

AIR WAR COLLEGE

AIR UNIVERSITY

COMMAND ISSUES FOR MILITARY ADVISORS

By

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A Research Report Submitted to the Faculty

In Partial Fulfillment of the Graduation Requirements

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20 February 2018

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## **Biography**

Lieutenant Colonel David McElliott is assigned to the Air War College, Air University, Maxwell AFB, AL. He is a Marine Corps Infantry Officer and Foreign Force Advisor by trade. He enlisted into the Marine Corps Reserve in 1992. In 1997, he was commissioned and his first assignment was as an infantry platoon commander with the 11th Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable). Over his career, he has commanded infantry, reconnaissance and force reconnaissance units from the platoon to battalion level. From 2010 to 2012 he served as the Operations Officer and Executive Officer of the Advisor Training Cell (ATC) at I Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF), Camp Pendleton California. He served overseas in Asia, Iraq, and South America, and performed advisor tours in Albania and the Republic of Georgia.



## **Abstract**

Partnering with like-minded nations is a key component of the United States' National Security Strategy. Historically, the United States' record on partnering in conflicts has been mixed. The Department of Defense has made significant investments in building partner capacity in the last two decades. Training, education, and organization focus on partnering at the tactical and operational levels and have improved significantly from their near-zero status prior to the Global War on Terror. Even so, a key element to foreign force advising remains unexplored. Are U.S. military advisors serving overseas simply to provide their best military advice to the host nation, or are they to actually command those foreign forces, either directly or indirectly, in order to achieve the strategic aims of the United States? This subject can be expanded to ask further questions such as: are there some instances where command is warranted? does the nature of the conflict or the capacity and capabilities of host nation forces influence the decision between the two? are there trade-offs to be made between commanding and advising and if so what are they?

By examining the experience of General Joseph Stilwell, US Army, who served as the senior military advisor to China during WWII, this paper suggests four factors which military advisors should carefully consider when confronted with the dilemma of commanding or advising host nation forces. These four factors are the host nation's leadership, the stability of the strategic situation, the host nation's cultural conceptions of command, and the desired relationship between the United States and the host nation.

## Introduction

A cornerstone of US foreign policy since World War II is multilateralism and maximizing the participation of allies in the pursuit and defense of American interests. This is reflected in the United States' strategy and policy documents. The 2017 National Security Strategy (NSS) of the United States, lists "Encouraging Aspiring Partners," as a tenet of one of its four pillars to protect American interests and preserve and promote peace.<sup>1</sup> The NSS goes on to use the phrase, "Allies and partners," 42 times.<sup>2</sup> Similarly, the 2015 NSS uses the term, "allies and partners," 14 times and uses the word, "allies" 31 times.<sup>3</sup> In the military realm, the relationships between the United States and its allies and partners are gained, fostered, and maintained through advisors. Military advisors are selectively screened and trained military personnel who, "Teach, coach, mentor and advise FSF [Foreign Security Force] personnel IOT [in order to] develop FSF professional skills and build capability and capacity within the organization in accordance with US Government, Service, and FSF objectives."<sup>4</sup>

A recurring dilemma these advisors face is whether they are to *advise* foreign military forces or *command* them. Should the advisor provide the host nation military sound advice to further the common military and political objectives, or are they to command those same forces? The common guideline from recent experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan is captured in this quote from T.E. Lawrence, the British officer who facilitated an Arab revolt against the Ottoman Empire during WWI: "Better the Arabs do it tolerably than that you do it perfectly."<sup>5</sup> Lawrence's advice was sound given the context of its time and conflict. Unfortunately, it has become something akin to canon law rather than a guiding principal. The counter-argument is that US advisors should *command* host nation forces, but that smacks of both imperialism and colonialism. Despite the negative connotations, there are a variety of situations in which it *might*

be appropriate for an advisor to *command* foreign forces, either directly or indirectly. Similarly, there are situations where, if an advisor were to take command, while it may provide short-term tactical and operational gains, it may also cause larger strategic setbacks. Like any military effort, the choice is determined by the mission and the context of the situation. The dilemma of whether to command or advise is not a binary choice, but a nuanced one consisting of a variety of trade-offs.

By using the historical method and analyzing a past US military advisor as a case study, this paper will demonstrate four factors an advisor should consider when confronted with the dilemma of commanding or advising. The first factor is the host nation's leadership. If the host nation is perceived as either incapable of, or unwilling to, provide the leadership required, the advisor will naturally gravitate towards command. The second factor is the strategic situation. If the strategic situation becomes desperate then the need to achieve tangible results may demand the advisor take command. The third factor to consider is the concept of command within the host nation's culture. Loyalties, authorities, notions of the chain of command, and delineations between personal and professional obligations are not universal, and thus it cannot be assumed that a host nation's military will readily operate under a Western-style command structure or an American commander. The fourth and final factor is based on the question, what is the desired relationship between the United States and the host nation? If the relationship between the two nations falls along the lines of patron and client, then command may be more appropriate. However, the opposite of this argument may also hold true. When the relationship between the United States and the host nation is to be one of co-equals, and this co-equal partnership is itself a political objective, then an advisor commanding foreign troops may very well be counterproductive to the larger desired political end-state. Context matters and there is no

universal solution to the command or advise dilemma. In some instances, command may be warranted. In others, limiting the advisor's role to only advising may provide the most successful outcome.

Given its long tradition in fielding advisors, the military can look to the past to better illuminate the way forward. In particular, General Joseph Stilwell provides an excellent historical resource. Stilwell served as the senior advisor and chief of staff to the Chinese Nationalist leader, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek, from 1942 to 1944.<sup>6</sup> Stilwell possessed many of the characteristics expected in an advisor. Stilwell spoke Mandarin and before WWII he served multiple tours in China; as language officer from 1920-1923, with the 15<sup>th</sup> Infantry Regiment in Tientsin from 1926-1929, and as military attaché from 1935-1939.<sup>7</sup> Not only did Stilwell possess the language and operational culture skills so highly prized today, he also possessed exceptional tactical and operational skills.<sup>8</sup> He served as an instructor at the Infantry School at Fort Benning and in 1942 was the initial, "commander-designate" for Operation GYMNAST: the US invasion of North Africa.<sup>9</sup> Instead of North Africa, Stilwell was given the more difficult assignment as advisor to the Chinese Nationalists.<sup>10</sup> Despite this impressive list of skills and abilities, Stilwell was recalled from his duties on 19 October 1944 at the request of Chiang Kai-shek. Stilwell's meteoric career, impressive list of skills, and the tumultuous relationship between himself and his host make for a worthy case study.<sup>11</sup> Additionally, Stilwell's diary and letters were published, thus providing valuable primary source material. Stilwell's duties put him between heads of state, Chiang Kai-shek and President Franklin Delano Roosevelt, revealing the interplay between the command or advise dilemma and international diplomacy. All of this took place in an environment of extremes, where, from the very outset China was plagued with multiple enemies and remained at a strategic disadvantage.

## **The United States and China 1941**

When the United States entered WWII in December 1941, China was already in a precarious state. China had already been at war with Japan for five years when Pearl Harbor was bombed on 7 December 1941.<sup>12</sup> The second Sino-Japanese war began in July 1937, when an incident at the Marco Polo bridge near Beijing China quickly escalated into war.<sup>13</sup> Long before that, war raged across China, first in internecine fighting between various warlords and the Chinese central government and then between Communist and Nationalists forces.<sup>14</sup> Before Pearl Harbor, the Japanese occupied Manchuria, Eastern China, the Yangtze river valley, and the port cities along the Yellow Sea.<sup>15</sup> Following the Pearl Harbor attack, Japan occupied Thailand, captured Singapore, and began an invasion of Burma.<sup>16</sup> China now faced being cut off from the rest of the world.<sup>17</sup>

Despite China's grave situation, the United States saw several advantages in an alliance with the Asian nation. The first two of these dealt with geography and manpower.<sup>18</sup> Geographically, China's close proximity to Japan made it a good site for bases from which to launch air offensives against Japan, and eventually, to launch an invasion of the Japanese home islands. For manpower, Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist Revolutionary Army (NRA) boasted 300 divisions.<sup>19</sup> Since the Sino-Chinese war in 1937, the Japanese Army maintained a number of divisions in Manchuria and Eastern China to protect their occupied territory.<sup>20</sup> As the United States saw it, keeping China in the war against Japan would ensure those Japanese divisions would not be transferred to another theater.<sup>21</sup> President Roosevelt had other ambitions as well.



Roosevelt's initial desire was to treat China as a great power and make China an equal partner in the coalition along with Great Britain and the Soviet Union.<sup>22</sup>

Similarly, China's leader, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, saw advantages in partnering with the United States. The Chinese Nationalists National Revolutionary Army (NRA) was large, but it was ill-equipped and needed military aid to modernize and fight. The NRA needed this aid not just to fight the Japanese.<sup>23</sup> Even with a foreign Army on Chinese soil, Chiang Kai-shek considered the Chinese Communists the greater threat.<sup>24</sup> Any military aid he might receive could be used against the communists as well as the Japanese. Also, some historians theorized that given the degree of war weariness from fighting for decades, Chiang Kai-shek was content to let the United States and the other Western Allies do all the major fighting against Japan; the idea of *yǐ yí zhì yí*, "using barbarians to manage barbarians."<sup>25</sup> Chiang Kai-shek could sit on the sidelines and after the United States defeated the foreign enemy of Japan, he could focus on his domestic enemy, the Chinese Communists.

Seeing the advantages of mutual support, the United States and China made an alliance. Chiang Kai-shek was recognized by the Allies as the Supreme Commander of Allied forces in the China theater.<sup>26</sup> Chiang Kai-shek in turn asked for a high-ranking US officer to serve as an advisor and his allied chief of staff.<sup>27</sup> With this request came a vague offer of command over, "one or two of his armies."<sup>28</sup> With this initial agreement in place, the United States now had to find the right man for the job.

### **General Joseph Stilwell in China 1942-1944**

Into this world was thrust General "Vinegar" Joseph Stilwell. Stilwell performed a multitude of roles while serving in China. An official history published by the US Army lists

Stilwell's titles as, "Commanding General United States Army Forces, China, Burma and India Theater of Operations," and, "Acting Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Southeast Asia," and, "Commanding General Chinese Army in India," and, "Commanding General, Northern Combat Area Command."<sup>29</sup> In addition to these duties, Stilwell also managed Lend-lease aid to China.<sup>30</sup> A full accounting of Stilwell's actions in China goes well beyond the length of this paper. The dilemma of commanding or advising that Stilwell faced can be demonstrated by exploring three periods during his service. The first is the period from Stilwell's initial reception in China in the spring of 1942 until the fall of Burma shortly after his arrival.<sup>31</sup> The second period covers Stilwell's role as commander of the Chinese Army in India (CAI), as well as his largely successful efforts to reform the NRA from 1942 through 1944. The final period covers Stilwell's recall in October 1944. During each of these periods, Stilwell confronted challenges revolving around the command or advise dilemma. These challenges were further influenced by the larger, and sometimes shifting political attitudes of the two nations.

## **Part I**

### **February to May 1942: The Fall of Burma**

Stilwell began his duties as Chiang Kai-shek's military advisor and chief of staff in February 1942.<sup>32</sup> In May 1942, the strategic situation in China changed dramatically when Burma fell to the Japanese.<sup>33</sup> Throughout this period, Stilwell gravitated towards commanding vice advising. This was for two reasons. The first was his overall poor impression of Chinese leadership. The second was the sense of urgency driven by a rapidly deteriorating strategic situation.

As mentioned previously, one factor which would incline an advisor to command rather than advise is the condition of the host nation's leadership. When the host nation's leadership is

considered to be incapable of achieving the desired ends, an advisor might be inclined to commanding over advising. Before being assigned to China, Stilwell was first personally interviewed by both Army Chief of Staff George Marshall and Secretary of War Henry Stimson.<sup>34</sup> During these interviews, Stilwell was given his objectives, one of which was to, “improve the combat efficiency of the Chinese Army.”<sup>35</sup> Stilwell responded that in order to be successful he needed command of the NRA forces.<sup>36</sup> Stilwell recorded in his diary that when asked by Marshall if he thought he could get results; “I said yes if I have command.”<sup>37</sup>

Stilwell’s predilection towards command was likely based on his own observations of the NRA’s leadership while serving as Defense Attaché in 1938.<sup>38</sup> He felt that the Chinese soldiers were good, expressing, “confidence in Chinese soldiers as fighting material and believed that, if properly led, they could become the equal of any army in the world.”<sup>39</sup> H.H. Chang, who interviewed Chiang Kai-shek and wrote a biography of the Generalissimo, noted how Stilwell publicly paid “high tribute,” to the Chinese soldier.<sup>40</sup> However, Stilwell felt the Chinese officer class so poor as to render Chinese soldiers completely ineffective.<sup>41</sup> Stilwell also expressed a low opinion of the man he would later advise. “CKS [Chiang Kai-shek] is no soldier,” Stilwell recorded privately in 1938.<sup>42</sup>

After arriving in China and assuming his role of chief of staff, many of Stilwell’s notions about NRA leadership seemed true. The NRA was plagued with corruption, low morale, inadequate training and terrible logistics.<sup>43</sup> Reports indicated that some units lost as much as 40% of their personnel just to disease or malnutrition.<sup>44</sup> The NRA’s lauded 300 divisions were found to be at an average of 60%-70% strength.<sup>45</sup> Reform was needed if this force was to be successfully employed against the Japanese.

A second factor that influences the decision to command or advise is a thorough understanding of what command means to the host nation. Despite his previous experience in China, Stilwell may not have fully appreciated what the concept of command meant inside Chiang Kai-shek's army. Unlike in the US Army, where the chain of command and loyalties are straightforward; in China loyalty was conditional.<sup>46</sup> While some divisions were loyal to the Generalissimo, many were loyal to their local warlord or province chief.<sup>47</sup> "The whole tangled structure of Chinese politics, culture and society was reflected in the question of what troops would obey whom under what set of circumstances. Loyalty being a conditional virtue in most men, only an observer gifted with clairvoyance could state with accuracy that such and such a division would obey the orders of Chungking under all circumstances," wrote an official US Army history of Stilwell's mission.<sup>48</sup> Further complicating the matter, "Staff and command procedures were peculiar to the Chinese Army. Orders given through a staff officer meant nothing. Orders had to come from the commander personally, and, if written, bear his seal or *chop*."<sup>49</sup> Stilwell and his superiors assumed that the position of chief of staff had the same meaning to the Chinese as the US Army. He wrote in his diary, "The angle is that I may be appointed chief of staff of Chiang K'ai-shek's joint staff, whatever that is, and in carrying out Chiang K'ai-shek's instructions I exercise command."<sup>50</sup> Unfortunately, since a chief of staff had a much different connotation in the NRA than in the US Army, Stilwell found himself in a position where he could issue orders, but it was unlikely they would be followed. Stilwell and his superiors may have been correct in their appraisal of the NRA's leadership and thus the American inclination for Stilwell to command. However, no common understanding between the two nations was actually reached, causing a great deal of confusion and tension during this first period in Stilwell's tour.

A third factor which may incline an advisor towards commanding over advising is a deteriorating strategic situation. Shortly after his arrival Stilwell faced such a situation. In March 1942, the situation in Burma became grave with the British forces there collapsing before Japanese advances. By capturing Burma, the Japanese could sever the Burma road, the one remaining supply line between China and the west.<sup>51</sup> To protect Burma and its vital supply line, Chiang Kai-shek gave Stilwell figurative command of an expeditionary force consisting of the Chinese 5<sup>th</sup> and 6<sup>th</sup> Armies.<sup>52</sup> Stilwell's command was figurative because the commanders of the Chinese Expeditionary force still took their orders from Chiang Kai-shek.<sup>53</sup> In the following months, much to his frustration, Stilwell experienced tension between two of the factors in the command or advise dilemma: the need to assume command out of strategic necessity, and the need to conform with a host nation's conception of command. From March to May 1942, Stilwell attempted to counter the Japanese conquest of Burma, but found his efforts frustrated by his Chinese subordinates who would actively or passively disobey his orders. Stilwell recorded his dissatisfaction with his subordinate Chinese commanders:

They feel, of course, the urgent necessity of pleasing the Generalissimo, and if my suggestions or orders run counter to what they *think* he wants they offer endless objections. When I brush off these objections, they proceed to positive measures - for instance, stopping the move of a regiment until it is too late to bring it to bear - or just fail to get the order out, or getting it out with a lot of "ifs" and "ands" in it, or when pushed, simply telling lower commanders to lay off and not carry it out. Or just put on a demonstration and report opposition too strong. I can't shoot them; I can't relieve them; and just talking to them does no good.<sup>54</sup>

Equally frustrating, Chiang Kai-shek communicated directly with those generals, bypassing Stilwell altogether. In another diary entry, Stilwell wrote, "What a gag. I have to tell Chiang K'ai-shek with a straight face that his subordinates are not carrying out his orders, when in all probability they are doing just what he tells them."<sup>55</sup> Stilwell's frustration over the chain of

command is also reflected in the writings of one of his contemporaries, Field Marshal Viscount William Slim who commanded the Commonwealth forces in Burma from 1942 until the end of the war.<sup>56</sup> In his memoir, *Defeat into Victory*, Slim summarized Stilwell's challenges:

Stilwell was much hampered by inadequate staff and signals. Moreover, there was a Commander-in-Chief of the Chinese Expeditionary Force, General Lo Cho Ying, through whom all his orders had to go to the Army Commanders. These officers evinced considerable independence in selecting which of the orders they would accept, and even divisional commanders at times showed a tendency to pick and choose. They were able to back up their refusals with some show of legality as Chiang Kai-shek had not actually given Stilwell his official seal as Commander-in-Chief.<sup>57</sup>

Recognizing the gravity of the situation, Chiang Kai-shek provided Stilwell with his own seal, providing him the necessary trapping of a commander.<sup>58</sup> The gesture was too little, too late. Despite being newly armed with Chiang Kai-shek's seal, the situation in Burma had deteriorated further than Stilwell could recover. With Chinese, British and Indian forces fleeing before them in all directions, the Japanese captured Burma in May of 1942.<sup>59</sup>

## **Part II**

### **1942 to 1944: Reforming the Chinese Army and Returning to Burma**

Stilwell narrowly escaped the Burma disaster only by marching on foot through 140 miles of jungle (at age 59 no less).<sup>60</sup> Similarly, remnants of his Chinese Expeditionary Force fled from Burma into bordering India.<sup>61</sup> With the Burma road now severed, supplies to China had to be flown in over, "the hump," an air corridor beginning in the Assam state of India, passing over the Himalayas, and terminating at Kunming, China.<sup>62</sup> With only an air bridge of limited capacity connecting China with the Western allies, logistics became a paramount concern for both Stilwell and Chiang Kai-shek. Even so, Stilwell's mission to, "improve the combat efficiency of the Chinese Army," remained unchanged.<sup>63</sup>

Stilwell was once again caught in the dilemma between commanding or advising. On the one hand, the strategic situation remained precarious given the logistical situation, and Chinese leadership remained questionable. On the other hand, after Burma, Stilwell was well aware of the difficulties of commanding Chinese troops given their different concept of command. The size of China's army was also a factor. Stilwell felt it too large to equip and reform and told the Generalissimo so in May 1942.<sup>64</sup> Considering all these factors, Stilwell took a middle approach between commanding and advising focused on two objectives. For the first objective, Stilwell argued that he retain command of the Chinese units in India which would be designated Chinese Army India (CAI). The 100,000-man CAI would undergo the training and equipping necessary to improve their "combat efficiency."<sup>65</sup> Stilwell's second objective was more along the lines of traditional advising. Recognizing the need to reform the NRA, but also recognizing the difficulty given its size, Stilwell asked for limited command and oversight of a program to modernize, train and equip a small and select number of Chinese divisions.<sup>66</sup>

Chiang Kai-shek agreed to Stilwell's proposal and identified 30 divisions for induction into Stilwell's training and equipping program, and tasked Lieutenant General Lo Cho-ying to assist. Stilwell happily noted in his diary, "So she [Madame Chiang] went and talked to Chiang Kai-shek and that's the agreement. I command; I control training; Lo runs administration and discipline."<sup>67</sup>

With Chiang Kai-shek's approval, the reformation of the Chinese Army could begin. Stilwell worked to set up schools for infantry training, artillery training, and badly needed training for support troops.<sup>68</sup> Stilwell established two major centers. The first was in Ramgarh, India and served the CAI.<sup>69</sup> The second was in Yunnan, China and would train and equip those units selected by Chiang Kai-shek to make up Y-Force (alternatively called Yoke Force).<sup>70</sup>

Together, these modernized forces would, “Recapture Burma,” and reopen China’s supply line with the west.<sup>71</sup>

The limitations of the hump air route made supplying any force in China challenging. Logistics became even more difficult when in May of 1943, against Stilwell’s advice, Chiang Kai-shek authorized a large-scale air offensive to be launched from Eastern China against the Japanese.<sup>72</sup> Conducted by the 14<sup>th</sup> Air Force, this effort took up the majority of the supplies flown over the hump and hampered Stilwell’s reform efforts.<sup>73</sup> Even so, in December 1943 Stilwell launched his offensive to retake Burma.<sup>74</sup> Coordinating the movements of both the CAI attacking from India and Y-Force attacking from Yunnan, China, over the course of 1944, Stilwell was able to clear the Japanese out of North Burma and reopen the vital land supply routes into China. In October 1944, President Roosevelt summarized the successes of the North Burma campaign to Chiang Kai-shek, noting, “Your decision to employ Yunnan forces on the Salween was sound in my opinion. The maintenance and increased facilities for a supply route into China demanded the occupation of Myitkyina and I am now informed the vital gas supply and low level flying route are assured by the opening of the pipeline at Myitkyina on September 29.”<sup>75</sup>

From the fall of Burma in the spring of 1942 through the spring and summer of 1944, Stilwell continued in his task to, “improve the combat efficiency of the Chinese Army.” Despite logistics challenges, the Stilwell trained Y-Force and CAI began offensive operations to retake Burma.<sup>76</sup> Unfortunately for Stilwell, a series of crises began in 1944 combining all of the identified factors in the command or advise dilemma. The combined tensions between these various factors ultimately led to Stilwell’s recall.



### **Part III**

#### **April to October 1944: Crisis and Recall**

An advisor may be inclined towards commanding over advising for practical reasons, such as to compensate for the host nation's poor leadership, or to halt a deteriorating strategic situation. Politics also play a factor. Sometimes the political relationship between nations is an objective in itself, and thus, will also influence the command or advise dilemma, creating a tension between various factors in the dilemma. Such was the case in this final period of Stilwell's service in China beginning in the spring of 1944 and ending on 19 October 1944 with his recall.

In the spring of 1944, there were new reasons reinforcing the practicality of Stilwell's command authority. There was still the ongoing need to reform modest portions of the Chinese Army, and the recapture of Burma was not yet complete. Now there was a new reason, as the strategic situation in China once again appeared on the verge of collapse. Stilwell had strongly advised Chiang Kai-shek against the air offensive against the Japanese, warning "any increased air offensive that stung the Japs enough would bring a strong reaction that would wreck everything and put China out of the war."<sup>77</sup> Stilwell's prediction came true when in the spring of 1944, the Japanese launched operation ICHIGO.<sup>78</sup> ICHIGO's aim was to overrun the Allied airfields in Eastern China.<sup>79</sup> Attacking with 300,000 men organized into two separate armies, the Japanese overcame Chinese resistance and soon overran seven of the twelve airfields.<sup>80</sup>

ICHIGO's success shaped the strategic calculus of the United States. The contrast between Stilwell's success in advancing into Burma, contrasted with the Chinese Army's failure to halt the ICHIGO could not be overlooked. Equally threatening was a fear that Chiang Kai-shek might be overthrown by either the communists or burgeoning separatist movement in Eastern China.<sup>81</sup> Any one of these situations had the potential of ending with China making a

separate peace with Japan. In a memorandum for the president dated 4 July 1944, the Joint Chiefs of Staff identified that, "The situation in Central China is deteriorating at an alarming rate. If the Japanese continue their advances to the west, Chennault's 14<sup>th</sup> Air Force will be rendered ineffective, our very long-range bomber airfields in the Chengtu area will be lost and the collapse of China must inevitably result."<sup>82</sup> The memorandum went on to recommend to President Roosevelt, "That you dispatch to the Generalissimo the attached message, urging him to place General Stilwell in command of all Chinese armed forces."<sup>83</sup> President Roosevelt acted on the recommendation. In a message hand-delivered to Chiang Kai-shek, Roosevelt stated, "I am promoting Stilwell to the rank of full general and I recommend for your most urgent consideration that you recall him from Burma and place him directly under you in command of all Chinese and American forces."<sup>84</sup>

The military practicality of placing Stilwell in command of Chinese forces seems obvious today, although Stilwell expressed doubts about Chinese willingness to accept such a proposal.<sup>85</sup> Advising is not just about military efforts, however. It is also about achieving shared political goals and maintaining positive relations between the involved nations. During these final months of Stilwell's tenure, tension ensued between military practicalities and political desires. At the outset of the war, President Roosevelt desired to treat China as a great power and make it something of an equal partner in the coalition along with Great Britain and the Soviet Union.<sup>86</sup> Similarly, Chiang Kai-shek wanted to be seen as an equal member of the Allied coalition.<sup>87</sup> By 1944, Roosevelt felt that, "some calculated political risks appear justified when dangers in the overall military situation are so serious and immediately threatening."<sup>88</sup> It is ironic that Roosevelt would demand Stilwell be given command of Chinese forces, as such a demand would be seen as an attack on Chinese sovereignty and a personal humiliation for Chiang Kai-shek.

Chiang Kai-shek initially demurred, repeating that command of Chinese forces is not the same as commanding western forces. He then asked Roosevelt for a political advisor, and stated that Stilwell could only have command after a “preparatory period” of undetermined length.<sup>89</sup> As ICHIGO proceeded with success, Roosevelt responded more urgently. In a note hand-delivered to the Generalissimo by Stilwell, Roosevelt wrote, “I have urged time and again in recent months that you take drastic action to resist the disaster which has been moving closer to China and to you. Now, when you have not yet placed General Stilwell in command of all forces in China, we are faced with the loss of a critical area in East China with possible catastrophic consequences.”<sup>90</sup>

The success of ICHIGO and the unreliable performance of the Chinese Army perhaps clouded priorities. While appointing a commander who could get results was important, the relationship between the two nations was more important. From the Chinese perspective, this demand was too great an insult to bear. Chiang Kai-shek is said to have considered this demand the “greatest humiliation,” of his life, and keeping Stilwell would make him a, “prisoner in his own house.”<sup>91</sup> The Generalissimo responded with not only a refusal to place Stilwell in command, but a demand for his recall in an *aide-mémoire* to President Roosevelt. Chiang Kai-shek explained, “Far from leading to an intensified effort against the common enemy, the appointment of General Stilwell as Field Commander would immediately cause grave dissensions in the new command, and do irreparable injury to the vital Chinese-American military cooperation.”<sup>92</sup>

With Chiang Kai-shek’s *aide-mémoire* to Roosevelt, the command or advise dilemma rose to the highest level. If Stilwell were not given command, the danger was that the Chinese Army would neither implement the necessary reforms nor achieve any results on the battlefield.

On the other hand, a continued push for Stilwell by the President might ruin the already stressed Chinese-American cooperation. In his *aide-mémoire*, Chiang Kai-shek indicated he would support another qualified officer as field commander, but doubts existed as to whether or not this was actually true. Marshall stated that if Stilwell was recalled, he “would not allow another American general to be placed in the position of Chief of Staff and Commander of the Chinese Armies for it was so evident that no American would be loyally supported.”<sup>93</sup> In the end, the need to preserve the alliance took priority. Stilwell was recalled. Upon his departure the CBI theater was dissolved. General Albert C. Wedemeyer, US Army replaced Stilwell as Chiang Kai-shek’s allied chief of staff and Lieutenant General Daniel Sultan appointed to head operations in the India-Burma Theater. In the same memo to the Generalissimo confirming Stilwell’s recall, Roosevelt wrote, “I do not feel that an American should in the present situation assume responsibility in a command position for operations of Chinese forces in China.”<sup>94</sup> Stilwell would not command the Chinese Armies but neither would any other American.

After returning to the United States, in a private ceremony, Stilwell was awarded another Legion of Merit as well as an Oak Leaf Cluster to his Distinguished Service Cross by Secretary of War Henry Stimson. Stimson recorded the event in his diary:

I was particularly happy to lay this encomium on Stilwell’s hard and terrific work in Burma and in China and so I read the two citations myself and made a few comments to Stilwell which I think he appreciated. I said I thought he had the toughest job of any of our generals and that I had never conveyed one of these medals with such pleasure as I had in doing this.<sup>95</sup>

### **The Current State of Military Advising**

Long after Stilwell’s time, members of the US military continue to serve as advisors. After the September 11, 2001 attacks and the launch of the Global War on Terror, the United

States military placed a premium on advising. In Iraq and Afghanistan, military personnel were trained as advisors and sent to build the military capacity of those nations.<sup>96</sup> In keeping with the National Security Strategy, smaller teams of advisors continue to deploy overseas to train and assist partners from a variety of nations, from Jordan to the Republic of Georgia and from Mexico to Uganda.<sup>97</sup> In recognition of the value of these advisors and the need to align human capital with security objectives, the services have recently built advisor capacity into their tables of organization. In February 2017, the US Army announced the formation of six Security Force Assistance Brigades (SFABs) as well as an advisor training academy in Fort Benning, Georgia.<sup>98</sup> Similarly, the Marine Corps has plans to stand up its own advisor groups, and established its own advisor training command known as Marine Corps Security Cooperation Group (MCSCG) in 2011 at Fort Story, Virginia.<sup>99</sup>

The recognition of the importance of advisors and the implementation of training institutions and force structure is refreshing. Despite these advancements, the military's current approach to advisors is missing an important mark. Foreign force advising, like all military operations, is a means to a political end state. In this case, achieving the political ends is more elusive than in conventional military methods because the advisor has the additional burden of reconciling his own nation's political goals with the politics of the host nation. Given this tension between the political goals of two sovereign nations, the issue of command is essential. Regrettably, doctrine provides little help in the matter. Aside from statements of the obvious, such as, "The requirement for a coherent, logical command chain is essential," and, "The establishment of a clear and effective command structure that ensures the unified, coherent and cohesive delivery of SFCB (Security Force Capacity Building) that best suits the HN (Host Nation) is required," doctrine provides little in the way of specific guidance for an advisor

confronted with problematic issues of command.<sup>100</sup> Fortunately, history offers case studies worthy of investigation, such as General Joseph Stilwell's situation where he faced the dilemma of whether to command or advise. From Stilwell's experience several recommendations can be gleaned.

### Recommendations

The Stilwell case study suggests four recommendations for the future of US military advising (See Figure 1:1).

Figure 1:1 Recommendations for the Future of Advising

1.	Maintain Force Structure for Advisors
2.	Train Advisors on the Command or Advise Dilemma
3.	Provide Legal Frameworks for Advisors to Assume Command Authorities.
4.	Provide Rank Appropriate Training

*Maintain Force Structure for Advisors.* Upon its entry into WWII, the United States had no existing forces who were trained and organized to perform advising missions. Building advisor capacity initially was an *ad hoc* process and came at the expense of conventional forces. Stilwell was originally on the slate to command the North Africa invasion but was pulled from that mission and sent to China instead. Since Iraq and Afghanistan, the US military has built advisor structure into the Army and Marine Corps. This is a positive trend, and assuming that foreign force advising will be a mission in the future, building and maintaining advisor capacity should continue.

*Train Advisors on the Command Advise Dilemma.* Not only is it necessary to have advisor force structure in place, it is also necessary that the advisors are properly trained. Current training for advisors is heavily weighted towards operational language and culture. The large amount of evidence compiled from the advising efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan suggest that such training is worthwhile and that an absolute lack of operational culture and language skills can be disastrous. However, language and culture training is no panacea. Stilwell spoke Mandarin and had served multiple tours in China before his assignment to Chiang Kai-shek, but as his case study showed, command issues were his greatest challenges. Advisors work with other nations to achieve the policy objectives of the United States. These missions are inherently political with command an important element, and yet, advisors receive very little political training or training on command issues. Additionally, cultural training should include the host nation's perceptions on command. Despite his prior experience in China, neither Stilwell nor his superiors understood how personal Chinese loyalties influenced their attitudes towards command, causing Stilwell problems from the outset of his mission.

*Provide Legal Frameworks for Advisors to Assume Command Authorities.* Another recommendation is to establish the proper legal framework for an advisor to command (or not) at the outset of a mission. Stilwell's mission was confused from the beginning, given Chiang Kai-shek's vague promise of command of certain Chinese armies, and the differing notions of a chief of staff's authorities. Having an established legal framework between the involved nations would allow for a more clearly established starting point to approach the command or advise dilemma. Such frameworks might also alleviate disparities in rank, as Americans typically advise senior allied officers. Without such a starting point, the dilemma would be tackled just as Stilwell tackled it in China, in an *ad hoc* manner consisting of much trial and error.

*Provide Rank Appropriate Training.* Stilwell received no advisor specific training prior to deploying to China. While he was qualified for the tactical, operational and strategic tasks of a general officer of the army, he was not trained for the politics and foreign policy challenges of his role as Chiang Kai-shek's allied chief of staff. This is a problem which remains to this day. Today, an advisor sergeant who is teaching and coaching a foreign military on basic marksmanship will be operating in a much different environment than a lieutenant colonel who is an allied division commander's personal military advisor, or an even more senior officer working directly for a chief of defense. Thus, it makes little sense for all these hypothetical individuals to go through the same training programs. Unfortunately, that is precisely what is happening today. At MCSCG, the Marine Corps advisor training center, Marines of all ranks attend the same training. A lance corporal goes through the same training as a lieutenant colonel or even a colonel. Given their widely different missions, and given the command issues that senior officers might face, it makes little sense for personnel of such widely different ranks to go through a one-size-fits-all training pipeline.

## **Conclusion**

Stilwell may indeed have had the "toughest job" of any of the American generals of World War II.<sup>101</sup> His tour as advisor to Chiang Kai-shek was tumultuous, and from start to finish Stilwell faced the dilemma of commanding or advising. Stilwell's experience shows that not only does this dilemma exist, but that there are also several factors which an advisor needs to consider when confronted with it. The leadership challenges within the NRA, the evolving strategic situation, Chinese attitudes towards command, and the diplomatic relations between the United States and China all contributed to Stilwell's approach to the command or advise



dilemma from 1942 until his recall in 1944. It is his experience that informs this paper's suggestion that there are four factors to consider when faced with the dilemma of command or advise. These factors are the quality of the host nation's leadership, the overall strategic situation, the host nation's cultural conceptions of command, and the desired relationship between the United States and the host nation.

Despite the example provided by Stilwell, current doctrine does little to address the command or advise dilemma and as a result, advisors may be inclined to avoid the issue of commanding altogether. However, the Stilwell case study demonstrates certain circumstances may require an advisor to take on the role of command, if only in a limited fashion and for a set period of time. Even so, an American who is contemplating taking command has to consider the larger context of the political relationship between the involved nations. The peer-to-peer relationship between Chiang Kai-shek's China and the United States during WWII not only made the idea of Stilwell's exercise of widespread command of Chinese forces problematic, but it also forced a political crisis which necessitated Stilwell's recall.

Advisors should not long for the days of colonialism and imperialism when they were given wide latitude. Nor should they remain passive and limit themselves simply to providing advice. As in any military operation, advisors should consider their mission and know how to weigh the many elements of their particular situation. The security strategy of the United States suggests that advising will remain a requirement in the future. If things do not change, advisors will relive the same frustrations, mistakes, and breakdowns General Joseph Stilwell endured so long ago.

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## Notes:

<sup>1</sup> *National Security Strategy of the United States December 2017* (Washington DC, 2017), 38.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, I-VI, 1-55.

<sup>3</sup> *National Security Strategy of the United States February 2015* (Washington DC, 2015), 1-30.

<sup>4</sup> (1) For the purpose of this paper, "military advisors" or, "advisors" will be used as blanket terms to cover the wide range of names assigned to personnel who conduct advising-type missions, such as; security assistance officers, Foreign Security Force Advisors (FSFA), foreign force advisors, foreign military advisors, etc. (2) "Teach, coach, mentor and advise..." Navy and Marine Corps (NAVMC) 1200.1B, *Military Occupational Specialties Manual (Short Title: MOS Manual)*, 1 July 2016, 1-35.

<sup>5</sup> T.E. Lawrence, "The 27 Articles of T.E. Lawrence," *The Arab Bulletin*, (20 August 1917).

<sup>6</sup> Charles F. Romanus and Riley Sunderland, *United States Army in World War II, China-Burma-India Theater: Stilwell's Mission to China* (Washington DC: Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, 1953), 70.

<sup>7</sup> Barbara W. Tuchman, *Stilwell and the American Experience in China 1911-45* (New York, New York: The Macmillan Company, 1971), 61-200.

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<sup>8</sup> Ibid., 123-142.

<sup>9</sup> Romanus and Sunderland, *Stilwell's Mission to China*, 64. And Joseph W. Stilwell, *The Stilwell Papers*, ed. Theodore H. White (New York, New York: William Sloane Associates, Inc., 1948), 13,14, 15.

<sup>10</sup> "Stilwell was given the more difficult assignment as advisor to the Chinese Nationalists," referencing the diary of Secretary of War Henry Stimson as quoted in Romanus and Sunderland, *United States Army in World War II, China-Burma-India Theater: Stilwell's Command Problems* (Washington DC: Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, 1953), 471.

<sup>11</sup> While researching this paper, the history of two other advisors were explored. The first was Major General Smedley Butler, USMC, who served as the founder and commander of the Haitian Gendarme from 1915 to 1917. The second is John Paul Vann, who served in Vietnam from 1962 to 1972, first as an Army Lieutenant Colonel and later as a Deputy in Civil Operations and Rural Development Support (CORDS), a civilian agency which integrated elements of USAID, the US Information Service, the Central Intelligence Agency, the State Department, and the US military. An exploration of their experiences is beyond the scope of this paper, however, their histories support this paper's arguments. The references related to Butler and Vann are included in the bibliography.

<sup>12</sup> Romanus and Sunderland, *Stilwell's Mission to China*, 5-7.

<sup>13</sup> Romanus and Sunderland, *Stilwell's Mission to China*, 5-7. And; Tuchman, *Stilwell and the American Experience in China*, 165.

<sup>14</sup> R. Ernest Dupuy and Trevor N. Dupuy, *The Harper Encyclopedia of Military History: From 3500 B.C. to the Present (Fourth Edition)*, (New York, NY: HarperCollins Publishers, Inc., 1993), 1144.

<sup>15</sup> Romanus and Sunderland, *Stilwell's Mission to China*, 6, 22-23, 38.

<sup>16</sup> Dupuy and Dupuy, *The Harper Encyclopedia of Military History*, 1240.

<sup>17</sup> Romanus and Sunderland, *Stilwell's Mission to China*, 8.

<sup>18</sup> Ibid.

<sup>19</sup> "Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist Revolutionary Army (NRA) boasted 300 divisions." The number 300 is an approximation based on different sources and different accountings (For example, how independent brigades and regiments are counted). Romanus and Sunderland, *Stilwell's Mission to China*, 35. And; Tuchman, *Stilwell and the American Experience in China*, 221.

<sup>20</sup> Tuchman, *Stilwell and the American Experience in China*, 233.

<sup>21</sup> Romanus and Sunderland, *Stilwell's Mission to China*, 23.

<sup>22</sup> Romanus and Sunderland, *Stilwell's Command Problems*, 71.

<sup>23</sup> Romanus and Sunderland, *Stilwell's Mission to China*, 7. And; Tuchman, *Stilwell and the American Experience in China*, 221.

<sup>24</sup> Stilwell, *The Stilwell Papers*, 317, 321. And; S.I. Hsuing, *The Life of Chiang Kai-shek* (London: Peter Davis, 1948), 343-358.

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<sup>25</sup> yǐ yí zhì yí: to use foreigners to subdue foreigners (idiom); let the barbarians fight it out among themselves; use Western science and technology to counter imperialist encroachment. From: “Chinese English Pinyin Dictionary,” Yabla, 1 February 2018, <https://chinese.yabla.com/chinese-english-pinyin-dictionary.php?define=yiyizhiyi>.

<sup>26</sup> Tuchman, *Stilwell and the American Experience in China*, 238.

<sup>27</sup> Ibid., 242.

<sup>28</sup> Quoted in Tuchman, *Stilwell and the American Experience in China*, 242.

<sup>29</sup> Romanus and Sunderland, *Stilwell’s Command Problems*, ix.

<sup>30</sup> Romanus and Sunderland, *Stilwell’s Mission to China*, 159-161.

<sup>31</sup> Romanus and Sunderland, *Stilwell’s Mission to China*, 81-148.

<sup>32</sup> Stilwell, *The Stilwell Papers*, 45. And, Romanus and Sunderland, *Stilwell’s Mission to China*, 93.

<sup>33</sup> Dupuy and Dupuy, *The Harper Encyclopedia of Military History*, 1242.

<sup>34</sup> Stilwell, *The Stilwell Papers*, 25-26.

<sup>35</sup> Letter from George C. Marshall to Stilwell, 2 Feb 1942, sub: Instructions as U.S. Army Representative to China, with 4 Incls. History of CBI Sec. III App III Item 36A. Quoted in Romanus and Sunderland, *Stilwell’s Mission to China*, 74.

<sup>36</sup> Stilwell, *The Stilwell Papers*, 26.

<sup>37</sup> Ibid.

<sup>38</sup> Tuchman, *Stilwell and the American Experience in China*, 172-173.

<sup>39</sup> Ibid., 172.

<sup>40</sup> H.H. Chang, *Chiang Kai-shek: Asia’s Man of Destiny*, 271.

<sup>41</sup> Tuchman, *Stilwell and the American Experience in China*, 172.

<sup>42</sup> Ibid., 183, 197.

<sup>43</sup> Tuchman, *Stilwell and the American Experience in China*, 264-265. And; Romanus and Sunderland, *Stilwell’s Mission to China*, 32-37.

<sup>44</sup> Tuchman, *Stilwell and the American Experience in China*, 264.

<sup>45</sup> Romanus and Sunderland, *Stilwell’s Mission to China*, 34.

<sup>46</sup> Ibid., 33-35.

<sup>47</sup> Ibid.

<sup>48</sup> Ibid., 35.

<sup>49</sup> Ibid., 36. “The chop...” The *chop* is a Chinese seal or stamp used to sign official documents. The Chinese chop is most commonly made from stone, metal, or a similar hard material. Qiu Gui Su, “Chinese Chops Or Seals,” ThoughtCo.com, 15 May 2017, <https://www.thoughtco.com/chinese-chops-seals-2278409>.

<sup>50</sup> Stilwell, *The Stilwell Papers*, 26.

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- <sup>51</sup> Dupuy and Dupuy, *The Harper Encyclopedia of Military History*, 1242.
- <sup>52</sup> Stilwell, *The Stilwell Papers*, 58.
- <sup>53</sup> Ibid., 58-80.
- <sup>54</sup> Ibid., 76-77.
- <sup>55</sup> Ibid., 79.
- <sup>56</sup> Field-Marshal Viscount William Slim, *Defeat into Victory: Battling Japan in Burma and India, 1942-1945* (New York, New York: Cooper Square Press, 2000), 17, 47, 87, 116.
- <sup>57</sup> Ibid., 17.
- <sup>58</sup> Romanus and Sunderland, *Stilwell's Mission to China*, 120.
- <sup>59</sup> Dupuy and Dupuy, *The Harper Encyclopedia of Military History*, 1242.
- <sup>60</sup> Stilwell, *The Stilwell Papers*, 64, 95-106.
- <sup>61</sup> Romanus and Sunderland, *Stilwell's Mission to China*, 138-139.
- <sup>62</sup> Tuchman, *Stilwell and the American Experience in China*, 246-247.
- <sup>63</sup> Romanus and Sunderland, *Stilwell's Mission to China*, 74.
- <sup>64</sup> Notes for Generalissimo, 26 May 42. Stilwell Documents, Hoover Library. Quoted in Romanus and Sunderland, *Stilwell's Mission to China*, 153.
- <sup>65</sup> Stilwell, *The Stilwell Papers*, 109. And, Romanus and Sunderland, *Stilwell's Mission to China*, 254-255.
- <sup>66</sup> Joseph Stilwell, "Notes for Generalissimo, 26 May 1942." Stilwell Documents, Hoover Library. Quoted in Romanus and Sunderland, *Stilwell's Mission to China*, 153-154.
- <sup>67</sup> Stilwell, *The Stilwell Papers*, 117.
- <sup>68</sup> Joseph Stilwell, "Notes for Generalissimo, 26 May 42." Stilwell Documents, Hoover Library. Quoted in, Romanus and Sunderland, *Stilwell's Mission to China*, 154.
- <sup>69</sup> Romanus and Sunderland, *Stilwell's Mission to China*, 185, 250.
- <sup>70</sup> Ibid., 282, 293-295.
- <sup>71</sup> Ibid., 136.
- <sup>72</sup> Stilwell, *The Stilwell Papers*, 204.
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- <sup>76</sup> Stilwell, *The Stilwell Papers*, 204. And; Dupuy and Dupuy, *The Harper Encyclopedia of Military History*, 1273.
- <sup>77</sup> Stilwell, *The Stilwell Papers*, 204.
- <sup>78</sup> Romanus and Sunderland, *Stilwell's Command Problems*, 316-322.



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- <sup>80</sup> Dupuy and Dupuy, *The Harper Encyclopedia of Military History*, 1281.
- <sup>81</sup> Romanus and Sunderland, *Stilwell's Command Problems*, 408-412.
- <sup>82</sup> "Memorandum for The President from The U.S. Chiefs of Staff Dated 4 July 1944." Quoted in Romanus and Sunderland, *Stilwell's Command Problems*, 381-382.
- <sup>83</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>84</sup> "Radio transcript received in Chungking, Roosevelt to Generalissimo, 6 July 1944." Quoted in Romanus and Sunderland, *Stilwell's Command Problems*, 383-384.
- <sup>85</sup> "Radio, Stilwell to Marshall, 3 July 1944." Quoted in Romanus and Sunderland, *Stilwell's Command Problems*, 380-381.
- <sup>86</sup> Romanus and Sunderland, *Stilwell's Command Problems*, 71. And; Romanus and Sunderland, *Stilwell's Mission to China*, 158. While Roosevelt expressed a desire to treat China as a great power, China was never admitted as a member of the Combined Chiefs of Staff or admitted as a member of the munitions control board.
- <sup>87</sup> Romanus and Sunderland, *Stilwell's Mission to China*, 158.
- <sup>88</sup> Quoted in Romanus and Sunderland, *Stilwell's Command Problems*, 386.
- <sup>89</sup> Letter from Chiang Kai-shek to President Roosevelt dated 8 July 1944. Quoted in Romanus and Sunderland, *Stilwell's Command Problems*, 386.
- <sup>90</sup> Letter from President Roosevelt to Generalissimo dated 16 September 1944. Quoted in Romanus and Sunderland, *Stilwell's Command Problems*, 445.
- <sup>91</sup> Quoted in Laura Tyson Li, *Madame Chiang Kai-shek* (New York, New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 2006), 257.
- <sup>92</sup> *Aide-mémoire*, Generalissimo for Hurley 25 September 1944. Quoted in Romanus and Sunderland, *Stilwell's Command Problems*, 453.
- <sup>93</sup> Quoted in Romanus and Sunderland, *Stilwell's Command Problems*, 458.
- <sup>94</sup> Memo, McCarthy for Handy, 18 October 1944, with Incl, Memo President for Generalissimo. Quoted in, Romanus and Sunderland, *Stilwell's Command Problems*, 468-469.
- <sup>95</sup> Quoted in Romanus and Sunderland, *Stilwell's Command Problems*, 471.
- <sup>96</sup> William Rosenau et al., *United States Marine Corps Advisors: Past, Present, and Future*, CNA Strategic Study (Alexandria, VA: CNA, August 2013), 5-6, 36-37, 56.
- <sup>97</sup> Ibid., 75 and 76.
- <sup>98</sup> U.S. Army Public Affairs, *Army creates Security Force Assistance Brigade and Military Advisor Training Academy at Fort Benning*, Army.mil, 16 February 2016, [https://www.army.mil/article/182646/army\\_creates\\_security\\_force\\_assistance\\_brigade\\_and\\_military\\_advisor\\_training\\_academy\\_at\\_fort\\_benning](https://www.army.mil/article/182646/army_creates_security_force_assistance_brigade_and_military_advisor_training_academy_at_fort_benning).
- <sup>99</sup> "Marine Corps Security Cooperation Group (MCSCG)," U.S. Marine Corps Concepts and Programs, 2 July 2014, <https://marinecorpsconceptsandprograms.com/programs/preparing-tomorrows-fight/marine-corps-security-cooperation-group-mcscg>.

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<sup>100</sup> (1) “The requirement for a coherent, logical command chain is essential,” Marine Corps Reference Publication (MCRP) 3-03D.3, *Security Force Capacity Building Handbook*, 2 May 2016, 4-3. (2) “The establishment of a clear and effective command structure that ensures the unified, coherent and cohesive delivery of SFCB (Security Force Capacity Building) that best suits the HN (Host Nation) is required,” *Ibid.*, 1-4.

<sup>101</sup> Romanus and Sunderland, *Stilwell’s Command Problems*, 471.

