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THE SOVIET CONCEPT OF THE "CORRELATION OF FORCES"

By: MICHAEL J. DEANE

Prepared for:

DEFENSE ADVANCED RESEARCH PROJECTS AGENCY
1400 WILSON BOULEVARD
ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA 22209

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ABSTRACT

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FOREWORD

In the long-term global competition between capitalism and socialism, the Soviet Union designs and implements complex strategies which encompass a wide range of political, military, economic, social, ideological, and scientific-technical factors. These strategies require a sophisticated assessment and an overall projection of general trends in the world. It is important, consequently, to understand the critical role assigned to the calculation of the correlation of forces for the formulation of Soviet foreign policy.

This report on the Soviet concept of the correlation of forces is one of two tasks set forth in Item 0001 of Contract No. MDA903-75-C-0347, sponsored by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency. This study was prepared by the author, Dr. Michael J. Deane, under the general supervision of Mr. Richard B. Foster, Director of the Strategic Studies Center, and specific supervision of Dr. Richard Pipes, Senior Research Consultant. Dr. Pipes will publish a separate, brief Technical Note containing his observations on the correlation of forces concept.

The author, Dr. Deane, wishes to acknowledge the valuable assistance of SSC research personnel Alla Pietscn, Arthur A. Zuehlke, Jr., and Anne Lieberman in the preparation of material for this report.

Richard B. Foster
Director
Strategic Studies Center

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

The purpose of this paper is to analyze the Soviet concept of the correlation of forces. It attempts from a review of historical and contemporary Soviet literature (1) to illuminate the various factors subsumed under the concept, (2) to indicate the extent to which the concept represents a systematic approach to foreign policy, and (3) to assess the Soviet leadership's current evaluation of the international balance between the United States and the USSR.

A. A brief historical survey illustrates that the concept of the correlation of forces has frequently been utilized by the Soviet spokesmen since the Bolshevik Revolution. It is a general concept that is applied to numerous diverse situations in order to evaluate the balance between two forces or groups of forces in a conflict relationship. Moreover, the "correlation of forces" concept includes a wide range of factors, only one of which is military. Major shifts in the correlation of world forces are identified as having occurred in 1917, 1949, and 1969-1970.

B. The calculation of the correlation of forces takes into consideration numerous economic, military, political, and international factors. In speaking of the correlation of forces, Soviet spokesmen appear to differentiate two levels of analysis: (1) the general, worldwide level, and (2) a level of individual factors and/or regions. Assessment on the first level is essentially an intuitive process in which the correlation of forces is based upon a "feel" for world events. With respect to individual factors or geographic regions, analyses are made more systematically because of the far fewer elements to be assessed at a given moment. Therefore, whereas the overall correlation of world forces may intuitively show the trend of the international situation, a more specific calculation of individual factors (e.g., economic, military, etc.) or in a separate geographic region is needed in order to assist in the formulation of foreign policy actions.

Among the difficulties encountered in the calculation of the correlation of forces, Soviet sources emphasize two. First, only some of the factors in the equation are quantifiable; some factors can be evaluated only qualitatively. Second, independent forces or "wandering values," which lack a predetermined and steadfast place in the international class conflict, often arise to complicate the expected course of events. These forces, therefore, inject a portion of uncertainty in any calculation of the correlation of forces.

C. Present-day analyses of international affairs consistently assert that a substantial shift in the correlation of forces in favor of socialism transpired about 1969-1970. The latest shift occurred in conjunction with the Soviet attainment of strategic parity. This attainment shifted the main competition between the two systems away from the military arena and towards the economic, political, and ideological spheres.

The advance of the socialist community is complemented by "the general crisis of capitalism," which is presently said to be at its most severe since the 1930s. It embraces all aspects of capitalist life. Even if capitalism recovers from the present crisis, its general trend is to disintegration. Thus, it is underscored that the historically determined shift in the correlation of forces rests on a much broader foundation than a mere balancing of military strength.

The Third World is viewed as the most suitable arena for future Soviet-inspired anti-imperialist struggles. In conjunction with the intensification of problems in the capitalist camp, the Soviets have sought to extend further support to national liberation movements with decreasing likelihood of Western retaliation. Moreover, the victories of national liberation struggles are presented as plus for the socialist side. Thus, these achievements are pointed to as proof that the correlation of forces is shifting in favor of the communist side and that the communist system is advancing toward an inevitable worldwide victory over capitalism.

D. Confusion sometimes arises because "correlation of forces" (sootnosheniye sil) is translatable into English terms with varying tone. Thus, irregularity of translation may lead to confusion concerning Soviet intent.

In comparison to Khrushchev, Brezhnev has been less inclined to use catch-phrases, such as "correlation of forces," especially since about 1968. It might be speculated that Brezhnev has consciously sought to draw less attention to the conflict aspect by short-hand terms, which critics of detente could easily attack. The seriousness with which the correlation of forces concept is held is underlined by the fact that it is used more frequently in scholarly journals on international affairs than in journals directed toward particular audiences.

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THE SOVIET CONCEPT OF THE
"CORRELATION OF FORCES"

I INTRODUCTION

Despite the optimistic expectations of some Americans, the era of detente ushered in by the May 1972 and June 1973 Summit Conferences has not dissuaded the Soviet leadership from its continued dedication to undermining the global position of its principal adversary, the United States. Soviet spokesmen have consistently pointed out that "peaceful coexistence"--the Soviets' preferred term for detente--does not imply the possibility of "ideological reconciliation" between the two systems. Indeed, the recent relaxation of tensions requires only the avoidance of direct Soviet-American military confrontation; it supposes conflict in every other area. As stated in the authoritative Party journal Kommunist:

Peaceful coexistence represents a specific form of class struggle in the international arena and a dialectically complex form of struggle in which the superiority of this or that social system is tested and determined not by a clash of weapons and not by the tempo of preparation for armed conflict, but by the interaction of the sum total of the elements constituting the actual power of the state: economic, political, social, and spiritual.¹

¹ N. Lebedev, Doctor of Historical Science, "On the Class Character of Peaceful Coexistence," Kommunist, No. 4 (March 1975), p. 57. Italics in original. Similarly, a Kommunist editorial straightforwardly noted that "...peaceful coexistence does not remove the contradiction between socialism and capitalism--the main contradiction of the contemporary epoch. The class struggle of the two world systems continues; it is developing in three basic forms: political, economic, and ideological." See "International Relations and the Ideological Struggle," *ibid.*, No. 14 (September 1973), p. 4.

Considering the complexity of this interaction, the struggle could result in unfavorable consequences if left unmanaged. Soviet leaders since Lenin have asserted that the struggle between the two opposing systems must not be left to find its own random course. Rather, historical factors must be subjected to an "objective" Marxist analysis in order to arrive at a scientifically substantiated course of action. In April 1917, for example, Lenin pointed out to his followers that:

Marxism requires from us a strictly exact, objectively verifiable analysis of the correlation of classes and the concrete features of each historical situation. We, Bolsheviks, have always tried to meet this requirement, which is absolutely essential from the standpoint of any scientific substantiation of policy.¹

Similarly, a 1974 article in Kommunist explained that, inter alia, "the Party's theoretical and practical activity rests on a strong foundation of objective assessments and accurate information" and that "all party documents devoted to domestic problems and foreign policy conditions of the building of communism are distinguished by this strict scientific nature and party-mindedness."²

Utilizing such an approach, Soviet leaders attempt to evaluate the forces and trends of the contending systems for the purpose of devising a course of action which will guide socialism to its "inevitable victory" over capitalism. As one Soviet writer has noted:

Marxists-Leninists not only analyze the very correlation of forces in the world arena and in accordance with this determine their actions. They also take into account the

¹ V.I. Lenin, "Letters on Tactics," Polnoye sobraniye sochineniy (Complete Works), Vol. 31 (Moscow: Publishing House for Political Literature, 1969), p. 132.

² "The Effective Force of the Leninist Principles of Party Leadership," Kommunist, No. 16 (November 1974), p. 6.

character of the correlation of world forces and the trends of their development. On consideration of these changes and trends is based their assurance of the inevitability of the victory of socialism on a worldwide scale, as well as the possibility of preventing a new world war.¹

Thus, Soviet leaders indicate that a "scientific" analysis of the changing correlation of forces between the two social systems is vitally necessary for understanding and managing the direction of history and demonstrating the shifting of the correlation of forces in favor of socialism.

The purpose of this paper is to analyze the Soviet concept of the correlation of forces. It will attempt from a review of historical and contemporary Soviet literature (1) to illuminate the various factors subsumed under the concept, (2) to indicate the extent to which the concept represents a systematic approach to foreign policy, and (3) to assess the Soviet leadership's current evaluation of the international balance between the United States and the USSR.

¹ Colonel S. Tyushkevich, Doctor of Philosophical Science, "The Correlation of Forces in the World and Factors of War Prevention," Kommunist Vooruzhenykh Sil, No. 10 (May 1974), p. 13.

II SOVIET USE OF THE "CORRELATION OF FORCES"¹ CONCEPT SINCE THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION

Historically, the concept of a "correlation of forces" (sootnosheniye sil in Russian) has been sufficiently malleable so as to be adaptable to several different contexts, entailing minor variations in terminology. In its most general respect, correlation of forces denotes the relative alignment of two opposing forces or groups of forces. As exemplified by its various usages, the concept may be applied to the alignment of forces (or groups of forces) in the domestic arena (for example, the internal correlation of forces) or the international arena (for example, the international correlation of forces, or the correlation of world forces), as well as to the alignment of specific types of forces (for

¹ While it has not been possible to determine the origin of the term "correlation of forces," it is noteworthy that non-Bolsheviks as well had utilized the term in some variation (See fn. 1, p. 5) in the decade before the 1917 Revolution. For example, at the 2nd Congress of the RSDRP in 1903, M.I. Liber, a delegate from the Jewish Bund, presented a justification for the existence of a separate organization for Jewish proletariat based upon "the grave legal conditions" of the Jews and the absolutely distinctive "correlation of social forces" among the Jewish people. (Vtoroy s"yezd RSDRP, iyul'-avgust 1903 goda. Protokoly (Second Congress of the RSDRP, July-August 1903. Protocols) (Moscow: Publishing House for Political Literature, 1959), p. 53. See also the discussions of Liber's proposition by Murav'yev (p. 73) and Bekov (p. 78).) Then, at the 3rd RSDRP Congress in 1905, the assembly approved a resolution authorizing the RSDRP to participate in a temporary revolutionary government "subject to the correlation of forces and other factors resisting an exact prior definition." ("Resolution on a Temporary Revolutionary Government," in M.N. Lyadov, ed., Tretiy ocherednoy s"yezd Rossiyskoy Sotsial-Demokraticheskoy Rabochey Partii, 1905 goda. Polnyy tekst protokolov (Third Regular Congress of the Russian Social-Democratic Worker's Party, 1905. Full Text of the Protocols) (Moscow: State Publishing House, 1924), p. 520.) Particularly interesting is a book on the First and Second Dumas by Professor T.V. Lokot' (Politicheskaya partiya i gruppy v Gosudarstvennoy Dume (Political Parties and Groups in the State Duma) (Moscow: "Pol'za" Publishing House, 1907 passim), which employs "correlation of forces"

example, the correlation of class forces, the correlation of political forces, the correlation of economic forces, the correlation of military forces).¹

The purpose of the historical overview in this section is to illustrate that the Soviet leadership has always considered the calculation of the "correlation of forces" to be an important, indeed necessary, activity. This calculation has been consistently utilized by the highest leaders of the Soviet Union to assist in defining the proper course of action in

in some variant fourteen times. Herein, Professor Lokot' refers to the correlation of political forces (pp. 4, 8, 184), the correlation of real forces (pp. 9, 13, 15), the correlation of forces (pp. 12, 17, 22), the correlation of real political forces (pp. 17, 201-202, 238), the correlation of industrial forces (p. 282), and the correlation of social forces (p. 283).

Similarly, the term was utilized by non-Bolshevik speakers during the Revolutionary period. For example, noting the decline of the Petrograd Soviet's authority following an abortive Bolshevik coup in July 1917, the Menshevik Irakli Tseretelli expressed the opinion that:

A new era in the history of the Revolution has begun. Two months ago the Soviets were stronger. Now we have become weaker, for the correlation of forces has changed to our disadvantage.

(Quoted in Aleksander F. Kerensky, The Catastrophe. Kerensky's Own Story of the Russian Revolution (New York: D. Appleton and Co., 1927), p. 256. Moreover, Kerensky himself uses the term in his prefatory remarks to Tseretelli's statement.)

- ¹ Therefore, the following variations are frequently encountered:
- internal correlation of forces (vnutrennoye sootnosheniye sil)
 - international correlation of forces (mezhdunarodnoye sootnosheniye sil)
 - correlation of world forces (sootnosheniye mirovykh sil)
 - correlation of class forces (sootnosheniye klassovykh sil)
 - correlation of political forces (sootnosheniye politicheskikh sil)
 - correlation of economic forces (sootnosheniye ekonomicheskikh sil)
 - correlation of military forces (sootnosheniye voyennykh sil)

domestic and/or foreign policy. Thus, "correlation of forces" is not a recently invented concept used to justify current acts, but rather a time-honored methodological tool. Nor is it a mere instrument to justify acts ex post facto.

A. During the Leninist Period

During the negotiations with the Germans to terminate Russian involvement in World War I, Leon Trotsky suggested that the Soviet regime should unilaterally declare an end to hostilities, even without the conclusion of a formal peace agreement. Trotsky agreed that the Russian side could no longer sustain its war effort and that the German side was not in a position to renew its offensive in the East. A faction of Left Bolsheviks led by Nikolay Bukharin alternatively proposed an immediate cessation of negotiations and initiation of a "revolutionary war." Lenin rejected the possibility of a revolutionary war because, in agreement with Trotsky, he considered further Russian hostilities to be unfeasible. However, he was not as optimistic as Trotsky that the Germans were unable to launch an offensive. Thus, in January 1918, Lenin advanced twenty-one theses explaining why the Soviet Government should accept the German peace terms. Two of these, numbers 13 and 16, relied heavily on an assessment of the correlation of class forces in Russia. First, Lenin stressed the impossibility of revolutionary war:

Summing up the arguments in favor of an immediate revolutionary war, it must be concluded that such a policy would perhaps respond to the needs of mankind to strive for the beautiful, the spectacular, and the striking, but that it would be totally disregarding the objective correlation of class forces and material factors at the present stage of the socialist revolution already begun.¹

¹ V.I. Lenin, "Theses on the Question of an Immediate Conclusion of a Separate and Annexationist Peace," Polnoye sobraniye sochineniy, Vol. 35, p. 248.

Moreover, pointed out Lenin, the peasantry would be unlikely to support a continuation of hostilities:

The poor peasantry in Russia is in a position to support the socialist revolution led by the working class, but it is not in a position immediately and at the present moment to begin a serious revolutionary war. To ignore this objective correlation of class forces on the present question would be a fatal blunder.¹

Despite Lenin's assessment, a meeting of Bolshevik leaders voted to support the Trotsky formula. On February 10, 1918, Trotsky announced at Brest that Russia was leaving the war and there would be no further talks. The German response was to launch a tremendously successful offensive one week later. After several days of fighting, the Germans demanded the reopening of negotiations. On threat of resignation, Lenin secured support for the conclusion of an immediate peace accepting harsh German terms. During the Party's discussions concerning ratification of the peace terms at the Seventh Congress of the R.K.P. (B), a resolution on war and peace was adopted on March 8 which (while reaffirming support for a future world revolution) justified the acceptance of the treaty based upon the correlation of world forces. As the resolution stated:

The Congress is confident that from the standpoint of the interests of the international revolution the step taken by the Soviet authority, in view of the present correlation of forces in the world arena, was inescapable and necessary.²

Moreover, during the discussion Lenin spoke against a Trotsky amendment, which would have forbidden the Soviet Government from concluding peace treaties with the Ukrainian or Finnish separatist movements, saying:

¹ Ibid., p. 249

² V.I. Lenin, "The Resolution on War and Peace," *ibid.*, Vol. 36, p. 36. A footnote indicates that this particular paragraph had been inserted into the resolution by G. Ya. Sokol'nikov and G. Ye. Zinov'yev.

We must in no way bind our hands in any strategic maneuver. Everything depends upon the correlation of forces and the moment of the offensive against us by these or those imperialist countries and upon the moment when the rehabilitation of our army, which is undoubtedly beginning, reaches the point that we will be in a position and will be obliged not only to refrain from concluding peace, but also to declare war.¹

With the Bolshevik Party's support for the peace treaty, the Extraordinary Fourth All-Russian Congress of Soviets was convened on March 10 to decide the ratification issue. By a vote of 453 to 36, the Congress voted its approval for ratification. In the main report, Lenin had again invoked the concept of the correlation of forces as a justification for ratification. Characterizing the present situation as a "turning point" in the Revolution "from easy victories within the country to exceptionally heavy defeats without," Lenin argued that this "turn in events" was the result of an adverse correlation of forces. He explained:

And it could not be otherwise by virtue of that correlation of forces between the revolutionary classes and the reactionary classes, which is found at the present time in the international arena.²

Despite the internal disorder caused by widespread famine, the Civil War, and Allied intervention, Lenin aired the optimistic view on several occasions that the overall correlation of forces was favorable to the Bolshevik regime. In July 1919, for example, Lenin contrasted the prevailing situation with that which had existed a year earlier. As he stated:

¹ V.I. Lenin, "Speech Against the Amendments of Trotsky to the Resolution on War and Peace," *ibid.*, p. 37.

² V.I. Lenin, "Speech on the Ratification of the Peace Treaty," *ibid.*, p. 97.

...We can tell the truth that: yes, the situation is difficult, but a comparison of that which was experienced last year with what the situation is now...shows, even on the side of the simple internal correlation of forces and even on the side of the confrontation of facts related to temporary difficulties, that our present situation is incomparably more stable and therefore to give way to panic would be a thousand times criminal.¹

Similarly, on May 5, 1920, Lenin assessed the internal and external correlation of forces to be such as to assure a Soviet victory over the enemy. According to Lenin:

What is now happening in all capitalist countries, and as time goes on the more strongly, especially in such a country as Poland, gives us the confidence that if we emerged victorious from a war doubtlessly more severe and if we have correctly studied the dissension and the impossibility of reconciliation among the bourgeoisie of the various groups and parties at times when they particularly need this unity, then now the improvement of our international position is enormous. This gives us confidence not only in view of the internal, but also the international correlation of forces. If we consider the all contemporary imperialist states and all their aspirations...and evaluate them totally objectively, in view of the irrefutable facts of the history of recent years and especially the past half year, then it is revealed to us that the international enemy weakens, that all attempts of unity among the imperialists become more and more hopeless, and that in this way our victory is assured.²

By the end of 1920, with minor exceptions, the Bolshevik forces had won victories on all major fronts and most of the old tsarist empire had been recaptured. Consequently, at the 10th Congress of the R.K.P. (b) in March 1921, L.B. Kamenev reported to the assembly that "a certain equilibrium" (nekotoroye ravnovesiye) had arisen between the capitalist

¹ V.I. Lenin, "On the Contemporary Situation and the Immediate Tasks of the Soviet Government," *ibid.*, Vol. 39, pp. 31-32.

² V.I. Lenin, "Speech at a Joint Meeting of the VTsIK, the Moscow Soviet, the Trade Unions, and Factory Committees," *ibid.*, Vol. 41, p. 116.

countries and non-capitalist Asia.¹ In a report delivered to the 3rd Congress of the Communist International (Comintern) on July 5, 1921, Lenin likewise spoke of "a certain equilibrium of forces" (izvestnoye ravnovesiye sil), but he was quick to add that it applied only in a military sense.² Moreover, in a series of ten theses drawn up for the Comintern Congress, Lenin remarked that this equilibrium, "although extremely fragile and extremely unstable," allowed the Soviet Republic to continue to exist despite an encirclement by capitalism. Based upon this assessment, Lenin devoted two of his ten theses to a description of "the correlation of class forces on an international scale" and "the correlation of class forces in Russia."³ Again in December 1921, Lenin addressed the relationship between the prevailing equilibrium and the correlation of forces. In a report to the 9th All-Russian Congress of Soviets, he asserted:

This, comrades, is what I consider necessary to say on the issue of our international situation. To a certain extent, it has reached an unstable equilibrium. Materially with respect to the economic and the military, we are extremely weak, but morally--of course, not understanding the idea from the standpoint of abstract morals, but understanding it as the correlation of the real forces of all classes in all states--we are stronger than everyone.⁴

In a report to the 4th Comintern Congress in October 1922, Karl Radek noted the existence of "a certain equilibrium," but predicted

¹ Desyatyy s"yezd RKP(b): Stenograficheskiy otchet (Tenth Congress of the RKP(b): Stenographic Record) (Moscow: State Publishing House for Political Literature, 1963), p. 465.

² V.I. Lenin, "Report on the Tactics of the R.K.P.," Polnoye sobraniye sochineniy, Vol. 44, pp. 34-35.

³ V.I. Lenin, "Theses of a Report on the Tactics of the R.K.P.," ibid., pp. 4-5.

⁴ V.I. Lenin, "On the Internal and Foreign Policy of the Republic," ibid., p. 300.

increasing instability in the international situation. In a section of his report entitled "The Correlation of Forces of the Versailles Peace," Radek argued that the postwar treaty had established a new division of power among the Entente states, a fact which he predicted would gradually, but inevitably, lead to new intra-capitalist conflicts. Consequently, he advised the members of the Congress that "a thorough analysis of all the changes of world politics...is necessary if the working class wants to play an increasingly prominent role in this politics."¹

B. During the Stalinist Period

At the 16th Congress of the V.K.P.(b) in June 1930, Stalin assessed that "the contradictions inherent in world capitalism" were intensifying as a result of the increasing severity of the worldwide depression. Like Radek earlier, Stalin predicted an exacerbation of intra-capitalist camp struggles. In Stalin's view, the world economic crisis

is laying bare and intensifying the contradictions among the major imperialist countries, the struggle for markets, the struggle for raw materials, the struggle for the export of capital. None of the capitalist states are now satisfied with the old distribution of spheres of influence and colonies. They see that the correlation of forces has changed and it is necessary in accordance with this to repartition markets, sources of raw materials, spheres of influence, etc.²

Despite its collaboration with the Allied countries during World War II, the Soviet leadership's postwar view envisioned a world split into "two camps," fundamentally favorable to the Soviet Union. As A.A. Zhdanov

¹ Karl Radek, Likvidatsiya versal'skogo mira. Doklad IV Kongressu Kommunisticheskogo Internatsionala (Abolition of the Versailles Peace. Report to the IV Congress of the Communist International) (Petrograd: Publication of the Communist International, 1922), p. 64.

² I.V. Stalin, "Political Report of the Central Committee to the XVI Congress of the VKP(b)," Sochineniya (Works), Vol. 12 (Moscow: State Publishing House for Political Literature, 1949), p. 248.

pointed out at the founding conference of the Communist Information Bureau (Cominform) in September 1947, the defeat of the fascist bloc reflected in a general shift in the alignment between the two social systems:

The conclusion of the Second World War introduced essential changes in the entire international situation. The military defeat of the bloc of fascist states, the anti-fascist, liberation nature of the war, and the decisive role of the Soviet Union in the victory over the fascist aggressors sharply changed the correlation of forces between the two systems-- socialist and capitalist--in favor of socialism.¹

As a result of the postwar shift, observed Zhdanov, "the general correlation of forces between the world of capitalism and the world of socialism has still more greatly heightened the significance of the foreign policy of the Soviet State and extended the scale of its foreign political activities."² In retrospect, it seems possible that Zhdanov's statement reflected a growing belief of the Soviet leadership in its ability to take foreign policy initiatives and to probe into the Western "camp" without fear of a direct American military retaliation on the Soviet Union. Thus, the Soviet Union undertook in the immediate postwar years such acts as the satellization of Eastern Europe, attempted expansion into Iran, support for anti-Western forces in Greece and Turkey, the blockade of Berlin, and assistance for the North Korean invasion of South Korea.

The lack of direct American military response to Soviet initiatives, coupled with the significant improvements in Soviet military power after the detonation of its first nuclear bomb in 1949, appears to have convinced

¹ A. Zhdanov, "On the International Situation," in Informatsionnoye soveshchaniye predstaviteley nekotorykh kompartiy v Pol'she v kontse sentyabrya 1947 goda (Informational Conference of the Representatives of Some Communist Parties in Poland at the end of September 1947) (Moscow: State Publishing House for Political Literature, 1948), p. 13.

² Ibid., p. 24.

Stalin that the Soviet Union was relatively secure from a capitalist--that, is, a United States--attack for the foreseeable future. However, this postwar shift in the correlation of forces, by making the Soviet Union less vulnerable, called into question the traditional communist position on the inevitability of war between the two opposing systems. Therefore, in a series of articles collectively titled "Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR" published on the eve of the 19th Party Congress, Stalin revised the tenet on the inevitability of war in accordance with his perception of the new correlation of forces. According to Stalin's explanation, the contradictions between capitalism and socialism were "theoretically" stronger than the contradictions among the capitalist states. Yet, the capitalists were more fearful of a war with the socialist camp, because "war between capitalist countries puts in question only the supremacy of certain capitalist countries over others, [but] war with the USSR must certainly put in question the existence of capitalism itself."¹ Using the example of World War II, a war initiated between capitalist states, Stalin pointed out as proof of his position that "the struggle of the capitalist countries for markets and their desire to crush their competitors proved in practice to be stronger than the contradictions between the capitalist camp and the socialist camp."²

C. During the Khrushchev Period

In the main report to the 19th Party Congress in October 1952, Georgiy Malenkov reiterated Stalin's thesis and even more strongly asserted that a war between capitalism and socialism "would provoke the disintegration of the world capitalist system."³ In addition, Malenkov maintained that the postwar international peace movement gave significant support for

¹ Joseph V. Stalin, "Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR," Selected Works (David, Calif.: Cardinal Publishers, 1971), p. 336.

² Ibid.

³ G. Malenkov, "Otchetnyy doklad XIX s'yezdu partii o rabote tsentral'nogo komiteta VKP(b) (Accountability Report to the 19th Party Congress on the Work of the Central Committee of the VKP(b)) (Moscow: State Publishing House for Political Literature, 1952), p. 51.

"the preservation of peace and the prevention of a new war." Indeed, contended Malenkov, "the present correlation of forces between the camp of imperialism and war and the camp of democracy and peace makes this prospect fully realistic."¹

The tenets concerning the "inevitability of war" underwent further modification under Nikita Khrushchev. Whereas Stalin maintained that the possibility of war would be eliminated only with the destruction of capitalism-imperialism, Khrushchev introduced the premise that the shift in the postwar correlation of forces had increased the likelihood of eliminating all types of wars. In the Accountability Report to the 20th Party Congress in 1956, Khrushchev promulgated the idea that war was no longer "fatalistically inevitable" because of the change in the correlation of forces.

War is not fatalistically inevitable. Today there are mighty social and political forces possessing formidable means to prevent the imperialists from unleashing war....²

In general, during the Khrushchev era, the competition between the two systems was envisioned as a peaceful struggle by means of which the Soviets would attain victory because of the inherent superiority of the socialist system. As the declaration issued at the conference of twelve Communist Parties held in Moscow in 1957 observed:

In connection with the profound historic changes and fundamental shifts in the correlation of forces in the international arena in favor of socialism and as a result of the increasing power of attraction of

¹ Ibid., p. 39.

² N.S. Khrushchev, "Accountability Report of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union to the 20th Party Congress," in XX s"yezd Kommunisticheskoy partii Sovetskogo Soyuza. Stenograficheskiy otchet (20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union), Vol. I (Moscow: State Publishing House for Political Literature, 1956), pp. 37-38.

the ideas of socialism among the working class, working peasantry, and working intelligentsia, more favorable conditions are being created for the victory of socialism.¹

Under Khrushchev, the assessment of the correlation of forces relied more firmly upon economic factors than was previously the case. According to Khrushchev, the superiority of the socialist economic system would gradually receive increasing recognition.² In time, this would lead to a preponderance of forces favorable to socialism, an alignment from which even more favorable conditions would be developed. Thus, Khrushchev asserted in a report to the 21st Party Congress in 1959 on the new seven year plan that:

Fulfillment of the plan will increase the economic potential of the USSR to such an extent that, coupled with the growth of the economic potential of all socialist countries, it will secure a decisive preponderance in the correlation of forces in the international arena in favor of peace, and thus will come into existence new and still more favorable conditions for averting world war and preserving peace on earth.³

¹ Pravda, 22 November 1957.

² For example, in an interview given to I. McDonald, Foreign Editor of The Times (London) on 31 January 1958, Khrushchev remarked:

The time is not far off when we shall overtake the most advanced capitalist states and outstrip them in per capita output. Everything now points to this, and when it has been achieved the indisputable superiority of the socialist system will be even more obvious to everyone.

N.S. Khrushchev, For Victory in Peaceful Competition With Capitalism (New York: E.P. Dutton, 1970), p. 91.

³ N.S. Khrushchev, "On the Planned Figures for the Development of the USSR National Economy in 1959-1965," Vneocherednoy XXI s"yezd Kommunisticheskoy partii Sovetskogo Soyuza. Stenograficheskiy otchet. Extraordinary 21st Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Stenographic Report (Moscow: State Publishing House for Political Literature, 1959), p. 72.

In addition, the Khrushchev view of the international situation modified the Stalin-Zhdanov "two camp" formula. Now, Third World countries were no longer automatically assigned to the capitalist camp. It was maintained that newly liberated countries might, from the Soviet statement, make a positive contribution to the correlation of forces, especially in averting world war. Indeed, Khrushchev noted in his report to the 21st Party Congress that:

There need be no doubt that at this time new countries, liberated from the colonial yoke, are joining with the states coming out for the consolidation of peace. The idea of the admissibility of war is already deeply rooted in the consciousness of these peoples. The new correlation of forces will be so obvious that the clear hopelessness of any attempt to unleash a war against the socialist camp will stop even the most die-hard imperialists.¹

At the same time, Khrushchev recognized that, while decreasing in likelihood, war between the two systems continued to be a possibility. It followed that the military factor in the correlation of forces retained a major importance. In light of this consideration, Khrushchev assured the representatives at the 21st Party Congress that:

The Soviet States, as any other socialist country, is not guaranteed against the possibility of aggression from the side of the imperialist states. However, the correlation of real forces (sootnosheniye real'nykh sil) in the world is now such that we can repulse any enemy's attack.²

At the 22nd Party Congress in 1961, Khrushchev unwrapped a new Party Program, which was supposed to set the guide lines for the transition to the initial stages of communism. The Program predicted that by 1970 the Soviet Union would, inter alia, substantially create the material-technical basis of communism, surpass the richest capitalist countries

¹ Ibid., p. 73.

² Ibid., p. 107.

in per capita production, secure material comfort for all Soviet citizens, and abolish hard physical labor. During the succeeding decade (1971-1980), it would, inter alia, complete the material-technical basis of communism, secure an abundance of material and cultural blessings, and move toward implementation of the principle "to each according to his need." "Thus," proclaimed the Program, by 1980, "communist society will on the whole be constructed."¹

As outlined by Khrushchev, this program of development emphasized large non-military investments and, thereby, presupposed an era of peaceful coexistence between the two social systems. For this reason, it was emphasized that the competition between socialism and capitalism should be essentially ideological and economic, not military. Consequently, Khrushchev was pressed to demonstrate to Soviet hardliners that inter-systemic wars could be prevented.² Accordingly, Khrushchev stated in a report on the Party Program, "a comprehensive and profound analysis of the forces operating in the international arena...leads to the indisputable conclusion that the correlation of world political, economic,

¹ "Program of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union," in XXII s"yezd Kommunisticheskoy partii Sovetskogo Soyuza. Stenograficheskiy otchet (22nd Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Stenographic Record), Vol. III (Moscow: State Publishing House for Political Literature, 1962), p. 276.

² In the period preceding the 22nd had occurred several significant events, which served to emphasize the importance of this exercise. One was the American-supported Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba in April, and another was the Berlin Crisis of June and July. Hardline spokesmen described the invasion of Cuba as proof of imperialism's belligerent designs. The Berlin Crisis reinforced this picture and had created a crisis atmosphere with the potential for a direct Soviet-American confrontation. Under these pressures, Khrushchev announced an increase of 3 billion rubles in defense spending and the suspension of proposed troop reductions. (Pravda, 9 July 1961). At the end of August, the draftees scheduled to be released from active duty had their terms extended (*Ibid.*, 30 August 1961), and the resumption of suspended nuclear testing was announced (*Ibid.*, 31 August 1961).

and military forces have already changed in favor of the peaceloving camp."¹

Khrushchev elaborated that this "preponderance" (pereves) derived from four factors. First, Soviet military power is an effective deterrent to war. Second, the world socialist camp forms a strong force against "imperialist" aggression. Third, "a large group of young national states of Asia, Africa, and Latin America" uphold a "policy of peace" (that is, an anti-American policy) and possess interests which coincide with those of the socialist camp. Fourth, in various capitalist countries, coalitions organized by the "international working class" (that is, directed by local Communist Parties) were forming "very heterogeneous mass movements, which are united by the desire to rid mankind of military catastrophe forever." In summary, Khrushchev optimistically asserted:

Such are the main forces of the present blocking the road to war. At present, they are, indeed, already incalculable. Tomorrow, they will be even more powerful.²

In summary, the brief historical survey illustrates that the concept of the correlation of forces has frequently been utilized by Soviet spokesmen since the Bolshevik Revolution. It is a general concept that can be applied to numerous diverse situations in order to evaluate the balance between two forces or groups of forces in a conflict relationship. Moreover, the "correlation of forces" concept covers a wide range of factors, only one of which is military.

¹ N.S. Khrushchev, "On the Program of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union," in XXII s"yezd Kommunisticheskoy partii Sovetskogo Soyuza. Stenograficheskiy otchet, Vol. I, p. 233.

² Ibid., p. 234.

Keeping in mind the diverse applications of the general concept, the remainder of this study will focus on the correlation of forces in the world arena. To this point, the Soviets have identified two major shifts in the correlation of world forces, both of which have been in favor of socialism. The first took place in 1917 with the emergence of the first socialist state. The second occurred at the end of World War II with the defeat of German fascism and the emergence of an international community of socialist states. As will be shown, a third significant shift occurred about 1969-1970.

However, before taking up the issue of the current assessment of the correlation of forces in the world arena, it is necessary to make some observations concerning the translation, conceptualization, and utilization of the "correlation of forces."

III ELEMENTS IN THE "CORRELATION OF FORCES" CONCEPT

Unlike "balance of power," which the Soviets perceive as derived ultimately from an evaluation of military strength even when it is used in its broadest sense, "correlation of forces" is fundamentally conceived of as an estimate of class forces. In the view of Soviet spokesmen, Western and Soviet analysts proceed from divergent orientations.

In contrast with the concepts of bourgeois political analysts, Marxist-Leninist theory proceeds from the fact that the category of the correlation of forces in the world arena cannot and should not be reduced to the correlation of the military potential of states, and that in the last analysis the correlation is none other than the correlation of class forces on the scale of the worldwide system of international relations.¹

It follows, of course, that only the Soviets are able to arrive at a correct assessment of the international situation and to devise a correct policy based upon this assessment.²

Starting from this class viewpoint, Soviet analysts enumerate several elements which are examined in arriving at the "correlation of forces" assessment. One of the most detailed descriptions of the various factors has appeared in the authoritative party-theoretical journal Kommunist, according to which:

¹ A. Sergiyev, "Leninism on the Correlation of Forces As a Factor of International Relations," Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn', No. 4 (April 1975), p. 104. Italics in original.

² D. Tomashevskiy, Lenin's Ideas and Modern International Relations (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1974), p. 82.

A great many criteria exist for an evaluation of the correlation of forces. With regard to economics the factors usually compared are the gross national product on a per capita basis, the productivity of labor, the dynamics of economic growth, the level of industrial production, especially in the leading branches, the technical equipping of labor, resources and degree of qualification of the labor force, the number of specialists, and the level of development of theoretical and applied science. With regard to the military side of affairs, the factors compared are the quantity and quality of armaments, the fire power of armies, the combat and moral qualities of soldiers, the training of the command staff, the forms of troop organization and their experience in waging military actions, the character of the military doctrine and the methods of strategic, operational, and tactical thinking. With regard to politics, the factors taken into consideration are the breadth of the social base of the state authority the mode of its organization, the constitutional procedure of relations between the government and legislative organs, the possibility of making operative decisions, and the degree and character of popular support of the domestic and foreign policy. Finally, with regard to an evaluation of the strength of this or that international movement, the factors taken into consideration are its quantitative composition, influence among the masses, position in the political life of individual countries, principles and norms of relations among its component parts, and the degree of their cohesion.¹

The author of the Kommunist article points out, however, that this scheme only permits the analyst "with greater or lesser precision to determine the correlation of forces in some area or at some given moment, and can be utilized for short-term forecasts." Stopping just short of saying that an overall assessment of the correlation of forces in the world is impossible, the author states that:

¹ G. Shakhnazarov, "On the Problem of the Correlation of Forces in the World," Kommunist, No. 3 (February 1974), p. 86. Italics added.

Incomparably more complex is the overall correlation of forces in the world. It is difficult to give a calculation of the number of factors partaking in its formation. Some of them have changing significance and are capable of behaving in an unpredictable manner.¹

Thus, one might reach the conclusion that the calculation of the correlation of forces is made, and has traditionally been made, on two levels: (1) the general, worldwide level, and (2) individual factors and/or regions. Drawing on Shakhnazarov, it would appear that the assessment on the first level is essentially an intuitive process in which the Soviet leadership's comprehension of the correlation of world forces is based upon a "feel" for world events. Zhdanov's assessment of the correlation of forces at the founding conference of the Cominform, for example, might best be understood in this vein. Despite the obvious preponderance of U.S. economic and military might after the war, Zhdanov was probably expressing the overall impression that a trend toward a relative (nb., not an absolute) shift in favor of socialism had transpired with the emergence of new socialist states.

With respect to individual factors or geographic regions, analyses are apparently made more systematically. This is feasible because of the far fewer number of factors to be assessed at a given moment. For example, Khrushchev's revision of the "inevitability of war" doctrine was, to a significant degree, based upon his calculation of the correlation in U.S.-USSR military forces. Although the Soviet Union did not possess military superiority, the correlation of military forces had become such as to make a general East-West war unlikely.

Therefore, whereas the overall correlation of world forces may intuitively show the trend of the international situation, a more specific calculation must be made of individual factors or in a separate geographic

¹ Ibid.

region in order to assist in the formulation of foreign policy actions. In an effort to illustrate this dual process in operation, a review of Soviet initiatives in the Third World will be made later in this paper.

Among the difficulties encountered in the calculation of the correlation of world forces by the Soviets, two are worth emphasizing. First, Soviet writers point out that, while the material factors in the correlation of forces (that is, the economic and the military factors) are to a degree quantifiable, the equally important socio-political factors can be evaluated only qualitatively. Concerning the socio-political factors, one spokesman has noted that "one cannot always give a quantitative description to these factors, but in a qualitative respect they are an objective reality."¹ Another has explained:

In addition to the material factors examined above, there are factors, which do not easily lend themselves to a quantitative calculation, but their importance for the development of international relations and the balance of world forces is extremely great. Besides, they are inseparably linked with the material factors; it is often difficult to separate one from the other.²

Among the non-quantifiable factors, the latter writer lists the following repeatedly cited categories: (1) the general crisis of capitalism, (2) the struggle for national liberation, (3) the mobilization of international mass anti-imperialist movements, and (4) the stratification of the Western leadership's attitude toward cooperation with the socialist community.³

A second difficulty arises with respect to the existence of independent forces or "wandering values" which do not have a predetermined and

¹ Tyushkevich, p. 12.

² Sh. Sanakoyev, Doctor of Historical Sciences, "The Problem of the Correlation of Forces in the Contemporary World," Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn', No. 10 (1974), p. 46.

³ Cf. V.V. Zhurkin, SShA i mezhdunarodno-politicheskiye krizisy (The USA and the International-Political Crises) (Moscow: Nauka Publishing House, 1975), p. 6.

steadfast place in the class conflict. Their influence on particular circumstances may be great, but cannot be determined beforehand. These values, therefore, inject a portion of uncertainty in the calculation of the correlation of forces. As pointed out in one Soviet source:

Finally, there are forces, which have not "defined their position," have not taken clearcut positions, and to a certain extent vacillate between the main participants of the class conflict. Therefore, when calculating the correlation of forces, it must be taken into consideration that the international arena has its own type of "wandering" values, which in each concrete case can significantly influence the outcome of events.¹

As examples of vacillating independent forces might be cited the activity of (1) Egypt in the Mid-East crisis, (2) liberal political parties in capitalist states, and (3) the North Vietnamese in the Sino-Soviet conflict.

¹ Shakhnazarov, p. 87.

IV THE CURRENT SOVIET ASSESSMENT OF THE CORRELATION
OF FORCES IN THE WORLD AND ITS IMPACT ON THE CONDUCT
OF SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY

Present-day Soviet analyses of international affairs consistently assert that a substantial shift in the correlation of forces in favor of socialism transpired about 1969-1970. The extent to which this view reflects the results of an actual official reassessment is unclear. Nonetheless, the proposition is frequently cited¹ as a "decisive factor" which has led to a "qualitatively new stage" in the struggle between the two systems.² Thus, it is important to examine the current Soviet assessment of the correlation of world forces, because in accordance with it "the Communist Parties set themselves their immediate tasks and determine the current policy or tactics" and a change in the correlation of forces "can lead to a change in the general line, in the entire strategy of the world communist movement."³ Consequently, this section will take a closer look at foundations of the shift in the correlation of forces, especially the influence of the "general crisis of capitalism," the effects of the shift on the Soviet-American balance, as well as its impact on Soviet policy in the Third World.

¹ Such statements usually refer to Brezhnev's June 1974 preelection speech wherein the General Secretary claimed: "Having assessed the overall correlation of forces in the world, we came to a conclusion several years ago that there exists a real possibility of securing a radical turnabout in the international situation." Pravda, 15 June 1974.

² Sh. Sanakoyev, "Socio-Political Upheavals in the West and World Relations Today," International Affairs (Moscow), No. 3 (March 1975), p. 96.

³ V. V. Zagladin, ed., The World Communist Movement. Outline of Strategy and Tactics (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1973), pp. 41 and 36, respectively.

A. The Current Soviet Assessment

According to Soviet spokesmen, such as G. Arbatov, Director of the Institute of the United States and Canada, the shift in the correlation of forces "is not some kind of abstract formula, but a tangible reality."¹ The occurrence of the shift is closely connected in Soviet literature with the onset of strategic parity. While rejecting the contention that military power is the permanently dominant factor in the correlation of forces, Soviet spokesmen argue that the military environment as it developed at the turn of the decade forced the capitalist states to admit to a "fundamental restructuring" of international relations. Thus, when the Soviet Union achieved strategic parity (usually dated at about 1969), the capitalist states, especially the United States, were compelled to reappraise their policy of acting "from a position of strength" and to enter into "an era of negotiations." As one Soviet writer noted:

Recognition of Soviet-American parity in the area of strategic arms filled a particular place in the process of the West's realization of our day's international realities and the corresponding corrective amendment of the political course with regard to the socialist countries...

The realities of the nuclear age, the growth of the might of world socialism, and the inability of the United States, despite its attempts for a quarter of a century, to attain "strategic superiority" over the USSR ultimately brought American leaders not only to acknowledge a "nuclear deadlock," but to accept the idea of maintaining a "strategic equilibrium" with the Soviet Union on the basis of mutual agreement and to seek new forms of interrelations between the two powers.²

¹ Izvestiya, 22 June 1972.

² D. Tomashevskiy, "On the Path to a Radical Reconstruction of International Relations," Mirovaya Ekonomika i Mezhdunarodnyye Otnosheniya, No. 1 (January 1975), pp. 5-6.

A second Soviet writer declared in a similar vein:

To sum it up, the balance of world forces had further shifted in socialism's favour by the early 1970s as evidenced, for example, by the attainment of Soviet-American nuclear and missile parity and the awareness by the USA of its limited possibilities to influence diverse events in the world by means of military forces. This made the U.S. ruling class start a "reappraisal of values" and acknowledge the need "to reconcile the reality of competition between the two systems with the imperative of coexistence."

As a result of this reappraisal, the United States switched over from the policy of confrontation to a policy of negotiations with the USSR and other socialist countries.¹

In sum, then, the attainment of strategic parity shifted the main competition between the two systems away from the military towards the economic, political, and ideological spheres.²

Even the collective assessment of the non-military factors is said to demonstrate that the correlation of forces has shifted in favor of socialism. According to one author, "the general trend has been the steadfast growth of the forces of socialism, and the growth of the economic might, defensive might, and international prestige of the community of countries which took the road to socialist construction."³ In this respect, the current assessment of the correlation of forces in the world reinforces the long-held Soviet line that history is moving along a pre-determined course toward the inevitable worldwide victory of socialism.

¹ G. Trofimenko, "From Confrontation to Coexistence," International Affairs (Moscow), No. 10 (October 1975), p. 38.

² N. Inozemtsev, "Unity of Theory and Practice in the Leninist Peace Policy," Kommunist, No. 18 (December 1975), pp. 46-47; V. Pavlovskiy, Izvestiya, 8 January 1976, morning edition; and G. Arbatov, "Strength-Policy Impasses," Soviet Military Review, No. 1 (January 1975), p. 47.

³ V.G. Dolgin, "Peaceful Coexistence and the Factors Contributing to its Intensification and Development," Voprosy Filosofii, No. 1 (January 1974), p. 57. See also, Colonel A. Migolat'yev, "The Progress of International Relations and the Opponents of Detente," Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil, No. 21 (November 1975), p. 83.

Along with a recognition of the shift in the correlation of forces, other Soviet spokesmen, the capitalist states were required to accept peaceful coexistence as the guiding principle of international relations and to enter into a detente or "relaxation of tensions" with the socialist states.¹ It must be borne in mind, of course, that peaceful coexistence and detente do not imply an end to inter-systemic conflicts, but only necessitate that conflict be transferred to areas other than direct Soviet-American military confrontation. Accordingly, they are weapons of struggle for undermining the West. "Peaceful coexistence," stated one Soviet writer,

is essentially a class policy conducive to the strengthening of the position and prestige of the socialist countries, while undermining the aggressive imperialist forces and narrowing their opportunities for plotting against the cause of peace and social progress.²

Reiterating this point, Brezhnev admitted at the 25th CPSU Congress in February 1956 that "we make no secret of the fact that we see in detente the way to create more favorable conditions for peaceful socialist and communist construction."³

Indeed, the Soviets view the opposing social systems as engaged in, what one Soviet writer calls, a "two-in-one process," in which the socialist side continuously wins a series of victories and the capitalist camp gradually decays and disintegrates. In the words of Boris Ponomarev, a candidate member of the Politburo and secretary of the Party Central Committee, "if the influence of socialism on the course of events grows, this

¹ See, for example, the speech of M.A. Suslov, member of the Politburo, marking the 105th anniversary of Lenin's birth in Pravda, 23 April 1975; and N.V. Podgorny, member of the Politburo and chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, in Izvestiya, 13 February 1975, morning edition. The Nixon Doctrine and the SALT agreements are generally cited as two instances of proof in which the shift in the correlation of forces required the United States to modify its aggressive plans.

² N. Kapchenko, "Socialist Foreign Policy and the Restructuring of International Relations," International Affairs (Moscow), No. 4 (April 1975), p. 8.

³ Pravda, 25 February 1976.

means that the resources of the imperialist and reactionary forces will diminish correspondingly, and the resources of the forces of peace, national independence, and social progress will increase."¹ While individual setbacks (such as the ouster of the socialist-oriented Allende regime in Chile) are acknowledged, the overall trend is said to remain constant. A major factor in the disintegration of Western society is the "general crisis of capitalism."

B. The General Crisis of Capitalism

According to Soviet analysts, the post-World War I international situation gave rise to a "general crisis of capitalism," (obshchiy krizis kapitalizma) which is described as "the historic period during which occurs the process of the revolutionary downfall of capitalism and its replacement by socialism on a worldwide scale."² In the main speech to the 4th CPSU Congress in 1971, Brezhnev asserted that "the general crisis of capitalism continues to deepen" despite capitalism's attempts to adapt to the changing international situation.³ Quoting himself on this point at the 25th Congress in 1976, Brezhnev stated further that "the events of recent years with new force confirm that capitalism is a society devoid of a future."⁴ Thus, the factors which lead to the exacerbation of the general crisis of capitalism are viewed as significantly contributing to the shift in the correlation of forces in favor of socialism.

¹ Boris Ponomarev, "The Role of Socialism in Contemporary World Development," Problemy Mira i Sotsializma, No. 1 (January 1975), p. 11.

² I.T. Rogovskiy, Politicheskaya ekonomiya kapitalizma (The Political Economy of Capitalism) (Minsk: Publishing House of Belorussian State University imeni V.I. Lenin, 1975), p. 228.

³ L.I. Brezhnev, "Accountability Report of the Central Committee of the CPSU to the 24th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union," in XXIV s"yezd Kommunisticheskoy partii Sovetskogo Soyuza. Stenograficheskij otchet, Vol. 1, p. 38. Italicized in the original.

⁴ Pravda, 25 February 1976.

By commonly accepted standards, the general crisis of capitalism is divided into three broad stages,¹ whose periodization is derived from "the essential change of the correlation of forces between capitalism and socialism."² The first stage began with the emergence of the first socialist state after World War I and lasted until the beginning of World War II. Within this stage are three specific crises corresponding to the years 1920-21, 1929-33, 1937-38. The second stage arose as a consequence of the defeat of fascist Germany and the emergence of several socialist states and lasted into the mid-1950s. During this time occurred the specific crises of 1948-49 and 1953-54. The third, and present, stage is dated as of the mid-1950s. Relative to the latter stage, one Soviet source noted:

Deep qualitative changes took place in the socialist system in the mid-50s. The socialist people started the full-scale construction of communist society. The multi-layered structure of the economy was on the whole liquidated in a majority of the countries of people's democracy, and they entered into the concluding stage of the construction of socialism. Under the leadership of the Leninist Communist Party, the Soviet people created mighty missile and space equipment, laid the foundation of the approaching space triumphs--the first artificial satellites in the world, the historic flight of Yu. A. Gagarin, the first ground launching into outer space. The successes of the socialist economy and Soviet science permitted the creation of powerful means of defense, which forever excluded the possibility of the restoration of the aggressive capitalist path.

Put together in the international arena, all of these altered the correlation of forces of the two systems in favor of socialism. As a result after the second half of the 50s arose a new, third stage of the deepening of the general crisis of capitalism.³

¹ For several recent discussions of the periodization of the general crisis of capitalism, see, for example, Rogovskiy, pp. 228-232; and I. Gur'yev, "The General Crisis of Capitalism and Its Further Deepening," Mirovaya Ekonomika i Mezhdunarodnyye Otnesheniya, No. 10 (October 1975), pp. 34-36.

² "The General Crisis of Capitalism" in Bolshaya Sovetskaya Entsiklopediya (The Great Soviet Encyclopedia), Vol. 18 (Moscow: Publishing House of the Soviet Encyclopedia, 1974), p. 252.

³ Gur'yev, p. 36.

Within the third stage are delineated crises occurring in 1957-58, 1960-61, 1969-70, and 1973-to the present.

In a report to the second joint scientific conference of IUSAC and IMEMO, held in July 1975, one speaker noted that the 1973-75 capitalist crisis has been "the deepest and most severe crisis since the beginning of the 1930s" and that it marks "a definite landmark in the development of the general crisis of capitalism."¹ A second speaker at the conference supported this position, noting that "in all its 'parameters'--in duration, scale, and severity, and in the problems generated by it-- the present crisis is the most severe of all the crises in the postwar history of the USA."² Among the major elements of the present crisis are generally listed: (1) a slump in business activity, (2) decline in gross production, especially in the automotive industry, (3) the highest unemployment in postwar years, (4) an unrestrained rise in prices, (5) the further devaluation of the dollar on the international currency market, (6) runaway inflation, (7) energy problems, (8) increased conflicts between labor and capital, (9) and the decline of real wages.³ Considering all these factors, points out D. Kostyukhin, the deputy director of the Market Studies Institute of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Trade, "the present crisis

¹ I.D. Ivanov, "The Lessons of 1973-1975," in "The Economic Situation of the United States (A Scientific Conference)," SShA: Ekonomika, Politika, Ideologiya, No. 10 (October 1975), p. 60.

² Yu. I. Bobrakov, "The Long Drawn-Out Character of the Withdrawal from the Crisis," in *ibid.*, p. 53.

³ See, for example, the lead article in Izvestiya, 30 January 1975; V.M. Kudrov, department head at IMEMO, "Some Issues of the Economic Competition of the USSR and the USA," SShA: Ekonomika, Politika, Ideologiya, No. 9 (September 1975), p. 17; Y. Kvashnin and G. Nikolayev, "Class Battles Under Detente," International Affairs (Moscow), No. 9 (September 1975), p. 110; V. Martynov, deputy director of IMEMO, "The World Nature of the Economic Crisis," in "Economic Crisis in the World of Capitalism (Discussion at the Academic Council of the Institute of World Economics and International Relations)," Mirovaya Ekonomika i Mezhdunarodnyye Otnosheniya, No. 4 (April 1975), p. 15; Yu. Pokatayev, "The USA: The Crisis Deepens," in *ibid.*, p. 23; and S.V. Safronov, department chief of the Scientific Research Institute of Business Cycles (NIKI) of the Ministry of Foreign Trade, "The Situation in the American Economy," SShA: Ekonomika, Politika, Ideologiya, No. 3 (March 1975), p. 3.

eclipses all the previous postwar economic perturbations in the various capitalist countries or the capitalist world economy as a whole."¹

A unique feature of the present crisis, note Soviet analysts, is its geographic breadth. Unlike other postwar crises, the present one extends simultaneously to practically all of the major capitalist countries. Thus, the factors leading to the asynchrony of the crisis cycles of capitalist countries are gradually losing their force, and the factors leading to a synchronization of crises cycles are becoming considerably stronger.² The result is that capitalist crises are no longer isolated phenomena, but have become mutually reinforcing.

Numerous Soviet authors have taken note that the present crisis is not solely an economic crisis. It is claimed, rather, that capitalism is experiencing problems in a wide range of fields. As one such writer has remarked:

It would be a mistake to regard the present difficulties only from the economic angle--as another cyclical crisis of overproduction that has hit all capitalist countries. For it is not only an economic recession but a crisis of their social, political and ideological struggle. It is an eruption of all the contradictions inherent in the development of modern state-monopoly capitalism.³

In sum, it is of such a "profound nature" that it "embraces all aspects of life in the capitalist countries."⁴

¹ D. Kostyukhin, "The Great Depression of the Seventies," New Times (Moscow), No. 26 (June 1975), p. 18.

² V. Martynov, deputy director of IMEMO, "A Concluding Word," in "Economic Crisis in the World of Capitalism (Discussion at the Academic Council of the Institute of World Economics and International Affairs)," Mirovaya Ekonomika i Mezhdunarodnyye Otnosheniya, No. 6 (June 1975, pp. 101-102.

³ Kostyukhin, p. 18.

⁴ A. Grechikhin, "The Economy of Socialism and Capitalism in the First Half of the 1970s," Mirovaya Ekonomika i Mezhdunarodnyye Otnosheniya, No. 2 (February 1976), p. 6.

According to traditional Marxist-Leninist theory, capitalism is incapable of preventing the occurrence of periodic crises, because such crises arise from the "basic contradiction" of the capitalist socio-economic system, namely, "the contradiction between the social nature of production and the private capitalist form of appropriation of the results of production."¹ Despite this predilection to emphasize the debased condition of capitalism, however, Moscow's spokesmen exclude the implication that the collapse of the capitalist system is imminent. Indeed, as one Soviet writer points out, the present crisis "is cyclical and therefore transient."² Still, there is much ambiguity as to the timeframe when the U.S. may be expected to begin its recovery from the present crisis. For example, during the second joint scientific conference of IUSAC and IMEMO, one analyst cautiously suggested that "the 'bottom' of the crisis, so it seems, has passed by,"³ while another predicted that "a surge phase (faza pod'yema) will set in no earlier than 1977."⁴

C. The Correlation of Forces and the Third World

In their calculation of the Third World, Soviet analysts consider not only the resources and capabilities of the U.S. and the USSR, but all of the forces and processes at work in the international arena which contribute to, or detract from, the power, prestige and influence of the two superpowers. In this regard, the Soviet leadership views the countries

¹ S. Menshikov, professor and doctor of economic sciences, The Economic Cycle: Postwar Developments (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1975), p. 10. Cf. Yu. Pokatayev and V. Shenayev, "Some Features of the Contemporary Economic Crisis," Kommunist, No. 12 (August 1975), p. 85.

² S.A. Dalin, "The Contemporary World Economic Crisis and the Economy of the USA," SShA: Ekonomika, Politika, Ideologiya, No. 8 (August 1975), p. 20.

³ I.D. Ivanov, p. 60.

⁴ Yu. I. Bobrakov, p. 54.

of the Third World as the most active and successful arena of the worldwide "anti-imperialist" struggles led by the Soviet Union. Indeed in the first of a two part series of articles on socialist revolution, V. V. Zagladin, the deputy chief of the CC CPSU International Department, took note that, unlike the developed capitalist countries where the conditions for revolution are ripe but no revolution has occurred, some less developed countries lack the preconditions but are developing "under the socialist banner."¹ Consequently, the Third World is viewed as a key factor in helping shift the correlation of forces in favor of the Soviet Union and world socialism:

The intensified struggle of the developing countries against international imperialism for the freedom to choose a path for social-economic development is bringing about important changes in the correlation of forces and has probably become the most outstanding feature of the present stage in the national liberation movement.²

The Soviets consider the Third World to be a legitimate arena for superpower competition, a zone in which conflict can be managed within acceptable limits. Traditionally fluid and unstable, the Third World with its relatively low potential for direct superpower military confrontation, as opposed to that of Europe, has been viewed since the Khrushchev era as a target of opportunity. In the current era, material and political support for national liberation struggles are not construed by the Soviets to contradict the principles of "detente" and peaceful coexistence. To the contrary, the national liberation movement in the Third World is specifically excluded from the principles of "peaceful coexistence"³ and

¹ V. V. Zagladin, "The Preconditions of Socialism and the Struggle for Socialism," Voprosy Filosofii, No. 10 (October 1975), p. 39.

² Ye. Tarabrin, "The 'Third World' and Imperialism: A New Alignment of Forces," Mirovaya Ekonomika i Mezhdunarodnyye Otnosheniya (World Economics and International Relations), No. 2 (February 1975), p. 12.

³ For example, see A. Vovetov, "Peaceful Coexistence--A Real Factor in International Relations," International Affairs (Moscow) No. 9 (September 1972), p. 14; Yu. Molchanov, "Soviet Foreign Policy as a Factor Promoting the Revolutionary Transformation of the World," International Affairs (Moscow), No. 12 (December 1972), p. 5; A. Kosygin, speech on 3 July 1972, Pravda, 4 July 1972.

is seen as an ally of "world socialism" in the "joint offensive against imperialism and capitalism" for the "victory of socialism."¹ Soviet analysts frequently point out that the socialist system and the national liberation movement reinforce each other--"merging more closely on an international scale." They assert that the Soviet Union's victory in World War II and the emergence of the socialist community "created a new historical situation exceptionally favorable for the world revolutionary movement in general and for the national liberation movement in particular."² In fact, the Soviets maintain that it is "quite clear" that without the world socialist system this rapid collapse of colonialism would have been impossible:

Under the impact of socialism's successes, there is a further aggravation of the crisis of the old system and an exacerbation of its contradictions in all spheres of life; social, economic, political and cultural. This crisis makes itself felt not only in permanent slumps in production and in inflation, as the ideologists of imperialism would like to describe it. The crisis has already resulted in changes in the life of many countries and peoples. It has resulted in the triumph of national liberation revolutions in Asian and African countries and in the disintegration of the colonial system of imperialism.³

Thus, the upsurge of the "anti-imperialist national liberation struggle" has been greatly facilitated by the shift in the correlation of forces between the Soviet Union and the United States and by detente. As a result of this shift, "neocolonialism has not been able to fight the young states' attempt to control their own resources and to be masters in their own houses."⁴ Indeed, the Soviets reason that the relative and

¹ V. Tyagunenکو, "World Socialism and National Liberation Revolution," Kommunist, No. 8 (May 1973).

² E. Zhukov, "The Rise of the National Liberation Movement After the Second World War," International Affairs (Moscow) No. 7 (July 1972), p. 15.

³ Sh. Sanakoyev, "Foreign Policy and the Masses of People," International Affairs, No. 7 (July 1972), pp. 31-32.

⁴ Tarabrin, p. 21.

absolute growth in their military power vis-a-vis the United States, and the present detente relationship between the two global powers, deter Western military responses to the national liberation movement in the developing countries.¹

Moreover, according to the Soviet image, the Third World has not only benefited from, but has contributed significantly to, the shift in the correlation of forces. While not itself pleased with all of these developments, nevertheless Moscow discerns a steady erosion of the position and role of the United States in the Third World, as a result of such factors as:

- The emergence of a communist Cuba;
- The deterioration of U.S. influence and political-economic control over its "strategic rear," i.e., Latin America;
- The collapse of the U.S. venture in Vietnam;
- The retrenchment of the U.S. global containment policy as reflected in the Nixon Doctrine;
- The loss by the United States of its assured majority in the United Nations;
- The growing number of developing countries which have established close relations with the Soviet Union; and
- The pressure for a new world economic order.

In the first half of 1975, a Soviet military history journal published a two-part series on the issue of local war by General of the Army I. Ye. Shavrov, chief of the Military Academy of the General Staff imeni K. Ye. Voroshilov, in which the author sought to prove that the post-World War II correlation of forces showed a trend increasingly favorable to socialism and

¹ For example, see General of the Army A. Yepishev, "The Historical Mission of the Socialist State's Army," Kommunist, No. 7 (May 1972), pp. 56-58; L. I. Brezhnev, speech at banquet for Tito of Yugoslavia, Pravda, 6 June 1972; speech in Havana, Pravda, 31 January 1974 and speech on anniversary of World War II victory, Radio Moscow, 8 May 1975; M. Bagley, "Peaceful Coexistence and the Ideological Struggle," Trud, 9 January 1975.

that, as a result, "the number of victories of the forces of socialism and national liberation over the forces of imperialism and reaction" had correspondingly grown. Shavrov claimed that, of the 468 wars and military conflicts occurring between 1945 and 1975, "258 ended in defeat or with the forces of reaction not attaining their aims."¹ Moreover, in breaking down the timespan into five periods, the author asserted that the ratio of victories to defeats for the "progressive forces" was increasing advantages. Thus, he presents the following statistics:²


Years	Total	Including		Victory of Progressive Forces			Victory of Reactionary Forces		
		Local Wars	Military Conflicts	Tot.	L.W.	M.C.	Tot.	L.W.	M.C.
1945-50	28	16	12	13	10	3	15	6	9
1951-55	40	15	25	26	12	14	14	3	11
1956-60	122	10	112	60	7	53	62	3	59
1961-65	127	17	110	66	15	51	61	2	59
1966-70	106	13	93	60	8	52	46	5	41
1971-75	45	3	42	33	3	30	12	0	12
1945-75	468	74	394	258	55	203	210	19	191

¹ General of the Army I. Shavrov, "Local Wars and Their Place in the Global Strategy of Imperialism," Voyenno-Istoricheskiy Zhurnal, No. 3 (March 1975), p. 65. Part two appears under the same title in issue number four, April 1975.

² Adapted from *ibid.*, p. 64.

Plotting the totals of these wars and conflicts, Shavrov attempts to illustrate graphically that the number of victories for the reactionary forces have decreased sharply.¹

Number of
Wars and
Military
Conflicts



Based upon this general assessment of the impact made by the latest shift in correlation of forces on Third World affairs, the Soviet leadership has undertaken to increase activity there. This has been particularly true with regard to Soviet military involvement in the Third World. Indeed, on several occasions Soviet spokesmen have taken note of "a deepening of the external function of the Soviet armed forces."² Moreover, in

¹ Ibid., p. 66.

² General of the Army A. A. Yepishev, Chief of the Main Political Administration, "The Historic Mission of the Army of the Socialist State," Kommunist, No. 7 (May 1972), p. 62. See also Marshal of the Soviet Union A. A. Grechko, Minister of Defense, "The Leading Role of the CPSU in Building the Army of a Developed Socialist Society," Voprosy Istorii KPSS, No. 5 (May 1974), pp. 30-47. Significantly, although both are military men, neither article appears in a military journal.

delineating the diverse types of assistance which the Soviet Union extends to Third World states, one Soviet writer remarked:

Victorious in one country, the proletariat must not only defend its own socialist achievements, but also give direct assistance, including military assistance, to the proletarian revolutionary movement in other countries. This is, as taught by V. I. Lenin, one of its most important international tasks. Military support could be carried out by various means and methods: by sending detachments, military advisors, specialists, by supplying weapons, ammunition, etc.¹

In part, then, one manifestation of the current Soviet assessment of the correlation of world forces has been a significant increase in Soviet military aid extensions to Third World states over the past five years. Such aid during the period 1970-1974 represents more than half (51.4%) of all Soviet military aid extended since the initiation of the aid program in 1955. (See Table 1.)

In addition, it is within this context of the shifting correlation of world forces and increasing Soviet activity in Third World affairs that the Soviets have stepped up their material and economic involvement in Angola. Thus, Soviet support for the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) has included a massive military assistance program with sophisticated weapons, numerous Soviet and East European advisors, and over ten thousand Cuban troops as proxies. The Soviets apparently believed, or so it appears evident from their assessment of the correlation of forces, that the West would lack the will and, thereby, the ability to offset Soviet involvement.

¹ Colonel (Reserves) M. Molodtsygin, "Leninist Principle of Internationalism in the Organization of the Military Defense of Socialist Countries," Voyenno-Istoricheskiy Zhurnal (Military-History Journal), No. 9, p. 4 (September 1974).

Table 1

ANNUAL SOVIET MILITARY AID EXTENSIONS TO LESS
DEVELOPED COUNTRIES 1955-1974
(Million U.S. \$)

1955-60	1,285
1961	830
1962	415
1963	390
1964	875
1965	260
1966	450
1967	515
1968	460
1969	340
1970	985
1971	1,375
1972	830
1973	1,240
1974	1,735
Total	<u>11,985</u>

Source: Annual issues of U.S. Department of State,
Communist States and Developing Countries:
Aid and Trade.

D. Summary

The current Soviet assessment maintains that the correlation of forces is shifting in socialism's favor. The United States is seen as gradually retreating under the pressure of the socialist forces. Moreover, the shift is being constantly reinforced by the internal problems generated by capitalism's "general crisis" and by the increasing victories of anti-Western movements in the Third World. In sum, while the West may be able to make short-term advances, the general trend in the correlation of forces is in favor of socialism. Such a trend makes the West less capable of responding to Soviet initiatives.

APPENDIX

APPENDIX

"CORRELATION OF FORCES": QUESTIONS OF TRANSLATION, CONCEPTUALIZATION, AND UTILIZATION

In order to avoid possible confusion, this study has strictly adhered to "correlation of forces" as the translation for the Russian term sootnosheniye sil. Neither American nor Soviet translators are so precise. Indeed, sootnosheniye sil is variously translated by U.S. translators as "correlation of forces," "alignment of forces," "ratio of forces," "relationship of forces," or "balance of power." Likewise, Soviet translators of original Russian-language publications¹ generally fluctuate between "correlation of forces," "alignment of forces," "ratio of forces," and less frequently "relationship of forces." For reasons to be discussed below, Soviet publishers avoid "balance of power" as the translation of sootnosheniye sil.

This inconsistency of translation may result in some confusion. As noted earlier, correlation of forces (sootnosheniye sil) denotes the relative alignment of two opposing forces or groups of forces. The concept accents the hostility and conflict in a relationship. It is not a neutral term suggesting a mere interaction, for which Soviet spokesmen utilize the terms otnosheniye (relations) and vzaimootnosheniye (inter-relations). Therefore, those unable to compare a translation to the original Russian-language text may sometimes be misled as to the tone of the context and the implied intent. Moreover, a reader dependent solely on English translations might be led to a false evaluation concerning the seriousness of a concept which seemingly lacks consistency of agreed terminology, when the problem is rather one of translation. As a consequence, uniformity has been adopted.

¹ This can easily be seen by comparing the Russian-language Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn' with its Soviet-sponsored English translation International Affairs and the Russian-language Novoye Vremya with its Soviet-sponsored English translation New Times.

One essential note to make is that Soviet translators, unlike their American counterparts, are careful to avoid the translation of sootnosheniye sil as "balance of power." In Soviet parlance, "balance of power"--translated directly into Russian as balans sil--is an imperialist doctrine, which serves as a conceptual instrument of anti-communism. Soviet spokesmen acknowledge their agreement with those international relations theorists, naming especially Hans Morgenthau, who view power in its broadest sense as a function of its geographic, natural resource, industrial, military, popular, moral, and diplomatic components.¹ However, the balance of power concept of international relations is anathematized by the Soviets because:

- It is a non-class concept, which emphasizes state-to-state relationships as opposed to communist-to-imperialist relationships;²
- It is a description of the international arena, which favors retention of the status quo and an "equilibrium of forces," rather than a correlation of forces shifting in the socialist favor;³
- It assumes that the power position of a country is more important than its ideological orientation;
- It suggests that powerful states, even capitalist states, could stand outside of the international class conflict; and
- It emphasizes the overriding importance of military power and, thereby, gives impetus to the arms race.⁴

¹ V. I. Krivokhizha, "The Concept of 'Power' in American Research," SShA: Ekonomika, Politika, Ideologiya, No. 9 (September 1975), p. 116.

² Dmitry Volsky, "'Balance of Power'--A Pernicious Concept," New Times, No. 44 (October 1975), p. 18.

³ "'Balance of Power,'" in "Political Dictionary," SShA: Ekonomika, Politika, Ideologiya, No. 1 (January 1975), p. 121.

⁴ For scholarly treatment of these and related issues, see also A.A. Karenin, "The 'Balance of Power' Doctrine and the Modern World," Voprosy Filosofii, No. 9 (September 1973), pp. 29-41; A.A. Karenin, "The Theory of the 'Balance of Power,'" Voprosy Istorii, No. 2 (February 1975), pp. 74-92; and I.B. Ponomareva, "Some Aspects of the Theory of 'Balance of Power,'" Voprosy Istorii, No. 11 (November 1975), pp. 202-210.


In view of this, Soviet spokesmen draw a clear distinction between correlation of forces (sootnosheniye sil) and balance of power (balans sil), both terminologically and conceptually.

In addition to the earlier detailed description of the current meaning and significance of the correlation of forces concept, some preliminary insights may be gained from a limited sampling of the concept's usage in Soviet publications. Three analyses have been conducted. While they are extremely elementary and do not in themselves lead to definitive conclusions, the analyses do indicate several hypotheses worthy of further investigation. The first analysis compares the usage of the term by Khrushchev and Brezhnev. The second surveys the usage by Brezhnev over time. The third compares the usage in several major Soviet journals during 1975. The methodology utilized is a simple quantification of the term in the sample texts.

A. Comparison of Khrushchev and Brezhnev

Six CPSU Congresses have been convened since the death of Stalin. The keynote speech at the first three was delivered by CPSU First Secretary N. S. Khrushchev and at the latter three by CPSU General Secretary L. I. Brezhnev. The keynote speech is traditionally divided into three major sections: (1) the international situation, (2) the economic situation, and (3) party affairs. For purposes of comparison, the six sections concerning the international situation have been quantitatively surveyed for the application of the term "correlation of forces" to the international arena. These six sections have been selected not only because of the symmetry in numbers of speeches, but also because of the authoritativeness of the keynote address in setting the tone for the inter-Congress period. For contrast, the use of the term "peaceful coexistence" has likewise been surveyed.

Figure 1



Sources: N.S. Khrushchev, "Accountability Report of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union to the 20th Congress of the Party," in XX s"yezd Kommunisticheskoy partii Sovetskogo Soyuz. Stenograficheskiy otchet, Vol. I, pp. 9-42; N.S. Khrushchev, "On the Control Figures for the Development of the USSR National Economy in 1959-1965," in Vneocherednoy XXI s"yezd Kommunisticheskoy partii Sovetskogo Soyuz. Stenograficheskiy otchet, Vol. I, pp. 62-93; and N.S. Khrushchev, "Accountability Report of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union to the 22nd CPSU Congress," in XXII s"yezd Kommunisticheskoy partii Sovetskogo Soyuz. Stenograficheskiy otchet, Vol. I, pp. 17-51.


L.I. Brezhnev, "Accountability Report of the CPSU Central Committee to the 23rd Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union," in XXIII s"yezd Kommunisticheskoy partii Sovetskogo Soyuz. Stenograficheskiy otchet (23rd Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Stenographic Record), Vol. I (Moscow: Publishing House for Political Literature, 1971), pp. 20-47; L.I. Brezhnev, XXIV s"yezd Kommunisticheskoy partii Sovetskogo Soyuz. Stenograficheskiy otchet (24th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Stenographic Record), Vol. I (Moscow: Publishing House for Political Literature, 1971), pp. 26-55; and Pravda, 25 February 1976.

B. Brezhnev's Usage of the Correlation of Forces Concept

Intermittently during the past six years, four volumes of selected speeches and articles by CPSU General Secretary Brezhnev have been published under the title On a Leninist Course.¹ Dealing with a wide range of subjects, each volume has been highly acclaimed as authoritative, comprehensive, and "an event of tremendous ideological and political significance."² It can be assumed, that the four volumes highlight those themes which Brezhnev considers necessary to emphasize. Included in this is the concept of the correlation of forces in the international arena.

A survey of quantitative application of the concept, according to volume and year, illustrates the following:

Figure 2




¹ L.I. Brezhnev, Leninskim kursom: Rechí i stat'í (On a Leninist Course), 4 Vols. (Moscow: Publishing House for Political Literature, 1970-1974). The timeframes covered by the individual volumes are: Vol. 1--October 1964 to April 1967; Vol. 2--April 1967 to April 1970; Vol. 3--May 1970 to March 1972; and Vol. 4--June 1972 to March 1974.

² See, for example, the review of the fourth volume "On the Leninist Course--to Communist," Kommunist, No. 10 (July 1974), pp. 18-32.

Figure 3

FREQUENCY OF USE BY YEAR



C. Usage in Several Major Journals in 1975

From the numerous Soviet journals published in 1975, four have been surveyed for usage of the correlation of forces concept. The purpose of this test is to draw up some tentative conclusions concerning the level of sophistication upon which the concept is employed and the type of audience to whom the concept is directed. The most authoritative party theoretical journal, Kommunist (sometimes abbreviated hereafter as Kom.), was selected because it presumably reflects the views of the highest party leadership and, therewith, sets the standards for all other publications. The other three journals were chosen because they are the organs of prestigious institutes under the USSR Academy of Sciences:


- Aziya i Afrika segodnya (Asia and Africa Today, abbreviated hereafter as AiAs), published jointly by the Institute of Oriental Studies and the Institute of Africa
- Mirovaya Ekonomika i Mezhdunarodnyye Otnosheniya (World Economics and International Relations, abbreviated hereafter as MEIMO), published by the Institute of World Economics and International Relations
- SShA: Ekonomika, Politika, Ideologiya (USA: Economics, Politics, Ideology, hereafter abbreviated as SShA), published by the Institute of the USA and Canada.

MEiMO is generally considered the leading Soviet journal in international affairs so that it was selected because, like Kommunist but on a more restricted basis, it presumably reflects the most generally accepted views on international affairs and sets the standards for all other publications in this field. Against the norm will be tested the journals SShA and AiAs, which are directed towards specific audiences: the capitalist system in regard to SShA and the Third World in regard to AiAs.

Thus, for the year 1975 were surveyed Kommunist (18 issues, totalling 2304 pages), AiAs (12 issues, 672 pages), MEiMO (12 issues, 1764 pages), and SShA (12 issues, 1524 pages). In order of the absolute number of times using the term "correlation of forces," the journals rank: (1) MEiMO, (2) Kommunist, (3) SShA, and (4) AiAs. However, in consideration of the disparity among the journals in the number of issues and pages, the Figure 4 represents the number of times per 100 pages of the journal that the term is used.

Figure 4

AVERAGE FREQUENCY PER 100 PAGES



D. Summary

Figure 1 notes that, in comparison with Khrushchev, Brezhnev has been relatively less inclined to use political jargon such as "correlation of forces" or "peaceful coexistence." In his report on the international situation at the 23rd through 25th CPSU Congresses, Brezhnev described and evaluated the factors subsumed under the correlation of forces, but only at the last Congress did he utilize the specific term. Moreover, Figures 2 and 3, which summarize a more broad selection of Brezhnev's speeches, indicate that Brezhnev's use of the term decreased to a bare minimum after 1968. While it must remain highly speculative, it might be hypothesized that during the post-1968 improvement in Soviet-American relations Brezhnev may have consciously sought to draw less attention to the conflict aspect. Thus, he avoided use of the short-hand term, which critics of detente could easily attack.

Figure 4 tends to suggest that correlation is not a term or concept utilized merely for popular consumption. As the figure illustrates, the term is more frequently cited in MEiMO, which is generally accepted as the most scholarly and influential Soviet journal in international affairs. Thus, it seems possible to conclude tentatively that the "correlation of forces" concept is not directed toward a specific type of audience such as the Third World or the CPSU, itself. This view is supported to a degree by the fact that the term was least frequently found in the journal which focuses on research concerning the U.S. and Canada. Based upon the material covered so far, it appears that, despite problems of translation and supposed differences in conceptualization, the correlation of forces concept is employed seriously by the Soviets to evaluate the competition of the opposing social systems in the world arena.