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Report Title

Final Report: Danger; Understanding Privacy Risks of Ubiquitous Personal Augmented Reality Head-mounted Displays

ABSTRACT

Under this effort, we investigated the space of realistic information leakage by personal mobile platforms such as mobile phones, AR devices, and their purposefully and accidentally obtained imagery. The hardware supported efforts in two research areas, namely in leveraging compromising observations of those devices to infer information about the user's environment and her position. Second, we investigated the leakage potential of the emanations of the devices when in use.

Enter List of papers submitted or published that acknowledge ARO support from the start of the project to the date of this printing. List the papers, including journal references, in the following categories:

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Sub Contractors (DD882)

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Scientific Progress

Hardware was purchased.

Technology Transfer

Final Report for "Danger; Understanding Privacy Risks of Ubiquitous Personal Augmented Reality Head-mounted Displays"

Under this effort, we investigated the space of realistic information leakage by personal mobile platforms such as mobile phones, AR devices, and their purposefully and accidentally obtained imagery. The hardware supported efforts in two research areas, namely in leveraging compromising observations of those devices to infer information about the user's environment and her position. Second, we investigated the leakage potential of the emanations of the devices when in use.

Compromising Observations

The hardware obtained under this grant provided the enabling compute and experimental platforms for several research efforts in the area of exploitation of the data captured on mobile AR platforms [1, 5, 6, 7, 9].

Mobile AR platforms and mobile phones have developed and will further developed into our daily capture platforms and will capture more and more of our lives in the near future. This is especially true when used in ubiquitous AR platforms. In Heinly et al. [1] we proposed a novel, large-scale, structure-from-motion framework that advances the state of the art in data scalability from cityscale modeling (millions of images) to world-scale modeling (several tens of millions of images) using just a single computer. This platform shows that realistically an attacker can join the information across the streams of large numbers of different users to obtain a model of their environment and the user's position at the time of the capture. The main enabling technology in this effort is the use of a streaming-based framework for connected component discovery. Moreover, the system employs an adaptive, online, iconic image clustering approach based on an augmented bag-of-words representation, in order to balance the goals of registration, comprehensiveness, and data compactness. We demonstrated our method on a world-scale dataset the publicly available 100 million image crowd- sourced photo collection containing images geographically distributed throughout the entire world. Results illustrate that our streaming-based approach does not compromise model completeness, but achieves unprecedented levels of efficiency and scalability. In summary, this shows that even large-scale datasets as soon will be created by personal augmented reality devices can realistically be efficiently analyzed to infer information about the user and his peers capturing the data.

To drive efficiency of large-scale reconstruction systems such as in the system of Heinly et al. [1] to even larger scales of user data we investigated methods into even faster image overlap detection (geometric verification), which is the main bit in correlating data across user's and across different images of the same user. In Schönberger et al. [5,7] we targeted a more efficient method for geometric verification. Typically, the geometric verification recovers the epipolar geometry of two views for a moving camera by estimating a fundamental or essential matrix. The essential matrix describes the relative geometry for two views up to an unknown scale. Then two-view triangulation or multi-model estimation approaches can reveal the relative geometric

configuration of two views, e.g., small or large baseline and forward or sideward motion. Information about the relative configuration is essential for many problems such as recovering the environment model and the user's position in the environment. However, essential matrix estimation and assessment of the relative geometric configuration are computationally expensive and hence a bottleneck in any large-scale exploit of user photos. To overcome this bottleneck, we proposed a learning-based approach for efficient two-view geometry classification, leveraging the by-products of feature matching. Our approach can predict whether two views have scene overlap and for overlapping views it can assess the relative geometric configuration. Our experiments show that through combining the above methods [1,5] efficient user localization and environment extraction is possible.

We also investigated the amount of information that can be extracted from the imagery of these devices. Specifically, in Schönberger et al. [6] we researched the level of detail information that is retrievable from the images. High resolution detail is often of interest in privacy attacks, as it for example allows the attacker to read text in the scene and notice even small objects of interest. While the above methods [1, 5, 7] boost scalability, they traditionally also limit the amount of detail that the large-scale reconstruction systems are able to produce. In Schönberger et al. [6] we introduced a joint reconstruction and retrieval system that maintains the scalability of large-scale Structure-from-Motion systems [1, 5, 7], while also recovering the often lost ability of reconstruction strategies. We demonstrated the method on a large- scale dataset of 7.4 million images downloaded from the Internet. This effort proves that the obtained reconstructions allow recovery even of small details of the captured environment.

AR glasses as an Ad Hoc Surveillance Network

Another existing limitation in the reconstruction of the environment is the fact that dynamic moving objects such as people and cars could not be reconstructed. We analyzed if this automatically provides privacy for the captured users but found this not to be the case since we were able to research a method of correctly localizing imaged users or other moving objects. Specifically, in Price et al. [9] we proposed a method to bring 3D reconstructions to life by populating them with transient objects as observed in the real world. We focus on detecting

people in individual images and accurately placing them into an existing 3D model of the environment. As part of this placement, our method also estimates the metric scale of the scene from object semantics, namely the size distribution of the population. Alternatively, if the observed users are known we could use their specific body measures. Moreover, our method models a smooth approximation of the ground surface, which is typically difficult to reconstruct in crowd-sourced image sets. We have tested our approach on a large number of unordered Internet photo collections and demonstrate realistic visualizations of such previously unobtainable scene elements. This effort demonstrates that AR glasses and their observations.

Privacy Threats through Compromising Emanations

The purchased hardware was critical in enabling our research in leveraging information of the user and content on the device available to an attacker [2,3,8]. Privacy on mobile devices has multiple facets on one hand the privacy of the user using the device and on the other hand the privacy of the people in the user's environment. We researched both aspect.

First, we analyzed the private information of the AR device's user that could be leaked. One interesting source of information is the recovery of the user's gaze direction and hence the ability to recover her interest objects in the environment. In Perra et al. [2] we introduced a continuous, locally optimal calibration scheme for use with head-worn devices. It removes the need of existing calibration schemes to solve for a globally optimal model of the eye-device transformation by performing calibration on a per-user or once-per-use basis. Removing, this requirement is critical in enabling the powerful threat of tracking the users gaze from exposed or intercepted data not intended for tracking. Our calibration scheme allows an attacker to calculate a locally optimal eye-device transformation on demand by computing an optimal model from a local window of previous frames. By leveraging naturally occurring interest regions within the user's environment, our system can calibrate itself without the user's active participation. Experimental results demonstrate that our proposed calibration scheme outperforms the existing state of the art systems while being significantly less restrictive to the user and the environment.

Another aspect of leaked information from head-sets, mobile devices, and even static screens is the recovery of information displayed on the user's screen. In Xu et al. [3] we proved that video content played on a device can efficiently be recovered even when not directly seen. In Price et al. [8], we extended this method to show more robustness against a number of transformations on the video and in the observed video screen, i.e. perspective foreshortening of the video.

Another aspect of mobile device privacy is the more and more popular biometrics based user authentication. We evaluated the safety of protecting user accounts and information through facial identification. In Xu et al. [4] we showed that, by leveraging a handful of pictures of the target user taken from social media, we are able to create realistic, textured, 3D facial models that undermine the security of widely used face authentication solutions. Our framework makes use of virtual reality (VR) systems, incorporating along the way the ability to perform animations (e.g., raising an eyebrow or smiling) of the facial model, in order to trick liveness detectors into believing that the 3D model is a real human face. The synthetic face of the user is displayed on the screen of the VR device, and as the device rotates and translates in the real world, the 3D face moves accordingly. To an observing face authentication system, the depth and motion cues of the display match what would be expected for a human face. Our analysis lets us argue that such VR-based spoofing attacks constitute a fundamentally new class of attacks that point to a serious weakness in camera-based authentication systems: Unless they incorporate other sources of verifiable data, systems relying on color image data and camera motion are prone to attacks via virtual realism. To demonstrate the practical nature of this threat, we conducted thorough experiments using an end-to-end implementation of our approach and show how it

undermines the security of several face authentication solutions that include both motion-based and liveness detectors. Our innovative research showing this fundamental flaw in the security of biometrics for user authentication on mobile devices was enabled by the hardware purchased under this grant [4].

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