


PB 7-17-4

Infantry

October-December 2017



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U.S. Army Infantry School**RUSSELL A. ENO**

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INFANTRY (ISSN: 0019-9532) is an Army professional bulletin prepared for quarterly publication by the U.S. Army Infantry School at Fort Benning, GA. Although it contains professional information for the Infantryman, the content does not necessarily reflect the official Army position and does not supersede any information presented in other official Army publications. Unless otherwise stated, the views herein are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the Department of Defense or any element of it.

www.benning.army.mil/infantry/magazine

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Secretary of the Army
1734201

Distribution: Special

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

Infantry

OCTOBER-DECEMBER 2017

Volume 106, Number 4

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
22 REVITALIZE YOUR UNIT'S MARKSMANSHIP PROGRAM BY FOCUSING ON FUNDAMENTALS, EMPOWERING JUNIOR LEADERS

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1SG Matthew Peeler
Joseph M. Pisarcik

Infantry One Station Unit Training (OSUT) regularly produces companies of Infantrymen in which more than 80 percent of the formation scores sharpshooter or better during qualification. OSUT's marksmanship strategy covers 18 periods of rifle marksmanship instruction, placing an emphasis on the four fundamentals of marksmanship, the five elements of a steady position, natural point of aim, and the integrated act of firing.



26 FUNDAMENTALS, ADAPTIVE LEADERSHIP, AND MISSION COMMAND: MEETING THE CHALLENGE OF EXECUTING MISSIONS IN DEPLOYED ENVIRONMENTS WHILE MAINTAINING HOME-STATION READINESS

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CSM Bryan D. Barker
CPT Paul D. Erickson
CPT Dino C. Buchanan

The 3rd Cavalry Regiment (CR), a Stryker brigade combat team (SBCT), has deployed multiple times to Iraq and Afghanistan. However, not until its most recent deployment to Afghanistan (May 2016 to February 2017) did the regiment encounter several unique challenges, many of which now constitute a new "norm" for BCTs in the Army — deploying with less than half of its assigned force and being spread throughout an operational theater. The 3rd CR's preparation for and execution of its mission offers pertinent lessons to other BCTs which may face a similar set of challenges in the future.

Check out the U.S. Army Infantry School website at:

<http://www.benning.army.mil/Infantry/>

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<https://www.facebook.com/USArmyInfantrySchoolFt.BenningGA/>


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
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


ON THE COVER:

Paratroopers assigned to Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 2nd Battalion, 503rd Infantry Regiment (Airborne), 173rd Airborne Brigade, fire the M252A1 81mm Mortar System during a night fire range on 20 October 2017 in Grafenwoehr, Germany. (Photo by SSG Alexander C Henninger)

BACK COVER:

Soldiers assigned to Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa's (CJTF-HOA) East African Response Force (EARF), fire M240 weapons systems and practice bounding movements on 1 November 2017 during an exercise in Djibouti, Africa. (Photo by SrA Erin Piazza, USAF)



SUBMIT ARTICLES TO *INFANTRY* MAGAZINE

Infantry Magazine is always in need of articles for publication. Topics for articles can include information on organization, weapons, equipment, and experiences while deployed. We can also use relevant historical articles with emphasis on the lessons we can learn from the past. For more information or to submit an article, call (706) 545-2350 or email us at [usarmy.benning.tradoc.mbx.infantry-magazine@mail.mil](mailto:benning.tradoc.mbx.infantry-magazine@mail.mil).

Commandant's Note

BG CHRISTOPHER T. DONAHUE

Setting the Conditions

Our Army confronts a complex array of threats across multiple domains and multiple continents. Russia has learned from its interventions in Syria, Georgia, Ukraine, and it is prioritizing the synchronization of cyber, deception, and information operations to confuse and overwhelm its opponents. China is improving its anti-access/area-denial (A2AD) capabilities to create stand off by making it increasingly difficult for us to deploy maneuver forces throughout the Pacific Command (PACOM) theater. North Korea has a robust amount of artillery aimed at Seoul, along with special forces, NBC (nuclear, biological, chemical) capabilities, and an expanding arsenal that could spark a highly lethal conflict. Iran continues to foment unrest across the Middle East, including support to various terrorist groups. And although ISIS has lost much of its self-declared caliphate, we continue to confront serious threats in Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan, North Africa, Horn of Africa, and beyond.

In short, we live in a dangerous and complicated world. In this period of protracted competition oriented against multiple adversaries, a major war could unfold with little to no notice. Army forces continue to be engaged in ongoing combat missions, as well as operations to deter adversaries and reassure our allies. How does the Infantry help set conditions to achieve our national objectives and win in the next fight?

The Infantry School is undertaking an array of efforts to do precisely that. Our top priority for the Infantry School is to produce Soldiers and leaders that can fight, win, and survive against any enemy in a multi-domain environment now and in the future. We will accomplish this through multiple initiatives.

First, with regard to leadership and education, we are reviewing all of our programs of instruction (POIs) across officer and NCO education systems and functional courses like Ranger School to ensure we are producing Infantry leaders who are prepared to fight and win against a near peer. We are also analyzing methods to ensure we produce the most skilled Infantryman to the force upon completion of One Station Unit Training (OSUT).

Regarding the Office of the Secretary of Defense Close Combat Study, we are providing the necessary input to ensure the Army garners additional resources to develop Infantry Soldiers and squads as platforms that are lethal, mentally and physically dominant, and that are trained in the basics to master any environment and can close with and destroy any threat.

The subterranean operating environment represents a near-term priority for the Maneuver Center of Excellence/ Infantry School. We are leading a synchronized effort for the Army for the development of doctrine, a rigorous training plan, and equipping solutions. This will help ensure our Infantry

Soldiers and squads are ready to fight and win in this very complex environment.

Regarding the health of the Infantry branch as a whole, we acknowledge the multitude of manning requirements and demands on the force. We are seeking to meet these requirements for Infantry officers and NCOS while minimizing disruption to the force to the greatest extent possible and highlighting to the leadership how we are mitigating risk.

We are also ensuring continuity in key initiatives including marksmanship and the Russian New Generation Warfare (RNGW) study. The Infantry School Command Sergeant Major, CSM Martin Celestine, continues to advance the proposed marksmanship qualification table. We are also sending RNGW briefing teams to each of the divisions to ensure they fully understand the results of the study, and thereby better educating and preparing our Infantry Soldiers and leaders in the field for this threat.

Finally, the Infantry School is increasing our interaction with units that are forward deployed in sustained competition with potential adversaries. We are incorporating video teleconferences with deployed units into the Infantry Basic Officer Leader Course (IBOLC) and Maneuver Captains Career Course (MCCC) to discuss current conditions as well as to share the latest tactics, techniques, and procedures. We leverage our allied nation liaison officers to provide comprehensive briefings on current and future threats in their respective regions.

There is no magic elixir to guarantee success in a multi-domain environment — it will take leadership, training, education, and rigorous, holistic preparation for combat. The initiatives and efforts outlined above embody a few of the ways the Infantry School is tackling these challenges. The Infantry School's core mission — to produce Soldiers and leaders that can fight, win, and survive against any enemy — is more important now than ever. The Infantry School continues to make every effort to ensure we are prepared to succeed on the battlefields of tomorrow. I am confident the Infantry can and must prevail. The Infantry remains the close combat force for our nation, always ready to close with and destroy our enemies by fire and maneuver.

As always, we welcome and encourage your input and collaboration to make our branch even better.





SQUAD OVERMATCH

Training Methodology Integrates Classroom, Virtual, and Live Training

MIKE CASEY

The air horn blares to signal the start of training. A sergeant shouts, "Lock and load." The bolts of 10 M4s click. And the squad moves out.

It seems like a typical start to a training exercise, but this one was different. Soldiers with the 25th Infantry Division took part in a special exercise last August at Schofield Barracks, HI. It was the final pilot test for Squad Overmatch.

Squad Overmatch is a training methodology that integrates classroom teaching, virtual training, and live exercises to improve resilience, team development, battlefield medical skills, advanced situational awareness, and after action reviews (AARs). It stemmed from the Army's effort to improve individual and unit performance, and help Soldiers cope with the stresses from combat and multiple deployments.

In 2013, the Program Executive Office for Simulation Training and Instrumentation (PEO STRI), the Maneuver Center of Excellence, and other organizations began work on Squad Overmatch. The program is funded by the Defense Health Agency. The 25th ID's exercise was the fourth such event at Army and Marine Corps locations.

But before the Hawaiian exercise started, Squad Overmatch had to win over two doubters — the NCO and officer who were going to lead the event.

"I was skeptical about it," SSG James Kinkead said.

"I never heard of it," 2LT Bryton Vanderloop said.

Their misgivings were understandable, particularly considering their significant challenges. Soldiers in the exercise came from different units and had never trained with



Photos by Mike Casey

Soldiers question role players during a training exercise at Schofield Barracks, HI. The Soldiers used information from the role players to conduct patrols as part of a Squad Overmatch training exercise. The training helps the Army improve readiness and develop leaders.

each other. And Kinkead and Vanderloop, along with other instructors, had less than a week to meld the Soldiers into two effective teams. Yet, by week's end both were impressed with the squads' successful completion of their missions.

"When we started, we could see how much they were lacking as a team," Kinkead said. "Then to see how well they performed in live training. That shows that Squad Overmatch works."

"They came together and performed as an expert team," said Vanderloop. "It was great to see."

In the Classroom

Kinkead's and Vanderloop's journey from skeptics to believers started the week before the training kicked off.

That's when they and other 25th ID instructors reviewed Squad Overmatch's train-the-trainer package with videos, PowerPoint slides, training scenario outlines, and other resources to help them become expert instructors.

Both Kinkead and Vanderloop found the training package helpful as did other instructors, including SPC Cassie Matthews. She said the training package materials prepared her better for teaching Squad Overmatch than taking a class to learn the instruction process.

"I liked the various portals that allowed you to get additional information," she said. "One of the videos showed how another instructor had taught the course."

Yet, Squad Overmatch is not a course in a box. The 25th ID instructors used their own experiences in their lectures. In preparing to teach the resilience course, Matthews learned how self-talk helps Soldiers focus on mission-critical tasks when things go wrong. Self-talk uses positive thoughts and personal encouragement to manage stress.

During a lecture, Matthews, a medic, told the Soldiers that the weekend before the course started, she was in the field and had a problem finding a Soldier's vein for inserting an IV. Then she explained how self-talk helped her to calm herself and regain her confidence to successfully insert the IV.

"With some training, you wonder: 'Am I ever going to use this?'" she said. "Well, I did use this training."

Giving Soldiers the responsibility to lead the instruction program marked a change from previous exercises when a PEO STRI team essentially ran the training. COL Dan Irizarry of PEO STRI explained that Squad Overmatch's future success will rest on Soldiers becoming the instructors.

"We just can't rely on a cadre of outside instructors," he said. "We want to pass on the knowledge to a unit so they

can carry it forward. It's like teaching someone to fish rather than just giving them a fish."

Some of the classroom instruction consisted of standard PowerPoints and videos, but it also included hands-on training.

For the combat casualty care section, Soldiers left the classroom to improve their battlefield medical skills. Under palm trees, the Soldiers practiced putting a tourniquet on a mannequin that simulates blood loss. To stop the bleeding, Soldiers had to yank the tourniquet very tight.

PFC Lottie Hill said the training was better than previous combat medical care training.

"In the past, I put a tourniquet on battle buddies, but you can't tighten it enough as you would have to to stop the bleeding because it hurts them," she said. "Today's training was more realistic."

Virtual Team Building

One of the exercises' major challenges was creating a team from a bunch of Soldiers who didn't know each other. Both 10-Soldier squads were from the 65th Brigade Engineer Battalion (BEB) with one consisting of Soldiers with a mix of specialties and the other composed of sappers from three platoons. Yet, the teams coalesced quickly.

After the Soldiers finished their initial classroom instruction, they trained on Virtual Battlespace 3 (VBS3), a first-person gaming program that gave the squads the opportunity to practice for their live missions.

At the start of VBS3 training, SGT Connor Nelson, a squad leader, looked at a computer screen map for the upcoming mission and selected a casualty collection point. A medic squad member, SPC Sze Yeh, pointed out that the location didn't provide much cover. Nelson asked, "Where should it go?" Yeh pointed to the screen and Nelson agreed.

The two team leaders in the squad swiftly arranged their teams.

"Wedge formation. SAWs on the weak side."

"What's your weak side?" one team leader asked the other.

"Right."

"OK, mine's on the left."

During the virtual exercises, it took less than 30 minutes for the 20-something Soldiers to learn how to make their avatars run, jump, and shoot. Squad members communicated through headsets. The virtual training followed scenarios similar to the upcoming live exercises. The squads went to a fictitious Balkan village and met a friendly key leader who had information about insurgents terrorizing the town. Other Soldiers played the roles of villagers and terrorists, and they also had avatars in the virtual world.

During virtual training, the squad initially had problems coordinating maneuvers. One team was too far from the other team to provide support during a sniper attack. Following that misstep, the squad encountered the same problem. Nelson



A Soldier applies a tourniquet to a mannequin during Squad Overmatch training at Schofield Barracks.



A squad rehearses missions with Virtual Battlespace 3 as part of Squad Overmatch training.

halted the training. In an instant, the squad members' avatars returned to the starting point and this time moved out in proper order. The quick reset shows one of the strengths of virtual training. When things go wrong, it's easy to begin again as opposed to a time-consuming restart in a live exercise.

As part of Squad Overmatch's integrated approach, the virtual missions allowed Soldiers to practice the skills they learned in the classroom such as calling in a 9-line medical evacuation request or recognizing anomalies while on patrol.

Most important of all, the virtual training started turning a group of Soldiers into a squad.

"It helped us correct shortfalls in leadership and communication," Nelson said. "It helped us determine our roles and responsibilities."

Live Training

After two days in the classroom and the virtual world, the squads headed for Schofield Barracks' military operations on urban terrain (MOUT) site. Following the air horn blast, Soldiers advanced and took cover in the treeline to observe the village's market square, multi-story buildings, and shattered church.

In the market square, Soldiers played the roles of villagers, tending their stalls to serve food and sell trinkets. One Soldier played the role of the parish priest who had important information about the insurgents. After meeting with the priest, the squad members acted on the intelligence and continued their patrols.

In all, there were three training scenarios, and all of them could have resulted in a very bad day for an infantry squad. Each scenario tested the Soldiers' abilities to maintain the fight as Soldiers and civilians became casualties to improvised explosive devices (IEDs), snipers, and suicide bombers. And each successive mission amplified anxieties with more casualties and role players' shriller screams.

Yeh's heart beat quicker as the exercise's intensity

increased. "As a medic, it was more real than I expected, and it definitely raised my stress level," she said.

"It felt real," said Nelson who has deployed to Afghanistan. He added the role players' performances raised the exercise's authenticity.

The realistic performances arose from careful design. SGT Michael Phillips taught the advanced situational awareness portion of the course and spent a week preparing the role players. In the classroom, he instructed Soldiers to be aware of body language as tip-offs to possible dangers. Phillips coached the role

players so their nervous pacing or crossed arms at the MOUT site meshed with the classroom instruction.

The exercise also sparked spontaneous training. After finishing lunch in the field, Soldiers, without orders, practiced clearing an imaginary room. A private first class told two other privates: "You go right. You go left. I got the center. Go." After clearing the room, the Soldiers did it again, and again, and again, and again.

Vanderloop, the lieutenant in charge of the exercise, was impressed with the Soldiers' attention to the unscheduled training.

"It was a direct reflection of what they discussed in an AAR," he said. "They recognized a need to do additional training, and they were proactive."

Vanderloop said Squad Overmatch's integrating training in the classroom, virtual environment, and live exercise produced improvements in the squad's resilience, team development, battlefield medical skills, advanced situational awareness, and AARs.

"From just classroom instruction, the Soldiers probably understood 10 percent of the content," he said. "But through the entire training, they were able to connect the dots." And the improvements showed up in the AARs.

AARs

After each mission, the squads participated in an AAR with the instructors asking open-ended questions to help the Soldiers recognize their errors and discover how to correct them.

For example, one Soldier was wounded and his battle casualty card said he could treat himself, but one of his team members ran to help him without first asking about the seriousness of the wound — something that the Soldiers had been taught in the classroom. An instructor asked the Soldier who administered first aid about the consequences of him providing assistance when it wasn't necessary. "It

reduced our fire superiority,” the Soldier replied.

In a following exercise, a sniper wounded a Soldier, and squad members asked the wounded Soldier if he could treat himself. The wounded Soldier said he could, and the other Soldiers held their positions and resumed firing at the sniper.

The instructors also benefited from the AARs.

“How I’m used to doing AARs is to ask: What was supposed to happen? What did happen? How can we improve?” said Kinkead, the NCO in charge of the training.

The Squad Overmatch philosophy is to look beyond what happened and learn why it happened.

“Now we’re asking these questions: What was your behavior? What were you doing as a team? How were you communicating?” Kinkead said. “When we asked these questions, we saw improvement happen in the team. Not only were they more effective, the improvement happened much faster.”

25th ID Reaction

The results of the Squad Overmatch training impressed Schofield Barracks leaders.

“It helps us to improve our readiness to fight tonight,” said LTC James Krueger, commander of the 65th BEB. He said he anticipates conducting similar training with other unit members.

COL (P) Johnny Davis, the 25th ID’s deputy commander

for operations, was impressed with what he saw.

“Today, I witnessed the advancement and growth of a squad as they negotiated multiple live-training scenarios across a multitude of warrior skills,” he said. “These are exactly the skillsets we need to improve readiness and unit cohesion within today’s complex environment.”

He added, “Any time you are able to combine virtual training with live training exercises focused on developing physiological, cognitive, and leadership skills to improve warfighter performance, you maximize the ability to generate readiness across squads and platoons.”

Prior to the Schofield Barracks exercise, a study showed Squad Overmatch’s benefits. The 2016 scientific report found improvements of 26 percent to 43 percent in the areas of team building, advanced situational awareness, and the conduct of AARs and tactical combat casualty care.

Squad Overmatch’s future

The Schofield Barracks exercise followed ones at Fort Benning, GA; Camp Buehring, Kuwait; and Camp Lejeune, NC. With each exercise, the PEO STRI team responsible for Squad Overmatch improved the train-the-trainer package that contains the course outlines, scenarios, role players’ descriptions, and other training materials.

“It prepares unit instructors to develop Soldiers into high-performing teams. It also develops leadership skills for the NCO and platoon leaders to plan and conduct effective training that meets collective and individual skill requirements,” said Rob Wolf, the Squad Overmatch program manager.

Wolf said his team is continuing to make improvements to the program and will focus on enhancing the resilience skills in 2018 by working with the Army Resiliency Directorate and Walter Reed Army Institute of Research.

Units interested in Squad Overmatch training can contact Wolf at (407) 384-5233.

(Mike Casey serves as the public affairs officer for the Combined Arms Center-Training at Fort Leavenworth, KS.)

A squad patrols the MOUT site at Schofield Barracks as part of Squad Overmatch training. Soldiers played the roles of villagers, key leaders, and insurgents in the exercise. Role players practiced for a week to add realism to the exercise.



Quartermaster School Releases PAVPB

CPT MATTHEW JOHNSON

In January 2017, the U.S. Army's Quartermaster School's Logistics Training Department began work on an initiative to create a Property Accountability Virtual Playbook (PAVPB), a computer-based training resource that promotes property accountability and improves Army readiness.

Army leaders have the responsibility to achieve/sustain readiness and to ensure that their Soldiers have the right types and quantities of equipment needed to fight and win on the battlefield. The Department of the Army's excess equipment and Financial Liability Investigations of Property Loss (FLIPLs) derived from inventories indicate that the Army is attacking the problem, but that challenges remain with Soldier knowledge of property accountability principles.

To address the knowledge gap, the Quartermaster School assembled a team of experts spanning several different organizations to design and develop an interactive training product with an overall objective of improving property accountability across the Army.

The PAVPB is an online interactive virtual 3D training resource that is designed to teach users about property accountability by demonstrating the proper way to conduct a change-of-command inventory. The target audience for the PAVPB is non-logistician leaders across the Army from commanders to sub-hand receipt holders.

The PAVPB scenario focuses on the change-of-command inventory to demonstrate proper property accountability techniques because it is one of the most important types of inventories conducted at the tactical level. It is the one time that a company commander will be fully dedicated to property

accountability for all the equipment in their unit. The change-of-command inventory is also the baseline inventory from which quarterly, cyclic, and sensitive item inventories are derived. PAVPB users will learn about the people, property, and processes that are encountered during the pre-inventory, inventory, and post-inventory phases of a change-of-command inventory.

PAVPB users will conduct a virtual inventory of a Stryker Infantry Carrier Vehicle (ICV), Abrams tank, and three different weapons systems. It will explain the roles of the officers, warrant officers, and NCOs who are involved in the change-of-command process and work to help ensure property accountability. With the Army's transition from the Property Book Unit Supply Enhanced (PBUSE) to the Global Combat Support System – Army (GCSS-Army), the PAVPB will also help to familiarize the user with the new terminology inherent to GCSS-Army that they will continue to encounter throughout the Army. The PAVPB will also include tactics, techniques, and procedures and best practices that have been collected from units and subject matter experts across the Army. It will link users to valuable property accountability and Command Supply Discipline Program (CSDP) resources and references to assist all who have responsibility for property across the Army.


See the box below for instructions on how to download and run PAVPB. Read more about the PAVPB project at: <https://benningnews.org/2017/08/07/the-property-accountability-virtual-playbook/>.

(CPT Matthew Johnson works for the Quartermaster School's Logistics Training Department.)

Directions to Download and Run PAVPB

1. Go to <http://www.cascom.army.mil/pavpb/pavpb.zip>.


2. The following options will appear:



3. Select "save as" and choose the location where you would like to save the PAVPB.zip folder.


4. Once the download is complete, close the current window and find the PAVPB.zip folder at the destination where you saved it.

5. **Windows 10** - Once you have located the PAVPB.zip folder, double-click the .zip folder and select "Extract" then "Extract All;" select a destination to extract the files. **Note:**



Ensure the "show extracted files when complete" tab is engaged with a check mark (it should be by default).

Windows 7 - Once you have located the PAVPB.zip folder, right-click on the icon and select "open with -->Windows Explorer." Then choose "Extract All" and again select a destination to extract the files. **Note:** Ensure the "show extracted files when complete" tab is engaged with a check mark (it should be by default).



6. Both Windows 10 and 7: Once the download is complete, find the PAVPB folder and double-click to open. Right click on the PAVPB.html and select "Open with Firefox." **Note:** Firefox browser MUST be utilized to open the PAVPB.





Enhanced View Webhosting: *A Tactically Responsible Imagery Intelligence Tool*

MAJ JERRY V. DREW II

Since the turn of the 21st century, satellite imagery has become increasingly available to the tactical user. Originally the product of highly classified photo-reconnaissance satellites, the advent of the commercial imagery industry combined with improved data distribution technologies has made imagery that was once only available to strategic customers a ready tool for companies and platoons. While an Army unit may request imagery from national satellites, the likelihood that a tactical unit will receive significant priority in the collection process is small. Further, the classification of such imagery is often problematic.

On the opposite end of the spectrum of availability, web-based imagery sources like Google Earth are readily available and sharable with coalition partners. Such sources suffer two serious weaknesses for the tactical user, however. First, web-based imagery may be multiple years old. Second, their utilization depends upon access to the internet at the time of need, a capability that may not be available in future operating environments.

The Enhanced View (EV) WebHosting system offers a middle-of-the-road alternative to formal imagery collection through intelligence channels and informal collection at the Soldier level. Unlike many government sources, the imagery on EV WebHosting is unclassified, sharable, and available to all federal employees. Unlike much website imagery, EV Webhosting allows users to download current products and to perform basic operations within common geospatial intelligence software packages. In short, EV WebHosting provides a valuable tool to supplement a tactical unit's imagery needs.

A Very Brief History of Satellite Imagery

To understand the way that satellite imagery enables the tactical user on today's battlefield requires a brief look at the development of space-based imagery intelligence (IMINT). Like the Abrams tank or the Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicle, imagery satellites were born out of Cold War fears of Soviet aggression. Specifically, President Dwight Eisenhower and his security advisors feared that the U.S. trailed the USSR in long-range bombers and intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), the two most effective means of delivering atomic weapons.¹ Conventional intelligence collection, including the




Figure 1 — Artist's Rendering of the Internal Workings of a Corona Spacecraft
(Note the strips of film wound through the vehicle)⁵

high-altitude U2 flights that violated Soviet air space, provided limited intelligence of the border regions but almost nothing about the hinterland.² Part of the solution to closing the intelligence gap was Project Corona, which fell under a security umbrella referred to as Keyhole.³ Corona consisted of a series of imagery satellites that relied on film cameras (see Figure 1). Upon completion of the mission, the film canisters reentered the atmosphere and parachuted toward a patrolling aircraft, which caught (or attempted to catch) the canisters mid-air. Much to Eisenhower's relief, satellite imagery confirmed that the missile and bomber gaps were nonexistent.⁴

The imagery from Corona was neither timely nor intended for tactical use. The high cost of the system, advanced technology, limited amount of film, and desire for secrecy ensured that only select people within the federal government had access to products that the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) produced from the returned film. Furthermore, from the moment the image was taken to the time it could be interpreted was days to weeks — slow by today's standards but adequate for its mission of assessing the bomber and missile capabilities. In the days before digital information, sharing the imagery required replication of film from the negatives and heavily regulated distribution procedures. Thus, while Corona ultimately was

able to distinguish objects as small as 5-7 feet — adequate resolution to be tactically useful — the images were not used for tactical purposes.⁶

Between the first successful Corona mission in 1960 and the launch of IKONOS, the first commercial imagery satellite in 1999, technology had advanced greatly, hinting at the possibility of wider access to satellite imagery for the tactical community.⁷ First, digital downlink had replaced parachuting film canisters, which not only greatly simplified the collection process but also greatly extended the useful life of a satellite. A digital imagery satellite may last for a decade or more whereas the Corona satellites were useless after a few months when they ran out of film. Second, distribution of imagery no longer depended on hard-copy photographs. In the late 1990s, high-speed fiber optics, high-throughput communications satellites, and the expansion of the internet provided new means of transmitting large amounts of data. For the first time, a commercial company was photographing the earth at resolutions approaching what had previously only been available from tightly controlled intelligence community satellites (ground sample distances of less than one meter), and the information was becoming available to an unprecedented number of users.

With large amounts of data and the infrastructure to distribute it, it was only a matter of time before someone assembled the available imagery into a user-friendly, web-based format. The original satellite imagery service website belonged to the Keyhole Corporation of Mountain View, CA, so named in honor of Project Corona's security designation. In 2004, Google acquired the company and renamed it Google Earth.⁸ Today, many sites offer satellite imagery (Bing Maps, Yahoo Maps, MapQuest, just to name a few), but the original Google Earth format based on Keyhole's work remains the most widely used. The capability of Google Earth has continued to expand, allowing for user-defined graphics and overlays, information sharing, and even intelligence analysis.

While tools like Google Earth are incredibly useful for many applications, the dependence of tactical users on such web-based imagery has two potentially fatal flaws. First, the imagery may be three or more years old. In Google's case, the company advertises that "most of the images are about one to three years old."⁹ Using imagery for tactical planning that does not accurately reflect the current operational environment can render the plans useless and possibly quite dangerous. Second, and perhaps more importantly, reliance on web-based imagery presumes internet access, a capability that may not exist in immature theaters or in a conflict against an enemy capable of denying, degrading, or destroying friendly communications networks. Warfighters, then, require a source of satellite imagery that is current, tactically useful, and storable.

Current Imagery Practices and the Case for Decentralization

Imagine this: an infantry battalion is deployed in support of a humanitarian response mission and needs high-resolution

Using imagery for tactical planning that does not accurately reflect the current operational environment can render the plans useless and possibly quite dangerous.

imagery to plan its operations. The designated member of the battalion staff, perhaps someone in the S2 shop, programs in a direct request to a dedicated imaging satellite, which captures the imagery and begins downlinking it to a nearby ground terminal. The imagery to begin planning is available within minutes.

For multiple reasons, of course, the capabilities of space-based collection assets are not so responsive. As mentioned in the overview of Corona, satellites have historically existed as strategic-level assets, and as such, the priority of collection targets remains a matter of great concern. The Army's standard imagery collection process requires that all imagery requests funnel to the unit collection manager. In a division, the collection manager resides within the intelligence section (G2). Any unit may request imagery from a national-level satellite, but even if the request is high enough on the priority list, the image itself may not be sharable with combat Soldiers, coalition partners, or host-nation partners because of classification concerns.

Realizing the need for a decentralized approach to obtaining timely, high-quality unclassified satellite imagery, the Army's Space and Missile Defense Command (SMDC) fielded specialized commercial exploitation teams (CETs) — later renamed commercial imagery teams (CITs) — throughout Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom (OIF and OEF). CITs deployed to Naval Support Activity (NSA) Bahrain and consisted of six people with expertise in space-based capabilities, geospatial intelligence, and network communications. While these teams, like collection managers at higher echelons, maintained the capability to request imagery from national assets, they specialized in obtaining commercial imagery and exporting it via a variety of means, including hard copy, email, external hard drives, or the Global Broadcast Service (GBS). In this way, CITs provided a service that freed the customer's organic intelligence analysts and supported ad hoc requests from Soldiers and units — even units outside of Central Command (CENTCOM) — sidestepping the more hierarchical imagery collection process.

Despite the teams' value-added products and regular training missions to assist coalition forces in their use of commercial imagery, their existence was relatively unknown by the Army at-large. Regardless, the CIT kept steadily busy until the transfer of their mission to a Continental U.S. (CONUS) reach-back node within the SMDC G2. To augment the commercial imagery capability available to the force, Army Space Support Teams (ARSSTs) provide limited commercial imagery services and the ability to reach back to SMDC. ARSSTs continue to attach to divisions and corps for major exercises and deployments.

While the hierarchical imagery request process and the less formal CIT imagery request process were available, commercial websites like Google Earth have filled a critical role since 2004 because they are readily available and sharable with everyone. As mentioned, however, such web-based services have their limitations. In an attempt to address the same capability gap that the Army meant to fill with the CITs, the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) began sponsoring web-based archives for commercial satellite imagery companies. Early interfaces were not user friendly, but a current service offered by DigitalGlobe Inc. of Longmont, CO, combines a timely, high-quality, commercial imagery database that is user-friendly and allows for imagery download, sidestepping the requirement for continuous internet connectivity.

EV WebHosting


The EV WebHosting program is an effective web-based tool for accessing satellite imagery that allows users to obtain current imagery and perform basic operations that a tactical user may require. Among the most important functions provided in EV WebHosting are the ability to create graphics and export the data to other devices or software suites such as Google Earth or ArcGIS, the common software suite of geospatial intelligence engineers. Further, EV Webhosting allows for the comparison of multiple images of the same area over a period of time to assess any changes. The EV

WebHosting user interface is intuitive enough that anyone can make use of the system with a minimal time investment but also expansive enough that more advanced users (for example, intelligence analysts and geospatial intelligence engineers) can use it for their purposes.

All of the imagery within the system is commercially produced and is therefore unclassified, but a classified version of the system exists to allow for the addition of graphics or annotations that may increase the classification of the manipulated image. The site is available on non-classified internet protocol router network (NIPRnet) at <https://rdog.digitalglobe.nga.mil/myDigitalGlobe> and on the secret internet protocol router network (SIPRnet) at <https://evwhs.nga.smil.mil>. DigitalGlobe offers an expansive user's guide, which is linked to the site's homepage, and customer support via email or telephone.

The service is offered to all persons in federal service and is accessible either via common access card (CAC) or via a username and password established during initial account setup. It is important to note that although National Guard Soldiers cannot access the website unless federalized, the Nextview End User License Agreement, the agreement between DigitalGlobe and the NGA that governs the use of EV WebHosting's products, states that federal users may share the data with "state governments, local governments, foreign governments and inter-governmental organizations, [non-

Figure 2 — A One-Page Annotated Help Guide Produced by DigitalGlobe



governmental organizations] and other non-profit organizations.” In other words, the imagery is intended for widest dissemination, and any authorized user may distribute it at his or her discretion.

For all the benefits of the system, EV WebHosting is still a planning tool that is most effective when used well in advance of an operation. Prior to exercise or deployment when the internet connectivity is still robust, EV WebHosting allows a unit to create its own set of baseline commercial imagery, which can be stored and updated as the mission requires or allows. A useful feature of EV WebHosting allows the user to set up alerts to receive notification when a region of interest has changed.¹⁰ It is worth noting that Google Earth’s “Follow Your World” tool, in beta testing, “allows the user to mark a location and receive notifications when the imagery is updated.”¹¹ In this way, a Soldier in a company intelligence support team (COIST) or battalion S2 does not need to continuously troll for updated imagery; the system will notify the user.

The need for commercial satellite imagery has never been greater, nor has the ability of the warfighter to utilize it for tactical success. Odds of success greatly increase, however, when the imagery being used is high-quality, current, and easily accessible by the intended users. While the formal intelligence collection process and Google Earth remain powerful tools that are still useful for many applications, as a system for acquiring satellite imagery for tactical purposes, EV WebHosting meets the criteria of being timely, high-quality, sharable, and downloadable. It is therefore a more responsible choice than other imagery acquired off of the open-source internet.

Notes

¹ Bruce Berkowitz, “The National Reconnaissance Office at 50 Years: A Brief History,” Center for the Study of National Reconnaissance, Chantilly, VA, 2011, 9.

² James Clay Moltz, *The Politics of Space Security: Strategic Restraint and the Pursuit of National Interests* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2011), 101.

³ Berkowitz, 11.

⁴ William E. Burrows, *This New Ocean: The Story of the First Space Age* (NY: Modern Library, 1999), 321.

⁵ National Reconnaissance Office, “Corona Imagery,” Accessed 14 April 2016 from <http://www.nro.gov/history/csnr/corona/imagery.html>.

⁶ Berkowitz, 11.

⁷ See, for example, DigitalGlobe, “IKONOS Data Sheet.” Accessed 14 April 2016 from http://global.digitalglobe.com/sites/default/files/DG_IKONOS_DS.pdf.

⁸ “Google Acquires Keyhole, Digital-Mapping Software Used by CNN in Iraq War,” *Wall Street Journal*, 27 October 2004. Accessed 9 February 2016 from <http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB109888284313557107>.


⁹ Google, “Maps Imagery Updates.” Accessed 14 April 2016 from <https://support.google.com/maps/answer/2789536?hl=en>.

¹⁰ DigitalGlobe, “My DigitalGlobe with EnhancedView Web Hosting Service User Guide v.7.4.” Accessed 9 February 2017 from <https://evwhs.digitalglobe.com/myDigitalGlobe/login>.

¹¹ Google, “Follow Your World.” Accessed 9 February 2017 from <https://followyourworld.appspot.com>.


MAJ Jerry V. Drew II is currently a student at the School of Advanced Military Studies at Fort Leavenworth, KS. His previous assignments include serving as commander of Bravo Detachment, 1st Space Company, 1st Space Battalion, 1st Space Brigade, Camp As Sayliyah, Qatar; deputy team leader of Army Space Support Team 6, 2nd Space Company, 1st Space Battalion, 1st Space Brigade, Colorado Springs, CO; and Headquarters Company executive officer and scout platoon leader for the 1st Combined Arms Battalion, 5th Brigade, 1st Armored Division, Fort Bliss, TX. He graduated from the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, NY, with a bachelor’s degree in art, philosophy, and literature. He has also earned a master of business administration from Webster University, a master of science in astronautical engineering from the Naval Postgraduate School, and a master of military art and science from the Command and General Staff College.

New Releases from Center for Army Lessons Learned



This newsletter consists of 10 chapters focusing on fundamental skills designed to communicate doctrinal solutions to the persistent observations from the National Training Center. The goal is to better prepare brigade combat teams to decisively win the first fight of the next war.

<http://usacac.army.mil/sites/default/files/publications/17-19.pdf>



This bulletin is intended to provide senior Army leaders a concise understanding of knowledge management (KM) and what they can do to improve important organizational processes (e.g., the military decision-making process and operations process).

http://usacac.army.mil/sites/default/files/publications/18-02_KM.pdf

Rebuilding a Culture of Deployment Readiness

BG JEFF DRUSHAL
CPT ALEX BRUBAKER

“Fight tonight,” “First to fight,” “Wheels up in 18 hours” — these are recognizable slogans that emphasize readiness to go anywhere, anytime, fast. But what is the Army’s deployment readiness narrative?

The Army utilizes pre-positioned stocks for a rapid employment force projection capability, but what are we doing to affect follow-on forces? What if our strategy of assurance and deterrence fails and we have armed conflict with a nation state?

A recent effort to assemble an armored brigade combat team in Europe took 14 days.¹ If war was declared tomorrow, how long would it take to move an Army corps into the Pacific or Eastern Europe? It’s a tough question with variables outside the Army’s control, but we can do better at training what is in our control.

This article will discuss how our expeditionary deployment skills have atrophied and some solutions to help get them back.

Atrophied Deployment Skills

Years of predictive deployments within the Army Force Generation model combined with outsourcing our deployment process to strategic enablers have eroded our expeditionary deployment skills.

When the Army deployed to operations like Desert Storm, Desert Shield, and the first rotations to Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom, each unit was responsible for the readiness of its equipment, deploying it, and bringing it back.

As we looked for cheaper, faster ways to integrate into theater, we began using theater-provided equipment and



Photo by PFC Ethan Valetski

leaving unit equipment in the left-behind equipment program. During major exercises in other countries, we used Army pre-positioned stocks. Those vital deployment skills have slowly transitioned out of the force.

Years of sustained conflict in Iraq and Afghanistan have caused the narrative and culture to change. Instead of deployment being viewed as an operation for commanders, it became a task for logisticians. Years of strategic enablers like deployment support teams, left-behind equipment, and theater-provided equipment have eroded units' deployment expertise and responsibility, and the onus is now on sustainers.

The reasons we shifted our focus made sense at the time, but over the course of 20 years, the overall impact grew. Recently, the Army conducted inspections of the deployment readiness exercise (DRE) program in order to assess current capabilities. The results showed sub-optimized deployment training, focusing on tasks like "Alert," followed by scheduled training for the day. Units rarely executed DREs in conjunction with installation transportation office (ITO) support. The few that did highlighted the ITO's inability to resource 24/7 operations without additional personnel. The command deployment discipline program (CDDP) was found to be stove-piped in S4/G4 channels, limiting commander knowledge and involvement. On the whole, units struggled to execute realistic training of the deployment process.

Six Solutions to Emphasize Deployment Readiness

The spectrum of potential missions — including direct action, deterrence, security force assistance, and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief — all have one common thread: the ability to rapidly alert, assemble, and deploy to any known point on the globe. The Army must be ready to deploy, fight, and win anywhere in the world. The time to start rebuilding our culture of deployment readiness is now.

Deployment Narrative

The Army has no wide-spread narrative when it comes to deployment. As the Chief of Staff of the Army continues to beat the drum for readiness, we must convey the importance of deployment readiness. To do so, we must leverage the processes within the Army, the joint staff, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense to develop a narrative for Army forces that encompasses the current operational environment as well as operation plan requirements.

We need to influence the development and content of the 2018+ National Military Strategies to ensure that it includes discussion of deployment readiness, the Army's strategic deployment capabilities, and the requirements that Army forces must meet. This will drive the prioritization of resources toward deployment capability.

Army Policy Adjustments

The Army should publish a policy revision requiring unit commanders to reconcile their unit equipment list with the unit property book every month. This will force the use of our systems of record and increase the accuracy of movement and dimensional data, and it will also assist with the mobility

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community's quality assurance and quality control checks.

The Army should establish clear installation deployment standards across the globe so that the process is simple and known no matter where you go. Additionally, port call messages should be published through DA G-3 operations channels to ensure unit compliance.

Commander's Actions

As leaders, we can only emphasize a finite amount of priorities. It is time to start increasing our emphasis on deployment training. Command deployment discipline inspection results should be put into commanders' channels to give them accurate snapshots of their deployment readiness. Divisions could also add or modify their deployment readiness slide in the logistics readiness review briefings and make it more comprehensive to provide a total picture of capabilities.

Units should consider adding unit movement briefings as part of company-level change of command out-briefings. Part of the briefing would detail the unit's last roll-out program that moved 100 percent of its modified table of organization and equipment items through the installation deployment process.

Collective Training

There is no standardized baseline for the "deploy" mission essential task (MET). Look at three different companies within a brigade combat team (BCT) on the Army Training Network (ATN) and you'll see three different collection of tasks. The armored company has eight collective tasks. The signal company has three collective tasks. The distribution company has 27 collective tasks.

The difference in the number of tasks being trained between a distribution company and a signal company in an BCT is 24. We need to standardize the "deploy" MET and subordinate collective tasks across the Army. The centers of excellence need to establish a working group and determine what tasks all units should train. Deployment fundamentals should not be radically different among the various types of tactical units.

The Army must revamp its institutional approach to deployment training for CTC rotations and warfighter exercises. We should evaluate units deploying to CTCs from fort to port and from tactical assembly area to fort. Deployment and redeployment should be included in the after action review.



Photo by PVT Audrianna Arellano

An 82nd Airborne Division paratrooper rigs a vehicle during a deployment readiness exercise at Fort Bragg, NC, on 25 July 2017.

Build Individual Expertise

We must determine the best options for Soldiers to gain individual experience in an environment that is increasingly hampered by time limitations and resource constraints. These options should be conducive to a generation that uses the internet to get quick and easy answers.

The Deployment Process Modernization Office maintains a repository of deployment information, including best practices, forms, regulations, and deployment smart books on its "Deployer's Toolbox" website.²

Army Deployment Rehearsal

For the United States to deter conventional attacks, its opponents must know that it can mass forces on their doorsteps. We must resource and execute the deployment of an Army division from the United States to one of our geographic combatant commands every two years based off an existing operation plan's time-phased force deployment data. Only then can we validate the Army's force projection capabilities and speed of assembly. From these drills, we will gather vital data metrics and understand our limitations to better enhance our preparedness for conflict.

Conclusion

Rebuilding a culture of deployment readiness is a deliberate process that will take time, resources, and energy. The effort belongs to every Soldier and Civilian.

Most of our personnel who experienced expeditionary deployment are senior officers and NCOs. Many of these

Soldiers will leave the Army in the next five years, and we need to leverage their expertise before we have to relearn what we have lost. Enacting new policies and commander's actions, training in new ways, and emphasizing deployment as an operation will help us get back to a culture of deployment excellence to ensure the Army is ready for the future fight.

Notes

¹ Sydney J. Freedberg Jr., "Army Soldiers Slash Time To Move From Port To Front: Deterring Russia," *Breaking Defense*, 17 March 2017. Accessed 3 October 2017 from <https://breakingdefense.com/2017/03/army-soldiers-slash-time-to-move-from-port-to-front-deterring-russia/>.

² Link to the toolbox can be found on the Transportation Corps' website at <http://www.transchool.lee.army.mil>.

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CPT Alex Brubaker currently serves as the proponent officer for the Transportation Corps. He previously commanded a composite truck company (light) in Germany and a movement control team at Fort Campbell, KY. He received his commission from the University of Michigan and is a graduate of the Transportation Basic Officer Leader Course, Combined Logistics Captains Career Course, and Support Operations Course.

Maximizing the HHC in Support of TF Maneuver

CPT RYAN J. HUNTOON

On a moonless, cold night at the National Training Center (NTC) at Fort Irwin, CA, a battalion task force (TF) raced across the Mojave Desert through the Whale Gap towards its assigned mission. The battalion's headquarters and headquarters company (HHC) was within doctrinal supporting range and was poised to fully support that mission. The TF ultimately achieved its objectives, but it was a "close-run thing." The HHC — manned and equipped to maximize assigned and attached combat enablers — never received the clear orders that would have assured TF victory. In that imperfect planning vacuum, the leadership of the HHC took the initiative and executed a creative and nested concept of support. If the HHC had received more clarity of purpose and detail in the TF orders, the battalion would have achieved a clear and synchronized victory instead of a close one.

We have seen this outcome repeated several times during training rotations here at the NTC; outstanding leaders at all levels are not fully providing the opportunity for their infantry, Stryker, and armored battalion TFs to fully employ the key capabilities of the HHC. There are ways to do this better in training which will have a positive result in combat. In this article, I will briefly describe how the HHC should be doctrinally employed, how it is often utilized in training rotations, and then propose ways to improve its performance during that training to improve the readiness our force needs to best deliver on the battlefield.

The HHC is often underutilized in infantry, armored, and Stryker battalions to enable their TFs to fight and win in a decisive action environment. The HHC's roles, responsibilities, and mission sets may not always be maximized to support the battalion's training mission for several reasons. These may include that the HHC's role was minimized through the orders process during a rotation at NTC or that there was a



Photos courtesy of author

An HHC commander provides the tactical task and purpose to his Soldiers while at NTC.

misunderstanding of the full combat power of its commonly attached units. There are several ways to fix these problems and best employ the enabling combat power of the largest company in the battalion. For example, the HHC's role in the battalion fight can be directed in several critical roles to give its battalion a maximum tactical advantage and strengthen its value. The HHC commander can fight forward and take charge as a fourth maneuver commander. The HHC commander can also marshal the company's assets and enablers to best allow line companies to focus on their part of the close fight. Combat enablers such as psychological operations (PSYOP) and civil affairs (CA) teams, and external attachments such as engineer or explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) detachments, are often allocated to the battalion without an assigned headquarters to command them. The HHC command team is the right headquarters to take on that task. The HHC commander is the senior leader solution to command and control that the battalion does not have time to create. Army doctrine should be rewritten to redefine HHC roles and responsibilities and best position the TF to use its full capacity to shape the fight.

Current Doctrine on the HHC's Role

Current doctrine has the HHC commander used as the mission command conduit for the battalion trains. The HHC should provide "direct interface" and mentorship between the battalion trains operations and battalion command posts (CPs).¹ The HHC commander can be a guide to the battalion staff and forward support company (FSC) command teams operating there and move forward toward the fight. To accomplish this, the HHC must see itself as a battalion asset, not as a traditional company. In general, the HHC must evolve from an outdated doctrinal position in the battalion trains and lead in the tactical fight. As a fourth maneuver commander, the HHC commander can relieve the weight of the complex tasks with leadership and mission command of battalion specialty team enablers, attachments, and the battalion reserve. The arrival of the FSC to the fight relieves logistical roles the HHC has. The doctrine also specifies that the HHC can lead multiple tactical tasks in maneuver, security, or mission command-oriented roles, and also lead local area, helicopter landing zone, and route security for all offensive, defensive, and stability mission sets. Applications of current Stryker and combined arms doctrine to visiting rotational unit observations at NTC does not always reflect these opportunities to maximize the strength of the HHC in its direct support of the battalion TF mission.

The HHC commander is a maneuver leader and belongs forward in the tactical fight. Current doctrine describes the roles, responsibilities, and mission of the HHC and headquarters and headquarters troop (HHT) in general terms. Those roles are logistics-focused, less leader intensive, and limit the mobility of the HHC command team to positively influence the fight. Combined arms battalion (CAB) doctrine describes the role of the HHC as to provide "reconnaissance, sniper, mortar, communication, supply, administration, and medical support for battalion."² This reference limits the command team to be centralized around the company trains command post (CTCP); it states that the HHC commander "has the responsibility" of the CTCP and is assisted by the battalion logistics staff officer (S4).³ This reference does note that the primary function of the FSC is to execute battalion sustainment. It states, "The FSC in direct support of the CAB provides most sustainment to the battalion."⁴ Stryker doctrine is almost identical in its definition of the roles and responsibilities of the HHC.⁵ There are historical reasons why the doctrine recommends that the HHC commander be positioned at the CTCP. Prior to the FSC's creation, the HHC was

wholly responsible for the battalion concept of support and its sustainment. With the arrival of the FSC on the battlefield, the HHC should not have to position itself permanently at the CTCP or brigade support area (BSA) and be wholly accountable for sustainment coordination.

The Problem with HHC Being Tied to Battalion Sustainment

What is the major risk with giving the HHC commander too much of a logistical support role? Without established roles and responsibilities, there may be confusion, dangerous assumptions, and failure to complete tactical requirements. If the HHC does what the previously described doctrine states, it usually will become wholly sustainment focused — a common occurrence during some NTC rotations. The HHC command team then maximizes its time and energy synchronizing the logistical flow of support from the BSA forward to all CPs and units. This was exemplified during several recent rotations where HHC commanders committed most of their energy to maintaining a 24-hour focus on logistical support operations. Their time was occupied with understanding the CTCP's capabilities and working with the FSC to determine logistical requirements (originating from reporting tools such as expenditure reports and combat slants), shortfalls to support the forward line, and what their mitigation was (managing resources of transportation assets, class of supply distribution, etc.).

These tasks derive from a battalion concept of support, one charged naturally to the FSC. During one recent rotation, the HHC led the logistical sustainment mission as part of its oversight of the battalion trains. The FSC commander was positioned at the BSA during the rotation and separated from his company, which then staged out of the CTCP under direct leadership of the HHC commander. Other key logistics planners directly involved with battalion sustainment — the S1 and S4 — operated from the battalion main CP. Ammunition expenditures were coordinated and synchronized with next available assets



A combat train command post moves into a new position during an NTC rotation at Fort Irwin, CA.

to support the line companies prior to an upcoming battalion defensive operation. A critical, no-fail request for Javelins and AT4s to replenish company combat power was expedited on the next logistics package (LOGPAC). The S4 submitted the requirement to the CTCP via FM and Joint Capabilities Release (JCR). The requirement was delayed at the BSA when sent to higher because there were no expenditure reports, a problem that could have been solved early on in the request process with a better system. Each key leader involved — the S4, HHC commander, and FSC commander — assumed others were accountable to follow up, remedy the issue, and complete the requirement. Is the HHC commander responsible for ensuring assets and resources are allocated to the units? Is it the FSC commander? Or is it the S4 or distribution platoon leader? Once expenditure reports were submitted, the BSA could not support the AT4 and Javelin

requests in time, and it took commander involvement to ensure the ammunition was prioritized and the resupply mission completed. Ultimately, the ammunition ended up arriving at the logistical resupply points (LRPs) too late for the companies' no later than (NLT) defend time. The failure of timely logistics contributed to their depleted available combat power to support the battalion defensive operation.

What is the lesson? When everyone assumes someone else is responsible due to no clear task delineation, no one is accountable. This is apparent in the multiple chains of command the logistical requirements went through and the failed accountability and leader checks at each point. Battalion commanders need to clearly delineate these roles and responsibilities to ensure proper sustainment. The doctrine should be rewritten to give the sustainment mission solely back to the FSC. Otherwise, the HHC will overlap in duties and responsibilities and can create mission failure in logistics.

Get the HHC Commander into the Fight

HHC commanders often have additional tactical experience, maturity, and judgment. They can assist in synchronizing warfighter functions through mentorship of the key leaders of the battalion trains: the S1, S4, medical operations officer (MEDO), FSC commander and executive officer (XO), and HHC XO and first sergeant. With training and mentorship, these leaders can take on these elements within the battalion trains. This will release the HHC command team to get into the forward fight with confidence in the leaders they left behind to direct those positions. Stryker doctrine describes this mentorship as providing "direct interface" of mission command of the battalion trains and their logistical, medical, and support operations.⁶ "To be effective, the HHC commander must understand not only the breadth of his authority and responsibility, but also his relationship with, and the role and



An HHC commander coaches the medical operations officer at the Role 1 Aid Station.

function of, every leader with whom he interacts.”⁷

The HHC commander instinctively takes the role as a battalion officer-in-charge (OIC) of the CPs because that is where his personnel are and it is what doctrine tells him to do: operate at the CTCP (CAB doctrine) or back at the BSA (Stryker doctrine). For example, CAB doctrine describes the purpose of leadership across the battalion trains; it states that HHC and FSC commanders “provide the CAB commander with a degree of command oversight for the battalion trains. A technique for these two commanders in the field is a split of location and responsibility.”⁸ The overall purpose is to ensure there is senior company-grade leadership at each battalion trains CP and accountability rearward while the battalion commander focuses forward to win the tactical fight. The battalion commander relies on accountable leaders to provide tactical judgment and “direct interface” of his guidance rearward to synchronize the warfighter functions forward to support his fight. Charge that role and responsibility and delegated leadership of CP footprints to the option of the S1, S4, and HHC XO.

The HHC commander executes the original doctrinal role of “direct interface” — a main conduit of mission command for leaders of the battalion trains. With tactical-level experience and operational understanding, the HHC commander can translate guidance from the field-grade level to the company-grade level battalion trains leaders. They can then understand it, relay and report, and then adopt the responsibility of “direct interface.” In order to measure the effectiveness of his mentorship, an HHC commander can assess how well mentees report friction points that delay or halt synchronization of warfighter functions. They can then have complete flexibility of the HHC commander to circulate between all mission CPs and develop the right subordinates to move fluidly throughout all major CPs — the field trains command post (FTCP), the CTCP, the main CP, and the tactical command post (TAC). For security, as outlined in

CAB doctrine, the HHC commander can develop his XO and 1SG to oversee initial entry on the battlefield, security, and survivability, supported by oversight on each node's security posture, gaps, site selection and use of terrain, and overall contingency and displacement readiness.⁹ This will allow the CTCP to act as the reserve CP, too. For operations at the CTCP, the HHC commander can mentor the S4 into running the CTCP as he is accountable to report on combat power. The S4 can best support the battalion XO's concept of sustainment from this footprint.

This command and control enables FSC key leaders — its most senior logisticians — to work freely across the BSA, CTCP, tactical operations center (TOC), TAC, and forward line of own troops (FLOT). During NTC rotations, the HHC commander has been the catalyst to reinforce relationships between sustainment leaders (such as the S4 and the FSC) when confusion develops over roles and responsibilities or miscommunication delays sustainment operations. In other observations, the HHC commander has advised the MEDO on use of terrain, time, space-distance analysis, "golden-hour criteria," and security fundamentals to help the MEDO best place the forward aid station during the fight. The commander's coaching of those players enables them to get involved in the planning and sync their warfighter function with the plan. It also directs their systems toward the fight. It then enables them to operate with tactical perspective and translated guidance from the field-grade level to the company-grade junior leader levels. The HHC commander's direct leadership and mentorship across the battalion trains — combined with delegating leadership of these elements to the S1, S4, HHC XO, and 1SG — further allows him to be freed up to support the battalion forward fight for maximum battalion tactical advantage.

Goal: HHC Commander as Additional Maneuver Commander

Having the HHC commander as an additional maneuver commander will help reduce tactical weight on the battalion

mission. Through strengthened leadership, the HHC commander is freed to support the battalion tactically as an additional maneuver commander. In this capacity, the HHC can reduce the weight of tactical tasks and enablers/attachments that often overwhelm line companies. The HHC commander and 1SG can maneuver the battalion reserve forward at the battalion commander's call. They can also maneuver battalion assets — augmented with security — to include medical, enablers, fires, and emergency resupply forward logistics elements (FLEs). Once the battalion's tactical tasks have been determined during the military decision-making process (MDMP), the HHC headquarters section can take much of those enabler tasks, to include PSYOP, CA, unmanned aircraft systems (UAS), and any battalion attachments assigned for the operation. During multiple NTC rotations, the HHC commander was assigned combat power of a section of M1s and a dismounted squad to provide outer cordon security while CA and PSYOP teams were safely injected into the village to conduct their key leader engagement (KLE). In two other rotations, HHC commanders mission-commanded deception TOCs. The TOCs included PSYOP and CA trucks, tents, antennas, and other vehicles in addition to brigade CP node team communications equipment to appear as a mission command node. The TOCs were positioned near a main supply route to be in minimal view for the opposing force (OPFOR) to identify but not obvious enough in an unconcealed or covered environment. The deception TOCs successfully drew and separated OPFOR from the main attack body which had been directed at company defensive positions.

Moreover, the HHC commander can also provide the enabler teams a voice during the MDMP process to make sure they get used. Most enabler teams are led by junior company-grade leaders who may have trouble communicating how they are added value in the mission and how they are synchronized effectively in the maneuver plan. They may also struggle to understand guidance from a field-grade battalion XO or S3. The HHC commander can help to translate that guidance to the enabler team leadership.



During an NTC rotation, an HHC commander mission-commanded a deception tactical operations center.

The HHC commander can also lead a reinforced reconnaissance platoon combined with any array of infantry or armor to support it. The platoon's purpose can be to operate in an intermediate security zone and handle tactical tasks in lieu of a supporting brigade cavalry squadron in the area of operations. This was attempted during one rotation but with a staff officer who had not previously worked with the recon platoon. The HHC commander is the ideal leader for this mission as he has spent the most time with the reconnaissance platoon supporting their training readiness in garrison. An example of the HHC taking tactical task weight off forward line companies would be handling all local outer security, the battalion reserve element, helicopter landing zone and its local security, and passenger screening of evacuated personnel during a noncombatant evacuation operation (NEO). This enables companies to focus on their primary tactical tasks without becoming overwhelmed with additional assets that the battalion allocates to them before or during their mission.

Integrate the HHC Early On to Get It into the Fight

Where can HHC commanders affect input for effective placement of their teams during the mission? One way is to position them left of the planning timeline, ideally during the course of action (COA) development step of the MDMF. By then, mission analysis is complete and the headquarters staff is prepared to begin identifying key battalion tactical and enabling tasks, and those tasks and/or attachments are then ready to be assigned to company headquarters. During COA development, HHC/HTT commanders can redirect enablers and attachments under their headquarters section.

The Importance of HHC Command Team Selection

These recommended roles for the HHC are connected to HHC company-grade leader selection. That selection in garrison is based on criteria of tactical experience, judgment, and maturity. Selected HHC commanders, company XO's, and 1SGs are almost always prior line company command teams. They are picked on their ability to lead and synchronize training readiness of the headquarters staff, battalion medics, scouts, and mortar platoons in garrison. They are charged with leading several mission essential task list training pathways and ensuring combat readiness. In short, selection of HHC commanders should be carefully considered since they are called to manage the most complexity in competing training interests of all company commands. That same experience, maturity, and judgment can be applied in the planning and execution of the battalion mission in combat training. Problems arise due to the absence of battalion TF guidance for the HHC prior to planning and execution. As a result, an HHC command section may adopt a less leader-intensive role across the mission command nodes of the battlefield, and capabilities may be misemployed. That cascading effect can decrease an HHC's value to the battalion. The HHC command team should evolve and adapt its roles and responsibilities from the garrison to the combat environment — not take the garrison duties with it.

Deliberately manned and equipped to best support the TF mission, the HHC is often an untapped battalion asset for

The HHC commander is the right person to maneuver additional combat power and combat enablers as a battalion asset in support of the battalion, has the maturity and command experience to manage multiple non-standard capabilities and time, and is able to effectively phase HHC force multipliers on the battlefield when required by the TF.

key supporting roles. The HHC commander should be placed forward in the tactical fight and be taken out of the battalion trains. This commander can become a fourth maneuver commander to mobilize, deploy, and lead key battalion enablers and attachments in support of the mission and to reduce tactical task weight from the line companies. The HHC commander is able to leave an outdated doctrinal role and move to support the fight by becoming a coach to battalion staff and FSC command teams operating throughout the battalion trains. He can also provide tactical perspective, translate guidance from the field-grade levels forward, and delineate roles and responsibilities throughout the battalion CP nodes. The HHC commander is the right person to maneuver additional combat power and combat enablers in support of the battalion, has the maturity and command experience to manage multiple non-standard capabilities and time, and is able to effectively phase HHC force multipliers on the battlefield when required by the TF.

As warfare progressively becomes more volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous, the need for more specialized supporting mission sets grows. We require all our leaders to be able to operate jointly with other branches of service and allied formations with little time to adapt. The HHC commander is the best leader who can quickly harness those capabilities and employ them into the battalion TF maneuver plan and ensure its overall success.

Notes

¹ Army Techniques Publication (ATP) 3-21.21, *SBCT Infantry Battalion* (March 2016), 7-28.

² ATP 3-90.5, *Combined Arms Battalion* (February 2016), 1-59.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ ATP 3-21.21, 1-58.

⁶ Ibid, 7-28.

⁷ ATP 3-90.5, 1-62.

⁸ Ibid, 7-21.

⁹ Ibid, 2-26-37.

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An Infantryman Down Under

MAJ RUSSELL B. THOMAS

“Conducting military engagements with partners, fostering mutual understanding through military-to-military contacts, and helping partners build the capacity to defend themselves. These actions are an investment in the future that the nation cannot afford to forego. The Army must cultivate positive relationships before they are needed. It must be a reliable, consistent, and respectful partner to others.”

— Field Manual (FM) 3-22,
*Army Support to Security Cooperation*¹

The U.S. Army and Australian Army Military Personnel Exchange Program is one that has remained reliable, consistent, and continued to cultivate positive relations between the two militaries. Specifically, the U.S. Exchange Officer position at the School of Infantry offers great opportunity for security cooperation. The exchange program began in the late 1960s with the signing of the Australia Status of Forces Agreement, Australian Treaty Series 1963 No. 10. The treaty's original purpose was to further the efforts of the two countries to promote peace and stability in the Pacific and other areas of mutual interest.²

The agreement stands today and is the authority by which the exchange of an Infantry officer and NCO from the U.S. Maneuver Center of Excellence at Fort Benning, GA, and the Australian School of Infantry occurs along with many other exchanges of military personnel in Australia and the U.S. This article provides a brief overview of the U.S. strategic guidance and policy with respect to security cooperation, the tasks of Military Personnel Exchange Program (MPEP) Soldiers, specific duties of the American Infantry officer currently stationed at the Australian School of Infantry, and the benefits of this program.

Security cooperation with the United States and other countries is clearly articulated from the Commander-in-Chief through the chain of command in many policy directives. Presidential Policy Directive 23, Security Sector Assistance (05 April 2013) states that security assistance is aimed at strengthening the ability of the United States to help allies and partner nations build their own security capacity.³ The document provides the goals for U.S. security assistance as:

1. Help partner nations build sustainable capacity to address common security challenges;
2. Promote partner support for U.S. interest;
3. Promote universal values, such as good governance; and
4. Strengthen collective security and multinational defense agreements and organizations.

While military personnel exchanges are considered security cooperation versus security assistance, personnel exchanges with partner nations achieve these aims.



Photo courtesy of author

MAJ John Taylor, MAJ Russell B. Thomas, and CAPT Cameron Clarke participate in Anzac Day Ceremonies in Singleton, NSW Australia.

The Chief of Staff of the Army in 2011 stated the purpose of security cooperation, writing that the U.S. Army must “engage our partners, foster mutual understanding through military-to-military contacts; and help partners build capacity to defend themselves.”⁴ Other U.S. Army policy and directives that address security cooperation are FM 3-22 and Department of the Army (DA) Pamphlet (PAM) 11-31, *Army Security Cooperation Handbook*, which specifies the tasks of all exchange officers as providing training, conducting military-to-military activities, and exchanging personnel for the purpose of counterterrorism, stabilization and reconstruction, coalition operations, and others.⁵

The exchange of military personnel with other countries is exceptional at achieving our national security cooperation objectives. By living and working with our partner countries, properly placed exchange personnel have the ability to positively affect many of the strategic security cooperation goals at a low cost to the nation since it requires no additional manning and minimal funding. Additionally, at the tactical level, the exchange is beneficial for sharing ideas within the specific roles that each of the exchange Soldiers hold.

The position for the U.S. exchange officer at the School of Infantry is a role that affords the U.S. Army a great opportunity for security cooperation. The position has changed over the years, ranging from an instructional specific role to the current appointment of the U.S. officer assigned as the officer commanding and senior instructor (OC/SI) of the Specialist Wing of the school. This command position is indicative of the mutual trust and respect between the U.S. and Australian Army.

As the OC/SI, the U.S. officer supervises, manages, resources and leads the Specialist Wing, which consists of the Reconnaissance Team, Sniper Team, Pioneer Team, Direct Fires Support Weapons Team (DFSW/heavy weapons), and the Combat Shooting Cell (CSC). Each team is responsible for conducting courses throughout the year based on a directed-training requirement (DTR) derived from the needs of the Australian Army. At the school, the Specialist Wing instructs officer/NCO courses as all of the basic specialist courses (sniper, recon, pioneer, and DFSW) are taught at the soldiers' home battalion.

The Reconnaissance Team trains the officers and NCOs of the Australian Army via the Reconnaissance Officer/NCO Course. The course is offered twice a year, training soldiers in the rank of lance-corporal (LCP) through captain for employment within the battalions of the Royal Australian Regiment (RAR). Prior to leading a reconnaissance platoon, the platoon leaders and platoon sergeants must attend this course. A parallel course does exist in the U.S. — the Reconnaissance and Surveillance Leaders Course (RSLC) at Fort Benning and similarly, the Army Reconnaissance Course.

The Sniper Team provides training to the RAR via the Advanced Sniper Team Leaders (ASTL) Course and the Sniper Supervisors Course. Unlike U.S. Army snipers who are centrally trained at Fort Benning, snipers in Australia receive their basic sniper training with their respective battalions. After gaining experience as a sniper in a battalion, they then receive centralized training at the School of Infantry in the ASTL Course. Here, they are instructed on the finer sniper skills required for long-range precision engagements and advanced sniping techniques; however, a critical component of the course is instruction on the Military Appreciation Process (MAP). The Australian MAP is very similar to the U.S. military decision-making process. By receiving this training at the ASTL Course and in the other Specialist Wing courses, the soldiers depart able to readily participate in the planning process and facilitate employment of their trade or specialty platoon at the company and battalion levels. The Sniper Supervisor Course is a two-week course that further develops sniper leaders (typically the senior NCOs) to plan and supervise sniper training and missions within an infantry battalion. This differs greatly from the U.S. Army Infantry in that there is a sniper supervisor (rank of SFC) and a reconnaissance platoon sergeant (rank of SFC) in every reconnaissance and surveillance platoon. Thus, the dynamics of incorporating snipers into planning is very different and the level of sniper expertise is greatly increased.

The Assault Pioneer Platoon is an organization with no true parallel in the U.S. Army. Australian Assault Pioneers most closely resemble a U.S. engineering sapper platoon, but the soldiers in a Pioneer Platoon are all infantrymen. Each battalion has an Assault Pioneer Platoon that specializes in engineering tasks of mobility, counter mobility, and survivability. The Assault Pioneer Team in Specialist Wing provides two officer/NCO courses a year training LCPs through captains in the skills and knowledge required of this trade. The training consists of engineering training such as field defenses, water/boat

operations, combat breaching, and infantry search training.

The DFSW Team trains all DFSW officers and NCOs on how to employ the platoon as part of a company or battalion. The weapons utilized by DFSW platoons include the 240B 7.62mm machine gun (called the MAG 58 in Australia), the 84mm Karl Gustav, the .50 caliber M2 Machine Gun, the Mk-47 (40mm) Lightweight Automatic Grenade Launcher (just this year replaced the Mk-19), and the Javelin. During the five-week course, officers and NCOs learn how to integrate with a battalion to achieve the commander's desired effects with these anti-armor and suppressive effects weapons. While the majority of the weapon systems within a DFSW platoon are very similar to what are used in the U.S., the Australian Army uses the 240B in the extended range mode, something not done in the U.S. To execute this, a C2 sight is attached to the machine gun (similar to a mortar), and the gunners use predicted data to allow the machine gun to be fired in the indirect mode using a Ground Fire Controller (GFC). This can have great benefits, allowing the machine gun to fire effectively at ranges up to 3,000 meters away without needing to have direct line of sight on the target. To conduct this effectively requires exceptional attention to detail and training, which the Soldiers first receive at their battalions and then become experts at while at the DFSW Officer/NCO Course.

The tactical courses in the Specialist Wing are very similar to those in the U.S. but at the same time are vastly different. As an exchange officer, it has certainly opened my aperture as to how different armies organize and fight and the implications of that in interoperability. Minor differences such as those described above can make a great difference in discussions of planning. For example, an Australian "troop" is equivalent to a U.S. platoon; an Australian infantry section is equivalent to a U.S. infantry squad; and an Australian "brick" is equivalent to a U.S. team. This basic understanding of terminology differences with a force that speaks the same language highlights the difficulties that can arise when partnered with other nations where there is an additional layer of difficulty due to a language barrier.

The newest addition to the Specialist Wing at the School of Infantry is the CSC. The School of Infantry established the CSC as part of a larger initiative to improve combat shooting within the Army and Australian Defence Force (ADF). The CSC is the hub for Army innovation and expertise in combat shooting (from 0 to 200 meters), responsible for inculcating the Australian battalions and larger ADF with the latest shooting techniques and enhancing doctrine to increase the lethality and survivability of the Australian combatant. Through the use of innovative targetry (robots, steel, etc.), pistol incorporation, reality-based training, and adult learning techniques, the CSC is the lead for combat shooting in Australia and an exciting new addition to the wing.

As the OC/SI of Specialist Wing, the U.S. exchange officer to the School of Infantry in Australia is able to execute two of the primary tasks for exchange officers of providing training and conducting military-to-military engagement on a daily basis. Additionally, the commander of the School of Infantry has entrusted the U.S. officer to be the lead for many of the

modernization efforts that the school is involved in. These projects can range from developing new requirements within a specialist trade (new weapons, optics, sights, etc.), to facilitating the efficient introduction of new weapon systems into service. At a time when the Australian Army is considering incorporation of an infantry fighting vehicle to their formations by 2025, the U.S. exchange officer, who often has experience in a Bradley or Stryker battalion, can be very beneficial to the development of this capability now and in future assignments.

As evident above, the position as an exchange officer at the School of Infantry is not only beneficial to the Australians as I fill a critical command role, but the assignment is also extremely beneficial to me professionally. In this role, I have learned a vast deal of how the Australian Army as a whole operates — from the army's headquarters down to the tactical battalion level. My understanding of the difficulties with interoperability and the importance of facilitating it have increased greatly over a very short period of time. Observing how different armies employ similar assets, such as the sustained-fire machine gun and Assault Pioneers, is very advantageous and has broadened my understanding of just how different maneuver tactics can be with similarly organized forces. Without a doubt, the knowledge I have gained in this position is immeasurable and will certainly serve me well in any future assignment.

The School of Infantry is an institution where the trust and mutual respect between the Australian and American armies

is evident to all Soldiers assigned to the school and every soldier who completes a course there. This bilateral respect permeates throughout the Australian Army and cultivates positive relationships that are required between our two partner nations. Every exchange member within Australia and other partner nations have this same effect in the organization; thus, the relationships are well-established and — in the case of the United States and Australia — will continue to provide mutually strategic benefits for years to come.

Notes

¹ FM 3-22, *Army Support to Security Cooperation* (January 2013), 1-5.

² Australian Treaty Series 1963 No. 10, <http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/other/dfat/treaties/1963/10.html>, accessed 2 March 2017.

³ Presidential Policy Directive 23, *Security Sector Assistance*, 5 April 2013.

⁴ GEN Raymond T. Odierno, "CSA Editorial: Prevent, Shape Win," <https://www.army.mil/article/71030>, accessed 2 March 2017.

⁵ DA PAM 11-31, *Army Security Cooperation Handbook* (6 February 2015), 37.

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Photo by SPC Mitchell Ternay

Australian Defence Force machine gunners with 7th Battalion, Australian Army, demonstrate the MAG 58 machine gun's ability to aim at an enemy target in Shoalwater Bay Training Area during Talisman Sabre 2011 in Queensland, Australia on 9 July 2011.



Revitalize Your Unit's Marksmanship Program

*by Focusing on Fundamentals,
Empowering Junior Leaders*

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Infantry One Station Unit Training (OSUT) regularly produces companies of Infantrymen in which more than 80 percent of the formation scores sharpshooter or better during qualification. OSUT's marksmanship strategy covers 18 periods of rifle marksmanship instruction, placing an emphasis on the four fundamentals of marksmanship (steady position, breathing, trigger control, and sight picture/sight alignment), the five elements of a steady position, natural point of aim, and the integrated act of firing.

The training plan moves through back-up iron sights (BUIS), grouping/zeroing (25 meters), confirmation of zero (at distance to achieve a true 300-meter zero), known distance (KD)/location of hit or miss (LOMAH) courses of fire, BUIS qualification, M68 Close Combat Optic grouping/zeroing, confirmation of zero (at distance), combat field fire, and barrier shooting before culminating with a qualification course of fire. This strategy works well because the drill sergeants focus on each individual fundamental, building a shooting position from the ground up through dry-fire drills, transition training, shooter analysis, shot group analysis, concurrent training, reinforcement training, and remedial training (when necessary) to reinforce and fine-tune the shooting skills required.

The focus on teaching fundamentals first and then practicing, drilling, and rehearsing has yielded tremendous results. Teaching a steady position correctly can have the largest impact on a shooter. The process starts with the identification of the shooter's center of gravity and then establishes that the most stable platform is the ground — the further away from the ground, the less stable you are. Reinforcement of a wide base during all positions (prone supported, prone unsupported, kneeling unsupported, kneeling barricade supported, and standing barricade supported) ensures that trainees have a solid platform to engage targets from. Reinforcement of stability is provided through four functions: support (artificial and bone), muscle relaxation, natural point of aim (NPA), and recoil management (recovery and follow through after the shot). Trainers cover leg position, stance and center of gravity, firing elbow, non-firing elbow, firing hand, non-firing hand, butt stock, and stock weld — all while reinforcing that comfort equals durability and sustainability of the shooting position.

Many poor shooters will display their bad habits in one of the above mentioned body positions. An unsteady position causes muscle fatigue, brings a Soldier off his NPA, and reduces recoil management. These three effects can be analyzed with a few drills that will indicate if a Soldier has a steady position. To find their NPA, have Soldiers close their eyes and allow their bodies to shift into a comfortable position. If the rifle has moved off target, they then reposition the body to naturally bring the rifle on target and repeat the process once again. Fatigue can be exacerbated by hanging a full canteen or other weight from the rifle. This drill exaggerates the muscles that will fatigue first and highlights incorrect positions. A common drill to examine recoil management, especially in the kneeling and standing positions, is for a trainer to push the muzzle of the rifle back into the shoulder. This drill quickly demonstrates if a Soldier's body is not balanced or stable. There are many more creative drills, but the point is to break down stable position into the

The focus on teaching fundamentals first and then practicing, drilling, and rehearsing has yielded tremendous results. Teaching a steady position correctly can have the largest impact on a shooter.

three effects to determine weaknesses and then which of the eight points of contact need to be adjusted to correct it.

Trigger control is broken into three factors: trigger finger placement, trigger squeeze, and trigger reset. Trigger finger placement means gripping the weapon so the finger naturally falls across the trigger. There is no specific place on the finger the trigger should lie so the correct position varies from Soldier to Soldier. Trigger squeeze is applying smooth pressure to the trigger until the weapon fires. The speed of the trigger squeeze is not as important as a smooth squeeze. Trigger reset (or follow through) is deliberately returning the trigger to the forward position. A good practice is for Soldiers to pause long enough on the squeeze that when they reset the trigger they can easily hear the reset. The most common drill to teach proper trigger squeeze is the dime and washer drill, which involves balancing the washer on an extension rod that is set in the barrel.

Sight picture and sight alignment are the next most common issues poor shooters have. Identifying eye dominance is a common issue especially with Soldiers who are cross dominant, meaning their dominant eye is on the opposite side as their dominant hand. If Soldiers are accustomed to shooting with their monodominant eye due to cross dominance, they may experience an initial drop off in marksmanship when using the correct eye. Though discouraging, this drop off is normal and temporary. Training and familiarity with the dominant eye will lead to shooting better than with the monodominant eye.

Another common issue is incorrect sight alignment. This is caused by Soldiers' natural tendency to want to focus on the target instead of the clear cutting edge of the front sight or reticle. Leaders need to emphasize keeping the front sight or reticle in focus while firing. Sight alignment issues usually arise when Soldiers do not correctly identify the range to the target nor the point of aim to a target at that distance. For the standard 300-meter zero, Soldiers should aim at the center of visible mass for the target; all other targets must be engaged utilizing a hold under center mass.

There are several training aids to teach correct sight picture and sight picture alignment. These analog tools have the advantage of being small enough to fit in an assault pack and can be quickly used when a leader identifies time for quick opportunity training. The M15 Sighting Device is a small cardboard sleeve with a plastic overlay that resembles a rear and front sight point alignment. The Soldiers move the card to demonstrate they understand what a proper sight picture looks like. This tool can be used to demonstrate the proper point of aim on targets at varying distances based on trajectory. Using this tool, the drill sergeant can demonstrate to Soldiers



Photos courtesy of author

A Soldier watches his battle buddy for correct use of the fundamentals.

how to aim at targets from 150-300 meters and in turn have Soldiers use the device to demonstrate they understand the correct point of aim.

A training exercise that pays dividends teaching soon-to-be Infantrymen proper sight picture and sight alignment is the target box exercise. During this exercise, a Soldier sets his rifle on wooden blocks or otherwise immobilizes the weapon while he aims at a piece of paper. A battle buddy has a cutout of an E-type silhouette that has a small hole in the center of mass. Without moving his rifle, the first Soldier directs his buddy to move the target until he is aiming at the correct point of aim. The Soldier holding the silhouette marks the location and then moves the target and the exercise repeats. In this fashion, the Soldier can see where the target was in relation to his point of aim for each iteration. A few iterations of this exercise produce a shot group on the paper for a firer to gauge his consistency; the goal is to be able to achieve a two-centimeter shot group on paper. This drill can also be very versatile and turn into a competition for the tightest shot group. Silhouettes of different sizes can simulate different ranges, and the hole in the silhouette can be adjusted for the correct point of aim. Different firing positions can also be used. This is a low-cost, low-resource method of providing the Soldier feedback. The drill can be quickly set up and completed out in the field as concurrent training at 10 and 25 meters.

Improper breathing is usually caused by Soldiers trying to hold their breath to completely eliminate any movement of their weapon. Soldiers need to be taught that breathing will naturally produce an arc of movement in the rifle (usually in the form of a figure eight or a W [wobble zone/area]) and to shoot within the movement instead of fighting it. The pressure to perform well at a range will naturally elevate heart rates and breathing so it is important to teach Soldiers to take deliberately slow and deep breaths throughout the entire firing process.

Sometimes called “combat breathing,” this process also exaggerates the natural pause between the inhale and the exhale.

The exercises discussed above are all simple techniques that focus on fundamentals of marksmanship and can be conducted and resourced at the team-leader level. At training events where the Soldiers already have weapons drawn, these exercises make good concurrent training. Leaders need to be aware of these exercises and resources in order to empower their junior leaders to conduct marksmanship training long before live ammunition is ever used. By trusting our junior NCOs to conduct thorough and rigorous training at their level, we ensure that time with more resource-intensive tools is not squandered covering basics that should already have been established.

Marksmanship training begins with BUIS. Many units have become reliant on optics. These offer great advantages in combat situations but can prevent leaders from identifying weaknesses in a Soldier’s use of the marksmanship fundamentals. Ammunition and range allocation may not allow for a BUIS zero and qualification, but there are many dry-fire drills that are best conducted with an iron sight. For the above reasons, seven of the 18 periods of instruction on marksmanship at Infantry OSUT are conducted with BUIS.

Marksmanship is honed using simulation systems before the first live round is ever fired. One of the better-known systems is the Engagement Skills Trainer (EST) II, which uses an M4 of accurate weight to provide immediate feedback to Soldiers. The system follows the path of a Soldier’s sight picture, measures recoil management and follow-through during trigger squeeze, and offers a myriad of scenarios. The EST is immobile and requires prior coordination so it becomes a training event in itself, and emphasis needs to be placed on efficiency of training. Leaders who have not worked through a marksmanship training plan will find their junior NCOs spending time at the EST range working with weak shooters on the fundamentals that should have been previously identified and trained. Infantry OSUT uses the EST II to train on grouping before a live-fire group and zero and then again before qualification. This progression allows Soldiers to demonstrate their mastery of the fundamentals before the first round is ever fired.

The first live range in a unit’s training plan is to conduct a grouping exercise and then zero individual weapons. A common mistake is for experienced Soldiers to get a quick confirmation of their battle sight zero while new Soldiers are rushed through with a “good enough” zero in order to maximize time on the qualification range. Oftentimes, Soldiers who fail to qualify are sent back to a zero range to confirm their zero and sent right back to qualification tables. A more efficient technique is for a trainer to run through the dry-fire drills as a diagnostic to determine which fundamental is weakest. The diagnostic drill will also ensure space on the range and that ammunition is not being wasted. A good practice to ensure

a more accurate 25-meter zero is to use five-shot groups as opposed to three-shot groups. Ammunition is usually allocated to take into account three-shot groups, but the advantages of having better marksmanship is that fewer rounds will be needed to retest at the qualification ranges. Leaders need to ensure that Soldiers are using the correct offset when using optics. This information is located in the technical manual for each optic. Treating the zero range as its own event prevents the conflict of time, trainers, and ammunition being shared between a 25-meter zero range and a qualification range. A separate zero range ensures that the proper amount of emphasis is being placed on the training.

The grouping and zero range is followed up by a KD range to confirm the zero up to 300 meters. According to Training Circular (TC) 3-22.9, *Rifle and Carbine*, "The most important step in the zeroing process is zero confirmation out to 300 meters." The key to the confirmation is the range must provide feedback to the firer on where rounds are impacting the target. A mistake some units make is to use a qualification range with the 300-meter targets up to confirm zero. An automated record fire range ran in this matter does not provide the Soldier with the point of impact information needed to make adjustments to his rifle. A recommendation is that a KD range or a LOMAH be utilized for zero confirmation at distance. The 300-meter confirmation is critical to ensure that Soldiers can accurately and confidently engage all targets up to 300 meters.

Many units incorporate ranges that cover techniques beyond the three positions used during qualification tables as well as to incorporate barriers, physical exertion, and a myriad of other techniques to make the range provide conditions more realistic to a battlefield. During OSUT, the two ranges that capture battlefield conditions are the introduction to barricade shooting range and combat field fire (stress shoot). Beyond expanding the Soldiers' skill sets, the purpose of these ranges is to build confidence and familiarity with the rifle while shooting from multiple firing positions while wearing the Advanced Combat Helmet (ACH), Fighting Load Carrier (FLC,) Improved Outer Tactical Vest (IOTV), and eye and hearing protection. Soldiers who may get test anxiety at a qualification range will now be more confident because they have successfully engaged targets under stress and in positions that are new to them. The challenges at these ranges also force Soldiers to think about the fundamentals of marksmanship, the factors of a steady position, and how well they have been applying these concepts during marksmanship. Soldiers are being challenged to find a steady position against a window and a wall and adjust their body to provide a stable platform. During the combat field fire, Soldiers are put in conditions that induce muscle fatigue and elevated breathing rates. These conditions force the Soldier to be much

more conscience of breathing (natural respiratory pause/stopping the breathing cycle), trigger squeeze, and steady position to accurately engage targets at multiple ranges. Placing these two ranges before the qualification range serves the same purpose as the previous dry-fire training: to build confidence by creating conditions that highlight the importance of marksmanship fundamentals.

In an ideal world, marksmanship training across the enterprise would get the same focus as Infantry OSUT places on it, but other requirements prevent this in many units. Leaders can ensure that concurrent training is providing the best training value to Soldiers by ensuring junior leaders have access to — and are trained on — all the training aids available. The integrated weapons training strategy (IWTS) provides new requirements for the force to conduct preliminary rifle instruction, utilize simulations (EST and others), and conduct drills, grouping/zeroing, practice fires and qualification ranges. A robust program also relies on company leadership validating the trainers on the new doctrine, especially since the new TC 3-22.9 was published on 12 March 2016 and the changes may not be well known. Drill sergeants have gotten amazing results with brand new marksmen by placing a heavy emphasis on the fundamentals and training them in detail. This same return to basics and empowering junior leaders can revitalize a unit's marksmanship program or take an already well-established program to the next level all while sustaining this perishable skill set and improving lethality across the force.

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Fundamentals, Adaptive Leadership and Mission Command:

Meeting the Challenge of Executing Missions in Deployed Environments While Maintaining Home-Station Readiness

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This article first appeared in the April-June 2017 Cavalry & Armor Journal and is reprinted with permission of the U.S. Cavalry & Armor Association.

The 3rd Cavalry Regiment (CR), a Stryker brigade combat team (SBCT), has deployed multiple times to Iraq and Afghanistan like most BCTs in our Army. However, not until its most recent deployment to Afghanistan (May 2016 to February 2017) did the regiment encounter several unique challenges, many of which now constitute a new “norm” for BCTs in the Army — deploying with less than half of its assigned force and being spread throughout an operational theater. Thus, the 3rd CR’s preparation for and execution of its mission offers pertinent lessons to other BCTs which may face a similar set of challenges in the future.

The 3rd CR was successful in spite of the challenges it faced because it focused on **developing fundamental skills, encouraging adaptive leadership, and exercising mission command**. Strengthening these three initiatives enabled the regiment and its troopers to accomplish a variety of unique mission sets, both in combat and at home station. As future leaders prepare for similar challenges, they should plan and execute a training path to accomplish five things:

- Build warfighting competence through decisive action (DA) training;
- Integrate specific mission requirements into training events where appropriate;
- Develop the right training plan to appropriately switch from a DA-focused mission set to mission-specific training;
- Develop adaptive leaders who build teams and solve complex problems; and
- Continually exercise mission command.

This article proceeds in three parts. First, we will analyze the regiment’s actions within the broader context of the training and operating

environment. Second, we will demonstrate how the regiment ensured mission success as they planned, prepared, and executed home-station training and combat operations. We will conclude by offering recommendations to the Army going forward.


Defining the Problem

Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 3-0, *Operations*, conceptualizes the Army’s unified land operations (ULO) framework as the activities units undertake to “synchronize the efforts of non-governmental entities with military operations in order to achieve unity of effort.” ULO are executed through decisive action, by means of combined arms maneuver (CAM) as well as wide area security (WAS), and guided by mission command.¹

Decisive action requires simultaneous combinations of offense, defense, and stability tasks. Typically thought of in terms of decisive battles fought squarely against conventional or hybrid threats, units often revert back to conducting “force-on-force” training. However, under the new ULO framework, it must be noted that decisive action consists not just of the traditional



Figure 1 — Unified Land Operations



Army Doctrine Publication 3-0, *Unified Land Operations*

offensive and defensive tasks but also stability operations and defense support of civil authorities.²

Doctrine describes adequately what is supposed to happen. The operating environment greatly affects what actually happens. The regiment's squadrons, troops, and small units experienced the full challenges associated with training for multiple mission sets. At Fort Hood, TX, these challenges included personnel turnover, maintenance schedules and equipment fielding, and the professional growth associated with conducting a maneuver-centric training path. In Afghanistan, troops worked through force management-level requirements, targeting engagement authorities, and force protection needs. These constraints affected daily operations even as 3rd CR advised and assisted a partner force battling a resurgent Taliban, a persistent al Qaeda threat, and an aggressive Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant-Khorasan Province (ISIL-K). It is within this complex framework that the 3rd CR would plan, prepare for, and execute its mission in support of Operation Resolute Support (ORS) 2016-17.

Building Capability by Training the Fundamentals

The primary reason the regiment successfully met the demands of executing the forward and home-station missions is because it focused on training and developing fundamental skills. Having redeployed from ORS in the spring of 2015, the regiment began training for its next mission, which at the time, remained unknown. After experiencing significant personnel turnover and re-hauling equipment, the regiment's training cycle began in earnest. Initially, squadrons focused on increasing operational readiness, which included the development of individual and collective skills as well as maintaining the regiment's fleet of Strykers. This period of fundamentals-focused training would prove extremely important. Not only

did it develop the individual and collective skills necessary to further build trained and ready troops and squadrons, but it also laid the foundation from which troopers could later transition to assume the wide variety of skill sets needed in Afghanistan.

Individual proficiency was the regiment's early focus in the summer of 2015. Using Army readiness standards as a guide, the regiment and its squadrons ensured that all Soldiers met individual medical, fitness, weapons qualification, and other administrative requirements. To increase the proportion of healthy troopers, physical readiness training was redesigned to focus on strength, agility, and endurance. Additionally, special population physical training (PT) was organized at the squadron level (as opposed to the troop level where typically leaders were inevitably consumed by other tasks). Troops spent weeks rebuilding marksmanship proficiency utilizing basic, close quarters, and advanced progressions.

As a motorized brigade, the regiment also needed to emphasize the maintenance and readiness of its Stryker fleet. Unlike infantry BCTs (IBCTs), which can largely meet company-level training objectives without incorporating vehicles, SBCTs and armored BCTs (ABCTs) must integrate their vehicle fleet into collective training tasks. Unfortunately, by the end of ORS 14-15, troopers had not seen their Strykers for months. As a direct result, leaders and troopers lacked experience in maintenance as well as mounted marksmanship and tactics. Moreover, at Fort Hood, a significant amount of vehicle maintenance was performed by civilian contract and contributed to the loss of operator 10-level proficiency. However,

Troopers with Lightning Troop, 4th Squadron, 3rd Cavalry Regiment, tactically move through grassy terrain toward their target on 27 April 2016 at Pilot Knob Multi-Use Range on Fort Hood.

Photo by SSG Tomora Clark



through proactive leader involvement and adherence to strict maintenance standards, the regiment successfully regained this proficiency over time. The regiment specifically found a way to account for the myriad of crew certifications, platform modifications, communication integration, and maintenance schedules associated with its fleet. The 3rd CR's 1st Squadron, for example, achieved the highest operational readiness rate through driver and crew certification, maintenance training, and by exceeding post-wide commodity shop standards. In this case, leader involvement ensured trooper ownership and care of equipment at the operator level and ultimately contributed to their success.

As individual proficiency improved, the regiment deliberately introduced collective training with a focus on developing the skills of CAM. Proficiency in CAM requires a significant amount of organizational energy, dedication, and in many cases, a willingness to learn (or in some cases, relearn). Beginning in the summer of 2015 and lasting through the regiment's decisive action training environment (DATE) rotation (16-04) to the National Training Center (NTC) at Fort Irwin, CA, in February 2016, the regiment's collective training experience demonstrated the unique interaction between dismounted infantry squads and reconnaissance teams, terrain, the Stryker platform, and various enabler units.

Early on, the collective training period focused on the crew and squad level. Maneuver squadrons conducted team and squad live-fire exercises (LFXs) while vehicle and fires crews conducted Stryker live-fire density as well as M777 and fire support team (FIST) certifications. In the early fall, squadrons conducted platoon LFXs which incorporated the use of Strykers.

Then, in the late fall, the regiment drastically increased the pressure on its squadrons by conducting a regimental field training exercise (FTX). This exercise replicated NTC's hybrid and conventional threat environment and included both live and constructive iterations in the form of a troop combined arms live-fire exercise (CALFEX) and FTX respectively. In turn, these were controlled by a regimental tactical operations center (TOC) concurrently conducting a fire control exercise (FCX). The CALFEX specifically tested troops in their ability to integrate fires and breaching assets with organic mounted and dismounted squads as they reduced obstacles and seized objectives. The concurrent FTX, Rifles Strike II, focused on developing the respective squadron and regimental staffs in the conduct of supporting troop movement to contact, defense, and urban clearance. The FCX — the first done in over a decade — not only

controlled CALFEX iterations but also simulated command post (CP) activities across multiple domains as leaders reacted to friendly and enemy injects. The completion of all of these exercises ultimately certified each troop, squadron, and the collective regiment for NTC.

To enable CAM, the other warfighting functions also focused on the fundamentals. The regiment's Military Intelligence (MI) professionals began by establishing Fort Hood's first MI gunnery in more than two years. Unit MI teams focused on the basics of analysis: intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB — ATP 2-01.3) to provide intelligence support to mission analysis, operational terms and military symbols (ADRP 1-02) to enable analysts to communicate effectively to maneuver leaders, and lastly opposing force (OPFOR) tactics (TC 7-100.2) to understand the fundamentals of offensive and defensive maneuver. Gunnery methodology established a regimen of sequenced individual training that would develop the necessary skills for collective training. MI Soldiers of varying disciplines trained on individual systems and programs to hone knowledge of their instrument of war. Many of these systems were a part of the Distributed Common Ground System-Army (DCGS-A) family of intelligence systems that provided interconnectivity to other Army Battle Command Systems (ABCS). DCGS-A was essential to allow intelligence to feed into mission command. Analysts and collectors trained on their DCGS-A systems in classrooms and in field environments throughout the training cycle. This painstaking process during MI gunnery paid dividends both at the regimental FTX and NTC, which in turn enabled staffs to leverage these powerful tool sets and intelligence feeds once deployed.

During this training period, our higher headquarters informed us that our mission would change — that the regiment needed to be capable not only of conducting pure DA but also security force assistance (SFA) as seen in Afghanistan. Yet, the requirement to conduct a regimental-level FTX as well as a DA rotation at NTC did not disappear. Thus, the regiment faced somewhat of a conundrum as it departed for NTC: the missions

Figure 2 — The Regimental FTX

	DEC TRP LFX																
30-NOV-15	1-DEC-15	2-DEC-15	3-DEC-15	4-DEC-15	5-DEC-15	6-DEC-15	7-DEC-15	8-DEC-15	9-DEC-15	10-DEC-15	11-DEC-15	12-DEC-15	13-DEC-15	14-DEC-15	15-DEC-15		
Set-Up	TLP	A/1/3			Re-Training	TLP	G/3/3			Re-Training	TLP				MICLIC		
		TLP	B/1/3			LFX Retrain	TLP	H/3/3			LFX Retrain	1/3 FCX					
			TLP	C/1/3				TLP	I/3/3				3/3 FCX				
	TLP	K/4/3+Predator PLT LFX w/Tiger				K/4/3 FTX							4/ 3FCX				
	L/4/3 FTX					TLP	L/4/3+Pred PLT LFX w/Thunder										
						M/4/3 FTX						M/4/3+Pred PLT LFX					
	Thunder FTX					Tiger FTX					RGT/SQDN FCX						
Unit	1 Dec	2 Dec	3 Dec	4 Dec	5 Dec	6 Dec	7 Dec	8 Dec	9 Dec	10 Dec	11 Dec	12 Dec	13 Dec	14 Dec	15 Dec		
A/1/3	CALFEX	CALFEX	FTX	FTX	FTX	FTX	FTX	FTX	FTX	FTX	TLP	FCX	REC	REC	REC		
B/1/3	FTX	CALFEX	CALFEX	FTX	FTX	FTX	FTX	FTX	FTX	FTX	TLP	FCX	REC	REC	REC		
C/1/3	FTX	FTX	CALFEX	CALFEX	FTX	FTX	FTX	FTX	FTX	FTX	TLP	FCX	REC	REC	REC		
G/3/3	FTX	FTX	FTX	FTX	FTX	CALFEX	CALFEX	FTX	FTX	FTX	TLP	TLP	FCX	REC	REC		
H/3/3	FTX	FTX	FTX	FTX	FTX	FTX	CALFEX	CALFEX	FTX	FTX	TLP	TLP	FCX	REC	REC		
I/3/3	FTX	FTX	FTX	FTX	FTX	FTX	FTX	CALFEX	CALFEX	FTX	TLP	TLP	FCX	REC	REC		
K/4/3	CALFEX	CALFEX	CALFEX	CALFEX	FTX	FTX	FTX	FTX	FTX	FTX	TLP	TLP	TLP	FCX	REC		
L/4/3	FTX	FTX	FTX	FTX	FTX	CALFEX	CALFEX	CALFEX	CALFEX	FTX	TLP	TLP	TLP	FCX	REC		
M/4/3	FTX	FTX	FTX	FTX	FTX	FTX	FTX	FTX	FTX	FTX	TLP	FCX	FCX	FCX	REC		
Pioneer	CALFEX	CALFEX	CALFEX	CALFEX	FTX	CALFEX	CALFEX	CALFEX	CALFEX	FTX	FTX	FTX	FTX	FTX	REC		
RSS	FTX	FTX	FTX	FTX	FTX	FTX	FTX	FTX	FTX	FTX	FTX	FTX	FTX	FTX	REC		
Steel	CALFEX	CALFEX	CALFEX	CALFEX	FTX	CALFEX	CALFEX	CALFEX	CALFEX	FTX	TLP	FCX	FCX	FCX	REC		




Figure 3 — MI Gunnery

at NTC would not fully replicate the operating environment in Afghanistan. Indeed, the lack of a simulated partnered force, ORS legal authorities and rules of engagement, and theater-specific concepts of operation (CONOP) requirements suggested that the regiment would leave its NTC rotation fully trained in CAM but merely proficient in mission-specific tasks.


After a short but intense mission analysis, the regimental and subordinate staffs concluded that the regiment needed to conduct a concentrated training progression to certify individuals and junior leaders on mission-specific tasks prior to deploying. Key tasks revolved around critical recertification of drivers and gun crews for usage of specific in-theater vehicle platforms as well as route clearance and counter-improvised explosive device (C-IED) training for engineers. In order to prepare for Guardian Angel (GA) requirements, troops would need small arms progressions and advanced situational awareness training (ASAT). The regimental intelligence section, along with its MI company (MICO), would also need to synchronize information collection (IC) platforms with analytical systems being used in theater to ensure

maximum input and output of exploitable intelligence products. Additionally, intelligence personnel within the regiment would need to transition their focus from the expansive doctrinal methodology of a conventional “near-peer” threat to the highly dynamic and diverse counterinsurgency mindset. Squadrons would also need to work with Fort Hood Training Support to replicate expeditionary advisory platform (EAP) operations and fixed-site security operations. Finally, with little time to prepare for its upcoming train, advise, and assist (TAA) mission, the regiment reached out to the forward deployed unit (3rd Brigade, 10th Mountain Division) in Train, Advise, and Assist Command-East (TAAC-E) to prepare an Afghan-centric

mission readiness exercise (MRX).

In February 2016, the regiment executed NTC Rotation 16-04. This DA rotation trained the regimental commander and staff in synchronizing assets in time and space against a hybrid threat. This hybrid threat consisted of irregular, special operations forces (SOF), or non-state actors with conventional weapons and maneuver capabilities. As such, this rotation offered opportunities for junior leaders to incorporate the Stryker platform against tanks and infantry fighting vehicles in a CAM and WAS environment. During the rotation, the Brave

Figure 4 — The Road to War



Rifles conducted one regimental defense and three iterations of offensive operations to include a regimental LFX. As such, the rotation at the NTC offered the regiment multiple repetitions to further develop and enhance the fundamental skills which it had trained during the preceding nine months. Uniquely, 2nd Squadron was on a separate training path and would not participate. Instead, a combined arms battalion, combat service support battalion, aviation task force, and Paladin battery were attached to the regiment. These organizations brought with them capabilities foreign to the regiment. To ensure success, these units integrated with 3rd CR during the FTX, FCX, and certified artillery Table 18 live-fire density prior to execution.

Undoubtedly, this DATE rotation thoroughly tested the regiment's ability to execute mission command and utilize organic systems in an austere environment. As such, the rotation at NTC exposed and underscored several relative strengths and weaknesses of the regiment. One of the relative strengths exposed was the regiment's ability to employ the Stryker as a mobility platform vice fighting vehicle. This attribute surfaced while encountering the significant armored threat either during movements or within complex or urban terrain. In these instances, commanders refined their ability to utilize the Stryker either as a mobility platform, a support-by-fire platform, or a follow-on force. Specifically, troops maneuvered to vehicle drop-off points, conducted offset dismounted infiltration, and completed their stated mission successfully. A second strength exposed during the rotation was the ability of the regiment's combat support officers and NCOs to accurately predict the enemy's course of action and employ multiple ISR assets and targeting methods to find, fix, and enable the finish during operations. This included the integration of several systems, such as Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below (FBCB2) or Joint Capabilities Release (JCR) software, with geospatial intelligence and organic unmanned aerial system (UAS) enablers. Ultimately, this provided commanders with a timely and accurate read on the enemy's composition, disposition, and courses of action. Their ability to consistently provide intelligence and enable mission command was not founded entirely on systems or on a rigid cycle but, rather, the

fundamentals engrained during earlier training events. Finally, the use, comprehension, and display of the common operating picture (COP) using collaborative platforms such as JCR and Command Post of the Future (CPOF) continued to progress during NTC. These systems and capabilities improved the commander's battlefield understanding to enable his ability to provide intent to his subordinate commanders.

In terms of relative weaknesses exposed at NTC, the greatest concerned communications. The vast distances at NTC directly affected FM retransmission (RETRANS) placement and therefore range of capabilities. Significant friction concerning the establishment and use of upper and lower tactical internet (TI) hindered horizontal and vertical communication. With respect to fires, although targeting proved effective in support of the deep scheme of maneuver, failures in communications and redundancies in the approvals process hampered the synchronization of fire and maneuver at the small unit level. Additionally, complex terrain and enemy capabilities influenced fixed-site security to become an economy-of-force effort. As a result, few troopers gained any significant repetition in this regard and would inevitably retrain security operations prior to deployment. Finally, shortages in manpower continued to lower effectiveness on the battlefield (even if notional). For example, rifle platoons averaged two fully manned squads; the average mounted reconnaissance section had only three to five dismounts. Furthermore, the average NCO was serving at one echelon above his typical position. Although this presented the regiment's leaders with opportunities for growth, it had a direct and tangible impact on combat power and maneuver capabilities in training.

After returning from NTC, the regiment conducted brief recovery before executing a short but intense training period to certify newly arrived troopers and all leaders prior to deployment. This period included Expert Infantryman

Soldiers from the 3rd Cavalry Regiment identify enemy targets during the unit's National Training Center rotation on 21 February 2016.

Photo by SPC Joshua Wooten



Badge (EIB) training in support of fundamental individual tasks as well as other collective, mission-specific tasks. Many of these tasks proved difficult to replicate, such as contracting, dynamic targeting operations, or working through host-nation counterparts. Although the squadrons and the regimental staff touched these elements during the MRX, they would not gain full proficiency until deployed. This was also true in many instances for the troop level and below. For example, although 60mm mortars are not organic to a reconnaissance squadron, during the deployment, 4th Squadron certified these crews and utilized the asset on multiple patrols. Additionally, C-IED and route clearance training, which would prove essential in Afghanistan, was fundamentally constrained at Fort Hood. Dismounted clearance equipment, for example, was not readily available for Soldier use. As a direct result, route clearance was conducted as an off-post training event at Fort Leonard Wood, MO. Other small unit requirements — such as sensitive site exploitation (SSE) tactics, SOF support, and Guardian Angel requirements — were difficult to incorporate given the focus on CAM. Perhaps the constraint most difficult to replicate was the impact of terrain and weather on both organic and/or theater-level assets. In addition, typically highly involved staff efforts such as deliberate “green” and “red” targeting were virtually impossible to replicate simply because these processes remained underdeveloped until the regiment actually deployed.

By April 2016, the regiment had spent nearly 12 months executing a high operational tempo training program focused on the fundamentals of DA. At key moments, mission-specific training had also been introduced. In doing so, the regiment’s leaders helped develop a foundation of skills which emphasized individual and collective proficiency across each of the warfighting functions. Moreover, multiple repetitions of training, both at Fort Hood and at the NTC, instilled a high degree of confidence in the regiment’s troopers as they prepared to deploy. Most importantly, the regiment’s training cycle successfully built a foundation of fundamental skills which enabled the regiment and its troopers to adapt to the specific demands of operating within TAAC-E.

Encouraging Adaptive Leadership and Teamwork

The second reason behind the regiment’s ability to overcome the challenges associated with this period of concurrent combat and home-station training was the regiment’s continual emphasis on leader development and team building. Throughout the training cycle, the regiment continued to address an existential shortage in senior officers and NCOs. To compensate, the regiment sought to continually challenge its on-hand leaders through a variety of methods. This enabled the regiment to select the right leaders to serve in the right roles and positions where they, subsequently,

could build cohesive teams capable of accomplishing their respectively assigned missions.

One of the key ways the regiment challenged its junior leaders — to include platoon sergeants, platoon leaders, first sergeants, and troop commanders — was through a series of deliberate oral, written, and physical events. Individual briefings, counseling sessions, professional military discussions, and PT revealed unique personalities as well as individual leader strengths and weaknesses. These events, and their results, enabled regimental and squadron leadership to better compare available leaders with the needs associated with future roles and responsibilities.

The primary method of leader development outside of training events was through a robust leader professional development (LPD) program to develop the key leaders in the squadrons as well as in the entire regimental staff on how to fight and win in both DA and SFA environments. The LPD program consisted of three separate series: a troop/company/battery commanders series, a field grade officers series, and a weekly “how we/they fight” seminar with all key leaders. This LPD program ensured all leaders were current in Army doctrine, SBCT tactics, and recent lessons learned. Sessions specifically integrated maneuver and support company-grade commanders with field grade officers. For example, it was during these LPDs that intelligence leaders and analysts honed their skills in articulating intelligence through multiple IPB briefs, presentations on 11th ACR tactics, and updates on the current enemy situation in eastern Afghanistan. They produced a weekly open-source graphical intelligence summary (GRINTSUM) that broadened the understanding of varying threat actors around the globe. Not only did these projects and exercises develop the fundamentals of the MI team, but they also built self-confidence and trust in the intelligence warfighting function with the commanders as they learned “how to fight” both Donovanian and real-world adversaries. Furthermore, sessions always concluded with a practical exercise or tactical




Figure 5 — How We Fight LPD Series

exercise without troops (TEWT). Finally, squadron commanders and command sergeants major subsequently replicated these events for their own platoon leadership.

With a clear understanding of individual leader abilities, commanders at each echelon made specific decisions concerning the placement of leaders one to two levels down. Those identified to serve as advisors underwent a brief but important period of cultural training appropriate for the roles they would soon assume. One such event was ASAT. Considered invaluable by many senior leaders, ASAT increased an individual's emotional quotient or self-awareness by exposing leaders to the moods and intentions of host nation security forces. Ultimately, this would enable advisors and troopers filling Guardian Angel requirements to better prevent insider attacks in theater. Troops and platoons identified to deploy to locations which were geographically isolated from their higher headquarters were similarly handpicked based on the maturity and experience levels of their leadership.

Identifying the right kinds of leaders for specific requirements and tasks is certainly not a novel concept. Indeed, the Army expects its leaders to do this routinely. However, the challenges caused by leader turnover, unique manning requirements, and a constrained training timeline compounded as the regiment prepared for deployment. The regiment's constant emphasis on leader development throughout the training cycle, combined with an emphasis on decentralized mission command, further enabled subordinate commanders to build teams based on one central principle — place the right leader in the right role.

The fact that a significant percentage of the force would remain at Fort Hood during the deployment — more than 50 percent — merited special consideration and carried important ramifications for training expectations and tasking availability. The regiment decided early on that rear detachments, often used by the Army's brigades during deployments, would not be used. Instead, squadron commanders and their staffs would be

held equally responsible for home-station mission command as they would be for results in combat. Indeed, home-station leadership became as much of an important investment in mission accomplishment as the forward team. Thus, squadrons had to make tough decisions as to who would deploy and who would stay at home. Some squadrons used non-branch-qualified captains to fill duplicate staff functions as primaries went forward. Many squadrons used outgoing branch-qualified captains and field grade officers to act as home-station element commanders. In the same way that using talented individuals as liaison officers to external organizations can build unit credibility, so too did entrusting home-station responsibility to good leaders ensure success at Fort Hood. It should be noted that unit leadership clarified command relationships to aid with disciplinary adjudication, assist with orders production and concept approval, and retain an emphasis on maintenance.

Exercising Constant Mission Command

Preparing to Deploy


The third and final component of the regiment successfully meeting the demands of executing concurrent mission sets was a continual emphasis on the exercise of mission command. Undeniably, executing a DA-centric training path developed important fundamental skills and focusing on the development of adaptive leaders helped build and form teams, but the role of mission command was likewise paramount as it ultimately enabled successful operations. Specifically, the exercise of mission command during each training event enabled leaders to gain valuable experience operating within a commander's intent, taking prudent risks, producing mission orders, and exercising disciplined initiative.³

The regiment sought to incorporate mission command as heavily as possible during the execution of current operations. The Joint Operations Center (JOC) staff specifically conducted multiple mission command exercises (MCXs) or mission command systems integration (MCSI) exercises.

MCSIs are three-part exercises that progressively focus on the installation and maintenance of the network and mission command systems. MCSI-1 focuses on internal effectiveness factors, concentrating on TOC setup and baseline systems and procedures. MCSI-2 focuses on system functionality, networking, and the establishment of SOPs and continuity throughout shift changes and battle drills. MCSI-3 is the culmination of the previous phases and is conducted as part of the regimental FTX, prior to NTC. MCSI-3 validates the regimental and squadron functional and integrated cells fusing the commander's and staff's tasks on a COP and creating subsequent mission orders.

NTC fully stressed CPs' deployability, capacity, range, and survivability as units countered the moves of a free-thinking OPFOR. For example,

Figure 6 — The Principles of Mission Command



Army Doctrine Publication 6-0, Mission Command



Soldiers assigned to the 3rd Cavalry Regiment provide security during an expeditionary advisory package mission to the Surobi district of Afghanistan on 27 December 2016.

Photo by CPT Grace Geiger

the regimental headquarters was greatly tested while using the upper and lower TI. The regiment successfully created collaborative space, which allowed staff and subordinate commands to effectively and efficiently report and keep a COP for the commander. Additionally, the transportation of highly sensitive equipment during maneuver operations impacted the equipment's functionality and ability to effectively support multiple TOC jumps. Although RETRANS training was conducted during all events, it ultimately proved easier to execute during the FTX and MCSI than at NTC due to the nature of the local terrain.

The regiment's ability to conduct mission command was further honed by the execution of an MRX prior to deployment. Conducted at Fort Hood, the MRX included participants from the forward unit and successfully tested JOC networks, functions, and leaders as they balanced SFA with coalition force (CF) maneuver operations. This exercise was particularly valuable as the regiment was able to at least partially replicate theater-level ISR integration, joint terminal attack controller (JTAC) use in Combined Joint Operations Afghanistan (CJOA), and unique communication requirements of expeditionary advisory packages for its squadrons. Targeted requests for information were brought back from the forward subject matter experts, enabling the first realistic repetition in TAAC-E daily operations.

Finally, as the regiment prepared to deploy, staffs expended considerable effort to flatten their organizations by developing a battle rhythm that anticipated frequent interaction between deployed and home-station elements. This required the generation of a unique battle rhythm and orders production model that had to be nested vertically with the 1st Cavalry Division (CD) as well as TAAC-E and HQ Resolute Support. Over time, a useful model emerged, and communication

between elements in Afghanistan and Fort Hood occurred regularly throughout the deployment. Horizontally, staff counterparts and command teams communicated at least weekly via VTC. Regimental leadership incorporated routine home-station briefs into their schedules to ensure there was no loss of focus on readiness or family care as units dispersed geographically.

Deployed Environment

The regiment's ability to conduct mission command at echelon was tested in May 2016 when the first elements of the regiment deployed to Afghanistan. Initially, four out of the seven squadron commands went forward while three remained at Fort Hood. The 2nd Squadron, one of three remaining at Fort Hood, would later go forward as the situation in Afghanistan changed. As a result, 2nd Squadron needed to conduct an additional Stryker live-fire density and several iterations of troop collective training. This presented the home-station regimental and squadron staffs with the significant challenge of supporting and certifying an element of considerable size for combat operations while fulfilling garrison support requirements. Specifically, the regiment assumed risk by conducting a condensed training path without a rotation to NTC. To mitigate this risk, the regimental staff planned to focus on critical collective tasks, to include a CALFEX. The 1st CD ultimately approved this training path, enabling 2nd Squadron to deploy as a trained and ready force.

As the regiment deployed, it immediately assumed responsibility for the execution of multiple mission sets across Afghanistan. The bulk of the regiment, to include its

headquarters, comprised TAAC-E. Our mission was to provide functionally based security force assistance (FBSFA) to the 201st and 203rd Afghan National Army (ANA) Corps and the 202nd and 303rd Afghan National Police (ANP) Zones. Portions of three squadrons, along with an infantry squadron in its entirety, assumed different mission sets. The 1st Squadron provided security forces to the commander of Bagram Airfield (BAF) and helped secure the BAF ground defense area (GDA). Two squadrons, with their subordinate troops, secured their own respective GDAs within TAAC-E. Squadron leadership advised counterparts at the corps level while regimental leadership divided roles and responsibilities with 1st CD leadership for advising senior Afghan leadership as well as non-governmental organizations. In addition, four separate troops provided uplift to NATO Special Operations Component Command Afghanistan (NSOCC-A). In total, the regiment worked in five locations across Afghanistan for various disparate headquarters.

Fundamentals, Leadership, and Mission Command

As the deployment began and both forward and home-station elements became familiar with their respective missions, each soon encountered challenges that had been anticipated but not fully trained for. However, by developing fundamental skills, placing the right leaders in the right positions, and exercising constant mission command, the risks to mission and the force were ultimately overcome. Several unique challenges, as well as the regiment's means of meeting and overcoming them, are described in further detail below.

Functionally Based Security Force Assistance

The primary task of FBSFA is to TAA Afghan staffs to develop systems and capabilities, build capacity across key functions, and communicate vertically and horizontally. This type of SFA requires advisors at the operational and strategic level. In traditional SFA, the partnered force is generally trained at all

levels to ensure proficiency (similar to foreign internal defense). In FBSFA, the main effort is at the corps or ANP type-A level. There, staffs and commanders advise their counterparts across essential functions focused on budgeting, internal controls, civilian governance, force generation, intelligence, communications, and maneuver operations.

The key challenges and nuances associated with FBSFA were indicative of the health of the host nation force. There was (and remains) an existential issue with the quality of Afghan leadership, to which there may only be a generational solution. Endemic intelligence weaknesses, a lack of technology, and a fluid political situation hindered the Afghan National Security Forces' response to the increasing threat throughout the country. Conversely, the ANDSF learned to consolidate combat power, coordinate to support maneuver, and in some cases, correctly utilize SOF elements to augment conventional efforts or conduct targeting efforts. TAA efforts in information collection, management, and dissemination dramatically improved the ANA corps' and police zones' ability to rely less on U.S. partners for battlefield situational awareness and prediction of enemy activities. The regiment continued to move closer to the end state of ANA implementing its own intelligence production models that drive maneuver operations. There has also been some success with train-the-trainer programs as U.S. forces and Western contractors have slowly withdrawn from ground-level operations and maintenance.

Undoubtedly, the majority of leaders conducting advisory operations were executing missions outside of their traditional skill sets. In spite of this, the regiment was successful because of prior leader development and placement. This theme would continue to play out in other ways unique to the Afghan theater.

Tactical Nuances in Theater

There are other nuances to the effort in Afghanistan worth noting that drastically altered our ability to affect wide area security. First and foremost, the primary maneuver force in theater is the host nation force. Outside of named operations or kinetic strikes, the majority of CF combat power efforts were directed at enemy groups within non-contiguous GDAs. Furthermore, an unpredictable and well-resourced enemy force provides continuous challenges to both efforts of force protection and FBSFA. The enemy composition in TAAC-E is the most diverse and complex in all Afghanistan. More than 1,000 kilometers of shared border with Pakistan serves as a permissive environment for three-quarters of the DoD-recognized insurgent organizations in Afghanistan. The regiment's area of operations was expansive, with more than 124,000 square kilometers consisting of 14 provinces, 165 districts, and a population of more than eight million. Stability remains ever-threatened with the 80,000



Photo by CPT Grace Geiger

Lt. Gen. Muhammad Waziri, the 201st Afghan National Army Corps commander, and CSM Bryan Barker, Train Advise Assist Command-East command sergeant major, discuss collective training in Afghanistan's Surobi district on 27 December 2016.

ANDSF soldiers and policemen having to battle an entrenched insurgency and numerous violent extremist organizations.

In spite of the TAA mission, force protection remained the number one priority. This was maintained through security patrols, terrain denial missions, active information operations, and multiple security shuras with local leaders and ANDSF counterparts. Specifically, GDA operations consisted of combined arms route clearance, perimeter security, or partnered patrols that enable CF to prevent and deter indirect fire attacks or complex attacks on various bases. Although it may sound limiting in nature, the Brave Rifles were as proactive and aggressive as possible in order to maintain a high state of force protection. Intelligence collection and analytical teams at the TAAC and squadron levels provided the necessary focus on each enemy threat network within each GDA. This information drove the maneuver mission and aided in the synchronization of enabler assets to include close air support (CAS), air weapon teams (AWT), ISR, and fires.

Although it may have been difficult to mass combat power, massing effects was relatively easy. Task force staffs worked to synchronize enabler use with CF or ANDSF action in order to disrupt or destroy the enemy across TAAC-E. For example, to produce complementary effects against imminent high profile attack (HPA) or indirect fire (IDF) threats, organic ISR could be used in conjunction with IDF or CAS assets to conduct point of origin (POO) site terrain denial missions.

There is, however, a tangible trade-off in assets when making decisions pertaining to ANDSF support vice Resolute Support lines of operation. As the CF presence has decreased with the transition to the TAA mission set, so too has the wealth of intel enablers (ISR, human intelligence, signal intelligence collectors, etc.) afforded to U.S. units. Yet, the TAA mission requires that TAAC-E provide intelligence support to our ANDSF partners. In practice, countless hours of analytic effort and allocation of limited ISR assets were devoted to confirming or denying convoluted reporting processes from the host nation force. To reduce this impact, extra attention was paid to fostering the intelligence of the ANDSF and creating releasable "RELAFG" intelligence to enable the regimental FBSFA advisors to ensure Afghan intelligence drove operations. This freed assets to support other Resolute Support priorities. These priorities were subsequently revised and revisited on a bi-weekly basis as part of the green (ANDSF) and red (threat) targeting processes.

Finally, even with limited manning, traditional requirements such as the Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP), Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF), and field ordering officer (FOO) remained critical functions. Drivers and marksmanship training, as well as re-certification of IDF systems, required a unique process that took weeks to conduct. This delayed the unit's ability to rapidly affect the battlespace upon arrival.

Continuous Training

Remaining focused on the fundamentals of soldiering was a challenge in Afghanistan. Even so, readiness remained a top priority, and those who could continue to train did so. Physical fitness, first responder, marksmanship progressions, and EIB and Excellence in Armor training remained constants. Other



Figure 7 — 3rd CR Vision Statement

events (such as selections for Ranger School, the Gainey Cup, and the Best Ranger Competition) punctuated security operations. Some locations offered outstanding facilities which enabled troops to conduct collective training such as squad situational training exercises (STXs) and LFXs. The ability to train enabled units to merge with their home-station counterparts seamlessly upon return from Afghanistan.

The Home-Station Mission

Those at home station continued to work towards accomplishing the commander's vision and priorities. In doing so, they ensured a smooth transition upon the regiment's return from Afghanistan. Personnel in the rear provided a massive reach-back capability for the regiment in the event of personnel loss, personal family events, or intelligence support. To support forward elements and simultaneously prepare for the next fight, individuals continued to focus on medical readiness, small arms marksmanship, and physical fitness. Collective training occurred where feasible but proved difficult due to home-station mission requirements and leader shortages.

The majority of the home-station element consisted of the regimental engineer and regimental support squadrons. Through these organizations, along with the squadron forward support companies, the regiment made significant progress on Stryker maintenance. Leaders developed a detailed maintenance plan designed to meet the desired goal of an operational readiness rate above 95 percent. Not only did this plan help to identify priority of effort for the subordinate squadrons, but it also established an efficient method of conducting services with limited combat power.

Finally, legacy equipment still lingered from the unit's previous designation as an armored cavalry regiment. In addition to removing excess equipment, squadrons redistributed equipment across their formations. Typically, the majority of unit equipment shortages are identified during critical periods. In our case, home station continued to focus on filling shortages throughout the entirety of the unit's deployment.

Conclusion and Recommendations

Like that of other Army BCTs, the regiment's recent history



Photo by SGT Marcus Floyd

Soldiers with the 3rd Cavalry Regiment participate in a combined live-fire exercise on 21 July 2016 at Fort Hood, TX.

involves the completion of a deployment with less than half of its forces to multiple locations within a combat theater while forces at home station continued to maintain readiness. For the foreseeable future, the Army's BCTs will continue to encounter similar endeavors and all of the associated challenges therein — primarily how to deploy the right teams capable of fighting and winning in a dynamic environment while maintaining the right leaders at home to ensure the organization maintains proficiency and accomplishes all assigned tasks.

The 3rd CR leadership proactively analyzed the internal strengths and weaknesses of the organization, recognized impending friction points, and applied leadership early in the training cycle to mitigate risk. These same leaders focused on three factors that ultimately contributed to 3rd CR's ability to overcome these challenges. First, a training path focused on developing DA proficiency established a foundation of fundamental skills from which troopers could quickly adjust to mission-specific tasks and requirements. Second, a continuous emphasis on leader development forged trained and ready teams led by bold and adaptive leaders serving in the right positions. Finally, constant mission command employment and enforcement during both the regiment's training cycle and deployment enabled leaders to operate within the intent of their respective squadrons while taking prudent risks and exercising disciplined initiative to accomplish the mission. The combination of these three factors — fundamental skills, adaptive leadership,

and mission command — ultimately contributed to the success of 3rd CR from 2015-2017. As BCTs continue to embark on similar missions, we recommend the following:

Build Capability Through the Fundamentals. The Army continues to train for a variety of conflicts. This is evident in the return to DATE rotations at our CTCs and simultaneous regional alignments within our BCTs. There is little doubt that we have a responsibility to continue to prepare for the next war. We absolutely must continuously train and certify our staffs in CAM, for our Stryker knowledge and ability to integrate fires or conduct reconnaissance against hybrid threats may be tested in the near future. Stryker units must purposefully make a continual effort to maintain balance across the warfighting functions and integrate all service and support into planning, operations, CAM, and WAS in order to maintain this proficiency.

Additionally, there is a direct conflict between the available population and garrison or U.S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) requirements. It is difficult to train individual skills, or even conduct effective collective training, when units lose leaders and troopers immediately following certification. As a result, units must recertify the same collective training repeatedly or in a condensed time period. Internal to the BCT, every effort must be made to seek and exploit efficiencies in training. For example, certifications that may be critical to unit readiness status, such as gunnery and drivers training, can be delayed until after the typical Army manning cycle is complete.

Incorporate the Current Mission Wherever Possible.

Over time, it was clear that the CTC did not fully address the complexity of the current state of the conflict in theater. Admittedly, we exercised WAS and elements of CAM in Afghanistan, but the nuances cannot be ignored. Yet, there is a conflict between training for a purely DA mission and one that primarily utilizes host nation forces as the maneuver element. TAAC-E requirements — such as contracts, SOF support, military or police advisory teams, Guardian Angels, C-IED, and force protection efforts — simply could not be entirely covered at NTC or the regimental FTX. Again, every effort should be made to seek out and exploit efficiencies in rotations to integrate potential mission-specific training with METL-based collective training. For example, establishing a tactical command post during collective training has direct parallels with the expeditionary advisory packages that are currently conducted in Afghanistan. A thorough understanding and training of both analog and regular mission command systems will provide concrete examples to share with our ANDSF partners. Fixed-site security, targeting processes, kinetic strike battle drills, and the integration of unique indirect or direct fire platforms can only add to the quality of training. Conducting defensive operations can also alleviate the learning curve for fixed-site security operations in theater. In other cases, some training events, such as C-IED, would be easier to integrate if equipment and subject matter experts were simply more readily available or led by mobile training teams.

Incorporate Mission-Specific Training at the Proper Time. The incorporation of mission-specific training can alleviate some of the pain associated with a mission pivot. However, there is an appropriate time to focus on mission-specific training for those deploying. This must be a deliberate decision on the part of regimental leadership. At the operational level, planners must clearly articulate the priority for the unit within the collective training timeline. Conducting MRXs or adjusting task organization early can help build cohesive teams prior to execution. There is no feasible way to safely ignore kinetic strike battle drills, Guardian Angel requirements, theater-engagement authorities, and targeting processes. Even if brief, robust MRXs can mitigate risk by forcing advisory teams, maneuver elements, and operational staffs to test planning, coordination, and synchronization systems prior to going forward. As staffs refine these skill sets, the home-station element can focus on red-cycle requirements and individual training.

Additionally, the time between a BCT's CTC rotation and its MRX and subsequent deployments must be adjusted to give adequate time to prepare. Six to seven weeks is simply not enough time, which places significant stress on personnel, systems, and equipment.

Develop Adaptive Leaders. We must develop leaders that are not only experts in 10-level tasks but adaptable subject matter experts capable of both CAM and navigating the nuances of unique combat environments. A deliberate and aggressive LPD program will allow BCTs to assume risk where manpower and resources are reduced. Participating leaders must subsequently be carefully placed to enable execution of mission command regardless of geographic separation.

Continually Exercise Mission Command. As is increasingly acknowledged across the force, we are in an era of continual planning, coordinating, and synchronization. We must continue to make every effort to create clarity around what we are doing, why we are doing it, and how we are going to get there. To drive towards this clarity, we need to focus on two common points of friction.

First, we need to continually strive to flatten our organizations by enforcing knowledge management, ensuring that proper communication and network platforms are operational, and supporting training on these systems in order to fully enable shared understanding. One way to ensure this occurs is by conducting repetitive command post exercises and FCXs which stress and build important staff capabilities. At the troop level, integration of multiple domains and communications platforms such as high frequency and tactical satellite radios will build a baseline of proficiency that will enable operations in combat.

Second, we need to keep our organizations intact. We expect our small unit leaders to utilize a sensible task organization, disseminate a clear intent, and execute simple plans that enable subordinates. Unfortunately, at higher echelons we have continued to reduce unit readiness and effectiveness by muddling our BCT task organizations. There is a tangible impact on the combat effectiveness of our maneuver formations when we divide and task units for too great a number of various combat and home-station missions. In the same way we enforce a concept of commander-centric operations, we need to enforce a concept of unit-centric operations. In other words, an organically whole unit — BCT, squadron, or even troop — is fundamentally more effective than a team of borrowed leadership and mixed labor.

Notes

¹ ADP 3-0, *Unified Land Operations* (2011), iii, 1-2.

² William Shoemate and Benjamin Jensen, "Training for Decisive Action," *Military Review*, September-October 2016, 102-103.

³ ADP 6-0, *Mission Command* (2014), iv.

At the time this article was written, **COL Kevin D. Admiral** was serving as the commander of the 3rd Cavalry Regiment at Fort Hood, TX. He earned a bachelor's degree from the University of Kansas as well as a master's degree in campaign planning and strategy from the Joint Advanced Warfighting School, National Defense University. Prior to arriving at Fort Hood, he was a Senior Service College Fellow at the Royal College of Defence Studies in London. Previously in his career, COL Admiral has served in various command and staff positions. Additionally, he served in Project Warrior as an observer-controller at the National Training Center, CA, and a small group instructor for the Armor Captain's Career Course at Fort Knox, KY.

At the time this article was written, **CSM Bryan D. Barker** was serving as the 3rd CR command sergeant major. He earned an associate's degree from Excelsior College. CSM Barker is a graduate of Airborne School, Ranger School, Jumpmaster School, Pathfinder School, U.S. Marine Corps Winter Mountain Leader Course, Pre-Command Course and all levels of the NCO Education System to include the U.S. Army Sergeants Majors Course. CSM Barker has served in various positions as an Infantryman. He has held all positions from rifleman to operations sergeant major and command sergeant major. CSM Barker is also a recipient of the Order of Saint Maurice and the Order of Saint George-Bronze.

CPT Paul D. Erickson and **CPT Dino C. Buchanan** are currently serving within the 3rd CR in command and staff positions.

Training Notes



TF No Fear at JRTC: *Maximizing Opportunities While Supporting a Combat Training Center Rotation*

MAJ AL LEMAIRE

The Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) at Fort Polk, LA, prepares brigade combat teams (BCTs) to deploy, fight, and win on battlefields throughout the world. Since 2012, JRTC has emphasized the decisive action training environment (DATE) scenario to incorporate unified land operations, ensuring units and Soldiers are sufficiently prepared for any mission worldwide. JRTC provides several key training enablers for rotational training units (RTUs) conducting a DATE scenario. These enablers are composed of highly professional units, Soldiers, and leaders; however, they remain constrained with manning and resource shortfalls that require additional support from the RTU's command headquarters.

This RTU support package generally consists of augmentation units to support opposing force (OPFOR) and host nation security force (HNSF) elements, key leaders to serve as observer-coach-trainers (OCTs), and additional sustainment elements to support the rotation. For JRTC Rotation 17-04, the 25th Infantry Division's 2nd Infantry Brigade Combat Team (2/25 IBCT) was the RTU while the 25th's 3rd IBCT was assigned with providing augmentation and support requirements. The 3rd IBCT gave the OPFOR and HNSF augmentation mission to its 2nd Battalion, 27th Infantry Regiment "Wolfhounds" — Task Force (TF) No Fear.

This mission included the following specified tasks, among others:

- 1) Provide two infantry companies to serve as OPFOR companies with the 1st Battalion, 509th Infantry Regiment (TF Geronimo);
- 2) Provide one infantry company to serve as an untrained and unorganized resistant guerrilla force for the Special Forces Operation Detachment Alpha (SFODA); and
- 3) Provide one infantry company to serve as an HNSF element with battalion key leadership to mission command the HNSF and interact as role-players with RTU leadership.

The TF No Fear command team analyzed this requirement and determined that JRTC provided an ideal

opportunity to maximize multiple training resources to increase unit proficiency and improve readiness. TF No Fear could focus collective training objectives on assigned mission essential tasks (METs), leverage additional training opportunities provided by JRTC, and culminate with post-rotation platoon (PLT) live-fire exercises (LFXs) at the Peason Ridge training area. TF No Fear's ultimate training objective was to complete PLT LFXs since the next opportunity for this level of training would not be until the 4th Quarter of FY17. This opportunity also afforded TF No Fear Soldiers to train on Peason Ridge, one of the U.S. Army's premier live-fire training areas. This required the battalion to deploy its entire staff and establish a "white cell" command post (CP) to facilitate this mission. Based on this assessment, TF No Fear increased its augmentation package to include the majority of the entire battalion and specified the following tasks:

- 1) A/2-27 IN and B/2-27 IN will serve as the OPFOR companies for TF Geronimo; B/2-27 IN will conduct PLT LFX following the rotation.
- 2) C/2-27 IN will serve as the guerilla force for the SFODA and conduct PLT LFX following the rotation.
- 3) D/2-27 IN and Headquarters and Headquarters Company

Task Force No Fear Task Organization






Photo by CPT Josh Geis

Soldiers from Alpha Company, 2nd Battalion, 27th Infantry Regiment (Wolfhounds) serving as a Geronimo OPFOR element establish a company command post to mission command offensive operations against the rotational training unit.

(HHC)/2-27 IN will serve as an HNSF battalion (-) including HNSF key leaders and mission command node.

4) HHC/2-27 IN will also establish an administrative mission command node or “white cell” to serve as a resource provider, establish and run the JRTC aid station rear (JASR) on North Fort Polk, and provide additional OCTs for the RTU.

5) The white cell will resource and establish the PLT LFXs on Peason Ridge, coordinate staff training with the leader training program (LTP), and coordinate any additional training throughout the rotation.

TF No Fear deployed under the task organization seen below. It deployed a robust battalion headquarters element to establish a battalion CP on the North Fort Polk cantonment area. The white cell was centered around the majority of the primary staff. Led by the executive officer (XO), its priorities included expediting the reception, staging, and onward movement, and integration (RSOI) process; coordinating and resourcing training opportunities; exercising supply and maintenance functions; and mission-commanding all rear battalion operations at Fort Polk with the rear detachment remaining at Schofield Barracks, HI.

The white cell began with establishing the JASR and mission command of its units through the RSOI process. This removed the burden from company leadership and eased the processes of units drawing prepositioned vehicles, uniforms, and multiple integrated laser engagement system (MILES) equipment. The white cell integrated those TF No Fear staff members who were not participating as HNSF with TF Geronimo. This offered the capability of observing OPFOR mission command processes and getting an external perspective on the OPFOR military decision-making process (MDMP). The white cell also integrated a liaison officer (LNO) with the JRTC Operations Group (OPSGRP) on South Fort Polk to maintain situational awareness on the RTU, HNSF units, and all exercise operations.

Once the exercise began, the white cell’s primary function

was to plan and resource the PLT LFXs, conduct regular sustainment functions, and coordinate any available training opportunities. To assist with PLT LFX coordination, 3/25 IBCT provided TF No Fear with additional personnel (a captain, staff sergeant, and three Soldiers) to serve as the LFX Tiger Team. This team was under operational control (OPCON) of the white cell and given the task of coordinating and liaising with Fort Polk range control to ensure completion of LFX range requirements. As the LFX Tiger Team began synchronizing with range control, the white cell coordinated with various tenant units on Fort Polk to sign for vehicles and equipment necessary to execute PLT LFX training.

Mission Essential Tasks

A/2-27 IN and B/2-27 IN provided OPFOR augmentees to serve as South Atropian People’s Army (SAPA) forces and fully incorporate into TF Geronimo operations. This included integration

into TF Geronimo’s MDMP where companies conducted parallel and collaborative planning, troop leading procedures (TLPs), and combined arms rehearsals (CARs) prior to entering the “box” to begin the rotational exercise. To effectively mission command operations, both companies established CPs forward in the box as well as in the rear area to resource training support with the white cell on North Fort Polk. The OPFOR augmentation task enabled both companies to train lethal platoons and squads with a focus on the following METs: conduct an area defense, conduct a movement to contact, and conduct area security.

The “conduct an area defense” MET was the task that most commanders had assumed risk with on their collective training plans leading up to JRTC. During the scenario, TF Geronimo ordered A/2-27 IN to conduct a defense of Marjani Village. This mission enabled the Alpha Company commander to train on a key MET emphasizing the following supporting collective and individual tasks: area reconnaissance, engagement area development, employment of obstacles, integrate direct and indirect fires, establish fighting positions, and individual and equipment camouflage.

The C/2-27 IN Soldiers working with the SFODA team focused various tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) at the squad and team levels including infantry battle drills, reconnaissance, human intelligence (HUMINT) information collection, and field craft.

D/2-27 IN was tasked with providing two HNSF company elements operating under a small battalion headquarters. This assignment provided a unique perspective on the interactions between the RTU, HNSF, and the civilian population. The company gained new TTPs on building relationships with civilian and local nationals on the battlefield.

No matter the task assigned, companies were able to focus on training lethal platoons and squads. The companies validated unit tactical and planning standard operating

procedures (SOPs), mission command systems, battle drills, and collective and individual TTPs.

Additional Training Opportunities During the Rotation

During the rotation, threat cap levels limit how many OPFOR Soldiers can operate in the training area at a given time. TF Geronimo had the ability to reinforce or scale back operations based on the RTU's training objectives. When operations scaled back, the OPFOR companies were able to seize a variety of different training opportunities. Supporting the SFODA, C/2-27 IN was spread over a large area conducting individual and small unit operations for the rotation. With SFODA support requiring only small numbers of Soldiers for various events, this was an ideal opportunity to maximize training resources for individual and collective training. The C/2-27 IN commander's (CPT Dan Woods) intent was to "find and maximize all training opportunities." The C/2-27 IN's rear CP used the white cell to resource various training events including the Fort Polk obstacle course, land navigation site, Engagement Skills Trainer (EST), Call-for-Fire Trainer (CFFT), and an orienteering course.

The C/2-27 IN events tested individual physical and mental capacity and exertion and built teamwork and camaraderie within the company and attached fire support team (FIST), scout, and mortar elements. With CPT Wood's guidance, the company conducted a variety of opportunity training which included buddy-team competition events, EST/CFFT, urban assault course, individual day/night land navigation, obstacle course, and a meta-cognitive challenge event.

To prepare for squad and PLT LFXs, B/2-27 IN needed to qualify a few remaining Soldiers on close quarter marksmanship (CQM). With B/2-27 IN focused on its training rotation mission, the white cell resourced the land, ammunition, and support requirements needed execute a CQM range. As TF Geronimo scaled back the threat level, B/2-27 IN rotated its Soldiers to conduct the CQM range on South Fort Polk. This was an essential opportunity, enabling B/2-27 IN to continue its mission against the RTU but still be prepared for the squad and PLT LFX following the rotation. B/2-27 IN additionally resourced one of the unused villages in the box to conduct close quarters battle (CQB) to further train lethal platoons and squads.

Commanders stated that the training areas were generally superior to what they have access to at their home station, and they were excited that they were able to take advantage of the various opportunities while at JRTC.

HHC was also able to execute additional staff training. The battalion XO and primary staff coordinated with the Fort Polk LTP program to receive classes on aspects of MDMP. LTP coaches provided the academics and staff members began establishing relationships with the trainers and coaches they will be working with in the coming year during TF No Fear's LTP. And while not a doctrinal mission command element, the battalion tactical command post (TAC) forward in the box was able to exercise many young assistant staff officers and NCOs while serving as the foreign security forces' battalion HQ.

Post-Rotation LFX

Following the rotation, TF No Fear began redeploying elements to Hawaii while the battalion staff and two rifle companies re-focused on conducting PLT LFXs. The battalion faced numerous friction points planning and executing the PLT LFXs at Peason Ridge in addition to normal LFX planning requirements. Logistically, the main friction point was that the LFX training took place after the containers had been packed with equipment and sealed in order to meet 2/25 IBC's reverse RSOI timeline. The battalion CP that provided mission command through both the rotation in the training area and reverse RSOI was essential to overcoming this friction. While companies conducted various OPFOR missions throughout the training area, the battalion CP was focused on looking ahead to the reverse RSOI process and planning to reduce any friction. Because of this, companies were able to smoothly turn in MILES gear and pre-positioned equipment before signing out new equipment from Fort Polk tenant units for LFX execution.

Friction throughout the planning process was complicated even further due to the fact that the unit was planning a complex LFX in a different time zone than its home station and with agencies that it was initially unaware of. The LFX Tiger Team officer-in-charge (OIC) and NCO-in-charge (NCOIC) were able to attend the JRTC D+90 conference at Fort Polk. The LFX Tiger Team was also able to return TDY to Fort Polk in order to become Fort Polk OIC/range safety officer (RSO)-certified so that the team could provide RSO/OIC support to 2-27 IN without needing help from Fort Polk tenant units. In addition to the LFX Tiger Team, 2-27 IN was able to send two planners to recon the training areas and confirm possible LFX scenarios. Due to the support of its higher headquarters, Fort Polk tenant units, and Fort Polk agencies, 2-27 IN was able to execute a successful PLT LFX. The Tiger Team was essential in taking administrative requirements off of the training audience so



Photo by 2LT Charles Chikelu

Soldiers from Headquarters Company, 2nd Battalion, 27th Infantry Regiment, work in conjunction with Soldiers from the 2nd Infantry Brigade Combat Team, 25th Infantry Division while serving as a host nation security force element.



Photo by SGT Perique Roseberry

Soldiers from Bravo Company, 2nd Battalion, 27th Infantry Regiment, suppress an enemy objective while executing a platoon attack live-fire exercise at the Peason Ridge Training Area.

that those companies could focus on getting the most of the training opportunity. As LTC Glen T. Helberg, commander of 2-27 IN, stated in the after action review, it is important to "... take as many requirements off of the training unit as possible."

Lessons Learned

TF No Fear quickly realized how to successfully maximize training opportunities while concurrently providing augmentation support during JRTC Rotation 17-04. However, there were several key lessons learned and recommendations for units looking to accomplish similar training events. These recommendations include:

- * Ensure the LFX Tiger Team is OPCON to the augmentation unit prior to deployment and throughout the duration of the rotation. The team was a key asset for coordinating and executing the LFX. However, its focus was diverted to other 3/25 IBCT priorities prior to departure and throughout the rotation. This caused slight friction with getting the LFX Tiger Team oriented to the latest LFX plan. Integrating the LFX Tiger Team into the battalion planning process and keeping them attached throughout completion would facilitate the overall execution.

- * Another way to better integrate the LFX Tiger Team into the planning process would have been by tasking a battalion planner to the LFX Tiger Team. This would ensure the LFX Tiger Team had a relationship with all the 2-27 IN companies and staff that would reduce planning friction.

- * While the JRTC Live Fire Branch that provides LFX support to the RTU was not tasked to support 2-27 IN, their planners were essential in providing previously used LFX training scenarios for many of the training areas within Peason Ridge. In the future, units should contact the Live Fire Branch as early as possible in the planning process.

- * The JRTC is provided with two to three companies from around the army for a typical DATE rotation. Sending the majority of 2-27 IN with a headquarters element reduced friction points with the planning process. It also provided the OPSGRP and TF Geronimo a central mission command node versus multiple company command nodes throughout the rotation.

- * Each company participating in the LFX should send representatives early to attend the Fort Polk OIC/RSO Course with Range Control. This would assist with companies gaining access to available ranges throughout a rotation and maximize opportunities.

- * Coordination with Fort Polk tenant units was discussed between planners but was not codified in the orders process. This led to friction in execution due to not all Fort Polk tenant units being aware of the previous agreements. If units wish to utilize support from Fort

Polk tenant units, it would be beneficial to codify agreed-upon requirements in an order from the JRTC G3 to ensure a formal tasking rather than "handshake con."

Conclusion

This article describes how a battalion task force can take advantage of training opportunities while supporting a JRTC rotation. It offers a practical framework for how units under similar circumstances can take advantage of available training during a support rotation. Overall, JRTC Rotation 17-04 served as an incredibly valuable event for TF No Fear. All participants were impacted in a positive manner, and it assisted the unit with improving readiness through accomplishing individual training and collective-level METs. TF No Fear capitalized on various training opportunities offered by JRTC while concurrently supporting 2/25 IBCT's rotation. There is no doubt that deploying an entire battalion task force provided the task organization necessary to coordinate the variety of training options available and enable companies to focus on the specified missions.

At the time this article was written, **MAJ Al LeMaire** was serving as the executive officer (XO) for the 2nd Battalion, 27th Infantry Regiment (Wolfhounds), 3rd Infantry Brigade Combat Team (IBCT), 25th Infantry Division, Schofield Barracks, HI. His previous assignments include serving as maneuver planner for the 25th Infantry Division; student at the School of Advanced Military Studies; student at the Air Command and Staff College; observer-coach-trainer (OCT) at the Mission Command Training Program (MCTP); commander of A Company and assistant operations officer for 1st Battalion, 506th Infantry Regiment, 4th IBCT, 101st Airborne Division; and S2, scout platoon leader, and mechanized rifle platoon leader for the 2nd Battalion, 8th Infantry Regiment, 2nd Armored Brigade Combat Team, 4th Infantry Division. MAJ LeMaire earned a bachelor's degree in history from the University of North Carolina at Charlotte and a master's degree in adult and continuing education from Kansas State University.

A Platoon Leader's Reflection on Readiness

1LT JASON R. LALLY

It was the night of 24 March 2017, though to my platoon it was simply "X5" as it was the fifth day of exercise Allied Spirit VI. The hillside where my platoon staged was dense with fog and brush. It was the dead of night, devoid of illumination. Under night-vision goggles, visibility was 20 meters at best. My platoon's six M113A3 vehicles were in secluded battle positions a kilometer behind our company's forward limit of advance. Faint gunfire rang in the far distance and the artillery barrages had finally ceased. For the first time in three days, my platoon was not the front line of the battalion. The eerily quiet night was shaping up to perhaps be a full night of rest.

A couple hours after settling into our positions, radio chatter radiated through the quiet cabin of my M113, "enemy movement towards Checkpoint (CP) 18." I knew CP18 was only a couple kilometers to my south. Before my company commander gave the order, I realized the imminent mission for my platoon: travel south and destroy the enemy's offensive in our area of operations. I began getting my crew together to prepare our vehicle for departure and soon heard my mission over the command net. My commander ordered my platoon to transition to the highest readiness condition (REDCON 1) in order to potentially join the fight at CP18. "Roger, sir. Moving to REDCON 1 at this time."

I made a net call on my platoon frequency and informed my squad leaders and platoon sergeant of the enemy movement to our south. Frustratingly, one squad leader was unresponsive on the radio despite several minutes of hailing. My other squads had established observation posts (OPs) using their dismounts, all of whom needed to be located and led back to the platoon for mobilization. The situation to our south escalated quickly, and my commander ordered an adjacent platoon to begin movement in support of friendly units already by CP18. I suspected that Blackfoot Company, the unit to our south, would need more reinforcements and tried to speed up our transition to REDCON 1. Ten minutes elapsed and I still had no contact with one of my squads and multiple

OPs were still dismounted. With rising aggravation, I sent a fire team to search for the unresponsive squad and set time hacks for being REDCON 1. "All 3rd platoon elements, we have one-five mikes to be REDCON 1."

The enemy successfully penetrated Blackfoot Company's defense to the south. Their mobility and tempo were sufficient to overwhelm initial defensive positions, and I felt my heartbeat intensify as I realized my platoon was nowhere near ready to join the fight. Forty minutes had elapsed since my first net call and finally all my squads were responsive and mounting up. My time hacks had passed, yet the dismounts were sluggishly strapping their gear to vehicles as a final preparation for movement. At last I received REDCON 1 reports from every vehicle, no less than an hour from our initial call to action. Embarrassed and agitated, I sent up our REDCON 1 status to my commander only to hear that the fight was over and Blackfoot Company had been severely attrited. I am still unsure if my platoon would have been mobilized to CP18, but I am confident that if we were ready to roll in 20 minutes we could have saved some lives in our sister company.

The failures here span from higher echelons, myself, and to Soldiers in my platoon. From a company command or




Photo by SGT Seth Plagenza

Soldiers from the 173rd Airborne Brigade discuss possible routes during Exercise Allied Spirit VI at 7th Army Training Command's Hohenfels Training Area, Germany, on 20 March 2017.

higher perspective, my platoon lacked a clear mission set. I knew to find battle positions on my hillside and to, of course, maintain some level of security, but my commander did not specify beyond that. However, the primary failure was mine as a platoon leader. Despite minimal guidance, I understood ongoing operations and locations of adjacent units, thus our implied role of being a reserve force should have been obvious. I was focused on our immediate surroundings — secluded, quiet, far from the front line, etc. These factors should influence the severity of my immediate security but should not dictate my overall task and purpose. Simply put, I became complacent, and war will never forgive complacency. I could have concluded that we were a reserve element and issued out potential REDCON 1 time hacks prior to ever hearing about CP18, thereby allowing subordinates to array their vehicles and dismounts to make it happen. At the Soldier level, everyone should be ready to mobilize in well under an hour no matter the situation. Thus, complacency, not just lack of guidance, was a factor in their sluggish response. Leaders set the conditions and environment for their subordinates, and I suspect that some level of complacency began above my level, which I perpetuated, and it came to fruition through my Soldiers.

If I had known what the enemy had in store at CP18, I

would have been at REDCON 1 all night, but the underlying lesson here is not that sometimes we lack all the information we want. The lesson is about the detrimental capacity of complacency. My platoon was extremely effective during our battles throughout Allied Spirit VI — except on the night of X5 when complacency led to our lethal fighting force not even joining the fight. Unfortunately, this same principle applies on a larger scale beyond platoons. Allied Spirit VI aimed to bolster readiness and interoperability across NATO allies. The rotational training units likely achieved this goal by developing tactical and operational skills on the battlefield. However, such a success also leaves a unit more susceptible to complacency. Leaving a training rotation feeling confident and having gained skills is a positive outcome, but this should set the tempo for continued high-level training rather than justify stagnation. The burden lays on the shoulders of leaders to remain proactive in training and readiness, which will set the conditions for our Soldiers to be ready to join any fight that comes.

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Photo by SGT Matthew Hulett

Soldiers from the 1st Battalion, 4th Infantry Regiment serve as the opposing force during Exercise Allied Spirit VI on 18 March 2017.

Small Units Abroad:

A Model for Strategic Engagement

CPT JON M. VOSS

Physically dislocated more than 5,000 miles from their battalion and brigade headquarters, the Bulls of B Company, 1st Battalion, 21st Infantry Regiment, 2nd Infantry Brigade Combat Team (IBCT), 25th Infantry Division, participated in Operation Southern Jackaroo in May 2017 as the sole U.S. Army representatives in the multinational exercise. The exercise was hosted near Darwin, Australia, by the Australian 1st Brigade and also included elements from the 5th Battalion of the Royal Australian Regiment, the Japanese Ground Self Defense Forces, and the U.S. Marine Rotational Force - Darwin. Set in the unforgiving outback, the ad hoc battle group coalesced to engage a fictitious enemy invasion of northern Australia. During the two-week exercise, the Bulls learned several key lessons that will grow in significance as partnered Theater Security Cooperation Programs (TSCPs) in the Pacific become a bigger and bigger pillar of readiness.

Company-level disaggregated operations can (and should) become a norm for strategic engagement. Several high-profile multinational training exercises take place in the Pacific theater that see a battalion- or brigade-sized U.S. contribution. These exercises are unfortunately very expensive and require an equally expensive investment in manpower and resources to plan and prepare. Additionally, the echelon that participates in these exercises must become wholly dedicated to its execution, effectively removing that unit from short-term availability to its parent brigade or division headquarters. This was not the case with Southern Jackaroo.

The scope of this operation included only one U.S. Army infantry company. This limited footprint was light enough to allow the Bulls to turn around from a training rotation at the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) at Fort Polk, LA, and reset, retrain, and deploy to Australia within 65 days. In truth, from



Photos courtesy of the 5th Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment

A Bull Company machine-gun team practices suppressing an enemy location during training at the Mount Bundy Training Area in Australia.

the time the company's equipment arrived back to its home station on Oahu to the time it departed was less than 10 days. More significantly, this took place without restricting the parent battalion headquarters or the remainder of the battalion's combat power from fulfilling a standard load of administrative, training, and planning requirements. Specifically for 1-21 IN, this meant a dedicated recovery and leave period, four changes of command (including the battalion change of command), three weeks of Expert Infantryman Badge testing, and redeployment of the majority of the battalion back to JRTC for opposing force (OPFOR) and host nation role-player support.

In this sense, the deployment of a single rifle company fulfilled strategic priorities while representing an efficient economy of force at the unit level. An added, though ironic, benefit was that the limited self-sustainment capability internal to a rifle company enhanced the effort to build partnership by requiring the Bulls to integrate more directly with the hosting battalion for necessary support. Company-level TSCP operations can thus allow for greater tempo in regional engagement while also enhancing the development of interoperability during those engagements.

To appropriately represent the capabilities of a U.S. Army rifle company, 1-21 IN conducted a micro-surge of manpower into Bull Company, allowing it to deploy as a complete company as per the doctrinal modified table of organization and equipment (MTOE). This micro-surge filled positions that were otherwise manned by Soldiers who were non-deployable due to medical, administrative, or professional development-related reasons. Second only to the professionalism and competence shown by the Bulls during Southern Jackaroo, this full-force representation spoke most clearly to the multinational participants about American commitment to support the exercise.

This prioritization of manpower for Bull Company to support the exercise did not come without a cost. The sister rifle companies that contributed personnel lost some of their ability to achieve the 85-percent manning standard required by the Army's Digital Training Management System (DTMS) in order to earn a "Trained" status during training. Similarly, training conducted by the Bulls during Southern Jackaroo did not produce as tangible of an increase in the Bulls' DTMS-reflected readiness because those personnel returned back to their parent companies upon return to Schofield Barracks, preventing the Bulls from counting them toward the DTMS standard. So, while the overall readiness of the battalion to deploy and conduct partnered, joint, and coalition operations



Japanese and U.S. contingent company commanders receive an operations update from the Australian battalion staff during training at the Mount Bundy Training Area in Australia.

clearly increased due to the exercise, the technical readiness — as seen through the metrics of DTMS — suffered. Units participating in future company-level TSCPs will have to balance this metric-based readiness with the less-tangible readiness cornerstones of the TSCP.

In addition to appropriately tailored manpower, Southern Jackaroo showed how company-level expeditionary operations (especially in northern Australia) can be enhanced with several key non-standard pieces of equipment. The 2nd IBCT headquarters fielded several items to the Bulls based on feedback from the exercise planners, to include individual tents for protection from particularly ferocious mosquitoes and wildlife, boonie hats, and high-strength insect repellent. These proved vital. The hosts of the exercise, the 1st Brigade of the Australian Army, employed several other pieces of equipment to great effect, to include solar chargers, jungle fatigues and combat shirts, man-portable radio amplifiers, and high frequency (HF) radio systems. By fielding equipment like solar chargers and emphasizing the use of HF radio, units can increase their flexibility and reduce the logistical overhead for rifle companies operating independently.

Not to overstate the independence of the Bulls during Operation Southern Jackaroo, it bears noting that the brigade headquarters deployed a small mission command element to support the Bulls with over-the-horizon communication and exercise support. This element consisted of two Soldiers to operate a few pieces of brigade-level communication equipment, along with several junior officers to coordinate staff functions, conduct routine reporting, and manage unexpected issues. Led by a captain, the brigade "white cell" was a small but necessary addition to the manifest. Thanks to the help of this element, the Bulls were able to focus almost exclusively

on training and integration with their Australian hosts.

As part of Operation Southern Jackaroo, each multinational partner participated in live-fire training exercises at the platoon and company levels. Live-fire training is invaluable for unit and leader development, but units participating in TSCP operations need to be careful not to assume live-fire training hosted by partner nations will replicate training standards at home-station facilities. In the case of Southern Jackaroo, Australian range control regulations and training management techniques proved difficult for the Bulls to navigate through effectively, ultimately resulting in live-fire training scenarios that did not meet the requirements laid out in Army training and evaluation outlines (T&EOs) for platoon and company live-fire training. To avoid this, leaders at the company, battalion, and brigade levels need to have an early and open dialog with exercise planners to clearly articulate the U.S. training objectives for the training (per the mission essential task list [METL]) and determine where those objectives line up with the training objectives of the TSCP. During planning and execution, junior and senior leaders need to guard their expectation that participating in a TSCP will fulfill sustained readiness requirements like platoon certification and

must be prepared to absorb a potential decrease in DTMS qualifications in order to meet the operational or strategic objectives of the multinational training deployment.

These lessons came along with incredible relationships and newfound respect and confidence in our Pacific partners and in our ability to operate alongside them in the future. The future of warfare in the Pacific most likely includes companies operating dislocated from their parent headquarters and in close conjunction with partnered nations. Training exercises with those nations represent an incredible opportunity to build and reinforce the lessons that will make such warfare successful. To maximize those opportunities, company-level engagement is the most effective and efficient model when applied along with lessons from the Bulls during Operation Southern Jackaroo.

At the time this article was written, **CPT Jon M. Voss** was serving as commander of B Company, 1st Battalion, 21st Infantry Regiment, 2nd Infantry Brigade Combat Team, 25th Infantry Division. He currently serves as the military assistant to the U.S. Army Pacific Strategic Effects Director.

Soldiers from Bull Company integrate closely with their Australian partners during an urban engagement as part of Operation Southern Jackaroo.



Elements from Bull Company load a U.S. Marine Corps MV-22 Osprey with their attached Australian Military Police Dog Handling Team during Operation Southern Jackaroo.



Lessons from the Past



An Infantryman's Journey with a Medical Platoon

TOM ROZMAN

One day many years ago, an infantry battalion was deep into its preparation to be validated for its new mission as part of a heavy force element being prepared for enhancing the XVIIIth Airborne Corps' contingency capabilities. The separate brigade the battalion was assigned to had been reorganizing as a mechanized brigade and was well along in that process. Its tank battalion, one of its mechanized infantry battalions, and its armored cavalry troop were already in place. Several units were still in progress of reorganizing — one of the infantry battalions, the artillery battalion, and the combat engineer company being the most critical.

Adding to the array of challenges confronting the battalion in the reorganization, the battalion was informed two months before the scheduled U.S. Army Forces Command two-week field validation exercise that the replacement for the medical platoon leader would not report to the battalion until several weeks after the exercise. The previous platoon leader had been reassigned about a month before. The battalion S1, the officer responsible for the battalion's medical platoon, was very concerned about the medical platoon's readiness for the coming evaluation.

Among his concerns was the condition of the 12 six-wheeled Gama Goat ambulances (M561—the ambulance version was the M792). This was a "somewhat" amphibious all aluminum magnesium construction vehicle whose cockpit/cab and truck bed and suspensions system were designed to make maximum contact with the ground under the vehicle — the bed could rotate separately from the cab and the suspension system could compress and extend well beyond other truck systems. The number of "u" joints made for a vehicle that did take some attention to maintain operationally.

With the amount of added ancillary equipment for a medical version of the vehicle, the S1's concerns were not unfounded. The platoon hadn't had a platoon leader for some time, had recently received a new platoon sergeant, and was only weeks away from a high profile evaluation. He needed a strategy to give the medical platoon its best chance to do well. The question was — how?

Two first lieutenants had recently been assigned to the battalion after having returned from overseas. One had commanded several platoons and had other battalion experiences but had not been a company executive officer (XO). The other lieutenant had commanded several platoons, been the XO of three companies, served on a division staff, and had completed the battalion personnel officer's extension course through the Adjutant General's School.

Both lieutenants were expected to be promoted to captain in five to six months. The S1 recommended to the commander that the lieutenant who had not had experience as a company XO be assigned as XO in one of the rifle companies. He recommended that the other lieutenant be assigned as the battalion's assistant adjutant focused on the battalion's pre-deployment personnel files, a huge personnel management



National Archives photo

Two Gama Goat ambulances sit near a detention compound during Operation Urgent Fury on 28 October 1983.

requirement for units prepared to deploy on short notice for contingencies. These files integrated all elements of personnel action administration for the deploying Soldiers' pay actions, family member administration, and survivor benefits among other items — a huge undertaking at the time in an organization of some 1,000 members.

The commander concurred with the S1's recommendations. The lieutenant selected as the assistant adjutant had led a provisional infantry platoon for riot control duty and a mechanized rifle platoon at a stateside post for almost a year. He had then been an XO of a mechanized infantry company, a mechanized battalion headquarters company, and a tank brigade headquarters company, also at a stateside post, for more than a year. The lieutenant was then an infantry platoon leader overseas and a division staff officer at an overseas deployed division.

The S1 decided he had a possible solution to the leadership dilemma confronting the battalion for the validation exercise. The experience of the assistant adjutant might be sufficient to allow him to do a "crash course" on medical platoon operations and then be able to pull off leading the medical platoon through the validation exercise.

The S1 informed the assistant adjutant that he would be the medical platoon's acting platoon leader over the next six weeks through the validation exercise. The assistant adjutant acknowledged the assignment with a number of misgivings he did not share with the S1, the 12 Gama Goats looming large on the list of concerns.

The newly assigned platoon leader lost no time. He met with the platoon sergeant and they mutually developed a plan to prepare the platoon for the exercise. The plan addressed the most essential individual and collective training needing emphasis. It focused on thorough maintenance of the vehicles with necessary inspections as well as full layout inspections of individual and platoon equipment.

The platoon leader then assembled the platoon and introduced himself as the new platoon leader. He stated the mission ahead and outlined the platoon's plan to meet and exceed the mission required. Then, he engaged the platoon — it was a mission the entire platoon was taking on, and each Soldier would be important to getting it done.

The medics responded with guarded enthusiasm. They barely knew the platoon sergeant, and the lieutenant was only known as the guy putting the alert folders together — and he was an Infantryman. But time was short, and it was made clear that the medics would be "on parade" — the upcoming exercise was a "big deal" in establishing that they were the professionals they thought they were.

Then preparation began — the lieutenant and the platoon sergeant were shoulder to shoulder with every medic in the platoon working through the training, the inspections, and the work-up of the Gama Goats. And Soldiers received feedback on what they were doing well on and what needed improvement, but the direction was always positive.

As weeks passed and the alert that would initiate the validation exercise became an ever-present possibility, a team formed that indicated it would be able to take on the exercise and excel. However, even though much had been done in a short time, the team had not tested itself on a sustained deployment — one that would evaluate every aspect of its operations.

The alert came and the battalion "deployed." Though at a southern post, it was winter and several nights dipped below freezing. Without heaters, the Gama Goats were especially unforgiving in such weather. However, the platoon demonstrated a level of teamwork and cohesion as well as tactical competence in its unique mission during a demanding exercise.

The platoon conducted evacuation operations from the companies to the battalion aid station, triage, battalion trains operations, engagement with brigade trains, and air evacuation operations with great skill and competence. On some days, the battalion trains displaced as many as three times. The aid station even conducted a real evacuation of an injured Soldier during the exercise.

Incredibly, the focus of Gama Goat maintenance both before and during the exercise produced 100-percent availability of the vehicles. This was remarkable in its own right given the cold snap encountered. The validation exercise came to a close, and the hotwash confirmed that the battalion passed its validation. The medical platoon unexpectedly drew exceptional comment and was rated as one of the top units evaluated in its category.

This result did not tend to be a normal occurrence for such units for a number of reasons. But it did verify that engaging Soldiers and making them skilled members of the team will release the best in them. The result was their rather spectacular performance during the exercise. The medics made their success story — they earned it by ability, determination, dedication, and teamwork. It was their achievement.

The platoon leader also gained a valuable insight — one he always believed was the case, but the medics proved. Infantry Soldiers when well led and cohesive in their unit can accomplish almost the impossible. The medics demonstrated that they were as capable of taking on the tough tasks and prevailing as their infantry brothers.

Tom Rozman graduated from the U.S. Military Academy, the University of Massachusetts Graduate Business School, and the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. He served in the U.S. Army for 27 years with a last assignment as the director of the Collective Training Directorate, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Training, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command. He then continued his career as a member of the Virginia Departments of Conservation and Recreation and Labor and Industry, retiring as a director in the latter. He served for three years on the Department of the Army Armored Family of Vehicles Task Force. He exercised instructor privileges at the University of Massachusetts, Western New England College, and Westfield State College for over three years as an assistant professor. He has published 45 articles in U.S. and foreign military journals and more than 30 manuals, papers, policy documents, and reviews.

Book Reviews




The Stalingrad Cauldron: Inside the Encirclement and Destruction of the 6th Army

By Frank Ellis

Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2013, 558 pages

Reviewed by Maj Timothy Heck,
USMC Reserve



Stalingrad. The city's name alone conjures images of desperate hand-to-hand fighting in ruined industrial plants and destroyed apartment blocks, snipers stalking their targets across the snow-filled urban landscape, and, ultimately, the long march into Soviet prison camps for survivors of the German 6th Army. Stalingrad, in much of Western historiography, is the turning point for German ambitions in the East and the start of the long, bloody slog back to Berlin. Frank Ellis' *The Stalingrad Cauldron: Inside the Encirclement and Destruction of the 6th Army* sheds new light on the famous battle while elucidating the truths behind our collective understanding and impressions.

The Stalingrad Cauldron is, in reality, more a collection of essays than a coherent narrative. As Ellis states in his introduction, "my study is more tactical and personal, more concerned with some of the lesser-known detail than with the bigger operational picture." Those looking for a comprehensive analysis of the battle from start to finish are best served looking elsewhere, like David Glantz's recent *Stalingrad Trilogy*. Ellis' work is immaculately sourced and researched, creating an in-depth analysis of life for the 6th Army, Soviet citizens inside the battle zone, and the fate of German prisoners after the battle.

He begins with an overview of the battle and the conditions facing the 6th Army. The problems the Germans faced as the battle wore on, he argues, had their genesis in the larger German campaign in the Soviet Union. Ellis explains that most German infantrymen arrived on the Volga River already malnourished, and the encirclement only reduced their already meager energy stores. When coupled with the weather, which Ellis meticulously plots, the impact non-battle influences had on the German failure is clear. He also includes a brief but insightful analysis of recent historiography and discussion of his sources.

Three previously unpublished war diaries or operational histories of the 16th Panzer Division, the 94th Infantry Division, and the 76th Berlin-Brandenburg Infantry Division follow the introduction. Written retrospectively by survivors, these archival finds present the attritional impact of intense urban combat on the encircled German army. For today's combat leaders, the war diaries elucidate the decision-making

process and actions of a surrounded army facing logistical burnout and dwindling strength that is also battling the cold.

All three chapters repeatedly cite the German officer and NCO as critical in holding defensive positions and maintaining unit integrity during the battle, especially during retreats. Hauptmann (Captain) Rudolf Krell of the 94th Infantry Division remarks that "the initiative, the willingness to make decisions, and the skill and boldness of the junior leaders alongside the quality, endurance, and bravery of the troopers were now [in January 1943] more than ever decisive for the deployment of the forces and for the outcome of the fierce battles." These words could as easily have been written by American forces as well and serve as a reminder that the junior leaders are the backbone of all armies.

After the three war diaries, the focus on the minutiae of the battle takes center stage in the book. He begins with a chapter on the Soviet and German application of snipers in Stalingrad. His analysis calls into question the popular memory created by films like *Enemy at the Gates* and Soviet propaganda highlighting the sniper's success. While explaining the impact of a well-trained and employed sniper on the urban battlefield, Ellis argues that the German army was more successful than commonly thought in employing snipers. Using released NKVD interrogation documents and reading between the lines in war diaries and memoirs, Ellis synthesizes the role and impact of German and Soviet snipers in the battle. Furthermore, he debunks the Zaitsev-Konings duel at the center of *Enemy at the Gates*.

His next chapter focuses on the role of Soviet ethnic minorities, deserters, and prisoners of war who supported German efforts inside the encirclement. These men and women, numbering between 20,000 and 30,000, provided a large boost to the 6th Army. Their presence and assistance, as both support troops and as combatants, extended the lifespan of 6th Army and prolonged the battle immeasurably. It is a fascinating chapter on the role disaffected Soviets played in supporting the German war effort.

Ellis concludes his book with chapters on the role of intelligence operations during the battle, the experience of German prisoners in Soviet hands, and the case of Oberst (Colonel) Arthur Boje. The intelligence operations chapter has parallels to American line-crossing efforts in Korea and stay-behind operations like NATO's Gladio program in Europe. The chapter looks almost entirely at human intelligence, leaving an opening for further study in other intelligence disciplines and their place in the battle.


The fate of the men of 6th Army in Soviet hands serves as a reminder that even after surrender, the battle continued for many Germans, most of whom were too physically depleted to survive the movement to captivity and the conditions

found there. The need for a prisoner of war code of conduct becomes apparent as one reads Oberst Boje's story. The chapter is based on his captivity narrative and released NKVD documents. It focuses on the role of Soviet intelligence and German collaboration in the Soviet war crimes trial process and eventually concludes with the release of the prisoners in the mid-1950s.

The Stalingrad Cauldron is a dense and heavy work full of rigid scholarship and new insights into the life and death of the 6th Army. This said, it is not a book for casual reading for uninitiated readers or to gain a greater sense of the battle, its causes, or ultimate impact. Works like David Glantz's *Stalingrad Trilogy* and Robert Citino's *Death of the Wehrmacht* place the battle in its context whereas Ellis narrows his scope to the often-overlooked areas of the battle and reexamines some of the better-known events using new primary source material. Ultimately, *The Stalingrad Cauldron* should be seen as a detailed companion to broader studies and narratives rather than a stand-alone source.

***To Bataan and Back:
The World War II Diary of
Major Thomas Dooley***
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Henry C. Dethloff
College Station, TX: Texas A&M
Press, 2016, 238 pages

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There are times when a book's road to publication can be long and winding. Such was the case with *To Bataan and Back: The World War II Diary of Major Thomas Dooley*. For nearly 70 years, the diary of Dooley was only read by family members and close friends. These written words were contained in six paper notebooks totaling some 500 tiny printed pages. It appeared that these journals would never be seen by the public. However, the availability of the Dooley diary would begin to see a significant change in the summer of 2005.

During that time, Jerry Cooper (editor of this volume and a 1963 graduate of Texas A&M University) asked the family if a document of Dooley's could be used in a book focused on a great Aggie tradition — the muster. This discussion led to an inquiry about the accessibility of Dooley's diary which Cooper was well aware of. Conversation continued until 2009 when the journals were released to the Texas A&M archives, and then subsequently Cooper received permission from the family to publish them. After substantial annotation and editing, the diary was available to the public in book form in 2016.

Before discussing the diary itself, it is important to provide a brief synopsis of Dooley's military career. After graduating from A&M in 1935, he entered the Army as a second lieutenant. When the United States entered World War II, Dooley was

serving as aide-de-camp in the Philippines for then-MG Jonathan Wainwright. Dooley was part of the force that fought gallantly (he was awarded the Silver Star for his actions) when the Japanese invaded the Philippines. Like many, Dooley was ultimately captured and a prisoner of war for 40 months. He survived this incredible ordeal and continued his military service until his retirement as a colonel in 1969. His career culminated with assignments as Fort Knox's Armored Command chief of staff and deputy post commander.

Dooley's diary encompasses the period from the beginning of the Japanese bombing of the Philippines (8 December 1941) through just after the Japanese surrender in the Philippines (6 September 1945). As you would expect in a wartime diary, Dooley writes on the subjects that were part of his everyday life. This is amplified even more when the diary moves into his ordeal as a prisoner of war. Dooley writes of his struggle to survive and details his challenges with the availability of food and water, his relationship with guards and fellow prisoners, and describes his day-to-day activities which included reading more than 200 books (these books are listed as an appendix in the book).

I believe readers will find two aspects of the diary especially beneficial and appealing. The first is the breadth of Dooley's experiences which he provides incredible insight. These include the Japanese invasion of the Philippines, his capture by the Japanese, his 40 months as a prisoner of war, and his attendance at the Japanese surrender ceremony on board the USS Missouri. The second is Dooley's perspective on Wainwright. Certainly, Dooley, as his aide, was in a unique position to see a side of Wainwright which most did not experience. Dooley touches on a wide array of areas as they pertain to Wainwright. They include perceptions on his personality, leadership style, decision-making process, and his relationships with other senior leaders.

Cooper has done a remarkable job in transforming Dooley's six notebooks into a superb volume. In particular, two decisions he has made will clearly stand out for readers. First, he adds just enough of his own background copy to truly put Dooley's words in perspective. This is refreshing since I have read many books of this genre where an editor seems to want his words to be the focus. Cooper has placed the emphasis where it needs to be.

The second decision is the "extras" he has included within the text. Throughout the volume, Cooper has added numerous relevant photographs, maps, Dooley's own sketches, and official correspondence. He has also placed a pertinent appendix section which contains documents such as the Japanese instrument of surrender, a comprehensive glossary, a suggested reading list, and the aforementioned list of books Dooley read while a prisoner of war.

In summary, we are extremely fortunate that Dooley's words are available to the public due to the generosity of the Dooley family and the diligence of Jerry Cooper. The result is a volume which is a tremendous addition to the body of knowledge. It may have taken some 70 years to add to this body, but readers will find it was well worth the wait.

Headquarters, Department of the Army
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PIN: 202867-000

