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RACIAL HARMONY TRAINING FOR COMPANY COMMANDERS: A PRELIMINARY EVALUATION

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ARI FIELD UNIT AT PRESIDIO OF MONTEREY

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Distribution Unlimited

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U. S. ARMY RESEARCH INSTITUTE

FOR THE BEHAVIORAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCES

A Field Operating Agency under the Jurisdiction of the
Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel

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Research accomplished under contract to
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Racial Harmony Training

Research Problem Review 78-20

6 RACIAL HARMONY TRAINING FOR COMPANY COMMANDERS:
A PRELIMINARY EVALUATION.

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U.S. Army Research Institute for the
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Since 1972, the Army Research Institute (ARI) has been active in research on the policy, operational problems, and programs of the Army's Race Relations/Equal Opportunity (RR/EO) program. In 1973, in response to a specific requirement of the Office of Equal Opportunity Programs of the Army's Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel (DCSPER), ARI initiated the development of a Racial Harmony Training Program for Unit Commanders. The purpose of the program was to improve a commander's skills and effectiveness in handling multi-ethnic problems in his/her unit.

This technical paper, the second of three, covers the research involved in the preliminary evaluation of the Commanders' Training Program, during the period January 1974 to September 1974. The first report, "An Approach to Improve the Effectiveness of Army Commanders in Multi-Ethnic Settings," ARI Research Problem Review 78-19, describes the development of the training program. The research was conducted under Army Project 2Q162108A743, "Race Harmony Promotion Programs," in the FY 75 Work Program, as an in-house effort augmented by a contract with Race Relations Consulting, Inc., under contract DAHC 19-74-C-0014.

Since 1974, the Army Equal Opportunity Research Program has been conducted at the Presidio of Monterey, Calif., Field Unit.

JOSEPH ZEIDNER
Technical Director

RACIAL HARMONY TRAINING FOR COMPANY COMMANDERS: A PRELIMINARY EVALUATION

BRIEF

Requirement:

To develop a 3-day training course for company commanders in race relations to help them carry out their responsibilities in their own companies; and to conduct a preliminary evaluation of the effectiveness of this training course using appropriate experimental procedures.

Procedure: *THIS REPORT Evaluates*

~~To evaluate~~ the effectiveness of this training with an appropriate experimental design, the training was presented to 19 company commanders, who were assigned to the experimental group. Seventeen other commanders were assigned to a control group. Immediately after training, commanders in both groups completed tests measuring knowledge and skills acquired in race relations; 45 days later, enlisted soldiers, key subordinates, and the commanders themselves completed surveys that evaluated the commander and the unit in race relations. Records of several types of administrative action were also obtained for this time period.

Findings:

Commanders exposed to the training program demonstrated greater knowledge of the facts, methods, and skills needed to diagnose and analyze interpersonal relations and to deal with interracial issues in a military unit than did commanders not exposed to training. Enlisted soldiers serving under commanders from the experimental training group reported that their commanders implemented more policies to insure racial harmony and that their commanders were more effective in dealing with racial problems than did enlisted soldiers serving in units of commanders not exposed to the experimental training. The measures of administrative action did not reflect the effects of training. The number and scope of firm conclusions that could be made were restricted because of the nonrandom assignment of commanders to the experimental and control groups.

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Utilization of Findings:

This training course for company commanders was later presented to
another sample of commanders for a more extensive evaluation of the pro-
gram effectiveness. From both evaluations it appears that the program
has a modest but positive effect on the enlisted soldier within the
trained commanders' units. The training program, or elements from it,
can improve in a small way, commanders' effectiveness and unit harmony
in race relations.

RACIAL HARMONY TRAINING FOR COMPANY COMMANDERS: A PRELIMINARY EVALUATION

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RACIAL HARMONY TRAINING FOR COMPANY COMMANDERS:
A PRELIMINARY EVALUATION

INTRODUCTION

In 1973, a project was started to develop a race relations training program for Army commanders. This program was designed to help commanders handle race-related problems in an increasingly multi-ethnic Army. The development of the commanders' training program has already been described (Thomas, McNeill, & Laszlo, 1978). The current paper describes a curriculum revision to the program, as well as a preliminary experimental evaluation to test its effectiveness.

The initial 36-hour curriculum was developed for company commanders (CO's) following a review of relevant literature and interviews with 42 company commanders and 104 enlisted men in CONUS and Europe. The resulting curriculum was presented four times to classes totaling 36 company commanders at two posts in the southern United States. The pretraining interviews with commanders and enlisted men and field trials of the curriculum with company grade officers revealed a number of individual and organizational constraints reducing involvement of officers with race relations efforts. The content and instructional methods of the course represented attempts to deal with some of these constraints, including

1. Underestimation of the frequency of discrimination;

2. Attributing discrimination primarily to civilians;

3. Explaining racial conflict as a product of minority group deviance;

4. Perceiving more cost than benefit for involvement in Race Relations/Equal Opportunity (RR/EO) efforts; and

5. Interpreting RR/EO efforts as counter to Army norms necessary for maintenance of discipline.

Following the tryout classes, the company commanders filled out questionnaires about their impressions of the curriculum. Eighty percent of those commanders described the instructional objectives as relevant or highly relevant to their success as company commanders. Over half of the commanders said they experienced moderate, considerable, or very considerable change in the direction described by the objectives. Thirteen of the 17 topics were enjoyed or enjoyed very much by at least 60% of the commanders. Two consistent recommendations for improvements were (a) to shorten the curriculum so that the commander would not have to spend so much time away from his unit and (b) to develop practical exercises that more accurately reflected realities of life in the unit. In addition,

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though not mentioned by commanders, it seemed wise to evaluate more carefully the impact of this new training curriculum before concluding that it could be implemented profitably on a wide scale.

This report describes the modification of the original training program for presentation to a new group of company commanders. In addition, a preliminary evaluation was conducted of the results of training, including collection and analysis of both objective and subjective data.

The report is divided into several sections. First, the report discusses the revision of the commanders' training curriculum, showing the modification of objectives, topics, and practical exercise. A separate report (Hart, 1978) presents the revised curriculum. Second, the evaluation plan outlining the general strategy of evaluation, the development of subjective and objective measures, the experimental groups, and the timing of measures are discussed. Third, the results of the evaluation experiment are presented. To describe the effects of the experimental training program five sources of data were reviewed:

1. Observation of commanders during training;

2. Commanders' evaluations of the curriculum;

3. Responses of experimental and control group commanders to measures taken at the end of the training course;

4. Objective and subjective data collected from commanders, men in their units, and post administrators 45 days after training; and

5. Observations by the project staff while carrying out the training and evaluation plans.

In addition, some of the statistical properties of new measures specifically tailored for this project are described as part of the results. A summary of the findings and observations about the Army's race relations efforts conclude the report.

This study should be considered as an exploratory effort. Only a small sample of commanding officers was available for training; officers were assigned to experimental and control groups on a nonrandom basis; and there was no testing sample upon which to perform instrument validation. Despite these limitations, the data from the project can contribute useful insights into race relations training in the Army.

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DEVELOPING A REVISED TRAINING PLAN

This section describes the two basic modifications made to the curriculum: (a) the reduction from 35-1/2 hours to 21-1/2 hours and (b) the modification of the practical exercises.

Reduction of the Curriculum

Although a reduction in training time was a project objective, there was no implication that commanders needed less than 35-1/2 hours training. Strictly from the viewpoint of the Army's race relations effort, a longer training program would probably be better. However, many of the commanders who took the original course said it was difficult for them to be away from their units for 5 consecutive work days. For this reason the curriculum was reduced to 21-1/2 hours.

The original curriculum (Thomas et al., 1978) contained 17 individual topics or blocks of instruction ranging in length from 1 to 3 hours. Each topic was modified in one of three ways to fit the new time requirements for training: (a) some were edited by removing less essential supporting material; (b) some were combined with others to produce new presentations (the topics that were combined covered logically related material); and (c) some were unchanged in form or time.

An overview of the resulting curriculum changes appears in Table 1.

A restatement of lesson objectives had to be made after the curriculum was rearranged and condensed. The five lesson objectives in the original curriculum were condensed to three in the revised curriculum. The original and revised lesson objectives are shown in Table 2.

Appendix A provides an overview of the curriculum and its revisions. Appendix B gives detailed training objectives. The 21-1/2 hour revised curriculum is described in Hart (1978).

Modification of Practical Exercises

The second task in modifying the curriculum involved making some of the practical exercises more relevant to the issues and situations characteristic of the company level. It was decided to devote the same proportion of time to practical exercises in the revised curriculum. Because overall training time was reduced, the number of practical exercises was reduced to four (see Table 1).

Table 1

Location of Changes in Commanders' Training Curriculum

Revised Curriculum	Original Curriculum	Mexican-Americans	Puerto Ricans*	Blacks	Resistance to Change*	Games	Stereotypes	Surveys*	Role'Expectations	Theory X and Theory Y*	Personal Communication*	Guidelines	CO's Role*	Capitalizing	Approaches	External Consultants	Rap Sessions*	Indicators
Mexican-Americans		R																
Puerto Ricans			R															
Blacks				R														
Stereotypes							U											
Games*						C					C						C	
Role Expectations									U									
Guidelines												C				C		
Resistance to Change*					U													
Detecting and Dealing*										C								C
CO's Role													U					
Surveys and Small Groups								R										
Approaches*															R			
Capitalizing														R				

Note. R = topic reduced in length; C = combined with others; U = unchanged.

*Included a practical exercise.

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Table 2

Lesson Objectives

Original curriculum	Revised curriculum
I. To promote greater understanding of the conditions and issues promoting racial separation and conflict in the United States. (7-1/2 hours)	I. To promote greater understanding of the conditions and issues promoting racial separation and conflict in the United States. (4 hours)
II. Awareness of methods for analyzing cohesiveness and level of racial tension in a military unit. (8 hours)	
III. Enhanced skill at interpersonal relations with members of diverse ethnic groups so problems can be discussed and plans formulated that will facilitate a resolution to problems. (8 hours)	II. Diagnosing and analyzing factors influencing interpersonal relations in a military unit. (9-1/2 hours)
IV. Greater ability to coordinate the development and implementation of programs in the unit to ensure equal treatment of soldiers of different ethnic groups. (8 hours)	III. Developing, implementing, and evaluating RR/EO programs in a military unit. (8 hours)
V. Improved skill at monitoring the results of efforts to reduce racial tension. (8 hours)	

Note. Time includes 4 hours for assessment in the original curriculum.

EVALUATION PLAN

The general plan for evaluating the commanders' training program is outlined below. The strategy was to examine the effectiveness of the race relations training program at three successive levels. Observations over all levels consist of several kinds of data, including cognitive, attitudinal, and behavioral measures. Except for a biographical measure and two course evaluation instruments, the measures used in the study reflect three levels of training effectiveness: (a) comprehension of facts and ideas presented; (b) willingness to enact these ideas in the commanders' own unit; and (c) effect of these enactments and of race relations training on race relations in the unit. Table 3 shows these three levels of training effectiveness.

Table 3

Three Levels of Training Effectiveness

Commanders	Commanders	Key subordinates	Enlisted men
Course - - - - - -	Race relations programs, policies	- Enact CO's race - - - relations programs	- Behavior and attitude change
Level 1		Level 2	Level 3

Measures taken at Level 1 assessed the characteristics of the company commander and the knowledge and skill acquired during the training program. It was assumed that the knowledge and skills obtained from the course represent the foundation or tools which the company officer has at his disposal for more effective problem-solving and for the promotion of racial harmony.

Measures taken at Level 2 asked key subordinates of the commander to describe the various race relations programs in the unit and to describe some of the race relations policies of the commander. It was assumed that if the company commander has the skills described by the course he will be able to discontinue ineffective programs, establish more effective ones, and articulate policies and procedures to produce more racial harmony and increase equal opportunity.

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Measures taken at the third level involve administrative actions affecting enlisted men and the enlisted men's estimates of the commanders' race relations policies and skills. It was assumed that if the company commander mastered the skills and content taught and was effective in the areas of program and policy implementation, the race-related behaviors and perceptions of his men should reflect these environmental improvements. It should be noted that all commanders and enlisted soldiers who participated in this experiment were men because the experiment was conducted in combat units, which by law have been restricted to men. For this reason, results of the evaluation can only be generalized fairly to men in combat units. Table 4 gives a description of the nature, content, and purpose of the attitudinal and cognitive measures administered at the first, second, and third levels in the evaluation plan.

The first level measures, which were administered to officers in experimental and control groups at the end of the course, consisted of (a) an Information Questionnaire; (b) a Situations Questionnaire; and (c) the Racial Perceptions Questionnaire. Some other measures not considered to be first level were also collected at the end of the course. These measures included a biographical data sheet and both daily and end-of-course evaluations of the training curriculum from those exposed to the course. The Information Questionnaire consisted of 50 items designed to assess mastery of the training objectives. The 50 items were subdivided into three scales, with each scale representing one of the three overall lesson objectives. The number of questions in each scale is roughly proportional to the amount of instructional time spent on that lesson objective.

The Situations Questionnaire consisted of 15 items selected from a version of a cultural assimilator. The cultural assimilator used had been designed to teach white junior officers more about black culture in the Army (Landis et al., 1976). The items were selected by the instructors of the experimental course on the basis of relevance to course objectives. Commanders read each situation and selected what they considered to be the best response.

The Racial Perceptions Inventory (RPI) consisted of 73 questions. These questions are distributed across four scales: (a) Perceived Discrimination Against Blacks (PDB); (b) Attitude Toward Racial Interaction (ATI); (c) Feelings of Reverse Racism (FRR); and (d) Racial Climate (RC). The RPI is an established research instrument (Fiman, 1974; Hiett et al., 1978a, 1978b).

The second level measures were administered 45 days after the beginning of the training program to executive officers or platoon leaders and first sergeants and platoon sergeants, and were contained in the Key Subordinates' Checklist. Section I of the checklist asked questions about the race relations programs instituted by the CO; for each of 13 items, the key subordinate indicated if the program existed, how long it existed, how much it was stressed, and how effective it was. Section II

Table 4

Nature, Content, and Purpose of Attitudinal and Cognitive
Measures Included in the Evaluation Plan

Measures	Content	Purpose
First Level Measures:		
Information Questionnaire	Sampling of course content	To indicate knowledge and skills obtained from the course
Situations Questionnaire	Military situations indicating racial conflict	Assess interracial awareness and skill at interpreting interracial behavior
Racial Perceptions Inventory Completed by Commanders	Attitudinal and perceptual questions about race relations in the unit	Measure race-related attitudes in four areas
Second Level Measures:		
Key Subordinates' Checklist	Existence, stress, effectiveness, time of initiation of race relations policies and programs in unit	Assess direct and observable differences in race relations approaches as a result of the training
Third Level Measures:		
Company Commanders' Checklist	Existence, stress, effectiveness, time of initiation of race relations policies and programs in unit	Assess direct and observable differences in race relations approaches as a result of training

Table 4 (continued)

Measures	Content	Purpose
Third Level Measures (continued):		
Enlisted Men's Checklist	Application of positive policies in race relations by CO; estimates of racial problems, CO's effectiveness, race relations training needs	Assess direct and observable differences in race relations approaches as result of training
Racial Perceptions Inventory completed by Enlisted Men	Attitudinal and perceptual questions about race relations in the unit	Measure race-related attitudes in four areas
Other measures:		
Daily Course Evaluation	Relevance, time allotment, learning ratings of course topics	General assessment of quality. Feedback for future modification and improvement
End-of-Course Evaluation	Relevance, time allotment, learning ratings of course objectives; instructor ratings; overall course value	General assessment of quality. Feedback for future improvement
Biographical Data	Biographical and demographic questions about individual	Background data characterizing sample; moderator variables

asked how well nine statements regarding various race-related policies applied to the commander. Section III asked for general ratings of the degree of racial problems in the unit, the need for unit race relations training, and the commanders' effectiveness in handling racial problems. The items in Sections I and II were developed primarily by adapting statements of the commanders' race relations responsibilities from his post's Affirmative Action Plan.

The Level 3 measures were administered 45 days after the beginning of training. Questionnaire measures included the Commanders' Checklist, which was identical to the Key Subordinates' Checklist except that it called for a self-rating. The primary Level 3 measures consisted of the Enlisted Men's Checklist and the Racial Perception Inventory. The RPI was taken by enlisted men only. The Enlisted Men's Checklist consisted of Sections II and III of the Commanders' and Key Subordinates' Checklist, including the nine items about unit race relations policy and three general items. The three sections of the checklists are shown in Appendix C.

The cognitive and attitudinal information collected at Level 3 was supplemented with behavioral indexes considered to be fairly objective, routinely kept, and possibly related to the racial climate of the unit. Behavioral indexes consisted of the records of administrative action (see Table 5). The behavioral indexes shown in Table 5 were collected to see if the commanders' training would have a favorable effect on the frequency of less-than-honorable discharges, punishments, offense rates, etc.

The objective of experimental design for this evaluation project was to produce information on the effectiveness of the commanders' training course on race relations in the unit. The project design called for the selection of two representative brigades. Fifty company commanders from these two brigades were to have been assigned to one of two treatment groups: 25 to the experimental group, which would take the race relations course; and 25 to the control group, which would receive no instruction. Because of the lack of previous research indicating which parameters determine the effectiveness of race relations training in the Army, random assignment of commanders to experimental and control groups seemed appropriate to equalize the groups.

The plan called for the collection of cognitive and attitudinal measures from three different samples of Army personnel. The first level measures, the biographical data, and the course evaluation measures were to be collected from company commanders. Key subordinates (one first sergeant, one platoon sergeant, and one platoon leader), who were to be given the second level measures, were to be randomly selected from each company (total n = 150, 3 x 50 companies). The third level measures were to be collected from a random sample of enlisted men (excluding NCO's) from each company (total n = 400, 8 x 50 companies). The Commanders' Checklist, which was to be collected from the 50 company commanders, was also a third level measure.

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Table 5

Measures of Administrative Action Included in Evaluation Plan

Origin	Variable	Content
AG Office	Article 15's	Unit, ethnic group, infraction, punishment
	Courts Martial	Unit, ethnic group, infraction, punishment
	Separation under AR 635-200 & AR 635-206	Unit, ethnic group, reason
Confinement Officer	Confinement to stockade	Unit, ethnic group, infraction, pretrial confinement length
Drug and Alcohol Office	Drug and alcohol clients	Unit, ethnic group
JAG Data	Separation via Chapter 10	Unit, ethnic group, reason
Provost Marshal's Office	Arrests	Unit, ethnic group, incident
	Complaints of crime	Unit, ethnic group, incident

IMPLEMENTING THE TRAINING AND EVALUATION PLANS

The training and evaluation plans were implemented at a midwestern post with some changes made in the original plans. The experimental and control groups each were comprised of 20 officers instead of 25; and a series of administrative problems reduced the samples to 19 experimental and 17 control group commanders. These changes affected other parts of the evaluation plan. Instead of 150 key subordinates, as in the evaluation, 108 were expected. Instead of 400 enlisted men, 288 were involved. Then, rather than selecting commanders from two representative brigades, commanders were selected from five major commands with various missions on post. Officers were selected so that the number from each command in both the experimental and control groups was roughly proportional to the size of the command.

One of the most serious threats to the validity of the evaluation results was that it was not possible to randomly assign commanders to the experimental and control groups. The selection of commanders, according to the evaluation plan, was to be at random from each major unit. However, selection of commanders and their assignment to experimental and control groups was actually carried out by the commands from which the men came. At least one criterion for selection to the training group was "availability," which seemed to mean the CO's unit would not have excessive training commitments during the period of race relations instruction. The result of this and other criteria used for selection was that the experimental and control groups differed significantly on a number of biographical variables. These differences are reported later in the Results section. A consequence was that it was more difficult to make clear inferences about the effects of training, particularly with a small sample size. The differences found between the experimental and control groups may not have been due to the training program itself, but to other preexisting differences. These deviations from the evaluation plan, most of which took place before training began, set limits on the scope of conclusions that can be drawn from this project.

Commanders' attendance at the actual training sessions was also a problem because some officers said they had their battalion commanders' consent to miss some of the training to do work in the company. Attendance was also a serious problem with the control group commanders on the day they were to complete the evaluation instruments. Only 3 out of 19 officers arrived on time. Another 4 arrived within 20 minutes. Some men had to be called from the field, with no prior notice, to complete the instruments. These attendance problems seem to reflect, in part, the low priority the commanders and their superiors placed on race relations training.

Problems were also encountered when collecting followup data after 45 days. A random sample of eight enlisted soldiers from each of the participating companies was requested. This sample was to consist of soldiers between the pay grades of E1 to E4, half of whom were black

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and half of whom were white. The actual request was modified so that no ethnic characteristics were requested, and pay grades were changed to include soldiers between E1 and E6. Although the eight enlisted men were supposed to be selected at random, the companies themselves were involved in the selection of enlisted soldiers, creating the possibility of some bias. Many of the soldiers on the original unit lists did not show up for the survey, and a large number of men were sent as substitutes or replacements. This self-selection by the unit of participants could have biased the results. When data collection was completed, 110 key subordinates and 312 enlisted men from the experimental and control companies had participated.

There seemed to be some resistance in releasing the record data covering the administrative actions shown in Table 5, particularly since the data was requested by race, even though approval for its release was obtained. The reliability of this data may be open to question because it covered the frequency of administrative actions over a short period of time (45 days).

RESULTS OF THE EVALUATION

Commanders' Reactions to Training

To understand the reactions of the commanders to the training course, it may be useful to examine some of the biographical characteristics of the men who took the training class. The 17 captains and 2 majors in the class were career-oriented men, 75% of whom had already spent at least 7 years in the Army. Because of this length of service, it is not surprising that two-thirds of these men were over 30 years old. Everyone had at least some college experience, with 63% of the men holding at least an undergraduate degree. The officers came from all parts of the United States, and all were white. Though few of them had lived in neighborhoods with members of racial minority groups, over half said they had had daily close personal contact with minorities before joining the Army. At the time of the course, however, only 11% said they had daily close personal contact when off-duty.

During the course itself, commanders seemed to indicate that attention to race relations was an unappealing alternative to punishment. Although the reasoning varied in form, this idea seemed to recur throughout the training. The chain of reasoning seemed to be that race relations problems caused disciplinary problems, which called for punishment. Then, if race relations goals as understood by commanders are taken seriously, the CO must talk rather than discipline. But, as one commander put it, if the commander goes slack on punishment, "the unit will go to hell."

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Some commanders experienced considerable conflict over what was expected of them. They felt that it was not possible to synthesize race relations activities with other command activities. For example, how could a commander hold the line on discipline and still create the trusting atmosphere necessary to the honest communication essential for a race relations program? These commanders often attributed the inconsistencies in what was expected of them to inconsistent messages from their superiors. Commanders never expressed the belief that the Army really expected them to pay much attention to race relations programs, policies, and goals. In spite of assertions of sincerity and commitment from the highest echelons of the Army concerning race relations, the company commanders did not appear to fully believe their superiors' commitment.

The situation as seen by the commander was graphically illustrated by class response to a practical exercise in the block entitled "Detecting and Dealing with Racial Tension." The purpose of the exercise was to develop a composite picture of the class impressions of their subordinates, peers, and superiors. Class members were asked to call out any adjectives that came to mind to describe the (a) average EM, (b) the average company/battery commander, and (c) Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. The results are shown in Table 6. The commanders seemed to see themselves as the men in the middle with the impossible task of applying ill-considered contradictory policy to immature and ungrateful troops. This block, "Detecting and Dealing with Racial Tension," was considered by commanders to be the block where they learned the most (see Table 7). Discussions about apparent contradictions in what was expected of them caught the commanders' interest.

At the conclusion of the course, the commanders were asked to rate each of the 13 blocks of instruction according to three criteria: (a) the relevance of the topic, (b) how much the commanders had learned, and (c) the amount of emphasis each topic should have received. These ratings are shown in Table 7. In this table the reactions of the commanders to each of the 13 blocks of instruction can be compared. The ratings in Table 7 suggest the commanders see the ideal commanders' training course allotting most time to Detecting and Dealing with Racial Problems, the CO's Role in Improving Race Relations, Games Soldiers Play, and Guidelines to Improved Interpersonal Relations.

The commanders would like to see little emphasis on stereotyping and on interpreting survey results. Judging from these ratings, it seems commanders want to explore more deeply some of the organizational and interpersonal issues that influence the nature of race relations in the Army. It appears the current focus of concern for commanders is on coping with the realities of the Army as an institution, including its values, communication norms, and styles of resolving conflict rather than simply learning more about ethnic groups. This is not to say commanders are knowledgeable about ethnic groups or that they are free of stereotyped thinking.

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Table 6

Commanders' Reactions to Subordinates, Peers, and Superiors

Average EM	Average company/ battery commander	Dept. of the Army Washington, D.C.
1. Young	1. Intelligent	1. Disneyland East
2. Unsure and unsettled	2. Hassled	2. Water walkers
3. Black	3. Forced to prostitute values	3. Don't know what it's like
4. Inexperienced	4. Not enough time in his day	4. Lack of perception
5. Smokes pot	5. Some education	5. Permissive
6. Rebelling against parents	6. Under the gun	6. Overreact too late
7. Dislike Army	7. Must do everything	7. Shiftless and nonproductive
8. Did not get what recruiter promised	8. Scapegoat	8. Paper passers
9. Impressionable	9. Lot of time in grade (slow promotions)	9. 0900-1300 workday
10. Does not understand the system	10. Career man	10. Self-contradictory
11. Goes AWOL	11. Fearful of RIF	11. Don't practice what preach
12. Has high school diploma but didn't earn it	12. Father image to troops	12. Power hungry
13. Violator of laws		13. Expletive deleted
		14. Obsolete
		15. Lack of in-house communication
		16. Bureaucratic

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Table 7

Commanders' Ratings of the 13 Blocks of Instruction

Course Topic	Relevance of topic		Amount learned		should receive	
	Mean[a]	Rank[b]	Mean	Rank	Mean	Rank
Lesson Objective I:						
Mexican Americans	3.29	11	2.41	10	2.58	11
Puerto Ricans	3.63	9	2.61	7	2.64	10
Black Americans	3.74	7	2.60	8	3.03	8
Lesson Objective II:						
Stereotypes	3.09	12	2.27	12	2.17	13
Games	3.96	4	2.97	5	3.47	5
Role expectations	3.80	6	3.03	4	3.49	4
Guidelines	4.15	3	3.17	2	3.69	3
Resistance	3.44	10	2.83	6	2.99	9
Lesson Objective III:						
Detecting and dealing	4.18	2	3.51	1	3.95	1
Commanders role	4.25	1	3.12	3	3.83	2
Surveys	2.81	13	2.25	13	2.35	12
Approaches	3.87	5	2.29	11	3.30	6
Capitalizing	3.74	7	2.52	9	3.30	6

[a]The larger the number, the more a given block of instruction was rated as relevant, the more a commander indicated he learned a great deal, or the more emphasis the commander thought the topic should be given. Ratings were made on a 5-point scale.

[b]The 13 topics are ranked from 1 to 13 according to how favorably they were rated, with "1" being the most favorable rank.

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Reaching the commander about race relations seems to require addressing some of the issues concerning the Army's problems as a human organization. This may require some shifts in emphasis and in methods of presentation of the present course. Considerably more emphasis on how the Army as an organization works, both ideally and actually, may be needed. Topics such as prejudice and stereotyped thinking about ethnic groups could be explored in terms of how such processes influence perception, decisionmaking, and action in the military using observations of actual units to develop samples.

When asked to assess the overall value of the course, 7% of the commanders said it was "superior," 20% said "very good," 33% said "fair," and 13% said "poor." These percentages indicate that commanders' overall reactions were not uniform.

Results of First Level Measures

The results of the commanders' responses to measures taken at the end of the course are reported next. These measures include the first level measures: (a) the Information Questionnaire comprised of three scales, (b) the Situations Questionnaire, and (c) the Racial Perceptions Inventory. These scales were included to measure knowledge and skills and changes in attitude acquired during the program. Knowledge and skills obtained represented tools the commander had for implementing programs and solving problems. The first level measures were administered to both experimental and control group commanders to measure the impact of training upon knowledge, skills, and attitudes of the training class.

Prior to discussing results of first level measures, the biographical characteristics of commanders in the two groups were compared to determine their equivalence in terms of important background variables. This check is important because the experimental and control groups were not equated through random assignment to the experimental and control groups. An examination of the biographical characteristics of experimental and control group commanders showed that the groups were similar in terms of the following: (a) race (all white), (b) age, (c) rank, (d) level of civilian education, (e) career orientation (nearly all intended to pursue Army careers), (f) racial composition of the neighborhood they lived in prior to entering the service (mostly white), and (g) the area of the country they lived in prior to entering the service (all areas).

Other important differences between the two groups are as follows:

1. In the experimental group, 95% of the subjects had enlisted. In the control group, only 56% had enlisted, and 44% were drafted.

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2. The control group generally had less active duty time in the service than the experimental group. As of May 1974, 73% of the experimental group had 7 or more years, whereas only 56% of the control group had spent that much time in the Army.

3. The control group members, however, had been in their units longer than the experimental group members. For example, although 69% of the experimental group members had 1 year or less in their unit, only 44% of the control group had 1 year or less.

4. There were also important differences between the two groups with regard to the frequency of close personal contacts with people of other races. Before entering the military, for example, 23% more of the control group reported daily close personal interracial contacts than did the experimental group. This same pattern of interaction was found within the military with 39% more of the controls reporting daily close personal interracial contacts than did the experimentals. Thus, it appears that the experimental group members had more volunteers for the service, more total active duty time, less time in their present unit, and less frequent interracial contacts before and after joining the service than did the control group.

The reliabilities of the Information and Situation Questionnaires and the Racial Perceptions Inventory were examined prior to testing for training effects. The Information and Situation Questionnaires were constructed specifically to assess knowledge and skills gained from this particular training project; reliabilities had not been previously computed for these measures. Reliability measures the internal consistency of scales and indicates the extent to which the same results can be expected from the repeated administration of the same scales. A scale cannot validly measure what it is supposed to measure if it is not reliable.

Cronbach's coefficient alpha was selected to estimate scale reliability because its estimate is conservative when one or more of its assumptions are violated. Because a presample was not available for the Information and Situations Questionnaires to test the characteristics of these tests, it was impossible to determine ahead of time (a) whether or not each item measured a common factor, (b) if item intercorrelations were equal, or (c) whether, given equal item difficulty, item variances were equal. Therefore, the alpha's reported for the Information and Situation Questionnaires are lower bound estimates of reliability. Also, due to the lack of a presample, no items were eliminated on the basis of the item analysis procedures. For data analysis purposes, each scale of the Information Questionnaire was treated as a separate test. On a rational level, the three scales reflected differences in curriculum lesson objectives from which questions were drawn.

The alpha coefficients on each of the first level measures, taken
by both experimental and control group commanders, are shown in Table 8.
From Table 8 it is apparent that each scale has adequate reliability
except for Scales I and III of the Information Questionnaire. Item/total-
scale-score correlations were computed for the Information and Situations
Questionnaires. Median item/scale correlations are reported in Table 8
for these questionnaires. The median r's reported are simply the point
biserial correlations above and below which 50% of the correlations lie.
These median correlations again indicate that Scales I and III of the
Information Questionnaire are unreliable.

Table 8

Reliabilities of Commanders' First Level Measures

Measures	Alpha coefficients	Median r
Information Questionnaire[a]		
Scale I	.08	.00
Scale II	.63	.20
Scale III	-.13	.02
Situations Questionnaire[b]	.72	.28
Racial Perceptions Inventory[c]		
PDB	.89	--
ATI	.57	--
FRR	.83	--
RC	.81	--

[a] The scales measure knowledge relevant to objectives in Table 2.

[b] Items taken from a cultural assimilator designed to teach about black
culture in the Army.

[c] Reported reliabilities are for commanders' responses.

A multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) was used to test the
null hypothesis that there were no differences between the experimental
and control groups on the Racial Perceptions Inventory, the Information
Questionnaire, and the Situational Questionnaire. The MANOVA considers
all dependent variables simultaneously and is sensitive to any group

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differences that might exist. Results of the analysis indicated that there was a difference between the two groups on the dependent variable scales. The approximate F ratio for the multivariate test was significant, $F(8,26) = 2.76$, $p = .02$.

Once a significant difference between the experimental and control groups has been obtained, it is useful to determine which of the scales or tests were important in differentiating the two groups. A discriminant analysis was therefore performed that derived a linear composite of the original variables under the criterion of maximizing the between-groups variance with respect to the within-group variance. The linear composite or primary discriminant function was obtained and the correlation of each scale or test with the discriminant function was calculated. These correlations are shown in Table 9.

Table 9

Correlations of First Level Measures with
the Primary Discriminant Function

Test or scale	Weights	Correlation
Racial Perceptions Inventory		
PDB	.003	.318
ATI	.005	-.353
FRR	-.002	.106
RC	-.006	-.360
Information Questionnaire		
Scale I	.024	.284
Scale II	.055	.876
Scale III	.011	.322
Situations Questionnaire	.009	.441

These correlations indicate the relative importance of each end-of-course measure in differentiating the experimental and control groups. It can be seen, for example, that the Information Questionnaire Scale II ($r = .88$) and the Situational Questionnaire ($r = .44$) were most important in characterizing the dimensions separating the two groups. These findings indicate that the largest differences between experimental and control groups were found in commanders' responses to

questions about diagnosis and analysis of interpersonal relations in a military unit (Information Questionnaire Scale II) and in the amount of understanding they showed in responding to a series of interracial situations (Situations Questionnaire).

Following the discriminant analysis, univariate analyses of variance (ANOVA's) on each dependent variable were performed. It is recognized that the dependent measures have been obtained from the same subjects and are thus correlated, making the F tests dependent. The fact that the overall MANOVA was significant, however, legitimizes the examination of variables individually. Table 10 lists the results of the ANOVA's and the group means on each variable. It should be noted that the experimental group did significantly better on the Information Scale II and the Situations Questionnaire than the control group. These two variables were also the most important in characterizing the differences between the control and experimental groups via the discriminant analysis.

Table 10

Analysis of Variance and Means
on First Level Measures

Test or scale	Maximum score	Experimental mean	Control mean	F
Racial Perceptions Inventory				
PDB	100	78.46	73.38	2.84
ATI	100	43.44	46.58	3.50
FRR	100	65.20	63.28	.31
RC	100	40.35	46.46	3.63
Information Questionnaire				
Scale I	11	5.42	4.62	2.26
Scale II	23	16.79	12.94	21.47**
Scale III	16	8.00	7.06	2.90
Situations Questionnaire	15	12.00	10.47	5.44*

*$p < .05$.
**$p < .01$.

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Overall, the statistical analysis of end-of-course measures demonstrates that commanders in the experimental training group were better able to respond to questions about diagnosing and analyzing interpersonal relations in a military unit. In addition, when presented with interracial situations, they could more accurately diagnose the key interpersonal factors determining behavior than could commanders who had not been exposed to the experimental training program.

Results of Second Level Measures

First level measures determined knowledge and skill acquired by commanders; second level measures were used to see if knowledge and skill gained were translated into programs of action within the unit in the 45-day period after training.

The Commanders' and Key Subordinates' Checklists were taken 45 days after training. The first section of both the Commanders' and Key Subordinates' Checklists contained 13 items describing possible race relations programs for a military unit (see Appendix C). The programs listed were selected because they were contained in either the Affirmative Action Plan of the installation where training occurred, in the training course itself, or in both.

It should be noted that there were no independent data collected, other than the commanders' and key subordinates' responses to the checklists, that could be used to verify the existence or effectiveness of any of the unit programs. Because many of the programs cited in the checklist were obtained from the Affirmative Action Plan of the participating post, socially desirable answers were expected. A tendency for commanders and key subordinates to say that all programs existed, were stressed, and seemed to work was expected. For these reasons, a substantial program was considered to have existed only if both the commander and key subordinates agreed that it existed.

Table 11 shows which of the 13 programs in Section I of the checklist were said to exist in the experimental or control units by at least 75% of the commanders, key subordinates, or both. An X in the table indicates at least 75% of the group said it existed. Data are presented in a descriptive manner without statistical inference because of the nature of these measures. Percentage differences between experimental and control groups were small--well within the range of what might be expected by chance alone.

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Table 11

Race Relations Programs Said to Exist

| | Groups | | | | | | Total |
| | Experimental | | | Control | | | |
Programs	CO	KS	Both	CO	KS	Both	All groups
1. Displays duty roster	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
2. Has minority magazines	X	X	X		X		
5. Calls race relations meetings	X						
6. Supports AAP				X			
7. Uses RR/EO help				X			
9. Education for all levels	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
10. Establishes race relations/ human relations council	X	X	X	X			
11. Rap sessions	X	X	X	X			
12. Insures EM go to seminars and training	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
13. Insures NCO's and officers go to seminars and training	X	X	X	X	X	X	X

Note. Programs were said to exist by at least 75% of an experimental or control group completing Section I of CO's or key subordinate's (KS) checklist.

Table 11 shows that seven programs were said to exist by high percentages of both commanders and key subordinates in the experimental group, while only four programs were said to exist by high percentages of commanders and key subordinates in the control group. Two of the three programs that were said to exist by both commanders and key subordinates in the experimental group but not in the control group were programs that were said to exist prior to training and may therefore not be training effects. Those two programs were developing race relations or human relations councils and having rap sessions. Unfortunately neither program was given much stress or seen as being very effective. Having minority magazines in day rooms was the third program said to exist in the experimental but not the control group by both commanders and key subordinates.

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In summary, commanders exposed to the experimental training program did not seem to make any notable changes in their programs within the 45-day period, nor did they seem to put more stress on existing programs. The differences in programs between experimental and control groups involved primarily programs requiring little effort or involvement by the experimental commanders who claimed to have initiated them.

Results of Third Level Measures

The results obtained from several data collection instruments administered 45 days after the beginning of training are discussed in this section. These instruments include the Company Officer's Checklist, the Key Subordinate's Checklist, the Enlisted Men's Checklist, and the RPI. The Company Officer's Checklist was administered to CO's from experimental and control units. The Key Subordinate's Checklist was administered to samples of executive officers or platoon leaders, first sergeants, and platoon sergeants from experimental and control units. The Enlisted Men's Checklist and the RPI were administered to samples of enlisted men from both units.

Third level measures attempt to assess the impact of the experimental training on the target population--the soldiers within the unit. A primary criterion for evaluating race relations training for leaders is the impact that it has on enlisted soldiers within the commander's company. If trained commanders implement knowledge and skill gained within the unit, then the enlisted soldiers should become aware of an improved race-related environment within the unit. Third level measures were taken to assess this environment 45 days after training.

In Section II of Appendix C, nine items are shown that describe the commanders' race relations policies. In the Commanders' Checklist, commanders rated these items about themselves, while in the Key Subordinates' and Enlisted Mens Checklists, soldiers rated the extent to which these policies applied to their own company commanders. The ratings on all Checklists were made 45 days after training. Section III of Appendix C shows three other questions that commanders, key subordinates and enlisted soldiers were asked: (a) "Overall, do you feel that racial problems exist in your unit?" (b) "Do you feel there is a need for race relations training/ education in your unit?" (c) "Overall, how effective do you feel your company commander has been (you as a company commander have been) in dealing with racial problems in your unit?" Commanders answered the last question about themselves, and subordinates rated their commander on this item. Enlisted soldiers constitute an important target population for race relations training for leaders, and for this reason the enlisted soldiers' responses to the preceding questions were the primary third level measures. The commanders' and key subordinates' responses to these questions perhaps could be considered first and second level measures, but are presented here for the sake of conciseness along with the enlisted responses.

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The nine items that described the commanders' race relations policies (Section II, Appendix C) were used to form a single scale. The reliabilities of this scale from the Commanders', Key Subordinates', and Enlisted Men's Checklists are shown in Table 12. Correlations between individual items and total scales scores were also computed for these checklists. The median point biserial correlation on each checklist is reported in Table 12. Table 12 again reports the reliabilities of the four scales from the Racial Perceptions Inventory, this time based on the responses of enlisted soldiers. The alpha coefficients and median correlations in Table 12 indicate that all scales from each of the checklists have adequate reliability.

Table 12

Reliabilities of Third Level Measures

Measures	Alpha coefficients	Median r
Commanders' Policies[a]		
Commanders' Checklist (Section II)	.74	.36
Key Subordinates' Checklist (Section II)	.94	.65
Enlisted Men's Checklist (Section II)	.88	.58
Racial Perceptions Inventory[b]		
PDB	.92	--
ATI	.64	--
FRR	.85	--
RC	.81	--

[a]Unit race relations policies were rated on nine items. Commanders rated themselves, and key subordinates and enlisted men rated commanders.

[b]Reliabilities are for enlisted men's responses.

Results from the Company Commanders' Checklist are examined first. The Section II policies scale covering the commanders' race relations policies and the three questions from Section III were used as the dependent variables in a multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) testing differences between the control and experimental groups. The results

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indicated that there were no overall differences between the groups on these measures, $F_{(4, 28)} = .60$, n.s. Because the MANOVA was not statistically significant, univariate tests on each of the dependent variables were not performed. These results indicate that differences between commanders' responses in the experimental and control groups on any of these four dependent variable measures can best be attributed to chance. In other words, the experimental training course did not seem to influence commanders' views of their units' race relations problems, policies and training needs, or their estimates of their own personal effectiveness.

Results from the Key Subordinates' Checklist are examined next. Again, the scale covering the commanders' race/relations policies and the three questions from Section III were used as the dependent variables in a multivariate analysis of variance testing differences between experimental and control groups. Again, the MANOVA indicated that there were no statistically significant differences between the experimental and control groups on these indexes, $F_{(4, 105)} = .62$, n.s. Because of the insignificant overall multivariate F, no univariate tests were performed. The experimental training course did not influence the key subordinates' estimates of their (a) unit's race relations problems, (b) training needs, (c) commander's policies, or (d) commander's effectiveness in race relations.

The Enlisted Men's Checklist is examined next. The analysis for the enlisted men involved eight dependent variables. The first four (policies scale and three general ratings from Section III) were identical to those used in the analyses of the company commanders' and key subordinates' data. In addition, since the enlisted men completed the Racial Perceptions Inventory (RPI), the last four correspond to the RPI scales. The MANOVA testing the difference between the experimental and control groups was highly significant, $F_{(1, 306)} = 3.15$, $p = .002$. Univariate analyses of variance (ANOVA's) were then run on each of the dependent variables. The means, F ratios, and levels of statistical significance for each dependent variable are presented in Table 13.

A significant difference was found between the experimental and control groups on the nine-item scale where enlisted men rated the race relations policies of their commanders (see Table 13). The mean difference between the groups suggests that enlisted men of the experimental group viewed their company commander more favorably in terms of the race-related policies and activities described than did the control group. There was also a statistically significant difference on the question about the overall effectiveness of the company commander in dealing with racial problems. Again, enlisted men in the experimental group saw their company commanders as being more effective in the area of race relations than the control group members did. With respect to the need for race relations training and the existence of race problems in the unit, there were no statistically significant differences between the two groups. Overall, these results speak favorably of the company commanders who participated in the training.

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Table 13

Analyses of Variance and Means for
the Enlisted Men's Checklist

Dependent variable	Maximum score	Experimental mean	Control mean	F
Policies followed by Commanders	45	28.16	24.72	12.83
Race problems in unit	5	2.91	3.16	3.20
Race relations training needed	5	2.95	2.88	<1.00
Effectiveness of Commanders	5	3.17	2.73	11.42**
Racial Perceptions Inventory				
PDB	100	67.20	63.71	4.92*
ATI	100	50.93	53.66	2.91
FRR	100	60.67	60.91	<1.00
RC	100	54.01	59.84	16.68**

*$p < .05$.
**$p < .001$.

Note. Experimental group, N = 147; control group, N = 165. The unit of
analysis should have been the company. The enlisted men's responses
from each of the participating companies should have been averaged,
and the means treated as dependent variables. The results in Table
13 are based on enlisted men as the unit of analysis. Unfortunately,
the original data were not available for reanalysis using the cor-
rect procedure.

Two scales on the Racial Perceptions Inventory exhibited significant
differences between the experimental and control groups. Scores on the
first scale, Perceived Discrimination Against Blacks (PDB), suggest that
the enlisted men in the experimental group perceived more discrimination
against blacks than did the control group; they also perceived a lower qual-
ity of race relations in the Army and a lower level of commitment of the
Army to racial harmony than did the control group, as evidenced by their
scores on the Racial Climate (RC) scale. Past research has shown that

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race relations training often has the effect of increasing *perceived* discrimination, particularly among white soldiers. Although at first glance this may not seem to be a desirable result, on closer inspection this difference seems to reflect an increased understanding by white soldiers of discrimination that blacks have had to face, and this understanding eventually may reduce discrimination and increase racial harmony.

There were no significant differences on the scales reflecting Attitudes Toward Racial Interaction (ATI) and Feelings of Reverse Racism (FRR). Overall, the ATI scores were the lowest.

A discriminant analysis between the experimental and control groups using the eight variables was also computed. Table 14 lists the discriminant weights and variable-function correlations with the primary discriminant function. The results of the discriminant analysis mirror those found with the univariate analyses of variance in Table 13. It can be seen that the nine item policy rating scale ($r = .71$), the overall effectiveness of the company commander ($r = .67$), and the racial climate scale ($r = -.80$) of the RPI correlated highest with the discriminant dimension. The high positive correlations of the two rating scales and the negative correlation of the RC scale suggest that the dimension is characterized by high leadership involvement and effectiveness in dealing with racial problems and low Army support for programs.

Table 14

Discriminant Analysis on Enlisted Men's Checklist

Variable	Weights	Correlation
Policies followed by CO	.0007	.706
Race problems in unit	-.0008	-.353
Race relations training needed	.003	.094
Effectiveness of CO	.004	.666
Racial Perceptions Inventory		
PDB	.00004	.437
ATI	-.00005	-.336
FRR	-.0003	-.032
RC	-.0007	-.805

Table 15 compares the responses of the enlisted men with their leaders--the commanders and key subordinates. Enlisted men rated the race-related policies followed by their commanders less favorably than did the commanders themselves or key subordinates. Enlisted men thought that there were more racial problems in the unit than their leaders did and rated the effectiveness of the commander in race relations less favorably than the commander himself or the key subordinates. In general, commanders and key subordinates saw the commanders' performance and the unit's status in race relations more favorably than did enlisted men.

Table 15

Comparison of Mean Responses of Enlisted Men, Key Subordinates, and Commanders on Third Level Measures

Dependent variable	Maximum score	Response group		
		Commanders	Key subordinates	Enlisted men
Policies followed by Commander	45	36.4	34.8	26.3
Race problems in unit	5	2.2	2.4	3.0
Race relations training needed	5	3.1	2.7	2.9
Effectiveness of Commander	5	4.0	3.6	2.9

In summary, the experimental training course did not seem to substantially influence commanders' views of their units' race relations problems, policies, and training needs or their estimates of personal effectiveness. However, commanders who attended the training class were perceived by enlisted men in their units as more involved in policies to promote harmony and more effective at solving racial problems than were commanders who had not received the experimental course. At the same time, enlisted men in experimental units saw significantly less support for racial harmony, a lower quality of race relations in the Army, and more discrimination against blacks than did enlisted men from control units. The discrepancies between maximum ratings and actual ratings on the checklists suggest that all levels of the company organization, including the commander, felt the commander could improve his involvement and effectiveness in race relations. However, there seemed to be less perceived need for such improvement as one went up the chain of command.

Results of Analyzing Administrative Action Data

As described in the evaluation plan, cognitive and attitudinal information from questionnaires was supplemented with behavioral indexes considered to be fairly objective, routinely kept, and related to racial climate in the unit. These behavioral indexes involved several classes of administrative actions within the unit. The race of the individual affected was available for six of the administrative actions used as objective measures, including (a) Separation Actions under Chapter 10 of AR 635-200; (b) Article 15's and Courts Martial; (c) Separation Actions under AR 635-200 other than Chapter 10 and under AR 635-206; (d) Confinement to the Stockade; (e) Drug Treatment Clients; (f) Alcohol Treatment Clients. For two other objective measures, number of arrests and number of complaints of crime from each unit, no data on race were available. For these measures a separate analysis for effects of membership in experimental or control companies was conducted.

Because most of the minority group members represented in the administrative actions that comprise the objective data were black, other minority groups such as Mexican Americans, American Indians, and Puerto Ricans were combined with blacks to produce a white/minority dichotomy. For the data analysis involving the objective measures, the data were treated as follows: The frequency with which a given type of administrative action occurred for whites or minorities was divided by the number of whites or minorities in the company involved and multiplied by 100. The resulting figure represents the frequency of that administrative action per 100 of that ethnic group in that unit.

A two-way multivariate analysis of variance was used to test the null hypothesis that race, membership in the experimental or control group, and the interaction of race and treatment condition have no effect on the magnitude of differences observed on the six objective measures of administrative action described above for which racial data were available. Results of this analysis showed (a) there was no significant training effect and (b) there was no significant training x race interaction. In other words, there were no significant differences between the experimental and control groups on any of the six measures of administrative action for which racial data was available and no significant differences between the way white and minorities were treated in the experimental and control groups.

Training did not appear to influence these behavioral indexes with the data for whites and minorities combined. Neither did the training influence these measures differently for whites or minorities. In other words, training did not reduce the frequency with which minority soldiers received the above administrative actions compared to whites. Because no race data were available on the dependent variables of (a) Arrests and (b) Complaints of Crimes, a one-way MANOVA was performed comparing the experimental and control groups on these two dependent variables. The

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overall effect was not significant. This analysis indicates that there were no significant differences between experimental and control companies in overall numbers of arrests or in overall complaints of crimes.

The validity of this record data covering administrative actions is open to some question because of the short period of time over which the indexes were collected and due to the poor control that the researchers had over data collection procedures.

DISCUSSION

Summary

Results of the evaluation experiment were classified as first, second, and third level results based on tracing the impact of the training from (a) knowledge and skill gained by commanders, to (b) programs implemented by them, and (c) the effect the training had on enlisted soldiers. In terms of the first level of training effectiveness--the comprehension of the facts and ideas presented in the course--significant differences were demonstrated between the experimental and control groups. Commanders exposed to the training program demonstrated more knowledge of the facts, methods, and skills needed to diagnose and analyze interpersonal relations and to deal with interracial issues in a military unit than did commanders not exposed to the training.

At the second level of training effect--willingness to enact course ideas in the company commanders' own unit--some differences were observed in the programs of commanders in experimental and control units which suggested that experimental group commanders had more programs operating in their units and that they had been in operation for a longer time. For the most part, however, the course did not seem to affect the commanders' view of unit race relations problems, policies, and training needs or their estimates of personal effectiveness. Notable changes in programs did not occur following training, and the programs differentiating experimental and control units seemed to be ones requiring little effort or involvement by the experimental commanders who reported them.

At the third level of training effect--race relations within the unit--the findings were encouraging. Enlisted men serving under commanders from the experimental training group reported that their commanders implemented more policies to insure racial harmony and that their commanders were more effective in dealing with racial problems than did enlisted men in the units of commanders not exposed to the experimental training. The measures of administrative action did not reflect the effects of training, but the reliability of this data is suspect because of the short interval between training and data collection and because of lack of control over data gathering procedures.

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In this evaluation, a variety of measures were employed to tap behavioral, cognitive, and attitudinal variables related to the adequacy of commanders' skills in dealing with racial problems in the unit. The weakest of the measures employed appear to be Scales I and III of the Information Questionnaire and the behavioral variables. The race relations policies scale from Section II of the checklist for commanders, key subordinates, and enlisted men, has good reliability and could be used in further work on Army race relations.

The entire study, including the instrumentation, must be considered an exploratory effort. The small sample of CO's available for training, the nonrandom selection procedure for members of both the control and experimental groups, and the lack of a testing sample upon which to perform instrument validation restrict the number and scope of firm conclusions which can be drawn from the data. The differences between the experimental and control groups that were identified in the experiment could have been due to the nonrandom selection of commanders for training. In other words, those selected for training could have been commanders most favorably disposed toward race relations in the first place, so that the enlisted men's favorable evaluation of the trained commanders might not have been due to the training itself, but to the commanders' initial favorable disposition.

There were some differences in background variables that were identified between the commanders in the experimental and control groups, but it would be hard to explain how the differences in background variables could account for the other dependent variable differences that have been identified as training effects. There was no evidence that the commanders differed on biographical characteristics that were significantly correlated with training outcome measures. Because units could influence to some extent the selection of enlisted participants to take the survey, some bias could have occurred here. Leaders in the experimental condition may have been more motivated to send their "good troops" to take the survey. In spite of these unanswered questions, the preliminary results seem encouraging enough to warrant further evaluation of this program. A future evaluation experiment could provide more firm conclusions about the effectiveness of this training program.

Observations About Training Commanders

The experiences of training commanders and collecting evaluation data produced a set of informal observations made by the trainers and researchers. Many hours were spent interacting with and observing officers. A few brief comments drawn from this informal data follow.

One focus of concern among commanders in the training class was coping with the realities of the Army as an institution, including its values, communication norms, and styles of resolving conflict, and not simply upon learning more about ethnic groups. It became apparent that

the Affirmative Action Plans, at least at the participating installation, were not necessarily widely or consistently applied across units. Programs were often stressed relatively little by the commanders, perhaps because commanders doubted the need for and the effectiveness of such programs. This failure of company level officers to act in ways that would maintain their credibility with troops of all ethnic groups may stem partly from the lack of credibility in the commanders' eyes of senior officers who are developing the policies and programs to be implemented. In the training class, commanders were asked to give their initial reactions to the average enlisted man and the Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. The composite responses were given in Table 6. The commanders' unfavorable reactions to the phrase "Department of the Army" suggest that there may be a credibility problem among them about the policies and directives they receive from the Department of the Army, particularly those in the area of race relations. The lists shown in Table 6 suggest the possibility that the resistance of the Army to efforts in race relations may not be based entirely on individual or institutional racism. Instead, the Army's chronic organizational dilemmas are blocking efforts to address the human problem of race relations. Anxiety and ambivalence are increased by the recognition that there are some very painful organizational issues that must be looked at and worked through to improve race relations. One way to start reducing the credibility gap within the chain of command is to increase the communication among its members. This would not be easy, but it could be extremely rewarding.

There is, of course, a culture that is unique to the Army. It is the sum of Army concepts, habits, skills, arts, instruments, institutions, etc. Elements of this culture include such diverse things as the drill sergeant's hat, Infantry Hall at Fort Benning, Ga., Army humor, and West Point. This culture also includes behavioral instructions that are grouped into whole ideologies. These ideologies are developed in such detail that appropriate responses to almost every possible situation are included. These ideologies exist only in the abstract, as the whole mass of information cannot be found in any one individual. On the contrary, each man has been exposed to a unique mixture of cultural information to which he makes his own private amendments, additions, and corrections. Observations of men at the training site and to a lesser extent earlier in the project helped researchers and trainers to see at least a few elements of these behavioral instructions that may have a significant impact on Army race relations.

First, particularly among the officers with whom we came in contact, there was tremendous concern about the issue of control. This is natural, to an extent, considering the officers' position within the organization. They make up a rather small elite who must control many men, sometimes in situations of extreme chaos or violence. In a company, for example, it is not unusual for officers to be outnumbered by 100 to 1.

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Many officers seem to see their ability to control at least a sizable minority, if not a majority, of their men resting solely on their ability to administer punishment rapidly and with the required (in their estimation) severity. Punishment is so strongly linked to the concept of control that the two often seem to be synonymous, and any attempt to restrain the ability to punish or to suggest alternatives to it are heard as an exhortation to anarchy. Reactions to assertions by an instructor that there may be situations in which punishment is counterproductive clearly indicated that this is a very distressing notion for many commanders.

Closely related to this is a second ideology concerning the theme of personal assessment. Commanders must decide who deserves punishment and who does not. The development of a system of categorizing enlisted men seems to assist most officers in this task. Though the criteria vary from officer to officer, most commanders categorize enlisted men as either "duds" or "good troops." If a man becomes known as a "dud" his chances of being punished are far greater than if he were regarded as a "good troop." It also seems likely that the "dud" will be punished more severely. The punishment of a "dud" is seldom presented as rehabilitative. Rather, the point seems to be to weight that individual's official record with negative information in an attempt to maneuver him out of the unit or the Army. However, if a "good troop" runs afoul of regulation it is usually regarded as a mistake rather than a confirmation. The "good troop" is given minimal punishment only to satisfy regulation. Minority troops often seem to be categorized as "duds" through race-related criteria such as education.

Also, commanders seem to have a strongly developed sense of the sacrosanct. There are some areas of possible activity that it is difficult to discuss because it violates this sense. Issues such as hair length or neatness have taken on a value of their own that exists independently of any function they may perform. Race relations activity, for example, seems to violate many commanders' sense of what is appropriate activity for the commander.

The structure of the Army's race relations program suggests that policymakers assume that if an officer is given an order (and in some cases trained in procedures necessary to carry out that order) the order will in fact be carried out. However, the case of race relations programs calls this assumption into question. Instead, the officer may assess the importance of the source of the order, assess the order's effect on his ability to control his unit in the accustomed way, determine its relationship to sacrosanct norms, and finally act in the manner that violates the fewest elements of the Army culture.

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APPENDIX A

REVISIONS MADE IN TOPICS OF ORIGINAL COMMANDER'S TRAINING CURRICULUM TO PRODUCE SHORTENED VERSION

Original Topic	Revision
1. Mexican-Americans: History; Life Styles; Current Status; Relation to White Americans.	1. Reduced from 3 hours to 1 1/2 hours
2. Puerto Ricans: History; Life Styles; Current Status; Relation to White Americans.	2. Reduced from 2 hours to 1 hour
3. Black Americans: History; Life Styles; Current Status; Relation to White Americans.	3. Reduced from 2 1/2 hours to 1 1/2 hours
4. Sources of individual and organizational resistance to change.	4. Unchanged
5. The Games Soldiers Play: Fear, resentment, guilt and jealousy as barriers to cooperation.	5. Combined with material from "personal communications" block (#10) and "rap sessions" (#16) into a new 2 1/2 hours presentation entitled "The Games Soldiers Play: Barriers to Cooperation"
6. Common stereotypes and interpretations of the behavior of minority group members.	6. Unchanged
7. Survey and small group discussion methods to measure attitudes in a military unit.	7. Reduced from 3 hours to 2 hours
8. Role expectations blacks and whites have for each other in social relations and the impact of their roles.	8. Unchanged
9. Role expectations and interpersonal attitudes implied in current management styles: Theory X and Theory Y.	9. Combined with material from the "indicators" block (#17) into a new 2 1/2 hour presentation entitled "Detecting and Dealing with Racial Problems"

Original Topic	Revision
10. Value of personal communication between members of different ethnic groups to clarify and understand real feelings.	10. Combined with material from the "games" block (#5) and "rap sessions" block (#16) into a new 2 1/2 hour presentation entitled "The Games Soldiers Play: Barriers to Cooperation"
11. Guidelines for improved interpersonal relations between members of majority and minority groups.	11. Combined with material from "external consultants" block (#15) into a new 2 hour presentation of the same title
12. Commander's role in groups working within the unit to improve race relations.	12. Unchanged
13. Capitalizing on interest within the unit and obtaining relevant materials for unit race relations education programs.	13. Reduced from 2 hours to 1 hour
14. Approaches to dealing with racial tensions.	14. Reduced from 2 hours to 1 hour
15. Obtaining and using external consultants to assist in the development of the unit race relations program.	15. Combined with material from the "guidelines" block (#11) into a new 2 hour presentation entitled "Guidelines for Improved Interpersonal Relations between Members of Majority and Minority Groups"
16. Evaluating progress of efforts to improve race relations by using rap sessions.	16. Combined with material from the "games" block (#5) and the "personal communications" block (#10) into a new 2 1/2 hour presentation entitled "The Games Soldiers Play: Barriers to Cooperation"
17. Interpreting obvious and subtle indicators of dysfunction in a unit.	17. Combined with material from the "x and y" block (#9) into a new 2 hour presentation entitled "Detecting and Dealing with Racial Problems"

APPENDIX B

INDEX OF LESSON AND TRAINING OBJECTIVES

Lesson Objective I: To promote greater understanding of the conditions and issues promoting racial separation and conflict in the United States.

Training Objectives:

A. Mexican Americans

Knowledge Objectives:

1. The student will learn that racist attitudes held by Anglos were of such magnitude that they had a selective influence on the evolution of American institutions.

2. The student will retain certain facts about Mexican-Americans relating to:

a. their acquisition by conquest,

b. their arbitrary treatment under the law, and

c. their search for equal status under the law and for gainful employment.

3. The student will understand that the outcome of historical forces has been to create modern day differences between Mexican-Americans and Anglos, especially in relation to:

a. housing

b. educational attainment

c. employment

d. political activism

B. Puerto Ricans

Attitude Objective: The student should be aware of some perceptions and attitudes Puerto Rican soldiers may have about their commanders.

Knowledge Objectives:

1. The student should understand the nature and effects of the relationship of colonialism which has existed between the United States and Puerto Rico.

2. The student should understand certain cultural factors influence the behavior of Puerto Rican soldiers as they adjust to Army life.

3. The student should recognize differences between the experiences of Spanish-speaking soldiers of Mexican and Puerto Rican heritage.

C. Black Americans

Attitude Objectives:

1. The student will be aware of the attitudes prevalent among the contemporary generation of black soldiers well enough to identify those attitudes.

2. The student will understand the origin of these attitudes in the concepts of white supremacy and black inferiority and in the actions of individual and institutional racism and will recognize the effects of these attitudes within a military unit.

3. The student will understand how feelings of mistrust and suspicion between blacks and whites have arisen and still perpetuate experiences of negative contact.

Knowledge Objective: The student will recognize that color played an important role in the development of the New World and that color was used to determine who would be free and who would be enslaved.

Lesson Objective II: Diagnosing and analyzing factors influencing inter-personal relations in a military unit.

Training Objectives:

D. Stereotypes

Attitude Objective: The student should know that racial stereo-typing by an individual is not necessarily predictive of that person's racial attitudes.

Knowledge Objectives:

1. The student should know that racial stereotyping by an in-dividual is not necessarily predictive of discriminatory behavior by that individual.

2. The student should know that stereotypes are undesirable.

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3. The student should know that stereotypes serve different functions and are, therefore, susceptible to change through different techniques.

4. The student should know that stereotyping may be more a function of class than of race.

5. The student should know that stereotypes are fostered by the mass media and textbooks.

E. Games

Attitude Objectives:

1. The student should have an appreciation for the destructive potential of both individual and institutional gamesmanship for unit race relations.

2. The student should appreciate the value of honest communication for promoting healthy race relations.

Knowledge Objectives:

1. The student should be able to recognize both individual and organizational games.

2. The student should know that honest communication is the most effective method of reducing gamesmanship.

3. The student should know certain principles for promoting honest communication.

Task Objective: The student should have a greater ability to identify hidden agendas in group discussion.

F. Role Expectations

Attitude Objective: The student should know the social attitudes or expectations black and white troops will have learned prior to their entry into the Army and how these attitudes may influence their relationships in the unit.

Knowledge Objectives:

1. The student should learn that the docile, submissive behavior pattern at one time characteristic of many blacks represented a reaction to the expectations of whites that blacks adopt the role of inferior in social relationships.

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2. The student should learn that many blacks expected that whites would behave in an arrogant, abusive manner toward them and that such behavior on the part of whites was seen as an assertion that the white was superior to the black.

3. The student will recognize that role relationships along rank lines in the military are often complicated by the race of the superior and subordinate such that misunderstandings of motives and intentions on both sides are likely.

4. The student will understand the importance of fair, just, and impartial treatment by white superiors toward black subordinates as a step in reducing racial tension and increasing unit effectiveness.

Task Objective: The student will establish a conscious awareness of the perceptions that contemporary young blacks have toward superior officers and change the troops' behavior by treating them fairly, justly and equally, by recognizing the role that the color of one's skin has traditionally played in American society well enough to establish cohesiveness and minimize tension and conflict within the unit due to the race issue.

G. Guidelines

Attitude Objective: The student will be aware of some of the attitudes that he has about himself as a commander and how he sees himself in relation to his superior officer, his non-commissioned officers and his troops.

Knowledge Objectives:

1. The student will recognize that his perception of minority group members has developed under conditions involving little chance of equal status association and that as a result he is likely not to have developed a foundation of attitudes toward minorities supporting positive contact experiences.

2. The student should recognize that the sense of responsibility for changing distorted attitudes must come from within and that such change requires knowing one's self and one's relationships with others.

3. The student should be aware of the conflicts going on within young black soldiers who are trying to create new self-images which will portray what they believe are "manly" qualities.

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H.   Resistance to Change

Knowledge Objectives:

1.   The student should be aware that resistance to change is not uniform, and can be seen as good and bad.

2.   The student should be familiar with the ways people deal with inner conflict.

3.   The student should be familiar with the various sources of resistance to change in the personality.

4.   The student should be familiar with the various sources of resistance to change in social systems.

5.   The student should know that resistance to change can be overcome faster and more stably by reducing it than by overwhelming it by force.

Task Objective: The student should be able to analyze a problem situation in terms of factors contributing to change and factors inhibiting change.

Lesson Objective III: Developing, implementing and evaluating race relations and equal opportunity programs in a military unit.

Training Objectives:

I.   Detecting and Dealing with Racial Tension

Knowledge Objectives:

1.   The student should be aware of the limitations placed on his ability to command a unit by the exclusive use of authoritarian management.

2.   The student should be aware of a management theory which will provide him with an alternative to authoritarian management.

3.   The student should be able to decide which management system is appropriate for a specific situation.

4.   The student should know certain indicators of unit racial health.

5.   The student should be aware of one method of collecting and interpreting data on those indicators.

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J. Commander's Role

Knowledge Objectives:

1. Whites and blacks have different perceptions of the racial
    situation in the Army.

2. Perceptions of the Army's racial problems also vary by
    grade.

3. The student should know that there are several principles
    accepted as widely applicable in intergroup relations.

4. The student should be familiar with the requirements for
    company commanders stated in the latest draft of AR 600-21.

5. The student should understand that problem-solving has
    three components.

6. The student should be aware of positive actions he can
    take to facilitate communications and actions regarding
    improved race relations within his unit.

Task Objectives:

1. The student should be able to formulate and weigh pros and
    cons for issues concerning the establishment of a unit race
    relations or human relations council.

2. The student should then be able to establish this council.

K. Understanding the Results of Surveys and Small Group Discussions

Attitude Objectives:

1. The student will be aware that attitude surveys taken within
    his unit or small group discussions involving members of
    different ethnic groups in his unit will probably reveal
    significant discrepancies between the attitudes of blacks
    and whites concerning race relations.

2. The student will understand some of the factors which con-
    tribute to these discrepancies in attitude including processes
    of change in the black community previously unrecognized by
    whites.

Knowledge Objectives:

1. The student will recognize the link between discrepant atti-
    tudes, the factors which shaped these discrepant attitudes,
    and conflict between blacks and whites.

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2. The student will *recognize* the importance of obtaining data by surveys and small group discussions as a step toward understanding race relations in his unit.

L. Approaches to Dealing with Racial Tension

Attitude Objectives:

1. The student should recognize that he is being trained to be the future General who will be responsible for policy making and implementation for men of diverse backgrounds. Consequently, making sure that he establishes a productive goal today will insure healthier conditions tomorrow in race relations.

2. The student should recognize the importance of effective two-way communication in fostering understanding among officers, enlisted men, and between officers and enlisted men in units comprised of men of diverse ethnic backgrounds.

Knowledge Objectives:

1. The student should be aware of the need to establish a goal to reduce racial tension and the consequences this goal may produce.

2. The student should be aware of where and why racial tension *exists and what he can do to begin its* elimination.

3. The commander should be aware of different types of approaches that are being used to reduce and eliminate racial tension.

M. Capitalizing on Interest

Attitude Objectives:

1. The student will appreciate the importance of developing a race relations program which is relevant to the felt needs of soldiers.

2. The student will be more accepting of the value of listening to the men in his unit as a way of fulfilling his responsibilities in the area of race relations and equal opportunity.

Knowledge Objectives:

1. The student will learn a series of steps useful in becoming more aware of race relations in a military unit.

2. The student will learn some of the more common complaints
    made by minority group soldiers about their life in the
    Army.

3. The student will learn some guidelines useful in planning
    follow-up activities after receiving a complaint of racial
    discrimination.

APPENDIX C

CHECKLISTS FOR COMMANDERS, KEY SUBORDINATES, AND ENLISTED MEN

Section I

Commanders and Key Subordinates rated (1) whether each program in Section I existed, (2) how long it existed, (3) the extent to which it was stressed by the commander, and (4) how effective each program was for each of the 13 programs or actions listed below.

1. Prominently display duty rosters to avoid discrimination complaints.

2. Subscribe or make available minority oriented magazines and newspapers in Day Room.

3. Have implemented "specialty nights" at Mess Halls: "Soul Food," etc.

4. Sponsor community action program(s) involving the unit.

5. Call together a group of soldier representatives of the company to discuss race relations issues in the unit.

6. An affirmative action plan has been developed for the unit with CO's full support.

7. Bring in military race relations specialists for educational and problem solving sessions with the unit.

8. There is a seminar established by the CO that meets on a regular basis for men to discuss ideas and problems concerning race relations.

9. Establish an on-going educational program to include all levels of personnel in the unit.

10. There is a Race Relations or Human Relations Council established by the CO in the unit.

11. CO has rap sessions with men in the unit in the barracks.

12. CO makes sure lower ranking enlisted men attend race relations training and seminars.

13. CO makes sure NCOs and officers attend race relations training and seminars.

Section II

To what extent do the following statements apply to your CO (to you as a CO)?

1. Not at all
2. Little
3. Moderately
4. Much
5. A great deal

1. Insure that offensive terms, statements, and/or situations causing a negative reaction by racial groups are not allowed.

2. Emphasizes a policy of treating each individual equally and fairly to all officers and enlisted men in the unit.

3. Makes clear to all that they will not be punished for opinions or statements about company race relations.

4. Checks duty roster to be sure assignments are fairly assigned.

5. Encourages all enlisted men and officers to participate actively in race relations councils or seminars.

6. Feels free to talk about racial issues and brings the subject up yourself in conversation.

7. Rewards platoon leaders and NCOs for race relations/equal opportunity efforts on their OERs/EERs.

8. Encourages all men in the unit to discuss complaints of on and off post discrimination with him (you).

9. Takes effective action on racial complaints.

Section III

1. Overall, do you feel that racial problems exist in your unit?

1. Not at all
2. Little
3. Some
4. Much
5. A great deal

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2. Do you feel there is a need for race relations training/education in your unit?

   1. Not at all
   2. Little
   3. Some
   4. Much
   5. A great deal

3. Overall, how effective do you feel your company commander has been (you as a company commander have been) in dealing with racial problems in your unit?

   1. Very ineffective
   2. Ineffective
   3. Somewhat effective
   4. Effective
   5. Very effective