DEVELOPING, UNDERSTANDING, AND WIELDING INFLUENCE THROUGH EXPANDED MANEUVER – A COGNITIVE DIMENSION APPROACH

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree

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Developing understanding and wielding influence are an essential component of the value SOF provides the Nation. The SOF network of personnel, assets, and formations represent means by which to obtain early understanding of trends, emerging trans-regional threats, and opportunities. Employment of the SOF network also provides capabilities needed to shape and influence outcomes. In an era characterized by an increasing interconnected and complex environment highlighting the relevance of the population-centric aspects of competition and conflict, SOF must operate as part of a whole of government approach to mitigate our Nation's challenges in accordance with the 2017 National Security Strategy to upgrade, tailor and innovate the wielding of influence. Therefore, the Army and Joint Force writ large require an expanded concept of maneuver that considers both physical and cognitive dimension in and across multiple domains to move both force and ideas in time and space in pursuit of physical and cognitive objectives across the entire operational continuum, but particularly so in security environments below the threshold of Large Scale Combat Operations (LSCO) where state and non-state actors seek to gain an asymmetric advantage by operating in the seam between peace and war.

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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

ABSTRACT

DEVELOPING UNDERSTANDING AND WIELDING INFLUENCE THROUGH EXPANDED MANEUVER – A COGNITIVE DIMENSION APPROACH, by Kurt Able, 65 pages.

Developing understanding and wielding influence are an essential component of the value SOF provides the Nation. The SOF network of personnel, assets, and formations represent means by which to obtain early understanding of trends, emerging trans-regional threats, and opportunities. Employment of the SOF network also provides capabilities needed to shape and influence outcomes. In an era characterized by an increasing interconnected and complex environment highlighting the relevance of the population-centric aspects of competition and conflict, SOF must operate as part of a whole of government approach to mitigate our Nation's challenges in accordance with the 2017 National Security Strategy to upgrade, tailor and innovate the wielding of influence. Therefore, the Army and Joint Force writ large require an expanded concept of maneuver that considers both physical and cognitive dimension in and across multiple domains to move both force and ideas in time and space in pursuit of physical and cognitive objectives across the entire operational continuum, but particularly so in security environments below the threshold of Large Scale Combat Operations (LSCO) where state and non-state actors seek to gain an asymmetric advantage by operating in the seam between peace and war.

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ACRONYMS

AO	Area of Operations
ARSOF	Army Special Operations Forces
CCDR	Combatant Commander
CO	Cyber Operations
COIN	Counter Insurgency
CT	Counter Terrorism
CTC	Combat Training Center
FID	Foreign Internal Defense
I3	Integration, Interdependence and Interoperability
IE	Information Environment
IO	Information Operations
IW	Irregular Warfare
JFC	Joint Force Commander
JIIM	Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental and Multinational
JRTC	Joint Readiness Training Center
JTF	Joint Task Force
JOE	Joint Operational Environment
LOE	Line of Effort
LNO	Liaison Officer
LSCO	Large Scale Combat Operations
MISO	Military Information Support Operations
NTC	National Training Center
OE	Operational Environment

PME	Professional Military Education
PSYOP	Psychological Operations
SOJTF	Special Operations Joint Task Force
TAA	Target Audience Analysis
TAAW	Target Audience Analysis Worksheet
TSOC	Theater Special Operations Command
UA	Unified Action
ULO	Unified Land Operations
USG	United States Government

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Context

National interests are achieved and preserved in many ways, but none are more definitive than through Large Scale Combat Operations (LSCO) or campaigns. For large-scale efforts, Army Special Operations Forces (ARSOF) conduct activities that support the Joint Force Commander (JFC) throughout the operation or campaign. Complex campaigns may require ARSOF and Conventional Force (CF) to conduct simultaneous activities.[1] Prior to interdependent activities, ARSOF shape the inevitable and perpetually existent deep-fight in order to set favorable conditions throughout the Joint Operational Area (JOA).



Figure 1. Contrasting Conventional and Irregular Warfare

Source: Headquarters, Department of the Army, *Army Special Operations Unconventional Warfare* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2008), sec. 1-6.

[1] Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), Joint Publication (JP) 3-05, *Special Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, July 2014), sec. II-9.

ARSOF executes this persistent effort through Irregular Warfare (IW); within IW exists Unconventional Warfare (UW), Foreign Internal Defense (FID), Counter Insurgency (COIN), Counter-Terrorism (CT) and Stability Operations. Combatant Commanders (CCDR) are mandated to implement IW-related concepts into their training, exercises and planning[2] through coordination with the Commander of United States Special Operations Command (CDRUSSOCOM).



Figure 2. USSOCOM Activities

Source: United States Army Special Operations Command, *Unconventional Warfare Pocket Guide* (Fort Bragg, NC: United States Army Special Operations Command, 2016), 4.

[2] Deputy Secretary of Defense, Department of Defense Directive (DoDD) 3000.07, *Irregular Warfare (IW)* (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, August 2014), 11.

In the current Joint Operational Environment (JOE), there exists a misconception within CF as to how ARSOF develops and wields influence through expanded maneuver in support of the JFC. ARSOF is not just a CT unit that executes Direct Action (DA).

ARSOF develops understanding and wields influence through expanded maneuver by approaching each problem set through a multi-domain, multi-platform, multi-functional lens. ARSOF dominates the physical and cognitive battlefields by employing Psychological Operations (PSYOP), in concert with lethality, where the Human and Cyber Domain are the focal points of influence. Prior to conducting PSYOP in peacetime, contingencies, or during declared war, the CCDR must have their PSYOP program or plan approved – PSYOP programs and plans are submitted to the joint staff for staffing through the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD[P]) as stand-alone programs, as part of a theater security cooperation plan or campaign plan.[3]

ARSOF are expertly trained to apply solutions to complex problem sets through a multi-faceted lens with CCDR strategic mentality application. Within this context, ARSOF executes expanded maneuver by linking tactical effects to the operational and strategic levels through the enablement of PSYOP. PSYOP's execution of the narrative influence the Human and Cyberspace Domain to set favorable conditions for the Joint Force with geo-political and socio-economic considerations.[4] ARSOF expands the

[3] Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA), Field Manual (FM) 3-05.301, *Psychological Operations Process, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, August 2007), sec 1-2.

[4] Thomas M. Scanzillo and Edward M. Lopacienski, "Influence Operations and the Human Domain" (CIWAG Case Studies, U.S. Naval War College, Newport, RI, 2015), 10.

current framework of Unified Land Operations (ULO) by applying PSYOP to the Cyberspace and Human Domains with a decisive operation approach, as opposed to a subsidiary effort within a Mission Command Warfighting Function Task.[5]

ARSOF, through the enablement of PSYOP, utilize the Cyberspace and Human Domains as a means to an end to influence audiences. The military, as a Joint Force, must ascertain a common understanding in ULO between ARSOF and CF with how PSYOP are able to facilitate expanded maneuver. PSYOP influence both the physical and cognitive aspects of warfare throughout the Cyberspace and Human Domains while applying a multi-faceted analysis toward diplomacy, information, military and economic considerations[6] that the CCDR also considers in mission planning.

Proposed Research Question

The primary question is how can ARSOF expand the Army's current frame for Unified Land Operations beyond physical to consider outmaneuvering adversaries both physically and cognitively to ensure the Joint Force is better positioned to maintain a competitive edge over our Nation's adversaries?[7] The secondary question is how can ARSOF, as part of the Joint Force, better prepare and shape the contemporary and future

[5] Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA), Field Manual (FM) 3-0, *Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, December 2017), sec. 2-24.

[6] Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJSC), Joint Publication (JP) 5-0, *Joint Planning* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, June 2017), sec. B-2.

[7] U.S. Army Special Operations Command (USASOC), "USASOC Academic Research Topics," accessed September 27, 2018, https://www.soc.mil/SWCS/SWEG/ResearchPapers.htm.

operating environment for success through the conduct of "Cognitive Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB)?"[8]

Importance and Relevance

The effective application of expanded maneuver in the joint environment is vital to the success of future large-scale conflict executed by the United States' Military. In the future, compartmentalized planning degrades between ARSOF and CF to a secondary function, while integrated planning takes precedence. Liaison Officers (LNO) and liaison personnel from both parties will become more robust and further integrated into the critical nodes of mission planning between the elements. The complexity of war has evolved to necessitate a change to improve joint-understanding between ARSOF and CF. The distribution of Joint Publications (JP) and execution of Professional Military Education (PME) does not adequately facilitate shared understanding and mutually supporting efforts between ARSOF and CF, thus requiring its validation through actual use in the JOE.

Information Warfare executed by an enemy of peer-to-peer capabilities utilize cyberspace, perception management, deception, electronic means, physical destruction and operational security in order to gain a marked advantage.[9] PSYOP facilitate expanded maneuver by manipulating the cognitive battlefield and countering an enemy's Information Warfare endeavor by executing a Target Audience Analysis (TAA).[10] Army

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[8] USASOC, "USASOC Academic Research Topics."

[9] HQDA, FM 3-0, sec. 1-10.

[10] HQDA, FM 3-05.301, sec. 2-1.

Special Forces, also known as Green Berets, execute operations in concert with PSYOP in order to maximize shaping effects both near and long-term in support of the JFC. The relevance of this remains at the operational and strategic level as PSYOP, through the TAA, consider nodes of criticality such as; history, culture, current events, society and politics.[11]

ARSOF is uniquely purposed to achieve operational and strategic shaping effects in support of the Joint Force. Theater Special Operations Command (TSOC) Priorities are always nested with the CCDR's Priorities. However, the inverse is not true resulting in a lack of understanding for the CCDR's joint-staff. This critical gap fosters an inefficiency of planning and execution between ARSOF and CF in support of the Joint Force.

Limitations

This thesis will focus on how to expand maneuver warfare between ARSOF and CF with PSYOP as the medium. Mutual supporting endeavors for expanded maneuver reside upon the shoulders of PSYOP. ARSOF and CF must holistically understand the end state within the CCDR's Strategic Approach in order to obtain appropriate Measures of Performance (MOP) and Effectiveness (MOE) with the use of PSYOP.

This thesis will concentrate on the Integration, Interdependence and Interoperability (I3) between ARSOF and CF through the use of appropriate LNO packages between the two forces. Planning, execution and assessments of joint functions will be addressed through the use of doctrine, theory and practice at the Army's Training Centers (CTC) located at Fort Polk, Louisiana and Fort Irwin, California.

[11] HQDA, FM 3-05.301, sec. 2-1.

This thesis will examine the joint-implementation measures and current joint-practices at the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) and National Training Center (NTC) in order to improve ARSOF and CF shared understanding. This is pivotal in preparing the Joint Force for LSCO in support of the JFC. The CTCs serve as the cornerstone in preparing for combat as a Joint Force prior to deployment.

Delimitations

This thesis will not concentrate on the management of information and intelligence. Management of information and intelligence differs between units throughout the Joint Force due to policy. This thesis will not focus on changing the Army Force Management Model or Personnel Readiness Management (PRM) that assesses current combat capabilities, projects future requirements and individual readiness as it pertains to Information Operations (IO) for CF and PSYOP for ARSOF.[12] Furthermore, it will not focus on changing current operational planning doctrine but rather how to better apply it in order to increase combat effectiveness throughout the JOA.

Summary and Conclusion

Mark Esper, the current Secretary of the Army, stated "there is a reason why the JRTC and the National Training Center are last stops for any unit before they go abroad on a deployment. We know these are the places where they get the most demanding, the

[12] Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA), Field Manual (FM) 1-0, *Human Resources Support* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, April 2014), sec. 3-1.

most rigorous, the best training so that they are ready to deploy"[13] during a recent visit to Fort Polk. The importance of this statement resonated with military units undertaking arduous and realistic training. Although not mentioned, readiness of the Joint Force also implies an understanding of mutually supporting roles between ARSOF and CF throughout the Joint Force which is critical to success.

The CCDR's purpose, vision and end state provide the "ends" for ARSOF and CF to achieve I3 through mutually supporting efforts. ARSOF executes expanded maneuver within the CCDR's Intent while accounting for Joint Task Force (JTF) subordinate maneuver elements and Special Operations Joint Task Force (SOJTF) activity. ARSOF retains acute situational awareness throughout multiples Areas of Operation (AO).

Within these interwoven areas of responsibility exists PSYOP, who enable ARSOF to shape the deep-fight throughout the JOA. The JSOA, which doctrinally resides within a JOA as established by the JFC,[14] facilitate freedom of movement for ARSOF to shape the environment. The JSOA normally resides well beyond the Forward Line of Troops (FLOT) in an area that is inaccessible to CF. The shaping of this environment effects the JOA directly as ARSOF executes expanded maneuver. However, the shaping of the joint-operation environment is hindered when JTF subordinate maneuver elements, specifically CF, do not appropriately exploit PSYOP effects.

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[13] Chuck Gannon, "Army Secretary Talks Readiness, Future Warfare in Joint Readiness Training Center, Fort Polk Visit," U.S. Army, accessed October 1, 2018, https://www.army.mil/article/209485/army_secretary_talks_readiness_future_warfare_in_joint_readiness_training_center_fort_polk_visit.

[14] CJCS, JP 3-05, sec. III-11.

While ARSOF serves as the arbiter for expanded maneuver, the effort results in a failure if the Joint Force does not take advantage of it. The implementation of ARSOF and CF LNO packages facilitate the means to synchronize joint-military operations in time and space. The exchange of these units must be done at the appropriate level as assessed by SOJTF and JTF subordinate maneuver commanders. PSYOP remains as the ways to achieve expanded maneuver through a joint-effort between ARSOF and CF. ARSOF's adaptive use of PSYOP provides an understanding and wields influence throughout the Human and Cyberspace Domains at an unprecedented level for the Joint Force. This thesis will show how PSYOP facilitates this and while providing recommendations for improving ARSOF CF I3 efforts.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

The purpose of this chapter is to provide a review of published doctrine, theory and current body of knowledge dedicated to PSYOP in the Human and Cyberspace Domains. The primary question remains as to how can ARSOF, as the premiere practitioners of cognitive maneuver, expand the Army's current frame for Unified Land Operations beyond physical to consider outmaneuvering adversaries both physically and cognitively to ensure the Joint Force is better positioned to maintain a competitive edge over our Nation's adversaries? The application of PSYOP in the multi-domain environment, as it relates to influencing human behavior in the Human and Cyberspace Domain, resides in a stage of infancy in current military doctrine due to the rapid evolution of warfare.

The evolution of technology, as a platform for PSYOP, has progressed at such a rate that doctrine cannot keep up. Notwithstanding changes in technology, the end state for PSYOP to influence behavior remains the same thus making the relevancy of doctrine a prominent factor in its execution. Due to this prominent factor, PSYOP is the arbiter of action within ARSOF to execute expanded maneuver. This chapter will outline literature in the order of doctrine, theory and research in order to take a deductive approach to understand ARSOF's PSYOP application within the Human and Cyberspace Domains.

Cyberspace Domain

The *2018 Department of Defense Cyber Strategy* concisely delivers the message that the Joint Force will employ offensive cyber capabilities and innovative concepts that

allow for the use of cyberspace operations across the full spectrum of conflict.[15] This strategic approach hearkens the Department of Defense (DoD) in its totality to become "cyber fluent." The most critical piece of this document is the guidance and direction for every leader and staff member to understand the cyberspace domain to gain strategic, operational and tactical advantages against adversaries to the U.S.[16]

This exemplifies an evolution of guidance within the senior military culture that supports the assertion of LSCO where individuals at all levels must understand a complex battlefield through a multi-domain and multi-layered lens. There is no rigid dichotomy in the DoD's fundamental approach to cyber as it must be accounted for at the tactical, operational and strategic levels throughout all military formations.

JP 3-12*, Cyberspace Operations* defines manipulate as way to "control or change information, information systems, and/or networks in gray or red cyberspace to create physical denial effects, using deception, decoying, conditioning, spoofing, falsification, and other similar techniques."[17] The purposeful usage of broad terms allows, in accordance with authorities, for PSYOP to execute expanded maneuver. The tactical, operational and strategic level application of Cyber Operations (CO) are codified in current doctrine to support the JFC with flexibility.

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[15] Department of Defense (DoD), *Department of Defense Cyber Strategy 2018 Summary* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, September 2018), 1.

[16] Ibid., 5.

[17] Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), Joint Publication (JP) 3-12, *Cyberspace Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, February 2013), sec. II-7.

United States Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) and United States Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM) are the supported command for global or trans-regional CO even as it supports one or more JFC's operations. For specific CO, the supported or supporting command relationship will be established in an Execution Order (EXORD).[18] This joint command relationship is important to understand within the Domain of Cyber as it is susceptible to change depending on the desired effect. Doctrine has codified flexibility for the JFC to be supported with an increased concurrent effort from two Functional Combatant Commands thus proving the importance of CO. The next global conflict will be planned and executed by a robust Joint Force and doctrine continues to evolve to reflect that.

Doctrine for the U.S. Army continues to evolve to include joint implications. FM 3-12, *Cyberspace and Electronic Warfare Operations* amplifies the importance of Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental and Multinational (JIIM) coordination for CO by defining considerations across the full-spectrum that this effort effects.[19] Doctrine is preparing the JFC and its subordinate JTF elements to execute with a common knowledge base to achieve shared understanding prior to the execution of LSCO. DoD guidance and published doctrine (Joint and Army) is attempting to evolve to obtain the same level of understanding that ARSOF has always had in order to be better prepared as a Joint Force for future conflicts.

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[18] CJCS, JP 3-12, sec. II-6.

[19] Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA), Field Manual (FM) 3-12, *Cyberspace and Electronic Warfare Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, April 2017), sec. A-1.

FM 3-0, *Operations* further delves into CO by preparing commanders in both Unified Action (UA) and Unified Land Operations (ULO) by graphically depicting the layers of complexity that resides within the Cyberspace Domain. The most important factor addressed in the doctrinal manual is the requirement to operate throughout it while simultaneously controlling others.[20] Commanders at the tactical, operational and strategic levels will be required to account for this multi-layered and multi-domain contested environment.



Figure 3. Cyberspace in the Multi-Domain Extended Battlefield

Source: Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-0, *Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2017), sec. 1-8.

[20] HQDA, FM 3-0, sec. 1-8.

The U.S. Army is preemptively codifying doctrine to ensure combat readiness cross-functionally for LSCO, as a joint-construct, in order to address the reach and impact of CO in a multi-domain complex problem set.

Human Domain

The *2016 Department of Defense Strategy for Operations in The Information Environment* explicitly tasks subordinate formations to invest in their organization's human capital to prepare to combat an emerging complex threat through a joint effort involving JIIM. The strategy's pillars of People, Programs, Policies, Partnerships (P4) concludes that information is challenging the ability of governments to control their populations and maintain civil order, while at the same time changing how wars are fought and aiding groups in mobilizing and organizing.[21] The DoD's modification to a whole-of-government approach signifies the shift in understanding how critical the Human Domain is when shaping operations in support of the JFC. The tasks listed throughout the strategy require a new way of thinking in the joint-environment for influencing the Human Domain for CF, yet echo the ARSOF Truths from FM 3-05*, Army Special Operations*.

The ARSOF Truth of "Anticipate and Control Psychological Effects" states that ARSOF must integrate PSYOP into all their activities, anticipating and countering propaganda and disinformation themes, as needed, to allow for maximum control of the

[21] Department, of Defense (DoD), *Department of Defense Strategy for Operations in the Information Environment* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, June 2016), 15.

environment.[22] The DoD's P4 strategic approach pulls the from same vein with the additive that technology serves as a conduit to influence the Human Domain. The application of this endeavor requires a joint-effort between ARSOF and CF.

JP 3-05, *Special Operations* states that Special Operations Forces and CF should plan Military Information Support Operations (MISO) to support all phases of operations and campaigns. MISO are planned to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals in a manner favorable to the originator's objectives.[23] Doctrinally, this refers to an act that ARSOF, enabled by PSYOP, executes in support of the JFC because MISO is not a military unit. The highlight of ARSOF and CF I3 is indicative of change within the codifying of doctrine DoD-wide due to the requirements the JFC will have to consider when employing JTF subordinate maneuver elements. PYSOP exploits the initiative by shaping the joint environment through manipulating the human domain.

FM 3-05.301, *Psychological Operations Process Tactics, Techniques and Procedures'* utilization of the TAA accounts for the Joint Force without compromising flexibility. The end state is to influence the human domain regardless of platform. ARSOF's PSYOP dissemination method can include an indigenous (face-to-face),

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[22] Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA), Field Manual (FM) 3-05, *Army Special Operations Forces* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, September 2006), sec. 1-14.

[23] CJCS, JP 3-05, sec. II-14.

physical (paper), visual (television), auditory (radio) and Cyber (Internet)[24] in order to facilitate expanded maneuver for the JFC. ARSOF's influence with PSYOP has influenced the change and modernization of doctrine to support LSCO in the joint-environment.

Doctrinal Research and Theory

As doctrine continues to evolve rapidly, research publications and documents continue to be spear-headed by the ARSOF community in order to prepare the JFC for LSCO in a complex multi-domain environment. *Counter-Da'esh Influence Operations – Cognitive Space Narrative Simulation Insights* synthesized an extensive joint-research effort through computer simulation consisting of PSYOP, United States Government (USG) and international observers, interagency representatives, population experts from Iraq and North Africa, Da'esh experts, universities, and think tanks sponsored by the University of Maryland. This computer simulated experiment, powered by the University's International Communication & Negotiation Simulations Project Network (ICONSnet), proved that an increased operational tempo within the narrative space, combined with multidisciplinary experts, appeared to increase the effectiveness of DoD messaging[25].

[24] HQDA, FM 3-05.301, sec. 6-9.

[25] Rafa Linera Rivera, Gregory Seese, Samuel Rhem, Devin Ellis, and Kay Mereish, "Counter-Da'esh Influence Operations - Cognitive Space Narrative Simulation Insights," Academia, accessed October 1, 2018, https://www.academia.edu/27503019/Counter-Daesh_Influence_Operations_Cognitive_Space_Narrative_Simulation_Insights, 3.

Counter-Da'esh Influence Operations displays the flexibility of ARSOF's PSYOP capability in multi-domain environment where a whole of government approach was the recipe for success. ARSOF's PSYOP dissemination methods were transacted holistically, including within the Cyberspace Domain, to influence behavior throughout the Human Domain. For example, visual dissemination methods had a lesser impact in influencing human behavior whereas the adaptation of the text-narrative was quicker and avoided information fratricide.[26] PSYOP planning and execution permeates across multiple domains, which require acute situational awareness throughout time and space in order to remain as an effective weapon system. The Lines of Effort (LOE) produced by PSYOP in this simulation reflect the complex multi-domain planning considerations required when effecting cognition.

[26] Rafa Linera Rivera et al., "Counter-Da'esh Influence Operations - Cognitive Space Narrative Simulation Insights," 8.



Figure 4. PSYOP Lines of Effort ICONSnet Simulation

Source: Rafa Linera Rivera, Gregory Seese, Samuel Rhem, Devin Ellis, and Kay Mereish, "Counter-Da'esh Influence Operations - Cognitive Space Narrative Simulation Insights," Academia, accessed October 1, 2018, https://www.academia.edu/27503019/Counter-Daesh_Influence_Operations_Cognitive_Space_Narrative_Simulation_Insights, 10.

White Paper on Bio-Psycho-Social Applications to Cognitive Engagement, a Strategic Multi-Layer Assessment (SMA) Periodic Publication, takes joint-publication and research to revolutionize the concept of PYSOP application where the cognitive dimension is considered key terrain[27]. This publication approaches cognitive engagement

[27] Rafa Linera Rivera, Gregory Seese, Matthew Martin, Shmuel Bar, Spencer Gerrol, A. R. Mallory, Shelly Bumphus, Victoria Romero, and Dana Lafon, "White Paper on Bio-Psycho-Social Applications to Cognitive Engagement," Academia, accessed

from a lens that PYSOP continues to operate in to effect, which includes the Human and Cyberspace Domains. The Human and Cyberspace Domains simply serve as a platform for PSYOP to execute the narrative. Furthermore, the research provides a sophisticated and weaponized solution with how humans are the target audience for the narrative.

White Paper on Bio-Psycho-Social Applications to Cognitive Engagement recommends approaching strategic narratives as if they were a target audience to facilitate linking them to the operational and tactical levels in ways that can be traced and interconnected.[28] ARSOF and CF LNO packages can facilitate this inter-connective application in the multi-domain joint-environment in support of the JFC by proper personnel emplacement so as long as the JFC includes this critical aspect in his intent.

JP 2-01.3, *Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Environment* visually depicts how the cognitive dimension serves as the connective tissue between the Cyberspace and Human Domains while concurrently influencing others. It further amplifies the pivotal role that PSYOP will be required to undertake in the joint-environment when ARSOF facilitates expanded maneuver in LSCO. The application of the narrative will become a critical component to the JFC's JTF subordinate maneuver elements in the next conflict due to how it holistically effects the Operational Environment.

October 1, 2018, https://www.academia.edu/30484528/White_Paper_on_Bio-Psycho-Social_Applications_to_Cognitive_Engagement, 13.

[28] Linera Rivera et al., "White Paper on Bio-Psycho-Social Applications to Cognitive Engagement," 54.



Figure 5. Holistic View of the Operational Environment

Source: Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 2-01.3, *Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Environment* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, May 2014), sec. I-3.

Narrative Warfare

Dr. Ajit Maan's published book *Narrative Warfare* concludes that narratives are central to cognition. Weaponized narratives represent a deep threat to national security, international security and cooperation that cannot be addressed without a joint-effort.[29] This book puts into action guidance from the *2016 Department of Defense Strategy for Operations in The Information Environment* where the JIIM environment must flourish with collaboration in order to modernize the DoD's military application within the IE. Dr.

[29] Ajit Maan, *Narrative Warfare* (Lexington, KY: Narrative Strategies, 2018), 10.

Ajit Maan's focality within her book harkens for the U.S. to execute a multi-layered strategic level comprehensive narrative strategy in order to exploit adversarial weaknesses and mitigate their strengths on the level of influence.[30] This is important to understand as it will require multiple compelling narratives, voiced and supported by recognized and legitimate leaders and voices that are accepted by the target audience.

Dr. Maan provides a cognitive overview of how to dissuade, deter and influence Russia and China in the current Operational Environment. The reader of her published literature can infer that Russia is focusing on influencing and shaping low-intensity conflict zones to cause regional instability to project a false sense of physical security. This is critical in Narrative Warfare as non-state actors and state-actors can be influenced throughout the region being affected in order to shape the environment. Dr. Maan bluntly states that Russia's actions in Syria and on the border of Ukraine embody a characteristic reflecting military overstretch thus providing an opportunity to execute Narrative Warfare in order to exploit this as a weakness.[31] Russia executes Narrative Warfare within the Cyberspace and Human Domains through use of internet, open-source news, social media and funding Non-Governmental Organizations influence the cognitive dimension.[32]

The focus of this research is not to present strategic narrative strategies to counter Russia and China's actions but rather highlight that cognitive influence resides at the

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[30]Maan, *Narrative Warfare*, 12.

[31] Ibid.

[32] Michel Martin, "Russian Influence Operations," *National Public Radio*, accessed October 5, 2018, https://www.npr.org/2018/07/21/631164942/russian-influence-operations.

pinnacle of PSYOP throughout all phases and campaigns of LSCO. Narrative Warfare is executed before, during and after in support of LSCO in order to shape the Operational Environment. Dr. Maan provides multiple case-studies and articles within her book that prove cognition is at the heart of influencing in the Human and Cyberspace Domain.

Summary and Conclusion

JP 2-01.3, *Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Environment* defines key terrain as any locality, or area, the seizure or retention of which affords a marked advantage to either force.[33] It's important to understand that the cognitive space serves as key terrain for PSYOP. The Cyberspace and Human Domains are environments that serve as a means to an end in how PSYOP influences behavioral cognition, which essentially effects the Operational Environment (OE) holistically.

Thematically, the literature reviewed provided an outline in a manner that was deductive in order to better understand how the joint-operational environment will be for LSCO and ULO in reference to PSYOP. Two criteria, training and application, will be provided in the subsequent chapter in order to address the methodology of research that supports how PSYOP executes expanded maneuver for the Joint Force as no one else in the DoD compares.

[33] Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), Joint Publication (JP) 2-01.3, *Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Environment* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, May 2014), sec. III-4.

CHAPTER 3

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

The purpose of this chapter is to address two criteria, training and application, in order to answer the primary research question of how ARSOF expand the Army's current frame for Unified Land Operations beyond physical to consider outmaneuvering adversaries both physically and cognitively to ensure the Joint Force is better positioned to maintain a competitive edge over our Nation's adversaries? This chapter will be interwoven with the reviewed literature from the previous chapter in order to address training and application as evaluation criteria of ARSOF's PSYOP and prove how its efforts at expanded maneuver support the deep-fight for LSCO. Training will focus on the TAA and dissemination platforms of PSYOP whereas application will be focused on the U.S. Army's CTCs at Fort Irwin, California (NTC) and Fort Polk, Louisiana (JRTC) as this supports the JOE. The research method itself is qualitative.

PSYOP Training

There are seven phases to the PSYOP Planning Process; (1) Planning, (2) TAA, (3) Series Development, (4) Product Development and Design, (5) Approval, (6) Production, Distribution and Dissemination and (7) Evaluation.[34] TAA is further defined as; the process by which the potential target audiences are refined and analyzed to determine how best to influence their behavior. The target audience analysis work sheet (TAAW) is the document that captures this analysis. Multiple TAAWs are generated

[34] HQDA, FM 3-05.301, sec. IX.

during this phase. TAA is the single most important task in planning well-crafted PSYOP. The PSYOP Soldier must have sufficient knowledge and understanding of TAs to develop effective methods to influence behavior favorable to U.S. Objectives.[35] The TAAW example within FM 3-05.301, *Psychological Operations Process, Tactics Techniques and Procedures* encompasses five pages – due this limiting factor, the TAAW Checklist, as illustrated below, serves as a highlight in order to depict the layer of complexity that the PSYOP planning process undertakes and what type of training is conducted for ARSOF.



1. Header Data:
   a. Include date and analyst name.
   b. Define supporting PSYOP objective.
   c. Define target audience.
   d. Include classification.
2. Effectiveness:
   a. Define the specific desired behavior.
   b. Consider TA's authority, power, and control.
   c. Consider any restrictions on TA.
   d. Consider how success with the TA would affect overall SPO.
   e. Rate on scale of 0 to 5.
   f. If effectiveness rating is 0, 1, or 2, stop analysis and select another TA.
3. Conditions:
   a. Identify conditions by using cause- and-effect analysis.
   b. Define the TA's current behavior.
   c. Identify the motivations and consequences of the TA's current behavior.
   d. Understand that conditions can be internal and external.
   e. Categorize causes as Economic, Political, Social/Cultural, Environmental/Physical, or Military/Security.
   f. Understand that Effects/Consequences are positive, negative, and secondary.
   g. Number sequentially.
   h. Note sources.
   i. Note assumptions.
4. Vulnerabilities:
   a. Define as characteristics, motives, or conditions of the TA that can be used to influence behavior.
   b. Derive four types of vulnerabilities: motives, psychographics, demographics, and symbols.
   c. Understand that vulnerabilities may not be directly related to SPO behavior, but evoke a consistent/predictable emotional or behavioral response from the TA.
   d. Cite any conditions linked to each motive.
5. Susceptibility:
   a. Define as likelihood that the TA will be open to persuasion.
   b. Assess Perceived Risks, Perceived Rewards, and Consistency with values and beliefs for the TA to engage in the desired behavior.
   c. Rate on scale of 1 to 5.
   d. Make recommendation on how to proceed with the TA, focusing on a PSYOP argument or PSYACTs, or combination of both, and possibly other TAs to target first or simultaneously.
6. Accessibility:
   a. List each medium individually.
   b. Give each medium its own rating from 1 to 5.
   c. Explain each rating—pros and cons.
7. PSYOP Argument/PSYACTs:
   a. Include guidance for the development of a PSYOP series of products and actions.
   b. Include a main argument, supporting arguments, appeal, and techniques for the PSYOP argument.
   c. Understand that the main argument is the conclusion that PSYOP Soldiers want the TA to reach.
   d. Understand that supporting arguments lead to a conclusion and are derived from vulnerabilities and conditions.
   e. Understand that techniques are persuasion and influence tactics that PSYOP Soldiers can use to deliver the supporting arguments.
   f. Consider vulnerabilities when recommending techniques and when developing specific products and actions.
   g. Understand that PSYACTs are actions taken by other than PSYOP forces to influence TA behavior.
   h. Derive recommended PSYACTs from vulnerabilities and consequences with the intent of changing conditions of the TA.
   i. Understand that PSYACTs are recommended and coordinated by PSYOP Soldiers, but planned and executed by the supported unit/other agency.
8. Refined Assessment Criteria:
   a. Refine the Initial PSYOP Assessment Criteria determined during planning.
   b. Include measurable and observable impact indicators based upon the current/desired behavior of the TA.
   c. Phrase as a question that when answered, over time, will assist in determining achievement of the SPO.

Figure 6. PSYOP Target Audience Analysis Worksheet Checklist

Source: Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-05.301, *Psychological Operations Process, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, August 2007), sec. B-9.

[35] HQDA, FM 3-05.301, sec. IX.

PYSOP TAA's "The Five Key Questions" seek to answer the following in order to yield critical information in the PYSOP Process.[36] These questions include;

1. What target audiences will be most effective in accomplishing the Psychological Operations Objectives (SPO)?
2. What are the reasons for the TA's current behavior?
3. What are the best means of communication to reach the TA?
4. How can the TA be influenced to achieve the desired behavior?
5. What are the appropriate criteria by which to assess behavior change?

The SPO is defined as the specific behavioral goal for a group or individual, as it relates to PSYOP activities.[37] It's important to understand that there are multiple SPOs for multiple narratives that PSYOP executes. These five key questions imbue ARSOF's PSYOP capability with a multi-platform understanding when required to influence the cognitive dimension. The execution of ARSOF's PSYOP Qualification Course is intellectually rigorous throughout its 38-week duration at Fort Bragg, North Carolina.[38]

The PSYOP Qualification Course produces students who possess the capability to execute PSYOP across the full spectrum of operations; this includes joint, interagency, multi-national or coalition operations. Students graduate and are able operate in technologically superior as well as austere environments while becoming more responsive to asymmetrical challenges. Students graduate with the ability to be adaptive

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[36] HQDA, FM 3-05.301, sec. 2-3.

[37] Ibid.

[38] Janice Burton, ed., "FY 2019 Academic Handbook," *Special Warfare* 31, no. 2 (2018): 18.

and comfortable with ambiguity while remaining culturally aware, regionally focused and language-capable.[39] The training results in an unrivaled PSYOP specialist who is able to execute Narrative Warfare in a complex multi-domain problem set. This criterion, coupled with application, offers an unparalleled advantage to the JFC in LSCO while shaping the deep-fight.

PSYOP Application

The CTCs at Fort Irwin, California (NTC) and Fort Polk, Louisiana (JRTC) provide PSYOP application in a peer-to-peer environment where the Human and Cyberspace Domains are platforms to influence the cognitive dimension. This research methodology is critical in ascertaining how ARSOF's PSYOP expand the Army's current frame for ULO in support of the Joint Force. PSYOP's ability to shape the deep-fight at the CTCs can have either a positive or negative effect for JTF subordinate maneuver elements. The deep-fight will not change for ARSOF to execute expanded maneuver in LSCO due to its non-contiguous nature. The derivative from the CTCs will include personal-based experiences working with and alongside ARSOF PSYOP subject matter experts as a Special Operations Training Detachment Observer, Controller, Trainer (OCT) and Mentor for two years. This thesis will further utilize the After Action Review (AAR) database from the CTCs to obtain data on where PSYOP activities were utilized, or not, by the Joint Force in order to ARSOF CF I3 current gaps and seams.

[39] Burton, "FY 2019 Academic Handbook," 20.

Summary and Conclusion

A modified version of Kurt Lewin's Force Field Analysis Model provides the qualitative research method to analyze the obtained data for this thesis. The following chapter will approach the thesis question, in concert with the Force Field Analysis Model, in five steps, which include; defining the problem, defining the change objective, identifying the driving forces, identifying the restraining forces and develop the change strategy.[40] The table below will be filled out in the following chapter in order to display the data gathered and supported its aggregated analytics from the CTCs. Critical inputs and outputs from the Driving Force and Restraining Force will be addressed as well.

[40] Kurt Lewin, "Kurt Lewin's Force Field Analysis," Kent State University Analysis Strategies, 1, accessed November 16, 2018, http://literacy.kent.edu/eureka/strategies/force_field_analysis.pdf.



Figure 7. Kurt Lewin's Force Field Analysis Model (Modified)

Source: Kurt Lewin, "Kurt Lewin's Force Field Analysis," Kent State University Analysis Strategies, accessed November 16, 2018, http://literacy.kent.edu/eureka/strategies/force_field_analysis.pdf, 2.

When applying PSYOP as a unique ARSOF capability, it's critical to understand the investment made into shaping it during training. ARSOF's PSYOP doctrine has shaped the way the DoD employs strategy throughout the organization. This strategy has resulted in a robust change in how joint-publications and U.S. Army field manuals are written. This doctrinal shift for the larger force proves that ARSOF is the arbiter for this cultural change and the Joint Force will be better prepared for LSCO because of it. Training and application, the two criterions of evaluation for this thesis, will illuminate in

the following chapter of analysis that ARSOF's execution of expanded maneuver by PSYOP grows the Army's current frame for ULO by weaponizing the narrative in the Human and Cyberspace Domain to influence cognition and human behavior.

CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS

The purpose of this chapter is to analyze the qualitative data obtained for this thesis using a modified version of Kurt Lewin's Force Field Analysis Model. The data obtained for this thesis resides within 12 After Action Reviews (AAR) obtained from JRTC and NTC. In order to expand the qualitative research base, 6 AARs were taken from JRTC and NTC, respectively. These AARs strive for objectivity based upon the observation, coaching, training and mentorship from the Special Operations Training Detachment.

An observer, controller, trainer and mentor (OCT) for the Special Operations Training Detachment prepare SOF units across all military service branches to deploy by achieving or meeting their training objectives at the CTCs in accordance with USASOC policy. The AARs are the end result of each rotation. The final AAR is executed with the rotational training unit holistically prior to their departure back to home station in a classroom learning environment.

The data within the AARs provide the foundation of information to execute a qualitative research method to support this thesis through a modified Force Field Analysis Model to answer the primary research question. The primary question remains as how can ARSOF, as the premiere practitioners of cognitive maneuver, expand the Army's current frame for Unified Land Operations beyond physical to consider outmaneuvering adversaries both physically and cognitively to ensure the Joint Force is better positioned to maintain a competitive edge over our Nation's adversaries?

Summary of Literature Review

In its most primitive form, the summarization of literature remains imbued with the common theme throughout which focuses on the narrative to influence the cognitive domain regardless of platform throughout a Multi-Domain Operational Environment. Narratives are regarded as living, breathing and adapting entities. Although developed by individuals and groups, a narrative's ability to morph and evolve makes it challenging to seize. A narrative's reach and adaptation can grow exponentially. This fact becomes a challenge when developing strategic narratives in support of operational and tactical themes and messaging.[41] This subchapter will highlight the use of narratives as they pertain to the Cyber and Human Domains with supporting doctrine and theory showing platforms of delivery to influence cognition.

The Narrative in the Cyber Domain

JP 3-12, *Cyberspace Operations* highlights Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental, Multi-National (JIIM) and Host Nation considerations when executing cyber-electromagnetic activity (CEMA). When executing any type of narrative to influence cognition on the battlefield, regardless of platform, the JFC must drive the operations process with a multi-faceted lens to synchronize it. The joint-publication further annotates key differences in structure, liaison requirements and horizontal nesting to achieve desired objectives within the JFC's Campaign Support Plan.

[41] Linera Rivera et al., "White Paper on Bio-Psycho-Social Applications to Cognitive Engagement," 51.

JP 3-12, *Cyberspace* Operations provides the JFC with considerations to apply CO in a Multi-Domain Operational Environment. For example, the joint-publication highlights that interagency and intergovernmental partners often have command relationships, lines of authority, and planning processes that can vary greatly from the Army thus requiring liaison elements to be in place before operations, as it will likely be too late and ineffective to establish these elements after-the-fact. While interagency partners often manage tasks through committees, steering groups, and working groups organized along functional lines the JFC is responsible for developing interagency and intergovernmental coordination requirements and will likely require a robust liaison element similar to that required for multi-national operations.[42]

This doctrinal change toward a whole-of-government approach signifies that a collective effort across all partners involved in LSCO, regardless of affiliation, requires deliberate joint-planning to appropriately apply the narrative to influence the cognitive space to shape the OE. Dr. Ajit Maan's conclusion in *Narrative Warfare* remains profound in that narratives are central to cognition.[43] However, the JFC cannot obtain Dr. Maan's requirement to execute Narrative Warfare through a multi-layered approach within the Cyber Domain without the emplacement of liaisons. The literature review provides a bridge between doctrine and research that shows PSYOP, as a capability of ARSOF, must be applied with a capable liaison element to facilitate expanded maneuver. This applies to the Cyber Domain exclusively as it is inherently joint in nature.

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[42] CJCS, JP 3-12, sec. A-2.

[43] Maan, *Narrative Warfare*, 2.

The Narrative in the Human Domain

The research compiled by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) is highlighted in *White Paper on Bio-Psycho-Social Applications to Cognitive Engagement* by Linera Rivera et al. to support cognitive influence of narrative application. Narratives exert a powerful influence on attitudes and behavior. They consolidate memory, shape emotions, cue heuristics and biases in judgment, influence in-group/out-group distinctions, and may affect the fundamental contents of personal identity.[44] The document concludes that solutions are required in order to better operationalize narratives that support themes nested at the strategic level. Linera Rivera et al. proposes that treating the narrative as a target in the same manner that PSYOP utilizes a target audience will provide the analytical basis for its effectiveness at the operational and tactical level.[45] The solutions proposed in their research precedes U.S. Army field manual and joint-publication changes.

The literature review supports the argument that interagency and intergovernmental research assisted by ARSOF's PYSOP personnel led doctrinal changes to perpetuate the Human Domain as a key component of consideration for the JFC. For example, FM 3-0, *Operations* and JP 3-0*, Operations* both highlight the requirement to influence the human domain and their publication changes occurred the following year. Further changes are slated to occur in the near-term for both documents as the military applies on-going research specifically pertaining to information and influence. There is a

[44] Linera Rivera et al., "White Paper on Bio-Psycho-Social Applications to Cognitive Engagement," 53.

[45] Ibid., 54.

clear investment in human capital by the DoD and interagency partners to better prepare the JFC for LSCO as ARSOF's PSYOP methodologies are continuing to be imbued throughout larger forces to foster shared understanding.

Analysis of the Secondary Research Question

The secondary question is; can ARSOF, as part of the Joint Force, better prepare and shape the contemporary and future operating environment for success through the conduct of Cognitive Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB)? This question supports the primary research thesis question, discussed in the following subchapter, by focusing on mission analysis and understanding of the OE in support of the JFC. This secondary question will be answered through the lens of ARSOF shaping operations for the JFC that set favorable conditions for Conventional Forces and not as a process of IPB itself within the Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP). The data analyzed will focus on driving and restraining force sub-elements extrapolated from 12 AARs between JRTC and NTC. The data obtained throughout the qualitative research approach points to four (4) driving forces and four (4) restraining forces within the modified Force Field Analysis Model.

The driving forces for the secondary research question residing within the liaison personnel are; TAA, early integration, debriefing and MDMP. The restraining forces residing within CF application are; time available, mass, rigidity of systems and knowledge management. Between the driving and restraining forces exists the problem which is the secondary research question itself.



Figure 8. Force Field Analysis Model (Modified) For Secondary Question

Source: Kurt Lewin, "Kurt Lewin's Force Field Analysis," Kent State University Analysis Strategies, accessed November 16, 2018, http://literacy.kent.edu/eureka/strategies/force_field_analysis.pdf, 1.

Analysis of the data showed zero (0) of twelve (12) times for PSYOP Target Audience Analysis (TAA) shared understanding between ARSOF and CF. Specifically, JTF subordinate maneuver commanders were never given an in-depth capability brief from any ARSOF unit or data collected therein as it pertains to TAA. Commanders within the Conventional Force were hindered in their ability to drive their unit's operations process by not understanding access and placement of ARSOF beyond core mission sets. This lack of shared understanding proposes a negative impact for knowledge management.

At the CTCs, the area of operations for ARSOF resides within CF's area of interest and influence. FM 3-0, *Operations* states that understanding the relationship between an area of operations, area of influence, and area of interest assists commanders in developing their operational framework.[46] Commanders from the Conventional Force were limited in their ability to drive the operation's process for their staff due to lack of shared understanding of their units' area of interest and area of influence. This data supports the secondary research question as Cognitive IPB can be improved through increased shared understanding and knowledge management between ARSOF and CF specifically for the TAA.

Early integration of ARSOF and CF planning occurred twelve (12) out of twelve (12) rotations where liaisons were emplaced. During each rotation at the CTCs, ARSOF liaisons were embedded with CF at the JTF subordinate maneuver element headquarters immediately upon their arrival from home station. However, the inverse was not true with CF as their liaison personnel did not arrive until three (3) to seven (7) days later to the Special Operations Command and Control Element (SOCCE). This is attributed to rotations for all SOF personnel at the CTCs beginning one-week earlier than CF. This early integration of ARSOF within the subordinate JTF maneuver element headquarters at the CTCs provided joint-mission analysis and MDMP as a force multiplier across formations.

FM 6-03.05, *CF/SOF Multi-service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Conventional Forces and Special Operations Forces Integration and Interoperability*

[46] HQDA, FM 3-0, sec. 1-29.

states units should meet and integrate early, prior to combat rotations, to foster the relationship, instill the "one team, one fight" mentality, understand each other's staff planning procedures and defuse any misconceptions or friction points. If at all possible, units should attend training events together, specifically, National Training Center (NTC) or joint readiness training center (JRTC). Good practices include traveling to one's home station, briefing each other's capabilities and limitations, mission goals, and linking up staff function sections.[47] Efforts from ARSOF and CF support current doctrine and best practices at the CTCs.

ARSOF has supported Cognitive IPB through relationship fostering by providing mission analysis products from their SOCCE while answering priority information requirements for JTF subordinate maneuver elements at the CTCs. Twelve (12) of twelve (12) rotations between JRTC and NTC showed that, regardless as to the type of unit, SOF made a concerted effort to cross-pollinate information for the CF rotational unit. This sharing of mission analysis products is critical in ARSOF's contribution to Cognitive IPB as it supports the JFC and the subordinate maneuver elements that reside therein.

Debriefing from ARSOF access and placement capabilities pertaining to the application of Unconventional Warfare occurred with JTF subordinate maneuver elements twelve (12) of twelve (12) times. The data supports the analysis that, regardless of importance or value, CF was unable to implement critical information and intelligence into their battle plan from the debriefings. For example, debriefs with CF from the

[47] Air Land Sea Application Center, Field Manual (FM) 6-03.05, *CF/SOF Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Conventional Forces and Special Operations Forces Integration and Interoperability* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, March 2010), 32.

liaisons pertaining to composition, disposition and strength of the enemy forced no change in the JTF's friendly battle plan. Restraining forces, which will be analyzed in depth in a subsequent subchapter, proved to mainly be time, mass and rigidity of CF processes. Specifically, elements within the CF were unable to alter their plan upon completion of a combined arms rehearsal or mission brief due to the inflexibility of their large formations.

Further analysis shows that CF was unable to integrate information from ARSOF due to the possibility of disintegrating the holistic shared understanding of the current operation's plan for CF. The primary issue remains in the realm of shared understanding throughout the JTF subordinate maneuver element as a whole. However, CTCs are designed to create natural friction points in regards to shared understanding and knowledge management across rotational training unit formations. Liaisons remain a critical part of Cognitive IPB as a joint-effort between ARSOF and CF where debriefing serves as a critical key component to assist in shaping the OE.

MDMP, the final driving force for the secondary question within the modified Force Field Analysis Model, provided solidarity in ARSOF's ability to supplement CF within Cognitive IPB where liaisons spearheaded interdependence and interoperability. Three (3) of six (6) JRTC rotations and two (2) of six (6) NTC rotations saw liaison personnel excel in non-lethal targeting and mission analysis. Notwithstanding the negation of TAA, MDMP proved fruitful due to the diligence of liaisons.

Sharing of intelligence products, information requirements and macro-analysis occurred supporting Cognitive IPB by ARSOF's unique analysis of state and non-state actors. For example, data shows that when ARSOF provided an in-depth center of gravity

analysis for non-state actors supporting enemy forces that effected the deep fight within five (5) of twelve (12) rotations CF utilized this as part of their mission analysis during initial MDMP. Other data points pertaining to this driving force went uncaptured in other AARs resulting in the omission of the other seven (7). Time constraints, mass of force and rigidity of CF systems inhibited this process later on during operations due to multiple dilemmas being presented to CF thus hindering shared understanding and situational awareness. The continuation of an aggregate analysis for the restraining forces will remain in a subsequent chapter in order to capture all qualitative data factors.

Analysis of the Primary Research Question

The primary question persists; how can ARSOF, as the premiere practitioners of cognitive maneuver, expand the Army's current frame for Unified Land Operations beyond physical to consider outmaneuvering adversaries both physically and cognitively to ensure the Joint Force is better positioned to maintain a competitive edge over our Nation's adversaries? The data obtained throughout the qualitative research approach points to four (4) driving forces and four (4) restraining forces within the modified Force Field Analysis Model.

The driving forces for the primary research question residing within the liaison personnel are; early integration, MDMP, joint-decision support matrix and communication platforms. The restraining forces residing within CF application are; time available, mass, rigidity of systems and knowledge management. Between the driving and restraining forces exists the problem which is the primary research question.



Figure 9. Force Field Analysis Model (Modified) For Primary Question

Source: Kurt Lewin, "Kurt Lewin's Force Field Analysis," Kent State University Analysis Strategies, accessed November 16, 2018, http://literacy.kent.edu/eureka/strategies/force_field_analysis.pdf, 1.

While early integration supported Cognitive IPB production value supporting the secondary research question, the data showed further development with ARSOF early integration into CF planning processes. Between NTC and JRTC, twelve (12) of twelve (12) CTC rotations saw ARSOF liaisons and SOCCE commanders attend and brief at the CF's Combined Arms Rehearsal (CAR). The CAR serves as an operation's order brief over a large sand-table that is attended by all key leaders and staff in the CF's formation prior to mission execution. Furthermore, attendance included subordinate element ARSOF commanders in order to foster shared understanding and a common operating picture prior to the eventual decentralized execution of ARSOF and CF operations. Upon further research, zero (0) of twelve (12) CF commanders attended ARSOF mission briefs.

Figure 10. CF/SOF Spheres of Influence

Source: Air Land Sea Application Center, Field Manual 6-03.05, *CF/SOF Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Conventional Forces and Special Operations Forces Integration and Interoperability* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, March 2010), 35.

FM 6-03.05, *CF/SOF Multi-service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Conventional Forces and Special Operations Forces Integration and Interoperability* states CF commanders can leverage SOF experience in the aspects of operational

variables to fully understand the OE.[48] Analysis of CTC data contradicts doctrine and best practices in the field manual by CF. The operational variables consist of political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, physical environment and time as a lens of analysis to better understand the OE. Expanded maneuver cannot be facilitated for the JFC by ARSOF if commanders across the different subordinate components do not jointly understand the OE in a holistic manner.

MDMP saw substantial ARSOF and CF liaison effectiveness specifically during mission analysis. Four (4) of six (6) times at both JRTC and NTC saw sharing of the initial information collection plan, mission analysis brief and initial themes and messages from eight (8) of twelve (12) data captures. As a result, analysis of ARSOF and CF integrated mission planning with liaisons provided an increase in interoperability and interdependence. This increased cohesion across ARSOF and CF formations facilitates asset deconfliction at higher echelons and joint-targeting efforts across the JFC's area of operations. The ARSOF and CF liaison exchange serves as the lynch pin in this endeavor.

The Decision Support Matrix (DSM) is a key output during MDMP when course of action analysis is executed. FM 6-0, *Commander and Staff Organization and Operations* states that the decision support matrix portrays key decisions and potential actions that are likely to arise during the execution of each course of action.[49] Three (3) of six (6) JRTC and two (2) of six (6) NTC rotations saw the implementation of ARSOF

[48] Air Land Sea Application Center, FM 6-03.05, 35.

[49] Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA), Field Manual (FM) 6-0, *Commander and Staff Organization and Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, May 2014), sec. 9-26.

PSYOP activities tied to the CF's DSM during MDMP. Other data points pertaining to this driving force went uncaptured in other AARs resulting in the omission of the other seven (7). The end result of this led the DSM to become a joint-product between ARSOF and CF during future operations.

CF was able to better exploit ARSOF PSYOP effects when this non-lethal effort was included in the DSM. For example, enemy strategic reserve forces were delayed at JRTC coming across the Sabine River due to ARSOF's PSYOP ability to incite protests in major population centers through underground surrogates as part of U.S. sponsored Unconventional Warfare. This ARSOF effect, conveyed by ARSOF liaisons to CF from the SOCCE, increased freedom of movement for conventional JTF subordinate maneuver elements allowing them to exploit the initiative during offensive operations.

Communications systems served as a hard-lesson learned for liaison personnel for both ARSOF and CF. Due to the cyber threat at JRTC and NTC, communications systems for CF are often hacked thus disrupting the common operating picture. Communications are further degraded for CF when JTF subordinate maneuver elements are required to displace their command posts. Two (2) of six (6) rotations at both JRTC and NTC, totaling four (4) of twelve (12), saw ARSOF liaison communications leveraged by CF to maintain situational understanding. Communications assets within ARSOF are inherently more robust and heavily encrypted in order to account for a cyber threat. Data shows that a further investment of joint-encrypted ARSOF and CF communications platforms are necessary by the Department of the Army in order to increase information security and sharing timeliness. The data within the AARs showed no deficiencies in knowledge management as it pertains to ARSOF sharing of products. The degraded

communications during headquarters displacement for CF and the cyber attacks remained as the driving force effecting the common operating picture.

Aggregate Analysis of the Restraining Forces

The restraining forces applied to the qualitative research methodology remained the same in answering the primary and secondary research questions. The restraining forces for CF consisted of time, mass, rigidity and knowledge management. These factors, through ARSOF and CF liaison package application, were identified in the AARs by CF liaisons. The data provided evidence that while the command team from the SOCCE element attended CF AARs, the inverse remained untrue. Zero (0) of twelve (12) AARs conducted at the behest of the Special Operations Training Detachment did not include CF commanders at any level. While invitations were consistently offered each rotation, only the CF liaison team attended. The restraining forces identified by the CF liaisons served as trends thus leading to their application in the Force Field Analysis. The four (4) restraining forces identified were those brought up during the AARs from CF rotational unit liaisons serving at the SOCCE.

Lack of time available and mass of the CF unit were two critical aspects brought up during each AAR by CF liaisons. For example, CF missed opportunities to exploit ARSOF's lethal and PSYOP non-lethal shaping operations due to the deficiency in time to react. This restraining force was further highlighted by annotating the large mass and size of the CF thus leading to the inability to exploit ARSOF shaping efforts. CF liaisons highlighted these trends six (6) of twelve (12) times at the AARs in total. One data point from an AAR was omitted due to lack of evidence supporting the above trends. Further aggregate analysis of the restraining forces showed that time and mass were not brought

up by CF liaisons when ARSOF's PSYOP application was included in the CF's DSM. This is an important data point as it supports a causational relationship between the driving and restraining forces.

Rigidity and knowledge management remain as the final restraining forces identified by the CF liaisons to the SOCCE. For example, CF CARs that were executed following their forward deployment at the CTCs were unable to implement ARSOF's lethal and PSYOP non-lethal effects upon its completion. Regardless of relative importance to JTF subordinate maneuver elements, the rigidity of the CF culture at the CTCs inhibited flexibility in their planning when facing multiple dilemmas. This restraining force was identified by CF liaisons four (4) of six (6) times at JRTC and three (3) of six (6) times at NTC. Knowledge management remained a prevalent issue from CF liaisons as it was brought up twelve (12) of twelve (12) times during AARs. According to CF liaisons, the paucity of knowledge management occurred internal to their own JTF subordinate maneuver elements as ARSOF continued to share intelligence, lethal effects, special activities and PSYOP shaping efforts.

Explicit Response to the Primary Research Question

A special warfare package consisting of PSYOP, Civil Affairs and Special Forces personnel must be incorporated into a liaison package for CF at the CTCs in order to properly facilitate expanded maneuver in support of the JFC and the JTF subordinate maneuver elements contained therein. Inversely, the SOCCE at the CTCs requires a larger investment from CF when allocating their liaison package as well. The application of Special Warfare is holistic in nature thus requiring subject matter experts from across the ARSOF formation in its entirety. The weaponization, effectiveness and performance

of Narrative Warfare in the joint-environment between ARSOF and CF must be understood across both formations which resides among a strong LNO exchange package.

The Human and Cyber Domains that provide the platform for cognitive influence through ARSOF's PSYOP execution must be conveyed by the LNO package to CF. This LNO package must be robust as units across both formations are largely dispersed across the multi-domain OE. Due to the vastly different battle rhythms between ARSOF and CF at the CTCs, the requirement for synchronization becomes even more important. Desynchronization is at risk if a misappropriation of investment occurs in human capital when assigning the liaison exchange between ARSOF and CF. ARSOF's PSYOP inherently executes expanded maneuver by influencing cognition across multiple fronts. This expanded maneuver effort is nullified if shared understanding is not achieved between ARSOF and CF – the liaison packages inherit this responsibility.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Introduction

The primary question remains; how can ARSOF, as the premiere practitioners of cognitive maneuver, expand the Army's current frame for Unified Land Operations beyond physical to consider outmaneuvering adversaries both physically and cognitively to ensure the Joint Force is better positioned to maintain a competitive edge over our Nation's adversaries? The research has shown that ARSOF can expand the current frame of Unified Land Operations for the Army by synchronizing ARSOF's Psychological Operations through ARSOF CF I3. ARSOF's unique capability and authorities to execute Psychological Operations facilitate expanded maneuver for the JFC and subordinate maneuver elements when executed in concert with Civil Affairs and Special Forces. The liaison exchange between ARSOF and CF serve as the conduit to expanded maneuver.

Conclusion

Cognitive maneuver is facilitated by ARSOF's special warfare package, which contains PSYOP, Civil Affairs and Special Forces – this must be the new standard liaison package to the CF from ARSOF to facilitate expanded maneuver and contribute to Unified Land Operations in a manner that is conducive to shaping the environment. It is from ARSOF's specific and unique capabilities that expanded maneuver occurs for the JFC and JTF subordinate maneuver elements. However, the data has proved that liaison packages at the CTCs were of most critical value when ARSOF capabilities were applied in a holistic nature and not in a singular fashion. Explicitly, Direct Action as an ARSOF

capability is enhanced when a Psychological Operation is executed in concert. This can be further effective by implementing Civil Affairs activities. This remains as a focal point in the data where ARSOF's PSYOP activity was embedded into the CF's DST and DSM allowing Direct Action to be an invaluable ARSOF exploitation method when shaping the environment. Furthermore, Civil Affairs was able to capitalize on NGO support to subsequently support the psychological and direct action operation. The conveying of Special Operations and the effects therein remain in the charge of the liaison personnel thus proving the criticality in the investment.

Cognitive maneuver resides within ARSOF's PSYOP arsenal of capabilities but requires Special Forces and Civil Affairs efforts to exponentially increase its value to the Joint Force for exploitation. This value can either be decreased or increased depending on the liaison package exchange between CF and ARSOF. The data further bears significance toward reiterating the importance of Narrative Warfare. Narrative Warfare in the joint-environment between ARSOF and CF must be understood across both formations which resides among a strong liaison exchange package where ARSOF efforts and effects can be translated.

The multi-domain Operational Environment replicated at the CTCs serves as a pivotal testing ground for ARSOF CF I3 concepts. These concepts succeed or fail with the liaison exchange that facilitate expanded maneuver both physically and cognitively through their integration. The conveyance of ARSOF and CF effects must be understood in a universal manner among a Joint Force in order to exploit and seize the initiative across multiple fronts in a multi-domain Operational Environment.

Recommendations

ARSOF must provide the TAA, or an abbreviated version, to the CF in order to foster a common operating picture to achieve shared understanding. Lethality will increase along with joint-targeting. This shared understanding will synergize non-lethal shaping operations to be better exploitable by ARSOF and CF in a joint-environment. The lack of training for CF in the operations process also hinders ARSOF CF integration and must be addressed across formations by unit commanders below the JFC level. CF mission planning must integrate IW capabilities at lower echelons in order to better prepare for future conflicts. ARSOF capabilities must be tailored to the CF current mission set in order to achieving nested effects and synchronization. Furthermore, these capabilities must be further emphasized for CF at Leadership Training Programs (LTP).

PSYOP and MISO are still misunderstood across CF formations at the CTCs. The CTCs must shift the brigade leadership and staff AAR to include PSYOP instead of it currently being separate. Leader involvement and oversight at the General Officer level must increase at the CTCs for the CF in order to increase ARSOF CF synergistic application. ARSOF invests heavily in Senior Mentors from the Special Forces Groups while the CF currently does not as one Senior Mentor is provided for the commander of the brigade. The United States Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) Commanding General and the staff therein are heavily invested in the CTCs with frequent visits, video-teleconferences, mentoring and feedback. CF must invest in human capital and mentorship in the same manner as ARSOF in order to increase joint-effects.

The research, limitations and delimitations contained in this thesis did not afford the opportunity to look at stability operations and consolidation of gains due to scope and

focus. Additional research of expanded maneuver can support areas beyond the CTCs. The authors of *A Concise History of the U.S. Army in Operation Uphold Democracy* provide valuable insight to stability efforts and highlight tensions between ARSOF and CF due to the misunderstanding of mission sets, authorities and capabilities. The ways and means differentiation are highlighted between ARSOF and CF between 3rd Special Forces Group (Airborne) and the 10th Mountain Division (Light Infantry) which provide insight into the difficulties in achieving expanded maneuver.[50] Stability and consolidation of gains as an additional lens to research for ARSOF to facilitate expanded maneuver through the cognitive dimension would add to a vital body of work to increasing understanding amongst a Joint Force.

Additional research questions could be considered to further add to the body of knowledge as to how ARSOF contributes to the framework of Unified Land Operations. The following five (5) primary questions could be considered for research. Secondary research questions are contained within.

First, are the CTCs the best place to evaluate PSYOP effectiveness? CTCs train brigade-sized elements. Some capabilities unique to CF exist at the division level as opposed to the brigade. Research into Fort Leavenworth's Mission Command Training Program (MCTP) with the same primary research question contained in this thesis may add to the body of U.S. Army knowledge at the MCTP focuses their training on division-sized elements with ARSOF.

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[50] Dr. Robert Buamann, Walter Kretchik, and John Fishel, *A Concise History of the U.S. Army in Operation Uphold Democracy* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College Press, 1998), 120.

Second, do Brigade Commanders and their staff know enough about PSYOP and MISO capabilities to properly use it and furthermore exploit it? Should the U.S. Army further broaden the Pre-Command Course (PCC) to amplify the importance of ARSOF so as to increase shared understanding. ARSOF and CF are working together prior to their joint-deployment to the CTCs in order to prepare but is that enough?

Third, are the trends identified in this thesis ARSOF specific or is this an indicator of a bigger problem for U.S. Army Brigades in reference to cultural differences and authorities? Is rigidity among CF formations a concern for cross-pollination with ARSOF and does their inability to react to ARSOF shaping activities require a change in Mission Command?

Fourth, is the time available considered adequate for ARSOF and CF units deploying to the CTCs? Should ARSOF and CTC units deploying to the CTCs be co-located already at their home station in order to facilitate an enhanced joint-planning process? Are regionally aligned Brigades a complimentary factor to ARSOF designated regions or is it obsolete? How can ARSOF and CF improve the joint-planning process prior to the CTCs and build upon the progress that has already been made?

Fifth, should doctrine change the DST and DSM to become a joint-ARSOF and CF required output? Should Brigade Commanders and Staff provide ARSOF their requested non-lethal effects as part of the planning process? What are the ramifications of this and will it lead to a positive or negative result across a Joint Force?

The first recommendation pertaining to the MCTP should be considered as the top research priority due to the changing of U.S. Army doctrine reflecting a Division-level refocus in order to prepare for LSCO. Stability operations that have occurred, such as

Haiti, should be considered as the second priority but still of equal importance. Its relevancy cannot be addressed enough as stability operations will follow LSCO with consolidation of gains.

The next major military conflict will require ARSOF and CF to become interwoven well beyond its current state. ARSOF's PSYOP capability will spearhead the shaping of the joint-Operational Environment in a multi-domain and complex battlefield. ARSOF's ability to influence cognition, which serves an inextricably linked interstate where all facets of the Operational Environment connect, will set conditions for a successful large-scale military campaign. ARSOF and CF must be prepared for this by investing in human capital. That human capital remains within the liaison exchange.

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