



Translational Research

at the USMC Center for Advanced Operational Culture Learning

FOREIGN MILITARY CULTURE WHITE PAPER

By Blagovest Tashev PhD, Translational Research Group, CAOCL
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INTRODUCTION

How to Use this Publication

Conducting missions with foreign militaries is challenging as differences in structure, language, culture, and equipment create friction points in an already complex operational environment. Even when two foreign militaries have similar structures, tactics, and materiel, many non-quantifiable, cultural elements – such as morale, unit cohesion, and leadership – affect how they act and interfere with understanding, cooperation and the ability to act jointly. This problem is greatly compounded when the foreign military is an actual or potential opponent, and direct observation of and interaction with that force as a means of understanding how it behaves is impossible.

This publication will not attempt to answer the question of how these cultural elements influence the behavior of a foreign military. Instead it provides Marines with a foundation to help them understand the military culture of foreign countries. It also provides a common set of considerations and vocabulary in the exploration of military culture. This publication helps Marines create a mental map for navigating the complexities of a foreign military culture. Successfully constructed, this mental map should enable Marines to better understand foreign military organizations and their personnel and increase mission effectiveness.

This publication does not introduce an analytical framework capable of predicting the behavior of a military organization; how a military organization behaves is determined not only by intangibles like culture but also by material factors. Nevertheless, military culture adds another dimension to the process of gaining understanding of foreign military organizations.

This publication is intended to guide the inquiry into military organizations that are recognized as formal institutions – organizations that are associated with recognized states. It is not intended to provide insights into the culture of any other types of organizations for collective violence, e.g., militias or terrorist groups.

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CAOCL Government Contact: 703-432-1504, CAOCLadmin@usmc.mil
Lead Researcher: Blagovest Tashev, 703-432-1504, btashev@prosol1.com

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Outline of the Publication

This publication introduces five sets of factors that help to gain insights into any military culture, including: 1) Strategic culture; 2) National security system; 3) Civil-military relations; 4) Organizational culture; and 5) Military sub-cultures. Each set of factors represents an aspect of military culture. The first three sets of factors provide an essential context without which understanding military culture is very difficult. They illustrate the issues and factors that shape the culture of a military organization, and also point out how this organization interacts with other institutions and in the process affects each other's cultures. The last two sets of factors directly address the culture of the military organization and its personnel. Each factor in the sets is followed by a set of questions and sub-questions designed to guide Marines and curriculum developers to gather relevant information needed to gain understanding of the respective factor and the larger aspect of military culture.

The operational relevance of some the questions may not be apparent on first reading. However, the accumulation of answers makes it possible to construct a more holistic assessment of military culture or to identify the significance of a particular aspect of it.

What is Military Culture?

There are a great number of intangible factors that account for how a military organization recruits, trains, learns, endures, overcomes, adapts, fights, and perceives the world and itself. According to MCDP- 1, *Warfighting*, "war is shaped by human nature and is subject to the complexities, inconsistencies, and peculiarities which characterize human behavior."¹ This is "the human dimension which infuses war with its intangible moral factors."² This publication deals with the subset of intangibles related to military culture. The military culture of a nation is a set of complex, ever-changing and interconnected historical, environmental, organizational, group, and psychological factors that shape the perceptions, motives, and behavior of a military organization and its members.³

In a publication intended to be used by practitioners, it is not practical to provide definitions of social science terms and concepts - there are a great number of attempts to define culture, for example. What matters is how concepts used in social science are useful in gaining understanding of a social phenomenon, in this case military culture.

Why is Military Culture Important?

According to *Warfighting*, "morale, fighting spirit, perseverance, or the role of leadership," although wholly intangible, are central in war. Like the tangible factors, including physical terrain and materiel, a foreign military culture is an element of the operational environment which creates both opportunities and challenges for

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Marines. Understanding the military culture of a foreign country may not necessarily help predict the behavior of its armed forces; rather it provides insights into a range of possible and probable. Thus, knowing the culture of a foreign military will enable Marines to enhance their mission effectiveness.

Although the history of warfare suggests that military culture matters a great deal on the battlefields, there is very little systematic study investigating why this is so. There are disparate efforts investigating the effect of doctrine, or cohesiveness, or leadership, etc., but very limited attempts at bringing together various cultural aspects of the military organization and studying their impact.

How Do We Get to Know a Military Culture?

Military culture displays both persistent and dynamic tendencies. As with any culture, military culture has persistent values, organization, and functions that endure over extended time. Concurrently, military culture changes in response to variations in the state and society, the impact of war, the role of leadership, the advance of technology, and aggregations of changes in individual thought and behavior. Understanding another military culture requires that Marines and curriculum developers capture both the persistent and dynamic tendencies. These tendencies are not "states." They are trends that require human action - cultural patterns do not persist unless people think and act in ways that maintain them. Understanding the human action to maintain or change the patterns of a military culture requires historical perspectives, collection and analysis of current information, and observation of ongoing interactions with the other military.

How does one get this knowledge and information? Some of it is already widely available in open sources.⁴ There are many national level history books that provide information on the role of the military in the history of the country; they outline the traditional functional role of the military organization, how it has performed in various conflicts, how it sees itself in the life of the nation, and what its relationship is with the society and the state. This body of knowledge also describes military values, what the organization measures itself against, and what it sees as its traditional allies and enemies, both internal and external. Furthermore, journal and news articles can provide a more contemporary snapshot of the organization's doctrine and formal missions, its attitudes, self-image, and relationship with society and state institutions. In many cases, however, information may be simply unavailable particularly in regard to a specific unit with whom Marines are interacting. In these cases, the Marines will have to gather it through observation of the foreign force and asking their counterparts questions while working with them.

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As this publication will discuss below, Marines are not interacting with a foreign unit that shares a uniform culture with all the other units in that same military. Rather, each unit has its unique subculture, sometimes very distinct from the subcultures of other units and from the prevailing culture of the entire military organization (special forces vs. infantry vs. support units for example). While interacting, Marines must figure out on their own what the actual culture of the unit is and what aspects are most relevant to the mission. In this case, observation and asking the right questions go a long way. When analyzing a potential military foe, direct observation and interaction as a means of gaining information and understanding is, of course, much more difficult.

There is no single approach to gaining complete understanding of a foreign military culture short of being part of the military organization. Interaction with any foreign military poses unique challenges including among others the length of interaction, the available planning time, the characteristics of the foreign military, and the purpose of the interaction. This publication provides selected information categories that can assist Marines gain understanding of a foreign military culture. It provides guidelines for collecting and analyzing information, asking pertinent questions, and observing behavior relevant to a foreign military's numerous intangibles that define its culture.

Mirror imaging is a constant hazard; when Marines are about to interact with a foreign military force it is all too easy to assume that the foreign military is fundamentally organized like their own, basically functions like themselves, and its military personnel's values and motivations are similar to their own. But then the actual interaction with the foreign force often leads to numerous friction points and accordingly to frustration and sometimes anger on both sides. Military forces from different countries find it hard to work together despite their pledge to a common mission. Having the right information and knowledge of the cultural influences that may be impacting the behavior of the other force is a first step in overcoming friction points. It may also assist Marines identify areas of similarity or resonance that can help them build rapport and relationships. The relationships help both sides through challenges that arise due to the inevitable occasional cross-cultural missteps.

Although militaries do often have similar structures and functions, there are also significant differences that account for starkly different behaviors. Having an open mind and suspending judgment in the process of getting to know a foreign military also go a long way. For example, in the US, the military is seen as the defender of the Nation against external enemies while under civilian control and oversight. Other militaries may have more extended functions, including as defenders of the ruling elite, overseers of internal order, even direct governing. These functions, very foreign to the American military, require and create very different values, attitudes, and behaviors among military personnel; in other words they require very different culture. In addition, even in countries where

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military structure and functions are similar to those in the US, unless the defense organizations operate in societies with attitudes and values similar to those of American society, military culture will be different. For example, a foreign military culture may have a very different understanding of what represents a legitimate and proportional use of force based on a very specific societal level view of what is just and proportional.

Not Only About External Defense

Until recently the military of Turkey had traditionally seen itself not only as the defender of the country against external enemies but also as the guardian of the secular and republican nature of the state. Following deep political and economic crises, the military staged coup d'état three times - in 1960, 1971, and again in 1980 - against democratically elected governments. Even when not directly ruling the country, the military has exerted influence behind the scenes in the name of maintaining stability in the country. It was a role which, not only the military but also many Turks used to see as legitimate and welcome.

STRATEGIC CULTURE

If strategy refers to the way a state uses the instruments at its disposal, including military power, in the pursuit of its interests, a strategic culture approach helps unpack how cultural context shapes a state's interests, preferences and choices. The strategic culture of each state is unique.⁵ The United States is a large and powerful country with global political and economic interests, protected by two oceans from other large countries, while experiencing no civil war or war with its neighbors in more than a century. These factors, among others, breed and sustain a particular strategic culture that is very different from the strategic cultures of other states. Strategic culture has a very important impact on the military, its structure, what it does, and how it does it. The American military has few functions that involve maintaining internal order and stability, and is usually deployed to defend national interests globally. This requires the ability to quickly deploy forces, of various sizes, to any location, and is, in fact, one of the explanations for the existence and the functions of the Marine Corps - a self-sustaining expeditionary force capable of deploying anywhere in the world very

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fast. This also partially explains why many other countries do not have, and do not need, a force similar to the Marine Corps.

Identity

Identity is a term describing how people perceive themselves and other people. Groups of people, societies, and nations have identities, including ethnic, racial, religious, and national. Identity has security dimensions.⁶ For example, one identity is frequently defined in opposition to another identity. Nations have emerged, endured, and sometimes disappeared as result of struggles between groups with different identities. These conflicts have enduring effects as memories of past struggles frequently dominate how groups and states view other groups and states. Identities have an impact on the dynamics of contemporary relations between groups and states.

Societies and states have historically determined notions about their traditional friends and foes among other societies and states. Accordingly, the state uses all tools at its disposal, including the military, to manage relations with other states. In other words, the military's functions are influenced by the security dimensions of the dominant national identity. In addition, military personnel, as part of society, have already internalized the main narratives and outlooks of the national identity, a process which the military frequently reinforces through training and education.

Different identities may pit against each other not only two states, but also groups within the same state. Groups within a state may not share the same identity and may have a history of conflicts. In this case, the dominant group in the state may perceive the other group, or groups, as the most significant threat to the state. Accordingly, the military may be expected to not only provide defense against external threats but also to assure the security of the dominant group against internal challenges posed by other groups in the state. In other words, the military may be tasked with a significant internal security function.

The impact of conflict on identity should not be overstated. There are numerous other factors that significantly influence identity - physical environment, for example. The point is that there is a complex interplay between identity and conflict that has significant implications, including the possible scope and intensity of potential conflicts between different groups or states, the various second and third effects conflicts can have on identities, and militaries' perceptions of their foes' intentions and motives, among others.

Questions to consider:

- Did the state emerge while in a struggle with other political entities (colonial power, empire, dominant state)?

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- Does the state incorporate in its symbols, national narratives, and education system, any memories and histories of fights that took place during the formative years of the state?
 - Who are the foes in these national struggles?
 - Are the current foes the same as those during the formative years of the state?
 - How much of the formative years' struggles are depicted in the national narratives, education, arts?
- Is the national identity explicitly formed as a rejection of another state or a group of people?
- Is any other state seen as having provided help in the formative years of the nation?
- Is there a single national identity or are there multiple groups holding different national identities in the state?
 - Are these conflicting identities?
 - Is there a history of violent conflict between these groups?
- Is there a group in the state, which does not share the national identity and would like to either break up the state or join another state?
- Are there any groups which have identities that are incompatible with the prevailing national identity?
 - Have these groups been in conflict in the past?
 - Are these conflicts capable of breaking the state?

National Interests

Nations have perceptions about themselves and about their place in the international system. These perceptions heavily influence national interests – what the states want the international system to look like, what they value, and what they want to achieve. The military is one of the instruments in the attainment of national interests.

States either accept the fundamental order of the international and regional system or they reject it. In both cases this may be overt or concealed. The first group of states sees the existing order, however imperfect, as good and seeks to maintain it, sometimes using military force. These states are also called status quo states. The second group of states sees the regional and international order as unjust, stacked against their national interests, and depending on their national capabilities, works to undermine it and create a different one. These states are also called revisionist states. There are various reasons states may want to change the existing order. A state may see its international borders as unjust, claiming a territory and people in other states as its own. It is then in this state's national interest to seek a change to international borders. A state may espouse an ideology and declare the spread of this ideology to other states in its national interest. This state then may actively support groups in other countries that espouse the same ideology, including with material and military assistance.

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States are usually open about their national interests. National security strategies, white papers, speeches by leading politicians and government officials frequently enumerate national interests. National interests vary in their importance and scope. They can range from spreading democracy to other countries, to maintaining access to natural resources and international trade, to maintaining international and internal stability and peace, to keeping good relations with neighboring countries. National interests related to security and defense are usually defined as vital and states go to great lengths to ensure that the missions of the national militaries promote those interests. Therefore, identifying those national interests of a country is a good first step in understanding the potential role and missions of its military.

Questions to consider:

- What has the state identified as its vital interests and long-term goals in official documents, including in:
 - constitution and laws;
 - national security strategy;
 - national defense doctrine, and national defense strategy?
- What have prominent political figures or other key influencers identified as the state's vital interests and goals in official and informal statements? Are they different from the ones identified in official documents?
- Does the state see the international/regional system as fundamentally just or unjust?
- Is the state a status-quo or a revisionist state: does the state seek to preserve the existing regional/international order or change it?
 - Are there official documents and positions calling for change to regional borders?
 - Are there official documents calling for the end of another power's presence in the region?
 - Are there official documents calling for changes to regional and/or international order?
- Does the state have a program/strategy to remake the international/regional system?
- Does the state have a history of trying to change the regional and international order?
- Does the state have a history of trying to enlarge its territory? At the expense of which neighboring states?
- Do the national interests tend to change according to changes in government, or do they remain relatively constant?
 - What changes in government lead to changes in national interests?
 - Are there any groups in the state that demand changes to the official national interests?

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The State's Outlook on International Relations and Conflict

States have markedly different views of the nature of the international system and how it works. Some states subscribe to the view that the international environment is inherently conflict and violence prone, war is the rule, and its absence is the exception. Other states believe that the international system is relatively ordered, predictable, and peaceful; violent conflict is the exception that must be managed collectively by the international community. The former states see cooperation as a zero-sum game, in which either you win or lose from cooperation.⁷ The latter states view cooperation as a win-win process, in which all states gain from cooperation. The outlook of most states falls in between these two extreme views. Different outlooks lead to differences in how states view the roles of their militaries, and accordingly, to differences in doctrines, missions, and training. States that have little faith in the international institutions and cooperation see the military organization as the only reliable guarantee of national security, while other states see the military as but one of many instruments to face threats.

Questions to consider:

- How does the state view the nature of the international system, ranging from chaotic and violent to inherently harmonious and peaceful?
- Does the state see relations with other states as a zero-sum game or a win-win game?
- Does the nation see cooperation as possible-but-temporary or desirable-and-mutually beneficial?
- Does the state have disputes with other states?
 - Are these disputes handled exclusively through diplomacy and international law?
 - Is the state making references to possible use of force in disputes with other states?
- Does the state see wars as unavoidable, matter of time events or aberrations which can be further limited?
- Does the state see military power as the ultimate guarantee for national security or does the state see the expansion of international organizations and law as the ultimate solution to interstate wars?
- Does the state seek to further its interests through participation in international institutions (formal alliances; political and economic organizations; international treaties), or does the state take part in very limited number of international institutions?
- Is the state a party to all important international treaties (disarmament, non-proliferation, international criminal court, etc)?
- Are any international institutions using sanctions to force the state in compliance with international law? Does the state have a history

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of not complying with international law and subverting international sanctions?

- Do national leaders, including those not in power, make frequent references to the possibility of using force in defense of national interests and in disputes with other states?

State's View on Legitimacy of Violence

States have different views on what legitimate violence is. Some states, as pointed out previously, view the international system as inherently violent and are, accordingly, relatively quick to resort to violence to solve conflicts. The same states are also more prone to use violence to address internal conflicts, including against groups within the state vying for power or dominance.

Other states view the use of force as a tool of last resort, applied after all other means to solve the conflict have been exhausted. The same states also tend not to use the military against groups within the state. In other words, the military is used only against external threats and almost never against internal threats or challenges.

States also differ on how military force can be used in international conflicts. Some states believe that any use of force must not only formally comply with international law, but also requires the explicit approval of international institutions, particularly the United Nations. Other states, while not rejecting the requirements of international rules and norms, do not submit to the need to obtain an explicit endorsement of international institutions before deciding to use military force.

Questions to consider:

- Has the state in the past used military force against internal challenges, including insurgencies, political groups, and groups with identities different from the dominant identity?
- Has the state traditionally used military force only against external threats?
- Has the state sought in the past legal sanction and support from international organizations before the use of military force against external threats?
- Has the state used violence against external enemies despite an explicit international resolution prohibiting the action?
- Has the state used violence against internal enemies despite an explicit international resolution prohibiting the action?

State's View of its Place in the International Security Environment

What the state can achieve in the international system and how it goes about achieving it, depends on the state's power - including

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political, military, economic, and demographic power. The state's power is always relative. States assess their power by comparing their own power to the powers of other states - in the region or globally. This relative power defines how the state goes about achieving security. Relatively less powerful states, unable to accumulate more power from internal sources, seek alliances and membership in international institutions as a way to achieve security. Relatively more powerful states, while not neglecting the assistance of alliances and international institutions, can also rely more on their own power to achieve security. These conceptually different approaches lead to different roles for the military organization. How the state uses the sources of its power - military, economic, political, etc. - depends on its assessment of their relative strength as compared to those of other states. In general, states with greater military strength tend to have more military options in the exercise of power compared to less powerful states. As pointed out earlier, however, the process of defining a state's policies and options is not only about tangible assets; it is also fundamentally cultural.

Questions to consider:

- Does the state see itself as a big or small state in relation to other states - regionally or globally?
- Does the state see itself as having a regional or a global reach?
- How does the state's relative power affect the role of the military? Does its relative power make the state more prone to use the military in international conflicts?
- How does the state's relative power affect the mission of the military?
- How does the state's relative power affect its military's posture?
- Does the military have an expeditionary mindset and capabilities?

NATIONAL SECURITY SYSTEM

The military organization is a part of the state's national security system in which various other institutions - police, courts, intelligence agencies, etc. - have their own place and functions. Every state's security system is uniquely determined by constitution, strategic culture, politics, and mission. The national security system seeks to address both internal and external threats to the state. How those threats are defined depends on the security environment and the nature of the political system.

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Structure of the National Security System

Analyzing the nature of the national security system not only identifies what the military's role is, it also provides insights into the state's views of security and defense. Some states perceive intense security threats and uncertainty, and accordingly their security sector, including the military, is relatively larger than those of states who perceive a more benign security environment. In other words, the size and structure of the security system reflects the nature and extent of security perceptions in the state. How, or whether, these perceptions are translated into security and defense policies, will be addressed in the next section of the publication.

Security Environment Matters

Compare how much Israel and Austria, two prosperous and democratic states, spent on defense in the 2000-2010 period. Situated in a dangerous, conflict-prone region, every year Israel spent between 6.5% and 9.6% of its Gross Domestic Product on defense. Austria, surrounded by other democratic and prosperous states, which pose no threat to its security, never spent more than 1% of its GDP on defense each year in the same period.

Identifying the nature and structure of the national security system is an important step in understanding the role and culture of the national military. Militaries tasked to address external threats face various barriers to involvement in domestic functions. On the other hand, militaries tasked to face external and internal threats, promote a culture in the ranks which views the institution as an essential instrument not only in external defense, but in maintaining a particular political, social, and economic order in the state and society. Accordingly, the military considers itself as a player which, along with other institutions, defines and implements policies that sometimes have very little to do with defense functions. In a later section, it will be discussed how the military's more extensive functions, including domestic ones, lead to distinct civil-military relations.

Questions to consider:

- How is the national security system organized according to law?
- According to the formal structure of the security system, which institution has a leading role, including authority and mission?

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How does the military compare to other security institutions in the system?

- Is there a difference between formal and informal structure of the national security system? Do some security institutions seem to have informal roles not prescribed by law? What are those roles and how are they conferred?
- Which of the institutions in the security system gets the largest share of resources, including funding and manpower?
- How does the military compare to other security institutions in terms of resources?
- How does the formally prescribed role of the military in the security system affect the military's self-perceptions?

The Politics of National Security

The issues of national security and defense inevitably play out in national politics. How they play out, depends on numerous factors, including the nature of threats the country faces, strategic culture, political system, tradition, political personalities, and context. The politics of national security tend to be fluid and fast changing; much more so than strategic culture, for example. Thus, a view of the politics of national security provides a snapshot of how security and defense issues figure in the country's larger political life.

When a population has a heightened sense of insecurity, the issues of national security become more prominent in the political life of the country. State institutions, political parties, organized groups, and citizens then tend to pay more attention to the functions of the institutions of the national security system, including the military. It also gives these institutions more opportunities to influence public debates about security policies, budgets, and resources. Conversely, when the public and political players perceive a more benign security environment, security and defense issues tend to lose prominence in the country's political conversation. This does not mean national security ceases to be part of politics. Rather, it means it is handled in a more routine manner.

National security can be a powerful factor in mobilizing the public, and political leaders often use it to mobilize constituents for action. Even when there is no change in the security environment, leaders can influence the public's security perceptions in order to attain political goals. In other words, changes in narratives about national security may have very little to do with national security but rather with other political issues.

Questions to consider:

- Is national security a priority issue in national politics? Does the public take a heightened interest in the issue? How do state institutions and political players (government, parliament, presidency, political parties, interest groups, etc.) use the

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issues of national security to gain political advantage and deal with each other and the public?

- How do issues of national security affect the political process in the country in different contexts during security crisis and non-crisis periods?
- Do security crises (external or internal) pose a challenge to the established relationships between national and political institutions?

CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS

Civil-military relations are about the relationship of a country's military with the state and the society. The importance of civil-military relations stems from a simple paradox - the very institution created to protect the state and society has sufficient power to become a threat to them.⁸ When the military surveys the security environment it sees threats, both external and internal, and accordingly plans for conflict and demands resources from the state. The civilians, however, may have a different reading of the security environment. In addition, even the population and civilian institutions may be internally divided on what constitute threats to the state and the public, and how those threats should be addressed. These differences - between the military and the state, and among the public - lead to frictions. How these frictions play out and are handled is the content of civil-military relations.

Relations Between Military and State

Fearing the military's insubordination to civilian institutions and intervention in politics, states implement various policies to maintain control and oversight over the armed forces. In addition to instituting legal impediments to intervention in politics, the state designs structural barriers to the military's political activism. For example, the state, while maintaining the military's strength to face external challenges, may divide the forces into service branches with very distinct functions while encouraging rivalries among them. The state leadership may also create separate armed forces - national guard, border police, paramilitary forces, and militias - and discourage their interaction with the military, thus dispersing the means of violence in the security system. The state also may empower secret service agencies or a party organization to penetrate the military and prevent it from acting independently.⁹

State policies designed to bring the military under civilian control and oversight, designed to eliminate its ability to intervene in politics, can interfere with the armed forces' function to prepare and fight effectively. This is a problem recognized by the state. Therefore, some states put their efforts in curtailing the military's disposition to intervene in politics. Accordingly, states and

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militaries, especially in Western societies, consider the notion of military professionalism to be inconsistent with the military's involvement in politics. Some states and militaries deliberately cultivate the officer corps' staying out of politics as a value and encourage both the military and the public to prize it.

Yet, military intervention in politics occurs frequently, but to varying degrees, even in democracies. In one extreme, a military may see itself as the only functioning institution amid failing state and political institutions, and accordingly may feel compelled to intervene and restore order; thus a coup d'état. Even short of coup d'état, militaries are still capable of exerting great influence over politics and society, and of displaying independent behavior. In some countries militaries see themselves as institutions entrusted not only with protecting the state from external threats, but also with maintaining a particular political, social, and economic order, without necessarily having to directly govern the country.¹⁰

Another important dynamic in civil-military relations is the role of the political order in the states. Civil-military relations in democracies are distinctly different from civil-military relations in non-democracies. In democracies, the militaries are generally under civilian and democratic control and oversight; the militaries accept their subordination to civilian authorities. This particular relationship has numerous important consequences. In general, these militaries are easier to study and analyze as the democratic form of government promotes more transparency and accountability in defense policies. The government and the military make public strategies, policies, doctrines, missions, plans, budgets, and other information that reveals what the military does and how it does it. It is also easier to find out how the military interacts with other institutions.

In non-democracies - various forms of government including communist, military junta, authoritarian, etc. - civil-military relations are more diverse in form and content, depending on the state's political system. Non-democracies are capable of exerting effective civilian, although not democratic, control and oversight over the military. They can also have a very limited control over what the military does; the military can be the strongest institution in the states, unwilling to submit to civilian control. And of course, the military in some countries is in direct control of the state - so called military regimes, or juntas.

Non-democratic forms of government have important consequences for defense policies. Above all, the military and its relations with the state are more difficult to study and analyze as less information is made public. Defense policies and institutions are generally less transparent and accountable than those in democracies. Strategies, policies, doctrines, budgets, plans are not readily available, and even when made public are less forthcoming. In a non-democratic state, politics in general are less transparent, making it difficult to discern the politics of national security. It is hard to find out what the essential relationships are between the military and the other state and political institutions. Such environment also breeds a

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military culture that discourages critical thinking, openness, and communication among personnel.

The lack of democracy can also enable a country's leadership to abuse its authority over the military. The lack of rule of law and the absence of check and balances can allow the leadership to employ the military for what is politically expedient. Of course, the same lack of factors, also make it possible for the military to intervene in politics and even overthrow those in power.

Questions to consider:

- What type of political system does the country have, ranging among:
 - democratic;
 - weak democratic system;
 - authoritarian;
 - one party rule;
 - military rule;
 - strongman;
 - communist?
- How does the country's political system affect relations between the military and the state?
- Does the country have civilian and democratic control and oversight over the military? To what degree? In control and oversight of the armed forces, what are the roles of:
 - executive power;
 - legislative power;
 - national courts;
 - non-governmental organizations?
- If there is no democratic civil-military relations, who is in control of the military? How is this control exercised?
- How do relations between the military and the state influence the effectiveness of the military organization?
- Does the military perceive excessive interference from civilian leadership beyond regular control and oversight? How does that affect the functions of the military?
- Does the military have a history of intervening in national politics? What is the extent of this intervention (ranging from high level of intervention to no intervention), including:
 - coup d'état;
 - insubordination and maintaining autonomy from government over a wide range of defense issues;
 - influencing national policies beyond defense issues, including political, economic, and social ones;
 - dominance over the process of strategy, planning, and budgets;
 - the government and the armed forces have an equal share of influence in formulating defense policies; the armed forces are apolitical and stay out of non-defense policy issues;

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- o lack of engagement in national politics - the military is apolitical and civilian authority has full control over all defense issues, while limiting the military's input?
- Who prevails when there is a dispute - the military or the civilian authority:
 - o during armed conflict;
 - o during peacetime?
- How transparent is the military, including in:
 - o formulating defense policies;
 - o defining missions;
 - o budgeting;
 - o expenditures;
 - o procurement;
 - o strategy, doctrine, white papers, etc.?
- Is there a single institution that exercises control and oversight over the military or are there multiple institutions (executive branch, legislative branch, judicial branch, etc)?

Relations Between Military and Society

The relationship between the state and the military may seem more important than between the military and society as it directly influences the functions of the armed forces.¹¹ However, in some states, relations between the military and society have a significant impact on what the armed forces do and how they do it. One of the most important questions is how representative is the military of the society. Militaries that mirror the society in terms of demographic makeup, including race, ethnicity, gender, class, region, religion, etc., tend to develop a closer relationship with the population. In contrast, militaries that recruit from a more limited social strata - from a particular ethnic group, for instance - tend to develop a less extensive relationship with the society. The extent and intensity of the relationship between the military and society has significant consequences in terms of public support for the military's functions, continuing sourcing, the ability of the state to mobilize citizens into the armed forces, the legitimacy of the military's participation in domestic affairs, and in general the legitimacy of the military as a state institution. Of course, one should analyze the military's demographic makeup in its proper context. All-voluntary militaries rely on the citizens' willingness to join, while conscript militaries may have an easier time achieving a makeup that closely mirrors the national demographics.

The distance between the public and the military - physical, psychological, ethical - is like no other between the civilian population and any other state institution. It ranges on a continuum from almost complete insulation of the armed forces from the society to almost complete integration within the society. Some militaries isolate their personnel from the society, requiring them to live on

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bases some distance from population areas, granting few liberty passes, and giving military leaders at all levels extensive authority over what and how their subordinates serve and live. Other militaries seek to maintain their personnel's connections with society, including by encouraging them to live off base and associate with civilian networks. In between these two extremes there are ranges of policies that lead to discrete relationships between militaries and societies.

Questions to consider:

- How representative of the demographic makeup of society is the military in terms of:
 - race;
 - ethnicity;
 - tribe/clan;
 - language;
 - religion;
 - geography;
 - economic status;
 - education;
 - gender;
 - political affiliation?
- What causes discrepancies between the demographic makeup of the military and society?
 - Is the state's leadership imposing a particular demographic makeup in the military that tends to change with change in leadership?
 - Is the nature of military recruitment (volunteer vs. draft) imposing a certain demographic makeup in the military?
- How is the military's demographic makeup affecting relations between the military and society?
- How do the public and the military view each other?
 - What is the public support of the military profession?
 - Does the public view the military as defenders of the nation or an instrument of state's leadership?
 - Is the public supportive of defense expenditures?
 - Is the public supportive of the military's functions?
 - Do they trust each other?
 - Are there different social sectors or groups that differ from the prevailing view(s)?
- How isolated is the military from society?
 - Are military personnel forced to live on base?
 - Are military bases isolated from population centers?
 - What is the liberty pass policy? Does it limit regular interaction with civilians?

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ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE

The military culture in any state is different, to varying degrees, from the prevailing cultures in society. The military organization has a structure that can be unlike any other in the state, with distinct norms, beliefs and content.¹² At the same time, the military can be a powerful instrument in changing the culture of those joining its ranks. In fact, in many cases, the beliefs, and behavior of military personnel may be inconsistent with those prevailing in society at large. Steep hierarchy, strict discipline, and readiness to self-sacrifice for the mission or a brother-in-arms in the armed forces are sometimes quite incompatible with the individualism and self-indulgence found in some societies. Of course, military organizations have varying ability, or willingness, to change the culture of recruits. Some militaries are apprehensive of changing the culture of personnel so much that there emerges a large gulf between society and armed forces in terms of beliefs and behavior. Such a gulf is believed to create unacceptable frictions between the military on the one hand, and the society and state on the other. Other states, however, place functional requirements above all else and do not fear cultivating a military culture that is very different from the society's.

These two alternative approaches, with many variations in between, lead to distinct organizations, doctrines, missions, training, education, and personnel culture. The point is that the military organization and the society in which it functions are often different in their cultural patterns, and the differences arise from a variety of sources.

Military's Mission

Mission is the task, or tasks, the military is ordered to do. In a democracy, it is expected that the military is ready to perform missions that are explicitly defined and transparent. In other countries, however, the military, in addition to the formally defined tasks, may be ordered to complete tasks that are not publicly declared; suppressing internal dissent, for instance, may not be a formal mission of the military, but one that the military may be called upon to complete when national leadership sees no other ways to assure its survival. Some countries task their militaries with additional functions, including the promotion of economic development, education of the youth, social assistance, and disaster response.¹³ In other countries, however, the leadership may in fact prevent the military from conducting its mission; the leaders may fear the military and see it as a potential threat to existing order.

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Fearing the Military

Nicolae Ceausescu, the leader of communist Romania during the Cold War, fearing the national military might challenge his hold on power, intentionally kept the military weak, and instead relied on the party apparatus and the secret service agencies to stay in power. This policy decreased the military's ability to challenge Ceausescu for a long time, but also negatively affected its warfighting functions.

More recently, Libya's strongman Muammar Qaddafi perceived the national armed forces as a potential threat to his rule and intentionally kept the institution relatively weak. Instead he relied on clan loyalties to stay in power. Facing a popular uprising supported by NATO airstrikes, Qaddafi relied on mercenaries rather than the national military in his attempt to put down the revolt.

Many countries are not explicit about the full range of their militaries' missions. Marines need to identify not only the formal, but also the informal missions of the foreign military. Thus one needs to look at variety of sources to discern what the probable missions may be, including formal documents, history of warfare, history of the military's intervention in politics, history of the military's participation in the nation's life, etc. The military's mission has significant implications for its culture. It shapes how the military trains, what it expects from its personnel, what types of qualities and skills it attempts to instill among its members, and how it sees its environment. The mission provides its personnel a shared sense of purpose.

When identifying the military's missions, one should look beyond what are considered to be strictly military missions. Many militaries see themselves not only as warfighting organizations but also as national institutions called upon to preserve the nation's purpose and values. In the context of weak institutional environments, the military may perceive itself to be the only stable institution capable of preserving the cultural traits that allow the nation to persevere. Accordingly, in many countries with weak, corrupt institutions, the military consistently enjoys high public approval and support.

Questions to consider:

- What are the formal missions of the military as identified in national security documents, including in:
 - national security strategy;

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- o defense strategy;
 - o defense doctrine;
 - o defense white papers, etc.?
- What are the missions of the military as identified in speeches, articles, and presentations by leading members of the ruling elite?
- What are the missions of the military according to formal and informal statements of members of the military leadership?
- What are the missions of the military as identified in speeches, articles, and presentations by leading members of the political elite which are not in power?
- Are there any missions the military is expected to perform that are not explicitly formulated as missions sets in security and defense documents, including:
 - o history of performing such missions;
 - o evidence of beliefs among military leadership and personnel about military missions which are not explicitly formulated in security and defense documents;
 - o beliefs and expectations among the country's leadership about possible military missions that are not explicitly formulated in security and defense documents?
- Does the military hold beliefs about its role in society and the state that may lead to actions (missions) not formulated in official documents?
- Is there a discrepancy between the formal missions of the military and what it trains and prepares for? Are there discrepancies between:
 - o formal missions and personnel training;
 - o formal missions and defense planning;
 - o formal missions and weapons and materiel acquisitions?
- What is the military's performance in current missions?
- How does mission performance affect the military's self-perception in:
 - o past missions;
 - o most recent missions?
- Has the military been on current missions for an extended period of time or are they relatively new? What prompted any change in missions, including:
 - o change in the leadership of the country;
 - o a significant process of foreign policy reorientation;
 - o significant changes in the country's international security environment;
 - o a process of significant defense reorganization and reform?
- If the military has a relatively new set of missions, is the military taking the right steps to align its structure, training, education, acquisition policies, and personnel policies with the new mission set?

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- If the military has a relatively new set of missions, how does the military perceive those missions?
- Is there evidence the country's leadership may prevent the military from conducting its formal and informal missions in certain contexts?

Doctrine

Doctrine provides guidance on how the military accomplishes its assigned missions. However, one must keep in mind that often formal doctrine is only a part of what can be defined as a military's warfighting philosophy. Marines are familiar with Doctrine and doctrine – the former including formal publications and the latter including both formal publications and Marines' informal understanding of warfighting philosophy. Therefore when one studies a foreign military's doctrine, one must look at what the military actually does and how it does it.

Doctrine reveals how a military thinks about and prepares for war. As Marines know very well from MCDP-1 *Warfighting*, doctrine is not about specific techniques or procedures, but rather about concepts and values guiding the services in their missions. Doctrine reveals how the military sees the world and place of conflict in it, how it sees the nature of war, how it prepares for war, and how the military organization prepares to face challenges and threats. In other words, it is supposed to reveal partially the culture of the organization and its personnel. However, one must keep in mind that different militaries have varying abilities to internalize and apply the philosophy of their doctrines; doctrine defines the standards, goals, and values the organization and personnel strive to attain, it does not define how good they are in achieving them.¹⁴ There are numerous other factors that affect these abilities; the military organization and its personnel may be torn between doctrinal requirements and prevailing cultural imperatives.

Questions to consider:

- What are the military's formal doctrinal publications?
- Does the military have informal publications that it considers part of its doctrine?
- What is the main philosophy in the military's doctrine?
 - How does the military see the nature of the international security environment?
 - How does the military see the nature of warfare?
 - Are there any references in the doctrine to enduring philosophical postulates about war (Clausewitz, Sun Tzu, etc.)?
 - How does the military prepare to fight and wage war?
 - Does doctrine identify any values and qualities that it sees essential in its personnel?

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- Is there congruence between the military's missions and doctrine? If not, what explains the discrepancy?
- Has the military had the doctrine for a long time or is it relatively new?
- What caused the adoption of latest version of doctrine, including:
 - change in security environment;
 - change in the country's foreign policy orientation;
 - change in the country's defense missions;
 - modernization and reform;
 - change in the country's leadership and consequent defense posture?
- Has the military adopted the requirements of its doctrine in organization, training, thinking, and beliefs?
 - Do personnel share the philosophy of the doctrine?
 - Are all members of the military organization expected to be familiar with doctrine or just certain ranks?
- How does doctrine affect the way the military fights? Does the military fight according to doctrine?
- If there is a discrepancy between doctrine and warfighting, what does seem to be the military's warfighting philosophy?
- How does doctrine deal with operations and functions other than warfighting?
- How does non-warfighting philosophy effects organization, training, thinking, and beliefs?

Values, Beliefs, Norms, and Important Narratives

The values, beliefs, norms, and important narratives - the belief system, in short - of military culture emerge partially in response to the need of military organizations to fight and win wars. In other words, there is an aspect of military culture that transcends time and national boundaries. At the same time, every military operates in a distinct historical, geographical, political, and social context and so develops a distinct cultural pattern of operation. Therefore, the culture of every military organization has a belief system that distinguishes its members from the members of any other military organization.

The military's belief system plays an important role by strengthening personnel's attachment to the institution and instilling in them a purpose which transcends individual self-interest in favor of a presumed higher good. It also contributes to the prevailing attitudes, assumptions, and expectations in the institution and shapes its behavior. In other words, the belief system serves as a standard for judgment as well as justification and motivation for action. Thus knowing the belief system of a military can make it easier to anticipate the military's range of probable behaviors and actions.

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Values, defined as the relative worth and importance attached to things, behavior, and states, differ in their relative importance across militaries. Some militaries may put a premium on the quality of initiative among its officers, while others rate initiative lower and instead train officers to follow a carefully planned sequence of steps in the execution of missions.¹⁵ The military values both a particular type of conduct (bravery and leadership, for example) and the attainment of end states (prevailing in battle and bringing everyone home, for example). Accordingly, it makes sure personnel share these institutional values by instilling and maintaining a particular belief system. Knowing how a value ranks in different contexts in a military's belief system provides insights into how intense various values are and how the military mobilizes those who share these values.¹⁶ Contexts matter. The military is likely to have competing and sometimes conflicting values and narratives. What value is mobilized depends on the context. For example, Marines value both discipline and initiative and tell stories about these values that may seem contradictory. It is the context that determines which of the two values takes precedence over the other. Above all, it is important to understand that values vary both across militaries and across contexts.

The military articulates a belief system, and after instilling it in its personnel, attempts to consistently reinforce it through formal and informal policies, norms, rituals, etc. This belief system appears in doctrine, statements about ethos, code of conduct, oath of office, etc. It is also seen in the military artifacts, including uniforms, unit and service patches, hats, colors, monuments, hymns, ceremonies, and rituals.

Every established military organization has a set of narratives - stories the organization shares about itself, others, and events. They provide insights into how the military sees its history, enemies, battles, and ultimately, its role. Narratives also provide insight into what the military values and wants to achieve in the short- and long-term, and are used to reinforce the identity of the organization and to mobilize members for action. Narratives are not necessarily about facts; instead they mix history, perceptions, facts, and myths. Nevertheless, they are a source of important insights as they reveal how a military organization perceives the past and its own role in it and how the past is used to explain current events and challenges the organization faces, and its role now and in the future. Narratives can also reveal what the military values and the foundations, especially the historical ones, of its belief system.

Along with its defined belief system, each military institution has an informal belief system, either cultivated by the military or transplanted from the cultures in the society. This system is not written down, but nevertheless exerts a powerful influence over the military. One must not assume that all components of a belief system are supported by the military institution. Some may run at cross purposes with the functional imperatives of the organization.

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Militaries may articulate and promote a particular belief system; however, it matters whether the personnel internalize this belief system and operate by its imperatives. The military organization may be simply unable to socialize the culture it desires in its personnel – the organization may be inept at changing the culture of its personnel, the recruits may find the organization's culture too incompatible with their own culture, or the society may demand a particular military culture and undermine the existing cultural patterns in the organization. In any event, one must distinguish between what the military formulates as the desired belief system in its organization and among its personnel and what actually exists as a belief system.

Questions to consider:

- What are the values of the military according to:
 - formal and informal doctrinal publications;
 - codes of conduct;
 - statements about military ethos;
 - statements about leadership traits;
 - oaths of commissioned officers, NCOs, enlisted, and conscripts?
- What are the military's shared values which are not formally defined?
 - How are these informal values socialized and maintained (training and education; the tacit promotion or penetration of religions, political, and ideological beliefs in the military; the disproportionate presentation of a particular cultural group in the military; etc.)?
 - Are these informal values complementary to the formal values or do they undermine them?
 - Are the informal core values promoted by the military or any other group or institution?
 - Are the informal values residuals from the prevailing cultures in the society (family and clan ties, for example)?
- What does the military value most according to formal and informal value systems, including, but not limited to:
 - service to state and society;
 - honor;
 - bravery;
 - defense of territorial integrity at all cost;
 - status of the military institution and profession in society; self-preservation;
 - stability;
 - ideology;
 - status of a particular group in the state?
- Are the values of the military universally socialized or instilled only among certain groups, including among:
 - officers only;

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- o officers and NCOs only;
 - o officers, NCOs, and enlisted, but not conscripts?
- How does the military instill the belief system among its personnel, including through:
 - o indoctrination during initial training - boot camp, basic training, officer and NCO courses;
 - o career-long training and education?
- Does the military maintain a process to ensure personnel maintain the preferred belief system, including through:
 - o individual learning experience that reinforces the initially acquired belief system;
 - o training and education process to reinforce the desired belief system;
 - o process of rewarding the behavior consistent with the desired belief system and correcting deviation from it?
- How successful is the military in instilling and maintaining the preferred belief system?
 - o Do recruits seem to display the belief system promoted by the military?
 - o Do personnel seem to display throughout their career the belief system promoted by the military?
- Does the military espouse an ideology, including:
 - o religious;
 - o political - nationalism, communism, etc.;
 - o ethnic?
- Is the declared belief system of the military old or relatively newly established?
 - o What prompted the establishment of the new belief system?
 - o If newly established, has the military managed to establish a process to instill and maintain the new belief system?
 - o If newly established, are personnel internalizing the new belief system?
- Are there any broader cultural patterns/values that might be particularly important understanding the military, including but not limited to:
 - revenge;
 - justice;
 - fairness;
 - concept of human rights?
- What are the main narratives in the military, including about:
 - o past war and battlefield experience;
 - o military's role in the emergence of the state and nation;
 - o role of the military in the life of the state and nation;
 - o past, present and future missions of the military;
 - o enemies of the state;
 - o potential foes of the military;
 - o virtues of military service;

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- o what makes this military unique compared to other militaries;
 - o relations with other institutions in the state and with the society?
- How does the belief system espoused in the narratives compare to the one officially promoted by the military? Do they complement each other or work at cross purposes?

Experience in Warfighting and Other Missions

The ultimate test of every military organization, and everyone in the military, is war. Warfare challenges the military's capabilities and abilities to the extreme and renders a sweeping judgment on its quality and strength. Many militaries, however, lack a recent warfighting experience, thus making the use of the ultimate test to evaluate the armed forces as an organization impossible. Nevertheless, most militaries perform numerous operations other than war, which provide a useful gauge of their performance.

Past experience in war and other mission settings provides insights into how the military may perform in similar future missions, and how it confronts challenges, adapts, learns, and endures under stress. It also provides information on how the organization prepares for action and learns from its experience. In general, past experience provides insights into how military culture reacts when the military organization is put to the ultimate test.

Questions to consider:

- Does the military have recent warfighting experience? How did the military perform?
- Did the leadership of the country and the military anticipate the war? Did the military prepare adequately for the war effort?
- Did the military strategy and doctrine adequately anticipate the challenges posed by the armed conflict?
- Aside from material factors, what intangible (cultural) elements seem to pose challenges to the performance of the military, including problems with cohesiveness, leadership failures, lack of initiative, etc?
- Was the military able to identify frictions during warfare and adapt in response?
- Was the military able to learn from mistakes and failures?
- After the war, did the military initiate a review of its performance?
- In response to lessons learned after the war, did the military adopt changes in:
 - o strategy and doctrine;
 - o tactics;
 - o leadership;

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- o training and education;
 - o planning;
 - o personnel policies;
 - o procurement of weapons and systems?
- Does the military have experience in operations other than war? How did the military perform?
- Were these operations other than war formally identified in the military's mission set?
- Did the military's strategy and doctrine adequately anticipate the challenges posed by these missions?
- Was the military able to identify friction during these missions and adapt adequately in response?
- After the missions, did the military initiate a review of its performance?
- In response to lessons learned after the missions other than war, did the military adopt changes in:
 - o strategy and doctrine;
 - o tactics;
 - o leadership;
 - o training and education;
 - o planning;
 - o personnel policies;
 - o procurement?
- Aside from material factors, what intangible (cultural) elements seem to pose challenges to the performance of the military in operations other than war?
- Does the military have an experience in diverse missions or a narrow set of missions?
- According to the military's track record, does the organization spend most of its efforts in preparation to face the most likely challenges or the challenges that pose the gravest danger to national security?

Differences Between Military Culture and Prevailing Civilian Cultures

Military culture is shaped by functional imperatives - the defense of state and society against threats. The military, however, does not exist in isolation; society, with its own cultures, also influences the military's institutional culture. In other words, military culture is shaped by both functional and societal imperatives and influences.¹⁷

There are frictions between the cultural patterns of the military, on the one hand, and prevailing cultural patterns in society, on the other. Military culture is simply different from any of the existing cultures in society. Therefore, studying only the cultural patterns of local populations limits a full appreciation of the cultural patterns of the armed forces in the same state.

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The military organization can be a powerful instrument in changing the culture of those joining its ranks. However, different militaries have varying degrees of ability, or willingness, to change the culture of their members. Sometimes, the military and its civilian leadership are apprehensive of changing the culture of personnel too much and thereby creating a large gulf between society and armed forces in terms of belief systems.¹⁸ Other militaries may simply be inept in their efforts to change the culture of their recruits and personnel; weak institutions may encounter recruits with deeply entrenched cultural patterns that defy processes intended to instill new belief systems. Conversely, some militaries are willing, and capable of instilling a culture among their personnel that is significantly different from those in the civilian society.¹⁹

Identifying the differences between the military and society's civilian cultures serves two important purposes. First, it provides a measure of the military organization's ability to change the culture of its personnel and the ability to maintain distinct cultural patterns. Second, it provides a sense of what tenets of the civilian culture may influence military culture when contexts and circumstances change.²⁰ Thirdly, it indicates whether there are tensions between the military culture and society in general and how these tensions may play out in different contexts.

Questions to consider

- What are the differences between the military and civilian cultures in terms of belief systems and behavior?
- Are the military and its civilian leadership concerned with a gap between the military and civilian cultures and how do they address this concern?
- How does the military instill and maintain a desired culture in its personnel, including through:
 - indoctrination of recruits; initial training;
 - acculturation and socialization;
 - policies, regulations, and expectations about desired beliefs and behaviors;
 - career-long training and education and indoctrination;
 - physical separation from society;
 - instilling a maintaining of sense of separateness, elitism, and superiority among personnel;
 - recruitment from groups already possessing cultural patterns which are distinct from those in the rest of the society?
- What is the military's ability to change the culture of its recruits to comply with a defined military belief system? What explains the military's ability or inability to change the culture of recruits?
- What is the military's ability to maintain a desired culture among its personnel? What explains the degree of this ability or inability?

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- What explains the differences between military and civilian cultures, including:
 - military's ability to create and maintain desired cultural patterns in the organization;
 - overrepresentation in the ranks of certain groups in the society, including religious, ethnic, racial, geographic, social, class, ideological, and political groups;
 - changes in society which let a further divergence from military culture?
- What cultural patterns and events in the society tend to have influence over military culture, including:
 - family, clan, tribal, and ethnic ties and loyalties;
 - formal versus informal authority;
 - corruption?
- Are there any cultural patterns in the society that make it very difficult for the military to instill and maintain a desired cultural pattern among personnel, including:
 - a high degree of cultural diversity, including ethnic, racial, linguistic, tribal, clan, and regional;
 - clashing ethnic, ideological, and political traits among potential recruits in the society?

Functional versus Social Imperatives

Until the early 1990s, the Republic of South Africa enforced an ideology of racial discrimination, which empowered the white minority, while subjugating non-whites. For a long period of time non-whites were banned from serving in the military. However, beginning in the 1960s the military leadership recognized that the all-white armed forces would be unable to defend the country on its own in various conflict scenarios unless non-whites were recruited. Subverting a national culture supportive of racial segregation, the military gradually began to recruit and integrate non-whites in the organization. The functional imperatives shaping the military had a more powerful effect on the military organization than the societal imperatives arising from ideology and institutions dominating the society.

Organizational Culture: Power and Authority

Studying the formal structure of a foreign military is important in order to help understand how authority and power flow in the organization. Knowing the ranks, for example, may indicate who is in charge. It is important also to understand the military's informal

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structures since in some militaries a lower rank officer may exercise more authority and power than a higher ranking officer, not because he has more experience, but because of informal powers based on ethnic affiliation, class status, or family connections. Similarly, in some militaries, officers may circumvent the formal chain of command and instead report to, or seek input from, officers with whom they share informal ties. These patterns were observed by US Marines partnering with local forces in Afghanistan – Afghan officers would disregard chain of command and deal directly with superior officers with whom they share ethnic ties. Getting to know both the formal and informal structure of power and authority and systems of relationships is an effective step towards understanding how the military organization really operates.

Questions to consider:

- What is the formal structure of the military?
- What is the rank structure of the military? What is the number distribution of ranks? What's the percentage of E-3 and below?
- What is the average age of personnel?
- What is the percentage of operating forces?
- What are the power centers in the military?
- Is there an informal structure of power and authority in the military? What are the informal networks and groups in the organization which yield power?
- Do power and authority flow according to formal structure or are they determined according to informal structures and networks, including:
 - religious, ethnic, racial, tribal, clan, class, and family affiliations and loyalties;
 - ideological and political affiliations;
 - civilian leadership interference and decision-making;
 - interference by country's leadership (dictator, strongman, etc.)?
- Is there a tension between formal and informal structures in the military?
- Does the military attempt to eliminate informal structures?
- What are the formal and informal relationships between officers, enlisted, and draftees?

Capacity for Joint Operations

Whether a country aims to perform joint operations depends on the nature of the threat it faces and the size of the organization. Some militaries simply don't have the resources to achieve this capacity regardless of the imperatives of existing threats. Capacity for joint operations and actual experience tend to be a good indicator for the ability of the military to work alongside a foreign force. It must be

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kept in mind that sometimes a military's failure to conduct joint operations has more to do with political reasons rather than a lack of capacity – the national leadership may intentionally encourage rivalries among the services, or the services themselves may be unwilling to train and operate jointly.

Questions to consider:

- Does the military prepare for joint operations? Do the military's strategy, missions, doctrine, training, and equipment reflect intent to participate in joint operations?
- Does the military have any experience in joint operations? How did it perform?
- Does the military prepare for combined operations? Do the military's strategy, missions, doctrine, training, and equipment reflect readiness to participate in combined operations?
- Does the military have any experience in combined operations? How did it perform?
- Are there any reasons the services are incapable or unwilling to participate in joint operations?

Institutional Versus Occupational Models of the Military

Military personnel traditionally see themselves as committed members of an institution, driven by well-defined and constantly reinforced belief system and behavior. They serve the society and follow a calling captured by concepts such as duty, honor, commitment, country. However, social and political changes, including the end of conscription in many Western societies, have gradually infused the military institution with additional values. Marketplace factors play an increasingly prominent role in the recruitment and retention of personnel. As the demand for highly specialized skills has increased, potential recruits and members of the military have increasingly become involved in cost-benefit analysis when considering military careers. Furthermore, changes in societal values, attitudes and expectations penetrate more significantly the military institution and, in turn, have changed expectations about the proper identity and role of military professionals. In other words, the military institution is increasingly infiltrated by other institutions and professions and their attendant values and norms. Of course, the military organization, being an autonomous institution reflects these broader social institutions, values, and norms.

The military institution faces a clash between institutional and occupational values and attitudes. An institution is about a belief system associated with a purpose transcending individual self-interest in favor of a collective purpose. An occupation is about a cost-benefit consideration in the market place – the proper monetary reward for a professional competency.²¹ Of course, militaries combine elements from both models; there are no militaries at the two extremes.²² Nevertheless, whether the military leans towards one or the other

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model has significant consequences for its culture. It must be noted that does not necessarily have an effect on the competence of the military and the skills of its personnel. However, it does affect belief systems, attitudes, commitments and loyalties. In a military closer to the institutional model recruits join and stay not so much because of compensation and monetary benefits, but because of the appeal of belonging to an exclusive institution and the notion of service. Benefits in the institutional model tend to be low, some are non-monetary, and some are deferred (retirement benefits, being taken care of if injured and disabled). The military professional achieves esteem in society based on service rather than prestige based on level of monetary compensation. Even family life in the institutional model tends to differ – spouses tend to be part of the larger military family, while having relatively limited stable ties with civilians. This is also reinforced by living arrangements as military housing tends to be either on or close to military bases.

Questions to consider

- Do personnel tend to join and stay in the military because of monetary compensation and other material benefits or because of willingness to belong to an exclusive institution and to serve the nation?
- Does the military manage to recruit for positions which are better compensated in the civilian market place?
- Is recruit pay low or high? Does the military manage to fill its recruit quota?
- Are there extensive formal and informal networks and institutions to support veterans and disabled?
- Are military skills easily transferable in the civilian marketplace?
- Are military veterans hired in the civilian marketplace because of their service and their personal qualities or because of their professional competencies?
- What are common fields entered by former military personnel?
- Do military personnel and their families tend to live on base? Are military bases separate from towns and cities? Are they isolated geographically?
- Do military spouses tend to mostly interact with other military spouses in various military networks? Do they tend to interact in civilians outside the military networks?
- Is the military personnel's status in society based on service or pay?
- Is military personnel's evaluation in the organization conducted in a:
 - o holistic and qualitative manner (think assignment of MOS in the Marine Corps' TBS)?
 - o segmented and quantitative manner (think a check list of criteria with well-defined scores)?

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- Are veterans' benefits similar to those of the civilian retirees?

MILITARY SUB-CULTURES

Although the previous pages have attempted to describe military culture, anyone who has interacted with a large military organization can attest that there are, in fact, multiple cultures, or sub-cultures. The military organization includes parts with unique roles and personnel with diverse backgrounds, training, educations, and functions. This diversity in function, skills, and environment creates subcultures. The U.S. military has the Army, the Air Force, Navy, Marine Corps, and the Coast Guard. The services all do different things and use different tools. This creates differences in terms of doctrine, operation, personnel, training, and education. The services' personnel also develop different attitudes, values, norms, assumptions, beliefs, and behavior; in other words, they develop different cultures. The existence of sub-cultures in the U.S. military is not confined to differences between the services. They exist within a service. Even in the Marine Corps where Marines strive to maintain a uniform identity and culture, one can identify subtle subcultures depending on Marines' occupational specialty and experience.

The different services, groups, and networks within a military, sometimes coexist peacefully and sometimes interact intensely and clash over resources, missions, and the direction of the larger organization. They create temporary alliances with each other over one issue, while another issue creates a different set of clashing alliances. Challenges and debates confronting the military do not elicit a uniform response from all groups in the organization. Some groups have higher stakes in how the organization responds and accordingly are spurred into action, while other groups may see little that confronts their narrow group interests.²³

Many of the factors of military culture discussed in the Organizational Culture section are present also in military sub-cultures. For example, the various services in the armed forces (Army, Navy, etc) have their own missions, doctrine, and belief systems and thus possess distinct sub-cultures. This section includes only factors which are pertinent primarily to sub-cultures in the larger military organization.

Leadership

According to *Leading Marines*, the only reason the U.S. "has a Marine Corps is to fight and win wars."²⁴ Therefore, the primary goal of leadership in the Corps "is to instill in all Marines the fact that we are warriors first." In other words, leadership is a factor in achieving congruence between organizational objectives and the norms governing Marines. Military leaders at all levels have several important functions including transmitting the military's goals to

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their unit, leading their unit in achieving these goals, maintaining the norms governing their unit, and creating and maintaining effective members in the organizational unit they lead. However, for leadership to be successful, the military culture must encourage and demand particular leadership traits.

The growing complexity of the military organization gradually transforms the nature of leadership.²⁵ Military professionals become more of managers than leaders as they are expected to manage technology, logistics, and processes, rather than people in face-to-face interaction. However, in small units, companies and below, continuous, intimate interaction with personnel remains the crucial way to lead.

Questions to consider:

- Does the military cultivate and encourage leadership across the ranks?
- Is leadership rewarded? Is lack of leadership punished?
- Do commanders share hardship and stress with personnel?
- Do commanders spend face-to-face time with personnel?
- Do commanders mentor personnel?
- Do commanders address their personnel's physical, psychological, and emotional needs?
- Do commanders get involved in personnel's "off-hours" and home life issues?
- Do commanders create and maintain unit cohesion?
- Do commanders protect personnel from outside interference?

Cohesion

Military cohesion is about the bounding of members of a unit in such a way as to sustain their will and ability to complete the mission of their unit and organization. Cohesion is often identified as the determining factor when comparing the human element in opposing armies.²⁶ It is widely assumed that all things being equal, cohesive units perform better than units with low level cohesion.²⁷ In other words, the more cohesive the unit the better it performs.²⁸ Cohesion can be horizontal - bonding among members at the same hierarchical level - and vertical - between members of different ranks. Unit cohesion is mostly about the small unit, company and below, as interpersonal, daily interaction, which is essential for the development and maintenance of cohesion, is rare at a higher level (see the section on Esprit de corps for a different type of cohesiveness at the higher level).

Militaries recognize the importance of unit cohesion and accordingly strive, to varying degrees, to build it. There are a number of reasons to build cohesion: it can maintain unit integrity during duress, especially battles; it is believed to enhance unit performance; it enables members to cope with stress and avoid adverse

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mental effects; it enables units to train and prepare for the missions ahead; it decreases disciplinary problems; it can be utilized to support desired belief systems and behaviors that benefit the group and the mission; it enables the group to serve the social, psychological, and emotional needs of its members.

How do we recognize cohesive units? The existence of emotional bonds among the members of a unit is important, but does not necessarily mean that the group is cohesive. The members of the unit may like and care about each other, may enjoy each other's company and feel emotionally close; this is a dynamic frequently observed in cohesive units. However, this type of cohesiveness, also called social cohesiveness, is insufficient for high performing units. In addition, there is so-called task cohesion, which requires a shared commitment among the members of the unit to achieving the objectives of the group and the larger organization. A unit with high task cohesion includes members who may or may not care about one another but are motivated to pull together to achieve the unit's goals, especially under duress. In other words, when determining the cohesiveness of a unit it is important to find out whether its members just like each other or whether they also share goals.

There is no single factor that can explain the level of cohesion in military units. Instead there are organizational, social, ideological, as well as situational factors that account for cohesion in a unit. These include: the ability of the unit to provide for the member's primary needs; unit integrity and stability; congruence of military's and unit's belief systems; the influence of an ideology; clear organizational goals and missions; commonality of values; lack of heterogeneity;²⁹ trust;³⁰ and leadership;

Questions to consider:

- Does the military organization establish clear goals, objectives, and missions for the small units in terms of:
 - role in the larger organization;
 - missions;
 - role of leadership;
 - responsibilities of members;
 - small unit training;
 - indoctrination of recruits in small unit settings?
- Does the military organization establish the requisites for small unit cohesiveness, including:
 - institutionalizing the small size units - fire teams, squads, platoons;
 - stability of the small unit - members of the group are together over extended period; there is low turnover;
 - members spend most of the time together, including living in barracks;
 - every member of the military is associated with a unit;
 - establishing the small group as the basic tactical operational unit?

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- Does the small unit serve as:
 - the group which satisfies the basic social, psychological, and emotional needs of each member;
 - the group providing security and safety to members;
 - the dominant group controlling the behavior of its members in accordance with the military's values, norms, and objectives;
 - the main instrument to correct the deviant behavior of members?
- To what extent do members of the small unit have affiliations, memberships and loyalties which lie outside the small unit, including:
 - membership in and affiliations with political parties and civic organizations;
 - friendships with civilians;
 - network affiliations;
 - loyalties, ties, and interaction with various groups including national, racial, ethnic, cultural, etc.?
- Do the spouses of the members socialize with each other or do they seek friendships and support among civilians not associated with the unit?
- Do members of the unit understand the goals and the mission of the larger organization?
- Do the members of the unit like each other?
- Do members of the group trust each other's competence and commitments?
- How homogenous is the small unit in terms of:
 - ethnicity;
 - race;
 - tribe/clan;
 - language;
 - religion;
 - gender;
 - geographic origin;
 - social background;
 - economic status;
 - common experience;
 - political affiliation;
 - education;
 - age?
- If the unit is not homogeneous, do diverse traits among its members seem to create tensions and affect unit effectiveness, or is cohesion in spite of diversity taken as a value?
- In addition to small unit loyalties and commitments, do members of the unit share secondary group commitments and loyalties (see Esprit de corps section)

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- In addition to small unit and secondary group loyalties and commitments, do members of the unit share commitment and loyalties to:
 - nationalism;
 - political system;
 - nation's way of life;
 - religious beliefs?
- Do members of the small unit have social cohesion?
- Do they seek each other's company in off-hours?
- Do they forge friendships?
- Do friendships last after service in the same group?
- Do members of the small group get involved in each other's "off-hours" and home issues?
- Is there congruence between small units and the military in terms of belief system and behavior?
- Does small unit leadership contribute to cohesion by:
 - transmitting the military's goals and mission to the small unit;
 - leading the members of the small unit in achieving those goals;
 - transmitting and maintaining the military's belief system to the small unit; holding each member to organizational standards;
 - setting a personal example to members of the unit;
 - sharing hardship and discomfort with members;
 - promoting open and honest communication with members;
 - developing among members a trust in his/her competence, credibility, and ability to care for the members;
 - mobilizing resources from the larger organization to provide for the needs of the unit's members;
 - shielding members of the unit from outside interference;
 - exercising control and oversight over the members' duties, free time, promotion, punishment;
 - mobilizing group pressure to correct deviant behavior in members;
 - spending extensive time in face-to-face interaction with members;
 - assisting members in matters not related to unit tasks, including personal, family, and financial issues?
- Are there any societal factors that impinge on cohesion, including:
 - public's negative views of the military;
 - lack of support network for military families and personnel in need of help;
 - public's negative view of a particular mission;
 - public's demand for changes in military culture that may undermine cohesiveness?

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Ethnic Tensions and Cohesion

The population of the Soviet Union included peoples of diverse ethnic background who coexisted uneasily. The Soviet military leadership recognized the negative effect ethnic tensions had on military cohesion but was unable to overcome this problem. Instead, the military sought to include in elite combat units only conscripts of a single ethnic group, mostly of Slavic origin, while assigning other ethnic groups to support units. This was a practice widely used in other communist militaries where in addition to fears about cohesion, the national leadership feared conscripts from minority groups would acquire essential combat skills and thus enable minority groups to challenge the majority in future domestic conflicts.

Esprit de Corps and Morale

While cohesion is about the small unit, esprit de corps is about the larger organization. Esprit de corps is a higher concept of cohesion which implies social, emotional, and psychological devotion and commitment to the larger organization. It is about cohesiveness among personnel who do not have day-to-day interaction, yet feel part of the same group. While cohesiveness is about the personal bonding between peers in the primary group, esprit de corps is about the bonding of the individual to an institution. This bond is essential as it ties the individual's efforts to the national cause. It is the most difficult cohesiveness to build since it goes beyond face-to-face interaction among peers and immediate leaders.³¹

Militaries have tried to instill esprit de corps through various approaches and policies. It involves the use of distinctive names, flags, uniform, recruitment, training, home bases, traditions, ceremonies, narratives, long service in the same organizational unit, publications, etc. The Marine Corps is a good example of a military organization successfully promoting a strong esprit de corps. The regimental system in Great Britain, another good example, makes a good use of distinct uniforms, traditions, geographic location, etc., to promote cohesiveness and esprit de corps.³²

Morale is the enthusiasm, eagerness, and persistence with which the members of the group perform their prescribed tasks, including in high-stress or danger environments. Morale is highly dependent on cohesion and esprit de corps, as well as factors that in most cases

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are beyond the control of the military organization, including pay and benefits, status of the military profession in the society, and operational context.

Questions to consider:

- Do personnel associate themselves with an organizational unit larger than the small unit group but smaller than the military organization including corps, division, and brigade? What is the size of this organizational unit?
- Do personnel take pride in being part of this unit?
- What distinguishes this unit from other units in the military, including:
 - missions and roles in the larger military organization;
 - uniforms and batches, colors;
 - home base, geographic location;
 - distinct recruitment, training, and education;
 - traditions, ceremonies, symbols, heroes, memories, narratives, museum, memorials;
 - battlefield performance;
 - personnel demographics: race, ethnicity, tribe/clan, language, religion, socio-economic background, geographic origin, education, gender;
 - political affiliation; ideology;
 - belief system;
 - status in military;
 - status in society?
- How is esprit de corps maintained in the distinct organizational unit?
- What is the effect of esprit de corps on the organizational unit in terms of:
 - overall performance;
 - ability to participate in joint operations;
 - unit and personnel morale;
 - ability to adapt and change?
- How does the rest of the military perceive the unit's distinct esprit de corps?
- How does the society perceive the unit's distinct esprit de corps?
- What is the unit's morale?
- Do the personnel seem enthusiastic carrying out their tasks?
- How do personnel handle stress? How do they handle repeated stress?
- How do personnel handle scarcity of sleep, food, and amenities?
- How do personnel handle the stress of combat?
 - Is there a breakdown of battle order?
 - Is there a breakdown of discipline?

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- How do casualties affect the performance of the rest of the unit? How do casualties affect morale in the unit? How quickly does the unit is ready to perform effectively after battle?
- Do commanders at all levels address morale issues in the unit?
- How prevalent is the loss of personnel in the unit due to:
 - disciplinary infractions;
 - suicide;
 - PTSD and other psychological traumas;
 - AWOL;
 - accidents?
- To what degree and how is the loss of personnel tracked ?
- How does the unit handle psychological traumas in personnel?
- Does the unit continue to perform effectively after sustaining casualties due to injuries, psychological traumas, dismissals, etc?
- Are personnel experiencing physical and psychological traumas able recover and rejoin the unit?
- Are personnel willing to remain in the unit while sustaining injuries?
- Has the unit recently experienced:
 - battle defeats;
 - large turnover of personnel;
 - large turnover of leadership;
 - significant change in structure, role in the larger military organization, resources;
 - frequent changes in mission;
 - status in the larger organization?

The Promotion of Esprit de Corps

The regimental system in Britain promotes very strong loyalty and commitment among personnel. Personnel stay with the regiment for most of their military careers; they train, live, and deploy together. A sense of belonging to an exclusive group is promoted by the adoption of distinct regimental uniforms, bands, names, ceremonies, traditions, narratives, museums, etc. Even the personnel's social life is dominated by the regiment as members have limited ties and networks outside the regiment. Personnel within a regiment even marry among each other's families.

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Legitimacy of Violence

In principle, the state possesses an absolute monopoly over the use of force. It has the powers to authorize various institutions - military, police, secret services, etc. - to use violence on its behalf. Additionally, in the West, the purpose of war is to serve a political end defined by the state. Political ends, legitimate violence, and war, in this view, are inextricably tied to the state. Social scientists, however, have observed that there are societies, where the state is an alien concept, or a relatively recent construct. In these societies there persist belief systems which legitimize violence and war in very different ways. In fact, war and violence have very different forms and logics from the ones the West is familiar with from the history of the modern nation-state. Violence and war can be spurred by revenge, reparations for insults, divine demand, and the spread of an idea (religion, ideology, etc.).³³ These motivations and ends are associated with belief systems that clash with the idea of the state holding the monopoly over the use of force. What one might see as an act of violence unsanctioned by the state, and thus illegitimate, may, in fact, be a normal, well-regulated, and culturally acceptable, practice of addressing a conflict between two parties or seeking a certain non-political end. These belief systems and associated practices of war-making and violence exist in countries that are formal states with all the usual attributes, including armed forces. There may be an underlying belief system shared by the military personnel which sees some violence and war-making practices as legitimate while they clash with the understanding of the military as an instrument of the state. The military organization in the state may simply be unable to fundamentally alter the belief system of its personnel that legitimize violence and war-making. In this case it may be more appropriate to speak of martial culture rather than military culture.

Questions to consider:

- Does the country have a tradition of weak state authority due to:
 - the state being a recent creation;
 - the state having traditionally failed to exert its authority over the entire territory of the country and over all the population; the state and its institutions being very weak;
 - communities in the state not seeing the state as the source of authority and legitimacy;
 - large portions of the population being organized in self-governing communities as federations, tribes, clans, etc., while relying very little on the state?
- Are there groups in the country which view the use of violence as a means to address a grievance without the sanction of state authority (court, police, army, etc) as legitimate?

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- Is the state's view of the military as the instrument of state policy shared by military personnel?
- Do military personnel have belief systems that view legitimate war and violence in different ways?
- Are there groups in the country which see militias as a legitimate instrument of violence?

Learning, Innovation, and Use of Technology

Military culture influences all range of personnel activities, including how personnel learn. Discerning the culture of learning goes beyond identifying the formal training and educational steps taken by personnel, although this matters too. It also includes identifying sequences, methods, and techniques in the learning process. It is important to know whether recruits, for example, learn through lecture-style instruction or hands-on experience, what the role of mentoring is, and whether the learning process is influenced by levels of literacy.

It is culture, rather than technology itself, that explains whether, and how, a military organization innovates and adopts technology and doctrine. This element of military culture is inevitably sub-cultural as services in a military have varying degrees of use and reliance on technology - air force and navy, by virtue of their missions - tend to be more technology heavy compared to ground forces.

Questions to consider:

- What are the training and educational institutions and steps for personnel in the military?
- What are the learning methods in the military, including:
 - lecture type instruction versus interactive learning;
 - hands-on learning;
 - mentoring;
 - written versus oral instructions?
- What is the intensity of educational and training events and phases?
- Are military personnel encouraged to pursue studies and training in civilian institutions?
- Are educational and training experiences rewarded in the military including through pay, promotion, and other benefits.
- What are attitudes of military subgroups toward training and education?
- Do doctrine and the military culture encourage innovation? Is failure punished when an innovative approach is applied to solve a new, complex problem?

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- When missing resources, are commanders and personnel encouraged to improvise and press on, or are they expected to await further instructions and assistance?
- Are commanders and personnel encouraged to experiment with techniques, tactics, and procedures?
- Does the military incorporate in doctrine new Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures which have demonstrated effectiveness?
- Do technology changes lead to their adoption in the military, including in doctrine, education, and training?
- How does the military unit compare to other units in the military in terms of the degree of technology use?
- What explains the level of technology use in the unit, including:
 - level of technological sophistication in the society;
 - level of technological sophistication among personnel;
 - unit's mission and role?

CONCLUSION

This publication introduces a framework, including five sets of factors, to guide inquiry into any foreign military culture. It identifies the essential intangibles influencing a military's outlook, perceptions, and behavior. It also guides the search for insights into the particular cultural patterns of a foreign force that are relevant to a particular mission. The purpose of the Marine Corps makes Marines naturally interested in how a foreign force fights. This publication will help Marines gain insight into how cultural factors influence a foreign force's warfighting abilities. And since Marines frequently conduct security cooperation missions, this guide will also help Marines and curriculum developers understand how a foreign force learns, trains, and adapts.

This publication is not an analytical tool. It rather provides ranges of possible and probable behavior based on an understanding of a foreign force's belief system and past experiences, as well as larger outside social and institutional influences. In addition to gathering the information pertinent to the five sets of factors, Marines should also analyze how these factors interact. This may require the assistance of subject matter experts with substantial knowledge of the foreign country.

¹ U.S. Marine Corps, *Warfighting*, MCDP 1, p. 13.

² Ibid.

³ For attempts to broadly define military culture see, James Burk, "Military Culture" in Lester Kurtz, ed., *Encyclopedia of Violence, Peace, and Conflict*, Vol. 2 (Oxford: Elsevier, 2008): 1242-1256; Donna Winslow, *Army Culture* (U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral Social Sciences, November 2000), ARI Research Note 2001-04; Peter H. Wilson, "Defining Military Culture," *Journal of Military History*, Vol. 72 (January 2008): 11-41; Stephen

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Wilson, "For a Socio-Historical Approach to the Study of Western Military Culture," *Armed Forces and Society*, Vol. 6, No. 527-52; Harry Bondy, "Postmodernism and the Source of Military Strength in the Anglo West," *Armed Force and Society*, Vol. 31, No. 1 (Fall 2004): 31-61; Karen O. Dunivin, "Military Culture: Change and Continuity," *Armed Forces and Society*, Vol. 20, No. 4 (Summer 1994): 531-47; Don M. Snider, "An Uninformed Debate on Military Culture," *Orbis*, Vol. 43, No. 1 (1999): 11-26; Daniel Zirker, Constantine P. Danopoulos, and Alan Simpson, "The Military as a Distinct Ethnic or Quasi-Ethnic Identity in Developing Countries," *Armed Forces and Society*, Vol. 34, No. 2 (January 2008): 314-37. On the importance of military culture see, Williamson Murray, "Does Military Culture Matter?" John F. Lehman and Harvey Sicherman, eds., *America the Vulnerable: Our Military Problems and How to Fix Them* (Philadelphia, PA: Foreign Policy Research Institute, ?): 134-51; Montgomery McFate, "The Military Utility of Understanding Adversary Culture," *Joint Forces Quarterly*, Vol. 38 (July 2005): 42-48.

⁴ Various open sources provide relatively concise (10-30 pages) reports on various aspects pertinent to military culture, including Library of Congress, CIA, US State Department, Country Watch, International Country Risk Guide, Military Periscope, etc. It must be pointed out that products from these sources do not treat the military culture of countries as a distinct dimension. Instead they provide information and knowledge that is relevant to military culture. For example, various texts from these sources point out whether there is a civilian and democratic control of the armed forces or whether the military in the country is controlled by a strongman or an authoritarian government. Marines also can seek the assistance of subject matter experts available in the Marine Corps. The Center for Advanced Operational Culture Learning has a staff with regional expertise that can provide insights into the military culture of various countries. Another approach is to use the expertise of other Marines who have interacted with the military of the country in question and seek answers to the mission relevant set of questions included in this publication. Time permitting, Marines can also look for information in various publications provided by high quality think-tanks in the Washington, DC area. Most of these publications are available online for free. Once again, however, subject matter experts in the Marine Corps can easily guide the Marines as to what reports are most useful for the mission and where to find them. In addition, the Marines Corps provides classified publications that discuss various aspects of states' military cultures.

⁵ For discussion of the concept of strategic culture see Colin S. Gray, "Comparative Strategic Culture," *Parameters* (Winter 1984); Alastair Ian Johnson, "Thinking About Strategic Culture," *International Security*, Vol. 19, No. 4 (1995); John Glenn, Darryl Howlett, Stuart Poore, eds., *Neorealism versus Strategic Culture* (Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2004); Colin S. Gray, "Out of the Wilderness: Prime Time for Strategic Culture" (Defense Threat Reduction Agency, Advanced Systems and Concepts Office: October 2006).

⁶ On the interplay of security and identity see Peter J. Katzenstein, ed., *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identities in World Politics* (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1996); Robert A. Rubinstein and Mary LeCron Foster, eds., *The Social Dynamics of Peace and Conflict: Culture in International Security* (Dubuque, IA: Kendal/Hunt Publishing Company, 1997); Pat Caplan, ed., *Understanding Disputes: The Politics of Argument* (Providence RI: Berg Publishers, 1995).

⁷ One example of states subscribing to the first view is Russia. For an excellent summary of Russia's strategic culture see, Dmitri Trenin, "Russia's Threat Perceptions and Strategic Posture" in *Russian Security Strategy Under Putin: U.S. and Russian Perspectives* (Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2007): 35-47. The members of the European Union subscribe to opposite view. For a discussion of their outlook and policies see a collection of articles in the *Oxford Journal on Good Governance*, Vol. 2, No. 1 (March 2005).

⁸ For more on civil-military relations see, Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldiers and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995); Morris Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait* (Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 1960); Charles C. Moskos, John Allen Williams and David R. Segal, eds., *The Postmodern Military* (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2000); Samuel E. Finer, *The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2009); Eric A.

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Nordlinger, *Soldiers in Politics: Military Coups and Governments* (New York, NY: Prentice-Hall, 1977); Amos Perlmutter, *The Military and Politics in Modern Times: On Professionals, Praetorians, and Revolutionary Soldiers* (New Heaven, CT: Yale University Press, 1977). For a review of the civil-military relations literature see, Peter D. Feaver, "Civil-Military Relations," *Annual Review of Political Science*, Vol. 2 (1999): 211-41; Laura R. Cleary, "Lost in Translation: The Challenge of Exporting Models of Civil-Military Relations," *Prism*, Vol. 3, No. 2 (March 2012): 19-36; James Burk, "Theories of Democratic Civil-Military Relations," *Armed Forces and Society*, Vol. 29, No. 1 (Fall 2002): 7-29.

⁹ In communist countries during the Cold War, the ruling regimes introduced party cells in the armed forces and thusly exercised control over every aspect of military life.

¹⁰ The military of Turkey has traditionally seen itself as defender of the republican and secular character of the state, and guarantor of domestic order. Accordingly, even when not directly ruling the country after coup d'état, the military has had a say in national policies not directly related to national defense.

¹¹ The relationship between the military and society is extensively discussed in the literature referenced in the previous section. See also, Matthew J. Morgan, "The Reconstruction of Culture, Citizenship, and Military Service," *Armed Forces and Society*, Vol. 29, No. 3 (Spring 2003): 373-91; Pew Research Center, *The Military-Civilian Gap: War and Sacrifice in the Post-9/11 Era* (5 October 2011). Available at <http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/files/2011/10/veterans-report.pdf>.

¹² On the importance of military culture see, Williamson Murray, "Does Military Culture Matter?" in John F. Lehman and Harvey Sicherman, eds., *America the Vulnerable: Our Military Problems and How to Fix Them* (Philadelphia, PA: Foreign Policy Research Institute, ?): 134-51; Montgomery McFate, "The Military Utility of Understanding Adversary Culture," *Joint Forces Quarterly*, Vol. 38 (July 2005): 42-48.

¹³ John Keegan observes that militaries have long performed functions seemingly unrelated to their warfighting functions. Commanders in Clausewitz's time set up regimental schools to educate young officers, teach soldiers to read and write, and train their wives in craft trades. See John Keegan, *A History of Warfare* (New York, NY: Vintage Books, 1993), 14.

¹⁴ Paul Johnston, "Doctrine is not Enough: The Effects of Doctrine on the Behavior of Armies," *Parameters*, Vol. 30, No. 3 (Autumn 2000): 30-39.

¹⁵ Darryl Henderson notes that the Soviet military tended to punish initiative. In the Soviet military tradition there was a need to assign blame when there was a failure. However, blame was not assigned when the officer followed the prescribed steps in the detailed plan, even if the mission ultimately failed. This made Soviet officers fear failure and discouraged initiative. See, Darryl Henderson, *Cohesion – The Human Element in Combat: Leadership and Societal Influence in the Armies of the Soviet Union, the United States, North Vietnam, and Israel* (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1985), 138.

¹⁶ See Michael W. Grojean and Jeffrey L. Thomas, "From Values to Performance: It's the Journey that Changes the Traveler" in Thomas W. Britt, Amy B. Adler, and Carl Andrew Castro, eds., *Military Culture*, Vol. 4 (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2006): 35-59.

¹⁷ For a detailed discussion on how the military organization and the society interact, see Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995).

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¹⁸ Post-World War II Germany, for example, thinking back to the collaboration of the armed forces with the Nazi regime, aimed to maintain a strong connection between military and society by deliberately cultivating “citizen-soldiers” – active members of society and the political community, sharing a professional ethos tied to the values of democracy. See, for example, Maj. Petra McGregor, “The Role of Innere Führung in German Civil-Military Relations,” *Strategic Insight*, Vol. V, Issue 4 (April 2006).

¹⁹ Thomas Ricks makes the case that there is a gap between society and the military and that the values of contemporary American society are the opposite of those needed to succeed in the Marine Corps. See Thomas E. Ricks, *Making the Corps* (Scribner: New York, NY, 2007).

²⁰ Thomas Ricks observes that after experiencing a transformation in belief system in boot camp, many young Marines revert to old behaviors when confronting life outside the barracks. Many enlisted Marines, feeling the pulls and demands of civilian life, fail to complete their first contract.

²¹ For a discussion of the institutional versus occupational models in the military see Charles C. Moskos, “From Institution to Occupation,” *Armed Forces and Society*, Vol. 4, No. 1 (November 1977): 41-50; Morris Janowitz, “From Institutional to Occupational,” *Armed Forces and Society*, Vol. 4, No. 1 (November 1977): 51-54; Charles C. Moskos, “Institutional/Occupational Trends in Armed Forces: An Update,” *Armed Forces and Society*, Vol. 12, No. 3 (Spring 1986): 377-82; David R. Segal, “Measuring the Institutional/Occupational Change Thesis,” *Armed Forces and Society*, Vol. 12, No. 3 (Spring 1986): 351-76; Henning Sorensen, “New Perspectives on the Military Profession: The I/O Model and Esprit de Corps Reevaluated,” *Armed Forces and Society*, Vol. 20, No. 4 (Summer 1994): 599-617.

²² It must be noted that although research testing the institutional versus occupational thesis has been accumulated, more studies are needed to make conclusions about the transition to the occupational model in the military. Furthermore, existing studies focus mostly on the US military and thus it is impossible to offer even some tentative observations about the cross-national applicability of this model. Nevertheless, research on the US military offers evidence of a fluctuating mix of institutional and occupational beliefs among personnel. See for example Segal, “Measuring the Institutional/Occupational Change Thesis” and Sorensen, “New Perspectives on the Military Profession.”

²³ For a discussion of military sub-cultures see, Winslow, *Army Culture*.

²⁴ U.S. Marine Corps, *MCWP 6-1: Leading Marines*, 93.

²⁵ See discussions in Huntington; Moskos; Janowitz; and Henderson.

²⁶ For two examples of this approach see, Darryl Henderson, *Cohesion – The Human Element in Combat: Leadership and Societal Influence in the Armies of the Soviet Union, the United States, North Vietnam, and Israel* (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1985) and Nora Kinzer Stewart, *Mates and Muchachos* (New York, NY: Brassey’s, Inc., 1991). In the first book Henderson compares and assesses cohesiveness in four armed forces of four countries during the Cold War – the U.S., North Vietnam, Israel, and the Soviet Union. In the second book, Stewart compares cohesion in military units in the British and Argentinean militaries during the 1982 Falkland war.

²⁷ For more on military cohesion see, Robert J. MacCoun and William M. Hix, “Unit Cohesion and Military Performance” in *Sexual Orientation and U.S. Military Personnel Policy* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2010). Available at http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2010/RAND_MG1056.pdf; Frederick J. Manning, “Morale, Cohesion, and Esprit de Corps” in Reuven Gal and A. David Mangelsdorff, eds., *Military Psychology* (John Wiley & Sons Inc.: New York, NY, 1991): 453-70; Alon Peled, *A Question of Loyalty: Military Manpower Policy in Multiethnic States* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998); Guy L. Siebold, “Military Group Cohesion” in Thomas W. Britt, Amy B. Adler, and Carl Andrew Castro, eds., *Military Live: The*

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Psychology of Serving in Peace and Combat, Vol. 1 (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2006): 185-201; Neville A. Stanton, ed., *Trust in Military Teams* (Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2011); Dave Grossman, *On Killing* (New York: Back Bay Books, 2009); Peter A. Hancock and James L. Szalma, eds., *Performance Under Stress* (Ashgate Publishing Company, Burlington, VT, 2008); Robert J. MacCoun, Elizabeth Kier, and Aaron Belkin, "Does Social Cohesion Determine Motivation in Combat: An Old Question with an Old Answer," *Armed Forces and Society*, Vol. 32, No. 1 (2005): 1-9; Charles Kirke, "Group Cohesion, Culture, and Practice," *Armed Forces and Society*, Vol. 35, No. 4 (July 2009): 745-53; Gyu L. Siebold, "Key Questions and Challenges to the Standard Model of Military Cohesion," *Armed Forces and Society*, Vol. 37, No. 3 (February 2011): 448-68.

²⁸ A meta-analysis of military research found a high correlation between cohesion and performance. See Laurel W. Harman, Joan Harman, Elizabeth Hoover, Stephanie M. Hayes, and Nancy A. Pandgi, "A Qualitative Integration of the Military Cohesion Literature," *Military Psychology*, Vol. 11, No. 1 (1999): 57-83. However, it must be kept in mind that cohesion and performance seem to reinforce each other; one meta-analysis suggests that it is performance that has greater impact on cohesion, rather than the reverse. In other words, victory and success on the battlefield reinforce cohesion. See Brian Mullen and Carolyn Copper, "The Relation Between Group Cohesiveness and Performance: An Integration," *Psychological Bulletin*, Vol. 115, No. 2, (1994): 210-27.

²⁹ During the Cold War the Soviet military, recognizing the negative effect the clash between conscripts of diverse ethnic background might have on the cohesion of units, sought to include in their elite combat units only conscripts from a single ethnic group, mostly Slavs. See Darryl Henderson, *Cohesion – The Human Element in Combat: Leadership and Societal Influence in the Armies of the Soviet Union, the United States, North Vietnam, and Israel* (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1985): 35, 153.

³⁰ On the development and the importance of trust among members of small units see, Barbara D. Adams and Robert D.G. Webb, *Trust in Small Military Units* (research carried under contract to the Defense and Civil Environment Medicine: Canada, PWGSC Standing Offer W7711-017703/001/TOR); Barbara D. Adams, Lora E Bruyn, and Greg Chung-Yan, *Creating a Measure of Trust in Small Military Teams* (research conducted on behalf of Department of National Defense, Canada, PWGSC Contract No. W7711-017747/001/TOR, April 2004).

³¹ Frederick J. Manning, "Morale, Cohesion, and Esprit de Corps" in Reuven Gal and A. David Mangelsdorff, eds., *Military Psychology* (John Wiley & Sons Inc.: New York, NY, 1991): 453-70.

³² On the regimental system and its effect see Nora Kinzer Stewart, *Mates and Muchachos* (New York, NY: Brassey's, Inc., 1991).

³³ For an excellent discussion of the cultural dimension of warfare see John Keegan, *A History of Warfare* (New York: Vintage Books, 1993). See also Morton Fried, Marvin Harris, and Robert Murphy, eds., *War: The Anthropology of Armed Conflict and Aggression* (New York, NY: The National History Press, 1968).

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