


AD-A054 495 ARINC RESEARCH CORP ANNAPOLIS MD F/G 1/2
DEVELOPMENT OF AIR FORCE FLIGHT SAFETY MODELS. VOLUME 14. T-39A--ETC(U)
SEP 76 F09603-72-A-1132

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C54-01-1-1406-VOL-14

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DEVELOPMENT OF AIR FORCE
FLIGHT SAFETY MODELS

Volume 14

T-39A
AIRCRAFT

September 1976

(4)
AP



Prepared for

SERVICE ENGINEERING DIVISION
SAN ANTONIO AIR LOGISTICS CENTER
Kelly Air Force Base, Texas

Under Contract F09603-72-A-1132-SA01

Publication C54-01-1-1406

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REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE			READ INSTRUCTIONS BEFORE COMPLETING FORM
1. REPORT NUMBER C54-01-1-1406 ✓	2. GOVT ACCESSION NO.	3. RECIPIENT'S CATALOG NUMBER	
4. TITLE (and Subtitle) DEVELOPMENT OF AIR FORCE FLIGHT SAFETY MODELS VOLUME I4		5. TYPE OF REPORT & PERIOD COVERED	
7. AUTHOR(s) Not Listed		6. PERFORMING ORG. REPORT NUMBER C54-01-1-1406 ✓ 8. CONTRACT OR GRANT NUMBER(s) F09603-72-A-1132-SA01	
9. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME AND ADDRESS ARINC Research Corporation ✓ 2551 Riva Road Annapolis, Maryland 21401		10. PROGRAM ELEMENT, PROJECT, TASK AREA & WORK UNIT NUMBERS	
11. CONTROLLING OFFICE NAME AND ADDRESS SERVICE ENGINEERING DIVISION SAN ANTONIO AIR LOGISTICS CENTER Kelly Air Force Base, Texas		12. REPORT DATE September 1976 13. NUMBER OF PAGES 52	
14. MONITORING AGENCY NAME & ADDRESS (if different from Controlling Office) SERVICE ENGINEERING DIVISION SAN ANTONIO AIR LOGISTICS CENTER Kelly Air Force Base, Texas		15. SECURITY CLASS. (of this report) UNCLASSIFIED 15a. DECLASSIFICATION/DOWNGRADING SCHEDULE	
16. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of this Report) UNCLASSIFIED/UNLIMITED			
17. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of the abstract entered in Block 20, if different from Report)			
18. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES			
19. KEY WORDS (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number)			
20. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number) A general description of the Flight Safety Prediction Technique, and the documentation associated with its specific application to the T-39A aircraft, are presented.			

Q2P-1-1-170

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

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SAN ANTONIO AIR LOGISTICS CENTER
Kelly Air Force Base, Texas
Under Contract F09603-72-A-1132-SA01

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
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ABSTRACT

A general description of the Flight Safety Prediction Technique, and the documentation associated with its specific application to the T-39A aircraft, are presented.

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GLOSSARY

This glossary presents general definitions of terms used in this report. The reader will find certain of these terms defined in somewhat different words in the text, depending on the context of the discussion; but the meaning will be consistent with the definitions given here.

Criticality

- A numerical index of the significance of equipment failure history relative to aircraft safety. As an analysis parameter, it can be considered proportional to the likelihood that an item will fail and thereby cause an accident. It is the product of the failure probability and the sensitivity of an equipment item.

Dependency

- See link dependency.

FSPT

- Flight Safety Prediction Technique

Flight Phases

- Discrete segments of the aircraft mission profile. For present purposes, the flight phases are defined as 1) startup and taxi, 2) takeoff, 3) climb, 4) cruise, 5) tactics, 6) cruise, 7) descend, 8) land, and 9) taxi and shutdown.

Functional Analysis

- The determination of equipment relationships to aircraft functions performed, and the interrelationships of these functions.

Functional Link

- The simplest form of functional relationship in which one function is dependent upon the next lower function.

Functional Path

- The compilation of functional links, in sequence, through which a function is identified as being dependent upon another.

Link Dependency

- The conditional probability of a dependent function failing, given that a particular function it is dependent upon has failed.

Provisory Condition

- Operation of an aircraft in a mode or environment such that the safety-related importance of certain equipments is increased. Provisory conditions include icing, night flight, supersonic flight, etc.

Provisory Factor

- The probability that a provisory condition exists. Also used to describe the coded notation used to indicate that a functional relationship is dependent on a particular provisory condition.

Safety Sensitivity

- Same as "sensitivity".

- Sensitivity**
- A quantitative indication of the degree of safety degradation to be expected if a function or piece of equipment fails. The more specific terms are "functional sensitivity" or "equipment item sensitivity".
- Sensitivity Path**
- A particular sequence of functional dependencies (beginning at the top level in the hierarchical structure) through which a function or piece of equipment derives a sensitivity value. Equipment and functional sensitivity values are often derived through several such sensitivity paths.

FOREWORD

This document is part of a 16-volume report describing the application to specific aircraft types of ARINC Research Corporation's Flight Safety Prediction Technique (FSPT). The technique was developed under previous Air Force contracts (see Appendix A). The present effort, undertaken in 1972 under Contract F09603-72-A-1132-SA01, has led to further refinement of the FSPT through its broad application to many different types of aircraft. The flight safety models generated for these aircraft are presented in individual volumes of this report as follows:

<u>Volume</u>	<u>Aircraft</u>	<u>Volume</u>	<u>Aircraft</u>
2	T-38	10	B-52G, H
3	F-111A, FB-111A	11	C-130E
4	A-7D	12	KC-135
5	F-4D, E; and RF-4C	13	C-5A
6	C-141	14	T-39
7	A-37	15	F-15
8	O-2	16	UH-1N Helicopter
9	OV-10		

Volume 16 will document the results of a feasibility study of extending the FSPT to rotary-wing aircraft.

Volume 1, an overall summary of the contractual effort, will be issued at the end of the contract period.

CONTENTS

	<u>Page</u>
ABSTRACT	iii
GLOSSARY	v
FOREWORD	vii
1. INTRODUCTION	1-1
2. METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING FSPT	2-1
2.1 Definition of Safe Aircraft	2-1
2.2 Mathematical Basis of FSPT	2-1
2.3 Sensitivity Assignments	2-2
3. MODEL DEVELOPMENT	3-1
3.1 Functional Analysis	3-1
3.2 Major-Function Sensitivity Assignment	3-2
3.2.1 Assignment Method	3-2
3.2.2 Link Dependency Assignment	3-5
3.2.3 Provisory Factors	3-5
3.2.4 Computer Processing	3-5
3.2.5 Model Maintenance	3-7
4. T-39A MODEL DEVELOPMENT	4-1
APPENDIX A: Historical Summary of FSPT	A-1
APPENDIX B: Formulation of Criticality-Assessment Technique	B-1
APPENDIX C: FSPT Documentation Methods	C-1
APPENDIX D: FSPT Documentation of T-39A Aircraft	D-1

ILLUSTRATIONS AND TABLES

<u>Figure</u>		<u>Page</u>
1-1	Example of Criticality Ranking Process	1-2
3-1	Activities and Data Inputs to Flight Safety Criticality Assessment . .	3-1
3-2	Hierarchical Structure of Aircraft Functions	3-3
3-3	Phases of Aircraft Mission	3-4

Table

3-1	Provisory Factor Codes	3-6
4-1	T-39A System Documentation	4-1

INTRODUCTION

The Flight Safety Prediction Technique developed by ARINC Research Corporation provides for assessment of the impact on flight safety of the failure of specific items of equipment within an aircraft. In the FSPT, mathematical modeling procedures are applied for processing aircraft-equipment failure data to yield a quantified index ranking safety-related problems on the basis of their likelihood of occurrence and the resulting degradation in the aircraft's capability to fly.

The ranking factor is called "criticality", which in its simplest form is the product of the failure probability and flight-safety sensitivity of an equipment. (A more detailed definition appears in Section 2 and Appendix B.) The failure probability inputs are from basic failure-data sources, AFM 66-1 and 65-110. The sensitivity estimates are derived by the following process:

- a. Systematic analysis of aircraft functions to determine those essential to flight safety
- b. Identification of the hardware required to perform these functions
- c. Evaluation of the safety significance of the hardware in performing these essential aircraft functions.

The criticality values resulting from this approach provide a relative ranking of all malfunctions with respect to their safety significance. Figure 1-1 is a simplified example of how three equipment items would be ranked on the combined basis of their failure probability and safety sensitivity. This figure illustrates an example in which item A has the highest failure probability, but due to the low sensitivity value is ranked below item B in criticality.

The methodology has the ability to rank malfunction problems currently and continuously by their accident potential. This ranking, based on criticality assessment, can provide the basic parameters necessary for:

- a. Identifying equipment items whose failure history and application pose a threat to aircraft safety
- b. Quantifying the degree of threat associated with each equipment item
- c. Evaluating and tracking the effectiveness of modifications to the aircraft
- d. Assessing safety benefits versus the cost of proposed aircraft modifications, changes in maintenance or flight operations, or alternative aircraft designs.




Figure 1-1. Example of Criticality Ranking Process

In this report, Section 4 and Appendix D pertain specifically to the T-39A aircraft. The remainder of the document provides support information that will make the T-39A data, and the method by which the data were obtained, more meaningful to the general reader.

Section 2 presents an overview of the development and utilization of the Flight Safety Prediction Technique; Section 3 discusses the steps associated with generating a safety model for calculating the safety criticality of various equipments of an aircraft; and Section 4 describes how the safety models for the T-39A aircraft were developed. Appendix A summarizes the contractual history of the development of the FSPT; Appendix B discusses mathematical considerations underlying the technique; Appendix C discusses FSPT documentation methods; and Appendix D presents functional relationship diagrams for a listing of keypunch cards that comprise the safety model documentation for the T-39A aircraft.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING FSPT

This section discusses the basic definitions and mathematical concepts associated with the Flight Safety Prediction Technique.

2.1 DEFINITION OF SAFE AIRCRAFT

To develop a relative measure of aircraft safety degradation resulting from specific equipment malfunctions, it is first necessary to define a "safe" aircraft. For purposes of the FSPT assessments, an aircraft is assumed to be in a safe condition if it is operating within its prescribed performance limits. Conversely, an aircraft operating (or about to operate) outside these limits is considered to be unsafe - in a condition where property damage and personal injury may result.

The safety prediction methodology does not attempt to assess the extent of possible personal injury or aircraft damage resulting from an unsafe condition. Neither does the concept consider ejection capability, parachutes, life rafts, etc., which do not make an aircraft safer per se but provide for the survivability of the aircrew when the aircraft is unsafe. Collision is also excluded from consideration because of the complexity of the interrelationships between pilot, aircraft equipment, ground surveillance, and traffic density.

2.2 MATHEMATICAL BASIS OF FSPT

The probability of an accident caused by the failure of an element can be expressed as the probability of the element failing multiplied by the conditional probability that the failure of the element will cause an accident. Stated in equation form:

$$P(A, j) = P(j)P(A|j) \quad (1)$$

where

$P(A, j)$ = Probability of an accident due to failure of just the j^{th} element*

$P(j)$ = Probability that element j fails

$P(A|j)$ = Probability of an accident given that the j^{th} element fails.

This equation reflects the basic relationships addressed in the FSPT where:

a. The criticality of the j^{th} element is an estimate of $P(A, j)$

b. The sensitivity of the j^{th} element is an estimate of $P(A|j)$

*In this and subsequent discussions, unless otherwise stated, expressions such as "failure of the j^{th} element" should be interpreted to mean: failure of only the j^{th} element, assuming all other elements are not failed.

Because an element's effect on safety may depend on the mission phase (see Section 3.2.1), the above model can be expanded to:

$$P(A, j) = \sum_{k=1}^N P_{j,k} P(A|j, k) \quad (2)$$

where

N = Number of mission phases

$P_{j,k}$ = Probability that the j^{th} element is failed in the k^{th} phase

$P(A|j, k)$ = The j^{th} element's sensitivity in the k^{th} phase.

To identify the importance of discrete elements to aircraft safety, a flight profile consisting of nine distinct phases was defined. The phases are discussed in Section 3.2.1.

To utilize equation 2, it was necessary to develop a method for obtaining the values of $P(A|j, k)$, the probability that a malfunction in element j during mission phase k will result in an accident. This method in turn requires the estimation of two parameters: the probability of accident if a major function is not available during each mission phase, and the dependence of the major function on subfunctions and elements during each such phase*. Each function and equipment item thus derives its sensitivity value from its relationship to the major function(s) dependent upon it.

2.3 SENSITIVITY ASSIGNMENTS

A great deal of information is available on the causes of aircraft accidents, but little exists from which to make the sensitivity assignments [$P(A|j)$]. These assignments are therefore largely subjective, based on the analyst's knowledge of the system and any information he may have on previous accident history. The sensitivity assignments are reviewed (and revised as necessary) by an Air Force/contractor team working on a particular model to ensure that consistent criteria have been followed. The team review and negotiation of sensitivity assignments is the mechanism by which the value becomes sufficiently objective for use with the model. This negotiation considers all of those top level functions as a group and reassigns sensitivity values as necessary to assure that the most objective proportionality is attained for the particular aircraft model. The same major-function sensitivity values are used for major functions on all aircraft models where configuration and mission profiles permit.

The development of criticality rankings for the various elements (j 's) is dependent upon the ability to quantify the failure probability [$P(j)$] and the element sensitivity [$P(A|j)$] for each element. Since the intent of the concept is to provide a relative safety ranking of all malfunctions, it is not necessary to develop absolute

*For a more detailed discussion of the mathematics of the FSPT, see Appendix B.

values for $P(A|j)$. If the sensitivity values developed are correct relative to each other, a proper criticality ranking will be established. It is intended that criticality be an index proportional to $P(A,j)$ and therefore provide the same relative rank ordering of elements. The major reasons for proportionality, rather than equality, are:

- a. The FSPT does not account for the effect of extraordinary pilot intervention to prevent an accident in case of equipment malfunction.
- b. Criticality quantification was limited in its treatment of simultaneous occurrence of independent, primary failures.
- c. Operational and malfunction data yield only a proportional estimate of the required information.

While strict proportionality cannot be mathematically proven, it is believed that the criticality rankings provide reasonable relative measures of equipment problem potential.

3 MODEL DEVELOPMENT

Figure 3-1 summarizes the approach to the assessment of flight-safety criticality of aircraft equipment. The first contractor activity is the identification of all functions the aircraft is expected to perform and the determination of their inter-relationships. Next, each functional relationship is documented; and then sensitivity assignments are made at the major functional levels (below these levels, link dependency values are estimated; see discussion, Section 3.2.2). This process is carried out until each work unit code associated with a major function has been identified with respect to the function performed and dependencies have been estimated. Computer processing calculates the safety sensitivity for each work unit coded item, combines these values with the operation and failure data input by the Air Force, and produces the equipment criticality ranking.




Figure 3-1. Activities and Data Inputs to Flight Safety Criticality Assessment

The steps in this process are discussed in greater detail in the following sections.

3.1 FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS

Functional analysis entails the systematic identification of the relationships of hardware to the functions performed by the aircraft and documented in the aircraft technical orders. Tabulated for each aircraft function are the equipments necessary for its performance as well as all outputs required for other systems. The complexity of the functional interdependencies of an aircraft requires the use of a systematic

accounting procedure, as discussed below, to assure that all relationships have been identified and that no functional paths have been overlooked.

Certain top-level functions (comprised of both "primary" and "major" functions) have been defined as applicable to all aircraft types, and serve as the starting point for a safety analysis. Figure 3-2 lists these top level functions with the primary function of Flight Control expanded to show its typical major functions. Below the major function level, differences in aircraft types result in function identification and structuring specifically suited to each aircraft. In Figure 3-2, for instance, the major function Roll Control is subdivided into Left Roll and Right Roll, and further into aileron and spoiler actuation subfunctions. This structure is that applicable to an F-4 aircraft, in which ailerons have an extremely limited upward travel and lift is primarily lost through spoiler operation. Finally, each item in the aircraft WUC ("-'06") manual is identified with respect to the function it performs.*

Every function and every WUC included in the model receives an "alpha designator" unique to that aircraft model. Due to the large number of alpha designators required in a model, an indenturing system is utilized to prevent duplication. However, the location in the hierarchical structure and the number of characters in the alpha designators are often independent, since such correlation is not necessary for subsequent computer processing.

The functional relationships from the system diagram, and identification of the equipment necessary for each function, are next documented in an 80-column punch-card format (see Appendix C). The total functional diagram for the aircraft is then a compilation of the system diagrams, with one punchcard for each functional link.

With the aircraft functions completely documented, the functional paths by which a piece of equipment contributes to the operation of the aircraft can be identified by computer. Performing the path-identification/documentation task by computer proves to be not only useful but necessary — the human analyst could neither keep track of nor assign sensitivity values to all functional paths. The machine processing capability allows the analyst to consider only one functional link at a time. The ability to follow all of the functional interrelationships within the aircraft, which is necessary for meaningful assessment of safety, is then provided by the computer.

3.2 MAJOR-FUNCTION SENSITIVITY ASSIGNMENT

3.2.1 Assignment Method

As stated earlier, the sensitivity of a function or equipment item is an estimate of the probability that its failure will cause an accident. From functional analysis of the aircraft under consideration, major functions are identified and are assigned sensitivity values for each phase of the mission.

*Certain WUC items in the "'-06" manual may not be included in the safety model, these items being either 1) eliminated by TCTOs; 2) purely structural items in the 11000 series; 3) necessary only for survivability or ejection; 4) of lower indenture than the LRU level, where computer data screening eliminates failure reports.




Figure 3-2. Hierarchical Structure of Aircraft Functions

The relative importance of primary functions, major functions, and functions is not necessarily constant throughout a flight. The failure, for example, of one engine of a multi-engine aircraft is far more critical on takeoff than it is during the rest of the flight, and is of relatively little importance during startup and taxi. To accommodate this variability of importance, the mission of an aircraft is divided into nine flight phases:

1. Startup and taxi
2. Takeoff
3. Ascend (climb-out)
4. Cruise, outbound
5. Intercept or tactical phase
6. Cruise, inbound
7. Descend
8. Land
9. Taxi and shutdown

These phases are illustrated in Figure 3-3.




Figure 3-3. Phases of Aircraft Mission

A sensitivity value is assigned for each of the phases, and represents the best estimate of the likelihood that the aircraft will enter a hazardous mode if the function is not present in that phase. The numerical values assigned are proportional rather than absolute, and range from 0.0 to 1.0. The keypunch card format limits this assignment to increments of 0.1. Increments smaller than 0.1, when required, were assigned by defining a quasi-function for insertion between the major function and its dependent primary function.

3.2.2 Link Dependency Assignment

"Link dependency" is defined as the probability that the loss of a function will result in the loss of a dependent function. (For a more detailed discussion of this term, see Appendix B.) The assignment of link dependency values requires knowledge of the operation of specific aircraft because it is concerned only with functional levels below the "major" category. At this lower level, no evaluation is made of the impact on flight safety of the loss of functions. Instead, the effect of the loss of one function on the performance of another function becomes the evaluation criterion. Like sensitivities, link dependency values are assigned in increments of 0.1. Additionally, the method of attenuation used in assigning sensitivity values can also be applied to link dependencies.

3.2.3 Provisory Factors

The sensitivity of major functions with respect to aircraft safety, and at the lower levels the link dependency between functions, can be dependent on external influences and aircraft operating conditions. To accommodate these external influences, a set of provisory factors has been identified. An example would be a windshield anti-ice system, which has a safety sensitivity close to 1.0 during landing under icing conditions but a negligible effect on a dry, warm day.

Under such circumstances, the procedure is to assign the "worst case" value (assuming the condition exists). During model exercise the likelihood that the condition exists can be "read-in", thereby allowing the sensitivity value to be assigned by the computer based on the likelihood of the condition and the probability that the higher level function will therefore be lost. Table 3-1 lists the standard provisory factors used in FSPT models.

3.2.4 Computer Processing

Documentation of a flight safety analysis by ARINC Research thus consists of functional diagrams, coded functional tabulations, a functional data processing card deck, and a machine-prepared printout of the card deck data. Under this contract, the documentation is then sent to San Antonio Air Logistics Center for review by MMER personnel and representatives of the Air Logistics Center responsible for the particular aircraft (if other than SA/ALC).

SA/ALC processes the functional data card deck utilizing a number of computerized operations. First, a functional deck edit is accomplished to identify certain format or logic errors that may exist. Next, a path identification/documentation run is made that traces all possible paths associated with each function and calculates the numerical sensitivities by flight phase down to the WUC level. Then, a path combination run is made taking into account the dependence of more than one major function on a particular WUC. Finally, failure information from the 66-1 data system and numerical factors for provisory conditions are input and a WUC criticality list by rank order is generated by the computer.

TABLE 3-1. PROVISOORY FACTOR CODES

Code	Provisory Condition
A	Icing conditions
B	Adverse speed/altitude operations (Helicopter)
C	Runway stopping distance/confined area (Helicopter)
D	Night operation
E	IFR conditions
F	Supersonic flight
G	Rain
H	Solo flight
I	Loss of function for which indication is provided
K	Normal system failed
T	Flame-out
X	Fire
Y	Cold weather
2	One of three available units is required
3	Two of three available units are required
4	One of four available units is required
5	Two of four available units are required
6	Three of four available units are required
8	Four of eight available units are required

An additional product generated by the computer is a two-part criticality trend analysis. Part I contains the criticality rankings and linear regression analysis by WUC for the previous 12 months. Part II contains plots of the criticalities and regression lines for the 25 WUCs top-ranked according to safety criticality.

3.2.5 Model Maintenance

Each time an aircraft type for which a safety model has been developed undergoes a modification, the effects of the changes on the model must be evaluated. Technical order and WUC revisions must be incorporated into the model. Removal of existing hardware, the installation of new hardware, or design improvements may change link dependencies and sensitivity assignments. The update procedure should follow the same general steps as outlined for the initial analysis effort.

Existing block diagrams and a printout of the functional card deck form the baseline for change identification. Functional relationships should be reviewed to determine the impact of changes on the documented safety analysis. Diagrams should be revised to reflect functional differences, WUC changes should be noted, and all differences listed on a flight-safety functional tabulation sheet. The functional deck printout can be used for manual indication of what the changes are and where they occur. New data cards are prepared and the functional deck updated by the removal of obsolete cards and the insertion of new cards. From this point on, the computer is again utilized to edit the functional deck, perform path identification/documentation, and calculate sensitivities for each WUC.

Block diagrams and other affected portions of the specific aircraft safety analysis report should be updated and revised pages issued that reflect these changes. Maintaining an accurate and updated model is important to obtaining an accurate assessment of the safety significance of hardware failures.

T-39A MODEL DEVELOPMENT

The FSPT model for the T-39A aircraft was begun in September 1975. The total aircraft documentation was submitted for "GO-95" computer edit at SA/ALC in August 1976.

The aircraft flight manual and maintenance technical orders provided the information on aircraft system operation. The model developed represents T-39A aircraft configured to the latest time compliance technical orders (TCTOs) documented in the manuals supplied by SA/ALC. Table 4-1 lists the manuals and their revision status applicable to the developed model. As noted in the table, two technical manuals (1T-39A-2-3 and 2-4) were not received in their entirety. However, SA/ALC supplied reproduction copies of applicable sections from the manuals which were used for model development. The reproduction copies are assumed to be the most recent revisions, which occurred during 1975.

TABLE 4-1. T-39A SYSTEM DOCUMENTATION

Nomenclature	Title	Revision/Date
1T-39A-1	Flight Manual	Change 1, 31 January 1975
1T-39A-2-3	Engines and Related System	Circa 1975*
1T-39A-2-3-1	Power Plant Ground Operation and Conditioning	Change 18, 2 June 1975
1T-39A-2-4	Flight Control and Hydraulically Operated Systems	Circa 1975*
1T-39A-2-5	Instruments and Electrical Systems	Change 17, 19 February 1974
1T-39A-2-6	Radio Communication and Navigation Systems	Change 21, 30 April 1975
1T-39A-06	Work Unit Code Manual	Basic, 1 April 1975

*See discussion, Section 4.

Because of the vulnerability of the functional logic/sensitivity documentation to such errors as omission of links, duplication of cards, and incorrect keypunching, quality reviews were conducted at various critical points in the model development. In addition to keypunch verification, each card was checked against the functional link shown on the original rough draft and the final functional diagram and the diagrammed link was checked off. Missing or duplicated functional links were thus identified. Work unit codes used in the model were checked off against the WUC manual to assure completeness.

The quality reviews were first conducted prior to computer verification of the aircraft deck by SA/ALC. Following computer verification, a second quality review was performed by representatives of Warner Robins ALC and ARINC Research. Finally, the first criticality printout obtained from application of actual aircraft data was reviewed to identify any terms whose sensitivity appeared to be unreasonable. In such cases the paths were traced manually and changes made if an erroneous relationship was found.

Appendix C presents the methods and standard used in documenting an FSPT aircraft model. Appendix D presents the FSPT documentation for the T-39A aircraft.

APPENDIX A
HISTORICAL SUMMARY OF FSPT

HISTORICAL SUMMARY OF FSPT

In 1965, the desirability and practicability of quantifying the significance of specific equipment malfunctions relative to flight safety was explored in a feasibility study conducted by ARINC Research Corporation for the Air Force. The feasibility of a safety-quantification approach, which has subsequently become known as Flight Safety Prediction Technique (FSPT), was demonstrated; and the method was developed and refined in a series of studies, as follows:

<u>Study Phase</u>	<u>Subject/Date</u>	<u>Sponsor*/Publication No.</u>
I	Feasibility Study, September 1965 to June 1967 (Phase I)	Sacramento Air Materiel Area (SMNE), Contract AF09(603)62335, SM-67-2; publication 705-01-1-777
II-A	Technique Development, October 1967 to July 1968 (Phase II-A)	San Antonio Air Materiel Area (SANEW), Contract AF09(603)-67-A-0267-SA01; publication 734-01-1-895
II-B	Technique Development, July 1968 to July 1969 (Phase II-B)	San Antonio Air Materiel Area (SANEW), Contract F09(603)-68-A-0317-SA01; publication 754-01-1-985 (Revision 1)
	FSPT System Documentation for the F-4C and T-37 Aircraft, October 1970 to June 1971	San Antonio Air Materiel Area (MMER) Contract F41608-71-C-0576; publication 697-01-1-1118

In the Phase II-B study, the FSPT was applied to the F-106 aircraft. Concurrent with Phase II-B, the U. S. Naval Safety Center contracted ARINC Research to extend the methodology to produce a flight safety criticality model for the F-4J aircraft. The results of this effort are documented in ARINC Research Publication 753-01-3-982 (Revision 1).

In 1970, ARINC Research was contracted to develop suitable input data to permit the application of the technique to the T-37 and F-4C aircraft. These data were derived in the form of mathematical model functional documentation as input to the basic computer program developed and applied to the F-106.

In 1972, ARINC Research Corporation was awarded a contract, with the subsequent modifications in 1973 and 1974, to apply the Flight Safety Prediction Technique to 15 aircraft, working jointly with cognizant Air Logistics Centers. Aircraft to which the FSPT has been applied under this latter contract (F09603-72-A-1132-SA01) include:

- a. T-38
- b. F-111A and FB-111A

*The office symbols of Service Engineering at the Sacramento and San Antonio Air Materiel Areas are now SM/ALC/MME and SA/ALC/MME, respectively.

- c. A-7D
- d. F-4D, E; RF-4C
- e. C-141
- f. A-37
- g. O-2
- h. OV-10
- i. B-52G, H
- j. C-130E
- k. KC-135
- l. C-5A
- m. T-39
- n. F-15
- o. UH-1N Helicopter*

*Feasibility study of adaptation of FSPT to rotary-wing aircraft.

APPENDIX B
FORMULATION OF CRITICALITY-ASSESSMENT TECHNIQUE

FORMULATION OF CRITICALITY-ASSESSMENT TECHNIQUE


To implement the basic safety model defined in Section 2.2, it is necessary to develop a submodel for the probability that a malfunction in element j during mission phase k will result in an accident. This submodel in turn requires that we estimate two parameters: the probability of accident if a major function is not available during each mission phase, and the dependence of the major function on element j during each mission phase.

The first parameter is termed "functional sensitivity" and is estimated for each major function. The functional analysis performed in this task established for an aircraft the following hierachal scheme:

Aircraft
Primary functions
Major functions
Function
Elements (Work Unit Codes)

A primary function would be one such as Flight Control. Major functions under Flight Control would include Pitch Control and Yaw Control.

The second parameter, "link dependency," is a vehicle for showing the influence of each functional-path element on the performance of a major function. For example, if the major function being considered is External Lighting, the following diagram illustrates the nature of functional sensitivity and link dependency values.



* Link dependencies

+ Functional sensitivity

The 0.8 value means that failure of the Control function will result in loss of the Landing Light function 80% of the time. The 0.1 functional sensitivity value denotes that loss of external lighting will result in an accident 10% of the time. The values must be interpreted in a proportional sense, in that the actual accident probability is dependent upon external factors (see Section 3.2.3).

The remainder of this appendix discusses the procedures and model used to obtain element sensitivities; e.g., in the above example, the accident probability given that a Work Unit Code in the Control function malfunctions.


Three principal types of functional relationship--series, redundant, and parallel--were identified as representing the major forms to consider in modeling element sensitivity.

Series Relationship -- A function having only one input. Schematically,




which indicates that outside of its own elements, the success of function B is only affected by the success of function A.

Functional Redundancy -- A function having one or more backup functions that can provide the required inputs to successor functions. Schematically,



where A_1 and A_2 represent a functional redundancy in that either may provide the necessary input to B.


Parallel Functions -- Two or more functions independent of each other in terms of functional success, but each of which may be required for a successor function. Schematically,



B will generally require both A_1 and A_2 ; but A_1 does not depend on A_2 , nor does A_2 depend on A_1 .

In some cases the distinction between functional redundancy and parallel paths is very slight, and may depend on mission phase. For example the four engines of a plane can be considered to be a redundant configuration providing inputs to the primary propulsion function during cruising, but would generally be considered to be parallel functions during takeoffs requiring full power.

In general, given a schematic relationship of the form,




we can say that A and B are in a functionally redundant configuration if the success probability of C is the same if 1) A and B are successful, 2) A only is successful, or 3) B only is successful. If, for example, C is more likely to be successful if both A and B are successful, rather than A or B alone, then the relationship is one of parallel paths.

It is noted that the model will also account for element redundancy and parallel elements through inputs such as $P(\bar{A}|I_a)$, representing the probability that the A^{th} function fails given that the I_a^{th} element in A has failed. If I_a is a parallel element, the probability would depend on mission requirements and other parallel-element states.


Link dependency is the conditional probability of a functional failure, given the failure of immediate predecessor functions. The link dependencies applicable to the three basic designs defined above are shown below.

Series Relationship




Link dependency = $P(\bar{B}|\bar{A})$ = probability that B fails given that A fails.

Functional Redundancy




equivalent to



$$\text{where } \bar{B} = \bar{B}_1 \bar{B}_2$$


Parallel Functions



We shall generally assume that the dependencies of B_1 with respect to A , and of B_2 with respect to A , are independent of each other, so that

$$P(\bar{B}_1 \bar{B}_2 | \bar{A}) = P(\bar{B}_1 | \bar{A}) P(\bar{B}_2 | \bar{A})$$

We then can consider three link dependencies from A to B as follows:




noting that

$$P(\bar{B}_1 | \bar{A}) = P(\bar{B}_1 B_2 | \bar{A}) + P(\bar{B}_1 \bar{B}_2 | \bar{A})$$

$$P(\bar{B}_2 | \bar{A}) = P(B_1 \bar{B}_2 | \bar{A}) + P(\bar{B}_1 \bar{B}_2 | \bar{A})$$

Models are shown below for determining the sensitivity of elements within a function for each of the three basic designs. The following basic assumptions apply:

- a. Except for cases where an element has a redundant or parallel counterpart or is located in a function with a redundant or parallel function, only the element under consideration shall be assumed to have failed initially. Thus the expression $P(A|i_a)$, representing the accident probability given failure of the i^{th} Work Unit Code element, is based on the assumption that no other element has failed unless element i is in some redundant or parallel configuration. For cases in which there are redundant or parallel counterparts, failures of such counterpart elements or functions are considered in accordance with their occurrence probabilities.
- b. The success of all immediate predecessors ensures the success of a function, provided that the function experiences no element failures. Thus for the series function relationship




we assume

$$P(\bar{B} | A) = 0,$$

provided B experiences no element failures. If an element in function A is under consideration, the latter provision is always true by assumption "a."


The element sensitivity models are:

Series Relationship



$$P(A|i_a) = P(\bar{A}|i_a) P(\bar{B}|\bar{A}) P(\bar{C}|\bar{B}) P(A|\bar{C})$$


Functional Redundancy



$$P(M|I_a) = P(\bar{A}|I_a) P(\bar{B}| \bar{A}) P(\bar{C} | \bar{B}) P(M | \bar{C})$$

$$P(M|I_{b1}) = P(\bar{B}_1 | I_{b1}) P(\bar{B}_2 | \bar{B}_1) P(\bar{C} | \bar{B}_2) P(M | \bar{C})$$

Parallel Functions




$$P(M|I_a) = P(\bar{A}|I_a) \{ P(\bar{B}C | \bar{A}) P(\bar{D} | \bar{B}C) + P(B\bar{C} | \bar{A}) P(\bar{D} | B\bar{C})$$

$$+ P(\bar{B}\bar{C} | \bar{A}) P(\bar{D} | \bar{B}\bar{C}) \} P(M | \bar{D})$$

$$P(M|I_b) = P(\bar{B}|I_b) \{ P(\bar{C} | I_b) P(\bar{D} | \bar{B}\bar{C}) + P(C | I_b) P(\bar{D} | B\bar{C}) \} P(M | \bar{D})$$

A case not explicitly included in the above three basic functional relationships is one for which a function is in two paths, e.g.,



then

$$\begin{aligned} P(A|i_a) = & P(\bar{C}|i_a)P(B|i_a)P(A|\bar{C}B) + P(C|i_a)P(\bar{B}|i_a)P(A|C\bar{B}) \\ & + P(\bar{C}|i_a)P(\bar{B}|i_a)\{1 - P(\bar{A}|\bar{C})P(\bar{A}|\bar{B})\} \end{aligned}$$

where it is assumed that the effects of loss of the major functions in accident occurrence are independent of each other.

Use of Numerical Provisory Factors for Partially Redundant Systems

The numerical provisory factors (see Table 3-1) are used where more than two identical functions are involved in a redundancy. For example, aircraft with more than two engines often have identical and independent systems for hydraulic pressurization, and for electrical power generation, one driven by each engine. If the aircraft can be operated safely with one or more of such systems in a failed state, one of the numeric codes is utilized in assigning link dependency values. Consider, for example, the following:

If N identical and independent units* are available and at least M are required for safe operation, where $0 < M < N$, then the provisory factor of a given unit, say U_j , is the probability that the failure of U_j will cause the aircraft to enter an unsafe state. This is the probability that exactly $M-1$ of the remaining $N-1$ units will be in an unfailed state. This probability can be calculated by the formula for the binomial distribution, and is given by

$$P(U_j) = \binom{N-1}{M-1} p^{(M-1)} q^{(N-M)}$$

where $P(U_j)$ = probability that failure of the j^{th} unit will cause the aircraft to enter an unsafe state, and

M = Number of units required

N = Number of units available

p = Probability that a single unit will be in an unfailed state

q = Probability that a single unit will be in a failed state or $(1-p)$

*Units may be either elements, element assemblies, or functions.

Assignment of link dependencies to N identical and independent units of which only M are required proceeds as follows. The value assigned to each unit is the dependency of the higher level function on receiving an output from M of the units (usually 1.0). The provisory factor is the appropriate numeric code. In the evaluation of the path sensitivity, the computer is programmed to select the binomial formula that corresponds to the provisory factor listed.

APPENDIX C
FSPT DOCUMENTATION METHODS

FSPT DOCUMENTATION METHODS

Because of the extreme complexity of aircraft, it is necessary to develop a computerized method to identify and document all possible paths associated with each function as well as to determine the safety sensitivity associated with each path. A computer routine has been devised that takes the data from the functional card deck and traces and documents all paths. For each WUC, it also computes the flight-phase sensitivities for each path in which the WUC is present. The resulting computer printout provides a combined functional path sensitivity.

C.1 ALPHA CODING

As each system of the aircraft is functionally diagrammed, the functional blocks are assigned an "alpha code". This code aids the analyst in the bookkeeping tasks of functional diagramming and provides the computer with an identification of the elements to be processed. For standardization among aircraft, nine top-level functions have been defined and each has been assigned an initial or first-alpha designator. Each block in the functional diagram carries the same initial alpha as the top level function. Subsequent letters added to the initial alpha uniquely identify each block.

The only restrictions placed on the assignment of alpha codes are that:

- a. All characters in a code must be a letter of the alphabet, and
- b. The maximum number of characters in one code is seven.

C.2 ALPHA CODING AND COMPUTER PROGRAM COMPATIBILITY

Additional rules for alpha coding required to obtain the desired results from computer processing include:

- a. When a WUC item operates in the same mode to perform more than one function, the same alpha code is used in each application.
- b. When a WUC item operates in a different mode to perform each of more than one function, a different alpha designator is assigned for each operating mode.

C.3 FUNCTIONAL TABULATION

The "Flight Safety Functional Tabulation" sheet is used to code the safety model for keypunching. The sheets are coded as follows (refer to Figure C-1) for an example).

- a. Columns 1 through 3. Used to identify the aircraft represented by the model. For certain aircraft modeled under this contract more than one model - designation series MDS - was included. For instance, a single functional deck was created for four MDSs of the F-4 aircraft. Cards with "F4B"** in columns 1-3 were common to all aircraft. For example,

*B = blank

Figure C-1. Flight Safety Functional Tabulation

when these cards are combined with those carrying "F4E" in columns 1-3, then it produces an F-4E FSPT model deck.

- b. Columns 4 through 31. Contain the title of the function or the WUC item.
- c. Columns 32 through 36. Contain the left-justified WUC number.
- d. Columns 37 and 38. Blank
- e. Columns 39 through 46. Contain the assigned alpha designator for the function and/or the WUC. Column 39 contains either an L or an R, or is blank. The L and R designate left and right for those instances when the function and/or WUC pertains to the left or right side of the aircraft.
- f. Columns 47 and 48. Blank.
- g. Columns 49 through 55. Normally left blank, but are used after a deck is operational to substitute the data on a card for that stored in the computer by punching the line record number in this field.
- h. Columns 56 through 63. Identify the dependent functions for either the function or specific WUCs being coded. Column 56 may contain L, R or blank for the same purpose as that of column 39.
- i. Column 64. Contains the alphanumeric code of the "provisory factor" applicable to the link value assigned.
- j. Columns 65 through 69. Contain the alpha designator of a function that is an alternate for the function being coded. (Column 65 is used for "L" or "R" as in Column 39.) The presence of the "alternate alpha" flags the importance of the link dependency as being affected by the success probability of the alternate function.
- k. Column 70. Contains the work unit code dependency value (1 = 0.10; 2 = 0.20;A = 1.0). This value is applicable to all flight phases.
- l. Column 71. Contains special instructions to the computer through the use of letters F, S, or being blank. Cards with an "S" or "blank" in column 71 are used in sensitivity computations. Cards with an "F" document a functional relationships which, although present in the system, would produce an erroneous sensitivity value when combined with other nonindependent paths (having the same function in common at some higher level). The "F" prevents the computer from including the link in the sensitivity calculations.
- m. Columns 72 through 80. Contain functional dependencies for each of nine flight phases as described in Section 3.2.1 of the text. Coding is the same as for column 70.

C.4 DIAGRAM CONSTRUCTION

The diagrams produced under the contract document the functional inter-relationship of the aircraft systems considered in the model. In the interest of extending the useful life of the diagrams, WUC items are not shown, thereby eliminating the necessity of updating the diagrams with each (and sometimes frequent) change to the WUC manual.

As discussed earlier in this report, the diagrams represent the hierarchical structure of the paths from which the sensitivity values are derived. The diagrams, although consistent with the system schematic and reliability block diagrams, are not equivalent due to this hierarchical method of documentation. In the actual system, signals and/or fluids pass from one component to the next and are thus documented in schematics; conversely, the hierarchical approach only identifies the components that must operate to achieve a given function, independent of the direction and/or sequence of signal flow. This approach directly addresses the system impact of a component failure without the necessity of identifying the intrasystem secondary failures. Each line connecting functions on the diagram is documented by a punchcard, with the lower function providing the "alpha designator" and the higher function's alpha designator indicator as the "dependent function".*

*The card deck also documents functional relationships not shown on the diagram; the work unit codes (mentioned earlier) and the "S" cards discussed in paragraph C.3.1.

APPENDIX D
FSPT DOCUMENTATION OF T-39A AIRCRAFT

FSPT DOCUMENTATION OF T-39A AIRCRAFT

This appendix contains the functional relationship diagrams and a listing of the keypunch cards that comprise the T-39A aircraft FSPT safety model documentation.


D. 1 DIAGRAMS


The diagrams illustrating the functional relationships considered in the T-39A safety model will be found on pages D-5 through D-19, and are listed below:

	<u>Diagram</u>	<u>Page</u>
Propulsion		
Propulsion/Engine	B-1	D-5
Propulsion/Engine Status	B-2	D-6
Propulsion/Fuel	B-3	D-7
Communications/Navigation/Identification		
Comm/Nav/Ident	C-1	D-8
En Route Aids	C-2	D-9
Information and Displays		
Info & Displays	D-1	D-10
Environmental Control		
Environmental Control	E-1	D-11
Environmental Control	E-2	D-12
Flight Control		
Flight Control	F-1	D-13
Yaw/Pitch Control	F-2	D-14
Ground Control		
	G-1	D-15
Mission Support		
	M-1	D-16
Landing Gear		
Landing Gear	N-1	D-17
Gear Retract	N-2	D-18
Utilities		
	U-1	D-19


D. 2 CARD LISTING

Pages D-21 through D-57 are a reproduction of the punchcard listing. The listing is alphabetical by "alpha designator", and the format is that of the 80-column punchcard itself as described in Appendix C. At the top of each page the card columns are printed vertically; for example, column 34 is printed "3".







PROPELLER - ENGINE STATUS		
AIRCRAFT	DATE	DIAGRAM
T-38A	SEP 76	B-2




D-7







TITLE: COMM/NAV/IDENT

AIRCRAFT	DATE	DIAGRAM
T-39A	SE P 76	C-2







TITLE: ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL
 AIRCRAFT DATE DIAGRAM
 T-39A SEP 76 E-1



D-12




TITLE: FLIGHT CONTROL		
AIRCRAFT	DATE	DIAGRAM
T-39A	SEP 76	F-1





TITLE: FLIGHT CONTROL


AIRCRAFT	DATE	DIAGRAM
T-38A	SEP 78	F-2




TITLE: MISSION SUPPORT	
AIRCRAFT	DATE
T-38A	ME/PW







TITLE: LANDING GEAR		
AIRCRAFT	DATE	DIAGRAM
T-38A	SEP 76	N-2



BEST AVAILABLE COPY

PGG095.J1R1 DATE = 09/09/76

FLIGHT SAFETY PREDICTION TECHNIQUE

0000000001111111122222222333333334444444455555555566666666677777777778				
12345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890				
PGG095.J1C0 T-39	T39	1 T39		
T39 PROPULSION		B		AAAAAAA
T39 BASIC ENGINE, EA OF TWO		BAA	B	04111110
T39 BASIC ENGINE,EA OF TWO		BAA	B	K BAB
T39 BASIC ENGINE, EA OF TWO		BAA	BAB	0AAAAAA
T39 ONE FNGINE FAILED		BAK	BAB	SAAAAAAA
T39 CONTAINMENT		BAC	BAA	FAAAAAAA
T39 FLEX MOUNT	2311A	BACA	BAC	A
T39 STEADY MOUNT	2311B	BACB	BAC	A
T39 DEFLECTOR	1161C	BACC	BAC	1
T39 TRUNNION MOUNT	1161H	BACD	BAC	1
T39 RETAINER	23114	BACE	BAC	1
T39 SUPPORT	23115	BACF	BAC	1
T39 BRACKET	23116	BACG	BAC	1
T39 TRUNNION	23117	BACH	BAC	A
T39 TRUNNION SUPPORT	23118	BACJ	BAC	1
T39 SCOOP, RAM AIR	1161E	BACK	BAC	0
T39 DOOR,UPR,FWD,INBRD	11612	BACL	BAC	0
T39 DOOR,UPR,FWD,OUTBRD	11613	BACM	BAC	0
T39 DOOR,UPR,AFT	11614	BACN	BAC	0
T39 DOOR,LOWER	11615	BACP	BAC	0
T39 LATCH ASSY	11617	BACQ	BAC	0
T39 SKIN	11618	BACR	BAC	0
T39 SKIN	11632	BACS	BAC	0
T39 ACCESS DOOR	11633	BACT	BAC	0
T39 FRAME	11634	BACU	BAC	1
T39 THRUST		BAD	BAA	AAAAAAA
T39 TAIL PIPE	23176	BADA	BAD	1
T39 TAIL PIPE CLAMP	23177	BADB	BAD	2
T39 COMBUSTION		BAE	BAD	AAAAAAA
T39 CASE ASSY,COMB CHB,INNER	23AEA	BAEA	BAE	A
T39 CBR ASSY,COMB NO 1,5,7	23AEB	BAEB	BAE	A
T39 CBR ASSY,COMB NO 2,4,8	23AEC	BAEC	BAE	A
T39 CHB ASSY,COMB NO 3	23AED	BAED	BAE	A
T39 CHB ASSY,COMB NO 6	23AEE	BAEE	BAE	A
T39 CLAMP ASSY,CHB RETAINING	23AEF	BAFF	BAE	A
T39 CASE ASSY,COMB CHB,OUTER	23AEG	BAEG	BAE	A
T39 NUT ASSY,COMB CHB FIRESEAL	23AEH	BAEH	BAE	A
T39 FUEL DRAIN VALVE	2315C	BAEJ	BAE	1
T39 DUCT ASSY,CMB CHB OUTLET	23AFA	BAEK	BAE	5
T39 SUP ASSY,CHB OUTLET DUCT	23AFC	BAEL	BAE	5
T39 CORE ENGINE		BAF	BAE	AAAAAAA
T39 CORE ENGINE		BAF	LBAX	FAAAAAAA
T39 CORE ENGINE		BAF	RBAX	FAAAAAAA
T39 CORE ENGINE		BAF	LBAY	FAAAAAAA
T39 CORE ENGINE		BAF	RBAY	FAAAAAAA
T39 COMP ROTOR/STATOR ASSY	23AAA	BAFA	BAF	8
T39 COMP INLET CASE	23AAE	BAFB	RAF	8
T39 BRG NO 1	23AAG	BAFC	BAF	A
T39 SEAL,NO 1 BRG	23AAH	BAFD	BAF	8

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T39 HOUSING,NO 1 BRG	23AAJ	BAFE	BAF	1
T39 VANE,COMP INLET	23AAL	BAFF	BAF	A
T39 VANE/SHROUD ASSY-1ST STA	23AAM	BAFG	RAF	8
T39 VANE/SHROUD ASSY-2ND STA	23AAN	BAFH	BAF	8
T39 VANE/SHROUD ASSY-3RD STA	23AAP	BAFJ	BAF	8
T39 PLATE,COMP VANE,INNER	23AAW	BAFK	BAF	A
T39 VANE,1ST STA	23AAZ	BAFL	BAF	A
T39 FRONT HUB	23ARB	BAFM	BAF	8
T39 BLADE,1ST STA	23ACD	BAFN	RAF	A
T39 BRG,COMP,REAR	23AC2	BAFQ	HAF	A
T39 SEAL ASSY,COMP RR BRG HSNG	23AC8	BAFR	BAF	8
T39 DIFFUSER CASE	23ADA	BAFS	BAF	A
T39 VANE AND SHROUD ASSY	23ADD	BAFT	BAF	8
T39 SHROUD ASSY,1ST STA VANE	23AFB	BAFU	BAF	8
T39 CASE ASSY,TURBINE	23AFD	BAFV	BAF	8
T39 SEAL,TB ROTOR,1STA,OUTER	23AFE	BAFW	BAF	8
T39 SPACER,TB ROTOR,1STA SEAL	23AFG	BAFX	BAF	1
T39 SHROUD/SEAL ASSY,TB VANE	23AFH	BAFY	BAF	1
T39 SEAL,TB ROTOR,2ND STA	23AFJ	BAFZ	BAF	8
T39 VANE,TB,1ST STA	23AFM	BAFZA	BAF	A
T39 VANE,TB,2ND STA	23AFN	BAFZB	BAF	A
T39 TURBINE ROTOR	23AFP	BAFZC	BAF	A
T39 SEAL ASSY,TB BRG	23AFQ	BAFZD	HAF	8
T39 SUPPORT,TB BRG SEAL	23AFS	BAFZE	BAF	1
T39 SHIELD ASSY,TB BRG,HEAT	23AFT	BAFZF	BAF	2
T39 DTSK,2ND STA TB	23AFW	BAFZG	BAF	8
T39 RING,RETAINING BRG IN RACE	23AF2	BAFZH	RAF	8
T39 BRG,TURBINE	23AF3	BAFZJ	BAF	A
T39 BLADE,TB,1ST STA	23AF5	BAFZK	BAF	A
T39 BLADE,TB,2ND STA	23AF6	BAFZL	BAF	A
T39 CASE ASSY,TB EXHAUST	23AF7	BAFZM	BAF	A
T39 CONE AND STRUT ASSY	23AF8	BAFZN	BAF	8
T39 NOSE GUIDE VANE	1161G	BAFZP	BAF	8
T39 AIR INLET DUCT &NOSE ASSY<11616		BAFZQ	BAF	2
T39 ENGINE OIL DISTRIBUTION		BAG	BAF	00AAAAAA00
T39 TUBE-TURBINE BRG TRANSFER	23CAP	BAGA	BAG	8
T39 OIL SUPPLY		BAH	BAG	AAAAAAA4AA
T39 MAIN OIL STRAINER	23CAB	BAHA	BAH	2
T39 SPT ASSY,OIL STRAINER	23CAC	BAHB	BAH	1
T39 OIL TANK ASSY	23CAE	BAHC	BAH	8
T39 TUBE ASSY,FR BRG-PUMP RTN	23CAH	BAHD	BAH	1
T39 TUBE ASSY,TB BRG EXT RTN	23CAJ	BAHE	BAH	1
T39 STRAINER ASSY,CMP RR BRG	23CAM	BAHF	BAH	1
T39 STRAINER ASSY,TB BRG	23CAN	BAHG	BAH	1
T39 STRAINER SCREEN GEARBX OIL	23AHP	BAHH	BAH	1
T39 OIL PRESSURIZATION		BAJ	BAG	AAAAAAA4AA
T39 MAIN OIL PUMP	23CAA	BAJA	BAJ	A
T39 OIL PRESS RELIEF VALVE	23CAD	BAJB	BAJ	2
T39 MANF ASSY,PRESS MAIN BRG	23CAK	BAJC	BAJ	8
T39 NOZZLE ASSY,CMP RR BRG	23CAL	BAJD	BAJ	1

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FLIGHT SAFETY PREDICTION TECHNIQUE

T39	NOZZLE CMP FR BRG	23CAR	BAJE	BAJ	1
T39	SEAL, STARTER/GEN PAD	23AJ5	BAJF	BAJ	1
T39	TUBE ASSY FRONT BEAR PRES	23CAG	BAJG	BAJ	1
T39	VENTING		BAK	BAG	000000000
T39	MANF ASSY,TANK BREATHER	23CB8	BAKA	BAK	1
T39	MANF ASSY,BREATHER,EXT FR	23CFC	BAKB	BAK	1
T39	TUBE ASSY,CMP FR BRG BRTHR	23CBD	BAKC	BAK	1
T39	SEAL BREATHER SHAFT GEAR	23AJG	BAKD	BAK	0
T39	OIL COOLING		BAL	BAG	004888000
T39	FUEL OIL COOLER	23517	BALA	BAL	8
T39	ENGINE ANTI-ICE		BAM	BAF	A 888888888
T39	RELAY	23413	BAMA	RAM	A
T39	ENG INLET DE-ICE VALVE	23417	BAMB	BAM	A
T39	DUCT	23418	BAMC	BAM	A
T39	CIRCUIT BREAKER	4152	BAMD	BAM	1
T39	GROUND START		BAN	BAE	000000000
T39	BSHNG,START/GEN DR SHT BRG	23AHL	BANA	BAN	1
T39	SHAFT,STARTER/GEN DR	23AJ3	BANB	BAN	A
T39	SUPPORT ASSY,START/GEN	BRG23AJ7	BANC	BAN	1
T39	COVER,START/GEN ACCESS DR	23AJ8	BAND	BAN	0
T39	STARTER BUTTON	23312	BANE	BAN	A
T39	STARTER-GENERATOR	42131	BANF	BAN	A
T39	RLY,GENERATOR,MONITOR	4217C	BANG	BAN	A
T39	RLY,GENERATOR,FIELD CONTR	4217D	BANH	BAN	A
T39	RLY,BATTERY START	42171	BANJ	BAN	A
T39	RLY,EXT PWR CUTOUT	42172	BANK	BAN	0
T39	RELAY START CONTROLLER	4217J	BANL	BAN	A
T39	CIRCUIT BREAKER	42152	BANM	BAN	1
T39	AIR START		BAP	BAE	T 00AAAAAA00
T39	SW.,AIR START	23313	BAPA	BAP	A
T39	RELAY	23314	BAPB	BAP	A
T39	CIRCUIT BREAKER	42152	BAPC	BAP	1
T39	START/IGNITION		BAQ	BAN	A00000000
T39	START IGNITION		BAQ	BAP	0AAAAAAA00
T39	EXCITER,IGNITION	23FAB	BAQA	BAQ	A
T39	CABLE,ELEC PWR,EXC-IGN	23FAC	BAQB	BAQ	A
T39	IGNITER PLUG %4EAC	23FAD	BAQC	BAQ	2
T39	CABLE,BRND,AIRFRAME/ENG	23FAE	BAQD	BAQ	A
T39	SW.,ENGINE MASTER	23131	BAQE	BAQ	A
T39	SW.,FUEL-IGNITION	23311	BAQF	BAJ	A
T39	LIGHT INDICATOR	23318	BAQG	BAQ	0
T39	CIRCUIT BREAKER	23132	BAQH	BAQ	A
T39	CABLE ASSY PN 10 166435	23123	BAQJ	BAQ	8
T39	CONTROLLED FUEL		BAS	BAE	AAAAAA0000
T39	MANIFOLD ASSY,FUEL	23BAK	BASA	BAS	A
T39	NOZZLE ASSY,FUEL MTERING	23BAN	BASB	BAS	?
T39	CONNECTOR,PRESS VALVE UNK	23BAP	BASC	BAS	0
T39	TUBE,XFER,PRESS VALVE	23BAQ	BASD	BAS	2
T39	TUBE ASSY,FUEL SIGNAL	23BAT	BASE	BAS	A
T39	DRAIN MANIFOLD	2311F	BASF	BAS	0

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000000000111111111222222222333333334444444445555555566666667777777778				
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T39 DIAPHRAGM	23112	BASG	BAS	3
T39 DIAPHRAGM SEAL	23113	BASH	BAS	3
T39 FUEL PRESS & DUMP VALVE	23BAR	BASJ	BAS	8
T39 VALVE ASSY,FUEL CHECK	23BAS	BASK	BAS	0
T39 ENGINE FUEL CONTROL		BAT	BAS	AAAAAAA
T39 FUEL CONTROL%ALT	23BABC	BATA	BAT	5
T39 FILTER SCREEN & SPRT ASSY	23BAD	BATB	BAT	1
T39 BLEED ACTUATOR ASSY	23BAE	BATC	BAT	3
T39 POWER LEVER X-SHAFT ASSY	23BAF	BATD	BAT	8
T39 SUPPORT,X-SHAFT	23BAG	BATE	BAT	1
T39 ARM/LEVER,X-SHAFT	23BAJ	BATF	BAT	A
T39 GEAR SHAFT,FUEL CONTR DR	23AJC	BATJ	BAT	A
T39 BOSS ASSY,FUEL CONTROL	23AJE	BATK	BAT	5
T39 THROTTLE CONTROL		BAU	BAT	AAAAAAA
T39 QUADRANT ASSY	23221	BAUA	BAU	8
T39 FRICTION LOCK	23222	BAUB	BAU	1
T39 ROD ASSY	23226	BAUC	BAU	8
T39 ROD ASSY,LH	23227	BAUD	BAU	8
T39 ROD ASSY,RH	23228	BAUE	BAU	8
T39 TELESCOPIC UNIT	2322C	BAUF	BAU	8
T39 TELEFLEX CABLE	2322A	BAUG	BAU	A
T39 DIFFUSER PRESS SENSE		BAV	BAT	AAAAAAA
T39 PROBE,FUEL CONT PRESS SENS	23ADJ	BAVA	BAV	A
T39 TUBE ASSY,DIFF PRESS SENS	23BAU	RAVB	BAV	A
T39 COMP INLET PRESS SENSE		BAW	BAT	AAAAAAA
T39 PROBE ASSY,COMP IN PRESS	23AAK	BAWA	BAW	A
T39 TURE ASSY,COMP IN PRESS	23RAV	BAWB	BAW	8
T39 LEFT ENG ACCESS DR		LBAX	RPFB	AAAAAAA
T39 LEFT ENG ACCESS DR		LBAX	LUDQ	AAAAAAA
T39 RIGHT ENG ACCESS DR		RBAX	RUDQ	AAAAAAA
T39 CPL,GEAR BOX DR SHAFT	23AGB	LBAXA	LBAX	A
T39 CPL,GEAR BOX DR SHAFT	23AGB	RBAXA	RBAX	A
T39 SPACER,UPR BRG SLEEVE,IN	23AGD	LBAXB	LBAX	1
T39 SPACER,UPR BRG SLEEVE,IN	23AGD	RBAXB	RBAX	1
T39 GEAR BX	23AHA	LBAXC	LBAX	8
T39 GEAR BX	23AHA	RBAXC	RBAX	8
T39 PLUG,DR SHAFT	23AHC	LBAXD	LBAX	0
T39 PLUG,DR SHAFT	23AHC	RBAXD	RBAX	0
T39 ADPTR,GEAR BOX-POSN BOSS	23AHD	LBAXE	LBAX	0
T39 ADPTR,GEAR BOX-POSN BOSS	23AHD	RBAXE	RBAX	0
T39 HSG ASSY,DR GEARBOX	23AHG	LBAXF	LBAX	1
T39 HSG ASSY,DR GEARBOX	23AHG	RBAXF	RBAX	1
T39 COVER,ENG ACCESS DR	23AJN	LBAXG	LBAX	1
T39 COVER,ENG ACCESS DR	23AJN	RBAXG	RBAX	1
T39 GEAR MAIN COMP DRIVE	23ACW	LBAXH	LBAX	A
T39 GEAR MAIN COMP DRIVE	23ACW	RBAXH	RBAX	A
T39 LEFT ENG BLEED AIR DISTR		LBAY	ECW	AAAAAAA
T39 LEFT ENG BLEED AIR DISTR		LBAY	UHC	11111111
T39 RIGHT ENG BLEED AIR DISTR		RBAY	ECV	AAAAAAA
T39 RIGHT ENG BLEED AIR DISTR		RBAY	UHC	11111111

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T39 BLEED VALVE & LINKAGE	23DAA	LBAYA	LBAY	A		
T39 BLEED VALVE & LINKAGE	23DAA	RBAYA	RBAY	A		
T39 STRAP ASSY,COMPRESSOR	23DAB	LBAYB	LBAY	8		
T39 STRAP ASSY,COMPRESSOR	23DAB	RBAYB	RBAY	8		
T39 CONNECT LINK,BLEED VALVE	23DAC	LBAYC	LBAY	A		
T39 CONNECT LINK,BLEED VALVE	23DAC	RBAYC	RBAY	A		
T39 ARM,AIR BLEED VALVE	23DAH	LBAYD	LBAY	A		
T39 ARM,AIR BLEED VALVE	23DAH	RBAYD	RBAY	A		
T39 ROD,VALVE LINKAGE	23DAL	LBAYE	LBAY	A		
T39 ROD,VALVE LINKAGE	23DAL	RBAYE	RBAY	A		
T39 ENGINE STATUS		BAZ	BAT	AAAAAAA		
T39 THROTTLE CONTROL DATA ATTN		BAZA	BAZ	11111111		
T39 OIL PRESSURE		BAZAA	BAZ	I BAG	AAAAAAA	
T39 OIL PRESS INDICATION		BAZB	BAZAA	11111111		
T39 INDICATOR,OIL PRESSURE	51441	BAZBA	BAZB	A		
T39 XMITTER,OIL PRESSURE	51442	BAZBB	BAZB	A		
T39 CIRCUIT BREAKER	42231	BAZBC	BAZB	1		
T39 LOW PRESS WARNING		BAZC	BAZAA	11111111		
T39 SW.,OIL PRESSURE	51443	BAZCA	BAZC	A		
T39 LIGHT PANEL	44241	BAZCR	BAZC	1		
T39 LIGHT,MASTER	44242	BAZCC	BAZC	1		
T39 LIGHT,INDICATOR	44243	BAZCD	BAZC	2		
T39 RELAY,TEST	44244	BAZCE	BAZC	0		
T39 CIRCUIT BREAKER	42152	BAZCF	BAZC	1		
T39 OIL OVERHEAT WARNING		BAZD	BAZ	I BAL	11111111	
T39 BULB,OIL TEMP	51426	BAZDA	BAZD	A		
T39 LIGHT PANEL	44241	BAZDB	BAZD	1		
T39 LIGHT,MASTER	44242	BAZDC	BAZD	1		
T39 LIGHT,INDICATOR	44243	BAZDD	BAZD	2		
T39 RELAY,TEST	44244	BAZDE	BAZD	0		
T39 CIRCUIT BREAKER	42152	BAZDF	BAZD	1		
T39 EXHAUST PRESS IND		BAZE	BAZA	03222222		
T39 INDICATOR,EXHAUST PRESS	51431	BAZEA	BAZE	A		
T39 XMITTER,EXHAUST PRESS	51432	BAZER	BAZE	4		
T39 MANIFOLD ASSY,UPPER LEFT	23HAA	BAZEC	BAZE	5		
T39 MANIFOLD ASSY,LOWER LEFT	23HAB	BAZED	BAZE	5		
T39 MANIFOLD ASSY,LOWER RIGHT	23HAC	BAZEE	BAZE	5		
T39 MANIFOLD ASSY,UPPER RIGHT	23HAD	BAZEF	BAZE	5		
T39 CIRCUIT BREAKER	42231	BAZEG	BAZE	1		
T39 ENGINE RPM		BAZG	BAZA	11111111		
T39 INDICATOR,TACHOMETER	51411	BAZGA	BAZG	A		
T39 GENERATOR,TACHOMETER	51412	BAZGB	BAZG	A		
T39 GEARSHIFT TACH DRIVE	23AJR	BAZGC	BAZG	8		
T39 SEAL TACH DRIVE	23AJV	BAZGD	BAZG	1		
T39 ENGINE SYNC		BAZH	BAZA	00000000		
T39 SYNCHROSCOPE	51413	BAZHA	BAZH	A		
T39 EXHAUST GAS TEMP INDICATION		BAZJ	BAZA	11111111		
T39 INDICATOR,EXHAUST TEMP	51421	BAZJA	BAZJ	A		
T39 EXHAUST TEMP RES SPOOL	51422	BAZJB	BAZJ	A		
T39 THERMOCOUPLE	23GAA	BAZJC	BAZJ	A		

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T39 LIGHT, INDICATOR	46225 BSWA
T39 LIGHT, PANEL	44241 BSWB
T39 LIGHT, MASTER	44242 BSWC
T39 LIGHT, INDICATOR	44243 BSWD
T39 RELAY, TEST	44244 BSWE
T39 CIRCUIT BREAKER	42152 BSWF
T39 FUEL QUANTITY	BSX
T39 FUEL QUANTITY	BSX
T39 FUEL QTY INDICATION	BSY
T39 INDICATOR, FUEL QTY	51521 LBSYA
T39 INDICATOR, FUEL QTY	51521 RBSYA
T39 TANK UNIT #7 EAC	51522 LBSYB
T39 TANK UNIT #7 EAC	51522 RBSYB
T39 REFENCE CONDENSER	51523 LBSYC
T39 REFENCE CONDENSER	51523 RBSYC
T39 THERMISTOR	51525 LBSYD
T39 THERMISTOR	51525 RBSYD
T39 THERMISTOR CONTROL	51526 LBSYE
T39 THERMISTOR CONTROL	51526 RBSYE
T39 TEST SWITCH %SELECTOR%	51524 BSYF
T39 CIRCUIT BREAKER	42231 BSYG
T39 FUEL LEVEL LOW WARING	BSZ
T39 LIGHT, PANEL	44241 BSZA
T39 LIGHT, MASTER	44242 BSZB
T39 LIGHT, INDICATOR	44243 BSZC
T39 FILTER WARNING	BTA
T39 SW., DIFF PRESSURE	23218 BTAB
T39 LIGHT, PANEL	44241 BTAC
T39 LIGHT, MASTER	44242 BTAD
T39 LIGHT, INDICATOR	44243 BTAE
T39 CIRCUIT BREAKER	42152 BTAF
T39 COMM/NAV/IDENT	C
T39 COMMUNICATION	CA
T39 EXTERNAL COMMUNICATION	CAA
T39 VHF COMMUNICATION	CAC
T39 VHF-101	62100 CACA
T39 STATIC DISCHARGER	6211A CACB
T39 ANTENNA	62111 CACC
T39 CONTROL	62112 CACD
T39 MOUNT	62116 CACE
T39 WILCOX 807A	62200 CACF
T39 ANTENNA	62211 CACG
T39 CONTROL	62112 CACH
T39 MOUNT	62216 CACJ
T39 VHF TRANSMIT	CAD
T39 TRANSMITTER	62118 CADA
T39 TRANSCEIVER	62217 CADB
T39 VHF RECEIVE	CAE
T39 RECEIVER	62117 CAEA
T39 TRANSCEIVER	62217 CAEB

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T39 DISTANCE		CFD	CFA	00011000
T39 PILOT DISTANCE		CFDA	CFD	K CFDB AAAAAAAA
T39 HORIZ SITUATION IND	51317	CFDAA	CFDA	8
T39 CIRCUIT BREAKER	42231	CFDAB	CFDA	1
T39 COPILOT DISTANCE		CFDB	CFD	K CFDA AAAAAAAA
T39 BEARING-DIST-HEAD IND	51314	CFDBA	CFDB	8
T39 CIRCUIT BREAKER	42152	CFDBB	CFDB	1
T39 HEADING		CFE	CFA	44444444
T39 PILOT HEADING		CFEA	CFF	K CFEB AAAAAAAA
T39 ATTITUDE DIRECT IND	51232	CFEAA	CFEA	8
T39 CIRCUIT BREAKER	42231	CFEAB	CFEA	1
T39 COPILOT HEADING		CFEB	CFF	K CFEA AAAAAAAA
T39 COPILOT 1		CFEC	CFEB	11111111
T39 BEARING-DIST-HEAD IND	51314	CFECA	CFEC	8
T39 CIRCUIT BREAKER	42152	CFECD	CFEC	1
T39 COPILOT 2		CFED	CFEB	11111111
T39 OMNIMAG COURSE IND	51312	CFEDA	CFED	8
T39 CIRCUIT BREAKER	42231	CFEDB	CFED	1
T39 ENROUTE NAV ELECTRONICS		CFF	CF	AAAAAAA
T39 TACAN		CFG	CFF	11111111
T39 MODULATOR MD-359	7121A	CFG A	CFG	8
T39 AZIMUTH GATE TD-273	7121B	CFG B	CFG	8
T39 AMPLIFIER AM-2212	7121D	CFG C	CFG	8
T39 RT UNIT RF-98	7121E	CFG D	CFG	8
T39 POWER SUPPLY PP-2331	7121F	CFG E	CFG	8
T39 VIDEO DECODER KY-290	7121G	CFG F	CFG	8
T39 PRESELECTOR Z108	7121K	CFG G	CFG	0
T39 CHANNEL SELECTOR C-2875	7121L	CFG H	CFG	8
T39 CRYSTAL SELECTOR TG-68	7121M	CFG J	CFG	A
T39 CIRCUIT BREAKER	42231	CFG K	CFG	1
T39 REC/TRANSMIT		CFH	CFG	AAAAAAA
T39 ANTENNA	7121N	CFHA	CFH	A
T39 REC/XMITTER RT-220C	71211	CFHB	CFH	8
T39 CONTROL PANEL C-1763	71212	CFHC	CFH	8
T39 MOUNT ASSY MT-929	71216	CFHD	CFH	0
T39 SHOCK ASSY	71217	CFHE	CFH	0
T39 RADIO INST MASTER RELAY3/471114		CFHF	CFH	1
T39 RANGE		CFJ	CFG	00011000
T39 RANGE CONTROL	7121C	CFJA	CFJ	8
T39 RANGE GATE TD-272	7121H	CFJB	CFJ	8
T39 COUPLING		CFK	CFG	888888888
T39 TACAN COUPLER	71220	CFKA	CFK	8
T39 IND COUPLER	71221	CFKB	CFK	8
T39 RANGE MODULE	71222	CFKC	CFK	1
T39 AZIMUTH MODULE	71223	CFKD	CFK	8
T39 PHASE DETECTOR	71224	CFKE	CFK	8
T39 MOUNTING	71225	CFKF	CFK	0
T39 VOR		CFL	CFF	11111111
T39 VOR		CFL	CHD	AAAAAAA
T39 CONTROL PANEL	71512	CFLA	CFL	8

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FLIGHT SAFETY PREDICTION TECHNIQUE

0000000001111111122222222333333334444444445555555566666666677777777778				
12345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890				
T39 INST MASTER RELAYS 3 AND	571114	CFLB	CFL	1
T39 CIRCUIT BREAKER	42152	CFLC	CFL	1
T39 INSTRUMENTATION		CFM	CFL	AAAAAAA
T39 INSTRUMENTATION UNIT	71514	CFMA	CFM	d
T39 POWER SUPPLY AC 516A-1	71515	CFMB	CFM	8
T39 POWER SUPPLY AC 516B-3	71516	CFMC	CFM	8
T39 RF-1F AMP MODULE 51X2B	71517	CFMD	CFM	8
T39 1F AND AUDIO MODULE	71518	CFME	CFM	8
T39 500KC FILTER MODULE	7151A	CFMF	CFM	3
T39 CIRCUIT BREAKER	42231	CFMG	CFM	1
T39 RECEIVE		CFN	CFL	AAAAAAA
T39 REF AMP MODULE 344B1	71518	CFNA	CFN	8
T39 VARIABLE AMP MODULE	7151C	CFNB	CFN	8
T39 CONVERT DISCRIM MODULE	7151E	CFNC	CFN	8
T39 BEARING SERVO MODULE	7151F	CFND	CFN	8
T39 VOR FLAG CONT MODULE	7151H	CFNE	CFN	1
T39 BEARING MECHANISM MODULE	7151J	CFNF	CFN	8
T39 AC POWER SUPPLY MODULE	7151K	CFNG	CFN	8
T39 CHASSIS ASSY MODULE	7151L	CFNH	CFN	1
T39 MOUNT ASSY	7151M	CFNJ	CFN	0
T39 RECEIVER	71511	CFNK	CFN	8
T39 ANTENNA	71513	CFNL	CFN	A
T39 REMOTE DIRECTIONAL GYRO		CG	CE	888888888
T39 RELAY	7171A	CGA	CG	1
T39 REPEATER AMP A5	7171B	CGB	CG	8
T39 REPEATER MECHANISM MOD A-6	7171C	CGC	CG	8
T39 DIRECTIONAL GYRO	71712	CGD	CG	A
T39 COMPASS AMPLIFIER	71714	CGE	CG	8
T39 SHOCK MOUNT	71715	CGF	CG	C
T39 SERVO AMP A1	71716	CGG	CG	8
T39 PRE AMP A2	71717	CGH	CG	8
T39 POWER SUPPLY A3	71718	CGJ	CG	8
T39 GYRO	71912	CGK	CG	A
T39 COUPLER	71914	CGL	CG	8
T39 MOUNT	71915	CGM	CG	0
T39 SLAVING AMP	71916	CGN	CG	8
T39 POWER SUPPLY	71917	CGP	CG	8
T39 MECHANISM COMPASS	71918	CGQ	CG	8
T39 REMOTE MAG FLUX DETECT	51315	CGR	CG	3
T39 CYRO MODE SELECT SWITCH	51322	CGS	CG	5
T39 APPROACH AND LANDING AIDS		CH	CE	000000080
T39 VOR/ILS		CHA	CH	11111111
T39 HEADING		CHB	CHA	AAAAAAA
T39 PILOT HEADING		CHBA	CHR	K CHBB 11111111
T39 ATTITUDE DIRECTOR IND	51232	CHBAA	CHBA	8
T39 CIRCUIT BREAKER	42231	CHBAB	CHBA	1
T39 COPILOT HEADING		CHBB	CHB	K CHBA AAAA
T39 COPILOT 1		CHBC	CHBB	11111111
T39 BEARING-DIST-HEAD IND	51314	CHBCA	CHBC	8
T39 CIRCUIT BREAKER	42152	CHBCB	CHBC	1

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FLIGHT SAFETY PREDICTION TECHNIQUE

		CHBD	CHBB	
T39	COPILOT 2			1111111111
T39	OMNIMAG COURSE IND	51312	CHBDA	CHBD 8
T39	CIRCUIT BREAKER	42231	CHBDB	CHBD 1
T39	GLIDESLOPE		CHC	AAAAA AAAAAA
T39	POSER SUPPLY 51V-3	7141A	CHCA	CHC 8
T39	RF OSCILLATOR	7141E	CHCB	CHC 8
T39	POSER SUPPLY DGS-20	7141F	CHCC	CHC 8
T39	TOKE FILTER	7141H	CHCD	CHC 1
T39	RECEIVER	7141I	CHCE	CHC 8
T39	ANTENNA	71412	CHCF	CHC A
T39	CONTROL PANEL	71413	CHCG	CHC 8
T39	MOUNT ASSY	71414	CHCH	CHC 0
T39	PILOT GLIDESLOPE		CHCX	K CHCY AAAAAA AAAAAA
T39	ATTITUDE DIRECTOR IND	51232	CHCXA	CHCX 8
T39	CIRCUIT BREAKER	42231	CHCXR	CHCX 1
T39	COPILOT GLIDESLOPE		CHCY	K CHCX AAAAAA AAAAAA
T39	OMNIMAG COURSE IND	51312	CHCYA	CHCY 8
T39	CIRCUIT BREAKER	42231	CHCYB	CHCY 1
T39	VOR RECEIVE		CHD	CHA AAAAAA AAAAAA
T39	LOCALIZER OUTPUT MODULE	7151G	CHDA	CHD 8
T39	ADF		CHE	CH K CHA AAAAAA AAAAAA
T39	ADF RECEIVE		CHEA	CHE A AAAAAA
T39	ANTENNA	71811	CHEAA	CHEA A
T39	CONTROL	71812	CHEAB	CHEA 8
T39	INDICATOR	71813	CHEAC	CHEA 1
T39	DYNAMOTOR	71814	CHEAD	CHEA A
T39	RECEIVER	71815	CHEAE	CHEA 8
T39	MOUNT	71818	CHEAF	CHEA 0
T39	CIRCUIT BREAKER	42152	CHEAG	CHEA 1
T39	CIRCUIT BREAKER	42231	CHEAH	CHEA 1
T39	BEARING		CHER	CHE AAAAAA AAAAAA
T39	PILOT BEARING		CHEC	CHEB K CHED AAAAAA AAAAAA
T39	HORIZ SITUATION IND	51317	CHECA	CHEC 8
T39	CIRCUIT BREAKER	42231	CHECB	CHEC 1
T39	COPILOT BEARING		CHED	CHEB K CHEC AAAAAA AAAAAA
T39	BEARING-DIST-HEAD IND	51314	CHEDA	CHED 8
T39	CIRCUIT BREAKER	42152	CHEDB	CHED 1
T39	MARKER BEACON		CHF	CH 000000000
T39	RJ AND IF MODULE 512Z	7161A	CHFA	CHF 8
T39	AMPLIFIER MODULE 512Z	71618	CHFB	CHF 8
T39	RECEIVER	71611	CHFC	CHF 8
T39	ANTENNA	71612	CHFD	CHF A
T39	SENSITIVITY SWITCH	71613	CHFE	CHF 1
T39	INDICATOR LIGHT	71614	CHFF	CHF 1
T39	SWITCH TEST	71615	CHFG	CHF 0
T39	DIM AND TEST RELAY BOX	71112	CHFH	CHF 0
T39	FLIGHT DIRECTOR GROUP		CJ	CF 1111111111
T39	COMPUTER	71311	CJA	CJ 8
T39	FLT DIRECTOR SELECT SW	71312	CJB	CJ 5
T39	MOUNT ASSY	71313	CJC	CJ 0

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00000000111111112222222233333334444444455555555666666666677777777778							
12345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890							
T39 DEAD RECONING		CK	CD	K CE	00AAAAAA0		
T39 HEADING		CKA	CK		AAAAAAA		
T39 STANDBY COMPASS	51311	CKAA	CKA		1		
T39 COMPASS CORRECTION CARD	51324	CKAB	CKA		0		
T39 SEXTANT	51316	CKAC	CKA		1		
T39 SEXTANT MOUNT	51318	CKAD	CKA		0		
T39 TIME		CKB	CK		AAAAAAA		
T39 CLOCK	51321	CKBA	CKB		0		
T39 WEATHER AVOIDANCE		CL	CD		000000000		
T39 MODULATOR	7221A	CLA	CL		8		
T39 REC-XMITTER RT-101B-28	72221	CLB	CL		8		
T39 INDICATOR IN-112	72212	CLC	CL		8		
T39 ANTENNA AT-113	72213	C LD	CL		A		
T39 MOUNT MT-104AH	72214	C LE	CL		0		
T39 INFO AND DISPLAY		D			AAAAAAA		
T39 FLIGHT STATUS		DA	D		011111130		
T39 ATTITUDE		DAA	DA	E	0000000A0		
T39 CIRCUIT BREAKER	42231	DAAA	DAA		1		
T39 INST PANEL VIBRATOR 2 EA	51111	DAAA	DA		0		
T39 SHOCK MOUNT	51112	DAAAB	DA		0		
T39 CKT BKR VIBRATOR	51113	DAAAC	DA		0		
T39 TURN-SLIP INDICATION		DAB	DAA	K DAC	AAAAAAA		
T39 INSTR PANEL COPILOT OUTBDRD	12112	DABA	DAB		1		
T39 RATE GYRO TRANSMITTER	5123A	DABB	DAB		8		
T39 TURN AND SLIP INDICATOR	51233	DABC	DAB		A		
T39 CIRCUIT BREAKER	42152	DABD	DAB		1		
T39 ROLL-PITCH		DAC	DAA		999999999		
T39 PILOT INDICATION		DAD	DAC	K DAE	AAAAAAA		
T39 INSTR PANEL PILOT OUTBDRD	12111	DADA	DAD		1		
T39 ATTITUDE DIR INDICATOR	51232	DADB	DAD		A		
T39 VERTICAL GYRO MD1	51234	DADC	DAD		A		
T39 RATE SWITCHING GYRO MC1	51235	DADD	DAD		A		
T39 COPILOT INDICATION		DAE	DAC	K DAD	AAAAA		
T39 INSTR PANEL COPILOT OBRD	12115	DAEA	DAE		1		
T39 ATTITUDE INDICATOR	51231	DAEB	DAE		A		
T39 VERTICAL GYRO MD1	51234	DAEC	DAE		A		
T39 RATE SWITCHING GYRO MC1	51235	DAED	DAE		A		
T39 ALTITUDE INFO		DAF	DA	E	00A111AA0		
T39 VERTICAL VELOCITY		DAG	DAF		000000010		
T39 PILOT INDICATION		DAH	DAG	K DAJ	AAAAAAA		
T39 INSTR PANEL PILOT OUTBDRD	12111	DAHA	DAH		1		
T39 VERT VELOCITY INDICATOR	51224	DAHB	DAH		A		
T39 COPILOT INDICATION		DAJ	DAG	K DAH	AAAAAAA		
T39 INSTR PANEL COPLT OUTBDRD	12115	DAJA	DAJ		1		
T39 VERT VELOCITY INDICATOR	51224	DAJB	DAJ		A		
T39 ALTITUDE INDICATION		DAK	DAF		AAAAAAA		
T39 COMMUTER CPU-46A B26	5123B	DAKA	DAK		0		
T39 MOUNT	5123C	DAKB	DAK		0		
T39 COMPUTER CPU 46A/A	5123D	DAKC	DAK		0		
T39 PILOT INDICATION		DAL	DAK	K DAM	AAAAAAA		

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12345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890								
T39 DRAIN PLUG	51245	DBFA	DBF	O				
T39 STATIC PORT %ALT<	51247	DBFB	DBF	A				
T39 STATIC NO 2 DIST		DBG	DAJ	AAAAAAA				
T39 STATIC NO 2 DIST		DBG	DAM	AAAAAAA				
T39 STATIC NO 2 DIST		DBG	DAW	AAAAAAA				
T39 ALTERNATE SELECT NO 2		DBH	DBG	K DBJ	AAAAAAA			
T39 STATIC SELECTOR VALVE	51243	DBHA	DBH	A				
T39 STATIC NO 2 PRESSURE		DBJ	DAN	AAAAAAA				
T39 STATIC NO 2 PRESSURE		DBJ	DRG	DBH	11111111			
T39 STATIC NO 2 PRESSURE		DBJ	DEA		AAAAAAA			
T39 DRAIN PLUG %2 EAC	51245	DBJA	DBJ	O				
T39 LEFT STATIC PORT		DBK	DRJ	11111111				
T39 STATIC PORT	51244	DBKA	DBK	A				
T39 RIGHT STATIC PORT		DBL	DBJ	11111111				
T39 STATIC PORT	51244	DBLA	DBL	A				
T39 LH PITOT-STATIC %PITOT<		DBM	DAS	AAAAAAA				
T39 PITOT HEAD	51241	DBMA	DBM	A				
T39 DRAIN PLUG	51245	DBMB	DBM	O				
T39 PITOT ANTIICE		DBN	DBM	A	AAAAAAA			
T39 CIRCUIT BREAKER	42152	DBNA	DBN	I				
T39 HEATING ELEMENT	51242	DBNB	DBN	A				
T39 RH PITOT-STATIC %PITOT<		DBP	DAW	AAAAAAA				
T39 RH PITOT-STATIC %PITOT<		DBP	DEA	AAAAAAA				
T39 RIGHT PITOT-STATIC PITOT		DBP	NAT	00000000				
T39 PITOT HEAD	51241	DBPA	DBP	A				
T39 DRAIN PLUG %2 EAC	51245	DBPB	DBP	I				
T39 PITOT ANTIICE		DBQ	DRP	A	AAAAAAA			
T39 CIRCUIT BREAKER	42152	DBQA	DRQ	I				
T39 HEATING ELEMENT	51242	DBQB	DBQ	A				
T39 FREE AIR TEMP INFO		DC	D	00000000				
T39 FREE AIR TEMP INFO		DC	DAZ	AAAAAAA				
T39 INSTR PANEL COPLTS OUTBPD	12115	DCA	DC	I				
T39 CIRCUIT BREAKER	42152	DCB	DC	I				
T39 FREE AIR TEMP INDICATOR	51237	DCC	DC	I				
T39 FREE AIR TEMP DETECTOR	51238	DCD	DC	A				
T39 WARNINGS		DD	D	011111110				
T39 PERSONNEL WARNING		DOB	DD	000000000				
T39 CIRCUIT BREAKER	42152	DOBA	DOB	I				
T39 ALARM BELL	49311	DOBB	DOB	A				
T39 MISC INFO AND DISPLAY		DE	D	000000000				
T39 SIGNAL DATA RECORD		DEA	DE	AAAAAAA				
T39 CABIN AIR DUMP SAFETY VAL	41212	DEAA	DEA	5				
T39 CIRCUIT BREAKER	42152	DEAR	DEA	1				
T39 VGH FLIGHT DATA RECORDER	55100	DEAC	DEA	8				
T39 RECORDER COMPUTER	55111	DEAD	DEA	A				
T39 MAGAZINF	55112	DEAE	DEA	A				
T39 ACCELEROMETER	55113	DEAF	DEA	A				
T39 ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL		E		AAAAAAA				
T39 LIGHTING		EA	F	111111121				
T39 INTERNAL LIGHTING		EAA	EA	0AAAAAAAO				

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PGG095.J1R1 DATE = 09/09/76

FLIGHT SAFETY PREDICTION TECHNIQUE

00000000111111112222222233333333444444444555555556666666667777777778 12345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890					
T39 CABIN LIGHTING		EAB	EAA	000000000	
T39 CONTROL PANEL	44211	EABA	FAB	1	
T39 SWITCH 10 EACH	44212	EABB	FAB	1	
T39 LIGHT ASSY 8EA	44215	EABC	EAB	1	
T39 LIGHT ASSY SIGN 2EA	44216	EABD	EAB	1	
T39 COCKPIT LIGHTING		EAC	EAA	AAAAAAA	
T39 EMERGENCY LIGHTING		EAD	EAC	K EAE	AAAAAAA
T39 RELAY CONTROL	44218	EADA	EAD	A	
T39 POWER UNIT-EMERGENCY	4421E	EADB	EAD	A	
T39 LIGHT ASSY 3EA	44215	EADC	EAD	1	
T39 NORMAL LIGHTING		EAE	FAC	EAD	111111111
T39 CIRCUIT BREAKER DC	42152	EAEA	EAE	1	
T39 CIRCUIT BREAKER AC	42231	EAEB	EAE	1	
T39 INSTRUMENT LIGHTS EA OF 2		EAF	EAE	111111111	
T39 RESISTOR DIMMING	4421C	EAF	EAF	1	
T39 CONTROL PANEL	44211	EAFB	EAF	1	
T39 LIGHT ASSY FLOOD	44215	EAFC	EAF	1	
T39 LIGHT ASSY INSTR	44231	EAFD	EAF	1	
T39 CONSOLE LIGHTS EA OF 2		EAG	EAE	000000000	
T39 RESISTOR DIMMING	4421C	EAGA	EAG	1	
T39 CONTROL PANEL	44211	EAGR	EAG	1	
T39 LIGHT ASSY	44215	EAGC	EAG	1	
T39 DOME LIGHTS		EAH	EAF	000000000	
T39 RESISTOR DIMMING 2EA	4421C	EAHA	EAH	1	
T39 CONTROL PANEL	44211	EAHB	EAH	1	
T39 SWITCH 2EA	44212	EAHC	FAH	1	
T39 LIGHT ASSY	44215	FAHD	FAH	1	
T39 EXTERNAL ATTENUATION		EAL	EA	111111121	
T39 EXTERNAL LIGHTING		EAM	EAL	111111111	
T39 CIRCUIT BREAKER	42152	EAMA	EAM	1	
T39 LAND/TAXI LIGHTS		EAN	EAM	100000051	
T39 CONTROL PANEL	44112	EANA	FAN	1	
T39 LANDING AND TAXI LT ASSY	44113	EANB	EAN	5	
T39 LAND AND TAXI LT BRACKET	44117	EANC	EAN	1	
T39 SWITCH	44118	EAND	EAN	5	
T39 POSITION LIGHTS		EAP	EAM	000000000	
T39 CONTROL PANEL	44112	EAPA	EAP	1	
T39 POSITION LIGHT ASSY 6EA	44114	EAPB	EAP	1	
T39 SWITCH	44118	EAPC	EAP	5	
T39 ANTI-COLLISION LIGHT		EAQ	EAM	000000000	
T39 CONTROL PANEL	44112	EAQA	FAQ	1	
T39 ANTI-COLLISION LT ASSY 2EA	44115	EAQB	FAQ	1	
T39 SWITCH	44118	EAQC	FAQ	5	
T39 ICE CHECK LIGHTS		EAR	EAM	000000000	
T39 CONTROL PANEL	44112	EARA	EAR	1	
T39 ICE CHECK LIGHT ASSY 2EA	44116	EARB	EAR	1	
T39 SWITCH	44118	EARC	EAR	5	
T39 CIRCUIT BREAKER	42152	EARD	EAR	1	
T39 WINDSHIELD CLEARING		EB	EBC	0A00000AO	
T39 RAIN REMOVAL		ERA	EB	G	010000010

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FLIGHT SAFETY PREDICTION TECHNIQUE

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T39 BLADE 2EA	49411	EBA	EBA	1			
T39 ARM ASSY 2EA	49412	EBA	EBA	1			
T39 CONVERTER ASSY	49413	EBAC	EBA	8			
T39 FLEX DRIVE	49414	EBAD	FBA	A			
T39 MOTOR ASSY	49415	EBAE	EBA	8			
T39 CIRCUIT BREAKER	42152	EBAF	EBA	1			
T39 ANTI-ICE		EBB	EB	A	010000010		
T39 WINDSHIELD HEAT	41530	EBBA	EBB	0			
T39 HEATING ELEMENT 5EA	41531	EBBR	EBB	1			
T39 SENSING ELEMENT 5EA	41532	EBBC	EBB	1			
T39 OVERHEAT THERMOSWITCH	41533	EBCD	EBB	5			
T39 CONTROLLER	41535	EBBE	EBB	3			
T39 SWITCH	41536	EBBF	EBS	A			
T39 AC GENERATOR SYSTEM	42210	EBBG	EBB	0			
T39 GENERATOR ENG DRIVEN 2EA	42211	EBBH	EBB	1			
T39 ADAPTER QAD	42212	EBBJ	EBB	8			
T39 LIGHT PANEL	44241	EBBK	EBS	1			
T39 LIGHT MASTER	44242	ERBL	FBB	1			
T39 LIGHT INDICATOR	44243	EBBM	EBS	1			
T39 CIRCUIT BREAKER	42152	EBBN	EBS	1			
T39 ATTENUATION		EBC	E		010000020		
T39 CABIN ENVIRONMENT		EC	E		111111111		
T39 AIR COND AND PRESSURIZATION		ECA	EC	ED	001111100		
T39 COCKPIT AIR OUTLET 4EA	41116	ECAA	ECA	0			
T39 CABIN AIR OUTLET 12EA	41117	ECAB	ECA	0			
T39 CAB GRD AIR COND FIT-CK V	41215	ECAC	ECA	0			
T39 CIRCUIT BREAKER 7EA	42152	ECAD	ECA	1			
T39 CABIN AIR DUMP MAN CONT VL	41213	ECAE	ECA	0			
T39 HOT AIR SUPPLY		ECB	ECA		AAAAAAA		
T39 EMERGENCY DUCTING		ECC	ECH	K ECD	AAAAAA		
T39 EMER PRESS BLEED SHTOFF VALV	4111E	ECCA	ECC		A		
T39 PRESS DUCTFAIL SWITCH	99418	ECCB	ECC		1		
T39 DUCT FAIL LIGHT	44242	ECCC	FCC		1		
T39 NORMAL HOT AIR		ECD	ECH	ECC	111111111		
T39 BLEED AIR FLO LIMIT VALV	4111C	ECDA	FCD		1		
T39 DUCTING	41114	ECDB	ECD		1		
T39 SEALING		ECE	ECA		111111111		
T39 REV FLO CK VALV 2EA	4111F	ECEA	ECE		1		
T39 DOOR SEAL PRESS RESERVOIR	41311	ECEB	ECE		1		
T39 PNEUMATIC PRESS CK VALV	41312	ECEC	ECE		1		
T39 ESCAPE HATCH SEAL	41313	ECED	ECE		3		
T39 ESCAPE HATCH SEAL NIPPLE	41315	ECEE	ECE		0		
T39 ENTRANCE DOOR SEAL	41316	ECEF	ECE		3		
T39 REGULATOR ASSY DOOR SEAL	41317	ECEG	ECE		8		
T39 RAIN SEAL ENTRANCE DOOR	11215	ECEM	ECE		1		
T39 PRESSURE REGULATION		ECF	ECA		333333333		
T39 AUTO REGULATION		ECG	ECF	ECH	111111111		
T39 CAB AIR PRESS REG	41211	ECGA	ECG		A		
T39 PRESSURE DUMP		ECH	ECF	K ECG	AAAAAAA		
T39 CAB AIR DUMP-SAFTY VALV	41212	ECHA	ECH		1		

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PGG095.J1R1 DATE = 09/09/76

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FLIGHT SAFETY PREDICTION TECHNIQUE

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T39 LIGHT INDICATOR 44243 ECUD	ECU 1
T39 RIGHT ENGINE BLEED AIR ECV	ECC AAAAAAAA
T39 RIGHT ENGINE BLEED AIR ECV	ECD K ECW AAAAAAAA
T39 ENG RLFED SHUTOFF VALVE 4111D ECVA	ECV 5
T39 REVERSE FLO CK VALV 4111F ECVB	FCV 1
T39 DUCTING 41114 ECVC	ECV 1
T39 LEFT ENGINE BLEED AIR ECW	ECD K ECV AAAAAAAA
T39 ENGINE BLEED SHUTOFF VALVE 41110 ECWA	ECW 5
T39 REV FLOW CHECK VALVE 4111F ECWB	ECW 1
T39 DUCTING 41114 ECWC	ECW 1
T39 DESCENT SUPP PRESSURE ECX	ECF 0000000100
T39 CAB FLOOD FLOW VALVE 41127 ECXA	ECX A
T39 PRESSURE INTEGRITY ECY	ECE 1111111111
T39 PILOTS SLIDING WINDOW ASSY 11120 ECYA	ECY 8
T39 COCKPIT WINDOW ASSY 11140 ECYB	ECY 0
T39 CABIN WINDOW ASSY 11170 ECYC	ECY 0
T39 ENTRANCE DOOR ASSY 11210 ECYD	ECY 8
T39 EMER ESCAPE INNER DR ASSY 11310 ECYE	ECY 3
T39 EMER ESCAPE OUTER DR ASSY 11320 ECYF	ECY 3
T39 EMER ESCAPE JETTISON SYST 11330 ECYG	ECY 0
T39 BACKUP ED	EC K ECA 00AAAAAA00
T39 VENTILATION EDA	ED 3333333333
T39 EMERG RAM AIR SUPPLY VALV 41222 EDA	EDA A
T39 CIRCUIT BREAKER 42152 EDAB	FDA 1
T39 RAM AIR INLET VALVE 41520 EDAC	EDA A
T39 HEATING ELEMENT 41521 EDAD	EDA 0
T39 BIRD STOPPER FLAPPER DOOR 41522 EDAE	EDA 1
T39 OXYGEN EE	ED AAAAAAAA
T39 BACKUP OXYGEN EEA	EE K EEB AAAAAAAA
T39 RECHARGER HOSE ASSY 4711M EEA	EEA 0
T39 PORTABLE OXYGEN CYLINDER 47211 EEB	EEA A
T39 GAGE 47212 EEC	EEA 0
T39 SUPPORT BRACKET 47213 EED	EEA 0
T39 REGULATOR 47214 EEA	EEA 8
T39 FIXED OXYGEN EEB	EE EEA 2222222222
T39 SUPPLY EEC	EEB AAAAAAAA
T39 MANIFOLD 4711P EEECA	EEC 3
T39 OXYGEN CYLINDER 47112 EEECB	EEC A
T39 FILLER VALVE 47113 EEECC	EEC 1
T39 PRESSURE REDUCER 47115 EEECD	EEC 1
T39 COCKPIT OXYGEN EED	EEB AAAAAAAA
T39 REGULATOR PILOTS 2EA 4711D EEEDA	EED 1
T39 MASK 2EA 4711F EEEB	EED 1
T39 AIR BREATHING VALVE 2EA 4711G EEEC	EED 1
T39 MASK-TO-REG HOSE 2EA 4711J EEDD	EED 1
T39 CABIN OXYGEN EEE	EEB 0000000000
T39 REGULATOR PASSENGER 4EA 4711E EEEE	EEE 1
T39 MASK 7EA 4711F EEEB	EEE 1
T39 AIR BREATHING VALVE 4EA 4711G EEEC	EEE 1
T39 IN-USE-VALVE 7EA 4711H EEED	EEE 1

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FLIGHT SAFETY PREDICTION TECHNIQUE

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12345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890				
T39 MASK-TO-RFG HOSE 7EA	4711J	EEEE	EEE	1
T39 COMPARTMENT DOORS 7EA	4711K	EEEF	EEE	0
T39 OXYGEN SHUTOFF VALVE	4711A	EEEG	EEF	A
T39 OXYGEN CONTROL VALVE	4711B	EEEH	EEE	A
T39 INDICATION		EEG	EEA	1111111111
T39 CIRCUIT BREAKER	42152	EEGA	EFG	1
T39 CIRCUIT BREAKER	42231	EEGB	EFG	1
T39 PRESSURE SWITCH	4711B	EEGC	EEG	A
T39 INDICATOR LIGHT	4711C	EEGD	EFG	1
T39 FLOW INDICATOR 2EA	4711N	EEGE	EFG	1
T39 PRESSURE TRANSMITTER	47116	EEGF	FFG	1
T39 PRESSURE GAGE	47117	EEGG	EEG	1
T39 CABIN FIRE EXTINGUISH		EF	E X	AAAAAAAAAA
T39 PORTABLE SYSTEM	49230	EFA	EF	8
T39 BRACKET ASSY	49231	EFB	EF	0
T39 GAGE	49232	FFC	EF	0
T39 EXTINGUISHER	49233	EFD	EF	8
T39 FLIGHT CONTROL		F		AAAAAAAAAA
T39 LIFT AUGMENTATION		FA	F	010000030
T39 FLAPS POSITIONING		FAA	FA	AAAAAAAAAA
T39 INDICATOR, POSITION	51611	FAAA	FAA	0
T39 XMITTER, POSITION	51612	FAAB	FAA	0
T39 CIRCUIT BREAKER	42152	FAAC	FAA	1
T39 LEFT FLAP POSITIONING		LFAB	FAA	AAAAAAAAAA
T39 RIGHT FLAP POSITIONING		RFAB	FAA	AAAAAAAAAA
T39 WING FLAP ASSY	14610	LFABA	LFAB	1
T39 WING FLAP ASSY	14610	RFABA	RFAB	1
T39 SKIN	14612	LFABB	LFAB	0
T39 SKIN	14612	RFABB	RFAB	0
T39 HONEYCOMB	14613	LFABC	LFAB	0
T39 HONEYCOMB	14613	RFABC	RFAB	0
T39 FRAME STRUCTURE	14615	LFABD	LFAB	1
T39 FRAME STRUCTURE	14615	RFABD	RFAB	1
T39 INBOARD ROLLER ASSY	14616	LFABE	LFAB	3
T39 INBOARD ROLLEP ASSY	14616	RFABE	RFAB	3
T39 OUTBOARD ROLLER ASSY	14617	LFABF	LFAB	3
T39 OUTBOARD ROLLER ASSY	14617	RFABF	RFAB	3
T39 TRACK ASSY	14631	LFABG	LFAB	3
T39 TRACK ASSY	14631	RFABG	RFAB	3
T39 LEFT FLAP ACTUATION		LFAC	FAA KR FAC	OOAAAAAA
T39 RIGHT FLAP ACTUATION		RFAC	FAA KL FAC	OOAAAAAA
T39 ACTUATOR	14635	LFACA	LFAC	A
T39 ACTUATOR	14635	RFACA	RFAC	A
T39 FLEX SHAFT	14632	FACB	LFAC	A
T39 FLEX SHAFT	14632	FACB	RFAC	A
T39 INTERCONNECT	14634	FACC	LFAC	A
T39 INTERCONNECT	14634	FACC	RFAC	A
T39 FLAPS CONTROL		FAD	FAA	OOAAAAAA
T39 SW., FLAPS	9914A	FADA	FAD	A
T39 SLATS POSITIONING ATTENUATE		FAE	FA	1111111111

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FLIGHT SAFETY PREDICTION TECHNIQUE

000000000111111111222222222333333334444444455555555666666666777777777778				
12345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890				
T39 SLATS POSITIONING	FAF	FAE	111111111	
T39 LEFT SLATS POSITIONING	LFAG	FAF	111111111	
T39 RIGHT SLATS POSITIONING	RFAG	FAF	111111111	
T39 LEADING EDGE SLAT ASSY	14710 LFAGA	LFAG	1	
T39 LEADING EDGE SLAT ASSY	14710 RFAGA	RFAG	1	
T39 SKIN	14717 LFAGB	LFAG	0	
T39 SKIN	14717 RFAGB	RFAG	0	
T39 TRACK	1471C LFAGC	LFAG	5	
T39 TRACK	1471C RFAGC	RFAG	5	
T39 ROLLERS	1471D LFAGD	LFAG	5	
T39 ROLLERS	1471D RFAGD	RFAG	5	
T39 SLAT,INBOARD	14712 LFAGE	LFAG	1	
T39 SLAT,INBOARD	14712 RFAGE	RFAG	1	
T39 SLAT,INB,INTERMEDIATE	14713 LFAGF	LFAG	1	
T39 SLAT,INB,INTERMEDIATE	14713 RFAGF	RFAG	1	
T39 SLAT,INTERMEDIATE	14714 LFAGG	LFAG	1	
T39 SLAT,INTERMEDIATE	14714 RFAGG	RFAG	1	
T39 SLAT,OUTB,INTERMEDIATE	14715 LFAGH	LFAG	1	
T39 SLAT,OUTB,INTERMEDIATE	14715 RFAGH	RFAG	1	
T39 SLAT OUTBOARD	14716 LFAGJ	LFAG	1	
T39 SLAT OUTBOARD	14716 RFAGJ	RFAG	1	
T39 FITTING,INTERCONNECT	1471B LFAGK	LFAG	1	
T39 FITTING,INTERCONNECT	1471B RFAGK	RFAG	1	
T39 YAW CONTROL	FB	F	010000030	
T39 RUDDER POSITIONING	FBA	FB	AAAAAAA	
T39 RUDDER ASSY	14510 FBAA	FBA	1	
T39 ROOT RIB	1451A FBAB	FBA	0	
T39 SKIN	14512 FBAC	FBA	0	
T39 HINGE SUPPORT	14515 FBAD	FBA	2	
T39 ACCESS DOOR	14517 FBAE	FBA	0	
T39 RUDDER CONTROL	FBB	FBA	AAAAAAA	
T39 TORQUE TUBE	14522 FBBA	FBB	8	
T39 LINKAGE	14525 FBBB	FBB	8	
T39 CABLE	14526 FBBC	FBB	A	
T39 FAIRLEAD	14527 FBBD	FBB	0	
T39 BUNGEE	14528 FBBE	FBB	1	
T39 RUDDER PEDAL CONTROL,EA OF2	FBC	FBB	111111111	
T39 PEDALS	14521 FBCA	FBC	8	
T39 TRIM CONTROL	FBD	FBB	000000000	
T39 TRIM TAB	14518 FBDA	FBD	1	
T39 ACTUATOR	14543 FBDB	FBD	A	
T39 SW.,TRIM SELECTOR	14117 FBDC	FBD	8	
T39 RUDDER TRIM INDICATOR	51623 FBDD	FBD	0	
T39 RUDDER POSITION XMITTER	51624 FBDE	FBD	0	
T39 CIRCUIT BREAKER	42152 FBDF	FBD	1	
T39 NORMAL TRIM ACTIBATION	FBE	FBD	FBF	111111111
T39 SW.,TRIM %NORMAL%	14541 FBEA	FBE	A	
T39 SW.,EMER DISCONNECT %2EAC	14116 FBEB	FBE	1	
T39 ALTERNATE TRIM ACTIVATION	FBF	FBD	K FBE	AAAAAAA
T39 SW.,TRIM %ALTERNATE%	14542 FBFA	FBF	A	

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T39 PITCH CONTROL	FC	F	0AAAAAAAO
T39 ELEVATOR POSITIONING	FCA	FC	AAAAAAA
T39 ELEVATOR CONTROL	FCB	FCA	094444490
T39 PILOT CONT WHEEL/COLUMN	FCBA	FCB	1
T39 COPILOT CONT WHEEL/COLUMN	FCBB	FCB	1
T39 HOR WEIGHT BUNGEE	FCBC	FCB	0
T39 TORQUE TUBE	FCBD	FCB	8
T39 LEFT ELEVATOR DRIVE	LFCC	FCB	KRFCC AAAAAAAA
T39 RIGHT ELEVATOR DRIVE	RFCC	FCB	KLFCC AAAAAAAA
T39 CABLE	14434 LFCCA	LFC	A
T39 CABLE	14434 RFCCA	RFCC	A
T39 LINKAGE	14433 LFCCB	LFC	8
T39 LINKAGE	14433 RFCCB	RFCC	8
T39 HORN	14438 LFCCC	LFC	1
T39 HORN	14438 RFCCC	RFCC	1
T39 LEFT ELEVATOR POSITIONING	LFCD	FCB	AAAAAAA
T39 RIGHT ELEVATOR POSITIONING	RFCD	FCB	AAAAAAA
T39 ELEVATOR ASSY	14410 LFCDA	LFC	1
T39 ELEVATOR ASSY	14410 RFCDA	RFCD	1
T39 SKIN	14412 LFCDB	LFC	0
T39 SKIN	14412 RFCDB	RFCD	0
T39 HINGE SUPPORT	14415 LFCDC	LFC	2
T39 HINGE SUPPORT	14415 RFCDC	RFCD	2
T39 HOR STAB TRIM POSITIONING	FCE	FCA	011000110
T39 TORQUE TUBE	14326 FCEA	FCE	8
T39 STAR POS INDICATOR	51625 FCEB	FCE	0
T39 STAB POS XMITTER	51626 FCEC	FCE	0
T39 CENTER SECTION BEAM	14325 FCED	FCE	8
T39 BIAS BUNGEE	14425 FCEE	FCE	1
T39 FLEX SHAFT ASSY	14324 FCEF	FCE	A
T39 CIRCUIT BREAKER	42152 FCEG	FCE	1
T39 LEFT TRIM ACTUATION	LFCF	FCE	KRFCF AAAAAAAA
T39 RIGHT TRIM ACTUATION	RFCF	FCE	KLFCF AAAAAAAA
T39 ACTUATOR TRIM	14322 LFCFA	LFCF	A
T39 ACTUATOR TRIM	14322 RFCFA	RFCF	A
T39 STABILIZER POSITIONING FA 2	FCG	FCE	AAAAAAA
T39 HOR STAB ASSY	14310 FCGA	FCG	1
T39 SKIN	14312 FCGB	FCG	0
T39 NORMAL TRIM ACTIVATION	FCH	FCE	FCJ 111111111
T39 SW.,TRIM SELECTOR	14117 FCHA	FCH	A
T39 SW.,TRIM &NORMAL<%2EAC	14113 FCHB	FCH	1
T39 SW.,EMER DISCONNECT&2EAC	14116 FCHC	FCH	1
T39 ALTERNATE TRIM	FCJ	FCE	K FCH AAAAAAAA
T39 SW.,TRIM SELECTOR	14117 FCJA	FCJ	A
T39 SW.,TRIM &ALTERNATE<	14115 FCJB	FCJ	A
T39 ROLL CONTROL	FD	F	0AAAAAAAO
T39 AILERON POSITIONING	FDA	FD	AAAAAAA
T39 AILERONS POSITIONED,EA OF 2	FDB	FDA	021111120
T39 AILERON ASSY	14210 FDRA	FDB	1
T39 SKIN	14212 FDRA	FDR	0

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T39 SW., LIMIT	14832	FFHA	FFH	A
T39 LIGHT, WARNING	14834	FFHB	FFH	I
T39 LIGHT, PANEL	44241	FFHC	FFH	I
T39 LIGHT, MASTER	44242	FFHD	FFH	I
T39 LIGHT, INDICATOR	44243	FFHE	FFH	I
T39 RLY, TEST	44244	FFHF	FFH	O
T39 GUST LOCK		FG	F	000000000
T39 GUST LOCK ASSY	14911	FGA	FG	I
T39 TELEFLEX CABLE SYSTEM	14913	FGB	FG	I
T39 GROUND CONTROL		G		AAAAAAA
T39 SPEED CONTROL		GA	G	CCDCDQAO
T39 SPEED CONTROL		GA	GAX	50J000005
T39 WHEEL BRAKING %EA OF 2<		GAA	GA	AAAAAAA
T39 WHEEL BRAKING %EA OF 2<		GAA	GAD	AAAAAAA
T39 ROD ASSY	13611	GAAA	GAA	8
T39 BELL CRANK	13612	GAAB	GAA	A
T39 BRAKE ASSY	13621	GAAC	GAA	8
T39 BRAKE CONTROL VALVE	13622	GAAD	GAA	A
T39 SHUTTLE VALVE	13623	GAAE	GAA	5
T39 PRESSURE PLATE	13626	GAAF	GAA	A
T39 BRAKE DISC	13627	GAAG	GAA	A
T39 BACK PLATE	13628	GAAH	GAA	A
T39 DUAL VALVE ASSY	13647	GAAJ	GAA	I
T39 PEDAL %2EAC	14521	GAAK	GAA	I
T39 PARKING BRAKE		GAC	GAA	00J0C0000
T39 PARKING BRAKE	13640	GACA	GAC	I
T39 TELEFLEX ASSY	13642	GACR	GAC	I
T39 DUAL VALVE ASSY	13647	GACC	GAC	I
T39 DIFFERENTIAL BRAKING		GAD	GB	K GBA 0A00000AA
T39 ATTENUATION		GAX	G	111111111
T39 DIRECTIONAL CONTROL		GB	G	110000011
T39 NOSE WHEEL STEERING		GBA	GB	K GAD 110000011
T39 NOSE WHEEL STEERING		GBA	GBJ	FAAAAAAA
T39 LINKAGE %2EAC	13511	GBAA	GBA	I
T39 BELLCRANK %2EAC	13512	GBAB	GBA	I
T39 ROD ASSY %2EAC	13513	GBAC	GBA	I
T39 LOCKING LEVER	13514	GBAO	GBA	O
T39 PEDAL %4EAC	14521	GBAE	GBA	I
T39 STEERING ACTUATION		GBB	GBA	AAAAAAA
T39 CONTROL VALVE	13521	GBBA	GBB	A
T39 SWIVEL VALVE	13522	GBBB	GBB	5
T39 ACTUATING CYLINDER	13523	GBBC	GBB	8
T39 CONTROL VALVE FILTER	13524	GBBD	GBB	O
T39 CHECK/THERMAL RELIEF VALV	13525	GBBE	GBB	I
T39 STEERING CONTROL		GRC	GBA	AAAAAAA
T39 CIRCUIT BREAKER	42152	GBCA	GBC	I
T39 LOAD SWITCH MLG EA. OF 2	13244	GBCB	GBC	I
T39 MAIN CONTROL		GBD	GBC	K GBF AAAA
T39 LOAD SWITCH NOSE GEAR	13443	GHDA	GBD	A
T39 CONT WHEEL/COLUMN PILOT	14111	GBDB	GBD	I

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FLIGHT SAFETY PREDICTION TECHNIQUE

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T39 CONT WHEEL/COLUMN COPILOT	14112	GBDC	GBD	1		
T39 NORMAL SELECT		GBE	GBD		AAAAAAA	
T39 PEDESTAL	12116	GBEA	GBE	1		
T39 STANDBY CONTROL		GBF	GPC	K GBD	AAAAAAA	
T39 AUTO SELECT		GBG	GBF	GBH	111111111	
T39 CONTROL BOX	13531	GBGA	GHG		8	
T39 FEED BACK POT	13532	GBGB	GBG		A	
T39 COMMAND POT	13533	GBGC	GBG		A	
T39 CONTROL RELAY	13534	GBGD	GBG		5	
T39 HOLD RELAY	13535	GBGE	GBG		5	
T39 MANUAL SELECT		GBH	GRF	K GRF	AAAAAAA	
T39 PEDESTAL	12116	GBHA	GBH	1		
T39 STEERING INDICATION		GBJ	GBH		333333333	
T39 MONITOR SWITCH	13536	GBJA	GBJ	0		
T39 LIGHT PANEL	44241	GBJB	GBJ	1		
T39 LIGHT MASTER	44242	GBJC	GBJ		1	
T39 LIGHT INDICATOR	44243	GBJD	GBJ		1	
T39 HYDRAULIC DIST		GCA	G		S10000011	
T39 HYDRAULIC DIST		GCA	G	C	S000000080	
T39 HYDRAULIC DIST		GCA	GAA		FAAAAAAA	
T39 THERMAL RELIEF VALVE	13624	GCAA	GCA	1		
T39 EMERGENCY PRESSURE		GCB	GCA	K GCC	AAAAAAA	
T39 RESERVOIR	13625	GCBA	GCH	A		
T39 EMERGENCY BRAKE	13630	GCBB	GCB	8		
T39 HANDLE ASSY	13631	GCBC	GCB	8		
T39 TELEFLEX ASSY	13632	GCBD	GCB	8		
T39 NORMAL DIST		GCC	GBR		FAAAAAAA	
T39 NORMAL DIST		GCC	GCA	GCH	111111111	
T39 MISSION SUPPORT		M			AAAAAAA	
T39 SUPPORT EQUIPMENT		MA	M		000000000	
T39 FLOOR	1211A	MAA	MA	C		
T39 INERTIA REEL	1211B	MAB	MA	O		
T39 UPHOLSTERY	1211D	MAC	MA	O		
T39 SEAT COCKPIT	12130	MAL	MA	1		
T39 WELD ASSY	12132	MAM	MA	1		
T39 SAFETY BELT	12133	MAN	MA	1		
T39 BAGGAGE COMPARTMENT GEN	12200	MAP	MA	C		
T39 CABIN COMPARTMENT GEN	12300	MAQ	MA	O		
T39 SEAT CABIN	12330	MAR	MA	O		
T39 SEAT PAN	12332	MAS	MA	O		
T39 SEAT BELT	12336	MAT	MA	1		
T39 CHURCH KEY	9912X	MAV	MA	A		
T39 LANDING GEAR		N			AAAAAAA	
T39 EXTEND GEAR		NA	N		0000000AO	
T39 EXTEND MAIN GEAR		NAA	NA		AAAAAAA	
T39 NORMAL CONTROL		NAB	NA	NAC	111111111	
T39 INST PANEL PILOT INBRD	12112	NABA	NAB	1		
T39 GEAR AND DOOR CONT VALVE	13111	NABB	NAB	A		
T39 GEAR CONTROL HANDLE	13112	NABC	NAB	A		
T39 DOWNLOCK SWITCH 2EA	13242	NABD	NAB	A		

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PGG095.JIR1 DATE = 09/09/76

FLIGHT SAFETY PREDICTION TECHNIQUE

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1234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890
T39 AFT RELAY PANEL 9913A NABE NAB 1
T39 CIRCUIT BREAKER 42152 NABG NAB 1
T39 CONTROL UNLOCK BACKUP NAC NA K NAB AAAAAAAA
T39 CONTROL UNLOCK BACKUP NAC NAD K NAE AAAAAAAA
T39 CONTROL UNLOCK BACKUP NAC NBB K NBC AAAAAAAA
T39 DOOR ACTUATE EA OF 2 NAD NAA AAAAAAAA
T39 TORQUE TUBE FAIRING DOOR 11242 NADA NAD A
T39 LOCK ROLLER FAIRING DOOR 11246 NADB NAD A
T39 LOCK ASSY STRUT DOOR 1125A NADC NAD A
T39 LOCK ROLLER STRUT DOOR 11253 NADD NAD A
T39 DOOR UNLOCK AND OPEN NAE NAD NAC 1111111111
T39 DOOR ACTUATING CYLINDER 13234 NAEA NAE A
T39 SHUTTLE VALVE 13235 NAEB NAE 1
T39 CHECK VALVE 13236 NAEC NAE 1
T39 RESTRICTOR 13237 NAED NAE 1
T39 DOOR OPERATE NAF NAD AAAAAAAA
T39 MAIN GEAR DOOR ASSY 11240 NAFA NAF 8
T39 ROD 11243 NAFB NAF A
T39 HINGE FORWARD 11244 NAFC NAF 1
T39 HINGE AFT 11245 NAFO NAF 1
T39 MG STRUT DOOR ASSY 11250 NAFE NAF 8
T39 DOOR ATTACHING 1321D NAFF NAF 1
T39 TORQUE LINK 13214 NAFG NAF 8
T39 EMERGENCY CONTROL NAG NAC AAAAAAAA
T39 EMERGENCY CONTROL NAG NAK AAAAAAAA
T39 EMERGENCY CONTROL NAG NAN AAAAAAAA
T39 EMERGENCY CONTROL NAG NBG AAAAAAAA
T39 INSTR PANEL PLT OUTBRD 12111 NAGA NAG 1
T39 INSTR PANEL PLT INBRD 12112 NAGB NAG 1
T39 EMERGENCY SYSTEM 13140 NAGC NAG 0
T39 HANDLE ASSY 13141 NAGD NAG A
T39 DOOR EMERG UNLOCK AND OPEN NAH NAC AAAAAAAA
T39 CABLE ASSY 13142 NAHA NAH A
T39 LINKAGE 13145 NAHB NAH A
T39 LG DUMP VALVE DOOR 13148 NAHC NAH 5
T39 GEAR UNLOCK EA OF 2 NAJ NAA AAAAAAAA
T39 UPLOCK MECHANISM 13216 NAJA NAJ A
T39 UPLOCK RELEASE BACKUP NAK NAJ K NAL AAAAAAAA
T39 UPLOCK RELEASE NAL NAJ NAK 1111111111
T39 UPLOCK ACTUATING CYLINDER 13232 NALA NAL 3
T39 ACTUATOR PIN 1321F NALB NAL A
T39 DOOR UPLOCK SWITCH 13243 NALC NAL A
T39 GEAR ACTUATE EA OF 2 NAM NAA AAAAAAAA
T39 DOWNLOCK MECHANISM 13217 NAMA NAM A
T39 STRUT ASSY 13212 NAMB NAM 8
T39 SIDE BRACE 13213 NAMC NAM A
T39 LINKAGE 13215 NAMD NAM A
T39 ROTATE AND LOCK BACKUP NAN NAM K NAP AAAAAAAA
T39 ROTATE AND LOCK NAP NAM NAN 1111111111
T39 ACTUATING CYLINDER 13231 NAPA NAP A

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FLIGHT SAFETY PREDICTION TECHNIQUE

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12345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890						
T39 DOWNLOCK ACTUATING CYL	13233	NAPB	NAP	A		
T39 CHECK VALVE	13236	NAPC	NAP	1		
T39 DOOR CLOSE AND LOCK		NAQ	NAP		000000000	
T39 TORQUE TUBE	11242	NAQA	NAQ	A		
T39 LOCK ROLLER	11246	NAQB	NAQ	A		
T39 DOOR ACTUATING CYLINDER	13234	NAQC	NAQ	A		
T39 DOWNLOCK SWITCH	13242	NAQD	NAQ	A		
T39 EMERGENCY GEAR RELEASE		NAR	NAC		AAAAAAA	
T39 EMERGENCY GEAR RELEASE		NAR	NAK		AAAAAAA	
T39 CABLE ASSY	13142	NARA	NAR	A		
T39 LINKAGE	13145	NARB	NAR	A		
T39 LG DUMP VALVE GEAR	13148	NARC	NAR	5		
T39 GEAR FREE FALL AND LOCK		NAS	NAC		AAAAAAA	
T39 GEAR FREE FALL AND LOCK		NAS	NAK		AAAAAAA	
T39 GEAR FREE FALL AND LOCK		NAS	NAN		AAAAAAA	
T39 GEAR FREE FALL AND LOCK		NAS	NBG		AAAAAAA	
T39 BUNGEE 2EA	13146	NASA	NAS	5		
T39 BUNGEE NOSE	13414	NASB	NAS	5		
T39 EXTEND INDICATION		NAT	NAG		AAAAAAA	
T39 WARNING SYSTEM	13120	NATA	NAT	0		
T39 POSITION INDICATOR LIGHT	1312A	NATB	NAT	1		
T39 CONTROL HANDLE LIGHT	1312B	NATC	NAT	1		
T39 DIMMING RESISTOR	1312C	NATD	NAT	0		
T39 HORN	13121	NATE	NAT	1		
T39 CUTOUT SWITCH	13122	NATF	NAT	0		
T39 THROTTLE POSITION SWITCH	13123	NATG	NAT	0		
T39 RELAY	13124	NATH	NAT	0		
T39 SIGNAL GENERATOR	13125	NATJ	NAT	0		
T39 RECTIFIER	13126	NATK	NAT	0		
T39 CIRCUIT BREAKER COCKPIT	13128	NATL	NAT	1		
T39 DOWNLOCK SWITCH 2EA	13242	NATM	NAT	A		
T39 DOOR UPLOCK SWITCH 2EA	13243	NATN	NAT	1		
T39 DOWNLOCK SWITCH	13442	NATP	NAT	A		
T39 AIRSPEED ALT WARN SWITCH	51246	NATQ	NAT	0		
T39 EXTEND NOSE GEAR		NBA	NA		AAAAAAA	
T39 GEAR AND DOOR UNLOCK		NBB	NBA		AAAAAAA	
T39 LOCK NG DOOR	11227	NBBA	NBB	A		
T39 UPLOCK MECHANISM	1341D	NBBB	NBB	A		
T39 GEAR AND DOOR RELEASE		NBC	NBB		NAC 11111111	
T39 TORQUE LINK	13416	NBCA	NBC	A		
T39 UPLOCK ACTUATING CYLINDER	13432	NBCB	NBC	A		
T39 GEAR ACTUATE		NBF	NBA		AAAAAAA	
T39 DOWN LOCK MECHANISM	1341E	NBFA	NBF	A		
T39 AXLF CENTERING BLOCK ASSY	1341C	NFBF	NBF	1		
T39 STRUT ASSY	13412	NBFC	NBF	8		
T39 DRAG BRACE	13413	NBFD	NBF	A		
T39 TRUNNION	13415	NBFE	NBF	A		
T39 TORQUE LINK	13416	NBFF	NBF	A		
T39 GEAR ROTATE AND LOCK BACKUP		NBG	NBF	K NBH	AAAAAAA	
T39 GEAR ROTATE AND LOCK		NBH	NBF	NBG	11111111	

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0000000001111111111222222223333333344444444455555555666666666677777777778	12345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890
T39 ACTUATING CYLINDER GEAR	13431 NBHJ
T39 DOWNLOCK ACTUATING CYL	13433 NBHK
T39 RESTRICTOR	13434 NBHL
T39 DOOR OPEN	NBJ
T39 NOSE GEAR DOOR ASSY	11220 NBJA
T39 LINKAGE	1122A NBJB
T39 HINGE FORWARD	11222 NBJC
T39 HINGE AFT	11223 NBJD
T39 RETRACT GEAR	NC
T39 RETRACT CONTROL	NCA
T39 INST PANEL PILOT INBOARD	12112 NCAA
T39 GEAR AND DOOR CONT VALVE	13111 NCAB
T39 GEAR CONTROL HANDLE	13112 NCAC
T39 UPLOCK SWITCH 2EA	13241 NCAD
T39 LOAD SWITCH 2EA	13244 NCAE
T39 UPLOCK SWITCH NOSE	13441 NCAF
T39 CIRCUIT BREAKER	42152 NCAG
T39 AFT RELAY PANEL	9913A NCAH
T39 MLG RETRACT EA OF 2	NCB
T39 DOOR OPERATION	NCD
T39 MAIN GEAR DOOR ASSY	11240 NCDA
T39 TORQUE TUBE	11242 NCDB
T39 ROD	11243 NCDC
T39 HINGE FORWARD	11244 NCDD
T39 HINGE AFT	11245 NCDE
T39 LOCK ROLLER	11246 NCDF
T39 DOOR ACTUATING CYLINDER	13234 NCDG
T39 SHUTTLE VALVE	13235 NCDH
T39 CHECK VALVE	13236 NCDJ
T39 RESTRICTOR	13237 NCDK
T39 MAIN GEAR STRUT DOOR ASSY	11250 NCDL
T39 LOCK ASSY	1125A NCDM
T39 LOCK ROLLER	11253 NCDN
T39 DOOR ATTACHING	1321D NCDP
T39 GEAR LOCK RELEASE	NCE
T39 TORQUE LINK	13214 NCEA
T39 DOWNLOCK MECHANISM	13217 NCEB
T39 DOWNLOCK ACTUATING CYL	13233 NCEC
T39 CHECK VALVE	13236 NCED
T39 DOOR UPLOCK SWITCH	13243 NCEE
T39 GEAR UP AND LOCK	NCF
T39 ACTUATOR PIN	1321F NCFA
T39 STRUT ASSY	13212 NCFB
T39 SIDE BRACE	13213 NCFC
T39 TORQUE LINK	13214 NCFD
T39 LINKAGE	13215 NCFE
T39 UPLOCK MECHANISM	13216 NCFF
T39 ACTUATING CYLINDER	13231 NGFG
T39 UPLOCK ACTUATING CYLINDER	13232 NGFH
T39 RESTRICTOR	13237 NGFJ

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T39 NLG RETRACT	NCH	NC	AAAAAAA	
T39 GEAR AND DOOR LOCK RELEASE	NCJ	NCH	AAAAAAA	
T39 LOCK NOSE DOOR	11227 NCJA	NCJ	A	
T39 DOWNLOCK MECHANISM	1341E NCJB	NCJ	A	
T39 TORQUE LINK	13416 NCJC	NCJ	A	
T39 DOWNLOCK ACTUATING CYL	13433 NCJD	NCJ	A	
T39 GEAR UP AND LOCK	NCK	NCH	AAAAAAA	
T39 AXLE CENTERING BLOCK ASSY	1341C NCKB	NCK	I	
T39 UPLOCK MECHANISM	1341D NCKC	NCK	A	
T39 STRUT ASSY	13412 NCKD	NCK	8	
T39 DRAG BRACE	13413 NCKE	NCK	A	
T39 TRUNNION	13415 NCKF	NCK	A	
T39 TORQUE LINK	13416 NCKG	NCK	A	
T39 ACTUATING CYLINDER	13431 NCKK	NCK	A	
T39 UPLOCK ACTUATING CYLINDER	13432 NCKL	NCK	A	
T39 RESTRICTOR	13434 NCKM	NCK	I	
T39 DOOR CLOSE AND LOCK	NCL	NCH	AAAAAAA	
T39 LINKAGE	1122A NCLA	NCL	A	
T39 HINGE FORWARD	11222 NCLB	NCL	I	
T39 HINGE AFT	11223 NCLC	NCL	I	
T39 LOCK	11227 NCLD	NCL	A	
T39 RETRACT INDICATION	NCM	NX I NC	010000000	
T39 WARNING SYSTEM	13120 NCMA	NCM	0	
T39 POSITION INDICATING LIGHT	1312A NCMB	NCM	I	
T39 CONTROL HANDLE LIGHT	1312B NCMC	NCM	I	
T39 DIMMING RESISTOR	1312C NCMD	NCM	0	
T39 RECTIFIER	13126 NCME	NCM	I	
T39 CIRCUIT BREAKER	13128 NCMF	NCM	I	
T39 UPLOCK SWITCH ZEA	13241 NCMG	NCM	A	
T39 DOOR UPLOCK SWITCH ZEA	13243 NCMJ	NCM	A	
T39 UPLOCK SWITCH NOSE	13441 NCMK	NCM	A	
T39 ROLLING SUPPORT	ND	N	1A00000A1	
T39 WHEELS	13700 NDAA	ND	0	
T39 MAIN WHEEL ZEA	13711 NDAB	ND	A	
T39 NOSE WHEEL ZEA	13731 NDAC	ND	A	
T39 TIRES	13800 NDAD	ND	0	
T39 MAIN TIRE RH	13812 NDAE	ND	8	
T39 MAIN TIRE LH	13813 NDAF	ND	8	
T39 NOSE TIRE ZEA	13821 NDAG	ND	4	
T39 AXLE BEARING SEAL	1341A NDAH	ND	0	
T39 AXLE	13417 NDAJ	ND	A	
T39 AXLE BEARING	13418 NDAK	ND	I	
T39 RETRACT ATTENUATION	NX	N	111111111	
T39 NON ESSENTIAL AC	UAA	CFG	AAAAAAA	
T39 NON ESSENTIAL AC	UAA	CHEA	FAAAAAAA	
T39 NON ESSENTIAL AC	UAA	CHF	AAAAAAA	
T39 NONESSENTIAL AC DIST	UAA	DFA	AAAAAAA	
T39 NONESSENTIAL AC DIST	UAA	EAE	111111111	
T39 ESSENTIAL AC DISTRIBUTION	UAB	BAZB	AAAAAAA	
T39 ESSENTIAL AC DISTRIBUTION	UAB	BAZE	AAAAAAA	

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00000000011111111122222222333333334444444455555555666666667777777778 1234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890					
T39 ESSENTIAL AC DISTRIBUTION	UAR	HSQ	AAAAAAA		
T39 ESSENTIAL AC DISTRIBUTION	UAB	BSY	AAAAAAA		
T39 ESSENTIAL AC BUS	UAB	CFA	AAAAAAA		
T39 ESSENTIAL AC BUS	UAB	CFL	FAAAAAAA		
T39 ESSENTIAL AC BUS	UAB	CHBA	FAAAAAAA		
T39 ESSENTIAL AC BUS	UAB	CHBR	FAAAAAAA		
T39 ESSENTIAL AC BUS	UAB	CHC	AAAAAA		
T39 ESSNTIAL AC BUS	UAB	CHEB	FAAAAAAA		
T39 ESSENTIAL AC BUS	UAB	CJ	FAAAAAAA		
T39 ESSENTIAL AC BUS	UAB	CL	AAAAAAA		
T39 ESSENTIAL AC DIST	UAB	DAA	AAAAAAA		
T39 ESSENTIAL AC DIST	UAB	EAE	11111111		
T39 ESSENTIAL AC DIST	UAB	ECR	AAAAAAA		
T39 ESSENTIAL AC DIST	UAB	EEG	555555555		
T39 ESSENTIAL AC DIST	UAB	UHG	11111111		
T39 NORMAL FEED	UAC	UAB	UAD	11111111	
T39 INVERTER CHANGOVER CONTROL	42232	UACA	UAC	1	
T39 RELAY AC TRANSFER	42234	UACB	UAC	1	
T39 EMERGENCY FEED		UAD	UAB	K UAC	AAAAAAA
T39 INVERTER CHANGE OVER CONTR	42232	UADA	UAD	A	
T39 RELAY AC TRANSFER	42234	UADB	UAD	A	
T39 MAIN INVERTER SYSTEM		UAE	UAA	AAAAAAA	
T39 MAIN INVERTER SYSTEM		UAE	UAC	AAAAAA	
T39 INVFRTER MAIN	42221	UAEA	UAE	A	
T39 SWITCH INVERTER	42224	UAEB	UAE	A	
T39 CKT BKRS MAIN INV	42225	UAEC	UAF	A	
T39 RELAY MAIN INV POWER	42238	UAED	UAE	A	
T39 STANDBY INVERTER SYSTEM		UAF	UAD	AAAAAAA	
T39 INVERTER STANDBY	42222	UAFA	UAF	A	
T39 CKT BKRS,STBY INV	42225	UAFB	UAF	A	
T39 SWITCH INVERTER	42224	U AFC	UAF	A	
T39 POWER WARNINGS		UAG	UAD	00000000	
T39 CAUTION LIGHT PANEL	44241	UAGA	UAG	1	
T39 MASTER CAUTION LIGHT	44242	UAGB	UAG	0	
T39 CAUTION LIGHT, INV FAIL	44243	UAGC	UAG	1	
T39 CAUTION LIGHT, INST PWRUFF	44243	UAGD	UAG	1	
T39 RELAY, TEST	44244	UAGE	UAG	0	
T39 ESSENTIAL DC DISTRIBUTION		UDA	BAM	AAAAAAA	
T39 ESSENTIAL DC DISTRIBUTION		UDA	BAP	AAAAAAA	
T39 ESSENTIAL DC DISTRIBUTION		UDA	BAZC	AAAAAAA	
T39 ESSENTIAL DC DISTRIBUTION		UDA	BAZD	AAAAAAA	
T39 ESSENTIAL DC DISTRIBUTION		UDA	BAZK	AAAAAAA	
T39 ESSENTIAL DC DISTRIBUTION		UDA	BBA	AAAAAAA	
T39 ESSENTIAL DC DISTRIBUTION		UDA	BPH	SAAAAAAA	
T39 ESSENTIAL DC DIST		UDA	BPC	FAAAAAAA	
T39 ESSENTIAL DC DIST		UDA	RPD	FAAAAAAA	
T39 ESSENTIAL DC DISTRIBUTION		UDA	RPH	AAAAAA	
T39 ESSNTIAL DC DISTRIBUTION		UDA	BSE	AAAAAA	
T39 ESSENTIAL DC DISTRIBUTION		UDA	BSN	FAAAAAAA	

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T39 ESSENTIAL DC DISTRIBUTION	UDA	BSS	FAAAAAAAAA
T39 ESSENTIAL DC DISTRIBUTION	UDA	BST	FAAAAAAAAA
T39 ESSENTIAL DC DISTRIBUTION	UDA	BSU	FAAAAAAAAA
T39 ESSNTIAL DC DISTRIBUTION	UDA	BSV	FAAAAAAAAA
T39 ESSENTIAL DC DISTRIBUTION	UDA	BSW	AAAAAAA
T39 ESSENTIAL DC DISTRIBUTION	UDA	BSZ	FAAAAAAA
T39 ESSENTIAL DC DISTRIBUTION	UDA	BTA	AAAAAAA
T39 ESSENTIAL DC BUS	UDA	CA	AAAAAAA
T39 ESSENTIAL DC BUS	UDA	CB	AAAAAAA
T39 ESSENTIAL DC BUS	UDA	CC	AAAAAAA
T39 ESSENTIAL DC DIST	UDA	CE	S008888800
T39 ESSENTIAL DC BUS	UDA	CFA	FAAAAAAA
T39 ESSENTIAL DC BUS	UDA	CFL	FAAAAAAA
T39 ESSENTIAL DC BUS	UDA	CG	FAAAAAAA
T39 ESSENTIAL DC BUS	UDA	CHCY	AAAAAAA
T39 ESSENTIAL DC BUS	UDA	CHEA	FAAAAAAA
T39 ESSENTIAL DC BUS	UDA	CHF	AAAAAAA
T39 ESSENTIAL DC BUS	UDA	CJ	FAAAAAAA
T39 ESSENTIAL DC BUS	UDA	CL	AAAAAAA
T39 ESSENTIAL DC	UDA	DAB	AAAAAAA
T39 ESSENTIAL DC DIST	UDA	DAV	AAAAAAA
T39 ESSENTIAL DC DIST	UDA	DBN	AAAAAAA
T39 ESSENTIAL DC DIST	UDA	DC	AAAAAAA
T39 ESSENTIAL DC DIST	UDA	DEA	AAAAAAA
T39 ESSENTIAL DC DIST	UDA	EAE	AAAAAAA
T39 ESSENTIAL DC DIST	UDA	EAN	AAAAAAA
T39 ESSENTIAL DC DIST	UDA	EAP	AAAAAAA
T39 ESSENTIAL DC DIST	UDA	FAQ	AAAAAAA
T39 ESSENTIAL DC DIST	UDA	EBA	AAAAAAA
T39 ESSENTIAL DC DIST	UDA	EBB	AAAAAAA
T39 ESSENTIAL DC DIST	UDA	ECA	AAAAAAA
T39 ESSENTIAL DC DIST	UDA	EDA	FAAAAAAA
T39 ESSENTIAL DC DIST	UDA	EEG	FAAAAAAA
T39 ESSENTIAL DC DISTRIBUTION	UDA	FAA	DOAAAAAA
T39 ESSENTIAL DC DISTRIBUTION	UDA	FBD	AAAAAAA
T39 ESSENTIAL DC DISTRIBUTION	UDA	FCE	AAAAAAA
T39 ESSENTIAL DC DISTRIBUTION	UDA	FDF	AAAAAAA
T39 ESSENTIAL DC DISTRIBUTION	UDA	FFB	AAAAAAA
T39 ESSENTIAL DC	UDA	GBC	AAAAAAA
T39 ESSENTIAL DC DIST	UDA	NAB	FAAAAAAA
T39 ESSENTIAL DC DIST	UDA	NAT	FAAAAAAA
T39 ESSENTIAL DC DIST	UDA	NCA	FAAAAAAA
T39 ESSENTIAL DC DIST	UDA	NCM	FAAAAAAA
T39 ESSENTIAL DC DIST	UDA	UAF	FAAAAAAA
T39 ESSENTIAL DC DIST	UDA	UHB	AAAAAAA
T39 ESSENTIAL DC DIST	UDA	UHG	FIIIIIIII
T39 CKT BKRS ESSENTIAL BUS	42152	UDAA	1
T39 BOX POWER DIST	42157	UDAB	1
T39 BOX RELAY	42158	UDAC	1
T39 TERMINAL STRIP	42150	UDAD	0

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T39 SECONDARY DC BUS	UDB	CFBB	AAAAAAA		
T39 SECONDARY DC BUS	UDB	CFDB	FAAAAAAA		
T39 SECONDARY DC BUS	UDB	CFEC	FAAAAAAA		
T39 SECONDARY DC BUS	UDB	CHBC	FAAAAAAA		
T39 SECONDARY DC BUS	UDB	CHED	FAAAAAAA		
T39 SECONDARY DC DIST VIBRATE	UDB	DA	F000000000		
T39 SECONDARY DC DIST	UDB	D90	AAAAAAA		
T39 SECONDARY DC DIST	UDB	EAE	111111111		
T39 SECONDARY DC DIST	UDB	EAR	AAAAAAA		
T39 SECONDARY DC DIST	UDB	E8B	AAAAAAA		
T39 SECONDARY DC DIST	UDB	ECP	AAAAAAA		
T39 CKT SKRS, SEC BUS	42152	UDBA	UDB	A	
T39 BOX POWER DIST	42157	UDBB	UDB	I	
T39 BOX RELAY	42158	UDBC	UDB	I	
T39 RFLAY SECONDARY BUS	9942B	UDBD	UDB	A	
T39 TERMINAL STRIP	4215D	UDBE	UDB	I	
T39 STARTER BUS POWER DIST		UDC	BAN	AAAAAAA	
T39 PARALELLING BUS		UDD	UAA	SAAAAAAA	
T39 PARALELLING BUS		UDD	UAB	S111111111	
T39 PARALELLING BUS		UDD	UAE	FAAAAAAA	
T39 PARALELLING BUS		UDD	UDB	FAAAAAAA	
T39 PARALELLING BUS		UDD	UDH	AAAAAAA	
T39 PARALLELING BUS		UDD	UH8	AAAAAAA	
T39 TERMINAL STRIP	4215D	UDDA	UDD	O	
T39 BOX POWER DIST	42157	UDDB	UDD	I	
T39 BOX RELAY	42158	UDDC	UDD	I	
T39 BATTERY BUS		UDE	DD8	AAAAAAA	
T39 BATTERY BUS		UDE	EAD	AAAAAAA	
T39 BATTERY BUS		UDE	K UDH	SAAAAAAA	
T39 BATTERY BUS		UDE	UDJ	SAAAAAAA	
T39 BATTERY BUS		UDE	UDK	FAAAAAAA	
T39 BATTERY BUS		UDE	UDL	FAAAAAAA	
T39 BATTERY BUS		UDE	UDM	FAAAAAAA	
T39 TERMINAL STRIP	4215D	UDEA	UDE	I	
T39 BOX POWER DIST	42157	UDEB	UDE	I	
T39 BOX RELAY	42158	UDEC	UDE	I	
T39 EXTERNAL START POWER		UDF	UDC	100000000	
T39 RECEPTACLE EXT START	42154	UDFA	UDF	A	
T39 MICROSWITCH	42155	UDFB	UDF	I	
T39 BATTERY START POWER		UDG	UDC	100000000	
T39 RELAY BATTERY START	42171	UDGA	UDG	A	
T39 NORMAL OPERATION		UDH	UDA	UDJ	111111111
T39 RELAY ESSENTIAL BUS	42177	UDHA	UDH	A	
T39 BACKUP OPERATION		UDJ	UDA	K UDH	AAAAAAA
T39 RELAY ESS BUS EMER K512	9942A	UDJA	UDJ	A	
T39 MASTER SWITCH	42156	UDJB	UDJ	A	
T39 AUTO SWITCHING		UDK	UDJ	UDL	111111111
T39 RELAY GEN MONITOR	4217C	UDKA	UDK	A	
T39 BATTERY SWITCH	4211B	UDKB	UDK	A	
T39 MANUAL SWITCHING		UDL	UDJ	K UDK	AAAAAAA

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T39 BATTERY SWITCH	4211B	UDLA	UDL	A	
T39 BATTERY PARALLELING		UDM	UDD	000000000	
T39 RELAY BATTERY	42176	UDMA	UDM	A	
T39 GENERATOR STATUS		UDN	UDJ	000000000	
T39 VOLTMETER	4213C	UDNA	UDN	1	
T39 GEN OFF WARN LIGHT	44243	UDNB	UDN	1	
T39 CAUTION LIGHT PANEL	44241	UDNC	UDN	1	
T39 MASTER CAUTION LIGHT	44242	UDND	UDN	0	
T39 RELAY TEST	44244	UDNE	UDN	0	
T39 GEN LIGHT CKT BKR	42152	UDNF	UDN	1	
T39 LOAD SWITCH	4215F	UDNG	UDN	0	
T39 VOLTMETER TEST SWITCH	4213A	UDNH	UDN	1	
T39 LOADMETER	4213B	UDNJ	UDN	1	
T39 CKT BKR VOLTMETER	42152	UDNK	UDN	1	
T39 EXTERNAL UTILITY POWER		UDP	UDD	000000000	
T39 PLUG DISCONNECT	4215C	UDPA	UDP	0	
T39 RECEPTACLE EXT UTIL	42153	UDPB	UDP	8	
T39 RELAY EXT PWR CUTOUT	42172	UDPC	UDP	A	
T39 RELAY EXT PWR MONITOR	42175	UDPD	UDP	A	
T39 LEFT GENERATOR SYSTEM		LUDQ	UDR	AAAAAAA	
T39 LEFT GENERATOR SYSTEM		LUDQ	UDD	KRUDQ	AAAAAAA
T39 RIGHT GENERATOR SYSTEM		RUDQ	UDB		AAAAAAA
T39 RIGHT GENERATOR SYSTEM		RUDQ	UDD	KLUDQ	AAAAAAA
T39 STARTER GENERATOR	42131	LUDQA	LUDQ	A	
T39 STARTER GENERATOR	42131	RUDQA	RUDQ	A	
T39 ADAPTER QAD	42132	LUDQB	LUDQ	A	
T39 ADAPTER QAD	42132	RUDQB	RUDQ	A	
T39 DUCT FLEX COOLING	42135	LUDQC	LUDQ	1	
T39 DUCT FLEX COOLING	42135	RUDQC	RUDQ	1	
T39 VOLTAGE REGULATOR	42136	LUDQD	LUDQ	A	
T39 VOLTAGE REGULATOR	42136	RUDQD	RUDQ	A	
T39 KELAY GEN MONITOR	4217C	LUDQE	LUDQ	A	
T39 RELAY GEN MONITOR	4217C	RUDQE	RUDQ	A	
T39 RELAY GEN FIELD CONTROL	4217D	LUDQF	LUDQ	A	
T39 RELAY GEN FIELD CONTROL	4217D	RUDQF	RUDQ	A	
T39 CKT BKRS	42152	LUDQG	LUDQ	A	
T39 CKT BKRS	42152	RUDQG	RUDQ	A	
T39 MASTER SWITCH	42156	LUDQM	LUDQ	A	
T39 MASTER SWITCH	42156	RUDQM	RUDQ	A	
T39 REVERSE CURRENT RELAY	9942C	LUDQJ	LUDQ	A	
T39 REVERSE CURRENT RFLAY	9942C	RUDQJ	RUDQ	A	
T39 GEN SWITCH	9942D	LUDQK	LUDQ	A	
T39 GEN SWITCH	9942D	RUDQK	RUDQ	A	
T39 BATTERY SYSTEM NO.1		LUDR	UDE	555555555	
T39 BATTERY SYSTEM NO.1		LUDR	UDG	AAAAAAA	
T39 BATTERY SYSTEM NO.2		RUDR	UDE	555555555	
T39 BATTERY SYSTEM NO.2		RUDR	UDG	AAAAAAA	
T39 BATTERY	42111	LUDRA	LUDR	8	
T39 BATTERY	42111	RUDRA	RUDR	8	
T39 QUICK DISCONNECT	42114	LUDRB	LUDR	A	

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T39 QUICK DISCONNECT	42114	RUDRB	RUDR	A			
T39 CABLE	42115	LUDRC	LUDR	8			
T39 CABLE	42115	RUDRC	RUDR	8			
T39 SUMP JAR	42116	LUDRD	LUDR	1			
T39 SUMP JAR	42116	RUDRD	RUDR	1			
T39 VENT AND DRAIN HOSE	42118	LUDRE	LUDR	0			
T39 VENT AND DRAIN HOSE	42118	RUDRE	RUDR	0			
T39 NORMAL HYD DISTRIBUTION		UHA	FFD	AAAAAAA			
T39 NORMAL HYDRAULIC DIST		UHA	GCC	UHD	11111111		
T39 NORMAL HYDRAULIC DIST		UHA	NAH		S555555555		
T39 NORMAL HYDRAULIC DIST		UHA	NCA		S555555555		
T39 CHECK VALVE HYDR 4EA	4531A	UHAA	UHA	1			
T39 FILLER VALVE ACCUMULATOR	4521C	UHAB	UHA	1			
T39 ACCUMULATOR	45211	UHAC	UHA	1			
T39 RELIEF VALVE	45214	UHAD	UHA	1			
T39 DUMP VALVE	45215	UHAE	UHA	0			
T39 FILTER PRESSURE	45216	UHAF	UHA	1			
T39 NORMAL HYD PRESSURE		UHB	UHA	AAAAAAA			
T39 NORMAL HYD PRESSURE		UHB	UHD	FA00000000			
T39 CIRCUIT BREAKER 2EA	42152	UHBA	UHB	1			
T39 CHECK VALVE HYDR	4511A	UHBB	UHB	0			
T39 PRESSURE SWITCH 2EA	4511F	UHBC	UHR	A			
T39 MOTOR HYDRAULIC PUMP	4511L	UHBD	UHR	A			
T39 MOTOR DRIVEN PUMP	45111	UHBE	UHS	8			
T39 FILTER RETURN	45217	UHBF	UHB	1			
T39 HYDRAULIC PUMP SWITCH	9945A	UHBG	UHB	A			
T39 HYDRAULIC SUPPLY		UHC	UHR	AAAAAAA			
T39 CHECK VALVE AIR	4511B	UHCA	UHC	1			
T39 DRAIN VALVE AIR TANK	4511C	UHCB	UHC	0			
T39 FILTER AIR	4511D	UHCC	UHC	0			
T39 COUPLING EXTERNAL HYD	4511G	UHCD	UHC	0			
T39 COUPLING EXTERNAL AIR	4511J	UHCH	UHC	0			
T39 CAP AIR COUPLING	4511K	UHCJ	UHC	0			
T39 PRESSURE REGULATOR	45114	UHCK	UHC	1			
T39 RESERVOIR ASSY	45115	UHCL	UHC	8			
T39 TANK AIR	45116	UHCM	UHC	1			
T39 FILLER CAP RESERVOIR	45117	UHCN	UHC	0			
T39 DRAIN VALVE RESERVOIR	45118	UHCP	UHC	1			
T39 AUXILIARY HYD DISTRIBUTION		UHD	FFE	AAAAAAA			
T39 AUXILIARY HYDRAULIC DIST		UHD	GCC	K UHA	AAAAAAA		
T39 CHECK VALVE NORMAL 4 FA	4511A	UHDA	UHD	1			
T39 ACCUMULATOR AUX	45311	UHDB	UHD	A			
T39 FILLER VALVE ACCUM AUX	45313	UHDC	UHD	8			
T39 RELIEF VALVE AUX	45316	UHDD	UHD	1			
T39 DUMP VALVE AUX	45317	UHDE	UHD	0			
T39 SHUT OFF VALVE AUX	45318	UHDF	UHD	A			
T39 CKT BKR	42152	UHDG	UHD	0			
T39 PRESSURE INDICATION		UHG	UHD	11111111			
T39 CIRCUIT BREAKER	42225	UHGA	UHG	1			
T39 LIGHT PANEL CAUTION	44241	UHGB	UHG	1			

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T39	LIGHT MASTER CAUTION	44242	UHGC	UHG	1
T39	LIGHT INDICATOR CAUTION	44243	UHGD	UHG	1
T39	GAGE PRESSURE	4521A	UHGE	UHG	1
T39	GAGE ACCUMULATOR NORM	4521B	UHGF	UHG	0
T39	PRESSURE TRANSMITTER NORM	45213	UHGG	UHG	1
T39	GAGE ACCUMULATOR AUX	45312	UHGH	UHG	0
T39	PRESSURE TRANSMITTER AUX	45315	UHGJ	UHG	0
T39	PRESSURE SNUBBER	45212	UH GK	UHG	0
T39	PRESSURE SNUBBER AUX	45314	UHGL	UHG	0

CARD COUNT IS 00001808. CARDS WITH ERRORS 00000000