4 June 1868, wrote that the two departments, War and Interior,

were in constant conflict on the Indian problem and as a result the Indians were neglected and their treaties were broken or forgotten. The editor said, "The savages are thus provoked to war, and our frontiers suffer the penalty." This newspaper, and presumably its readers, wanted the department of government which made the treaties to have the power to enforce them. Because the Interior Department did not have the means to punish violators, it should not be given the power to make treaties. ". . . Nothing is plainer than this."⁶

When it became apparent that the government was going to set aside large amounts of land north of the Platte River for a great Sioux reservation, western opposition grew very strong. The Yankton Union and Dakotan called the reservation scheme "the most foolish . . . invention that ever emanated from the brain of a full grown man."⁷ Rumors of gold in the Black Hills made giving this area to the Indians unthinkable to Dakotans. The attitude in Wyoming was much the same. Gold had been discovered along the Sweetwater and prospectors had high hopes of finding the yellow metal on the Wind River and the Big Horn.⁸

The Indian Peace Commission, which had negotiated the Medicine Lodge treaties and met with the Indians at Fort Laramie in 1867, arrived again at Fort Laramie on 10 April 1868 to convene a new round of talks. Eastern humanitarians hoped for success over the previous year, confident that by giving up the Powder River the negotiations would go much smoother. In the view of Western settlers, the Medicine Lodge treaties had not brought peace and they remembered that the new Indian depredations had started before the council fires were cold. The night before the new Fort Laramie meeting began, the Cheyenne Leader expressed doubts about

the success of the meeting:

The old residents, travelers, freighters, and miners of the plains and mountains, can have no hope of peace They will continue to rely on their vigilance, their strong hearts and strong arms for protection, and this meeting of chiefs shall be unto them as nothing.⁹

Although runners were sent to Red Cloud and other hostile chiefs to inform them of the government's concession of the Powder River forts and to invite them to meet with the Peace Commission at Fort Laramie, none of the chiefs were there to meet the commissioners when they arrived. Finally, Spotted Tail, leader of the Brule Sioux, spoke to the commissioners, but did not have the authority to represent any of the other tribes of Sioux.¹⁰ The draft treaties were left with the commandant of Fort Laramie with instructions to secure Red Cloud's signature. The Indian Peace Commissioners then left Fort Laramie for the East with a feeling of pessimism about their work.

By the summer of 1868 Indian depredations and murders had reached an alarming level. The elusive peace sought at Medicine Lodge and Fort Laramie had not been realized. The failure of the government to bring peace to the West through the use of diplomacy resulted in the loss of public support for diplomatic initiatives during the early months of 1868. General Sherman again expressed the opinion that the responsibility for Indian affairs should be transferred back to the War Department where it had resided prior to 1848. The Atchison Daily Champion agreed with General Sherman.¹¹

The Indian Bureau, usually quick to blame the army for any hostilities, was silent. The army had not provoked the Indians and the government had honored the terms of the treaties. General Sherman

blamed the inaction of Congress and the irresponsible acts of citizens for the renewed hostilities of the tribes. In his annual report, he said:

Our people continue . . . to settle on exposed points of the frontier, to travel without protection . . . to run after every wild report of gold . . . thus coming into daily . . . contact with the discontented and hostile Indians.¹²

Citizens in the East agreed with the assessment and concluded that part of the problem with the Indians and the government's inability to find peace was caused by "obstacles thrown in their way by traders, speculators and others who are opposed to peace on the frontier."¹³

The treaties of Medicine Lodge were finally ratified on 25 July 1868, but Congress took until 24 February 1869 to ratify the Fort Laramie treaties even though they had been signed by Red Cloud in November 1868.¹⁴ The public considered the delay in Congress as contributory to the renewed Indian hostilities. Congress also showed its indecisiveness by rejecting both General Sherman's recommendation to transfer the Indian Bureau back to the War Department and the recommendation of the Department of the Interior to make the Indian Bureau a separate department. Instead, the Congress decided to leave Indian affairs under the Department of the Interior and give control of the money for the Indians to General Sherman. When Secretary of the Interior Orville H. Browning attempted to limit General Sherman's role as a disbursing agent, the General objected to any restrictions and issued an order establishing two military districts. General William B. Hazen was designated to command the one in the south for the Cheyennes, Arapahoes, Kiowas and Comanches. General William S. Harney was designated to command the one in the north for the Sioux. In

addition, the military commanders were told to consider themselves agents in their area for all Indians without reservations.¹⁵

By the time the Medicine Lodge treaties were ratified, the Kiowas and Comanches were raiding in Texas. Chiefs Ten Bears and Toshaway led a raid through the Chickasaw Nation and then across the Red River into Texas where they attacked isolated ranches and settlements and drove off hundreds of horses to fill the herds of the Comanche braves. They also brought back scalps and prisoners throughout the summer.¹⁶ General Hazen compared the Indians with lepers being loose on the streets and advocated the use of force to drive the Indians back to the reservations.¹⁷

By the end of July 1868 the Cheyennes and Arapahoes, who had been assembled at Fort Larned, Kansas, to collect the arms and ammunition promised by the Peace Commission, disappeared after discovering the guns were being withheld. The Indians were suspected of moving their women and children to the south for security and from where they could return to commit hostile acts along the border. General Alfred Sully ordered all commanders in his department to concentrate their forces along the Arkansas River in an attempt to locate the Indians.¹⁸

Citizens in the West were uncertain about the protection they could expect from the military. Rumors concerning the whereabouts and the number of Indians were numerous. The New York Times discounted much of western fears: "We can . . . hardly credit the statement (from dispatches) that one Indian chief has under his command a force of 25,000 braves, at whose head he is carrying terror and desolation across the frontier."¹⁹ The editor agreed, however, that action needed to be taken and expressed doubts that the Indians would "now conform to the agreement

made with the Commissioners."

On 10 August 1868 the Cheyennes and Arapahoes surfaced again, raiding, burning and pillaging new settlements along the Saline and Solomon Rivers. The Western settlers were shocked and cried that this was the worst disaster since the Fetterman massacre in December 1866.²⁰ In the East news reports expressed compassion for the citizens of Kansas, but also warned that this would be the excuse Westerners would use to rid the central plains of the Indian population.²¹ The New York Times supported this view:

The accounts of recent Indian atrocities in Kansas are fearful to contemplate. A large band of Indians has carried death and destruction to a peaceful section of the State Hundreds of industrious settlers are reported as having been rendered utterly destitute by this raid. . . . The Indians who committed these outrages . . . owned lands there which whites coveted and were determined to seize. . . . The Kansas papers were filled with outrageous threats of driving out these tribes.²²

Both in the East and West the public cry for immediate action was recognized by the government and the army. General Sherman responded by sending General Philip Sheridan to drive all the Indians in Kansas south of the state line. Sherman left the task of providing refuge to the friendly Comanches and Kiowas to General Hazen and allotted fifty thousand dollars for that purpose.²³ At the same time other Indians were crossing from Kansas to Colorado and wreaking great havoc in that territory. Dispatches from Denver City on 19 August 1868 reported large numbers of Cheyennes and Arapahoes attacking emigrants and stagecoaches and stealing horses in Colorado.²⁴

Fear of the Indians increased in the Great Plains and an atmosphere of excitement prevailed across the nation. The public demanded

action and if the federal government was not disposed to act immediately, the states were. When Governor Frank Hall of Colorado called for volunteers to "pursue the savages,"²⁵ General Sheridan authorized the troops at Fort Reynolds to cooperate with him. Eastern humanitarians saw Hall's action as the beginning of a war of extermination. Meanwhile, in Kansas, Governor Samuel J. Crawford obtained government sanction to expell all the Indians from the state by any means. The army and the citizenry, East and West, were ready for armed action, and such a policy of aggression was supported by most newspapers.²⁶

Against this overwhelming cry for action, Edward W. Wynkoop, government agent for the Cheyenne and Arapahoe, with the full support of Superintendent Thomas Murphy and influential Eastern humanitarian groups, stood undaunted and attempted to shift the blame away from the Indians. Wynkoop contended that many of the Indians living in Kansas were peaceful and had lived up to the terms of the treaties. He was opposed to driving these Indians "from their lands which have been secured to them by treaties . . . (and to) confining them on tracts . . . unknown to them, depriving them of their means of living. . . ."²⁷ Wynkoop wanted to summon friendly Indians to Fort Larned where they could be protected from white settlers. The New York Times supported Wynkoop in an off-hand way by pointing out that the citizens of Kansas "had for several years attempted to root the Indians from the land"; and although the guilty should be punished, "robbing the innocent" would not solve the Indian problem.²⁸

As General Sherman and General Sheridan planned their war strategy, Governor Crawford of Kansas issued a proclamation that declared that a general war existed in Kansas and called for "five companies of cavalry,

to be organized from the militia of the State, for service upon the border."²⁹ Meantime, General Sheridan and General Hazen met with the Comanches and Kiowas on 20 September 1868 at Fort Larned and told them that they would have to report to their agency or be treated as hostile. Seventeen hundred Indians, seven hundred of them Comanches, reported to Fort Cobb, General Hazen's headquarters, in the Leased District. They were hungry and asked to be fed. General Hazen found it difficult to care for such a large number of Indians.³⁰

The public reacted favorably to the initiatives to date of Generals Sherman and Sheridan in quelling the raids in Kansas and Colorado. With the exception of Indian Agent Wynkoop and his supporters, citizens in the East and the West preferred the new aggressive policy to the indecisive method of the Indian Bureau. Although the New York Times had condemned armed warfare during the last Indian War, the paper supported the "most strenuous measures" because this uprising was started by the Indians.³¹

After the councils of Medicine Lodge and Fort Laramie, Congress approved over \$7,500,000 for the purchase of gifts and annuities for the Indians. Large quantities of food, clothing, trinkets, guns and ammunition were issued. The Indians considered these councils more important for the receipt of gifts than for making binding agreements. When the supply of gifts slowed, the Indians became hostile. The public viewed this renewed warfare by the Indians as a breach of faith, and angry citizens demanded immediate action. The New York Times, usually pro-humanitarian, felt that the Indian atrocities would "disarm the most humane apologist among the whites, utterly change our Indian policy, and . . . authorize and justify the most stringent measures which our military commanders in the disturbed

district may inaugurate and execute."³²

Generals Sherman and Sheridan agreed that the way to end the depredations and murders perpetrated by the Indians was to remove them from the territories that were being harassed. They made plans to drive all the Indians in Kansas and Colorado to an area beyond the Platte and the Arkansas Rivers and remote from the Pacific and Santa Fe Railroads. Anxious to see the Trans-Mississippi West cleared of Indians, the public supported the general's plan for a winter campaign. General Sheridan later explained his reason for this campaign:

The experience of many years of this character of Indian depredations with security to themselves and families in winter, had made them very confident and bold. . . . So boldly had this system of murder and robbery been carried on, that not less than eight hundred people had been murdered since June 1862. . . . To disbase (sic) the minds of the savages of this confident security, and to strike them at a period at which they were most. . . helpless . . . became necessary.³³

While plans were being made for the winter campaign, the army prepared for combat. In August the Seventh Cavalry moved to the Arkansas River and the Tenth Cavalry went to the Republican River. In September the Fifth Cavalry was sent to the Republican River to support the Tenth Cavalry.³⁴ General Sheridan had also sent his aide, Major George A. Forsyth, to enlist a company of frontiersmen from Kansas to protect the railroad lines near Fort Wallace, Kansas. After recruiting a force of frontiersmen at Fort Hays, Kansas, he advanced along the smoky Hill River to Fort Wallace.

Major Forsyth suggested to General Sheridan that a small, lightly equipped, fast-moving organization had a better chance of locating the Indians and making them fight than a large one. On 10 September 1868, Major Forsyth took fifty men and rode across the flood plain of the

Arikara River, a branch of the Republican, to a point ninety-five miles west of Fort Wallace. On the morning of 17 September 1868 the soldiers spotted three hundred to four hundred Cheyenne and Sioux on the bluffs about two miles away. Major Forsyth crossed to a small island that was covered with brush and dismounted his men. The Indians, now estimated at seven hundred, attacked. The battle lasted all day and into the night, and Forsyth's men held their ground. About eleven o'clock at night two scouts slipped out of the camp and made their way back to Fort Wallace for help. It took the scouts until 23 September to reach the fort. In the meantime, Major Forsyth resisted the Indians for three days, during which time he was shot through the left leg and right hip. Lieutenant Beecher, for whom the island was later named, was shot in several places and his back was broken. Doctor Moore, the surgeon, was shot in the head, and two scouts were killed. All the livestock was killed, and the soldiers had to eat horse flesh for another nine days until help arrived. Back at Fort Wallace, the commandant of the fort sent one hundred men with provisions, ammunition, and horses to Forsyth's relief. He also sent runners to find Colonel Louis H. Carpenter, who was about forty-five miles to the west, to get him to provide assistance.³⁵

The significance of the Battle of Beecher's Island was the attention it focused on the emerging aggression policy which was finding greater acceptance in the East. The New York Times concluded:

The moral of the whole story [Battle of Beecher's Island] is the necessity of vigorous, untrammelled action against the Indians . . . It must now be evident that a large part of the Cheyenne, Arapahoe and Sioux Indians are on the war-trail; that they are well supplied . . . with improved firearms; that our own troops are comparatively weak in numbers. There is no hope of doing anything with these Indians until they have been once or twice soundly thrashed.³⁶

When the Indian Peace Commission met in Chicago on 7 October 1868, the events of the Saline and Solomon Rivers and Beecher's Island were fresh in their minds. Samuel F. Tappan insisted that the Indians had no other choice but to fight, but General Sherman violently disagreed as did the American public. Those who wanted aggressive action were able to completely control the proceedings and decide the Commission's recommendations to the President. The Commission resolved that the government should recognize existing treaties with Indians and feed and clothe those Indians who abided by the treaty provisions; that no longer should the government recognize the Indian tribes as "domestic dependent nations" to be dealt with diplomatically; that the Indians should be held individually accountable for their actions and subject to the laws of the United States like other citizens; that no more treaties would be made with the Indians; that the Bureau of Indian Affairs be transferred back to the War Department.³⁷ General Sherman also called for the abolition of the Indian Peace Commission and the abrogation of the Indian hunting rights outside the assigned reservations. When the Indian Peace Commission adjourned, the principle of using armed force to carry out the peace policy had been established. General Sherman had won a victory for his aggressive plans of a winter campaign. With confidence, he hurried back to his headquarters, and on 9 October 1868 issued orders to General Sheridan to set the campaign in motion.³⁸ On 25 October 1868 the New York Times expressed approval of General Sherman's action:

If he possesses the power and feels authorized, we can trust General Sherman to carry out this policy. . . . General Sherman has the confidence and will have the support of the public in carrying out any measures which he may conceive for the removal of the Indians.

The Times predicted that Congress would adopt the policy at its next session because it was "the only alternative which remains for us to do."³⁹

During the fall of 1868, General Sheridan provided only enough troops to relieve the pressure of Indian hostilities in Kansas, because his main concern was to prepare for the upcoming winter offensive. General Sherman had instructed Sheridan to bring destruction to the Cheyennes and Arapahoes for failing to abide by the provisions of the treaties and to see that these Indians were "soundly whipped."⁴⁰ The Army and Navy Journal agreed that "We have long enough supplied the Indians with powder and ball [and] . . . the newest and best breech loaders wherewith to kill such officers as Moore and Beecher" and suggested that it was time to break up the Indian Bureau and its friends. The Journal contended the Indians had respect for the army and the word of its officers, but that the conflict between the army and the Indian Bureau allowed the Indians to take advantage of the situation. Although the Journal agreed with the worth of the reservation system, it recommended that all the agents should be military officers.⁴¹

General Sheridan's plan for the winter campaign included an attack upon the Cheyennes and Arapahoes in their winter sanctuaries along the Republican and Washita Rivers. He organized three columns for the task. The first column left Fort Bascom, New Mexico, on 18 November 1868. It was led by Major Andrew W. Evans and consisted of 563 men, six troops of the Third Cavalry, two companies of the Thirty-seventh Infantry and an artillery section of four mountain howitzers. Their destination was the South Canadian River. The second column, led by Major Eugene A. Carr, departed Fort Lyon, Colorado, on 2 December 1868 and went in a southerly

direction towards Antelope Hill and the headwaters of the Red River. This column of seven troops of the Fifth Cavalry, four troops of the Tenth Cavalry and one troop of the Seventh Cavalry totaled 650 men. General Sheridan accompanied the third column of eleven troops of the Seventh Cavalry, five infantry companies and was supposed to have included the Nineteenth Kansas Cavalry. The Kansas unit did not arrive by 22 November and General Sheridan ordered Lieutenant Colonel George A. Custer to move the column without them. On the morning of 23 November the third column, 800 strong, headed south for the Washita River.⁴²

On the morning of 27 November 1868 Custer reached his objective, Black Kettle's band of Cheyennes. He attacked the sleeping village and drove the Indians into the snow, killing 103 warriors and capturing 53 women and children. He burned the village, destroyed all the provisions, and slaughtered 800 horses.⁴³ Some of the Cheyennes managed to escape. Major Joel H. Elliott chased one group down the Washita valley where he ran into other Indians who killed him and his men. By mid-morning other warriors, well armed and ready to fight, arrived on the scene and attacked Custer's force. Custer set up his defenses and made limited counter attacks throughout the day. In the late afternoon Custer moved his force down the valley and the Indians withdrew to protect their own villages. This allowed Custer to make his escape.⁴⁴

General Sheridan considered the Battle of the Washita a resounding success, proving the soundness of the winter campaign. Not only had the army closed with and defeated the Indians, but more important, by destroying their provisions, horses, arms and shelter, the army had dealt a blow that severely crippled the Cheyennes' ability to wage war in the future.

The New York Times gave its approval to the army's campaign and praised Lieutenant Colonel Custer for his success:

The fight on the Washita is proof of the theory that a Winter campaign, and that alone, can avail against the Indians. It is a hard and perilous affair. . . . Troops are lost or frozen in the blinding snow; supplies are ice-bound in rivers. . . . But "stout hearts" will do much; and one or two repetitions of Custer's victory will give us peace on the Plains.⁴⁵

Sheridan reported that "The blow Custer struck was a hard one, and fell on the guiltiest of all the bands - that of Black Kettle. It was this band that, without provocation, had massacred the settlers on the Saline and Solomon, and perpetrated cruelties too fiendish for recital."⁴⁶ A loud protest from Eastern humanitarians regarding the Battle of the Washita caused General Sheridan to reveal the deeds of Black Kettle's band of Indians. He produced a sworn statement from Edmund Guerriere, a resident of Colorado Territory, who was with Black Kettle during his raids on the Saline and Solomon Rivers and who swore to the depredations and murders that took place there.

The Atchison Daily Champion, reporting on comments from the Indian Bureau, presented a different version of the winter offensive from that given by army sources. According to the Bureau, the fight with Black Kettle's Cheyennes "occurred upon the reservation that the Government had set aside for the Indians, and that the tribes destroyed have not committed depredations."⁴⁷ Members of the Indian Peace Commission accused the army of attacking "peaceful bands which were on the march to their new reservations."⁴⁸ On 9 December 1868 A. G. Taylor, Commissioner of Indian Affairs, called for the immediate end to the "war policy" and asked the government to organize a new Department of Indian Affairs with sole power and accountability for the Indians. He wrote of the Indians: "We have taken their heritage. . .

Now it is too much we carve for them liberal reservations out of their own lands. . . . If we find them fierce, hostile and revengeful, . . . let us remember that two hundred and fifty years of injustice, oppression and wrong heaped upon them by our race."⁴⁹ The Sacramento Union disagreed with Taylor and suggested that the military could provide a more honest execution of the Indian policy and should be given the opportunity to do so.⁵⁰

The public, in general, was elated by the army's successes. They thought it was quite an accomplishment. "Fighting Indians in the dead of winter, in their own villages, and tracking them in snow twelve inches deep, is a new business for our soldiers." In rebuttal to the Eastern humanitarians, the New York Times continued:

The Indian agent, as usual, is apprehensive that innocent Indians will suffer in the campaign. The agents are always apprehensive of something of this sort. We admit, too, that there is some danger of this, but the necessity of striking a hard blow has long been apparent. No Indians who have applied to go to the reservation will suffer.⁵¹

On 12 December 1868 Wynkoop resigned his post as agent for the Cheyenne and Arapahoe Indians. His very eloquent letter of resignation was published in newspapers across the country and added fuel to the humanitarian fire. He left the impression that he was being forced to gather his Indians into the Washita valley much as a Judas' goat for the slaughter. He told the press that the Battle of the Washita was no more than a massacre on the same scale as that of Sand Creek.⁵²

On Christmas Day another of Sheridan's columns, led by Major Andrew F. Evans, found the Comanches camped at Soldier Spring on the western end of the Wichita Mountains. With about 300 troopers from the Third Cavalry,

Evans attacked, driving the Comanches from their camp. He killed twenty-five warriors and burned their village. The Comanches, aided by the Kiowas, counterattacked. Unable to defeat the soldiers, the Indians eventually gave up. This battle, like that of Custer on the Washita, was significant because the Indians lost their means to wage war.⁵³ Both of these battles caused the Indians to turn themselves in at Fort Cobb and declare to General Hazen that they were friendly.

On New Year's Day, 1869, General Sheridan telegraphed his report on the winter campaign from Fort Cobb. He credited Major Even's destruction of the Comanche village on Christmas Day as the "final blow to the backbone of the Indian Rebellion." He reported that the Arapahoe and Cheyenne chiefs had come to Fort Cobb on 31 December 1868 to surrender and make arrangements for their people to come to the reservation. The Indians made no demands except to ask for protection from further operations of the army. In answer to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs and Eastern humanitarian statements about the "massacre of innocent Indians," General Sheridan denied that the Battle of the Washita took place on the reservation and that he had found photographs of his murdered courier at Black Kettle's camp which had been stolen from the scene of outrages on the Solomon and Saline Rivers.⁵⁶

While the winter campaign was in progress, the House of Representatives, on 8 December 1868, voted to transfer the Bureau of Indian Affairs back to the War Department. By a vote of 116 to 27, the House overwhelmingly passed the bill, indicating support for the winter campaign and the aggressive policy executed by the army. The Army and Navy Journal reported that "Action so prompt - completed on the very day after assembly

of the Congress - has been like a bomb shell in the Indian lobby."⁵⁴

Throughout December 1868 and January 1869, the public basked in the glory of the military victories of the winter campaign. The Eastern humanitarians were outgunned and outshouted, but they still maintained powerful allies in Congress. When it was time to bring the transfer measure to a vote in the Senate, the "Indian Ring" managed to get it delayed. On 2 January 1869 the Army and Navy Journal described the "Indian Ring" as "a few placeholders, a few philanthropists and a few plunderers, its head and front are at Washington, and not on the Plains; its nucleus is the Indian Bureau, its strength the horde of Indian agents, contractors, and peddlers, its boundary the magic circle of the 'Indian Ring'."

Sherman and Sheridan had won their battle with the Congress and had gained the support of the American public during the winter campaign. This forced the Eastern humanitarians to regroup and start again in 1869. The need for military force as a part of future peace initiatives had been established, and from this point on, the public would demand the use of force when the Indians left their reservations and committed depredations. The humanitarians would have to accept this and find other ways to protect the "noble red man." The next round of disagreements between the army and the defenders of the Indians began with the assumption of the Presidency by Ulysses S. Grant.

CHAPTER II

ENDNOTES

- ¹Olson, Red Cloud and the Sioux Problem, 12.
- ²Jones, The Treaty of Medicine Lodge, 196.
- ³Atchison (Kansas) Daily Champion, 8 January 1868.
- ⁴James D. Richardson, comp., Messages and Papers of the Presidents 1789-1892, 6: 454.
- ⁵Olson, Red Cloud and the Sioux Problem, 71.
- ⁶Atchison (Kansas) Daily Champion, 4 June 1868.
- ⁷Yankton (South Dakota) Union and Dakotian, 24 August 1867; Olson, Red Cloud and the Sioux Problem, 89.
- ⁸Olson, Red Cloud and the Sioux Problem, 90; Commissioner of Indian Affairs, Annual Report (1869), 272.
- ⁹Cheyenne (Wyoming) Leader, 3 April 1868.
- ¹⁰Olson, Red Cloud and the Sioux Problem, 74-75.
- ¹¹Atchison (Kansas) Daily Champion, 4 January 1868.
- ¹²Secretary of War, Annual Report (1868), 1f; Jones, The Treaty of Medicine Lodge, 182.
- ¹³New York Times, 1 July 1868.
- ¹⁴Jones, The Treaty of Medicine Lodge, 181-182; Utley, Frontier Regulars, 143-144.
- ¹⁵Commissioner of Indian Affairs, Annual Report (1868), 82-184; Olson, Red Cloud and the Sioux Problem, 78; Dee Brown, Bury My Heart at Wounded Knee (New York: Bantam Books, Inc., 1970), 128-130.
- ¹⁶Hagan, United States - Comanche Relations, 45-51.
- ¹⁷New York Times, 5 July 1867.
- ¹⁸Ibid., 29 July 1869.

- ¹⁹Ibid.
- ²⁰Ibid., 20 August 1868.
- ²¹Ibid.
- ²²Ibid.
- ²³Hagan, United States-Comanche Relations, 53.
- ²⁴New York Times, 30 August 1868.
- ²⁵Ibid.
- ²⁶Ibid.
- ²⁷Ibid.
- ²⁸Ibid.
- ²⁹Ibid., 21 September 1868.
- ³⁰Hagan, United States-Comanche Relations, 52-53.
- ³¹New York Times, 4 October 1868.
- ³²Ibid.
- ³³Secretary of War, Annual Report (1869), 44.
- ³⁴Utley, Frontier Regulars, 119.
- ³⁵Atchison (Kansas) Daily Champion, 24 September 1868; Utley, Frontier Regulars, 147; New York Times, 25 October 1868.
- ³⁶New York Times, 25 October 1868.
- ³⁷New York Times, 13 October 1868; Olson, Red Cloud and the Sioux Problem, 77; Commissioner of Indian Affairs, Annual Report (1868), 371-372; Henry Fritz, The Movement of Indian Assimilation 1860-1890 (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1963), 87.
- ³⁸Secretary of War, Annual Report (1869), 44.
- ³⁹New York Times, 25 October 1868.
- ⁴⁰Secretary of War, Annual Report (1869), 12.
- ⁴¹Army and Navy Journal, 3 October 1868.

⁴²Utley, Frontier Regulars, 149-152; Secretary of War, Annual Report (1869), 44.

⁴³Atchison (Kansas) Daily Champion, 26 January 1869; New York Times, 3 December 1868; Secretary of War, Annual Report (1869), 46-47.

⁴⁴Utley, Frontier Regulars, 152.

⁴⁵New York Times, 4 December 1868.

⁴⁶Secretary of War, Annual Report (1869), 46-47.

⁴⁷Atchison (Kansas) Daily Champion, 6 December 1868.

⁴⁸Ibid., 18 December 1868.

⁴⁹New York Times, 9 December 1869.

⁵⁰Army and Navy Journal, 9 January 1869.

⁵¹New York Times, 4 December 1868.

⁵²Ibid., 13 December 1868; Leavenworth (Kansas) Commercial, 12 December 1868.

⁵³Utley, Frontier Regulars, 154.

⁵⁴New York Times, 12 December 1868.

⁵⁵Army and Navy Journal, 2 January 1869.

⁵⁶Ibid., 23 January 1869.

CHAPTER III

THE GRANT PEACE POLICY

On 4 March 1869 Ulysses S. Grant was inaugurated President of the United States. The army viewed this event as one of good fortune and expected added support for its aggressive Indian policy. The public was jubilant over the army's successful winter campaign and hoped that the action of the military, combined with the hard line recommendations of the Indian Peace Commission, would bring an end to the Indian problem.¹ The new year, however, brought more hostilities, bickering between the army and the Indian Bureau, and disagreements between the President and Congress.

The army had made progress in the field in 1868 and consequently the House of Representatives had voted to transfer the Bureau of Indian Affairs back to the War Department. The Senate, however, delayed action until 1869 because the Committee on Indian Affairs opposed the measure. The Committee preferred to increase the power of the Indian Bureau by expanding it to a cabinet department.² The public blamed the "Indian Ring" for the failure of the bill to pass. The Atchison Daily Champion predicted that the measure would not pass in the next session of Congress, and, in fact, it was effectively defeated throughout the Grant years.³

Although the military success of General Custer and Major Evens during the winter campaign consolidated the Kiowas and Comanches on

reservations near Fort Sill, their victories were short lived. The movement of the Cheyenne Dog Soldiers under the leadership of Tall Bull and the other Cheyennes under Little Robe north of the Republican River during the winter and early spring was an indicator of failure. It was reported that this movement was the result of dissatisfaction on the part of the warriors in the southern Indian districts with the government's failure to furnish the supplies promised by the army in return for Indian movement onto the reservations during the winter campaign.⁴ In addition to the Cheyennes, forty lodges of the Arapahoes and half the Kiowa nation under Satanta and Spotted Tail, all of whom had refused to surrender, were still on the Red River threatening the border of Texas.⁵

Into this hostile environment surrounding Indian affairs came the new President. As he stood before an anxious nation to make his inaugural address, it was clear to all but the most casual observer that President Grant was no longer the well-known supporter of the army philosophy of whipping the Indians into submission, but that he had his own views of Indian affairs. He spoke of a more humanitarian policy stating that he would "favor any course towards them [the Indians] which tends to their civilization and ultimate citizenship."⁶ He did not propose to defeat them nor did he insist that the Indian Bureau could function properly only under the War Department. Instead, he spoke of a new policy, later known as the "Grant Peace Policy," or the policy of "conquest by kindness," which left control of Indian affairs in civilian hands.

With the reservation system at the heart of his policy, Grant set out to organize a Board of Indian Commissioners to oversee fund disbursements, to solicit the nomination of Indian agents and superintendents

from church groups, and to press for the revocation of the treaty system which viewed the Indian tribes as "domestic dependent nations."⁷

As the President's plan became known to the public, the public voiced full support. The American citizenry had for some time been concerned about the corruption in the Indian Bureau and the mysterious connection with the "Indian Ring." News of the reorganization and removal of questionable officials by the administration brought applause. The Atchison Daily Champion wrote that the efforts the new administration would exert "to rout the shysters and speculators who have made the Indian service synonymous with trickery and rascality," would be welcomed.⁸ When it was announced that General J. D. Cox was proposed as Secretary of the Interior, both the New York Times and the Army and Navy Journal commented that this would be a "severe blow" to the "Indian Ring."⁹ The nomination of Ely Parker for the post of Commissioner of Indian Affairs generated favorable comments from the Atchison Daily Champion. The editor praised Parker as a man who could not be "bought, coaxed, or frightened by the great Indian Ring."¹⁰ Parker's nomination was confirmed in the Senate on 13 April 1869 by a vote of thirty-six to twelve, and he assumed office on 26 April 1869.¹¹

Ely Parker had been Grant's private secretary during the Civil War and was respected by those with whom he came in contact. The new Commissioner of Indian Affairs had the advantage of being an Indian. He considered the Indians to be wards of the government and the Bureau of Indian Affairs the responsible agency for regulating their activities. He further believed that the only practical solution to the Indian problem was to civilize and Christianize the redmen. Quaker agents fit into his

ideas for a peaceful Indian administration.

The New York Times recommended that Ely Parker and the "Quaker experiment" be given a "fair trial," because the time was right for such an experiment; first, because the hostile tribes had been "soundly thrashed" and were in the right frame of mind to be approached with peace offerings; second, because the Quakers had two million dollars at their disposal for the civilization of the Indians; third, because the Bureau of Indian Affairs was rid of the corrupt officials who had previously dealt with the Indians; and last, because the Bureau and the army seemed to be working together.¹²

The Central and Southern Superintendencies were turned over to the Quakers. This area included most of the Plains tribes that were still hostile. The rest of the superintendencies and agencies were staffed by army officers on special duty with the Bureau of Indian Affairs. In addition, the army was responsible for all Indians found off the reservations.¹³ When the Atchison Daily Champion learned that the Quakers would receive two million dollars for their mission, the editor commented that "that little job would be cheap at twenty times the sum."¹⁴ The New York Times supported the use of these volunteer agents from religious groups and pointed out the economy of such a move using General William B. Hazen as an example. While he was at Fort Cobb, his expenses had been only one-third the amount used by the Indian Bureau for the purchase of the same articles. The Times looked forward to seeing what the Quakers could do with government finances.¹⁵

On 10 April 1868 Congress approved two million dollars for the President to use in maintaining peace among the Indians. The money for

the "Quaker experiment" came from these funds. In addition, as a part of the appropriation, the President was authorized to organize a Board of Commissioners to oversee the disbursement of these and other funds to be made available.

On 3 June 1869 the Board of Indian Commissioners was established by Executive Order, and the positions were filled with well known and respected citizens. The Commission was chartered to administer Indian affairs in cooperation with the new Indian Bureau. It was authorized to inspect the records of the Indian Office and the Indian superintendencies and agencies, to be present at the payment of annuities and councils with the Indians, and to oversee the purchase of supplies.¹⁶ The New York Times expressed optimism because men of such character were involved with Indian affairs.¹⁷ The Times thought it "cheaper to support them [the Indians] as paupers than to subdue them as enemies," provided the funds for this purpose in fact reached the Indians. This was a task for which the Times thought the Quakers were suited. If the reservations of the Colorado and Kansas tribes were changed, there was no good reason why the "mild rule of the Quakers should not be successful."¹⁸

While Vincent Colyer, a well known New York philanthropist and representative of the Humanitarian Society of New York, roamed the plains under the auspices of the President, looking for ways to prevent bloodshed, the snows melted and a new season of Indian depredations and murders began.¹⁹ On the night of 13 April 1869 eight hundred head of cattle were stolen by Indians in the vicinity of Medicine Bluff, Indian Territory.²⁰ On 13 May 1869 Major Eugene A. Carr, operating out of Fort Lyon, reported that he encountered 150 Indian lodges on Beaver Creek. When he was spotted,

the Indians advanced and a battle ensued. Carr's forces routed the Indians and followed them for 130 miles before they dispersed. He left the trail without a decisive blow being struck.²¹

On 29 May 1869 the Chicago Times reported more depredations in Kansas.²² Dispatches from Fort Leavenworth on 1 June 1869 indicated that about twenty settlers were killed by Indians in western Kansas during the preceeding week: "The scene of the operations has extended from the Republican and Solomon Rivers to the end of the Kansas Pacific railway. Settlers in that part of the state are scattered, and very much exposed."²³ A report from Topeka, Kansas, on 2 June 1869 indicated that thirteen people were killed by Indians in Saline County and citizens were moving eastward away from the hostile area.

As public indignation increased, a reporter predicted that if "Quaker agents do not hurry up, the 'poor, innocent' savages will destroy all the frontier settlements in Kansas and Colorado."²⁴ By 5 June 1869 the Chicago Times was reporting Indian "war parties" all over the central plains.²⁵ Dispatches from Fort Leavenworth on 6 June 1869 reported that General Miles' couriers had found two more bodies on the Salina.²⁶ The Chicago Times complained that the Indians were devastating the settlements on the Solomon and Republican Rivers once more.²⁷

General Christopher C. Augur, commanding the Department of the Platte, telegraphed from Omaha that he needed help immediately. Orders were sent to Major Carr at Fort Lyon to move his troops quickly to Fort McPherson on the Platte River. On 12 June 1869 General Sheridan reported that the depredations in Kansas were being perpetrated by the Cheyennes who had spent the winter in the Powder River country and had just lately

moved down into Kansas. On the advice of his Cabinet, President Grant directed Generals Sheridan and John M. Schofield to send troops to protect the lines of the Kansas Pacific Railroad and the settlers along the frontier of Kansas. The new Indian troubles furnished "conclusive evidence that the savages are determined to keep up the bloody and relentless war all along our frontier. The attacks on the settlements were wholly unprovoked."²⁸

In the midst of the Indian attacks in Kansas, which increased every day, the Commissioner of Indian Affairs received a telegram from Enoch Hoag, Quaker superintendent at Atchison, Kansas, that "The reports of hostilities in northwestern Kansas are exaggerated and contradictory."²⁹ On the same day, 9 June 1869, Major Carr left Fort McPherson with elements of the Fifth Cavalry reinforced by a battalion of Pawnee scouts on an expedition along the *Republican River* in search of the Cheyenne Dog Soldiers.³⁰

While the western community was preparing for another summer of war with the Indians, the new Indian Commission was sworn in on 6 June 1869 in Washington, D. C. Later the same month Ely Parker issued instructions to the Indian superintendents and agents. Expressing the philosophy of the Grant Peace Policy as it was to be applied to the field, Parker gave the following guide:

It being the wish of the government of the United States to collect the Indians and locate them in permanent abodes, upon reservations, and reasonable appointments having been made to assist them in sustaining themselves, after such permanent location, by the pursuits of civilized life, you are earnestly requested to use your best endeavors in co-operating to advance this humane and wise policy. Hence you will use every means to inform yourself as fully as possible respecting the conditions of the Indians in your superintendency; in

impressing the Indian mind, upon every favorable opportunity, with the view of the government, and thus prepare them to submit to the change from their mode of life to pursuits more congenial to a civilized state. You will endeavor to keep constantly before their minds the pacific intentions of the government, and obtain their confidence by acts of kindness and honesty in dealing with them - thereby securing that peace which it is the wish of all good citizens to establish and maintain.

Your success in the accomplishment of these objectives will depend greatly on the efficiency, discretion, and care to be exercised by you in the economical means placed at your disposal for this purpose, and it is constantly hoped that the results will prove the wisdom and efficiency of your appointment for this responsible duty.³¹

By mid June the Indian depredations were at a worrisome level again and the citizens of Kansas and Colorado were extremely nervous. Senator Edmund A. Ross of Kansas requested that General Sherman concentrate troops in western Kansas at a more rapid rate to protect the settlers. Sherman replied that he had troops on the way to the troubled area and that if more were needed, he would authorize General Schofield to raise a volunteer force. He also told Generals Sheridan and Schofield to treat all Indians off the reservations as hostile.³²

The Indians attacked farms thirty-five miles north of Solomon City. When the citizens tried to pursue the perpetrators, the Indians proved too strong. The settlers had to retire from the field. The governor of Kansas inspected the damage inflicted by the Indians at Salina and then provided large stocks of arms for the settlers so that they would be prepared to provide their own security.³³

As depredations mounted and the rumors of Indian movements permeated the state of Kansas, a series of discussions were prompted in the newspapers proposing solutions for the Indian problem. The New York Herald suggested that the government capture important Indians and hold them as

hostages to assure peace.³⁴ General Sherman thought the fastest way to make the Indians settle down was to send ten regiments to kill the buffalo which the Indians used for food.³⁵ Horace Greeley suggested making the Indians herders and stock raisers because of their natural abilities and upbringing.³⁶ The Army and Navy Journal wanted to govern the Indians through the discipline of military service. "Because they are natural soldiers," wrote the editor of the Journal, they should be taken into the army where they would learn to live with the white man.³⁷ The British thought that the only way to peace was the complete annihilation of the Indians.³⁸ Although the Army and Navy Journal supported the Grant Peace Policy, it thought that in the end the Indians would probably have to be annihilated.

On 4 July 1869 General Sherman, in support of the peace policy, issued orders that the military was to leave the Indians on the reservations alone unless invited by the agent to assist. In the same order, however, he instructed that all the Indians found off the reservations were considered under the "exclusive jurisdiction" of the army.³⁹

Returning to the Republican River in July, Major Carr found a new Indian trail and traveled up the Arikara fork to near where the Battle of Beecher's Island had taken place. On 11 July he found Tall Bull and his band of Cheyenne Dog Soldiers at a place known as Summit Springs. Carr attacked and drove the Indians from the camp. He killed fifty-two warriors and captured seventeen women and children. The Battle of Summit Springs effectively destroyed the Cheyenne Dog Soldiers as a threat on the Republican forever. Although Indian depredations continued on the Plains, Carr's action at Summit Springs marked the end of major actions

between the Platte and the Arkansas Rivers, the area that the army had the mission to clear for white migration.⁴⁰

The forceful military actions of the winter campaign and the spring expeditions drove many of the warring Indians back onto the reservations. Vincent Colyer, representing the humanitarians, suggested that "in less than two years we shall have heard the last of the Indian outrages." This assessment was overly optimistic, but reflected the view that the reservation system was starting to work.⁴¹ In addition, the Quaker agents sent to provide the mild and peaceful administration at the Indian agencies were impressing the citizenry with their progress.⁴²

The New York Times summed up the events of the year on 10 December 1869 in writing, "The public has long since ceased to have any sentiment about the 'noble savage' it knows him as a wild, half brutalized creature." The editor went on to say that the frontiersmen wanted to exterminate him, but the nation on the other hand had become aware of its responsibility to the Indian "who's main crime has been . . . to stand in the pathway of civilization on this continent." Further, the editor continued, people now see the Indian more as a victim of fraud and oppression and our "conduct towards this weak barbarian . . . a disgrace to our civilization and Christianity."⁴³ The Times supported the use of army officers as agents and praised the methods President Grant had established for Indian affairs.

The year 1869 ended with the new Indian policy yet unproven, but firmly established by public support. The New York Times wrote, "It looks like the Indians might receive fair play."⁴⁴

CHAPTER III

ENDNOTES

¹ Atchison (Kansas) Daily Champion, 20 February 1869; Utley, Frontier Regulars, 188-190.

² Chicago Times, 8 December 1868.

³ Atchison (Kansas) Daily Champion, 25 February 1869.

⁴ Chicago Times, 5, 10 May 1869; Commissioner of Indian Affairs, Annual Report (1869), 82-83.

⁵ Chicago Times, 5 May 1869.

⁶ Richardson, Messages and Papers, 7:8.

⁷ Utley, Frontier Regulars, 188-190.

⁸ Atchison (Kansas) Daily Champion, 25 February 1869.

⁹ New York Times, 19 March 1869; Army and Navy Journal, 13 March 1869.

¹⁰ Atchison (Kansas) Daily Champion, 25 February 1869.

¹¹ New York Times, 14 April 1869; William H. Armstrong, Warrior in Two Camps: Ely S. Parker, Union General and Seneca Chief (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1978), 155.

¹² New York Times, 1 May 1869.

¹³ Utley, Frontier Regulars, 190.

¹⁴ Atchison (Kansas) Daily Champion, 8 April 1869.

¹⁵ New York Times, 30 March 1869.

- ¹⁶Richardson, Messages and Papers, 7: 23-24.
- ¹⁷New York Times, 30 March 1869.
- ¹⁸New York Times, 25 April 1869.
- ¹⁹Chicago Times, 5 May 1869.
- ²⁰Ibid.
- ²¹Ibid., 21 May 1869.
- ²²Ibid., 29 May 1869.
- ²³Ibid., 2 June 1869.
- ²⁴Ibid.
- ²⁵Ibid., 5 June 1869.
- ²⁶Ibid., 27 June 1869.
- ²⁷Ibid., 8 June 1869.
- ²⁸Atchison (Kansas) Daily Champion, 12 June 1869.
- ²⁹Chicago Times, 9 June 1869.
- ³⁰Utley, Frontier Regulars, 156-157.
- ³¹Chicago Times, 8 June 1869.
- ³²Atchison (Kansas) Daily Champion, 15 June 1869.
- ³³Leavenworth (Kansas) Times, 16 June 1879.
- ³⁴Atchison (Kansas) Daily Champion, 16 June 1869.
- ³⁵Ibid., 26 June 1869.
- ³⁶Army and Navy Journal, 26 June 1869.

³⁷Ibid.

³⁸Ibid.

³⁹Atchison (Kansas) Daily Champion, 4 July 1869.

⁴⁰Utley, Frontier Regulars, 156-157.

⁴¹New York Times, 15 July 1869.

⁴²Ibid., 5 November 1869.

⁴³Ibid., 10 December 1869.

⁴⁴Ibid., 17 December 1869.

CHAPTER IV

POLICY IN TRANSITION

On 6 December 1869 President Grant sent his first annual message to Congress and in it he credited the western railroads with providing settlers access to the agricultural and mining areas of the country and bringing the white man into contact with the tribes of western Indians. "No matter what ought to be the relations between such settlements and the aborigines, the fact is they do not harmonize well, and one or the other has to give way in the end," he said. He admitted the Indians had been a source of embarrassment and expense to the government as a result of their robberies, murders, and wars. "I have attempted a new policy towards these wards of the nation . . . with fair results," he said. The use of religious groups, such as the Society of Friends, as agents and superintendents was the only alternative he could see to the policy of extermination. He felt that the Indians must be placed on large reservations as rapidly as possible and there be given protection.¹

Two days before Christmas, 1869, Ely Parker, Commissioner of Indian Affairs, forwarded his annual report to the Secretary of the Interior. Referring to the new measures of the Grant Peace Policy, he wrote:

The measures to which we are indebted for an improved condition of affairs are, the concentration of the Indians upon suitable reservations, and the supplying them with means for engaging in agricultural and mechanical pursuits, and for their education and moral training. As a result, the clouds

of ignorance and superstition in which many of these people were so long enveloped has disappeared, and the light of a Christian civilization seems to have drawn upon their moral darkness, and opened up a brighter future.²

The belief, shared by President Grant and Commissioner Parker, in the progress of the new policy for Indian affairs based on kindness was strongly contested in the next four years, but for now, the atmosphere of the holiday season clouded the issue.

For two years bands of Blackfeet Indians living in the northern portions of Montana and just across the border in Canada, had been raiding settlements and ranches. After committing their depredations and killing a large number of occupants of the area, they would escape through the passes in the Little Belt range. All attempts to stop them had been unrewarded. During the fall of 1869, raids reported to be perpetrated by the Piegans, a tribe of the Blackfeet, had been severe. The citizens of Montana wanted to organize an armed force to control these Indians. The government was opposed to this idea and sent federal troops into Montana to find and punish the Indians responsible for the raids.

On 23 January 1870 Major Eugene M. Baker, with two squadrons of the Second Cavalry, attacked a Piegan camp on the Marias River and killed 173 Indians. Among the casualties was a large group of women and children. When eastern humanitarians learned of Baker's action, they branded him a barbarian and called for his punishment. When Sheridan and Sherman went to his aid, they were also branded culprits. The humanitarians appealed to President Grant to put an immediate halt to the atrocities being committed by the army.³

A strong denunciation came from the Board of Indian Commissioners on 22 February 1879. The Board reported to the public that of the 173

Indians killed on the Marias, only fifteen were men between twelve and thirty-seven (considered of fighting age), ten were thirty-seven to sixty, and eight were over sixty. Ninety of the dead were women and fifty were children under twelve years of age.⁴ The Chicago Times wrote of these figures:

Can anything more utterly unwarranted, more sickening and atrocious than this summary be imagined? By the side of Baker, Chivington becomes a human being, and Herod, the child murderer, and Haynau, the Austrian butcher, become angels of mercy and compassion. How long will the country submit to such shocking massacres."⁵

The Chicago Times held General Sheridan accountable for this action. In addition, it suggested that if President Grant did not put a stop to the army, "The only power that can be evoked to put a stop to these horrors is one that outranks Baker, Sheridan, Sherman, and Grant. It is public opinion."⁶

On 13 March 1870, the Chicago Times wrote:

The proof is clear as to the responsibility of the guilty parties. There is no dispute as to the facts of the massacre. Sheridan boasts that he planned and ordered the wholesale assassination. Baker was but a subordinate - a willing one, it must be confessed - in the infernal work. . . . Has he not brought foul disgrace upon the American name? Has he not stained the nation's history by an act of damnable atrocity, for which, if he be not punished, the government and the people will be responsible.⁷

In an open letter to the public published on 14 March 1870, Vincent Colyer answered General Sheridan's claim that the Piegan operation was necessary by suggesting that not only had Major Baker struck women and children sick with smallpox, but that the Piegans were not the Indians responsible for the depredations in Montana in the first place. He wrote, "Cease your bloody work; these are not the guilty. . . . Strike, if you must strike, the guilty, not the innocent."⁸

On 16 March 1870, a large delegation of Quakers arrived in Washington to see President Grant and General Sherman and to protest General Sheridan's actions against the Piegan Indians. They demanded that General Sheridan be removed from command of the troops in the Indian country and recommended that he be punished for barbarian ways.⁹ No action was taken against Sheridan or Baker in this matter, however.

The confrontation over the Baker matter between the Eastern and Western leaders filled the newspapers for many days. In the end this action adversely affected the army's role in Indian affairs. The transfer measure to move the Bureau of Indian Affairs back to the War Department, about to be passed as a part of the appropriations bill, was killed by Congress. Army officers serving as Indian agents were prohibited from further assignment in this capacity, and the army's influence in Indian matters was severely limited.¹⁰

On 11 March 1870 the Secretary of the Interior informed the President that the conditions along the whole border were such that the country was in danger of a general war and suggested that the President put the matter before Congress.¹¹ General William B. Hazen had reported that all the Indians south of Kansas were restless and had held a council at Antelope Hills on the Washita River in December in an attempt to gain enough support to drive the white man from Indian country. Three days later, another council was held, and the Indians decided not to start a war.¹²

General Hazen suggested that if the government honored their agreements, hostilities in that area might be avoided. He added that there was a great stir over the activities of railroad agents who were

trying to get subsidies of land from the Indians. The activities of these agents had angered the Indians and they wanted all white men removed from the area.¹³

Colonel David S. Stanley, writing from Fort Sully in Dakota Territory, said he was ashamed to even talk to the Sioux anymore because he was unable to tell them what had happened to the supplies promised and not delivered by the government.¹⁴ Citizens of Wyoming had tried to convince the government to open the Big Horn area of that state for mining exploration. Although the government understood the concern for having such a large portion of the territory allotted to the Indians, it was reluctant to break the treaty with the Sioux who held the area for their use.¹⁵

By 1870, the citizens had gained enough support in Cheyenne to launch an expedition with or without the government's approval. They organized the Big Horn Mining Association to that end. General Christopher C. Augur made a trip to Cheyenne to investigate these activities and reported to Washington that they posed a serious problem.¹⁶ President Grant referred the problem to the Cabinet and it decided that General Augur should use his own discretion to prevent an invasion of Indian lands.

In April 1870 Red Cloud, the Sioux leader, sent word that he wanted to visit the "Great White Father" in Washington. He indicated that he wanted to talk about going to the reservation. With this news, the mining expedition to the Big Horn was killed by the President. He directed General Augur to prevent the Big Horn Mining Association from leaving Cheyenne.¹⁷

On 18 May 1870, Red Cloud left Fort Fetterman for Fort Laramie

to meet Colonel John E. Smith who had been sent by Ely Parker to escort Red Cloud to Washington. The Indians arrived in the Capital on 1 June 1870, and went to stay at the Washington House. Upon entering the hotel, Red Cloud came face to face with Spotted Tail and his delegation of Brule Sioux who had been in Washington since 24 May 1870. Spotted Tail had signed the treaties at Medicine Lodge and had become known as the representative of the friendly Sioux, while Red Cloud was known as the leader of the hostile Sioux. On Friday, 3 June 1870, Red Cloud met with Secretary of the Interior Cox and Ely Parker. Cox assured Red Cloud that the government desired peace. Red Cloud asked for supplies, including guns and ammunition. Cox was surprised by the request and told Red Cloud that he would discuss his demand with the President.¹⁸ On 6 June 1870, Red Cloud and his delegation were escorted to the White House to meet President Grant. The Indians were taken into the East Room and sat in chairs along the wall. The candles were lit, giving off a dazzling brilliance in the room. This impressed the Indians, as did the fresh strawberries served with the meal. The wealth displayed at this gathering did much to convince the Indians of the might of the white man.¹⁹

On 8 June 1870, the Secretary of the Interior and Ely Parker, along with a group of notable men including Felix R. Brunot, chairman of the newly appointed Bureau of Indian Commissioners, met with Red Cloud at the Department of the Interior offices. Secretary Cox made the opening speech, assuring the Indians that if they went peacefully to their assigned reservations, all the goods promised them would be provided. Red Cloud then made a very eloquent speech which summed up the frustrations of his people:

What I have to say to you and to these men, and to my great father, is this: Look at me! I was raised where the sun rises and I came from where he sets. Whose voice was the first heard in this land? The red people's. Who raised the bow? The great father may be good and kind, but I can't see it. I am good and kind to white people, and have given my lands, and have now come from where the sun sets to see you. The great father has sent his people out there and left me nothing but an island. Our nation is melting away like the snow on the side of the hills where the sun is warm, while your people are like the blades of grass in the spring when summer is coming. I don't want to see the white people making roads in our country. Now that I have come into my great father's land see if I have any blood when I return home. The white people have sprinkled blood on the blades of grass about the line of Fort Fetterman. Tell the great father to remove that fort, and then we will be peaceful, and there will be no more trouble.

I have yet two mountains in that country - the Black Hills and the Big Horn. I want no roads there. There have been stakes driven into that country, and I want them removed. I have told those things three times, and now I have come here to tell them for the fourth time. I have made up my mind to take that way. I don't want my reservation on the Missouri home of these people. I hear my old men and children dying off like sheep. The country don't suit them. I was born at the forks of the Platte. My mother and father told me that the land there belonged to me. From the north and west the red nation has come into the great father's house. We are the last of the Ogalalas. We have come to know the facts from our fathers, why the promises which have been made to us have not been kept. I want two or three traders that we asked for at the mouth of Horse Creek in 1852. There was a treaty made and the man who made the treaty, who performed that service for the government, told me the truth. The goods which have been sent out to me have been stolen all along the road, and only a handful would reach to go among my nation.

Look at me here! I am poor and naked. I was not provided with arms, and always wanted to be peaceful. The great spirit has raised you to read and write and has put paper before you: but he has not raised me that way. The men whom the president sends us are soldiers, and all have no sense and no heart. I know it today. I didn't ask that the whites should go through my country killing game, and it is the great father's fault. You are the people who should keep peace. For the railroads you are passing through my country, I have not received so much as a brass ring for the land they occupy. I wish you to tell my great father that the whites make all the ammunition. What is the reason you didn't give it to me? Are you afraid I am going to war? You are great and powerful, and I am only a handful.²⁰

On 10 June 1870, Red Cloud and his delegation met with President Grant again. After hearing a repeat of their demands, President Grant indicated that he wanted peace with the Indians, but that he would not close Fort Fetterman, because it was there for the protection of the Indians as well as the white man. He also told Red Cloud that he would build roads wherever they needed to be. The Chicago Times commented: "The red men have asked for a fish and received a stone."²¹

Red Cloud met again with Secretary Cox on 11 June 1870. He was extremely dissatisfied that the President would not close Fort Fetterman. He told Secretary Cox that if trouble started, it was the "great father's" fault. The troops in his country were all fools, he said, and the government was wasting their money. Red Cloud said, "All the promises made in the treaty have never been fulfilled. The object of the whites is to crush the Indians down to nothing."²² The Indians were very disheartened. Secretary Cox arranged another meeting for the next day to explain the treaties to the Indians. When the Indians arrived at the Interior building, they found that the government had reinterpreted the treaties in the Indian's favor. This changed the complexion of the meeting. Now, the Sioux would be allowed to collect their goods without going to the reservation. Also, they would be allowed on the headwaters of the Big Cheyenne River near Fort Fetterman. These concessions were important to Red Cloud. He expressed his cooperation to Secretary Cox, and the meeting was considered a success by both parties.²³ Red Cloud left Washington in triumph.

Reaction to Red Cloud's visit to Washington varied across the country. In the East high hopes were reflected in the New York Times with glowing reports each day of the progress of the talks. On 8 June 1870 the

Times wrote: "We might search in vain through a month's file of the Congressional Globe for a speech as interesting as that delivered by Red Cloud at the Indian Council yesterday."²⁴ The Times considered Red Cloud's visit a success.²⁵ On the other hand, the Chicago Times reported that the Indian visit to Washington "amounted to nothing. The visitors are on the way back home; and there is nothing to prevent the breaking out of an Indian war at any moment. All this goes only to prove that Mr. Grant and his administration are incapable of handling the Indian question, just as they are incapable of handling the financial question."²⁶ The Omaha Weekly Herald commented on Red Cloud's visit: "Rumor has it that Red Cloud is to become a member of the Cabinet."²⁷ The Yankton Union and Dakotian felt that the only solution to the Indian problem was for the government to give Red Cloud "a dose of terrible war."²⁸

Although the western communities saw little worth in the Red Cloud meetings, the confrontation aided in the search for peace on the frontier. Red Cloud left the East with a determination to provide peace for his people. The Indian Commissioners met in the spring of 1870 and suggested that the American public had two courses of action with regard to the Indians. They could, "take the necessary means of extending to the Indians. . . the blessings of civilization and Christianity," or they could witness the results of the "heartless and bloodthirsty cry for extermination" which was raised by others such as General Sheridan.²⁹ The Indian Commission implored those citizens who supported the humane alternative to organize groups to educate the public and put pressure on Congress to stop the bloodshed. The Indian Commission suggested that expenditures of public money for Indian wars was unnecessary and that the full

implementation of the Grant Peace Policy could save \$30,000,000 a year.³⁰

By the time Red Cloud arrived in Washington, however, the plans for peace and putting away the guns and sabers was only an academic exercise because Indian raids were already occurring on the frontier. On 7 June 1870, the Chicago Times reported attacks by the Arapahoes on Bear Creek Station, forty miles south of Fort Dodge, Kansas. These Indians killed several white men and drove off sixty mules. It was also reported that all the Indians left Camp Supply and the new Indian agency on the Canadian River.³¹ An expedition of four companies of the Seventh Cavalry and one company of infantry left for the Republican River.³² Three batteries from Fort Riley, Kansas, were sent to relieve the Seventh Cavalry guarding the frontier on the Solomon and Republican Rivers.³³ The Seventh Cavalry was concentrated at Fort Hays, Kansas, with orders to take the most vigorous action against the Indians. By 8 July 1870 Indian depredations had increased in the Indian territory near Fort Sill. Several white men were killed and a large number of horses and mules were taken. "The Quaker agent was obliged to arm his employees and call for troops to defend his agency."³⁴ The Laramie Sentinel reported that there had been a general massacre of miners in the North Park area by Ute Indians.³⁵

The summer of 1870 was marked by small scale sporadic actions. It was generally concluded, however, that the level of Indian depredations was less than in 1869 and that the Grant Peace Policy was working better than the prior policies. The army was regaining some stature that it had lost as a result of the Baker massacre. The annual report from the War Department and the Department of the Interior reflected a new optimism about the government's success against the Indians.

CHAPTER IV

ENDNOTES

¹Richardson, Messages and Papers, 7: 38; William B. Hessletine, Ulysses S. Grant, Politician (New York: Dodd, Mead and Company, 1935), 76.

²Commissioner of Indian Affairs, Annual Report (1869), 3.

³Utley, Frontier Regulars, 191; Commissioner of Indian Affairs, Annual Report (1870), 3; New York Times, 23 February 1870; Chicago Times, 29 January 1870.

⁴Chicago Times, 29 January 1870; 24 February 1870; New York Times, 23 February 1870.

⁵Ibid.

⁶Ibid.

⁷Chicago Times, 13 March 1870.

⁸Ibid., 14 March 1870.

⁹Ibid., 16 March 1870; 17 March 1870.

¹⁰Utley, Frontier Regulars, 192.

¹¹Chicago Times, 11 March 1870.

¹²Ibid.

¹³Saint Louis Democrat, 5 March 1870; Maran E. Kroeker, Great Plains Command: William B. Hazen in the Frontier West (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1976), 34-35.

¹⁴Chicago Times, 11 March 1870.

¹⁵Olson, Red Cloud and the Sioux Problem, 98-100.

¹⁶Ibid.

¹⁷Commissioner of Indian Affairs, Annual Report (1870), 4; Chicago Times, 14 March 1870.

- ¹⁸Olson, Red Cloud and the Sioux Problem, 100-101; New York Times, 3 June 1870.
- ¹⁹Olson, Red Cloud and the Sioux Problem, 103.
- ²⁰Chicago Times, 8 June 1870.
- ²¹Ibid., 10 June 1870.
- ²²Ibid., 11 June 1870.
- ²³Olson, Red Cloud and the Sioux Problem, 108.
- ²⁴New York Times, 8 June 1870.
- ²⁵Ibid., 1 June 1870.
- ²⁶Chicago Times, 11 June 1870.
- ²⁷Omaha (Nebraska) Weekly Herald, 8 June 1870.
- ²⁸Yankton Union and Dakotian, 16 June 1870.
- ²⁹New York Tribune, 10 May 1870.
- ³⁰Ibid.
- ³¹Chicago Times, 8 July 1870.
- ³²Ibid.
- ³³Ibid.
- ³⁴Ibid.
- ³⁵Ibid.
- ³⁶Ibid.
- ³⁷Laramie Sentinel, 7 July 1870.

CHAPTER V

THE GRANT PEACE POLICY IN ARIZONA

As 1871 began, the effects of the "Baker Affair" continued to plague the army and impede its ability to influence the formulation of Indian Policy or to control Indian affairs. Congress had changed the laws on 15 July 1870 so as to prohibit army officers from serving as Indian agents. Although publicly this action was considered the result of the poor treatment of the Piegan Indians by Major Eugene M. Baker, informed observers suggested that it was really an act of retribution against the President because he had discontinued the practice of giving positions in the Indian service as payment for political favors. President Grant retaliated by appointing additional church groups to oversee those superintendencies and agencies vacated by the army. These posts were filled from the ranks of the Episcopalians, Presbyterians, Roman Catholics, Baptists, and Lutherans as well as the Quakers. As the army lost these positions their influence was damaged to a greater degree. The generals had to work harder to convince the peace advocates that force was necessary as an element of the peace plan.¹

By early 1871 the Grant Peace Policy had been accepted, at least in principle, by most of the Indian tribes with the notable exception of the Apaches in the southwest. General Sheridan, commanding the Division of the Missouri, wrote in his annual report of 1871 that the duties of

his command had been of a "passive character usual of times of peace on the frontier."² General C. C. Augur, Department of the Platte, wrote, "I am happy to be able to state that not a single white man has been killed by Indians within this military department during the past year. It is believed that this cannot be said of any other year since the country was settled."³ General John Pope, Department of the Missouri, where so much trouble had taken place before with the Kiowas and Comanches, wrote, "The danger from these tribes may be considered substantially at an end."⁴

The army, recognizing the potential dangers of the Apache situation in the Arizona Territory, had organized a separate department under the Division of the Pacific, on 15 April 1870, with Brevet Major General George Stoneman as the first commander.⁵ The meager appropriations for the Quartermaster's Department in 1870 and 1871 made it necessary to reduce the expenses in Arizona. As military forts were closed and the number of soldiers was reduced, Indian outrages increased and the citizens of Arizona began loud protests for aid from the government.⁶ General Stoneman attempted to implement the Grant Peace Policy in Arizona by instituting a network of feeding stations for the Indians. He intended to feed and supply the friendly Indians and to pursue with military force the hostile Indians. As Stoneman enticed some Indians to his feeding stations, Cochise, the now famous war leader of the Chiricahua Apaches, continued his robberies and murders. He carried to New Mexico and Arizona devastation and havoc. His Apaches took every opportunity to chastise the white man.⁷ The San Diego Union of 1 April 1871 wrote, "The intelligence daily received from Arizona shows that Indian affairs in that unhappy Territory are

growing continually worse. It is safe to say that at no time, since the American occupation of the country, have the Apaches held more complete and unobstructed way."⁸ The San Diego Union went on to say that the Apaches had left their historical haunts and had spread out over the whole area of New Mexico and Arizona.⁹ Major General Schofield, Commander of the Division of the Pacific, wrote in his annual report for 1871 that the Department of Arizona was in a state of war with the Apaches and that the troops in the field were incurring extraordinary losses and expenses as a result.¹⁰ The Arizona Citizen was indignant about the way post commanders in Arizona made agreements with the Indians and then supplied them with rations and ammunition which later showed up being used to support further depredations.¹¹ The San Diego Union suggested that if General Stoneman was properly backed by the government, he could probably settle the Apache problem in short order and went on to write, "We believe . . . the War Department understands . . . and is inclined to do the right thing, in this crisis. The trouble is with the mistaken philanthropists of the East, who have not the most remote conception of the Apache character, and who . . . influence the Administration."¹²

As the Indian situation intensified, General Stoneman increased his efforts to draw the friendly Apaches onto the temporary reservations and separate them from the hostile bands. This was an almost impossible task. One of Stoneman's feeding stations was located at Camp Grant north of Tucson. The Apaches at that station were under the protection of the army. On 29 April 1871, Captain Thomas S. Dunn, Twenty First Infantry, Commanding Officer at Fort Lowell, Arizona, heard that a large force of citizens and Papagoe Indians had left Tucson headed for Camp Grant with

the express purpose of killing the Apaches camped there under the protection of the Army. He sent a messenger on horseback to notify the commanding officer of Camp Grant of the danger. The dispatch was delivered at seven-thirty the next morning, too late. When First Lieutenant Roger E. Whitman, Third Cavalry, commanding Camp Grant, arrived at the Indian camp, it had already been attacked. Five hundred Indians had been camped there and now the camp was deserted except for sixty-three bodies. Most of the casualties were women and children. The total number killed in the action was over one hundred.¹³

The Camp Grant action was praised by westerners but was called a massacre in the East. The San Diego Union reported, "The joyful news has just been received of the killing of 85 Apaches and the capture of 28 prisoners (children)."¹⁴ The Union supported this action with great joy and went on to say, "This long suffering and much exasperated people has finally commenced the work of retaliation upon the Apaches." The final blow that caused the citizens to act according to the Tucson Citizen was the killing of four white citizens by the Apaches at Camp Grant.¹⁵ It was reported that the guilty Indians were traced to Camp Grant two weeks before and it was the intent of the citizens of Tucson to "make their own power felt." It was also reported that a horse stolen from a farm south of Tucson and a gold breast pin which had belonged to a woman murdered at Tubac had been found in the Indian camp.¹⁶ The Missouri Republican reported that, "one Indian killed during a recent depredation, was recognized as one of the government's 'pets' who was being fed at Camp Grant and pretending to be friendly."¹⁷ This satisfied everyone that those Indians, while being fed by the government, were murdering and robbing the people." The

Republican wrote that on this and similar evidence those citizens condemned the entire body of Indians to death.

President Grant voiced the view that the Camp Grant attack was "purely murder" and told Arizona Governor Anson P. K. Safford that if the people responsible were not brought to trial, he would declare martial law in Arizona.¹⁷ As a result of the President's threat, a trial was held. The jury deliberated for a total of nineteen minutes and then freed more than one hundred defendants.¹⁸ The Army and Navy Journal suggested that if the citizens of Arizona were going to place themselves above the law, and thereby force the officers of the government into a position of appearing to violate good faith with the Indians, military forces should be withdrawn from the territory, leaving those citizens to settle their own matters with the Indians.¹⁹

Hearing of the problems in Arizona, Ely Parker, in a letter to the Secretary of Interior, recommended that the Board of Indian Commissioners send a representative to the troubled area to assist the military in collecting the Indians on the reservations and to try and convince them that war was futile.²⁰ A few days after the Camp Grant attack the White Mountain Apaches near Camp Apache, Arizona, broke out in open warfare, attacking isolated settlements between the White Mountain area and Mexico. A general war now seemed inevitable.²¹ All eyes looked to Washington for help and for some ray of hope in the peace effort. The Secretary of Interior decided to take Ely Parker's advice and elected to ask Vincent Colyer, well known supporter of the peace policy, philanthropist, and Secretary of the Board of Indian Commissioners, to become a special commissioner to seek out and make peace with the Arizona tribes.²²

While the Tucson citizens were bringing infamy to the history of Arizona, another incident occurred in Texas which would change the government's view of the status of Indian war chiefs. General Sherman, concerned by the increased reports of Indian depredations in Texas, decided to make an inspection of the troubled area himself. He was in sympathy with General Sheridan's policy of holding Indians responsible for their actions and had decided that if the complaints in Texas were true then punitive measures were in order. Accompanied by Inspector General Randolph B. Marcy, he arrived at San Antonio, Texas, on 29 April 1871 where he met with General J. J. Reynolds, the department commander. It was Reynolds' opinion that the depredations were a major problem in the Texas border areas. On 2 May 1871 Sherman left San Antonio with an escort from the Tenth Infantry to inspect the frontier. All along the way he encountered burned out and abandoned ranches and settlements. He arrived at Fort Richardson, Texas on 17 May 1871. Late that evening, Tom Brazeale, a driver from a wagon train attacked that afternoon, came into Fort Richardson and talked to General Sherman. He told the general that the wagon train had been attacked while crossing the Salt Creek prairie by more than one hundred hostile Kiowas led by Satanta, Satank, and Big Tree. General Sherman's party had passed through the same area only minutes before the attack. It was learned later that the only reason Sherman was not attacked was because the wagon train was expected and was thought by the Indians to be bigger game. General Sherman sent Colonel R. S. MacKenzie to investigate the attack site with instructions to follow after the Indians if the story was confirmed. Sherman continued his trip arriving at Fort Sill on 23 May 1871. He met with Agent Lawrie Tatum and

asked if Satanta was on the reservation. Tatum indicated that he would have to check, but soon after Sherman's arrival, Satanta, Satank, and Big Tree arrived at Fort Sill to collect their government annuities. Satanta not only admitted that he had led the attack on the wagon train at the Salt Creek, but he boasted of the deed. Lawrie Tatum became alarmed and went to General Sherman and put the matter in his hands. Sherman arrested the chiefs and prepared to send them back to Texas for trial.²³

Colonel MacKenzie, arriving from Texas, was given the task of transporting the Indian chiefs back to Jacksboro, Texas, for trial. On 8 June 1871, he started the trip south with his prisoners. Before he had gone two miles, Satank attempted to escape and was shot down. When the citizens of Texas learned that MacKenzie was bringing the Indians in under military guard, they rallied in Jacksboro to observe the event.²⁴

The trial started on 5 July 1871. Both Satanta and Big Tree were found guilty and sentenced to death. This was the first time that Indians were tried and held personally responsible for their actions in a civil court. The implications of this trial were tremendous. The trial placed emphasis on Sherman's policy of "punishment must follow the crime." Enoch Hoag, the Quaker superintendent, protested to the President. He said that this action would bring the Indians on the frontier down on the white settlements and would cause a blood bath. Agent Tatum and Judge Charles Soward, the judge who had tried the case, asked the Governor to commute the death sentence on the grounds that the Jacksboro court might not have had jurisdiction. The Governor commuted the sentence to life in prison on 2 August 1871 and the Indians were turned over to the warden of the penitentiary at Huntsville, Texas. The imprisonment of Satanta

and Big Tree reduced the number of raids all along the Southern Plains between 1871 and 1873 and changed the Indian policy by making individual Indians aware of their personal liability for wrong doing.²⁵

By the middle of June 1871 Vincent Colyer was ready to take up his new duties as a special commissioner. In an address to the New York Peace Society he talked of the "starved Apaches of Arizona" and their desire to live in peace with the white man. He indicated that he believed that the only thing that was holding up such a peace was the wrongs perpetrated against the Indians by the white settlers.²⁶ Now, as a special commissioner working with the commission of the President, he would have a chance to set things right.

In July 1871, Colyer traveled to Arizona. As a result of the Camp Grant attack, General Stoneman had been relieved on 4 June 1871 and replaced as department commander by Lieutenant Colonel George Crook at the request of Governor Anson P. K. Safford of Arizona. By the time Colyer arrived, Crook had toured his new command and had been convinced that the Indians would never settle down until they had been beaten militarily. Colyer met with Crook in September and got his assurance that he would delay further campaigning until Colyer had the opportunity to try and bring the Apaches to peace without war.²⁷

On 20 July 1871, the newspapers announced the resignation of Ely Parker as the Commissioner of Indian Affairs. In a letter to the President, dated 24 June 1871, Parker indicated that the recent actions of Congress with regard to Indian affairs had "divested the office of all importance." President Grant accepted Parker's resignation on 13 July 1871.²⁸

Coinciding with Parker's resignation was a general loss of support for the Grant Peace Policy. Settlers in the West had had enough promises that led to nothing but more depredations and murders and the continued loss of rich lands to the reservation system. Eastern humanitarians were also frustrated by the lack of progress towards final peace. On 4 August 1871 the San Diego Union wrote of the inaction of the army in Arizona:

It was generally believed that the sending of the dashing Indian fighter, General Crook, to Arizona, indicated a determination on the part of the President to bring about permanent peace in the rich yet underdeveloped and desolate Territory.

Grant's Indian policy is totally undeserving of the praise bestowed upon it by his flatterers while he permits chaos to reign in Arizona. It is his plain duty and one very easy to be performed, to suppress the murderous savages in that territory, and to do it effectually. He deserves no rest while he knows that American women and children are daily being slaughtered by the red fiends within our borders. He willfully refuses to put an end to this terrible state of things.²⁹

It was generally felt by the public in the West that if General Crook was allowed to start his campaign against the Apaches that the problem would be over in a very short period of time. As the San Diego Union put it, "he would deliver the white people of Arizona from their old and relentless foes."³⁰

By August 1871, the Apache situation had reached such proportions that General Crook sent orders to Tucson "to permit no government supply train to depart except with strong escorts" and further recommended that civilians be made aware of the schedules of those armed trains so they could take advantage of the protection.³¹ Even as depredations increased General Crook kept his forces leashed awaiting action of the President's special commissioner.

Vincent Colyer reached Camp McDowell, Arizona, in October 1871

and, with a strong escort of troops, set about gathering in the Tonto Apaches. The San Diego Union wrote that it had no doubt that Colyer would succeed as long as the armed force was present. "When Colyer goes home, and tells how amiable and lovely the Apaches are, and how pleasant was his sojourn among them, those tame Indians will be roving through the country, massacring women and children, torching settlers over slow fires, burning ranches, and stealing stock." The Union went on to say it preferred General Crooks' method for obtaining a lasting peace.³²

Vincent Colyer considered his visit to Arizona as beneficial to the peace movement. He reported back to Washington that he had found the Indians desirous of peace and willing to abide by the government policies. Even as he proclaimed this attitude on the part of the Indians, depredations continued to increase. The San Francisco Bulletin suggested that it was now time to get Colyer out of the picture and give the reins back to General Crook.³³ The San Diego Union reported that General Crook did not trust Colyer's peace and had cited over a hundred years of history with the Apaches in Arizona of "repeatedly violated pledges of peace and friendship" as his reason and had suggested that a lasting peace could not be accomplished without a "conquest at arms" which he was prepared for and confident he could effect.³⁴

By November 1871 the attitudes towards Vincent Colyer were becoming extremely hostile. The San Diego Union calling for armed intervention, wrote of a depredation in Arizona, "Here is an attack . . . by sixty Apaches who have come all the way from Vincent Colyer's Reservation They have murdered one of our citizens, wounded another . . . [and] Vincent Colyer says the Apaches are in a starving condition and anxious to

make peace. How long, O Lord, shall these people suffer?"³⁵ The Eastern papers reflected a hostile attitude towards Colyer on 13 November 1871.

The New York Times wrote:

Mr. Vincent Colyer reports that he has conciliated the Apaches in Arizona: but, unfortunately, he seems to have left, unconciliated, behind him a population at least as important as the Apaches, namely, the whites He was sent to Arizona to make peace with the Indians, and appears to have addressed himself exclusively to the Indians; conceiving, apparently, that no one but these Apaches had a right to his sympathies or care. He would hold no intercourse with the white inhabitants. . . and [he] seemed to regard these whites as objects of distrust.³⁶

The Times went on to say that the citizens of Arizona had done everything they could think of to portray a proper picture to Vincent Colyer, but he would have nothing to do with them. When Colyer arrived in Arizona, according to the Times, the Governor issued a proclamation asking the people to assist him. Mister Colyer was invited to meet with the respectable citizens of the Territory, which he declined. He rejected all offers of assistance from the whites. He did not condemn the outrages of the Indians and treated them in all cases as though they had been wronged. In addition, he showed an attitude of dislike and mistrust of whites in the presence of the Indians giving them a distorted view of the government position.³⁷ Vincent Colyer was seen by the Eastern press as a well meaning man with the Indians' interests at heart, but his methods had become highly suspect by the end of 1871.

On 17 November 1871 the San Diego Union published a list of murders and depredations that had occurred since Vincent Colyer had concluded his peace with the Apaches, which is summarized as follows:³⁸

12 September 1871 - Horses and mules were stolen from Camp Apache four days after the peace was concluded.

- 13 September 1871 - U.S. Mail rider was killed by Apaches within five miles of Tucson.
- 15 September 1871 - Mexican herder killed by Indians near Tucson.
- 22 September 1871 - Indians stole twenty head of cattle a few miles above Tucson and were pursued to Camp Grant.
- 1 October 1871 - U.S. Mail carrier fired on between Pheonix and Tucson.
- 2 October 1871 - Two men attacked near Tucson.
- 6 October 1871 - Man chased through the Dragoon Pass.
- 9 October 1871 - Military patrol fired on.
- 12 October 1871 - Military patrol fired on.
- 20 October 1871 - Farm attacked in San Simon valley.
- 24 October 1871 - Twenty five soldiers of the Third Cavalry attacked.

Governor Safford was angry over Colyer's handling of the peace efforts. He attempted to get Colyer removed from office and when that failed, started writing letters to the press explaining the white Arizonan's viewpoint. One of these letters was picked up by the press across the country as a plea of the citizens of Arizona and was published in the New York Times on 21 November 1871. Its contents summarized the plight of the white man as the Governor saw it on 31 October 1871:

The rich and prosperous never lack support, but it requires a brave man to stand up for the poor and friendless, and such are the people of Arizona. With natural resources unsurpassed; with gold and silver mines that ought to be yielding annually \$20,000,000, the people are in poverty, and have undergone for years scenes of death and torture unparalleled in the settlement of any of our new countries, and, instead of receiving sympathy and encouragement from our countrymen on the outside we are denounced as border ruffians The people of Arizona want peace, they care not how it is obtained; but they know from years of experience that to feed the Indians and let them roam over large reservations only places them in a secure position to raid upon the settlers

General Crook struck the key-note when he enlisted Indians against Indians. . . had he been allowed to pursue this policy it would have taken but a few months to conquer a lasting peace. But Mr. Colyer countermanded this order and millions will have to be expended and hundreds of lives lost before the end will be reached. . . . If it is a crime to undertake to settle and develop our new countries, then the sooner it is known and declared the better. If not, then such a man as Colyer ought never to be sent with his deep-seated prejudices against the white settlers to arrange the difficulty.³⁹

On 23 November 1871, Major General John M. Schofield, Commander of the Military Division of the Pacific, received orders from the War Department to resume the campaign against the Apaches with all forces available. The Indians were to be subdued and driven on to the reservations and compelled to remain there. This was a drastic change from the "peace by kindness" approach pursued for the past two years. Vincent Colyer was out and General Crook was given the word to implement his plan.⁴⁰ Colyer's work in Arizona was now being repudiated publically and private letters from Washington indicated he was in disfavor and had overstepped the authority of his instructions as a peace commissioner and was, "considered responsible for the outrages and bloodshed which followed his visit in Arizona."⁴¹ The San Diego Union wrote that the citizens of Arizona "rejoice at the news of the change in Indian policy."⁴²

General Crook readied his troops for the renewed campaign against the Apaches. He worked on developing his pack trains which were of particular interest to him for staying on the trail of the Indians because of the endurance of the mule. He overhauled equipment and got rid of those who would slow him down. He sent word to the Indians that they had until 15 February 1872 to report to their agencies or be hunted down as hostile.⁴³ Hundreds of Apaches came in to spend the winter on the reservations and to take advantage of the government food and supplies.

Another round of Indian affairs drew to a close. The year 1871 had seen the establishment of a rudimentary reservation system in Arizona and New Mexico. This would provide a structure from which to operate during the coming year. Vincent Colyer had gone back to Washington with a sense of accomplishment, not shared by many Westerners, but important to the future affairs in the Southwest. The peaceful solution to the Indian problem had been tested and found to be difficult to control. It appeared, as Christmas 1871 came, that the next move would be the responsibility of the army.

CHAPTER V

ENDNOTES

¹Utley, Frontier Regulars, 190-192; Oliver O. Howard, My Life and Experiences Among Our Hostile Indians (Hartford: A. T. Worthington & Co., 1907; reprint ed., New York N.Y.: Da Capo Press, 1872), 121.

²Secretary of War, Annual Report (1871), 26.

³Ibid., 31.

⁴Ibid., 34.

⁵Utley, Frontier Regulars, 192.

⁶Secretary of War, Annual Report (1871), 67.

⁷Howard, My Life and Experiences, 122-123.

⁸San Diego Union, 1 April 1871.

⁹Ibid.

¹⁰Secretary of War, Annual Report, 66.

¹¹Arizona (Tucson) Citizen, 29 March 1871; 30 March 1871.

¹²San Diego Union, 1 April 1871.

¹³Army and Navy Journal, 3 June 1871; Commissioner of Indian Affairs, Annual Report (1871), 69-76; Utley, Frontier Regulars, 192.

¹⁴San Diego Union, 11 May 1871.

¹⁵Arizona (Tucson) Citizen, 9 May 1871.

¹⁶Missouri (Saint Louis) Republican, 25 May 1871.

¹⁷Utley, Frontier Regulars, 193; Arizona (Tucson) Citizen, 24 June 1871.

¹⁸Daily Alta (San Francisco) California, 3 February 1872.

- ¹⁹ Army and Navy Journal, 3 June 1871.
- ²⁰ Utley, Frontier Regulars, 193.
- ²¹ Secretary of War, Annual Report (1871), 67.
- ²² Howard, My Life and Experiences, 122.
- ²³ Carl Coke Rister, Border Command, General Phil Sheridan in the West (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1944), 174-176.
- ²⁴ Ibid., 175-180; Captain Robert G. Carter, On the Border with MacKenzie: On Winning West Texas from the Comanches (New York: Antiquarian Press, 1961), 19.
- ²⁵ Ibid., 180-186.
- ²⁶ San Diego Union, 24 June 1871.
- ²⁷ Commissioner of Indian Affairs, Annual Report (1871), 77-78; Dan L. Thrapp, The Conquest of Apacheria (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1967), 79-103.
- ²⁸ San Diego Union, 20 July 1871.
- ²⁹ San Diego Union, 4 August 1871.
- ³⁰ Ibid.
- ³¹ Arizona (Tucson) Citizen, 9 September 1871.
- ³² San Diego Union, 7 October 1871.
- ³³ San Francisco Bulletin, 23 October 1871.
- ³⁴ San Diego Union, 25 October 1871.
- ³⁵ Ibid., 4 November 1871.
- ³⁶ New York Times, 13 November 1871.
- ³⁷ Ibid.
- ³⁸ San Diego Union, 17 November 1871.

³⁹New York Times, 21 November 1871.

⁴⁰San Diego Union, 24 November 1871.

⁴¹Ibid.

⁴²Ibid., 13 December 1871.

⁴³Thrapp, The Conquest, 126.

CHAPTER VI

CROOK'S CAMPAIGN 1872-1873

When Vincent Colyer left the southwest in the fall of 1871, he was confident that he had established peace with the Apaches of Arizona and New Mexico. Eastern humanitarians, however, were not so optimistic. They were starting to listen to the stories of murder and depredations reported from the West. True, Colyer had accomplished much toward the creation of a permanent reservation system by convincing several hundred Apaches to relocate on the designated reserves, but the Southwest was a long way from being peaceful.

When it was learned that General Crook had been given the authority to resume his Indian campaign in the fall of 1871, Eastern humanitarians called for a new peace initiative. At the same time, Westerners demanded punitive action under Crook's leadership.¹ The New York Times, commenting on recent depredations in Arizona, 8 March 1872, wrote,

It is clear . . . these murderous scoundrels of Arizona have become very bold . . . they have been dealt with too leniently. The strong disposition to shield the Apaches manifested by certain officials in Arizona may originate in humane and honorable feelings, but if these savages as a consequence are to rob, shoot and scalp at their own sweet will, there really appears no particular good in keeping a large force of United States soldiers in the Territory.²

As a result of the public clamor and indignation over the failure of Colyer's peace and the urging of Eastern humanitarians to make one

more try to secure peace through diplomacy rather than the use of force, President Grant appointed Brigadier General Oliver O. Howard to replace Vincent Colyer as special Indian commissioner in the southwest. It was hoped that General Howard would be able to exert his influence with the Apaches as he had been able to do with the black men as the head of the Freedmen's Bureau, a post he had held since 1866. It was further felt that this humanitarian fighting man would have an advantage in dealing with Cochise, leader of the Chiricahua Apaches, over Colyer who had always displayed a very narrow view of how to treat the Indians. It was known by both Easterners and Westerners that a peace without Cochise's involvement would not be a lasting peace.³ It was felt that General Howard's appointment would be met by the public with "general satisfaction."⁴

Crook's disappointment at having his military campaign plans dashed for the second time was softened somewhat by General Howard's agreement with him that force was a necessary ingredient for controlling those Indians who were incorrigibly hostile. Howard also concurred in the use of Indians to fight Indians, an important element of Crook's military plans.⁵ Crook contented himself with chasing the "incorrigibles" while General Howard spent most of April and May 1872 retracing Vincent Colyer's steps. He did convince some additional Indians to move to the reservations and made some minor changes in those reservations. However, he failed to make contact with Cochise, which had been the prime reason for his visit to the Southwest.⁶ In the meantime, depredations continued to bring on the ire of Westerners and cause serious doubts in the minds of Easterners as to the feasibility of peaceful settlement of the Indian problem. General Howard became more convinced of the need for force, writing Crook on

9 May 1872:

The object of the telegram of the 21st [March 1872], to prevent collision, as far as possible, between troops and Indians, was to enable the Secretary of Interior to make one more effort to settle all trouble peaceably. That effort has been made through me, as Special Commissioner. As robberies and murders still continue among the incorrigibly hostile, those who are not on reservations, and who will not go on reservations, there is no course left but to deal with them with vigor, according to your discretion, until the murders and robberies and those who sympathize with them, whatever tribe they belong to, be made to feel the power of the Government to punish crime.⁷

General Howard went back to the East during the summer of 1872, but returned to Arizona again in the fall to try and reach Cochise one more time. The San Diego Union of 3 September 1872, reported that General Howard had arrived at Camp Apache and was attempting to regulate the reservation system with great difficulty. The Union wrote, "We are informed that he is using every endeavor to correct this evil (of the Indians using the reservations to hide in after coming back from a stealing expedition) He will not in the least interfere with military operations, and is very desirous that all evil doers may be promptly and severely punished."⁸

While General Howard tried to make contact with Cochise, Crook operated under the more liberal agreement Howard had authorized in his 9 May 1872 letter. Toward the end of September, Crook sent a column commanded by Captain Julius W. Mason of the Fifth Cavalry on an expedition to hunt down the Indians responsible for depredations recently committed. Mason was successful and managed to catch the Indians. He killed forty warriors of the Date Creek tribe that had been responsible for the depredations as well as the Wickenburg Massacre of November 5, 1871.⁹ This action ended the Apache resistance in the western part of the

territory.

Meanwhile, General Howard had sent out messengers to try and locate Cochise. In September 1872 they returned without success. Howard did not give up. Making an inspection tour of the Tulerosa camp in New Mexico, he learned of a white frontiersman, Tom Jeffords, who was supposed to know where Cochise's camp was located. Howard asked if Jeffords would guide him to the camp. Jeffords said he would if Howard was willing to go alone. Howard agreed to take only one officer with him. The next morning Howard, Jeffords, Captain Sladen, an Indian named "Chie" who was Cochise's nephew, the interpreter Jack May, and two packers headed for the Canada Alamosa, then followed the tributaries of the Rio Grande. On 23 September 1872 they arrived at Fort Bayard where they replenished their stores. Two days later they followed the trails beyond Silver City. When they arrived in the vicinity of the Peloncillo Mountains they met a scout from Cochise's camp. He made Howard reduce the size of his party and then they headed south across the Chiricahuas. The first day's ride was forty miles. The next was thirty, across the San Simon valley in Arizona. They rode to the foothills of the Dragoon Mountains and rested that night at Roger's ranch, twenty-five miles from Fort Bowie, Arizona. Two days later they were in Cochise's camp. Cochise was impressed by Howard's bold, unprotected, ride into the stronghold. Howard was able to strike a bargain with Cochise. Although not committed on paper, Cochise agreed to stop fighting with the whiteman and Howard agreed to let the Chiricahua Apaches have the Chiricahua Mountains as a reservation and to assign Tom Jeffords as their agent. By this bold act Howard was able to end the Cochise wars.¹⁰

Unfortunately, General Howard's bold stroke did not stop the large scale murders and depredations in the Southwest. The official records of the army show thirty-three actions involving the army in Arizona and New Mexico during the year of 1872, up until November when Crook's campaign started. There were at least twenty-six civilians and ten soldiers killed, not counting the strictly civilian fights.¹¹ It was evident to the public that Crook's campaign was overdue. Even the Eastern humanitarians now admitted that force was necessary to conclude the Indian problem. Although Howard and Colyer had coaxed a large number of Indians on to the reservations, thousands still refused to submit. Their effort could not be considered a complete failure and, by today's standards was quite an accomplishment. In less than two years, between the two of them, they had established the Tularosa reservation in New Mexico for the Southern Apaches, the Chiricahua Reserve for Cochise's band, the San Carlos reservation for the Aravaipas, Pinalis, and Coyoteros, and the reserves at Camp Verde and Date Creek for the Yavapais.¹²

The western settlers were not impressed by the Indian Bureau statistics and demanded action. Citizens wanted to take matters in their own hands and threatened another Camp Grant Massacre if Crook was not immediately unleashed.¹³ The Indian Bureau admitted that force was needed, but not war.¹⁴ General J. M. Schofield, forwarding Crook's annual report wrote, "I think it must be evident that forbearance toward the Apaches of Arizona has reached its extreme limit, and that no course is left us but vigorous and unremitting prosecution of the war they have so long invited, until they are completely subdued."¹⁵ Crook said that he had earnestly and honestly supported the agents sent to Arizona in their

attempts for a peaceful solution to the Indian problem but that the "long and bloody list of murders and robberies committed during the year, by the very Indians who, at one time or another, have been fed at the public expense, is a ghastly commentary upon the results. . . . I think I am justified in saying that I have fully carried out that portion of my instructions which require me to co-operate with the agents referred to, and believe that humanity demands that I should now proceed to carry out the remainder of my instructions, which require me to punish the incorrigible hostile."¹⁶

In addition to the reports in the United States, Mexico was up in arms about the protection the Indians received on reservations after committing depredations in Mexico. A correspondent from Mexico wrote, "Sonora-unfortunate state-is suffering from a scourge, dreadful as a pestilence, in the ravages of these barbarous savages. The Indians are comfortably protected on the reservations of the U.S. Government near the border in Arizona, and thence they make their horrid incursions into Senora, carrying desolation and death among the suffering population."¹⁷

The stage set, Crook was given the go-ahead to unleash his campaign. Crook had issued his General Order Number 10 on November 21, 1871, in which he stated that roving bands would go to the reservations or be regarded as hostile. Now, a year later, he ordered subordinate commanders to prepare to enforce this order.¹⁸ Using his experience with the Paiute operations from which he brought three elements of successful warfare against the Indians, he prepared for action in Arizona. As his first element, he believed in the extensive use of Indians against Indians. He had recruited Apaches as scouts, as warriors, and as spys. The

second element developed by Crook was the use of mules for pack trains which allowed faster movement than wagons and mobility in terrain that wagons could not traverse. The third element of Crook's equation was to instill a higher level of esprit and confidence in his men.¹⁹ In additon, Crook instilled in his men the precept that once on the trail of the Indians, the trail is never given up. He expected the men to continue to pursue the Indians at all costs.²⁰

Crook's strategy called for a winter campaign. He intended to send columns to outlying areas frequented by the Apaches. Camps Verde, McDowell, Grant, and Apache were laid out in a semicircle around the Tonto Basin. By driving the Indians out of their secure areas and killing those who resisted, the rest would flow into the Tonto Basin and could be gathered together and put on the reservations. The idea was that the enemy would be starved, frozen and whipped into submission.²¹

The campaign started on 15 November 1872. Crook's instruction to his columns was that if the Indians wanted to surrender, accept; if they wanted to fight, give them all the fighting they could take in one dose; in either case, hunt them down.²² Three columns left Camp Haulpai on 16 November 1872 with orders to scout the Chino Valley, headwaters of the Verde, the area around the San Francisco Mountains and then to operate around Camp Verde. These columns had varying luck. Captain Emil Adam, commanding one of the columns, had the best results when he struck a band in Red Rock country killing eleven warriors and capturing three women and a child.²³ Two additonal columns were organized at Camp Verde. After the original three columns reached Verde and were resupplied, all five columns left on 3 December 1872 to scout the area. The five columns

kept the Indians off balance in small actions, and, then, on 28 December 1872, a command under Captain William H. Brown and Captain James Burns caught a band of Yavapais in a shallow cave in the Salt River Canyon. Of the one hundred or so Indians in the cave, seventy-six were killed. This was known as the battle of Salt River or Skull Cave.²⁴

As the winter campaign continued it became very obvious to the army that the role of the Indian scout was extremely important. Most of the contacts with the hostile Indians were made by the scouts operating from twelve to twenty-four hours ahead of the cavalry. Without the scouts, the troops could not find the enemy. With the scouts they seldom missed.²⁵

Throughout the remainder of the winter the units screened the area around the Tonto Basin and the Mazatzals, Sierra Ancha, and Superstitions. Depredations continued to be reported, but as the winter wore on, the Indians' morale wore thin. The New York Times on 17 March 1873 wrote, "Gen. Crook is at Camp McDowell with his entire command of twelve companies. His policy toward the hostile Indians gives great satisfaction in Arizona."²⁶ As Crook kept the pressure on the Indians, public support increased daily. The last of the humanitarian criticism died away.

On 27 March 1873, Captain George M. Randall's command of the Twenty-third Infantry, surprised a band of Indians camped on the top of Turret Peak. Twenty-three warriors were killed in Randall's charge. Turret Peak broke the resistance of the Apaches and Yavapais and they started turning themselves in by the hundreds.²⁷ Cochise and his band of approximately one thousand turned themselves in to the agency and took up residence at Sulfer Springs.²⁸ By April the newspapers were reporting how well the reservation system was working, now that there was a method to force the

Indians onto the reservations. The New York Times, 10 April 1873 reported, the case in point being Cochise, "Nothing can be better proof of the good intentions of these Indians than to know that under all these circumstances they have conformed to the last letter of the treaty made with General Howard. No Indians in the territory have behaved as well."²⁹

When Crook's campaign ground to a halt, over two hundred Indians had been killed, but six thousand Apaches and Yavapais had turned themselves in to the agents at Camp Verde, Fort Apache, Fort Bowie, and the San Carlos in Arizona and the Tularosa in New Mexico.³⁰ The Army had dramatically and decisively proven the precept of force as a key element of peace operations. The Tonto Basin Campaign stood as a success for Crook and for the army's role in the Peace Policy. Both military and civil authorities found satisfaction in the results achieved. Never again was the need to use force against those Indians who broke out of the reservations debated.³¹

AD-A076 926

ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLL FORT LEAVENWORTH KS F/G 5/4
THE U.S. ARMY, PUBLIC OPINION, AND PRESIDENT GRANT'S INDIAN PEA--ETC(U)
JUN 79 R C KEY

UNCLASSIFIED

NL

2 of 2
AD-
A076926



END
DATE
FILMED

12-79
DDC



NATIONAL BUREAU OF STANDARDS
MICROCOPY RESOLUTION TEST CHART

CHAPTER VI

ENDNOTES

¹Dan L. Thrapp, The Conquest of Apacheria (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1967), 107.

²New York Times, 8 March 1872.

³Thrapp, Conquest of Apacheria, 107; Seymour, The Story of the Red Man, 103; Utley, Frontier Regulars, 194-196.

⁴New York Times, 8 May 1872.

⁵Ralph Hedrick Ogle, Federal Control of the Western Apaches: 1848-1886 (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1940), 105; Utley, Frontier Regulars, 193; Howard, My Life, 120-162.

⁶Utley, Frontier Regulars, 193.

⁷New York Times, 6 June 1872.

⁸San Diego Union, 3 September 1872.

⁹Thrapp, Conquest of Apacheria, 113; John G. Bourke, On the Border With Crook (New York: Charles Scribner and Sons, 1891), 166-171; George Crook, General George Crook: His Autobiography. Ed. by Martin F. Schmitt, Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1946, new addition 1960), 173-174.

¹⁰Howard, My Life, Chapters 12-14; Commissioner of Indian Affairs, Annual Report (1872), 175-178.

¹¹Thrapp, Conquest of Apacheria, 117.

¹²Utley, Frontier Regulars, 193.

¹³Ibid.

¹⁴Commissioner of Indian Affairs (1872), Annual Report, 5-6.

¹⁵Secretary of War, Annual Report (1872), 72.

¹⁶Ibid., 78.

- ¹⁷San Diego Union, 4 April 1873.
- ¹⁸Thrapp, Conquest of Apacheria, 119.
- ¹⁹Utley, Frontier Regulars, 196.
- ²⁰Bourke, On the Border, 109-112; Thrapp, Conquest of Apacheria, 8.
- ²¹Thrapp, Conquest of Apacheria, 119; Utley, Frontier Regulars, 196-197; Bourke, On the Border, Chapters 10-11.
- ²²Bourke, On the Border, 182.
- ²³Thrapp, Conquest of Apacheria, 120-122.
- ²⁴Utley, Frontier Regulars, 197; Thrapp, Conquest of Apacheria, 126.
- ²⁵Bourke, On the Border, 203; Thrapp, Conquest of Apacheria, 126-127.
- ²⁶New York Times, 17 March 1873.
- ²⁷Utley, Frontier Regulars, 197.
- ²⁸New York Times, 26 March 1873.
- ²⁹New York Times, 10 April 1873.
- ³⁰Utley, Frontier Regulars, 197.
- ³¹Ibid., 198.

CHAPTER VII

CAPTAIN JACK AND THE MODOCS

During the winter of 1872-1873, while General Crook carried on his very successful campaign against the Apaches and Yavapais in Arizona and New Mexico, the newspapers were dominated by another series of events occurring in California and Oregon and involving the Modoc Indians.

The Modocs, a warlike people numbering around eight hundred, had been dispossessed of their lands by a treaty with the white man in 1864. After moving to a reservation which was also inhabited by their traditional enemies, the Klamaths, the Modocs found conditions unbearable and broke out to return to their homeland on the Lost River in California and Oregon. Periodic attacks on white travelers caused Superintendent Alfred B. Meacham to attempt to move the Modocs back to the Klamath reservation in 1869. Although the Modocs returned to the reservation, they stayed only about sixty days and then headed back to California.¹

In July 1872, Thomas B. Odeneal, Meacham's successor, received word from the Indian Bureau that they would support action to again return the Modocs to the reservation using force if necessary. General Edward S. Canby, Commander, Department of the Columbia, authorized his subordinates to assist Odeneal as necessary in accomplishing this task. At dawn, 29 November 1872, Captain James Jackson with three officers and forty men of B Troop, First Cavalry, deployed outside the Modoc camp on the west bank of the Lost River and demanded the surrender of the

Indians' firearms. A fight ensued and half an hour later the Modocs fled.²

The New York Times of 22 December 1872 reported, "The United States troops seem to have been worsted, for the Indians retired from the field to pillage the settlements and murder the white inhabitants in the vicinity of their camp."³ The Times reflected the opinion that the Indians were wholly at fault for this incident. "For several months past they have been sullen without cause, and, in consequence of the annoyances to which they subjected the settlers, an order was obtained from the Commissioner of Indian Affairs requiring them to remove to the reservation. "Captain Jack" and "Scar-face Charley," the chiefs of the tribe, flatly refused to obey this order."⁴ This incident made the public uneasy and rumors of a general Indian uprising spread. Demands for action to avoid such a calamity were voiced in the newspapers across the nation.

As the Modocs escaped to the lava beds south of the Tule Lake, on the border of California and Oregon, they slaughtered at least fourteen settlers. On arriving in the lava beds, they set up defenses in this natural fortress, which was to become known as "Captain Jack's Stronghold." Lieutenant Colonel Frank Wheaton, Twenty First Infantry, commanding the District of the Lakes, arrived from Camp Warner on 21 December 1872 to assume command of the operation to forceably remove the Modocs to their assigned reservation.⁵ On the night of 16 January 1873 Wheaton moved his troops to the lava flows. At dawn they advanced under the cover of fog and the bombardment of two twelve-pound mountain howitzers firing ahead of them. As the fog lifted, the troops were easy targets for the Indians hiding in the rocks. The Modocs kept the soldiers pinned down with highly

accurate rifle fire all day. That evening, the soldiers were forced to withdraw under the cover of darkness. The Battle of the Stronghold, as it became known, cost Wheaton nine killed and twenty-six wounded. No Modocs were hit.⁶

As a result of the army's inability to achieve a fast victory and to dislodge the Modocs from the lava beds, Alfred Meacham, former Indian superintendent, convinced the Secretary of Interior to send peace emissaries to see Captain Jack in hopes they could secure his return to the reservation by peaceful means.⁷ On 4 March 1873 the San Diego Union reported that the Peace Commission had visited the Modoc camp and presented terms to the Indians. First, the Indians would surrender to the military authorities and, second, they would return to their assigned reservation. The commission reported that the terms were initially accepted by Captain Jack but were ultimately rejected because there was disagreement in the Indian ranks. Negotiations broke down.⁸ The New York Times, usually optimistic about the peace efforts, reported "little progress of any peaceable adjustment of the Modoc difficulties,"⁹ and blamed the military success of the Modocs against the army as the reason for Captain Jack's attitude of being "somewhat exacting in his conditions"¹⁰ for a peaceful settlement of the situation.

Late in March, Secretary Delano concluded that the peace effort was a failure and gave General Edward R. S. Canby authority to reconstitute the commission under his leadership.¹¹ Canby increased the military pressure on the Indians by tightening the circle around the Modocs in the lava beds. On 26 March 1873 the San Diego Union reported that General Canby had talked with Captain Jack, but that the council had amounted to

very little. Captain Jack wanted a general amnesty and asked that he and his people be allowed to stay at the Lost River. Canby's answer to this was to draw the ring of troops tighter and to ship a large quantity of hand grenades into the area.¹² Writing of his council with Captain Jack, General Canby stated:

Accompanied by Col. Gillem, I had an unsatisfactory interview with Captain Jack The results confirmed the impression previously reported that the war faction is still predominant. Captain Jack's demeanor is that of a man under duress and afraid to exhibit his real feelings The substance of all that could be elicited from him was that he did not want to fight; that the lava bed was a bad place, and that he wanted to go to his home on Lost River.¹³

On 11 April 1873 General Canby and the Peace Commission made up of Meacham, Doctor Eleasar Thomas, Commissioner L. S. Dyer, Toby Riddle, the interpreter, and Riddle's wife again met with the Modoc chiefs. The designated spot was outside the picket lines of the government troops. There they met Captain Jack, John Schonchin, Black Jim, Shack Nasty Jim, Ellens Man, and Hooker Jim. The Indians did not have their rifles with them but carried pistols in their belts. They sat down in a circle with the Peace Commissioners. Meacham opened the talks and told the Indians what the Commission wanted to do for them. Captain Jack talked next, indicating that he wanted peace. As the next speaker took his turn, there was the noise of a percussion cap misfiring. Mister Dyer looked around in time to see Captain Jack pointing his pistol at General Canby's head. A dozen shots rang out. Both General Canby and Doctor Thomas were killed. Troops from the camp were immediately alerted and rushed to the council area. By the time they arrived, the Indians were on their way back to the lava beds.¹⁴

Reports from the military camp near Tule Lake indicated that the murders of General Canby and Doctor Thomas had "thrown a gloom over the

camp, and created a bitter feeling in the hearts of the men."¹⁵ The murder of General Canby had far reaching effects across the nation. The New York Times reported that, "No other officer was so universally respected and esteemed as General Canby. He was a true Christian and brave soldier, and died in the discharge of his duty."¹⁶ From San Francisco the news of the massacre of the Peace Commissioners created a great deal of excitement. Citizens called for action. One reporter wrote, "The policy of dallying with the treacherous savages is strongly denounced by all classes of people. The folly of such a course was demonstrated in Arizona before, in the Brooks campaign."¹⁷

In Washington the Modoc massacre was the exclusive topic for consideration in Congress. The President called for the severest action against the Modocs, but warned the army not to take action against the peacefully settled Indians of other tribes in the process. General Sherman commented that "treachery is inherent in the Indian character" and then went on to relate to the press several examples he was aware of when in the West.¹⁸ General Sherman told the press that President Grant was deeply affected by the death of General Canby and fully concurred with Sherman that no mercy should be given to the Modocs.¹⁹

General Sherman took action to punish the Modocs. On 12 April 1873 he sent a dispatch to General Alvin C. Gillem, commander of the troops at the scene:

Your dispatch announcing the terrible loss to the country of Gen. Canby by the perfidy of the Modoc band of Indians has been shown to the President, who authorizes me to instruct you to make the attack so strong and persistent that their fate may be commensurate with their crime. You will be fully justified in their utter extermination.²⁰

On 13 April 1873 in a dispatch to General Schofield, Sherman wrote:

The President now sanctions the most severe punishment of the Modocs, and I hope to hear that they have met the doom they so richly have earned by their insolence and perfidy.²¹

The Secretary of Interior reported that he would not ask for any mercy for the Modocs. He said he did not think this would change the Indian policy which protected the friendly Indians and punished the hostile Indians.²²

From Minnesota, Governor Austin wrote the President that "the Modoc assassinations have excited a deep and earnest feeling in Minnesota, and opinion seems to be unanimous that a bold, decided policy should be inaugurated by the Government and pushed to practical results in dealing with the hostile Indians."²³ Austin suggested a strong policy with the needed force to back it up. He wrote of the "squaw government" that the Indians did not respect needing change.²⁴

From Chicago the press noted that the murder of General Canby had created a feeling of intense indignation against the Indian policy of the government. The Chicago Tribune reported that the city advocated "extermination of Captain Jack's band of outlaws and the hanging of the murderers who attended the conference."²⁵ The Chicago Times blamed the Indian Policy for the murders.²⁶

The public everywhere openly debated the worth of the Grant Peace Policy. General Canby's death acted as a catalyst for the reassessment of the Government position. The New York Times of 16 April 1873 carried the statement that "the Government policy in regard to the treatment of the Indians is still vigorously and variously discussed. The inflamed feeling is subsiding as a clearer comprehension of what is meant by the

peace policy prevails."²⁷ The Department of Interior assessed the effects of the Canby murder on the public and saw the need for an education effort directed towards the public concern. L. L. Crounse, an employee of the Department of Interior, wrote the following to Secretary Delano on 15 April 1873:

The excitement and exasperation of the public mind, growing out of the treachery of the Modocs, which resulted in the death of Gen. Canby and Commissioner Thomas, and the serious, if not fatal wounding of Commissioner Meacham, has led, and will continue to lead, to severe criticism on what is termed the "Peace policy." Many observations have been and are likely hereafter to be made, of a general nature, condemning that which is not, perhaps, well understood, and expressing general opinions Would it not be well, however, to enable the public to understand anew . . . what is meant by the "peace policy."²⁸

General Canby was quickly replaced by Jefferson C. Davis, Colonel of the Twenty-third Infantry. As Davis prepared to move to the location of the Modoc operations, Colonel Gillem, already on the scene, took the offensive. A dispatch from Gillem published in the New York Times, 17 April 1873, indicated that he would take every action to prevent the Modocs from escaping.²⁹ At the same moment, Canby's body arrived in Yreka, California, where a procession of citizens went to receive his body and other citizens hanged Secretary Delano in effigy.³⁰ Between 15 and 17 April 1873, Gillem struck the Modoc defenses. The troops worked their way through the lava beds in an attempt to corner the Indians. On the third day the army discovered that the Modocs had slipped away. Colonel Gillem sent Captain Evan Thomas to find the Indians' new camp. On 26 April Thomas was ambushed and he and half his command were killed. The rest broke and ran.³¹

General Davis arrived at Colonel Gillem's camp on 2 May 1873 and,

finding the state of morale extremely low, went to work to correct the situation. On 14 May 1873, his battalions once again surrounded the Modoc defenses. Again, the Indians' camp was found to be empty. The Modocs had abandoned the lava beds.³²

Hooker Jim and thirteen men deserted Captain Jack and headed west with their families. On 18 May 1873, they ran into Captain Henry C. Hasbrouck and his squadron of cavalry south of Klamath Lake. Captain Hasbrouck managed to kill several of the Modocs and four days later Hooker Jim and his followers surrendered to General Davis.³³

Hooker Jim volunteered to go after Captain Jack. General Davis saw this as a chance to end the Modoc war and authorized Hooker Jim, Bogus Charley, Steamboat Frank, and Shacknasty Jim to draw arms and ammunition to go after Jack. They headed for Willow Creek and on 28 May 1873, found Captain Jack. Major John Green, under General Davis's direction, moved his cavalry squadrons forward. On 29 May 1873 they reached Captain Jack's camp and dispersed the Indians throughout the area. The Modocs gave up in small groups of one or two. Only Captain Jack now remained at large.³⁴ Finally, on 3 June 1873, Captain David Perry found Jack and his family hiding in a cave and convinced him to surrender.³⁵

General Sherman, on hearing the Captain Jack was in custody, said that General Davis should have killed every Modoc. He wanted to have Captain Jack tried in a military court. He wrote General Schofield and told him to guard Captain Jack closely.³⁶ It was his intent to see that Captain Jack and the other perpetrators of General Canby's murder were hanged. A week later General Davis received authority to hold a military court. Meeting 1 through 9 July 1873, the military commission sentenced

Captain Jack, Schonchin John, Black Jim, Boston Charley, Barncho and Sloluck to death. President Grant, however, commuted the sentences of two to life in prison. The others were hanged on 3 October 1873.³⁷

Because of his service to the army, Hooker Jim and his followers escaped punishment. The rest of the Modocs were settled on reservations in Indian Territory. Only one hundred and fifty-five Modocs survived. This was the end of the Modoc troubles for all times. The Modoc War and Canby's death did more to discredit the Grant Peace Policy than any other event. Newspapers across the nation saw it as sound evidence that Indians could not be trusted. The debate continued and even the humanitarians became more pragmatic.

President Grant still attempted to pursue his policies for peace with the Indians in spite of the growing public opposition. He ended the year 1873 by stating in his Fifth Annual Message to the combined houses of Congress that:

The policy has been to collect the Indians as rapidly as possible on reservations, and as far as practicable within what is known as the Indian Territory, and to teach them the arts of civilization and self support. Where found off their reservations, and endangering the peace and safety of the whites, they have been punished, and will continue to be for like offences.³⁸

CHAPTER VII

ENDNOTES

¹Utley, Frontier Regulars, 199-200; Keith A. Murry, The Modocs and Their War (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1959), 16.

²Ibid.

³New York Times, 22 December 1872.

⁴Ibid.

⁵New York Times, 21-22 January 1873.

⁶Utley, Frontier Regulars, 201-202.

⁷Ibid.

⁸San Diego Union, 4 March 1873.

⁹New York Times, 3 March 1873.

¹⁰New York Times, 8 March 1873.

¹¹Utley, Frontier Regulars, 202.

¹²New York Times, 25 March 1873; San Diego Union, 26 March 1873.

¹³New York Times, 27 March 1873.

¹⁴New York Times, 15 April 1873; San Diego Union, 13 April 1873.

¹⁵New York Times, 13 April 1873; Max L. Heyman, Prudent Soldier: A Biography of Major General E. R. S. Canby, 1817-1873 (Glendale: 1935), 211.

¹⁶Ibid.

¹⁷New York Times, 13 April 1873.

¹⁸New York Times, 15 April 1873.

¹⁹Ibid.

- ²⁰New York Times, 15 April 1873.
- ²¹Ibid.
- ²²Ibid.
- ²³Ibid.
- ²⁴Ibid.
- ²⁵Chicago Tribune, 14 April 1873.
- ²⁶Chicago Times, 14 April 1873.
- ²⁷New York Times, 16 April 1873.
- ²⁸New York Times, 17 April 1873.
- ²⁹Ibid.
- ³⁰New York Times, 18 April 1873.
- ³¹New York Times, 17, 18, 19 April 1873; Utley, Frontier Regulars,
204.
- ³²Ibid.
- ³³Ibid.
- ³⁴San Diego Union, 3 June 1873.
- ³⁵Army and Navy Journal, 23 June 1873.
- ³⁶Sherman to Schofield, 3 June 1873, House Ex. Doc., 43d Cong.,
1st Sess., No. 122, 84-86.
- ³⁷Utley, Frontier Regulars, 206.
- ³⁸Richardson, Messages and Papers of the Presidents, 252.

CHAPTER VIII

THE RED RIVER WARS

In 1873, Commissioner of Indian Affairs Francis A. Walker, commenting on the warlike character of the Indians, suggested that the red man did not appreciate the strength of the white civilization and should be shown. As a result of this view, he decided to bring a select group of the hostile chiefs to Washington, D.C. so that they might observe for themselves the might of the country.

When the call went out to the tribes, the Kiowas refused to send representatives unless they were allowed to consult with their imprisoned leaders, Satanta and Big Tree. Walker agreed and had Satanta and Big Tree brought from the state prison at Huntsville, Texas, to Saint Louis.¹ This action infuriated the Western citizenry. The Austin, Texas Tri-Weekly Statesman reported that while in Saint Louis Satanta and Big Tree "might enter into a mutually profitable partnership . . . to supply . . . the best quality of 'human hair' guaranteeing that it be taken from the heads of women who did not die of disease."²

After meeting with the chiefs the Kiowas went on to Washington where Walker promised them that Satanta and Big Tree would be released from prison. Unfortunately, Walker had not considered the reaction of the Texans, and the Texas legislature rejected the position by a vote of sixty-two to nothing.³ However, Eastern humanitarians brought pressure to bear

on the governor of Texas and finally the chiefs were released. This action infuriated General Sherman and caused Lawrie Tatum, Agent for the Kiowas and Comanches, to resign in disgust. There was good reason for their concern because as soon as the chiefs were released, depredations by the Kiowas and Comanches increased dramatically causing the frontiersmen to take up arms and call for government aid.

The winter of 1873-1874 was marked by harassment of Texas settlers by Kiowa and Comanche war parties. The military was kept busy, but every time the army got close to the hostile Indians, they would scurry back to the reservations for protection. General Pope, commenting on this hopeless situation, wrote:

Under present circumstances there is a divided jurisdiction over Indian affairs. While the Indians are officially at peace . . . the military forces stationed in Indian country have no jurisdiction over them . . . and no power to take any action The first that is known of Indian hostilities is a sudden report that the Indians have commenced a war. . . . By the time such information reaches a military commander, the worst has been accomplished and the Indians have escaped . . . as soon as the military forces . . . have succeeded in forcing the Indians into such a position that punishment is possible, the Indians seeing the results and the impossibility of avoiding it, immediately proclaims his wish to make peace. The Indian agent, anxious . . . to negotiate a treaty, at once interferes 'to protect' the Indians from the troops, and arrests the further prosecution of the military expedition just at the moment when results are to be obtained.⁴

This separation of powers for Indian management between the Department of Interior and the War Department frustrated both the army and the Indian Bureau in their attempts to bring lasting peace to the frontier. There were also significant problems for the Indians, which added to the unrest. Food supplies dwindled during the winter of 1873-1874. As the Kiowas and Comanches grubbed for food, white buffalo hunters slaughtered large

quantities of the herds and left the meat on the prairie to rot. As a result, when spring arrived the Kiowas and Comanches, joined on occasion by the Cheyennes and Southern Sioux, raided in all directions.⁵

On 27 June 1874 the Comanches and Cheyennes attacked a settlement at Adobe Walls north of the Canadian River. Although they were scattered by white hunters with high powered rifles, this was just the start of the Indian depredations.⁶ On 7 July 1874, the Indian Bureau received an urgent dispatch from John D. Miles, agent for the Cheyenne and Arapahoe Indians, stating that the Indians from his agency, combined with the Kiowas and Southern Sioux, were raiding in the vicinity of the agency. He had dispatched a courier to Fort Sill for help and then escaped through the lines of Indians to a telegraph station in Western Kansas. Asking for assistance, he wrote:

Now, I ask and shall expect to receive at once, two or three companies of cavalry, one to be stationed at Baker's ranch to protect the government interests of this one road, and one at the agency. These troops should be transported as quickly as possible to Wichita by rail. No hostile Indians shall be quartered at the agency, and I must have troops to back it up. Let the hostile elements be struck, and with such power as shall make the work quick and effectual.⁷

The New York Times reflected great surprise at John Miles' warlike comments. As a Quaker agent his call for military force was considered unusual. The Times wrote that he was considered "cool and thoroughly reliable" by the Indian Bureau and as a result they indorsed and recommended his request for immediate attention by the army. The hostile Indians he referred to were estimated to number about 2,000, or one-fourth of the Cheyenne, Kiowa, and Arapahoe tribes.⁸ The Society of Friends were appalled by Miles' statements and asked for his resignation.⁹ On 9 July 1874

the Atchison Daily Champion reported that Miles' report had been received by the army and that General Pope, commanding the Department of Missouri, had been directed to use his cavalry in Kansas and in the Indian Territory for the purpose "of breaking up the raid of the Indians and forcing them upon their reservations."¹⁰

The news of the new raids in Kansas and Indian Territory caused a great stir of activity and in public opinion in both the East and West. The New York Times wrote:

Two or three thousand Indians - Cheyennes and Sioux - seem to be sufficient to turn the whole North-western border into a state of alarm. We, who dwell in the security of a great city, can have but a faint idea of the apprehension which an 'Indian scare' excites on the frontier.¹¹

The Atchison Daily Champion reporting on an interview by a New York Herald correspondent with General Sherman commented by writing that he sounded like a cynic. "The Indians," he says, "under the humane and tender treatment of our Christian brethern, have been well fed during the past winter. Now the grass is high enough for roving and predatory purposes, and the noble redskins have no particular use for the mild-mannered gentlemen until next winter."¹²

Although depredations mounted, Enoch Hoag, Superintendent of the Central Superintendency, continued to send glowing reports to the Indian Bureau of the progress he and his agents were making in the civilization of the Kiowas, Comanches, and Apaches. He seemed to be blind to the threat.¹³ But, finally, on 10 July 1874, Hoag sent a letter to the Indian Bureau relaying a report from Agent Haworth, who had replaced Lawrie Tatum, which said, "There remains no longer a doubt of the fact of the Cheyennes and Comanches, or a part of each tribe, now being on the war-path."¹⁴

General Sherman knew that drastic action had to be taken and pressed for authority to pursue the hostile Indians onto the reservations. By this time Secretary of the Interior Delano and Commissioner of Indian Affairs E. P. Smith, were becoming more receptive to Sherman's views and took the matter under advisement. In the meantime, General Sherman planned to have several columns converge on the hostile Indians and force them to surrender. On 17 July 1874, in anticipation of the summer's actions, he sent a telegram to General Sheridan suggesting that the Sixth and Tenth Cavalry converge at Fort Sill and "settle this matter at once, and prevent the Indians from turning toward Texas. . . . Each detachment could follow some fresh trail, and word could be sent to the friendly Indians in advance to collect for safety at Fort Sill. . . . Unless something is done now the rascals will merely rest and start afresh."¹⁵ The following day, General Sheridan replied:

I coincide with you fully that Gen. Pope should make the Sixth Cavalry take the offensive. I asked him to do so about a week ago, but he has asked further time. He is taken with the idea of defense, and does not see the absurdity of using cavalry in that way. I will make him use his cavalry on the offensive, and will stir up the Tenth also.¹⁶

In forwarding these telegrams to the Secretary of the Interior, the Secretary of War wrote:

If these Indians may on every provocation, real or assumed, sally forth and kill and steal of the exposed frontiersmen, we can never expect peace. Defensively it will require 10,000 cavalry to give even a partial protection, but offensively 1,000 cavalrymen can follow them and punish them as they surely merit.¹⁷

The Commissioner of Indian Affairs agreed with this assessment and forwarded his recommendation to the Secretary of Interior on 18 July 1874 that the reservation lines should be no barrier to the military's pursuit

of the hostile Indians. On 20 July 1874, Secretary of War Belknap issued instructions to the military stating, "In accordance with suggestions and recommendations received today from the Acting Secretary of the Interior and Commissioner of Indian Affairs, the guilty Indians will be pursued and punished wherever found, and the reservation lines should be no barrier to such operations."¹⁸ On 22 July 1874, General Sheridan received the news and launched his campaign and the Red River War began.¹⁹

The news that the military was being allowed to chase the hostile Indians into the reservations was accepted by the public with a general sigh of relief. The public was ready for this change in policy. The Atchison Daily Champion of 26 July 1874 remarked:

The policy recommended by Indian Agent Miles, and carried out by the Department [of Interior] seems to have had a most salutary effect upon the Indians that have been committing the late depredations. The bands that were harassing hunting parties and stealing from traders and settlers along the panhandle of Texas and the extreme western limits of Kansas seem to have fallen back to their agencies.²⁰

Sheridan organized his forces for an all out drive to quiet the marauding Indians once and for all. General Augur commanded in Texas and part of the Indian Territory and General Pope commanded the rest of the Indian Territory and Kansas, New Mexico and part of Colorado. These areas encompassed the bulk of the hostile bands. While these commands outfitted their troops for the long summer, the Indian agents were busy trying to get all of the friendly Indians into the agencies where they could be accounted for while the campaign was in progress.

Colonel Nelson A. Miles, commanding General Pope's main force, was ordered to move down from Camp Supply with eight troops of the Sixth Cavalry, four troops of the Fifth Cavalry and three field guns to operate

southward into Indian Territory. Colonel Ronald S. Mackenzie, General Augur's main commander, moved up from the Mexican border with eight troops of the Fourth Cavalry, five companies of infantry, and thirty Indian scouts. His mission was to move westward and establish a supply base on the fork of the Brazos River. Lieutenant Colonel George P. Buell with six troops of cavalry, two companies of infantry and thirty Indian scouts, established a supply base on Wanderer's Creek near the Red River and was to operate north of Mackenzie. Lieutenant Colonel John W. Davidson moved west from Fort Sill with six troops of the Tenth Cavalry, three companies of infantry, and forty-four Indian scouts. Major William R. Price, with four troops of the Eighth Cavalry, moved eastward from Fort Union. All the columns were to converge on the hostile Indians that had been responsible for the recent depredations.²²

Throughout the month of August 1874, Indians reported into their reservations in hopes of finding safety from the advancing soldiers. Big Red Food and his band of Nakoni Comanches tried to enroll after the rolls had been closed. Lieutenant Colonel Davidson refused to give them safety since they were responsible for the depredations at Adobe Walls. Big Red Food took his band to the Wichita Agency and Davidson went after him with four troops of the Tenth Cavalry. Davidson found the Nakoni band and ordered them to surrender. While his troops were disarming the Comanches, a band of Kiowas under Lone Wolf and Woman's Heart, turned on the troops and fired at them. Immediately, the Kiowas ran with the troops in hot pursuit. In the skirmish that followed, three soldiers were shot and many of the Indians were killed. The Comanche lodges and camp were burned. As the Indians ran, they killed four citizens settled near the

camp.²³

Commenting on the Wichita agency action, the New York Times wrote:

In this case the Indians clearly seem to have been entirely to blame A reasonable explanation of the sudden malice of the Kiowas may possibly be found in the fact that the whole section of the Indian Territory in which they live is overrun by whiskey peddlers and low white banditti, who spread drunkenness among the redskins.

But the army ought to be able to catch and punish every refractory Indian, or body of Indians. The savage would never leave his reservation if he were fully convinced that behind the "peace policy" there would always be sufficient force to punish any infringement of that policy on his part. . . . Give the Indians a peace policy and protection so long as he deserves it, but let the army have the power to inflict speedy punishment upon him the moment he willfully and wantonly does wrong.²⁴

It became more and more obvious that the public wanted the Indians secured on the reservations at all costs and it was the general belief that the army could provide this end.

In mid-July, 1874, Captain A. E. Bates left Camp Brown, Wyoming Territory, for the purpose of punishing the Arapahoes who had been committing depredations in Owl Creek and the neighboring valley. After a skirmish with them at Owl Creek, they moved south. Sending a delegation to Fort Fetterman in August 1874 to talk to General Sheridan, the Indians asked if the General wanted war. General Sheridan told them to give up and remain on their reservation or he would kill as many of them as he could. With this threat they headed for the Red Cloud agency to live in peace.²⁵ By the end of August most of the Arapahoes had turned themselves in to their reservation. The enemy by this time consisted of some 1,800 Cheyennes, 3,000 Comanches, and 1,000 Kiowas.²⁶

The Indians were moving in large bands along the Washita River and the forks of the Red River. Colonel Miles and Major Price were marching

towards this area at the end of the month of August. On 30 August 1874 Colonel Miles met between four hundred and five hundred Cheyennes twelve miles from the banks of the Red River. After a hard engagement, lasting over five hours, Miles drove the Indians over thirteen miles of high hills and almost impassable canyons with a loss to the Indians of about thirty-five killed.²⁷ Although Colonel Miles had to turn back for supplies, he burned the Indians' village and a large quantity of their provisions.

A drought afflicted the southern Plains sustaining exceptionally warm temperatures and drying up water holes. This had made conditions almost unbearable to the extent that at one point soldiers were opening up the veins in their arms to get some moisture. On 7 September 1874 the drought finally lifted bringing storms and dropping temperatures. Miles met Price's column on the same day the rains started. Both columns headed north to find supplies. Finding instead more Indians, the next few weeks became known as the "Wrinkled-Hand Chase." The rains continued and the Kiowas and Comanches clashed with Miles. On 9 September 1874 they found Miles' supply trains. Among these warriors was Lone Wolf, Satanta and Big Tree. After three days of fighting, the Indians fled in the face of Major Price's approach.²⁸ Woman's Heart and some of the Comanches had had enough and went back to the Darlington Agency. Satanta and Big Tree were in his Band. The rest of the Kiowas and Comanches moved in search of the main body of the hostile Indians.²⁹

On 9 October 1874, Buell destroyed a large camp on the Salt Fork of the Brazos belonging to the Kiowas. By 20 September 1874, Mackenzie had supplied his column and was in route to the Staked Plains with eight cavalry troops. Three infantry companies guarded his supply camp and

two escorted his wagons. On the night of 16 September 1874, Mackinzie's column was hit by about two hundred and fifty Comanches. He counterattacked and scattered the Indians. Mackinzie attacked a consolidated camp of the Kiowas, Comanches and Cheyennes on the Prairie Dog Fork of the Red River in the Palo Duro Canyon and routed the Indians.²⁹ On 17 October 1874, Captain A. R. Chaffee, of Mackinzie's command, destroyed a camp near the Washita. On 8 November 1874, Lieutenant Frank Baldwin captured a force of Cheyennes on McClellan Creek in Texas.³⁰ There was no relief for the Indians. The army was accomplishing its plan to wear them down. In small groups they started turning themselves in to the agencies.

The Indian Bureau had its hands full taking care of the Indians turning themselves in and keeping track of those who were considered hostile. By the end of the year, cooperation with the army had become routine. By 5 December 1874, the Indian Bureau put out a circular instructing the agents to cooperate with the army commands in their area in any matters that had to do with punishing the Indians for depredations and to take action against any Indian the agent knew to have committed a crime.³¹

On 11 February 1875, Buell struck a Kiowa and Comanche camp near Double Mountain in Texas and destroyed it. Late in February Lone Wolf and about five hundred Kiowas surrendered. Most of the balance of the Indians surrendered by early March 1875. Eight hundred Cheyennes surrendered on 6 March alone.³²

General Sheridan wanted the hostile Indians tried by a military commission for their crimes. Secretary Delano agreed with Sheridan's suggestion and on 18 December 1874, Sheridan directed General Augur to

establish such a commission at Fort Sill. As a result of this action, seventy-five Indians were found guilty of crimes and sent to Saint Augustine, Florida, for imprisonment.³³ Satanta was sent back to Huntsville where he committed suicide in March 1878.³⁴

The Red River Wars were a success in terms of the number of Indians that surrendered rather than the number killed. The wars ended forever the ability of the Kiowas, Comanches, Cheyennes, Arapahoes and Plains Apaches to challenge the authority of the federal government and set the pattern for future Indian policy. As 1874 drew to a close this success was noted by the Commissioner of Indian Affairs who stated in his annual report that at twenty-one agencies, "Indians who at the beginning of this period made no effort and showed no inclination toward labor or self support, or education for their children, seem now to have settled into an earnest purpose to adopt a civilized mode of life."³⁵ In his report at the end of 1876, the Commissioner of Indian Affairs concluded that the events of the past few years showed the need to adopt three principles for Indian policy: concentration of all the Indians on a few reservations, allotment to them of lands in severalty, and extension over them of United States law and the jurisdiction of the United States courts.³⁶

In all, the Red River Wars brought into balance the ideas of the Indian Bureau, the Army, and the American public. They acted as a stepping off point for a more united effort to solve the Indian problem which never-the-less continued to plague the country for the next twenty years.

CHAPTER VIII

ENDNOTES

- ¹Rister, Border Command, 186.
- ²Tri-Weekly Statesman, (Austin, Texas), 3 October 1873.
- ³Rister, Border Command, 189.
- ⁴Army and Navy Journal, 22 August 1874.
- ⁵Utley, Frontier Regulars, 213.
- ⁶Atchison Daily Champion, 10 July 1874.
- ⁷New York Times, 8 Jjly 1874; Atchison Daily Champion, 8 July 1874.
- ⁸New York Times, 8 July 1874; Carl Coke Rister, The Southwest Frontier, 1865-1881 (Cleveland: Arthur H. Clark Company, 1929), 91.
- ⁹Atchison Daily Champion, 18 July 1874.
- ¹⁰Atchison Daily Champion, 9 July 1874.
- ¹¹New York Times, 11 July 1874.
- ¹²Atchison Daily Champion, 15 July 1874.
- ¹³Commissioner of Indian Affairs, Annual Report (1874), p 214.
- ¹⁴New York Times, 15 July 1874.
- ¹⁵New York Times, 26 July 1874.
- ¹⁶Ibid.
- ¹⁷New York Times, 27 July 1874.
- ¹⁸New York Times, 22 July 1874.
- ¹⁹Commissioner of Indian Affairs, Annual Report (1874), 9-10.
- ²⁰Atchison Daily Champion, 26 July 1874.
- ²¹Commissioner of Indian Affairs, Annual Report, 10.

²²Rister, Border Command, 192-193; Utley, Frontier Regulars, 220; Army and Navy Journal, 5 September 1874; John Bigelow, Tenth Regiment of Cavalry (New York: Maynard, Merrill and Company, 1896), 33.

²³New York Times, 26, 27 August 1874; Utley, Frontier Regulars, 221; Army and Navy Journal, 29 August 1874; Atchison Daily Champion, 27 August 1874.

²⁴New York Times, 27 August 1874.

²⁵New York Times, 28 August 1874.

²⁶Utley, Frontier Regulars, 221.

²⁷Atchison Daily Champion, 9 September 1874.

²⁸Utley, Frontier Regulars, 223-224.

²⁹Ibid.

³⁰Rister, Border Command, 193-195.

³¹Army and Navy Journal, 5 December 1874.

³²Utley, Frontier Regulars, 228; Rister, Border Command, 193-194.

³³Ibid., 196.

³⁴Utley, Frontier Regulars, 232-233.

³⁵Commissioner of Indian Affairs, Annual Report (1874), 3.

³⁶Commissioner of Indian Affairs, Annual Report (1876), VII.

CHAPTER IX

CONCLUSIONS

Throughout the history of the United States Indian affairs have been replete with the frustrations, indecision, faltering policies, and intense disagreements associated with the dominance of one race over another. Even so, out of this confused and emotionally charged climate came a series of actions which followed a somewhat logical path toward the solution of the clash between white man and Indian. An understanding of the role of the Grant Administration in the evolution of Indian policy is necessary because the political, sociological and military actions taken under this policy brought about the change of United States Indian policy from a system of cooperating with domestic dependent nations to inclusion of the Indians as American citizens under the law.

Prior to 1849 the Indians were considered to be sovereign nations of red men to be dealt with by treaties. The army had the sole responsibility to negotiate these treaties with the aim of securing right of way through Indian lands for westward expansion and land for building forts on the routes through Indian country. In 1825, the Calhoun Plan which reflected the attitude of the government and white citizens that the Indians had to be moved out of the way of white expansion, was put into effect. White consciences were salved by offering the Indians in exchange land, monetary considerations, and annual payments in supplies

and trade goods. A great Indian domain, or reservation, between the Missouri River and the Rocky Mountains was envisioned and the reservation system was instituted.

In 1849, the Bureau of Indian Affairs was established under the Department of the Interior. This action divided the responsibility for Indian affairs between the Indian Bureau and the Army. Under this arrangement, the 1850's were spent attempting to move the Indians to the envisioned great reserve and out of the way of settlers in Ohio and Missouri.

In 1866, the Fetterman Massacre on the Bozeman trail shocked the nation and a Peace Commission was created to solve the growing Indian problem through negotiation. The Treaty of Medicine Lodge in 1867 and the Treaty of Fort Laramie in 1868 ensued. Neither of these peaceful attempts brought peace. They did further restrict the movement of the Indians by clearing the center of the great Indian reserve, that area between the Platte River and the Arkansas River, so that western expansion across the Great Plains could take place. Four reservations, two north of the Platte and two south of the Arkansas, were created.

The Indian Bureau was unable to force the Indians to move to the new reservations. As hostilities increased, the army took on a new, more aggressive policy toward the Indians, a policy which was accepted by the nation as the means necessary to move the Indians out of the way. Successes were achieved in the Battle of Beecher's Island and the Battle of the Washita. These successes by the army resulted in the acceptance of force as part of the peace policy. As a result, the Indian Commission was dissolved after its 1868 meetings.

The Grant Indian Peace Policy was initiated in 1869. "Conquest by kindness" was a key part of the policy. More important was the termination of the treaty system which moved the Indians toward citizenship by doing away with their sovereign status. The year 1869 also saw the reintroduction of army authority over Indians found off the reservations. The eight years of the Grant administration brought subsequent modifications and refinements of the Indian policy initiated in 1869.

In 1870, the Baker Affair was a set-back to the army's authority in developing Indian policy and resulted in the elimination of army officers from assignment as Indian agents. On the other hand, the President took a harder line on maintaining roads and forts in Indian territory stating to the Indians that the government could build roads and forts anywhere it deemed them necessary for the protection of the white citizens and the Indians alike. In 1871 Grant appointed additional members of religious sects to the posts of Indian agents and superintendents, and the trial of Satanta and Big Tree by the civil courts in Texas was the first move toward holding Indians personally accountable for their hostile acts. This principle became a part of Indian policy and was exercised as a matter of course in the future.

Both Crook's campaign in 1872-1873 and the Modoc War in 1873 emphasized the use of force as a tool of peace. The use of peace emissaries such as Vincent Colyer and General Howard, with authority to hold the military at bay, was discontinued as a result. In 1874 the army was given the authority to pursue hostile Indians on to the reservations and thus was eliminated the last legal protection of the hostiles. The

army's success in the Red River War convinced all doubters that force was a key instrument of peace.

With respect to the effects of public opinion in establishing the policies outlined above, it is clear that during the period there were four principal views which had to be taken into account: the Eastern humanitarian view, which until 1873 was consistently for any peaceful means of solving the Indian problem; the Western view, which demanded that the Indians be controlled, preferably by elimination; the army view, which wanted the Indians kept on the reservations and punished if they strayed beyond their boundaries; and the view of the uncommitted American public, which did not have a position unless Indian affairs got out of hand and then usually sided with the best logic of the other three groups. This fourth view became a potent force only when aroused.

Public opinion determined whether military actions were victories or massacres. In November 1868, when General George A. Custer found Black Kettle's camp on the Washita and destroyed the inhabitants, including women and children, the public praised Custer as a hero. Yet, in 1864, Colonel John M. Chivington's Colorado Volunteers had attacked Black Kettle under exactly the same circumstances as Custer's attack in 1868 and Chivington was branded a murderer. The Baker Affair, a similar battle, in 1870 resulted in Major Baker being branded a barbarian and resulted in army officers being prohibited from serving as Indian agents. But, the Battle of the Washita, Custer's victory, resulted in the House of Representatives voting to move the Indian Bureau back to the War Department. The only difference between the three battles was the public's perception of them. Yet, all three battles had the same

disastrous effect on the Indians.

Humanitarians used the Baker Affair as the means to ridicule the army's opinions and recommendations for the use of force. As a result, they were successful in keeping Generals Sherman and Sheridan at bay for almost two years. This was accomplished with the aid of pro-humanitarian newspapers such as the New York Times, which continually drew public opinion into the humanitarian camp.

From 1869 to the end of 1872, the humanitarian viewpoint dominated Indian affairs. Their attempt to settle affairs without the use of force was not successful, but did delay other approaches through the political potency of humanitarian constituency. No one was ever sure of who they were talking about when they referred to the power of the "Indian Ring," but this group of Easterners, both philanthropists and government officials, controlled much of the policy until general public discontent with the policy ensued and became too powerful for the "Indian Ring" to control.


The threat of public action influenced the government in its choice of alternatives. During the period of this study the western settlers demonstrated this influence on many occasions. If Indian depredations increased, the settlers called for federal troops for protection. If adequate force was not forthcoming, the settlers threatened to attack the Indians themselves. This usually caused the government to mass troops in the troubled area. This was the case in Kansas and Colorado in 1868 and 1869. Raids on the Solomon and Saline Rivers were amplified in the Western press, the governors reacted demanding action and threatened mobilization, settlers brandished their


weapons and reported every violation by the Indians to the newspapers, and the federal government gave in and sent troops. Between raids, humanitarians continued their efforts to control the Indians by peaceful means. But, when the public perceived that the humanitarians could not deliver peace on the frontier by their peaceful methods, public support decreased. Such was the case after Vincent Colyer's and General Howard's peace attempts in Arizona and New Mexico in 1871-1872. This shift of public opinion from support of the Peace Commission to support of the military influenced the government's decision to allow General Crook to reinitiate his campaign of 1872-1873. Crook's campaign marked the return to power of the military. The success of the Crook campaign reinforced the army view in the eyes of the American public as reflected in the newspapers. This public popularity allowed and supported the army's demand for access to the Indian reservations when chasing hostile Indians and directly led to the government decision of 1874 to authorize the army to cross the boundaries of the reservation at any time. The climate of public support of the army caused even the pro-humanitarian elements to join in the support of the army's position, and ended the debate on the use of force as a tool of the Indian peace policy.


Public opinion, the army, and Indian policy were interwoven throughout the Grant administration. This thesis has discussed some of the men, ideas and events which formed opinion, caused military action, and provoked policy shifts. In any society, the forces that influence change are often subtle and interrelated. The Indians of the Great Plains were forced to give way to the mass of white men pushing westward to new lands and new opportunities. They could not stand against the

volatile combination of white public opinion, armed force and a policy which was formally stated in the laws of the land.

APPENDIX A







BIBLIOGRAPHY

BIBLIOGRAPHY

BOOKS

- Alexander, Evelin M. Cavalry Wife: The Diary of Evelin M. Alexander 1866-1867. College Station: Texas A&M Press, 1977.
- Armstrong, William H. Warrior in Two Camps: Ely S. Parker, Union General and Seneca Chief. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1978.
- Bigelow, John. Tenth Regiment of Cavalry. New York: Maynard, Merrill Company, 1896.
- Brown, Dee. Bury My Heart at Wounded Knee. New York: Bantom Books, Inc., 1970.
- Brooke, John Gregory. On the Border With Crook. New York: Scribner's and Sons, 1892.
- Carter, Captain Robert G. On the Border with Mackenzie: On Winning West Texas from the Comanches. New York: Antiquarian Press, 1961.
- Crook, George. General George Crook: His Autobiography. ed. Martin F. Schmitt. Norman, Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma Press, 1946.
- Ellis, Richard N. General Pope and U.S. Indian Policy. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1970.
- Fritz, Henry. The Movement of Indian Assimilation 1860-1890. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1963.
- Hagan, William Thomas. United States-Comanche Relations: The Reservation Years. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1976.
- Hesseltine, William B. Ulysses S. Grant, Politician. New York: Dodd, Mead and Company, 1935.
- Heyman, Max L. Prudent Soldier: A Biography of Major General E. R. S. Canby, 1817-1873. Glendale:
- Howard, Oliver O. My Life and Experience Among Our Hostile Indians. Hartford, Conn, 1907.

- Jackson, Helen H. A Century of Dishonor. Minneapolis: Ross and Haines, Inc., 1880, repr. 1964.
- Jones, Douglas C. The Treaty of Medicine Lodge. Norman, Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma Press, 1966.
- King, James T. War Eagle: A Life of General Eugene Carr. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1963.
- Kroeker, Maran E. Great Plains Command: William B. Hazen in the Frontier West. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1976.
- Marshall, Brigadier General S. L. A. Crimsoned Prairie. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1972.
- Murry, Keith A. The Modocs and Their War. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1959.
- Ogle, Ralph H. Federal Control of the Western Apaches 1848-1886. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1940.
- Olson, James C. Red Cloud and the Sioux Problem. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1965.
- Richardson, James D., comp. Messages and Papers of the Presidents, 1789-1892. Vol VII, Government Printing Office.
- Rister, Carl Coke. Border Captives: The Traffic in Prisoners by Southern Plains Indians, 1835-1875. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1940.
- _____. Border Command: General Phil Sheridan in the West. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1944.
- _____. The Southwestern Frontier 1865-1881. Cleveland: Arthur H. Clark Company, 1928.
- Seymour, Flora Warren. The Story of the Red Man. New York: Longmans, Green and Company, 1929.
- Sheridan, Philip H. Outline Description of the Posts in the Military Division of the Missouri. Chacago: 1876.
- Thrapp, Dan L. The Conquest of Apacheria. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1967.
- Utley, Robert M. Frontier Regulars: The United States Army and the Indian 1866-1891. New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, Inc., 1973.
- _____. The Last Days of the Sioux Nation. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1963.

GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS

U.S. Congress. House of Representatives. 43d Congress, 1st. Session, House Executive Document, No. 122, 3 June 1873.

U.S. Department of the Interior, Annual Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs to the Secretary of the Interior for the Year 1869 et sqq. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1870, 1871, 1872, 1873, 1874, 1875, 1876, 1877.

U.S. Department of War, Annual Report of the Secretary of War on the Operations of the Department for the Fiscal Year Ending June 30, 1868 et sqq. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1868-1876.

NEWSPAPERS

Atchison Daily Champion, Atchison, Kansas.

Army and Navy Journal, Washington, D.C.

Cheyenne Leader, Cheyenne, Wyoming.

Chicago Times

Daily Alta California, San Francisco, California.

Laramie Sentinel, Laramie, Wyoming.

Leavenworth Times, Leavenworth, Kansas.

New York Times

New York Tribune

Omaha Weekly Herald, Omaha, Nebraska.

Saint Louis Democrat

San Diego Union

San Francisco Bulletin

Tucson Citizen, Tucson, Arizona.

Tri-Weekly Statesman, Austin, Texas.

Yankton Union and Dakotian, Yankton, South Dakota.