

KalKi: High Assurance Software-Defined IoT Security

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DoD urgently needs to embrace commodity loT technologies in its tactical systems.

Security concerns over untrusted supply chains are an obstacle.

• We are developing a solution that remains resilient and trustworthy, even in the presence of a powerful attacker.

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Attacks on IoT Devices

Microsoft catches Russian state hackers using loT devices to breach networks arstechnica



cnet.com

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Latest Mirai variant targets routers and other IoT devices using 13 exploits

Your smart air conditioner could help bring down the power grid Hacked appliances could overwhelm the grid, researchers say.

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A 100,000-router botnet is feeding on a 5-year-old UPnP bug in Broadcom chips arstechnica







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IoT Threats – Vulnerable Device







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KalKi: High Assurance Software-Defined IoT Security Platform

Solution: Move Security Enforcement to the Network

Create an IoT security platform highly resilient to a collection of prescribed threats

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Enables the integration of IoT devices into DoD networks

The term "KalKi" is of Sanskrit origin, and it is the name of an avatar of the god Vishnu, the destroyer of filth and bringer of purity, truth and trust.

Protects the networks even if the IoT devices are not fully trusted or configurable

Static Firewalls

- Are not device-specific



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Limitations of Existing Systems

Gateways/Firewalls Can become compromised

Research Review 2019 Software-Defined Aspect

Use software-defined networking (SDN) and network function virtualization (NFV) to create a highly dynamic IoT security platform.



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Each IoT device, D, senses/controls a set of environment variables, EV.

Network traffic to/from each device is tunneled through µmboxes that implement the desired network defense for the device's current security state. $\mu mbox[SS_1] = Firewall$ $\mu mbox[SS_2] = IPS, ...$

loT controller maintains a shared statespace composed of {EV} and security state (SS) for each device. SS = {Normal, Suspicious, Attack}

Changes in the shared statespace are evaluated by policies and may result in the deployment of new µmboxes.

High Assurance Aspect

Incrementally develop and verify security properties of elements of the softwaredefined IoT security platform using überSpark/überXMHF, a framework for building secure software stacks.

Control Node Properties

 Policy data integrity, including security state machine

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Data Node Properties

 µmbox image storage integrity
µmbox deploy-time integrity, including integrity of data flow definition

Year 1 Accomplishments



Initial Threat Model to guide development

Policy Model to set conditions to change security state, and actions to be taken

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Initial Architecture and prototype of the IoT Security Platform



FUNCy Views (Secure) system architecture: hardware-assisted, low-latency, low-TCB, compartmentalization of legacy code on x86 platforms



Initial Dashboard to configure system

Year 2 Accomplishments



IoT Security Platform prototype full development

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Dashboard Update



Creation of Policies and µmboxes for four representative IoT devices



Experiment to Test different scenarios and red team attacks



Extension of überXMHF and überSpark to include überObject protections for sensitive areas of the Control node and Data node

Year 2 Accomplishments – IoT Security Platform Prototype



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- Able to monitor devicespecific vulnerabilities
- Supports different policies for each security state
 - Runs on commodity hardware/software

IoT Security Platform prototype implemented (software-defined part)

Year 2 Accomplishments – Dashboard Update

Real-time monitoring of security state, easy configuration of security policies

Carnegie Mellon University Kalki Dashboard				Home		
UNTS						
Udoo NeoType:Udoo NeoIP Address:10.27.151.101Tags:			Security State: No Group: N /			
Alert History	Status History	Alert Conditions	State Tra	ansitions Reference	umBox Instances	
Refresh C Show 10	entries		•	Attributes		
Sep 13th 19, 9:40:36 am				accelerometerX: 0.0136639999999999 accelerometerY: -0.040504 accelerometerZ: -0.98576 gyroscopeX: 1.75 gyroscopeY: 0.8125 gyroscopeZ: 0.25 magnetometerX: 59.6 magnetometerY: 115.5 magnetometerZ: 53.9000000000000000000000000000000000000		
Sep 13th 19, 9:40:26 am				accelerometerX: 0.010003999999999 accelerometerY: -0.041968 accelerometerZ: -0.995764 gyroscopeX: 2.1875 gyroscopeY: 0.625 gyroscopeZ: -0.1875 magnetometerX: 67.3 magnetometerY: 115.5 magnetometerZ: 40.7 tempinput: 0.0 tempmax: 0.0 tempmax_hyst: 0.0		

Showing 1 to 2 of 2 entries

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FUNCy View DB Management State Reset	KalkiD	ashboard	Home
	Device List Show 10 entries		
	Device	Security State	Latest Alert
Search:	DLC	Normal	no alert history
	Kalki	Normal	no alert history
	PHLE	Normal	no alert history
	UNTS	Normal	unts-acceleration
	Showing 1 to 4 of 4 en	tries	
revious 1 Next			

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Year 2 Accomplishments – Policies and µmboxes Creation of policies and µmboxes for four representative IoT devices

Smart Plug



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Temperature Sensor



IP Camera





Smart Light





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Year 2 Accomplishments – Experiment + Red Team Attacks

Executed multiple test scenarios to measure:

Resiliency to attacks

• Performance (time to react to threats)

 Scalability (effect of the number of devices in performance)

Year 2 Accomplishments – überXMHF Extensions



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Added support to protect state machines using überObjects via FUNCy views

- Verified, lightweight micro-hypervisor protects resource access
- Unauthorized applications can't access State Machines encapsulated as überObjects

Year 3 – Next Steps

- and adoption
 - (LCDR Jeff Greenwald)
 - University

• Final platform development and optimizations - Integrate überXMHF security properties into prototype - Simplify integration of new devices and policies - Increase performance and reduce resource utilization

- Establishing contacts with organizations leading IoT projects, including US Army Research Office (Durham), USAF Office of Scientific Research (Arlington), and Purdue

Publication of results and open source release of platform code

- Transition activities identify transition partners for validation, testing,
 - Working with CMU liaisons for Navy (LCDR Christopher Lueken) and Marine Corps

Looking Ahead



- Full platform tested with realistic IoT deployments
- Results published

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Platform adapted and integrated into existing DoD networks

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protections



• Al techniques developed to automate and improve security policies and

KalKi IoT Security Platform - Summary Enables the secure integration of loT devices into DoD networks even though they are not fully trusted



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- Has flexible policies to define states, transitions and actions
- Reacts using network and environment information
- Uses different network defenses for each device and state
- Adapts to device-specific vulnerabilities or limitations
- Secures critical areas through integration with überSpark /überXMHF

Kalki Team

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