

CIVIL AFFAIRS IN THE UNITED STATES ARMY RESERVE:
AN ANALYSIS OF THE POLICY, ORGANIZATION,
AND TRAINING OF MODERN ARMY
CIVIL AFFAIRS

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Military History

by

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ABSTRACT

CIVIL AFFAIRS IN THE UNITED STATES ARMY RESERVE: AN ANALYSIS OF THE POLICY, ORGANIZATION, AND TRAINING OF MODERN ARMY CIVIL AFFAIRS, by MAJ Mark Flynn, 120 pages.

Civil Affairs (CA), organized under a US Army Reserve (USAR) headquarters, previously provided adequate, skilled, specially trained capabilities supporting the conventional Army and Army Special Operations Forces (ARSOF) as a part of the US Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) organic force structure. The multi-component organization of USASOC until 2006 allowed tailored force packages to fill critical, rotational, enduring global GPF and SOF requirements. This task- organization allowed US Special Operations Command (USSOCOM)/USASOC to maintain proponentcy of CA as a “special operation” while leveraging the vast resources and functional specialties found in the USAR CA community. The organization of the total CA force was simple, functional, and effective. In the current organizational structure, CA capabilities provided by the Army differ depending on the component from which they originate. Significant training deficiencies and discrepancies exist that separate the Active force from the Reserve force. The Reserve lacks the robust foundational training provided to the Active force. The USAR remains well-postured to return to a multi-component USASOC structure and immediately assume operational missions and oversight of the entirety of CA forces

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ACRONYMS

ASI	Additional Skill Identifier
AOC	Area of Concentration
ARSOF	Army Special Operations Forces
ASD/RA	Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs
CACOM	CA Commands
CA	Civil Affairs
CAO	Civil Affairs Operations
CATP	Civil Affairs Training Program
CMO	Civil Military Operations
CORDS	Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support
DOTMLPF-P	Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel, Finance, and Policy
FM	Field Manual
FHA	Foreign Humanitarian Assistance
FORSCOM	US Forces Command
GCC	Geographic Combatant Commander
HN	Host Nation
IPI	Indigenous Populations and Institutions
INDOPACOM	Indo-Pacific Command
JFC	Joint Forces Command
JP	Joint Publication
MSG	Military Support to Governance
NLF	National Liberation Forces

NGOs	Nongovernmental Organizations
PO	Psychological Operations
PSRC	Presidential Selected Reserve Call-Up
SWCS	Special Warfare Center and School
TSOC	Theater Special Operations Command
USAJFKSWCS	US Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School
USACAPOC(A)	United States Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command (Airborne)
USAR	United States Army Reserve
USASOC	US Army Special Operations Command
USSOCOM	US Special Operations Command

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

CA establishes the process, sets short-term, mid-term and long-term goals and objectives, and plans for the transfer of the assistance mission to mid- and long-term aid providers such as the UN, USAID, the NGO/PVO community and the host nation itself. In other words, CA works its way out of a job once stability is achieved. To have an exit strategy, one must first enter the country and determine the conditions within those ministries that must establish a rule of law, provide essential services and promote conditions for economic growth.¹

The US Army Reserve (USAR) has historically been the source for, and is currently postured to fill virtually all US Army Civil Affairs (CA) capabilities. This paper focuses on the history of Army CA, the policy changes affecting CA, and the organization and training of CA forces before and after the separation of Active and Reserve CA in 2007. This paper further reviews the relationship of the USAR to the CA force from 2007 through 2017 and develops the analysis by highlighting the organization and training components of the Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel, Finance, and Policy (DOTMLPF-P) framework.

This paper argues that the USAR should maintain a multi-component CA headquarters consisting of conventional and special operations CA capabilities. This headquarters should be the proponent of all CA training requirements and coordinate the utilization of CA capabilities to satisfy total Army mission requirements. In this organizational structure, the US Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) could have follow-on education and/or training available, as required, for special operations-

¹ Bruce B. Bingham, Michael J. Cleary, and Daniel L. Rubini, *U.S. Army Civil Affairs-The Army's "Ounce of Prevention"* (Arlington, VA: The Institute of Land Warfare, March 2003), 18.

designated soldiers and provide the skill identifier “K9” (Special Operations Support) to those soldiers completing the requisite specialty training, education, or operational requirements.

The hypothesis is that the CA branch, organized under a USAR-led, multi-component headquarters, previously provided adequate, skilled, specially trained capabilities supporting the conventional Army and Army Special Operations Forces (ARSOF) as a part of the USASOC organic force structure, and this structure must be restored. The multi-component organization of USASOC and the United States Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command (Airborne) (USACAPOC(A)) until 2006 allowed tailored force packages to fill critical, rotational, enduring global special operations requirements. Further, this organization allowed United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM)/USASOC to maintain proponency of CA as a “special operation” while leveraging the vast resources and functional specialties found in the USAR CA community. The organization of the total CA force was simple, functional, and effective.

After 2007 this was no longer the case for a variety of reasons, critical among them being training. CA forces must be trained to the same standard no matter their component. When a new graduate of the CA qualification course arrives at their first assignment, the receiving unit, whether Active or Reserve, should expect that the officer can perform a standardized menu of skills. USACAPOC(A) remains well-postured to return to a multi-component structure and immediately assume command and control of the entirety of Army CA forces.

Background

The USAR is home to nine of the ten existing CA Brigades,² accounting for 88 percent of the total Army CA force structure.³ In 2006, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, acting on guidance from the Secretary of Defense, directed that USACAPOC(A) be separated from USASOC,⁴ and on October 1, 2007, this action was executed.

USASOC severed ties with the USAR CA forces, amongst other Reserve capabilities, and created additional structure in active component CA forces, eventually growing from one Battalion to two Brigades. The USAR maintained the Reserve Component CA force structure previously assigned to USASOC via USACAPOC(A) and continued to utilize these forces in operational assignments and deployments fulfilling total Army requirements well after the reorganization.

In 2018, USASOC identified critical gaps in CA capabilities and has sought solutions to these gaps within the DOTMLPF-P⁵ framework. The development of this

² US Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command (Airborne), “How Many Civil Affairs Brigades are in the Army Reserve,” accessed November 15, 2018, <https://www.usar.army.mil/Commands/Functional/USACAPOC/USACAPOC-Units/>.

³ US Army Special Operations Command, “SOF Civil Affairs,” accessed November 4, 2018, <https://www.soc.mil/95th/95thhomepage.html>.

⁴ US Department of the Army, General Orders No. 12, *Reassignment of United States Army Reserve Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Organizations from the United States Army Special Operations Command to the United States Army Reserve Command* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, October 2006).

⁵ US Army Special Operations Command, *FY18 Priority Research Topics* (Fort Bragg, NC: United States Army Special Operations Command, July 2017), accessed October 23, 2018, http://www.soc.mil/SWCS/SWEG/_pdf/GRAD/USASOCFY18PriorityResearchTopics.pdf.

thesis topic primarily derived from the *Academic Year 2018 USASOC Command Graduate Research Topics* that formally addressed these issues and provided prospective researchers broad areas of interest to the command.⁶ One of these topics noted gaps in the areas of CA capabilities, specifically referring to how ARSOF must improve its ability to lead or enable Military Support to Governance (MSG).⁷ These topics further discussed: (1) Global Force Management mechanisms and existing authorities are insufficient in delivering capable forces within required timelines and (2) that 100 percent of all MSG capability is in the USAR, a key issue for USASOC.⁸

Based on the topics identified by USASOC, three questions are addressed by this paper (1) Is the USAR CA properly organized and trained to support ongoing requirements? (2) What were the USAR CA mission requirements prior to and after 2006? (3) How is USAR CA presently organized and trained, and is this feasible, acceptable, and suitable? The chapters that frame the paper are: Background and Understanding of Civil Affairs; Civil Affairs to 1946; Civil Affairs 1946 to 2001; and Civil Affairs 2001 to 2017. The final chapter provides analysis and conclusions addressing key CA capabilities in today's Army in the area of organization and training.

In an effort to reduce the scope of this research, the author intends to discuss only the activities of CA organizations and officer personnel throughout the thesis. The reason for this is twofold: First, the general limitations in length and detail set forth by the

⁶ United States Army Special Operations Command, *FY18 Priority Research Topics*.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Ibid.

Command and General Staff College for writers warrants a narrowing in overall scope. Secondly, it is assumed that the CA and Psychological Operations (PO) forces organized prior to, during, and subsequent to the reorganization of 2006 experienced similar difficulties. These difficulties were due to their task-organization, they are presently facing the same difficulties, and they can effectively offer the same capabilities to USASOC and the Army at present. Finally, the choice was made to limit the focus to either enlisted personnel or officer personnel simply to reduce the scope to a manageable amount of research.

The paper utilizes primary source documents including the official command histories of the USAR, USASOC, and the USACAPOC. Congressional records, statements, and reports are also used to shape the discussion and understanding of the topic. Further, the Army policies, doctrinal manuals, and task-organization during each era will be reviewed, as will the key operational deployment and utilization histories of the relevant commands. Additionally, other source material and secondary research will be utilized including professional and academic research conducted by former students attending the US Army Command and General Staff College, the US Army School of Advanced Military Studies, and the US Army War College. Finally, the author will use articles and statements published in professional books and periodicals.

Numerous articles and works exist that discuss the utilization of CA forces as well as the difficulties that existed prior to the separation of USACAPOC(A) and USASOC, and the difficulties created by the separation. A common theme amongst professionals and practitioners is that a significant difference exists between active and reserve

component CA capabilities, primarily due to unequal organization, training, and experiences.

It is the author's intent to interview key players and stakeholders in the 2006 decision to remove USACAPOC(A) from USASOC including LTG(R) Robert Wagner, former Commanding General, USASOC; MG(R) David Morris, former Commanding General USACAPOC(A); MG(R) Herbert Altshuler, former Commanding General, USACAPOC(A); CSM(R) Neil Heupel, former Command Sergeant Major, USACAPOC(A); and COL John Novak, Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Reserve and Mobilization Affairs) and former Commander, 361 CA Brigade. When interviews are not available, quoted statements or testimony from these, and other, professionals will be referenced.

This paper focuses on operational units only, though there are several CA training units in the Active and Reserve Army. Additionally, in-depth discussion of CA history will begin with CA development in the inter-war period after 1918. While a great deal of background could be derived from the Army's early understanding and use of CA or Civil-Military Operations (CMO) before this time, the "story" of modern CA begins after the conclusion of World War I. Finally, within the context of CA history from the inter-war period, this thesis will attempt to further narrow the scope of research and discussion to focus on CA in Europe. Though other locations may be referenced for context, the focus will remain on European CA efforts.

Understanding Civil Affairs

To provide context to this thesis, it is important to understand the function of CA in the current Army structure and the doctrinal definition(s) and employment of this

unique capability. According to the Army Field Manual (FM) 3-57, *Civil Affairs*

Operations:

The United States Army Civil Affairs forces are the Department of Defense's primary force specifically trained and educated to shape foreign political-military environments by working through and with host nations, regional partners, and indigenous populations. These forces, and the operations they conduct, are the commander's asset to purposefully engage nonmilitary organizations, institutions, and populations.⁹

Blending the definition of CA from Joint Publication (JP) 3-57, *Civil-Military Operations* and Army FM 3-57, *Civil Affairs Operations*, CA forces are designated Active and Reserve Component forces and units organized, trained, and equipped specifically to plan and execute all Civil Affairs Operations (CAO) across the range of military operations, engaging indigenous populations and institutions (IPI), intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), Host Nation (HN) organizations, and other government agencies (OGAs) to support the Joint Force Command's (JFC's) CMO concept, which, in turn, supports the attainment of national strategic objectives and achieves the JFC capstone mission of unified action.¹⁰ "The intent of CAO is to enhance stability, to mitigate or defeat threats to civil society, and to assist in establishing local government capacity for deterring or defeating future civil threats."¹¹

⁹ US Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 3-57, *Civil Affairs Operations*, Change 2 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2014), 1-1.

¹⁰ Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication (JP) 3-57, *Civil Military Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2018), GL-6; Department of the Army, FM 3-57, *Civil Affairs Operations*, 1-3.

¹¹ Department of the Army, FM 3-57, *Civil Affairs Operations*, 1-3.

According to FM 3-57, the mission of the CA forces is:

to mitigate or defeat threats to civil society and conduct responsibilities normally performed by civil governments across the range of military operations by engaging and influencing the civil populace and authorities through the planning and conducting of CAO, or to enable CMO, to shape the civil environment and set the conditions for military operations. CA forces plan, prepare for, execute, assess, and transition CAO at all levels of war.¹²

FM 3-57 continues by describing when and why these CAO are taking place:

CAO are conducted within the scope of five core tasks and may occur prior to, simultaneously, or sequentially with combat operations depending on the operational environment. Although these tasks are the focus for all CA force training, planning, execution, and assessment, these tasks are not solely the responsibilities of CA forces. As part of the larger category of CMO, these core tasks nest within the maneuver commander's overall responsibility for planning and executing stability tasks. The five core tasks of CAO are interrelated with one another. Each of these core tasks may support the overall CMO goals and objectives as outlined in the [Joint Force Commander] JFC's civil-military strategy, but rarely do they do so independently. Instead, the core tasks of CAO tie into and support one another. As such, CA forces are the maneuver commander's primary asset to plan, coordinate, support, and execute CAO across the range of military operations.¹³

To accomplish the CAO mission there are five core tasks: Populace and Resources Control; Foreign Humanitarian Assistance (FHA); Civil Information Management; Nation Assistance; and Support to Civil Administration.¹⁴

Populace and Resources Control "provides security for the populace, mobilizes human resources, denies enemy access to the population, and detects and reduces the effectiveness of enemy agents."¹⁵ Populace control includes Dislocated Civilian

¹² Department of the Army. FM 3-57, *Civil Affairs Operations*, 1-1.

¹³ Ibid., 1-4.

¹⁴ Ibid., 1-3.

¹⁵ Ibid., 3-2.

Operations and Noncombatant Evacuation Operations. Resource controls “regulate the movement or consumption of material resources, mobilize materiel resources, and deny materiel to the enemy. Resources controls target specific sectors of a nation’s material wealth and economy, including natural resources, food and agriculture, immoveable property, finances, and cultural and critical infrastructure.”¹⁶ CA forces may support populace and resources control operations by identifying, evaluating, and advising on PRC measures; publicizing control measures among IPI; assisting in arbitrating problems that arise from populace and resources control measures; and creating products that depict affected populations and vulnerabilities.¹⁷

The FHA programs are “conducted to relieve or reduce the results of natural or man-made disasters or other endemic conditions, such as human pain, disease, hunger, or need that might present a serious threat to life or that can result in great damage to or loss of property.”¹⁸ FHA is conducted outside of the continental United States and is limited in scope and duration and designed to supplement or complement the efforts of the HN and Intergovernmental Organizations.¹⁹ CA tasks within FHA missions may include preparing, reviewing, and monitoring FHA plans and operations; assessing the operational environment of planned and actual FHA operations; confirming or validating the HN or Intergovernmental Organizations’ ability to manage Humanitarian Assistance;

¹⁶ Department of the Army, FM 3-57, *Civil Affairs Operations*, 3-6.

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ Ibid.

and establishing a CMOC to coordinate and synchronize operations within a FHA operation.²⁰

Civil Information Management “ensures the timely availability of information for analysis and the widest possible dissemination of the raw and analyzed civil information. This is provided to military and nonmilitary partners throughout the AO”²¹ by CA. When properly executed it enhances operations by preventing the duplication of information gathering efforts by follow-on forces.²²

Nation Assistance “is civil or military assistance (other than FHA) rendered to a nation by US forces within that nation’s territory [that cannot be provided by the host nation] during peacetime, crises or emergencies, or war based on agreements mutually concluded between the United States and that nation.”²³ The goal is to promote long-term regional stability, and are usually coordinated with the US Ambassador through the country team.²⁴

Support to Civil Administration operations “help to stabilize or to continue the operations of the governing body or civil structure of a foreign country, whether by assisting an established government or by establishing military authority over an

²⁰ Department of the Army, FM 3-57, *Civil Affairs Operations*, 3-9.

²¹ Ibid., 3-10.

²² Ibid.

²³ Ibid., 3-13.

²⁴ Ibid.

occupied population.”²⁵ These operations most often occur during stability operations and consist of civil administration in friendly or occupied territory. Civil administration supports governments of friendly territories during peacetime, disasters, or war. This may include “advising friendly authorities and performing specific functions within limits of the authority and liability established by international treaties and agreements.”²⁶ Civil administration in occupied territory may establish a temporary government to exercise authority over the populace of a territory taken from an enemy until an indigenous civil government can be established.²⁷ Civil Administration activities conducted by CA forces may include evaluating essential service infrastructure; assessing the needs of the IPI; liaise between military and civilian agencies; synchronizing joint, interagency, or multinational support to civil administration operations; and assisting, coordinating, and synchronizing the transition of authority from military to international or indigenous government administration.²⁸

The CA and CMO are a part of every level of war: Strategic, Operational, and Tactical. Within this construct, CMO and CA link the tactical military actions to the achievement of national objectives. Actions at one level may affect the actions or outcomes at other levels, and CA and CMO efforts at any level can impact the strategic outcome.

²⁵ Department of the Army, FM 3-57, *Civil Affairs Operations*, 3-17.

²⁶ Ibid., 3-18.

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ Ibid.

The levels of warfare “model the relationship between national objectives and tactical actions. There are no fixed limits or boundaries between these levels, but they help commanders visualize a logical arrangement of operations, allocate resources, and assign tasks to appropriate commands.”²⁹ CMO, “at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels . . . during all military operations . . . facilitate unified action between military forces and non-military entities within the OA.”³⁰ These actions are conducted “particularly in support of shaping, stability, and counterinsurgency (COIN), and other activities . . . [and] may permeate other aspects of national security and military strategy for an operation or campaign.”³¹

CMO, as it relates to the levels of warfare is further specified and defined, below:

1. Strategic:

CMO focus on larger and long-term issues that may be part of USG shaping, stabilization, reconstruction, and economic development initiatives in failing, defeated, or recovering nations. CMO are an essential tool used to improve the HN in improving the capacity, capability, and willingness required to regain governance. Strategic CMO are part of a geographic combatant commander’s (GCC’s) SC guidance in the theater campaign plan (TCP). During certain contingency operations, the Secretary of Defense (SecDef) and the Secretary of State will integrate stabilization and reconstruction contingency plans with military contingency plans and develop a general framework to coordinate stabilization and reconstruction activities and military operations.³²

2. Operational:

²⁹ Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication (JP) 3-0, *Joint Operations*, Change 1 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2018), I-12.

³⁰ Joint Chiefs of Staff, JP 3-57, *Joint Operations*, I-3.

³¹ Ibid.

³² Ibid., I-7.

CMO synchronize stability activities with other activities and operations (offense and defense) within each phase of any joint operation. CMO also integrate the stabilization and reconstruction efforts of USG interagency, international organization, and NGO activities with joint force operations. Joint force planners and interagency partners should identify civil-military objectives early in the planning process. CMO are integrated into plans and operations through interagency coordination, multinational partnerships, and coordination with international organizations and NGOs. Coordination of CMO for current and future operations is conducted at the operational level. Information management (IM) enables CMO and facilitates interorganizational cooperation to efficiently distribute resources and measure success using nontraditional operational indicators.³³

3. Tactical:

A civil-military team or civil-military operations center (CMOC) may facilitate tactical CMO among the military, the local populace, NGOs, and international organizations. Commanders can coordinate, integrate, and synchronize with the civil component through military engagement, civil reconnaissance (CR), a civil-military support element, or through an established CMOC. Tactical CMO are normally focused on specific areas or groups of people and have more immediate effects.³⁴

When the United States conducts military operations under the Unified Land Operations construct, CMO and CAO are most visible in phases zero (Shape), four (Stabilize), and five (Enable Civil Authority). Through a simple understanding of the names of the phases, one can comprehend the reason(s) why CMO and CAO are so important during these periods. To ensure a clear doctrinal understanding of how a Geographic Combatant Commander (GCC) can effectively utilize CMO and CAO capabilities, the linkage between the two are noted below:

Phase 0 (Shape):

In general, shaping activities help set conditions for successful theater operations. Shaping activities include long-term persistent and preventive military

³³ Joint Chiefs of Staff, JP 3-57, *Joint Operations*, I-7.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, I-7 – I-8.

engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence actions to assure friends, build partner capacity and capability, and promote regional stability. They help identify, deter, counter, and/or mitigate competitor and adversary actions that challenge country and regional stability. . . . In the best case, shaping activities may avert or diminish conflict. At the least, shaping provides a deeper, and common, understanding of the OE . . . [and] improve the [Joint Force Commander] JFC's understanding of the OE.³⁵

Shaping activities are largely conducted through other interorganizational participants (e.g., USG departments and agencies, PNs), with DOD in a supporting role. . . . Military engagement and security cooperation activities are executed continuously to enhance international legitimacy and gain multinational cooperation. These activities should improve perceptions and influence adversaries' and allies' behavior, develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, improve information exchange and intelligence sharing, provide US forces with peacetime and contingency access, and positively affect conditions that could lead to a crisis. These activities prepare the OE in advance to facilitate access, should contingency operations be required. The joint community, in concert with multinational and interagency partners, must maintain and exercise strong regional partnerships as essential shaping activities in peacetime to ensure operational access during plan execution.³⁶

During implementation of the CCDR's SC planning objectives, CMO can mitigate the need for other military operations in response to a crisis. CA support FID and contribute to planning. Before a crisis, CA working with HNs, regional partners, and IPI can shape the OE. Shaping operations can include regional conferences to bring together multiple stakeholders with competing concerns and goals, economic agreements designed to build interdependency, or regional aid packages and other capability/capacity building activities to enhance stability.³⁷

During the conduct of phase zero operations "CMO should be integrated with flexible deterrent options to generate maximum strategic or operational effect. CMO, in conjunction with deterrence activity, builds on shaping activities and can provide a

³⁵ Joint Chiefs of Staff, JP 3-0, *Joint Operations*, V-9.

³⁶ Ibid.

³⁷ Joint Chiefs of Staff, JP 3-57, *Joint Operations*, I-14.

stabilizing effect on the OE [Operational Environment], reduce uncertainty, and influence the perception of joint force intentions.”³⁸

Phase 1 (Deter):

Successful deterrence prevents an adversary’s undesirable actions, because the adversary perceives an unacceptable risk or cost of acting. Deterrent actions are generally weighted toward protection and security activities that are characterized by preparatory actions to protect friendly forces, assets, and partners, and indicate the intent to execute subsequent phases of the planned operation. . . . Many deterrent actions build on security cooperation activities. They can also be part of stand-alone operations.³⁹

Phase 2 (Seize Initiative):

JFCs seek to seize the initiative in all situations through decisive use of joint force capabilities. In combat, this involves both defensive and offensive operations at the earliest possible time, forcing the enemy to culminate offensively and setting the conditions for decisive operations. . . . Operations to gain access to theater infrastructure and expand friendly freedom of action continue during this phase, while the JFC seeks to degrade enemy capabilities with the intent of resolving the crisis at the earliest opportunity.⁴⁰

In conjunction with other joint force activities to seize the initiative, CMO are conducted to gain access to theater infrastructure and to expand friendly freedom of action in support of JFC operations. CMO are planned to minimize civil-military friction and support friendly political-military objectives. CMO conducted before the outbreak of conflict may also be used to create opportunities to aid in seizing the initiative, such as development of dual-use infrastructure and relationship building with IPI.⁴¹

Phase 3 (Dominate):

These actions focus on breaking the enemy’s will to resist or, in noncombat situations, to control the OE. Successful domination depends on overmatching enemy capabilities at critical times and places. . . . Operations can

³⁸ Joint Chiefs of Staff, JP 3-57, *Joint Operations*, I-14.

³⁹ Joint Chiefs of Staff, JP 3-0, *Joint Operations*, V9-V10.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, V10.

⁴¹ Joint Chiefs of Staff, JP 3-57, *Joint Operations*, I-14.

range from large-scale combat to various stability actions depending on the nature of the enemy. Dominating activities may establish the conditions to achieve strategic objectives early or may set the conditions for transition to a subsequent phase of the operation.⁴²

CMO also help minimize HN civilian interface with joint operations so that collateral damage to IPI from offensive, defensive, or stability activities is limited. Limiting collateral damage may reduce the duration and intensity of combat and stability activities. Stability activities are conducted as needed to ensure a smooth transition to stabilization activities, relieve suffering, and set conditions for civil-military transition.⁴³

Phase 4 (Stabilize):

These actions and activities are typically characterized by a shift in focus from sustained combat operations to stability activities. These operations help reestablish a safe and secure environment and provide essential government services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief. The intent is to help restore local political, economic, and infrastructure stability. Civilian officials may lead operations during part or all of this period, but the JFC will typically provide significant supporting capabilities and activities. The joint force may be required to perform limited local governance (i.e., military government) and integrate the efforts of other supporting interagency and multinational partners until legitimate local entities are functioning. The JFC continuously assesses the impact of operations on the ability to transfer authority for remaining requirements to a legitimate civil entity.⁴⁴

Stabilize actions are required when there is no fully functional, legitimate civil governing authority. This condition can be caused by a natural or man-made disaster, major combat operation, or regime collapse. The joint force may be required to occupy territory, perform limited local governance, or take on full governing responsibilities through a transitional military authority. It must then integrate the efforts of other supporting or contributing multinational, international organization, NGO, or USG department and agency participants until legitimate local entities are functioning. CMO facilitate humanitarian relief, civil order, and restoration of public services as the security environment stabilizes. Throughout these activities, the JFC continuously assesses whether

⁴² Joint Chiefs of Staff, JP 3-0, *Joint Operations*, V10.

⁴³ Joint Chiefs of Staff, JP 3-57, *Joint Operations*, I-14.

⁴⁴ Joint Chiefs of Staff, JP 3-0, *Joint Operations*, V10.

current operations enable transfer of overall regional authority to a legitimate civil entity.⁴⁵

Phase 5 (Enable Civil Authority):

Joint force support to legitimate civil governance typically characterizes these actions and activities. The commander provides this support by agreement with the appropriate civil authority. In some cases, especially for operations within the US, the commander provides this support under direction of the civil authority. The purpose is to help the civil authority regain its ability to govern and administer the services and other needs of the population. The military end state is typically reached during this phase, signaling the end of the joint operation. CCMD involvement with other nations and other government agencies beyond the termination of the joint operation, such as lower-level stability activities and FHA, may be required to achieve national objectives.⁴⁶

These activities are predominantly characterized by joint force support to legitimate civil governance in the OA. This includes coordination of CMO with interagency, multinational, IPI, international organization, and NGO participants; establishing and assessing measures of effectiveness (MOEs) and measures of performance (MOPs); and favorably influencing the attitude of the HN population regarding both the US and the local civil authority's objectives.⁴⁷

JP 3-57 and FM 3-57, both recently published, clearly identify and define CA as designated Active and Reserve Component forces and units organized, trained, and equipped specifically to plan and execute all CAO to support the JFC's CMO concept, which, in turn, supports the attainment of national strategic objectives and achieves the JFC capstone mission of unified action.⁴⁸ The Department of Defense and Department of the Army, through these two publications, demonstrate the understanding that the CA

⁴⁵ Joint Chiefs of Staff, JP 3-57, *Joint Operations*, I-14.

⁴⁶ Joint Chiefs of Staff, JP 3-0, *Joint Operations*, V10.

⁴⁷ Joint Chiefs of Staff, JP 3-57, *Joint Operations*, I-14 – I-15.

⁴⁸ Joint Chiefs of Staff, JP 3-57, *Joint Operations*, GL-6; Department of the Army, FM 3-57, *Civil Affairs Operations*, 1-3.

force is composed of both the Active and Reserve Forces. The two forces must work together to accomplish the missions assigned to the total force, and leverage the unique capabilities of each to complement the other.

CHAPTER 2

CIVIL AFFAIRS TO 1946

United States Army Civil Affairs traces its roots to the Revolutionary War, when elements of the Continental Army helped re-establish governance in areas formerly occupied by British forces, and to our country's first experience using military power in extended conflict on foreign soil, when General Winfield Scott established a military government in Central Mexico in 1847. Modern Army Civil Affairs dates back to World War II, when the Army organized units to address the needs of the local population during and immediately after combat operations and to implement military government functions in the occupations of post-war Europe and Japan.⁴⁹

The CA forces of the USAR conduct operations that are inextricably linked to the foundation of the United States. The Army Reserve has its roots to colonial America and the "Citizen-Soldier" of the militia. The CA can trace its heritage to the Continental Army and dealing with the native peoples on the continent. As the nation and the Army grew, so too did the development of the Army Reserve and CA capabilities within the nation's military force. Through the Mexican-American War and the Punitive Expeditions, to World War I then to World War II, CA forces were established, deployed, and employed. Post- World War II Europe was a test for CA, but the rise of communism and the Soviet Union required the United States to be prepared for every type of conflict including minor state disputes, regional contingencies, and preparing for atomic warfare. Following the fall of the Soviet Union, the United States became a sort of "world police" ensuring regional stability and peace were maintained in the face of any threatened

⁴⁹ US Army Special Operations Command, "U.S. Army Civil Affairs Regiment," accessed April 4, 2019, <https://www.soc.mil/SWCS/RegimentalHonors/CivilAffairs.htm>.

democracy. The CA capability became a critical piece of America's ability to wage peace throughout the world amid rapidly rising insurgencies and dictatorial states.

Early History

CMO in the United States were becoming major activities for the Continental Army during the revolution. CMO were the link between the local populations and support to military needs, and included the impact of military operations on the local populations. While there was certainly more to the Army's involvement in Westward expansion, through the establishment of garrisons and trading posts and the arranging and protecting of treaty councils, the Army of this period was "investing more time and effort in peace enforcement among the various Indian tribes than in fighting them."⁵⁰

Lieutenant General Winfield Scott's use of CMO in the US-Mexican War was successful. The local population were kept from interfering in military affairs and limited the impact of military operations on the non-combatant local populations. Combined with his respect of local sensitivities, Scott's success was attributed to his enforcement of formal orders and rules governing military conduct while in the area.⁵¹

As America entered the 19th century, it became involved in a number of conflicts in Latin America and the Caribbean as it began to expand its influence and power in the region. This expansion of power using the military as the primary element of national power highlights the beginning of the Western Way of War in the United States. A

⁵⁰ Stanley Sadler, *Glad to See Them Come and Sorry to See Them Go: A History of U.S. Army Tactical Civil Affairs/Military Government, 1775-1991* (Fort Bragg, NC: US Army Special Operations Command History and Archives Division, 1993), 4.

⁵¹ US Army Special Operations Command, "U.S. Army Civil Affairs Regiment."

notable example of the use of CAO in this period is when Major General Leonard Wood restored order and governance to Cuba in 1898 after the Spanish-American War.

While maintaining the peace in Cuba, the United States also remained active in stability operations in the Dominican Republic, Haiti, Nicaragua, and Panama during the 20th century. In these operations, the Army was learning how to better execute these CMO and were generally effective in restoring peace, governance, and economic stability. The United States recognized a need to organize civilian capabilities, especially in the medical profession, to assist in times of military necessity. A Congressional effort, this early reserve medical element consisted of approximately 3,000 professionals to be available for call-up if needed.⁵² Thus, the Army Reserve can trace its lineage to the organization of this Medical Reserve Corps in 1908.

With war beginning in Europe in 1914, the United States looked ahead and expanded the size and role of the Reserve through the National Defense Act of 1916.⁵³ This Act defined the roles all elements of the Armed Forces, including the Reserve Corps which was statutorily established through the Act.

America's first military test of global power occurred in 1917 when the United States entered into World War I. For CA, "The American Army of occupation lacked both training and organization to guide the destinies of the nearly one million civilians

⁵² Richard Crossland and James T. Currie, *Twice the Citizen: A History of the United States Army Reserve, 1908-1995* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1997), 17.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, 28.

whom the fortunes of war had placed under its temporary sovereignty”⁵⁴ after World War I. Though neither the Army nor the government fully accepted CMO or governance as a military function, even after all of the efforts in Mexico, the Confederate South, and Germany after World War I, the Army did recognize that the administration of occupied territories was “more than a minor incidental of war” in the publication of the *Hunt Report* in 1920.⁵⁵ This report was the first time that the Army would formally recognize that military governance could not be an afterthought to operations.

Following World War I, the United States reduced the size of the total military force and the Great Depression gripped the country. “National Defense Policy during the years between World Wars I and II was that maintaining a relatively small Regular Army, supplemented by a much larger force of trained reservists. Philosophically, this is what the nation desired; fiscally, however, it was not prepared to support even this modest level of military activity.”⁵⁶ As part of President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s “New Deal” program, the Civilian Conservation Corps was established. The Army assumed command and control of this program and the 1,315 associated camps.⁵⁷ During the life of the Civilian Conservation Corps, over 30,000 reserve officers were mobilized to act as cadre and caretakers of the Civilian Conservation Corps camps, marking the first use of

⁵⁴ I. L. Hunt, *American Military Government of Occupied Germany, 1918-1920* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office. 1943), 65.

⁵⁵ Earl F. Ziemke, *The U.S. Army in the Occupation of Germany 1944-1946* (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, 1975), 3.

⁵⁶ Crossland and Currie, *Twice the Citizen* (1997), 37.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, 43.

the Reserve as an operational force in what we now call Defense Support to Civil Authorities.⁵⁸ While there was not yet a formal CA branch or functional area, US Army officers performed the task. This use of the Reserve conducting CAO through Defense Support to Civil Authorities is the first indication of CAO being nested in the Army Reserve.

World War II and the Establishment of Civil Affairs

The narrative begins in the 1930s, before the outbreak of war in Europe, and concludes in mid-1946, a little more than a year after the victory. Although the likelihood of U.S. military forces occupying Germany appeared infinitesimal (sic) in the late 1930s and only slightly greater in the first two years of the 1940s, the actions taken in those years were in some ways more significant than the subsequent mission-oriented plans and preparations. It was, of course, most important that the Army, albeit somewhat reluctantly, had recognized the need for civil affairs-military government doctrine and training before the requirement to administer occupied territory was placed on it. This recognition was a true innovation in the conduct of military affairs.⁵⁹

In 1940, the Army War College class produced the first manuscript on the administration of an occupied territory⁶⁰ and as the years passed FM 27-10, *The Rules of Land Warfare*, and FM 27-5, *Military Government*, would be published,⁶¹ marking the first formal directives for military governance and CMO. While the United States had yet to establish any formal training on the matter, the British intelligence office established a

⁵⁸ Brad Striegel, "Maintaining the Operational Reserve," *Small Wars Journal*, January 15, 2016, accessed October 23, 2018, <https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/maintaining-the-operational-reserve>.

⁵⁹ Ziemke, *The U.S. Army in the Occupation of Germany 1944-1946*, v.

⁶⁰ Ibid., 4.

⁶¹ Ibid.

“politico-military course” to train officers in post-war reconstruction. Attending this course in October 1941, two American Army officers received training dealing in “history, geography, economics, and politics aimed at giving the officer-students background knowledge rather than specific instruction in military government.”⁶²

While these two officers cannot be credited for the development of US civil-military training, their attendance, in conjunction with the directives in FM 27-5, certainly laid the foundation for a formal training program to be developed in the United States. By November 1941, military government instruction was incorporated into the newly formed military police school. However, because civil-military governance was strikingly different from police activities, the military governance portion of the training was removed.

On April 2, 1942 the School of Military Government, still organized under the Office of the Provost Marshall, was established at the University of Virginia with Brigadier General Cornelius W. Wickersham as the commandant ⁶³ and Colonel Cuthbert P. Stearns as the director of military faculty. The first course was taught beginning in May 1942.⁶⁴ “The likelihood that the Army would have to assume world-wide relief obligations as well as govern occupied territory . . . could mean that at some time all the

⁶² Ziemke, *The U.S. Army in the Occupation of Germany 1944-1946*, 5.

⁶³ Ibid., 7.

⁶⁴ Ibid., 8.

forces in the field would have substantial civil affairs or military government responsibilities.”⁶⁵

The War Department needed to establish an organizational structure to manage CAO by early 1943. Operation Husky was slated to place the United States in “relationships between civil and military authorities, the handling of the civilian population, and the arrangements with respect to both which would have to be made with the British.”⁶⁶ To effectively manage these and other CA issues, the War Department created the Civil Affairs Division on March 1, 1943. The Civil Affairs Division established itself as the lead US Government agency for all matters related to CA and military governance. It would “act for the Chief of Staff and . . . coordinate for the War Department all actions of civilian agencies in theaters of operations.”⁶⁷

By the end of 1943, the 450 Army students at the University of Virginia could not support the pool of officers required for ongoing and planned operations for the war, focused in Europe. While other options were considered, such as establishing an additional course, the Army created the Civil Affairs Training Program (CATP). The CATP was designed to pull students from the civilian sector and train them in two phases. The first was a one-month program of military and military governance training; the second was a three-month training course hosted by a number of universities in

⁶⁵ Ziemke, *The U.S. Army in the Occupation of Germany 1944-1946*, 8.

⁶⁶ Ibid., 17.

⁶⁷ Ibid.

specialty fields of study.⁶⁸ The primary difference between the CATP and the school at University of Virginia was that a CATP student “spent half his time studying a foreign language and most of the other half in foreign area studies. The CATP graduate was expected to deal directly with the people in occupied areas, the Charlottesville graduate primarily with his own allied staffs.”⁶⁹

In the last four months of 1943, Charlottesville and the CATP schools together turned out more than two thousand graduates, thereby nearly filling the estimated wartime European requirements. Recruitment for the European training program ended in December [1943] and the last European courses at the schools were completed in April 1944.⁷⁰

The British students attending British versions of CA course were able to complete the courses and return to their homes or home units. American students would require a long trans-Atlantic movement before becoming operationally available. As such, American leadership accepted the risk that the American CA personnel would possibly be “kept hanging about [in England] for a long time as the price for having them at hand if they were suddenly needed.”⁷¹

By December 1943, the American School Center at Shrivenham, England, about 100km West of London, is where the CA Center was established by Colonel Stearns to train CA officers and enlisted personnel upon their arrival to the European Theater of Operations. This former girls’ school, and home to army officer candidate training, was

⁶⁸ Ziemke, *The U.S. Army in the Occupation of Germany 1944-1946*, 18-19.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, 19.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, 20.

⁷¹ *Ibid.*, 32.

selected by Stearns as it simply had enough room to house and train roughly 1,000 additional men⁷² onsite. Following training, the CA Center assigned the soldiers to detachments and conducted additional specified training. This CA Center provided the constant flow of soldiers with adequate training to capable and equipped detachments with subject-matter-experts on a pinpoint location of responsibility during the occupation.

The CA Center first received and processed the soldiers, then immediately held a series of four boards to organize the men before beginning two phases of training prior to forward movement into continental Europe. Of the four boards conducted, the first had the most impact on the individual concerned. In this first board, the soldier was placed for consideration in one of the other three assignment boards consisting of Army Group, Army, Corps, and Division staff; CA Detachment; and finally, service with the British Army. Within the CA Detachment board, which consumed the majority of the personnel, the soldiers were further filtered into one of four sub-categories determining the type of area in which the soldier would specialize. The first of these was considered an “elite” assignment, Group “A”: Major Cities, including Berlin and Paris. The remaining three selections, groups “B”, “C”, and “D”, were progressively smaller cities, villages, and hamlets. Of possibilities, selection into Group “A” or “B” was most desirable in terms of berthing opportunities, experiences, and promotion potential, but Group “C” and “D” assignments were most needed by the Army and took the most men from the boards.⁷³

⁷² Ziemke, *The U.S. Army in the Occupation of Germany 1944-1946*, 62.

⁷³ *Ibid.*, 63.

On January 27, 1944, the first 416 officers arrived at Shrivenham and an additional 308 arrived on January 29th, with a total of 770 total officers in training by the first of February. By the end of February 1944, an additional 1,000 officers arrived for CA training and assignment. The conditions at the school were uncomfortable, and the general mood of the trainees was low. This group of Soldiers that began their journey in the United States would be prepared to undertake the monumental task of military governance in Europe following the Allied invasion of France in June 1944.⁷⁴

The bottom line for allied planners was that they recognized:

the purpose of military government in Germany would be to assist the military commander to impose his will on the enemy, and the first concern would be to help maintain the striking power of the military forces by controlling movements of people and by preventing disease and disorder. Relief, an important function in liberated Allied territory, would be restricted in Germany to those measures which the Supreme Allied Commander may specifically direct to prevent a general breakdown of civil life and the spread of disease.⁷⁵

As the war in Europe raged from Normandy to the east, cities and nations were liberated. The war finally won, operations in rear areas of the combat zone began to take on the majority of the CA and military governance requirements. “In the field, by the end of June 1946, the military government detachments were divorced from the tactical commands, much reduced in strength, partially civilianized, and limited to observing and advising German governmental agencies. Military government as it was conceived during the war and installed in Germany in 1944 and 1945 had ended.”⁷⁶ “In all, civil affairs

⁷⁴ Ziemke, *The U.S. Army in the Occupation of Germany 1944-1946*, 64.

⁷⁵ Ibid., 32.

⁷⁶ Ibid., v.

involvement in World War II was largely successful, as 25,000 civil affairs personnel aided over 80 million civilians in enemy and allied nations, largely by governing or advising governments.”⁷⁷

In the years prior to 1946, the United States slowly developed a concept of CA as an integral component of military operations, with early success observed through Scott’s formulation of orders to govern both the local populations as well as the conduct of his forces a century before. Few improvements were made to the concept of CA or military governance until after World War I, and even then, not until after hostilities had ceased. Recognizing the woefully inadequate response to reconstruction efforts at the conclusion of the Great War, the United States, through the *Hunt Report* during the interwar period, truly established an ‘American Way of War’ in that “the Army . . . had recognized the need for civil affairs-military government doctrine and training before the requirement to administer occupied territory was placed on it. This recognition was a true innovation in the conduct of military affairs.”⁷⁸

American leaders utilized a corps of specially trained soldiers, based on their civilian sector professional experience, to support the military commanders in imposing the will of the Allies. They maintained peace and order, and re-established basic governance, infrastructure, agriculture, and economy in the immediate aftermath of active

⁷⁷ Kathleen H. Hicks, Christine E. Wormuth, and Eric Ridge, “The Future of the U.S. Civil Affairs Forces: A Report of the CSIS International Security Program” (Report, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, DC, February 2009), 4, accessed October 21, 2018, https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/legacy_files/files/publication/130409_Hicks_FutureCivilAffairs_Web.pdf.

⁷⁸ Ziemke, *The U.S. Army in the Occupation of Germany 1944-1946*, v.

war, occupation, and liberation. CA and Military Governance was now the responsibility of military commanders.⁷⁹ Following World War II, CA underwent key changes and were repeatedly called upon to support national efforts across the globe.

⁷⁹ Ziemke, *The U.S. Army in the Occupation of Germany 1944-1946*, 64.

CHAPTER 3

CIVIL AFFAIRS 1946 TO 2001

Following hostilities in Europe, and the use of CA in the rebuilding of the governments, infrastructure, and culture of numerous European nations, the USAR and CA underwent important changes that shaped their organization, training, and utilization today. Importantly, the USAR and CA forces, through legislative efforts, were brought to parity with the Active force in terms of priority of manning, equipping, training, and benefits. Utilization of the USAR, particularly in the CA force, was observed from Korea through the Global War on Terrorism.

After its passage, a number of studies, debates, inquiries, and boards were convened to better define, understand, and implement the NSA of 1947. Secretary of Defense James Forrestal convened one such board, the Committee on Civilian Components, which was commonly referred to as the “Gray Board”.⁸⁰ In its final report to Congress, the Gray Board recommended the abolishment of the National Guard and Reserve, and their reorganization into a single federally-controlled force: The National Guard of the United States. This board recommendation failed due to strong opposition in Congress and by interest groups, as well as lack of endorsement by Forrestal. The board did, however, identify what would be a long-running theme within the Reserve: that the Reserve was “long on experience, but short on Readiness.”⁸¹

⁸⁰ Library of Congress Federal Research Division, *Historical Attempts to Reorganize the Reserve Components* (Washington, DC: Library of Congress, 2007), 2.

⁸¹ *Ibid.*, 2-3.

Another critical piece of post-war legislation was Public Law 80-759, the Selective Service Act of 1948, which authorized the President or Congress to call up members of the Reserve component with less than 90 days active service, exclusive of periods of active duty for training, for a period of up to 21 months.⁸² The immediate result of this piece of legislation was the mobilization and use of “a total of 404 units of the Organized Reserve, plus 10,584 individual Organized Reserve officers” by the end of August, 1950 for service in Korea.⁸³ In total, 240,500 members of the Organized Reserve were called to active duty to support the war effort in Korea. Of note is the Army policy at this time that “officers and enlisted personnel would not be stripped out of organized units and sent to Korea as replacements.”⁸⁴ This would be the first time that the Army would recognize and act on the idea that Reserve unit readiness would be negatively affected by the loss of even small numbers of personnel.

An Era of Conflict: Korea, Vietnam, the Cold War and Peacekeeping

“The Korean War marked a sea change in the U.S. approach to civil affairs, with those operations overtaking military governance as the chief mission priority for the first time. . . . Although civil affairs tasks were at first narrowly focused on protecting civilians, the overwhelming number of . . . refugees . . . led to social unrest, economic

⁸² Library of Congress Federal Research Division, *Historical Attempts to Reorganize the Reserve Components*, 2.

⁸³ Crossland and Currie, *Twice the Citizen* (1997), 96.

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, 97.

turmoil and public health concerns.”⁸⁵ The CA concentrated on three critical tasks in Korea: achieve peace; reestablish political economic conditions; and hold free elections for a unified Korea. Continuing their mission, CA efforts expanded to stabilization efforts including the provision of public health assistance, law enforcement, and infrastructure assessments and rehabilitation.⁸⁶

In 1952, Public Law 66-476, the Armed Forces Reserve Act of 1952, was passed by Congress. This law was created after mobilization difficulties were identified during the onset of the Korean War. “Reservists discovered . . . that hardship could occur without being mobilized. Indeed, within two months . . . of war in Korea, reports were reaching the Department of the Army that Organized Reserve and National Guard members, because of the uncertainty surrounding their possible mobilization, were having trouble finding permanent employment.”⁸⁷ Stated in a memorandum to the Secretaries of the Army, Navy, Air Force from a member of the Civilian Components Policy Board, morale in the Reserve had sharply decreased to the point that many members were eager to resign their commission at the first opportunity. “This is not because of any unwillingness to serve their country in a time of war, but because the reservist finds himself unduly penalized in time of limited mobilization.”⁸⁸

⁸⁵ Hicks, Wormuth, and Ridge, “The Future of the U.S. Civil Affairs Forces,” 4.

⁸⁶ Ibid., 4-5.

⁸⁷ Crossland and Currie, *Twice the Citizen* (1997), 99-100.

⁸⁸ Ibid., 100.

The Armed Forces Reserve Act of 1952 specifically created the seven Reserve forces (Army Reserve and Army National Guard, Air Force Reserve and Air National Guard, Naval Reserve, Marine Corps Reserve, and the Coast Guard Reserve) and further prioritized their resourcing in creating the Ready Reserve, the Standby Reserve, and the Retired Reserve. The Act also established an end strength of 1.5 million personnel and allowed them to volunteer for routine, non-combat active duty in lieu of possible mobilization.⁸⁹ Importantly, the Armed Forces Reserve Act of 1952 contained a requirement from Congress that consideration be given to the nature and duration of any future mobilization of reserve forces. The law required that any reserve units or members being involuntarily ordered to active duty be shall be ordered to duty only with their units.⁹⁰

The Army established the Civil Affairs–Military Government branch in the Army Reserve on August 17, 1955 and re-designated this organization the CA branch on October 2, 1959⁹¹ based on the demonstrated requirement to maintain in the Army inventory the unique professional skills brought by the citizen-soldier of the Army Reserve. “By the early 1960s, almost all (97 percent) of the US Army’s CA capability was in the Army Reserve, where it remains today. This was (and remains) appropriate

⁸⁹ Library of Congress Federal Research Division, *Historical Attempts to Reorganize the Reserve Components*, 3.

⁹⁰ Crossland and Currie, *Twice the Citizen* (1997), 101.

⁹¹ It was not until October 16, 2006 that Civil Affairs was established as a basic branch in the Regular Army. US Army Special Operations Command, “U.S. Army Civil Affairs Regiment.”

because the professional competence of CA personnel is derived principally from their civilian careers.”⁹²

Following Korea, the first notable use of CA was in 1965 when the United States deployed nearly 23,000 soldiers to the Dominican Republic after several years of political strife in that nation. USAR CA forces distributed food, restored power, and restarted trash collection services, as well as other essential services for this island nation. While unable to assist with government reforms due to legal issues, the success of the CA efforts led to overall mission success and the emergence of the revitalized CA branch.⁹³

Later in 1965, “Reserve forces policy precipitated a crisis in political-military relations as the United States began deploying massive ground forces to Vietnam in July 1965.”⁹⁴ After returning from Vietnam in July 1965, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara recommended to President Lyndon Johnson an increase in the active force in Vietnam, including a call-up of over 235,000 Reserve soldiers. The Army was already preparing for the presidential directive, as the Deputy Secretary of Defense had learned that the President was “favorably disposed” to this action. The Department of Defense was, however, surprised to learn on July 23, 1965, that Johnson would not be mobilizing any members of the Reserve for service in Vietnam.⁹⁵

⁹² Bingham, Cleary, and Rubini, *U.S. Army Civil Affairs-The Army’s “Ounce of Prevention,”* 4.

⁹³ Hicks, Wormuth, and Ridge, “The Future of the U.S. Civil Affairs Forces,” 5.

⁹⁴ Lewis Sorley, “Reserve Components: Looking Back to Look Ahead,” *Joint Force Quarterly*, no. 36 (December 2004): 18.

⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, 19.

The decision by Johnson to deny McNamara the use of the Reserve was astounding, and it created a crisis for the Army, since every plan previously made included the use of the Reserve. The Army was reliant on the Reserve, and according to Army Chief of Staff General Harold Johnson, “without the Reserve the quality of the Army is going to erode and we’re going to suffer very badly.” Further, once the news that Reserve units would not deploy to Vietnam was made public, the Reserve force was filled by personnel actively attempting to avoid service in Vietnam. Compounding the issue, much of the equipment that was in the Reserve was transferred to newly formed Active units, thus making any chance of creating a ready and able Reserve force nearly impossible.⁹⁶

In November 1965, as US forces began large scale operations in Vietnam, CA would focus on fighting two separate strategies: the conventional fight in the North against the National Liberation Forces (NLF), and a counterinsurgency fight in the South against the Viet Cong. Vietnam, due to extenuating political upheaval in the US, did not see the use of the USAR in any significant numbers, except in the use of CA personnel. Vietnam marked the first concerted effort of the United States to wage war by “winning the hearts and minds” of local populations in the protracted guerrilla campaign in South Vietnam. The establishment and use of a civic action program called Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) by the Military Assistance Command Vietnam established the concept of CA as a force multiplier and critical dimension of modern conflict.

⁹⁶ Sorley, “Reserve Components,” 19-20.

CORDS coordinated US government efforts in civil-military pacification in all 44 provinces. Composed largely of Reserve CA officers, the companies of 60 officers and 100 soldiers had three primary objectives: eliminate the Viet Cong insurgency in South Vietnam; diminish the Viet Cong's recruiting capability; and recruit indigenous tribes to fight the Viet Cong and NLF conventional army forces.⁹⁷ Through CORDS, five additional tasks including new life development; revolutionary development cadre; refugee support; psychological operations; and public safety were initiated to remove the Viet Cong from South Vietnam. CORDS was considered largely successful as its organized command and control and improved accountability throughout the region.⁹⁸

Fighting in the North, the 41st CA Company deployed and became the primary unit providing CA support to the First Field Force–Vietnam. The 41st CA Company (active duty) consisted of twenty teams assigned to every major tactical unit deployed throughout the First Field Force–Vietnam area of operations. Deactivated on February 28, 1970, the company served five continuous years in Vietnam.⁹⁹ While the Army, and CA, had been fighting the war in Vietnam, many changes were occurring in the military as a whole. Amongst these changes, the policy decisions of the departments were the most notable.

⁹⁷ Hicks, Wormuth, and Ridge, "The Future of the U.S. Civil Affairs Forces," 6.

⁹⁸ Ibid.

⁹⁹ US Army Fort Bragg, "Lineage of the 83rd Civil Affairs Battalion," accessed January 13, 2019, <https://home.army.mil/bragg/index.php/units-tenants/xviii-airborne-co/16th-military-police-brigade/83rd-civil-affairs-battalion>.

The single most important policy decision to affect the modern USAR force was first envisioned in 1970, when Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird championed the integration of the Reserve and Active components in a “total force” concept that had the Active component supported by a well-trained and ready Reserve. This concept would solve manpower gaps as the Vietnam draft was abolished, and compensated for budget reductions in the active component as the war in Vietnam ended.¹⁰⁰ The idea of the total force concept was an integration of Reserves into the active capability. Integrated into active plans, this created a dependence on the Reserve for future conflicts and deployments by the Army as a whole.¹⁰¹ The total force concept continued into the 21st Century and is the basic policy that guides the Army today.

Vietnam brought lasting changes to CA. On September 15, 1971, the CA School moved to Fort Bragg, North Carolina and eventually became part of the US Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School (USAJFKSWCS). While the Army disbanded most active-duty CA units, the 96th CA Battalion remained and the preponderance of CA units stayed in the USAR.¹⁰²

Officially, adopted in 1973, the Department of Defense Total Force Policy was the basis for the manning, training, and equipping of forces through the post-Cold War era. The idea was to integrate unique capabilities of both the Active and Reserve

¹⁰⁰ Library of Congress Federal Research Division, *Historical Attempts to Reorganize the Reserve Components*, 15.

¹⁰¹ Sorley, “Reserve Components,” 21.

¹⁰² US Army Special Operations Command History Office, *U.S. Army Civil Affairs History Handbook* (Fort Bragg, NC: United States Army Special Operations Command, 2016), 5.

component forces.¹⁰³ The United States sought to conserve resources with a small Active force augmented by a strong Reserve, all while maintaining the ability to project military power, ensure national security, and adapt to global requirements. This policy balanced where the military capabilities would be located in the Active and Reserve components, and assumed that the Reserve component would be the primary means of augmentation to the Active force in a time of crisis.

In an effort to ensure that the Reserve, as a whole, would be used in future conflicts and could not be ignored as Johnson had done in Vietnam, the Army force structure was modified to place a majority of specific, required functions and capabilities in the Reserve and not in the active component. These units were primarily combat support and combat service support units, and in needing these units to be a fully functional Army, the idea of a “round out” capability was conceived. This idea had Reserve elements of battalion or larger tied to active component units in the event of conflict, with the Reserve mobilization required before the Active unit could be considered “combat ready”.¹⁰⁴

In 1975, Army Chief of Staff Creighton Abrams recognized and agreed that future wars could not be fought without the use of the Reserve. General Abrams developed the “Abrams Doctrine” that addressed Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger’s concerns that the Army was hollow; it was filled with personnel, but lacked the training and

¹⁰³ Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, *The Reserve Components of the United States Armed Forces* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1996), 11.

¹⁰⁴ Sorley, “Reserve Components,” 22.

readiness to be effective in combat. This “Abrams Doctrine” was grounded in the “Roundout Strategy” that aligned Reserve Brigades with Active duty Divisions to fill, or “round out” the reduced manpower in organizations.

Additionally, this policy provided equal priority to Active and Reserve units for equipping and modernization efforts. Finally, the “Abrams Doctrine” addressed a political issue that existed at the time: The use of military power by the President or Congress must also be supported by the people of the United States.¹⁰⁵ The “Abrams Doctrine” use of Reserve component forces to support the Active component forced the military to impact society by using the Reserve. This use affected families and businesses throughout the nation as the Reserve members would be “taken away” in times of military crisis. This Total Force Policy is still in place today.

In 1976, Congress provided the President the authority to call up Reservists to active duty for 90 days, without their consent, for situations other than a national emergency. This authority was called the Presidential Selected Reserve Call-Up (PSRC), and it has since evolved into Section 12304 of Title 10, US Code.¹⁰⁶ While there were other reasons for this policy, by allowing the President to call up members of the Reserve for short periods, the Army could capitalize on the specialized, functional expertise only found in its civilian sector members when needed most.

¹⁰⁵ Library of Congress Federal Research Division, *Historical Attempts to Reorganize the Reserve Components*, 15.

¹⁰⁶ Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, *The Reserve Components of the United States Armed Forces*, 57-58.

Strengthening the Total Force Policy, the Abrams Doctrine, and the role of the Reserve, in June of 1982 Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger introduced the “First to Fight” concept. This concept effectively stated that those units, regardless of component, that were slated to fight earliest in conflict would receive the priority in equipping and modernization.¹⁰⁷

Becoming a core element of Army Special Operations, the Active duty 96th CA Battalion was organized under the 1st Special Operations Command, established at Fort Bragg, North Carolina on October 1, 1982. This transition of the Active duty CA forces to special operations was the beginning of what would be a long relationship between CA and USASOC, and it informally identified CA as a “special operation”.¹⁰⁸ Throughout the 1980s, the USAR was called upon to support limited contingency operations throughout the world. From Grenada to Panama, CA played a critical part of every major operation in which the United States participated.

In October 1983, USAR CA were deployed to support the Grenada mission, Operation Urgent Fury, with the purpose of rescuing American college students, restoring order, and restoring the popular government of the island nation.¹⁰⁹

Despite a lack of civil affairs planning before the invasion, once on the ground, civil affairs teams secured the environment and reconstructed the island, conducting tasks such as caring for displaced citizens and rebuilding

¹⁰⁷ Library of Congress Federal Research Division, *Historical Attempts to Reorganize the Reserve Components*, 16.

¹⁰⁸ US Army Special Operations Command History Office, *U.S. Army Civil Affairs History Handbook*, 6.

¹⁰⁹ Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, *The Reserve Components of the United States Armed Forces*, 7.

infrastructure, including schools, public utilities, communications, public works, roads, and sewage systems.¹¹⁰

The success of the CA efforts was clear. CA, in conjunction with combat operations, were now an integral part of future planning. The failures of the combat force during this mission were glaring, and the most notable issue was that the Services needed to work together to achieve joint interoperability. One solution to the problem was the provision of more power to the Office of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff through the Goldwater-Nichols Act.¹¹¹

In 1986, Congress passed Public Law 99-661, the National Defense Authorization Act for 1987, which included the provision to establish USSOCOM as a unified command.¹¹² Additionally, the FY 1997 National Defense Authorization Act increased from 100,000 to 200,000 the number of Reserve members that the President could order to active duty, involuntarily, and increased by an additional 90 days the call-up authority for these members.

By 1988, the Reserve constituted more than one-half of the Army force.¹¹³ That year, US House Representative Bill Chappell, Chairman of the House Appropriations Defense Appropriations Subcommittee, requested that the Army investigate the

¹¹⁰ Hicks, Wormuth, and Ridge, “The Future of the U.S. Civil Affairs Forces,” 7.

¹¹¹ Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, Public Law 99-433, 99th Cong. (October 1, 1986).

¹¹² Andrew Feickert, *U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF): Background and Issues for Congress* (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, April 2018), 1.

¹¹³ Library of Congress Federal Research Division, *Historical Attempts to Reorganize the Reserve Components*, 30.

feasibility of the Chief, Army Reserve “dual hat” as the Commander of the Army Reserve. While not supported by the Army at the time, particularly by US Forces Command (FORSCOM), Congress continued to stress the importance of a single chain of command for the Army Reserve.¹¹⁴

Later, in 1989, US House Representative John Murtha, Chairman of the House Defense Appropriations Subcommittee (this is a new committee, not the same committee as Rep. Chappell in 1988) told the Secretary of the Army that the committee was concerned about the command structure of the Army Reserve, and further directed that the Army begin to realign the command and control of the Reserve to the Chief, Army Reserve as the command and control of the Air Force Reserve and National Guard Bureau is to their respective Chiefs.¹¹⁵

As the Cold War ended, the United States was required to face new threats as a result of the power vacuum in the former Soviet empire. Regional instability and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction were of primary concern. The fall of the wall also signified a major shift in US action throughout the world, that of peacekeeper. The new demand of ensuring world peace caused the US to realize that it would rely heavily on the Reserve component to fill the new peacekeeping and stability operations requirements. Whether by direct unilateral action, supported by other partner nations, or as a part of a United Nations force, American involvement in global security through

¹¹⁴ Library of Congress Federal Research Division, *Historical Attempts to Reorganize the Reserve Components*, 17.

¹¹⁵ Crossland and Currie, *Twice the Citizen* (1997), 322; Library of Congress Federal Research Division, *Historical Attempts to Reorganize the Reserve Components*, 17.

stabilization, peacekeeping, or humanitarian action dramatically increased after 1989. These peacekeeping and humanitarian intervention actions were executed to stabilize state-to-state relationships as well as protect the people within them. This is a critical aspect of demonstrated US foreign policy, and CA was, and is, the key component of these missions as it links the diplomatic and military aspects of national power to national security policy.

As an example, Army Reserve CA teams were a part of the airborne infiltration, combat actions, and stability operations during Operation Just Cause, the liberation of the Republic of Panama.¹¹⁶ In an attempt to bring Panamanian President Manuel Noriega to justice for the attack on two US service members by Panamanian Defense Forces, President George H. W. Bush deployed American forces to restore popular government and protect American lives, property, and interests in the Panama Canal area.¹¹⁷ The CA forces helped to establish law and order; provided support to the new government; established and managed refugee camps; established civil-military operations support; aided in conducting nation-building operations;¹¹⁸ cared for displaced persons; and restored public services.¹¹⁹ At virtually the same time, the USSOCOM was established on December 1, 1989, with the 96th CA Battalion immediately becoming a part of that organization. All of the Reserve CA units were task organized under a similar

¹¹⁶ Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, *The Reserve Components of the United States Armed Forces*, 8.

¹¹⁷ Hicks, Wormuth, and Ridge, "The Future of the U.S. Civil Affairs Forces," 7.

¹¹⁸ Sadler, *Glad to See Them Come and Sorry to See Them Go*, 378.

¹¹⁹ Hicks, Wormuth, and Ridge, "The Future of the U.S. Civil Affairs Forces," 7.

organization called the USAR Special Operations Command, headquarter alongside USASOC at Fort Bragg.¹²⁰

On August 2, 1990, Iraqi military forces invaded Kuwait. The United States responded with Operation Desert Shield. In concert with a coalition of nations, US forces deployed to support the Arab nations in the Persian Gulf from the aggression of Saddam Hussein. After the Iraqi Army seized the country of Kuwait, the exiled Kuwaiti government sought support to remove the occupying Iraqi forces from their county. Saudi Arabia and other neighboring nations expressed concern that Iraq would continue its annexation into other Gulf States and requested the support of the United States in their defense. Specifically, the United States and the coalition sought to shield Saudi Arabia from the Iraqi forces in Kuwait, and immediately sent combat troops to the region to conduct this mission.

By August 22, 1990, the first involuntary call to active duty was executed under the Total Force Policy¹²¹ through Partial Mobilization and PSRC by President Bush. During the totality of the Persian Gulf War, some 85,276 reservists served¹²² under PSRC authority and an additional 165,000 were mobilized under Partial Mobilization.¹²³ The US military response included the mobilization of combat support and combat service

¹²⁰ US Army Special Operations Command History Office, *U.S. Army Civil Affairs History Handbook*, 6.

¹²¹ Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, *The Reserve Components of the United States Armed Forces*, 8.

¹²² *Ibid.*, 32.

¹²³ *Ibid.*, 63.

support units and personnel from the Army Reserve, but did not include any “round out” Brigades,¹²⁴ though several were called up for training.

As hostilities were ending, CA forces, generally assigned to Task Force Freedom, were responsible for repairing Kuwait’s infrastructure including the power grid. Additionally, CA elements delivered food and water; repaired law enforcement systems such as vehicles and communications; provided veterinarian services to the zoo; established commercial vendors for services and goods; and supported the reestablishment of the banking system. They also oversaw contracts for hundreds of millions of dollars in emergency services.¹²⁵

In 1990, the US Army Reserve Command was also established, though it was placed under the control of FORSCOM, not the Chief, Army Reserve. Congress was aware of the Army’s plan and initiated legislation to force the Army to establish US Army Reserve Command as a separate command under the Chief, Army Reserve.¹²⁶ Congress further established its position in the FY 1991 Defense Appropriations bill when it directed that “Command and control relationships between and active and reserve forces, which are perceived by many as contributing factors to the relatively low

¹²⁴ Library of Congress Federal Research Division, *Historical Attempts to Reorganize the Reserve Components*, 16.

¹²⁵ Hicks, Wormuth, and Ridge, “The Future of the U.S. Civil Affairs Forces,” 8.

¹²⁶ Library of Congress Federal Research Division, *Historical Attempts to Reorganize the Reserve Components*, 18.

readiness status of the Army reserve, are not sufficiently changed in the current Army plan to provide actual command and control to the Chief of the Army Reserve.”¹²⁷

Congress then passed Public Law 101-510, Section 903, the National Defense Authorization Act for FY 1991, requiring the “establishment of a United States Army Reserve Command under the command of the Chief of Army Reserve. The Army Reserve Command shall be a major subordinate command of Forces Command.”¹²⁸ Further, on November 27, 1990, the Army Reserve Special Operations Command was officially re-designated the USACAPOC(A). With this designation, USACAPOC(A) was organized as a subordinate unit of the USASOC and absorbed the totality of Army CA and PO units and organizations, including the active duty 96th CA Battalion.¹²⁹

Understanding that the United States would be engaging in combat operations in the Middle East, the Pentagon recommended to Congress that Active component forces be capable of deploying to a conflict for 30 days without the support from the Reserve component.¹³⁰ On January 17, 1991, Operation Desert Storm commenced on the order of President Bush. This offensive was designed to forcibly remove Iraqi forces from Kuwait and destroy the Iraqi army to the point that it lacked the will or capability to continue its desire of annexation. With the commencement of combat operations, President Bush

¹²⁷ Library of Congress Federal Research Division, *Historical Attempts to Reorganize the Reserve Components*, 18.

¹²⁸ Ibid.

¹²⁹ US Army Special Operations Command History Office, *U.S. Army Civil Affairs History Handbook*, 6.

¹³⁰ Library of Congress Federal Research Division, *Historical Attempts to Reorganize the Reserve Components*, 31.

executed a Partial Mobilization on January 18, 1991, and called nearly one million Reserve personnel to active duty for two years to support the operation. During this conflict, the rapid deployment and effective actions of numerous Reserve units validated the concept of the modern Total Force Policy for the military.¹³¹ In Desert Shield and Desert Storm “Civil Affairs assets, which were originally slated to play a minor role, were suddenly in greater demand. From preventing civilian interference with combat missions to handling displaced citizens and refugees and providing emergency aid to Kuwaitis immediately after that country’s liberation, civil affairs played a vital role.”¹³²

In a panel discussion at the 2014 to 2015 CA Symposium, it was noted that “prior to Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, military organizations relegated much of the CA planning to exercising for future wars. But since expeditionary operations depend on friendly forces for planning capabilities, contract oversight, and civil-military interaction, Desert Shield/Storm reemphasized the need for CA.”¹³³ The panel further noted that after this short war, CA became a well-recognized and “valued function” for theater staff(s).¹³⁴

¹³¹ Michael D. Doubler, *Civilian in Peace, Soldier in War-The Army National Guard, 1636-2000* (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas. 2003), 229. Cited in Library of Congress Federal Research Division, *Historical Attempts to Reorganize the Reserve Components*, 18.

¹³² Hicks, Wormuth, and Ridge, “The Future of the U.S. Civil Affairs Forces,” 7.

¹³³ Christopher Holshek and John C. Church, Jr., ed., *2014-2015 Civil Affairs Issue Papers: “The Future of Civil Affairs”* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Army War College Press, 2015), 9.

¹³⁴ *Ibid.*, 10.

Following the Desert Shield and Desert Storm actions, the USAR underwent a modernization effort to bring equity to its force, including DoD Directive 1225.6, *Equipping the Reserve Forces* from November 2, 1992. With this directive, the Reserve component began the massive modernization needed to assume what would become a significant increase in operational tempo necessary to support the peacetime operations, operations other than war, contingencies, and other augmentation. This unknowingly prepared the force for the rapid and numerous mobilizations after September 11, 2001.¹³⁵

The General Accounting Office released a report in 1993 that discussed the effectiveness of Reserve units that supported Operation Desert Shield and Operation Desert Storm. In this report, the General Accounting Office found that a majority of the Reserve units and personnel called to support operations were not adequately trained or ready to assume combat duties.¹³⁶ This report raised concern in Congress and the Department of Defense, as it questioned the effectiveness of the Total Force Policy.

In 1993, after the completion of the Bottom-Up-Review, the Department of Defense worked to establish a National Security Strategy to address post-Cold-War issues.¹³⁷ In this review, the Department of Defense recognized a future force requirement that was able to deal with regional conflicts, stability operations in failing

¹³⁵ US Department of Defense, Department of Defense Directive 1225.6, *Equipping the Reserve Forces* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, November 1992), 2.

¹³⁶ Library of Congress Federal Research Division, *Historical Attempts to Reorganize the Reserve Components*, 16-17.

¹³⁷ Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, *The Reserve Components of the United States Armed Forces*, 9.

and/or developing states, countering weapons of mass destruction, and other threats to national security.¹³⁸ Due to these emerging requirements, additional emphasis was placed on Reserve units and personnel, and additional force structure and reorganization was required and emplaced.

The Bottom-Up Review also identified that the Reserve component would be required for peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance missions, and that they must be ready to meet short-notice challenges not seen during the Cold War. The Reserve would be required to provide large numbers of individual augmentees and units to reinforce the Active units during the early stages of unforeseen regional conflicts, as rotational units during large combat operations, and specialized capabilities during stability and peacekeeping operations.

These specialized capabilities, including CA, were organized within the special operations community¹³⁹ under USASOC. This was due to their utilization in “unique” operations. Special Forces, PO, and CA were becoming a key component of US military operations throughout the world. Active and Reserve component CA organizations “officially” became members of ARSOF on March 3, 1993, with Secretary of Defense Les Aspin’s formal designation.¹⁴⁰ In fact, CA forces were conducting “special” operations long before this formal declaration.

¹³⁸ Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, *The Reserve Components of the United States Armed Forces*, 9.

¹³⁹ Hicks, Wormuth, and Ridge, “The Future of the U.S. Civil Affairs Forces,” 8.

¹⁴⁰ US Army Special Operations Command History Office, *U.S. Army Civil Affairs History Handbook*, 6.

To better align and organize the USAR for future conflicts, Congress enacted Public Law 103-160 in the FY 1994 National Defense Authorization Act. This law amended the FY 1991 Defense Authorization Act to state that the Army Reserve Command “shall be a separate command of the Army commanded by the Chief, Army Reserve.” and further directed that all Army Reserve forces would be assigned to the Commander, US Atlantic Command and not to FORSCOM.¹⁴¹ This reorganization did not include the forces assigned to USACAPOC(A), as a part of USASOC. Further, in 1994, the Department of Defense directed a major overhaul and reorganization of the Reserve component. In this response to the Bottom-Up Review, the Army aligned all reserve component combat units to the National Guard, and all combat support and combat service support units to the Army Reserve, with few exceptions.¹⁴² While the Special Forces units moved from the Reserve to the Guard, CA and PO capabilities remained in the Reserve.

This was the first major reorganization of the Reserve component since its inception. Thus, the primary role of the Army Reserve in the mid-1990s was to provide combat support and combat service support to the Active Army. While only accounting for 20 percent of the total force structure, the Army Reserve provided 30 percent of the

¹⁴¹ Library of Congress Federal Research Division, *Historical Attempts to Reorganize the Reserve Components*, 18.

¹⁴² *Ibid.*, 32.

combat support and 45 percent of combat service support of the capability to the total force,¹⁴³ and 95 percent of all CA force structure.

On September 19, 1994, President Bill Clinton utilized PSRC to mobilize Reserve members,¹⁴⁴ including CA, for deployment to Haiti in support of United Nations Security Council Resolution 940 as a part of Operation Uphold Democracy.¹⁴⁵ The purpose of this action was to restore and support the elected government of President Jean Bertrand Aristide until the democracy was capable of sustaining itself. Secondary to this mission was an effort to prevent a large number of Haitians from attempting to reach the United States in ramshackle boats and other craft.¹⁴⁶ While the mission was limited, the CA forces were able to “complete hundreds of reconstruction projects while working with civilian organizations.”¹⁴⁷ Brigadier General (Retired) Bruce B. Bingham, former Commanding General, USACAPOC(A) and then CA Advisor for the Haitian mission to the Commander in Chief, US Atlantic Command, stated that the Haiti mission highlighted CA personnel as an integral part of the success of Operation Uphold Democracy.¹⁴⁸

¹⁴³ Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, *The Reserve Components of the United States Armed Forces*, 32.

¹⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 58.

¹⁴⁵ United Nations Security Council, *Resolution 940* (New York: United Nations Security Council, July 31, 1994), accessed March 18, 2019, <http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/doc/940>.

¹⁴⁶ Holshek and Church, *2014-2015 Civil Affairs Issue Papers*, 2.

¹⁴⁷ Hicks, Wormuth, and Ridge, “The Future of the U.S. Civil Affairs Forces,” 9.

¹⁴⁸ Holshek and Church, *2014-2015 Civil Affairs Issue Papers*, 3.

In December 1995, the NATO Implementation Force was deployed to Bosnia-Herzegovina to enforce the military aspects of the Dayton Peace Agreement following the country's 1992 to 1995 civil war. US involvement included critical CA capabilities not found in other branches, services, or nations. Following the Implementation Force action, the NATO Stabilization Force helped to maintain a secure environment in the country.¹⁴⁹ The rapid initial mobilization of these Reserve personnel via the PSRC, and their continued use was an excellent example of how Reservists would be used throughout the 1990s and beyond.

Following the efforts in Bosnia, CA forces were deployed to Kosovo in 1999 to render humanitarian assistance to hundreds of thousands of refugees. By the end of the conflict, CA had coordinated for the construction of refugee camps and food stations, distributed other humanitarian aid, and facilitated numerous development programs. Supporting the United Nations Mission in Kosovo, CA forces established civil services included emergency services and sewage capabilities. In total, CA forces coordinated “large-scale humanitarian assistance efforts with U.S. government agencies and NGOs, supplying food, medical care, and shelter for refugees.”¹⁵⁰

The Army Reserve was beginning to experience an increased operational tempo in the 1990s, as indicated by the missions described above. One of the reasons for the increased use of the Reserve was that by 1996, the Army Reserve was the primary owner of a great majority of the support units in the total Army. The Reserve also constituted

¹⁴⁹ Holshek and Church, *2014-2015 Civil Affairs Issue Papers*, 4.

¹⁵⁰ Hicks, Wormuth, and Ridge, “The Future of the U.S. Civil Affairs Forces,” 10.

over 95 percent of all CA in the Army.¹⁵¹ The Active component comprised 31 percent of the total Army force, while the Ready Reserve stood at 33 percent of the force. Within the Ready Reserve, the Selected Reserve and Individual Ready Reserve were 19 percent and 14 percent of the total force, respectively. An additional 1 percent of available personnel were in the Standby Reserve, with the remaining 35 percent of the total force manpower coming from Military Retirees.¹⁵²

By 1996, the process by which a Reserve member or unit could be called to active duty was modified. This modification allowed for essentially two methods to access to these Reserve personnel. While public law and the general understanding of “mobilization” did not drastically change, the myriad ways of bringing the Reserve member to active duty was streamlined.

First, for major conflicts it was assumed that the Reserve component would be ordered to active duty without their consent,¹⁵³ often called an “involuntary mobilization.” In executing this process, there were five methods to involuntarily bring a soldier to Active duty: Selective Mobilization, PSRC, Partial Mobilization, Full Mobilization, and Total Mobilization. Finally, for lesser conflicts or domestic events

¹⁵¹ Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, *The Reserve Components of the United States Armed Forces*, 34, chart 2.

¹⁵² *Ibid.*, 11, figure 1.

¹⁵³ *Ibid.*, 58.

where the Reserve could be required, the Army identifies individuals for “voluntary mobilization”¹⁵⁴ and then builds or fills organizations or units from those personnel.

The critical part of these methods of mobilization is determining what or where the capability would be required, and when is the appropriate time to mobilize units involuntarily. The mobilization process is predicated on the assumption that the President will know when the forces will be needed, before conflicts begin or when the emergency required vast numbers of soldiers regardless of how long it takes to get them to the fight. Once a conflict has started, the mobilization process means that the units would need time to assemble, train, and deploy. The historical solution to this problem has been that the President mobilizes select Reserve units in advance of full US military action in the region. This provides the time needed to have those capabilities prepared for use in the conflict. In determining suitability for utilization, in 1996 the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs (ASD/RA) identified several factors in using Reserve component capabilities in lieu of Active component forces:

Reservists have unique skills which are relevant for conduct of peace operations. Humanitarian assistance, peacekeeping, nation building, or other peaceful operations involve a broad and substantial interaction between U.S. military forces and the people or government of another country. A successful peace operation is often measured by the ability to create a stable environment, to achieve support for that process by the local population or government, and to assist that population or government to assume control of its own future. Needed are Reservists who serve in civilian life as city managers, public works professionals, banking, commerce and agriculture experts, health systems and disease prevention specialists, and in other specialties not normally found in the Active forces. Reservists can fill the gap between initial stability/security operations and the assumption of longer term civil government and other

¹⁵⁴ Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, *The Reserve Components of the United States Armed Forces*, 59.

operations by public and private organizations, including local, regional and international groups.¹⁵⁵

In 1996, the ASD/RA also said: “The short-notice alert and successful call-up of Reserve Component units and individuals for Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR [sic] vividly demonstrate the increased reliance and responsibility being placed on America’s Reserve forces.”¹⁵⁶ Continuing, the ASD/RA stated that “reservists are a reflection of society, centered on enduring values and core competencies. The days when our Nation’s defense could be provided by citizens who put aside their tools and pick up their firearms are long past. Modern warfare and weapons require continuous training and preparation. The commitment of the Reserve components must therefore be focused and powerful.”¹⁵⁷ Further, he stated “As in the past, they form the vital link between the government, the armed forces and the people. The citizen soldier is, in the final analysis, the glue that holds the nation together in time of crisis.”¹⁵⁸

The National Defense Authorization Act for FY 1997 repealed several conflicting or redundant laws and consolidated them into Section 10171 of Title 10, USC titled “US Army Reserve Command.” In this law, Congress reaffirmed that the US Army Reserve Command is a separate command of the Army, commanded by the Chief of the Army Reserve. It did, however, allow the Secretary of the Army to prescribe the chain of

¹⁵⁵ Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, *The Reserve Components of the United States Armed Forces*, 60.

¹⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, 9.

¹⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, 10.

¹⁵⁸ *Ibid.*

command for the Army Reserve in the continental United States. This organization would be under the command of Atlantic Command, except for those assigned to the unified command for Special Operations.¹⁵⁹ Those assigned to Special Operations Command included all of the USACAPOC(A) CA forces in the USAR.

A critic of the manner in which the Total Force Policy had been used in relation to the USAR was COL(R) James Currie, former USAR command historian, a well-published military historian, and expert on the history of the Reserve component. He penned an article in the *Army Times* titled “If You Overdeploy [sic] the Reserves, They’re Not Really Reserves”¹⁶⁰ in which he pointedly states that using the Reserve to fill Active component requirements as a matter of practicality is both an improper use of the Reserve Force as well as disservice to the American people. Essentially, he said that if the number of missions or operational tempo of the Active component is so great as to have to continually call on the Reserve to fill the requirement, the Government must increase the end strength of the Active force and not continue to depend on the Reserve for anything short of major wars. It is worth noting that this article was published prior to Global War on Terrorism and the proceeding 18 years of combat operations around the globe, all of which have placed a heavy burden on the Reserve to support.

Following World War II, and the use of civilian professional skills, CA became the leader in the rebuilding of the governments, infrastructure, and culture of numerous

¹⁵⁹ Library of Congress Federal Research Division, *Historical Attempts to Reorganize the Reserve Components*, 18-19.

¹⁶⁰ James T. Currie, “If You Overdeploy the Reserves, They’re Not Really Reserves,” *Army Times* 60, no. 35 (March 2000): 62.

European nations. In the years following, the Army Reserve and Army CA underwent important changes. Importantly, the USAR and CA forces, through legislative efforts resulting in doctrine and policy changes, were brought to parity with the active force in terms of priority of manning, equipping, training, and benefits. Utilization of the USAR, particularly in the CA force, was widespread from Korea through the Global War on Terrorism.

The concept and implementation of the Total Force policy was a critical moment for both the USAR and CA. This policy truly linked the ability of the Active force with the capabilities found in the Reserve, and CA exemplified this linkage. The Army absolutely required the capabilities of civilian professionals in the Reserve to effectively manage civil populations and institutions, as well as humanitarian issues found in conflict zones. The other most notable policy effort during this time was the implementation of the PSRC, which allowed the President to activate reserve members for up to 90 days without their consent. This action allowed for future short term, short notice use of Reserve CA members to fulfill mission requirements alongside their Active duty counterparts. Critical to this concept however, was that the President would still need to make the decision to activate elements of the Reserve before they were needed to reap the benefit of their capability when they were needed.

The numerous policy changes affecting the structure and organization of the Army Reserve would eventually play a part in the “ownership” of CA forces, as the force began to shift to a special operations alignment. The organization of the CA force formed slowly and purposefully throughout the 20th Century. The organizational growth and

development during this period were based on demonstrated need identified by proposed and actual utilization in conflict.

Organizational and training changes for CA during the period were most noted during and after Vietnam. It was during this time that an Active unit, the 95th CA Battalion, was formed, while the Reserve organized and maintained the preponderance of the total force. While the general organization of CA did not change until much later, the establishment of Army Special Operations command in 1989 signaled a transformation in CA as all elements, Active and Reserve, soon fell under the command and control of this organization.

Reserve forces had noted operational success in Korea in the 1950s, and achieved success in distinct areas of the Vietnam War in the 1960s and 1970s. Active and Reserve CA proved to be a functional, effective, and welcome enabler on the battlefield. Continued success during conflicts of the 1980s and Desert Shield and Desert Storm in the 1990s proved that CA forces were a critical asset of the total force. Engagements during peacekeeping-era operations after the cold war indicated that CA was properly organized, trained, and ready for any challenge. The Army and its CA force, however, was ill-prepared for the tumultuous times following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.

CHAPTER 4

CIVIL AFFAIRS 2001 TO 2017

During his tenure (2001 to 2006), Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld advocated for additional military transformation with the goal of building an adaptable force that could counter global terrorism.¹⁶¹ His ideas of transformation were not always supported by the force commanders, though his aggressive personality often drove his desires to fruition. One such desire was to separate the USAR capabilities, specifically CA, from USASOC. The organization and training of CA forces prior to 2006 was well defined and produced for the Department of Defense a capability on which it could rely, though the force lacked capacity. After Rumsfeld's reorganization directive was executed, the CA capability provided by the Army as a whole was fractured within the Reserve–Active and General Purpose–Special Operations lines. The organizational structure and training pipelines after 2006 produced disparate capabilities between the two components, and the result was lack of standardized capability provided to the force when needed most.

The Global War on Terrorism and the Overhaul of Civil Affairs

The CAO throughout the conduct of the Global War on Terrorism placed an immense strain on USACAPOC(A), the multi-component organizational headquarters and primary provider for all USAR and Active CA forces until 2006. “By the time the

¹⁶¹ Library of Congress Federal Research Division, *Historical Attempts to Reorganize the Reserve Components*, 21.

first rotation of Operation Iraqi Freedom was over, more than half of the qualified and available Reserve Component CA personnel had been exhausted.”¹⁶²

The active-duty 96th CA Battalion deployed teams to Afghanistan in late 2001. Their mission was focused on life-sustaining relief efforts, humanitarian assistance and civil- military operations in support of the ground force. They interfaced with local Afghan councils to plan relief efforts and coordinate with the U.S. Air Force to select drop-zones for food drops. CA’s short-term humanitarian relief mission was expanded as the 96th was replaced by teams mobilized from Army Reserve CA battalions. These teams select and recommend projects that look to both the country’s short-term sustainment and long-term recovery: medical, veterinary, agricultural, water, schools, roads, bridges. The CA teams must move about Afghanistan with Special Forces teams and are collocated with Operational Detachment Alpha teams. CA battalion teams are also deployed to Pakistan and other locations throughout the region in support of civil-military operations in Afghanistan. These missions represent the first level in the spectrum of CA capabilities. CA brigade and command personnel mobilized from the Army Reserve are assigned to planning teams and also as forward elements at U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), Special Operations Command-CENTCOM, and U.S. Army-CENTCOM.¹⁶³

In 2003, ASD/RA Thomas Hall recognized the high operational tempo and utilization of the USAR, and directed that the Active and Reserve component “rebalance” the assigned missions.¹⁶⁴ Highlighting the high operational tempo of reserve CA, members of the Army Reserve 401st CA Brigade, including Captain Steve McAlpin and 16 other unit members, refused to sign a waiver to return to combat after only 11 months home from their last combat deployment.¹⁶⁵ This refusal to deploy garnered nation-wide

¹⁶² Holshek and Church, *2014-2015 Civil Affairs Issue Papers*, 10.

¹⁶³ Bingham, Cleary, and Rubini, *U.S. Army Civil Affairs-The Army's “Ounce of Prevention,”* 12.

¹⁶⁴ Library of Congress Federal Research Division, *Historical Attempts to Reorganize the Reserve Components*, 33.

¹⁶⁵ Striegel, “Maintaining the Operational Reserve.”

media attention and spotlighted the Army Reserve operational tempo and CA as a predominately Reserve capability. The inability to provide the Army with the capability it demanded (in totality, not just in the 401st example) was detrimental to the CA Branch. The Department of Defense and US Government as a whole were forced to seek new ways to achieve the needed capability.¹⁶⁶

Beginning in 2003, Rumsfeld notably questioned why CA was organized under USSOCOM, as CA has an indirect approach to war while units like the Ranger Regiment are Direct Action forces. Through a series of what were to be known as “snowflake” memoranda, Rumsfeld argued CA were “inherently different”¹⁶⁷ from Special Operations and asked senior leaders to opine on whether CA should be moved to another part of the Army, away from USSOCOM. The Department of Defense and Army took a position, according to a report on CA from the Center for Strategic and International Studies, that reassigning CA out of USSOCOM would not allow better integration of CA into General Purpose forces and would degrade the effectiveness of CA as a whole.¹⁶⁸ Further, the Army, USSOCOM, USASOC, and USACAPOC(A) resisted the move for nearly two years, but the plan went forward anyway.

By the end of 2003, the number of CA units and personnel executing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the lack of the ability of the Army to provide sufficient force structure, caused the Department of Defense to begin using Navy and Air Force officers

¹⁶⁶ Holshek and Church, *2014-2015 Civil Affairs Issue Papers*, 26.

¹⁶⁷ Hicks, Wormuth, and Ridge, “The Future of the U.S. Civil Affairs Forces,” 36.

¹⁶⁸ *Ibid.*

as Provincial Reconstruction Team leaders.¹⁶⁹ These Provincial Reconstruction Teams were effectively quasi-CA organizations conducting CMO focused on regional issues in Afghanistan.

By 2004, criticism of the use, or overuse, of Reserve forces in the Global War on Terrorism resurfaced. The drawback to the Total Force Policy was that it had placed a great dependence on the Reserve to assume missions previously within the role of the Active force. This dependence gave rise to many critics of the use of the Total Force Policy, including that of Lieutenant Colonel (Retired) Lewis Sorley, the noted author of a critical book on the Vietnam War, who published an article in *Joint Force Quarterly*. He stated: “What seems undeniable is that for whatever reason—fiscal, political, or strategic—the Nation is unwilling to maintain an active force that is adequate to current missions and operational tempo. As a consequence, Reserve forces not only supplement or reinforce the active force but often act as a surrogate for it. This stands the concept of Reserve forces on its head.”¹⁷⁰

In fairness, Sorley was not necessarily arguing against the use of the Reserve; rather he seems to have argued for an increase of Active component end strength, a robust, well trained and equipped Reserve, and a balanced use of both in keeping with the original Total Force Policy. Sorley stated that “few policy issues are as complex, controversial, and in flux as those concerning Reserve Forces”¹⁷¹ and he continued to say

¹⁶⁹ Holshek and Church, *2014-2015 Civil Affairs Issue Papers*, 26.

¹⁷⁰ Sorley, “Reserve Components,” 22.

¹⁷¹ *Ibid.*, 18.

that “if policymakers perceive no difference between the active and Reserve components in deployability in relative peacetime, a heavy burden falls on Reserve forces.”¹⁷² Sorley concluded the article by stating “The motivations that led to the Total Force and to structuring the Army so Reserve mobilization would form part of any major deployment of ground forces remain as compelling as ever. Reservists . . . in Desert Shield and Desert Storm . . . validated what General [Creighton] Abrams sensed about the link to public support.”¹⁷³

In 2004, *Joint Force Quarterly* published a series of articles relating to the future of the Army Reserve. In the opening to the series, the unknown author stated: “The Total Force is part of today’s paradigm of integrated operations, where we work in an increasingly joint, combined, and interagency environment with a diverse set of new partners. Past stovepipes between the active and reserve components are being removed, and the all-volunteer Total Force has a healthy future. But, as always, issues remain that require debate and continual reassessment.”¹⁷⁴

Army Reserve restructuring and transformation began anew in 2005. Similar to the Army National Guard Restructuring Initiative, implemented in 2002 by Secretary of the Army Thomas White, the Army Reserve was committed to building readiness by placing the emphasis of training units prior to their being alerted for mobilization. In doing so, the Army would be more capable of overcoming the lack of readiness observed

¹⁷² Sorley, “Reserve Components,” 22.

¹⁷³ Ibid., 23.

¹⁷⁴ Joint Force Quarterly, “Forum- The Future of Reserve Forces,” *Joint Force Quarterly*, no. 36 (December 2004): 17.

in the Reserve since Vietnam.¹⁷⁵ This restructuring also included initiatives that were designed to end cross-leveling of soldiers between units and ensuring that soldiers were qualified, and deployable, in their military specialty, amongst others.¹⁷⁶ For CA forces, this would not be true.

Beginning in 2005, intense demand for CA capabilities forced the Department of Defense to seek CA personnel through “unconventional” sources including the Individual Ready Reserve, cross-leveling, and by directing the Navy and Air Force to provide personnel.¹⁷⁷ The personnel supplied through these methods were not CA soldiers by trade, nor civilian professionals; they had joined the military, been trained, and often had a great deal of experience in their military career field prior to receiving a deployment order to function as a CA generalist. As could be expected, “partners in the field . . . were often disappointed.”¹⁷⁸

In 2005, the Army established the Human Terrain System to provide combat commanders with the socio-cultural understanding they required in their operational area. Made up of Human Terrain Teams of functional specialists, the Human Terrain System was an effective tool used to embed academic social scientists into ground combat units

¹⁷⁵ Library of Congress Federal Research Division, *Historical Attempts to Reorganize the Reserve Components*, 22.

¹⁷⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷⁷ Holshek and Church, *2014-2015 Civil Affairs Issue Papers*, 26.

¹⁷⁸ Ibid., 25.

in an effort to “increase local sociocultural knowledge.”¹⁷⁹ This is exactly what CA should have been doing, but due to the lack of available personnel, the Army built and filled Human Terrain System with contracted civilians. These civilians were arguably well-qualified and performed admirably, though the program was ultimately shuttered due to rising costs, duplicative efforts, and trouble with the contract(s) and the contractors.¹⁸⁰

Active and Reserve CA forces, by 2006, had been stretched to the point of failure. The Department of Defense, however, recognized that the missions and results of CA operations in Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom were critical to the foreign policy and national strategic goals of the United States. Over reliance on USAR CA forces during the Global War on Terrorism proved to be a breaking point for the total CA force.

In October 2006, against the professional guidance of the Army staff and the commands directly involved, and based solely on the order of Rumsfeld, Army Chief of Staff Peter Schoomaker directed that all active CA forces would fall under USASOC. All Reserve CA would fall under USACAPOC(A) and be transferred to the Army Reserve Command.¹⁸¹ Like slicing a finger while cutting a lemon, the impact of this decision was painfully and immediately felt across the force. After the fracture, the CA force in the

¹⁷⁹ Brian R. Price, “Human Terrain at the Crossroads,” *Joint Force Quarterly*, no. 87 (4th Quarter 2017): 69.

¹⁸⁰ Ibid.

¹⁸¹ US Department of the Army, General Orders No. 12.

Army was split along Reserve/Active and General Purpose/Special Operations lines. As noted in a CSIS report,

In essence, this memorandum designated that active Army civil affairs personnel would be considered special operations forces, but reserve Army civil affairs personnel would not. Commonly referred to as “the divorce,” the decision to split Army civil affairs into special operations forces and general-purpose forces generated a number of negative outcomes. Culturally, the designation of only active civil affairs personnel as special operations forces created and “us-them” mentality that exacerbated broader active component-reserve component tensions and fueled the perception that reserve civil affairs personnel were somehow second class citizens relative to their active component brethren.¹⁸²

What the CSIS authors missed here is that the tensions were not exacerbated by the active CA force being designated “special operations”, it was that all CA forces prior to the “divorce” were “special operations” since CA, as a function, is a “special operation” and the proponent of CA doctrine is USSOCOM. The divorce simply cast the majority of the force structure, that of the Reserve, out of special operations, stripping away an element of their identity. Further, CA professionals are intentionally civilian-centric, and, due to their civilian careers, also members of the Reserve.

The idea at that time was that USACAPOC(A), task-organized under Army Reserve Command and thus FORSCOM, would provide the totality of the CA forces required to support General Purpose and conventional missions, while the remaining Active Duty CA Battalion, the 95th CA BN, would provide USASOC and USSOCOM “special operations” CA support as required. The reality, however, was that neither USACAPOC(A) nor USASOC was prepared or capable of being the sole provider of a

¹⁸² Hicks, Wormuth, and Ridge, “The Future of the U.S. Civil Affairs Forces,” 36.

specific CA capability to the Army. The fact that CA was resoundingly a multi-component capability was made painfully clear after the fracture.

According to the 95th CA Brigade, “when al-Qaida terrorists attacked the United States on Sept 11, 2001, the Army’s only active-duty Civil Affairs force consisted of the 96th Civil Affairs Battalion which was comprised of 206 Soldiers.”¹⁸³ but due to “accelerated growth to support our Nation’s needs” the Battalion was re-designated a Brigade in March 2006 and activated on March 16, 2007.¹⁸⁴ Under this new Brigade, four additional CA Battalions were immediately established and, eventually, an additional CA Brigade in September 2011. This second Active CA Brigade of five battalions, supported the conventional forces and was organized not under USASOC but under FORSCOM. Noted by USASOC, “As history has shown, more changes will come.”¹⁸⁵

The reality for the Reserve was that nothing had truly changed. The Reserve CA force was repeatedly called upon to support both conventional and special operations missions, as the active CA force either lacked the required number of CA positions, was committed elsewhere, or incapable of executing its assigned mission due to a lack of specialized functional expertise. As such, Reserve CA forces were called to support the Active force and were doing so in a piecemeal fashion. As in years past, the Reserve was not being used as whole units. It was being called to provide individual augmentees to fill

¹⁸³ 95th Civil Affairs Brigade, “History,” accessed January 12, 2019, <https://www.soc.mil/95th/95thhomepage.html>.

¹⁸⁴ Ibid.

¹⁸⁵ United States Army Special Operations Command History Office, *U.S. Army Civil Affairs History Handbook*, 7.

capability gaps in the active units. In so doing, the Reserve units from where these individuals were coming were being decimated in terms of unit readiness. With the required reserve dwell ratio of five years at home for every one year deployed, the units were unable to support their mission when assigned. These units often were filled by members from other reserve units, thus causing the cycle to repeat itself and further compound the problem.

Organization of Civil Affairs in the Army of 2017

After several years of these organizational failures, the Army CA capability in 2017 had generally settled out. Due in part to the reduction of mission requirements as operations in Iraq and Afghanistan slowed, the structure looks strikingly similar to the pre-fracture days of a multi-component unit, though without the single chain of command to doctrinally align the command and control of the force. To highlight the problem with the organizational structure of the Army CA force, the following chart details the command relationships in place prior to, and after the fracturing of the force in 2007. One can observe that pre-fracture, the totality of the Army CA force was managed by a single command element which allowed for simplified administration of total Army requirements. In the chart depicting today's CA force, the problem is made readily visible.




Figure 1. Organization of Army Civil Affairs organizations prior to 2007

Source: Adapted from US Army Reserve, “USACAPOC(A) Command,” accessed November 15, 2018, <https://www.usar.army.mil/Commands/Functional/USACAPOC/USACAPOC-Units/>; and US Army Special Operations Command, “95th Civil Affairs Brigade (Airborne),” accessed November 15, 2018, <https://www.soc.mil/95th/95thhomepage.html>. Note that a force requestor such as EUROM could receive CA forces from two organizations only; its assigned CA force, the 361 CA BDE (USAR) or from USACAPOC(A). At this time, USACAPOC(A) maintained options for CA force provision in that it could send immediate force requirements from its active duty unit, or provide forces from aligned USAR forces.

Making up roughly 90 percent of the total operational CA capability in the Army, the Reserve CA structure has not drastically changed since the early 1990s. As a major subordinate command of Army Reserve Command, USACAPOC(A) consists of five CA Commands (CACOM), each with several subordinate Brigades and Battalions. This CA force structure is the largest in the world, and is managed by a Major General with the command headquarters at Fort Bragg, North Carolina (see figure 3).

The mission of USACAPOC(A) is to support “the Army and Joint Force with strategic, operational, and tactical civil affairs . . . capabilities across the range of military operations.”¹⁸⁶ The soldiers of the command “combine regional and trans-regional expertise, political-military awareness, and cross-cultural communication skills to conduct and support civil-military operations for conventional and special operations forces.”¹⁸⁷ According to USACAPOC(A), its “Soldiers are integrated in current global U.S. operations including Iraq, Afghanistan, Horn of Africa, European, Pacific, and Central/South American regions.”¹⁸⁸ Further it attests that it “is the only strategic CA structure in DoD.”¹⁸⁹ “USAR CA units can be mobilized to provide support to conventional forces and the theater security cooperation activities of the geographic

¹⁸⁶ US Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command (Airborne), “About USACAPOC(A),” accessed December 27, 2018, <https://www.usar.army.mil/Commands/Functional/USACAPOC/About-Us/>.

¹⁸⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸⁸ Ibid.

¹⁸⁹ Ibid.

combatant command under FORSCOM, as part of ongoing shaping operations in each theater; for engagement or exercises.”¹⁹⁰

Each CACOM is regionally oriented and aligned to a Geographic Combatant Command, with one CACOM responsible for both EUCOM and AFRICOM,¹⁹¹ wherein:

The Civil Affairs Command’s (CACOM’s) primary mission is to provide theater-level CAO planning, coordination, policies, and programs in support of the geographic combatant command’s regional civil-military operations strategy and stabilization, reconstruction, and development efforts. The CACOM may deploy a theater-level Civil Military Affairs Operation Center to coordinate, analyze, and enable policies, programs, and civil- military operations capabilities in support of the geographic combatant command or JFLCC, and to develop and manage the strategic level civil inputs to the common operating picture.¹⁹²

Brigades organized under these CACOMs support specific sub-regions within the GCC’s AOR and have specific functions and capabilities:

The CA brigade functions as the regionally focused, expeditionary, operational-level CA capability that supports the Army corps and the Joint Task Force headquarters. The USAR CA brigade supports the corps and . . . The CA brigade focus is development, reconstruction, and stabilization. The CA brigade enables support to civil administration and is the operational mission command system structure to form a joint civil-military operations task force. The brigade headquarters provides mission command and staff supervision of the operations of the CA brigade and assigned CA battalions or attached units. Its focus is on tactical and operational employment of CA forces and attached civil- military operations forces. The CA brigade plans, enables, shapes, and manages CAO by and with indigenous populations and institutions, intergovernmental organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and other governmental agencies through its civil liaison team. The brigade has a functional specialty cell with limited capabilities in four of the six functional specialty areas (rule of law,

¹⁹⁰ US Department of the Army, Department of the Army (DA) Pamphlet 600-3, *Commissioned Officer Professional Development and Career Management* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, December 2014), 188, accessed April 10, 2019, <https://www.army.mil/e2/c/downloads/376665.pdf/>.

¹⁹¹ Department of the Army, FM 3-57, *Civil Affairs Operations*, 2-14.

¹⁹² Department of the Army, DA Pamphlet 600-3, *Commissioned Officer Professional Development and Career Management* (2014), 189.

governance, public health and welfare, and infrastructure). The brigade provides operational-level support to the corps or an equivalent-level ACOM/Joint Task Force during stability tasks.¹⁹³

In further discussing the Reserve CA Brigade, it is important to highlight the unique capability present in the Reserve not found in active duty Brigades: that of the Functional Specialist (38G). As described by the Army:

The USAR CA brigade supports the corps and possesses a CA functional specialist (38G MOS) cell not present within the RA [Regular Army or Active Duty] CA brigades. The 38G applies to civilian-acquired core competencies found within the six CA functional specialty areas—governance, rule of law, public health and welfare, infrastructure, economic stability, and public education and information—provide CA the capability to conduct responsibilities normally performed by civil Governments and emergency services. **Functional specialists are unique within CA forces because they provide special or unique civilian core competency skills** [emphasis added] which are enhanced through advanced military education programs. These programs are designed to operationalize their skills within a cultural context for the application in foreign lands.¹⁹⁴

The 38G (Military Government Specialist) program, commonly referred to as “military support to governance” or MSG, “leverages civil sector expertise inherent of officers within the United States Army Reserves (USAR).”¹⁹⁵ This program, residing solely within the Reserve, states that the officer “must possess expertise in one of the civilian core competencies: economist, public education, civil supply, public transportation, facilities, safety, public communication, agriculture, and culture affairs . . .

¹⁹³ Department of the Army, DA Pamphlet 600-3, *Commissioned Officer Professional Development and Career Management* (2014), 189.

¹⁹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁹⁵ US Department of the Army, “MILPER Message Number 16-237, FY17 Military Government Specialist (38G) Panel Announcement (Army Reserves),” Department of the Army, August 19, 2016.

[and] must understand how to utilize the characteristics of their civilian skills to assist in the accomplishment of the core Civil Affairs (CA) tasks.”¹⁹⁶

Providing civil-military operational advice to a commander of a battalion, brigade or division is something that could clearly be done by either active or reserve components. But when the mission calls for an investment banker with fifteen years of Wall Street experience or someone who runs schools or a health care system, or an engineer who has built national road systems, the mission planner cannot go to the active component and say, “Give me one of these people.” By their very nature, these positions require civilian-acquired skills and must come from the reserve.¹⁹⁷

Further, these officers “enable the force to assess, monitor, protect, reinforce, establish, and transition political, economic, social, and cultural institutions and capabilities to achieve US national goals and objectives”¹⁹⁸ as a part of the CA support to the GCC, JFC, and others.

¹⁹⁶ U.S. Department of the Army, “MILPER Message Number 16-237.”

¹⁹⁷ Bingham, Cleary, and Rubini, *U.S. Army Civil Affairs-The Army's “Ounce of Prevention,”* 7.

¹⁹⁸ U.S. Department of the Army, “MILPER Message Number 16-237.”

Table 1. Organization of USACAPOC(A)

RESERVE CIVIL AFFAIRS USACAPOC(A)					
COMMAND	ALIGNMENT	SUBORDINATE COMMANDS	SUBORDINATE COMMANDS	CITY	ST
USAR USACAPOC(A)	SOUTHCOM	350th Civil Affairs Command (Theater)		Pensacola	FL
		321st Civil Affairs Brigade		San Antonio	TX
			402nd CA BN (TAC)	FT Buchanan	PR
			478th CA BN (ABN)(TAC)	Perrine	FL
			436th CA BN (TAC)	Sanford	FL
			486th CA BN (TAC)	Tulsa	OK
			410th CA BN (TAC)	FT Bliss	TX
			413th CA BN (TAC)	Lubbock	TX
			451st CA BN (TAC)	Houston	TX
			490th CA BN (TAC)	Grand Prairie	TX
	INDOPACOM	351st Civil Affairs Command (Theater)		Mountain View	CA
		358th Civil Affairs Brigade		Riverside	CA
			416th CA BN (ABN)(TAC)	San Diego	CA
			425th CA BN (TAC)	Encino	CA
			426th CA BN (TAC)	Upland	CA
			492nd CA BN (TAC)	Buckeye	AZ
		364th Civil Affairs Brigade		Clackamas	OR
			405th CA BN (TAC)	Pleasant Grove	UT
			440th CA BN (TAC)	FT Carson	CO
			445th CA BN (TAC)	Mountain View	CA
			448th CA BN (TAC)	JBLM	WA
	CENTCOM	352nd Civil Affairs Command (Theater)		FT Meade	MD
		354th Civil Affairs Brigade		Riverdale	MD
			401st CA BN (TAC)	Wester	NY
			414th CA BN (TAC)	Southfield	MI
			422nd CA BN (TAC)	Greensboro	NC
			437th CA BN (TAC)	FT Story	VA
		360th Civil Affairs Brigade		FT Jackson	SC
			412th CA BN (ABN)(TAC)	Columbus	OH
			431st CA BN (TAC)	N. Little Rock	AR
			450th CA BN (TAC)	Riverdale	MD
			489th CA BN (TAC)	Knoxville	TN
	EUCOM	353rd Civil Affairs Command (Theater)		Staten Island	NY
		304th Civil Affairs Brigade		Bristol	PA
			403rd CA BN (TAC)	Mattydale	NY
			404th CA BN (ABN)(TAC)	JBMDL	NJ
			411th CA BN (TAC)	Danbury	CT
			443rd CA BN (TAC)	Newport	RI
		308th Civil Affairs Brigade		Forest Park	IL
			407th CA BN (TAC)	Arden Hills	MN
			415th CA BN (TAC)	Portage	MI
			418th CA BN (TAC)	Belton	MO
			432nd CA BN (TAC)	Green Bay	WI

Source: Adapted from US Army Reserve, “USACAPOC(A) Command,” accessed November 15, 2018, <https://www.usar.army.mil/Commands/Functional/USACAPOC/USACAPOC-Units/>.

One of two operational Reserve CA capabilities residing in the USAR, but not assigned to USACAPOC(A) is the 361st CA Brigade, based in Kaiserslautern, Germany (see table 2). This Brigade is the only permanently forward-stationed CA force in the Army, and while Reserve, it the assigned CA force to US Army Europe via the 7th Mission Support Command. Its only CA Battalion, the 457th CA Battalion, is located in Grafenwoehr, Germany and has subordinate companies in Germany and Italy. The 361 CA Brigade operates with the same capabilities as described under USACAPOC(A) Brigades.

Table 2. Organization of the 361st Civil Affairs Brigade

RESERVE CIVIL AFFAIRS 361 CA BRIGADE					
COMMAND	ALIGNMENT	SUBORDINATE COMMANDS	SUBORDINATE COMMANDS	CITY	ST
USAR (7th MSC)					
EUCOM	EUCOM (Assigned)	361st Civil Affairs Brigade		Kaiserslautern	DE
			457th CA BN (TAC)	Grafenwoehr	DE
			A Company 457th CA BN	Longare	IT

Source: Adapted from US Army Reserve, “7th Mission Support Command,” accessed March 10, 2019, <https://www.usar.army.mil/Commands/Geographic/7th-MSC/7th-MSC-Units/>.

The second non-USACAPOC(A) USAR operational unit is the 322nd CA Brigade, assigned to Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM) via the 9th Mission Support Command (USAR) (see table 3) The 322nd CA Brigade operates within the same general construct as described under USACAPOC(A) Brigades, though it has no subordinate battalions.

Table 3. Organization of 322nd Civil Affairs Brigade

RESERVE CIVIL AFFAIRS 322 CA BRIGADE					
COMMAND	ALIGNMENT	SUBORDINATE COMMANDS	SUBORDINATE COMMANDS	CITY	ST
USAR (9th MSC)					
INDOPACOM	INDOPACOM (Assigned)	322nd Civil Affairs Brigade		FT Shafter	HI

Source: Adapted from US Army Reserve, “9th Mission Support Command,” accessed March 10, 2019, <https://www.usar.army.mil/Commands/Geographic/9th-MSC/About-Us/>.

Within the Active force, after the rapid bloating of 2006 to 2012, the structure has balanced back to a single active Brigade within USASOC, stationed at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, and one GPF Battalion assigned to FORSCOM, also at Fort Bragg, North Carolina (see table 4).

The Active duty 95th CA Brigade consists of five (5) Battalions of five (5) companies each, with each Battalion regionally aligned to support the Theater Special Operations Command (TSOC) supporting a GCC.

Table 4. Organization of the 95th Civil Affairs Brigade

ACTIVE CIVIL AFFAIRS USASOC					
COMMAND	ALIGNMENT	SUBORDINATE COMMANDS	SUBORDINATE COMMANDS	CITY	ST
AC					
USASOC	Special Operations Forces	95th Civil Affairs Brigade		FT Bragg	NC
	SOCAF		91st CA BN	FT Bragg	NC
	SOCEUR		92nd CA BN	FT Bragg	NC
	SOCCENT		96th CA BN	FT Bragg	NC
	SOCPAC		97th CA BN	FT Bragg	NC
	SOC SOUTH		98th CA BN	FT Bragg	NC

Source: Adapted from US Army Special Operations Command, “95th Civil Affairs Brigade (Airborne),” accessed November 15, 2018, <https://www.soc.mil/95th/95thhomepage.html>.

According to the 95th CA Brigade web page, the Brigade “provides Civil Affairs Soldiers to support Department of Defense Special Operations Command task forces and the five U.S. geographic combatant commands . . . [and] as of November 2012 . . . [it consisted] of more than 1,200 Soldiers . . . [and] is in the process of growing . . . to more than 1,800 Soldiers by 2017.”¹⁹⁹ A more detailed description of the Brigade’s function is found in DA PAM 600-3:

The mission of the RA CA brigade assigned to USASOC is to rapidly deploy regionally focused, language capable, initial entry CATAs, Civil Military Affairs Operation Center, CA battalions, and CA companies to plan, enable, shape, manage, and execute CAO in support of a geographic combatant command, Joint Task Force, TSOC, joint forces special operations component, interagency, corps, division, or BCT. The brigade can serve as the core of a joint civil-military operations task force and can provide mission command system capabilities for assigned forces. The CA brigade headquarters provides mission command and staff supervision of the operations of the brigade and assigned CA battalions or attached units. This headquarters is rapidly deployable, providing USASOC with a responsive, flexible, and modular CA force package. While serving in an initial entry role during contingency operations, the brigade is able to transition with the follow-on CA forces supporting conventional forces.²⁰⁰

The only active duty CA not organized under USASOC is the 83rd CA Battalion. Assigned to FORSCOM, and activated on September 16, 2012, the 83rd CA Battalion serves as Army’s “active duty, Central Command aligned conventional forces civil affairs battalion.”²⁰¹ (See table 5).

¹⁹⁹ 95th Civil Affairs Brigade, “History.”

²⁰⁰ Department of the Army, DA Pamphlet 600-3, *Commissioned Officer Professional Development and Career Management* (2014), 188.

²⁰¹ U.S. Army Fort Bragg, “Lineage of the 83rd Civil Affairs Battalion.”

Table 5. Organization of 83rd CA Battalion

ACTIVE CIVIL AFFAIRS FORSCOM					
COMMAND	ALIGNMENT	SUBORDINATE COMMANDS	SUBORDINATE COMMANDS	CITY	ST
AC					
FORSCOM	CENTCOM (GPF)		83rd CA BN	FT Bragg	NC

Source: Adapted from US Army Fort Bragg, “Lineage of the 83rd Civil Affairs Battalion,” accessed January 13, 2019, <https://home.army.mil/bragg/index.php/units-tenants/xviii-airborne-co/16th-military-police-brigade/83rd-civil-affairs-battalion>.

Again, DA PAM 600-3 offers the Army’s more detailed function of the Brigade:

The mission of the RA CA brigade assigned to FORSCOM is providing supported commanders with an initial entry capable, responsive, flexible, and modular CA force package. The brigade can rapidly deploy expeditionary forces . . . that are regionally focused, language capable, and possess the ability to plan, enable, shape, manage, and execute CAO in support of a geographic combatant commands, ASCC, joint forces special operations component, Joint Task Forces, interagency, corps, division, or BCT. The brigade can serve as the core of a joint civil-military operations task force and can provide mission command system capabilities for assigned forces. While serving in an initial entry role during contingency operations, the brigade is able to transition with the follow-on CA forces. The CA brigade possesses a limited special functions cells and a Public Affairs staff capability.²⁰²

Training Civil Affairs in the Army of 2017

The United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School (USAJFKSWCS) Special Operations Center of Excellence, through the Directorate of Training and Doctrine maintains the CA branch proponentcy. The purpose of this proponent organization is to design and develop all doctrine and training related to the entirety of CA organizations and operations such as field manuals, training publications,

²⁰² Department of the Army, DA Pamphlet 600-3, *Commissioned Officer Professional Development and Career Management* (2014), 188.

and training strategies. Further, the CA Proponent assesses current doctrine and develops future concepts for CA.²⁰³

[CA Proponent] also conducts analysis, design, development and internal evaluation for . . . officer and enlisted institutional individual training and education in support of SWCS's proponent responsibilities. It researches, identifies and analyzes operational requirements and matches training systems and resources to ensure that CA . . . qualification courses and advanced-skills graduates are prepared to execute missions tied to desired operational capabilities and the demands of full-spectrum operations. It designs and develops education and training, incorporating professional development and instructional techniques and strategies for synchronous and asynchronous instruction utilizing adult and active learning, and outcome-based methodologies. TDD manages the internal curriculum review boards (CRB) process to verify and/or adjust the curriculum, based on changing mission needs, lessons learned, and/or new equipment. It reviews and provides input to other branch, service or joint courses that refer to or require input concerning ARSOF training and leader development. It ensures that new systems, equipment, simulators, simulations and training devices are introduced as soon as available to improve training effectiveness. It creates, updates and manages the curriculum content for the SOCoE Learning Managements System.²⁰⁴

Interestingly, the CA proponent recognizes the requirement to maintain the force, consisting of Active and Reserve capabilities. As noted on the USAJFKSWCS website, "Critical to the success of our branches is the personnel life cycle functions to develop and implement plans, programs and policies for both active and reserve components **to ensure the personnel readiness** [emphasis added] of our three regiments."²⁰⁵

²⁰³ United States Army Special Operations Command, "U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School: The Special Operations Center of Excellence," accessed April 4, 2019, <https://www.soc.mil/SWCS/organization.html>.

²⁰⁴ Ibid.

²⁰⁵ Ibid. The three regiments indicated in this statement refer to Civil Affairs, Psychological Operations, and Special Forces.

Training the Active Army

Active Army officers desiring to become CA officers, must initiate an application through their home unit and be selected by the USAJFKSWCS, commonly called SWCS (Special Warfare Center and School) (pronounced swick), for further consideration. If selected, the CA candidate will then undergo a rigorous 44-week training pipeline that results in graduation from the CA course and award of the CA Branch designator “38A,” Civil Affairs Generalist.²⁰⁶ (See figure 3 for a graphic depiction of this timeline)

Civil Affairs Assessment and Selection is a ten-day selection course designed to “assess character, courage, commitment, and intellect”²⁰⁷ of the candidate. Prior to arriving at the selection course, the candidate is expected to be able to complete a litany of physical tasks, including running three to six miles at a nine minute per mile pace, march 12 miles carrying a 35- pound pack in less than three hours, and score a minimum of 240 of 300 points on the legacy Army Physical Fitness Test. In addition to these physical standards, the candidate is expected to function as a leader while under mental and physical stress, develop individual and group-based solutions, and effectively communicate as a leader and member of a team.²⁰⁸

If selected from Civil Affairs Assessment and Selection to continue their CA training, the candidate will then, after being selected on the Captain promotion list, attend

²⁰⁶ US Army, “Careers and Jobs,” US Army Go Army website, accessed April 10, 2019, <https://www.goarmy.com/careers-and-jobs/special-operations/civil-affairs/civil-affairs-training.html>.

²⁰⁷ Ibid.

²⁰⁸ Ibid.

the US Army Airborne School at Fort Benning, Georgia, if not already qualified, prior to attending the 12-week ARSOF Captain's Career Course at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. After completing the ARSOF Captain's course, CA officer candidates will then attend the CA qualification course, entering the 44-week, four-phase CA training pipeline.²⁰⁹

This CA training pipeline includes a basic CA branch phase, a collective training event, language and cultural training, and finally a regional analysis phase. All phases must be completed for the candidate to receive the functional designation as a CA officer.²¹⁰ Breaks between training phases are not authorized.

During the CA branch phase of the training pipeline, the candidate receives "tactical, technical, and leader training" to operate as a member of a CA team. This phase of training introduces the candidate to unconventional warfare, combat skills, CAO planning, conducting civil engagement, negotiations, and mediation.²¹¹ Once completed, the students enter a collective training phase and begin to apply their individual skills as a member of a team.

In the collective training phase, referred to as exercise "Sluss-Tiller" the candidates are organized into teams. In this exercise, the candidates are inserted into a fictional country and required to operate within the scenario that is full of turmoil and tension. It is worth noting that the fictional country of "Pineland" is the same training location, scenarios, and role-players used during the Special Forces Qualification Course

²⁰⁹ US Army, "Civil Affairs Training," US Army Go Army SOF website, accessed April 10, 2019, <https://goarmysof.com/ca-training/>.

²¹⁰ Ibid.

²¹¹ US Army, "Careers and Jobs."

known as “Robin Sage.” During this scenario, the candidates must effectively operate as leaders and members of a team while navigating the physical, political, and human terrain associated with this well-developed scenario set.²¹²

In addition, the Active officer candidate’s training includes a language and culture phase. In this 25-week course, the students will study the language and culture of their assigned region. The region and language assignment are based off of several factors including the candidates background, demonstrated ability as indicated on the Defense Language Aptitude Battery, and needs of the Army. The language assignment normally correlates with the candidate’s future unit of assignment, upon successful completion of the remainder of the course. Students are introduced to one of a number of “operational” languages, or languages that the Army deems necessary to effectively conduct military operations. Included in this list are languages such as Russian, French, Arabic, Chinese, Farsi, Korean, Tagalog, Urdu, and Portuguese.²¹³

The last of the four phases of the candidate’s training is regional analysis. It is during this phase that the candidate receives instruction on US national policy and strategy and the operational variables. Further, the candidate will focus on a specific region of the world and conduct an in-depth study of that region’s history, culture, and characteristics in order to build an understanding of those factors as they influence the region in the contemporary society.²¹⁴

²¹² US Army, “Careers and Jobs.”

²¹³ US Army, “Civil Affairs Training.”

²¹⁴ US Army, “Careers and Jobs.”

Once the candidate has completed all phases of the training pipeline, they graduate and receive the “38A” area of concentration (AOC) branch designator. They are thereafter identified as a “CA Generalist.” From this point they will be formally assigned to one of the six active duty CA battalions at Fort Bragg, North Carolina.²¹⁵

During the training pathway, the CA candidate and CA officer may be afforded the opportunity for advanced training opportunities, including those related to operational design and planning, warfighting, and advanced civilian degrees. CA officers may also be afforded the opportunity to study contract training, network development, operational design, and Masters programs in Special Operations-related fields from the National Defense University and the Naval Postgraduate School.²¹⁶

Reserve officers have a much different training regimen. Though both the Active and Reserve officer will receive the same “38A” designator, the menu of skills brought by each is vastly different based primarily on the differences in the initial training provided by SWCS.

²¹⁵ US Army, “Careers and Jobs.”

²¹⁶ US Army, “Civil Affairs Training.”




Figure 3. Active Army Civil Affairs Training Pipeline

Source: US Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, *Academic Handbook Fiscal Year 2019* (Fort Bragg, NC: Special Warfare Center and School, April-June 2018), 12-13.

Training the Reserve

The CA qualification training for the Reserve officer is sub-par, at best. In the Reserve, officers identified for training are not required to undergo any type of selection process to determine suitability for advancement into the profession of arms. Rather, they simply volunteer for assignment as a CA officer after completing any basic branch officer’s training. Assuming the Reserve CA unit accepts them into the unit, the officer is then scheduled to begin the USAJFKSWCS prescribed “training pipeline” (see figure 4).

Entering the pipeline in Phase 1, the Reserve officer CA candidate will attend the CA Captains Career Course via distance learning. This course consists of 75 hours of training focused on “leadership and operations in company-sized organization” which

includes leadership, cross-cultural skills, unified land operations, staff officer competencies, unit training management, decision making, and mission command.²¹⁷




Figure 4. Army Reserve Civil Affairs Training Pipeline

Source: US Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, *Academic Handbook Fiscal Year 2019* (Fort Bragg, NC: Special Warfare Center and School, April-June 2018), 12-13.

During Phase 2, the Reserve candidate attends a four-week course at Fort Bragg that “trains and educates U.S. Army Reserve commissioned officers in the Army Captains Career Course Common Core requirements, including a combined arms exercise, before transitioning to CA Branch-required learning of regional analysis.”²¹⁸

²¹⁷ US Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, *Academic Handbook Fiscal Year 2019* (Fort Bragg, NC: Special Warfare Center and School, April-June 2018), 14.

²¹⁸ Ibid.

Continuing in the distance learning program, the Reserve CA candidate enters Phase 3 of their training. In this phase, they study “Civil Affairs by learning about its heritage, organization and structure, doctrinal foundations, methodologies for examining the civil component, core tasks and unified-action partners. They gain cultural competence and become attuned to the complexity of the operating environment in population-centric conflicts.”²¹⁹

Finally, in Phase 4 of the Reserve CA candidates training, they will again attend a resident course at Fort Bragg. This culminating event “trains and educates the US Army Commissioned Officers with the tactical, technical and leader knowledge needed to lead a CA team.” and ends with the “assessment of each student on their application of their knowledge and skill of civil affairs.”²²⁰ Finally, in the words of the USAJFKSWCS:

The outcome of this course is to produce CA officers who are critical and creative thinkers and adaptive problem solvers whose expertise in the Human Domain of military operations allow them to lead teams that conduct CA operations that shape, deter and influence foreign political and military environments in order to prevent war. With cultural competence and the ability to bridge language barriers, they plan both CAO and civil-military operations and collaborate with unified-action partners. The CA officer will be attuned to the complexity off the operating environment, regionally focused and possess unique capabilities necessary to operate and influence effectively and efficiently in population-centric missions utilizing innovative, low-cost and small-footprint approaches.²²¹

The organization and training of CA forces prior to 2006 was well defined though the force lacked capacity. Secretary Rumsfeld reorganized the CA force against the

²¹⁹ US Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, *Academic Handbook Fiscal Year 2019*, 15.

²²⁰ Ibid.

²²¹ Ibid.

advice and guidance of his subordinate commanders and advisors. Because of this, Army CA was fractured along Reserve–Active and General Purpose–Special Operations lines. Immediately following the reorganization, when needed most, the Army could not provide a sufficient amount of adequately trained CA to the field forces. The Department of Defense looked elsewhere for a solution, and established multiple organizations that were doing exactly what CA should have been doing.

The organizational structure of CA was split in 2007 for no particular reason. The fractured force became less responsive; Active CA could not keep up with the demand and Reserve forces were being used in a piecemeal fashion, filling capability gaps with individuals and not units. With no reserve available to use, Active CA exponentially grew force structure in an attempt to keep up with requirements. Not until the demand signal reduced, and the grossly bloated Active duty force shrank, could any real discussion be had related to total CA force organization and what “right” looked like. By this time, however, the training requirements for Active and Reserve had dramatically changed, and the supporting cast of Reserve members no longer brought to the fight the same capabilities as expected of a CA professional.

Indeed, the training requirements did change. While it could be argued that the CA candidate receives equitable training in both the Active and Reserve training pipelines, the statement is simply not true. The newly minted CA officer of the Active force has, after an intensive selection program and attendance at the ARSOF Captain’s Career Course, experienced a minimum of 44 weeks in intensive, region and culture focused training prior to being awarded the designation as a CA Officer. This officer’s Reserve counterpart, however, signs-up for CA at his local unit, attends a total of seven

weeks of resident training interspersed with distance learning, and lacks regional specialization or formal language training. Completing these events, this individual also receives the designation as a CA Officer. The training provided by SWCS for the Active candidate is superb; for the Reserve the training is not acceptable. The current Reserve CA training pipeline is not a suitable or acceptable alternative to the Active duty version.

CHAPTER 5

SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The hypothesis that the CA branch, organized under a USAR-led, multi-component headquarters, previously provided adequate, skilled, specially trained capabilities supporting the conventional Army and ARSOF as a part of the USASOC organic force structure is supported. The multi-component organization of USASOC and USACAPOC until 2006 allowed tailored force packages to fill critical, rotational, enduring global conventional and special operations requirements. This organizational construct allowed USSOCOM/USASOC to maintain proponentcy of CA as a “special operation” while allowing USACAPOC(A), the majority stakeholder of the total CA capability, to command and control the overall force.

Under this organization, USASOC was able to leverage the vast resources and functional specialties found in the USAR CA community to support the mission requirements, and while the organization of the total CA force was simple and generally functional, it proved less effective. The organization failed to prohibit individual Reserve CA soldiers from filling capability gaps force-wide, and thus undermined the ability of the Reserve to provide full-unit rotations when needed most. This problem compounded itself with every deployment cycle, eventually requiring the Army and Department of Defense to source the capability elsewhere.

Organization

In 2007, Active CA under USASOC increased the size of the force to adapt to the overwhelming demand for CA missions. This was done at the expense of the Reserve

CA, who were well capable of providing the force, as whole units, but were relegated to providing individual backfills or whole units composed of ad-hoc personnel, including those converted from other specialties or services. This piecemeal support was contrary to standing policy which stated that units that train together should deploy together. The Army recognized that USAR unit readiness is greatly reduced by the utilization of individual backfills from the USAR to support Active unit personnel shortages.

Well stated in the CSIS discussion of the history of CA, “organizationally, command relationships prior to the divorce were relatively simple, with all civil affairs personnel and issues being handled by USACAPOC under USASOC, reporting to USSOCOM. After the bifurcation, command relationships became far more complicated.”²²² In the midst of the Global War on Terrorism, the largest conflict since World War II, the Department of Defense rapidly and dramatically reorganized and restructured the organization and training of Army CA and effectively decreased the overall capability of the CA force.

To highlight the convoluted mess of CA “organization” after 2007, between 2014 and 2017, CA forces were deployed to Europe in support of Atlantic Resolve, the US European Command (EUCOM) mission to deter Russian aggression.²²³ These forces were provided by three separate command structures coming from both Active and Reserve components: The assigned CA forces came from the 361 CA Brigade (USAR), the regionally oriented 353 CACOM (USAR), and the 95th CA Brigade (USASOC). The

²²² Hicks, Wormuth, and Ridge, “The Future of the U.S. Civil Affairs Forces,” 36.

²²³ US Army Europe, “Operation Atlantic Resolve Fact Sheet,” accessed December 28, 2018, <http://www.eur.army.mil/atlanticresolve/>.

CA forces were not organized, or trained adequately or equally, to provide the Army or EUCOM with the comprehensive CA capabilities required for the mission. The CA force was disparate, disorganized, inappropriate, and less than optimally effective.

An examination of the CA forces utilized in Atlantic Resolve is an example of the multi-component capabilities that could be immediately available to the Army and USASOC under a properly task-organized and trained CA branch. The assigned 361 CA Brigade should have been the single point of contact and integrator of the EUCOM planning and operations process, through which all other CA forces and activities coordinated. Once additional requirements were identified by the 361 CA Brigade, support should have been provided by the 353 CACOM. The 95th CA Brigade should have provided additional capability outside of the 361st CA Brigade abilities, if needed, to support any SOF mission requirements. This is juxtaposed to the broken and confusing CA forces actually provided to the Combatant Commander at the time, highlighted in the same Atlantic Resolve scenario.

Training

The Active duty officer that desires to become a CA Officer must, after rigorous selection and ARSOF Captains Career Course, complete a minimum of 44 weeks of intensive, regional focused, and culturally aligned training, including formal professional language training, to become qualified as a CA officer. This equates, based on the SWCS seven-day training week, to roughly 308 days of training. The Reserve officer, after simply asking to become a CA Officer at a local unit, will not attend any type of selection process nor attend the ARSOF Captains Career Course before entering the training pipeline. The pipeline they enter encompasses 94 days of total training, with only 55 of

those days in a resident training status. To make it clearer: The Reserve officer receives only 30.5 percent of the total amount of training as their active duty counterpart, and only 17.8 percent of actual resident training. Additionally, this Reservist will not receive the deep regional and cultural expertise and training relevant to the unit to which they are assigned, nor will SWCS provide this Soldier with any formal language training. SWCS will, however, state that at the completion of the Reserve training pipeline the individual is a fully qualified CA Officer. Given the training received, and the fact that both the Active and Reserve officer are qualified CA Officers, both should be able to provide the Combatant Commander with the same menu of skills. Unfortunately, they cannot.

Conclusions

The USAR is properly organized to support the totality of CA requirements for the Army. Currently organized with a central headquarters led by a Major General, USACAPOC(A) could simultaneously deploy one entire CACOM to four of the five Geographic Combatant Commands to support missions in the respective areas of operation. Further, these CACOMs are regionally oriented units doctrinally designed to support the GCC, theater army, and subordinate corps and divisions. The USAR is organized with enough strength to conduct this large-scale activity with sufficient forces remaining in “reserve.” Further, the USAR also maintains two non-USACAPOC(A) CA Brigades, one assigned to INDOPACOM and the other to EUCOM. Considering that each Brigade is doctrinally designed to be the “go-to” CA provider for the theater command, these two units are, and should be, continually engaged within their assigned theater. As the lead CA force in theater, all CA missions should be routed through these units for seamless, continual support to the GCC. Unfortunately, while these CA

elements are the assigned force, they are grossly underutilized by the Army. The presence of these two units outside of the USACAPOC(A) command and control is an organizational anomaly that should be rectified.

The Reserve CA officer is not adequately trained. Significant training deficiencies and discrepancies exist that clearly and disturbingly separate the Active force from the Reserve force. The Reserve lacks the robust foundational training provided to the Active force and, while not directly addressed in this thesis, lacks the ongoing training opportunities provided, and often required, of their Active counterparts. The Army would not likely consider allowing its Reserve aviators to attend a training pipeline that is only 30 percent of the Active training regimen, then consider them “fully qualified” to conduct missions flying multi-million-dollar airframes in combat. Nor would the Army allow an Armor officer to attend a Reserve course consisting of just 17 percent of the actual in-residence training of the Active program, then send the officer off to war commanding a tank platoon. The Army does not allow separate training programs that result in the same qualifications in any other part of the force.

Making the point further, housed under the same “roof” as the CA proponent resides the Special Forces proponent within SWCS and USASOC. In the Special Forces regiment, one of the three SOF regiments, all candidates undergo the same rigorous selection and training program to receive the coveted green beret. Members of this regiment, both Active and Reserve (National Guard), are interchangeable pieces in the Special Forces capability. When a Combatant Commander asks for a Special Forces officer or unit, they receive the same quality, high-caliber asset with a known menu of capabilities. Within the CA regiment, this is not true. This disparate training readiness is

a major mission-essential deficiency. As the CA proponent for the Army, USASOC is ultimately responsible for these shortfalls and has a model that could fix the problem.

The CA missions for the Reserve prior to and after 2007 have not dramatically changed. World War II proved that the Army needed to rely on the civilian expertise of the citizen soldier to effectively conduct CAO and CMO during the conduct of war and immediately thereafter. Implementing many of the lessons learned from this experience, the Army was able to execute CAO and CMO effectively during the Korean War, though the requirements exposed in that experience proved a new challenge. Vietnam blended the two types of operations together; One supported conventional force-on-force combat operations and the other engaged in a counter-insurgency campaign to “win hearts and minds” through CORDS after 1967. The Reserve CA officer provided the expertise found overwhelmingly in the civilian workforce.

Following the early use and growth of the CA Branch through Vietnam, the nation began to take on more humanitarian assistance missions and CA, primarily a Reserve force, was again called to support the nation’s needs. Reorganization of the Army during the 1980s, particularly with Goldwater-Nichols, changed the structure of not only the Army Reserve, but also the Special Operations Force and CA. Organized under USASOC, the CA force managed by USACAPOC(A) continued to successfully support ongoing low intensity small wars with myriad specialties coming primarily from the civilian experience of the assigned personnel. Highlighting the importance of CA within the Army, Desert Shield, Desert Storm, and the remainder of the “peacekeeping” years proved busy for the Reserve CA force. In the 18 years of the Global War on

Terrorism, Reserve CA forces have continued to deploy supporting the needs of the nation.

Army Civil Affairs has evolved considerably since its origins in the post-WWI occupation of Germany. The Army has recognized the continuing need for formalized CA instruction and planning, and the requirement for a standing Civil Affairs force. CA engages across the spectrum of warfare ranging from the prevention of hostilities through unconventional warfare to assisting people to restore order and normality after hostilities end. The demand for CA remains strong because it is a force multiplier.²²⁴

Recommendations

Policy

Mobilization policy for Reserve members should be addressed by Congress. While not applicable to all elements of the Reserve, certain segments, such as CA, PO, and portions of logistics capabilities not present in the active force must have the ability to immediately mobilize and deploy in support of global contingency operations. Simple modifications to existing mobilization authorities, such as PSRC, would make this possible. This action would address the deficiencies of the Global Force Management mechanisms and existing authorities, and allow the Army and USASOC, through the Reserve, to deliver capable CA forces within required timelines.

Congress needs to further stipulate, in law, that Reserve units must deploy as whole units and not be used to fill capability gaps below company level. The utilization of individual volunteers should be restricted to units not within three years of identified mobilization. In this same law, it is recommended that individuals that volunteer for mobilization outside of their assigned unit lose all rights of dwell upon return from the

²²⁴ United States Army Special Operations Command History Office, *U.S. Army Civil Affairs History Handbook*, 7.

voluntary mobilization. In this manner, unit readiness would be better protected in times of crisis.

Organization

The organization of Army CA requires immediate remediation to remain a viable capability for the total force. While numerous other studies have recommended many of the same concepts, three organizational recommendations are proffered here:

1. Reorganize all Army CA capabilities under a multi-component, Reserve-oriented headquarters such as USACAPOC(A). This organization should be the lead element and for the totality of CA capabilities, as the vast majority of all traditional CA forces reside in the Reserve and 100 percent of all of the MSG (38G) capability resides there. Further, by providing the Reserve with the overall organizational command and control, this element would be well-suited to manage and balance the requirements to the forces available and thus better tailor the force package response to the needs of the Army.
2. Re-assign the two non-USACAPOC(A) USAR CA Brigades from their respective GCC to USACAPOC(A). Upon re-assignment, immediately place the two units under the operational control of the GCC from which they came. In this manner, these units would benefit from the vast resources of USACAPOC(A), be united in training and resourcing efforts, and importantly control the USAR CA force under a single chain of command. The GCC would maintain the ability to have a CA force in a direct, habitual, supporting relationship and would benefit from the CA unit being able to reach back to USACAPOC(A) for support when needed, without delay.

3. Establish a Reserve “pool” of CA officers assigned and reporting directly to USACAPOC(A). In a manner similar to the Individual Mobilization Augmentee program in the total Reserve, this pool would remain assigned to USACAPOC(A) but not have any requirement to attend normal Reserve weekend training. These CA Officers would maintain their civilian employment across the world, receive specialty training in their craft through both civilian and military channels, and would be utilized for CA requirements on an as-needed basis. This would provide the Active force with a small pool of CA officers from which to draw when small capability gaps did occur, and would also maintain full, ready Reserve units available for whole-unit mobilizations. Included in this group would be both CA Generalists (38A) and functional specialists in the MSG (38G) program.

Training

Training the CA force must be made equitable. Under the current training construct administered by SWCS, a Reserve and an Active CA Officer are vastly different upon award of the CA designation. There are no reasonable arguments for this discrepancy to continue. The fact that this disparate training is occurring in the Army of 2019 is unacceptable in terms of user-unit expectations. USSOCOM and the Office of the Chief, Army Reserve must take an active role in correcting this grievous disparity and the Army must ensure that it happens as soon as practicable.

The active duty training pipeline is superb and should not be changed. This training regimen should be the standard by which all CA candidates are measured. Any Reserve CA training organizations located outside of this SWCS program should be

reassigned and relocated to SWCS at Fort Bragg, North Carolina to allow for the increased flow of Reserve personnel through the unified training pipeline. Funding to support the increased number of trainees should be made available to both the Reserve and Active force and would be partially offset by the reduction in training sites and instructors currently in the Reserve.

The CA force should amend the Additional Skill Identifier (ASI) “K9” (Special Operations Support) already existing in the Army. The amendment should remove the statement “For use with any AOC authorized in a SOF unit except AOC 18A, AOC 37A or AOC 38A.”²²⁵ This should be available to CA (38A) and MSG (38G) as it would directly apply to the Reserve CA force. This ASI is designed to identify Soldiers across the branches that have specialized training and experience working for and with Special Operations Command. The existing proponent of the “K9” ASI is SWCS, and the personnel policy guide already stipulates the requirements to be awarded the “K9” identifier. These requirements for Active duty Soldiers include “Successfully complete 22 months in an active duty capacity in any area of concentration (AOC) with a Special Operations Forces (SOF) designated unit USSOCOM, TSOC, USASOC, USASFC, USAJFKSWCS, USASOAC, USAMISOC, 95th CA Bde, or 528th Sustainment Bde) or a 12 month SOF deployment.”²²⁶ For members of the Reserve the requirement, above, is adjusted in that “Army Reserve or National Guard officers must meet the same

²²⁵ US Department of the Army, Department of the Army (DA) Pamphlet 611-21, *Military Occupational Classification and Structure* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, July 2018), Table 4-3, accessed April 18, 2019, https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/pdf/web/ARN8940_P611_21_FINAL.pdf.

²²⁶ Ibid.

qualifications, but require a cumulative 22 months of assignments in a SOF designated unit or a 12 month SOF deployment.”²²⁷ Additionally, both Active and Reserve members must be airborne qualified.

Given that this specialty identifier already exists, it is recommended that the single, comprehensive CA training pipeline currently identified for Active forces be used as the standard for training all Army CA forces. All Soldiers meeting the requirements for the “K9” ASI, which would include all Reserve CA and Active GPF forces in the 83rd CA Brigade, should be awarded the identifier. In this manner, any “special operations” capability gaps identified by the force could be filled first by those members, or units, with additional “special operations” support experience.

Other Recommendations

The Civil Affairs Regimental Association, the fraternal organization of past, present, and associate CA professionals, should become more vocal in their recommendations and guidance to the CA Branch. Numerous examples of formal, professional discussions and meetings were observed in the research of this thesis in which the association has made recommendations for improving the CA Branch, yet the recommendations have not been implemented. This association, particularly through its close, symbiotic relationship with the CA Branch possesses the best opportunity to actually influence change in the Branch through direct, frank discussions with Army senior leaders.

²²⁷ US Department of the Army, DA Pamphlet 611-21, *Military Occupational Classification and Structure*, Table 4-3.

The guidance and recommendations of numerous organizations, including the US Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute should be given special consideration by USASOC. This organization, within the limited scope of this thesis, has addressed numerous issues identified and provided recommendations for the improvement of CA. Contributing to, and participating in, the research of the PKSOI are key leaders of the CA Branch including past commanders and senior leaders of USASOC, USACAPOC(A), and the 95th CA Brigade. These leaders continue to advocate for change in the CA Branch, yet the Active Army remains deaf to their ideas and recommendations.

USSOCOM, as the final authority on matters pertaining to US Special Operations Forces, should take ownership of the issues identified in this thesis, as well as other issues identified by organizations such as the CA Regimental Association and the PKSOI. In so doing, USSOCOM, working as a Geographic Combatant Command and a Component Command, in conjunction with the greater national security enterprise, should establish a long-term strategy for the use and implementation of the unique CA capability. CA, more so than any other capability in the Defense inventory, provides the critical link between the diplomatic and military elements of national power and the overall National Security Strategy. As both the owner of the capability and an end-user, USSOCOM has the ability to bring cohesion and finality to current issues and conflict facing the CA Branch.

Further Research

Numerous instances were observed wherein USACAPOC(A) claimed that the advantage of the Reserve is the professional skills and experience brought to the force by

Reserve members through their civilian skills, experiences, and qualification. These claims have not been supported by any in-depth, scholarly research. Questions identified within the scope of this thesis are any data related to the USACAPOC(A) claim that the CA professionals within their organization are the functional specialists. Specifically, how many, and what percent of the Battalions, Brigade, and CACOMs are actually lawyers, judges, city managers, waste supervisors, etc.?

Another point of research includes the contention that the Reserve forces deploy on similar rates as their active counterparts, often filling the capability gaps in USASOC, or SOF, mission sets. What is the deployment rate of Reserve CA, as individuals and units, for both their own missions as compared to missions that AC cannot fill? How many individual reserve augmentees are actually used as backfill to active units, specifically the 95th CA Brigade. This data would be highly useful in supporting or refuting the findings of this thesis.

A major point of contention made by the Reserve CA force is that CA candidates within the Reserve are actually unable to attend the Active duty training pipeline due to constraints from their civilian lives, including disruption of employment, family commitments, and the like. Is this true; are the Reserve CA candidates simply unwilling to attend the extensive training; or do other factors such as Army funding impact this statement? Statistical analysis could not be located while conducting research for this thesis to support the USACAPOC(A) claim.

This question should be compared to the Special Forces (18A) training pipeline. In this case, SWCS is also the proponent of the branch and the training, and conducts only one type of training. The training pipeline is a comprehensive, intensive, year-long

program for both Active and Reserve Component (National Guard) candidates. These National Guard members successfully prepare for and complete the training, and the product (18A Special Forces Soldier) is a fully capable member with no distinguishable differences between Active and National Guard. This research should examine the overall impact of the training to the 18A candidate as compared to the 38A candidate as well as the number of personnel in the Reserve and National Guard that (1) have not attended the training pipelines due to an identified constraint; (2) the number of members that would attend the 18A selection if it were reduced in duration to a level similar to the Reserve CA pipeline; the number of members that would attend the CA pipeline if it were increased to a level similar to the Active pipeline; and (4) the willingness of USASOC to reduce the 18A pipeline to a level similar to the Reserve CA pipeline, and the issues or concerns identified as results of such a reduction.

While purposefully not considered within the scope of this thesis, the questions addressed herein may also relate to PO forces. As USASOC maintains an Active PO force, USACAPOC(A) owns the vast majority of the total force, and SWCS is the training proponent, questions related to the correlation between CA and PO capabilities are present. Do USASOC, USACAPOC(A) and SWCS have a different relationship with these forces; is the training pipeline vastly different; and did the separation of USASOC and USACAPOC(A) in 2007 impact the two branches in a similar manner?

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