

ADVANCING U.S. INTERESTS IN THE INDO-PACIFIC THROUGH
BILATERAL MARITIME SECURITY COOPERATION
WITH INDONESIA

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army
Command and General Staff College in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE
General Studies

by

CHRISTOPHER T. DIBBLE, LT, USN
B.S., Tulane University, New Orleans, LA, 2007

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
2018

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. Fair use determination or copyright permission has been obtained for the inclusion of pictures, maps, graphics, and any other works incorporated into this manuscript. A work of the United States Government is not subject to copyright, however further publication or sale of copyrighted images is not permissible.

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE				<i>Form Approved</i> <i>OMB No. 0704-0188</i>	
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing this collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden to Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports (0704-0188), 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to any penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR FORM TO THE ABOVE ADDRESS.					
1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY) 15-06-2018		2. REPORT TYPE Master's Thesis		3. DATES COVERED (From - To) AUG 2017 – JUN 2018	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Advancing U.S. Interests in the Indo-Pacific through Bilateral Maritime Security Cooperation with Indonesia				5a. CONTRACT NUMBER	
				5b. GRANT NUMBER	
				5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER	
6. AUTHOR(S) LT Christopher T. Dibble				5d. PROJECT NUMBER	
				5e. TASK NUMBER	
				5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER	
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) U.S. Army Command and General Staff College ATTN: ATZL-SWD-GD Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-2301				8. PERFORMING ORG REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)				10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)	
				11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)	
12. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for Public Release; Distribution is Unlimited					
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES					
14. ABSTRACT Indonesia is a critical U.S. partner in the heart of the Indo-Pacific. With its vast archipelago, maritime security is a principal Indonesian concern. Additionally, the U.S. is deeply invested in maintaining a free and open Indo-Pacific, as affirmed in the most recent National Security Strategy. This thesis analyzes how the United States can advance its interests in this region through cooperation with Indonesia to improve Indonesian maritime security. Through application of operational design, derived from U.S. military doctrine, across the instruments of national power, this research analyzes how Indonesia combats three of its primary maritime security problems: illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing; unresolved borders; and maritime piracy and armed robbery. Founded on the tenets of the U.S.-Indonesia bilateral relationship, this study identifies gaps in Indonesia's approach to these maritime security problems and recommends ways the U.S. can help to close these gaps. This U.S. assistance will strengthen Indonesian maritime security and will advance U.S. regional interests. These actions aim to deepen this strategic relationship and maintain a free and open Indo-Pacific.					
15. SUBJECT TERMS Maritime Security; Indonesia; Indo-Pacific; South China Sea; IUU Fishing; Instruments of National Power; Operational Design; Maritime Piracy; Border Delimitation					
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT (U)	18. NUMBER OF PAGES 133	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
a. REPORT (U)	b. ABSTRACT (U)	c. THIS PAGE (U)			19b. PHONE NUMBER (include area code)

Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98)
Prescribed by ANSI Std. Z39.18

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

THESIS APPROVAL PAGE

Name of Candidate: LT Christopher T. Dibble

Thesis Title: Advancing U.S. Interests in the Indo-Pacific through Bilateral Maritime
Security Cooperation with Indonesia

Approved by:

_____, Thesis Committee Chair
Robert M. Brown, MMAS

_____, Member
Phillip G. Pattee, Ph.D.

_____, Member
Richard T. Anderson, M.S.

Accepted this 15th day of June 2018 by:

_____, Director, Graduate Degree Programs
Robert F. Baumann, Ph.D.

The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

ABSTRACT

ADVANCING U.S. INTERESTS THE INDO-PACIFIC THROUGH BILATERAL MARITIME SECURITY COOPERATION WITH INDONESIA, by LT Christopher T. Dibble, 133 pages.

Indonesia is a critical U.S. partner in the heart of the Indo-Pacific. With its vast archipelago, maritime security is a principal Indonesian concern. Additionally, the U.S. is deeply invested in maintaining a free and open Indo-Pacific, as affirmed in the most recent *National Security Strategy*. This thesis analyzes how the United States can advance its interests in this region through cooperation with Indonesia to improve Indonesian maritime security. Through application of operational design, derived from U.S. military doctrine, across the instruments of national power, this research analyzes how Indonesia combats three of its primary maritime security problems: illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing; unresolved borders; and maritime piracy and armed robbery. Founded on the tenets of the U.S.-Indonesia bilateral relationship, this study identifies gaps in Indonesia's approach to these maritime security problems and recommends ways the U.S. can help to close these gaps. This U.S. assistance will strengthen Indonesian maritime security and will advance U.S. regional interests. These actions aim to deepen this strategic relationship and maintain a free and open Indo-Pacific.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

First and foremost, I would like to thank my wife, Bonnie. Your support has been invaluable and your complete understanding through this long and arduous process has been truly remarkable. Without you, I never would have finished this thesis. Innumerable evenings, weekends, and holidays have been dedicated to this project. Thank you for allowing me to spend so much of our short time in Kansas writing. I owe you!

My committee's support has been vital throughout this process. Mr. Brown, Dr. Pattee, and Mr. Anderson—at many points, you were more positive than I was. I appreciate your unwavering support and guidance. Thank you for guiding me over the past eight months.

The support of David Haertel has also been crucial throughout this process. David, thank you for marking the trail ahead of me. Your academic counsel and friendship have kept me moving in the right direction. Thank you.

Last, I would like to thank Evan Laksmana. Though we have never met, you have given me valuable context and provided critical research materials. I entered this project knowing almost nothing about Indonesia. With your help, I now know a little. Thank you.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE THESIS APPROVAL PAGE	iii
ABSTRACT.....	iv
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS	v
TABLE OF CONTENTS.....	vi
ACRONYMS.....	viii
CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION	1
Introduction.....	1
Primary Research Question	4
Secondary Research Questions.....	4
Assumptions.....	5
Definitions of Terms.....	5
Limitations	6
Scope and Delimitations	7
Significance of Study.....	7
Conclusion	8
CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW	11
Introduction.....	11
The Instruments of National Power	11
Maritime Security	14
IUU Fishing	15
Indonesia’s Approach to Maritime Security and Related Issues	17
Indonesian Maritime Security Focus Areas.....	22
United States Regional and Bilateral Security Policy	29
Conclusion	32
CHAPTER 3 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY	38
Introduction.....	38
Doctrinal Basis—Operational Art and Operational Design	38
Analytical Approach	40
Conclusion	43
CHAPTER 4 ANALYSIS	45

Introduction.....	45
Section 1: Indonesia’s Maritime Security Vision, Problems, and Goals.....	46
Section 2: Indonesia’s Maritime Security Condition and Actions	61
IUU Fishing—Diplomatic Instrument of National Power.....	61
IUU Fishing—Information Instrument of National Power.....	63
IUU Fishing—Military Instrument of National Power.....	64
IUU Fishing—Economic Instrument of National Power.....	67
Unresolved Borders—Diplomatic Instrument of National Power.....	67
Unresolved Borders—Information Instrument of National Power.....	68
Unresolved Borders—Military Instrument of National Power.....	69
Unresolved Borders—Economic Instrument of National Power.....	70
Maritime Piracy and Armed Robbery—Diplomatic Instrument of National Power	71
Maritime Piracy and Armed Robbery—Information Instrument of National Power	71
Maritime Piracy and Armed Robbery—Military Instrument of National Power	72
Maritime Piracy and Armed Robbery—Economic Instrument of National Power..	74
Conclusion	74
Section 3: Indonesia’s Maritime Security Gaps	76
Section 4: The U.S.-Indonesia Bilateral Maritime Security Relationship.....	79
U.S.-Indonesia Diplomatic Relationship	79
U.S.-Indonesia Information Relationship	81
U.S.-Indonesia Military Relationship	82
U.S.-Indonesia Economic Relationship	85
Section 5: Research Question Analysis	86
Recommended Solutions across the U.S. Instruments of National Power	87
The Benefit to the United States	91
Risks to the United States	94
Conclusion	95
CHAPTER 5 CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS	106
Introduction.....	106
Interpretation of the Findings	107
Recommendations for Further Study.....	108
Research Process Considerations.....	110
Conclusion	111
APPENDIX A SUPPORTING INFORMATION	112
Maritime Piracy	112
Maritime Armed Robbery.....	112
Illegal, Unregulated, and Unreported (IUU) Fishing.....	113
BIBLIOGRAPHY.....	115

ACRONYMS

APMSS	Asia-Pacific Maritime Security Strategy
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
BAKAMLA	<i>Badan Keamanan Laut</i> (Indonesian National Maritime Security Agency)
BAKORKAMLA	<i>Badan Koordinasi Keamanan Laut</i> (Indonesian Coordinating Maritime Security Agency)
CARAT	Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training
CSIS	Center for Strategic and International Studies
DIME	Diplomacy, Information, Military, Economy (Instruments of National Power)
DOD	Department of Defense
EEZ	Exclusive Economic Zone
FAO	United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GMF	Global Maritime Fulcrum
INDOMALPHI	Indonesia-Malaysia-Philippines Trilateral Maritime Patrols
IUU	Illegal, Unreported, Unregulated (Fishing)
JP	Joint Publication
MCC	Millennium Challenge Corporation
MDA	Maritime Domain Awareness
MEF	Minimum Essential Force
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
MSI	Southeast Asia Maritime Security Initiative
NDL	Nine-Dash Line

NDS	National Defense Strategy
NSS	National Security Strategy
PSMA	Agreement on Port State Measures to Prevent, Deter, and Eliminate IUU Fishing
ReCAAP	Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia
RSIS	S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies at Nanyang Technological University
SCS	South China Sea
TNI	<i>Tentara Nasional Indonesia</i> (Indonesian Military)
TNI-AL	<i>Tentara Nasional Indonesia – Angkatan Laut</i> (Indonesian Navy)
UNCLOS	United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
USIBDD	United States – Indonesia Bilateral Defense Discussion
USPACOM	United States Pacific Command

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Introduction

Stretching from the west coast of the U.S. to the west coast of India, the Indo-Pacific region is critically important to the global economy and the world order. The South China Sea (SCS), in the heart of this region, carries over \$5 trillion of cargo and half of the world's oil annually.¹ The Indo-Pacific holds over half of the world's population and is a critical part of the United States' import and export markets. The SCS, in particular, is of great strategic importance to the U.S. and to the world, but it is an area of some instability due to competing maritime territorial claims. The primary driver of this regional instability is China, through its island reclamation efforts and excessive maritime territorial claims. Despite this instability in the SCS, the U.S. is committed to the Indo-Pacific. Admiral Harry Harris, commander of U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM), said during Congressional testimony in April 2017 that "America's future security and economic prosperity are indelibly linked to this critical region, which is now at a strategic crossroads where real opportunities meet real challenges."² To meet these challenges, the U.S. has a network of allies and partners throughout the Indo-Pacific.

Key among these partners is Indonesia. Indonesia is the world's third largest democracy, fourth most populous nation, largest Muslim-majority nation, and 10th largest economy by purchasing power. Additionally, Indonesia is the largest country and economy in Southeast Asia.³ The U.S. has a long history of diplomatic relations with Indonesia. The first U.S. consular post was opened in Indonesia in 1801 and its first

embassy in 1949. With \$25.2 billion in trade in 2016, including \$6 billion in U.S. exports, the bilateral economic relationship continues to grow.⁴ However, this relationship is still developing. As recently as the last decade, the U.S. and Indonesia had a more strained relationship.

Following an Indonesian military intervention in 1991 against a pro-independence demonstration in East Timor that killed more than 270 local residents, the U.S. instituted arms restrictions against Indonesia. In 1999, the U.S. enacted an arms embargo after Indonesia killed more than 1,500 residents and caused widespread destruction in another intervention intended to prevent East Timor from seceding. The George W. Bush administration removed some restrictions on non-lethal equipment sales in 2005 and lifted the arms embargo in 2006, resuming sales of lethal equipment and resumption of military cooperation.⁵

However, some restrictions remain against Indonesian special forces units, specifically the *Kopassus* unit directly responsible for the atrocities in East Timor. In 2010, President Barack Obama restored some contact between the U.S. military and *Kopassus*, but most restrictions remained. In early 2018, following U.S. Secretary of Defense James N. Mattis's visit to Indonesia, the U.S. agreed to gradually lift the remaining restrictions.⁶ The recent lifting of sanctions and other restrictions against Indonesia demonstrates that this bilateral relationship is still developing.

In addition to these historical tensions, the U.S. relationship with Indonesia offers some other unique challenges. Indonesia is a founding member of the Non-Aligned Movement. Consequently, Indonesia rejects the formation of alliances with any country or alignment with any particular bloc at the expense of another. This policy, while not

unique within Southeast Asia, inherently limits the extent of the U.S.-Indonesia defense relationship. A complicating factor of Indonesia's non-aligned status, especially within the defense sector, is Indonesia's relationship with Russia and China. The Indonesian military uses U.S. weapons systems alongside Russian and Chinese weapons systems. The analysis in this thesis remains within Indonesia's acceptable foreign policy limits.

Despite this history, U.S. President Barack Obama and Indonesian President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono signed a Comprehensive Partnership agreement in 2010. This agreement strengthened the bilateral relationship, focusing primarily on the countries' trade and economic relationships. In 2015, President Obama and then-newly-elected Indonesian President Joko Widodo elevated the Comprehensive Partnership to a Strategic Partnership. This more-encompassing Strategic Partnership reflects the concern, by both countries, over the SCS territorial disputes. Among other areas, the Strategic Partnership introduces maritime and defense cooperation as areas of mutual effort and focus.⁷ A Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on Maritime Cooperation accompanies the Strategic Partnership agreement. This MOU states that closer maritime cooperation enhances mutual trust and promotes friendly relationships; through the MOU, the U.S. and Indonesia agree to cooperate on several different maritime fronts, including security, trade, safe navigation, and environmental protection. The Strategic Partnership, coupled with the Maritime Cooperation MOU, reflects the importance the U.S. places on its ties with Indonesia.⁸

The maritime domain is particularly important to Indonesia. With over 17,500 islands spread across fifty degrees of longitude from the Indian Ocean to the Pacific Ocean, Indonesia has a vast maritime territory. However, Indonesia's maritime trade and

security capabilities remain underdeveloped. President Joko Widodo was elected in 2014. A primary part of Widodo's election platform was restoration of Indonesia's maritime culture and identity. Widodo's vision is to transform Indonesia in to the nexus between the Pacific and Indian Oceans. This vision is called the "Global Maritime Fulcrum" (GMF). The GMF vision and its subsequent implementation are discussed at length in the following chapters.

This rejuvenation of Indonesia's maritime identity, the simmering tensions in Southeast Asia, and a new U.S. presidential administration offer a good opportunity to analyze important maritime security issues. This thesis looks at ways the U.S. can help Indonesia improve its maritime security condition. The underlying premise of this analysis is that improved Indonesian maritime security will advance U.S. regional interests. This thesis analyzes Indonesia's approach to solving three of its maritime security problems to identify gaps in its approach. Informed by the U.S.-Indonesia bilateral relationship, this analysis recommends ways the U.S. can help improve Indonesia's maritime security situation. Finally, this thesis assesses how these improvements to Indonesian maritime security will advance U.S. regional interests.

Primary Research Question

What diplomatic, informational, military, or economic opportunities can the U.S. leverage to improve Indonesia's maritime security?

Secondary Research Questions

1. What are Indonesia's primary maritime security concerns?

2. How would improvements to Indonesian maritime security advance U.S. interests in the Indo-Pacific region?

Assumptions

Three assumptions underpin this thesis. The first assumption is that there will not be a significant change to the security situation in the USPACOM area of responsibility. An example of this type of change is outbreak of a war or other hostilities. The second assumption is that Indonesia does not make any significant political or policy changes that affect its approach to maritime security or its relationship with the U.S. The third assumption is that the U.S. will not make any significant political or policy changes that affect its approach to the Indo-Pacific in general or to Indonesia in particular; this research is predicated on the U.S. desire to maintain its policy of forward presence in the region.

Definitions of Terms

Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Member States. Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam.⁹

Alliance. The relationship that results from a formal agreement between two or more nations for broad, long-term objectives that further the common interests of the members.¹⁰

Indo-Pacific. The U.S. and Indonesia both use this term. The countries' interpretations are similar. The U.S. views the Indo-Pacific as the region that stretches

from the west coast of the U.S. to the west coast of India.¹¹ The Indonesian view of the Indo-Pacific is an integrated maritime world of the Pacific and Indian Oceans.¹²

IUU Fishing. See Appendix A.

Maritime Piracy and Armed Robbery. See Appendix A.

Nine-Dash Line (NDL). A Chinese-developed map of the South China Sea with a line denoting their extensive territorial claims. This line and the associated Chinese actions are the basis for many of the disputes in the South China Sea. The area enclosed by the nine-dash line accounts for about 90 percent of the SCS and greatly exceeds waters claimable under international law.¹³

Partner Nation. In security cooperation, a nation with which the Department of Defense conducts security cooperation activities.¹⁴

Primary Source. A government document, speech, or other document that establishes or otherwise conveys official policy. Examples include the U.S. National Security Strategy, congressional testimony, and policy-based speeches.

Secondary Source. An analysis of a topic, event, or policy by an author not responsible for establishing or conveying official policy. Examples include academic journal articles and news reports.

Limitations

All research materials are open source, publicly available information. No classified material, including For Official Use Only, is used in this research. No travel or interviews were conducted for this research. Additionally, all sources used are in the English language. When required, translations from the Indonesian language are accepted without verification.

Scope and Delimitations

This thesis primarily focuses on maritime security issues from the Indonesian perspective. Consequently, this thesis does not conduct in-depth analysis of the U.S. maritime security posture or interests in the Indo-Pacific region. However, a central interest of this research is understanding how improving Indonesian maritime security advances U.S. interests. To understand U.S. interests in the Indo-Pacific, this thesis relies on U.S. Government documents and remarks by civilian and military leaders. This thesis does not use secondary source analysis of U.S. positions and interests, such as from academic journals and articles. This delimitation narrows the scope of this study by focusing the research on Indonesian issues and problems.

This scope of this thesis is further narrowed by focusing on the policies of the incumbent administrations. In Indonesia, the relevant time period is the current Widodo term, from October 2014 to present. In the U.S., the relevant time period is the current Trump term, from January 2017 to present. Some historical information is used to provide context. The research uses no materials published later than April 2018.

Across various articles, speeches, and translations, Widodo's Global Maritime Fulcrum doctrine is sometimes referred to using "axis" instead of "fulcrum." For consistency, this thesis uses the term "fulcrum," or the acronym "GMF," except when direct quotations use a different term.

Significance of Study

The purpose of this study is to understand how the U.S. can further its vision and goals for the Indo-Pacific through cooperation with a partner nation. Moreover, about three years have elapsed since the Department of Defense issued the *Asia-Pacific*

Maritime Security Strategy (APMSS). APMSS lists U.S. maritime security objectives in the now-Indo-Pacific region and explains the underlying rationale and the U.S. approach. DOD has not renewed this 2015 document, though maritime security issues in the Indo-Pacific are as dynamic as ever. This thesis informs the discussion underpinning U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy and planning and can contribute to the successor of the APMSS.

Further, through analysis of Indonesia's maritime security problems, the recommended solutions in this thesis can inform civilian and military planners about how U.S. resources can achieve the best value in the Indo-Pacific. As the Trump administration is only in its second year and senior leaders, such as at the Department of State and USPACOM, are also new, this thesis is timely as the U.S. reevaluates its global posture. To contribute to this high-level discussion, the research methodology and recommendations in this thesis are constructed to fit in a whole-of-government approach to the Indo-Pacific.

Conclusion

Indonesia, as rising economic and political power in the Indo-Pacific, is a key U.S. regional partner. Under President Joko Widodo, Indonesia is renewing its maritime tradition and focus. With a nascent U.S. presidential administration in Washington, opportunities exist to focus U.S. efforts and to strengthen this bilateral relationship. This thesis analyzes Indonesian maritime security concerns to understand how Indonesia combats its problems and to identify where the U.S. can provide assistance. This U.S. assistance will improve Indonesia's maritime security and advance U.S. regional interests, while strengthening this strategic relationship.

¹ U.S. Department of State, “U.S. Relations with Indonesia,” last modified January 17, 2017, accessed October 1, 2017, <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2748.htm>.

² Harry Harris, “Statement on U.S. Pacific Command Posture 2017,” Congressional Testimony, House Armed Services Committee, Washington, D.C., April 26, 2017, 1, accessed October 24, 2017. https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Harris_04-27-17.pdf.

³ U.S. Department of State, “U.S. Relations with Indonesia.”

⁴ U.S. Trade Representative, “Indonesia,” accessed March 28, 2018, <https://ustr.gov/countries-regions/southeast-asia-pacific/indonesia>.

⁵ Scott Morrissey, “U.S. Lifts Indonesia Arms Embargo,” Arms Control Association, last modified January 1, 2006, accessed April 28, 2018, https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2006_01-02/JANFEB-Indonesia.

⁶ Amanda Hodge and Nivell Rayda, “Indonesia Says Uncle Sam to Lift Last Bans on Kopassus Troops,” *The Australian*, February 21, 2018, accessed April 28, 2018, <https://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/world/us-to-lift-ban-on-indonesian-kopassus-troops/news-story/54a4128144e2d34cef1924f1a948e170>.

⁷ U.S. President and Indonesian President, “Joint Statement by the United States of America and the Republic of Indonesia,” White House, last modified October 26, 2015, accessed September 30, 2017, <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/10/26/joint-statement-united-states-america-and-republic-indonesia>.

⁸ U.S. Secretary of State and Indonesian Foreign Minister, “Memorandum of Understanding on Maritime Cooperation Between the Government of the Republic of Indonesia and the Government of the United States of America,” Washington, D.C. October 24, 2015.

⁹ Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), “ASEAN Member States,” accessed October 1, 2017, <http://asean.org/asean/asean-member-states/>.

¹⁰ U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, July 2017), 14.

¹¹ U.S. President, *National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, December 2017), 45–46 accessed December 23, 2017, <https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf>.

¹² Vibhanshu Shekhar and Joseph Chinyong Liow, “Indonesia as a Maritime Power: Jokowi’s Vision, Strategies, and Obstacles Ahead,” Brookings Institution, November 7, 2014, accessed September 28, 2017, <https://www.brookings.edu/articles/indonesia-as-a-maritime-power-jokowis-vision-strategies-and-obstacles-ahead/>.

¹³ Ronald O’Rourke, *Maritime Territorial and Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) Disputes Involving China: Issues for Congress*, Congressional Research Service Report for Congress R42784 (Washington, D.C.: Library of Congress, September 15, 2017), 24, accessed October 16, 2017, https://www.everycrsreport.com/files/20170915_R42784_558b32517d9348b693bc49afd429462b6f05734d.pdf.

¹⁴ U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, 181.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

Introduction

Chapter 2 provides an overview of the primary and secondary source literature used in the methodology and analysis throughout this thesis. This chapter covers six broad research areas: the doctrinal concept framework; maritime security as a theoretical concept; illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing; Indonesia's broad approach to maritime security; Indonesia's approach to specific maritime security issues; and U.S. regional and bilateral security policy. These sections address the general topic areas used in the chapter 4 analysis.

The Instruments of National Power

This section introduces the primary doctrinal concept used in this thesis, the instruments of national power. This concept, which derives primarily from U.S. military strategy and policy, is a convention that explains how governments use various tools and resources to effect change. Consequently, as this thesis analyzes Indonesia's efforts to improve its maritime security and recommends U.S. actions to support these Indonesian efforts, the instruments of national power provide a useful lens. Chapter 3, Methodology, gives a more thorough explanation of how this thesis uses the instruments of national power to support the operational design analytical framework. This section provides an overview of the literature that underwrites and explains the foundational concept of the instruments of national power.

U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) joint doctrine provides the conceptual basis for the instruments of national power. Joint Publication 1, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States* (JP 1) introduces the DIME construct, in which the instruments of national power are diplomacy, information, military, and economics. JP 1 explains these instruments as the mechanisms through which the U.S. government achieves its national strategic objectives.¹ As JP 1 is a military publication, its discussion of the DIME framework is military-focused and it does not provide a holistic look at the government's broader use of these four instruments to exercise national power.

A more thorough analysis of the exercise of national power is in the *U.S. Army War College Guide to National Security Issues*. This two-volume document, published by the U.S. Army War College as part of its course materials, contains essays on various national security and strategic topics. The first volume of this document is titled "Theory of War and Strategy." The second part in this first volume contains seven essays that analyze the use of national power and the applicability of each of the specific instruments. Written from academic perspectives, these essays explain the American use of the instruments of national power in pursuit of strategic objectives. R. Craig Nation, in one of these essays, identifies 'power,' in the international sense, as an essential but ambiguous concept. Nation contends this concept is defined most easily as "the capacity to impose a desired outcome in the face of resistance." Power can be exercised coercively or through the legitimacy of institutions.² Nation further identifies power as "the measure of a relationship," which can exist in a number of different ways, depending on desired outcomes and other considerations. The mechanisms used to express national power are varied. While national security is often a prime motive of behavior, and the military is the

most obvious guarantor of national security, Nation argues that military power is just one of many tools available to nations to exercise power on the international stage.³

Therefore, government approaches beyond those offered by the military are necessary to achieve national security objectives.

To account for the need to employ approaches beyond military power in the exercise of national power on the international stage, several models express the breadth of available sources of national power. While DIME is the most common framework, Nation highlights two other systems: DIMEFIL (Diplomatic, Information, Military, Economic, Financial, Intelligence, and Law Enforcement); and MIDLIFE (Military, Intelligence, Diplomacy, Legal, Information, and Economic Power).⁴ Nation contends the common theme across these models is the emphasis on the expression of national power through means other than military might. Rather, the increased globalization of the world makes armed conflict between world powers less likely, so nations employ a broader palette of tools to achieve goals in their national interest.⁵ J. Boone Bartholomees, Jr., who both edited the *Guide to National Security Issues* and contributed essays, argues the DIMEFIL and MIDLIFE constructs were created by the counter-terrorism community to support additional considerations unique to the War on Terror. Bartholomees states that these expanded constructs have not been widely adopted outside this specific community.⁶ Consequently, this thesis uses the DIME construct to describe and discuss the use of national power in pursuit of national interests. Although the U.S. developed the DIME construct, this thesis uses it to also understand Indonesian Government actions. Chapter 3, Methodology, explains more thoroughly how DIME is incorporated in the analytical approach.

Maritime Security

The concept of maritime security is also important to the academic basis of this thesis. However, this term is not self-explanatory. Christian Bueger, a researcher at Cardiff University in the United Kingdom, wrote an article for the journal *Marine Policy* in March 2015 titled “What is Maritime Security?” on the topic of explaining maritime security as a concept. In this article, Bueger argues that “maritime security” is without a widely-accepted definition or framework. Bueger claims maritime security is often defined as the absence of a list of threats, such as terrorism, piracy, trafficking, and proliferation. However, this approach is incomplete, as it does not provide much specificity, and leaves out a number of related issues and problems. Alternatively, Bueger asserts, others define maritime security as “good and stable order at sea,” a nebulous definition that does not provide much specificity.⁷ Therefore, in the lack of academic consensus, Bueger recommends approaching “maritime security” as a buzzword, rather than attempting to reach a widely-accepted definition. Bueger contends that maritime security generally acquires its meaning by actors taking action in the name of it. As a result, the meaning of the term varies, depending on the involved actors and relevant issues.⁸ Building on Bueger’s approach, this thesis does not strive to develop an Indonesia- or U.S.-specific definition of maritime security. Rather, this analysis uses Bueger’s contention that maritime security is often viewed as an absence of threats at sea. This approach to maritime security supports the analytical goals of this thesis, which focus on reduction of three specific maritime problems.

IUU Fishing

The third key concept in this thesis is IUU fishing. A diverse range of literature exists on this topic. Although IUU fishing is a major regional and global problem, this thesis only discusses IUU fishing in the context of Indonesia, as the scope of this research is narrow. IUU fishing is an umbrella term for a set of activities. Appendix A, Supporting Information, contains explanations of the principal components of IUU fishing. This section of chapter 2 discusses literature on IUU fishing as a general problem; discussion of IUU fishing issues specific to Indonesia is later in this chapter.

One of the leading recent articles on IUU fishing is “Below the Surface: How Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated Fishing Threatens our Security,” written in 2017 by Cathy Haenlein, a researcher at the Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies in London. Haenlein’s article focuses globally on high-volume IUU fishing and its nexus with transnational organized crime. Specifically, Haenlein contends that IUU fishing has been historically treated as a regulatory matter instead of a security problem. Consequently, many states do not treat IUU fishing as they would other transnational crimes.⁹ Haenlein’s primary argument is that high-volume IUU fishing should be handled as transnational organized crime that threatens national security. Research on the security aspects of IUU fishing is germane to this thesis, as Indonesia’s approach to combating IUU fishing is aimed, in part, at the security risks inherent in the activity. To develop her paper, Haenlein’s methodology uses a variety of open-source literature and consultations with experts. As Haenlein focuses on the security aspects of high-volume IUU fishing, she does not address related issues, such as resource security.

However, this paper gives a thorough overview of IUU fishing as a threat to national security and a type of transnational organized crime.¹⁰

In November 2017, the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), in partnership with National Geographic, published a report titled *Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated Fishing as a National Security Threat*. The authors, Gregory B. Poling and Conor Cronin, contend that while IUU fishing is frequently viewed in terms of its economic, regulatory, environmental, and food security effects, it also presents significant non-traditional risks to national security.¹¹ Poling and Cronin identify two main effects of IUU fishing on national security. The first effect is its direct support to illegal networks engaged in trafficking and other maritime crime. Second, IUU fishing damages local livelihoods and food security, resulting in more productive recruiting for illicit activities. Contributing, IUU fishing reduces government revenues, which hampers states' abilities to counter these challenges.¹² Poling and Cronin state that 90-percent of the world's fish stocks are overexploited or fully fished, with IUU fishing accounting for 20 percent of worldwide catches.¹³ Moreover, one-third of global IUU fishing occurs in Indonesian waters.¹⁴ The assertions in this article are related to those put forth by Haenlein. Haenlein's article is one of the sources used by Poling and Cronin. Like Haenlein, Poling and Cronin synthesize open-source materials and do not conduct original research. However, their analysis of IUU fishing as a national security threat is in-line with much of the literature about Indonesia's problems with IUU fishing and other maritime security issues. Review of literature on Indonesia's specific maritime security problems is later in this chapter.

Indonesia's Approach to Maritime Security and Related Issues

Indonesian President Joko Widodo was elected in July 2014 and inaugurated on 20 October 2014. A major part of Widodo's campaign platform was revival of Indonesia's maritime culture and image. Chapter 4 provides more detail and analysis of Widodo's specific policies; however, myriad literature exists on Indonesia's maritime security concerns and Widodo's maritime policies. This section first reviews literature associated with Widodo's general policies and Indonesia's broad maritime security concerns. Second, this section reviews literature on the three Indonesian maritime security focus areas in this thesis: IUU fishing, unresolved borders, and maritime piracy and armed robbery. Much of the literature used in this section comes from researchers in the Indo-Pacific, including Singapore, Indonesia, and Australia. Other literature comes from U.S. researchers. This array of literature provides a broad set of experts on the myriad relevant issues. In addition to academic literature, this section uses primary source material, such as Indonesian Government documents and speeches by Indonesian leadership.

Building on his campaign platform, Widodo unveiled his vision for Indonesia as a "Global Maritime Fulcrum" (GMF) in November 2014 at the East Asia Summit in Myanmar. In this speech, Widodo explained that he views the world's political and economic center of gravity shifting to Asia. Consequently, the maritime domain will have increasing importance. Widodo established five pillars of his GMF doctrine to emphasize and increase the importance and influence of Indonesia, a vital link between the Pacific and Indian Oceans.¹⁵ These pillars are explained in chapter 4.

Australian diplomat and academic Adelle Neary, writing for CSIS in 2014, states the security and economic problems posed by Indonesia's vast geography are not new. With over 17,500 islands, high transportation costs, and an inadequate navy, Neary contends Indonesia functions as a conglomeration of "weakly integrated economies" instead of a normally functioning country with one common economy. Facing this problem set, Neary continues, Widodo came in to office in 2014 with maritime policy at the forefront.¹⁶ Vibhanshu Shekhar and Joseph Chinyong Liow, in a November 2014 Brookings Institution article, argue that Widodo's vision is to make Indonesia into a maritime power, not just achieve maritime security. The Indonesian archipelago, which spans millions of square miles, is not well-connected. Some regions, particularly in the outer eastern islands, have self-sufficient economies, neither benefitting from nor contributing to the national economy. Port infrastructure in disrepair hampers improvements to inter-island connectivity. A major part of Widodo's maritime vision is to transform Indonesian maritime connectivity to boost international economic power and to improve Indonesian utilization and protection of maritime resources.¹⁷

Iis Gindarsah and Adhi Priamarizki, in their policy report "Indonesia's Maritime Doctrine and Security Concerns," written for the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS) at Nanyang Technological University in Singapore in April 2015, identify the GMF doctrine as an "all-encompassing concept for political and economic development in Indonesia."¹⁸ With diplomacy as a key tool, Gindarsah and Priamarizki argue that for Indonesia to achieve its strategic vision and GMF goals, cooperation with neighboring countries and regional organizations, such as the Indian Ocean Rim Association, is imperative.¹⁹

However, the Australian researcher Natalie Sambhi, in a 2015 journal article titled “Jokowi’s ‘Global Maritime Axis’: Smooth Sailing or Rocky Seas Ahead?” argues that Widodo’s GMF policy is piecemeal and incomplete. This article provides a good perspective on the GMF doctrine soon after its initiation. Sambhi views the GMF doctrine as a unifying concept for Widodo’s larger policy ambitions, but identifies inherent weaknesses. Specifically, no actionable blueprint had yet been produced, relegating the GMF doctrine to a largely rhetorical base.²⁰ The lack of fidelity in the maritime concept, according to Sambhi, introduces uncertainty about the scope of Widodo’s vision. For example, it is unclear whether Widodo’s vision is more attuned to Indonesian waters or whether it is designed in a “Mahanian” sense, with broader ambitions. Further, Sambhi argues the foreign policy implications of the GMF doctrine have been overstated, as Widodo’s real focus is on domestic improvements ahead of more ambitious power projection.²¹ Lack of GMF doctrine fidelity is only a part of the problems identified by researchers writing in this period, early in Widodo’s term. Researchers cite other issues, as well.

Neary argues that Indonesia will have a hard time funding this expansive vision internally, especially for port infrastructure upgrades. To make up the difference, Neary expects Widodo to try to attract foreign investment. Another challenge, Neary continues, is getting the Indonesian Government to function in support of the GMF transition and endeavor. Specifically, while Widodo established a new Coordinating Minister for Maritime Affairs, the Cabinet must still be coaxed to work together to support Widodo’s vision.²² Neary contends that increased domestic integration may not be in Indonesia’s best interest, as some regions may have more efficient trade relations in their current

arrangements than could be achieved under tighter central control.²³ Despite these reservations, the literature also highlights many positive aspects of Widodo's vision.

Shekhar and Liow, writing for the Brookings Institution in late 2014, argue Widodo's emphasis on maritime security has reinvigorated the Indonesian national debate on the subject. While the Yudhoyono government, in power from 2004-2014, made maritime security improvements, Widodo's new approach is better suited to address Indonesia's most pressing threats. With a vast maritime domain, Shekhar and Liow assert Indonesia's most significant security risks are maritime, though the Indonesian military, *Tentara Nasional Indonesia* (TNI), has historically been a land-based force. Widodo's approach is geared toward correcting the strategic imbalance of an army defending a vast archipelago.²⁴ Additionally, Widodo has expanded Indonesia's strategic view, according to Shekhar and Liow. A portion of Indonesia's strategic community has historically felt the country's view was too narrowly focused and aligned with ASEAN. To open this aperture, Shekhar and Liow contend that under Widodo's leadership, Indonesia is striving to assume its role as a power between two continents, Australia and Asia, and two oceans, the Pacific and the Indian. Widodo's view is with Indonesia as the epicenter of, and bridge between, the Indian and Pacific Oceans, hence the "fulcrum" metaphor.²⁵

In March 2017, to correct some of the GMF doctrine challenges identified by Sambhi, Neary, and others, Widodo released a document referred to as the "Indonesian Sea Policy." This policy provides more detailed guidance for the GMF doctrine, with better integration into government efforts. The Sea Policy document defines the GMF vision as designed for a "sovereign, developed, and strong maritime state capable of positively contributing to the peace and security of the region and the world, according to

its national interests.” The original five pillars were expanded in to seven.²⁶ As with the 2014 GMF doctrine, the Sea Policy pillars are listed and explained in chapter 4.

Evan Laksmana, a scholar writing for the CSIS Asia Maritime Transparency Institute, contends the Sea Policy does not constitute a fundamental change to the Indonesian Government’s approach to the GMF doctrine. Laksmana argues that many of the details associated with the Sea Policy are relegated to a diaspora of ministries and agencies. Consequently, the policy assumes risk due to a lack of centralized control. The Coordinating Ministry for Maritime Affairs is designated to monitor, coordinate, and evaluate, but not control, the fit of each program within the Sea Policy.²⁷ Laksmana further argues the Sea Policy, like the original GMF doctrine, is still domestically-focused. As a result, Laksmana continues, the Sea Policy is unlikely to bolster Indonesia’s external GMF components and will not boost Indonesia into the fulcrum it desires to become.²⁸ Keoni Marzuki, in commentary written for RSIS in March 2017, gives the Sea Policy a slightly less-skeptical assessment than Laksmana. Marzuki assesses the policy to be an important step in realizing the GMF vision. Through the Sea Policy framework, the Indonesian government has established a regulatory framework with sufficient detail to enable ministries and agencies to plan and execute its initiatives. However, Marzuki contends, similar to Laksmana, that the Sea Policy is a skeletal framework, rather than a robust and detailed plan.²⁹

The relatively short period since Widodo’s election in 2014 ushered in a new era of Indonesian maritime focus has produced a robust body of commentary and analysis on Indonesian maritime security. This literature provides a broad view of Indonesian maritime security concerns, views, actions, and responses. The next section of this

chapter builds on this broad analysis to review literature associated with the specific maritime security problems focused on in this thesis.

Indonesian Maritime Security Focus Areas

Gindarsah and Priamarizki identify three areas of primary concern for Indonesia's maritime interests: Unresolved borders, IUU fishing, and maritime piracy and armed robbery. In their article, Gindarsah and Priamarizki argue these areas threaten Indonesia's sovereignty, stability, and security. As a result, the authors assert government effort is required to address and influence these problem areas.³⁰ This thesis focuses on Indonesian maritime security in the context of these three problems, as they provide a good lens to analyze Indonesia's maritime security situation. This section reviews literature on these three problems. This thesis mainly uses secondary source analysis to quantify these problems, though some primary source government materials inform the discussion.

With 33,000 miles of coastline and a large maritime Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), eradication of IUU fishing is a top priority for Widodo. The Indonesian Government identifies IUU fishing as a principal maritime security problem. In a 2015 CNN Interview, Widodo stated that, of the 5,000-7,000 ships in Indonesian waters every day, 90 percent are conducting illegal fishing. In Widodo's view, this "stealing" requires firm action.³¹ However, Sambhi asserts Indonesia faces myriad challenges in its efforts to combat IUU fishing. Several countries have agreed to partner with Indonesia to combat this problem by providing Indonesia advances in technological capabilities which can improve their ability to monitor and address the problem.³² Gindarsah and Priamarizki contend the Indonesian government has taken steps to combat IUU fishing. In particular,

the Indonesian Government has confiscated and sunk foreign fishing vessels found in Indonesian waters. Gindarsah and Priamarizki contend that the Widodo government has taken these measures to assert their domestic authority to enforce laws. However, the government has been more measured in its response to Chinese vessels, indicating it is aware of the potentially more serious ramifications of strong action against China.³³ China, as both a primary violator of fishing laws and a major investor in Indonesia, complicates Indonesia's efforts to combat IUU fishing. Sambhi argues Indonesia must walk a fine line to maintain good relations with China while combating illicit Chinese fishing vessels.³⁴

Indonesia has maritime borders with ten countries, the most of any country in the world.³⁵ Many of these borders are not formally agreed upon; consequently, delimitation of these borders is a high priority for the Indonesian Government. Dikdik Mohamad Sodik, an Indonesian law professor writing in the journal *Ocean Development and International Law* in 2012, states that Indonesia's extensive diplomatic negotiations have resulted in resolution of many of its border disputes.³⁶ The key drivers of Indonesia's interest in resolving its borders, according to Sodik, are Indonesia's international responsibilities to ensure free and safe navigation through its waters and to gain legal standing to enforce violations of law in its waters.³⁷

Part of Indonesia's border problem derives from China's excessive maritime claims in the SCS. While China's claims are responsible for much of the border tension in the SCS, Indonesia remains a non-claimant in the matter. However, any analysis of border issues in maritime Southeast Asia is incomplete without analysis of Chinese influence. Consequently, there is a body of literature that discusses China's nine-dash line

(NDL) claims, the associated effects on Indonesia's border claims, and Indonesia's reaction.

Geographically, the only Indonesian territory encroached on by China's NDL claims is the Natuna Islands, arrayed over 100,000 square miles in the southwest SCS. Researcher Ristian Atriandi Supriyanto contends, in a 2016 article in the journal *Asia Policy*, that Indonesia's concerns over the SCS territorial disputes are primarily related to the encroachment against these islands. The waters around the Natuna Islands contain rich fisheries and abundant undeveloped natural gas reserves. While the islands are outside China's NDL, their waters are not, and China has not reassured Indonesia that it considers Natuna outside its claimed area. Moreover, Chinese fishing vessels, accompanied by Chinese government patrol vessels, regularly operate within the seas surrounding the Natuna Islands.³⁸ Sambhi argues the potential for Chinese incursions against the Natuna Islands risks upsetting the peaceful nature of the GMF doctrine. The militarization required to secure the Natuna region against illegal fishing and illegal natural gas exploration could increase the risk of escalation and miscalculation with China.³⁹

Indonesia's foundational belief in institutions and international cooperation is upset by China's NDL claims. Supriyanto states that Indonesia raised objections in 2009 against China's NDL claim due to its disregard for the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) agreement. Moreover, Indonesia believes the NDL presents risk to the free flow of commerce through the SCS. Indonesia is expected to reject any Chinese implementation of an air defense identification zone or shipping reporting requirements.⁴⁰ Additionally, Supriyanto argues that Chinese violations of

international law in the SCS could put Indonesia's non-aligned foreign policy at risk. If tensions continue to rise, and Indonesia is forced to take a side, Jakarta would likely side with Washington, because Beijing is viewed to be largely responsible for inciting regional unrest.⁴¹

In response to these threats against the Natuna Islands, Indonesia announced in July 2017 that it renamed the area around the islands the “North Natuna Sea.”⁴² Prashanth Parameswaran, writing for *The Diplomat* shortly after Indonesia’s announcement, argues this move underscores Indonesia’s claim it does not recognize China’s NDL claims and reinforces Indonesia’s willingness to defend its territory. Parameswaran continues that this declaration is part of a broader Indonesian trend of using diplomatic mechanisms to resolve disputes and stake legal claims. However, Parameswaran doubts that this change will have much of an effect on China’s actions and is unlikely to resolve Indonesia’s difficulties cooperating with China.⁴³

The third major Indonesian maritime security problem is maritime piracy and armed robbery. As with IUU fishing, definitions of these concepts are in Appendix A. Indonesia combats maritime piracy and armed robbery for reasons similar to the other two problems, as maritime piracy and armed robbery counter Widodo’s vision of a safe and productive maritime domain. Less literature exists on the Indonesian approach to this problem, compared to IUU fishing and unresolved borders. The literature used for this discussion derives from secondary source analysis and primary source materials.

One of the leading primary source materials is the annual report from the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP) Information Sharing Centre, located in Singapore. While the

specific numbers in this report are beyond the scope of this chapter, ReCAAP tracks and reports on maritime piracy and armed robbery incidents throughout Asia. This annual report summarizes incidents throughout 2017, with historical data for comparison. These incidents demonstrate the prevalence and trends of piracy and armed robbery throughout the waters germane to this thesis.

To combat maritime piracy and armed robbery, Gindarsah and Priamarizki assert Indonesia is hesitant to join non-ASEAN multilateral efforts. Rather, the government tends to tackle this problem internally.⁴⁴ Following a spate of kidnappings and other attacks in the Sulu and Celebes Seas in 2016, Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines agreed to conduct coordinated maritime patrols to address these challenges. Jacqueline Espenilla, writing for *The Diplomat* in May 2016, contends the tri-border area around the Sulu and Celebes Seas has been generally ignored by leaders in all three countries. Consequently, Espenilla contends these piracy and kidnapping problems require coordinated multi-national responses. These tri-lateral patrols are a step in that direction. However, Espenilla argues wide-ranging action is necessary to properly address the problem. For example, maritime domain awareness and information sharing capabilities must be implemented to connect and synthesize information from all three nations. Further, Espenilla argues the tri-border area must remain at the forefront of the efforts, and not be prioritized behind areas with fewer competing national interests.⁴⁵

A significant rise in tensions aside, Supriyanto contends that Indonesia will be able to avoid getting involved in political fights and advance relationships with both China and the U.S.⁴⁶ By working pragmatically and cautiously with both countries, Indonesia can advance its security interests while remaining in compliance with its non-

aligned foreign policy.⁴⁷ At its core, Indonesia's beliefs are to preserve the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and oppose the domination of a single major power in the region.⁴⁸ The SCS, according to Supriyanto, is becoming more unstable and causing anxiety in Indonesia.⁴⁹ Therefore, Indonesia cannot afford to be passive. Rather, Indonesia must be proactive to influence events in its national interest.

To improve its maritime security capabilities, Indonesia desires an advanced navy able to combat modern threats. Indonesia's current naval capabilities are among the weakest in Southeast Asia. Shekhar and Liow contend that while military upgrades are in progress, small budget, limited vision, and lack of inertia hamper significant developments. President Yudhoyono, Widodo's predecessor, introduced a "Minimum Essential Force" (MEF) modernization plan in 2005. This plan aims to increase the size of the Navy to 274 ships by 2024, with corresponding advances in the Indonesian defense industry. While the military has made advances, it is not on track for 274 ships by 2024. Widodo has reinvigorated the emphasis on defense modernization, pledging to raise the defense share to 1.5 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) in five years, coupled with increased foreign investment. Possible sources of this foreign investment include the U.S., China, Japan, South Korea, and Russia.⁵⁰ However, Shekhar and Liow identify numerous challenges facing Widodo in this endeavor. The large financial commitment required to increase the size of the navy will require a lot of support from the legislature and populace. Widodo's limited foreign policy experience and pressing domestic issues present the potential to derail his efforts.⁵¹ Laksmana, in a 2014 book chapter titled "Rebalancing Indonesia's Naval Force," states the MEF initiative is designed to develop the Indonesian Navy into a greenwater navy capable of combating a variety of

sovereignty challenges. Laksmana contends the MEF initiative is aimed more at modernizing the existing navy instead of expanding the navy into a significantly larger force. To truly increase the fleet's size, Laksmana argues the navy must adjust its focus and domestic political relationships.⁵²

The Indonesian military, TNI, has traditionally been a land-focused force; however, a facet of the GMF doctrine is to increase its maritime capabilities. Sambhi argues that additional tasks undertaken by TNI, including law enforcement and counter-terrorism duties, will cause strains as Widodo works to expand TNI's maritime capabilities. Spending restraints and the necessity of these additional responsibilities must be balanced to expand TNI's maritime reach.⁵³

Another key topic addressed in the relevant literature is Indonesia's maritime security coordination problems. Laksmana, in his 2014 book chapter, contends that with nearly a dozen agencies responsible for some aspect of maritime security and law enforcement, communication problems and authority overlaps and gaps abound. Contributing, the dozens of relevant laws and regulations lead to significant confusion and inefficiency controlling the maritime domain.⁵⁴ Parameswaran, writing for *The Diplomat* in April 2017, contends Indonesia's maritime security coordination problems are complicated by deep-seated interests and turf wars. To correct some of these problems, Widodo created a Maritime Security Agency, known as by its Indonesian acronym BAKAMLA, soon after his inauguration in 2014. Parameswaran argues this new agency struggles to achieve its mission due to poor resourcing and granting of authorities.⁵⁵ Similarly, Muhamad Arif and Yandry Kurniawan, researchers writing for Australian National University in 2017, state the Indonesian Navy is closely tied into

maritime security and law enforcement responsibilities. While existing law authorizes these actions by the navy, Arif and Kurniawan contend the overlapping responsibilities between the navy and civilian maritime security agencies prevent these agencies from developing and becoming independent and effective.⁵⁶ These maritime coordination problems cause problems that affect the three primary maritime security areas on which this thesis focuses.

This section has provided an overview of the literature discussing Indonesia's approach to maritime security in general and the three specific focus areas in particular. While the analysis in chapter 4 uses literature beyond that discussed in this section, the literature discussed here provides an overview of the state of the academic discussion on these issues. The next section of this chapter looks at U.S. security policy toward the Indo-Pacific and Indonesia. As the Indonesian discussion focuses on the Widodo administration, the U.S. discussion focuses primarily on the Trump administration's approach and policies, informed by the prior administration's actions where required.

United States Regional and Bilateral Security Policy

This section discusses literature on U.S. security policy in the Indo-Pacific in general and the U.S. relationship with Indonesia in particular. As this thesis focuses on Indonesian issues and the bilateral U.S.-Indonesia relationship, a detailed analysis of U.S. regional security policy is beyond the scope of this thesis. Further, secondary source literature and research used in this thesis focuses predominately on the Indonesian perspective. Consequently, this thesis uses less academic research and writing about U.S. policy, compared to the literature used to understand Indonesian policy.

The Trump administration released its *National Security Strategy* (NSS) and *National Defense Strategy* (NDS) in December 2017 and January 2018, respectively. Consequently, these documents, along with the underlying strategy, remain nascent. The NSS regional policy is based on the U.S. desire for a free and open Indo-Pacific. While the NSS does not detail this concept, it describes China as a strategic competitor. Specifically, China's regional influence, through political, economic, and military means, often run against the U.S. vision for the region. To counter China's influence, the NSS cites the need for cooperation with allies, partners, and multilateral organizations in the region.⁵⁷

The NDS is a complementary document to the NSS. While the NSS is produced by the National Security Council and the White House, the NDS is produced by the Office of the Secretary of Defense. In a change from previous versions, the majority of the 2018 NDS is classified. The only unclassified part of the NDS is an eleven-page summary; this thesis does not use any information from the classified body of the NDS. The themes in the unclassified NDS summary are in line with the themes in the NSS. For example, the NDS describes the world's security situation as complex, with China as a strategic competitor and a "revisionist power."⁵⁸ The NDS desires a favorable regional balance of power in the Indo-Pacific, enhanced by expansion of alliances and partnerships to advance U.S. interests.⁵⁹ Beyond these two national-level documents, this thesis uses several speeches by military and political leaders. For example, the Commander of USPACOM addresses Congress annually to provide an assessment of his command's posture. In April 2017, Admiral Harry Harris spoke before House Armed

Services Committee. At this hearing, Harris identified the United States as indelibly linked to the Indo-Pacific, from both economic and security perspectives.⁶⁰

Additionally, the Department of Defense, under the Obama administration in 2015, released the *Asia-Pacific Maritime Security Strategy* (APMSS). This document, which has not been renewed, provides an overview of U.S. objectives and strategy in the Indo-Pacific region. As discussed in chapter 1, the term “Indo-Pacific” has replaced “Asia-Pacific” in general usage since APMSS was issued, though the covered geographic region is effectively the same. APMSS identifies U.S. maritime objectives in the region as “safeguard the freedom of the seas, deter conflict and coercion, and promote adherence to international law and standards.”⁶¹ While this document differs in some respects from the approach in the NSS and NDS, it remains germane, as it still largely reflects contemporary U.S. Indo-Pacific policy.

Literature in this thesis on U.S. policy specific to the bilateral relationship with Indonesia derives predominately from these documents and speeches. The NSS, for example, cites Indonesia, along with other Southeast Asian nations, as growing regional partners, while identifying organizations such as ASEAN and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation as central to the regional architecture and free order.⁶² Similarly, Harris, in his 2017 posture statement, cites Indonesia as a critical maritime security partner; Harris states that the bilateral relationship is enhanced and strengthened through a robust annual military engagement schedule.⁶³ There is also academic literature and analysis of the U.S.-Indonesia relationship. Prashanth Parameswaran, writing for the Brookings Institution in December 2015, states that the bilateral strategic partnership agreement signed in October 2015 was a significant accomplishment, but distance still exists

between U.S. and Indonesian goals and opportunities for cooperation. Specifically, Parameswaran contends Indonesia's free and open foreign policy may conflict with strong U.S. regional actions such as freedom of navigation operations and basing of U.S. Marines in Australia.⁶⁴ Shekhar and Liow, writing for Brookings in November 2014, state that Widodo's renewed maritime emphasis should create opportunities for the U.S. to increase bilateral cooperation and engagement.⁶⁵

Conclusion

Through an overview of relevant literature, this chapter explains some key concepts and provides context for the analysis in this thesis. This literature review indicates a robust body of writing exists on the myriad facets of Indonesian maritime security. This thesis continues the academic discussion introduced in this chapter by analyzing Indonesian maritime security across the framework of the instruments of national power. This approach provides new analysis and synthesis of the U.S.-Indonesia bilateral relationship. Further, this analysis recommends U.S. actions to strengthen Indonesian maritime security in the still-new Trump administration. This timing offers opportunities to influence U.S. policy and strategic documents.

¹ U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 1-0, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States (Change 1)*, (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, July 12, 2017), I-12.

² R. Craig Nation, "National Power," in *U.S. Army War College Guide to National Security Issues*, vol. 1, *Theory of War and Strategy*, ed. J. Boone Bartholomees Jr., 5th ed. (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2012), 147, accessed March 5, 2018, <https://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=1109>.

³ Ibid., 148.

⁴ Ibid., 149.

⁵ Ibid., 149–50.

⁶ J. Boone Bartholomees Jr., “A Survey of the Theory of Strategy,” in *U.S. Army War College Guide to National Security Issues*, vol. 1, *Theory of War and Strategy*, ed. J. Boone Bartholomees Jr., 5th ed. (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2012), 19, accessed March 5, 2018, <https://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=1109>.

⁷ Christian Bueger, “What Is Maritime Security?” *Marine Policy* 53 (March 2015): 159–60, accessed March 3, 2018, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.marpol.2014.12.005>.

⁸ Ibid., 163.

⁹ Cathy Haenlein, “Below the Surface: How Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing Threatens Our Security,” *RUSI Occasional Paper* (July 2017): 1, accessed March 21, 2018, <https://rusi.org/publication/occasional-papers/below-surface-how-illegal-unreported-and-unregulated-fishing-threatens>.

¹⁰ Ibid., 3–4.

¹¹ Gregory B. Poling and Conor Cronin, *Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated Fishing as a National Security Threat* (Washington, D.C.: CSIS, November 2017), 1, accessed January 23, 2018, <https://www.csis.org/analysis/illegal-unreported-and-unregulated-fishing-national-security-threat>.

¹² Ibid., 8.

¹³ Ibid., 16.

¹⁴ Ibid., 12.

¹⁵ Rendi A. Witular, “Jokowi Launches Maritime Doctrine to the World,” *The Jakarta Post*, November 13, 2014, accessed December 24, 2017, <http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2014/11/13/jokowi-launches-maritime-doctrine-world.html>.

¹⁶ Adelle Neary, “Jokowi Spells Out Vision for Indonesia’s ‘Global Maritime Nexus,’” *Southeast Asia from Scott Circle* 5, no. 24, (November 26, 2014), accessed September 30, 2017, <https://www.csis.org/analysis/jokowi-spells-out-vision-indonesia’s-global-maritime-nexus>.

¹⁷ Shekhar and Liow, “Indonesia as a Maritime Power: Jokowi’s Vision, Strategies, and Obstacles Ahead.”

¹⁸ Iis Gindarsah and Adhi Priamarizki, “Indonesia’s Maritime Doctrine and Security Concerns,” *RSIS Policy Report* 9 (2015): 3, accessed November 5, 2017, <https://www.rsis.edu.sg/rsis-publication/idss/indonesias-maritime-doctrine-and-security-concerns/#.WvGhyi-ZMUE>.

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ Natalie Sambhi, “Jokowi’s ‘Global Maritime Axis’: Smooth Sailing or Rocky Seas Ahead?” *Security Challenges* 11, no. 2 (2015): 42, accessed November 19, 2017, <http://apo.org.au/node/58233>.

²¹ Ibid., 43.

²² Neary, “Jokowi Spells Out Vision for Indonesia’s ‘Global Maritime Nexus.’”

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ Shekhar and Liow, “Indonesia as a Maritime Power: Jokowi’s Vision, Strategies, and Obstacles Ahead.”

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ Evan Laksmana, “Indonesian Sea Policy: Accelerating Jokowi’s Global Maritime Fulcrum?” Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, last modified March 23, 2017, accessed February 24, 2018, <https://amti.csis.org/indonesian-sea-policy-accelerating/>.

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ Ibid.

²⁹ Keoni Marzuki, “Indonesia’s National Sea Policy: Concretising the Global Maritime Fulcrum,” *RSIS Commentary*, no. 052 (March 24, 2017), accessed February 24, 2018, <https://www.rsis.edu.sg/rsis-publication/rsis/co17052-indonesias-national-sea-policy-concretising-the-global-maritime-fulcrum/#.WvGiWC-ZMUE>.

³⁰ Gindarsah and Priamarizki, “Indonesia’s Maritime Doctrine and Security Concerns,” 3–5.

³¹ CNN, “Interview with Indonesian President Joko Widodo,” interview by Christiane Amanpour, January 26, 2015, accessed October 14, 2017, <http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/1501/26/ampr.01.html>.

³² Sambhi, “Jokowi’s ‘Global Maritime Axis’: Smooth Sailing or Rocky Seas Ahead?” 48–49.

³³ Gindarsah and Priamarizki, “Indonesia’s Maritime Doctrine and Security Concerns,” 3–5.

³⁴ Sambhi, “Jokowi’s ‘Global Maritime Axis’: Smooth Sailing or Rocky Seas Ahead?” 48–49.

³⁵ Dikdik Mohamad Sodik, “The Indonesian Legal Framework on Baselines, Archipelagic Passage, and Innocent Passage,” *Ocean Development & International Law* 43, no. 4 (October 2012): 332, accessed April 9, 2018, <https://doi.org/10.1080/00908320.2012.726830>.

³⁶ Ibid.

³⁷ Ibid., 336.

³⁸ Ristian Atriandi Supriyanto, “Out of Its Comfort Zone: Indonesia and the South China Sea,” *Asia Policy*, no. 21 (2016): 22, accessed October 1, 2017, http://www.nbr.org/publications/asia_policy/Free/092316/AsiaPolicy21_SouthChinaSeaRT_January2016.pdf.

³⁹ Sambhi, “Jokowi’s ‘Global Maritime Axis’: Smooth Sailing or Rocky Seas Ahead?” 47.

⁴⁰ Supriyanto, “Out of Its Comfort Zone: Indonesia and the South China Sea,” 23.

⁴¹ Ibid., 24.

⁴² Tom Allard and Bernadette Christina Munthe, “Asserting Sovereignty, Indonesia Renames Part of South China Sea,” *Reuters*, July 14, 2017, accessed February 24, 2018, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-indonesia-politics-map/asserting-sovereignty-indonesia-renames-part-of-south-china-sea-idUSKBN19Z0YQ>.

⁴³ Prashanth Parameswaran, “Why Did Indonesia Just Rename Its Part of the South China Sea?” *The Diplomat*, July 17, 2017, accessed March 2, 2018, <https://thediplomat.com/2017/07/why-did-indonesia-just-rename-its-part-of-the-south-china-sea/>.

⁴⁴ Gindarsah and Priamarizki, “Indonesia’s Maritime Doctrine and Security Concerns,” 3–5.

⁴⁵ Jacqueline Espenilla, “Abductions at Sea: A 3-Way Security Challenge for Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines,” *The Diplomat*, May 5, 2016, accessed April 11, 2018, <https://thediplomat.com/2016/05/abductions-at-sea-a-3-way-security-challenge-for-indonesia-malaysia-and-the-philippines/>.

⁴⁶ Supriyanto, “Out of Its Comfort Zone: Indonesia and the South China Sea,” 25.

-
- ⁴⁷ Ibid., 26.
- ⁴⁸ Ibid., 27.
- ⁴⁹ Ibid., 28.
- ⁵⁰ Shekhar and Liow, “Indonesia as a Maritime Power: Jokowi’s Vision, Strategies, and Obstacles Ahead.”
- ⁵¹ Ibid.
- ⁵² Evan Laksmana, “Rebalancing Indonesia’s Naval Force: Trends, Nature, and Drivers,” in *Naval Modernisation in South-East Asia: Nature, Causes and Consequences*, ed. Geoffrey Till and Jane Chan (Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2014), 193–95, accessed December 5, 2017, https://www.academia.edu/16314933/Balancing_Indonesias_Naval_Force_Trends_Nature_and_Drivers.
- ⁵³ Sambhi, “Jokowi’s ‘Global Maritime Axis’: Smooth Sailing or Rocky Seas Ahead?,” 51–52.
- ⁵⁴ Laksmana, “Rebalancing Indonesia’s Naval Force: Trends, Nature, and Drivers,” 193.
- ⁵⁵ Prashanth Parameswaran, “Confronting Indonesia’s Maritime Coordination Challenge,” *The Diplomat*, April 27, 2017, accessed September 30, 2017, <http://thediplomat.com/2017/04/confronting-indonesias-maritime-coordination-challenge/>.
- ⁵⁶ Muhamad Arif and Yandry Kurniawan, “Strategic Culture and Indonesian Maritime Security,” *Asia & the Pacific Policy Studies* 5, no. 1 (January 2018): 86–87, accessed April 15, 2018, <https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1002/app5.203>.
- ⁵⁷ U.S. President, *National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, 2017, 45–47.
- ⁵⁸ U.S. Department of Defense, *Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, January 2018), 2, accessed January 23, 2018, <https://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf>.
- ⁵⁹ Ibid., 4, 9.
- ⁶⁰ Harry Harris, “Statement on U.S. Pacific Command Posture 2017,” 1.
- ⁶¹ U.S. Department of Defense, *The Asia-Pacific Maritime Security Strategy: Achieving U.S. National Security Objectives in a Changing Environment* (Washington, D.C.: July 27, 2015), 1, accessed September 30, 2017, <https://www.defense.gov/Portals/>

⁶² U.S. President, *National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, 2017, 46.

⁶³ Harris, “Statement on U.S. Pacific Command Posture 2017,” 27.

⁶⁴ Prashanth Parameswaran, “The New U.S.-Indonesia Strategic Partnership after Jokowi’s Visit: Problems and Prospects,” *Brookings Institution*, December 8, 2015, accessed September 28, 2017, <https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/the-new-u-s-indonesia-strategic-partnership-after-jokowis-visit-problems-and-prospects/>.

⁶⁵ Shekhar and Liow, “Indonesia as a Maritime Power: Jokowi’s Vision, Strategies, and Obstacles Ahead.”

CHAPTER 3

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Introduction

Chapter 3 explains the methodology used to conduct the analysis in this thesis. First, this chapter explains the doctrinal basis of the analysis, operational design. This concept derives primarily from Joint Publication 5-0, *Joint Planning* (JP 5-0). Next, this chapter explains how the analysis uses operational design to identify gaps in Indonesia's maritime security. Finally, this chapter explains how this thesis analyzes these gaps to develop answers to the research questions.

Doctrinal Basis—Operational Art and Operational Design

Operational design is a principal component of U.S. military joint operational planning. This process aids commanders and planners with developing understanding of operational environments, as it is imperative to understand an environment prior to creating plans to conduct operations which will influence the environment.¹ Operational art is a methodology to apply operational design to identify ends, ways, means, and risk to develop an operational approach, which ties broad concepts into specific missions and tasks to produce an executable plan.² Operational design is typified by the continuous interaction of four major components: understand the operational environment, understand strategic guidance, define the problem, and develop the operational approach. While these four components continuously interact, the understanding of the environment and the problem are requisite prior to developing planning options. Options, in this context, are expressed through the operational approach.³

To address a new problem, the first step in operational design is understanding the current environment. There are myriad factors in a given environment.⁴ The depth of understanding of an environment is proportional to the environment's complexity and the tools available to gather information. In new and complex foreign theaters, for example, the understanding may be superficial at first. However, through detailed study and information collection, situational understanding develops and becomes more complete. From this understanding of the current environment, the second step is to develop a vision of the future environment. This future environment vision is informed by strategic guidance and national goals and must be considerate of local interests. In the operational design construct, the future end state is referred to as the "ends."⁵ Once the current and desired future environments are identified, the third step is to identify the problems, or gaps, that exist between these two states. Finally, planners develop an operational approach, or a set of recommended actions, which will close these gaps. These actions, referred to as "ways," are generally military actions working in concert with civilian actions.⁶ The resources required to facilitate these actions are referred to as the "means," which can come from the military, the U.S. government, foreign governments, or affected civilians.⁷ Risk, or the "chance of failure or unacceptable consequences," underpins this entire process. Understanding risk inherent to operational plans is vital, as planners must know where their plans are most likely to encounter problems. While some amount of failure is inevitable, the approach must quantify how much failure is permissible.⁸

This operational design framework derives from military doctrine. Consequently, the discussion above has a military perspective. Nonetheless, this approach—current conditions, desired future conditions, gaps, solutions, and risk—is a useful lens to analyze

complex non-military problems. The next section explains how this thesis applies these concepts to analyze Indonesian maritime security and answer the research questions.

Analytical Approach

This thesis uses the operational design process as a lens to study Indonesian maritime security and the U.S.-Indonesia bilateral relationship. As this study is different from the military problems to which operational design is normally applied, some modifications are necessary. Additionally, the purpose of this thesis is not to develop high-fidelity operational plans. Consequently, this thesis uses the principals and concepts that underpin operational art and operational design to analyze Indonesia's maritime security condition, identify gaps, and recommend ways the U.S. can help to improve this condition and advance U.S. regional interests.

The analytical methodology in chapter 4, an adaptation of the operational design concept discussed above, has five major components: first, assessment of Indonesia's desired maritime security state; second, assessment of the current state of Indonesian maritime security; third, identification of gaps between these two states; fourth, understanding of the bilateral maritime security relationship; and finally, recommended U.S. actions to close the gaps, supplemented with an analysis of benefits and risks to the U.S. The strategic framework underpinning this operational design methodology is the instruments of national power, or DIME. As discussed in chapter 2, the four DIME domains provide a holistic look at how nations exert power to achieve their objectives. Use of the DIME framework throughout the analysis provides consistency and draws conceptual threads through the different analytical sections. This analysis uses a combination of primary and secondary sources. While primary sources enable

understanding of national leaders' intentions, desires, and goals, secondary sources provide useful context and perspective. Further, some Indonesian primary sources are not available in English; in these cases, secondary sources are necessary.

The first part of this analysis identifies Indonesia's goals and desired future state, or "ends" for three specific maritime security problems: IUU fishing, unresolved borders, and maritime piracy and armed robbery. These three problems are the focus of the analysis and actions throughout this thesis. While the operational design approach puts understanding of the current environment first, this analysis starts with the desired future environment. This order establishes a broad understanding and emphasizes the importance of these maritime security problems at the beginning of the analysis. To achieve this broad understanding, this initial analysis not structured by the instruments of national power. Rather, this section looks at the three problems individually, explains why Indonesia cares about them, and projects Indonesia's desired future state for each problem.

The second part of the analysis looks at Indonesian maritime security actions to identify the current state of the three problems on which this thesis focuses. JP 5-0 states that understanding of the current environment helps to identify the problem, anticipate outcomes, and understand the effects of various actions.⁹ To develop this understanding, this section look at each maritime security problem across the instruments of national power. By analyzing each instrument independently, this section develops a robust picture of how Indonesia uses its national power to achieve its maritime security objectives. Further, this in-depth analysis develops understanding of the current condition

of these problems. This current condition is a key input to the operational design methodology's gap analysis.

Gap identification is the third part of operational design. JP 5-0 states “defining the problem is essential to addressing the problem.”¹⁰ In this thesis, the term “gaps” is used to identify what JP 5-0 calls “problems.” To identify these gaps, the analysis uses the “desired future state” from the first section and the “current state” from the second section. The differences between these two states constitute the gaps that the recommended actions must address. As the purpose of this analysis is to recommend U.S. actions to help Indonesia, the identified gaps are those which can closed with foreign assistance. Further, to maximize the effectiveness of the recommended actions, this analysis synthesizes the earlier operational design inputs to identify gaps which affect multiple maritime security problems. This synthesis makes the recommendations more relevant and easier to operationalize.

While this analysis focuses on Indonesia's maritime security desires and current condition, the gaps are intended to be addressed through U.S. action. Therefore, understanding the U.S.-Indonesia bilateral maritime security relationship provides vital context to inform these actions. The fourth section of the analysis looks across the instruments of national power at the U.S.-Indonesia bilateral relationship. These engagements and connections provide the basis for the recommended actions in the fifth analytical section. While this discussion centers on maritime security aspects of the relationship when possible, some aspects of the broader bilateral relationship are included for context. This part of the analysis is not a specific component of the operational design

framework; however, the context it provides enables the recommendations in the next section.

The fifth section of the analysis completes the operational design methodology. This section provides the “ways” and “risk” parts of the methodology, while answering the primary and secondary research questions. Resource constraints are not a focus of this thesis, so the “means” part of operational design is only discussed briefly. The first part of this section looks across the U.S. instruments of national power to recommend actions to close the identified maritime security gaps. These actions take the form of new, or changes to existing, U.S. engagements with Indonesia. These actions span the instruments of national power to maximize the impact of government action. Finally, this section analyzes the benefit of improved Indonesian maritime security to the U.S., tempered by a discussion of inherent risk.

Conclusion

Operational design is a powerful lens to analyze this important bilateral relationship. The methodical approach in this thesis presents a picture of how Indonesia uses its instruments of national power to achieve its interests and how U.S. and Indonesian interests intertwine. Through application of design principles, this thesis gains a thorough understanding of how the U.S. can advance its interests through cooperation with partners and allies.

¹ U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 5-0, *Joint Planning* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, June 16, 2017), IV-6.

² Ibid., IV-1.

³ Ibid., IV-6–IV-7.

⁴ Ibid., IV-5.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ Ibid., IV-10.

¹⁰ Ibid., IV-14.

CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS

We believe that the sea should unite, not divide us.

—Indonesian President Joko Widodo, “Indonesia in the Changing World: A Conversation with President Joko Widodo of Indonesia”

Introduction

Chapter 4 contains the bulk of the analysis in this thesis. To support this analysis, the chapter is divided into five main sections. These sections inform the components of the operational design methodology described in chapter 3. The first section explains how Indonesia views maritime security in order to understand the country’s goals and vision. To facilitate and focus this discussion, this chapter identifies three areas of primary Indonesian maritime security concern: IUU fishing, unresolved borders, and maritime piracy and armed robbery. This initial analysis is not framed in terms of the instruments of national power. Rather, the characterization of these maritime security problems is a broader, more holistic look, to inform the “desired final state” of the operational design methodology. The second section of this chapter analyzes these three maritime security problems individually across the instruments of national power to understand the actions Indonesia is taking and the current condition of these areas. This section informs the “current state” of the operational design methodology. The third section compares the analyses in the first two sections to identify gaps in the Indonesian approach to addressing the three maritime security focus areas. This section is not organized by either the problem areas or the instruments of national power. Rather, to maximize the applicability and effectiveness of the recommended solutions, these gaps are common to

one or more of the primary maritime security problems. The gaps in this third section of chapter 4 inform the “problem” part of the operational design methodology. The fourth section summarizes the U.S.-Indonesia bilateral maritime security relationship across the instruments of national power. While not directly informing a component of the operational design methodology, this section provides context for, and an understanding of, how the United States and Indonesia cooperate to advance mutual maritime security interests. The fifth and final section of this chapter answers the primary and secondary research questions. Specifically, this last section looks across the instruments of national power to identify what activities the U.S. can initiate or modify to close the gaps identified in the third section’s analysis. To complete the operational design methodology, the fifth section constitutes the “approach” or “solution.” This fifth section also explains how improvements to Indonesian maritime security advance U.S. Indo-Pacific interests and discusses some risks inherent to this bilateral relationship.

Section 1: Indonesia’s Maritime Security Vision, Problems, and Goals

The Indonesian people elected Joko Widodo President in 2014, following the ten-year term of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono. Restoration of Indonesia’s maritime identity was at the forefront of Widodo’s campaign platform. Vibhanshu Shekhar and Joseph Chinyong Liow, writing for the Brookings Institution in late 2014, contend that while maritime security came to the forefront of Indonesian politics during the Yudhoyono administration, Widodo’s campaign platform brought maritime issues into the public discourse. Shekhar and Liow argue that Widodo’s policies are based on the premise that Indonesia’s most significant threats are maritime in nature and cannot be dealt with by a land-based military, as has been the historical focus of the Indonesian armed forces.¹

Widodo's vision is for Indonesia to become a maritime power that connects the world between the Pacific and Indian Oceans through Southeast Asia. Shekhar and Liow contend that Widodo's vision is to make Indonesia the power between Australia and Asia and between the Pacific and Indian Oceans.² Speaking at the Brookings Institution in Washington, D.C. in October 2015, Widodo said "We believe that the sea should remain as a public good. We reject any attempt by any state to control and dominate the sea and turning it into an area for strategy competition. The sea should be safe, secure, and free for sea-born trade. The sea is a source of livelihood for our people."³ In his October 2014 inauguration speech, Widodo asserted his belief that Indonesia should value the sea for its economic capacity and national strength, rather than see the sea as a disadvantage.⁴

To explain this renewed focus on maximizing Indonesia's maritime capabilities, Widodo described his vision of Indonesia as a "Global Maritime Fulcrum" (GMF) connecting the East to the West. Widodo unveiled this concept at the Ninth East Asia Summit in Myanmar in November 2014, about a month after his inauguration. At this summit, Widodo remarked at the world's center of gravity was shifting from West to East. Consequently, Widodo assessed that Asian countries were on the rise, and with waterways as the region's vital connective tissue, the importance of free and open seas would increase. The five pillars of Widodo's GMF doctrine, announced at the East Asia Summit, support and enable this transformation:

1. A revival of Indonesia's maritime culture, recognizing the link between the country's archipelagic geography, identity, and livelihood;

2. Improved management of Indonesia's oceans and fisheries through the development of the country's fishing industry and building maritime "food sovereignty" and security;
3. Boosting Indonesia's maritime economy by improving the country's port infrastructure, shipping industry, and maritime tourism;
4. Maritime diplomacy that encourages Indonesia's partners to work together to eliminate conflict arising over illegal fishing, breaches of sovereignty, territorial disputes, piracy, and environmental concerns like marine pollution; and
5. Bolstering Indonesia's maritime defenses, both to support the country's maritime sovereignty and wealth, and to fulfill its role in maintaining safety of navigation and maritime security.⁵

The GMF doctrine was designed as a unifying vision for Widodo's policies. Natalie Sambhi, an Australian researcher, wrote in the journal *Security Challenges* in 2015 that Widodo's GMF doctrine was intended to address a number of challenges, both domestic and international.⁶ Widodo views maritime development as critical to Indonesia's material advancements, through improved trade, inter-island connectivity, and safeguarding of marine resources.⁷ As a result of Widodo's GMF doctrine, a maritime focus was put on many Indonesian Government initiatives. However, GMF did not suffice in its original form.

While the GMF doctrine renewed the maritime focus of the Indonesian Government, it was never codified with a sufficient detail to enable full implementation. Sambhi asserted that without this unifying blueprint, the GMF vision would suffer as a

result of its breadth and likely not be fully implemented. Specifically, without an accompanying strategy, conceptual issues would remain unresolved, limiting Indonesia's maritime development.⁸ To advance Widodo's vision, the Indonesian Government updated the GMF doctrine to provide additional specificity and detail.

In March 2017, the Indonesian Government released its "Sea Policy." This policy is a framework designed to implement the GMF doctrine, with policy detail the initial iteration lacked. Under the Sea Policy, the GMF vision for Indonesia is a "sovereign, developed, and strong maritime state capable of positively contributing to the peace and security of the region and the world, according to its national interests."⁹ The five pillars of the 2014 GMF doctrine were expanded into seven:

1. Marine and human resource development;
2. Naval defense, maritime security, and safety at sea;
3. Ocean governance institutionalization;
4. Maritime economy, infrastructure, and welfare;
5. Environmental protection and ocean space management;
6. Nautical culture; and
7. Maritime diplomacy.¹⁰

These Sea Policy pillars are further broken down into seventy-six programs and hundreds of activities. Responsibility for these programs lies within dozens of ministries and agencies, though overall oversight and coordination is assigned to the Coordinating Ministry for Maritime Affairs.¹¹ The initiatives grouped under the Sea Policy are largely existing programs put within a new framework. Some researchers assess that the Sea Policy is a positive step but will require refinement and further development.¹²

However, the priorities highlighted by GMF and the Sea Policy are illustrative of Indonesia's maritime security concerns. One of the five GMF pillars is "maritime diplomacy." Within this pillar, Widodo expresses his intention to work with other countries to combat illegal fishing, sovereignty and border disputes, piracy, and environmental issues.¹³ Similarly, within the pillars of the Sea Policy, the same focus areas are contained within "naval defense, maritime security, and safety at sea," "ocean governance institutionalization," and "maritime diplomacy."¹⁴ These areas constitute some of Indonesia's most significant maritime security problems. Namely, IUU fishing, sovereignty and border disputes, and piracy and armed robbery are top among the Indonesian Government's priorities of effort.

Within Indonesia's maritime resurgence, a major focus is on maritime infrastructure and connectivity. These efforts aim to improve connectivity among the country's thousands of islands to develop and support commerce, access to natural resources, and tourism. These infrastructure investments consist of ports, highways, railways, and toll roads. The Indonesian Government has expressed the ambitious goal of building as many as twenty-four new ports at a cost of more than \$20 billion.¹⁵ While the impact of this infrastructure development is an important focus for Indonesia and presents some interesting challenges for the U.S., infrastructure is not the focus of this thesis. However, the risk discussion at the end of this chapter touches on risk to the U.S. associated with foreign investments in Indonesian maritime infrastructure.

The next part of this section explains why IUU fishing, unresolved borders, and maritime piracy and armed robbery are primary maritime security concerns for Indonesia. Additionally, this discussion identifies what Indonesia desires to see in these areas. This

part informs the “desired final state” of the operational design methodology described in chapter 3.

IUU fishing is an area of significant concern for Indonesia. In a 2015 interview at the Brookings Institution in Washington, D.C., Widodo stated that if his administration did not take a harder stance against IUU fishing, then “within six to seven years, there would be no more fish in our oceans. There would be no more coral, no more marine ecosystem.”¹⁶ Similarly, in a 2015 interview with CNN, Widodo stated that every day, 90 percent of the 5,000-7,000 boats in Indonesian waters are fishing illegally.¹⁷ These statements demonstrate why Widodo has adopted a zero-tolerance approach to IUU fishing and underscore the serious impacts to Indonesia’s economy and food security.

IUU fishing is a term that covers a breadth of activities in coastal waters, on the high seas, and by domestic and foreign vessels. Appendix A contains a more thorough explanation of the specific activities that comprise IUU fishing. Estimates for the impact of IUU fishing vary widely, but it is generally considered to be around 20 percent of the annual global catch. A 2009 study estimated the impact to be \$10-\$23.5 billion, while a 2016 Interpol and UN study estimated the losses to be \$11-\$30 billion.¹⁸ However, IUU fishing consists of illicit activities beyond the catching of fish. Related problems include vessel registration, port inspections, and seafood sales. These problems exist throughout the worldwide seafood supply chain.¹⁹ Because the impact of IUU fishing is global and happens across and beyond myriad jurisdictions, no one country alone can defeat the problem.

IUU fishing is often seen as a regulatory problem. This view is very near-sighted and fails to capture the true impacts and effects of IUU fishing. Cathy Haenlein, in a

journal article written for the Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies in July 2017, asserts that IUU fishing is a type of transnational organized crime.²⁰ Haenlein writes in her article specifically about high-volume IUU fishing, which constitutes a major portion of the problem about which Indonesia is concerned. IUU fishing has not yet been designated by the United Nations (UN) as a type of transnational organized crime, though lobbying initiatives in favor of this designation are underway.

The Indonesian Government's view of IUU fishing as a transnational crime is in line with the reasoning in Haenlein's article. At the 2016 Interpol General Assembly, held in Bali, Indonesia, the Indonesian Vice President, Muhammad Jusuf Kalla spoke on behalf of Widodo. Referring to IUU fishing, Kalla stated that the practice already met the UN's criteria for a transnational crime, as codified in the *United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime*. Specifically, Kalla stated that IUU fishing is closely related to smuggling, trafficking, forced labor, and environmental damage. For these reasons, and others, Indonesia believes IUU fishing should be approached more holistically, with additional emphasis on law enforcement and security. In these remarks, Indonesia vouches for closer cooperation with international law enforcement organizations, such as Interpol, to increase collective efforts to combat IUU fishing.²¹ However, Indonesia believes IUU fishing is not a solitary crime.

High-volume IUU fishing often exists in concert with transnational organized crime, such as smuggling of illicit commodities, trafficking, money laundering, and forced labor.²² Further, IUU fishing causes significant threats to food security, as the vessels deplete the ocean stocks on which affected nations rely. Complicating the response, affected nations are limited in their legal and regulatory enforcement

capabilities against illegal vessels.²³ The strong connection between IUU fishing and other crimes is a key reason Indonesia and other nations in Southeast Asia are so concerned about IUU fishing. In addition to the impacts on food security, IUU fishing reduces government revenues, as governments cannot collect taxes and other types of fees on the catches.²⁴ These financial losses are significant.

As discussed above, estimates of the global financial impacts of IUU fishing vary widely. Consensus over Indonesia's financial losses is no exception. A 2015 report from the Indonesian Ministry of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries estimated that 670,000 tons of seafood are poached from Indonesian waters annually. Numerical estimates for the impact range from \$672 million to \$25 billion annually.²⁵ Although accurate statistics on IUU fishing are hard to attain, all studies indicate that IUU fishing causes significant impacts on food security, tax revenue, and criminal activity.

Many of the vessels conducting IUU fishing within Indonesian waters come from foreign countries, including China. Illegal Chinese vessels present particularly challenging problems for Indonesia because some are state-sponsored. For example, Chinese paramilitary vessels have harassed Indonesian vessels confronting illegal Chinese boats operating near Indonesia's Natuna Islands in the southwest SCS.²⁶ This state support for IUU fishing in Indonesian waters complicates Indonesia's efforts to combat both IUU fishing and Chinese expansion.

Consequently, the problems associated with IUU fishing are significant for Indonesia and were at the forefront of Widodo's policies following his inauguration in October 2014. In support of this thesis's operational design methodology, Indonesia's desired end state for IUU fishing is eradication. As IUU fishing is an extensive problem

and hard to quantify, complete eradication is a lofty goal. Nonetheless, Indonesia is taking a strong stand. Section two of this chapter addresses the Widodo Administration's actions to combat IUU fishing.

Another major maritime security concern for Indonesia is unresolved borders, both land and maritime. As this thesis focuses on maritime security issues, Indonesian land borders are not a focus of this analysis; however, the preponderance of Indonesia's borders are maritime. Indonesia has ten maritime boundaries, the most of any country in the world. Indonesia borders, in alphabetical order, Australia, India, Malaysia, Palau, Papua New Guinea, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Timor-Leste, and Vietnam.²⁷ There are three types of maritime borders: territorial seas, exclusive economic zones, and continental shelf. However, the specific characteristics of these boundaries is beyond the scope of this thesis. The following discussion focuses on maritime borders more generally. As of 2010, Indonesia had forty-six pending maritime boundary lines, comprised of eleven territorial seas segments, fifteen EEZ boundaries, and fifteen continental shelf boundaries.²⁸ Including a 2017 agreement with Singapore, Indonesia has twenty maritime border agreements with eight of its ten neighboring states. The only neighboring states with whom Indonesia does not have maritime border agreements are Palau and Timor-Leste. Most of Indonesia's border agreements resolve continental shelf and territorial waters, and of the pending disputes are over the extent of exclusive economic zones.²⁹

Indonesia is dedicated to resolving its maritime borders because it is through these borders that Indonesia has the authority to enforce national and international law. Before a declaration by then-Prime Minister Djuanda Kartawidjaja in 1957, Indonesia drew

baselines around each of its more than 17,500 islands. Between the islands, the waters were considered international, depriving Indonesia of a legal basis to enforce laws and regulations. With the “Djuanda Declaration” in December 1957, Indonesia redrew its waters with straight baselines between the outermost islands. This significant change united the waters inside the baselines, enabling Indonesia to exert sovereignty and control over activities on its seas. Over the next two decades, Indonesia had a very active maritime border diplomacy policy, as border agreements were negotiated with many of its neighbors. Indonesia’s straight baselines and other maritime claims were codified internationally through the *United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea* (UNCLOS), developed in 1982 and ratified by Indonesia in 1985. Indonesia maintains maritime border diplomacy as a key component of its contemporary foreign policy.³⁰

Respect for the sanctity of UNCLOS is another reason Indonesia is concerned about border delimitation and security. UNCLOS recognizes Indonesia as an archipelagic state. As mentioned in the previous paragraph, UNCLOS permits archipelagic states to draw straight baselines joining the outermost points of the outermost islands.³¹ Baselines drawn in this manner yield a much simpler and larger exclusive economic zone (EEZ), compared to baselines drawn around individual land features. Ristian Atriando Supriyanto, writing for the journal *Asia Policy* in 2016, argues that China’s NDL claims threaten the rights granted by UNCLOS.³² China’s claims threaten UNCLOS because they do not conform with the baseline and EEZ policies and guidance that are critical to the UNCLOS agreement. Therefore, Indonesia fears that if China can realize its expansive EEZ claim, then the integrity of UNCLOS would be at risk, threatening Indonesia’s EEZ claims and the resultant benefits.

With over 17,500 islands and whose area, including EEZ, is two-thirds water, Indonesia has many maritime borders with which it must contend. As discussed previously, China's policies in the South China Sea, specifically its land reclamation and claimed EEZ, have led to disputes throughout the region. Indonesia has officially remained a non-claimant in the SCS dispute. However, Widodo realizes that Indonesia is not invulnerable to the effects of China's expansionist policies and tendencies. Indonesia's most significant maritime concerns exist with its most-outlying islands, the Natuna Islands, on the edge of the SCS, and the Merauke territories, at Indonesia's eastern extreme.³³ There are two principal reasons the Natuna Islands are so important to Indonesia. First, the EEZ around the Natuna Islands contains what is potentially the largest natural gas reserve in Asia. The East Natuna Block gas field, which has not been developed, is believed to contain forty-six trillion cubic feet of natural gas. Second, the seas surrounding the Natuna Islands are very productive fisheries but are vulnerable to IUU fishing.³⁴ China's NDL overlaps with Indonesia's claimed EEZ around the Natuna Islands; this overlap is discussed in section two of this chapter. Sambhi contends the Indonesian approach to the Natuna Islands presents an inherent conflict with the GMF doctrine. Indonesian foreign policy generally, including GMF, professes a desire to remain neutral. However, Chinese action in the SCS in general, and around the Natuna Islands in particular, requires an appropriate response from Indonesia, one that likely consists of a more muscular defense.³⁵ Rising tensions in the SCS could also force Indonesia to take sides in a major power standoff. Supriyanto argues this risk could put Indonesia in conflict with its non-aligned foreign policy. A key tenet of Indonesia's foreign policy is to maintain good relations with China and the U.S. However, the

Indonesian Government views the two countries as both contributing to rising regional tensions.³⁶

Besides the disputes over China's excessive EEZ claims in the SCS, Indonesia has pending border disputes with at least six of its neighbors. While an in-depth account of these pending disputes is beyond the scope of this thesis, some examples are relevant to provide context to this analysis. In 2015, Indonesia entered negotiations with Timor-Leste to resolve maritime borders at points of intersection in the Ombai Strait, Wetar Strait, and the Timor Sea.³⁷ Additionally, Australia and Indonesia signed the Perth Treaty in 1997, delineating the maritime boundary and EEZ as the midline between the two countries. However, seabed resource rights in this border region are based on the extent of the continental shelf, as codified in agreements from the early 1970s. Between Indonesia and Australia, the continental shelf extends north of the median line. Consequently, these overlapping boundaries give Australia more area for seabed mining and exploration and give Indonesia more water for fishing. Indonesia never ratified the Perth Treaty, so it is not officially in force, though both countries abide by its requirements.³⁸ The Yudhoyono administration resolved a border dispute between Indonesia and the Philippines in May 2014 which had been pending for over twenty years.³⁹ Section two of this chapter discusses how Indonesia uses its national power to resolve border disputes. However, Indonesia is very protective of its sovereignty, given the massive challenge of securing the more than 17,500 islands in its archipelago.⁴⁰

Consequently, unresolved border disputes are a primary concern for Indonesia. In support of this thesis's operational design methodology, Indonesia's desired final state for its maritime borders is to fully delimit all unresolved borders. This objective requires

Indonesia to work with many countries, including China. However, resolution of its border disputes is a major priority of the Widodo administration.

The third primary maritime security problem Indonesia faces is maritime piracy and armed robbery. These illicit activities run counter to Indonesia's vision and goals for law-abiding, safe use of the oceans. Piracy and armed robbery are transnational crimes. Consequently, Indonesia's efforts to eradicate these acts are, in many ways, related to its efforts to combat IUU fishing, which is approached as a transnational crime. UNCLOS Article 101, "Definition of Piracy," defines maritime piracy.⁴¹ The International Maritime Organization defines maritime armed robbery in Resolution A.1025(26), "Code of Practice for the Investigation of Crimes of Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships."⁴² Complete definitions of piracy and armed robbery are in Appendix A, but they are similar acts of illegal aggression against vessels. The primary delineation between the two is location: piracy occurs on the high seas, while armed robbery occurs within a state's internal waters, archipelagic waters, or territorial seas.

Several organizations track statistics on maritime piracy and armed robbery in the Indo-Pacific. One of the principal tracking organizations is the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP), formed in 2006. This organization is comprised of twenty contracting party nations, not including Indonesia, and seven partnered international organizations. Through its Information Sharing Center in Singapore, ReCAAP tracks and reports on maritime piracy and armed robbery incidents in Asia. According to ReCAAP's 2017 annual report, there were 101 incidents of piracy in Asia, a 19 percent increase from 2016. Of these 101 incidents, there were 89 actual incidents and twelve attempted incidents. Two-thirds of

the incidents were in port or at anchor and one-third were underway.⁴³ Indonesian waters accounted for a plurality of the incidents in 2016 and 2017. In 2016, Indonesia had thirty-two incidents; in 2017, Indonesia had thirty-three incidents.⁴⁴ ReCAAP assesses that Indonesia's 2017 piracy and robbery numbers were the lowest in a five-year period, less 2015 and 2016. Thirty of Indonesia's incidents were in port or at anchor, while three were underway. Only one incident met ReCAAP's highest level of severity categorization.⁴⁵ However, characterization of incidents specifically in Indonesian waters paints an incomplete picture. Piracy and robbery incidents across Southeast Asia are all part of the same larger problem. The ReCAAP report tracks data in locations such as the South China Sea, with five incidents in 2016 and twelve in 2017, and the Straits of Malacca and Singapore, with two incidents in 2016 and nine in 2017.⁴⁶ Piracy and armed robbery are problems through Southeast Asia; this transnational crime does not respect international borders or boundaries.

Piracy and armed robbery are especially problematic in the tri-border region of the Sulu Sea and Celebes Sea. This region, in Indonesia's northern central region, is also bounded by Malaysia and the Philippines. Covering 620,000 square miles, the Indonesian Foreign Ministry reported in 2015 that Sulu and Celebes Sea saw more than 100,000 ships, 55 million metric tons of cargo, and more than 18 million passengers.⁴⁷ Prashanth Parameswaran, writing for *The Diplomat* in June 2016, cites the Sulu and Celebes Seas region as an often-neglected region, relative to the SCS and the Straits of Malacca and Singapore. However, Parameswaran contends that the Sulu-Celebes area presents significant security problems, with great opportunities. This area is a good encapsulation of the myriad problems in Southeast Asia, given the porous borders, weak governance,

rising crime, and poverty. A series of maritime kidnappings for ransom, starting in early 2016, brought the Sulu-Celebes region back into the limelight, offering new opportunities for cooperation to address the relevant problems.⁴⁸ Jacqueline Espenilla, writing for *The Diplomat* in May 2016, contends this region has largely been overlooked by policymakers seeking to avoid contentious issues of borders and sovereignty in this porous area.⁴⁹ For 2017, ReCAAP reported three actual and four attempted incidents of crew abductions in the Sulu-Celebes Sea area. Between March 2016 and December 2017, fifty-nine crewmembers were abducted. As of December 2017, twenty-eight of these crewmembers were released, fifteen were rescued, seven were killed, and nine remained in captivity.⁵⁰ Consequently, the Sulu-Celebes region is a major focal point for Indonesian efforts to counter maritime piracy and armed robbery.

These criminal actions are in opposition to Indonesia's vision for safe and productive waterways. Throughout its expansive archipelago, Indonesia faces piracy and armed robbery problems, which flaunt the rule of law and waste precious resources. Therefore, combating this problem is critical to Indonesia's efforts to improve its maritime security. In support of the operational design methodology, Indonesia's desired final state for piracy and armed robbery, like its goals for IUU fishing, is eradication.

The Indonesian Government does not apply a time-phased approach to these three maritime security problem areas. Specifically, there are no metrics for a certain reduction in maritime crime by a particular point in time, as no academic literature or government materials support Indonesian acceptance of lower objectives. Rather, the government aims to reduce maritime crime in pursuit of eventual eradication. For example, Widodo frequently speaks of Indonesia's efforts against IUU fishing as a war.⁵¹ This metaphor

highlights the expanse of the problem. This same principle applies to resolution of Indonesia's maritime borders, where its goal is to delimit all borders. To reach these desired final conditions, Indonesia uses its suite of instruments of national power.

Section 2: Indonesia's Maritime Security Condition and Actions

The Widodo view of Indonesia as a global maritime fulcrum is a powerful motivator around which the Indonesian Government and people rally. However, the three maritime security problems identified in this chapter introduce risk to Indonesia's maritime prosperity. To combat these problems, Indonesia applies its instruments of national power in myriad ways. This second section explores this application of national power against each of the three problems. Specifically, this section seeks to understand how Indonesia uses diplomacy, information, military power, and economics to combat IUU fishing, unresolved borders, and maritime piracy and armed robbery. This section informs the "current state" component of the operational design methodology.

IUU Fishing—Diplomatic Instrument of National Power

As discussed in the previous section, IUU fishing is a primary maritime security concern for Indonesia. In line with Indonesia's preferred approach to most disputes, diplomacy is a principal tool. One multilateral approach to defeat IUU fishing is the "Agreement on Port State Measures to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing," more commonly known as the Port State Measures Agreement (PSMA). This agreement, sponsored by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), is an initiative designed to close avenues that support and facilitate IUU fishing. Indonesia is one of 53 parties to PSMA, which was approved in

2009 and entered into force on 5 June 2016.⁵² PSMA levies pre-arrival notification requirements on fishing vessels and enables local officials to inspect foreign-flagged vessels suspected of IUU fishing. Before PSMA was in force, port states were more limited on the actions they could take against foreign-flagged vessels.⁵³ Haenlein contends that PSMA is a “significant initiative” to end IUU fishing.⁵⁴ This program is one part of Indonesia’s diplomatic efforts against IUU fishing.

Additionally, Indonesia lobbies the United Nations to designate IUU fishing as a transnational organized crime under the *United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime*. As discussed above, IUU fishing facilitates many established components of transnational organized crime. In numerous forums, both Widodo and the Indonesian Minister for Maritime and Fisheries Affairs, Susi Pudjiastuti, have expressed their goal to make this change. Designation of IUU fishing as a transnational organized crime would enable a more robust law enforcement response by affected states. Specifically, with IUU fishing classified as transnational organized crime, international organizations such as Interpol and the UN Office on Drugs and Crime could wield additional enforcement powers to combat the problem.⁵⁵

Besides lobbying international organizations, Indonesia also works with its neighbors to combat IUU fishing. For example, in February 2018, Indonesia and Australia signed a Joint Declaration on Maritime Cooperation. Part of this agreement is a commitment to work together to combat IUU fishing and other maritime crimes.⁵⁶ Diplomacy is a key tool to fight IUU fishing, but it is only part of a larger approach.

IUU Fishing—Information Instrument of National Power

Indonesia uses the information instrument of national power to combat IUU fishing in several key ways. Indonesia's general approach is to ensure its intolerance for IUU fishing is well-known. The goal of this publicity and information promulgation is to ensure those who consider conducting IUU fishing are aware of the risks and to gain domestic and regional support to counter this illicit activity. In numerous speeches and events abroad, Widodo and his cabinet ministers routinely talk about the problems of, and need for solutions to, IUU fishing.⁵⁷ With IUU fishing as a frequent discussion point, Indonesian leaders gain international support to counter IUU fishing and deter regional countries from fishing illicitly in Indonesian waters. However, Jakarta also takes more proactive and visible measures.

Widodo and his advisors assessed that a more proactive approach was necessary to counter IUU fishing, as more passive measures in the past had not worked well. Consequently, Indonesia has taken a strong stand against vessels found to be fishing illegally in Indonesian waters since the early days of Widodo's presidential term. A policy referred to as "sink the vessels" is a principal part of this more-aggressive approach.⁵⁸ Under this policy, Indonesia has publicly blown up, or sunk through other means, captured foreign vessels found to be fishing illegally. This policy is designed to send strong messages to other countries in the region that Indonesia takes IUU fishing seriously.⁵⁹ Speaking with CNN in 2015, Widodo firmly defended Indonesia's right to blow up foreign vessels, citing the significant damage to the Indonesian economy and food security caused by their illegal actions.⁶⁰ This policy has extended to Chinese vessels, as well, though not to the same extent as other countries. Gindarsah and

Priamarizki, writing for RSIS in 2015, state that Indonesia cancelled Chinese fishing company privileges to operate in Indonesian waters.⁶¹ In May 2015, Indonesia sank a Chinese fishing vessel alongside with forty other seized boats.⁶² This aggressive government policy sank over four hundred boats in 2017 alone.⁶³

Indonesia has had some success through this sinking policy and other initiatives. In October 2017, Pudjiastuti stated that annual fisheries production had doubled, from six million to twelve million pounds. Sinkings, however, are not the only informational methods Indonesia has used to combat IUU fishing. Some vessels have been displayed for the public as museums.⁶⁴ The information instrument of national power is important to Indonesian efforts against IUU fishing and is complementary to other efforts.

IUU Fishing—Military Instrument of National Power

The Indonesian use of military power to conduct maritime law enforcement activities is different than that permitted in the United States. Specifically, Indonesian Law 34/2004 codifies that part of the mission of the Navy, or *Tentara Nasional Indonesia-Angkatan Laut* (TNI-AL) includes law and security enforcement within Indonesian waters. TNI-AL's operational doctrine includes maritime security as a key task in addition to more traditional naval defense operations.⁶⁵ Therefore, as TNI-AL plays a significant role in maritime security and law enforcement, it is relevant to discuss Indonesia's maritime law enforcement capabilities and problems in the context of the military instrument of national power.⁶⁶ Many of the issues discussed in this part are germane to the following analyses of unresolved borders and maritime piracy and armed robbery.

Reorganization of Indonesia's maritime security and law enforcement capabilities was a key part of the 2014 GMF implementation. Widodo created the National Maritime Security Agency, commonly referred to by its Indonesian acronym BAKAMLA, which stands for *Bedan Keamanan Laut*. BAKAMLA replaced the Coordinating Maritime Security Agency, known as BAKORKAMLA, or *Bedan Koordinasi Keamanana Laut*. This reorganization was designed to streamline maritime security efforts and create efficiency. Sambhi, writing in 2015, states that BAKAMLA, a civilian organization, was given responsibility for conducting safety and security patrols within Indonesia's territorial waters and jurisdictional areas. BAKAMLA is designed to be more powerful than BAKORKAMLA, with more authority and plans for a larger staff and a larger fleet. However, BAKAMLA's authority for maritime security is not absolute; its responsibilities overlap with other agencies and institutions.⁶⁷ Parameswaran, writing for *The Diplomat* in April 2017, asserts BAKAMLA was envisioned to be a Coast Guard-like agency. However, Parameswaran cites Luh Binsar Pandjaitan, Indonesia's Coordinating Minister for Maritime Affairs, as saying that the vision of BAKAMLA becoming a true coast guard was still a "dream," as Jakarta continued to face significant problems with maritime coordination.⁶⁸ BAKAMLA's fleet, despite plans for its size to increase, remains woefully inadequate to police the vast waters of Indonesia.⁶⁹ These problems with BAKAMLA are just a few of Indonesia's many maritime security authority and coordination problems.

Indonesia has a dozen different agencies and institutions with responsibility for maritime security and law enforcement. These agencies include TNI-AL, the Transportation Ministry, and the Maritime Affairs and Fisheries Ministry. Widodo

created BAKAMLA in part to combat infighting and entrenched interests among these groups. In addition to BAKAMLA, Widodo also created a Coordinating Minister for Maritime Affairs.⁷⁰ Despite Indonesia's efforts to streamline its maritime security capabilities, Muhamad Arif and Yandry Krniawan, writing in *Asia & The Pacific Policy Studies* in 2017, contend that TNI-AL is reluctant to give up its domestic security role to focus on traditional naval defense. Consequently, the agencies responsible for maritime security and law enforcement have a confusing combination of overlapping roles and responsibilities, resulting in reduced efficiency and effectiveness.⁷¹

Due in part to these problems, Indonesia has problems policing its waters to enforce its laws and regulations. Although BAKAMLA is envisioned as a Coast Guard-like agency, and is even referred to as the Coast Guard, it remains under-resourced and under-staffed. Consequently, Indonesia's ability to truly tackle the IUU fishing problem is hampered due to limited patrolling and maritime domain awareness (MDA) capabilities. Indonesia recognizes the problem with MDA, as the 2015 *Defence White Paper* often mentions the need for improved satellite and drone reconnaissance capabilities.⁷² While the *Defence White Paper* discusses MDA capabilities in the general context of maritime defense, these capabilities are relevant to Indonesia's broader ability to understand and control its waters.

Indonesia implements its efforts to combat IUU fishing through an amalgam of agencies and organizations. With limited resourcing, Widodo's vision of reforming the Indonesian maritime law enforcement and security organization has yet to reach maturity. Consequently, this implementation of national power remains underdeveloped.

IUU Fishing—Economic Instrument of National Power

Part of Indonesia's efforts to convince the UN to declare IUU fishing transnational organized crime is to give muscle to economic measures. Haenlein contends this official designation would enable affected countries, such as Indonesia, to pursue money laundering and tax fraud crimes associated with IUU fishing. A more robust and coordinated international response would be able to "follow the money" better than any one country working by itself.⁷³ Otherwise, the economic instrument of national power is not as prominent in Indonesia's fight against IUU fishing as are its other instruments.

Unresolved Borders—Diplomatic Instrument of National Power

Bilateral and multilateral negotiations are the principal tool Indonesia uses to resolve its border disputes. Indonesia has a long history of using diplomatic agreements to resolve its borders, dating back to the decades following the 1957 Djuanda Declaration. Indonesia's Foreign Minister, Retno L.P. Marsudi, in her 2018 annual press statement, stated that Indonesia conducted thirty-five boundary demarcation negotiations in 2017. Of these negotiations, eleven were related to maritime borders, nineteen to land borders, and five with Malaysia.⁷⁴ Border delimitation negotiations is a primary focus of Indonesia's foreign ministry.⁷⁵

One of Indonesia's most publicized moves in 2017 was the July designation of the EEZ surrounding the Natuna Islands as the "North Natuna Sea." This designation is Indonesia's most direct affront to China's NDL claim thus far. Many analysts see this move as an assertion of Indonesian sovereignty. However, despite the name change, Indonesia remains a non-claimant in the SCS dispute.⁷⁶ During Secretary of Defense Mattis's visit to Indonesia in January 2018, the United States recognized the North

Natuna Sea declaration, a sign of staunch support for Indonesia's territorial and sovereignty claims.⁷⁷

In February 2017, Indonesia and Singapore ratified their third border treaty. This treaty delimits the maritime boundary in the eastern Strait of Singapore and completes the Indonesia-Singapore border, less an area shared trilaterally with Malaysia.⁷⁸ As mentioned early in the first section, Indonesia and the Philippines resolved a border dispute in May 2014 following twenty years of negotiations. This agreement resolved an EEZ dispute in the Celebes Sea, in northern central Indonesia and the southern Philippines.⁷⁹ Moreover, these treaties are part of the twenty agreements Indonesia has with its neighbors. This extensive portfolio and the ongoing negotiations are clear indications of Indonesia's dedication to diplomatic resolution of its maritime borders.

Unresolved Borders—Information Instrument of National Power

To resolve its borders, Indonesia uses the information instrument of national power to support its diplomatic efforts. For example, Indonesian leadership advocates its position and interests in myriad international forums. This tactic is similar to parts of the informational approach to IUU fishing. By frequently speaking about border issues, the Indonesian Government ensures its neighbors understand Indonesia's positions and desires for peaceful border resolution. Additionally, Indonesia's North Natuna Sea declaration shows use of the information instrument of national power to complement its diplomatic efforts. By renaming these waters and demarcating its EEZ more clearly, Indonesia stakes out a more forceful position relative to China's NDL claims. Indonesia uses this declaration to convey its sovereign territorial claims, which it codifies legally through diplomatic efforts. Parameswaran, writing for *The Diplomat* soon after

Indonesia's announcement in July 2017, contends the North Natuna Sea designation shows Indonesia does not recognize China's NDL claim. This declaration, Parameswaran continues, is in line with actions by other countries in the region. Specifically, the SCS is referred to by the Philippines as the "West Philippine Sea" and by Vietnam as the "East Sea."⁸⁰ These examples show Indonesia uses information to ensure its neighbors understand its positions and claims; these declarations complement diplomatic efforts aimed at permanent claims resolution.

Unresolved Borders—Military Instrument of National Power

As previously discussed, Indonesia's broad approach to resolution of its border disputes aims to avoid use of military force. Maintenance of sovereignty is a key tenet of Indonesian policy and Naval power is Indonesia's final guarantor of its sovereignty and border claims. However, TNI-AL is a weak power compared to its regional neighbors, such as Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam. This relatively weak Navy inhibits Indonesia's ability to patrol its waters to enforce its borders and protect against traditional and non-traditional threats.⁸¹

To improve Indonesia's naval capabilities, the Yudhoyono administration initiated a twenty-year procurement program in 2004 called "Minimum Essential Force," or MEF. MEF is an ambitious blueprint from 2005-2024 to increase the size of TNI-AL to 274 ships with diverse capabilities deployed in five fleets. To support this ship modernization and build-up, the MEF plan includes weapons procurement and improvements to the indigenous defense industry, including shipbuilding.⁸² The Navy's role, even under MEF, retains its maritime security responsibilities in addition to traditional defense operations.⁸³ Although MEF started under Yudhoyono in 2004, the

Widodo administration has continued the program. As part of his broad maritime rejuvenation, Widodo promised to raise defense spending to 1.5 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) from its historical level of less than 1 percent annually. From 2001 to 2013, Indonesia's defense budget nearly quadrupled, though it still lags many of its regional neighbors which spend over 2 percent of GDP on defense.⁸⁴ Despite Widodo's election promise of an increase in defense spending, the defense budget remained under 1 percent of GDP through 2016, according to the latest data available from the World Bank.⁸⁵

In addition to its buildup of its naval forces, Indonesia is also building up its forward naval bases, including construction of a base on the Natuna Islands. The distance from TNI-AL's primary naval bases complicates Indonesia's protection of its distant maritime borders and enforcement of other laws and regulations in the Natuna region. With forward basing in the Natuna Islands, Indonesia is better able to enforce its borders, address maritime security problems, and protect resources, such as natural gas claims, within its EEZ.⁸⁶

Unresolved Borders—Economic Instrument of National Power

The economic instrument of national power is not a primary tool for Indonesia to resolve its borders, though delimitation of its borders is indelibly tied to Indonesia's economic progress. A growing Indonesian economy is necessary to fund the organizational and equipment changes discussed above. The EEZ around the Natuna Islands holds one of the largest undeveloped natural gas reserves in the world. Within its resolved borders, Indonesia can enforce and collect taxes and fees from other commercial operations like fishing and hydrocarbon extraction. Therefore, Indonesia desires

resolution of its borders to supports its economic development, though the economic instrument of national power itself is not a primary tool use to delimit unresolved borders.

Maritime Piracy and Armed Robbery—Diplomatic Instrument of National Power

To combat maritime piracy and armed robbery, Indonesia uses the diplomatic instrument of national power to foster cooperation with and gain support from other countries. In her 2018 annual press statement, Indonesian Foreign Minister Marsudi cited diplomacy as a principal tool to fight transnational crime.⁸⁷ However, Gindarsah and Priamarizki argue Indonesia largely views the issue of maritime piracy as domestic. Consequently, Indonesia has been hesitant to join non-ASEAN multilateral counter-piracy efforts. Although Indonesia is not one of ReCAAP's twenty member-nations, Indonesia does contribute to other similar multilateral organizations, such as the Information Fusion Centre, discussed below. Additionally, Indonesia uses its diplomatic tools to organize and coordinate efforts such as the Sulu Sea and Celebes Sea trilateral patrols, also discussed below. While Indonesia uses diplomacy to develop consensus and gain support for its efforts against maritime piracy and armed robbery, diplomacy is not Indonesia's primary instrument of national power.

Maritime Piracy and Armed Robbery—Information Instrument of National Power

Indonesia's approach to maritime piracy and armed robbery through the information instrument of national power is very similar to its use of information to combat IUU fishing and unresolved borders. Namely, Indonesia uses information to

express its positions and garner support for diplomatic and multinational efforts. For example, Indonesia widely publicized the trilateral Sulu and Celebes Sea patrols, discussed in the next section, to gain popular support and to create a deterrent effect. Additionally, Indonesia is a contributor to the Information Fusion Centre hosted by the Republic of Singapore Navy.⁸⁸ This organization, established in 2009 and located at Changi Naval Base, strives to develop and share a common Southeast Asia maritime security picture; piracy and fisheries crimes are issues central the Information Fusion Centre's mission. As one of twenty-three contributors, Indonesia shares and receives information to track and combat at-sea incidents and crime.⁸⁹ With its robust efforts to promulgate its positions against this illicit activity, Indonesia uses information to support and enable its other instruments of national power.

Maritime Piracy and Armed Robbery—Military Instrument of National Power

The Sulu and Celebes Seas are among the most dangerous areas in the world for maritime piracy and armed robbery. To counter these problems, and specifically in response to the maritime kidnapping events discussed above, Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines agreed to trilateral counter-piracy patrols in May 2016. These patrols, referred to as INDOMALPHI, are part of a larger multilateral effort to combat crime in the region. Other measures include coordination centers and communications hotlines.⁹⁰ The INDOMALPHI patrols began in mid-2017, with three maritime command centers established on the western side of the Celebes Sea in the Philippines, Malaysia, and Indonesia, as well as a joint operations center.⁹¹ Parameswaran asserts that the INDOMALPHI patrols, comprised of both maritime and air components, are a positive

step to address the security issues in the Sulu-Celebes region.⁹² ReCAAP cites these patrols as a positive measure to combat the regional piracy and abduction problem, though work on trilateral procedural development and implementation continue.⁹³ The U.S., thus far, has not been involved in these patrols. During his January 2018 visit to Indonesia, Secretary of Defense Mattis commended Indonesia for the trilateral effort and pledged U.S. assistance in areas such as maritime domain awareness, education, and training.⁹⁴

A March 2017 report from the DOD-sponsored Daniel K. Inouye Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, in partnership with King's College London, titled "The Indo-Asia-Pacific's Maritime Future: A Practical Assessment of the State of Asian Seas" studied maritime piracy, among other issues. This report, based on information from the International Maritime Bureau, contends that local law enforcement agencies in the Indo-Pacific region are best-suited to address piracy and armed robbery. However, this report contends that many countries lack the material capacity to adequately address piracy and armed robbery. Therefore, multilateral cooperation is a positive means to combat these problems.⁹⁵ Multilateral cooperation enhances Indonesia's approach to combating maritime piracy and armed robbery through the military instrument of national power. However, the problems with maritime security coordination discussed above are germane to these efforts; Indonesia remains limited in its ability to combat illicit activity at sea.

Maritime Piracy and Armed Robbery—Economic Instrument of National Power

Similar to the above discussion about unresolved borders, the economic instrument of national power is not a primary tool Indonesia uses to combat maritime piracy and armed robbery. A robust economy provides funding to support these counter-piracy measures and reducing maritime crime helps to advance Indonesia's economy. However, economic measures are not a primary tool to combat this illicit activity.

Conclusion

This section has illustrated how Indonesia uses its instruments of national power to resolve three of its maritime security problems. As this section has shown, it is difficult to draw accurate assessments of Indonesia's progress combating illicit fishing and maritime piracy and armed robbery. It is easier to understand the status of maritime border delimitation. However, the discussion in this section has demonstrated the thorough approach Indonesia uses to combat these problems.

Through its robust approach against IUU fishing and maritime piracy and armed robbery, Indonesia has made progress; however, much work remains to eradicate these illicit activities. Despite the focus by Indonesia and its neighbors, accurate statistical data on these problems is difficult to acquire, as their true scope is hard to quantify. Hanelein asserts there are numerous difficulties in calculating the impact of IUU fishing, as it is a broad problem conducted via many methods across multiple jurisdictions.⁹⁶ For example, accepted estimates of the financial impact of IUU fishing vary over 150 percent. Accurate statistics on piracy and armed robbery incidents are also hard to gather. While ReCAAP and other regional organizations closely track piracy and related problems, these

organizations are limited by the information they receive. ReCAAP, for example, reported incidents in its 2017 annual report that were on the International Maritime Organization's list of incidents but were not reported to ReCAAP. Therefore, although it is difficult to garner accurate assessments of progress against these problems, this section has shown that Indonesia uses an array of instruments to combat IUU fishing and maritime piracy and armed robbery.

Indonesia's unresolved maritime borders do not suffer from a lack of statistical fidelity, but statistics about border disputes are less important than for illicit activity. To delimit its borders, Indonesia relies on all its instruments of national power, with primary emphasis on diplomacy. The other instruments of national power support and reinforce diplomatic efforts. Given the success in recent years, with the 2014 Philippines agreement and the 2017 Singapore agreement, Indonesia's robust series of negotiations in 2017 should be a launchpad to resolve its pending disputes and disagreements. However, border negotiations tend to be long processes, so Indonesia must continue to work with its neighbors to find mutually acceptable solutions.

In support of the operational design methodology, this section informs the "current state" of Indonesia's maritime security. Despite the assessment limitations discussed above, this section shows how Indonesia uses its instruments of national power to address its primary maritime security problems and concerns. This robust array of actions illustrates Indonesia's belief in using broad governmental approaches rather than focusing on any specific instrument.

Section 3: Indonesia's Maritime Security Gaps

This third section of chapter 2 analyzes the first two sections to identify problems, or gaps, in Indonesia's approach to solving its maritime security problems. Like the previous sections, which focused specifically on Indonesia's condition and actions, this section is not informed by U.S. engagement with Indonesia. In support of the operational design methodology, the gaps identified in this section inform the recommended solutions in section five. This section synthesizes information from the previous two sections; consequently, this section is not organized by either the instruments of national power or by the three primary maritime security problems. Rather, the gaps identified in this section apply to one or more of the primary maritime security problems. To maximize the value of the U.S. contribution to Indonesian maritime security, this synthesis approach enables the solutions in section five to require one or more instruments of national power to solve maritime security gaps that apply to multiple problems. The gaps in this section are ones with which the U.S. can assist, not gaps that are domestically-focused. For example, the Indonesian approach to resolving its maritime borders, primarily through diplomatic efforts, is successful and productive. The U.S. cannot add much value to these diplomatic efforts. However, there are other areas in which the U.S. can help to improve Indonesia's maritime security situation.

The common thread across Indonesia's approach to maritime security is the vastness of its archipelago. With over 17,500 islands and five million square miles of maritime area, the problem of understanding what activities, illicit or otherwise, are occurring at sea is staggeringly difficult. Further, influencing and controlling those activities presents an even larger challenge. Although Indonesia has the largest economy

in Southeast Asia, it still has a relatively limited maritime capability, in both TNI-AL and its civilian law enforcement agencies. These problems are known to Indonesia; in fact, these problems are foundational to the genesis of Widodo's GMF doctrine. Widodo's understanding of the limitations of Indonesia's maritime capabilities drive his focus on rejuvenating Indonesia's maritime culture and identity.

One of Indonesia's maritime security gaps is maritime patrolling capability and maritime security organization and structure. As previously discussed, Widodo created BAKAMLA to become a Coast Guard and synchronize many of Indonesia's maritime security responsibilities and requirements. However, this vision has not been realized, as the delineation of responsibilities across the dozen agencies responsible for maritime security overlaps and remains poorly defined. Additionally, TNI-AL still plays a significant role in enforcing maritime law, which detracts from the Navy's conventional military role. A critical component of this gap is Indonesia's maritime domain awareness (MDA) capability. MDA is understanding activities occurring at sea. Indonesia's maritime domain awareness capabilities remain limited, which inhibits its ability to influence activities and address maritime security problems. Further, BAKAMLA's fleet remains small. Without enough vessels, BAKAMLA cannot operate effectively as a Coast Guard. This gap touches all three of the maritime security problems focused on in this thesis. A better-developed maritime security organization would yield myriad improvements to Indonesia's problems with IUU fishing, unresolved borders, and maritime piracy and armed robbery. Specifically, a more capable maritime security organization would enable to Indonesia to better identify and react to vessels conducting IUU fishing or piracy and armed robbery in Indonesian waters. Further, as many of these

illicit acts occur on ships inport or at anchor, a more capable Coast Guard would have better capability to secure these vulnerable locations. While Indonesia's approach to border delimitation is primarily through diplomatic negotiations, a better developed maritime security organization would improve Indonesia's capability to detect and respond to violations of, and threats to, border sovereignty. As border protection is traditionally a naval role, a more defined split of responsibility between TNI-AL and the civilian maritime security agencies would improve the Indonesian Government's collective ability to manage its borders and combat other maritime security problems.

A second Indonesian maritime security gap is international attention to the crimes and problems associated with IUU fishing. As discussed earlier in this chapter, IUU fishing is chief among Indonesia's maritime security concerns, as it has a profound effect on Indonesia's economy and food security. While the global community recognizes IUU fishing as a major problem, the earlier discussion about the UN declaring IUU fishing transnational organized crime highlights a crucial point. Namely, as a crime that respects neither borders nor jurisdictions, eradication of IUU fishing requires increased international attention and action. PSMA, while a positive step, is still a nascent program, as it has been in force for only about two years. Moreover, PSMA is just one part of the broad solution necessary to combat IUU fishing and related criminal activity. The lack of official UN designation of IUU fishing as transnational organized crime highlights a gap in the international approach. This UN designation would be a positive step toward the international community gaining increased capability to combat IUU fishing through law enforcement measures.

These two gaps highlight some of Indonesia's most pressing maritime security problems. The government must organize and equip its institutions to address multiple problems simultaneously and to maximize these institutions' effectiveness across relevant domains. Yet, Indonesia is part of a larger global fabric, reliant on coordinated international action to address transnational problems like IUU fishing. The gaps identified in this section lend themselves to outside assistance, as the underlying problems are not solely domestic. The U.S. can leverage experience and resources to help Indonesia close these gaps. Recommendations for ways the U.S. can assist with Indonesian maritime security improvements are in the fifth section of this chapter.

Section 4: The U.S.-Indonesia Bilateral Maritime Security Relationship

This fourth section looks across the instruments of national power to understand the U.S.-Indonesia bilateral maritime security relationship. To provide context, this section expands its aperture beyond maritime security to ensure the broader bilateral relationship is understood more completely. This analysis does not focus on the three maritime security problems discussed in the earlier sections; rather, this discussion is more holistic. This section does not constitute a particular part of the operational design methodology. Instead, this section gives a basis for the recommended actions in section five. It is imperative to understand what comprises the current relationship to make reasonable recommendations for U.S. actions in Indonesia.

U.S.-Indonesia Diplomatic Relationship

In 2010, the U.S. and Indonesia, under President Obama and President Yudhoyono, signed a "Comprehensive Partnership" agreement. This agreement, signed

four years after the U.S. lifted military sanctions on Indonesia, signified mutual agreement on the importance of the bilateral relationship. While the Comprehensive Partnership joint statement does not identify any specific military or maritime security goals or initiatives, it does emphasize close cooperation and assistance. The agreement promises to pursue bilateral cooperation as well as cooperation through multilateral organizations, such as the G-20, ASEAN, the East Asia Summit, and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum.⁹⁷ The Comprehensive Partnership agreement was a positive step to strengthening bilateral ties between the U.S. and Indonesia.

In 2015, the Comprehensive Partnership agreement was upgraded to a “Strategic Partnership.” This agreement, signed by President Obama and the then-newly-elected President Widodo, is much more encompassing and far-reaching than the Comprehensive Partnership agreement. One of the new elements in this agreement was initiation of an annual bilateral ministerial strategic dialogue. The U.S. Secretary of State and the Indonesian Foreign Minister jointly lead this dialogue, designed to encourage collaboration on bilateral and international issues.⁹⁸ Additionally, maritime and defense cooperation are specific initiatives in the Strategic Partnership agreement. A memorandum of understanding (MOU) titled “Memorandum of Understanding on Maritime Cooperation” codifies a set of bilateral maritime activities.⁹⁹ This MOU was signed concurrent with the Strategic Partnership agreement by Secretary of State John Kerry and Foreign Minister Marsudi. Specific cooperation areas in this MOU include maritime security, maritime economy, marine resources and fisheries conservation and management, maritime safety and navigation, and marine science and technology.¹⁰⁰ The Strategic Partnership agreement, and its accompanying maritime cooperation MOU, is a

clear endorsement of the importance the U.S. and Indonesia put on bilateral cooperation and maritime security.

U.S.-Indonesia Information Relationship

The 2010 Comprehensive Partnership and the 2015 Strategic Partnership are strong examples, through both words and actions, of employment of the information instrument of national power, as these agreements emphasize the importance the U.S. and Indonesian Governments put on their mutual relationship. However, other more recent events can shed additional light on the informational aspects of this bilateral relationship. Vice President Pence visited Indonesia in April 2017, early in the Trump administration. During this visit, Pence met with leaders of Indonesia, ASEAN, and local businesses. In a joint statement with Widodo, Pence highlighted the importance the U.S. puts on the strategic relationship with Indonesia, through both defense and economic ties. Pence recognized that Indonesia is an important partner to defend the rules-based order in the Indo-Pacific. Similarly, Widodo remarked that the economic relationship with the U.S. was very important to Indonesia.¹⁰¹ Soon after this meeting in Jakarta, President Trump met with Widodo during the G-20 summit in Hamburg, Germany in July 2017. In the short remarks released after this meeting, Trump and Widodo expressed an informal desire for Trump to visit Indonesia, but the leaders did not make any substantive remarks on the bilateral relationship.¹⁰² Former Secretary of State Rex Tillerson visited the Indo-Pacific twice during his tenure at the State Department, in March and August 2017. However, neither of these trips included a stop in Indonesia. Trump traveled to the region in November 2017, but did not visit Indonesia. The first cabinet-level visit to Indonesia was Secretary of Defense Mattis in January 2018. During this visit to Jakarta, Mattis met

with the Indonesian Minister of Defense, Ryamizard Ryacudu. The information and communication aspect of this meeting is notable, as Mattis used it to recognize Indonesia's claim to the North Natuna Sea. Further, Mattis highlighted Indonesia's role as the "maritime fulcrum" between the Pacific and Indian Oceans and praised Indonesia's defense cooperation with the U.S. and its regional neighbors, particularly through the INDOMALPHI patrols.¹⁰³ As previously discussed, Widodo visited Washington, D.C. in October 2015 in conjunction with the establishment of the Strategic Partnership agreement. Indonesian Foreign Minister Marsudi visited Washington in May 2017 and March 2018. These numerous interactions illustrate the information instrument of national power by demonstrating how national leaders demonstrate the importance of the ties between the U.S. and Indonesia.

U.S.-Indonesia Military Relationship

As part of the 2015 Strategic Partnership agreement, U.S. Secretary of Defense Carter and Indonesian Minister of Defence Ryacudu signed a joint statement on comprehensive defense cooperation between Indonesia and the U.S. This statement evokes the principles of the strategic partnership and identifies six broad areas of cooperation: maritime cooperation, defense procurement and joint research and development, professionalization, cooperation on peacekeeping operations and training, humanitarian assistance and disaster response, and countering transnational threats.¹⁰⁴ The maritime cooperation portion of the joint defense cooperation statement focuses on continuing development of a close bilateral relationship. Specific maritime cooperation focus areas, in line with the maritime cooperation MOU, include mutual understanding on maritime security issues; capacity building, particularly in maritime domain

awareness; best practices for safeguarding maritime interests; establishment of working groups and subject matter expert dialogues; and promotion of peaceful and stable conditions.¹⁰⁵

A key component of the bilateral defense relationship is the annual United States-Indonesia Bilateral Defense Discussion (USIBDD). USPACOM leads this annual meeting for the U.S. USIBDD is the primary channel for the U.S.-Indonesia military relationship. This forum encompasses issues from the strategic to the tactical levels and is comprised of seven working groups which coordinate the annual roster of bilateral military activities.¹⁰⁶

The bilateral military exercise and training schedule is robust, with an over 200 activities per year. In 2017, there were 221 events.¹⁰⁷ In 2018, 222 events are scheduled.¹⁰⁸ Key among the naval exercises is Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training (CARAT) Indonesia. This exercise is part of a nine-nation series of CARAT exercises across the Indo-Pacific region. CARAT Indonesia “promotes bilateral security [and] fosters the growing relationship between the U.S. and Indonesian navies.” Recurring activities in this exercise include surface and submarine warfare, maritime interdiction, diving and salvage, and MDA.¹⁰⁹ CARAT Indonesia is only one part of the bilateral exercise calendar.

Garuda Shield is an annual exercise focused on land warfare training. However, the 2017 iteration featured bilateral Apache helicopter maritime interdiction training. This maritime interdiction training included littoral gunnery exercises, which were the first such training in USPACOM area of responsibility outside the Korean Peninsula.¹¹⁰ Other major bilateral exercises include Gema Bhakti, focused on humanitarian assistance

and disaster relief, and Cope West, focused on airpower interoperability. The November 2016 iteration of Cope West was the first bilateral fighter-focused training in nineteen years.¹¹¹

Besides military exercises and joint training, the U.S. sells military equipment to Indonesia through the Foreign Military Sales Program. Since 2013, the U.S. has sold about \$1.5 billion of weapons system and related support to Indonesia. These sales include Apache Longbow helicopters, anti-tank missiles, air-to-air missiles, and fighter jets.¹¹² The U.S. is not the sole weapons supplier to Indonesia, however. As this chapter discusses in section five, Indonesia purchases weapons systems from several countries, including Russia and China.

At the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore in May 2015, then-Secretary of Defense Carter announced a new U.S. endeavor called the “Southeast Asia Maritime Security Initiative,” or MSI. MSI is a five-year \$425 million program designed to build maritime security capacity in Southeast Asia.¹¹³ This initiative focuses on Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand, and Vietnam. Specific objectives of MSI are improving maritime domain awareness, communications, interoperability, networking and development of a common operating picture for the region.¹¹⁴ In February 2018, *Jane’s 360*, a defense news organization, reported that Indonesia is slated to receive, through MSI funding, four ScanEagle unmanned aerial vehicles in mid-2018. These drones, built by Boeing, can carry a variety of sensors and are designed primarily for maritime surveillance.¹¹⁵ Detailed information on other assistance provided to Indonesia through MSI is limited. However, a November 2015 fact sheet from the White House states that U.S. intentions

are to increase Indonesia's patrol capacity, improve its Coast Guard's organizational development, and advance other capabilities.¹¹⁶

U.S.-Indonesia Economic Relationship

The U.S. and Indonesia have a close economic relationship. In 1996, the U.S. and Indonesia signed a Trade and Investment Framework Agreement, which provides a forum for consultations to discuss bilateral trade and investment issues, further economic ties, and increase cooperation. This agreement with Indonesia is not unique, as the U.S. has Trade and Investment Framework Agreements with dozens of countries around the world. Objectives under this agreement include monitoring trade and investment relations, consultations on items of mutual interest, and identification and removal of trade impediments.¹¹⁷

According to data from the U.S. Trade Representative, as of 2016 Indonesia was the thirty-fifth largest goods export market for the U.S. The bilateral trade relationship grew 53 percent in the decade prior to 2016, up to \$25.2 billion in two-way trade. \$6 billion of this total was in U.S. exports. Major U.S. exports to Indonesia are soybeans, aircraft, machinery, food waste and animal feed, and cotton. U.S. foreign direct investment in Indonesia was \$13.5 billion in 2015, while Indonesian foreign direct investment in the U.S. was \$1.6 billion.¹¹⁸

In addition to trade, the U.S. makes investments in Indonesia through various forms of economic assistance. One of the largest foreign aid investments was through the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), an independent U.S. foreign aid agency dedicated to fighting global poverty. MCC issues foreign aid through two methods, the largest of which is a large five-year grant called a compact.¹¹⁹ The \$600 million

Indonesia compact, which was in effect from April 2013 to April 2018, was the largest MCC compact in Asia. The initiatives under the compact, which do not directly involve maritime security, were the “Community-Based Health and Nutrition to Reduce Stunting Project,” “Green Prosperity Project,” and the “Procurement Modernization Project.”¹²⁰ These initiatives, underscored by the financial size of this compact, are indicative of the importance the U.S. puts on Indonesian advancement and development. The United States Agency for International Development, which issues and tracks foreign aid, identifies \$186 million in total economic assistance to Indonesia in 2016, including the MCC compact. Military assistance in 2016 was \$36.4 million. The total amount of economic assistance, which includes foreign aid and military assistance, was \$222.4 million. Compared to the 2013 to 2015 period, military assistance increased significantly in 2016.¹²¹

Section 5: Research Question Analysis

The primary research question in this thesis aims to understand how the U.S. can leverage its instruments of national power to improve Indonesia’s maritime security. The secondary research questions seek to define Indonesia’s primary maritime security concerns and understand how improvements to Indonesia’s maritime security advance U.S. interests in the Indo-Pacific region. This fifth and final section of chapter 4 synthesizes the previous analyses of Indonesia’s three primary maritime security concerns to provide recommendations for U.S. action and to understand how these actions advance U.S. regional interests.

This section is arranged in three parts. First, this section recommends U.S. actions, across the instruments of national power, to help solve the maritime security gaps

identified in the third section of this chapter. Second, this section explains how improving Indonesia's maritime security advances U.S. interests in the Indo-Pacific region. Third, this section closes with a discussion of risks inherent in the bilateral relationship. This discussion of risk focuses on how Chinese and Russian influence in Indonesia exposes the U.S. to vulnerabilities. All analysis in this section is from the U.S. perspective.

Recommended Solutions across the U.S. Instruments of National Power

This first part completes the operational design methodology. These recommended solutions are a set of options to close the gaps that exist between the current state and the desired future state of Indonesian maritime security. The framing of these solutions across the U.S. instruments of national power puts this analysis in a design consistent with other analyses in this chapter.

The U.S. should maintain its close diplomatic ties to Indonesia. Codified in 2010 under the Comprehensive Partnership agreement and reaffirmed in 2015 under the Strategic Partnership agreement, this bilateral relationship is very valuable to both countries. A new version of this agreement should be signed by 2020. Renewal of this partnership would be a strong endorsement of the bilateral relationship's importance. Signing this agreement in 2020 will be after Indonesia's presidential election and before the November 2020 U.S. presidential election. Additionally, the 2015 MOU on maritime cooperation expires after five years unless renewed.¹²² Approval of an updated version of this MOU would ensure continued bilateral cooperation on maritime issues. These agreements offer good opportunities for the U.S. to strengthen the bilateral diplomatic relationship.

Under the information instrument of national power, Indonesia should be near the front of U.S. messaging in the Indo-Pacific. With its vast geography and regional influence, Indonesia is a powerful partner for the U.S. Further, Indonesia should be commended for its efforts to counter actions that run afoul of international law, such as IUU fishing and maritime piracy and armed robbery. However, to close the gap related to international action against IUU fishing, the U.S. should be a strong advocate on the international stage for the eradication of IUU fishing. The U.S. should routinely recognize IUU fishing as a serious transnational crime and vouch for the UN to declare it transnational organized crime. As a global leader, the U.S. is well-positioned to bring wide attention to this problem. In addition to gathering global support to combat IUU fishing, the U.S. can gain credibility with Indonesia and myriad other nations to whom IUU fishing is a major problem.

Militarily, there are several actions the U.S. can take to improve Indonesian maritime security and close its gaps. The current schedule of over 200 annual military engagements should continue, as this close relationship develops the full spectrum of Indonesia's military capabilities beyond those associated with maritime security. However, one of Indonesia's maritime security gaps is platforms for its nascent Coast Guard, BAKAMLA. Indonesia requires platforms for both patrolling and reconnaissance. While the 2018 ScanEagle purchase is a major step, additional reconnaissance assets are necessary to cover Indonesia's vast space. The 2015 Defence White Paper identifies satellite and drone technology as capabilities requiring improvement; this stated need is indicative of Indonesia's internal recognition of this gap. Consequently, the U.S. should continue to supply Indonesia with reconnaissance technology as well as surface vessels.

Given the U.S. Coast Guard recapitalization and U.S. Navy modernization efforts, the U.S. military should identify excess defense articles, such as small ships and boats, to sell to Indonesia. These used vessels, coupled with sales of new vessels, can increase the size of BAKAMLA's fleet and improve its seagoing capabilities. Additionally, as improving its indigenous shipbuilding capability is an Indonesian priority, the U.S. should explore partnerships between U.S. and Indonesian shipyards.

Improvements to Indonesia's reconnaissance capabilities are part of broader improvements to its maritime domain awareness capability. MDA is an important capability to counter illicit activities. While this thesis does not conduct in-depth analysis of MDA in Southeast Asia and the associated challenges, more advanced MDA capabilities will improve Indonesia's maritime security situation. U.S. material improvements to these capabilities will help Indonesia improve its maritime security.

Funding for these materiel improvements can come, in part, through MSI. With annual funding in fiscal years 2018, 2019, and 2020 of nearly \$100 million, there should be sufficient MSI money available to make significant improvements.¹²³ Although MSI funding is spread across five countries, Indonesia should get a large percentage of the annual distribution. If MSI funding is inadequate, the U.S. should draw funding from other sources.

Indonesia's maritime security gaps require organizational and training solutions in addition to materiel improvements. As previously discussed, myriad agencies, including TNI-AL, comprise the Indonesian maritime security apparatus. Although the Indonesian approach to maritime security and law enforcement is different from the U.S. approach, the U.S. can still help Indonesia develop a clearer delineation of responsibilities among

the cognizant agencies and organizations. While the annual schedule of military engagements gives important training to TNI-AL, the civilian maritime security apparatus can also benefit from training assistance. Organizational and training improvements to these non-military agencies and organizations requires personnel from multiple U.S. departments and agencies, such as the Navy, the Coast Guard, Customs and Border Protection, and the Department of Homeland Security. This broad set of knowledgeable U.S. agencies can help develop BAKAMLA into the Coast Guard-like agency it is intended to be and help define responsibilities across Indonesia's assorted cognizant agencies. With organizational improvements and better training, Indonesian maritime security agencies and organizations will be better equipped to combat the array of maritime threats they face.

The economic instrument of national power can also improve Indonesian maritime security by growing Indonesia's GDP. One of Widodo's campaign promises was raising defense spending to 1.5 percent of GDP in five years.¹²⁴ Although Indonesian defense spending remains under 1 percent of GDP, this share could be larger in a larger economy. Increased defense spending would provide more money for maritime security advancements and improvements. A principal reason Indonesia's maritime security condition is in its current state is due to inadequate funding. While focused U.S. programs like MSI inject resources directly into the military and related entities, increased investment across the economy will increase the Indonesian government's ability to spend on its needs. In 2015, while visiting the U.S. in conjunction with the signing of the Strategic Partnership agreement, Widodo expressed interest in joining the Trans-Pacific Partnership free trade agreement, though he acknowledged that significant

domestic reform would be required to meet the trade pact's requirements.¹²⁵ However, the U.S. pulled out of the agreement in early 2017, before it was finalized. Eleven countries signed a new variant of the agreement, known as the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership, in March 2018. These countries include the Southeast Asian nations Brunei, Malaysia, Singapore, and Vietnam. Australia, another of Indonesia's neighbors, is also a member.¹²⁶ While it is beyond the scope of this thesis to draw specific conclusions on the merits, or risks, associated with multilateral trade agreements, continued advancement of trade between the U.S. and Indonesia can benefit both countries. Given the Trump administration's preference for bilateral trade agreements, the U.S. and Indonesian Governments may benefit from a U.S.-Indonesia free trade agreement or similar pact.¹²⁷ With a larger economy, the Indonesian Government would have more money to spend on its defense and maritime security programs; increased funding would increase the government's ability combat the problems addressed in this thesis. The U.S. should explore ways it can increase its investment in the Indonesian economy.

The Benefit to the United States

The United States will benefit from improved Indonesian maritime security. With a more secure maritime domain, Indonesia will become a steadfast regional partner, better able to support the rules-based international order, a key tenet of U.S. Indo-Pacific policy. The 2017 NSS cites the desire for a "free and open Indo-Pacific" and specifically recognizes China's actions, including its land reclamation in the SCS, as destabilizing and threatening; China also seeks to expand its influence through economic measures, influence operations, and military action and threats. This array of Chinese activities

could lead to further destabilization of the region, while the NSS envisions an Indo-Pacific where all countries work together to advance peacefully.¹²⁸

While the 2017 NSS does not specifically mention the rules-based international order, the Obama-era 2015 NSS codifies this concept as the “international legal architecture, economic and political institutions, as well as alliances and partnerships” established by the United and other like-minded nations since the end of the second world war.¹²⁹ This concept is germane to contemporary U.S. policy, even though the Trump administration does not put the rules-based order as central of its NSS. Secretary of Defense Mattis, speaking at the Shangri-La Dialogue in June 2017, affirmed the U.S. commitment to the rules-based international order. Specifically, Mattis asserted that the rules-based international order is the product of many nations’ efforts toward stabilization and the rule of law.¹³⁰ Similarly, Vice President Pence, speaking before the ASEAN Secretariat in Jakarta in April 2017, pledged continued U.S. commitment to work with ASEAN to uphold the rules-based order in the SCS to ensure the free flow of commerce and peaceful resolution of disputes.¹³¹ Admiral Harry Harris, the commander of USPACOM, spoke at a conference convened by the Institute for International and Strategic Studies in Singapore in October 2017. In this speech, Harris highlighted Indonesia as a key partner in supporting the principles of the rules-based international order. The specific principles Harris cited are: “the peaceful resolution of disputes, freedom of navigation for military and civilian ships and aircraft, and unimpeded lawful commerce.”¹³² As Harris indicated, Indonesia’s approach to its maritime security problems exemplifies its commitment to the rules-based international order. For instance, Indonesia seeks to delimit its maritime borders in accordance with UNCLOS. UNCLOS

is a good example of an international set of rules by which the rules-based order abides. Indonesia's aggressive efforts to combat IUU fishing and maritime piracy and armed robbery are similarly in adherence to relevant laws and regulations.

A general theme of the Indo-Pacific section of the 2017 NSS is cooperation with regional partners and allies to maintain peace, advance the rule of rule of law, and defend the freedom of the seas. The NSS addresses Indo-Pacific maritime issues as well, by stating the U.S. is committed to "peaceful resolution of territorial and maritime disputes in accordance with international law." In Southeast Asia specifically, the NSS identifies Indonesia, along with Vietnam, Malaysia, and Singapore as "growing security and economic partners of the United States." The NSS declares the U.S. will strengthen the U.S. partnership with Indonesia to help Indonesia become a "cooperative maritime partner."¹³³ Indonesia's actions, as this thesis has explained, are in line with the U.S. vision for the Indo-Pacific. Indonesia is committed to peaceful resolution of maritime disputes, international cooperation, and eradication of criminal maritime activity.

In his October 2017 speech in Singapore, Admiral Harris stated that the key to success in the Indo-Pacific region and of the rules-based order in general is for all countries to work together to uphold the international values that have led to flourishing economies and the longest period of peace in the modern era. Further, Harris contends a successful Indo-Pacific is vital to worldwide prosperity.¹³⁴ Indonesia is postured to help achieve the ideals Harris contends the U.S. strives for. Indonesia's actions are exactly what Harris says is necessary to support and extend the rules-based order. Therefore, as Indonesia's maritime security situation improves, U.S. regional interests advance.

Risks to the United States

Although the U.S. has a lot to gain from increased maritime security cooperation with Indonesia, there are risks inherent in this approach. As a non-aligned nation, Indonesia will never be as close to the U.S. as are some other countries in the region. Therefore, the overall gain the U.S. can make through Indonesia is limited. For example, Indonesia is unlikely to join a mutual defense treaty with the U.S. Similarly, Indonesia is unlikely to allow permanent basing of U.S. military forces.

Indonesia works closely with countries besides the U.S. These relationships includes arms purchases. For example, in February 2018, concurrent with its ScanEagle purchase, Indonesia bought “*Wing Loong I*” strike-capable aerial drones from China.¹³⁵ Indonesia also buys arms from Russia. These defense relationships demonstrate two areas of risk. First, the U.S. is competing with both China and Russia for influence in Indonesia. Second, use of Chinese and Russian technology alongside U.S. technology presents risk of technology proliferation.

Additionally, Chinese investment in Indonesia is sizeable. China’s “Belt and Road Initiative” is a plan to develop trade routes via improved land and maritime infrastructure in sixty countries throughout Asia and Europe.¹³⁶ An April 2016 report by the *Economist Corporate Network* states Indonesia is slated to receive \$87 billion under this program. This sum is the largest investment in ASEAN and is about twice the amount planned for Vietnam or the Philippines. This Chinese money will upgrade Indonesia’s highways, railways, ports, and energy infrastructure.¹³⁷ While the “Belt and Road Initiative” is a complex topic that this thesis does not cover, the effect of \$87 billion in infrastructure improvements is bound to have influence in Jakarta and beyond. These Indonesian

interests in U.S. adversaries highlight some of the difficulties the U.S. faces in developing this important bilateral relationship. Consequently, the U.S. Government must be cognizant of competing influences and the associated risks.

Conclusion

This chapter demonstrates that Indonesia is committed to aggressively confronting the many maritime security problems and threats it faces. However, within Indonesia's approach to solving these maritime security issues, there are gaps. As this chapter has outlined, the U.S. has abundant resources and expertise to help Indonesia close these gaps and improve its maritime security. As a defender of the rules-based international order, Indonesia is a critical and strategic partner for the U.S. Therefore, to advance U.S. interests in the Indo-Pacific, Washington must deepen its relationship with Jakarta.

¹ Shekhar and Liow, "Indonesia as a Maritime Power: Jokowi's Vision, Strategies, and Obstacles Ahead."

² Ibid.

³ Joko Widodo, interview by Richard C. Bush III, "Indonesia in the Changing World: A Conversation with President Joko Widodo of Indonesia," 9, Brookings Institution, October 27, 2015, accessed October 14, 2017. https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/20151027_indonesia_widodo_transcript.pdf.

⁴ Gindarsah and Priamarizki, "Indonesia's Maritime Doctrine and Security Concerns," 2.

⁵ Neary, "Jokowi Spells Out Vision for Indonesia's 'Global Maritime Nexus.'"

⁶ Sambhi, "Jokowi's 'Global Maritime Axis': Smooth Sailing or Rocky Seas Ahead?," 39.

⁷ Ibid., 42.

⁸ Ibid., 42–43.

⁹ Laksmana, “Indonesian Sea Policy: Accelerating Jokowi’s Global Maritime Fulcrum?”

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² Marzuki, “Indonesia’s National Sea Policy: Concretising the Global Maritime Fulcrum.”

¹³ Neary, “Jokowi Spells Out Vision for Indonesia’s ‘Global Maritime Nexus.’”

¹⁴ Laksmana, “Indonesian Sea Policy: Accelerating Jokowi’s Global Maritime Fulcrum?”

¹⁵ Sambhi, “Jokowi’s ‘Global Maritime Axis’: Smooth Sailing or Rocky Seas Ahead?,” 43.

¹⁶ Joko Widodo, “Indonesia in the Changing World: A Conversation with President Joko Widodo of Indonesia,” 7–8.

¹⁷ CNN, “Interview with Indonesian President Joko Widodo.”

¹⁸ Haenlein, “Below the Surface: How Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing Threatens Our Security,” 5–7.

¹⁹ Ibid., 10–11.

²⁰ Ibid., 1–2.

²¹ Muhammad Jusuf Kalla, “Speech of H.E. Joko Widodo at the 85th Interpol General Assembly” (speech presented at the 85th ICPO-Interpol General Assembly, Bali, Indonesia, November 7, 2016), 5, accessed April 10, 2018, <https://www.interpol.int/News-and-media/Events/2016/85th-INTERPOL-General-Assembly/85th-INTERPOL-General-Assembly>.

²² Haenlein, “Below the Surface: How Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing Threatens Our Security,” 1–2.

²³ Ibid., 33–34.

²⁴ Poling and Cronin, *Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated Fishing as a National Security Threat*, 8–9.

²⁵ Sambhi, “Jokowi’s ‘Global Maritime Axis’: Smooth Sailing or Rocky Seas Ahead?,” 48.

²⁶ Gindarsah and Priamarizki, “Indonesia’s Maritime Doctrine and Security Concerns,” 7.

²⁷ Sodik, “The Indonesian Legal Framework on Baselines, Archipelagic Passage, and Innocent Passage,” 332.

²⁸ Muhammad Tri Andika, “Indonesia Border Diplomacy under the Global Maritime Fulcrum,” *Ritsumeikan International Affairs* 15 (2017): 55, accessed April 9, 2018. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/319826875_Indonesia_Border_Diplomacy_Under_The_Global_Maritime_Fulcrum.

²⁹ Ibid., 58.

³⁰ Arif Havas Oegroseno, “Maritime Border Diplomacy: An Indonesian Lifeline,” in *Maritime Border Diplomacy*, by Judy Ellis, (Dordrecht: BRILL, 2012), 31–33, accessed April 9, 2018, ProQuest Ebook Central.

³¹ United Nations Division for Ocean Affairs and Law of the Sea, *United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea* (United Nations, 1982), pt. IV art. 47, accessed April 5, 2018, http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/convention_overview_convention.htm.

³² Supriyanto, “Out of Its Comfort Zone: Indonesia and the South China Sea,” 23.

³³ Indonesian Ministry of Defence, *Indonesia Defence White Paper 2015*, (Jakarta, Indonesia, November 20, 2015), 42, accessed November 10, 2017, <https://www.kemhan.go.id/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/2015-INDONESIA-DEFENCE-WHITE-PAPER-ENGLISH-VERSION.pdf>.

³⁴ Sambhi, “Jokowi’s ‘Global Maritime Axis’: Smooth Sailing or Rocky Seas Ahead?,” 46.

³⁵ Ibid., 47.

³⁶ Supriyanto, “Out of Its Comfort Zone: Indonesia and the South China Sea,” 24.

³⁷ Andika, “Indonesia Border Diplomacy under the Global Maritime Fulcrum,” 59.

³⁸ I Made Andi Arsana, “The Delineation of Indonesia’s Outer Limits of Its Extended Continental Shelf and Preparation for Its Submission: Status and Problems,” United Nations-Nippon Fellowship Programme 2007-2008 (2007): 71–72, accessed April 10, 2018. http://www.un.org/depts/los/nippon/unnnff_programme_home/fellows_pages/fellows_papers/arsana_0708_indonesia.pdf.

³⁹ *BBC News*, “Philippines and Indonesia Resolve 20-Year Border Dispute,” May 23, 2014, accessed March 23, 2018, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-27535004>.

⁴⁰ Sambhi, “Jokowi’s ‘Global Maritime Axis’: Smooth Sailing or Rocky Seas Ahead?,” 45.

⁴¹ United Nations Division for Ocean Affairs and Law of the Sea, *United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea*, pt. VII art. 101.

⁴² International Maritime Organization, *Code of Practice for the Investigation of Crimes of Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships*, (Resolution A.1025(26)), (London: IMO, January 18, 2010), 4, accessed April 13, 2018, <http://www.imo.org/en/OurWork/Security/PiracyArmedRobbery/Guidance/Documents/A.1025.pdf>.

⁴³ ReCAAP, *ReCAAP Information Sharing Centre 2017 Annual Report* (Singapore: ReCAAP, 2017), 3, accessed April 11, 2018, <http://www.recaap.org/reports>.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 6.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 17.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 6.

⁴⁷ Prashanth Parameswaran, “Indonesia, Philippines, Malaysia Agree on New Joint Patrols Amid Kidnappings,” *The Diplomat*, May 6, 2016, accessed April 11, 2018, <https://thediplomat.com/2016/05/indonesia-philippines-malaysia-agree-on-new-joint-patrols-amid-kidnappings/>.

⁴⁸ Parameswaran, “Confronting Indonesia’s Maritime Coordination Challenge.”

⁴⁹ Espenilla, “Abductions at Sea: A 3-Way Security Challenge for Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines.”

⁵⁰ ReCAAP, *ReCAAP Information Sharing Centre 2017 Annual Report*, 35.

⁵¹ Prashanth Parameswaran, “Indonesia’s War on Illegal Fishing Continues with New Sinkings,” *The Diplomat*, November 1, 2017, accessed March 20, 2018, <https://thediplomat.com/2017/11/indonesias-war-on-illegal-fishing-continues-with-new-sinkings/>.

⁵² United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization Fisheries & Aquaculture Department, “Parties to the Port State Measures Agreement,” accessed April 5, 2018, <http://www.fao.org/fishery/psm/agreement/parties/en>.

⁵³ United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization “Port State Measures Agreement,” last modified 2018, accessed April 11, 2018, <http://www.fao.org/fishery/psm/agreement/en>.

⁵⁴ Haenlein, “Below the Surface: How Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing Threatens Our Security,” 39.

⁵⁵ Prashanth Parameswaran, "Indonesia Wants Global War on Illegal Fishing," *The Diplomat*, May 9, 2017, accessed March 22, 2018, <https://thediplomat.com/2017/05/indonesia-wants-global-war-on-illegal-fishing/>.

⁵⁶ Australian Foreign Minister and Indonesian Foreign Minister, "Joint Declaration on Maritime Cooperation between the Government of Australia and the Government of the Republic of Indonesia," February 26, 2017, accessed April 10, 2018, <http://dfat.gov.au/geo/indonesia/Documents/australia-indonesia-joint-declaration-maritime-cooperation.pdf>.

⁵⁷ Parameswaran, "Indonesia Wants Global War on Illegal Fishing."

⁵⁸ Prashanth Parameswaran, "Explaining Indonesia's 'Sink the Vessels' Policy under Jokowi," *The Diplomat*, January 13, 2015, accessed March 22, 2018, <https://thediplomat.com/2015/01/explaining-indonesias-sink-the-vessels-policy-under-jokowi/>.

⁵⁹ Ibid.

⁶⁰ CNN, "Interview with Indonesian President Joko Widodo."

⁶¹ Gindarsah and Priamarizki, "Indonesia's Maritime Doctrine and Security Concerns," 5.

⁶² Prashanth Parameswaran, "Why Did Indonesia Just Sink a Vessel From China?" *The Diplomat*, May 22, 2015, accessed April 13, 2018, <https://thediplomat.com/2015/05/why-did-indonesia-just-sink-a-vessel-from-china/>.

⁶³ Parameswaran, "Indonesia's War on Illegal Fishing Continues with New Sinkings."

⁶⁴ Ibid.

⁶⁵ Arif and Kurniawan, "Strategic Culture and Indonesian Maritime Security," 85.

⁶⁶ Laksmana, "Rebalancing Indonesia's Naval Force: Trends, Nature, and Drivers," 184.

⁶⁷ Sambhi, "Jokowi's 'Global Maritime Axis': Smooth Sailing or Rocky Seas Ahead?" 50.

⁶⁸ Parameswaran, "Confronting Indonesia's Maritime Coordination Challenge."

⁶⁹ Arif and Kurniawan, "Strategic Culture and Indonesian Maritime Security," 87.

⁷⁰ Parameswaran, "Confronting Indonesia's Maritime Coordination Challenge."

⁷¹ Arif and Kurniawan, "Strategic Culture and Indonesian Maritime Security," 78.

⁷² Indonesian Ministry of Defence, “Indonesia Defence White Paper 2015,” 37–38.

⁷³ Haenlein, “Below the Surface: How Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing Threatens Our Security,” 43.

⁷⁴ Retno L.P. Marsudi, “2018 Annual Press Statement of the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Indonesia H.E. Retno L.P. Marsudi” (Speech, Jakarta, Indonesia, January 9, 2018), 11–12, accessed March 20, 2018, <https://www.kemlu.go.id/id/pidato/menlu/Pages/PPTM2018%20MENLU%20RI%20ENG.pdf>.

⁷⁵ Ibid., 15.

⁷⁶ Allard and Munthe, “Asserting Sovereignty, Indonesia Renames Part of South China Sea.”

⁷⁷ U.S. Department of Defense, “Readout of Secretary Mattis’ Meeting with Indonesian Minister of Defense,” last modified January 23, 2018, accessed April 6, 2018, <https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Releases/News-Release-View/Article/1422071/readout-of-secretary-mattis-meeting-with-indonesian-minister-of-defense/>.

⁷⁸ *The Straits Times*, “Singapore, Indonesia Submit Third Sea Border Treaty to UN,” September 27, 2017, accessed April 10, 2018, <http://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/singapore-indonesia-submit-third-sea-border-treaty-to-un>.

⁷⁹ *BBC News*, “Philippines and Indonesia Resolve 20-Year Border Dispute.”

⁸⁰ Parameswaran, “Why Did Indonesia Just Rename Its Part of the South China Sea?”

⁸¹ Shekhar and Liow, “Indonesia as a Maritime Power: Jokowi’s Vision, Strategies, and Obstacles Ahead.”

⁸² Ibid.

⁸³ Laksmana, “Rebalancing Indonesia’s Naval Force: Trends, Nature, and Drivers,” 188.

⁸⁴ Shekhar and Liow, “Indonesia as a Maritime Power: Jokowi’s Vision, Strategies, and Obstacles Ahead.”

⁸⁵ Trading Economics, “Military Expenditure (% of GDP) in Indonesia,” accessed April 17, 2018, <https://tradingeconomics.com/indonesia/military-expenditure-percent-of-gdp-wb-data.html>.

⁸⁶ *The Jakarta Post*, “Indonesia Reinforces Its Command over Natuna Waters through Military Bases,” September 27, 2016, accessed April 17, 2018, <http://www.thejakartapost.com/seasia/2016/09/27/indonesia-reinforces-its-command-over-natuna-waters-through-military-bases.html>.

⁸⁷ Marsudi, “2018 Annual Press Statement of the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Indonesia,” 15.

⁸⁸ Christian Bueger, “From Dusk to Dawn? Maritime Domain Awareness in Southeast Asia,” *Contemporary Southeast Asia* 37, no. 2 (2015): 175, accessed July 17, 2017. https://www.academia.edu/12041839/From_Dusk_to_Dawn_Maritime_Domain_Awareness_in_South_East_Asia.

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, 169.

⁹⁰ Parameswaran, “Indonesia, Philippines, Malaysia Agree on New Joint Patrols Amid Kidnappings.”

⁹¹ Prashanth Parameswaran, “What’s Next for the New Sulu Sea Trilateral Patrols?,” *The Diplomat*, June 20, 2017, accessed April 11, 2018, <https://thediplomat.com/2017/06/whats-next-for-the-new-sulu-sea-trilateral-patrols/>.

⁹² *Ibid.*

⁹³ ReCAAP, *ReCAAP Information Sharing Centre 2017 Annual Report*, 35.

⁹⁴ U.S. Department of Defense, “Readout of Secretary Mattis’ Meeting with Indonesian Minister of Defense.”

⁹⁵ Kerry Lynn Nankivell, Jeffrey Reeves, and Ramon Pacheco Pardo, eds., *The Indo-Asia-Pacific’s Maritime Future: A Practical Assessment of the State of Asian Seas* (Honolulu, HI: Daniel K. Inouye Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies in partnership with King’s College London, March 2017), 45–46, accessed April 11, 2018, <http://apcss.org/the-indo-asia-pacifics-maritime-future-a-practical-assessment-of-the-state-of-asian-seas-2/>.

⁹⁶ Haenlein, “Below the Surface: How Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing Threatens Our Security,” vii.

⁹⁷ U.S. President and Indonesian President, “Joint Declaration on the Comprehensive Partnership between the United States of America and the Republic of Indonesia,” White House, last modified November 9, 2010, accessed September 30, 2017, <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2010/11/09/joint-declaration-comprehensive-partnership-between-united-states-america>.

⁹⁸ U.S. President and Indonesian President, “Joint Statement by the United States of America and the Republic of Indonesia.”

⁹⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰⁰ U.S. Secretary of State and Indonesian Foreign Minister, “Memorandum of Understanding on Maritime Cooperation Between the Government of the Republic of Indonesia and the Government of the United States of America.”

¹⁰¹ Michael R. Pence and Joko Widodo, “Remarks by the Vice President and Indonesian President Widodo to the Press,” Jakarta, Indonesia, April 20, 2017), accessed September 23, 2017, <https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/04/20/remarks-vice-president-and-indonesian-president-widodo-press>.

¹⁰² Donald J. Trump and Joko Widodo, “Remarks by President Trump and President Widodo of Indonesia before Bilateral Meeting,” Hamburg, Germany, July 8, 2017), accessed October 14, 2017, <https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/07/08/remarks-president-trump-and-president-widodo-indonesia-bilateral-meeting>.

¹⁰³ U.S. Department of Defense, “Readout of Secretary Mattis’ Meeting with Indonesian Minister of Defense.”

¹⁰⁴ U.S. Secretary of Defense and Indonesian Minister of Defence, “Joint Statement on Comprehensive Defense Cooperation Between the Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Indonesia and the Department of Defense of the United States of America,” October 26, 2015.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid.

¹⁰⁶ Joaquin F. Malavet and Atok Dushanto, “Joint Statement on the United States-Indonesia Bilateral Defense Discussions,” November 7, 2017.

¹⁰⁷ Harry Harris, “Statement on U.S. Pacific Command Posture 2017,” 27.

¹⁰⁸ Malavet and Dushanto, “Joint Statement on the United States-Indonesia Bilateral Defense Discussions,” 6.

¹⁰⁹ Harry Harris, “The United States-Indonesia Bilateral Security Partnership” (Speech, Indonesia Society & American Chamber of Commerce, Jakarta, Indonesia, August 7, 2017), accessed October 24, 2017, <http://www.pacom.mil/Media/Speeches-Testimony/Article/1272444/the-united-states-indonesia-bilateral-security-partnership/>.

¹¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹¹ Ibid.

¹¹² Defense Security Cooperation Agency, “Indonesia.”; Phil Stewart, “Eyeing China, U.S. Moves to Strengthen Indonesian Defense Ties,” *Reuters*, January 22, 2018, accessed April 14, 2018, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-indonesia-military/eyeing-china-u-s-moves-to-strengthen-indonesian-defense-ties-idUSKBN1FB25X>.

¹¹³ Ashton B. Carter, “IISS Shangri-La Dialogue: ‘A Regional Security Architecture Where Everyone Rises’” (Speech, Shangri-La Dialogue, Singapore, May 30, 2015), accessed September 26, 2017, <https://www.defense.gov/News/Speeches/Speech-View/Article/606676/iiss-shangri-la-dialogue-a-regional-security-architecture-where-everyone-rises/>.

¹¹⁴ Prashanth Parameswaran, “America’s New Maritime Security Initiative for Southeast Asia,” *The Diplomat*, April 2, 2016, accessed April 19, 2018, <https://thediplomat.com/2016/04/americas-new-maritime-security-initiative-for-southeast-asia/>.

¹¹⁵ Ridzwan Rahmat, “Indonesian Navy to Receive Four ScanEagle UAVs in 2018,” *Jane’s 360*, last modified February 23, 2018, accessed April 19, 2018, <http://www.janes.com/article/78118/indonesian-navy-to-receive-four-scaneagle-uavs-in-2018>.

¹¹⁶ White House, “FACT SHEET - U.S. Building Maritime Capacity in Southeast Asia,” last modified November 17, 2015, accessed July 20, 2017, <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/11/17/fact-sheet-us-building-maritime-capacity-southeast-asia>.

¹¹⁷ U.S. Trade Representative and Indonesia Minister of Industry and Trade, “Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Republic of Indonesia Concerning the Establishment of the Council on Trade and Investment,” July 16, 1996, accessed October 28, 2017, https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/agreements/tifa/asset_upload_file10_10199.pdf.

¹¹⁸ U.S. Trade Representative, “Indonesia.”

¹¹⁹ Millennium Challenge Corporation, “About MCC,” accessed March 28, 2018, <https://www.mcc.gov/about>.

¹²⁰ Millennium Challenge Corporation, “Indonesia Compact,” accessed March 28, 2018, <https://www.mcc.gov/where-we-work/program/indonesia-compact>.

¹²¹ U.S. Agency for International Development, *U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants: Obligations and Authorizations (July 1, 1945 - September 30, 2016)*, (Washington, D.C.: USAID, September 30, 2016), 136, accessed March 28, 2018, http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/pbaah600.pdf.

¹²² U.S. Secretary of State and Indonesian Foreign Minister, “Memorandum of Understanding on Maritime Cooperation Between the Government of the Republic of Indonesia and the Government of the United States of America,” 9.

¹²³ Parameswaran, “America’s New Maritime Security Initiative for Southeast Asia.”

¹²⁴ Sambhi, “Jokowi’s ‘Global Maritime Axis’: Smooth Sailing or Rocky Seas Ahead?,” 51.

¹²⁵ Prashanth Parameswaran, “Indonesia Wants to Join TPP: President Jokowi,” *The Diplomat*, October 27, 2015, accessed April 22, 2018, <https://thediplomat.com/2015/10/indonesia-wants-to-join-tpp-jokowi/>.

¹²⁶ Government of Canada, “Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership Ministerial Statement - March 8, 2018,” last modified March 8, 2018, accessed April 22, 2018, http://international.gc.ca/trade-commerce/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/agr-acc/cptpp-ptpgp/joint_statement-declaration_conjointe.aspx?lang=eng.

¹²⁷ U.S. President, *National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, 2017, 47.

¹²⁸ *Ibid.*, 46.

¹²⁹ U.S. President, *National Security Strategy* (Washington, D.C., February 2015), 23, accessed September 30, 2017, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/docs/2015_national_security_strategy_2.pdf.

¹³⁰ James N. Mattis, “Remarks by Secretary Mattis at Shangri-La Dialogue” (Speech, Shangri-La Dialogue, Singapore, June 3, 2017), accessed September 26, 2017, <https://www.defense.gov/News/Transcripts/Transcript-View/Article/1201780/>.

¹³¹ Michael R. Pence, “Remarks by the Vice President at ASEAN,” (Speech, ASEAN Secretariat, Jakarta, Indonesia, April 20, 2017), accessed October 10, 2017, <https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/04/20/remarks-vice-president-asean>.

¹³² Harry Harris, “IISS Fullerton Lecture” (Speech, IISS Fullerton Lecture, Singapore, October 17, 2017), accessed November 1, 2017, <http://www.pacom.mil/Media/SpeechesTestimony/tabid/6706/Article/1345916/iiss-fullerton-lecture.aspx>.

¹³³ U.S. President, *National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, 2017, 46–47.

¹³⁴ Harris, “IISS Fullerton Lecture.”

¹³⁵ Prashanth Parameswaran, “What’s Behind Indonesia’s China Drone Buy?,” *The Diplomat*, February 27, 2018, accessed April 22, 2018, <https://thediplomat.com/2018/02/whats-behind-indonesias-china-drone-buy/>.

¹³⁶ Andrew Staples, *ASEAN Connections: How Mega-Regional Trade and Investment Initiatives in Asia Will Shape Business Strategy in ASEAN and Beyond*, ed. Pamela Qiu (Economist Corporate Network, April 2016), 6, accessed April 22, 2018, http://ftp01.economist.com.hk/ECN_papers/ASEANConnections.

¹³⁷ *Ibid.*, 10.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Introduction

This thesis analyzes Indonesia's maritime security situation, with a focus on three specific areas. Looking across the instruments of national power, this analysis identified gaps in Indonesia's approach to achieving its maritime security goals and recommended ways the U.S. can assist Indonesia in its pursuit of these goals. These recommended U.S. actions are designed to improve Indonesian maritime security and advance U.S. interests in the Indo-Pacific region.

This concluding chapter interprets the findings discussed in chapter 4 and provides recommendations for further study and reflections on this research. Specifically, this chapter puts the recommended actions and their implications in context to demonstrate how these recommendations can be implemented in U.S. policy. The other purpose of this chapter is to provide recommendations for further study and reflections on ways this research could have been improved. These recommended study areas and reflections are intended to help future researchers focus their work and improve efficiency.

Chapter 4 provided recommendations for ways the U.S. can use its instruments of national power to improve Indonesian maritime security and advance U.S. regional interests. These recommendations address gaps in Indonesia's approach to combating problems associated with IUU fishing, unresolved borders, and maritime piracy and armed robbery. For example, a few of the recommended solutions in chapter 4 are to renew the bilateral Strategic Partnership Agreement and its accompanying maritime

cooperation MOU, vouch for Indonesia's maritime security interests on the international stage, and to look for ways to develop Indonesia's maritime domain awareness and patrolling capabilities. These solutions, coupled with the other recommendations in chapter 4, contribute to a comprehensive whole-of-government approach to solving Indonesia's maritime security problems.

Interpretation of the Findings

Closer cooperation between Indonesia and the U.S. can result in myriad benefits to both countries. The research in this thesis indicates that many opportunities exist for the U.S. to contribute to Indonesia's maritime security. Of course, implementation of any of these recommendations is contingent on the Indonesian Government's desire for assistance. However, an extensive bilateral relationship already exists and the recommendations in this thesis do not constitute a monumental change to the bilateral dynamics. Therefore, Indonesia is likely to be amenable to further assistance. Supporting this conclusion is the theme throughout this analysis that Indonesia, under the Widodo administration, is serious about improving its maritime security situation. As discussed, Widodo's focus on rejuvenating Indonesia's maritime culture and addressing its maritime security problems provide good opportunities for the U.S. to strengthen the bilateral relationship and advance U.S. regional interests. To make these advancements, U.S. policy must take Indonesia's problems and needs into account.

As U.S. policymakers and their staffs evaluate the U.S. posture in the Indo-Pacific and look to distribute resources throughout the region, Indonesia should be a primary focus. If the Department of Defense issues an update to the *Asia-Pacific Maritime Security Strategy*, perhaps as the *Indo-Pacific Maritime Security Strategy*, the problems

and recommendations analyzed in this thesis can inform this strategy's approach to Indonesia. The analysis and priorities in this thesis emphasize the links between Indonesia's maritime security and U.S. regional interests. Therefore, as the U.S. government plans military exercises and other activities, including distribution of funds and sales of excess defense articles, U.S. planners should understand how Indonesia fits into the fabric of U.S. regional involvement.

Recommendations for Further Study

Any of the three problem areas examined in this thesis could benefit from study in greater depth. However, IUU fishing represents one of the most pressing and serious problems throughout Southeast Asia. As this thesis has explained, IUU fishing violates national sovereignty, threatens food security, and is a nexus for transnational crime. An in-depth study of how nations in Southeast Asia combat IUU fishing could yield additional areas for U.S. assistance and strengthening of regional relationships. In many ways, the approach to combating IUU fishing benefits other maritime security areas. For example, MDA and information sharing help detect IUU fishing and strengthen nations' capabilities to understand and enforce their maritime borders. Additionally, networks designed to share maritime information internationally contribute to increased interoperability and closer national ties. Regional information sharing and closer national ties contribute to U.S. regional interests.

Another area that could yield useful research is a deeper analysis of Indonesia's naval shipbuilding industry and modernization programs. Research into these areas could identify ways for the U.S. Navy and the U.S. defense industry to work closer with the Indonesian government and the indigenous defense industry. For example, Indonesia's

Minimum Essential Force program is designed to increase the size and capability of the Indonesian Navy. However, the research in this thesis indicates the program is not on track to meet its ambitious goals. A study of this program's results and complicating factors could recommend additional ways the U.S. can assist Indonesian naval development and strengthen the bilateral relationship.

A third recommendation for further study is to analyze maritime security issues from the reverse perspective from this thesis. While this thesis looks at maritime security problems from the Indonesian perspective and recommends U.S. solutions, an analysis of U.S. regional maritime security problems designed to identify multilateral solutions could be beneficial. Specifically, an in-depth analysis of U.S. maritime security interests, approach, and gaps could identify areas for the U.S. to seek additional cooperation from partners and allies in the region. The methodology used in this thesis, applying operational design to the instruments of national power, could work well for analysis of U.S.-centered maritime security issues.

Fourth, analysis of some aspect of Indonesia's maritime security apparatus could yield results to further the recommendations of this thesis. A framework like DOTMLPF-P (doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, facilities, and policy), a common U.S. military analytical lens, would be useful, as it could lead to high-fidelity problem recognition and specific recommendations. However, in-depth analysis of this sort would likely require use of Indonesian language sources, as it is unlikely sufficient information exists in English. A discussion of the language problems encountered in this thesis is below.

The topic of maritime security in the Indo-Pacific, and particularly in Southeast Asia, can yield myriad research topics. This thesis has taken a relatively broad look at some maritime security issues facing Indonesia. However, the problems identified in this study are not unique to Southeast Asia's largest country. Many, if not all, of the countries in the region have similar sets of problems. Therefore, the topics studied in this thesis have wide applicability to future research endeavors.

Research Process Considerations

As discussed in chapter 1, the research in this thesis used English language sources exclusively. Although Indonesia uses English widely, it is not the official language. A researcher who reads *Bahasa Indonesia*, the official language of the nation, could explore these topics more completely, as some germane sources do not exist in English. For example, Widodo's election platform and speeches, as well as Indonesian government documents for the 2017 Sea Policy, do not exist in English. The 2015 *Defence White Paper* is available in English, but it reads awkwardly, which could result in misunderstandings of its intentions and nuance. To compensate for materials that exist only in the Indonesian language, this research relied on newspaper articles and other secondhand accounts instead of using original sources. Consequently, it is impossible to have full confidence in the account and analysis without the ability to reference the original source. Researchers who can use Indonesian language sources can conduct a more thorough analysis.

Another problem encountered in this analysis was the developing policies of the nascent Trump administration. The research for this thesis started in summer 2017 and concluded in spring 2018. During this eight-month period, the Trump administration's

foreign policy gained fidelity. For example, the *National Security Strategy* and the *National Defense Strategy* were released in December 2017 and January 2018, respectively. This mid-research addition modified the U.S. approach, policy, and goals that underpin the conclusions in chapter 4. As the Trump administration's foreign policies continue to develop, the analysis and recommendations in a study like this one can gain accuracy and relevance.

Conclusion

As the U.S. remains committed to maintaining a free and open Indo-Pacific, and the U.S. Navy remains committed to forward presence in the Indo-Pacific, the maritime domain will only grow in importance. With an expansive maritime territory, maritime security is at the forefront of Indonesia's attention. In pursuit of becoming a Global Maritime Fulcrum, Indonesia has rejuvenated its maritime focus. This renewed focus has created opportunities for the U.S. to strengthen this strategically important bilateral relationship. As this thesis has shown, the U.S.-Indonesia relationship has immense potential for the United States. A key avenue to strengthen this relationship is through increased U.S. investment in Indonesian maritime security, as Indonesia's maritime security is closely tied to its overall strength as a partner nation. Heightened focus on this bilateral relationship, and implementation of the recommendations in this thesis, can advance U.S. interests in the Indo-Pacific and help to achieve U.S. strategic objectives regionally and beyond.

APPENDIX A
SUPPORTING INFORMATION

Maritime Piracy

Reference: United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Article 101¹

Piracy consists of any of the following acts:

1. Any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation, committed for private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private ship or a private aircraft, and directed: on the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against persons or property on board such ship or aircraft; against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place outside the jurisdiction of any State;
2. Any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship or of an aircraft with knowledge of facts making it a pirate ship or aircraft;
3. Any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described in subparagraph (1) or (2).

Maritime Armed Robbery

Reference: International Maritime Organization Resolution A.1025(26), “Code of Practice for the Investigation of Crimes of Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships”²

“Armed robbery against ships” means any of the following acts:

1. Any illegal act of violence or detention or any act of depredation, or threat thereof, other than an act of piracy, committed for private ends and directed against a ship or against persons or property on board such a ship, within a State’s internal waters, archipelagic waters and territorial sea.

2. Any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described above.

Illegal, Unregulated, and Unreported (IUU) Fishing

Reference: United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization, “International Plan of Action to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated Fishing”³

Illegal fishing refers to activities:

1. Conducted by national or foreign vessels in waters under the jurisdiction of a State, without the permission of that State, or in contravention of its laws and regulations;
2. Conducted by vessels flying the flag of States that are parties to a relevant regional fisheries management organization but operate in contravention of the conservation and management measures adopted by that organization and by which the States are bound, or relevant provisions of the applicable international law; or
3. In violation of national laws or international obligations, including those undertaken by cooperating States to a relevant regional fisheries management organization.

Unreported fishing refers to fishing activities:

1. Which have not been reported, or have been misreported, to the relevant national authority, in contravention of national laws and regulations; or
2. Undertaken in the area of competence of a relevant regional fisheries management organization which have not been reported or have been misreported, in contravention of the reporting procedures of that organization.

Unregulated fishing refers to fishing activities:

1. In the area of application of a relevant regional fisheries management organization that are conducted by vessels without nationality, or by those flying the flag of a State not party to that organization, or by a fishing entity, in a manner that is not consistent with or contravenes the conservation and management measures of that organization; or
2. In areas or for fish stocks in relation to which there are no applicable conservation or management measures and where such fishing activities are conducted in a manner inconsistent with State responsibilities for the conservation of living marine resources under international law.

¹ United Nations Division for Ocean Affairs and Law of the Sea, *United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea*, pt. IV art. 101.

² International Maritime Organization, *Code of Practice for the Investigation of Crimes of Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships*, Resolution A.1025(26), 4.

³ United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization, *International Plan of Action to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing*, (Rome: UN FAO, 2001), 2–3, accessed May 6, 2018, <http://www.fao.org/3/a-y1224e.pdf>.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Government Sources

- Australian Foreign Minister and Indonesian Foreign Minister. "Joint Declaration on Maritime Cooperation between the Government of Australia and the Government of the Republic of Indonesia," February 26, 2017. Accessed April 10, 2018. <http://dfat.gov.au/geo/indonesia/Documents/australia-indonesia-joint-declaration-maritime-cooperation.pdf>.
- Bartholomees Jr., J. Boone. "A Survey of the Theory of Strategy." In *U.S. Army War College Guide to National Security Issues*. Vol. 1, *Theory of War and Strategy*, edited by J. Boone Bartholomees Jr., 5th ed. 13–43. Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2012. Accessed March 5, 2018. <https://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=1109>.
- Carter, Ashton B. "IISS Shangri-La Dialogue: 'A Regional Security Architecture Where Everyone Rises'." Speech, Shangri-La Dialogue, Singapore, May 30, 2015. Accessed September 26, 2017. <https://www.defense.gov/News/Speeches/Speech-View/Article/606676/iiss-shangri-la-dialogue-a-regional-security-architecture-where-everyone-rises/>.
- Government of Canada. "Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership Ministerial Statement - March 8, 2018." Last modified March 8, 2018. Accessed April 22, 2018. http://international.gc.ca/trade-commerce/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/agr-acc/cptpp-ptpgp/joint_statement-declaration_conjointe.aspx?lang=eng.
- Harris, Harry. "IISS Fullerton Lecture." Speech, IISS Fullerton Lecture, Singapore, October 17, 2017. Accessed November 1, 2017. <http://www.pacom.mil/Media/SpeechesTestimony/tabid/6706/Article/1345916/iiss-fullerton-lecture.aspx>.
- . "Statement on U.S. Pacific Command Posture 2017." Congressional Testimony, House Armed Services Committee, Washington, D.C., April 26, 2017. Accessed October 24, 2017. https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Harris_04-27-17.pdf.
- . "The United States-Indonesia Bilateral Security Partnership." Speech, U.S. Indonesia Society & American Chamber of Commerce, Jakarta, Indonesia, August 7, 2017. Accessed October 24, 2017. <http://www.pacom.mil/Media/Speeches-Testimony/Article/1272444/the-united-states-indonesia-bilateral-security-partnership/>.

- Indonesian Ministry of Defence. *Indonesia Defence White Paper 2015*, November 20, 2015. Accessed November 10, 2017. <https://www.kemhan.go.id/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/2015-INDONESIA-DEFENCE-WHITE-PAPER-ENGLISH-VERSION.pdf>.
- Kalla, Muhammad Jusuf. "Speech of H.E. Joko Widodo at the 85th Interpol General Assembly." Speech, 85th ICPO-Interpol General Assembly, Bali, Indonesia, November 7, 2016. Accessed April 10, 2018. <https://www.interpol.int/News-and-media/Events/2016/85th-INTERPOL-General-Assembly/85th-INTERPOL-General-Assembly>.
- Malavet, Joaquin F., and Atok Dushanto. "Joint Statement on the United States-Indonesia Bilateral Defense Discussions." Jakarta, Indonesia, November 7, 2017.
- Marsudi, Retno L.P. "2018 Annual Press Statement of the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Indonesia H.E. Retno L.P. Marsudi." Speech, Jakarta, Indonesia, January 9, 2018. Accessed March 20, 2018. <https://www.kemlu.go.id/id/pidato/menlu/Pages/PPTM2018%20MENLU%20RI%20ENG.pdf>.
- Mattis, James N. "Remarks by Secretary Mattis at Shangri-La Dialogue." Speech, Shangri-La Dialogue, Singapore, June 3, 2017. Accessed September 26, 2017. <https://www.defense.gov/News/Transcripts/Transcript-View/Article/1201780/>.
- Millennium Challenge Corporation. "About MCC." Accessed March 28, 2018. <https://www.mcc.gov/about>.
- _____. "Indonesia Compact." Accessed March 28, 2018. <https://www.mcc.gov/where-we-work/program/indonesia-compact>.
- Nation, R. Craig. "National Power." In *U.S. Army War College Guide to National Security Issues*. Vol. 1, *Theory of War and Strategy*, edited by J. Boone Bartholomees Jr., 5th ed. 147–58. Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2012. Accessed March 5, 2018. <https://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=1109>.
- O'Rourke, Ronald. *Maritime Territorial and Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) Disputes Involving China: Issues for Congress*. Congressional Research Service Report for Congress R42784. Washington, D.C.: Library of Congress, September 15, 2017. Accessed October 16, 2017. https://www.everycrsreport.com/files/20170915_R42784_558b32517d9348b693bc49afd429462b6f05734d.pdf.
- Pence, Michael R. "Remarks by the Vice President at ASEAN." Speech, ASEAN Secretariat, Jakarta, Indonesia, April 20, 2017. Accessed October 10, 2017. <https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/04/20/remarks-vice-president-asean>.

- Pence, Michael R., and Joko Widodo. "Remarks by the Vice President and Indonesian President Widodo to the Press." Remarks, Jakarta, Indonesia, April 20, 2017. Accessed September 23, 2017. <https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/04/20/remarks-vice-president-and-indonesian-president-widodo-press>.
- Trump, Donald J., and Joko Widodo "Remarks by President Trump and President Widodo of Indonesia before Bilateral Meeting." Remarks, Hamburg, Germany, July 8, 2017. Accessed October 14, 2017. <https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/07/08/remarks-president-trump-and-president-widodo-indonesia-bilateral-meeting>.
- U.S. Agency for International Development. *U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants: Obligations and Authorizations (July 1, 1945 - September 30, 2016)*. CONG-R-0105, September 30, 2016. Accessed March 28, 2018. http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/pbaah600.pdf.
- U.S. Defense Security Cooperation Agency. "Indonesia." Accessed April 14, 2018. <http://www.dsca.mil/tags/indonesia>.
- U.S. Department of Defense. *The Asia-Pacific Maritime Security Strategy: Achieving U.S. National Security Objectives in a Changing Environment*. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, July 27, 2015. Accessed September 30, 2017. https://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/NDAA%20A-P_Maritime_Security_Strategy-08142015-1300-FINALFORMAT.PDF.
- . "Readout of Secretary Mattis' Meeting with Indonesian Minister of Defense." Last modified January 23, 2018. Accessed April 6, 2018. <https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Releases/News-Release-View/Article/1422071/readout-of-secretary-mattis-meeting-with-indonesian-minister-of-defense/>.
- . *Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America*. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, January 2018. Accessed January 23, 2018. <https://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf>.
- U.S. Department of State. "U.S. Relations with Indonesia." Last modified January 17, 2017. Accessed October 1, 2017. <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2748.htm>.
- U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. *DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, July 2017.
- . Joint Publication 1-0, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States (Change 1)*. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, July 12, 2017.

- . Joint Publication 5-0, *Joint Planning*. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, June 16, 2017.
- U.S. President. *National Security Strategy*. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, February 2015. Accessed September 30, 2017.
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/docs/2015_national_security_strategy_2.pdf.
- . *National Security Strategy of the United States of America*. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, December 2017. Accessed December 23, 2017.
<https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf>.
- U.S. President and Indonesian President. “Joint Declaration on the Comprehensive Partnership between the United States of America and the Republic of Indonesia.” White House. Last modified November 9, 2010. Accessed September 30, 2017.
<https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2010/11/09/joint-declaration-comprehensive-partnership-between-united-states-america>.
- . “Joint Statement by the United States of America and the Republic of Indonesia.” White House. Last modified October 26, 2015. Accessed September 30, 2017. <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/10/26/joint-statement-united-states-america-and-republic-indonesia>.
- U.S. Secretary of State and Indonesian Foreign Minister. “Memorandum of Understanding on Maritime Cooperation between the Government of the Republic of Indonesia and the Government of the United States of America.” Washington, D.C., October 24, 2015.
- U.S. Secretary of Defense and Indonesian Minister of Defence. “Joint Statement on Comprehensive Defense Cooperation Between the Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Indonesia and the Department of Defense of the United States of America.” Washington, D.C. October 26, 2015.
- U.S. Trade Representative. “Indonesia.” Accessed March 28, 2018.
<https://ustr.gov/countries-regions/southeast-asia-pacific/indonesia>.
- U.S. Trade Representative and Indonesia Minister of Industry and Trade. “Memorandum of Understanding Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Republic of Indonesia Concerning the Establishment of the Council on Trade and Investment,” July 16, 1996. Accessed October 28, 2017.
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/agreements/tifa/asset_upload_file10_10199.pdf.

White House. "FACT SHEET - U.S. Building Maritime Capacity in Southeast Asia."
Last modified November 17, 2015. Accessed July 20, 2017.
<https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/11/17/fact-sheet-us-building-maritime-capacity-southeast-asia>.

Academic Articles

Andika, Muhammad Tri. "Indonesia Border Diplomacy under the Global Maritime Fulcrum." *Ritsumeikan International Affairs* 15 (2017): 45–66. Accessed April 9, 2018. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/319826875_Indonesia_Border_Diplomacy_Under_The_Global_Maritime_Fulcrum.

Arif, Muhamad, and Yandry Kurniawan. "Strategic Culture and Indonesian Maritime Security." *Asia & the Pacific Policy Studies* 5, no. 1 (January 2018): 77–89. Accessed April 15, 2018. <https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1002/app5.203>.

Arsana, I Made Andi. "The Delineation of Indonesia's Outer Limits of Its Extended Continental Shelf and Preparation for Its Submission: Status and Problems." United Nations-Nippon Fellowship Programme 2007-2008 (2007). Accessed April 10, 2018. http://www.un.org/depts/los/nippon/unff_programme_home/fellows_pages/fellows_papers/arsana_0708_indonesia.pdf.

Bueger, Christian. "From Dusk to Dawn? Maritime Domain Awareness in Southeast Asia." *Contemporary Southeast Asia* 37, no. 2 (2015): 157–82. Accessed July 17, 2017. https://www.academia.edu/12041839/From_Dusk_to_Dawn_Maritime_Domain_Awareness_in_South_East_Asia.

———. "What is Maritime Security?" *Marine Policy* 53 (March 2015): 159–164. Accessed March 3, 2018. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.marpol.2014.12.005>.

Gindarsah, Iis, and Adhi Priamarizki. "Indonesia's Maritime Doctrine and Security Concerns." *RSIS Policy Report* 9 (2015). Accessed November 5, 2017. <https://www.rsis.edu.sg/rsis-publication/idss/indonesias-maritime-doctrine-and-security-concerns/#.WvGhyi-ZMUE>.

Haenlein, Cathy. "Below the Surface: How Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing Threatens Our Security." *RUSI Occasional Paper* (July 2017). Accessed March 21, 2018. <https://rusi.org/publication/occasional-papers/below-surface-how-illegal-unreported-and-unregulated-fishing-threatens>.

Marzuki, Keoni. "Indonesia's National Sea Policy: Concretising the Global Maritime Fulcrum." *RSIS Commentary*, no. 052 (March 24, 2017). Accessed February 24, 2018. <https://www.rsis.edu.sg/rsis-publication/rsis/co17052-indonesias-national-sea-policy-concretising-the-global-maritime-fulcrum/#.WvGiWC-ZMUE>.

- Nankivell, Kerry Lynn, Jeffrey Reeves, and Ramon Pacheco Pardo, eds. *The Indo-Asia-Pacific's Maritime Future: A Practical Assessment of the State of Asian Seas*. Honolulu, HI: Daniel K. Inouye Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies in partnership with King's College London, March 2017. Accessed April 11, 2018. <http://apcss.org/the-indo-asia-pacifics-maritime-future-a-practical-assessment-of-the-state-of-asian-seas-2/>.
- Neary, Adelle. "Jokowi Spells Out Vision for Indonesia's 'Global Maritime Nexus'." *Southeast Asia from Scott Circle* 5, no. 24 (November 26, 2014). Accessed September 30, 2017. <https://www.csis.org/analysis/southeast-asia-scott-circle-jokowi-spells-out-vision-indonesia's-global-maritime-nexus>".
- Poling, Gregory B., and Conor Cronin. *Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated Fishing as a National Security Threat*. Washington, D.C.: CSIS, November 2017. Accessed January 23, 2018. <https://www.csis.org/analysis/illegal-unreported-and-unregulated-fishing-national-security-threat>.
- Sambhi, Natalie. "Jokowi's 'Global Maritime Axis': Smooth Sailing or Rocky Seas Ahead?" *Security Challenges* 11, no. 2 (2015): 39–55. Accessed November 19, 2017. <http://apo.org.au/node/58233>.
- Sodik, Dikdik Mohamad. "The Indonesian Legal Framework on Baselines, Archipelagic Passage, and Innocent Passage." *Ocean Development & International Law* 43, no. 4 (October 2012): 330–41. Accessed April 9, 2018. <https://doi.org/10.1080/00908320.2012.726830>.
- Supriyanto, Ristian Atriandi. "Out of Its Comfort Zone: Indonesia and the South China Sea." *Asia Policy*, no. 21 (January 2016): 21–28. Accessed October 1, 2017. http://www.nbr.org/publications/asia_policy/Free/092316/AsiaPolicy21_SouthChinaSeaRT_January2016.pdf.

Online Sources

- Allard, Tom, and Bernadette Christina Munthe. "Asserting Sovereignty, Indonesia Renames Part of South China Sea." *Reuters*, July 14, 2017. Accessed February 24, 2018. <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-indonesia-politics-map/asserting-sovereignty-indonesia-renames-part-of-south-china-sea-idUSKBN19Z0YQ>.
- Association of Southeast Asian Nations. "ASEAN Member States." Accessed October 1, 2017. <http://asean.org/asean/asean-member-states/>.
- BBC News*. "Philippines and Indonesia Resolve 20-Year Border Dispute," May 23, 2014. Accessed March 23, 2018. <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-27535004>.

- CNN. "Interview with Indonesian President Joko Widodo." Interview by Christiane Amanpour, January 26, 2015. Accessed October 14, 2017. <http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/1501/26/ampr.01.html>.
- Espenilla, Jacqueline. "Abductions at Sea: A 3-Way Security Challenge for Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines." *The Diplomat*, May 5, 2016. Accessed April 11, 2018. <https://thediplomat.com/2016/05/abductions-at-sea-a-3-way-security-challenge-for-indonesia-malaysia-and-the-philippines/>.
- Hodge, Amanda, and Nivell Rayda. "Indonesia Says Uncle Sam to Lift Last Bans on Kopassus Troops." *The Australian*, February 21, 2018. Accessed April 28, 2018. <https://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/world/us-to-lift-ban-on-indonesian-kopassus-troops/news-story/54a4128144e2d34cef1924f1a948e170>.
- International Maritime Organization. *Code of Practice for the Investigation of Crimes of Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships*. (Resolution A.1025(26)). London: IMO, January 18, 2010. Accessed April 13, 2018. <http://www.imo.org/en/OurWork/Security/PiracyArmedRobbery/Guidance/Documents/A.1025.pdf>.
- The Jakarta Post*. "Indonesia Reinforces Its Command Over Natuna Waters Through Military Bases," September 27, 2016. Accessed April 17, 2018. <http://www.thejakartapost.com/seasia/2016/09/27/indonesia-reinforces-its-command-over-natuna-waters-through-military-bases.html>.
- Laksmana, Evan. "Indonesian Sea Policy: Accelerating Jokowi's Global Maritime Fulcrum?" Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative. Last modified March 23, 2017. Accessed February 24, 2018. <https://amti.csis.org/indonesian-sea-policy-accelerating/>.
- Morrissey, Scott. "U.S. Lifts Indonesia Arms Embargo." Arms Control Association. Last modified January 1, 2006. Accessed April 28, 2018. https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2006_01-02/JANFEB-Indonesia.
- Parameswaran, Prashanth. "America's New Maritime Security Initiative for Southeast Asia." *The Diplomat*, April 2, 2016. Accessed April 19, 2018. <https://thediplomat.com/2016/04/americas-new-maritime-security-initiative-for-southeast-asia/>.
- . "Confronting Indonesia's Maritime Coordination Challenge." *The Diplomat*, April 27, 2017. Accessed September 30, 2017. <http://thediplomat.com/2017/04/confronting-indonesias-maritime-coordination-challenge/>.
- . "Explaining Indonesia's 'Sink the Vessels' Policy Under Jokowi." *The Diplomat*, January 13, 2015. Accessed March 22, 2018. <https://thediplomat.com/2015/01/explaining-indonesias-sink-the-vessels-policy-under-jokowi/>.

- . “Indonesia, Philippines, Malaysia Agree on New Joint Patrols Amid Kidnappings.” *The Diplomat*, May 6, 2016. Accessed April 11, 2018. <https://thediplomat.com/2016/05/indonesia-philippines-malaysia-agree-on-new-joint-patrols-amid-kidnappings/>.
- . “Indonesia Wants Global War on Illegal Fishing.” *The Diplomat*, May 9, 2017. Accessed March 22, 2018. <https://thediplomat.com/2017/05/indonesia-wants-global-war-on-illegal-fishing/>.
- . “Indonesia Wants to Join TPP: President Jokowi.” *The Diplomat*, October 27, 2015. Accessed April 22, 2018. <https://thediplomat.com/2015/10/indonesia-wants-to-join-tpp-jokowi/>.
- . “Indonesia’s War on Illegal Fishing Continues with New Sinkings.” *The Diplomat*, November 1, 2017. Accessed March 20, 2018. <https://thediplomat.com/2017/11/indonesias-war-on-illegal-fishing-continues-with-new-sinkings/>.
- . “The New U.S.-Indonesia Strategic Partnership after Jokowi’s Visit: Problems and Prospects.” Brookings Institution. December 8, 2015. Accessed September 28, 2017. <https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/the-new-u-s-indonesia-strategic-partnership-after-jokowis-visit-problems-and-prospects/>.
- . “What’s Behind Indonesia’s China Drone Buy?” *The Diplomat*, February 27, 2018. Accessed April 22, 2018. <https://thediplomat.com/2018/02/whats-behind-indonesias-china-drone-buy/>.
- . “What’s Next for the New Sulu Sea Trilateral Patrols?” *The Diplomat*, June 20, 2017. Accessed April 11, 2018. <https://thediplomat.com/2017/06/whats-next-for-the-new-sulu-sea-trilateral-patrols/>.
- . “Why Did Indonesia Just Rename Its Part of the South China Sea?” *The Diplomat*, July 17, 2017. Accessed March 2, 2018. <https://thediplomat.com/2017/07/why-did-indonesia-just-rename-its-part-of-the-south-china-sea/>.
- . “Why Did Indonesia Just Sink a Vessel From China?” *The Diplomat*, May 22, 2015. Accessed April 13, 2018. <https://thediplomat.com/2015/05/why-did-indonesia-just-sink-a-vessel-from-china/>.

Rahmat, Ridzwan. “Indonesian Navy to Receive Four ScanEagle UAVs in 2018.” *Jane’s* 360. Last modified February 23, 2018. Accessed April 19, 2018. <http://www.janes.com/article/78118/indonesian-navy-to-receive-four-scaneagle-uavs-in-2018>.

- Shekhar, Vibhanshu, and Joseph Chinyong Liow. "Indonesia as a Maritime Power: Jokowi's Vision, Strategies, and Obstacles Ahead." Brookings Institution, November 7, 2014. Accessed September 28, 2017. <https://www.brookings.edu/articles/indonesia-as-a-maritime-power-jokowis-vision-strategies-and-obstacles-ahead/>.
- Stewart, Phil. "Eyeing China, U.S. Moves to Strengthen Indonesian Defense Ties." *Reuters*, January 22, 2018. Accessed April 14, 2018. <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-indonesia-military/eyeing-china-u-s-moves-to-strengthen-indonesian-defense-ties-idUSKBN1FB25X>.
- The Straits Times*. "Singapore, Indonesia Submit Third Sea Border Treaty to UN," September 27, 2017. Accessed April 10, 2018. <http://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/singapore-indonesia-submit-third-sea-border-treaty-to-un>.
- Trading Economics. "Military Expenditure (% of GDP) in Indonesia." Accessed April 17, 2018. <https://tradingeconomics.com/indonesia/military-expenditure-percent-of-gdp-wb-data.html>.
- United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization. "Port State Measures Agreement." Last modified 2018. Accessed April 11, 2018. <http://www.fao.org/fishery/psm/agreement/en>.
- United Nations Food and Agricultural Organization Fisheries & Aquaculture Department. "Parties to the Port State Measures Agreement." Accessed April 5, 2018. <http://www.fao.org/fishery/psm/agreement/parties/en>.
- Widodo, Joko. "Indonesia in the Changing World: A Conversation with President Joko Widodo of Indonesia." Interview by Richard C. Bush III. Brookings Institution, October 27, 2015. Accessed October 14, 2017. https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/20151027_indonesia_widodo_transcript.pdf.
- Witular, Rendi A. "Jokowi Launches Maritime Doctrine to the World." *Jakarta Post*, November 13, 2014. Accessed December 24, 2017. <http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2014/11/13/jokowi-launches-maritime-doctrine-world.html>.

Other Sources

- Laksmiana, Evan. "Rebalancing Indonesia's Naval Force: Trends, Nature, and Drivers." In *Naval Modernisation in South-East Asia: Nature, Causes and Consequences*, edited by Geoffrey Till and Jane Chan, 175–203. Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2014. Accessed December 5, 2017. https://www.academia.edu/16314933/Balancing_Indonesias_Naval_Force_Trends_Nature_and_Drivers.

- Oegroseno, Arif Havas. "Maritime Border Diplomacy: An Indonesian Lifeline." In *Maritime Border Diplomacy*, by Judy Ellis, 31-33. Dordrecht: BRILL, 2012. Accessed April 9, 2018. ProQuest Ebook Central.
- ReCAAP. *ReCAAP Information Sharing Centre 2017 Annual Report*. Singapore: ReCAAP, 2017. Accessed April 11, 2018. <http://www.recaap.org/reports>.
- Staples, Andrew. *ASEAN Connections: How Mega-Regional Trade and Investment Initiatives in Asia Will Shape Business Strategy in ASEAN and Beyond*. Edited by Pamela Qiu. Economist Corporate Network, April 2016. Accessed April 22, 2018. http://ftp01.economist.com.hk/ECN_papers/ASEANConnections.
- United Nations Division for Ocean Affairs and Law of the Sea. *United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea*. United Nations, 1982. Accessed April 5, 2018. http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/convention_overview_convention.htm.
- United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization. *International Plan of Action to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing*. Rome: United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization, 2001. Accessed May 6, 2018. <http://www.fao.org/3/a-y1224e.pdf>.