

AIR WAR COLLEGE

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THE CONFLUENCE OF AMERICAN AND JORDANIAN EXCEPTIONALISM: AN  
ENDURING OR TRANSACTIONAL RELATIONSHIP

by

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## **Biography**

Lieutenant Colonel Megan Kinne is an Airfield Operations officer in the United States Air Force. She received her commission in 1999 from the Reserve Officer Training Corps through Texas A&M University, where she graduated with a Bachelor's degree in Chemistry. Lt Col Kinne has served in variety of assignments at the wing and Air Staff level, and was a Defense Legislative Fellow in the U.S. Senate. In addition to several deployments to the Middle East and South Asia, Lt Col Kinne served a two-year tour at Headquarters, U.S. Central Command as the commander's legislative strategist. Currently, she is a student at the Air War College, Maxwell AFB, Alabama.



## **Abstract**

The confluence of shared security interests, King Abdullah II's leadership in the region, and the country's geographically strategic position make Jordan a vital U.S. partner in the pursuit and protection of national security interests in the Middle East region. Policymakers must ensure U.S. engagement with the Jordanian government promotes an enduring partnership rather than devolving into a merely transactional relationship. Lawmakers and military leaders must understand the dynamics of the security, economic, and social threats that jeopardize the stability of Jordan, and work to balance our liberal desires for the region with the realities of the regime's carefully controlled democratization. American policy toward the Hashemite Kingdom should acknowledge and enhance "Jordanian Exceptionalism."



# **America's Relations with Jordan**

## **Introduction**

American politicians have promoted a vision for America as aspiring to the status of the “city on a hill,” inspiring the rest of the world through its liberal, democratic values. Political scientists such as Hilde Restad refer to this concept as “American Exceptionalism;” both as a defining characteristic of American identity and as an ideology that shapes how the United States engages the rest of the world.<sup>1</sup> This view of “exceptionalism” as an ideology counters the more traditional political science definition held by those who want to prove that America can be legitimately called exceptional on an empirical basis, citing distinct political and economic institutions.<sup>2</sup> Instead, Restad supports Henry Nau’s idea that national identity informs how a state will use its national instruments of power.<sup>3</sup> Politicians will use both the ideology and the fact of America’s distinct position, political culture, and capabilities to justify their policies. Whether viewed through the political science or identity lens, “American Exceptionalism” forms the basis of the civic nationalism at the heart of American identity, in contrast to the ethnic heritage of other states.<sup>4</sup> After World War I, “American Exceptionalism” became a mission and shaped the U.S. foreign policy agenda through active promotion of democracy and capitalism.<sup>5</sup> The United States created a multilateral international order that enhances the influence and wealth of the United States and her allies, amplifying the American ideology of distinct greatness from the rest of the world.

According to Mansoor Moaddel, the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan also deserves the label “exceptional” for its distinct system of governance and national identity.<sup>6</sup> The British government established Jordan as a nation following World War I. It only achieved full independence in 1946, and yet emerged very quickly as a highly influential state in the Arab

world. As a constitutional monarchy, founding father King Hussein's strategic vision promoted a pluralistic and non-ideological political culture to unite a diverse population. This approach has enabled the Hashemite regime to survive and to cultivate a national identity capable of weathering economic hardships, continuing security challenges, religious extremism, and nationalist movements, in contrast to the violent experiences of Egypt, Syria, and Iran.<sup>7</sup>

Jordan is a crucial partner for the United States in an otherwise unstable region of the world. Successive versions of the National Security Strategy highlight Jordan's efforts to liberalize, allowing greater to popular representation, its moderate Islamic approach, and its security cooperation efforts.<sup>8</sup> U.S. military leaders have applauded Jordan as an "anchor" and "our strongest, most reliable partner" in the region.<sup>9</sup> This paper will compare the national interests of both countries, assess the strength of the relationship, and offer recommendations to promote an enduring relationship that accentuates the "exceptionalism" of both.

## **Jordanian Interests: Regime Survival and National Security**

The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan is geographically positioned at the juncture of several regional conflicts, surrounded by civil war, violent extremism, and religious, ethnic, and tribal tensions.<sup>10</sup> Compared to the nations on its borders, Jordan lacks not just oil reserves, but also sufficient arable land and the water needed to support its population. In recent years, conflicts in neighboring states have put further social and economic strain on the government, in addition to the security concerns posed by radical extremists. From its inception, the Hashemite kings understood that the stability of the country, and ultimately regime survival, would depend on a more moderate system of government with a strong foundations in prevailing tribal and Islamic customs, as well as external security and economic assistance.<sup>11</sup> While Friedman argues that early in the nation's history, which King Hussein employed a short-term strategy to remain in power, under his decades-long rule Jordan quickly rose to become an unexpected, strategically important regional power. The same interests remain at the forefront of Hashemite policies today.<sup>12</sup>

### **Jordanian Nationalism: Uniting Arabs, Tribes, and Muslims**

Unlike neighboring Arab kingdoms, the Hashemite legacy lacks any foundation within the geographic boundaries of present-day Jordan. The Hashemite ruling family justifies its rule based on hereditary lineage to the Prophet Mohammad, tribal identity, and skill in managing foreign relations to harness domestic support. They have developed a national identity formally codified in the Jordanian National Charter. This formulation seeks to gain the allegiance of a heterogeneous population while guaranteeing basic human rights to all. According to Moaddel, the combination of this nationalism with a good government serves as the foundation of strength for the regime, which justifies the term "Jordanian Exceptionalism."<sup>13</sup> Furthermore, government

initiatives, such as “Jordan First” launched in 2002, put national priorities over those promoted by regional and global partner nations. This initiative sought to further reinforce national unity.<sup>14</sup>

The Hashemite monarchs have commonly cited their status as direct descendants of the Prophet Mohammad, has taken a leadership role in the Muslim community as a whole. For example, King Abdullah II and the Crown Prince released the *Amman Message* in November 2004 which defined what is and is not Islam, recognized eight Muslim sects, forbade the practice of declaring other Muslims apostates, and set the conditions for the issuance of *fatwas*.<sup>15</sup> Ratified by religious leaders from 50 countries, the *Amman Message* provides a basis for unity, for curbing religious infighting, and for discrediting the claims of radical Islamist groups. It proposes Islamic solutions to address the social challenges facing many Muslim nations, and encourages Muslims in non-Muslim countries to practice good citizenship.<sup>16</sup> With its world-wide reach, the *Amman Message* accentuates the global influence of the Hashemite king, while simultaneously cementing his leadership in the eyes of his overwhelmingly Muslim majority.

### **Authoritarian-Pluralism Government**

Bosmat Yefet describes the government of Jordan as “authoritarian pluralism” or “liberalized autocracy.” This system of government falls short of an ideal democracy by Western standards, but does allow for open dialogue and representation of the people in government. It affords freedoms to all segments of the population, united under the Hashemite monarchy.<sup>17</sup> The king enjoys broad control of government institutions, to include the military. Moreover, human rights organizations have had success in gaining government sponsorship. Minorities and women have equal rights in most, but not all aspects of Jordanian society.



## External Security and Economic Assistance

In the interwar period, the British supported the fledgling Hashemite government economically and militarily, due to its lack of local resources to combat tribal unrest.<sup>18</sup> As British power waned, Jordan turned to the United States as well as its Arab neighbors for security and economic assistance, as well as for trade agreements and development investments. The dependent nature of the Jordanian economy has forced the regime to balance its domestic and foreign policy, to avoid accusations of permitting excessive influence from outside powers while supporting the needs of the population. Domestic policies have focused on catering to the tribal influence within the country through landownership laws and favorable representation in government, while also promoting the development of social classes in harmony with political party goals.<sup>19</sup>

Without indigenous oil resources but owning a capable sea port at Aqaba, Jordan pursued a strong economic relationship with Iraq in the 1980's that resulted in tremendous financial benefit for the struggling nation and its population for the greater part of a decade. This relationship also brought challenges. Out of concern for internal and external security, King Hussein chose to mediate on behalf of Iraq following Saddam's invasion into Kuwait in 1990, instead of bandwagoning with the U.S. and Gulf nations to oppose the occupation. This savvy tactic bought the regime tremendous domestic support, despite its pro-Western orientation during a period of anti-Western public sentiment. Ultimately this only produced minor friction with the United States.<sup>20</sup> Further, the economic stability gained through the bilateral trade agreement with Iraq created economic and social growth without long-lasting detriment to Jordan's relationship with the United States and Arab nations.<sup>21</sup>

Beginning in 2011, the conflict in Syria has created tremendous challenges for Jordan and the stability of the Hashemite regime due to the resulting political, security and economic consequences. Jordan has absorbed more than 622,000 refugees from Syria over the past six years, which threatens the delicate balance of the political situation and strains government-provided services and resources.<sup>22</sup> According to Achilli, providing assistance to refugees reportedly cost the Jordanian government \$1.2 billion in 2015, forecasted to rise to over \$4 billion in subsequent years.<sup>23</sup> Furthermore, the conflict has forced the closure of the major trade route through Syria to Europe, costing Jordan economic loss of \$1.5B annually.<sup>24</sup>

The public sentiment regarding the refugees further impacts the regime's stability. In the beginning, the Jordanian population supported the flow of Syrian refugees due to strong familial, cultural and geographic ties between the two nations.<sup>25</sup> Attitudes have changed as Jordanians face a rising cost of living and decreasing employment opportunities.<sup>26</sup> The government has responded by implementing policies to prevent refugees from leaving camps for urban areas, and by also restricting the freedom of movement and services provided to those that already reside outside of camps.<sup>27</sup> Jordan also faces an increased security threat from the country's participation in military operations to defeat the Islamic State and the threat of homegrown terrorists.

## **Confluence of U.S. and Jordanian National Security Interests**

*"The United States and Jordan had stood together for decades. It has been a partnership strategic in scope, important in the region and important in the world." U.S. Vice President Mike Pence, Jan. 21, 2018 during an official meeting with King Abdullah II in Amman, Jordan.*

In the years following the attacks against the homeland on September 11, 2001, successive National Security Strategies (NSS) of the United States were heavily focused on counterterrorism efforts in the Middle East. The American strategic approach to the region evolved from a war time strategy in September 2002, to a more encompassing approach: the United States seeks to shape the security environment through a variety of programs including the promotion of liberal ideals of multilateral economic order and continued democratic expansion.<sup>28</sup> By 2015, the Obama Administration sought to reduce the U.S. presence in the region by relying on coalition support and security cooperation activities in order to balance the economic challenges facing the nation and the expense of long-term operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. The 2015 NSS defined U.S. interests in terms of security, prosperity, values, and international order. It outlined initiatives related to U.S. interests in the Middle East and laid the framework to preserve national security across the full spectrum of threats.<sup>29</sup>

The current NSS released by the Trump Administration promotes a strong United States as its first priority and aims to produce tangible outcomes. It touts the civic-minded national identity of Americans as "a lasting force for good in the world," but challenges partner nations to join "in pursuit of shared interests, values, and aspirations" rather than endeavoring to export U.S. ideology.<sup>30</sup> This updated document defines U.S. vital interests in realist terms of protecting the homeland and American way of life, promoting American prosperity, preserving peace through strength, and advancing U.S. influence in the world.<sup>31</sup> Building on the President's campaign platform, this "America First" strategy primarily focuses on unilateral actions that

reinforce U.S. strength and hegemony in the world, in addition to domestic programs to strengthen the viability and resiliency of the security and economic sectors. Notably, this strategy does not describe international engagement in terms of the traditional four instruments of national power to, but instead replaces diplomacy and information with the term “politics.”<sup>32</sup> It criticizes previous strategies that relied on diplomacy and membership in international institutions as the primary ways of building partnerships with nations.<sup>33</sup>

The two consecutive national security strategies agree on one key assumption – the need for the United States to assert global leadership. They disagree on the means for achieving that leadership. However, the two strategy documents portray the threats and opportunities for security partnerships with nations of the Middle East in similar ways, specifically that the United States and Jordan continue to complement each other’s security concerns. The 2015 National Security Strategy’s multilateral approach and themes “Security, Prosperity, Values, and International Order” offers an analytical framework by which to assess the confluence of U.S. and Jordanian security interests and strength of the relationship.

## **Security**

The 2015 NSS prescribes defending the homeland through execution of eight broad efforts, of which four apply to U.S. actions in the Middle East – combating terrorism, building military and governance capacity of partner nations, preventing the spread and use of weapons of mass destruction, and assuring access to shared spaces, such as cyber and space domains.<sup>34</sup> Each of these four actions rely on working with willing and capable partners in the region. Actions outlined to defend the homeland in the 2017 NSS focus on unilateral efforts to secure the borders and critical infrastructure, respond to threats of weapons of mass destruction, and address cyber vulnerabilities. It uses stronger, more direct language to counter the existential threats to the

homeland posed by violent extremist groups, but still calls for eliminating safe havens, building partners' military and governance capacity, and utilizing information operations and public diplomacy.<sup>35</sup> Present-day conditions in and around Jordan, particularly the continued threat of state and non-state violent extremist groups and availability of weapons of mass destruction, demand that the United States actively engage with the Hashemite government to ensure security in the region, and by extension to the homeland.

### **Prosperity**

While the 2015 NSS sought to address domestic concerns and maintain U.S. economic power, the document also promoted U.S. responsibilities to maintain open markets and free trade as the leader of the world's economy. It further laid out requirements to pursue economic reforms, strengthen the economies of partner nations, encourage development, and address poverty and inequality.<sup>36</sup> The second pillar of the 2017 NSS, "Promote American Prosperity," declares "Economic security is national security" and seeks to rebalance U.S. trade, reform international economic institutions, and hold accountable those nations who exploit their membership in institutions to the detriment of the United States and partners. In doing so, it also retains the commitment to develop economic opportunities for "like-minded partners."<sup>37</sup> Directly related to homeland defense, both documents highlight the need for transparency in global financial systems to combat financing of criminal and terrorist organizations.<sup>38</sup> Through free trade agreements, international institutions, and military and economic aid programs, the United States and Jordan enjoy a strong economic relationship that greatly benefits Jordan as a foreign aid-dependent nation. The United States receives indirect benefit from the reduction in threat of potential conflict garnered from promoting prosperity in the region. To remain a beneficiary of

U.S. economic aid, Jordan seeks to continue its economic and development policies as a “like-minded” partner.

## **Values**

The 2015 NSS claimed that the United States draws strength and security from the promotion of liberal values: “defending democracy and human rights is related to every enduring national interest.”<sup>39</sup> This enduring commitment to the advance of democracy and human rights complicated some relationships abroad, but it remained the defining character of U.S. foreign policy. The 2015 NSS committed the resources of the United States to help countries move toward more open and democratic models and provide representative government, particularly in the Middle East.<sup>40</sup> Promotion of American liberal values is not a *pillar* of the 2017 NSS, but it a *line of effort* under the fourth and final pillar of Advancing American Influence. Specifically this updated strategy asserts that the United States will “remain a beacon of liberty and opportunity around the world” and that good governance and cooperation between nations are foundational elements of global peace, security, and prosperity.<sup>41</sup> Under the new strategy the United States will not export its values, but rather it will provide incentives to governments that implement reforms and commit resources only to select fragile or weak states whose failure would threaten the homeland.<sup>42</sup>

## **International Order**

In its final focus area, the 2015 NSS commended the achievements of the post-World War II international order, but it also drew attention to the challenges facing legal, economic and political institutions that impact their ability to meet responsibilities. The document also called for strict action against state and non-state actors that disrupt the international order.<sup>43</sup> It specifically prescribed military activities to bring stability and peace in the Middle East included

defeating terrorist groups, defending allies against aggressors, guaranteeing the free flow of resources, and preventing the development, proliferation and use of weapons of mass destruction.<sup>44</sup> The 2015 NSS also advocated for diplomatic efforts such as continued foreign military aid, de-escalation of sectarian tensions, and a negotiated two-state solution for Israel and Palestine to achieve long-term stability in the region.<sup>45</sup> The 2017 NSS repeats many of these same security concerns though it commits the United States to a continued military presence in the Middle East focused on building military capacity for counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations. It also highlights that Iranian activities, rather than policies towards Israel, destabilize the region.<sup>46</sup> The influx of refugees from Syria over the past six years has imposed an enormous challenge on Jordan with growing implications for the stability of the entire region. The new strategy announces that the United States will lead efforts to end the Syrian civil war and facilitate return of the Syrian refugees to their home country.<sup>47</sup> All of this represents the variety of reasons that Jordan remains a critical partner for U.S. interests, to stabilize order in the region through counterterrorism, improve relations with Israel, and other stability efforts.

### **Assessment of the Relationship**

Given the ongoing conflict in the Middle East, the United States and Jordan have both made efforts to reinforce their bilateral security relationship. Because U.S. security interests in the region correspond with Jordan's own internal and regional security concerns, the United States has offered, and Jordan has accepted, the economic and military resources it needs to ensure regime survival. However, the United States measures the strength of its relationship with Jordan by what the Hashemite Kingdom does to advance U.S. interests in the region, its tempered reaction when U.S.-Jordanian interests diverge, and the steps taken adopted to U.S.

values. Simon and Fromson highlight Jordan's role as a conduit to Russia for deconflicting coalition military operations in Syria, as well as its position in the Middle East Peace Process as examples of advancing U.S. interests.<sup>48</sup> The measured Jordanian response to President Trump's announcement committing the United States to move its Embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem also shows the value of this relationship. More importantly, Jordan has taken small, pragmatic steps to develop its economy, advance human rights, and reform its government in line with U.S. values, rather than search for another great power sponsor.





## **Recommendations**

In the first year of the Trump Administration, Leon Hadar describes U.S. foreign policy as becoming much more transactional, as opposed to the “transformational diplomacy” pursued by the Bush Administration, or the coexistence policies of the Obama Administration.<sup>49</sup> While the necessity of restraining desired ends to the available means requires avoiding any aggressive nation-building, democracy promotion, or human rights agendas, a presidential administration cannot drop or shift national interests as casually as a business changes its goals. Instead, Hadar describes a nation’s interests as a reflection of enduring national values and identity. They represent concepts such as national security and defense of the homeland that resist quantification.<sup>50</sup>

Although the United States and Jordan have a longstanding relationship founded in shared interests, they do view the world and their national security very differently. Both parties have to negotiate their differences and remain closely aligned for each to retain its version of “exceptionalism.” Transitioning to a purely transactional relationship would create a credibility problem between American ideals and policy, but the 2017 NSS points out that pursuing the same foreign policy agenda also faces challenges.

### **Security**

Because the U.S.-Jordanian relationship rests in the shared interest of national security, the United States can improve this cooperation. In addition to support for on-going coalition combat operations in Syria and Iraq, the United States must continue to support training, education, and military-exercise opportunities for Jordanian military forces. While such opportunities translate into increased military effectiveness, they also help bridge cultural and values differences. The Department of Defense and Intelligence Community should also seek

openings for increased information and intelligence sharing to benefit the national security of both countries. Every opportunity should also be sought to address the disparity between the military technology provided to Israel and Jordan to ensure that United States remains the benefactor of choice, but also to further strengthen the Israeli-Jordanian relationship.

As the recent NSS emphasizes, the Syrian civil war destabilizes the entire region, but finding a solution acceptable to all parties involved in the conflict eludes diplomats. In the near term, the United States must lead the development of durable solutions to the refugee crisis and terrorism threats stemming from this continued conflict. Achilli argues persuasively that the United States cannot sustain a policy of containing the refugee problem to the Middle East and providing only financial assistance.<sup>51</sup> The Hashemite government has verbally announced a commitment to open borders, but the European University Institute's Migration Policy Centre notes that both refoulement and voluntary return to Syria have occurred.<sup>52</sup> Gulf States have contributed large amounts of aid, but through diplomacy the U.S. might be able to encourage these nations to relax immigration laws to facilitate resettlement of refugees.<sup>53</sup> Any additional financial aid should be directed at enhancing education, healthcare, and employment programs for refugees in an effort to relieve the impact on the Jordanian people. Finally, promoting the *Amman Message* and replicating programs found in other areas to educate against support to terrorism should be considered.<sup>54</sup>

## **Prosperity**

In the 2015 NSS, the United States committed to enhancing the economies of partner nations through aid, development, trade agreements, and other economic initiatives. Addressing the needs of the Jordanian population through provision of scientific loans and grants, and human capital to develop solutions to water and agricultural challenges represent two important

areas for assistance.<sup>55</sup> Further investments in alternate energy, climate change, technology, and industry development, to include specialized education in these areas offer other opportunities to strengthen the Jordanian economy. Sweis, et al., recommend support for efforts to improve communication-spectrum policies that will enhance democratic reforms, but also economic development and technological innovation.<sup>56</sup> In light of disruptions to the major trade route to Europe, renewing bilateral and multilateral trade agreements with Jordan to replace revenue lost due to the Syrian conflict can also provide critical aid for the stability of the Jordanian economy.

## **Values**

An area of divergence between the United States and Jordan lies in attempts to promote American-style democracy and liberal values. Research does not demonstrate a strong link between democracy and reduced terrorism levels.<sup>57</sup> The United States must also understand that democracies might not result in pro-American governments and accept that liberalism and secular nationalism do not offer any prospect of enhancing stability in the Middle East.<sup>58</sup> The 2017 NSS is realistic on this point. American leaders must accept that Jordan's model of Islam and governance may present a solution to curbing violence and bringing stability to the region. The United States should support continued good governance and services for the Jordanian people, and encourage the Hashemite regime's support for nationalist, liberal organizations that can offer alternatives to Islamist groups. Not only should U.S. lawmakers and diplomats vocalize support for the initiatives of the *Amman Message* but champion its tenets in international forums and bilateral diplomatic engagements.<sup>59</sup> The United States must also address publically the double standards it tolerates from longtime allies and itself in the area of human rights, which complicates relationships with other foreign governments.<sup>60</sup> Arab nations perceive that Trump Administration's transactional style of diplomacy will reduce the focus on human rights, but the

U.S. Congress is likely to continue the coupling of advances in human rights policy to financial and military aid.<sup>61</sup>

## **International Order**

The United States considers Jordan a critical partner in the management of several conflicts that threaten the international order; aggression by Iran, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, violent extremism, and the Syrian crisis. The Hashemite regime has assumed risk by maintaining a working relationship with Israel and it has contributed to the Middle East Peace Process.<sup>62</sup> The United States must address its lack of credibility on this issue with greater efforts in the process and firmness in halting aggression by all parties.<sup>63</sup>

To some extent, the 2017 National Security Strategy bears out Hadar's concerns, but it also retains the verbiage of the longstanding, values-based tenets of U.S. foreign policy and identity, leaving an opening for consistency in programs that are showing effects. Additionally, the new administration's transactional style of diplomacy does not depart radically from historical precedent. It resembles Secretary Kissinger's "linkages" policy during the Cold War that failed.<sup>64</sup> In thoughtfully closing the gap between American ideals and foreign policy, the U.S. can advance its national security interests through a strong, enduring relationship with Jordan. All efforts should include public diplomacy, not just private meetings with regime leaders. We want to ensure that the Jordanian people, and mass audiences throughout the Middle East, do not see King Abdullah II and his government as a puppet of the United States, which would disrupt the support he enjoys from the majority of the Jordanian people.<sup>65</sup>

## Conclusion

Andrew Bacevich portrays the United States as consumed by never-ending conflict – defending vital interests abroad – decades in which domestic politics too heavily influenced foreign policy decisions.<sup>66</sup> He argues that a return to true realism and understanding of the limits of power will minimize the unintended consequences of foreign policy decisions that feed threats to national security.<sup>67</sup> While his argument holds elements of truth, American politicians promote “American Exceptionalism” through soft power and liberal identity. On the other hand, “Jordanian Exceptionalism” represents success in promoting religious tolerance, “official Islam,” limited democracy, and a pluralistic national identity.<sup>68</sup> With the limits of U.S. hard and soft power, and the “exceptional” traits of the country of Jordan in mind, this paper provides informed recommendations for advancing the U.S. relationship with Jordan and working towards mutual interests in a thoughtful way. Jordan will remain a critical partner in the region based on our shared security interests, King Abdullah II’s leadership in the region, and its geographically strategic position. By supporting Jordan’s national security interests and domestic initiatives without an overemphasis on the American way, Jordanian political culture can continue to move toward liberal democracy.<sup>69</sup> Cultivating a stalwart, enduring relationship with the stable and influential Hashemite government that remains aligned with the West ultimately serves the best national security interests of the United States. Lawmakers and military leaders must pursue a foreign policy with Jordan that builds on the exceptionalism of each nation, rather than relying on simple transactional diplomacy. After all, U.S. national security and a predictable world order rest on the foundation of America’s liberal ideals.<sup>70</sup>

## Notes

(All notes appear in shortened form. For full details, see the appropriate entry in the bibliography.)

1. Restad, *American Exceptionalism*, 2-3.
2. Ibid., 17 citing Ross, *Origins of American Social Science*.
3. Nau, *At Home Abroad*, 41-42.
4. Restad, *American Exceptionalism*, 33.
5. Ibid., 7.
6. Moaddel, *Jordanian Exceptionalism*, 27-28.
7. Ibid., 23.
8. *National Security Strategy (NSS)*, 2003, 2006, 2010, 2015.
9. GEN Austin, *US Central Command Posture Statement*, 2015 and GEN Votel, *US Central Command Posture Statement*, 2017.
10. Moaddel, *Jordanian Exceptionalism*, 28.
11. Ibid., 28.
12. Friedenber, *Throne at All Costs*, i.
13. Moaddel, *Jordanian Exceptionalism*, 27-28.
14. Yefet, *Politics of Human Rights in Egypt and Jordan*, 47.
15. *Amman Message*, vi.
16. Ibid., vii.
17. Yefet, *Politics of Human Rights in Egypt and Jordan*, 3-5.
18. Moaddel, *Jordanian Exceptionalism*, 28.
19. Ibid., 66-70.
20. Friedenber, *The Throne at All Costs*, 78-80.
21. Ibid., 98.
22. Rpt 2 pg 1 (cites UNHCR Data)
23. Achilli, *Syrian Refugees in Jordan*, 2.
24. Oddone, "Syrian border closure."
25. Achilli, *Syrian Refugees in Jordan*, 2.
26. Ibid., 2-3
27. Ibid., 5-6
28. *NSS, 2015*, 2.
29. Ibid., 1-5.
30. *NSS, 2017*, 1.
31. Ibid., 3-4.
32. Ibid., 26.
33. Ibid., 3.
34. *NSS, 2015*, 7-14.
35. *NSS, 2017* 7-14.
36. *NSS, 2015*, 15.
37. *NSS, 2017*, 17, 20.
38. *NSS, 2015*, 15 and *NSS, 2017*, 11.
39. *NSS, 2015*, 19.
40. Ibid., 20.
41. *NSS, 2017*, 1, 41.
42. Ibid., 39 - 40.
43. *NSS, 2015*, 23.
44. Ibid., 26.
45. Ibid., 26.
46. *NSS, 2017*, 49.
47. Ibid., 49.

48. Simon, "Jordan's Pragmatism in Syria."
49. Hadar, "Limits of Trump's Transactional Foreign Policy."
50. Ibid.
51. Achilli, *Syrian Refugees in Jordan*, 8.
52. Ibid., 3.
53. De Bel-Air, "A Note on Syrian Refugees," 8.
54. Abbot, "U.S. Ups Extremist Fight in Pakistan."
55. Bacevich, *Limits of Power*, 180-181.
56. Sweis, "Spectrum Policy Reforms," 553.
57. Gause, "Can Democracy Stop Terrorism?"
58. Hamid, *Islamic Exceptionalism*, 29.
59. *Amman Message*, viii.
60. Yefet, *Politics of Human Rights in Egypt and Jordan*, 34.
61. Hennessy-Fiske, "Why Gulf Arab leaders are welcoming Trump's transactional foreign policy."
62. Friedenberg, *Throne at All Costs*, 6.
63. Zaharna, "American Public Diplomacy in the Arab and Muslim World," 4.
64. Hadar, "Limits of Trump's Transactional Foreign Policy."
65. Zaharna, "American Public Diplomacy in the Arab and Muslim World," 2.
66. Bacevich, *Limits of Power*, 2-3.
67. Bacevich, *Limits of Power*, 180-181.
68. Moaddel, *Jordanian Exceptionalism*, 5.
69. Hamid, *Islamic Exceptionalism*, 267.
70. Leffler, "The Worst First Year of Foreign Policy."

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