




# Radical Islamist English-Language Online Magazines

*Research Guide, Strategic Insights,  
and Policy Response*





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


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**RADICAL ISLAMIST ENGLISH-LANGUAGE  
ONLINE MAGAZINES: RESEARCH GUIDE,  
STRATEGIC INSIGHTS, AND POLICY  
RESPONSE**

**Robert J. Bunker  
Pamela Ligouri Bunker**

**August 2018**

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
## FOREWORD

This unique Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) resource, authored by Robert J. Bunker and Pamela Ligouri Bunker—both of whom possess considerable counterterrorism analytical expertise—required many months of sustained research, analysis, and writing to produce. Simply collecting and cataloging the initial publication dataset itself represented a time-consuming process. As a result, this new research guide constitutes the most comprehensive work done to date on radical Islamist English-language online magazines for U.S. military educational and applied response purposes. This topical area is of great importance to the U.S. Army—and our national security posture in general—due to the association these magazines have with radical Islamist propaganda and recruitment, migration (*hijrah*) to Syria and Iraq, and attacks on the West utilizing “open source jihad (OSJ)” and later “just terror” techniques.

This book discusses and analyzes the more well-known radical Islamist English-language online publications—al-Qaeda’s *Inspire* magazine, the pro-Taliban *Azan* magazine, and the Islamic State’s (IS) *Dabiq* magazine—as well as a number of lesser-known publications associated with al Shabaab (*Gaidi Mtaani* and *Amka*) and al-Nusrah Front (*Al-Risalah*). Additionally, early Islamist works such as *Benefit of the Day*, *Jihadi Recollections*, and *Defenders of the Truth* are highlighted. Further, *Inspire* guides and special theme publications and IS reports, news, and little-discussed eBooks—the *Black Flags*, *Shudada* (Martyrs), *Islamic State*, and *The West* series—are addressed. It next offers a comparative analysis of basic narratives found in 30 combined issues of *Inspire* and *Dabiq* magazines. Al-Qaeda and

IS online magazine clusters are then provided along with a discussion of the differing strategic approaches of these transnational terrorist organizations. Finally, policy response options are offered as a counter to the emergence of these publications, a detailed radical Islamist online magazine chronology has been constructed, and a glossary of Arab terms found in the two dominant magazines is provided.

SSI hopes this unique research guide focusing on radical Islamist English-language online magazines (and many lesser-known guides and eBooks), and the strategic insights and policy response recommendations found within it, will be of great interest to U.S. Army organizations engaged in offensive and defensive operations against these terrorist entities as well as to the broader U.S. strategic community, especially within counterterrorism and homeland security-focused agencies.

A handwritten signature in black ink, reading "Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr." in a cursive script.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.  
Director  
Strategic Studies Institute and  
U.S. Army War College Press



## ABOUT THE AUTHORS

ROBERT J. BUNKER is an international security and counterterrorism professional and is presently an adjunct research professor at the Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) of the U.S. Army War College (USAWC) and an instructor with the Safe Communities Institute, University of Southern California. Past associations include Futurist in Residence, Behavioral Research and Instruction Unit at the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Academy in Quantico, VA and Distinguished Visiting Professor and Minerva Chair at SSI, USAWC. Dr. Bunker holds university degrees in political science, government, social science, anthropology-geography, behavioral science, and history and has undertaken hundreds of hours of specialized counterterrorism and counternarcotics training. He has delivered hundreds of presentations—including U.S. Congressional Testimony—and has hundreds of publications including numerous books, booklets, reports, papers, articles, response guidance, and research notes. Radical Islamist-focused publications and activities include co-editorship of a recent five-volume *Small Wars Journal* anthology series on this topical area as well as earlier works ranging from the weaponization of unmanned aerial systems (UAS), use of teleoperated sniper rifles and machine guns, and suicide bombers (including internal body cavity), along with related efforts extending back to pre-9/11 research on al-Qaeda doctrine, later published for U.S. law enforcement counterterrorism purposes, as well as pre- and post-9/11 Los Angeles Terrorism Early Warning Group (LA TEW) activities.

PAMELA LIGOURI BUNKER is a researcher and analyst specializing in international security and terrorism—with a narratives analytical focus—and is presently a non-resident fellow in terrorism and counterterrorism, TRENDS Research and Advisory, Abu Dhabi and an associate with *Small Wars Journal—El Centro*. She is a past senior officer of the Counter-OPFOR Corporation and has professional experience in research and program coordination in university, non-governmental organization (NGO), and city government settings. She holds undergraduate degrees in anthropology-geography and social sciences from California State Polytechnic University Pomona, an M.A. in public policy from the Claremont Graduate University, and an M.Litt. in terrorism studies from the University of Saint Andrews, Scotland. She is a co-editor of *Global Criminal and Sovereign Free Economies and the Demise of the Western Democracies: Dark Renaissance* (Routledge, 2015) and has published a number of referred and professional works—individually and co-authored—in *Small Wars & Insurgencies*, *Small Wars Journal*, *FBI Library Subject Guides*, and in various edited book projects including *Narcos Over the Border* (Routledge, 2011) and *Criminal-States and Criminal-Soldiers* (Routledge, 2008). She is currently engaged in research projects related to the Islamic State (IS) online magazine *Rumiyah* and “just terror” activities, strategies to mitigate IS foreign fighters from returning to their homelands, and the effects of rising economic inequality in the United States and the United Kingdom and its Armed Forces employment implications.

## SUMMARY

Radical Islamist online magazines first appeared in November 2003 with the publication of *Sawt al-Jihad* (Voice of Jihad) in Arabic. This magazine discontinued publication in April 2005 after 29 issues, having been shut down by the Saudi security services. The magazine was produced by the Saudi branch of al-Qaeda that later evolved into al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). It called upon other al-Qaeda groups to develop and franchise their own magazines. Besides the plethora of radical Islamist online magazines in Arabic that has been produced since 2003—along with those in many other languages including Urdu, Russian, German, French, and Turkish—English-language editions have been in existence since April-May 2007. There have been a number of these magazines published at varying dates and for varying periods of time. Some, such as *Al Rashideen* and *Ihya-e-Khilafat*, were initiated but fell by the wayside, victim to a lack of audience, the capture or death of an editor, or their initiating group's evolution. In the cases of al-Qaeda's *Inspire* and Islamic State's *Dabiq* magazines, the publications have been ongoing—until very recently with the demise of *Dabiq*—with over a dozen issues each, and have notably been cited in relation to terrorism cases by law enforcement. Beyond their propaganda potentials, each magazine can be said to promote a specific jihadi culture, to be embraced in total by followers of the particular group in question in order to achieve its desired utopian vision. Toward that end, components of these online magazines address the group's successes and legitimacy, offer a vision of a desirable end state, encourage recruitment into their ranks, direct violent action against stated enemies,

and provide instructional materials and advice with regards to its enactment.

The fact that an online magazine-style format has been used across groups over a notable period of time and the availability of a comprehensive data set of the issues of these magazines, both current and archived, is believed to provide a unique opportunity for evaluation of the nature of the threat these organizations potentially pose. It is not surprising, then, that the appearance and ongoing publication of English-language based magazines have caught the attention of scholars and counterterrorism researchers who have analyzed the better-known series of these magazines in numerous manuscripts, reports, and articles. Where useful, these works have been cited in the magazine database that follows. In reviewing the work done to date on radical Islamist English-language online magazines, however, efforts toward the analysis of online radical jihadist media in general—and online English-language magazines in particular—have been piecemeal. The results fall into three main categories: single magazine generalizations, comparisons between magazines, and those—largely popular media—pieces connecting these magazines to violent action.

In investigating these radical Islamist English-language online magazines and the body of work surrounding them, the authors determined that there was no document available in open-source form providing a comprehensive overview of this magazine genre, along with their predecessors and offshoot English-language periodicals. In addition, none of the existing studies provided a thorough look at the entire contents of *Inspire* and *Dabiq*—as the two then-primary ongoing publications—in a way that would be useful

to U.S. military and governmental researchers and policymakers.

The focused analysis of these magazines in this book, both chronologically and comparatively in their entirety, has not been done before, and provides essential insights into both the development and ebb and flow of the publications themselves, as well as how the narratives related to the important aspects of these terrorist groups have differed, overlapped, and adapted over time. In the following sections, the authors have provided a broad in-depth overview and analysis of the subject matter that they believe will provide invaluable information to researchers as well as useful insights to policymakers in this area. First, the authors have constructed an informational database of the radical Islamist English-language online magazine genre. In it, they have identified a wide breadth of precursor works that exist in a magazine or similar format to the online English-language magazines in question along with more tactically focused works of these or similar groups. The authors then present a profile of each magazine in terms of its editor, contributors, the region of publication, target group, length, and dates and numbers of issues. Information on each specific issue of a particular magazine, including its stated topic, date, length, and main articles, as well as offshoot documents, is also included. Next, the authors undertake an in-depth analysis identifying the basic narratives found among and between issues of the two main radical Islamist English-language magazines – *Inspire* and *Dabiq* – with regard to four primary topics: the desired end state of the group; the “enemy” relevant to that particular issue; statements made related to recruitment strategies; and any particular tactics, techniques, and procedures advocated – along with the narratives

supporting them within each magazine data set by issue and as a whole. They further determined what specific themes arose per issue and between groups along with changes and trends over time. Finally, the authors provide preliminary recommendations toward an appropriate U.S. policy response given those trends that have been identified within. In addition, a glossary of all Arabic terms used in *Inspire* and *Dabiq* is included herein, plus a master listing of all radical Islamist English-language online magazines (see appendix I), and a listing of those magazines' allegiance and foreign terrorist organization (FTO) affiliation (see appendix II) are provided.

Two strategic insights can be readily gained from the research and analysis conducted on radical Islamist English-language online magazines. First, such magazines exist in distinct clusters or groupings, revolving around either al-Qaeda or the Islamic State terrorist organizations. Second, these competing terrorist organizations have very different strategic approaches that they are promoting in their core magazines *Inspire* and *Dabiq*, respectively. Some of the narratives related to these differing strategic approaches were analyzed in this book; however, some additional narratives can also be tentatively surmised.

The strategic approaches related to these terrorist organizations and promoted in their supporting online magazine clusters are presented in table form in this book. This table represents an extension of the four themes—pertaining to end state, enemy, recruitment, and tactics—found in the *Inspire* and *Dabiq* datasets analyzed earlier. To this table has been added a wide range of additional attributes related to the differing strategic approaches of al-Qaeda and the Islamic State. These additional attributes have been deduced by

means of a close reading of the magazine datasets as well as the other magazines and eBooks in their respective English-language publication clusters.

A suggested generic policy response to the emergence of radical Islamist English-language magazines has been provided in this manuscript. It draws upon a targeting schema that identifies five stages in the magazine life-cycle process: **environmental motivators, production, end product, distribution, and outcomes**. Each of these life-cycle stages represents target sets that can be influenced by the U.S. Army, joint force, intelligence community, and ultimately whole-of-government response activities. These magazine life-cycle stages, as well as the desired response end state and the response measures required to achieve that response end state, are highlighted in a table provided in the book. Given the research project boundaries of this book, only a generalized response template and analytical discussion will be provided. Further, a “Blue Sky” response measures approach has been taken so as not to initially narrow the policy options that may be explored. There is hope that these elements will provide a form of “intellectual program starter” upon which U.S. agencies can build in order to respond to the emergence of Islamist English-language online magazines. Of course, for implementation purposes, two distinct programs—one focused on the *Inspire* (al-Qaeda) and the other focused on the *Dabiq* (Islamic State) magazine clusters and the inherent differences in their strategic approaches—must be specifically developed in order to respond to their emergence effectively.

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# **RADICAL ISLAMIST ENGLISH-LANGUAGE ONLINE MAGAZINES: RESEARCH GUIDE, STRATEGIC INSIGHTS, AND POLICY RESPONSE**

Increasingly, the primary threats to U.S. security have involved hybrid warfare challenges including the use of irregular tactics and the rise of nonstate actors. Hybrid warfare merges conventional warfare with non-traditional military approaches including terrorism, insurgency, and information and cyber warfare, and the U.S. Army has had to adapt its role in responding to these new and varied threats.<sup>1</sup> In the post-9/11 period, the nature of its global counterterrorism and counterinsurgency response has necessitated shifting its information operations focus in order to deal with the impact of radical jihadist organizations' skillful use of social media and the internet at large, particularly as these are used to propagate narratives supporting the employment of tactics, techniques, and procedures hostile to the United States and its allies and interests around the world.

One innovative way in which these radical jihadist organizations have attempted to promote their narratives is through the use of online radical Islamist English-language magazines that draw upon that method of publication in order to reach out to a broader cohort of existing constituents and affinity groups in the West while maintaining an internet presence that intimidates outsiders. The magazine format allows an organization to present a coherent and encompassing vision of their status and mission without the distortion found in more interactive forms of online media such as chat rooms and forums, which are subject to questions and commentary from outside

the established “party line.” In addition, they provide the ease of access of an online resource with the ability to print out and circulate the magazine to those without access or those who are simply more comfortable with an older media format—something the publishers have actively encouraged. While the singular effectiveness of an online magazine in achieving a group’s intentions is outside the scope of this paper—and, ultimately, very difficult to ascertain—the ideals set forth in terms of the narrative presented and the tactics, techniques, and procedures promoted can be seen as representing the desired means and ends of these groups in question.

Radical Islamist online magazines themselves first appeared in November 2003 with the publication of *Sawt al-Jihad* (Voice of Jihad) in Arabic. This magazine discontinued publication in April 2005 after 29 issues, having been shut down by the Saudi security services—although a 30th issue may have been published in February 2007.<sup>2</sup> The magazine was produced by the Saudi branch of al-Qaeda that later evolved into al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). It called upon other al-Qaeda groups to develop and franchise their own magazines.<sup>3</sup> Besides the plethora of radical Islamist online magazines in Arabic that has been produced since 2003—along with those in many other languages including Urdu, Russian, German, French, and Turkish—English-language editions have been in existence since April-May 2007. There have been a number of these magazines published at varying dates and for varying periods of time. Some, such as *Al Rashideen* and *Ihya-e-Khilafat*, were initiated but fell by the wayside, victim to a lack of audience, the capture or death of an editor, or their initiating group’s evolution. In the cases of al-Qaeda’s *Inspire* and Islamic State’s

*Dabiq* magazines, the publications have been ongoing—until very recently with the demise of *Dabiq*—with over a dozen issues each, and have notably been cited in relation to terrorism cases by law enforcement. Beyond their “propaganda” potentials, each magazine can be said to promote a specific jihadi culture, to be embraced in total by followers of the particular group in question in order to achieve its desired utopian vision. Toward that end, components of these online magazines address the group’s successes and legitimacy, offer a vision of a desirable end state, encourage recruitment into their ranks, direct violent action against stated enemies, and provide instructional materials and advice with regards to its enactment.

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and those—largely popular media—pieces connecting these magazines to violent action.

In the first case, some works have looked at individual (or even several) issues of a single online English-language magazine to make generalizations on its overall content.<sup>4</sup> There is often great interest at the onset of a new magazine's publication, falling off in the attention-cycle after that point unless an issue is particularly sensational in nature. With *Inspire* and *Dabiq* in particular, the focus is often upon their glossy and Western style of presentation contrasted with the emphasis on radical Islamist ideology. Many authors rely largely upon the title to discern the issue's primary content and emphasis. Much in particular is made of the potentials for radicalization and recruitment of Western Muslims without any in-depth study evidencing those effects. Most of what is written about the publications primarily focus upon specific issues of academic interest or else paint the collection of issues with a broad stroke. A few of these, however, have made a note of the strategic and tactical insights to be found.<sup>5</sup> The next common type of analysis of these online magazines are those which focus on two or more in comparison, largely *Inspire* and *Dabiq*—with particular note of their rivalry—although early attempts considered *Azan* and others in the mix.<sup>6</sup> The last type are largely popular media pieces which mention a magazine in relation to its presumed connection with inciting violent acts—these crop up most often just after a specific terrorism-related event or just after publication of a specific issue promoting such an act.<sup>7</sup> In investigating these radical Islamist English-language online magazines and the body of work surrounding them, the authors determined that there was no document available in open-source form

providing a comprehensive overview of this magazine genre, along with their predecessors and offshoot English-language periodicals. In addition, none of the existing studies provided a thorough look at the entire contents of *Inspire* and *Dabiq*—as the two then-primary ongoing publications—in a way that would be useful to U.S. military and governmental researchers and policymakers.

The focused analysis of these magazines in this book, both chronologically and comparatively in their entirety, has not been done before, and provides essential insights into both the development and ebb and flow of the publications themselves, as well as how the narratives related to the important aspects of these terrorist groups have differed, overlapped, and adapted over time. In the following sections, the authors have provided a broad, in-depth overview and analysis of the subject matter that they believe will provide invaluable information to researchers as well as useful insights to policymakers in this area. First, the authors have constructed an informational database of the radical Islamist English-language online magazine genre. In it, they have identified a wide breadth of precursor works that exist in a magazine or similar format to the online English-language magazines in question along with more tactically focused works of these or similar groups. The authors then present a profile of each magazine in terms of its editor, contributors, the region of publication, target group, length, and dates and numbers of issues. Information on each specific issue of a particular magazine, including its stated topic, date, length, and main articles, as well as offshoot documents, is also included. Next, the authors undertake an in-depth analysis identifying the basic narratives found among and between issues of

the two main radical Islamist English-language magazines—*Inspire* and *Dabiq*—with regard to four primary topics: the desired end state of the group, the “enemy” relevant to that particular issue, statements made related to recruitment strategies, and any particular tactics, techniques, and procedures advocated—along with the narratives supporting them within each magazine data set by issue and as a whole. They further determined what specific themes arose per issue and between groups and changes and trends in these over time. Finally, the authors provide preliminary recommendations toward an appropriate U.S. policy response given those trends that have been identified within. In addition, a glossary of all Arabic terms used in *Inspire* and *Dabiq* is included herein, plus a master listing of all radical Islamist English-language online magazines (see appendix I), and a listing of those magazines’ allegiance and foreign terrorist organization (FTO) affiliation (see appendix II) are provided.

## ONLINE MAGAZINE PROFILES

The online English radical Islamist magazines that will be profiled in the initial part of this section are the better-known ones. They are *Jihadi Recollections*, an al-Qaeda affinity magazine initially published in April 2009, *Defenders of the Truth*, an al-Qaeda linked magazine initially published in July 2009, *Inspire*, an AQAP magazine initially published in June 2010, *Gaidi Mtaani*, an al Shabaab magazine initially published in April 2012, *Azan*, a Taliban magazine initially published in March (or possibly May) 2013, *Dabiq*, an Islamic State magazine initially published in July 2014, *Resurgence*, an al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS) magazine initially published in October







2014, *Amka*, an al Shabaab – al-Muhajiroun magazine initially published in February 2015, and *Al-Risalah*, an al-Nusrah Front magazine initially published in July 2015. Of these nine magazines, *Inspire* and *Dabiq* are by far the most influential, have had the greatest impact on radical Islamist thinking, and have the most digital issues, 16 and 15 respectively. The profiles of all of these magazines follow. In addition to a short overview of each magazine, tables have been provided that list all of the issues of these digital publications, images of their covers, and the main articles contained within them (see tables 1-9).

### ***Jihad Recollections (al-Qaeda Affinity)***

The first widely known online English-language magazine to be published is *Jihad Recollections*, whose initial issue came out in April 2009.<sup>8</sup> Four issues of the magazine were produced with the last one appearing in September 2009 (see table 1). The magazine was published by Samir Khan—a U.S. citizen born in Saudi Arabia—who produced the magazine in the basement of his father’s home in Charlotte, North Carolina. As a teenager, Khan increasingly became radicalized through ties to a local branch of the Pakistani Tanzeem-e-Islami. Two years prior to publishing the magazine, he initially established an online blog called Revival and was later followed by the blogs *Inshallahshahed* (A Martyr, God Willing) and Revolution.<sup>9</sup> Given Khan’s expanding extremist ties, his magazine was distributed by al-Qaeda’s al-Fursan Media. This brought him increased notoriety in the radical Islamist community. He then left North Carolina in October 2009 and traveled to Sana’a, Yemen to join AQAP. There he continued his online magazine editorship under the new

al-Qaeda flagship magazine that he founded, *Inspire*.<sup>10</sup> The first three issues of *Jihad Recollections* averaged 75 pages in length, with thematic clusters such as politics and economy, religion and biography, strategy and lessons, social technology, and health evident in issue 2. The fourth issue produced was much smaller at 49 pages and dropped the thematic clusters with only a features section, possibly attributable to the fact that Khan was preparing to move to Yemen. One critique of the work said, “The magazine was overproduced – slick but too busy and at times unreadable, loosely inspired by popular American magazines.”<sup>11</sup> The magazine provided original jihadi-inspired material up to the master’s degree level of writing to English-speaking Muslims – per the editor’s introduction in the first issue – to begin to get them caught up to what their brothers in the Arabic jihadi media were reading. Besides the usual jihadi rhetoric, the articles on technology are of note. Some of them explain practical items such as generations of night vision technology and how mobile shooter detection systems work, while others focus on esoteric areas of little present utility for jihadists, such as electromagnetic pulse devices and sixth sense computer interfaces. No method of contacting the editor of the magazine is listed in any of the issues. *Jihad Recollections* does provide links to various videos and a few speeches as well as recognized jihadist websites.





| No.     | Issue Name   | Date                              | Length | Main Articles   |
|---------|--|-----------------------------------|--------|---|
| Issue 1 | The Predications of the Conquering of Rome<br>            | Rabi' al-Thani 1430H (April 2009) | 70 pp. | The Predications of the Conquering of Rome; The Emphasis for an Identity in the Storm of the Kufr; Staying in Shape Without Weights; Obama's Questionable Economic Stimulus Package; The Warrior Trainer; The Siege of Tawheed Al-Hakimiyyah; The Political Implication of the CIA's Scandal in Algeria; Four Practical Steps to Expand the Global Jihad; The Science Behind Night Vision Technology. |
| Issue 2 | Obamaturk: The Secular Phenomenon<br>                     | Jumada al-Awwal 1430H (May 2009)  | 73 pp. | Obamaturk: The Secular Phenomenon; Western reaction to Abu Mansoor al-Amriki; Infaq: The forgotten deed; A critical look into Dr. Israr's 'Tanzeem-e-Islami'; America: Bully among bullies and Columbine's Macrocosm; Forget cell phones—the sixth sense is coming; Tips on making your exercises realistic.  |
| Issue 3 | From Uncle Sam to AllahuAkbar<br>                        | Sha'aban 1430H (August 2009)      | 82 pp. | From Uncle Sam to AllahuAkbar: My life in Iraq and Journey to Islam; Defending Afghanistan: Is it defending Islam or defending al-Qa-idah?; Tableeghi Jama'ah on the strategic spectrum; Assessing the Role and Influence of As-Sahab Media; Islamic Demonstrations and their relationship with the Mujahideen; The Techno-Tawqa age.   |
| Issue 4 | The Men Behind 9/11 and The Motives That Bound Them<br> | Ramadan 1430H (September 2009)    | 49 pp. | The Men Behind 9/11 and The Motives That Bound Them; Letter from Michael Scheuer to Usama bin Laden; The Hidden Reasons for 9/11: US Foreign Policy and the Islamic World; An unforgettable Sentiment; The Last Moments before the world changed; Is 9/11 Directly Responsible for the US & Global Financial Crisis?  |

**Table 1. *Jihad Recollections* Online Magazine.**


### ***Defenders of the Truth* (Al Mosul Islamic Network; al-Qaeda)**

This online magazine was produced by the Al Mosul Islamic Network—an al-Qaeda linked group. No individual or individuals claimed editorship of this five issue magazine that was published from July 2009 through January-February 2010 (see table 2). Very little analysis has been written on *Defenders of the Truth* with the primary Al Mosul website—which also provided jihadist videos, news, and press releases—shutting down by April 2010.<sup>12</sup> An internet search found one defunct English site, which was established as early as April 2009—a few months before the magazine’s publication—apparently as an affiliated site.<sup>13</sup> Their primary Al Mosul Media website and a secondary site have also since been shuttered.<sup>14</sup>

The magazine was predominantly written in English with some Arabic script present. Articles are presented in a two-column format like *Jihadi Reflections*, but the type of font and line spacing gives this magazine a less polished feel. Graphic color pictures—especially of armed mujahid and martyrs—are peppered throughout the issues with many advertisements for links to jihadi videos.<sup>15</sup> Writers associated with the magazine include: Hamzah al Farooq (also spelled Hammzah Farooq), a frequent contributor; Abu Hazma; Abu Thareef (also spelled Thareer); and Ibrahim Abdul-Wahid with the spelling variations suggesting that author pseudonyms are being utilized. The magazine attempted to appeal to the global al-Qaeda ummah of interest with stories and imagery spanning the globe including accounts of jihadist groups in the Caucasus, Pakistan, Thailand, Yemen, Somalia, and the Maghreb while still somewhat remaining focused on activities in Iraq.

| No.     | Issue Name  | Date   | Length | Main Articles   |
|---------|---|--|--------|---|
| Issue 1 | No Title<br>   | Rajjab 1430<br>(July 2009)                                       | 57 pp. | The reason behind the Declaration of the Islamic Emirate of the Caucasus; Slaying and Striving in Allah's Cause – A Glimpse into Jihad; Jihad in the light of Ahadith; The Islamic personality; The reason 9/11 attacks were a justified attack; Islamic Fundamentalism in Southern Asia. |
| Issue 2 | No Title<br>   | Sha'baan 1430<br>(August 2009)                                   | 65 pp. | Theoretical Notes on Snipers; The Rewards of Martyrdom (Part 1); Notes on Program[m]ing; Jihaad in the light of the Ahadith, The Truth about Jihad –Part I; Islamic Fundamentalism in Central Asia; The Blessed Month of Sha'baan.  |
| Issue 3 | Death of Nationalism<br>                                | Shawwaal/<br>Dhul Qa'dah<br>1430<br>(October 2009)               | 51 pp. | The Truth about Jihad (Part II); The Western Muslim Complex – A Short Introduction; Jihad in the light the Ahadith; The Islamic Maghreb; Exploits in Jihad by Women Companions; Death of Nationalism – The Signs of Calamity over the Despotie Regimes.                                   |
| Issue 4 | The place for Shariah: Amongst the causes of Islam<br> | Dhul Qa'dah/<br>Dhul Hijjah 1430<br>(November/<br>December 2009) | 36 pp. | Introducing the Salafi Jihadi Movement; The Rewards of Martyrdom (Part 2); The Place for Shariah amongst the causes of Islam; Salaah (prayer) in Islam; Friends of Allah; Hamas.  |

**Table 2. *Defenders of the Truth* Online Magazine.**





| No.     | Issue Name   | Date  | Length | Main Articles  |
|---------|--|---|--------|--|
| Issue 5 | Battle Ground Iraq, The Post Graduate University of Muslim Mujhahid<br> | Muharram/<br>Saffar 1431<br>(January/<br>February 2010) | 39 pp. | A Glimpse into the Lives of the Women Companions; The Acquisition of knowledge in Islam; Al-Mosul Media Exclusive Interview with a Mujahid of the Tareek-e-Taliban in Swat; Battle Ground Iraq, The Post Graduate University of Muslim Mujhahid. |

**Table 2. *Defenders of the Truth* Online Magazine.  
(cont.)**

### ***Inspire* (AQAP)**





The flagship al-Qaeda English-language magazine *Inspire* is published by al-Qaeda Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) via its propaganda arm Al-Malahem Media. Given the high profile nature of the magazine, a number of reports and studies have been written about it.<sup>16</sup> The magazine has been publishing since June 2010 and has recently come out with its 16th issue in November 2016 (see table 3). The magazine was founded and edited by Samir Khan, who was discussed earlier concerning his publication of *Jihad Recollections*. Along with Sheik Anwar al-Awalki – another American who went over to join al-Qaeda and became an enemy of the United States – they were involved in the publication of the initial seven issues of *Inspire* until both of them were killed in a U.S. drone strike in Yemen at the end of September 2011. No issues of the

magazine were published until May 2012 when issues 8 and 9 under the new editorship of Yahya Ibrahim appeared. This new editor has consistently provided a very short “Editor’s Letter” since taking over publication of the magazine—it is unknown, however, if this is the editor’s real name or likely a pseudonym, given the inherent danger involved in being the editor of this magazine. This slick, professional magazine, which contains minimal Arabic script, varies in length from 23 to 102 pages with about 60 to 70 pages being an average issue size with wide page fluctuations taking place. Numerous articles are published in each issue with some advertisements for jihadi audio messages and videos provided. One of the most important components of the magazine is its “open source jihad (OSJ)” section that is meant to promote lone jihad attacks. A comprehensive overview of certain narratives found within this magazine will be covered later in this book. Starting with the initial issue, the explanation of how to use encrypted messages by means of the Asrar al-Mujahideen program was described in the magazine.<sup>17</sup> This program could then be used with a changing 2048-bit public key to contact the magazine editor and staff by means of various email addresses.<sup>18</sup> This resulted in “Letters to the Editor” becoming a regular feature of the publication. By issue 3, email communication difficulties appeared which were fixed by the next issue with these email addresses changing over time as accounts were either compromised or closed down.<sup>19</sup> By March 2014, in issue 12, reader email communications with the magazine were permanently suspended due to technical and security reasons, though a “temporary notice” has been utilized to this effect for over 2 years now.<sup>20</sup>





| No.             | Issue Name  | Date                          | Length | Main Articles   |
|-----------------|---|-------------------------------|--------|---|
| Issue 1         | May Our Souls Be Sacrificed For You!<br>                                 | Summer 1431<br>(June 2010)    | 67 pp. | May our souls be sacrificed for you!; Abu Basir Interview; Make a bomb in the Kitchen of your Mom; Six calls of al-Anfal; How to use Asrar al-Mujahideen: Sending & Receiving Encrypted Messages; The Jihadi Experiences [The Schools of Jihad].  |
| Issue 2         | Photos from the Operations of Abyan<br>                                  | Fall 1431<br>(October 2010)   | 74 pp. | The Operations of Abyan in Images; I am proud to be a traitor to America; The New Mardin Declaration; Interview with Shaykh Abu Sufyan al-Azdi; My life in Jihad; Obama's ploy and the peak of Islam; A Call to Islam; Legitimate Demands 2.  |
| Special Issue 3 | \$4,200<br>   | Fall 1431<br>(November 2010)  | 23 pp. | \$4,200; The Objectives of Operation Hemorrhage; Technical Details; Exclusive Images.   |
| Issue 4         | The Ruling on Dispossessing the disbelievers wealth in Dar al-Harb<br> | Winter 1431<br>(January 2011) | 67 pp. | The Ruling on Dispossessing the disbelievers wealth in Dar al-Harb; Q&A with Shakyh Adil al-Abbab on targeting non-Muslim civilians and Yemeni soldiers; The Jihad in Abyan; The Central Issue; Which is better: Martyrdom or Victory?; Why did I choose al-Qaeda?; Roshanara & Taimour: Followers of the borderless loyalty. |

**Table 3. *Inspire* Online Magazine.<sup>21</sup>**



| No.             | Issue Name   | Date                          | Length | Main Articles  |
|-----------------|--|-------------------------------|--------|--|
| Issue 5         | The Tsunami of Change<br>                       | Spring 1431<br>(March 2011)   | 70 pp. | The Tsunami of Change; The short & long-term plans after protests; The Overlooked Backdrop; Al-Saud: Lodging a Criminal; The Oppressor's End; The Egyptian; The way forward; Individual Terrorism Jihad; The Middle path & the Enemy's plot; What to expect in Jihad?; My Life in Fallujah.  |
| Issue 6         | Sadness, Contentment & Aspiration<br>           | Summer 1432<br>(August 2011)  | 61 pp. | Sadness, Contentment & Aspiration; The Martyrdom of Shakyh Usama; An Address to the Revolutionaries; Progeny of the exceptional; Shuhada's Special; A Question on takfir; It is either Jihad or Disgrace. So Choose.; Why did I choose al Qaeda? [part 3]; Conditions for the Resistance to use individual jihad; Making Acetone Peroxide; Training with the AK.       |
| Special Issue 7 | The Greatest Special Operation of all time<br> | Fall 1432<br>(September 2011) | 36 pp. | The Greatest Special Operation of all time; The Media Conflict; Iran & the Conspiracy Theories; A Decade in Pictures from 9/11 Till Today.   |
| Issue 8         | Targeting Dar al-Harb Populations<br>         | Fall 1432<br>(May 2012)       | 63 pp. | Targeting Dar al-Harb Populations; The Jihadi Experiences: The main arenas of operation for individual jihad; Lust and Fear: An insight into the Pakistani Army & its role in the Crusades; Take from their guidance for there is no refuge from jihad; Freedom from blind following; Shuhada Arabian Peninsula; Training with the handgun; Remote Control Detonation. |

**Table 3. *Inspire* Online Magazine. (cont.)**

| No.              | Issue Name   | Date                        | Length | Main Articles  |
|------------------|--|-----------------------------|--------|--|
| Issue 9          | Win[n]ing on the Ground<br>           | Winter 1433<br>(May 2012)   | 62 pp. | Win[n]ing on the Ground; The convoy of martyrs; It is of your freedom to ignite a firebomb; Qualities of an Urban Assassin; My story with Al Awlaki; Samir Khan: The Face of Joy; Was Al Awlaki justified in his dislike of America?; The Jihadi Experiences: The most important enemy targets aimed at by the individual jihad. |
| Issue 10         | We Are All Usama<br>                  | Spring 1434<br>(March 2013) | 60 pp. | We Are All Usama; Inspire Exclusive: From Adam Gadahn; Torching Parked Vehicles; Causing Road Accidents; The Jihadi Experiences: The Strategy of Deterring with Terrorism; Woman of the Glorious Ummah.  |
| Special Issue 11 | Who & Why<br>                        | Spring 1434<br>(May 2013)   | 39 pp. | Who and Why?; The Inevitable; America's Bitter Harvest; Inspired by Inspire; Allah will restrain the evil might of those who disbelieve.   |
| Issue 12         | Shattered: A Story About Change<br> | Spring 1435<br>(March 2014) | 72 pp. | Shattered: A Story About Change; Car Bombs Inside America; Car Bombs: Field Data; Rumbling Blaze Under Calm Ash; The Crusade and The Swap of Stances; Palestine: Betrayal of Human Conscience; 24/7 Terrorism.   |

**Table 3. *Inspire* Online Magazine. (cont.)**

| No.      | Issue Name  | Date                            | Length  | Main Articles   |
|----------|---|---------------------------------|---------|---|
| Issue 13 | Neurotmesis<br>                  | Winter 1436<br>(December 2014)  | 102 pp. | Neurotmesis: Cutting the Nerves & Isolating the Head; Exclusive Interview with the AQ-Chef; The Hidden Bomb; Letter to the America People; Strike the Sea with Your Stick; Independence & Courage; The Story of Abu Rawi As-Sway'Ari; The Glad Tidings of Victory; The Virtues of Inghimaasi; Between Yesterday & Tomorrow; Al-Malahem's Q&A Session. |
| Issue 14 | Assassination Operations<br>     | Summer 1436<br>(September 2015) | 88 pp.  | Assassination Operations; Making a Timed Hand Grenade; Assassinations – Field Tactics; The Blacks in America; Conditions of the Word of Tawheed; Charlie Hebdo Military Analysis; If You Return, We Too Shall Return; Remembering Boston.   |
| Issue 15 | Professional Assassinations<br> | Spring 1437<br>(May 2016)       | 90 pp.  | Professional Assassinations; Making explosives for home assassinations; Exclusive Interview: Abu Khubeib As-Sudani; Jihad Upon Clear Insight; O Knife Revolution, Head Towards America; The Coner: Inside Obama's Rationality; Jihad Profiles: Khalid Sheikh Muhammad; Natural Calamities or Terror.  |
| Issue 16 | The 9/17 Operations<br>        | Autumn 1438<br>(November 2016)  | 48 pp.  | Inspire Guide #4; The Successful Pressure Cooker Bomb; Those Who Defy Justice; A Thousand Times Greater than the USS-Cole; Echoes of Events; Rulings of Lone Jihad; The Issue of African Americans; A Message to Our Muslim Brothers in America; The American Globalization is Falling.   |

**Table 3. Inspire Online Magazine. (cont.)**

## ***Gaidi Mtaani* (al Shabaab)**





The magazine *Gaidi Mtaani* published by al Shabaab loosely means “Terrorist on the Street” or “Street Terrorism” in Swahili.<sup>22</sup> Its seven issues (see table 4) were published from April 2012 through February 2015 with issue size widely fluctuating between 14 pages in issue 1, to 65 pages in issue 7. The initial editor of the magazine was listed as Abu-Saif (also spelled Abu-Sayf) with Abu Usama al-kenyi listed as the later editor. Of note was the increasingly English content of the magazine, which also featured articles in Swahili, from one or two articles in the initial issues to multiple ones in the later issues. The choice of using Swahili itself is of note because that language is not widely spoken in Somalia. It was said that al Shabaab chose that language because it would allow for better access to Muslims in Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania where it has official status and is greatly utilized.<sup>23</sup> This is in line with an expert who analyzed the magazine in the context of al Shabaab’s then-activities:

This Swahili publication, with the occasional English language item, is explicitly targeted at the Kenyan *Ummah*. Launched three months after al-Shabaab declared it [sic] intentions to mount war within Kenya, four issues were produced up to November 2013. The articles are well written, and show a good understanding of Kenya’s history and the particular concerns of its Muslim population. Professionally produced, with multiple illustrations and eye-catching slogans, *Gaidi Mtaani* is visually powerful and clearly intended to appeal to a younger audience.

The magazine provides a powerful insight into the organisation’s public relations mission, revealing important aspects of al-Shabaab’s recruitment and propaganda strategy. Articles link current oppression to Kenya’s long-history Muslim marginalisation, portraying

the Kenyan state as being in collaboration with foreign powers that wish to attack Muslims.<sup>24</sup>

From a U.S. homeland defense perspective, this focus on Kenyan Muslim populations and those in surrounding African states, rather than actual clusters of Somalia expatriates in the United States—such as in Minnesota—is welcome news. This is especially true given the fact that the English content of the magazine rose over time, since this would mean that English-speaking audiences in Africa were the primary targets of the al Shabaab propagandists rather than individuals living in the United States. Still, some converts from the Twin Cities were identified in the magazine.<sup>25</sup> Some additional limited analysis of *Gaidi Mtaani* has taken place noting that occasional Arabic script is also included in the magazine as well as the typical selective usage of Quranic passages supporting jihadist narratives. The magazine's stance in later issues that "democracy is blasphemy and jihad is the solution" was also noted with calls for readers to remove themselves from the unbelievers and seek martyrdom.<sup>26</sup> Additionally, one of the more practical articles in the magazine focused on cell phone security as a counter to the capabilities of Western security forces.<sup>27</sup> While the layout of the magazine increased professionally over time with a glossy feel and plenty of images, the few supporting links mainly pointed to YouTube videos and a file-sharing site rather than dedicated jihadist websites. However, by issues 3 and 4, more web resources were listed.<sup>28</sup> A contact email was also provided as well as a Twitter account, which had no activity and only a handful of followers.<sup>29</sup>

| No.                                  | Issue Name   | Date                                    | Length | Main Articles<br>(In English)   |
|--------------------------------------|--|---|--------|---|
| Toleo<br>No. 1                       | Operation Linda<br>Uislamu<br>  | Rabi al-Thani<br>1433<br>(April 2012)   | 14 pp. | Leveling the Scales.  |
| Toleo<br>No. 2                       | The Long Road to<br>Kismayu<br> | Rajab 1433<br>(June 2012)               | 27 pp. | The Long Road to Kis-<br>mayu; Operation Linda<br>Ukafiri.  |
| Toleo<br>No. 3                       | Sheikh Aboud Rogo<br>          | Rabi al-Thani<br>1434<br>(March 2013)   | 41 pp. | A Greater Scheme of<br>Things; What is Democra-<br>cy and what is the Islam-<br>ic verdict on democracy;<br>Molotov Cocktail; Mobile<br>Phone Security.                     |
| Toleo<br>Special<br>Edition<br>No. 4 | #Westgate<br>                 | Dhul Hijja<br>1434 (No-<br>vember 2013) | 45 pp. | Westgate Operation;<br>#Westgate; Was the Bad-<br>ru Nairobi Operation A<br>Cowardly Act?; The Basis<br>of the Defeatist Move-<br>ment; More Than Just A<br>Thousand Words. |

**Table 4. *Gaidi Mtaani* Online Magazine.**

| No.                         | Issue Name  | Date                            | Length | Main Articles<br>(In English)   |
|-----------------------------|---|---------------------------------|--------|---|
| Toleo Special Edition No. 5 | Muslims of Bangui & Mombasa: A Tale of Tragedy<br>                           | Not listed (November 2014)      | 30 pp. | Muslims of Bangui & Mombasa: A Tale of Tragedy; On Bangui; On Events in Mombasa; To the Believers in the Levant; On Chechyna; More Than Just A Thousand Words.  |
| Toleo No. 6                 | My Journey of Hijra & Jihad<br>  | Dhul Qaada 1435 (December 2014) | 57 pp. | My Journey of Hijra & Jihad; The Path to Paradise: From the Twin Cities to the Land of Two Migrations; Fight for the Sake of Allah Not For Democracy; More Than Just A Thousand Words; Who Was Gary Schroen?          |
| Toleo No. 7                 | May Our Mothers Be Bereaved Of Us Should We Fail to Avenge Our Prophet<br> | Jumada al-Ula (February 2015)   | 65 pp. | War with peace.; Diary of Mujahid: The Battle; From the 'hood' to an Eternal Paradise; May Our Mothers Be Bereaved Of Us Should We Fail to Avenge Our Prophet; Perplexed Propaganda; More Than Just A Thousand Words. |

**Table 4. *Gaidi Mtaani* Online Magazine. (cont.)**

## ***Azan* (Taliban/Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan)**

The name of *Azan* magazine in Arabic script means “A Call to Prayer,” though its unknown editor was also attempting to associate the word with “A Call to Jihad” as the cover of the first issue of the magazine suggests.<sup>30</sup> Hence, the initial issue editorial states that:

the call of mankind has always been the same: to be free of the servitude of created beings to the servitude of The One, The Almighty, The Law-Giver, The Creator of the heavens and the earth, Allah. It is this very call that *Azan* aims to invite mankind to.<sup>31</sup>

By engaging in this call—that requires the actions of the Mujahid against the forces of Satan—the salvation of mankind will take place. *Azan* is produced by the pro-Taliban Abtalul Media Group and is linked to the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan. It is one of the better-known examples of the English-language radical Islamist online magazines in addition to the much larger *Inspire* and *Dabiq* series. As a result, two focused products—an initial short report in 2014 and a more detailed scholarly article in 2015—have been produced pertaining to this magazine.<sup>32</sup> Six issues and one special report were published from March 2013 through August 2014 (see table 5) with the issues roughly 50 pages in length with their length steadily dropping over time. Similarities between *Azan* and *Inspire* are evident—although it is devoid of an OSJ section—with some writers suggesting it helped to fill the jihadist publication gap while the AQAP magazine ceased publication from mid-2013 for about 10 months.<sup>33</sup> Analysts state that the magazine focuses on promoting domestic Western attacks over joining jihadi groups overseas, though some of the groups in the al-Qaeda cluster—specifically



al-Nusrah Front and al Shabaab—had now been promoting Western recruitment over such attacks during late 2013.<sup>34</sup> The magazine had a professional feel with a good use of imagery and colors, with Arabic script occasionally mixed in as a supporting Islamic cultural archetype. Cover titles maximized their propaganda value with statements such as “You’ll Never Be Safe,” “An Awakened Ummah,” and “To the Jihadis in the West” meant to send continued threatening messages to the United States and Europe.<sup>35</sup> A number of articles across the issues focused on the United States’ use of armed drones, which is a preoccupation of the Taliban given the ongoing leadership losses that they have suffered from such attacks over the years. Also of interest is the special issue/report focusing on the American security firm Blackwater (renamed Xe, now Academi) and Pakistani intelligence—the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI)—supposedly working together based on the debriefing of a young teenager who was captured by the Taliban mujahideen. In the initial issue of *Azan*, an email contact address was provided for the magazine; however, issue 2 provided a different contact email, and later issues saw further address iterations.<sup>36</sup> Asrar-ul-Mujahideen Version 2 website links to download encrypted software belonging to that program as well as updated public keys were provided in the various issues, although only one reference to jihadist videos for download was made in the entire series, suggesting that the editor thought the readership might have had broadband download or streaming limitations or simply did not see the value of such videos.<sup>37</sup>

| No.     | Issue Name   | Date  | Length | Main Articles  |
|---------|--|---|--------|--|
| Issue 1 | A Call to Jihad<br>                 | Jamadi-ul<br>Awwal<br>1434H<br>(March 2013)         | 80 pp. | The Road to Khilafah; The Drone Chain; Malala, Education and an Unruly Media; The Pakistan Army Doctrine U-Turn; Prison Break: Adnan Rasheed; All the more reason to Rise...; The Religion of Democracy; Nationalism and Islam.  |
| Issue 2 | You'll Never Be Safe<br>            | Jamadi II/<br>Rajab 1434H<br>(April/May<br>2013)    | 97 pp. | The Last Night; Boston Special: The Victorious Strangers; Let's understand "Suicide Bombing..."; Secular Education; Disavowal of the Kuffar: A Quranic Perspective; Fatwa: "The Islamic Ruling on Media"; My Story: A Mujahid's journey; 3 <sup>rd</sup> World War and Dajjal. |
| Issue 3 | An Awakened Um-<br>mah<br>         | Sha'ban/<br>Ramadan<br>1434H<br>(June/July<br>2013) | 84 pp. | Destroying the "Country" idol; An Address to the Ummah; An Open Letter to Malala Yousafzai; An Interview with Brother Abu Adam; The Real Freedom; To the Muslims of India; The Emergence of Imam Mehdi.  |
| Issue 4 | To the Jihadis in the<br>West<br> | Autumn 1434<br>(December<br>2013)                   | 74 pp. | To the Jihadis in the West; The Grave; Destroying the Country Idol (Part 2); Around the World; Pharoahs: Today & Yesterday; Dajjal (Part 1); The Wisdom and Goals of Jihad, Steeds of War.   |

**Table 5. *Azan* Online Magazine.**





| No.           | Issue Name   | Date                                   | Length | Main Articles  |
|---------------|--|--|--------|--|
| Issue 5       | <p>Those Who Bow Down To Allah Do Not Bow Down to Anyone Else!</p>  | Winter 1435<br>(March 2014)            | 37 pp. | The Life after Death: "Reward and Punishment in the Grave"; Counter-Drone Strategy (Cover Story); Destroying the "Country" Idol (Part 3); Establishing Islam through Democracy?; Conflict of Definitions: "Peace"; The Mir Ali Massacre; Third World War and Dajjal: "The Fitn of Dajjal." |
| Special Issue | <p>Blackwater &amp; ISI</p>   | Sha'aban 1435<br>(June 2014)           | 18 pp. | Atif Khan captured and debriefed by the Mujahideen related to Blackwater and ISI working together in Pakistan.   |
| Issue 6       | <p>The Scales Have Turned!</p>                                    | Sha'aban 1435<br>(August 2014, Summer) | 43 pp. | The Resurrection; The Rise and Fall of America (Cover Story); Dajjal and The World Today; Rulings on the Participants of the Democratic System; The Fundamentals of the Islamic Khilafah; My Story: A Scholar, A Veteran, A Mujahid; From the Pages of History: Scholars of Resolve.       |

**Table 5. *Azan* Online Magazine. (cont.)**




## *Dabiq* (Islamic State)

The Islamic State magazine *Dabiq* – which refers to the site where the End of Days battle will be fought as forecasted in radical Islamist eschatology – was initially published in July 2014, just weeks after the proclamation that the Caliphate had been reestablished. Since that time, 15 total issues of the magazine have been published with the last and final one being released in July 2016 (see table 6). The magazine is thought to be published in Raqqa, Syria, which is the capital of the Islamic State. As with *Inspire*, numerous papers and reports have been written about what was the Islamic State’s flagship English-language online magazine. One of the best and earliest analysis was written in August 2014 by the Institute for the Study of War.<sup>38</sup> Other writings have been produced by The Clarion Project as well as in academic journals and related articles with more narrow research foci.<sup>39</sup> *Dabiq*, which is published by the Islamic State Al Hayat Media Center, can be considered an extension of the earlier *Islamic State News* (ISN) and *Islamic State Reports* (ISR), which had existed for a short time prior to its launching.<sup>40</sup> The intent of the magazine is to specifically promote *hijrah* (emigration) by Western recruits to the Caliphate with in-place lone jihadist attacks being a secondary consideration. It is also being used as a vehicle to launch direct criticism against al-Qaeda and its leader Ayman al-Zawahiri. It differs from *Inspire* in that no editor is identified and contributors to the articles are typically not listed. While this gives the magazine a slightly impersonal feel, it provides a united and somewhat monolithic magazine voice and further helps to protect the magazine staff from being specifically targeted for elimination by means of drone




strikes or other methods.<sup>41</sup> The magazine is professional in appearance with its use of colors and imagery and with Arabic script kept to a minimum. Weapons and action shots are common as are numerous advertisements for Islamic State action and execution videos. The magazine also contains highly controversial imagery, including the destruction of cultural sites and artifacts, slaves for sale, and graphic executions.<sup>42</sup> The magazine averages about 60 pages with 42 to 83 representing the lower and upper issue lengths. Recurring contents which have appeared over the course of a number of issues include ISRs, Among the Believers are Men, To Our Sisters, In the Words of the Enemy, mujahideen interviews across the globe, statements from John Cantlie, a British war photographer and correspondent who was kidnapped in Syria in November 2012. Reader communication with the magazine editors was attempted in the third issue of *Dabiq* in September 2014, with three initial email addresses using the Asrar El Moujahedeen 2048-bit public key system.<sup>43</sup> No letters to the editor were generated in the magazine from this outreach attempt, and no further reader outreach was ever attempted again in future issues. As with *Inspire*, an overview of specific narratives found within *Dabiq* are addressed later in this manuscript. It is then comparatively analyzed against it. With the Caliphate in decline and the foreseen loss of the actual town of Dabiq coming, this magazine has now been superseded by the new Islamic State magazine *Rumiyah* that began publication in September 2016 and is promoting a different narrative strategy.

| No.     | Issue Name  | Date                               | Length | Main Articles   |
|---------|---|------------------------------------|--------|---|
| Issue 1 | The Return of the Khilafah<br> | Ramadan 1435<br>(July 2014)        | 50 pp. | Dabiq Magazine; Khilafah Declared; Islamic State Reports; Imamah is from the Millah of Ibrahim; The Islamic State in the Words of the Enemy; From Hijrah to Khilafah; Islamic State News.   |
| Issue 2 | The Flood<br>                  | Ramadan 1435<br>(July 2014)        | 44 pp. | Foreword; It's Either the Islamic State or the Flood; Islamic State Reports; The Flood of the Mubahalah; The Islamic State in the Words of the Enemy; Islamic State News.   |
| Issue 3 | A Call to Hijrah<br>          | Shawwal 1435<br>(September 2014)   | 42 pp. | Foreword; The Islamic State Before Al-Malhamah; Islamic State Reports; Hijrah from Hypocrisy to Sincerity; The Islamic State in the Words of the Enemy; Foley's Blood is on Obama's Hands; The Complete Message from Foley.   |
| Issue 4 | The Failed Crusade<br>       | Dhul-Hijjah 1435<br>(October 2014) | 56 pp. | Foreword; Indeed Your Lord is Ever Watchful; My Provision was Placed on Me in the Shade of My Spear; The Revival of Slavery Before the Hour; Islamic State Reports; Reflections on the Final Crusade; In the Words of the Enemy; A Message from Sotloff; Hard Talk. |

**Table 6. *Dabiq* Online Magazine.**



| No.     | Issue Name  | Date                                   | Length | Main Articles   |
|---------|---|--|--------|---|
| Issue 5 | <p>Remaining and Expanding</p>                                       | Muharram 1436<br>(November 2014)       | 40 pp. | Foreword; Yahya Lessons from a Shahid; Islamic State Reports; Hikmah; Remaining and Expanding; In the Words of the Enemy; If Cantlie were the US President Today.   |
| Issue 6 | <p>Al-Qaidah of Waziristan: A Testimony from Within</p>              | Rabi' al-Awwal 1436<br>(December 2014) | 63 pp. | Foreword; Advice from the Soldiers of the Islamic State; The Qa-Idah of Adh-Dhawahiri, Al-Harari, and An-Nadhari, and the Absent Yemeni Wisdom; Islamic State Reports; Al-Qa'Idah of Waziristan—A Testimony from Within; In the Words of the Enemy; Melt-down—John Cantlie.   |
| Issue 7 | <p>From Hypocrisy to Apostasy: The Extinction of the Grayzone</p>  | Rabi' al-Akhir 1436<br>(February 2015) | 83 pp. | Foreword; The Burning of the Murtadd Pilot; Advice for the Leaders of the Islamic State; Islam is the Religion of the Sword Not Pacifism; Islamic State Reports; Among the Believers are Men; The Extinction of the Grayzone; The Good Example of Abu Basir Al-Ifriqi; Interview with Abu Umar Al-Baljik; The Anger Factory—John Cantlie. |

**Table 6. *Dabiq* Online Magazine. (cont.)**



| No.      | Issue Name  | Date                                | Length | Main Articles  |
|----------|---|-------------------------------------|--------|--|
| Issue 8  | Shari'ah Alone Will Rule Africa<br>      | Jumada al-Akhirah 1436 (March 2015) | 68 pp. | Foreword; The Allies of Al-Qa'idah in Sham; From the Pages of History; Islamic State Reports; Hikmah; Among the Believers are Men; To Our Sisters; Irja' the Most Dangerous Bid'Ah; In the Words of the Enemy; Interview with Abu Muqatil At-Tunusi; Paradigm Shift – John Cantlie.  |
| Issue 9  | They Plot and Allah Plots<br>            | Sha'ban 1436 (May 2015)             | 79 pp. | Foreword; The Allies of Al-Qa'idah in Sham: Part II; The Virtues of Ribat for the Cause of Allah; Conspiracy Theory Shirk; From the Pages of History; Islamic State Reports; Hikmah; Among the Believers are Men; From Our Sisters; And Allah is the Best of Plotters; In the Words of the Enemy; Interview with the Amir of the Yarmuk Camp Region; The Perfect Storm – John Cantlie. |
| Issue 10 | The Law of Allah or the Laws of Men<br> | Ramadan 1436 (July 2015)            | 79 pp. | Foreword; The Allies of Al-Qa'idah in Sham: Part III; Tawhid and Our Duty to Our Parents; A Fatwa for Khurasan; From the Pages of History; American Kurdistan; The Qawqazi Caravan Gains Pace; Hikmah; Among the Believers are Men; From Our Sisters; The Law of Allah or the Laws of Men; In the Words of the Enemy; Interview with Abu Samir Al-Urduni.                              |

**Table 6. *Dabiq* Online Magazine. (cont.)**



| No.      | Issue Name  | Date                               | Length | Main Articles   |
|----------|---|------------------------------------|--------|---|
| Issue 11 | From the Battle of Al-Ahzab to the War of Coalitions<br> | Dhul-Qa'dah 1436 (September 2015)  | 66 pp. | Foreword; The Allies of Al-Qa'idah in Sham: Part 4; The Evil Division and Taqlid; The "Mahdi" of the Rafidah: The Dajjal; Wala and Bara Versus American Racism; The Danger of Abandoning Darul-Islam; From the Pages of History; Islamic State Reports; Hikmah; Among the Believers are Men; To Our Sisters: A Jihad Without Fighting; From the Battle of Al-Ahzab to the War of Coalitions; In the Words of the Enemy; Interview with Abul-Mughirah Al-Qhtani.   |
| Issue 12 | Just Terror<br>  | Safar 1437 (November 2015)         | 65 pp. | Foreword; The Allies of Al-Qa'idah in Yemen; The Allies of Al-Qa'idah in Sham: The End; To Our Sisters: Two, Three, or Four; Hikmah; Military Operations by the Islamic State; And as for the Blessing of Your Lord, Then Mention It; O You Who Have Believed, Protect Yourself and Your Families from Fire; The Revival of Jihad in Bengal; You Think They are Together, but their Hearts are Divided; Paradigm Shift Part II—by John Cantlie; In the Words of the Enemy; Amongst the Believers are Men; Interview with Abu Muharib As-Sumali. |
| Issue 13 | The Rafidah: From Iban Saba' to the Dajjal<br>         | Rabi' al-Akhir 1437 (January 2016) | 56 pp. | Foreword; Kill the Imams of Kufr; From the Pages of History: The Safawiyah; Military Reports; Hikmah; Among the Believers are Men; To Our Sisters: Advice on Ihdad; Do They Not Then Reflect on the Qur'an; The Rafidah: From Ibn Saba' to the Dajjal; In the Words of the Enemy; Interview with the Wali of Khurasan.  |

**Table 6. *Dabiq* Online Magazine. (cont.)**



| No.      | Issue Name   | Date                        | Length | Main Articles   |
|----------|--|-----------------------------|--------|---|
| Issue 14 | The Murtadd Brotherhood<br> | Rajab 1437<br>(April 2016)  | 68 pp. | The Murtadd Brotherhood; Foreword; Operations; From the Pages of History; Among the Believers Are Men; In the Words of the Enemy; Interview; The Knights of Shadadah in Belgium; Kill the Imams of Kufr in the West; Do They Not Then Reflect on Qur'an; The Blood of Shame.                  |
| Issue 15 | Break the Cross<br>         | Shawwal 1437<br>(July 2016) | 82 pp. | Break the Cross; Foreword; Contemplate the Creation; From the Pages of History; The Fitrah of Mankind; Words of Sincere Advice; Why We Hate You & Why We Fight You; Wisdom; How I Came to Islam; Operations; Interview; Among the Believers Are Men; In the Words of the Enemy; By the Sword. |

**Table 6. *Dabiq* Online Magazine. (cont.)**

### ***Resurgence* (AQIS)**

*Resurgence* is one of two al-Qaeda associated magazines – along with *Al-Risalah* mentioned in the following section – ideologically targeting the Islamic State and its leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi.<sup>44</sup> Reports state that this online magazine is produced by As Sahab, al-Qaeda's propaganda arm tied into its senior leadership.<sup>45</sup> Adam Gadahn, a U.S. citizen who later joined al-Qaeda, in an interview in the second issue, said that it was conceived of by Jama'at Qa'eda al-Jihad in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS), who produced and published it under the editorship of Hassan Yusuf.<sup>46</sup> Prior to the magazine's release, a video with an audio clip of Malcolm X over various images including the Boston marathon bombing was utilized to advertise it.<sup>47</sup> The

intent of the magazine, according to the editorial in the first issue, was to extend the wave of jihad originating in Afghanistan into the Subcontinent (i.e., Al Hind) which includes India and Bangladesh as well as Pakistan and Burma. The Word of Allah is to be made supreme and the archenemy of Islam and Muslims – the United States – is to be targeted. The liberation of the Muslims in Palestine and Gaza is also mentioned. The magazine (see table 7) is only composed of two issues, with the first issue produced in October 2014 and the second issue produced in June 2015.<sup>48</sup> Each issue averaged about 105 pages in length. The first issue has a number of articles that are well-footnoted, giving the magazine an academic feel. While this magazine is written in English, the use of Arabic script and short Quranic passages is utilized to tie it to al-Qaeda's cultural foundations. Given the great volume of Gadhafi material utilized in the magazine, his death in January 2015 – prior to the release of his second special issue interview – may have contributed to its limited existence. Reader contact with the magazine publishers was facilitated by email utilizing a public key for the Asrarul Mujahideen computer program.<sup>49</sup>

| No.             | Issue Name   | Date                   | Length  | Main Articles   |
|-----------------|--|------------------------|---------|---|
| Issue 1         | Besiege Them!<br>                                   | Fall 2014<br>(October) | 117 pp. | A Step Towards Unity of Ranks; Keys with the Imam; The Land of the Prophets Awaits You; Besiege Them!; The Other Side of the Story; Land of the Other; The Future of Muslims in India; Islamization of a Declining System?; On Targeting the Achilles Heel of the Western Economies; Strategic Overstretch in Guerilla Warfare. |
| Special Issue 2 | An Exclusive Interview with Adam Yahiyeh Gadahn<br> | Summer 2015<br>(June)  | 92 pp.  | Adam Yahiyeh Gadahn Interview.  |

**Table 7. *Resurgence* Online Magazine.**



### ***Amka* (al Shabaab – al-Muhajiroun component)**

This online magazine is issued by al-Muhajiroun (Emigrants of East Africa) and was meant to be periodic in nature. It began publication in February 2015, a month after the January founding of al-Muhajiroun from the merger of Ansar al-Mujahideen and al Hijra (formerly the Muslim Youth Center).<sup>50</sup> The magazine (see table 8) was not sustainable, with only two issues created and the second issue published in July 2015. The editor, Abu Salim Al-Kenyi, has been identified as Ahmed Iman Ali, a Kenyan, who is al-Muhajiroun's senior leader.<sup>51</sup> The group is composed of

members mostly from Kenya as well as Canada, Australia, and France. Al-Muhajiroun is subordinate to al Shabaab—and its leader Sheikh Ahmad Umar Abu Ubaidah—until it matures and then it will become an independent al-Qaeda sanctioned terrorist group operating in Kenya.<sup>52</sup> In the initial issue, the editor states that the magazine is supportive of al Shabaab (a terrorist group in Somalia) and swears “irrevocable Baya’-ah” (loyalty) to Ayman al-Zawahiri (current leader of al-Qaeda).<sup>53</sup> In addition to English articles, which are the dominant focus of the magazine, the two issues also contain articles and notices written in Swahili and Arabic. Average issue size based on its two issues is about 26 to 27 pages in length. *Amka* provided their readership with email accounts to get more information and for correspondence purposes with the editor.<sup>54</sup> Al-Muhajiroun’s organizational objectives are as follows:

Though the group[’s] main focus of operation is [in] Kenya, its chief objectives are to spread jihad in East Africa as well as recalibrating Islamic discourse in the region so that it aligns to a strict Wahhabi interpretation of Islamic teachings.<sup>55</sup>

The magazine appears to be published in Kenya. The second issue specifically noted readership in the Mahenge region of Tanzania and Mombasa, Kenya, as well as the area of interest including Uganda and Somalia.<sup>56</sup>

| No.            | Issue Name  | Date  | Length | Main Articles<br>(English Only)  |
|----------------|---|---|--------|--|
| Toleo<br>No. 1 | East Africa's<br>Baya'ah<br>           | Rabi'ul Thani-Ja-<br>madil Awal 1436<br>(February 2015) | 23 pp. | Statement from HSM<br>Leadership; Charlie<br>Hebdo (Attack); Mes-<br>sage to the Ummah of<br>East Africa; East Africa's<br>Baya'ah.  |
| Toleo<br>No. 2 | East Africa: Jihad's<br>Homecoming<br> | Shawaal 1436<br>(July 2015)                             | 30 pp. | Defying the Kuffar:<br>Sheikh Makaburi; Eid<br>Greetings from Amir<br>Sheikh Abu Ubaidah;<br>East Africa: Jihad's<br>Homecoming; Nussey-<br>ba – Islam's Woman<br>Warrior: Part I. |

**Table 8. *Amka* Online Magazine.**




### ***Al-Risalah* (al-Nusrah Front)**

*Al-Risalah*, like *Resurgence* profiled earlier, is published by an al-Qaeda associate, and is meant to discredit the Islamic State and the ideology of its leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi.<sup>57</sup> The publisher—the Mujahideen in Bilad Ash Shaam (al-Nusrah Front or Jabhat al-Nusrah)—is primarily located in Syria with some of its personnel also operating in Lebanon. The first issue of *Al-Risalah* came out online in July 2015; the second issue in October 2015 (see table 9). An exclusive article on “Jihad: A Life Time” for the planned third issue was advertised in the second issue and eventually published

in two parts in the July 2016 issue.<sup>58</sup> The editor of the magazine is not identified, with the high-quality publication thought to be produced somewhere in Syria. The average magazine issue is about 50 pages long with many of the pages composed of images. One analysis of the work states that:

The magazine presents to its readers Jabhat al-Nusra's achievements, along with its partners in Jaysh al-Fath ('Army of Conquest')—a coalition of seven jihadist organizations which cooperate with each other to liberate Syria from the regime of President Bashar Assad, and work together to battle the Islamic State in Syria.<sup>59</sup>

In addition to hostility expressed toward the Islamic State and the Assad regime, animosity toward the Iranian proxy terrorist group Hezbollah—that has sent fighters to support the Assad regime—is noted in the online magazine. Abu Qatada, the preacher and al-Qaeda sympathizer deported from Britain, also has an article (The Markets of Faith) in the second issue, although he later disavowed that he wrote the article.<sup>60</sup> The first issue of this online magazine was released independently of any jihadi media groups with the second issue linked to the larger Global Islamist Media Front (GIMF), which released a promotional video supporting it.<sup>61</sup> The GIMF also later defended the independent status of the magazine and its authenticity.<sup>62</sup> The third issue is larger than the earlier issues and is self-sacrifice—imprisonment and martyrdom—as well as tactical combat clothing (i.e., jihadi cool) focused. Smartphone security and cell tower triangulation dangers are also highlighted in the issue. No email means exist to contact the magazine editor, but SureSpot and Media on Telegram (encrypted chat messengers) and a Twitter account are listed for online encryption queries.

| No.     | Issue Name   | Date                            | Length | Main Articles  |
|---------|--|---------------------------------|--------|--|
| Issue 1 | Al-Risalah<br>                | Ramadan 1436<br>(July 2015)     | 43 pp. | Jaish Al Fatah; Army of Victory; The Battle of Victory; The Keys of Jannah, Hijra – My Story; Ramadan: The Month of Striving; Khilafa One Year On; This is Al Qaeda; An eulogy for Shiek Abu Baseer al Wuhayshi; Halab Under Fire; An Exclusive Interview with Amir Muslim Shishani; Everlasting Reward.   |
| Issue 2 | Victory Loves Preparation<br> | Muharram 1437<br>(October 2015) | 48 pp. | Abu Tomahawk; A Call From Usama; And There is No Victory Except from Allah; The Mountains of Turkestan; The Markets of Faith: Sheik Abu Qatada; Legacy – Amer Deghayes; The Mountains of Turkestan – Part 2; Exclusive: Interview with Sheikh Abu Firas; The Progress of Jaish Al-Fath: Sheikh Abdullah Al-Muhaysini; Judg[e]ment is for None But Allah; Encryption—Online Security; Everlasting Reward: Abu Hamza Sudani. |
| Issue 3 | Has The Time Not Come<br>    | 1437<br>(July 2016)             | 58 pp. | Dougma: Self Sacrificial Operations; Jihad A Life Time: Journey to Guantanamo (Part I & II); Bilad Al Hijratayn: Abu Bushra Birtani; Has The Time Not Come; Everlasting Reward: Abu Baseer Al Birtani; Utopia: Smart Phone Security; Incite The Believers.   |

**Table 9: *Al-Risalah* Online Magazine.**

## Additional Online Magazines

In addition to the nine better-known radical Islamist English-language online magazines profiled above, a number of other more minor and lesser



known ones exist. These tend to be more specialized or niche publications, very early and unknown series, relatively unsuccessful ones, or very recent ones with limited information currently existing on them. They are chronologically listed as follows with supplemental information on these magazines provided in table 10.

*Benefit of the Day (al-Qaeda Affinity)*

This is the earliest identified English-language online magazine to be published. It predates the publication of Samir Khan's *Jihad Recollections* magazine by 2 years, with the first issue appearing in April-May 2007. The magazine has been mostly forgotten with little analysis or reporting existing on it. It was produced by At-Tibyan Publications, which was a website earlier administered by Aabid Hussain Khan—a British al-Qaeda supporter—who was sentenced by UK authorities in August 2008 for distributing terrorism-related materials online.<sup>63</sup> The major difference between *Benefit of the Day* and *Jihad Recollections* is that the former one essentially only contained translations of pre-existing jihadi material.<sup>64</sup> This material is provided in daily readings for each day of the month of that magazine issue. The magazine also has a less sophisticated—almost amateurish—desktop publishing feel to it and relies upon stock, clip-art type imagery, reminiscent of greeting cards or basic website designs with numerous nature scenes, although the al-Qaeda flag occasionally appears in some of the article headers. Numerous short essays promoting martyrdom and supporting the mujahideen interspersed with more mainstream Islamic tenants are hidden behind its benign veneer.<sup>65</sup> Still, the more subtle orientation of the magazine, some of the topical foci, and the 2nd year series, which carried a “Dar At-Tibyan Sisters” banner

cover on two of the issues suggest that women were a targeted audience for readership.<sup>66</sup> Twelve issues have been identified as being published from April 2007 through roughly October 2008, with issue gaps acknowledged. The typical issue size is about 22 to 32 pages in length with Arabic script interspaced within the dominant English text. No editor or group contact information is provided in any issues of the magazine. The magazine's original website is no longer available; however, some of the issues are presently available on a few file-sharing sites.<sup>67</sup>

### *In Fight (Taliban)*

The English-language online magazine is published by the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan that is linked to Ansar al-Mujahideen, which hosts an English Forum known as the Ansar-Al Mujahideen English Forum (AMEF).<sup>68</sup> In 2012, this forum was "considered the primary English-language jihadi forum, disseminating the majority of al-Qaeda's propaganda for the English-speaking West."<sup>69</sup> The magazine focuses on pro-Afghan Taliban military operations and propaganda related to Afghanistan. Images and listings of United States, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and allied Afghan troop casualties are heavily focused upon in this publication. Forty-one issues of *In Fight* can be readily accessed spanning issue number 20 "War on Roads" posted in August 2010 (with no issue month or year designation) through number 60 "Retrospective NIMROZ..." listed as the December 2013 issue.<sup>70</sup> This English-language magazine originally dates back to June 2009 and was initially posted "on the website of the Taliban's Arabic-language monthly magazine, 'al-Samoud'" before it later migrated to the

AMEF site. Paywall research access exists from issue number 60 to pre-number 20 issues.<sup>71</sup> Images of an *In Fight* issue number 67 dating to September 2014 and an issue number 68 dating to November 2014 are the last ones that were identified, which suggests that this magazine is no longer being published.<sup>72</sup>

*Al Rashideen (Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan [SSP])*

The English-language magazine *Al Rashideen* (The Righteous) was published in February 2013 by “Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP), a Pakistani Salafist-jihadist group.”<sup>73</sup> The first issue, which is not numbered, has the title “Iran Must Fall Before Palestine Can Be Liberated.” The magazine is anti-Shi’a and, interestingly, has “Free Syrian Army News” written on part of the cover.<sup>74</sup> The Special (March 2013) issue is titled “The Iranian Revolution” while the third (also March 2013) issue has no specific featured theme. The magazine had a news Twitter account that was active from April 2013 through February 2015, as well as a now-defunct supporting website and contact email address.<sup>75</sup> The magazine was published by Saad Aziz – who attended the Institute of Business Administration, Karachi – and some of his former classmates.<sup>76</sup> Saad Aziz and his associates were later arrested by Pakistani authorities in May 2015 for their involvement in a large-scale attack on Ismaili (Shi’a sect) adherents on a bus.<sup>77</sup> While the magazine issues can no longer be accessed from their original *Scribd.com* digital location, they all currently exist behind a for-profit intelligence group paywall.<sup>78</sup>

### *Lone Mujahid Pocketbook (AQAP)*

This to-date single-issue 63-page periodical was published in March 2013 by AQAP. It was distributed by Al-Malahem Media with the cover designation “Spring 1434 | 2013 | OSJ Special.” The publication represents a compendium of OSJ articles from issues 1-10 (June 2010 to March 2013) of *Inspire* magazine.<sup>79</sup> It may be considered an addendum to it.<sup>80</sup> Instructions are provided in the magazine for lone jihadists to torch parked vehicles, cause road accidents, start forest fires, drive a large pickup truck to run people down, use propane gas to blow up a building, make bombs (including acetone peroxide explosives and remote detonators), train and employ small arms, and send and receive encrypted messages for basic operational security requirements. A communication method to Al-Malahem Media is provided at the end of the document utilizing email accounts by means of a 2048-bit public key cryptosystem.<sup>81</sup>

### *Palestine (AQAP)*

In August 2014, a single-issue 47-page English magazine was published by AQAP. The magazine, *Palestine: Betrayal of the Guilty Conscience* is derived from past content from earlier *Inspire* issues as well as from new writings created for this special publication. It was produced under the Al-Malahem Media banner and initially released via Twitter.<sup>82</sup> In support of its focus on liberating Gaza and the Al Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem, it calls for attacks on the United States and Great Britain—as supporters of Israel—rather than upon Israel itself. This was to be accomplished by lone wolf terrorists utilizing such methods as a pressure cooker

bomb or car bomb, both of which are detailed in step-by-step articles drawn from earlier *Inspire* issues.<sup>83</sup>

*Azbiru (al-Nusrah Front)*

The existence of this alleged al-Nusrah Front magazine was made known in September 2014. The first issue was roughly 18-pages long per the table of contents and said to be leaked by a Dutch Islamic State member who was mocking it for being so amateurish vis-à-vis *Dabiq*. The magazine was never officially published on radical Islamist websites and has a July 2014 date on the cover. Much of the issue is said to be focused on “the personal story of a jihadist in Syria named Abu Ali al-Kiswaani.”<sup>84</sup> This, however, is in variance to the table of contents that has numerous jihad-themed articles listed. It is unknown if this magazine – which appears to only have appeared in a single issue – was a forerunner of or in any way linked to the later al-Nusrah Front publication *Al-Risalah* which emerged about 10 months later.

*Ihya-e-Khilafat (Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan Jamaatul Ahrar [TTPJA])*

This magazine, the title of which means Revival of the Caliphate, first appeared in English in October 2014 with “Re-structuring of Tehreek-E-Taliban Pakistan” listed as the dominant article on the cover. It is published by Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan, which has been publishing this online magazine in the Urdu language. Apparently, Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan split into factions with TTPJA arising under the leadership of Omar Khalid Khorasani. The TTPJA faction was prompted to discuss their split from Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan in this first-ever English-language version of

the magazine. Additionally, it is thought that by publishing in English, TTPJA may be able to draw recruits from the West. In an article in the inaugural issue, it was explained how public opinion on the jihadi movement had become a major challenge for the Taliban.<sup>85</sup> Issue 2 of the magazine appeared in December 2014 with the cover story “Who kills innocent people?” dominant.<sup>86</sup> The opening editorial of the issue shows that the group is positioning itself as an ally of the Islamic State and gives Abu al-Baghdadi an honorific title. No further issues have since been published.

### *Inspire Guides (AQAP)*



Two Portable Document Format (PDF) files, each four-pages long, were published in June and July of 2016, focused on the active shooter “Orlando Operation” and the use of a truck in the “NICE Operation, France,” respectively.<sup>87</sup> Evolution between the guides is evident, with the initial one having a less articulated and structured outline than the second. The first guide is broken down into a dedication to Allah, an overview (To Proceed:), a mention of the most important characteristics and advantages of the operation, and detractions related to targeting minorities (Latinos) as opposed to the Anglo-Saxon community even though the grouping was composed of “homosexuals.” Advice to make the attack more effective – that is, using explosives – referencing *Inspire* issues 1 and 12 were made. The second guide has a delineated summary (and dedication to Allah), events of the operation, analysis of the operation, operation guide, and conclusion (Finally). It was critiqued as a much more effective attack than the earlier one and was directly linked to instructions for such actions published in

*Inspire* issue 2. Both of these operational reviews were written by what is known as the “Lone Jihad Guide Team.” A third shorter one — “Comment on arresting our Muslim sisters in France” — has since appeared in September 2016.<sup>88</sup> This has been followed by a fourth guide published in November 2016 in *Inspire* issue 16 as well as a standalone publication published September 20, 2016.<sup>89</sup> It is titled “New Jersey, Minnesota, and Chelsea Operations” with tactical points mentioned as operational critiques of the three attacks. The guides appear to be a novel method to quickly link OSJ promoted in *Inspire* to real-world al-Qaeda terrorism outcomes. They also serve as an instructional critique and rating of how the operation was carried out, giving AQAP members a publicly interactive means of reaching out to their readership and congratulating them on their lone wolf attacks — albeit posthumously. Such interaction may have become even more important since reader email communications with the *Inspire* publishing staff were terminated by March 2014.

#### *Rumiyah (Islamic State)*





This new series is the Islamic State’s follow-on publication to *Dabiq*. Recognizing that the city of Dabiq, Syria would eventually fall to the coalition aligned against it — which subsequently happened in mid-October 2016 — the Islamic State refocused its premier English-language online magazine on Rumiyah, which in classical Arabic means Rome. The new propaganda mythos is that the fall of Rome now needs to be focused upon instead of the End of Days battle at Dabiq.<sup>90</sup> The first issue (issue 1: Dhul-Hijjah 1437) of this magazine was published in September 2016, the second issue (issue 2: Muharram 1438) published a month later, and the third issue (issue 3: Safar 1438) published in November. The first two issues are 37 pages long, and

the third issue is 45 pages long. They do not have issue titles. Instead, they list the issue's contents and a cover picture of a mujahideen (holy Islamic fighter) in ranks, that of a bloody combat knife being held up, and the front of a bombed out building along with responder personnel, respectively. The publication of this new magazine fully signifies a shift in Islamic State strategy from extending the Caliphate in Syria and Iraq to one of engaging in lone wolf and small cell attacks primarily in the West but also in locales such as Kenya and Bangladesh. *Rumiyah* is a shorter and inferior product to *Dabiq* and is illustrative of the mounting pressure the Islamic State is now under financially and militarily as it continues to lose cities and territories within its shrinking Caliphate.<sup>91</sup> The third issue, however, has grown in size and appears to be increasing in overall quality.

| Name /No.                          | Issue Name  | Date                                    | Length | Main Articles  |
|------------------------------------|---|---|--------|--|
| <i>Benefit of the Day</i> /Issue 1 | No Title<br>  | Rabee' al-Awwal 1428<br>April-May 2007) | 51 pp. | Tawheed is the Most Trusty Handhold; Virtues of the Martyrs; Account Yourself; Another Day, Another Mission; Reflecting on Death; The Seven Blessings of a Martyr. |
| <i>Benefit of the Day</i> /Issue 2 | No Title<br> | Jumaad al-Awwal 1428<br>(May-June 2007) | 32 pp. | The Virtues Of Encouraging Jihad; The Conditions of "Laa Ilaaha Illaa Allah"; Death; Advice from a Mujahid; The Muslims Must Unite; The Assemblies of Faith.       |

**Table 10. Additional Radical Islamist Online Magazines.<sup>92</sup>**







| Name /No.                          | Issue Name  | Date                                       | Length | Main Articles  |
|------------------------------------|---|--|--------|--|
| <i>Benefit of the Day</i> /Issue 3 | No Title<br>   | Jummad ath-Thanni 1428<br>(June-July 2007) | 30 pp. | The Conditions of “Laa Ilaaha Illaa Allah”; Support the Mujahideen; O Christ Worshipers!; Beware of the Vulture Culture!; A Qur’anic Formula of remaining hidden from enemy sight; How to recognize if you are allied with the Kuffar. |
| <i>Benefit of the Day</i> /Issue 4 | No Title<br>   | Rajab 1428<br>(July-August 2007)           | 30 pp. | “...Then know...you are in the middle of a battle...”; The Straight Path; True Love of A Mujahid; “The Prophet was Sent with 4 Swords...”; Dead Hearts; Justifying Sins By Intention.  |
| <i>Benefit of the Day</i> /Issue 5 | No Title<br>  | Sha’baan 1428<br>(August-September 2007)   | 31 pp. | Malcom X: This is what I believe in...; The Two Faced Person; Letter from a Muslim Captive; The Muslims are all one Hand against those that Oppose them...; An Imprisoned Mujahid’s Dream that ‘Isaa (‘alayhi assalam) is coming soon. |
| <i>Benefit of the Day</i> /Issue 6 | No Title<br> | Ramadan 1428<br>(September-October 2007)   | 22 pp. | Allah is Sufficient as Witness; The Death of the People of Hell; Like Chickens in the Fields; “Before He was Taken to Prison”; How To Seek Laylatul-Qadr; The Winners in Ramadan.  |




**Table 10. Additional Radical Islamist Online Magazines. (cont.)**

| Name /No.                                 | Issue Name  | Date                                     | Length | Main Articles   |
|---|---|--|--------|---|
| <i>Benefit of the Day</i> /Issue 7        | No Title<br>   | Shawwaal 1428<br>(October-November 2007) | x pp.* | Unknown.  |
| <i>Benefit of the Day</i> /Issue 2, No. 1 | No Title<br>   | Muharram 1429<br>(January-February 2008) | 22 pp. | One Sin led to his Repentance; A Great Lady in the Battle of Jalalabad; Take Pride in Islam; Why We Should Migrate; The Severity of the Test Causes Elevation of Rank; Heroic Woman.                                    |
| <i>Benefit of the Day</i> /Issue 2, No. 2 | No Title<br>  | Safar 1429<br>(February-March 2008)      | 23 pp. | Umar's Exile of the Jews...; "This day I have completed your religion,"; How to Benefit From the Qur'aan; Shari'a and Islam; Shaykh al-Islam Ibn Taiymiya on Apostates; I Saw Fire!; There is No Bachelorhood in Islam. |
| <i>Benefit of the Day</i> /Issue 2, No. 3 | No Title<br> | Rabi' al-Awwal<br>(March-April 2008)     | x pp.* | Unknown.  |




**Table 10. Additional Radical Islamist  
Online Magazines. (cont.)**

| Name /No.                          | Issue Name   | Date                                      | Length | Main Articles  |
|------------------------------------|--|---|--------|--|
| <i>Benefit of the Day</i> /Unknown | No Title<br>  | Ramadan 1429<br>(~September-October 2008) | 33 pp. | Ramadan in History (Parts 1-3); Darkness & Its Lamps; Piety; Wisdom Behind Fasting (Parts 1-7); Sharh As-Siyaam Wa Al-Qiyaam (Parts 1-4); The Majority of Hellfires Inhabitants. |
| <i>Benefit of the Day</i> /Unknown | No Title<br>  | Shawal 1429<br>(~October-November 2008)   | x pp.* | Unknown.   |
| <i>Al Rashideen</i> /Issue 1       | Iran Must Fall Before Palestine Can Be Liberated<br> | February 2013                             | x pp.* | Unknown.   |
| <i>Al Rashideen</i> /Special Issue | The Iranian Revolution<br>                          | March 2013                                | x pp.* | Unknown.   |





**Table 10. Additional Radical Islamist Online Magazines. (cont.)**

| Name /No.                         | Issue Name  | Date        | Length | Main Articles   |
|-----------------------------------|---|-------------|--------|---|
| <i>Al Rashideen</i><br>/Issue 3   | No Title<br>                   | March 2013  | x pp.* | Unknown.  |
| <i>Lone Mujahid</i><br>Pocketbook | Lone Mujahid<br>Pocketbook<br> | March 2013  | 63 pp. | Torching Parked Vehicles; Causing Road Accidents; Starting Forest Fires; the ultimate mowing machine (Using pick trucks to run down people); Destroying Buildings; Bomb Making: Kitchen Fun; Making Acetone Peroxide; Remote Control Detonation; Training with the Handgun; Training with the AK (I & II); Special Consultancy; How to use Asrar al-Mujahideen.   |
| <i>Palestine</i>                  | Palestine<br>                 | August 2014 | 47 pp. | Palestine in Focus; Palestine Betrayal of the Guilty Conscience; Hatred Has Already Appeared From Their Mouths; Irrational Alliance; Blood for Blood and Destruction for Destruction; Timeline; Fighting...Our Obligation; Palestine...Now The Battle Has Reached Its Pinnacle; Liberating Palestine; O Hesitant One: It's an Obligation; OSJ: Preparing a Pressure Cooker Bomb; OSJ: Car Bombs inside America. |




**Table 10. Additional Radical Islamist  
Online Magazines. (cont.)**

| Name /No.                           | Issue Name   | Date                          | Length | Main Articles   |
|-------------------------------------|--|-------------------------------|--------|---|
| <i>Azbiru</i><br>/ Issue 1          | No Title<br>(Jihad Theme)<br>                           | Ramadan 1435<br>(July 2014)** | 18 pp. | Jihad Theme: Abu Qatadah Al Filistini; Abu Muhammad Al-Maqdisi; Giants of Jihad; Shaheed Stories; Journey to Jihad; Sahaba Stories; Sham; Shahda; Sahaba Stories; Wake Up; Ibn Qayyim Aljawzia.   |
| <i>Ihya-e-Khilafat</i><br>/ Issue 1 | Re-structuring of<br>Tehreek-e-<br>Taliban Pakistan<br> | Safar-1436<br>(October 2014)  | 55 pp. | Stat[e]ments of the leaders regarding the restructuring of Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan; Operation Zarb-E-Azb; Nationalism: An Old Concept & A New Religion; In Pursuit of Territory; An Exclusive Interview of Respected Ameer Omar Khalid with Ihya-e-khilafat; Why I chose to join Jihad-e-Pakistan; Still Not Time to Wake Up; How Would Pakistan Look Under Shariah; Public Opinion: Major Challenge Faced In Jihad Of Pakistan. |
| <i>Ihya-e-Khilafat</i><br>/ Issue 2 | Who kills<br>innocent people<br>                      | Safar-1436<br>(December 2014) | 47 pp. | Muhammad Ali Jinnah: Hero or Traitor; Our Right to Spread Terror; Who Kills Innocent People; Army Proposed, Allah Disposed (Part 1); Interview with Ameer Omar Khalid Khorasani (Part 2); Naseeha from Frontline; Imam Izzudin; Mufti Nizamuddin Shamzaee Fatwa; Obstacles in Jihade Pakistan (Part 1); Jihad – The Solution of Pakistan’s Problems; Dream of Mujahida; Mujahid Kids; 2014 – What Was Gained and Lost.              |

**Table 10. Additional Radical Islamist  
Online Magazines. (cont.)**

| Name /No.                | Issue Name   | Date                                 | Length | Main Articles  |
|--------------------------|--|--------------------------------------|--------|--|
| <i>Inspire Guide 1</i>   | Orlando Operation<br>   | 1437/9/12<br>(June 17, 2016)         | 3 pp.  | Orlando Operation.   |
| <i>Inspire Guide 2</i>   | Nice Operation, France<br>  | 1437/10 /12<br>(July 17, 2016)       | 3 pp.  | Nice Operation, France.  |
| <i>Rumiyah / Issue 1</i> | No Title<br>  | Dhul-Hijjah 1437<br>(September 2016) | 37 pp. | Stand and Die upon That for Which Your Brothers Died; The Religion of Islam and the Jama'ah of the Muslims; Interview with the Amir of the Central Office for Investigating Grievances; Among the Believers are Men: Abu Mansur al-Muhajir; O Women, Give Charity; The Wicked Scholars are Cursed; The Kafir's Blood is Halal for You, So Shed It. |
| <i>Inspire Guide 3</i>   | Comment on arresting our Muslim sisters in France<br><br>Arabic Cover Version | 1437/12/8<br>(September 10, 2016)    | 1 p.   | Comment on arresting our Muslim sisters in France.   |

**Table 10. Additional Radical Islamist Online Magazines. (cont.)**

| Name /No.   | Issue Name   | Date                               | Length | Main Articles   |
|---|--|------------------------------------|--------|---|
| <i>Inspire Guide 4</i>  | New Jersey, Minnesota, and Chelsea Operations<br> | 1437/12/18<br>(September 20, 2016) | 4 pp.  | New Jersey, Minnesota, and Chelsea Operations.  |
| <i>Rumiyah /Issue 2</i>   | No Title<br>                                      | Muharram 1438<br>(October 2016)    | 37 pp. | A Message from East Africa; Important Memorandums; The Shuhada of the Gulshan Attack; Just Terror Tactics; The Religion of Islam and the Jama'ah of the Muslims –Part 3; Paths to Victory –Part 1; Brutality and Severity towards the Kuffar; Glad Tidings of Imminent Victory to the Patient; Stories of Steadfastness from the Lives of the Sahabiyyat.   |
| <i>Rumiyah /Issue 3</i>   | No Title<br>                                     | Safar 1438<br>(November 2016)      | 45 pp. | The Weakest House is That of a Spider; This is What Allah and His Messenger Promised Us; Just Terror Tactics –Part 2; Among the Believers Are Men: Abu 'Abdillah al-Britani; The Religion of Islam and the Jama'ah of the Muslims –Part 4; Paths to Victory –Part 2; Towards the Major Malhamah of Dabiq; The Obligation of Exposing Wicked Scholars; Jihad through Du'a; Sultan Mahmud al-Ghaznawi; Abide in Your Homes; Military and Covert Operations. |
| Notes:<br>*Page count is unknown.<br>**The magazine has the date of publication as July 2014 on it but the earliest online confirmation is September. |  |                                    |        |   |

**Table 10. Additional Radical Islamist Online Magazines. (cont.)**

All of the English-language magazines identified in this book—both major and minor (except for *In Fight* with its 68 issues)—have been compiled into a master magazine chronological listing (see appendix I) for future research purposes. Further, for all of these magazines, this book provides their terrorist group allegiance/foreign terrorist organization (FTO) designation (see appendix II) where applicable.<sup>93</sup>

### ***Islamic State News (ISN) and Islamic State Reports (ISR) and eBooks***

In addition to the aforementioned radical Islamist magazines, the Islamic State experimented with two short-lived series of English-language news and reports that were eventually combined into *Dabiq* magazine in July 2014.<sup>94</sup> These are the ISN and ISR series. They ran between 5 to 10 pages in length (not counting the cover) with about 7 pages being the norm. Three ISN and four ISR were produced, with all the magazines released in June 2014, except for the initial ISN issue that appeared on May 31, 2014. See table 11 for more information and cover images. These series are all available for research online.<sup>95</sup> About the relationship of these publications to *Dabiq*:

ISIS's [Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham's] media strategy has adapted to prioritize this religious requirement in the aftermath of its June 2014 offensive. In the month before the invasion of Mosul, ISIS's English-language military reporting came through the *Islamic State News* (ISN) magazine, first released on May 31, 2014, and its English-language political reporting came through the *Islamic State Report* (ISR), first released on June 3, 2014. Each series published a few short issues until July 5, 2014, when *Dabiq* apparently combined both ISN and ISR, adding additional religious commentary. The new







magazine brings together ISIS's military, governance, and religious activities into one united outreach effort. This change reflects an effort by the group to integrate military and governance actions to support a coherent religious vision.<sup>96</sup>

This analysis of the role of these publications is supported by the military themes focused upon in the ISN issues—car bombs, destroying tanks, military offensives, ambushes, and war plunder—and the political themes found in the ISR issues—governance, consumer protection, collecting taxes for the poor (*zakah*), the liberation of Mosul, the redrawing of political boundaries, and ethnic cleansing.<sup>97</sup>

|                           | Title   | No./Date   | Length | Series: Bylines (Selected)  |
|---------------------------|---|--|--------|---|
| <i>Islamic State News</i> | Top Story: Car Bomb Rocks Ar-Raqqah<br>                  | 1/June 1, 2014<br>(Shaban 1435)<br>Posted online<br>May 31, 2014 | 6 pp.  | Islamic State News: Car Bomb Rocks Ar-Raqqah; Gates of Al-Khair Reached; Shola in Homs Bombed; Hunting for Tanks; Aid Distribution; Command is for Allah; Re-taking Al-Khayr.   |
|                           | Trade Flourishes Under the Rule of the Islamic State<br> | 2/June 5, 2014<br>(Shaban 1435)                                  | 10 pp. | Islamic State News: Fresh Produce; Implementing the Hudud; Istishhadiyyun; Fight Them; To Repent or Not; On the Hunt; Liberation of As-Sabhah and Al-Bareehah; Answering the Call to Prayer; Wait for Them in Every Place of Ambush.                      |
|                           | Enter Upon Them Through the Gates<br>                   | 3/June 10, 2014<br>(Shaban 1435)                                 | 6 pp.  | Islamic State News; Enter Upon Them Through the Gates; Brazen Attack on Mosul; Join the Ranks Oh Brothers!; Maliki's Forces Humiliated; Islamic State Advances on Al-Khayr; Community Shows Support for Hadd; Islamic State Provides Security to Farmers. |

**Table 11. *Islamic State News (ISN) and Islamic State Report (ISR) pre-Dabiq.*<sup>98</sup>**

|                      | Title  | No./Date                         | Length | Series: Bylines (Selected)  |
|----------------------|--|----------------------------------|--------|---|
| Islamic State Report | Propagating the Correct Manhaj<br>                            | 1/June 3, 2014<br>(Shaban 1435)  | 6 pp.  | Islamic State Report: Propagating the Correct Manhaj; Interview with Seminar Organizer Shaikh Abul-Hawraa' Al-Jazaa'iri; On Patrol with the Office of Consumer Protection; Consumer Protection/Complaints Officials Interviews. |
|                      | Farmers Reap the Rewards of their Harvest by Giving Zakah<br> | 2/June 7, 2014<br>(Shaban 1435)  | 6 pp.  | Islamic State Report: Farmers Reap the Rewards of their Harvest by Giving Zakah; On the Beat: ISR Examines How the Islamic Police Safeguards Ar-Raqqah and their Importance to State Building.                                  |
|                      | Islamic State Liberates the City of Mosul<br>                | 3/June 13, 2014<br>(Shaban 1435) | 5 pp.  | Islamic State Report: Islamic State Liberates the City of Mosul.  |
|                      | Smashing the Borders of the Tawaghit<br>                    | 4/June 21, 2014<br>(Shaban 1435) | 7 pp.  | Islamic State Report: Smashing the Borders of the Tawaghit; The Battle of Asa-dullah Al-Bilawi.   |

**Table 11. *Islamic State News (ISN) and Islamic State Report (ISR) pre-Dabiq. (cont.)***

Additionally, a large group of English-language eBook publications has been produced and are associated with the Islamic State. While some of these early works predate the establishment of the Islamic State—and may initially be considered al-Qaeda manuscripts—they have since been co-opted by the Islamic State and integrated into their narratives. A short discussion of these publications is provided to facilitate future research, as no readily available listing of these eBooks, chronological or otherwise, exists anywhere in defense counterterrorism literature.<sup>99</sup> This is due to the fragmented analysis that exists as well as some related title and publication date confusion that is evident. See table 12 for more information and cover images. Some of these eBook publications read very much like collections of internet essays combined with images, while others resemble mostly text-based reports with some supporting pictures and maps included in what appears to be word processing documents turned into PDF files. They can be roughly divided into four thematic series: *Black Flags*, *Shudada* (Martyrs), *Islamic State*, and *The West*.

The first series is composed of the following eBooks—*Black Flags from the East: The Movements Past, Present, and Future 1979-2012* (November 2012), *Black Flags from Syria: 2020: Return of the Global Caliphate* (May 2013), *Black Flags from Arabia* (September 2013), *Black Flags from Persia* (October 2014), *Black Flags from Rome (Europe): Armed Gangs & Missiles* (January 2015), *Black Flags from Palestine* (Magic, Deception & War) (April 2015), and *Black Flags from the Islamic State: How al-Qa'idah became the Islamic State (1989-2016)* (November 2015).<sup>100</sup> These manuscripts primarily relate to prophecy, geopolitical events, and wars. *The East* eBook is focused on Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda

with an emphasis on the years 1979 through 2011, discusses near future predictions (2012 onward), and then provides a special short section on *Black Flags* from the East, which is related to al-Qaeda goals. The *Syria* eBook in the series is composed of sections on guerilla warfare; events in Iraq from 2003-2011; the Syrian revolution from 2012 onward; al-Qaeda in Iraq and the Syria merger in April 2013; al-Qaeda's 7-step strategy for a Global Caliphate by 2020; inside al-Qaeda; the Syrian dilemmas; Israel enters Syria; prophesized figures; updates on Muslim-world conflicts; al-Qaeda's global guerrilla war; and the past, present, and future of al-Qaeda. The *Arabia* manuscript provides:

a brief history of the modern conflict in Arabia, explains how the conflicts in countries neighboring Arabia will lead to the fall of the tyrant rulers in the entire Muslim world, and how this will give rise to the Global Khilafah (Caliphate) which begins from Makkah, Arabia.<sup>101</sup>

The *Persia* eBook is divided into sections on the Pre-Islamic Persians, 2003: America invades Iraq & Revives the Persian empire, the Syrian Jihad and the Islamic State (2010-2014 onward), the Global Alliance against Sunnis, Yemen: the Houthi Shi'a take over Yemen's capital, Predictions of near Future Events (up to 2020 onward), the beginning of the Conquest of Rome, and the Malhama al-Kubra (Armageddon) spills into Europe—How? The *Rome* eBook discusses the events in Europe that—according to the prophetic narrations—could lead to an alliance between the Western Romans (Europeans) and the Sunni Muslims against the Russians and Shi'a Muslims. The Islamic State and the Roman alliance would win, with Persia then conquered by Sunnis and later a “breaking of the cross” would occur. This event would set in motion the battle

at Dabiq to start the *Malhama al-Kubra* (The Great Armageddon). The *Palestine* work has sections on The History of the Jews (2000 B.C.–1800 C.E.), The goal to make Israel (1800–1986), Israel the State, Palestine: The Resistance & Islamic Awakening (1987–2014), The Islamic State Project (2014 onward), and The End of Time Battles. It draws upon radical Islamist prophecy to argue that a mujahideen army will eventually defeat Israel and the Black Flags will be raised in Jerusalem as a prelude to the Armageddon and final destruction of the Earth. Finally, the *Islamic State* eBook—that is more practical and applied in nature—chronicles the foundations of global jihad laid down by al-Qaeda and the rise of the Islamic State and then discusses lone jihad, insurgency, and the Paris attacks of November 2015.<sup>102</sup>

The second series is composed of *The Undead Warriors* (January 2013), *Miracles in Syria* (2012–13) (November 2013), *Revivers of the Khilafah* (November 2013), and *Martyrs in Syria* (2014) (July 2014)—also known as *Heroes of Syria: Shuhada stories from al-Sham* (September 2014). These four works are spiritual and motivational in nature and focus on the martyrdom of Islamic State and earlier mujahideen fighters. *The Undead Warriors* focuses on this Surah: “Think not of those who are killed in the Way of Allah as dead. Nay, they are alive, with their Lord, and they have provision” as it relates to early mujahideen martyrs in Afghanistan.<sup>103</sup> These warriors are also known as *Ushaq al Hoor* (Lovers of the Maidens of Paradise), which is also one of the variant preface titles of this eBook. While equally pertinent to al-Qaeda adherents, this work is being promoted by the Islamic State in their eBook series media. *Miracles in Syria* chronicles the appearance of an angel on an urban battlefield, captured fighters bodies that do not burn, smiling martyrs in their burial shrouds, food

meant for 5 feeding 20 grown men, enemy bombs that detonate but do not hurt Islamic State fighters, martyr bodies that do not decay, and related miracles taking place. The bulk of *Revivers of the Khilafah* is dedicated to stories of the Shuhadaa (martyrs) in Syria, Bilaal al-Bar'jaawi, Aboud Rogo Muhammad, Abu Huraira Al-Ansari et al., as well as providing information related to the war in Syria and information on Twitter accounts and additional eBook readings. *Martyrs in Syria* is divided into sections on stories about martyrs who have entered the eternal abode, Dutch Mujahideen in al-Shaam (Greater Syria), Dawlat al-Islam (My ummah [people], dawn has appeared – referring to the return of the Caliphate), and media extras.<sup>104</sup>

The third series is composed of the works *The Revived Caliphate* (August 2014), *The Islamic State* (January 2015), and *Hijrah to the Islamic State: What to Pickup, Who to Contact, Where to Go, Stories and More!* (February 2015). The initial publication chronicles the rise of the Caliphate by means of a radical Islamist narrative. It first discusses the life of Abu Mus'ab al-Zarqawi and highlights events from 2003 in Iraq, and 2011 in Syria, and the merging of these event timelines in April 2013. Finally, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi and the prophecy that had been predicted to take place in 2017 are discussed. The second eBook provides an overview of the workings of the Islamic State. It is divided into sections on leadership, soldiers, services, media, and the future as well as information on Twitter accounts and further readings. The third work focuses on providing new Islamic State recruits a hijrah (emigration) guide to Syria and includes directions on what to pack for the trip and how to get through Turkish border security.<sup>105</sup> It also includes a section on the stories of Arab fighters' emigration to Syria.

The fourth series focuses on how individual operatives and small groups can attack Europe and the United States, and it is composed of *How to Survive in the West: A Mujahid Guide* (eBook 1: March 2015) and *Muslim Gangs: The Future of Muslims in the West* (eBook 2: July 2015). The first work contains information on how a jihadist should hide their identity, make money, obtain weapons and train with them, and then engage in attacks.<sup>106</sup> It also provides internet security protocols that should be undertaken for communication purposes. The second work focuses on shifting from lone wolf terrorism into resistance cells (e.g., small gangs) with military and propaganda arms.<sup>107</sup> Gang recruitment, planning against police raids with fortified homes, and reaction protocols to limit the damage a police raid can do to a resistance cell are also covered.





| Title  | No./Date  | Length        | Series: Sections/Chapters   |
|--|---|---------------|---|
| <p><i>Black Flags from the East: The Movements Past, Present, and Future 1979-2012</i> (Alternate Cover – <i>Black Flags from Khurasan: The Movements Past, Present, and Future 1979-2012</i>)</p>  | <p>Book 1;<br/>November 2012<br/>(Also dated to<br/>2013)</p> | <p>82 pp.</p> | <p><i>Black Flags</i>: Introduction: The Boy's Dream; Part 1–1979-1989—a new Islamic century; Part 2—(1989-2000)—the Foundation of the Movement; Part 3: (2001-2002); Part 4—(2002-2005)—Settling in Pakistan; Part 5—New Allies (2005-2012); Part 6—Block the Global supply routes; Part 7—The Arab Springs (2011+); Part 8: Osama gets killed; Part 9: Near Future Predictions (2012+); Part 10: Special—the Black Flags from the East.</p> |

Table 12. Islamic State eBooks Chronology.<sup>108</sup>





| Title   | No./Date                  | Length  | Series: Sections/Chapters   |
|---|---------------------------|---|---|
| <p><i>The Undead Warriors</i><br/>(Alternate—<i>Ushaq al Hoor</i><br/>and <i>The Undead Warriors</i>)</p>  | Book 1;<br>January 2013   | 135 pp.<br>(Part 1)<br>(alt. ver-<br>sion<br>218 pp.) | <i>Shuhada</i> : History of Afghanistan; Virtues of the Martyrs; Martyrs listed; The Coalition Launches War; Martyrs listed; Stories from the Battlefield; The New Wave.  |
| <p><i>Black Flags from Syria:</i><br/>2020: Return of the Global<br/>Caliphate</p>                         | Book 2; May<br>2013       | 106 pp.   | <i>Black Flags</i> : What is Guerrilla warfare?; Ch. 1: Iraq (2003- 2011); Ch. 2: The Syrian Revolution (2012+); Ch. 3: AQ Iraq & Syria Merger (April 2013); Ch. 4: Al Qa'idah's 7-step Strategy for a Global Caliphate by 2020; Ch. 5: How does Jabhat and AQ affiliates work?; Ch. 6: the Syrian dilemmas; Ch. 7: Israel; Ch. 8: Prophecised figures; Ch. 9: Updates on the Muslim-world conflicts; Ch. 10: *Special*: AQ's Global Guerrilla war—Smashing Borders; Ch. 11: Past, Present & Future of AQ; Further Reading. |
| <p><i>Black Flags from Arabia</i></p>    | Book 3;<br>September 2013 | 126 pp.   | <i>Black Flags</i> : Sec. 1: Arabia—Bilaad al Haramain—The Land of the Two Holy Mosques; Sec. 2: Syria Updates (up to late August 2013); Sec. 3: The Islamic State ( <i>Dawat-ul-Islaamiyah</i> )—how is it like?; Sec. 4: Egypt (2013); Sec. 5: AQ Objective coming true: The West is losing its grip over Muslim lands; Sec. 6: Israel - the not-so-quiet borders; Sec. 7: An Interview with a Mujahid in Syria from the West; Sec. 8: Prophecies; Sec. 9: Ummah Updates; Sec. 10: Must Watch Videos.                     |

**Table 12. Islamic State eBooks Chronology. (cont.)**

| Title   | No./Date  | Length   | Series: Sections/Chapters   |
|---|---|--|---|
| <p><i>Miracles in Syria (2012-13)</i></p>    | November 2013<br>(1434-1435)                    | 77 pp.   | <i>Shuhada</i> : The Beginning – the Boy who sprayed on the Wall; Fighting Begins; “The 5 star Jihad”; Miracles (Part I & II); Funny stories of Battle; 6 Mujahideen vs. Bashar’s battalion; The Sahwa (Awakening) Groups of Syria; Shuhadaa (Martyrdom) stories; Twitter accounts; Further Reading ebooks. |
| <p><i>Revivers of the Khilafah (Global Caliphate)</i></p>    | November 2013; Shuhadah Stories (1434 H I 2013) | 104 pp.  | <i>Shuhada</i> : Stories of the Shuhadaa (Martyrs) – [Numerous individuals discussed; Series of Syria related questions]; Twitter Accounts; More Books.   |
| <p><i>Martyrs in Syria (2014)</i><br/>(Alternate Cover – <i>Heroes of Syria: Shuhada stories from al-Sham</i>)</p>  | July 2014<br>(September 2014)                   | 99 pp.<br>(alt. version 100 pp. [1 added blank]) | <i>Shuhada</i> : Part 1: The Eternal Abode (Series 1 & 2); Part 3: Dutch (Netherlands) Mujahideen in al-Shaam; Part 4: Dawlat al-Islam – the Islamic State; Part 5: Extras – Media.   |



**Table 12. Islamic State eBooks Chronology. (cont.)**

| Title  | No./Date                                     | Length  | Series: Sections/Chapters   |
|--|--|---------|---|
| <p><i>Black Flags from Persia</i></p>     | Book 4; October 2014                         | 85 pp.  | <p><i>Black Flags</i>: Sec. 1: The Pre-Islamic Persians; Sec. 2: 2003: America invades Iraq &amp; Revives the Persian empire; Sec. 3: The Syrian Jihad and the Islamic State (2010-2014+); Sec. 4: The Global Alliance against Sunnis; Sec. 5: Yemen: the Houthis Shi'a take over Yemen's capital; Sec. 6: Predictions of near Future Events (up to 2020+); Sec. 7: The beginning of the Conquest of Rome; Conclusion; Further Reading.</p>   |
| <p><i>The Revived Caliphate</i></p>       | eBook 1, Part 1; August 2014                 | 105 pp. | <p><i>Islamic State</i>: Abu Mus'ab al-Zarqawi—the man who sowed the seed of the Caliphate; Iraq (2003-2011+); Attack on the UN HQ in Iraq; Abu Hamza al Muhajir &amp; Abu Umar al-Baghdadi—AQI to Dawlat al-Islam (2006-2010); The Syrian Revolution (2011+); Announcement: Islamic State of Iraq &amp; Syria Merger (April 2013); The Sahwa (Awakening groups) of Syria (2014); Life in the Islamic State—a Personal experience; Khalifah Ibrahim—Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi al Qurayshi al-Husseini al-Baghdadi; Prophecy: Order of International Conquests; Did You Know: European and Western Muslims in Syria; Summary.</p> |
| <p><i>The Islamic State (2015)</i></p>  | eBook 1, Part 2 (also eBook 2); January 2015 | 99 pp.  | <p><i>Islamic State</i>: Leadership; Soldiers; Services; Media; Future; Twitter Accounts; Further Reading.</p>  |

**Table 12. Islamic State eBooks Chronology. (cont.)**

| Title   | No./Date                      | Length  | Series: Sections/Chapters   |
|---|-------------------------------|---------|---|
| <p><i>Black Flags from Rome (Europe): Armed Gangs &amp; Missiles</i></p>                                   | Book 5; January 2015          | 99 pp.  | <p><i>Black Flags</i>: Introduction; 90s—the Islamic Jihad Revival in Europe; European Arabs; Bosnian Jihad; 2011+—The Syrian Jihad—which changed the world; Did You Know: How Intelligence Agencies work; Omar Nasiri's story: A meeting with Laurent, the dealer; Muslims—the oppressed citizens turn to Insurgency; How will European borders be smashed? Answer: Russia; Italy on the Map; Further Reading.</p> |
| <p><i>Hijrah to the Islamic State: What to Pickup, Who to Contact, Where to Go, Stories and More!</i></p>  | No Designation; February 2015 | 49 pp.  | <p><i>Islamic State</i>: How Islamic State members get into &amp; out of Syria; Hijrah Advice—Suggested Setup for Packing, Know Your Strengths &amp; Weaknesses, Getting Stopped in Turkey; Stories of Arab Fighters Migration to Syria; Interview with Abu Hurayra al-Ameriki—a miracle story; Twitter Accounts; Ahadith on Hijrah; Further Reading.</p>   |
| <p><i>How to Survive in the West: A Mujahid Guide</i></p>   | eBook 1; March 2015           | 70 pp.  | <p><i>The West</i>: Foreword; Introduction; Ch. 1: Hiding the Extremist Identity; Ch.2: Breaking Allegiance; Ch. 3: Earning Money; Ch. 4: Internet Privacy; Ch. 5: Training; Ch. 6: Primitive Weapons; Ch. 7: Modern Weapons; Ch. 8: Bomb Making; Ch. 9: Transporting Weapons; Ch. 10: What happens when you are spied on and get raided; Ch. 11: The Jihad Begins; Ch. 12: Escaping for Safety; Resources.</p>     |
| <p><i>Black Flags from Palestine (Magic, Deception &amp; War)</i></p>                                    | Book 6; April 2015            | 149 pp. | <p><i>Black Flags</i>: Part 1: History of the Jews (2000 BC-1800 AD) Part 2: The goal to make Israel (1800-1986); Part 3—Israel the State; Part 4: Palestine: The Resistance &amp; Islamic Awakening (1987-2014); Part 5: The Islamic State Project (2014+); Part 6: The End of Time Battles; Further Reading.</p>  |

**Table 12. Islamic State eBooks Chronology. (cont.)**

| Title   | No./Date                     | Length  | Series: Sections/Chapters   |
|---|------------------------------|---------|---|
| <p><i>Muslim Gangs: The Future of Muslims in the West</i></p>    | No Designation;<br>July 2015 | 44 pp.  | <i>The West</i> : Gangs – the Future trend in the modern world; Propaganda Arm; A Military Arm; How Gangs recruit?; Building Defences; The Battle of Badr – the victory repeated throughout history.  |
| <p><i>Black Flags from the Islamic State: How al-Qa'idah became the Islamic State (1989-2016)</i></p>  | Book 7;<br>November 2015     | 129 pp. | Black Flags: Ch. 1: Al Qa'idatu al-Jihad (the Foundation of the global Jihad) (1989-2001); Ch. 2: Al Qa'idah dispersed (2001+); Ch. 3: Iraq (2003); Ch. 4: The Arabian Peninsula (2003-2006); Ch. 5: Rise of the Islamic State (2006-2020+); Ch. 6: The Scary Events leading to the Future Global Jihad; Ch. 7: Lone wolves -> Clandestine Cells -> Insurgency -> Army; Ch. 8: The Jihad for Rome begins; Ch. 9: Final Chapter – Be prepared for a Global War which will hit every member of this Ummah (Muslim Nation); Further Reading. |

**Table 12. Islamic State eBooks Chronology. (cont.)**

For this research book, the authors – due to project constraints – will solely focus on the 15 issues of the AQAP magazine *Inspire* and the 15 issues of the Islamic State magazine *Dabiq* that have been published through July 2016. This is being done in order to give the reader a more in-depth analysis of some of the major content themes that can be viewed over time. It should be noted that the 16th edition of *Inspire* recently came out in November 2016. Because of its sudden last-minute appearance, it was not incorporated into this preliminary analysis but has been included in the magazine dataset listings in other sections of this book.

## COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

This section looks at the basic narratives with regard to four primary themes present in the entire dataset of existing (as of summer 2016) issues of *Inspire* (see figures 1-15) and *Dabiq* (see figures 16-30) magazines. These four primary themes are those related to the desired end state of the group, the “enemy” as defined in that particular issue, statements made related to recruitment strategies, and preferred tactics (both broadly and narrowly defined) of the group—together presenting a snapshot of the group as idealized in that particular issue. In the following figures, two or three representative quotes on each theme are provided, where available, making up a topical narrative. The dates given are the online release dates for that particular issue; thus, multiple issues may be sequential in subject matter yet share the same release date. The following should be considered not an end state for research but rather a preliminary analysis of the issues, providing enough detail to offer useful insights for researchers in the context of the current events of each specific issue’s publication date. Because it allows for recognition of general trends, it can then suggest a jumping off point for interested individuals desiring to pursue further research into specific issues without their having to do the groundwork into the expanded contents of each issue. This gets past having to rely merely on the title of each issue for guidance as the present authors have found that the titles are not necessarily representative of the ultimate content of that issue. In fact, a title often indicates simply the topic of the primary featured article—possibly only several pages out of a 50-80 page issue—and is thus deceptive of what that issue covers, if used as a research

guidepost. It is hoped that the offered descriptions and subsequent preliminary analysis will be more useful toward that end.

### **Al-Qaeda (*Inspire*) Narratives**

Although there is great deal of mention of Islam as eventually ruling supreme over the world, there is surprisingly little said in issue 1 about an eventual Caliphate except for in the introductory statements. America as crusader is the clear primary enemy throughout the issue—being guilty of everything from climate change to the ill effects of globalization—although its allies and “puppet governments” clearly fall into the target set of the jihadists as well. In this issue, individual Western targets are specifically indicated, primarily as a result of the outcry surrounding the publication in the Western media of cartoons mocking the Prophet Muhammad. Those countries, such as France, which were attempting to ban the wearing of the niqab or burqa were also given mention. Recruitment—heretofore seen by motivated individuals as requiring setting off to training camps in the Middle East to prepare for fighting in the fronts there—is broadened to focus particularly on young Muslims already in the West who are well-placed to attack Westerners by whatever means are available, creating fear and panic and resulting in increased (and costly) security measures. The tactic of bomb making and use is particularly focused upon with an emphasis on the operation of Umar al-Faruq al-Nigiri and his ability to bypass airport security while downplaying the “technical glitch” that did not allow it to come to fruition. The issue dedicates 16 pages to practical tactics and helpful hints for the jihadist. Its OSJ section includes the detailed (although questionably effective) and now infamous article “Make a bomb in the kitchen of your Mom.”<sup>109</sup>

| End State  | Enemy  | Recruitment  | TTPs   |
|--|--|--|--|
| "Jihad has been deconstructed in our age and thus its revival in comprehension and endeavor is of utmost importance for the Caliphate's manifestation." (p. 2) | <p>"We are not against Americans for just being American; we are against evil, and America as a whole has turned into a nation of evil." (p. 57)</p> <p>"The government, political parties, the police, the intelligence services, blogs, social networks, the media, and the list goes on, are part of a system within which the defamation of Islam is not only protected but promoted....This would make the attacking of any western target legal from an Islamic standpoint." (p. 28)</p> | <p>"There are many Muslims who have the zeal to defend the <i>ummah</i>...we tell the Muslims in America and Europe: There is a better choice and easier one to give support to your <i>ummah</i>. That is individual work inside the West such as the operations of Nidal Hassan and Faisal Shahzad." (p. 33)</p> <p>"you have two choices: either hijra or jihad. You either leave or you fight...with your hand, your wealth, and your word. I specifically invite the youth to fight in the West or join their brothers in the fronts of jihad." (p. 58)</p> | "O Muslims rise up in defense of your Messenger: a man with his knife, a man with his gun, a man with his rifle, a man with his bomb, by learning how to design explosive devices, by burning down forests and buildings, or by running over them with your cars and trucks...do not be weak and you will find a way." (p. 17) |

**Figure 1. Selected Excerpts from *Inspire* Issue 1: May Our Souls Be Sacrificed For You! (June 2010).<sup>110</sup>**

If the first issue of *Inspire* could be said to imply that some extended period of rejuvenation and fighting of jihad must precede any reestablishing of the Caliphate, issue 2 furthers that idea in its sense that the establishment of Islamic rule it seeks is at present a localized one. It speaks to the issue of Palestine and Gaza and that this issue lies at the heart of its issue with the West. The Jewish state of Israel and the Shi'a state of Iran thus represent the worst of the near enemy, although the government of Saudi Arabia is presented as an apostate one with which to do battle. Recruitment focuses on those on the edge, pushing them to take the leap. The emphasis for Western recruits remains upon fighting in their own backyard over going abroad, but there is emphasis in the face of the new Mardin Declaration decrying extremist violence that nonviolent solutions to the issues of the Middle East are ineffective and unacceptable. Accordingly, there is some effort to recruit enemy soldiers to their ranks. Tactically, the photo section on the operations in the Abyan region of Yemen shows checkpoint attacks, a base ambush, vehicle bombings, and dead government soldiers. The



OSJ section offers suggestions on how to use a modified pickup truck to mow down Western pedestrians in crowded locations and suggests the target countries of Israel, the United States, Great Britain, Canada, Australia, France, Germany, Denmark, Holland, and any others with either a sympathy toward Israel's occupation of Palestine, the defamation of the Prophet, or the American invasion of Afghanistan or Iraq. The OSJ section also provides tips for Western jihadis on avoiding suspicion in executing operations. It suggests that firearm operations are the fastest and easiest to undertake, but that innovative ideas are always welcome and even effective weapons of mass destruction may not be out of the reach of those with a degree in the hard sciences.

| End State   | Enemy   | Recruitment   | TTPs  |
|---|---|---|---|
| "Here we start and in Jerusalem we meet." (p. 4)  | "America is increasing its military budget not to fight Martians but to fight Muslims. On the other hand, Iran is building the most powerful military in the region. The foundations of the empire of the Shi'a are being laid in front of our own eyes." (p. 37) | "There is also the tantalizing thought that...Deep inside their hearts, many [Yemeni] soldiers realize that they are on the wrong side." (p. 4)   | "I strongly recommend all the brothers and sisters coming from the West to consider attacking the West in its own backyard. The effect is much greater, it always embarrasses the enemy, and these types of individual attacks are nearly always impossible for them to contain." (p. 24)               |
| "The goal of every jihad has been to defeat the enemy and to establish Islamic rule." (p. 18)                   | "our worst enemies are the Jews and poly-theists. The Shi'as are polytheists." (p. 44)  | "Until when must the love of jihad remain just another one of those hobbies of yours with which you while away your free time. We're neither looking for discerning viewers nor the emotions of sympathizers: we are looking for you in our midst...We shall target you with our media productions, ... as admonish-ments and reminders which will fill your souls with thoughts and inflame your hearts with a desire to join the caravan of champions." (p. 65) | "Islam does recognize changing through force and that is what fighting <i>fa sabillah</i> is. Today we cannot expect Palestine, Iraq or Afghanistan to be freed again except by force. Israeli and American aggression cannot be met by olive branches but must be met with bullets and bombs." (p. 36) |
| "We will not let you [America] enjoy peace as long as we do not live it in our lands and in Palestine." (p. 23) | "My position towards the al-Saud government is the Islamic position: They have entered into apostasy by more than one door and Islam orders me and every Muslim to revolt against them and fight them." (p. 43)   |   |   |

**Figure 2. Selected Excerpts from *Inspire* Issue 2: Photos from the Operations of Abyan (October 2010).<sup>111</sup>**

Issue 3, as a special issue dedicated to the operations in which al-Qaeda sent explosive packages on FedEx and UPS cargo jets, focuses on having achieved its goal of economically bleeding America by requiring it to

continually put more effort and funding into its security efforts while at the same time serving to disrupt the economics of the airline industry. While the proximate end state is to “bring down America,” AQAP reminds readers that the issue of liberating Palestine and the Muslim lands remains central. To that end, its enemies are the allied crusader countries of the West, Israel and the Jews, and the traitor Arab governments. Recruitment here is largely by example with the suggestion that more could be done if other “true” Muslims responded to the call. As if proof of responsibility were necessary, *Inspire* goes into great detail regarding the operation with photos and the specifics of the devices used and suggestions of how they evaded security. Emphasis is placed on just how little these operations cost relative to their effects, even if considered “foiled.”

| End State  | Enemy   | Recruitment  | TTPs  |
|--|---|--|---|
| <p>“to bring down America we do not need to strike big.” (p. 3)</p> <p>“Today we are facing a coalition of Crusaders and Zionists and we in al Qaeda of the Arabian Peninsula will never forget Palestine. How can we forget it when our motto is: ‘Here we start and in al-Aqsa we meet?’” (p. 7)</p> | <p>“This operation is a response to the Crusaders aggression against the Muslims of Afghanistan, Iraq, Somalia, the Maghreb, Chechnya and the Arabian Peninsula. It is a response to the continuous support to the usurping Jews who are invading Jerusalem and blockading Gaza.” (p. 10)</p> <p>“This operation comes to expose the traitor Arab rulers who are competing in pleasing their American masters.” (p. 11)</p> | <p>“This operation comes to prove to every true Muslim that there is no comparison between the price of sacrifice for the sake of Allah and the price for submission to the Jews and Christians.” (p. 11)</p> <p>“Dear Muslim hasten to join the ranks of the mujahidin or to form cells to perform operations against the disbelievers in their own land. We are paying back America for only a small portion of what they do to our nation.” (p. 11)</p> | <p>“That is what we call leverage. A \$4,200 operation will cost our enemy billions of dollars.” (p. 15)</p> <p>“The next phase would be to disseminate the technical details of our device to the mujahidin around the world” (p. 15)</p> <p>“the strategy of a thousand cuts.” (p. 3)</p> <p>“In such an environment of security phobia that is sweeping America, it is more feasible to stage smaller attacks that involve less players and less time to launch.” (p. 3)</p> |

**Figure 3. Selected Excerpts from *Inspire* Issue 3 (Special Issue): \$4,200 (November 2010).<sup>112</sup>**

The title of issue 4 implies that its focus is largely on the issue of economic attacks and the funding of jihad. While the six-page title article does address these issues—stressing that the taking of *ghanimah* or war booty is an acceptable and important way of

funding jihad especially in the light of a crackdown on fundraising—it is but a small piece of what is covered by the magazine. It reinforces the notion that the end state is indeed a *Khalifah* or Caliphate, but that there is much work to be done first in removing both the crusaders and disbelieving regimes from Muslim land and that, indeed, this was the *raison d'être* for the al-Qaeda organization. The organization thus must fight the triad of enemies—the third side of which is the *Rafidha* sect of the Shi'a. Recruitment thus is on two fronts—those in the region are called to fight to save themselves from the *Rafidha* onslaught while those in the West should fight where they are until the Caliphate becomes a reality. Tactically, this is reinforced with the sense that winning will not come from fighting at open fronts but rather through guerrilla and terrorist operations. Specifically, the issue provides OSJ instruction as to the best way to burn and destroy buildings, in this case, a high-rise apartment complex, and training with Kalashnikov's automatic (AK) rifle, the standard weapon of the mujahideen—as well as an invitation and help toward reaching out to al-Qaeda securely. There is also the beginning of an al-Qaeda self-promotion series by Sheik Abu Mus'ab al-Awlaki on "Why did I choose al-Qaeda," contrasting it with other groups. The visual on the last page of a Palestinian child holding onto a dead loved one is an emotional reminder to supporters of what they feel is at stake.

| End State   | Enemy   | Recruitment   | TTPs   |
|---|---|---|--|
| <p>"Q2: Why do you target the soldiers in Yemen?...We target the soldiers because they are the ones who are protecting the deviant sect of Ismaili's... they are standing with the crusaders in their occupation of Muslim land...We target them because they are the ones standing against the establishment of the <i>khalifah</i>." (p. 21)</p> <p>"The idea of defending the Muslim lands from the disbelieving occupation forces had taken on a new meaning. It was an idea that paved the way for the al Qaeda Organization." (p. 13)</p> | <p>"The Zionist-Crusader alliance, the apostate regimes and the Shi'a represent the triangle of enemies for the Muslim ummah....We would like to state that our war is with the Rafidha Shi'a sect which is alien to Yemen and was only imported recently from Iran, and not with the Zaydi Shi'a sect." (p. 5)</p> <p>"The central issue is that jihad will remain <i>fard'ayn</i> until America and her apostate allies are removed from the Muslim lands. Her allies not only include the disbelievers of origin, but also the apostate <i>tawaghit</i> who...modify the laws of Allah to fit their lifestyles." (p. 16)</p> | <p>"We call the people of ahl as-sunnah to join the battalions of defense of the honor of the Prophet and we warn them of the coming danger of the Shi'a and if they do not hasten then the Rafidha Shi'a would do to them what they have done to the ahl as-sunnah in Iraq and Afghanistan." (p. 6)</p> <p>"my brothers residing in the states of the Zio-Crusader coalition...know that jihad is your duty as well, and that you have an opportunity to strike the leaders of kufr and retaliate against them on their own soil" (p. 17)</p> <p>"My advice to the Muslims in the West...to support the mujahidin in any front of jihad with your wealth and selves, everyone according to his capacity until Allah makes a way out for you to make hijrah when the Islamic Khalifa is established." (p. 23)</p> | <p>"All of this has confirmed that confronting the campaigns of American and allied forces in an overt way, according to the methods of the Open Fronts, and through defending permanent positions is still in its wrong time...the Resistance's military activity against America and her allies now, must lie within the framework of 'light guerrilla warfare,' 'civilian terror' and secret methods, especially on the level of individual operations and small Resistance Units completely and totally separated from each other." (p. 32)</p> <p>"Rather than the Muslims financing their jihad from their own pockets, they should finance it from the pockets of their enemies." (p. 60)</p> |

**Figure 4. Selected Excerpts from *Inspire* Issue 4: The Ruling on Dispossessing the Disbelievers Wealth in *Dar al-Harb* (January 2011).<sup>113</sup>**

This fifth issue comes in the wake of the events of the Arab Spring of early 2011. It offered al-Qaeda a chance to counter criticism of its methods in the wake of what was seen as a relatively peaceful change. Its response was to point out that the regimes that were being ousted were puppets of the West and that, in fact, these changes were good first steps toward the Islamic government they desired. They reiterated that change must often—citing Libya—come through force and that the people must always be prepared to back up their words with violent action. Through the removal of these regimes, al-Qaeda saw a clearer chance to target Israel now that the regimes hindering the mujahideen were being removed. Accordingly, recruitment to jihad in those states will now

be free to proceed openly. Western recruits are still encouraged to remain in the West and are offered a number of potential targets there. The OSJ section of this issue offers a second part to training with the AK assault rifle while the method of “terrorizing enemies” is expounded as a religious duty and thereby praiseworthy. An AQAP Military Report is a new addition detailing recent operations in the region.

| End State   | Enemy   | Recruitment  | TTPs  |
|---|---|--|---|
| <p>“With the removal of the despots, the ummah will speak its voice, and when it does, it will chant: Here we start and in al-Aqsa we’ll meet.” (p. 5)</p> <p>“Our ideology is not <i>takfir</i>...Our ideology is the <i>aqidah</i> of <i>ahl as-sunnah wal jama’ah</i>. We are openly against extremism in <i>takfir</i> and seek a balance.” (p. 11)</p> <p>“This is what your brothers in the al Qaeda Organization and other jihadi organizations have been working for: inspiring the people to rise up for the Islamic cause of eliminating the tyrants so that we have a clear shot at Israel.” (p. 44)</p> | <p>“We only hate the West for their foreign policies upon the Islamic world. They invaded our lands, killed and continue to kill our people, and subjugate our ummah through various means, including the media. So we hate them for it and fight them because of it.” (p. 10)</p> <p>“We are living in a time where the Jews and Christians are attacking the land of Islam and have been supported by the <i>fawaghit</i> who supplied them with oil, food substances, intelligence, and secured for them all pathways in the sea, on land and in the air. They prevented the <i>mujahidin</i> from fighting them.” (p. 63)</p> | <p>“the preaching of jihad will be heard publically [sic] in societies that have freed themselves from the tyrants.” (p. 4)</p> <p>“killing 10 soldiers in America, for example, is much more effective than killing 100 apostates in the Yemeni military...So we are asking our brothers in the West to come to this realization.” (p. 11)</p> <p>“We must also awaken in the ummah the spirit of resistance and jihad; confrontation of aggression, oppression and tyranny; firmness on the truth; and rejection of the culture of concession and the method of backtracking.” (p. 35)</p> | <p>“Al Qaeda is not against regime changes through protests but it is against the idea that the change should only be through peaceful means to the exclusion of force.” (p. 5)</p> <p>“[In individual jihad]...Your pool of targets are large, so make sure to think of all of the available options. An example of something local, easy and effective is attacking an army recruiting center, nightclub, highway or busy shopping mall. Targets of greater difficulty, like the stock market, well-guarded individuals or intelligence agencies, will naturally require you to scout the enemy and the area of attack thoroughly.” (p. 11)</p> |

**Figure 5. Selected Excerpts from *Inspire* Issue 5: The Tsunami of Change (March 2011).<sup>114</sup>**

This sixth issue was late in its release due to the aftermath of the killing of Osama bin Laden and his replacement by Sheik Ayman al-Zawahiri as head of the al-Qaeda organization. Beyond eulogizing bin Laden himself, the issue includes a section introducing the reader to five other “martyrs,” emphasizing the joy that comes with achieving such an honorable death and the signs that one has gone on to *jannah* or paradise. Accordingly, recruitment lies in the admonishment to those who do nothing to take up arms and seek out paradise as the martyrs have done or to die a death of disgrace. The end state is an eventual one of the

promised Caliphate ruled by sharia, although here we find a broader definition than previous, extending its bounds beyond the Middle East, while the immediate end remains the obliteration of Israel. The OSJ section continues with a third lesson on the AK rifle in its “gun school,” while its self-described “bomb school” offers a recipe for making acetone peroxide—to be used as either a primer or a main charge in a homemade explosive device. Interestingly, while the previous mention of individual jihad had stressed a purposeful lack of direct coordination and using individual initiative for targeting, the article here by al-Suri specifically seems to contradict that idea while maintaining the emphasis on that method’s necessity as a strategic choice in the face of an overwhelming imbalance of power.

| End State  | Enemy   | Recruitment   | TTPs   |
|--|---|---|--|
| <p>“The work of the mujahidin is growing in bounds. While the different parties are bickering, the mujahidin are busy laying the foundation for the coming of the rule of shari’ah.” (p. 3)</p> <p>“The religion of Allah, from which is jihad, will always remain to be, its creed carried by those with pure hearts, striving to be revived by those with pure hands, and seeking to be made supreme by bands of truthful men, unharmed by those who oppose them or abandon them until the Promise of Allah comes to be.” (p. 8)</p> | <p>“Al Qaeda declared war against the Jews and Christians and their <i>murtadin</i> agents and made its plan clear to restore the Islamic Caliphate which extends from China in the east to Andalusia in the West; indeed beyond that according to capability until the land of the <i>kuffar</i> are conquered.” (p. 33)</p> <p>“The shari’ah does not permit any ‘<i>ahd</i> (covenant) with Israel; in fact, it declares that jihad is <i>fard ‘ayn</i> (individually obligatory) there until its liberation.” (p. 50)</p> | <p>“Men soar to great levels in Allah’s eyes for their qualities of action as opposed to inaction. So why do you continue to rush to your homes and not to the palaces of Paradise?” (p. 24)</p> <p>“Therefore, know O Muslim: that bringing about the <i>millah</i> of Ibrahim in this age is not achieved except with paying the highest costs, and settling the soul to bear harm—and whoever is not confronted with harm, he will not clinch the <i>millah</i> of Ibrahim.” (p. 33)</p> <p>“It is either jihad or disgrace, so choose!” (p. 55)</p> | <p>“The general principles for the theory of individual jihadi action in the Resistance Call from a practical perspective are:...Spreading the culture of Resistance and transforming it into an organized strategic phenomenon....Spreading the ideology of the Resistance.... Directing the Resistance fighters to areas of operation.... Directing the Resistance fighters to the most important targets....Spreading the legal, political, military and other sciences and knowledge that the mujahidun need....Instructing the youth in the armed operational method....and Coordinating method in which all efforts are joined.” (p. 15)</p> |

**Figure 6. Selected Excerpts from *Inspire* Issue 6: Sadness, Contentment & Aspiration (August 2011).<sup>115</sup>**

This Special Issue 7 of *Inspire*, celebrating the 10th anniversary of the 9/11 operations, only offers 15 pages of actual articles. Beyond lauding both the short- and

long-term “successes” of those events in that section, the second half of the magazine provides a photo essay of each significant al-Qaeda coordinated action against the West since that time. It admonishes the ummah not to let America “become great in your eyes,” citing the number of instances that small groups of al-Qaeda jihadists have struck and defeated them.<sup>116</sup> It reinforces its animosity with the Shi’a and Iran in that they refuse to give al-Qaeda credit, thus showing how little they support jihad against the great enemy of America, without whose support of Israel they feel Palestine would be liberated. In emphasis of the theme of how just a few individuals can create great outcomes, they play up the role of their media efforts—especially *Inspire*—in spreading the word of the true face of the West as against the ideology of all Muslims. There is no OSJ section in this issue.

| End State  | Enemy  | Recruitment  | TTPs  |
|--|--|--|---|
| “9/11 was neither the beginning of the war between the Muslims and the West nor was it the end. It was merely an episode in a long, protracted war that started at the time of the Messenger of Allah and will end with al-Malhama, the epic battle mentioned in the hadith.” (p. 3) | <p>“Iran and the Shi’a in general do not want to give al Qaeda credit for the greatest and biggest operation ever committed against America because this would expose their lip-service jihad against the great Satan.” (p. 4)</p> <p>“The operations of 9/11 came as a result of decades of American aggression...half a century of American support for the state of Israel. Without this American support, the Israeli occupation of the Holy Land would have been impossible.” (p. 13)</p> | <p>“this media conflict between the West and the mujahidin quickly become a war of Western secular ideology and Islam...Muslims throughout the world asked: ‘Wait, are they not then concluding that a good practicing Muslim is their fundamentalist enemy?’” (p. 10)</p> | <p>“A powerful media production is as hard hitting as an operation in America’... Although the mujahidin are considered to be the underdogs in the war, it goes without saying that we have thrown something at America and her allies that they will always be stuck with.” (p. 9)</p> <p>“Ten years on, what have the operations achieved?...Never in history has such a small number of fighters brought about so much damage to the enemy.” (p. 13)</p> |

**Figure 7. Selected Excerpts from *Inspire* Issue 7: The Greatest Special Operation of all time (September 2011).<sup>117</sup>**

*Inspire* issue 8 draws a line clearly polarizing Muslims from the West and the law of sharia from any man-made law. There is an attempt to tie the ends of the Arab Spring with those of al-Qaeda in that the

removal of the apostate regimes will allow for the installation of rule by sharia, which is consistent with the values of the protesters. To this end, there is also a clear recognition that civilians within *Dar al-Harb* (non-Muslim ruled nations) are legitimate targets and that “the continuation of jihad takes precedence.”<sup>118</sup> This includes the tactics of poisoning and other forms of mass killing. There is an emphasis on the individual pursuing jihad wherever he can be present “in a natural way.” If in the West, one must undertake jihad then because there is a clear assertion that one cannot be an American and a Muslim. The issue also contains the now regular recognition of martyred soldiers and additionally singles out the Pakistani army as protecting the crusader’s supply lines and providing air bases for economic gain. Interestingly, in a list of priority regions to target, America—the head of the snake—is last (number seven of seven) with closer and easier targets listed first, despite the ongoing urging that Muslims target the West in its own backyard. This can be accomplished through handguns and remote control detonation training provided in the OSJ section.



| End State   | Enemy  | Recruitment  | TTPs   |
|---|--|--|--|
| "Our criticisms of the regimes are similar to those of the masses and we call for the exclusive Islamic solution of establishing shari'ah since we believe in Allah's statement: 'Establish the religion and don't be divided therein'." (p. 3) | "Regarding the priority of arenas in which we must strike the [invader] enemy....1. The countries on the Arabian Peninsula, the Levant, Egypt and Iraq....2. The countries of North Africa from Libya to Mauritania....3. Turkey, Pakistan and the countries of Central Asia....4. The rest of the Islamic World....5. The American and allied interests in third world countries....6. In European countries allied with America and participating with her in the war....7. In the heart of America herself....She is the snake's head." (pp. 18-19) | "To be a Muslim in one thing while to be an American is another. To be the latter is to undertake what Allah detests and to overlook the religious texts for the sake of creation. The mujahidin that have come from America have been exceptional role models....They risked their lives for a greater cause." (p. 9)<br><br>"By coming to jihad, you are with the greatest of people in your time; the men who are making history; the men who will comfort you on your path to paradise." (p. 59) | "Hence, our method should be to guide the Muslim who wants to participate and resist, to operate where he is, or where he is able to be present in a natural way, and to pursue jihad in secrecy and alone, or with a small cell of trustworthy people." (p. 18)<br><br>"The populations of the countries that are at war with the Muslims... should be targeted in operations that employ explosives, poisons, firearms and all other methods that lead to inflicting the greatest harm." (p. 47) |

**Figure 8. Selected Excerpts from *Inspire* Issue 8: Targeting *Dar al-Harb* Populations (May 2012).<sup>119</sup>**

This ninth issue comes after the deaths of Sheik Anwar al-Awlaki and Samir Khan, who to this point had been chiefly responsible for the magazine's publication and editorials. This issue's new editor, Yahya Ibrahim, reaffirms that it will continue to fulfill its primary objectives: to inspire jihad in the English-speaking world and to provide operational instruction to carry out attacks in the West. There are martyrdom pieces eulogizing al-Awlaki and Kahn, and it is clear that there is a renewed sense of vengeance against America directly in the face of their loss. A particular issue is made of the U.S.-directed killing of al-Awlaki's 16-year old son in a drone strike. Another article presents strategic targets within the United States and her direct allies. In this issue's OSJ, guidance is first provided into undertaking firebomb operations to create firestorm conditions in populated areas of the West (a

later article provides the theological justification). Its second part provides direction as to whether one has the qualities to become an “urban assassin” and offers hints on targeting, as well as how to blend into normal Western society to avoid suspicion. The OSJ section also includes what might be called a “job application” in which those desiring to undertake individual jihad and particularly martyrdom operations are invited to apply via an encrypted email. There is an obvious tension then within the group as to whether “individual jihad” is to be undertaken by “lone wolves” who are operating in the name of al-Qaeda or by those who are still under al-Qaeda’s direct coordination. The tactic for recruitment here seems to be in a dare that only the toughest individuals can be a mujahideen and that Islam can only achieve its natural place of superiority if members of its ummah are willing to pay the price. Ultimately, this battle is the only way to achieve the stated end state of an Islamic Caliphate.

| End State  | Enemy  | Recruitment   | TTPs   |
|--|--|---|--|
| <p>“Today we are fighting a battle that will reap the fruits of the global <i>khilafah</i>’s return, Insha’ Allah.” (p. 19)</p> <p>“The goal of the Resistance and the Individual Terrorism Jihad is to inflict as many human and material losses as possible upon the interests of America and her allies, and to make them feel that the Resistance has transformed into a phenomenon of popular uprising against them.” (p. 23)</p> | <p>“In today’s world where America has launched an aggressive crusader campaign against the Muslim world—both on the battlefield and in the war for the hearts and minds of the Muslims—the Americans need to be taught a lesson that they need to mind their own business and butt out of our internal affairs. As long as they continue to kill our people, occupy our lands, support Israel, fund the tyrannical puppets in the Muslim lands and try to re-interpret Islam, we will punish them and their nation severely.” (p. 19)</p> <p>“It is upon the Americans to remember that they are always attacked without exceptions if their foreign policies does not change.” (p. 57)</p> | <p>“The trials, difficulties and challenges the mujahidin go through are unlike any other in the world....The <i>munafiqeen</i> who prefer sitting back wouldn’t dare go through what we are going through for even an hour....For I swear by Allah, jihad <i>fe sabillillah</i> is the path that exposes the <i>munafiqeen</i> from the <i>mu’mineen</i>; so stick your head out of the crowd of hypocrites to show Allah whose side you’re really on.” (p. 53)</p> <p>“In the world of ideologies, our Islamic ideology is the most superior one. And at the peak of that comes jihad <i>fe Sabee-illallah</i> Allah. Our principles will <i>bi idhnillah</i> end up winning. Sometimes you truly win when you pay the price yourself.” (p. 58)</p> | <p>“The most important targets in America and in Western countries allied to her militarily....1. Main political figures....2. Large strategic economic targets....3. Military bases....4. Media personalities and media centers....5. Centralized information and computer centers....6. Places where Jews are gathered....7. Official offices of governmental institutions....8. Buildings of the security services and the central intelligence....9. Striking civilians in general....avoiding women and children when separated from men....A final remark...one should avoid targeting places of worship for any religion or faith.” (p. 24)</p> |

**Figure 9. Selected Excerpts from *Inspire* Issue 9: Win[n]ing on the Ground (May 2012).<sup>120</sup>**

In *Inspire* issue 10, the two main current events driving the issue are the recent French military intervention in Mali and the release of the 14-minute long anti-Islamic film entitled “The Innocence of Muslims.” In response to this perceived blasphemy against the Prophet Muhammad, al-Qaeda called upon Muslims to defend his honor. A common chant during protests was the phrase “We are all Usama [Osama bin Laden].”<sup>121</sup> Several articles in this issue allude to the fact that, despite his death at U.S. hands, Sheik Osama’s vision is now carried on by the millions embracing his path. The issue contains the first article in the series written by a woman urging other women to support jihad and encourage their male relatives to participate. In addition, there is a specific call to utilize the media in all its forms to get the word of jihad out—both in the West and in the “newly liberated” countries of the region. The focus on performing individual jihad continues, and the OSJ section includes detailed instruction on torching parked vehicles using petrol and a matchstick and advice on causing road accidents through creating slick road conditions and camouflaged “tire-busters.” There is further advice on tactics geared toward individual professions such as doctors preparing anthrax or ricin. These operations will ultimately bring down America, the contention goes, at which point the secondary enemies will not have the incentive to participate. Then, the mujahideen can destroy Israel and bring about the “pan-Islamic state.”

| End State  | Enemy   | Recruitment  | TIPs  |
|--|---|--|---|
| <p>"Al-Qaeda's main goal in this stage—at least—is to aid every oppressed muslim in this world regardless of his <i>madhhab</i> and race. As for its long-term goal, is to reestablish the Islamic Caliphate through Jihad in the cause of Allah and to implement the Shari'ah of Allah in the whole land of Allah, <i>Biidmillaah</i>." (p. 35)</p> <p>"Inshallah it is only a matter of time before the American empire collapses in the hands of the mujahideen in defeat and disarray, leading to the destruction of Israel and the establishment of a powerful pan-Islamic state which will implement the Law of Allah, hence it will play a major political and economic role in the world ever since and become renowned for its justice and prosperity." (p. 45)</p> | <p>"nowadays there is not only one type of enemy. There are the primary enemies such as America, Israel or England and then there are the secondary enemies such as general non-Muslim states and the lackey puppet governments which populate our lands. These secondary enemies enter the fight usually from fear of punishment or financial incentive" (p. 22)</p> <p>"Let us make it our priority during this stage to focus on...America and its NATO partners, particularly France and Britain...until the day comes when the people of the West are forced to make a choice: either the continuation of the Crusade against the Muslims and the continuation of their backing of Israel, or the continuation of viable governments." (p. 38)</p> | <p>"O sister, you have to wake up the hearts of the men, and arouse the determination of the heroes....You have to push you loved ones to the battlefield." (p. 32)</p> <p>"I present to you some modest advices out of love and compassion about failing to perform jihad....In <i>Jihad</i>, total bliss and glee is achieved in this life and the Hereafter. O who sits behind, talk to your self to perform Jihad, prepare yourself, as I fear for you having part of Nifaq (hypocrisy) in your heart." (p. 40)</p> <p>"It is you, Yes it's you and you alone—The terrorist next door. So be true to Allah, and being true to Allah is taking your weapon, praying your two rakaat, asking Allah to help you—Get out to your enemy, He is just next door." (P. 58)</p> | <p>"We mustn't miss this opportunity to bring the message of <i>Tauheed</i> and <i>Jihad</i> to a region and a world emerging from under the dark shroud of dictatorship and police state, and we must make every effort to reach out to Muslims through both new media like Facebook and Twitter as well as the traditional broadcast and print media preferred by the older generations." (p. 38)</p> <p>"In these small operations, work alone. Let it be a secret between Allah and you. Make it impossible for any one to point a finger at you. This is for your safety." (p. 57)</p> |

**Figure 10. Selected Excerpts from *Inspire* Issue 10:  
We Are All Usama (March 2013).<sup>122</sup>**

This issue turns its focus to what it calls the lie of American invincibility—illustrated, it purports, most recently by the Boston Marathon bombings and the killing of a British soldier on the streets of southeast London. Rather than posing large end-state goals, *Inspire* issue 11 contents itself with the satisfaction that recent events have further shown America's weakness, and, just as the mujahideen convinced Russia to leave Afghanistan, it can exert the same pressure on the United States. The focus on America's downfall is an interim end state justified as due to its support of Israel—the near-enemy preventing al-Qaeda from its more primary goal of the liberation of Palestine.

Therefore, the terrorist acts in the West are seen as providing the necessary pressure to convince the “infidels” to pull out of the region and abandon support of Israel, thus leaving al-Qaeda to focus on Israel directly. Individuals are encouraged to join the jihad by the successes of the past as well as the wide-ranging effects of the recent acts in the West. They are shown that using only items at hand, as the Tsarnaev brothers did, they too can find glory in the eyes of God. Thus, recognizing these acts in the magazine will serve to recruit new individuals to undertake further lone jihad operations. Tactics, techniques, and procedures for these operations do not require “a balance of power,” but merely supplies one can find in the kitchen and for one to be opportune in one’s targeting and timing.

| End State   | Enemy   | Recruitment  | TTPs   |
|---|---|--|--|
| <p>“The peace you enjoyed before September 11 is merely just part of history. In other words, you will never enjoy peace until we live it practically in Palestine and all the infidel forces leave the Peninsula of Muhammad and all other Muslim lands.” (p. 3)</p> <p>“Sheikh Usama—may Allah accept his martyrdom—made it clear when he said ‘As you kill, you will be killed until you leave our lands and stop supporting Israel.’” (p. 21)</p> <p>“As long as America attacks Islam and Muslims, its people should be ready for more and more fatalities unless they exert pressure on their government to take its hands off the Muslim <i>ummah</i> and stop the aggression on <i>Shari’ah</i>.” (p. 34)</p> | <p>“The Afghan <i>Jihad</i> against the Russians awoke the spirit of the <i>jihad</i> in the <i>ummah</i>....Then came the <i>Jihad</i> against America, it weakened the US and exposed the treacherous leaders. It sowed the <i>um-mah</i> with seeds of <i>jihad</i> against the treacherous rulers, and the fruits are still ripening.” (p. 15)</p> <p>“The enemy is very weak. He cannot even protect himself from attacks. Do not be deceived by their propaganda, which its goal is to frighten us....If we do not do that we will become victims of their aggression.” (p. 17)</p> | <p>“After this, it is an obligation upon every muslim to fight in the Way of Allah as per his capability. Whoever is able to join the mujahideen he should join their ranks, if not, he should look around for a head of <i>kufr</i> by which targeting it will restrain the evil might of those who disbelieve.” (p. 15)</p> <p>“Beware of belittling yourself and your capability. The Boston Bombings have uncovered the capabilities of the Muslim youth, they have revealed the power of a Lone Jihad operation...So Take things into your hands. You are a Muslim, It is your obligation.” (p. 17)</p> | <p>“Our fight with the enemy does not require balance of power....And if we reflect of the words of Allah...we will find that preparation is in accordance with capability, then comes fighting with available methods even if we have nothing but stones.” (p. 14)</p> <p>“Yes, this is the only solution. A Lone Jihad operation like that of the Boston Marathon requires nothing more than a few utensils, some matchsticks, a box of nails, and a clock for timing. Another ingredient I should mention is a group of American citizens gathered in a ceremony, sports event or just surprising time or place.” (p. 31)</p> |

**Figure 11. Selected Excerpts from *Inspire* Issue 11: Who & Why (May 2013).<sup>123</sup>**

The title of *Inspire* issue 12, “Shattered,” refers to America’s loss of reputation and economic power as

it has developed as a superpower after the Cold War. Instrumental in this, the point is made, were the work of jihad beginning with the “shattering” blow of 9/11 through the more recent terrorist attacks both on its soil and on those sharing its interests, the most recent being the Nairobi Mall attack with mention of a foiled car bombing attack in the United States. To that end, the OSJ section shares information on how to put together car bombs at home with available materials to bring to fruition this type of attack. The focus is clearly upon lone jihad attacks designed to hit America’s civilian population in order to exhaust its economic resources in an attempt to maintain domestic security. There is an emphasis on anyone with sympathies to not hesitate and move to individual jihad as soon as possible. As the prime enemy, the United States is said to be guilty of any number of concrete violations of the rights of the lands of Islam, from which it must withdraw. Contrastingly, the goals of the al-Qaeda organization are implied to be firmly in the realm of ideology and belief: a clash of civilizations that will only end with one winner. The group foresees that its own organization would potentially disappear as unnecessary once “the whole ummah” is drawn into this battle.<sup>124</sup>

| End State   | Enemy   | Recruitment   | TTPs   |
|---|---|---|--|
| <p>"What the American regime is refusing to confess is that Al-Qaeda is a message before being an organization. A message which has spread and reached by the Grace of Allah, and the Muslims have embraced it. The message is simple and comprehensible: O Muslims, if you want to live freely, gloriously and honorably, you have to defend this glory." (p. 11)</p> <p>"the deep nature of the conflict between Islam and kufr. The war in its real essence is not about Al-Qaeda and America; it is between Tawheed and shirk, belief and disbelief. This is what it is about all the time, and this is what it will be until the very end of this universe." (p. 40)</p> | <p>"We all know that without America's financial support for Israel, Israel would simply not be in the powerful state that it is in today. As a Muslim, I couldn't live with the fact that my tax dollars were going to Israel to kill my own kind. Forget that, I couldn't even live with the fact that I was residing under the greatest enemy today—the one who finances tyrants and launches wars of injustice in the name of protecting its freedom." (p. 25)</p> <p>"Know that Al-Qaeda's terrorism is against all who show enmity towards Islam. It is not necessary for the enemy of Islam to have blue eyes or yellow skin. Al-Qaeda is terrorizing the enemies of Allah: the Jews, the Christians, the apostates and others." (p. 32)</p> | <p>"So I want to do just that and advice my dear brothers and sisters of the Muslim nation, especially those who for some reason are still residing in Europe and the USA, to join the ever growing ranks of the mujahideen in the lands of Jihad or do operations inside Dar-ul Kufr itself. You don't even have to do it as a group. Do it on your own. Don't tell anyone, not even your closest friends....If you need any ideas just go online, preferably an internet-café so security forces can't track you easily." (p. 15)</p> <p>"For how long will you live in tension? Instead of just sitting, having no solution, pack up your tools of destruction. Assemble your bomb, ready for detonation." (p. 50)</p> | <p>"Resistance is not impossible. We have to exhaust America's economy by provoking it to continue with its enormous spending on its security. America's weak point is its economy which is staggering from hemorrhage in military and security spending." (p. 12)</p> <p>"Therefore, if you ask me as a tactic, is targeting the civilian population of the West a good thing to do? I would say yes, because it is so much more potent and powerful. Soldiers are expected to die anyway.... But a civilian is not. So when you hit the civilian you hit them where it hurts most and this is what our tactics are about." (p. 17)</p> <p>"As a journalist said 'There is no need to send 19 to hit America anymore, a 19 year old young man could do that.' Yes, it could be done by Lone Jihad." (p. 56)</p> |

**Figure 12. Selected Excerpts from *Inspire* Issue 12: Shattered: A Story About Change (March 2014).<sup>125</sup>**

The title of *Inspire* issue 13, "Neurotmesis," is defined in the issue as "Cutting the Nerves and Separating the Head from the Body," with the nerves of the war with America being its economy, and the goal of the operation is to "decapitate America from the rest of the world."<sup>126</sup> (An interesting reference is made therein to anti-sectarianism and cooperation with groups outside al-Qaeda.) The overall program is set to achieve these goals by the two-pronged strategy of occasional large centrally directed operations and a large number of lone jihad operations set to target the "Achilles' heel" of America's security—its transportation system.<sup>127</sup> To that end, the OSJ section educates the individual jihadi on ways to breach airport security, the choice of targets, and—its *pièce de résistance*—the making of a hidden (potentially even a body cavity) bomb. Youth, in particular, are singled out by al-Qaeda's recruitment. With its emphasis on the actions of an individual, there is a concern addressed as to



how one attributes responsibility for the attack to a felt affiliation with al-Qaeda. The magazine provides suggestions including calling during the execution of a martyrdom operation or using a timed email or other method that won't affect the operation's chances of success or—in non-martyrdom operations—either anonymously claim using Wi-Fi or leaving an untraceable attribution or symbol at the scene. In an attempt to address the operations at the fronts, there is a piece on *inghimaasi* (fighting one's way in close up before detonating a bomb with an assumption of one's own death) operations. The early mention of the killing of the hostage Luke Somers, after the 3-day ultimatum for the release of U.S. prisoner Dr. Aafia Siddiqui, becomes, in this issue, something of an afterthought. Though the end state is said to be about religion, there is a sense here that much is about vengeance, particularly for Palestine.

| End State  | Enemy   | Recruitment   | TTPs  |
|--|---|---|---|
| "The reasons of this war are always undermined. Many think it is a war for land or for wealth...these could be secondary reasons, but the essence and the core of this war is Tawheed." (p. 4) | <p>"The Muslim ummah has identified its enemy. Muslim groups and individuals have labeled America as the common enemy, the head of the snake." (p. 4)</p> <p>"Israel is a crime and must be destroyed and everyone whose hands are steeped in this crime must pay the price, and pay it dearly. The Palestinian blood being spilled in the Holy Land must be avenged" (p. 12)</p> | <p>"All in all, we call Muslims to participate in lone Jihad and make use of what the Mujahideen write and advise so that they achieve a better result Biddhnilah." (p. 21)</p> <p>"We are living in special, dangerous and trailing times. The youth of the ummah need to rise to the occasion....If Allah wants an end he prepares its means. Allah wants victory for this ummah and Allah is preparing the means for that. Let us not sit on the sidelines. Lets be part of that victory." (p. 33)</p> | <p>"Hereby, Inspire magazine is committed to arm Muslim individuals—as well as Muslim groups as in this issue—in their jihad on America. Previously, we have presented Muslims with different weapons, including bombs and tactics...now we are obliged to give our ummah something special. Something unique that can easily be prepared at home." (p. 4)</p> <p>"If you join the ranks of the <i>Muhajireen</i> and Mujahideen, you will be a Soldier of Allah. But if you carry out a lone jihad operation amidst the <i>kufar</i>, you will be an Army of Allah." (p. 35)</p> |

**Figure 13. Selected Excerpts from *Inspire* Issue 13: Neurotmesis (December 2014).<sup>128</sup>**

*Inspire* issue 14 followed up on the January 2015 attacks against the Charlie Hebdo satirical newspaper



cartoonists in response to its mocking of the Prophet Muhammad. The attacks put France front and center as a clear enemy alongside the United States. The operation demonstrated clearly the two strands of al-Qaeda tactics in the West—large operations centrally organized along with the support of al-Qaeda influenced but independently orchestrated lone jihad acts. While the incidents in France clearly dominated this issue, other significant pieces covered the issue of the shootings of black Americans by the police (pointing out that Islam does not differentiate by race) and, in several other pieces, giving admonishment to be merciful to your fellow Muslims and engage in forgiveness not faultfinding—avoiding internal division among jihadi groups.<sup>129</sup> As a companion piece to the Charlie Hebdo coverage, the OSJ section covers assassination operations—targets, collecting information, preparation (acquiring weapons, training, and spiritual contemplation), and an example of its execution at a workplace. There is also a detailed piece on designing a timed hand grenade. While reference to a Caliphate has been scarce, a graphic in this issue professes that “America’s Defeat + Da’awah + Defense = Establishing Khilafa.”<sup>130</sup>

| End State  | Enemy   | Recruitment  | TTPs  |
|--|---|--|---|
| <p>"As for our goal, it is to make the religion of Allah established on earth. Liberate Muslim lands, liberate Palestine. Remove people from being slaves of the tyrants into worshipping Allah alone. And removing them from the confinements of this world: wealth, economy, politics, and religious ignorance. Free people from democratic systems, capitalism, monopolism, opportunism, and discrimination into implementing the Laws of Allah which also deals with matters pertaining to non-Muslims." (p. 14)</p> | <p>"Look at it. It is France that has shared all of America's crimes. It is France that has committed crimes in Mali and the Islamic Maghreb. It is France that supports the annihilation of Muslims in Central Africa in the name of race cleansing. They are the party of Satan, the enemies of Allah the Almighty and the enemy of his Prophets—peace be upon them." (p. 6)</p> <p>"France has always been at the forefront of this war. A secularist nation that has tirelessly been working to spread and instill their ideals on Muslims" (p. 30)</p> <p>"O mujahideen, not to be preoccupied by internal enemies keeping you from focusing upon the main enemy." (p. 55)</p> | <p>"We at Inspire, and in the cause of the events of 9/11, encourage the Muslim in the West to join the Lone Jihad caravan. The caravan that has and will always continue to trouble and bring nightmares to the west." (p. 4)</p> <p>"So where are the noble mujahideen who will return the battle to America on their own soil?...Where are the youth who will drag the head of America in the sand.... Show us your bravery." (p. 36)</p> <p>"Whoever intends to perform a Lone jihad operation, finds in his heart a stiff mountain hindering him from making any move...Do not fear nor hesitate. Indeed it is a mountain, but out of ice. It requires nothing but your truthful resolute...transforming it from a stiff solidified mountain to simple tranquil water....O My brother, make resolute and take action, and you will see how the mountain will gradually melt." (p. 37)</p> | <p>"The Charlie Hebdo operation is considered a special intelligence operation which is categorized under assassinations....at first, the central leadership began by selecting a particular target—they made consultations and resolved in selecting two methods in achieving this goal...First Method—Lone Jihad...They achieved this by placing the targeted persons on a wanted list...Inspire magazine was used as the medium to distribute this list...Second Method—Operation organized by a Jihadi group...The leadership then selected the method and a suitable person to execute this important operation....Selection of the target was from the central leadership (AQ). The planning and initiation of the operation was in the Arabian Peninsula....And it is not for the organization to give out an open plan, except that the leader of the operation and the executioner of its details, possess excellent abilities and exceptional skills" (p. 41)</p> |

**Figure 14. Selected Excerpts from *Inspire* Issue 14: Assassination Operations (September 2015).<sup>131</sup>**

*Inspire* issue 15, while nominally—and indeed specifically in its OSJ section—deals with the topic of professional assassinations, very little of the actual text covers this topic beyond a piece dedicated to the so-called ongoing “knife revolution,” which since the 1980s has seen Jews targeted in stabbing incidents.<sup>132</sup> Instead, an underlying theme of this issue seems to be one of crisis, patience, and unity. While not an obvious tactic, technique, or procedure per se, the mention of an emphasis on conduct in the quote below is indicative of a sense that al-Qaeda seeks to distinguish itself (and other jihadist groups which share its views) from those who are singled out by the Muslim people as extremist

and harsh in their judgments of the ummah at large, pronouncing anyone whom they do not like as takfiri. In one sense, this is a tactic to hold together its support base in the face of competition while, at the same time, it encourages the lone jihadi to ensure they follow the goals and priorities of the al-Qaeda organization. The list of enemies is long, and the fall of America is a crucial first step. As the holy war will not be quick, the mujahideen must fight tirelessly, without wasting energy bickering among themselves. In the OSJ section, the focus is on home assassinations of important targets with the tactics of the parcel bomb, magnetic car bomb, and door-trap bomb detailed.

| End State  | Enemy  | Recruitment   | TTPs   |
|--|--|---|--|
| <p>"We are fighting a Holy war with America. We will never put down our weapons until we fulfill what Allah wants from us." (p. 4)</p> <p>"We are seeking to give victory to the religion of Allah by every available means, by word and sword. We will fight tirelessly and we will keep sacrificing upon this path until the word of Allah is the highest and the Islamic Shari'ah be our laws in life." (p. 14)</p> <p>"The liberation of Jerusalem and al-Aqsa mosque requires, and Allah knows best, two things: Firstly: Striking the West...Secondly: Establishing a Muslim state in Egypt and the Levant for the mobilization of the Ummah to liberate Palestine." (p. 17)</p> | <p>"Today we face an American, European, Russian, Rafidhi and Nusayri aggression....We must stand united as a single row from East Turkistan to Morocco in the face of the aggressive satanic alliance against Islam, its Ummah and its lands. Verily the Americans, the Russians, the Iranians, the Alwaites and Hizbullah are coordinating their war against us." (p. 17)</p> <p>"We cannot establish an Islamic state until total meltdown of America, the head of the snake. If it falls then its tail, and the regimes it backs, will fall too. America is standing like a brick wall in front of us infighting the Jews who occupy Palestine. Furthermore, it aids the Jews, militarily, economically, security and spiritual support. Its fleets and planes take off from its bases in the land of the two mosques to place siege and kill Muslims" (p. 55)</p> | <p>"It is the duty of each Muslim to spread this revolt to the throats of Americans in their very own homes. Showing that we want an end to their aid to Jews against our Muslim brothers in Palestine....I direct my words to the Muslims in America in particular, indeed these youth; the heroes of the revolution of the knives have created a challenge to every Muslim in matters of jihad. There is no reason for anyone to excuse himself from jihad nor say he is incapable. Jihad is also driven by knives." (p. 37)</p> <p>"If a person or group were to perform a Jihadi operation in their homeland, this serves as an inspiration to other Muslims from the same community. Muslims who are zealous towards their religion. Encouraged by it, reiterating it but also serving as an inspiration for others in different communities to face the American Government." (p. 48)</p> | <p>"our conduct has to convince the Muslim people that we are really keen to be judged by Sharia if we are called upon, and that we keep our promises, and that we do not commit aggression on the sanctity of Muslims. And we do not exaggerate in Takfeer, and that we are the kindest to our people, and that we do not seek to dominate the Muslims." (p. 19)</p> <p>"And of what is required for the Lone Mujahid, to take note with regards to knowledge in these times, is to be aware of the <i>waqih</i> (facts and reality), and study the fiqh of prioritization. Understanding the general views of the mujahideen, their goals and arranging them according to the importance and priorities of each. In order that his jihad is in line with their jihad and acquire the best desired results of jihad for the sake of Allah." (p. 34)</p> |

**Figure 15. Selected Excerpts from *Inspire* Issue 15: Professional Assassinations (May 2016).<sup>133</sup>**

In summation of the previous 15 issues of *Inspire* magazine, we see both continuity and fluctuation depending on the topical area viewed. With regard to the desired end state of the group, we see an ebb and flow between whether the focus is on ultimately bringing down Israel for the liberation of Palestine or whether the true end lies in the establishment of a “pan-Islamic state” or Caliphate, predicated on sharia law. The extent of this Caliphate’s boundaries also seems somewhat in question. Al-Qaeda presents itself as something of a tool designed to reawaken the commitment to jihad for the sake of Allah and Islam yet also does not seem to project its role beyond facilitating the destruction of America and, ultimately, Israel. This goes hand-in-hand with its identification of its primary enemies. America is—and remains throughout—utmost as the “head of the snake,” protecting Israel and insulting Islam. Other enemies include of course Israel, and then Jews, Christians, America’s allies, Russia, Iran and the Shi’a, with the more local “apostate” governments and *Alawite* groups considered a secondary concern. Understandably, then, the focus has been on recruiting individuals—especially youth—in the West to perform jihad where they are. While in the early issues, simply reawakening individuals to jihad itself was a focus and attacking American and other Western interests in the Middle East was also a parallel theme, later issues focused primarily on returning the battle to the West at home and, in particular, to America. With regard to tactics, techniques, and procedures the emphasis increasingly moved away from centrally planned operations and moved to centrally “inspired” lone jihad undertaken by individuals. *Inspire* magazine’s major focus has been to offer these individual jihadists the al-Qaeda

organization's assistance in planning actions based on approved means and targets so as to stay in line with their overall goals of jihad. A primary goal is to shatter the United States economically through the continual need for it to spend large amounts on increased security in reaction to terrorist acts in new arenas and by upgraded means. Thus, while air transportation has remained a continued focus since 9/11, the types (passenger or cargo) and means of attack (various types of explosives from underwear to packages to potentially internal) have shifted. On the other hand, al-Qaeda has also encouraged street-level efforts as well, including having "inspired" the high-profile Boston Marathon bombings and putting its efforts into both "inspiring" individual actors while simultaneously putting together organized operations as in the case of the Charlie Hebdo attacks.

### **Islamic State (*Dabiq*) Narratives**

The first issue of *Dabiq's* narrative relies heavily on the words of Amirul-Mu'minin (Commander of the Faithful) Abu Bakr al-Husayni al-Qurashi al-Baghdadi, leader of the Islamic State and emir of the Caliphate. It establishes that the Caliphate is the rightful authority within the territory it holds and that those who oppose it will be fought, indeed "struck upon the neck." Tribes are urged to give allegiance to the group and join its forces as are those from other regions which are encouraged to emigrate as soon as possible to the Islamic State—particularly those with useful skills for state-building. It has a wide range of enemies it will be fighting to hold onto the territory it claims and into which it desires to expand including America, its allies, Russia, the Jews, the disbelievers,

and those jihadi “claimants” who are frozen at a prior stage of tactics and who have deviated from the true path upon their founder’s death, a veiled reference to al-Qaeda under al-Zawahiri. There is a short three-page accounting of recent attacks among various villages in the area, during which only the enemy seems to incur civilian casualties. There is also a listing of those who have “repented” upon surrender to the Islamic State, amounting to thousands of individuals in all.

| End State  | Enemy   | Recruitment  | TTPs  |
|--|---|--|---|
| <p>“Amirul-Mu’minin said: ‘O Muslims everywhere, glad tidings to you and expect good. Raise your head high, for today—by Allah’s grace—you have a state and Khilafa, which will return your dignity, might, rights and leadership.” (p. 7)</p> <p>“The victories in Ninawa, al-Anbar, Salahuddin, al-Khayr, al-Barakah, and elsewhere, all aided the declaration made by the Islamic State on the first of Ramadan 1435H, in which the Khilafah was officially announced. This new condition opens the path for the complete unification of all Muslim peoples and lands under the single authority of the Khilafah.” (p. 40)</p> <p>“And upon them is to understand that The Islamic State ...is regarded as an unquestionable imamah. As such, anyone who rebels against its authority inside its territory is considered a renegade, and it is permissible to fight him after establishing the hujjah against him (i.e. clarifying his error to him with proof).” (p. 27)</p> | <p>“Amirul-Mu’minin said: ‘O Ummah of Islam, indeed the world today has been divided into two camps and two trenches, with no third camp present: The camp of Islam and faith, and the camp of kufr (disbelief) and hypocrisy—the camp of the Muslims and the mujahidin everywhere, and the camp of the Jews, the crusaders, and their allies, and with them the rest of the nations and the religions of kufr, all being led by America and Russia, and being mobilized by the Jews.” (p. 10)</p> <p>“Sadly, they are now opposed by the present leadership of famous jihad groups who have become frozen in the phase of nikayah attacks.... What makes matters worse is that the new leadership of these groups took advantage of the old leadership’s shahadah to start propagating a hitherto suppressed deviant methodology.” (p. 38)</p> | <p>“Amirul-Mu’minin said: ‘Therefore, rush O Muslims to your state. Yes, it is your state. Rush, because Syria is not for the Syrians, and Iraq is not for the Iraqis.... The State is a state for all Muslims. The land is for the Muslims, all the Muslims. O Muslims everywhere, whoever is capable of making hijra (emigration) to the Islamic State, then let him do so, because hijra to the land of Islam is obligatory... We make a special call to the scholars, fuqaha’ (experts in Islamic jurisprudence) and callers, especially the judges, as well as people with military, administrative, and service expertise, and medical doctors and engineers of all different specializations and fields.” (p. 11)</p> | <p>“The Islamic State has an extensive history of building relations with the tribes within its borders in an attempt to strengthen the ranks of the Muslims, unite them under one imam, and work together towards establishment of the prophetic Khalifah. Its practice of attending tribal forums, addressing the concerns of the tribal leaders and accepting their bay’ah is regularly met with success.” (p. 13)</p> <p>“we will strike the neck of anyone—whenever he may be—that attempts to usurp his leadership, and we will remain patient in the face of such tribulation with the help of Allah.” (p. 29)</p> |

**Figure 16. Selected Excerpts from *Dabiq* Issue 1: The Return of the *Khalifah* (July 2014).<sup>134</sup>**

If expanding the Caliphate is the Islamic State's end state, then issue 2 makes clear that those people that come under its territorial umbrella must toe the line with regard to their—correct—version of Islam. In holding with these beliefs, photos show the group demolishing religious tombs and shrines of non-conforming groups. It encourages recruits to this new territorial Caliphate through inviting them to the new homes and services that are awaiting them and their families upon arrival and appealing to their desire to make a difference in the liberation of the Holy cities of Mecca, Medina, and Jerusalem.<sup>135</sup> The focus therein is on the near enemies including the apostates, the Jews, the Kurdistan Workers' Party, and the Jawlani—otherwise known as the al-Nusrah Front, an al-Qaeda affiliate. The group is particularly sensitive to being “slandered” by competing groups such as the Jawlani. The following list outlines the tactics employed during one of several operations—here, in Raqqa—in which the typical Islamic State response of fighting to the death or execution of the enemy is underlined.

| End State   | Enemy   | Recruitment   | TTPs   |
|---|---|---|--|
| <p>"the flood was a clear sign of the falseness of giving choice between truth and falsehood in da'wah. For the flood was the result and consequence of opposing the truth, and evidence that anyone who rejected the truth would be punished in the dunya before the Hereafter." (p. 9)</p> <p>"So until we return to the correct state of Islamic affairs, it's upon us all to work together to eradicate the principle of 'free choice,' and to not deceive the people in an attempt to seek their pleasure....Rather, we must confront them with the fact that they've turned away from the religion, while we hold on to it, grasping its purity,...and that we're completely ready to stand in the face of anyone who attempts to divert us from our commitment to making the religion of Allah triumphant over all religions." (p. 11)</p> | <p>"As for the massacres taking place in Gaza against the Muslim men, women, and children, then the Islamic State will do everything within its means to continue striking down every apostate who stands as an obstacle on its path towards Palestine...it is only a matter of time and patience before it reaches Palestine to fight the barbaric jews." (p. 4)</p> <p>"The Islamic State did not hesitate to wage war against the communist murtaddin of the PKK/YPG, while simultaneously continuing their fight against the nusayri regime and the sahwat." (p. 12)</p> <p>"the problem with the opponents of the Islamic State is that they treat mu-bahalal and slander like a childish game...the words of the Jawlani leadership are filled with implied and indirect slanderings." (pp. 23, 25)</p> | <p>"The first priority is to perform hijrah from wherever you are to the Islamic State, from darul-kufr to darul-Islam....Rush to the shade of the Islamic State with your parents, siblings, spouses, and children. There are homes here for you and your families. You can be a major contributor towards the liberation of Makkah, Madinah, and al-Quds...if you cannot perform hijrah for whatever extraordinary reason, then try in your region to organize bay'at (pledges of allegiance) to the Khalifah Ibrahim...then distribute them through all forms of media including the Internet." (p. 3)</p> | <p>"Wilayat Ar-Raqqah—Ramadan 26. The soldiers of the Islamic State carry out an assault on the nusayri regime's Division 17 army base outside the city of Ar-Raqqah and succeed in capturing it...Numerous enemy soldiers fled from the base in terror and were subsequently rounded up in nearby villages and executed by the mujahidin. The hands of the mujahidin soaked in the blood of the filthy nusayriyyah are a testament to the jihad of the Islamic State against Bashar and his minions...the soldiers of the Islamic State, whose hearts re devoid of any mercy towards the nusayriyyah, are busy terrorizing them, chasing them out of their strongholds and herding them to their deaths." (p. 42)</p> |

**Figure 17. Selected Excerpts from *Dabiq* Issue 2: The Flood (July 2014).<sup>136</sup>**

Unlike many issues of the jihadi magazines, this particular one largely sticks to its theme of *hijrah* (emigration) to the Islamic State. The Islamic State sets itself aside as a unique entity based on the expanse of its territory and its Caliphate being populated by a sampling of Muslims from around the world who have come solely to dedicate themselves to its cause of establishing a Caliphate in the name of the religion of Allah. There is a very direct focus on recruiting people to join the movement to *hijrah*, giving up all earthly things in order to support it. They are very clear that this Caliphate concerns itself with not only jihad but with all aspects of its citizens' lives in order to keep them upon the appropriate methodology. There is



a carrot-and-stick encouragement in that should one choose to come, they will have benefits in this life and the next such as leaving the world of work and sin behind, but this comes hand-in-hand with the reminder that there really is not a choice since it is obligatory according to religious doctrine. This third issue also coincides with the period in which the American journalist hostages James Foley and eventually Steven Sotloff were beheaded when the United States refused to negotiate with the Islamic State by releasing Muslim prisoners, and there are a couple of articles covering this topic. The Islamic State makes no hesitation in listing just who its overarching enemies are—America, the Christians, the Jews, and the apostates—but also makes it clear that it considers tribes who cross them and other jihadist groups that oppose it to be equally worthy of its scorched-earth retribution.

| End State   | Enemy  | Recruitment  | TTPs  |
|---|--|--|---|
| <p>"Were the muwahhid to search every book authored by the historians, he would not find mention of any state similar to the Islamic State, particularly as it exists following its revival under the wing of Amir-ul-Mu'minin Abu Bakr... Were any of them established by the emigration of poor strangers from the East and the West, who then gathered in an alien land of war and pledged allegiance of an 'unknown' man, in spite of the political, economic, military, media, and intelligence war waged by the nations of the world against their religion, their state, and their hijrah?...I have no doubt that this state...is a marvel of history that has only come about to pave the way for al-Malhamah al-Kubra (the grand battle prior to the hour)." (pp. 5-6)</p> | <p>"the USA decided to get officially involved once again in the affairs of the Muslim Ummah by conducting airstrikes against the Islamic State and its people. There were a number of related events that the Obama administration and western media tried to ignore when discussing the strikes and the consequential execution of James Foley....Their were demands made prior to the US strikes, for the release of Muslim prisoners held by the US in exchange for Foley's release, but they were arrogantly ignored." (p. 3)</p> <p>"The Islamic State has become a reality that everyone can see. Even the apostates cannot ignore its threat, let alone the cross worshippers and the Jews. Yet those who are falsely associated with jihad turn away from the Islamic State, even publicly declaring their enmity against it in bizarre competition with the crusaders and the apostates." (p. 6)</p> | <p>"Thus, the strangers are those who left their families and their lands, emigrating for the sake of Allah and for the sake of establishing his religion...they are the most wondrous of the creation in terms of faith, and the strangest of them all." (p. 8)</p> <p>"every Muslim professional who delayed his jihad in the past under the pretense of studying Shari'ah, medicine, or engineering, etc., claiming he would contribute later with his expertise, should now make his number one priority to repent and answer the call to hijrah, especially after the establishment of the Khalifah...As for the Muslim students...they should know that their hijrah from darul-kufr to darul-Islam and jihad are more obligatory...abandoning jihad is a trait of hypocrisy. So be wary of its or else it may seize you by your heart." (p. 26)</p> <p>"The modern day slavery of employment, work hours, wages, etc., is one that leaves the Muslim in a constant feeling of subjugation to a kufr master...Whereas when you compare the situation of the Sahabah after hijrah and jihad, you see that the dunya came to them without them following its tail." (p. 29)</p> <p>"Jihad not only grants life on the larger scale of the Ummah, it also grants a fuller life on the scale of the individual...This life of jihad is not possible until you move to the Khilafah." (p. 31)</p> | <p>"Abu Mus'ab az-Zarqawi (rahimahullah) said 'So we warn the tribes, that any tribe or party or assembly whose involvement and collaboration with the crusaders and their apostate agents are confirmed....we will target them just as we target the crusaders....From now on, everyone whose affiliation with the pagan guards, police, and army is confirmed, or his collaboration and espionage for the crusaders is verified, then his ruling is execution, and not only that, his house will also be destroyed and burnt, after removal of the women and children.'" (p. 12)</p> <p>"Islam cannot be compartmentalized and approached piecemeal. We cannot adopt the mindset that jihad is acceptable without da'wah, or that the hudud cannot be established during defensive jihad...As such, the Islamic State actively works to educate its citizens, preach to and admonish them, enforce their strict adherence to Islamic obligations, judge their disputes, implement the shar'i hudud, eradicate all traces of shirk and heresy, incite the people to jihad and call them to unite behind the Khalifah." (p. 17)</p> |

**Figure 18. Selected Excerpts from *Dabiq* Issue 3: A Call to Hijrah (September 2014).<sup>137</sup>**

*Dabiq* issue 4 rests greatly upon an impassioned speech by Sheik Abu Muhammad al-Adnani in which he rallies the Islamic State soldiers and threatens their enemies with his declarations that the Islamic State does not fear death and that it is preordained that they will reign victorious as this is the crusader's final campaign. The West is encouraged to send as much military equipment as they can to the front as it will only end up in the hands of Islamic State soldiers as *ghanimah* or war booty. After the previous issue's focus on the role of *hijrah*, there is no mention of it to be seen, but rather a hailing of the pledging of allegiance by local groups

and the inciting of Western Muslims to rise up and attack the crusaders where they live in the manner of lone jihad (encouraged by al-Qaeda) but with distinct attribution to the Islamic State. This is notably the first issue to have a piece by the British journalist hostage John Cantlie.<sup>138</sup> Cantlie decries the United States and the United Kingdom for their policy of not negotiating with the Islamic State in the face of the beheadings of his four cellmates – James Foley, Steven Sotloff, David Haines, and Alan Henning—while hostages from other countries have been released. There is also mention of the execution of the men and the well-publicized taking of female slaves—along with justification of this action—from amongst the Yazidi population.

| End State   | Enemy  | Recruitment   | TTPs   |
|---|--|---|--|
| <p>"This religion is the one promised with victory, not the religion of division, partisanship, innovation, and pride in personal opinion, nor the religion void of bay'ah, imarah, and khilafah. This is the religion truly manifest at the level of the individual, community, and nation....Today we witness the end of the lie called western civilization and the rise of the Islamic giant'....This prompted the enemy of Allah—Bush—to say after the blessed rise of the Islamic State, 'They strive to establish an Islamic State stretching from China to Spain.' He spoke the truth although he is a liar." (pp. 3-4)</p> <p>"Since the collapse of the mushrikin in Arabia, Persia, and India at the hands of the Sahabah and the Tabi'in, the bulk of all jihad was against the cross-worshipping Romans with Sham playing an important role in all wars between the Muslims and crusaders. And this will be the case until the taghut cross is broken by the Mash' Isa ('alay-his-salam)." (p. 32)</p> | <p>"Shaykh Abu Muhammad al-Adnani...said, 'And so we promise you [O crusaders] by Allah's permission that this campaign will be your final campaign. It will be broken and defeated....We will conquer your Rome, break your crosses, and enslave your women, by the permission of Allah, the Exalted.'" (p. 5)</p> <p>"Our war with the Kurds is a religious war. It is not a nationalistic war—we seek the refuge of Allah. We do not fight Kurds because they are Kurds. Rather we fight the disbelievers amongst them, the allies of the crusaders and jews in their war against the Muslims. As for the Muslim Kurds, then they are our people and our brothers wherever they may be." (p. 9)</p> <p>"This bay'ah comes at a time when the Islamic State is facing a growing list of enemies, and it further underscores the fact that the lines are being drawn and the camps of iman and kufr are both being cleansed.... There will be no room to sit on the fence." (p. 21)</p> | <p>"How can you enjoy life and sleep while not aiding your brothers, not casting fear into the hearts of the cross worshippers, and not responding to their strikes with multitudes more?" (p. 9)</p> <p>"one who abandons jihad and instead busies himself with making money has been censured....So the best condition for the believer is that his time is spent in obedience of Allah, jihad fi sabilillah, and da'wah to his obedience. He should not seek the dunya." (p. 12)</p> <p>"The Muslims have continuously received one piece of good news after another since the announcement of the re-establishment of the blessed Islamic Khalifa. One of the most recent pieces of good news was that the group 'Ansar al-Islam in Iraq', including both its leaders and soldiers, has pledged allegiance to the Islamic State." (p. 21)</p> | <p>"At this point in the crusade against the Islamic State, it is very important that attacks take place in every country that has entered into the alliance against the Islamic State, especially the US, UK, France, Australia, and Germany. Rather, the citizens of the crusader countries should be targeted wherever they can be found....Every Muslim should get out of his house, find a crusader, and kill him. It is important that the killing becomes attributed to patrons of the Islamic State." (p. 44)</p> <p>"Upon conquering the region of Sinjar in Wilayat Ninawa, the Islamic State faced a population of Yazidis, a pagan minority exstant for ages in regions of Sham and Iraq... Accordingly, the Islamic State dealt with this group as the majority of fuqaha have indicated how mushrikin should be dealt with. Unlike the Jews and Christians, there was no room for jizya payment....After capture, the Yazidi women and children were then divided according to the Shari'ah amongst the fighters of the Islamic State who participated." (p. 15)</p> |

**Figure 19. Selected Excerpts from *Dabiq* Issue 4: The Failed Crusade (October 2014).<sup>139</sup>**

With the ongoing success of the Islamic State in holding and expanding its territory, issue 5 of *Dabiq* expounds upon those successes and offers many visuals of the Black Standard flying over their newly taken lands. The end-state narrative follows that the flag will not only continue to fly over these lands but will fly over Mecca and Medina, Jerusalem and Rome, indeed to the very eastern and western ends of the earth. It will do so, moreover, because Allah wills it and they have given their blood in his name to ensure that happens, thus confounding the will of their enemies—the Americans, the Jews, Christians, the Shi’a, and the house of Saud. With regard to the latter, it is pointed out that the jihadi claimants—read as al-Qaeda affiliates—have only served to hinder progress in the fight against these groups. The emphasis is on consolidating the state in their name (e.g., the move toward coinage) and seeking the allegiance of an increasing number of groups in the adjacent territory in order to further expand at the perimeters. This momentum in increasing the numbers of local followers has led to their downplaying *hijrah* from the West in the issue, with an emphasis on the strides those groups have made back at home in lone jihad-type operations in its name in direct response to the calls from Sheik Abu Muhammad al-Adnani printed in the last issue.

| End State   | Enemy  | Recruitment   | TTPs   |
|---|--|---|--|
| <p>"The flag of Khilafah will rise over Makkah and al-Madinah, even if the apostates and hypocrites despise such. The flag of Khilafah will rise over Baytul-Maqdis and Rome, even if the Jews and Crusaders despise such. The shade of this blessed flag will expand until it covers all eastern and western extents of the Earth, filling the world with the truth and justice of Islam and putting an end to the falsehood and tyranny of jahliyyah, even if America and its coalition despise such." (p. 3)</p> <p>"And indeed the Islamic State will remain. It will remain because it was built on the corpses of martyrs and it quenched its thirst with their blood." (p. 32)</p> | <p>"And when we heard the trumpets of the Jews and Christians—the callers upon the gates of Hell-fire—we answered the order of Allah's Messenger that obliged sticking to the jama'ah of the Muslims and the Imam." (p. 24)</p> <p>"Sadly, after the shahadah and arrest of the mujahidin there some years ago, certain corrupted methodologies prepared by jihad claimants called for the stopping of all operations within the Arabian Peninsula even after the ability to re-launch them, leading to a halt on jihad, until the hearts were reawakened to strike the Rafidah and Al Salul." (p. 26)</p> | <p>"This month, the ranks of the Muslims were further strengthened and unified with the bay'at of the mujahidin in Sinai, Libya, Yemen, Algeria, and the Arabian Peninsula, in addition to the bay'ah of more than 30 Kurdish village in Wilayat Halab." (p. 12)</p> <p>"Therefore, O people of tawhid in the Arabian Peninsula, the truth had appeared and prevailed. So come to your State and rally around your Khalifa... the jihad you prepared your saddles for has arrived to the doorsteps of your homes, and no borders will prevent you from reaching it." (p. 23)</p> <p>"Prior to the announcement of the new wilayat, a number of groups in Khurasan, al-Qawqaz, Indonesia, the Philippines, and elsewhere had pledged their allegiance to the Khilafah, and continue to do so daily." (p. 24)</p> <p>"And the numbers of Muslims taking up arms in the name of jihad under the banner of the Islamic State are growing, and they're growing fast...over 35,000 fighters." (p. 38)</p> | <p>"Algeria, Libya, and Sinai are lands strategically near each other, making it possible to expand further despite the whims of the tawaghit and support the mujahidin who have pledged allegiance to the Khilafah in other lands." (p. 32)</p> <p>"In an effort to disentangle the Ummah from the corrupt, interest-based global financial system, the Islamic State recently announce the minting of new currency based on the intrinsic value of gold, silver, and copper." (p. 18)</p> <p>"the Islamic State is now truly moving with great momentum. As an entity enjoys success, it attracts more to its fold...until it achieves some sort of critical mass, the point at which it becomes self-perpetuating, self-sustaining." (p. 36)</p> <p>"All these [recent] attacks were the direct result of the Shayk's call to action, and they highlight what a deadly tinderbox is fizzing just beneath the surface of every western country." (p. 37)</p> |

**Figure 20. Selected Excerpts from *Dabiq* Issue 5: Remaining and Expanding (November 2014).<sup>140</sup>**

Interestingly, the foreword of *Dabiq* issue 6 spent no time on its title subject but instead again lauded the accomplishments of the lone jihadists who undertook attacks in the West. There was also an article with 31 pieces of advice for soldiers of the Islamic State – with a few pieces of uncharacteristic advice for the group such as admonishing them not to declare takfir without giving credence to preventive factors and with full evidence, and to “deal gently with the people.”<sup>141</sup> The two articles addressing the title subject, a 10-page article – “The Qa’idah of adh-Dhawahiri, al-Harari, and an-Nadhari, and the Absent Yemeni Wisdom” – and the 16-page feature article – “al-Qaidah of Waziristan:

A Testimony From Within” — make up the bulk of the issue. The first of these focuses on Harith an-Nadhari in Yemen, who was seen as emulating the response of the al-Jawlani Front (the al-Qaeda affiliate al-Nusra), while the latter details one jihadi’s experience with al-Qaeda and how it changed after the death of Osama bin Laden, leading him to break his *bay’ah* and join the Islamic State. While the foreword covers successes of lone jihad, the Islamic State as primarily an insurgent group comes through in this issue with its emphasis upon local recruitment and the training of soldiers in Islamic State camps. Receiving disgruntled soldiers from al-Qaeda and other groups is seen as a fruitful recruitment technique. *Dabiq* issue 6 also includes references to the killing of American petroleum expert William Henderson and the capture of a Jordanian pilot (who was later burned alive), but these are not covered in much detail. Despite its successes, the Islamic State ultimately recognizes that it has some way to go before it is anywhere near its desired expansive end state and must be on its guard to hold on to its territory.

| End State   | Enemy   | Recruitment   | TTPs   |
|---|---|---|--|
| "O soldiers of Allah, know that both we and you are honored with the establishment and defense of the Islamic State in the land of the two rivers, but also know also that it is not the state of Harun ar-Rashid whereby we address the clouds in the sky as he used to do [informing them that wherever they poured their rain it would pour upon Muslim's land due to the expansiveness of the Khilafah.] Rather, it is the State of the vulnerable. We fear the enemy's attack and we terrorize them, just as the Sahabah in the first Islamic State of al-Madinah would never leave their weapons due to fear." (p. 9) | "after 'the Arab Spring' began and some prominent leaders of al-Qaidah attained shahadah, there emerged unwise guidelines and policies from adh-Dhawahiri, al-Amriki, al-Basha, and Husam 'Abdur-Ra'uf in Khurasan. Meanwhile, an-Nadhiri and his likes in Yemen exposed what they had concealed of desires in their hearts all these long years." (p. 23)<br><br>"By clarifying the truth, however, one is only further exposed to being targeted by the deviants. This fact is underscored by the discovery of a cell of Khawarij hiding within the land of the Islamic State as they sought to recruit others to their misguidance." (p. 31) | "There will be others who follow the examples set by Man Haron Monis and Numan Haider in Australia, Martin Couture-Rouleau and Michael Zehaf-Bibeau in Canada, Zale Thompson in America, and Bertrand Nzohabonayo in France....The Muslims will continue to defy the kafir war machine, flanking the crusaders on their own streets." (p. 4)<br><br>"Yes, we gave bay'ah to Amir-ul-Mu'minin Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi after I already had a bay'ah of imarah to Mulla Muhammad Umar and also had bayah to Shayk Usamah and likewise Dr. Ayman adh-Dhawahiri, but only because of ...nullification of the conditions of the bay'ah." (p. 53)<br><br>"Tandhim al-Qa'idah....Many of those they moved in pursuit of have either given bay'ah to the Islamic State or are on their way to do so." (p. 55) | "Embolden your hearts, for doing so is a means of victory and triumph. Know that the most difficult thing for a soldier of Allah to train for is getting used to a lot of combat. Make frequent mention of the grudges you have against the enemy, for they increase your boldness." (p. 11)<br><br>"the Islamic State has established numerous training camps dedicated to providing an essential level of training to its mujahidin, including physical, tactical, weapons, and shar'i training, before sending them into battle or assigning them to specific units for more specialized training." (p. 26) |

**Figure 21. Selected Excerpts from *Dabiq* Issue 6: Al-Qa'idah of Waziristan (December 2014).<sup>142</sup>**

At a substantial 83 pages, *Dabiq* issue 7 covers a lot of territory. Articles include everything from advice for the leaders of the Islamic State from Abu Hamza to a mocking of a plea from al-Zawahiri to Muhammad Morsi to an article by the newly emigrated wife of the mujahid (Amedy Coulibaly) who died in the recent operations in Paris. A general theme is a stark comparison between the Islamic State and other jihadist groups, setting the former apart for its stark willingness to engage in tactics and procedures it feels follow the letter of sharia law. For example, it covers the beheading of a Japanese captive, the burning alive of a captured Jordanian pilot, a revenge attack of Coptic Christian Egyptians, the execution of a Pakistani soldier, throwing a man off a building for "sexual deviance," and the stoning of a woman to death for adultery among other punishments. It also lists any number of ways to target Western civilians including explosives, bullets,

and fists. There should be no mistake, it contends, that Islam is the religion of the sword. That sword is meant to target polytheists, the Christians and Jews, the religious hypocrites, and the aggressors. The 14-page feature article, "Extinction of the Gray Zone," critiques the differences between the Islamic State and other groups now that there are only two camps: belief and disbelief. One of the first matters renounced by the hypocrites abandoning the gray zone and fleeing to the camp of apostasy and *kufr* (disbelief) – or remaining in the land of *kufr* versus performing *hijrah* – was the clear-cut obligation to kill those who mock the Messenger. The article also launches an attack against apostate imams (now considered hypocrites) who took for themselves a *masjid* (mosque) in order to sow harm and disbelief among the people. Jihadi claimant groups, it says, are more interested in maintaining power than the unity of the ummah under the Caliphate, whose message it sees as inheritor to the legacy of that of the Prophet. Recruits continue to be primarily through the *bay'ah* of local groups, especially disgruntled members of al-Qa-eda affiliates, over an encouragement in the magazine for emigration since it is putting more emphasis on the success of attacks in the West.



| End State   | Enemy  | Recruitment   | TTPs   |
|---|--|---|--|
| <p>"The announcement of the Islamic State's expansion to Sham followed by the subsequent announcement of the Khalifah...bringing the grayzone to the brink of permanent extinction...by reviving the great body of Islam so no Muslim had any excuse to be independent of this entity embodying them and waging war on their behalf in the face of kufr...comparable to the division resulting from the Islamic message when it was first conveyed by the Messenger." (p. 55)</p> | <p>"pacifist" Japan has once again defied wisdom by entering into another crusader coalition against the Muslims...all Japanese citizens and interests—wherever they may be found—are now a target for the soldiers and patrons of the Khalifah." (pp. 3-4)</p> <p>"Allah has revealed Islam to be the religion of the sword...Allah's messenger was sent with four swords...a sword for the mushrikun...a sword for the Ahlul-Kitab...a sword for the munafiqin...and a sword for the bughat (rebellious aggressors)." (pp. 20-21)</p> <p>"scores of fighters from within the Sahwah and the Jawlani Front continue to abandon their misguided mission only to join the Islamic State...these so called "Islamic" groups have chosen to stand in the same trench as the secularists." (pp. 38-39)</p> | <p>"This month, a number of mujahid groups in Khurasan announced their bay'ah to Amirul-Mu'minin...after gathering and holding consultations to fulfill the requirements for the expansion." (p. 33)</p> <p>"the majority of the mujahid divisions in both Dagestan...and Chechnya (Nokhchicho) declared their bay'ah along with a number of other mujahid divisions located across other regions of Qawqaz." (p. 35)</p> <p>"By Allah, our rallying under one leader is harder on the enemies of Allah than a thousand victories on the battlefield." (p. 36)</p> <p>"Likewise, we renew our call to the muwahhidin in Europe and the disbelieving West and everywhere else, to target the crusaders in their own lands...We will argue, before Allah, against any Muslim who has the ability to shed a single drop of crusader blood but does not do so, whether with an explosive device, a bullet, a knife, a car, a rock, or even a boot or a fist." (p. 37)</p> | <p>"In burning the crusader pilot alive and burying him under a pile of debris, the Islamic State carried out a just form of retaliation for his involvement in the crusader bombing campaign which continues to result in the killing of countless Muslims." (p. 6)</p> <p>"This month, the soldiers of the Khalifah in Wilayat Tarabulus captured 21 Coptic crusaders, almost five years after the blessed operation against the Baghdad church executed in revenge for...sisters tortured and murdered by the Coptic Church of Egypt." (p. 32)</p> <p>"After declaring their bay'ah, the mujahidin publicly displayed their execution of a murtadd soldier belonging to the Pakistani army, an act that serves to highlight the contrast between the <i>aqidah</i> of the Islamic State—the <i>aqidah</i> of Ahlus-Sunnah—and that of some jihad claimants who see nothing wrong with making du'a for the tawaghit waging war against the Muslims." (p. 33)</p> <p>"the Islamic State continues its efforts...by implementing the ruling of Allah on those who practice any form of sexual deviancy or transgression...a man found guilty of engaging in sodomy...was taken to the top of a building and thrown off." (p. 43)</p> |

**Figure 22. Selected Excerpts from *Dabiq* Issue 7: From Hypocrisy to Apostasy (February 2015).<sup>143</sup>**

*Dabiq* issue 8 is entitled "Shari'ah Alone Will Rule Africa," however, the attention paid in the issue specifically to that region is limited to the three-page article "The Bay'ah from West Africa" and two pages noting actions in the Libyan Arena. In contrast, there is a 16-page article on "Irja: The Most Dangerous Bid'ah (and its effect on the jihad in Sham)." The latter article discusses at length the concept of *irja*, literally meaning "postponing." As an Islamic philosophy, *irja* means holding off on violent action and letting God be the judge. The Islamic State decries this notion as an

innovation in religious matters, without precedent as set in the religious texts. It claims in the article that to embrace this notion trivializes even major sins and thus dilutes the religion. They cite the Salaf who warned that it would lead to an abandonment of the religion altogether. The significance for the Islamic State is that they are often likened to the *Khawarij*, against whose extreme obligations to action the original *irja* was directed. Thus, they perceive it as a direct affront and consider it at best hypocrisy. The Islamic State attribute *irja* most directly in the article to the “jihad claimants,” often a veiled reference in *Dabiq* to certain al-Qaeda affiliates—among other groups. These groups at large are seen as accommodating nationalistic sympathies in their regions. Where the idea of the sharia ruling in Africa does come into play in the issue is in its return to a call for *hijrah*—here to the nations of Chad, Niger, and Libya where the Islamic State has taken hold of territory and needs greater numbers of sympathetic and skilled individuals to back it up and where emigrating does not set up as much of a red flag. A further article by a female writer serves to incite women to recognize their own obligation for *hijrah*. Of particular note in this issue with regard to tactics are the employment of “lion cub” child soldiers, who have their own dedicated Islamic State training camps and who have been seen on video performing the execution of captives. Additionally mentioned is the rationale behind the destruction of art and artifacts of ancient cultures—with pictures showing the sledgehammering of Assyrian antiquities due to the fact that they represent civilizations Allah has doomed to fail and thus should not be held up as anything to be revered.

| End State   | Enemy  | Recruitment   | TTPs  |
|---|--|---|---|
| <p>"It is the rejection of nationalism that will drive the Khilafah to continue expanding until it takes Constantinople and Rome from the Crusaders and their allies by Allah's permission." (p. 5)</p> <p>"And now, has the time not come for the crusaders, atheists, and apostates to realize that the Islamic State and its message are here to stay?" (p. 6)</p> | <p>"We perform jihad so that Allah's word becomes supreme and that the religion becomes completely for Allah... Everyone who opposes this goal or stands in the way of this goal is an enemy for us and a target for our swords, whatever his name may be and whatever his lineage may be." (p. 3)</p> <p>"So, according to the allies of al-Qa'idah in Syria, there is no difference between Muslim, Christian (Assyrian/Syriac), and Nusrayni, Rafidi, Durzi, and Isma'ili: Syria is a country for all of them!... The Jawlani front will find that its betrayal of the muhajirin and ansar of the Islamic State will end up in the Sahwah's betrayal of the Jawlani." (p. 11)</p> | <p>"And we bring you the good news today of the Khilafa's expansion to West Africa, for the Khalifa (hafidhullah) has accepted the pledge of allegiance made by our brothers.... So come, O Muslims to your State, for we call on you to mobilize for jihad and incite you and invite you to emigrate to your brothers in West Africa. And we specifically call upon students of Islamic knowledge and the callers to Islam." (p. 15)</p> <p>"Libya has become an ideal land of hijra for those who find difficulty making their way to Sham, particularly those of our brothers and sisters in Africa." (p. 26)</p> <p>"This ruling is an obligation upon women just as it is upon men, for Allah (ta'ala), when excluding those incapable of performing hijrah, He excluded the incapable women just as He excluded the incapable men." (p. 33)</p> | <p>"These are the children of the Ummah of jihad, a generation raised in the lands of malahim (fierce battles) and nurtured under the shade of Shari'ah.... The Islamic State has taken it upon itself to fulfill the Ummah's duty towards this generation in preparing it to face the crusaders.... It has established institutes for these ahhbal (lion cubs) to train and hone their military skills, and to teach them the book of Allah and the Sunnah of his Messenger." (p. 20)</p> <p>"Last month the soldiers of the Khilafah with sledgehammers in hand, revived the Sunnah of their father Ibrahim (alayhis-salam) when they laid waste to the shirki legacy of a nation that had long passed from the face of the earth. They entered the ruins of the ancient Assyrians in Wilayat Ninawa and demolished their statues, sculptures, and engravings." (p. 22)</p> |

**Figure 23. Selected Excerpts from *Dabiq* Issue 8: Shari'ah Alone Will Rule Africa (March 2015).<sup>144</sup>**

The title of *Dabiq* issue 9, "They Plot and Allah Plots," is the first part of a verse of the Quran—the second part of which is the title of its 10-page feature article "And Allah is the Best of Plotters." The article uses a number of theological references to make its case that, despite the "deviance and arrogance" of its enemies who plot Allah's religion, they are weak because they are the plots of *Shaytan* (Satan). These plots of the enemies, therefore, will end in their own demise. The lesson for the Muslims, then, is not to be dismayed about plots against them and lapse in their religion as Allah favors those who are true to the truth. This will be their last plot, moreover, because the crusaders are weak and forced to make allies of their own enemies such as Iran. The topic is further covered in the six-page

article, "Conspiracy Theory: Shirk." Therein, the conspiracy theories trying to deny the role of the Muslim mujahideen in carrying out 9/11 are discussed, as are their impossibility given the number of people whose secrecy would have to be relied upon. The reasoning behind such conspiracy theories is attributed to those who want to deny the Muslims their humiliation of America and those who wish to abandon jihad and *bay'ah* and instead pursue the *dunya* or life on earth in the way of the *kuffar*. The narrative of the end state, then, is to reiterate that Islam is a religion of war and that it has carried out great operations without resort to any kind of conspiratorial actions just as it has accomplished such in the past. The enemies thus are those who openly conspire together against the Islamic State, and these are listed. Recruitment remains on *bay'ah* and *hijrah* although those that remained behind in the West and pursued lone jihad-type activities are also lauded. There is a focus on the process of operations, generally given a more superficial overview in the magazine with the focus merely on the end result. One extended quote, given below, shows the extent to which its tactics, techniques, and procedures are detailed. The capture of the 4th Regiment Base (a key piece of linking territory) and the Yarmuk Camp (near the region of the prophesied "al-Mahalma") are each given their own articles, as both are important strategic moves. This issue offers a woman's support for the mujahideen's taking of concubines from among captured "slave girls," claiming it is a more moral treatment than the Western use of women as prostitutes. There are a number of criticisms of al-Qaeda and affiliates with the implication that al-Zawahiri is the only reason al-Qaeda still exists. Finally, while it may be easy to disregard these as mere propaganda to frighten

the West, note that the regular article by John Cantlie throws in a reference to the ease by which one can procure and transport nuclear devices.

| End State   | Enemy  | Recruitment  | TTPs  |
|---|--|--|---|
| <p>"One only has to ask these theorists, were the Muslims able to establish a state and expand it only with the consent from the Roman and Persian empires? Were the Muslims agents of the Romans or Persians during their wars against these two rival empires?...The answer to these questions is undoubtedly no. Has the world changed so much for these grand conspiracies to develop and overpower the world? The answer is no." (p. 17)</p> <p>"On 25 Rajab 1436, the Khalifah (hafidhahullah) ...briefly mentioned the background of a new plot against Islam in the making...He also said, 'O Muslims, Islam was never for a day the religion of peace. Islam is the religion of war. Your Prophet (sallallahu 'alayhi wa sallam) was dispatched with the sword as a mercy to creation. He was ordered with war until Allah was worshipped alone.'" (p. 52)</p> | <p>"The real conspiracies are not secrets hidden from mankind. The Iraqi Sahwah openly met with Bush, the Iraqi regime and Rafidi leaders. The 'Islamic' Sahwah factions of Iraq would openly fight alongside the tribal Sahwah against the Islamic State....The Syrian Sahwah openly meets in Qatar, Turkey, and 'Saudi' Arabia. The Americans openly discuss their backing of the Syrian Sahwah and the support...by American allies." (p. 18)</p> <p>"The historical origin of the 'Arab Spring' banners...is a flag designed by the British crusader Mark Sykes...of the Sykes-Picot Agreement, which divided the Muslim lands...every Muslim should reject any group raising these jahili banners and every party cooperating with those who raise them against the Islamic State." (pp. 20, 23)</p> <p>"But due to the deviance and arrogance of the enemies of Allah, they plot against His religion...And yet their plot is inherently weak, as it is part of the weak plot of Shaytan." (p. 51)</p> | <p>"As for those who continue to suffer from the disease of being indifferent towards the obligations of hijrah, jihad, and bay'ah,...then let them prepare their flimsy excuses for the angels of death." (p. 4)</p> <p>"Either ones (sic) performs hijrah to the wilayat of the Khalifah or, if he is unable...he must attack the crusaders, their allies, the Rafidah, tawaghit, and their apostate forces, wherever he might be with any means available to him, and he should not hesitate to do so, nor consult any supposed 'scholar' on this obligation. He should attack after declaring bay'ah to the Khalifah, so as not to die a death of Jahiliyyah." (p. 54)</p> <p>"the Islamic State recently opened the Medical College in ar-Raqqa as well as the College for Medical Studies in Mosul....This should be received as a wake-up call for the many Muslim students in the lands of kufr...instead of performing hijrah to the Islamic State....The Islamic State offers everything you need to live and work here, so what are you waiting for?" (p. 26)</p> | <p>"Last month, the soldiers of the Khilafah succeeded in capturing the 4th Regiment base in Wilayat Shamal Baghdad. The region...connects together four wilayat.... The victory...meant that the Islamic State had now cut off the main Safawi supply route from Baghdad through al-Ambar. The operation... had multiple phases, including recon-naissance using both aerial drones and ground units, which succeeded in identifying important targets outside the regiment base....The battle commenced with the mujahidin attacking the main gate in order to pave the way for the ishishadi brothers...the ishishadi brother...entered... driving an...armored vehicle carrying 7 tons of highly explosive substances...to target and destroy the base command center...A second ishishadi brother...then entered with an...armor-plated water truck carrying 8 tons of explosives...to...destroy the military intelligence officers building and ammunition storage center....A third and final ishishadi attack... with an...armor-plated water truck carrying 8 tons of explosives...to...destroy the soldiers' barracks." (p. 29)</p> |

**Figure 24. Selected Excerpts from *Dabiq* Issue 9: They Plot and Allah Plots (May 2015).<sup>145</sup>**

The 15-page feature article of this 10th issue of *Dabiq* is entitled "The Law of Allah or the Laws of Men," but its subtitle "Is Waging War Against the Khilafah Apostasy?" really gets to the heart of its argument that, because the *Sahwah* Coalition (including the Free Syrian Army, the Shamiyyah Front, Faylaq as-Sham, Jaysh al-Islam, and the Jawlani front) nor any other

groups with the ability to hold land did not rule by the sharia in a single village but rather by manmade laws, they ruled outside Allah's law despite their claim that they would achieve this after the war is over. The Islamic State, on the other hand, claims to rule solely by the word of sharia in all its territory, thereby having legitimacy, and thus those who oppose it are waging war against the religion of Allah. Further, aiding the *kuffar* against the Muslims is apostasy. It instead calls for the soldiers to turn on these groups and to fight them in their strongholds.<sup>146</sup> The present *Khilafah* is the end state to only be writ large as it spreads and grows in territory and recruits until there is no more land to incorporate. The words of its leader or *Khalifah* are enough to demand submission to the group. The above groups—and the crusader supporters—are the enemy and even a wife must separate from her husband to save themselves from sin should they not follow the Islamic State. This call is the way of recruitment—turning groups and families on themselves. Tactics remain harsh, both locally and abroad, but all of it is justified one way or another as the defense of Islam and the Muslim ummah rather than for their own aggrandizement.

| End State   | Enemy  | Recruitment   | TTPs   |
|---|--|---|--|
| <p>"the Islamic State (may Allah honor it) in its announcement of establishing a Khilafah and appointing a khalifah for the Muslims, its spreading of its influence to vast regions of the blessed land and the core of the Islamic world, its sending of leaders and wulat (plural of wali) to the other lands and regions, the pledging of allegiance of many groups to it, and its proclamation of animosity towards the world order and jihad against it wherever such is possible, and its controlling many of the important regions, all of this and other matters are from the clearest things showing the reality of this blessed Khilafah and that it is in accordance with and following the purposes and approaches of the Shari'ah regarding the general imamah." (p. 21)</p> <p>"it is also well known that if someone is given the pledge of khilafah in any of the lands and then sends his delegates to other regions and lands, then such is sufficient to make it obligatory upon the people of those lands to obey him and that his order is to be executed merely by the arrival of his delegates to them." (p. 23)</p> | <p>"The Mujahid Shayk Abu Muhammad al-Adnani ash-Shami—may Allah protect him and make him a thorn in the throats of the apostates, munafiqin, and "theorists"—said "We likewise renew our call to the soldiers of the factions in Sham and Libya. We call on them to think long before embarking to fight the Islamic State, which rules by that which Allah revealed...beware, for by fighting the Islamic State you fall into kufr whether you realize it or not." (p. 50)</p> <p>"So when will the soldiers of the Jawlani front repent and realize that their war against the Islamic State only serves the interests of their allies in the Sahwah Coalition that they belong to and the allies of their allies (the Crusader Coalition)? And when will the "rational minds" in al-Qaidah repair the condition of their organization before al-Qaidah—with all of its branches—becomes a sawah led by its spite, envy, partisanship, and by the sorcery of the media, in the war against the revived Khilafah?" (p. 69)</p> | <p>"Earlier this year, the ranks of the Khilafa were bolstered by our brothers from al-Qarwaz (The Caucasus) as numerous mujahidin have since joined the ranks of the Khilafah in the region." (p. 36)</p> <p>"We call the Muslims and the mujahidin everywhere to give bay'ah to the Khalifah in obedience to Allah's command, for the truth has become as clear as the sun in the middle of the day, and only the blind one is incapable of seeing it." (p. 37)</p> <p>"Perhaps the wife of a Sahwah soldier will be shocked by my words...know there are only two options before you...advise your husband and make him fear Allah....If, however, he shows arrogance...then it's upon you to abandon him.... And here I call on you to make hijrah to us here in the lands of the blessed Islamic State!" (p. 47)</p> | <p>"In Lyon, a daring Muslim came to the defense of the Khilafah by storming a French factory and beheading a kafir belonging to France, a crusader coalition nation waging war against the Khalifah. Two even bloodier strikes were carried out in Tunisia and Kuwait by wilayat of the Islamic State. In Kuwait, a Rafidi temple was rocked by an explosion set off by...a mujahid who charged into the middle of the Rafidah and punished them in defense for Ahlus-Sunna and in the defense of the Khalifah, which the government of Kuwait is waging war against as part of the crusader coalition. In Tunisia, the mujahid...made his way into a hotel beach resort in the town of Sousse with an assault rifle and massacred dozens of citizens belonging to a number of European crusader states also involved in the coalition." (p. 3)</p> |

**Figure 25. Selected Excerpts from *Dabiq* Issue 10: The Laws of Allah or the Laws of Men (July 2015).<sup>147</sup>**

*Dabiq* issue 11 compares the historical events leading to the Prophet fighting the coalitions of the *mushrikin* (polytheist) tribes, along with the Jews and "hypocrites" of that time, in the Great Battle of Badr to those that have beset the Islamic State at present. In the former battle, the Muslims prevailed in the face of an overwhelming number of opponents. The feature article outlines the four coalitions that are currently battling the Islamic State which totals more than 70 nations and groups, including alliances — or at least tolerance — between entities that are otherwise enemies.

A particular focus is upon the operations of Iran and Russia in Syria. Another main focus of the issue is on the recently revealed death of the Imam Mullah Omar, the former leader of the Afghan Taliban to whom large numbers of mujahideen—including those of affiliates of al-Qaeda—had pledged their allegiance. Omar, it seems, had actually died 2 years previous in 2013, a fact that was kept secret from the public. Those operating in his name, the foreword states, purposefully used the concealment of his death to release statements supporting national reconciliation with the Afghan regime and to allow them to wage war against the *Khilafah*—splitting from earlier positions. As a result, increasing numbers of its fighters were said to have joined the ranks of the Islamic State. Al-Qaeda scholars, however, maintained their justification for the untruth. The Islamic State criticized al-Zawahiri for having pledged allegiance to Akhtar Mansur, the man who had perpetuated the lie. A strong theme is this corruption of the “scholars” and the duplicity of the “jihadi claimants” who ultimately “side with the crusaders and apostates” against the Islamic State. There is still a call for a large number of recruits to make *hijrah* to Libya as it is a new addition to the Caliphate and needs personnel to fill jobs there. It is a place of *darul-Islam*, in contrast to the many Syrians making *hijrah* to the West which is a place of *darul-kufr*—a sin—and the Islamic State use of the now famous picture of the 3-year old Syrian boy’s body washed up on the beach in Turkey to make a point of what might happen to one’s family if one chooses this path. On the other hand, women are targeted in the pitch for the wonders of the end state of living in the *Khalifah*, especially the ability to provide a righteous upbringing for children. In terms of tactics, the emphasis is placed on the use of *istishhadi*



operations and, for women, the importance of gaining knowledge in order to argue those who might set them on the wrong path. Notable at the end of the magazine are two “for sale” posters seeking ransom for the Islamic State’s Norwegian and Chinese prisoners.

| End State   | Enemy  | Recruitment  | TTPs   |
|---|--|--|--|
| <p>"He honored you with the life on the soil of the Khilafah. So take advantage of that as much as you can to give your children a righteous upbringing upon a clear tawhid, a correct aquidah, kufr bit-taghut and worship of Allah alone, teaching them the heart-softeners, the remembrance of Allah, the Prophet's biography, and the fiqh of jihad...And here before you are the Shar'ah institutions, training camps, and even the kindergartens. All of them in our state—may Allah support it—are upon the methodology of prophethood, insha'allah, and to Allah belongs all praise." (p. 45)</p> | <p>"Just as the Companions had to face coalitions of various Jewish, pagan, and hypocrite parties in the battle of al-Azhab, the Muslims of the Islamic State face various coalitions of kuffar having a common interest in seeing the Khilafah destroyed... the Crusader Coalition... Front Stage Coalition... with Iran, Syria, and Russia...The Safawi Empire... the Rafidah...The Sahwah Coalitions...the nationalist Ikhwan-oriented resistance factions and nationalist Sururi-oriented 'jihadi' factions." (pp. 46-52)</p> <p>"As for the Muslim who is unable to perform hijrah... there is much opportunity for him to strike out against the kafir enemies of the Islamic State. There are more than seventy crusader nations, taghut regimes, apostate armies, rafidi militias, and sawhah factions for him to choose from" (p. 54)</p> <p>"And if matters carry on as they had in Sham, the common enemy between the Yemeni Qa'idah and the nationalist resistance will become the Khilafah." (p. 7)</p> | <p>"The Islamic State here in Libya is still young. It is in great need of every Muslim who can come especially medical, shari, and administrative personnel, in addition to fighters.... There is no reward without hardship...But it is easy for those for whom Allah makes it easy....So we call you, our brother, to perform your hijrah for Allah and in support of His religion." (pp. 62-63)</p> <p>"the correct way to address the issue of racism from an Islamic perspective is....A Muslim's loyalty is determined, not by his skin color, his tribal affiliation, or his last name, but by his faith.... Today, non-Arab Muslims come to the lands of the Khilafah...and are received by their Arab brothers with enthusiasm." (pp. 19-20)</p> <p>"Hijra is an obligation from darul-kufr to Darul-Islam... Sadly, some Syrians and Libyans are willing to risk the lives and souls of...their children...sacrificing many of them during the dangerous trip to the lands of the war waging crusaders ruled by laws of atheism and indecency." (p. 22)</p> | <p>"Sell your lives to Allah, the Mighty and Sublime. Strike with istishhadi operations and explosive belts! These istishhadi operations have proven their benefit and have produced their fruits... and they have become a source of calamity and destruction for the crusaders... they are more harmful than rifles and machine guns. They have planted terror in their hearts, so much so that the enemies of Allah...wait for death to come to them from every direction. In addition to that, they result in the least amount of loss out of all the shari's methods of fighting, while at the same time being the most effective." (p. 35)</p> <p>"My Muslim sister, indeed you are a mujahidah, and if the weapon of the men is the assault rifle and the explosive belt, then know the weapon of the women is good behavior and knowledge. Because you will enter fierce battles between truth and falsehood...let your motivation be the motivation of an Ummah, and so you see in the eyes of all of your lion cubs a deeply knowledgeable scholar and a conquering leader." (pp. 43-45)</p> |

**Figure 26. Selected Excerpts from *Dabiq* Issue 11: From the Battle of Al-Ahzab to the War of Coalitions (September 2015).<sup>148</sup>**

*Dabiq* issue 12 seems to have been prepared in haste, despite its lengthy 65 pages. The page number does not fit with the other issues (which count the cover page), and there is no dedicated feature article—the

closest it gets is the regular contribution by hostage John Cantlie, who writes therein on the proposal that the West considers (at least openly) the Islamic State's actions to be "just terrorism." He contends that the reality, should one care to look, is that the Islamic State is indeed a full-fledged state—minting coins, collecting taxes, dispensing justice, and providing necessary services to its people by well-paid professionals. His speculation is that, by making it a "terrorist" organization, the West keeps up the urgency and willingness to support military action. Thus, the end state hoped for is well underway—the Islamic State functioning as a true Caliphate and fighting the good fight against the aggressor crusaders and the apostates until the time comes to move things into the next stage as prophesied. Despite the fact that they are considered a lesser enemy compared to America, France, and Russia, *Dabiq* continues to spend a lot of line space—as it has in the last couple issues—continuing its attacks on al-Qaeda and its affiliates. This time, several articles focus on al-Qaeda affiliates and allies in Yemen and Sham and their relations with al Shabaab. There are four pages dedicated to recent operations, including the Paris attacks. The tactics of the latter and those of the Russian attack are discussed—stressing in Cantlie's piece that a state can indeed use "terrorist" tactics as part of its toolkit. With regards to recruitment, the importance of *hijrah* is emphasized, pointing out that it is not only an obligation but has the positive results of allowing one to both fit into society and protect the next generation.<sup>149</sup> Finally, a piece directed at women by a woman writer seeks to defend the practice of polygamy.

| End State  | Enemy   | Recruitment   | TTPs   |
|--|---|---|--|
| <p>"So when will the crusaders end their hostilities toward Islam and the Muslims? When will they realize that the Khilafah is here to stay?" (p. 3)</p> <p>"by Allah's grace, the Khilafa was revived from the blessed land of Sham on 1 Ramadan 1436. The rise of the Khilafah and its effective media campaign brought the light of hope to the hearts of young mujahidin." (p. 39)</p> <p>"And nothing changes for the Islamic State, as it will continue to pronounce takfir upon the Jews, the Christians, the pagans, and the apostates....It will continue to wage war...until the truce decreed sometime before the Malhalma. Thereafter, the slave markets will commence in Rome by Allah's power and might." (p. 46)</p> <p>"And all the while, the Caliphate country they fight and die to support has continued to grow and mature...what happens over the next few years is more up to the Islamic State than any exterior force. The first option is that they continue to expand the borders of the Caliphate throughout the region until economic or military limitations stop them.... Too bad for the West, it doesn't look like such limitations exist....The second option is that they goad the West into launching an all-out ground attack, thereby setting the scene for the final battle between Muslims and the crusaders prophesied to be held at Dabiq in Syria." (p. 50)</p> | <p>"On '30 September 2015,' after years of supporting the Nusayri taghut in the war against the Muslims of Sham, Russia decided to participate directly with its own air force in the war. It was a rash decision of arrogance from Russia, as if it held that its wars against the Muslims of al-Qawqaz were not enough offence." (p. 2)</p> <p>"on '19 September 2014,' France haughtily began executing airstrikes against the Khilafah. Like Russia, it was blinded by hubris, thinking that its geographical distance from the lands of the Khilafah would protect it from the justice of the mujahidin. It also did not grasp that its mockery of the Messenger would not be left unavenged." (p. 2)</p> <p>"So the kuffar—whether they are Catholic, Protestant, or Orthodox Christians, whether they are Orthodox, Conservative, or Progressive Jews, whether they are Buddhists, Hindus, or Sikhs, whether they are capitalists, communists, or fascists—they are ultimately allies of one another against Islam and the Muslims." (p. 43)</p> | <p>"On this occasion, we will not forget to commend the martyred 'lone' knights of the Khilafah who struck out against the kafir and apostate enemies near them. These brave men...did not use the obstacles laid down by jihad as an excuse to abandon jihad against the enemies. They did not use a younger age or lack of training as an excuse to be mere by-standers....These are the deeds of those upon the methodology of the revived Khalifah....So let every such mujahid...record his will, renew his bay'ah, carry the Khilafah banner, and strike the crusaders and their pagan and apostate allies wherever he can find them, even if he is alone." (p. 3)</p> <p>"What led you to herd your family to the lands of the crusaders in the first place, and what keeps you...refusing to perform hijrah to the Islamic State?...Is it a sincere desire to call the kuffar and murtaddin to Islam...Or is it perhaps a firm intention to fight them in their own lands? Or is it simply your deluded hope of attaining the Dunya... Rather, you should fear that He will punish you in this Dunya—through your children, amongst other means." (p. 35)</p> | <p>"after having discovered a way to compromise the security at the Sharm el-Sheikh International Airport and resolving to bring down a plane belonging to a nation in the Western-led coalition against the Islamic State, the target was changed to a Russian plane. A bomb was smuggled onto the airplane, leading to the deaths of 219 Russians and 5 other crusaders only a month after Russia's thoughtless decision." (p. 2)</p> <p>"the Islamic State dispatched its brave knights to wage war in the homelands of the wrecked crusaders, leaving Paris and its residents 'shocked and awed'....A nationwide state of emergency was declared as a result of the actions of eight men armed only with assault rifles and explosive belts." (p. 2)</p> <p>"It is the requirement of the American government and its allies to verbally belittle the Islamic State in public comments by referring to it as just a terrorist 'organization.' True, it is a functioning state that uses terror as a tool....People understand the words 'terrorists' or 'jihadists' and will largely support any military action against them....But to concede that the Islamic State is indeed a state in any spoken comment would be an admission of their victory that no political leader is currently prepared to make." (p. 48)</p> |

**Figure 27. Selected Excerpts from *Dabiq* Issue 12: Just Terror (November 2015).<sup>150</sup>**

This 13th issue of *Dabiq* concerns itself with the correct interpretation of and the appropriate way to deal with the sins of the *Rafidah*; the enemy focused most upon therein. An early three-page article addresses the question of "Who were the Safawiyah?" looking in historical detail at the evolution of the group which

“subdued Persia with ambitions to wipe out all traces of the Sunnah and its people.” A not so veiled reference to the Shi’a, it goes on to deny that this group follows Islam but claims that it instead deters people from it. The title article, “The Rafidah: From Ibn Saba’ to the Dajjal,” is 13 pages and compares the *Rafidah* with the Jews and cites the “Jewish” beginnings of the sect—emphasizing that the latter, however, are worse in that they have apostatized by rejecting legitimate Islamic authority and have been pronounced takfir. The issue also uses the article as another chance to discredit the jihadi claimants—in particular, al-Qaeda under al-Zawahiri.<sup>151</sup> The issues of the *Rafidah* are also touched upon in the seven-page “Interview with the Wali of Khurasan.”<sup>152</sup> Besides the *Rafidah* and the “jihadi claimants,” another group singled out as apostates are the Saudis, especially the Islamic scholars supporting the regime. With regard to recruitment, the *bay’ah* from numbers of soldiers of the Taliban following the confirmation of Mullah Omar’s death are noted as having increased the Islamic State’s numbers. Recruitment is also emphasized in recognition of the recent lone acting San Bernardino bombers—man and wife—whom they feel set the standard for others to follow in their own countries. Emigration to the region of Khurasan, however, takes precedence here. The reason for this is the emphasis placed on the importance of the region as a stepping-stone in reclaiming neighboring lands into the *Khalifah* toward its desired end state. General advice toward operations includes the necessity of treating the *Rafidah* with the severest of acts—going beyond basic beheading—although more detailed tactics in a number of regions can be found in the six pages of operations listed.<sup>153</sup> A final notable piece included in the issue is the article for women on *ihdad* or the period

of mourning after a husband's death—showing a further reaching out to include women in its readership.<sup>154</sup>

| End State  | Enemy  | Recruitment   | TTPs  |
|--|--|---|---|
| <p>"Wilyat Khurasan has great importance....It had once been under the authority of the Muslims, along with the regions surrounding it. Afterwards, the secularist and Rafidi murtaddin conquered some of these regions, and the cow-worshipping Hindus and atheist Chinese conquered other nearby regions, as is the case in parts of Kashmir and Turkistan. So the Wilayah, by Allah's permission, is a gate to re-conquering all these regions until they are ruled once more by Allah's law." (p. 49)</p> <p>"The Khilafah is an extremely significant matter in Allah's law. It builds unity between Muslims and it prevents division. It also steers their affairs." (p. 54)</p> | <p>"In their 'justification' of murdering mujahidin, the Saudis stated that the plans of some of these brothers were 'to...harm the Kingdom's...relations and interest with...friendly countries,' specifically...the U.S. Consulate'...adh-Dhawahiri ...criticized the apostate regime but made no mention of the evil scholars backing them." (p. 8)</p> <p>"the Islamic State faces increased hostility...from factions that ascribe themselves to Ahlus-Sunnah, some of whom even raise 'Islamic' banners...they are groups that have apostacized." (p. 14)</p> <p>"The Jews and the Rafidah are two sides of the same coin. The religion of Rafid ('Shiism') was nothing but a plot by a Jew....The Jew Ibn Saba', like Paul, hated Islam and desired to devastate the Muslims and corrupt their religion." (p. 33)</p> | <p>"May Allah accept the sacrifices of our noble brother Syed Rizwan Farook and his blessed wife...and use their deeds as a means to awaken more Muslims in America, Europe, and Australia." (p. 4)</p> <p>"the Muslims are making hijrah to the land of Khurasan in multitudes....It is upon every Muslim who wants to support the shan'ah to hasten in making hijrah to this wilayah or to one of the other wilayah of the Khilafah, for it is their land, the land of Islam. It is upon them to make hijrah in order to escape from the humiliation of the Dunya and the punishment of the Hereafter." (p. 50)</p> <p>"after the establishment of the Khilafah, all the truthful mujahidin in the movement...gave bay'ah to the Khilafah, and therefore there is no one left in Taliban 'Pakistan' except for the corrupters." (p. 52)</p> | <p>"Allah reminds...the believers that each individual is only responsible for himself. He should not look around and base his decision to make hijrah and wage jihad for the cause of Allah on what other people are doing. Nor should he hesitate to strike the enemies of Allah if it's within his means to do so, even if he were alone." (p. 29)</p> <p>"The ruling of apostasy... dictates that the Rafidah are to be treated with the sword against riddah, which differs from the sword against kufr asli. The difference between the two swords is...The murtadd can be killed after he is taken prisoner even if he declares repentance.... The murtadd cannot pay jizya....A murtadd cannot be released for ransom... that the Rafidah are apostates necessitates more severity when applying the sword of jihad to their filthy necks." (p. 43)</p> |

**Figure 28. Selected Excerpts from *Dabiq* Issue 13: The Rafidah – From Ibn Saba to the Dajjal (January 2016).<sup>155</sup>**

Again focusing on a near enemy, *Dabiq* issue 14 looks at the long-standing Egyptian based Islamic organization, the Muslim Brotherhood or "Jama'at al-Ikhwan al-Muslimin," which it finds to be an invasive entity – a cancer – spreading a deviant form of the religion that accepts democracy, liberalism, pacifism, and socialism for the ends of political expediency. The Muslim Brotherhood's founder Hasan al-Banna is quoted as saying that "Pure Islam does not oppose a religion nor destroy another creed" – the antithesis of what the Islamic State proposes to do in its end-state

mission to spread Islam to the world.<sup>156</sup> The topic of the *Ikhwan* is the subject of a 16-page feature article regarding the relation of the *Ikhwan* to the *Rafidah*, who were featured in the last issue, as well as to crusader states and complicit regimes such as that of Egypt's Hosni Mubarak. Once again, the Islamic State ensures that the jihadi claimants are called out—this time for their having been penetrated years previous by the *Ikhwani* through the *Salafiyah*.<sup>157</sup> In the article “Kill the Imams of Kufr in the West,” the crusaders are said to use *mur-taddin* like the *Ikhwan* imams to create disunity among the Muslims. Thus, the crusader enemies—with the focus of the forward section upon recently attacked Belgium as representative of Europe—are also not forgotten. Recruitment then can come from those performing *hijrah* to the East to join the ranks of the mujahideen or those performing jihad in the name of the Islamic State from where they are in *dar al-kufr* using any weapon and with any number of valid and obligatory targets. The tactics used in the latter encompass—per John Cantlie's article “the only message they [America] will respond to”—the seemingly indiscriminate violence that it says will continue to haunt the West.<sup>158</sup> On a more detailed tactics, techniques, and procedures note, six pages of recent operations are included in the issue.

| End State   | Enemy   | Recruitment  | TTPs   |
|---|---|--|--|
| <p>"Any disbeliever standing in the way of the Islamic State will be killed, without pity or remorse, until Muslims suffer no harm and governance is entirely for Allah." (p. 4)</p> <p>"Allah has chosen us to be from among the soldiers of the Khilafah.... The Prophet has promised us that this religion will reach wherever night and day reaches... the stage of khilafah upon the prophetic methodology... would be the final stage before the Day of Judgment. Thus, we trust this blessed khilafah will remain until the Last Day and that all the regions in the world, including Bengal, will sooner or later come under its shade and be ruled by what Allah has revealed, insha'allah." (p. 64)</p> | <p>"Flames ignited years ago in Iraq have now scorched the battleground of Belgium, soon to spread to the rest of crusader Europe and the West. Paris was a warning. Brussels was a reminder." (p. 4)</p> <p>"The person who calls himself a 'Muslim' but unapologetically commits blatant kufr is not a munifiq (hypocrite), as some mistakenly claim. Rather, he is a murtadd (apostate)." (p. 8)</p> <p>"The cancer known as 'Jama'at al-Ikhwan al-Muslimin' (The 'Muslim Brotherhood' Group) was founded in '1928CE' by Hasam al-Banna." (p. 28)</p> <p>"Despite the shirk that Hosni Mubarak implemented and the oppression he inflicted upon the Muslims of Egypt, the Ikhwan would defend him and his government, even cooperating with his regime against the Muslims." (p. 39)</p> | <p>"One must either take the journey to dar al-Islam, joining the ranks of the mujahidin therein, or wage jihad by himself with the resources available to him (knives, guns, explosives, etc.) to kill the crusaders and other dis-believers and apostates, including the imams of kufr, to make an example of them, as all of them are valid—rather, obligatory—targets according to the Sharī'ah." (p. 17)</p> <p>"it is obligatory upon all Muslims to perform hijrah to the Khalifah, which is the only body standing in the way of the Murtadd Brotherhood, the crusader masters of the Brotherhood, and the Rafidah allied to the Brotherhood." (p. 43)</p> | <p>"Bullets and shrapnel will slash and pierce all those whom Allah's soldiers reach. Survivors will be scarred physically and mentally, haunted whenever their eyes are closed, whenever they blink. The sound of sirens will fill the air, preceded by bombs planted in all the right places." (p. 5)</p> <p>"In a belated response to the executions of my former cellmates last year, America has formally changed its policy on ransoms for hostages. It's clear that violence is the only message they will respond to." (p. 52)</p> |

**Figure 29. Selected Excerpts from *Dabiq* Issue 14: The Murtadd Brotherhood (April 2016).<sup>159</sup>**

At 82 pages long, the 15th issue of *Dabiq* is a substantial issue dedicated to the reinforcement of the contention that the only way forward for those whom the Islamic State is currently fighting is to repent, accept Islam, and submit to Allah. The majority of articles therein follow this logic either through individual testimonials of their conversion (or posthumous ones in the case of two who were martyred), a historical look at what happened when societies encountered Islam and were not enlightened by its tenets, or through detailing the reasons behind why the Islamic State fights its enemies. The 17-page feature article attempts to force other people of the book to see the ways these religions (Judaism and Christianity) have moved away from the true path. It covers where Islam feels the religions overlap (e.g., the names of God, the shared prophets) and

where those other religions falsely moved apart (e.g., that the “pagan” trinity was a political creation, that the crucifixion as told was a falsehood attributable to the writings of Paul who never met Jesus). The coming of Muhammad, moreover, is explained as foretold by Abraham, Moses, and Jesus and, indeed, it is said that Jesus himself will break the cross and crush the false notions of Christianity. Thus, since “the true religion of Jesus Christ is . . . Islam,” the Islamic State gives the crusaders a final invitation to convert.<sup>160</sup> Should this not happen, the issue provides a foreword detailing the latest attacks in the West, six pages of the Islamic State operations across its territories, and an article entitled “By the Sword” which explains that this is a divinely warranted war, that the “Lord” in the Bible and Quran is a “person of war,” and that even Jesus clearly refers to violently applying the law of God. The Muslims, it contends, unlike the others, are simply not afraid of following God’s rules. The first step to this is *hijrah* or, alternatively, performing jihad where one finds oneself.



| End State   | Enemy  | Recruitment   | TTPs  |
|---|--|---|---|
| <p>"There is no ilah but Allah, meaning none deserves worship and obedience save Allah. He is to be worshipped alone via love, hope, fear, supplication, prostration, sacrificial slaughter, etc. He is to be obeyed alone by following His Final Messenger, seeking judgment from His law, rejecting every law legislated by other than Him, and abandoning any laws abrogated by him.... Where is your servitude to Him? Where is your respect of what he loves?... We call you to reflect on these questions as the blood-thirsty knights of the Caliphate continue to wage their war of just terror against you. And have no doubt that the war will end with the black flag of Tawhid (Islamic monotheism) fluttering over Constantinople and Rome." (pp. 6-7)</p> | <p>"That enemy is spear-headed by the Crusaders and their Jewish allies, not to mention their puppets in the Gulf and other countries seized by apostate rulers....And all of these open enemies are supported by the Crusader voters and taxpayers in the democratic countries of the West...making the obligation to target them even more obvious." (p. 28)</p> <p>"it becomes important for us to clarify to the West in unequivocal terms—yet again —why we hate you and why we fight you... because you are disbelievers; you reject the oneness of Allah...because your secular, liberal societies permit the very things that Allah has prohibited while banning many of the things He has permitted....We hate you for your crimes against Islam...your drones and fighter jets bomb, kill, and maim...invading our lands....We fight you to bring you out from the darkness of disbelief." (pp. 32-33)</p> | <p>"Rush to perform hijrah (emigration) to the land of Islam, where the Shari'ah is in full application. Hijrah is a sign of both one's love for unity and his adherence to the Sunnah of Allah's Messenger....But if you are unable to do so, then know that you have been blessed with the opportunity to serve a much greater purpose than dwelling among Muslims and waging jihad on the outer edges of the land of Islam. Indeed, you are behind enemy lines, able to strike them where it hurts the most." (p. 28)</p> <p>"I sincerely advise every Muslim to perform hijrah. It's not even allowed nor is it good for you to reside in the lands of the disbelievers....you can't really practice your religion there....there...once you begin thinking about performing hijrah, you'll find many obstacles....When you take the first step, Allah will take care of the rest." (p. 39)</p> | <p>"As for a final word of advice to you regarding your operation, do not make intricate plans, but instead, keep it simple and effective. If you can obtain a weapon, do so and use it, as soon as possible and in a place that will cause the most damage and panic, bringing death and injury to the enemy of Allah, the disbelievers." (p. 29)</p> <p>"The clear difference between Muslims and the corrupt and deviant Jews and Christians is that Muslims are not ashamed of abiding by the rules sent down from their Lord regarding war and enforcement of divine law. So if it were the Muslims, instead of the Crusaders, who had fought the Japanese and Vietnamese or invaded the lands of the Native Americans, there would have been no regrets in killing and enslaving those therein...they would have been thorough and without some 'politically correct' need to apologize years later." (p. 80)</p> |

**Figure 30. Selected Excerpts from *Dabiq* Issue 15: Break the Cross (July 2016).<sup>161</sup>**

Over the 15 issues of *Dabiq*, which are covered here, there is no mistaking that the end state for the Islamic State is the consolidation and expansion of their fledgling Caliphate. The rhetoric soundly affirms that this Caliphate is unique and significant—the one prophesied to usher in the end battle—and that it, therefore, will remain and spread until its flag flies from East to West. As the legitimate source of authority for the Muslim ummah, all are obligated to follow its rulings, or they

will find themselves in the camp of “untruth.” There is no compromise – no room for nationalism or working with the enemy. This is a definite zero-sum game – us or them, all or nothing. While there is something of a hedge in that the Islamic State recognizes that the final battle may not take place in this generation, it nonetheless assures readers that it will definitely be under this everlasting Caliphate’s watch. The priority enemy to be fought, however, fluctuates per issue. While the primary battle is with the disbelievers – seemingly with America and Israel as their figureheads – the actual fighting is prioritized as with the near enemy, within the Caliphate and at its borders. The crusader West (including here, Russia and Japan) which is committing airstrikes is a definite target, as are Israel and the Jews and Christians within their midst. However, these are the obvious ones. The Islamic State over time, as portrayed through its issues of *Dabiq*, stands ever ready to condemn anyone who stands in its way, and the locally grown enemy is first in its gunsights. Those who are thought to be apostates to the religion are considered worse than those who have never believed and are to be dealt with in the harshest ways. Thus, the Islamic State finds itself declaring battle against any number of coalitions which may overlap, going beyond the crusaders in all their forms to the Safawi (Iran, Russia, and Syria), *Rafidha* (Shi’a), *Sahwah* (Iraqi tribal groups who rose up against the brutality of the jihadists), *Ikhwan* (Muslim Brotherhood), the jihad claimants (primarily al-Qaeda affiliates), and Gulf puppet and apostate governments. In fact, *Dabiq* issue 11 lists 70 such groups in its enemy list. It is of no wonder then that the emphasis on recruitment is – with caveats – on encouraging individuals in the West to make *hijrah* to the territories controlled by the Islamic State and to demand that

tribal and jihadi groups (currently in it or in territory it wants to move to) declare *bay'ah* to its leadership. Over time, there is a noticeable fluctuation in this demand for *hijrah* in the issues, conceivably because their ability to manage it becomes overwhelmed, and it may have sufficient fighters available in that specific region. Thus, during later issues, there is an uncharacteristic call for jihad in the West even as it continues to condemn life in *dar al-kufr*. When new territories open up, for example Libya, the push is once again for emigration to that specific region. Overwhelmingly, the tactics of the Islamic State lauded in these issues are brutal. They repeatedly use the concepts of “showing no mercy” and that Islam is a violent “religion of the sword.” There is a great deal of emphasis on the dire nature of the consequences that will fall not only on those faced in battle but also on all those who violate its strict adherence to the laws of sharia.

Having looked at each of the magazines’ sets of excerpts in isolation, it may be helpful to make a short comparison of them on each point. *Inspire* magazine was in existence for roughly 4 years prior to the first issue of *Dabiq*. During that time, the group which would become the Islamic State (originally, al-Qaeda in Iraq which then became the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham) was an affiliate of al-Qaeda and thus the comparison will begin at the point where the two magazines came into co-existence with release of the first issue of *Dabiq* in July 2014. While prior to this first issue and the Islamic State’s “establishment of the Caliphate” al-Qaeda had stressed in *Inspire* the need to fight in order to establish the beginnings of a pan-Islamic state, there is no direct reference in *Inspire* to the Islamic State’s claim or any recognition of its “Caliphate.” It instead continues to stress that the time is not

yet right to fight on open fronts but rather that guerilla and terrorist tactics are still the order of the day until America is defeated. The Islamic State, on the other hand, makes the point repeatedly that all other groups have a present obligation to pledge allegiance to it and to join its ranks. Further, it continually refers to its mujahideen as “soldiers of the Islamic State” in order to reinforce its position as a territorial entity. The taking of *ghanimah* (war booty) has further allowed it to assemble a respectable arsenal akin to that of a regular army. Al-Qaeda’s most pressing need, then, is for recruits in the West willing to undertake acts in those countries where the impact of terrorism is greatest; while the Islamic State needs skilled bodies to fill the practical requirements of its newly acquired territories and its ever-expanding army and thus presses recruits to *hijrah*. The two groups are also thus quite divergent with regard to their end state in that one is still seeking what the other claims it already has—although both feel the final scene of this present war is the end-of-days battle at *al-Malhama*. In terms of identified enemies, the Islamic State makes a point of discrediting al-Qaeda and its affiliates whenever it can, particularly its leader Ayman al-Zawahiri. It refers to them as “jihadi claimants” rather than the real thing. Al-Qaeda, for its part, disparages the Islamic State more obtusely by calling on its readers, and ultimately its mujahideen, to employ conduct—contrary to the Islamic State—that does not go against the sharia by committing aggression against fellow Muslims and to avoid dominating them as well as refraining from pronouncing takfir when unwarranted. Tactically, al-Qaeda remains true to its promotion of individual jihad, although under the guidance of the organization through *Inspire* magazine and other sources of media, as well as its own less frequent larger scale operations. In *Dabiq*, we see

a need to come across as the group unafraid to follow God's law to the letter as opposed to others who hold back from the most brutal of acts of the *hudud*—those punishments mandated under Islamic law.

## STRATEGIC INSIGHTS

Two strategic insights can be readily gained from the research and analysis conducted on radical Islamist English-language online magazines. First, such magazines exist in distinct clusters or groupings, revolving either around the al-Qaeda or around the Islamic State terrorist organizations. Second, these competing terrorist organizations have very different strategic approaches that they are promoting in their core magazines *Inspire* and *Dabiq*, respectively. Some of the narratives related to these differing strategic approaches were analyzed in the prior section of this document; however, some additional narratives can also be tentatively surmised. More specific information pertaining to these strategic insights follow.

### Al-Qaeda and Islamic State Online Magazine Clusters

Two major radical Islamist English-language online magazine clusters have been identified in this research monograph. The first magazine cluster revolves around al-Qaeda and its affiliates who have roughly produced 11 different magazines, and 2 *Inspire* compilations since April-May 2007 (see figure 31). *Inspire*, produced by AQAP, is at the center of this cluster having been published now for over 6 years with 16 issues out between June 2010 and November 2016. *Jihad Recollections*, that was initially published by Samir Khan—originally an al-Qaeda affinity member—from April

to September 2009 with four issues produced, is the precursor to *Inspire*, given Khan's future editorship of that magazine. The five issues of *Defenders of the Truth* published by the Al Mosul Islamic Network from July 2009 through January-February 2010 can be viewed as an auxiliary al-Qaeda-linked publication that existed just prior to the emergence of *Inspire*. At a minimum, it had to have had some indirect influence on *Inspire* given its partial publication overlap with Khan's *Jihad Recollections* as the only other somewhat similar jihadi English-language magazine then in publication. *Defenders of the Truth* is important given the global jihadist view it attempted to promote with stories highlighting al-Qaeda affiliated groups worldwide.


The two even earlier radical Islamist English-language online magazines that existed in the al-Qaeda cluster were *Benefit of the Day* and *In Fight*. Neither magazine appears to have had much influence on the later development of *Inspire*, with either considered niche or specialized publications. *Benefit of the Day* is by far the oldest magazine of this type to be published. Roughly, 12 issues have been identified as being produced from April 2007 through October 2008. It was linked to Aabid Hussain Khan, a British al-Qaeda supporter, and provided daily Islamic and jihadist readings that had been translated. Beneath the benign façade of this magazine and its greeting card stock photos was an attempt to provide radical Islamist narratives to the reader periodically. *In Fight* – a Taliban linked publication – is another magazine outlier. Sixty-eight issues of this magazine were produced from June 2009 through November 2014, making its sheer number of issues produced greater than all the other al-Qaeda cluster magazines put together. Still, its impact has been quite limited given its primary focus on pro-Afghan Taliban

operations and coverage of United States, Coalition, and Afghan Government casualties.

The *Inspire* publication team has also been involved in two derivative publications. Both the *Lone Mujahid Pocketbook* published in March 2013 and *Palestine* published in August 2014 utilized reprinted materials from that magazine. *The Pocketbook* represents a compendium of OSJ articles from issues 1 through 10 of *Inspire*. The *Palestine* magazine, on the other hand, brings in some new material in addition to past *Inspire* content. The magazine called upon its readers to attack the United States and Great Britain as supporters of Israel by means of lone jihad terrorist attacks. In addition, four short *Inspire Guides* have been created from June through September 2016 related to: the Orlando, Florida, nightclub shooter attack; the Nice, France, truck rundown of pedestrians; the interdicted “Muslim sisters” attack in France; and operations in New Jersey; Minnesota; and Chelsea, New York. These guides are meant to show how OSJ in the various *Inspire* issues are resulting in actual terrorist attacks and also provide critiques of them so that their readers can become more tactically proficient.

A request by the al-Qaeda leadership for magazines similar to *Inspire* to be produced by affiliate groups has also resulted in numerous – albeit typically short-lived – publications to emerge. The initial one was *Gaidi Mtaani* produced by al Shabaab that saw seven issues published from April 2012 through February 2015. The magazine, which also includes articles in Swahili, principally focuses on recruitment in Kenya and surrounding states rather than in Europe or the United States. The next magazine was *Azan* produced by the Taliban with six issues and a special report published between March 2013 and August 2014. This was followed by *Resurgence* published by AQIS with two large issues

that came out in October 2014 and June 2015. Both of these magazines promoted al-Qaeda network goals, though *Resurgence* was meant to target the legitimacy of the Islamic State and its leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. *Amika* then enjoyed a short existence with two issues coming out in February and July 2015. The magazine was produced by the al-Muhajiroun component of al Shabaab just as *Gaidi Mtaani* was ceasing its publication run. It also focused on gaining recruits in Kenya and surrounding states as well as providing some of its articles in Swahili. The final two magazines – *Azbiru* and *Al-Risalah* – are tied to the al-Nusrah Front. Only one issue of *Azbiru* appeared in September 2014. That magazine may have been later linked to *Al-Risalah*, which had three issues come out between July 2015 and July 2016. If it is still publishing, a fourth issue can be expected to appear anytime in the near future.




**Figure 31. Al-Qaeda and Affiliate Online Magazines.**



The second online magazine cluster is focused on the publications of the Islamic State – including numerous eBooks – along with a couple of auxiliary magazines published as early as November 2012 (see figure 32). This magazine cluster has more of a linear feel to it than that of the al-Qaeda cluster of magazines. That is because it is derived from the pre-Caliphate, Caliphate, and potentially post-Caliphate time periods. It should be remembered that the origins of the Islamic State are that of Jamaat al-Tawhid wal-Jihad (1999-2004), al-Qaeda in Iraq (2004-2006), and Majlis Shura al-Mujahedin (2006) prior to its later becoming the Islamic State of Iraq (2006-2013) and then ISIS (2013-2014).<sup>162</sup> It was only during the November 2012 through June 2014 period of the pre-Caliphate when the Islamic State began to publish English-language eBooks and magazines. These publications were composed of six of the initial *Black Flags* and *Shuhada* series of eBooks along with the much later ISN and ISR that appeared in seven issues, although ISN and ISR only existed for a very short period between May through July 2014. To this initial cluster of works can be added *Al Rashideen* as an auxiliary anti-Shi'a magazine. *Al Rashideen* was published by SSP with three issues appearing during February and March 2013. While SSP was not apparently directly linked to that early variant of the Islamic State, the group shared with the Islamic State strong anti-Shi'a sentiments, making some attributes of its brand of Pakistani Salafism readily compatible with it.

During the Caliphate period, the Islamic State published 10 more eBooks. These eBooks were from the *Black Flags*, *Shudada*, *Islamic State*, and *The West* series. They were produced between July 2014 and November 2015, bringing the total number of such eBooks to 16 before this line of publications was abandoned. It was also during this period, from July 2014 through July

2016, that 15 issues of the Islamic State flagship magazine *Dabiq* were published. Additionally, the Islamic State affinity magazine *Ihya-e-Khilafat* produced by TTPJA was published. While only two issues were produced in October and December of 2014, the magazine portrayed how Taliban factions were positioning to align themselves with the Islamic State rather than with their traditional ally al-Qaeda. The potentially post-Caliphate phase is tied to the ongoing coalition—and tacit agreement—offensives being launched against the Islamic State from a host of major states and interests that would normally not work together except for the fact that they now all share a common enemy. With the Islamic State seeing the coming loss of the town of Dabiq, Syria, it ceased publication of its magazine with that name after the release of the 15th issue “Break the Cross” in July 2016. In order to reposition its English-language narrative, the Islamic State created the new magazine *Rumiyah*, which means Rome, and began to publish that magazine in September 2016 a month before the town of Dabiq was captured by the Syrian rebel Hamza Brigade backed by Turkish forces.<sup>163</sup> Two more issues of *Rumiyah* have since appeared in October and November 2016, with the magazine shifting its focus to promoting attacks (jihad) in the West rather than advocating emigration (*hijrah*) to the lands of the Islamic State.



**Figure 32. Islamic State Online Magazines and eBooks.**

## Al-Qaeda and Islamic State Strategic Approaches

The strategic approaches related to these terrorist organizations and promoted in their supporting online magazine clusters can be viewed in table 13. This table represents an extension of the four themes – pertaining to end state, enemy, recruitment, and tactics – found in the *Inspire* and *Dabiq* datasets analyzed earlier. To this table has been added a wide range of additional attributes related to the differing strategic approaches of al-Qaeda and the Islamic State. These additional attributes have been deduced by means of a close reading of the magazine datasets as well as the other magazines and eBooks in their respective English-language publication clusters. Additionally, warnings concerning the “threat of caliphate yearnings and the eschatology that spawns it” were made at least 8 years prior to

the initial establishment of the Caliphate in Syria and Iraq in June 2014.<sup>164</sup> These centered on Al Zarqawi's *bay'at* to al-Qaeda on October 17, 2004, and his use of quotes from the *Hadiths*. It was predicted that al-Qaeda's later actions—in actuality, Zarqawi's old splinter group—would follow three sequential aims which were to create a base of operation in a targeted nation (holding and taking land), enforce its version of sharia law on the populace (one of cultism and extreme brutality), and then produce a Caliphate candidate (Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi) in order to fulfill this eschatology.<sup>165</sup> Such actions were followed, which have resulted in what has become known as the Islamic State. Being cognizant of such future potentials has thus allowed for some time and reflection to take place when surmising these strategic attributes.

| Attributes                      | Al-Qaeda ( <i>Inspire</i> )   | Islamic State ( <i>Dabiq</i> )   |
|---------------------------------|---|--|
| Post-Osama bin Laden Leadership | Ayman al-Zawahiri is the rightful al-Qaeda leader; He has pledged loyalty to Mullah Haibatullah Akhundzada who is the Taliban leader.         | Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi is the rightful leader of the Caliphate; He is the absolute Islamic authority on earth. |
| Command and Control             | Networked and devolved; Adaptive response to earlier elimination of al-Qaeda central.   | More centralized and hierarchical; Sovereign state-mimicking.  |
| Criticism of Opposing Group     | Indirect attacks in <i>Inspire</i> on the Islamic State and its leadership; Use of <i>Resurgence</i> and <i>Al-Risalah</i> for proxy attacks. | Direct and constant attacks in <i>Dabiq</i> on al-Qaeda and its leadership.                                  |
| Time                            | Time is not important; This holy war will take generations.   | The time is now; We live in special and prophesied times.  |
| Physical Terrain                | Holding land at this point is meaningless and counter-productive.   | Holding and taking land is key.  |

**Table 13. Al-Qaeda and Islamic State Strategic Approaches.<sup>166</sup>**

| Attributes                          | Al-Qaeda ( <i>Inspire</i> )   | Islamic State ( <i>Dabiq</i> )   |
|-------------------------------------|---|--|
| Enemy                               | Discriminate / selective; America as primary enemy; Followed by Israel, Jews, Christians, America's allies, and Russia on down to lesser enemies.   | Indiscriminate / all those not with IS; Local enemies whose lands are being expanded into are given priority; Extreme anti-Shi'a hostility; America, Israel, France, Iran, and Russia amongst numerous other enemies listed. |
| Caliphate Establishment             | The Caliphate is illegitimate; This is a premature and ill-advised action.  | The Caliphate is legitimate; All must pledge loyalty ( <i>bay'at</i> ) to its leader.  |
| End State                           | Defeat America economically; Later establish the Caliphate; Then End of Days battle at Dabiq.   | Expand the Caliphate; Later End of Days battle at Dabiq.   |
| Brutality                           | Instrumental violence; Do not alienate constituents; Don't target holy places; Public opinion matters.  | Unrestrained violence; Extreme forms of brutality – crucifixion, torture, mass executions; Slave taking; Public opinion is of no consequence (as they are doing God's will).   |
| Western Recruits                    | Utilize recruits in place for jihad in the United States and in Europe; and their interests elsewhere.  | Utilize recruits for emigration ( <i>hijrah</i> ) to the lands of the Islamic State as fighters / other personnel; Some calls for jihad in the West.   |
| Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures | Terrorism via open source jihad directed against the West for destabilization, governmental overreaction, and economic warfare purposes; Al-Qaeda influence and support of lone jihad terrorists; Still some centrally planned operations take place. | Insurgency and conventional warfare; Terrorism conducted in support of Caliphate expansion; Utilize war booty ( <i>ghanimah</i> ) to fuel expansion; Islamic State direct command of forces.                                 |

**Table 13. Al-Qaeda and Islamic State Strategic Approaches. (cont.)**

Of the new differing attributes, the first one concerns post-Osama bin Laden leadership. The ideological schism between the original al-Qaeda group and the Islamic State challenger has gone straight to the supreme leader level with Ayman al-Zawahiri and Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi as competing authorities.<sup>167</sup> Each leader has his own organizational vision of how he wants his radical Islamist group to operate and his place within the overall global ummah. Al-Zawahiri, for instance, has been willing to subordinate himself – at least nominally – to the new Taliban leader Mullah Haibatullah Akhundzada while al-Baghdadi considers himself the supreme authority over all others as the rightly guided leader of the re-established Caliphate.<sup>168</sup> Command and control differ between the two groups, with al-Qaeda learning to devolve its activities after much of its central leadership have been eliminated. This goes hand-in-hand with it considering the holding of physical terrain being counterproductive and taking a long-term rationalistic perspective with the holy war being conducted expected to take generations. On the other hand, the Islamic State is more centralized and hierarchical in nature – as al-Qaeda once was – and is sovereign state-mimicking with the physical terrain composing its Caliphate needing to be both consistently secured, administered, and expanded. This has given the Islamic State a more immediate concept of time and sense of destiny, which is also rather cult-like in orientation, with prophesied times now said to be upon us.

Al-Qaeda has also now been strategically following a path of moderation with indirect criticisms and attacks in *Inspire* on the Islamic State and its leader, whom they consider illegitimate. That group has long argued that this was an ill-advised action and that the

establishment of a Caliphate would not be sustainable, which, given current events, may be borne out with current ground and air offensives being launched against the Islamic State's shrinking physical territories from all sides. Further, this strategic moderation is also being seen in al-Qaeda attacks, which are more instrumental in nature. Holy places are not to be targeted, and public opinion needs to be at least considered so that al-Qaeda constituents—including affinity members and potential sympathizers—are not alienated. Still, high-profile attacks, such as the Charlie Hebdo operation in Paris in January 2015 linked to the AQAP, are being promoted in order to keep the group in the media spotlight as a viable movement. The Islamic State's strategy, instead, has been one of excess. It has constantly directed criticisms and attacks against al-Qaeda and its leader in *Dabiq* and cares little for potential constituents or world opinion. The philosophy is that either you are with the Islamic State and must pledge allegiance to it or you are not. Those considered enemies of the Caliphate are subjected to extreme forms of brutality and torture—which may include crucifixion, drowning, or immolation—and being taken as slaves and forced as concubines, including underage girls. Targeting has taken an anything goes perspective with holy places—especially Shi'a ones—being actively bombed and archeological and World Heritage sites destroyed.

When the four themes of end state, enemy, recruitment, and tactics, techniques, and procedures are added into this overview of the contrasting al-Qaeda and Islamic State strategic approaches (see table 13), it can readily be seen that these groups operate very differently. Al-Qaeda can be principally considered a strategic level terrorist threat to the United States.

That group is advocating for continental U.S.-focused terrorist attacks as well as those on airlines and other economic targets of critical importance. Their intention is to ultimately undermine the United States—either directly (via attacks) or indirectly (by U.S. governmental expenditures)—by bleeding it dry economically. Hence, al-Qaeda’s primary focus on OSJ and lone jihad attacks in the West. While much of this thinking is reflected in its online cluster of magazines, exceptions do exist with groups such as Al Shabaab (publisher of *Gaidi Mtaani* and *Amka*) and the Taliban (publisher of *Azan*) which have more regional and insurgent-like strategic considerations as priorities. The Islamic State, in turn, can be principally considered a strategic-level insurgent (and even conventional force) threat to U.S. allies. That group is advocating for outside of the continental U.S. territorial expansion in Iraq, Syria, Libya, and other regions of the world. Their intention is to create a transnational Caliphate under the direct authority of the Islamic State and those groups that have pledged *bay’at* to it. While substantial terrorism potentials linked to the Islamic State exist in the United States and Europe, this has not been their primary strategic imperative while publishing *Dabiq*. *Hijrah* (emigration to the Caliphate) over jihad in the West has been their principal view on the utility of new English-language speaking recruits. The strategy of Caliphate expansion over terrorism in the West, however, may now be changing with the publication of *Dabiq* ceasing after issue 15 in July of 2016 and the emergence of their new online magazine *Rumiyah* (Rome) in September 2016.



## POLICY RESPONSE

A suggested generic policy response to the emergence of radical Islamist English-language magazines has been provided below. It draws upon a targeting schema that identifies five stages in the magazine life-cycle process: **environmental motivators, production, end product, distribution, and outcomes**. Each of these life-cycle stages represents target sets that can be influenced by U.S. Army, joint force, the intelligence community, and ultimately whole-of-government response activities. These magazine life-cycle stages, as well as the desired response end state and the response measures required to achieve that response end state, are highlighted in table 14. Given the research project boundaries of this book, only a generalized response template and analytical discussion will be provided. Further, a “Blue Sky” response measures approach has been taken so as not to initially narrow the policy options that may be explored. There is hope that these elements will provide a form of “intellectual program starter” upon which U.S. agencies can build in order to respond to the emergence of Islamist English-language online magazines. Of course, for implementation purposes, two distinct programs—one focused on the *Inspire* (al-Qaeda) and the other focused on the *Dabiq* (Islamic State) magazine clusters and the inherent differences in their strategic approaches—must be specifically developed in order to respond to their emergence effectively.

| <b>MAGAZINE<br/>LIFE CYCLE</b> | <b>RESPONSE END<br/>STATE</b>   | <b>RESPONSE MEASURES<br/>(EXAMPLES)</b>   |
|--------------------------------|---|---|
| Environmental<br>Motivators    | Remove Conditions<br>Promoting Perceived<br>Need to Produce Mag-<br>azines. | -Settle the Palestinian Issue;<br>-Promote Democratic Governance in<br>States with Majority Islamic (Sunni)<br>Populations;<br>-Create Strong Formal Economies<br>and Employment (and Education)<br>Opportunities for Youth;<br>-Enfranchisement of Women; and,<br>-Facilitate Separation of Mosque and<br>State. |
| Production                     | Disrupt and Destroy<br>Capability to Produce<br>Magazines.                  | -Target the Editor and Production<br>Staff;<br>-Target the Contributors;<br>-Make Outside Communication Im-<br>possible; and,<br>-Deny the Group a Safe Haven for<br>Magazine Production.   |
| End Product                    | Ensure Magazine is<br>Viewed Negatively<br>Once Produced.                   | -The Magazine is Viewed as Inaccu-<br>rate or Un-Islamic;<br>-Polluted Clone Magazine Copies<br>Exist;<br>-The Magazine File is Dangerous to<br>Access; Trojan Horse, Governmental<br>Tracking; and,<br>-Make Possession Illegal.   |
| Distribution                   | Ensure Downloading<br>and Viewing Sites are<br>Viewed Negatively.           | -Make it Known that Downloading<br>and Viewing Sites Have Key Loggers<br>and Trojan Horses;<br>-Implement Governmental Monitor-<br>ing of these Sites; and,<br>-"Honeypot" Sites Created by the<br>Government.  |
| Outcomes                       | Effectively Respond to<br>the Internal and Exter-<br>nal Reader Effects.    | -Establish Counter Radicalization<br>Programs;<br>-Mitigate Propaganda and Psycho-<br>logical Operations Directed at West-<br>ern Audiences;<br>-Force Protection and Homeland De-<br>fense (Security) Adaptations; and,<br>-U.S. Army Leader Training and Ed-<br>ucational Implications.                         |

**Table 14. "Blue Sky" Policy Responses to Radical  
Islamist English-Language Online Magazines.**

## **Environmental Motivators**

This stage refers to the underlying conditions contributing to the emergence of the magazine. These are not the conditions that individually motivate English-language (e.g., Western) readers of these magazines but rather those environmental motivators found in the Islamic world that have given rise to groups such as al-Qaeda and the Islamic State in the first place. The ultimate response strategy in this instance would be to remove such conditions as the Palestinian Statehood issue, lack of democratic governance in states with majority Islamic (Sunni) populations, weak economies and lack of job (and educational) opportunities for youths, barriers to the enfranchisement of women, and the synthesis of mosque and state (e.g., religion and politics).

## **Production**

These are the steps, personnel, and materials needed to produce the magazine. A counter to the production of a magazine is the ability to disrupt or destroy the capacity to create it. Not all of these production components may be targetable. Still, a magazine is required to have an editor and possibly a staff, may have outside contributors, is required to have outside communication ability (even if only an internet link), and some sort of production location — which can be a simple room or office — in a safe haven that is not under immediate threat of being raided, bombed out, or overrun by liberating forces. All of these production steps can be mapped out to look for vulnerabilities that can be influenced.

## End Product

This stage signifies the resulting magazine issue that has been produced. Once a magazine has been created, a response to its eventual distribution as a “jihadi informational product” is to make sure it is viewed negatively so that it becomes an unwanted commodity. One way to make a digital magazine like this “toxic” is to have the potential users cognizant that the information contained within it is inaccurate or un-Islamic. One method to do this would be to implement a new series of counter-jihadi magazines such as *Haqiqah*.<sup>169</sup> Another method would be to have respected Islamic jurists—not necessarily known moderates—write opinions on the components of the new magazines and post them online in order to counter the radical Islamist narratives contained within them. Another way to create magazine toxicity is to publish “polluted clone copies” of them which have passages within them rearranged and the narratives within them changed so that the reader is provided with less radical information and OSJ instructions that result in inert devices or ones that malfunction during their assembly. A third way to generate potential user negativity toward a magazine is to make it known that the magazine file itself is dangerous to access. This can be done by either suggesting that its producers have placed malicious software within it, or that U.S. governmental tracking software has been placed in altered magazine file copies—even if this has or has not been actually done. Finally, making it a criminal act to possess magazines such as *Inspire* and *Dabiq* (now *Rumiyah*) might be considered, as has been done in the United Kingdom, although this may conflict with current free speech tenets in the United States.

## **Distribution**

The transmission of the magazine to the readers represents the next life-cycle stage. When these magazines initially come out, they are distributed by Twitter, group emails, web, and download sites. For point-to-point PDF distribution, the end product response strategies mentioned prior would suffice. In the case of download and online viewing distribution, the preferred strategy would be to make the act of actually going to the download or viewing the site considered dangerous in nature. At a basic deterrence level, this can be achieved by broadcasting the fact that such sites can indeed themselves be malicious. More advanced approaches would be the actual tracking of internet traffic to such jihadi downloading and viewing sites and even the placement of tracking software on such sites. Ultimately, the actual creation of governmental “honeypot” sites containing new copies of the various jihadist magazines can be undertaken for intelligence gathering and criminal case development.

## **Outcomes**

This stage represents the internal and external effects that are presumed to result from the magazine being read by various audiences. A response to the propaganda content of the magazine, when rebroadcasted and reported by the news media for Western audiences, is to create effective narratives and counterarguments that will help to negate its disruptive and psychological operations effects. One current response to presumed internal (psychological) effects upon Western readers with radical Islamist leanings is to establish counter-radicalization programs

specifically addressing them, assuming it can be determined what these effects actually are. Policy options related to one potential form of external effects—that is, any actual conduct of jihadi operations by magazine readers against Western targets—are to respond with force protection adaptations outside of the continental United States, and homeland defense and security adaptations in the continental United States. These examples would be meant to counter OSJ methods advocated in some of the magazine issues—specifically *Inspire*—that have been employed in the bombing, active shooter, and truck crowd overrun attacks in the United States, France, and in other locales. Additionally, the sizeable collections of radical Islamist English-language magazines and eBooks that exist—as chronicled in this book—offer a wealth of primary sources that may help to open windows into the jihadist mindsets of al-Qaeda and Islamic State operatives. Such primary sources related to jihadist worldviews, narratives, and strategic perspectives—as well as those terrorist and insurgent tactics, techniques, and procedures which support the end states being strived for—offer many training and educational potentials for U.S. Army leaders from the tactical through the operational and into the strategic levels of study.

In summation, drawing upon improvised explosive device “left of bang” response thinking, the U.S. Army and related governmental agencies, if they are to be truly proactive, will be required to get “left of magazine creation.” The earliest stage to attempt to do this is at the environmental motivators level, but this may prove to be an almost impossible task due to the intractability of the problems. For example, the U.S. Government had little past success in seeing the “Palestinian Issue” of statehood settled or its attempts

at nation-building in Afghanistan or Iraq that would have resulted in true democratic governance taking hold or the creation of strong formal economies and youth employment (and education) opportunities. Similarly, any external promotion of a separation of the religious and secular realms in the Islamic world – equivalent to what took place in Western Europe from the 16th through the 18th centuries – is unlikely to be well received. One current response to such presumed internal (psychological) effects upon Western readers with radical Islamist leanings is to establish counter-radicalization programs specifically addressing them. More studies need to be done in this area; however, to determine what the actual effects of these radical Islamist English-language online magazines – alone and in combination with other factors – in provoking violence are before any effective program to counter them can be undertaken.

This only leaves us with focusing upon “magazine production” for interdiction purposes. Given how easy it is to produce these online magazines – ultimately a desktop publishing program, access to the internet, English-language skills, and radical Islamist intent with actual (or affinity) links to either al-Qaeda or the Islamic State – stopping magazine production is in itself not an easy task. While a radical Islamist English-language magazine editor may either be captured or killed from time-to-time, which disrupts the publication of a magazine or even shuts it down for good, new editors will always potentially exist to come in and fill the void. What this suggests is that getting “left of magazine creation” will only take place sporadically and that a blended mitigation strategy of targeting the production, end product, distribution, and outcomes phases should be utilized across the board.

This may not represent an ideal strategy to combat the emergence of radical Islamist English-language magazines, but it represents a realistic one allowing for the development of a follow-on template that can be further optimized for the specific needs of the al-Qaeda or Islamic State cluster of magazines our policy response is focusing upon.

With this said, it is imperative that red teaming and wargaming take place prior to any form of policy response being implemented. Both unintentional and intentional (al-Qaeda and Islamic State countermoves) outcomes will take place that will result in second and third order effects to come about. It may be found in some cases that a magazine editor is incompetent and that, if eliminated, a new replacement editor coming in could be far more competent and cause more damage at the helm of that magazine than the previous editor who had just been eliminated. Further, the distribution and downloads of a specific magazine may actually be actively monitored by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and U.S. intelligence community resources. A cost-benefit analysis of whether such download opportunities should be allowed to continue would then need to be determined. The tradeoff in such a scenario is one of active intelligence gathering and the establishment of new terrorist case files versus Western individuals becoming further radicalized and having access to OSJ material such as those providing instructions on how to create pressure-cooker bombs. Hence, no simple right or wrong answers exist in our policy response to the emergence of radical Islamist English-language online magazines. Before undertaking such policies, it is thus imperative that they should be well informed and part of a larger endeavor that goes beyond individual and joint-service perspectives



or only intelligence community needs and instead embraces a whole-of-government programmatic response. This is an approach that ultimately should transcend radical Islamist English-language online magazines and eBooks and also include the plethora of other English-language online social media forms being utilized by both al-Qaeda and the Islamic State.

## ENDNOTES

1. Such perceptions are not new. A number of counterterrorism professionals and military scholars have long been aware that proto-forms of hybrid warfare and various forms of nonstate actors with “war making capacity” have been emerging for decades now. See for instance Brian Michael Jenkins, *New Modes of Conflict*, R-3009-DNA, Santa Monica: RAND, June 1983, available from <https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/reports/2006/R3009.pdf>; Martin van Creveld, *The Transformation of War*, New York: The Free Press, 1991; and Robert J. Bunker, “Epochal Change: War Over Social and Political Organization,” *Parameters*, Summer 1997, pp. 15-25, available from <http://strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/parameters/articles/97summer/bunker.htm>.

2. “Sawt al-Dschihad returned – Ausgabe No. 30 am 8.2.2007 Online gestellt” (*Sawt al-Jihad* returned – Issue No. 30 on February 8, 2007 posted online), Online Jihad: Monitoring Jihadist Online Communities, February 13, 2007, available from <https://onlinejihad.wordpress.com/2007/02/13/sawt-al-dschihad-returnd-ausgabe-no30-am-822007-online-gestellt/>.

3. Carsten Bockstette, *Jihadist Terrorist Use of Strategic Communication Management Techniques*, Occasional Paper No. 20, Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany: George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, December 2008, p. 18. The reference is sourced to Yassin Musharbash, *The New al-Qaida: Insights into a Learning Terror Network*, Bonn, Germany: Spiegel Online, 2006 (published in German).

4. Some examples include: “Inspire: Inside the al-Qaeda magazine,” Channel 4 News, April 24, 2013, available from <https://www.channel4.com/news/inside-the-al-qaeda-magazine>; Liz Burke, “Islamic

State magazine Dabiq's disturbing apocalyptic message," *News.Com.Au*, September 17, 2014, available from <http://www.news.com.au/world/middle-east/islamic-state-magazine-dabiqs-disturbing-apocalyptic-message/news-story/e80338764f4a07a93be446bfd3b1371a>; and David Denby, "The Perfect Children of ISIS: Lessons from Dabiq," *The New Yorker*, November 24, 2015, available from <http://www.newyorker.com/culture/cultural-comment/the-perfect-children-of-isis-lessons-from-dabiq>.

5. See, for example, Anthony N. Celso, "Dabiq: IS's Apocalyptic 21st Century Jihadist Manifesto," *Journal of Political Sciences and Public Affairs*, Vol. 2, Iss. 4, 2014, pp. 1-4, available from <http://www.esciencecentral.org/journals/dabiq-iss-apocalyptic-21st-century-jihadist-manifesto-2332-0761.1000e111.php?aid=36093>; and "Terrorist Propaganda Encourages Attacks With Common Items," Anti-Defamation League, ADL Blog: Extremism, Terrorism & Bigotry, July 15, 2016, available from <http://blog.adl.org/extremism/terrorist-propaganda-encourages-attacks-with-common-items>.

6. See, for instance, David B. Skillicorn and Edna F. Reid, "Language use in the Jihadist magazines inspire and Azan," *Security Informatics*, Vol. 3, Iss. 9, 2014, pp. 1-16; available from <https://security-informatics.springeropen.com/articles/10.1186/s13388-014-0009-1>; and the more inclusive magazine dataset found in Stuart Macdonald, Nuria Lorenzo-Dus, Matteo di Cristofaro, David Mair, Anina Kinzel, Saffron Lee, Nyasha Maravanyika, David Nezri, Jodie Parker, Elliot Parry, Kate Thomas, and Luke Walker, *Online Terrorist Magazines*, Cyberterrorism Project Research Report No. 5, 2015, United Kingdom: Swansea University, available from [www.cyberterrorism-project.org](http://www.cyberterrorism-project.org).

7. For example, Richard Spencer, "Boston Marathon bombs: al-Qaeda's Inspire magazine taught pressure cooker bomb-making techniques," *The Telegraph*, April 16, 2013, available from <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/al-qaeda/9998886/Boston-Marathon-bombs-al-Qaedas-Inspire-magazine-taught-pressure-cooker-bomb-making-techniques.html>; and Marc A. Thiessen, "Opinions: The attack in Nice shouldn't have been a surprise," *The Washington Post*, July 15, 2016, available from [https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-attack-in-nice-shouldnt-have-been-a-surprise/2016/07/15/1c599b14-4a94-11e6-acbc-4d4870a079da\\_story.html?utm\\_term=.cef22d997d55](https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-attack-in-nice-shouldnt-have-been-a-surprise/2016/07/15/1c599b14-4a94-11e6-acbc-4d4870a079da_story.html?utm_term=.cef22d997d55).

8. "Henceforth, we have decided to take it upon ourselves to produce the first Jihadi Magazine in English," quoted from *Jihad Recollections*, Issue 1, April 2009, p. 2 (Interior p. 1). This work is widely regarded as the first online radical Islamist English-language magazine though it is not. Background English-language mujahideen print newsletters were said to have existed as early as the 1980s and an English language version of a Taliban print newsletter *Dharb-e-Momin* (Shield of the Believer) was said to be available in some British mosques prior to 9/11. Madison Pauly, "Inside the jihadi lifestyle magazine wars," *Hopes&Fears*, November 10, 2015, available from <http://www.hopesandfears.com/hopes/now/media/216747-jihadi-lifestyle-magazine-wars-inspire-dabiq>; and Innes Bowen, *Medina in Birmingham, Najaf in Brent: Inside British Islam*, London, UK: C. Hurst & Company, Limited, p. 31. One source claims *Jihad Recollections* was "the second English-language Jihadi magazine" to appear, which is correct. The predecessor was said to have "little more than recycled translations of existing Jihadi material." The name of this earlier magazine was not stated. See "Transnational Threats Update," Transnational Threats Project, Vol. 7, No. 4, April 2009, Washington, DC: Center for Strategic & International Studies, p. 1, available from [https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/legacy\\_files/files/publication/ttu\\_0704.pdf](https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/legacy_files/files/publication/ttu_0704.pdf). Additional research suggests that the original English online magazine produced was called *Benefit of the Day*. It is discussed later in this book.

9. "Samir Khan: American Blogger and Al Qaeda Propagandist," New York: Anti-Defamation League, October 3, 2011, available from <http://www.adl.org/assets/pdf/combating-hate/samir-khan-2013-6-5-v1.pdf>.

10. "Samir Khan," Counter Extremism Project, n.d., available from <http://www.counterextremism.com/extremists/samir-khan>.

11. John M. Berger, *Jihad Joe: Americans Who Go to War in the Name of Islam*, Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2011, p. 191. For additional critiques of this magazine, see Rusty Shackelford, "American Based Jihad Magazine Analyzed," *The Jawa Report*, April 8, 2009, available from <http://mypetjawa.mu.nu/archives/197166.php>; and Eric Shawn, "Glossy Internet Magazine Targets Americans for Jihad Training," *Fox News*, May 1, 2009,

available from <http://www.foxnews.com/story/2009/05/01/glossy-internet-magazine-targets-americans-for-jihad-training.html>.

12. "English Jihad Magazine Targets Western Audience," Anti-Defamation League, July 17, 2009, updated April 23, 2010, available from [https://web.archive.org/web/20140426082556/http://archive.adl.org/main\\_terrorism/english\\_jihad\\_magazine.html#.WwLCU8kUk-4](https://web.archive.org/web/20140426082556/http://archive.adl.org/main_terrorism/english_jihad_magazine.html#.WwLCU8kUk-4).

13. English version of the Al Mosul affiliated website, moderated by Ansarsunnah01, was previously available from <http://almosul01.blogspot.com/>.

14. Al Mosul Media's primary website was available from <http://www.almosul.co.cc/>, with contact emails (for forum joining and other purposes) of [almosulmedia@aol.com](mailto:almosulmedia@aol.com) and [servent1@inmail24.com](mailto:servent1@inmail24.com). A secondary site was also once available from <http://www.al-mosul.tk/>.

15. For examples of armed mujahid, see *Defenders of the Truth*, Iss. 3, Shawwaal/Dhul Qa'dah 1430 (October 2009), pp. 47-49. For examples of martyrs, see *Defenders of the Truth*, Iss. 4, Dhul Qa'dah/ Dhul Hijjah 1430 (November/December 2009), pp. 12-13.

16. The earliest of these analyses even doubted that *Inspire* was authentic. See Max Fisher, "5 Reasons to Doubt Al-Qaeda Magazine's Authenticity," *The Atlantic*, July 1, 2010, available from <http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2010/07/5-reasons-to-doubt-al-qaeda-magazines-authenticity/59035/>. Examples of later analyses include Susan Currie Sivek, "Packing Inspiration: Al Qaeda's Digital Magazine *Inspire* in the Self-Radicalization Process," *Faculty Publications*, January 1, 2013, available from [http://digitalcommons.linfield.edu/mscmfac\\_pubs/12/](http://digitalcommons.linfield.edu/mscmfac_pubs/12/); Meagan Schreiner, Mark A. E. Williams, and S. David Zuckerman, "Inspirations and Limitations: Reason, the Universal Audience, and *Inspire* Magazine," *Journal of Communication & Religion*, Vol. 36, Iss. 1, April 2013, pp. 196-210; and Anthony F. Lemieux, Jarret M. Brachman, Jason Levitt, and Jay Wood, "Inspire Magazine: A Critical Analysis of its Significance and Potential Impact Through the Lens of the Information, Motivation, and Behavioral Skills Model," *Terrorism and Political Violence*, Vol. 26, Iss. 2, 2014, pp. 354-371.

17. For the magazines' instructions on how to use encrypted messages, see *Inspire*, Iss. 1, Summer 1431 (June 2010), pp. 41-44.

18. Ibid., p. 65, the email addresses provided for contact were *inspire1magazine@hotmail.com*, *inspire11malahem@gmail.com*, *inspire22malahem@fastmail.net*, and *inspire2magazine@yahoo.com*.

19. *Inspire*, Iss. 3, 1431 (November 2010), p. 22.

20. *Inspire*, Iss. 12, 1435 (March 2014, Spring) p. 1.

21. Issue 1 of *Inspire* has an alternative publication month listed in some reports as July; June is accurate. Issues 8 and 9 were released at the same time. See "AQAP Releases Very Different Issues of *Inspire*," Anti-Defamation League, May 11, 2012, available from <http://www.adl.org/combating-hate/international-extremism-terrorism/c/aqap-releases-inspire-8-and-9.html#.WDZfwlc79FI>.

22. Quite a few translations of the term exist. These two translations are from David M. Anderson and Jacob McKnight, "Understanding al-Shabaab: clan, Islam and insurgency in Kenya," *Journal of East African Affairs*, Vol. 9, Iss. 3, 2015, available from <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17531055.2015.1082254>; and note 34 that is referenced back to "Shabaab Supporters Focus on Westgate in 4th Issue of Gaidi Mtaani," SITE Institute, January 15, 2014, in Ken Menkhaus, "Al-Shabab's Capabilities Post-Westgate," *CTC Sentinel*, Africa Special Issue, Vol. 7, No. 2, February 2014, p. 6, available from <https://ctc.usma.edu/app/uploads/2014/02/CTCSentinel-Vol7Iss2.pdf>.

23. See the blog "Gaidi Mtaani-Issues 1 & 2," Billao Journal of Somali Security Studies, July 11, 2012, available from <http://somalisecuritystudies.blogspot.com/2012/07/gaidi-mtaani-issues-1-2.html>.

24. Anderson and McKnight.

25. *Gaidi Mtaani*, Iss. 6, Dhul Qaada 1435 (December 2014), pp. 16-19.

26. See, for instance, Cleophus Tres Thomas III, "Somalia: Al-Shabaab Attempts to Justify Violent Jihad," *all Africa*, December 19, 2014, available from <http://allafrica.com/stories/201412220159>.

html; and "Al-Shabaab Supporters Release Sixth Edition of Jihadist Magazine 'Gaidi Mtaani'," Somalia Newsroom, December 15, 2014, available from <https://somalianewsroom.com/2014/12/15/al-shabaab-supporters-release-sixth-edition-of-jihadist-magazine-gaidi-mtaani/>.

27. *Gaidi Mtaani*, Iss. 3, Rabi al-Thani 1434 (March 2013), pp. 30-34.

28. *Ibid.*, p. 38; and *Gaidi Mtaani*, Iss. 4, Dhul Hijja 1434 (November 2013), p. 29.

29. The contact email provided by *Gaidi Mtaani* was [gaidimtaani@yahoo.com](mailto:gaidimtaani@yahoo.com) and the Twitter account was @gaidimtaani.

30. "AZAN Magazine—Profile Analysis," Herzliya, Israel: Jihadi Monitoring Group, International Institute for Counter-Terrorism, September 23, 2014, p. 2, available from <https://www.ict.org.il/Article/1218/AZAN-Magazine-Profile-Analysis>.

31. *Azan*, Iss. 1, Jamadi-ul Awwal 1434H (March 2013), p. 2.

32. "AZAN Magazine—Profile Analysis"; see also Haroro J. Ingram, "An Analysis of the Taliban in Khurasan's *Azan* (Issues 1-5)," *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, Vol. 38, Iss. 7, 2015, pp. 560-579.

33. "Afghani Azan Magazine Picks Up Where Inspire Left Off," Anti-Defamation League, ADL Blog: Extremism, Terrorism & Bigotry, December 3, 2013, available from <http://blog.adl.org/extremism/afghani-azan-magazine-picks-up-where-inspire-left-off>.

34. *Ibid.*

35. The quotes are taken from the covers of *Azan*, Iss. 2, Jamadi II/Rajab 1434H (April/May 2013); *Azan*, Iss. 3, Sha'ban/Ramadan 1434H (June/July 2013); and *Azan*, Iss. 4, Autumn 1434 (December 2013), respectively. See also table 5 of this book.

36. *Azan*, Iss. 1, provided a contact email of [azan23452@yahoo.com](mailto:azan23452@yahoo.com); *Azan*, Iss. 2, provided a contact email of [azan\\_2013@mail.ru](mailto:azan_2013@mail.ru).

37. A little more than a year and a half after the final publication of this defunct magazine, an individual claiming to be its

editor—Muhammad Qasim (which may be a pseudonym)—released a communiqué, which said that difficult local conditions had forced the termination of the magazine. In addition, he stated that a debate was then taking place within the magazine production team concerning the legitimacy of the Islamic State vis-à-vis the older al-Qaeda group, and that he now has pledged his allegiance to Al-Baghdadi of the Islamic State. See “Editor of ‘Azan’ Magazine Joins Islamic State, Says: ‘ISIS Does Not Declare The Takfir Of The General Masses Of The Muslims’; Promises New Publications To Support The Caliphate,” MEMRI Cyber & Jihad Lab, April 7, 2016, available from <http://cjlalab.memri.org/lab-projects/tracking-jihadi-terrorist-use-of-social-media/editor-of-azan-magazine-joins-islamic-state-says-isis-does-not-declare-the-takfir-of-the-general-masses-of-the-muslims-promises-new-publications-to-support-the-caliphate/>.

38. Harleen K. Gambhir, “Dabiq: The Strategic Messaging of the Islamic State,” Backgrounder, Washington, DC: Institute for the Study of War, August 15, 2014, available from [http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Dabiq%20Backgrounder\\_Harleen%20Final.pdf](http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Dabiq%20Backgrounder_Harleen%20Final.pdf).

39. These include “Islamic State’s (ISIS, ISIL) Horrific Magazine,” The Clarion Project, September 10, 2014, available from <http://www.clarionproject.org/news/islamic-state-isis-isil-propaganda-magazine-dabiq>; Jean E. Rosenfeld, “Notes on *Dabiq*, The Online Journal of the IS,” World Religions & Spirituality Project (WRSP), Virginia Commonwealth University, September 15, 2014, available from <https://wrldrels.org/2016/02/25/jihadism/>; Matteo Vergani and Ana-Maria Bliuc, “The Evolution of the ISIS’ language: a quantitative analysis of the language of the first year of *Dabiq* magazine,” *Sicurezza, Terrorismo e Società*, Vol. 2, 2015, pp. 7-20, available from <http://www.sicurezzaterrorismosocieta.it/?p=301>; and Haroro J. Ingram, “An analysis of Islamic State’s *Dabiq* magazine,” *Australian Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 51, Iss. 3, 2016, pp. 458-477.

40. *Dabiq*, Iss. 1, Ramadan 1435 (July 2014), p. 3.

41. Some of these insights and others—based on an interview with Dr. Haroro Ingram, a research fellow at Australian National University—can be found in Nick Robins-Early, “4 Things To Know About *Dabiq*, ISIS’ Slick Propaganda Magazine,” *The Huffington*

Post, February 10, 2016, available from [http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/isis-dabiq-magazine\\_us\\_56a7e6cfe4b04936c0e8938a](http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/isis-dabiq-magazine_us_56a7e6cfe4b04936c0e8938a).

42. For examples including the destruction of cultural sites and artifacts, see *Dabiq*, Iss. 2, Ramadan 1435 (July 2014), pp. 14-17; *Dabiq*, Iss. 8, Jumada al-Akhirah 1436 (March 2015), pp. 22-24. For examples of slaves for sale, see *Dabiq*, Iss. 11, Dhul-Qa'dah 1436 (September 2015), pp. 64-65. For examples of graphic executions, see *Dabiq*, Iss. 3, Shawwal 1435 (September 2014), pp. 4, 21; *Dabiq*, Iss. 7, Rabi' al-Akhir 1436 (February 2015), p. 5; *Dabiq*, Iss. 15, Shawwal 1437 (July 2016), p. 80.

43. *Dabiq*, Iss. 3, p. 41, gave the following contact email addresses: *dabiq-is@yandex.com*, *dabiq-is@india.com*, and *dabiq-is@0x300.com*.

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47. "al-Qaeda Teases New English-Language Magazine Entitled 'Resurgence' in New Video."

48. Analyses of the two *Resurgence* issues include Thomas Joscelyn, "Analysis: Al Qaeda's 'Resurgence' focuses on Indian Subcontinent," *FDD's Long War Journal*, October 23, 2014, available from [http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2014/10/al\\_qaedas\\_resurgence-2.php](http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2014/10/al_qaedas_resurgence-2.php); and "Al-Qaeda's 'Resurgence' Magazine Features Posthumously Released In-Depth Interview with Al-Qaeda Media Operative Adam Gadahn," MEMRI's *Jihad and Terrorism Threat Monitor* (JTTM), Special Dispatch Series No. 6083, June 25,



2015, available from <http://www.memrijttm.org/al-qaedas-resurgence-magazine-features-posthumously-released-in-depth-interview-with-al-qaeda-media-operative-adam-gadhan.html>.

49. The email account provided in the magazine was [resurgencemag@yahoo.com](mailto:resurgencemag@yahoo.com). For directions on using the Asrarul Mujahideen program, see the first issue of *Inspire* magazine. *Inspire*, Iss. 1, p. 116.

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51. It is likely that "editor" in this sense does not mean the managing or actual editor because Ahmed Iman Ali, as the leader of al-Muhajiroun, is not going to be able to spend his time on day-to-day magazine production. For background information on this individual, see Nyambega Gisesa, "A Portrait of a Jihadist Born and Bred in Nairobi," Africa News Online, January 30, 2012, available from <http://africanewsonline.blogspot.com/2012/01/portrait-of-jihadist-born-and-bred-in.html>.

52. Avraham Ben Adam, "Al Muhajiroun – Al Qaeda's New Branch In Kenya," Intelligence Brief, Strategic Intelligence News, March 17, 2015, pp. 2-4, available from <http://intelligencebriefs.com/al-muhajiroun-al-qaedas-new-branch-in-kenya/>.

53. Abu Salim Al-Kenyi, "From the Editor," *Amka*, Toleo No. 1, Rabi-ul Thani-Jamadil Awal 1436 (February 2015), p. 3.

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55. Ben Adam, p. 4.

56. Abu Salim Al-Kenyi, "From the Editor," *Amka*, Toleo No. 2, Shawaal 1436 (July 2015), p. 3.

57. Stewart, pp. 1-5.

58. "Exclusive In Our Next Issue – Jihad: A Life Time," *Al-Risalah*, Iss. 2, Muharram 1437 (October 2015), p. 19.

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63. "British 'cyber groomer' jailed for recruiting UK's youngest terrorist," *The Evening Standard*, August 19, 2008, available from <https://www.standard.co.uk/news/british-cyber-groomer-jailed-for-recruiting-uks-youngest-terrorist-6882440.html>.

64. Shackleford.

65. For examples promoting martyrdom, see *Benefit of the Day*, Iss. 1, Rabee' al-Awwal 1428 (April-May 2007), p. 17. For examples supporting the mujahideen, see *Benefit of the Day*, Iss. 3, Jummad ath-Thanni 1428 (June-July 2007), p. 19.

66. See the covers of *Benefit of the Day*, Iss. 2, No. 1, Muharram 1429 (January-February 2008); and *Benefit of the Day*, Iss. 2, No. 2, Safar 1429 (February-March 2008).

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70. For *In Fight* issues No. 20 to No. 60, see "In Fight Magazine: New issue of In Fight Magazine #60," *Jihadology*, January 3, 2014, available from <http://jihadology.net/category/in-fight-magazine/>.

71. "Taliban Distributes English-Language Magazine, 'In Fight'," *Jihadist News*, SITE Intelligence Group, June 11, 2009, available from <https://ent.siteintelgroup.com/Jihadist-News/site-intel-group-6-12-09-english-language-mag-in-fight-1-5.html>; and "'In Fight' Magazine Documenting Afghan Taliban Activity, Issues 6-13," *Periodicals*, SITE Intelligence Group, February 26, 2010, available from <https://ent.siteintelgroup.com/Periodicals/site-intel-group-2-26-10-in-fight-magazine-issues-6-13.html>.

72. See *Bimonthly Report: Summary of Information on Jihadist Websites The First Half of September 2014*, Periodic Review, Herzliya, Israel: Jihadi Monitoring Group, International Institute for Counter-Terrorism, September 2014, p. 13, available from <https://www.ict.org.il/UserFiles/JWMG192014.pdf>; and *Bimonthly Report Summary of Information on Jihadist Websites The First Half of November 2014*, Periodic Review, Herzliya, Israel: Jihadi Monitoring Group, International Institute for Counter-Terrorism, November 2014, p. 15, available from <https://www.ict.org.il/UserFiles/JWMG-1-11-2014.pdf>.

73. *Periodical Review: Summary of Information from Jihadi Forums - The Second Half of February 2013*, Herzliya, Israel: Jihadi Monitoring Group, International Institute for Counter-Terrorism, February 2013, p. 15, available from <https://www.ict.org.il/Article/547/Periodical%20Review%20Summary%20from%20the%20Jihadi%20>

Forums%20-%20The%20Second%20Half%20of%20February%202013#gsc.tab=0.

74. "SSP Releases First Issue of English Magazine 'Al-Rashideen,'" Jihadist News, SITE Intelligence Group, March 4, 2013, available from <https://news.siteintelgroup.com/Jihadist-News/ssp-releases-first-issue-of-english-magazine-qal-rashideenq.html>.

75. The magazine's news Twitter account was @AlRashideen, their website was formerly available from [alrashideen.weebly.com](http://alrashideen.weebly.com), and contact email was [alrashideen.feedback@gmail.com](mailto:alrashideen.feedback@gmail.com).

76. Omar R. Quraishi, "Saad Aziz's Road to Radicalization," ARY News, June 10, 2015, available from <http://arynews.tv/en/saad-azizs-road-to-radicalization/>.

77. Hussain Nadim, "Pakistan's New Breed of Militants," Foreign Policy, June 9, 2015, available from <http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/06/09/pakistans-new-breed-of-militants/>.

78. See, "SSP Releases First Issue of English Magazine 'Al-Rashideen,'" Jihadist News, SITE Intelligence Group, March 4, 2013, available from <https://news.siteintelgroup.com/Jihadist-News/ssp-releases-first-issue-of-english-magazine-qal-rashideenq.html>; "SSP Releases Special Issue of English Magazine, Focuses on Iran," Periodicals, SITE Intelligence Group, March 19, 2013, available from <https://ent.siteintelgroup.com/Periodicals/ssp-releases-special-issue-of-english-magazine-focuses-on-iran.html>; and "SSP Releases Third Issue of English Magazine 'Al-Rashideen,'" Jihadist News, SITE Intelligence Group, April 4, 2013, available from <https://news.siteintelgroup.com/Jihadist-News/ssp-releases-third-issue-of-english-magazine-qal-rashideenq.html>.

79. "AQAP Compiles 'Inspire' Manuals into 'Lone Mujahid Pocketbook'," Jihadist News, SITE Intelligence Group, March 1, 2013, available from <https://news.siteintelgroup.com/Jihadist-News/aqap-compiles-inspire-manuals-into-lone-mujahid-pocketbook.html>. For a copy of this publication, go to "al-Malahim Media presents a new booklet from al-Qa'idah in the Arabian Peninsula: 'The Lone Mujahid Pocketbook'," Jihadology, March 2, 2013, available from <https://jihadology.net/2013/03/02/al-mala%E1%B8%A5im-media-presents-a-new-booklet-from-al-qaidah-in-the-arabian-peninsula-the-lone-mujahid-pocketbook/>.

80. "Bi-monthly Report: Summary of Information on Jihadist Web Sites The First Half of March 2013," *Periodical Review*, Herzliya, Israel: ICT's Jihadi Website Monitoring Group, International Institute for Counter-Terrorism, March 2013, p. 14, available from <https://www.ict.org.il/Article/548/Periodical%20Review%20Summary%20from%20the%20Jihadi%20Forums%20-%20The%20First%20Half%20of%20March%202013>.

81. The contact email addresses provided in the periodical were [inscont@yahoo.com](mailto:inscont@yahoo.com), and [pirezine@yahoo.com](mailto:pirezine@yahoo.com). See *Lone Mujahid Pocketbook*, March 2013, p. 62.

82. "AQAP Exploits Gaza Conflict to Call for Lone-Wolf Attacks Against U.S.," Anti-Defamation League, August 19, 2014, available from <http://www.adl.org/combating-hate/international-extremism-terrorism/c/aqap-lone-wolf-terror-attacks-english-propaganda.html>; and "New AQAP Magazine Calls For Lone-Wolf Attacks Against U.S. And U.K.," Anti-Defamation League, ADL Blog: Extremism, Terrorism & Bigotry, August 19, 2014, available from [http://blog.adl.org/international/new-aqap-magazine-calls-for-lone-wolf-attacks-against-u-s-and-u-k?\\_ga=1.264095500.1288846456.1467561144](http://blog.adl.org/international/new-aqap-magazine-calls-for-lone-wolf-attacks-against-u-s-and-u-k?_ga=1.264095500.1288846456.1467561144).

83. Thomas Joscelyn, "AQAP seeks to capitalize on anti-Israeli sentiment in new English-language magazine," *FDD's Long War Journal*, August 17, 2014, available from [http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2014/08/aqap\\_seeks\\_to\\_capita.php](http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2014/08/aqap_seeks_to_capita.php).

84. *Bimonthly Report: Summary of Information on Jihadist Websites The First Half of September 2014*, pp. 13-14. The ICT report references this Twitter source for its information on this magazine, available from <https://twitter.com/abuzuba1r/status/509673292165566465>. Mention of this magazine also exists at "Pro-IS Jihadist Distributes Alleged English Magazine of al-Nusra Front," Jihadist News, SITE Intelligence Group, September 10, 2014, available from <https://news.siteintelgroup.com/Jihadist-News/pro-is-jihadist-distributes-alleged-english-magazine-of-al-nusra-front.html>.

85. "JTTM Reports About Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan's (TTP) English-Language 'Ihya-e-Khilafat' Magazine," Special Announcements No. 338, The Middle East Media Research Institute (MEMRI), October 30, 2014, available from <http://www.memri.org/report/en/print8199.htm>.

86. "In Issue II Of Ihya-e-Khilafat, Pakistani Taliban Commander Justifies ISIS Savagery & Beheadings: 'One Of The Titles Of The Prophet Was Nabi Al-Malahim, Which Means Prophet Of Fierce Battles Or Bloodshed'," Jihad & Terrorism Threat Monitor, The Middle East Media Research Institute (MEMRI), March 1, 2015, available from <http://www.memrijttm.org/in-issue-ii-of-ihya-e-khilafat-pakistani-taliban-commander-justifies-isis-savagery-and-beheadings-in-article-titled-our-right-to-spread-terror-one-of-the-titles-of-the-prophet-was-nabi-al-malahim-which-means-prophet-of-fierce-ba.html>; and "SITE Intelligence Group: The Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) offshoot Jamat-ul-Ahrar released the second issue of its English magazine, 'Ihya-e-Khilafat,' featuring the second installment of an interview with an official, and new article from a British fighter, 'Abu Okasha al-Britani,' about preparing to immigrate and his experiences," Gossip Shack, January 14, 2015, available from <https://willaiyi.wordpress.com/2015/01/14/site-intelligence-group/>.

87. Conceptually, these guides appear to be predated by the essay "Charlie Hebdo: Military Analysis," *Inspire*, No. 14, September 2015, pp. 38-42.

88. A third guide—called "Comment on arresting our Muslim sisters in France"—was published in September 2016. The guide pertains to three Muslim women arrested before they could engage in a jihad operation. The "Mujahedeen brothers" are scolded in the guide for allowing their "virtuous Muslim sisters" in attempting to engage in such an operation by themselves. For the interior image of the one-page guide, see TRACterrorism.org (@TRACterrorism), "Malahim Media Issues Inspire Guide n°3: Comment on arresting our Muslim sisters in #France," Twitter, September 15, 2016, available from <https://twitter.com/tracterrorism/status/776377596351250432>.

89. "Inspire Guide 4," *Inspire*, Iss. 16, 1438 (November 2016, Autumn), pp. 4-9; for the standalone publication, see *Inspire Guide 4*, 1437/12/18 (September 20, 2016).

90. Thomas Joscelyn, "Town of Dabiq falls to Turkish-backed forces," Threat Matrix, blog of FDD's *Long War Journal*, October 17, 2016, available from <http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2016/10/town-of-dabiq-falls-to-turkish-backed-forces.php>.

91. Bethan McKernan, "Isis' new magazine Rumiyah shows the terror group is 'struggling to adjust to losses'," *The Independent*, September 6, 2016, available from <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/isis-propaganda-terror-group-losses-syria-iraq-a7228286.html>; and Meira Svirsky, "Latest Issue of ISIS Rumiyah Magazine Released," The Clarion Project, October 11, 2016, available from <http://www.clarionproject.org/analysis/latest-issue-isis-rumiyah-magazine-released>.

92. This listing does not include the 68 issues of the *In Fight* magazine series, and *The Benefit of the Day* dataset is incomplete. Issues were obtained via radical Islamist and sympathizer file sharing sites.

93. While a short overview of this specialized magazine is provided in this book, the inclusion of this dataset would overwhelm the online magazine chronology.

94. Gambhir, p. 2.

95. For the *Islamic State News* (ISN) and *Islamic State Reports* (ISR) and eBooks, see Jihadology, available from <http://jihadology.net>.

96. Ibid.

97. Though some blurring of these themes take place in the second issue of ISN with its focus on fresh fruit in the Halab Market and restriction (Hudud) on alcohol drinking in Aleppo province (Wilayat Halab), see *Islamic State News*, No. 2, Shaban 1435 (June 5, 2014), pp. 2-3.

98. ISN issue 1 has a publication date of June 1, 2014, but was posted online May 31, 2014, see "al-Hayāt Media Center presents a new issue of the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Shām's newsletter: 'Islamic State News #1'," Jihadology, May 31, 2014, available from <https://jihadology.net/2014/05/31/al-%E1%B8%A5ayat-media-center-presents-a-new-issue-of-the-islamic-state-of-iraq-and-al-shams-newsletter-islamic-state-news-1/>. All other dates in this table are also referenced to the Jihadology site.

99. Some analysis of individual eBooks has taken place. See, for instance, John Rossomando, "Islamic State Manifesto: Sleeper

Cells Sent To Europe Posing As Refugees,” IPT News, December 1, 2015, available from <http://www.investigativeproject.org/5052/islamic-state-manifesto-sleeper-cells-sent-to>; and Edward Peter Delmonico, “Hijrah to the Islamic State: A Preliminary Analysis, Thesis Paper,” Tempe: Barrett, The Honors College, Arizona State University, May 2016.

100. For the *Black Flags from Rome* release dating, see Rosso-mando, “Islamic State Manifesto.”

101. *Black Flags from Arabia*, Book 3, n.p., September 2013, p. 7.

102. For more analysis of this Islamic State eBook, see John Rossomando, “Islamic State Manifesto Details Paris Attacks, Describes Expansion Plans,” IPT News, December 11, 2015, available from <http://www.investigativeproject.org/5093/islamic-state-manifesto-details-paris-attacks>.

103. Quran, “Surat al-Imran” (“The Family Of Imran”), verse 169 (Surah 3:169) as quoted in *The Undead Warriors*, n.p., Dar Al Murabiteen Publications, January 2013, pp. 85, 88, 111.

104. The section “Dawlat al-Islam” is related to the Islamic State song “Dawlat al-Islam Qamat,” see Simon R. Gardner, “The Islamic State Produced the Most Influential Song of the Year,” *New Republic*, December 30, 2014, available from <https://newrepublic.com/article/120665/islamic-states-dawlat-al-islam-qamat-most-influential-song-2014>.

105. Constanze Letsch, Carmen Fishwick, and Vikram Dodd, “UK police move to take down Islamic State how-to guide from internet,” *The Guardian*, February 25, 2015, available from <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/feb/25/uk-police-islamic-state-travel-guide-hijrah-turkey-syria-ctiru>.

106. For a detailed analysis of this work, see “E-Book Distributed Via Twitter: ‘How To Survive In The West – A Mujahid Guide’,” MEMRI Jihad and Terrorism Threat Monitor (JTTM), May 3, 2015, available from <http://www.memrijttm.org/e-book-distributed-via-twitter-how-to-survive-in-the-west-a-mujahid-guide.html>.



107. An initial mention of this eBook is found in this article: Tom Wyke, "ISIS supporter releases guide on establishing 'Muslim gangs', how to spread hate among Islamic communities, stop them integrating with non-Muslims, and using charities as fronts to raise cash," *Daily Mail*, July 8, 2015, available from <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3153237/ISIS-supporter-release-guide-establishing-Muslim-gangs-spread-hate-Islamic-communities-stop-integrating-non-Muslims-using-charities-fronts-raise-cash.html>.

108. For *Black Flags from the East: The Movements Past, Present, and Future 1979-2012*, the November 2012 publication date corresponds to an Islamic State eBook advertisement with a link to the document; researchers have listed a generic 2013 date, which may be tied to the Khurasan cover variant. *The Black Flags* series are also described as the Conquest works confirmed by prophecy. See Paul Kamolnick, "On Self-Declared Caliph Ibrahim's May 2015 Message to Muslims," *Small Wars Journal*, June 4, 2015, en. 20, available from <http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/on-self-declared-caliph-ibrahim-s-may-2015-message-to-muslims>. *The Undead Warriors* has an alternate version titled *Ushaq al Hoor and The Undead Warriors* that is available from [https://archive.org/stream/UshaqAlHoorAndTheUndeadWarriors/UshaqAlHoor\\_djvu.txt](https://archive.org/stream/UshaqAlHoorAndTheUndeadWarriors/UshaqAlHoor_djvu.txt). The *Miracles in Syria* November publication date was confirmed via online document posting—it possibly could have been published earlier.

109. *Inspire*, Iss. 1, pp. 33-40.

110. *Ibid.*, pp. 2, 17, 28, 33, 57-58.

111. *Inspire*, Iss. 2, Fall 1431 (October 2010), pp. 4, 18, 23-24, 36-37, 43-44, 65.

112. *Inspire*, Iss. 3, pp. 3, 7, 10-11, 15.

113. *Inspire*, Iss. 4, Winter 1431 (January 2011), pp. 5-6, 13, 16-17, 21, 23, 32, 60.

114. *Inspire*, Iss. 5, Spring 1431 (March 2011), pp. 4-5, 10-11, 35, 44, 63.

115. *Inspire*, Iss. 6, Summer 1432 (August 2011), pp. 3, 8, 15, 24, 33, 50, 55.

116. *Inspire*, Iss. 7, Fall 1432 (September 2011), p. 4.
117. *Ibid.*, pp. 3-4, 9-10, 13.
118. *Inspire*, Iss. 8, Fall 1432 (May 2012), p. 45.
119. *Ibid.*, pp. 3, 9, 18-19, 47, 59.
120. *Inspire*, Iss. 9, Winter 1433 (May 2012), pp. 19, 23-24, 53, 57-58.
121. *Inspire*, Iss. 10, Spring 1434 (March 2013), p. 44.
122. *Ibid.*, pp. 22, 32, 35, 38, 40, 45, 57-58.
123. *Inspire*, Iss. 11, Spring 1434 (May 2013), pp. 3, 14-15, 17, 21, 31, 34.
124. *Inspire*, Iss. 12, 1435 (March 2014, Spring), pp. 26-27.
125. *Ibid.*, pp. 11-12, 15, 17, 25, 32, 40, 50, 56.
126. *Inspire*, Iss. 13, 1436 (December 2014, Winter), p. 63.
127. *Ibid.*, p. 64.
128. *Ibid.*, pp. 4, 12, 21, 33, 35.
129. *Inspire*, Iss. 14, 1436 (September 2015, Summer), pp. 47, 55.
130. *Ibid.*, p. 43.
131. *Ibid.*, pp. 4, 6, 14, 30, 36-37, 41, 55.
132. "O Knife Revolution, Head Towards America," *Inspire*, Iss. 15, 1437 (May 2016, Spring), pp. 36-39.
133. *Inspire*, Iss. 15, pp. 4, 14, 17, 19, 34, 37, 48, 55.
134. *Dabiq*, Iss. 1, Ramadan 1435 (July 2014), pp. 7, 10-11, 13, 27, 29, 38, 40.
135. Referring to the "liberation of Makkah, Madinah, and al-Quds." See "Foreword," *Dabiq*, Iss. 2, p. 3.

136. Ibid., pp. 3-4, 9, 11-12, 23, 25, 42.
137. *Dabiq*, Iss. 3, pp. 3, 5-6, 8, 12, 17, 26, 29, 31.
138. Given the circumstances, John Cantlie's writings are being taken as Islamic State propaganda and not the independent writings of this British hostage.
139. *Dabiq*, Iss. 4, Dhul-Hijjah 1435 (October 2014), pp. 3-5, 9, 12, 15, 21, 32, 44.
140. *Dabiq*, Iss. 5, Muharram 1436 (November 2014), pp. 3, 12, 18, 23-24, 26, 32, 36-38.
141. *Dabiq*, Iss. 6, Rabi' al-Awwal 1436 (December 2014), pp. 7, 9.
142. Ibid., pp. 4, 9, 11, 23, 26, 31, 53, 55.
143. *Dabiq*, Iss. 7, pp. 3-4, 6, 20-21, 32-33, 35-39, 43, 55.
144. *Dabiq*, Iss. 8, pp. 3, 5-6, 11, 15, 20, 22, 26, 33.
145. *Dabiq*, Iss. 9, Sha'ban 1436 (May 2015), pp. 4, 17-18, 20, 23, 26, 29, 51-52, 54.
146. See *Dabiq*, Iss. 10, Ramadan 1436 (July 2015), p. 64.
147. Ibid., pp. 3, 21, 23, 36-37, 47, 50, 69.
148. *Dabiq*, Iss. 11, pp. 7, 19-20, 22, 35, 43-52, 54, 62-63.
149. See, for example, *Dabiq*, Iss. 12, Safar 1437 (November 2015), p. 34.
150. Ibid., pp. 2-3, 35, 39, 43, 46, 48, 50.
151. See *Dabiq*, Iss. 13, Rabi' al-Akhir 1437 (January 2016), p. 37.
152. See Ibid., p. 53.
153. See Ibid., pp. 14-19.
154. See Ibid., p. 24.

155. Ibid., pp. 4, 8, 14, 29, 33, 43, 49-50, 52, 54.
156. Hasan al-Banna as quoted in *Dabiq*, Iss. 14, Rajab 1437 (April 2016), p. 32.
157. See, for example, Ibid., p. 42.
158. Ibid., p. 52.
159. Ibid., pp. 4-5, 8, 17, 28, 39, 43, 52, 64.
160. *Dabiq*, Iss. 15, p. 49.
161. Ibid., pp. 6-7, 28-29, 32-33, 39, 80.
162. Daveed Gartenstein-Ross and Bridget Moreng, "Foreword: The Islamic State's Growth and Misrule, and the Future of Violent Non-State Actors," in Dave Dilegge and Robert J. Bunker, eds., *Global Radical Islamist Insurgency: Al Qaeda and Islamic State Networks Focus: A Small Wars Journal Anthology*, Vol. II: 2012-2014, Bloomington: IN: iUniverse, 2016, pp. xxvii-xli.
163. "Syria war: Turkish-backed rebels seize Dabiq from ISIL," Al Jazeera, October 16, 2016, available from <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/10/syria-war-turkish-backed-rebels-seize-dabiq-isil-161016093547972.html>.
164. Hakim Hazim and Robert J. Bunker, "Perpetual Jihad: Striving for a Caliphate," in Robert J. Bunker, ed., *Criminal-States and Criminal-Soldiers*, London, UK: Routledge, 2008, p. 117. This essay was written in mid-to-late 2006 for a special double-issue of *Global Crime* that was then republished as this work.
165. Ibid., p. 101.
166. These are the dominant approaches during the publication time frame of *Inspire* (al-Qaeda) and *Dabiq* (Islamic State) online magazines.
167. Of note is the fact that both have major U.S. bounties for information leading to their being brought to justice. For Ayman al-Zawahiri the bounty is \$25 million, see "FBI—Most Wanted Terrorist: Ayman Al-Zawahiri," FBI.gov official site of the U.S. Government, U.S. Department of Justice, n.d., available from

[https://www.fbi.gov/wanted/wanted\\_terrorists/ayman-al-zawahiri](https://www.fbi.gov/wanted/wanted_terrorists/ayman-al-zawahiri); and for Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi the bounty is \$25 million, see “Wanted Information that brings to justice . . . Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi: Up to \$25 Million Reward,” Washington, DC: Rewards For Justice, n.d., available from [https://www.rewardsforjustice.net/english/abu\\_dua.html](https://www.rewardsforjustice.net/english/abu_dua.html).

168. Thomas Joscelyn, “Ayman al-Zawahiri swears allegiance to the Taliban’s new leader,” *FDD’s Long War Journal*, June 11, 2016, available from <http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2016/06/ayman-al-zawahiri-swears-allegiance-to-the-talibans-new-leader.php>.

169. This magazine, which means “Reality,” is specifically meant to counter Daesh (e.g., Islamic State) narratives. See *Haqiqah*, Iss. 001, April 2015, and *Haqiqah*, Iss. 002, October 2015, available from <http://haqiqah.org/haqiqah-magazines/>. It is produced by Imams Online, available from <http://imamsonline.com/>. Unfortunately, only two issues of about 20 to 34 pages respectively have been produced—Issue 1, “What is the Truth Behind ISIS?” in April 2015, and Issue 2, “Escape From Hell” in October 2015—with the publishing effort now apparently abandoned. For a video that discusses the launching of this magazine, see Imams Online, “‘Haqiqah’—What is the truth behind ISIS? Digital Magazine Launch,” YouTube, April 1, 2015, available from <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=F6iCHqm5Xm4>.



## GLOSSARY OF ARABIC TERMS

These Arabic terms were utilized in *Inspire* (al-Qaeda) magazine issues 1 to 15 (June 2010-May 2016) and in *Dabiq* (Islamic State) magazine issues 1 to 15 (July 2014-July 2016). Some of these words and phrases are nonstandard in their spelling and/or usage and can be considered jihadist slang—that is to say deviations and corruptions of traditional Arabic terms. The meanings of the terms were determined by checking them against a number of online resources—including radical Islamist ones—and Islamic dictionaries and then analyzing them within the context of their usage. Term capitalization, or lack thereof, is derived from their original usage in the magazines.

**Ad-Dawlah al-Islamiya:** the original name of the group known as the Islamic State from which is derived the acronym DAESH (by which it is sometimes derogatorily referred).

**adhan:** Islamic call to prayer.

**adl:** justice.

**ahl al-dhimma:** protected non-Muslims who pay *jizya* (tax).

**ahl as-Sunnah/ahlus-Sunnah:** the “saved” sect of Islam who follow the true creed; the largest/majority branch of Islam adhered to by Sunni Muslims.

**Ahlul-Kitub/ahl al-kitab:** people of the Book; that is, monotheistic followers of the previous scriptures—the Bible and the Torah.

**ajr:** reward, recompense.

**akhira:** the hereafter, the afterlife.

**akhlaq:** virtue, morality, ethics, and manners.

**al-fadihah:** scandal.

**al-Firdaws al-A'la:** the highest part of Paradise.

**al-ghuraba:** strangers; as in "Islam came as a strange religion."

**al-haramain/al haramayn:** referring to the two holy cities of Mecca and Medina.

**al-wala wal bara:** loyalty to Islam and disavowal of the opposite; love and hate for Allah's sake.

**al-watan al-Islami:** the larger Islamic homeland.

**Alawite:** sect of Shi'a Muslims who also hold beliefs that predate Islam; founder was Ibn Nusayri.

**Alayhis Salam:** "peace be upon him"; said after reference to archangels and prophets before Muhammad.

**Allaahu Musta'an/Allah Musta'an:** the one whose help is sought and in whom refuge is taken (e.g., blessings, provisions, cure of diseases, or security); also phrased as "to Allah alone is the complaint."

**Allahu akbar:** means "God is greater."



**amanah:** fulfilling or holding trusts; alternately “free will.”

**amka:** to wake.

**Ansar/Ansari:** those who helped Muhammad on arrival in Yathrib/Medina and fought for Islam; generically, those who help immigrants settle; alternately used as a word for local mujahideen as opposed to foreign fighters who have emigrated.

**aqeedah/aqidah:** beliefs, affirmations in Islam; namely the six articles of faith.

**ar-rahab:** excessive fear.

**arhaba:** to terrify; vs. hiraba (terrorism).

**As-Salamu’alaykum wa Rahmatullahi wa Barakatuh:** formal greeting to a Muslim meaning “Peace be upon you and the mercy of God and his blessing”; the shortened version is “Assalamu alaykum” meaning “Peace be with you.” The proper response would be “Wa alaykum assalaam” meaning “and upon you.”

**asbal:** lion cub.

**Asha’ira/Ash’ari:** early school of Sunni Islam that bases its creed on logical thought; not considered part of ahl as-Sunnah.

**awliya/wali:** ally or close friend, supporter.

**ayah:** a verse of the Quran.

**'aynah:** transactions including riba (interest).

**Azza wa Jal:** often follows a reference to Allah, means “perfect praise be to him” or alternately “mighty and majestic is He.”

**baghy:** aggression; insurrection, insurgency.

**bai'yah/bay'at:** approval of (having given) an oath of allegiance to.

**baqi/baqiyah:** remaining, surviving.

**bara:** disavowal of the unbelievers.

**batil:** falsehood; void.

**Bayt al-Mal:** Treasury; literally, house of money.

**Baytul-Maqdis:** the al-Aqsa Mosque.

**bi idhnillah:** by Allah's will; literally, with permission (Egyptian term used in the same way as Insha'allah).

**bid'ah:** innovation in religious matters without precedent; considered heretical.

**bismillah:** the first word in the Quran. It is the shortened form of the Quran's opening phrase in Arabic (“In the name of God, the most gracious, the most merciful” or alternately “In the name of God, the merciful, the compassionate”).

**bughat:** aggression, rebellion.

**cihad/cihat:** jihad (Turkish form).

**dar al-harb/darul-harb:** land of war or chaos (where divine will is not observed and authorities presumed hostile to Muslims).

**dar al-Islam/darul-Islam:** house or land of Islam; Muslim ruled region.

**dar al-kufr:** land of disbelievers.

**da'wah/daawah:** the preaching of Islam.

**dhikr:** devotional acts.

**dhimmah:** tolerated non-Muslim citizens of a Muslim state protected by the payment of *jizya* (tax).

**dhirk:** the remembrance of God.

**din/deen:** religion—right living under Islam, religious devotion/conviction.

**du'a/du'aa:** ritual of Muslim prayer or act of supplication.

**du'at:** callers to Allah, missionaries; literally, one who invites people to the da'wa or preaching of Islam.

**dunya:** the temporal world, the test leading to Paradise.

**fa sabilillah/fe sabeelillah:** in the cause of Allah; for the sake of Allah; also “sincerely.”

**fahishah:** obscenity.

**fai, fay:** wealth taken from disbelievers without resistance; root means to restore or return.

**fajir:** an evil-doer who openly disobeys God.

**fard:** religious duty; literally, “compulsory.”

**fard ayn:** obligatory act or individual religious duty.

**fasad:** spreading disorder in a Muslim land; mischief and moral corruption.

**fatwa:** an Islamic legal ruling issued by a religious authority/scholar in sharia.

**faqih (pl. fuqaha):** Islamic jurist, expert in Islamic law.

**fiqh:** Islamic jurisprudence.

**firasah:** insight, intuition; seeing with the light of God.

**Fir’awn:** Pharoah, King of the Copts.

**fisq:** first stage of error — disobeying God.

**fitan:** trials and tribulations.

**fitnah:** trial, affliction, distress—especially that faced internally by Muslims.

**fitrah:** instinctive, inborn predisposition to include a natural belief in God and a distinction between good and evil.

**fujur:** immorality, depravation; alternately, lying to the extreme.

**ghanimah:** the spoils of battle; wealth taken by force.

**ghareeb/ghareebah:** strange, stranger.

**hadd (pl. hadud):** Quran mandated punishment for crimes considered against the rights of God (e.g., robbery, apostasy, infidelity).

**hadith:** a saying or account from the life of the prophet Muhammad; Al Hadith means "The Tradition."

**hafidhahullah:** means "may Allah protect him."

**hajj:** pilgrimage to Mecca.

**hajr:** abandonment, avoidance.

**haqq:** truth.

**harid:** to incite or inspire a person that is perishing to do otherwise.

**hashashin:** 11th century Nizari Ismaili sect of Shi'a Islam who assassinated their enemies; considered heretical by Sunnis.

**hijamah:** treatment or prevention of disease by cupping.

**Hijaz:** highly populated region in Saudi Arabia containing the cities of Mecca and Madinah.

**hijrah:** Refers to Muhammad's journey from Makkah (Mecca) to Yathrib, later renamed Al-Madinah (Medina). Generically, this refers to any migration done for Allah.

**hijri:** year or era in the Islamic lunar calendar, beginning in 622 AD.

**hikmah:** wisdom; highest level of understanding attainable by a Muslim (equivalent to faith in God who is wisdom).

**hisbah:** accountability to Sharia; the right of a ruler to intercede on its behalf; Al Hisbah are the Islamic States' (IS) religious police.

**hizbiyyah/hizbiyyin:** from the groups or parties of "misguidance and bigotry"; partisanship.

**hoor:** the "fair females" of Paradise.

**Hud:** Islamic prophet mentioned in pre-Quranic texts but not in the Bible.

**hudud:** fixed punishments under Islamic law for crimes against God.

**hukm:** law or ruling in the Quran or Sunnah.

**ibadah:** obedience to Allah with submission and humility from the heart.

**Iblis:** Satan/the devil; an evil jinn.

**Ibrahim:** Islamic prophet known as Abraham in the Hebrew bible.

**i'dad:** preparation and training for jihad.

**iddah:** a woman's 4 month and 10 day period of waiting after widowhood or divorce before remarrying.

**ihdad/hidad:** period of 4 months and 10 days during which women must abstain from adornment or beautification after the death of a husband; it is 3 days for the death of other close family members.

**ijazah:** grant of authority or certification used by Sunnis regarding a person's ability to transmit a certain proficiency in the Quran or other text.

**ijma:** consensus of the community.

**ijtihad:** juristic reasoning; personal reflection allowing individual interpretation in juristic matters.

**Ikhlas:** sincerity or purity of belief.

**Ikhwan:** literally, brotherhood; presently often synonymous with the Muslim Brotherhood which modeled itself on an early 20th century Wahhabi religious and military brotherhood that helped unite the Arabian Peninsula under Ibn Saud.

**‘ilm:** knowledge, especially knowledge of God.

**imamah:** doctrine of the succession of religious, spiritual, and political leadership.

**iman:** absolute faith (with reason, not blind faith).

**imarah:** leadership of a political territory.

**inah:** sale of a commodity on credit; bai’ al-inah is that sale with an immediate repurchase at a higher price.

**inghimasi:** suicide fighter who infiltrates the enemy’s line with no intention of coming back; often fires a weapon before detonating a bomb, thus the tactic of “infiltrate then detonate.”

**Inna Allaha Ma’a As-Sabireen:** “Allah is with the patient.”

**Insha’Allah:** “if Allah wills it.”

**irhab al-batil:** terrorism of falsehood; used by thieves and oppressors.

**irhab madhmum:** “blameworthy” terrorism harming the innocent.

**irhab Mahmud:** “praiseworthy” terrorism.

**irja:** literally, postponing; i.e., only God can decide who is a true Muslim so men cannot deem someone an apostate; this stance is most often seen by Muslims as heresy.



**Isa Ibn Maryam:** Jesus, son of Mary; believed in Islam to be a Prophet and Messenger.

**Ismaili/Isma'iliyyah:** branch of Shi'a Islam that recognizes 7 rather than 12 imams; followers of Imam Isma'il ibn Jafar; believe in the metaphorical and mystical nature of God.

**istihlal:** to erroneously refer to an action as permissible or halaal (literally means "untie").

**istikhara:** prayer for guidance.

**istishhadi, ishtishhadiyyin:** one who is martyred; from term "istishhad" meaning martyrdom.

**istislam:** submission.

**izzah:** might, power; may also mean inviolable "honor."

**jahannam:** also known as al-Nar (fire); similar to the concept of hell; a place of torment in hellfire in the hereafter; there are various levels (e.g., nutama is the lowest of the low).

**jahil:** ignorant, foolish (Arabic Urdu term).

**jahiliyyah:** generically, ignorance of divine guidance; specifically, the superstitious time before the coming of the Prophet Muhammad.

**Jama'ah:** the consolidated majority or group.

**jannah:** Muslim paradise/garden – similar to concept of heaven. There are various levels (e.g., Firdaws – highest level of the prophet, martyrs, and the truly pious).

**Jibril:** Arabic variant of the name of the archangel Gabriel of the Old Testament who God had reveal the Quran to Muhammad.

**jihad:** struggle, battle.

**jihad fard ‘ayn:** defensive jihad; compulsory for each individual in the event that the land of Islam is attacked.

**jihad fard kifaya:** communal obligation; not compulsory on each individual as long as their goal is maintained (e.g., military service, feeding the hungry).

**jihad fi sabilillah:** just war or war in the cause of God; fighting for the purposes of Allah.

**jizya:** per capita yearly tax leveled on dhimmis (non-Muslims).

**Kaaba, Ka’abah:** name for the black cube-shaped structure at the center of the sacred Al-Masjid mosque in Mecca; where Muslims face for prayer.

**kafir:** disbeliever.

**kalima/kalimah:** affirmation of faith; literally means “word”; the six Kalimas are the texts to memorize to learn the fundamentals of Islam.

**kalimat:** statement.

**karamatul-awliya:** the “wonders” that appear at the hands of those persons close to Allah; miracles.

**khalifa (pl. khulafa):** successor, inheritor, caretaker of the Caliphate.

**khalil:** a close friend.

**khalwah:** allowed level of seclusion, that is, being alone without being visible to a third party; prohibited with the opposite gender unless they are one’s spouse or closely related, unmarriageable kin.

**Khawarij (followers called Khariji):** a third branch to Sunnis and Shi’as who broke off during the first century Islam after the death of Muhammad; they were considered extremely devout but also extremist in their embrace of violence.

**khilaf/khilaaf:** conflict, differing.

**Khilafa:** Caliphate; the political embodiment of Islamic Rule.

**khums:** the tithe or tax of one-fifth of the spoils of war payable to the State of Islam through its Caliph.

**khuruj:** rebellion.

**khushu:** humility.

**khutbas:** formal occasion for sermons or public preaching.

**kibr:** pride.

**kidmah:** service to others.

**Kitab:** book in general; refers to the complete book of divine revelation (along with the Bible and the Torah) of which the Quran is the final part or al-Kitab (the Book).

**kuffar:** community of unbelievers.

**kufur:** second stage of error (rejecting the idea of obeying God).

**kufur bawah:** open unbelief.

**la ilaha illa allah(u):** there is no God but Allah—this is the basic pillar of the Muslim faith. It is in the Quran twice and is a part of the call to prayer.

**lutiyyah:** sodomites.

**madhhab:** school of thought within Islamic jurisprudence; in Sunni Islam there are four main schools.

**Madkhalis, Madkhalism:** Salafi movement based on the works of Rabee Al-Madkhali. It supports secular government in Arab states like Saudi Arabia and was a reaction to the Muslim Brotherhood and Qutbis. It currently exists primarily in Europe.

**Mahdi:** the prophesied redeemer of Islam; the guided one.

**mahram:** male (non-marriageable) or female relative that can chaperone a woman when in the company of the opposite sex.

**Malahim, Malahim al-Kubra:** Armageddon.

**Malhama/al-Malhama:** the Great War or End Battle; Armageddon; World War III.

**maluh:** deserving of worship.

**manhaj:** the method by which truth is reached; way of worship of the Salaf through receiving, analyzing, and applying knowledge.

**manhaj as Salikeen:** the Code of the Righteous.

**mantiqat al-amaliyyat al-wusta:** the middle area of operations; the Greater Middle East.

**maqdur ‘alayhim:** something within the power of Muslims to do.

**marfu hadith:** where words are conveyed as the Prophet’s.

**Masha’Allah:** means “whatever Allah wills”; used when admiring or glorifying something (rather than when hoping something happens).

**Masih:** “anointed”; refers to the Messiah Isa (Jesus).

**masjid, masajid:** a place of worship, alternate term for a mosque (which some jihadis consider an insulting term having its basis in the word “mosquitos” or

literally something to be swatted – most scholars deny this and say it is only a dialectic translation of “masjid” over time).

**maslahah:** ruling under traditional law not shari’a; something that is in the public interest.

**millah:** religion – that the community of believers shares; more generally, religious traditions other than Islam which uses the term “deen.”

**mosque:** Islamic place of public worship; see also “masjid.”

**mubahahah:** challenge invoking “curse prayers” by each of the opposing parties in order to determine who is right in the eyes of God.

**mudhaharah:** public demonstrations.

**muhajir/muhajirin(m)/muhajirit(f):** Muslim immigrants from India to Pakistan; can mean generically “immigrant” or more specifically “immigrant for the sake of Allah.”

**muklis:** sincere one.

**mumtani’in:** abstainers, refusers.

**munafiqeen/munifiqun:** outward Muslims who are really religious hypocrites.

**murabit:** one who performs ribat; also may refer to a hermit or ascetic.

**Murji'ah or Murjia:** upholders of *irja*; postponers; no current adherents but held akin to more pragmatic Muslims.

**murtad/murtadd:** an apostate, one who has abandoned Islam.

**Musa:** Islamic prophet known in the Old Testament as Moses.

**mushrikin:** polytheist.

**muslimah:** Muslim woman, niqqabi.

**mustaslim:** submitting, inwardly surrendered.

**mutakallimin:** scholastic theologians, philosophers.

**mutawatir:** hadith conveyed by so many narrators it is inconceivable that it is not true.

**mu'tazilah:** "those who stand apart"; political or religious neutralists.

**muwahhid:** unitarian Muslim, monotheist; used by Salafis, the Druze, and Alawis to describe themselves.

**na'am:** yes (in agreement or as response when your name is called).

**Nasaara:** Christian sect but also may refer at times to Christians in general.

**Nasheed/nashid:** vocal music sung a cappella or with percussion instruments only on subjects regarding Islamic beliefs or events; plural is “anasheed.”

**nasihah:** seeking to find the best outcome in a situation; alternately, to offer good, sincere advice.

**nazi’ (pl. nuzza):** stranger(s) who break off from their family and tribe; for example, those who perform hijra.

**nifaq:** hypocrisy, dishonesty.

**nikaya, nkejja:** operations of vexation or annoyance.

**Nuh:** Islamic prophet known as Noah in the Old Testament.

**Nusayri/Nusairi:** see Alawites; a branch of Shi’a Islam mixing Islamic, Gnostic, and Christian beliefs; found primarily in Syria and Turkey.

**qada:** determination for carrying out or fulfilling.

**qadar/qadr:** divine predestination; Allah has the power to change what he wills.

**Qareen:** a companion in this world from among the evil jinn whom Allah has sent to accompany men and may push them to disobey Him.

**Qiblah:** the direction of the Ka’aba in Mecca.



**Qisas/quisas:** the concept in Islam of equal retribution for harm; e.g., the right of a murder victim's next of kin to take the life of their killer if they so desire.

**qital:** literally, fighting or killing (in the way of Allah).

**qiyam:** standing prayer.

**qiyas:** reasoning through deductive analogy between the Quran and Hadith to apply a known rule to new circumstances.

**qudsi/kudsi hadith:** God's words as related by the Prophet Muhammad.

**Quran/Koran:** the holy book of Islam, revealed by Allah in Arabic.

**Quraysh:** tribe controlling Mecca into which Muhammad was born and later clashed with over his claim of being a prophet; it is claimed the imam of the Islamic Caliphate must be Qurayshi.

**qurra:** quranic reciters; here used as those who would "recite" the Quran from the throat not the heart, referring to hypocrite imams.

**qu'ud:** "holding back," the abandonment of jihad (action), refers to the word for "sitting down in prayer."

**raddah:** fleeing; renouncing; as in apostasy.

**radiyallahu ‘ahnu(m) or ‘anna(f):** means “Allah is pleased with him”; honorific said after the name of the Prophet’s Companions.

**Rafida/Rafidha:** rejectionists/rejecters of legitimate Islamic authority; may be a veiled reference to Shi’as.

**raghba:** desire.

**Rahimullah:** phrase used after mentioning righteous Islamic personalities coming after the companions of Muhammad.

**Rahmah/rahman:** God’s benevolence and mercy.

**RAND Muslim:** derogatory term for a moderate Muslim.

**Rasoolullah /Rasulullah:** the messenger of Allah (i.e., Mohammed or Muhammad).

**riba:** usury, unjust exploitive gains on money.

**ribat/ribaat:** voluntary defense of Islam (technically, a ribat was a house for those who fought to defend Islam); also, to stand guard.

**riddah:** apostasy.

**riya/riyaa:** to falsely make oneself appear virtuous; to show off.

**ruwaybidah:** ignorant people who speak out about public affairs; worthless people who lack integrity.

**Safawi/Safavid:** Sufi dynasty ruling Iran/Persia in 16th-18th century which converted Iran to Shi'a Islam; now used as a derogatory term for Iranian Shi'as.

**Sahaba:** the companions, disciples, scribes, and family of Muhammad (singular reference is *sahabi* for males and *sahabia* for females).

**sahwah:** literally, awakening; refers to tribal "awakening" of 2007-08 against Salafism and the mujahideen; *Sahwah* are the "awakened."

**Sahwat:** collaborators, esp. Sunni; "the worst of the worst."

**Salaf as-Saalih:** people of the past.

**Salafiyyah:** member of the Salafi ultra-conservative reform movement in Sunni Islam; also known as "the Saved Sect."

**salah:** daily prayer including ablution with prescribed words and actions.

**salamah:** sincerity; integrity.

**salim:** safe; secure.

**sallallahu 'alayhi wa sallam:** means "peace be upon him," said after the Prophet's name.

**sam':** hearing, listening.

**samma'in:** avid listeners to the *kuffar*.

**Seerah:** the life of the prophet.

**Shahada:** personal commitment to Islam; invoking the statement of faith consists of two phrases, “There is no God but Allah” and “Muhammad is his Messenger” (or slight variations thereof); also may be used as a variant term for “martyr.”

**Shahadatayn:** the twin testimonies of Islam, see above.

**shahid/shaheed:** Muslim martyr.

**Shubuhah:** specious arguments regarding Islam where falsehood is apparent and needs no rebuttal.

**Shuhada:** martyrs.

**Shaytan:** equivalent to Christian “Satan” or the devil.

**shirk:** worship of anyone/anything other than Allah. Unforgivable if unpardoned before death.

**siyam:** fasting.

**Subhanallah:** Glory to God.

**sujud:** prostration to God in prayer.

**Sunnah:** literally “path” or “way”; generally refers to the record of the deeds and teachings of Muhammad and his Companions; may also apply to a religious ruling.

**Sururi:** Syrian Sunni faction dating to the time of the tribal awakening; beliefs involve a blend – but not totally embracing – of Salafism alongside the ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood.

**ta’ah:** obedience.

**ta ‘ala:** exalted.

**Tableeghi/Tablighi:** refers to the Tablighi Jamaat, orthodox Sunni proselytizers.

**tabligh:** to convey, communicate.

**taghut/tawagheet/tawaghit:** the third stage of error – worshipping anyone or anything other than Allah; exceeding the limits of Islam; also can mean rebelling against God and imposing this on others.

**Takbir/takbeer:** term for the phrase Allahu Akbar (God is Greater); used in the call to prayer but not found in the Quran.

**takfir:** the labeling of fellow Muslims as unbelievers; excommunication from Islam.

**takfiri:** one who labels fellow Muslims as unbelievers.

**takhmis:** the state’s taking of one-fifth of the spoils of battle.

**tamkin:** operations of consolidation; literally, control over an asset.

**tandhim:** organization.

**taqlid:** to follow one of the four Islamic scholars or imams in interpreting the shari'a.

**taqwa:** piety.

**tarah:** pity, compassion, mercy.

**tarahhum:** asking "May Allah have mercy" on someone/something.

**tarbiyah:** education and upbringing.

**tashri:** legislation.

**tawahhush:** mayhem, chaos, savagery, brutality, barbarism, and anarchy.

**tawa'if mumtani'ah:** forcibly resisting (the implementation of sharia); a refusing faction.

**tawakkul:** trust in God's plan.

**tawfeeq:** the ability and opportunity to achieve success.

**tawheed:** belief in the oneness of God.

**taz-kiyat an-nafs:** self-purification; purification of the soul (Sufi term).

**thiqat:** reliable, trustworthy sources.

**turhibuna:** to strike fear, terrify.

**ukhty:** sister; also generic Muslim “sister.”

**ulema/ulama:** leaders of Muslim society.

**umami:** universal.

**umma:** the community of all Muslim believers.

**ummi:** one who is unschooled.

**usul:** Islamic principle tenets or foundations.

**Wa Alhamdullilahi Rabbil Alamin:** prayer stating “special praise be to Allah, the sustainer of creation.”

**wala:** loyalty toward believers.

**Walahi/Wallahi:** “I swear to God,” or “I promise by God.”

**wali:** protector, guardian, or friend.

**wa illahil-hamd:** version of Allahu akbar; hamd means sincere praise and gratitude.

**waqf/wakf:** charitable donation or endowment.

**waqiah:** inevitable.

**wasiya:** Islamic will or bequest.

**wilayah:** province.

**wulatu umurina:** governors of our issues, guardians of our matters.

**Yahood:** Jews.

**Yusuf:** refers to the Surah Yusuf (Joseph), the 12th surah of the Quran; Yusuf has a dream that he will be a Prophet, thus when Yusuf is given a choice between prison and immoral behavior, he chooses prison.

**zahid:** ascetic, devout.

**zanadiqa:** heretic; alternately, atheist.

**Zani(m)/zaniya(f):** adulterers, fornicators.

**Zaydi/Zaidi:** Shi'a sect located in Yemen closer to Sunni Islam in their theology.

**Zaydism/Zaidism:** Eighth century sect of Shi'a Islam in reverence of Zayd ibn Ali's failed uprising against the Caliph.

**zeket, zakat:** alms giving, a religious tax.

**zina:** prohibition on or sin of unlawful sexual relations between Muslims who are not married to each other.

**zindiq:** heretic; originally medieval term for those holding views contrary to Islam.

**zunah:** adulterers.



## APPENDIX I

### RADICAL ISLAMIST ONLINE MAGAZINE CHRONOLOGY

| Online Magazine*  | Terrorist Group                     | Date                    |
|---|-------------------------------------|-------------------------|
| <i>Benefit of the Day</i><br>(1: No Title)                                    | Al-Qaeda Affinity                   | April-May 2007          |
| <i>Benefit of the Day</i><br>(2: No Title)                                    | Al-Qaeda Affinity                   | May-June 2007           |
| <i>Benefit of the Day</i><br>(3: No Title)                                    | Al-Qaeda Affinity                   | June-July 2007          |
| <i>Benefit of the Day</i><br>(4: No Title)                                    | Al-Qaeda Affinity                   | July-August 2007        |
| <i>Benefit of the Day</i><br>(5: No Title)                                    | Al-Qaeda Affinity                   | August-September 2007   |
| <i>Benefit of the Day</i><br>(6: No Title)                                    | Al-Qaeda Affinity                   | September-October 2007  |
| <i>Benefit of the Day</i><br>(7: No Title)                                    | Al-Qaeda Affinity                   | October-November 2007   |
| <i>Benefit of the Day</i><br>(2/1: No Title)                                  | Al-Qaeda Affinity                   | January-February 2008   |
| <i>Benefit of the Day</i><br>(2/2: No Title)                                  | Al-Qaeda Affinity                   | February-March 2008     |
| <i>Benefit of the Day</i><br>(2/3: No Title)                                  | Al-Qaeda Affinity                   | March-April 2008        |
| <i>Benefit of the Day</i><br>(Unknown: No Title)                              | Al-Qaeda Affinity                   | ~September-October 2008 |
| <i>Benefit of the Day</i><br>(Unknown: No Title)                              | Al-Qaeda Affinity                   | ~October-November 2008  |
| <i>Jihad Recollections</i><br>(1: The Predications of the Conquering of Rome) | Al-Qaeda Affinity                   | April 2009              |
| <i>Jihad Recollections</i><br>(2: Obamaturk: The Secular Phenomenon)          | Al-Qaeda Affinity                   | May 2009                |
| <i>Defenders of the Truth</i><br>(1: No Title)                                | Al Mosul Islamic Network (Al-Qaeda) | July 2009               |

| Online Magazine*   | Terrorist Group                          | Date                       |
|--|--|----------------------------|
| <i>Jihad Recollections</i><br>(3: From Uncle Sam to Allahu Akbar)  | Al-Qaeda Affinity                        | August 2009                |
| <i>Defenders of the Truth</i><br>(2: No Title)   | Al Mosul Islamic Network (Al-Qaeda)      | August 2009                |
| <i>Jihad Recollections</i><br>(4: The Men Behind 9/11 and The Motives That Bound Them)                   | Al-Qaeda Affinity                        | September 2009             |
| <i>Defenders of the Truth</i><br>(3: Death of Nationalism)   | Al Mosul Islamic Network (Al-Qaeda)      | October 2009               |
| <i>Defenders of the Truth</i><br>(4: The place for Shariah: Amongst the causes of Islam)                 | Al Mosul Islamic Network (Al-Qaeda)      | November/<br>December 2009 |
| <i>Defenders of the Truth</i><br>(5: Battle Ground Iraq, The Post Graduate University of Muslim Mujahid) | Al Mosul Islamic Network (Al-Qaeda)      | January/February<br>2010   |
| <i>Inspire</i><br>(1: May Our Souls Be Sacrificed For You!)  | Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) | June 2010                  |
| <i>Inspire</i><br>(2: Photos from the Operations of Abyan)   | Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) | October 2010               |
| <i>Inspire</i><br>(Special Issue 3: \$4,200)   | Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) | November 2010              |
| <i>Inspire</i><br>(4: The Ruling on Dispossessing the Disbelievers' Wealth in Dar al-Harb)               | Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) | January 2011               |
| <i>Inspire</i><br>(5: The Tsunami of Change)   | Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) | March 2011                 |
| <i>Inspire</i><br>(6: Sadness, Contentment & Aspiration)   | Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) | August 2011                |
| <i>Inspire</i><br>(Special Issue 7: The Greatest Special Operation of all time)                          | Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) | September 2011             |
| <i>Gaidi Mtaani</i><br>(Toleo 1: Operation Linda Uislamu)  | Al Shabaab                               | April 2012                 |

| Online Magazine*   | Terrorist Group                          | Date           |
|--|--|----------------|
| <i>Inspire</i><br>(8: Targeting Dar al-Harb Populations)                     | Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) | May 2012       |
| <i>Inspire</i><br>(9: Win[n]ing on the Ground)                               | Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) | May 2012       |
| <i>Gaidi Mtaani</i><br>(Toleo 2: The Long Road to Kismayu)                   | Al Shabaab                               | June 2012      |
| <i>Al Rashideen</i><br>(1: Iran Must Fall Before Palestine Can Be Liberated) | Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP)            | February 2013  |
| <i>Inspire</i><br>(10: We Are All Usama)                                     | Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) | March 2013     |
| <i>Gaidi Mtaani</i><br>(Toleo 3: Sheikh Aboud Rogo)                          | Al Shabaab                               | March 2013     |
| <i>Azan</i><br>(1: A Call to Jihad)  | Taliban                                  | March 2013     |
| <i>Lone Mujahid Pocketbook</i><br>(from <i>Inspire</i> articles)             | Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) | March 2013     |
| <i>Al Rashideen</i><br>(Special/2: The Iranian Revolution)                   | Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP)            | March 2013     |
| <i>Al Rashideen</i><br>(3: No Title)   | Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP)            | March 2013     |
| <i>Azan</i><br>(2: You'll Never Be Safe)                                     | Taliban                                  | April-May 2013 |
| <i>Inspire</i><br>(Special Issue 11: Who & Why)                              | Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) | May 2013       |
| <i>Azan</i><br>(3: An Awakened Ummah)  | Taliban                                  | June/July 2013 |
| <i>Gaidi Mtaani</i><br>(Toleo Special Edition 4: #Westgate)                  | Al Shabaab                               | November 2013  |
| <i>Azan</i><br>(4: To the Jihadis in the West)                               | Taliban                                  | December 2013  |
| <i>Inspire</i><br>(12: Shattered: A Story About Change)                      | Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) | March 2014     |

| Online Magazine*   | Terrorist Group                                   | Date           |
|--|---|----------------|
| <i>Azan</i><br>(5: Those Who Bow Down To Allah Do Not Bow Down to Anyone Else!)                  | Taliban   | March 2014     |
| <i>Azan</i><br>(Special Issue: Blackwater & ISI)   | Taliban   | June 2014      |
| <i>Dabiq</i><br>(1: The Return of the Khilafah)  | Islamic State                                     | July 2014      |
| <i>Dabiq</i><br>(2: The Flood)   | Islamic State                                     | July 2014      |
| <i>Azan</i><br>(6: The Scales Have Turned!)  | Taliban   | August 2014    |
| <i>Palestine: Betrayal of the Guilty Conscience</i> (from <i>Inspire</i> articles)               | Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)          | August 2014    |
| <i>Dabiq</i><br>(3: A Call to Hijrah)  | Islamic State                                     | September 2014 |
| <i>Azbiru</i><br>(1: No Title – Jihad Theme)   | Al-Nusrah Front                                   | September 2014 |
| <i>Dabiq</i><br>(4: The Failed Crusade)  | Islamic State                                     | October 2014   |
| <i>Resurgence</i><br>(1: Besiege Them!)  | Al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS)        | October 2014   |
| <i>Ihya-e-Khilafat</i><br>(1: Re-structuring of Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan)                      | Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan Jamaatul Ahrar (TTPJA) | October 2014   |
| <i>Gaidi Mtaani</i><br>(Toleo Special Edition 5: Muslims of Bangui & Mombasa: A Tale of Tragedy) | Al Shabaab  | November 2014  |
| <i>Dabiq</i><br>(5: Remaining and Expanding)   | Islamic State                                     | November 2014  |
| <i>Inspire</i><br>(Special Issue 13: Neurotmesis)  | Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)          | December 2014  |
| <i>Gaidi Mtaani</i><br>(Toleo 6: My Journey of Hijra & Jihad)                                    | Al Shabaab  | December 2014  |
| <i>Dabiq</i><br>(6: Al-Qaidah of Waziristan: A Testimony from Within)                            | Islamic State                                     | December 2014  |

| Online Magazine*   | Terrorist Group   | Date           |
|--|---|----------------|
| <i>Ihya-e-Khilafat</i><br>(2: Who kills innocent people)   | Tehreek-e-Taliban<br>Pakistan Jamaatul<br>Ahrar (TTPJA) | December 2014  |
| <i>Gaidi Mtaani</i><br>(Toleo 7: May Our Mothers Be<br>Bereaved Of Us Should We Fail to<br>Avenge Our Prophet) | Al Shabaab  | February 2015  |
| <i>Dabiq</i><br>(7: From Hypocrisy to Apostasy:<br>The Extinction of the Grayzone)                             | Islamic State   | February 2015  |
| <i>Amka</i><br>(1: East Africa's Baya'ah)  | Al Shabaab –<br>Al-Muhajiroun<br>component              | February 2015  |
| <i>Dabiq</i><br>(8: Shari'ah Alone Will Rule<br>Africa)  | Islamic State   | March 2015     |
| <i>Dabiq</i><br>(9: They Plot and Allah Plots)   | Islamic State   | May 2015       |
| <i>Resurgence</i><br>(2: An Exclusive Interview with<br>Adam Yahye Gadahn)                                     | Al-Qaeda Indian in<br>the Subcontinent<br>(AQIS)        | June 2015      |
| <i>Dabiq</i><br>(10: The Law of Allah or the Laws<br>of Men)   | Islamic State   | July 2015      |
| <i>Amka</i><br>(2: East Africa: Jihad's<br>Homecoming)   | Al Shabaab –<br>Al-Muhajiroun<br>component              | July 2015      |
| <i>Al-Risalah</i><br>(1: Al-Risalah)   | Al Nusrah Front   | July 2015      |
| <i>Inspire</i><br>(14: Assassination Operations)   | Al-Qaeda in the<br>Arabian Peninsula<br>(AQAP)          | September 2015 |
| <i>Dabiq</i><br>(11: From the Battle of Al-Ahzab<br>to the War of Coalitions)                                  | Islamic State   | September 2015 |
| <i>Al-Risalah</i><br>(2: Victory Loves Preparation)  | Al Nusrah Front   | October 2015   |
| <i>Dabiq</i><br>(12: Just Terror)  | Islamic State   | November 2015  |
| <i>Dabiq</i><br>(13: The Rafidah: From Iban Saba'<br>to the Dajjal)  | Islamic State   | January 2016   |

| Online Magazine*   | Terrorist Group                          | Date           |
|--|--|----------------|
| <i>Dabiq</i><br>(14: The Murtadd Brotherhood)  | Islamic State                            | April 2016     |
| <i>Inspire</i><br>(15: Professional Assassinations)  | Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) | May 2016       |
| <i>Inspire Guide</i><br>(1: Orlando Operation)   | Al-Qaeda Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)        | June 2016      |
| <i>Dabiq</i><br>(15: Break the Cross)  | Islamic State                            | July 2016      |
| <i>Al-Risalah</i><br>(3: Has The Time Not Come)  | Al Nusrah Front                          | July 2016      |
| <i>Inspire Guide</i><br>(2: Nice Operation, France)  | Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) | July 2016      |
| <i>Rumiyah</i><br>(1: No Title)  | Islamic State                            | September 2016 |
| <i>Inspire Guide</i><br>(3: Comment on arresting our Muslim sisters in France)                   | Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) | September 2016 |
| <i>Inspire Guide</i><br>(4: New Jersey, Minnesota, and Chelsea Operations)                       | Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) | September 2016 |
| <i>Rumiyah</i><br>(2: No Title)  | Islamic State                            | October 2016   |
| <i>Inspire</i><br>(16: the 9/17 Operations)  | Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) | November 2016  |
| <i>Rumiyah</i><br>(3: No Title)  | Islamic State                            | November 2016  |
| Note:<br>*This chronology does not include the 68 issues of the <i>In Fight</i> magazine series. |  |                |

## APPENDIX II

### RADICAL ISLAMIST ENGLISH-LANGUAGE ONLINE MAGAZINE'S ALLEGIANCE AND FOREIGN TERRORIST ORGANIZATION (FTO) AFFILIATION

| Online Magazine  | Terrorist Group<br>Foreign Terrorist<br>Organization (FTO) Date <sup>1</sup>   | Allegiance                          |
|--|--|-------------------------------------|
| <i>Benefit of the Day</i> ; 12 Issues;<br>Partial Data Set<br>(April 2007-October 2008)  | Al-Qaeda Affinity<br>No Designation  | Al-Qaeda                            |
| <i>Jihad Recollections</i> ; 4 Issues<br>(April 2009-September 2009)   | Al-Qaeda Affinity<br>No Designation  | Al-Qaeda                            |
| <i>In Fight</i> ; 68 Issues<br>(June 2009-November 2014)   | Taliban (Islami Emirate<br>Afghanistan)<br>(No SDN Designation) July<br>2002 <sup>2</sup>                            | Al-Qaeda                            |
| <i>Defenders of the Truth</i> ; 5 Issues<br>(July 2009-January/February<br>2010)   | Al Mosul Islamic Network<br>December 17, 2004 (As<br>al-Qa'ida in Iraq)  | Al-Qaeda                            |
| <i>Inspire</i> ; 16 Issues (June 2010-<br>November 2016); Also <i>Lone<br/>Mujahid Pocketbook</i> (March 2013)<br>and <i>Palestine</i> (August 2014)<br>Magazines and 4 <i>Inspire Guides</i><br>(June-September 2016) | Al-Qaeda in the Arabian<br>Peninsula (AQAP)<br>January 19, 2010  | Al-Qaeda                            |
| <i>Gaidi Mtaani</i> ; 7 Issues (April<br>2012-February 2015)   | Al Shabaab<br>March 18, 2008   | Al-Qaeda                            |
| <i>Al Rashideen</i> ; 3 Issues<br>(February-March 2013)  | Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan<br>(SSP)<br>No Designation   | Unknown<br>(Anti-Shi'a<br>Magazine) |
| <i>Azan</i> ; 7 Issues<br>(March 2013-August 2014)   | Taliban<br>(No SDN Designation) July<br>2002 <sup>3</sup><br>Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan<br>(TTP)<br>September 1, 2010 | Al-Qaeda                            |
| <i>Dabiq</i> ; 15 Issues<br>(July 2014-July 2016)  | Islamic State (as Islamic State<br>in Iraq and the Levant; ISIL)<br>December 17, 2004                                | Islamic State                       |

| Online Magazine   | Terrorist Group<br>Foreign Terrorist<br>Organization (FTO) Date                       | Allegiance                  |
|---|---|-----------------------------|
| <i>Azbiru</i> ; 1 Issue<br>(September 2014)   | Al Nusrah Front<br>May 15, 2014   | Al-Qaeda                    |
| <i>Resurgence</i> ; 2 Issues<br>(October 2014-June 2015)                                      | Al-Qaeda in the Indian<br>Subcontinent (AQIS)<br>June 30, 2016 <sup>4</sup>           | Al-Qaeda                    |
| <i>Ihya-e-Khilafat</i> ; 2 Issues<br>(October 2014-December 2014)                             | Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan<br>Jamaatul Ahrar (TTPJA)<br>September 1, 2010             | Islamic State<br>(Affinity) |
| <i>Amka</i> ; 2 Issues<br>(February 2015-July 2015)   | Al Shabaab – Al-Muhajiroun<br>component<br>March 18, 2008                             | Al-Qaeda                    |
| <i>Al-Risalah</i> ; 3 Issues<br>(July 2015-July 2016)   | Al Nusrah Front<br>May 15, 2014   | Al-Qaeda                    |
| <i>Rumiyah</i> ; 3 Issues<br>(September-November 2016);<br>Successor magazine to <i>Dabiq</i> | Islamic State (as Islamic State<br>in Iraq and the Levant; ISIL)<br>December 17, 2004 | Islamic State               |

## ENDNOTES – APPENDIX II

1. Bureau of Counterterrorism, “Foreign Terrorist Organizations,” U.S. Department of State, n.d., available from <http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/other/des/123085.htm>.

2. Office of Foreign Assets Control, “Alphabetical Listing of Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons (‘SDN List’),” U.S. Department of the Treasury, n.d., available from <https://www.treasury.gov/ofac/downloads/sdnlist.txt>. See also, John Parkinson and Lee Ferran, “White House: Yes, The Taliban Is a Terrorist Organization,” ABC News, June 4, 2014, available from <http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/white-house-taliban-terrorist-organization/story?id=23981888>.

3. Office of Foreign Assets Control, U.S. Treasury Department; Parkinson and Ferran.

4. Office of the Spokesperson, “State Department Terrorist Designations,” Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State, June 30, 2016, available from <https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2016/06/259219.htm>.



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
**Editor for Production  
Dr. James G. Pierce**

**Publications Assistant  
Ms. Denise J. Kersting**

**\*\*\*\*\***

**Composition  
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