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U.S. Army Code of Conduct Training: Let the POWs Tell Their Stories.

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This paper examines the origins and meaning of the Code of Conduct, as well as current Army training procedures, which basically consist of rote memorization of the idealistic phrases and articles of the code. It also examines the experiences of POWs in the Korean and Southeast Asian Wars, and the U-2, RB-47, and Pueblo incidents.

This paper concludes that the Army must supplement its idealistic portrayal of the Code of Conduct with the readily available experiences of how former POWs actually implemented the code. More importantly, Code of Conduct instruction must include practical instruction in combating the pressures of interrogation, isolation, depression, suicide, malnutrition, and primitive medicine. This instruction must explain how former POWs overcame the problems associated with escape, torture, resistance, propaganda, communication, and camp organization.

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
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U.S. ARMY CODE OF CONDUCT TRAINING

LET THE POWS TELL THEIR STORIES



U.S. ARMY CODE OF CONDUCT TRAINING

LET THE POWS TELL THEIR STORIES

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army  
Command and General Staff College in partial  
fulfillment of the requirements for the  
degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

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1976

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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the individual student author and do not necessarily represent the views of either the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

#### ABSTRACT

The U.S. Army must improve its Code of Conduct training methods. While the code is really a flexible guide to govern POW behavior, the Army teaches the code as if it were an inflexible guide which contains all that the soldier needs to know to survive as a POW.

This paper examines the origins and meaning of the Code of Conduct, as well as current Army training procedures, which basically consist of rote memorization of the idealistic phrases and articles of the code. It also examines the experiences of POWs in the Korean and Southeast Asian Wars, and the U-2, RB-47, and Pueblo incidents.

This paper concludes that the Army must supplement its idealistic portrayal of the Code of Conduct with the readily available experiences of how former POWs actually implemented the code. More importantly, Code of Conduct instruction must include practical instruction in combating the pressures of interrogation, isolation, depression, suicide, malnutrition, and primitive medicine. This instruction must explain how former POWs overcame the problems associated with escape, torture, resistance, propaganda, communication, and camp organization.



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## CHAPTER 1

### INTRODUCTION

#### BACKGROUND

It is neither dishonorable nor heroic to be [captured, but part of ] 'the fortunes of war,' [the fate of the unlucky] the soldier of misfortune. In combat, luck cannot smile on all participants.

The fortunes of war forced the United States to abandon Corregidor and its American defenders to the Japanese in World War II. More recently, during six critical hours on January 23, 1968, American air power and naval forces were unprepared to aid the captured USS Pueblo. Thereafter, United States decisionmakers refused to risk a second Asian conflict or the beginning of World War III to liberate this 83 man crew.

As perceived by the POW, capture may be a misfortune, perhaps a disaster. As perceived by the American public, the American POW must live up to the high ideals and traditions of Nathan Hale, Patrick Henry, and John Paul Jones. Therein lies a conflict which President Dwight D. Eisenhower hoped to eliminate with Executive Order 10631, The Code of Conduct for members of the Armed Forces of the United States (Appendix A). This order, which was signed by a retired five star general of the Army who had become the Commander

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<sup>1</sup>The Report of the Secretary of Defense's Advisory Committee of Prisoners of War, POW: The Fight Continues After the Battle (Washington: Government Printing Office, August 1955), p. 1.

in Chief of the Armed Forces, established the standards for all American military personnel in combat and as prisoners of war (POWs). The Code of Conduct was written amid controversy and continues to remain a controversial, perhaps misunderstood, document.

Debaters may reasonably argue that the Code of Conduct was the official expiation of the U.S. military and the American government for the adverse publicity associated with our Korean War POWs. Many Americans were perturbed to learn that United States pilots signed germ warfare confessions and that 21 American POWs (the turncoats) refused repatriation. The sensational, inquisition-like, anti-Communist hearings of the late Senator Joseph McCarthy may have still troubled many people. The trial of Hungarian Cardinal Jozsef Mindszenty and the tribulations of American civilians and missionaries behind the Bamboo Curtain of Communist China also contributed to the nebulous, world-wide conspiracy environment associated with the release of these POWs.

Even though this type of atmosphere existed, it was the returning POWs themselves who strongly recommended that the American Armed Forces adopt a standardized, clearly defined guide for future POWs.<sup>2</sup> These Korean War POWs had lived with the different POW regulations of each service before the establishment of the Code of Conduct in 1955. The legal restrictions and punishments associated with these former regulations were fragmented until the establishment of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) in 1951.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>2</sup>The Report of the Secretary of Defense's Advisory Committee on Prisoners of War, p. vii.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid., p. 6.

The August 17, 1955 Code of Conduct, which was adopted as a result of our Korean War POW experiences, is still valid and should remain unchanged for both the armed forces in general and the U.S. Army specifically. The concepts of the Code of Conduct are in accordance with the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (GPW) of August 12, 1949.<sup>4</sup> As with the United States, the GPW is part of the law of most foreign nations. Consequently, Code of Conduct training in the U.S. Army implies that other nations will adhere to the articles of the GPW. However, the rules of the GPW have often been discarded by other nations during hostilities. Therefore, U.S. Army Code of Conduct training should emphasize the realistic problems that U.S. POWs have encountered and overcome and will likely face in the future.

#### PROBLEM STATEMENT

Although the Code of Conduct is a valid document and should remain unchanged, there is something lacking in the manner in which the Army indoctrinates its soldiers with the concepts of the Code of Conduct. The Army "trains" soldiers as potential POWs simply by teaching the Articles of the Code of Conduct. Code of Conduct instruction has become the accepted method of preparing soldiers for the tribulations which they might encounter as POWs. This approach does not prepare soldiers to cope with the realistic dilemmas that former POWs

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<sup>4</sup>American representatives signed the GPW on August 12, 1949 and the U.S. Senate ratified it on July 6, 1955. President Eisenhower ratified the GPW on July 14, 1955 and proclaimed it on August 30, 1955. The Swiss Federal Council received the American ratification on August 2, 1955 and the GPW officially entered into force with respect to the United States on February 2, 1956. U.S., Department of State, United States Treaties and Other International Agreements, Vol 6, Part 3, 1955 (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1956), p. 3316.

have described. The U.S. Army must improve its Code of Conduct training methods in order to adequately prepare the soldier for the harsh and traumatic experiences which he may encounter as a POW.

Current Code of Conduct classes are designed to reinforce rote memorization of the six articles of the code so that all POWs will have a common standard to guide their conduct. What is lacking in Army Code of Conduct training is the practical knowledge learned by former POWs in meeting the day-to-day challenges of imprisonment. How can soldier--all potential POWs--be provided with the wisdom, experience, and specific lessons learned of the Korean War, USS Pueblo, and Southeast Asian POWs? How, for example, did the Hanoi POWs modify and adapt the Code of Conduct to their specific situation? How did the Hanoi POWs organize themselves, establish policy, communicate directives, and maintain morale? To what extent can the Army develop these lessons and communicate these experiences so that future POWs can be spared the agony of having to rediscover valuable lessons?

Code of Conduct training should teach the U.S. soldier how others have coped with the specific problems of malnutrition, improper sanitation and hygiene, dysentery, beriberi, skin disease, indoctrination, isolation, and "give-up-itis." He should be exposed to the "tap code" and the "plum" policies of the Hanoi POWs in North Vietnam. The soldier should examine the coerced statements and propaganda films of former POWs, accompanied by their post-release explanations of the propaganda. He should understand the effects of propaganda charades on national and international affairs. The soldier must be told how former POWs maintained a positive mental attitude and kept themselves physically and mentally active in cramped surroundings.

As President Eisenhower directed in the introduction to his Executive Order on the Code of Conduct,

... specific training and instructions designed to better equip [each soldier] to counter and withstand all enemy efforts against him [will be developed], and [he] shall be fully instructed as to the behavior and obligations expected of him during combat or captivity. [Appendix A, p. A-1]

Department of Defense Directive 1300.7 reinforces this line of thought by adding: "...many examples of successful and heroic resistance should be held up as ideals, and will be the focal points of instruction and training on this subject."<sup>5</sup>

In spite of this guidance, Army Code of Conduct training seems to have remained at the basic soldier trainee level. This training is not progressive according to the individual's advancement in rank and responsibility.<sup>6</sup> It continues to emphasize constant repetition of the Articles of the Code of Conduct. It describes idealized situations. Army training film 21-2720 (Code of the Fighting Man), for example, depicts escape during the initial confusion of capture as being relatively easy.<sup>7</sup> It does not address the dilemmas associated with escaping from permanent POW compounds. This film implies that captured Americans will be able to adhere to the GPW requirement of Article 17, which states that, when questioned, a prisoner "is bound to give only"

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<sup>5</sup>U.S., Department of Defense, Training and Education Measures Necessary to Support the Code of Conduct, DoD Directive 1300.7 (Washington: Department of Defense, July 8, 1964 with Change #1, October 1, 1964), p. 3.

<sup>6</sup>Ibid.

<sup>7</sup>TF 21-2720, Code of the Fighting Man, Department of the Army, Black and White, 57 minutes, 1959.



name, rank, service number, and date of birth.<sup>8</sup> It assumes that the enemy will accept name, rank, service number, and date of birth as the standard reply to endless hours of detailed interrogation.

A number of other topics are not addressed. What happens, for example, if the International Committee of the Red Cross (IRC) or a neutral nation is not permitted to oversee POW operations?<sup>9</sup> How will the outside world know of a POW's existence? Should a POW participate in enemy propaganda exploitations in order to tell the United States that he is alive, if he receives no acknowledgement (after a year or two years) that his Capture Card or letters are being received? What should a POW do if the senior POW refuses to take command, is incompetent, or seems to collaborate with the enemy? How should a POW deal with fellow POWs who do not actively oppose the enemy, passively accept enemy mandates, or are informers?

These type situations represent discussion dilemmas for advanced level code of training and case study analysis, but they are not addressed as part of the Army's progressive education system. No formal Code of Conduct/POW instruction is taught at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College (CGSC). Yet, AR 350-30, Code of Conduct Training, says:

... Code of Conduct [training] will be continued throughout the individual's military career ... during leader courses of instruction at Army schools and as part of leadership development in units.

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<sup>8</sup>U.S., Department of State, Geneva Conventions (of August 12, 1949), Department of State Publication 3938, General Foreign Policy Series 34 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1950), p. 91.

<sup>9</sup>The IRC is an organization composed of neutral Swiss citizens. It is distinct from the League of Red Cross Societies, which consists of national Red Cross organizations.

[It] will further develop the individual's depth of knowledge and understanding, commensurate with increasing leadership responsibilities [to] include more detailed information and problem solving concerning ... organisation and operation of a chain of command in a PW camp, covert communications between PW's, responsibilities of a senior ranking officer (SRO), permissive leadership and group dynamics, operation and control of escape mechanisms, special responsibilities of medical personnel and chaplains in PW camps ....

...the scope, duration and detail of such training [will consider] the relative risk-of-capture potential of the personnel being trained.<sup>10</sup>

The material for this kind of advanced level POW instruction is readily available. Many first hand accounts of POW life have appeared in periodicals dating back to the 1950's. Some former POWs have written books about their experiences. Major General John P. Flynn, USAF, has talked to the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College (CGSC) about his experiences as the senior American POW in Hanoi, North Vietnam. But what will happen when General Flynn's presentation is eliminated? Will existing video cassette recordings of his talk be shown or will all students receive a printed copy of his talk?<sup>11</sup> CGSC special elective R-235 examined the Code of Conduct in academic year 1973-74 and recorded an interview with Hanoi POWs Lieutenant Colonel Wells, USAF, Retired, and Lieutenant Commander Edward Davis, USN, on

<sup>10</sup>U.S., Department of the Army, Code of Conduct Training, AR 350-30, (Washington: TAGO, August 15, 1975), p. 8.

<sup>11</sup>John P. Flynn, "Presentation by Major General John P. Flynn to the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College on 15 May 1974." For the transcribed text material, contact the USAF liaison office, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. For similar video cassette recordings of this presentation, contact The CGSC Audio-Visual Support Center, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas (Major General John P. Flynn: Post Theatre (Presentation to the wives), May 16, 1974 and Hanoi Experiences of Major General John P. Flynn, September 19, 1974).

video cassettes.<sup>12</sup> This elective class also video taped a briefing presented to General Flynn and ex-Hanoi POW Rear Admiral Jeremiah Denton on proposed changes to the Code of Conduct.<sup>13</sup> Unfortunately, this elective has been discontinued.

#### STUDY ORGANIZATION

In order to recommend changes for improving Army Code of Conduct training, it is necessary to establish how current Code of Conduct training is accomplished in an operational environment. Therefore, Chapter 2 will focus on the training and instructional problems of a notional company commander because the U.S. Army company commander is the primary Code of Conduct trainer. This training occurs at company level under the company commander's supervision. The reader must appreciate the company commander's operational pressures and constraints in order to understand how effective this training is and how it might be improved. The notional company commander in Chapter 2 is a peacetime company commander whose job is to train soldiers for combat. His observations concerning the prescribed one hour period of annual Code of Conduct indoctrination, the type of material available, and the type of material presented cause him to conclude that Code of Conduct training in U.S. Army combat units remains at the idealistic, basic trainee level

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<sup>12</sup>P.O.W. Panel, Special Elective R-235, Parts 1 and 2, Video Cassette Discussion, (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Department of Command, Staff Judge Advocate Officer, April 12, 1974).

<sup>13</sup>The Code of Conduct--General Officer Briefing, Special Elective R-235 (What, if Anything, Should Be Done About the Code of Conduct?), Audio-Visual Cassette, (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College Audio-Visual Support Center, May 16, 1974).

of rote memorization. The message of this annual hour of indoctrination amounts to: "These are the six Articles of the Code of Conduct, memorize them, and adhere to them if you ever become a POW."

The company commander's dissatisfaction with the superficiality of unit level code of conduct training leads to his reflections on the individual articles of the code in Chapter 3. These reflections on the meaning and philosophy of the code as a guide for POW behavior point out a serious deficiency. Code of Conduct instruction has become the primary means of conducting POW training, but it does not provide the soldier with a day-to-day understanding of the realities of POW life as described by former POWs. The classes do not provide the soldier with the knowledge of how to organize, communicate, maintain health and morale, and survive while implementing the ideals of the code. Consequently, the company commander examines recent POW experiences in order to better evaluate Code of Conduct training and its relationship to the POW. Chapters 4 (Korea), 6 (Peacetime Incidents), and 7 (Southeast Asia) examine POW experiences in considerable detail, while Chapter 5 (The Code's Development) establishes the link between the need for the code as a result of the Korean War and its subsequent application in peacetime incidents and Southeast Asia. The information in Chapters 2 and 3 provides the reader with the knowledge of how the Code of Conduct trains the soldier for the POW environment.

Chapters 4, 6, and 7 chronologically examine the experiences of American POWs since 1950, with occasional references to World War II experiences. Chapter 4 discusses the Korean War POWs, their high death rate, the breakdown of leadership and morale into "progressive" and "reactionary" elements, the propaganda effects of germ warfare and

brainwashing, and the fate of the 21 turncoats. The 6th chapter discusses such peacetime incidents and surveillance missions as Francis Gary Powers' 1960 U-2 reconnaissance plane mishap, the 1960 survival of two members of an RB 47 crew shot down over the Barents Sea, and the USS Pueblo incident. With the advent of the "cold war era" of constant military preparedness, there is no "peacetime" for a large portion of the Department of Defense, which has units deployed world-wide in a combat ready posture. Chapter 7 reviews the situations of captured servicemen in Laos, South Vietnam, and North Vietnam from 1960 through 1973.

In Chapters 4, 6, and 7, the reader should note the increasing national and international implications of POW confessions and audio-visual propaganda recordings. Once made, the coerced origins and many falsities incorporated within a propaganda confession or recording are forgotten. What seems ridiculous and innocent to the POW may not be ridiculous to the interrogator.

Chapter 5 deals with the inception of the Code of Conduct in 1955, opinions about its validity, and the interservice difficulties of standardized training. It provides insight into the beliefs and recommendations of the individuals who wrote the code.

Chapter 8 concludes with recommendations for incremental levels of Army training, the establishment of a permanent anthology of POW experiences and lessons learned, the development of audio-visual cassettes featuring concise, provocative discussions by former POWs, and the initiation of a Code of Conduct/POW syllabus patterned after the current Human Resources Development seminars. The POW anthology might be a field manual similar to DA Pamphlet 360-522 (The U.S.

Fighting Men's Code), but it would feature more detailed portrayals of the environment and logic behind the decisions made by former POWs. It would be a collection of brief case studies of the dilemmas that POWs have faced. These case studies would provide realistic situations suitable for group discussions. In this regard, Chapters 4, 6, and 7 provide the reader with these type situations.

In analyzing this study, it is possible to examine only Chapters 1, 2, 3, 5, and 8. However, Chapters 4, 6, and 7 provide the realistic POW environment against which the reader can judge how well Army Code of Conduct training serves the needs of the POW.

The notional company commander will now examine unit level Code of Conduct training based on the expertise available within his company, the accessibility of reference material, and the amount of time that can be devoted to this training effort.

## CHAPTER 2

### UNIT LEVEL CODE OF CONDUCT TRAINING

Current U.S. Army training policies require the company commander to conduct annual Code of Conduct training for his unit in accordance with the Army Master Training Program. Although this mandatory training may not relate directly to the primary mission of the company commander's unit, he realizes its potential importance. As is typical in most companies, neither the company commander nor anyone in his unit has been or knows a former POW. None of the unit lieutenants and sergeants E5 and below have served in Vietnam. In accordance with normal practices, the company commander assigns a platoon leader to conduct this training as outlined in the current Army Subject Schedule 21-15 (Code of Conduct, April 20, 1967).<sup>1</sup>

The lieutenant platoon leader initially refers to Army Subject Schedule 21-15, which prescribes one hour of annual Code of Conduct instruction and suggests the use of three films that might support this lesson: AFIF 90 (The Code - The U. S. Fighting Man's Code of Conduct, 29 minutes, produced in 1959 [and now obsolete]), AIF 5 through AIF 10 (six short films depicting the six articles of the Code of Conduct, 54 minutes total, produced in 1959 through 1961), and AIF 138 (Name, Rank, and Service Number, two actual POW cases from Southeast Asia and the Korean War, 21 minutes, produced in 1965). A 20-

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<sup>1</sup>U.S., Department of the Army, Code of Conduct, Army Subject Schedule 21-15 (Washington: TAGO, April 20, 1967).

minute classroom lecture is intended to supplement the teaching objectives of these films. The subject schedule suggests that this lecture discuss POW conduct in Korea, the writing of the Code of Conduct, code Articles II through V, and the relationship of UCMJ Articles 105 and 104 to Code of Conduct Articles IV and V respectively.

Additional subject schedule material for this one-hour class includes the following publications:<sup>2</sup>

1. Army Regulation (AR) 350-30: Code of Conduct Training.
2. AR 350-225: Survival, Evasion, Resistance, and Escape (SERE) Training.
3. Field Manual (FM) 21-77: Survival, Evasion, and Escape.
4. FM 27-10: The Law of Land Warfare.
5. Department of the Army Pamphlet (DA Pam) 20-213: History of Prisoner of War Utilization 1776-1945.
6. DA Pam 21-71: The U.S. Fighting Man's Code, which was superseded by DA Pam 360-522 with the same title in 1968.
7. DA Pam 30-101: Communist Interrogation, Indoctrination, and Exploitation of Prisoners of War.
8. The 1955 pamphlet report POW - The Fight Continues After the Battle, by the Secretary of Defense's Advisory Committee on Prisoners of War, which wrote the Code of Conduct. This pamphlet is no longer supplied by Department of the Army.
9. Eight law review articles, copies of which are not supplied by Department of Army.

Of the teaching material mentioned, the AR's, FM's and UCMJ would probably be the only references available at company, kaserne,

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<sup>2</sup>Code of Conduct, Army Subject Schedule 21-15, p. 3.



or station level, to include local libraries. As most company commanders know, Department of the Army Pamphlets are usually brief, "ad hoc" booklets that are generally issued directly to the individual soldier on a one-time basis. Over the years, these pamphlets probably have become lost or discarded from the company's military references. The Staff Judge Advocate office might have some of the law references at a division level post.

The enterprising lieutenant platoon leader continues to prepare for his class. He discovers the existence of additional Code of Conduct training references which are not mentioned in Army Subject Schedule 21-15, Code of Conduct. One of these references is Instructor's Film Reference FR TF 21-2720 (Code of the Fighting Man), which describes Training Film TF 21-2720 (Code of the Fighting Man) as containing "'must know' information for all combat army personnel."<sup>3</sup> Instructor's Film Reference FR TF 21-2720 also relates the film Code of the Fighting Man to TF 21-1973 (Escape) and TF 30-2562 (Resist). Additionally, FR TF 21-2720 makes reference to the six Code of Conduct posters (which the company does not have); Department of the Army Pamphlets 21-46 (Behind Enemy Lines), 355-51 (I Am an American Fighting Man), and 355-106 (Code of the U.S. Fighting Man); and (S) FM 21-77A (Joint Worldwide Evasion and Escape Manual (U)).<sup>4</sup>

The reference to secret FM 21-77A startles the lieutenant and perplexes the company commander. Most companies and battalions do not retain classified training reference files. The company commander

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<sup>3</sup>U.S., Department of the Army. Code of the Fighting Man, Instructor's Film Reference FR TF 21-2720, (Washington: TAGO, May 29, 1963), p. 1.

<sup>4</sup>Ibid., p. 2.

wonders how much of the material in this FM is classified. The title suggests that the information in this FM might be factual. If so, would the entire company have to possess security clearances to enable the lieutenant to discuss the material in FM 21-77A? The idea of using FM 21-71A material is discarded because of the near impossible task of obtaining confidential clearances for a company of soldiers within a six-month period, let alone obtaining secret clearances within a couple of months or weeks. The company commander later locates a copy of this secret manual and discovers that Chapter 6, "Resistance to Enemy Interrogation, Indoctrination, and Exploitation," is unclassified. Chapter 7, (C) "Prisoner Communication;" Chapter 8 (C) "Prisoner of War Camp Procedures;" and Chapter 9, (C) "Escape" contain mostly unclassified material.<sup>5</sup> These chapter titles are of vital interest to all POWs, but generally these topics are not discussed in Code of Conduct classes.

Although secret Field Manual 21-77A is probably unavailable to most company level instructors, its classification causes the company commander to think about the existence of classified POW debriefings. Could some of this debriefing material be declassified (without offending the dignity of the individuals concerned) and discussed in troop classes to better prepare soldiers for what to expect if they become POWs?

As the lieutenant continues to read instructor's Film Reference FR TF 21-2720, Code of the Fighting Man, he finds a suggested classroom quiz which reinforces the major teaching objectives of the movie,

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<sup>5</sup>U.S., Departments of the Air Force, the Army, and the Navy, (S) Joint Worldwide Evasion and Escape Manual (U), FM 21-77A (Washington: Departments of the Air Force, the Army, and the Navy, August 1, 1967).

Code of the Fighting Man. This quiz emphasizes that a soldier never surrenders voluntarily, but evades capture and attempts to rejoin other fighting elements by infiltration in small groups of three to five soldiers. Ammunition, weapons, water, and food from the dead must be redistributed among the living. An isolated unit can defend while awaiting relief, fight its way out, evade through infiltration (preferably at night), or conduct guerrilla operations. The specific course of action depends on the resources available, the probability of reinforcements arriving, and the will of the soldiers to resist. All soldiers must be prepared to fight with their rifles as infantrymen.<sup>6</sup>

This quiz further emphasizes that the primary duty of a POW is to escape and to help others to escape; that the best opportunities for escape occur immediately after capture in the confusion of battle; and that a POW is authorized to tell the enemy only his name, rank, service number, and date of birth.<sup>7</sup>

At the local post and civilian libraries, the lieutenant locates such easily read POW books as: General Dean's Story (Korean War); Valley of the Shadow (the dramatic escape of USAF Captain Ward Millar from North Korea); The Captives of Korea (an unofficial white paper on the treatment of U.S. and enemy POWs in the Korean War and the efforts of the International Red Cross); Operation Overflight (the 1960 Russian shoot down and trial of U-2 pilot Gary Francis Powers); The Little Toy Dog (the Russian shoot down of Captains

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<sup>6</sup>Instructor's Film Reference FR TF 21-2720, Code of the Fighting Man, pp. 2-3.

<sup>7</sup>Ibid.

John R. McKone and Freeman B. Olmstead in an RB-47 reconnaissance plane over the Barents Sea in 1960); books about the 1968 USS Pueblo incident in North Korea; Reported to be Alive (captive Americans in Laos 1960-61); Five Years to Freedom (the South Vietnam capture and escape of Army Major James N. Rowe 1963-68); The Passing of the Night: My Seven Years as a Prisoner of the North Vietnamese (USAF Colonel Robinson Risner and the pilot POWs of Hanoi 1965-73); and They Wouldn't Let Us Die (the Vietnam POWs tell their story). The lieutenant considers the idea of bringing these books to the classroom to show the company what books are readily available at the local library. Brief discussions of these books might encourage off-duty study of POW experiences and potential Code of Conduct conflicts. These books present the life and death decisions which POWs must make in support of the deceptively simplistic 247 words of the Code of Conduct.

The lieutenant also locates a reprint of the article "Solitary Torment of a Tough American." This five page story of Army Major Lawrence R. Bailey, Jr., assistant attache at the United States Embassy, Vientiane, Laos, deals with Major Bailey's unexpected 17 month captivity by the Pathet Lao in 1961-62.<sup>8</sup> This reprint describes the first of the two stories depicted in AIF 138 (Name, Rank, and Service Number). The film uses a fictitious name for Major Bailey.<sup>9</sup>

The lieutenant discusses with his company commander the large amount of material available for inclusion in the Code of Conduct

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<sup>8</sup> Joseph P. Blank, "Solitary Torment of a Tough American," reprint from a 1963 copy of True magazine, reprint by Troop Information Division, Office of the Chief of Information, Department of the Army, Washington, 1963.

<sup>9</sup> AIF 138, Name, Rank, And Service Number (Army Pictorial Center, 21 minutes, August 1965).

instruction period. He even suggests that the POW books be given to selected soldiers a couple of weeks before the class presentation. These soldiers would then be prepared to talk about the problems of POWs relative to the ideals of the Code of Conduct.

Although the lieutenant's ideas would improve his Code of Conduct class, the company commander decides that this class will follow the outline described in Army Subject Schedule 21-15, Code of Conduct. The movie TF 21-2729, Code of the Fighting Men, will be shown. The company commander makes his decision based on the one-hour class length, the limited amount of preparation time available, and the more immediate training needs of his company. He commends the lieutenant's background research and is impressed at the quantity of related material that the lieutenant has discovered on his own preparation time. The company commander wishes that all of the lieutenant's additional references were listed in Army Subject Schedule 21-15, to provide a more complete and detailed bibliographical listing for preparing Code of Conduct classes. Even though each of the lieutenant's books might require at least eight hours of reading time, they contain the type of realistic material which is more suitable for Code of Conduct classes, if the time is available. These books contain enough material for two or three days of combined Code of Conduct/POW and leadership development discussion groups on the platoon or company level. However, the company generally lacks the resources to organize this material into a suitable presentation format.

The company commander attends the lieutenant's class, watches the film, and observes a number of heads nodding in light sleep. While part of this head nodding is found whenever instructional movies are

shown to troop audiences, the company commander attributes the increased number of "dozers" to the repetitious nature of the Code of Conduct film, which stressed sing-song rote memorization of the six Articles of the Code of Conduct. The episodes depicted do not feature comments by the real-life participants. An air of superficiality or play acting is present. The inner emotions, fears, and stresses of the participants are not realistically projected. Most of the scenes are structured to portray POW adherence to a particular phrase or article of the Code. The Code of Conduct is presented as an ironclad set of rules, instead of as a guide for POW behavior that is designed to enhance POW survivability.

The company commander also notes that troop lectures on the Code of Conduct to an audience of 100 or 200 soldiers tend to produce dull classes. Often, the instructor's background knowledge is superficial. He lacks the credibility of having been a POW. The audience probably has not read about the exploits of former POWs or can recall only vague memories of this reading. In a large class, the instructor's one-hour presentation is limited to saying that this is the Code of Conduct and you must remember these key phrases. The instruction does not discuss the detailed exploits of a specific POW and his adherence to the philosophy of the Code of Conduct. There is a tendency to preach the stars and stripes forever; my country, right or wrong; and "give me liberty or give me death." Peacetime soldiers do not picture themselves as POWs. They rationalize that other soldiers may become POWs, but that misfortune will never happen to them. First, there has to be a war. Even then, the odds of any one soldier becoming a POW are statistically very low. It is contrary to the positive mental

attitude of the individual soldier to be a POW.

The company commander recalls similar Code of Conduct classes. All of these classes showed nearly identical movies. He concludes that the current classroom environment is designed to present the Code of Conduct in a clear-cut, easy to understand, unthinking atmosphere. The objective of the annual Code of Conduct class seems to be an hour of refresher training in memorizing the key phrases and articles of the code. While the current training program and available instructional aids may be sufficient for basic entree-level trainees in a peacetime Army, they do not meet the needs of a combat ready unit.

In order to establish what the Code of Conduct needs of a combat ready unit might be, the company commander decides that he ought to study the articles and philosophy of the code in more detail, even though he has read it many times. He therefore analyzes the meaning of the key phrases of the Code of Conduct in Chapter 3.

## CHAPTER 3

### THE CODE OF CONDUCT

After the lieutenant's Code of Conduct class in Chapter 2, the national company commander continues to reflect on the effectiveness of this instruction as prescribed by the Army Subject Schedule. Even though he has read the code many times, he is not sure that he completely understands its meaning and philosophy. On his own initiative, he privately begins to examine the written material contained in the ten page Army Subject Schedule 21-15 (Code of Conduct, April 20, 1967) and the twelve page AR 350-30 (Code of Conduct Training, August 15, 1975), as well as other references. He reflects on the key phrases of each article as summarized in the following discussions and illustrates some of the articles with actual occurrences in order to make the discussions more meaningful. He discusses Articles I and VI first because they are relatively general in nature, applying to all military personnel, whether they are located in a stateside training installation, a combat division in Europe, or a prisoner of war camp. Article I introduces the code, while Article VI summarizes it with the key phrase "RESPONSIBLE FOR MY ACTIONS." Article II pertains to the physically demanding stresses of battle. Articles III, IV, and V apply specifically to captured and detained personnel.



## ARTICLE I

I AM AN AMERICAN FIGHTING MAN. I SERVE IN THE FORCES WHICH GUARD MY COUNTRY AND OUR WAY OF LIFE. I AM PREPARED TO GIVE MY LIFE IN THEIR DEFENSE.

Article I specifies your readiness to die in defense of the American way of life. As a POW, you are still a soldier who acted and continues to act as an instrumentality of your nation, not as a law-breaker. A POW has everything to live for. There should be no reason for a POW to die. Nevertheless, a POW is still prepared to die in defense of the United States, just as he was prepared to die as an active combatant.

## ARTICLE VI

I WILL NEVER FORGET THAT I AM AN AMERICAN FIGHTING MAN, RESPONSIBLE FOR MY ACTIONS, AND DEDICATED TO THE PRINCIPLES WHICH MADE MY COUNTRY FREE. I WILL TRUST IN MY GOD AND IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.

Article VI reaffirms the soldier's unceasing responsibility for his own actions. The ideals of the Code of Conduct support the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ). As a POW, you are still subject to UCMJ, and the laws and regulations of your service and nation. Belief in God can be a tremendous source of strength to an isolated person, particularly a POW. The article emphasizes a POW's need to trust in the fact that someone in the American government is always tasked with looking after his welfare and his family's welfare, that he is never forgotten, and that his release is always being sought.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>President Eisenhower's Press Release accompanying Executive Order 10631, the Code of Conduct. Albert D. Biderman, March to Calvary (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1963), p. 280.

Unfortunately, the United States cannot always gain a prisoner's release before the enemy voluntarily repatriates him. Even though the United States may have a POW's camp address, his physical location may be unknown. The raiders of a POW camp at Sontay, North Vietnam discovered that the camp was empty. This type of raid requires pinpoint intelligence information, favorable environmental and enemy circumstances, and thorough preparation. It is normally a one-time occurrence.

The North Korean's would not mark their POW camps and would not provide the U.N. Command with POW camp locations as required by Article 23 of the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (GPW). POW attempts to spell out "POW" with cabbage leaves or trampled snow failed.<sup>2</sup> On more than one occasion, American planes accidentally straffed and killed U.S. POWs. For example, F-80's once attacked a camouflaged ammunition dump which temporarily housed some U.S. POWs; and on another occasion, F-51's accidentally attacked the known but unmarked Bean Camp POW compound, killing 30 or 35 POWs.<sup>3</sup> At another time, when U.S. planes first discovered an American POW camp and one of the planes repeatedly rocked its wings over the camp in successive passes, it was "as good as a letter from home" according to the POWs below.<sup>4</sup> It may be difficult to always trust your nation's actions, but it is essential for survival.

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<sup>2</sup>William Lindsay White, The Captives of Korea (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1957), pp. 144-145.

<sup>3</sup>White, pp. 50-63.

<sup>4</sup>White, pp. 57-58.

## ARTICLE II

I WILL NEVER SURRENDER OF MY OWN FREE WILL. IF IN COMMAND I WILL NEVER SURRENDER MY MEN WHILE THEY STILL HAVE THE MEANS TO RESIST.

Article II pertains to your own combat actions or the actions of your subordinates while the battle is being fought. You will never surrender until the enemy physically captures you and you are unable to resist that capture. UCMJ Articles 99 (Misbehavior Before the Enemy) and 100 (Subordinate Compelling Surrender) are the legal counterparts to this article.

Each FOW has had to decide when he could no longer resist. Army Major General William Dean evaded the enemy for 35 days with a broken shoulder and almost no food. He avoided capture on several occasions and had to be physically overpowered at the time of his final capture. General Dean traveled mostly at night, sometimes in the wrong direction, other times in apparent circles, and hid during the day, when a USAF lieutenant general in a light airplane was searching for him over the very area in which he was wandering. Dean's bowels stopped functioning for 32 days, but he was later informed by American medical personnel that this phenomenon has lasted for 100 days.<sup>5</sup> He estimated that he had lost 100 pounds during these 35 days. This six foot general normally weighed 210 pounds.<sup>6</sup>

Major Lawrence Bailey parachuted alone from a C-47 shot down in Laos. His left upper arm was broken and his left leg did not function. He could go nowhere. He needed help, even from the Communist

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<sup>5</sup>William F. Dean, General Dean's Story (New York: The Viking Press, 1954), pp. 44-81.

<sup>6</sup>Dean, p. 126.

Pathet Lao, who found him an hour after he landed.<sup>7</sup> As can be seen from these two examples, it is not an easy decision to establish when further evasion becomes futile.

Chaplains and medical personnel (platoon and company medics) may voluntarily stay behind to attend the sick and wounded. Their subsequent capture is not voluntary surrender. These special categories of soldiers are technically classified as "retained personnel," not POWs, by Article 33 of the GPW.<sup>8</sup>

ARTICLE III

IF I AM CAPTURED I WILL CONTINUE TO RESIST BY ALL MEANS AVAILABLE. I WILL MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO ESCAPE AND AID OTHERS TO ESCAPE. I WILL ACCEPT NEITHER PAROLE NOR SPECIAL FAVORS FROM THE ENEMY.

Article III does not define the means of resistance that are available. POW group unity and loyalty are the major means of resistance. Individual POWs have discovered an inner delight in finding unique methods of resistance and thereby buoying up their own spirits and the spirits of their fellow POWs. One Hanoi POW let the water faucets drip. He considered this act to be so many less drops of water for the war effort.<sup>9</sup> The number of enemy guards is also a measure of POW resistance

<sup>7</sup>Joseph P. Blank, "Solitary Torment of a Tough American," reprint from a 1963 copy of True magazine, reprint by Troop Information Division, Office of the Chief of Information, Department of the Army, Washington, 1963, p. 1.

<sup>8</sup>U.S., Department of the Army, Code of Conduct Training, AR 350-30, (Washington: TAGO, August 15, 1975), pp. 4-5.

<sup>9</sup>P.O.W. Panel, Special Elective R-235 Part I, Video Cassette Discussion (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Department of Command, Staff Judge Advocate Officer, April 12, 1974).

because each guard is one less enemy combat soldier on the active battlefield. However, needless guard harassment could become detrimental to your personal health and welfare or that of your fellow POWs.<sup>10</sup>

Escape is a duty, a positive mental attitude, a source of hope, a reason for living, an ever present possibility.<sup>11</sup>

GPW Article 93 recognizes a prisoner's right to attempt escape by saying:

. . . offenses committed by prisoners of war with the sole intention of facilitating their escape and which do not entail any violence against life or limb, such as offenses against public property, theft without intention of self-enrichment, the drawing up or use of false papers, or the wearing of civilian clothing, shall occasion disciplinary punishment only.<sup>12</sup>

POW escapees who commit assault and battery or murder risk the possibility of being executed, if recaptured. While capital punishment may be outlawed in the United States, it is a legal punishment in other countries and authorized by the GPW. GPW Article 101 provides a six month delay between the time of sentencing and the time of execution.<sup>13</sup> The following escape stories illustrate that most escapees occur from semi-permanent POW camps and involve a large amount of risk, which some POWs may not accept, but escape against great odds is possible, especially with helicopter assistance.

USAF Captain Ward Miller escaped from North Korea using wooden walking sticks as crutches and ill-fitting galoshes to support his

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<sup>10</sup>U.S., Department of the Army, Code of Conduct Training, AR 350-30, p. 4.

<sup>11</sup>Ibid., pp. 4-5.

<sup>12</sup>U.S. Department of State, Geneva Conventions (of August 12, 1949), Department of State Publication 3938, General Foreign Policy Series 34 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1950), p. 120.

<sup>13</sup>Ibid., pp. 122-123.

improperly set broken ankles. He was aided by a North Korean Sergeant and an uncommon amount of luck. Ninety days after bailing out of his plane, he managed to signal an F-80 pilot with a mirror. Three flights of aircraft then protected him until the arrival of a rescue helicopter. His weight had dropped from 170 to 120 pounds.<sup>14</sup>

In 1964, Lieutenant (J.G.) Charles Klusmann ended his three month captivity in a Laotian POW camp with a three-day ground escape, aided by two Laotian POWs, one of whom was recaptured. Klusmann's plane had been shot down over Laos.<sup>15</sup>

Weighing 157 pounds, Lieutenant (J.G.) Dieter Dengler crash landed in Laos on February 1, 1966 and was held in a crude jungle POW camp with six others. Six months later (when monsoon water was more plentiful), his crude SOS signal panels were spotted by an A-1 Sky-raider, which radioed for a helicopter to rescue this 98 pound POW. He had to kill six guards in escaping from his camp and managed to evade the enemy for 22 days. His fellow POW and USAF escape partner (a rescue helicopter pilot) was hacked to death with a machete on the 17th day of the escape.<sup>16</sup>

Marine Sergeant James Dodson and Corporal Walter Eckes escaped from primitive captivity in South Vietnam after having been POWs for more than a month in 1966.<sup>17</sup>

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<sup>14</sup>Ward Miller, Valley of the Shadow (New York: David McKay Co., Inc., 1955), pp. 131-134, 232-237.

<sup>15</sup>U.S., Department of Defense, The U.S. Fighting Man's Code, DA Pam 360-522 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1963), pp. 62-63.

<sup>16</sup>U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Imprisonment and Escape of LT. (J.G.) Dieter Dengler, USNR, (News release, Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs), Washington, September 13, 1966), Hearing, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., September 11, 1966 (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1966), pp. 11-14.

<sup>17</sup>U.S., Department of Defense, The U.S. Fighting Man's Code, DA Pam 360-522, p. 85.

After five years of jungle captivity, Army Major James Rowe's South Vietnam escape was a calculated life or death situation. Within some ten minutes, this bearded, black pajama-clad POW killed his guard and barely avoided being gunned down by attacking helicopters, one of which swooped him to freedom. The flight commander did not know of Major Rowe's presence, but only wanted to capture a Viet Cong (VC) soldier. Major Rowe willingly became that captured soldier amidst the confusion of VC bullets and a devastating hail of Cobra gunship and light observation helicopter bullets.<sup>18</sup>

Each escape or attempted escape may reduce the number of front line enemy soldiers by increasing the number of POW guards. Escapes may also result in violent repercussions. After two POWs unsuccessfully escaped from a sizeable North Vietnam compound, the backlash was fierce. One escapee never returned. The North Vietnamese seemed to lose their heads as they initiated a reign of terror among the already weakened POWs. Three POWs were "busted" separately with hundreds of lashes from a fan belt to provide the names of those on the escape committee and the other committees. The names provided did not match because there were no committees. The Vietnamese ended up with the entire POW communication system. They had so much information that they could not determine the truth.<sup>19</sup>

The duty to escape must be tempered by good judgement and existing conditions. At some level of probability, (perhaps 100 to 1, 20 to 1, 5 to 1 or even 1 to 1 odds), the chance of successful

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<sup>18</sup> James N. Rowe, Five Years to Freedom (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1971), pp. 421-433.

<sup>19</sup> P.O.W. Panel, Part 1, Video Cassette Discussion.

escape versus remaining in captivity reaches a breakeven point for different individuals.<sup>20</sup>

In the high density population areas of Asia, a hulking six-foot American POW is very conspicuous with his light skin and round eyes. He needs outside help, perhaps a bribed local national, to effect a successful escape.<sup>21</sup>

The Oriental escape situation may not be so easy as it was for English speaking, German POW Reinhold Pabel at Camp Washington near Peoria, Illinois on September 10, 1945. Reinhold's preparations included selling war medals and souvenirs to American guards for \$15 and obtaining a white shirt and blue dye to color his trousers. He then walked through the skimpy fence, bought a Chicago bus ticket, ate bacon and eggs, and slept in an all night movie house on the first day. Initially, he worked as a dishwasher and bowling pin setter and lived in a cheap boarding house. He obtained a social security card under the invented name of Phillip Brick, filed income taxes and received a \$75 rebate, and married an American wife in a Catholic church with the aid of name changes on his German birth and baptismal certificates. Brick worked for the Chicago Tribune and opened his own book store. The FBI arrested him on March 9, 1953, perhaps because of food and clothes packages which he sent to his mother in Germany. Of the 430,000 German and Italian POWs held in North American POW camps, 2,803 escaped and five remained at large in 1953.<sup>22</sup>

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<sup>20</sup>Ibid.

<sup>21</sup>Ibid.

<sup>22</sup>B. Fay, "It's Easy to Bluff Americans," Colliers, 131: 35 (May 16, 1953), 20-23.



The acceptance of parole or special favors is the quickest way to destroy camp unity and integrity. It might also reduce the number of enemy guards required for active resisters. POWs must be able to trust each other implicitly. They must resist (to the utmost of their ability) giving information or making propaganda statements and confessions in return for a privilege from the enemy. Among any group of deprived, isolated human beings, the simple pleasures of a cigarette, candy, and a letter or package from home can become very enticing rewards as the period of captivity increases.<sup>23</sup> The receipt of special favors might allow the enemy to blackmail a POW into doing something that he would not do otherwise. POW "esprit de corps" and group pressure are major deterrents to the temptations of special favors.

The "retained personnel" status of chaplains and medical personnel, as provided by GPW Articles 33, 34, and 35, allows them to receive what might seem to be a form of parole. They may receive what appears to be special favors and privileges in the performance of their duties. Retained personnel do not, as individuals, have a duty to escape or to actively aid others in escaping, as long as they are treated as retained personnel by the enemy."<sup>24</sup>

#### ARTICLE IV

IF I BECOME A PRISONER OF WAR, I WILL KEEP FAITH WITH MY FELLOW PRISONERS. I WILL GIVE NO INFORMATION OR TAKE PART IN ANY ACTION WHICH MIGHT BE HARMFUL TO MY COMRADES. IF I AM SENIOR, I WILL TAKE COMMAND. IF NOT I WILL OBEY THE LAWFUL ORDERS OF THOSE APPOINTED OVER ME AND WILL BACK THEM UP IN EVERY WAY.

<sup>23</sup>U.S., Department of Defense, The U.S. Fighting Man's Code, DA Pam 21-71 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1959), p. 10.

<sup>24</sup>U.S., Department of the Army, Code of Conduct Training, AR 350-30, p. 5.

Group faith, loyalty, and cooperation form the core of Article IV. Group solidarity and unity are the keystones to a soldierly, disciplined, well-organized POW camp which does not aid the enemy in any way. As Vietnam POW Lieutenant Commander Edward Davis put it, it was not "united we stand, provided we can, [but] united we are going to stand, even if we never get out."<sup>25</sup> Davis also commented there was some information which was withheld from certain POWs because their loyalty and trustworthiness were questionable. These POWs were too friendly or cooperative with the North Vietnamese.<sup>26</sup>

The establishment of an overt or covert chain of command and a communication system is essential. POWs need a supportive organizational structure in which to place their complete faith and have trust and dependency delegated to them. The senior ranking soldier (excluding chaplains and medical personnel), regardless of service, will successively assume command until there is no one left to command. A lieutenant, noncommissioned officer, or private could become the senior POW if the enemy attempts to isolate leaders and interrupt communications.<sup>27</sup>

If the ranking POW becomes incapacitated or unfit, the next senior ranking POW will command.<sup>28</sup> Assumption of command or relief of command by a lesser ranking POW is a serious matter and must be legally defensible under the provisions of the UCMJ upon repatriation. There is a fine line between relief for cause and POW mutiny. In Hanvi, a POW

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<sup>25</sup>P.O.W. Panel, Part 2, Video Cassetta Discussion.

<sup>26</sup>Ibid.

<sup>27</sup>U.S., Department of the Army, Code of Conduct Training, AR 350-30, p. 5.

<sup>28</sup>Ibid.

was relieved of one of the lesser commands.<sup>29</sup> After the Korean War, a West Point Lieutenant Colonel was charged with "making disloyal statements to prisoners, leading Communist discussion groups, and writing and broadcasting propaganda statements."<sup>30</sup> His court-martial convicted him of "making recordings that were inimicable to the interests of the United States."<sup>31</sup>

Other irrational occurrences (sometimes verging on insanity) have taken place in POW camps. In the hold of a prison ship evacuating captured survivors of the Bataan Death March to Japan, prisoners were choking each other. A throat was cut and the blood was drunk. A West Point son was killing his West Point father. In the years just past, these two had cared for and protected each other.<sup>32</sup>

It may become necessary to elect a prisoners' representative or have one appointed by the capturing nation in accordance with GPW Articles 79, 80, and 81. The senior military POW will still covertly command all POWs.<sup>33</sup> Command authority is the basis for all legal actions. Lawful military orders will be obeyed by the chain of command. UCMJ Article 105 (Misconduct as a POW) is the legal correlation to this Code of Conduct Article.

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<sup>29</sup>P.O.W. Panel, Part 2, Video Cassette Discussion.

<sup>30</sup>Eugene Kinkead, In Every War But One (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1959), p. 71.

<sup>31</sup>Ibid.

<sup>32</sup>Sidney Stewart, Give Us This Day, (New York: Popular Library, 1961), p. 120.

<sup>33</sup>U.S., Department of the Army, Code of Conduct Training, AR 350-30, p. 5.

## ARTICLE V

WHEN QUESTIONED, SHOULD I BECOME A PRISONER OF WAR, I AM BOUND TO GIVE ONLY NAME, RANK, SERVICE NUMBER AND DATE OF BIRTH. I WILL EVADE ANSWERING FURTHER QUESTIONS TO THE UTMOST OF MY ABILITY. I WILL MAKE NO ORAL OR WRITTEN STATEMENTS DISLOYAL TO MY COUNTRY AND ITS ALLIES OR HARMFUL TO THEIR CAUSE.

Article V is perhaps the most misunderstood article of the Code of Conduct. Part of this confusion is due to the phrase, "BOUND TO GIVE ONLY," which is a direct quotation from Article 17 of the GPW. Article 17 is partially quoted below.

Every prisoner of war, when questioned on the subject, is bound to give only his surname, first names and rank, date of birth, and army, regimental, personal or serial number, or failing this, equivalent information.

If he willfully infringes this rule, he may render himself liable to a restriction of the privileges accorded to his rank or status.

Each Party to a conflict is required to furnish the persons under its jurisdiction who are liable to become prisoners of war, with an identity card showing the owner's surname, first names, rank, army, regimental, personal or serial number or equivalent information, and date of birth . . . . The identity card shall be shown by the prisoner of war upon demand, but may in no case be taken away from him.<sup>34</sup>

The phrase, "BOUND TO GIVE ONLY," is thus not an absolute, but the minimum required information to establish your status as a POW under the GPW. Article 17 of the GPW also allows the identity card to contain the owner's signature, fingerprints, and "... any other information the Party to the conflict may wish to add

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<sup>34</sup>U.S., Department of State, Geneva Conventions (of August 12, 1949), pp. 91-92.

concerning persons belonging to its armed forces."<sup>35</sup> The U.S. Armed Forces Identification Card, DD Form 2A, 1 July 74, contains the serviceman's signature, picture, term of service expiration date, height, weight, hair and eye color, blood type, and Geneva Convention Category.

This ambiguous phrase, "BOUND TO GIVE ONLY," can work for or against the POW. Lesser ranking enlisted personnel may interpret these four words in an absolute sense: this is the "only" information that can be given to the enemy. This type of reasoning - "These four items (name, rank, service number, and date of birth) are all my country will allow me to say. I will give no other information." - may be very comforting and helpful. The rules of the interrogation game are clearly defined. Enemy interrogators may eventually accept forceful pronouncements of this repeated answer. The POW's steadfastness may be tested by some physical deprivation or torture, but the enemy may end the interrogation effort sooner and leave the POW alone. This situation represents the ideal case.

However, the "BOUND TO GIVE ONLY" phrase may present the POW with a life or death dilemma. "Hard core" POWs may have steadfastly displayed the ultimate resistance by dying for their country when they refused to tell the enemy anything other than "NAME, RANK, SERVICE NUMBER, AND DATE OF BIRTH." Their rationale is that once you give more than these four items, the enemy will constantly force you to give more information. The enemy wants to "break" you.

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<sup>35</sup>Ibid., p. 92.

A Special Forces lieutenant colonel in South Vietnam had dysentery, beriberi, and malaria. He had been chained to a rack for three months, could keep no food down, and had wasted away to 85 pounds. If he did not sign an enemy statement that day, he knew he would die the next day. He signed. That night he almost died from depression. He had violated the Code of Conduct. The next day, other POWs were allowed to minister to and comfort him. They had reached similar critical decision points. Their statement signing had caused mental depression which was as bad or worse than continued physical pressure by the enemy, but they were alive.<sup>36</sup>

Then there is the intermediate level of interrogation response. An Army study on Korean War POWs estimated that 97% of the repatriated POWs were interrogated and 91% of these POWs wrote autobiographies during the interrogation procedures. In formal interrogation, 99.5% of the POWs were asked more than their name, rank, service number and date of birth. Additionally, 50% of the POWs were interrogated about Tables of Organization and Equipment, 25% about military equipment and supplies, 15% about tactics and strategy, and 13% about political affiliations and personal attitudes. About 70% of the POWs knowingly or unknowingly sided the Communists by:

- Signing Communist propaganda petitions (39%).
- Making propaganda recordings (22%).
- Writing articles for enemy newspapers (11%).
- Writing propaganda petitions (5%).
- Circulating petitions (5%).
- Performing full-time propaganda duties, e.g., as cartoonist or writer (16%).<sup>37</sup>

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<sup>36</sup> P.O.W. Panel, Part 2, Video Cassette Discussion.

<sup>37</sup> Julius Segal, Factors Related to the Collaboration and Resistance Behavior of U.S. Army PW's in Korea, HamRRO Technical Report 33 (Washington: George Washington University, June 1956), p. 7.

Yet, 88% of the Korean War POWs fully rejected Communist ideologies.<sup>38</sup>

About 90% of the Hanoi POWs were forced by the enemy to do something that was "clearly and seriously immoral" as far as they were concerned.<sup>39</sup> Lieutenant Commander Edward Davis, a Hanoi POW, claims that within an hour he can force virtually anyone to do something against that person's will with three feet of rope. But has that person's mental will to resist been broken? The answer is no if that person "bounces back" and refuses to give more information or do other things.<sup>40</sup>

After WW II, interrogation experts concluded: "It is virtually impossible for anyone to resist a determined interrogator .... [but] he may be evaded by the prisoner."<sup>41</sup> A loaded question might be side-stepped. Thus, "BOUND TO GIVE ONLY" may be a deliberately ambiguous phrase designed to give POWs with different backgrounds and training some latitude in responding to enemy demands for information. The ambiguity of this phrase is one of the dilemmas of the Code of Conduct.

The ambiguous word, "EVADE," can be interpreted to mean not to answer anything else or to parry an interrogator's questions.

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<sup>38</sup> Ibid.

<sup>39</sup> John P. Flynn (Major General, USAF), "Presentation by Major General John P. Flynn to the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College on 15 May 1974," (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: USAF liaison office, 1974), p. 10.

<sup>40</sup> P.O.W. Panel, Part 1, Video Cassette Discussion.

<sup>41</sup> The Report of the Secretary of Defense's Advisory Committee on Prisoners of War, POW: The Fight Continues After The Battle (Washington: Government Printing Office, August 1955), p. 61.

Barrying involves the discussion of tangential subjects or the invention of a fictitious story. An expert interrogator might be able to skillfully exploit tangential subjects. The same interrogator usually can discover the inconsistencies of a fictitious story.<sup>42</sup>

The WW II German BUNA (Beute and Nachrichten Abteilung - booty and information center) maintained thousands of files on captive and non-captive American pilots. These files were painstakingly put together from home town newspaper clippings, class books, and items recovered at crash sites. Similarly, the British were supposed to have had the name and address of all German sailors when the war began.<sup>43</sup>

The thoroughly intimate details of the German files caused nine out of ten prisoners to cooperate with a friendly interrogator in this battle of wits. The POWs were often desirous of talking to someone after their traumatic capture. It is human nature to want to "unload" to someone who speaks your language. The prisoner may want to know about other crew members or what will happen to him. He may want a smoke to help him relax a bit. German interrogator Hanns J. Scharff claimed that these data files and a conversational questioning approach enabled him to successfully interrogate nearly 500 U.S. pilots.<sup>44</sup>

Uncooperative POWs sometimes cooperate unknowingly with their interrogators. A pill spiked glass of water might cause the POW such acute indigestion that the interrogator can appear genuine in his

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<sup>42</sup>U.S., Department of Defense, The U.S. Fighting Man's Code, DA Pam 360-522, pp. 79-80.

<sup>43</sup>The Report of the Secretary of Defense's Advisory Committee on Prisoners of War, pp. 59-61.

<sup>44</sup>IBML, p. 60.



expressed sympathy that the POW not die from peritonitis. Surely, the POW wants his next of kin notified . . . . Other means of obtaining information include enemy cellmates, concealed cell microphones, and teams of Dr. Jehyll and Mr. Hyde interrogators using concealed observation mirrors.<sup>45</sup>

Interrogator "loss of face" for having been deceived by a phony story may result in severe retribution. POW Major James Rowe devised a cover story to conceal his West Point, artillery, and Special Forces training. He became a military engineer, a builder of roads, bridges, and buildings. He could plead ignorance to all other military topics. Five years later, this cover story in the heart of the dense U Minh Forest of South Vietnam was blown by information provided by American war dissenters or third country nations. Fortunately, Rowe escaped before his arrival at a higher headquarters where more skilled interrogators would have obtained their desired information or executed him.<sup>46</sup>

When an officially released North Korean photo of some members of the USS Pueblo crew was published in the U.S., the press noticed that the crew displayed the Hawaiian good-luck sign, more commonly known as "the finger." When the North Koreans realized that they had "lost face," they initiated Hell Week and the most steadfast crew member, a Marine, attempted suicide.<sup>47</sup>

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<sup>45</sup>Ibid., pp. 60-61.

<sup>46</sup>James N. Rowe, Five Years to Freedom, Condensed Book, Book Section, Reader's Digest, 100: 597 (January, 1972), pp. 197, 218-219.

<sup>47</sup>Ed Brandt, The Last Voyage of USS Pueblo (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1969), pp. 154-155, 222.

POWs who EVADE or deceive the enemy must be prepared to accept retribution, which might be worse than the punishment received from giving only name, rank, service number and date of birth. Yet, the code ambiguously recognizes that beyond an undefined limit, the POW may have to provide the enemy with additional information.

"THE UTMOST OF MY ABILITY" or "the physical and mental endurance" of a POW is different for every person. It can be legitimately argued that "TO THE UTMOST OF MY ABILITY" applies to all of Article V and even to the entire Code of Conduct, not just to the one sentence in which this phrase appears. "TO THE UTMOST OF MY ABILITY" is a qualifier for the entire Code of Conduct.

It must be recognized that some POWs possess information which must not be divulged under any circumstances. Enemy knowledge of this information could cause the deaths of fellow POWs, active battlefield combatants, or the civilian population at home. Each POW has to determine the importance of his information and how best to protect it. Death may be the only solution.

General Dean attempted to execute a vengeful suicide plan with the aid of a stolen enemy submachine gun which jammed in his hands as he was overpowered by guards. He planned to kill his most hated interrogator and then stick the muzzle in his mouth. The North Koreans had badgered him about the defense plans of Japan, which he knew. He pleaded ignorance of these plans and described himself as America's dumbest general (he had been captured). Severe dysentery provided him with an excuse for frequent (up to 36 times daily) trips to the toilet and a short respite during questioning sessions. About the time of the Inchon landing (apparently Dean knew nothing about this

operations plan),<sup>48</sup> the undershort clad Dean was subjected to three grueling periods of interrogation which lasted 68, 48, and 32 continuous hours in 33 degree temperatures. These periods wore out his three interrogators, who worked successive four hour shifts. Dean was then threatened with such hard tortures as pressured water in the mouth or rectum, bamboo splinters under the fingernails, and electrical treatments. At one point, his captors planned to cut out his tongue. Dean felt that he was too weak physically to resist these tortures. He might say something before he died. Following this attempted suicide, the North Koreans realized that they had approached Dean's breaking point. They would get no information from him. His captors then adopted a more lenient strategy of keeping this famous captive alive and well.<sup>49</sup>

While most of the Code of Conduct is self-explanatory and straightforward, Article V does conceal some technical rules of the GFW. GFW Article 70 provides for the optional completion of a standardized 14 item capture card for mailing to the Central Prisoner of War Agency, International Committee of the Red Cross, Geneva, Switzerland (Figure 3-1).<sup>50</sup> Until 1968, the capture card was not

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<sup>48</sup> Although General Dean indicates in General Dean's Story that he did not know about the Inchon landing plans, page 31 of White's The Captives of Korea indicates that Dean attempted suicide "to guard ... the still more terrible secret of the Inchon Landing." White further adds "the terrible secret of Inchon, for which the General was trying to give his life, was a secret no longer." The Marines had landed two weeks earlier and marched to Seoul.

<sup>49</sup> Dean, General Dean's Story, pp. 98-161.

<sup>50</sup> U.S., Department of State, Geneva Conventions (of August 12, 1949), p. 111.

# CAPTURE CARD

(see Article 70)

1. Front

<b>PRISONER OF WAR MAIL</b>	<b>Postage free</b>
<b>CAPTURE CARD FOR PRISONER OF WAR</b>	
<p style="text-align: center;"><b>IMPORTANT</b></p> <p>This card must be completed by each prisoner immediately after being taken prisoner and each time his address is changed (by reason of transfer to a hospital or to another camp). This card is distinct from the special card which each prisoner is allowed to send to his relatives.</p>	<p><b>CENTRAL PRISONERS OF WAR AGENCY</b></p> <p><b>INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS</b></p> <p style="text-align: right;"><u>GENEVA</u> SWITZERLAND</p>

2. Reverse side

Write legibly and in block letters	1. Power on which the prisoner depends .....
2. Name .....	3. First names (in full) .....
5. Date of birth .....	4. First name of father .....
7. Rank .....	6. Place of birth .....
8. Service number .....	
9. Address of next of kin .....	
*10. Taken prisoner on: (or) Coming from (Camp No., hospital, etc.) .....	
*11. (a) Good health - (b) Not wounded - (c) Recovered - (d) Convalescent - (e) Sick - (f) Slightly wounded - (g) Seriously wounded. ....	
12. My present address is: Prisoner No. .... Name of camp .....	
13. Date .....	14. Signature .....
* Strike out what is not applicable. Do not add any remarks-- See explanations overleaf.	

Remarks. This form should be made out in two or three languages, particularly in the prisoner's own language and in that of the Detaining Power. Actual size: 15 by 10.5 centimetres.

Figure 3-1.

Best Available Copy

illustrated in Army Code of Conduct literature.<sup>51</sup>

Imagine a POW's shock when he is told to complete this official looking capture card, which an unscrupulous enemy might alter to obtain other items of information. The POW knows that he is "BOUND TO GIVE ONLY NAME, RANK, SERVICE NUMBER AND DATE OF BIRTH." If he completes the form, he probably will fill in only items 2, 3, 5, 7, and 8. The remaining items should be crossed out or deleted, if not completed. Yet, the Congress of the United States has approved and ratified the GPW. The Code of Conduct and UCMJ allow a POW to complete the capture card.<sup>52</sup>

The information on the capture card will be read by the enemy. It might aid the enemy in quickly obtaining a POW's personal history from third party elements. Maybe a facsimile of a POW's signature could be made from the capture card and affixed to propaganda statements and confessions or used to blackmail him in some other manner.

GPW Article 71 authorizes the sending of at least two letters and four post cards each month, excluding capture cards (Figure 3-2 Correspondence Card and Figure 3-3 Correspondence Letter).<sup>53</sup> The enemy may gain some useful interrogation data from these messages, even though the POW has censored his writing. The enemy will also censor POW correspondence.

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<sup>51</sup>U.S., Department of Defense, The U.S. Fighting Man's Code, DA Pam 360-522, p. 78.

<sup>52</sup>U.S., Department of the Army, Code of Conduct Training, AR 350-30, p. 6.

<sup>53</sup>U.S., Department of State, Geneva Conventions (of August 12, 1949), p. 111.

13

CORRESPONDENCE CARD

(see Article 71)

1. Front

<b>PRISONER OF WAR MAIL</b>		Postage free <input type="checkbox"/>
<b>POST CARD</b>		
		To .....
<b>Sender:</b>		
<b>Name and first names</b>	.....	
<b>Place and date of birth</b>	.....	<b>Place of Destination</b>
<b>Prisoner of War No.</b>	.....	.....
<b>Name of camp</b>	.....	<b>Street</b>
<b>Country where posted</b>	.....	<b>Country</b>
		<b>Province or Department</b>

2. Reverse side

<b>NAME OF CAMP</b>	<b>Date</b>
.....	.....
.....	.....
.....	.....
.....	.....
.....	.....
.....	.....
.....	.....
.....	.....
Write on the dotted lines only and as legibly as possible.	

Remarks.—This form should be made out in two or three languages, particularly in the prisoner's own language and in that of the Detaining Power. Actual size of form: 15 by 10 centimetres.

CORRESPONDENCE

LETTER

(see Article 71)

**PRISONER OF WAR MAIL**

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Postage free

To .....

.....

Place .....

Street .....

Country .....

Department or Province .....

.....

.....

---

Country where posted .....

Name of camp .....

Prisoner of War No. ....

Date and place of birth .....

Name and first names .....

Sender: .....

.....

Remarks.—This form should be made out in two or three languages, particularly in the prisoner's own language and in that of the Detaining Power. It should be folded along the dotted line, the tab being inserted in the slit (marked by a line of asterisks); it then has the appearance of an envelope. Overleaf, it is lined like the postcard above (*Answer IV Cr*); this space can contain about 250 words which the prisoner is free to write. Actual size of the folded form : 29 by 15 centimetres.

Best Available Copy

Figure 3-3.

POWs may not complete questionnaires, personal history statements, self-criticisms, or propaganda recordings.<sup>54</sup> Russia and most of the Communist Block countries signed the GPW with a reservation to Article 85, whereby POWs

. . . convicted under the law of the Detaining Power, in accordance with the principles of the Nuremberg trial, for war crimes and crimes against humanity . . . must be subject to the conditions obtaining in the country in question for those who undergo their punishment.<sup>55</sup>

POW statements and confessions, regardless of how obtained, might be used against a POW to convict him of a war crime or a crime against humanity. Such a "conviction" forfeits the benefits of POW status and protection under the GPW.<sup>56</sup>

The North Koreans attempted to convict captured U.S. pilots of germ warfare violations. The North Vietnamese attempted to do a similar thing with charges of air piracy. Even prisoners "charged with" or "thought" to have committed war crimes or crimes against humanity might be denied POW status by some Communist nations.<sup>57</sup>

GPW Article 85 retains the benefits of POW status for any POW ". . . prosecuted under the laws of the Detaining Power for acts committed prior to capture . . . , even if convicted . . . ." <sup>58</sup>

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<sup>54</sup>U.S., Department of the Army, Code of Conduct Training, AR 350-30, p. 6.

<sup>55</sup>U.S., Department of State, Geneva Conventions (of August 12, 1949), p. 253.

<sup>56</sup>U.S., Department of the Army, Code of Conduct Training, AR 350-30, p. 6.

<sup>57</sup>Ibid.

<sup>58</sup>U.S., Department of State, Geneva Conventions (of August 12, 1949), p. 118.



Nevertheless, General Dean was considered to be a war criminal in 1950 by his North Korean captors because of acts committed against the Korean people, i.e., against Communist sympathizers or ideologies, while he was military governor of South Korea in 1947-48.<sup>59</sup>

Article 119 allows the detaining nation to retain POWs serving criminal sentences until the completion of their punishment, even if a cease fire repatriation has occurred.<sup>60</sup>

#### THE CODE - A BEHAVIORAL GUIDE

While reviewing the articles and key phrases of the Code of Conduct, the company commander becomes entranced with the dogmatically repetitious language of "I am . . . ." and "I will . . . ." Should a POW commit suicide if he fails to abide by the code? The concept of a fall back or recuperation position in case of failure does not exist or is not readily apparent.

Most Americans are taught the Ten Commandments in a similar manner, but with one important exception. We are shown that our human frailty may cause us to deviate from these ten ideals. We accept human faults or weaknesses, are encouraged to improve, and are urged to show compassion and forgiveness. A form of confession or penance is available to atone for our weaknesses and we "bounce back" to our former selves as if there had been no deviation from the professed standards.

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<sup>59</sup>Dean, General Dean's Story, pp. 141-151.

<sup>60</sup>U.S.. Department of State, Geneva Conventions (of August 12, 1949), p. 130.

Department of Defense Directive 1300.7 stresses the inculcation of "a positive and unswerving acceptance of, belief in, and devotion to the spirit and letter of the Code of Conduct, and the recognition that the Code is a binding military obligation."<sup>61</sup> Yet, like the Ten Commandments, experience has shown that a POW may deviate from or be forced to do something against the Code of Conduct.

While a POW must bolster his resolve to resist by dwelling on the positive phrases of the Code of Conduct and the successful ordeals of former POWs, he may have to recall the nebulous phrase, "TO THE UTMOST OF MY ABILITY." POWs may have to adopt a "fall back" position and then "bounce back" to the professed ideals of the Code of Conduct. Most of the Korean War turncoats even adopted a modified "bounce back" position, as evidenced by the fact that only two of the 21 U.S. turncoats remained in Communist China as of 1966.<sup>62</sup>

The status of the Code of Conduct is another confusing issue. The Judge Advocate General of the Navy had to retract his statement that the USS Pueblo crew would be tried for violations of the Code of Conduct.<sup>63</sup> This confusion arises because the President, who is also Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces, issued the Code of Conduct in the form of an executive order to govern the conduct of all military personnel. What is the similarity of an executive order to a military order? What is the punishment for failure to comply? The answer is

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<sup>61</sup>U.S., Department of Defense, Training and Education Measures Necessary To Support The Code of Conduct, DoD Directive 1300.7 (Washington: Dept. of Defense, July 8, 1964 with Change #1, October 1, 1964), p. 2.

<sup>62</sup>U.S., Department of Defense, The U.S. Fighting Man's Code, DA Pam 360-522, p. 58.

<sup>63</sup>P.O.W. Panel, Part 1, Video Cassette Discussion.

that all POWs are held accountable for their actions under the rules of evidence of UCMJ. The Code of Conduct is a guide, a simple creed.<sup>64</sup> Very few POWs have been found guilty of violating the UCMJ if their actions were as a result of intense enemy coercion. Very few POWs have been able to withstand enemy interrogations by giving "ONLY NAME, RANK, SERVICE NUMBER AND DATE OF BIRTH."

#### PRACTICAL CODE OF CONDUCT TRAINING

The company commander completes his analysis of the Code of Conduct and determines that the code was written to stress, then the morale and reinforce the obligations of the POW. It is a mental weapon to steel the POW's will to resist, to solidify the strict military discipline that is often essential to individual and group survival in a POW camp. Articles III, IV, and V contain the heart of the Code of Conduct and govern the actions of the POW.

The company commander concludes that current U.S. Army Code of Conduct training lacks the philosophical and practical depth of knowledge required by combat ready soldiers. Current training appears to end with the reinforcement of rote memorization of the key phrases and articles of this code. Soldiers will at least know the words of the Code of Conduct, should they become POWs. But this type of training does not meet the needs of the battle-ready soldier. Today, U.S. Army divisions in Korea and Germany are poised for rapid commitment in combat. The 82d Airborne Division maintains a combat ready posture

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<sup>64</sup>U.S., Department of Defense, The U.S. Fighting Man's Code, DA Pam 360-522, p. 2.

for world-wide deployment within six to eighteen hours. The First Infantry Division (Mechanized) annually flies to Europe for Reforger exercises designed to rapidly augment European defenses. The remaining Army divisions have assigned contingency missions and serve as a sustaining rotational base for higher priority divisions.

Current Army Code of Conduct training does not stress the day-to-day problems and experiences of American POWs since 1950. These basic problems of POWs are avoided with statements suggesting that life as a POW will be difficult, but probably no more taxing than the rigors of the front line soldier. Soldiers are not trained to cope with or do not study the fundamental interpersonal living conditions which POWs have encountered and are likely to encounter in the future. It is only after capture that Army POWs seem to learn the existing maxims of former POWs.

Since the Korean War, POWs have become a political weapons of the enemy which is almost as important as battlefield victories. In the current era of stalemated wars negotiated at the peace table, the training of soldiers as potential POWs must be expanded. Code of Conduct indoctrination must include an indepth study of POW experiences. The personal experiences of former POWs are available and should be exploited. Let these former POWs tell their stories to today's soldiers before these experiences become covered with dust.

While Code of Conduct training should emphasize the extremes that some servicemen have endured to avoid the deplorable conditions of captivity, it must be recognized that not all servicemen have the incentive to avoid capture at all costs, as in the case of President Dwight Eisenhower's son John. When Army Major John Eisenhower was

ordered to Korea during the war, the President told him,

In time I could learn to bear [your death] if you were killed. . . . But for God's sake don't let them take you prisoner. If they held you, I don't think I could carry on with this heavy job I must now take.<sup>65</sup>

Due to circumstances, however, capture may be inevitable and successful escape may be impossible. Consequently, practical POW behavior and organizational training should supplement the idealized words of the Code of Conduct.

The next chapter will present the more mundane aspects of Korean War POW life and the survival problems associated with living under Communist indoctrination, propaganda, and behavior demands. An understanding of the behavior of Korean War POWs will enable the reader to transition into the development of the code in Chapter 5 and its subsequent application in Chapters 6 and 7. Chapter 8 will present some improved training recommendations to better prepare the soldier to live by the Code of Conduct, should he become a POW. The knowledge of Chapters 2 and 3 will aid the reader in evaluating how well current Code of Conduct training serves the needs of the POW.

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<sup>65</sup>"Missing In Action," U.S. News & World Report, 35:6 (August 7, 1957), 29.

## CHAPTER 4

THE KOREAN WAR: JUNE 25, 1950 - JULY 27, 1953

### POW OVERVIEW

The stalemated Korean War introduced the importance of American POWs as propaganda instruments, political pawns, and as a means of Oriental face-saving. Communism emerged as an organized, global threat. The United Nations evolved in part as a world propaganda forum. The heavy American military censorship of World War II decreased. The world seemed to shrink with the expanding technological capabilities of radio, television, data links, and the jet airplane.

The Korean War POWs were released under the pall of germ warfare accusations brainwashing, a breakdown in discipline, and the emergent turncoats. The military could not tolerate these acts and the American public did not understand them. Very few of these POWs were heroes. Of the 1,600,000 U.S. servicemen that served in Korea, 7,190 were classified as POWs. 2,730 U.S. POWs or 38% of the 7,190 died in North Korean POW camps. 4,428 Americans were recovered.<sup>1</sup> The original 23 turncoats became 21 when two of these POWs escaped from the Communists and their fellow turncoat collaborators and were repatriated.<sup>2</sup> In mid 1955, Communist China released 15 U.S. Airmen who were

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<sup>1</sup>The Report of the Secretary of Defense's Advisory Committee on Prisoners of War, POW: The Fight Continues After the Battle (Washington: Government Printing Office, August 1955), pp. 25, 79-82.

<sup>2</sup>"3 Ex-GI's Who Got 'Fed Up'," U.S. News & World Report, 39:1 (July 1, 1955), 24.

captured in North Korea during the war.<sup>3</sup> Appendix B contains more detailed statistics about the Korean War POWs.

The 7,190 Korean War POW count excludes at least 5,000 other MIAs who died in authenticated enemy atrocities or otherwise died or disappeared while missing (i.e., their bodies were recovered while they were classified as MIAs or their whereabouts is unknown and "presumptive findings of death were made under the Missing Persons Act").<sup>4</sup>

Of the 6,656 Army POWs, only 138 were recommended for valorous or meritorious awards for their conduct as POWs. A total of "55 individuals or their survivors...[received] two Legions of Merit, eighteen Bronze Stars, and thirty-five Army Commendation Ribbons with Metal Pendant."<sup>5</sup> On the other hand, the conduct of 425 Army POWs was closely examined. Two hundred and ten of these individuals had received their discharges and the Justice Department took no legal action against them. Of the remaining 215 POWs still on active duty, 47 of them had their cases approved for general court-martial. Only 12 cases were tried, resulting in 9 convictions and 3 acquittals. Two other repatriates (not part of the 47) had been court-martialed earlier. The remaining 35 cases were handled by administrative military boards which issued 26 honorable discharges and 9 less desirable discharges.<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>3</sup>"Americans The Reds Still Hold," U.S. News & World Report, 38:23 (June 10, 1955), 36.

<sup>4</sup>Albert D. Biderman, March to Calumny (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1963), pp. 94-100.

<sup>5</sup>Eugene Kinhead, In Every War But One (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1959), pp. 151-152.

<sup>6</sup>Kinhead, pp. 63-76.

Despite the ominous nature of these figures, Albert D. Biderman (Ph.D., Sociology), a noted authority on the behavior of World War II and Korean War POWs, concluded that "...American [POWs] in Korea behaved by and large as have others in history who have had similar kinds of demands placed upon them."<sup>7</sup>

Biderman graphically illustrated the death rates of U.S. Army POWs by Korean War period as follows:<sup>8</sup>

<u>PERIOD CAPTURED</u>	<u>EVENTS</u>	<u>U. S. ARMY POWs CAPTURED</u>	<u>DIED</u>
June - Oct. 1950	Delay to Pusan Inchon Landing U.N. Drive to Yalu River	1,037	575
Nov '50 - Feb '51	Chinese Offensive Communists Recapture Seoul	4,139	1,896
Mar - June 1951	U.N. Retakes Seoul Communist Counterattack	975	165
July '51 - Apr '62	Truce Talks Start Germ Warfare Charges	234	15
May '52 - Mar '53	More Truce Talks	130	9
Apr - Aug 1953	Little Switch POWs Armistice Signed Big Switch POWs	139	0
Capture Period Unknown		<u>6,656</u> <sup>2</sup>	<u>2,662</u> <sup>2</sup>

<sup>7</sup> Albert D. Biderman, March to Calumny (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1963), p. 271. During World War II, Biderman had daily contact with German POWs as an internment specialist. He later interviewed the survivors of German and Soviet camps as a member of the Allied psychological warfare headquarters and as a member of the intelligence organization of the occupation forces. From 1951 to 1961 he was an Air Force consultant and employee specializing in POW evaluations and reports. He also advised the 1955 Defense Advisory Committee on Prisoners of War that wrote the Code of Conduct. Biderman, pp. 273-277.

<sup>8</sup> Biderman, p. 111.



These figures show that most of the Army POWs became prisoners and died during the initial confusion of the first year of the Korean War. During the first year, the Communists almost captured all of South Korea, were then driven back to the northern border of North Korea on the Yalu River, and then launched a successful Chinese counterattack and recaptured Seoul, South Korea.<sup>9</sup>

Statistically speaking, it is possible to refute Biderman's POW behavior conclusion by citing the fact that a greater percentage of American POWs died in North Korean camps than in any other U.S. war since the Revolutionary War.<sup>10</sup> Therefore, something must have been wrong with the way POWs behaved in North Korea. 2,730 U.S. POWs or 38% of the 7,190 captive Americans died in North Korean camps.<sup>11</sup> Contrastingly, only 11% or 14,090 of the 129,701 U.S. POWs held by Axis nations in World War II died in captivity. For World War I, the figure was 3.6% or 147 of the 4,120 U. S. POWs held by Germany. During the Civil War, 14% of the North's POWs died in Southern captivity, to include 26% of the 49,485 Union POWs at Andersonville.<sup>12</sup> Eugene Kinkead mentions the Revolutionary War figure as being 33%.<sup>13</sup>

The World War II figure, however, does not present a complete representation of the facts. 10,031 U.S. POWs or 37% of the 26,943

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<sup>9</sup>Appendix C, Korean War Chronology, contains a more complete listing of major events of the Korean War.

<sup>10</sup>The Report of the Secretary of Defense's Advisory Committee on Prisoners of War, p. 25.

<sup>11</sup>Ibid., p. 79.

<sup>12</sup>"Armed Forces: A Line Must Be Drawn," Time, 66:9 (August 29, 1955), 16.

<sup>13</sup>Kinkead, p. 17.

Army and Air Force personnel captured by the Japanese died in captivity, while only 1,238 or 1% of the 96,321 Army and Air Force POWs held in the European and Mediterranean theaters died.<sup>14</sup> Biderman further states that it is believed that 60% of the American POWs in the Philippines in early World War II died. During their initial six weeks of internment at Camp O'Donnell in 1942, 1,492 or 68% of about 2,200 U.S. POWs died.<sup>15</sup>

The above statistics generally seem to support Biderman's conclusion that the behavior of the Korean War POWs was not unusual, if judged by captivity death rates, particularly the death rates in Japanese POW camps. The real meaning might be that Code of Conduct training with respect to Articles III, IV, and V should be reoriented to place greater emphasis on POW survival techniques. The whole POW problem might be considered similar to the sudden incarceration of a law-abiding American citizen into the worst United States civil prison for a period of years.

Biderman's conclusion about the behavior of Korean War POWs is further supported and quantified in the study analysis performed by Julius Segal (another advisor to the Code of Conduct Committee) under a HumRRRO contract with the Army. Segal classified 80% of the Army POWs as "Middle Men," "who seldom performed acts of resistance [and] seldom committed acts of participation."<sup>16</sup> The remaining POWs

<sup>14</sup>"Armed Forces: A Line Must Be Drawn," 16.

<sup>15</sup>Biderman, p. 102.

<sup>16</sup>Julius Segal, Factors Related to the Collaboration and Resistance Behavior of U.S. Army PW's in Korea, HumRRRO Technical Report 33 (Washington: George Washington University, June 1956), pp. 4, 9.

were categorized as 15% "Participant" progressive quislings and 5% "hard core" resister reactionaries.<sup>17</sup> Biderman intuitively supports Segal's estimate that 80% of the Army POWs "played it cool" by saying "the ordinary man, when in a large mass of men, does not rush forth to be either a spectacular hero or a notorious traitor."<sup>18</sup> Biderman also cites a number of psychologists who agreed with Edgar H. Schein that the POW "play it cool" syndrome was essentially an emotional withdrawal from "involvement with the captor....to survive and to be left alone as much as possible."<sup>19</sup> Kinkead categorized the "Middle Men" in stronger terms by saying they "chose...the path of least resistance....[they sadly lacked discipline] ...they cooperated [with their captor's less extreme demands] in a passive sort of way."<sup>20</sup>

Biderman's entire book, March to Calvary, is devoted to a didactic attack on Kinkead's one sided "strident evangelism" in In Every War But One.<sup>21</sup> Kinkead's philosophy [and that of many military personnel] is to indoctrinate American servicemen with the notable instances of successful resistance to the Communists, five examples of which are provided in Appendix D. While this approach does have merit, it is felt that most human beings and servicemen would not have responded as depicted in these five cases. Kinkead seems to overstate the

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<sup>17</sup>Segal, p. 4.

<sup>18</sup>Biderman, p. 43.

<sup>19</sup>Biderman, p. 45.

<sup>20</sup>Kinkead, p. 130.

<sup>21</sup>Biderman, p. 271.

resistance capabilities of POWs in a psychological warfare and propaganda environment.

Therefore, most of this chapter will give a more balanced and more detailed view of POW life as described by General William Dean and correspondent William White. The reader should attempt to personally involve himself in each of these brief case studies and decide how he would have reacted. These case studies present situations which may well occur in future conflicts. Every serviceman, from private to general, will have to make personal or policy decisions relative to the facts presented and then discipline himself or his fellow POWs to carry out the decisions.

With respect to the "Death Marches," the reader should evaluate his own chances of survival against the attention he would bring to himself if he attempted to organize a march unit and ensure the survival of everyone. To what degree would the captors allow POWs to organize a march unit? What would happen to the remaining POWs if some managed to escape?

With respect to malnutrition, vitamin deficiencies, and medical problems, the reader should ask himself how much knowledge he has in recognizing these illnesses and attempting primitive cures?

With respect to the "Man with Drooping Wrists," the British, the Tank Lieutenant, and the germ warfare confessors, the reader should ask himself at what intensity of punishment would he cooperate with his captors?

The Artilleryman, the Ranger, and the Turks represent POWs with an unusual amount of quick-wittedness, discipline, and physical and mental endurance. The reader should attempt to evaluate himself

against their exploits and leadership initiatives.

Major General William F. Dean was an unusually strong and well disciplined man, yet he attempted suicide and gave the enemy more than his NAME, RANK, SERVICE NUMBER, AND DATE OF BIRTH. Dean talked about the enemy's obsession with his signature and the fact that he wrote statements and letters which he immediately regretted. Of particular significance was his realization that he never told his 24th Infantry Division soldiers why they were fighting, an item that many of today's leaders may also overlook or assume away. Dean also explained how he kept himself physically and mentally alert. In effect, General Dean teaches the reader how to respond in some very common PCW situations.

The Turncoats refused to KEEP FAITH WITH [their] FELLOW PRISONERS, and decided that Communist China offered a better alternative to repatriation. Yet, most of them eventually returned to the United States. Their lesson is that life in an American prison or with the stigma of a dishonorable discharge is preferable to living under Communism. Therefore, all POWs should KEEP FAITH WITH [their] FELLOW PRISONERS and return home when repatriated, regardless of how cooperative they may have been with the enemy. It is also important for non-repatriated POWs to keep faith in America because the United States will never forget them. It will continuously seek their release.

The next section of this chapter contains a description of the initial confusion of the Korean War, a confusion which may well occur again during the initial stages of a mid-intensity war, while the remaining sections present the case studies. Because "knowledge is power," it is felt that an understanding of these cases will better

inform a potential POW of the problems that he may face. This knowledge should enable him to make better decisions in similar circumstances.

#### PIECEMEAL COMMITMENT AND CONFUSION

The post World War II occupation Army of Japan, which was committed precipitously without warning into the Korean War caldron, was not one of America's finer armies. General Dean's 24th Infantry Division was scattered all over southern Japan. It was manned at two-thirds strength (i.e., two battalions per infantry regiment and two batteries per artillery battalion versus the normal three), equipped initially with 2.6" bazookas and M24 light tanks, and composed of only 15% World War II veterans.<sup>22</sup> General Dean describes his division as "fat and happy in [its] occupation billets, complete with Japanese girl friends, plenty of beer, and servants to shine their boots."<sup>23</sup> The U. S. occupation troops in Korea had withdrawn to Japan by June of 1949.

The commander of the 500 U.S. advisors of the Korean Military Advisory Group (KMAC), Brigadier General Lynn Roberts, had completed his normal tour of duty and sailed from Korea on June 24, 1950. The KMAC chief of staff was in Japan when the North Koreans attacked at 0400 hours, June 25, 1950. Many KMAC members believed that the American evacuation order issued by the U.S. Embassy in Seoul included them. A number of these KMAC personnel immediately departed Korea for Japan.<sup>24</sup>

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<sup>22</sup>William F. Dean, as told to William L. Worden, General Dean's Story (New York: The Viking Press, 1954), pp. 13-14.

<sup>23</sup>Dean, p. 29.

<sup>24</sup>Dean, pp. 15-16.

General Dean's Task Force Smith (the first U.S. combat unit sent to Korea) consisted of 406 riflemen plus 4.2" mortars, 77 MM recoilless rifles, bazookas, and some artillerymer.<sup>25</sup> This Task Force arrived in Korea on July 1, 1950 and was given the general mission of going forward, engaging the enemy on sight, and stopping the North Koreans.<sup>26</sup> Task Force Smith was smashed by about 40 North Korean T34 medium tanks (Russian supplied) firing at point blank range. About half of this once front line force fought its way to the rear through encircling Communist forces. Artillery pieces had to be abandoned. Additional Task Force personnel continued to infiltrate through the North Koreans over the next few days. General Dean, as Commander of his own arriving 24th Infantry Division, was also appointed Commander of all U.S. Forces in Korea, to include KMAC.<sup>27</sup>

#### POW DEATH MARCHES

The early part of the Korean War and the harsh winter of 1950-51 was marked by a number of POW Death Marches. In one of these marches, 500 of the 700 POWs perished in knee-deep snow and polar winds before reaching their POW camp.<sup>28</sup>

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<sup>25</sup>Dean, p. 17.

<sup>26</sup>James F. Schnabel, Office of the Chief of Military History, U.S. Army, United States Army in the Korean War, ed. Maurice Matloff, Vol III, Policy and Direction: The First Year (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1972), pp. 80-82.

<sup>27</sup>Dean, pp. 16-23.

<sup>28</sup>The Report of the Secretary of Defense's Advisory Committee on Prisoners of War, p. 8.

Master Sergeant Robert Shaw was captured by responding to the deceitful pless for help of an already captured U.S. soldier. On Shaw's ensuing night road marches (which lasted 23 days), U.S. POWs with diarrhea sometimes could not keep up, fell out, and were shot or left to die in the cold.<sup>29</sup> Many of those left behind were apparently too weak to escape to U.N. lines. In another night road march, a POW tells of others getting diarrhea from eating dirty snow or drinking ditchwater. The digestive system was further aggravated by the sharp splinters from half-cooked corn. Oftentimes, those with diarrhea would conserve their strength to run to the front of the column, take care of their physical needs, and hope to join the end of the column.<sup>30</sup> Strict military discipline was not established and maintained as a means of coping with Communist march orders so that the sick and injured could accompany the column.

Private First Class Rogers Herndon had his hand amputated by a Communist doctor. On the fourth night of a nine day march, he was placed in a room with 17 other POWs, 15 of whom froze to death by morning. Starvation aided these deaths. Only 18 of the original 60 POWs completed the march.<sup>31</sup>

Corporal Vernon Warren walked 20 or 30 miles a night with frozen, frostbitten feet. Those with bad feet refused an offer by

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<sup>29</sup>"Real Story of Returned Prisoners," U.S. News & World Report, 34:22 (May 29, 1953), 54.

<sup>30</sup>William L. White, The Captives of Korea, An Unofficial White Paper (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1957), p. 47.

<sup>31</sup>"Real Story of Returned Prisoners," 57.



their captors to remain behind "because the fellows knew that if anybody was left behind, they'd never catch up with the group again...."<sup>32</sup> A captured American Doctor named Anderson amputated toes and a foot without anesthesia using a butcher knife and scissors. Warren's hands froze in his POW camp when he was forced to hold an icy board over his head.<sup>33</sup>

White's Artillery Lieutenant told of his unit being overrun at night. Before dawn, the remnants of this U.S. unit joined the rear ranks of a well disciplined outfit dressed in American helmets, packs, and fatigues. This new outfit was a Chinese unit trained and equipped by American General "Vinegar" Joe Stilwell in World War II. The lieutenant temporarily escaped amidst wounding grenade fragments into a creek bed, where he had a showdown with an unarmed Chinese officer. The Artilleryman could not force his finger to squeeze his caliber 45 pistol trigger. The area was swarming with Chinese and one shot would have brought 100 other Chinese.<sup>34</sup>

Shortly thereafter, the captured lieutenant watched a North Korean officer allow captured South Korean prisoners to "volunteer" for the North Korean Army. The alternative was to receive a brutally effective face smashing, which the North Koreans obliging administered to a young South Korean Army nurse with the butt end of a tommy gun.<sup>35</sup>

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<sup>32</sup>Ibid., 58.

<sup>33</sup>Ibid., 58-61.

<sup>34</sup>White, pp. 39-41.

<sup>35</sup>White, pp. 42-43.

At a POW collection point in 20 degree below zero weather, the Artillerymen paced up and down all night to keep his circulation going, while another POW with wet, sweaty clothes slept on moist hay and froze to death. At dawn, the POWs decided that the sick should have first priority with their meager rations. A healthy, insubordinate soldier disagreed with this policy and the lieutenant knocked him sprawling to the ground.<sup>36</sup>

The Artillery Lieutenant's ensuing 300 mile night road march was a nightmare. American officers led the column and could not mingle with the enlisted personnel. Some POWs wanted to carry along with them an officer with a leg wound, while others feared that the Chinese would kill him if he slowed the march pace. The Chinese had said that all wounded would be left behind. Occasionally, villagers would be aroused from their homes and forced to watch the passing Americans. Children spit and threw stones at the POWs. The POWs received two baseball sized globs of splintery, boiled or unboiled, cracked corn (pig-mash) per day, one at dusk before marching and the other at dawn after their 40 mile marches. Water was distributed once a day, at dawn. The frequent absence of salt in this 800 calorie diet may have caused some POWs to become temporarily insane. Unless these shouting and screaming soldiers could be quieted, they were bashed with a rifle butt and left on the road. Vitamin deficiencies developed into night blindness, and one such afflicted soldier wandered off the edge of a bridge without siderails and fell 70 feet to his

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<sup>36</sup>White, pp. 43-44.

death. Thereafter, soldiers with night blindness hung onto the person in front of them.<sup>37</sup>

The senior American, a lieutenant colonel who later died in a POW camp, threatened to court-martial the Artillery Lieutenant and three others if they attempted to escape from the march column. One of the daytime resting villages was also an ammunition dump for camouflaged Russian trucks. It was strafed by F-80's, resulting in a number of dead and wounded POWs. Towards the end of this march, the Chinese allowed the POWs to carry their wounded with them, but discipline had broken down and the enlisted personnel would not obey American officer commands to carry improvised stretchers. The POWs had lost from 60 to 90 pounds each. Only 120 of the original 320 POWs reached the Yalu River POW camps. Only four of the original 17 officers survived captivity. At the Bean Camp collecting point, 150 POWs were buried during a six week period. In another march, 450 of the 650 POWs perished. Only nine of these 650 POWs survived the harsh winter and spring famine and eventually returned to America. Some friction also developed among the various POW nationalities: French, British, American, et cetera.<sup>38</sup>

By the time he was hospitalized, the wounded Artillery Lieutenant had wasted away from 150 to 90 pounds and he had developed diarrhea, pneumonia, and beriberi. He noted that the daily hospital death rate was 10% initially. The dead were often left in their own defecation until more space was needed. A 65 pound American major, who had

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<sup>37</sup>White, pp. 45-48.

<sup>38</sup>White, pp. 49-63.

denounced a statement by Chou En-lai and was consequently beaten, tortured, and hung by his hands, died 48 hours after he was hospitalized. The Artilleryman estimated that 500 POWs died in the hospital during his four-month stay.<sup>39</sup>

#### FOOD AND MEDICINE

The POW ration often consisted of insufficiently boiled "soya bean, whole-kernel corn, millet and kaoliang (unsweet sorghum used in America to feed cattle)."<sup>40</sup> The half cooked soya beans, which required a minimum of 2 1/2 hours cooking (a fact the POWs may not have known), produced diarrhea and the hard, splintered, sharp edges of these beans irritated the intestines. The frequent refusal of POWs to eat these soya beans aggravated the effects of an already insufficient diet.<sup>41</sup>

POW: The Fight Continues After the Battle describes the POWs' scanty rations as consisting of "a basic diet of rice occasionally leavened with some foul kind of soup."<sup>42</sup> The Communists claimed that this was the same ration issued to the camp guards, but the guards were accustomed to a rice diet, and the Chinese rations were supplemented with canned beef or pork. Some North Korean camp doctors received fish at least two times a week, a valuable source of protein, vitamins, and minerals. Because of these conditions, perhaps it is understandable how a boiled egg or a covert good meal from the Chinese mess provided

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<sup>39</sup>White, pp. 117-119.

<sup>40</sup>White, p. 55.

<sup>41</sup>White, pp. 76-77.

<sup>42</sup>The Report of the Secretary of Defense's Advisory Committee on Prisoners of War, pp. 8-9.

the incentive for POW collaboration. The collaborators seemed to be much more healthy in appearance than the other POWs. Other rewards for "cooperative conduct" included candy, tobacco, and mail.<sup>43</sup>

Starvation and high death rates may have been part of the Communist plan to bring about moral degeneration as a prelude to concentrated indoctrination and propaganda exploitation. The lack of unified, unbreakable discipline may have led individual POWs to conclude that they must passively cooperate with their captors if they ever expected to return to the United States and their families.<sup>44</sup>

Other POWs reacted differently to the poor food and harsh environmental and social conditions. They withdrew into themselves and developed the deadly disease of "give-up-itis." Major (doctor) Clarence L. Anderson, a POW himself, described the progress of this disease as being very easy to monitor, if recognized.

The sufferer first became despondent; then he lay down or covered his head with a blanket [often in the fetal position]; then he wanted ice water to drink with his food; next no food, only water; and eventually, if he was not got to and helped, death would come.... If you didn't get to him within three weeks, he would be gone. However, [if gotten to] he could usually be saved.... One of the best ways to get a man on his feet initially was to make him so mad by goading, prodding or blows that he tried to get up and beat you. If you could manage this, the man invariably got well.<sup>45</sup>

According to Doctor Anderson, this disease could also be treated by forced feeding, dragging a man upright, forcing movement of his limbs, choking him till he would eat, and refeeding him his own spitout food.

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<sup>43</sup>White, pp. 55, 76, 104.

<sup>44</sup>White, p. 105.

<sup>45</sup>Kinkead, pp. 148-149.

A man could recover in about ten days, but he required careful watching to prevent regression.<sup>46</sup> Similar symptoms and treatments were observed by American POWs in Japanese camps during World War II.<sup>47</sup>

Sometimes, kind words, sympathy, and talk about home life would bring a man out of his "give-up-itis" shell, while shock treatment was needed at other times. A Chief Petty Officer in Korea noticed a man who would not eat and said,

Tell that \_\_\_\_\_ to go out and dig his own grave before he gets too weak to do it. Otherwise, some of the rest of us will have to do it for him, and we've got more important things to do.<sup>48</sup>

The man then began to eat again and he came out of his shell.

Towards the spring of 1951, the health and diet of the POWs improved somewhat with the addition of some vegetables, a little wheat flour, some pork liver and a tablespoon of sugar per man per week. American POWs also began copying the Turks' method of making weed tea out of dandelions, lamb's quarters, and sheep sorrel. This weed tea provided some of the deficient vitamins and minerals which the POWs desperately needed. The American POWs finally began to understand why the Turkish POWs had scraped away snow during the winter months to search for unfrozen greens, bulbs, and tender bark. The Turks also knew how to cook the soya bean, which may have had a counterpart in their native staple diet in Anatolia, Turkey.<sup>49</sup>

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<sup>46</sup>Ibid.

<sup>47</sup>J. E. Nardini, "Survival Factors in American Prisoners of War of the Japanese," American Journal of Psychiatry, 109 (1952), 242.

<sup>48</sup>U.S., Department of Defense, The U.S. Fighting Man's Code, DA Pam 360-522 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1968), p. 74.

<sup>49</sup>White, pp. 93-95.

Vitamin and mineral deficiencies caused skin eruptions, pellagra, beriberi, edema, elephantiasis of the scrotum, intestinal disturbances, nervous disorders, night blindness, and memory losses.<sup>50</sup> Similar diseases had occurred among the nutritionally deprived POWs on the bounteous island of Java in World War II, such as beriberi, pellagra, and malnutritional neuritis. This neuritis caused so much burning pain in a POW's nerves that he could not sleep at night. It sometimes caused blindness. The POWs called a form of the disease "burning feet," because they often kept their feet in cold water all night to alleviate the pain.<sup>51</sup>

Charcoal was used to treat diarrhea. Almost all POWs became infested with intestinal worms. A number of cases of hepatitis occurred in the summer of 1951 following typhus and smallpox immunisations. The same needle was used for inoculating groups of five men and the same syringe was never replaced. Dental problems were a common occurrence, partly due to small stones in the food grains and cereals. These stones broke teeth and loosened fillings.<sup>52</sup>

#### THE MAN WITH DROOPING WRISTS

White's once vigorous junior officer, "The Man with the Drooping Wrists," was betrayed by fellow officers for developing an escape plan. The Communists wired his wrists behind his back and trussed him over a beam, with his feet just touching the ground. His tortured confession

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<sup>50</sup>White, p. 109.

<sup>51</sup>Laurens van der Post, The Night of the New Moon (London: The Hogarth Press, 1970), pp. 38-39, 104.

<sup>52</sup>Biderman, pp. 295-297.

was extracted at the expense of his useless fingers. He could only clasp things between his palms. Outwardly, Drooping Wrists became a progressive collaborator. Privately, he told his friends, "I am going along with this business because I've got to. They've got me hooked. Don't say anything in front of me you don't want them to know."<sup>53</sup> Drooping Wrists "knew just what he had to do and why he had to do it," but he was not brainwashed.<sup>54</sup>

#### THE BRITISH

British prisoners tell of being marched onto the frozen Yalu River in their bare feet. Their feet were then coated with water and they reflected upon their "crimes" for hours at a time. The handcuffs on another British prisoner were frequently tightened over an eight month period. Reactionaries in a jail near Camp 5 had to use their teeth to hold a long, pencil-like, wooden or metal stick which protruded through a door. Without warning, the guards would occasionally drive the stick into a POW's mouth, knocking out teeth, splitting cheeks, and forcing a POW to gag as the stick struck the back of the mouth. Another British POW had to kneel on two small, jagged rocks while holding a third rock over his head. He could not walk for days after this type of treatment.<sup>55</sup>

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<sup>53</sup>White, pp. 107-108.

<sup>54</sup>White, p. 108.

<sup>55</sup>"How British Soldiers Were Tortured by Red Chinese," U.S. News & World Report (extracts from the official British Ministry of Defense report "Treatment of British Prisoners of War in Korea"), 39:8 (August 19, 1955), 99.



## THE RANGER

White's Ranger was using a B-26 to reconnoiter behind-the-lines parachute drop sites for infiltrators, when the plane was shot down. The quick thinking Ranger then assumed a new identity and became an old friend of the dead pilot. He was now a joy-riding soldier enjoying an unfortunate plane ride instead of an expert in guerrilla drop activities, an item of keen interest to the enemy.<sup>56</sup> The Communists later accused him of being an espionage agent and a war criminal. He was placed in solitary confinement, given almost no water, and initially fed rice or kaoliang at three day intervals. At night, the temperatures dropped to 35 degrees below zero. By pretending that he would talk, he received four needed respites of food and warmth. He gave no information and resumed his solitary confinement after each interrogation. His weight dropped from 189 to 110 pounds, yet he was repatriated with a personal sense of dignity.<sup>57</sup> Within his POW camp, the Ranger initiated a number of morale building programs and may have been responsible for the repatriation of the isolated "Lame Captain," who mysteriously appeared among the exchanged POWs as if he had been resurrected.<sup>58</sup>

## THE TANK LIEUTENANT

White's concussion injured Tank Lieutenant was shown a paper written by his captured battalion commander which told the enemy everything they wanted to know about U.S. tanks. This paper also provided

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<sup>56</sup>White, pp. 130-134.

<sup>57</sup>White, pp. 199-205.

<sup>58</sup>White, pp. 220-227, 252-255.

personality sketches and descriptions of the decisionmaking processes used by many important Pentagon officers who might be sent to Korea. When questioned on the weights and ranges of tank ammunition, the lieutenant transposed the figures. This tactic agitated the interrogator, who showed the lieutenant an American manual with the correct answers. Thereafter, the Tank Lieutenant had the top of a finger and fingernail removed by a pair of pliers and he was thrown down a flight of stairs. He finally wrote tank technical characteristics which duplicated what he remembered from the manual. This procedure of writing field manual answers from memory may be of more importance to the enemy than the manual itself, because people tend to respond with replies that specify how they actually accomplish a task as opposed to what the manual says. The Tank Lieutenant then convinced his interrogators that he knew nothing else. One interrogator was a schizophrenic who could be charming and big brotherly or completely irrational and beserkish. This interrogator had witnessed a 2,000 pound Air Force bomb destroy a house which contained his sister.<sup>59</sup>

The Tanker also told of three Americans who escaped from Pak's Palace with the aid of Captain Gibbons of the Royal Artillery, who diverted the attention of a guard. When the captain refused to divulge the escape route of the three POWs (he may not have known the route), bamboo splinters were driven under his fingernails, his fingers were wired and twisted, and his genitals were squeezed and twisted. The captain never revealed the escape route. At least one of the three

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<sup>59</sup>White, pp. 63-69.

escapees was recaptured and beaten so badly that he died just after reaching a POW camp.<sup>60</sup>

While it may be true that no American successfully escaped from a permanent North Korean POW camp, Americans held in lesser facilities did successfully evade or escape the enemy. USAF Captain Ward Miller escaped from an enemy hospital area, while USAF First Lieutenant Melvin J. Shaddock escaped from the enemy after 3½ days of captivity. Biderman says that a large number of the 647 U.S. soldiers "returned to military control" were escapees. Unsuccessful escapes by four percent of the Army repatriates and 15% of the Air Force returnees were corroborated during and after the prisoner exchanges.<sup>61</sup>

#### THE TURKS

In contrast to the American POWs, whose leadership was often segregated into officer, senior noncommissioned officer, corporal, private, and resister or collaborator compounds, the record of the Turks is astonishing. None of the 229 captured Turkish soldiers died in captivity. Their chain of command remained unbroken. Strict military discipline was a guiding principle from the time of capture to the time of release. Fellow Turks nursed sick Turks back to health. Two healthy Turks accompanied each Turk ordered to the hospital and remained with him until he was released. Food and clothing were shared equally by all ranks. If the Communists cooked for the camp, two Turks brought the food to their group. There was no "hogging, no rule of

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<sup>60</sup>White, pp. 70, 118.

<sup>61</sup>Biderman, pp. 88-89.

"dog eat dog." Food was divided equally to the last morsel. The Chinese camp commander was told that the senior Turk was in charge of the Turkish element. All orders for Turks were to be given only to the senior Turk, who would have his soldiers execute the orders as appropriate. If only two privates were left, the senior private would be in charge. Removal of the senior Turk meant that the next Turk (not the Chinese Camp Commander) would be in charge. The Chinese could kill Turks, but they could not make the Turks do things that the Turks refused to do. All Turks knew that discipline was their salvation. Refusal of a Turk to obey an order from a chain-of-command Turkish superior meant a literal "teeth-knocking-in" session by the nearest Turk. Superiors were to be obeyed. During the repatriation process, a Turk always responded that his unit was "Third Company, First Turkish Regiment, Turkish Volunteer Brigade" or some other similar designation. All too often, American POWs responded with the company or platoon of the prison camp number to which they were assigned.<sup>62</sup>

White places the sharp behavior contrast between the Americans and Turks (or other allies) in a better perspective by saying that the other Allied nations sent far fewer troops to Korea than the United States. These other soldiers tended to be members of elite, highly trained units. They had trained and worked with each other prior to combat and were often mature veterans of World War II. About half of the American POWs were 17 to 21 year old draftees with three months of

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<sup>62</sup>Kinhead, pp. 164-168.

basic training. They became faceless unit replacements.<sup>63</sup>

The Turks were aided further by a language barrier and their country's Russian border. The Chinese had no Turkish interrogators. The one person who could interpret for the Chinese was a Greek, a traditional enemy of the Turk. The Turks knew about communism and its evils from their native land.<sup>64</sup>

Bideman degrades the legend of Turkish invincibility by noting that half of the Turks were captured in April 1951, when POW treatment began to improve. The Turks did carry banners in the "POW Olympics," a Communist propaganda spectacle; a Turk was a member of the Camp 5 "Peace Committee;" and one Turk refused repatriation, then changed his mind.<sup>65</sup>

#### MAJOR GENERAL WILLIAM F. DEAN

U.S. Army Major General William F. Dean was the only POW who spent his entire captivity with the North Koreans. The North Koreans literally hid him from the Chinese, who supervised all other POWs. Dean was treated relatively well and he was never tortured. In his first interrogation following his August 25, 1950 capture (the date of his wedding anniversary), he voluntarily wrote that his orders were "To assist the Republic of Korea in repelling the aggressors from the North."<sup>66</sup> He thought that this answer would succeed in his desire to make the North Koreans mad. He was frequently asked where Syngman Rhee, the

<sup>63</sup>White, p. 84.

<sup>64</sup>White, p. 24.

<sup>65</sup>Bideman, pp. 152-163.

<sup>66</sup>Dean, p. 20.

president of South Korea, was. In an early press conference with North Korean reporters, he freely answered all of the harmless questions and was told that Syngman Rhee had been taken to Japan. An edited version of this press conference was published by North Korean papers. Russia's Tass later mentioned Dean's capture, but this initial information that he was alive did not reach his family.<sup>67</sup>

In further interrogations on important military subjects, Dean made up baldfaced lies, developed a bad memory, or simply refused to answer. He was asked about the war plan of South Korea, how and why he had been captured, and what was the strength of the 24th Infantry Division.<sup>68</sup> He responded that the 24th Infantry Div. had a strength of 8,000. He refuted an American manual of unit strengths by saying, "that table is for war. We didn't expect a war, so we came under-strength....The Inmum Gun [North Korean Army] has not done as well as you think...."<sup>69</sup> When asked "Did you personally explain to your men why they are fighting? Do your officers and men know why they are fighting?", Dean had to "lie like a trooper."<sup>70</sup> He answered "Of course I did," but privately resolved "never to let that explanation detail slide again, no matter how tough the situation or how little time I had. That question really hurt me...."<sup>71</sup>

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<sup>67</sup>Dean, pp. 90-97.

<sup>68</sup>Dean, pp. 107-113.

<sup>69</sup>Dean, p. 113.

<sup>70</sup>Dean, pp. 113-114.

<sup>71</sup>Dean, p. 114.

The interrogation procedures always seemed to contain a mixture of innocuous questions interspersed with more important ones.<sup>72</sup> On one occasion, Dean received an indirect compliment from his interrogators when they told him that he "never violated Korean womanhood... never had a concubine" while he was the Military Governor of South Korea in 1947-48.<sup>73</sup> But, he was still a thief and a murderer, a war criminal. This example illustrates the thoroughness, the depth, and the length of time over which the North Korean intelligence system had been gathering its detailed information.

Some of the interrogations were long political harangues, complicated statements which required a long time for the interrogator to compose. These statements ended with the query, "What is your conclusion?"<sup>74</sup> A four word reply by Dean, "I have no conclusion," would enrage the interrogator and deflate his ego.<sup>75</sup>

The interrogators were obsessed with a need for Dean's signature. If he would not sign something, then they wanted a statement saying why he refused to sign. At one point, Dean wrote the following statement:

Fortunately, I do not know the information you seek. But even if I did, I would not give it to you, because by so doing I would be a traitor to my country. So help me God. William F. Dean.<sup>76</sup>

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<sup>72</sup>Ibid.

<sup>73</sup>Dean, p. 150.

<sup>74</sup>Dean, p. 151.

<sup>75</sup>Ibid.

<sup>76</sup>Dean, p. 135.

It was almost as if an interrogator needed proof for a superior of a session with Dean.<sup>77</sup> As a personal favor for one of the kinder interrogators who was about to depart, Dean wrote two harmless notes. The first note told of Dean's industrial accomplishments in helping to rebuild South Korea while he was governor. The second note described President Rhee as a devoted patriot working in the best interests of his country.<sup>78</sup>

He wrote a five sentence letter to Lieutenant General Walton Walker (Eighth Army Commander). In part, this letter said:

... I've been well treated but I'm anything but happy at being a prisoner of war. I urge that you impress upon the Air the necessity to confine our attacks to military targets.  
William F. Dean.<sup>79</sup>

He hoped that Walker would understand his desire for "more and better bombing, not less of it."<sup>80</sup> Dean was concerned about the wasted bombing efforts which he observed; but upon reflection, he keenly regretted having written this letter and attributed it to a lapse in judgment which occasionally affects most POWs.<sup>81</sup>

On another occasion, when he was feeling very cagey, cute, and quite clever, Dean wrote a statement (couched in "meaningless words to confuse the Communists") that said the United Nations should cross the 38th parallel into North Korea. His interrogator was elated until

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<sup>77</sup>Dean, p. 103.

<sup>78</sup>Dean, pp. 162-164.

<sup>79</sup>Dean, p. 131.

<sup>80</sup>Ibid.

<sup>81</sup>Dean, pp. 129-131.



the real meaning of the statement was recognized by someone with an excellent knowledge of English.<sup>82</sup>

Another interrogator trick was to increase or distort Dean's mental apprehensiveness, his hopelessness, by saying, "You know that you're dead? Your own people think you're dead, so we can do anything to you that we want to do.... Do you want to write a last message?"<sup>83</sup> Dean did write a ten line last letter to his family describing his evasion and overpowering capture. He told his pregnant daughter to make her mother a grandmother, his son that "integrity is the most important thing of all," and expressed his love of his wife.<sup>84</sup> The next day, Dean attempted suicide, so that the enemy would be unable to torture any information from him.

Dean's frequent medical examinations always included a curious chest thumping, perhaps as a check for tuberculosis, which was a common North Korean ailment. For 18 months he was forbidden to stand up or to exercise by walking for fear that people would see a tall American.<sup>85</sup> The leg muscles of this ardent walker atrophied and escape became impossible. Eventually, he was allowed to walk for ten minutes a day on a four step diagonal in his room and once he succeeded in walking 2,500 yards during his brief walking period. He learned to

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<sup>82</sup>Dean, pp. 132-133.

<sup>83</sup>Dean, pp. 155-156.

<sup>84</sup>Dean, p. 156.

<sup>85</sup>Dean, pp. 161-170.

do 20 or 25 different calisthenics while the guards thought he was sleeping.<sup>86</sup>

To combat boredom, General Dean killed 40,671 flies over a three year period. He sometimes obtained a first hit-kill probability of .850, in a similar manner to baseball hitting averages. His daily hygiene included a considerable amount of time in picking lice off his winter clothes. He learned the game of chong-gun (similar to chess) and played it with his guards. He spent days in planning his homecoming meal and calculated algebraic problems and square root sequences in his head. He played word games by making up all the words he could think of from the letters of such cities as Sacramento, San Francisco, et cetera.<sup>87</sup>

Dean rationalized that many of his bluffs with his captors attained his objectives at that particular time. As the Allies advanced in late 1950, he was transported across the Yalu and spent about a week in Manchuria, China.<sup>88</sup>

On October 29, 1951, he was moved to an isolated house built especially for him, the cleanest building he had seen in North Korea. Nevertheless, he still had frequent battles with rats that fell from their tunnel homes in the sod roof. He was now allowed 45 minutes of daily sunbaths. On December 19, 1951, he unexpectedly was required to write the first letter that his wife would receive from him. He also wrote to his daughter. These letters were given to United Nations

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<sup>86</sup>Dean, p. 209.

<sup>87</sup>Dean, pp. 4, 191-217.

<sup>88</sup>Dean, p. 186.

representatives on 20 or 21 December as the first letters in a POW mail exchange. The Communists published the full text of Dean's letters before his family received the originals. On January 2, 1952, he received three telegram replies from his mother, wife, and daughter. These replies were forwarded by United Nations correspondents to Communist functionaries at the Korean truce talks.<sup>89</sup>

Australian correspondent Wilfred Burchett (of the French left-wing newspapers Ce Soir and later L'Humanite) initially visited Dean on the night of December 21, 1951, along with a group of camera carrying oriental correspondents. Burchett briefed Dean on the events of the past 18 months and wrote a story about Dean's evasions and capture. Pictures were taken of Dean and Burchett and of Dean doing his calisthenics. Burchett also inquired about Dean's walking privileges, gave Dean a book of Selected Short Stories by Pastofsky, provided some news about Dean's family, and promised to write Mrs. Dean a letter (which reached her on December 23, her birthday).<sup>90</sup>

As a result of Burchett's extensive interview and picture taking session (which lasted most of the night), Dean was treated as a human being for the remainder of his captivity. His food improved, he was allowed to have writing materials, and he began to receive letters. His calisthenic time increased and he began to walk the screened 12 yard hillside path between his house and the latrine as much as 100 round trips daily. Eventually, he would walk this path three miles a day. Burchett visited Dean on a couple of other occasions.

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<sup>89</sup>Dean, pp. 231-250.

<sup>90</sup>Dean, pp. 227-245.

Dean's book sincerely devotes a 25 page chapter to this Communist correspondent entitled "My Friend Wilfred Burchett."<sup>91</sup>

Dean summarizes the remainder of his captivity by saying that he received 318 letters (family, relatives of POWs from his division, the press) and two magazines. Only 15% of his letters to his family were received. His family received no letters between February and October 1952 and he received no letters between December 27, 1952 and May 10, 1953. British correspondent Alan Winnington also paid Dean a visit. During his captivity, Dean suffered from eye and ear diseases, deteriorating teeth, malaria, and night blindness. He shared his special food treats with his guards, who had earlier shared their food with him. It is also interesting to note that the immediate family members of some of his guards and interpreters were killed in bombing raids while they were holding him captive.<sup>92</sup>

#### THE HANLEY REPORT

On November 14, 1951, the Eighth Army's Judge Advocate General, Colonel James M. Hanley, made an "unauthorized" release of a report on Communist war crimes. This report blamed the Chinese for the deaths of 2,513 U.S. POWs since November 1, 1950.<sup>93</sup>

POW atrocities in Korea were numerous during the first year of this war. Recall the Death Marches. Additionally, 34 members of a 5th Cavalry mortar platoon were shot with their hands tied behind their

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<sup>91</sup>Dean, pp. 242-250.

<sup>92</sup>Dean, pp. 251-296.

<sup>93</sup>White, p. 143.

backs.<sup>94</sup> A Chinese regimental commander ordered 200 U.S. Marines lined up and shot. The bodies of 365 U.S. servicemen were recovered with bullets in the back of their heads, their hands tied behind their backs.<sup>95</sup> The lone survivor of 60 GI's tells of his group being thrown in a ditch, riddled with bullets, and buried alive. He was rescued by South Koreans after having been tied to a dead man for 60 hours.<sup>96</sup> In the Suchon Tunnel Massacre, 138 U.S. servicemen were shot in cold blood.<sup>97</sup> Ten 1st Division Marines, captured near Nakchon Dong on January 19, 1951, were used for bayonet practice.<sup>98</sup>

Colonel Hanley was almost court-martialed. It was feared that this sensational news might inflame the American public and block peace negotiations. It made the Chinese furious, but it did cause them to make an intense effort to account for all American POWs killed in air attacks or who had died before reaching POW camps. The report forced the Chinese to release a propaganda statement signed by 1,362 American and British POWs attesting to their good treatment. This statement was the POWs only way of letting the outside world know that they were alive. On December 18, 1951, the Chinese Peace Committee announced

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<sup>94</sup>"News in Pictures: The Record: Red Atrocities in Korea," Time, 62:19 (November 9, 1953), pp. 24-25.

<sup>95</sup>"Atrocities In Korea - How Bad," U.S. News & World Report, 34:18 (May 1, 1953), 16.

<sup>96</sup>"Patriot's Tears," Newsweek, 42:24 (December 14, 1953), 24.

<sup>97</sup>"U.S. Details of Red Atrocities, Tosses Issue into U.N. Lap," Newsweek, 42:9 (November 9, 1953), 36-38.

<sup>98</sup>"Armed Forces: Barbarity," Time, 62:19 (November 9, 1953), 23.

over Radio Peiping the names of 3,198 American POWs, along with the fact that 571 Americans had died in captivity. The Hanley Report goaded the Chinese into reducing or eliminating POW deaths.<sup>99</sup>

The Hanley Report caused some problems for White's Artillerymen. The Communists forced the POWs to complete a questionnaire which refuted American charges of mistreatment. The Artillerymen told the truth and was later sentenced by a Chinese People's Court to ten months of isolation in jail. He was accused of giving "untruthful [as far as the Chinese were concerned] answers to the Hanley Report questionnaire," stealing the camp assembly bell, and doing other things.<sup>100</sup> An American lieutenant, "The Kid," falsely testified that the Artillerymen stole the bell. Both of these officers ended up in the same jail cell and were forced to sleep together in a cocoon arrangement to conserve body heat. Yet, the Artilleryman's hatred of The Kid's false testimony was so intense that he would not speak to The Kid. This self-imposed communication ban was broken when the other POWs played Santa Claus to these two on Christmas Eve, 1952. The Artilleryman thereafter rationalized that he could forget The Kid's testimony, even if he could not forgive it.<sup>101</sup>

#### BACTERIOLOGICAL AND GERM WARFARE CHARGES

The bacteriological and germ warfare charges of the Korean War were unbelievable hoaxes to most Americans and Western Europeans, but

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<sup>99</sup>White, pp. 143-146.

<sup>100</sup>White, p. 209.

<sup>101</sup>White, pp. 206-223.

their propaganda value in the Communist and neutralist third world presses was uncalculable. American Air Force, Navy and Marine pilots were coerced or tortured into making false confessions which were publicized world-wide and presented to the United Nations. On March 11, 1952, Secretary of State Dean Acheson issued a categorical denial of American use of these substances.<sup>102</sup> Yet, chemical agents were used in the trenches of World War I. In December 1949, a Soviet military tribunal at Khabarovsk, Siberia, charged 12 Japanese with "preparing and employing the bacteriological weapon [in World War II]."<sup>103</sup> Similar charges could be revived in future wars. In the 1960's and 1970's, sheep mysteriously died near Dugway Proving Grounds, Utah; chemical defoliants and tear gas were used routinely in Vietnam;<sup>104</sup> and Army helicopters and fixed wing aircraft were equipped to disperse riot control agents and propaganda leaflets. The Korean War "germ bombs" were actually the remains of containers used to drop leaflets.<sup>105</sup> As a minimum, Army aviators and artillerymen need to know the preposterous background behind these charges because they have the theoretical capability of delivering germ and chemical agents. Other Army personnel should be instructed in the potential political consequences of an obviously false confession.

The logical reasons behind the bacteriological and germ warfare campaign are numerous. White claims that the high Japanese health

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<sup>102</sup>White, p. 150.

<sup>103</sup>John J. Driscoll (Colonel), "It Could Have Been You," Air Force Magazine, 35:11 (November, 1952), 24.

<sup>104</sup>"U.S. Admits to Using Tear Gas in South Vietnam Routinely," The New York Times, December 6, 1969, p. 3, Col. 1.

<sup>105</sup>Driscoll, 24.

standards during Korea's World War II occupation had eliminated flea and lice borne typhus in North Korea. However, typhus (different from milk or water borne typhoid fever bacillus) remained endemic in neighboring Manchuria from whence the Chinese "volunteers" emerged in the fall of 1950. Naturally, the invading Chinese allies could not be blamed for the epidemics that occurred in North Korea when flea and lice carrying rats were driven indoors by the frost and cold.<sup>106</sup> The North Koreans could not blame themselves for their own inadequate health services which caused their own people to suffer. General Dean tells of a massive four-shot inoculation program in February 1952 for every North Korean. He himself received a single combination shot which caused his arm to swell and created a lump that was harder than any previous Army shot.<sup>107</sup> Therefore, American planes had to be spreading biological diseases.

Colonel John J. Driscoll lists additional reasons for these germ warfare charges:

1. To cause anti-American sentiment among Asiatic people.
2. To gain a better bargaining position at the truce talks.
3. To provide an excuse for retaliatory attacks with Russian produced biological agents.
4. To counter possible United Nations demands for Nurnberg type war crimes trials as a result of the publication of the Hanley atrocity report by claiming that U.S. pilots were confessed bacteriological war criminals.<sup>108</sup>

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<sup>106</sup>White, p. 147.

<sup>107</sup>Dean, p. 276.

<sup>108</sup>Driscoll, 23-24.



On March 5, 1951, the Chinese International News Service in Peiping broadcasted accusations that the United States was using poison gas and bacteria in North Korea, but this poorly coordinated propaganda campaign ended in July 1951. A more coordinated propaganda campaign was then developed.<sup>109</sup> In December 1951, a Russian magazine charged that typhus was being spread by the American Air Force. Communist interrogators were then forced to obtain the necessary substantiating confessions from American airmen captured after this time.<sup>110</sup> On January 13, 1952, the USAF B-26 of First Lieutenants John S. Quinn and Kenneth L. Enoch (the first germ warfare confessors) was shot down over North Korea.<sup>111</sup>

The Chinese Communist News Agency reported on February 21, 1952 that the U.S. was dropping bombs filled with "insects infected with the bacilli of the plague, cholera, and typhus."<sup>112</sup> In late February and early March 1952, the Red Cross organizations of Communist Hungary, Poland, and Romania demanded that the International Red Cross (IRC) investigate and stop this barbaric form of warfare. However, North Korea denied access to an IRC committee of internationally recognized plague and vector control experts from India and Pakistan. Radio Peiping denounced the IRC and the committee of neutralist experts as tools of Wall Street Imperialism. The Communists also rejected an investigation by the World Health Organization.<sup>113</sup>

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<sup>109</sup>Driscoll, 24.

<sup>110</sup>White, pp. 147-148.

<sup>111</sup>Driscoll, 23.

<sup>112</sup>Driscoll, 24.

<sup>113</sup>White, pp. 148-152, 166.

In the meantime, Lieutenants Quinn and Enoch were held in solitary confinement and pressured by relays of interrogators. One Communist interrogator claimed, "That's a funny thing about Americans, just throw them in the hole [solitary confinement] a couple of weeks, and they'll sign anything."<sup>114</sup> The lieutenants were "war criminals who would be tried, convicted, and never see America again."<sup>115</sup> Cooperation would entitle them to the Lenient Treatment Policy. According to Enoch, "insanity, death, or these absurd confessions were the alternatives."<sup>116</sup> In early May, Enoch "fabricated [his confession] to keep them [the interrogators] happy."<sup>117</sup> The confessions of Enoch and Quinn were backdated to April 8th and 14th, 1952, respectively.<sup>118</sup>

General Dean's "friend," Wilfred C. Burchett (always with a glass of brandy, vodka, or wine) edited Enoch's draft germ warfare confession in Enoch's room. Enoch was also visited by two French Communist journalists, Yve Farge and Claude Roi. Eventually, Enoch learned that he could not trust even Caucasians.<sup>119</sup> At least four other British correspondents and Communist fellow travelers (Alan Winnington and Michael Shapiro of the London Daily Worker, London solicitor Jack Gaster, and Monica Felton of the Women's International Democratic Federation and a Stalin Peace Prize winner) visited North Korean POW camps

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<sup>114</sup>White, p. 172.

<sup>115</sup>White, p. 168.

<sup>116</sup>Ibid.

<sup>117</sup>Ibid.

<sup>118</sup>Driscoll, 24-25.

<sup>119</sup>White, pp. 168-169.

during the war and publicized Communist propaganda.<sup>120</sup> Joliot-Curie, a French Communist scientist, was vigorously denounced by 12 Nobel prize-winning scientists for having endorsed the germ warfare charges.<sup>121</sup> England's "Red Dean" of Canterbury Cathedral, the Very Reverend Hewlett Johnson, also supported the Communist germ warfare charges.<sup>122</sup> Both French and British soldiers became POWs in Korea, yet the aforementioned correspondents and travelers to North Korea retained their French and British passports and citizenships.<sup>123</sup>

Of the 78 U.S. fliers who eventually were accused of being bacteriological war criminals, 38 succumbed to Communist duress and signed confessions, often after "extreme and prolonged physical and mental torture."<sup>124</sup> One pilot, who was threatened with non-repatriation after months of hard interrogation and threats, finally broke down and said, "All right, I'll sign anything you want. What do you want me to sign."<sup>125</sup>

U.S. News & World Report featured a candid six page discussion with four repatriated USAF officers (Colonel Walker M. Mahurin, Colonel Andrew J. Evans, First Lieutenant George F. Brooks, and Second Lieutenant

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<sup>120</sup>"How British Soldiers Were Tortured By Red Chinese," 100-102.

<sup>121</sup>Driscoll, 25.

<sup>122</sup>"Back of Germ-War Hoax-Torture: U.S. Officers' Own Story of Forced 'Confessions'," U.S. News & World Report, 35:12 (September 18, 1953), 20.

<sup>123</sup>"How British Soldiers Were Tortured By Red Chinese," 100-102.

<sup>124</sup>"Destroying American Minds - Russians Made It a Science," U.S. News & World Report, 35:19 (November 6, 1953), 99.

<sup>125</sup>White, p. 120.

Richard Voss) concerning their confessions. Colonel Mahurin, a famous World War II European ace who broke his arm when he crash landed his plane in North Korea, was interrogated by Alan Winnington for military information. Mahurin was threatened

with death, all kinds of torture, of being shot, anything you can think of.... I spent over a month sitting on a stool 15 hours a day at regular attention... our wives didn't know we were alive.... There was a good possibility that we would never go home.... I tried to commit suicide by slashing my wrists.... [Everyone knows that germ spreading] fleas, flies, and mosquitoes [do not fly in 40 degree below zero weather in January nor spread tetanus or typhoid fever].... I used names of officers who were dead...or retired...so...if anybody with brains examined the confessions, they would know it was ridiculous to start with...[four other pilots had previously mentioned my name in recordings played for me long before I confessed].<sup>126</sup>

Lieutenant Voss, who had crash related burns on his hands, knees, and face, was not subjected to physical torture, but received the "maggot" treatment. Flies lit on his dirty bandages and the resulting maggots crawled all over his wounds for three or four weeks. He confessed to germ warfare (but not atomic or gas warfare) when he could no longer stand the maggots that were down in his ear. Voss said that the interrogators whom he occasionally slugged would have to be replaced because they "lost face" by having a prisoner slug them. When threatened with death, he called an interrogator's bluff and that ended the death threats.<sup>127</sup> Lieutenant Brooks added that all of his interrogation and confession pressure consisted of mental, not physical torture.

Within the large POW camps, the soldiers were lectured on the evils of germ warfare and listened to the confessions of some of the

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<sup>126</sup>Back of the Germ-War Hoax - Torture: U.S. Officers' Own Story of Forced 'Confessions,' 20-22.

<sup>127</sup>Ibid., 23-26.

fliers. In one camp, a germ warfare lecture was greeted with howls of laughter. These soldiers were shown a vial containing a bug which was infected with deadly germs. As the POWs filed by this vial, one soldier seized the bug and ate it. As punishment, he was rushed to the hospital for two months and kept on greatly reduced rations. The Communists threatened him with death if he told his fellow POWs that the bug was harmless.<sup>128</sup>

In another instance, American POWs had the last laugh when anti-rader strips of aluminum foil chaff or windrow were dropped on the camp by U.S. planes. The Chinese feared that these strips contained cholera. They rolled up their sleeves in surgical fashion to pick up all of the chaff with chopsticks. Later, ranking Chinese officials appeared not to notice a dead rat in a parachute harness which two POWs had hung from a bush near the guards' quarters. The first Chinese guard to see this swinging rat was terrified, but his superiors realized that the Americans were attempting to harrass the guards.<sup>129</sup> This type of GI humor was manifested in other ways, as when one GI was told to fill out an elaborate Communist form and replied "Last time I filled out something like this, I landed in the Army," while another GI requested to be sent home so he could consult with his lawyer about the form.<sup>130</sup>

On October 1, 1952, the Soviet Union transmitted to the United Nations (for distribution to all delegations) the 300,000 word document

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<sup>128</sup>"War Fare," Newsweek, 42:7 (August 17, 1953), 29.

<sup>129</sup>White, p. 219.

<sup>130</sup>"patriot's Tears," 25.

"Report of the International Scientific Commission for the Investigation of Facts Concerning Bacterial Warfare in Korea and China," which included as annexes the handwritten confessions of USAF Lieutenants Enoch, Quinn, O'Neal, and Kniss. The appearance of these four officers before the "scientific commission" was filmed and given world-wide distribution in English, French, Spanish, and other languages. On March 12, 1953, the Soviet Union presented the United Nations with the germ warfare confessions of two U.S. Marine Corps officers, Colonel Frank H. Schwable and Major Roy Bley.<sup>131</sup> A post repatriation Marine Corps court of inquiry found that Colonel Schwable was subjected to such a high degree of mental and physical torture that his "will would be broken, he would go insane, or he would die."<sup>132</sup> Finally, in April 1953, the Soviet Union stated that it would drop its germ warfare charges in the United Nations General Assembly if the United States would not demand an impartial investigation.<sup>133</sup> Many of these U.S. fliers publicly renounced their germ warfare confessions upon repatriation.<sup>134</sup>

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<sup>131</sup>"Destroying American Minds - Russians Made It a Science," 97-98.

<sup>132</sup>"What To Do About Brain Washing," U.S. News & World Report, 39:2 (July 8, 1955), 24-25.

<sup>133</sup>"Germ Warfare: The Lie That Won," Fortune, 48 (November 1953), 94.

<sup>134</sup>"Germ Warfare: Forged Evidence," Time, 62:19 (November, 1953), 22.

## THE TURNCOATS

At the end of the Korean War, 23 United States servicemen, all enlisted Army personnel, initially refused to be repatriated and were labeled "turncoats." It is hoped that the behavior of these personnel represented a unique occurrence which will never be repeated.<sup>135</sup> Yet since the Korean War, other American servicemen have defected to Communist nations. During the Vietnam War, many deserters and draft dodgers fled to Canada, Western Europe, and other non-Communist nations. There are some things that the Code of Conduct cannot do. The American educational system and family life must teach our youth that regardless of America's faults, this nation still enjoys one of the highest degrees of individual freedom and personal prosperity in the world. Communist ideological propaganda is very deficient in practice, but not in rhetoric.

As was noted earlier, most of these turncoats eventually left Communist China and returned to the United States. Although the turncoats were very small in number, their propaganda value greatly humiliated America's pride. Contrastingly, the United Nations forces captured and interned 171,000 enemy POWs, of whom 38,000 were reclassified as civilian internees and released. On June 18, 1953, Syngman Rhee unilaterally released 27,000 ardent anti-Communist POWs who had sworn that they would kill themselves rather than return to Communism. During the repatriation processing, an additional 23,000 enemy POWs

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<sup>135</sup>In the American Civil War, some 3,170 captured Yankee soldiers donned grey uniforms while approximately 5,450 captured Confederate soldiers donned blue uniforms. The Report of the Secretary of Defense's Advisory Committee on Prisoners of War, p. 51.

refused to be repatriated or could be labeled Communist turncoats as opposed to American turncoats. The importance of this staggering rebuke to communism was overwhelmed by the tremendous propaganda value associated with just over a score of American turncoats.<sup>136</sup>

Corporal Edward S. Dickenson reconsidered his initial repatriation refusal, claimed illness, went to the neutral Indian hospital, and demanded repatriation through the Indian guards. He literally escaped from the strong group control that the 23 turncoats had imposed on each other.<sup>137</sup> After his escape, Dickenson indicated that others might be wavering. With the proper explanations, they might also change their minds.<sup>138</sup> Corporal Claude Batchelor was the only other turncoat to change his mind before the final decision date of January 23, 1954. Both Dickenson and Batchelor were court-martialed for collaboration offenses committed prior to their initial repatriation refusals. They received respective sentences of 10 and 20 years at hard labor in Fort Leavenworth's Disciplinary Barracks.<sup>139</sup>

The background of the final 21 turncoats is described in the book, 21 Stayed. The author, Virginia Pasley, traveled some 15,000 miles and visited 23 states for the purpose of conducting extensive interviews with the families, teachers, and clergy of the final 21

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<sup>136</sup> White, pp. 232-234.

<sup>137</sup> "There Is Joy in Crackers Neck," Newsweek, 42:18 (November 2, 1953), 22.

<sup>138</sup> "Why Some GI's Stay With Reds," U.S. News & World Report, 35:20 (November 13, 1953), 38.

<sup>139</sup> "3 Ex-GI's Who Got 'Fed Up,'" U.S. News & World Report, 39:1 (July 1, 1955), 24.



turncoats.<sup>140</sup> She summarized their background as follows:

- 20 were regular army, 1 was a draftee.
- 20 had never heard of communism except as a dirty word.
- 19 felt unwanted by their fathers or stepfathers.
- 19 were oldest or only boy in the family.
- 18 grew up in poverty.
- 18 took no part in school activities or sports.
- 17 never finished high school.
- 16 came from broken homes.
- 16 were average or below in I.Q.
- 16 came from small towns or rural communities.
- 16 were described as withdrawn, "lone wolves."
- 15 were 21 years of age or younger when captured.
- Only 3 had ever been in trouble with the Army.
- Only 3 had ever been in trouble with juvenile authorities.
- Only 2 were married.<sup>141</sup>

This data might be considered non-descriptive, but it does stress the importance of a strong, supportive family life and educational system.

Against the advice of Army Counsel, Secretary of Defense Charles E. Wilson had the Department of the Army issue dishonorable discharges to the 21 turncoats on January 25, 1954.<sup>142</sup> Technically, the turncoats were now U.S. civilians living in China. For Rufus Douglas, Mr. Wilson's action had no impact. Douglas mysteriously died of a "heart attack" in China in June 1954. His previous medical history revealed a noted absence of heart trouble.<sup>143</sup>

In July 1955, Otho G. Bell, William Cowart, and Lewis Griggs left China. In a Hong Kong interview, Cowart stated that he feared

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<sup>140</sup>Virginia Pasley, "21 American GI's Who Chose Communism," U.S. News & World Report, 39:3 (July 15, 1955), 41.

<sup>141</sup>Ibid., 43.

<sup>142</sup>"Reception for Turncoats," Newsweek, 46:3 (July 18, 1955), 34. For date of January 25, 1954, see "3 Ex-GI's Who Got 'Fed Up,'" 25.

<sup>143</sup>Virginia Pasley, "21 American GI's Who Chose Communism," U.S. News & World Report, 39:3 (July 15, 1955), 123.

he would be punished if he were repatriated from his POW status in 1953. Burchett, Winnington, and others wrote his propaganda statements during the repatriation period. He did not allow himself to be interviewed by American interrogators during this time. Griggs was recovering from an operation in a POW hospital and kept under continuous Communist observation while American repatriation personnel were talking to the turncoats. Seven wavering turncoats, to include Bell and Cowart, were kept in a hospital until the American explanation period ended.<sup>144</sup>

While in China, agents followed them every time they left their place of work. Their jobs consisted of repairing and overhauling captured American trucks and Ford tractors in a Chinese factory. In this capacity, they decided to "mess" things up by putting "bearings in backward, or put discs in wrong or left three or four out, and turned [piston] rings bottom-side up."<sup>145</sup> The Chinese eventually discovered what these three Americans were doing.

Cowart could not withstand the extreme Chinese regimentation. His aims were to enjoy life. He planned to go from Hong Kong to Japan where "you can have a good time.... sit drinking some beer, find a girl, go dancing."<sup>146</sup> Bell, who had a wife in the United States, and Griggs wanted to return to America, accept their punishment, and then campaign against the Chinese Communist regime.<sup>147</sup>

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<sup>144</sup>"Turncoat GI's Tell Story of Red China," U.S. News & World Report, 39:4 (July 22, 1955), 115.

<sup>145</sup>"Story of GI Turncoats: They Chose Red China, and Then-," U.S. News & World Report, 42:26 (June 28, 1957), 64-67.

<sup>146</sup>"3 Ex-GI's Who Got 'Fed Up'," 25.

<sup>147</sup>"Turncoat GI's Tell Story of Red China," 115.

Richard Tenneson left China in December 1955. He was quoted as saying, "Communism was all right for those who want it.... Most others [turncoats] would come home sometime."<sup>148</sup> In a later interview, he said,

I just wanted to get out of China .... I wanted to get home again...even if I was to face a firing squad when I got back. I didn't care. I had to get out of China, away from something I didn't know what.<sup>149</sup>

Arlie Pate and Arron Wilson left China on December 6, 1956. At that time, Pate said, "If I had to do it all over again, I'd have come right home."<sup>150</sup> Pate received a U.S. State Department loan to buy a plane ticket home. This "collaborator" Pate is not to be confused with Sergeant Lloyd W. Pate, who organized a resistance movement in his POW camp, inserted covert "reactionary" spies into a "progressive" segment of the camp, and received a Communist imposed sentence of one year at hard labor for tearing up a "progressive" petition.<sup>151</sup> Sergeant Lloyd Pate was the principal government witness in the court-martial of Sergeant James C. Gallagher, who was convicted of hurling two GI's (sick with dysentery) into the subzero snow to freeze to death and also of spreading Communist propaganda. Sergeant Gallagher was sentenced to life imprisonment at hard labor.<sup>152</sup>

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<sup>148</sup>"Turncoat Return," U.S. News & World Report, 39:26 (December 23, 1955), 4.

<sup>149</sup>"Story of GI Turncoats: They chose Red China, And Then-," 62.

<sup>150</sup>"Two More Came Home," U.S. News & World Report, 41:24 (December 14, 1956), 10.

<sup>151</sup>"The Sergeant... And the Men Who Wouldn't Be Brainwashed," Newsweek, 46:8 (August 22, 1955), 22-24.

<sup>152</sup>"For What a Man Did," Newsweek, 46:9 (August 29, 1955), 18.

Turncoat David Hawkins left China in February 1957, because he was disgusted at Communist atrocities in Hungary.<sup>153</sup> In a later interview, he told of being afraid to be repatriated as a POW because of a possible 20 or 30 year prison term. His reasons for leaving China then included the facts that he was tired of Chinese regimentation, self-criticism, and a lack of personal freedom and private thoughts.<sup>154</sup>

Andrew Fortuna departed China on June 15, 1957. During the repatriation proceedings at Panmunjom, Korea, he told correspondents that he would be seeing them one of these days. He returned to the U.S. because the American peace movement had become stronger and most people didn't want war. Fortuna's reason for going to China was to express his dissatisfaction with the Korean War. He considered himself an American, always intended to return to America, and had become homesick. Fortuna mentioned that four of the remaining turncoats had married Chinese girls, but he still expected them to return to America.<sup>155</sup>

Apparently, none of the returning turncoats were tried for their actions as POWs, as was the case with Dickenson and Batchelor who were convicted by court-martials. The passing of time worked in favor of the China turncoats. Most of the remaining China turncoats have subsequently returned to the United States. As of 1966, only two of the 21 remained in Communist China.<sup>156</sup>

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<sup>153</sup>"Turncoat," U.S. News & World Report, 42:10 (March 8, 1957), 14.

<sup>154</sup>"Story of GI Turncoats: They Chose Red China, And Then-," 70.

<sup>155</sup>Ibid., 74.

<sup>156</sup>U.S., Department of Defense, The U.S. Fighting Man's Code, DA Pam 360-522, p. 58.

## NON-REPATRIATED AMERICAN POWS

On Memorial Day, May 30, 1955, Communist China announced that it would release four USAF pilots shot down over North Korea during the Korean War. Red China had tried these aviators on May 24, 1955 and sentenced them to deportation for "flying their military aircraft into China's territorial air."<sup>157</sup> They all pleaded guilty to the charges.<sup>158</sup> Captain Harold Fischer had shot down ten MIG aircraft before being downed himself and captured on April 7, 1952 near Suiho Reservoir, North Korea. First Lieutenant Roland W. Parks was shot down on September 4, 1952. First Lieutenant Lyle W. Cameron parachuted from his plane 25 miles south of the Chinese - North Korean border on October 26, 1952. Lieutenant Colonel Edwin L. Heller was shot down on January 23, 1953, three miles south of the Yalu River which separates North Korea from China.<sup>159</sup> The four had spent from six to 26 months in solitary confinement. Parks had an eye ailment and Fischer needed dental work. Heller's now shortened left leg (broken when he parachuted out of his plane) had undergone repeated Chinese surgery and had a plate in it.<sup>160</sup>

Eleven other airmen, crew members of a leaflet dropping B-29 shot down over North Korea about 35 miles south of the Yalu River on

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<sup>157</sup>"Freedom for Four," Newsweek, 45:23 (June 6, 1955), 23.

<sup>158</sup>"Foreign Relations: Across the Sham Chua," Time, 65:24 (June 13, 1955), 34.

<sup>159</sup>"Freedom for Four," 23-24.

<sup>160</sup>"Foreign Relations: Across the Sham Chum," 33.

January 12, 1953, were released by Communist China on August 4, 1955.<sup>161</sup> Colonel John K. Arnold, the senior officer, told of being in solitary confinement for 30 months and losing 40 pounds. He screamed when tightened wrist manacles cut off the circulation in his hands and his fingers were milked like a cow. Only Major William H. Baumer was able to resist signing anything for his captors.<sup>162</sup> Colonel Arnold also told of having foot bindings (similar to tight sprained ankle bandages) placed on his feet and being forced to stand for six days. After 30 hours, he was ready to scream. He was beaten about the head and body with sticks dipped in his own "honey" pail. As has occurred with other POWs, the wife of Airman Daniel G. Schmidt had remarried.<sup>163</sup>

The late repatriation of POWs by Communist nations is not an unusual occurrence, as evidenced by the fact that Russia retained many German and Japanese POWs for years after the end of World War II. Hence the added significance of the Article VI sentence: I WILL TRUST IN MY GOD AND IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.

The Korean War initiated the United States into the harsh realities of Communist indoctrination, propaganda, and psychological warfare as practiced with our POWs. This was America's first stale-mated war in which the enemy did not surrender and those responsible for mistreating, torturing, and killing our POWs were not punished. Although the realities of Communist treatment of our POWs in Korea may

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<sup>161</sup>"One More Measure of How Far Reds Can Be Trusted," U.S. News & World Report, 39:7 (August 12, 1955), 32-33.

<sup>162</sup>"How Reds Tortured U.S. Prisoners," U.S. News & World Report, 39:10 (September 2, 1955), 26-27.

<sup>163</sup>"No Bands Playing," Newsweek, 46:9 (August 15, 1955), 21.

well be an indication of how future POWs will be treated and will behave, America was not prepared to accept the unpatriotic statements and actions which our POWs were coerced into making. Consequently, the dogmatically Spartan and patriotic Code of Conduct was formulated as discussed in Chapter 5. It was meant to codify the services existing standards of POW behavior and prevent the breakdown in POW morale and discipline which occurred in Korea. Chapter 5 will now discuss the problems, intentions, and recommendations of the code's authors and some of the difficulties involved with Code of Conduct training.

## CHAPTER 5

### THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE CODE OF CONDUCT

#### THE CODE'S AUTHOR

As a result of the adverse publicity associated with the Korean War POWs, Secretary of Defense Charles E. Wilson appointed an all-service commission in 1954 to examine the situation and make recommendations. This commission was disbanded when it could not decide whether or not to retain or discard the old Spartan code of "give name, rank, service number, and date of birth only."<sup>1</sup>

On May 17, 1955, Secretary Wilson issued his Terms of Reference to the newly formed Defense Advisory Committee on Prisoners of War. This committee was given 60 days to develop recommendations for a Code of Conduct, including Code of Conduct indoctrination and training guidelines, for future conflicts.<sup>2</sup>

As a consultant to this committee, Brigadier General Samuel (S. L. A.) Marshall, USA (Retired) actually wrote the exact words of the Code of Conduct, assisted by Vice Admiral Charles A. Lockwood, USN

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<sup>1</sup>Samuel (S. L. A.) Marshall, "The Code and the Pueblo - Some Questions and Answers," Air Force/Space Digest, 52 (July 1969), 75.

<sup>2</sup>The Report of the Secretary of Defense's Advisory Committee on Prisoners of War, POW: The Fight Continues After The Battle (Washington: Government Printing Office, August 1955), p. 37.



(Retired); Major General Merritt A. Edson, USMC (Retired); and a dozen pages of committee notes. Marshall told the "full committee" that he objected to the "ambiguous" language of Article V (I AM BOUND TO GIVE ONLY NAME, RANK, SERVICE NUMBER, AND DATE OF BIRTH), because "It can be interpreted in such a way that one service or another may not carry out your intent or understand what you have resolved."<sup>3</sup> In a previous advisory group on Special Forces, psychological warfare, and escape and evasion (including resistance to interrogation) Marshall had concluded in his staff study paper that:

... a POW [cannot] behave like an Egyptian mummy after giving his captors the four points of information that were mandatory. We knew ... that about ninety-six percent of soldiers, of whatever nation, must find some release in talk under intense interrogation. Further, we knew that the average U.S. rifleman, as an example, knew little or nothing that would help the enemy. We also knew that our ablest resisters in the Korean camps were fabulous talkers, if not great liars.<sup>4</sup>

However, with respect to Article V, General Marshall said that the Secretary of Defense's Advisory Committee on Prisoners of War "had composed its views and resolved the language; I [Marshall] had nothing to do with the form or substance" of Article V.<sup>5</sup> Army General John E. Hull, (Retired), the Committee Vice Chairman and the Commander of U.S. forces in the Far East during the Korean War also recognized the ambiguity of Article V. Marshall quotes Hull as saying:

... we must risk it. For one thing, we are using the words of the Geneva Convention. Further, if we are too explicit, we may open the flood gates. Each service, as we have already

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<sup>3</sup>Marshall, 76.

<sup>4</sup>Marshall, 75-76.

<sup>5</sup>Marshall, 76.

agreed, has its own peculiar training problem in line with the general principle, and I think we will be understood because we are already writing training guidance to ensure that very point.<sup>6</sup>

General Marshall added:

... the committee [unmistakably] understood [that] the POW could be tricked or coerced into going far beyond the Geneva requirement. Article V was therefore intended to give breadth to the new training, instead of permitting it to be constricted by traditional but futile limits....<sup>7</sup>

... the code frees [the POW] to resist by discussing almost anything with his captors, provided he does not betray the interests of the United States or its allies, or do anything to hurt his fellow prisoners. It was written in 1955 specifically to give the POW this much freedom of action, and to cut away from the former demanding requirement that was both unworkable and contrary to nature....<sup>8</sup>

There is nothing wrong with the code. The fault is that the services, with the exception of the Air Force, did not try to make it work. The Army programmed and spent much money on training, but not in accordance with what the committee intended; it marched deliberately in the opposite direction. The Navy practically ignored the recommendations and such training as it did might have better been left undone.

But the heaviest default was at a higher level still. In the committee's long report, a pamphlet titled POW, its main recommendation was that to ensure standardization, responsibility for training under the code and for inspecting to see that the services were doing their part be placed in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. That office simply winked its eye and left the problem to Heaven.<sup>9</sup>

Concerning the Article V dilemma, the committee's published report concluded "... that a line of [POW] resistance [to enemy demands] must be drawn somewhere and initially as far forward as

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<sup>6</sup> Marshall, 76.

<sup>7</sup> Marshall, 76.

<sup>8</sup> Marshall, 74.

<sup>9</sup> Marshall, 76.

possible."<sup>10</sup> Almost by default, the GPW requirement for name, rank, service number and date of birth became the accepted line of resistance. Many prisoners had withstood interrogation in Axis camps and in Korea. They refused to sign enemy statements. A confession could enable the enemy to consider a POW as a "war criminal" and thus deny his status and rights as a POW.

The committee recognized that as:

... POW may be subjected to an extreme of coercion beyond his ability to resist. If in his battle with the interrogator he is driven from his first line of resistance he must be trained for resistance in successive positions. And, to stand on the final line to the end - no disclosure of vital military information and above all no disloyalty in word or deed to his country, his service or his comrades.

Throughout, the serviceman must be responsible for all of his actions. This ... is the spirit and intent of the Code of Conduct....<sup>11</sup>

Contrastingly, the committee knew that:

Only a handful of the POWs in Korea were able to maintain absolute silence under military interrogation. Nearly all of the American prisoners went beyond the "absolute" name, rank, number, date of birth restriction.<sup>12</sup>

It was recognized that "every man has a breaking point."<sup>13</sup>

However, the committee nicely side-stepped these conflicting views by establishing the code and then specifying that it was now the responsibility of the Department of Defense to "devise a special training program to teach American servicemen the ways and means of resisting enemy

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<sup>10</sup>The Report of the Secretary of Defense's Advisory Committee on Prisoners of War, p. 18.

<sup>11</sup>The Report of the Secretary of Defense's Advisory Committee on Prisoners of War, p. 18.

<sup>12</sup>The Report of the Secretary of Defense's Advisory Committee on Prisoners of War, pp. 14-15.

<sup>13</sup>The Report of the Secretary of Defense's Advisory Committee on Prisoners of War, p. 17.

interrogations."<sup>14</sup> In effect, the committee established the idealism of the Code of Conduct without specifying how to realistically implement it.

The methods of how to realistically implement the Code of Conduct have been and will be debated for a long time. Lieutenant Commander Edward Davis, USN, said that he and his fellow Hanoi POWs discussed and debated the meaning of the Code of Conduct during their captivity far more than it will ever be discussed in the United States.<sup>15</sup> The problems involved with implementing the code may never be solved because of the uniqueness of each serviceman and POW and America's democratic principles and freedom of speech. Yet, it is also human to strive for idealistic perfection. If there are difficulties in specifying the exact, inflexible meaning of every word of the Code of Conduct, at least the spirit and intent of it can be conveyed by studying how it has actually been applied by POWs.

#### OPINIONS ABOUT CODE OF CONDUCT TRAINING

In 1955, Army Chief of Staff General Maxwell Taylor signed an Army regulation on which emphasized that Code of Conduct training should stress how to avoid capture as opposed to how to withstand the

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<sup>14</sup>Ibid., p. 15.

<sup>15</sup>P.O.W. Panel, Special Elective R-235, Part 1, Video Cassette Discussion, (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Dept. of Command, Staff Judge Advocate Officer, April 12, 1974).

stress of life as a POW. Army Code of Conduct training would include classroom training.<sup>16</sup>

Rear Admiral Daniel V. Gallery, USN, Chief of Air Reserve Training, consulted with the Defense Advisory Committee on Prisoners of War. Gallery's solution to Code of Conduct and POW training was to have the President issue an Executive Order stating,

...if captured by the Reds, they [POWs] may sign any document the communists want them to or appear on radio or TV programs and deliver any script the Reds hand them. Tell them they can confess that the United States poisoned Lenin and Stalin; they can call the President a capitalist, warmongering dog of Wall Street; they can broadcast peace appeals, agree to settle behind the Iron Curtain when the war is over, and sign long-term leases on houses in Moscow. Give the Reds anything they want for propganda purposes and defy them to use it!

...the United Nations [would receive] a blistering statement explaining why [the President issued the Executive Order], and serving notice that hereafter statements of our prisoners, made to the enemy, would be a bunch of fairy stories. This statement should be accompanied by several hundred affidavits from our men who went through the brain washing process that will stink to high heaven. Properly published, this could put the Reds on the defensive.... We should hammer home, on the Voice of America and at the United Nations....

World-wide publication of such an Executive Order would make the Reds look ridiculous on this side of the Iron Curtain....

... they [the Reds] can manufacture confessions for the benefit of their own slave peoples-make them up out of whole cloth. They need "confessions" to convince gullible neutrals, and our disavowal will reach and impress them.<sup>17</sup>

Gallery would throw the book at POWs "who squealed on [their] buddies or who sold them out for [their] own benefit."<sup>18</sup> He has

<sup>16</sup>"POW Conduct Code Training Begins," The Army-Navy-Air Force Register, 76:3261 (November 5, 1955), 4.

<sup>17</sup>Daniel V. Gallery, Rear Admiral, USN, "We Can Baffle the Brainwashers!," The Saturday Evening Post, 227:30 (January 22, 1955), 94.

<sup>18</sup>Gallery, 20.

much sympathy for tortured POWs who gave "military information" of the nature we publish in newspapers and magazines. Those POWs who heroically withstood Communist interrogations and torture in Korea accomplished nothing, other than internal satisfaction and the knowledge that they withstood it.<sup>19</sup> Gallery further claims that POWs only have to remain silent for a week after capture to protect front line units. Our potential adversaries have access to more authentic military and technical information in our libraries, government publications, and free press than they can comprehend. Those personnel with knowledge of vital secrets and plans should not be allowed to travel to locations where they are subject to capture. Gallery advocates the use of evasive interrogation strategies and the telling of so many lies interspersed with some truth that the enemy doesn't know what to believe.<sup>20</sup>

Colonel Carl E. Williamson, counters Gallery's evasive strategies by stating that,

...the average soldier is a poor actor and a worse liar.... There are clever individuals who will successfully employ old and new [evasive strategems] in future wars.... [but these are] exceptional persons adept in deceit.<sup>21</sup>

Colonel Williamson recommends that soldiers be taught that their survival rate will be as good or better under the Spartan code of name,

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<sup>19</sup>Gallery, 20.

<sup>20</sup>Gallery, 25.

<sup>21</sup>Carl E. Williamson, (Colonel, Judge Advocate General's Corps), "Name, Rank, and Serial Number," Student Individual Study (Carlisle Barracks, Penn: U.S. Army War College Log #65-3-194, March 26, 1956), p. 41.

rank, service number, and date of birth as it will be under any lesser strategem.<sup>22</sup>

Army psychiatrist Major William E. Mayer, who interviewed and/or studied the cases of about 1,000 Army POWs, concluded that our POWs were not treated so badly by the Chinese Communists. The POW sanity rate was no higher "than any group of healthy American troops."<sup>23</sup> No POWs died as a direct result of resisting brainwashing or indoctrination. The Korean POWs' physical surroundings, diet, and management was at least as good as that of other POWs in previous wars, to include the American Civil War. According to Major Mayer, the Army POWs

1. "...did not develop a 'buddy system.'" "Always before men have depended for their lives upon one or two or three other men in the camp, possibly to the exclusion of everybody else....Thousands of men come back as if they were almost complete strangers.... Ultimately there was at least one informer...in every squad...of four or five men."

2. They did not create conspiracies ... "to harass the captors ... to escape ... to resist various rules and regulations... to overthrow the whole camp."

3. They did not maintain their own military organization and discipline "... to seek out and punish or kill collaborators; [ ] to organize [ ] escape committees, food committees, recreation committees. None of these existed in Korea."

4. "... did not [ ] receive after mid 1951 the [ ] widespread torture, abuse, forced physical labor, degradation that has always characterized other countries' handling of our prisoners."<sup>24</sup>

In a U.S. News & World Report interview, Mayer reconstructed the official Chinese Communist appraisal of the American POW in Korea as:<sup>25</sup>

<sup>22</sup>Williamson, pp. 41-42.

<sup>23</sup>Robert S. Bird, "What is a Prisoner's Breaking Point?" The Army-Navy-Air Force Register, 78:4063 (October 19, 1957), 11.

<sup>24</sup>Bird, 11.

<sup>25</sup>"Why did Many GI Captives Cave In?," U.S. News & World Report (an interview with MAJ William E. Mayer, U.S. Army Expert), 40:8 (February 24, 1956), 59.

1. possessing "weak loyalties to family, community, country, religion, and fellow soldiers."
2. having "hazy concepts of right and wrong" and being prone to opportunism.
3. underestimating "his own worth, strength, and ability to survive" and feeling "insecure and inadequate by himself."
4. being "ignorant of social values, social tensions, and conflicts."
5. lacking knowledge of the American political system from the grass-roots community level to the national level.
6. being "insular and provincial" and lacking knowledge about the objective of "'foreigners' and their countries."
7. feeling that America is inherently invincible.
8. failing "to appreciate the meaning of, and the necessity for, military organization and discipline."
9. feeling that "military service is a kind of hateful, unavoidable servitude" instead of the required "hardship and sacrifice" necessary to keep America invincible.

Major Mayer's conclusions about the buddy system, group conspiracies, camp committees, and the American POW imply that the Army can teach POW organization and behavior specifics through group dynamics and discussion classes.

#### U.S. AIR FORCE AND NAVY HIGH-RISK POW TRAINING

The U.S. Air Force approach to POW training has always placed much more emphasis on the realities of POW life than the idealistic, Spartan teachings of the Army and Marine Corps, which say in effect "This is the code, memorize it, let it be your inflexible guide if you are captured." The Air Force philosophy is "that a man who knows what to expect next will be less likely to break down under torture



and interrogation."<sup>26</sup> The Air Force approach of conducting centralized POW training with survival training courses may be much more cost effective than in the other services. Air Force pilot training represents a very high dollar cost. Air Force crews have a greater basing mobility and hence greater ease in being sent to a single professional training facility where many of the instructors are former POWs. Finally, there are a relatively small number of high-risk air crews as opposed to the 100,000's of high-risk front line Army and Marine Corps troops. However, the realism of Air Force training in the 1950's was heavily criticized by well meaning, but otherwise ignorant parents, congressmen, the press, and the public at-large.

In 1955, Air Force flight crews were sent to Stead AFB, Nevada, where they were subjected to high intensity floodlight questioning by former wartime interrogators, received electrical shock questioning, stood in awkward positions for long periods of time, and were placed in cramped boxes which would not allow a person to sit or stand upright. Other discomforts included barefoot "death" marches (if the trainees were captured on an infiltration-evasion course), confinement in a dark underground hole shoulder deep in water, the sweat box, and clotheless interrogations for shy personnel. The trainees were taught to eat maggots (which contain valuable proteins) and the headless portions of rats (the head contains poison). Their meals consisted of uncooked spinach and beet-toddened raw spaghetti served lukewarm. They were told that dysentery can be treated by burning a bone (from a human corpse if

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<sup>26</sup>"National Affairs: The 'School for Survival'.... Headlines, 'Explanations,' And the Facts," Newsweek, 46:12 (September 19, 1955), 36.

necessary) and eating the ashes which contain valuable calcium.<sup>27</sup>

The interrogation efforts were designed to teach the trainees "not to talk. Then...how to talk in the event they are tortured into it."<sup>28</sup> The best students outwitted their captors. One student convinced his interrogator that he was too dumb to answer questions. Another simulated an epileptic attack and escaped when the guards sought medical help. Another jumped barefoot from a moving truck. Some men actually broke down under these simulated conditions. One student talked after watching his best buddy collapse while performing kneebends. He thought that if he didn't talk, his buddy would have to do kneebends forever. Others reacted violently under interrogation and blew up. They lost their "cool," a condition which might lead to reprisals from a wartime enemy.<sup>29</sup>

Even though some 29,000 men had participated in this 17 day survival course (it contained only a few days of POW training under the supervision of medical personnel and five psychologists), the publication of the above examples in Newsweek created a "furor" at the Pentagon. Newspapers labeled the POW training procedures as "torture." Congressman Thomas M. Felly of Seattle, Wash., urged Defense Secretary Wilson to immediately suspend this program and initiate a full investigation. Senator John C. Stennis of the Armed Services Committee demanded a full

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<sup>27</sup>Peter Wyden, "Ordeal in the Desert," Newsweek, 46:11 (September 12, 1955), 33-34.

<sup>28</sup>Wyden, 33.

<sup>29</sup>Wyden, 34.

report from the Air Force or else Congress would launch its own investigation. On the CBS program "Face the Nation," Air Force Secretary Donald A. Quarles praised the publication of the Newsweek article and wanted to expand this training program so that more personnel could receive this experience. The Air Force even held a special news conference to explain the Stead training. As could be expected, most of the personnel who underwent this training generally approved of it.<sup>30</sup> Nevertheless, United Press published a story in December 1955 stating that the Air Force was suspending some of this realistic training and planning to use demonstrations instead.<sup>31</sup>

Several generals also responded variously to the Stead AFB publicity. A former Commandant of the Marine Corps, Lieutenant General Clifton B. Cates, felt that a man should be prepared and know what might be done to him. Cates added, "...if a man knows he may be crucified, he'll sell himself more dearly, or even fight his way out and not be captured."<sup>32</sup> Army General Mark W. Clark; a former commander of United Nations forces in Korea, said,

We must do everything we can psychologically to prepare our soldiers for the torments of these heathen Red foes. We've already made some progress...but much more needs to be done.<sup>33</sup>

Army General Jacob L. Devers thought the training has to be tough but not cruel or inhuman. Devers favored demonstrations, not actual torture,

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<sup>30</sup>"National Affairs: The 'School for Survival'.... Headlines, 'Explanations,' And the Facts," 36-37.

<sup>31</sup>John W. Finney, "AF Suspends 'Brainwash' School Quiz," Washington Post and Times Herald, December 14, 1955, p. 9, Col. 3.

<sup>32</sup>"National Affairs: The 'School for Survival'.... Headlines, 'Explanations,' And the Facts," 37.

<sup>33</sup>Ibid.

and said, "The American boy can take most anything if he knows what he's up against."<sup>34</sup> Former Air Force Chief of Staff General Carl Spaatz added that the services "train men to fight and not to be prisoners."<sup>35</sup> These opinions show that military personnel do not agree on how much realism or how much time can be devoted to POW training.

United States Air Force pilots are not the only military personnel receiving POW "torture" training. In 1976, an embittered Navy pilot, Lieutenant Wendell R. Young, "blew the whistle" on U.S. Navy survival, evasion, resistance and escape (SERE) schools near Warner Springs, California and in northwestern Maine. The lieutenant filed a 15 million dollar assault and battery law suit against Navy personnel. Young claimed that he suffered a broken back from judo flips administered during this training, which also included incarceration in fetid, 16 cubic feet tiger cages with a coffee can in which to defecate, instructor administered beatings, and the water board treatment in which the trainee is strapped head down on an inclined board and has cold water poured over his towel covered face. Personnel undergoing the water treatment retch, gag, and choke under the supervision of a Navy doctor, who prevents accidental drowning. In 1961, an enlisted man suffocated to death in the confining tiger cages, which were then enlarged. Another sailor suffered a heart attack on a cross-country hike in 1967. Lieutenant Young was also appalled that the trainees could be "tortured into spitting, urinating and defecating on the American flag, [and supposedly]

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<sup>34</sup>Ibid., 38.

<sup>35</sup>Ibid.

masturbating before the guards and, on one occasion, engaging in sex with an instructor."<sup>36</sup> The Navy has admitted to conducting physical punishment and administering the water board treatment, but it has denied sexual abuse.<sup>37</sup>

The disgruntled Lieutenant Young claimed that he was forced to participate in this SERE training. Otherwise, authorities might take disciplinary action against him. Young called the SERE camp "an insane asylum" which creates real pain. The Navy and its trainees have kept the existence of these schools a secret to preclude the enemy or prospective students from learning about them. Students are urged to keep their attendance at SERE schools a classified "secret." Trainee resocialization to these SERE schools has been similar to that described in the case of the Stead Air Force Base POW training. "Many returning [Vietnam] POW's believe that SERE gave them increased will power and the ability to survive," while other personnel termed this training "degrading, demoralizing and dehumanizing....[you learn that] you're not going to win any battle as a POW by resisting physically. The only way to resist is psychologically."<sup>38</sup>

Considering the problem of Army POW training in light of the training given to high-risk Air Force and Navy pilots, several significant differences are evident. The Army may not be able to establish a single POW training facility because of the expense of transporting hundreds of thousands of high-risk, front line, combat arms soldiers to that

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<sup>36</sup>Dennis A. Williams with Martin Kasindorf, "The Navy: Torture Camp," Newsweek, 87:12 (March 22, 1976), 28.

<sup>37</sup>Ibid.

<sup>38</sup>Ibid., 31.

location. It may be impractical to establish POW training cadres at all major bases or to have a team of former POWs travel from base to base to conduct realistic training and tell of their experiences. Perhaps one does not have to learn how to cope with torture by experiencing it. The coping aspect relies more on mental discipline and a positive mental attitude in which the POW determines to outwit and overcome whatever the interrogator may do to him. One solution to the Army problem of how to train soldiers as potential POWs might be to develop a group discussion lesson plan for troop units on the problems that former POWs have encountered and overcome. Selected former POWs might also be asked to video cassette record their experiences in an effort to stimulate provocative Code of Conduct/POW behavior discussions at the unit level. In this regard, it is significant that Navy Lieutenant Commander and Vietnam POW Edward Davis thought he learned at least as much from survival school coffee break discussions with former World War II and Korean War POWs (who were also instructors) as he did during the formal periods of instruction.<sup>39</sup> Also, the Army might consider using divisional intelligence company personnel to conduct mock interrogations. This training method would give our interrogators the type of wartime intelligence practice that they require and it would train high-risk soldiers to resist interrogation ploys.

#### SUGGESTED CODE OF CONDUCT REVISIONS

Another way in which to assess the effectiveness of the Code of Conduct and its training is to examine proposed Code of Conduct changes.

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<sup>39</sup>P.O.W. Panel, Part 1, Video Cassette Discussion.

In 1974, a group of Command and General Staff College students did this and briefed Major General John P. Flynn, USAF and Rear Admiral Jeremiah Denton, USN (both ex-Hanoi POW leaders) on their findings. These students examined the question, "What, if anything, should be done about the Code of Conduct?"<sup>40</sup> This group reasoned that there were four possible solutions:<sup>41</sup>

1. Do not change the code.
2. Make minor but critical changes in the code.
3. Rewrite the code.
4. Eliminate the code.

Their general consensus was that the code should remain as written and emphasis should be placed on training. A minority element wanted to rewrite the code while a small but vocal faction wanted to eliminate the code and rely on the Oath of Office or Enlistment.<sup>42</sup> The following changes were presented.<sup>43</sup>

In Articles I and VI, the term "AMERICAN FIGHTING MAN" should be replaced by "a member of the Armed Forces of the United States," in deference to the increasing role of women in the armed forces. A proposed (but student rejected) change to the Article I phrase "OUR WAY OF

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<sup>40</sup>The Code of Conduct - General Officer Briefing, Special Elective R-235 (What If Anything, Should Be Done About the Code of Conduct?), Audio-Visual Cassette (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Audio-Visual Support Center, May 16, 1974).

<sup>41</sup>Ibid.

<sup>42</sup>Ibid.

<sup>43</sup>The reader should consult Appendix A as necessary to review the Articles of the Code of Conduct.

LIFE" was "I SERVE IN THE FORCES WHICH GUARD MY COUNTRY AND the principle of freedom of life for all people." This proposed change would clarify why Americans sometimes fight overseas. General Flynn agreed with the logic that "OUR WAY OF LIFE" is too selfish because the Communists are fighting for "their way of life."<sup>44</sup>

In Article VI, the last sentence "I WILL TRUST IN MY GOD AND IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA" was altered to read "I will never lose hope and WILL TRUST IN MY GOD AND IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA." In times past, POWs might have lost hope, given up, and died. General Flynn proposed the addition of the phrase "and my fellow Americans or prisoners. [He added], faith in God, country, and fellows [sustained as in Hanoi]. You must trust the other guy."<sup>45</sup>

In Article II, it was proposed that the two appearances of the word "NEVER" be replaced by the word "not." "NEVER" was perceived as more of an unconditional absolute than "not."<sup>46</sup>

The idealistic resist and escape mandates of Article III were made more realistic by the students. Article III was completely rewritten to say,

If I am captured, I will continue to do my duty as a member of the American Armed Forces. I will continuously prepare myself and others to escape whenever favorable opportunities arise. I will continue to resist and I will accept no favors from the enemy.<sup>47</sup>

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<sup>44</sup>The Code of Conduct - General Officer Briefing.

<sup>45</sup>Ibid.

<sup>46</sup>Ibid.

<sup>47</sup>Ibid.



General Flynn felt that the word "PAROLE" was a difficult term to address. The students deleted "PAROLE" because they felt it was an uncommon term that was adequately covered by the word "favors." General Flynn brought up the subject of early POW release. The early releases were considered to be heroes in the United States, whereas those remaining in the "poky" were shocked with their actions. General Flynn added, "their release was divisive, a bomb to morale....Early release was a gut issue faced by the PWs....People don't understand parole; they do understand early release."<sup>48</sup> The circumstances for early release must be spelled out. For example, the sick and wounded must be released before the healthy. Good will releases of healthy POWs can only be made based on sequential date of capture or shoot down, with the earliest captured POW being released first. Admiral Denton thought that "PAROLE" should be retained because it means "favors 'on the condition that' [and] the greatest favor was going home [and an early release]."<sup>49</sup>

In Article IV, the students clarified "SENIOR" to specify the intended meaning "regardless of service." The rewrite said, "IF I AM SENIOR, regardless of service, I WILL TAKE COMMAND." General Flynn considered this change to be beneficial because it might be forgotten in five years. He indicated that there was no problem with seniority in Hanoi, but there may have been a problem with it among the Army and Marine Corps enlisted POWs captured in South Vietnam and imprisoned at the Plantation compound under USAF Colonel Ted Guy.<sup>50</sup>

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<sup>48</sup>The Code of Conduct - General Officer Briefing.

<sup>49</sup>Ibid.

<sup>50</sup>Ibid.

In Article V, "BOUND TO GIVE ONLY" was changed to "Required TO GIVE ONLY," a change which General Flynn liked. The rigidity of the last two sentences in Article V was clarified by saying

To the utmost of my ability, I will make no oral or written statements disloyal to my country or its allies or harmful to their cause and will answer no questions that may be of military significance or otherwise helpful to the enemy.<sup>51</sup>

General Flynn found that many of the prisoners who initially established the ground rules with their interrogators and gave "only name, rank, service number, and date of birth" were better off. Otherwise, a POW's vulnerability increased.<sup>52</sup>

Concerning Code of Conduct training, the students recommended the following specifics:<sup>53</sup>

1. Training to avoid depression.
2. Training in communication procedures.
3. Training in skillfully wasting time, in mental stimulation drills.
4. Training in POW physical fitness exercises.
5. Training in interrogation techniques and how to avoid emotional participation with the interrogator by "staying cool."
6. Training in maintaining a sense of humor, faith in life, country, and your fellow man.

The students also recommended the establishment of a common Department of Defense training facility to standardize Code of Conduct

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<sup>51</sup>The Code of Conduct - General Officer Briefing.

<sup>52</sup>Ibid.

<sup>53</sup>Ibid.

interpretations, to provide updated and revised training materials, and to pool POW experiences. General Flynn agreed 100% with this concept, but he indicated that the four services might not be able to agree on joint training. However, the Air Force and Navy air elements should be able to accommodate each other as they have done in Korea and Vietnam.<sup>54</sup>

After the formal student presentation, Admiral Denton philosophized about the code and observed that there are two versions of the code. The small print of the code is the second version. The services have not fully agreed on a standard interpretation of the code. Admiral Denton mentioned his conservative outlook and the fact that he was 98% conservative in adopting code changes. He had talked to some of the authors of the code and was impressed with the detail with which they had examined the issues. It is hard to improve on the writing or small print of the code. He admitted that the code had some grey areas, but then the conditions of captivity have varied from Korea, to the Pueblo affair, to North Vietnam, and to South Vietnam. POWs need some flexibility in establishing or modifying the ground rules of captivity. Admiral Denton advocated more "how to" training such as how to communicate, resist, maintain your health, and bounce back. The philosophy of the code should be emphasized. POWs can be broken, but then a line of resistance must be reestablished. The POW must learn to bounce back to a more "conservative, iron clad line depending on [his] guts and condition."<sup>55</sup> The POW has to "roll" with the conditions imposed by his captors. He must analyze what they are forcing him to do and what he will accede to depending on the severity of the pressures. Admiral

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<sup>54</sup>The Code of Conduct - General Officer Briefing.

<sup>55</sup>The Code of Conduct - General Officer Briefing.

Denton's last thoughts were that the Communist objective is to make you do something contrary to your personal ethics and standard of right and wrong. The Communists want to "take you beyond... degrade you... have you say something you thought degrading and [your] country thought degrading."<sup>56</sup>

General Flynn ended the briefing by saying that he was in favor of slight modifications to the Code of Conduct to clarify its apparent rigidity. The small print does clarify the six articles, but people do not read the small print and they will not understand the concepts of the small print five years from now.<sup>57</sup>

With respect to the code's small print, philosophic background, and manner of factual presentation, the results of a 1971 survey among 104 basic and advanced trainees at Fort Jackson, South Carolina, and 90 enlisted and officer personnel in the 82d Airborne Division and Special Forces at Fort Bragg, North Carolina are interesting. In response to the question, "Can you be punished for not living up to the Code of Conduct?" 63% to 100% of the groups answered yes. The correct answer is no because personnel can only be punished under the Uniform Code of Military Justice. This survey also revealed a high percentage of soldier ignorance about the capture card, about what to expect as a POW, and about the benefits that are provided to the families of POWs. Fifty-five to eighty-seven percent of the surveyed personnel said yes in response to the statement: "A PW may not under any circumstances divulge

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<sup>56</sup>The Code of Conduct - General Officer Briefing.

<sup>57</sup>Ibid.

more than his name, rank, service number, and date of birth," whereas only 33% of a group of 12 ex-POWs responded affirmatively.<sup>58</sup>

Although the consultants and members of the 1955 Secretary of Defense's Advisory Committee on Prisoners of War disagreed among themselves on the exact wording of the Code of Conduct, they hoped that the code's small print and an all-service Department of Defense commission would standardize its implementation and training. That all-service training and indoctrination commission was not formed. Military leaders and the services interpreted the need for code training differently. Its meaning remained subject to debate. The real test of the adequacy of the code of conduct could only be established by military detainees and POWs themselves. Chapter 6 will now examine the code's application in the "peacetime" environment of the "cold war era," an area in which the code applies, but an area which the code's authors may not have foreseen.

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<sup>58</sup>U.S., United States Combat Developments Command Special Operations Agency, Doctrine for Captured/Detained United States Military Personnel (Short Title: USPOW), USACDC Control Number CUCSDA-S-0200-72, Volume II, Main Report, Part III (Fort Bragg, North Carolina: United States Army Combat Developments Command Special Operations Agency, March 1972), pp. G-II-1 to G-III-9.

## CHAPTER 6

### PEACETIME INCIDENTS

#### INTRODUCTION

Although the Code of Conduct evolved as a result of POW activities in the Korean War for use during times of future armed conflict, its applicability in the "cold war era" of constant military preparedness has greatly increased. There is no "peacetime" for a large portion of the Department of Defense, which has units deployed world-wide in a combat ready posture.

This chapter will examine the three most famous and widely publicized peacetime incidents: The U-2, RB-47, and USS Pueblo incidents. But the reader should know that there have been a number of other less highly publicized incidents, many of which had no survivors. Between 1950 and 1960, 75 Americans were lost when their planes were attacked or otherwise disappeared in 11 incidents along the Soviet periphery, mostly over international waters.<sup>1</sup> On April 11, 1969, North Korean fighter aircraft shot down an unarmed U.S. Navy EC-121 electronic intelligence aircraft. Thirty-one personnel died when this patrol aircraft crashed in the Sea of Japan, 90 miles south-east of Chong-jin, Korea

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<sup>1</sup>William L. White, The Little Toy Dog (New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., Inc., 1962), pp. 5-6.

and well outside North Korean airspace.<sup>2</sup> And then too, the electronic intelligence ship USS Liberty was mistakenly attacked in international waters by Israeli fighter-bombers during the 1967 Mid-East War, with the loss of 34 personnel and an additional 75 wounded.<sup>3</sup>

Other American border guards, attaches, technicians, and advisors have been seized for political, economic, and propaganda motives. On December 19, 1968, Prince Norodom Sihanouk of Cambodia announced that he would release 12 American hostages as a Christmas gesture. Eleven of these Army hostages were captured on July 17, 1968 when their landing craft inadvertently crossed the Cambodian border on the Mekong River. Cambodia retained the landing craft. In August, Sihanouk had demanded 14 bulldozers as ransom for the crew and landing craft. He was also interested in American recognition of Cambodian border disputes with South Vietnam and Thailand.<sup>4</sup> The twelfth hostage had jumped or fallen from a helicopter near the Cambodian border in November 1968.<sup>5</sup>

On August 17, 1969, the North Koreans shot down a U.S. OH-23 scout helicopter that had become disoriented on a training flight and flown into North Korea. The United Nations Command said that "the pilot . . . radioed that he was disoriented, his location was unknown, he was being fired upon, was hit, was going down."<sup>6</sup> The three American

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<sup>2</sup>Lloyd M. Bucher, Bucher: My Story (Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1970), p. 404.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid., p. 85.

<sup>4</sup>The New York Times Index 1968, Vol. 56 (New York: The New York Times Company, 1969), p. 180.

<sup>5</sup>"Cambodia Frees 12 U.S. Soldiers," The New York Times, December 20, 1968, p. 3. col. 1.

<sup>6</sup>"U.S. Copter, Carrying 3, Downed in North Korea," The New York Times, August 18, 1969, p. 1. col. 6.

crew members, to include Warrant Officer Malcom W. Loepke, were wounded. These three soldiers were released on December 3, 1969, after Major General Arthur H. Adams signed a U.S. apology for the crew's "criminal acts," an apology insisted upon by the North Koreans in an effort to further their claim that the crew confessed to being "sent to infiltrate North Korea."<sup>7</sup> General Adams immediately repudiated his apology at a news conference outside the demilitarized zone. In a similar incident, two helicopter pilots were downed on May 17, 1963 and released by the North Koreans a year later. North Korea had claimed espionage and the U.S. had apologized.<sup>8</sup>

A light Army aircraft carrying two American Army generals accidentally landed on the wrong side of the Turkish-Soviet border on October 21, 1970 due to navigational error and the personnel involved were detained until November 10, 1970.<sup>9</sup>

On March 4, 1971, four American airmen radar technicians were kidnapped by the Turkish People's Liberation Army terrorists, who demanded a \$400,000 ransom, which the United States refused to pay.<sup>10</sup> One airman wrote a ransom note saying, "If you have any idea of not doing what they want, please reconsider," and another added, "We would like to live."<sup>11</sup> Although the terrorists threatened to execute the captives,

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<sup>7</sup>"Three Americans Released by the North Koreans Are On Way to Hospital in U.S.," The New York Times, December 4, 1969, p. 5, col. 3.

<sup>8</sup>"U.S. Copter Carrying 3, Downed in North Korea," The New York Times, August 18, 1969, p. 1, col. 6.

<sup>9</sup>"Hostage Generals: A Closed Case But-," U.S. News & World Report, 69:21 (November 23, 1970), 39.

<sup>10</sup>"4 U.S. Airmen Kidnapped by Extremists in Turkey," The New York Times, March 5, 1971, p. 1, col. 6.

<sup>11</sup>"2 Die in Ankara in Hunt for G.I.'s," The New York Times, March 6, 1971, p. 1, col. 2.



they were released on March 8, 1971.<sup>12</sup> The terrorists claimed to have met their objective of disgracing the Turkish government and showing police incompetence.<sup>13</sup>

In reviewing the next three sections of this chapter, the reader should consider the "after the fact" peaceful and warlike options and risks available to our national leaders and the potentialities of a nuclear holocaust. The reader should also attempt to place himself in the position of the persons involved and decide how he would have reacted and what he would have done. As an item of special interest, the reader should consider the information released by the armed forces and published in the American press, its helpfulness to enemy interrogators, and its effect on the captives.

With respect to the Francis Gary Powers U-2 incident, would you have:

1. Used the deadly curare needle?
2. Risked severing your legs by using the ejection seat?
3. Activated the 70 second delay explosives before attempting to climb part way out of your falling plane against the resistive G forces?
4. Used the 22 caliber pistol?

Would realistic capture training and prior knowledge of the Central Intelligence Agency's (CIA) cover story have prevented you from being so cooperative and talkative with your Russian interrogators when you were caught "red handed" with your marked flight route maps and airplane

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<sup>12</sup>"Kidnappers Free 4 G.I.'s in Turkey," The New York Times, March 8, 1971, p. 1, col. 4.

<sup>13</sup>"Turkey Continues Hunt for Airmen, Rioting Subsides," The New York Times, March 6, 1971, p. 1, col. 2.

wreckage? What commitment would you have maintained to your previous military training of tell them only name, rank, service number, and date of birth; your CIA guidance of "tell them everything, otherwise they'll get it from you;" and your American citizenship?

With respect to the RB-47 incident, would you have maintained your truthful answer that you were shot down over international waters if you had received the same type of punishingly brutal beatings that were administered to the Pueblo crew? Would you have maintained complete trust in Bruce Olmstead if you were John McKone and vice versa? How important would faith in God have been in sustaining yourself during seven months of solitary confinement? How many Russian propaganda lies and distortions would you have put in your letters as opposed to not being able to correspond at all?

With respect to the USS Pueblo incident, would you, as Commander Lloyd Bucher, have returned fire, manually scuttled and sunk your ship, or surrendered? How real were the Korean beatings and particularly the death threats in compelling the crew to produce false propaganda? How much responsibility for the Pueblo incident rests with the crew as opposed to their naval superiors, the national intelligence community, and the president? Did the crew live up to the Article V Code of Conduct phrase "TO THE UTMOST OF MY ABILITY?" Should America's highest military and civilian leaders have authorized a United States Army Major General to sign a false acknowledgment of the Pueblo's wrong doing in order to obtain the crew's release while implying that the crew failed to live up to the Code of Conduct?

## THE U-2 INCIDENT

Brainwashing, drugs, and torture [have] been the lot of prisoners in the past.... As [U-2] pilots, we were not only unprepared for capture, we were ill-prepared, in many ways a much worse situation. The [Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)] advice "You may as well tell them everything, because they're going to get it out of you anyway" was, under the circumstances, bad.... Because I [Francis Gary Powers] believed the Russians knew a great deal more than they probably did, I may well have told them far more than was necessary.... At no point in my agency training was I instructed on how to handle myself during an interrogation.<sup>14</sup>

It can be argued that U-2 pilot Francis Gary Powers, a General Service 12 (GS-12) civilian employee under contract to the CIA, was an espionage agent.<sup>15</sup> As such, his case has no applicability to the military services and the Code of Conduct. But, consider the employment circumstances of this controversial pilot.

In May 1956, Reserve First Lieutenant Powers, then an active duty pilot with exceptional pilot ratings, was recruited into the CIA's U-2 program with the direct assistance of the Air Force. Powers voluntarily entered this risky, but patriotic program because he loved to fly. Then too, his current monthly take-home pay of over \$400 as a lieutenant became \$1,500 or \$2,500 per month gross as a U-2 pilot, depending on whether he was assigned in the U.S. or overseas.<sup>16</sup> He always considered himself as a pilot, not a spy. He was hired as a pilot, not an espionage agent.<sup>17</sup> Secretary of the Air Force, Donald A. Quarles cosigned a document

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<sup>14</sup>Francis Gary Powers, Operation Overflight (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1970), pp. 366-367.

<sup>15</sup>Powers, p. 38.

<sup>16</sup>Powers, pp. 4-7, 20.

<sup>17</sup>Powers, pp. 13, 367.

guaranteeing his planned return to active duty service upon contract completion with the equivalent rank and retirement time of his contemporaries.<sup>18</sup>

The U-2 remained an Air Force plane, without external identification marks, even though it flew for the CIA. The Soviets dubbed it "The Black Lady of Espionage."<sup>19</sup> Its parts bore the names of American manufacturers such as Pratt & Whitney, General Electric, and Hewlett-Packard. The fueling hatch was stencilled "Fuel only with MIL-D-25524A."<sup>20</sup>

As a cover for high altitude operations, Powers' U-2 unit was officially called the Second Weather Observation Squadron (Provisional), or Detachment 10-10. It was commanded by a USAF colonel, with a CIA civilian executive officer. The USAF provided logistics support while the CIA planned and ran the operations.<sup>21</sup> His unit in Incirlik, Turkey was visited by Air Force Chief of Staff Thomas D. White and the commander of United States Air Force, Europe, General Frank F. Everest.<sup>22</sup>

While in the Air Force, Powers had attended survival school at Hazelhurst, Georgia and advanced survival training at Stead Air Force Base, Nevada in 1953. Some of the Stead training included Korean War POW experiences and brainwashing techniques, training Powers hoped he would never have to use. He later received atomic munitions delivery procedures training and was assigned a specific nuclear target behind the Iron Curtain.<sup>23</sup>

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<sup>18</sup>Powers, pp. 26-27.

<sup>19</sup>Powers, picture, p. 185.

<sup>20</sup>Powers, pp. 136-137.

<sup>21</sup>Powers, pp. 37-44.

<sup>22</sup>Powers, p. 112.

His only CIA "capture" type training consisted of a week's evasion and escape procedures at a "safe house," where he was taught how to breach electrical fences and mine fields.<sup>24</sup> The CIA provided no resistance or interrogation guidance in how to behave if captured other than:

a. If evasion is not feasible and capture appears imminent, pilots should surrender without resistance and adopt a cooperative attitude toward their captors.

b. At all times while in the custody of their captors, pilots will conduct themselves with dignity and maintain a respectful attitude toward their superiors.

c. Pilots will be instructed that they are perfectly free to tell the full truth about their mission with the exception of certain specifications of the aircraft. They will be advised to represent themselves as civilians, to admit previous Air Force affiliation, to admit current CIA employment, and to make no attempt to deny the nature of their mission.<sup>25</sup>

Powers' activities between 1956 and May 1, 1960 are rather sketchy. Like other U-2 pilots, he probably flew a number of weather and atomic radiation sampling missions, as well as some Soviet border surveillance flights. He did conduct a number of flights into the Soviet Union, the importance of which increased when the Soviets launched their first intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) and Sputnik in 1957. Post flight analysis of the recording instruments indicated that the Russians were tracking and firing missiles at the U-2's.<sup>26</sup> Additionally, he flew "special missions" over such politically sensitive tension spots as the Suez Canal during the 1956 take over, the Sinai Campaign of October-November 1956, Cyprus, Lebanon in 1968, and Yemen in

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<sup>24</sup>Powers, pp. 35-36.

<sup>25</sup>Powers, p. 315.

<sup>26</sup>Powers, pp. 63-69.

1959.<sup>27</sup> For these exploits, along with the other U-2 pilots, Powers was told that he had been awarded the Distinguished Flying Cross. His military records would be appropriately annotated.<sup>28</sup>

On May 1, 1960, Powers attempted to fly the first U-2 all the way across the Soviet Union. During this flight, his plane was disabled by a Soviet missile at an altitude in excess of 68,000'. The G forces pushed his body forward and prevented him from using his ejection seat, for fear of severing his legs three inches above the knees. He did not activate the plane's delayed fuzing self-destruct explosives before struggling part-way out of the cockpit, and then the G forces and a frosted face mask prevented him from reaching the 70 second delay switch.<sup>29</sup> Even had he activated the explosive timer, the U-2's two-and-a-half pounds of explosives were incapable of destroying all of the recording instruments or the plane itself.<sup>30</sup>

Powers has been criticized for not committing suicide, but suicide was not part of his CIA contract. This was the first flight on which he ever carried the deadly curare needle, but it was his option to carry the needle and his option to use it, mainly to prevent torture.<sup>31</sup> Powers claimed that he would have used the needle if he had been so ordered, or he would not have taken the flight.<sup>32</sup> Powers carried the needle

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<sup>27</sup>Powers, pp. 307-311.

<sup>28</sup>Powers, p. 63.

<sup>29</sup>Powers, pp. 73-84.

<sup>30</sup>Powers, pp. 353, 365.

<sup>31</sup>The Russians tested the needle on a dog by pricking the dog's upper left hind leg. Sixty seconds later the dog rolled over on its side. At ninety seconds, the dog stopped breathing. A horrible paralysis of the respiratory system had occurred. The heart stopped after three minutes and the dog died. Powers, pp. 143, 183.

<sup>32</sup>Powers, pp. 69, 77, 324.

on this particular flight because he knew that this U-2, #360, was a temperamental "dog." Due to a malfunctioning autopilot, a mission abort situation, he almost returned to his starting base, but he was then 1,300 miles inside Russia and the weather was good.<sup>33</sup>

While parachuting to the ground, he tore his marked flight suit map into little pieces. He barely avoided hitting a power line as he landed in a plowed field and slammed his head on the ground. Two nearby farmers helped him to his feet and he was shortly surrounded by 20 or 30 school children. He did not use his readily available 22 caliber survival pistol, which was equipped with a silencer. He allowed the Russians to remove the pistol from the outside of his flight suit.<sup>34</sup>

Shortly after landing, Powers was hustled off in a small car. He described himself as being "terrifically tense, extremely tired [and perhaps] in a state of mild shock."<sup>35</sup> He was humiliated by thorough physical examinations administered by women doctors.<sup>36</sup> The only thing that Powers knew for sure was that "sooner or later they [the Russians] would kill me."<sup>37</sup> He also became aware of the fact that "no one knew where I was" and no one could help him.<sup>38</sup>

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<sup>33</sup>Powers, pp. 68, 76-77, 81.

<sup>34</sup>Powers, pp. 88-90. As Powers parachuted to the ground, he removed the curare needle from its silver dollar hiding place and slipped it into his flight suit pocket. He had access to the needle for about three hours after capture, when the Russians finally found it. He then voluntarily warned them about its contents, because he "didn't want to be responsible for the death of any human being, KGB [Russian secret police] or not," implying that he might not have used his pistol to kill anyone, even if he had the chance. Powers, 88, 92, 94, 102.

<sup>35</sup>Powers, p. 90.

<sup>36</sup>Powers, pp. 92, 94, 99, 101.

<sup>37</sup>Powers, p. 97.

<sup>38</sup>Powers, p. 108.

A few hours after being captured, he saw the flight route navigational maps which had been recovered from the cockpit or the crash scene, along with some additional maps which he did not know were aboard the U-2.<sup>39</sup> His captured survival seat pack contained an American flag, which was overprinted with "I am an American. . ." in 14 languages.<sup>40</sup> His wallet contained an Air Force civilian identification card imprinted with his 10-10 Detachment number, a National Aeronautics and Space Administration card, U.S. and international driver's licenses, Selective Service and Social Security cards, American, German, and Turkish currency, and other things. After four years of successful U-2 missions, he had become complacent, security wise.<sup>41</sup>

Later that day, Powers was flown to Moscow and locked up in Lubyanka Prison, the headquarters of the Russian Secret Police (KGB). The interrogators were not too concerned about his initial story in which he claimed that he had lost his bearings while piloting a weather plane from Pakistan to Turkey and accidentally flew over the border. They wanted him to admit that he was a military pilot (meaning an aggressor and the lead element of an American invasion), not a civilian pilot (meaning a spy) as indicated on his Air Force civilian employee card. After seeing his recovered navigational maps, he quickly changed his cover story and admitted to being a civilian employee of the CIA.<sup>42</sup>

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<sup>39</sup>Powers, p. 94.

<sup>40</sup>Powers, pp. 45, 90.

<sup>41</sup>Powers, p. 95.

<sup>42</sup>Powers, pp. 91-99.



Powers now decided that, when questioned, he would tell the truth, up to a point. If he told the truth about little things, maybe he could cover up the big things, such as his real flight altitude, Air Force atomic munitions delivery training, politically sensitive "special missions," and previous Russian overflights. He steadfastly protected the U-2's actual maximum altitude and his own altitude at the time of missile impact by continually maintaining that he was shot down at the U-2's maximum flight altitude of 68,000' (both lies, yet relatively realistic figures). He emphasized the fact that he was just a pilot, who activated instrumentation switches according to the flight plan. He was not an intelligence agent or spy. Powers maintained that he knew nothing about the special equipment which the U-2 carried. He acknowledged that he had made legal border surveillance eavesdropping flights to account for his activities of the past four years and to prevent disclosure of his other overflights. He disclaimed any knowledge of what kind of intelligence data was gathered. Powers did not know why his flight was flown so close to the approaching summit meeting between President Dwight Eisenhower and Premier Nikita Khrushchev on May 16, 1960, an important question which the Russians repeatedly asked. Powers believed that the answers he gave established his credibility and represented a realistic middle ground approach between his service training of interrogation silence and the CIA intelligence officer's instructions "tell them everything because they're going to get it out of you anyway."<sup>43</sup> His biggest problem with half truths and lies was to remember what he had previously said.<sup>44</sup>

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<sup>43</sup>Powers, p. 102.

<sup>44</sup>Powers, pp. 99-108.

Powers was relatively well treated, perhaps because of his apparent cooperativeness. The Russians took him on a tour of Moscow during his second day of captivity.<sup>45</sup> They were very anxious about the fact that he could not force himself to eat during his first seven days because of a lack of appetite.<sup>46</sup> His cell in Lubyanka Prison was lighted 24 hours a day, but he was allowed to use a handkerchief as a blindfold at night.<sup>47</sup> He asked for and received a Bible and other books by such authors as Agatha Christie, Rex Stout, and Ellery Queen.<sup>48</sup>

His interrogations began in earnest on May 3, 1960, and averaged 11 hours a day, morning, afternoon, and evening. He received some respite while an interpreter translated the interrogator's questions and Powers' replies. He gained extra time by occasionally asking his own questions. At random times, Powers judiciously used a request for a glass of water or a trip to the toilet as a fake questioning decoy or sometimes to avoid some questions or sensitive areas which he hoped the interrogator would not pursue after the interruption. He refused to answer whether he had notified his home base that his plane had been hit.<sup>49</sup>

His two primary interrogators used the Mutt and Jeff routine, with one being impatient and threatening while the other was sympathetic and kind. Powers recognized this routine, but he part way succumbed to it in spite of knowing what the interrogators were attempting to do. He

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<sup>45</sup>Powers, p. 107.

<sup>46</sup>Powers, pp. 114, 124.

<sup>47</sup>Powers, p. 109.

<sup>48</sup>Powers, pp. 115, 127, 153.

<sup>49</sup>Powers, pp. 110, 113-114, 128-129.

answered questions which the Soviets could obviously find out from the free press, made up some lies, frequently said that he did not know, and did not volunteer information.<sup>50</sup> The interrogators could not believe that he had no names, addresses or letter drops for Russian underground contacts. He was required to initial each page of the previous day's interrogations, which were written in Russian, a language he could not speak or read.<sup>51</sup>

In early May, he suddenly asked the interrogators "Why should I talk to you? You're going to kill me anyway.... There's no way out of this for me." [And they replied] "there may be a way," but Powers could only think of defection to Russia or becoming a double agent.<sup>52</sup> The possibility of a spy swap had not yet entered his mind.

He was told of Premier Khrushchev's speech announcing his capture and his parents' reply to that speech. His parents' quoted newspaper response was so typical that he then knew that the outside world knew of his captivity.<sup>53</sup>

However, the American press often supplied the Russians with information that they used in an attempt to shake his responses or to prove that he was lying. For example, he had told the Russians that he had never taken a lie detector test, but the New York Times said that "...all the CIA job applicants are required to take polygraph tests."<sup>54</sup> He explained away this apparent lie by saying that agents may have to take the tests, but not pilots like himself who merely fly airplanes.

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<sup>50</sup>Powers, pp. 110-123.

<sup>51</sup>Powers, pp. 121, 125.

<sup>52</sup>Powers, p. 132.

<sup>53</sup>Powers, p. 133.

<sup>54</sup>Powers, p. 135.

In truth, he had taken a CIA polygraph test.<sup>55</sup>

In the middle of May, his interrogators took him to Moscow's public display of his wrecked U-2, and asked him questions about the parts and components, but he claimed that that was the first time he had seen the recording instruments and that he knew nothing about how they operated.<sup>56</sup> His formal interrogation lasted 61 days until June 30, 1960.<sup>57</sup> In early July, Powers was again questioned about RB-47 electronic intelligence flights, but he did not know that the Russians had shot down an RB-47 on July 1, 1960 and captured two crewmen.<sup>58</sup>

On August 17, 1960, the date of Powers' thirty-first birthday, his public trial began, with a maximum penalty of death. Even if he pleaded guilty and refused to testify, the prosecution would still read his interrogation transcripts into the record. His refusal to testify would be held against him. In effect, he testified against himself by answering the prosecutor's questions. His defense attorney did not object to any question asked. Whereas the prosecution had interrogated him for more than 1,000 hours, his own defense attorney had not talked with him for more than five hours. Powers' wife and parents attended the trial, as well as a large number of press and television people. During this large propaganda extravaganza of a trial, Powers remained very polite and cooperative. He was sentenced to ten years imprisonment in Vladimir Prison. Powers' voluntary surrender, truthful statements, and "sincere" repentance were mentioned as mitigating circumstances.<sup>59</sup>

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<sup>55</sup> Powers, p. 23.

<sup>56</sup> Powers, p. 136.

<sup>57</sup> Powers, p. 146.

<sup>58</sup> Powers, p. 152.

<sup>59</sup> Powers, pp. 148-195.

After the trial, he was allowed a three hour conjugal visit with his wife.<sup>60</sup> He also wrote a Soviet requested letter to the New York Times in an effort to clarify an incorrect post-trial statement by his father. In this letter, Powers reiterated that he was shot down at his maximum altitude of 68,000', while the New York Times footnoted Powers' letter saying that military experts in the United States have said that 68,000' "was substantially under the maximum altitude of the plane, a fact that should have been known to Mr. Powers."<sup>61</sup>

Powers' Vladimir Prison cellmate was a multilingual Latvian named Zigurd Kruminsh, who also spoke Russian and English. After World War II, the British intelligence service recruited and trained Zigurd and returned him to the Latvian underground, where he was caught and sentenced to 15 years imprisonment for treason.<sup>62</sup>

The Vladimir Prison routine consisted of two hours of exercise per day, in which pigeon feeding was a major pastime, and two daily trips to a "bomb sight" toilet that was flush with the floor. The two cellmates used a five gallon can for human waste during the intervals between these latrine breaks. The prison inmates used a wall tapping code to communicate between cells.

Breakfast consisted of hot tea, soup (fish, which Powers could not stomach, or dried pea), porridge (manna like Cream of Wheat, boiled oats, barley, millet, or buckwheat), and a daily supply of black or rye bread. Powers gave his black bread to Zigurd. Lunch consisted of an

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<sup>60</sup>Powers, pp. 198-199.

<sup>61</sup>Powers, pp. 201-202.

<sup>62</sup>Powers, pp. 205-209.

excellent soup, a main course such as cabbage, noodles, rice, mashed potatoes or manna, and a special treat of a half tin of milk in deference to Powers' presence. For supper, the prisoners received cabbage or boiled potatoes. This menu was supplemented by a thumbnail size cube of meat per week. The American Embassy sent a 17 pound food package monthly and Powers was allowed to purchase such local items as white bread, margarine, or butter, when they were available in the prison commissary. Even though a doctor or nurse visited him weekly, Powers still lost the use of his central vision, perhaps due to a vitamin deficiency. His cellmate, Zigurd, who had also suffered similar vision problems, asked his parents to send some vitamin pills, and these pills restored Powers' full sight. He received clean sheets, socks, and underwear every five days and a shower every ten days.<sup>63</sup>

At 6 AM each day, the radio speaker in his cell began broadcasting radio Moscow and this broadcast continued until 10 PM, excluding the period 2:30 to 4 PM. The volume on the speaker could be turned down, but not turned off. The Russians even went to the trouble of providing him with English language reading books from the Moscow University Library. Additionally, he participated in one of the small scale prison manufacturing processes, and made envelopes in his cell. He rationed himself to 250 envelopes per day, in order to be able to make more envelopes the next day. He also made some small rugs from burlap bags and wool and wrote a daily journal and diary, parts of which were mentally encoded to serve as a memory aid upon completion of his sentence. Powers

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<sup>63</sup>Powers, pp. 205-214.

was allowed to write four letters a month and receive an unlimited amount of return letters. He became very despondent over his wife's frequent failure to write. Occasionally, he saw Russian movies.<sup>64</sup>

At 8:52 AM February 10, 1962, U-2 pilot Powers was rather ignominiously exchanged at the Glienicker Bridge separating Potsdam from West Berlin for convicted Russian master spy Colonel Rudolf Able, who had been convicted of espionage by an American court in 1957 and was serving a 30 year sentence in Atlanta Federal Penitentiary. Powers weighed 152 pounds, having lost about 25 pounds in captivity, yet gaining two extra inches at the waistline due to lack of exercise.<sup>65</sup>

Politically speaking, the Russians used Powers' capture as a tremendous propaganda excuse for cancelling the May 16, 1960 summit meeting between the Russian and American heads of state. This propaganda depicted America as an aggressive, imperialist warmonger, while Russia was a peaceful law abiding nation. Intelligence wise, Powers' preparation for possible capture was grossly lacking. He did not even know what the CIA's cover story would be if his plane went down.<sup>66</sup>

A post release CIA board of inquiry, conducted by retired Federal Appeals Court Judge E. Barrett Prettyman, found that Mr. Powers "was one of the outstanding pilots in the whole U-2 program... [who] lived up to the terms of his employment and instructions in connection with his mission..."<sup>67</sup> President Kennedy scheduled a White House meeting with Mr. Powers and then inexplicably cancelled it. The Senate

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<sup>64</sup>Powers, pp. 206, 215-276.

<sup>65</sup>Powers, pp. 281-292.

<sup>66</sup>Powers, 182-189, 367-369.

<sup>67</sup>Powers, 315-216, 319.

Committee on Armed Services had a special session with Powers and praised his performance. The CIA presented him with one of its highest awards, the Intelligence Star medal, for "'courageous action' and 'valor' prior to 1960."<sup>68</sup> This award was presented in April 1965, but backdated to a secret ceremony on April 20, 1963, in which several other U-2 pilots, excluding Powers, received this award. The Air Force, while offering Powers a chance to rejoin the service, reneged on Air Force Secretary Quarles' written promise of being credited with retirement longevity for his service with the CIA. It also refused to recognize his 1957 Distinguished Flying Cross.<sup>69</sup>

After returning to the United States, Powers obtained a divorce from his alcoholic (and unfaithful) wife, but the marriage had been a tenuous, troubled arrangement from the beginning, and was exacerbated by his overseas separations.<sup>70</sup>

#### THE RB-47 INCIDENT

Two months to the day following Francis Gary Powers' ill-fated U-2 flight, a Russian MIG shot down an American Strategic Air Command (SAC) RB-47 electronic reconnaissance aircraft which was flying at an altitude of 30,000' over international waters above the Barents Sea on July 1, 1960. The MIG pilot was awarded the Order of the Red Banner for shooting down the RB-47.<sup>71</sup>

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<sup>68</sup>Powers, 344, 349.

<sup>69</sup>Powers, 343-344.

<sup>70</sup>Powers, 19, 273-275, 338.

<sup>71</sup>William L. White, The Little Toy Dog (New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., Inc., 1962), pp. 34-35.



The three electronic surveillance crewmen presumably crashed into the sea with the RB-47. Their bodies were never recovered. The Russians recovered the body of Major Willard Palm, the aircraft commander, on July 4th, publicly announced this recovery on July 11th, and released the body to American authorities in Moscow on July 26, 1960. Even though one of the two surviving crew members was asked to verify Major Palm's salt water soaked identification card, neither survivor was informed that Major Palm was dead.<sup>72</sup>

Meanwhile, USAF Captains John R. McKone, the navigator, and Freeman B. Olnstead, the copilot who incurred a broken back in exiting the aircraft, parachuted into the 33 degrees fahrenheit water of the Barents Sea and struggled to survive in their individual rubber dinghies.<sup>73</sup> The same Soviet fishing trawler rescued these two weak, numb officers about a half hour apart, after they had spent some six to eight hours in their survival boats. Immediately, each officer tried to communicate to the ships crew that they should continue searching for other survivors. On July 2, they were successively taken to Moscow by coast guard cutter, a land-rover type vehicle, DC-3 aircraft, and a rough riding prison truck. The Russians eventually placed them in Lubyanka Prison.<sup>74</sup>

Under separate questioning, they refused to reveal the names of their crew members, not knowing that the names, ranks, and home addresses of the six man crew had been published all over the United States and that the American public was being told that they carried "electronic

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<sup>72</sup>White, pp. 95-96, 111, 133-135.

<sup>73</sup>White, p. 44. SAC survival specialists estimate that a submerged airman could live for only 18 minutes in 33 degree waters.

<sup>74</sup>White, pp. 39-70.

equipment for checking sites and frequencies of aircraft direction systems.<sup>75</sup> The Russians would not permit them to contact the American Embassy.

McKone wore a blue, pin-striped suit for his interrogations. One captive was pitted against the other, in the sense that each was told that the other provided the desired information, therefore you should too. But the Soviets refused to allow these two to see or hear each other. They were individually interrogated at least three times daily, with each interrogation period lasting one-half to three hours or longer during their initial weeks of captivity. They came to realize that the Code of Conduct would not provide them with specific answers at the interrogation table. They had to depend on their own brain power and integrity as American officers. McKone "mulishly" attempted to give only name, rank, service number, and date of birth and was considerably shaken when the Russians told him that he was born in St. Luke's Hospital, Kansas City. His interrogator seemed to know more about the missions and staging bases of his Air Force Wing during the past ten years than his wife knew. The interrogators occasionally showed the captives pictures of their Russian children and expressed a desire that the children grow up in a peaceful world.<sup>76</sup>

As with captive U-2 pilot Powers, the Russian interrogators used interpreters to question these two officers. The interrogators frequently mentioned Powers' name during July and August, and Olmstead

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<sup>75</sup>White, pp. 75-77.

<sup>76</sup>White, 81-94.

thought he caught a glimpse of Powers in a Lubyanka hallway.<sup>77</sup> Olmstead was asked where his poison needle was and replied "I had none."<sup>78</sup> In response to a question about self-destructing explosives aboard the RB-47, Olmstead said "there were none in my equipment."<sup>79</sup> He summed up his interrogators' objectives when he told them that if they knew his unit, "...why do you ask me?" [and they replied] "We want you to say it. And if you don't we can keep you in prison forever."<sup>80</sup>

For political reasons, the Soviets did not announce the RB-47 shoot down until July 11th, when it also announced the existence of two survivors. The Russians claimed that the RB-47 was shot down over Soviet air space. The crew "would be tried with the 'full rigor' of Soviet law."<sup>81</sup> Russia sent Britain a threatening note because the RB-47 was based in Britain. Norway received a similar note because Olmstead "supposedly" said that he was to have landed there. Powers' U-2 destination had been Bodo, Norway. The Soviet note to Norway also mentioned the use of an emergency radio station.<sup>82</sup>

On July 22, the Soviet Union began discussing the RB-47 incident in the United Nations Security Council. The wives of the six crew members were present. The Russians claimed that the RB-47 was similar to those planes that regularly patrolled the Arctic with nuclear weapons,

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<sup>77</sup>White, pp. 86-91.

<sup>78</sup>White, p. 91.

<sup>79</sup>White, p. 92.

<sup>80</sup>White, p. 84.

<sup>81</sup>White, p. 104.

<sup>82</sup>White, p. 98.

that it had penetrated Soviet air space, and that it was then shot down at precisely 1803 hours Moscow time. United States Ambassador to the United Nations, Henry Cabot Lodge, then dropped a "bombshell" on the Russian delegation. Lodge claimed radar proof that the plane was still airborne 20 minutes after the Russians said it had crashed and that it had never been less than 30 miles from the Soviet coast. Lodge then requested that an international commission examine the crash site and talk to the survivors. Nine members of the Security Council voted for a similar proposal, while the Soviet Union and Poland opposed the motion, thereby negating it because the Soviet Union, as a permanent Security Council member, cast a dissenting vote.<sup>83</sup>

In the meantime, it was not until July 16th that Bruce Olmstead had his back X-rayed and was put into traction. Even after treatment, he would pass out from the pain associated with lifting his arm over his head.<sup>84</sup>

As in the case of Gary Fowers, these two fliers were asked to sign the Russian language version of their interrogation periods, because it "...was a legal requirement for [their] trial."<sup>85</sup> When Olmstead refused because the Russians had altered his replies, they explained that they were only establishing the gist of what he said. After refusing to sign for several days, Olmstead began signing the English translation of his interrogations, the words of which he attempted

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<sup>83</sup>White, pp. 115-132.

<sup>84</sup>White, pp. 105-106, 191-197.

<sup>85</sup>White, p. 216.

to have changed to correspond to his actual responses. He eventually began signing the Russian language copy of his interrogations with the annotation "This page has been translated to me in the English language."<sup>86</sup> McKone also capitulated to signing the interrogation documents, but offered this post release advice: "Don't sign anything. It does no good and can only get you in deeper."<sup>87</sup> Both officers signed statements acknowledging that they had been told of the crimes they were accused of committing. These statements, signed about July 21st, were backdated to July 5th by the Russians "to keep all their records in conformity with Soviet law."<sup>88</sup>

On August 3rd, the Soviet Embassy in Washington told their wives that they could write to their husbands. The husbands were also allowed to write letters, subject to such Soviet advice as

...first, [say] that you are in perfect health--you can discuss your injuries later--second, that you are very sorry for what you have done; third, that you feel that in the interest of world peace American planes should not again cross Soviet borders.<sup>89</sup>

A few days later, the Russians told Olmstead "We won't tell you what to write. We will only tell you what not to write."<sup>90</sup>

McKone wrote his first letter on August 3rd, and admitted in it that he overflowed the Soviet Sea border [in order to have it mailed]. Olmstead was a little more "hard headed." His interrogators told him to

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<sup>86</sup>White, p. 218.

<sup>87</sup>White, p. 219.

<sup>88</sup>White, p. 110.

<sup>89</sup>White, p. 138.

<sup>90</sup>White, p. 138.

think about what he would write. He wrote an unacceptable letter on August 6th, rewrote it on August 12th to delete a prayer he had included in it and to add some dictated phrases, and then refused to change the August 12th date or make further changes. It was mailed to his wife sometime after August 30th. Both officers thought it important to establish a letter numbering system, because some letters were neither sent nor received. The Russians told these two captives to tell their wives to limit their writing to family affairs, not international matters. McKone used the phrase "high latitude" to convey the idea to his wife and the Air Force that he had not penetrated Soviet air space. He also used his formal signature of John R. McKone, instead of John, to indicate that he was "compelled" to say certain things in some of his letters.<sup>91</sup>

Both fliers were deeply religious men. Olmstead repeatedly asked for an English language Bible, but the Soviets would not ask the American Embassy for a copy, nor did they give him the Bible sent by his parents until an hour before his release. McKone spent five minutes of his exercise period kneeling down in prayer. The Russians ignored his requests for visits by a minister, priest, or religious man.<sup>92</sup>

Both officers steadfastly adhered to their own convictions that they had not penetrated Soviet air space. They denied their interrogators the type of public trial that Powers was forced to endure. In effect, they convinced the Russians that they had not violated Soviet air space,

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<sup>91</sup>White, pp. 138-147, 286.

<sup>92</sup>White, pp. 112-113, 196.

that they had been shot down over neutral international waters, and that a public trial would be a propaganda disaster. Author White references one unconfirmed reason for the RB-47 shoot down as the fact that the Soviets were testing submarine missiles 30 to 40 miles off the Russian coast when the airplane appeared.<sup>93</sup> Then too, the MIG fighter pilot may have been over zealous in his desire to obtain his Order of the Red Banner medal.

In December, the Soviets gave these fliers more books to read, took them on tours of Moscow, and showed them some movies. In 1961, Premier Nikita Khrushchev reportedly told American newspaper columnist Drew Pearson that he would have released McKone and Olmstead in October 1960, but feared that such a release would aid the presidential election of Richard Nixon.<sup>94</sup> On January 24, 1961, just after the inauguration of President John Kennedy, the Russians released the fliers to the American Embassy in Moscow. President Kennedy announced their release at his first presidential news conference, along with accompanying remarks to the effect that there would be no more overflights. The President himself, along with the fliers wives, greeted these two returning "heroes" at Andrews Air Force Base, Washington, after they had endured seven months of solitary confinement as Russian prisoners.<sup>95</sup>

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<sup>93</sup>White, pp. 201-202.

<sup>94</sup>White, pp. 54-55 (Picture caption of Ambassador Llewellyn Thompson), 227-228.

<sup>95</sup>White, pp. 266-301.

THE USS PUEBLO INCIDENT

The North Korean attack and capture of the USS Pueblo may have been a face-saving gesture. It occurred two days after 31 North Korean Communists attempted unsuccessfully to assassinate South Korean President Chung Hee Park in the Blue House Raid of January 21, 1968, an incident about which the Pueblo crew remained ignorant.<sup>96</sup> Then too, the North Koreans may have thought that this ship was attempting to infiltrate agents into North Korea. The first North Korean boarders of the Pueblo were amazed that this ship carried a crew of 83 men.<sup>97</sup> Prior to her refitting as an electronic intelligence ship in 1967, the Pueblo had served in the South Korean Merchant Marine.<sup>98</sup>

About noon on January 23, 1968, the Pueblo was approached by a fully armed North Korean sub chaser, the crew of which was at its General Quarters Battle Stations. The Pueblo was then located about 16 miles from the nearest land off Wonsan harbor in 180 feet of water. As a precautionary measure, Commander Lloyd Bucher, the ship's Captain, ordered his two civilian oceanographers to visibly perform their tasks, which provided a plausible cover for the Pueblo as an oceanographic research vessel performing her tasks on the high seas in international waters. After the Pueblo had hoisted her U.S. flag, she was ordered to "Heave to or I will fire" by the North Koreans, whose strength had

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<sup>96</sup> "North Korea: A New Belligerence," Time, 91:5, February 2, 1968), 32.

<sup>97</sup> Lloyd Bucher, Bucher: My Story (Garden City, New York: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1970), pp. 212, 220.

<sup>98</sup> Daniel V. Gallery, The Pueblo Incident (Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1970), pp. 1-3.



increased to two sub chasers, four torpedo boats, and two MIGs. North Korean 57-mm cannon shells and machine gun fire then raked the decks of the Pueblo. Bucher was wounded and a red-hot sliver of shrapnel pierced his rectum. One man died and another was badly wounded. The crew's two Korean linguists, who had taken a 16 week Korean language course, were not proficient enough to translate what the Koreans were saying prior to the attack. The North Koreans boarded the Pueblo, tied and blindfolded the crew, and took the ship to Wonsan harbor, arriving there about 8:30 PM. Just before boarding, the Pueblo crew was reminded of the Code of Conduct and told to give no information other than name, rank, service number, and date of birth.<sup>99</sup>

Upon arrival in Wonsan, the crew was spit upon by North Korean crowds and continued to be pummeled by rifle butts, judo chops, and painful kicks from the guards. The North Koreans then placed the crew on a train and took them to a prison compound.<sup>100</sup>

The initial period of confinement was a terrifying time for the crew. They were "carefully beaten and abused just enough to fill them with horror at what might be coming later."<sup>101</sup> Within 48 hours of his capture, Bucher made a tape recording and signed a confession admitting to spying within North Korean territorial waters. Threats were very real, such as "You are a spy! You are a spy! You must confess! You must confess! You will be shot!.... You will be shot!...."<sup>102</sup> A

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<sup>99</sup>Bucher, pp. 174-218.

<sup>100</sup>Bucher, pp. 218-225.

<sup>101</sup>Gallery, p. 67.

<sup>102</sup>Bucher, p. 222.

pistol was placed next to Bucher's head, while he whispered "I love you, Rose! [his wife]..."<sup>103</sup> The pistol "misfired." Bucher was then beaten unconscious with kicks and blows to the stomach, small of the back, testicles, and kidneys. He screamed and retched, and urinated blood when he regained consciousness. He finally gave into his captors' demands after being shown the mangled, pulpy body of a still alive South Korean who was pinned to a torture wall, an "eyeball [dangling] out of its socket in a dark ooze of fluid coagulating on his cheek."<sup>104</sup> Bucher was prepared to have these Communist animals do these things to him, but not to his men while he was forced to watch. He signed a propaganda confession and then attempted to drown himself in a bucket of water in his room, after he broke the layer of ice above the water.<sup>105</sup> Beatings, false confessions, and international propaganda news conferences became a way of life. Boils, dysentery, and a form of scurvy spread among the crew. Men uncontrollably defecated in their pants. Flies, mosquitoes, and lice abounded as the weather became warmer.<sup>106</sup> Bucher's weight dropped from 205 pounds when captured to 127 pounds at the time of his release.<sup>107</sup>

Bucher's captured personnel records showed that he had attended the Navy's CIC (Combat Information Center) School. To the North Koreans, CIC was as good as CIA, and hence he became a CIA agent in their minds.<sup>108</sup>

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<sup>103</sup>Bucher, p. 240.

<sup>104</sup>Bucher, p. 243.

<sup>105</sup>Bucher, 247-248.

<sup>106</sup>Ed Brandt, The Last Voyage of USS Pueblo (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1969), pp. 148-149.

<sup>107</sup>Bucher, p. 372.

<sup>108</sup>Bucher, pp. 230-231.

By late April 1968, the crew had written 102 letters to their sweethearts, families, senators, and even President Lyndon Johnson.

In one letter, Ensign Timothy Harris wrote:

Don't worry about me, because I am being treated well.... The Pueblo was captured in the act of collecting intelligence in the territorial waters of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. The penalty for espionage...is death. [For us to return home,] the U.S. government [must] admit its crime, apologize and give assurance that it will not happen again. [Otherwise,] we will be executed...even as a grown man I have broken into tears many times.<sup>109</sup>

In a propaganda letter to President Johnson, Bucher inserted "...I carry out my orders to the letter...because I am a man of my word." meaning that he is an honorable man who never entered North Korean waters and that the rest of this letter is propaganda.<sup>110</sup> The whole crew signed a letter of apology to the Korean people.<sup>111</sup> Bucher's final confession in September 1968 admitted to 16 incursions into North Korean territorial waters and included references to such famous per- sanges, things, and oaths as The Great Speckled Bird, Commander Buzz Sawyer (Bucher's claimed boss), Fleet General Barney Google, Sol Lox- finger (of the CIA), the fickle finger, and So Help Me Hanna (the last words of his confession, like "So Help Me, God").<sup>112</sup> In another letter, he sent his best regards to Nick and Lotta O'Blarney.<sup>113</sup>

The crew's daily lives were governed by the nine Rules of Life, which included:

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<sup>109</sup>"North Korea: A Strange Correspondence," Time, 91:15 (April 12, 1968), 30.

<sup>110</sup>Bucher, pp. 323-324.

<sup>111</sup>Bucher, pp. 301-307.

<sup>112</sup>Bucher, pp. 426-433.

<sup>113</sup>Bucher, p. 335.

g. You must not talk loudly or sing in your room.

h. You must not sit or lie on the floor or bed except during prescribed hours but should sit on the chair.

i. You will entertain yourself only with the culture provided.<sup>114</sup>

The men could be punished for false statements, refusing to answer questions, inciting others to resist, communicating between rooms, disrespect to the guards, or any other offense.<sup>115</sup> They did play touch football and basketball and in October they were entertained by Korean acrobats and tumblers and an army band and chorus. They also went to the Pyongyang Grand Theater of the People and the Sinchon Museum of Imperialist Atrocities, where they saw Korean War germ warfare displays. The North Koreans evidently expected to release the Pueblo crew before the end of October, but this plan was changed for some reason or other.<sup>116</sup>

The crew retained their pen knives, but did not attempt to escape, nor were they able to make all of the parts needed for a radio. One crew member killed a guard's favorite plant by watering it with urine for several weeks. Stealing by one of the guards was cured by baiting him with a urine impregnated apple. A North Korean propaganda film gave them the idea of the Hawaiian Good-Luck Sign, otherwise known as "the finger."<sup>117</sup> As a sign of resistance, the men displayed the finger in an officially released North Korean photo that was eventually carried by Associated Press and published in Time magazine, with a short explanation specifically calling attention to the unusual positioning of some

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<sup>114</sup>Bucher, p. 281.

<sup>115</sup>Bucher, p. 281.

<sup>116</sup>Bucher, pp. 247-250.

<sup>117</sup>Brandt, pp. 143-145, 180-187, 150-155.

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of the middle fingers of the crew.<sup>118</sup> The North Koreans later learned that the crew used the Hawaiian Good-Luck Sign to defy them, to make North Korea "lose face" in the United States. As a result, the North Koreans initiated Hell Week in early December and Marine Corporal Hammond, the staunchest resistor, attempted suicide by slashing his wrist.<sup>119</sup> Bucher passed the word that the crewmen were "to resist to their utmost betraying the activities of their shipmates, [but] one or two of [the] men cracked and blabbered out all the details of their own and their shipmates' transgressions."<sup>120</sup> Some of the men were beaten into a senseless heap, and Bucher was beaten twice a day for several days, but the end of their captivity was fast approaching.

At 11:30 AM December 23, 1968, Commander Bucher started walking across Freedom Bridge from North to South Korea while loudspeakers broadcasted his own tape-recorded confession: "I am Commander Lloyd Bucher, captain of the USS Pueblo...who was captured while carrying out espionage activities...our act was a criminal act...."<sup>121</sup> Eighty-one men with heads bowed (as instructed by their captors) and one coffin followed him at 20' intervals. The crew arrived in San Diego at 2 PM Christmas Eve.

The crew's release was obtained when Major General G. H. Woodward, the chief U.S. negotiator at Panmunjom, signed a North Korean dictated

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<sup>118</sup>"Picture of 8 Pueblo Crew Members," Time, 92:16 (October 18, 1968), 38. Also see photo section in Brandt's book.

<sup>119</sup>Brandt, p. 222.

<sup>120</sup>Bucher, pp. 356-358.

<sup>121</sup>Brandt, p. 232.

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apology, which said in part:

The Government of the United States of America, acknowledging the validity of the confessions of the crew of the USS Pueblo and of the documents of evidence produced by the representative of the government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to the effect....<sup>122</sup>

After signing this apology, General Woodward immediately repudiated it. It is interesting to note that in September 1968 General Woodward told his father that the U.S. could not indulge in lies, while his father urged him to apologize and then repudiate the apology.<sup>123</sup>

At the Navy's post release Court of Inquiry, Bucher presented what he considered irrefutable testimony that the Code of Conduct did not apply to the officers and men of the USS Pueblo. The Navy even said that the code did not apply in the Pueblo incident, and then the Navy reversed itself a few days later. Bucher recommended that Articles IV and V be reviewed.<sup>124</sup>

The five admirals composing the Court of Inquiry had all seen action during the Korean War in the vicinity of Wonsan harbor. They were concerned that Bucher had surrendered the Pueblo without firing a shot in return. It did not seem to matter to them that his two 50 caliber machine guns were very exposed to enemy fire and frozen at the time of the North Korean attack. Then too, covert ships and planes like the Pueblo had often been harassed by enemy ships and planes without serious incident. The Court recommended that Bucher be tried by general court-martial on five counts, but the Chief of Naval Operations reduced this recommendation to a Letter of Reprimand.<sup>125</sup> Secretary of the Navy

<sup>122</sup>Brandt, p. 228.

<sup>123</sup>Brandt, p. 172.

<sup>124</sup>Bucher, pp. 386-387, 437.

<sup>125</sup>Bucher, pp. 138-141, 211.

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John H. Chaffee, then "whitewashed" these charges (and presumably the Letter of Reprimand) by saying "They have suffered enough. No judgment regarding the guilt or innocence of any of the officers [will be made]."<sup>126</sup> According to Bucher, his recommended awards for several crew members seemed to have been lost in Navy administrative channels.<sup>127</sup>

The above examples of "peacetime" incidents generally indicate that American captives attempted to adhere to the philosophy of the Code of Conduct, but were unable to resist giving only their "NAME, RANK, SERVICE NUMBER, AND DATE OF BIRTH." The captives were unprepared for their interrogation ordeals. They tended to evaluate the realities of their situations and cooperate with the enemy when they felt that there was no other alternative. But the significance of these incidents may be considered relatively minor because of the small number of personnel involved and the fact that they were not involved in an active war. Therefore, the next chapter will examine the situation of American POWs in the undeclared Southeast Asian war in Laos and Vietnam. This environment will provide a better understanding of how effective Army Code of Conduct training is when the combatants know that there is a chance that they might become POWs.

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<sup>126</sup>Brandt, p. 235.

<sup>127</sup>Bucher, pp. 399-400.

## CHAPTER 7

### THE SOUTHEAST ASIAN CONFLICT

#### INTRODUCTION

In the Southeast Asian war in Laos and Vietnam, American POWs became political pawns with a very high propaganda value. North Vietnam refused to admit the existence of its POWs, whereas the United States wanted its POWs repatriated. Some American POWs were released to U.S. anti-war elements instead of being released to official American military representatives or the International Committee of the Red Cross. These early releases intensified American dissent over our involvement in this long war.

As a result of our Korean War experiences, the American public was better prepared to accept the fact that Southeast Asian POWs could be coerced into making televised propaganda statements. The American public also demonstrated its support for the plight of these POWs. Some Americans displayed automobile bumper stickers saying "POWS NEVER HAVE A NICE DAY." Others wore arm bracelets with the name and shoot-down or capture date of a particular POW.

By service, the number of POWs released at the conclusion of active American involvement in this war in March 1973 included 324 Air Force, 136 Navy, 76 Army, and 26 Marine Corps personnel, plus 23 civil-



ians.<sup>1</sup> Most of these personnel were officer pilots or elite Special Forces personnel. Only 71 of these POWs were enlisted men, and then most of these 71 were career noncommissioned officers.<sup>2</sup> Approximately 500 Hanoi POWs of North Vietnam were recommended for some 2,400 awards and decorations, including two (Congressional) Medals of Honor (one posthumously).<sup>3</sup> There were no courts-martial as a result of unfavorable POW actions. President Richard Nixon even invited all of the returning POWs to a reception at the White House.

As in Chapters 4 and 6, the reader should attempt to interject himself into the following brief case studies. He should ask himself how he would have reacted and what he would have done.

With respect to "Reported to Be Alive," the key issues are when to escape, how to live amicably in the same room with two other prisoners, and how to keep oneself occupied.

Major James N. Rowe's survival ordeal shows that the effects of malnutrition, disease, "give-up-itis," and early releases can be countered by a positive mental attitude and a will to resist.

The "Escapes, Early Releases, and Executions" section shows that escape from primitive confinement facilities is possible. It also raises the issue of when a POW should cooperate with the enemy in an effort to curry favor and seek release rather than continue a minimal prisoner existence and risk death by starvation, disease, or execution.

<sup>1</sup>"Let's Go Home," Soldiers, 28:4 (April 1973), 6.

<sup>2</sup>Stephen A. Rowan, They Wouldn't Let Us Die (Middle Village, New York: Jonathan David Publishers, 1973), p. 13.

<sup>3</sup>John P. Flynn, "Presentation by Major General John P. Flynn to the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College on May 15, 1974," Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: Command and General Staff College, USAF Liaison Office, 1974), p. 10.

The last two sections explain how the Hanoi POWs survived for almost nine years in some cases, yet maintained their integrity. These sections reinforce the importance of prisoner communications, a supportive chain of command, and belief in God. More importantly, these sections illustrate how these POWs made the Code of Conduct function with some modifications.

REPORTED TO BE ALIVE: LAOS 1961-1962

On May 15, 1961, Mr. Grant Wolfkill, a 38 year old NBC photographer and former World War II Marine, was flying in an Air America helicopter which made a forced landing in Laos because of mechanical problems. Mr. Ed Shore, a 27 year old former Army captain, was the pilot, while John McMorrow, a 20 year old former Navy aircraft mechanic, was the crew chief/mechanic. All three were captured by the Communist Pathet Lao. Wolfkill became the natural leader of these three, perhaps because of his age, experience in Southeast Asia, and ability to speak French, while McMorrow initially tended to follow the lead of his helicopter pilot, Shore.<sup>4</sup>

Over the next several weeks, these prisoners were often hog-tied to a stake at night, with their arms pinned behind their backs and a rope around their necks.<sup>5</sup> Wolfkill's poorly constructed boots lacerated his feet, which became severely infected. Even though Communist nurses and aid men treated his feet with aspirin and a watery weak

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<sup>4</sup>Grant Wolfkill with Jerry A. Rose, Reported To Be Alive, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1965), pp. 24-25.

<sup>5</sup>Wolfkill, pp. 56-57.

merthiolate solution, he still lost all of his toe nails and pus oozed from his feet, which looked like "putrescent meat." While washing in a river one day, a leech attached itself to his ulcerated right heel and apparently sucked out all of the pus and infection, because thereafter the sore began to heal.<sup>6</sup> This leech incident raises the unanswered question of the medical value of leeches and maggots in helping festered wounds to heal.

From the very beginning of captivity, Wolfkill urged his companions to attempt to escape with him through 50 miles of Pathet Lao infested jungles and rivers, but they declined and he was initially too feverish, weak, and footsore to attempt an escape alone. McMorrow also developed a bad case of dysentery.<sup>7</sup> After almost nine months of captivity, they had the opportunity to escape at night from their permanent jail cell with some Meo tribesmen cellmates, but Shore and McMorrow declined because they felt that this escape, which was assisted by a guard, was a trap in which the guards planned to kill them.<sup>8</sup>

These three were asked to sign some harmless statements, but they were not pressured or tortured to do this. Wolfkill signed a statement to the effect that the helicopter made an emergency landing due to mechanical failure, but to be on the safe side, he signed his name as Frank Holfskill, not Grant Wolfkill, with an almost illegible flourish.<sup>9</sup> With respect to verbal or written statements, Wolfkill developed the following policy:

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<sup>6</sup>Wolfkill, pp. 58, 74-76, 91, 101, 112, 121.

<sup>7</sup>Wolfkill, pp. 89-110.

<sup>8</sup>Wolfkill, pp. 302-306.

<sup>9</sup>Wolfkill, pp. 87-89.

I would say or sign anything that I would say or sign as a free man; I would sign nothing that I did not believe, and I would sign nothing damaging to my country or of use to the enemy. Further, I would not sign anything on the promise of good or better treatment.<sup>10</sup>

For most of their captivity they were held in a dark jail cell with sealed shutters. Their ankles were locked in stocks at night. They were allowed to toilet twice a day, used tin cans to hold their human waste in between toilet times, and were lucky if they could wash once a day without soap. They acquired sore rectums from using leaves as toilet paper and thereafter collected any scraps of paper they could find for this purpose.<sup>11</sup> It was almost a year before Wolfkill had his first shave and haircut.<sup>12</sup> Their staple meal was cold rice (often served with gobs of yellow mucus spat by the guards), rock salt, weed soup, and an ammo can of leaf and tree bark tea, with some occasional meat or dried fish, which McMorrow detested. Wolfkill lost 60 pounds on this diet. They were allowed to smoke hand rolled cigarettes. They ate charcoal in an attempt to control bouts of nauseous dysentery and to clean their teeth. They were also bothered by rats and mosquitoes.<sup>13</sup>

To pass the time of day, they played 20 questions, told of their past lives and hobbies, made a deck of cards, sang, and exercised. Shore got on Wolfkill's nerves by meticulously describing every detail about the color and consistency of his daily bowel movements.<sup>14</sup>

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<sup>10</sup>Wolfkill, p. 87.

<sup>11</sup>Wolfkill, pp. 176, 121-122.

<sup>12</sup>Wolfkill, p. 327.

<sup>13</sup>Wolfkill, pp. 289, 374, 155-157.

<sup>14</sup>Wolfkill, pp. 200-207.

Special Forces Captain Walter Moon and Sergeant Orville Ballenger were also detained in their same compound, but in separate solitary confinement cells. These two, along with Sergeants Biber and Bischoff, had been captured on April 23, 1961, when Vang Vieng was overrun. Moon was wounded in the shoulder and head, and his condition worsened in solitary confinement. He became mentally deranged and the guards shot him when he attempted to escape on a trip to the toilet. Ballenger was eventually able to toilet daily with these three, and he told them how he passed his days by making charcoal drawings, building things with pebbles and stones, observing his pet spider, and playing a monopoly-like game.<sup>15</sup>

Wolfkill, Shore, and McMorrow received a food package which the guards had pilfered. They shared part of it with Ballenger on latrine trips. Ballenger was so grateful for a small square of chocolate that he literally thought about it for hours, sniffed it, and took little bites out of its edges. The next day he said that he did not need a second square because he still had most of the first square left. They also gave him a vial of instant coffee, which he sniffed for its good aroma instead of drinking it.<sup>16</sup> They were visited once by an IRC representative from Geneva, Switzerland, from whom they vainly requested such items as blankets, clothes, better food, mail, a Bible, and more outdoor exercise.<sup>17</sup>

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<sup>15</sup>Wolfkill, pp. 130, 157-204.

<sup>16</sup>Wolfkill, pp. 215-225.

<sup>17</sup>Wolfkill, pp. 268-274.

Just before their release, the Pathet Lao permitted two Chinese journalists to interview them. Whereas the three civilians did answer questions, Sergeant Ballenger gave only his "NAME, RANK, SERVICE NUMBER, AND DATE OF BIRTH," and called his captors' bluff when they threatened not to release him unless he answered the journalists' questions. On August 17, 1962, a Russian air crew flew these prisoners and Major Lawrence R. Bailey (who joined them at the last moment) to Vientiane for their release. It was only then that they learned that a captive civilian named Duffy had starved to death and that the whereabouts of Sergeants Biber and Bischoff were still unknown.<sup>18</sup>

President John Kennedy awarded the Medal of Freedom to Wolfkill for his "boldness, tenacity, and courage in the face of probable execution ... [his] unquenchable spirit [which] elevated the morale of his fellow prisoners and tempered their will to resist...."<sup>19</sup> Major Bailey, Captain Moon (posthumously), and Sergeant Ballenger were also decorated. Wolfkill attributed a large portion of the credit for his release to the constant reminders and pressure brought to bear by his NBC radio and television network commentators such as Ed Newman and Frank McGee. These commentators reminded the American people of their captive plight. The press corps also wrote articles from such places as Vientiane, Geneva, and Washington.<sup>20</sup>

MAJOR JAMES N. ROWE

On October 29, 1963, Army Major (then lieutenant) James N. Rowe,

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<sup>18</sup>Wolfkill, pp. 351-369.

<sup>19</sup>Wolfkill, p. 373.

<sup>20</sup>Wolfkill, pp. 373-377.

Captain Humbert "Rocky" Versace, and medic Dan Pitzer were with a South Vietnamese Special Forces unit when they were wounded and captured in a battle with the Viet Cong. Whereas the enemy shot every wounded South Vietnamese soldier in the head, the wounded Americans were taken into captivity.<sup>21</sup> Over the next few years, these three were joined by five other American soldiers. In September 1965 the Viet Cong executed Captain Versace, perhaps because of his continuous "hard core" resistance, but officially in retaliation for the South Vietnamese execution of three Viet Cong terrorists in Danang.<sup>22</sup> Three of the five other soldiers died of "give-up-itis." They had lost the will to live. One of these Americans had lost 80 pounds when he arrived at Rowe's jungle camp. He was a human hulk of skin and bone who refused to eat rice, curled up in a tight ball, and never returned from the "hospital" to which he was supposedly taken. The second "give-up-itis" POW began vomiting his food, withdrew into himself, became lethargic except for latrine visits, refused to eat, became incoherent, and died. The third POW died in a similar manner.<sup>23</sup> In October 1967, Pitzer and the two other soldiers (including one prisoner who stopped eating, began vomiting, and was dying) were released in Cambodia under the Viet Cong's lenient treatment policy. Supposedly, these three had showed the right, sincere attitude whereas Rowe had unsuccessfully attempted to escape three times and would not recognize the just cause of the Viet Cong revolution.<sup>24</sup> Rowe finally escaped in December 1968, as described in Chapter 3.

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<sup>21</sup>James N. Rowe, Five Years to Freedom, The Reader's Digest, Book Section, 100:597 (January 1972), 178-180.

<sup>22</sup>Rowe, The Reader's Digest, 188-198.

<sup>23</sup>Rowe, The Reader's Digest, 202-205.

<sup>24</sup>Rowe, The Reader's Digest, 206-208.

In commenting on his POW experiences, Rowe explained that he faced a two-sided fight: physical and psychological. The enemy could constrain him physically without controlling his mind and spirit; but once they controlled a man psychologically, they controlled both his physical actions and his mental will to resist.<sup>25</sup> After one of his escapes, he found that the enemy could punish him in his already weakened state to the extent that he agreed outwardly to their terms, even though they had not conquered his internal spirit.<sup>26</sup>

With respect to the Code of Conduct, Rowe found that the Communists would teach it to a POW, but with the idea that the United States would punish a POW who violated the code. At some point during captivity, the Communists would cause a POW to violate the code. Then they would try to convince the prisoner that since he violated the code, he is an American criminal, so he may as well cooperate with them and receive better treatment. It is this type of mental torture that the POW must resist. He must also prevent himself from dwelling on his captors' subtle hints that his wife might divorce him or that the United States has forgotten him. The POW has to learn how to sustain himself. Rowe found that faith in God, his country, his government, and his fellow POWs helped sustain him. Although anti-war statements from America were disturbing, he accepted the fact that in America people are free to dissent, whereas under Communism people may not dissent. He was fighting

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<sup>25</sup>James N. Rowe, "P.O.W. in Southeast Asia," (Presentation and Question Period), Audio Tape Recording (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College Library, January 23, 1971).

<sup>26</sup>Rowe, The Reader's Digest, 202.



to preserve American freedoms.<sup>27</sup>

His other experiences were very similar to those described by other POWs under similar circumstances. He suffered from dysentery (his body was often encrusted in his own filth), beriberi, jaundice, hepatitis, and a black fungus infection which covered most of his body with sores and ate away his fingernails and toenails. Viet Cong injections of strychnine and vitamin B1 cured his beriberi and his bloated, liquid filled body shrunk to an emaciated stature of skin and bones. One particularly disliked form of punishment was the removal of his clothes and mosquito net at night so that hordes of mosquitoes attacked his body.<sup>28</sup>

The daily diet consisted of rice twice a day with some high protein nuoc mam fish sauce, occasional fish, and perhaps some vegetables four times a year. A photographer took pictures of five of the POWs eating a special Christmas meal, which consisted of a scrawny chicken, two heads of Korean cabbage, three small papayas, a type of French roll, manioc root, garlic, black pepper, and grease.<sup>29</sup>

To pass the time, Rowe kept his own diary (often with a bamboo reed for a pen and his own blood for ink), was forced to attend a Communist political indoctrination school, devised his cover story, established his own game of baseball, mentally planned American meals, and raised a couple of puppies and two baby eagles during his last year of captivity.<sup>30</sup>

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<sup>27</sup>Rowe, "P.O.W. in Southeast Asia," Audio Tape Recording.

<sup>28</sup>Rowe, The Reader's Digest, 198.

<sup>29</sup>James N. Rowe, Five Years to Freedom (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1971), pp. 240-246.

<sup>30</sup>Rowe, Five Years to Freedom, pp. 132, 286, 318.

In commenting about POW letter writing in Communist captivity, Rowe said that the first paragraph was always the same:

I have not been beaten or physically tortured.  
 I have adequate food and medication.  
 I have adequate clothing for the climate.  
 I thank the National Liberation Front for its lenient and humane treatment.<sup>31</sup>

Rowe was also grateful for having learned how to say the same thing in 25 different ways in his English classes at the U.S. Military Academy.<sup>32</sup>

#### ESCAPEES, EARLY RELEASEES, AND EXECUTIONS

In Army, Colonel Robert Rigg stated that 37 POWs had escaped or been released as of January 10, 1969.<sup>33</sup> In the Air Force/Space Digest of October 1969, Louis R. Stockstill quoted the number of escapees as being less than two dozen, with another 16 prisoners having been released by the Viet Cong and nine by the North Vietnamese in Hanoi.<sup>34</sup> As previously described in this paper, these figures appear to be accurate. Recall the trials of Grant Wolfkill, Major Bailey, and Sergeant Ballenger, as well as the seven other POWs with Major Rowe. Navy Lieutenants Charles Klusmann and Dieter Dengler escaped from Laos, while marine Sergeant James Dodson and Corporal Walter Eckes escaped from captivity in South Vietnam. Cambodia released 12 American detainees in late 1968.

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<sup>31</sup>Rowe, "P.O.W. in Southeast Asia," Audio Tape Recording.

<sup>32</sup>Rowe, "P.O.W. in Southeast Asia," Audio Tape Recording.

<sup>33</sup>Robert B. Rigg, "Celebrations: Is the Code of Conduct Dead?", Army, 19:3 (March 1969), 63. Rigg was also a prisoner of the Chinese Communists in China in 1947, and he was a staff member of the 1955 Secretary of Defense's Advisory Committee on Prisoners of War.

<sup>34</sup>Louis R. Stockstill, "The Forgotten Americans of the Vietnam War," Air Force/Space Digest, 52:10 (October 1969), 42.

On 24 November, 1963, the Viet Cong captured Army Sergeants Kenneth M. Roraback, Isaac Camacho, George E. Smith and Specialist Fifth Class Claude D. McClure at Hiephea Special Forces Camp north of Saigon. Camacho escaped in August 1965, Roraback was executed in September 1965 in retaliation for the execution of Viet Cong terrorists in Danang (similar to the execution of Captain Versace), and Smith and McClure were released in Phnompenh, Cambodia about November 30, 1965. At the time of their release, Smith and McClure expressed strong anti-war statements and wanted "to conduct a campaign to get the United States out of Vietnam."<sup>35</sup> Early release became a more modern version of "parole or special favors" under Article III of the Code of Conduct.

Specialists Fourth Class James Brigham, Thomas Jones, and PFC Donald Smith were released by the Viet Cong near Tay Ninh, South Vietnam in early 1969, while Specialist Fourth Class Willie Watkins and PFCs James Strickland and Coy Tinsley were freed in November 1969.<sup>36</sup> It would seem that these enlisted personnel were freed because of their low ranks and perhaps a cooperative attitude with their captors. Others were not so fortunate.

In June 1965, the Viet Cong executed an American soldier and in 1967 they tortured and killed an Army sergeant and Marine lieutenant shortly after their capture and just before the Viet Cong positions were overrun. In July 1969, Specialist Fourth Class Larry D. Aikens was

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<sup>35</sup>"Two Freed G.I.'s Say U.S. Should Quit Vietnam," The New York Times, December 1, 1969, p. 1, col 4.

<sup>36</sup>Eric G. Ludvigsen, "Missing, Dead or Captured," Army, 20:2 (February 1970), 30.

bludgeoned in the head by the enemy just before his hospital camp was overrun by American forces. He died two weeks later.<sup>37</sup> These incidents seem to say that POWs must be prepared to escape if their camp is about to be overrun.

Special Forces Sergeant Edward Flora, Jr., who was himself captured in July 1967, told of three Special Forces personnel whom the enemy hung upside down from a tree, doused with gasoline, and set afire. Flora also told of another soldier who had his Green Beret nailed to his head.<sup>38</sup> But these incidents seemed to have occurred early in the war, when the enemy may have been more disorganized and could not cope with POWs.

In North Vietnam, the North Vietnamese seemed to derive their biggest propaganda exploitations from the release of three groups of three POWs each to dissident anti-war groups from the United States. Lieutenant Colonel Norris M. Overly, USAF; Captain John D. Black, USAF; and Lieutenant (J.G.) David P. Metheny, USN, were released after less than six months captivity in February 1968. USAF Majors James F. Low, Fred N. Thompson, and Captain Joseph V. Carpenter, USAF, were similarly released in July 1968. Perhaps the most publicized release was that of Lieutenant Robert F. Frishman, USNR, along with Captain Wesley L. Rumble, USAF, and Seaman Douglas B. Hegdahl on August 5, 1969. These last three had been imprisoned for 15 to 26 months.<sup>39</sup> Like the

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<sup>37</sup>Ludvigsen, "Missing, Dead or Captured," 26-27.

<sup>38</sup>Rowan, pp. 98-103.

<sup>39</sup>Stockstill, "The Forgotten Americans of the Vietnam War,"

six other releasees, these POWs probably displayed sympathy to the Communist cause during their captivity and were expected to protest the war. Instead, Frishman wrote an article in The Reader's Digest telling of his bad treatment in Hanoi and explaining why he had cooperated with the enemy.<sup>40</sup> But worse than the fact that these men had apparently cooperated with the enemy was the terrible effect of their release upon the morale of the remaining POWs, some of whom had been prisoners since 1964. These early releasees were treated as heroes in the United States whereas General John Flynn and the remaining Hanoi POWs were appalled at their actions.<sup>41</sup> The Hanoi POWs had a mutual understanding that all POWs would be released by date of shoot-down or capture, with the earliest captured being released first, except for the critically sick or injured or those honorably expelled by the North Vietnamese. These nine had refused to abide by these conditions.

## THEY WOULDN'T LET US DIE

James A. Rowan's book, They Wouldn't Let Us Die, is perhaps the best written account about the POWs of North Vietnam. Its 250 pages cover the exploits of about fifty POWs and can be read as an interesting, racy novel or studied chapter by chapter to learn how these POWs endured captivity for as long as nine years in the case of Navy Lieutenant Everett Alvarez, the first airman captured in North Vietnam in 1964. Alvarez was initially fed hamburger and other types

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<sup>40</sup>Robert F. Frishman, "I was a Prisoner in Hanoi," The Reader's Digest, 95:572 (December 1969), 111-115.

<sup>41</sup>The Code of Conduct - General Officer Briefing, Special Elective R-235, A Video Cassette Briefing and Discussion with Major General John P. Flynn and Rear Admiral Jeremiah Denton, (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College Audio-Visual Support Center, May 16, 1974).

of American food, but not for long.<sup>42</sup>

At the time of capture, many of the pilot POWs had broken arms or legs. The local peasants stripped them to their underwear and often stoned, kicked, beat them with sticks, and spat upon them until they were turned over to military authorities. Before the North Vietnamese government offered a reward for captured Americans, Commander Robert Doremus said that the peasants often killed the captives.<sup>43</sup>

Doctor (Major) Floyd Kushner told of men dying in his arms within two weeks of telling him that they couldn't take it any longer-- the "give-up-itis" disease.<sup>44</sup> At one point or another, most of the POWs felt that suicide would be better than the torture they were enduring, but they could not kill themselves. Colonel Robinson Risner reasoned that suicide was against his religious beliefs and he also knew that he was still a father to his children and a husband to his wife. He used these arguments with himself when he was tempted to commit suicide. He had to support his family when he was released. He had things that he wanted to rectify and new things that he wanted to do upon release.<sup>45</sup>

Rats, cockroaches, and lice were the continuous cellmates of these POWs and solitary confinement often became a way of life. Their staple diet consisted of rice, cabbage, or pumpkin; along with soup, a

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<sup>42</sup>Rowan, pp. 68-69.

<sup>43</sup>Rowan, pp. 34-40, 102, 131-132, 158-159.

<sup>44</sup>Rowan, p. 39.

<sup>45</sup>Robinson Risner, The Passing of the Night: My Seven Years as a Prisoner of the North Vietnamese (New York: Ballantine Books, 1973), pp. 110-111.

small loaf of bread, and a quart of water a day. Sometimes, they received bamboo shoots, peanuts, or kohlrabi (cattle food in the U.S., which some health enthusiasts eat).<sup>46</sup> More than 90% of these POWs needed facial or oral dental treatment upon their release because of physical abuse or rocks in their rice.<sup>47</sup> All were affected by weight loss and dysentery. One POW even coughed up a ten inch stomach worm.<sup>48</sup>

In combating boredom, one POW grew orange tree seedlings in his cell, using two handfuls of dirt collected in his cell for soil, but the rats ate the tree shoots. Other POWs tended some cucumber plants in their exercise yard and used their own excrement for fertilizer. All of them thoroughly reviewed their lives. Another POW stretched his meals into one-and-a-half-hour "feasts" to help pass the time.<sup>49</sup>

The key element that kept these POWs together was their faith in each other and their ability to communicate. Occasionally, they used the Morse Code, but more commonly they talked between their cell walls with the Tap Code. The Tap Code deleted the letter K ("C" or "X" could replace it) from the alphabet and symmetrically arrayed the remaining letters in alphabetical order five letters across and five letters down:

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<sup>46</sup>Rowan, pp. 19-20.

<sup>47</sup>"POW Dental Ills," Army Times, December 31, 1975, p. 10.

<sup>48</sup>Rowan, p. 78.

<sup>49</sup>Rowan, pp. 93-94, 110.

A . . .	B ..	C ...	D ....	E .....
F . . .	G .. ..	H ... .	I .. ....	J .. .....
L ... .	M ... ..	N ... . .	O ... .....	P ... .....
Q .... .	R ..... .	S ..... .	T ..... .	U ..... .
V ..... .	W ..... .	X ..... .	Y ..... .	Z ..... .

This code could be tapped on walls, between touching hands, or with a POW's feet. They also passed notes under lavatory buckets and used cups or cone shaped megaphones made from towels or paper to concentrate their voices on a wall, yet muffle the voice sound so that guards could not hear it outside their cells. For writing material, they used match heads, the lead in toothpaste tubes, and a ground brick or charcoal solution.<sup>50</sup>

Even in their solitary confinement, they held church services by having the Senior Ranking Officer (SRO) tap on the wall when all the men were to begin church. They would then repeat the "Lord's Prayer," the "Pledge of Allegiance," et cetera. If they could hear each other, their spirit of oneness was increased. Otherwise, they derived a spirit of unity by knowing that their fellow POWs were praying at the same time. When they were eventually combined into larger cell groups, church services became more formal with a choir and preacher.<sup>51</sup>

There were some unsuccessful escape attempts. Before arriving in a permanent POW compound, two POWs stole two boats on the South China

<sup>50</sup>Rowan, pp. 17, 85.

<sup>51</sup>Rowan, pp. 118, 244-246.



Ses, but the boats sank. The escape of two other POWs from a permanent compound was similar to that of German POW Reinhold Pabel from a U.S. POW compound during World War II, as discussed in Chapter 3. These two escapees stockpiled skin coloring, surgical masks, and Vietnamese clothing. They darkened their skin, wore surgical masks like the Orientals do when they are afflicted with the flu, donned their Vietnamese clothes, sandals, and conical hats, and carried a pole over their shoulder with baskets attached. But they were caught and it is believed that one of them was tortured to death, because he was not repatriated. The other POW was severely tortured for 30 days. The Vietnamese also tortured many other POWs because of this escape and "normal" POW life was upset for about 18 months.<sup>52</sup>

In discussing interrogations and torture, Rowan found that the POWs had to teach each other how to respond to the enemy. The POWs were not able to hold their first line of resistance with the standard Code of Conduct and Geneva Convention reply of "ONLY NAME, RANK, SERVICE NUMBER, AND DATE OF BIRTH." To avoid torture, they had to come up with an answer, "any answer-true or false-as long as they didn't get caught in an outright lie."<sup>53</sup> Otherwise, the individual POW decided how much torture he would take to maintain loyalty to his fellow prisoners, except when the Senior Ranking Officer specified that the prisoners were not to tell their captors about the American chain of command, codes, and communications.<sup>54</sup>

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<sup>52</sup>Rowan, pp. 89-90.

<sup>53</sup>Rowan, p. 26.

<sup>54</sup>Rowan, p. 26.

As in Korea, some POWs collaborated with the enemy, and did not keep faith with their fellow POWs or attempt to strictly follow the Code of Conduct. After becoming a POW, Navy Captain Walter E. Wilber decided that U.S. "involvement in the Vietnam War was illegal and immoral."<sup>55</sup> He, along with one or two other officers, voluntarily wrote statements protesting this "undeclared" war. As a result of such activities in North Vietnam, court-martial charges were preferred against eight enlisted men and two officers upon their release. However, the Service Secretaries involved dismissed these charges shortly after one of the enlisted men committed suicide. The Service Secretaries cited POW hardships as mitigating circumstances for dismissing these charges.<sup>56</sup>

#### THE SENIOR RANKING OFFICERS

USAF Colonel Robinson Risner was the Senior Ranking Officer (SRO) POW in the early part of the war, as well as a key resistor throughout the war and an important promulgator of POW policies. Risner had the distinction of having been a Korean War ace, with eight North Korean aircraft to his credit. On a mission over North Vietnam on March 2, 1965, he was shot down and managed to "bail out" over the South China Sea, where he was rescued. As a result of this incident, he made a good will tour of the United States, and his picture appeared on the April 23, 1965 cover of Time magazine.<sup>57</sup> His aircraft was hit a number

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<sup>55</sup>Rowan, p. 155.

<sup>56</sup>Rowan, pp. 16, 81-83.

<sup>57</sup>"Armed Forces: The Fighting Airman," Time, 85:17 (April 23, 1965), 22-26.

of other times, and on September 16, 1965, he was shot down again and became a POW.<sup>58</sup> The publicity which Risner received from his Time write ups gave his captors useful information about his background and made him a prime interrogation target.<sup>59</sup>

Risner's interrogation sessions quickly degenerated into torture sessions. At one point, the pain that he felt from being hogtied was so intense that he tried to choke himself into unconsciousness. When the bonds were loosened a bit, the pain was still so intense that he tried to knock himself unconscious by hitting his head on the floor.<sup>60</sup> In order to prevent himself from making propaganda recordings, he attempted to destroy his voice by judo chopping his larynx. When that didn't work, he gargled with some highly acid lye soap, but this attempt failed also and he made the tape recordings.<sup>61</sup> His captors also forced him to hold a news conference with some visiting North Korean correspondents. Risner's replies to the correspondents' questions did not please the North Vietnamese, and they made him write an apology to the North Koreans in which he said "I have committed many grave crimes against your people and country for which I am sincerely sorry."<sup>62</sup> He also had an interview with a visiting American woman named Mary McCarthy.<sup>63</sup>

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<sup>58</sup>"Armed Forces: Down in Thanh Hoa," Time, 86:13 (September 24, 1965), 28.

<sup>59</sup>The North Vietnamese also received such publications as: Newsweek, U.S. News & World Report, Air Force Times, Stars and Stripes, and The Christian Science Monitor. Risner, p. 64.

<sup>60</sup>Risner, pp. 86-87.

<sup>61</sup>Risner, pp. 111-113.

<sup>62</sup>Risner, p. 161.

<sup>63</sup>Risner, pp. 162-163.

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In addition to having spent many months in solitary confinement, Risner developed painful kidney stones when the North Vietnamese restricted his liquid intake to a pint of water a day. An enemy doctor then injected his kidneys with a dilating solution after having hit them with a blow that knocked him out. He was then given all the water he could drink and the stones passed out of his system a number of days later.<sup>64</sup>

Risner's code name was Cochise, and he established a number of guidelines to supplement the Code of Conduct and to aid his fellow POWs. He urged the POWs to resist Vietnamese attempts to obtain information

...until you are tortured. But do not take torture to the point where you lose your capability to think and do not take torture to the point where you lose the permanent use of your limbs.<sup>65</sup>

His essential guidelines for himself and his fellow POWs are as summarized below:<sup>66</sup>

1. Fight the North Vietnamese and international communism-- the enemy of freedom and the American way of life. Resist giving the enemy propaganda with which to influence world opinion.
2. Fulfill your duty to freedom and American patriotism.
3. The American people are behind you. They have not changed, even though the anti-war dissidents have a loud voice.
4. Believe in God and your eventual release.

On October 29, 1967, then Colonel John P. Flynn, USAF, was shot down over Hanoi and became the SRC for the duration of the war. Flynn

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<sup>64</sup>Risner, pp. 145-148.

<sup>65</sup>Risner, p. 123.

<sup>66</sup>Risner, pp. 169-172.

was ably assisted by Risner, Commander Jeremiah Denton, and a number of other senior POW leaders. As Flynn analyzed the situation, the enemy wanted to do three things to the POWs:

1. Get military information.
2. Prostitute [the POWs] for propaganda.
3. Maintain a punishing environment.<sup>67</sup>

The enemy attempted to accomplish these objectives by instilling the fear of torture and holding the POWs in solitary confinement.<sup>68</sup>

To combat the enemy objectives, the American POWs had their integrity, the Code of Conduct, and their ability to communicate with the Tap Code. Without communications, General Flynn unequivocally stated that "some [POWs] would not have returned and many would not have returned with honor."<sup>69</sup> As the period of confinement evolved, Flynn supplemented Risner's four POW guidelines with the following policies, called Plums:<sup>70</sup>

Plum 1. If the senior cellmate or compound commander refuses to take command, then the next ranking POW will assume command.

Plum 2. Establish lines of resistance (such as church services will be held, regardless of enemy rules) and lines of capitulation (such as standing for guards to avoid needless conflict) so that the POWs and the enemy know the rules.

Plum 3. Reinterpret the guidelines provided by the Code of Conduct so that men who are about to lose their life, limbs, or mental

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<sup>67</sup>Flynn, "Presentation to CGSC, May 15, 1974," p. 2.

<sup>68</sup>Flynn, "Presentation to CGSC, May 15, 1974," p. 3.

<sup>69</sup>Flynn, "Presentation to CGSC, May 15, 1974," p. 4.

<sup>70</sup>Flynn, "Presentation to CGSC, May 15, 1974," pp. 7-9.

faculties as a result of torture could accede to some enemy demands.

Plum 4. "It is neither Christian nor military to nag a repentant sinner to his grave." If a man is too friendly with the enemy or commits some other mistake, let him know that he is always welcome with open arms to return to the fold.

Plum 5. Establish the conditions of early release, such as the seriously sick and wounded first, or those honorably expelled by the North Vietnamese, then release by date of capture, with those captured first being released first.

Plum 6. "A man's reputation is his most prized asset." Do not comment on the POW behavior of others when you are released, except to an official board of inquiry. Even then, give only the facts.

Plum 7. Establish the right of redress. Exceptions to policy will be granted when appropriate.

Plum 3 was particularly important because of a number of POWs who didn't return to the United States. USAF Captain Ron Storts believed in his principles more than his life. He was tortured and starved but would not yield to his captors, and the North Vietnamese reported that he had died in captivity.<sup>71</sup> A Navy commander and two Air Force captains became very emaciated and mentally unbalanced. The North Vietnamese dealt with mental cases in a strange way. It was almost as if they thought of it as a communicable disease. At repatriation in 1973, they too were listed as having died in captivity.<sup>72</sup> And General Flynn noted

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<sup>71</sup>Risner, pp. 63-71.

<sup>72</sup>Risner, pp. 184-187.

that the North Vietnamese did not release any amputees. The POWs never saw another POW who had a missing limb.<sup>73</sup>

When Risner returned home, he found that his 22 year old son had become an ardent supporter of Senator George McGovern because the son believed that McGovern's peace policies would enable his father to return home sooner.<sup>74</sup> Commander Richard Straton also found that his sister, Ellen Cooper, strongly opposed the war.<sup>75</sup> But both of these POWs reasoned that that is what democracy is all about. They fought to maintain democracy and the right of Americans to legally protest the injustices which the individual American perceives as being morally wrong.

The incidents described in this chapter have generally shown that the strong character and high motivation of the officer pilot and Special Forces POWs in Southeast Asia made the Code of Conduct function in captivity. However, there still were isolated instances of passive and active collaboration with the enemy. In this regard, some POWs functioned as did the collaborators in Korea and as many were lesser experienced, lesser ranking POWs might have functioned in Southeast Asia, had they been captured. After having examined current Army Code of Conduct training in Chapter 2, the meaning of the code in Chapter 3, the behavior of the Korean War POWs in Chapter 4, the formulation of the code in Chapter 5, and its application in Chapters 6 and 7, Chapter

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<sup>73</sup>Flynn, "Presentation to CGSC, May 15, 1974," p. 19.

<sup>74</sup>Risner, pp. 238-243.

<sup>75</sup>Rowan, p. 252.

8 will recommend some proposals to improve current Army Code of Conduct/POW training in an effort to better enable soldiers to survive and resist the enemy, should they become POWs.



## CHAPTER 8

### IMPROVED ARMY CODE OF CONDUCT TRAINING

#### CONCLUSION

As previously discussed, it was the Korean War POWs themselves who recommended the adoption of a standardized, clearly defined guide for POWs. This guide was formulated in 1955 as the Code of Conduct for Members of the Armed Forces of the United States, and is in accordance with the Geneva Conventions Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (GPW) of August 12, 1949. If all nations abided by the GPW, there would be no problem with implementing the code and Army Code of Conduct/POW training would be adequate. An annual hour of refresher training in memorizing the 247 words of the code would be enough. But, in the post World War II ideological confrontation between communism and democracy, the Communist Bloc nations have not abided by the GPW and captured Americans have endured a very difficult survival ordeal. From the examples and discussion presented in this paper, it is evident that the Code of Conduct is still valid as a guide for the behavior of American POWs. However, Army Code of Conduct/POW training must be improved to portray the code as a flexible guide with successive lines of resistance, should the enemy not abide by the GPW. Army Code of Conduct/POW training must focus on the problems of escape, ~~resistance~~, interrogation, propaganda, communications, organization, and the experiences discussed in Chapters 4, 5, 6, and 7 of this paper.

The Army currently teaches its front line, high-risk soldier that the code is an inflexible guide which contains all that he needs to know to survive as a POW. This approach is contrary to the more realistic training that Air Force and Navy fliers receive as discussed in Chapter 5. Due to the nature of war, U.S. Army soldiers will become POWs, particularly in a mid-intensity combat environment. Escape may be impossible; aggressive, blatant resistance may be futile; the soldier may be compelled to give more than "NAME, RANK, SERVICE NUMBER, AND DATE OF BIRTH;" and survival "with honor" may become a prime concern.

The Army has to teach its soldiers that the conditions of captivity may dictate a more flexible approach to following the Code of Conduct. The Army has to teach the underlying philosophy behind the Code of Conduct, which philosophy is summed up in the Article VI phrase "I AM ... RESPONSIBLE FOR MY ACTIONS." The Army has to teach the soldier specific POW survival techniques and skills in conjunction with Code of Conduct training. Rote memorization of the Code of Conduct may be all that recruits can reasonably master when they make the transition from civilian to soldier in basic training, but thereafter, a professional, combat ready soldier must be exposed to the harsh realities of POW life and the underlying philosophy of the Code of Conduct.

#### RECOMMENDATIONS

In order to improve Army Code of Conduct/POW training, the following actions should be taken.

1. As mentioned in Chapters 2 and 5, Army Subject Schedule 21-15, Code of Conduct, should outline a series of flexible group discussion

periods designed around books and articles by former POWs and featuring provocative audio-visual presentations by former captives. The syllabus for this outline might be patterned after the current Human Resources Development group dynamics seminars and would include discussions of the problems that POWs have encountered and overcome, similar to the material presented in Chapters 4, 5, 6, and 7 of this paper. If soldiers are exposed to the repetitive nature of the difficulties and dilemmas that captives have faced in Korea, the peacetime incidents, and Southeast Asia, then their survival rate as future POWs should increase because they will know what to expect and how to handle themselves. Some excellent audio-visual discussion recordings are listed in the bibliography of this paper and include:

- a. The Code of Conduct - General Officer Briefing.
- b. Hanoi Experiences of Major General John P. Flynn.
- c. P.O.W. PANEL.
- d. P.O.W. in Southeast Asia (Major Rowe).
- e. Pueblo (ABC Television Presentation).

The audio-visual cassettes might also include the coerced propaganda films and recordings made by former POWs, accompanied by a post release explanation by that particular POW.

2. Army Subject Schedule 21-15 and Code of Conduct Training AR 350-30 should include the following books and articles as references for discussion groups:

- a. Korea
  - (1) C. Blair, Jr., Beyond Courage.
  - (2) William F. Dean, General Dean's Story.
  - (3) Ward Miller, Valley of the Shadow.

(4) William L. White, The Captives of Korea.

b. Peacetime Incidents

(1) Ed Brandt, The Last Voyage of USS Pueblo.

(2) Lloyd Bucher, Bucher: My Story.

(3) Daniel V. Gallery, The Pueblo Incident.

(4) Francis Gary Powers, Operation Overflight.

(5) William L. White, The Little Toy Dog.

c. Southeast Asia

(1) Joseph P. Blank, "Solitary Torment of a Tough American" (Major Bailey in Laos).

(2) Robert F. Frishman, "I was a Prisoner in Hanoi."

(3) Robinson Risner, The Passing of the Night: My Seven Years as a Prisoner of the North Vietnamese.

(4) Stephen A. Rowan, They Wouldn't Let Us Die.

(5) James N. Rowe, Five Years to Freedom.

(6) U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, "Imprisonment and Escape of Lieutenant (J.G.) Dieter Dengler."

(7) Grant Wolfkill, Reported To Be Alive.

3. Multiple copies (200-500) of DA Pamphlet 360-522, The U.S. Fighting Man's Code, should be made available at local post libraries so that Code of Conduct discussion group leaders could distribute this pamphlet to soldiers and lead a page by page discussion of its contents. Extra copies of the references in paragraph 2 above should also be made available at local post libraries.

4. A permanent, unclassified anthology of POW experiences and lessons learned should be published and distributed to company level units

in the form of a Field Manual. This anthology might include greatly condensed versions of the references listed in paragraph 2 above, similar to Major Rowe's 26 page condensed book, Five Years to Freedom, that appeared in the Book Section of the January 1972 issue of The Reader's Digest. The Reader's Digest Association might even be commissioned to write this anthology. The anthology should also include portions of the out of print pamphlet POW: The Fight Continues After the Battle and the law review articles referenced Army Subject Schedule 21-15, April 20, 1967. As a minimum, this anthology should include declassified material pertaining to primitive medicine cures (beriberi, dysentery, night blindness, frost bite, jaundice, hepatitis, fungus diseases and boils, malnutrition, and give-up-itis); POW organizations, camp structures, communications, and the Tap Code; escape, resistance, and interrogation; the capture card; how to productively waste time in captivity; POW physical fitness; the Plums of the Hanoi POWs; and the political and international implications of GFW Article 85 and POW confessions as in the U-2 and Pueblo incidents.

5. Division Military Intelligence Company Interrogators of Prisoners of War should be trained and made available to conduct practical interrogations of soldiers during Code of Conduct instruction. As was mentioned in the Chapter 5 section on Air Force POW training, pilots are taught first "not to talk, then how to talk." The interrogation demonstrations by Military Intelligence Interrogators would benefit both the soldier by exposing him to how he should respond to an interrogation and the interrogators by improving or maintaining their proficiency.

6. The POW books listed in paragraph 2 above should be incorporated into the reading and English curriculum of on duty high school and college education classes. Such mandatory readings would increase the exposure of the soldier to the exploits of former POWs.

7. Progressive NCO and officer case study leadership courses should be developed around POW experiences. The nature of these courses would be progressively designed for increasing levels of authority. In the case of officers, these courses would include perhaps four hours of Code of Conduct/POW instruction for basic officer, advanced officer, command and staff officer, and war college officer levels of Army education.

#### AREAS REQUIRING ADDITIONAL STUDY

In order to adequately develop the recommended audio-visual cassettes and Code of Conduct/POW leadership development case study lesson outlines, the Army should ask the Air Force and Navy POW/Survival schools for assistance. As discussed in Chapter 5, these schools have taken a much more realistic view of how to train military personnel in implementing the Code of Conduct and acquitting themselves "with honor and integrity" as a POW.

**APPENDICES**

**APPENDIX A**  
**EXECUTIVE ORDER 10631**  
**CODE OF CONDUCT FOR MEMBERS OF THE ARMED**  
**FORCES OF THE UNITED STATES**

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By virtue of the authority vested in me as President of the United States, and as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces of the United States, I hereby prescribe the Code of Conduct for members of the Armed Forces of the United States which is attached to this order and hereby made a part thereof.

Every member of the Armed Forces of the United States is expected to measure up to the standards embodied in this Code of Conduct while he is in combat or in captivity. To ensure achievement of these standards, each member of the Armed Forces liable to capture shall be provided with specific training and instructions designed to better equip him to counter and withstand all enemy efforts against him, and shall be fully instructed as to the behavior and obligations expected of him during combat or captivity.

The Secretary of Defense (and the Secretary of the Treasury with respect to the Coast Guard except when it is serving as part of the Navy) shall take such actions as is deemed necessary to implement this order and to disseminate and make the said code known to all members of the Armed Forces of the United States.

**THE WHITE HOUSE**

*Code of Conduct for Members of the United States Armed Forces*

**I**

**I am an American fighting man. I serve in the forces which guard my country and our way of life. I am prepared to give my life in their defense.**

**EXPLANATION**

A member of the Armed Forces is always a fighting man. As such, it is his duty to oppose the enemies of the United States regardless of the circumstances in which he may find himself, whether in active participation in combat, or as a prisoner of war.

**II**

**I will never surrender of my own free will. If in command I will never surrender my men while they still have the means to resist.**

**EXPLANATION**

As an individual, a member of the Armed Forces may never voluntarily surrender himself. When isolated and he can no longer inflict casualties on the enemy, it is his duty to evade capture and rejoin the nearest friendly forces.

The responsibility and authority of a commander never extends to the surrender of his command to the enemy while it has power to resist or evade. When isolated, cut off, or surrounded, a unit must continue to fight until relieved or able to rejoin friendly forces by breaking out or by evading the enemy.



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**III**

**If I am captured I will continue to resist by all means available. I will make every effort to escape and aid others to escape. I will accept neither parole nor special favors from the enemy.**

**EXPLANATION**

The duty of a member of the Armed Forces to continue resistance by all means at his disposal is not lessened by the misfortune of capture. Article 82 of the Geneva Convention pertains. He will escape if able to do so, and will assist others to escape. Parole agreements are promises given the captor by a prisoner of war upon his faith and honor, to fulfill stated conditions, such as not to bear arms or not to escape, in considerations of special privileges, usually release from captivity or lessened restraint. He will never sign or enter any parole agreement.

**IV**

**If I become a prisoner of war, I will keep faith with my fellow prisoners. I will give no information nor take part in any action which might be harmful to my comrades. If I am senior I will take command. If not, I will obey the lawful orders of those appointed over me and will back them up in every way.**

**EXPLANATION**

Informing or any other action to the detriment of a fellow prisoner is despicable and is expressly forbidden. Prisoners of war must avoid helping the enemy identify fellow prisoners who may have knowledge of particular value to the enemy, and may therefore be made to suffer coercive interrogation.

Strong leadership is essential to discipline. Without discipline, camp organization, resistance, and even survival may be impossible. Personal hygiene, camp sanitation, and care of sick and wounded are imperative. Officers and noncommissioned officers of the United States will continue to carry out their responsibilities and exercise their authority subsequent to capture. The senior officer, noncommissioned officer, or private (including comparable grades in the other services, see AR 600-15) within the prisoner of war camp or group of prisoners will assume command according to rank (or precedence) without regard to Service. The responsibility and accountability may not be evaded, except when an individual is prohibited by appropriate Service regulations from assuming command (para 3-11, AR 600-20 governs for Army personnel). If the senior officer, noncommissioned officer, or private is incapacitated or unable to act for any reason, command will be assumed by the next senior. The legal responsibility for obeying the lawful orders of superior United States military personnel remains unchanged in captivity. If the foregoing organization cannot be effected, an organization of elected representatives, as provided for in Articles 79-81 Geneva Conventions Relative to Treatment of Prisoners of War, or a covert organization, or both, will be formed.

Prisoners' representatives may send periodic reports on the situation in the camps and the needs of the prisoners of war to the representatives of the Protecting Powers.

Every representative elected must be approved by the Detaining Power before he has the right to commence his duties. Where the Detaining Power

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refuses to approve a prisoner of war elected by his fellow prisoners of war, it must inform the Protecting Power of the reason for such refusal.

In all cases the prisoners' representative must have the same nationality, language, and customs as the prisoners of war whom he represents. Thus, prisoners of war distributed in different sections of a camp, according to their nationality, language, or customs, shall have for each section their own prisoners' representative, in accordance with the foregoing paragraphs.

V

When questioned, should I become a prisoner of war, I am bound to give only name, rank, service number, and date of birth. I will evade answering further questions to the utmost of my ability. I will make no oral or written statements disloyal to my country and its allies or harmful to their cause.

EXPLANATION

When questioned, a prisoner of war is required by the Geneva Convention and permitted by this Code to disclose his name, rank, service number, and date of birth. A prisoner of war may also communicate with the enemy regarding his individual health or welfare as a prisoner of war and, when appropriate, on routine matters of camp administration. Oral or written confessions true or false, questionnaires, personal history statements, propaganda recordings and broadcasts, appeals to other prisoners of war, signatures to peace or surrender appeals, self-criticisms, or any other oral or written communication on behalf of the enemy or critical or harmful to the United States, its allies, the Armed Forces, or other prisoners are forbidden. A detainee is required to adhere to the same standards as are required of a prisoner of war.

It is a violation of the Geneva Convention to place a prisoner of war under physical or mental torture or any other form of coercion to secure from him information of any kind. If, however, a prisoner is subjected to such treatment, he will endeavor to avoid by every means the disclosure of any information, or the making of any statement or the performance of any action harmful to the interests of the United States or its allies or which will provide aid or comfort to the enemy.

Under Communist Bloc reservations to the Geneva Convention, the signing of a confession or the making of a statement by a prisoner is likely to be used to convict him as a war criminal under the laws of his captors. This conviction has the effect of removing him from the prisoner of war status and according to this Communist Bloc device denying him any protection under terms of the Geneva Convention and repatriation until a prison sentence is served.

VI

I will never forget that I am an American fighting man, responsible for my actions, and dedicated to the principles which made my country free. I will trust in my God and in the United States of America.

EXPLANATION

The provisions of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, whenever appropriate, continue to apply to members of the Armed Forces while prisoners of

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war. Upon repatriation, the conduct of prisoners will be examined as to circumstances of capture and through the period of detention with due regard for the rights of the individual and consideration for the conditions of captivity.

A member of the Armed Forces who becomes a prisoner of war has a continuing obligation to remain loyal to his country, his service, and his unit.

A member of the Armed Forces who is forcibly detained by a foreign state or entity must never give up hope. He must resist all attempts at indoctrination and remain loyal to his country, his service, and his unit.

The life of a prisoner of war is hard. Prisoners of war who stand firm and united against the enemy will aid one another in surviving this ordeal.

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APPENDIX B - KOREAN WAR POW STATISTICS

TOTAL U.S. POWS IN KOREA (AS OF JULY 20, 1955)<sup>1</sup>

1,600,000 U.S. servicemen participated in the Korean War.

7,190 U.S. POWs (Including the 15 USAF personnel released by Red China in 1955).

4,428 POWs repatriated (including the four pilots of May 31, 1955).

( 149) Little Switch (White, p. 262).

(3,597) Big Switch (White, p. 262).

( 682) Returned to Military Control (escaped, liberated by combat advances, or released at the front by captors),

11 USAF personnel released by Red China on August 4, 1955.

21 Refused repatriation.

2,730 Died in POW camps.

470 Additional personnel still classified as missing.

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<sup>1</sup> Report of the Secretary of Defense's Advisory Committee on Prisoners of War. POW: The Fight Continues After the Battle (Washington: GPO, August, 1955), p. 79.

U.S. POWs and MIAs in Korea by Service  
(POWs and MIAs are separate, distinct, noncomparable categories)

	<u>POWs</u> (Sec. Def. Adv. Report, POW)			<u>MIAs</u> (Biderman, p. 100)			
	<u>U.S. POWs</u>	<u>Returned Alive</u>	<u>Died in Camps</u>	<u>Turn-Coats</u>	<u>MIA</u>	<u>Died While Missing</u>	<u>Returned To Mil. Control</u>
Army	6,656	3,973	2,662	21	4,442	3,778	664
Air Force	263*	235	28	0	859	806	53
Marines	231	200	31	0	391	391	0
Navy	$\frac{40}{7,190}$ (POW p. 8)	$\frac{31}{4,439}$ (POW p. 81)	$\frac{9}{2,730}$	$\frac{0}{21}$	$\frac{174}{5,866}$	$\frac{161}{5,136}$	$\frac{13}{730}$

\* Includes 15 USAF personnel released in 1955.

U.S. LEGAL INVESTIGATIONS OF POW ACTIONS BY SERVICE  
 (Sec. Def. Advisory Committee on POWs, POM, pp. 81-82)

	<u>Processed</u>	<u>Cleared</u>	<u>More Detailed Investigation</u>	<u>Cleared</u>	<u>Final Action</u>
Army	3,973	3,547	(426)	247	14 Court-Martials with 3 acquittals (Kinkaid p. 67) 165 Discharges (honorably or under lesser circumstances)
Air Force	235*	148	( 87)	77	7 Separated 3 Resigned
Marines	200	148	( 52)	49	1 Reprimand 2 Restricted assignment
Navy	$\frac{31}{4,439}$	$\frac{31}{3,874}$	$\frac{( 0)}{(555)}$	$\frac{0}{373}$	$\frac{0}{192}$

\*Includes 15 USAF personnel released in 1955.

## APPENDIX C

### CHRONOLOGY OF KOREAN WAR EVENTS<sup>1</sup>

- 9 Sep 1945 U.S. accepts Japanese surrender of Korea south of 38th parallel. Russia establishes Communist "people's" government north of 38th parallel.
- Dec 1948 USSR occupation troops withdraw from North Korea.
- Jun 1949 U.S. occupation troops withdraw from South Korea.
- 12 Jan 1950 Secretary of State Dean Acheson says Korea is outside the U.S. defense perimeter. The U.N. will aid South Korea if attacked.
- 25 Jun 1950 0400 hours, North Korean cross 38th parallel, invading South Korea.
- 27 Jan 50 President Truman orders U.S. air and sea aid to South Korea.
- 28 Jun 50 North Koreans capture South Korean capital of Seoul.
- 30 Jun 50 President Truman orders U.S. ground forces to aid South Korea.
- 1 Jul 50 Task Force Smith flown to South Korea.
- 3 Jul 50 U.S. State Department announces that it will abide by the GPW of August 1949 and cooperate fully with the International Red Cross.
- 13 Jul 50 North Korean Minister of Foreign Affairs Pak Hwa Yen informs U.N. Secretary General "The Army of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea is strictly abiding by the principles of the Geneva Convention in respect to Prisoners of War."  
(White, p. 7.)
- 3 Aug 50 U.S. troops retreat to Pusan Perimeter.

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<sup>1</sup>Extracted from Albert D. Biderman, *March To Calumny* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1963), pp. 283-285.

- 6 Sep 50 High point of Red offensive; Reds capture Pohang.
- 15 Sep 50 Inchon landing.
- 26 Sep 50 UN retakes Seoul.
- 8 Oct 50 1st UN crossing of 38th parallel.
- 19 Oct 50 UN captures Pyongyang.
- 25 Oct 50 Overt crossing of Yalu by Chinese.
- 21 Nov 50 U.S. 7th Division reaches Manchurian border.
- 26 Nov 50 Chinese open massive offensive; hurl UN forces back.
- 5 Dec 50 UN abandons Pyongyang.
- 8-24 Dec 50 Chanyin Reservoir battles; UN evacuates by sea from Hungnam.
- 4 Jan 1951 Seoul is recaptured by Reds.
- 11 Jan 51 UN Korean truce committee proposes a cease-fire and peaceful settlement of Far Eastern problems.
- 17 Jan 51 China gives "outrageous and unacceptable" reply to U.S. cease-fire proposal.
- 20 Jan 51 Chinese set up first permanent POW camp near Pyektong.
- 22 Jan 51 India submits revised peace proposal to UN.
- 23 Jan 51 Malik of U.S.S.R. suggests cease-fire in UN broadcast.
- 1 Feb 51 General Assembly labels Communist China the aggressor.
- 12-18 Feb 51 Communist counteroffensive.
- 15 Mar 51 Allies retake Seoul.
- 31 Mar 51 UN crosses 38th parallel again.
- 11 Apr 51 Truman removes MacArthur.
- 19 May 51 Red counterattack breaks through UN line.
- 14 Jun 51 UN takes Pyongyang.
- 8 Jul 51 Truce talks begin.



- 5 Aug 51 UN quits truce talks in protest against propaganda violations.
- 11 Aug 51 Truce talks are resumed.
- 23 Aug 51 Reds break off truce talks, charging air attacks on Kaesong.
- 25 Oct 51 Truce talks resume.
- 14 Nov 51 Col. Hanley reveals North Korean and Chicom atrocities against U.S. POW's.
- 27 Nov 51 Agreement in truce talks on location of cease-fire line.
- 12 Jan 1952 Mig 15's attack U.S. planes for first time.
- 25 Feb 52 Bacteriological Warfare propaganda campaign goes into high gear. Peiping radio charges U.S. uses it. Charges repeated from Moscow radio to lowest Communist organization. UN officer says Communists attempting to shunt blame for epidemics which plague own people.
- 4 Mar 52 Secretary of State Acheson denies U.S. used or is using BW. British Foreign Office report calls Communist charges "fantastic and disgraceful."
- 11 Mar 52 Acheson asks International Red Cross to probe nature, extent, and cause of epidemic.
- 14 Mar 52 Chinese radio says "International Committee of Democratic Jurists" arrived in Korea, March 4, to study BW crimes.
- 28 Apr 52 UN submits proposals on voluntary repatriation of POW's to end truce deadlock.
- 7-10 May 52 Communist POW's hold Gen. Dodd hostage at Koje-do.
- 13 May 52 Suen is wiped out--biggest UN air blow.
- 21-22 Jul 52 Seesaw battle for "Old Baldy."
- 4 Sep 52 Truce talks in sixth week of deadlock.
- 8 Oct 52 Communists reject UN truce proposals; negotiations postponed indefinitely.
- 17 Nov 52 India submits new proposal on POW repatriation.
- 2 Dec 52 President Elect Eisenhower goes to Korea.

- 15 Dec 52 Chou En Lai charges U.S. continues BW against China and NK.
- 26-28 Mar 1953 "Old Baldy" and "Vegas" Hill fighting.
- 28 Mar 53 Red China yields on POW repatriation, accepts neutral custodian for prisoners unwilling to go home.
- 20 Apr 53 "Little Switch" exchange of "sick and wounded" POW's begins.
- 7 May 53 Reds agree to let reluctant prisoners stay in Korea; propose 5-nation POW trusteeship.
- 8 Jun 53 UN and Reds agree on voluntary repatriation; settle truce dispute.
- 18 Jun 53 Rhee frees 27,000 anti-Communist POW's in defiance of UN.
- 27 Jul 53 Armistice is signed at Panmunjon.
- 3 Aug 53 "Big Switch" prisoner exchange begins.
- 6 Sep 53 "Big Switch" is completed.
- 25 Jan 1954 Final deadline for choosing to go home passes for POW's declining repatriation.
- 1 Aug 1955 Last of 15 USAF prisoners detained in China are released.
- 17 Aug 55 Defense Department Report on POW's released and "Code of Conduct" promulgated.

## APPENDIX D

### NON-COLLABORATORS' FATE

#### CASE I

I was asked for an opinion of General George C. Marshall. I replied, "General Marshall is a great American soldier." A rifle butt knocked me to the ground. The question and answer were repeated, but no rifle butt. I won my battle in which my resistance was being tested. The Communists respected my attitude. I was repatriated after three years in prison camp. I steadfastly rejected all that my captors stood for. My principles were intact. I was willing to sacrifice my life on the battlefield. I was still willing to sacrifice it upon capture. I followed to the best of my ability the course that seemed morally correct. I was willing to suffer. I was willing to die. Eugene Kinkead, In Every War But One (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1959), p. 134.

#### CASE II

An Air Force captain was put in solitary confinement for fourteen months, mostly handcuffed in a small thatched hole in the ground. His philosophy was: "If I can't go back with my self-respect, I won't go back at all." He came home. Kinkead, p. 162.

#### CASE III

##### An Air Force lieutenant

"was interrogated and pressured for four months by the Chinese Communists. Eight times he was ordered to confess, offered relief if he did, death if he didn't. Eight times he refused. He was stood at attention for twenty-two hours until he fell, confined eight days in a doorless cell less than six feet long, held by two guards while a third guard kicked and slapped him, hit with the side of a hatchet, interrogated for three hours with a pistol at the back of his head, placed under a roof drain all night during a rainstorm, left without food for three days, put before a firing squad, and hung by the hands and feet from the rafters of a house."

Then the Chinese gave up on him as an apparently hopeless case. He came home. Kinkead, pp. 161-162.

A Navy lieutenant was a POW for more than two and a half years.

"He was beaten, starved and frozen for many months, confined for days at a time in a near-freezing hole in the ground, and fed rotten food. He began generating great quantities of gas in his intestines. He mastered the art of controlled gas release. Thereafter, he quit talking to his interrogators. His responses became sonorous, contemptuous farts, which infuriated his interrogators and caused them to lose face with their guards and junior officers who were present. After three or four sessions--with vicious beatings in between--they gave up on him. He was let alone." Daniel V. Gallery, The Pueblo Incident (Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1970), p. 79.

#### CASE V

Were the Americans capable of mass resistance to the Communists? Yes, they were. On May Day 1952, the POW's were told they would parade with red banners and new uniforms. The word was passed by certain individuals not to march "no matter what." The POWs did not march. The parade was cancelled. Only the suspected leaders were jailed. The rest received no punishment. Another time, one man refused to allow the Communists to take his picture as the POW's exercised. Everyone else followed his example. "The Chinese were furious, but took no retributive action." One other incident concerned unjust treatment to a POW. The men fell out en masse and demanded his release on threat of mutiny. He was released with no Chinese retribution. "The prisoners

" The prisoners won because there was no way of compelling a group, through methods of mass psychological pressure, to do something it says firmly it won't do. Mass resistance in that case always wins." Kinked, p. 169.

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