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
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CURRENT TRENDS AND
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
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OCTOBER 1976

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ISRAELI PERCEPTIONS OF AMERICAN SECURITY POLICY:
CURRENT TRENDS AND FUTURE ALTERNATIVES

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FINAL REPORT

OCTOBER 1976

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One of the most significant outcomes of the 1973 October War and its aftermath has been the emergence of the United States as both the major weapons supplier to Israel, as well as certain Arab states, and as a principal agent attempting to establish a strategic balance in the Middle East region. In addition, the U.S. has sought to achieve its own interests in peace and economic stability through diplomatic means, directed at assisting the regional states in reaching both interim and final settlement accords.		

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In this effort, it is necessary for U.S. defense planners to develop a range of options that meet the vital security needs of Israel, in terms of critical weapons systems, secure borders, early warning assistance, and supporting economic aid without creating destabilizing shifts in the critical force balance. To assist in this process the present report extends an earlier analysis to perceptions of the Middle East strategic balance held by the Israeli leadership and public. Since it is these views which ultimately serve to shape Israeli policy, and the demands placed on the United States, this analysis explores both how the Israelis view alternative American policy options, and the impact various alternative American options can be expected to have on the Israeli decision-making process and ultimate policy flexibility. *Analyzes*

Part One of the report addresses the specific questions of how the Israeli leadership and segments of the public construct the reality in which they view the regional strategic balance and U.S. policy; how the ongoing quantitative and qualitative arms race in the Middle East serves to shape this view; and what impact the policies of the superpowers have had on policy-making in Israel.

Part Two of the report undertakes a detailed consideration of the views which the Israeli political and military leadership hold of the basic security situation, U.S. policy, and trends which the Israelis perceive as taking place in U.S. policy.

Part Three of the report reviews some of the important findings with respect to how the Israeli public views key security and settlement issues, as well as the role of the United States. Finally, the report concludes with an analysis of the practical options open to American defense planners, and their likely impact on Israeli policy.

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PREFACE

The present research extends and updates the analyses of the Israeli leadership and public previously performed with regard to the perceptions of the security situation and strategic balance held by the Israeli political and military leadership as well as the Israeli assessment of American policy options. As the views of security held by this leadership and public are critical to the decision-making process, they will have a substantial impact on both the formation of Israeli policy, and the requests made to the United States for security assistance.

Many individuals, both in the United States and Israel, have made significant contributions to the present work, as well as the author's understanding of the problems involved. In the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs) the author has had the benefit of discussions with James Noyes, Maj. Gen. Clark Baldwin, Lt. Col. Thomas A. Pianka, Richard Peyer, Robert H. Kubal, Lt. Cdr. Gary Sick, Lt. Gen. Gordon Sumner, Jr., now with the Inter-American Defense Board, and Jerrold K. Milsted. The author wishes to express his gratitude to each of these individuals.

The research and preparation of this study have benefited from the aid and counsel of Carol K. Wagner, presently with the Atlantic Richfield Company, Jeffrey T. Richelson, University of Texas, and Paul A. Jureidini, R. D. McLaurin and William Hazen of Abbott Associates, Inc. The author would also like to express his appreciation to Robert Ellsworth, Deputy Secretary of Defense, Andrew W. Marshall, Office of the Secretary of Defense (Net Assessment), and Anthony H. Cordesman, Office of the

Deputy Secretary of Defense. While each of these individuals has made a contribution to this study, the author bears sole responsibility for any errors of fact or judgment.

A.R.W.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

One of the most significant outcomes of the 1973 October War and its aftermath has been the emergence of the United States as both the major weapons supplier to Israel, as well as certain Arab states, and as a principal agent attempting to establish a strategic balance in the Middle East region. In addition, the U.S. has sought to achieve its own interests in peace and economic stability through diplomatic means, directed at assisting the regional states in reaching both interim and final settlement accords. Here the United States continues to play a central role in maintaining the conventional force balance in the region while working to achieve a long term stabilization or final peace agreement among the parties.

In this effort, it is necessary for United States defense planners to develop a range of options that meet the vital security needs of Israel, in terms of critical weapons systems, secure borders, early warning assistance, and supporting economic aid, without creating destabilizing shifts in the critical force balance. To assist in this process the present report extends an earlier analysis to perceptions of the Middle East strategic balance held by the Israeli leadership and public. Since it is these views which ultimately serve to shape Israeli policy, and the demands placed on the United States, this analysis explores both how the Israelis view alternative American policy options, and the impact various alternative American options can be expected to have on the Israeli decision-making process and ultimate policy flexibility.

The research takes into account the problems posed for United States defense planners as well as those in Israel by the present Middle East situation, in terms of those scenarios most likely to occur in the near term. The goals of the research have been:

- to assess the impact on the Israeli military and political leadership of American defense policy, as that in turn impacts on Israeli policy flexibility;
- to evaluate the perceptions of the Israeli political and military leadership of emerging trends in American public opinion, Congressional support, and assistance programs; and
- to explore the range of policy options open to United States defense planners in meeting the objective security needs of Israel and maintaining the strategic balance in the Middle East region.

This report reaches the following major conclusions which are of importance to the making of United States defense policy in the Middle East region, and in evaluating the effectiveness and implications of the U.S. military assistance and supporting aid program for Israel:

- Continued escalation of the Middle East arms race, in both qualitative and quantitative terms has made the Israeli leadership increasingly concerned both over the frontiers and conditions required to protect vital security interests, as well as relations with the U.S. which provides critical

weapons systems. The net result has been a sharp tension between the perceived demands for national security, and the need to produce an accommodation oriented policy.

- The aftermath of the 1973 October War and various internal Israeli political developments have produced a weak coalition government headed by three key ministers with differing constituencies, diverging policy perspectives on many crucial points, and growing personal antagonisms. Faced with a need to produce effective defense and security policy, this leadership has become rigid and often unable to act. In the past year alone this situation has produced strains in the American - Israeli relationship as well as a loss of public support for the government within the country. Barring any major shifts in Israeli leadership personalities, however, it is unlikely that the Rabin Government or any of its immediate successors will be able to take major new policy initiatives acceptable to the Arab states for further interim or final settlement accords.
- Over the course of negotiations since the 1973 war it has become clear that Israeli policy toward security and settlement will be based primarily on considerations of perceived security, with political questions of secondary importance to the Israelis.
- Regardless of the diplomatic initiatives and assistance

programs which are within acceptable limits to the U.S., the present Israeli leadership will be both unwilling and unable to make the type of concessions required for progress in any of the key settlement areas: with Syria on the Golan Heights; with Jordan; with respect to the Palestinians; and even with regard to further progress with Egypt.

- Within the current Israeli perception of the worst-case threat, almost any level of military and supporting assistance is likely to be viewed as still not fulfilling some critical Israeli security need. Until the Israelis develop the capability to assess their actual needs, in terms of the demand made in the U.S., the level of satisfaction is likely to remain close to the level of satiation. The adverse financial and logistic impact which such weapons acquisition programs will have on Israel, even with high levels of supporting assistance, are still generally unrecognized and unappreciated within Israel.
- In the final analysis, it appears that the credibility of the United States commitment to Israel and the continuity of American aid, rather than the level of aid in any given year, will enable Israel to deter war and reach a settlement with the Arab states, if indeed such a settlement is within reach.

Part One of the report addresses the specific questions of how the Israeli leadership and segments of the public construct the

reality within which they view the regional strategic balance and U.S. policy; how the ongoing quantitative and qualitative arms race in the Middle East serves to shape this view; and what impact the policies of the superpowers have had on policy-making in Israel.

Part Two of the report undertakes a detailed consideration of the views which the Israeli political and military leadership hold of the basic security situation, United States policy, and trends which the Israelis perceive as taking place in U.S. policy. Included here are the views of the three key ministers (Rabin, Peres and Allon), several of the "peripheral" political figures (Dayan, Eban and Begin), and major IDF figures (Gur and Tal).

Part Three of the report reviews some of the important findings with respect to how the Israeli public views key security and settlement issues, as well as the role of the United States. As in the previous part, this part considers both the critical areas of security policy and issues of American policy and commitment. Finally, the report concludes with an analysis of the practical options open to American defense planners, and their likely impact on Israeli policy.

The analysis makes clear that the following considerations are perceived in Israel as being critical to continued Israeli security, and will be of primary importance in Israeli policy-making:

Fundamental American Commitment to Israeli Security: While this basic tenet of U.S. policy remains unchanged, the continued restatement and reaffirmation of this posture is of considerable importance to Israeli policy-makers.

Levels of U.S. Military and Supporting Assistance: As witnessed by public and private statements of the Israeli leadership, they have come to place increasing importance on both the quantity and technological level of U.S. military and supporting economic assistance over the long term. Here the Israelis will continue to seek levels of aid which meet the full extent of the threat they perceive from the Arab states.

Perceptions of the United States' Ability to Act: Of increasing importance in Israeli policy-making are the perceptions which the Israeli leadership and public hold of the general American ability to carry out worldwide commitments. Sparked by recent American experiences in Vietnam and Angola, the leadership has expressed growing concern over the future validity of American assurances. Under conditions of revised Israeli security frontiers, such as the pre-June 1967 lines, such commitments are perceived as being vital to the security of the state.

Final Settlement Objectives: Behind much of the Israeli reluctance to increase policy flexibility is the uncertainty over the final settlement objectives which will be supported by the United States. Here the fear is that in the final analysis, the U.S. policy will be to suggest or sponsor a renewed version of the 1970 Rogers Plan, calling on Israel to accept security frontiers which compromise basic security in return for Arab assurances which fall far short of "full peace".

U.S. Arming of the Arab Confrontation States: A more recent,

but growing Israeli concern comes with the possible role of the U.S. as a supplier of major weapons systems, as well as a nuclear reactor capability, to the Arab confrontation states, such as Egypt, as part of evolving Arab - American relations. While most Israelis acknowledge the utility of such relations in general, they express grave concern that such supplies could upset the force balance the Israelis seek to maintain. At the same time, there is a general Israeli unwillingness to recognize the benefits, in terms of Arab moderation and further settlement negotiations, which such aid could help to induce.

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PART ONE

ISRAEL AND SECURITY: THE STRATEGIC CONTEXT

1.1 INTRODUCTION

Purpose of the Project

One of the most significant outcomes of the 1973 October War and its aftermath has been the emergence of the United States as both a major weapons supplier to Israel, as well as various Arab states, and a principal agent attempting to establish the strategic balance and security for all nations in the Middle East region. In search of these goals, the United States has undertaken massive arms transfers to Israel and other states, in addition to assisting Israel, Egypt and Syria in reaching several interim accords. Here the United States continues to play a central role in maintaining the conventional force balance and helping to reach a long term stabilization, or final peace, agreement among the parties.

In this role it is necessary for United States defense planners to develop a range of options that meet the security needs of Israel without creating destabilizing shifts in the conventional force balance, and are not disruptive of domestic security interest or economically unfeasible. To assist those charged with these difficult tasks, the present report extends an earlier analysis to perceptions of the strategic balance held by the Israeli leadership and public.¹ Since it is these views which ultimately serve to shape Israeli policy and the demands placed on the United States, this analysis explores both how the Israelis view alternative American options, and the impact various options will have on Israeli policy flexibility and the region's stability.

The research takes into account the problems posed for Israel

by the current Middle East situation, as well as those scenarios most likely to occur in the near term. The basic thrust of this analysis is centered on perceptions of United States policy and the American commitment to maintaining the force balance and Israel security. The goals of this research have been to:

- (1) Assess the impact of Israeli perceptions of American defense options on Israeli security policy and policy flexibility;

- (2) Evaluate the perceptions of the Israeli leadership and public of emerging trends in American public opinion, Congressional support, and overall policy; and

- (3) Suggest possible new directions in United States defense policy aimed at meeting both the vital security requirements of Israel and the balance necessary to achieve an overall settlement.

A companion study, currently in progress, addresses the specific questions of how the form, structure and conduct of the American-Israeli arms supply relationship is perceived by the Israelis and impacts Israeli policy.

This part of the report addresses the specific questions of how the Israeli leadership and public construct the reality within which they view the strategic balance; how the ongoing quantitative and qualitative arms race in the Middle East serves to shape this view; and what impact the policies of the superpowers and other nations of the world have had on policy-making in Israel. Specifically, section 1.2 develops the psychological framework within which the key Israeli decision-makers and public operate, or the subjective environment,

while section 1.3 reviews some of the significant elements of the Arab-Israeli arms race that continue to play major roles in the Middle East force balance. The latter is in some sense aimed at establishing some baseline objective reality against which to measure both Israeli perceptions and United States policy.

Section 1.4 considers the role which the superpowers have undertaken in the Middle East following the 1973 October War, and the impact this has had on Israeli policy. Clearly this area is one of considerable importance to the Israeli leadership and public alike, both in the formulation of their own policy and the expectations placed on the United States. Finally, section 1.5 examines the trend of diminishing world support for Israeli policy and the impact this phenomenon has had on that policy and the policy flexibility available to Israeli decision-makers.

Part Two of the report undertakes a detailed consideration of the views which the Israeli leadership holds of the basic security situation, United States policy, and the trends which the Israelis see as taking place in the United States and U.S. policy. In this analysis are the views of the top political leadership (Rabin, Allon, and Peres), the "peripheral" political leadership, and the key military leadership.

Finally, Part Three of the report reviews some of the more important findings with respect to how the Israeli public, as a whole, views key security issues and the role of the United States. As is the case with the analysis of leadership perceptions, this part considers both the critical areas of security policy and issues of American policy

and commitment. Finally, the report concludes with an analysis of the practical options open to American defense planners, and their likely impact on Israeli policy.

How Much is Enough?

As an introductory note, it is worthwhile to set forth several basic considerations which underlie virtually all Israeli thinking about matters of security and defense, and consequently the policies adopted by that nation. First, the experiences of the 1973 war and its aftermath presented Israel with a complex set of interrelated political and military problems with which that small nation was ill equipped at best to deal. Long range and strategic planning was virtually non-existent, defense management in the modern sense was almost unheard of, and the nation's leaders were forced to make vital policy decisions in an uncertain and hurried context.

As might be expected, the initial reaction, and one which continues to a major extent, was to look to "essential" security considerations above all, and only secondly to underlying political questions and policy alternatives. Thus, to a large extent, perceived security questions still dominate all policy making, rendering perceptions of the strategic considerations of prime importance in the search for overall political solutions.

Second, and closely related to the first point, is the task which has been thrust upon Israel of developing the capability for modern defense planning and management. Lost in the glitter of IDF

battlefield activities is the stark reality that prior to 1973 Israel had attempted to undertake modern warfare and the development of modern armed forces without fully developing related planning and management capabilities. While the United States was able to learn valuable lessons regarding strategy, force and financial planning during the 1950's and 1960's that could be applied in the 1970's, the leisure of a twenty-year time frame has not been available to Israel.²

The upshot of this often unnoticed "failure" has been a crash program to develop a force planning and defense management capability, and an operational environment in which perceived threats of weapons system insufficiency, or possible adverse territorial concessions, take on an importance overriding all other considerations. It is with the rhetorical question "How much is enough?", borrowed from Enthoven and Smith, that this analysis proceeds.

1.2 THE PSYCHOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK

Failure of Deterrence - 1973

One of the most obvious conclusions to be drawn from the 1973 October War, as from all previous conflicts, is that one party had failed again to deter others from launching an attack on itself and initiating yet another war. As a prelude to understanding how the Israelis perceive the security situation and the American role in helping them to deter future conflict, it is necessary to consider, at least briefly, the obvious, but non-trivial, situation of deterrence failure and examine the elements which have in the past precipitated this failure.³

Such an analysis is most clearly accomplished through the use of an elementary decision calculus, which compares the value of the status quo (V_{sq}) with the value of "victory" in a potential conflict (V_v), discounted by the probability of achieving such a victory (p_v) and the value (cost) of defeat (V_d). Assuming a rational decision process by a nation's leadership, deterrence can be expected to fail and a war undertaken if the nation's decision-makers make the following evaluation:

$$(p_v) (V_v) - (1-p_v) (V_d) > (V_{sq})$$

Put in words, deterrence fails if the expected value to be gained from launching an attack, less the potential cost of defeat, is greater than the assessed value of the current situation (status quo). Breaking a given situation into these elements is often of considerable analytical value. In 1973, for example, Egypt and Syria perceived it in their

best interests to launch an attack on Israel as opposed to the status quo situation. That is, given their best estimate of the chance of achieving "victory" in the return of part of the occupied territories, in light of anticipated losses of weapons systems and forces, such a situation was preferred to the lack of progress toward a settlement and continued Israeli occupation of territories taken in the 1967 conflict.⁴

Leaving aside, for the moment, the rhetoric of Arab national honor, the striking fact remains that Israeli, Arab and superpower assessments of the strategic balance differed sufficiently to permit a major war generally unanticipated by the best informed analysts of what are reputed to be the world's most effective intelligence services, in the United States and Israel.⁵ While this is not to say that such a decision calculus necessarily would have predicted this conflict, it is clear that it provides a useful framework upon which to evaluate the perceptions of a given nation.

In the 1973 example cited, general agreement exists that the information possessed by both the U.S. and Israel on weapons systems and their deployment was fairly good.⁶ The essential problem appears to lie in a failure to analyze correctly the perceptions of the inter-related political-military balance, and the expected values associated with the alternative courses of action. Looking to the problem at hand, it is, therefore, necessary to consider both the subjective elements of reality, or the psychological "lens" through which the Israeli leadership views the strategic balance and United States policy,

as well as the "objective" elements which constitute the balance. The subjective framework is then used to identify those elements of the objective, or operational, environment which are most critical to the making of Israeli defense and security policy.

From the academic literature has emerged a line of analysis that places this operational environment within the psychological context. As deRivera observes, it is these perceptions of reality that determine actions, rather than what reality actually might exist, and herein lies the danger:

It is difficult even to intellectually grasp the fact that we *construct* the reality in which we operate. We take our perception of the world for granted. . . . We know what is real and act accordingly. . . . If someone else points out that our perceptions may be wrong we may intellectually admit the possibility, but we continue to act as though our perceptions were true. We are familiar with illusions but dismiss them as interesting playthings. Our reality seems so solid, and we feel so in touch with it, that it is impossible for us to act with the realization that in fact our reality is inferred by us and may not match the reality which future events reveal. It is precisely in this feeling of certainty that the danger lies.⁷

Thus, the critical factor in policy-making is not simply the force balance and conflict expectations which an objective analysis might reveal, were such a totally objective analysis possible, but rather the perceptions of the balance which the decision-makers hold and the actions they see as being available to them. For a nation, such as Israel, to be deterred from initiating a conflict the elements of the strategic deterrence situation must favor the status quo, and

to deter its potential enemies, that situation must exist for its adversaries as well. The policy objective which flows from such an analysis corresponds to the elements in the deterrence situation.

Value of the Status Quo

The first, and most obvious, consideration involves an analysis of the "non-war" situation among the potential adversaries, although this is by no means limited to a static point in time. Clearly, for the case in point, a major objective of any party seeking to deter conflict will be to raise the value of current conditions for the other. Where Israel largely failed to do so prior to the 1973 war, the interim accords and agreements have taken steps in this direction following that conflict. Specific actions taken by Israel to raise the (V_{sq}) for Egypt and Syria include:

- (1) Disengagement with Egyptian forces following the 1973 war and return of the Suez Canal to Egypt, along with that part of the Sinai occupied by Israel in June 1967;⁸
- (2) Disengagement with Syrian forces following the 1973 war and limited territorial return of Golan Heights territory occupied by Israel in June 1967;⁹
- (3) A second interim agreement with Egypt in 1975 providing for the return of additional Sinai territory and an improved economic, political and military climate for Egypt.¹⁰

Similarly a basic thrust of United States policy toward all states in the region has been to raise the value of the non-war, or

status quo, situation so that an additional element of stability is introduced into the region, increasing the possibilities open for an overall settlement. In this regard, the U.S. has effectively employed:

- (1) Economic and military assistance to Israel and various Arab states;¹¹
- (2) American monitors in the Sinai buffer zone at early warning stations, increasing the V_{sq} for both Israel and Egypt;
- (3) American initiated diplomatic efforts and communication links to facilitate Arab-Israeli exchanges and crisis management;¹²

While such contributions to stabilizing the Middle East tend to be overlooked in some analyses, they, nevertheless, play an important role in the security perceptions of both Israel and the Arab states.

The Value of Victory

A second element in the psychological framework involves the value of "victory" to a potential aggressor, discounted by the subjective probability of achieving such a victory. The policy objective in seeking to deter war, therefore, becomes a dual one of reducing the expected value of such a victory and decreasing the probability estimate that such a victory can be achieved.

For Israel, this means limiting the extent of any victory it might achieve over the Arab states in another conflict. Here the

prime elements of such a victory would be additional territorial conquests, destruction of Arab military capability, and sundry political concessions which might be obtained in the cessation of hostilities.

For the Arab states, a similar set of criteria apply, including limited territorial movements, damage to IDF forces, and additional flexibility from the Israeli leadership. In their mutual efforts to deter another round of war, each side has attempted to limit to the fullest extent possible the value the other side could expect to achieve.

Israel, for its part, has taken such measures as implementing early warning systems; advancing the readiness and training of IDF units; integrating stand-off, PGM, and other modern technologies into its force planning in an effort to affect Arab assessments of the possible value of another "victory" and deterring war. Similar actions by the Arab states have been implemented to reduce or minimize the value of another Israeli victory, should a war break out.

Related to these considerations are the probability estimates each side must make of the potential for achieving a victory over the other side in any renewed round of fighting. Although this is a distinct element, it can be seen that many of the specific measures undertaken to achieve a minimum V_v also serve to reduce the probability of such a victory taking place. A clear example of this is the early warning systems both sides now have established in the Sinai, along with the American monitor stations.

In this area as well, it has been an objective of United States policy to minimize the chances for another war by limiting insofar as

possible the value either side attaches to winning another war, and reducing the probability of a major victory for either side. This policy goal has been achieved best through a series of measures designed to maintain a strategic balance in the region, as well as through direct action to undercut tension and provide both sides with common buffer zones and early warning capabilities. On balance, it appears that U.S. efforts in this regard have met with considerable success and have made a major impact on the perceptions held by all parties to the conflict.

The Value of Defeat

The third, and final, major concern of each side in assessing the utility of engaging in war is the value, or cost, of a possible defeat discounted by the probability such a defeat might take place. In light of the 1967 experience, as well as the ultimate military position in the 1973 war, this is a significant consideration for the Arab states.¹³

For Israel, the catastrophic consequences of any military defeat are an essential part of all thinking in the area of security and defense. The components of this cost, in economic, political and military terms, are all part of the psychological assessment which is made. Indeed, the potential costs Israel might incur in any renewed round of warfare are prime considerations in the thinking of the nation's political and military leadership.¹⁴ Following the 1973 war, the economic and political consequences of any future conflict have played an increasingly important role in Israeli calculations. There is considerable evidence to suggest that this is the case for the major Arab confrontation

states, such as Egypt and Syria, as well.

Actions by both Israel and the Arab states following 1973 have demonstrated that any new conflict is likely to be costly to all involved, in economic and military terms, if not political as well. For its part, the United States has made it clear to all parties that renewed conflict will necessarily place a high price on aggression. Here again, such a policy has served to stabilize a volatile situation, and aided in deterring both sides from war.

Resistance to Change in Beliefs

As indicated above, the essential elements in determining any perception are the beliefs held by the decision-maker. In dealing with security and defense issues, the beliefs held by the Israeli leadership and public about the factors in the deterrence situation and their adversaries generate the perceptions held and policy made. A problem arises, however, in that these perceptions may be in error because these beliefs lead the decision-makers to select the wrong possible interpretations of events. Simply put, since perceptions of events are selected by means of the decision-maker's beliefs, it may be very difficult for events to change these beliefs.¹⁵

What is required, in many cases, are major or catastrophic events which thoroughly shake an established system of beliefs. In many respects, the experience of the 1973 war and its aftermath provided the force necessary to change established beliefs within the Israeli leadership and public, and did so. For many, this change did not go far enough; this has resulted in an ongoing leadership crisis, an apparent stalemate

on the diplomatic front, and a general loss of public confidence. These factors are considered at further length in Part Three below.

In the discussion of Israeli leadership perceptions contained in Part Two, considerable use is made of public statements made by various Israeli leaders which serve to portray these belief systems, as well as individual differences among the leaders.

An additional consideration must be kept in mind when formulating any kind of a framework, or model, to interpret events and policy-making; to avoid overrationalizing the actions of the decision-makers under analysis. As deRivera points out:

This compulsion to fit everything into one's model is a particular problem when the data are sparse - as they are when one is dealing with a country other than one's own. For example, a Soviet diplomat may interpret American Middle Eastern policy as being determined by the large oil companies. He may not realize that the more politically powerful segment of the American oil industry is domestically based and would be happier without competition from Middle Eastern oil.

Overrationalization is a particular problem when the other society is in competition with the expert's own. Competition almost forces the expert to assume that his opponent is rational so that the expert may play the game in an optimal way. The problem is that this adoption of rationality as an optimal strategic assumption becomes confused with one's perception of the real situation. A statement such as "The Russians will attack us as soon as they believe they have a military advantage" may be a good assumption on which to base policy, because *if* it were true the consequences would be enormous. But a person using this assumption begins to believe that it is a true picture of the world when it *probably* is not true. A good strategic assumption becomes confused with a good description of the other nation's behavior and intentions. For strategy, the *possible* is important, but this may become confused with the *most probable* at the expense of exaggerating

our perception of the opponent's rationality, power and aggressiveness.
[Emphasis in the original]¹⁶

Thus, it is with this caveat in mind that the present analysis of Israeli perceptions is undertaken. As an introductory note, it may be said that in some cases the Israeli leadership has itself made this mistake; they have confused strategic assumptions with reality and the possible with the most probable. Before analyzing this leadership, sections 1.3, 1.4 and 1.5 review some elements of reality which are of particular importance, namely the strategic balance in the Middle East and Israel's relationships with other nations of the world.

1.3 THE MIDDLE EAST ARMS RACE

The Lessons of October 1973

One of the major conclusions that emerges from the 1973 October War is that major shifts have taken place in both the quality and quantity of weapons systems employed by both sides during the conflict. While major changes in the level and sophistication of weapons used by the adversary parties were clear as early as the 1970 War of Attrition, the demonstration of sophistication and force level utilization by the Arab states in the 1973 conflict were largely unanticipated by Israel.¹⁷ Indeed, the massive deployment and utilization of sophisticated weapons by both sides during the 1973 war came as a surprise to the parties involved as well as the superpowers.

While the parameters of this arms race are considered in further detail below, it is important to note the net effect of this shift on the parties to the conflict, and their perception of the strategic balance. The present analysis is limited to the impact of these shifts on the Israeli leadership and public, although the impact of these changes on the Arab states and the superpowers can be documented as well. As the "surprised" party in the 1973 war, Israel was forced to come to grips with both a surprise attack by Egypt and Syria, as well as major shifts in the levels of sophistication and military effectiveness of their adversaries. Although Israel was ultimately able to stabilize and reverse initial setbacks, major damage

was incurred by the fixed beliefs held by the Israeli military and political leadership.¹⁸

The net effect of this experience for Israel has been a renewal of the arms race on both qualitative and quantitative levels to maintain what the Israeli leadership perceives as a strategic balance with the Arab states. Perceptions of what constitutes a "balance" and an effective deterrent posture for Israel are at the very heart of the current debate in Israel over policy, Israeli requests for military and economic assistance, and the flexibility which Israel has been willing to exhibit in its negotiations with the Arab states.

Trends in Weapons Acquisition and Defense Spending

Facing decision-makers on both sides of the Middle East conflict is an exponentially increasing quantity and quality of sophisticated weapons systems, and forces increasingly well trained to use them.¹⁹ In the absence of meaningful political relations prior to the 1973 October War, Israel and the major Arab confrontation states have engaged in an arms race limited only by their ability to obtain weapons systems of increasing complexity and in increasing quantities.²⁰ As Kemp points out, in the past year alone some \$13 billion in weapons have been transferred to the Middle East region.²¹ This year such transfers are likely to exceed the \$16-billion mark. Kemp traces this massive influx of arms to the dual factors of the Arab-Israeli conflict, as well as the desire of the oil-producing states to "bolster their security in a region beset with political and military conflict."²²

The magnitude of the Middle East arms race, in quantitative terms, is reflected in Tables 1.1 and 1.2. Table 1.1 indicates some historical trends in defense spending of the major adversaries, while Table 1.2 compares the historical trends of two major categories of weapons systems which have been essential to Israel and the Arab states throughout the period; namely, jet combat aircraft and tanks. Table 1.3 provides a more detailed analysis of the arms race and holding of the key nations before, during, and after the 1973 war.

Not included in these figures, but of considerable concern to many Israeli defense planners, is the major influx of arms to the so-called "non-confrontation" Arab states, such as Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Libya and Lebanon which, as the Israelis view it, could play a substantial role in any new round of warfare. From published reports of arms requests made by Israel and the Arab states, as well as data on ongoing assistance programs, it is evident that this influx is likely to continue well into the 1980's.²³ Clearly evident in these figures is the spectre of a conventional war so intense that it exceeds the maximal cost limits, both in economic and manpower terms, of the parties (particularly Israel), as well as the ability of the parties to absorb sophisticated weapons.

In qualitative terms a major escalation is also evident. While it was clear by the 1970 War of Attrition that major changes in technology and force capability were under way, it was not until October 1973 that Israel experienced the deployment and relatively effective utilization by the Arab states of sophisticated Soviet weapons systems, including:

TABLE 1.1

ARAB-ISRAELI MILITARY EXPENDITURES: 1951-1973

(in U.S. \$ millions)

	<u>Annual Averages</u>		
	<u>1951 - 1960</u>	<u>1961 - 1970</u>	<u>1971 - 1973^a</u>
A. Israel	143.6	531.2	1406.7
B. Arab States			
1. Egypt	191.6	649.7	1575.0
2. Syria	45.5	121.8	214.3
3. Jordan	36.8	75.7	104.5
C. Ratio of total Arab to Israel	1.9	1.6	1.3
D. Percent increase from prior period			
1. Israel	-	270%	165%
2. Egypt	-	239%	142%
3. Syria	-	168%	76%
4. Jordan	-	106%	38%

^aFigures from 1973 do not reflect expenditures caused by the 1973 October War

Source: Abraham R. Wagner, *Crisis Decision-Making: Israel's Experience in 1967 and 1973*, New York: Praeger, 1974.

TABLE 1.2

ARAB-ISRAELI OPERATIONAL INVENTORIES OF
JET COMBAT AIRCRAFT AND TANKS ON EVE OF WAR

	Jet Combat Aircraft			Tanks		
	1956	1967	1973	1956	1967	1973
A. Israel	110	290	488	400	800	1700
B. Arab States						
1. Egypt	205	431	620	430	1300	1955
2. Syria	44	78	326	200	400	1270
3. Jordan	16	18	52	105	300	400
C. Ratio of total Arab to Israel	2.4	1.8	2.0	1.8	2.5	2.1

Source: Abraham R. Wagner, *Crisis Decision-Making: Israel's Experience in 1967 and 1973*. New York: Praeger, 1974.

TABLE 1.3

MAJOR MILITARY EQUIPMENT HOLDINGS IN THE MIDDLE EAST

	ISRAEL			SYRIA			EGYPT		
	Pre- Oct. 1973	Losses Oct. 1973	Present Total 1975	Pre- Oct. 1973	Losses Oct. 1973	Present Total 1975	Pre- Oct. 1973	Losses Oct. 1973	Present Total 1975
Medium Tanks	1,700	810	2,260	1,500	1,050	1,950	1,850	900	1,920
Armored Vehicles	3,000		3,300	1,100		1,150	2,000		2,500
Field Artillery	550	n.a.	710	900	n.a.	800	1,400	n.a.	1,500
Submarines	3	0	2	-	-	-	12	0	12
Destroyers	1	0	0	-	-	-	5	0	5
Missile Boats	13	0	18	8	5	6	19	3	16
Bombers	12	0	10	n.a.	0	n.a.	30	0	30
Fighter-Bombers	308	79	380	110		150	180		140
Interceptors	59	12	47	200	165	250	210	182	250
Reconnaissance	6	0	6	-	-	-	-	-	-

n.a. = not available

Source: Strategic Survey: 1974. London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1975.

(1) Air Defense Systems:

SA-2	Guideline	(surface-to-air missile)
SA-3	Goa	(surface-to-air missile)
SA-6	Gainful	(surface-to-air missile)
SA-7	Graill	(surface-to-air missile)
MiG-21MF	Fishbed J	(interceptor)
ZSU-23-4		(sp aa gun)
Missile Radars:		Fan Song, Low Blow, Flat Face, Straight Flush and Long Track

(2) Anti-Tank Weapons:

Sagger	(ATGW)
Swatter	(ATGW)
Snapper	(ATGW)

(3) Advanced Fighter Aircraft:

MiG-17	Fresco	(fighter-bomber)
MiG-21	Fishbed	(interceptors)
MiG-23	Flogger	(fighter-bomber)
Su-7	Fitter C	(fighter-bomber)

(4) Armor and Tanks:

T-62	(medium tank)
JS-2/T-10	(heavy tanks)
PT-76	(light tanks)
SU-100	(tank destroyer)

In addition, the forces of Egypt and Syria used a wide variety of less sophisticated conventional weapons and modern C³ equipment. Combined with the initial surprise of the war, the unanticipated effectiveness of these systems caused major material losses for the IDF in the early days of the 1973 war, amounting to approximately one-half of the IDF armored force and one-quarter of the fighter aircraft. Because of the effective air defense umbrella established in the theatre by the Arab states, Israel was largely inhibited from utilizing the type of effective offensive air power that had provided a strategic advantage in

earlier wars.

Thus, at the onset, Israel lacked the two basic strategic advantages which were previously in her favor; (1) surprise and (2) the ability to wage an effective air war over enemy territory. In subsequent stages of the conflict Israel was able to introduce some advanced ECM and ECCM systems for IDF aircraft, which in addition to the ground action, restored some of the IAF's ability to carry out effective air strikes. Particularly useful in such interdictive strikes were ATG precision-guided munitions (PGM's) supplied by the United States. These electro-optical (EO) guided PGM's include the Mk-84 HOB0, MAVERICK, and WALLEYE-I. The perceived effectiveness of these weapons in 1973 lies behind much of the importance Israel attaches to acquiring still more advanced PGM's (such as laser-guided systems) and stand-off technology. What is missing in much of the Israeli thinking is a realization that such technological advantages are both difficult and costly to maintain.²⁴

As indicated, Israel too exhibited a vast array of modern armaments in the 1973 war not previously employed in large numbers. Such systems included the following major components:

(1) Air Defense and Reconnaissance:

HAWK	(surface-to-air missile)
RF-4E Phantom	(reconnaissance)
Mirage III C	(reconnaissance)

(2) Anti-Tank and ATG PGM's:

TOW	(ATGW)
Mk-84 HOB0	(ATGW)
MAVERICK	(ATGW)
WALLEYE-I	(ATGW)

(3) Advanced Fighter-Bomber Aircraft:

F-4E Phantom II	(fighter-bomber)
A-4E/F/N Skyhawk	(fighter-bomber)
Mirage III-C	(fighter-bomber)

(4) Armor and Tanks:

M-48	(medium tank)
M-60	(medium tank)
M-113	(APC)
T-54/55, T-62, PT-76	(captured Soviet, modified)

Despite the effective use of such systems, Israel was forced to pay a substantial price for its "victory" in manpower, which it can ill afford, and in economic terms, which have had a grave impact on Israel's defense posture.

Future Use of Technology

What emerges from the 1973 experience, for the Israeli leadership, is a realization that because of the geographic and demographic imbalance with the Arab states, the high cost to Israel in terms of manpower in any major war, and the inability of Israel to rely on the element of surprise as in the 1967 case, it is necessary to maintain a net advantage in offensive and defensive weapons technology, in order to maintain at least an overall net balance with the Arab states.

As one Israeli authority defines this need:

It is the technology of precision, both in time and space which carries the promise of advantage of defense over offense, and the credibility of defense by few against many. Under technologies of precision, one could list: intelligence and surveillance, command and control, target acquisition and precision guided weapons. These are not to be separated from the

basic elements of the battlefield: mobility and firepower. A conscious integration of all the elements will result in a new balance between the two elementary concepts of force structuring - of "arming the man" and "manning the weapon". This defines the context, wherein successful conventional defense by the few against the many is possible.²⁵

Specific areas of technological need which Israelis perceive as being critical in the years ahead include:

(1) Early warning systems: Covered here are both ground and airborne systems. For many, this is the most critical element since it bears on Israel's defense posture and state of readiness.

(2) Real time battlefield intelligence, and target acquisition: Because of advancements in the armed forces of the Arab states and the ratio of Arab to Israeli forces, the IDF views the timely and accurate acquisition of such information as critical to utilize efficiently the IDF order-of-battle and to reduce costly decision errors.

(3) Secure C³ and IFF capabilities: Because of the dense environment, short reaction times, and need to effectively apply limited forces in the defense, Israel views this capability as vital as well.

(4) Tactical and logistic mobility: Given the demands of deploying a largely reserve IDF and the possibility of varied and shifting battlefield situations, the IDF sees such capability as important to Israel's ability to react effectively.

(5) Night and long-range target acquisition: Closely related to (2) above is the ability to detect and target under adverse conditions, such as night and limited visibility, as well as at long ranges,

employing the natural, defensive feature of the terrain.

(6) Precision guided munitions (PGM's): A major asset in overcoming some of the problems of the basic Israeli-Arab force imbalance are the new generations of PGM's, both airborne and used by ground forces. Such systems dramatically increase the effectiveness of interdictive air power, and the cost effectiveness of defensive ground forces. In addition, such systems tend to create a "stand-off" capability, reducing the amount of territory Israel would be required to trade for mobilization time under conditions of an Arab attack.²⁶

(7) Barrier and area munitions: Again, to limit the need for defensive territory and attrition of ground forces, such technologies serve to increase the capability of a limited manpower force, such as the IDF under a variety of battlefield situations. Use of such systems is closely related to the early warning, target acquisition and PGM technologies.

Participation of Non-Confrontation States

Of increasing concern to the Israelis is the possibility that any renewed fighting could involve the traditional "confrontation" states, such as Egypt, Syria and Jordan, supported to a considerable extent by the "non-confrontation" states, such as Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Libya and Lebanon. Such nations have been significant purchasers of modern weapons systems and could contribute these, as well as forces, to the conflict. Such a worst case analysis could increase significantly projections of Israeli force attrition even though Israel ultimately

would prevail on the battlefield.

Viewing such a worst case as the most likely, Israeli defense planners have pressed the United States since the 1973 war to aid in the development of a conventional force capability which is both capable of deterring another Arab attack, and allowing Israel to win with minimal casualties should renewed fighting break out.

The Arms Race in Retrospect

Several aspects of the present and developing situation in the Middle East arms race appear particularly destabilizing. First is the magnitude and scope of the conventional arms race itself. Already the most heavily armed part of the non-industrialized world, the Middle East continues to witness an ongoing qualitative and quantitative arms race of the most unstable type. A 1970 study by the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency points this out:

. . . it is an extremely competitive race with adversary states procuring offsetting armaments in a continuous action-reaction process; new arms accretions have repeatedly involved generational jumps in the quality of armaments, at periodically faster rates, and with sharp increases in military expenditures; finally, each side aims, not at equilibrium, but at achieving a preponderance of power.²⁷

It is only fair to point out the nature of the debate that continues over the relationship between arms races and war. It is by no means settled that arms races of any type inevitably lead to war, and in some cases they have been shown to have a stabilizing effect.²⁸ In

the present case of the Middle East, the empirical evidence would suggest the former, while the extent and magnitude of the current situation combined with the efforts of the United States to maintain a balance in the region may suggest the latter as a real possibility.

A second element of the current balance that is of considerable concern to Israeli leaders is the focus of Israeli strategy and tactics around the element of surprise. Central to Israeli strategic doctrine has been the concept that Israel must anticipate its adversaries and gain the momentum of surprise, establishing initial air superiority supportive of ground forces, carrying the war into the territory of the enemy. Yigal Allon, presently Israel's Foreign Minister and one of Israel's early military leaders, summed up this view:

As long as the Arab rulers refuse to make peace with Israel and continue to hope to overthrow her by economic blockade, or by direct military attack, the moral right and practical ability to carry out an interceptive counter-attack, whenever necessary, form the military guarantee for Israel's future existence...

Sometimes it must precede [Arab aggression] by months, sometimes by weeks and sometimes even by a few days... Where there is no choice...by only a few hours, but precede it it must.²⁹

To this end Israel undertook preemptive action in 1956 and 1967, and was successful in both the Sinai Campaign and the Six Day War.

Reacting to such doctrine, the Arab states (particularly Egypt and Syria) acquired sophisticated air defense and themselves took the initiative in the 1973 October War. Losing the element of surprise,

Israel suffered considerable casualties and materiel losses in 1973 while regaining the initiative lost in the first phase of the conflict. Thus, the apparent need to preempt, for both sides, adds an additional element of instability.

A third factor, closely related to the foregoing, is raised by the availability and deployment of offensive missiles to the major Arab confrontation states, most notably the Soviet Scud-B, Frog-7 and Samlet SSM's. Current reports also indicate the *Kelt* and *Atoll* AAM's to be either deployed or on schedule for delivery.³⁰ Such systems are generally capable of striking Israeli population centers and strategic targets in Israel from Arab territory directly, limiting the utility of territorial buffers acquired by Israel in earlier conflicts. Such systems pose a sizable threat to Israel, against which there are at best limited defenses. Use of these weapons by the Arab states would necessitate Israeli escalation of any future conflict to strikes against Arab population centers from the outset, increasing the probability of an intense regional conflict and escalation beyond the region as well. Indeed such a scenario might well lead to a superpower confrontation.

Thus, while it is by no means certain that the ongoing Middle East arms race will lead to another round of full-scale hostilities, it is certainly clear that should such fighting erupt again, the level of force and weapons utilization, as well as the cost to the parties, will be of major proportions, presenting real dangers for both the Middle Eastern states and the superpowers.

1.4 SUPERPOWER INVOLVEMENT IN THE MIDDLE EAST

The Historical Perspective

Since the inception of the State of Israel in 1948, it has been clear that the Middle East had global significance and was a potential arena for superpower conflict. Indeed, since this time, the ongoing Arab - Israeli conflict has had an impact on both relations between the United States and the Soviet Union and bilateral relations between the two superpowers and the states within the region. The present analysis focuses largely on the Israeli perception of one of these bilateral relations, namely the American - Israeli one, although it is important to note that Soviet involvement in the Middle East plays a significant role in the way U.S. policy is viewed. The purpose of the present section is to provide a broad overview of the way American and Soviet involvement in the Middle East affects Israeli perceptions of U.S. policy, and thus Israeli policy-making. Further discussion of the United States role in the Middle East is contained in sections 2.2 and 3.3 below.

While both the U.S. and the Soviet Union took considerable interest in and supported the establishment of Israel in 1948, the interests of the two superpowers in the Middle East region have often diverged in subsequent years. Particularly after the foundation of NATO in 1949, the United States sought stability, economic development, and a defense to Soviet hegemony in the Middle East as well as Western Europe. At the same time, the Soviets sought to promote their own interests in

the perpetuation of instability and conflict within the Middle East region, as in Europe and other parts of the world.

Indeed, Soviet actions lie behind much of the conflict that has plagued the region for the past quarter century and the inability of the parties to reach a settlement.³¹ While the Soviets generally refrained from entering the region as a major weapons supplier until 1958, the level and quality of Soviet weapons introduced has increased for almost two decades.³² In addition to arming the Arab states, the Soviets have worked to instigate conflict both within various Arab states and between Israel and the Arab states. Indeed, the crisis leading to the 1967 Six Day War can be attributed directly to Soviet purposes. Ultimately, they initiated use of the Washington-Moscow hotline to prevent further escalation of the crisis to the superpower level.

Following the 1967 conflict, both the Soviet Union and the U.S. increased their involvement in the region as arms suppliers, with the United States taking over the role of Israel's principal weapons source from France following a French embargo of arms to the region. American efforts were being directed at maintaining the balance, and meeting the level of technology introduced by the Soviets prior to and during the War of Attrition.³⁴

When the 1973 October War erupted, and both sides began to suffer unanticipated losses, it was necessary for the superpowers to engage in active resupply programs for the combatant forces during the conflict. This factor, combined with superpower activities following the cessation of hostilities, added another dimension to superpower involvement in

the Middle East and the perceptions which the Israelis and Arabs hold of the U.S. and the Soviet Union, and the role the superpowers are willing and able to play in the region.

It has been suggested that any analysis of United States policy in the Middle East be considered along two major lines; the way in which American policy affects Soviet - American relations directly, and secondly, the bi-lateral relationships that each of the superpowers has with the regional states.³⁵ The impact of the 1973 war and its aftermath on *detente* have been the subject of much critical examination, and are not considered to any major extent here. What is of importance to this analysis is the view which the Israeli leadership and public hold of Soviet - American relations and the impact which this perception has on the available alternatives. Similarly American - Israeli relations and the entire set of relationships which the U.S. has developed in the Middle East have undergone intensive analysis. Again, the important area of concern is the assessment which the Israelis make of these relations and the impact on policy-making.

Soviet Interests and Intervention

Underlying Soviet policy and actions in the Middle East since the mid-1950's has been a conviction that this region was vital to Soviet security, in strategic terms, and that it was necessary to maintain substantial influence over the states in the region. For over two decades the principal mechanisms for maintaining and extending this influence have been the inter-Arab and Arab - Israeli conflicts.³⁶

To this end, the Soviets have exploited Arab nationalist ambitions, local rivalries, economic needs, the Palestinian refugee problem as well as the fundamental Arab - Israeli dispute. To the extent any solution offered regional stability, it was not in the Soviet interest. At the other extreme the prospect of escalating the regional conflict into a major superpower confrontation, as the case appeared on 24-25 October 1973, was not seen in the Soviet interest either.

In light of the 1973 war and its aftermath, Soviet policy has become hard-pressed, particularly in the Middle East, as the Israelis see it, leaving few major options open. The experience of 1973 and level of arms escalation generally preclude another round of full-scale fighting as being in the Soviet interest. Any such fighting is likely to involve the loss of arms, territory and prestige for the Soviet client states. It is doubtful that even the direct introduction of conventional Soviet forces after the initiation of conflict could prevent such a loss.

Two additional factors have had a direct impact on Soviet policy in the region since the 1973 conflict, namely the loss of influence in Egypt following the war, and secondly, the Soviet role as co-chairman of the Geneva peace conference. The first of these has served to place additional restraints on the Soviet Union's ability to exert influence among the Arab states. As a result, the Soviet Union has been forced to direct its efforts toward Syria, and the non-confrontation states such as Libya and Iraq.

The second factor places the Soviets in a more difficult position vis-a-vis Israel and the region. Here the Soviet role as a superpower publically committed to peace and security runs directly counter to its interest in regional instability. In practice this dilemma has caused the Soviets to abandon positions previously acceptable, such as Soviet - Israeli relations, modification of the pre-June 1967 demarcation lines, and others in favor of positions *a priori* unacceptable to Israel.³⁷

At present, Soviet policy has found refuge in Syrian - Israeli irreconcilability, the Israeli refusal to negotiate with the PLO, and the general inability of the parties to agree on a formula for the reconvening of the Geneva conference. Should any of these circumstances change in the future, the prospect of stability and settlement loom large, Soviet policy will indeed be hard pressed.

United States Policy

Since the 1973 war, the United States has sought a Middle East policy with the interrelated goals of meeting its own economic interests, achieving stability and development in the region, as well as assisting the parties to the conflict in reaching mutually beneficial settlement accords. The methods used to implement this policy have included a broad range of diplomatic, military and economic initiatives directed toward "minimizing the risks of instability" and the effects of the implications of Soviet ambition. Thus, while American actions at times appear parallel to those of the Soviet Union, the direction and

goal of American policy is quite the opposite.

(1) Diplomatic Initiatives: For over two decades it has been an objective of American policy to secure a stable Middle East and an overall settlement to the Arab - Israeli conflict. From the very beginning, as sponsor and party to a series of efforts aimed in this direction, from Rhodes in 1949 through current undertakings, the U.S. has sought continually both a formula for peaceful coexistence and a forum for the adversary parties. As circumstances permitted, the U.S. has utilized both international action through the United Nations and multi-lateral initiatives, such as the 1970 Rogers mission and the rounds of "shuttle diplomacy" conducted by Secretary of State Kissinger during and after the 1973 war.

On balance, such initiatives have enabled the parties to reach a number of stabilizing solutions, although final peace has yet to be established. The 1970 Rogers mission succeeded in ending the costly War of Attrition while American mediation was able to yield a series of three interim settlement accords following the 1973 October War.³⁸ In all of these efforts American mediation was viewed in Israel as being at best neutral, and considerable skepticism was voiced. In retrospect, such actions generally are viewed by the Israelis as being in their interest and stabilizing to the region. What this has cost U.S. policy, in seeking to increase Israeli policy flexibility at critical points, is an increased resistiveness in response to threats of military insufficiency, as perceived by the Israelis. Given this increasing policy rigidity and unwillingness to compromise, the potential for additional diplomatic

initiatives becomes more and more limited over time.

(2) Military Assistance Programs: While the initial position of the United States in the Middle East following the Second World War was to limit its contribution to arms proliferation in this region, and to refrain from becoming the principal arms supplier of any of the major regional states, succeeding events have necessitated a shift in this policy. Following the 1967 Six Day War and the subsequent embargo of French arms to Israel, the U.S. was forced to take up the burden of meeting Soviet military aid to the Arab states and maintaining the strategic balance by providing Israel and other states with advanced weapons and military aid.

The enormous losses suffered by Israel in the 1973 October War required a massive increase in American military assistance just to maintain this balance.³⁹ The military assistance provided to the region by the U.S. in the past two years alone is presented in Table 1.4. Current estimates indicate that this type of military assistance is likely to continue at a high level for at least the near and medium term. In providing this assistance, the U.S. has sought to both maintain the balance in the region, enabling Israel to deter Arab aggression and not begin a war itself, and provide sufficient resources for Israeli security so that it might be able to demonstrate the policy flexibility necessary to achieve an overall settlement with the Arab states. While the U.S. has been reasonably successful in the former over the past two years, it has yet to succeed in the latter. Israeli resistance to such "pressure" is considered at further length in earlier works,

and in Part Two of the present work.⁴⁰

(3) Economic Incentives: Closely related to the U.S. MAP in the Middle East has been a program of supporting economic assistance designed to stabilize the nations within the region by helping them to overcome some of their more pressing problems of economic development and growth. Since the end of the Second World War, and particularly since its establishment as a state in 1948, Israel has required considerable amounts of external support in dealing with a complex set of economic problems.

In the early years, basic problems of refugee resettlement and survival were met with aid from both the public and private sectors in the U.S.⁴¹ Public support has included US Overseas Loans, grants (AID) and aid through a variety of established national and international programs. The extent of this aid to the region since WW-II is outlined in Table 1.5. In sum, this aid has enabled Israel to become the most advanced of the developing nations, and has helped it meet many of its unique economic problems.

Beyond this direct public economic support, the U.S. has acted to facilitate substantial aid from the private sector in the U.S. Here American policy, coupled with favorable securities, tax and other laws, has permitted Israel to sell development bonds directly in the U.S., enabled U.S. citizens to contribute funds under favorable circumstances, and permitted official and quasi-official Israeli agencies to operate for these purposes within the U.S. Since 1948, such policies have

TABLE 1.4

UNITED STATES MILITARY ASSISTANCE
PROVIDED TO THE MIDDLE EAST, FY-1974 and FY-1975^a

Country	Grant ^{b/} (\$000)	Foreign Military Sales ^{c/d/} (\$000)	Commercial Sales ^{e/} (\$000)	Total (\$000)	Military Assistance as % of Military Assistance to		
					ME	ME (-) Aegean	Subregion
<u>MILITARY ASSISTANCE</u>							
<u>Persian Gulf Subregion</u>							
Bahrain	600	--	116	716	Insig	Insig	Insig
Iran	19	1,488,922	70,644	1,559,585	28.9	32.9	78.3
Iraq	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Kuwait	--	7,643	212	7,855	0.2	0.2	0.4
Oman	--	1,611	80	1,691	Insig	Insig	0.1
Qatar	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Saudi Arabia	168	385,362	36,062	421,592	7.8	8.9	21.2
United Arab Emirates	--	--	252	252	Insig	Insig	Insig
Subtotal	787	1,883,538	107,366	1,991,691	36.9	42.0	100.0
<u>Aegean Subregion</u>							
Cyprus	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Greece	28,985	234,845	3,372	268,202	5.0	--	40.9
Turkey	266,438	114,766	6,604	387,808	7.2	--	59.1
Subtotal	295,423	349,611	9,976	656,010	12.2	--	100.0
<u>Other Mid-East Countries</u>							
Algeria	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Egypt	258,000	--	--	258,000	4.8	5.4	9.4
Ethiopia	16,634	9,459	92	26,185	0.5	0.6	1.0
French Sahara/Israel	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Israel	374,500	1,717,721	100,236	2,192,457	40.6	46.2	79.7
Jordan	178,118	28,594	184	206,896	3.8	4.4	7.5
Lebanon	609	4,499	1,150	6,258	0.1	0.1	0.2
Libya	--	315	2,096	2,411	Insig	Insig	0.1
Morocco	796	11,725	76	12,597	0.2	0.3	0.5
Pakistan	512	30,041	3,244	33,797	0.6	0.7	1.2
Somalia	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Sudan	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Syria	--	--	214	214	Insig	Insig	Insig
Tunisia	7,752	451	--	8,203	0.2	0.2	0.3
Yemen Arab Republic (YAR)	--	3,005	--	3,005	0.1	0.1	0.1
Yemen (PDY)	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Subtotal	836,921	1,805,810	107,292	2,750,023	50.9	58.0	100.0
Total	1,134,131	4,038,959	224,634	5,397,724	100.0	100.0	--

^{a/} This assistance represents that actually delivered rather than that programmed, except where specifically noted otherwise for FY 1975 information.

^{b/} Includes MAP (less EDA), EDA at acquisition cost, and security supporting assistance (economic assistance provided to a friendly government to help in its defense by overcoming economic instability or other problems relative to military expenditures).

DOD, DSAA, The Journal FY 1974 (U). 75 (CONFIDENTIAL).

DOD, DSAA, Excess Deliveries (EDA-Real Value) During FY 75 (U). 9 Jun (CONFIDENTIAL).

DOD, DSAA, Military Assistance Program Data, Status of Deliveries through 31 Mar 75 (U). 30 Apr 75 (CONFIDENTIAL).

MAP deliveries for the 4th quarter of FY 75 were assumed to equal 3d quarter FY 75 deliveries.

DOD, DSAA, Excess Deliveries During FY 75-Acquisition Cost (U). 9 Jun 75 (CONFIDENTIAL). EDA acquisition costs for the 4th quarter of FY 75 were assumed to equal one-third of the delivered acquisition cost for the first three quarters of FY 75.

STATE DEPT, AID, US Overseas Loans and Grants and Assistance from International Organizations and Loan Authorizations (FY 74). Draft, 75 (UNCLASSIFIED).

STATE DEPT, AID, Operating Year Budget FY 1975. Apr 75 (UNCLASSIFIED).

^{c/} DOD, DSAA, The Journal FY 1974 (U). 75 (CONFIDENTIAL).

^{d/} DOD, DSAA, Foreign Military Sales (FMS) Status of Deliveries through 31 Mar 75 (U). 31 May 75 (CONFIDENTIAL). FMS deliveries during the fourth quarter of FY 75 were assumed to be equal to those delivered during the third quarter of FY 75.

^{e/} Commercial sales deliveries for FY 75 were estimated to be equal to those for FY 1974. (FY 75 actual or programmed deliveries not available.)

Source: Engineer Studies Group, Office, Chief of Engineers, Department of the Army, *United States Involvement in the Middle East (A Framework for Assessment)* (U) Department of the Army, October, 1975 S-76-1
 (SECRET/NOFORN)

TABLE 1.5

UNITED STATES ECONOMIC GRANT ASSISTANCE
PROVIDED TO THE MIDDLE EAST, FY-1946 through FY-1975^a

Country	Total ^{b/c/d/}	Economic Grant Assistance As % of Economic Grants to		
		ME	ME Excluding Aegean	Subregion
		ECONOMIC GRANT ASSISTANCE		
<u>Persian Gulf Subregion</u>		(\$000)		
Bahrain	108	Insig	Insig	Insig
Iran	407,957	6.5	9.1	87.3
Iraq	31,100	0.5	0.7	6.7
Kuwait	--	--	--	--
Oman	512	Insig	Insig	0.1
Qatar	--	--	--	--
Saudi Arabia	27,500	0.4	0.6	5.9
United Arab Emirates	--	--	--	--
Subtotal	467,177	7.4	10.4	100.0
<u>Aegean Subregion</u>				
Cyprus	58,536	0.9	--	3.1
Greece	1,377,900	21.7	--	73.6
Turkey	435,938	6.9	--	23.3
Subtotal	1,872,374	29.5	--	100.0
<u>Other Mid-East Countries</u>				
Algeria	172,728	2.7	3.9	4.3
Egypt	305,297	4.8	6.8	7.6
Ethiopia	189,691	3.0	4.3	4.7
French Afars/Issas	--	--	--	--
Israel	393,877	6.2	8.8	9.8
Jordan	388,487	6.1	8.7	9.7
Lebanon	108,403	1.7	2.4	2.7
Libya	183,700	2.9	4.1	4.6
Morocco	353,293	5.6	7.9	8.8
Pakistan	1,255,783	19.8	28.1	31.4
Somalia	62,572	1.0	1.4	1.6
Sudan	83,618	1.3	1.9	2.1
Syria	42,000	0.7	0.9	1.1
Tunisia	430,966	6.8	9.7	10.8
Yemen Arab Rep (YAR)	29,734	0.5	0.7	0.7
Yemen (PDRY)	4,500	Insig	Insig	0.1
Subtotal	4,004,649	63.1	89.6	100.0
Total	6,344,200	100.0	100.0	--

^{a/} The assistance represents that actually given (delivered) rather than that programed, except where specifically noted otherwise.

^{b/} STATE DEPT, AID, US Overseas Loans and Grants and Assistance from International Organizations, Obligations and Loan Authorizations (FY 74). Draft. 75 (UNCLASSIFIED). About 98 percent of security support assistance is grant aid (estimated by AID). Economic assistance provided to a friendly government to help in its defense by overcoming economic instability or other problems relative to military expenditures is included here under military assistance.

^{c/} STATE DEPT, AID, Operating Year Budget FY 1975. Apr 75 (UNCLASSIFIED).

^{d/} STATE DEPT, AID, US Economic Assistance, Military Assistance, and Credit Sales Programs Estimated for FY 1975. May 75 (UNCLASSIFIED).

Source: Engineer Studies Group, Office, Chief of Engineers, Department of the Army, *United States Involvement in the Middle East* (A Framework for Assessment) (U) Department of the Army, October, 1975 S-76-1 (SECRET/NOFORN)

enabled Israel to raise major amounts of development capital in hard currency at favorable interest rates, as well as substantial ongoing contributions from the American Jewish community.

The Impact of U.S. Policy: 1948-76

The impact of U.S. policy toward Israel, and the Middle East as a whole, must be viewed with a certain amount of historical perspective if any rational assessment is to be made. With respect to Israel, it is important to note that in the immediate post-independence period a major division existed within the Israeli leadership and public over that nation's foreign policy and alignment. The leftist *Mapam*, now part of the ruling *Ma'arach* (Labor Alignment) urged a pro-Soviet alignment, if not a neutral or "non-aligned" posture up through the 1967 war.

Over the years continued Soviet intervention, support of the Arab states, and a positive U.S. policy have succeeded in strengthening American - Israeli ties and virtually eliminating any pro-Soviet elements in Israel. Although not the subject of this present report, this same effect can be observed in much of the Arab world since the 1973 conflict. Thus, while Israel continues to display disagreement and dissatisfaction with elements of U.S. policy and the arms supply relationship, it must be viewed within a general understanding that American and Israeli interests in a stable Middle East are coincident, and that the U.S. commitment to this goal is a valid one.

1.5 ISRAEL IN AN ERA OF ISOLATION

The Search for Support

Since its inception in 1948, Israel has of necessity sought the support and recognition of nations small and large throughout the world. In part because of its isolation in the Middle East, and in part out of a conviction that it must maintain contact with Jews throughout the "Diaspora", Israel sought to establish relations with other nations on a scale unprecedented for a nation of its size.⁴²

Under its first prime minister, David Ben-Gurion, Israel viewed itself as an Asian nation, seeking to establish relations with that part of the world. As a lay Foreign Ministry official of that period writes:

The availability in Israel of a reservoir of skills was seized upon by various Asian and African states (including India) who both invited Israeli experts to come and assist them, and sent their nationals to Israel for advanced training in various fields. In particular, ties of this nature were created with countries like Burma; despite many difficulties Israel has been able to establish a useful pattern of friendly relations, not limited only to political relations but going much further, with Ceylon, Thailand, the Philippines, Nepal, Japan and others. To this must be added the fact that satisfactory relations, both political and economic, exist with a number of non-Arab Moslem countries in Asia and in Africa.

Israel is, therefore, no longer isolated on the Asian and African continents. The difficulties in the way of expanding these ties are not underestimated. They are not rendered any easier by the fact that two important Asian countries, Pakistan and Indonesia, are themselves Moslem Powers, or by the fact that the Chinese People's Republic - recognized by Israel in 1950 - is today, like the rest of the Communist world, espousing the Arab cause and thus appearing hostile to Israel. But the existence of common interests - political, economic and cultural - between

Israel and the several Asian countries has been learned. This supplies a measure of sober confidence that the next decade of Israel's independence will see further substantial progress towards the country's integration in the Asian continent.⁴³

During her tenure as Foreign Minister, Golda Meir sponsored a major campaign to establish Israeli relations with the new nations of Africa in an effort to outflank Israel's Arab neighbors. Such efforts led to Israeli economic, military and technical support missions to a number of African nations, in the hope that these newly admitted United Nations members would provide a balance to the anti-Israel coalition. One Israeli critic of this policy recalls:

[The policy] was a total disaster. We expended millions on these nations, which we could ill afford, and when did we ever get their support on a single vote? They could never seem to make the connection between the support we were giving them and the political support we wanted.⁴⁴

Speaking of one early beneficiary, Uganda's Idi Amin, he continued:

Amin was typical...he didn't know what he needed, and we could never give him enough. . . he would buy the Hayarkon [a river in Tel-Aviv] if we would give him the credit.⁴⁵

The ultimate collapse of Mrs. Meir's Africa policy was to come during the 1973 war, when all these nations, save one, broke relations with Israel in an instant. For Israel, the only reliable African ally remains South Africa, a nation which has finally established full diplomatic relations with Israel, and a nation which is likely to play

an increasingly important role in Israeli foreign policy in the years to come.

More productive results were achieved in Israeli relations with the nations of Western Europe in the 1950's and 1960's. Handled by Ben-Gurion himself, along with his young protege, Shimon Peres, these relationships were critical to the defense requirements of the state and saw the development of key links between Israel and three major NATO powers, namely Great Britain, France and the FRG.⁴⁶ As Peres describes these efforts:

In our search for a more general power of deterrence, we tried to get guarantees from the United States and certain European countries. We tried to reach an alliance with them. We investigated the chances of being accepted as full or auxiliary members of NATO. We made efforts to join the Common Market. We considered the possibilities of an association with the European Defence Community. So urgent was our desire to break out of our isolation and achieve links with large world organizations that in 1953, the then Chairman of our parliamentary Defence and Foreign Affairs Committee, the late Mr. Meir Argov, openly urged that Israel should try to join the British Commonwealth!⁴⁷

Although unsuccessful in its efforts to secure European "guarantees" of security, Israel was able to establish major weapons procurement programs with both France and the FRG.⁴⁸ These relationships served to meet Israel's vital defense needs, if not its search for international political support through the 1967 Six Day War, after which France adopted a more "even handed" policy and a resulting arms embargo to the region. This embargo placed a major strain on Franco - Israeli relations, and ended the Israeli belief that Europe could be relied upon for either

the political or military support Israel required if it were to survive.

The Aftermath of the October War

As indicated previously, the outbreak of the 1973 conflict brought with it the rupture in relations between Israel and a host of "third world" nations in Africa, Asia, and other areas. While not unexpected, the number of nations breaking relations, and the speed with which they did so in a war begun by the Arab states, came as a surprise to even the most skeptical of Israelis. In an instant, the net result of over two decades of Israeli diplomacy and foreign aid had been reduced to shambles.

The end of hostilities in 1973, largely orchestrated by the United States and Soviet Union, had little to do with other nations. When a solution acceptable to the adversaries and the superpowers was reached, the United Nations was used as an instrument for the implementation of the cease-fire accords. Supported by both major blocs, the UNEF and UNDOF missions received approval in the U.N. In no way, however, did Israel view this U.N. action as evidence of the ability of the U.N. and the world community to assist the regional states in reaching a just and peaceful settlement.

Similarly, the legitimacy accorded the PLO by various nations following the 1973 war, and subsequently the U.N. as well, is viewed in Israel as yet another step in a process of isolating Israel from what were perceived originally to be her national allies. Thus, for purposes of the present study, this trend of isolation has two major policy

implications for Israel:

- (1) For the Israeli leadership, the only security guarantees which have any possibility of being credible for the foreseeable future are those provided by the United States, and;
- (2) The only real key to Israeli security lies in near or complete self-sufficiency in defense capabilities.

As considered below, Israel has attempted to move in both of these directions to meet its vital security needs since October 1973.


NOTES: PART I

1. See Abraham R. Wagner, *The Impact of the 1973 October War on Israeli Policy and Implications for U.S. Defense Policy (U)* (Washington: OASD(ISA), June 1975) (UNCLASSIFIED); Abraham R. Wagner, *Israel: Prerequisites for Security and Settlement (U)* (Washington: OASD(ISA), June 1975). (UNCLASSIFIED).
2. See Alain C. Enthoen and K. Wayne Smith, *How Much Is Enough? Shaping the Defense Program 1961-1969(U)* (New York: Harper & Row, 1972). (UNCLASSIFIED).
3. See, Albert Wohlstetter, "The Delicate Balance of Terror", *Foreign Affairs* (January, 1959); and Abraham R. Wagner, *Crisis Decision-Making: Israel's Experience in 1967 and 1973*. (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1974) for considerations of deterrence failure in early conflicts.
4. Such calculations for Israel in the 1967 conflict and in the 1973 war are considered in detail in Wagner (1974),
5. The specific failures of the United States and Israeli intelligence services have been the cause of considerable criticism and analysis in both nations. See *Press Release Issued by the Commission of Inquiry - Yom Kippur War Upon Submission of its Third and Final Report to the Government and the Defence and Foreign Affairs Committee of the Knesset on 30 January 1975* [Report of the Agranat Commission]. (Jerusalem: Israel Government Press Office, 30 January 1975), and Terrence Smith, "Israeli Errors on Eve of War Emerging," *The New York Times* (10 December 1973).
6. The discussion here does not consider the debate over the failure of the Israeli intelligence services to detect and properly analyze certain Arab and Soviet actions prior to the outbreak of the 1973 war.
7. See Joseph H. deRivera, *The Psychological Dimension of Foreign Policy*. (Columbus: Charles E. Merrill, 1968), and Irving L. Janis, *Victims of Groupthink: A Psychological Study of Foreign Policy Decisions and Fiascos*. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1972), p. 21.
8. Coupled with a partial Israeli "withdrawal" from territory captured west of the Suez canal as well as in the Sinai, this represented a substantial change in the status quo from that existing after the cessation of hostilities as well as the pre-war situation.
9. Here the disengagement and return of some territory (including Quneitra to the Syrians similarly improved their position.

10. The impact of this change for Egypt allowed it to re-open the Suez Canal and turn to critical internal economic problems, effecting a major shift in the status quo.
11. An excellent analysis of U.S. military aid to Israel in this respect is contained in *The Effectiveness of United States Military Aid to Israel (ISMILAIID)*: (U) Report by the Secretary of Defense in Compliance with PL 93-199 (Revised, July 1975) (SECRET/NOFORN).
12. The value of the "American connection" as a stabilizing factor in itself is often underestimated or ignored by many analysts. The theoretical usefulness for such a function is found in Thomas C. Schelling, *The Strategy of Conflict* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960).
13. Particularly for Egypt, it should be remembered that at the end of hostilities in 1973, a major part of the Egyptian Third Army was cut off in the Sinai, Israel held a substantial sector of Egyptian territory west of the Suez Canal, and massive economic and military damage had been suffered. The losses and damage to Syria in the 1973 conflict was striking as well. See, for example: Chiam Herzog, *The War of Atonement: October, 1973*. (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1975), Zeev Schiff, *October Earthquake: Yom Kippur 1973*. (Tel-Aviv: University Publishing Projects, 1974), Insight Team of the Sunday Times, *Insight On the Middle East War* (London: Andre Deutsch, 1974), Yeshayahu Ben-Porat, et al., *Kippur* (Tel-Aviv: Special Edition Publishers, 1974), Mohamed Heikal, *The Road to Ramadan*. (London: Collins, 1975).
14. See, Wagner (1975), *op. cit.* Recent interviews with various members of the Israeli leadership confirm this finding.
15. deRivera, *op. cit.*, p. 23. See also: Ole R. Hosti, "Cognitive Dynamics and Images of the Enemy," *International Affairs*, 21 (1967), pp. 16-39.
Ole R. Hosti, "The Belief System and National Images: A Case Study," *J. Conflict Resolution*, 6 (1962), pp. 244-52.
Saville R. Davis, "Recent Policy Making in the United States Government," *Daedalus* 89 (1960), pp. 951-66.
16. deRivera, *op. cit.*, p. 28. See also, Raymond A. Bauer, "Accuracy of Perception in International Relations," *Teachers College Record*, 64 (1963), pp. 291-88 (p. 294).
17. See Edgar O'Ballance, *The Electronic War in the Middle East: 1968-70* (London: Archon Books, 1974), and *Aviation Week and Space Technology* 3 December 1973, 10 December 1973, and 17 December 1973).
18. See Abraham R. Wagner, *Political Change and Decision-Making in Israel*:

The Aftermath of the October War. (Washington: Department of State, Bureau of intelligence and Research, 1974).

19. See *ISMILAIID*, *op. cit.* See also: *Final Trip Report, U.S. Military Equipment Validation Team (USMEVTI) JCS-2369/49-2*, 20 November 1973 (TOP SECRET). Generally referred to as the "Casey Report".
20. Discussion of the Arab-Israeli arms race are contained in Nadav Safran, *From War to War* (New York: Pegasus Books, 1969), J.C. Hurewitz, *Middle East Politics: The Military Dimension* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1969), and Fuad Jabber, "Not by War Alone: Curbing the Arab-Israeli Arms Race," *Middle East Journal* (Summer, 1974).
21. Geoffrey Kemp, "The Military Build-Up: Arms Control or Arms Trade?" in *The Middle East and the International System*, *op. cit.* p. 31.
22. *Ibid.*
23. See Strategic Survey: 1974 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1975), Engineer Studies Group (Office, Chief of Engineers, Department of the Army), *United States Involvement in the Middle East: A Framework for Assessment* (U), October 1975 (SECRET-NFD), and Kemp, *op. cit.* Data on U.S. aid to the region in recent fiscal years are given in Section 1.4.
24. See James F. Digby, *Precision Guided Weapons: New Chances to Deal with Old Dangers*. [P-5384] (Santa Monica: The RAND Corporation, March 1975).
25. Saadia Amiel, "Defense Technologies for Small States," (U), paper delivered at the International Symposium, Jerusalem, 12-17 October 1975 on Military Aspects of the Israeli-Arab Conflict. The author is indebted to Dr. Amiel for extended discussion on this subject.
26. This problem of territory for time comes from the basic character of Arab forces as standing forces and the IDF as largely a reserve force. Assuming an Arab-initiated crisis, the following figure illustrates the selective mobilization:



Here the critical times from prior to t_z when Arab forces have nearly or fully mobilized, and Israel is^z undergoing mobilization, it may be necessary to fall back and limit losses during this period. The $t_0 - t_z$ interval is reduced by early warning systems, and the territory needed to buffer attacks by PGMS and barrier munitions.

27. Quoted in Jabber, *op. cit.*, p. 233.
28. The view that arms races inevitably lead to war is put forth in: Emmanuel Kant, "Eternal Peace," in Philip Noel-Baker (ed.), *The Arms Race*. (London: 1958), Lewis F. Richardson, *Arms and Insecurity* (Chicago: The Boxwood Press, 1960). The opposite view is to be found in: Samuel P. Huntington, "Arms Races: Prerequisites and Results." *Public Policy* (Spring, 1972), Colin S. Gray, "Traffic Control for the Arms Trade?" *Foreign Policy* (Spring, 1972). See also Amelia C. Leiss et. al., *Arms Transfers to Less Developed Countries*, Vol. III of *Arms Control and Local Conflict*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970), and John A. Ferejohn, "On the Effects of Aid to Nations in Arms Races," California Institute of Technology, *Social Science Working Paper No. 78* (April, 1975).
29. Yigal Allon, *Masakh Shel Hol* [Curtains of Sand] (U) (Tel-Aviv: Ha'Kibbutz Ha'meuhad, 1959), p. 64.
30. *The Military Balance 1975-1976* (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1975).
31. See R. D. McLaurin and Mohammed Mughisuddin, *The Soviet Union and the Middle East*. (U) (Washington: American Institutes for Research, October 1974). See also Abraham S. Becker and Arnold L. Horelick *Soviet Policy in the Middle East* (Santa Monica, The RAND Corporation, 1970).
32. The original Soviet Egyptian arms agreement was disguised as "Czechoslovakian". Subsequent Soviet actions have fueled the Middle East arms race almost continually since then.
33. See Wagner (1974), *op. cit.*
34. See O'Ballance, *op. cit.*
35. See Malcolm MacKintosh, "The Impact of the Middle East Crisis on Super-power Relations," in *The Middle East and the International System: I. The Impact of the 1973 War*, Adelphi Papers No. 114. (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1975), p. 1.
36. See Mohamed Heikal, *The Road to Ramadan* (London: Collins, 1975). At the height of Soviet military involvement in the Middle East, Soviet air defense forces stationed in Egypt, and the Soviet naval air squadrons deployed at Cairo and Aswan, were used to carry out air

surveillance of the Eastern Mediterranean, largely anti-NATO activities. See McIntosh, *op. cit.*, p. 2.

37. This is, in brief, the condition of the private meeting between Israeli Foreign Minister Allon and Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko in New York in late 1975. See also, George Lenczowski, *Soviet Advances in the Middle East* (Washington: American Enterprise Institute, 1972).
38. Namely the two with Egypt (Sinai I and II) and one with Syria in the Golan Heights.
39. See ISMILAI, *op. cit.*
40. See Abraham R. Wagner, *Israel: Prerequisites for Security and Settlement* (U) (Beverly Hills, California: A.R. Wagner & Co., 1975) (UNCLASSIFIED).
41. See, *Ibid.*
42. See, Walter Eytan, *The First Ten Years: A Diplomatic History of Israel*. (London, 1955).
43. Shabtai Rosenne, "Basic Elements of Israel's Foreign Policy," (U) *India Quarterly* (October-December 1961) p. 349.
44. A senior Foreign Ministry official, interview with A. R. Wagner, October 1969.
45. *Ibid.*
46. See Shimon Peres, *David's Sling*. (New York: Random House, 1970).
47. *Ibid.*, p. 144.

Peres continues, in part:

Our efforts to join NATO hardly got off the ground. They were abandoned after a brief exploratory mission undertaken in 1957 by the late Reuven Shiloah, one of our Foreign Ministry's most experienced diplomats, and myself. Our direction was to visit a number of countries who were members of NATO to find out if there was any way of associating Israel with that body.

Our attempts to open a path to the European Defence Community were similarly short-lived - for European and not Middle Eastern reasons. The EDC had in fact encountered at the very start all the difficulties that had bedevilled the efforts to unite Europe - political conservatism; the reluctance of each State to give up part of its sovereignty; the unwillingness of national institutions with vested interests

to adapt themselves to change and become part of a single, united, European institution; the problem of deciding which countries to invite as members; and the pace at which it was to be established. To these general obstacles were added the specific difficulties arising out of the differences and varying standards between the potential members of the EEC in their military organization, operational capacity and methods, technology, weapons, research and development, production patterns, and emphases in their defence budgets. In short, attempts to translate into practice the notion of unity and partnership foundered amid the clash of numerous and powerful interests, each exercising a centrifugal force. The one factor which could have brought this group of nations together was a common vision, and this apparently was not strong enough. In such circumstances, there could clearly be no interest in Israel.

pp. 147-8.

48. This latter relationship, with the FRG, was shrouded in secrecy for many years, and the full extent of this "special relationship" is still not a matter of public record.

PART TWO

ISRAELI LEADERSHIP PERCEPTIONS

2.1 INTRODUCTION

Who Decides?

Preliminary to any analysis of a leadership's perception of United States policy and its implications is at least a brief consideration of what constitutes the relevant leadership in the vital security and defense area. Earlier work has considered in some detail various aspects of the Israeli political and military system, analyzing both what key groups are in a position to exert influence over policy-making as well as what leadership represents these groups.¹ In the final analysis, there is no easy answer to the basic question of "who decides?" In Israel, decision-making in the security and defense areas involves several sets of leaders, political and military, each constrained by a variety of parameters and a particular constituency.

The reality of Israel's political system is that of a parliamentary system, in which no political party has ever held a majority of the nation's *Knesset*, or Parliament.² Following the 1973 October War and national elections in December 1973, the *Ma'arach* (Labor Alignment) was forced to form the first minority government in Israel's history. With the resignation of the Meir Government in April 1974, and the election of the Rabin Government by a divided Labor leadership, Israel has been left with a weakened and divided political leadership constrained by a number of significant parameters.

Nominally governed by a Cabinet of some twenty members, and a *Knesset* (Parliament) of 120, neither is in fact the locus of power. More important, in the political sphere, is a select group of the

Cabinet, composed of the Prime Minister (Rabin), the Defense Minister (Peres), and the Foreign Minister (Allon), augmented by several of the leading figures of the *Mapai* (Israel Labor Party). In working out the interim accords, the Cabinet has in fact designated this three-member "team" to act for the government, and they in turn have been in contact with other political figures. Thus, section 2.2 below considers the perceptions held by these three key ministers.

The present decision-making process cannot, however, be confined to a consideration of this small group, or even the political leadership as a whole. Here it is necessary to consider the impact of the military leadership on policy as well as some of the internal developments which have recently taken place. In undertaking this task, section 2.3 looks at several key Israeli personalities outside the top leadership circle who are likely to have a significant impact on policy-making in the security and defense area. Although termed "peripheral" in the present analysis, it must be remembered that a number of these individuals may come to play important roles in the days ahead.

Next, section 2.4 examines the perceptions and role of what has been termed the "military" or defense leadership. Included in this category are both military leaders *per se*, such as influential members of the general staff, as well as an emerging group of civilian defense leaders within the Defense Ministry. Finally, this part concludes with an analysis of what implications these changes in leadership, policy-making, and perceptions of U.S. policy hold for Israeli policy.

Recent Developments

In the period immediately following the 1973 October War and the subsequent Israeli elections, it was forecast by most observers that significant changes would be forthcoming in both the Israeli leadership and decision-making process, as a result of the failures of October 1973.³ Public pressure at the time called for both "new leadership" and changes in the decision-making process that would correct failures observed in the 1973 experience. Toward this end, an official commission of inquiry [The Agranat Commission] was empaneled to investigate individual and collective actions during the October War and recommend changes that might be necessary.⁴

The 1973 elections in themselves did not bring about the changes the public wanted. The major parties offered the same candidate lists which they had offered in years past, and got the same electoral results with only marginal changes at best.⁵ As a result of public dissatisfaction and inter-party fighting early in 1974 Mrs. Meir encountered considerable difficulty in forming a government, and was only able to form a weak minority government after considerable effort. Increasing public dissatisfaction with the 1974 Meir government and the final report of the Agranat Commission, issued in April 1974, caused the final resignation of the Meir government.

By a close vote, the *Mapai* leadership chose Yitzhak Rabin to form a new government, a feat that was accomplished with no small effort, and at a cost of both policy concessions to the coalition partners and a set of constraints in Rabin's flexibility in policy-making. As a result,

Rabin has been unable to demonstrate either decisive leadership, or the flexibility necessary to achieve further settlements with the Arab states. This in turn has led several of the major Israeli papers and various political figures to call for new elections.⁶ Whether or not such elections would provide either the leadership or mandate required to make the policy the public seeks is doubtful.

Summarizing the developments which are most significant to the policy-making process and the current leadership, it is necessary to consider at least the following:

(1) Internal Leadership Conflicts: Stemming from differing policy perspectives and personality differences, the three key Israeli leaders have developed a set of growing antagonisms which have added to the Government's difficulty in formulating policy. Clearly the loser in this struggle is Foreign Minister Allon, who has often advocated a more moderate Israeli position in the Cabinet. Likewise, Prime Minister Rabin has now lost considerable public support, and has yet to demonstrate the leadership qualities the public demands.⁷ Public satisfaction with Rabin since taking office is shown in Table 2.1 below. Over this same time frame public satisfaction with Allon has dropped from 38% in July 1975 to 26% in January 1976, while satisfaction with Peres remains the highest of the three at 69% in January 1976.⁸

In general, the Israeli public has displayed an increasing lack of confidence in the present political leadership, but has failed to show any support for an alternative. The only individual with widespread public support continues to be Defense Minister Peres, although it is

TABLE 2.1

SATISFACTION WITH PRIME MINISTER RABIN

"Are you satisfied or not with Yitzhak Rabin as Prime Minister?"

	Jan. 1976 (1241)	Aug.- Sept. 1975 (1188)	July 1975 (1205)	April 1975 (1206)	Feb. 1975 (1226)	Sept. 1974 (1180)	June 1974 (1193)
Satisfied	43%	56%	63%	56%	32%	65%	56%
More of less satisfied (Vol.)	32%	20	19	24	24	17	12
Not satisfied	19	20	11	14	33	8	21
Don't know	7	4	8	6	12	10	11
	100%	100%	101%	100%	101%	100%	100%

Source: Public Opinion Research of Israel (PORI)

unlikely that the *Mapai* would permit him to assume the Prime Ministry under present political arrangements. Seeking to achieve some measure of public support, Rabin has assembled a "steering committee" of party leaders, including Mrs. Meir, to help formulate policy. In the short run this may help to resolve several leadership problems which have developed in the *Mapai* itself, but it is unlikely that such marginal measures will serve to stem eroding public confidence in the present leadership.

(2) Economic Problems: At the center of much of the public dissatisfaction with the present leadership are Israel's ongoing economic problems, which are in large measure related to the massive defense expenditures the nation has had to endure.⁹ Despite massive military and economic assistance from the United States, as demonstrated in Part One, Israel continues to suffer from huge balance-of-payments deficits, taxes, declining currency exchange rates, capital flights, emigration of skilled labor and other adverse economic factors. In part these economic problems stem from the heavy defense burden, and in part from the inability of Israel's socialist government and economic institutions to deal effectively with these problems. The net result has been a declining standard of living for the Israeli public over the past year, increasing dissatisfaction with the government and its policies, and increasing numbers of Israelis seeking to emigrate to other countries.¹⁰

The economic future Israel faces, at least under this leadership, is not particularly bright. Currency and balance-of-payments problems will continue, if not increase in severity, while the nation continues to accumulate larger amounts of public debt at higher interest rates.¹¹

As long as the present government fails to provide effective solutions to the nation's economic problems, there is little likelihood that it will enjoy broad-based public support, even though this would be necessary to conclude a far reaching settlement with the Arab states. Further, as long as Israel's economic situation remains critical and continues to deteriorate, that nation will look to the United States for ever increasing amounts of military and economic aid, regarding any sum given as insufficient which does not provide an observable positive shift in the standard of living.

(3) Defense Management: Although recommended by the Agranat Commission and a variety of military and political leaders, the Israeli Government has yet to implement most of the institutional changes deemed necessary in light of the 1973 experience. Prime Minister Rabin has failed to carry out the establishment of an Israeli National Security Council or provide for integrated crisis management and policy-making in the security area. Top level policy-making continues to operate on a highly personal and ad hoc basis. In leaving the Rabin administration, both Minister Aaron Yaariv and Security Advisor Gen. Ariel Sharon have pointed to this shortcoming.¹² A so-called "think tank" organized to formulate alternative policy proposals on an inter-ministerial basis did function for some time during 1975, but has since lost most of its key members.¹³

Within Israel's ministries and intelligence services, several efforts at analysis, planning and policy support have been undertaken. Most advanced in this area is the Defense Ministry where a long range

and strategic planning capability has been undertaken to support the Minister's efforts; a planning branch developed in the general staff to coordinate activities and military planning; and efforts have begun to upgrade the analytical capabilities of Israeli Military Intelligence. Israel's external intelligence service, *Mossad*, has similarly created an analytical support capability to augment its collection and operational capabilities. Within the Foreign Ministry a new unit designated "M.M.T." has been created to parallel the analytical and policy support given the U.S. State Department by its Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR).

The least advanced in this area would appear to be the Office of the Prime Minister, where Rabin continues to rely on a Security Advisor who has resigned, his military assistant, and several close staff members. Coordination among these support activities appears to be limited at best, and it is difficult to determine the extent to which non-defense support activities are given access to requisite data.¹⁴ Most important, however, is a recognition that virtually all of these efforts are just getting under way, and that most lack the methodological expertise and top level executive support needed to provide the principal decision-makers with the support they need.

The Impact of Sinai II

Current Israeli leadership perceptions and policy must be considered in light of the second interim agreement concluded with Egypt in September 1975 (Sinai II). While this agreement represents a major step in the achievement of an overall settlement between Israel and the Arab states, the process by which it was achieved in Israel and the impact

on the Israeli leadership and public alike will continue to dominate policy-making over the near term. The process of achieving this agreement in Israel has affected substantially both internal Israeli power relationships as well as American - Israeli relations.

As early as February 1975, it became clear that the Prime Minister lacked both the public mandate and personal stature to negotiate even a limited Sinai concession without the approval of the Defense and Foreign Ministers. Indeed, the experience of the unsuccessful March 1975 Kissinger shuttle demonstrated the ability of the Defense Minister in particular to severely limit Israeli policy flexibility. Thus it is important to note that while none of the three key ministers appears to have the ability to negotiate on behalf of Israel alone, at least the Prime Minister and Defense Minister have the personal ability to block tentative agreement. Thus policy-making in the vital security area continues to hinge on the interpersonal relationships of the three key ministers. To the extent that these individuals, in the absence of alternative political formulations, continue to develop personal and political differences, Israeli policy will suffer from decreasing flexibility and an inability to offer viable options.

Second, with respect to U.S. policy, it is becoming clear that while Israeli dependence on American aid and armaments provides limited opportunity for the U.S. to exercise influence over Israeli policy, perceived threats of military and economic insufficiency may serve counterproductive purposes, ultimately limiting Israeli ability to make the major concessions necessary to achieve an overall settlement to the

Arab - Israeli conflict. The reaction of the leadership and public to perceived "pressure" has been to limit the range of alternatives open.

For Israel and the United States there are no simple solutions to these problems. Increasing U.S. aid, even to levels perceived by the Israelis as adequate to meet any projected threats, is unlikely to provide either the flexibility required or stability within the region. The implications of this situation for Israeli policy are considered in section 2.5 below.

2.2 TOP LEADERSHIP: RABIN, PERES, ALLON

Israel and Self-Defense

Fundamental to any understanding of the top Israeli leadership attitudes toward major security and defense issues, such as weapons procurement, negotiations with Syria or the PLO, creation of a Palestinian state on the West Bank, and acceptance of United States or other super-power security guarantees is an appreciation of their perception of Israel's basic defense posture and ability to defend herself. None of the top political or military leadership would deny that Israel is heavily dependent on outside arms suppliers, principally the United States. This dependence is particularly acute in the areas of advanced weaponry, although Israel has recently made several developments toward self-sufficiency in sophisticated and heavy systems such as the *Kfir*, a fighter-bomber patterned after the Mirage III-CJ.

In the opinion of the top leadership, however, there exists a basic difference between being dependent on other nations for weapons and being dependent on other nations for actual forces to fight for Israel. While the former type of dependence is, at least for the foreseeable future, unavoidable, the top leadership views the latter type as not only avoidable but mandatorily so.

The following statements by Rabin, Peres and Allon respectively make their positions quite clear on the matter:

[Rabin] There never was any Israeli government which asked for foreign guarantees for its existence. When it comes to our defense, we must rely on our own strength and on defensible frontiers and be able to safeguard these

frontiers.¹⁵

[Peres] In order to stand up to this, Israel must bear in mind the principle attached to the concept of her defense, namely that her defense is of deep concern, and she must not allow herself to deteriorate into a country incapable of defending itself.¹⁶

[Allon] Guarantees is a fine word, but no one knows what they are. I believe that everyone understands that all Israel is demanding is to be able to defend itself on its own. The guarantees can be added to this demand which cannot be a substitute for it.¹⁷

These guarantees which are not substitutes for Israel being able to defend herself, according to Foreign Minister Allon, include a possible U.S. - Israeli defense treaty, according to Prime Minister Rabin.

Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin said on Friday that "those who propose" a U.S.-Israel defense treaty are seeking it as 'a substitute for defensible borders... It can by no means be a substitute for Israel's capacity to defend herself under her own steam'¹⁸

Such statements generally reflect a realization on the part of the political and military leadership that the introduction of U.S. or other external ground forces into a conflict would be difficult, if not impossible, on a meaningful basis given the likely timing and logistic situations. That is, any situation which required an American force presence would be one of rapid military and territorial deterioration, where the U.S. would be unable to field sufficient ground forces in a short enough time frame to stabilize the situation.

Similarly, the Israelis have made the argument that in an opposite situation, the Soviets would be unable to provide the necessary ground

and air support to prevent or forestall an Arab collapse.¹⁹

Thus, it is reasonable to expect that in any decision-making with respect to weapons procurement or negotiations, including any decision concerning whom to negotiate with, that the Israeli political leadership will not accept:

(1) territorial changes which might sacrifice Israeli security, viewed in terms of what the IDF can sustain under worst case conditions without introduction of external ground forces;

(2) international guarantees or assurances of security unsupported by firm hardware commitments enabling the IDF to maintain secure borders; or

(3) security guarantees as substitutes for borders deemed to be defensible.

The Egyptian Front

Since the 1948 Arab-Israeli war, Egypt has presented the greatest threat to Israeli security, and has consumed the greatest amount of attention from the Israeli political leadership, the IDF, Israel's intelligence services, and Israeli diplomats abroad. While hopes originally rose following the 1952 Egyptian socialist revolution that Israel would now be able to come to terms with its major adversary, such hopes were quickly dashed in the ensuing months. Through 1973, Egypt continued to dominate both the Arab world and the Arab "struggle for the elimination of Israel".

Leadership changes brought about by Egyptian President Anwar

el-Sadat prior to the 1973 war went largely unnoticed in Israel, and the regard for Egypt as Israel's principal adversary and Soviet satellite in the Middle East remained throughout this period. One of the major changes brought about by the 1973 October War and its aftermath, for Israel, has been a gradual but marked shift in the Israeli perception of its traditional adversary. During the 1973 war and the immediate aftermath, extreme skepticism dominated all Israeli thinking about Egyptian motives and intentions. Viewing their experiences of 1957, 1967 and 1970 in retrospect, the Israeli leadership was reluctant to make any concessions to the Egyptians whatsoever which might serve to compromise Israeli security.


Under the auspices of the Geneva Conference, the United States was, however, able to mediate between Israel and Egypt, assisting the parties to reach an original disengagement of forces and interim agreement in late 1973. This agreement (Sinai I) provided for the reintroduction of United Nations forces into a buffer zone between Egyptian and Israeli lines in the Sinai and an initial stabilization of the political and military situation. More importantly, Sinai I provided the first major step toward resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict in recent times. It successfully provided for direct Israeli - Egyptian contacts at the military working level, mechanisms for the reduction of tension and successive steps toward overall settlement in the region.

In terms of superpower relations, the 1973 war and Sinai I marked a major shift by the Egyptian leadership under President Sadat away

from the Soviet sphere and toward the United States. Sinai I was followed by a resumption of American - Egyptian diplomatic relations and increasing U.S. influence in the region. Such developments were viewed by the Israeli leadership as having a positive impact on the Arab-Israeli problem, and continued U.S. efforts were sought to resolve the conflict and achieve an overall settlement.

Following an unsuccessful attempt at "shuttle diplomacy" in March 1975, a new round of talks finally produced a second stage interim agreement between Israel and Egypt in September 1975. This agreement provided for further territorial concessions by Israel in return for a set of Egyptian concessions designed to reduce tensions still further and eliminate the use of force over some three years. Among other things, the Sinai II agreement provided both sides with an early-warning capability and introduced American monitors into the Sinai to augment this warning capability. These elements are depicted in Figure 2.1.

In retrospect, the 1973 war is likely to be the high water mark in the Egyptian - Israeli conflict. The net effect of the Sinai I and II agreements have been a major shift in Israeli leadership perceptions of the Egyptian position. Where the Israeli leadership once regarded their Egyptian counterparts as impossible to deal with and totally "untrustworthy", the period following Sinai I and II has been marked with increasing Israeli respect for both President Sadat and the possibility of dealing with the Egyptian leadership and reaching an overall peace settlement. This belief is reflected by the Israeli public as well, and is considered in section 3.2 below.



In general, the top leadership perception of the Egyptian - Israeli relationship can now be described as one of increasing optimism, with some lingering reservations over Egypt's ability to maintain a posture different from that of the other confrontation states; continued efforts by Egypt to rebuild her armed forces; and potential dangers to Israel from excessive concessions of strategic territory in the Sinai. In a "deep background" press interview Prime Minister Rabin recently addressed these questions:

When the matter [of non-belligerency] is considered seriously one gets the feeling that the only front for progress on a non-belligerency agreement is with Egypt. Such an agreement would give Egypt significant parts of Sinai up to Al-'Arish-Ras Muhammad line, and Israel would have calm on the Egyptian side.

But there are two problems here:

--Would Egypt go it alone on a non-belligerency agreement when the last interim agreement isolated it from the rest of the Arab world?

--Is Israel able to concede significant parts of Sinai which gives it strategic depth in return for a promise of non-belligerency, while it has no guarantee that Egypt will in fact, honor it when aggressive acts occur on other Arab fronts?

When all is said and done, Egypt and Israel have already agreed, in the interim agreement, to solve the differences between them peacefully. Despite this, we bear witness to the fact that Egypt is trying to strengthen its armed forces by all possible means such as purchasing Phantom engines for its MIG-21's. Can we be sure that Egypt's policy will really change as long as there is no progress with Syria and on the Palestinian problem? Of course we cannot.²⁰

Since the conclusion and successful implementation of the Sinai II agreement, the focus of the Israeli leadership has turned to Syria,

and leadership comments with respect to Egypt have been both limited and conciliatory. It would appear that this approach is part of a deliberate effort on the part of the top leadership to reduce tension on this front and provide for the ongoing improvement of relations.

Comments by all three of Israel's key leaders have recently reflected this sentiment, generally combining some praise for various Egyptian actions, along with expected concern over Egyptian intentions. Defense Minister Peres recently praised a reserve forces plan adopted by Egypt:

Defence Minister Shimon Peres said yesterday that he is encouraged by evidence that Egypt is reducing its standing army "by an important percentage" and trying to organize a reserve force to take its place.

Addressing the morning session of the Prime Minister's Israel Bond Conference at the Jerusalem Hilton, Peres noted that the regular army of "our most important neighbour" comprise 800,000 men during the Yom Kippur War, but that, "probably following Israel's example," Egypt is now trying to organize a reserve formation. "We are looking with hope to this development," he said, "because when a nation reduces its war machine, it increases the chances for peace."²¹

The Prime Minister has openly stated Israel's policy of a willingness to return substantially all of the Sinai. In his statement on "Objectives for the 1976 Policy" Mr. Rabin stated:

In the south the policy is to be ready for a far-reaching compromise in Sinai, but not to be content with the international border which existed between the land of Israel and Egypt. The policy is to insure presence and control in Sharm ash-Shaykh and a territorial strip to Sharm ash-Shaykh.²²

It must, however, be kept in mind that Israel's three key leaders maintain considerable skepticism with respect to Egypt, and pay no small amount of attention to Sadat's remarks, as the following comment by Foreign Minister Allon reflects:

Even on United States soil, President as-Sadat chose to say that the question of peace between Israel and its neighbours should be postponed until the coming generation. At the same time, he in fact threatens that, if peace is not achieved in the Middle East, he will resort to force and to war. I do not know how President as-Sadat can straighten out such a contradiction in his own mind. But I am convinced that this is necessary, and possible in our own generation. The generation that suffered the wars on its own flesh is the one that must put an end to them and bring peace to its sons. No matter how difficult, this can definitely be achieved. Only good intentions, political soundness and courage no less than necessary for making warlike threats or actually going to war. . . are required.²³

The critical element in Israeli policy-making, toward Egypt as well as the other Arab states, will continue to be actions taken and Israeli perceptions of them. Here Egyptian actions following the 1973 war, and in implementing the Sinai I and II accords have had a positive influence on the Israeli leadership, which is clearly reflected in the present Israeli approach to settlement on this front.

The Syrian Front

Since the conclusion of the Sinai II agreement in September 1975, the focus of Israeli concern in the defense and security area has been toward Israel's northern border with Syria, and more recently with the possibility of a "greater Syria" encompassing Lebanon and Jordan as well.

The top Israel leadership has expressed opinions on relations with Syria ranging from the general conduct of relations to specific negotiating points. The most general area on which they have commented is the sincerity of Syria's desire, or lack of desire, for peace on acceptable terms. At a less general level they have discussed the possibility of another interim agreement to supplement the 1974 disengagement agreement. Most specifically, they have stated their attitudes toward possible terms for withdrawal from the Golan Heights and removal of the Israeli settlements established there as part of a final peace accord.

All three of the key ministers have expressed negative sentiments with regard to Syria's attitude in bringing about a solution of the Arab-Israeli dispute. A recent article in the *Jerusalem Post* reported Rabin's sharp criticism of Syrian President Assad's position in the Sinai II accord with Egypt:

Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin said last night that Israel expects attempts by Syria and the PLO, and possibly by the Soviet Union, to thwart implementation of the Sinai accord and mar the atmosphere of gradual reconciliation which the accord was intended to foster. From public statements by Syrian leaders, as well as from diplomatic channels, he continued, it appeared that Syria does not want to negotiate with Israel.²⁴

Two weeks after this speech, a terrorist group crossed into Israel from Syria and attacked the Ramat Magshimim settlement. This attack certainly strengthened Rabin's perception of Syrian policy and intentions. The Prime Minister stated that the group's crossing from Syria represented the first violation of the disengagement agreement with Syria and that

continued vigilance was required.²⁵

Most recently, Rabin has tried to hold the Syrians and Syrian-backed Palestinian elements responsible for rioting among Israel's own Arab population.

A view similar to that expressed by Prime Minister Rabin was expressed by Defense Minister Peres in mid-August 1975:

About Syria, Mr. Peres said that in the past 27 years Syria has placed itself at the head of the radical and belligerent camp, though war is not what would give Syria its glory. Indeed, Syria has procured large quantities of arms from the Soviet Union and is preparing a line of fortifications from the border up to Damascus; but war will do Syria no good.²⁶

Finally, Foreign Minister Allon has said recently that statements by the Syrian foreign ministers and other Syrian leaders made it quite clear that they were not ready to enter into negotiations but that Israel would hope for a change in their position.

Concerning the possibility of a second stage interim agreement with Syria to supplement the 1974 disengagement of forces agreement, the key Israeli leaders were not much more optimistic. While not opposed to the possibility of another interim agreement, all three leaders have expressed doubts about the feasibility of obtaining such an agreement under present conditions. This view has not changed for the better since the signing of the second interim agreement with Egypt.

Indeed, the unanticipated Syrian reaction to the conclusion of the Sinai II agreement with Egypt has made the Israeli leadership increasingly skeptical about the possibility of concluding such an additional agreement

with Syria. In part the Israeli leadership blames Soviet pressure on the Syrians for perceived rigidity, and in part a general Syrian inability to make meaningful compromises to obtain such an agreement. Few among this leadership are, however, willing to recognize the Israeli refusal to negotiate with respect to settlements placed on the Golan Heights in this light.

In a television interview given at the beginning of June 1975, Prime Minister Rabin asserted that:

I still contend that with Syria I see almost no way for an additional interim settlement, because Israel's ability to maneuver in the Golan Heights is very limited and it is difficult for me to believe that Syria will be content with an interim settlement based on ridiculous matters.²⁷

This sentiment was reiterated several times in a week long period following the conclusion of the second interim agreement with Egypt. Typical of these remarks was one made on September 5th in which the Prime Minister asserted that Syria would not accept an agreement based on an Israeli withdrawal of "200-300 metres" and that he did not "see a possibility of a territorial concession that is not measured in metres."²⁸

Rabin's unwillingness to yield more than 200-300 meters in the Golan Heights is based on his opinion that to yield more would endanger substantially the Israeli defensive position.

South of Kuneitra the ridge is a first-class defence line [and] we can't give up even one metre. The same holds true for the area north of Kuneitra, along Vardit and Hermon.²⁹

Although disputed by some Israeli military authorities, most political and military leaders point to the fact that beyond the hills surrounding Quneitra, no natural defensive positions would separate Syrian and Israeli forces, and that only a short distance and downhill terrain would separate Israeli settlements in the Hula Valley from frontal attack. The fact that such settlements are already in range of Syrian missiles and long range artillery has had little impact on this aspect of Israeli thinking.

Several military authorities have raised the argument that the new Israeli settlements on the Golan Heights raise more defensive problems for Israel than they could solve, and that Israeli security would be better served by their voluntary removal. The political sensitivity of this issue has, however, served to eclipse such logic.

Defense Minister Peres has been equally skeptical about the possibility of an interim agreement with Syria. In a press conference held during his visit to Paris in early June, Peres stated that the best way to settle the dispute with Syria was through an overall settlement because the Golan Heights territory was too small for the step-by-step method. He again expressed this opinion during a trip to Washington in September 1975, shortly after the conclusion of negotiations on the second stage interim agreement with Egypt.³⁰ Similar views of the relationship with Syria have been expressed by Foreign Minister Allon.

Of course, the Israeli leadership's estimates of the possibility

for further interim agreements with Syria take as fixed the concessions they would be willing to make in order to secure an agreement. Thus, the question remains as to what the Israeli leaders are willing to yield in exchange for either an interim or comprehensive settlement with the Syrians. For such an agreement the Syrians have sought both Israeli territorial concessions in the Golan Heights, and political concessions with respect to the Palestinians. Separating the two issues, the Israelis have shown limited willingness to engage in further territorial concessions, most often referred to as "cosmetic changes" by the Israelis, but have continued to oppose any settlement of the Palestinian problem along lines other than those presently sponsored by Israel. This latter issue is considered in further detail below.

In actuality, a major part of the problem for the Israeli political leadership in making more than such "cosmetic changes" on the Golan Heights involves the newly established settlements in forward areas previously mentioned. Here it is clear that while arguments based on the need for territory to insure Israeli security are put forth, the political questions of removing a number of these settlements are really at issue. In view of the current weak position of the Rabin Government, and the internal political sensitivity over this issue, it is unlikely that the present government would be able to undertake the removal of these settlements, even in exchange for an additional interim accord with Syria.

From the remarks cited above and others, it is clear that the present Israeli political leadership is willing to offer very little in exchange

for an additional interim agreement with Syria and they correctly perceive what they are willing to offer as very little; which is one reason why they remain so skeptical of obtaining Syrian agreement to such an accord.

None of the three key Israeli leaders would advocate presently withdrawal from the Golan Heights as part of an interim settlement accord. Additionally, Rabin and Peres have expressed total opposition to any removal of settlements as part of another interim agreement. In an interview conducted at the beginning of September 1975, Rabin stated that "in an interim agreement none of us even imagines adversely affecting any existing settlement on the Golan Heights."³¹

Six weeks earlier, Defense Minister Peres stated that "I am against the removal of settlements" in the context of a discussion concerning the possibility of an interim settlement.³² On the other hand, Foreign Minister Allon holds a slightly different view and stated that he was in favor of negotiations with Syria without such preconditions.³³

There are limitations to what territory in the Golan the Israelis would be willing to give back in return for an interim settlement, as well as for a comprehensive or overall settlement accord. Numerous statements by the Israeli leadership are unclear as to whether they oppose certain measures in exchange for *only* an interim settlement or specific ultimate settlement terms.

Even when dealing with the subject of a comprehensive peace treaty, Rabin sees the division of forces line on the Golan Heights as a question of basic sovereignty. Rabin views the deployment of the Israeli

Defense Forces as a suitable topic for negotiations, but refuses to consider questions such as continued Israeli occupation of the Golan Heights, the demilitarized status of the Mt. Hermon region, or the possible removal of recently established Israeli settlements on the Golan Heights. In a June 1975 interview with *'Al Hamismar*, Rabin unequivocally stated that Israel "would not come down from the Heights under any circumstances," that is even with a final peace treaty.³⁴ Later that month *Ma'Ariv* quoted the Prime Minister as saying that he had explained this position to President Ford during his trip to Washington, but continued that "a long term interweaving of sovereignty changes and IDF deployment is possible."³⁵

It would seem that Rabin views a long-term settlement with Syria as consisting of cosmetic changes in territory more than substantive changes in return for a peace accord. Clearly, he is not willing to return to the pre-June 1967 borders under any condition. Obviously, the Prime Minister's demand for secure and defensible borders is a major influence in determining his attitude toward the Golan Heights.

The position of Defense Minister Peres is less clear. A *Jerusalem Post* report of an NBC "Today" show interview at the end of September 1975 stated that Peres denied Israel had ever announced that she would not withdraw from the Golan Heights.³⁶ This statement appears to be in direct contradiction to Rabin's policy, and may reflect increasing policy difference between the two. Given Peres' position on other issues, however, it seems unlikely that he would support withdrawal

from the Heights "under any circumstances."

The most accommodation-oriented of the three key leaders, Foreign Minister Allon, has stated that he does not consider the Golan Heights as essential "to safeguard current security in the settlement of the Hula Valley, Upper Galilee or the Jordan Valley" but rather "as a strategic possession for the defense of the country, if we think that the north of the country is part of the country." He did not, however, express the belief that Israel should not come down from the Heights "under any circumstances" and warned against "soft or intransigent statements on the Golan Heights before the time comes."³⁷

The positions of both Peres and Allon, then, are unclear and ambiguous on the question of what tradeoffs Israel should agree to in return for total peace with Syria. In the case of the Prime Minister, there are clear limits to what concessions he will agree to.

Palestine Liberation Organization

A central focus of the present Arab - Israeli conflict continues to be the refusal of Israel to deal with the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) as representative of the Palestinians. This policy has been staunchly defended by Prime Minister Rabin, Defense Minister Peres, and to a lesser extent, Foreign Minister Allon and has remained relatively consistent throughout the years.

The fundamental position taken by the Rabin Government is that since the PLO does not recognize the right of the state of Israel to exist, and calls for its replacement by a "secular democratic state",

any negotiations are impossible. In addition, the PLO's use of violence and terror tactics also serve, according to Rabin, to disqualify them as a negotiating partner. When asked if Israel would negotiate with the PLO if it acknowledges Israel's right to exist, Rabin replied that he does not like to deal with "hypothetical" questions.

The positions attributed to Rabin are expressed by him in the following statement quoted in the *Jerusalem Post*:

It doesn't enter our minds to negotiate with a body that would negate our existence as a state and resorts to violence and terror to destroy our state.³⁸

and the following exchange on a television interview given in late September 1975:

- Q: Why are you referring to the so-called PLO?
You don't consider that the PLO is a reality?
- A: I do not consider them a liberation movement.
I just consider them as murderers and assassins
and they do not represent the Palestinians.
- Q: Would you be prepared to deal with PLO if this
organization underlines Israel's right of existence?
- A: I do not deal with hypothetical questions.³⁹

Over the course of the past year, the position of Defense Minister Shimon Peres has varied more than that of the Prime Minister but has apparently settled in the same position with respect to the PLO issue. In a statement quoted in the *Jerusalem Post* in late January 1975, Mr. Peres said that he did not "see much chance" of negotiations with the PLO. In an interview with *L'Express* during a June visit to France the following exchange took place:

- Q: You still object to the PLO, which the United Nations has made the official representative of the Palestinians. Is this position final?
- A: A Talmudic question. You are asking me why I do not want to meet a tiger in the apparent process of becoming a cat. I will not change my opinion until it has actually become a cat. For the present, the PLO is an organization which is trying to liquidate the State of Israel while only changing the means.
- Q: But yet you substitute "for the present" for "always"?
- A: To allow for the miracle that would change a tiger into a cat.⁴⁰

During the same visit, the Agencie France Presse reported that Mr. Peres "told a press conference that Israel was also prepared to negotiate with the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) as soon as it ceased to be an organization which wanted the destruction of Israel."⁴¹ Meanwhile, *Le Monde* quoted Peres as stating that Israel would negotiate with the PLO only "if that organization ceased to be what it is: an organization with the aim of destroying the state of Israel."⁴²

These statements interpreted as conceding the possibility, however remote, of negotiations with the PLO, were noted with considerable concern by some members of the Knesset. In a parliamentary question to the Defense Minister, MK Yediya Be'eri of the *Likud* (Liberal Party Faction) asked, "with what authority and as whose representative did you make that offer?"⁴³

Subsequently, Peres' stated position on negotiations with the PLO became closer to that of Rabin. In a *New York Times* article of 31 October 1975, Peres was quoted as saying that "We are not ready to negotiate with an organization that regards the murder of children as a political system."⁴⁴

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ISRAELI PERCEPTIONS OF AMERICAN SECURITY POLICY: CURRENT TRENDS--ETC(U)

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
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Even more emphatic were Peres' statements during a "Face the Nation" interview in mid-December 1975. His statements were perfectly in line with Rabin's policy, including the dismissal of "hypothetical" questions. It is worth quoting the following exchange between Peres and his questioner [Rowland Evans]:

Evans: ...do you see any possibility that if the PLO said we will recognize the existence and sovereignty of Israel, under which you could sit down and negotiate with the PLO?

Mr. Peres: You know, it's a little bit strange to listen to such a question. Suppose I should ask you if Mao Tse-Tung will become a Republican. Will you vote for him?

Evans: Well, sir -

Peres: There is something deep in the structure, in the nature of things. We, I repeat, we are ready to talk with any and all Palestinians about every possible subject, day and night. We don't want to be shot or killed by the PLO. If the PLO would come back to Israel, stay there as a million and a half Arab people are doing, stop shooting, and trying to look peace, then they won't be the PLO, and you won't have a question and I won't have to answer it.

Evans: Well, then your answer would be yes, we would sit down and speak with the body that now calls itself PLO?

Peres: Then there wouldn't be a body like that. What is the body? It's a coalition of six armed parties, undisciplined, getting money from Libya, Iraq and Syria, getting arms from the Russians. We are talking about something which exists, and Israel.⁴⁵

Thus, Peres' most recently stated views take Rabin's refusal to answer hypothetical questions one step further by denying that such a question has any meaning; that is, the PLO cannot recognize the right

of Israel to exist and be the PLO at the same time.

The reluctance of the Prime Minister and Defense Minister to even consider negotiations with PLO is based on more than just their abhorrence of PLO terror tactics, although that is certainly part of the reason. In his "Face the Nation" interview, Peres argued that no agreement made with Arafat would necessarily be obeyed by all the organizations which make up the PLO. This, however, is possibly the least of the Israeli worries. A second more powerful reason to avoid negotiations with the PLO is the fear that such negotiations would lead inevitably to the creation of a PLO-run state on the West Bank whose aim would still be the destruction of Israel. By maintaining a hard line toward the PLO, there is the hope of getting the Arab states to again recognize Hussein as the negotiator for the West Bank and force the PLO, whom the Israelis do not consider representative of the West Bank residents, out of the picture.⁴⁶

Working against the present Israeli policy with respect to the PLO is a growing realization on the part of all three key ministers that the Palestinian issue is eroding Israel's support in the world community, and is beginning to have an impact in the United States as well. Peres expressed this concern recently in a Labor Party political debate:

The controversy around the Palestinian issue is liable to erode Israel's position in American public opinion and supply U.S. mass media with a topic that would seriously harm Israel's interest, Defense Minister Shim'on Peres said last night at a political debate

held at the Labor Party Sharon District in Herzliya.

The defense minister rejected resolutions about the establishment of a Palestinian third state between Israel and Jordan, stressing that such a state would be subject to Soviet influence and would constitute a grave security threat to Israel.⁴⁷

Evidence of a growing Israeli concern over possible U.S. "pressure" on the Palestinian issue came in reaction to the so-called "Saunders document" which outlined the critical nature of the Palestinian problems to the Arab - Israeli conflict. This document said in part:

In many ways, the Palestinian dimension of the Arab-Israeli conflict is the heart of that conflict. Final resolution of the problems arising from the partition of Palestine, the establishment of the State of Israel, and Arab opposition to those events will not be possible until agreement is reached defining a just and permanent status for the Arab peoples who consider themselves Palestinians.

Today, however, we recognize that, in addition to meeting the human needs and responding to legitimate personal claims of the refugees, there is another interest that must be taken into account. It is a fact that many of the three million or so people who call themselves Palestinians today increasingly regard themselves as having their own identity as a people and desire a voice in determining their political status. As with any people in this situation, there are differences among themselves, but the Palestinians collectively are a political factor which must be dealt with if there is to be a peace between Israel and its neighbors.

What is needed as a first step is a diplomatic process which will help bring forth a reasonable definition of Palestinian interests--a position from which negotiations on a solution of the Palestinian aspects of the problem might begin. The issue is not whether Palestinian interest should be expressed in a final settlement, but how. There will be no peace unless an answer is found.

As Secretary Kissinger has said, "We are prepared to work

with all the parties toward a solution of all the issues yet remaining--including the issue of the future of the Palestinians." We will do so because the issues of concern to the Palestinians are important in themselves and because the Arab governments participating in the negotiations have made clear that progress in the overall negotiations will depend in part on progress on issues of concern to the Palestinians. We are prepared to consider any reasonable proposal from any quarter, and we will expect other parties to the negotiation to be equally openminded.⁴⁸

Reaction to the Saunders statement, as an indication of a possible shift in U.S. policy with respect to the Palestinian issue, brought sharp responses from all three key Israeli leaders. Indeed, the strength of the initial Israeli reaction necessitated clarifications from Secretary Kissinger himself. This Israeli reaction should be viewed as evidence of the extreme sensitivity of the political leadership on this issue, and a corresponding inability to make effective policy rather than a specific reaction to the content of the Saunders statement.

The statements of Foreign Minister Allon during the early part of 1975 with respect to the Palestine issue were in accord with the position of both the Prime Minister and Minister of Defense. In an interview with *Le Soir* in mid-May 1975, Allon said that:

It is not only in its political program that the PLO denied Israel the right to exist, but in interviews Yasir Arafat or Abu Iyad clearly explain that once a Palestinian state has been established on the West Bank of the Jordan they will demand the creation of what they call "the secular Arab-Jewish state". And if the Jews refuse? They reply that they will achieve it by force.⁴⁹

As late as November 1975 Allon was quoted in the *London Times*

in response to a question on Israeli negotiation with the PLO:

The PLO is a self-appointed leadership of a congerly of gangs, deeply divided among themselves and denying Israel's right of existence, so it is a hypothetical question. I do not think that I can give your question a concrete answer; it is as if you had asked me whether I would be ready to ride on the back of a tiger once it became a horse; it could never become a horse.⁵⁰

Allon's statement is remarkably similar to Peres' remarks of December 1975. It is most likely a case of Allon restating the established government policy position despite his own reservations. Later reports in the *Jerusalem Post*, however, give clear evidence to a slightly different view. The *Post* reported that some Cabinet sources claimed to have detected signs of support from Allon for the more moderate "Yariv-Shemtov" formula which proposes Israeli talks with any group that recognizes Israel and desists from acts of terror.⁵¹ Other reports have stated Allon has asked to be allowed to begin any future Cabinet debates on the Palestinian-PLO issue with some "new thoughts".

Shortly after these reports appeared in the press the Prime Minister was quoted in the *Jerusalem Post* as warning other Israeli leaders that any hesitation, or raising of questions about the Government's stand on the Palestinian issue, would be interpreted by friend and foe as a sign of weakness and would increase pressure on Israel. His remarks were interpreted as being in response to a report concerning Allon's position.⁵²

As of yet, the division between Rabin, Peres and Allon on the

Palestinian issue has not come to the forefront, largely since no Cabinet debate on PLO-Palestinian questions has been permitted to take place recently. This has been due, in large part, to Rabin's strong desire to avoid any such debate for fear of bringing out those divisions and opening up his policy to internal challenge.

The West Bank

In his statement before a subcommittee of the House Committee on International Relations considered above, Harold Saunders asserted an understanding on the part of the U.S. Government that the Palestinian dimension of the Arab - Israeli conflict is the heart of that conflict. While Israeli policy is presently unwilling to recognize the PLO as the legitimate party to negotiate on behalf of the Palestinians, neither Israel nor the Palestinians would deny that the Palestinian issue is of major importance, and that a prime component of the issue is the fact of the occupied West Bank.

In a BBC interview during September 1975, Prime Minister Rabin rejected the view that was later expressed by Mr. Saunders, that the Palestinian issue was the key to the solution of the Arab - Israeli conflict, although he did accept the idea of a Palestinian "identity". Rather, he argued that Israel's relations with Egypt were the most important element in trying to bring about a solution to the Arab - Israeli conflict.⁵³

Rabin's public statements on the Palestinians and the West Bank have, in part, reflected these priorities in that his public statements

have been fairly vague and ambiguous. On one possible solution, however, he has been very clear; the concept of a third [Palestinian] state located in the occupied West Bank, wedged between Jordan and Israel, is unthinkable in terms of present Israeli policy. Such a state, it is claimed, would amount to granting the PLO a national territory bordering Israel from which to carry on its campaign of terror against Israel, and declared objective of eliminating Israel as a state.

A clear expression of Rabin's views came during an interview on Austrian TV in August 1975:

[Rabin] I do not believe that there is room for a third state between Israel and Jordan. Every attempt at creating a state would be something in the nature of a time bomb aimed at Israel and Jordan. There is no motive for such a state -- other than that it would serve as a springboard for efforts to destroy Israel and deeper tensions. I have already pointed out what possibilities exist for solving the problem without a third state, and definitely without including the terrorist organizations in the talks.⁵⁴

These views have been reaffirmed in various statements made subsequently by Rabin.⁵⁵

As for the possibilities that Rabin sees for solving the fundamental problem of the West Bank territory, one of his most extensive statements on the subject came in an interview in late July 1975.⁵⁶ In this interview Rabin suggested two alternatives: The first is the concept that the territory that was originally Mandate Palestine from 1918 (which included territory on both sides of the Jordan) should consist of two states: namely, Israel and a Jordanian-Palestinian state to the east. Implicit in this concept is the notion that the

Palestinian entity be subsumed by Jordan, and that following a set of security assurances and peace negotiations with the Jordanian government, the Israeli-occupied West Bank would substantially be returned to Jordanian sovereignty. A second approach involves expanding King Hussein's 1972 proposal of a federation, under which the regions on both sides of the Jordan -- both the east and west banks -- would be joined in a loose confederation with Israel.

Whatever alternative is chosen, Rabin has stressed that it must: (1) recognize a united Jerusalem as the capital of Israel; (2) involve no direct Israeli dealing with the PLO; (3) recognize the right of Jews to settle anywhere in the confederation in the case of the second alternative; (4) open borders, and (5) recognition of the Jordan River as Israel's security frontier. Hence, Israeli troops would have to remain stationed on the west bank, regardless of the solution.

Rabin has not expressed a preference for either alternative. In fact, he has rarely mentioned them. The focus of his public comments has been on what he will not permit, namely an independent, third state and what Israel must have in terms of recognizing the Jordan River as Israel's security frontier, a united Jerusalem as Israel's capital, and the other factors considered above.

Since a formal Cabinet debate on the West Bank and Palestinian issues has yet to take place, Allon's views on both of these questions are the subject of intense speculation. In an interview with *Die Welt* in late February 1976, Allon stated that he "accepts the phenomenon" that the Palestinians are becoming a "people".⁵⁷ A recent [December 1975]

article in *Ma'ariv* described Allon as one who "continuously talks about a 'Palestinian entity' which has to be taken into consideration."⁵⁸

As to his views on possible solutions, Allon suggested, in a talk with the Dutch Foreign Minister, that there were three options:

(1) negotiations with Jordan and a return of the territories to its control; (2) the establishment of a "small" Palestinian state on the West Bank and Gaza Strip under a "context of peace"; or (3) the establishment of a Jordanian-Palestinian federation, within the framework of which extensive self-administration would be granted to the Palestinians in coordination with the federal government. Of the three, Allon stated he preferred the third alternative.⁵⁹

It was also reported in a conversation with a visiting U.S. Senator in August 1975 that Allon remarked that the establishment of a Palestinian state on the West Bank is perhaps the only solution. An article in the *Jerusalem Post* of 9 December 1975 heightened this line of speculation. It said, in part, that:

Foreign Minister Yigal Allon's views on the Palestinian question are at the focus of attention in Jerusalem political circles as the oft-deferred Cabinet debate on the question becomes imminent. A Foreign Ministry statement issued yesterday, far from discouraging speculation over the minister's opinions and intentions, in fact heightened the speculation

The statement followed a newspaper report which asserted that Allon saw a separate Palestinian state [on the West Bank and Gaza strip] as an acceptable possibility in a peace settlement - and that he would say so at the Cabinet debate on the Palestinian question.

A Foreign Ministry statement issued at midday yesterday

firmly denied that Allon had said anything, in any conversation, which might be construed as meaning he was going to propose to the Cabinet that Israel agree to a Palestinian state on the West Bank.⁶⁰

This statement only heightened speculation since it did not deny that Allon held views substantially different from the established government position or that he ultimately was going to present them to the Cabinet, only that he did not tell anyone he would. A further indication that Allon may accept the concept of an independent Palestinian state on the West Bank was his personal demurring to the "violence" in the Cabinet's rejection of the Saunders document.

The most outspoken of the three key ministers on the subject of the Palestinian problem and the West Bank has been Defense Minister Shimon Peres, who has had primary responsibility for the occupied territories. As was the case with Prime Minister Rabin, Peres unequivocally rejects the idea of an independent Palestinian state on the West Bank between Jordan and Israel under the PLO or any other administration. Such a state, according to Peres:

will be oriented upon Soviet Russia, will have Russian arms, their missiles, their guns, will menace our parliament, our populated areas, and in addition to that they may transfer the Fatah bases from Lebanon to the West Bank, making life almost impossible for all of us.⁶¹

Peres' "personal proposal" is for the federation between the Arabs living on the West Bank and Israel.⁶² Specifically, Peres proposes splitting Israel into several states and then federating them with the

occupied West Bank areas of Judea and Samaria, and the Gaza Strip. The proposed federal government would control matters such as security and defense, foreign affairs and finance. The state governments would control their own courts, police forces, school systems, medical facilities and other social services. Other services would be handled at the municipal level. In practice, such a plan would amount to continued Israeli domination of the occupied territories, including the West Bank, with some decentralization of governmental functions outside the defense and security areas. Such a plan would in operation closely resemble the situation which now prevails in the West Bank.

Under the Peres proposal, citizenship would be offered to West Bank residents on both the state and federal levels. Those rejecting Israeli citizenship would be allowed to vote or run for office in state and municipal elections but not in national elections where voting is limited to citizens.

With respect to the western demographic problem and the fear of losing the Jewish majority in the area of the federation, Peres sees two alternatives. The first is to freeze, for an agreed number of years, representation at the federal level to the existing proportion of the population, namely two-thirds Jewish and one-third Arab. The second alternative is to allow the demographic process to take its course for an unspecified term. Legislative action would then be taken "in accord with the Jewish majority which will then exist." Peres remains confident that with the peaceful conditions that will then prevail inside the

Israeli federation and along its borders a Jewish majority will be maintained through growing waves of Jewish immigration.

Such a proposal would allow the Palestinians to conduct their domestic affairs according to their own cultural values, according to Peres. He suggests discussing the whole proposal with the existing West Bank leaders, but definitely not with the PLO.

An additional possibility in Peres' view is the subsequent inclusion of Jordan in the confederation. This Peres sees as an option rather than a condition. Should it come about, Peres foresees the possibility of setting up a common market for these regions, a ministerial council, a countrywide Parliament similar to the European parliament, and a joint army in addition to the national armies.

As can be seen, there is far from complete agreement between any pairing of key Ministers over the future of the West Bank except on the single issue of maintaining a united Jerusalem. Both Peres and Rabin rule out the consideration of an independent Palestinian state whereas there is some indication, however slight, that Allon ultimately might accept such an idea.

On the question of possible federative schemes, Rabin has mentioned both a Palestinian-Jordanian federation and an Israeli-Jordanian-Palestinian federation with no stated preference for either, while Allon has stated a preference for the former. Allon has not dealt publicly with the question of security guarantees for Israel in the case of a Jordanian-Palestinian confederation, while Rabin has made it clear that the Jordan River would have to serve as Israel's security frontier in that case.

Peres' proposal would formalize the Jordan River as the Israeli federation's security border. From a security standpoint, the Peres proposal seems much more conservative than Allon's, since it allows Israel to control completely the national security machinery of the state in which the Palestinians would live. On the other hand, if a Jordanian-Palestinian federation came to be dominated by extreme elements it could represent a serious threat to Israel. This may, of course, be the reason why Rabin continues to demand the Jordan River as Israel's security border in case of a Jordanian-Palestinian federation.

From a domestic standpoint, the Peres proposal is much more radical, although not as radical as a Jordanian-Israeli-Palestinian confederation, since it suggests major institutional changes in the state of Israel itself, changes that may, to some extent, reduce its "Jewishness".

Relations with the United States

Of both critical and increasing importance to Israeli policy-making are the ongoing relations between Israel and the United States. Because of its role as Israel's principal arms supplier, as well as through actions taken to promote peace in the region, U.S. policy has become the focus of both Israeli and, to a large extent, Arab hopes for an overall settlement to the regional conflict. While both the U.S. and the Soviet Union have played major roles in the region, the general Israeli perception exists that only the U.S. is in a position to promote such a settlement.

The reason behind this difference, as expressed by Defense Minister Peres, lies in the differing roles which the two superpowers themselves have assumed:

If there was a difference in the method of entry of the two great powers, there is also a difference in the nature of their respective presence in the Middle East. Russia supports the States themselves; America supports principles - the principles she considers essential for the good of the region and of the world, such as peace, freedom of navigation, and the right of self-determination. Russia's system obliges her to identify herself with the stands taken by the States she supports. She has thus placed herself at the side of the Arabs in the local dispute - or rather against Israel. America, on the other hand, identifying herself with a principle, opposes communism and encourages States which are less 'revolutionary'. She thus finds herself supporting both Israel and certain elements on the Arab side in matters arising out of the regional conflict.⁶³

Thus, an important element in any Israeli decision-making process concerning foreign affairs or security will obviously be the Israeli perception of U.S. policy and the potential impact of Israeli actions on continued American military assistance and political support.

The so-called reassessment of U.S. policy in the Middle East undertaken by the Ford Administration following the March 1975 breakdown of negotiations toward a second stage interim accord between Egypt and Israel, led to numerous statements by the top Israeli leadership concerning U.S. policy. In the first weeks of the reassessment Prime Minister Rabin stated on numerous occasions that the reassessment did not represent a "crisis" in U.S. - Israeli relations.

I would not see it as a crisis; under any circumstances. It is my view that certain differences of opinion exist, but I believe that the friendship and the understanding between the United States and Israel have a firm basis, and this is why I am sure that we, as in the past, will be able to overcome the current differences of opinion.⁶⁴

Part of the reason for the "special understanding" which has developed between the United States and Israel derives, according to Rabin, from the fact that Israel has never asked for any U.S. military aid in the form of American troops. As do other Israeli leaders, Rabin believes that a strong Israel is of vital interest to the United States security interest and a strong Israel is one that is able to say "no" and live by its decision. The "no" in this case refers to the governmental decision not to make additional compromises under threat of U.S. pressure in March 1975 which could impair vital Israeli security interests. Viewed as a rationalization of Israeli actions in several quarters, this posture achieved strong public support among the Israeli public.

Rabin's optimism was strengthened by the letter subsequently secured from seventy-six senators expressing their support for Israel, which Rabin took as indicating these Senators were closer to Israel than to the Arabs. Rabin also noted that all the freshman senators were among the signees, and that this showed an indication of growing U.S. congressional support for Israel.

Discussing the effect of the reassessment on the possible flow of arms, Rabin denied the U.S. was exerting pressure on Israel saying

during June 1975, that "the American arms shipments to Israel are continuing", and that U.S. policy toward Israel was unchanged. As reported publicly, however, the final negotiation of an American - Israeli agreement with regard to the certain weapons systems (such as the F-15 fighter-bomber and the Lance missile system) was suspended until the completion of the U.S. reassessment. Rabin stated that "I am inclined to be optimistic regarding American assurances of arms supply."⁶⁵ Rabin also expressed positive views concerning the prospects of supporting economic assistance and President Ford's attitude toward Israel. Rabin also expressed the belief that United States policy-makers as a whole better understood that there was a limit to Israel's ability and readiness to pay for further reductions in Soviet influence in the Middle East region. Following his most recent visit to Washington, Rabin came back with the impression that there was a genuine appreciation within the U.S. Executive of the need to limit Soviet expansion and influence in the region, and that the United States would be willing to utilize both diplomatic initiatives and a full range of military and economic support to achieve this goal.⁶⁶

Other statements, however, have reflected both the awareness of competing U.S. interest in the Middle East region and occasional skepticism of U.S. reliability. In late June 1975 Rabin stated that:

Israel is not the only child to America's Middle East policy. The United States has a moral bond toward Israel and it has a practical and substantial interest

in a strong Israel....But we must not err in surrendering to illusions. The United States has additional interest in the Middle East, and it has an interest in widening friendship with Arab countries.

Since the Yom Kippur War a substantial strategic-political change has taken place in our region: The United States was given -- in its view -- the chance of attaining cooperation and understanding with more Arab countries, particularly with Egypt. Israel's problem is how to understand these U.S. interests and how not to oppose them under the clear and explicit condition, however, that this will by no means be at Israel's expense.⁶⁷

Even more to the point was a statement by Rabin the following month that "anyone who doubts the intimate relationships between America's reappraisal and reluctance to provide Israel with arms, and the state of American - Israeli understanding had better wake-up."⁶⁸ A month later he further expanded on this line, stating that the United States government had now taken a negative attitude toward Israel and the U.S. government had delayed the approval of F-15 planes to Israel together with other kinds of weaponry, simply to induce Israeli policy concessions.

Even more recent events may have affected Rabin's view in a more negative manner. A November 3rd article in the *New York Times* reported that Rabin asserted that the United States had *reneged* on a commitment concerning American aid made by Secretary of State Kissinger when he mediated the second stage interim agreement with Egypt (Sinai II). Rabin asserted that a \$2.3 billion dollar assistance program was promised for FY-76 while only \$2.24 billion was actually requested. Further reductions of the administration aid request to \$1.8 billion

have drawn sharp criticism from both the Israeli political leadership as well as the American Jewish leadership and the so-called "Israel lobby" in Washington.

Two events which have also affected Rabin's perception of U.S. reliability include the Saunders testimony, previously considered, and the Angolan aid cut-off by Congress. While the Saunders document itself has been bitterly attacked by the Cabinet, Rabin has been quoted as saying that the paper did not indicate a U.S. change of position on the PLO.

There has been only limited reaction by the key Israeli leadership on the Congressional suspension of aid in Angola. In part Israeli reaction is muted by the strong support given by the administration for such aid, subsequently denied by the Congress. Here the Israeli leadership feels that, given executive support, there is sufficient support in the Congress to pass on any administration request. Indeed, Secretary of State Kissinger has advised the Israeli leadership publicly that it must pay considerable attention to the Angolan cut-off, as a possible harbinger of the growing mood in the Congress.

Prior to the Angolan situation, Rabin dismissed arguments that events in Southeast Asia did anything to weaken Congressional support and U.S. credibility within Israel, noting that the situations were not comparable, in that the U.S. was not being asked to introduce troops and the Israelis were willing to fight their own battles. When such a situation occurred in Angola, however, it was some cause for concern.

As was the case with Rabin, Foreign Minister Allon has denied that the United States policy reassessment constituted a crisis in American - Israeli relations. Unlike Rabin, however, Allon has painted a more rosy picture of the present state of these relations.

On his return from one visit to the United States in late April 1975, during the "reassessment" period, Allon said that while differences of opinion with United States over the suspension of the talks continued to exist, the ice had begun to thaw. He emphasized that even at the peak of tensions a "crisis" did not exist and that a rich tradition of friendship and understanding between the United States and Israel would allow them to overcome differences.⁶⁹

In a statement several days later, Allon spoke of the reassessment as being "perfectly natural" under the circumstances.⁷⁰ He stated that it was inconceivable that the reassessment would result in any United States actions that would damage or even weaken Israel's defensive capacity - an optimism clearly not shared by the Prime Minister.

The much heralded June 1975 letter from the 76 senators further bolstered Allon's optimism:

. . . the senators' letter, which by the way, was signed by all the senators who were elected for the first time, was an encouraging phenomenon that attested to the continuity of the traditional positive attitude toward Israel.⁷¹

His optimism continued unabated throughout 1975, despite the Saunders document and problems with the Israeli aid request. Allon rejected any notion that the United States had changed its stand on the PLO or

had gone back on its basic commitment to maintaining Israeli security.

As with Rabin, Allon dismissed events in Southeast Asia as not casting doubt on U.S. reliability. In mid-October 1975, he expressed a "certainty" that the United States would honor all its commitments to supply needed arms and extend vital economic aid.⁷²

The perceptions of Defense Minister Peres regarding the basic nature of the United States - Israeli relationship appear similar to those of Rabin and Allon, although Peres continues to demonstrate increasing skepticism over the American commitment and willingness to act. On several occasions Peres has expressed the view that there is a deeply rooted relationship with the United States based on common political and cultural ideals that will survive the differences that occur inevitably between two countries.⁷³

Unlike his fellow ministers, Rabin and Allon, however, he has referred to the United States reassessment of Middle East policy as a "crisis" which had eroded, to some extent, the U.S.-Israeli friendship. At the time he was publicly optimistic that the crisis would pass. If it did not pass, however, Israel would to some extent be able to take care of her own vital defense needs:

Defence Minister Shimon Peres said yesterday Israel is ready to produce as much as 50 percent of its own weaponry if the United States decided to cut back military aid. He said the reassessment of U.S. Middle East policy now under way means a crisis for Israel, but added, I am convinced that this is a passing crisis.

This is not the first time that differences of opinion have appeared in the friendship of long standing, and

the deep-rooted understanding that exists between Israel and the U.S.⁷⁴

As this statement indicates, Peres did not fully share the optimism of Allon during the reassessment period, and does not at the present time. Indeed, the personal positions of Peres and Allon continue to grow farther apart, as the antagonisms between these two ministers grow deeper. Peres indicated on several occasions that he saw the possibility of several negative changes taking place in the United States' attitude toward Israel, and that Israel would have to make sacrifices to accomodate any such shifts in United States policy.

The defense budget request Peres subsequently submitted to his own government and *Knesset* reflected this concern, calling for increased Israeli capability to manufacture weapons systems previously imported, with an aim toward baseline self-sufficiency over the medium-to-long term. This budget met with considerable opposition within the Israeli government, and was subsequently reduced.

At the beginning of 1975, Peres stated that Israel must expect to be called on to "pay a price" so that the U.S. can maintain its influence within the region and guarantee its own legitimate interest in the Middle East.⁷⁵ While he stated that Israel had, however, no alternative to American support and must not try to lose this connection, he also stated that Israel had no alternative, or at least not many, to American aid.⁷⁶ Later in the year, he warned that there might be a change in the presently friendly ties "when America pursues with greater vigour her effort to gain access to Arab hearts."⁷⁷

This statement came in part to what Peres perceived as intense U.S. pressure in an effort to achieve a second stage agreement between Egypt and Israel, but reflects the reservations which Peres genuinely holds about U.S. policy and interest in the Middle East.⁷⁸

Peres also sees the possibility, however slight, that the United States will turn her back on the world as whole. He denies, however, that the events in Indo-China cast doubt on U.S. reliability.⁷⁹ He has not commented publicly on the Angolan situation and American support to any great extent. On the question of the United States policy toward the PLO, Peres stated recently that "we are in full agreement" on the issue.⁸⁰

Thus, while all three key ministers talk of a "deep-rooted" relationship between the United States and Israel, and agree in general on their perceptions of U.S. attitudes toward Israel, the Arab states, the PLO, the differences between the Israeli situation and Vietnam, and the future of U.S. assistance to Israel, there exist significant differences among these leaders. For a number of reasons, including internal Israeli politics, these differences continue to grow and the personal relations among the three are marked with increasing animosity and antagonisms.

Foreign Minister Allon continues to be, by far, the most optimistic and flexible of the three. As early as April 1975, he was asserting that the "ice" (not "crisis") in U.S. - Israeli relations had thawed and has not changed that view substantially. At the same time, Allon's voice and standing within the Israeli political leadership continue to diminish

in stature.

At the center, Rabin's early optimistic statements which were close to those of Allon have become more skeptical and hard line, at times outpacing those of Defense Minister Peres, demonstrating a cynical concern over possible tradeoffs between U.S. assistance and Israeli policy toward settlement. Of late Rabin's criticisms have been more muted, but he has continued to adopt a line closer to that of Peres than Allon toward U.S. policy.

Defense Minister Peres has consistently taken the most skeptical and hard-line view of U.S. policy, openly referring to the 1975 Middle East policy reassessment as a "crisis" and mentioning a number of long range scenarios which would clearly have undesirable implications for Israel. More recently, Peres has openly clashed with the Prime Minister over the vital character of the Israeli assistance request, *Matmon-B* and other critical policy issues. In the final analysis, Peres' views of U.S. policy and commitment are strongly colored by his personal visits and discussions with American leaders. Here his personal distrust of Secretary of State Kissinger is reflected in the overall skepticism he holds about U.S. interests and resolve. On balance, his meetings with both President Ford and Defense Secretaries Schlesinger and Rumsfeld have given Peres a more positive feeling toward the American role, although his concerns are likely to remain for some time to come.⁸¹

2.3 PERIPHERAL LEADERSHIP

Given the nature of Israel's coalition government, and the weak position of Prime Minister Rabin within that government, the roles and perceptions of a number of major Israeli personalities outside the current top leadership are of increasing importance. First, it is possible that one of these individuals could emerge as Israel's next Prime Minister, or in one of the other key leadership positions. Secondly, because of their public standing and party influence, it is likely that their views will have some impact on policy-making.⁸²

The present section considers the perceptions of three of these so-called "peripheral leaders" -- Moshe Dayan, Abba Eban and Menahem Begin. While these three are by no means the totality of the peripheral leadership, they do represent three major approaches to alternative leadership. Dayan, Israel's former Defense Minister, has taken a series of positions on settlement issues differing from his former associates. Abba Eban, formerly Israel's Foreign Minister and best known spokesman, represents a far more moderate and conciliatory approach to settlement questions than his colleagues in the Labor Alignment. Finally, Menahem Begin, leader of the opposition *Likud* and former Minister without Portfolio, represents the mainstream of opposition bloc thought, and the policy approach which would be in effect were the *Likud*, or a *Likud* dominated coalition to win a future Israeli election.

Moshe Dayan

One issue which has occupied much of Dayan's attention since his

resignation from office has been the possibility of achieving a settlement with Syria. Dayan's view concerning possible negotiations expressed several times in early 1975 is that Israel should not have occupied the Golan Heights to begin with, but now that Israel has them, the government should not consider giving them up:

. . .I was opposed to taking the Heights...but now that we are there, I wouldn't advocate that we should come down. I don't believe in reversing historical facts. Rabin believes that Syria will yet make peace with us while we are still on Golan. I disagree - even if we evacuated the ridges, Syria would still not make peace with us.⁸³

Thus, Dayan appears to be saying that while the Heights were not worth taking in the first instance, their seizure has altered the situation so that giving them back would only do more harm than good.

Recently, however, Dayan's views seem to be more flexible. In early 1976 he still expressed doubt that the Syrians would make peace, but indicated that if they were to be willing to do so he would be in favor of major territorial concessions:

[Q.] Mr. Dayan, what are you prepared for today concerning an interim agreement with Syria? cosmetics, removing settlements, or nothing at all?

[A.] If Syria would have been prepared to end the state of belligerency, I would have been prepared for significant changes in this respect. It would be much more than cosmetics. If settlements would also be involved in it, and if it would mean an end to belligerency, I would not flatly reject it.⁸⁴

With respect to U.S. policy in the region, there are many similarities

between Dayan's perceptions of the U.S. - Israeli relationship and the views of the top leadership. Dayan views the United States with alternating degrees of skepticism and hope. The balance between skepticism and hope varied with the events of the last year.

At the very beginning of 1975 Dayan stated that he considered the good relations between Israel and the United States as "the most positive phenomenon of the generation" for Israel. "I do not believe that their friendship is shallow or that they would sell us for the sake of a few dollars less per ton of oil."⁸⁵

By April 1975, however, in the wake of the breakdown in the March 1975 Kissinger shuttle, and the U.S. reassessment of Middle East policy, Dayan became highly critical of the United States policy toward Israel. In an interview with the *Washington Post* he protested the linking of military aid to the negotiating process under the "guise" of a reassessment of U.S. Middle East policy. He said: "It's a suspension...it's a warning and a challenge that unless 'you do what we want we won't provide weapons'."⁸⁶

Dayan held this general feeling throughout the balance of 1975. By early December 1975, Dayan suggested that the root of the differences of opinion between Israel and the United States springs from the American administration's desire to achieve a new breakthrough in the region, plus their desire to draw closer to the Arab countries, especially Egypt.⁸⁷ He did not, however, see any signs of pressure by the United States to create a Palestinian state alongside Israel in the occupied West Bank territory.⁸⁸ Early 1976 revealed Dayan to be more optimistic than anytime

since the breakdown of the March 1975 Kissinger shuttle. His optimism was due in part to his perception of President Ford as having given up his "determination not to permit a deadlock and assure progress toward peace."⁸⁹ For Dayan, Americans now seemed to be assuming a passive role in Middle East negotiations.

Dayan attributes this "passivity" to "their [the United States] unwillingness to fight for us [Israel]." - due to this unwillingness, the United States was not pressing Israel to give up areas that it considered vital. American objectives were, for the present, limited to avoiding a collision with the Soviet Union and a second oil embargo.⁹⁰

Although Dayan was pleased to see a lessened U.S. involvement on the one hand, he still believed that the good will of the United States was vital to Israel's defense conceivably, in large part, because of the weapons that only the U.S. could provide. An article in the *Jerusalem Post* of 2 February 1976 stated that:

Former Defense Minister Moshe Dayan said yesterday that although Israel had done a great deal in developing her own weapons between the 1967 and 1973 wars, she was unable to keep the pace with development of modern arms or maintain peacetime production at a level sufficient to meet the needs of the battlefield. The U.S. was the only possible source to fill this gap.⁹¹

Additionally, as other Israeli leaders have done, he expressed the view that the American people would respect Israel as long as she was willing to defend herself and not compromise on that issue. Thus, Dayan's overall view on U.S. - Israeli friendship and the importance of that relationship

to Israel's survival's tempered by periods of frustration and anger over perceived U.S. attempts to pressure Israel into sacrifices affecting basic Israeli security motivated by U.S. interests.

As indicated above, Dayan is opposed to the creation of an independent Palestinian state between Jordan and Israel. In early 1975 he said: "I am against a separate independent Palestinian state and no responsible [Palestinian] ever suggested it. They all know it is nonsense..."⁹²

Dayan reiterated this view early in 1976 on Israeli television. This view implies no talks with the PLO or any such group judging from the following exchange:

[Q.] Mr. Dayan, you say: we shall not negotiate with the PLO, rain or shine, come what may...

[A.] Please, please excuse me, I am saying, no negotiations over the establishment of a Palestinian state.

[Q.] Is there any other issue one can discuss with the PLO?

[A.] No, but on that issue talks must be held neither with the PLO nor with anybody else.⁹³

Presumably, Dayan sees, as do the other Israeli leaders, that any such state would inevitably be "Arafatist" in nature. Dayan's policy toward the West Bank is much firmer and extensive than that of Rabin. In the Spring of 1973, while still a key minister in the Government, Dayan made the following proposals as reported in the *New York Times*:⁹⁴

A sharp increase in the establishment of Israeli settlements in the occupied areas.

Construction of major new Israeli urban settlements

at certain strategic points such as the Southern end of the Gaza Strip.

Economic integration of the West Bank, Gaza and Israel permitting an unrestricted flow of workers across the armistice lines between these areas.

Permission for Israeli citizens to buy land anywhere in the West Bank. [At present, only the government may acquire land in the occupied areas].

Thus, Dayan has been quoted as being in favor of extensive economic and social integration of the West Bank and Israel. His views, apparently, have not changed since then. In January 1975 he was calling for the Government to permit permanent Jewish settlement in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. He demanded that the Government "state without mumbling" that for historical and security reasons Israel's boundary on the east lies on the Jordan River.⁹⁶ In January 1976 he said that he was prepared to go to war over withdrawal to the so-called "green line," [the 1949 Armistice lines] that the Arabs actual readiness for peaceful coexistence with Israel was as much a determinant of war as withdrawal.⁹⁷

Dayan has expressed the view that a consistent refusal to negotiate would ultimately force the Arab states and the Palestinians to recognize Jordan as the bargaining agent for West Bank Arabs when they saw that the Rabat decisions could not be implemented.⁹⁸ He supported the Government's decision not to participate in recent Security Council debates in which the PLO participated.

Abba Eban

Of all the Israeli leaders both in and out of office, Eban appears

to be the one who places the greatest value for Israel on maintaining good relations with the United States at all times. To a great extent Eban views the American - Israeli relationship as being more fragile than other leaders do.

Eban was sharply critical of the present leadership's failure to accept the proposed agreement with Egypt in March of 1975, arguing that a bad agreement was better than antagonizing the United States. He saw the failure of the talks as having potentially serious repercussions in terms of both United States military and economic aid. Shortly after the breakdown in talks, Eban stated, in an interview with *Ma'ariv*, that:

The main thing is to recognize the severity of the prevailing chill. The day following the suspension of Dr. Kissinger's talks the Israeli official and unofficial statements were afflicted with a certain lack of consideration for the seriousness of the matter. The statements spoke about a "family dispute" and about "states of mind" and recently I read an expression about a "period of coolness in Israeli-U.S. relations". In my opinion such phrases deviate from the truth. The situation is not one of passing emotion, a personal disappointment on a natural human wish by someone to find consolation and compensation for hitches in Southeast Asia. All these elements exist and are given their due, but I was very impressed with the sincerity of U.S. administration officials in their disappointment with Israel and with its policies.

The acceptance of a bad agreement is better than shattering the negotiations. Had it been possible -- and it was possible -- to find a compensation to the shortcomings of the agreement by strengthening the partnership with Americans and by American commitments which will compensate us for the dangers involved in the agreement, the government should have accepted the proposed agreement.⁹⁹

While Eban did express confidence that Israel's current difficulties

in relations with the U.S. could be overcome, this confidence was contingent on Israel's taking "political initiatives". Thus, unlike the top leadership--who view "time" as the main healing factor in American - Israeli relations--Eban links improvement in U.S. - Israeli relations to positive action and more progressive policy on the part of Israel.¹⁰⁰ Also, unlike other leaders Eban did not mention U.S. public opinion or Congressional support in providing a "cushion" against possible action by the administration.

Eban's views on both the PLO and the occupied West Bank territory have shown a great deal of variance over the course of the past year. In February 1975 his statements indicated a willingness to negotiate with the PLO. The *Jerusalem Post* quoted Eban as saying:

I think that Israel should negotiate with anyone among the Palestinians provided they accept the fact of the state of Israel as irreversible.

Besides, the PLO went to Geneva, that would mean it had changed its ideology, the negotiations are necessarily being conducted in the framework of United Nations Resolutions 242 and 338 which formally establishes our sovereignty.¹⁰¹

Here Eban's view sharply differs from those held by Rabin, Peres and Dayan, all of whom have continuously maintained that Israel will not and should not negotiate with the PLO, and that a PLO which accepted Israel's right to exist would be a contradiction in terms.

On the subject of an independent Palestinian state, Eban expressed himself in favor of such an idea in the early part of 1975. Interviewed

on French radio in March 1975 Eban said: "[W]e can accept nothing as an alternative to Israel. But if a 'Palestine' alongside Israel is proposed our answer must be an affirmative yes."¹⁰² By May 1975 Eban was suggesting that perhaps the time had come for an arrangement under which the Palestinian Arabs would establish an entity to the east of Israel which would be politically separate, while continuing its economic and cultural ties with Israel.¹⁰³ By late 1975, however, and in early 1976, when the prospect of Eban's returning to the Cabinet arose, he was quoted as saying that he was now opposed to a third state, but in favor of a Jordanian-Palestinian state.¹⁰⁴

Likewise, on the subject of the PLO, Eban has expressed divergent views over a short period of time. At a Labor Party conference in late December 1975, he apparently supported Rabin's refusal to negotiate with the PLO. He was quoted as saying that "there is no historical precedent for negotiations which put in question the very sovereignty and survival of one of the negotiating partners."¹⁰⁵

By early 1976, however, Eban appeared to reverse himself again and expressed support for the idea of negotiating with the PLO:

...I am in favor of a dialogue with every representative Palestinian organization which will regard Israeli sovereignty as a fact, will declare it will say that it does not wish to take Israel's place and will discuss the question of what should be the relations between the state of Israel and of the Palestinian public.¹⁰⁶

...Mr. Eban recommended Israeli readiness to negotiate with any Palestinian group which accepts Israeli sovereignty and seeks negotiation.¹⁰⁷

The seemingly extreme variations in Eban's position and perceptions over this relatively short time period may in part be explained by the events of the period, which included both a crisis in American - Israeli relations and the successful negotiation of the second stage interim accord with Egypt. Even more significant may be the negotiations which Eban held with Prime Minister Rabin, over a possible return of Eban to a Cabinet position. This would explain the shift toward the Rabin position and then away from it, back to a position more clearly his own.

Menahem Begin

Fundamental to Menahem Begin's perception of American - Israeli relations is his belief in the existence of "three Americas" developed prior to the breakdown of the March 1975 Kissinger shuttle and the "reassessment" of U.S. Middle East policy. Here Begin stated:

...there are three Americas. There is the State Department...[whose] Arabists...are prepared to sacrifice Israel's security...But in addition to this America, and it is a very small one, there are two other Americas. One is represented by the two Houses of Congress, the elected representatives of the great American people... there has not been a congress whose two houses have been more favorable to Israel than this one. *And then there is a third America, perhaps the America that matters most: the public opinion of a free country* [emphasis added]...Public opinion in the United States has not only Jewish but also non-Jewish support and has never been bound by such strong bonds of sympathy to Israel as in these times.¹⁰⁸

Given these perceptions, Begin's view of the U.S. policy reassessment and related difficulties in American - Israeli relations was some-

what less tense than that of Mr. Eban. This was, in fact, revealed in an interview in May 1975 following the breakdown in talks:

...we must also withstand the additional period of reassessment, and here I want to say that, as regards the supply of equipment to Israel, we enjoy considerable support in Congress - in both houses - and, no less important, very strong support from the American public -- not only among the Jews but from the Christian community as well. In other words, I am convinced that we stand a good chance of withstanding this difficult period as well as of receiving vital equipment from the United States....the American Administration will not be able to say no to the supply of equipment to the State of Israel. The administration could possibly suggest a certain curtailment.¹⁰⁹

Thus while the March 1975 breakdown in settlement talks might have had some negative consequences for Israel and even a curtailment in U.S. commitments on arms supplies, these consequences would not be adverse or highly detrimental due to Israel's strong support outside of the executive branch. Implicit in this view is the notion that Israel has considerable latitude in accepting or rejecting future Administration proposals since any Administration pressure towards Israel will likely be tempered by strong Congressional and public support within the U.S.

Turning to the issues of PLO recognition and the occupied West Bank it has been clear that as leader of the rightist opposition bloc, Begin has been unalterably opposed to Israeli negotiations with the PLO, which he has referred to as "the PDO: Palestine Destruction Organization."¹¹⁰ Additionally, he opposes any return of West Bank territory to Jordan; and the creation of an Israeli-Palestinian or Jordanian-Palestinian federation for

both philosophical as well as security reasons.

Begin argues that West Bank areas such as Judea, and Samaria are all part of "Eretz Yisrael" [The Land of Israel], the traditional Jewish homeland, and must be maintained as such. Begin's clearest statement of this view came in early 1975 when he stated:

We believe the land of Israel, which includes Judea and Samaria, belongs by right to the Jewish people. It was partitioned, it was reunited, it should not be partitioned again.¹¹¹

Practically speaking, any Palestinian (which Begin perceives as inevitably "Arafatist") state would be a major setback both for the United States and Israel:

What kind of state would the Arafat state be, in terms of its internal regime or international relations? Incontestably, it would be the most pro-Communist or pro-Soviet in the Middle East.¹¹²

While Begin's views with respect to the West Bank territories appear to be identical to Rabin, Peres, and Dayan, particularly on the subject of a possible independent Palestinian state, he seems much less flexible when it comes to possible policy alternatives. While the others seem to be interested in a solution which gives Israel essentially pre-June 1967 Israel security borders, Begin sees certain of the territory captured in the 1967 Six-Day War as traditionally, historically Israeli and thus it must remain part of Israel, even if there are alternative solutions which would not threaten Israel's security and survival.

In part this policy stand comes from Begin's role as the opposition leader, and a need to oppose current Government policy on at least some points. There is, however, considerable evidence that Begin has developed a strong emotional commitment to this position as well. What flexibility Begin might be able to demonstrate as a minister in a new government, or even as Prime Minister in a *Likud*-led coalition remains to be seen.¹¹³

2.4 MILITARY LEADERSHIP

The Role of the Military and Defense Leadership

Markedly absent from the major policy debate which has taken place within Israel since the 1973 October War has been a significant input from the Israeli military and defense leadership as such. In practice this continues a trend which has existed in Israel since its beginnings, and differs from the example of most other developing nations.¹¹⁴ Given the failures that the political leadership were charged with following the 1973 war, it might be expected that the military and defense leadership would come to play a far more important, if not visible role in policy-making. To date this has not been the case.

Several reasons exist for this phenomena. First, the Israeli public which comprises the citizen-army of Israel would be unwilling to tolerate a stronger role for the military under less than "worst case" conditions. Secondly, the present leadership which took control in April 1974, all have substantial military and defense backgrounds, untainted by the "failures" of the 1973 experience. Rabin, formerly IDF Chief of Staff, had been in Washington as Defense Attache. Peres, formerly Deputy Minister of Defense had opposed the Meir policy prior to the outbreak of war and had strong support both within the Israeli public and IDF alike. Third, Allon served as one of Israel's early military leaders and managed to miss the final meetings prior to the 1973 war's outbreak. Finally the IDF has itself undergone significant changes in leadership since the 1973 war in an effort to eliminate some

of the institutional problems and personalities which contributed to IDF setbacks in the first phase of the war.

In terms of policy-making, the military and defense leadership has by and large played a supportive role to the political leadership, offering what they perceive to be objective analyses of Israel's vital security requirements as an input to the decision process, rather than taking a public policy stand or undermining the position of the political leadership.

One of the things that may have served to reduce potential military-political tension has been the inclusion of top military and defense leaders at policy-making sessions. Under Mrs. Meir the Chief of Staff and Director of Military Intelligence (DMI) frequently attended meetings of the informal "Kitchen Cabinet" and participated in the policy-making process. Throughout the negotiations toward Sinai I and II, and the accord reached with Syria in the Golan Heights, Israeli military and defense officials played a significant role. Indeed, their arguments were used to buttress the Peres-Rabin decision to terminate the March 1975 negotiations.

Where the military and defense leadership have played their most important role, at least with respect to the policy-making process, is in formulating the parameters of Israeli security requirements, in terms of manpower, weapons systems, and security frontiers. These fundamental parameters then form a basis for both Israeli domestic policy, such as budgeting, as well as assistance requests placed through the United States and limits on the Israeli negotiating posture.

One of the problems Israel experienced in its defense establishment since its inception has been an overall failure to develop either a tactical planning capability or an effective defense management effort. Hence the IDF was able to respond with considerable success to acute crisis and battlefield situations, but otherwise unable to support a program which would meet Israel's minimal security needs and still be able to provide for a settlement of the Arab - Israeli conflict, and be within the ability of Israeli resources. In short, the focus of the IDF has been on waging war of increasing complexity, rather than waging peace within the limits of Israeli resources.

Under Defense Minister Peres major steps have been taken to make up for these shortcomings. Peres has moved to install long range and strategic planning capabilities both within the MoD and the General Staff Branch.¹¹⁵ To date these efforts have focused on specific issues of weapons system requirements, and only secondly on the broader issues of security under alternative settlement conditions. Peres has also made significant efforts toward developing effective defense management within the MoD, to deal with a range of issues from procurement problems to defense research and development programs. Indeed, the focus of many of these efforts has been on Israeli defense self-sufficiency.

In terms of actual, or expressed perceptions of United States policy the military and defense leadership has been severely limited. In both practice and reality Defense Minister Peres, in his official capacity rather than as a political leader, speaks for this community. Already considered at some length above, Peres' views generally coincide

with those of key military and civilian defense leaders. Certainly none have openly moved to challenge Peres, and criticism of Peres among these individuals privately is almost non-existent.¹¹⁶ What opinions have been expressed have been by a precious few top officials, and have generally been on domestic budgetary issues, in contrast to views expressed by ministers other than Peres.

In looking at this leadership, it is necessary to separate the defense leadership within the MoD from the IDF, or military leadership. In practice, virtually all of the key leadership positions are held by active or reserve military, often blurring distinctions that might otherwise arise.

Defense Leadership Under Peres

With the mandate of the Agranat Commission's findings and the new leadership of Shimon Peres, there has been a concerted effort to transform the Israeli Defense Ministry (MoD) into an institution providing modern defense management and policy support for Israel's increasingly modern and complex armed forces, the IDF. Prior to the Peres tenure, the MoD suffered from a number of major problems, including a failure to develop a defense management capability, in terms of planning, procurement and administration, as well as a personalization of important management functions.

These two problem areas are interrelated and stem from the fact that for many years under Ben-Gurion the MoD assembled a number of individuals, each taking on one or more important tasks such as weapons procurement (Peres), logistics (Criden), training (Shimshoni), tactics

(Ben-Natan) and others. In the early days, this process and these individuals served well. As the defense problems and weapons systems increased in size and complexity, and these individuals left the MoD, their functions failed to be institutionalized effectively within the MoD and the inefficient bureaucratization which characterizes much of Israeli administration beset the MoD as well. The net result was a Parkinsonian increase in the number of individuals employed by the MoD, with little change in the ability of the ministry to meet the challenge of managing defense in the modern era.¹¹⁷

Under Peres some effort has been made to provide the institutional mechanisms for meeting these specific problems, beginning in the critical areas of procurement, strategic force planning and long range research and development. Whether or not these changes will prove successful remains to be seen. To some extent Peres has taken a similar approach to that of his mentor, Ben-Gurion, by assembling a group of highly skilled individuals close to him in the Ministry, charged with developing these important functions. This group includes: Dr. Yuval Ne'eman (since resigned), Dr. Sa'adia Amiel (Director of Long Range and Strategic Planning), Dr. Pinhas Zusman (Director General), Gen. Israel Tal (Advisor), Asher Ben-Natan (Advisor), Zvi Zur, Yehoshafat Harkabi (presently on leave) and others in whom Peres has personal confidence. How successful either Peres or these individuals will be in institutionalizing their roles and developing the functions required by the MoD remains to be seen.

In some areas, such as domestic defense budgeting and military research and development programs, the MoD is achieving some success. In

others, such as long range force planning and tactical doctrine, formulation of assistance program requests and others, it would appear that obstacles still remain. Among the MoD leadership there has been a tendency to blame the United States in general, and defense policy makers in particular, for somehow failing to meet all of Israel's vital security needs, rather than admit shortcomings in the Israeli capability to effectively analyze long range defense requirements.¹¹⁸

Here the conclusion of several key Israeli defense officials has been that the United States has erred in its assessment of the potential threat to Israel over the medium to long term, both from the confrontation and non-confrontation Arab states, as well as the prospect for further Soviet hegemony and arms transfers to the region. At present this aspect of the American - Israeli debate continues largely unabated.

Public remarks by defense leaders other than Minister Peres have, as indicated above, been strictly limited to matters of internal policy, such as the following attempt to cover up a sharp dispute between the Defense and Finance Ministries over budget matters:

Speaking at a hurriedly called press conference, Aluf [general] (Res.) Tal minimized current differences between the two ministries over the defence budget, and said relations were closer than ever.

Both ministries agreed about the basic facts and figures, he said. The main differences were over the breakdown of the defence appropriation suggested by the Treasury, particularly the amounts available for new orders to be placed with local industry.

While Treasury experts expect the overall size of local defence production to be more or less maintained, the

Defence Ministry sees no way but to reduce it drastically. This is in order to set free funds for more urgent priorities owing to the growth of military strength and the need to complete various projects started in the past.¹¹⁹

Specific differences within the Defense Ministry over policy matters tend to be resolved without much public exposure, and generally by the resignation of an individual for "personal reasons", such as in the case of Chief Scientist Dr. Yuval Ne'eman, who favored a policy line harder than that supported by the Defense Minister.¹²⁰

IDF Leadership Perceptions

More rigid and hierarchical in its organization and structure than the MoD, the IDF leadership is headed by the IDF General Staff, and it by the Chief of Staff (CoS), currently Lt. Gen. Mordechai ("Motta") Gur. To the extent perceptions are publicly expressed, they are done so by Gur and to a limited degree by Israeli Air Force Commander Maj. Gen. Benjamin Peled.¹²¹ In large part comments by Gur and his colleagues have been limited to:

- (1) General statements about IDF preparedness and abilities in case of renewed warfare;
- (2) The need for new and advanced weapons systems to meet perceived threats;
- (3) Denunciations of acts and intentions of the Arab states and the Palestinians.

Such views were expressed recently in one of the few comprehensive interviews given by Gur:

If a new war breaks out with the Arabs we will have to finish it quickly so that the Arabs will not be able to dictate conditions for a cease-fire to us, and so that foreign political elements will not be able to prevent us from ending the war with a clear and unequivocal victory.

Today, he added, we have a larger and stronger army than in the Yom Kippur war. It is equipped with sophisticated and modern equipment and for this we must be grateful to the Government of the United States and to world Jewry.

...in the future we must build the IDF in such a way that it will be able to stand up to three technologies: That of the USSR, of Europe and of the United States. Equipment from these technologies is flowing into the Arab countries which are paying for it with money from Libya and Kuwait. If war breaks out we will have to destroy the enemy stock-piles so that they will not be able to reequip themselves for an additional war. To this end we will have to buy the best equipment for the IDF in the coming years and we are sure that the Jewish people in the world will make this possible.

At the same time the chief of staff pointed out that Israel's military problem is third in priority, the first being the problem of immigration, and the second, the unity of the people.

Lt General Gur expressed doubt as to the possibility of solving the problem in the region through diplomatic means, but in his opinion the situation today is not such that we are bound to agree to a solution that will satisfy the wills of foreign elements.

In speaking about events in Lebanon the chief of staff stressed that the main danger is of Syria intervening there and making Lebanon into a confrontation state against Israel. "We are sufficiently strong in order to stop Syria and to prevent any intervention in Lebanon," he said. "The Syrians know this very well and they remembered the lesson of 1970 when they intended to invade Jordan and thanks to the concentration of Israeli forces in the north this was prevented.

Speaking about the situation in Jordan, the chief of staff said that today this country has no reason to fight against Israel since the Rabat conference removed the West Bank and the Palestinian entity from Jordan's hands and turned it over to the PLO. Despite this Jordan has tightened its

links with Syria and recently the Jordanians and the Syrians have held joint field maneuvers--something that has not happened before. At the same time the chief of staff complained about the American missiles that will flow into Jordan in the near future and will help it to fight against Israel.¹²²

Turning to the question of possible American military aid to the major Arab confrontation states, such as Egypt, Gur placed this question within the context of the overall Middle East force balance, as he perceives it:

[Question] As-Sadat is now in the United States in the framework of a "historic visit". He has asked for arms. Does the equipping of the Egyptian Army with American arms have critical significance for Israel's security?

[Answer] The military strengthening within the Arab world is very worrying, both quantitatively and qualitatively. Quantitatively, the Middle Eastern countries are reaching paradoxical proportions: 6,000 tanks for the Arabs is more than the Germans and Russians had together at some stages of the Second World War. In these numbers, there is power which is above any discussion of balance of forces. This is a power that has become a quality in its own right. Qualitatively, the Arab armies will have three technologies at their disposal: Russian, American and European. The IDF will be compelled to contest large-scale sophisticated arms. For example, electronically: There is a substantial difference whether the IDF has to contest one kind of technology, or find responses to three sophisticated technologies. The antiaircraft missiles of the three technologies is an exceedingly complicated matter: "Hawks" in Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait; "Krotal" in Egypt and possibly in other Arab countries; and the complex of Russian missiles in other Arab countries; U.S., Russian and European tanks; assorted artillery and every other armament. From the point of view of the IDF and its combat readiness, we are obliged to consider the huge Libyan arsenal in the west and that of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait in the east as part of the arsenal that would be against us.¹²³

On balance, Gur and the IDF leadership generally support the views of Defense Minister Peres and the military assistance requests put forth by the Government. Within the military defense community of Israel this leadership has favored a fairly tough line on security frontiers, both in the Sinai and Golan Heights, but have not taken stands which would inhibit further policy flexibility if this were the policy of the political leadership.

2.5 IMPLICATIONS FOR ISRAELI POLICY

Given these leadership perceptions of both the vital security policy areas and United States policy in the Middle East, it is possible to consider the directions which Israeli policy could take. In looking at these policy alternatives the areas of most critical importance to U.S. policy-makers are first the flexibility available to the Israeli leadership in attempts to reach an overall settlement to the Arab-Israeli conflict, and secondly the demands which the Israeli leadership is likely to make on the United States to help meet perceived defense and economic needs.

Problems in Israeli Policy-Making

One of the more obvious conclusions which can be drawn from the foregoing analysis, is that the approach and flexibility of Israeli policy will depend on the composition of the leadership group. The presently weak position of Prime Minister Rabin, coupled with increasing discord among the top political leadership suggests that changes in the coalition, or new elections are a likely possibility over the near term. A continued failure by Rabin to achieve further settlement accords, anticipated levels of support from the U.S., or improvements in the Israeli economy will handicap Rabin even further, if not force his departure from office.

At present, the following scenarios all appear to have some degree of possibility:

- o Rabin's continued tenure as Prime Minister, although increasingly subject to "direction" from the party's

old guard "established leadership";

- o Replacement of Rabin in mid-term by a more popular candidate, such as Shimon Peres;
- o New elections, followed by greater, although unlikely, popular mandate for Rabin;
- o New elections or a government resignation followed by the formation of a *Likud*, or *Likud-Rafi* dominated coalition.

Each of these possibilities would most likely present a different approach to policy questions. Considered below are some possible directions these alternative leaderships could be anticipated to take.

Settlement Issues

Barring any major shifts in Israeli leadership in the political arena, it is unlikely that the Rabin government or any of its probable successors will be able to formulate any major new policy initiatives acceptable to the Arab states for further interim or final settlement of the basic conflict. In view of the growing skepticism displayed over the long term reliability of weapons system supply from the United States, it appears that the Israeli leadership will increasingly want to rely on territorial buffers to provide a strategic advantage over the Arab confrontation states.

For a number of internal political as well as strategic considerations, it appears that any Israeli leadership would be barred from making significant concessions on the Golan Heights area without a popular expressed mandate to do so. In the short term this may serve to block any further settlement with Syria, with the most likely outcome being

a *de facto* armistice at the expiration of the UNDOF mandate in May 1976.

Other things being equal it would appear that further accords and a final settlement could ultimately be achieved between Israel and Egypt. Such progress is, however, currently keyed to further progress on the Syrian front and some movement on the issue of the Palestinian and the occupied West Bank territory. Here the broad spectrum of the current Israeli leadership and likely replacements consistently refuse to deal with the Palestinian issue on a basis acceptable to even the most moderate Palestinians and Arab states. Until a compromise on this fundamental issue can be achieved, the potential for progress on other issues remains limited. As considered in Part Three below, it is unlikely that the Israeli public is presently willing to tolerate such a policy shift.

Thus, while the Israeli political and military leadership is anxious that the United States continue its diplomatic initiatives in the region aimed at achieving a settlement, it is unwilling and unable (in their perception) to make the kinds of concessions necessary to bring such a settlement about.

Requests for United States Assistance

Of critical importance to Israeli policy-makers is the nature and extent of U.S. military and supporting assistance that will be available to Israel over the next several years, along with the policy demands which the leadership perceives as being attached to continued American aid. Already the topic of much criticism and debate in the media, this "pressure" has been viewed by the leadership as having

both positive and negative aspects. On the positive side, perceived U.S. pressure has been used as a justification internally by the Rabin government to permit what flexibility has been demonstrated in prior negotiations. At the same time, the leadership was able to claim that American military support enabled Israel to make these strategic concessions.

Indeed, what emerges from this analysis is the conclusion that the military and geographic factors which the Israeli leadership perceives as being vital to the strategic balance will be far more important to achieving an overall settlement than any political considerations. To the extent that perceived threats of military insufficiency by the United States are used to produce major policy concessions, they are likely to be unsuccessful. Here the emphasis must be placed on Israeli perceptions of potential insufficiency, rather than whether or not such an imbalance is actually likely.

Finally, to the extent that the Israelis perceive the United States as becoming increasingly unable to deal effectively with world problems in general and maintain the strategic balance in the Middle East in particular, they will hesitate from increasing their own policy flexibility.

NOTES: PART TWO

1. See Abraham R. Wagner, *The Impact of the 1973 October War on Israeli Policy and Implications for U.S. Defense Policy* (U) (Beverly Hills, California: A. R. Wagner & Co., June 1975), and Abraham R. Wagner *Political Change and Decision-Making in Israel: The Aftermath of the October War* (U) (Washington: Department of State, INR/XR, August 1974).
2. See Abraham R. Wagner, *Crisis Decision-Making: Israel's Experience in 1967 and 1973* (New York: Praeger, 1974) for an analysis of this problem. See also, Don Peretz, "The War Elections and Israel's Eighth Knesset", *Middle East Journal*, 28 (Spring, 1974).
3. Reports of these so-called "failures" (the Hebrew term generally used is *Michdal*, meaning "omission"), see Y. Ben-Porat, et. al. *Ha'michdal* ("The Omission") (Tel Aviv: Special Edition Publishers, 1974). Forecasts of these anticipated changes are contained in Abraham R. Wagner, *Political Change and Decision-Making in Israel: The Aftermath of the October War*, op. cit.
4. See Press Release Issued by the Commission of Inquiry - Yom Kippur War Upon Submission of its Third and Final Report to the Government and the Defence and Foreign Affairs Committee of the Knesset on 30 January 1975 [Report of the Agranat Commission]. (Jerusalem: Israel Government Press Office, 30 January 1975), and Terrence Smith, "Israeli Errors on Eve of War Emerging," *The New York Times* (10 December 1973).
5. Under Israel's party list system, each party presents the electorate with a list of 120 candidates for Knesset seats, with voters choosing only a preferred list. Seats are then allocated in proportion to votes received for each list.
6. See, for example, *Ma'ariv*, 9 December 1975, p. 1.
7. An extensive analysis of Israeli public opinion is contained in Part Three below.
8. Israeli public opinion data are from the Public Opinion Research of Israel (PORI) organization, supplied by USIA.
9. See, Central Intelligence Agency, *Israel: Economic Outlook* (U) (January 1976) ER-76-10058 (SECRET/NFD).
10. For the first time since 1948, Israel suffered a net outflow of people in 1975.

11. In several respects the situation which caused a major fiscal crisis in New York City is similar to that in Israel. For example, Israel has not repaid earlier development loans, but rather has rolled them over at higher rates, in addition to other borrowings. Other parallels include bureaucratic work and inefficiency, low labor productivity, capital flight, and large scale tax evasion.
12. In departing his post as Information Minister, Yaaviv criticised both Rabin's failure to implement the NSC plan and the government's approach to the Palestinian problem. See Terence Smith, "Yaaviv Resigns Israeli Information Post," *The New York Times*, 30 January 1975, p. 2. and "Yariv Quits Government Formally," *The Jerusalem Post*, 2 February 1975, p. 1.
13. Included here were Mordechai Gazit (Prime Minister Office), Y. Harkabi (Defense), and Avraham Kidron (Foreign Ministry), who have all left their previous posts.
14. There is some evidence to indicate that much intelligence data is closely held by the collective agencies.
15. Sarah Honig and Yoel Dar in the *Jerusalem Post*, 21 February 1975, pp. 1,2.
16. Speech by Shimon Peres, Reported in *Foreign Broadcast Information Service* [hereafter *FBIS*], 21 February 1975, pp. 1, 2.
17. Yigal Allon, interview in *Le Soir*, 11-12 May 1975. Reported in *FBIS*, 15 May 1975, p. N-3.
18. *Jerusalem Post*, 23 February 1975, p. 1.
19. Such a discussion was at the heart of the debate in October 1973 over whether or not Israel should accept a Soviet ultimatum for a cease-fire in place. Dayan and others argued that the Soviets were incapable of fielding the threatened seven airborne divisions, in time to save their Arab clients, and that any Soviet forces deployed in time could easily be dealt with by the IDF.
20. Erol Guiney, "The Israel-American Initiative: A Political Maneuver More Than a Step Toward Peace," *Yediot Aharonot*, 24 February 1976, p. 9.
21. Judy Seigal, "Cairo Reserves Plan 'Raises Peace Chances'", *The Jerusalem Post*, 14 January 1976, p. 1.
22. Broadcast over Jerusalem Domestic Service [Radio], 27 December 1975. Reported in *FBIS*, 29 December 1975, p. 5.
23. Israel Government Press Office, Tel-Aviv, 29 October 1975.
24. Judy Siegal, in *The Jerusalem Post*, 13 October 1975, p. 1.

25. Jerusalem Domestic Service, report of 31 October 1975, reported in *FBIS*, 3 November 1975, "Rabin Suggests Further Syrian Violations of Agreement."
26. Jerusalem Domestic Service, 19 August 1975. Speech reported in *FBIS*.
27. Jerusalem Domestic Television Service, 3 June 1975, reported in *FBIS*.
28. 5 September 1975. Speech reported in *FBIS*.
29. *Ibid.*
30. "Peres: Israel Willing to Pledge Nuclear Non-Use," *The Jerusalem Post*, 18 September 1975, p. 1.
31. Interview with Henry Kamm, *The New York Times*, 7 September 1975.
32. 31 July 1975, interview by T. V. panel *Moked*, reported in *FBIS*.
33. Interview in *Ha'arev*, 9 October 1975, p. 2, reported in *FBIS*.
34. *Al Hamishmar*, supplement, 30 May 1975, pp. 4-7, reported in *FBIS*.
35. *Ma'ariv*, 23 June 1975, reported in *FBIS*.
36. *Jerusalem Post*, 23 September 1975, pp. 1,2.
37. Jerusalem Domestic Service [Radio], 20 September 1975, reported in *FBIS*.
38. *The New York Times*, 5 November 1974, p. 3.
39. Government Press Office release of 24 September 1975, reported in *FBIS* - interview with Rabin broadcast over Israeli television, 22 September 1975.
40. Peres interview with *L'Express*, 6 June 1975, pp. 46-47.
41. *Agence France Press*, 6 June 1975, reported in *FBIS*.
42. *Le Monde*, 8-10 June 1975, p. 3, reported in *FBIS*.
43. "Peres PLO Bid Rapped", *Jerusalem Post*, 10 June 1975, p. 2.
44. Special to *New York Times*, 31 October 1975, p. 5.
45. Shimon Peres, "Face the Nation" interview. Broadcast over CBS Television 14 December 1975.

46. *Ibid.*
47. *Davar* in Hebrew, 6 January 1976, p. 3
48. Statement by Harold H. Saunders before the Special Subcommittee on Investigations of the House Committee on International Relations. November 12, 1975.
49. Yigal Allon, interview with *Le Soir*, 11- 12 May 1975, p. 3.
50. *London Times*, 4 November 1975, Europa Supplement, pp. 1, 16.
51. David Landau, "Israel to Boycott U.N. Move on PLO, Ired at American Compromise," *The Jerusalem Post* , 2 December 1975, p. 1. Named for Cabinet Ministers Ahron Yariv (since resigned) and Victor Shemtov, this minority position in the government supports a more flexible approach to negotiations with the PLO, and would seemingly provide the basis for the steps suggested in the "Saunders document". [See Note 48 above]
52. "Mustn't Be Hesitant on Policy, Rabin Says," *The Jerusalem Post*, 10 December 1975, p. 1. See also, "Rabin Tells Allon to Quit or Stop Criticizing," *Jerusalem Post*, 23 December 1975, p. 1.
53. BBC Television Interview, 18 September 1975. Reported in *FBIS*. In the final analysis, Rabin has committed himself to taking the question of Israeli concessions in the West Bank directly to the Israeli people, as in the following statement:

As to the central part, in effect both Golda's government which was formed after the last elections, and the present government have in essence said: We are prepared to negotiate for peace with Jordan; we are prepared to consider a territorial compromise. If a peace agreement with Jordan demands territorial concessions in Judea and Samaria, we must take it to the people to decide in elections.

Interview on Jerusalem Domestic Service, 27 December 1975, reported in *FBIS*.
54. Interview on Vienna Domestic TV Service, 12 August 1975, reported in *FBIS*.
55. See Mark Rabinowitz, "Rabin: Opposed to Third State Between Israel and Jordan," *Jerusalem Post*, 17 September, 1976, pp. 1-2.
56. Interview on *Copenhagen Belingske Tidende*, 20 July 1975, pt. 1, p. 4, reported in *FBIS*.

57. Interview with Brian Arthur. See the *Jerusalem Post*, 27 February 1975, p. 1.
58. *Ma'ariv*, 25 December 1975, p. 2.
59. *Ibid.*
60. David Landau, "Focus on Allon's Palestinian Views". *Jerusalem Post*, 9 December 1975, p. 2.
61. Peres interview on "Face the Nation," *op. cit.*
62. *Ibid.* See also *The Jerusalem Post*, 20 April 1975, p. 1.
63. Shimon Peres, *David's Sling* (New York: Random House, 1970) pp. 139-40.
64. 2 July 1975. Television interview Mainz Television, reported in *FBIS*.
65. Interview on Jerusalem Domestic Television Service, 13 June 1975. Reported in *FBIS*, 16 June 1975.
66. Interview with the author, Jerusalem, January 1976.
67. Interview on Jerusalem Domestic Television Service, 13 June 1975. Reported in *FBIS*, 16 June 1975.
68. *The Jerusalem Post*, 13 July 1975, p. 1.
69. *The Jerusalem Post*, 22 April 1975, p. 1.
70. *Le Figaro*, 28 April 1975, p. 2.
71. *Yedi'ot Aharonot* (Weekend Supplement) 6 June 1975, pp. 1,2, 14.
72. Jerusalem Domestic Service, 15 January 1976, reported in *FBIS*, 16 January 1976.
73. Shimon Peres, *David's Sling*, *op. cit.*
74. "Peres Convinced U.S. Reassessment is 'Passing Crisis'," *The Jerusalem Post*, 13 April 1975, p. 1.
75. Shimon Peres, "War and Peace in the Middle East", *New York Times*, 9 January 1975, p. 35.
76. Jerusalem Domestic Service, reported 25 March 1975.
77. "Israel's Manpower Too Limited to Yield Sinai Passes: Peres", *The Jerusalem Post*, 20 June 1975, p. 1.

78. Peres expressed similar concerns in several interviews with the author, Tel-Aviv, January 1976.
79. "Israel's Manpower Too Limited to Yield Sinai Passes: Peres," *The Jerusalem Post*, 20 June 1975, p. 1.
80. "Face the Nation" interview, *op. cit.*
81. See note 78.
82. See Wagner (1975:1) *op. cit.* for an analysis of how this peripheral leadership impacts on the making of Israeli defense policy.
83. "Voices Across the Fence," *Newsweek*, 3 March 1975, p. 35.
84. Jerusalem Domestic Television Service, 6 January 1976, reported in *FBIS*, 8 January 1976.
85. Ya'acov Friedler, "Dayan: Arab's Won't Start War Soon", *The Jerusalem Post*, 19 January 1975, p. 3.
86. "Dayan Sees U.S. putting Squeeze On", *The Jerusalem Post*, 24 April 1975, p. 1.
87. Jerusalem Domestic Service, 5 December 1975, reported in *FBIS*, 8 December 1975.
88. "Rabin Wins Cautious Support of Dayan, Eban", *The Jerusalem Post* 28 December 1975, pp. 1-2.
89. Ya'acov Friedler, "Dayan: Peace Chances Better than Ever", *The Jerusalem Post*, 28 February 1976, p. 2.
90. *Ibid.*
91. Sraya Shapiro, "Dayan Warns: Must Maintain Arms Ratio," *The Jerusalem Post*, 2 February 1976, p. 1.
92. Wolf I. Blitzer, "Dayan: I'm Not Out Yet, But Wouldn't Join Rabin Government," *The Jerusalem Post*, 27 January 1975, p. 2.
93. Jerusalem Domestic Television Service, 6 January 1976, reported in *FBIS*, 8 January 1976.
94. Terence Smith, "The Debate Has Become a Fracas", *New York Times*, 8 March 1973, p. 8.
95. Ya'acov Friedler, "Dayan: Arabs Won't Start War Soon", *op. cit.*

96. "Dayan Urges Clear Policy Statement on Future Borders," *The Jerusalem Post*, 19 January 1975, p. 3.
97. Jerusalem Domestic Television Service, 6 January 1976, reported in *FBIS*, 8 January 1976.
98. "Dayan: No War in Next Two Months", *The Jerusalem Post*, 10 February 1975.
99. *Ma'ariv*, 9 May 1975, pp. 22, 28, reported in *FBIS*, 12 May 1975.
100. Jerusalem Domestic Service, 2 May 1975, reported in *FBIS* 5 May 1975.
101. "Eban Wants Return to Geneva Conference," *The Jerusalem Post*, 3 February 1975, p. 4.
102. Jack Maurice, "Eban: Palestinian State Alongside Israel," *The Jerusalem Post*, 17 March 1975, p. 1.
103. Ernie Meyer, "Eban Calls on Academics for Ideas on Peace," *The Jerusalem Post*, 19 May 1975, p. 2.
104. David Landau, "Eban Sees Rabin: May Return to Cabinet," *The Jerusalem Post*, 28 December 1975, p. 1-2. See also, "Rabin Wins Cautious Support of Dayan, Eban", *The Jerusalem Post*, 28 December 1975, pp. 1-2.
105. *Ibid.*
106. Jerusalem Domestic Television Service, 9 January 1976, reported in *FBIS*.
107. David Landau, "Eban Sees Rabin: May Return to Cabinet", *op. cit.*
108. Menahem Begin, "Security and Peace in Eretz Yisrael", *The Jerusalem Post*, 4 February 1975.
109. Tel-Aviv, IDF Radio, 15 May 1975, reported in *FBIS*, 20 May 1975.
110. "Meet the Press" interview, 6 April 1975.
111. Henry Kamm, "Menahem Begin Opposes a Withdrawal from the West Bank," *The New York Times*, 4 March 1975, p. 4.
112. Menahem Begin, "Soviets Look to Arafat for a Base", *The Jerusalem Post*, 4 January 1975, p. 8.

113. There are some indications that Begin would be more flexible and accomodation oriented in such a leadership position. This was the impression given in interviews with the author, Tel-Aviv and Jerusalem, January 1976.
114. See Amos Pearlmuter, "The Israel Army in Politics: The Persistence of the Civilian over the Military," *World Politics*, XX, 4 (July 1968), pp. 606-643.
115. Directed by Sa'adia Amiel and Gen. Avraham ("Abrashar") Tamir, such efforts are still in their early stages.
116. Interviews with the author, various dates. See also Anthony H. Cordesman, *Interviews with the Israeli Generals* (U) OASD(I) 1975 (SECRET/NFD).
117. See C. Northcote Parkinson, *Parkinson's Law and Other Essays in Administration* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co. 1957). It is interesting to note that Parkinson's original (and true) analysis was based on administration of the British Navy, and that the British model was in large measure the one adopted by the Israelis. See also, "Defense Ministry Reorganization Effective 1 December", *Ha'aretz*, 20 November 1975, p. 1.
118. Interviews with the author, Tel-Aviv, December 1975 - January 1976.
119. "Tal: Defence, Treasury See Almost Eye-to-Eye", *The Jerusalem Post*, 23 December 1975, p. 2.
120. Interview with the author, Tel-Aviv, January 1976. Discussing his own resignation, Ne'eman wrote:
Israel is giving geographic, military and economic assets to Egypt, and in return for this Egypt is giving a wider foothold for American influence in the region and is continuing to keep the Russians shelved. What is good for the United States (which thereby strengthens the Iran-Saudi Arabia-Egypt axis as a guarantee for a continuous flow of oil into Europe and America), is also good for Israel.

Yuval Ne'eman, "Why I Resigned from the Defense Ministry," *Ha'aretz*, 6 February 1976.
121. The private views of a number of IDF military leaders were reported in Anthony H. Cordesman, *op. cit.*
122. "Gur Predicts Quick Victory in Event of War", *Yedi'ot Aharonot* [in Hebrew] 21 January 1976, p. 2.

123. "Chief of Staff Discusses IDF Preparedness, Lebanon" *Ma'ariv*, in Hebrew, 31 October 1975, pp. 22.

PART THREE:

TRENDS IN ISRAELI PUBLIC OPINION

3.1 INTRODUCTION

Politics, Policy and the Public

Of all the Middle Eastern states, Israel is perhaps the most democratic and the least efficient in terms of its policy-making process. In many respects Israeli politics and the policy-making process reflect the worst case of the old maxim about the inefficiency of democratic governments.¹

Decision-making with respect to foreign affairs and security matters has been in a state of evolution ever since Israel's first Prime Minister, David Ben-Gurion, resigned in 1965.² Under Prime Minister Levi Eshkol, Israel's Ministerial Committee on Security and Defense (MCSD) evolved as the primary decision-making body in the area of national security policy, with actual decisions being ratified by majority vote in the full Cabinet. Composed of a sub-set of the full Cabinet, the MCSD served as a genuine decision-making mechanism, with Eshkol taking the role of "first among equals" rather than as an executive to be advised by the MCSD.

Prior to the 1967 Six Day War the MCSD had a generally broad base and enjoyed the support of a clear majority of the electorate and the nation's political parties. When the events of May 1967 caused many in the public and several political factions to lose confidence in Eshkol and the MCSD, Eshkol was forced to expand both his Government, the Cabinet, and the MCSD to include both the opposition (*Gahal*, now *Likud*) and other figures in whom the public had confidence, such as General Moshe Dayan.³

By virtually all accounts, it was the combination of public pressure on the Government, along with the threat of minor parties, such as the National Religious Party (NRP), to withdraw from the coalition which brought about Israel's decision to launch the 1967 Six Day War. Between 1969 and 1970 the enlarged MCSD was multi-partisan and had the support of the national "unity government". In the words of opposition member and then Minister Without Portfolio Menachem Begin:

. . . (the MCSD) actually made decisions. Every member could express opinions and they were taken seriously. If he desired, each member could bring his motion to a vote in the full Cabinet. As it happens, I voted with the majority more often than (Foreign Minister Abba) Eban did.⁴

The accession of Golda Meir as Prime Minister in 1969, on Eshkol's death, brought major changes to the Prime Minister's Office; the conduct of foreign and security policy; and in the decision-making process itself. Mrs. Meir took a more personal and decisive role in actual policy-making than Eshkol had, essentially eliminating the fundamental role of the MCSD. With the departure of the opposition *Gahal* (*Likud*) from the government in 1970, decision-making was limited to Mrs. Meir and a few of her closest colleagues and staff. Termed the "Kitchen Cabinet" this informal group enjoyed general party and public support prior to the outbreak of war on 6 October 1973.⁵

Viewed as a disaster, or failing in Israel, the surprise of the Arab attack and initial Israeli setbacks greatly diminished Mrs. Meir's ability to utilize this group as the principal decision-making body.⁶ In the months following the Sinai I accord, Mrs. Meir, along with Defense Minister Dayan, CoS Gen. Elazar, and Israel Galili, came under

increasing criticism from the opposition bloc, *Likud*, minor parties within the coalition, such as the NRP, and the public at large over the pre-war decisions and the conduct of the war.

In response to mounting charges from the public and political circles, the Agranat Commission (headed by Israel's Chief Justice Shlomo Agranat) was empaneled to conduct an official investigation of Government actions prior to and during the October War.⁷ Publication of the Commission's findings in April 1974, along with Gen. Elazar's subsequent resignation and countercharges brought yet further public pressure on the Meir Government. Where the 1973 *Knesset* elections had failed to provide the sought after leadership changes the public sought, public reaction to the Commission's findings appeared to have this effect. Under this pressure, the *Ma'arach* leadership chose Yitzhak Rabin by a narrow margin over Shimon Peres to form a new government as Prime Minister, with Peres assuming the critical Defense Minister's post.

The 1973 Election Results

In passing it is important to note that although many of the questions raised by the 1973 war appeared as election issues, the results were only a limited demonstration of public sentiment, largely owing to the Israeli electoral system. Since 1948 the Israel Labor Party (*Mapai*) and later the Labor Alignment (*Ma'arach*) have led every government and coalition, while the distribution of *Knesset* seats among the parties has remained remarkably stable. Indeed, both the Labor and opposition (*Herut*, *Gahal*, *Likud*) leadership have remained in the same hands over the years.⁸

Despite the enormous impact of the 1973 war and its aftermath, the party lists presented to the Israeli electorate in December 1973 offered the same leadership, in virtually all parties, to the voters.⁹ Exceptions to this being the addition of Gen. Ariel ("Arik") Sharon to the *Likud* list, and Yitzhak Rabin to the *Ma'arach*. While pre-election polls showed general dissatisfaction with Mrs. Meir, few viewed the opposition *Likud*, under its perennial leader, Menachem Begin as a viable alternative.

The election results do, however, show several significant electoral shifts:

(1) The Alignment (*Ma'arach*) lost 6 of the 57 seats it held in the Seventh Knesset, in what was seen as a vote of confidence in Mrs. Meir's leadership. This loss was viewed in Israel, by both the Alignment and *Likud*, as a loss for Mrs. Meir. A better indication of this loss, in absolute terms, was her inability to form a majority government following the elections. When a government was finally formed, it was a minority government which collapsed following the interim report of the Agranat Commission.

(2) The opposition *Likud* gained 8 seats for a total of 39, in an unprecedented show of strength. Veteran observers feel that if Begin had not headed the *Likud* list, this total would have been substantially higher. The inclusion of Gen. Sharon on the *Likud* list and the strong public support the *Likud* received in voting among the IDF indicate an increasing pattern of support, and tends to undermine the prevailing general notion that the Alignment will always dominate Israeli politics.

(3) The religious parties suffered a loss of 2 seats to 15, and were unable to force Mrs. Meir to meet their minimal demands for inclusion in the government, demonstrating a decline in the electoral strength of the NRP.

(4) General public dissatisfaction with the established leadership, of both major blocs, was witnessed in the increased support for minor parties. In particular, a new Civil Rights Party, offering "new" leadership, gained an unexpected 3 seats.

Indicative of the impact of the 1973 war on the Israeli public and the failure of the subsequent elections to provide meaningful leadership changes were the events surrounding the formation of the 1974 Meir Government. Most notably, Mrs. Meir and her colleagues were unable to form a coalition for some six weeks following the elections, at a time when critical negotiations with the Arab states were under way.¹⁰

A key obstacle to the formation of a viable coalition was the demands of the National Religious Party (NRP) that: (a) the Government be a broad coalition or unity government ("*likud leumi*") including the opposition *Likud* bloc, and; (b) the Government agree to a revision of Israel's Law of the Return. In actuality the NRP leadership was willing to concede one of the two issues as its price for joining the Government, but not both issues as Mrs. Meir insisted.

Despite urging by her close associates, Mrs. Meir refused to concede either of these two issues to the NRP, and for the first time since 1948 the NRP did not join in the new Government. Leaving aside the second

demand, it was the feeling of the influential NRP that the needs of the nation could only be met by a unity government, representing a clear majority of the Israeli electorate, in lieu of totally new leadership which the 1973 elections did not provide.¹¹

By mid-February 1974, Defense Minister Moshe Dayan and his colleagues in *Rafi*, most notably Shimon Peres, adopted a similar position, with Dayan and Peres refusing to serve in a new Meir Government that did not include the opposition *Likud* as well. This action served notice that Dayan sought a broader power base in the Israeli public, and that *Rafi* should again be considered as an independent political entity.

It was only in light of a new crisis on the Syrian front that Dayan and Peres agreed to join the Government. By 20 February 1974, Mrs. Meir was finally able to present a minority government, holding 58 of the 120 Knesset seats, a weak government at best, in a situation that demanded strong leadership.

Despite this supposed formation of a coalition, the Alignment continued under strong internal and public pressure. Bitter disputes between the Party's younger "doves" and the older "hawk" factions prevented any unified stand on foreign affairs or security matters, or support for the established Party leadership. Demands for the resignation of Dayan, Mrs. Meir, and their associates continued unabated from a substantial number in the Party's ruling Central Committee. Added to this were a series of public protests, rare in Israel, against Dayan and secondarily Mrs. Meir.

Finally, fed up with the Party's incessant infighting, as well as

attacks from the public and the press, Mrs. Meir informed the Party that she would not head the next government.¹² Prevailed upon by her close associates, the Premier reversed her stand and agreed to form a government on 6 March 1974, after Dayan and Peres had reversed their own refusal to join in a minority government. The 1974 Meir Government was confirmed by a 62 - 46 Knesset vote on 10 March 1974.¹³

Public sentiment against the Meir - Dayan leadership intensified after the formation of this "new" government. A wave of major new criticism erupted with the charges and issue of the interim report of the Agranat Commission (2 April 1974), and the subsequent resignations of Generals Elazar, Zeira, and others.¹⁴ Although cleared of direct responsibility by the Commission for any errors with regard to the October War, and praised for their actions, Mrs. Meir and her close associates came under fire from many in the press and public, as well as significant numbers in the Alignment who did not agree with the Commission's findings. Adding fuel to this fire were Elazar's own letter of resignation, denying the charges made against him, and the publication of additional reports and documents in the Israeli press.¹⁵

Mrs. Meir's response to this wave of criticism was to largely ignore it. Despite the war, its aftermath, and the enormous impact on the public, the Alignment had offered the same party list as before; barely formed a minority government; and took the attitude that "we're the only government you have."

By 9 April 1974, public demands for Dayan's resignation intensified still further, particularly within the Alignment's Central Committee, with

a majority in Mapai seeking his ouster. A large element called for the resignation of the entire government.¹⁶ Unable to control her own party, Mrs. Meir realized a superficial cabinet shuffle would only prolong the crisis. When Dayan refused to resign in the face of growing party demands, Mrs. Meir and her government resigned on 10 April 1974.

Emergence of the Rabin Government

Following the resignation of the Meir Government, a series of events brought marked, but short lived, changes in Israeli morale, attitude and leadership. First, Palestinian terrorist attacks, particularly the massacre at Qiryat Shemona, had a galvanizing effect on public demands. It became clear to the Israeli public and leadership alike that decisive action, be it military, political or both, was required to stem these attacks. A continuation of the status quo had become unacceptable to the public, the press, and the broad leadership of the Alignment.

Second, Gen. Mordechai Gur, a popular figure untainted by the October War, was appointed Chief of Staff filling the vacancy left by Elazar's resignation. Gur had been in Washington prior to and during the War, and was therefore unassociated with the decision-making during the War and the scandal surrounding the IDF leadership. A man with a strong background and reputation, Gur was acceptable to virtually all political elements.

Third was a majority feeling among the Alignment that new leadership should be sought within the Party, and new elections avoided for the time being. Specifically, this element sought the removal of Ministers Dayan,

Galili, Bar-Lev, Allon, and Eban, members of what was seen as the established leadership.

Prospects for new leadership centered around Yitzhak Rabin, who had been recently an "outsider" to the Party; Shimon Peres, a popular compromise candidate; and two "dark horses", namely Joseph Almogi and Chaim Zadok. Most importantly, the dovish Rabin received the support of the late Pinhas Sapir, then Israel's powerful Finance Minister and himself a dove, against Peres. Despite efforts by the *Likud* to discredit Rabin, and internal dissension by various Alignment elements, Rabin was selected to form a new government.¹⁷

Public pressure was also focused on the *Likud* to replace its perennial leader, Menachem Begin. While the *Herut* faction of *Likud* is still dominated by Begin and Chaim Landau, there are signs of new leadership appearing, such as Sharon, Gen. Ezer Weitzman and others.

Despite the claim of new leadership in the Alignment under Rabin and the widely heralded passing of control to the generation of "sabras", both the Alignment Central Committee and the Cabinet retained sufficient numbers of the old guard, and policies of the old guard, to remain far from solving the problems raised by the War, and the demands of the Israeli electorate.¹⁸

After almost two years in office, the Rabin Government has yet to provide either the leadership sought by the Israeli electorate or a policy satisfactory to a majority of the population. The nation's press has both criticized Rabin and called for new elections. In part, this leadership failure is related to Rabin's own personal inability to

lead his Labor Party, and in part the public's perception of Rabin's ineffectiveness in dealing with "pressure" from the United States externally, and Israel's economic problems internally.

As Rabin's position within the Government and within the party continues to weaken, his ability to direct policy necessarily decreases, making him far more subject to pressures from the public as well as the party leadership.¹⁹ Clearly aware of this pressure, Rabin has bowed to the formation of a "leadership forum" within the party, led by Mrs. Meir and her aged associates, to pass on policy and select the party's next candidate for Prime Minister.

Until new elections give Rabin, or another candidate, a clear mandate to make vital policy decisions, the government will be increasingly constrained by the dictates of public opinion on vital security and defense issues. Considered in sections 3.2 and 3.3 are the public attitudes on several of the more critical issues areas in addition to the public perceptions of U.S. security policy. Section 3.4 concludes with some conclusions for U.S. defense policy options in this environment.

3.2 AREAS OF STRATEGIC CONCERN

As indicated previously, there are several key policy areas where Israeli public opinion and perceptions of United States policy play a central role in the decision-making process. For the political considerations already enumerated, the political leadership is sensitive to public views on these issues. Considered in this section are several of these policy areas, along with some recent results taken from Israeli survey data. Particularly important in these findings are the trends that appear to be emerging, and the constraints which they place on the Rabin Government or its successor in its efforts to achieve a settlement with the Arab states, and in its relations with the United States and other nations of the world.

The Egyptian Front

Following the successful conclusion of the second stage interim agreement between Israel and Egypt in September 1975 (Sinai II), the Israeli public generally viewed the agreement as advancing a final settlement with Egypt, but a substantial segment retained a healthy skepticism that Egypt would honor the accord fully, or that a final peace treaty with Egypt could be signed. Similar skepticism prevailed among the Israeli public on the durability of the "special" U.S. - Israel relationship. Agreeing that the U.S. had played a beneficial role in the agreement, the Israeli public disagreed among itself that the U.S. could be trusted to protect Israel's interests in future negotiations.

In response to a question about whether or not the Sinai II agreement would increase the probability of a final peace settlement with Egypt, forty percent of the population surveyed in the early fall of 1975 felt the agreement would advance the final peace accord, while another third felt it would not (as shown in Table 3.1). By October 1975 more than one-half of the survey population (56 percent) approved the Government's signing of the Sinai II agreement even though many had expressed intense opposition to the accord as it was debated in *Knesset*.

Despite this approval, survey data from 1974 through 1976 illustrate an erosion in Israeli public confidence that a final peace treaty with Egypt will be achieved, though substantial portions of the public during this time period have never felt a final peace treaty would be signed, as shown in Table 3.2.

While the Israeli public, in general, approved the signing, only a third of the population felt that Egypt would fulfill its commitments under the accord (Table 3.3). This popular distrust has persisted even though several indications of increased moderation in official Egyptian policy have occurred, such as the closing of "Voice of Palestine" radio station in Cairo, public announcement by Egyptian President Sadat that the state of Israel was an established fact, and decreased hostility in Egyptian media announcements. A long history of Egyptian-Israeli hostilities combined with Israeli fears over Sadat's longevity as President and the influence of other Arab states with stronger anti-Israel views may account for this continued public pessimism. Widespread anxiety about Sadat's visit to the United States,

TABLE 3.1

INTERIM AGREEMENT WITH EGYPT

"Would or wouldn't an interim agreement with Egypt advance the final peace settlement?"

	<u>August-September 1975</u> (1188)
Would	42%
Maybe	20
Would not	31
Don't know	<u>7</u>
	100%

TABLE 3.2

CHANCES OF A FINAL PEACE TREATY WITH EGYPT

"What are the chances, in your opinion, for a final peace treaty with Egypt?" (August-September 1975)

"How do you now see the chances of a peace treaty with Egypt?" (November 1974)

"What are the chances, in your opinion, for a final peace treaty with Egypt?" (June 1974)

	<u>August-September 1975</u> (1188)	<u>November 1974</u> (1260)	<u>June 1974</u> (1193)
Good	12%	15%	29%
Only fair	18)	34	41
Little	28) "So-So"		
None	35	41	22
Don't know	<u>8</u>	<u>10</u>	<u>8</u>
	101%	100%	100%

Source: *Public Opinion Research of Israel (PORI)*

TABLE 3.3

EGYPT'S FULFILLMENT OF THE INTERIM AGREEMENT

"Do you believe that Egypt will keep the cease-fire through the three years of the interim agreement, or that another war with Egypt will take place?" (December 1975)

"Do you or don't you believe that Egypt will fully carry out the interim agreement?" (October 1975)

"Do you believe that the armistice with Egypt will be kept or that a new war with Egypt will break out in the near future?" (May 1974)

	<u>December 1975</u> (1206)	<u>October 1975</u> (1198)	<u>May 1974</u> (1181)
Yes, believe	36%	31%	34%
Depends (Vol.)	6	6	-
No, new war	44	43	41
Don't know	<u>15</u>	<u>19</u>	<u>25</u>
	101%	99%	100%

TABLE 3.4

AMERICAN PRESENCE IN THE SINAI BUFFER ZONE

"Are you for or against an American presence at the early warning stations in the Sinai buffer zone?"

	<u>August-September 1975</u> (1188)
For	57%
Depends (Vol.)	2
Against	29
Don't know	<u>12</u>
	100%

Source: *Public Opinion Research of Israel (PORI)*

the first by an Egyptian President at which U.S. arms sales to Egypt was a topic of discussion, appears to have deepened this pessimism and aroused considerable Israeli concern over the future of an American - Egyptian arms supply relationship.

What is perceived as advancing at least the probability of a settlement, and stabilizing the Israeli - Egyptian force balance, is the American presence in the Sinai buffer zone at the early warning stations. As indicated in Table 3.4, this presence has been endorsed by a clear majority of the Israeli population.

The Syrian Front

Even following the successful conclusion of the second stage interim agreement with Egypt (Sinai II), few in the Israeli population held out much hope for reaching any new interim accord with Syria, or concluding a final peace treaty in this area. This public assessment of the realities of the strategic balance on the Syrian front are particularly significant in light of the rather substantial segment of the Israeli population willing to have the government sign such an agreement (47 percent) and exchange further territory in the Golan Heights to reach a peace settlement (34 percent).

The Israeli public generally has not expressed much confidence that further interim agreements similar to those reached with Egypt could be achieved with Syria. Here the geopolitical constraints are far more restricting in the Golan Heights than in the Sinai, and the public and leadership perception of Syria's willingness to negotiate and make concessions is far more limited than with respect to Egypt. As indicated in Table 3.5, only five percent of the Israeli public viewed the prospects

of a further Israeli - Syrian interim accord as very good.

This same enduring pessimism exists regarding the prospects of a final peace treaty with Syria (Table 3.6).

Despite these widespread negative assessments, Israeli public opinion is divided on whether or not to continue diplomatic efforts needed to reach further interim disengagement agreements, including the removal of Israeli settlements and the exchange of territory on the Golan Heights. The prospect of signing new agreements with Syria split Israeli public opinion in half (47 percent in favor and 46 percent opposed), and a significant third of the public identified themselves as willing to give up territory on the Golan Heights in exchange for peace (Table 3.7).

Here it might be of some comfort to note that prior to the second stage interim agreement with Egypt, only 47 percent of the population supported further concessions in the Sinai, even in exchange for an Egyptian non-belligerence agreement. In general, the Israelis consider the Golan Heights as far more crucial to the strategic balance than the returned Sinai territory and are concerned that American pressure regarding territorial concessions may be substantial.

The net result of this has been an increasing expectation on the part of the Israeli public that yet another war with the Arab states is inevitable. As indicated in Table 3.8, approximately three-fourths of the population believed such a war would come in the near future, by February 1975, and there is reason to believe that this figure has not decreased since then.

One indication that this feeling comes from a public perception of an emerging strategic imbalance can be found in the relatively

TABLE 3.5

CHANCES FOR A NEW ACCORD WITH SYRIA

"Regardless of whether you favor or oppose it, what do you think are the chances for reaching a new agreement with Syria on the Golan Heights in the next six months or so--very good, good, only fair, or poor?"

	October 1975 (1198)
Very Good	1%)
Good	4) 5%
Only fair	27
Poor	37) 60%
None at all (Vol.)	23)
Don't know	9
	<u>101%</u>

"Do you or don't you believe that it is possible to come to an agreement with Syria similar to the agreement reached with Egypt?"

	May 1974 (1181)	March 1974 (1399)
Possible	24%	27%
Some Possibility (Vol.)	23	20
Not possible	48	49
Don't know	5	5
	<u>100%</u>	<u>101%</u>

TABLE 3.6

CHANCES OF A FINAL PEACE TREATY WITH SYRIA

"What are the chances, in your opinion, for a final peace treaty with Syria?"

	August-September 1975 (1188)	June 1974 (1193)
Good	2%	4%
Only fair	5)	"So-So" 22
Little	16)	
None	69	65
Don't know	8	9
	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>

Source: Public Opinion Research of Israel (PORI)

TABLE 3.7

OPINION ON A NEW GOLAN INTERIM ACCORD

"In general, do you favor or oppose our government's signing a new interim disengagement agreement with Syria on the Golan Heights?"

	<u>October 1975</u> (1198)
Favor	33%)
More or less favor, no other choice (Vol.)	14) 47%
Oppose	46
Don't know	7
	<u>100%</u>

"Are you for or against giving up more territory in the Golan Heights in exchange for a peace treaty with Syria?"

	<u>April 1975</u> (1206)
For	20%)
Somewhat in favor (Vol.)	14) 34%
Against	63
Don't know	3
	<u>100%</u>

TABLE 3.8

EXPECTATION OF WAR WITH THE ARAB STATES

"As the situation stands now, do you or don't you believe that another war between us and the Arab states will break out in the near future?"

	<u>February 1975</u> (1226)	<u>November 1974</u> (1260)	<u>September 1974</u> (1180)
Yes	71%	63%	55%
Depends, maybe (Vol.)	7	8	14
No	10	17	20
Don't know	12	12	12
	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>101%</u>

Source: *Public Opinion Research of Israel (PORI)*

high percentage of the Israeli population willing to admit the possibility that the Arab states would or might win the next war (25 percent) (Table 3.9). The critical role of the United States in such a war, in maintaining the military balance, is further considered below.

The West Bank and the PLO

Central to the security situation and the peaceful resolution of the Middle East conflict is a resolution of the Palestinian question. As indicated previously, there continues to be widespread debate over this issue in the Israeli leadership, prompted by such recent events as the U.N. vote to allow PLO representation in the Security Council debate, and the recent strife in Lebanon. Unlike the Israeli political leadership, which continues to take a hard line on the Palestinian issue, a substantial segment of the population recognizes the right of the Palestinians to a "state of their own", either unequivocally (43 percent) or on a qualified basis (11 percent) (Table 3.10)

The acceptance of such an independent Palestinian state in principle, however, by this segment of the population does not carry over in full force to the concept of establishing such a state in the West Bank and Gaza Strip territories. Here a clear majority of the public (59 percent) flatly opposes such a move, even if the PLO were to cease hostilities against Israel and recognize Israel's right to exist (Table 3.11). At the same time, it appears that this opposition, which seems to have peaked in June 1974 (at 71 percent) is now on the decline. It is possible that future actions of the PLO, should they be responsible, will serve to influence both the Israeli public attitudes as well as the leadership in a more favorable direction.

TABLE 3.9

CONFIDENCE IN ISRAEL'S SURVIVAL

"If no peace is reached with the Arab states in the coming years, is it possible that the Arab states will become so strong that they could defeat Israel?"

	<u>February 1975</u>	
	<u>(1226)</u>	
Arabs would (will) win	12%)	25%
Arabs might win	13)	
Arabs won't win	67	
Don't know	8	
	<u>100%</u>	

TABLE 3.10

A PALESTINIAN STATE--IN PRINCIPLE

"In principle, are or aren't the Palestinians entitled to a state of their own?"

	<u>December 1975</u>	
	<u>(1206)</u>	
Are	43%	
Depends (Vol.)	11	
Are not	38	
Don't know	9	
	<u>101%</u>	

Source: *Public Opinion Research of Israel (PORI)*

TABLE 3.11

A PALESTINIAN STATE--ON THE WEST BANK

"Are you for or against an independent Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, if they recognize Israel and stop all hostilities?"

	<u>December 1975</u> (1206)
For	30%
Depends (Vol.)	5
Against	59
Don't know	6
	<u>100%</u>

"Are you for or against constructing a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza Strip as a solution to the Palestinian problem within the framework of a peace settlement?"

	<u>June 1974</u> (1193)	<u>March 1974</u> (1399)
For	14%	19%
Only in part of the areas (Vol.)	7	11
Against	71	60
Don't know	8	10
	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>

TABLE 3.12

ESSENTIALITY OF THE WEST BANK

"Do you believe that holding the West Bank -- Judea and Samaria -- is vital for Israel's security?" (November 1974)

"Do you think that holding the West Bank of the Jordan is vital for Israel's security?" (January 1974)

	<u>November 1974</u> (1260)	<u>January 1974</u> (1201)
Yes, all of West Bank	73%)	55%)
Yes, part of West Bank	10) 83%	24) 79%
No	11	11
Don't know	6	9
	<u>100%</u>	<u>99%</u>

Source: *Public Opinion Research of Israel (PORI)*

As demonstrated in Table 3.12, there is almost universal agreement in Israel that Israeli security is vitally linked to retention of at least part of the West Bank and Gaza Strip territories, and it is doubtful that any actions of the Palestinians could substantially reduce this figure. Clearly the return of these territories will continue to be a major stumbling block in the search for an overall peace settlement in the region.

3.3 AMERICAN SECURITY POLICY AND ISRAEL

Relations with the United States

As was the case with the Israeli leadership, the Israeli public views the United States as the central figure in maintaining the strategic balance in the Middle East, and the basic security of Israel. Here the Israeli view of United States policy orientation (Table 3.13) demonstrates that the vast majority of the population still believes the U.S. to be either pro-Israel (36%) or at least even-handed in the region (42%). The reason for such support, as suggested in Table 3.14, stems from a widespread belief in a community of American and Israeli interests.

What should give rise to some caution, however, is the apparently declining trend in this perception. In some part this decline can be traced to American efforts to mediate the Middle East conflict following the 1973 war, and the reaction of the Israeli population to the breakdown of the March 1975 Kissinger mission, probably reflected in the April 1975 survey statistics. Equally important may be continued Israeli apprehensions that may have been aroused by improvements in U.S.-Arab relations. Publicized discussions about U.S. sales of military hardware to Arab nations, partially to confrontation states such as Egypt, the increased importance of Arab energy reserves, Arab purchases of Western defense technology and recent anti-Israel actions in the U.N., have all served to increase Israeli apprehensions about their continued commonality of interest with the U.S. and the durability of a strong pro-Israeli

sentiment among the American public.

In addition, while the U.S. may be a staunch defender of Israel's existence, its evaluation of the strategic importance of specific territories will be less than Israeli evaluations, hence undermining to some degree Israeli perceptions of common interests.

Such concerns are reflected in the decreasing level of satisfaction with American officials, such as Secretary of State Kissinger. This level has decreased markedly for Secretary Kissinger since mid-1974 (Table 3.15). President Ford has experienced a similar decline in Israeli approval. The Israeli public increasingly has been dissatisfied with Ford's attitude toward Israel; a high of 44 percent satisfaction in September, 1974 to a low of 16 percent satisfaction in December 1975.

Behind much of this skepticism over United States policy and the commitment to Israel appears to be some question on the part of many Israelis that the U.S. and the Soviet Union could come to an agreement at Israel's expense. Statements by Kissinger on the need to maintain momentum on the U.S. - U.S.S.R. detente, the recent firing of Defense Secretary Schlesinger over supposed disagreements of relative strengths and ultimate goals, and expressions of doubt in the American press regarding President Ford's strengths as negotiator and world leader, have buttressed fears regarding a possible U.S. - U.S.S.R. agreement on the Middle East which might compromise Israeli security. As Table 3.16 demonstrates, a majority of the population feels that such a deal is likely, and that this attitude has been fairly consistent over time.

TABLE 3.13

UNITED STATES MIDDLE EAST POLICY ORIENTATION

"Do you think that the current United States policy in the Middle East mainly supports Israel, mainly supports the Arab states, or is more or less even-handed in its support?"

	<u>July 1975</u> (1205)	<u>April 1975</u> (1206)
Mainly Israel	18%	37%
Mainly Arab states	19	10
Even-handed	23	42
Neither, self-interested (Vol.)	29	2
Don't know	<u>11</u> 100%	<u>10</u> 101%

TABLE 3.14

COMMONALITY OF BASIC SECURITY INTERESTS

"In your opinion, are the basic interests of our country [Israel] and those of the United States very much in agreement, fairly well in agreement, rather different, or very different?"

	<u>April 1975</u> (1206)	<u>January 1974</u> (1133)	<u>March 1972</u> (1004)
Very much in agreement	19%) 59%	38%) 70%	21%) 79%
Fairly well in agreement	40)	42)	58)
Rather different	22) 31%	7) 10%	11) 13%
Very different	9)	3)	2)
Don't know	<u>10</u> 100%	<u>10</u> 100%	<u>7</u> 99%

Source; *Public Opinion Research of Israel (PORI)*

TABLE 3.15

SATISFACTION WITH SECRETARY KISSINGER

	Dec. 1975 (1206)	July 1975 (1205)	May-June 1975 (1218)	Feb. 1975 (1226)	Dec. 1974- Jan. 1975 (1213)	Nov. 1974 (1260)	Sept. 1974 (1180)	Aug. 1974 (1205)	June 1974 (1193)
Satisfied	9%	13%	13%	30%	25%	24%	30%	48%	64%
More or less satisfied (Vol.)	21	16	16	24	25	29	23	24	21
Not satisfied	64	62	63	34	40	38	40	18	13
Don't know	6	10	8	12	9	10	6	9	3
	100%	101%	100%	100%	99%	101%	99%	99%	101%

Source: Public Opinion Research of Israel (PORI)

TABLE 3.16

SUPERPOWER AGREEMENT AND INFLUENCE IN THE MIDDLE EAST

"Is it likely or unlikely that the United States will come to an agreement with the Soviet Union at Israel's expense?"

Survey Date	Likely	Maybe Likely (Volunteered)	Sub- Total	Not likely	Don't know	TOTAL
1969: November ^a	35%	19%	(54%)	29%	17%	100%
1971: January ^a	27	19	(46)	41	13	100
March ^a	28	22	(50)	38	12	100
November ^a	32	18	(50)	36	15	101
1972: May ^b	15	17	(32)	50	18	100
November	25	31	(56)	37	7	100
1973: April	18	26	(40)	42	14	100
May ^c	20	23	(43)	43	13	99
November	38	25	(63)	26	10	99
1974: March	36	23	(59)	34	7	100
September	27	28	(55)	37	9	101
1975: May-June	28	23	(51)	37	12	100

"Which of the two superpowers do you think will have more influence in shaping events in the Middle East during the next several years -- the United States or the USSR, or do you think they will have about equal influence on events in the Middle East?"

October 1975
(1198)

United States	45%
USSR	7
About equal influence	38
Neither (Vol.)	2
Don't know	9
	101%

^aQuestion wording: "Do you think it is possible or impossible that the U.S. will come to an agreement with Russia at Israel's expense?"

^bQuestion wording: "Do you think that President Nixon could, in the coming visit to Moscow, come to an agreement with Russia at Israel's expense?"

^cQuestion wording: "Is it likely or unlikely that President Nixon will come to an agreement with Russia's leader Brezhnev at Israel's expense at their meeting in Washington?"

Source: Public Opinion Research of Israel (PORI)

The Israeli public, by and large, believes the U.S. will continue to play an important role in Middle Eastern events, thus heightening concern with perceived, whether real or imaginary, lessening of U.S. support for Israel or U.S. strength as a world leader vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. Table 3.17 demonstrates the level of Israeli public confidence in the U.S.'s ability to deal wisely with world problems. The current competition for the U.S. Presidency and Congressional offices will, no doubt, serve to increase their current apprehensions.

Despite the fact that the Israeli public believes the U.S. will continue to play a role in the Middle East and that in general it supports Israel, there are limits to the importance the Israeli public is willing to give to U.S. guarantees. Despite critical reliance on U.S. support, the Israeli public believes that strategic territories are more important than American support and that the Israeli government should defy U.S. pressures to withdraw to pre-Six Day War boundaries. (Table 3.18)

What can be concluded from these figures is a picture of an Israeli public which is skeptical about the present policy of the United States, the ability of its leaders to deal effectively with world problems, and maintaining the strategic balance, short of another round of full scale fighting in the Middle East.

In the event of another war, however, a clear majority of the Israeli population believes that the United States will provide all necessary military aid, short of the direct introduction of American forces (Table 3.19). This support is particularly critical to Israel, as indicated in Table 3.20,

TABLE 3.17

CONFIDENCE IN UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY

"How much confidence do you have in the ability of the United States to deal wisely with present world problems -- a great deal, a fair amount, not very much, or none at all?"

<u>May-June 1975</u> <u>Categories</u>	<u>April 1975</u> <u>Categories</u>	<u>May-June^a</u> <u>1975</u> (1218)	<u>April^a</u> <u>1975</u> (1206)
A great deal	Very great	12%)	12%)
A fair amount	Considerable	33) 45%	31) 43%
Not very much	Little	35)	33)
Not at all	Very little	8) 43%	15) 48%
Don't know	Don't know	12	9
		<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>

"In negotiations with Syria on the Golan Heights, how much confidence would you have in the United States to protect Israel's interests -- a great deal of confidence, a fair amount, not very much, or none at all?"

	<u>October 1975</u> (1198)
A great deal	10%)
A fair amount	38) 48%
Not very much	30)
None at all	16) 46%
Don't know	7
	<u>101%</u>

^aThe small difference between the April 1975 and May-June 1975 results may be due to the slightly different categories of response employed on the two surveys, as indicated.

Source: *Public Opinion Research of Israel (PORI)*

TABLE 3.18

IMPORTANCE OF U.S. SECURITY GUARANTEES AND TERRITORY

"How important would it be to have a formal U.S. guarantee of Israel's security as part of a peace settlement with the Arabs -- essential, of considerable value, of some value, or of little or no value?"

	<u>February 1975</u> (1226)
Essential	32%
Considerable value	35
Some value	8
Little or no value	17
Don't know	8
	<u>100%</u>

"What is more important in your eyes, strategic territories or American support?"

	<u>October 1975</u> (1198)
Territories	46%
American support	17
Both (Vol.)	29
Don't know	8
	<u>100%</u>

"Do you believe in general that the more territories we have, the more security we will have, or that our security is not necessarily connected with territories?"

	<u>August 1974</u> (1205)	<u>January 1974</u> (1133)
Territories are security	49%)	40%)
Depends which territories (Vol.)	16) 65%	20) 60%
Territories aren't security	30	35
Don't know	5	4
	<u>100%</u>	<u>99%</u>

"If the United States were to exert heavy pressure on Israel to withdraw to the pre-Six Day War boundaries with only slight modifications, should the Government of Israel do so?"

	<u>May 1974</u> (1181)
Should	12%)
Depends, maybe (Vol.)	18) 30%
Should not	64
Don't know	6
	<u>100%</u>

Source: *Public Opinion Research of Israel (PORI)*

TABLE 3.19

THE UNITED STATES COMMITMENT TO ISRAEL

"In the event our country's existence were actually imperiled in another war with the Arabs, how far do you think the United States would be likely to go in providing support?"

	<u>April 1975</u> (1206)	<u>December 1974- January 1975</u> (1213)
Would be neutral, step aside	3%	4%
Provide diplomatic and moral support	5	6
Provide limited military aid	23	17
Provide all necessary military aid short of troops	56	48
Intervene with U.S. troops	6	9
Don't know	8	16
	<u>101%</u>	<u>100%</u>

TABLE 3.20

DEPENDENCE ON AND ADEQUACY OF U.S. MILITARY AID

"In your opinion, could or couldn't Israel hold on if the United States sent us no more military equipment?"

	<u>May-June 1975</u> (1218)	<u>September 1974</u> (1180)
Could	26%	19%
Could not	53	65
Would be difficult (Vol.)	13	12
Don't know	8	5
	<u>100%</u>	<u>101%</u>

"Do you think that United States military assistance is or is not adequate to meet Israel's current needs?" (August-September 1975)

"Do you think that the present rate of United States military assistance is or is not adequate to meet Israel's needs?" (February 1975)

	<u>August-September 1975</u> (1188)	<u>February 1975</u> (1226)
Adequate	47%	25%
Not adequate	29	41
Don't know	23	33
	<u>99%</u>	<u>99%</u>

Source: Public Opinion Research of Israel (PORI)

with a majority of the population convinced that Israel would be unable to "hold on" without such aid in another war. Thus, the supply of American military equipment continues to be the central factor in the maintenance of the strategic balance of the Israeli public, as well as that nation's political and military leadership.

3.4 CONCLUSION: AMERICAN DEFENSE OPTIONS AND ISRAELI POLICY

While the purpose of the present analysis has been to review and analyze the perceptions which this Israeli leadership and public hold of United States security policy, and some of the key issue areas involved in the settlement process, rather than formulate any set of options which U.S. defense policy might take, it is possible to suggest what directions are open to U.S. policy-makers based on this analysis. The first part of this conclusion consists of a summary of those factors which the Israelis view as critical, and are likely to have a substantial impact on future efforts to achieve a settlement in the region. Second, the range of options and policy areas open to the U.S., both as an arms supplier and agent for peace in the Middle East, is reviewed with some discussion of what approaches are likely to be most effective in terms of the United States' expressed policy goals.

Critical Factors in Israeli Policy-Making

As indicated at several points in the analysis, it has become increasingly clear over the course of negotiations since the 1973 war that the Israeli policy toward security and settlement will be based primarily on considerations of security, with various political questions taking a distant second place. Indeed Prime Minister Rabin has now openly admitted Israeli demands for "nonbelligerency" to be functionally meaningless and Defense Minister Peres has sought to focus on "substantive elements" rather than a political formula. Here the Israeli leadership and public alike can be expected to look to the United States for a policy which they perceive as providing for Israel's continued physical, economic and

political security over time. The extent to which this leadership, or any foreseeable alternative leadership, will be able to make policy concessions ultimately depends on this fundamental perception of U.S. policy. Summarizing the elements of this policy which are of greatest importance to the Israelis, it is possible to suggest the following non-exclusive categories of primary concern:

(1) Fundamental American Commitment to Israeli Security: While the fundamental commitment of U.S. policy to the security and sovereignty of Israel has remained firm and unchanged since Israel's inception, the continued restatement and reaffirmation of this commitment remains a vital necessity in any American policy. As witnessed by the Israeli reaction to an address by Secretary Kissinger before the American Jewish Congress, the Israeli leadership requires regular reassurance of this position for its own self-assurance, as well as for internal political purposes;

(2) Levels of U.S. Military and Supporting Assistance: Sparked by the surprise of the 1973 war, Israeli setbacks during the initial phase of that war, and Israeli forecasts of Arab military capabilities over the next several years, the Israeli leadership has come to place increasing importance on the level of long-term military and supporting economic assistance from the U.S. Here the Israelis will continue to seek levels of aid and technology which meet the full extent of the threat they perceive from the Arab states. Meeting this demand, it must be as much a part of U.S. policy to assist the Israelis in correctly assessing the threat, as creating a force imbalance meeting a threat which does not in actuality exist;

(3) Perceptions of the United States' Ability to Act: Of vital and increasing importance in Israeli policy-making is the perception the Israeli leadership and public have of America's ability to carry out its worldwide commitments. While the Vietnam and Angolan experiences were generally disclaimed by the Israeli leadership as not being analogous, at least in the public sphere, these same leaders have expressed their deep concern in private of the future validity of American assurances. Under conditions of revised Israeli security frontiers, such as a return to the pre-June 1967 frontiers, such commitments are viewed as being vital to the defense of the State,

(4) The United States' Final Settlement Objectives: Behind much of the Israeli leadership's reluctance to increase its policy flexibility is the uncertainty over the final settlement objectives which will ultimately be supported by the United States. Here the fear is that in the final analysis the U.S. policy will be to suggest or sponsor a renewed version of the 1970 Rogers Plan, calling on Israel to accept security frontiers which compromise basic security in return for Arab assurances which fall short of "full peace";

(5) Arming of the Arab Confrontation States: A more recent, but growing Israeli concern will be the role of the U.S. as a supplier of major weapons systems to the Arab confrontation states. While most Israelis acknowledge the utility of Arab-American relations which have developed since the 1973 war, they have expressed increasingly grave concerns that in the future U.S. arms could be supplied to confrontation states, such as Egypt, upsetting the force balance which the Israelis would like to maintain. At the same time there is a general unwillingness

to recognize the benefits, in term of Arab moderation and willingness to undertake further settlement negotiations which such aid could induce.

The Range of United States Options

Under present political arrangements existing in Israel, and those most likely to occur even with new elections, it is unlikely that the Rabin Government or its possible successors will be able to exhibit either increased policy flexibility or present acceptable new policy initiatives. An objective assessment of the current situation reveals that regardless of the various diplomatic efforts and assistance programs which are within acceptable limits to the U.S., the Israeli leadership will be both unwilling and unable to make the type of concessions required for further progress in any of the key settlement areas: with Syria on the Golan Heights; with Jordan; with respect to the Palestinians; and even with regard to further progress with Egypt. Lacking in resolve, the present leadership is opposed to taking policy positions which do not have broad public support in Israel and have structured public opinion to preclude policies which would be necessary to achieve further settlement accords.

With this in mind, and in keeping with its own stated policy objectives, the basic thrust of U.S. policy in the near future is likely to be toward maintaining regional stability, reducing tensions, and promoting economic growth and development among the regional states. It is hoped that such a focus will serve to prevent further rounds of full-scale war between Israel and the Arab states, as well as pave the way for an overall settlement at some future time. In promoting these aims the range of policy options open to the U.S. is not far broader than those presently

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ISRAELI PERCEPTIONS OF AMERICAN SECURITY POLICY: CURRENT TRENDS--ETC(U)

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
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employed. Turning to the broad policy areas, the analysis suggests the following:

(1) Diplomatic Efforts: As the only superpower with diplomatic relations with all parties to the conflict, the U.S. remains in a unique position to act as both an intermediary and an agent for peace. No doubt the U.S. should and will continue to play an active role in assisting the parties to achieve further levels of stability and settlement, and in arranging accommodations which are of mutual benefit. Lacking the cooperation and compromise required from both Israel and the Arab states, it is unlikely that the U.S. will be able to induce accords of a major scale, and might concentrate efforts on incremental improvements, such as trade, exchange of educators and journalists, tourism, open borders and other tension reducing steps. Further, the U.S. can continue to play a vital role in crisis management, acting to reduce the likelihood of war in the absence of formal communications links between them.

(2) Military and Supporting Assistance Programs: In dealing with a highly complex issue such as the basic level of military and supporting economic assistance, and what systems are to be supplied to Israel, several considerations must be kept in mind. First, maintaining a strategic balance in the region is as important to overall security as maintaining Israeli superiority. While potentially unpopular, such a posture increases the likelihood future wars will be deterred. Second, within the current Israeli perception of the worst case threat, almost any level of assistance is likely to be viewed as still not fulfilling some Israeli security need. Until the Israelis develop the means to assess their actual security needs, the level of satisfaction is likely

to remain close to the level of satiation. The impact which such massive arms programs will have on Israel, in economic and social terms, even with high levels of supporting assistance are still generally unappreciated and unrecognized within that nation.

In the final analysis it appears that the credibility of the U.S. commitment to Israel and the continuity of American aid, rather than the level of aid, will enable Israel to reach a settlement if indeed such a settlement is within reach.

NOTES: PART THREE

1. For a background in foreign policy making in Israel, see Michael Brecher, *The Foreign Policy System of Israel* (New York: Yale University Press, 1972); Michael Brecher, *Decisions in Israel's Foreign Policy* (Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 1975) and R. D. McLaurin, Mughisuddin, Mohammed and Abraham R. Wagner, *War and Foreign Policy* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1976).
2. As both Prime Minister and concurrently Israel's Defense Minister, Ben-Gurion largely dictated policy and enjoyed Cabinet and Knesset support. See Brecher (1976), *op. cit.*
3. See Abraham R. Wagner, *Crisis Decision-Making: Israel's Experience in 1967 and 1973* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1974).
4. Interview with the author, Tel-Aviv, October 1972.
5. See Abraham R. Wagner *Political Change and Decision-Making in Israel: The Aftermath of the October War* (U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, August 1974.)
6. See, for example, interview with Dr. Elimelech Rimalt, Jerusalem Domestic Service (in Hebrew) 23 March 1975. Reported in *FBIS* 25 March 1975, p. N-7.
7. See the Agranat Commission Report, *op. cit.*
8. See "Israel: Back to the Kitchen", *The Economist* (London), 13 March 1976, p. 49.
9. See Don Peretz, "The War Election and Israel's Eighth Knesset" *The Middle East Journal* (Spring 1974), pp. 111-125.
10. Under Israeli law, Mrs. Meir was allowed two 21 day periods in which to present a new Government. The Premier presented her minority Government to President Katzir only in the final hours of the second period.
11. See, for example, *The New York Times*, 4 January 1974, p. 8.
12. See, for example, *The New York Times*, 18 February 1974. Public opinion polls at this time measured Mrs. Meir's popular "approval" at approximately 25%, a record low in Israel. The question employed by the IIASR and Dahaf Agency is similar to the presidential approval question employed in the United States.

13. Mrs. Meir's 1974 Cabinet was virtually the same as the previous Government, with the NRP's slots being held open for their possible inclusion in the coalition.
14. A Transcript of the Agranat Commission's Interim Report is reprinted in *The New York Times*, 4 April 1974, p. 12.
15. The text of Gen. Elazar's letter is reprinted in *The New York Times*, 4 April 1974, p. 12.
16. Within the Labor Alignment (*Ma'arach*) a majority of the *Mapai*, and virtually all of the *Achdut Ha'avodah* members called for Gen. Dayan's removal. In pure political terms, the younger and more dovish elements were calling for the removal of the hawkish *Rafi* Minister of Defense.
17. Yigal Allon, in particular, called for new elections. The final vote in the *Ma'arach* Central Committee was: Rabin 295, Peres 254.
18. The feeling of many Israelis summed up in an editorial entitled "The Worst Government," which said in part :

Does Mr. Rabin really think that what is needed by the country today is a very sick man who talks too much at the Foreign ministry, plus Messrs. Rabinovitch, Yadin, Baram, Ofer and Shulamit Aloni, not to speak of the same old guard of Mapam and the Independent Liberals? That these are the people capable of facing outside pressures and dealing with urgent local problems, including inflation and growing social unrest? If he intends to carry on with this team for any length of time, as presumably he does, he is hardly fit to run the country himself...

The major shortcoming of the Government is that -- quite apart from its weakness -- it represents the view of no more than a minority of the population. In every Government decisions are taken by majority vote. In Mr. Rabin's Government, it is very clear indeed, that the majority will be far more ready to make concessions than most of those who voted for the Labour Party list headed by Mrs. Meir want. The equilibrium point is far to the left of Centre. And this is after an election in which there was a sizeable shift to the Right! In other words, this Government not only does not represent the view of the 45% of the electorate who voted for the Likud and the religious parties (now in the opposition). It also does not represent the views of at least another 20% of the electorate which voted for the Alignment -- but did not expect

to get such a dovish coalition or such a weak team. The only sections of the population happy with present developments are the Rakach and Moked communists, Mapam, about half the Labour Party and the followers of Mrs. Aloni. Even the Independent Liberals are uneasy.

The Israel Economist, May 1974, p. 84.

19. Discussing the return of Mrs. Meir and her colleagues, the *Economist* has recently noted:

Israel's ruling Labour party has found itself where it never expected to be again, back in Golda's kitchen. Mrs. Golda Meir, aged 78 and with half a century of public service behind her, was thought to be gone for good when she was virtually booted out of office after the 1973 war...Now, in an effort to strengthen Israel's hamstrung and divided government and to pull the Labour party together, she has been recalled to head a "leadership forum".

The forum is to meet every Friday, two days ahead of the weekly cabinet sessions. Its decisions will be binding on party leaders. Its nine members include the prime minister but the five considered "strong" are Mrs. Meir herself, the finance minister, Yehoshua Rabinovitch, the defence minister, Shimon Peres, the justice minister, Haim Zadok, and the minister without portfolio, Israel Galili. A notable omission is the deputy prime minister and foreign minister, Yigael Allon, who will not take this kindly when he returns from America at the end of this week.

The main job of the five "strong men" will be to choose Israel's next prime minister. At present there appear to be four likely courses of action:

- Mrs. Meir could be reinstated as prime minister. This would mean an early election, because she gave up her Knesset seat when she retired.
- Mrs. Meir could put "her" people, possibly including Moshe Dayan, into jumping off positions on the party list for the election due at the end of next year.
- Mr. Peres might replace Mr. Rabin in mid-term.
- Mr. Zadok could replace Mr. Rabin in mid-term

Thus the forum represents a serious setback to Mr. Rabin's political career - unless he uses it to redeem himself. To do this, he would have to learn how to work as part of a mettlesome team instead of going off into a corner on his own.

"Israel: Back in the Kitchen", *op. cit.*

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