The United States Army's Balance of Capabilities to Meet the Warfighters' Needs

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Abstract

The warfighter needs capabilities to fill gaps that could jeopardize mission success or lead to serious injury or death. These gaps result from evolving threats often discovered during contingency operations. The Army places the highest priority on keeping the warfighter safe and providing the warfighter with the equipment needed to win. The Army has fielded numerous systems in order to meet the Urgent Operational Needs (UONs) of warfighters since 9/11. The UONs have put a strain on the portfolio of systems managed by the Army by competing for limited resources. The competition between UONs and the portfolio of systems requires that the Army balance the portfolio against the needs. Is the Army properly balancing the portfolio of programs in order to deliver capability to the warfighter now and still meet the emerging need for capabilities tomorrow?

The research shows that there are multiple processes to meet the warfighter's UONs. With limited information and data, there is an appearance that each of the processes may place priorities on the needs differently. Established criteria is essential to place priorities equally across the different processes.

Additional research and specific data collection is required to conclude that the Army is properly balancing the portfolio. The Army should undertake a scrub of the processes to ensure that the Army is maintaining a balance of development and fielding in the context of urgent, mid-term and long-term requirements without jeopardizing the ability to sustain them. The Army should also investigate the impacts that urgent requirements are having on the long-term requirements. A level of data collection is necessary to support successful research of the topic.

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Introduction

Background

The U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) and the U.S. Army have policies that enable the acquisition and fielding of material solutions required to mitigate capability gaps that threaten lives or mission success. DoD has a process for Joint Urgent Operational Needs (JUONs) that acquires material solutions to meet a joint need, and acquires the solution in a rapid acquisition environment. The U.S. Army has a process to address an Operational Need Statement (ONS) and acquire a material solution for Army specific needs. The authority exists to streamline the acquisition of systems in order to meet urgent requirements that, if unfulfilled, would result in serious injury to personnel or would compromise the mission success during combat operations. In the FY 2016 National Defense Authorization Act, Congress gave the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) and Deputy Secretary of Defense (DEPSECDEF) the authority to waive any provision of law, policy, directive, or regulation, within certain limitations. If the provision would slow down and hinder the acquisition of systems required to meet the urgent requirements coming from the warfighter, then the special authority is granted to waive the provision in order to acquire the systems rapidly. The special authorization has resulted in delivering some capabilities to the warfighter in two years or less that were otherwise hindered by law, policy, directive, or regulation. Some capabilities cannot be delivered in two years because the technological maturity requires engineering and development.

The Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS), The Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Execution System (PPBES), and the Defense Acquisition System (DAS) lengthy and rigorous processes that ensure the combat and material developers get the

soldier what the soldier wants and the solution is supportable and affordable. The Army is consistently working to balance the Programs of Record (PORs) with programs to meet urgent requirements. PORs are programs that are intended to meet mid-term and long-term needs and go through the entire acquisition cycle to include JCIDS, PPBES, and DAS. The programs that meet the urgent needs are programs that bypass portions of the acquisition process or attain waivers in order to rapidly support the warfighter.

Research Question

Is the U.S. Army properly balancing its portfolio of urgent, midterm, and long-term warfighter capabilities in light of the profound increase of UONs created since the onset of continuing contingency operations in 2001? UONs are requirements, identified by the warfighter that must be met, lest mission success or loss of life is at risk.

UONs are sometimes satisfied through non-material solutions, such as training or doctrine. This paper focuses on the material solution aspect of satisfying UONs. In order to answer the research question, these supplementary questions were used:

- What organizations or groups participate in the processes for the various types of UONs?
- How often do those groups process requests for the various UONs?
- Who assigns priorities to the UONs?
- How is the priority determined for new UONs in the context of all existing UONs or systems in development?
- What criteria has been established in order to validate and resource UONs?
- What is the correct criteria to set priorities, validate, and resource UONs?

- When and by whom is the lifespan of a system, cued by a UON or a Directed Requirement (DR) determined?
- How often is the lifespan reassessed?
- How do UONs compete with standard PORs for resources?
- Has DoD mortgaged its ability to field systems by taking funding from PORs and resourcing the influx of UON – cued programs?
- What are the impacts to PORs are being seen, as a result of UONs and DRs?
- Are the impacts to PORs actually creating additional UONs?
- Is the "limited" lifespan of a DR-cued system enforced?

Purpose of the Study/Significance

The purpose of the research is to identify any gaps in the current processes for UONs that appear to substantively impact the Army's ability to balance the system portfolio, and to provide insight toward mitigating the effect of those gaps.

Research Methodology

The research began during a discussion with Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (ASA (ALT)) leadership regarding the impact to PORs because of Directed Requirements (DRs). Although underpinned by a literature review, discussions with an Army policy representative, personnel from the Army UAS Program Office, DAU, and the Army Staff resourcing staff helped guide the research and point at certain documents. A look at how draft policy from the ASAALT would affect the family of Small Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) initiated the research. The researcher met with the Deputy

Product Manager for the Family of Small UAS. The Deputy PM was very helpful in explaining challenges with UONs, but was not able to provide adequate information on the acquisition history of the family of small UAS to analyze the impact of the draft policy. During this time, research was performed using google and google scholar, and keyword searches were performed, using "Urgent Operational Needs", "Operational Need Statement", and "Directed Requirements". The research expanded to include additional papers using the reference lists from the original group of papers to increase the breadth and width of the information on the topic. During the research, the researcher had multiple discussions with a Subject Matter Expert (SME) from the Army G-3/5/7 and a SME from Defense Acquisition University (DAU). These SMEs directed me to literature, such as "How the Army Runs". This path of discovery led to the final Research Question.

Limitations/Recommended Areas of Additional Research

The research duration was limited due to the schedule for the Senior Service College Fellowship (SSCF). The research breadth was limited to literature reviews and some discussions with the aforementioned personnel. During the research, data was not available at the level necessary to answer some secondary questions.

Literature Review

The literature review includes salient points from reviewed documents paraphrased below.

Urgent Operational Needs and Other Quick Reaction Capabilities, Department of Defense Instruction (DoDI) 500 0.02, Enclosure 13

DoDI 5000.02 defines the Defense Acquisition System (DAS). This reference provides a baseline understanding of terms and policies regarding the management of urgent requirements. It also defines the disposition analysis for UONs. The DAS is a highly detailed process that spans years for high-level programs to complete during the acquisition life cycle of a program. ROI of this prepositional phrase? The DAS is a tailorable system based on the level of complexity and the total acquisition costs of a system or program. DoD's highest priority revolves around providing the warfighters with the capabilities needed to overcome threats, achieve mission success and reduce the risk of casualties. DoD Components will use available authorities to deliver capabilities quickly and sustain the capabilities for the duration of the urgent need (Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology & Logistics), 2015). Enclosure 13 provides definitions of Urgent Operational Needs and other Quick Reaction Capabilities. Enclosure 13 also provides many of the streamlined processes that are used to deliver capabilities quickly that meet the warfighters' requirements.

There are three types of quick reaction capabilities. Those quick reaction capabilities are either a DoD Component Specific Need, a Warfighter Senior Integration Group (SIG) identified issue, or a SECDEF or DEPSECDEF Rapid Acquisition Authority (RAA) Determination. The RAA should be considered when a waiver of any provision of law, policy, directive, or

regulation will greatly accelerate the delivery of a capability to the warfighter (Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology & Logistics), 2015).

The Validated UONs are identified by the Army Service Component Command (ASSC) and are either approved by the Combatant Command (COCOM) as a joint requirement and processed as a JUON or Joint Emergent Operational Need (JEON), or is determined to be a U.S. Army Component UON (Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology & Logistics), 2015). A U.S. Army sponsored JUON or JEON is assigned to the Army G-3/5/7 Operations Directorate via a memo from the Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell (JRAC). The Army Component UON is processed as an ONS, defined in AR 71-9 and approval authorities reside within the U.S. Army. The Warfighter Senior Integration Group (SIG) documents issues in critical warfighter issue statements and provides instructions on program management and execution to the U.S. Army for programs that the Army sponsors. "Issues" can include urgent requirements from various sources and often result in providing material solutions to coalition partners.

The SECDEF or DEPSECDEF will sign a determination that a capability is required and gives RAA to waive law, policy, directive or regulation to greatly accelerate the delivery of the required capability in response to validated UONs from a COCOM. If a validated UON, or a Warfighter SIG-identified Issue is assigned to the Army with a determined limited lifespan, then it is considered a Directed Requirement (DR) (Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology & Logistics), 2015).

For these Urgent Needs, the Milestone Decision Authority (MDA) and program managers streamline strategies and the amount of oversight required to create a rapid environment for the execution of urgent requirements. Enclosure 13 describes Streamlining and tailoring that is dependent upon the complexity of the program and the time available to meet the

operational need. DoD Components will use parallel processes instead of sequential process when possible and the entire program will be expedited to the maximum extent possible to include concurrent development and production (Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology & Logistics), 2015).

A critical element effecting the portfolio of programs is the disposition of the quick reaction capabilities. A disposition analysis is required within 1 year after the program enters operation and sustainment. The Component Acquisition Executive (CAE) will prepare a disposition decision based on analysis performed. The analysis should look at the capability and compare it to science and technology activities to determine at what point the capability should be terminated, if it should be sustained for the current contingency of if it has application and transitions to a POR (Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology & Logistics), 2015).

Presentation - Urgent and Emergent Operational Needs and their Fulfillment

During a presentation to the 39th Annual DoD Cost Analysis Symposium, Buhrkuhl (2006) describes the "Big Acquisition" process as lengthy, very structured, future focused and a large investment. The presentation describes the "Little Acquisition" process as more *ad hoc*, limited development, and limited investment. Because the process to deliver equipment is still restrictive and inefficient, the JRAC monitors, coordinates and facilitates executing the Combatant Commanders' requirements. The JRAC consists of a Core Group and an Advisory Group. Each of the military services provides a flag officer to participate (Buhrkuhl, 2006). Figure 1 provides a list of the membership for the JRAC.



Figure 1 JRAC Membership. From Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell – Presentation to the 39th Annual DoD Cost Analysis Symposium by Dr. Buhrkuhl, (2006. p.8).

Buhrkuhl (2006) also stated that the JRAC's focus is on near-term materiel and logistics solutions. The capabilities must be fielded quickly and provide a level of performance that satisfies the COCOM needs. The JRAC process flows from the Combatant Commander (CCDR) and the Immediate Warfighter Need (IWN) or UON to execution of the requirement (Buhrkuhl, 2006).



Figure 2 JRAC Flow Chart. From Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell – Presentation to the 39th Annual DoD Cost Analysis Symposium by D.R. Buhrkuhl (2006. p.12).

Dr. Buhrkuhl (2006) provided a flow chart for UONs through the JRAC as depicted in Figure 2. Buhrkuhl (2006) shared information regarding the differences in the acquisition process for distant capabilities and urgent capabilities. Dr. Buhrkuhl (2006) mentions that a disposition analysis is required for all UONs within one year of entering the operation and sustainment phase. The disposition analysis will support a decision to terminate, sustain, or transition the program to a program of POR and follow the normal acquisition system. For programs that will transition to a POR, the Defense Acquisition Executive decides if a material solution to a UON should enter the formal acquisition process for an Acquisition Category (ACAT) I program. For an ACAT II program or below, the Component Acquisition Executive,

Service Acquisition Executive, or component established process makes the decision if the solution should enter the formal acquisition process (Buhrkuhl, 2006).

Buhrkuhl (2006) states that follow-on funding for sustainment or additional quantities is generally a Service responsibility considered during the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) process. A disposition decision is required in an Acquisition Decision Memorandum (ADM) for all UONs that will endure past fielding the initial requirement. The ADM should specify the entry point into the formal acquisition process as well as the required documentation and funding that is required to transition (Buhrkuhl, 2006).

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3470.01, Rapid Validation and Resourcing of JUONS in the Year of Execution,

The CJCSI 3470.01 "Establishes policy and procedures to facilitate assessment, validation, sourcing, resourcing (in accordance with DOD 7000.14-R, "DoD Financial Management Regulations (FMRs)") and fielding of operationally driven urgent, execution-year combatant commander needs" (Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2005, p. 1). The instruction does not replace JCIDS but accelerates the process of fielding systems to meet urgent needs from the warfighter. The document instructs and provides policies and procedures required to meet UONs from the COCOMs (Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2005).

> "The purpose of this instruction is to document the process to rapidly validate and resource deployed and/or employed combatant commander's JUONs. This need must be quickly addressed in order to prevent combat-related loss of life and/or mission failure. It must also be considered inherently joint in nature (e.g., theater-wide combatant commander need spanning multiple Services) and outside of the

> scope of existing DOD 5000 series and Service processes; i.e., Air Force's combat capability document (CCD), Army's operational need statement (ONS), Marine's urgent universal need statement (UNS), Navy's rapid deployment capability (RDC) and USSOCOM's combat-mission need statement (CMNS). This process is not intended to compete with any of the current Service processes but rather to complement them. It is also not intended to replace any other Joint Staff process; e.g., the combating terrorism, rapid initiative fund (Cbt, RIF), combatant commander initiative fund (CCIF) or the command and control initiative program (C2IP) but rather potentially leverage off these processes and focus them when necessary in support of combatant commander JUONs." (Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2005, p. 2)

CJCSI 3470.01 defines the process and responsibilities of the parties involved in JUONs. The JUON process includes ranking from the COCOMs. The instruction illustrates the flow from approval by the COCOM to approval by the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC). Figure 3 shows the flow of processes defined in CJCSI 3470.01.



Figure 3 JUON Process. From CJCSI 3470.01 Rapid Validation and Resourcing of JUONS in the Year of Execution (2005. p. A4).

Schwartz (2005) provides a process and details a process that ranks and validates JUONs through the process. The validation of JUONs occurs at the COCOM level, ranked at the COCOM level and ranked again across all COCOM priorities by the Joint Capabilities Board (JCB) (Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2005).

Memorandum - Use of the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense's Rapid Acquisition Authority (RAA)

HON Frank Kendall (2016) signed a memorandum to the Secretaries and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Kendall (2016) defined a process by which the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense (SECDEF, DEPSECDEF) may expedite the acquisition of capabilities required by the warfighter. Congress authorized the SECDEF or DEPSECDEF in the Fiscal Year (FY) 2003 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), to fulfill a COCOM UON rapidly. The FY 2016 NDAA provided changes to the authority, known as the RAA. The NDAA added authority to address cyber-attack through acquisition. The FY 2016 NDAA assigned the Director, Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell (JRAC), as the senior official with primary responsibility for making recommendations to the SECDEF or DEPSECDEF. The FY 2016 NDAA set caps on the authority at $200 million each fiscal year for each of the three types of urgent needs categories and the total authority is limited to $600 million. The goal is to award all acquisitions, using this authority, within 15 days of the RAA determination. The RAA determination allows for a waiver of any provision of law, policy, directive, or regulation within certain limitations that addresses the establishment of the requirement, the research, development, test and evaluation, or the solicitation and selection, and the award of the contract for the capabilities identified. The JRAC assesses an RAA request based on how an RAA would accelerate the delivery of the

capability. During the assessment, the JRAC also considers the amount and availability of funding required upfront (Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics), 2016)

Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on the Fulfillment of Urgent Operational Needs

Today's adversaries are changing at an accelerated pace and U.S. forces must respond rapidly to emerging threats. A Defense Science Board (DSB) Task Force (2009) studied the current acquisition system and made three recommendations based on their findings. These three recommendations will assist the DoD in fielding systems rapidly in response to new threats. The primary finding of the DSB (2009) was that the DoD cannot meet all of the needs through one acquisition system. The degree of urgency and technology readiness level should be used to differentiate a program and the acquisition path between "rapid" and "deliberate". The DSB found the current approach to be unsustainable and have a number of barriers that inhibit success (Defense Science Board, 2009).

The recommendations from the DSB (2009) are for the SECDEF to formalize dual acquisition paths that delineate between "rapid" and "deliberate" acquisitions. The next recommendation was to establish a new agency that was strictly responsible for the rapid acquisition and fielding. This agency should employ streamlined and integrated approaches for rapid acquisition. The rapid process should focus on existing technologies and delivering capability between two to 24 months (Defense Science Board, 2009).

Report of the Defense Science Board for Linking and Streamlining the Defense Requirements, Acquisition, and Budget Processes

The DSB (2012) describes the theoretical big "A" acquisition process as linked and streamlined. The Requirements Process, Acquisition Process, and Budget Process are linked together. Congress and Industry are informed of what DoD needs. Figure 4 is a graphic of the theoretical Big "A" Acquisition Process (Defense Business Board, 2012).



Figure 4 Theoretical Big "A" Acquisition Process. From REPORT FY12-02 Linking and Streamlining Defense Requirements, Acquisition, and Budget Processes, by Defense Science Board (2012, p. 6).

How the Army Runs (HTAR), Chapter 10, Section V, Urgent and Emergent Operational Need Validation

HTAR defines the process for Urgent and Emergent Operational Need Validation. The Defense Acquisition System (DAS) design is appropriate for deliberate acquisition; however,

tailoring may be appropriate with approval from the MDA in order to deliver and field capability to the warfighter. Every Service component has established a process to meet critical requirements from the combatant commanders. These critical requirements are rapid responses to situations that put life at risk or risk mission failure. The individual Service's intent was not to compete with the processes defined in JCIDS or the DAS, but to compliment the standard acquisition system. The DoD continues to improve their capabilities and material development processes in order to respond to COCOM urgent needs (U.S. Army War College, 2015).

The Army established the Army Requirements and Resourcing Board (AR2B) in December 2004 in order to identify solutions in the year of execution that require resource realignment. Figure 5 shows the membership of the AR2B. The AR2B had funding available to resource the ONS requests during the year of execution. The AR2B withheld a small percentage of funding from PORs at the beginning of the fiscal year. The AR2B would meet to determine funding realignments in order to support the emerging requirements (U.S. Army War College, 2015)

Figure 5 Army Requirements and Resourcing Board Organization. From How The Army Runs by U.S. Army War College (2015. p.10-20).

HTAR describes the process for ONS, which is the Army process to meet the Army Service Component Command (ASCC) urgent needs and is defined in AR-71-9. Headquarters, Department of Army (HQDA) may reject an ONS for reasons like conflicting needs, higher priorities need the available funding, or the capability already exists (U.S. Army War College, 2015) HTAR provides graphics that give detail to memberships at the Joint Service level and at the Army level that are involved in the ONS process. From discussions with Subject Matter

Experts (SMEs) in ASA (ALT) and G-3/5/7, the process description in HTAR is outdated, but the document has valid information that is valuable when trying to understand the balance of the Army portfolio of systems.

HTAR explains that Congress annually approves budgets. Once Congress approves the budget, the budget is not dynamic or variable and is not able to flex or adjust based on dynamic or evolving requirements. The Army develops budget submissions based on the known requirements at the time of the planning, programming, and budgeting. Figure 6 details the process for budget development and the opportunities to insert new funding requirements.



Figure 6 Army Requirements and Resourcing Board Organization. From How The Army Runs by U.S. Army War College (2015. p.10-20).

Services should submit their Program Objective Memorandum (POM) and Budget Estimate Submission (BES) to the Office of the SECDEF (OSD) by September, thirteen months before Congress gives funding and obligation authority. UONs and DRs are a result of evolving threats during contingency operations

During execution of the budget, the Services are able to make course corrections. The Services are able to reallocate resources to meet changing requirements. The Services hold a mid-year review and reprogramming activity (U.S. Army War College, 2015). During this

activity, the PMOs and PEOs provide updates on their PORs. The PMOs identify when a POR was able to award contracts below the planned amount and have funding that is available for reprogramming. Like never? The Services also review the execution of PORs and determine which programs are under-executing against the planned obligation rates and are at risk of having expired funding. Funding from under-executing programs is often reprogrammed and provided for resourcing UONs, DRs, and other PORs that may have challenges or funding shortfalls.

Congress accepts that DoD must be able to move some of the funding to meet unforeseen requirements or changes in operating conditions. Congress allows federal agencies to reprogram funds appropriated for current programs in order to finance unfunded requirements. Congress limits the reprogramming amount without Congressional approval. Below Threshold Reprogramming requires Congressional notification (U.S. Army War College, 2015).

DoD Directive 5000.71, Rapid Fulfillment of Combatant Commander Urgent Operational Needs

In 2012, the DEPSECDEF established the Warfighter SIG. The Warfighter SIG was established as a forum to facilitate a rapid process to meet combatant commander urgent operational needs UONs and to mitigate risks associated with near-term operations (Deputy Secretary of Defense, 2012).

DoD Directive 5000.71 directs the establishment of this group. At the time of the Warfighter SIG, DoD needed a Senior Integration Group that was responsible for oversight of the execution of urgent requirements from the warfighter. DoD also needed the SIG to have the

authority to effect change and to request authorization for waivers when necessary to expedite programs.

DoD Directive 5000.71 "establishes policy, assigns responsibilities, and provides direction to facilitate the rapid delivery of capabilities in response to UONs, consistent with all applicable laws and governing regulations" (Deputy Secretary of Defense, 2012, p. 1). The solution must also be rapid acquisition, independent of the solution's phase of development or fielding (Deputy Secretary of Defense, 2012).

The Co-Chairs of the Warfighter SIG will rank actions to meet the UONs and may field an interim solution if technology will not allow for a solution within 2 years. The acquisition plan and the program will be tailored dependent upon the level of urgency. The accelerated process and use of authorities must be disciplined and transparent to congress. The UONs process will be accelerated and an acceptable level of risk will be accepted in order to optimize the speed of the program. Senior leaders will facilitate an accelerated staffing to ensure no delay of the program due to bureaucracy. Communications will also exist between the requirement owner and the acquisition community to assist with streamlining the process (Deputy Secretary of Defense, 2012).

Army Regulation 71-9, Warfighting Capabilities Determination

Army Regulation (AR) 71-9 establishes policies for the determination and integration of warfighting capabilities. AR 71-9 applies instruction and direction for validation and approval of warfighting capabilities that meet urgent needs of operational commanders. AR 71-9 implements the processes defined in JCIDS within the Department of the Army (Department of

the Army, 2009). The process defined by AR 71-9 is the ONS process for UONs that fulfill urgent warfighter requirements for the ASCCs.

COCOMs use an ONS to document the urgent need for a new capability and is required to correct a deficiency or improve existing capabilities in order to achieve mission success. The ONS allows the operational commander the opportunity to identify a required capability outside of the standard requirements process. Once a COCOM submits an ONS, the ONS requires validation and ranking against competing requirements. If the Deputy Chief of Staff (DCS) G-3/5/7 validates an ONS, the ONS still must be ranked and may not be resourced. However, if the requirement's ranking falls above the threshold, funding of the requirement happens and the acquisition process begins. Fulfilling the required capability with an existing solution that differs slightly than the capability requested, due to funding constraints sometimes occurs (Department of the Army, 2009).

Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) will look at all ONS and will analyze the impact to the current or future Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership, Personnel, and Facilities (DOTMLPF) and policy. The ONS impact could expedite all reviews and analysis and shorten the reviews/analysis based on the level of urgency associated with the required capability. ONS priorities differ being dependent on the requests coming from deployed units, deploying units, or non-deployed and non-deploying units (Department of the Army, 2009).

Once the ONS is validated and ranked by the DCS, G-3/5/7, the ONS goes to the AR2B where recommendations are made to either: procure, if the ONS is funded by the JRAC; rank on an unfunded requirements (UFR) list; Reprogram funds from other capabilities; or decline action because of a low priority (Department of the Army, 2009).

The Capabilities Development for Rapid Transition is a process that looks at standard and nonstandard equipment that is currently in-use but is not sustained equipment. The process transitions these capabilities into the standard army process for service wide implementation as an enduring capability (Department of the Army, 2009).

GAO-11-273 Report - Warfighter Support:

The Government Accountability Office (GAO) (2011) studied the processes resulting from UONs and determined that while the services are rapidly acquiring systems to meet the needs of the warfighters. The processes are very complex and there appears to be a level of duplicity amongst programs. The GAO (2011) also found that there is very limited visibility of programs across services, which is lending to the duplication of programs (Government Accountability Office).

Getting War Fighters What They Need and When They Need It

Schaefer (UNK) wrote a paper for the Air University Maxwell Papers. In the paper, Schaefer (UNK) discusses the Defense Acquisition Framework. The framework has resulted in programs that have exceeded both cost and schedule requirements (Schaefer). The standard acquisition process is not able to meet the urgent capability requirements generated by operational commanders due to emerging threats. As a result, the services have developed their own processes that address the service component commands' urgent needs (Schaefer). Figure 7 shows the multiple processes for the services to acquire UONs for the warfighter.

	Joint	*Army*	*Air Force*	*Navy*	*SOCOM*
Rapid acquisition process name	Joint urgent operational need	Operational needs state-ment & Rapid Equipping Force	Rapid Response Process	Urgent Needs Process	SOFCIDS-U
Primary document	CJCSI 3470.1 (15 July 2005)	ECOP User's Guide	AFI 63-114 (12 June 2008)	SECNAVNOTE 5000 (15 March 2009)	USSOCCOM D 71-4 (9 June 2009)
Approval	Budget Office Director Board	HQDA	CSAF	CNO	Deputy SOCOM
Funding	No specific fund	No specific fund	No specific fund	No specific fund	CMNS fund
Timeline to IOC	IWN—120 days JUON—120 days–2 years	REF—90–360 days ONS—90 days–2 years	60 days	Less than 2 years	180 days–2 years
Solution goal %	70–80%	80%	None specified	None specified	80%

Figure 7 Summary of rapid acquisition processes throughout the Department of Defense. From "Getting Warfighters What They Want and When They Need It," by L.C. Schaefer, n.d., Maxwell Paper Number 55, p. 125.

Path from Urgent Operational Need to Program of Record

In an article published by the Army Research Journal, Whaley, and Stewart (2014) state that multiple systems were developed as solutions to validated UONs. The United States went to war in Afghanistan and Iraq not equipped to meet the mission requirements. Many UONs were submitted to meet the needs of the warfighter for a limited duration. Due to the contingency operations continuing to endure, many of the solutions became enduring capabilities and have or will transition from only fulfilling an urgent need to a full POR. Whaley and Stewart (2014)

identify current policies, procedures, processes, and required actions associated with the transition.

The Army established the Operational Need Statement (ONS) process in the 1980s and utilized the process in order to meet the COCOM needs. The ONS process is not a JCIDS process. More than 20 ad hoc organizations exist that are working to address warfighter urgent needs and all are working on developing a rapid capability. The Rapid Equipping Force (REF) primarily focuses on meeting the need or filling a capability gap with Commercial off the Shelf (COTS) technologies. The term "equipping" describes the mission of providing a rapid solution without the long-term sustainment that comes with a "fielding" (Whaley & Stewart, 2014).

The Capabilities Development for Rapid Transition (CDRT) process does not include all processes or actions that are required under the Defense Acquisition Framework. If the requirement is approved to become an enduring requirement, then there are many documents that must be developed that help to assess its ability to become an enduring requirement or if the requirement is ready to transition to a POR. The sustainment actions required for a POR are not complete and can result in costly upgrades later. Contractors often provide support and transition to organic support can be extremely costly. The programs typically author JCIDS documentation in parallel with material development and production. Many documents, such as test documents, are not available after delivery, but much of the data required is available. An ONS should establish or identify funding that is required and the approval authority should consider the sustainment costs during the approval process (Whaley & Stewart, 2014).

The U.S. Army Operating Concept: Win in a Complex World

> "The Army Operating Concept (AOC), "Win in a Complex World" describes how future Army forces will prevent conflict, shape security environments, and win wars while operating as part of our Joint Force and working with multiple partners. The AOC guides future force development by identifying first order capabilities that the Army needs to support U.S. policy objectives. It provides the intellectual foundation and framework for learning and for applying what we learn to future force development under Force 2025 and Beyond." (TRADOC (PAM 525-3-1), 2014, p. i)

The AOC identifies risks to the success of future operations. One of the risks identified is bureaucracy and includes the DAS as a source of the bureaucracy. The risk mitigation addresses the institutionalization of rapid acquisition and fielding of capabilities (TRADOC (PAM 525-3-1), 2014).

Paper - Equipping the Force

Brinkman (2012) wrote a paper addressing the challenges of equipping the U.S. military with outside factors such as budget reductions and the sustainment costs that follow. The document also addresses the Urgent Needs Process and describes how the U.S. Navy handles an urgent need. Brinkman (2012) says that when not delivering the required capability is likely to result in the inability to accomplish the mission or may result in casualties or the loss of life, the urgent need is handled as an exceptional request. This process definition is very similar to the process for Army ONS defined in AR 71-9. Brinkman (2012) also states that the Navy has optimized the acquisition process for an urgent need in order to gain speed. Risk acceptance is

also important to gain speed. The Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel and Facilities (DOTMLPF), integration, sustainment, test and other considerations are balanced against the level of urgency and impacts to schedule. Delaying some of these technical and logistics considerations until after fielding can present challenges and additional expense (Brinkman, 2012).

Paper - Sustaining Equipment and the Rapid Acquisition Process: The Forgotten Phase

Whitson (2012) writes about shortfalls of the defense acquisition system that were highlighted during the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. Emerging processes to implement rapid acquisition and to streamline current or ongoing acquisition processes overcame the inability to field new material to the combatant commands. The rapid acquisition process often neglected the work that is required for long-term operations and sustainment (Whitson, 2012). Whitson (2012) discusses the current sustainment systems available and considers options available to implement the right strategy and sustainment concepts.

Whitson (2012) says that Performance Based Logistics (PBL) is a strategy that defines the outcome and parameters instead of segmented logistics support. "PBL is defined as a strategy for system product support that employs the purchase of support as an integrated, affordable performance package designed to optimize system readiness" (Whitson, 2012, p. 9). Whitson (2012) also discusses that PBL is a great way to optimize the cost of a system. Key players must be educated on the Total Life Cycle Systems Management and PBL structures to include strategies, guidance and regulation. A dedicated and stable funding stream is also critical to ensure long-term sustainment (Whitson, 2012).

Testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, Defense Acquisition Reform Panel on Rapid Acquisition of Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) Vehicles

The GAO (2009) reported that the tailored approach for the acquisition of the MRAP vehicles was successful. The program relied on proven technologies and products that were commercially available. The program also used a concurrent approach to testing and production and awarded production contracts to nine commercial sources. The government took responsibility of integrating the mission equipment packages in order to expedite fielding. The schedule and performance results were very good for the MRAP. The success was related to the priority the DoD placed on the MRAP and the availability of supplemental funding. Programmatic decisions to use proven technology, minimize requirements, infuse competition in contracting, and keep the integration with the government also led to the great success. Challenges remain in MRAP sustainment, mobility, reliability, and safety (Government Accountability Office, 2009).

Presentation - Joint Capability Technology Demonstrations (JCTDs) P rocess

The Chief Technology Officer (UNK) presented a process for JCTDs. The Chief Technology Office (UNK) stated that the objective of JCTDs are to rapidly demonstrate and deliver significant capabilities to the CCDRs. The Advanced Concepts and Experimentation (ACE) Office is the entry point for all emerging technologies and JCTDs. ACE works to deliver advanced capabilities that are more effective to the warfighter and with greater agility. JCTDs address CCDRs Joint Urgent Operational Needs (JUONs) and assess solutions in operational demonstrations. The JCTDs address needs with mature technologies and innovative concepts.

JCTDs result in significant increases is Coalition, Interagency, and/or Joint capability (Chief Technology Officer, UNK).

Paper - A Next Generation Business Model: Bridging the Gap in Support of the Defense Industry

Aslett and Haines (2017) discuss the need for a next generation business model that allows industry to invest and better support the Department of Defense with new technology and capabilities. Because of the challenges that the U.S. and U.S. allies face, the DoD requires defenses that are technologically robust. The U.S. DoD and allies also require that the technology can be developed and fielded rapidly within cost constraints and be effective in a constantly evolving operational environment. Emerging threats come from new adversaries and adversaries that have been around a long time. Warfighting capabilities must meet technical requirements and be deployed in a timely fashion to meet the challenges of the CCDRs. Recent acquisition reforms do not address the problems of driving and funding rapid and affordable innovations in applied technologies (Aslett & Haines, 2017).

Paper - Rapid Acquisition Impact on Major Defense Acquisition Programs

Pelczynski (2010) explains that rapid acquisition programs are having an impact on Major Defense Acquisition Programs (MDAP). Pelczynski (2010) also discusses that the Defense Acquisition System (DAS) does not support the schedule needs of the rapid acquisitions. Therefore, the DAS is streamlined to support such programs that require rapid acquisition. Funding for many rapid acquisitions is not available, so the agency is forced to take money that was programmed for an MDAP in order to fund the rapid acquisition program. The

MDAP processes and the DAS must evolve to meet unplanned but essential warfighter needs (Pelczynski, 2010).

Memorandum for - Requirements Process for Program Executive Offices (PEOs)

O'Neill (2011) defined policy in a memorandum that stated PEOs have accepted responsibility for satisfying requirements without receiving formal responsibility from the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics and Technology) (ASA(ALT)). O'Neill (2011) directed that all PEOs in receipt of an approved requirement send the requirement to the Deputy for Acquisition and Systems Management (DASM), who will evaluate the requirement and make a recommendation to the ASA(ALT) and will ensure system of systems integration and proper assignment. This applies to All ONS, JUONS, JCID requirements, or modifications to formal programs (O'Neill, 2011).

Paper - Lessons Learned From Rapid Acquisition: Better, Faster, Cheaper

C.R. Rasch (2011) examined the MRAP vehicle program and considered the impacts that wartime acquisition initiatives have on the acquisition system. Rasch (2011) focused on the processes developed to handle the numbers of wartime requirements. Rasch (2011) also addressed the challenge of long-term life cycle considerations handled by the traditional acquisition processes.

Analysis & Findings

Key Assumptions

In order to bind the problem concerning the research question, two key assumptions were made:

1. Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) funding is not forever. Programs resourced initially from appropriated funding for OCO cannot continue to be funded from OCO for long-term.
2. The Defense Budget offers a zero sum gain. When the warfighter identifies urgent requirements, the budget is not increased to provide additional funding to resource the requirement.

The Process for Urgent Operational Needs

The result of contingency operations and evolving threats, the warfighter has required additional capabilities rapidly in order to achieve mission success, overcome unforeseen threats, and reduce the risk of casualties. DoDI 5000.02 defines the process for deliberate acquisitions of systems. In order to field the additional capabilities to the warfighter rapidly, the acquisition system must be tailored. DoDI 5000.02 acknowledges the need for tailored processes and includes descriptions of UONs, which are prime examples of tailored acquisition processes. In many cases, the warfighter needs these capabilities in days or months. DoD Components are acquiring quick reaction capabilities in a rapid acquisition environment. DoD Components use all authorities available to assess, fund, develop, produce, deploy and sustain urgent capabilities for the duration required to meet the need of the warfighter (Under Secretary of Defense

(Acquisition, Technology & Logistics), 2015). The UONs processes are developed to meet the urgent needs or quick reaction capabilities, but do not address the resulting impacts to the long-term needs.

The Process for JUONs

CJCSI 3470.01 defines the process to validate, set priorities, and assign UONs to the appropriate service as a JUON. UONs with application to the Joint Services are ranked and approved by the COCOM and are submitted through the J8 "gatekeeper". The JROC ultimately assigns a JUON to the Army G-3/5/7 or other services for execution (Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2005).

CJCSI 3470.01 clarifies that the funding recommendation is made by the Directed Service or Agency (DS/A) but does not address the process of resourcing nor criteria used for identifying solutions for resources. The instruction also does not give details on setting priorities against previous JUONs or mid-term and long-term capabilities needed by the warfighter and are competing for the same resources.

The Process for ONS

Many UONs do not have Joint application. In the event that an urgent requirement does not have Joint application but should be managed by the Army, the COCOM will return the request to the ASCC for staffing through the Army for fulfillment. AR 71-9 defines a process to validate, resource, and execute the requirements for materiel solutions to the UONs, characterized by the Army as ONS. An ONS request is validated by the ASCC. Validated ONS are actioned through DCS G-3/5/7 for staffing, validation, ranking and execution. Ultimately, a Requirements Staffing Officer (RSO) in the G-3/5/7 coordinates the ONS with the ASA(ALT)

staff and the DASM then dispatches the ONS to a PEO or Program Management Office (PMO) for execution. The PEO or PMO develops a Program Office Estimate (POE) and a material solution and returns the solution to the RSO at the G-3/5/7 for review. The RSO then staffs the ONS with ASA (ALT), ASA (FM&C), and TRADOC, before sending the ONS to the AR2B for resourcing and against other requirements, to include PORs. The AR2B may disapprove the requirement because of a lack of ranking versus competing requirements (Department of the Army, 2009). According to sources at the pentagon, the AR2B is no longer active. According to conversations with personnel within the G-3/5/7, a Budget Replanning and Programming (BRP) Process has replaced the funding realignment that was performed by the AR2B. The BRP Process includes a mid-year review of "under-executing" programs and programs of lower priority in January and a year-end review in June. The BRP process occurs twice a year and supplements the standard PPBES process to address urgent requirements. The BRP process is an Army mechanism for balancing the portfolio of systems, but procedures for the BRP process were not available for review or analysis.

The Process for Warfighter SIG-identified Issues

CJCSI 3470.01, DoDD 5000.71, AR 71.9, and DoDI 5000.02 do not identify processes to address issues identified by the Warfighter SIG. DODI 5000.02 mentions that many of these issues may be resolved by fielding materiel solutions to strategic partner nations (Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology & Logistics), 2015). According to sources in the Pentagon, the process appears to flow from the initiation of a Warfighter SIG-identified Issue to the DCS G-3/5/7 for Army sponsored programs and follows the ONS process per AR 71-9 defined previously.

Analysis of UONs



Figure 8 Army Process Flow for ONS, JUONs and Warfighter SIG-identified Issues, Adapted from CJCSI 3470.1 by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2005 and AR 71-9 by the Dept. of the U.S. Army, 2009

Figure 8 is a representative understanding of the process for JUONs, ONS, and Warfighter SIG-identified issues. The figure highlights that the three requirements are all submitted to the G-3/5/7 for action from different sources. Once the JUON, ONS, or Warfighter SIG-identified Issue request is validated, the process is similar for all three. Information within CJCSI 3470.01 and AR 71-9 does not provide enough detail to understand if consistent criteria is used to set priorities amongst JUONs, ONS, and Warfighter SIG-identified Issues. This drives the question, "How are JUONs, ONS, and Warfighter SIG-identified Issues reconciled against each other for priority at each level?"

Determination of Lifespan and "Limited" Application

During the validation and resourcing of DRs, a lifespan determination is critical information in determining a solution for resourcing. The lifespan will influence decisions and actions that directly impact the balance of the portfolio of systems by under resourcing sustainment and robbing PORs. If the lifespan of the need is properly determined, the sustainment can be planned. DoDI 5000.02 states that the Component Acquisition Executive (CAE) determines that some needs are not enduring and are only for a "limited" duration. Information is not available to understand if a duration is defined in more fidelity than "limited". The lifespan is not set up front. The lifespan is required to be set within one year after the system is in operation. Information regarding the process of determining the lifespan is not available.

CJCSI 3170.01 shows that funding for sustainment and/or additional quantities are generally a Service responsibility as part of the PPBES (Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2015). Planning, programming and budgeting must consider sustainment costs for those JUONs

and ONS assigned to the Army and have an enduring lifespan, while establishing the budget for the Army. Determining the lifespan of JUONs and ONS is extremely important in order to budget for the requirement.

CJCSI 3170.01I shows that validated JUONs must go through a review by the validation authority 2 years after the previous validation date. Once a JUON is determined to be an enduring requirement it will transitions to a POR and it no longer requires re-validation. The DoD Components are encouraged to apply the same process to DoD Component UONs (Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2015). A briefing given by Buhrkuhl, (2006) former Director of the JRAC, detailed that a disposition must be documented for all UONs within one year of entering operation and sustainment phase. Buhrkuhl (2006) also stated that the disposition analysis determines if the Service may terminate the capability, sustain the current "limited" capability or transition the enduring capability to a POR for sustainment and possible fielding (Buhrkuhl, 2006). The disposition analysis and decision critical information is necessary for the Army to understand what the future of the DRs looks like and to properly balance the portfolio of systems. A disposition decision identified as limited must be repeated every 2 years or until it is determined to be enduring.

Impacts to PORs

UONs and DRs impact PORs. These needs require funding from the year of execution and take funds allocated to PORs. Some reprogramming can result from circumstances that require additional funding to put the program back on track. Reprogramming is not only a result of UONs but can be a result of other changes in requirements for PORs.

The research does not provide clarity on submittal rates for submitted UONs. The research has led me to the following strategic questions related to the implications of UONs and DRs:

- Has the increase in UONs and DRs resulted in increased reprogramming from PORs?
- Has the increased reprogramming of PORs resulted in schedule delays or quantity decreases for PORs?
- Has the schedule delays or quantity decreases for PORs resulted in increased UONs and DRs?

Criteria for Validation and Resourcing

CJCSI 3470.1 and AR 70 - 9, do not provide criteria for either validation, or ranking. The COCOM validates and ranks the JUONs at the COCOM level. Analysis from the research would suggest that validation and rankings are based on the threat to achieving mission success and the risk of casualties, along with the urgency. The analysis does not identify how the requests are ranked against previously submitted requests. The GAO (2011) reported, "The DoD cannot readily identify the totality of its urgent needs efforts as well as the cost of such efforts because it has limited visibility over all urgent needs" (Government Accountability Office, 2011, p. 27). Because of the separate processes for validation and ranking of JUONs and ONS, ranking the urgent needs against those previously submitted and those of other COCOMs does not appear in the process.

The priorities for urgent requirements are not set in the context of POR priorities. Officials in the COCOMs stated in a GAO (2011) report that the COCOMs do not have visibility

into the databases belonging to the Services, which prevents them from setting priorities in the context of POR priorities. Without total visibility during the approval process, there is a risk of duplicating efforts. The approval process must have visibility into all programs during the approval process of JUONs and ONS in order to rank all programs and balance the portfolio.

Controlling the Effects from UONs and DRs

The research did not identify if controls within the approval process are being enforced that would limit the lifespan of UON-cued systems and DR-cued systems. Whaley and Stewart (2014) state that UONs and DRs often show their value and prove their worth in the field. A capability that the Warfighter defined as a need for one contingency operation has the tendency to show application to the rest of the Service. The capability also has a tendency to linger because it is difficult to assess the duration of a conflict and how long a contingency operation will last. The duration or lifespan of a capability for a contingency operation can continue long after it was originally projected (Whaley & Stewart, 2014).

Analysis of AR 71-9 reveals that the Army does not address transition, termination, or transfer ONS (Whaley & Stewart, 2014). The disposition analysis and decision, previously discussed and defined in CJCSI 3170.01I, is not only essential to budgeting and resourcing decisions, but is beneficial to ensure that the capability is still needed by the warfighter (Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2015). The disposition decision assists with preventing UONs and DRs from continuing to require sustainment beyond the benefit or the need. However, the concern, and possibly the greater impact to PORs, is that a DR, by definition, is "limited" (Department of the Army, 2009). Therefore, the Army is not planning, programming or budgeting for the long-term sustainment of a DR system because the DR is limited. As the

DR system continues, sustainment funding must be identified and secured from PORs through reprogramming.

Conclusions & Recommendations

The research did not offer data from the documents available, to assess definitively whether the Army is balancing the portfolio of programs that deliver urgent, mid-term, and long-term capabilities. The path to balancing the portfolio of programs is to have clear and concise criteria used consistently across all processes. It appears that many DR systems have lingered well past their initially determined lifespan. The potential resource impacts from the extended lifespan of DR systems compel additional research.

Recommendation 1: Perform Additional Research

Perform additional research to answer the primary and secondary research questions. It is important to have access to the groups that are executing the formal and informal processes today to obtain current and accurate data. Access to the G-3/5/7 and ASA(ALT) staffs is essential because of their overall responsibilities and the importance of capturing current processes and organizational equities. The research should not be limited to literature reviews but should allow for interviews from subject matter experts of the processes. Areas of focus for the research should include current processes, effective criteria for setting priorities and reprogramming, and lifespan determination and management.

Recommendation 2: Data Collection

To support the research in Recommendation 1, create actions between G-3/5/7 and ASA(ALT) to track the following data:

- The number of UONs that required reprogramming since 2000

- The amount reprogrammed to resource UONs since 2000
- The number of DRs that required reprogramming since 2000
- The amount reprogrammed to resource DRs since 2000
- The actual lifespan of every DR system since 2000
- The number of PORs that resourced DRs since 2000
- The amount of funding from PORs to resource DRs since 2000
- The effects to PORs from reprogramming for DRs (quantity, schedule, etc.)

Definitions

Directed Requirement (DR) – A DR is prepared by the Director, DAMO CI for approval by the VCSA if an operational assessment of a JUON or ONS, or the results of a JCTD or ATD indicate that a "specific limited but necessary need" exists and has application within the Army (Department of the Army, 2009).

DoD Component-Specific Urgent Operational Needs (UONs) – A UON that only services a specific service component. The approval authorities for these UONs are at the component level and include their validation, program execution, and the designation of the Milestone Decision Authority (MDA) (Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology & Logistics), 2015).

Joint Urgent Operational Needs (JUONs) – A JUON is an urgent need identified by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (VCJCS), or a Combatant Commander (COCOM) involved in an ongoing contingency operation (Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology & Logistics), 2015).

Joint Emergent Operational Needs (JEONs) – A JEON is an emergent need identified by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (VCJCS), or a Combatant Commander (COCOM) for an anticipated or pending contingency operation (Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology & Logistics), 2015).

Program of Record – A program that is approved and funded through the POM. The program becomes a line item record in the budget.

Warfighter Senior Integration Group (SIG) – Urgent Issue – A critical issue for the warfighter. Issues often include material support to coalition partners (Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology & Logistics), 2015).

Validated UONs – Include JUONs, JEONs and Component Specific UONs (Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology & Logistics), 2015).

Warfighter Capability – A warfighter capability can be delivered through DOTMLPF that gives the warfighter the ability to defeat a threat.

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Acronyms

ACAT	Acquisition Category
ACE	Advanced Concepts and Experimentation
ADM	Acquisition Decision Memorandum
AOC	Army Operating Concept
AR	Army Regulation
AR2B	Army Requirements and Resourcing Board
ASA (ALT)	Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics and Technology
ASCC	Army Service Component Command
BES	Budget Estimate Submission
BOD	Budget Officer Director
BRP	Budget Replanning & Programming
C2IP	Command and Control Initiative Program
CAE	Component Acquisition Executive
Cbt RIF	Combating Terrorism Rapid Initiative Fund
CCD	Combat Capability Document
CCDR	Combatant Commander
CCIF	Combatant Commander Initiative Fund
CDRT	Capabilities Development for Rapid Transition
CJCSI	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction

CMNS	Combat Mission Need Statement
COCOMS	Combatant Commands
COTS	Commercial Off The Shelf
DAS	Defense Acquisition System
DASM	Deputy for Acquisition and Systems Management
DAU	Defense Acquisition University
DCS	Deputy Chief of Staff
DEPSECDEF	Deputy Secretary of Defense
DoD	Department of Defense
DoDI	DoD Instruction
DOTMLPF	Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel and Facilities
DR	Directed Requirements
DS/A	Directed Service or Agency
DSB	Defense Science Board
ECOP	Equipment Common Operating Picture
ESD	Equipment Sourcing Document
FCB	Functional Capabilities Board
FMR	Financial Management Regulations
FY	Fiscal Year
GAO	Government Accountability Office
GOTS	Government Off The Shelf

GWOT	Global War on Terror
HQDA	Headquarters of the Department of the U.S. Army
HTAR	How the Army Runs
IED	Improvised Exploding Devices
IWN	Immediate Warfighter Needs
JCB	Joint Capabilities Board
JCIDS	Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System
JCTD	Joint Capability Technology Demonstrations
JEON	Joint Emergent Operational Need
JRAC	Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell
JROC	Joint Requirements Oversight Council
JUON	Joint Urgent Operational Need
KPP	Key Performance Parameters
LRIP	Low-Rate Initial Production
MDA	Milestone Decision Authority
MDAP	Major Defense Acquisition Programs
MRAP	Mine Resistant Ambush Protected
NDAA	National Defense Authorization Act
OCO	Overseas Contingency Operations
OEF	Operation Enduring Freedom
OIF	Operation Iraqi Freedom
ONS	Operational Need Statement

OSD	Office of the Secretary of Defense
PBL	Performance Based Logistics
PEO	Program Executive Office
POM	Program Objective Memorandum
POR	Program of Record
PPBES	Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution System
RAA	Rapid Acquisition Authority
RDC	Rapid Deployment Capability
REF	Rapid Equipping Force
RSO	Requirements Staffing Office
SECDEF	Secretary of Defense
SIG	Senior Integration Group
SSCF	Senior Service College Fellowship
TRADOC	Training and Doctrine Command
U.S.	United States
UAS	Unmanned Aerial System
UFR	Unfunded Requirement
UNS	Universal Need Statement
UON	Urgent Operational Need
VCSA	Vice Chief of Staff, U.S. Army
VDJ-8	Vide Director / J-8
WG	Working Group

Disclaimer

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