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TRENDS IN CHINA'S 'COLD WAR' AFTER MAO AND THE GANG OF FOUR. (U)  
MAY 78 J S CURRAN

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AFTER MAO AND THE GANG OF FOUR

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**STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE  
US ARMY WAR COLLEGE  
Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania**

**TRENDS IN CHINA'S "COLD WAR"—  
AFTER MAO AND THE GANG OF FOUR**

by

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**Joseph S. Curran, Jr.**

**27 May 1978**

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## **DISCLAIMER**

The views of the author do not purport to reflect the position of the Department of the Army or Department of Defense. Research for this paper was completed in May 1977.



## FOREWORD

This memorandum concerns research of national broadcasts by the People's Republic of China about the Soviet Union from March 1, 1976 through April 30, 1977. The author's purpose was twofold: to survey the *content* of the attacks by China on Russia, and then to compare the *frequency* of the attacks for the six months immediately preceding the death of Mao Tse-tung and the purge of the Gang of Four one month later, with those for the six-month period immediately thereafter. With the results, the author conjectures what course the future direction of Chinese policy toward the Soviet Union might take.

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This memorandum was prepared as a contribution to the field of national security research and study. As such, it does not reflect the official view of the College, the Department of the Army, or the Department of Defense.



ROBERT G. YERKS  
Major General, USA  
Commandant

### **BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF THE AUTHOR**

**LIEUTENANT COLONEL JOSEPH S. CURRAN** joined the Strategic Studies Institute in 1975, after completion of the master's degree program at the *University of Michigan in Asian Studies*. He entered the Army in 1958 after receiving a bachelor's degree in English literature from Boston College. Colonel Curran is also a graduate of the Army's Foreign Area Specialist Program for China, and his out of country assignments include Canada, Korea, Vietnam, and Taiwan.

TRENDS IN CHINA'S "COLD WAR"—  
AFTER MAO AND THE "GANG OF FOUR"

你不說他頭禿  
他不說你眼瞎

You do not call him bald-headed;  
He does not call you blind.

Old Chinese Proverb

The Asian balance of power has been relatively stable in recent years—the enmity between the Soviet Union and the PRC has remained at a comparatively high level since the border clashes of 1969. The split has allowed the United States a considerable degree of flexibility in its Asian policy—and has given the United States a considerable advantage when dealing with either country. This advantage would disappear should movement between the two result in their own relationship becoming closer than that which either has with the United States.

Although a complete rapprochement between Russia and China is most unlikely, considering past history between the two and the lack of mutual interests, there still is a range of cooperative behavior possible between the current "cold war" and rapprochement.

Most China analysts have felt that any closer movement on China's part was highly unlikely as long as Mao was alive, or as long as his more radical followers were positioned high enough in the Party hierarchy to carry on in his name. Although outside knowledge of how China's foreign policy decisions are formulated, and who takes part in the process, is extremely limited, it can sometimes be deduced *ex post facto*. At other times, especially after a high-level purge, enough will leak out to enable analysts to draw some conclusions.

After the Sino-Soviet border clashes of 1969, there was informed speculation that what touched off the fracas was a decision by the radicals to create the crisis in order to neutralize some sort of reconciliation possibility with the Soviet Union then under consideration by a moderate faction of the Chinese leadership.<sup>1</sup>

On September 9, 1976, Mao Tse-tung died. On October 6, 1976, in a spectacular coup (or "countercoup," depending on one's viewpoint), the so-called "Gang of Four" were arrested. The Gang of Four consisted of:

- Wang Hung-wen, deputy chairman of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). He first became prominent during the Cultural Revolution, and rocketed from a rather obscure position of a factory worker in Shanghai to, at the time of his purge, the second ranking man in the CCP.

- Chang Ch'un Ch'iao, first secretary of the Shanghai Communist Party and head of the General Political Department of the armed forces. He was a propagandist of the Chinese guerrillas in World War II, a leader in literary and art circles in Shanghai after 1949, became prominent during the Cultural Revolution, and at Mao's death ranked fourth in the CCP.

- Chiang Ch'ing—born Lan P'ing, a Shanghai movie actress in the 30's, who became Mao's wife in Yenan. Chiang Ch'ing was purported to be a key influence on her husband, but "went public" only from 1963. Her forte was the radicalization of Chinese art, literature, drama, and opera. She ranked sixth in the CCP.

- Yao Wen-Yuan, member of the Politburo and second secretary of the Shanghai Communist Party, credited with the official start of the Cultural Revolution by writing an article vilifying a play which



indirectly attacked Mao. He eventually had significant control of the official Chinese press. He ranked seventh.

So the key people who were considered obstacles to change in PRC-USSR relations were no longer in position to obstruct any such change. Over two months after Mao's death, and five weeks after the Gang of Four purge, Fox Butterfield of *The New York Times* surveyed the Chinese press and reported "The Chinese press has continued its almost daily polemics against what it sees as Russian military and economic expansionism."<sup>2</sup> The purpose of this paper is to see if such quotations were accurate then, and were equally accurate six months after the purge. To be considered in the meaning of the statement is its implied assumption that the polemics were continuing *at the same rate* as they had before Mao's death and the purge.

### THE METHODOLOGY

The source material forming the basis for this study is the Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) Daily Report on the People's Republic of China. All national broadcasts about the Soviet Union appearing therein were read from the period March 1, 1976 through April 30, 1977. Since the Chinese media is controlled, and provincial broadcasts usually do no more on national issues than echo those in Peking; the latter were the ones studied. Eliminated from use in this study were the few so-called "straight" news broadcasts about the Soviets, since these lacked a point of view. Also not used were broadcasts which consisted mainly of the Chinese quoting sources abroad attacking the Soviet Union, since in most cases said sources were newspapers and individuals whose circulation and influence were somewhat limited, to say the least, whose timing was fortuitous rather than planned, and, in any event, who were quoted by the Chinese mostly for "piling on" effect, and to show that non-Chinese *also* were coming to realize what "bounders" the Russians were.

The two main categories of broadcasts encountered were New China News Agency (NCNA) originated, the first for outside consumption, in English, the second under the subhead Peking Domestic Service (PDS), translations into English by *FBIS* of the original Mandarin intended for the information of the ordinary Chinese radio listener. Some of the broadcasts concentrated on shortcomings within the Soviet Union, but the vast majority attacked Soviet actions against other countries. Some of the broadcasts indicated that their content was appearing as well in

articles in China's national newspaper Jen Minh Jih Pao (JMJP) *The People's Daily*; obviously the circulation was the most extensive throughout China when both media were involved.

The purpose of the study, then, is to survey the *content* of the attacks by China on Russia; then to compare the *frequency* of the attacks for the six months immediately preceding the death of Mao Tse-tung and the purge of the Gang of Four one month later, with those for the six-month period immediately thereafter. The results, hopefully, might be able to give clues as to the future direction Chinese policy towards the Soviet Union may head, with all that that answer implies for the world balance of power, US-Soviet detente, and US strategy toward the PRC.

#### FLOGGING THE RUSSIAN BEAR— THE FIRST SIX MONTHS

On November 11, 1966 a *People's Daily* article<sup>3</sup> summarized the points over which China was in dispute with the Soviet Union. In Soviet domestic policy, the PRC was highly critical of Soviet "capitalistic" agriculture, and its general economic organization. In foreign affairs, the Soviet Union was rated low for its cosiness towards the United States, its nonchalant attitude towards the Vietnam War, and towards the issues of disarmament, nuclear proliferation, and the test ban treaty. Ten years later, in analyzing the points of dispute now mentioned, most of the old favorites still remain, while others have even been expanded. Only Vietnam seems to have dropped by the wayside completely, due to events in the interim. In March 1976 there were 53 broadcasts critical of the Soviet Union, more than a third of which (22) were for internal dissemination. Of that total, 13 attacked the Soviet Union's domestic policies—these included Soviet crop failures; poor industrial production; corruption, theft and speculation; squeezing the peasants; revisionist educational practices; and a "fascist rule" within the country, with the KGB in the saddle suppressing dissent.<sup>4</sup> In describing the Soviet condition of having lots of weapons, but not enough food, the Soviet Union was called "a giant with feet of clay."<sup>5</sup>

In foreign policy, March broadcasts accused the Soviet Union of aggression practically everywhere—against Japan, Angola, South Asia, and Egypt, among others. They also accused the Soviets of attempting maritime hegemony in the Indian Ocean, plundering international



fishing waters, carrying out neocolonialism, collaborating with Israel, and general worldwide expansionism. One broadcast calls the Soviet leaders "the new tsars . . . big mosquitos in the world of today that fly everywhere to bite people and suck their blood . . . ."6 Another details Soviet hypocrisy in talking disarmament while actually expanding its arms, but concludes that although "the Soviet revisionists may outstrip Hitler in trickery . . . they likewise cannot escape the punishment of history."7 Comparison of the Soviet "revisionists" with Hitler is frequently made throughout these months.

Of April's 36 broadsides, 11 attack the Soviet Union domestically. Included in the attacks are agricultural failures, the subjugation of the working class, the oppression of non-Russian nationalities, and even the Soviet publication of what is termed revisionist patriotic literature. The USSR is taken to task for being in technological debt to the West in order to build more arms, and the West is warned that Soviet economic cooperation through a facade of detente "harbors evil intentions."8 Attacks in the foreign policy area repeat much of March's criticisms; added are more accusations that the Soviet Union wants to dominate Antarctica, and has been usuriously taking advantage of all comers. One broadcast, after stating that the Soviet version of detente is equivalent to the USSR's own expansionism tactics, concludes with the warning that "ordinary double-crossers appear to be honest at times, but the new tsars always tell lies."9 (An observation which succeeded in one-upping US columnist William F. Buckley, Jr., who had limited his "permanent prevarication rule of thumb" to Brezhnev and Kosygin, and then only to sentences they began with the phrase, "as everyone knows.")

May's domestic attacks cover old ground, with the exception of one broadcast which scores the Soviets for putting its critics into institutions for the mentally retarded. The 31 foreign policy attacks plow some new ground—the Soviet Union is accused of plundering Sierra Leone's fishing reserves, and acting generally like a "Soviet revisionist fishery despot;"10 of looting the Third World's oil resources, and generally acting with a policy of economic imperialism towards both the Third World and Eastern Europe; and of bullying Japan and spying on its territory. Brezhnev is called "Khrushchev the Second" for lying that he opposes war,<sup>11</sup> and one broadcast declaiming against Soviet expansionism in exploitation of Egypt sums it up with these words:

In the vocabulary of Soviet revisionist hegemonism, just as 'detente' is 'military expansion' and 'war preparations,' 'aid' is 'exploitation and plunder,' and 'friendship' is 'aggression and intervention.' What Soviet revisionism verbally claims it does *not* seek is precisely what it keeps a covetous eye on and is only too happy to devour at one gulp.<sup>12</sup>

The image of a rampaging ravenous wolf is nurtured as well in June's 54 broadcasts; the Soviet Union is accused of "running amuck" in the Pacific and the Sea of Japan,<sup>13</sup> plundering Canadian fishing waters, using gunboat diplomacy in the Mediterranean, cultural infiltration of Japan "to drown the Japanese people in the illusion of detente,"<sup>14</sup> and trying to emasculate the Indian Ocean peace zone concept, all the while "harboring ill intent under the pretense of innocence."<sup>15</sup> The domestic bankruptcy of the Soviet Union is a favorite June theme, which China highlights in the broadcasts by pointing out the Soviet Union's labor strikes; its policy of "Soviet guns and American butter" testifying to its failed agricultural policy;<sup>16</sup> and the lies of the leadership, especially Brezhnev, in the process of exploiting the people, earning him the appellation "hypocritical and perfidious," and "the most amoral person in the Soviet Union."<sup>17</sup> Also given as examples of a country turned revisionist are the existence of a new Soviet bourgeoisie in art and literature, and a new class elite in education, both of which the broadcasts castigate.

The hot weather in July seems mirrored in the phraseology used that month to describe Soviet deviations from Chinese standards of Marxist orthodoxy. Within the Soviet Union, recent military literary works are called "refurbished versions of Hitler's fascism," perverting patriotism to make it synonymous with aggression.<sup>18</sup> Low Red Army morale is described, and called "the common weakness of all reactionary armies;"<sup>19</sup> one broadcast calls the current Soviet five-year economic plan "a mess" and declares that "the economy of Soviet revisionism has become an incurable disease;"<sup>20</sup> the foreign policy area does not fare much better. The great majority of the 31 July broadcasts, in addition to the normal areas of Soviet aggression mentioned in previous months, detect as well further signs of Soviet expansionism—these include military interference with the Danish armed forces, abetting a coup in the Sudan, and strangling India with its economic aid; especially decried was the Soviet view that somehow its increased supply of arms will in some obscure way lead to detente; one broadcast warns specifically that "the benefits obtained by the Soviet revisionists through 'detente' are enormous, while the pleasant days and fine landscape of detente

described by them for the Western countries are nothing but castles in the air.”<sup>21</sup>

The 52 broadcasts in August continued the grand theme of Soviet attempts at world hegemony. It is accused of trying to dominate the nonaligned movement, of military expansionism since the Helsinki Conference, especially in the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf; spying in Europe; betraying the Palestine cause, and even profiteering through foreign aid—“they will do everything impervious to conscience and justice as long as there is profit to gain;”<sup>22</sup> even the Soviet cheating in the Olympics is pointed out as symptomatic and condemned. In domestic affairs, one broadcast calls the Soviet consumer goods industry a mess; another describes the prerequisites of a parasitic Soviet class, and compares that situation with the lack of “perks” among the rest of Soviet citizens; a third calls this group a “bureaucrat-monopoly bourgeoisie,” a “group of bloodsuckers and parasites” which exploits the rest of the Soviet people.”<sup>23</sup> One noteworthy broadcast analyzes the Soviet Union’s degenerative signs, and declares that “the Soviet revisionists admit that such social problems as indulging in excessive drinking, religious beliefs, and the corruption and degeneration of youth are very difficult to solve,” and concludes that:

Of course they cannot solve these social problems, which have resulted from the social-imperialist system itself. As for the rascals and hoodlums, the Soviet revisionist authorities openly shield them, saying that although they wear jeans, have long hair and like the twist dance, they are people ‘with a clear-cut goal in life’ and are ‘good at pondering over problems.’<sup>24</sup>

#### NUMERICAL STANDARDS—THE FIRST SIX MONTHS

Altogether, during the March-August 1976 timeframe, the Chinese government initiated and broadcast 262 attacks on the structure or actions of the Soviet Union. Of the total, 106 (or 40 percent) were in Mandarin directed to the Chinese people themselves, and 88 (or 34 percent) were also reproduced in written form in *The People’s Daily*. The statistical breakdown in detail by month and depicted on a graph are shown in Figures 1 and 2.

#### THE CRISIS PERIOD-SEPTEMBER AND OCTOBER 1976

During this crisis period in PRC history, wherein their great Helmsman Mao Tse-tung died on September 9th, and his purportedly strongest radical followers, Chiang Ch’ing, Chang Ch’un Ch’iao, Yao Wen-yuan, and Wang Hung-wen, were all arrested on October 6th,



<u>MONTH</u>	<u>PDS</u>	<u>NCNA</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>DOM</u>
March	22	31	53	13
April	12	24	36	11
May	19	17	36	5
June	21	33	54	11
July	11	20	31	7
August	21	31	52	8

PDS - Peking Domestic Service Transmission.

NCNA - International Transmission.

DOM - Soviet Domestic Policy Subject.

Figure 1.

Chinese attacks on the Soviet Union by radio continued, though on a considerably smaller scale. For example, both September and October had 20 broadcasts each, as compared with the previous six month's average of over 43 per month. The tone of the broadcasts, however, did not seem to change appreciably. In foreign affairs, the attacks concentrated as before on Soviet expansionism and exploitation—during these two months the Soviet Union was accused of threatening Iran, infiltrating into the South Pacific, competing with the United States in Lebanon, and of using “missile diplomacy” against Norway,<sup>25</sup> among the usual coterie of charges. It was also accused of exploiting Mongolian mineral resources, actively resisting the 200-mile fishing zone, seeking to enslave the Third World, and of using the MBFR talks as a smokescreen for arms expansion. Within the Soviet Union itself, the Chinese charged that a new capitalist class “mercilessly fleeces the working people and lives a life of extravagant depravity,”<sup>26</sup> buttressing its charges in a later broadcast that in its professed desire to attain a “more developed” status, the Soviet Union had been transformed into a country

depending on the food of ‘developed capitalism,’ with many of its population sipping soft drinks of ‘developed capitalism,’ listening to the pop music of ‘developed capitalism,’ dancing to the ‘Rock and Roll’ of ‘developed capitalism’ and, on top of it all, enjoying all this with the money borrowed from ‘developed capitalism.’<sup>27</sup>

All in all, one of the last October broadcasts concludes, the Soviet




Figure 2. Totals March - August 1976

"social imperialists" with their fascism at home and aggression and expansion abroad, "have made themselves directly opposed to the Soviet people, the people of the East European countries, the people of the Third World and revolutionary people the world over."<sup>28</sup> Clearly, Chinese hyperbole had not been affected by the momentous events of September and October.

#### THE COMPARISON PERIOD— THE SIX MONTHS AFTER THE CRISIS

November's broadcasting attacks on the Soviet Union totaled 25, only one of which was devoted to weaknesses within the country—one of the major themes in foreign policy charges was that the Soviet Union was continuing to deceive the West. In talking peace while preparing for war, one charged that the Soviet Union was "the biggest peace swindler in our epoch."<sup>29</sup> Another detailed the Soviet military buildup over the years in Europe which, it concluded, "makes a mockery of the West's inclination for appeasement."<sup>30</sup> Another opined that

the Soviet revisionists try to lull the West with the song of 'detente.' They want to grab through 'detente' more loans, expertise and grain from the West to relieve their domestic economic difficulties, so that they may expand their armament and prepare for war on a larger scale.<sup>31</sup>

One broadcast concluded darkly that the Soviet detente policy was "a sinister policy of luring the fish to take the bait. In other words, one who takes the bait must be prepared to be fried."<sup>32</sup>

Scathing comments on the Soviet exploitation of non-Russian nationalities in Central Asia, adopting a "guns instead of butter" policy, and of the leaders oppressing the ordinary citizen, were among the themes of the five December broadcasts devoted to domestic subjects. All in all, one radiocast concluded, the Soviet masses "lead a life of utter destitution."<sup>33</sup> The remainder of December's 28 attacks on Soviet policy were concerned with its relations with the rest of the world—one cited Soviet hypocrisy in talking about nuclear bans, but refusing to agree to it in Latin America—a hypocrisy which consists, it said, of "utter the finest possible words, and do the worst possible things."<sup>34</sup> The Soviets were also accused of pressuring France, aggression and expansion in the Red Sea area, trying to directly control Mongolia, and maritime expansionism in the South Atlantic, among many other "revisionist" policies repeated again for good measure. And although many of the broadcasts as a matter of course concluded with a



phrase suggesting that the world is slowly awakening to the realization of the consequences of various nefarious Soviet actions, two of December's broadcasts see brighter horizons ahead from the Chinese standpoint. One noted the reaction of Eastern Europe to being economically taken advantage of, saying:

As the folk saying goes, 'It takes more than a day's cold to freeze the river three feet deep.' And it has taken many years of foul play and villainy on the part of the social-imperialists to provoke such bitter opposition among the East European people as (exists) today.<sup>35</sup>

The other broadcast notes the year 1976 as being that during which Soviet attempts at hegemony have failed, and concludes somewhat smugly that "flowers fall off, do what one may."<sup>36</sup>

The dawning of the year 1977 saw no changing perception by the Chinese that the Soviet Union was about to reform itself. In fact, new signs of deterioration are noted and condemned. Of the total of 50 attacks during this period (23 in January, 27 in February), 10 are concerned with internal policy. They include an expose of the Soviet leaders spreading their bourgeois ideology by establishing lotteries, which everyone knows are "anesthetics to soothe the people disgruntled with the reactionary regime of bureaucrat-monopoly capitalists."<sup>37</sup> Along the same lines, the growth of religion in the Soviet Union was noted with disgust as a sign of revision—the Chinese broadcast explained it as part of a scheme:

In order to keep its, 'throne' and undermine people's determination to revolt, the Soviet revisionist leading clique will of course resort to the narcotic of 'religious superstition' in addition to material incentives, demoralizing music, decadent books, and other means of promoting sex and violence.<sup>38</sup>

Those who dissent from Soviet policies are spiritually murdered after being placed in madhouses, a policy one broadcast describes as being "worse than Hitler's assassination camps."<sup>39</sup> As for human rights generally in the Soviet Union, such a concern in the Soviet Union is less even than in the United States, a "fact" the Chinese broadcast underlines with the rhetorical questions below:

Are the KGB agents any better than the FBI men? Are the Soviet mental hospitals any more humane than the American prisons? Is it possible that the American Negro people in the southern states under racial oppression are longing for the great Russian chauvinism predominant in the Soviet

Kazakhstan? . . . Styling itself as the champion of 'human rights' while actually trampling underfoot the very rights of man—such is the hypocritical and repulsive character of the fascist dictatorship with the signboard of 'socialism.'<sup>40</sup>

Some favorite themes detailing defects in Soviet foreign policy are repeated during these first two months—threatening Japan, exploiting Eastern Europe, seeking maritime hegemony—while some new ones are added as well. For example, one broadcast accuses the Soviets of rivaling the United States in Australia; others of threatening Czechoslovakia on its Charter 77 response; another points out Soviet hypocrisy in condemning other Socialist countries for trading with the West, "like the magistrate who sets houses on fire while forbidding ordinary folk to light lamps."<sup>41</sup> Still others praise the resistance of Middle Eastern nations against Soviet gunboat diplomacy, while condemning Russian attempts at trickery in Cyprus, colonialism in Angola, and the adoption of a "hot and cold" strategy towards the White House, somewhat like the fox who "praises the crow while eyeing that piece of cheese in the latter's beak."<sup>42</sup>

The number of Chinese broadcasts attacking the Soviet Union in March and April of 1977 continued to be comparatively few—43 for the period (24 in March, 19 in April). The only new domestic subject attacked was the perceived Soviet penchant for brainwashing its youth through military education and training. On the other hand, numerous broadcasts attacked Soviet interventionism in Zaire, accusing it of "attempting to create a second Angola."<sup>43</sup> Past Soviet support for the previous regime's leaders in Cambodia was vividly recalled, as well as past exploitation of India. Mrs. Ghandi's rebuff in the Indian elections was seen in several broadcasts to be a rebuff to her collaborationist policy towards the Soviets, and thus a blow to them as well. Finally, in as good a sum-up as one could possibly get, one Chinese broadcast warns that all of the Soviets' evil deeds "will out" eventually—evil deeds ranging, the broadcast alleges, "from supporting notorious traitors to open intrusion into a sovereign state, and from ruthless exploitation of the developing countries to shameless plunder of the East European 'little brothers'."<sup>44</sup>

#### NUMERICAL STANDARDS—THE LAST SIX MONTHS

From November 1976 through April 1977, the Chinese government initiated and broadcast 146 attacks on the domestic and foreign policies

of the Soviet Union. Of the total, 54 (or 37 percent) were in Mandarin for domestic consumption; 27 (or 18 percent) were also reproduced in written form in *The People's Daily*. The statistical breakdown in detail by month and depicted in graphic form are shown in Figures 3 and 4.

<u>MONTH</u>	<u>PDS</u>	<u>NCNA</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>DOM</u>
November	7	18	25	1
December	9	19	28	5
January	6	17	23	3
February	13	14	27	7
March	12	12	24	4
April	7	12	19	-

Figure 3.

#### FREQUENCY OF ATTACKS—COMPARISONS AND CONTRASTS

The statistical breakdown by month for the entire period studied, March 1976 through April 1977, is given in Figure 5.

The next three Figures, 6, 7, and 8, graph the Chinese initiated attacks broadcast during the time in the three categories of: PDS in Mandarin, NCNA (in English, mostly), and both combined, respectively.

Eliminating the crisis period of September-October 1976 from comparison because of its atypicality, the difference in average monthly attacks is shown at the bottom of page 15. Translating these figures into percentages, one can see that during the six-month period immediately after Mao's death and the purge of the "Gang of Four," the total frequency of attacks on Chinese radio declined by 44 percent. Decreases in the subcategories of "PDS" and "NCNA" broadcasts were 49 percent and 41 percent, respectively, and their calculated "t" value in comparison with the March-August 1976 period showed a significant statistical difference at the .05 level.<sup>45</sup>

#### ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS

*The Tone.* The fact that, while the number of attacks on the Soviets over the air dropped dramatically, the tone of the broadcasts remained




Figure 4. Totals November 1976 - April 1977



<u>MONTH</u>	<u>PDS</u>	<u>NCNA</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>DOM</u>
March 1976	22	31	53	13
April	12	24	36	11
May	12	17	36	5
June	21	33	54	11
July	11	20	31	7
August	21	31	52	8
September	2	18	20	2
October	6	14	20	4
November	7	18	25	1
December	9	19	28	5
January 1977	6	17	23	3
February	13	14	27	7
March	12	12	24	4
April	7	12	19	-

Figure 5

	<u>Average for Mar-Aug 76</u>	<u>Average for Nov 76-Apr 77</u>
PDS	17.6	9.0
NCNA	26.0	15.3
TOTAL	43.6	24.3




Figure 6. PDS Broadcasts Attacking USSR March 1976 - April 1977






Figure 7. NCNA International Broadcasts Attacking USSR March 1976 - April 1977




Figure 8. Total Broadcasts Attacking USSR March 1976 - April 1977

at a level best described as hyperbolically shrill is not as paradoxical as it may seem at first glance. It has long been the practice of the PRC to consider the world rhetorically in terms of black or white only. Those countries considered the friends of China can, in print, do no wrong; on the other hand, the New China News Agency will spare no adjectives in verbally pillaring perceived enemies of the PRC. In the past, when countries have changed category from enemy to friend (sometimes after formally recognizing the PRC), the change in rhetoric has been even more striking than the change in category.

*The Frequency.* We know for a fact that the Soviet Union at the death of Mao Tse-tung stopped its polemics against the PRC, waiting to see possible changes in its foreign policy as a result of the new leadership. Its leaders may have read the article in *Foreign Policy* magazine in the spring of 1976 by a CIA analyst—he urged US recognition of the PRC before Mao died, because of the fact that Mao's successors might be less "hard-line" about the possibility of rapprochement with the USSR.<sup>46</sup> When the Gang of Four was purged, Moscow still held its rhetorical fire. It was only after the border negotiations collapsed in 1977 that the polemics resumed.

During this same time, as we have seen, radio broadcasts by the PRC which attacked Russia declined significantly. What we do *not* know, due to lack of time for further research, is whether such a reduction took place in broadcasts devoted to attacks on other countries as well, and if so, whether they were reduced to the same significant extent as those excoriating the USSR.

What we *do* know involving these broadcasts is that they do not seem to be related numerically to events affecting the PRC during this 14-month period—save for Mao's death and the Gang of Four purge. The author has compared the number of broadcasts in a given month with important events affecting China during that month; specifically, to the following:

April 1976	Teng Hsiao-p'ing purge
April 1976	Bomb explosion at USSR Embassy
July 1976	Tang Shan earthquake
October 1976	Hua Kuo-feng appointed Party Chairman
October 1976	Russian polemics stopped
October 1976	Brezhnev in speech to Central Committee says Sino-Soviet rift can be resolved
December 1976	National People's Conference standing committee meeting

March 1977	"High-level" gathering of Chinese leaders in Peking <sup>47</sup>
April 1977	Russian polemics resumed

The comparison does not reveal any apparent correlation between such events and the number of Chinese broadcasts attacking the Soviet Union.

*The Significance.* We know for a fact that Wang Hung-Wen, Chang Ch'un-ch'iao, Chiang Ch'ing and Yao Wen-yuan were listed at second, fourth, sixth, and seventh positions in the Chinese hierarchy as of Mao's death.<sup>48</sup> Aside from their ranking, they also had access to Mao himself, and their radical influence on him, reflecting his own theory of "permanent revolution" for the Chinese masses and "deep distrust" of the Soviet Union, must have been considerable.

The sudden removal of Mao and his most radical followers, and the subsequent decrease in frequency of Chinese broadcasts attacking the USSR continuing through April 1977 seems more than a coincidence. If, in fact, there has been a similar decrease in attacks on other countries as well—a question worthy of further inquiry—barring an explanation which sees continued power struggles as the reason, the significance of the decrease seems to be that moderation has taken over where extremism once ruled. This in turn could herald a swing in Chinese foreign policy generally, in which practical actions no longer need be justified in terms of revolutionary dogma in order to be deemed acceptable to Chinese decisionmakers.

If, on the other hand, the significant reduction in attacks in Soviet policies is confined to the Soviet Union, this fact would seem to indicate the first stages of possible change in the relationship between the two. At the least, it would indicate that the PRC leaders now feel that a downplaying of the differences between the two countries on the public record is in order. On the other hand, it may well indicate that the new Chinese leadership is now willing to start clearing the air prior to seeking to resolve the major differences between the two countries, or at least lessening them to the extent it is possible to do so.

The PRC has always stressed that its state to state relations with other countries need not be affected by "disputes in questions of principle." It told the USSR as much in a broadcast in November 1976.<sup>49</sup> As a practical matter, however, as Harold Hinton so well puts it, one of the prerequisites for detente "... is a more or less complete



cessation of propaganda polemics on both sides, since such polemics now feed the mutual hostility they also reflect."<sup>50</sup>

The reduction by China in attacks on the USSR noted herein may well indicate a PRC willingness to eventually stop them entirely, at a time deemed opportune; the reduction is almost certainly a result of Mao's death and the purge of his radical loyalists. On the other hand, the Soviet Union's officially renewed polemics<sup>51</sup> may be an indication that this possible six-month "hint" of change by China was missed. Only time will tell whether this phenomenon was one of a kind, or but the first indication by China of future movement towards the end of its "cold war."

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SELECTED CHINESE RADIO BROADCASTS ATTACKING SOVIET UNION  
MARCH 1976 - APRIL 1977

MARCH 1976

FBIS#	BD	N	P	D	J	FBIS#	BD	N	P	D	J	FBIS#	BD	N	P	D	J	FBIS#	BD	N	P	D	J	FBIS#	BD	N	P	D	J
44	3	X			X	63	29	X	X	X		88	3	X				111	7	X			X	138	15	X			X
"	3	X				"	30	X			X	89	5	X	X		X	112	8	X			X	"	15	X	X		X
45	4	X				"	30	X	X		X	"	5	X	X			"	8	X				139	16	X			
"	4	X				"	30	X	X			91	6	X				113	9	X	X		X	"	16	X			
"	4	X				64	31	X	X		X	92	9	X				"	10	X				"	18	X	X		X
46	5	X		X		APRIL 1976						"	9	X				114	9	X	X		X	140	19	X			
"	5	X				64	1	X				"	9	X				"	10	X	X		X	"	20	X			
"	6	X				66	2	X				93	7	X	X			"	10	X				141	19	X	X		
"	6	X				"	2	X				"	11	X				"	11	X	X	X		"	20	X			X
"	7	X		X		"	2	X				95	13	X		X		115	11	X				142	21	X			
47	4	X	X			"	3	X		X		96	14	X		X		"	13	X	X			143	22	X			
"	5	X	X			"	4	X	X	X		"	15	X	X			116	11	X	X		X	144	22	X			
"	8	X	X			67	4	X	X	X		"	15	X	X			"	12	X				"	23	X			X
"	8	X	X	X		69	5	X	X			97	15	X	X			"	13	X	X		X	"	23	X			
48	9	X	X			70	4	X	X			"	17	X				117	14	X				"	23	X			
"	9	X	X			"	6	X				98	18	X				"	15	X				145	25	X			X
49	10	X	X			"	7	X				99	19	X				"	15	X				146	25	X	X		
51	12	X	X			"	8	X		X		100	20	X	X			"	15	X	X	X		"	27	X			X
"	12	X				"	8	X		X		101	21	X				119	17	X				148	27	X	X		X
"	13	X				71	7	X	X			"	21	X				120	17	X				"	29	X	X		
52	11	X				"	9	X				"	22	X	X		X	"	18	X	X	X		149	28	X			
"	12	X				"	10	X		X		"	23	X		X		"	19	X				"	30	X			X
"	12	X	X			72	12	X	X		X	"	23	X				"	20	X	X			150	30	X	X		X
"	12	X				73	13	X				102	21	X	X	X		121	18	X	X	X		"	31	X	X	X	
"	14	X				74	14	X		X		"	23	X				"	19	X				151	31	X			
53	13	X				76	17	X		X		"	24	X				"	19	X				AUGUST 1976					
"	14	X	X			77	18	X				103	24	X	X	X		"	19	X		X		150	1	X			
"	14	X	X			78	20	X				104	26	X				"	20	X				"	1	X			
"	15	X	X			"	21	X	X			105	27	X	X	X	X	122	22	X				"	2	X			
55	17	X				79	21	X		X		106	28	X				"	22	X		X		152	1	X			
"	18	X	X			80	22	X		X		"	28	X				123	23	X	X	X	X	"	2	X			
"	18	X	X	X		"	22	X	X			"	29	X				124	24	X	X		X	"	2	X	X		X
56	20	X				"	23	X				"	29	X				"	24	X				"	4	X			X
"	20	X				81	25	X	X	X		"	30	X				125	25	X				"	4	X			X
57	22	X				82	26	X	X			"	30	X				"	26	X				"	4	X			
58	21	X	X			83	27	X	X	X		"	31	X				126	26	X				153	2	X			
"	23	X				84	27	X	X	X		107	29	X				127	29	X				"	5	X			
59	21	X	X			"	28	X				JUNE 1976						128	28	X	X	X		"	5	X			
60	24	X				85	29	X				107	1	X				"	30	X	X	X		"	5	X			X
"	24	X	X			"	29	X	X			108	2	X	X	X		"	30	X				154	6	X	X		
"	25	X				86	29	X	X			"	2	X	X	X		129	30	X				"	6	X			
"	25	X				"	30	X	X			109	3	X		X		132	26	X	X		X	"	7	X			
"	26	X				MAY 1976						"	3	X	X			JULY 1976						149	1	X			
61	26	X										110	4	X				130	3	X				155	7	X			
"	27	X										"	4	X				"	5	X				"	9	X			X
"	27	X										"	5	X		X		131	6	X	X		X	156	9	X			
"	28	X										"	6	X				"	6	X	X	X		"	10	X	X		
62	28	X	X									"	6	X				134	10	X				"	10	X			X
"	28	X	X	X								111	7	X				138	15	X				158	12	X	X	X	

KEY: BD - Date of Broadcast  
N - NCNA International Transmission  
P - Peking Domestic Service Transmission  
D - Soviet Domestic Policy Subject  
J - Also Appeared in JMJP

FBIS#	BD	N	P	D	J	FBIS#	BD	N	P	D	J	FBIS#	BD	N	P	D	J	FBIS#	BD	N	P	D	J
159	13	X			X	192	30	X				DECEMBER 1976	19			X		58	27			X	
"	15	X			X	OCTOBER 1976	234	2	X		X		20	28	X		X	"	23			X	
"	14	X				197	7	X		X		235	4	X				21	30		X		
160	15	X				198	10	X	X	X	X	"	5	X		X		FEBRUARY 1976	60	25	X		X
"	13		X		X	199	12	X				237	3	X				23	2	X		X	
"	16	X			X	201	14		X		X	"	4	X				24	2		X	X	
161	13	X				203	14	X	X	X	X	"	8	X		X		"	3	X			
"	13		X			"	17	X				240	6	X		X		25	1		X		X
162	16	X				"	18	X				"	8	X				"	4	X			
163	19	X				"	16	X			X	"	11	X			X	"	6	X			
"	17		X			204	19	X			X	"	12	X				26	1		X		
"	19	X			X	205	20	X				241	11	X				"	4		X		
164	18		X		X	206	21	X			X	242	13	X				"	8	X			
165	17		X		X	207	25	X				"	14	X				27	6		X		
"	20		X			"	23	X			X	243	12		X			30	13	X			
"	21	X			X	208	20		X			244	16	X				"	13	X			
167	22		X			"	22	X			X	245	18	X				32	15	X			
"	24		X	X	X	209	27	X				"	19	X				"	15	X			
"	25	X				210	29	X		X		246	14		X	X		33	17	X			
"	26	X				211	30	X			X	"	20	X				35	20	X			
169	27	X				"	29	X				"	15		X			"	15		X		
"	27	X				"	27		X		X	"	17		X			"	21	X			X
"	27		X			NOVEMBER 1976	248	22	X		X	248	22	X		X		"	21	X		X	
"	28	X			X	212	2	X			X	249	26	X				36	14		X		
"	29	X			X	213	1	X				"	19		X			38	18		X	X	
170	30	X			X	215	4	X				"	23	X		X		39	26		X		
"	30	X			X	"	4	X			X	250	27	X				40	28	X	X	X	X
"	27		X	X	X	216	5	X				1	31	X				"	23	X	X	X	
"	31		X	X	X	"	5		X		X	2	31	X		X		"	24	X		X	
SEPTEMBER 1976	217	8	X			JANUARY 1977	41	25		X		42	27		X								

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20. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number) This memorandum concerns research of national broadcasts by the People's Republic of China about the Soviet Union from March 1, 1976 through April 30, 1977. The purpose was to survey the content of the attacks by China on Russia, and then to compare the frequency of the attacks for the six months immediately preceding the death of Mao Tse-tung and the purge of the Gang of Four one month later, with those for the six-month period immediately thereafter. With the results, the author conjectures what course the future direction of Chinese policy toward the Soviet Union might take.		

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US Air Force . . . . .	3
432d Military Intelligence Detachment . . . . .	1
434th Military Intelligence Detachment . . . . .	1
467th Military Intelligence Detachment . . . . .	1
I ROTC Region Headquarters . . . . .	1
II ROTC Region Headquarters . . . . .	1
III ROTC Region Headquarters . . . . .	1
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