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**THE PROFESSIONAL ETHICS OF BRAZILIAN AIR
FORCE OFFICERS**

by

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THE PROFESSIONAL ETHICS OF BRAZILIAN AIR FORCE OFFICERS

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ABSTRACT

The Brazilian Air Force (FAB), through the Aeronautics Directorate of Education, executes twelve categories of courses to educate and train career officers and temporary officers. However, a look at the professional training of junior officers reveals shortcomings, especially concerning the teaching of military ethics. The document defining the professional profile of FAB officers, Professional Profile of Aeronautical Officers (PPOA), does not make clear distinctions about the ethical aspects associated with the combatant role of each specialty. Therefore, the PPOA does not define the attitudes, values, and skills necessary for the performance of the guard and security missions executed by all junior officers or warfare missions performed by career officers. Moreover, there is no conceptual and intellectual agreement in FAB about the competencies that characterize a military professional, nor any definitions about the roles that this professional should play in society. This thesis demonstrates that the curricula of the FAB courses for officers, in the military field, must be modified to meet the demands of the mission to be performed, which is evolving from a traditional profile to a hybrid war profile. Also, the thesis identifies the necessary balance between technical and military knowledge, demonstrating that ethical and moral education is the nucleus that connects all classes and specialties within the FAB.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

AFA	Air Force Academy
CADAR	Adaptation Course for Dentists
CAFAR	Adaptation Course for Pharmacists
CAMAR	Adaptation Course for Doctors
CFOAV	Training Course for Aviators Officers
CFOINT	Training Course for Quartermasters
CFOINF	Training Course for Infantry Officers
CFOE	Course for Specialist Officers
CIAAR	Aeronautical Instruction and Adaptation Center
COMGEP	General Personnel Command
DCA	Aeronautical Command Guideline
DIRAP	Directorate of Personnel Administration of the Aeronautics
DIRENS	Directorate of Education
EAOAp	Support Officers Adaptation Internship
EAOEAR	Adaptation Stage for Engineers Officers
EAOF	Adaptation Internship for Officers
EEAR	School of Aeronautical Experts
EIAC	Chaplain Education and Adaptation Internship
EPCAR	Preparatory School to Cadets-of-Air
FAB	Brazilian Air Force
PPOA	Professional Profile of Aeronautical Officers
MCA	Aeronautical Command Manual
NSCA	Aeronautics Command System Norm
OE	Organization of Education
QOCON	Specialty of Convoked Officers
SERENS	Regional Education Sections
SEREP	Aeronautics Personnel Recruitment and Training Services
SISTENS	Aeronautics Educational System
UNIFA	Air Force University

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I. THE PROFESSIONAL ETHICS OF BRAZILIAN AIR FORCE JUNIOR OFFICERS

A glance at the professional education of Brazilian Air Force (FAB) junior officers reveals several gaps, particularly regarding the teaching of military ethics. The FAB has no manual that establishes the teaching of necessary methodologies and techniques to build the ethical professional profile of commissioned officers and temporary officers¹ as required by the officers' various specialties, such as technicians (including pedagogues, lawyers, and journalists),² physicians, pharmacists, and veterinarians.³ Everything that must be transmitted to these officers is contemplated in the curricula of the courses, but much of the teaching of ethics linked to the organizational culture is carried out in the daily activities. These routines, although they constitute an informal curriculum, are not regulated centrally by the responsible organizations. In addition, the document that sets the Professional Profile of Aeronautical Officers (PPOA)⁴ does not make clear distinctions regarding the ethical aspects associated with the combat role of each specialty—and thus fails to define the attitudes, values, and abilities needed either for protection and security duty (required for all junior officers) or the role of warfighting (required for all commissioned officers).⁵

Furthermore, there is no conceptual and intellectual agreement in Brazil regarding the definition—or requirements—of a professional soldier. The only description of a

¹ The Complementary Officers Table, which refers to the Temporary Officer, is designed to complete Career Officer Charts, consisting of personnel graduated by higher education establishments, in courses officially recognized, in accordance with federal legislation, that meet to the requirements established by Decree 85.866 of April 1, 1981.

² Comando da Aeronáutica, *Currículo Mínimo da Primeira fase do Estágio de Adaptação Técnico* [Minimum Curriculum of the First Phase of the Technical Adaptation Stage] (EAT), ICA 37–239 (Brasília, DF: Comando da Aeronáutica, 2015).

³ Comando da Aeronáutica, *Currículo Mínimo da Primeira fase do Estágio de Adaptação e Serviço* [Minimum Curriculum of the First Stage of the Adaptation and Service Internship] (EAS), ICA 37–393 (Brasília, DF: Comando da Aeronáutica, 2015).

⁴ Comando da Aeronáutica, *Perfil Profissional do Oficial da Aeronáutica* [Professional Profile of Aeronautical Officers] (PPOA), MCA 36–7 (Brasília, DF: Comando da Aeronáutica, 2012).

⁵ Richard Gabriel, *To Serve with Honor: A Treatise on Military Ethics and the Way of the Soldier* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1982), 81.

professional soldier or of military ethos mostly concerns the soldier as a combatant and stems almost exclusively from the experience of the older officers: the inheritance of an obsolete organizational culture. Although using older officers as a source of professional development is valid in several aspects, such as to reinforce critical institutional values,⁶ it often does not reflect true, objective, professional education and accumulation of knowledge or expertise. In addition, relying on older officers to educate and train the new ones delays curriculum development; older officers tend to resist change.

Moreover, because the professional experience of the older officers generally reflects their personal perceptions and those of other older officers, changes in the officer training policy mostly depend on personal opinions and views rather than objective profession-related requirements. The lack of an established military ethos and these practices prevent adequate continuity in the educational process to provide improvement and allow for standardization, proportionality, and balance between the military officers' specialties.

A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION

This thesis attempts to answer the following research question: How can the Brazilian Air Force best adapt its existing military ethics-related curricula to help junior officers increase professionalism⁷ and, therefore, ensure personnel readiness for their combat missions?

This thesis demonstrates that the FAB's academic curricula, in the military field, must be modified to meet mission operational demands. Also, it identifies the necessary balance between technical and academic knowledge, demonstrating that ethical formation is the core that connects all classes and ranks inside the Brazilian Air Force.

⁶ Tania Godoy, "Educação aos Militares Após a Ditadura" [Education for Military after Dictatorship], XXVI Simpósio Nacional de História, July 17–22, 2011, http://www.snh2011.anpuh.org/resources/anais/14/1300881345_ARQUIVO_TextoANPUHTaniaRPGodoy.pdf.

⁷ Professionalism is understood in terms of expertise, corporateness, and responsibility, all of them applied in a specific jurisdiction and with social legitimacy.

B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION

The investigation of the FAB's military ethics and military ethics curricula is fundamental to the armed forces and the nation because of its practical implications. Since 2016, the FAB has been undergoing a period of restructuring and modernization to become more efficient. Achieving efficiency and effectiveness calls for developing a professional military capable of fulfilling the range of assigned missions at a reduced cost. In this connection, FAB's goal to be recognized internationally as an Operational and Combat Air Force requires coordination and cooperation among the three military branches, and, on an international level, requires coordination and cooperation of these branches with the armed forces of allied nations. In this context, this thesis will be useful to policy makers and the FAB because it seeks to identify specific steps, themes, and areas to improve the Brazilian Air Force's curricula aimed at modernizing the FAB and helping it fulfill new missions effectively.

C. LITERATURE REVIEW

To elaborate a coherent analysis of the social framework of the current military culture in Brazil, its values, priorities, and interpretations of professionalism, four specific areas are studied. These four directly influence the curriculum of the training courses for FAB's officers. The objective of this broad analysis is to achieve a complete picture of the creation of the military character today, how this character influences the development of ethics and professionalism in the barracks and, consequently, the definition of the ideal type of officer (professional military) that will guide the curricula of the training courses to officers.

First, this thesis analyzes the literature that discusses military professionalism to verify the conformity of military teaching in the Brazilian Air Force. The beginning of the research seeks to establish the necessary definitions for the understanding of the nature of the military profession. Then, this thesis reviews the literature on traditions of organizational culture, which is also very important when analyzing the military history of a nation.

1. On Military Professionalism

For this aspect, the first work that I analyze is *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations*, by Samuel Huntington. In this book, the author introduces the idea that civil-military relations are based on a balance of political power, with the military participating in that process as a professional body.⁸

Not necessarily a counterpoint, but a different approach to what Huntington presents is presented by Charles Moskos and Frank Wood in *The Military: More Than Just a Job?*⁹ Moskos and Wood are more incisive in establishing the uniqueness of the military profession by stating that although the military maintains its autonomy, society modifies the armed forces.¹⁰ For Moskos and Wood, the armed forces would be moving from an institutional profile to an occupational one.¹¹

To balance the ideas of Huntington, Moskos and Woods, this thesis uses the book *The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait*, by Morris Janowitz, one of the first sociologists to examine the military with this lens.¹² He analyzes the demographic evolution of the military, emphasizing changes in society and the advancement of technology as causes of change within the military. For Janowitz, despite the social pressures that derive from occupationalism, the spirit of the warrior remains alive as a necessity for the survival of the institution in the fulfillment of its social mission.¹³

To finish this first part of the analysis, I consider *The Future of the Army Profession*, edited by Don Snider, Gayle Watkins, and Lloyd Matthews. This work is a collection of essays by several authors with extensive experience in the military field and is divided into

⁸ Samuel Huntington, *The Soldier and the State* (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2000), 3 and 7.

⁹ Charles Moskos and Frank Wood, *The Military: More than Just a Job?* (Washington, DC: Pergamon-Brassey's, 1988), 3.

¹⁰ Moskos and Wood, 3.

¹¹ Moskos and Wood, 3–4.

¹² “The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait,” Goodreads, August 28, 2018, https://www.goodreads.com/book/show/1402264.The_Professional_Soldier.

¹³ Morris Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait* (New York: Free Press, 2017), 31–36.

seven different sections: Setting the Stage, The Profession's Military-Technical Expert Knowledge, The Political-Social Arena, Ethics and the Army Profession, Professional Leadership, Internal Expertise and Institutional Management, and Conclusions. The sections on which this thesis focuses are Section I - Setting the Stage, concerning professionalism; Section IV - Ethics and the Army Profession, regarding ethics; and Section V - Professional Leadership and Section VI - Internal Expertise and Institutional Management, about education.

Subsequently, I analyze the literature that explains how the armed forces incorporate moral values and create their Code of Ethics, which reinforce many of the paradigms and mythologies that underpin the role played by the military in Brazil.

2. On Military Ethics

A second body of literature discusses and analyzes military ethics. The first step is to evaluate the concept of universal and absolute values and their applicability, based on the book *The Abolition of Man*,¹⁴ by C.S. Lewis, which attempts to persuade the reader of the importance and relevance of universal values like honesty and veracity in contemporary society.¹⁵

Some ethicists discuss values in the armed forces. *True Faith and Allegiance: The Burden of Military Ethics*, by Dr. James H. Toner, highlights the imperative need for a moral construction of the soldier's personality; *To Serve with Honor: The Treatise on Military Ethics and the Way of the Soldier*, by Richard A. Gabriel, states that the military profession is qualitatively different from any other profession and has been "contaminated" by commercial and civilian standards, prejudicing its capabilities.¹⁶

Both works not only analyze the military moral precepts in contrast to the moral standards of society, but also establish professional foundations based on this concept. This will be essential in creating a connection with the issue raised in the first part of the

¹⁴ I use the Portuguese version of this book.

¹⁵ C.S. Lewis, *A Abolição do Homem* [The Abolition of Man] (São Paulo: Martins Fontes, 2005), 10, 33–34, 37–38.

¹⁶ Gabriel, xiii.

analysis, about the institutional organization—attached to military values, being influenced by civilian precepts and occupational organization—related to social market values.

Returning to the book *The Future of the Army Profession*, but this time focusing on Section IV - Ethics and the Army Profession, I confirm that morality is essential and helps to improve general competencies. The author of the first essay, John Mattox, asserts, as well as does Toner,¹⁷ that military professionals must have competence and character. They must be moral and technically skillful leaders.¹⁸

3. On Military Education

The next step is to extract from the existing literature how Brazilian military education reflects this social construct and this code of ethics. The idea of moral education is developed in the book *Lawrence Kohlberg: Ética e Educação Moral* (Lawrence Kohlberg: Ethics and Moral Education), by Angela Biaggio.¹⁹ Kohlberg's theoretical work reconciles philosophy with psychology in the study of morality and establishes practical applications for moral education in education organizations.²⁰

Military Education: Past, Present, and Future, by Gregory C. Kennedy and Keith Nielson, examines the “past failures and successes in the area of military education in the hope that the knowledge that history provides of such experiences will help modern military institutions to gain understanding of ... what can and cannot be done.”²¹ The idea of preparing leaders and not only warriors is central in military education. Any planned military course should focus its structure to impart experience through the study of military

¹⁷ James H. Toner, *True Faith and Allegiance: The Burden of Military Ethics* (Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 1995), 53–54.

¹⁸ Don Snider, Gayle Watkins, and Lloyd Matthews, *The Future of the Army Profession* (Boston: McGraw-Hill Primis, 2002), 291–292.

¹⁹ Angela Biaggio, *Lawrence Kohlberg: Ética e Educação Moral* [Ethics and Moral Education] (São Paulo: Moderna, 2002), 11.

²⁰ Biaggio, 11–12.

²¹ Gregory Kennedy and Keith Neilson, *Military Education: Past, Present, and Future* (Westport, CT: Prager, 2002), xi.

history.²² The authors agree with Toner about the military being a critical institution of the state machine, and that military education should be a government priority.²³

In Section V - Professional Leadership Section of *The Future of the Army Profession*, the author of the article “Reality Check: The Human and Spiritual Needs of Soldiers and How to Prepare them for Combat,” John Brinsfield, declares that the rise in spirituality and religiosity must be seen as a natural expression of human beings and culture, and is a tool for the improvement of the military as a profession.²⁴ These statements are strengthened with Lewis’s concepts of universal morality and Toner’s statement about transcendental truth as the origin of military morality.²⁵

On the other hand, Joe LeBoeuf, in his case study “The 2000 Army Training and Leader Development Panel,” argues that an education system must adapt to the operational needs of this new century.²⁶ He traces the need for a continuing education system and states that the focus of this new military education must be on full-spectrum operations.²⁷

4. On Traditions and Organizational Culture

Finally, I analyze the existing literature on the social structure of the Brazilian Armed Forces from its creation to the present, verifying how history has shaped the military and the relationship between barracks and society, establishing a link between the development of the curricula and all previous information collected.

In their book *A Invenção das Tradições* (The Invention of Traditions), Eric J. Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger discuss habits or behaviors that, for various reasons, are

²² Kennedy and Neilson, 85, 99.

²³ Kennedy and Neilson, ix.

²⁴ John Brinsfield, “Reality Check: The Human and Spiritual Needs of Soldiers and How to Prepare Them for Combat,” in *The Future of the Army Profession*, ed. Don Snider, Gayle Watkins, and Lloyd Matthews (Boston: McGraw-Hill Primis, 2002), 400–405.

²⁵ James Toner, “A Message to Garcia: Leading Soldiers in Moral Mayhem,” in *The Future of the Army Profession*, ed. Don Snider, Gayle Watkins, and Lloyd Matthews (Boston: McGraw-Hill Primis, 2002), 317.

²⁶ Joe LeBoeuf, “Case No. 3: The 2000 Army Training and Leader Development Panel,” in *The Future of the Army Profession*, ed. Don Snider, Gayle Watkins, and Lloyd Matthews (Boston: McGraw-Hill Primis, 2002), 493.

²⁷ LeBoeuf, 493.

absorbed in some societies as if they were part of the cultural heritage, when in fact they were created more recently according to state objectives. Similarly, the authors consider that the teaching system of an armed force is a result of its traditions and values.²⁸ Hobsbawm notes that the invented traditions fall into three overlapping categories: a) those that establish social cohesion in and the conditions of admission to a group; b) those that establish or legitimize institutions, status, or relations of authority, and c) those that promote socialization, the inculcation of ideas, value systems, and behavior patterns.²⁹

Hobsbawm affirms that “invented tradition” is a set of practices, usually regulated by rules or openly accepted, which seek to inculcate specific values and norms of behavior through repetition, practices, ritual, or symbols, evoking continuity with the past. In fact, whenever possible, attempts are made to establish continuity with an appropriate historical past.³⁰ In short, “they are reactions to new situations that either take the form of reference to previous situations or establish their own past through almost obligatory repetition.”³¹

In Hobsbawm’s view, the invented traditions differ from customs since the goal of such traditions is invariability. They impose fixed (usually formalized) practices, such as repetition.³² The custom, he maintains, cannot be invariant, because life is not so even in orthodox societies.³³ In Hobsbawm’s view, there is also an apparent difference between invented tradition and convention or routine.³⁴ He posits that social practice that must be repeated frequently, for convenience and greater efficiency, generates a certain number of conventions and routines to facilitate the transmission of custom.³⁵ Unlike traditions, he reflects, conventions have no relevant symbolic

²⁸ Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger, *A Invenção das Tradições* [The Invention of Traditions] (Rio de Janeiro: Paz e Terra, 1997), 21.

²⁹ Hobsbawm and Ranger, 17.

³⁰ Hobsbawm and Ranger, 9.

³¹ Hobsbawm and Ranger, 10.

³² Hobsbawm and Ranger, 10.

³³ Hobsbawm and Ranger, 10.

³⁴ Hobsbawm and Ranger, 11.

³⁵ Hobsbawm and Ranger, 11.

function, and their functions and technical justifications are not ideological.³⁶ With this in mind, it is easier to determine the origin of the process of inventing traditions in the case of officially instituted and planned ceremonials, provided they are well documented, such as the construction of Nazi symbolism, especially in the SS, for example.³⁷ Typically, this type of practice looks to the society's past for a repertoire of elements composed of florid language, as well as symbolic practices and communications.³⁸ Thus, political institutions, ideological movements, and groups without predecessors use the invention of historical continuity through the creation of an ancient past that goes beyond real historical continuity, whether by legend or invention, seeking to legitimize and strengthen its organization.³⁹

This is corroborated by the work of the anthropologist Mauro Celso Castro, in his book *A Invenção do Exército Brasileiro* (The Invention of the Brazilian Army), which explains some traditions and norms that helped to build the culture of the Brazilian Armed Forces.⁴⁰ Castro stresses that traditions are cultural constructs necessary for individuals to interpret and classify reality.⁴¹ Castro assumes that the symbols and rituals of the Brazilian Army, in the sense that they were not a natural expression of the military institution, were rather an institutional movement orchestrated to strengthen specific values.⁴² He further notes that these ceremonies and symbols allow, through the evocation of the past, for the building of the social identity of the army and for the development of the feeling that the army is perennially in opposition to social change, defining the moral values that are dear to it and forging its organizational culture.⁴³

³⁶ Hobsbawm and Ranger, 11.

³⁷ Hobsbawm and Ranger, 12.

³⁸ Hobsbawm and Ranger, 14

³⁹ Hobsbawm and Ranger, 15.

⁴⁰ Mauro Celso Castro, *A invenção do Exército Brasileiro* [The Invention of the Brazilian Army] (Rio de Janeiro: Zahar, 2002), 7.

⁴¹ Castro, 7.

⁴² Castro, 7.

⁴³ Castro, 7.

Castro makes it clear that the term “invention” does not point to something false or fake, as opposed to an authentic or true tradition. For him, it is a phenomenon found in the most diverse countries and historical contexts, recognizing that all traditions are true. The distinction is between those traditions that are inherited naturally and those that are mastered and created. In Castro’s words, “common to all cases would be the attempt to express identity, cohesion and social stability amid situations of rapid historical transformation, through the use of the invention of ceremonies and symbols that evoke continuity with an often-ideal or mythical past.”⁴⁴

Two clear examples of this dynamic are the institution of the Duke of Caxias as patron of the Brazilian Army and the creation of the mythical war against the communists represented in the ceremonial commemoration of the defeat of the Communist *Intentona*. Both symbols—the *Intentona* and the Duke of Caxias—emerged in the troubled 1920s and 1930s. It was not by chance that this happened. The whole period was marked by deep divisions inside the Brazilian Armed Forces, inherited from the 1889 coup that ended the monarchical regime and established the republic in Brazil.⁴⁵

In short, the literature suggests that inherited and invented traditions exist mutually and provide a service to help organizations accommodate a set of institutional values that are considered essential for their existence.

The information given by Castro concerning culture in the FAB as an inheritance of the culture of the Brazilian Army and the Navy is fleshed out in Shawn C. Smallman’s book *Fear and Memory in the Brazilian Army and Society, 1889–1954*, which focuses on almost half a century of the history of the Brazilian Army (EB).⁴⁶ One part of this book is especially useful to address facts directly connected with the traditions created inside the

⁴⁴ Castro, 7.

⁴⁵ To see more detail, see Appendix A - Brazilian Military History.

⁴⁶ Shawn C. Smallman, *Fear & Memory in the Brazilian Army & Society, 1889–1954* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2002), 1.

Brazilian Armed Forces. Another part underpins Appendix A, to complement information about military history in Brazil.

The fourth book that I use is *Antropologia dos Militares: Reflexões sobre pesquisas de campo* (Anthropology of the Military: Reflections on Field Research), edited by Mauro Celso Castro and Piero Leirner, in which diverse authors investigate how the military identity and its world understanding are constructed. Castro himself confirms Smallman's view about the military personnel's distrust of the ability of civilians to lead the nation, since it is clear that the militaries are considered intellectually, socially, and morally superior because of their institution.⁴⁷ In the same book, the small rituals, ceremonies, and physical expressions (haircut style, for example) are demonstrated to be essential in the construction of this institutional identity.⁴⁸

Finally, in closing the review of the literary research used in this work, I consider *Socialização em uma Instituição Total: Implicações da Educação em uma Academia Militar* (Socialization in a Total Institution: Implications of Education in a Military Academy), a thesis by Giuliana Franco Leal, in order to analyze the institutional characteristics presented in the Brazilian Army. Leal discusses the process of secondary socialization of cadets in the Brazilian Air Force.⁴⁹ The analysis demonstrates that the author directly confirms Castro's theories.

D. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES

I hypothesize that the Brazilian Air Force must establish a clear, fundamental military ethos with which to guide professional curricula development for both temporary and commissioned officers. These two professional profiles are very close in the military

⁴⁷ Mauro Celso Castro, "Em Campo com os Militares" [On Training Camp Together with the Military], in *Antropologia dos Militares: Reflexões sobre Pesquisas de Campo*, ed. Mauro Celso Castro and Piero Leirner (Rio de Janeiro: FGV, 2009), 24–26.

⁴⁸ Juliana Cavilha, "Das Entrevistas aos Rituais: Dialogando com os Militares," in *Antropologia dos Militares: Reflexões sobre Pesquisas de Campo*, ed. Mauro Celso Castro and Piero Leirner (Rio de Janeiro: FGV, 2009), 139.

⁴⁹ Giuliana Leal, "Socialização em uma Instituição Total: Implicações da Educação em uma Academia Militar" [Socialization in a Total Institution: Implications of Education in a Military Academy], *Educação & Sociedade* 34, no. 123 (April–June 2013), 389, <https://www.cedes.unicamp.br/publicacoes/edicao/47>.

aspect; however, the temporary officer performs activities related mainly to the security of the facilities and is not involved in combat activities. Nonetheless, temporary officers need an ethos—an ethical basis through which to understand their actions and mission, as do commissioned officers.

Today, officers' training courses do not clearly define what knowledge, skills, and attitudes form the core of the profession, which differs from training for other professions. Therefore, such knowledge, attitudes, and skills must be incorporated into the process of institutionalization. Thus, I hypothesize that ethical education, based on universal values, must precede technical and academic education, and the FAB curricula must be adapted so that the officers reach Kohlberg's post-conventional moral stages. I also hypothesize that the FAB curricula needs to reflect a balance between the institutional and occupational model, and military professionals have to be prepared to fulfill missions in an air force with a constabulary force profile, to fight in irregular and hybrid warfare.

E. THESIS OVERVIEW

Chapter II introduces the research question and analyzes the concepts related to military professionalism, establishing how these theories relate to each other through a detailed literature review. My purpose is to determine factors that create a professional of war and whether we can consider temporary officers as entirely or partially included in that concept.

Focusing on ethics, Chapter III addresses the concepts linked to ethics, morals, and values, starting from these concepts in a universal aspect and particularizing them in the military sphere. My aim here is to clarify the significance of the values in comparison to technical and academic knowledge in shaping an institutionalized military professional.

Chapter IV describes moral formation based on general concepts drawn by Kohlberg that will support some considerations related to military education. I use some material from education professionals, all with military experience, to outline how the Brazilian Armed Forces deal with the consequences of the previous conclusions about professionalism and values.

Chapter V analyzes how the historical facts can evidence military education and training throughout history. To trace this process, I describe how the Brazilian military was formed in the colonial era, analyzing its transformation after the independence process and creation of the Brazilian monarchy. I address the period of revolutions, which evoked political polarization within the Brazilian Armed Forces and the consequent involvement of the military in armed uprisings that helped to consolidate the military as a moderating power in the nation. Furthermore, I analyze two theses that take anthropological and sociological approaches,⁵⁰ which help me to evidence those elements in the modern military system of socialization. First, I consider those elements within the Brazilian Army, and then, within our focal branch: the Brazilian Air Force.

Chapter VI examines how the Brazilian Air Force educates and trains its future junior officers. Moreover, it compares the previous theory and history with the curricular evolution of the training courses of FAB officers, in terms of the typical military professional fields. The purpose of this comparison is to identify how much the concept of professionalism harmonizes with educational practice, and how that educational approach prepares new officers to fulfill the FAB mission.

Finally, Chapter VII summarizes, condenses, and analyzes the data and information collected to allow a logical chain of reasoning, presenting the findings for the confirmation of the hypothesis. In conclusion, since the academic curricula of the training for FAB officers must be modified in the military area of knowledge, I determine how best to improve it to fully meet the operational demands of the missions the Brazilian Air Force must perform.

⁵⁰ Mauro Celso Castro is an anthropologist and Giuliana Leal, a sociologist.

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II. MILITARY PROFESSIONALISM

The question that guides the research documented in this thesis—“How can the Brazilian Air Force best adapt its existing military ethics-related curricula to help junior officers increase professionalism?”—emphasizes three words: ethics, curricula, and professionalism. In this context, this chapter seeks to provide an overview of the main theoretical concepts related to military professionalism.

A. OVERVIEW OF MILITARY PROFESSIONALISM

Samuel Huntington was one of the first authors to deepen the study of the barracks, developing an analysis that sought to investigate and delineate the characteristics of the military as a profession. His work, *The Soldier and the State*, introduced the modern concept of the civil-military relationship. In practice, this concept maintains that the military is and always will be a political agent within the structure of the State.⁵¹ According to Huntington, “Military Institutions which reflect only social values may be incapable of performing effectively their military function. On the other hand, it may be impossible to contain within society military institutions shaped purely by functional imperatives.”⁵² From this assertion, we can deduce that an armed force that does not reflect prevailing social values will not be able to fulfill its assignments. In the same way, an armed force that reflects only the threats to which it was destined to fight⁵³ (reflected mainly in its capacities techniques) will not be able to fulfill its mission either.

It is in this context that Huntington expresses what he considers to be the most compelling thesis in his work: Huntington says that “a profession is a peculiar kind of functional group with highly specialized characteristics.”⁵⁴ Nonetheless, this definition is not sufficient to distinguish military professionals. To distinguish military professionals from medical or legal professionals, Huntington deepens his analysis and allows us a

⁵¹ Huntington, 3.

⁵² Huntington, 2.

⁵³ Huntington, 2.

⁵⁴ Huntington, 7.

conceptualization of professionalism that is the basis for the present review of the professional profile of the Brazilian Air Force Temporary Officer.

Huntington states that three distinct characteristics connect professionalism to a special kind of vocation: expertise, responsibility, and corporateness.⁵⁵ For this analysis to be as precise as possible, it is necessary to conceptualize each one of these characteristics so that it is possible to identify them, first in the Brazilian Armed Forces, and later, in the Brazilian Air Force, specifically in the Corps of Temporary Officers.

The first characteristic, expertise, is related to specialized knowledge and skill in a significant field of human endeavor. Professional experience is gained only through continued education and experience; that is, professional knowledge is recognized by its intellectual expression combined with practical experience. The academic and practical sides of a profession are maintained and enhanced through journals, conferences, and the movement of personnel between practice and teaching.⁵⁶ In the case of the armed forces, the expertise that distinguishes this professional from any other in society, making it a unique professional element, is the ability to manage violence.⁵⁷

The second characteristic highlighted by Huntington is responsibility, which is exemplified by the specialist who works in a social context and performs an essential service for the functioning of society.⁵⁸ The prime client of a professional would then be society. This social responsibility distinguishes the professional from other specialists who have only intellectual abilities but no sense of duty. According to this concept, the professional would cease to be professional if he used his skills in a way detrimental to society. Financial remuneration, in this case, cannot be the primary objective of the professional, but rather the service which is based on a higher ideal than the professional himself and his ambitions.⁵⁹ Consequently, services provided by a professional require

⁵⁵ Huntington, 8.

⁵⁶ Huntington, 8.

⁵⁷ Huntington, 11.

⁵⁸ Huntington, 9.

⁵⁹ Huntington, 9.

specific laws and codes to regulate their work and to clarify conflicts between the professional and society, the client.⁶⁰ The profession then incorporates specific ethics, linked to certain values and ideals that guide its members in their relations with the society they serve.⁶¹

Finally, Huntington's last characteristic for defining professionalism is corporateness, which is related to the sense of organic unity, stemming from the discipline and training required for professional competence and the sharing with one another a unique social responsibility.⁶² The ownership of specialization and the acceptance of special responsibility distinguish the professional from others. The specific interest of society in the skills of the professional limits the use of this professionalism only to the areas where this competence has relevance, while preventing professionals from other fields from claiming competence in that specific field.⁶³ This sense of duty and associated collectivity create an exclusivist ambience, which leads military institutions to be built as autonomous communities apart from society, even though they exist to serve it.⁶⁴ Because of this, the separation between personal and professional life in the military career is very tenuous since the institution, its values, and its duties absorb all aspects of the life of its members. Huntington argues that this separation between the military and the civilian society is represented by the use of uniform and insignia, which carry the symbolism of belonging to a closed system of specialists whose doorway incorporates daily rituals and rites of passage that begin at the base of the hierarchical chain, common to all who join it.⁶⁵ Ultimately, the primary goal of initial military education to which all are subjected is not to train the technician but to incorporate moral and institutional values (responsibility

⁶⁰ Huntington, 9.

⁶¹ Huntington, 10.

⁶² Huntington, 10.

⁶³ Huntington, 10.

⁶⁴ Huntington, 16.

⁶⁵ Huntington, 16.

and corporateness), eliminating those who have no vocation among the candidates for military officers.⁶⁶

In short, a member of the military can only be considered a professional if he or she possesses specific techniques to manage violence, techniques that are maximized by shared institutional experience. This service member must embody a sense of duty toward society, valuing it more than personal financial gain, similar to the attitude of a priest to the priesthood. Finally, military personnel must have a sense of belonging and clarity regarding the singularity of the institution to which they belong. In practice, while the expertise is related to the training of the military member as a technician, the other two characteristics—responsibility and corporateness—form the basis of military ethics, for they give rise to values such as duty, honor, and esprit de corps, for example.

Huntington does not go deeper into issues of values venerated in military institutions to contrast them with the values of Western society. After all, this is not the purpose of *The Soldier and the State*. Nonetheless, it is possible to extract from his work at least one important statement, which can be confirmed in the chapter dealing with ethics and military values. According to Huntington, the officer corps has always had a higher affinity for conservatism. In fact, he argues that as society moved in the direction of liberalism, the armed forces, in an attempt to maintain their Code of Ethics, moved in the opposite direction, toward conservatism.⁶⁷

After the American Civil War, military academies struggled to incorporate liberal technical education into their curricula while maintaining basic military training focused on absorbing institutional values and “violence management” techniques.⁶⁸ Trying to incorporate the fullness of what liberal technical training would have to offer, and at the same time, maintaining the military curriculum necessary for the incorporation of institutional values proved to be impractical, resulting in an inefficient outcome in both

⁶⁶ Castro, *O Espírito Militar: Um Estudo de Antropologia Social na Academia Militar das Agulhas Negras* [The Military Spirit: A Study of Social Anthropology at the Agulhas Negras Military Academy] (Rio de Janeiro: Jorge Zahar, 1990), 19.

⁶⁷ Huntington, 257–258.

⁶⁸ Huntington, 295.

respects.⁶⁹ The armed forces are then thought to incorporate into their ranks liberal technicians already trained by civilian universities, leaving to the academies the mission of adapting them to the value system and organizational culture. At that time, this proved to be problematic, as faculties would inculcate the values of a disgruntled society with military institutions, diminishing the quantity and quality of future officers yet to be trained.⁷⁰ On the other hand, training the liberal technician in military academies and leaving military training to a later stage also proved to be complicated. In the words of Huntington himself: “The armed services, however, were neither equipped nor inclined to compete with colleges and universities in the liberal arts area. It would indeed have been hard to justify the national government’s moving into liberal arts education even if all the graduates of the federal colleges entered government service.”⁷¹ The direct consequence of this dilemma is to consider that academic technical education cannot supplant specific military education, which risks unbalancing the Expertise-Responsibility-Corporateness triad, leading to the loss of qualifications that make it possible to consider a group of military personnel as “war professionals.”

Thus, we could summarize the main ideas of Huntington that are useful to this analysis as follows:

1. Military professionalism encompasses three characteristics that, if not fully met, do not allow the institution to be considered professional. They are expertise (which brings together technique and experience), responsibility (which brings together the sense of duty, devotion, and sacrifice), and corporateness (which nourishes the sense of belonging to something greater and sustains the organizational culture).
2. There is a clash between the values of liberal society, which pressures the military institution for the adoption of academic technicality, something

⁶⁹ Huntington, 295.

⁷⁰ Huntington, 296.

⁷¹ Huntington, 296.

that would deconstruct the integrity of professionalism previously mentioned.

Yet, in spite of the unique qualifications and quality of the military and the structuring of its institutions apart from society, in order to serve it better, it would be incoherent to deduce that the armed forces can exist outside social change and influence of society. This aspect of the professional realities of the military is little explored by Huntington but is the subject of a more focused analysis by Charles Moskos and Frank Wood in *The Military: More Than Just a Job?* In fact, the work makes clear in its first paragraph that the military has to be analyzed as a social organization, which grows and evolves as such. Despite the military maintaining its autonomy before society, it is modified by it.⁷²

One of the significant contributions of Moskos and Wood's thesis that complements Huntington's defined characteristics of the military professional is the presentation of a dynamic and interactive relation between that professional and the society he serves. While Huntington focuses on a static professional profile that appears unchanged over time and in diverse cultures, Moskos and Wood make it clear that this would be a dynamic and symbiotic system. To clarify how this interaction happens, Moskos and Wood introduce two concepts that are very important in understanding what is essential for the integrity of military institutions: the ideas of occupational social organization and institutional social organization.

The distinction between the two profiles is very clear, and summarized and contrasted by Moskos, using the 12 specific areas shown in Table 1:

⁷² Moskos and Wood, 3.

Table 1. Military Social Organization: Institutional versus Occupational⁷³

Variable	Institutional	Occupational
Legitimacy	Normative values	Marketplace economy
Societal Regard	Esteem based on notions of service	Prestige based on level of compensation
Role Commitments	Diffuse; generalist	Specific; specialist
Reference Groups	Vertical within the armed forces	“Horizontal” with occupations outside the military
Recruitment Appeals	Character qualities; life-style orientation	High recruit pay; technical training
Evaluation of Performance	Holistic and qualitative	Segment and quantitative
Basis of Compensation	Rank and seniority; decompressed by rank	Skill level and manpower shortages; compressed by rank
Mode of Compensation	Much in noncash form of deferred	Salary and bonuses
Legal System	Military justice; broad purview over member	Civilian jurisprudence; limited purview over member
Female Roles	Limited employment; restricted career pattern	Wide employment; open career pattern
Spouse	Integral part of military	Removed from military community
Residence	Work and residence adjacency; military housing; relocations	Work and residence separation; civilian housing permanence
Post-Service Status	Veterans’ benefits and preferences	Same as nonservicer

⁷³ Adapted from Charles Moskos, “Institutional and Occupational Trends in Armed Forces,” in *The Military: More than Just a Job?*, ed. Charles Moskos and Frank Wood (Washington, DC: Pergamon-Brassey’s, 1988), 16.

A closer look at the characteristics raised by Moskos, as seen in Table 1, reveals that some of the aspects pointed out by Huntington about the professional military appear in the descriptions of an institutional organization. It is a clear case of the variables of legitimacy, social regard, recruitment appeals, mode of compensation, spouse, and residence. As for societal regard, for example, Huntington highlighted the vocation of a class that donates its professional capabilities to society, without which society would perish. Because of this particular condition of dependence on these special services, specific laws and codes are established within the institution, while others are imposed to protect the relationship of the armed forces with society. This appears in the legitimacy variable in the Table 1. Additionally, the variable mode of compensation confirms what Huntington has stated, that in professional organizations, wages alone are unable to offer the rewards that the exercise of a selfless profession requires. As Huntington says, vocation ends up being important in a setting like this.

Clearly, this analysis of the characteristics of an institutional organization by Moskos and Wood further develops Huntington's observations. Moreover, the book *The Military: More than Just a Job?* identifies another more recent profile of the armed forces, one that is moving from the institutional to the occupational spectrum.⁷⁴

Moskos and Wood point out that in the last decades, military professionals have been under intense social pressure. On one hand, the internal institutional pressure tries to mold them to the current organizational culture and instill in them the military values system. On the other hand, there is the external pressure of the liberal society, which demands from this group, naturally isolated from society, an adjustment to the occupational groups with which there is some technical identification.⁷⁵ The military pilot is required by the air force to be "military," and at the same time is under social pressure to be a pilot. As these pressures affect all levels of the organization, they are reflected even in the military curriculum, which presents, in the construction of the professional profile, this tension between the liberal technician and the military specialist already delineated by Huntington.

⁷⁴ Moskos and Wood, 3–4.

⁷⁵ Moskos and Wood, 4.

In Huntington's view, the institutional organization outlined by Moskos and Wood would be the only organization that could be considered a real professional organization since it is the only one that leads to the necessary expertise, responsibility, and corporateness.⁷⁶ Migration from the institutional to the occupational profile would be, interpreting Huntington, the migration from professional to non-professional. Huntington asserts that the professional qualifications of the military are a direct result of the vital mission to be performed for the benefit of society. It would be intuitive to conclude, then, that if Huntington is right, the occupational organizations do not meet the demands of society and therefore do not fulfill their mission. But do Moskos and Wood in any way confirm this? They do, albeit partially: "Does a tilt toward civilization make any real difference in military effectiveness? We think that it does. The results of creeping occupationalism can be found in three key areas: mission performance, member motivation, and professional responsibility."⁷⁷

Regarding mission performance, Moskos and Wood argue that the military requires a behavior of its members that cannot be motivated by personal interests and demands a certain degree of self-denial.⁷⁸ The internalization of essential values is the differential that only an institutional organization can provide. It is these values that come from the intrinsic motivation that leads its members to fulfill the mission since the strength of an extrinsic motivation would be insufficient.⁷⁹ In fact, the dynamics of the use of extrinsic motivation in the long term can undermine the motivation of military professionals, given the impossibility of keeping military professionals relevant in all possible scenarios in which they can be deployed in missions performed by the armed forces.⁸⁰ Finally, when dealing with professional responsibility, Moskos and Wood are even more incisive in stating how an occupational organization is inadequate for the military compared to an institutional organization.

⁷⁶ Huntington, 8.

⁷⁷ Moskos and Wood, 4.

⁷⁸ Moskos and Wood, 5.

⁷⁹ Moskos and Wood, 5.

⁸⁰ Moskos and Wood, 5.

If military functions can be reduced to dollars, then ultimate decisions on the military organization and military personnel become the province of cost-benefit analysts; decisions are removed from the military profession. An institutional approach, on the contrary, never loses sight of uniqueness of military organization in a democratic society. The nation has entrusted its armed forces with responsibilities rarely, if never, found in civilian life...the real possibility that military members will risk life....⁸¹

Thus, it is clear that despite deepening the analysis of military proficiency, Moskos and Wood endorse the concepts presented by Huntington, who even though not using the definition of institutional organization, ends up agreeing with it as the profile that is necessary to consider the military as professionals capable of fulfilling their social duties.

While acknowledging the importance of institutional organization for maintaining the integrity of the armed forces in fulfilling their mission, however, Moskos and Wood's thesis makes it clear that it is impossible to avoid this "contamination" of the institutional profile by the occupational profile coming from civilian society, which ultimately leads to individual changes. The authors cite the work of Canadian Charles A. Cotton, who says it is impractical, and even undesirable, to isolate the military from society. In fact, isolating an institution already modified by the occupational profile would create what Cotton calls "the worst of two worlds: a military isolated from civilian society and a lack of cohesion within the military."⁸² Indeed, Cotton argues that the ideal situation would be a cohesive armed forces (i.e., with its strong institutional profile) congruent with civil society (i.e., that absorbs the best that the occupational profile has to offer).

Just as Huntington's work on professionalism was drawn from some critical considerations about military education, it is necessary to follow this same approach with Moskos and Wood, who argue that the first function of military academies is to instill institutional values.⁸³ Yet, they also say that conflicts between the institutional social organization and the occupational social organization (I/O) are present at this stage.⁸⁴ This

⁸¹ Moskos and Wood, 5.

⁸² Moskos and Wood, 7.

⁸³ Moskos and Wood, 9.

⁸⁴ Moskos and Wood, 9.

type of contrast is not different from that presented by Huntington, when the tension within the curriculum of the military academies between the technical-academic and the combative-technical profiles became evident. In other words, the contrast between focusing on training the military as warriors and educating the military as academics is also perceived by Moskos and Wood as a reality:

On the one hand, the institutional side of academy life is fostered by emphases on character, athletics, and spiritual concerns; on the other, occupational tendencies can be found in academic curricula, which converge increasingly with civilian institutions of higher education and marketing strategies that portray the academy along those lines.⁸⁵

Nonetheless, since full reversal of this tendency would be contraindicated or even impossible, Moskos and Wood argue that the armed forces can absorb a certain amount of occupationalism with intelligent policies that restrain the uncontrolled loss of institutional character, especially by developing specific policies for this purpose in the area of recruitment and retention, family, gender roles, organizational commitment, and leadership.⁸⁶

Thus, summarizing what stands out in this work of Moskos and Wood as useful for the analysis proposed in this thesis, two points can be considered:

1. Corporations, including the military, can be framed in two distinct profiles of the social organization: institutional and occupational. Of these, the institutional profile resembles the professional profile described by Huntington as essential for the accomplishment of the military's mission, something that Moskos and Wood also affirm.
2. Despite the need to preserve an institutional profile, it is impossible to avoid the influence of social changes within military organizations. The solution would be to maintain the institutional profile in what is essential and to give up this profile in favor of a positive influence of the

⁸⁵ Moskos and Wood, 9.

⁸⁶ Moskos and Wood, 13.

occupational profile on issues of minor relevance that do not jeopardize organizational culture and operational readiness.

Although the I/O duality does not appear explicitly in the works of Morris Janowitz, his book *The Professional Soldier: The Social and Political Portrait* contains some assertions that contribute to this thesis. Janowitz states that the history of modern armed forces can be summed up in the struggle for hegemony between the heroic leader who perpetuates the warrior model and incorporates martial spirit, values, and traditionalism, and the “military manager” who deals with the rational and scientific conduct of war. This manager, according to Janowitz, “reflects the scientific and pragmatic dimensions of war-making; he is the professional with effective links to civilian society.”⁸⁷ Nevertheless, with the advent of technological advancement, the figure of the technical specialist, named by Janowitz as a military technologist, emerged as a necessity for the organizational revolution experienced by the military.⁸⁸ In this context, despite the role played by all three military profiles, the institutional battle between the technologist and the heroic leader presents itself as a reality; it is surpassed only by the role played by the military manager, who foments the values represented by the “way of the warrior,” all the while breaking down some traditions that could represent resistance to the technological advances needed to maintain the operational capability of the military.⁸⁹

This conflicting reality that pits the warrior against the technician is the same struggle perceived by Huntington between the academic-technical that grows within military expertise and the valued and ethical concepts derived from responsibility and corporateness. And yet, it is the same conflict presented by Moskos and Wood as they confront the institutional, value-oriented, and occupational profile, geared to the technical-functional organization with measurable and, most importantly, negotiable causes and consequences. In fact, a more weighted analysis of these three different perceptions, presented by various authors, can be embedded on an analytical scale that runs from

⁸⁷ Janowitz, 21.

⁸⁸ Janowitz, 21.

⁸⁹ Janowitz, 22.

Huntington's universal analysis, undergoes an organizational analysis with Moskos and Wood, and ends with observation at the individual level (but with organizational consequences) by Janowitz.

Because of the new military reality imposed by technology, Janowitz sees an approximation in the structuring and *modus operandi* of military and nonmilitary organizations,⁹⁰ just as Moskos and Wood trace the migration from the institutional profile to the occupational. Yet, he also recognizes the uniqueness of the military profession, stemming from his specialization in the art of warfare and the organized use of violence. For him, the military community's style of living and military honor serves to perpetuate the organization's sense of distinction,⁹¹ a concept very similar to that developed by Huntington in the case of corporateness as an essential characteristic of the military professional. According to Janowitz, the officer's demands go beyond his duties as a member of the military and are perpetuated in all spheres of his personal life.⁹² The closed community in which the military lives is therefore crucial for the promotion of cohesion and spirit of loyalty, professionalism, and warlike mindset demanded of those who live in a constant state of readiness against a possible threat to the nation and, in a more tactical universe, to their own lives.⁹³ The integration between personal and professional life is evidenced in the emblematic military residences within military organizations⁹⁴ and by the absorption of the personal family nucleus by the large and institutional "military family."⁹⁵

Janowitz argues that in the face of the constant clash between modernization and traditionalism, military forces must be controlled by military managers, but their highest leadership must include the symbolism represented by heroic leaders in order to keep alive the fighting spirit that underpins the organizations.⁹⁶ Thus, military managers must ensure

⁹⁰ Janowitz, 15.

⁹¹ Janowitz, 15.

⁹² Janowitz, 175.

⁹³ Janowitz, 175.

⁹⁴ Janowitz, 177.

⁹⁵ Janowitz, 187.

⁹⁶ Janowitz, 35.

that the military profession maintains its organizational culture and must help heroic leaders inculcate warrior spirit in future generations of officers.⁹⁷ To cultivate this spirit involves no other source than honor. Honor would be the means and the end of all military organizations, the mainstay of everything that sets it apart from a civilian organization. By honor, “the professional soldier always fights.”⁹⁸

Finally, what may be considered Janowitz’s second and major differential from Huntington, Moskos, and Wood, is his prognosis of how the military can adapt to a future that will develop over a balance between organizational stability and adaptation to rapid technological development and political change.⁹⁹ Janowitz sets out three universal positions to be adopted by members of the armed forces, especially officers. First is the search for a balance between conventional and modern weapons in a hybrid scenario that combines nuclear capability with limited warfare, irregular warfare, and revolutionary uprisings. The second entails advising the authorities on the aforementioned threats and the use of force for deterrence and persuasion. The third is participation in political and administrative plans for inspection and control of military capabilities in regions of instability.¹⁰⁰ For the adequacy of the armed forces to the tasks just described, Janowitz indicates that it is necessary to redefine the professional requirements of the military. These requirements should be based on a change of concept regarding the use of the armed forces, which would migrate from military force to constabulary forces.¹⁰¹ In Janowitz’s own words, “The military establishment becomes a constabulary force when it is continually prepared to act, committed to the minimum use of force, and seeks viable international relations, rather than victory, because it has incorporated a protective military posture.”¹⁰² The armed forces of the future must be prepared to act from the strategic level, with long-range bombardments and weapons of mass destruction, to the tactical level with para-

⁹⁷ Janowitz, 35–36.

⁹⁸ Janowitz, 215.

⁹⁹ Janowitz, 417.

¹⁰⁰ Janowitz, 417–418.

¹⁰¹ Janowitz, 418.

¹⁰² Janowitz, 418.

military operations, guerrillas and counter-guerrillas, scaling up the use of force and the political and social consequences at each level of performance.¹⁰³ In this kind of scenario there is no clear distinction between peacetime and wartime, and little clarity on who the enemy is—whether a regular or irregular force—and how he will act.¹⁰⁴ Some analysts say the future conflict will be multi-modal. Instead of different opponents “with fundamentally different approaches (conventional, irregular or terrorist), [competitors] will employ all forms of war—including criminal behavior—simultaneously.”¹⁰⁵ This concept of combat is called hybrid warfare. Janowitz summarizes the final objective of his work, and at the same time provides a guide for the analysis of the professional competences in the FAB: “The constabulary concept provides a continuity with past military experiences and traditions, but it also offers a basis for the radical adaptation of the profession.”¹⁰⁶

To summarize Janowitz’s main ideas that are important to this paper, three points can be highlighted:

1. Military organizations are characterized by constant conflict between the military warrior and the military technician, both of which are necessary for the healthy development of the organization. For both to coexist efficiently and effectively, the military manager acts as one capable of conducting the institution and balancing the warrior way and the technician way.
2. In spite of the role played by the manager and the importance of the technician, the highest military leadership should be performed by the warrior because of his crucial role in representing institutional values and in perpetuating organizational culture for future generations.

¹⁰³ Janowitz, 418–419.

¹⁰⁴ Janowitz, 419.

¹⁰⁵ Frank Hoffman, “Hybrid Threats: Reconceptualizing the Evolving Character of Modern Conflict,” *Strategic Forum*, no. 240 (April 2009): 5, <https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/98862/SF240.pdf>.

¹⁰⁶ Janowitz, 418.

3. The migration of the military forces to a constabulary forces profile, capable of facing not only the external threats but also engaging in the demands of a hybrid war, marks the future to which the military must conform.

To finish this first part of the analysis, *The Future of the Army Profession*, by Don Snider, Gayle Watkins, and Lloyd Matthews outlines the characteristics that define an activity as a profession, to establish the qualifications that must be developed by military personnel so that they can be considered military professionals in the face of the changes that society is undergoing and of those that will still come.¹⁰⁷ Snider and Watkins begin by stating that specific skills and knowledge are the basis for a professional's qualifications.¹⁰⁸ At this point, there is a direct agreement with the statements of Huntington¹⁰⁹ and indirectly with those of Janowitz,¹¹⁰ since these authors express clearly that expertise is one of the main differentials, along with ethics, that distinguish the professionals of other careers. Further, Snider and Watkins add that the ability to adapt the use of these skills in a wide range of situations characterizes professionalism.¹¹¹ Because of these unique qualifications, professionals enjoy professional authority stemming from social validation for the essential services provided to society.¹¹² Professionals would then have the autonomy to impose their professional ethics on society, thanks to the trust conveyed from this social validation.¹¹³ This specific set of professional ethics is also recognized by Huntington, who says that it stems from the fact that differentiated services provided in an activity considered to be professional would be vital for the survival of society.¹¹⁴

¹⁰⁷ Snider, Watkins, and Matthews, xii.

¹⁰⁸ Don Snider and Gayle Watkins, "Introduction," in *The Future of the Army*, ed. Don Snider, Gayle Watkins, and Lloyd Matthews (Boston: McGraw-Hill Primis, 2002), 7.

¹⁰⁹ Huntington, 11.

¹¹⁰ Janowitz, 5–6.

¹¹¹ Snider and Watkins, 7.

¹¹² Snider and Watkins, 7.

¹¹³ Snider and Watkins, 7.

¹¹⁴ Huntington, 9.

Given the constant evolution of society, the professional, who depends on the validation of this same society, is always in a continuous search for a clear definition for his or her area of activity, which the authors refer to as professional jurisdiction.¹¹⁵ At this point, there is agreement with Janowitz, when it is said that social change points to a need for change in the professional profile of the armed forces.¹¹⁶ The constabulary concepts developed by Janowitz can be recognized in the ideas of Snider and Watkins who state that within the military profession in particular this pursuit of a new professional jurisdiction has been unfolding in four different areas of practice: conventional war, unconventional war, Military Operations other than War (MOOW), and homeland security.¹¹⁷ The book further states that, according to James Burk, a constabulary force generates a more politicized armed forces, capable of reasoning with strategic threats and fighting limited wars since its political interweaving with other spheres of power increases significantly in this.¹¹⁸ For Burk, the evolution of threat scenarios and opportunities for action requires the military to redefine its legality in the pursuit of social legitimacy, considering that part of the expertise in this range of new missions is shared with other sectors of society.¹¹⁹

Finally, Snider and Watkins make their differential contribution to this thesis when they attest that professionalism and bureaucracy become interdependent.¹²⁰ In the case of the armed forces, however, the high degree of military professionalism goes hand in hand with high effectiveness—“the effective and ethical use of expertise,”¹²¹ alternating this status with a high degree of bureaucracy that goes hand in hand with a high efficiency—“doing more with less.”¹²² In other words, the higher the level of professionalism, the

¹¹⁵ Snider and Watkins, 7.

¹¹⁶ Janowitz, 418–419.

¹¹⁷ Snider and Watkins, 8.

¹¹⁸ James Burk, “Expertise, Jurisdiction, and Legitimacy of the Military Profession,” in *The Future of the Army Profession*, ed. Don Snider, Gayle Watkins, and Lloyd Matthews (Boston: McGraw-Hill Primis), 27.

¹¹⁹ Burk, 32–33.

¹²⁰ Snider and Watkins, 9.

¹²¹ Snider and Watkins, 7.

¹²² Snider and Watkins, 9.

greater its effectiveness. This greater professionalism implies a smaller bureaucracy and, consequently, a lower efficiency. For the authors, the low budget to finance operational actions induces to the excess of bureaucracy¹²³ that ends up harming the professionalism.¹²⁴ This is precisely the situation in which FAB currently fits: low budget and search for new jurisdiction in pursuit of social legitimacy. If the consequence of this profile is to increase bureaucracy and reduce efficiency to the detriment of effectiveness, the military educational system should focus on strengthening institutional values, as attested by John Mattox,¹²⁵ while also investing in technical development aimed at supplanting loss of efficacy.

In sum, “a profession is a relatively high status [legitimacy] occupation whose members apply abstract knowledge [expertise] to solve problems in a particular field of endeavor [jurisdiction].”¹²⁶ It is important to highlight that, according to some sociologists, status and legitimacy depend on social needs.¹²⁷ Thus, according to Burk, professional practice is strong when the application of expertise within a particular jurisdiction is uncontested and recognized as legitimate.¹²⁸

To summarize the main ideas from *The Futures of the Army Profession* that are useful to this thesis, four points can be highlighted:

1. Military professionalism is the use of expertise in fulfilling a specific mission in a different jurisdiction that will find support in social legitimacy.
2. The quest for legitimacy requires expanding jurisdiction. To expand jurisdiction, expertise needs to be modified.

¹²³ Snider and Watkins, 9.

¹²⁴ Snider and Watkins, 11.

¹²⁵ John Mattox, “The Ties That Bind: The Army Officer’s Moral Obligations,” in *The Future of the Army Profession*, ed. Don Snider, Gayle Watkins, and Lloyd Matthews (Boston: McGraw-Hill Primis, 2002), 295.

¹²⁶ Burk, 21–23.

¹²⁷ Burk, 22.

¹²⁸ Burk, 32.

3. The modification of expertise currently points to the hybrid profile: conventional war, unconventional war, MOOW, and homeland security.
4. Changes to a hybrid profile increase efficiency and reduce bureaucracy.

B. CONCLUSION

The armed forces can be considered professionals when its members possess expertise, responsibility, and corporateness to fulfill a specific mission in a well-defined jurisdiction, thus finding social legitimacy. Given this, all efforts made in the FAB should be focused on developing these three characteristics in their future officers, perfecting its jurisdiction, and improving its mission and effectiveness.

In spite of the growing influence of liberal values within military institutions, provoking a break with institutional social organization toward the occupational social organization and giving up traditional organizational culture will only help to weaken the characteristics that define the military professional. This in turn harms the FAB in preparation for the accomplishment of its missions. Nevertheless, considering that the occupational organizational profile is the result of a dizzying technological evolution in society, which is necessary for the FAB to remain relevant in future employment scenarios, it is imperative to take preventive measures. Consequently, the FAB should rely on officers with a managerial profile who will balance the organizational culture that values the heroes of the past and the military man as a combatant while investing in the development of more technical curricula in the preparation of members who will develop new technologies. All this effort should be harmonized with an air force that should be designed to engage in wars with the hybrid profile, capable of acting both in conventional and irregular warfare missions, assuming a constabulary force profile.

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III. THE MILITARY ETHICS

Ethics is crucial for military professionalism. In a postmodern society where relativism reigns,¹²⁹ it is not only still possible but essential to establish values considered universal and impervious to cultural or temporal influences. These values are considered the core of military morality and distinguish the institution from civilian organizations that are usually transformed according to culture. This chapter provides an overview of how it is possible to understand and accept the concept of universal ethics that goes beyond culture and society, which is essential to combat moral and ethical relativism within the military. The section demonstrates how military ethics makes use of this premise to determine that the construction of the military ethos has as its primary objective the development of professionals who will be the guardians of this universal ethic, which will be faithful to virtue and not to the rules. By the end of this chapter, it will be clear that business values and neoliberalism can adversely affect a virtuous armed force, the military organizational culture, and consequently the military's ability to fulfill its constitutional tasks.

A. OVERVIEW OF ETHICS AND THE MILITARY PROFESSION

It is commonly accepted in a modern society that ethics is not universal, but rather tied to the culture of a community.¹³⁰ Thus, the first task performed in this chapter is to demonstrate that, even outside the military sphere or the professional aspect, a universal set of ethics exists, which goes beyond cultural and temporal elements, and allows us to establish absolute values in place of relative values.

The first approach to this task is made through the book *The Abolition of Man*, by C.S. Lewis. In this work, Lewis rejects the generic designation of “postmodernism” in society, a position that considers objective truth non-existent or relative (i.e., nothing is true in itself); postmodernism accepts that there are as many truths as the subjects that interact with an object or concept, and all of these “truths” are equally valid.¹³¹ To use an

¹²⁹ Toner, 10.

¹³⁰ Toner, 10.

¹³¹ Lewis, 6, 9, and 11.

illustration from Lewis's book,¹³² when a person says that "a waterfall is sublime," according to relativism, he/she would be just saying how he/she feels in the presence of the waterfall. As a consequence, those who follow the postmodernist thinking discard these feelings as unimportant or merely subjective without any rational foundation. If the waterfall is sublime for one person or awful for another one, both statements are equally true.

For the armed forces to be considered guardians of virtue, as explained in the works of James H. Toner and Richard Gabriel, and to defend the supremacy of certain values over others, the military must have strong philosophical evidence to help them argue against postmodern relativism. Lewis refers to the existence of some moral precepts common to various religions, cultures, and civilizations; such a universal value system subsists through tradition and objective values, which, for convenience, Lewis calls the Tao.¹³³ Despite the differences between cultural and religious traditions, C. S. Lewis argues that "what is common to them all is something we cannot neglect. It is the doctrine of objective value, the belief that certain attitudes are really true, and others really false, to the kind of thing the universe is and the kind of things we are."¹³⁴

On the other hand, according to Lewis, the person who is a critic of objective values is subject to a logical fallacy. The whole purpose of such arguments would be to share certain opinions that would be, to some extent, valiant and correct while appealing to individual perception to demystify the belief in universal values. That is, "there are no universal values and truths! And this is a universal truth!" In the words of C.S. Lewis himself:

This thing which I have called for convenience the Tao, and which others may call Natural Law or Traditional Morality or the First Principles of Practical Reason or the First Platitudes, is not one among a series of possible systems of value. It is the sole source of all value judgements...The effort to refute it and raise a new system of value in its place is self-contradictory. There has never been, and never will be, a radically new judgement of value

¹³² Lewis, 5.

¹³³ Lewis, 10.

¹³⁴ Lewis, 10.

in the history of the world. What purport to be new systems or (as they now call them) ‘ideologies’, all consist of fragments from the Tao itself.¹³⁵

Then, if universal values are real, and the armed forces can fight for them, Lewis attests that those values and education walk side-by-side. Lewis’s work emphasizes the importance of education, voluntary or involuntary (i.e., planned or unplanned), in the process of constructing the Tao.¹³⁶ According to Lewis, the mere fact of knowing and recognizing universal values does not guarantee adherence to them. Without the trained emotions the intellect remains impotent before the natural instinct. Lewis goes on to state, for example, that he

had sooner play cards against a man who was quite skeptical about ethics, but bred to believe that ‘a gentleman does not cheat,’ than against an irreproachable moral philosopher who had been brought up among sharpers. In battle it is not syllogisms that will keep the reluctant nerves and muscles to their post in the third hour of the bombardment.¹³⁷

Indeed, in the case of the armed forces, which require the self-sacrifice of their lives in defense of the nation, if it is necessary, Lewis states that it would be unlikely that ordinary people would feel an urge to do anything by species or posterity merely by instinct or rationality. Only those who received a specific type of education could bear in mind the idea of “posterity” and sacrifice for this anonymous collectivity.¹³⁸ In sum, Lewis states there are universal values common to the cultural and religious heritage of various civilizations that can be considered the basis of the moral sense of humanity. These values, in spite of being universal, are not intrinsic and are transmitted through education.

The next step is to investigate ethics and morals in the military world, and how military values present themselves to society. The first analysis comes from James H. Toner, *True Faith and Allegiance: The Burden of Military Ethics*. Toner analyzes military moral precepts in contrast to the morality of society and establishes the premise that barracks values must take precedence over common social values when both contradict

¹³⁵ Lewis, 20.

¹³⁶ Lewis, 9.

¹³⁷ Lewis, 12.

¹³⁸ Lewis, 18.

each other in the process of building organizational culture. A “bad man” may even be a good professional in many areas, but he can never be a good military man.¹³⁹

Toner begins his book by declaring that the study of ethics raises the noblest and essential questions that can be asked: what kind of attitudes and beliefs ennoble us? What does it really mean to be human?¹⁴⁰ This questioning that Toner uses as the cornerstone of his approach clarifies his alignment with the premise established by Lewis. For Toner, there are values that must be preserved and cultivated so that a person can be considered a human being. For Toner, as for Lewis, ethics differentiates men from animals.¹⁴¹ Toner makes it clear that in the face of cultural relativism, some values remain perennial within the concept of what is ethical, just and good, independent of the social lenses that are used to try to justify attitudes that, in return, will always be considered unethical, as in the case of anthropophagy, for example.¹⁴²

Thus, since there are fundamental, or universal, values that help “humanize” society, Toner establishes a direct relationship between military institutions and those values. First, he highlights the state of moral decay to which society is subject, where the concepts of virtue and duty are lost.¹⁴³ Toner demonstrates that the moral bankruptcy of modern society reflected in the culture¹⁴⁴ also appears in the educational system.¹⁴⁵ The direct consequence of this is that this bankruptcy must also be reflected in the system of military education, from which it is inferred that the study and practice of ethics are fundamental in the education process of the future members of the armed forces. Indeed, Toner affirms that the teaching and development of honor must precede training or technical qualifications.¹⁴⁶ At this point, there is clear consonance between Toner’s thought

¹³⁹ Toner, 20.

¹⁴⁰ Toner, xi.

¹⁴¹ Lewis, 28.

¹⁴² Toner, 9–11.

¹⁴³ Toner, 3, 12–16.

¹⁴⁴ Toner, 14–15.

¹⁴⁵ Toner, 12–13.

¹⁴⁶ Toner, 6.

and the claims of Huntington,¹⁴⁷ Moskos and Wood,¹⁴⁸ and Janowitz,¹⁴⁹ who emphasize in their works the singular importance of the development of the institutional profile (affection for morals and values) before the occupational profile (affection for technical issues). Toner uses the words of the British scholar-soldier Sir John Hackett to highlight the armed forces' fundamental role as "moral compass" in society.¹⁵⁰

This consonance between the works that analyze the military professionalism and the work of Toner also extends to the consideration of the unique character of the military profession. The duty to kill and die for a companion, for the constitution and cause of the nation, assuming the responsibilities arising from that duty, is the mark that distinguishes a soldier from a civilian.¹⁵¹ The military profession is similar to other professions in promoting the purposes for which they were created, in this case, to make war. Nevertheless, it is different from other professions, since its members undertake to defend not the personal or collective interests, but the interest of the nation expressed in the constitution.¹⁵² Moreover, as pointed out by Huntington,¹⁵³ Moskos and Wood,¹⁵⁴ the greatest danger to the military profession is that it "contaminates" itself through contact with exclusive centers of power and civilian influence, which may weaken military codes and adversely affect the competence of the organization.¹⁵⁵ Once again, the institutional versus occupational duality appears. Military ethics, in this case, would help maintain the integrity of the profession by requiring the military to distinguish right from wrong.

The entire military training system must then be geared to the training of war professionals in carrying out this duty. Regardless of the possibility of combat, the

¹⁴⁷ Huntington, 2, 9.

¹⁴⁸ Moskos and Wood, 5.

¹⁴⁹ Janowitz, 32–36.

¹⁵⁰ Toner, 3, 20.

¹⁵¹ Toner, 22, 37.

¹⁵² Toner, 132.

¹⁵³ Huntington, 15–16.

¹⁵⁴ Moskos and Wood, 5.

¹⁵⁵ Toner, 132.

preparation of the military should be focused on its purpose and not on the setting in which they are inserted; regardless of the imminent fight, education and training must be intense and a priority.¹⁵⁶ In fact, the paradox pointed out by the old Roman dictum, *Si vis pax, pacem bellum* (If you want peace, prepare for war) is that the more well prepared the armed forces of a nation are, the less likely they are to enter into combat.¹⁵⁷ This preparation requires not only accurate technical training, but the training of the virtue allied to it, combining competence and character.¹⁵⁸ In agreement with Huntington,¹⁵⁹ Moskos and Wood¹⁶⁰ on the fundamental role of military values in professional training, Toner, like Janowitz,¹⁶¹ associates the institutional (moral) to the occupational (technical) profile, stating that military education trains soldiers to associate talent with honor.¹⁶² A well-trained and well-armed troop without clear and cohesive morals could be a source of both good and evil.¹⁶³

Then, Toner makes clear that the moral preparation of the troops must enable them to obey legal orders without hesitation while disobeying flagrantly illegal orders. A professional soldier before being loyal to his leaders, his companions, his mission, or his duty, should be loyal to virtue itself.¹⁶⁴ Ultimately, connecting this concept with the concept espoused by C.S. Lewis,¹⁶⁵ true soldiers must be loyal to the Tao, and therefore, they must be educated for it. Toner openly declares what character can and should be taught and learned.¹⁶⁶ The path that can be useful in this learning process is to recognize the malevolent potential that exists in every human being; to emphasize, in the community, the

¹⁵⁶ Toner, 49.

¹⁵⁷ Toner, 49.

¹⁵⁸ Toner, 53–54.

¹⁵⁹ Huntington, 15–16, 257–258.

¹⁶⁰ Moskos and Wood, 4–5.

¹⁶¹ Janowitz, 21–22.

¹⁶² Toner, 73.

¹⁶³ Toner, 40.

¹⁶⁴ Toner, 56.

¹⁶⁵ Lewis, 9–10.

¹⁶⁶ Toner, 73.

duties in harmony with the rights; and restoring worship to national heroes.¹⁶⁷ In possession of these truths, military education institutions, whatever they may be, must be concerned with inculcating the moral virtue necessary for building the character of the military professional through policies that seek to hire and to promote teachers and instructors who incorporate the desired moral attributes into the troop. Also, the establishment of curricula with a high moral standard of competence, coupled with an organizational atmosphere that moves their staff toward the pursuit of virtuous behavior, is essential to achieve the ethical standard of excellence required by the military profession.¹⁶⁸

To sum up, what can be extracted from Toner's thinking is there are values that can be considered ethical, regardless of the culture or society in which they present themselves. These values are the basis of professional military ethics, which demands of these professionals who are trained to kill and die, an irreproachable value behavior, under the penalty of qualifying as propagators of evil or injustice. These professionals must be prepared and educated according to a high moral code, which associates obedience to the constitution with timeless and borderless virtue. Once this code gives space to a society's values that are not related to the values of duty and sacrifice typical of an armed force, there is a risk of degeneration of the military's ability to fulfill its mission.

To add more relevant points related to military ethics, an analysis of *To Sever with Honor: The Treatise on Military Ethics and the Way of the Soldier*, by Richard A. Gabriel, is needed. The single sentence that can synthesize the author's main premise appears at the beginning of his work: "[T]he effectiveness and success of a military force rests far more on the moral quality of its officers and men than it does on technical expertise."¹⁶⁹ The author states very forcefully that the military is suffering from a process of ethical erosion.¹⁷⁰ This process is triggered by a series of external and internal factors that

¹⁶⁷ Toner, 94.

¹⁶⁸ Toner, 147.

¹⁶⁹ Gabriel, 7.

¹⁷⁰ Gabriel, xiii.

contribute to the replacement of the traditional moral code of the military by a set of values that undermine the institution, weakening its character and its organizational culture.

Among the external factors listed by Gabriel are the changing moral standards in society, combined with permissiveness and liberal campaigns for greater individual rights and privileges within the military. This statement confirms Toner's perception¹⁷¹ of the moral degeneracy of society, giving strength to the emphatic defense of the need to preserve traditional values—Lewis' Tao¹⁷²—within the military. In addition, Gabriel also speaks of a “civilizing” process of the military, that is, the substitution of typically military values for values affecting civilian life. Finally, the third relevant external factor cited by Gabriel is the injunction of managerial and business values within the armed forces, which has turned many officers into managers rather than leaders.¹⁷³ It is interesting to note that these last two external factors agree with Moskos' and Wood's ideas, confirming the migration of the military from an institutional profile to an occupational profile.¹⁷⁴ The counterpoint to Gabriel would be the perspective of Janowitz, who does not view management values so perniciously, but even deems them necessary to balance the historic clash between the “warrior” and the “technician” profiles that fight for hegemony in the conduct of the armed forces.¹⁷⁵

In parallel, Gabriel cites four internal factors that have contributed to the erosion of military values. First, Gabriel mentions ethical relativism—the premise that if something works and gives results, then it is correct; a Machiavellian¹⁷⁶ thought that says the “ends justify the means.”¹⁷⁷ This relativism was also observed by Lewis,¹⁷⁸ not only within the

¹⁷¹ Toner, 3, 12–16.

¹⁷² Lewis, 10, 34–40.

¹⁷³ Gabriel, 10–11.

¹⁷⁴ Moskos and Wood, 3–4.

¹⁷⁵ Janowitz, 32–36.

¹⁷⁶ Niccolò Machiavelli was a philosopher, historian, poet, diplomat, and musician of Italian origin, who lived and worked during the Renaissance period. Consequentialist Ethics is latent in Machiavelli's works, such as “The Prince,” where at various times the author speaks of the importance of achieving the ends, the consequences of the acts practiced, under penalty of even not being considered ethical.

¹⁷⁷ Gabriel, 12.

¹⁷⁸ Lewis, 14, 27.

armed forces but in society as a whole. By analogy, Lewis's considerations about the ineffectiveness of ethical relativism¹⁷⁹ can also be considered within military institutions, which would have in the figure of the Tao values moral an argument that disqualifies Machiavellian thought. Second, Gabriel stresses the "loyalty syndrome," when soldiers' commitment ties are greater with their bosses than with the institution's moral values.¹⁸⁰ Toner fights this same problem, and highlights that members of the military should be taught to be faithful to virtue, resisting orders that pierce military ethics.¹⁸¹ Third, he speaks of an excessive zeal with the image of the armed forces that prevents moral stains from being exposed in the name of preserving the institution, hindering any institutional corrections necessary at the collective level.¹⁸² Finally, Gabriel refers to what he calls the "drive for success," which is more common among officials who are more prone to corruption of values tied to entrepreneurship, careerism, and managerialism.¹⁸³

Gabriel disagrees with the premise that claims the preparation of a good professional will lead to the preparation of a good citizen, an ethical subject. He notes the confusion between academics who discuss military ethics, between professional ethics and moral ethics, and between the ethics of virtues and ethics of duty.¹⁸⁴ In other words, good practitioners are not necessarily ethical subjects, and virtuous subjects will not necessarily fulfill their duties.

To combat eroded military morale, Gabriel proposes an ideological code of ethics that precedes individual ethics. Gabriel states that the proper teaching of this code is essential for the promotion of corrections that the military needs. The first point of this moral code is to recognize that the military is different from all other social institutions since military organization has as its function the social organization of violence, demanding the sacrifice of the life of its members—whether by the loss of individuality

¹⁷⁹ Lewis, 20.

¹⁸⁰ Gabriel, 12.

¹⁸¹ Toner, 56.

¹⁸² Gabriel, 12.

¹⁸³ Gabriel, 12.

¹⁸⁴ Gabriel, 8.

before the community or for death on the battlefield.¹⁸⁵ Gabriel goes further and establishes the four main characteristics that distinguish the military profession: the scope of the service, which associates it with the guarantee of survival of the state and of society;¹⁸⁶ the level of responsibility, which places on the “military shoulders” a significant burden related to care of the lives of an extended group of people;¹⁸⁷ the extension of personal responsibility, which demands of the military professional an integral commitment of his life—requiring the loss of certain individualities and the development of certain specific behavioral profiles—with the task to be fulfilled;¹⁸⁸ and, finally, the monopoly of practice which, in addition to considering that the exercise of organized violence is carried out only by the military, also believes that the skills developed within the armed forces will rarely have direct applicability outside the military corporation. These characteristics are in accordance with Moskos’ concepts of the primacy of institutional social organization,¹⁸⁹ and are partially corroborated by Toner,¹⁹⁰ who invokes these premises to justify the necessity of maintaining the high moral standard, dissociated from the social patterns that contradict them. This aspect of the uniqueness of the military profession is also echoed in the works of Huntington¹⁹¹ and Janowitz,¹⁹² who use this premise to justify the need to maintain the institutional profile.

Finally, it is possible to extract from Gabriel three basic directives for the future development of military professionalism.¹⁹³ The author talks about maintaining a distance from the methodologies of the civilian world, even though it seems attractive to apply these methodologies in the military environment because they have been successful for entrepreneurs and corporations. Second, as an extension of the first concept, Gabriel uses

¹⁸⁵ Gabriel, 19.

¹⁸⁶ Gabriel, 86.

¹⁸⁷ Gabriel, 86.

¹⁸⁸ Gabriel, 86–87.

¹⁸⁹ Moskos and Wood, 5.

¹⁹⁰ Toner, 22, 37, 132.

¹⁹¹ Huntington, 7–11.

¹⁹² Janowitz, 15.

¹⁹³ Gabriel, 116.

the term “owning his own house,” or the need to generate values specific to one’s own professional reality. Finally, Gabriel emphasizes the need for the military to develop a clear and assertive code of ethics regarding the duties of its members, not giving way to subjectivities. An analysis of these recommendations makes clear that while Janowitz preaches reconciliation between military and society, represented in the figure of “military manager,”¹⁹⁴ Gabriel advocates a certain distance to achieve autonomy. By contrast, Janowitz’s assertions that the military assumes a profile of a constabulary force¹⁹⁵ are not so conflicting with the demands made by Gabriel since they seek a more practical solution to maintain a strengthened institutional profile in view of the need to adapt to the social demands that have been presented to the military.

To sum up Gabriel’s assertions significant for this thesis, it is possible to say that the absorption of entrepreneurial values from the civil world and the incorporation of social values that are not in keeping with the unique characteristics of the military profession contribute to a moral crisis within the armed forces. This affects the military’s ability to fulfill its mission. The detachment of the military from these influences toward the establishment of methodological and ideological independence is the way to restore lost efficiency in this process.

Building on this, *The Future of the Army Profession*, by Don Snider, Gayle Watkins, and Lloyd Matthews, contains an essay about ethics by John Mattox, in which testifies, like Toner,¹⁹⁶ that military professionals must have competence and character. They must be moral and technically skillful leaders.¹⁹⁷ Morality is so important that Snider, Watkins, and Matthews point out, in the chapter introduction, an enlightening program for character renewal at all levels of the armed forces is an essential resource for professional transformation that maintains the effectiveness of the military.¹⁹⁸ Mattox makes it very clear, however, that while the armed forces must transform and adapt to remain socially

¹⁹⁴ Janowitz, 35.

¹⁹⁵ Janowitz, 418.

¹⁹⁶ Toner, 53–54.

¹⁹⁷ Snider, Watkins, and Matthews, 291–292.

¹⁹⁸ Snider, Watkins, and Matthews, 292.

relevant, and therefore professional, the moral standard must remain unchanged throughout the process.¹⁹⁹ He affirms that “by the nature of the profession of arms, only officers of firm moral character can discharge properly their professional obligations to the nation and to their subordinates that they are called to lead.”²⁰⁰ These affirmations not only confirm the claims of Huntington,²⁰¹ and Moskos and Wood,²⁰² on the importance of moral values for military professionalism, but they reinforce the assertions of Toner²⁰³ and Gabriel²⁰⁴ regarding the primacy of moral ethics on technical training and the values of civil society. For Mattox, as for Huntington,²⁰⁵ the differentiated nature of the military profession generates the need for professionals with a moral commitment differentiated from other professions in society.²⁰⁶

For Mattox, morality cannot exist without the state, which is the greater good of society, protecting man from the state of nature defined by Hobbes, where “man is wolf to man.”²⁰⁷ The state cannot exist without the military. So, ultimately, the military is the guardian of morality, and has a moral obligation to fight for the preservation of the state.²⁰⁸ Hobbes’ social contract implies that personal sovereignty given in favor of the state serves for the state to provide security to all members of the social contract under the penalty that those who guarantee security must relinquish their own sovereignty. That is, being military requires sacrifice.²⁰⁹

Mattox concludes his reasoning on the necessity of morality in the military affirming that before tasks that require correct moral reasoning, moral subjects are the most

¹⁹⁹ Mattox, 295.

²⁰⁰ Mattox, 295.

²⁰¹ Huntington, 2, 9.

²⁰² Moskos and Wood, 5.

²⁰³ Toner, 6.

²⁰⁴ Gabriel, 7.

²⁰⁵ Huntington, 9.

²⁰⁶ Mattox, 295.

²⁰⁷ Mattox, 299.

²⁰⁸ Mattox, 299.

²⁰⁹ Mattox, 308.

capable to complete these tasks.²¹⁰ Mattox echoes Toner²¹¹ and Gabriel²¹² when affirming that a military member must be of a high moral standard to carry out the responsibilities that his or her mission demands. In the most critical situations that deal with human lives and survival of the state, there are no external guarantees that a military member without high moral standards will fulfill his or her mission. Only morality can guarantee this.²¹³

Finally, Section V of the book *The Future of the Army Profession* also conveys some new ideas on Toner in an article titled “Message to Garcia: Leading Soldiers in Moral Mayhem,” where the author expresses concerns about relativism and states that the subjective or relativistic pattern of nihilism ends up being in itself an objective pattern and, therefore, contradictory.²¹⁴ This statement confirms Lewis’ argument on the subject²¹⁵ and disqualifies any subjective moral reasoning. This is not the only point of congruence between Lewis and Toner. In another passage, Toner says that the military ethos is morally defensible “to the extent that it is rooted in transcendent truth.”²¹⁶ This idea of transcendent truth closely resembles the concept of Tao presented by Lewis,²¹⁷ that is, military values are an expression of the Tao, being, therefore, objective and non-subjective values.

Toner, in his essay, reconfirms the concept he had set forth and his book, already analyzed in this chapter,²¹⁸ that the good man as a leader knows when to follow orders and when not to.²¹⁹ And not only this, it reinforces the concept that postmodern society corrupts characters in the most diverse social spheres, such as homes, schools, and churches,²²⁰ as

²¹⁰ Mattox, 301.

²¹¹ Toner, 20.

²¹² Gabriel, 7.

²¹³ Mattox, 304.

²¹⁴ Toner, “A Message to Garcia: Leading Soldiers in Moral Mayhem,” 316–317.

²¹⁵ Lewis, 20.

²¹⁶ Toner, 317.

²¹⁷ Lewis, 10.

²¹⁸ Toner, *True Faith and Allegiance: The Burden of Military Ethics*, 56.

²¹⁹ Toner, “A Message to Garcia: Leading Soldiers in Moral Mayhem,” 333.

²²⁰ Toner, 330.

he attested in *True Faith and Allegiance: The Burden of Military Ethics*, and as Gabriel²²¹ and Moskos and Wood²²² also attested.

According to Toner, three considerations can help a military professional to solve ethical problems: customs, rules, and results.²²³ Before the difficult decisions on what attitude to take, the military professional should analyze local customs. If local traditions corroborate a specific practice, the second step would be to examine the rules to which the armed forces and the country of origin of the military professional are subjected. Even so, if the analyzed practice goes through these first two filters, the result of the action must be taken into consideration.

Toner ends by pointing out four virtues, which according to him are more excellent than values and universal ethics, to which every military code should submit.²²⁴ For him, Wisdom, Justice, Fortitude, and Temperance are timeless, cross-cultural virtues that can never be negotiated.²²⁵ These two recommendations—the first with a chain of moral reasoning and the second with a universal ethical code—only corroborate the concepts of fidelity to the virtue and moral universality of military ethics, ostensibly defended by all the authors hitherto studied.

Thus, Section V of the book *The Future of the Army Profession* can be summed up in five short statements:

1. Postmodern society corrupts characters in the most diverse social spheres.
2. The military ethos is rooted in transcendent truth.
3. The moral standard must remain unchanged throughout the entire process of adapting the expertise of the armed forces.

²²¹ Gabriel, 12.

²²² Moskos and Wood, 4.

²²³ Toner, 323.

²²⁴ Toner, 333.

²²⁵ Toner, 333–334.

4. Three areas to consider and help a military professional to solve ethical problems: customs, rules, and outcomes.
5. A military man should be a good man, and as a leader, know when to follow orders and when not to.

B. CONCLUSION

There are moral values that can be considered universal. These values are common to several cultures and people throughout the history of mankind. Such moral values, independent of the ethical characteristics of each people cannot be ignored, and they are the expression of what it is to be human. Because of this, these values are the origin of ethics and being aligned with them is considered ethical. The military in general and the Brazilian Air Force in particular play a role as guardians of ethics in society and must incorporate the highest moral standards in a nation. These ethical standards are not intrinsic, nor can they be transmitted only by organizational culture; they must be instilled through an organized educational process. This moral-educational process should teach military personnel to consider customs, laws, and outcomes; to develop a fidelity to virtue, independent from codes; and to figure out what kind of mission is righteous and what is not. Nevertheless, due to social pressure to equate military professionals with their “equivalents” in civil society, values of business dynamics have been adopted by military institutions due to their successful employment in various branches of society. Nevertheless, the FAB, as well as the armed forces in general, must refrain from adopting values, techniques, or procedures originating in the civilian society without proper their adaptation to the reality of the barracks, and the singularity of military institutions, their values, and their mission.

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IV. MILITARY EDUCATION

The preceding chapters discussed the professional and ethical foundations of military institution building through the process of analysis and interlacing of concepts. This chapter describes how these ethical and professional principles are absorbed by future members of the armed forces during the education process. Following the same *modus operandi* used to unravel military ethics, the first step in the analysis of educational precepts is to check the general concepts of moral education before applying any research specifically related to military education. To achieve this goal, this chapter provides a review of the main concepts of military education.

A. OVERVIEW OF EDUCATION AND MILITARY EDUCATION CONCEPTS

The author who stood out for his many works in the field of moral education was Lawrence Kohlberg. For a more focused analysis of Kohlberg's extensive work, this thesis uses the book *Lawrence Kohlberg: Educação Ética e Moral* (Lawrence Kohlberg: Ethics and Moral Education), by Angela Biaggio. This book sums up the evolution of Kohlberg's theories throughout his professional life, and how this was reflected in the conduct of his professional and scholarly work.

Biaggio demonstrates how Lawrence Kohlberg's thinking was influenced by the ideas of the philosopher Immanuel Kant, the sociologist Émile Durkheim, and the psychologist Jean Piaget.²²⁶ Kohlberg used Kant's categorical imperative concept, which establishes the universal principles of morality²²⁷—very much in line with the Tao concept or universal ethics illustrated by C. S. Lewis.²²⁸ Kant expresses that all laws when, they are right, would be derived from and would reveal a superior, primary, and absolute law. This is summed up in Kant's formula of autonomy, which requires each person to “treat each

²²⁶ Biaggio, 20.

²²⁷ Biaggio, 20.

²²⁸ Lewis, 10.

person as an end and not as a means.”²²⁹ For Kohlberg, therefore, there are universal values that hover above culture and everyday values stemming from legalism.²³⁰

Kohlberg also appropriates a Durkheim concept that deals with the importance of the collective in the construction of the individual. Durkheim has shown that educational institutions include moral instruction not only in their explicit curriculum but also through their “hidden curriculum,” which consists of their disciplinary rules and procedures, authority structure, prize distribution and punishment, and norms and values shared.²³¹ According to Biaggio, Kohlberg believes that, in addition to the work to be done with the curriculum to improve the ethical aspects, it should be considered that the academic system, composed of this “hidden curriculum” of moral education, must also be perfected.²³² The existence of this “hidden curriculum” in the military education system, or informal curriculum based on traditions and organizational culture, appears to be decisive in the process of building the military ethos described in Janowitz’s works²³³ (with a sense of fraternity corresponding to institutional values that go beyond the curriculum) and Toner²³⁴ (with the valorization policies of the staff corresponding to the expected behavior of future officials). It is also endorsed by Moskos and Wood²³⁵ (with the incorporation of a belief system personified by the active-duty officers) in an essay in their book.

Finally, the last theoretical influencer of Kohlberg was Jean Piaget, who established a definition of stages of the moral reasoning. For Piaget, morality can be defined as an attitude of respect for people and rules based on a principle of universal morality,

²²⁹ Biaggio, 29.

²³⁰ Biaggio, 29, 37, and 41.

²³¹ Biaggio, 53.

²³² Biaggio, 53.

²³³ Janowitz, 127.

²³⁴ Toner, *True Faith and Allegiance: The Burden of Military Ethics*, 147.

²³⁵ Thomas McCloy and William Clover, “Value Formation at the Air Force Academy,” in *The Military: More than Just a Job?*, ed. Charles Moskos and Frank Wood (Washington, DC: Pergamon-Brassey’s, 1988), 135–137.

something very much in line with Kant's categorical imperative.²³⁶ Piaget delineated and named three levels of moral stages:²³⁷

1. The pre-moral stage, where there is no motivation for submission to the rules;
2. The heteronomous stage, where there is a feeling of obligation to the rules and submission to the constituted powers, aligned with the notion of punishment arising from the breaking of these rules; and
3. The autonomous stage, where the objectives for the existence of the rules and the consequences of the institution of the rules are considered. At this stage, the obligation is based on reciprocity and exchange.

For both Piaget and Kohlberg, stages are structured systems that form an invariable sequence under all conditions, except in situations of trauma, and are hierarchical integrations; that is, higher-stage thinking comprises being able to think in lower stages.²³⁸ Following Piaget's ideas, Kohlberg understands that moral development is built primarily through social interaction. Thus, social interaction rich in moral dilemmas significantly contributes to moral development.²³⁹ From this perspective, schools and military education courses could help the individual to develop morally by providing moments of discussion of moral dilemmas. As a result of his research, Kohlberg identifies three levels of moral development: pre-conventional, conventional, and post-conventional,²⁴⁰ each subdivided into two stages, making up a total of six moral stages:²⁴¹

- Stage I: Morality of punishment and obedience (physical consequences determine what is right).

²³⁶ Biaggio, 37.

²³⁷ Biaggio, 22–23.

²³⁸ Biaggio, 38.

²³⁹ Biaggio, 52.

²⁴⁰ Biaggio, 23.

²⁴¹ Biaggio, 24–27.

- Stage II: Morality of instrumental hedonism (that which satisfies one's needs is what is right).
- Stage III: Morality of the "good boy - good girl" (maintaining good relations with others and obtaining their approval is what is right).
- Stage IV: Morality of maintenance "of law and order" (obedience to authority and duty is what is right).
- Stage V: Morality of contract, individual rights and democratically accepted law (standards critically examined and supported by society as a whole determine what is right).
- Stage VI: Morality of the individual principles of consciousness (the decision of one's conscience, according to the principles chosen by him, based on logical comprehensibility, universality, and consistency, determines what is right).

It is essential to make clear that moral stages are conceptualizations of moral reasoning and not of moral content. In other words, when faced with a dilemma, it is not so much the choices made, but the kind of logic that leads to action, regardless of the trend.

According to Kohlberg, there is sufficient evidence that the sequence of stages is universal and that there is a core of universal values, such as causing no harm to others, remaining loyal, keeping promises, and respecting human life. Culture would act as a modulating factor, accentuating some values and types of moral reasoning and diminishing others, but without negating a human essence common to all of them²⁴²—something also demonstrated by Lewis in his concept of the Tao.²⁴³ Then, Kohlberg's thoughts lead us to conclude that a proper morality is based on universal principles applicable to all mankind. On the other hand, everyday morals are more grounded in "do-or-not-do" rules. Hence,

²⁴² Biaggio, 86.

²⁴³ Lewis, 10.

Kohlberg's conclusion is that principles guide moral decision making, and are freely chosen because of their intrinsic moral validity, while laws are grounded in social authority.

According to Biaggio, most citizens in Brazilian and American societies are classified at the conventional level.²⁴⁴ At this level are stages III and IV described earlier. These are the levels of internalization of moral principles, when a person believes in the value of what he considers correct, acting in the name of friendship, acceptance of his companions or established law and order.²⁴⁵ According to Biaggio, the average Brazilian, at age 16, is in stage III (interpersonal agreement and compliance).²⁴⁶ In moving students beyond this stage during their military education, it is important to consider the following:

- only 3 to 5 percent of people in society reach stage VI;²⁴⁷
- military ethics, according to Toner, should guide the soldier beyond obedience, distinguishing the honorable from the shameful;²⁴⁸ and
- the soldier's moral commitment in the face of an immoral order, as discussed by Huntington.²⁴⁹

It appears education in military schools should focus on increasing the moral judgment of students to reach stage V (where the ability to distinguish between a fair law and an unfair law is present). This goal is reinforced by Biaggio's statement that the most common target in moral education is to direct a person to a stage immediately above the stage he or she occupies. Looking again at the assertion that Brazilian society would be between levels III and IV, a goal of stage V would be realistic and plausible.

Given this scenario about education and the consequences in the military education system, it is imperative to analyze some specific assertions about education in the armed

²⁴⁴ Biaggio, 23.

²⁴⁵ Biaggio, 30.

²⁴⁶ Biaggio, 34.

²⁴⁷ Biaggio, 29.

²⁴⁸ Toner, 23.

²⁴⁹ Huntington, 78.

forces. The book *Military Education: Past, Present, and Future*, by Gregory C. Kennedy and Keith Neilson, performs this task.²⁵⁰ In this book, Andrew Lambert demonstrates that military education does not consist of the “acquisition of skills in tasks that can be objectively tested.”²⁵¹ In fact, education is designed to prepare great leaders, not merely great warriors. A well-educated combatant must be able to plan his actions and lead his subordinates guided by the fundamental values of his education.²⁵² It is technical education combined with moral education. The complexity of the war generates an environment of novelties and constant uncertainties. In this scenario, it is education rather than training that prepares officers to analyze the context and make coherent decisions; and to develop new perspectives and deal with change.²⁵³

Faced with the importance of education for the effectiveness of the armed forces, Lambert warns that the constant practice of end activity (in the case of the military, war) is the source for a continual process of improvement that leads to professional education to fulfill its role effectively. In the words of the authors themselves, “the understanding that experience has been the basis of every effective system of military education is central to modern military professionalism.”²⁵⁴ Thus, the more an army fights wars, the more prepared it is to wage war. Faced with this, a paradox presents itself. Lambert reiterates the thoughts of General Moltke²⁵⁵ in stating that “the only substitute for experience is the experience of others in the same profession.”²⁵⁶ Military journals, educational exchanges, joint seminars, and even the study of the experiences and practices of other armed forces in other nations can and should remedy any lack of experience of the national armed forces.

²⁵⁰ Kennedy and Neilson, ix, 1, and 11.

²⁵¹ Andrew Lambert, “History as Process and Record: The Royal Navy and Officer Education,” in *Military Education: Past, Present, and Future*, ed. Gregory Kennedy and Keith Neilson (Westport: Praeger, 2002), 83.

²⁵² Lambert, 83.

²⁵³ Lambert, 84.

²⁵⁴ Lambert, 85.

²⁵⁵ Lambert, 100.

²⁵⁶ Lambert, 85.

The author presents a practical solution concerning educational policy to be implemented by an armed force determined to perfect its professional experience within an efficient education system. Lambert speaks to “the need [of] a balanced program, focused on the study of war, from all disciplinary perspectives and, like *On War*, founded on history.”²⁵⁷ That is, all disciplines of a military curriculum deal with various perspectives and approaches; war is the hardcore of all academic planning, drawing on shared historical experiences to illustrate theoretical concepts, transporting those concepts to a more practical dimension where they can be confirmed or refuted. Also, according to Castro in *The Invention of the Brazilian Army*, constant contact with past achievements and with heroes and leaders who embody values and military morale helps strengthen the organizational values and institutional profile necessary for the military effectively fulfill its mission.²⁵⁸ In fact, this mindset demonstrates how crucial it is in the military educational system to understand past experiences and their use for the development of their future.²⁵⁹ Since this educational system turned to military history ends up (but providentially) to promote institutional values and their symbolism, this corroborates Kohlberg’s precept²⁶⁰ about the existence of a hidden curriculum that exists in parallel to the formal curriculum and which nevertheless supports the maintenance of institutional values.

Analyzing the competition between Science and Technology versus Liberal Arts,²⁶¹ Kennedy and Neilson’s book seems to agree with Moskos,²⁶² Toner,²⁶³ and especially Gabriel,²⁶⁴ who put ethics and moral teaching as a center of gravity around which all other professional skills of the military revolve. Initially, Kennedy and Neilson’s book emphasizes the conflictive environment of military education, where the clash between

²⁵⁷ Lambert, 99.

²⁵⁸ Castro, 7.

²⁵⁹ Lambert, 83, 98.

²⁶⁰ Biaggio, 53.

²⁶¹ Kennedy and Neilson, 11.

²⁶² Moskos and Wood, 5.

²⁶³ Toner, 6.

²⁶⁴ Gabriel, 57–58.

institutional and occupational social organization are present (using the terms established by Moskos and Wood). Later in their work, though, the authors establish the importance of leadership, judgment, independence of thought, analytical skills, and critical self-sufficiency to the detriment of technology.²⁶⁵ This type of analysis makes clear that these qualities are timeless, appearing since the time of Roman Legions until the concepts of Clausewitz. Although moral education is not an exact science, it is responsible for giving the necessary cohesion to military schools in the process of building united and professional military forces.²⁶⁶ The Lieber rules, approved by Abraham Lincoln in 1863, are proof that moral thinking and behavior is a need and not a choice: “Men who take up arms against one another in public war do not cease on this account to be moral beings, responsible to one another and to God.”²⁶⁷

To summarize, Lawrence Kohlberg’s studies combined with principles of moral education pointed out by Toner and Gabriel indicate that society expects members of the military to develop their moral judgment at the post-conventional level in stages V and VI of Kohlberg. Since it is difficult for most people to reach stage VI, and Brazilian society is mostly at stage IV, the aim of military moral education should be to guide future officers to reach Kohlberg’s stage V, where the ability to distinguish a just law from an unjust law is present. At the same time, the considerations of Kennedy and Neilson indicate that, given the high professional standards required of the military in fulfilling complex and vital missions, education must have priority in the planning process of the military. Unlike training, education prepares leaders to analyze and to act in the chaotic and uncertain environment of war. Since only experience can provide an efficient education process, lack of experience must be overcome by combining moral education with technical education planning centered on military history.

²⁶⁵ T. G. Otte, “Educating Bellona: Carl von Clausewitz and Military Education,” in *Military Education: Past, Present, and Future*, ed. Gregory Kennedy and Keith Neilson (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2002), 28–29.

²⁶⁶ Lori Bogle, “Sylvanus Thayer and the Ethical Instruction of Nineteenth-Century Military Officers in the United States, in *Military Education: Past, Present, and Future*, ed. Gregory Kennedy and Keith Neilson (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2002), 79.

²⁶⁷ Stromberg, Wakin and Callahan, *The Teaching of Ethics in the Military*, (Hastings-on-Hudson, NY: The Hastings Center, 1981), 7.

Finally, considering the book *The Future of the Army Profession*, John Brinsfield, the author of the article “Reality Check: The Human and Spiritual Needs of Soldiers and How to Prepare them for Combat,” stresses the importance of military education institutions being prepared to enhance the spirituality and religiosity of military personnel during educational process.²⁶⁸ According to Brinsfield, spiritual needs are a reality for the military of the future.²⁶⁹ For him, spirituality and religiosity, aligned with morality, must be seen as a natural expression of human beings and culture, and these qualities can be a tool for the improvement of the soldier as a professional.²⁷⁰ These statements can be better understood if they are analyzed in the light of Lewis’ concepts of universal morality and transcendental truth as the origin of military morality as set forth by Toner,²⁷¹ since both defend that religion is one of the sources of objective values.

Just as Brinsfield addresses the intangible sphere of the educational process, Joe LeBoeuf addresses the tangible realm in his case study “The 2000 Army Training and Leader Development Panel.” Speaking about the American Army’s Officer Training System (OES), LeBoeuf argues that the system should adapt to the operational needs of this modern world.²⁷² Given this, the first adaptation he cites is the need for a continuing education system, which begins in the early stages of the military purse and accompanies the military throughout its career.²⁷³ LeBoeuf also states that the focus of this new military education system should be on regional threats and full-spectrum operations.²⁷⁴ The U.S. Army defines full-spectrum operations as “the combination of offensive, defensive, and either stability operations overseas or civil support operations on U.S. soil.”²⁷⁵ This concept

²⁶⁸ Brinsfield, 400.

²⁶⁹ Brinsfield, 417.

²⁷⁰ Brinsfield, 400–405.

²⁷¹ James Toner, “A Message to Garcia: Leading Soldiers in Moral Mayhem,” 317.

²⁷² Snider, Watkins, and Matthews, 493.

²⁷³ Snider, Watkins, and Matthews, 493.

²⁷⁴ Snider, Watkins, and Matthews, 493.

²⁷⁵ Kevin Benson and Jennifer Weber, “Full Spectrum Operations in the Homeland: A ‘Vision’ of the Future.” *Small Wars Journal*, accessed February 5, 2019, <https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/full-spectrum-operations-in-the-homeland-a-”vision”-of-the-future>.

of Full-Spectrum closely resembles the concept of constabulary force pointed out by Janowitz²⁷⁶ and ratified by Snider and Watkins.²⁷⁷ Another crucial point cited by LeBoeuf is that “officers must be trained to a set of common standards, those that certify professionals to the nation, consistent with the emerging principles of officership.”²⁷⁸ Thus, the education system must find a common core in the officer’s military education, which at the same time meets the professional demands and social validations pointed out by James Burk.²⁷⁹ Thus, since technical competencies are specific to each FAB officer’s specialty, military disciplines linked to the constabulary force profile, for guard and security of facilities, for example, should be considered common to all officers and should be standardized to increase effectivity. Likewise, disciplines related to military ethics could be standardized and, following the Kennedy and Neilson recommendations, those related to military history.

Finally, one of Burk’s strongest educational recommendations says that “only the best-qualified, most experienced officers should be teachers, mentors and role models in...service school.”²⁸⁰ That is, it corroborates the policy of valuing the informal curriculum, as was approached by Biaggio in her book about Kohlberg.²⁸¹ A career plan for the officers, aimed at teaching professionals should be developed, valuing education organizations, boosting academic production, and providing models capable of optimizing military socialization and incorporating values by example.

The two essays related to education from the book *The Future of the Army Profession* can be summarized in three points:

1. Military education institutions must to be prepared to use the spirituality and religiosity of military personnel to construct the military character.

²⁷⁶ Janowitz, 418–419.

²⁷⁷ Snider, Watkins, and Matthews, 8.

²⁷⁸ Snider, Watkins, and Matthews, 493.

²⁷⁹ Burk, 21–23.

²⁸⁰ LeBoeuf, 497.

²⁸¹ Biaggio, 53.

2. The focus of the military education system should be on regional threats and full-spectrum operations.
3. Only the best qualified, most experienced officers should be teachers and mentors.

B. CONCLUSION

Due to the high degree of complexity of war and the fulfillment of missions in the conduct of combat, the military education process must be considered a priority in the Ministry of Defense, in the Brazilian Armed Forces and in the FAB itself. Although training is necessary, only the education process can prepare leaders for the conduct of wars, not just warriors who will fight them. Since FAB combat experiences go back to World War II, an education system based on military history and based on case studies, exchanges and joint missions, focusing on full-spectrum operations, is the most appropriate way to accumulate the experience needed to accomplish the task. With this focus, incorporating moral education into technical-professional education is essential. Thus, through the experiences shared by other armed forces and other nations, and through the aforementioned techniques, the objective of the FAB should be to promote the development of the moral reasoning of its officers to reach the post-conventional level. At this level, they will be able to distinguish a fair law from an unjust law. That is, they will be able to identify that a norm may be lawful but may not be moral. Finally, an education career plan must be developed to incrementally increase the proportion of competent officer-teachers in organization of education.

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V. HISTORY OF THE BRAZILIAN MILITARY AND SOCIALIZATION IN MILITARY ACADEMIES

Analyzing the military history of a nation is not a simple task. Because the armed forces constitute a unique institution, apart from society, with its own rules and conduct, its history also unfolds apart from society on many occasions. Cultural influences that modify society do not necessarily have the same impact inside the barracks. In order to effectively perform a historical analysis of the organizational culture and the values that characterize the Brazilian Armed Forces, this chapter first demonstrates that Brazilian military traditions, which sustain organizational culture and indirectly also support institutional values, are often invented with the aim of fostering a specific morality. To demonstrate this, this chapter presents phases of Brazilian history that were relevant to the cultural construction of today's Brazilian Armed Forces, highlighting some of the moral values and perceptions that the military has of itself and society. Finally, the chapter concludes by showing how the military ethics that were presented in the previous chapter and the organizational culture built during Brazilian history are used in the process of ethical education and socialization of the future members of the Brazilian Armed Forces and, specifically, of the FAB.

A. THE MILITARY AND THE BRAZILIAN HISTORICAL CONTEXT

According to the theories of Hobsbawm and Castro presented in Chapter I, the Brazilian military makes and uses invented traditions reflected in symbols, rituals, ceremonies, and historical figures and events, with the purpose of constructing an ethic unique to the military and capable of meeting its institutional demands. For a more accurate understanding of this historical construction of the military character, whose traditions were constructed within a particular socio-cultural context, it is necessary to analyze this context before attempting to understand its rites and traditions. Looking to Appendix A, which presents the social framework of organizational culture generated in the monarchic period up to the early years of the Old Republic (1889–1930), it is evident that the period was marked by the spontaneous development of traditions and moral values that have continued in the FAB up to today. Frank McCann,

in his book *Soldados da Pátria*, affirms that the Brazilian Army ranks were filled by criminals, poor people, and any kind of social slag at that time.²⁸² Smallman, in the book *Fear and Memory in the Brazilian Army and Society*, similarly notes that “many officers came from poorer provinces, and it was not uncommon for them to come from families of declining fortune seeking to ensure that their sons would not sink into poverty and disgrace.”²⁸³ From this situation arose a worrisome domestic heterogeneity and a sense of alienation between the army and the dominant classes. Yet, the same army was designed to serve as an instrument of order defending the privilege of the slaveholding elites.²⁸⁴ But the landholding class did not trust the army, which created tension between the Brazilian military and the political elites.²⁸⁵ Because that tension allied with a rising positivist ideology,²⁸⁶ the army doubted both the willingness and the capability of the traditional elites to solve Brazil’s problems. It was during this period that Brazilian officers began to think of the army as the “nation’s savior,” which became an important aspect of the military’s depiction of itself.²⁸⁷ The tense relation between the authorities and the army created military officers riddled by resentment; they started to see themselves as the only ones who could break a failed order of political games and construct a new one. From 1920 onward this phenomenon continued, but it was accompanied by invented traditions that would reinforce certain moral values and specific ethics in the face of a cultural reality that needed to be combated or even eliminated, according to the institutional vision of the military proposed by the generals.

In sum, the historical events created an organizational culture in which the Brazilian military feels itself the most qualified to watch over the integrity of the nation and its institutions. The incorporation of mestizos and blacks into the ranks of the Brazilian Army

²⁸² McCann, 29.

²⁸³ Smallman, 9.

²⁸⁴ Smallman, 9.

²⁸⁵ Smallman, 9.

²⁸⁶ Smallman, 17.

²⁸⁷ Smallman, 16.

still at its inception helped to strengthen this idea that all races meet democratically in the armed forces. Moreover, the military maintains a bond of distrust before the constituted civil authorities, since the same positivist operational culture mentioned previously ends up valuing technical competence, something that is not seen in the politicians. The combination of these two factors ultimately led the Brazilian military to perceive itself as morally superior and to take on the role of homeland saviors, a vision that has ended up being shared by a large part of the population. This tendency of military members to view themselves as moral guardians of society is something defended by Toner and Gabriel. Institutional isolation from the premise that the military's ethical and technical qualifications make its members different from civil society is also something that Huntington and Moskos and Wood acknowledge. Samuel Finer, also recognizes that same premise.²⁸⁸ In the book *The Man on Horseback*, Finer affirms that in societies with primitive economies, and even in more advanced societies like Brazil, the military is used to improve the economy through its advanced technology and equipment.²⁸⁹ The danger lies in the military allowing itself to be induced to use these premises to legitimize interventions in the national democratic order,²⁹⁰ something that has happened repeatedly throughout Brazilian history.²⁹¹ Faced with this, in the process of forming the military character, educators should pay attention to the diffusion of the characteristics identified earlier but combat misinterpretation regarding the use of these characteristics.

B. THE INVENTED TRADITIONS

The first tradition to be analyzed will be the veneration of the greatest hero of the Brazilian Army, its Patron, the Duke of Caxias.

²⁸⁸ Samuel Finer, *The Man on Horseback - The Role of the Military in Politics* (London: Transaction, 2006), 63.

²⁸⁹ Finer, 15.

²⁹⁰ Finer, 15.

²⁹¹ For more details, see Appendix A - Brazilian Military History.

1. The Duke of Caxias

In the 1920s, divisions within the Brazilian Armed Forces were furthered by political polarization between the left and right, leading to a series of revolts known as the *Tenentista* Movement or *Tenentismo*, headed mostly by junior officers. These revolts were suppressed with the Revolution of 30. In 1929, leaders of the *Paulista* (which in the Portuguese language means “from São Paulo”) oligarchy violated the alliance with the Minas Gerais’ leaders, a policy of coalition known as *café com leite*, when the *Paulista* President Washington Luiz, advocated another *Paulista*, Júlio Prestes, as the candidate for the presidency of the Republic.²⁹² In reaction, the elites of Minas Gerais and Rio Grande do Sul decided to support the candidacy of Getúlio Vargas, a former governor of that latter state.²⁹³ Vargas alleged a conspiracy that was justified by a possibility of fraud in the elections in March 1930, which would keep São Paulo in power once Julio Prestes won the election.²⁹⁴ Taking advantage of the demand for changes in politics and inside the army, Vargas colluded with the *Tenentistas* (a group of revolutionary junior officers, reformists and technocrats, with populist ideologies) to overthrow the government.²⁹⁵ Several disgruntled army officers, influenced by the *Tenentistas* and seeing São Paulo’s policy as damaging to the country, organized a revolt to change the government.²⁹⁶ Thus, the growth of the movement and the adhesion of a considerable number of officers of the military police led to a civil-military coup in October, 1930. “Collapsing from within, the army prevented a bloody civil war only by turning power to Vargas on November 3, 1930,”²⁹⁷ since it failed to negotiate a new government acceptable to the revolutionaries.²⁹⁸ It was the end of the Old Republic in Brazil. Even so, no consensus

²⁹² McCann, 361.

²⁹³ Smallman, 38.

²⁹⁴ Smallman, 38.

²⁹⁵ Smallman, 38.

²⁹⁶ McCann, 367.

²⁹⁷ Smallman, 41.

²⁹⁸ McCann, 382.

was reached within the army. Internal conflicts continued to be motivated by doctrinal, organizational, and political divergences.²⁹⁹

Nevertheless, a movement seeking the isolation of the army from politics and social-cultural influences started to gain strength because the groups of conservative officers inside the Brazilian Army (the majority) realized that a possible consequence of the opening of society to the army was to open the army to society, making it more susceptible to external influences.³⁰⁰ This was considered detrimental to the integrity of the organization. The introduction of political factionalism was a significant obstacle to building a strong, disciplined, and efficient military structure, and threatened the power of the army as a political actor.³⁰¹

Solving the army's institutional crisis and sustaining its integrity became the organization's primary goal and involved, among other things, the adoption of a whole new set of symbolic elements. More than the reorganization of an institution divided by political and ideological issues, what resulted was "the invention of the Army as a national institution, inherited from a specific tradition and with a role to play in the construction of the Brazilian Nation."³⁰² Given this, the introduction of the Duke of Caxias as a patron of the Brazilian Army was an attempt to focus on the figure of a war hero, one who would gather in himself the qualities intended for all army officers, providing unity and a redirection of the army from business related to domestic politics.³⁰³

To promote the necessary changes, the most important initiatives were directed toward the recruitment process of the Brazilian Military Academy, by restricting access to candidates coming from military schools, preparatory courses, or the ranks. Inside the military schools, the training itself began to give paramount importance to ideological

²⁹⁹ Castro, *A invenção do Exército Brasileiro* [The Invention of the Brazilian Army], 8.

³⁰⁰ José Carvalho, "Armed Forces and Politics in Brazil, 1930–45," *The Hispanic American Historical Review* 62, no. 2 (May 1982): 194, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2514978194>.

³⁰¹ Carvalho, 194.

³⁰² Castro, 8.

³⁰³ Castro, 11.

indoctrination, with a strong emphasis on ideological preparation as the very essence of the social policy of a modern army. The idea was to mirror the parallel effort of communism, teaching morals and civics to enlisted men and sociology, of all things, to cadets. On the negative side, legislation meant to forbid military involvement in partisan politics was introduced.³⁰⁴ At the same time, 107 officers and 1,136 noncommissioned officers and soldiers were expelled from the army between 1935 and 1938, accused of being communists, and many other less drastic forms of punishment were used that frequently resulted in irrevocable harm to an officer's career, such as imprisonment, transfer, or reprimand.³⁰⁵ In sum, the history of the period between 1930 and 1937 is the story of how the army's leadership fought civilian elites for control of the military. The changes in recruitment patterns, training, and promotion systems were only part of the project to consolidate the military and the political power of the armed forces.

With this motivation, the content of the messages transmitted by the military chiefs about Caxias and the Day of the Soldier, after the 1920s and during the 1930s, would have the objective to function symbolically, internally to the institution, as an "antidote" against the indiscipline and politicization of the military.³⁰⁶ This objective is evident in an analysis of the speeches of various commanders of that time. One of them said that "when politics wants to take you in its deceptive plots trying to make you believe that it is not perjury the breaking of the duties of discipline and the insurgency against the authorities, do not forget that Caxias, a mirror of loyalty, despite having militated in politics, he was constantly the impregnable bulwark of legality."³⁰⁷ Since 1930, the content of the messages on Caxias has emphasized not only legality and discipline but has presented Caxias as the greatest fighter for the unity and integrity of the homeland.³⁰⁸

³⁰⁴ Carvalho, 205–206.

³⁰⁵ Carvalho, 209.

³⁰⁶ Castro, 11.

³⁰⁷ Castro, 11.

³⁰⁸ Castro, 12.

Over the years, however, the figure of Caxias was not well understood by the soldiers. The extreme, almost mystical exaltation of Caxias turned him into an unattainable and inimitable model. Thus, the symbol lost the ability to promote an emotional connection with the troops, composed of “fallible beings” and full of too human weaknesses. The result ended up being the opposite of what one wanted to achieve with the exaltation of the Patron: “Caxias” came to designate an overly strict individual in discipline—a meaning which also spread among civilians.³⁰⁹ Nonetheless, the image of an army united around the aura of the patriotism of the Duke of Caxias, despising the politicians and abstaining from the politics, continues until today.

This withdrawal of the military from social and political conflicts is clear in the words of Colonel José Pessoa, who was responsible for the invention of new traditions in the Military School of Realengo, the military academy of the Brazilian Army at the time:³¹⁰

Cadets! The duty that the Army had to perform towards the Republic is already consummated. ... But the Revolution is not over yet, that is the order of the moment. The Republic is saved, it is left to save the Nation. To redeem the Republic was the means, to magnify the Nation is the only true purpose. Revalidated the form of government, it is necessary to restore Brazil. ... The Army, as a democratic institution par excellence, as a true bone of nationality is, by its very nature, the institution that must first and soon be recovered, so much so that the integrity of the Motherland, rather than that of the regime, rests in its efficiency.

For Colonel Pessoa, military policy and discipline were two things that should not be mixed.³¹¹ One of his measures to strengthen discipline was the creation of the Cadet Corps of the Brazilian Army. A set of symbols was created that expressed the cadets’ belonging to a tradition linked to what was considered to be the deepest national values. With the creation of the Cadet Corps, the student enrolled in the school

³⁰⁹ Castro, 17.

³¹⁰ Castro, 19.

³¹¹ Castro, 19.

was now considered part of a collective entity.³¹² In his own words after four years of command, “an ideology has been created, which is a mixture of “Brazilianness” and military sentiment, amalgamated by the cult of the past, by the spirit of tradition.”³¹³ Thus, the symbolism of the removal of military life in relation to civil life, represented in the creation of a unique entity and separated from the civilian reality (the Corps of Cadets) with its own symbolism and rituals, played a fundamental role in the social framework of the Brazilian Army, and consequently, of the FAB that we have today.

A parallel between the Duke de Caxias and the Brazilian aviator Alberto Santos-Dumont can be quickly established. Santos-Dumont was an idealist endowed with intellectual and imaginative capacities above average and ahead of his time. Considered by Brazilians as “the father of aviation,” after success with balloons and airships, Santos-Dumont went on to another line of research: flying with a vehicle heavier than air. After two unsuccessful attempts, on October 23, 1906, the dream materialized: at the Bagatelle Field in Paris, France, a crowd saw their first aircraft, the 14-Bis, fly for 60 meters and land without difficulty.³¹⁴ The Brazilians and French consider this the first time that man managed to take off and land by his own means on an object heavier than air. Santos-Dumont made his last flight in September 1909. During his lifetime, he was responsible for the creation of several inventions, among them the hot shower and the wristwatch. In June 1931, he was elected a member of the Brazilian Academy of Letters.³¹⁵ With this enviable curriculum vitae, it was not difficult to establish him as the Patron of Aeronautics and to extract from his life the example of values linked to courage, innovation, and intelligence, desired attributes in any official. His life is celebrated every year in military ceremonies throughout the

³¹² Castro, 20.

³¹³ Castro, 22.

³¹⁴ Tenente João Elias, “Aniversário de Santos-Dumont: 2018 Marca 145 anos do Patrono da Aeronáutica” [Birthday of Santos-Dumont: 2018 Marks 145 years of the Aeronautics’ Patron], Agência Força Aérea, last modified July 19, 2018, [http://www.fab.mil.br/noticias/mostra/32454/PAI DA AVIAÇÃO](http://www.fab.mil.br/noticias/mostra/32454/PAI_DA_AVIAÇÃO).

³¹⁵ Elias.

country and his achievements are remembered through continuous references within the FAB's organizational culture.

The same happened with the figure of Eduardo Gomes, who in 1991, ten years after his death, received the title of Patron of the FAB. Born in 1896, Eduardo Gomes graduated from the Military School of the Brazilian Army in 1918 and participated in some of the famous historical episodes such as the movement of "The 18 of the Fort," the Revolution of 1924, the fight against the Communist *Intentona* of 1935, and the anti-submarine patrol on the coast of Brazil during the Second World War, when he commanded aerial units. He was also responsible for the precursor of the National Air Mail (CAN) and twice Minister of Aeronautics. Finally, he was one of the few military men to reach the rank Marshal-of-Air.³¹⁶ His life is shrouded in a mystique that transformed him into a synonym for various moral values venerated within the FAB.

2. The Communist *Intentona*

Another fact of great importance for the understanding of the formation of Brazilian military culture was the frustrated communist revolt of November 1935, since it promoted the anti-communist ideology inside the armed forces.³¹⁷

After the Russian Revolution of 1917, the Brazilian Communist Party was created in 1922. With the conversion of the leader of the *Tenentista* Movement, Luís Carlos Prestes, to communism, the strengthening of communist ideology with the support of the *Tenentes*, and the emergence of the political group the Alliance National Liberation Army (ALN) that was dominated by the communists,³¹⁸ there was the real intention of the communists to come to power by revolutionary means.

The *Tenentes* employed careful organization and propaganda as they subverted Brazilian troops to their movement. Aided by a faction of civilian elites, the *Tenentes*

³¹⁶ "Conheça a História do Patrono da Força Aérea Brasileira" [Know the History of the Brazilian Air Force Patron], Agência Força Aérea, last modified January 19, 2012, <http://www.fab.mil.br/noticias/mostra/9735/>.

³¹⁷ Castro, 29.

³¹⁸ Castro, 29.

enjoyed great success in their effort. At the time, the army's leaders would face a movement that not only rallied widespread support within the institution, but also had powerful civilian allies. The *Tenentes* had always believed that because of officers' technical skills, they could offer a dispassionate vision that could serve as a basis to modernize the nation. They thought that regional elites had co-opted military superiors, who had been too willing to have the army serve as a tool of special political interests. According to the *Tenentes*, they would be different.

It was in this context that a communist revolt broke out in Natal, Recife, and in Rio de Janeiro, in 1935. Involving members of the Brazilian Army and linked to the Comintern—the International Communist organization—the rebels were quickly defeated by the central government. The episode was called the *Intentona*—a Portuguese word that means a crazy intent, foolish plan, folly—a name that in itself helped to build the mythology behind the event: heroic soldiers saving the nation from evil and crazy communists.³¹⁹ Getúlio Vargas—who assumed control of the Brazilian government after the 1930 coup and ruled the country until 1945, as provisional president (1930–1934), constitutional president (1934–1937) and dictator (1937–1945)—and the military commanders promoted strong repression, expelling all left-wing military from the armed forces.³²⁰ Although the opposition to communism within the organization preceded this episode, it was from the *Intentona* that the communists came to be identified as the greatest enemy.³²¹ In Castro's words, “this process had as its focal point the institutionalization, by the military, of commemoration on the anniversary of the victory over the *Intentona*. The ritual of remembrance of the dead loyal to the government, repeated every year in Rio de Janeiro, made their sacrifice present, renewed the anti-communist vows of the military and socialized the new generations in the same spirit.”³²²

³¹⁹ Castro, 29.

³²⁰ Castro, 29.

³²¹ Castro, 30.

³²² Castro, 30.

The military regime initiated in 1964 further reinforced the idea of the communist threat. The regime promoted the concept that, in 1935 and in 1964, the communists attempted an onslaught, which was hampered by the guardians of the nation, the saviors of the homeland, the armed forces. The association between 1935 and 1964 became mandatory.³²³ In the words of the commander of the II Army, in commemoration of the defeat of the *Intentona*, in 1976, the mention of two military men considered traitors—one in the *Intentona*, another in the military regime—reinforced the symbolic link between 1935 and 1964: “In our barracks no more Lamarcas will appear, no more Agildos Baratas will appear, because our quarters are now purified.”³²⁴

3. The Guararapes Battle

Despite the strong anti-socialist and anti-communist sentiment that is part of the organizational culture of the Brazilian Armed Forces, the democratization of Brazil and the assumption of five consecutive governments linked to left-wing political parties, rituals, and symbols connected to the counterrevolution of 1964 and the defeat of the Communist *Intentona* of 1935 lost their strength and effectiveness. To take their place, in 1994, on the date of the First Battle of Guararapes, a new ritual was invented. In 1648, the Battle of Guararapes marked the moment when local troops, composed of units of whites, blacks, and Indians, using irregular tactics of war, defeated a superior enemy in number and equipment, expelling the Dutch troops that occupied the region of Pernambuco between 1630 and 1654. In Castro’s words, “the central idea of the new commemoration is that in Guararapes would have been born at the same time as the Brazilian nationality and Army.”³²⁵ This idea is reinforced by the symbolism of three races—the white, black and Indian—who constitute the Brazilian people, fighting side by side to protect territory and national identity. The internal enemy, represented by communism, has lost part of its force against the foreign enemy, the

³²³ Castro, 32.

³²⁴ Castro, 33.

³²⁵ Castro, 36.

foreigner who invades Brazil to steal its wealth.³²⁶ Analyzing the documents in the national defense area it is easy to establish a parallel with the riches of the Amazon and the doctrines of resistance and tactics developed to protect the region.

4. The Brazilian Expeditionary Force

The history of Brazilian Expeditionary Force (FEB) started in the Getúlio Vargas Government. Vargas was a dictator in the mold of European fascism, establishing relationships with Nazi Germany at the beginning of the *Estado Novo*. During the war, Vargas broke with Germany and went on to support the allied powers. The most influential groups within Brazilian politics, including Vargas, believed that Brazil would benefit by participating in the war, and the *Estado Novo* would be preserved.³²⁷ Minister of War Dutra was tasked to organize an expeditionary force (FEB) to fight Germany, however, with little support from the general staff, which was against this decision.³²⁸ Inside the Brazilian Army a myth was created that the contact with U.S. troops in Italy led the FEB to adopt democratic and liberal values, which contributed to Vargas's downfall in 1945.³²⁹

Several historians have generally agreed that the FEB had a profound impact on the Brazilian Army. Some of them will defend the view that the FEB was a relevant factor in consolidating the base for the coup of 1964 and the military regime that followed. These historians say that the FEB³³⁰ was used to create the idea of the Brazilian Army hero: an idealist, nationalist and attached to values such as freedom and democracy. This idea was essential to validate the military regime after 1964, despite the FEB being formed by nationalist forces sympathetic to Vargas and by some groups connected with the Communist parties and organizations, which spent years struggling against the army's high command before violence smashed their political influence in 1952.³³¹

³²⁶ Castro, 36.

³²⁷ Smallman, 75.

³²⁸ Smallman, 75–76.

³²⁹ Smallman, 77.

³³⁰ Smallman, 77.

³³¹ Smallman, 77.

The Brazilian Air Force also made use of this same dynamic of the Brazilian expeditionary heroes who went to fight in unknown lands, risking their lives in the name of democracy and freedom. The creation of the 1st Fighter Group, composed only by volunteer aviators³³² most of whom lost their lives in combat in Italy in the 1940s,³³³ constitutes the basis of Brazilian aeronautical mythology. This critical episode in the history of the FAB reverberates in the present-day ceremonies of great importance that extend reverence to the memory of those who died in Italy, and helped to create the mystique necessary to forge heroes who represent the values that should be shared by the troops.³³⁴

Thus, it is clear that rituals and symbology play a fundamental role in the shaping of the Brazilian military ethos, and which is essential for the existence of any social group. Castro states that “it is not enough for individuals to think that they are part of a particular community: we must act, and act in common. It is necessary also to celebrate—remember together. Through rituals, beliefs become effectively social to their participants. It is the regular and collective repetition of the rituals that creates and recreates the collective itself as such, renewing in its participants the feeling of belonging to something in common,”³³⁵ in this case, the Brazilian Armed Forces.

To sum up, the invention of traditions around historical figures (such as Santos Dumont, Eduardo Gomes, and Caxias) or around historical events (such as the Communist *Intentona*, the Battle of the Guararapes, and the Expeditionary Forces of the Army and Air Force) has been used to shape moral values essential for the organizational culture of the Brazilian military. These traditions help to ground the mystique of the antiquity of military values, elevating them to the almost mythical status.

³³² Tenente Gabrielli, “Entenda Como a Missão de Defender Está no DNA da FAB Desde Sua Criação” [Understand How the Defending Mission Is in the FAB’s DNA since Its Creation], Agência Força Aérea, last modified Jan 18, 2018, <http://www.fab.mil.br/noticias/mostra/31566/COMEMORAÇÃO>.

³³³ Tenente Gabrielli, “Ala 12 Realiza Cerimônia em Homenagem aos Pilotos da FAB Mortos na Segunda Guerra” [Wing 12 Holds Ceremony in Tribute to FAB Pilots Dead in Second War], Agência Força Aérea, last modified Apr 20, 2018, <http://www.fab.mil.br/noticias/mostra/31987/AVIAÇÃO>.

³³⁴ Castro, 11.

³³⁵ Castro, 40.

Courage, patriotism, self-sacrifice, discipline, initiative, and ingenuity are just some of the qualities identified in these traditions and historic figures and are perpetuated year after year to generations of new members of the Brazilian Armed Forces. This makes it clear that any military education process that wants to inculcate values and generate institutional socialization in its new military men must invest in the intense ritualism and worship directed at current symbols, heroes, and historical episodes that represent the ethics one wants to forge in new professionals of the armed forces.

C. MILITARY SOCIALIZATION PROCESS

The Brazilian Air Force was created in 1941 by President Getúlio Vargas, who transferred to the new institution military personnel, civilian professionals, airplanes, and facilities, of the Brazilian Navy and the Army. As early as 1941, the Aeronautical School was created (to educate and train officers), as was the School of Aeronautical Experts (for education and training of graduates), from the School of Military Aviation and the School of Naval Aviation until then belonging to the Brazilian Army and the Navy, respectively.³³⁶ Thus, it is natural that part of the organizational culture and military ethics formed throughout the 19th century and the first half of the 20th century was transmitted to the Brazilian Air Force, along with the military from the other two branches of the armed forces. The author of this thesis, who for seven years worked at the Brazilian Air Force Academy (AFA), six of these years directly in the Aeronautical Cadet Corps (CCAER) can attest that many of the rituals practiced in that institution come mainly from the traditions initiated in the Academy Military of the Agulhas Negras (AMAN), belonging to the Brazilian Army, which in turn inherited its traditions from its older version, the Military School of Realengo. Thus, understanding the ethical motivations in AMAN is like investigating the beginnings of the ethical motivations practiced in the AFA.

³³⁶ “Aeronáutica Celebra Sete Décadas e Meia de História” [Aeronautics Celebrates Seven Decades and a Half of History], Agência Força Aérea, last modified January 17, 2016, <http://www.fab.mil.br/noticias/mostra/24341/75>.

The book *Antropologia dos Militares*, edited by Mauro Celso Castro and Piero Leirner, confirms Smallman's³³⁷ and McCann's³³⁸ statements about the military's distrust of the ability of civilians to lead the nation, since it is clear that the military consider themselves to be intellectually, socially, and morally superior, due to the strength of the institution.³³⁹ This self-image constructed throughout history ends up creating a direct opposition between the military world and the civilian world, an opposition that is essential in the social framework and military identity.³⁴⁰ To Smallman, military personnel believe that they are capable technicians that carry the necessary knowledge and moral values to identify the nation's needs and lead it through a crisis. Castro's book sees the same thing, but as a result of the strength of the institution, it demands the isolation of its members from civil society. Anyway, that division between civilian and military is a reality and necessary to achieve the complete socialization that profession demands.

Thus, not by the same routes mapped by Huntington,³⁴¹ Janowitz,³⁴² and Moskos and Wood,³⁴³ but with the same consequences, the Brazilian Armed Forces are built up from the society they seek to preserve and defend, developing the idea of a "military family," which is one of its fundamental concepts.³⁴⁴ At the same time, the Brazilian military strengthens the distinction between friends and foes, without a diffuse spectrum between these extremes, an important dichotomy in "military mythology."³⁴⁵ From all that was presented, the Brazilian military confirms the studies of Moskos and Wood,³⁴⁶ pointing out that the armed forces developed a process of socialization, centered in self-sacrifice, that aims to give vocation to those who persevere and to forge a new

³³⁷ Smallman, 16.

³³⁸ McCann, 13.

³³⁹ Castro, "Em Campo com os Militares" [On Training Camp Together with the Military], 24.

³⁴⁰ Castro, 24.

³⁴¹ Huntington, 16.

³⁴² Janowitz, 175–177.

³⁴³ Moskos and Wood, 4.

³⁴⁴ Castro, 26.

³⁴⁵ Castro, 27.

³⁴⁶ Moskos and Wood, 5.

institutionalized individual.³⁴⁷ In this process, the small rituals and corporal expressions (a short haircut, for example) that develop within military education courses are essential in the formation of this institutional identity.³⁴⁸

Then, those characteristics of social, cultural, and moral frameworks that could be identified within AMAN, also can be recognized within the AFA. Leal in her book *Socialização em uma Instituição Total* directly confirms theories from Castro's book,³⁴⁹ and consequently, Moskos and Wood's conclusions,³⁵⁰ verifying that in the process of incorporation of the new cadets to the AFA, the mortification of the "self" and socialization with a transformation of identity³⁵¹ is essential. This process is developed by methodologies, rituals, and symbolism very similar to those presented by Castro in AMAN. This agreement of Leal with Castro ends up confirming that part of the organizational culture of the FAB was inherited from the Brazilian Army, as already stated in this chapter.

In this process of building the organizational culture of the FAB, Leal shows an educational paradox inside the AFA curriculum. According to her, the educational documents say that it is desirable to achieve in the AFA, on the one hand, the homogenization of behavior and unrestricted obedience, and on the other hand, the spirit of initiative, responsibility, and leadership (assuming autonomy). These two positions, however, eventually weaken, as opposed to mutually exclude, one another.³⁵² Thus, Leal points out that the "mortification of the self" cannot be maintained throughout the process of education.³⁵³ This is extremely important for the development of the curriculum of the education courses of the FAB officers, since, by logical deduction, it is understood that they must go through a stage of personal identity breach and incorporation of collectivism.

³⁴⁷ Piero Leirner, "Etnografia com Militares: Fórmula, Dosagem e Posologia," in *Antropologia dos Militares: Reflexões sobre Pesquisas de Campo*, 41–42.

³⁴⁸ Cavilha, 139.

³⁴⁹ Leirner, 41–42.

³⁵⁰ Moskos and Wood, 5.

³⁵¹ Leal, 390.

³⁵² Leal, 390.

³⁵³ Leal, 398.

Further, after the process of socialization has reached a point where the individual is institutionalized, he or she must be motivated to detach him- or herself from the collective, now no longer as the former citizen-civilian, but as the new citizen-soldier, to exercise this new individuality and autonomy in the field of battle. Leal uses a statement from Huntington that the military's task is to know and to know how to devise strategies and tactics that are following the politically defined goals for the national state that he defends.³⁵⁴ Then, for her, not only the AFA but all officer courses have to construct an independent thinker together with a socialized military individual. As a consequence, the necessity of this mixture of subordination and homogeneity versus initiative and autonomy both in the AFA and in other FAB courses should balance institutional social organization and occupational social organization, confirming the views of Moskos and Wood,³⁵⁵ and to some degree, Janowitz.³⁵⁶

Finally, in the analysis of Leal's work, the importance given to Kohlberg's³⁵⁷ hidden curriculum,³⁵⁸ which appears in social relations and in the administrative conduct of military education courses, is also evident inside the AFA. Leal proves that informal curriculum is reinforced by the traditions, symbolism, and rituals present in the daily life of the barracks. All this confirms Kohlberg's assertions that the hidden content, although not present in the curriculum, should at least be planned to avoid contradictions involving theoretical content and practical content. It is imperative this kind of planning to be included at a tactical level and supervised by the highest levels of FAB's military education.

In sum, the shaping of the organizational culture of the state and many of its institutions, including the military, inherits, in a natural and unplanned way, some traditions throughout its history. Many of the traditions of the Brazilian Armed Forces, though, were invented with the intent of interpreting specific moral values, such as

³⁵⁴ Leal, 398.

³⁵⁵ Moskos and Wood, 7.

³⁵⁶ Janowitz, 32–36.

³⁵⁷ Biaggio, 53.

³⁵⁸ Leal, 391.

esprit de corps, for example, in periods of history when these values were threatened by cultural transformations in society. These social transformations could affect the integrity of occupational social organization (to draw on Moskos and Wood), interfering with the essence of the armed forces and altering their level of Responsibility and Corporateness (to use Huntington-defined terms). Through the veneration of heroes and historical episodes, ceremonies, and symbology, traditions are incorporated into the barracks, perpetuating a previously desired ethic. Since the primary function of military academies is to inculcate values and socialize the members of the armed forces, the educational processes in these places must be emphasized with all the legendary representativeness that guides the students in their individual transformation, which rises from a level of individualistic civilian life to a collective military being, something really close to some of McCann statements.³⁵⁹ The focus on episodes in history that enhance institutional values, the use of symbols that embody military ethics, the encouraging of attitudes that symbolize a break with civilian life, or the exaltation of national heroes that represent and incorporate the desired stance in their soldiers—all these are techniques used in the process of military socialization, and should be integrated into military education courses. Thus, all these elements are essential guides for the beginning of the analysis of the military curricula of the FAB, which will be done in the next chapter, serving as clear parameters in the development of the professional profile that will determine which disciplines should be maintained, which ones should be modified, which ones should be eliminated, and which ones should be incorporated. If the analysis demonstrates that no change fits in the curricula when compared to these premises, then the hypothesis of this thesis will be wrong. But if the investigation shows an incompatibility between curricula and theory for the effective construction of efficient military ethics, then the conclusion of this thesis will expose, in the epilogue, the diagnosis and lines of action recommended to the FAB authorities for the improvement of the education of their officers.

³⁵⁹ McCann, 35.

VI. EDUCATION IN THE BRAZILIAN AIR FORCE

This chapter describes the military curricula in the light of previously established professional, ethical, and educational premises, regarding the organizational culture of the FAB. The objective of this approach is to identify the consonances and dissonances of the current educational process with the necessary characteristics for the development of competent military professionals and to prepare them for the fulfillment of their constitutional missions. The focus of this review is the profile of the military member as a combatant and as an ethical individual since this is the focus of this thesis.

A. MILITARY EDUCATION COURSES FOR OFFICERS IN THE FAB

The main distinction between all the courses within FAB is “how” and “where” the professionals are prepared to actuate within the military. The Air Force Academy (AFA) and the Aeronautical Instruction and Adaptation Center (CIAAR) prepare officers from all territories to be actuated in all territories and so distributes them, after graduation, to military organizations scattered throughout the country. Education and training are centralized, i.e., unified in one place. This facilitates the supervision of the Directorate of Education (DIRENS) and the use of measures of technical standardization and, above all, the development of institutional values and the incorporation of organizational culture and military ethics. McCann testifies to this by saying that the disintegrated military training developed by the Brazilian Army in the first half of the 1900s had damaging effects on the social structure of the troops, a problem that was solved only with the standardization and centralization of teaching at the Agulhas Negras Military Academy.³⁶⁰ The sense of belonging to something bigger and older than Brazilian society itself is more present in this type of educational model, since the feeling about the greatness of the military is intensified when the student abandons his or her culture and region to be incorporated in an institution that puts all national representatives, together, in one place. On the other hand, Specialty of Convoked Officers (QOCON) personnel—Temporary Officers—are selected for a

³⁶⁰ McCann, 13.

specific locality to serve in the FAB. Usually, they are themselves representatives of those same local communities. Because a national law regulates this kind of military service, the Temporary Officers cannot be moved to other locations throughout their eight years of service. Since the military officer is entitled to financial compensation when he or she is moved, this measure also helps to relieve the military budget. Yet, since the Specialty of Convoked Officers (QOCON) personnel cannot be moved, their education and training process cannot be centralized, i.e., realized in the same place, which explains the necessity of the Regional Education Sections (SERENS) and a geographically scattered educational system.³⁶¹

If the data presented earlier highlights the importance of greater attention to the planning and development of the Military Education Courses for Temporary Officers, future prognoses only intensify this certainty. From 2010 through 2016 there was a 67 percent increase in the hiring of temporary military personnel. In 2010, the number was 4,986; in 2012, 5,983; and in 2016, there were 8,328 military personnel in the temporary cadres of sergeants and officers.³⁶² The number is expected to increase further.³⁶³ According to the strategic planning for the so-called Air Force 100, which outlines prospects for the FAB when it reaches its 100th anniversary in 2041,

the recruitment dynamics should focus on structuring a mixed workforce with career professionals and temporary professionals, associated with the introduction of new weapons systems and concepts in the various areas, as a way of reducing the number of personnel in the area of support and strengthening those resources directed to the final activity.³⁶⁴

³⁶¹ For more details related to the Brazilian Air Force Educational System (SISTENS), see Appendix B- Aeronautics Educational System (SISTENS).

³⁶² “Ampliação de Número de Militares Temporários Dinamiza Política de Recursos Humanos” [Expansion of Number of Temporary Military Enhances Human Resources Policy], Agência Força Aérea, last modified February 10, 2016, <http://www.fab.mil.br/noticias/mostra/24479/GESTÃO>.

³⁶³ “Comandante diz que FAB está sendo reestruturada” [Commander says FAB is being restructured], Correio do Estado, last modified January 24, 2018, <https://www.correiodoestado.com.br/brasilmundo/comandante-diz-que-fab-esta-sendo-reestruturada/320140/>.

³⁶⁴ Comando da Aeronáutica, *Concepção Estratégica Força Aérea 100* [Strategic Design: Air Force 100], DCA 11–45 (Brasília, DF: Comando da Aeronáutica, 2016), <http://www.fab.mil.br/Download/arquivos/FA100.pdf>, 39.

Occupational values may interfere with institutional values, as observed by Moskos and Wood,³⁶⁵ even more so if segregation in the training process exists, spreading around the country the military education courses for Temporary Officers, weakening FAB's global culture and strengthening regional values. Likewise, the organizational culture of the FAB can be affected by the decrease in the number of career officers who should be replaced by Temporary Officers, which may compromise effectiveness, as stated by Gabriel³⁶⁶ and Toner.³⁶⁷ Reduced effectiveness means increased bureaucracy to conquer social legitimacy, which increases efficiency.³⁶⁸ The breakdown of this vicious circle depends on an increase in disciplines, first in the military field and then in the technical-operational field, promoting an operational change to a hybrid profile to increase effectiveness,³⁶⁹ regardless of budget reductions. In addition, the rotation of these same temporary military personnel may make it difficult to maintain institutional values through the informal curriculum advocated by Kohlberg³⁷⁰ since these values should be reinforced with each generation that is replaced. Yet, there will be insufficient time for them to be incorporated in the organizational culture and to become propagators of institutional values, as officers with ten, 20, or 30 years of military service.

B. CURRICULUM OF MILITARY EDUCATION COURSES

In the Professional Profile of the Aeronautical Officer (PPOA)³⁷¹ there is a professional profile considered common to all specialties. This common core should be used to improve effectiveness, as stated by Burk.³⁷² The common profile encompasses knowledge, skills, and attitudes that make up part of the disciplines, most in the military field, which must be shared by all FAB's junior officers. The universal competencies listed

³⁶⁵ Moskos and Wood, 3–4.

³⁶⁶ Gabriel, 10–11.

³⁶⁷ Toner, 9–16.

³⁶⁸ Snider and Watkins, 7.

³⁶⁹ Snider and Watkins, 7.

³⁷⁰ Biaggio, 53.

³⁷¹ For more details, see Appendix B - Aeronautics Educational System (SISTENS).

³⁷² Burk, 21–23.

in the PPOA that have some connection with the military ethics studied in this thesis and that are reproduced in all courses for career officers are:

1. to cultivate ethical principles, values, and military duties, guiding their conduct by a line of correction of attitudes, both in civilian and military life;
2. to cultivate leadership, responsibility, patriotism, a spirit of belonging in a team, and to seek continuous improvement;
3. to understand the Basic Doctrine of the FAB, as well as to know the historical evolution of the military power, with emphasis on the aerospace power;
4. to understand the documents and procedures applied to the administrative sphere of Military Judicial Police, to military police inquiry, the imprisonment of suspects in the act, the investigative process in administrative sphere, etc.;
5. to know the constitutional responsibility of the armed forces and apply the basic foundations of law, in the areas of Constitutional Law, Administrative Law, Military Penal Process, Human Rights, and International Law of Armed Conflicts.
6. to employ techniques of close combat and survival in a hostile environment, except for QOCAPL [chaplain];
7. to participate in training and military operations in Brazil and abroad, being able to work in Peacekeeping Operations and other missions in support of Brazilian foreign policy;
8. to use, effectively, the armament of individual use made available by COMAER, except for QOCAPL [chaplain];

9. to carry out maintenance actions of an organic level for the conservation of portable weapons, made available by COMAER, except QOCAPL [chaplain];
10. to command grouping or fraction of troops in graduation ceremonies, maneuvers, and military exercises; and
11. to conduct the Officer-of-the-Day service or the services of proportionate to their responsibility.

When referring to ethical principles and values, the PPOA does not make clear what principles and what values these would be, permitting subjectivity and doubts, which in most cases are subject to the interpretations given to these terms by the higher-ranking officers, according to their own experiences. This type of interpretation is subject to constant change, as those responsible for these decisions are replaced in their functions.

In an attempt to minimize these doubts and standardize this interpretation, the FAB conceived an Aeronautical Command Manual (MCA) 909–1, called the Program for Teaching and Strengthening of Values (PFV). The manual establishes five central values, as defined in Aeronautical Command Guideline (DCA) 11–45 - Strategic Air Force Concept 100:³⁷³ discipline, professionalism, integrity, patriotism, and commitment. These values include a set of 18 additional values, extracted from Title II of the Military Statute,³⁷⁴ which codified the traditions and the Brazilian military organizational culture.

So, as far as institutional values are concerned, they originate in the spontaneous or invented traditions that were codified in the Military Statute and drawn to Strategic Air Force Concept 100 and Aeronautical Command Manual (MCA) 909–1. They should be reflected in the PPOA, which in turn makes incorporates them into the courses for FAB officers. When the PPOA refers to military ethics and values, they should be understood

³⁷³ Comando da Aeronáutica, *Concepção Estratégica Força Aérea 100* [Strategic Design: Air Force 100], DCA 11–45 (Brasília, DF: Comando da Aeronáutica, 2016), 20–21, <http://www.fab.mil.br/Download/arquivos/FA100.pdf>.

³⁷⁴ Estatuto dos Militares [Military Statute]. Law no. 6880. Published on Diário Oficial da União (December 11, 1980). http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/LEIS/L6880.htm.

as those 23 values spelled out in the Aeronautical Command Manual (MCA) 909–1. Although the MCA 909–1 works perfectly as a code of honor, to instill true ethics embodying the virtues as advocated by Toner,³⁷⁵ independent of codes and laws, it requires an educational process focused on the concepts of universal ethics as presented by Lewis in his theory of the Tao.³⁷⁶ Obedience to laws and ordinances, the same category in which a moral code can be classified, is related to the conventional level of moral judgment, second to the theory of Kohlberg.³⁷⁷ And as discussed in this thesis, the post-conventional level is one that meets the needs for the formation of a military ethic that supports the three professional characteristics established by Huntington³⁷⁸—expertise, responsibility, and corporateness—at the same time that it allows the strengthening of the institutional social organization, as established by Moskos and Wood.³⁷⁹

The educational process of the FAB officers begins with the definition of the curriculum, which seeks to meet the profiles outlined by the PPOA. The PPOA traces the military profile in a common way to all the staff, even the temporary military personnel. The document regulating entry and the duties assigned to Temporary Officers, however, makes a clear distinction between these professionals and the career military. Temporary Officers are employed in times of peace; that is, they will not compose troops on the battlefield.³⁸⁰ Thus, this distinction should appear more clearly in the PPOA, allowing the design of a curriculum that contemplates a greater emphasis on the profile of a constabulary force for Temporary Officers, and a hybrid profile in the development of other curricula.

³⁷⁵ Toner, 4.

³⁷⁶ Lewis, 10.

³⁷⁷ Biaggio, 25–26.

³⁷⁸ Huntington, 8.

³⁷⁹ Moskos and Wood, 5–6 and 16.

³⁸⁰ Comando da Aeronáutica, *Aviso de Convocação, Seleção e Incorporação de Profissionais de Nível Superior, Voluntários à Prestação do Serviço Militar Temporário, para o Ano de 2018* [Call Notice, Selection and Incorporation of Higher Level Professionals, Volunteers to the Temporary Military Service, for the Year 2018], (Brasília, DF: DIRAP, 2018), 14.

The curricula and stages of military education in the FAB are divided into three fields of activity: general field, technical-specialized field, and military field.³⁸¹ The first deals with academic disciplines, such as Public Administration, Law, and Analytic Geometry, and “provides, in addition to cultural and scientific support for the study of disciplines in the military and technical-specialized field.”³⁸² The second group brings together the individuals “with specific content” such as Aerodynamics, Aerial Navigation, and Meteorology, “aimed at the technical and specialized training of the various professionals who make up the Aeronautical Personnel Staff.”³⁸³ Finally, the military field brings together disciplines with specific content aimed at training the military professional, such as Weapons, Ammunition, and Shooting.

The military fields pertaining to the 12 FAB officer courses³⁸⁴ are divided into five different curriculum models since some of these courses share the same curriculum as the military area. The subjects related to these curricula are summarized in the Table 2, where they were classified by content similarity, although they have different names. Some subjects within the same curriculum were grouped under the same category, as is the case of military ethics and professional military ethics in the AFA curriculum, for example, that for this work were grouped in this table with the nomenclature “military ethics.”

³⁸¹ Comando da Aeronáutica, *Elaboração e Revisão de Currículos Mínimos* [Elaboration and Review of Minimum Curricula], ICA 37-4 (Brasília, DF: Comando da Aeronáutica, 2010), 10.

³⁸² Comando da Aeronáutica, *Elaboração e Revisão de Currículos Mínimos* [Elaboration and Review of Minimum Curricula], ICA 37-4, 10.

³⁸³ Comando da Aeronáutica, 10.

³⁸⁴ For more details, see Appendix B - Aeronautical Education System (SISTENS).

Table 2. Officer's Military Curricula in FAB.

CAREER OFFICERS				TEMPORARY OFFICERS
AFA	CIAAR			SERENS
CFO (AV/INT/INF)	EAOEAER / EAIC / EAOAp / CAMAR/CADAR/CAFAR	CFOE	EAOF	QOCON
First Aids	—	First Aids	—	—
Physical Training	Physical Training	Physical Training	Physical Training	Physical Training
Weapons, Ammunition, and Shooting	Weapons, Ammunition, and Shooting	Weapons, Ammunition, and Shooting	Weapons, Ammunition, and Shooting	Weapons, Ammunition, and Shooting
Military campaign / Military Camp	Military campaign / Military Camp	Military campaign / Military Camp	—	Military campaign / Military Camp
Intelligence	Intelligence	Intelligence	Intelligence	—
Civil-military Behavior	Civil-Military Education	—	—	Civil-Military Education
Military Doctrine	—	—	—	—
Military Ethics	Military Ethics	Military Ethics	Military Ethics	Military Ethics (out of the military field)
Military Profession	Military Profession	—	—	—
Military History	Brazilian Air Force History	—	—	Brazilian Air Force History
Parachuting	—	—	—	—
Survival	—	—	—	—
Military Legislation	Military Rules	Military Legislation	Military Rules	Military Legislation
Military Marching Drill	Military Marching Drill	Military Marching Drill	Military Marching Drill	Military Marching Drill
Military Mobilization	Military Mobilization	Military Mobilization	Military Mobilization	—
—	Junior Officer's Behavior	—	Junior Officer's Behavior	—
—	Air Force Operational Doctrine	—	Air Force Operational Doctrine	—
—	Armed Forces Structure	—	—	Armed Forces
—	Safety at Work	—	Safety at Work	—

CAREER OFFICERS				TEMPORARY OFFICERS
AFA	CIAAR			SERENS
CFO (AV/INT/INF)	EAOEAER / EAIC / EAOAp / CAMAR/CADAR/CAFAR	CFOE	EAOF	QOCON
—	—	Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Defense	—	—
—	—	Flight Safety	—	Flight Safety
—	Military Security	—	—	Military Security
—	Security Exercises	—	Security Exercises	—
Leadership	Leadership (out of the military field)	Leadership (out of the military field)	Leadership (out of the military field)	Leadership (out of the military field)
—	—	—	—	Military Hymns and Songs
—	Search and Rescue (EAOAp only)	—	—	—

Of all the disciplines in the military field, listed in Table 2, only six are present in all curricula: Physical Training; Weapons, Ammunition, and Shooting; Military Ethics; Military Legislation; Military Marching Drill; and Leadership. Of these six areas, Leadership appears within the military field only in the AFA curriculum, being in the general field in the other courses. Because of this distinction, Leadership is taught in the AFA from a military perspective, and is led by officers of the Cadet Corps (CCAER). In the CIAAR and SERENS courses, insertion of leadership material in the general field instead of the military field may allow an occupational or business emphasis, since the approach will seek academic references in civilian theorist, leading to critical institutional concepts linked to military ethics and military values to be replaced by corporate values, exactly as Gabriel and Moskos state. According to Gabriel, this type of content (with a strong civilian base) helps weaken the organizational culture of the military and, consequently, diminishes the effectiveness of the air force. Military Marching Drill; Weapons, Ammunition and Shooting; and Military Legislations are disciplines that can be considered technically military. Of these three subjects, Military Marching Drill may be

most commonly used to strengthen ethical concepts such as esprit de corps, hierarchy, and discipline.

Finally, Military Ethics is the discipline most directly connected to the concepts of organizational culture, institutionalism, and military values. It can be divided into two different approaches: one is oriented more toward moral values and to organizational culture—more prominent in the AFA—and the other, a more technical-professional approach. The latter approach is preoccupied with international codes, when the discipline is called “Professional Military Ethics,” which is found in all courses. This is the only approach to ethics in the CIAAR courses and the courses taught by SERENS. To reconcile this approach to ethics unrelated to the concepts closest to institutional values, classes such as Junior Officers’ Behavior explain moral practices linked to the military profession, such as functions and values related to Junior Officers daily routine. The focus of this type of approach is more practical than theoretical. In this sense, the aforementioned material shares an expected behavior, modeling of the future officers, and is characterized by stimulating the imitation of an ideal posture in a passive way, without working with the abstraction and universality necessary to reach the level that requires officers to interpret the relativity as well as a preformed ethics. In the Junior Officers’ Behavior discipline, two of the objectives presented are “to explain the essence of the values inherent in military life” and “to justify the importance of the values inherent in military life.”³⁸⁵ These targets end up strengthening the exclusionary social concept present in the military values versus civilian values. This approach by modeling and disaggregating realities (civilian versus military) does not allow an interpretation more closely related to the concepts of Tao, proposed by Lewis, or connected to fidelity to virtue and not to the law or legal ordinations, as presented by Toner. By offering a model to be followed, however, with clear examples of conduct, distinguishing the civilian reality from the military reality, the military organizational culture is strengthened. Then, it is clear that this discipline is useful

³⁸⁵ Comando da Aeronáutica, Currículo Mínimo do Estágio de Adaptação de Oficiais de Apoio da Aeronáutica [Minimum Curriculum for the Adaptation Stage of Aeronautical Support Officers] - EAOAp, ICA 37–628 (Brasília, DF: Comando da Aeronáutica, 2016), 18.

institutionally, but it would not be sufficient for the formation of universal military ethics, true to virtue.

Thus, Civil-Military Education complements the ethical approach. The aim of the course is to help the student to conceptualize morals and civics, to identify the moral and civic duties of the citizen, to identify military social roles in the community, to explain the concepts of Nation and State, to explain the meaning of national symbols, and to sing hymns and patriotic songs, as well as the hymns and songs of the Aeronautics.³⁸⁶ With this, military values go through a process of legitimization, gaining the universal character to justify the posture of cultural and institutional preservation necessary to strengthen the military and to enable the efficiency and effectiveness of the military.

Also, some disciplines that do not appear in the Course for Specialist Officers (CFOE) and Adaptation Internship for Officers (EAOF) courses are actually taught during the sergeant training course at the School of Aeronautical Specialist (EEAR). Since the military that are sent to the CFOE and Adaptation Internship for Officers (EAOF) are military personnel who attended the EEAR, this knowledge is present in the competences developed by the officers coming from these courses. One of these disciplines is Military History, pointed out by Gabriel as the basic knowledge around which the military curriculum must be built in order to provide accumulation of experience. Yet, much of the military history covered in the courses of CIAAR and SERENS focuses on the FAB. Although not sufficient to provide new experiences, this kind of approach, giving experience through the history of the Brazilian military, is far more conducive to fostering organizational culture and providing socialization through the presentation of military heroes and iconic military campaigns into the history of the nation.

Likewise, Military Campaign or Military Camp, intended to teach military camp techniques, survival, and progression in the field, for example, is practiced in all officer courses. According to the PPOA analysis, even in QOCON, whose purpose is “to fill, in temporarily, in peacetime, lapses existing in the structure of COMAER Military

³⁸⁶ Comando da Aeronáutica, 23.

Organizations, not filled by the Commissioned Officers,” these disciplines are taught.³⁸⁷ In other words, the functions provided by Temporary Officers are exercised outside the Theater of Operations—not related to war, battle, and combat. With this, it is deduced that the contact of these officers with real operational activities, linked to more combative actions, if they occur, will be carried out in the activities of guard and security, the guarantee of law and order, support to the population in public calamities, and medical-hospital actions.

On the other hand, every FAB Junior Officer is involved in activities related to guard and security through a shift called Officer-of-Day. In this role, the officer on duty is responsible for leading a staff of military men for 24 hours in the process of guarding the buildings and facilities of the FAB, controlling the access of people and using force, if necessary, to approach suspects and to neutralize threats. Thus, the military education course of the QOCON should focus on the constabulary force profile established by Janowitz, dispensing disciplines related to the performance of functions in times of war, with emphasis on police actions. Continuing to teach survival techniques such as how to obtain water and fire, for example—although useful for the development of organizational values linked to the institution’s end-activity, war—should not occupy a space in the curriculum that could be better used to develop other areas. Activities related to the use of tactical techniques and the study of military history—especially those historical episodes related to irregular warfare, hybrid warfare, public safety, and actions in calamities—should have priority.

The disciplines of Military Safety and Safety Exercises, respectively theory and practice of activities related to the guard and security of facilities, focus precisely on the profile of the constabulary force. This education and training package only exists in its entirety in the Adaptation Stage for Engineers Officers (EAOEAR), Adaptation Course for Doctors, Dentists, and Pharmacists (CAMAR / CADAR / CAFAR), Chaplain Education

³⁸⁷ Comando da Aeronáutica, Aviso de Convocação, Seleção e Incorporação de Profissionais de Nível Superior, Voluntários à Prestação do Serviço Militar Temporário, para o Ano de 2018 [Call Notice, Selection and Incorporation of Higher Level Professionals, Volunteers to the Temporary Military Service, for the Year 2018], 14.

and Adaptation Internship (EIAC), and Support Officers Adaptation Internship (EAOAp) courses. In Course for Specialist Officers (CFOE) and AFA courses it does not exist, in Adaptation Internship for Officers EAOF only the practical part, and in QOCON only the theoretical part. Although security and guard activities are carried out by sergeants throughout their careers, before these military members join the CFOE and EAOF, the leadership profile of a security team would undoubtedly require a revision of the concept and new learning, linked to the performance of duties as officers.

Another factor that should be considered in curriculum analysis are the activities that make up the informal curriculum, as defined by Kohlberg,³⁸⁸ and echoed by Janowitz,³⁸⁹ McCloy and Clover,³⁹⁰ and Toner.³⁹¹ Activities linked mainly to the period of adjustment to military life are developed in a planned way but are not directly addressed in the curriculum. In this regard, the QOCON curriculum refers to “appropriate learning experiences within and outside the classroom, summed of effective guidance, control, and ongoing indoctrination on the part of instructors.”³⁹²

In line with Castro’s and Leal’s thinking, this initial period of adjustment lends itself mainly to promoting the socialization of the individual, incorporating him or her fully into the institution.³⁹³ Indeed, at this stage of the process of education of FAB officers, rituals, symbols, and heroes are very important for the perpetuation of specific military legends that will foster the desired institutional values for the character and moral formation of future officers. Thus, activities such as the cutting the hair,³⁹⁴ quartering or temporary boarding, for example, promote, respectively, the loss of individuality and the

³⁸⁸ Biaggio, 53.

³⁸⁹ Janowitz, 127.

³⁹⁰ TMcCloy and Clover, 135–137.

³⁹¹ Toner, 147.

³⁹² Comando da Aeronáutica, *Currículo Mínimo da 1a Fase do Estágio de Adaptação Técnico* [Minimum Curriculum of the 1st Phase of the Technical Adaptation Stage] - EAT, ICA 37–393 (Brasília, DF: Comando da Aeronáutica, 2015), 7.

³⁹³ Castro, *O Espírito Militar*, 31–32; Leal, 390.

³⁹⁴ Leal, 397.

disconnection from the civilian identity, through collectivism and abrupt isolation.³⁹⁵ The use of the uniform could contribute to the development of esprit de corps; the nocturnal training and intense activities with reduced hours of rest could help build the sense of duty that demands a military person's self-sacrifice. Castro himself quotes Janowitz to establish a parallel between the period known as Beast Barracks at West Point and the period of adjustment existing in Brazilian military academies, demonstrating that the intensity of this phase lends itself to a purpose of converting ideas and thoughts to the ethics of the organization.³⁹⁶ An important addition is that within this informal curriculum, mainly during orientation weeks, chaplaincy actions aimed at maximizing belief in absolute values should be introduced in planning in order to make use of this educational fact.³⁹⁷

Therefore, some of these activities imposed on the students, or actions taken by those responsible for each one of the courses, are developed without specific regulation of the DIRENS. Rather, it is the responsibility of each Organization of Education (OE) to promote this standardization, according to each OE's own criteria. Even if these standard practices are not part of the curriculum of each course, they should be regulated by DIRENS, which would establish minimum standards to be considered during the planning and execution of the courses and internships, as well as during the orientation period. Questions such as "What is the haircut pattern?" and "What activities should be developed in a nocturnal training?" are examples of tactical issues that should be left to schools and SERENS to decide. However, DIRENS should enforce rules like the required haircut and minimum period of quartering, for example, in all military education courses under its responsibility, aiming at standardization in the process of ethics construction, at the same time strengthening the organizational culture.

C. CONCLUSION

It is necessary for formal and informal military curricula to be constructed in a way that minimizes possible "cultural contamination" of the institutional social organization by

³⁹⁵ Castro, 31.

³⁹⁶ Castro, 31.

³⁹⁷ Brinsfield, 400–405, 417.

the occupational one. The promotion of military personnel with a profile of manager, in order to balance the technical approach with the fighter approach, would be one of the preventive measures, as Janowitz states,³⁹⁸ to balance the desired and necessary technical profile of the temporary officers with the profile of the warrior, more present in the commissioned officers' behavior. At the same time, the three dimensions of the professional military expressed by Huntington³⁹⁹—expertise, responsibility, and corporateness—must be developed in a balanced way in military education courses within all organizations belonging to SISTENS. For this balance to be achieved, it is essential to promote universal ethics⁴⁰⁰ and to exalt symbols, heroes, and great military achievements to build a morally strong and cohesive military organization.⁴⁰¹

A profile of the constabulary force, as theorized by Janowitz,⁴⁰² meets the need to maintain a robust institutional profile while preparing career officers for a pattern of future combat linked to hybrid war,⁴⁰³ and enabling temporary officers to carry out their operational duties related to guard and security, which are primarily police duties. The FAB's combat profile focused on hybrid warfare would also be a strong driver of effectiveness, helping to reduce bureaucracy and increase its legitimacy in society.⁴⁰⁴

A clearer and more directive position of DIRENS is even more critical in the educational course for officers of QOCON, as the number of temporary military personnel has been increasing in recent years—and will continue to increase in the years to come—and this is the course with the shortest duration. The institutional profile should take precedence over the occupational profile, while the technical approach should be balanced with the approach focused on combat. The curriculum should be centered on military history, with an emphasis on irregular warfare and hybrid warfare. From these foundations,

³⁹⁸ Janowitz, 21–22.

³⁹⁹ Huntington, 8.

⁴⁰⁰ Lewis, 10; Toner, 3, 12–16.

⁴⁰¹ Castro, *A invenção do Exército Brasileiro* [The Invention of the Brazilian Army], 7.

⁴⁰² Janowitz, 417–419.

⁴⁰³ Hoffman, 5.

⁴⁰⁴ Snider and Watkins, 7.

an improved curriculum can be made for both QOCON and other military education courses in the Brazilian Air Force, something that will be the focus of the next and last chapter of this thesis.

VII. EPILOGUE

The members of the Brazilian Armed Forces can be considered professionals when they possess expertise, responsibility, and corporateness, focused on a specific jurisdiction that permits the FAB to attain social legitimacy. To permit liberal values and values of business within military institutions has a dangerous effect. Social transformations could affect the integrity of the occupational social organization, interfering with the essence of the armed forces and reducing the institution's level of responsibility, corporateness, and effectiveness. Considering that the occupational organizational profile comes together with technological evolution, the FAB should prepare manager officers capable of balancing the organizational culture and technical curricula, as well as promoting new technologies. Through the veneration of heroes and historical episodes, rites, and symbology, traditions are incorporated into the barracks, perpetuating a long-established ethic. Moreover, integrating moral education into technical-professional education is essential. Finally, to reduce bureaucracy and increase effectiveness, the educational process must assume a constabulary force profile, preparing the FAB to engage in hybrid war, to be used in conventional and irregular warfare.

Due to the high degree of complexity of the military task, military education must have priority in the FAB planning. Only the educational process can prepare leaders for the conduct of wars. Since its last experience in regular warfare was in World War II, the FAB has been used only for domestic security. The easiest way to close this gap in experience is through an educational system based on military history and case studies, as well as military personnel exchanges and joint missions. At the same time, the moral standard must remain unchanged throughout the entire process of adapting the expertise of the armed forces. Thus, through the experiences shared by other armed forces and other nations, the objective of the FAB ought to be to promote the development of the high moral standard of its officers.

In the process of developing the organizational culture, the FAB must consider universal moral values common to several cultures around the globe and throughout history. Since these values are the origin of ethics, the FAB must assume the role of guardian of ethics in the state and incorporate these ethical standards through an organized

educational process. Adopting those values counteracts the social pressure to equate military professionals with their “equivalents” in civil society. Due to the singularity of military institutions, their values, and their mission, the FAB must avoid incorporating values, techniques, or practices from civilian society without adapting them to the military reality. The FAB’s goal must be to guide its personnel, mainly its officers, to reach the post-conventional level of moral reasoning. This will permit them to distinguish a righteous law of an unjust one.

Many of the traditions of the FAB were created to strengthen specific moral values in periods of history when these values were threatened by cultural transformations in society. The primary function of a military course must be to inculcate values and socialize the members of the armed forces. Thus, the military’s educational process must focus on highlighting all the traditional narrative that guides the future armed forces personnel from their individualistic civilian lives to become subsumed within a collective military body. Techniques that should be integrated into military courses focus on episodes in history that enhance institutional values, use symbols that embody military ethics, encourage attitudes that symbolize a break with civilian life, or exalt national heroes who represent and incorporate the desired mindset.

A. CONSIDERATIONS RELATED TO TEMPORARY OFFICERS’ COURSES

Since the courses that prepare Temporary Officers in the FAB are the courses with the shortest duration and the number of temporary military personnel is increasing, all efforts to adjust the Brazilian military educational process must concentrate on those courses first. After analyzing each of the disciplines that compose the course for the Temporary Officers, and contrasting them with disciplines studied in other officer’s courses and with the theories seen throughout this thesis, it is recommended that a series of changes be made to improve the quality of the professionals provided to FAB. Military Campaign, although it is a useful discipline for the development of some important values related to military ethos, must be remodeled to meet a technical profile required by a constabulary force. It is clear that employing temporary military personnel in a Theater of Operations, where survival techniques are essential, should not be the target of this course.

The ability to operate from a military camp in operations during public calamities, or even during actions linked to domestic security, are the scenarios in which these officers will act. Thus, the gains concerning institutional values and adequate technical training could be balanced if Temporary Officers were educated and trained in this type of scenario. Similarly, because often only the FAB can reach regions affected by catastrophic events such as natural disasters, the FAB would benefit from knowledge of first aid. This knowledge could ensure the survival of civilians and companions until those displaced can be relocated to regions with more significant resources.

About the discipline Military Ethics for Temporary Officers, the focus should be on professional military ethics in balance with the ethics of values, with no emphasis on ethical business concepts. The discipline of ethics must compose the military field, and the concept of universal values—from which military ethics is a source—should be emphasized, incorporating Junior Officer’s Behavior and Civil-Military Education as a complement for the sake of behavioral illustration. The discipline History of the Brazilian Air Force must be maintained, but it should be added to general military history. Further, it should emphasize the formation of military values and the use of the FAB in various nations, including hybrid missions—regular and irregular warfare—and in relief activities during disaster relief. In addition, the disciplines of Military Mobilization and Security Exercises should be introduced into the Temporary Officers’ curriculum, with an emphasis on a constabulary force. Finally, yet in the QOCON curriculum, the discipline Leadership should be incorporated into the military field, and the focus should be on military leadership, not theories and techniques based on business leadership. For this, a good bibliography on military leadership is essential.

B. CONSIDERATIONS RELATED TO THE CAREER OFFICERS’ COURSES

Based on the same comparative analysis done to determine the changes to be applied in the course for Temporary Officers, changes can also be made in the Career Officers’ courses. To begin, the First-Aid discipline must be extended to all courses. Next, the Military Campaign discipline must be maintained with emphasis on the Theater of Operations, in particular. This emphasis is paramount as a key role of the air force end-activity, war, is played by these

officers. Since the discipline Military History should be the core of military education in which experiences are acquired and the organizational culture is strengthened, the recommendations made for the improvement of the course of the QOCON are also valid for all other courses. In this respect, AFA courses are the ones that need less adjustment since they already have a very extensive approach to military history. They are lack only in one regard: they need to harmonize the discipline with the events and characters of Brazilian history that can foster desired institutional values, while some emphasis must be placed on hybrid warfare and uneven warfare in other nations. In the specific case of the CFOE and EAOF, the revision of the military history curriculum should occur in the course for sergeants in the EEAR, which is the source of the students in these courses.

C. CONSIDERATIONS RELATED TO BOTH TYPES OF OFFICERS' COURSES

The teaching of military ethics, the disciplines connected to guard and security, and the composition of the informal curriculum are three features within military courses that can be considered common to all courses, following LeBoeuf's recommendation, and are mostly linked to the shaping of the organizational culture and the constabulary force profile. Thus, these characteristics must be developed in a standardized way to homogenize the professional profile of the officers who will compose the first positions of the officers' circle after the educational process.

Disciplines such as Military Profession, Civil-Military Education, and Military Doctrine can be incorporated into the discipline Military Ethics, which in addition to dealing with professional ethics must also include the ethics of values. The development of the concepts of universal ethics and the development of moral judgment seek to move students to the post-conventional level pointed out by Kohlberg. Thus, the application of the Moral Competence Test (MCT)⁴⁰⁵ or other tools developed to assess moral judgment or competence, at the time of entering the military course and throughout the education

⁴⁰⁵ According to George Lind, creator of the MCT, moral competence is the ability to solve problems and conflicts on the basis of moral principles through thinking and discussion, instead of through violence, deceit, or bowing down to others. Lind attests that MCT measures a particular aspect of this ability, namely the ability to judge arguments for and against a controversial decision on the basis of their moral quality, instead of on the basis of their opinion agreement or other non-moral attributes.

process, is essential for the improvement of the curriculum. In fact, procedures to identify the degree of moral judgment of an individual do not exist in the FAB, and even in Brazil as a whole, they are also rare. Then, use of this technique to aid the education process opens a range of research opportunities and new theses to validate the tools of moral judgment or tactics of moral education performed in Organizations of Education.

Military Security and Security Exercises, two disciplines dealing with guard and security, include developing techniques for approaching suspects and notions of close combat and self-defense, for example, which help to build knowledge and techniques that must be mastered by all Junior Officers in the exercise of their duties as Officer-of-Day. Because of this, their presence in all curricula is also indispensable. Finally, as mentioned earlier, linking the discipline of Leadership to the military field, emphasizing military leadership, helps reinforce the institutional profile and downplay values related to an occupational profile. Replacing occupationalism with the technical ability necessary for the development of competencies of the officers is essential within a constabulary force.

Finally, planning military courses should take into account the informal curriculum that helps to develop organizational culture. Thus, personnel policies must be constructed to motivate the educators responsible for conducting the disciplines to adopt behaviors that embody the values that are intended to be developed in the students. If education should be a priority activity in the FAB, and if the informal curriculum is directly affected by personnel policy, then the military instructors who make up SISTENS courses should be chosen according to the values they embody. At the same time, they should receive organizational incentives to carry out their activities in OEs, sharing these values with future officers. Thus, SERENS, although not a military organization, but a section within the SEREPs, should receive different attention in the composition of its personnel, with instructors capable of representing the institutional values in a faithful and committed way. Likewise, just as military schools make use of symbols and rites to reinforce the ethical concepts being conveyed in classrooms and during instruction, SERENS environments should emphasize symbols and ceremonies that point directly to personalities of Brazilian military history and to the great achievements of the military in the past. That practice will help to personify the organizational culture and reinforce the socialization of the new

officers. The SERENS chiefs, or the SEREPS chiefs, according to what Janowitz has emphasized, should embody the profile of the military man as a warrior, in order to serve as a model for those being educated in those organizations.

Thus, the necessary adjustment to military disciplines in FAB’s military courses for officers are summarized in Table 3. The new disciplines are in italics and underlined. The disciplines that must be removed or incorporated in other disciplines are shown with strikethrough markings. It is important to highlight that several changes also must happen outside of the curricula, in the planning and organization of those courses, as previously mentioned.

Table 3. New Military Curricula for Officers’ Courses

CAREER OFFICERS				TEMPORARY OFFICERS
AFA	CIAAR			SERENS
CFO (AV/INT/INF)	EAOEAER / EAIC / EAOAp / CAMAR/CADAR/CAFAR	CFOE	EAOF	QOCON
First Aid	<i>First Aid</i>	First Aid	<i>First Aid</i>	<i>First Aid</i>
Physical Training	Physical Training	Physical Training	Physical Training	Physical Training
Weapons, Ammunition, and Shooting	Weapons, Ammunition, and Shooting	Weapons, Ammunition, and Shooting	Weapons, Ammunition, and Shooting	Weapons, Ammunition, and Shooting
Military campaign / Military Camp	Military campaign / Military Camp	Military campaign / Military Camp	—	<i>Military Camp for constabulary forces</i>
Intelligence	Intelligence	Intelligence	Intelligence	<i>Intelligence</i>
Civil military Behavior	Civil Military Education	—	—	Civil Military Education
Military Doctrine	—	—	—	—
Military Ethics	Military Ethics	Military Ethics	Military Ethics	<i>Military Ethics (inside the military field)</i>
Military Profession	Military Profession	—	—	—
Military History	<i>Military History</i>	<i>Military History</i> (During previous course in the EEAR)	<i>Military History</i> (During previous course in the EEAR)	<i>Military History</i>
Parachuting	—	—	—	—
Survival	—	—	—	—

CAREER OFFICERS				TEMPORARY OFFICERS
AFA	CIAAR			SERENS
CFO (AV/INT/INF)	EAOEAER / EAIC / EAOAp / CAMAR/CADAR/CAFAR	CFOE	EAOF	QOCON
Military Legislation	Military Rules	Military Legislation	Military Rules	Military Legislation
Military Marching Drill	Military Marching Drill	Military Marching Drill	Military Marching Drill	Military Marching Drill
Military Mobilization	Military Mobilization	Military Mobilization	Military Mobilization	<u>Military Mobilization</u>
—	Junior Officer's Behavior	—	Junior Officer's Behavior	—
—	Air Force Operational Doctrine	—	Air Force Operational Doctrine	—
—	Armed Forces Structure	—	—	Armed Forces
—	Safety at Work	—	Safety at Work	—
—	—	Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Defense	—	—
—	—	Flight Safety	—	Flight Safety
<u>Military Security</u>	Military Security	<u>Military Security</u>	<u>Military Security</u>	Military Security
<u>Security Exercises</u>	Security Exercises	<u>Security Exercises</u>	Security Exercises	<u>Security Exercises</u>
Leadership	Leadership (out of the military field)	Leadership (out of the military field)	Leadership (out of the military field)	<u>Leadership</u> (inside the military field)
—	—	—	—	Military Hymns and Songs
—	Search and Rescue (EAOAp only)	—	—	—

D. CONCLUSION

In short, various theoretical premises drawn from three distinct areas—professionalism, ethics, and education—associated with the historical construction of the organizational culture of the FAB highlight several aspects of the FAB military courses that can be improved. First and foremost, the PPOA needs to be remodeled to introduce

the constabulary force concept for all specialties and include competencies tied to hybrid warfare and irregular warfare, distinguishing between Temporary Officers who would not fight in a regular war scenario, and Career Officers, who would be involved in all scenarios. Likewise, military ethics concepts should use the moral codes present in DCA 11–45 (Air Force 100) and MCA 909–1 (PFV) as a reference for working on more universal concepts of ethics, linking the moral loyalty of officers directly to virtue rather than to codes, which would raise the officers' moral judgment to the post-conventional level. Furthermore, technical competencies and combat competencies must be managed in a way that protects institutional values from being superseded by occupational values. Finally, the process of improving moral judgment should be the target of future research in the area of military ethics teaching. Such research could focus on the implementation of tools for measuring moral judgment, in particular, and on providing concrete data to improve the educational system of the FAB.

APPENDIX A. BRAZILIAN MILITARY HISTORY FROM THE EMPIRE TO THE OLD REPUBLIC

The first years of the newly consolidated nation, after the arrival of King Dom João VI and the Portuguese royal family⁴⁰⁶ in Rio de Janeiro in 1808, were marked by the necessity to construct a powerful army to sustain the government. At that time the first military academies were created, such as the Real Academy for *Guardas-Marinha* (the first rank in the Brazilian Navy), in 1808, and the Military Academy of Rio de Janeiro, in 1810. While the navy was formed from an aristocracy of officers, the Army did not follow the same way. Author Frank McCann, in his book *Soldados da Pátria* affirms that the ranks were filled by criminals, poor people, and any kind of social slag at that time.⁴⁰⁷ Smallman adds that “many officers came from poorer provinces, and it was not uncommon for them to come from families of declining fortune seeking to ensure that their sons would not sink into poverty and disgrace.”⁴⁰⁸ From this situation arose a worrisome domestic heterogeneity and a lack of identity with the dominant classes. Yet, the same army was designed to serve as an instrument of order defending the privilege of the slaveholding elites.⁴⁰⁹

The landholding class, however, did not trust the army, creating tension between the Brazilian military and the political elites.⁴¹⁰ Brazilian politics were governed by a small population of social and political elites. Its members controlled the land and the slaves, the main means of measuring wealth during the empire. While new groups (such as industrialists) could gain wealth, they could not join the ruling class in Brazil solely on the basis of this wealth.⁴¹¹ These elites maintained a weak central state to ensure the autonomy of the state governments, to exclude the general

⁴⁰⁶ The monarch at the time was Dom Joao VI of the Bragança dynasty. This dynasty reigned in Portugal from 1640 until 1910.

⁴⁰⁷ McCann, 29.

⁴⁰⁸ Smallman, 9.

⁴⁰⁹ Smallman, 9.

⁴¹⁰ Smallman, 9.

⁴¹¹ Smallman, 11.

population from politics, and to maintain slavery.⁴¹² The contrast between those powerful classes and a segregated army characterized by unprofessional behavior among the lowest ranks, sparking public disorder and violence in the capital city, was evident.⁴¹³

The situation intensified in 1831, after a war against Argentina—known as the Cisplatina War, which happened from 1825 to 1828 to decide what nation would rule Cisplatina, modern Uruguay—when the government resolved to reduce the size of the army and to diminish the threat against the elites' power.⁴¹⁴ Another consequence was the creation of a national guard in 1831. The ranks in the national guard, composed of members of the dominant classes, were responsible for protecting the cities and imposing internal law, under the authority of the Minister of Justice.⁴¹⁵ The elites' intent was to use the national guard to counterbalance the power of the army and to ensure their power. Because the elites feared the army, they provided the national guard with more resources than the army, which also lamented the fact that it had been forced to accept poor men (usually black men) in the ranks. By contrast, the national guard recruited the rich and the educated.⁴¹⁶ This inequality increased the racial division between the two organizations and, consequently, between the leading class and the armed forces.⁴¹⁷ In this moment, a gap between the military and the politicians started to take form.

Nevertheless, the government's attempt to reduce military prerogatives could not be sustained because of the Paraguayan War—also known as the War of Triple Alliance. The Paraguayan War, which occurred between 1864 and 1870, was the longest-running and deadliest international conflict in South America.⁴¹⁸ Paraguay lived under a dictatorship of Solano Lopez, who used the state as a personal possession for a perpetuation

⁴¹² Smallman, 12.

⁴¹³ Smallman, 12.

⁴¹⁴ Smallman, 10.

⁴¹⁵ Smallman, 13.

⁴¹⁶ Smallman, 13.

⁴¹⁷ Smallman, 13.

⁴¹⁸ Demétrio Magnoli, *História da Guerras* [War History] (São Paulo: Contexto, 2006), 253.

of his family in power.⁴¹⁹ In October 1864, Brazilian troops invaded Uruguayan territory in support of the Colorado Party in a civil war against the Blanco Party, the party of the government.⁴²⁰ As the Paraguayan government supported the Blanco Party the following month, the Brazilian civilian vessel *Marquês de Olinda* was imprisoned shortly after leaving the port of Asuncion in Paraguay and, at the end of December, Paraguayan troops attacked the Brazilian state of Mato Grosso, surprising the Empire.⁴²¹ Around 7,700 Paraguayan soldiers easily commanded the Imperial Army's 875 soldiers and the slightly less than 3,000 national guards who were unfit for combat. With its rearguard to the north, Solano López planned to advance over the Rio Grande do Sul toward Uruguay, where his forces would defeat Brazilian troops of just under 10,000 soldiers (the total manpower of the Imperial Army was 18,000 men). This victory would subject the Brazilian Empire to the Paraguayan government.⁴²² The incapacity of the national guard to actuate and to eliminate the threat of General Solano Lopez eventually led to an increase in the prerogatives of the Brazilian Armed Forces. The Brazilian Army increased not only its number of soldiers but also its number of black soldiers; this helped to enlarge the distance between the elite and the military.⁴²³ For this reason, with the end of the conflict, the elites in the legislature rapidly cut the military's budget and enlistment. To army leaders, the rapid cuts in their organization appeared to be a betrayal. The army doubted both the willingness and the capability of traditional elites to solve Brazil's problems. It was during this period that Brazilian officers began to think of the army as the "nation's savior," which became an important aspect of the military's depiction of itself.⁴²⁴ The Brazilian Armed Forces finished the war strengthened, but resentful because of measures adopted by the government that prejudiced them.⁴²⁵ This kind of treatment received from the government

⁴¹⁹ Magnoli, 255.

⁴²⁰ Magnoli, 258.

⁴²¹ Magnoli, 258.

⁴²² Magnoli, 259.

⁴²³ Smallman, 15–16.

⁴²⁴ Smallman, 16.

⁴²⁵ Smallman, 16.

expanded to some areas of society, creating a hostile environment for the veterans of the Paraguayan War.⁴²⁶

At the same time, the attitudes of the son of Dom João VI, the new Brazilian Emperor Dom Pedro I,⁴²⁷ were not so different since he also mistrusted the army but used it against his enemies when convenient. Author Frank McCann affirms that the monarchy used the army several times to maintain cohesion in the country.⁴²⁸ The emperor dissolved the Constituent Assembly in 1823 in what became known as “the Night of the Agony.”⁴²⁹ D. Pedro I, with military aid, ordered a siege on the building where the constituent deputies were assembled. Many were eventually arrested and then exiled. This decision sparked a rebellion in the northeast, where a series of provinces came together to establish the “Confederation of the Equator.” The emperor successfully put down this uprising by November 1824.⁴³⁰

The consequence of this constantly shifting relation between the authorities and the army created military officers who were riddled by resentment; they started to see themselves as the only ones capable of breaking a failed order of political games and constructing a new one. Abolitionists and liberal dissidents grew inside the army, also motivated by a positivist ideology that came from France.⁴³¹ They had a sense of not belonging to the governmental structure.⁴³² McCann also testifies to this sense of non-belonging that plagued the army. Nevertheless, McCann’s statements demonstrate that these feelings were more motivated by the role played by the army, acting as a nationalist institution responsible for consolidating the Brazilian territory and the population, and

⁴²⁶ McCann, 28.

⁴²⁷ Member of the dynasty of Bragança, Pedro I of Brazil or Pedro IV of Portugal, also known as “the Soldier King,” was the first Emperor of Brazil, from 1822 until his abdication in 1831, and also King of Portugal and Algarves as Pedro IV between March and May 1826. He was the fourth son of King Dom Joao VI of Portugal and Queen Carlota Joaquina of Spain.

⁴²⁸ McCann, 18–19.

⁴²⁹ Smallman, 11.

⁴³⁰ Smallman, 11.

⁴³¹ Smallman, 17.

⁴³² Smallman, 10.

creating a sense of “Brazilianness.”⁴³³ At same time, McCann talks about the shortage of officers in the political leadership generating a sense of detachment from the civilian elites and disengagement from the government.⁴³⁴ In fact, McCann argues that this sense of alienation was not due to the army’s view of itself as different and technically and morally superior to civilian authority, but because the army was like an entity that “hovered over other institutions,” filling a vacuum that the government could not fill because the government still had a regional character. Not even the Roman Catholic Church, which had an international organizational culture, could play that role. Only the Brazilian Army could because it was national and nationalistic at the same time.⁴³⁵

Then, Brazil entered a period of regency since D. Pedro I’s son was only six years old when his father abdicated from the throne and returned to Portugal under enormous social pressure.⁴³⁶ Thus, D. Pedro II would have to wait until 18 to be crowned. Between 1832 and 1845, the provisory government of regents were faced with five significant rebellions, some of which had a strongly regional character: The Cabanos War in Pernambuco (1832–35); the Cabanagem War in Pará (1835–40); the Sabinada in Bahia (1837–38); the Balaiada in Maranhão (1838–41); and the Farrapos War in the Rio Grande do Sul (1836–45).⁴³⁷ The army did not benefit from this period of turmoil, in part because military officers—army officers who resented the military reforms of the 1830s—participated in many of the uprisings. Despite the military’s role in ensuring the government’s survival, old patterns of mutual mistrust endured.⁴³⁸

The army’s unwillingness to support the military organization exacerbated a relationship of mutual suspicion between the elites and the military, leading to the military’s involvement in the future of society throughout the First Republic (1889–1930). In the words of Smallman, “The army’s perception of itself as the nation’s savior, its fear

⁴³³ McCann, 11.

⁴³⁴ McCann, 29.

⁴³⁵ McCann, 10–11.

⁴³⁶ Smallman, 13–14.

⁴³⁷ Smallman, 14.

⁴³⁸ Smallman, 14.

of competing institutions, and its difficult relationship with civilian elites, all had their roots in this period.”⁴³⁹ In this aspect, McCann speaks of the “Army’s modernizing ideology,” which collided with the interests of the regional agrarian oligarchies, interested in maintaining their status quo.⁴⁴⁰

Then, the first mix between military and politics happened. In 1889, the event known in Brazil as the “Proclamation of the Republic,” took place. It was, in fact, a military coup that put an end to the monarchist regime. Some leaders of the republican movement were linked to the Brazilian Army, such as Lieutenant Colonel Benjamin Constant. Republicans were intimately influenced by Auguste Comte’s positivism,⁴⁴¹ implying the idea of a strong, anti-slavery, anti-monarchical,⁴⁴² and laic state supported by a rational society planned by technocrats. For the coup against the monarchy to be successful, the republicans needed the support of the main military authority of the time, Marshal Deodoro da Fonseca, since the Brazilian Navy was aristocratic and loyal to the monarchy. Embodying the positivist ideology, Deodoro wrote the princess Isabel (daughter of Pedro II) to request that the army not be used to capture slaves in flight. A short time after, on May 13, 1888, Princess Isabel abolished slavery on behalf of her father.⁴⁴³ Thus, because the Brazilian agrarian economy deeply depended on slavery, military abolitionism served to exacerbate the difficult relationship between the army and the civilian leaders of the landowning class,⁴⁴⁴ at the same time that it dissolved some alliances between the emperor and the oligarchy.

Nevertheless, Deodoro was monarchist⁴⁴⁵ and a personal friend of the emperor D. Pedro II. To convince Deodoro of the need to overthrow the prevailing order, the

⁴³⁹ Smallman, 10.

⁴⁴⁰ McCann, 13.

⁴⁴¹ Smallman, 17.

⁴⁴² McCann, 31.

⁴⁴³ McCann, 31.

⁴⁴⁴ Smallman, 17.

⁴⁴⁵ June E. Hahner. “The Brazilian Armed Forces and the Overthrow of the Monarchy: Another Perspective,” *The Americas* 26, no. 2 (October 1969): 172, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/980297>.

republicans used the argument that the decisions of the Prime Minister of Pedro II, Viscount of Ouro Preto, would cause several losses to the army, which already was in bad condition at that time. The viscount was a liberal and planned to reduce the influence of the armed forces, cutting the budget, sending the army to the countryside, and improving the power of the national guard. Also, the republicans planted the information that, even if Ouro Preto was overthrown, a former personal enemy of Deodoro, Gaspar da Silveira Martins, would be chosen to replace him. Considering that republicans represented only one-fifth of the officers, but there were a lot of other small factions inside the army, and there was no consensus about the political program,⁴⁴⁶ Deodoro gathered a few hundred soldiers and advanced against the city of Rio de Janeiro with the goal of overthrowing the ministry of Ouro Preto.

This was the end of the monarchy and the beginning of the “military republic” of Brazil. It is interesting to note that the end of the monarchy, although it entailed significant social changes, was not characterized as a revolution. For McCann, a revolution would be a popular uprising that changes the nature of government and society.⁴⁴⁷ Although the events of 1889 were not necessarily popular as they were unleashed within the armed forces and modified the regime, they left the social and economic system almost intact,⁴⁴⁸ and thus, revolution would not be the adequate definition. Independent of this definition, however, changes occurred. Brazilian historians refer to it as the Sword Republic, a period in which Brazil was ruled by marshals Deodoro da Fonseca and Floriano Peixoto between 1889 and 1894. This was also the period when the first civilian president, Prudente de Morais, took office. It is a time characterized as a military dictatorship.⁴⁴⁹ During this period, the popular uprisings and the repression of resistance forces that wanted to restore the monarchy and the power to Emperor Dom Pedro II were common. After becoming president, Deodoro da Fonseca dissolved the National Congress by decree on November

⁴⁴⁶ Hahner, 174–175.

⁴⁴⁷ McCann, 20.

⁴⁴⁸ McCann, 17.

⁴⁴⁹ Francisco Martinho, *Democracia e Ditadura no Brasil* [Democracy and Dictatorship in Brazil], (Rio de Janeiro, EdUERJ, 2006), 33.

3, 1891. Then, to complete the coup, with another order the president instituted a state of siege in Brazil, authorizing the army to surround the Chamber and Senate and to arrest opposition politicians.

Almost two decades later, another process started in 1905 and peaked in 1913, when some groups inside the Brazilian Army tried to move the armed forces away from political involvement. Before reaching its conclusion in 1919, the movement sought to change the focus of internal (maintenance of republican institutions) to external (National Defense).⁴⁵⁰ The Brazilian government sent troops to Germany in 1905, and then brought a French mission to Brazil in 1919 to try to change the focus. Nevertheless, military involvement with politics, playing the role of saviors, had increased to the point that a myth about a communist rebellion within the army arose.⁴⁵¹ This myth was used for building unity within the armed forces with the objective of saving the Republic from the incompetence of politicians. The ideology of fear of social collapse eventually separates the army and civil society,⁴⁵² and has helped foster within the barracks a role of the armed forces as a national development institution support.⁴⁵³ According to McCann, during this period the army was the “core of the developing Brazilian State” and was the only truly national and non-regional institution.⁴⁵⁴ Because of this, one of the Brazilian Army’s major missions evolved to build state infrastructure.⁴⁵⁵

⁴⁵⁰ Smallman, 33.

⁴⁵¹ Smallman, 41 and 54.

⁴⁵² Smallman, 42.

⁴⁵³ Smallman, 66.

⁴⁵⁴ McCann, 10.

⁴⁵⁵ McCann, 14.

APPENDIX B. AERONAUTICS EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM (SISTENS)

This appendix provides an overview of the Aeronautics Educational System (SISTENS) and specifically details what branches and institutions make up SISTENS, what their functions are, and what the systemic relationship between them is. The appendix also identifies which categories of officers make up the Brazilian Air Force and their respective education process.

The normative document governing SISTENS is the Aeronautical Command System Norm (NSCA) 37–1.⁴⁵⁶ This document was created with the purpose of “establishing the organization, regulating the functioning and defining the responsibilities of the bodies of the Aeronautical Education System.”⁴⁵⁷ The Brazilian Air Force (FAB) organizes its centralized educational system in a Directorate of Education (DIRENS),⁴⁵⁸ a military organization based in the federal capital, Brasília, under the command of a general officer of the penultimate rank, a Major-Brigadier, and directly subordinate to the General Personnel Command (COMGEP).⁴⁵⁹ It is the responsibility of DIRENS “to determine the execution of the educational activities in a systemic way, in order to ensure the continued effectiveness of the SISTENS component organizations.”⁴⁶⁰ Figure 1 depicts DIRENS position within the FAB’s administrative structure.


⁴⁵⁶ Comando da Aeronáutica, *Sistema de Ensino da Aeronáutica* [Aeronautics Educational System], NSCA 37–1 (Brasília, DF: Comando da Aeronáutica, 2018).

⁴⁵⁷ Comando da Aeronáutica, 5.

⁴⁵⁸ Comando da Aeronáutica, 8.

⁴⁵⁹ Comando da Aeronáutica, *Regulamento da Diretoria de Ensino* [Regulation of the Directorate of Education], ROCA 21–104 (Brasília, DF: Comando da Aeronáutica, 2018), 7.

⁴⁶⁰ Comando da Aeronáutica, *Sistema de Ensino da Aeronáutica* [Aeronautics Educational System], NSCA 37–1, 5.




This figure shows where the Directorate of Education (DIRENS) is situated in FAB’s administrative structure. It is in the second hierarchical line, under the General Personnel Command subordination, under command of a three-star General.

Figure 1. FAB’s Organizational Chart.⁴⁶¹

The mission of DIRENS is to “plan, manage and control educational activities related to the training and post-training of Aeronautical Command personnel.”⁴⁶² Five Organizations of Education (OE) are directly subordinate to DIRENS: Air Force University (UNIFA), the Preparatory School to Cadets-of-Air (EPCAR), the School of Aeronautical Experts (EEAR), the Aeronautical Instruction and Adaptation Center (CIAAR), and the Air Force Academy (AFA), as depicted in Figure 2.

⁴⁶¹ Source: Rui Chagas Mesquita, “O Sistema de Ensino na Força Aérea Brasileira” [The Brazilian Air Force Education System] (presentation, XV Congresso Acadêmico sobre Defesa Nacional, 2018), https://www.defesa.gov.br/arquivos/ensino_e_pesquisa/defesa_academia/cadn/palestra_cadn_xi/xv_cadn/o_sistema_de_ensino_na_forca_aerea_brasileira.pdf.

⁴⁶² Comando da Aeronáutica, *Regulamento da Diretoria de Ensino* [Regulation of the Directorate of Education], ROCA 21–104, 7.



This figure shows the five Organizations of Education (OE) subordinate to DIRENS. The Air Force Academy and Aeronautical Instruction and Adaptation Center, organizations that educate career officers, are fourth and fifth from the left.

Figure 2. Directorate of Education’s Organizational Chart.⁴⁶³

SISTENS also has seven systemic educational bodies, which are the Regional Education Sections (SERENS), subordinate to the Aeronautics Personnel Recruitment and Training Services (SEREP).⁴⁶⁴ These systemic organizations are spread throughout the nation and, in addition to executing the education of Temporary Officers in their own regions, coordinate the execution of the courses for these military personnel in isolated military organizations within their jurisdiction, that is, those that are located in states where there is no SEREP. Thus, SERENS are not military organizations per se, but rather sections within the structures of the Aeronautical Recruitment and Personnel Services, administratively subordinate to SEREP but technically subordinate to DIRENS.⁴⁶⁵ The

⁴⁶³ Source: Rui Chagas Mesquita, “O Sistema de Ensino na Força Aérea Brasileira” [The Brazilian Air Force Education System] (presentation, XV Congresso Acadêmico sobre Defesa Nacional, 2018), https://www.defesa.gov.br/arquivos/ensino_e_pesquisa/defesa_academia/cadn/palestra_cadn_xi/xv_cadn/o_sistema_de_ensino_na_forca_aerea_brasileira.pdf.

⁴⁶⁴ Comando da Aeronáutica, *Sistema de Ensino da Aeronáutica* [Aeronautics Educational System], NSCA 37–1, 11.

⁴⁶⁵ Comando da Aeronáutica, 11.

SEREP, in turn, are subordinate to the Directorate of Personnel Administration of the Aeronautics (DIRAP), which like DIRENS, is under the General Personnel Command (COMGEP).



This figure shows Directorate of Education (DIRENS) and Directorate of Personnel Administration of the Aeronautics (DIRAP), side by side. It is possible to see the seven Aeronautics Personnel Recruitment and Training Services (SEREP) under DIRAP and, between the seven Organizations of Education (OE) under DIRENS, the two organizations responsible for educating career officers: The Air Force Academy (AFA) and the Aeronautical Instruction and Adaptation Center (CIAAR).

Figure 3. General Personnel Command’s Organizational Chart.⁴⁶⁶

Among the OEs mentioned previously, two participate directly in the education of future “career officers”—those who will remain in the military profession until retirement: Air Force Academy (AFA) and Aeronautical Instruction and Adaptation Center (CIAAR). In the AFA there are three military courses, lasting four years, where the Aviators (CFOAV), Quartermasters (CFOINT), and Infantry officers (CFOINF) are educated and trained. Most of them will undergo “career courses” and will reach the rank of Colonel. Some of them will be selected for promotion to General. Only aviators reach the last rank

⁴⁶⁶ “Organograma, COMGEP” [Chart, COMGEP], *Força Aérea Brasileira*, last modified August 1, 2018, <http://www.fab.mil.br/organograma>.

in the career, Lieutenant-Brigadier, becoming four-star Generals. The three courses receive young people between the ages of 18 and 23, coming directly from civilian education organizations through a *Concurso Público*.⁴⁶⁷

In CIAAR the situation is a bit more complex. The organization is responsible for six military courses: the Adaptation Course for Doctors, Dentists, and Pharmacists (CAMAR / CADAR / CAFAR), the Adaptation Stage for Engineers Officers (EAOEAR), and the Support Officers Adaptation Internship (EAOAp), lasting 17 weeks; the Chaplain Education and Adaptation Internship (EIAC), and the Adaptation Internship for Officers (EAOF), with a duration of 13 weeks; and the Course for Specialist Officers (CFOE), lasting two years. Unlike the Air Force Academy (AFA) courses, these courses have older age groups due to the origin of their students. The CAMAR / CADAR / CAFAR, the EAOEAR, and the EAOAp, for example, receive undergraduate students with some professional experience from civilian universities. On the one hand, older professionals bring a more diverse background by adding more of their technical-professional experiences to the technical performance of their functions in the barracks. On the other hand, the socialization of older individuals who already have consolidated their moral judgment can be much more challenging than that of the post-adolescent boys entering military academies. So, if military ethics education is more difficult with older students, while their technical skills are not more diverse, the focus of courses geared toward older students should be the military disciplines. Despite the similarities, only the CAMAR and EAOEAR allow officers to reach the rank of three-star Generals. Another difference is that in addition to theological training, the Chaplain Education and Adaptation Internship (EIAC) requires a series of denominational ecclesiastical requirements since only religious authorities have the competence to verify the technical abilities of those professionals. Then, this means that these students already have extensive professional experience, since they come from churches and religious organizations with recognized social standing. The EAOF provides the Sergeants with the opportunity to become officers, to reach the position

⁴⁶⁷ Most of the work positions to be filled in government agencies must use this modality, where the candidates are evaluated in exams of specific knowledge, physical exams, and medical examinations, being classified according to performance in each stage. Those that are better classified occupy the vacancies offered.

of Captain within their specialties, through physical and medical tests and assessments. This raises the age group of this course, which has students with ample experience in the barracks. The Course for Specialist Officers is also intended for the enlisted personnel, with the difference that it can only be accessed after ten years of military service and allows the professional to reach the rank of Colonel.

By contrast, there is a third category of officers, trained and educated by SERENS, who are not considered “career officers” but “Temporary Officers” and belong to the Specialty of Convoked Officers (QOCON). The main characteristic of this framework is the permanence in the armed forces for a maximum of eight years of service, based on an annually-reviewed contract. The human resources management policy at the FAB has been increasing the number of temporary officers based on two main aspects: on the one hand, employment opportunities for qualified and experienced professionals, and on the other, the diminishing of the payroll of inactive military personnel, since this number will decrease year after year after the continuous adding of temporary military personnel. It should be noted that QOCON officers are not required to do the *Concurso Público* like the other officers, but instead are selected through evaluation of their educational qualifications, when they are graded according to their performance on undergraduate, graduate, and post-graduate courses. Another relevant fact is the brevity of the education military course to which temporary officials are submitted: only 60 days.

The following table provides a comparison of the different professional specialties of the FAB officers:

Table 4. Officers' Military Courses in FAB.

COURSE	PLACE	CONCURSO PÚBLICO	STUDENT'S ORIGIN	AGE RANGE	COURSE DURATION	MAXIMUM RANK
CFOAV	AFA	YES	Civilian Schools	18–23	4 years	Lieutenant-Brigadier (4 stars)
CFOINT	AFA	YES	Civilian Schools	18–23	4 years	Major-Brigadier (3 stars)
CFOINF	AFA	YES	Civilian Schools	18–23	4 years	Brigadier (2 stars)
CAMAR	CIAAR	YES	Civilian Universities / Job Market	Under 36	17 weeks	Major-Brigadier (3 stars)
CADAR	CIAAR	YES	Civilian Universities / Job Market	Under 36	17 weeks	Colonel
CAFAR	CIAAR	YES	Civilian Universities / Job Market	Under 36	17 weeks	Colonel
EAOEAR	CIAAR	YES	Civilian Universities / Job Market	Under 36	17 weeks	Major-Brigadier (3 stars)
EOAP	CIAAR	YES	Civilian Universities / Job Market	18–32	17 weeks	Colonel
EIAC	CIAAR	YES (with technical evaluation)	Civilian Universities / ecclesiastical functions	30–40	13 weeks	Colonel
EAOF	CIAAR	YES (as Sergeant)	Internal	Minimum 36	13 weeks	Captain
CFOE	CIAAR	YES (as Sergeant)	Internal	Minimum 28	2 years	Colonel
QOCON	07 SEREP	NO	Job Market / Curriculum Analysis	Under 45	60 days	1 st Lieutenant

The Aeronautical Command Manual (MCA) 36–7 – Professional Profile of the Aeronautical Officer (PPOA),⁴⁶⁸ is the document that guides the development of the

⁴⁶⁸ Comando da Aeronáutica, *Perfil Profissional do Oficial da Aeronáutica* [Professional Profile of Aeronautical Officers] (PPOA), MCA 36–7.

curricula of the military courses in the FAB. It is in the PPOA that the professional competencies of each of the officers' specialties are described. Competencies are defined as the "clustering of related knowledge, skills and attitudes"⁴⁶⁹ performed in the fulfillment of a task. Attitudes are more linked to moral values and, therefore, to ethics, as can be inferred by comparing the following two definitions:

Competencies include...motives, traits, self-concepts, attitudes or values, content knowledge, or cognitive or behavioral skills—any individual characteristic that can be measured or counted reliably and that can be shown to differentiate significantly between superior and average performers, or between effective and ineffective performers.⁴⁷⁰

Competency...is a knowledge, skill, ability, or characteristic associated with high performance on a job, such as problem solving, analytical thinking, or leadership. Some definitions of a competency include motives, beliefs, and values.⁴⁷¹

⁴⁶⁹ Scott Parry, "The Quest for Competencies," *Training* 33, no. 7 (July 1996): 50, <https://search-proquest-com.libproxy.nps.edu/docview/203398191/fulltextPDF/C28D7F8DE3634B4BPQ/1?accountid=12702>.

⁴⁷⁰ Françoise Delamare and Jonathan Winterton, "What Is Competence?" *Human Resource Development International* 8, no. 1 (March 2005): 32, <https://www-tandfonline-com.libproxy.nps.edu/doi/full/10.1080/1367886042000338227?scroll=top&needAccess=true>.

⁴⁷¹ Richard Mirable, "Everything You Wanted to Know about Competency Modeling," *Training & Development* 51, no. 8 (August 1997): 75 <http://web.b.ebscohost.com.libproxy.nps.edu/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?vid=1&sid=a263794a-837d-4c69-8693-38eedaefe307%40pdc-v-sessmgr03>.

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