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
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# A SYSTEMS ANALYSIS VIEW OF THE VIETNAM WAR 1965-1972

Editor: **Thomas C. Thayer**

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Volume 10

**PACIFICATION AND  
CIVIL AFFAIRS**

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PACIFICATION AND CIVIL AFFAIRS

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A SYSTEMS ANALYSIS VIEW OF THE VIETNAM WAR: 1965-1972

Contents of the 12 Volumes

- Volume 1 - The Situation In Southeast Asia
- Volume 2 - Forces and Manpower
- Volume 3 - Viet Cong--North Vietnamese Operations
- Volume 4 - Allied Ground and Naval Operations
- Volume 5 - The Air War
- Volume 6 - Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF)
- Volume 7 - Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF)
- Volume 8 - Casualties and Losses
- Volume 9 - Population Security
- Volume 10 - Pacification and Civil Affairs
- Volume 11 - Economics: War Costs and Inflation
- Volume 12 - Construction and Port Operations in South Vietnam

contents

A Systems Analysis View Of The Vietnam War: 1965-1972

Volume 10

PACIFICATION AND CIVIL AFFAIRS

	Date	Page
<b>1. ROAD AND RAILROAD SECURITY</b>		
Vietnamese National Railways	Aug 68	1
Route #4 - Mekong Delta To Saigon	Dec 67	9
<b>2. PACIFICATION FORCES (Also See RVNAF - Territorial Forces - Vol. 7)</b>		
Marine Corps Pacification In I Corps	Feb 67	19
Marine Pacification In I Corps	Mar 67	23
USMC Combined Action Platoon Program	Jul 67	26
CAP vs. Non-CAP Hamlet HES Ratings In I CTZ	Jun 68	28
U.S. Marine Corps Combined Action Program	Nov 68	35
Problems In Providing Village Security	Mar 67	39
Revolutionary Development Personnel	Jul 67	40
Viet Cong Efforts To Disrupt Pacification	Sep 67	42
RD Cadre Attrition	Sep 68	47
RD Cadre Attrition: A Correction	Oct 68	52
National Police	Mar 70	54
<b>3. VC INFRASTRUCTURE (VCi)</b>		
VC Infrastructure	Oct 68	57
Phoenix Program And The VC Infrastructure	Dec 68	61
Phoenix And The NPFF	Mar 69	75
The Anti-Infrastructure Campaign In South Vietnam	Oct 69	79
Phoenix Program: 1970 Results	Sep/Oct 70	82
Phoenix	Jun/Jul 71	95
Phung Hoang Results	Aug/Oct 71	103
<b>4. CHIEU HOI (VC/NVA Defectors)</b>		
See VC/NVA Casualties And Losses - Volume 8		
<b>5. REFUGEES</b>		
The Refugee Problem In Vietnam	Sep 67	104
The Current Refugee Situation	Sep 72	110
<b>6. LAND REFORM</b>		
Land Reform And GVN Control	Jul 67	113
Is Land Reform A Necessary U.S. Objective?	Aug 67	114
Is Land Reform A Necessary U.S. Objective: A Rebuttal	Sep 67	117

Elections; and Gauging South Vietnamese Attitudes

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7. ELECTIONS

	<u>Date</u>	<u>Page</u>
GVN Versus VC Administration	Dec 68	120
GVN And VC Elections	Aug 69	124
Province/City Council Elections In RVN	Aug 70	131
The 1971 SVN Presidential Election	May 71	133
The August 29 Lower House Election	Aug/Oct 71	154

8. GAUGING SOUTH VIETNAMESE ATTITUDES

Aspirations Of The Vietnamese People	Aug 67	163
The Pacification Attitude Analysis Systems (PAAS)	Dec 70	168
What the Vietnamese Peasant Thinks	Jan/Feb 71	170
April Attitude Survey Highlights	May 71	185
Offensive's Impact on Vietnamese Attitudes	May 72	186
Highlights of Attitudes of Rural Dwellers in South Vietnam - August PAAS	Sep 72	187

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A Systems Analysis View Of The Vietnam War: 1965-1972

INTRODUCTION

This volume, plus the other eleven volumes in the series, contains every article ever printed in the Southeast Asia Analysis Report (a few additional papers not printed in the report are occasionally included, too.).

Fifty issues of the Southeast Asia Analysis Report were published from January 1967 through January 1972 by the Southeast Asia office under the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Systems Analysis). The Report had two purposes. First, it served as a vehicle to distribute the analyses produced by Systems Analysis on Southeast Asia. It thus provided other agencies an opportunity to tell us if we were wrong and to help prevent research duplications. We solicited and received frequent rebuttals or comments on our analyses which sharpened our studies and stimulated better analysis by other agencies. Second, it was a useful management tool for getting more good work from our staff -- they knew they must regularly produce studies which would be read critically throughout the Executive Branch.

The first page of the Report stated that it "is not an official publication of the Department of Defense, and does not necessarily reflect the views of the Secretary of Defense, Assistant Secretary of Defense (Systems Analysis), or comparable officials." The intent was solely to improve the quality of analysis on Southeast Asia problems -- and to stimulate further thought and discussion. The report was successful in doing precisely this.

We distributed about 350 copies of the Report each month to OSD (Office of the Secretary of Defense), the Military Departments, CINCPAC, and Saigon, and to other interested agencies such as the Paris Delegation, AID, State Department, CIA and the White House Staff. Most copies circulated outside OSD were in response to specific requests from the individual person or agency. Our readership included many of the key commanders, staff officers, and analysts in Washington and in the field. Their comments were almost always generous and complimentary, even when they disagreed with our conclusions. Some excerpts appear below:

"I believe the 'SEA Analysis Report' serves a useful purpose, and I would like to see its present distribution continued." (Deputy Secretary of Defense, 31 May 1968)

"We used a highly interesting item in your May Analysis Report as the basis for a note to the Secretary, which I've attached." (State Department, 28 June 1967)

"We were all most impressed with your first monthly Southeast Asia Analysis Report. Not only do we wish to continue to receive it, but we would appreciate it if we could receive 4 (four) copies from now on." (White House, 9 February 1967)



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In addition, readers reported about equal interest in each of the seven subject areas normally covered in the Report.

VC/NVA	18%
Air Operations	20%
RVNAF	17%
Facification	13%
Friendly Forces	12%
Deployments	12%
Logistics/Construction	8%
	<hr/> 100%

There was some negative reaction to the Report. Concern was expressed about "the distorted impressions" the Report left with the reader and its wide dissemination which "implies its acceptance by the Secretary of Defense, giving the document increased credibility."

Given the way in which the Southeast Asia Analysis Report was used, the important responsibilities of many of its readers, and the controversial aspects of the report, I decided to include in these twelve volumes every article ever published in a Southeast Asia Analysis Report. This will allow the users of these volumes to arrive at their own conclusions.

Thomas C. Thayer  
February 18, 1975

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VIETNAMESE NATIONAL RAILWAYS

Introductory Comment

There is little doubt that restoration of the Vietnamese National Railway System (VNRS) could be of considerable military and economic benefit in South Vietnam. The real question is whether the potential pay-off is worth the added cost of construction, maintenance, and security that would be needed. In fact, there is doubt that under present conditions it is feasible to provide the security needed if the railways are to be used more extensively.

This paper outlines the current status of the VNRS and analyzes the problems and some of the costs associated with getting the railway system back into relatively full operation. It is followed by an in-house critique pointing up some serious difficulties that cast doubt on the feasibility of getting the VNRS back into operation until conditions in SVN change markedly.

Background

The Vietnamese National Railways System (VNRS) is a line of communications asset which needs extensive restoration and repair before it can be fully used to support combat operations or the economy of South Vietnam. The system consists of 1109 kilometers of mainline and 248 kilometers of branch lines, but only 38% (517 kms) was operational on August 3, 1968 and another 8% (109 kms) was under repair. The Tet offensive reduced the operational sections of the railway to 29% for a short period.

The railway is forced to operate with insufficient personnel, funds, and equipment. A higher priority in the allocation of resources and more security forces would provide the military with a low cost, high volume means of transportation which cannot be duplicated by air or highway transportation. In addition, reconstruction and complete operation of the VNRS would have a significant influence on the overall social and economic development of South Vietnam.

South Vietnam by reason of its elongated and narrow shape, topography, climate, and agricultural development is most densely populated in the coastal and southern regions. These areas contain more than 90% of the population and most of the railway trackage. It is estimated that about half of the population could be served by the railroad.

The railway system originates at Saigon and serves the entire coastal area from Phan Thiet to Dong Ha. The railroad is well engineered with 413 bridges, 27 tunnels, controlling grades of less than 1-1/2%, steel ties, and vertical elevations well above the waterways. Its rolling stock consists of 59 serviceable locomotives and over 500 serviceable freight cars. The major repair facility in Saigon is equipped to perform major engine and car repairs. Other on-line shop facilities are adequate to handle all types of minor repairs. The VNRS employs some 3500 personnel (operating crews, maintenance, and construction forces) and has a 4-battalion (1900 men) security element.

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Because of wartime destruction, the system has operated in several separated sections (with minor exceptions during the 1961-1965 time frame). At the present time, it is broken into five sections (see map). This seriously reduces the efficiency of the system because they are unable to move rolling stock between inoperable sections.

The VNRS has the same one-meter gauge as the Burmese Railway, State Railway of Thailand, the Royal Cambodian Railway, and the Malayan railway. An inter-connected system utilizing these lines and penetrating Laos is technically feasible. In a political climate permitting regional development, an integrated system connecting these countries would be of great value -- economically, militarily and politically.

Operations

The VNRS transported 630,000 metric tons of freight and supplies during 1967 in addition to 350,000 passengers. Over 80% of the materiel was in direct support of the war effort and 90% of the passengers were workmen going to or from military installations. The following table shows freight and passenger traffic from 1956 through the first two months of 1968.

TABLE 1  
FREIGHT AND PASSENGER STATISTICS IN SVN

<u>Year</u>	<u>Freight (1000 MT)</u>	<u>Ton-Kilometers (Million)</u>	<u>Overall Average Haul Distance (KMS/MT)</u>	<u>Passengers (1000)</u>
1956	339.8	69.5	204	4204
1957	444.9	78.7	177	4217
1958	421.0	84.1	200	3551
1959	431.0	107.6	250	2657
1960	439.6	143.8	327	2613
1961	439.7	166.9	380	2580
1962	367.6	151.8	413	1733
1963	420.5	183.5	436	1367
1964	319.2	134.1	420	873
1965	161.5	31.8	197	144
1966	229.6	14.2	62	81
1967	630.0	27.0	43	350
1968 (2 mos. only)	36.7	1.8	49	42
Average <sup>a/</sup>	387.0	99.4	259	2030

Source: MACV-J-45 June 1968.

a/ 1968 Statistics not included in the average.

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The freight moved reached an all time high in 1967, but the average haul distance reached a new low. This was the result of a lack of railroad security and the need to rehabilitate sections of the track destroyed by enemy sabotage activity. Passenger traffic was well above the 1965 and 1966 levels, but was only about 10% of the pre-1958 levels.

Freight rates of the VNRS were \$2.50 VN (\$0.0212 US) per metric ton per kilometer as of August 1, 1968 (the rates are 15% less for freight moved on US military-owned cars). These costs are estimated to be from 30% to 40% lower than comparable contract truck costs to move the same type of cargo. Completion of connecting trackage and sidings at the major depots would, therefore, reduce transportation costs and help relieve highway congestion.

### Sabotage and Security

The sabotage incident rate has decreased since 1965 as shown in the following table. The reason was primarily because less trackage was in operation, not because of increased security or reduced enemy efforts. The remaining operational sectors of the system were located in the more secure areas of SVN.

TABLE 2

#### RAILWAY SABOTAGE INCIDENTS (Monthly Ave Per Quarter)

<u>Year</u>	<u>Jan - Mar</u>	<u>Apr - Jun</u>	<u>Jul - Sep</u>	<u>Oct - Dec</u>	<u>Ave/Mo</u>
1965	77	96	81	60	78.4
1966	36	15	24	17	23.0
1967	6	7	9	11	8.3
1968	17	22			18.0

Source: MACV-J-45 August 1968.

MACV uses a color coding to denote line of communication (LOC) security. If coded "green" a railroad segment is physically open and traffic can move during daylight hours with relative freedom from VC sabotage, attacks or harassment. Armed escort is not required but isolated incidents may occur. "Amber" indicates that the railroad is physically open but that the security of the surrounding area is such that thorough security measures, including armed escort, are required and frequent incidents may occur. "Red" indicates sectors of the railroads that are closed by VC/NVA military control of the area or by extensive physical destruction. Table 3 illustrates how the security situation has varied over the past 18 months.

### Rehabilitation Goals

By the end of this year, the goal is to complete restoration on the mainline from Saigon to II/I Corps boundary (375 kms), plus the section from Da Nang to Hue (105 kms), and change the security from "amber to green" on these sections. Achievement of this goal would connect four of the five

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separated sections of the railroad and provide rail transportation between three of the four major port areas (Saigon, Cam Ranh Bay, and Qui Nhon).

TABLE 3

### RAILROAD SECURITY

<u>Month</u>	<u>% GREEN</u>	<u>% AMBER</u>	<u>% RED</u>
Dec 1966	22	21	57
Feb 1967	28	17	55
Apr	35	7	58
Jun	32	4	64
Aug	40	5	55
Oct	41	3	56
Dec	31	7	62
Jan 1968	19	22	59
Feb	32	8	60
Mar	33	7	60
Apr	39	4	57
May	25	11	64
Jun	28	6	66

Source: MACV Measurement of Progress Reports.

The restoration of the VNRS mainline from Saigon to Dong Ha and the branch lines (excluding the Loc Ninh Branch) by the end of 1969 is the longer term goal. Planning is moving in this direction; but for the foreseeable future, it is clearly infeasible to maintain the mainline from Saigon to Dong Ha in a green condition. Given sufficient support in terms of security, construction personnel, and funding, it is possible that the rail line could be opened and operated in a "green" and "amber" condition. But the costs and personnel requirements would probably be prohibitive.

#### Planning and Execution

Overall planning for railway restoration began in June 1966 as a joint effort by the GVN and US agencies. All reconstruction efforts are coordinated through three standing committees composed of members of MACV, GVN, USAID, and the JCS with primary responsibility for railway restoration resting with the Joint Committee on railroad restoration. Actual construction is the responsibility of the VNRS except that rail spurs to US military installations are funded and built by US forces. Reconstruction work is done by six VNRS work trains operating on various sections of the track that have the capability to rebuild about 5 kilometers per month. USAID furnishes construction materials such as rails, ties, structural steel, bridge trusses, and equipment.

Funds programmed for railway restoration have been limited as shown in the following table.

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TABLE 4

PROGRAMMING  
(\$ Million)

<u>Year</u>	<u>GVN</u>	<u>USAID</u>	<u>Total</u>
1966	.8	-	.8
1967	2.3	9.2	11.5
1968	2.6	3.1	5.7
1969	2.5	4.5	7.0
	<u>8.2</u>	<u>16.8</u>	<u>25.0</u>

Source: MACV-J-45.

In July 1968, construction work began on the Da Nang to Hue segment of the railway. VNRS is restoring the roadbed, track, minor bridges, and trestles. US military engineers are repairing the major bridges using other than military construction funding. As of March 1967, the VNRS was operating three trains a week from Da Nang to Hue and only minor repairs were required to open this line to Dong Ha. When ten bridges were destroyed in April 1967, this section was abandoned and restoration rescheduled for 1969. Now, however, priority has been given to restoring the 103 kilometers between Da Nang and Hue and it is estimated that this segment will become operational on December 15, 1968.

The FY 1968 military construction program contains \$24.8 million to construct 56.6 miles of railroad and supporting facilities. This program when completed would provide: (1) 14 miles of spur line (\$5.3 million) to connect 1st Logistical Command facilities at Newport with the mainline of the VNRS; (2) 18 miles of spur and loading facilities (\$4.7 million), connecting the Qui Nhon port with the ammunition storage and maintenance areas; (3) 16 miles of branch lines connecting the VNRS mainline (\$6.3 million) to An Khe; and (4) 8.6 miles of trackage in Saigon (\$8.5 million). Previous programs providing for 14.1 miles costing \$4.2 million, however, have not been constructed and the funds have since been reprogrammed (except for a highway/railroad bridge at Cam Ranh Bay). As of June 30, 1968, no military construction work on railroads had been scheduled (DD-I&L 6727).

To date, the construction program has concentrated on providing on-base roads and upgrading the major highways to MACV standards. It is estimated that over \$225 million dollars have been provided for highways through FY 1968 from all sources (AID/DOD, MILCON, O&MA, OPN, AID (Roads and Quarries), MAP (bridge materials), and ARVN (Materials)). Another \$113 million is being provided for highways in 1969.

The MACV construction program (Complex Review) May 21, 1968, identifies 117 miles of railroad spurs and numerous loading facilities as being required in SVN. Requirements exist for additional trackage at various locations, but are not quantified in the "Complex Review".

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Construction costs for "Rule of Thumb" estimating of railway trackage is \$350,000 per mile (contractor cost), for new spurs and \$110,000 per mile for rehabilitating existing track. Corresponding costs for highway construction are \$200,000 per mile of highway upgraded to MACV standards and \$100,000 per mile of highway restored to prewar RVN standards. Construction costs for railway construction, while higher than highway, are partially offset by cheaper freight rates and less highway congestion.

#### Problem Areas

There are many steps that have to be taken before the main rail line can be restored from Saigon to Dong Ha. The foremost requirement is for adequate security. The 1900-man VNRS security force can only provide protection to the work force and trains. Security for the roadbed, bridges, and trestles is the responsibility of the military commander in each area utilizing available RF units.

The second problem is the GVN mobilization program. Since 1961, the VNRS has lost 45% of its employees to the armed forces. The drain will increase appreciably during the coming months as the mobilization program proceeds. Most of the VNRS employees are skilled craftsmen that cannot be readily replaced. The impact of the mobilization could be minimized by either detached service assignments (such as are used for teachers) or selected deferments for critically required supervisors and executives.

A third problem area is the GVN pay scale that is too low to attract technicians and laborers for construction work, especially when they have to live on work trains or at construction sites away from their homes. Most workers can find jobs paying higher wages with US agencies and contractors.

A final problem is the limited heavy construction capability of the VNRS. Permanent repair or replacement of the numerous destroyed bridges is now beyond the capability of the VNRS. Bridge construction by contractor, sponsored and funded by the GVN possibly with USAID funding assistance, would speed the construction effort.

#### Summary

Throughout history, railroads have proven to be invaluable assets in both peace and war. No better means have been developed to transport, efficiently, bulk dry cargo in quantity overland. Although the circumstances in RVN are not directly comparable, the railroads were indispensable during the Korean conflict and today transport about 90% of our supplies from the south toward the DMZ. Similarly, the railroads in North Vietnam have served as an integral part of the North Vietnamese logistical system and have proved to be relatively invulnerable to our bombing attacks. The VNRS could play a greater role in transporting needed supplies and equipment for RVN, US, and Free World forces if additional funds, equipment, and security are provided to expand its operations. Besides providing low cost military transportation, it will help develop South Vietnam both socially and economically.

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### Comments

The following comments were prepared by other members of the OSD staff who have doubts about the need to devote resources to the VIRS at this time or question the feasibility of providing adequate security to operate the rail system efficiently.

1. This railway paper is useful and interesting, but we feel that it does not stress some of the major considerations that must be taken into account in proposing to allocate additional resources to open the railroads. While it is clear that the railroad has been a low cost, high volume means of transportation in past wars, it may not be true in Vietnam. There is no safe, secure rear area and the enemy is able to interdict the line practically any time he wants and whenever he wants. A very large number of personnel are going to be needed to provide the appropriate security. It could run as high as 100 to 300 RF companies. Operations research theory and past practice indicate that any linear target accessible to the enemy is impossible to defend completely. No matter how many forces you put on it, you are still going to have problems. The personnel required to provide security could probably be better used to secure populated areas in South Vietnam.

2. The economic and military importance of the railroad was much greater when Saigon was only port-of-entry than today when there are five deepwater ports of entry. The existing port facilities and large air bases scattered up and down the coast enable us to move cargo into various points on the coast at reasonable prices. The railway runs only up and down the coast, and would contribute little to opening up the interior. This indicates that perhaps we should spend more on opening roads instead of the railroad; opening a road into an area gives us more pacification and economic benefits than opening the railroad. For example, people can get to markets and move farm products to the cities.

3. Expending forces to open the railroad does not help us at all in the Delta, where the interdiction of the key LOC (Route 4) is having the greatest impact on the SVN economy.

4. A major consideration which dictates giving highways first priority concerns the use of highways to provide security for the RR. The plan is to patrol the railways to maximum extent possible from parallel highways using highly mobile forces, e.g. Armed Cav. (Route 1, the main Vietnamese north-south highway, parallels the VICS for its entire route and is within one mile of the track for about 80 percent of the route. As this route is upgraded to MACV standards, it will permit rapid movement of area security forces to counteract VC attacks.)


5. Mobilization and low wages are real problems, but they impact across the board in all areas of endeavor. Too many agencies can make a good case for deferments due to essentiality. Their (GVN) problem is the one we would have if we had about 13 million in Armed Forces. The GVN answer is to defer some in all critical areas, but take some too. As for pay scales, all GVN employees are in the same disadvantageous position, including even RVNAF. Perhaps National wage and price controls are the answer, or some subsidization as now is available to the military through food programs.

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### VIETNAMESE NATIONAL RAILWAY SYSTEM (VNRS)

- OPEN (GREEN)
- XXXX RESTORATION SCHEDULED CY '68 (AMBER)
- +++++ RESTORATION NOT SCHEDULED (RED)



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### ROUTE 4 - MEKONG DELTA TO SAIGON

Route 4 runs south from Saigon about 217 miles to Quan Long (Cau Mau Peninsula). It is the most important commercial route in South Vietnam and has great strategic value in terms of political/economic overtones in the Vietnam conflict. This study examines the economic importance of Route 4 to the Government of Vietnam (GVN) and the attempt of the Viet Cong to maintain a degree of control over the route. It also discusses the security situation along the route using Hamlet Evaluation System (HES) and VC incident data. Finally, it discusses possible ways to increase GVN control over the route to enhance its contribution to the Vietnamese economy.

#### Economic Significance

Route 4 runs through 8 of the 16 provinces in the Mekong Delta. The bulk of the foodstuffs produced in the Delta are shipped to Saigon by this highway. In the past, water transportation was the most economic means; but this has changed. The reasons are twofold: (1) the security situation along the canals is not as good as it is on the roads, and (2) many of the barge owners are now operating in the Saigon port area where the chances for profit are greater. Barges still are used for some bulk commodities such as rice, cement and rock, but barges now move largely in infrequent convoys. The resulting delays raise costs and make water movement impractical for perishable commodities. CIA estimates that during the first 9 months of 1967, three-fourths of the Delta rice moving to Saigon was delivered by road and all of this was trucked at least part of the way on Route 4. In addition, most fish products delivered to Saigon come by truck via Route 4.

The trip from Quan Long to Saigon should, under normal circumstances, take from 9 to 11 hours. In fact it often takes days, depending on enemy activities, GVN troop movements and weather conditions. The major bottlenecks are one-way bridges, the Mekong Delta river ferries at My Thuan and the Bassac River ferries at Can Tho. Major military convoys pre-empt the ferries, delaying commercial traffic for hours or days at a time. This increases the cost of shipping commodities to Saigon and, for more perishable foodstuffs such as live fish, may mean the loss of most or all of the shipment.

VC activities add to the delays. Route 4 is a major military objective of the VC. The roads and bridges are repeatedly mined. This sabotage, together with heavy traffic and little maintenance, is leading to a serious deterioration of the road bed which in turn delays traffic and damages vehicles.

In addition, both the Viet Cong and the GVN have check points where trucks and commodities are taxed. A recent CIA study notes that one rice trucker reported paying 36 different parties on a round trip from Saigon to Bac Lieu (roughly 175 miles).

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The impact of these various factors on Route 4 and the Vietnamese economy was pointed out in Ambassador Komer's assessment of Pacification in SVN during October 1967. He stated:

"The VC effort to interdict land communications, particularly the Route 4 lifeline to the Delta, has burdened shippers with abnormal delays and losses of perishable commodities. However, no attempts at interdiction resulted in closure of major highways for more than five days. VC interdiction of Route 4, which President Thieu calls the "rice road," would facilitate their control of the rice harvest. The Delta rice crop promises to exceed that of 1966-67, and we are urging GVN to adopt a policy of a high price to farmers and removing obstructions to free flow of commercial traffic. Repeated VC mining and cratering, together with the wear and tear of heavy civilian and military traffic and prolonged heavy rains, is slowly reducing Route 4 to a critical state."

### Viet Cong Objectives

The significance of Route 4 to the Government of Vietnam has not gone unnoticed by the Viet Cong. A recent captured document states:

"The portion of route #4 from My Thuan ferry (My Tho) to Long An (south of Saigon) plays a highly important strategic role. This route connects Saigon with Western provinces and holds a great influence on enemy political, economic and military activities. It serves as a springboard and a strategic defense line for the southwestern area of Saigon. The U.S. imperialists have occupied this portion as a springboard from which they launch their troops to encroach upon and pacify the southern and northern areas. By strongly attacking route #4, which is the enemy main strategic point, we can smash his plan of pacifying the Mekong Delta. Our prolonged activities on this route puts the enemy on the defense, greatly confuses him in political, economic, military and logistic fields and visibly reduces his air and artillery activities and sweep operations." (DCEC Document #11-1049-67)

Another document (DCEC 11-1501-67) discussing the 1967-1968 winter campaign by the My Tho Province unit (which corresponds to the GVN Dinh Tuong and Go Cong provinces) states that the main objective will be to disrupt communications along Route 4. The document then lays out a plan of action which includes the following orders:

"Sabotage of Line of Communications: Insure that (land communication) on (Route #4) is discontinued for a period 15-20 days. Simultaneously, village guerrilla elements must be used to carry out day and night (harassing) attacks along the line of communication. During the first night, Chau Thanh (District) must expend 150 mines, Cai Lay (District) 100 mines and Cai Be (District) 120 mines. Main

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and secondary objectives for these mine attacks will be announced later. Each village in weak areas must mobilize six "A" (Squads) of civilian laborers equipped with tools to dig up roads. Each village in strong (VC) areas must have nine "A" (Squads) for the same purpose. Each district must establish ten earthen road-blocks and 15 obstacles with booby traps."

VC Activity along Route 4 - The Viet Cong appear to be heeding these injunctions to concentrate their efforts against Route 4. While Route 4 has historically been a major VC military objective (and a source of tax collections), the volume of mining and attacks has increased significantly in 1967. This is, in part, a reaction to the introduction of U.S. forces into the Delta. Most U.S. activity has been concentrated in Long An and Dinh Tuong provinces which are bisected by Route 4. In part, the VC reaction may also reflect a greater competition between the VC and the GVN for the resources (people and products) of the Delta--which will change the existing pattern of accommodation.

The table below shows that VC initiated activity against Route 4 in 1967 (through October) is already more than double all of 1966 in the three provinces between Saigon (Gia Dinh) and Can Tho. These numbers may understate VC activity because the objectives of the VC attack are not always labeled clearly. However, the data should be accurate enough to show the trend of VC activity. Included are such actions as minings, roadblocks and sniper fire.

VC ACTIVITY AGAINST ROUTE 4

<u>Province</u>	<u>1965</u>	<u>1966</u>	<u>1967<sup>a/</sup></u>
Long An	2	1	8
Dinh Tuong	49	57	120
Vinh Long	4	6	7
Total	<u>55</u>	<u>64</u>	<u>135</u>


a/ Based on data VCJSA File (NMCSSC) data for first 10 months of 1967.

Security Situation (HES Data)


We have grouped the hamlets near Route 4 based on their Hamlet Evaluation System (HES) scores. The hamlets are: secure (A, B, C), contested (D, E) and VC controlled. The series of hamlet status maps depicts all hamlets for a distance of 12 kilometers on either side of Route 4. Map 1 shows the hamlets rated secure by the HES. Maps 2 and 3 show contested and VC hamlets. Some sixty percent of the hamlets along Route 4 are VC or contested, as can be seen on Map 4.

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# STATUS OF HAMLETS ALONG ROUTE 4 AUGUST 1967




# STATUS OF HAMLETS ALONG ROUTE 4 AUGUST 1967




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# STATUS OF HAMLETS ALONG ROUTE 4 AUGUST 1967



# STATUS OF HAMLETS ALONG ROUTE 4 AUGUST 1967



## LEGEND

- A, B & C HAMLETS
- ▲ CONTESTED HAMLETS
- VC HAMLETS

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The simplest step, and perhaps the most productive, would be to provide additional ferries at the two major river crossings. If ferries are not immediately available, naval vessels such as LCM-8s or LCVPs could be used in the interim. Some way to avoid the long delays at the ferry points is badly needed.

Another problem that would seem amenable to solution is providing the material, including bridging equipment and surfacing material, to promptly repair damage due to mines. The key ingredient, however, is aggregate (crushed rock, gravel, clinkers, etc.) to fill in holes and provide a suitable base for the patching necessary to withstand heavy traffic. Aggregate is not readily available in the Delta and is normally trucked in from Saigon. It should be possible to build stockpiles of crushed rock at district and provincial towns that could be quickly trucked to the road cut. Alternatively, the R&D community may be able to develop ersatz fill material or a soil stabilizer to give more body to the fine alluvial soil in the Delta.

Preventing the mining is a far more difficult task, particularly since the VC control most of the area adjacent to the highway. Minings and road cuts often occur repeatedly in the same location as digging is easier and mines are harder to detect. A sapper team of 3 men can lay enough 20 kilogram command detonated demolitions in an hour to completely cut the road--and this often occurs within a few hundred meters of a manned outpost. Greater use of available technology and equipment might pay big dividends. Night vision, motion detection, and intrusion detection devices not only are unavailable to GVN forces in the area, but in general the U.S. advisors are unfamiliar with them. Their use might increase dramatically the amount of intelligence available on the VC efforts to interdict the road. Considering how straight the road is in most areas, various night vision or radar devices operated from high watch towers could provide effective surveillance. The few existing watch towers are only 6' high.

But the key factor in improving the security of Route 4, regardless of the technology or equipment provided, is to get the RVNAF troops to patrol and react to intelligence on VC activity. If this is not done, applying new technology which provides warning of VC activity will accomplish little. The fact that VC provincial and main force units regularly cross the route means that sizeable reaction forces would be needed to extricate a RF/PF unit. The presence of these units also inhibits the RVNAF from reacting to warnings of VC activity at night as they might encounter a full battalion.

Moreover, the capability of VC to respond, increasing their activity, must be considered. While they are already exerting great pressure against the road, they do permit a considerable volume of goods to move to Saigon. The traffic is a major source of tax revenue to the VC. The VC could probably devote more attention to interdiction and less to

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harassment. For example, there are two large bridges on Route 4 in Long An Province that the VC could probably destroy if they wanted. Thus a greater effort by the US GVN might result in less security and fewer trucks getting to Saigon.

The proposals discussed above are largely stop-gap measures to keep the traffic moving and to increase its flow. Such tactics attempt to prevent the VC from achieving his objective on the road by turning it into a battleground. A few words are in order about what would be required to provide lasting security for Route 4.

AB 143, the 1968 Combined Campaign Plan, charges the IV CTZ ARVN commander with responsibility to improve the security on Route 4 to "green." He can do this by committing all or most of his maneuver battalions to Route 4 and defend an envelope around it. However, no route has reached a permanent green status which has as high a density of VC and contested hamlets along it as has Route 4. A combination of GVN civil and military resources are required to neutralize the VC hamlets. Long term improvement in the security status of Route 4 cannot be achieved by the application of military force alone.

Recognition that the VC power structure must be attacked in depth to secure Route 4 is a major first step towards an effective action plan and program. None of the measures discussed previously attack the VC structure depicted on the hamlet status maps. Permanent improvement in security along Route 4 requires an integrated program of military operations, pacification and resettlement, a campaign plan which applies a mix of military forces, revolutionary development teams and GVN civilian program resources. The scope of this operation is such that even using all available resources it will probably require years to achieve the goal set in AB 143. Execution of such a plan is unprecedented in SVN.

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Visual inspection reveals that five stretches of road of five or more kilometers contain only VC or contested hamlets. The VC in such areas can collect taxes, plant mines, and otherwise harass road users at will. There are also many VC hamlets interspersed among friendly hamlets. The distribution of these hamlets facilitates raids on ninety percent of Route 4.

AB 143, the MACV-RVNAF Combined Campaign Plan for 1968, includes the goal of making secure during daytime Route 4 from Saigon to Bac Lieu (about 170 miles or 80% of its length) and achieving "amber status" for the remainder. Amber security status means that although the LOC is physically open frequent incidents will occur and an armed escort is required.

#### Highway Maintenance

Route 4 is basically a bituminous-surfaced (black top) road, 14 to 16 feet wide. Sections of gravel surfacing become more prevalent away from Saigon. Road conditions vary from good to poor. Raised shoulders and inadequate surface drainage cause rough and broken pavement in some sections. There are numerous bridges along the route. The surrounding terrain (largely rice paddies) restricts off-road movement during the rainy season and there are few alternate crossing points.

In the past the U.S. paid little attention to Route 4. Road programs emphasized LOC improvements to support military operations. But as military operations expand in the Delta and economic conditions are given more weight Route 4 is receiving greater attention. The MACV road rehabilitation program gives high priority to the 104 miles of Route 4 from Saigon to Can Tho. At present the effort is focused on just keeping Route 4 open; improvement is still some way off. COMUSMACV's November assessment summarized the situation as follows:

"Enemy interdiction of Route 4 in Dinh Tuong Province was heavy during the entire period. Road cratering and some hasty road blocks caused traffic halts during early morning hours. Rapid response by ARVN engineers and availability of crushed rock and general fill material obtained from U.S. sources at Dong Tam facilitated rapid repair. Route 4 was open to at least one lane traffic portions of each day. ARVN, U.S. and MPW (Ministry of Public Works) plans for 1968 have been coordinated toward the goal of restoring Route 4 to prewar conditions by rebuilding the base and sealing off or resurfacing where required."

#### Increasing the Security and Productivity of Route 4

A number of actions are feasible to make Route 4 more productive and secure. Some merely require resources, other require overt action by U.S. or Vietnamese forces. Most of these increases might improve security of the route but do not diminish the VC capability to threaten it.

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18

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Feb-67

III MAF POPULATION CONTROL

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TABLE A

COMPARISON OF III MAF AND MACV POPULATION CONTROL  
(Population in Thousands)

	CY 1966				Change
	Feb	May	Aug	Nov	
<u>III MAF</u>					
Population in TAOR	506.7	694.5	1050.3	1109.5	+602.8 <sup>a/</sup>
Population in 60 & 80% Secured Categories	217.5	370.9	521.8	618.1	+400.6
Percentage	42.9	53.4	49.7	55.7	+ 12.8 <sup>a/</sup>
<u>RVN POPULATION OUTSIDE III MAF TAOR</u>					
Total Population	2040.9	1924.6	1591.3	1523.9	-517 <sup>a/</sup>
Population Secured/Being Secured	870.3	826.1	890.1	750.7	-119.6
Percentage	42.6	42.9	55.9	49.3	+ 6.7
<u>TOTAL I CORPS</u>					
Population	2547.6	2619.1	2641.6	2633.4	+ 85.8
Population Secured/Being Secured	1109.8	1197.0	1325.9	1368.8	+259
Percentage	44	46	50	52	+ 8

<sup>a/</sup> The inconsistency in these numbers is due to a net change in the total population in I Corps due to natural population increase, refugees and census revisions.

In an attempt to evaluate the accuracy of the population control reporting systems of MACV/GVN and the Marine Corps, a comparative study was conducted. Since all of the I Marine Amphibious Force (III MAF) tactical areas of responsibility (TAOR) lie within I Corps in South Vietnam, III MAF population control data was compared with MACV/GVN I Corps data. It quickly became apparent that the two reporting systems

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differ considerably not only in the areas covered but in the criteria applied to measure security. Thus, the direct comparison of the two systems extremely difficult, and at present comparison impossible. Some tentative results were obtained, however, and are set forth in the following paragraphs.

The III MAF data (Table A) show the population in the 60 percent and above secured categories in their TAOR increased from 217,500 to 618,100 between February and November 1966. However, expansion of the III MAF TAOR increased its population by more than 602,000 (or 109,500 or 42 percent of I Corps) and it is likely that some of the rapid Marine progress is due to expanding into areas already in the being secured or secured MACV categories. For example, MACV/GVN I Corps reports indicate a 259,000 gain in the being secured and secured categories for the entire Corps; however, Table A indicates that in the shrinking area outside the Marine expanding TAOR a net loss of almost 120,000 people occurred in the foregoing two categories. This indicates that the Marine expansion absorbed the MACV/GVN reported progress.

MACV/GVN reports a decrease of 238,400 civilians under VC control over the 10-month time period. This is a result almost exclusively of the actions taken in June and July in the Danang area by the Ky government, and the operations of the USMC in the DMZ. There were corresponding increases in the other categories, particularly clearing.

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TABLE 1

MEASUREMENT OF PERCENT OF VILLAGES SECURED  
IN THE MARINE CORPS AREA OF OPERATION, 1965\*

	<u>Points</u>
1. <u>Destruction of Enemy Units</u>	
a. VC units destroyed or expelled	15
b. Local defensive force established	5
	<u>20</u>
2. <u>Destruction of Enemy Infrastructure</u>	
a. Village census completed	2
b. VC infrastructure destroyed	8
c. Local intelligence net established	5
d. Census, grievance interviews completed	2
e. Action completed on grievances	3
	<u>20</u>
3. <u>Vietnamese Establishment of Security</u>	
a. Defensive plan completed	2
b. Defensive installations completed	3
c. Security forces trained and in place	12
d. Communications net established	3
	<u>20</u>
4. <u>Establishment of Local Government</u>	
a. Village chief and council in office	4
b. Village chief residing in village	3
c. Hamlet chiefs and councils in office	4
d. Hamlet chiefs residing in hamlet	4
e. Psy-ops and information program established	3
f. Minimum social and administrative organization	2
	<u>20</u>
5. <u>Degree of New Life Program Development</u>	
a. Adequate public health program	4
b. Adequate education facilities	4
c. Adequate agricultural development	4
d. Adequate transportation facilities	4
e. Necessary markets established	4
	<u>20</u>
Total	100

\* Marine Corps categories include under 20 percent secured, 20 percent, 40 percent, 60 percent, and 80 percent or higher secured.

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TABLE 2

MACV DETERMINES A HAMLET SECURED WHEN THE FOLLOWING HAVE BEEN ACCOMPLISHED:

1. Census.  
VC infrastructure destroyed.  
Intelligence net established.
2. Popular forces trained.  
Popular forces armed.  
Popular forces qualified, ready.
3. Hamlet security effective within village defense system.
4. Hamlet grievances aired.  
Social/economic development projects begun.
5. Organization for RD and SD tasks.
6. Hamlet chiefs elected, trained, supported.

THE FOLLOWING ARE DEFINITIONS FOR THE MACV CATEGORIES OF AREA PACIFICATION:

Undergoing Clearing

1. RVNAF and/or FVMAF conducting operations to oust VC or NVA (company size minimum).
2. Can maintain or enhance security status achieved.

Undergoing Securing

1. Company size and over VC units eliminated.
2. RVNAF or FVMAF can prevent return.
3. Regular and Popular Forces operations provide security.
4. RD cadres working in hamlets to establish local government and eliminate VC infrastructure.

Secured

1. Hamlets secured or being consolidated.
2. Village councils elected.
3. Village administration committees appointed, trained and have support.
4. VC forces out and cannot return.

Uncontested

1. Neither actively attempting to exert political or military control.
2. Uninhabited area of no tactical or strategic importance.

VC Control

1. No GVN political or military presence.
2. VC can keep Regular and Popular Forces out.

1467

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MARINE PACIFICATION IN I CORPS

The III Marine Amphibious Force has operated in the I Corps area of South Vietnam since March of 1965. By the end of 1966, the USMC Tactical Area of Responsibility (TAOR) had expanded to include 1,109,500 civilians. Throughout the 21-month period, the Marine Corps has emphasized small unit counter-guerrilla actions, civilian population control and pacification techniques in attempting to achieve security in their area.

In an attempt to determine how effective they have been in this effort, we have used available data to compare the increase in Marine forces and operational area with the changes in the MACV monthly population control reports for the period February - December 1966. Enemy activity in the form of incidents was compared with the Marine Corps strength increase since March 1965 to gain insight into the VC/NVA reaction to the Marine buildup.

Analysis shows that I Corps pacification progress was excellent during the July - September 1966 buildup due exclusively to expansion of the Marine Corps area of operations; progress remained virtually stopped during the remainder of 1966.

Population Control

As shown in Table 1, the number of Marines increased from 46,700 in February 1966 to 70,600 by December 1966, while the Marine area of responsibility increased from 506,700 to 1,109,500 civilians during the same period. Table 1 also shows that the Marine area increased faster (in terms of civilian population) than the Marine forces until September, when the area leveled off in face of continued increases in Marine forces through December.

TABLE 1  
USMC TAOR EXPANSION VS MARINE STRENGTH

	<u>Feb</u>	<u>Jun</u>	<u>1966</u>	
<u>TAOR</u>			<u>Sep</u>	<u>Dec</u>
Number of Civilians (000)	506.7	797.5	1,086.6	1,109.5
Number of Marines (000)	46.7	55.7	57.6	70.6
Marines Per 1000 Civilians	92	70	53	64

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Table 2 compares the expansion of the Marine TAOR with the changes in the levels of security and population control in all of I Corps. The Marine Corps TAOR expansion does not affect the population control statistics significantly until after June 1966. Between June and September the TAOR expanded by about 290,000 people; this increase is reflected in a 280,000 decrease in the population under VC control during the same period. The decrease in VC controlled population, in turn, shows up as gains in the undergoing clearing and undergoing securing categories; very little of it is reflected in the secured category. In the ensuing period (Sep - Dec 1966), for which data is available, both the Marine Corp TAOR and the I Corps population control levels remained essentially static with a very slight decline both in the TAOR and the security levels, despite an increase in the number of Marines per 1000 civilian population (Table 1).

TABLE 2

USMC TAOR EXPANSION VS POPULATION CONTROL  
(Population in Thousands)

	1966			
	Feb	Jun	Sep	Dec
<u>USMC TAOR Expansion</u>	507	798	1086	1077
<u>I Corps Population</u>				
Under VC Control	842	886	606	623
Undergoing Clearing	568	499	661	569
Undergoing Securing	161	284	395	370
Secured	949	916	934	929

Thus data indicate that, after 15 months in I Corps (Mar 1965-June 1966), the Marine TAOR expanded into VC controlled areas for the first time and that the situation since September has remained static. The data also indicate that one must look at categories other than "secured" to assess pacification progress in I Corps.

VC/NVA Reaction to the Marine Buildup

Table 3 indicates that the enemy began to react to the Marine presence during the third quarter of 1965, about three months after the first Marines arrived. The reaction took the form of a 15% increase in total incidents (from 455 to 540 per month) and an 80% increase of incidents of harassing fire against troops (from 68 to 123 per month). During the next four quarters total incidents per month more than doubled, with the incident rate driven up largely by the fivefold increase of the harassing incidents.

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Increases in the harassing fire incidents seem to lag 90 days behind the increases in Marine strengths; similarly, the incident rate levels off one quarter behind the leveling off of the strength increases. As the harassing fire incidents reach their peak in the 2nd and 3rd quarters of 1966, sabotage incidents dropped by 65% to the lowest levels since early 1964.

TABLE 3

VC/NVA REACTION TO MARINE CORPS  
FORCE BUILDUP IN I CORPS  
(By Quarter)

	1964			1965				1966		
	2Q	3Q	4Q	1Q	2Q	3Q	4Q	1Q	2Q	3Q
<u>Nr. Marines (000)</u>				6	31	39	44	54	56	58
<u>VC/NVA Incidents (Monthly Avg)</u>										
Total Incidents	442	640	560	490	455	540	980	1130	1220	1205
Harassing Fire Against Troops	43	68	55	71	68	123	260	380	580	585
Sabotage	17	49	70	61	70	49	71	65	24	25



file 67

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USMC COMBINED ACTION PLATOON PROGRAM

The average security score of hamlets where Combined Action Platoons (CAP) are located is nearly twice that of the average hamlet security score in all of I Corps. Expansion of the CAP program to all insecure hamlets in SVN (10,454 out of 12,246 hamlets) would require about 279,000 Popular Forces and 167,000 US personnel at a cost of \$1.3 billion per year.

Concept and Program

U.S. Marine pacification efforts have been slowed by diversion of forces to the DMZ, but no Combined Action Platoons (CAP) have been pulled out of hamlets. The CAP concept calls for integrating one USMC rifle squad of volunteers with combat experience (14 plus 1 USN Corpsman) into a 39 man PF platoon, and putting the 54 man group into a hamlet to establish security. (In practice, PF platoons in I Corps average only 27 men instead of 39, which results in a ratio of 1 Marine per 1.7 PF in the average CAP.) In addition, headquarters support absorbs 1 additional Marine per CAP. At an estimated annual of \$10,000 per Marine, plus \$12,000 per PF platoon, the average CAP probably costs about \$172,000 per year.

The CAP program began in August 1965 with one platoon at Phu Bai in Thua Thien province. By the end of June 1967 there were 75 platoons (10 companies) throughout I Corps, including 1249 Marines and Navy Corpsmen and 2129 PF. The CY 1967 goal is to establish 114 CAPs (19 companies). This will require establishing CAPs at the rate of 6 or 7 per month during the last half of CY 1967 to form the 39 needed to meet the goal. Only 2.8 CAPs were established per month during January-May 1967. At this rate, the Marines would establish only 17 more CAPs by end 1967 - a shortfall of 22 platoons.

Effectiveness

The objectives of the CAP program are to strengthen the PF and bring them into the fight in support of revolutionary development, ultimately withdrawing the Marine squad when the PF platoon can stand on its own. In return, the Marines gain valuable intelligence, a thorough knowledge of the area and its people, and can provide greater security coverage for the population than U.S. troops alone could provide.

So far, no Marine squad has been withdrawn from a CAP, but the tangible benefits of the CAP program have included better intelligence and increased security for the 88,000 people in the CAP hamlets. The CAP hamlets have an average security score of 2.95 on the Hamlet Evaluation System (HES) scale of 5.0, a C rating; the average security score for all I Corps hamlets is 1.60, or D. According to the Marines, scores increase with the length of time a CAP is located in the hamlet. At least 20 of the 75 CAP hamlets have a B security rating. According to the Marine scoring system (based on villages), the 63 villages with CAPs have advanced twice as fast as those without. At the end of 1966, 23 (of 39 at that time) villages with CAP programs had reached the highest Marine rating (80% or more on a 100% scale). Less than one-sixth of the 114 villages in Marine areas without CAP teams reached that level.

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The morale and effectiveness of the PF in CAPs apparently increases. From August through December 1966, no PF deserted from CAP units. The CY 1966 kill ratio of CAPs (14 enemy for 1 friendly) far exceeds the I Corps PF kill ratio of 3 to 1.

### Expansion of the CAP Program

The reluctance of the GVN to assign PF personnel to CAPs is a serious problem in considering any expansion of the CAP program. Of the 24,000 PF in I CTZ in May 1967, less than one-tenth (2129) were in CAPs. Vietnamese officials are apparently reluctant to release PF from their absolute control to USMC supervision with the accompanying reduction of opportunities for graft, bribery and other corrupt practices.

Expansion of the CAP program to cover all of the 2242 unsecured I Corps hamlets (below A & B in HES) would require 62,776 PF and 35,872 US troops at an annual cost of \$386 million (\$172,000 per CAP). The May I Corps PF strength of 24,000 would furnish CAPs for 857 hamlets, requiring 13,712 U.S. personnel, and costing about \$147 million.

Countrywide expansion of the CAP program to cover all of the 10,454 unsecured hamlets in SVN would require 292,712 PF and 167,264 U.S. at an annual cost of about \$1.8 billion. The April worldwide PF strength of 142,500 would furnish CAPs for 5089 hamlets, requiring 81,424 US troops, and costing about \$875 million per year.

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June 68

CAP VERSUS NON-CAP HAMLET HES RATINGS IN I CTZ

Hamlets having US Marine Corps Combined Action Platoons (CAPs) nearby (as of January 1968) outperformed other I CTZ hamlets in terms of the Hamlet Evaluation System (HES) ratings between January 1967 and March 1968: security scores fell an average .20 points in CAP hamlets, while non-CAP dropped .26; development scores rose .16 in CAP hamlets, but fell .13 in non-CAP hamlets. HES ratings are made by CORDS district advisors.

The Marine CAP Program

The Combined Action Platoon (CAP) program of the US Marines, begun in August 1965, is aimed primarily at pacification. CAPs consist of a US Marine rifle squad (14 men) and a locally recruited Vietnamese Popular Force platoon (38 men). There are now 70 CAPs, all assigned within I CTZ.

To compare conditions in areas to which CAPs are assigned with non-CAP areas, we computed average HES indicator ratings in January 1967 and March 1968 for 58 hamlets nearest to the January 1968 locations of CAP teams in five provinces of I CTZ. (We excluded 37 hamlets, 12 with CAPs, in Danang because they were unrated by the HES in January 1967). For comparison, we also computed average ratings\* for the remaining 2357 hamlets in I CTZ (excluding those in Danang), even though many of them may have had CAPs in or near them at some time during the 15 months. A full fledged analysis would require data not available for our study: where each CAP was during each month, where the RD Cadre teams were, the conditions of each hamlet when the CAP was inserted, etc. Thus, our results are approximate at best and should be viewed accordingly.

I CTZ Overview

Because the heaviest conventional military activity of the war centers in I CTZ, the pacification effort there has not had a stable climate of security in which to operate. Table 1 shows that Hamlet Evaluation System (HES) security ratings for the 2415 hamlets in I CTZ (excluding 37 in Danang) dropped an average of .25 rating points over a 15 month period: from 1.54 (a "D minus" average) in January 1967 to 1.29 (an "E" average) in March 1968. HES development scores dropped .13 during the same period.

Table 1 shows that CAP hamlets outperformed non-CAP hamlets on every HES indicator but one - Hamlet Defense Plan (3A). Both CAP and non-CAP hamlets regressed significantly in security during the period: CAP hamlets dropped .20 in average ratings on the nine HES security indicators, while non-CAP hamlets fell .26. CAP hamlets also outpaced non-CAP on the nine development indicators: CAP hamlets gained .16, non-CAP regressed .13. In all cases CAP hamlets had higher average scores. The non-CAP hamlet average scores were reduced since more of the non-CAP hamlets were non-evaluated or VC controlled, however.

\* We assigned a zero score to VC and non-evaluated hamlets in calculating the averages.

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TABLE I

COMPARISON OF HES SCORES IN  
CAP VS. NON-CAP HAMLETS<sup>a/</sup>  
IN I CTZ  
January 1967 - March 1968  
(Average Numerical HES Ratings for all Hamlets)

	CAP Hamlets (As of Jan 1968) <sup>b/</sup>			Jan. 1967 Avg. Score
	Jan. 1967 Avg. Score	March 1968 Avg. Score	Difference	
1A VC Village Guerrilla Units	2.48	2.31	-.17	1.58
1B VC External Forces	2.44	2.33	-.11	1.42
1C VC Military Incidents	2.72	2.37	-.35	1.72
2A Hamlet Infrastructure	2.42	2.28	-.14	1.46
2B Village Infrastructure	2.39	2.26	-.13	1.51
2C Activities Affecting Hamlet	2.56	2.38	-.18	1.58
3A Hamlet Defense Plan	2.88	2.29	-.59	1.32
3B Friendly External Forces	2.72	2.52	-.20	1.56
3C Internal Security Activities	2.54	2.47	-.07	1.56
4A GVN Governmental Management	2.53	2.62	+.09	1.59
4B Census Grievance Program	1.97	2.19	+.22	1.20
4C Information/Psycop Activities	2.26	2.30	+.04	1.32
5A Public Health	1.95	2.28	+.33	1.17
5B Education	2.46	2.29	-.17	1.45
5C Welfare	2.05	2.33	+.28	1.32
6A Self Help Activity	1.97	2.10	+.13	1.59
6B Public Works	1.61	1.90	+.29	1.01
6C Economic Improvement	1.61	1.76	+.15	1.04
Security Score	2.57	2.37	-.20	1.52
Development Score	2.04	2.20	+.16	1.27
Total Score	2.31	2.28	-.03	1.40
Number of Hamlets	57	58		2299

- a/ CAP Hamlet - Hamlet closest to the assigned January 1968 location of each Combined Action Platoon  
Non-CAP Hamlet - All other hamlets in the five I CTZ provinces.
- b/ Excludes all hamlets in Danang.

# CONFIDENTIAL

b) b/

Difference	Non-CAP Hamlets <sup>b/</sup>		
	Jan. 1967 Avg. Score	March 1968 Avg. Score	Difference
-.17	1.58	1.33	-.25
-.11	1.42	1.04	-.38
-.35	1.72	1.30	-.42
-.14	1.46	1.27	-.19
-.13	1.51	1.31	-.20
-.18	1.58	1.39	-.19
-.59	1.32	1.12	-.20
-.20	1.56	1.28	-.28
-.07	1.56	1.34	-.22
+.09	1.59	1.33	-.26
+.22	1.20	1.20	0
+.04	1.32	1.24	-.08
+.33	1.17	1.08	-.09
-.17	1.45	1.22	-.23
+.28	1.32	1.17	-.15
+.13	1.59	1.17	-.42
+.29	1.01	.92	-.09
+.15	1.04	.91	-.13
-.20	1.52	1.26	-.26
+.16	1.27	1.14	-.13
-.03	1.40	1.20	-.20
	2299	2357	

All Hamlets <sup>b/</sup>		
Jan. 1967 Avg. Score	March 1968 Avg. Score	Difference
1.60	1.35	-.25
1.44	1.07	-.37
1.7-	1.33	-.41
1.48	1.29	-.19
1.53	1.33	-.20
1.60	1.41	-.19
1.36	1.15	-.21
1.59	1.31	-.28
1.58	1.37	-.21
1.61	1.36	-.25
1.22	1.22	0
1.34	1.26	-.08
1.19	1.11	-.08
1.47	1.25	-.22
1.34	1.20	-.14
1.60	1.19	-.41
1.02	.94	-.08
1.05	.93	-.12
1.54	1.29	-.25
1.29	1.16	-.13
1.42	1.22	-.20
2356	2415	

of each Combined Action Platoon.

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## Quang Tri Province

The northernmost province of I CTZ presents a startling contrast between CAP and non-CAP hamlets. Table 2 shows that the average HES total score in CAP hamlets increased .17 between January 1967 and March 1968, while that in non-CAP hamlets decreased .34 - a progress differential of +.51 for CAP hamlets. CAP hamlets improved on eleven indicators, regressed on five, and remained steady on two. Every HES indicator in non-CAP hamlets regressed except Census Grievance (4B).

TABLE 2

### QUANG TRI

#### SUMMARY OF HES SCORES CAP VS NON-CAP HAMLETS<sup>a/</sup>

January 1967 - March 1968

(Average Numerical HES Ratings for All Hamlets)

	<u>CAP Hamlets (As of Jan. 1968)</u>			<u>Non-CAP Hamlets</u>		
	<u>Jan</u> <u>1967</u> <u>Avg.</u> <u>Score</u>	<u>Mar</u> <u>1968</u> <u>Avg.</u> <u>Score</u>	<u>Differ-</u> <u>ence</u>	<u>Jan</u> <u>1967</u> <u>Avg.</u> <u>Score</u>	<u>Mar</u> <u>1968</u> <u>Avg.</u> <u>Score</u>	<u>Differ-</u> <u>ence</u>
Security Score	2.30	2.41	+ .11	1.75	1.39	- .36
Development Score	1.95	2.19	+ .24	1.77	1.44	- .33
Total Score	2.13	2.30	+ .17	1.76	1.42	- .34
No. of Hamlets	7	7		431	423	

<sup>a/</sup> CAP Hamlet - Hamlet closest to the assigned January 1968 location of each Combined Action Platoon.

Non-CAP Hamlet - All other hamlets in the province.

## Thua Thien Province

Thua Thien contains Hue, the historical capital of Vietnam, which suffered heavily during the VC/NVA Tet offensive. This is the only province in which CAP hamlets declined in HES total scores. However, the decline in CAP hamlets (.61) was less than for non-CAP hamlets (.77). Public Health, indicator 5A, rose in the CAP hamlets, while all other indicators (CAP and non-CAP) declined.

CONFIDENTIAL

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TABLE 3

## THUA THIEN

### SUMMARY OF HES SCORES CAP VS NON-CAP HAMLETS<sup>a/</sup>

January 1967 - March 1968

(Average Numerical HES Ratings for All Hamlets)

	<u>CAP Hamlets (As of Jan. 1968)</u>			<u>Non-CAP Hamlets</u>		
	<u>Jan</u> <u>1967</u> <u>Avg.</u> <u>Score</u>	<u>Mar</u> <u>1968</u> <u>Avg.</u> <u>Score</u>	<u>Differ-</u> <u>ence</u>	<u>Jan</u> <u>1967</u> <u>Avg.</u> <u>Score</u>	<u>Mar</u> <u>1968</u> <u>Avg.</u> <u>Score</u>	<u>Differ-</u> <u>ence</u>
Security Score	2.60	1.62	-.98	2.33	1.49	-.84
Development Score	2.25	2.00	-.25	2.02	1.33	-.69
Total Score	2.42	1.81	-.61	2.18	1.41	-.77
No. of Hamlets	14	14		441	454	

a/ CAP Hamlet - Hamlet closest to the assigned January 1968 location of each Combined Action Platoon.

Non-CAP Hamlet - All other hamlets in the province.

### Quang Nam Province

Both CAP and non-CAP groups made about the same progress during the January 1967 to March 1968 time period. Many of the CAP hamlets in Quang Nam had CAPs in place well before January 1967 and their progress since that date is not dramatic. Security score increases in non-CAP hamlets (.08) outpaced those in CAP hamlets (.03).

### Quang Tin Province

HES scores progressed in all hamlets. The CAP hamlets' development status rose .64 (from 1.73 to 2.37) from January 1967 to March 1968 while the non-CAP hamlets rose .23 (from .74 to .97). Security status also improved more in the CAP area (.25) than the non-CAP area (.13). The GVN Governmental Management indicator 4A shot up 1.00 in the CAP hamlets compared to a rise of only .28 in the non-CAP.

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TABLE 4

## QUANG BINH

### SUMMARY OF HES SCORES CAP VS NON-CAP HAMLETS<sup>a/</sup>

January 1967 - March 1968

(Average Numerical HES Ratings for All Hamlets)

	CAP Hamlets (As of Jan. 1968)			Non-CAP Hamlets		
	Jan 1967	Mar 1968	Differ- ence	Jan 1967	Mar 1968	Differ- ence
	Avg. Score	Avg. Score		Avg. Score	Avg. Score	
Security Score	2.56	2.59	+0.03	1.34	1.42	+0.08
Development Score	2.02	2.19	+0.17	1.00	1.12	+0.12
Total Score	2.29	2.39	+0.10	1.18	1.27	+0.09
No. of Hamlets	22	23		528	540	

a/ CAP Hamlet - Hamlet closest to the assigned January 1968 location of each Combined Action Platoon.

Non-CAP Hamlet - All other hamlets in the province.

TABLE 5

## QUANG TIN

### SUMMARY OF HES SCORES CAP VS NON-CAP HAMLETS<sup>a/</sup>

January 1967 - March 1968

(Average Numerical HES Ratings for All Hamlets)

	CAP Hamlets (As of Jan. 1968)			Non-CAP Hamlets		
	Jan 1967	Mar 1968	Differ- ence	Jan 1967	Mar 1968	Differ- ence
	Avg. Score	Avg. Score		Avg. Score	Avg. Score	
Security Score	2.07	2.32	+0.25	.93	1.06	+0.13
Development Score	1.73	2.37	+0.64	.74	.97	+0.23
Total Score	1.90	2.34	+0.44	.84	1.01	+0.17
No. of Hamlets	7	7		425	425	

a/ CAP Hamlet - Hamlet closest to the assigned January 1968 location of each Combined Action Platoon.

Non-CAP Hamlet - All other hamlets in the province.

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## Quang Ngai Province

Some security regression occurred in Quang Ngai's CAP hamlets during the period (a drop of .19) but less than in non-CAP hamlets (.33). CAP hamlets advanced enough in development to raise the total hamlet scores; non-CAP hamlet scores advanced in only three development indicators (1B, 6A, 6C).

TABLE 6

QUANG NGAI  
SUMMARY OF HES SCORES  
CAP VS NON-CAP HAMLETS<sup>a/</sup>  
January 1967 - March 1968  
(Average Numerical HES Ratings for All Hamlets)

	<u>CAP Hamlets (As of Jan. 1968)</u>			<u>Non-CAP Hamlets</u>		
	<u>Jan</u> <u>1967</u> <u>Avg.</u> <u>Score</u>	<u>Mar</u> <u>1968</u> <u>Avg.</u> <u>Score</u>	<u>Differ-</u> <u>ence</u>	<u>Jan</u> <u>1967</u> <u>Avg.</u> <u>Score</u>	<u>Mar</u> <u>1968</u> <u>Avg.</u> <u>Score</u>	<u>Differ-</u> <u>ence</u>
Security Score	3.32	3.13	-.19	1.29	.96	-.33
Development Score	2.11	2.45	+.34	.90	.89	-.01
Total Score	2.72	2.79	+.07	1.10	.92	-.18
No. of Hamlets	7	7		474	515	

a/ CAP Hamlet - Hamlet closest to the assigned January 1968 location of each Combined Action Platoon.  
Non-CAP Hamlet - All other hamlets in the province.

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CONFIDENTIAL

THE US MARINE CORPS COMBINED ACTION PROGRAM

The two original CAP program objectives of gaining 3 effective PF for 1 Marine, and improving the PF enough for the Marines to phase out, have not been met. There are only 1.4 PF per Marine in the 1968 program and the trend is down. A PF unit has not yet been brought up to the point where the Marines can withdraw. On the contrary, CAP Marines, per man, are taking 2.4 times the casualties of the PF in the CAPs. Nonetheless, CAPs may be paying their way in terms of pacification, protection of Danang and the roads in I CTZ, improved intelligence, and forward control of allied air and artillery support in populated areas.

The Combined Action Program of the US Marines began in August 1965. A Combined Action Platoon (CAP) consists of one US Marine rifle squad (14 men), one US Navy medical corpsman and a locally recruited Popular Force platoon (38 men). Six to twelve CAPs are administered and coordinated by Combined Action Companies (CACO) which in turn are organized in Combined Action Groups (CAGS). Mobile Training Teams (MTTs) are employed in training Popular Force platoons (PF) which are not a part of the Combined Action Program. The growth of the CAP Program and MTTs is depicted in Table 1.

TABLE 1<sup>a/</sup>

Combined Action Program

	<u>CAG</u>	<u>CACO</u>	<u>CAP</u>	<u>MTT</u>
1965	-	1	7	-
1966	-	8	57	--
1967	3	14	79	-
1968 <sup>b/</sup>	4	19	103 <sup>c/</sup>	11
1969 <sup>b/</sup>	5	31	237	15
1970 <sup>b/</sup>	5	31	237	15

a/ Source: HQMC (AO3E) and US Marine Forces in Vietnam March 1965-September 1968.

b/ Projected.

c/ Actual strength November 1968 is 99.

US Marine/Popular Force Participation

The CAP program originally envisioned that active participation by one US Marine would result in a gain of 3 effective Popular Force troops,<sup>1/</sup> but Table 2 shows that the program has never achieved a 3 to 1 ratio. The maximum

1/ FMFPAC, The Marine Combined Action Program Vietnam, p. 7.

CONFIDENTIAL

relative participation of 1.9 PF Forces to 1 Marine occurred in 1966 when the program was about half its current size (Table 1). Since 1966, the Popular Force participation has dwindled to an average 1968 low of about 1.4 PF to 1 Marine. Statistics are not available on projected PF participation in 1969 and 1970, but Marine/PF participation in 1970 would be about 1 to 1 if the 1966-68 trend continues.

TABLE 2  
US Marine/PF Participation in the  
Combined Action Program (Strength)

	<u>US Marines Total</u>	<u>PF Total</u>	<u>PF/USMC Ratio</u>
1965a/	97	160	1.6:1
1966a/	786	1482	1.9:1
1967b/	1353	2011	1.5:1
1968c/			
1Q	1465	2206	1.5:1
2Q	1836	2334	1.3:1
3Q	1974	2653	1.3:1

a/ Source: US Marine Forces in Vietnam March 1965-September 1967.

b/ Source: Operations US Marine Forces Vietnam - December 1967.

c/ Source: Operations US Marine Forces Vietnam - March, June, September 1968.

US Marine/Popular Force Casualties

The most basic objective of the CAP program was to permit an eventual orderly phase-out of US Marines as the PF improved enough to take over the security role by themselves.<sup>1/</sup> However, in over three years of operations no evidence exists that US Marines have been able to withdraw from a CAP solely because their Vietnamese counterparts were able to take over. On the contrary, review of casualty figures suggests that US Marines have assumed more than their proportionate share of combat tasks. Table 3 indicates that in 1968<sup>2/</sup>, CAP Marines were killed at a rate of 1.5 Marines to 1 PF, even though the personnel ratio of Marines to PF was 0.7 to 1. In the same period, 1.8 Marines were wounded for each PF wounded. Thus, per man, the Marine

<sup>1/</sup> Ibid.

<sup>2/</sup> Prior to 1968, Marine/PF casualties were not reported separately from total USMC/RVNAF casualties.

## CONFIDENTIAL

casualties were 2.4 times higher than the PF casualties during 1968. This suggests that the Marines have assumed a major share of the combat tasks and that they function more as direct combat leaders than as advisors in the Combined Action Program. In addition to combat leadership, the Marine is instrumental in providing US support to the PF in the form of artillery, air and other supporting arms, as well as medical evacuation and, in many cases, ground reinforcement. In short, the Marine appears to be the cornerstone of the PF effectiveness and it is doubtful whether he could be withdrawn without a significant decrease in PF performance.

TABLE 3<sup>a/</sup>

	<u>USMC Vs PF Casualties</u>		<u>USMC/PF</u>
	<u>USMC</u>	<u>PF</u>	<u>Ratio</u>
1968 <sup>b/</sup>			
KIA	193	127	1.5:1
WIA	635	360	1.8:1

a/ HQMC, Command Center and Casualty section, includes USN.

b/ As of 20 November 1968.

### Other Factors Which Must be Considered

The failure of the CAP program to meet two of its prime original objectives does not mean the program is a failure or that it does not provide significant benefits far exceeding its costs. Other evidence suggests that the program is quite worthwhile.

Hamlets having CAPs nearby (as of January 1968) outperformed other I CTZ hamlets in terms of the Hamlet Evaluation System ratings between January 1967 and March 1968. Security scores fell an average .20 points in CAP hamlets, while non-CAP hamlets dropped .26, or 30% more. Development scores rose .16 in CAP hamlets, but fell .13 in non-CAP hamlets. The HES ratings, made by CORDS district advisors, also indicate that CAP hamlets survived the Tet offensive better than hamlets not protected by these units.<sup>1/</sup> In total combat activities and combat performance, the Marines report that CAP units have consistently outperformed non-CAP PF and RD units and on several occasions, have outperformed US units.<sup>2/</sup> During the Tet offensive, the CAPs reportedly

1/ Southeast Asia Analysis Reports, June 1968, p. 52, and July 1968, p. 27.

2/ US Marine Forces in Vietnam March 1965-September 1967 and Operations of US Marine Forces, Vietnam, December 1967, January through September 1968.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

were instrumental in keeping enemy units out of Danang,<sup>1/</sup> the only major city in SVN that was not penetrated by the enemy; this alone could justify the program.

The impact of the CAPs on the enemy is difficult to assess, but his reaction to them has been pronounced. From November 1, 1967 to January 31, 1968, 49% of the enemy initiated attacks in I CTZ were directed against CAPs; in February 1968, 38% were against CAPs.<sup>1/</sup> It is significant that this period of high activity against the CAPs coincides with the buildup and attack phases of the Tet offensive.

It is also difficult to assess the benefits from locating CAPs along the lines of communication throughout I CTZ. They seem to be more than just an irritant to the enemy, because he has tried to dislodge CAPs from these positions by attacks on several occasions. The best example occurred on January 7, 1968 when the enemy attempted to dislodge three CAPs from positions astride National Route #1, north of Danang, in a well-coordinated series of attacks.<sup>1/</sup> If the CAPs are playing a key role in keeping I CTZ roads open at a lower cost than other means, this would be another plus for the program.

On numerous occasions Vietnamese civilians have voluntarily given intelligence to Marines and their PF counterparts. It is doubtful whether such information would be forthcoming to strangers, or whether it would be acted upon promptly if the Marines were not there. Again, assessment of this factor is difficult without comprehensive data.

There is some indication that villagers are ambivalent about having a CAP in their village. On the one hand, they fear that the enemy will target the village because the CAP is there. On the other, they welcome the improvement in day to day security which keeps the VC tax collector away, and the control the CAP exercises over allied artillery and air support, thus ensuring they won't be hurt by it. With the renewed emphasis on pacification, the CAP concept may provide a useful way to upgrade security in the short run and to ensure that application of massive allied firepower does not hurt pacification efforts.

<sup>1/</sup> Operations of US Marine Forces, Vietnam, January and February 1968.

CONFIDENTIAL

March 1967

**CONFIDENTIAL**

PROBLEMS IN PROVIDING VILLAGE SECURITY

The new GVN laws and decrees regarding village administration apparently may lead to the development of a hamlet militia force which would operate below the Popular Force level. This concept has not worked in the past.

The legal framework for the reorganization of village and hamlet administration and the election of village/hamlet officials stems from a series of laws and decrees promulgated on 24 December 1966 and 9 January 1967. The new laws restore an elected village council with authority over budget, taxes, land transfers, public services, and internal village legal matters.


As initially drafted, the decrees subordinated the local Popular Force commander and his troops to control of the village chief; however, reportedly under pressure from former Defense Minister Co and others, the language was changed in the final decree to give the village chief only the authority to request the Popular Forces to provide support. This effectively denies the village chief the direct control of forces needed to secure his village area. The Ministry of Revolutionary Development appears to have gotten around this barrier to military protection by sponsoring the enactment of a law creating "People's Self Defense Forces," a hamlet militia to be trained and equipped by RD teams. These militia groups supposedly will be able to provide security in hamlet/village complexes where no Popular Forces are available or where the local military commander is uncooperative. This type of force has been tried in SVN before and has not worked except in a few isolated cases. In addition, it adds one more uncoordinated security force to the many already in Vietnam.

**CONFIDENTIAL**

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REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT (RD) PERSONNEL <sup>a</sup>

Little progress in increasing the number of RD cadre in CY 1967 is evident and large increases are unlikely to occur during the rest of the year. In May 1967, only one more RD team was in the field than in January 1967 (Table 1 and Graph 1).



The RD team and support strength in May 1967 dropped 1079 below that of January. Concurrently, the number of Truong Son workers (a Montagnard security and development program) increased by nearly 15%, primarily due to input of personnel from other Montagnard programs which are being phased down and reorganized.

The Revolutionary Development program has significant problems in recruiting and retaining high quality personnel (Table 2). Total desertions of RD workers rose 354% from January to May 1967; II Corps was particularly hard hit with a 700% increase (Table 3 and Graph 2). RD resignations have doubled during the period. Discharges to weed out inefficient personnel also rose substantially, indicating that the quality of team workers has probably gone up, and that mere maintenance of the number of RD workers in the field should not be the sole criterion for judging the current strength of the program.

Any expectations of a large increase in RD workers during 1967 would appear to be over optimistic; consolidation, organization and vitalization of the RD worker program appear to be more appropriate goals for 1967.

a/ Includes RD workers, Truong Son, and Static Census Grievance personnel.

CONFIDENTIAL

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Table 1 - RD Strengths

	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May
	1967				
RD Teams	<u>420</u>	<u>416</u>	<u>413</u>	<u>411</u>	<u>421</u>
RD Strength - Teams and Support	23374	22992	22200	21440	22295
Truong Son Strength	5642	5416	6040	6280	6472
Static Census Grievance Strength	5131	5405	5463	5440	5259
RD and Truong Son Personnel in Training	<u>4455</u>	<u>4532</u>	<u>5826</u>	<u>6981</u>	<u>4945</u>
Total RD Personnel	<u>38602</u>	<u>38345</u>	<u>39599</u>	<u>40141</u>	<u>38971</u>

Table 2 - Monthly RD Personnel<sup>a/</sup> Losses by Type Loss - 1967

	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May
KIA	<u>38</u>	<u>27</u>	<u>80</u>	<u>73</u>	<u>43</u>
MIA <sup>b/</sup>	9	3	19	20	18
Captured <sup>b/</sup>	19	45	10	28	13
Discharged	131	167	199	183	279
Resigned	70	142	210	105	146
Deserted	<u>148</u>	<u>254</u>	<u>417</u>	<u>363</u>	<u>672</u>
TOTAL	<u>415</u>	<u>638</u>	<u>935</u>	<u>772</u>	<u>1173 c/</u>

- <sup>a/</sup> Includes RD Workers, Truong Son and Static Census Grievance personnel.  
<sup>b/</sup> MIA and captured figures may include some overlap.  
<sup>c/</sup> Includes two retirees.

Table 3 - RD DESERTIONS<sup>a/</sup> - CY 1967

	1967	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May
Corps						
I		48	85	47	43	115
II		49	81	220	190	392
III		18	18	16	67	83
IV		<u>33</u>	<u>70</u>	<u>134</u>	<u>63</u>	<u>82</u>
TOTAL		<u>148</u>	<u>254</u>	<u>417<sup>c/</sup></u>	<u>363</u>	<u>672</u>
RD Workers		144	227	361	310	435
Truong Son <sup>b/</sup>		4	27	55	53	237

- <sup>a/</sup> Includes RD Workers, Truong Son, and Static Census Grievance personnel.  
<sup>b/</sup> Montagnard "RD" Workers.  
<sup>c/</sup> Static Census Grievance one desertion.

**CONFIDENTIAL**



*July 1967*

## CONFIDENTIAL

### VC EFFORTS TO DISRUPT PACIFICATION

VC actions against Revolutionary Development workers are up sharply in 1967, and have caused a sharp rise in the desertion rate. However, the number of RD workers killed is running below the 1966 rate.

Prior to 1966 the enemy reaction to US-GVN pacification programs was mild; he apparently did not believe those programs threatened him. In 1966, however, his interest began to grow and a systematic pattern of activities including attacks, assassinations and kidnapping began to emerge.

Table 1 shows VC incidents against Revolutionary Development (RD) workers and RD worker attrition. It shows that:

1. Incidents against RD teams tripled abruptly in March 1967 and have remained at a rate 2.5 times higher than the January-February 1967 level.
2. The number of RD workers killed reached its highest level in March and April 1967, but the first half 1967 rate was slightly below the 1966 rate.
3. RD worker desertions rose sharply in March 1967 and the subsequent rate is about double the January-February level. Moreover, RD desertions per LOCO personnel have risen to 1.6 times the 1966 rate. About 16% of the RD cadre will desert this year, and average total losses will be about 34% of strength.
4. RD worker strength in the field declined from February to April and rose thereafter. The net gain between January and July was 1447 workers (6% over January).

Table 2 shows that RD workers comprise a growing proportion of the total GVN officials and employees who are assassinated, with the sharp rise in assassinations beginning in March 1967. Throughout the past year, RD workers have been abducted at a steady rate of about 5 per month.

**CONFIDENTIAL**

TABLE 1

RD CADRE: INCIDENTS AND LOSSES

	Total 1966	Jan	Feb	Mar
VC Incidents Against RD Teams	a/	44	48	126
RD Worker Attrition				
KIA	593	37	20	62
MIA b/	N/A	9	3	19
Captured b/	N/A	18	44	6
Discharged	N/A	127	108	174
Resigned	N/A	51	94	151
Deserted	N/A d/	144	227	361
Retired	N/A	0	0	0
Total Losses		386	496	773
RD Worker Field Strength	17998 e/	23374	22992	22200
Monthly Desertion Rate per 1000	8.4 d/	6.2	9.9	16.3

Source: CIA for 1967; USMACV/CORDS for 1966.

- a/ Not reported. 25 "major attacks" were recorded.
- b/ May include some overlap of MIA/Captured.
- c/ Average strength during period.
- d/ Reports available for Sept-Dec only show 603 desertions. On basis of average 19 this gives average monthly desertions of 8.4 per thousand.
- e/ Computed as average monthly desertions per average worker field strength in thou

1967						First Half 1967	1967 July
Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun		
44	48	126	110	83	109	520	126
37	20	62	60	36	45	260	35
9	3	19	20	18	0	69	0
18	44	6	22	11	25	126	40
127	108	174	165	252	209	1035	106
51	94	151	68	95	88	547	104
144	227	361	310	435	388	1865	311
0	0	0	0	2	0	2	8
386	496	773	645	849	755	3904	604
23374	22992	22200	21440	22295	23824	22688 $\frac{2}{1}$	24821
6.2	9.9	16.3	14.5	19.5	16.3	13.7 $\frac{2}{1}$	12.5

s. On basis of average 1966 strength of 17998,  
and.  
ker field strength in thousands.

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TABLE 2

ASSASSINATIONS AND ABDUCTIONS OF RD WORKERS  
(Monthly)

	3Q 1966 <sup>a/</sup>		4Q 1966		Jan
	No.	(%)	No.	(%)	
<u>Assassinations</u>					
RD Workers	7	(16)	10	(20)	5
Other GVN Officials/Employees	36	(84)	39	(80)	33
Total	43	(100)	49	(100)	38
<u>Abductions</u>					
RD Workers	8	(31)	2	(5)	6
Other GVN Officials/Employees	18	(69)	35	(95)	27
Total	26	(100)	37	(100)	33
<u>Total Assassinations and Abductions</u>					
RD Workers	15	(22)	12	(14)	11
Other GVN Officials/Employees	54	(78)	74	(86)	60
Total	69	(100)	86	(100)	71

Source: CORDS Public Safety Division Monthly Airgram, "VC Assassination and Abduction of GVN Person

a/ July 1966 data not available. Aug-Sept data was divided by 2.

4Q 1966

No.	(%)
10	(20)
39	(80)
<u>49</u>	<u>(100)</u>

1Q 1967

Jan	Feb	Mar
5	4	24
33	36	33
<u>38</u>	<u>40</u>	<u>57</u>

No.	(%)
11	(24)
34	(76)
<u>45</u>	<u>(100)</u>

2Q 1967

Apr	May	Jun
21	16	41
53	30	48
<u>77</u>	<u>46</u>	<u>89</u>

No.	(%)
27	(38)
44	(62)
<u>71</u>	<u>(100)</u>

No.	(%)
2	(5)
35	(95)
<u>37</u>	<u>(100)</u>

Jan	Feb	Mar
5	7	3
27	9	14
<u>32</u>	<u>16</u>	<u>17</u>

No.	(%)
5	(23)
17	(77)
<u>22</u>	<u>(100)</u>

Apr	May	Jun
12	0	2
30	26	15
<u>-2</u>	<u>26</u>	<u>17</u>

No.	(%)
5	(17)
24	(83)
<u>29</u>	<u>(100)</u>

No.	(%)
12	(14)
74	(86)
<u>86</u>	<u>(100)</u>

Jan	Feb	Mar
11	11	27
60	45	47
<u>71</u>	<u>56</u>	<u>74</u>

No.	(%)
16	(24)
51	(76)
<u>67</u>	<u>(100)</u>

Apr	May	Jun
35	16	43
83	56	63
<u>119</u>	<u>72</u>	<u>106</u>

No.	(%)
32	(32)
63	(68)
<u>100</u>	<u>(100)</u>

ation and Abduction of GVN Personnel and Civilians."

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### RD CADRE ATTRITION

Revolutionary Development cadre are deserting at a rate of 27% per year, higher than for any GVN military force, perhaps because they have a 30% better chance of being killed than the military forces. Adding other losses raises the total RD cadre attrition rate to 32% per year. Project Takeoff is attempting to reduce the attrition rate by improving RD cadre discipline, morale, and benefits. PF are being trained to play a larger role in RD as territorial security receives more emphasis.

### Desertions

Table 1 shows that RD cadre (including Truong Son, montagnard, cadre teams) deserted at a rate of 18 per 1000 per month, or 21% per year, in the second quarter of 1968. Other losses (KIA, captured/missing, resignations and retirements) attrite another 11% a year. Thus the RD program will probably lose 32% of its current strength in 1968 or over 13,000 men.

Table 2 shows that the RD cadre gross\* desertion rate is higher than the gross desertion rate for the RVNAF forces in 1967 and 1968. It ranges from 12% to 26% higher for the three half year periods shown, with the gap narrowing in 1968.

### KIA Rates

The high RD desertion rate may be due, in part, to a KIA rate which was 35% higher for RD cadre than for other RVNAF in 1968 (and 65% higher in the second half of 1967). Table 2 shows that RD cadre have been killed at the rate of 3.1 per 1000 each month in 1968, versus a rate of 2.3 for the RVNAF forces. An RD cadre in 1968 had twice the chance of getting killed as an RF or PF trooper.

### Project Takeoff Program

The high rate of RD cadre desertions is receiving attention in pacification planning. According to CORDS field reports in July 1968, US advisors are trying to get the GVN to reduce RD cadre attrition as a part of Project Takeoff. Among the RD program improvements which are being pushed are the following:

\* We have no data on RD cadre net desertions.

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1. Improving discipline by increasing punitive measures for deserting the program, including enforcing current GVN directives, removing AWOLs from the payroll, and drafting AWOL personnel into ARVN.
2. Increasing benefits as incentive for longer service, including giving a bonus for reenlistment.
3. Improving morale and prestige as a means of gaining stronger commitment to the RD program. For instance, the GVN Vietnam Information Service (VIS) is advertising the RD program on its radio/TV broadcasts. Also one corps headquarters reports that it has worked out plans to provide artillery support for RD teams within range of friendly supporting artillery. (We have no data concerning the others.)
4. Selecting better candidates for leadership training classes.
5. Using mobile RD and RF/PF training teams to re-motivate and refresh the training of RD groups regularly.
6. Regularly providing in-province training for recruits before they go to Vung Tau for RD "basic" training.
7. Stimulating interest and knowledge in the RD program among GVN officials.
8. Developing effective means of supervising "stay-behind" cadre after the full 59-man team leaves a completed hamlet. For instance, the 59-man teams may remain in the same village, a short distance away from the completed hamlet.

We do not know how well the programs are succeeding, but the statistics seem to indicate that more protection for the RD cadre might raise morale and lower attrition better than any other measure.

### Reevaluation of RD Priorities

The GVN Ministry of Revolutionary Development has directed the 714 RD teams to concentrate on building hamlet security, and to defer, at least temporarily, the hamlet development projects which formerly constituted 6 of the teams' 11 RD tasks. In addition, US advisors are emphasizing integrated territorial security planning at all levels: For instance, 1047 of the 4487 PF platoons have been programmed for training in RD tasks; of these, at least 561 had completed basic, refresher, or in-place RD training by July 31. Presumably the 1047 platoons will be able to assist the 5-man stay-behind RD teams in protecting hamlets already "pacified."

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TABLE 1

RD PROGRAM STRENGTH AND ATTRITION <sup>a/</sup>

	1967		1968		1967			
	1st Half	2nd Half	1st Half		1st Qtr	2nd Qtr	3rd Qtr	4th Qtr
<u>Average Strength (In Province)</u>								
RD Cadre	22688	26169	32336		22855	22520	24969	27369
Truong Son Cadre	6087	6302	6644		5699	6475	6479	6125
Total	28775	32471	38980		28554	28995	31448	33494
<u>Attrition</u>								
RD Cadre:								
KIA	260	441	617		119	141	174	267
Deserted	1865	2224	3030		732	1133	1017	1207
Other	1779	1574	1343		804	975	852	722
Total	3904	4239	4990		1655	2249	2043	2196
TS Cadre:								
KIA	93	98	104		23	70	59	39
Deserted	491	427	864		86	405	217	210
Other	139	249	234		79	60	120	129
Total	723	774	1202		188	535	396	378
Total:								
KIA	353	539	721		142	211	233	306
Deserted	2356	2651	3894		818	1538	1234	1417
Other	1918	1823	1577		883	1035	972	851
Total	4627	5013	6192		1843	2784	2439	2574
<u>Monthly Desertions Per Thousand In- Province Strength</u>								
RD Cadre	13.7	14.2	15.6		10.7	16.8	13.6	14.7
TS Cadre	13.4	11.3	21.7		5.0	20.8	11.1	11.4
Both	13.6	13.6	16.6		9.5	17.7	13.1	14.1
<u>Monthly Attrition Per Thousand In- Province Strength</u>								
RD Cadre	28.7	27.0	25.7		24.1	33.3	27.3	26.7
TS Cadre	19.8	20.5	30.2		11.0	27.5	20.4	20.6
Both	26.8	25.7	26.5		21.5	32.0	25.9	25.6

<sup>a/</sup> Source: CORDS.**CONFIDENTIAL**



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nd tr	3rd Qtr	4th Qtr	1968	
			1st Qtr	2nd Qtr
520	24969	27369	0272	34400
475	6479	6125	6847	6441
995	31448	33494	7119	40841
141	174	267	341	276
133	1017	1207	1365	1665
975	852	722	675	668
2249	2043	2196	2381	2609
70	59	39	57	47
405	217	210	328	536
60	120	129	138	96
535	396	378	523	679
211	233	306	398	323
1538	1234	1417	1693	2201
1035	972	851	813	764
2784	2439	2574	2904	3288
16.8	13.6	14.7	15.0	16.1
20.8	11.1	11.4	16.0	27.7
17.7	13.1	14.1	15.2	18.0
33.3	27.3	26.7	25.2	25.3
27.5	20.4	20.6	25.5	35.1
32.0	25.9	25.6	26.1	26.8

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TABLE 2  
COMPARISON OF RD AND RVNAF ATTRITION RATES a/

	1967			1968			1967		1968	
	1st Half	2nd Half	1st Half	1st Qtr	2nd Qtr	3rd Qtr	4th Qtr	1st Qtr	2nd Qtr	
<u>Desertions Per 1000 Per Month</u>										
RD/TSRD Cadre	13.6	13.6	16.6	9.5	17.7	13.1	14.1	15.2	18.0	
RVNAF:										
Regular Forces	10.7	10.4	15.9	11.7	9.7	9.7	11.0	16.1	15.8	
Regional Forces	10.5	9.7	12.0	10.2	10.7	10.0	9.4	10.3	13.4	
Popular Forces	13.6	13.1	15.0	14.2	13.0	13.5	12.7	13.3	16.6	
Total RVNAF	11.3	10.8	14.8	12.0	10.7	10.6	11.0	14.1	15.4	
<u>KIA Per 1000 Per Month</u>										
RD/TSRD Cadre	2.0	2.8	3.1	1.7	2.4	2.5	3.0	3.6	2.6	
RVNAF:										
Regular Forces	1.6	1.5	2.9	1.6	1.6	1.3	1.6	3.7	2.2	
Regional Forces	1.8	1.5	1.4	1.8	1.8	1.5	1.5	1.1	1.7	
Popular Forces	2.0	2.4	1.6	2.0	2.0	2.1	2.7	1.6	1.6	
Total RVNAF	1.7	1.7	2.3	1.7	1.8	1.5	1.8	2.6	2.0	

a/ Source: CORDS for RD cadre data.  
SEA Statistical Tables, Tables 1A, 4A, and 4B for RVNAF data.

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## RD CADRE ATTRITION: A CORRECTION

Last month we indicated that RD cadre are deserting at a higher rate than for any GVN military force. This was wrong. The rates cited were for RD cadre in provinces and should not have been applied to total RD strength nor compared to rates for total RVNAF strength. Applying two corrected approaches, we find that:

1. In terms of total strengths,

(a) RD cadre are deserting at a rate of 16% per year, below PF and Regular forces but above the RF and well within the noise level of these statistics.

(b) Total RD attrition rate in 1968 is at an annual rate of 26%.

(c) The 1968 RD cadre monthly KIA rate (through June) of 2.5 per 1000 is 79% above the PF rate, 56% above the RF rate, but 16% below the regular forces rate.

2. In terms of combat/in-province strength, RD cadre are deserting at about half the rate of gross desertions from Vietnamese Army and Marine combat units.

### Attrition Rates Based on Total Strength

Table 1 shows RD cadre desertion and KIA rates based on total strengths. In 1968, RD cadre are deserting at a rate of 16% per year (13.6 per 1000 per month); adding other losses raises the rate to 26% per year (21.6 per 1000 per month). The RD cadre monthly desertion rate of 13.6 per 1000 strength was less than RVNAF Regular Forces and PF rates (15.9 per 1000 per month and 15.0 per 1000 per month respectively), but higher than the RF rate of 12.0 per 1000 per month.

RD cadre this year have been almost twice as likely (179%) to be killed in action as PF and 156% as likely as the RF, but only 86% as likely as Regular Force personnel.

### Attrition Rates Based on In-Province/Combat Personnel

We do not have official data on Regular Force, RF, or PF KIA per 1000 combat (tactical unit) strength. We do have partial data on Regular Force gross desertions per 1000 combat strength. During January through August 1968 (March data not available), gross desertions of ARVN and VINMC regular force combat personnel averaged 31.5 per 1000 per month, compared with 16.6 per 1000 in-province RD cadre per month.

1/ See RVNAF desertions article elsewhere in this issue.

CONFIDENTIAL

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TABLE 1

RD CADRE AND RVNAF ATTRITION RATES

	1967		1968
	1st Half	2nd Half	1st Half
RD CADRE TOTAL STRENGTH <sup>a/</sup>	34,241	40,418	47,702
MONTHLY RD CADRE ATTRITION:			
KIA	59	90	120
Desertions	393	442	649
Other	320	304	263
Total	772	836	1,032
MONTHLY KIA/1000			
RD Cadre	1.7	2.2	2.5
RVNAF:			
Regular Forces	1.6	1.5	2.9
RF	1.8	1.5	1.4
PF	2.0	2.4	1.6
Total RVNAF	1.7	1.7	2.3
MONTHLY DESERTIONS/1000			
RD Cadre	11.5	10.9	13.6
RVNAF: <sup>b/</sup>			
Regular Forces	10.7	10.4	15.9
RF	10.5	9.7	12.0
PF	13.6	13.1	15.0
Total RVNAF	11.3	10.8	14.8

<sup>a/</sup> Includes RD and Truong Son personnel in province plus those in training.

<sup>b/</sup> Gross desertions.

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## NATIONAL POLICE

Summary. The National Police reached only 92% of their 1969 strength expansion goal of 92,200. The 1970 goal is 122,000 strength with most increases at village level where NP presence and performance has been less than in urban areas. VC arrests/KIA and weapons ammunition and medicine confiscations peaked in second quarter 1969.

Strength. The National Police (NP) expanded by only 6800 during 1969 and did not meet their 1969 goal of 92,200 total strength (December 1969 strength was 85,200). Difficulties in recruiting 13,000 volunteers for police service from within ARVN, and ARVN's first priority in the draft both hampered the police expansion. Unless new GVN manpower priorities are set, it appears unlikely that the NP can meet their 1970 goal of expanding to 122,000 strength. However, if the National Police Field Forces (NPF) continue to receive priority in NP manpower increases, they may approach their 1970 goal.

TABLE 1

	<u>NATIONAL POLICE STRENGTH</u>					<u>Goals</u>	
	<u>(End of Year)</u>						
	<u>1965</u>	<u>1966</u>	<u>1967</u>	<u>1968</u>	<u>1969</u>	<u>1970</u>	<u>1973</u>
NPF	-	6.1	11.9	11.6	15.0	20.0	-
Other	-	53.9	58.4	66.8	70.2	102.0	-
Total NP	52.2	60.0	70.3	78.4	85.2	122.0	163.0 <sup>a/</sup>

<sup>a/</sup> USAID planning number.

The National Police aims at extending and improving the legal influence and services of a civil police body. In this function, it is most active in the relatively secure areas where population density is highest. Below the provincial level, NP operations are centered in district towns and villages. As military security increased in rural areas during 1969, the NP expanded its police operations downward from district locations into villages. At the end of 1969 approximately 37,000 police were available within the provinces. Of these 43% were assigned at district level or below (15,881) versus a goal of 50%.

More than 6,000 uniformed police were actually assigned to 1621 villages (sub-districts) and most of the planned police increases in 1970 will be at the village level. The NP aims to have an average of 12 policemen per village, three times the current density of 4 per village. Thus, more than 24,000 will be needed ultimately to provide a useful level of civil law enforcement in over 2,000 villages. Current plans call for 1849 NP sub-district stations by the end of 1970.

The performance of the National Police in rural areas appears to be poorer than in urban areas. This may be due to lack of special rural

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training (the NP are not stationed in rural areas the year), or that that police are normally recruited for rural duty due to living conditions, etc. The NP are not necessarily loyal to their village chief, since they are still paid through province and district channels. A May 1969 CORDS study found the NP presence often consists of daily visits rather than a full time presence day and night, since to live overnight in a village means separation from family and no extra pay. No special funds have been provided for NP sub-district facilities or transportation.

Effectiveness. The primary mission of the National Police Field Force (NPF) and the Special Branch Police (SBP), which is an intelligence collection branch, is the Anti-VC Infrastructure campaign. During the past year the police contributed significantly to the program in terms of the number of VC KIA, captured, and suspects arrested. VC eliminations and arrests of deserters peaked during the 2nd quarter.

Other arrests by NP rose during the second half of the year and may reflect the increase in NP strength, their increasing deployment into rural areas, and the expansion of GVN control during 1969. Confiscations of weapons, ammunition and explosives, and medicines and drugs also peaked during the second quarter, while confiscation of food and POL peaked in the third quarter.

TABLE 2

<u>NPF OPERATIONAL RESULTS</u>				
(Weekly Average)				
	1969 <u>1Qtr</u>	<u>2Qtr</u>	<u>3Qtr</u>	<u>4Qtr</u> <sup>d/</sup>
<u>Arrests/KIA</u>				
VC KIA <sup>a/</sup>	83	200	178	96
VC Captured <sup>c/</sup>	240	497	375	195
VC Suspects Arrested <sup>a/</sup>	564	571	610	303
Deserters	271	333	90	93
Other <sup>b/</sup>	2510	2747	3131	3128
<u>Confiscations</u>				
Weapons	69	125	81	69
Ammo/Explosives <sup>c/</sup>	997	3,064	833	424
Food <sup>c/</sup>	36,553	40,251	49,820	31,067
Medicine/Drugs <sup>c/</sup>	327	11,949	1,414	1,993
POL <sup>c/</sup>	5,914	5,872	7,326	5,889

a/ Both guerrillas and political (infrastructure) VC.

b/ Draft evaders, illegal residents, curfew violators, improper ID, criminals, etc.

c/ Ammo: 100 rounds = 1 unit; food: 1 kilo/liter = 1 unit; drugs: 100 tab/caps or 1 ampoule = 1 unit; POL: 1 liter = 1 unit

d/ CORDS NP Bi-weekly Report changed to a monthly report in December. Weekly average includes adjusted December monthly numbers.

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The National Identification and Registration Program (NIRP) was initiated in October of 1968. The program is progressing; however, it must be accelerated if the projected fingerprinting and registration of 11,000,000 persons 15 years of age and older within the next three years is to be accomplished. At the end of 1969, 3,148,326 persons were registered, 1,187,675 short of the 4,236,001 goal for the year. The NIRP is already producing results. Since October 1968, the NP identification service identified 8,414 persons wanted for miscellaneous crimes, draft evasion, and desertion, including five known or suspected VC. Within the same time frame, the service has discovered 6,745 registration irregularities.

Casualties. National Police casualties declined sharply after first half 1968 (the Tet offensive period), as shown by Table 3. In 1969 they peaked in second quarter (the post-Tet offensive period) and declined in the second half of the year.

TABLE 3

### NP CASUALTIES

	<u>1968</u>				<u>1969</u>			
	<u>1 Qtr</u>	<u>2Qtr</u>	<u>3Qtr</u>	<u>4Qtr</u>	<u>1Qtr</u>	<u>2Qtr</u>	<u>3Qtr</u>	<u>4Qtr</u>
KIA	394	277	74	NA	56	100	44	40
WIA	653	629	113	NA	108	199	163	133
Captured	105	116	12	NA	2	0	0	0
Total	<u>1152</u>	<u>1022</u>	<u>199</u>	<u>NA</u>	<u>166</u>	<u>299</u>	<u>207</u>	<u>173</u>

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## VC INFRASTRUCTURE DATA

*Summary.* The August Hamlet Evaluation System (HES) reports indicate that the VC can claim an active infrastructure in areas containing 64% of the total SVN population and 81% of the rural population. Practically all (99%) of the hamlet population ring-ing Saigon is subject to an active VC infrastructure.

Table 1 shows that 11.2 million people in South Vietnam were rated C-D-E-VC on the HES VC Hamlet Infrastructure indicator (Indicator 2A) on August 31, 1968. This means that 64% of the total population lived in

TABLE 1

### SVN TOTAL POPULATION <sup>a/</sup> (In Millions)

<u>Overall Rating</u>	<u>Infrastructure Rating</u>		
	<u>A-B</u>	<u>C-D-E-VC</u>	<u>Total</u>
A-B-C	6.2 (54%)	5.3 (46%)	11.5 (100%)
D-E-VC	*	5.9 (100%)	6.0 (100%)
Total	6.2 (36%)	11.2 (64%)	17.4

### SVN RURAL POPULATION (In Millions)

<u>Overall Rating</u>	<u>Infrastructure Rating</u>		
	<u>A-B</u>	<u>C-D-E-VC</u>	<u>Total</u>
A-B-C	2.0 (36%)	3.6 (64%)	5.5 (100%)
D-E-VC	*	5.3 (100%)	5.3 (100%)
Total	2.0 (19%)	8.8 (81%)	10.8 (100%)

<sup>a/</sup> Detail may not add to total due to rounding.

<sup>\*/</sup> Less than .1 million.



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areas where some enemy agents under village or district control were still operative.<sup>1/</sup> Most of those living in areas in which there was infrastructure (8.8 million people, or 79%) lived in rural hamlets (i.e., in villages of less than 20,000). Stated another way, 81% of the SVN rural population was still subject to some degree of infrastructure presence as were at least 35% of the urban population.

Table 2 shows that of the relatively secure hamlet population (A-B-C overall), 63% (5.3 of 8.4 million) were subject to the infrastructure. The degree of VC penetration into the relatively secure population varies by Corps Tactical Zone and by VC Military Region (Table 2). III CTZ shows the highest penetration of hamlet population (82%) and is the only CTZ where urban hamlet penetration is greater than the rural penetration. Since Saigon is assumed to be free of infrastructure, only 51% of the III CTZ total population is said to live in areas containing infrastructure, compared to 75% of IV CTZ, and 65-66% of I and II CTZ.

The breakout by VC Military Region (Table 2) reveals that the VC have penetrated the hamlet population around Saigon (old VC Military Region 4) almost completely (99%). This probably indicates the strong VC attention to the area for many years and their continuing intention to concentrate on Saigon, despite the recent pullback of forces from that area.

The same data by province (Table 3) confirms the VC Military Region data: While the VC have penetrated 96% of the hamlet population in the five provinces ringing Saigon, the figure is only 65% for other III CTZ provinces.

<sup>1/</sup> The Hamlet Evaluation Worksheet uses the following definitions for VC infrastructure ratings: A -- Whole party apparatus appears to have been eliminated or neutralized. B -- All normal party apparatus identified and dealt with; agents under village or district control eliminated. C -- Intelligence indicates most of party apparatus identified; some agents under village or district control still operative. D -- Members and most leaders of VC hamlet organizations uncovered and neutralized but hamlet undercover agents still operative. E -- Party cadre underground by day but free to intimidate populace at night. No assurance party structure or leaders uncovered.

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TABIE 2

HES INFRASTRUCTURE DATA  
As of August 31, 1968

	Hamlet Population Only (In Millions)			Hamlet Plus Non-Hamlet Pop. (In Millions)		
	Overall A-B-C	C-D-E-VC On Ind. 2A	Total Pop	C-D-E-VC On Ind. 2A	Total Pop	% C-D-E-VC
<b>I CTZ</b>						
Urban	.3	.1	.3	.3	1.0	30
Rural	1.2	1.9	2.2	1.8	2.2	83
Total		2.0	2.5	2.1	3.2	66
<b>II CTZ</b>						
Urban	.5	.2	.5	.3	.9	37
Rural	1.4	1.6	2.1	1.6	2.1	76
Total	1.9	1.8	2.5	1.9	2.9	65
<b>III CTZ</b>						
Urban	1.1	1.1	1.3	1.2	3.6	33
Rural	1.0	1.6	1.8	1.6	1.8	88
Total	2.1	2.7	3.0	2.8	5.4	51
<b>IV CTZ</b>						
Urban	.9	.6	1.0	.6	1.1	53
Rural	2.2	3.8	4.8	3.3	4.8	81
Total	3.1	4.4	5.9	4.4	5.9	75
<b>SVZ</b>						
Urban	2.8	2.0	3.1	2.4	6.6	37
Rural	5.5	8.8	10.8	8.8	10.8	81
Total	8.4	10.8	13.9	11.2	17.4	74
<b>VC Military Region</b>						
MR1	1.0	.9	1.3	.9	1.3	72
MR2	1.8	2.1	3.1	2.1	3.2	56
MR3	1.5	2.7	3.1	2.7	3.1	87
MR4 (Saigon area)	.8	1.2	1.2	1.2	3.5	36
MR5	2.5	3.3	4.4	3.6	5.4	66
MR6	.6	.5	.7	.5	.7	64
MR10	.1	.1	.1	.1	.1	76
Total	8.4	10.8	13.9	11.2	17.4	64

a/ Detail may not add to total due to rounding.  
b/ Less than .1 million.

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TABLE 3  
RES INFRASTRUCTURE DATA  
BY PROVINCE  
As of August 31, 1968

Province	Hamlet Population Only (000)					Hamlet Plus Non-Hamlet Pop (000)		
	"Relatively Secure" a/	C-D-E-V On Ind. 2A	Total ESP	"Rel. Secure" Which is C-D-E-V on Ind. 2A Pop		C-D-E-V On Ind. 2A	Total Pop	% C-D-E-V
Quang Tri	134.0	190.9	258.7	66.3	49.4	150.9	283.7	67.3
Thua Thien	134.2	404.5	411.9	156.8	30.8	453.3	539.7	84.0
Quang Nam	264.5	487.1	655.5	26.0	35.3	591.2	845.2	69.9
Quang Tin	219.6	334.6	409.5	144.6	65.9	334.6	419.4	81.5
Quang Ngai	248.2	532.2	528.5	152.9	61.6	533.6	699.6	76.3
Hue	--	--	--	--	--	0	150.0	0
Danang	150.1	0	150.1	0	0	0	269.9	0
I CTZ	1,210.6	1,959.3	2,544.4	616.6	50.9	2,139.6	3,218.5	66.4
Kontum	75.7	77.1	90.5	62.3	82.3	78.9	98.7	80.0
Binh Dinh	420.9	511.4	740.5	191.7	45.5	525.7	885.4	59.4
Fleiku	82.1	133.9	155.7	60.3	73.5	134.1	155.9	86.0
Phu Bon	49.4	13.2	50.1	17.5	35.5	25.0	59.6	42.0
Phu Yen	225.7	247.4	277.1	196.1	86.9	272.9	321.2	84.9
Darlac	142.5	156.3	199.1	99.3	69.7	166.5	220.0	75.7
Khanh Hoa	245.5	232.6	254.4	213.7	87.0	237.9	387.1	61.5
Ninh Thuan	159.0	79.7	170.9	67.8	42.6	82.2	173.4	47.4
Tuyen Duc	69.8	73.2	93.8	54.1	77.6	79.6	98.5	80.8
Quang Duc	21.7	12.2	27.7	6.2	28.5	13.2	31.8	41.6
Lam Dong	43.5	35.5	52.0	17.2	39.4	37.7	66.5	56.8
Binh Thuan	207.1	144.4	258.4	83.1	40.1	144.9	270.3	53.6
Cam Ranh	68.1	7.8	68.1	7.8	11.5	7.8	68.7	11.5
Dalat	75.6	77.2	77.2	75.6	100.0	77.2	77.2	100.0
II CTZ	1,886.7	1,811.9	2,559.9	1,152.7	61.1	1,883.6	2,913.7	64.6
Binh Tuy	60.3	54.7	61.7	53.3	88.4	55.7	62.7	88.8
Long Khanh	124.1	57.8	143.9	43.0	38.7	67.8	144.4	46.9
Phuoc Long	13.8	33.6	35.6	13.8	100.0	44.0	46.5	94.6
Binh Long	43.8	53.6	67.8	29.6	67.6	53.9	68.1	79.2
Binh Duong	145.5	209.5	216.3	139.2	95.0	211.0	218.3	96.6
Tay Ninh	297.7	224.6	326.9	195.4	65.7	225.2	327.6	68.8
Hau Nghia	56.2	194.3	156.0	54.5	96.9	206.1	207.8	99.2
Bl. Hoa	356.4	361.3	431.3	286.4	80.4	365.4	443.4	82.4
Phuoc Tuy	62.9	90.4	104.1	49.2	73.2	115.2	128.9	89.3
Long An	119.6	257.4	305.7	111.2	93.0	358.4	395.2	90.7
Cta Dinh	766.0	1,069.5	1,061.7	753.8	98.4	1,069.5	1,083.8	98.7
Vang Tau	72.8	0	72.8	0	0	0	79.8	0
Saigon	--	--	--	--	--	0	2,204.9	0
III CTZ	2,120.1	2,561.7	3,047.3	1,734.4	81.8	2,772.2	5,411.4	51.2
Go Cong	111.7	91.1	176.2	26.7	23.9	94.1	179.2	52.5
Kien Tuong	29.9	37.6	37.5	29.9	100.0	39.6	47.4	83.4
Kien Phong	119.9	234.0	320.5	93.4	77.9	302.1	348.9	86.6
Dinh Tuong	231.8	452.6	576.7	107.7	46.5	459.2	589.7	77.9
Kien Hoa	239.9	505.6	573.0	172.4	71.9	505.6	575.9	87.8
Vinh Binh	120.7	347.2	357.4	70.5	58.4	347.2	409.8	84.7
Vinh Long	279.4	426.0	437.0	218.3	78.1	426.0	487.7	87.3
An Giang	520.0	55.1	520.0	55.1	10.6	55.1	529.0	10.4
Kien Giang	195.5	263.9	340.2	119.2	61.0	289.6	365.9	79.2
Chuong Thien	26.7	202.8	260.6	28.9	33.3	202.8	260.6	77.8
Phong Dinh	220.1	437.6	435.3	218.0	99.0	437.6	439.8	99.5
Ba Xuyen	194.2	368.9	373.8	183.3	94.4	368.9	379.8	97.1
An Xuyen	83.4	256.1	260.8	83.7	94.7	256.1	263.1	97.3
Bac Lien	141.2	179.9	259.8	61.3	43.4	179.9	259.8	69.3
Chau Doc	376.5	245.5	292.0	130.1	34.5	245.5	492.1	49.9
Sa Dec	184.8	224.7	232.5	155.0	81.7	224.7	267.9	83.9
IV CTZ	3,145.7	5,368.6	5,750.9	1,753.5	55.7	4,434.0	5,896.0	75.2
SVN	8,353.1	10,812.5	13,919.5	5,297.2	62.9	11,228.4	17,440.2	64.4

a/ Detail may not add to total due to rounding.

L. 118

CONFIDENTIAL

THE PHOENIX PROGRAM AND THE VC INFRASTRUCTURE

The political and administrative arm of the VC organization, often called the VC infrastructure, forms the heart of insurgency in South Vietnam -- its leadership, internal resource sources, and the cutting edge of its political activity. The infrastructure's strength gives the enemy a capability to continue or restart, after a cease fire, the VC's military activities without external aid and to maintain partial control over the vast majority of South Vietnam's population. Thus, an important key to insuring the ability of the GVN to survive after a US withdrawal is to weaken the VC infrastructure. This paper examines the success of our Phoenix program against the VC infrastructure.

Summary

During 1968, the Phoenix system will report the "elimination" of about 13,000 - 14,000 members of the VC infrastructure, or about 12% of their 111,000 personnel. However, this figure represents partially screened detainees. After subtracting the VC who are not part of the infrastructure and the "eliminated" VCI who subsequently return to their VC positions, the actual VC losses could be as low as 5,200 for 1968, a loss rate of only 4.9%. The overall impact of our anti-infrastructure effort lies probably between these two attrition estimates, with the most likely estimate 9%.

Most of the VC infrastructure "eliminated" are low-level members of relatively unimportant organizations. Of the 1,121 persons "eliminated" by Phoenix during October 1968, 429 were members of the three top priority organizations (Liberation Committees, Security Section, and Finance/Economy Section). However, only 124 out of the 429 held positions of leadership and only ten of these operated above the local level. Thus, attrition of the top VC leadership is less than 1% per year -- too low to cause the VCI any serious problems.

On the other hand, the Phoenix program's "eliminations" of low-level are much more effective. In five or ten provinces country-wide and Corps, in particular, we are probably reducing the effectiveness of the VCI low-level cadre.

At current rates of attrition, the VC can probably sustain its operations and replace its losses except in a few localities. This finding is corroborated by Hamlet Evaluation System data which shows that since January 1967, the VCI has increased its control over SVN's population from 9.33 to 10.94 million people -- 78% of SVN's rural population. Some or perhaps even most, of the upward trend is probably due to better reporting of infrastructure which existed all along. Nonetheless, part of this trend is likely to be real, given the strong and early VC emphasis on building infrastructure which contrasts with the Phoenix program's late start.

CONFIDENTIAL

61

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The two principal operational problems of the Phoenix system are a lack of operational control over the intelligence collection, exploitation, and imprisonment agencies and the failure of the GVN prison and judicial system to hold more than a fraction of the VCI arrested. Its lack of operational control means that Phoenix by itself is not able to increase greatly the effectiveness of the anti-infrastructure effort. The lack of a strong judicial and prison system has meant that as much as 70% of the VCI members arrested may be released within a year after they are detained.

At current attrition rates, our anti-infrastructure effort is not yet good enough to enable the GVN to extend its control over SVN's rural population in timely fashion even if NVA main force units are withdrawn.

#### The VC Infrastructure

The VC infrastructure is the political and administrative organization through which the Viet Cong control or seek control over the South Vietnamese people. The infrastructure includes the Party's (PRP) control structure, its subordinate command and administrative apparatus (COSVN), and the leadership of the parallel front organization (MLF). Together, these groups form the "shadow government" of the VC, which fulfills most of the functions of a normal civil government (postal, health and educational, services) as well as many functions peculiar to Vietnam.

These "peculiar" functions of the VC infrastructure form the heart of the insurgency in South Vietnam -- its command and control mechanism, its internal resources, and the cutting edge of all its political activity. The strength of the VC organization enables it, with varying degrees of success, to regulate the activity of most people in South Vietnam and use them to further the VC's goal of political control.

For the ordinary village in a VC area, this regulation means that "movement to and from GVN-controlled areas is strictly monitored; government papers and identification cards are frequently destroyed; government administrators are neutralized or executed and replaced by a VC autonomous administrative committee; heavy taxes are levied; fortifications are constructed in order to establish "combat villages"; local guerrilla forces are organized; the youths are urged or forced to join the party through propaganda and indoctrination; popular leaders are recruited and trained to act on behalf of the Party and/or the front; men are recruited or drafted for the Liberation Army; news media are strictly controlled so that all events are reported

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from the party's point of view; security agents control visitors and prosecute "spies"; villagers are forced to house and feed VC troops as they move through the area; women are urged to participate in demonstrations against GVN authorities; families of ARVN soldiers are constantly plagued to order their men back home; villagers are forced to provide bearer services for supplies and ammunition; and a constant barrage of propaganda vilifying "the American imperialists and their Saigon puppet government" is repeated. 1/

### The U.S. and GVN Response

To weaken the VC infrastructure, the U.S., with GVN cooperation, has established the Phoenix (Phung Hoang) intelligence collation and exploitation system. This system is designed to bring together all information on the VC infrastructure and coordinate all efforts to eliminate it. Its executive arm is comprised mainly of three paramilitary forces -- the National Police Field Forces (NFFF - 12,215 men), the National Police Special Branch (SB - 12,995 men), and the Provincial Reconnaissance Units (PRU - about 6,000 men) -- supported by regular military units when required. The purpose of the Phoenix system and these forces is to "eliminate the Viet Cong infrastructure from central down to village and hamlet level," (Phoenix Decree).

The Phoenix system has important operational limitations. First, the Phoenix system does not gather intelligence itself -- it collates and analyzes information received from the intelligence community. Thus, to fulfill its role, the Phoenix system depends on cooperation from other Allied intelligence units -- cooperation that is frequently hard to get from GVN intelligence agencies. For instance, the GVN National Police in Gia Dinh Province have refused to turn over their VC photo books to the Phoenix program.

Second, the Phoenix system itself is responsible for only a small fraction of Allied anti-infrastructure operations. Informal estimates indicate that only 10% - 20% of the VCI "eliminated" are specifically identified and then targeted through the Phoenix system. Likewise, the actual process of arresting or killing the enemy is largely carried out by other agencies. As shown in the following table, in October 1968, the forces with the primary anti-infrastructure mission -- the NFFF, SB, and PRU -- accounted for only 17% (267 out of 1,459 persons) of the reported "eliminations."

Third, the Phoenix system does not either charge or hold prisoners after interrogation. In general, prisoners are turned over the GVN (National Police) which in turn holds them in its province detention centers or in Directorate of Corrections prisons. Sentencing is carried out by a semi-judicial Provincial Security Section Committee.

1/ "The Viet Cong Infrastructure; Modus Operandi of Selected Political Cadre" July 1968.

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AGENCIES RESPONSIBLE FOR "ELIMINATING" VCI  
October 1968

<u>Primary Mission</u>	<u>Organization</u>	<u>VCI "Eliminated"</u>	<u>Percent of Total "Eliminations"</u>
Phoenix	PRU	134	
	PF (NP)	29	
	SP (NP)	39	
	Other	15	
	Subtotal	267	18.3
Area Security <sup>a/</sup>	Subtotal	362	24.8
Military Operations <sup>b/</sup>	Subtotal	464	31.8
Local Government <sup>c/</sup>	Subtotal	366	25.1
Grand Total		1,459	100%

<sup>a/</sup> Includes the National Police, Revolutionary Development Cadre, RF/PF, and Static Census Grievance.

<sup>b/</sup> Includes the ARVN, FWMF, U. S., and Chieu Hoi.

<sup>c/</sup> Includes the sector, subsector, and joint GVN agencies.

Thus, the Phoenix system itself has limited capabilities for improving the effectiveness of the whole anti-infrastructure effort -- it does not control or fully coordinate intelligence collection, it and the anti-infrastructure forces contribute less than one-fifth of the "VCI eliminations", and it has no control over prisoners once they have been interrogated.

The Effectiveness of the Anti-VCI Effort

From January through October 1968, the Phoenix system has reported 11,066 VCI "eliminated" or a monthly average of 1,106 -- 138 Chieu Hoi, 828 captured, and 140 killed. With the start of the Accelerated Pacification Campaign in October (goal; 3,000 VCI eliminations monthly), the number of "eliminations" has probably doubled in November (2,100 "eliminations") over the annual average.

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PHOENIX "ELIMINATIONS" REPORTED

	<u>Total</u>	<u>Rallied</u>	<u>Captured</u>	<u>Killed</u>
Jan 68	488	130	310	48
Feb 68	540	51	398	91
Mar 68	1,323	74	1,099	150
Apr 68	1,295	115	997	183
May 68	1,271	97	1,028	146
Jun 68	1,161	121	947	93
Jul 68	1,291	172	970	149
Aug 68	1,117	185	780	152
Sep 68	1,121	192	806	123
Oct 68	1,459	249	940	270
Nov 68 <sup>a/</sup> (Projected)	2,100	-	-	-
<b>Cumulative Total Through Oct 68</b>	<b>11,066</b>	<b>1,386</b>	<b>8,275</b>	<b>1,405</b>
<b>Projected 1968 Cumulative Total</b>	<b>13,272</b>	<b>1,656</b>	<b>9,924</b>	<b>1,692</b>

a/ From 20 October through 3 December, 5,175 VCI (unverified) were reported eliminated. Adjusting this total for an assumed 40% disqualification rate and a 30-day month, the number of eliminations may be 2,100 for November.

Source: "Status of Pacification in South Vietnam", monthly, MACCORDS.

The strength of the VC infrastructure is not known precisely. Estimates based on projected TOE strength derived from sample information put total strength at from 84,900 (MACV estimate) to 111,000 (CIA estimate) depending on slight differences in definition and sample data. These estimates have been checked by a count of the specific VCI names and identified positions held in the Phoenix files. This count found the VCI strength to be 95,708 persons, roughly corroborating the CIA and MACV TOE estimates.

With projected CY 68 eliminations of 13,272 VCI and an estimated strength of 111,000 persons (CIA estimate), the VCI will suffer a net loss of 12% in 1968, assuming "eliminated" cadre are not replaced. Taking the differences in strength estimates into account, the CY 68 attrition rates, based on Phoenix reports, vary from the low of 12% (CIA estimate) to a high of 15.7% (MACV estimate).

However, the Phoenix "eliminations" reports overstate the effectiveness of the anti-infrastructure effort by including "eliminations" of VC who are

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not part of the infrastructure. As defined by MACV and the CIA, the infrastructure does not include members of military units, rank and file members of front organizations, part time laborers, or VC sympathizers without a recognized position in the VCI. Yet, "eliminations" of such low level personnel are often included in the provincial reports submitted to the Phoenix staff and in the "eliminations" reports from the Phoenix staff to Washington, in spite of efforts by Phoenix to exclude them. In recent months, the Phoenix staff, as shown below, have rejected 29% to 36% of the "eliminations" reported to it.

VCI "ELIMINATIONS" SUBMITTED AND ACCEPTED

	<u>Submitted</u>	<u>Accepted</u>	<u>Percent Rejected</u>
May 68	1,430	1,271	11.2%
Jun 68	1,319	1,161	12.0
Sep 68	1,763	1,121	36.4
Oct 68	1,206	862	28.6 <sup>a/</sup>

<sup>a/</sup> Reporting incomplete, so total of 862 "eliminations" in October does not include 1455 "eliminations" eventually accepted.  
Source: MACV(CORDS).

Nevertheless, the failure to correct thoroughly "eliminations" reports made prior to August 1968 and the inclusion, even in current reporting, of many non-VCI as VCI eliminations mean that the attrition and attrition rates reported by Phoenix still overstate its actual results. As shown below, correction of the data for past over-reporting reduced the total "eliminations" from 11,066 to 9,805 in January - October 1968.

This data should be further corrected for inclusion of non-VCI members in the "eliminations" reports even as currently adjusted by the Phoenix staff. For instance, low level tax collectors are included now in VCI reports even though they are technically not members. The data available in Washington is not detailed enough to enable a systematic revision to be made. For lack of better information, the following analysis uses the official Phoenix data unadjusted for this reporting bias.

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PHOENIX "ELIMINATIONS" ADJUSTED FOR REPORTING ERRORS

<u>Month</u>	<u>Eliminations Submitted to Phoenix</u> <sup>a/</sup>	<u>Eliminations Accepted by Phoenix</u> <sup>b/</sup>	<u>Eliminations Adjusted for Reporting Errors</u> <sup>c/</sup>
Jan	-	488	390
Feb	-	540	432
Mar	-	1,323	1,058
Apr	-	1,295	1,036
May	1,430	1,271	1,017
Jun	1,319	1,161	1,144
Jul	-	1,291	1,033
Aug	-	1,117	1,117
Sep	1,763	1,121	1,121
Oct	-	1,459	1,459
Nov	3,500	2,100	2,100
(Proj)		-----	-----
Cumulative Total Through Oct		11,066	9,805

a/ Data on Phoenix submissions for omitted months is not available in Washington.

b/ "Eliminations" reported by Phoenix to Washington.

c/ Prior to August 1968, Phoenix's reported eliminations were not thoroughly inspected to see how many non-VCI were included. Reported eliminations for Aug-Nov 68 are accepted as substantially correct. To take account of over reporting prior to August 1968, the reported eliminations were reduced by 20% except in May and June 1968 when the submitted "eliminations" were reduced by 20%.

The attrition reported by Phoenix staff is concentrated in the district and below VCI. As shown in the table below, "eliminations" of these personnel represent 95% (12,576) of our total (13,272). On the other hand, province level and above eliminations represent at most only about 5% of the VCI being "eliminated." Thus, our highest attrition rates (15% for hamlet VCI is tops) are at the lowest levels of the VCI and at least 95% of our eliminations are district or below VCI.

Geographically, the Phoenix-reported "eliminations" are evenly spread among the four Corps areas. However, as shown below, we attrite III Corps (particularly Saigon) VCI at a CY 68 rate of 27%. This rate is twice that for the other Corps, because the VCI strength estimate is less than half the average estimate in the other three CTZ. The III CTZ strength estimate may be low, considering that 96% of the hamlet population in the five densely populated provinces around Saigon is subject to a working VC infrastructure.

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PHOENIX "ELIMINATIONS" - PROJECTED FOR CY 68

Level	1968 <sup>a/ b/</sup> Eliminations	CIA Definition	
		1968 Strength	Percent Eliminated
Provincial	324	10,000	3.2
District	1,500	17,000	8.8
Village	5,100	37,000	13.8
Hamlet	5,976	40,000	15.0
Other <sup>c/</sup>	372	7,000	5.3
Total	13,272	111,000	12.0%

- a/ Projected from Jan-Oct data using constant monthly attrition rate.
- b/ The data for the January through October period are not detailed enough to permit COSVN and Regional level "eliminations". In July 1968, the elimination of these levels was 1% and 1.2% at annual rates.
- c/ From the Phoenix reports, it is not clear what the "other" category of "eliminations" includes. For convenience alone, it is shown above arranged with the COSVN/Regional VCI strengths. To insure that the benefit of the doubt is given to Phoenix, it is assumed in this analysis that all of the "other" eliminations are province level or above, though this is certainly not true.

Source: "Analyzing Size of VC Infrastructure," MACJOIR Phoenix, June 1968.

PHOENIX "ELIMINATIONS" - PROJECTED FOR CY 68 <sup>a/</sup>

Corps	1968 "Eliminations"	Phoenix Definition	
		1968 Strength	Percent Eliminated
I	3,515	28,602	12.2%
II	3,322	31,827	10.4
III	3,217	12,094	26.6
IV	3,215	23,185	13.9
Total	13,272	95,708	13.9%

- a/ Projected using a constant monthly average of "eliminations" based on Jan-Oct 68 data.

Source: "Analyzing Size of VC Infrastructure", MACJOIR Phoenix, June 1968.

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DISTRIBUTION OF PROVINCE VCI ATTRITION RATES FOR 1968 a/

<u>Annual Attrition Rate</u>	<u>Number of Provinces a/</u>	<u>% Provinces</u>
41%-100%	2	4
31%-40%	6	14
21%-30%	7	16
11%-20%	11	25
0%-10%	18	41

a/ Based on Jan-Aug and Oct data projected on 12-month basis at constant rate. Phoenix strength estimate (95,708 persons) was used to estimate attrition.

Thus, assuming that a 30% attrition rate will greatly reduce the effectiveness of any province's VCI (a standard to the military assumption that 30% casualties renders a combat unit ineffective), we are not destroying the VCI in more than five to ten provinces. In a majority of individual provinces, the attrition rates (20% or less) appear to be sustainable by the VC, though with some decline in effectiveness.

The functional priorities established by the Phoenix system for targeting eliminations are:

Liberation Committees. Since mid-December 1967, the VC have established a nationwide network of committees separate from the Party network. Its purpose is to supplement the NLF organization as a "front" and serve eventually as an administrative apparatus for a post-war Vietnam.

Security Service Cadre. These cadre are mainly responsible for both the internal and external security and intelligence operations of the VC.

Finance/Economy Cadre. These cadre collect VC taxes, manage VC business activities, and coordinate VC logistic supply activities.

In the current Accelerated Pacification Campaign, the highest priority is given to Liberation Committee members. In October 1968, 71 members of the Liberation Committees were "eliminated". Of these, about 40 were in leadership positions within their committees, though only one was a leader above the

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village level. However, as shown below, this rate of attrition, projected over a 12-month period, could result in an 11% removal of one or more leaders from all the Liberation Committees currently established.

PHOENIX ELIMINATION OF LIBERATION (AUTONOMOUS)  
COMMITTEE MEMBERS AND LEADERS

Level	Projected 1969 Leaders Eliminated <sup>a/</sup>	Projected 1969 Members Eliminated <sup>a/ b/</sup>	% Committees With 1 Leader or More Removed	Number of Committees
Province	-	-	0%	17
District	12	24	18.0	33
City	-	24	0	5
Village	72	360	3.3	1,099
Hamlet	204	---	59.0	172
Other	-	-	-	2
Total	288	352	10.8%	1,328

<sup>a/</sup> Based on October 1968 data.

<sup>b/</sup> Includes leaders eliminated. Because a committee usually has more than one leader, we assume that half the leaders eliminated come from different committees.

Source: "Liberation Committees as of 9 November 1968", MACV(CORDS) November 1968.

The VC Security Service is the second priority target. During October 1968, 142 of its personnel were "eliminated" -- 137 of whom operated at the district level or below. Of the total eliminated, 37 were in leadership positions, but only six of these operated at the district level or above. Projecting October results over a 12-month period, we will "eliminate" about 9% of the VC security apparatus, with much lower (1% - 2%) attrition of the higher level cadre.

As the table on the following page indicates, our activities against the VC intelligence network, particularly at high levels, are not very successful and probably do not impede its operation.

The finance and economy cadre are one of the largest and easy-to-eliminate groups in Vietnam because their function requires a large number of low level tax collectors who must be in constant contact with the SVN public. The Phoenix system "eliminated" 216 VCI of this type in October 1968. However, only 47 of these (22%) held leadership positions and only three of these operated at the district level or above.

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PHOENIX ELIMINATION OF VC SECURITY SERVICE PERSONNEL

<u>Level</u>	<u>Projected Annual Eliminations</u> <sup>a/</sup>	<u>CIA Estimate 1968 Strength</u>	<u>Percent Eliminated</u>
Above			
Province	24	2,000	1.2%
Province	36	3,500	1.0
District	384	4,600	8.4
Village/ Hamlet	<u>1,260</u>	<u>10,000</u>	<u>12.6</u>
Total	1,704	20,100	8.5%

a/ October 1968 rates multiplied by 12.

Source: "The VC Security Service", CIA, June 1967, updated by author.

Overall, the Phoenix system reported 1,459 "eliminations" in October 1968, of which 429 were members of the three top priority organizations. However, only 124 persons "eliminated" held positions of leadership and of these only ten operated at the district level or above. Thus, the reported Phoenix "eliminations" of VC personnel in high level or key organization positions is very small, probably less than 1% of both our "eliminations" and VC strength levels. Thus, in spite of the high priority given to "elimination" of VCI in positions of leadership at district level or above, the attrition rate is low enough to cause the VCI no serious problems.

Of the VCI eliminated, about 88% are captured or rally through the Chieu Hoi program. Only 12% are killed. Because reported "eliminations" describe only the number of "kills" and "detentions", it is crucial to determine if the VCI captured are kept from rejoining their organizations.

For the SVN prison system, we estimate that two-thirds of the prisoners arrested and held during the period January - October 1968 were subsequently released or escaped. In January 1968, the SVN prison system held 34,000 prisoners. By October 1968, the number of prisoners had increased to 37,515. However, while there was a net addition of 3,515 prisoners during this period, 2,665 prisoners were released by VC attacks, 5,825 prisoners were released in a series of amnesties, and 8,389 prisoners were released through the termination of their sentences. The sum of the prisoners released (16,879 men) and the net addition to the prison population (3,515 men) must equal the total arrests and detentions during January - October 1968. Moreover, if most of the prisoners released were recent arrestees who were let go after temporary detention, it follows that a large fraction of the prisoners taken during 1968 were released.

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Our best estimate is that 66% or about 13,520 prisoners were released out of the total 20,394 arrested during 1968.

PRISONERS RELEASED AND PRISON POPULATION  
(January - October 1968)

<u>Reason</u>	<u>Prisoners Released</u>	<u>Prison Population</u>
Beginning Prison Population		34,000
Escaped/Released by VC Attacks	2,665	
Amnesty		
National Day	782	
Dead Souls Day	1,610	
Presidential Request	2,142	
MOI Request	<u>1,291</u>	
Subtotal	5,825	
Normal Releases		
Subtotal	8,389	
Total Releases	16,879	
Ending Prison Population		37,515
Total Jan-Oct 68 Arrests and Detentions		20,394
% Persons Arrested During 1968 who Subsequently were Released <sup>a/</sup>		66%

<sup>a/</sup> If we assume that 80% of the prisoners released during 1968 were arrested during 1968 (most people are detained, interrogated, and then released), then it follows that 13,520 persons (80% of the 17,000 released) or 66% of the 20,400 arrested were released. While this estimate is reasonable, more information is being sought to check it.

Source: MACV (CORDS/PSD).

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These releases occur for a wide variety of reasons. First, high level or wealthy VC can often bribe the National Police to release them after arrest but prior to detention. Second, while the physical capacity of SVN's prison system is greater than the number of prisoners, its administrative capacity to handle cases is not. Roughly 50% of the prisoners in jail at any time are awaiting sentence, because of the slowness of SVN's judicial system. Frequently, prisoners who can't be handled administratively are released -- even if they are VC. Third, the amnesty policy of the GVN purposefully releases large numbers of low level VC for propaganda purposes. For instance, 782 members of the VC infrastructure were released on National Day (November 1, 1968). For these reasons, the number of "eliminations" for any police program is probably much smaller than its arrests would indicate.

The release of VCI prisoners reported by the Phoenix as "eliminated" poses a major problem. As shown below, the prison population of "civil defendants", which includes the VCI arrested, actually declined during 1968 from 22,512 in May to 19,419 in September. Over this same period, we arrested or rallied 5,300 members of the Viet Cong infrastructure. Thus, the GVN prison system almost certainly released more VCI during this period than were "eliminated" by the Phoenix system.

	VCI Captured/Rallied			Civil Defendants Held <sup>a/</sup>		
	Rallied	Captured	Total	Detained	Sentenced	Total
May	97	1,028	1,125	11,161	11,351	22,512
June	121	947	1,068	9,840	11,838	21,678
July	172	970	1,142	8,786	11,959	20,745
August	185	780	965	8,721	11,204	19,925
September	192	806	998	8,052	11,367	19,419

<sup>a/</sup> The "Civil Defendants" prisoner category includes mostly VCI, but also other types or non-criminal civil prisoners.

Source: MACV (CORDS/PSD).

The Phoenix staff recognizes the problems created by these releases. On October 24, 1968 they tried to locate 127 district or higher level VCI "eliminated" during August and September. As of late November, the GVN was unable to determine if or where more than five out of the 127 were being held. Certainly, both reporting problems and executions probably account for part of this discrepancy, but most of these "eliminations" were probably released.

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Taking both the releases of VCI prisoners and the inclusion of non-VCI in reported eliminations into account, our attrition of the VCI is less than one-third as great as reported. As shown below, the attrition rate of VCI ranges between 3.8% and 5.0%, depending on the strength estimate, compared to the 12% to 15.7% range officially reported.

A COMPARISON OF VCI ELIMINATION ESTIMATES AND  
ATTRITION RATES - CY 68 PROJECTED

Alternative Strength Estimates	"Eliminations" Reported by Phoenix		"Eliminations" Reports Adjusted	
	Number of Eliminations <sup>a/</sup>	Attrition Rate	Number of Eliminations <sup>a/</sup>	Attrition Rate
MACV Definition (84,900)	13,272	15.6	4,194	5.0
CIA Definition (111,000)	13,272	12.0	4,194	3.8
Phoenix Definition (95,708)	13,272	13.9	4,194	4.4

<sup>a/</sup> Based on Jan-Oct alone. With inclusion of November "eliminations", the estimate of 1968 attrition would be higher.

Thus, the actual attrition of the VCI is much lower than is being reported. Because our information is imprecise, we judge that the true rate of attrition falls between 4% and 12%, with the same structure by area, level, and function as the Phoenix data indicates.

CONFIDENTIAL

200 69

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PHOENIX AND THE NPDF

Summary. Limited data indicates that only 1-2% of the VC the National Police Field Forces (NPDF) eliminate are members of the VC infrastructure (VCI), even though the primary mission of the NPDF is to eliminate VCI targeted by the Phoenix program. Better targeting on known VCI would have a high payoff, since the NPDF killed about twice as many VC per man as either RF or PF, and captured or apprehended seven VC for every one they killed.

NPDF Effectiveness

The 11,600 men of the NPDF are responsible for apprehension and neutralization of VCI targeted by other Phoenix forces, including the Special Branch Police (SBP) of the National Police. In addition, they cooperate with military units in providing territorial security. As of December 15, the NPDF were organized into 50 companies operating at province level; 1969 planning calls for at least one 46-man NPDF platoon to be deployed in each of SVN's 263 districts.

Table 1 compares NPDF, RF and PF effectiveness in killing VC during 1968. NPDF were twice as productive as RF/PF: each 1,000 NPDF killed 254 VC, versus 128 for RF and 101 for PF. Similarly, NPDF were 3-4 times as efficient as RF/PF: the NPDF enemy/friendly kill ratio was 13.2 versus 4.6 for RF and 2.7 for PF. The NPDF obtained these results with less than half the number of operations per unit as RF/PF, though NPDF operations may be much longer than RF/PF (in I CTZ, some NPDF operations lasted three weeks). In addition, the NPDF captured and apprehended another 7.3 VC for every one they killed (18,541 VC captured and apprehended in 1968, versus 2,535 VC KIA).

NPDF Contributions to Phoenix

Even though NPDF are assigned full-time to Phoenix, Table 2 shows that in October 1968 only 1-2% of the VC neutralized (killed, captured or apprehended) by the NPDF were accepted by Phoenix as "significant members" of the VC infrastructure. (Phoenix processing may take 1-2 months, so we used the average VC neutralized over the three month period August-October.) We do not know what portion of the VCI eliminated were confirmed by CORDS/Phoenix (who normally reject 31% based on name-by-name verifications), or what portion ultimately were released from detention (earlier studies suggest that two-thirds are released). In any case, based on limited data, we estimated that less than 1% of the VC neutralized by NPDF can be counted as permanent attrition against the VCI.

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Improving NPFF Effectiveness

The NPFF draw their targets from Phoenix VCI identification lists collated by Phoenix from all agencies participating in the district interrogation centers (DIOCC's). The Special Branch Police are mainly responsible for targeting VCI for the NPFF. MACV feels that better qualified advisors and better targeting are the keys to more VCI eliminations. Table 3 shows that the Provincial Reconnaissance Units (PRU's) with CIA advisors eliminated six times the number of VCI in\* October 1968 as the NPFF with less than half the total NPFF strength; NPFF are advised by USAID. If the NPFF could improve their targeting to provide, for example, a 10% yield of VCI to VC (versus the current 1%), they could increase total VCI eliminations 15-20%, and reduce Phoenix program dependence on military forces for total output.

TABLE 1

COMPARISON OF VIETNAMESE FORCE EFFECTIVENESS - 1968

	<u>VC</u>			<u>Avg.</u>	<u>Avg.</u>		<u>VC KIA</u>
	<u>Capt &amp;</u>		<u>Fr.</u>	<u>Fr.</u>	<u>Opns.</u>	<u>Kill</u>	<u>Per</u>
	<u>Appre-</u>		<u>KIA</u>	<u>Str.</u>	<u>Per Co.</u>	<u>Ratio</u>	<u>1000</u>
	<u>hended</u>	<u>KIA</u>	<u>KIA</u>	<u>(COO)</u>	<u>Per Mo.</u>	<u>VC/Fr.</u>	<u>Fr.</u>
National Police Field Forces <sup>a/</sup>	18541	2535	192	10.0	23.6	13.2	253.5
Regional Forces <sup>b/</sup>	N/A	24524	5359	192.2	55.8	4.6	127.6
Popular Forces <sup>b/</sup>	N/A	16494	6162	164.1	66.4 <sup>c/</sup>	2.7	100.5

<sup>a/</sup> Source: MACV-CORDS.

<sup>b/</sup> Source: TFES.

<sup>c/</sup> Assumes three PF platoons are equivalent to one RF or NPFF company.

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TABLE 2  
NPFF CONTRIBUTIONS TO  
PHOENIX PROGRAM

	<u>VC Killed, Captured, Apprehended<sup>a/</sup></u>				<u>VCI</u>	<u>% VCI<sup>c/</sup></u>
	<u>1968</u>			<u>Aug-Sep</u>	<u>"Eliminated"<sup>b/</sup></u>	
	<u>Aug.</u>	<u>Sep.</u>	<u>Oct.</u>	<u>Avg.</u>	<u>1968</u> <u>Oct.</u>	
I CTZ	580	1040	1040	887	0	0%
II CTZ	100	320	580	333	14	2.4-4.2%
III CTZ	600	580	600	593	4	.7%
IV CTZ	<u>220</u>	<u>340</u>	<u>720</u>	<u>427</u>	<u>11</u>	<u>1.5-2.6%</u>
SVN	1500	2280	2940	2240	29	1.0-1.3%

a/ Source: MACV-CORDS. Figures estimated to nearest 20 from briefing charts.

b/ Source: MACV-CORDS. VCI killed or captured by NPFF.

c/ Range depends on use of October 1968 vs. average August-October VC killed, captured, apprehended data.

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TABLE 3

CONTRIBUTIONS OF VARIOUS ALLIED FORCES  
TO PHOENIX PROGRAM  
OCTOBER 1968

<u>Primary Mission</u>	<u>Force</u>	<u>VCI "Eliminated"<sup>a/</sup></u>	<u>Friendly Strength (000)</u>	<u>VCI Elim. Per 1000 Fr. Str.</u>
<u>GVN:</u>				
Phoenix	Provincial Reconnaissance Units (PRU)	184	5.0 <sup>b/</sup>	36.8
	National Police Field Forces (NPF)F	29	11.6 <sup>b/</sup>	2.5
	National Police Special Branch (SBP)	39	13.5 <sup>b/</sup>	2.9
	Other	15	--	--
	Sub-total	<u>267</u>	<u>30.1</u>	<u>8.9</u>
Area Security	Regional & Popular Forces (RF/PF)	110	391.6	.3
	Revolutionary Development Cadre (RDC)	10	54.0	.2
	National Police - General Duty (NP)	240	51.9 <sup>b/</sup>	4.6
	Static Census Grievance Cadre (SCG)	2	6.2 <sup>b/</sup>	.3
	Sub-total	<u>362</u>	<u>503.7</u>	<u>.7</u>
Military Operations	RVNAF Subtotal	44	430.3	.1
Other	Joint GVN Agencies	72	--	--
	Chieu Hoi	249	--	--
	Province/District	294	--	--
	Sub-total	<u>615</u>	<u>--</u>	<u>--</u>
Total GVN		<u>1283</u>	<u>964.1</u>	<u>1.3</u>
<u>Joint GVN/US:</u>		56	--	--
<u>US/FW:</u>	US Forces	91	534.9	.2
	Free World Forces	24	65.9	.4
	Total US/FW	<u>115</u>	<u>600.8</u>	<u>.2</u>
Grand Total		<u>1459</u>	<u>1564.9</u>	<u>.9</u>

<sup>a/</sup> Initial reports prior to CORDS/Phoenix screening. About 31% of VCI "liminations" are rejected during screening.

<sup>b/</sup> Strength as of 31 December; all other strengths as of 31 October.

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THE ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE CAMPAIGN IN SVN

Increased eliminations of high level VCI and greater GVN support for the program indicate some improvement in the Phoenix/Phung Hoang anti-infrastructure campaign. But the program has made little impact on the overall VCI strength and the problems of premature release of captured VCI, slow judicial processing and inadequate facilities. The purpose of Phoenix is to neutralize the estimated 80-85,000 members of the VC infrastructure (VCI) in South Vietnam. By the end of September, 14,161 VCI were reported killed, captured or rallied, representing 66% of the 21,600 goal for this year. The full months of April, July, August and September reached or exceeded the 1969 monthly goal of 1,800 VCI neutralized. Other months averaged 1,200-1,500. If the July-September pace continues, the Phoenix program will achieve 90% of the year's goal.

TABLE 1

VCI ELIMINATIONS

	<u>1969</u>									
	<u>JAN</u>	<u>FEB</u>	<u>MAR</u>	<u>APR</u>	<u>MAY</u>	<u>JUN</u>	<u>JUL</u>	<u>AUG</u>	<u>SEP</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
Killed	388	376	485	557	NA	475	666	598	655	-
Captured	673	624	667	871	NA	565	703	783	322	-
Rallied	233	230	329	367	NA	303	421	458	525	-
Total	1294	1230	1481	1795	1384	1343	1790	1839	2005	14161

Improvements in the program include the following:

1. MACV and the GVN agreed on more restrictive criteria for defining members of the VCI. This has resulted in better reporting and sharper focus on hard core VCI, but many local GVN Phoenix personnel still count VCI supporters as regular VCI in order to meet their monthly quotas.
2. Emphasis on specific targeting of individual VCI using blacklists and intelligence derived from political ralliers and other sources has led to more high level VCI eliminations. The proportion of VCI neutralized who were district level or higher cadre increased from 18% in the first quarter to 20% in the second quarter to 22% in the third quarter. The proportion who were Liberation Committee leaders and PRP Current Affairs Committee leaders also increased, from 7% in 1st quarter to 8% in 2nd quarter to 10% in 3rd quarter. (Table 2)

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TABLE 2

PRIORITY VCI ELIMINATED

	1969									TOTAL
	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	
District Level or Higher VCI % of Eliminations	227 18	209 <sup>a/</sup> 17	281 <sup>a/</sup> 19	304 17	277 <sup>a/</sup> 20	300 22	396 22	431 23	413 21	2838 20
Liberation Committee Leaders	NA	47	72	94	70	52	102	121	112	670
PRP Current Affairs Cmte Ldrs	NA	28	46	78	36	34	62	75	66	425
Total	--	75	118	172	106	86	164	196	178	1095
% of Eliminations	--	6	8	10	7	6	9	11	9	--

a/ Estimated

3. Other positive factors are continued US and GVN emphasis on the program, better training for Phoenix personnel, and the increased cooperation of the National Police Field Forces.

Despite these improvements, the eliminations have made little impact on the overall strength of the infrastructure. Although more than 14,000 VCI were eliminated in the first nine months of 1969, the estimated VCI strength increased, probably due to better intelligence. In any case, the enemy apparently was able to replace eliminated VCI and maintain infrastructure strength.

In addition, the total VCI eliminations reported overstate the number of VCI actually neutralized. MACV estimates that 75-90% of all captured VCI are released before sentencing or receive prison terms of less than one year. Thus, 5-6,000 of the eliminations reported so far in 1969 were not neutralized very long. In addition, little is done to keep tabs on VCI released from prison or Chieu Hoi centers. Some may return to the VC. (MACV is working with the GVN to establish an automatic data processing program for tracking captured VCI from the initial report of capture through sentencing, prison, and release, but progress is reportedly slow.)

Another problem is that numbers of innocent persons have been held for extended periods without a hearing while real VCI are sometimes released before processing; there is evidence that some GVN officials are using the program against personal enemies. This has led to criticism of Phoenix Phung Hoang operations by the national assembly and the press.

Finally, overcrowded detention and interrogation facilities, instances of accommodation between VC and local GVN officials, and the reluctance of some officials to attack key VCI for fear of personal reprisal if a settlement is reached in Paris all remain problems.

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It seems clear that the program, at its current stage of development, will not be able to eliminate the VC infrastructure. Nonetheless, it remains a useful effort, which seems to be improving. Undoubtedly it is generating some portion of the increased Chieu Hoi figures this year, as cadre and other VC turn themselves in to avoid being targeted.

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*Sept 16/70*

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PHOENIX PROGRAM: 1970 RESULTS

Summary. The Phoenix program to eliminate the estimated 67,400-man Viet Cong infrastructure (VCI) has improved its record in the first half of 1970, but must achieve more advances in the near future if it is to succeed in crippling the VCI by 1972-73. About 20,000-21,000 VCI will be neutralized in 1970 at current rates, more than in any previous year (15,800 in 1968; 19,500 in 1969), even though using a stricter definition of "neutralize" which requires captured VCI to be sentenced. The enemy has historically been able to replace up to half of the VCI killed, captured, or rallied, however, and at a net loss of only 10-15% per year, the VCI will still have half its current strength at the end of 1973.

The quality of VCI neutralized has been increasing from year to year, but neutralizations of Party members accounted for less than a third (31%) of all neutralizations in the first half of 1970. One reason for the low number of high-level neutralizations is poor Phoenix targeting procedures: specific targeting accounted for only 13% of the total VCI brought in (killed, captured, or rallied) in the first half of 1970.

The VCI's concentration of 56% of their strength in only 9 "hard core" key provinces suggests a need for greater focus of the Phoenix effort on those provinces: they accounted for only 47% of VCI neutralizations in 1970 through June.

Per man, the Provincial Reconnaissance units are at least ten times as effective as any other anti-VCI action force.

The judicial system appears to be a major bottleneck in the disposition of personnel captured as suspected VCI. As of July, only 1930 (32%) of the 6111 personnel captured since January had been brought to trial, while 4181 (68%) were still awaiting judicial processing. MACV recently increased its advisory efforts to see that some of the backlog is processed.

VCI STRENGTH AND DISTRIBUTION

The Viet Cong infrastructure (VCI) is the enemy's subversive, political organization in South Vietnam. It is the clandestine organizational network which directs the flow of manpower, supplies and intelligence to the guerrilla insurgent forces. As such, its elimination is vital to the success of the GVN's counterinsurgency effort, not only so long as active fighting is in progress, but also under conditions of any future ceasefire arrangement. The VCI is now, and will remain, a prime target of the allied effort in South Vietnam.

Estimated total VCI strength has declined gradually over the past three years. By June 1970, it was 21% lower than the August 1967 figure (Table 1). This represents a yearly average of only 7% attrition, however. At this rate, the VCI will remain a serious threat even in 1972-73. This suggests that the anti-VCI effort needs to show dramatic improvement in the near future if any settlement of the Vietnamese war is to be stable.

19

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82

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TABLE 1

VCI - ESTIMATED TOTAL STRENGTH a/  
(In Thousands)

1967		1968		1969		1970
Aug	Dec	June	Dec	June	Dec	June
85.2	84.0	79.9	82.7	83.6	74.0	67.4

a/ Source: MACV-J2 Order of Battle Summary, Vol. II, July 1970.

Current VCI strength in South Vietnam displays a clearcut pattern of concentration. More than half of the total is to be found in the group of nine provinces, shown in Table 2.

TABLE 2

CONCENTRATION OF VCI STRENGTH AS OF MARCH 1970 a/

<u>Province</u>	<u>Estimated VCI Strength</u>	<u>Percent RVN</u>
Quang Nam, including Danang	6,155	8.1
Quang Tin	5,668	7.4
Quang Ngai	3,908	5.1
Binh Dinh	3,977	5.2
Ding Tuong	4,192	5.5
Kien Hoa	4,698	6.2
Vinh Binh	6,449	8.5
Vinh Long	3,714	4.9
An Xuyen	3,574	4.7
Subtotal	42,336	55.6
All other provinces and COSVIN	33,758	44.4
TOTAL	76,094	100.0

a/ Source: MACV Summary of VCI Activities (U) 7-70, 30 March-19 April

As the map shows, these provinces are clustered in two areas, one in the north and the other in the delta region. These areas have been centers of insurgent activity for many years, dating back in some instances to the Viet Minh period. The VCI, therefore, is not only numerous in these areas, but is deeply rooted in local society. This deep penetration will render the VCI doubly difficult to eradicate in these areas, and suggests that the anti-VCI effort needs to be concentrated in greatest force in these provinces.


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CONCENTRATION OF VCI STRENGTH<sup>ε/</sup>

As of March 15, 1970

Total VCI Strength: 76,094

Total in 9 Provinces with 3,000  
or more VCI: 42,336



<sup>ε/</sup> Source: MACV Summary of VCI Activities (U) 7-70, 30 March - 19 April 1970.

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### The Phoenix Program

To defeat a flexible, clandestine organization such as the VCI requires more than a purely military effort. Ideally, it demands the sort of multi-level, coordinated counterespionage organization that the British developed so successfully during the Malayan Emergency. By contrast, the South Vietnamese counterespionage effort has been chronically splintered, badly led, poorly financed, and understaffed. In 1967, the Phoenix program was established to remedy some of these shortcomings. The basic Phoenix concept was to enlist and coordinate the efforts of local-level leadership, the police, and paramilitary groups towards the end of identifying and eliminating the VCI.

The Phoenix program itself was not intended to be the actual instrument of neutralizing the VCI; it was instead to be a coordinating body for the efforts of district-level and province-level Intelligence Operations Coordinating Committees (DIOCC's and PIOCC's) in identifying the local VCI cadre and planning operations against the latter. These committees in turn are themselves coordinating bodies. In addition to a full time National Police staff, they include village council chairmen, village commissioners, hamlet chiefs, and others as ex officio members. PSDF group leaders and other paramilitary personnel participate on a coordinated basis.

Once plans are developed and VCI cadre are identified, actual neutralization operations are carried out by various action forces. These forces include the National Police, the National Police Field Force, the Special Police, RVNAF Military Security Teams, Armed Propaganda Teams, Census Grievance Cadre, PD Cadre, the PRU, and RVNAF forces.

The stated goal of the Phoenix program is to neutralize the high-ranking, important VCI cadre. Thus, the program is intended to target its greatest efforts against executive cadre at all levels of the VCI organization, and to focus special attention on eliminating members of the National Liberation Councils and Committees, Finance-Economy cadre of the People's Revolutionary Party, and members of National Alliances for Democracy and Peace. This goal suffers somewhat in the application. In practice, well over half of all VCI neutralized are non-party members, while three-quarters are village-level or lower.

### Results

Neutralizations. The objective of the Phoenix program is to neutralize members of the VCI. As of January 1970, "neutralizations" have been defined as all VCI killed, rallied, or sentenced. Captured personnel who have not yet been convicted and sentenced, do not count in the official neutralization totals.

The sentencing proviso was not required prior to January 1970. Under the previous definition, "neutralizations" were the total of all VCI killed, rallied, and captured, whether sentenced or not. By this definition 15,800 and 19,500 VCI were "neutralized" in 1968 and 1969 respectively (Table 3). Since VCI taken into custody were not always tried or sentenced, and since prisons were known to "leak" captives almost as rapidly as they received

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them, this definition clearly led to inflated figures for neutralizations for those years.

Table 3 also indicates that 20,000-21,000 VCI will be neutralized in 1970 at the current rate, even under the new, more exacting definition of "neutralization." If the 1970 figures are treated according to the earlier, less stringent, definition for 1968-69, the resulting monthly averages are markedly better than in the previous two years.

The improved rate of progress in the anti-VCI effort is not good enough. The improvement displayed in 1970 is not enough to ensure that the VCI will be crippled by 1972-73, even if the VCI replace only half their losses.

TABLE 3  
VCI NEUTRALIZATIONS a/

<u>Year</u>	<u>Previous Definition:</u> <u>Kills, Rallies and Captures</u>		<u>Current Definition:</u> <u>Kills, Rallies, and Sentences</u>	
	<u>Monthly Average</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>Monthly Average</u>	<u>Total</u>
1968	1315	15,780	--	--
1969	1628	19,536	--	--
1970	2046 b/	25,000 c/	1638	20-21,000 c/
1970				
1st Qtr			1267	3801
2nd Qtr	Details not available		1807	5421
3rd Qtr			1939 d/	5817 c/

a/ Source: MACV for 1968, 1969. VCENIS Computer File for 1970. (Figures differ slightly from official MACV data used in Tables 4, 5, etc.)

b/ Based on first 7-8 months.

c/ Projected, based on July-August rates.

d/ Based on July and August data.

Allocation of Phoenix Effort. An important measure of the allocation of the anti-VCI effort is the geographical distribution of actual neutralizations. In first half of 1970, GVN MR IV led with 41% of the countrywide total of 9098; MR II was next with 25% (Table 4). This pattern accords well with the overall pattern of VCI concentration. However, when total neutralizations by province are compared with the distribution of VCI strength by province, on the map shown previously, it becomes clear that some provinces are doing less well in neutralizations than they ought to, given the numbers of VCI reportedly within their borders.

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TABLE 4

TOTAL NEUTRALIZATIONS BY CORPS a/  
January - June 1970

<u>MR</u>	<u>Neutralizations</u>	
	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percent</u>
I	2269	25
II	1174	13
III	1940	21
IV	3715	41
<b>RVN Total</b>	<b>9098</b>	<b>100</b>

a/ Source: MACV. Neutralizations defined as killed, rallied, or sentenced.

As a group, the nine key provinces accounted for 56% of the total estimated VCI strength, but for only 47% of the neutralizations. Four of the nine (Kien Hoa, Vinh Binh, Vinh Long and An Xuyen--all in MR IV) contributed far less than their share of neutralizations (had 13% of the neutralizations, but 24% of the VCI) and were outperformed by other provinces containing substantially fewer VCI (such as Long An and Phong Dinh). Fragmentary August neutralization data indicate that Kien Hoa and Vinh Long improved their records sharply, to rank among the five leading provinces in neutralizations for that month. Vinh Binh and An Xuyen, however, may still lag.

TABLE 5

VCI STRENGTH ; NEUTRALIZATIONS a/  
January - June 1970

<u>Province</u>	<u>Neutralizations</u>		<u>VCI Strength<sup>b/</sup></u>	
	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percent</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percent</u>
Quang Nam/Danang	895	7.9	6,156	8.1
Quang Tin	730	8.0	5,668	7.4
Quang Ngai	502	5.5	3,908	5.1
Binh Dinh	522	5.7	3,977	5.2
Dinh Tuong	493	5.4	4,192	5.5
Kien Hca	331	3.6	4,698	6.2
Vinh Binh	217	2.4	6,449	8.5
Vinh Long	344	3.8	3,714	4.9
An Xuyen	264	2.9	3,574	4.7
<b>Total</b>	<b>4,298</b>	<b>47.2</b>	<b>42,336</b>	<b>55.6</b>
<b>(Total RVN)</b>	<b>9,098</b>	<b>--</b>	<b>76,094</b>	<b>--</b>

a/ Source: MACV.

b/ March 1970 estimate.

# CONFIDENTIAL

Importance of VCI Neutralized. The Viet Cong infrastructure, like any complex organization, is more sensitive to the loss of high level, experienced, leaders than to loss of rank-and-file members. The organization can sustain fairly large losses of the latter without losing too much effectiveness. Losses of high-level personnel damage the organization far more seriously, even when they are few in number, compared to rank-and-file losses. Thus, the importance of the VCI neutralized is an important consideration in assessing progress.

Central to the communist doctrine of revolutionary organization is the importance of the Party as the paramount policy-making and directive body. The Party is an elite body, highly selective in its membership, and admission is accorded only to the best trained, most experienced, and most ideologically correct adherents of the movement. The Party, in short, is the brains of the movement. Accordingly, neutralization of a full Party member represents a hard-to-replace loss to the insurgent organization.

Neutralizations of Party members accounted for less than a third (31%) of all neutralizations in the first half of 1970. Adding probationary party members raises the figure to 41% (Table 6). It is possible to argue, with some justification, that the replacements for these losses are of diminished quality. Nevertheless, it appears that there is room for improvement in the Phoenix program's targeting performance.

TABLE 6

NEUTRALIZATIONS OF COMMUNIST PARTY MEMBERS a/  
January - June 1970

	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percent of Total</u>
Full Member, People's Revolutionary Party	2,777	30.5
Probationary Member, People's Revolutionary Party	954	10.5

a/ Source: MACV

Another way of assessing the importance of the VCI neutralized is to examine their echelon within the organization's hierarchy. Province-level cadre, for example, are likely to have greater responsibilities and be harder to replace than hamlet-level personnel.

Countrywide, about 75% of all VCI neutralized in the past 2½ years have been at the village or hamlet level; the proportion declined from 82% in 1968 down to 75% in 1969 and in 1970 through June (Table 7).

This means that the proportion of higher level VCI neutralized has increased accordingly from 18% in 1969 to about 25% in 1969 and 1970. The actual number of District and higher VCI neutralized rose about 70% in 1969 and has stayed level at an average of about 400 per month since 1968. However,

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the 1970 figures are based on the new, more stringent criteria for neutralizations and are therefore more significant and substantial than the 1969 figures at the same level. Finally, about 75% of the high-echelon neutralizations occurred in MR III and MR IV. About 45% of all MR III neutralizations are district or higher level ones. The proportions in the other MR's range from 14% to 24% (Table 8).

TABLE 7

NEUTRALIZATIONS BY ECHELON - RVN a/

<u>Echelon</u>	<u>1968</u>		<u>1969</u>		<u>1st Half 1970</u>	
	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percent</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percent</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percent</u>
Province, Saigon, Region and COSVN	689	4.4	919	4.7	619	6.8
District	1,606	10.2	3,031	15.5	1,589	17.5
City b/	522	3.3	859	4.4	99	1.1
Village and Hamlet	12,959	82.1	14,725	75.4	6,791	74.6
<b>Total</b>	<b>15,776</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>19,534</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>9,098</b>	<b>100.0</b>

a/ Source: MACV. Personnel captured and awaiting sentencing included in 1968 and 1969 figures, not included in 1970.

b/ Not reported prior to November 1968.

TABLE 8

NEUTRALIZATIONS BY ECHELON BY MR a/

(First Half 1970)

<u>Echelon</u>	<u>MR I</u>	<u>MR II</u>	<u>MR III</u>	<u>MR IV</u>
Province, Saigon, Region, and COSVN	36	52	327	204
District	260	190	513	626
City	12	11	8	68
Village and Hamlet	1961	921	1093	2816
<b>Total</b>	<b>2269</b>	<b>1174</b>	<b>1941</b>	<b>3714</b>

a/ Source: MACV. Personnel captured and awaiting sentencing not included.

Action Forces and Targeting. A variety of forces take part in neutralizing VCI personnel. Of these, the following can generally be considered Phoenix bodies: National Police, National Police Field Force, Special Police, Provincial Reconnaissance Units (PRU), RD Cadre, Census Grievance Cadre, Armed Propaganda Teams, and the Military Security Service. Others are



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military forces: ARVN, US, and 3rd National Forces, Civilian Irregular Defense Groups, Regional Forces, and Popular Forces.

In theory, the Phoenix forces ought to shoulder the largest part of the burden of neutralizing the VCI. In practice, however, the RF/PF are by far the most productive action force for both kills and captures, accounting for 62% of all kills and 37% of all captures on a countrywide basis (see Table 9) from January to July 1970. In terms of VCI killed, US/FWMAF ranked second with 15% of all KIAs. In terms of captures, the National Police ranked second with 31% of the total. (The Police surpassed the RF/PF's capture record in II Corps, where RF/PF have historically been rated the worst in RVN. This was the only Corps in which the RF/PF ranked second in either kills or captures.)

TABLE 9

## ACTION FORCES RESPONSIBLE FOR VCI January - July 1970 a/

Action Force	Killed		Captured		Rallied		Total	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
RF/PF	2584	62	1825	37	434	10	4843	37
National Police	152	3	1516	31	168	4	1836	14
US/FW	623	15	436	9	126	3	1185	9
PRU	285	7	553	11	24	1	862	6
ARVN	236	6	322	6	64	2	622	5
Chieu Hoi Centers	--	--	--	--	2909	72	2909	22
Other b/	306	7	305	6	313	8	924	7
<b>Total</b>	<b>4186</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>4957</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>4038</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>13181</b>	<b>100</b>

a/ Source: VCINIS computer file. Omits 1154 VCI captured and tried in same month.

b/ CIDG, RD cadre, Census Grievance cadre, Armed Propaganda Teams, other (non-specified).

Aside from the National Police, only the PRU of all other non-military Phoenix forces emerges as a significant contributor of both kills and captures. This is doubly significant in view of the fact that the PRU is numerically very small: only some 3500 strong as of the second quarter 1970. Table 10 shows that, man-for-man, the PRU are more than 10 times as efficient as any other action force, bringing in (killing, capturing, or rallying) over 400 VCI per 1000 friendly strength annually.

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TABLE 10

## EFFECTIVENESS PER THOUSAND STRENGTH

<u>Action Force</u>	<u>Strength a/ (in thousands)</u>	<u>Annual VCI K/C/R b/ Achieved</u>	<u>K/C/R per 1000 Friendly Strength</u>
ARVN	431.5	1066	3
RF-PF	510.4	8302	16
C/DG	21.0	108	5
National Police	88.4	3147	36
APT	5.4	53	10
RD Cadre	51.0	86	2
FWMTF	68.7	329	5
US main fcs.	414.9	1702	4
PRU	3.5	1478	422

a/ June 1970. Source: DOD, OASD(Comptroller)

b/ Annualized from Jan-July, 1970 data. Source: VCINIS File. Omits VCI captured and tried in same month.

Another important aspect of the neutralization effort is the Phoenix program's ability to target its efforts effectively. Table 11 shows that specific targeting accounted for only 18% of the kills and captures during the first seven months of 1970. General targeting by Phoenix forces (non-military) accounted for another 10% of VCI brought in.

The great bulk (72%) of VCI are either killed or captured as the by-product of military operations which may or may not be generally targeted against VCI (44%), or are identified as ralliers under the Chieu Hoi program (28%).

What emerges from the table is that the operational part of the Phoenix program, despite recent efforts to strengthen the National Police, still depends primarily on general targeting by military forces, and on fall-out from the Chieu Hoi program, for the bulk of VCI neutralizations.

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TABLE 11  
ACTION FORCES VS TARGETING<sup>a/</sup>

January-July 1970

<u>Kills &amp; Captures:</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percent</u>
By Phoenix forces <sup>b/</sup>		
Specific Targeting:	1603	11.2
General Targeting:	<u>1495</u>	<u>10.4</u>
Total	3098	21.6
By military forces <sup>c/</sup>		
Specific Targeting	897	6.3
General Targeting	<u>6291</u>	<u>43.9</u>
Total	7188	50.2
<u>Rallies (Chieu Hoi Program)<sup>d/</sup></u>	<u>4039</u>	<u>28.2</u>
 Total K/C/R	 14325	 100.0

a/ Source: VCINIS File.

b/ National Police, PRU, RD Cadre, Census Grievance, Armed Propaganda Teams, & Military Security.

c/ ARVN, US Main Forces, FWMAF, CIDG, & RF-PF, and other (non-specified).

d/ Includes 1.7% who rallied to Phoenix forces and 4.4% who rallied to Military forces.

Captures and Sentencing Rates. Until January 1970 no reporting system existed to provide systematic follow-up data on persons captured as suspected VCI. Thus, it was impossible to determine whether captured personnel were ever processed by the Province Security Committee and given a sentence or released.

The VCI Neutralization Information System (VCINIS) was inaugurated by MACV in January of 1970 to provide a capability to track each individual detainee. The system assigns a permanent ID number to each detainee based on his name, birthdate, and time and place of capture. Data on the individual's processing and sentence or release are entered into the system at a later date, keyed to the ID number assigned. The analysis which follows is based on computerized data from the VCINIS.

Data for the first half of 1970 indicate that the Province Security Committees are not functioning with anything near the dispatch required to ensure punishment of the guilty, while avoiding prolonged detention of the innocent. As of July only 1930 (32%) of the 6111 personnel captured since

## CONFIDENTIAL

January had been processed, while 4181 (68%) were still awaiting processing.<sup>1/</sup> Despite the recent drive to speed up sentencing procedures, the apparatus still appears to be lagging badly.

The same data provides further indications that Phoenix targeting procedures require improvement. Were these procedures of good quality, comparatively few innocent people would be likely to be taken into custody,<sup>2/</sup> only to be exonerated and released at a later date. Of the 2614 personnel<sup>2/</sup> brought to trial during January-July 1970, 341 were released after trial. This represents a release rate of 13% or 1 person released for each 8 tried. If the same rate applies to the detainees still awaiting trial, several hundred innocent persons have undergone prolonged and unjust punishment due to the desultory actions of the GVN.

Finally, the VCINIS data shows that most (77%) of the sentences imposed on convicted VCI were for a period of one year or more.<sup>3/</sup> The average length of sentence was from 14 to 22 months (exact lengths of sentences not reported). Adding these sentenced personnel to those VCI killed gives over 5900 VCI "guaranteed neutralized" for at least one year or 41% of the 14,325 brought in by the Phoenix program during January-July 1970.

<sup>1/</sup> Another 684 persons were reported tried by VCINIS, but no capture information was available. These could represent VCI captured in 1969, or VCI captured in 1970 but not tracked properly in VCINIS.

<sup>2/</sup> Includes the 684 VCI tried but not tracked in the VCINIS.

<sup>3/</sup> At the end of a prisoner's sentence, the Province Security Committee can extend the sentence for an additional period. The figures shown are for the initial sentence only.

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TABLE 12

VCI SENTENCES AND RELEASES <sup>a/</sup>  
January-July 1970

	<u>Jan-Mar</u>	<u>Apr-June</u>	<u>July</u>	<u>Total Jan-July</u>
Captured During Period:	2315	3135	661	6111
Of Which: (as of July)				
Awaiting Trial	1648(71%)	2062(66%)	471(71%)	4181(68%)
Tried-Sentenced	535	984	181	1700
Tried - Released	<u>132</u>	<u>89</u>	<u>9</u>	<u>230</u>
Sub-Total Tried	667(29%)	1073(34%)	190(29%)	1930(32%)
Others Tried During Period: <sup>b/</sup>				
Sentenced	148	370	55	573
Released	<u>23</u>	<u>85</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>111</u>
Sub-Total Tried	171	455	58	684
Length of Sentence: <sup>c/</sup>				
Less than 6 mos.				199(9%)
6 mos. - 1 yr.		(detail not available)		316(14%)
1 - 2 yrs.				1048(46%)
2 yrs. or more				<u>710(31%)</u>
Total Sentenced				2273
Average Length of Sentence				14-22 mos.

<sup>a/</sup> Source: VCINIS computer file.

<sup>b/</sup> Those tried for which no capture information is available in VCINIS. May represent VCI captured in 1969, or VCI captured in 1970 but not tracked in VCINIS.

<sup>c/</sup> At the end of a prisoner's sentence, the Province Security Committee can extend the sentence for an additional period. The figures shown are for the initial sentence only.

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## PHOENIX

### Summary

In the past year, the Phoenix program to eliminate the Viet Cong Infrastructure has received a great deal of high level US attention <sup>1/</sup> as it became more and more apparent that the long term survival of the GVN is related to the success of this program.

Results through April 1971 indicate that Phoenix is still a fragmented effort, lacking central direction, control and priority. Most neutralizations still involve low level, relatively unimportant workers gained as a side benefit from military operations. Phoenix action forces continue to be only marginally effective probably the direct result of their low place in the GVN pecking order and their inability to obtain support.

Phoenix statistics refute the critic's charges that the program is primarily a means of widespread political assassinations. Only 2% of all VCI neutralized were specifically targeted and killed by Phoenix forces, and there have been very few reports of such assassinations from the field.

Finally, the GVN judicial system is still unable to process the 2500 or so suspected VCI captured each month. There is a constant backlog of about 2000 detainees whose cases have not yet been tried. Significant numbers of alleged VCI wait 6 months or more before going to trial. Every few months 300-400 suspects are released or transferred to other jurisdictions to keep the backlog in hand. President Thieu, in a last minute move, averted a complete stoppage in the judicial bottleneck by preserving the provincial security committee system. To do it, he had to override an overwhelming lower house vote which would have eliminated the system.

<sup>1/</sup> Sir Robert Thompson (in concert with his April 1971 study on the GVN National Police), and Ambassador W. E. Colby, former DEPCOMUSMACV (heading an assessment of Phoenix directed by Secretary Laird in December 1970).

CONFIDENTIAL

95

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## Details

The most recent MACV estimates available place VCI strength at about 67,000 (March 1971), down 7% from the end 1970 strength of 72,300. Direct comparison with prior year strengths cannot be made due to a change in the reporting system in November-December 1970. VCI strength probably declined 10-15% during 1970.

Over half of the reported VCI are found in thirteen of the forty-four SVN provinces. The map on the following page shows that the situation is even more serious than the numbers alone would indicate. Eleven of the thirteen provinces form three contiguous groups. Such grouping implies the ability to provide mutual support and operating flexibility.

Results. In 1970, MACV reported 21,159 VCI neutralized.<sup>2/</sup> In 1971 through March, there were 6265 neutralizations (about 60% of all neutralizations occur in the thirteen problem provinces described earlier).

The real problems in the attack on the infrastructure begin to appear when we examine the quality of those neutralized. The purpose of the program is to neutralize the driving force behind the enemy; it is critical that we deprive him of his leadership. In 1970 and 1971, less than 3% of those neutralized were full or probationary party members above the district level. In 1970 the six most important VCI reported neutralized were:

- a chief, Cadre Affairs Section PRP<sup>3/</sup> (captured, August 1970),
- a deputy chief, Military Proselyting Section, PRP (rallied, May 1970),
- a chief, Liaison element, Administrative Subsection, Military Proselyting Section, PRP (captured, Feb 1970),
- a chief, Documentation Subsection (Espionage/Intelligence), Security Section PRP (captured, Feb 1970),
- a deputy detention chief, Interrogation/Detention Subsection (POW and Detention Camps), Security Section, PRP (rallied, December 1970),
- a deputy chief, Rear Service Section, PRP, (captured, October 1970).

About fifty region or subregion PRP leaders were neutralized in 1970; seven in 1971 (thru 31 March). There have been no PRP leaders at COSVN level neutralized in 1971, nor have there been any high level (region or above) NLFSV or PRG leaders neutralized in either year.


<sup>2/</sup> Killed, rallied or sentenced. For a detailed description of how the program works and detailed definitions of terms, see the basic article, Phoenix Program: 1970 Results, SEA Analysis Report.

<sup>3/</sup> People's Revolutionary Party.

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**FIGURE 1**  
**PROVINCES WITH HIGH VCI STRENGTHS**



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Table 1 shows that three out of four people neutralized in both 1970 and 1971 are at the lowest organizational levels--village or hamlet--and that the majority of these are not party members. On the other hand, the large numbers of neutralizations at the village and hamlet level cannot be dismissed as ineffective. These types of neutralizations make it more difficult for the VCI to operate and recruit. The impact on the lowest organizational level is probably the most successful aspect of the program.

TABLE 1

VCI NEUTRALIZATION BY ECHELON AND PARTY MEMBERSHIP  
(Totals and Percent)

	<u>1970</u>		<u>1971</u>	
	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percent</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percent</u>
<u>Province, Saigon, Region, and COSVN</u>				
Full or Probat. Party Member	622	2.9	147	2.3
Other	799	<u>3.8</u>	<u>231</u>	<u>3.7</u>
Subtotal	<u>1421</u>	<u>6.7</u>	<u>378</u>	<u>6.0</u>
<u>District</u>				
Full or Probat. Party Member	1544	7.3	388	6.2
Other	1744	<u>8.2</u>	<u>574</u>	<u>9.2</u>
Subtotal	<u>3288</u>	<u>15.5</u>	<u>962</u>	<u>15.4</u>
<u>City</u>				
Full or Probat. Party Member	1103	0.4	46	0.7
Other	203	<u>1.0</u>	<u>76</u>	<u>1.2</u>
Subtotal	<u>306</u>	<u>1.4</u>	<u>122</u>	<u>1.9</u>
<u>Village and Hamlet</u>				
Full or Probat. Party Member	7053	33.3	2017	32.2
Other	9091	<u>43.0</u>	<u>2786</u>	<u>44.5</u>
Subtotal	<u>16144</u>	<u>76.3</u>	<u>4803</u>	<u>76.7</u>
<u>All Levels</u>				
Full or Probat. Party Member	9322	44.1	2598	41.5
Other	<u>11837</u>	<u>55.9</u>	<u>3667</u>	<u>58.5</u>
Total Neutralized	<u>21159</u>	<u>100.0</u>	<u>6265</u>	<u>100.0</u>

The inability of Phoenix to go to the heart of the enemy's control organization can be explained by who does the neutralizing and under what circumstances.

Action forces. Phoenix forces<sup>4/</sup> account for just over 20% of the VCI killed, capture, or rallied. Only half of their results (10% of the total) are the result of specific targeting. Military forces neutralize about

<sup>4/</sup> National Police, National Police field forces, Special Police, Provincial Reconnaissance Units, RD Cadre, Census Grievance teams, Armed Propaganda Teams

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half the VCI taken. The remaining 30% rally to the GVN for various reasons.<sup>5/</sup>  
In short, only ten percent of the job is being done in an organized way by the forces being paid to do it. (Table 2).

TABLE 2

ACTION-FORCES VS. TARGETING  
(Totals and Percent)

	1970		1971	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
<u>Kills and Captures:</u>				
by Phoenix Forces:				
Specific targeting	2806	10.8	648	9.1
General targeting	2692	10.3	833	11.7
Subtotal	5498	21.1	1481	20.8
by Military Forces:				
Specific targeting	2622	10.1	1179	16.6
General targeting	10354	39.8	2254	31.7
Subtotal	12976	49.9	3433	48.3
<u>Rallies (Chieu Hoi):</u>	7562	29.0	2194	30.9
Total K/C/R	26036	100.0	7108	100.0

Source: VCINIS

A still closer look at the data shows that the territorial forces (RF/PF) - especially in MR's 1 and 4 - account for the largest share of VCI killed or captured by a single force (1970 - 50%; 1971 - 39%). Police (NP/NPFF/SP) brought in 20% in 1970; 14% in 1971.

On a man-for-man basis however, the single most effective anti-VCI force has been the Provincial Reconnaissance Units (PRU). This 4400 man force killed or captured 1683 VCI last year, about 380 for every thousand men in the force; in 1971 they are neutralizing VCI at an annual rate of 263 per thousand. No other force comes close. The police, about 109,000 strong, kill or capture about 40 VCI per 1000 per year; RF/PF about 20 per 1000 per year.

The PRU are being incorporated into the special branch of the National Police. Their overall contribution to the Phoenix effort may diminish as they are absorbed into the police hierarchy. Hopefully, they will serve as a nucleus around which an improved police force may be built.

<sup>5/</sup> VCI who rally may or may not reduce the enemy's effectiveness. The tactic of legitimizing cadre by rallying seems to be more and more a goal of the VCI.

CONFIDENTIAL

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Charges of Political Assassinations. Critics have asserted that the Phoenix program is used more as a convenient way to assassinate political enemies than it is to eliminate hardcore VCI. Table 3 shows that during the 15 months from January 1970 to March 1971, only 616 VCI (2% of all VCI neutralized) were specifically targeted and killed by Phoenix forces. The vast majority of VCI killed (9827 of 10443) were killed "anonymously" and identified only later as VCI, either by military forces (RF, PF ARVN, etc.) or as subjects of general screening operations by Phoenix forces. This suggests that the charges are not valid, since so few VCI are actually targeted by Phoenix forces.

There is no way of telling from the data whether any political assassinations are taking place, but there have been very few reports from the field suggesting such misuse of Phoenix assets, and the data do indicate that any such misuse is likely to be quite small.

TABLE 3

SELECTED PHUNG HUANG PROGRAM RESULTS  
1970-1971 through March

<u>Force Responsible</u>	<u>VCI Killed</u>		<u>Total</u>	<u>%</u>
	<u>Specific Targeting</u>	<u>General Targeting</u>		
<u>Military</u>				
FW	45	253	298	2.8
US	98	766	864	8.3
ARVN	75	443	518	5.0
RF	1193	3439	4632	44.4
PF	767	1627	2394	22.9
CIDG	48	40	88	.8
Other	41	317	358	3.4
<u>Subtotal Military</u>	<u>2267</u> (21.7%)	<u>6885</u> (65.9%)	<u>9152</u>	<u>87.6</u>
<u>Phoenix</u>				
PRU	318	395	713	6.8
RDC	4	14	18	.2
CG	20	18	38	.4
APT	9	5	14	.1
MSS	14	10	24	.2
NIFF	127	113	240	2.3
NP	65	44	109	1.1
SP	59	76	135	1.3
<u>Subtotal Other</u>	<u>716</u> (5.9%)	<u>675</u> (6.5%)	<u>1291</u>	<u>12.4</u>
<u>Total Killed</u>	<u>2983</u> (27.6%)	<u>7560</u> (72.4%)	<u>10443</u>	<u>100.0</u>

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Processing Is a Problem. The final difficulty the GVN faces in eliminating the VCI is a cumbersome and leaky judicial machinery. Table 4 shows that in the last five quarters the case backlog has ranged from 1756-2953. Moreover, as the backlog builds, it is reduced in part by an increase in trials (a good sign) and in part by a seemingly disproportionate increase in the number of persons released after trial, transferred, or "unaccounted for" (presumably released or escaped from jail without trial). Informed observers agree that there is little chance that VCI released soon after capture have been reformed. They will either go deeper underground, relocate to another area, or even become false ralliers--thereby acquiring legal status, becoming useful to the enemy in a covert role.

TABLE 4

	<u>DISPOSITION OF VCI</u> (Quarterly Totals)				<u>1971</u> 1st Qtr
	<u>1970</u>				
	<u>1st</u> <u>Qtr</u>	<u>2nd</u> <u>Qtr</u>	<u>3rd</u> <u>Qtr</u>	<u>4th</u> <u>Qtr</u>	
<u>Captured in Period:</u>	2301	3105	2477	2483	2581
<u>Disposition of those Captured in Period:</u>					
Tried in period & sentenced	429	1036	1061	1226	1345
Tried in period & released	85	109	125	147	170
Tried before 1 Apr 71 & sent. a/	682	664	288	187	-
Tried before 1 Apr 71 & rel. a/	250	309	143	69	-
Subtotal tried as of 1 Apr	<u>1446</u>	<u>2118</u>	<u>1617</u>	<u>1629</u>	<u>1515</u>
Awaiting trial as of 1 Apr 71	855	987	860	854	1066
<u>Disposition by date of trial</u>					
Sentenced in period	432	1480	1841	1736	1735
Released in period	85	223	440	356	356
Transferred in period b/	28	205	428	213	248
Listed as unaccounted for	0	0	313	473	138
Total	<u>545</u>	<u>1908</u>	<u>3022</u>	<u>2778</u>	<u>2477</u>
Backlog as of end of quarter	1756	2953	2408	2113	2217
<u>Length of Sentence c/</u>					
0-6 months	54	109	178	131	107
6-12 months	86	198	234	203	148
12-24 months	168	702	841	882	933
over 24 months	124	471	588	520	547
Total	<u>432</u>	<u>1480</u>	<u>1841</u>	<u>1736</u>	<u>1735</u>

Source: VCINIS

- a/ Trials held in some period after the one in which capture occurred, but prior to April 1.
- b/ To military or civil court, to another province, drafted, classified as "POW" or listed as "other".
- c/ Initial sentence only. Sentence may subsequently be extended by administrative action of Province Security Committee.

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Recent Actions. The 1971 Community Defense and Local Development Plan reduced the neutralization goal from 1800 to 1200 per month in an attempt to emphasize quality instead of quantity. The plan specifically directs Phung Hoang committees to concentrate on key communist cadre. It further states that at least half of the 1200 are expected to meet sentencing criteria (sentenced to a year or more, referred to military courts, or classified POW).

CORDS Program 4 is the current primary source of informant reward funds to support Phung Hoang. In 1970, eleven provinces sampled expended only VN \$115,000 (US \$975--about \$90 a province). In 1971 (through April) these same eleven provinces have spent about US \$60 apiece.

A new high value rewards program was presented to the Commanding General, National Police Command in May 1971 by MACV. He in turn, directed a CVN program based on the US proposal be prepared for presentation to the Prime Minister. The funding source for the VN \$150 million (US \$1.3 million) in the program will be CORDS Military Support of Pacification (OSMA) funds.

CONFIDENTIAL

Aug-Oct 1971

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### PHUNG HOANG RESULTS

Territorial forces (RF/PF) continue to be the single most effective force in South Vietnam's struggle to neutralize the Viet Cong infrastructure.

- During July, RF/PF units brought in half of the nearly 1,500 VCI who were killed, captured, or who rallied to the GVN.
- About 20% of the neutralizations were direct ralliers to the Chieu Hoi program (another 10% rallied via the various action forces).
- About 5% were neutralized by regular forces.
- Only 25% of the VCI taken during July were neutralized by Phung Hoang forces (some improvement over the first quarter when these forces neutralized 20% of the total).

Thus, although neutralization of the VCI is the prime objective of the Phung Hoang program, most of the job (about 75%) is still being done by other than police forces.

Reports from field advisors indicate that the joint US-GVN program to dry up South Vietnam's drug traffic may have added to Phung Hoang's chronic problems:

- Phoenix assets are being used to ferret out drug dealers.
- Their attention has, in many provinces, been turned partially away from anti-VCI efforts.

While both problems are essentially police matters, they apparently cannot be handled concurrently. The number of province advisors who mentioned this in their July reports underscores the lack of depth of the Phung Hoang organization.

Phung Hoang goals were lowered for 1971 (from 1800 per month to 1200 per month) in an effort to improve the quality of neutralizations.

While the Vietnamese are meeting the lowered goal:

- Total neutralizations have been in a downtrend this year (from about 2000 per month in the 1st quarter to the current 13-1500 per month).
- There has been no change in the quality of neutralizations. VCI serving at district level or higher represented about 22% of those neutralized during 1970; they have been 20-27% of any month's total this year.

In short, Phung Hoang has changed very little. Although everyone agrees that it is critical, no one seems to be able to improve it.

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*September 1967*

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THE REFUGEE PROBLEM IN VIETNAM

Refugees in Vietnam were not a significant problem until 1965. During the early stages of the insurgency the number of persons who moved from insecure to secure areas was small enough not to strain the social organization of Vietnam. However, in the past two years the total cumulative number of officially recognized refugees has increased by 1,300,000 (from 645,000 in September 1965 to 1,945,000 as of July 31, 1967). These numbers largely exclude those attracted to the cities by jobs or by disenchantment with the VC.

In South Vietnam there is no generally accepted definition of a "refugee," and local GVN officials have considerable latitude in classifying a Vietnamese as a refugee. In providing a guide to field representatives the USAID's office of Refugee Coordination in Saigon defines a refugee as "a displaced person who is outside of his normal area of residence and who cannot return to his home area for fear of persecution or physical injury." This definition is adequate but is not applied by GVN officials, who normally disqualify any "refugee" from a Viet Cong controlled village thus rendering him ineligible for GVN aid. Only in the past month has this been changed in ICTZ. Thus the potential for winning the support of those who had lived under Viet Cong rule has not been realized.

Table 1 displays the official data available on the gross flow of officially recognized refugees. The refugee flow has been fairly steady except for the July-September 1966 period when it jumped to 166,000 per month, primarily due to expanded military operations in the populated areas of I and II CTZ.

The biggest surprise in the official numbers was the very sharp rise in the number of refugees returning to their original village (an increase from 311,000 to 607,000). This return of 296,000 Vietnamese to their homes was most marked in II Corps which reported 220,000 in June and July 1967. The meaning of this jump is uncertain due to the lack of a June report, a mathematical error of 98,000 in the July report, and the flexibility of definition.

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TABLE 1

THE REFUGEE SITUATION  
(Thousands)

	Sep 26 1965	Dec 26 1965	Mar 31 1966	Jun 30 1966	Sep 30 1966	Dec 31 1966	Mar 31 1967	Jul 31 1967
Total Refugees (Cum) <sup>d/</sup>	645	697	908	1,001	1,500	1,678	1,801	1,945
Net Change		(+52)	(+211)	(+93)	(+499)	(+178)	(+123)	(+144)
Resettled Refugees Refugees (Cum) <sup>a/</sup>	240	249	320	360	540	542	568	601
Net Change		(+9)	(+71)	(+40)	(+180)	(+2)	(+26)	(+33)
Temporary Refugees In & Out of Camps (Cum) <sup>b/</sup>	404	448	464	500	685	809	921	835
Net Change		(+44)	(+16)	(+36)	(+185)	(+124)	(+112)	(-84)
Returned to Orig. Villages (Cum) <sup>c/</sup>	0	0	123	140	280	325	311	607
Net Change			(+123)	(+17)	(+140)	(+45)	(-14)	(+296)

a/ Relocated (Resettled) Refugee. After a period of no more than three months in a "temporary" status, a refugee family is eligible for a one time resettlement payment of 3,500 piastres and 50 kilos of rice (or 3,000 piastres) per family per month for six months.

b/ Temporary Refugee. When he first comes in he is classified as a temporary refugee eligible to stay in government provided shelters, if available. A family is eligible for 10 piasters per day per person (or 4 piasters per day and 400 grams of rice per day -- i.e. 13 kilograms per month). Persons capable of working are entitled to receive this aid for one month; those over 60, disabled, and children under 8 years of age are eligible for three months.

c/ Including refugees resettled by the GVN and those who have resettled individually without GVN assistance. The latter signify to the GVN their intent to return to their original villages.

d/ Roughly the sum of the 3 other categories - except in July 1967 when it is 98,000 off.

Source: GVN Special Commissariat for Refugees (Provisional Statistics only, pending official census).



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The age and sex of refugees in Vietnam is shown in Table 2 and Figure 1. Basically the population is composed of non-combatants, i.e. children under 14 years old (43%) and women (30%). (About 17% are males between the ages of 15 and 49). While these persons are not necessarily members of the Viet Cong, they are the object of Viet Cong propaganda and may provide logistic and intelligence support. In view of the matriarchal nature of Vietnamese society, the opportunity exists to win the female refugees over to support of the GVN thus helping prevent regression in pacified areas.

Because approximately one out of eight South Vietnamese has been or is an official refugee, there has been a severe strain placed on social welfare services. The non-productive aspect of refugee existence has produced a requirement for a massive importation of rice during 1967. The current estimate is for between 760,000 and 900,000 metric tons. In large measure, the movement of South Vietnam from a rice exporter (approximately 500,000 tons) to a heavy importer is due in part to the labor withdrawal of the refugee from the agricultural part of the economy.

There is a gain from the refugee element in the form of an increase in population under the control of the GVN. However, the fracturing of the rural society; urbanization and the difficulties of refugee life tend to make the gain of somewhat doubtful value in terms of nation-building. Few modern nations have been able to cope successfully with the problems associated with massive numbers of refugees. In Vietnam the existence and effectiveness of the VC exaggerate the problem.

Further analysis and refinement of the data about refugees may provide reliable estimates of the number of potential refugees due to military operations in contested areas, as well as to indicate the depth of VC support in those areas. As pacification programs accelerate, the ebb and flow of population from areas undergoing pacification may be useful as an index of the effectiveness of such programs. As mentioned above, the statistics do not reflect Vietnamese who have become refugees from Viet Cong controlled areas. Unofficial estimates have set this additional figure at between 20 - 35% of the official total, or about 400,000 to 600,000 people -- an element which may represent a potential danger to the pacification effort. If the recently adopted I Corps policy of taking care of refugees from Viet Cong controlled areas is adopted countrywide, there is a strong likelihood the refugee population will show a marked rise in subsequent months.

The nature, scope and magnitude of the refugee problem indicate the need for further study of patterns of refugee flows, correlations with US and GVN military operations and pacification efforts, resettlement choices (to see if refugees prefer hamlets) and Viet Cong actions against the refugee. This publication will address, in future issues, some of these problems and attempt to relate them to the results of on going efforts in both the pacification and military environment.

TABLE 2

Age and Sex Structure of Refugees  
in Vietnam


(Based on sample registration of 113,067 refugees)

<u>Age Groups</u>	<u>Male</u>	<u>Female</u>	<u>Total</u>
1 - 4 yrs	9,237	8,942	18,179
5 - 9	10,498	9,849	20,347
10 - 14	8,485	7,578	16,063
15 - 19	5,216	5,394	10,610
20 - 24	1,857	3,369	5,226
25 - 29	2,310	3,952	6,262
30 - 34	2,758	3,836	6,594
35 - 39	2,933	3,309	6,242
40 - 44	2,328	2,819	5,147
45 - 49	2,130	2,278	4,408
50 - 54	1,675	1,761	3,436
55 - 59	1,362	1,510	2,872
60 - 64	1,264	1,431	2,695
65 - 69	966	1,059	2,025
70	<u>1,292</u>	<u>1,669</u>	<u>2,961</u>
<b>GRAND TOTAL:</b>	<b>54,311</b>	<b>58,756</b>	<b>113,067</b>

OCO/REF  
Apr/67


# AGE AND SEX STRUCTURE OF REFUGEES IN VIETNAM

(BASED ON SAMPLE REGISTRATION OF 113,067 REFUGEES)



REFUGEES IN VIETNAM

(7 REFUGEES)



FEMALE

18

1000/000/RDF  
MAR 1967

FIGURE 1

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THE CURRENT REFUGEE SITUATION

The total number of refugees generated since the beginning of the enemy Spring offensive increased to 1,000,600 thus far in September (an increase of 72,000 in the past 30 days). Homeless in identified locations rose to 609,400.

TABLE 1

MONTHLY ESTIMATES OF TOTAL REFUGEES CAUSED BY THE 1972 OFFENSIVE (Totals in 1,000s) a/

	<u>April</u>	<u>May</u>	<u>June</u>	<u>July</u>	<u>August</u>	<u>September</u>
<u>MR 1</u>						
Generated	248.55	529.90	484.90	484.90	513.00	545.00
In Identified Locations	b/	366.10	387.80	365.10	376.10	394.80
<u>MR 2</u>						
Generated	70.40	133.20	173.20	223.20	253.70	260.70
In Identified Locations	b/	117.80	166.90	184.60	161.90	154.80
<u>MR 3</u>						
Generated	35.00	66.80	106.50	112.70	112.70	112.70
In Identified Locations	b/	61.20	79.10	67.60	53.30	47.70
<u>GVN</u>						
Generated	12.65	36.40	69.60	89.50	97.20	102.20
In Identified Locations	b/	33.40	56.30	35.60	12.10	12.10
<u>GVN</u>						
Generated	366.60	763.30	834.20	910.30	976.60	1,020.60
In Identified Locations	b/	578.50	690.10	652.90	603.40	609.40

a/ The number of Refugees Generated is an estimation and should be considered less accurate than the number reported in Identified Locations which is derived from totals who register at refugee camps. Refugee estimates are revised as better data becomes available (e.g., June 72 figures). The number of Refugees Generated should not be expected to equal those reported in Identified Locations due to the degree of error inherent in the estimation and the fact that many war victims fend for themselves and do not register at camps for GVN assistance.

b/ Number not available for April.

c/ Partial total through September 21.

The Provinces

Renewed levels of enemy activity in MR 1 and MR 2 were primarily responsible for the increased totals.

OASD/SA/NEPRO  
September 23, 1972

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Classified by OASD/SA/NEPRO/SEA Division  
EXCEPT TO GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE OF  
EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652. AUTOMATICALLY DOWNGRADED  
AT TWO YEAR INTERVALS. DECLASSIFIED ON 12/31/78

... and Quang Nam Provinces created over 30,000 of these borders in that last three weeks.

Renewed combat in Than An District of Pleiku Province has caused over 7,000 people to relocate in sites near Pleiku City. Similar levels of combat and enemy movements in northern and northwestern Kontum Province has driven many Montagnards into GVN outposts or forced evacuations to Kontum City.

TABLE 2

TOTAL ESTIMATES OF REFUGEES CAUSED BY THE OFFENSIVE BY PROVINCE  
(Total in 1,000's)

	Generated 3/31-9/21	In Identified Locations 9/21
<u>MR 1</u>		
Quang Tri	250.00	0.00
Thua Thien	110.00	59.50
Quang Nam	59.00	20.80
Quang Tin	56.00	44.60
Quang Ngai	70.00	26.30
Danang	0.00	246.60
Total	545.00	394.80
<u>MR 2</u>		
Kontum	45.00	15.00
Pleiku	52.50	20.00
Binh Dinh	150.00	100.00
Phu Bon	3.70	0.00
Phu Yen	9.50	9.00
Darlac	0.00	6.00
Khanh Hoa (Kha Trang)	0.00	1.45
Ninh Thuan	0.00	1.25
Tuen Duc	0.00	.35
Lam Dong	0.00	.80
Cam Ranh City	0.00	.95
Total	260.70	154.80
<u>MR 3</u>		
Binh Long	45.00	.30
Phuoc Long	7.60	4.10
Binh Duong	4.20	26.70
Tay Ninh	10.00	.80
Hau Nghia	18.00	.00
Long Khanh	0.00	4.80
Bien Hoa	0.00	11.00
Phuoc Tuy	29.70	0.00
Total	112.70	47.70
<u>MR 4</u>		
An Xuyen	5.60	0.00
Chau Doc	10.50	0.00
Dinh Tuong	7.00	0.00
Kien Phong	20.00	3.60
Kien Tuong	10.00	3.70
Kien Giang	15.70	4.80
Vinh Binh	2.00	0.00
Chuong Thien	27.70	0.00
Ba Xuyen	3.70	0.00
Total	102.20	12.10

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Observations:

The fluctuating "In Identified Locations" summaries do not reliably indicate that substantial numbers of people are either entering the camps or departing to their homes (although an Embassy report of three weeks ago indicated that possibly as many as 250,000 Vietnamese citizens have been able to return). These variations appear to be caused by resurveys and other statistical variations rather than actual increases or reductions.

There are indications that more of the refugees are becoming increasingly discontent and uneasy over their homeless existence. Field reports of the last several months have indicated a rising inability of the GVN to care for large numbers of refugees over prolonged periods (these reports are contrasted to early reports of GVN interest and effectiveness in caring for the war victims). In addition to the squalor of many of the camps, reports from MR 2 indicate refugees are very concerned about the future of this year's rice crop due to slow RVNAF progress to retake the captured territory. Finally, the VC terrorist attack on a Danang refugee camp has re-inforced enemy attempts to discredit GVN security claims. Enemy attempts to resettle the homeless population in VC "liberated" areas have been reinforced.

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LAND REFORM AND GVN CONTROL

A recent RAND study\* finds that the greater the inequality of land distribution in a province the greater is GVN control. In addition to unequal land distribution, a secure province is one where few peasants farm their own land, no land distribution has been carried out, large French landholdings have existed in the past, population density is high, and cross-country mobility is low.

The study examined the relative importance of various socio-economic factors affecting GVN control in South Vietnam. It found that the most important explanatory variables are those which measure the inequality of land tenure arrangements. The statistical basis for the foregoing findings is land tenure data in the 1960 Agricultural Census of South Vietnam and December 1964 control data. Although the Census was a sample of only 10% of the hamlets in RVN, with a bias toward GVN-controlled hamlets, RAND indicates the results of this study still can be considered valid, since the control status of a province in 1964 was independent of the 4 year old Census bias. (We have verified the RAND findings using April 1967 GVN control data.)

The study speculates that, where land inequality is great and landlords dominate, most peasants probably live at subsistence level, entirely preoccupied with making a living. Thus, their levels of aspiration and discontent may be low, rendering them unresponsive to VC appeals and ensuring high GVN control. Although this study did not address the idea of land reform projects directly, the implication is that redistribution of land, with its disruptive effects, may lessen GVN control.

Another possibility investigated, but rejected, was that large landholders can exert influence on the central government to obtain more armed forces for their areas, and thus maintain a higher degree of GVN control. The statistics do not support this, because there was no significant tendency for more armed forces to be located in the areas of unequal land distribution (July 1964 data).

Finally, the docility of peasants in areas of unequal land distribution may not be the only factor affecting GVN control. In unequal areas authorities may be better able to organize and train local forces (not measured in the statistics), and engage peasants in self-defense activities.

\*RM-5101-ARPA, June 1967. "Land Tenure and Rebellion: A Statistical Analysis of Factors Affecting Government Control in South Vietnam."

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*Document 1867*

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Is Land Reform a Necessary US Objective?

No serious attempts have yet been made to assess the attitudes of the SVN farmer toward land reform. As a result, it is difficult to interpret the importance of land reform to the pacification effort in the rural community. The Stanford Research Institute has been engaged by AID to explore this issue, but as yet the study has not taken place.

In the absence of this information, a wide variety of views concerning land reform have developed. On one extreme, the popular American press claims that present land tenure conditions are inequitable and as such do not provide an adequate base for political stability. Some go so far as to blame the slow progress of the war on the need for land reform. However, such claims are based upon little or no direct information about land tenure conditions in SVN.

On the other extreme, a recent RAND study presents the major finding that greater GVN control is associated with greater inequality in land distribution. \* "...It is suggested that the greater power of landlords and relative docility of peasants in unequal areas may account for this situation..." However, the validity of this result is questionable. Being a statistical study, it merely correlates GVN control (measured by the percentage of hamlets in varying degrees of GVN control) with inequality of land distribution (measured by (a) the variation of the distribution of land holdings by size, and (b) by the percentage of land that is owner-operated).

Although these correlations are statistically significant, the conclusions that may be drawn are limited. First, the measure of GVN control does not necessarily reflect GVN control of the countryside where the farmers are located. Secondly, the census on land ownership was restricted to GVN controlled areas and thereby tends to bias the sample. This raises the question of whether GVN control implies inequality in land distribution. Third, the census data was gathered in 1960 and, as the study admits, "...at a time when VC influence was much less than it is now..." This raises the possibility that, although the peasants may have been

\* Edward J. Mitchell, "Land Tenure and Rebellion: A Statistical Analysis of Factors Affecting Government Control in South Vietnam", RAND Corporation, RM-5181-ARPA, June 1967.

**CONFIDENTIAL**

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2

docile in 1960 or before, VC propaganda activities in the interim could have reversed the situation. Finally, and probably most important, the study is wholly concerned with land distribution and ignores the much broader issue of land reform, which encompasses a spectrum of factors such as equity and predictability in rents and lease arrangements plus the availability of agricultural services that should be provided by the government, including assuring the farmer ready access to water, farm supplies, markets for his crops, credit, and technical information. The study therefore ignores the important question of the correlation between GVN control and the economic welfare of the peasant farmer.

Hans Heymann, a Special Assistant to the White House and a recognized authority on land reform problems in SVN, maintains that these broader issues in land reform are most crucial to the SVN farmer, while the matter of land ownership is relatively unimportant.

On the other hand, Wolf Ladejinsky, who served as Land Reform Expert for the Diem government, contends that land redistribution was the central rural issue in the 1950's. \*\* He further maintains that the laws enacted during the Diem regime to limit individual land ownership to 250 acres, limit rents to 15% - 25%, and improve tenure security, removed the major inequities in land tenure relationships. Unfortunately these laws, as well as those enacted in the interim, have not been fully implemented to date.

Perhaps the most important indicator of rural opinion toward land reform is exhibited by the attention this issue has received in the current political campaign. In recent months the GVN has stepped up its efforts to implement land reform policies, including the personal distribution of new land titles by Generals Ky and Thieu, the more favorable attitude of the Constituent Assembly toward land reform, and the promises of further land reform.

Other political candidates include the land reform issue in their campaign platforms. Suu and Dan, for example, propose a "land revolution" which includes reducing land holdings to 125 acres, placing a moratorium on rents for the remainder of the war, easing credit, and opening new and uncultivated land.

\*\* Wolf Ladejinsky, "Agrarian Reform in the Republic of Vietnam", in W. R. Fishel (ed.), Problems of Freedom, (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, Inc., 1959).

CONFIDENTIAL

115

CONFIDENTIAL

3

In conclusion, it is difficult to ascertain the need for land reform as a US objective because of the basic lack of information on this issue. The attention it has received as a political issue suggests some importance, but does not indicate the direction any new policy should take. In fact, such declarations may do more harm than good to the pacification effort because the inability to implement them results in a reduction in the credibility of the government.

CONFIDENTIAL

116

*referred to*

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ODCSOPS Comments: Is Land Reform A Necessary U.S. Objective?

As part of the continuing dialogue between SEAPRO and ODCSOPS, the latter has contributed the following comments on the article on this subject in the August issue:

The referenced report contains an article (pages 44-46) on land reform in RVN. It concludes:

" . . . it is difficult to ascertain the need for land reform as a U. S. objective because of the basic lack of information on this issue. The attention it has received as a political issue suggests the direction any new policy should take. In fact, such declarations may do more harm than good to the pacification effort because the inability to implement them results in a reduction in the credibility of the government."

Although it is true that no comprehensive attempt has been made to assess the attitudes of the South Vietnamese farmer toward land reform, there is no doubt that Communist promises of land reform in the 1950's, particularly in the Mekong Delta area, had a great appeal to the peasant farmer. In fact, Ladejinsky, in the article quoted in the referenced report, contends that achievement of equitable land tenure relationships in Vietnam quickly became an essential ingredient of winning and keeping the support of the peasant.

Under successive governments, land reform in its narrow sense largely took place in SVN in the 1950's. Legal limits were set on land holdings and rents. By the early 1960's the principal features of the land tenure pattern were that the majority of farm families owned at least a part of the land they farmed, that relatively few of the land holdings were as large as the 247 acre (100 hectare) maximum, and that rented lands typically belonged to small local rather than absentee owners. Much of the criticism of the land reform policy of the GVN is in fact attributable to war-related disruptions in the building of economic institutions rather than to land tenure conditions per se.

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The immediate land tenure problem before the GVN is to re-establish effective administration of existing law. Security is the primary limiting factor, however. The most important tasks concerning land reform are to assure equitable settlement of conflicting claims to land in areas liberated from VC control, to enforce the laws which set ceilings on rents and assure the farmer security of tenure, and to complete distribution of state-held lands. Of particular importance is the policy of exempting the farmer from having to pay back rent, and the landlord back taxes which may have accrued while their area was insecure. The GVN's reiteration of this policy in the form of an official circular in March 1967 constitutes a critical step in a realistic land policy for formerly contested rural areas. It is also important that the local village governments are being involved in land administration by the inclusion of an agriculture and land affairs member in the village administrative committee. This committee must consult the elected village council on all matters concerning land affairs. This portion of the land reform program is designed to shift a substantial measure of economic and political power to the hands of the rural population, and is thus of significance far beyond mere land reform.

Since land holding in Vietnam is not characterized by the great disparities found in some less developed nations, decisions on the precise nature of longer range land reform measures involve refined judgments of public philosophy. Having reduced individual holdings to 247 acres (100 hectare) and placed ceilings of not over 25 percent on rents, the issues remaining do not present clear-cut alternatives, but rather involve off-setting a variety of social, economic, and political values, and as a result, are more controversial. There is not sufficient information available on current tenure conditions to make intelligent judgments on the purely technical problems and implications of such measures. There is even less information on their social and political ramifications. In addition, the administrative capacity of the GVN to carry out new land reform measures is quite limited.

It is agreed that the RAND study quoted in the referenced report is of little significance or reliability, primarily because the statistics on which its conclusions are based are far out of date.

The objective of the Stanford Research Institute Project is not, as stated, to explore the issue of the importance of land reform to the Revolutionary Development effort in the rural community; rather, the

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objective of this research program is to provide the essential factual base upon which land tenure policy in Vietnam can be formulated. More specifically, the study will initially seek to overcome two critical deficiencies in present land tenure information by:

a. Assembling in one volume all of the relevant, available land tenure information, and assessing this information in terms of omissions, inconsistencies, and reliability.

b. Generating the data not now available but essential for execution of existing programs and formulation of new land policies.

On 6 September 1966, the US Embassy in Saigon, in a message to Secretary of State, stated that the Mission had developed land reform guidelines which would provide the policy framework within which the mission would advise and assist the GVN in planning and executing land reform programs. Included in their guidelines was the following: "The Revolutionary Development program must include tenure reforms which will prevent the re-establishment in pacified areas of former inequitable landlord-tenant relationships."

Thus, the U. S. Mission would seem to be on record as indicating that land reform is a necessary objective, especially in newly pacified areas.

L-100

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## GVN VERSUS VC ADMINISTRATION

### Summary

By October 31, the VC had reportedly formed about 1100 village level liberation committees with some in GVN relatively secure villages. The GVN has elected governments in about 1000 villages, leaving at least 200 villages without elected governments from either side. Despite the VC push to form a political structure in the countryside, the GVN has not tailored its mobilization program to allow experienced GVN civil servants to remain on the job at province and below.

### Communist Liberation Committees

Communist political cadre are moving ahead rapidly in VC controlled areas to establish a formal administrative system -- the so-called "liberation committee." The organization of these committees represents a further evolution of the enemy's political infrastructure from a clandestine administrative net to what he hopes will ultimately be a popular based, overt government.

The decision to set up the committee structure was made as part of the general offensive strategy conceived in Hanoi during the summer of 1967. Had the communists succeeded in toppling the Saigon regime during the Tet offensive, the committees would have served to replace GVN territory in the countryside. In the event the fighting continued, but was eventually followed by a compromise settlement, the committees would serve to bolster enemy claims to territorial control over large segments of the rural populace.

The initial effort to establish the committees in the post-Tet period was largely a failure. Subsequently, the committees have put more care and effort into the organizational process and have apparently succeeded, increasing the number of viable committees throughout much of the enemy-controlled area. There are also enemy claims, and some hard reports, of the establishment of the committees in contested areas and in government-controlled villages.

Table 1 shows the number and distribution of liberation committees by mid-November 1968. Caution is needed in using this data as it contains an undetermined amount of double counting and information from sources of untested reliability. Of the 1,328 committees formed, 538 or 41% are located in IV Corps. Almost 83% or 1,099 are village level committees. As of 31 December 1967, the Hamlet Evaluation System (HES) reported 2,277 villages: 229 rated A, 494 - B, 526 - C, 517 - D, 81 - E and 430 - VC.

<sup>1/</sup> This section draws heavily on CIA Memorandum 2047/68, "The Communist Liberation Committees in SVN," dated November 4, 1968.

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Assuming that this distribution is still approximately correct, it is likely that liberation committees are established in some villages rated "C" or above (1,099 village committees versus 1,028 VC-D-E villages).

Table 2 shows that local GVN elections were held in 5,450 hamlets and 939 villages in SVN during the spring of 1967. These account for 8.1 million people or 59% of the population of SVN. The data in Tables 1 and 2 indicate it is mathematically possible that no dual administrative structures exist at the village level, and some villages may have neither a VC liberation committee or elected GVN leaders (939 with elected GVN, plus 1099 VC village councils, plus 239 with neither, equals the 2277 total villages reported in the HES last December).

Data from the June 1968 HES indicate there are effective GVN administrations in 5,997 hamlets, or in 547 more hamlets than had elections in spring 1967 (only scattered elections have been held since).

The seemingly urgent pace of the current VC organizational campaign implies that some type of culminating event in the process could occur relatively soon. In any event, the low-level administrative framework for a formal government is rapidly being established and should soon be available for exploitation should the communists choose to shift fighting from the military front to the political arena.

TABLE 1

### Liberation Committees as of 9 November 1968

	<u>I CORPS</u>	<u>II CORPS</u>	<u>III CORPS</u>	<u>IV CORPS</u>	<u>TOTALS</u>
Regional	1	-	-	-	1
Subregional	-	-	1	-	1
Province	2	6	4	5	17
District	14	5	4	10	33
City	-	3	-	2	5
Village	226	259	172	446	1,099
Hamlet	33	52	10	75	170
Precinct	-	-	2	-	2
Totals	<u>276</u>	<u>321</u>	<u>193</u>	<u>538</u>	<u>1,328</u>

TABLE 2

### Hamlets and Villages where Local GVN Elections were Held

	<u>I CTZ</u>	<u>II CTZ</u>	<u>III CTZ</u>	<u>IV CTZ</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
Village	151	267	201	320	939
Hamlet	877	1,346	1,122	2,105	5,450

# CONFIDENTIAL

121



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## GVN Posture

Almost all reports on the impact of the GVN mobilization effort indicate some reduction in effectiveness at local levels. In addition, there are reports of continuing ineffectiveness of GVN administration at province level and below. Some examples from the CORDS Field Overview for September 1968 are given in the footnote. <sup>1/</sup>

These are not isolated reports. The July and August Overviews also contained similar reports. In addition, reports provided to CORDS on the impact of mobilization by the end of July 1968 indicate that the number of civil servants drafted/recalled was about 7% for an average RVN province. The losses in some provinces, however, are considerably larger: Quang Ngai - 30%; Binh Dinh - 16%, Pleiku - 20%, and Vinh Long - 19%. A number of provinces expect a considerable increase in losses in the near future.

Some provinces indicate that the hiring of replacements for mobilized personnel is prohibited by the GVN; in the remaining provinces the reports indicate that the use of civilian replacements for mobilization losses has not been significant. Except for teachers, mobilized civil servants have not been returned to duty in significant numbers and very few military personnel have been detailed to replace mobilized civil servants.

Of the offices mentioned most often as being hardest hit in the province by mobilization, education is most frequently mentioned - 30 provinces. Public works was indicated in 21 cases, and public administration 12 times. The reports indicate that in every corps area, the average provincial administrators experienced a significant decrease in effectiveness. A study of the Directorate General of Land Affairs shows that up to 50% of the technical and field personnel and 20% of officer personnel may be eligible for the draft. A majority of the province and district level service chiefs are also eligible. These are highly specialized personnel, not easily replaced.

<sup>1/</sup> "The most serious problem cited by provinces was the effect of the military draft on the over-all quality of province administration. The loss of key officials and their subsequent replacement by new and less experienced personnel is a major factor in reducing administrative effectiveness" from II Field Force Overview for the period ending Sep. 30, 1968, p4.

"Measures to improve Vietnamese governmental administration have been disappointing. The 1968 training program for village administrative committee and council members was delayed as funds were not released by the Ministry of Interior until late June."

"Particularly bothersome is the continuing lack of effectiveness among civil servants. Inroads made by mobilization must be taken into account. But aside from that, neither performance nor dedication of those remaining has improved noticeably despite talk of renewed vigor and unity in the face of the VC challenge" from IV CTZ CORDS Field Overview for quarter ending Sep. 30, 1968, p4.

122

# CONFIDENTIAL

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One reaction to assertions that mobilization is reducing over-all GVN effectiveness is that the officials being mobilized aren't doing anything anyhow. Prime Minister Huong's order to reduce personnel at government agencies tends to support this view. However, it is clear that mobilization is having an adverse impact on agencies losing experienced specialists to the armed forces. It is not clear that the draftees will be any better utilized in the armed forces, particularly in meeting the enemy political threat at the local level.

1/ Airgram from American Embassy, Saigon, A-1049, 21 November 1968.

CONFIDENTIAL

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GVN AND VC ELECTIONS

Both the GVN and VC are emphasizing electing village councils throughout RVN. As of March 1969, we found that the GVN had a 2.7 to 1 advantage over the VC in village populations participating in their elections, and an 8 to 1 advantage when we used HES security scores to help measure popular "commitment." The GVN apparently does not have majorities "committed" to it in I and IV CTZ, and only recently managed to achieve 53% A-B ratings for the country as a whole (excluding Saigon). The GVN probably does not have enough trained political cadre to oppose the political and propaganda efforts of the 80-100,000 VC infrastructure members.

Background. Both the GVN and the VC seem to be preparing for a political confrontation, based primarily on which side can establish stronger elected village governments. In speeches to his four corps commanders in July, President Thieu stated that the GVN must be certain this year of 50% of the people's vote, and more next year. He said the GVN has 1½ years to ensure a favorable vote, as there will be no elections before 1971. President Thieu apparently feels that in order to have "50% loyal to the National Government and determined to support the National Government, . . . these 50% should be located in A and B hamlets."<sup>1/</sup> To this end, the GVN established the goal for 1969 of raising 50% of the non-Saigon population to A-B Hamlet Evaluation System (HES) security ratings.

In addition, GVN planning for 1969 stressed the urgency of establishing elected governments in as many villages as possible. Province chiefs were instructed to hold elections as soon as possible after securing an area "in order to create confidence of the people in the government."<sup>1/</sup>

In mid-1968, the VC pushed hard to "elect" Village Revolutionary Committees everywhere they could. They appealed to the memory of the old Viet Minh People's Committees set up in every village in 1945 to help prevent return of the French.

GVN Election Data. GVN data on village elections is not entirely reliable. As recently as March 1969 the Ministry of Interior showed 2537 villages in RVN, while the HES showed only 2256 villages, plus 132 unrated villages with virtually no inhabitants. Between March and June, GVN officials dropped over 400 villages to make their figures agree more closely with the HES. By last report, the GVN now recognizes only 2132 villages, about the same number as the June HES shows.

Despite the unreliable data, the GVN has held an impressive number of elections in 1969: Table 1 shows that 589 villages held elections in March and 191 in June, bringing elected village governments to 1891, or 89% of all villages in RVN.

<sup>1/</sup> Presidential Directive #939/PTT, "The Special Pacification and Reconstruction Campaign 1969," July 1, 1969 (CONFIDENTIAL).

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TABLE 1

GVN VILLAGE ELECTION DATA

Type of Village Government	No. of Villages			
	June 67	Jan 69	Mar 69	June 69
Elected	1045	1111	1700 (67%)	1891 (89%)
Appointed	NA	NA	500	NA
No Govt/Other	NA	NA	337	NA
<b>Total Villages (GVN Data)</b>	<b>NA</b>	<b>NA</b>	<b>2537</b>	<b>2132</b>
<b>Total Villages (HES Data) a/</b>	<b>2333</b>	<b>2408</b>	<b>2388</b>	<b>2351</b>

NA = not available

a/ Includes 100-200 villages containing no rated hamlets.

VC Election Data. Data on VC Revolutionary Committees is much less reliable than the data on GVN elections. Table 2 shows that MACV-J2 (BIG MACK reporting system) and OSA apparently disagree on which villages have held VC elections. Both agencies report that by March 1969 the VC formed 900-1000 committees, but only 625 villages were listed by both agencies. The actual number of committees could range from a minimum of 625 (confirmed by both agencies) to a maximum of 1277 (total listed by either agency).

TABLE 2

VC REVOLUTIONARY COMMITTEES FORMED  
As of March 1969

	No. of Villages
On both lists ("minimum" estimate)	625
On BIG MACK list only	355
On OSA list only	297
<b>Total committees listed ("maximum" estimate)</b>	<b>1277</b>
BIG MACK estimate	980
OSA estimate	922

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Popular Commitment. The high number of GVN and VC elections suggests that both sides may be trying to hold elections in many of the same villages as they attempt to expand their influence. In this section we compare GVN and VC election methods, and look at how many villages have held both GVN and VC elections.

GVN and VC election procedures are very similar, as Table 3 indicates. Both systems apparently use a form of compulsion to assure high voter "turnouts," but neither requires any lasting personal commitment by the voters. A villager could easily participate in both sides' elections, since he does not have to "choose" to vote voluntarily for either side.

TABLE 3

## GVN AND VC ELECTION PROCEDURES

<u>Procedure</u>	<u>GVN</u>	<u>VC</u>
Candidacy	Decree Law 159: Over 25 years old Must be "in possession of his civic rights" Must not be "communist collaborator"	Varies with local security: Usually 18 or over age requirement Not an overt member of People's Revolutionary Party Some class restrictions Stricter ideological conditions in GVN areas
Nominations	Anyone can submit name to district chief	District Party committee draws up list
Ratio of Candidates to Seats	1.5 to 1	1+ to 1 (Party "preferred" candidates listed more prominently on ballot)
Voter Registration	Must have ID card or equivalent Must be 18 years old	No formal registration
Voter Participation	Invariably 80-95% Voter list posted prominently	Unknown, but "virtually everybody is allowed, indeed compelled to vote" (OSA document)
Regularity of Voting	Locked ballot boxes Watchdog committees Legal safeguards	Informal count by Party members

Source: "Comparative Government in the Delta," Study by CORDS, IV CTZ  
Public Administration Division, ca. June 1969.

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We compared the list of GVN elections with the VC election lists, and found that from 319 to 799 villages hedged their participation in one side's elections by also participating in the other side's. Table 4 shows that if we use the OSA list of VC elections, about one-third of GVN elections and 60% of VC elections occurred in a common set of 543 villages which voted for both sides; the figure could range from 319 to 799, depending on whether we use minimum or maximum estimates for the VC elections.

TABLE 4

GVN AND VC ELECTIONS  
(As of March 1969)

CTZ	GVN Elections Reported <sup>a/</sup>	VC Elections Estimates <sup>b/</sup>			Both GVN and VC Elections Held			Total No. Villages (HES)
		Min	OSA	Max	Min	OSA	Max	
I	285	181	206	319	75	93	169	518
II	478	80	163	246	48	120	184	685
III	319	79	144	210	48	97	150	417
IV	546	285	409	502	148	233	305	777
SVN	1628	625	922	1277	319	543	799	2391

- a/ Source: Village-by-village list of GVN elections. Agrees only approximately with official GVN election total (1700 in March - see Table 1).
- b/ Source: FIG MACK and OSA. Minima and maxima computed as in Table 2 and text.

Elections and Security. Popular commitment to the GVN cannot occur without adequate security. For instance, the GVN can hold elections in a D-E-VC village but fail to gain true popular commitment by not providing security as well. Similarly, a VC "election" in an A-B-C hamlet, for instance, does not necessarily indicate commitment to the VC. Therefore, in this section we used the following criteria to measure GVN and VC "popular commitment": (For convenience, we used only OSA estimates for VC elections.)

- GVN "Commitment" - GVN elections held in A-B-C village (no D-E-VC hamlets in village)
- VC "Commitment" - VC elections held in D-E-VC village (no A-B-C hamlets in village)
- No "Commitment" - All other non-Saigon population

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We found that as of March 1969, "GVN commitment" outweighed "VC commitment" 8 to 1: "commitment" to the GVN occurred in villages with 8.4 million people, or 56% of the 15.0 million non-Saigon population (Table 5); by contrast, VC "commitment" occurred for only 1.1 million people (7%), and 6.5 million (37%) were not "committed" to either side. If we had used participation in elections as the only criterion, participation for the GVN would have outnumbered that for the VC 2.7 to 1: 12.4 million people lived in villages electing GVN officials, versus 4.6 million for the VC. (Both figures include 3.4 million in villages which voted in both GVN and VC elections.)

TABLE 5  
ELECTIONS VS. HES SECURITY RATINGS  
As of March 1969  
Non-Saigon Population in Millions  
(% of Population in Parentheses)

HES Security Rating for Village	Elections Held			No Elections Held	Total
	GVN Only	Both GVN & VC	VC Only		
All A-B-C <u>c/</u>	6.9 <sub>a/</sub>	1.5	.1	.6	9.1 (60.7%)
Mixed: <u>d/</u>					
A-B-C	NA	NA	NA	NA	2.7 (18.0%)
D-E-VC	NA	NA	NA	NA	1.4 (9.3%)
Subtotal	1.9	1.7	.2	.3	4.1 (27.3%)
All D-E-VC <u>e/</u>	.2	.2	.9	.5 <sub>b/</sub>	1.8 (12.0%)
Tot. Population	9.0 (60.0%)	3.4 (22.7%)	1.2 (8.0%)	1.4 (9.3%)	15.0

Source: Hamlet Evaluation System - HAMLIA computer file. (Excludes 2.2 million Saigon population.) Village-by-village GVN and OSA election data; agrees only approximately with official GVN and BIG MACK data.

- a/ Includes .4 million secure non-hamlet population in cities other than Saigon.
- b/ Includes .2 million contested and VC non-hamlet population, and population in unrated villages.
- c/ All rated hamlets in village achieved A-B-C HES security ratings.
- d/ Some rated hamlets in village achieved A-B-C, others D-E-VC.
- e/ All rated hamlets in village achieved D-E-VC HES security ratings.

Although our countrywide figures showed a 56% majority for the GVN, I and IV CTZ each had less than 50% "commitment" as of March 1969. Table 6 shows that while the GVN apparently had a majority "committed" to it in II (63%) and III (93%) CTZ, I and IV CTZ had only 46-49% GVN "commitment."

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TABLE 6

GVN AND VC "POPULAR COMMITMENT"  
BY CORPS AREA  
As of March 1969

	<u>Population</u> <u>(000)</u>	<u>%</u>
<u>I CTZ</u>		
GVN Commitment	1301	46.0
No Commitment	1276	45.1
VC Commitment	254	8.9
Total	<u>2831</u>	<u>100.0</u>
<u>II CTZ</u>		
GVN Commitment	1940	62.6
No Commitment	1072	34.6
VC Commitment	86	2.8
Total	<u>3098</u>	<u>100.0</u>
<u>III CTZ</u>		
GVN Commitment	2282	92.9
No Commitment	99	4.0
VC Commitment	75	3.1
Total	<u>2456</u>	<u>100.0</u>
<u>IV CTZ</u>		
GVN Commitment	2865	48.6
No Commitment	2372	40.2
VC Commitment	657	11.2
Total	<u>5894</u>	<u>100.0</u>
<u>SVN</u>		
GVN Commitment	8388	55.9
No Commitment	5559	37.0
VC Commitment	1072	7.1
Total	<u>15019</u>	<u>100.0</u>

Note: For definitions of GVN, VC, and No "Commitment", see text.  
Source: See Table 5.

Our estimates of "commitment" may be high, because HES security ratings for March showed only 38-49% of the population rated A-B in the four CTZ. Since March, however, A-B population ratings have improved to a countrywide average of 53% for July, thus achieving the 50% goal set by the GVN. By corps area, July ratings range from 45% A-B for IV CTZ to 63% A-B for III CTZ.



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Local Political Leadership. The GVN is counting on newly trained local officials to strengthen its political position in the countryside. However, strength figures alone indicate that the GVN does not have trained political cadre to match the 80-100,000 man VC infrastructure in either numbers or quality. The 54,500 FD cadre in 30-man teams are supposed to make the GVN bureaucracy more responsive to local needs, but only a few thousand FD cadre and the 5500 men in Armed Propaganda Teams are trained, experienced political cadre. This year the GVN began giving 1-5 week political indoctrination courses to some 20,000 elected and appointed village officials; this training is designed primarily to increase GVN responsiveness. MACV and the GVN are apparently aware of the critical need for better political leadership, but so far have not been able to effect a remedy.

130

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Aug 70

PROVINCE/CITY COUNCIL ELECTIONS IN RVN

Summary. Should lower house bill 84 pass into law in SVN as expected, province councils could become a significant political and governmental force. Recent elections returned very few incumbents to office and resulted in a significant lowering of the average age of those serving on province councils. The June province council elections also prompted Vietnamese political parties to create district chapters and thus move closer to the people.

Background. Elections to forty-four province and six city councils were held throughout RVN in June 1970. These elections were the first since May 30, 1965. They were originally scheduled to be held in early 1968, but the terms of office were extended by decree.

Province councils were originally advisory bodies to the province chiefs and had no legislative or fiscal role. They now have a province council fund at their disposal<sup>1/</sup> and limited veto authority over the use of certain funds. Pending national legislation (lower house bill 84)<sup>2/</sup> will cause sweeping changes in local government if adopted. It will give the province council:

- policy making powers
- legislative authority
- budgetary and fiscal responsibility
- participation in selection of other province officials.

Service on province councils currently does not provide a convenient entry into national politics due to the limited role of the councils. However, several province councilmen helped draft the constitution and the 1967 election legislation.

Councilmen were formerly elected at large from each province, permitting the existence of power cliques and a centralization of political parties at province level. Now a councilman is elected by his district constituency. This has had the effect of:

- Breaking up the province level cliques
- Motivating parties to build district level chapters

<sup>1/</sup> In Binh Dinh the 1970 fund amounts to about \$500,000 (US).

<sup>2/</sup> Bill 84 has been extensively reviewed by the ministry of interior and returned to the assembly. USAID officials expect its passage in Spring 1971.

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Election Results. In the recent elections, 1930 candidates vied for 544 seats. Election activities reportedly were not particularly vigorous. Voter turnout was moderate (generally around 75%), there were few VC attempts to disrupt the process, and voting irregularities were not numerous. One province advisor remarked that observers were impressed by the "increased political maturity" exhibited by voters, candidates and election officials. Approximately 50% of those elected were independents, causing one US political observer to remark that this may indicate that well known political personalities of the French and Diem eras may have a better chance for success in the senatorial elections.

Preliminary reports of advisors in thirty-one provinces and four cities indicate:

- only 8% of those elected were incumbents (the data do not provide a basis for estimating the number of incumbents who ran).

- the average age of those elected is 40 (based on eight provinces reporting).

In the provinces reporting the occupations of 369 successful candidates:

- 28% are government employees
- 25% are military
- 11% are educators
- 10% are village officials
- 8% are businessmen or landowners
- 6% are farmers

These six groups account for 66% of the total.

The age distribution of 75 successful candidates is:

Age:	<u>20-29</u>	<u>30-39</u>	<u>40-49</u>	<u>50-59</u>	<u>60-</u>
%	18	32	24	23	3

The oldest successful candidate reported was 69; the youngest, 25.

Two province advisors who did not report details noted that the new council members were younger and had better educations than the former councilmen.

One experienced observer stated that the relative youth of successful candidates may indicate the cumulative effect of terrorism - older people may simply be afraid to run. Young people, on the other hand, may become candidates in order to secure the draft exemption that goes with the job. (Those already in the military are discharged to assume full time council duties.)

132

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THE 1971 SOUTH VIETNAMESE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION

Summary

In 1967:

- Thieu won with 34.8% of total vote, beating businessman Truong Dinh Dau (17.2%), Assembly Speaker Phan Kheo Suu (11%), former Premier Tran Van Huong (10%), and 7 other candidates.

- Thieu's strongest support (% of total vote won) came from thinly populated, upland provinces with high percentages of non-Viet peoples and little history of political organization.

-- He did best in Kontum (65%), Tuyen Duc (60%), Phuoc Long (60%), Quang Duc (60%), Darlac (59%), Lam Dong (54%), and Long Khanh (52%).

-- Another candidate won in Saigon, Hue, Danang, Hau Nghia, Thua Thien, Quang Nam, Kien Phong, Quang Ngai, Binh Duong, Tay Ninh, although these provinces provided 22% of Thieu's nationwide vote.

- Thieu was supported by military and Catholic voters.

Since 1967:

- Thieu has been building a political organization from the military-civilian bureaucracy and elected officials at province and village level.

- The Senate elections in August 1970 demonstrated:

-- Growing An Quang Buddhist political organization.

-- Little, if any, voter discipline in the military.

-- Split voting by Catholics.

In 1971:

- Thieu is clearly the front runner, but:

-- Voter discipline in the military may be less than in 1967.

-- Elected officials at village and province levels may not be solidly behind Thieu.

-- Thieu could suffer from a shift in concern from "security" to "economic" problems, with the GVN being blamed for higher prices.

-- Thieu may face a better An Quang organization in 1971.

-- The popular desire for peace (59% of respondents identified "peace" as their most important aspiration in April, according to a rural attitude survey) could hurt his chances.

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THE 1971 SOUTH VIETNAMESE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION

Introduction. An analysis of South Vietnamese election returns and other data suggests that President Thieu may face a stiffer fight for the South Vietnamese Presidency in 1971 than is implied by his formal dominance of the South Vietnamese political arena. While he is clearly the front runner at this stage of the campaign, there are indications that the base of his political power may be less firm than it was in 1967 and that he may face a better organized opposition than he did in his first election.

We looked at the 1967 election statistics in order to outline the base of Thieu's electoral support four years ago. Then, working with the election returns from the 1970 Upper House elections, some data supplied by the Pacification Attitudes Analysis System (PAAS), the Hamlet Evaluation System (HES) and other sources, we have tried to identify and assess changes which might affect the 1971 election results. Finally, we have tabulated some of the speculation of informed observers about the 1971 Presidential election.

Thieu's Power Base in 1967

In 1967 the Thieu-Ky ticket accumulated a total of 1,649,562 votes, about 35% of the 4.7 million cast, and almost twice the number of its nearest rival (817,120), the "peace" ticket of Truong Dinh Dzu. Thieu won because he had the only viable nationwide political organization, a factor which pushed other phenomena, such as the division of the voting caused by an 11-way race, in his favor.


The effect of 11 candidates. The 1.6 million votes Thieu achieved in 1967 won because the remaining 3 million votes were distributed among 10 other tickets, only three of which gained 10% or more of the total cast (Dzu received 17%, Suu received 11%, and Huong received 10%).

The high number of candidates worked to Thieu's advantage. Over half (53%) of Thieu's votes came from 12 of South Vietnam's 51 provinces and autonomous cities. But while these twelve (Gia Dinh, Saigon, Binh Dinh, Chau Doc, An Giang, Khanh Hoa, Bien Hoa, Sa Dec, Quang Ngai, Kien Hoa, Kien Giang, and Darlac--see Map 1) provided 867,868 votes for the Thieu-Ky ticket, Sa Dec and Darlac were the only ones of the group where the Thieu-Ky ticket received a majority of the votes cast (50% and 59% respectively). Thus, most of the provinces contributing heavily to the vote for Thieu, also contributed a heavy "anti-Thieu" vote. If Thieu's opposition had been less splintered, the nationwide result conceivably might have been different.

But even if he had faced fewer opposition candidates, Thieu would probably still have won a plurality. In 1967, the military was the only viable and effective nationwide political organization and Thieu was the military's candidate.

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Map 1 - Areas Contributing 25% of All Votes Cast for Thieu in 1967  
 (Highlighted)



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The Electoral Role of the Military

Although the political effectiveness of the military is hard to demonstrate from the electoral returns alone, there is some evidence that voter discipline in the military was high and that most (60-90%) of the roughly 700,000 votes represented by RVNAF soldiers and their dependents went to the Thieu-Ky ticket. The island of Con Son is a case in point. With few exceptions, every voter on the island was a member of the military unit stationed there or worked for the military. Nearly all those registered voted (94%); the Thieu-Ky ticket received 70% of the votes cast.

The degree of voter discipline in the military elsewhere is harder to identify because of the difficulty in separating "military" votes from civilian votes. Some indirect evidence of high military voter discipline for the slate is suggested by comparing the percentage of the total vote won by Thieu with the percentage of voters who were military personnel in the same area.

Considered as a group, the provinces where the Thieu ticket was strongest, (i.e., received 50% or more of all votes cast) also appear to have had slightly higher percentages of military personnel in the electorate.

See TABLE 1

The relationship between military presence and Thieu's strength is tenuous because the ticket did poorly in some areas where military personnel made up a significant percent of the electorate. The voting in Bac Lieu, Ba Xuyen, Vinh Long, Long An, Quang Ngai, Quang Tri, Binh Duong, and Hau Nghia, where the ticket was weak despite a high percentage of military personnel in the electorate, appears to have been driven by other factors unique to each province.

The weakness in Quang Tri, Quang Ngai, Binh Duong, Long An, Hau Nghia, and perhaps Ba Xuyen was probably due to whatever effectiveness the Tan Dai Viet Party, Buddhist, and Cao Dai organizations had in organizing an anti-Thieu vote.

The weakness in Bac Lieu is difficult to explain, but may have been due to Viet Cong participation there.

With a few exceptions, the eight provinces where Thieu did poorly despite a large RVNAF presence were somewhat less secure. Table 2 compares eight provinces in which Thieu did well and military voters constituted a high percentage of the electorate with the eight in which the military presence was high, but the Thieu-Ky ticket did poorly. With the exception of Chuong Thien, Phuoc Long and Quang Duc, Thieu's "low strength provinces" generally had lower HES security ratings than the "high strength" ones. This suggests that Viet Cong participation in the "low strength" provinces may have tended to offset the effect of RVNAF presence.

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PLACE OF MILITARY PERSONNEL a, c

Group 3

Military Personnel  
as Estimated %  
of Electorate c/

Thieu Vote - 30-32%  
Military Presence - 2%

Vote Cast b/

% Won by Thieu b/

Military Personnel  
as Estimated %  
of Electorate c/

11  
5  
19  
16  
12  
17  
22  
13  
13  
10  
6

Quang Tin  
Phuoc Tuy  
Vien Giang  
An Giang  
Binh Long  
Linh Tuong  
Phu Yen  
Kien Phong

86,013  
44,912  
110,756  
185,235  
24,385  
94,389  
101,279  
95,346

39  
36  
36  
34  
33  
32  
31  
30

12  
8  
6  
4  
11  
16  
6  
6

Group 4

Thieu Vote - 19-29%  
Military Presence - 7%

8  
10  
15  
8  
16  
12  
15  
5  
5  
3  
7  
6  
8

Tay Ninh  
Bac Lieu  
Ba Xuyen  
Phong Dinh  
Vinh Long  
Saigon  
Long An  
Danang  
Quang Ngai  
Quang Tri  
Binh Duong  
Quang Nam  
Thua Thien  
Hau Nghia  
Hue

112,527  
56,120  
35,703  
109,974  
123,087  
583,127  
63,918  
94,364  
176,229  
91,511  
88,256  
135,182  
156,086  
50,955  
45,203

29  
29  
26  
26  
26  
25  
25  
25  
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22  
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5  
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1

am Ranh.  
am; 41, 30 Nov 1967.  
egistered voters in the military and that  
ney were stationed. Source: DIA  
ilitary personnel.

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137

138

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TABLE 2

THIEU STRENGTH, MILITARY PREFERENCE AND SECURITY

"High Strength Provinces"

Province	Thieu Strength (% of Vote Men)	Military Preference <sup>a/</sup> (% of Electorate Military)	Security <sup>b/</sup>	
			AB	D,E,&V
Kontum	65	11	33.5	20.9
Phuoc Long	60	19	44.6	35.4
Quang Duc	60	16	19.6	31.5
Dar Lac	59	12	60.4	23.0
Lam Dong	54	17	34.8	29.2
Long Khanh	52	22	75.5	15.4
Chuong Thien	51	13	8.5	69.0
Go Cong	51	13	32.9	30.0

"Low Strength Provinces"

Bac Lieu	29	13	26.6	57.3
Ba Xuyen	26	23	23.9	44.5
Vinh Long	26	12	31.8	45.2
Long An	25	15	9.2	72.1
Quang Ngai	25	10	27.3	49.3
Quang Tri	24	11	15.3	52.6
Binh Duong	23	15	18.4	31.6
Hau Nghia	21	19	18.6	54.4

a/ Includes ARVN, RF and PF; assumes 100% turn out of registered voters in the military and that all military voters voted in the province in which they were stationed.

b/ Source: HES, August 1967.

Thus, while the electoral returns by no means prove that a high percentage of all military personnel voted for Thieu, they suggest that this was the case. When taken in context with the reports of observers at the time of the election, the argument appears strong.

The fact that the Thieu-Ky ticket demonstrated its greatest strength in areas where there was a heavy military presence among the electorate may also be cited as tenuous evidence that the military was effective in eliciting support for the slate from civilians. But here also the strongest support for the hypothesis is provided by observers, many of whom reported that the military--particularly the PF--was actively campaigning for the Thieu-Ky ticket.

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Absence of a Viable Opposition. The absence of a viable organization to counter the Thieu organization in 1967 is easier to portray from the returns than is the military's effectiveness in the election. With few exceptions (most notably Chuong Thien, Sa Dec and Co Cong), Thieu was strongest in thinly populated, upland provinces with high percentages of non Vietnamese peoples in which Vietnamese political organizations were weak. He was weakest in provinces which had comparatively strong political organizations, and lost to another candidate in three of South Vietnam's major urban areas (Saigon, Hue, and Danang). (Map 2).

In terms of ethnic and religious bloc voting patterns in provinces where this was a factor, President Thieu was either supported by the organizations which controlled votes or faced a fractured opposition. (Table 3)

Catholics emerged as the best organized voting bloc and went strongly for the Thieu slate. Catholic voter discipline probably accounts for the majority gained by the ticket in Kontum, Tuyen Duc, Quang Duc and Lam Dong where Catholics composed large percentage of the electorate, and probably contributed greatly to Thieu's victory in Chuong Thien.

Cao Dai member Dzu edged Thieu in Tay Ninh, Hau Nghia and Binh Duong, but only in Hau Nghia was his margin of victory wide (18 percentage points). In Long An and An Xuyen, where there were significant Cao Dai percentages of the population (26% and 12%), Thieu garnered enough support for a narrow plurality, partly due to Cao Dai factionalism.


Factionalism was characteristic of Hoa Hao behavior in 1967 also. Dzu won in Kien Phong, where the Hoa Hao constituted about 60% of the population, but Thieu swept Chau Doc (65% Hoa Hao).

Buddhists went against Thieu in their strongholds of Hue, Quang Ngai, Quang Nam and Thua Thien but split their vote among other candidates. The lack of a successful Buddhist organization probably contributed to Thieu's comparatively good showing in Quang Tin (he won a plurality with 39% of the vote). It is clear that Buddhist organizations were unable to direct the electoral behavior of the large numbers of South Vietnamese who identify themselves as Buddhists.

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140

Map 2 - 10 A map of the Republic of Vietnam in 1967  
 showing the Administrative Divisions and Military Regions  
 (UNCLASSIFIED)



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TABLE 3

THIEU ELECTORAL STRENGTH AND THE POPULATION'S RELIGIOUS AFFILIATION <sup>a/</sup>

Province/City	% Vote Won	Population (000)	Percent Buddhist	Percent Catholic	Percent Cao Dai	Percent Hoa Hao
Kontum	65	67.5	.9	90.7		
Tuyen Duc	60	95.2	46.4	29.3	1.9	
Phuoc Long	60	43.3	36.6	12.0	6.2	
Quang Duc	60	30.1	13.8	30.6	0	
Darlac	59	207.8	42.5	12.0	0	
Lam Dong	54	66.7	32.2	50.0	0	
Long Khanh	52	137.6	48.5	42.6	0	
Chuong Thien	51	209.1	86.0	7.2	1.3	.5
Go Cong	51	164.7	30.7	3.1	9.1	
Phu Ben	51	59.4	15.7			
Sa Dec	50	256.3	37.9	1.4	1.6	56.5
Ninh Thuan	49	155.7	74.5	8.6		
Pleiku	48	165.0	41.6	1.8		
Binh Tuy	48	58.8	42.0	36.0	1.3	
Vung Tau	45	68.1	70.1	29.9		
Binh Dinh	44	892.1	73.7	4.2	.7	
An Xuyen	42	255.4	80.6	6.2	11.8	
Vinh Binh	41	408.8	83.0	12.9	2.1	
Kien Tuong	41	50.3	84.4	5.8	8.3	
Gia Dinh	40	1033.8	78.7	19.2	8	
Chau Doc	40	464.9	21.2	0	1.1	67.6
Khanh Hoa	40	352.5	89.5	1.3	.6	.1
Bien Hoa	40	367.5	61.3	34.4		4.3
Kien Hoa	40	572.1	65.6	13.1	12.5	
Binh Thuan	40	262.8	57.9	5.5		

a/ No complete data on religious affiliation exists for August 1967; % used were adopted from HES/70. The security situation in 1967 probably worked to inflate the electoral strength of Catholic voters (who were probably located in relatively more secure areas) and depress the strength of Buddhists.

b/ HES, 1967. Population figure for Saigon adjusted to reflect 1970 re-evaluation.

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3/ AFFILIATION: 3/

Percent Cao Dai	Percent Hoa Hao	Province/city	% Vote Won	Population (000)	Percent Buddhist	Percent Catholic	Percent Cao Dai	Percent Hoa Hao
1.9		Quang Tin	39	303.0	69.5	5.6	0.1	
6.2		Lalat	37	77.7	63.4	6.6		
0		Phuoc Tay	36	174.9	75.0	22.7		
0		Hien Giang	36	375.9	74.2	14.5	2.0	.4
0		Cam Ranh	35	44.9	64.3	10.6		
0		An Giang	34	401.0	1.5	5.0	91.6	.6
0		Einh Long	33	73.3	71.2	6.3		
1.3	.5	Dinh Tuong	32	451.6	70.1	3.7	10.3	4.7
9.1		Phu Yen	31	306.5	68.7	1.1	.3	
		Kien Phong	30	305.5	22.7	3.8	5.0	63.4
1.6	56.5	Tay Ninh	29	301.1	7.1	2.5	89.5	
		Bac Lieu	29	243.5	61.1	.9		
		Ba Xuyen	26	447.9	89.2	6.5		
1.3		Phong Dinh	26	438.0	35.3	1.2	2.7	28.4
		Vinh Long	26	472.4	37.7	5.6	.7	17.6
.7		Saigon	25	1735.7	68.9	9.4	.5	
11.8		Long An	25	312.9	64.8	.7	25.8	
2.1		Danaug	25	243.9	85.9	14.1		
8.3		Quang Ngai	25	716.8	88.4	2.4	1.2	
8		Quang Tri	24	278.9	50.6	16.3		
1.1	67.6	Binh Duong	23	214.8	95.8	3.2	1.0	
.6	.1	Quang Nam	22	822.4	50.3	8.4	1.1	
	4.3	Thua Thien	22	446.9	82.2	9.0	1.5	
12.5		Hau Nghia	21	193.0	80.9	5.3	10.5	
		Hue	19	150.0	100.0			

August 1967; % used were probably worked to inflate probably located in relatively ts. reflect 1970 re-evaluation.

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### The Political Base in 1971

Several authors have argued that significant changes have occurred in the fabric of South Vietnamese politics and that the 1967 electoral experience is no longer a sufficient guide to what will happen in 1971.<sup>1/</sup> Two of the most important changes asserted are (1) that the military structure may be much less effective as a political organization and (2) that Thieu may face a far more effective opposition in 1971.

Changing Political Role of the Military. President Thieu has attempted, with some success, to consolidate his control of the civil-military structure. Since 1967, for example, three of the four politically potent MR commanders have been replaced, and 10 of the 11 division commanders have been shifted or replaced. The biographical data available does not clearly demonstrate that Thieu had filled the South Vietnamese high command<sup>2/</sup> with individuals who are personally loyal to him, but more members of the high command owe their positions to Thieu now than in 1967.

But while Thieu probably will have more personal control over the high command than he enjoyed in 1967, the structure of the military has changed in ways which could downgrade its political effectiveness. The fact that the size of the military has doubled since the 1967 campaign does not necessarily mean that President Thieu can now count on twice as many military votes. Greater size may mean less voter discipline among RVNAF voters. This movement would be accelerated if other candidates, such as Ky or Minh, can vitalize their own supporters in the military.

The returns from the August 1970 Upper House election hint that the military now votes less as a bloc than four years ago. In August 1970 military personnel and their dependents represented about 1.5 million votes. Had they voted as a bloc for the Cao ticket, which was recognized as the principal pro-GVN ticket by about 30% of a rural population sample,<sup>3/</sup> it is doubtful if the Mau ticket, identified as the opposition ticket by 34%, could have won a plurality.

Indeed, the salient characteristic of the 1970 Upper House election was the fairly even distribution of the vote. All 16 upper house tickets received between 3% and 12% of the total vote. In contrast, the vote in the 1967 Presidential election ranged from 2% to 35%. The absence of bloc voting by the military, perhaps coupled with split Catholic voting in 1970, probably contributed to the difference in the two patterns (Table 4).<sup>4/</sup>

<sup>1/</sup> See, for example, James Bullington and James Rosenthal, "Non-Communist Political Perceptions;" Samuel Popkin, "Pacification: Politics and the Village," both in Asian Survey, X:8 (August 1970).

<sup>2/</sup> Defined as General Officers, Division Commanders, and Province Chiefs.


<sup>3/</sup> Pacification Attitude Analysis System data, Jul-Aug 1970.

<sup>4/</sup> There are, of course, severe limitations to any comparison between the 1970 Upper House election and the 1967 Presidential contest. It could be argued that the reason the military-civil bureaucracy did not vote as a bloc in 1970 was that it was simply not ordered to do so. But several observers believe Thieu made an effort to line up a vote behind the Cao ticket (see, for example, CIA, Intelligence Memo, Oct 0530/70) and the fact that nearly a third of rural respondents in the PAAS could identify the Cao ticket as Pro-GVN suggests political cues were flowing through the bureaucracy.

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TABLE 4



The ability of the military to generate votes from the civilian population by campaigning for a given candidate may be decreasing also, at least so far as ARVN is concerned. Since 1967, ARVN has shifted away from areas of relatively dense population.

Table 5 indicates this trend. During the fall of 1967, for example, ARVN spent 175 battalion months in relatively densely populated areas (500 or more persons per sq. Km) compared to only 30 battalion months in areas where the population was 150 persons per sq. Km or less. By the summer of 1970 this pattern had shifted significantly. ARVN spent 103 battalion months in the densely populated areas and 170 battalion months in areas where the population density was 150 per sq. Km or less. The trend away from populated areas is likely to continue.



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TABLE 5

ARVN LOCATION (EXPRESSED IN BATTALION MONTHS AND POPULATION DENSITY)<sup>a/</sup>

Civilian Population Density (persons/sq. Km)	1967	1968	1969	1970
	4th Qtr	2nd Qtr	2nd Qtr	2nd Qtr
0	8	7	23	62
1- 19	0	0	1	7
19-150	30	17	40	101
150-300	38	28	47	60
300-500	60	53	31	25
500 +	175	199	185	103

a/ Source: (Bn locations) SEAPA computer file from MACV OB reports, (Population) HES 70 computer file.

This leaves the Regional and Popular Forces, estimated to number over 500,000 by the 1971 election, and which, because of their proximity to the civilian population, may represent an even greater campaign potential than in 1967.<sup>1/</sup>

The Opposition

Potential opposition organizations may be making significant progress. In the August 1970 elections Cao drew support from many of the same provinces which went for Thieu in 1967, but the interesting fact of the upper house election was the strong Buddhist showing.

Growing Buddhist political organization was indicated, for example, by the Mau ticket victories in Dalat and Binh Tuy, where electoral patterns previously were dominated by the Catholic hierarchies.

Likewise, the Mau ticket's showing in Phu Bon, Ninh Thuan, Binh Thuan and Go Cong suggests that the Buddhists may be putting together an effective political machine. In contrast to poor Buddhist voter discipline in Khanh Hoa in 1967, the 1970 elections indicated solid bloc voting by the Buddhists.<sup>2/</sup> (Table 6)

1/ But their proximity to the civilian population can work both ways. Rather than acting as part of Thieu's political organization, the RF/PF may simply reflect the political bias and fragmentation of the civil population in which they are embedded--particularly if GVN efforts to foster village autonomy are taking hold.

2/ The Catholic organization appears to have remained at least potentially powerful. Mau ticket victories in Dalat and Binh Tuy were in part due to a split of the Catholic vote between the Cao and Huyen tickets. Both the Cao Dai and Hoa Hao blocs have not demonstrated any greater solidarity than they had in 1967.

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TABLE 6

THIEU 1967 STRENGTH AND THE 1970 UPPER HOUSE ELECTION

(Cao = Pro-GVN)<sup>a/</sup>  
(Mau = Opposition;

Area Ranked by Thieu Strength in 1967	Thieu's % of Vote Won (1967)	1970 Upper House Elections <sup>b/</sup>			
		1st	% Total Vote Won	2nd	3rd
Kontum	65	Cao	18.0		
Tuyen Duc	60	Cao	17.1		
Phuoc Long	60	Cao	15.5		Mau
Quang Duc	60	Cao	23.3		
Darlac	59	Cao	21.0		
Lam Dong	54	Cao	24.9		
Long Khanh	52	Cao	16.9		
Chuong Thien	51	Cao	13.1		
Gc Cong	51				Mau
Phu Bon	51	Mau	16.3		
Sa Dec	50	Cao	14.1		
Ninh Thuan	49	Mau	21.1		
Pleiku	48				Mau
Binh Tuy	48	Mau	16.9	Cao	
Vung Tao	45			Cao	Mau
Binh Dinh	44	Mau	17.8	Cao	
An Xuyen	42	Cao	15.9		
Vinh Binh	41	Cao	14.2		
Kien Tuong	41				Mau
Gia Dinh	40			Cao	Mau
Chau Doc	40	Cao	25.0		Mau
Khanh Hoa	40	Mau	18.4		
Bien Hoa	40	Cao	13.9		
Kien Hoa	40	Cao	8.6		Mau
Binh Thuan	40	Mau	31.7		

<sup>a/</sup> State Department categorization of candidates identified Cao, Le, Cuu, Hy, and Canh as Pro-GVN; Mau, Bang and Cam as opposition; PAAS data identified Cao, Le, Huyen and Huy as Pro-GVN, Mau, Cam, Huy as opposition. Sources: State Airgram, A-255, Sep 19, 1970; PAAS, Augus 1970.

<sup>b/</sup> Source: US , Public Administration Bulletin Vietnam, 54, Sep 70.

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UPPER HOUSE ELECTION

(Cao = Pro-VN) a/  
(Mau = Opposition; Buddhist Support)

Elections b/		Area Ranked by Thieu Strength in 1967	Thieu's % of Vote Won (1967)	1970 Upper House Elections b/		
1st	2nd			3rd	1st	2nd
		Quang Tin	39	Cao - 16.5		
		Dalat	37	Mau - 17.4		Cao
	Mau	Phuoc Tuy	36	Cao - 12.1		
		Kien Giang	36		Cao	
		Cam Ranh	35	Mau - 15.3		
		An Giang	34	Cao - 22.3		
		Binh Long	33		Cao	Mau
	Mau	Dinh Tucng	32	Cao - 10.1		Mau
		Phu Yen	31	Mau - 23.4		
		Kien Phong	30	Cao - 17.0		
		Tay Ninh	29		Cao	
	Mau	Bac Lieu	29	Mau - 9.5		
		Ba Xuyen	26	Cao - 13.9		
	Mau	Phong Dinh	26	Cao - 9.1		
		Vinh Long	26		Cao	
		Saigon	25			Mau
		Long An	25			
	Mau	Denang	25	Mau - 22.3		
	Mau	Quang Ngai	25	Mau - 17.1		
	Mau	Quang Tri	24	Mau - 27.6		
		Binh Duong	23		Mau	Cao
		Quang Nam	22	Mau - 20.5		
		Thua Thien	22	Mau - 27.5		
	Mau	Hau Nghia	21		Cao	
		Hue	19	Mau - 33.2		

ified Cao, Le,  
opposition;  
-GWN, Mau, Cam,  
sep 19, 1970;

Total Votes:  
Mau - 1,149,597  
Cao - 1,106,288

tnam, 54, Sep 70.

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### The Changing Concept of Elections and Electoral Issues

There is also evidence which suggests the electorate's view of elections will be different in 1971 than it was in 1967. The concept that elections are a means of determining who makes policy is, of course, relatively new to South Vietnam, but attitudinal surveys have indicated the rural population is at least beginning to see elections as a way of getting rid of individuals or situations they dislike.

Table 7 shows a gradual shift toward the concept that elections are the way of replacing undesirable officials. According to the Pacification Attitude Analysis System (PAAS), the percentage of rural respondents who have identified the elections as the best way of getting rid of officials moved from about 49% in February 1970 to 67% this year.

TABLE 7

#### "HOW DO YOU REPLACE UNDESIRABLE OFFICIALS?" (% Rural Respondents) a/

	<u>1970</u> <u>February</u>	<u>June</u>	<u>October</u>	<u>1971</u> <u>February</u>
Electoral Process	49	56	62	67
Appeal to Authority b/	1	2	0	0
Appeal to Press	31	23	28	21
Doesn't Know	19	18	9	11
(No. of Respondents)	(870)	(856)	(1008)	(1045)

a/ Rounded to nearest %, may not add to 100%.

b/ Includes "request district or provincial officials or Saigon to replace him," and "request elders in community to influence him."

If the South Vietnamese are in fact beginning to view elections as a way of determining who wields power, prominent issues could have electoral significance. Again, attitudinal surveys indicate that the desire for security, peace and, more recently, a concern with economic problems are prevalent among potential voters. (In February 1971, the last time the PAAS raised the question, about 24% of 3133 rural respondents identified security as their most severe problem, 56% identified increased prices or other financial problems. During the same month, about 59% of 1044 respondents identified peace as their greatest aspiration.) Each of these issues has a different electoral implication.

Concern with security would probably work to the benefit of President Thieu. As a prominent symbol of the mechanism designed to obtain security, he is in the best position to appeal to those members of the electorate who place greatest importance on increased security.

Desires for peace could, as in the past, work against a Thieu victory. Dzu's showing in 1967 was in large measure due to his ability to appeal to this sentiment, and Thieu would face obstacles in portraying himself as a "peace" candidate.

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Economic concerns could work both ways. As economic problems are most severe in the cities, they would probably work against Thieu among the urban electorate. (In April 1971, 54% of 526 respondents from four urban areas said they thought GVN performance in handling economic problems was poor.) Inflation hits military personnel and civil servants hard and could erode Thieu's support among this group also. In the countryside, the economic concerns may work in Thieu's favor. The countryside is more prosperous now, and Thieu may be able to take credit for it.

On the other hand, the countryside also appears somewhat critical of GVN performance in the economic area. In April, the PAAS indicated 37% of the rural sample (1096 persons) rated the GVN as poor. Interestingly, the sample from some of the provinces in which Thieu had done very well in 1967 were highly critical of GVN economic performance. In the samples from Quang Duc, Ninh Thuan, Kien Hoa and Binh Tay--provinces in which Thieu had won at least 48% of the vote in 1967--at least 67% of those queried said GVN performance in solving economic problems was poor.

### Thieu's Political Strategy

Perhaps the best indication that the political context is changing are President Thieu's actions. Thieu has tried to build a new political structure centered on the village and provincial councils. While the effort may simply be a result of political savvy (Thieu's attempts to organize an effective political party involving urban politicians in 1966 and 1969 failed, and urban areas did not support Thieu's candidate Cao in August 1970), it signals a shift of political concern to the countryside, perhaps for the first time in a decade. It may also be an effort to eliminate Thieu's dependence on the ARVN.

But Thieu's chance of creating a viable political machine out of the new councils is problematical. Village and provincial councilmen owe their positions to the electorates at district level and below. They are not immune to direction from above, but they take their political cues more from the rural population than from Saigon.

Because of this, Thieu must base his control on persuasion to a far greater extent than was the case with the military structure in 1967. This takes time and effort, and while the 544 Provincial Council members may be a manageable group, the size of the group represented by the village councils and chiefs (2000+) may be too large.

Some argue that rural councilmen come from a milieu and represent an outlook which have very little in common with Thieu's.<sup>1/</sup> If so, Thieu's effort may be doomed from the start. Further, some observers believe that Thieu's strategy could put him in the middle without an effective organization. They argue that in the effort to capture the village officials (by giving them limited but important powers such as control of development programs, etc.) Thieu has alienated the ARVN command. Popkin, for example, sees Thieu wedged "between two sides, without the certain support of either."<sup>2/</sup>

1/ John Donnell, "Expanding Political Participation: The Long Haul from Villagism to Nationalism," Asian Survey, X:8 (August 1970), pp. 688-704.

2/ Popkin, "Pacification."

CONFIDENTIAL

150

**CONFIDENTIAL**

The 1971 Election: A Tentative Forecast

There are too many imponderables involved in the 1971 Presidential election to make a credible prediction about its outcome at this point in time. Since June of 1970, however, an attempt has been made to test the political winds in interviews with Province Chiefs and other key political figures. On occasion, these individuals make predictions which can be quantified (see Appendix for samples). Based on these statements, we have been able to make an initial tabulation of where 39% of the total votes in 1971 might go.

Table 8 presents the result. The figures assigned to Thieu and Minh represent the minimum number of votes each might receive given a three or four man race in which Minh receives the backing of An Quang Buddhists.

According to this admittedly tenuous assessment, President Thieu is assured of more votes than Minh, but the margin of "safe" votes is not large.

TABLE 8

PRELIMINARY FORECAST: THE 1971 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS<sup>a/</sup>

	Voter Registration <sup>b/</sup> Forecast	Vote Forecast <sup>c/</sup>	Thieu	Minh	Unable to Judgc
Military Region 1	1,114,000	865,000	153,000	231,000	481,000
Military Region 2	1,254,000	982,000	233,000	229,000	520,000
Military Region 3	2,133,000	1,521,000	105,300	67,500	1,348,200
Military Region 4	2,148,000	1,555,000	250,000	114,600	1,189,000
Nationwide			741,300	642,100	3,538,000

<sup>a/</sup> Assumes 2-4 slate race, Duong Van "Big" Minh as Thieu's primary opposition, and An Quang support for Minh.

<sup>b/</sup> Based on trend since Constituent Assembly election of 1966.

<sup>c/</sup> Based on trend since Constituent Assembly election of 1966.

Only one area (Lam Dong) has demonstrated increasing turn out in the three "national elections" to date (Sept. 11, 1966 Constituent Assembly, September 3, 1967 Presidential, Aug. 30, 1970 Senate).

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## APPENDIX

### Excerpts from Recent Interviews

Beginning in June 1970, an American observer with long experience in Vietnam began to interview Province Chiefs and other politically potent South Vietnamese officials on several topics, one of which has been the coming Presidential elections. To date, he has elicited comments on the election from about 70% of all Province Chiefs, in addition to those from several city mayors, Military Region Commanders and ARVN Division Commanders. The excerpts below are a sample of the interviews conducted since the beginning of 1971.

All the individuals interviewed are in politically knowledgeable positions. Many of them owe their positions to Thieu personally. Their comments on the electoral strength of potential candidates are probably often colored by (1) their association with President Thieu, (2) their knowledge that their views will reach US Government officials, and (3) their positions within Thieu's political organization. (Thieu probably will depend on them to get out the vote for him, a concept which some of the comments below indicate is recognized by the individuals involved.)

April 1971: Nguyen Hop Doan, Tuyen Duc Province Chief and Mayor of Dalat:

"The 102,000 people living in the countryside will strongly support President Thieu in the coming elections, but it will be very difficult to obtain a majority for Thieu from the 86,000 people who live in Dalat city. The An Quang Buddhists have considerable influence there, and the people have a low regard for the Provincial government..."

May 1971: Hoang Dinh Tho, Quang Tin Province Chief:

"President Thieu will receive the vast majority of votes because the An Quang Buddhists are not strong enough to prevent this..."

May 1971: Le Van Than, Thua Thien Province Chief:

"The An Quang Buddhists dominate political factions in Thua Thien and whomever they support will receive the majority of votes... The adverse economic situation will strongly detract from President Thieu's popularity..."

May 1971: Ton That Khien, Quang Tri Province Chief:

"The Buddhists in Quang Tri Province will support General Duong Van Minh, but I hope to obtain 50% of the vote for President Thieu... Ky has no support in the Province and would receive perhaps only 2 or 3% of the vote..."

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- Feb 1971: Hoan Duc Ninh, Bac Lieu Province Chief:  
"Thieu will receive between 70 and 80% of the votes in Bac Lieu Province..."
- Feb 1971: Nguyen Van Tai, Vinh Binh Province Chief:  
"248,000 or 400,000 people in Vinh Binh are of Cambodian origin and strong Thieu supporters. The Progressive National Movement has 10% of the population and will go for Minh. Thieu will get over 50% of the vote..."
- April 71: Nguyen Van To, Phu Yen Province Chief:  
"I expect Thieu to receive 65% of the votes in Phu Yen Province..."
- April 71: Ngo Tan Nghia, Binh Thuan Province Chief:  
"I now believe Thieu will receive a majority of the votes, but GVN and ARVN employees might vote against Thieu unless the situation improves before the elections..."
- May 1971: Le Tri Tin, Quang Nam Province Chief:  
"The Presidential candidate supported by the An Quang Buddhists will receive the majority of votes..."
- March 71: Lu Yem, Phuoc Long Province Chief:  
"Thieu will receive 90% of the vote..."
- Jan 1971: MG Nguyen Van Toan, 2d Division Commander:  
"If Minh is supported by the An Quang Buddhists, he probably would receive the majority of votes in the 2d Division..."

CONFIDENTIAL

153



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*Aug. Oct.  
1971*

THE AUGUST 29 LOWER HOUSE ELECTION

Summary

The Vietnamese Lower House Election, conducted on August 29, indicated a growing political viability on the part of some party organizations and suggested elected positions at province and municipal level are emerging as springboards to national office.

- The An Quang Buddhists virtually swept MR I, winning 16 of the 24 seats which were contested. An Quang will control about 16% of the lower house seats, compared to 11% in the 1967 house.

- Catholic political organizations -- Nhan Xa and the Greater Solidarity Force -- continued to show the atrophy demonstrated in the 1970 upper house contest.

- 82 provincial or municipal councilmen ran for the assembly; one in five made it. This compares favorably with military men (one in eight of the 327 that ran made it), teachers (one in eight) and civil servants (one in 16) and was bettered only by incumbents (of the 119 who ran, 41, or one in three, was a winner).

- The councilmen who ran came from provinces throughout Vietnam, but did best in MR IV. (Council members won 18% of the 56 seats representing MR IV; they picked up 12% of the seats in MR II, 7% in MR II and 4% in MR I.)

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### THE AUGUST 29 LOWER HOUSE ELECTION

#### Details

The deputies in the new South Vietnamese lower house ran for election on an individual basis from constituencies apportioned on the basis of one for every 50,000 voters; each province and city was guaranteed at least one seat. A total of 159 seats, 16 of which were reserved for representatives of ethnic minority groups, were at stake. 1/ This total was 22 more than had been contested in 1967.

#### Voting

About 5.6 million voters cast ballots in the election, the highest number of voters in any national election to that date. Turnout was 78.5% of the registered voters (about 7.1 million), up slightly from the turnout in the 1967 lower house election (72.9%), over ten percentage points above the 1970 upper house contest (about 67%), but below the 84% turnout of the 1967 Presidential election (and the 88% turnout reported for the Presidential referendum).

The highest absolute number of voters--2.0 million--turned out in MR IV (82% of those registered). This was followed by MR 3 (1.6 million, 72% of those registered) and MR 4 (1.0 million, 81% of those registered). MR I had the highest percentage of voter turnout, but the smallest absolute number of voters; 83% or slightly less than 1 million voted.

Voters turned out better in rural areas than in urban areas. (Only 60 percent of the electorate cast ballots in Saigon, a pattern similar in every national election held since the constituent assembly election of 1966.)

#### Assembly Profile

It is clear that the lower house is new in terms of personnel. Only 41 of the 119 incumbents who sought re-election were successful. In terms of delegate background, however, the new lower assembly will be quite similar to its predecessor in several respects. The average age of the 1967 lower house was 39; in the new house it is 40. Likewise, the proportion of military men, farmers, businessmen and other professional (lawyers, doctors, etc.) in the new house appears about the same as it was four years ago.

1/ Ethnic minority seats were contested in those provinces with the most significant population of Cambodians, Montagnards, Chams and North Vietnamese Montagnards. One seat was reserved for Vietnamese of Cambodian descent in Vinh Binh, Ba Xuyen, Chau Duc, Kien Giang, Bac Lieu, and Chuong Thien, respectively; one seat was reserved for a Vietnamese of Montagnard descent in Quang Ngai, Tuyen Duc, Darlac, Kontum, Pleiku, and Phu Bon; one seat went to a Cham in Binh Thuan and Ninh Thuan; one seat was reserved for a Vietnamese of North Vietnamese Montagnard refugee descent in Tuyen Duc and Binh Thuan.

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155

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As Table 1 indicates, however, there will be some significant differences. Over a third of the seats in the new house will be occupied by individuals who previously held an elected position. In the 1967 election only about a fifth of the delegates moved into the lower house from an elected position. In comparison with its predecessor, civil servants and teachers will occupy proportionately fewer seats in the new house than they did during the last four years.

TABLE 1  
DELEGATE PROFILE: 1967 and 1971

Delegate Background <sup>a/</sup>	1967	1971	Percent of Lower House <sup>d/</sup>	
			1967	1971
Military	30	43	22	27
Civil Servant	29	15	21	9
Elected Position <sup>b/</sup>	28	57	20	36
Teacher	26	13	19	8
Professional <sup>c/</sup>	10	17	7	11
Business	6	5	4	3
Farmer	4	7	3	4
Other	4	2	3	1
	137	159		

<sup>a/</sup> As listed in the official posting of candidates on August 6, 1971: Viet Nam Thong Tan Xa - 487448 (sang) Thu Sau 6.8.71.

<sup>b/</sup> For 1967, includes deputies to the constituent assembly and elected positions at prefect, province, city and village level. For 1971, includes preceding plus incumbents, former senators and provincial/municipal councillors.

<sup>c/</sup> Includes doctors, lawyers, pharmacists, etc.

<sup>d/</sup> Rounded, may not add to 100%.

Perhaps two of the most significant differences of the new house are the indications of (1) increased opposition to the administration's policies and (2) increased viability of political parties or quasi-parties.

While estimates of political tendencies in the newly elected lower house must be regarded as tentative for several reasons,<sup>1/</sup> preliminary assessments suggest about 84 deputies (53%) can be considered "pro-government," 60 (37%) appear to be basically "in opposition" and another 14 are "independent."

Most analyses of the new house suggest that the government will probably be able to pull together a majority on many issues, but the lower assembly is likely to show greater independence than its predecessor.

<sup>1/</sup> Accurate analysis of political tendencies is possible only after the delegates have spoken out on several issues; officially the delegates ran as individuals, not as party members.

Political organizations seem to have played an important role in getting the incumbents re-elected. Of the 41 who were returned, 21 were clearly associated with an identified political organization. Another 15 have been identified by the US Embassy as pro-administration, and their success may have been due to support from President Thieu's personal political machinery. Only five of the incumbents who made it appear to have won without the support of an identifiable political organization.

In terms of the political organizations which demonstrated strength in the election, the An Quang Buddhists and the Progressive Nationalist Movement (PNM) clearly did quite well. The An Quang Buddhists almost swept MR I, winning 16 of the 24 seats which were contested. They picked up at least nine other seats, mostly from coastal provinces in MR II. This makes them the single most important, clearly distinguishable, political group in the lower house. As Table 2 shows, the An Quang Buddhists will control about 16% of the lower house seats (compared to 11% in the 1967 house<sup>2/</sup>).

TABLE 2

POLITICAL AFFILIATION OF NEW DELEGATES a/

<u>Political Grouping b/</u>	<u>Number of Seats</u>	<u>Percent of Lower House</u>
<u>Opposition</u>		
An Quang	25	16
Progressive Nationalist Movement	19	12
Subtotal	44	28
<u>Swing</u>		
Worker Farmer Party	14	9
Hoa Hao (Tuong)	9	6
Revolutionary Dai Viet	5	3
MRS	4	3
Hoa Hao (Hinh)	3	2
Unified VNQDD	3	2
BNQDD, Vu Hong Khanh	1	1
Independent	5	5
Unknown	15	9
Subtotal	62	40
<u>Pro-GVN</u>		
Nhan	4	3
Southern VNQDD	1	1
VSG	1	1
"Independents"	47	30
Subtotal	53	35

a/ Preliminary assessment.

b/ Preliminary categorization.

2/ An Quang did not take an active part in the 1967 election, but placed 15 members in the lower house.

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In contrast to the increasing political powers of An Quang, the Catholic political organizations--Nhan Xa and the Greater Solidarity Force--continued to show the atrophy demonstrated in the 1970 upper house elections. In terms of the religious affiliation of the new delegates, at least 49 are Buddhists and about 21 are Catholic, a ratio less favorable for the Catholics than in the old house (about 65/35), although Catholics will still be proportionately more numerous than in the population at large (about 13% of the lower house, compared to about 10% of the South Vietnamese population).

### Recruitment Patterns

The delegate profile, portrayed above in Table 1, suggests that the recruitment channels tied to the lower house may be changing. Indeed, there is some evidence of growing viability on the part of electoral politics in Vietnam, at least in the sense that elected positions are becoming the springboard for movement into the lower house. Table 1 shows that the proportion of delegates who previously held elected positions moved from about 20 percent in 1967 to about 36 percent in 1971. Most of the increase was due to victories by incumbents; 41, about one in three of the 119 who ran for office, were successful.

The Incumbents. At least one incumbent ran in 52 of the 58 constituencies<sup>3/</sup> (no incumbent ran in Nha Trang, Vung Tau, My Tho, Phu Yen, Long Khanh, or An Xuyen). One half (26) of the constituencies in which incumbents ran returned at least one member to the lower house (shown by the shaded areas in Map 1).

It is difficult to identify the precise reasons why the 41 incumbents who were returned were successful. Ten of the successful incumbents have "political backgrounds" which extend into the pre-1967 period. Nine other incumbents with similar "political" backgrounds ran but lost, suggesting that such a background did not assure electoral success.

What seems to be happening is a gradual thinning of the older politicians, (in the sense of occupying elected positions for some time) as suggested by Table 3. Of the 117 members of the original Constituent Assembly of 1966, only eight now hold office in the lower house.

<sup>3/</sup> One for each province and city except Saigon, which had three separate constituencies, and Gia Dinh, which had two.

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TABLE 3

POLITICAL TRACE: INDIVIDUALS MOVING FROM 1966 POLITICAL POSITIONS TO THE 1971 LOWER ASSEMBLY

	1966	Running for Assembly 1967	Winners 1967	Running for Assembly 1971	Winners 1971
	Constituent Assembly Deputies	117 a/	40	19	14
Provincial/Prefecture Councillors b/	471	102	9	6	2

a/ Became the "Provisional Legislative Assembly" on April 1, 1967.

b/ Includes provincial or prefecture councillors (prior to 1970 election) elected in 1965.

Provincial Councillor

Membership on provincial or municipal councils appears to be an important channel to the lower house also. Fifteen of the new delegates moved up from councillor positions.<sup>4/</sup> An additional 68 councillors ran but lost, bringing the overall success of provincial and municipal council members to about 20%--one in five of those running were winners. This compares favorably with military candidates (about one in eight were successful), civil servants, (about 1 in 16) and teachers (about 1 in 8).

The geographical distribution of provincial counselors running for lower house seats was wide. One or more counselors ran in 38 or the 55 provinces and cities which elected delegates, that is, about 69% of all the constituencies had counselors as contestants. The success of counselors varied by area, however, as shown in Table 4.

TABLE 4

COUNCILLORS IN THE LOWER HOUSE: BY MILITARY REGION

	MR I	MR II	MR III	MR IV
No. Councillors running	6	14	34	29
No. Councillors winning	1	4	3	7
Total Seats	24	36	44	55
% of Seats won by Councillors	4	11	7	13

<sup>4/</sup> From the group of 554 elected in 1970.

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But in terms of provinces and cities in which council members ran, success varied from a high in Tuyen Duc--where both the counselors who ran were winners--to Saigon--where none of the nine councilmen who ran were successful (Table 5).

Party affiliation appears to have played an important role in the success of provincial counselors also.. Only 3 of the 15 winners had no clear party affiliation, and two of these were identified as pro-GVN individuals who may owe their success to the political aspects of the governmental apparatus.

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161



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TABLE 5

COUNCILLORS IN THE LOWER HOUSE: PROVINCES AND CITIES

<u>Province</u>	<u>No. Seats</u>	<u>No. Councillors Running</u>	<u>No. Winning</u>
<u>Group I (All running were winners)</u>			
Tuyen Duc	3	2	2
Quang Ngai	6	1	1
Khanh Hoa	2	1	1
Quang Duc	1	1	1
Chau Duc	6	1	1
Kien Thong	2	1	1
Vinh Long	4	1	1
Bien Hoa	1	1	1
<u>Group II (Some ran, some won)</u>			
Vinh Binh	4	3	2
Hau Nghia	2	2	1
Sa Dec	2	4	1
An Giang	5	7	1
Gia Dinh	11	10	1
<u>Group III (one ran, lost)</u>			
Quang Tin	3	1	0
Dalat City	1	1	0
Binh Thuan	2	1	0
Kontum	2	1	0
Pleiku	3	1	0
Vung Tao	1	1	0
Binh Tuy	1	1	0
Long An	3	1	0
Phouc Long	1	1	0
Rach Gia City	1	1	0
Ba Xuyen	4	1	0
Kien Hoa	5	1	0
Phong Dinh	2	1	0
Phuoc Tuy	1	1	0
<u>Group IV (Several ran--all lost)</u>			
Saigon	13	9	0
Binh Duong	2	5	0
Ninh Thuan	3	5	0
Da Nang	3	2	0
Thua Thien	4	2	0
Binh Dinh	3	2	0
Can Tho	1	2	0
Chuong Thien	3	2	0
Go Cong	1	2	0
Kien Phong	3	2	0
<u>Group V (none ran)</u>			
Hue		Darlac	Tay Ninh
Quang Nam		Lam Dong	My Tho
Quang Tri		Phu Bon	An Xuyen
Cam Ranh		Kien Giang	Bac Lieu
Qui Nhon		Phu Yen	
Nha Trang		Binh Long	
Dinh Tuong		Long Khanh	

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August 1967

Aspirations of the Vietnamese People

The most recent available SVN public opinion survey (Nov 1966 - Feb 1967), commissioned by CBS from the Opinion Research Corp., confirms earlier surveys by the Joint U.S. Public Affairs Office (JUSPAO) that economic goals rank very high in Vietnamese personal aspirations. A strong majority (64%) of some 1413 SVN survey respondents chose better employment, income, or cost of living conditions as their first wish for self or family. They cited economic factors (cost of living, unemployment, income opportunities, family finances) most frequently (88% of all responses) as the main causes for improvements or deteriorations in their lives over the past year. For their country, the Vietnamese people overwhelmingly desire peace and security as their first wish (84% of all responses). Victory, independence and freedom drew only 9% response.

The CBS survey was small, covering 536 Saigon residents, 132 residents of smaller cities, and 745 people in 11 provinces, all in secure areas. The survey underrepresents males of military age and farmers. It was conducted without the knowledge of US or GVN officials, however, and used rigid statistical sampling techniques to insure a representative sample of all age categories and social strata.

The JUSPAO survey taken in Oct - Dec 1965 was not as careful in its sampling methods. Interviewers could select their respondents at will in many cases; age, sex, and religious distributions were distorted; lower economic classes were overrepresented. Nevertheless, the survey confirms the average SVN resident's concern with personal economic problems. 42% of a Saigon sample cited high cost of living or personal finances as the most important problem they face. 41% of a combined urban-rural sample felt people were dissatisfied with life, and most of these cited economic factors (cost of living, family finances) as the source of dissatisfaction. The one wish for life which all respondents cited most often (35% of all responses) was for a better economic situation (working conditions, cost of living). A desire for greater government responsiveness to their needs was the next most frequent wish (29%), followed closely by a wish for peace and unity (20%).

A survey of 504 Saigon students in May 1966 indicates that student aspirations and fears are most often concerned with personal plans (career-related, academic, overseas travel). Their desires for changes in SVN are centered on standard of living, education, the governmental system, and economic/industrial development.

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CBS Public Opinion Survey, Nov 66 - Feb 67

What is your first wish for yourself and your family? (N = 1413 SWN residents)

Wishes related to:	%
Employment/income	54
Real estate/property	5
Cost of living	5
Economic	64
Health/welfare	14
Agriculture	5
Community welfare	6
Security	5
Other	6
Total	100

Is your life better or worse than it was one year ago? (N = 1413 SWN residents)

	%
Better	25
Reasons:	
Financial situation	18
Wages	3
More income earners in family	1
Economic	22
Other (security, health)	8
Total (multiple responses)	30
Worse	48
Reasons:	
Cost of living	23
Lower income	8
Fewer income earners in family	8
War-related income problems	7
Unemployment	20
Economic	66
Other	3
Total (multiple responses)	69
Same	27
Total	100

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What is your first wish for your country? (N = 1413 SVN residents)

Wishes related to:	<u>%</u>
Peace	81
Security	3
Unification of VN	2
Peace-related	<u>86</u>
Victory	4
Independence	4
Freedom	1
Victory-related	<u>9</u>
Prosperity	2
Other	1
Nothing	2
Total	<u>100</u>

What should the American forces do in the South? (N = 1413 SVN residents)

Go on fighting	<u>%</u>
Stop fighting, stay as advisors	39
Stop fighting, go home	21
No opinion	10
Total	<u>30</u>
	<u>100</u>

Should the Americans devote more attention to negotiating with NVN, or to military efforts against the North? (N = 1413 SVN residents)

More negotiation	<u>%</u>
More Military action	63
No opinion	15
Total	<u>22</u>
	<u>100</u>

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JUSPAO Survey, Jan - Dec 1955

What is the most important problem facing people like you? (N = 410 Saigon residents)

High cost of living	$\frac{4}{29}$
Finances	13
Economic	<u>42</u>
Transportation	7
Housing	9
Security/war	6
Education	2
Other	12
None	22
Total	<u>100</u>

Are people around here dissatisfied with their life as it is presently? (N = 1141 SVN residents)

Very Satisfied	$\frac{2}{9}$
Fairly Satisfied	38
Somewhat dissatisfied	34
Very dissatisfied	7
Reasons for any dissatisfaction:	
High cost of living	24
Finances	$\frac{12}{36}$
Economic	<u>36</u>
War-related	6
Public utilities	1
Unresponsive government	5
Total (multiple responses)	<u>48</u>

What would be your one wish for the government to do for people like you? (N = 1141 SVN residents)

Better working conditions	$\frac{2}{23}$
Lower cost of living	$\frac{12}{35}$
Peace/unity	20
Responsiveness to people's needs	29
Other	10
Nothing	4
Total (rounding error)	<u>98</u>

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Saigon Student Survey, Center for  
Vietnamese Studies, May 1966

What are your aspirations and/or fears? (N = 504 Saigon students)

	<u>%</u>
Aspirations:	
Career-related	23
Academic	29
Travel overseas	20
Total personal	<u>72</u>
Help family	28
Help society/nation	24
Total altruistic	<u>52</u>
Peace, unity, other	17
Total (multiple responses)	<u>141</u>
Fears and worries:	
Personal/family	52
Effect/outcome of war	34
Military obligation	7
Unstable politics	3
Welfare of society	2
Other	5
None	24
Total (multiple responses)	<u>127</u>

What changes would you like to see in South Vietnam? (N = 504 Saigon students)

	<u>%</u>
Answers related to:	
Standard of living	48
Education	37
System of government	35
Economic/industrial	27
War-related	23
Other	12
Total (multiple responses)	<u>182</u>

6

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The Pacification Attitude Analysis System (PAAS)

Description of the System

- PAAS is the CORDS attitude survey designed to portray:
  - Shifts and trends in rural opinions.
  - Rural reaction to specific events.
- Data is gathered on a monthly basis by up to 100 South Vietnamese research cadre trained in semi-structured interview techniques.
  - 30-33 provinces are included in each monthly survey.
  - About 3000 respondents are interviewed each month, with about 1000 commenting on "security," a second 1000 on "politics," and the rest on "development." (Respondents do not usually comment on more than one of the three topics.)

PAAS data since January 1970 indicate respondents:

- Felt more secure in October than at any other time in 1970 (52% said security was better than in September, 6% said it was worse, 42% said it was the same).
  - But 59% of the October sample said VC personnel could enter their hamlet at night, and 62% said that their hamlet was not secure enough to take down fortifications. (These percentages reflect the overrepresentation of C hamlet populations in the survey.)
- Increasingly view prices and financial problems instead of security as their greatest personal concerns (in November, 61% identified economic concerns as their most important problem, an increase of 13 percentage points since January).
- Have consistently ranked the National Police lowest of all US and RVNAF force in the ability to limit VC activity (58-68% of each sample have said the NP were ineffective).
- Increasingly identify security as a joint people/government undertaking (in October, 74% said it was a joint responsibility, an increase of 12 percentage points since January).
- Depend heavily on radio as a source of information for national and international affairs (44-54% have identified radio as a source since January), but are increasingly listening to local officials (in October, 20% identified local officials as a source for national and international affairs, an increase of 11 percentage points since January).
- Have increasingly viewed elections as a means of replacing undesirable officials (in October, 63% said elections were the way of replacing officials; an increase of 24 percentage points since January).

CONFIDENTIAL

CASD/SA  
December 24, 1970

168

**CONFIDENTIAL**

- Do not want to participate in hamlet and village government (in October only 4% said they would like to participate), primarily (55-60%) because they do not feel qualified.
- Do not have much awareness of several national programs (more than 50% pay no taxes; less than 20% report that agricultural service cadre, health service cadre, information service cadre, agricultural development bank representatives or land reform representatives have ever visited their hamlet).

Evaluation of System

- The PAAS is the most systematic effort to portray rural attitudes which is now available.
- It provides a reasonably accurate picture of rural thinking and is a useful supplement to HES.
- It has important limitations.
  - Semi-structured interviews allow some latitude for interviewers to interpret replies.
  - Small size of sample each month limits accuracy.
  - Sample overrepresents "C Hamlet" populations.



Jan-Feb - 1971

## CONFIDENTIAL

### WHAT THE VIETNAMESE PEASANT THINKS

Summary. The Pacification Attitude Analysis System (PAAS) for 1970 indicates the rural South Vietnamese population:

- Felt more secure as the year passed. Following a dip in the sense of security in the spring, 45-50% of the respondents were saying security was better. Only 8% of the respondents said security was worse in the last quarter of 1970.

- Improved their opinion of GVN security forces. In the last quarter of 1970 68-74% of those queried expressed the belief that the PF and RF were effective. The rating given ARVN dropped in the spring but rebounded to 1st quarter levels (54% said ARVN was effective) and remained there for the rest of the year. About 60% of every sample said the National Police were ineffective.

- Increasingly aspired to Peace. 65% of the respondents listed peace as their most important aspiration in November, highlighting a trend upward since January 1970 and perhaps reflecting the US Peace initiative in October. Awareness of the initiative was high. 79% of the respondents in the regular monthly survey for November indicated an awareness that new proposals had been made. In a special survey held in urban areas (where news media had more impact) 97% were aware of the new proposals.

- Were more concerned with economic problems as the year passed. By the end of the year 64% of the respondents listed increased prices or financial problems as their most severe problem, about a 17 percentage point increase since the first of the year.

- Increasingly saw security as a joint people-government undertaking. By the end of the year about 78% of those queried said security was a shared responsibility, a 19 percentage point increase since early 1970.

- Increasingly turned to local officials for information. About 19% of the respondents in December pointed to local officials as their source of information about national and international affairs. Another 37% took their cues from local officials regarding local or provincial affairs.

- Continued to be unaware of national programs. 68-97% of the respondents indicated information, health, agricultural, or land reform cadre seldom, if ever, visited their hamlets.

- Increasingly saw elections as a way of replacing officials. By the end of the year, 61% of the respondents stated elections were the best way of eliminating undesirable officials, an increase of about 16 percentage points since early 1970.

170

## CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

### The System

The Pacification Attitude Analysis System (PAAS) attempts to portray rural South Vietnamese attitudes toward security, politics, and economic development. It was developed by the Pacification Studies Group of CORDS at MACV and the Central Pacification and Development Council of the Government of Vietnam.

Monthly PAAS statistics start with January 1970 and portray two types of information: (1) trends or shifts in rural opinions, and (2) rural reactions to specific events. To indicate trends, the same series of questions are used in regular monthly surveys. To identify reactions to specific events, special topical issues (See Annex 1) are included in the regular surveys and, on occasion, have generated special surveys.

The system is based on semi-structured interviews conducted by trained South Vietnamese research cadre in rural areas of 30-33 provinces. In a typical monthly survey, three man survey teams (3 teams per province) are assigned a specific hamlet in which to conduct interviews. The cadre memorize the survey questions prior to entering the hamlet, and, guided by pre-established criteria, select respondents. Survey questions are posed indirectly in the course of conversation, and the replies of the respondent are coded in predetermined categories immediately afterward.

Any systematic effort to portray attitudes and beliefs is subject to error, and conditions in South Vietnam further limit the capability of the PAAS to portray South Vietnamese attitudes accurately. We recognize its limitations (Annex 2), but the PAAS is the only systematic survey of rural opinion we have in Vietnam, and it seems to be very useful. In August, for example, respondents' answers to the question, "What tickets will win in the Senate election?", called the first three winning tickets in exact order.

### The Composite Picture

Selected PAAS data indicate rural South Vietnamese increasingly felt secure after the second quarter of 1970. Their opinion of the effectiveness of ARVN, Popular Forces, and Regional Forces improved as the year passed. The increased sense of security was accompanied by heightened aspirations for peace and a growing concern with economic problems. Politically, there is evidence of growing viability on the part of local government. The awareness of Saigon remains vague, but there are premonitions of change which could affect the national political context in 1971.<sup>1/</sup>

<sup>1/</sup> Most of the figures used in the following tables were derived from the computer tapes sent from MACV. They sometimes differ slightly from those published in the PAAS monthly hard copy report because they have been adjusted to reflect the actual geographical distribution of the rural South Vietnamese population. The adjustment compensates for the tendency of the quota interview system used by the PAAS to overrepresent the opinions collected from less populated areas of the country.

CONFIDENTIAL

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## Feelings of Security

There was an overall trend toward a greater sense of security on the part of the rural population in 1970. Table 1 shows that the average percentage of respondents stating that security was "better" during the last quarter of 1970 was 7 and 15 percentage points higher than in the first and second quarters, respectively. For the most part, the increase came from the decline in the percent of respondents who claimed security was worse. Thus, although the feeling of security varied from month to month--and dipped sharply in the 2nd quarter, when enemy activity was high--there was a general upward shift in the feeling of security during the year.

TABLE 1

"How Does Security Compare with Last Month?" a/  
(Monthly Average % of Respondents)

	1970			
	<u>1st Qtr b/</u>	<u>2nd Qtr</u>	<u>3rd Qtr</u>	<u>4th Qtr b/</u>
Better	43	35	45	50
Worse	12	21	9	6
Same	44	43	46	44
No. of Respondents (Monthly Average)	870	869	901	1083

a/ Possible responses were: "much better," "a little better" (combined in tables); "same;" "a little worse," "much worse (combined in table); "does not know," "does not want to respond" (not included in table).

b/ January, February and December data not adjusted to reflect actual population distribution.

The sense of security varied between different parts of the country, however, and often reflected different trends in the various military regions. Chart 1, which compares changes in the sense of security in MR II and MR III, demonstrates the variations which occur within the country; in five of the seven months between April and November the shift in the sense of security portrayed by respondents from MR II moved in a direction opposite to that portrayed by respondents from MR III.<sup>2/</sup> (We have constructed indices of the shifts in the sense of security by subtracting the percentage of respondents who said security was worse from the percentage saying it was better.)


Thus, the gradual increase in security portrayed for all of South Vietnamese encompasses wide variations throughout the countryside.

<sup>2/</sup> The trends in MR I and IV differed from those portrayed for MRs II and III and from each other also. For the sake of clarity, they have not been included on Chart 1.

# CONFIDENTIAL

Chart 1

Security Index of MR II and MR III  
(% of respondents saying security better less % saying security worse)



We cannot fully identify the reasons for changes in the sense of security. Common sense dictates that an increase in enemy activity and terrorism ought to erode feelings of security, and there does appear to be some association between the number of enemy attacks experienced during a month and the sense of security as portrayed by the PAAS for that month. The period of April-June 1970, when the PAAS indicated the feeling of security was low (see Table 1), was a period of high enemy activity. The number of enemy attacks averaged about 436 per month in the April-June period, compared to 259 per month and 290 per month in the three months preceding and following the period--the number of terrorist incidents was comparatively high for April-June period as well.

But the relationship between enemy activity and the rural population's sense of security is probably more complex than the association with enemy attacks and terrorism suggests. We isolated 37 hamlets in which PAAS interviews were conducted before and after a terrorist incident in or near the hamlet, expecting to find that the terrorism would be followed by greater feelings of insecurity. The opposite was demonstrated; 47% of the respondents from these hamlets said security was better after the terrorist incident compared to 41% who said it was worse.

Thus, until we have investigated the relationship between enemy activity and the sense of security in greater depth, we are unable to generalize about the specific reasons for changes in the feeling of security.

The View of GVN Security Forces. Respondents clearly distinguish between government forces in terms of their effectiveness in achieving security. They have never had much regard for the ability of the National Police (NP) to limit VC activity and have consistently ranked them below the ARVN, Regional

CONFIDENTIAL

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Forces (RF) and Popular Forces (PF). Except for February and April, over 60% of each sample rated the NP as ineffective.

As Table 2 indicates, security force ratings paralleled changes in the rural sense of security. Following a dip in the effectiveness ratings in the second quarter of the year--also the low point for the sense of security (Table 1)--the ratings for all forces improved in the last half of the year.

The improvement was not uniform, however. The "effective" rating of both the PF and RF increased about 27 percentage points after the second quarter low, but the rating of ARVN stabilized at about the first quarter level. While the "effective" rating of the NP abruptly doubled in the second half of the year, "ineffective" ratings for the NP also increased.

Rating changes were due to different factors. In the cases of the PF and RF, the improved ratings were due to a shift from the group of respondents who stated the PF and RF were "ineffective" to the group which said these forces were "effective." Opinion on the NP tended to polarize; at the end of the year the group of respondents who earlier would express no opinion regarding NP effectiveness were more willing to rate the NP and were splitting about 7 to 1 in favor of the "effective" rating.

TABLE 2

"What do the people of the community think of the ability  
of the PF (RF) (ARVN) (National Police)?" <sup>a/</sup>  
(Monthly Average % of Respondents who have Contact with Subject Units)

	1970			
	<u>1st Qtr</u> <sup>b/</sup>	<u>2nd Qtr</u>	<u>3rd Qtr</u>	<u>4th Qtr</u> <sup>b/</sup>
<u>PF</u>				
effective	49	47	63	74
ineffective	43	47	33	25
<u>RF</u>				
effective	40	41	56	68
ineffective	52	49	38	27
<u>ARVN</u>				
effective	56	36	54	54
ineffective	22	26	18	26
<u>Police</u>				
effective	11	7	18 <sup>c/</sup>	24
ineffective	62	61	66 <sup>c/</sup>	64

<sup>a/</sup> Possible responses were: "Very effective--able to keep VC out of hamlet night and day;" "Effective--but hampered by poor support--VC able to operate to a limited degree" (combined under "effective" in table); "Fair performance--VC still have a good degree of operating capability," "Poor performance--have little effect on activities of VC," "Avoid contact with the enemy" (combined under "ineffective" in table); "Does not know," "Does not want to respond" (not included in table)

<sup>b/</sup> December, January and February figures not adjusted to actual SVN population distribution.

<sup>c/</sup> No data for August.

## CONFIDENTIAL

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## Attitudes Associated with Improved Security

As expected, the improved security situation in the second half of the year was accompanied by a decline in the expressed desire for security (18 percentage point decline since January 1970). The aspiration for peace, however, grew steadily, apparently stimulated by the anticipation of an end to the war and by President Nixon's peace proposals in October. As Table 3 indicates, the most significant increase in the percentage of respondents who voiced an aspiration for peace coincided roughly with the US/GVN peace initiative.

TABLE 3

"What are respondents aspirations for the future?" a/  
(Percent of Respondents)\*

	Monthly Average 1970			Oct	Nov	Dec c/
	1st Qtr c/	2nd Qtr	3rd Qtr			
Peace	43	45	46	51	65	58
Security b/	33	29	29	25	17	17
Stable Society	13	15	12	13	7	11
Better Economic Life	10	11	11	12	10	11
No. of Respondents	870	860	900	1012	1140	1107

- a/ Responses other than those listed: "Other," "Does not know," "Does not want to respond."  
b/ Response includes: "Security so that return to old hamlet is possible" and "security in respondents hamlet."  
c/ January, February and December data. Not adjusted to actual population distributions.  
\* May not add to 100% because of rounding.

Awareness of the peace initiative was high. In response to a special question included in the November survey, 79% of the respondents indicated awareness that a new proposal had been made. A special survey conducted in provincial capitals--areas of greater exposure to national news media--indicated 97% knew about the initiative. The high responses reflect both the extensive publicity which accompanied the proposal in South Vietnam and interest in the subject.

A further indication of the degree to which the rural population was attuned to the peace initiative is portrayed in Table 4. Although there was no clear consensus as to how the war will end, the Paris talks became prominent after the peace initiative was launched.

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TABLE 4

"How will the war end?" a/  
(Percent of Respondents)

	Monthly Average - 1970					
	1st Qtr b/	2nd Qtr	3rd Qtr	Oct	Nov	Dec b/
GVN Military Victory	22	29	28	29	33	35
Paris Peace Talks	14	11	16	23	24	21
Does not Know	17	23	20	15	9	13
VC Victory	.1	0	.1	0	0	0
No. of Respondents	870	860	900	1012	1140	1107

- a/ Responses other than those listed: "Some participation of NLF in government," "Division of SVN territory," "NVN will withdraw and VC will collapse," "Situation will become dangerous due to US withdrawal," "Fighting will continue indefinitely," "Does not want to respond."
- b/ January and December data not adjusted to actual population distribution; no data for February.

Regardless of how respondents thought the war might end, Table 5 shows a distinct increase of concern with economic problems. By the end of the year a clear majority (64%) of respondents said the most severe problem they faced was increased prices or financial problems. The percentage of respondents considering security their most severe problem remained constant at about 25% throughout the year. (We plan to run a check of the conditions in their hamlets to see if the consistency is related to the characteristics of the samples.)

TABLE 5

"What is most severe problem facing respondent?" a/  
(Monthly Average % of Respondents - 1970)

	1st Qtr b/	2nd Qtr	3rd Qtr	4th Qtr b/
Economic	47	48	59	64
Security	23	25	24	23
Other	30	27	17	13
No. of responden	891	2570	2600	3100

- a/ Responses included under "Economic": "Increased Prices," "Financial Problems;" other responses included "Draft status" (never more than 7%), "work problems" (reached 25% in May, but otherwise less than 10%), "Corruption" (never more than 4%), "Other" (never more than 3%), Does not know (less than 3%), and, "Does not want to respond (never more than 1%)
- b/ January, February and December data are not adjusted to actual population distribution.

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## Political Trends

Some of the structural changes in the political system over the last several years--the election of local and national officials, the granting of limited, but significant powers to the local governmental levels--were reflected in rural political attitudes. Several trends portrayed by the PAAS data point, for example, to growing viability on the part of local government and an increasing willingness on the part of rural respondents to accept and participate in some parts of the emerging South Vietnamese political system.

One of the most interesting indications along these lines has been the acceptance by the rural population of the concept that they share the responsibility for security with the government. Table 6 indicates there was a 19 percentage point increase in the respondent group that identified security as a joint people-government undertaking. The increase resulted mostly from a shift by those who earlier identified security solely as a government problem.

TABLE 6

"Do people of the hamlet have the responsibility to help the government keep the VC out of the hamlet, or is it the responsibility of government alone?" a/  
(Monthly Average % of Respondents--1970)\*

	<u>1st Qtr b/</u>	<u>2nd Qtr</u>	<u>3rd Qtr c/</u>	<u>4th Qtr b/</u>
Gov't-People/Gov't Responsibility	59	67	78	78
Gov't Responsibility Only	34	26	17	20
Uncommitted	7	8	6	2
No. of Respondents (Monthly Average)	880	850	890	1110

a/ Possible responses: "responsibility of people to assist the government;" "responsibility of government alone;" "does not know;" "no response."

b/ January, February and December data are not adjusted to actual population distribution.

c/ No data for August.

\* May not add to 100% due to rounding.

But the psychological entrance to the South Vietnamese political system may be a local affair. Some of the PAAS data suggest that the rural population's awareness and attitude toward the GVN remained divided between local government--which was increasingly accepted as viable, effective, and authoritative--and the national political system, which remained vague and distant.

Local officials clearly became more important as opinion leaders during 1970, not only for local or provincial affairs, but for the outside world as well. The 10-11 percentage point increases in the importance of local

# CONFIDENTIAL



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officials as sources of information, portrayed in Table 7, is impressive when compared to the stability or decline associated with other sources of information.

TABLE 7

How does respondent get information about national (international),  
(local), provincial affairs? a/

(Percent of respondents)

	<u>March</u>	<u>July</u>	<u>October</u>	<u>December</u>
Radio:				
Nat'l-Int'l affairs	48	57	50	47
Local-Prov affairs c/	18	26	17	19
VIS b/				
Nat'l-Int'l affairs	6	4	3	4
Local-Prov affairs c/	8	6	7	7
Local Officials				
Nat'l-Int'l affairs	8	13	18	19
Local-Prov affairs c/	27	31	36	37
Friends/Neighbors				
Nat'l-Int'l affairs	10	8	9	13
Local-Prov affairs c/	20	17	22	24
Does Not Know				
Nat'l-Int'l affairs	16	13	13	9
Local-Prov affairs c/	14	11	12	9
No. of respondents (Nat'l-Int'l affairs)	870	870	1012	1107

a/ Possible responses were (for nat'l-int'l affairs): VIS, radio, TV, newspapers, local officials, friends and neighbors, other, does not know, does not want to respond. For local-provincial affairs, TV was not a response; newspapers were broken into "local newspapers" and "national newspapers."

b/ VIS-Vietnamese Information Service.

c/ Not adjusted to reflect actual population distribution.

The growing importance of local officials as opinion leaders was accompanied by increasing percentages of respondents who professed (1) a high awareness of officials and (2) the belief that local officials have the trust and respect of the population. Between February and October the percentage of respondents who claimed they had knowledge of both hamlet and village officials increased about 10 percentage points to 72%; the percentage of respondents stating that local officials had the trust and respect of the population increased 11 percentage points to 81%.

But the rural awareness of Saigon did not appear to increase greatly. In contrast to the growing visibility of local officials, several national programs and institutions remained vague so far as about 75% to 95% of the

# CONFIDENTIAL

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respondents were concerned. Less than half of the respondents who were queried at various times through the year claimed to pay taxes.

Generally, less than 25% of each sample tested indicated that representatives of various national programs visited their hamlet regularly or occasionally (Table 8). Of the national cadre listed, only VIS cadre were relatively visible to rural residents, but Table 7 above suggests they are ineffective.

TABLE 8

THE VISIBILITY OF "NATIONAL" INSTITUTIONS a/  
(Percent of Respondents)\*

Respondents identifying Presence of	<u>March</u>	<u>June</u>	<u>August</u>	<u>December b/</u>
<u>Agriculture Service Cadre a/</u>				
Regularly/occasionally	14	10	7	no
Seldom/never/does not know	85	90	92	data
<u>VIS Cadre</u>				
Regularly/occasionally	25	24	17	33
Seldom/never/does not know	75	76	83	68
<u>Health Service Cadre</u>				
Regularly/occasionally	24	18	16	24
Seldom/never/does not know	76	82	84	77
<u>ADB Representative c/</u>				
Regularly/occasionally	10	14	6	10
Seldom/never/does not know	90	86	94	91
<u>Land Reform Representative</u>				
Regularly/occasionally	5	3	9	16
Seldom/never/does not know	95	97	91	84
<u>No. of Respondents</u>	<u>870</u>	<u>856</u>	<u>398</u>	<u>1102</u>

a/ "Do Information Service Cadre (etc.) visit the Hamlet?" (Other response was "Does not want to respond")

b/ Not adjusted to reflect actual population distribution

c/ ADB--Agricultural Development Bank.

\* May not add to 100% due to rounding.

While the association of the rural population with the South Vietnamese political system may be restricted primarily to the local level, one aspect of this involvement has "national" implications. Rural respondents did not express much desire to participate directly in government; less than 10% of the 3600 respondents queried between February and October indicated they would like to participate.

But there was a strong trend toward the belief that elections are the best way of replacing officials. Table 10 shows about a 16 percentage point increase in the importance of elections. The gain came from shifts by the uncommitted group and the respondents identifying appeals to authority as the means of replacing officials. Data such as these suggest the presidential and lower house elections in 1971 may occur in a political environment and under informal rules of the game which differ significantly from the 1967 experience.

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TABLE 10

"What steps would a community take to replace an undesirable official?"  
(Monthly average % of respondents)\*

	<u>1970</u> <u>1st Qtr a/</u>	<u>2nd Qtr</u>	<u>3rd Qtr</u>	<u>4th Qtr a/</u>
Elections	46	51	64 b/	62
Appeal to Authority c/	33	28	21	28
Outside Pressure d/	1	1	1	1
Does not know/no response	20	20	14	10
No. of respondents (Monthly Average)	870	860	900	1086

a/ January, February and December data are not adjusted to actual population distribution.

b/ May reflect high interest in Senate elections.

c/ Responses included "Request district, provincial or Saigon officials to replace him," "Request elders in community to influence him."

d/ Response was "Talk to the press to have the situation publicized."

\* May not add to 100% due to rounding.

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ANNEX 1

The following table lists the special issues which were addressed by the P/AS in 1970.

	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec
<u>The United States</u>											X	
US Peace Initiative												
Attitudes toward US Forces	X			X			X			X		
US troop Withdrawal			X			X		X				
Allied Drive-into Cambodia					X	X						
<u>The Government of Vietnam</u>												
<u>Gov't Problems</u>												
GVN Economic Performance				X	X	X	X	X	X		X	
High Prices and the Program Law									X	X		
Socio-Economic Problems												X
1971 Development Projects									X			
Village Self Development									X			
Effect of Land to the Tiller Law				X	X		X			X		X
<u>South Vietnamese Politics</u>												
Village Council Elections				X	X	X						
Province Council Elections							X	X				
Upper House Elections								X				
Quality of New Provincial Councils										X		
<u>Security Problems</u>												
Hamlet Security & Fortifications										X		
Off-Duty Soldiers & Carrying Weapons										X		
Use of Supporting Arms												X
Attitudes toward Hoi Chanh				X								
<u>Miscellaneous</u>												
Perception of VC Taxes & Collection				X								
Television										X		

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## ANNEX 2 PAAS LIMITATIONS

Two inherent limitations to the PAAS should be noted prior to any evaluation of the data the PAAS provides. These are (1) limitations due to the manner in which the data is collected, and (2) deficiencies in the sampling techniques which have been used.

1. Data Collection Limitations. Semi-structured interviews--in which the respondents' opinions are elicited during the course of a conversation rather than by the direct posing of specific, unambiguous questions--are probably the only feasible means of encouraging an open and frank response from Vietnamese at any time, and especially in the current environment. However, the technique necessarily introduces the bias of the research cadre into the survey results, for what the PAAS actually portrays is not the exact response to an unambiguously phrased question, but what the interviewer thought the respondent meant in responding to a question or line of conversation he (the interviewer) formulated. Interview training can minimize interviewer bias, but cannot fully eliminate the tendency of the interviewer to interject his own beliefs and opinions into the manner in which he phrases the question and the way he interprets the response.

Most respondents are probably reluctant to be entirely candid on all subjects surveyed, also. Research cadre are not formally identified as GVN agents and employ a wide range of "covers" designed to allay suspicions that they are. But they cannot help being viewed as "strangers" by respondents, and the research cadre are probably often associated with the GVN because of their conversational interests. Respondents undoubtedly consider this in making their responses, which, in turn, tends to limit the accuracy of the survey.

2. Sampling Limitations. Because quota rather than probability sampling techniques are employed in selecting both the hamlets and the individual respondents, the sample from which interviews are drawn is not a fully accurate representation of the South Vietnamese rural population. The PAAS tends, for example, to over represent the attitudes of "C" hamlet populations, as is apparent from the following table comparing the origin of respondents for the PAAS with the total South Vietnamese population and the distribution of the rural population as portrayed by HES.

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TABLE 1

PAAS SAMPLES AND THE SVN POPULATION <sup>a/</sup>  
(%)

Security Rating	January			June			October		
	Total Pop	Rural Pop	PAAS Sample	Total Pop	Rural Pop	PAAS Sample	Total Pop	Rural Pop	PAAS Sample
A	29.2	15.4	9.0	31.2	18.0	10.3	39.9	21.5	5.9
B	39.3	40.6	31.5	43.0	45.9	33.9	43.7	52.6	48.5
C	18.5	25.7	51.3	15.7	22.1	40.7	12.3	17.6	36.6
D	9.9	14.6	8.3	7.8	11.6	14.9	.5	7.4	8.9

<sup>a/</sup> Source for total and rural population by Security classification: HES 70.

The second difficulty with the interview sample is its size. Up to 3030 respondents have been interviewed each month between January and October, but in most cases each of the respondents was questioned on only one third of the three part interview. In effect, therefore, the monthly data dealing with the separate categories of security, politics and development was derived from generally about thirty individuals for each of the 30 to 33 provinces in which interviews were conducted. In view of the sometimes great differences in the cultural, social, and political context between provinces, there are severe limitations to representing Vietnam on the basis of the opinions expressed by about 30 persons per province, even if a different sample is used each month.

The size of the sample also tends to lower the validity of the trends the PAAS portrays. Although remarkable continuity has been maintained regarding some of the sample characteristics (Table 2), the effort to maintain comparable samples over time is in part downgraded by the small size of each.

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TABLE 2

SAMPLE VARIANCE (JANUARY-OCTOBER 1970) a/  
(% of Respondents)

	<u>Low</u>	<u>Mean</u>	<u>High</u>
Age			
18-25	10.5	12.54	14.0
26-40	44.6	45.77	48.2
41-55	38.5	41.57	44.0
Sex			
Male	63.4	67.94	72.2
Female	27.7	32.01	36.5
Ethnic Composition			
Vietnamese	87.0	88.33	92.3
Vietnamese/Cambodian	1.6	3.59	6.3
Montagnard	4.6	5.91	8.8
Cham	0	.56	1.9
Vietnamese/Chinese	0.4	.99	1.7
Nung (Mar-Oct only)	0.1	.44	1.6
Religion			
Buddhist	37.4	40.39	44.7
Catholic	7.4	10.65	13.2
Hoa Hao	4.1	7.04	9.9
Cao Dai	4.7	6.36	9.1
Ancestor Worship	27.5	31.25	35.2
Other	1.4	4.05	7.3

a/ "Of all respondents interviewed between January and October those between the ages of 18-25 made up least 10.5% but no more than 14.0% of each sample," etc.

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27

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## APRIL ATTITUDE SURVEY HIGHLIGHTS

April Pacification Attitude Analysis surveys, the first monthly surveys conducted in both urban and rural areas of South Vietnam, indicate South Vietnamese share the same opinions on several issues regardless of where they live. The April data indicate South Vietnamese:

- See the presence of Americans as at least somewhat beneficial to the Vietnamese,

-- About 75% of both samples said the people of Vietnam had benefitted at least somewhat by the American presence. (78% of the urban sample, 77% of the rural sample.)

- Saw little effect on job opportunities as a result of US troop withdrawals,

-- 56% of the urban sample indicated they expected no loss of job opportunities as a result of the US troop withdrawals; 72% of those asked in rural areas indicated they thought the withdrawals would not decrease job opportunities.

- But were ambivalent regarding their own feelings toward Americans,

-- In both samples, a majority of those asked said they "did not like but did not hate Americans" (67% in the cities; 51% in the countryside). 35% of 1125 respondents from the countryside said they "liked" Americans; 22% of 543 respondents from urban areas felt the same.

- Were aware of the ARVN operation in Laos (Lam Son 719),

-- 91% of the urban respondents said they were aware of Lam Son 719; 78% of the rural respondents said they knew about the Laos operation.

-- In the cities, 65% of those who were aware of the operation said it was wise; in the countryside, 75% of those aware thought the Laos operation was a wise decision.

- Are pessimistic regarding the end of the war.

-- Less than 10% of both the urban and rural sample said they thought the war would end in a year (9% for the rural sample; 5% for the urban).

-- About 20% of both samples said the war would end within four years.

-- 33% of the urban sample said the war would go on indefinitely; 20% of the rural sample felt the same way.

-- 49% of those asked in the countryside did not know when the war would end; 32% of the urban dwellers said they did not know.

1/ The rural survey in April was conducted among 3328 respondents from rural areas in 38 provinces. The April urban survey, which included several of the rural survey questions, drew on 1551 respondents from Saigon, Danang, Qui Nhon and Can Tho.

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OASD/SA  
17 May 1971

185



OFFENSIVE'S IMPACT ON VIETNAMESE ATTITUDES

Attitude surveys taken in early May provide some initial indication of how rural South Vietnamese perceive the North Vietnamese offensive. The surveys, drawing on 2,194 respondents primarily from A and B hamlets throughout the Republic, indicate:

- A general awareness of the offensive.

-- Nationally, 87% of those interviewed were aware of the offensive. Awareness was high in all MR's (93% in MR 1, 80% in MR 2, 91% in MR 3 and 89% in MR 4).

-- Most respondents learned about the offensive from the radio (56%), and neighbors (22%). Only 10% of the respondents identified local officials as their primary source of information about the offensive.

- A slight general decline in the sense of security.

24% of the respondents said security was worse now than last month, 6% said it was better. Prior to the offensive, generally between 6-10% said security was worse and 20-40% said it was better in each monthly survey.

- Differing views on the offensive's purpose.

-- 24% of the respondents said the objective of the offensive was to take control of one or more South Vietnamese provinces.

-- 19% said it was to influence peace negotiations in Paris.

-- 14% said it was to defeat ARVN.

-- 4% said it was to influence the US Presidential election.

- And some coalescing behind the GVN.

-- Although 30% said they now have a greater fear of the communists, 60% said the offensive strengthens support for the GVN.

-- 11% said the offensive weakens public support for the GVN; 29% said the offensive had no effect or that they did not know what effect it had.

OASD/SA/REPRO/SEA  
May 31, 1972

HIGHLIGHTS OF ATTITUDES OF RURAL DWELLERS IN SVN  
AUGUST PAAS

The attitudes of 3,400 rural civilians from 238 hamlets in 38 provinces were surveyed by the Pacification Attitude Analysis Survey (PAAS) in August.

Of those surveyed:

- 25% live in isolated hamlets, 75% reside in hamlets on a line of communication.
- 83% are 35 years old or over.
- 66% are male.
- 96% have less than a secondary education.
- 86% are married.
- 41% are buddhist, 10% are catholic, and 28% practice ancestor worship.
- 98% are employed.
- Monthly income ranges from 0-\$100. Median income is about \$18 per month.

Results

With regard to the war:

- 56% felt the most important problem facing SVN was to achieve peace and end the war (compared to 40% of urban dwellers who felt this way).
- 71% were aware of the current communist offensive (significantly, 26% were only vaguely aware of it).
- 35% felt the communists are trying to gain control of one or more provinces; 16% felt their goal is to defeat ARVN; 13% felt the enemy is trying to influence the Paris negotiations.
- Of those who feel the enemy is trying to control territory, 53% feel they will not be able to hold the territory gained; another 38% feel the enemy will lose some (but not all) of the land gained. Note: this contrasts with what urban dwellers felt - 74% thought the enemy would lose all their gains.

- Of those who think the enemy is after something other than territorial control, 44% feel they will completely fail, 45% feel they will generally fail in spite of some success. These percentages are almost identical to those among urban dwellers.

- 77% of those questioned felt ARVN is effective in the current offensive (Note: this result may be biased on the low side since it was only asked of non-natives in the areas surveyed).

- 46% rate government performance high in the current situation, 30% feel the GVN has performed adequately (urban dwellers felt the same way - 49% gave high ratings, 30% adequate ratings).

- 71% were aware of GVN efforts on behalf of war victims, however, 48% rate those efforts as unsatisfactory (compared to 36% in the urban sample).

With regard to their own security:

- 91% felt security was the same or better than in July.

- However, 47% credited VC forces with ability to operate in or near their hamlet at night. 97% felt the enemy could not operate during daylight.

- 55% had heard about or observed enemy terrorism in their hamlet or village in the past six months (in contrast to the 82% of the urban dwellers who had not heard of any).

- 28% felt the enemy could still tax villagers; 21% felt they were still able to recruit in the village (compared to 95% of urban dwellers who felt the enemy could do neither).

- 21% felt the VCI were more effective in their village compared to a year ago. Only 13% of the respondents felt there were no VCI in the area.

- ARVN or Regional Force (RF) units were reported present in or near villages of 32-36% of the respondents; 88% reported Popular Force (PF) presence (and 77% reported PF as effective).

Economics

- 78% reported no problems in getting to or from markets.

- However, less than half (47%) reported ample quantities of basic food-stuffs available for sale in local markets. 41% reported quantities limited; 10% said none was available (over 90% of urban residents reported ample quantities available).

- Availability of other essential commodities was reported to be even more limited: 33% said such goods were ample, 49% said limited, and 16% said they were not available.

- About half of the respondents reported no surplus of rice or other crops in the village.

- 45% reported their consumption of essential commodities to be lower than six months ago; 62% felt their consumption would remain the same or decline slightly in the next six months.

- 83% felt prices have risen faster this year compared to last year (48% felt all prices have been affected; 38% felt food prices have been most affected). A majority (54%) felt either soldiers or farmers were hardest hit by inflation.

- 33% give the GVN very poor marks for solving economic problems.

#### Other

Unlike the urban survey, 66% of rural residents were unaware of a drug problem in Vietnamese society. Of those who were aware of the problem, there appeared to be no significant polarization of responses. Interestingly, rural respondents felt that the more well off and those with secondary or higher education (both characteristics not associated in the respondents surveyed) were the most susceptible to drug abuse. A bare majority (51%) feel that the US presence has contributed to Vietnam's drug problem although, like the urban dweller, they also feel that other foreigners have contributed, especially the Nationalist Chinese and, to a lesser extent, the communists.