




STO TECHNICAL REPORT

TR-HFM-226

# **Civilian and Military Personnel Integration and Collaboration in Defence Organisations**

(Intégration et collaboration du personnel civil et  
militaire au sein des organisations de défense)

This Report documents the findings of the  
NATO STO HFM-226 Task Group.



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# The NATO Science and Technology Organization

Science & Technology (S&T) in the NATO context is defined as the selective and rigorous generation and application of state-of-the-art, validated knowledge for defence and security purposes. S&T activities embrace scientific research, technology development, transition, application and field-testing, experimentation and a range of related scientific activities that include systems engineering, operational research and analysis, synthesis, integration and validation of knowledge derived through the scientific method.

In NATO, S&T is addressed using different business models, namely a collaborative business model where NATO provides a forum where NATO Nations and partner Nations elect to use their national resources to define, conduct and promote cooperative research and information exchange, and secondly an in-house delivery business model where S&T activities are conducted in a NATO dedicated executive body, having its own personnel, capabilities and infrastructure.

The mission of the NATO Science & Technology Organization (STO) is to help position the Nations' and NATO's S&T investments as a strategic enabler of the knowledge and technology advantage for the defence and security posture of NATO Nations and partner Nations, by conducting and promoting S&T activities that augment and leverage the capabilities and programmes of the Alliance, of the NATO Nations and the partner Nations, in support of NATO's objectives, and contributing to NATO's ability to enable and influence security and defence related capability development and threat mitigation in NATO Nations and partner Nations, in accordance with NATO policies.

The total spectrum of this collaborative effort is addressed by six Technical Panels who manage a wide range of scientific research activities, a Group specialising in modelling and simulation, plus a Committee dedicated to supporting the information management needs of the organization.

- AVT Applied Vehicle Technology Panel
- HFM Human Factors and Medicine Panel
- IST Information Systems Technology Panel
- NMSG NATO Modelling and Simulation Group
- SAS System Analysis and Studies Panel
- SCI Systems Concepts and Integration Panel
- SET Sensors and Electronics Technology Panel

These Panels and Group are the power-house of the collaborative model and are made up of national representatives as well as recognised world-class scientists, engineers and information specialists. In addition to providing critical technical oversight, they also provide a communication link to military users and other NATO bodies.

The scientific and technological work is carried out by Technical Teams, created under one or more of these eight bodies, for specific research activities which have a defined duration. These research activities can take a variety of forms, including Task Groups, Workshops, Symposia, Specialists' Meetings, Lecture Series and Technical Courses.

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# Civilian and Military Personnel Integration and Collaboration in Defence Organisations

(STO-TR-HFM-226)

## Executive Summary

### Issue and Purpose

Defence organisations consist of military and civilian personnel working in partnership while governed by different personnel management systems and reflecting distinct cultures – all of which may affect military-civilian collaboration, personnel outcomes, and organisational effectiveness. Despite this, civilian-military working relationships and work culture have been largely unexplored. Thus, the NATO Science and Technology Organization (STO) Human Factors and Medicine (HFM) Research Task Group (RTG) 226 was established to examine military and civilian personnel work culture and relations in defence organisations through theoretical and empirical analyses.

### Scope and Procedure

The RTG examined existing data sources and policy/strategic documents to understand and compare military and civilian workforce demographics within defence organisations, and the policies and directives that guide their management. A large-scale cross-national survey, administered to nearly 8,000 civilian and military personnel in 11 nations, was developed to identify key aspects of military-civilian working relations and dynamics. In addition, a number of select topics were addressed, including:

- Empirical analysis of military-civilian personnel integration in operational and/or multinational settings;
- Theoretical examinations of military-civilian integration; and
- Military-civilian collaboration and integration in specific contexts through case studies.

Recommendations for effective personnel management of military and civilian workforces in defence organisations were generated.

### Results and Recommendations

Civilians represent a significant proportion of the total defence force in most nations (20% – 35%); they tend to be older, to include relatively more women, and to be employed in support areas and in a variety of services compared to military personnel. Survey results indicate positive working relationships and a high degree of interaction between military and civilian personnel, and many positive aspects of working in mixed military-civilian contexts, such as complementarity in roles/expertise, diversity of perspectives, and the stability provided by civilians. However, challenges include negative effects, especially for civilians, on career progression/training opportunities, and of the military rotational cycle; cultural barriers between military and civilian personnel; and perceptions of organisational unfairness related to differences in military and civilian management and rewards. Recommendations include:

- Prioritizing military-civilian personnel relations;
- Enhancing mutual understanding of cultures/roles through joint work and training opportunities;

- Developing super-ordinate identities emphasizing joint military-civilian identification with defence organisations along with unique subgroup identities;
- Encouraging senior leaders to emphasize the importance of military-civilian collaboration; and
- Examining optimal ways to combine practices, tools, and strategies to develop a comprehensive approach for managing military-civilian personnel integration.

### **Military/NATO Significance**

To date, most nations have not focused on civilian-military personnel integration and work culture or have done so in piecemeal fashion. NATO STO RTG HFM-226 planned and executed a program of work to address this gap. Findings indicate that military and civilian personnel who engage in positive personnel collaboration show greater job satisfaction, work engagement, and commitment to the defence organisation – all highly consequential for operational and organisational effectiveness. Overall, RTG findings suggest that military-civilian personnel management should be considered in personnel strategies in defence organisations. As such, the outputs of this research contribute to the NATO Long-Term Capability Requirement (LTCR) of Human Performance Enhancement in Defence Organisations.

# Intégration et collaboration du personnel civil et militaire au sein des organisations de défense

(STO-TR-HFM-226)

## Synthèse

### Enjeu et objet

Les organisations de défense se composent de personnel civil et militaire, travaillant en partenariat malgré des systèmes différents de gestion du personnel, lesquels reflètent des cultures distinctes ; tout cela peut influencer sur la collaboration entre militaires et civils, le travail accompli et l'efficacité de l'organisation. Néanmoins, les relations de travail entre civils et militaires et leur culture du travail n'avaient pas encore fait l'objet d'études approfondies. Le groupe de recherche (RTG) 226 sur les facteurs humains et la médecine (HFM) de l'Organisation pour la science et la technologie (STO) de l'OTAN a par conséquent été créé pour étudier la culture du travail chez le personnel civil et militaire et les relations au sein des organisations de défense, par le biais d'analyses théoriques et empiriques.

### Champ d'application et procédures

Le RTG a examiné les sources de données existantes et les documents relatifs aux politiques et stratégies, afin de comprendre et de comparer la démographie de la main-d'œuvre militaire et civile des organisations de défense, ainsi que les politiques et directives qui orientent leur gestion. Une enquête internationale à grande échelle a interrogé 8 000 civils et militaires de 11 pays afin d'identifier les aspects essentiels des relations et dynamiques de travail entre civils et militaires. Par ailleurs, un certain nombre de sujets sélectionnés ont été traités :

- L'analyse empirique de l'intégration du personnel civil et militaire dans les contextes opérationnels et/ou multinationaux ;
- L'examen théorique de l'intégration entre civils et militaires ; ainsi que
- La collaboration et l'intégration entre civils et militaires dans des contextes spécifiques à travers des études de cas.

Des recommandations ont été émises en vue de gérer efficacement la main d'œuvre civile et militaire dans les organisations de défense.

### Résultats et recommandations

Les civils représentent une part importante (entre 20 % et 35 %) des forces totales de défense dans la plupart des pays. Ils ont tendance à être plus âgés, à inclure relativement plus de femmes et à être employés dans les secteurs du soutien et dans une plus grande variété de services que le personnel militaire. L'enquête indique de bonnes relations de travail, un haut niveau d'interaction entre le personnel militaire et civil et de nombreux aspects très positifs du travail en contexte mixte, tels que la complémentarité des rôles / spécialités, la diversité des points de vue et la stabilité apportée par les civils. Par ailleurs, les problèmes relevés sont notamment, en particulier pour les civils, les effets négatifs sur la progression de la carrière ou les opportunités de formation et les effets négatifs du cycle de rotation des militaires, les barrières culturelles entre le personnel civil et militaire, la perception d'une inégalité de traitement au sein de l'organisation liée aux différences de rémunération et de gestion du personnel civil et militaire. Les recommandations sont les suivantes :

- Faire des relations entre le personnel civil et militaire une priorité ;
- Faciliter la compréhension mutuelle des cultures / rôles par un travail et des opportunités de formation mixtes ;
- Développer des identités prioritaires mettant l'accent sur l'identification mixte des civils et des militaires avec les organisations de défense, en plus d'identités uniques attribuées aux sous-groupes ;
- Encourager les cadres supérieurs à souligner l'importance de la collaboration entre civils et militaires ; et
- Etudier des méthodes optimales pour combiner les pratiques, outils et stratégies dans le but de développer une approche globale de gestion de l'intégration du personnel civil et militaire.

### **Importance au plan militaire / pour l'OTAN**

A l'heure actuelle, la majorité des pays ne se focalisent pas sur l'intégration du personnel civil et militaire et sur la culture au travail ou le font de manière parcellaire. Le RTG HFM-226 de la STO de l'OTAN a planifié et suivi un programme de travail pour combler ce fossé. Les résultats indiquent que le personnel civil et militaire qui collabore de façon positive est plus satisfait et plus engagé dans son travail et envers l'organisation de défense, ce qui se répercute sur l'efficacité opérationnelle et organisationnelle. Dans l'ensemble, les découvertes du RTG suggèrent que la gestion du personnel civil et militaire devrait être prise en considération dans les stratégies de gestion du personnel des organisations de défense. A ce titre, les conclusions de ces travaux contribuent au besoin capacitaire à long terme (LTCR) de l'OTAN consistant à améliorer les performances humaines au sein des organisations de défense.

# **Chapter 1 – INTRODUCTION: MILITARY-CIVILIAN PERSONNEL INTEGRATION AND COLLABORATION IN DEFENCE ORGANISATIONS**

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## **1.1 MILITARY-CIVILIAN PERSONNEL INTEGRATION AND COLLABORATION IN DEFENCE ORGANISATIONS**

Defence organisations are unique in that they comprise integrated military and civilian personnel working in partnership with each other (e.g., in headquarters, on bases, on missions, in academic settings). Many defence civilians are supervised by military supervisors and managers, while others are themselves responsible for managing military personnel. At the same time, despite often high levels of partnership and integration, military and civilian personnel are governed by very different personnel management systems, and have distinct cultures. These factors can affect the nature of collaboration between these integrated workforces and influence personnel outcomes and organisational effectiveness, as well as having resource implications. There are significant knowledge gaps in empirical research on this fundamental issue affecting defence organisations.

Although the issue of civilian-military working relationships and work culture is largely unexplored, as evidenced by international requests for information (e.g., The Technical Cooperation Programme / TTCP requests; [2])<sup>1</sup>, it is an important human resources issue in defence organisations. Several small-scale studies have indicated that there is a need for exploration in this area, with findings indicating that civilian employees feel that military personnel receive greater workplace advantages, that their skills and expertise are not recognized to the same degree as those of their military counterparts, and that the military rotational cycle impacts on their work. These studies indicate that military leaders and supervisors are generally ill-equipped to carry out civilian human resource responsibilities (e.g., Refs. [11] and [12]). Discussions of NATO HFM ET-109 on this topic confirmed that it is an important personnel issue in defence organisations and highlighted knowledge and research gaps requiring further exploration [3].

## **1.2 AIM AND SCOPE**

The NATO Science and Technology Organization (STO) Human Factors and Medicine (HFM) Research Task Group (RTG) 226 was established in order to extend understanding of military and civilian personnel work culture and relations in defence organisations through theoretical and empirical analyses, with the goal of identifying the challenges and enablers of effective collaboration between these integrated workforces. The RTG

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<sup>1</sup> Although little substantive information/research was received in response to the TTCP request for information, the importance of this issue for personnel management in defence organisations was noted by the TTCP nations, with reciprocal requests for feedback should information sought in the request be gathered. This feedback supported the need for research in this domain.

examined existing data sources, databases and policy and strategic documents in order to understand and compare military and civilian workforces within defence organisations, and the policies and directives that guide their management. Moreover, a personnel survey was developed specifically for the purpose of understanding key aspects of military-civilian working relations and dynamics (e.g., quality of relations and communications between military and civilian personnel; unique effects of working in a military environment on civilian personnel, and supervision of civilian personnel by military supervisors, and vice versa). This study will contribute to one of the basic NATO Long-Term Capability Requirements (LTCR), that of Human Performance Enhancement in Defence Organisations [13].

The objectives of the Research Task Group (RTG) were:

- To review and assess current knowledge and research in the area of civilian and military personnel work culture and relations in defence organisations;
- To extend the understanding of civilian and military personnel work culture and relations in defence organisations through theoretical analysis and empirical studies;
- To develop, operationalise, and test a conceptual model of military and civilian work culture and relations through a military-civilian personnel survey; and
- To generate recommendations and best practices regarding programmes and policies for effective personnel management of both military and civilian workforces [5].

Topics to be covered included, but were not limited to:

- Cross-national comparison of work-force ratios and demographics of military and civilian workforces;
- The nature and extent of interaction and integration between civilian and military personnel;
- Cross-national comparison of policies, procedures, and best practices relating to civilian and military personnel management;
- Examination of factors related to culture and relations among civilian and military personnel, and the effects of these on personnel and organisational outcomes such as organisational commitment, job satisfaction, and retention;
- Comparative benefits and drawbacks of employment in defence organisations for military and civilian personnel, as well as their effects on perceptions of organisational fairness;
- Issues related to leadership and supervision of integrated military-civilian workforces;
- Integration of civilians in operational and/or multinational settings;
- Theoretical/conceptual examinations of military-civilian integration; and
- Analyses of military-civilian collaboration and integration in specific settings through case studies.

### **1.3 KEY TERMS**

It is useful to define some key terms and to specify their meaning in the context of this report. These key terms have served as working definitions for the RTG.



### **1.3.1 Civilian Personnel<sup>2</sup>**

Recognizing variability across organisations, this category of personnel is specific to civilians who work within national defence organisations (see definition of “defence organisations” below). In addition to indeterminate, full-time civilian staff, this category may include term, contract, casual, or student personnel, and may include civilian personnel in a variety of general occupational categories (e.g., administrative support, technical, scientific and professional, executive, etc.) and specific occupations (e.g., defence scientist, general labourer, clerical worker). Civilian personnel may be unionized and/or governed by collective agreements. Civilian personnel may include former military members/veterans who are currently working in civilian jobs, as well as various (civilian) specialists.

### **1.3.2 Military Personnel<sup>3</sup>**

This category of personnel is specific to military members who work within (or are posted to) national defence organisations (see definition of “defence organisations” below). “Military personnel” is a blanket term used to refer to members of any armed force. Usually, military personnel are divided into branches of service, such as Army, Navy, and Air Force. Those who serve in a typical large land force are soldiers, making up an army. Those who serve in seagoing forces are seamen, and their branch is a navy. Military personnel may include regular force military personnel, reserve force military personnel, and other military personnel working within a variety of military occupational categories, general or specific. Military personnel may be governed by codes of service or conduct, and (in some cases) may be unionized.

### **1.3.3 Defence Organisations**

This category of organisations refers to national defence organisations, such as the Department of National Defence (DND) in Canada; the Department of Defense (DoD) in the United States; the Ministry of Defence (MoD) in the United Kingdom, the Estonian Ministry Of Defence (MOD) and the Estonian Defence Force (EDF); the Belgian Defence Organisation; the Dutch Defence Organisation; and so on. Defence organisations are comprised of both military and civilian personnel who may be required to interact, coordinate, or otherwise cooperate with one another (see definition of “cooperation” below) in the course of performing their jobs. Their roles vary to some degree, but generally pertain to the defence of their respective nations (at home and abroad), as well as collaboration in the goal of defence with allied nations.

### **1.3.4 Cooperation**

Within the context of NATO STO RTG HFM-226, this concept refers to the variety of ways in which civilian and military personnel may interact and collaborate with one another in the context of performing their jobs within defence organisations. Cooperation is a broad term that encompasses aspects such the nature and quality of the cooperation (or working relationship) between military and civilian personnel within defence organisations, the degree to which they work together or for what purpose (e.g., on projects); their level of direct contact (e.g., daily, weekly, monthly); the nature of their contact (e.g., for formal work purposes, for informal socializing); whether they are physically co-located or not; the quality of their communication; and various other

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<sup>2</sup> Although there is some overlap, conscripts are essentially considered to be civilians that serve as military, but do not usually consider themselves as military personnel per se.

<sup>3</sup> There is variability among definitions of military personnel, such that some classes of personnel (e.g., the Coast Guard within the United States, the Gendarmerie within France, the Defence League within Estonia, and the militia within Switzerland) may or may not be included in the definition – depending on the unique way that military personnel are defined in any given nation. This will be addressed within the report on a case-by-case basis.

qualities of the working relationship (e.g., whether it is hierarchical or egalitarian; whether there is mutual respect, mutual recognition of skills/contributions, and mutual understanding of terms of service; whether the relationship is productive, positive, or equitable; whether military and civilian personnel are focused on achieving the same goal; whether military [civilian] managers treat their civilian [military] personnel with fairness, etc.).

#### **1.4 INTERNATIONAL PROPORTIONS OF MILITARY AND CIVILIAN PERSONNEL IN DEFENCE ORGANISATIONS**

Personnel data bases and organisational documents were examined in order to compare the proportions of military members and civilian public/civil servants across defence organisations<sup>4</sup>. As can be seen in Table 1-1, in most cases civilian personnel represent a significant proportion of the “total force,” where the total force, for most countries, includes both regular military forces and reserve military forces or their equivalents, along with civilians. This civilian component of the total force reflects a significant proportion of the total defence organisation, and this appears to be the case regardless of the size of the total force.<sup>5</sup> Notable exceptions are Belgium and Turkey, where proportions of defence civilians are much lower.

**Table 1-1: International Proportions of Military and Civilian Personnel in Defence Organisations.**

<b>Nation</b>	<b>Regular Force</b>	<b>Reserve Force</b>	<b>Total Number of Military Personnel</b>	<b>Defence Civilians</b>	<b>Total Force</b>	<b>Civilian Percentage of Total Force<sup>6</sup></b>
<b>Australia<sup>a</sup></b>	57,994	22,072	80,066	21,818	101,884	<b>21.4%</b>
<b>Belgium<sup>b</sup></b>	29,681		29,681 <sup>7</sup>	1,709	31,390	<b>5.4%</b>
<b>Canada<sup>c</sup></b>	65,890	26,711	92,601	26,220	118,821	<b>22.1%</b>
<b>Estonia<sup>d</sup></b>	2,752		2,957	1,571	4,528	<b>34.7%<sup>8</sup></b>
<b>Germany<sup>e</sup></b>	186,459	36,116	222,575	94,708	317,283	<b>29.8%</b>
<b>Netherlands<sup>f</sup></b>	41,369	5,249	46,618	15,816	62,434	<b>25.3%</b>
<b>New Zealand<sup>g</sup></b>	9,006	2,312	11,318	2,771	14,089	<b>19.7%</b>
<b>Norway<sup>h</sup></b>	11,500		11,500 <sup>9</sup>	5,000	16,500	<b>30.3%<sup>i</sup></b>

<sup>4</sup> Data from the NATO STO RTG HFM-226 nations and several others who provided input were included in this comparison.

<sup>5</sup> It is important to note that the personnel data presented herein, and throughout this chapter, are derived from somewhat heterogeneous sources, and from different timeframes, and thus may capture slightly different population definitions. As such, although these data provide a useful overview of military and civilian personnel estimates, the personnel data may not be directly comparable in all cases.

<sup>6</sup> Due to rounding, the civilian percentages of the total force presented in Table 1-1, and other percentages cited in tables throughout this chapter, may differ slightly from those reported in the corresponding country report chapters.

<sup>7</sup> This figure includes full-time military personnel only, as data for other military personnel were unavailable.

<sup>8</sup> This civilian percentage (34.7%) is derived from a total force (4,528) that includes 1,571 civilian personnel, 2,752 regular military personnel (members of the Estonian Defence Forces) as well as other Estonian military personnel (e.g., from the Ministry of Defence, 9; the Defence Resources Agency, 2; and the Estonian Defence League; 194). For additional details, see Ref. [8].

<sup>9</sup> This figure includes regular force military personnel only.

Nation	Regular Force	Reserve Force	Total Number of Military Personnel	Defence Civilians	Total Force	Civilian Percentage of Total Force <sup>6</sup>
Sweden <sup>i</sup>	13,838	8,113	21,951	6,616	28,567	23.2%
Turkey <sup>k</sup>	457,677	211,381	669,058	49,215	718,273	6.9%
United Kingdom <sup>l</sup>	154,840 <sup>10</sup>	36,910 <sup>11</sup>	194,890 <sup>12</sup>	56,860	251,750	22.6%
United States <sup>m</sup>	1,340,766	839,102	2,179,868	724,782	2,904,650	25.1% <sup>13</sup>

<sup>a</sup> Government of Australia [6].

<sup>b</sup> Data as of 2015, as cited in Ref. [18].

<sup>c</sup> Data as of 2015, as cited in Ref. [4].

<sup>d</sup> Data as of 2015, as cited in Ref.[8].

<sup>e</sup> Data as of 2013, as cited in Ref.[9].

<sup>f</sup> Data as of 2016, as cited in Ref. [1].

<sup>g</sup> New Zealand Defence Force [14]; P. Kennedy, Manager HR Insights, Organisational Planning & Development, Defence Human Resources for New Zealand Defence Force), personal communication, January 10, 2016.

<sup>h</sup> Norwegian Armed Forces [15] – see <http://mil.no/organisation/personnel/Pages/personnel.aspx>.

<sup>i</sup> Does not include part-time reserves. Norway manages its reservists and Home Guard using conscription and thus does not allow for straightforward comparisons.

<sup>j</sup> Data as of 2011, as cited in Ref. [16].

<sup>k</sup> Data as of 2012, as cited in Ref. [10]. Reserve force includes the Gendarmerie and Coast Guard; the civilians within the Gendarmerie ( $N = 3,766$ ) and Coast Guard ( $N = 886$ ) are not counted in this table.

<sup>l</sup> Data as of 2015, as cited in Ref. [7].

<sup>m</sup> Data as of 2015, as cited in Ref. [17].

## 1.5 ORGANISATION OF THIS REPORT

One of the main objectives of this Research Task Group was to conduct a cross-national comparison of the demographic characteristics of the military and civilian workforces and policies and practices related to civilian and personnel management. Chapters 2 – 9, in Part II of this report, present the national reports along these dimensions based on the existing data sources, databases and policy and strategic documents available in each country, and Chapter 10 presents a cross-national summary of these national reports. This summary highlights common themes pertaining to both military-civilian personnel demographics and policies across the nations, particularly those policies that function to integrate the two workforces; but it also suggests that there are relatively few policies in place that focus explicitly on military-civilian integration and collaboration.

<sup>10</sup> This figure includes United Kingdom Regular Force and Gurkha personnel [7].

<sup>11</sup> This figure for the United Kingdom Reserve Forces includes the Volunteer Reserve, Serving Regular Reserve and Sponsored Reserve, excluding Royal Fleet Auxiliary; and excludes University Officer Cadets [7].

<sup>12</sup> This figure includes Additional Army Personnel, including Military Provost Guard Service and Locally Engaged Personnel [7].

<sup>13</sup> The United States, by definition, does not have full-time reservists, except in the National Guard, but these are, according to United States documents, not to be included with Active Duty Service (full-time service).

Another main component of the NATO STO RTG HFM-226 program of work was to assess military-civilian work culture and relations empirically, using feedback provided by military and civilian personnel. This was accomplished through the creation of the Military-Civilian Personnel Survey (MCPS), which was administered across 11 nations and explored a range of issues specific to collaboration between military and civilian personnel working together within defence organisations. The countries surveyed included: Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Canada, Estonia, Germany, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States. This is an important initiative in that, despite much anecdotal and incidental information, this was a first attempt to examine these issues systematically in large samples of military and civilian respondents, and further, to examine military-civilian relations and dynamics from the perspective of both military and civilian personnel.

Part III of this Report is dedicated to presenting the MCPS methodology and results using a cross-national approach. In particular, Chapter 11 delineates the objectives of the survey, the survey instrument, the sampling and survey administration procedures, and the national sample characteristics. Chapter 12 presents the cross-national descriptive results, including the extent of interaction between military and civilian personnel, quality of relations and communication between military and civilian personnel, effectiveness of intergroup supervision for civilians supervised by military managers and vice versa, effects of working in a military context on key aspects of civilians' employment, and military and civilian scores on key outcome variables such as job satisfaction and retention intentions. Chapter 13 presents and examines two conceptual models related to military-civilian personnel collaboration in defence organisations – the *Organisational Factors Model* and the *Work Culture and Relations Model* of military-civilian personnel integration. In particular, correlational analyses examining how aspects of military-civilian work culture and relations, as well as unique aspects of working in a military-civilian environment, relate to selected personnel and organisational outcomes of interest are presented. Chapter 14 presents the qualitative analyses based on the three open-ended questions included in the MCPS in order to complement the quantitative information and to allow personnel to express their attitudes, perceptions, and experiences related to military-civilian personnel collaboration and integration in their own words. More specifically, the questions asked respondents to identify the most important factors for establishing and maintaining positive military-civilian personnel work culture and relations, the challenges they experienced working in a military-civilian environment, and what they viewed to be the main advantages of working in a military-civilian environment.

Although this RTG research examines military-civilian relations in “defence organisations,” this term is used broadly and heuristically and it is important to recognize that there is great variability in defence workplaces and in the various contexts within which military and civilian personnel work together. Although exhaustive exploration of such contexts was not feasible, Part IV of this Report aims to extend our inquiry in this domain and provides research examining military-civilian work culture and relations in a cross-section of contexts within national defence organisations and in multi-national settings. Likewise, although the issue of military-civilian integration is complex and multifaceted, this section provides research delving into select specific key dimensions in this domain.

The contrast in military and civilians cultures may be especially evident in military educational institutions where the more authoritarian elements of military culture held by the military professors as well as divergent pedagogical approaches may conflict with the often much more liberal tendencies of civilian academics. Chapter 15 presents an analysis of military-civilian dynamics in United States military educational institutions, along with the unique challenges and considerations specific to military academies.

Chapter 16 presents a case study, based on research in the United Kingdom Defence Equipment and Support (DE&S) organisation where, unlike most of the other contexts examined in this report, military personnel are in

the minority (representing approximately 10% of the employees) and civilian personnel are in the majority. The data that supported this case study were derived from a PhD thesis based on a much broader social anthropological study using 126 interviews and 6 years of observations to investigate factors that affected the organisational culture of DE&S. Although the thesis was not designed to investigate cultural differences between military and civilian personnel, a number of findings in this regard were evident nonetheless and were therefore used to investigate some of the research themes within the context of this RTG. These findings, including issues related to organisational identification, onboarding, and intergroup dynamics within this milieu, are discussed.

One of the major demographic trends identified in this report concerns the divergent gender demographics of military and civilian workforces in defence organisations. Within all RTG HFM-226 defence organisations, women constitute a lower percentage of the military workforce than they represent within the civilian workforce, adding another dimension that may influence the work culture and relations between military and civilian personnel. Chapter 17, drawing on data from the MCPS, provides a gender-based analysis of military-civilian work culture and relations in defence organisations from a cross-national perspective.

Chapter 18 presents the findings of an empirical study of military-civilian personnel collaboration and integration in a multinational operational setting (i.e., within NATO Kosovo Force/KFOR Headquarters). This empirical study followed the suggestion by the NATO Allied Transformation Command (ACT) that the work of this task group may also inform some NATO priority capability issues, particularly the NATO Capability Requirement “Optimizing the Human Aspects of Operations.” Focus on this capability requirement stems from increasing primacy placed specifically on effectiveness in operations. ACT indicated that examination of military-civilian work culture and relations in a multinational operational setting would be a useful exploratory extension of the RTG program of work given that civilians are increasingly playing various roles on operations but that problems with their integration in such settings have been observed, interfering with their work and with overall operational effectiveness. Chapter 18 presents the challenges and enablers to military-civilian collaboration at NATO KFOR HQ, based on interviews with senior KFOR leaders and on data from a personnel survey administered to general samples of military and civilian personnel working within this multinational operational setting.

Chapter 19 presents the findings of an empirical study conducted at a strategic-level multinational setting, based on data collected at the NATO Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE). SHAPE’s mission is to prepare for, plan, and conduct military operations in order to meet Alliance political objectives. In 2014, a study of SHAPE’s Organisational Culture (OCS) was requested by the Chief of Staff to examine topics related to organisational culture and corporate identity, commitment, leadership, trust, job satisfaction, mission identification, working atmosphere, and command climate. In the context of this larger study, there was also an opportunity to explore aspects of military-civilian personnel work culture and relations within a multinational context and within this highest military NATO level, which employs personnel from 28 or more nations and comprises a relatively large proportion of civilians as compared to other multinational military deployments. As such, representatives from NATO STO RTG HFM-226 collaborated with researchers conducting the OCS to examine SHAPE’s integrated military and civilian staff. Chapter 19 presents the results of this analysis.

Chapter 20 focuses largely on the integration and workplace relations factors associated with civilian contractors. This issue has taken on greater importance given the increasing number of civilian contractors participating on operations and within other defence functions, and the likelihood that this trend will continue. Military and civilian public servants’ experiences and perceptions of working with civilian contractors are presented. This chapter also presents research related to public service civilians working in the United States Army and Navy and discusses how military personnel’s social comparisons with civilian co-workers in regard to benefits and costs of employment affect military members’ employment attitudes and retention intentions.

Civilians also continue to play greater roles in operational settings and are often thought to complement military capabilities in theatre. As such, RAND Corporation conducted research for the United States Department of Defense to recommend guidelines for establishing and maintaining a civilian deployment capability and identified lessons and best practices for civilian deployment. The goal of that report was to provide information on the civilian deployment practices and procedures of NATO and its individual members' defence organisations. Given the relationship between this RAND project examining the deployment of civilians and our general research on military-civilian integration in defence organisations, RAND summarized relevant content from the above-noted broader report to be included as a chapter in this RTG Report, as presented in Chapter 21. Drawing on extensive document review and subject matter consultation, they identified best practices and created a typology of four models of civilian deployment, highlighting the benefits and drawbacks of each.

Chapter 22 takes a broad theoretical approach and applies military-civilian personnel relations as studied in this RTG through the lens of concordance theory, suggesting that this approach can be used to benefit future NATO missions more generally. This chapter provides a theoretical and policy perspective and discusses the benefits of embracing institutional civil–military separations while simultaneously benefiting from overlapping boundaries regarding civil–military employee relations. Using this theoretical approach based in concordance theory, this chapter proposes that separate civil–military boundaries may exist alongside overlapping civilian and military spheres of activity and argues that the separation and co-mingling of boundaries would serve to strengthen NATO as it develops a wide spectrum of peacekeeping and state-building strategies. It is suggested that this alternative framework, which challenges strict notions of civil-military separation, may assist NATO in future missions to guide and advice nations seeking to rebuild their governments and their civil-military relationships.

Democratic or civilian control of the armed forces is the model by which democratic nations operate, which entails political leaders, representing the citizenry, determining the direction of the military. At the organisational level, senior civilian leaders or bureaucrats, through a variety of functions such as management of materiel and finance, work within defence organisations, complementing the functions of senior military leaders in order to enact the governance of civilian control of the armed forces through their central roles in decision making, policy development, and strategy. As a foray into this domain, Chapter 23 presents a select analysis of how the interplay and tensions between senior military and civilian leaders in the Netherlands Ministry of Defence influence changes in the governance structure of the defence organisation. It is emphasized that recognizing the different roles and perspectives of senior military leaders and defence bureaucrats enables the development of strategies for ameliorating potential tensions in defence and other public sector organisations.

Chapter 24 in Part V of this Report provides a synthesis and integration of the component chapters. The main findings are summarized, and the challenges and benefits experienced by military and civilian personnel working together in defence organisations are synopsized. Recommendations for addressing some of the challenges and for facilitating optimal military-civilian personnel integration and collaboration are proffered. Taken together, these recommendations may serve to harmonize the functioning of what are sometimes distinct and divergent systems and thereby optimally benefit military and civilian personnel, defence organisations, and operational outcomes.

## **1.6 CONCLUSION**

The issue of civilian and military personnel integration and work culture relations is an important topic for most defence organisations. Many defence organisations are now, more explicitly, recognizing the importance of ensuring optimal collaboration between the military and civilian workforces within their organisations. Given that this organisational issue has received little empirical attention, NATO STO RTG HFM-226 planned and executed a program of research to better inform this topic. Results of this research are presented in this report.

The outputs of this work fill knowledge gaps and inform practices and policy for effective personnel management of both military and civilian workforces in defence organisations.

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## Chapter 2 – MILITARY-CIVILIAN PERSONNEL: BELGIUM COUNTRY REPORT

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### 2.1 DEMOGRAPHICS

In this Report, the Belgian defence establishment is described in terms of demographics of military and civilian personnel, and policies and practices affecting military civilian integration. Specifically in terms of demographics, military and civilian groups are compared in terms of age, gender, and employment categories [2].

In the latest strategic vision document published in June 2016 [3], the Belgian government provides proper direction for the long term, which allows the Belgian Defence organisation to respond to the security challenges of tomorrow. This document also refers to the appropriate guidelines for the future of the personnel and the functioning of Defence. Despite the fact that half of Belgian service members will go into retirement in the next 10 years, the current operational commitment needs to remain at the appropriate level. Therefore, an important additional recruitment effort is foreseen in order to ensure that Defence maintains 25,000 full-time equivalents (consisting of about 24,000 military and 1,000 civilian staff members), with a focus put on young people and technological profiles.

Table 2-1, below, gives a picture of the evolution of the ratio of military personnel to civilians since 2011. In 2015, only 5.44% of the employees of the defence organisation were civilians [2].

**Table 2-1: Ratio of Military/Civilian Personnel (2011 – 2015).**


Categories	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
<b>Military</b>	32,182	30,982	31,027	30,512	29,681
<b>Civilian</b>	2,112	2,021	1,932	1,830	1,709
<b>Total</b>	<b>34,294</b>	<b>33,003</b>	<b>32,959</b>	<b>32,342</b>	<b>31,390</b>
<b>% Civilian</b>	<b>6.16%</b>	<b>6.12%</b>	<b>5.86%</b>	<b>5.66%</b>	<b>5.44%</b>

In the past 5 years, as it has also been the case for the military personnel, the number of civilians has slightly decreased. In 2015, there were 403 civilians less than in 2011.

Regarding the number of Full-Time Equivalents (FTEs), there are currently about 31,000 FTEs, including approximately 1,500 civilian FTEs.

As discussed earlier, according to the Strategic Vision 2016 (Figure 2-1; [3], p. 134), by 2030, it is projected that there will remain approximately 25,000 FTEs (around 24,000 military FTEs and around 1,000 civilian FTEs). This is explained by the fact that almost half of the current workers will retire in the next 10 years.

The organisational purpose is also to abandon the idea of *Life Time Employment* and to have more flexibility and younger talents among the workforce.



**Figure 2-1: Evolution of the Number of FTEs (Military and Civilian Personnel, 2016 – 2030).**

Among the 1709 civilians who are currently working for the defence organisation, 1544 are full-time equivalents (Table 2-2; [2]). And, in the following years, around 50 civilians will be hired each year.

**Table 2-2: Full-Time Equivalents Among Civilians (2015).**

	Level A				Level B				Level C				Level D				Total			
	Ind		FTE		Ind		FTE		Ind		FTE		Ind		FTE		Ind		FTE	
	M	W	M	W	M	W	M	W	M	W	M	W	M	W	M	W	M	W	M	W
<b>Statutory</b>	258	106	239.7	91.7	145	115	137.9	91.12	204	168	194.2	148	236	136	223.5	107.5	<b>843</b>	<b>525</b>	<b>795.2</b>	<b>444.3</b>
<b>Contractual</b>	45	18	41.26	17.4	7	12	6.8	10.08	15	28	15	23.85	55	161	53.7	136.6	<b>122</b>	<b>219</b>	<b>116.8</b>	<b>187.9</b>
<b>Total</b>	303	124	281	109.1	152	127	144.7	107.2	219	196	209.2	171.8	291	297	277.2	244.1	<b>965</b>	<b>744</b>	<b>912</b>	<b>632.2</b>
																	<b>1709</b>	<b>1544.14</b>		

**2.1.1 Type of Functions and Categories**

As shown in Table 2-3 [2], the majority of the civilians working for the Belgian Defence organisation (1709) work in various ACOS (*Assistant Chief of Staff*) and DG (*Direction Générale*). Among them, 415 are working for ACOS Operations and Training. We also find the most civilians in the medical service (188).

**Table 2-3: Distribution Among Departments (2015).**

Departments	Military	Civilian	Total
Army	10,661	100	10,761
Air	5,958	42	6,000
Navy	1,434	42	1,476
Medical Service	1,351	188	1,539
Other ACOS Operations and Training	507	43	550
ACOS Operations and Training	19,911	415	20,326
Other ACOS and DG	8,631	1,196	9,827
International Functions	704	7	711
Other Units inside MOD	181	44	225
Other Units outside MOD	254	47	201
<b>Total</b>	<b>29,681</b>	<b>1,709</b>	<b>31,390</b>

In the following Table 2-4 [2], one can see more detail into which category of personnel civilians belong. The majority of them (1183) are civil servants while the others are into more specific categories. Most civilians perform corporate functions (material resources, medical, academic staff) and are non-deployable, although there are some efforts to involve them in operations. Only very few are in combat or combat support structures.

**Table 2-4: Types of Status Among Civilians (2011 – 2015).**

	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
Statutory civil servants	1,496	1,415	1,341	1,277	1,183
Chaplains and moral counsellors	18	21	20	21	20
Security personnel (ACOS Intelligence Service)	61	66	60	60	55
Teaching personnel	92	97	96	77	74
Army museum personnel	35	38	38	36	36
<b>Statutory</b>	<b>1,702</b>	<b>1,637</b>	<b>1,555</b>	<b>1,471</b>	<b>1,368</b>
<b>Contractual</b>	<b>410</b>	<b>384</b>	<b>377</b>	<b>359</b>	<b>341</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>2,112</b>	<b>2,021</b>	<b>1,932</b>	<b>1,830</b>	<b>1,709</b>

Civilians working for the Belgian Defence organisation can be hired under two different types of contract: under contract, or “appointed”/until retirement. The majority of civilians have been appointed, so this means that, if they do not commit a serious misconduct, they will stay until retirement (i.e., until 65 years old, and soon, until 67 years old).

Civilians working at the Belgian Defence organisation are distributed among 4 various categories: level A, level B, level C and level D, according to their respective academic level (Table 2-5; [2]). For example, level A refers to university degrees.

**Table 2-5: Distribution of Level Among Civilians (2011 – 2015).**

	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
<b>Level A</b>	475	483	471	443	427
<b>Level B</b>	303	310	302	294	279
<b>Level C</b>	494	476	462	449	415
<b>Level D</b>	840	752	697	644	588
<b>Total</b>	<b>2,112</b>	<b>2,021</b>	<b>1,932</b>	<b>1,830</b>	<b>1,709</b>

Because the organisation wants to hire civilians who are specialists in some areas (e.g., Intel, Cyber and Influence Capacity, Research and technology, law; [3]), we can see that the number of levels of A & B has been quite constant. In contrast, the number of civilians with a lower level of educational background (level D) has been decreasing and will continue to decrease in the years to come.

Although most civilians are statutory civil servants, there is a trend to reduce this category of civilians in Belgium and to shift more people to contracts, thus avoiding rigidity and higher costs.

### 2.1.2 Gender Diversity

A little less than one civilian employee out of two is a woman (43.53%). As illustrated in the Table 2-6 below, women are mainly (over)represented among the lowest levels (levels C & D; [2]).

**Table 2-6: Gender Diversity and Types of Level Among Civilians (2011 – 2015).**

	Level A		Level B		Level C		Level D		Total	
	Women	W (%)	Women	W (%)	Women	W (%)	Women	W (%)	Women	W (%)
<b>2011</b>	152	32.00	136	44.88	217	43.93	393	46.79	<b>898</b>	<b>42.52</b>
<b>2012</b>	152	31.47	141	45.48	216	45.38	365	48.54	<b>874</b>	<b>43.25</b>
<b>2013</b>	149	31.63	138	45.70	216	46.75	341	48.92	<b>844</b>	<b>43.69</b>
<b>2014</b>	132	29.80	137	46.60	213	47.44	314	48.76	<b>796</b>	<b>43.50</b>
<b>2015</b>	124	29.04	127	45.52	196	47.23	297	50.51	<b>744</b>	<b>43.53</b>

If we compare the percentage of women between civilians and military personnel, not surprisingly, the percentage of women is lower among the latter group. As we can see in Table 2-7 below, only 7.72% of military personnel are women [2].

**Table 2-7: Gender Diversity Among Military Personnel (2011 – 2015).**

	Officers		NCOs		Soldiers		Total Military	
	Women	W (%)	Women	W (%)	Women	W (%)	Women	W (%)
<b>2011</b>	459	9.88	888	6.47	1,135	8.21	<b>2,482</b>	<b>7.71</b>
<b>2012</b>	469	10.42	864	6.56	1,022	7.68	<b>2,355</b>	<b>7.60</b>
<b>2013</b>	491	10.95	872	6.66	1,004	7.46	<b>2,367</b>	<b>7.63</b>
<b>2014</b>	498	11.19	885	6.77	949	7.31	<b>2,332</b>	<b>7.64</b>
<b>2015</b>	<b>532</b>	<b>11.81</b>	<b>878</b>	<b>6.80</b>	<b>881</b>	<b>7.18</b>	<b>2,291</b>	<b>7.72</b>

If we look at the distribution of women in the different military services (Table 2-8; [2]), we see that women are the most represented among the medical component (26.39%). In contrast, we have a very low percentage of women working in the Army (5.53%).

**Table 2-8: Gender Diversity Among Civilians (2015).**

	Women	Men	% Women
<b>Army</b>	1,014	17,312	5.53
<b>Air</b>	611	7,064	7.96
<b>Navy</b>	186	1,587	10.49
<b>Medical Service</b>	403	1,124	26.39
<b>Musicians</b>	33	153	17.74
<b>Not Distributed</b>	44	150	22.68
<b>Total</b>	2,291	27,390	7.72

### 2.1.3 Linguistic Diversity

Due to the linguistic composition of Belgium, there is a 60/40 ratio requirement for Dutch and French speaking personnel. Nevertheless, among higher ranks, there tend to be more Dutch speaking officers, while the proportion of French speakers is higher at the lower ranks, which probably reflects the impact of bilingual proficiency requirements for higher ranks (Table 2-9; [2]).

**Table 2-9: Dutch and French Speakers Among Military Personnel (2011 – 2015).**

	Officers		NCOs		Soldiers		Military Personnel			
	D	F	D	F	D	F	D	F	Dutch-Speakers (%)	French-Speakers (%)
2011	2,822	1,822	7,823	5,893	7,083	6,739	17,728	14,454	55.08	44.92
2012	2,755	1,744	7,471	5,708	6,844	6,460	17,070	13,912	55.09	44.91
2013	2,745	1,739	7,444	5,649	7,022	6,428	17,211	13,816	55.47	44.53
2014	2,712	1,737	7,468	5,611	6,757	6,227	16,937	13,575	55.50	44.50
2015	2,731	1,775	7,393	5,516	6,334	5,932	16,458	13,223	55.45	44.55

Among civilian employees (Table 2-10), around half of the personnel are French-speakers and they tend to be slightly overrepresented [2].

**Table 2-10: Dutch and French Speakers Among Civilian Personnel (2011 – 2015).**

	Level A		Level B		Level C		Level D		Civilians		
	D	F	D	F	D	F	D	F	Dutch-Speakers (%)	French-Speakers (%)	Total
2011	226	249	130	173	205	289	460	380	1,021	1,091	2,112
2012	259	224	175	135	273	203	412	340	1,119	902	2,021
2013	253	218	170	132	278	184	311	386	1,012	920	1,932
2014	229	214	162	132	272	177	291	353	954	876	1,830
2015	222	205	153	126	251	164	272	316	898	811	1,709

#### 2.1.4 Age Distribution

As previously mentioned, one of the major challenges of the Belgian Defence organisation is its unbalanced age distribution and overrepresentation of older workers. The current mean age is 41 years old for military personnel, as indicated in Table 2-11 and Figure 2-2.

Table 2-11: Age Distribution Among Military Personnel (2011 – 2015).

	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015		
					Men	Women	Average
<b>Officers</b>	37.72	37.82	38.10	38.25	39.29	33.49	38.57
<b>NCOs</b>	41.89	41.95	42.03	42.21	42.69	39.76	42.50
<b>Soldiers</b>	40.58	40.30	40.21	40.48	40.78	42.32	40.89
<b>Total</b>	<b>40.68</b>	<b>40.59</b>	<b>40.64</b>	<b>40.86</b>	<b>41.39</b>	<b>39.03</b>	<b>41.21</b>




Figure 2-2: Age Distribution Among Military Personnel (2011 – 2015).

For the civilian personnel, the mean age is even higher, with the majority of the current workers above 50 years old (Figure 2-3).




Figure 2-3: Age Distribution Among Civilian Personnel (2011 – 2015).

According to the Strategic Vision 2016 [3], the aim is to reduce the current mean age of 40.6 years old within the Belgian Defence organisation to 34 years old by 2030.

**2.1.5 Ethnic Diversity**

Since 2003, European Union (EU) citizens have been allowed to work for the Belgian Defence organisation. More than a decade after this new legislation, only 11 non-nationals are working as civilians and 139 as military personnel (see Table 2-12; [2]).

**Table 2-12: Nationality Among Civilian Personnel (2011 – 2015).**

Nationality	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015		
					Men	Women	Total
Belgian	2,098	2,010	1,919	1,819	961	737	1,698
Other	14	11	13	11	4	7	11
<b>Total</b>	<b>2,112</b>	<b>2,021</b>	<b>1,932</b>	<b>1,830</b>	<b>965</b>	<b>744</b>	<b>1,709</b>

As shown in Table 2-13, the majority of the civilian non-nationals are coming from France (3), Italy (3) and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) (2) [2].

**Table 2-13: Nationality of Civilians and Distribution by Level (2015).**

	Level A		Level B		Level C		Level D		Total		Total
	M	W	M	W	M	W	M	W	Men	Women	
Germany	1								1		1
France	1	1	1						2	1	3
Italy		1				1		1	0	3	3
Portugal								1	0	1	1
Switzerland								1	0	1	1
DRC							1	1	1	1	2
<b>Total</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>11</b>

As illustrated in Table 2-14, among the military personnel, 139 are non-nationals [2].

**Table 2-14: Nationality Among Military Personnel (2011 – 2015).**

Nationality	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015		
					Men	Women	Total
Belgian	32,086	30,869	30,892	30,377	27,270	2,272	29,542
Other	96	113	135	135	120	19	139
<b>Total</b>	<b>32,182</b>	<b>30,982</b>	<b>31,027</b>	<b>30,512</b>	<b>27,390</b>	<b>2,291</b>	<b>29,681</b>



As illustrated in Table 2-15 and partly due to linguistic constraints, mainly for Officers who have to be bilingual, the majority of non-nationals are coming from the Netherlands (61) and from France (33) [2].

**Table 2-15: Nationality of the Military Personnel and Distribution by Rank (2015).**

	Officers		NCOs		Soldiers		Total		Total
	M	W	M	W	M	W	Men	Women	
<b>Bulgaria</b>					1		1	0	1
<b>Germany</b>					6	2	6	2	8
<b>Finland</b>					1		1	0	1
<b>France</b>	2	3	11		16	1	29	4	33
<b>Greece</b>					1		1	0	1
<b>Ireland</b>	1				1		2	0	2
<b>Italy</b>					4	2	4	2	6
<b>The Netherlands</b>	4		12	3	38	4	54	7	61
<b>Poland</b>	1				2	1	3	1	4
<b>Portugal</b>				2	4		4	2	6
<b>Romania</b>			2	1	4		6	1	7
<b>Spain</b>			1		3		4	0	4
<b>Luxemburg</b>					1		1	0	1
<b>Sweden</b>					1		1	0	1
<b>Switzerland</b>					1		1	0	1
<b>United-Kingdom</b>			1		1		2	0	2
<b>Total</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>27</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>85</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>120</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>139</b>

## 2.2 POLICIES AND PRACTICES

One of the main challenges of the Belgian Defence organisation is the limited budget and the large costs allocated to personnel (around 75% of the defence budget). Annual Belgian defence expenditures are almost €4 billion, or about 1.9% of total public spending and around 1.1% of GDP. If we compare it to other NATO countries, we can easily recognize that Belgium is far below the NATO guideline (2%).

Aiming for a smaller but more modern defence organization, and in order to respond to the security challenges of tomorrow, the Belgian government has approved recent measures about the future of its military organisation. In its *Strategic Vision 2016*, there is a positive answer to the request of Belgium's partners in order to increase the "defence effort" and to reach 1.3% of the GDP in 2030 (Table 2-16; [3] p. 41).

**Table 2-16: Defence Expenditures (% GDP, 2015 – 2030).**

<b>2015</b>	3.8 bn €	0.94%						
<b>2016</b>	3.8 bn €	0.91%	<b>2021</b>	4.2 bn €	0.94%	<b>2026</b>	5.5 bn €	1.14%
<b>2017</b>	3.8 bn €	0.91%	<b>2022</b>	4.5 bn €	0.98%	<b>2027</b>	5.7 bn €	1.18%
<b>2018</b>	3.8 bn €	0.90%	<b>2023</b>	4.7 bn €	1.02%	<b>2028</b>	6.0 bn €	1.22%
<b>2019</b>	3.8 bn €	0.88%	<b>2024</b>	5.0 bn €	1.06%	<b>2029</b>	6.3 bn €	1.26%
<b>2020</b>	4.0 bn €	0.99%	<b>2025</b>	5.2 bn €	1.10%	<b>2030</b>	6.6 bn €	1.30%

The Belgian government also provides the appropriate guidelines for the future of the personnel and the functioning of the military organisation. Because half of the personnel will go into retirement in the next 10 years, an important additional recruitment effort will ensure that the Belgian Defence organisation maintains 25,000 full-time equivalents (consisting of about 24,000 military and 1,000 civilian staff members).<sup>1</sup>

In the past few years, several initiatives have been undertaken in order to manage an “old” defence organisation with a mean age above 40. So, for example, around 1500 persons have been recruited yearly, these new recruits have mainly been military personnel, rather than civilian personnel. So, as earlier discussed, the Belgian Defence organisation, with a fully integrated civilian-military Ministry Of Defence (MOD), has a very low proportion of civilians – just under 6% of the work force. As explained by Goldenberg, Andres and Resteigne [1], although military and civilian personnel work closely together in defence organisations, they are subject to different human resources practices and conditions of service. Because of these differences (in salaries, number of days off, retirement age, etc.) and according to social comparison theory, both categories of personnel may be inclined to compare themselves along a variety of dimensions. This statement is not specific to one country in particular, but the very low percentage of civilians encountered at the Belgian Defence organisation may encourage some majority–minority social processes, such as tokenism, and to reinforce some stereotypes regarding the minority group of civilians.

For military personnel, one of the big recent changes has been the creation, by a law adopted in 2013, of two new statuses (G1 and BDL) aimed at rejuvenating/modernising the current (personnel) strength. One (BDL) introduced shorter fixed-term contracts (6 – 8 years). The other (G1), among others, allows the transfer of military personnel declared medically unfit for reasons of duty to the civilian category. With the implementation of those changes, the aim is to recruit young people and technological profiles to a maximum extent. The aim of these recent changes is also to use civilian services through sourcing as much as possible, allowing the military personnel to focus on the operational commitments, insofar as this results in a cost reduction.

## 2.3 REFERENCES

- [1] Goldenberg, I., Andres, M. and Resteigne, D. (2016). Is military employment fair? Application of social comparison theory in a cross-national military sample. *Armed Forces & Society*, 42 (3), 518-541.
- [2] Ministry of Defence (2015). Annual Report 2015. Brussels: Directorate-General for Human Resources.
- [3] Ministry of Defence (2016). Strategic vision 2030 for the Belgian Defence. Brussels: Author.

<sup>1</sup> Also note that Belgium abolished conscription in 1994.

## **Chapter 3 – MILITARY-CIVILIAN PERSONNEL: CANADA COUNTRY REPORT**

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As described in the Introduction of this report (Chapter 1), the information in this chapter contains two main sections. The first section comprises a description of Canada’s military and civilian workforces along key demographic variables. The second section provides an overview of policies and legislative documents that relate directly to civilian employment within Canada’s Department of National Defence (DND), to military service within the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF), and to military-civilian integration within Canadian defence.

To set the stage for this discussion, we begin with a brief history of the Canadian defence context. The year 1966 marked a significant revolution in the organisation of defence in Canada, with the introduction of Bill C-243, the Canadian Forces Reorganisation Act. This legislation unified Canada’s armed forces, by abolishing the three separate services – the Canadian Army, the Royal Canadian Navy, and the Royal Canadian Air Force. This unification resulted in the establishment of the Canadian Forces, a single service with a common uniform and common rank designations.<sup>1</sup> However, the chain of command in the Canadian Forces remained separate from the Department of National Defence. Accordingly, the Canadian Forces were led by the Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS) at Canadian Forces Headquarters (CFHQ), whereas the Department of National Defence was headed by a Deputy Minister (DM). The DM was responsible for managing the department with the assistance of a department secretariat, known as the Deputy Minister’s Office (DMO) [16].

Persistent problems within management at the Department of National Defence resulted in the appointment of the Management Review Group (MRG) in 1971. The MRG was tasked with “examining all aspects of the management and operation of the Department of National Defence” ([2], p. 128). The MRG recommended that the “first step toward a better, more effective and efficient defence establishment must be the restructuring of the Department as a single entity” ([2], p. 128). The subsequent implementation of many of the recommendations by the MRG essentially amounted to a reorganisation that can best be characterized as the “integration” of the “military” and “civilian” parts of the headquarters to form a single organisation. More specifically, the DMO and CFHQ were consolidated in 1972 to create National Defence Headquarters (NDHQ), jointly headed by the DM and CDS, with both individuals reporting to the Minister of National Defence ([2], [14]). This organisational structure has remained to this day.

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<sup>1</sup> Headquarters personnel carried out this unification task in a very difficult environment, faced with ongoing public controversy and the resignations of several senior and middle-ranking military officers [2].

### 3.1 PART 1: DEMOGRAPHICS<sup>2</sup>

This section presents some key demographics pertaining to the civilian personnel within DND and the military personnel within the CAF, collectively referred to as the *Defence Team* in DND/CAF.

#### 3.1.1 Overall Population

In Fiscal Year (FY) 14/15, the military and civilian population consisted of 118,821 employees (Table 3-1). The military component, consisting of both Regular Force and Reserve Force<sup>3</sup> personnel, accounts for 55.4% and 22.5% of the total DND/CAF workforce, respectively, while civilian personnel account for 22.1% of this workforce.

**Table 3-1: FY 14/15 DND/CAF Population.**

Employee Group	Population	Proportion
Regular Force	65,890	55.4%
Reserve Force	26,711	22.5%
Civilian Personnel	26,220	22.1%
<b>Total</b>	<b>118,821</b>	<b>100%</b>

#### 3.1.2 The DND (Civilian) Workforce by Employment Category

The civilian population in DND is comprised of indeterminate, term, casual and student employees. In FY 14/15, the indeterminate tenure population accounted for 88.7% of the total DND civilian population (Table 3-2).

**Table 3-2: FY 14/15 DND Civilian Population by Employment Category.**

Employment Tenure	Population	Rate
Indeterminate	23,256	88.7%
Term	753	2.9%
Casual and Students	2,111	8.4%
<b>Total</b>	<b>26,120</b>	<b>100%</b>

#### 3.1.3 Military Personnel by Rank and Environment

Officers and Non-Commissioned Members (NCMs) account for 24.4% and 75.6% of the Regular Force population, respectively (Table 3-3). The Army (Land) represents the biggest Environment (i.e., Service) in the

<sup>2</sup> Unless otherwise specified, Regular Force data were obtained from the Director General Military Personnel Research and Analysis (DGMPPRA) database extracted from the Human Resources Management System (HRMS) current to end August 2015. Civilian data were obtained from the DGMPPRA database. Reserve Force data were obtained from the Director Human Resources Information Management (DHRIM) database (based on the 31 March 2015 report).

<sup>3</sup> The Reserve Force has four sub-components: the Primary Reserve, the Supplementary Reserve, the Cadet Instructors Cadre, and the Canadian Rangers. The data presented in this chapter only include the Primary Reserves.

CAF, comprising 53.2% of the Regular Force, followed by the Air Force (Air; 29.8% of Regular Force Personnel), and the Navy (Sea; comprising 17.0% of Regular Force Personnel), as shown in Table 3-4.

**Table 3-3: FY 14/15 Regular Force Population by Rank.**

<b>Regular Force</b>	<b>Population</b>	<b>Rate</b>
Officers	16,064	24.4%
NCMs	49,826	75.6%
<b>Total</b>	<b>65,890</b>	<b>100%</b>


**Table 3-4: FY 14/15 Regular Force by Rank and Environment.**

<b>Rank</b>	<b>Sea</b>		<b>Land</b>		<b>Air</b>		<b>Total</b>
	<b>#</b>	<b>%</b>	<b>#</b>	<b>%</b>	<b>#</b>	<b>%</b>	
Officers	3,033	18.9%	6,733	41.9%	6,298	39.2%	<b>16,064</b>
NCMs	8,148	16.4%	28,313	56.8%	13,365	26.8%	<b>49,826</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>11,181</b>	<b>17.0%</b>	<b>35,046</b>	<b>53.2%</b>	<b>19,663</b>	<b>29.8%</b>	<b>65,890</b>

### 3.1.4 Population Growth

The past decade or so has seen the modest growth of both the Regular Force military population and the DND civilian population. In order to provide more detail on the effects of this growth on the DND/CAF workforce, the demographic parameters that will be presented for the civilian and military population in FY 14/15<sup>4</sup> will include selective descriptions of how these parameters have changed in the last 10 years from FY 05/06, where this information is considered to be informative. As shown in Figure 3-1, the Regular Force CAF population has remained fairly stable over the past decade at approximately 65,000 personnel, whereas the civilian has experienced greater fluctuation.

<sup>4</sup> All results are presented at the end of a FY so that for the remainder of the chapter, any reference to a FY refers to 31 March of that year (i.e., FY 14/15 refers to the data as of 31 March 2015).



**Figure 3-1: Regular Force Military and Civilian Personnel Totals by Fiscal Year.**

In the last 10 years, the Regular Force population has grown by approximately 2,700 personnel, and the DND civilian population has grown by almost 2,500 personnel (Table 3-5). This corresponds to a relative growth of 4.3% and 10.5% for the Regular Force and civilian workforce, respectively.

**Table 3-5: Population Growth FY 05/06 – FY 14/15.**

Growth	Regular Force	Civilian Personnel
Absolute Growth	2,703	2,487
Relative Growth	4.3%	10.5%

As shown in Figure 3-2, the civilian workforce grew between FY 05/06 and FY 08/09, plateaued between FY 08/09 and FY 11/12, decreased slightly until FY 13/14, and rebounded slightly in FY 14/15. Given that indeterminate employees represent the majority of DND employees, these changes can be largely attributed to the indeterminate component.




Figure 3-2: DND Civilian Population by Fiscal Year.

The overall population of the Regular Force has grown from 64,187 in FY 05/06 to 65,890 in FY 14/15. This increase was due to a commitment by the federal government in 2006 to support the growth of the Regular Force to 68,000 personnel by 2012 [9]. As the DND/CAF transitioned to a lower pace of operations following the end of the combat mission in Afghanistan, it was announced in the Federal Budget 2012 that the Regular Force would be maintained at its current strength of 68,000 [11]. During the last 10 years, the Officer population and the NCM population have grown by 1,372 and 1,331, respectively. This corresponds to a relative growth of 9.3% and 2.7% for the Officer and NCM population, respectively (Figure 3-3).




Figure 3-3: Regular Force Population by Fiscal Year.

### 3.1.5 Years of Service in DND/CAF

The average number of years that civilians have been with DND in FY 14/15 is 12.1 years, with the average being 13.0 years for the indeterminate population (Table 3-6). These averages are actually higher than the average years of service for the Regular Force population at 10.8 years, although the average years of service is higher for Regular Force Officers (12.8 years) than NCMs (10.2 years). This tenure of civilian personnel in DND is surprising given that, as employees of the Public Service, civilians can transfer to different departments within the government with relative ease.

**Table 3-6: Years of Service in DND/CAF.**

<b>Population Subset</b>	<b>Mean Years of Service</b>
Civilians (all tenures)	12.1
Civilian Indeterminate	13.0
CAF (overall)	10.8
Officers	12.8
NCMs	10.2

### 3.1.6 Employment Categories

#### 3.1.6.1 Employment Category – Civilian

The civilian population at DND can be divided into seven employment categories based on the type of work they do: Administrative and Foreign Service, Administrative Support, Management, Operational, Scientific and Professional, Technical, and Others. The “Others” category consists of the individuals in the Leadership Programs occupation group. The proportion of the FY 14/15 DND civilian workforce categorized by employment category is presented in Table 3-7. The highest proportion of civilians belong to the Operational category (31.1%), followed closely by the Administrative and Foreign Service category (29.2%).

**Table 3-7: FY 14/15 DND Civilian Population by Employment Category.**

<b>Employment Category</b>	<b>Population</b>	<b>Rate</b>
Operational	8,146	31.1%
Administrative and Foreign Service	7,658	29.2%
Administrative Support	4,129	15.8%
Scientific and Professional	3,207	12.2%
Technical	2,842	10.8%
Management	176	0.7%
Others (i.e. Leadership Programs)	56	0.2%
<b>Total</b>	<b>26,214<sup>5</sup></b>	<b>100%</b>

<sup>5</sup> Six unknowns were removed from the 26,220 total.



Figure 3-4 presents the civilian population growth for each civilian employment category between FY 05/06 and FY 14/15. In the last 10 years, the Administrative and Foreign Service category has grown by 32.5% (1,880 individuals) and contributed most to the overall growth of the civilian population (representing 75.6% of the growth in the DND workforce over the past decade). The Scientific & Professional and Technical categories have both increased significantly in size from FY 05/06 to FY 14/15, growing by 43.6% (974 individuals) and 13.5% (335 individuals), respectively. By contrast, those in the Operational and the Administrative Support categories have decreased slightly, by 13.3% (-332 individuals) and 10.5% (-261 individuals), respectively.




Figure 3-4: DND Civilian Population by Employment Category and Fiscal Year.

### 3.1.6.2 Career Fields – Military

In FY 14/15, the Military Occupation Structure of the Regular Force population consisted of 34 Officer and 61 NCM occupations [13]. Every fiscal year, the CAF conducts Annual Military Occupational Reviews for each occupation in order to discuss the overall health of the occupation and the courses of action necessary to maintain or improve the personnel state of the occupation [15]. The result is that future recruiting and production targets can be derived and modified on an annual basis. Although discussion of each occupation is beyond the scope of this chapter, the Regular Force occupations can be categorized into 15 different career fields. Table 3-8 shows that there have been only slight changes in the proportion of Regular Force members by career field between FY 05/06 and FY 14/15.

Table 3-8: Regular Force Population by Career Field.

Career Field	FY 05/06		FY 14/15	
	Population	Rate	Population	Rate
Air Operations	4,661	7.4%	4643	7.1%
Air Operations Technical Support	6,407	10.1%	6879	10.5%

Career Field	FY 05/06		FY 14/15	
	Population	Rate	Population	Rate
Generals (Officers only)	88	0.1%	93	0.1%
Facility Support (NCMs only)	1,575	2.5%	1540	2.3%
Health Services	2,462	3.9%	2672	4.1%
Human Resources Management	306	0.5%	326	0.5%
Information Management	5,232	8.3%	5390	8.2%
Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance	2,142	3.4%	2646	4.0%
Land Operations	13,464	21.3%	14687	22.4%
Land Support	3,970	6.3%	4320	6.6%
Naval Operations	3,404	5.4%	3358	5.1%
Naval Technical Support	5,197	8.2%	5033	7.7%
Operations Support	11,671	18.5%	11288	17.2%
Specialist	2,540	4.0%	2776	4.2%
Training	63	0.1%	18	0.0%
<b>Total</b>	<b>63,182</b>	<b>100.0%</b>	<b>65,669</b>	<b>100.0%</b>

### 3.1.7 Capability Component – Military and Civilian

The civilian and military populations can also be compared by capability component (Table 3-9). This comparison provides insight into whether or not the ratio of DND civilian employees to Regular Force members differs by activity. The four capability components in which the proportions of civilian and military personnel differed the most in FY 14/15 were: Land Forces (34.4% military, 18.4% civilian); Air Forces (20.5% military, 8.7% civilian); Material Services (2.3% military, 12.8% civilian); and Science and Technology (0.1% military, 5.9% civilian). Figure 3-5 depicts the growth of DND civilian personnel along each capability component.

**Table 3-9: Capability Component – Military and Civilian.**

Capability Component	Regular Force		Civilians	
	Population	Rate	Population	Rate
Maritime Forces	9,036	13.7%	4,338	16.5%
Land Forces	22,662	34.4%	4,832	18.4%
Air Forces	13,497	20.5%	2,285	8.7%
Information Services	1,366	2.1%	1,356	5.2%
Personnel Services	10,340	15.7%	5,496	21.0%
Material Services	1,548	2.3%	3,359	12.8%

Capability Component	Regular Force		Civilians	
	Population	Rate	Population	Rate
Science and Technology	43	0.1%	1,555	5.9%
Other	7,392	11.2%	2,998	11.4%
<b>Total</b>	<b>65,884</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>26,219</b>	<b>100%</b>




Figure 3-5: DND Civilian Population by Capability Component and Fiscal Year.

### 3.1.8 Gender


Not surprisingly, the Regular Force population has a much lower female representation (14.3%) than the DND civilian population (41.8%), as shown in Table 3-10.

Table 3-10: Gender Proportions in DND and the Regular Force.

	Female		Male	
	Count	%	Count	%
<b>DND</b>	10,959	41.8%	15,247	58.2%
<b>Regular Force</b>	9,421	14.3%	56,469	85.7%

### 3.1.9 Age

The civilian workforce is older than the military workforce, with an average age of 47.6 years in FY 14/15 compared to an average age of 35.3 years for the Regular Force population. However, both groups of personnel are experiencing an age gap between younger and older members within their respective populations. The average age of the civilian population has increased slightly in the last 10 years (when the average age was 45.6 years in FY 05/06). By contrast, the average age of the Regular Force population has remained almost identical to the average age of 35.0 years in FY 05/06. The age profile<sup>6</sup> of the civilian population in FY 14/15 is presented below in Figure 3-6.



**Figure 3-6: Age Profile of the FY 14/15 DND Civilian Population.**

The age profile<sup>6</sup> of the military population in FY 14/15 is presented below in Figure 3-7.

<sup>6</sup> The individuals with age less than 16 or greater than 75 years were omitted from the profile and were not included in the calculations for average age.




Figure 3-7: Age Profile of the FY 14/15 Regular Force Population.

### 3.1.10 Attrition

#### 3.1.10.1 Civilian Attrition

The attrition rates<sup>7</sup> for the total DND civilian workforce and the indeterminate tenure population by fiscal year are shown in Figure 3-8. The attrition rate for the total civilian population is higher because it also includes term, casual and student employees whose positions are temporary and/or part-time. Generally, the attrition rate for the overall civilian workforce has been between 8% and 9% except for FY 12/13 and 13/14 when it reached 11.6% and 11.4%, respectively. This was due to a significant loss in the number of term and casual employees that fiscal year. Noteworthy, in FY 14/15 the attrition rate for the overall civilian workforce has shown a remarkable decrease since the previous year, from 11.4% to 6.6%. For the indeterminate tenure population, the attrition rate has been between 5% and 6% from FY 05/06 until FY 11/12. However, it increased notably in FY 12/13, reaching 7.8%. In FY 14/15 the attrition rate for indeterminate civilian population decreased significantly, falling to a new 10-year-low of 4.0%.

<sup>7</sup> The attrition rates in this chapter are calculated based on a formula provided in Ref. [20].




Figure 3-8: Attrition Rates for DND Civilian Population by Fiscal Year.

### 3.1.10.2 Military Attrition

Regular Force attrition has fluctuated by approximately +/-5% in the past two decades. Attrition rates are generally lower for Officers than for NCMs, as shown in Figure 3-9. Over the last decade, Regular Force attrition rates rose between FY 05/06 (6.0% for Officers and 7.1% for NCMs) and FY 08/09 (7.1% for Officers and 9.7% for NCMs), dipped between FY 08/09 and FY 11/12 (5.2% for Officers and 6.3% for NCMs), and have started to increase again up to fairly high rates of 6.2% for Officers and 8.5% for NCMs in FY 14/15. Of note, most Regular Force personnel who leave the CAF do so either before the end of their first year of service, or once they have become eligible for a military pension (normally after 25 years of service) [21].




Figure 3-9: Attrition Rates for Regular Force Population by Fiscal Year.

### 3.1.11 Comparison of Civilian and Military Personnel Demographics

Despite similarities that exist between the civilian and military workforce, such as in tenure and attrition rates, there are some key differences in certain demographic parameters between the two populations. Not surprisingly, the Regular Force population has a much lower female representation at 14.3% in FY 14/15 compared to 41.8% for the DND population. Furthermore, the civilian workforce is older, with an average age of 47.6 years in FY 14/15 compared to 35.3 years for the Regular Force population. However, both groups are experiencing an age gap between younger and older members of their respective populations, due to downsizing of the Public Service/DND in 1995 and the Force Reduction Program in the Regular Force in the 1990s.

The civilian and military populations can also be compared by capability component. This comparison provides insight on whether or not the ratio of DND civilian employees to Regular Force members differs by activity. The four capability components where the proportions in FY 14/15 differed the most between the civilian and military workforce were: Army (34.4% of Regular Force, 18.4% of civilian workforce); Air Force (20.5% of Regular Force, 8.7% of civilian workforce); Material Services (2.3% of Regular Force, 12.8% of civilian workforce); and Science and Technology (0.1% of Regular Force, 5.9% of civilian workforce).

## 3.2 PART 2: POLICIES AND PRACTICES

This section describes the roles and reporting structures of DND employees and CAF members. Policies and practices that inform an understanding of their respective roles and their term of employment or conditions of service are discussed.

### **3.2.1 The National Defence Act: Roles of the Canadian Armed Forces and the Department of National Defence**

The activities of the CAF and DND, like those of every other federal government organisation in Canada, are carried out within a framework of legislation that is approved and overseen by Parliament. In most respects, the DND is an organisation like other departments of government. It is established by a statute – the *National Defence Act* – which sets out the Minister’s responsibilities, including the Minister’s responsibility for the Department and the Canadian Armed Forces [3].

Under the law, the CAF are an entity separate and distinct from the Department. As stated in the Act, the Department is headed by a Deputy Minister of National Defence, the Department’s senior civil servant, while the CAF are headed by the Chief of the Defence Staff, Canada’s senior serving officer. Both are responsible to the Minister.

The CAF and DND have complementary roles to play in providing advice and support to the Minister of National Defence and in implementing the decisions of the Government on the defence of Canada and of Canadian interests at home and abroad. The separate authorities of the Deputy Minister and the Chief of the Defence Staff give rise to different responsibilities. In broad terms, the Deputy Minister has responsibility for policy, resources, interdepartmental coordination and international defence relations; and the Chief of the Defence Staff has responsibility for command, control and administration of the Canadian Forces and military strategy, plans and requirements.

### **3.2.2 The Canada First Defence Strategy**

The Canada First Defence Strategy (CFDS) [9] is the highest level general strategic document by the Chief of the Defence Staff. The Chief of Defence Staff has identified six key principles that will guide the direction of the CAF and the renewal of Canadian Forces culture. These include:

- **Canadian Forces Identity:** The first loyalty is to Canada. Service personnel must look beyond their environments and unit affiliations to identify with the CF “holistically” and to serve Canada with commitment.
- **Command Centric Imperative:** To establish a distinct and unambiguous chain of command that integrates strategic, operational, and tactical decision-making throughout the CF, and clearly separates line and staff functions.
- **Authorities, Responsibilities, and Accountabilities:** Commanders receive a clear articulation of their assigned authorities, responsibilities, and accountabilities. In turn, they can provide equal clarity in their guidance to subordinate commanders.
- **Operational Focus:** Operations and operational support has primacy over all other activities within the CF, particularly at the strategic level where departmental, corporate and CF priorities intersect.
- **Mission Command:** In essence, mission command articulates the dynamic and decentralized execution of CF operations, guided by a clear articulation and understanding of the overriding commander’s intent. Permits discretionary powers within the commander’s intent at the lowest levels in the battlespace.
- **An Integrated Regular, Reserve and Civilian CAF:** Encourages a more integrated effort where CAF structures are closely interconnected and interdependent, to ensure the best utilization of appropriate skills and experiences at every level.



While all of the above principles illustrate the overarching strategic vision of the CAF, the sixth and final principle, regarding integration, is highly relevant to the discussion on military-civilian work relations and culture. The inclusion of this last principle highlights the importance of an integrated and effective defence team, one that is comprised of both military and civilian personnel. Indeed, the vision of the Canada First Defence Strategy is for Canada to have a first-class, modern military that “will work in partnership with the knowledgeable and responsive civilian personnel of the Department of National Defence” ([10], p. 3). The other principles also have potential implications for the relationship between DND and CAF personnel. For example, it is not just CAF members who serve Canada with loyalty and commitment; the same can also be said about DND public servants as they share a commitment to serve Canada and its citizens. In addition, towards the goal of achieving the best use of appropriate skills and experiences at every level of the integrated defence organisation, common professional development opportunities, such as training and education courses attended by both senior civilian officials and military officers, are available. For instance, the Canadian Forces College runs courses such as the Canadian Security Studies Program which is attended by civilian and military personnel and the National Security Programme, which is attended by senior civilian and military leaders, both national and international. Such common education programs may increase the familiarity of civilians with military culture, and vice versa.

### **3.2.3 National Legislation for Public Servants – Including Defence Civilians**

#### **3.2.3.1 The Public Service Employee Act**

The Public Service Employee Act (PSEA) [4] regulates the conduct of Public Service (PS) employment, and is committed to ensuring a merit-based, non-partisan, and high quality PS in Canada. The PSEA sets the structure, roles and responsibilities of the Public Service Commission (PSC). The PSC is an independent agency reporting to Parliament that works with departments and agencies to recruit and appoint qualified persons to the Public Service of the Government of Canada [17], regulates the process for advertising employment opportunities and appointment processes for those already employed in the PS, as well as for external candidates, establishes deployment procedures for PS employees, establishes investigation and complaints processes regarding employment in the PSEA, and establishes the Public Service Staffing Tribunal (PSST)<sup>8</sup>. The PSST is an independent, quasi-judicial body with a mandate to consider and dispose of complaints regarding staffing in the federal public service, including complaints relating to internal appointments and lay-offs, and describes the rules and regulations regarding political activities for public servants.

#### **3.2.3.2 The Public Service Labour Relations Act**

The Public Service Labour Relations Act (PSLRA; [5]) regulates the labour management system through communication and dialogue between employers and bargaining agents representing employee unions. The Government of Canada is committed to fair, credible, and efficient resolution of matters related to the terms and conditions of employment in the PS, and the PSLRA exists to support this objective.

In particular, the PSLRA regulates labour relations related to matters such as employee freedom, management rights, consultation, bargaining rights, choice of process for dispute resolution, collective bargaining and collective agreements, essential services, arbitration, conciliation, striking, and unfair labour practice complaints; regulates grievance procedures; regulates the occupational health and safety policies for the PS; and regulates other general rules regarding the PS labour relations, such as rules related to the admissibility of evidence, remuneration and expenses, and provision of facilities and human resources.

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<sup>8</sup> In 2014, the PSST was merged with the Public Service Labour Relations Board (PSLRB) to create the Federal Public Sector Labour Relations and Employment Board (FPSLREB) – see [http://pslreb-crtefp.gc.ca/index\\_e.asp](http://pslreb-crtefp.gc.ca/index_e.asp).

### **3.2.4 Unionization and Collective Agreements**

The Treasury Board of Canada is the “employer of public servants” and is generally responsible for accountability and ethics, financial, personnel and administrative management, comptrollership, and approving orders and regulations [22].

Public Service employees, including those working in defence, belong to various “occupational groups.” Each occupational group is governed by a collective agreement managed by unions representing employees, and by the Treasury Board Secretariat representing the government. Although not unionized, CAF employment is also managed by Treasury Board. A collective agreement is an agreement between employers and employees which regulates the terms and conditions of employees in their workplace, their duties and the duties of the employer. It is usually the result of a process of collective bargaining between an employer (or a number of employers) and a group of trade union workers representing employees [18], [19].

### **3.2.5 The Code of Service Discipline**

In Canada, there exists a military justice system that is applied to CAF members and which is independent of the justice system that is applicable to civilians, including civilian public servants employed in the Department of National Defence. In particular, as part of the National Defence Act, the Code of Service Discipline [12] is the basis for the CAF military justice system. It is designed to assist military commanders in maintaining discipline, efficiency, and morale within the CAF.

In order to justify a separate justice system for the CAF, in 1992 the Supreme Court of Canada stated that Canada depends on the CAF to defend against threats to its security, and therefore the military must be able to enforce discipline effectively and efficiently in order to maintain its readiness. Accordingly, breaches of discipline must be dealt with speedily and will often result in more severe punishments than what a civilian might receive for the same conduct. The Supreme Court acknowledged that military tribunals are designed to meet the disciplinary needs of the CAF and that the ordinary courts would generally be inadequate to serve the particular needs of the military. For example, both summary trials and courts martial can be held wherever forces are deployed.

The Code of Service Discipline serves a number of functions. In particular it sets out who is subject to the military justice system; establishes service offences for which a person can be charged; establishes who has the authority to arrest and hold CAF members in custody; establishes service tribunals and their jurisdiction to conduct trials of persons charged with service offences; establishes processes for the review and appeals; and is charged with sentencing after trial.

### **3.2.6 Organizational Orders Dictating the Management of Military and Civilian Personnel**

Defence Administrative Orders and Directives (DAODs) are issued on or under the authority of the Deputy Minister and the Chief of Defence Staff. Given that in the CAF and DND, military personnel are often in a position of managing civilian personnel (and to a lesser degree vice versa), there are several DAODs that apply to all DND employees and also to all CAF members who act as managers of DND employees.

#### **3.2.6.1 Defence Administrative Order and Directive (DAOD) 5005-0: Civilian Human Resources Management**

In particular, the DAOD 5005-0, Civilian Human Resources Management [6] policy statement, applies to all DND and CAF personnel who manage DND employees, and states that the DND and the CAF are committed to

a cohesive, coherent, integrated and client-service-oriented approach to civilian human resources management and a consistent application of civilian human resources functions. This DAOD specifies the following set of requirements, indicating that DND and the CAF shall ensure the following:

- The alignment of civilian human resources management plans, policies and programs with departmental priorities and operational needs.
- A governance structure that defines civilian human resources management roles, responsibilities and accountabilities in DND and the CAF.
- Functional direction that informs senior managers in the execution of their civilian human resources management responsibilities.
- Coordination mechanisms to ensure appropriate planning and execution of policies and programs.
- Communication mechanisms to promote full consultation on a wide range of civilian human resources management issues to be responsive to the requirements of senior managers and maintain positive labour-management and employee relations.
- The measurement of DND and CAF performance in civilian human resources management.

### **3.2.6.2 Defence Administrative Order and Directive (DAOD) 5005-1: Governance of Civilian Human Resources Management**

DAOD 5005-1, Governance of Civilian Human Resources Management [7], is a further directive that applies to all DND employees and CAF members who act as managers of DND employees. This DAOD describes the governance structure of civilian human resources management in DND and the CAF, which consists of an accountability framework specifying the functional direction, performance measurement, committee structure, and delegation of authorities. These are described below.

#### *3.2.6.2.1 Functional Direction*

With respect to functional direction, the DAOD states that the Assistant Deputy Minister (Human Resources – Civilian) [ADM(HR Civ)] shall produce a functional plan to provide strategic direction and guidance to other senior managers, with respect to the execution of the civilian human resources program including:

- Functional guidance on the alignment of departmental and Public Service priorities;
- Planning guidance related to operational needs;
- Consistent, cohesive, coherent and integrated direction and standards; and
- Co-ordination and management of issues and activities related to corporate civilian human resources committees.

#### *3.2.6.2.2 Performance Measurement Framework*

DAOD 5000-1 also references the civilian human resources performance measurement framework, which provides senior managers with a common set of balanced, results-oriented performance information that will assist them in decision-making on civilian human resources management matters. The performance measurement framework focuses on a comprehensive set of measures and indicators that directly address the priorities of DND and the CAF for civilian human resources management and links to the overall DND and CAF performance measurement framework.

### 3.2.6.2.3 *Senior Management Committees*

A number of senior management committees are established in DND and the CAF with specific mandates to address civilian human resources management matters. These include:

- Defence Management Committee (DMC) that provides the DM/CDS with decision support/advice with respect to issues of strategic importance, thereby providing for the establishment of sub-committees to deal with human resources issues.
- Civilian Human Resource Committee (CHRC) that provides the DM, the committee chair, with a policy and decision-making body for strategic civilian human resources management issues.
- Strategic Human Resource Management Council (SHRMC), co-chaired by the ADM (HR-Civ) and Chief of Military Personnel (CMP), that serves as a forum to involve senior line managers and stakeholders across the organisation in discussing, resolving and providing guidance on strategic resource policies and issues.
- Civilian Human Resource Planning and Coordination Committee (CHRPCC), chaired by the ADM (HR-Civ), subordinate to the CHRC, and serves as the strategic cross-functional forum for stakeholders to formulate, prioritize, recommend, review and monitor civilian human resources management plans, policies and strategies.
- Union Management Consultative Committee that was established to deal with department-wide policies, programs and strategic issues. DND management are represented by the DM, Level One organizations below the DM (e.g., Assistant Deputy Ministers, Environmental Chiefs of Staff) and other management representatives designated by the DM. Bargaining agents and union representatives are represented by national Union Presidents and Heads of Unions or their delegates.
- Regional Human Resources Planning and Coordination Committees, which support the national CHRPCC. These are chaired by Regional Service Centre Directors and the strategic issues raised at these meetings are staffed up to the national CHRPCC for discussion and resolution.

DAOD 5000-1 also speaks to the flow of issues through the committee structure. In particular, it indicates that consideration should be given to conducting business and decision-making through avenues other than committees. However, if committee consultation is required, the aim is to have the right information available for the right people at the right time and to resolve issues at the lowest level possible. It is emphasized that a clear delineation of responsibilities between committees is required for good governance practices, and a terms of reference for the civilian human resources management committees exists for this purpose.

DAOD 5005-1 also delineates the specific responsibilities of ADM (HR-Civ), senior managers, and more direct-level civilian and military managers of civilian employees. In particular, it specifies these responsibilities as follows:

- ADM (HR-Civ) is responsible for:
  - Developing, implementing and managing corporate civilian human resources management plans, strategies, policies and programs to recruit, develop and retain civilian employees.
  - Providing supporting tools, advisory and operational services.
  - Identifying issues of critical importance to civilian human resources management.
  - Fully integrating and ensuring the consistent application of civilian human resources.
  - Administering civilian human resources policies and programs.

- Senior managers are responsible for:
  - Managing their civilian employees according to the ADM (HR-Civ) functional direction and guidance.
  - Developing and implementing strategic and operational civilian human resource plans for their organizations.
  - Managing civilian human resources within their area of responsibility.
- Civilian and military managers who directly supervise civilian employees are responsible for managing their civilian employees in accordance with the relevant legislation, terms and conditions of employment, collective agreements, directions of central agencies and public service-wide values and principles of human resources management.

### **3.2.6.3 Defence Administrative Order and Directive (DAOD) 5005-2: Delegation of Authorities for Civilian Human Resources Management**

DAOD 5005-2, Delegation of Authorities for Civilian Human Resources Management [8], is a further directive that applies to all DND employees and CAF members who act as managers or supervisors of DND employees. This DAOD is intended to provide instruction on responsibilities that flow from delegated civilian human resources management authorities in DND and to outline the conditions to be met before managers are eligible to exercise the assigned delegated authorities. The DAOD discusses the accountability of the DM and the modernization of public service human resources management in the government of Canada, speaks to interaction with unions, refers to pertinent legislative documents (such as the Public Service Labour Relations Act and the Public Service Employee Act), and discusses when and under what conditions delegation of authorities should be exercised.

### **3.2.7 Policies Related to Values**

One way to begin to understand the military-civilian personnel relationship is through analysis of the values, goals, and ethics of these two groups. Values guide and shape behaviour, and help individuals within a given organisation to maintain a level of coherence and foster a sense of spirit. To the extent that the values and goals in play within an organisation have been accepted by the personnel who work there, these values and goals can help to shape their identity as it evolves over time (e.g., as a member of a particular profession).

#### **3.2.7.1 Duty with Honour – Values of Canadian Armed Forces Members**

The document entitled *Duty with Honour* outlines the ideal professional identity to be cultivated by all CF members [23]. As outlined in *Duty with Honour* [10], the core military values are Duty, Loyalty, Integrity and Courage. These values, as specified in *Duty with Honour*, are defined below:

- *Duty* – Above all, duty entails service to Canada and compliance with Canadian laws. Members are obliged to adhere to the law of armed conflict as well as display dedication, initiative and discipline in the execution of tasks.
- *Loyalty* – Loyalty entails personal allegiance to Canada and faithfulness to comrades across the chain of command. All CAF members are required to support the intentions of superiors and readily obey lawful orders and directions. Loyalty is reciprocal and based on mutual trust, regardless of rank.

- *Integrity* – This requires unconditional and steadfast commitment and a principled approach to meeting CAF members’ obligations while also being responsible and accountable for their actions. Thus, integrity includes honesty, the avoidance of deception, and adherence to high ethical standards.
- *Courage* – Both physical and moral, courage allows CF members to disregard the cost of an action in terms of physical difficulty, risk, advancement, or popularity. Courage requires both willpower and resolve not to quit.

According to *Duty with Honour*, the Canadian military professional is further defined in terms of four attributes, including:

- *Responsibility* – Responsibility derives from two imperatives – societal and functional. First, the profession is responsible to protect Canadians and promote Canadian interests while remaining reflective of Canadian society and subordinate to civilian authority. Second, it is responsible to maintain the profession to the highest level of defence capability and operational readiness. It must be “fit to fight.”
- *Expertise* – Expertise comprises the full, wide range of knowledge and skills necessary to enable mastery of the battlespace across the spectrum of operations. This expertise is distributed and differentiated throughout the organisation of the CAF.
- *Identity* – The military profession is acutely aware of its unique place and role in society. Internally, there is a hierarchy of identities that ascends from Branch to Environment to the CAF, Canada and the rule of law.
- *Professional Ideology* – According to *Duty with Honour*, professional ideology is the attribute that infuses all the others with values and behaviour patterns that completes the professional construct. It claims a specialized, theory-based body of knowledge, authoritative in both a functional and cognitive sense, and a transcending value (ethos) that adjudicates how the knowledge is applied.

### **3.2.7.2 Public Service Code of Ethics – Values of DND Personnel**

As employees of the government, the conduct of public servants, including defence civilians, is governed by the values and ethics codes for the public service. The Public Service Code of Ethics ([1], p. 46) lays out four guiding values by which all public servants in Canada conduct their professional work. These include:

- *Democratic Values* – Democratic values include responsible government, rule of law, support of democracy, loyalty, respect for authority of elected officeholders, neutrality, non-partisanship, accountability, due process and the public good.
- *Professional Values* – Professional values include neutrality, merit, excellence, effectiveness, economy, frankness, objectivity and impartiality of advice, speaking truth to power, balancing complexity, fidelity to the public trust, quality, innovation, creativity, resourcefulness, service to citizens, collaboration and teamwork.
- *Ethical Values* – Ethical values include integrity, honesty, probity, prudence, impartiality, equity, selflessness, discretion and public trust.
- *People Values* – People values include respect, concern, civility, tolerance, openness, collegiality, fairness, moderation, decency, reasonableness, humanity and courage.

According to the Public Service Code of Ethics, democratic values are related to helping ministers, under law, to serve the public interest. Professional values involve serving with competence, excellence, efficiency, objectivity, and impartiality. Ethical values require acting at all times in such a way as to uphold the public trust.

People values require demonstrating respect, fairness and courtesy in one's dealings with both citizens and fellow public servants. These values are intended to serve as a guide for behaviour and to help public servants define themselves as individuals working within the public service domain. At the centre of these values is a set of implied core values: service to Canadians, direct support to the government of the day, and direct support to the minister.

Clearly, there are important similarities in the core stated values of the Public Service and those of the CAF, such as ethical behaviour, respect for law, and loyalty. Reflecting these similarities, in 2012, the Department of National Defence (DND) and the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) Code of Values and Ethics, which applies to both military and civilian personnel, was introduced. Such a code may serve to further synchronize the two workforces, in terms of their core values.

### **3.2.7.3 Similarities and Differences in Values Between Civilian and Military Personnel**

Although there are important similarities in the core stated values of the Public Service and those of the CAF, there are also some notable differences. In particular, the CAF values courage and demands more of its personnel than most non-military organizations, because of its requirement for "service before self and unlimited liability." These differences may impact on how group members see themselves, interact with members of other groups and ultimately how they situate their identity.

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## Chapter 4 – MILITARY-CIVILIAN PERSONNEL: ESTONIA COUNTRY REPORT

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### 4.1 BACKGROUND

#### 4.1.1 National Demography

Estonia is a small North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and European Union (EU) country with a total population of 1.3 million people. The population size has declined since restoring independence from the Soviet Union in 1991 but has remained quite stable over the last 15 years (Table 4-1; [20]), although maintaining a negative outlook due to migration and low birth rates. In terms of ethnic composition, national statistics show that over 30% of Estonia’s population is of ethnic non-Estonian (mostly Russian) origin, which is largely a direct consequence of the Soviet policy of colonisation during the period of occupation in 1940 – 1991. The proportion of ethnic minorities, however, has been steadily decreasing.

**Table 4-1: National Population by Ethnicity.**

	1989	2000	2015
<b>Estonians</b>	963,281 <i>(61.53%)</i>	930,219 <i>(67.89%)</i>	907,937 <i>(69.14%)</i>
<b>Russians</b>	474,834 <i>(30.33%)</i>	351,178 <i>(25.63%)</i>	330,258 <i>(25.15%)</i>
<b>Other Ethnicities</b>	127,547 <i>(8.14%)</i>	88,655 <i>(6.47%)</i>	75,076 <i>(5.71%)</i>
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>1,565,662</b>	<b>1,370,052</b>	<b>1,313,271</b>

As of 2016, 15.8% of Estonia’s residents did not hold Estonian citizenship and were either the citizens of foreign states (mostly the Russian Federation) or of an indeterminate citizenship status [2]. Such residents do not have the legal obligation to do military service as conscripts and, subsequently, to remain in the mobilisation reserve available for a call-up thereafter. They also cannot be employed by the defence organisation as active duty military service members or as civil servants. A few thousand of such residents, however, go through the naturalisation process every year and acquire the Estonian citizenship, thus becoming eligible to participate in the public and military service.

Gender-wise, Estonia’s population is 53% female (Table 4-2; [20]), while in terms of age distribution, over 37% of the population is now older than 50 years [20]. The latter reflects the overall trend of an ageing population in the developed world. However, various national policies (e.g., generous paid parental leave, child care benefits, etc.) adopted in Estonia in the 2000s have led to a small “baby boom,” which has helped to keep the proportion

of those under 30 years old at around 35% [20] and to maintain a relatively stable recruitment pool of youth for the defence organisation to draw upon.

**Table 4-2: National Population by Gender.**

	<b>2011</b>	<b>2015</b>
<b>Male</b>	619,700 (46.61%)	614,389 (46.78%)
<b>Female</b>	709,960 (53.39%)	698,882 (53.22%)

### 4.1.2 Background and Profile of the Defence Organisation

Estonia set out to re-establish its defence organisation in 1991, after regaining independence from the Soviet Union. It has been a substantial endeavour to build the structures, capabilities and organisational culture from scratch, using the inter-war Republic’s military history as an inspiration and utilising Western military assistance and advice. Applying Western norms, standards, practices and approaches has served as a key guiding principle in developing Estonia’s defence and in making the country eligible for membership in NATO and the EU.

The effort was productive and successful enough to warrant admission to NATO and the EU in 2004, indicating that Estonia had complied with the political, legal, economic, military and other criteria for membership in both organisations. Since then, the country has been an active member of NATO by participating in its operations in the Balkans and Afghanistan, being at the forefront of initiatives to strengthen cyber defence, and reaching (even slightly exceeding) the recommended defence expenditure level of 2% of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Estonia’s much noted principled position has been to deploy its contingents in operations without national caveats (e.g., in Afghanistan, where the Estonian infantry served in the most demanding military environment in the south of the country and, consequently, became a country that sustained one of the highest rates of casualties per capita among the International Security Assistance Force [ISAF] nations).

Historical experience, geographical position and the size of Estonia, however, have led to the establishment of “total defence” as its central defence concept. Cultural proximity and its relationship with Finland, which has been practicing this concept, also influenced to some extent Estonia’s strategic choice. The concept emphasises the duty of each citizen to defend the country’s independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity against military aggression; stipulates that all necessary means would be employed to achieve those ends; and seeks to build and maintain large mobilisation reserves for the event of a military crisis or war. Defence of the national territory rather than participation in expeditionary international crisis response operations is the main priority of its national defence strategy.

Estonia is one of very few NATO and EU countries still practicing military draft. Conscription lasts between 8 and 11 months and is mandatory to all male citizens between the ages of 19 and 27 years but only voluntary to female citizens.<sup>1</sup> Estonia also relies heavily on the voluntary contribution of citizens to defence preparedness (whole-of-society approach), channelling this contribution through voluntary organisations. At the same time, the current defence strategy and plans underline the need to prepare civilian organisations to perform their

<sup>1</sup> In practice, financial, infrastructural, human resources and other limitations mean that not all individuals from the age cohort are drafted to do military service; however, the current plans envisage increasing the number of conscripts drafted each year.

functions (e.g., ensure law and order, internal security, provision of vital services, etc.) during crisis and in wartime, which is predicated upon close co-ordination between civilian and military authorities (i.e., a “whole-of-government” approach).

Estonia’s defence budget was €412 million in 2015 and reached €423 million in 2016 (4.74% of Estonia’s national budget). By a broad political and societal consensus, the defence budget has been fixed at the NATO benchmark of 2% of GDP, which was achieved in 2012 and has been sustained at that level ever since, representing an annual growth in real terms of about 6%. The breakdown of defence expenditures in 2015 is presented in Table 4-3 [5]. As can be seen, personnel expenditures comprise just a quarter of the defence budget, which represents a stark contrast with many NATO countries, where personnel expenditures stand at 70% or 80% of the total defence budget [9]. However, when special expenditures are combined with personnel expenditures, Estonia’s spending on personnel-related defence expenditures reaches nearly 40% (Table 4-3).

**Table 4-3: Breakdown of Defence Expenditures by Categories in FY 2015.**

<b>Expenditure Category</b>	<b>% of Defence Budget</b>	<b>mln. EUR</b>
Personnel	25.4	104
Investments and Procurement	38.5	158.6
Operations and Maintenance	22.1	91.3
Special Expenditures <sup>2</sup>	12.9	50.7

The Estonian defence organisation has evolved and continues to develop in this historical, strategic and conceptual backdrop. Its characteristics, including the extent to which civilian and military personnel interact, have been strongly shaped by this context.

**4.1.3 Overall Architecture of the Defence Organisation**

Estonia’s overall defence organisation consists of the legal entities established by law and operating in the governing area of the Ministry Of Defence (MOD). The MOD, led by the Minister of Defence, drafts policies and plans for its area of governance and conducts the oversight of their implementation throughout the overall defence organisation. The MOD’s highest civil servant, in charge of the ministry’s management, is the Permanent Secretary. Candidates to fill this position are selected by a special commission of the Estonian Government’s Chancellery, which is responsible for recruiting top-level civil service executives. The selected candidate is then nominated by the Minister of Defence and submitted to the Estonian Government to be appointed for a fixed term of 5 years (which can be renewed). Four civilian undersecretaries – for defence policy, defence planning, defence investments and for legal and administrative affairs – coordinate distinct policy areas and departments of the MOD. They are selected by the same above-mentioned commission and appointed by the Minister of Defence for a renewable fixed term of 5 years.

<sup>2</sup> Special expenditures include support of defence voluntary organisations, special pensions, conscription, representation in NATO and the EU, etc. In NATO defence spending classification and statistics, these are counted as part of personnel expenditures.

Other entities in the overall defence organisation are:

- Estonian Defence Forces (EDF), consisting of two separate services (Navy and Air Force), two infantry brigades<sup>3</sup>, Support Command as well as some other units and structures under the direct command of and subordination to the Commander of the EDF (e.g., Staff and Signals Battalion, Intelligence Battalion, Military Police, Estonian National Defence College, etc.). Commander of the EDF is Estonia's most senior military officer nominated to this position by the Minister of Defence and appointed by the Estonian Government after hearings in the Defence Committee of the Estonian Parliament (Riigikogu) for a fixed term of 5 years, which can be extended for another 2 years.
- Estonian Defence League (EDL) is an organisation of national defence volunteers contributing to defence readiness and operations on a voluntary basis. The EDL has a major role in assisting civilian authorities in crises and emergencies as well as a leading role in territorial defence tasks, and some of its members and units have also contributed to international missions. Although it is part of the chain of command running from the Commander of the EDF, it is still a separate legal entity from the EDF. Its volunteer members – over 12,000 as of 2015 – do not constitute its full-time workforce. However, the organisation has some full-time staff, including active duty military personnel seconded from the EDF. The EDL Commander is a career military officer jointly nominated to this position by the Minister of Defence and Commander of the EDF and then appointed by the Estonian Government.
- Defence Resources Agency (DRA) is responsible for administering the conscription and reserve system as well as for part of the recruitment into the EDF. The DRA is headed by a civilian Director General and is subordinated to the Ministry of Defence.
- The Information Board is Estonia's civilian foreign intelligence service. Its composition, size and budget are classified; therefore it has been excluded from research for this report.
- Other legal entities, such as the Estonian War Museum and the International Centre for Defence and Security (ICDS) – the MOD-funded think tank with the legal status of a foundation. These organisations have not been included in the research for this report.

The MOD is dominated by the civilian staff, while military staff members are assigned to it on an ad hoc basis, with no specific positions fixed as military (except for the Estonian defence attachés accredited to foreign countries, who are part of the MOD staff) (Table 4-4) [8]. By contrast, military staff prevails in the EDF. Yet, one quarter of the entire EDF workforce are civilians. The EDL full-time staff is more balanced in civil-military composition, while the DRA's staff is almost entirely civilian.

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<sup>3</sup> The Estonian Navy and Air Force are very small services, and the overall military structure is land component-heavy. Recent reforms abolished the Land Force as a separate service, since the EDF are, by and large, the Land Forces. The position of Land Force Commander was changed into the Deputy Commander of the EDF and the Land Force staff has been absorbed into the Headquarters of the EDF. The combat formations of the Land Force – two infantry brigades – became subordinated directly to the Commander of the EDF.

**Table 4-4: Civilian and Military Workforce Ratios in the Estonian Defence Organisation (as of November 2015).**

Entity	Civilian Personnel (Number / % of Entity's Employees)	Military Personnel (Number / % of Entity's Employees)	TOTAL
<b>Ministry of Defence (MOD)</b>	205 / 95.79%	9 / 4.21%	<b>214</b>
<b>Defence Resources Agency (DRA)</b>	95 / 98.15%	2 / 1.85%	<b>97</b>
<b>Estonian Defence Forces (EDF)<sup>4</sup></b>	998 / 26.61%	2,752 / 73.39%	<b>3,750</b>
<b>Estonian Defence League (EDL)<sup>5</sup></b>	273 / 58.46%	194 / 41.54%	<b>467</b>
<b>TOTAL</b> (Entire Defence Organisation)	<b>1,571 / 34.69%</b>	<b>2,957 / 65.31%</b>	<b>4,528</b>

All entities in the overall defence organisation must cooperate very closely in formulating policies and plans as well as in executing them. This means that civilian and military personnel must interact frequently across the organisational boundaries of their entities (even if, in many cases, there is less civil-military interaction within those entities). This, in turn, makes the issues arising from different work cultures and relations between civilian and military workforces pertinent to ensuring the success of the overall defence organisation of Estonia.

## 4.2 PERSONNEL OF THE DEFENCE ORGANISATION

### 4.2.1 Civilian Personnel

Civilian personnel of the defence organisation fall into two broad categories – officials (i.e., civil servants) and contract employees.

#### 4.2.1.1 Officials

The category of officials is regulated by the Civil Service Act, the latest iteration of which came into force in 2013. An official (civil servant) is defined as “a person in the public-law service and trust relationship with the state or local government” (Paragraph 7), who is appointed into a position involving the exercise of official authority [3]. One of the elements of the official authority is “the permanent military defence of the state and preparation thereof” (Paragraph 7, Section 4, [3]). In this regard, military officials are also covered by most of the provisions of the Civil Service Act and constitute a subset of civil service (just as is the case, for instance, with police officers or Foreign Service diplomats).

Earlier versions of the Civil Service Act envisaged several categories of officials. For instance, the previous iteration categorized officials into junior, middle and senior officials. The new Act removes these distinctions and gives a great deal of freedom to individual ministries to define the positions, categories and pay scales of their officials. The result of this decentralised approach is that ostensibly similar civil service jobs may have rather different pays in different ministries or in their areas of governance (i.e., in the state executive agencies) – depending on budgetary resources, job descriptions and dynamics in the labour market.

<sup>4</sup> This entity includes the permanent workforce only (i.e., it excludes conscripts).

<sup>5</sup> This entity includes the permanent workforce only (i.e., it excludes volunteer members).

The Ministry Of Finance (MOF) is in charge of directing the development and administration of the entire civil service system, although the Estonian Government’s Chancellery also has a role in the selection and development of the top-level civil servants. The most senior career civil servant of Estonia – the State Secretary of the Government’s Chancellery – has the status of a member of Government equal to that of the cabinet ministers. The MOF has been rather thorough and comprehensive in defining various specialties that exist in the civil service and keeps track of the developments in this sector by publishing annual reports [1].

Along with the passage of the new Civil Service Act of 2013, the civil service of Estonia went through various reforms that sought to simplify its structure, reduce its size, increase flexibility, tailor rewards to individual responsibility and performance as well as minimize various monetary and non-monetary benefits associated with civil service. Much of this has been driven by the severe impact of the global financial crisis of 2008 – 2010 and by the government’s policy to retain balanced budgets as well as lower the national debt (currently less than 10% of GDP). As a result of downsizing, the MOD staff, including the number of officials, was reduced by over 20%, while the remaining staff experienced substantial (albeit temporary) pay cuts. Contrary to other employees, the officials are not allowed, by law, to go on strike as a way to protest for reducing their privileges, to protect their jobs or obtain additional privileges (although they are allowed to form trade unions).

**4.2.1.2 Employees**

Employees are employed on the basis of fixed or indeterminate term contracts in accordance with the provisions of the Employment Contracts Act [7]. This Act regulates the employment of public, non-governmental and private sector employees. Some of its provisions, such as those regulating the format of employment contracts, even apply to the officials (i.e., civil servants). In the drive to minimize costs and cut state expenditures, Estonia sought to reduce the number of officials and transfer many of them to the category of less privileged and less protected employees. As a result of this, All former officials of the EDL became employees. Most of the EDF civilians also belong to this category. As a result, the officials-employees ratio in the Estonian defence organisation is approximately 1:5 (see Table 4-5; [8]).

**Table 4-5: Distribution of the Civilian Personnel by Categories (as of November 2015).**

	<b>MOD</b>	<b>DRA</b>	<b>EDF</b>	<b>EDL</b>	<b>TOTAL</b>
<b>Officials (Civil Servants)</b>	141	58	68	0	<b>267</b>
<b>Employees</b>	64	37	930	273	<b>1,304</b>

In addition, as the Employment Contracts Act also regulates labour relations in the private sector, all of the civilians working for the contractors hired by the defence organisation (e.g., to deliver various infrastructure maintenance, catering, information technology, equipment maintenance, repair and other services) belong to the employee category. However, since they are not members of the defence organisation, their numbers (which may vary hugely from year to year) and demographic profile have not been researched for this report. On the other hand, leadership of the defence organisation has stated, on a number of occasions, that Estonia’s defence will be relying more heavily on the provision of services by private sector contractors (including by means of outsourcing and public-private partnerships) in the future. This means that the number of private sector employees working side-by-side with military personnel in defence structures is likely to grow in coming years, making it a key component of the overall success and an important subject for future research.

**4.2.2 Military Personnel**

Military personnel in the Estonian defence organisation consist of full-time military personnel as well as conscripts drafted for a period of 9 – 12 months, cadets of military schools, and reservists called up for refresher training. General conditions of military personnel employment are regulated by various provisions of the Civil Service Act. However, more specific terms and conditions of military service – professional status, obligations, duties, restrictions, rights and benefits pertinent to active military service personnel – are governed by a separate law, the Military Service Act, the new iteration of which entered into force in 2013 [15].

Provisions of the Military Service Act make particular exemptions of military personnel from the provisions of the Civil Service Act with regard to working time, limits to working time, organisation of work, overtime and night work in such circumstances as the state of emergency, military training and on secondments. Although military personnel must follow the Civil Service Act with regard to the fulfilment of their general public service obligations (e.g., information protection, state property preservation, records management) and service-specific orders (or refusal to carry them out), the Military Service Act places additional constraints on military personnel that do not extend to other officials in the public service. For instance, military personnel are not allowed to be members of political parties [15]. However, just as with other state officials and in accordance with both the Civil Service Act and the Military Service Act, military personnel are prohibited from going on strike. There is no legal prohibition to form military trade unions, but to this day military workforce unionisation has not been pursued in practice.

By law, military ranks are divided into three categories – soldiers, Non-Commissioned Officers (NCOs) and officers. The officers-NCOs ratio in the defence organisation is currently 1:1.7 and the number of full-time professional soldiers is very small since the EDF relies on conscription for generating its personnel in this category (see Table 4-6) [8].

**Table 4-6: Distribution of the Military Personnel Categories.**

	<b>EDF</b>	<b>EDL</b>	<b>MOD</b>	<b>DRA</b>	<b>TOTAL</b>
<b>Officers</b>	882	94	8	0	<b>984</b>
<b>NCOs</b>	1,561	100	1	2	<b>1,664</b>
<b>Soldiers<sup>6</sup></b>	309	0	0	0	<b>309</b>

Non-commissioned officers are categorised into junior NCOs and senior NCOs; officers are categorised into junior officers, senior officers and flag officers. In addition, military personnel authorities follow the principle of differentiating between generalists and specialists among military personnel. This provides for more flexibility in motivating the latter, as competition for specialised skills in the Estonian labour market is intensive and requires tailoring pay grades and motivational packages to the market conditions. However, the EDF has been resisting the pressure from the MOF to categorise military specialties in the same way as its guidelines for the public service stipulate. The main argument for this is that following those guidelines would require equating civilian and military jobs, which is quite difficult or even impossible in some cases; for instance, no civilian equivalent of a machine-gunner exists. At the same time, this would fail to take into account very special demands placed upon the military profession and the need to compensate for that accordingly (and above the civilian equivalents, if they exist; LtCol P. Läns, personal communication, June 13, 2013).

<sup>6</sup> This category includes only full-time professionals (i.e., EDF conscripts and voluntary members of the EDL are excluded).

The general direction in the defence organisation’s personnel structure is to increase the overall number of full-time military professionals, while “freezing” the number of civilians and outsourcing more non-military jobs to the private sector. This should partly alleviate the problem of military personnel shortages – and the reverberating effects of such shortages in terms of workload, motivation, retention, pay gaps and misalignment between ranks and positions with which the EDF has been struggling for a number of years – while keeping personnel expenditures in balance with other defence budget areas.

### 4.2.3 Workforce Demographics

Table 4-7, Table 4-8 and Table 4-9 offer insight into the demographics of the Estonian defence organisation, including the average age and average years of service of different personnel categories in various structures, as well as gender ratios [8]. It appears that, in general, the civilian workforce is older than the military workforce (with the exception of the MOD officials vs. MOD military staff), and employees tend to be older than officials (with the exception of the DRA; Table 4-7).

**Table 4-7: Detailed Demographic Profile of the Estonian Defence Organisation.**

Entity / Structural Unit	Personnel Type	Personnel Categories	Personnel Gender Ratio (%)		Average Age (Years)	Average Years of Service
			Male	Female		
MOD	Military	OFs <sup>7</sup>	87.5	12.5	39	n/a
		ORs <sup>8</sup>	100.0	0.0	33	n/a
	Civilian	Officials	48.2	51.8	37	7
		Employees	26.6	73.4	41	7
DRA	Military	OFs	0.0	0.0	0	0
		ORs	50.0	50.0	34	n/a
	Civilian	Officials	18.9	81.1	44	7
		Employees	35.1	64.9	42	6
EDF and EDL	Military	OFs	91.0	9.0	36	15
		ORs	88.8	11.2	33	9
	Civilian	Officials	61.8	38.2	37	10
		Employees	36.3	63.7	45	8
HQ EDF	Military	OFs	92.7	7.3	41	19
		ORs	82.5	17.5	38	16
	Civilian	Officials	51.6	48.4	44	12
		Employees	24.6	75.4	42	14

<sup>7</sup> OF refers to officers.

<sup>8</sup> OR refers to other ranks (NCOs and soldiers).



The civilian workforce, on average, has less experience in terms of average years of service in the defence organisation, than the military workforce (Table 4-8). In this regard, one particular comparison stands out: the MOD and DRA civilians (officials and employees) on average have the least amount of work experience in the defence organisation (6 to 7 years)<sup>9</sup>, while the EDF/EDL military officers have most (15 years; Table 4-7).

**Table 4-8: Estonian Defence Workforce by Average Age and Years of Service.**

Personnel Type	Average Age	Average Years of Service
Military	34	10.9
Civilian	44	7.9
<b>Overall</b>	<b>37</b>	<b>9.9</b>

The demographic profile also shows that the dominant workforce of the MOD and DRA – the civilian workforce – is more feminine, compared to the dominant workforce of the EDF and EDL – the military (Table 4-7). Across the entire defence organisation, the gender gap is particularly conspicuous in the military personnel category (Table 4-9). According to data provided by the MOD and EDF personnel authorities, as of 2015, there were only 88 female officers from a total of 984 officers (or 8.9%) and 221 female NCOs and soldiers in the total of 1473 (15%). Female military officers holding the highest military rank are currently lieutenant colonels – 2 out of a total of 112 holders of this rank [8]. Despite the fact that the female to male ratio in the national population favours women (Table 4-2), the military profession, and therefore, the defence organisation in general, remains overwhelmingly male.

**Table 4-9: Estonian Defence Workforce by Gender.**

	Male	Female
In Civilian Workforce (%)	37.4	62.6
In Military Workforce (%)	89.5	10.5
<b>Overall in Defence Workforce (%)</b>	<b>71.4</b>	<b>28.6</b>

Differences in personnel profiles are even more pronounced when comparing the two structures having the most frequent interaction – the MOD and the Headquarters of the EDF. The former is not only more civilian and feminine, but also younger and less experienced (in terms of average years of service) than the latter (Table 4-7). This tends to nurture certain mutual stereotypes between these two structures and thus could be one of the explanations for why the MOD and Headquarters of the EDF have had some cooperation difficulties in the past [14].

None of the entities in the Estonian defence organisation gathers data concerning the ethnic background of its workforce. In a country where one-third of the population is of a non-Estonian ethnic origin (Table 4-1), an ethnicity-blind approach to personnel carries both advantages and disadvantages. On the one hand, this approach sends a signal that ethnic background is irrelevant to pursuing employment and career opportunities in

<sup>9</sup> This accounts only for the time spent in a civilian capacity. Some civilians, however, are retired military – an aspect which the available data do not capture when it comes to calculating the average years of service.

the defence organisation – that only talent, skill, motivation and performance matter. Anecdotal evidence suggests that the military profession is quite popular among ethnic non-Estonians, with many positive role models and success stories in the rank and file of the EDF [12]. For instance, until Summer 2016, the Deputy Commander of the EDF and the Chief of Staff of the EDF headquarters (HQ) – both one-star flag officers – were of ethnic minority or mixed background. On the other hand, if a particular entity ends up – inadvertently or not – completely dominated by the ethnic majority (Estonians), it might create a perception that defence does not welcome, or discriminates against, ethnic minorities. This, in turn, might cause a reputational risk for the defence organisation in the overall context of the national policy of ethnic integration and also might deter talented individuals from ethnic minority groups from applying for jobs in the defence sector.

## **4.3 POLICIES AND PRACTICES**

### **4.3.1 Policies**

The capstone strategy of Estonia for the defence sector is a document called “National Defence Strategy,” which is reviewed periodically and constitutes the conceptual and policy basis for drawing long-, medium- and short-term defence plans. One of the key messages in the 2011 iteration of the document is that of ensuring national defence is a much broader undertaking than just military effort and that it requires participation and contribution of other ministries, civilian agencies, the non-governmental sector as well as private enterprises [17]. This entails close cooperation, constant interaction and common effort of military and civilian actors across organisational lines, including within the overall defence organisation.

The direction set by the National Defence Strategy is translated into plans through the 10-year National Defence Development Plan, currently covering the period of 2013 – 2022. In terms of personnel, the current plan stipulates the need to restore and maintain competitiveness of salaries for EDF and EDL active-duty military personnel, while keeping the proportion of the defence budget allocated to personnel at no more than 30%. The plan also envisages creation of a new agency under the MOD in order to centralize defence acquisition functions [16]. As this agency will have a mix of civilian and military personnel, the need for effective cooperation between, and management of, civilian and military personnel will remain strong.

In addition to the Civil Service Act and Military Service Act, there is a set of various policies, plans, regulations and procedures governing personnel matters in the MOD, EDF and other entities of the Estonian defence organisation. Human resources policy, recruitment and selection procedures, principles of training, attestation (qualification testing) guides, salary guides and internal rules of procedure comprise a set of policies at the MOD, which pertain to both civilian and military personnel. The EDF has its own Personnel Strategy, Code of Ethics, salary guide and internal rules of procedure, which also apply to all categories of personnel employed by the organisation. In essence, each entity in the defence organisation has its own personnel policy, even though there are also points of intersection and overlap. For instance, various provisions concerning military service apply to military personnel at the MOD (e.g., time for physical exercise counting as worktime, number of vacation days, etc.).

The EDF Personnel Strategy covering the period of 2013 – 2017 is particularly noteworthy as it affects the largest pool of civilian and military personnel employed by the overall Estonian defence organisation. One of the key tenets of this strategy is values-based management, which places a high emphasis on cooperation, equal treatment and fair compensation. For instance, in terms of remuneration, it calls for “equal treatment, transparency and comparability inside the institution, across the area of government and with the labour market” (LtCol P. Lääns, personal communication, June 13, 2013). This means that both civilian and military employees

should be able to compare remuneration within their categories, between different personnel categories in the EDF, between the EDF personnel and personnel of other governmental agencies, and within the private sector.

The EDF civilians, compared to their counterparts from other defence organisation entities, have a slightly more privileged position resulting from their involvement in international operations. All civilians employed by the Estonian Government can be deployed to international operations following the provisions of the Participation in International Civilian Missions Act [18], but the policy regulating the benefits and guarantees of veterans – Policy Regarding Veterans of the Defence Forces and the Defence League [19] – does not apply to the officials or contract employees deployed in accordance with this Act. However, the civilians employed by the EDF and accompanying military units to the operations in accordance with the International Military Cooperation Act [10] (the law defining the use of the EDF in collective defence and other operations abroad) fall in the category of veterans and are entitled to various privileges related to this status, just as their military counterparts.

At the policy level, however, none of the entities in the Estonian defence organisation addresses the questions of how to better integrate the civilian and military workforce or to facilitate management of the civilian workforce by the military (and vice versa). Cooperation and interaction patterns have rather emerged over time through various practices that bring civilians and military together.

#### **4.3.2 Practices**

As it was pointed out earlier, the MOD does not have any fixed military positions (with the exception of defence attachés) in its staff. Instead, it requests the EDF to second military personnel on a case-by-case basis, whenever it is considered that a particular project or position might benefit from military expertise. This tends to be seen by the EDF HQ as slightly disruptive, since it is difficult to anticipate the demand for military personnel, which is already in rather short supply for various roles in the EDF (LtCol P. Läns, personal communication, June 13, 2013). It has, however, become a regular practice to appoint military officers to important positions at the MOD, especially in the areas of defence planning and defence investments. One of the most interesting experiments took place a few years ago, when a senior military officer – the head of plans and policy (chief of J5) of the EDF HQ – was selected and appointed to the position of the MOD Permanent Secretary (the top civil service civilian official in the organisation).

Just as the MOD does not think systematically about the role of military personnel in its organisation, the EDF does not have a very clear and systematic view as to the role of the civilians in the organisation, or with regard to their training and career pathways. It does not provide any continuous training to its military personnel concerning the management of the civilian workforce – only a short induction to the applicable rules and regulations. In some cases, legal advisors of the units are utilised to provide advice on the application of the Employment Contracts Act and various regulations concerning the civilian workforce (LtCol P. Läns, personal communication, June 13, 2013). There is some anecdotal evidence that civilians (even retired military employed as civilians) are sometimes marginalised and kept apart from the “core processes” and decisions of the EDF.

On the other hand, the EDF seems to treat feedback from civilian subordinates of military superiors rather seriously (in one case, a military officer was even removed from his position because he could not properly handle civilians in his subordination; LtCol P. Läns, personal communication, June 13, 2013). It also helps that military officers returning from the secondments to the MOD have a better awareness of the legal framework, work culture and practices of an entity with a prevailing civilian workforce (the earlier mentioned senior military officer, who did a stint as a civilian Permanent Secretary of the MOD, went on to become the Commander of the EDF, i.e., the top military official in the country).

On the civilian side, familiarity with the military culture and organisation is facilitated by Estonia's mobilization-based defence model. Some officials have a background as conscripts and, subsequently, serve as defence reservists. Many others attend and graduate from reserve officer courses or become voluntary members of the EDL and, therefore, spend part of their time on military exercises. Furthermore, familiarity of the civilians with the military culture (and vice versa) is fostered by some common professional education opportunities, particularly at the Baltic Defence College (BALTDEFCOL) – a joint multinational staff and war college run together with Latvia and Lithuania. Their civil servant Course, which includes members not only from the MOD but from other ministries and civilian agencies, is integrated with the military Joint Command and General Staff Course. In a similar vein, the war college level Higher Command Studies Course includes both senior civilian officials and military officers [4].

### 4.4 KNOWLEDGE SOURCES

To a large extent, most Estonian sources deal with the broader issues of the relationship between the general society and defence, with regular public opinion surveys and surveys among conscripts being the prime examples. Also, institutional and political aspects related to the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) used to be a salient topic, especially in the run-up to NATO and EU membership, which is not surprising given that the new Estonian democracy sought to adopt Western standards and principles of governing the security and defence sector.

Although the salience of the DCAF as a topic has diminished to a certain degree, various reforms, such as recent changes to the Constitution and laws altering the procedure of appointing the Commander of the EDF, reducing the role of the President of the Republic and increasing the role of the Minister of Defence and the Estonian Government in defence governance, occasionally rekindle academic interest in the subject. Some studies do touch upon the issue of interaction between defence civilians and the military, but in the broader context of DCAF. A good example of the available sources of knowledge in this regard is the study of civil-military relations in Estonia, including relevant legal background and contemporary discourse [11].

In general, so far no systematic empirical studies comparing the civilian and military workforce (with corresponding data sets) and assessing their interaction in the defence organisation have been undertaken in Estonia. Much of what is known about the mutual perceptions, interactions and cooperation between these two categories of personnel has emerged as a corollary to various qualitative studies on different topics. For example, the ICDS report on organising defence at the strategic level [14] flagged a number of issues – such as communication problems between the MOD and EDF Headquarters, lack of mutual respect and trust and frequent conflicts between civilian and military decision-makers – which could be partly explained by cultural differences between civilian and military workforces. The international study on civil-military cooperation in conflict and post-conflict operations [6] assessed the perceptions of the Estonian military and civilian personnel deployed in international operations about the effectiveness of joint civil-military action (including mutual support and supervision, common pre-mission training, cooperation procedures, etc.).

A significant exception to this, however, is a comprehensive and detailed study defended as a Master's thesis at the University of Tartu, entitled, *Analysis of Values and Value systems in Civil-Military Relations: The Case of Estonia* [13]. The study explored and compared – with the help of a survey questionnaire – the values of the military and civilian workforce (and their various sub-categories) employed in the Estonian defence structures, and analysed how various identified differences influenced civil-military relations in Estonia [13]. Unfortunately, the study remains available in the Estonian language only, and no follow-up and follow-on studies have been conducted in its wake.

The MOD and EDF, however, conduct regular surveys among their employees to measure workplace satisfaction, motivation, retention intentions and other elements of importance in understanding personnel dynamics in an organisation. For instance, surveys among full-time military professionals – including at the point when they decide to leave the EDF – are undertaken on a routine basis. The results of such surveys are usually kept for internal use only and do not include specific questions about civil-military interaction in the workplace, even though the assembled data could potentially be used to compare different categories of personnel.

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## **Chapter 5 – MILITARY-CIVILIAN PERSONNEL: GERMANY COUNTRY REPORT**

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### **5.1 INTRODUCTION**

This chapter gives an overview of the cooperation between military and civilian German Armed Forces (i.e. Bundeswehr) personnel during the period of the research project.<sup>1</sup>

The starting point for the consideration is the historically induced separation between the Armed Forces in the narrower sense and the administration of the Bundeswehr due to an amendment to the German Basic Law in 1956, by including Article 87a (establishment and maintenance of the Armed Forces), and Article 87b (establishment and responsibilities of the Federal Defence Administration) [1]. Since that time, recruitment has been one of the main tasks performed by the Federal Defence Administration.

The integration of the National People's Army of the German Democratic Republic (GDR) into the Bundeswehr, after the reunification of Germany in 1990, led to a personnel strength of the armed forces of approximately 780,000 which was successively reduced to the current personnel strength of 185,000.

The participation of the Bundeswehr in international operations since 1992, as well as the social development in Germany, prompted an extensive reorganisation of the Bundeswehr, which also in the future will continue to pose new challenges for the increased cooperation and merging of armed forces and administration (i.e. the cooperation between civilian and military personnel).

This also involves various intensive efforts to further develop the organisational foundations, and the physical assets of the Bundeswehr in such a way as to enable the Bundeswehr to meet the demands resulting from the (particularly international) tasks it performs.


Examples of these developments are the “personnel trend change,” which was initiated in May 2016, as well as the establishment of the new major organisational element of “Cyber and Information Domain Service.” By 2023, the “personnel trend change” aims to improve the capabilities of the Bundeswehr, and increase sustainability in terms of the performance of tasks in selected areas of the military and civilian structures. The establishment of the new major organisational element of “Cyber and Information Domain Service” is a response to the increasing shift, also of military conflicts, to the cyber and information domain. Decentralized structures and competences in this area will be combined and organised more efficiently. The German Cyber and Information Domain Service Headquarters will also serve as an interface for other Federal Government ministries, for the economy, as well as for international allies, in order to jointly promote cyber security.

These new developments within the Bundeswehr, as well as the publication of a new federal government's White Paper on security policy (key document which underpins Germany's entire security and defence policy), which is envisaged for late 2016, are milestones for the further development of the Bundeswehr. However,

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<sup>1</sup> All presented data in the following chapter has been obtained from internal requests for data information from the Federal Ministry of Defence.

they will not significantly change the ratio between military and civilian Bundeswehr (current structure, see Figure 5-1) personnel. Hence, the data described in the following text continue to be relevant.



**Figure 5-1: Structure of the Bundeswehr.**

## 5.2 DEFENCE POLICY CONTEXT

The restructuring process of the Bundeswehr, aimed at reorienting the German Armed Forces, has been ongoing since 2012. The defence policy guidelines and the key elements of the reorientation of 18 May 2011 provided the security policy basis for the reorientation [3]. The reorientation serves to adapt the civilian and military structures of the Bundeswehr and the Federal Ministry of Defence (FMoD) to the changed security challenges. The aim is to increase the effectiveness and efficiency of these organisations. The reorientation of the Bundeswehr is aimed at maintaining and enhancing its operational capability in a constantly changing environment. At the same time, it adapts the Bundeswehr’s structures to demographic changes and places its capabilities on a sound financial footing. The underlying organisational principle is to concentrate expertise and responsibility in the same place. To that end, structures, processes and organisational culture must be looked at from a holistic perspective, harmonised and developed further.



Characteristics of the reorientation of the Bundeswehr are:

- Maintenance of the entire capability spectrum while accepting reduced sustainability (“breadth over depth”).
- Suspension of compulsory military service and introduction of voluntary military service.
- Reduction in Bundeswehr personnel strengths to a maximum of 185,000 servicemen and women and 56,000 civilian posts.
- Stationing according to the basic principles of functionality, cost-effectiveness, attractiveness and presence across Germany.
- The FMoD focusing on its core tasks and, in doing so, strengthening the command/office levels.
- Streamlining of the command and control organisation for the benefit of the operational areas.
- Pooling of tasks, whenever practical, in only one major organisational element, thus facilitating accelerated decision-making processes and reducing duplicate structures.
- Reduction of red tape by means of a deregulation programme.

The unshakable primacy of politics, which applies, in particular, to military tasks is reflected in the principle of Innere Führung (leadership development and civic education), which is a fundamental principle of the Bundeswehr.


The principles of Innere Führung form the basis of military service in the Bundeswehr and affect the image that military personnel have of themselves. These principles are an expression of key patterns of behaviour and leadership culture in the Bundeswehr. The term “Principles of Innere Führung” is embodied in the Act on the Parliamentary Commissioner for the Armed Forces. Although the Act does not specify these principles in detail, they are based on ethical (human dignity is inviolable), legal [1], political (primacy of politics), and social (a free and pluralistic society) foundations. They find expression above all in the following criteria:

- Integration into the state and society.
- Guiding principle of the “citizen in uniform.”
- Ethical, legal and political legitimacy of the mission.
- Realisation of fundamental constitutional and social values in the armed forces.
- Limits of “obedience to orders.”
- Application of the principle of mission command.
- Observance of the statutory participation rights of soldiers.
- Observance of the freedom of association guaranteed in the Basic Law (Article 9(3); [1]).

## **5.3 DEMOGRAPHICS**


### **5.3.1 Numbers and Proportions of Military and Civilian Personnel**

The number of military and civilian personnel, as well as reservists within the area of responsibility of the Federal Ministry of Defence (ministry and subordinate agencies) amounts to: 186,459 servicemen and women and 94,708 permanent civilian personnel (Figure 5-2).



**Figure 5-2: Numbers and Proportions of Military and Civilian Personnel (June 2013).**

The share of the military personnel is shown in Figure 5-3.



**Figure 5-3: Numbers and Proportions of Military Personnel (June 2013).**

Additionally, there are a total of 36,116 reservists in the reinforcement and personnel reserve.

There are a total of 94,708 civilian personnel, including 4,651 who are currently being trained as civil servants or employees (apprentices).

Upon completion of the reorientation of the Bundeswehr, the personnel target structure will be as follows, as shown in Figure 5-4.




Figure 5-4: Numbers and Proportions of Civilian Personnel in Future (June 2013).

### 5.3.2 Types/Classes of Civilian Personnel: Occupational Structure – General Categories

Civilian personnel within the area of responsibility of the Federal Ministry of Defence are employed according to two different status groups (trainees, interns and civil servants in preparatory service are not taken into account): approximately 23,970 personnel are civil servants, judges and professors; and approximately 66,087 are salaried employees (General Schedule [GS] and skilled craftsmen).

The main difference between the various status groups mentioned above lies in the regulation of their specific legal relationship with the Federal Republic of Germany. While the relationship between civil servants and the state is based on public law importing the concept of reciprocal trust and service, employees (GS) have concluded an employment contract with the state as the employer under private law. Due to the wide spectrum of activities within the area of responsibility of the Federal Ministry of Defence, the personnel employed in these activities have very different jobs covering the principal occupational specialties, as shown in Table 5-1.

Table 5-1: Principal Occupational Specialties (June 2013).

	Non-Technical Administrative Service	Technical Administrative Service	Other Specialist Service	Total
Civil Servants	12,686	8,430	2,854	23,970
Employees (GS)	17,806	2,459	10,305	30,570
Apprentices				4,651
Employees (Skilled Craftsmen)				35,517
			<b>Total</b>	<b>94,708</b>

### **5.3.3 Types/Classes of Civilian Personnel: Occupational Structure – Specific Occupations**

Civil servants are needed and employed at all levels and in all administrative fields of duty. Accordingly, there are different kinds of demands that are placed on civil servants. This is reflected in the (educational background-oriented) Civil Service Law with a structure of 4 career groups (sub-clerical, clerical, administrative and executive classes of service) to which a maximum of nine career paths can be assigned.

Within the Bundeswehr, civil servants are particularly employed in the following career paths:

- Ordinary service (non-technical administrative service);
- Intermediate service (vocational training, non-technical and technical administrative service);
- Higher intermediate service (bachelor's degree; non-technical and technical administrative service); and
- Higher service (Master's degree; non-technical and technical administrative service, linguistic and cultural service, natural-scientific service, medical service).

This career principle does not apply to employees; due to the variety of functions, they represent nearly all occupational groups. They include employees with technical skills or hands-on training, as well as employees with academic or equivalent training.

### **5.3.4 Types/Classes of Military Personnel: Occupational Structure – General Categories**

The Armed Forces consist of five military organisational elements:

- Army;
- Air Force;
- Navy;
- Medical Service; and
- Joint Support Service.

The Joint Support Service is a military organisational element that provides the common tasks distributed across all services/organisational elements “for all” as a means of increasing efficiency. This is to enable the three original services (Army, Air Force, and Navy) to focus on their core capabilities as described in the concept of the Bundeswehr. Bundeswehr and joint support capabilities for missions, routine duty activities and national territorial tasks will be pooled in the Joint Support Service.

In the three services, there are 177 areas of assignment:

- Army: 29 arms and services (e.g., airborne infantry, artillery, signal corps, armour).
- Air Force: 66 branches of service (e.g., 66 Combat and air operations, General engineering, Combat service support, Personnel management).
- Navy: 82 assignment sectors and career patterns (e.g., Operations, C2 support/information technology, engineering, military intelligence).

### **5.3.5 Types/Classes of Military Personnel: Occupational Structure – Specific Occupations**

In more detail, this means that there are 701 military operational specialties, which are distributed across the services as follows:

- Army: 144 military operational specialties.
- Air Force: 323 Air Force career identifiers.
- Navy: 234 Navy specialty groups.

### 5.3.6 Demographic Specifics of Military and Civilian Personnel

The share of females in the total number of military personnel is 10.07%. On the civilian side, the share of female employees is 36%. The absolute figures can be found in Figure 5-5.




Figure 5-5: Military (186,459; Panel A) and Civilian Personnel (94,708; Panel B) as of June 2013.

The average age of the military personnel is 31.8 years. The average age of civilian personnel is 50.2 years. The distribution of birth year, for both military and civilian personnel, is shown in Figure 5-6.




Figure 5-6: Year of Birth Distribution of Military and Civilian Personnel (June 2013).


The Bundeswehr does not collect any statistical data of migration background.

### 5.4 DEPLOYMENT DETAILS OF CIVILIAN PERSONNEL

In 2013, 1,394 Bundeswehr reservists took part in operations abroad. A total of 316 civilian employees of the defence administration took part in operations abroad as military-status reserve duty soldiers. In general the duration of deployment lasts four months. But it could differ from assignments of several weeks to more than four months, or in rare cases, up to one year (or more). Their assignments included special duty assignments as specialists (such as, e.g., language assistant, military psychologist, legal adviser), or assignments as a regular infantryman.

### 5.5 MILITARY EXPENDITURES

The 2013 defence budget was €33,258.1 million. The distribution of this sum to the different areas is as shown in Figure 5-7.



**Figure 5-7: Defence Budget 2013 (Sum in Million Euros).**

Personnel costs of €10,596.7 million are part of the operating expenses.

### 5.6 POLICIES AND PRACTICES

Employment law is the legal framework for the status group of tariff employees. It forms the basis for the terms of employment applicable to employees, and comprises all laws, regulations and other binding provisions governing dependent gainful employment. Employment law divides into individual employment law (the relationship between employees and employers) and collective employment law (the relationship between unions and work councils or staff councils on the one side, and employers’ associations and employers on the

other). An important element of employment law is employee protection. In addition, there are further legal/collective bargaining regulations governing the terms of employment as well as the employment relationship of employees in the Federal Civil Service. For reasons of efficiency, they are not displayed here.

The terms of employment for the status group of civil servants are determined by laws, in particular the Federal Civil Service Act, as well as the related legal regulations such as the Federal Civil Service Career Regulation, Working Time Directive and Recreation Leave Directive. Moreover, these regulations governing the terms of employment are complemented by a large number of directives.

The terms of employment for military personnel are also specified in laws (e.g., Military Personnel Act), legal regulations (e.g., Military Career Regulation, Ministerial Directive Governing Superior-Subordinate Relations), as well as directives (Joint Service Regulations, instructions, guidelines). Who is to issue a regulation is determined by the principle of materiality. Subsequently, Parliament itself must make basic value-based decisions, which it must not leave up to the administration.

### **5.6.1 Human Resources Policies**

Bundeswehr personnel management actions are guided by the constitutional performance principle and the principle of equal treatment as regards access to public offices. In the case of new hires, personnel development and advancement, personnel selection and the related decisions must always be guided by the criteria of aptitude, qualification and professional performance, observing equal-opportunity laws and regulations and, if applicable, specific regulations concerning disabled persons. In addition, the duty to act in accordance with the constitution makes it necessary to make processes and decisions transparent and comprehensible. Equality of opportunity must be ensured at all levels. This also applies to the personnel management of civilian employees and soldiers.

The principles for “handling personnel” (i.e., personnel management) is specified in the Sub-concept for Bundeswehr Personnel Management (Pers Mgmt SC). The following principles for the performance of tasks in personnel management apply. Bundeswehr personnel management:

- Is focused on ensuring the operational capability of Bundeswehr personnel.
- Is based on a form of cooperation between the requesting and supplying agencies that is close, constructive and conducted in a spirit of partnership (dialogue principle).
- Starts with a committed, motivated and qualified person who is able and willing to learn and draws on the various competences of personnel in the FMod’s area of responsibility.
- Takes account, in the case of all decisions, of the differences in the life situations and interests of women and men whenever possible – including with regard to work/family balance.
- Guarantees aptitude-related equal treatment regarding access to public office and merit-related occupational advancement in the Bundeswehr on an equal opportunity basis, and makes use of the permeability of careers within the framework of the legal requirements (Article 33; [1]).
- Advances the professionalization and personal enhancement of personnel by offering appropriate education, training and qualification programmes that will be of benefit in civilian occupations.
- Guarantees, as a competitive employer, the best possible use of potential for the “internal labour market” established by the Bundeswehr.
- Establishes the framework conditions for life-long learning.
- Takes due account of the personal and social concerns of an increasingly heterogeneous body of personnel.

- Promotes common thinking and acting as the basis for a common identity in the sense that there is an overarching organisational culture in the Bundeswehr.
- Requires the continuous evaluation of its own measures at various levels by means of systematic feedback, interview mechanisms and quality assurance.

### 5.6.2 Policies/Practices of Supervision of Civilians by Military and Vice Versa

The close cooperation between military and civilian personnel was indispensable to fulfil these tasks, even before the reorientation of the Bundeswehr. Particularly in the Armed Forces, the organisation often required a mixed structure (military and civilian personnel) within an agency. With the principles concerning the top-level structure, the chains of command and the command organisation in the FMoD and the Bundeswehr, dated 21 March 2012 [2], the Federal Minister of Defence determined within the framework of the reorientation of the Bundeswehr, that FMoD directorates, but also subordinate authorities and agencies, will increasingly be staffed by both military and civilian personnel to ensure greater Bundeswehr-wide task accomplishment. The civilian members of the Defence Administration will work hand in hand with the military personnel and vice versa. As a result, today even more so than in the past, military personnel are administrative superiors to civilian personnel or vice versa.

According to Section 62(2) of the Federal Civil Service Act, civil servants are obliged to comply with all official orders issued by their superiors and to follow their general guidelines [4]. Within the framework of the chain of command, a military superior is only authorised to give official instructions to a civilian employee in his or her capacity as administrative superior; however, he or she is not authorised to issue military orders. Civilian members of the Bundeswehr are thus obliged to comply with official orders of the employer (FMoD). According to the Federal Ministry of Defence Gazette ([6], p. 239) and the Joint Service Regulation ZDv 1/50, para 311, military superiors may also issue official orders to civilian members of the Bundeswehr [5]. Contrary to orders issued to soldiers, official orders issued to civilian members of the Bundeswehr may, however, not be enforced through use of coercive force or the threat of the use of coercive force.

Superiors in the sense of the Civil Service Law are those persons who are authorised to issue official orders (Section 3, Subsection 3 of the Federal Civil Service Act [4]). This applies to all of the civil servants' superiors. Who the superiors are in individual cases is contained in the administrative structure (Section 3, Subsection 3, of the Federal Civil Service Act [4]). In the civilian area, there is no general chain of command in the sense that higher ranking personnel are superior to all lower ranking civil servants.

The position of civil servant as such is not of relevance. The superior can also be employed in the status of a soldier or a tariff employee. The civil servants' duty of obedience is derived from the Federal Civil Service Act [4]; the duties of employees are stated in the contract of employment.

Apart from superiors as referred to above, civil servants also have official superiors. Official superiors are those persons who are responsible for decisions concerning personal issues of their subordinate civil servants (Section 3, Subsection 2, Federal Civil Service Act [4]). Here, too, the status is not of relevance. A soldier can, for example, be the official superior of a civil servant and take disciplinary measures, if he or she has been assigned these duties.

Soldiers do not only report to their military superiors but also to other superiors authorised to give orders – particularly if deployed outside of the armed forces. For reasons of legal security, the obligation to comply with official orders and the regulation regarding the responsibility of ordering superiors is clarified in a reference in



Section 11(3) of the Legal Status of Military Personnel Act to the relevant provisions of the Federal Civil Service Act [4].

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## **Chapter 6 – MILITARY-CIVILIAN PERSONNEL: NETHERLANDS COUNTRY REPORT**

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### **6.1 INTRODUCTION**

In today's world of globalisation, national borders have faded away, which poses new challenges and risks for national and international security. The ambition of the Netherlands Ministry of Defence is to share responsibility for the safety and stability of the international community. The three main tasks of the Defence organisation are formulated as follows:

- 1) Protecting the integrity of national and allied territory, including the Netherlands Antilles and Aruba.
- 2) Promoting stability and the international rule of law.
- 3) Supporting civil authorities in upholding the law, and providing disaster and humanitarian relief, both nationally and internationally [6].

In order to carry out these tasks, often in international alliances, and to successfully perform the requisite complex activities involved in these tasks, the Netherlands Defence organisation aspires to be professional, flexible, and multi-functional. This requires a well-balanced personnel structure of military and civilian personnel, working together effectively to accomplish the organisation's objectives. However, as far as we know, until now, civilian and military personnel work culture and relations in the Netherlands Defence organisation have not been subject to scientific study, in contrast with the extensive study of other forms of civil-military relations (e.g., the cooperation between the military and civilian actors and organisations in operational situations, such as between the military and national governments, local authorities and non-governmental organisations/NGOs).

The aim of this chapter is to provide insight into civilian and military personnel work relations in the Netherlands Defence organisation. First, we provide information about the size, structure, and workforce of the Netherlands Defence organisation. Then, we describe how the proportion of civilian and military personnel in the Netherlands Defence organisation originated and the rationale behind it. We subsequently address the work relations of civilian and military personnel, the management of these two groups of personnel (i.e., the policies and practices), and the issues and points of attention that can be identified.

The information we present and discuss in this chapter is based on (policy) documents, interviews, and secondary analyses of quantitative data collected periodically among Defence personnel by the Behavioral Sciences Services Centre. We conducted interviews with the following high-ranking personnel in charge of personnel affairs: the Head Director Personnel (responsible for all Defence personnel), the Director Personnel of the Navy, the Director Personnel of the Army, a staff member of the Army, the Commander of the Royal Netherlands Marechaussee, the Commander of the Support Command, and the Director of the Defence Materiel Organisation (DMO). Additionally, we interviewed the Director of the Behavioral Sciences Services Centre and the head of one of the largest unions of Defence personnel. The country report template served as our interview guideline.

## 6.2 THE NETHERLANDS DEFENCE ORGANISATION: EXPENDITURES, SIZE AND STRUCTURE

In the last several decades, the Netherlands Defence organisation has undergone multiple organisational changes that involved restructuring and downsizing. In 1996, the Netherlands armed forces transformed into an all-volunteer force. Figure 6-1 displays the development of Netherlands Defence expenditures since 1990.




Figure 6-1: Development of Netherlands Defence Expenditures.

The figure shows that, although the nominal expenditures (i.e., the Defence budget in euros) increased, the real expenditures (i.e., adjusted for inflation) substantially decreased over time. Just recently, because of international developments, the Dutch government decided to allocate more to the Defence budget (i.e., €50 million in 2015, €150 million in 2016, and €100 million per year from 2017). With that, in the Netherlands, a country of 17 million citizens, the Defence budget is €7.3 billion of the total government budget of €259.6 billion. Figure 6-2 demonstrates the development of Defence expenditures in percentage of Gross National Product (GNP), in relation to the NATO norm of 2% (Ministry of Defence [4], p. 26). As shown in the figure, the percentage of Defence expenditures has been below the NATO norm of 2% since 1994.




Figure 6-2: Development of Defence Expenditures (1990 – 2013) in % of GNP.

At the time of writing this chapter, the organisation has been in the midst of a process of downsizing and restructuring, which has involved a reduction in expenses of about €1 billion and a cut-back of 12,000 functions in the period 2011 – 2016 [3]. This reduction has impacted all aspects of the organisation.

The Netherlands Defence organisation consists of seven Defence units: the Central Staff, four Operational Commands (i.e., the Royal Netherlands Navy, the Royal Netherlands Army, the Royal Netherlands Air Force, and the Royal Netherlands Marechaussee), and two support units (i.e., the Defence Materiel Organisation/DMO and the Support Command) (Figure 6-3). The Central Staff advises the Minister and formulates organisational policy. The Secretary-General is the official leader of the organisation, the highest civil servant, and is responsible for the translation of political decisions into organisational execution. The Chief of Defence is the highest military leader and is responsible for the execution of military operations in the Netherlands and abroad. The Operational Commands are responsible for the readiness and deployment of military units. The Support Units support the other organisational units by providing products and services.




Figure 6-3: Organisation Chart.

### 6.3 THE WORKFORCE

Organisational changes have also involved changes in the workforce. In essence, the rationale guiding the proportion of civilian and military personnel in the Netherlands Defence organisation is simple: military personnel are required for military expertise. This means that all functions that are performed in special (war) circumstances, that involve handling a weapon (system), and/or that require military expertise, are to be fulfilled by military personnel [7]. All other functions can be performed by civilian personnel, who provide continuity and who bring in specific non-military (and often academic) expertise. However, as military personnel cannot perform operational functions continuously, they will also be assigned to non-operational functions, like staff functions. This creates a grey area of functions that can be performed by civilian or military personnel.

The considerations of expertise and continuity in developing a well-functioning organisation, and the developments over time, have led to a current ratio of civilian to military personnel of 27:73 (full-time equivalents/FTE; see Table 6-1; [5]). The proportion of civilian personnel (currently at 28%, based on actual numbers of civilian personnel) will decrease if outsourcing policies become more prominent. A development slightly in favour of civilian personnel is the identification of a number of military functions that can be changed into (less expensive) civilian functions. Military personnel clearly are more expensive because of:

- a) The higher rotation of jobs and lower level of specialisation (resulting in learning losses);
- b) The system of allowances in the military (e.g., for pilots or divers and during exercises and deployments);
- c) The availability of fully paid training and education in the military; and

- d) Better retirement schemes in the military, enabling military personnel to leave the organisation at a younger age compared to civilians.<sup>1</sup>

**Table 6-1: Proportion of Civilian Personnel (CP) and Military Personnel (MP) per Defence Unit.**

	# Personnel			FTE		
	CP	MP	Total	CP	MP	Total
<b>Navy</b>	2,244 (23%)	7,718 (77%)	9,962	2,184 (22%)	7,718 (78%)	9,902
<b>Army</b>	2,353 (12%)	17,069 (88%)	19,422	2,268 (12%)	17,069 (88%)	19,337
<b>Air Force</b>	983 (13%)	6,555 (87%)	7,538	902 (12%)	6,555 (88%)	7,457
<b>Marechaussee</b>	480 (8%)	5,761 (92%)	6,241	440 (7%)	5,761 (93%)	6,201
<b>DMO</b>	3,540 (82%)	753 (18%)	4,293	3,448 (82%)	753 (18%)	4,201
<b>Support Command</b>	5,291 (66%)	2,763 (34%)	8,054	4,948 (64%)	2,761 (36%)	7,709
<b>Central Staff</b>	925 (55%)	750 (45%)	1,675	900 (54%)	750 (46%)	1,650
<b>Total</b>	15,816 (28%)	41,369 <sup>2</sup> (72%)		15,090 (27%)	41,367 (73%)	
	57,185			56,458		

In addition to being more expensive than civilian personnel, military personnel also have to perform military-specific training and tests, such as shooting practice and sport programs.

Defence units are mixed to varying degrees; hence, the ratio of military to civilian personnel differs between the Defence units (Table 6-1) [5]. The more operational the Defence unit, the more military personnel there are in that unit. Not surprisingly, the Operational Commands are mainly staffed with military personnel. Of the four Operational Commands, the Royal Netherlands Navy has the highest (23%) and the Royal Netherlands Marechaussee the lowest (8%) proportion of civilian personnel. Civilian personnel are primarily represented in the Central Staff (55%) and the two support units: the DMO and the Support Command (82% and 66% civilian personnel, respectively).

<sup>1</sup> Military personnel may retire at age 60, as opposed to age 67 for civilians, and receive pensions the size of their last wage, as opposed to an average earned throughout the career received by civilians. Further, all financial increases over the last 10 years have gone to the military; and defence civilians are paid less than civil servants in other institutions. Civilians also have less job security, as the military can still search for new jobs in the internal military jobs market if their current position becomes redundant, which is not possible for civilians. The general tendency is that the military is better off financially than are civilians, even in the times of reductions and downsizing.


<sup>2</sup> In addition to 41,369 regular force military personnel, there are 5,249 reserve force military personnel, for a total of 46,618 military personnel when both forces are taken into account.

The proportion of female personnel is substantially higher among civilian personnel (25%) compared with military personnel (9%) (Table 6-2; [5]). Since 1983, women have had access to all military services, with the exception of the submarine service [8]. Moreover, women are not represented in the operational functions of the Special Forces (i.e., the *Korps Commandotroepen* of the Army and the Marine Corps of the Navy). The percentage of female military personnel has been rising slowly from 5.2% in 1992 to 9% in 2006 [8] and has subsequently stagnated at 9% until the present.

**Table 6-2: Gender Distribution Among Military and Civilian Personnel.**

		Male	Female
MP	# Personnel	37,477 (91%)	3,892 (9%)
	FTE	37,476 (91%)	3,892 (9%)
CP	# Personnel	11,878 (75%)	3,938 (25%)
	FTE	11,715 (78%)	3,375 (22%)

With respect to the age distribution of civilian and military personnel, it is interesting to note that the military workforce is relatively young (the average age of military personnel is 34.9 years; the largest groups of military personnel fall into age groups under 35 years of age), whereas the civilian workforce is relatively older (the average age of civilian personnel is 48.0 years; the largest groups of civilian personnel fall into age groups over 50 years of age (Figure 6-4 and Figure 6-5; [5]).



**Figure 6-4: Age Distribution Among Military Personnel (2015 and 2016).**






Figure 6-5: Age Distribution Among Civilian Personnel (2015 and 2016).

## 6.4 CIVILIAN AND MILITARY WORK RELATIONS AND EXPERIENCES

Georg Simmel and Rosabeth Moss Kanter described the significance of numerical distributions for social life [9] and behavior in organisations [2]. They argued that if proportions of significant types of individuals/employees are highly skewed, then this can produce different social experiences and interactions. Among other things, these social experiences and interactions can include performance pressure and the use of stereotypes.

Interestingly, despite the skewed numerical distribution of civilian and military personnel in the Netherlands Defence organisation, the high-ranking personnel we interviewed were of the opinion that no serious issues could be identified that affect civilian and military personnel work relations. However, they observed that the division of civilian and military personnel induces grouping, just as, for instance, the division of Army and Navy, or cavalry and infantry, produce group divisions. Interviewees acknowledged cultural differences between civilian and military personnel (one respondent described such differences as reflecting “two separate worlds”) and differences in work conditions and policies for both groups (which we will describe in the next section). When talking further, interesting differences between civilian and military personnel regarding work attitudes and experiences came to the fore.

Perhaps the most prominent difference in work attitudes and experiences is that civilian personnel join the organisation for a *function*, whereas military personnel enter the military for a *career* and perceive it more as a “calling.” This difference also reflects how the organisation is designed, in that there is no career planning for civilian personnel (in contrast with military personnel), civilian personnel are perceived by military personnel as immobile, and civilian personnel may experience performance pressure.

The organisation is designed for its core business: “*The organisation is organised to fight.*” The dominant view is that military personnel are the military: “*At the end, military personnel fight, civilian personnel not.*” From this view, one can conclude that the organisation needs military personnel and that the value of civilian personnel sometimes is not recognized. The director of the union argued that, although military personnel are the military, the organisation needs civilian personnel as well, “*even though they will never understand what it is to be military personnel.*” According to another respondent, military personnel often believe that: “*Someone who does not stand with his feet in the mud doesn’t understand, doesn’t know how it works.*” Various interviewees expressed the view that civilian personnel often have to prove their competence and make their skills known. It has been argued that what is most important is to be skillful and knowledgeable and to demonstrate the *relevance* of the expertise for the military organisation. Military personnel are likely to express more respect and understanding towards civilian personnel who have been deployed. Usually, civilian personnel in the

Netherlands Defence organisation are not deployable. Sometimes, they go on voluntary short-term working visits. Civilians do have the opportunity to apply for the Reserve Force and to be deployed (e.g., in academic or specialist functions). In these cases they have the same training and length of deployment as their military colleagues. When they return from deployment, they continue performing a civilian function. Other civilians with deployment experiences are ex-military. According to one respondent: “*One has to have experienced something in order to gain appreciation and respect.*” Furthermore, when being deployed, personnel speak the same language, have seen and experienced the theatre, and share operational experience.

With respect to operational experience, there may be trust issues in theatre. Civilians (e.g., militarised<sup>3</sup> or Reservists) usually lack operational experience, whereas military personnel have been through multiple deployments. Do military personnel trust civilian personnel with their lives? One interviewee said that the difference between civilian and military personnel should be made clearer in the mission area. Then people would know how best to make a comment, what can be expected, and who to follow in case of an incident.

Another difference between civilian and military personnel is that civilian personnel are outside the military hierarchy. Furthermore, military personnel have extensive networks that consist of strong ties: they typically have known each other a long time and very well. These networks arise and develop by going through the same socialization processes, education, training programs, and operational experiences, and by performing different functions in different parts of the organisation during their careers. These networks are oriented internally, whereas civilian personnel usually have elaborate networks outside the Defence organisation.

In addition to conducting interviews, we performed secondary data analyses of quantitative data collected periodically among Defence personnel, by the Behavioral Sciences Services Centre (e.g., job satisfaction research). We analysed recent data (2011 – 2012), collected among a subsample of Defence personnel ( $N = 3,822$  civilian personnel and  $N = 12,587$  military personnel). The aim was to examine differences between civilian and military personnel with respect to, among other things: work climate, fairness and respect, satisfaction, commitment, cynicism, and turnover intentions.

Both civilian and military personnel evaluated the work climate<sup>4</sup> fairly positively. Military personnel scored a little, but statistically significantly higher, compared with their civilian colleagues ( $M_{Mil} = 3.9$ ,  $SD = 0.6$ ;  $M_{Civ} = 3.8$ ,  $SD = 0.7$ , on a scale from 1 to 5). Significant differences were particularly prevalent within the Maurechaussee and the DMO (although effect sizes were small:  $\eta^2 < .01$ ).

Overall, levels of respect and fairness<sup>5</sup> were high, that is, mean scores for respect varied between 4.23 and 4.69 on a scale from 1 to 5, and mean scores for fairness varied between 3.85 and 4.22 on a scale from 1 to 5. No significant differences in respect or fairness were found within the Navy and Maurechaussee. Interestingly, regarding respect, civilian personnel scored significantly higher, compared with their military colleagues, within the Army and Air Force (organisation units in which civilians are a minority), whereas military personnel scored significantly higher in the two support units. Similarly, regarding fairness, civilian personnel scored higher

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<sup>3</sup> In cases of longer deployments, civilian personnel can be militarised (i.e., put into uniform, but without carrying a weapon) in order to get the same insurance and other conditions as military personnel (disability benefits, compensation in case of death, application of Status of Forces Agreements / SOFA). The role of “militarised” civilian personnel is not very well defined, creating various issues of trust and jurisdiction (disciplinary, legal). If civilians were Reservists, in contrast, they would benefit from the same training and familiarity with operational terminology as the military.

<sup>4</sup> Items included: “We work well together to get the work done,” “We talk to each other about attitude and behaviour,” and “Where I work, the work climate is good.”

<sup>5</sup> Items: “My colleagues treat me with respect,” “My supervisor treats me with respect,” “In my unit, I am treated fairly,” and “In my unit, everyone can count on fair treatment.”

within the Army, while military personnel scored significantly higher within the DMO (no significant differences were found in the other organisation units). These findings suggest that even though employees are a minority in a Defence unit, they can feel respected and treated fairly.

Perceptions of (un)fairness in the workplace can affect employees' work attitudes (e.g., satisfaction and commitment) and behaviours (e.g., absenteeism) [1], [10]. Overall, levels of satisfaction (with the unit and with the organisation) and commitment (to the unit and to the organisation) were moderate to high (mean scores varied between 3.3 and 4.0 on a 5-point scale). When significant differences in satisfaction and commitment were found, civilian personnel scored significantly higher than their military colleagues. Interestingly, with respect to absenteeism, civilian personnel also scored higher (within the Air Force and DMO), meaning that civilians were absent more often than military personnel.

Furthermore, if employees feel that they are not treated fairly, they may develop a cynical mindset at work [11], which means that they will just do their jobs, nothing more (perhaps even a little less). "They simply 'get by', as reflected in their mediocre level of productivity and their ditto sense of work engagement" ([11], p. 80). Among the surveyed Defence personnel, levels of cynicism were low (mean scores varied between 1.17 and 1.84 on a 1–7 scale), which is in accordance with the high levels of perceived fairness. Significant differences between civilian and military personnel show that military personnel were more cynical within the Army, whereas civilian personnel were more cynical within the DMO.

Levels of exhaustion were also low (mean scores varied between 0.92 and 1.39 on a 1–7 scale). Civilian personnel scored significantly higher than military personnel on exhaustion within the Army and Navy. Levels of enthusiasm among civilian and military personnel were moderate: mean scores varied between 3.75 and 4.18 on a scale from 1 to 7. Civilian personnel were significantly more enthusiastic within the Army, whereas within the DMO, military personnel scored higher than their civilian colleagues. Levels of perseverance were also moderate: mean scores varied between 3.63 and 4.13 on a scale from 1 to 7. Significant differences between civilian and military personnel were only found in the DMO, where military personnel scored higher.

Furthermore, levels of career and development possibilities were moderate: mean scores varied between 2.92 and 3.34 on a scale from 1 to 5. Where significant differences were found between civilian and military personnel (i.e., within the Marechaussee and the two support units), civilian personnel scored significantly higher than military personnel. This is an interesting and unexpected finding, compared with what we learned from the interviews, in that there are no career plans for civilian personnel. On the other hand, levels of job insecurity were moderate to fairly high: mean scores varied between 2.97 and 3.92 on a scale from 1 to 5. In all Defence units, civilian personnel were significantly more insecure than military personnel (with a moderate effect size:  $\eta^2 = .06$ ). This is in line with what we learned from interviewing the director of a union. The director noted that civilian personnel are concerned about their position in the ongoing reorganisations and that they are afraid to lose their positions to military personnel, which is expressed in meetings with union members, where emotions can get high. Whereas the results regarding job insecurity displayed a moderate effect size, all other aforementioned effect sizes were small ( $\eta^2 < .01$ ).

Finally, with respect to turnover intentions, military personnel scored significantly higher than civilian personnel (within the Army, Air Force, Marechaussee and DMO). Fifty-seven percent of the surveyed military personnel and 46% of the civilian employees considered finding another job; 39% of the military employees and 29% of the civilian employees had undertaken action to find another job.

## **6.5 CIVILIAN AND MILITARY PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT**

Within the Netherlands Defence organisation, no particular policy exists regarding the management of civilian and military personnel. However, there are clear differences in Human Resources Management (HRM) policies and regulations that create differences between civilian and military personnel with respect to, among other things: salary, leave, career development, various facilities (e.g., overnight stay), and deployments.

One respondent explained to us: *“Attention of the top management is different for the one group of personnel than for the other group,”* by which he meant that more attention is paid to military personnel. The underlying conditions relate to: the larger population of military personnel and the nature of the organisation (i.e., a military organisation). This implies that attention is particularly focused on military personnel. Because of the magnitude of the military population, the attention of the union(s) is particularly focused on military personnel, too. They are in the majority, in the Defence organisation, but also in union memberships, which of course is voluntary. Whereas more than 80% of military personnel have a union membership, many civilian personnel do not. *“The power is where the people are.”* This power is reflected, for example, in the tendency that the scarce growth in financial capacity over the last period was virtually always and totally spent on military personnel, to the detriment of civilian personnel salary conditions. The salary conditions of Defence civilian personnel have even become less positive compared to those of civil servants elsewhere in the Netherlands.

On the other hand, there is a tendency to put civilian personnel in higher ranking jobs that were usually the domain of military personnel, particularly in the field of finance. This has sometimes led to tensions and formal complaints. If civilians are preferred over military personnel in leadership positions, it is because of continuity and specialized expertise.

## **6.6 POINTS OF ATTENTION FOR CIVIL-MILITARY WORK RELATIONS IN DEFENCE ORGANISATIONS**

The division of civilian and military personnel induces diversity issues that may be similar to those affecting other groups in organisations. Advantages of diversity relate, among other things, to civilian and military personnel bringing in different (complementary) expertise and competences to the workplace, which can promote overall performance. Disadvantages, on the other hand, relate, among other things, to the risk of grouping and mutual misunderstanding or disrespect, which can hinder successful cooperation and organisational effectiveness. The interviewees recognized the existence of *“two separate worlds,”* but did not identify serious issues or conflicts that affect civilian and military work relations.

However, various points of attention can be identified that should be taken into account when promoting (and maintaining) a healthy and well-functioning mixed work environment. First, differences in HRM policies and regulations affecting military and civilian personnel have the potential to become problematic. Among other things, such differences can create perceptions of unfairness, which may have negative effects on work relations and organisational performance and effectiveness. Moreover, in view of changes in society (e.g., developments in the labour market, changing labour relations), and in order to retain qualified and motivated personnel and to have a competitive position in the labour market, the organisation must offer its personnel challenging and motivating work and good work conditions, including attractive opportunities for career development.

Second, although it has been recognized that civilian and military personnel bring in different qualities and competencies, the question is: does the organisation exploit these diverse contributions sufficiently? Or does one set of competencies outweigh the other, in terms of being valued by the organisation? It is important to promote a culture in which civilian and military personnel value their complementary qualities. Likewise, managers'

values, decisions and behaviours can have an important influence on employees' work experiences and on building a positive work culture and climate. This influence, in turn, has been associated with, among other things, positive work attitudes, productivity, intentions to stay, and organisational performance [11]. Third, the mobility and continuity issue is one that requires attention as it has important implications for, among other things, organisational learning and memory. Fourth, instead of relying on past developments, it is important to consciously think about what the Defence organisation needs and what a healthy mix of civilian and military personnel might look like.

## **6.7 FINAL REMARKS**

Although the high-ranking personnel we interviewed did not identify serious issues with respect to civilian and military personnel work relations, interesting differences between civilian and military personnel regarding work attitudes and experiences came to the fore. It is important to note, however, that the content of this chapter was based on the study of relevant documents, interviews with a selected number of high-ranking personnel, and secondary data analyses. Although the generated data provide valuable insight into (the management of) civilian and military personnel work relations in the Netherlands Defence organisation, the data were not collected among representative samples of personnel. Moreover, the quantitative data that were available did not include specific measures of work culture and relations between civilian and military personnel. A survey that includes such specific measures, distributed among a large sample of Defence personnel in 2014, addresses this gap, and is discussed in Chapter 12.

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## **Chapter 7 – MILITARY-CIVILIAN PERSONNEL: SWEDEN COUNTRY REPORT**

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### **7.1 INTRODUCTION**

The Swedish Armed Forces (SAF) represent one of the nation's largest institutions, and also one of the largest employers of young people. The primary task of the SAF is to train, organise and deploy military forces, domestically and abroad, while maintaining the long-term ability to defend the country in the event of war. For over a century, Sweden's military was built upon the concepts of conscription and territorial defence, supporting the longstanding national policy of non-alignment. Until the end of the Cold War, nearly all men reaching the age of military service were conscripted. In the summer of 2010, peacetime conscription ceased only to be replaced with contracted personnel. The transfer to the new system will be fully completed in 2018. The new defence organisation will be based on voluntary participation, and will consist of permanent and contracted units. The aim will be to create a more functional, available and flexible defence organisation.

On a daily basis about 20,000 people work in the SAF, and approximately 5,000 (25%) are civilian employees. The entire operational organisation of roughly 50,000 people, both civilian and military employees, can be operational within a week. The defence bill constitutes 1.24 % of the gross domestic product.

### **7.2 DEMOGRAPHICS**

The SAF consist of the following categories of military personnel (K = Continuously, T = Part-time):

- Officer OFF/K – Regular continuously serving officers (OF1-OF9).
- Officer OFF/T – Reserve part-time officers (OF1-OF3).
- Officer SO/K – Regular continuously serving Non-Commissioned Officers (NCO) (OR6-OR9).
- Officer SO/T – Reserve part-time serving NCO (OR6-OR7).
- Soldiers/seaman/K – Regular continuously serving enlisted (OR1-OR5).
- Soldiers/seaman/T – Reserve part-time serving enlisted (OR1-OR5).

The decrease of civilians, both in absolute numbers and in the proportion of the total defence force (Table 7-1<sup>1</sup>), can partly be explained by the fact that many civilians were transferred to Swedish Defence Materiel Administration during 2013 – 2014.

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<sup>1</sup> Demographic information presented in Table 7-1 – Table 7-3 has been obtained from the Swedish Armed Forces annual reports covering years 2011 through 2015 [1], [2], [3], [4], [5].

**Table 7-1: Share of Military and Civilian Personnel 2011 – 2015.**

Categories	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
Military	21,951	21,056	23,857	24,566	25,146
Civilians	6,616	6,567	5,365	5,195	5,168
Total	28,567	27,623	29,222	29,761	30,314
% Civilians	23%	24%	18%	17%	17%

As shown in Table 7-2, 41% of the civilian workforce and 6% of the officer corps are women. Women represent 7% of military personnel. In addition, 56% of the total female workforce, and 12% of the total male workforce, consists of civilians. An additional 20,000 people are engaged in the Home Guard, and within this population, the proportion of women is 14 % [4].

**Table 7-2: Share of Men and Women for Different Categories 2014.**

Categories	Officers (including NCO)	Soldiers/Seaman/K	Soldiers/Seaman/T	Civilians	Total
Men	8,590	4,950	9,348	3,059	25,978
Women	561	620	462	2,136	3,783
Total	9,151	5,570	9,810	5,195	29,726
% Women	6%	11%	5%	41%	13%

The Home Guard is an integral part of the Armed Forces operational force and constitutes the base protection of Sweden. Its mission is to function across the entire conflict spectrum, from supporting the community in situations of severe duress during peacetime, to armed combat during times of war. The personnel are mostly made up of locally recruited volunteers and consist largely of experienced soldiers and officers with a background in mission units. The overall age in the Home Guard is 41 years.

There are imbalances in the distribution of personnel by rank, age, gender and competence: for instance, there is a disproportionate number of senior officers (12.5% of military personnel, compared with 4.9% in Norway or only 0.5% in Finland) and many of them occupy well-paid administrative positions, while there are relatively fewer younger personnel in operational positions.

The proportion of employees serving 10 years or more was 57%. The proportion of employees serving less than 2 years was 12%.<sup>2</sup>

As part of the reforms, over the next 2 years many officer positions will be turned into those of NCOs and their current holders will be asked to make a switch from officer to NCO rank, which is already causing tensions in the military.

<sup>2</sup> These data were collected from the Försvarsmaktens verksamhetsindikator (FM VIND), a biannual job satisfaction survey within the SAF. In 2013, 10,304 respondents participated in the survey.



As shown in Table 7-3, the average age of officers is 44 years; NCOs, 28 years; and soldiers, 24 years. The average age of civilians is 46 years. The overall age of the total military population is 33 years. Therefore, taken as a whole, civilians tend to be older than military personnel.

**Table 7-3: The Average Age of Different Categories of Personnel.**

Categories	Average Age
Officers	44
NCOs	28
Soldiers	24
Civilians	46

The transition to an all-volunteer force has prompted questions not only about a weakening link with civilian society and a lower visibility of the military but also about its future demographic profile. In a bid to increase the diversity and visibility of minorities within the armed forces as well as to increase employment, a pilot project is being launched by the Swedish Employment Agency and SAF to recruit 500 citizens of non-European Union (EU) origin in various regions to do basic military training (3 months). The expectation is that some of these citizens will eventually join the armed forces as full-time employees.

As shown in Table 7-4, the largest numbers of personnel fall into the Army branch, as well as the Home Guard. The new personnel supply system for the SAF is still under development and is supposed to be fully operational in 2018 [6].

**Table 7-4: Number of Personnel Divided into Branches.**

Branch	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014
Army	16,500	15,100	14,929	13,078	1)
Navy	3,600	3,100	3,167	3,254	1)
Air Force	3,200	3,400	3,371	3,741	1)
Support/Intel	5,100	5,300	4,884	3,988	1)
Logistics	5,200	5,700	4,649	4,374	1)
Home Guard	38,000	33,000	22,000	22,000	2) 21,200
Total	72,000	65,600	53,000	50,400	2) 51,500

1) Figures not available in the pocket guide to the Swedish Armed Forces, 2013 [6].

2) Figures retrieved from Ref. [4].

### **7.3 ECONOMY AND CURRENT DEVELOPMENT**

In recent years there has been some budget reinforcement to the SAF regimental and air surveillance capabilities.

Sweden's approach to security policy has changed due to developments in the contemporary security environment. The Russian annexation of Crimea, the armed conflict in Ukraine, the increased number of exercises as well as intelligence activities in the Baltic Sea region, and now the SAF intelligence operation in the Stockholm archipelago, all demonstrate the necessity for Sweden to maintain a functional and effective operational defence organisation.

The geopolitical changes demonstrate how important it is to develop the national dimension of Sweden's defence. Safeguarding Swedish sovereignty and territorial integrity is a key task. The government considers that the military units and equipment acquisition of the SAF need to gradually be strengthened in accordance with the proposals of the Defence Commission. In the Budget Bill, the government proposed measures to strengthen the military activities and presence of the SAF in our vicinity. As such, the government underlines the importance of maintaining and strengthening a high standard of air surveillance. There should also be an increased presence on the island of Gotland.

Furthermore, the changes in the autumn 2014 budget proposed an additional contribution totaling SEK 210 million, in 2014, in order to strengthen exercise activities and the availability of military units. Additional reinforcements will also occur in 2015 and beyond.

Another priority in this budget will be the deepening of the Finnish-Swedish bilateral cooperation, which falls in line with the Statement of Government Policy. Through deeper cooperation between Sweden and Finland, Sweden will jointly strengthen accountability for security and stability in this part of Europe. Sweden has emphasized that Swedish units should contribute within the United Nations (UN), EU, and NATO international forces registers. This, like other cooperative efforts within the Nordic region, EU, UN and NATO, will provide opportunities to increase capabilities within the SAF and to improve interoperability.

### 7.3.1 Policies and Practices

For 2016, a new education system for basic military training has been developed and will be implemented in the summer of 2016. The system implies basic military training between 4 and 11 months [7].

The SAF is guided by a set of core values such as openness (cooperation, honesty, trust), results (create, deliver, be clear), and responsibility (give, take, demand). These values, according to the Chief of Defence, apply to both civilian and military personnel, which supports the notion of "One Defence Force" based on common values. Civilians still retain a distinct culture, which leads to some clashes and to some military not seeing them as part of the SAF.

The common value base provides support for how the SAF shall act, both in mission situations and together in other work situations. Different expertise is utilized, both civil and military, and the SAF act in accordance with the value base, both when accomplishing their tasks and in their free time [7].

Sweden is considered one of the most gender-equal countries in the world, and the legislation on the topic is extensive. The SAF continuously work in order to increase the proportion of women, as well as to enhance the working conditions for those already in the military system.

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## **Chapter 8 – MILITARY-CIVILIAN PERSONNEL: UNITED KINGDOM COUNTRY REPORT**

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### **8.1 OVERVIEW**

The United Kingdom (UK) Strategic Defence and Security Review 2010 (SDSR10 [9]) set out a restructuring of the UK Armed Forces, which included Regular manpower reduction targets and the creation of the Future Reserves 2020 (FR20) programme. The FR20 programme sought to increase Reserve strength and capability and to reinvigorate the relationship between:

- (i) Reserves and Regulars (moving towards a *Whole Force Approach*); and
- (ii) Reserves and the wider UK society.

The manpower reductions set out in SDSR10 have been achieved and the FR20 programme is on track to meet its targets.

On 23<sup>rd</sup> November 2015, the Ministry of Defence published the National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review 2015 (SDSR15). SDSR15 outlined plans to slightly uplift the size of the Regular Armed Forces, setting targets for a strength of 82,000 for the Army, increasing the Royal Navy/Royal Marines and Royal Air Force by a total of 700 personnel to be achieved by 2020, and on top of this increasing the Royal Navy/Royal Marines by a total of 150 personnel to be achieved by 2025. SDSR15 additionally announced the continuation of the FR20 programme and a commitment to reducing the size of the civilian workforce by approximately 30% to 41,000.

A reduction of civilian personnel is likely to have an impact on organisational culture and relations (e.g., staff gaps may place additional pressure on remaining personnel). The challenge is to mould a coherent workforce from a diverse network, where sources of workforce (e.g., Reserve vs. Regular Force) have different ethos, culture and behaviours.

### **8.2 INTRODUCTION**

The MOD sets out to protect the security, independence and interests of the UK at home and abroad. It works with its allies and partners whenever possible. Its aim is to ensure that the Armed Forces have the training, equipment and support necessary for their work, and that defence expenditures are kept within budget. The MOD is a ministerial department, supported by 28 agencies and public bodies.

The MOD comprises four distinct services (Royal Navy, Army, Royal Air Force, and Civil Service), with each further divided into professional branches and/or cap badge groups (in the case of the Army) that have developed different traditions and organisational cultures.

In 2015/16, Defence spending totalled £35.1 billion with the main area of resource expenditure being personnel (£11.0 billion), and the main area of capital expenditure being single use military equipment (£5.3 billion) [13].

### 8.3 WHOLE FORCE PERSONNEL NUMBERS (REGULAR, RESERVE, CIVIL SERVICE)

The number of Full-Time personnel (Regular, Full-Time Reserve Service [FTRS] and Gurkha<sup>1</sup> personnel) in the UK Armed Forces was 154,840 in October 2015 [11].

The Future Reserves 2020 (FR20) programme aims to increase the size of the Reserve Forces [8]. The number of personnel within the FR20 population in October 2015 was 36,910. The written ministerial statement released on the 19<sup>th</sup> of December 2013 detailed the planned growth of the FR20 population. This statement outlined the trained strength targets for financial year 18/19 as follows:

- 3,100 for the Maritime Reserve;
- 30,100 for the Army Reserve FR20; and
- 1,860 for the Royal Air Force Reserves.

The MOD total civilian population has fallen from 85,850 to 56,860 between 1 April 2010 and 1 October 2015 [12].

As seen in Table 8-1<sup>2</sup>, which shows more detailed service breakdowns based on 1 October 2015 data, there are 251,750 MOD employees of whom approximately 62% are UK Regular and Gurkha personnel, 15% are UK Reserve Forces, and 23% are Civilian Force. Accordingly, the percentage of civilians in the defence force based on UK Regular, Gurkha and civilian personnel only is 27%.

**Table 8-1: Service Breakdowns as at 1 October 2015.**

	Royal Navy / Royal Marines	Army	Royal Air Force	Total
<b>UK Regular &amp; Gurkha personnel</b>	<b>32,480</b>	<b>88,770</b>	<b>33,580</b>	<b>154,840</b>
<b>UK Reserve Forces</b> (includes Volunteer Reserve, Serving Regular Reserve and Sponsored Reserve, excluding Royal Fleet Auxiliary; excludes University Officer Cadets)	<b>4,120</b>	<b>29,460</b>	<b>3,340</b>	<b>36,910</b>
<b>Additional Army personnel</b> (includes Military Provost Guard Service and Locally Engaged Personnel)	–	<b>3,140</b>	–	<b>3,140</b>
<b>Total Service</b> (Head Count)	<b>36,600</b>	<b>121,370</b>	<b>36,920</b>	<b>194,890</b>
<b>Civilian</b>	<b>2,530</b>	<b>10,470</b>	<b>4,930</b>	<b>17,930</b>
<b>Civilian (Other)</b> (e.g., Head Office and Corporate Services)	–	–	–	<b>19,950</b>
<b>Civilian</b> (Trading Funds, locally engaged civilians and DES Bespoke Trading Entity)	–	–	–	<b>18,990</b>
<b>Total Civilian</b> (Full Time Equivalent)	–	–	–	<b>56,860</b>
<b>Total Force</b>	<b>39,130</b>	<b>131,840</b>	<b>41,850</b>	<b>251,750</b>
<b>Percentage Civilian</b>	<b>6.5%</b>	<b>7.9%</b>	<b>11.8%</b>	<b>22.6%</b>

<sup>1</sup> Gurkhas are recruited and employed in the British and Indian Armies under the terms of the 1947 Tri-Partite Agreement (TPA). They remain Nepalese citizens but in all other respects are full members of Her Majesty’s (HM) Forces. Since 2007, Gurkhas are entitled to transfer to the wider Army after completion of 5 years of service in the Brigade of Gurkhas and apply for British citizenship.

<sup>2</sup> To note: Statistics on Service personnel are for “Head count.” Statistics for Civilians are calculated as “Full-Time Equivalent.”

The Army has the largest Reserve Force (22% of all employees). The Royal Air Force has the highest proportion of civilians (12% of all employees). Thirty-five percent of civilians work in general head office/support functions and are not allocated to a particular service.

The proportion of civilian to military employees varies between different geographical locations, depending on the service, unit type and function.

Civilians are employed in a wide range of roles (e.g., as linguists, teachers, radio officers, management consultants and surveyors – in total, in over 80 areas of specialisation, and as generalists in such areas as administrative support and pay clerks).

### 8.3.1 Diversity

The gender representation of UK Regular Forces personnel by service [3] and of civilian personnel by service [5] is presented in Table 8-2.

**Table 8-2: Percentage of Females in the UK Regular Armed Forces and Civilian Personnel.**

Female Representation as of 01 October 2013	Number	%
All Armed Services	16310	9.8
Officers	3610	12.6
Other Ranks	12700	9.2
Royal Navy/Royal Marines	3010	9.0
Officers	690	10.0
Other Ranks	2320	8.7
Army	8340	8.6
Officers	1620	11.8
Other Ranks	6720	8.1
Royal Air Force (RAF)	4950	13.8
Officers	1300	16.3
Other Ranks	3650	13.1
Civilian	18250	37.3

Across civilian grades, 37.3% are female [10]. In comparison, 9.8% of trained and untrained UK Regular Forces military personnel are female. Among senior civil servants, 22.3% are female. Further, 52.3% of civilians in the lower grades (Band E) are female. For military personnel, the Royal Air Force has the highest proportion of female officers (16.3%), followed by the Army (11.8%), and the Royal Navy/Royal Marines has the lowest (10%). Overall the Army has the lowest proportion of females with 8.6%.

At 01 October 2013, Black, Asian and Minority Ethnic (BAME) personnel comprised 7.2% of the UK Regular Forces. The proportion differs between Officers (2.4%, constant since October 2011) and Other Ranks (8.2%, increasing 0.5 percentage points since October 2011; see Table 8-3).

**Table 8-3: Ethnic Origin and Nationality Representation  
of UK Regular Force by Service and Civilian Personnel.**

	<b>Number</b>	<b>%</b>
<b>All Armed Services</b>	11820	7.2
Officers	660	2.4
Of which UK	620	93.2
Of which non-UK	40	6.8
Other Ranks	11160	8.2
Of which UK	4050	36.3
Of which non-UK	7110	63.7
<b>Royal Navy/Royal Marines</b>	1150	3.5
Officers	120	1.8
Of which UK	120	95.1
Of which non-UK	10	4.9
Other Ranks	1020	3.9
Of which UK	530	52.0
Of which non-UK	490	48.0
<b>Army</b>	9970	10.3
Officers	370	2.7
Of which UK	340	90.8
Of which non-UK	30	9.2
Other Ranks	9600	11.6
Of which UK	3050	31.7
Of which non-UK	6560	68.3
<b>Royal Air Force (RAF)</b>	700	2.0
Officers	170	2.3
Of which UK	160	97.0
Of which non-UK	–	–
Other Ranks	540	2.0
Of which UK	470	88.2
Of which non-UK	60	11.8
<b>Civilian</b>	1630	3.8



The proportion of BAME personnel in the UK Regular Forces differs by Service: the Royal Navy/Royal Marines with 3.5% (remaining constant since October 2011), the Army with 10.3% (increasing 0.6 percentage points since October 2011), and the Royal Air Force with 2.0% (constant since October 2011; see Table 8-3).

Since 2009, Gurkha personnel have been able to transfer into the UK Regular Army, which may partially explain the larger proportion of BAME personnel in the Army.

In the Army, 66% of BAME personnel are from Foreign and Commonwealth countries. As of 01 October 2013, BAME personnel comprised 3.8% of the MOD Civilian population [10].

### 8.3.2 Age Profile

At 1 October 2013, the average age of military personnel (trained and untrained UK Regular Forces) was 30 years. The average age for Officers was 37 years and the average age for Other Ranks was 29 years [3]. For civilian personnel, at October 2013 the largest concentration was within the 50-59-age group, representing 35.3% of all personnel [5]. Approximately one-half (50.9%) of UK Regular Force personnel are under 30 years old. The civilian workforce is much older; only 7.4% are less than 30 years old and (as mentioned earlier) 35.3% are 50 – 59 years old.

**Table 8-4: Age Profile of UK Regular Force and Civilian Personnel, as at 1 October 2013.**

	Age Range (Number and Percentage)						Total
	< 20	20 – 29	30 – 39	40 – 49	50 – 59	> 59	
Military	8620 5.2%	76100 45.7%	52810 31.8%	24390 14.7%	4530 2.7%	10 0.0%	166460
Civilian	120 0.2%	3540 7.2%	7330 15.2%	15230 31.2%	17280 35.3%	5380 11.0%	48890

The age profile of the military is likely to change after 2020, when changes to career structures, career management and pensions will allow some military personnel, especially Officers, to serve for longer (until age 65 instead of 55). The implications of current differences in age profiles (perhaps also in interaction with gender profiles) between the civilian and military workforces should be examined more closely in relation to organisational culture. Of interest are questions such as: What effect might a greater age range of serving personnel have on the culture of the organisation? How do different age cohorts work together? Compared with older employees, for example, younger employees are said to be more collaborative, better educated, more technologically skilled, and more likely to choose a career that offers a balanced lifestyle [4], [7]. What attitudinal differences might exist between younger and older employees, and how are these attitudes likely to influence behaviours at work?

## 8.4 POLICIES AND PRACTICES

There is a short course run by the Defence Academy of the UK to support military personnel who have line-management responsibility for civilian personnel. The course covers topics such as recruitment, performance management, and development [6]. Similarly, there is a course for civilian personnel who are responsible for writing appraisal reports for military personnel [6].

For civilian personnel there is specific training for staff deployed to an operational theatre. This training gives them an overview of military structures and highlights other departments they might come across when deployed [6]. There are a number of civilian appointments, which are deemed to be Military Support Function (MSF) posts. These posts require a higher than average level of military knowledge. Those serving in MSF posts will generally work closely with the military in key support roles. MSF vacancies are openly competed mainstream civil service posts. Those in MSF posts are employed on mainstream Civil Service terms and conditions of service and will have a normal retirement age of 65. Retired military personnel occupy many of these posts.

The MOD conducts two staff attitude surveys annually: the Armed Forces Continuous Attitude Survey [1] for military personnel and the Your Say survey for civilian personnel [2]. There is some harmonisation of items between these surveys.

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## **Chapter 9 – MILITARY-CIVILIAN PERSONNEL: UNITED STATES COUNTRY REPORT<sup>1</sup>**

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### **9.1 DEMOGRAPHICS**

In terms of scale, the United States (US) Defense establishment is very large and complex and is therefore difficult to summarize succinctly. The focus of this chapter will be on the military-civilian demographics (including age, years of service, gender, category of work) as well as on policies and practices aimed at military-civilian integration. It is important to note that the numbers provided may vary slightly across sources due to missing data and/or rounding.<sup>2</sup>


#### **9.1.1 Overall Population**

The demographics presented in this report will include personnel from the US Army, Navy, Marine Corps, Air Force and Coast Guard, unless otherwise noted. Additionally, warrant officers will be included with officers. The Department of Defense (DoD) is the nation's largest employer (About the DoD, 2015) with military and civilian populations consisting of 2,904,650 members in FY 15. Military (including Active Duty, Selected Reserve, and cadets for all armed forces academies) and civilian DoD employees account for 75.0% and 25.09% of the total workforce, respectively. However, the civilian DoD employees account for 35.4% when compared only to Active Duty military personnel. Within the military (in FY 15), 61.4% was Active Duty while the rest fell under the Selected Reserve or National Guard components (DoD 101 sections, 2015). Figure 9-1 displays the breakdown of Active Duty personnel in each branch of service as well as those in the Selected Reserve/National Guard.

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
<sup>1</sup> The views expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the United States Air Force Academy, the Air Force, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

<sup>2</sup> Most information provided is from sources extracting data from the Defense Enrolment and Eligibility Reporting System (DEERS) (e.g., Military OneSource, Defense Manpower Data Centre/DMDC) and is dependent upon service members reporting the relevant information. Numbers provided will be indicated as being from either Fiscal Year (FY) 14 or FY 15.



**Figure 9-1: Breakdown of Active Duty Military in Each Branch as well as Total Selected Reserve/National Guard.**


Figure 9-2 shows what percentage of Active Duty members served in each branch of service for FY 15. As can be seen, the United States Army (USArmy) was the largest branch of the military and accounted for 36.3% of the total Active Duty force. The United States Navy (USNavy), United States Marine Corps (USMC), and United States Air Force (USAir Force) accounted for 24.1%, 13.7%, and 22.9%, respectively [12]. The United States Coast Guard (USCG), which accounted for the final 3.0% of the Active Duty military, typically operates under the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). The branch may be called to operate under the DoD in times of war or by order of the President [5].



**Figure 9-2: Breakdown of Active Duty Military in Each Branch.**

In FY 14, the majority of Active Duty personnel were spread across three different geographic locations: 87.1% were located within the US or its territories, 6.7% were forward deployed to East Asia, and 5.1% were stationed in Europe. Similarly, most of the Selected Reserve resided within the US or its territories (99.1%), predominantly in the states/commonwealths of California, Texas, Florida, Pennsylvania, New York, Ohio, Georgia, Virginia, Illinois, and North Carolina [8].

Of the 724,782 civilian employees who were employed by the DoD in FY 15, 35.4% worked for the US Army, 27.2% worked for US Navy, 23.4% worked for the US Air Force (USAF), and 14.0% worked for other DoD organizations (see Figure 9-3) [5], [8].



**Figure 9-3: Breakdown of DoD Civilians by Branch.**

### 9.1.1.1 Civilian Personnel

There are some difficulties in estimating the exact number of civilians employed by the DoD due to the large numbers of contractors as well as other government agencies involved in the defense field. Such agencies include the DHS, the State Department, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and the National Security Agency (NSA).

There are two categories of DoD civilian employees:

- 1) Appropriated Funds (APF) – which are funded through congressional appropriations; and
- 2) Non-Appropriated Funds (NAF) – which are funded through revenue-generating activities.

In FY 14, approximately 21% of the total DoD workforce was comprised of APF, whereas only 3.5% are NAF [8].

In FY 14, the average age of a DoD civilian employee was 47.3 years, and the typical length of service was 13.9 years. Furthermore, 49.3% of employees had bachelor’s degrees or higher. Gender demographics consisted of 56.5% men and 43.5% women [7]. The DoD prefers to hire civilians with previous military experience, and as

a result 24.93% of the DoD workforce were veterans. Of these, 7.9% were retired military – 1.8% were retired from the officer corps and 6.09% were retired enlisted personnel.

Within the civilian demographics, 90.6% of employees were white-collar in FY 14 (specifically, 26.2% were professional, 37.1% were administrative, and 27.2% were technical, clerical, or other). The remaining 9.4% of civilian employees were blue-collar [7]. The blue-collar, or Wage Grade (WG) schedule is based on the prevailing rates in a given local wage area. This system covers trade, craft, labor, and other blue-collar jobs. Each wage area pay scale is divided into three classes: WG (worker), WL (leader), and WS (supervisor) [4].

**9.1.1.2 Military Personnel**

Military personnel are made up of two separate groups: enlisted ranks and officer ranks. Table 9-1 shows the breakdown of enlisted personnel to officers in FY 15. The ratio of enlisted to officer within the Active Duty military was 4.15:1 in the Army, 4.96:1 in the Navy, 7.88:1 in the Marine Corps, 4.03:1 in the Air Force, and 3.75:1 in the Coast Guard [5].

**Table 9-1: Number of Personnel in Each Branch of Service.**

Service Branch	Enlisted	Officer	Total
Army	392,327	94,610	486,937
Navy	269,128	54,206	323,334
USMC	162,769	20,648	183,417
USAF	246,322	61,004	307,326
USCG	30,693	8,194	39,752
<b>Total Active Duty</b>	<b>1,101,239</b>	<b>238,662</b>	<b>1,340,766</b>

In FY 15, women made up 15.47% of the Active Duty military (see Table 9-2). Note that these numbers include neither cadets from any of the service academies nor US Coast Guard service members (data were not available) [5].

**Table 9-2: Male to Female Ratio in Each Branch of Service.**

Service Branch	Female Officers	Male Officers	Females Enlisted	Males Enlisted	Total
Army	15,948	78,662	53,405	338,922	486,937
Navy	9,414	44,792	49,855	219,273	323,334
USMC	1,456	19,192	12,625	150,144	183,417
USAF	12,367	48,637	46,289	200,033	307,326
<b>Total Active Duty</b>	<b>39,185</b>	<b>191,283</b>	<b>162,174</b>	<b>908,372</b>	<b>1,301,014</b>




In FY 14 approximately one-half of Active Duty enlisted personnel were 25 years old or younger, as opposed to only 13.4% of officers being in that age range. More than one quarter of officers across all branches were over the age of 41 years. The average age in the Active Duty military was 28.6 years (officers: 34.8 years; enlisted: 27.3 years). The average age of personnel in the Selected Reserve was 31.7 (officer: 39.3 years; enlisted: 30.3 years) [8].

Across the Active Duty, 20.7% of service members had a bachelor’s degree or higher, whereas 22.1% of the Selected Reserve had the same. Most enlisted personnel (92.1%) had a high school diploma and/or some college experience (but less than a bachelor’s degree), whereas 7.0% did attain a bachelor’s degree by FY 14. The majority of officers had attained a bachelor’s degree or higher (83.8%). Within the Selected Reserve, 83.3% of enlisted personnel had attained a high school diploma and/or some college experience, whereas 86.5% of Selected Reserve officers had attained a bachelor’s degree or higher [8].

### 9.1.1.3 Population Growth

The US Active Duty military has fluctuated over the past two decades. There have been several force reduction movements, the latest of which occurred in 2014. As can be seen in Figure 9-4, the US Army is consistently the largest force and has experienced the most contraction over the years. The substantial increase in ground troops (US Army and USMC) throughout the early-mid 2000s was a result of surges in Iraq and Afghanistan [5].



**Figure 9-4: Force Strength for Each Year – 1994 to 2015.**

## 9.2 POLICIES AND PRACTICES

The mission of the DoD is to provide the military forces needed to deter war and to protect the security of the US [1]. The military falls under the authority of two civilian commanders: the President and the Secretary of Defense. The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) assists the Secretary of Defense in planning and carrying out the nation’s security policies as directed by the Secretary of Defense and the President [9]. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) is responsible for planning and coordinating military deployments and operations, whereas the individual military departments are responsible for training and equipping their

respective military forces. Furthermore, Congress controls the military directly with regards to numbers of personnel, equipment, and organization, and plays an indirect role in doctrine [16].

The National Military Strategy (NMS) is delivered by the CJCS to the Secretary of Defense to outline the strategic aims of the armed services [18]. The CJCS works in conjunction with the JCS in describing the most significant regional threats to the US as well as international threats posed by terrorism. The 2015 NMS discussed strategic environment, specifically globalization, diffusion of technology, and demographic shifts and specified how armed forces personnel will be employed to protect national interests.

### **9.2.1 Standards of Conduct / Codes of Ethics**

The General Counsel is the official DoD Designated Agency Ethics Official (DAEO), which oversees the ethics and standards of conduct programs throughout DoD (both military and civilian), providing guidance to Army, Navy, Air Force, and DoD agencies. These responsibilities are carried out through the DoD Standards of Conduct Office (SOCO), a part of the Defense Legal Service Agency [10].

If a military or civilian employee is unsure of an appropriate action, they are advised to seek the advice of the ethics counselor. The mission of ethics counselors is to advise personnel on accomplishing goals without violating any standards of conduct (to include behavior with contractors, co-workers, use of federal property, federal funds, etc.). Disciplinary action cannot be taken against the employee if they act in good faith and rely on the advice of the ethics counselor following full disclosure of all relevant circumstances [10].

The DoD Employee's Guide to Standards of Conduct provides the following general guidelines to all public service employees:

- Act impartially to all groups, persons, and organizations.
- Give an honest effort in the performance of duties.
- Protect and conserve Federal property.
- Disclose waste, fraud, abuse, and corruption to appropriate authorities.
- Fulfill in good faith your obligations as a citizen, and pay your Federal, State, and local taxes.
- Comply with all laws providing equal opportunity to all persons, regardless of their race, religion, sex, national origin, or handicap.
- Do not use public office for private gain.
- Do not use non-public information to benefit yourself or anyone else.
- Do not solicit or accept gifts from persons or parties that do business with or seek official action from DoD (unless permitted by an exception).
- Do not make unauthorized commitments or promises that bind the Government.
- Do not use Federal property for other than authorized activities.
- Do not take jobs or hold financial interests that conflict with your Government responsibilities.
- Do not take actions that give the appearance that they are illegal or unethical.

The following regulations are issued under the authority of DoD Standards of Conduct:

- The DoD Directive 5500.07, Standards of Conduct.

- The DoD 5500.07-R, The Joint Ethics Regulation 9JER.
- 5 C.F.R., Part 3601. Supplemental Standards of Conduct for Employees of DoD.

These regulations provide a single source of standards of ethical conduct and ethics guidance, including direction in the areas of financial and employment disclosure systems, enforcement, and training [19].

### **9.2.2 Legislation and Compensation of Military**

“DoD provides active duty service-members with a comprehensive compensation package that includes a mix of cash, such as basic pay; non-cash benefits, such as health care; and deferred compensation, such as retirement pension. The foundation of each service-member’s compensation is regular military compensation, which consists of basic pay, housing allowance, subsistence allowances, and federal income tax advantage. The amount of cash compensation that a service-member receives varies according to rank, tenure of service, and dependency status. For example, a hypothetical service-member with 1 year of service at the rank of O-1 and no dependents would currently receive an annual regular military compensation of \$54,663, whereas a hypothetical service-member with 4 years of service at the rank of E-5 and one dependent would receive an annual regular military compensation of \$52,589. In addition to cash compensation, DoD offers current and retired service-members a wide variety of noncash benefits. These range from family health care coverage and education assistance to installation-based services, such as child care, youth, and family programs” [15].

### **9.2.3 Benefits for Military and Civilian Personnel**

Both civilians and military enjoy 10 paid holidays each year. Military receive 30 vacation days in one year while civilian employees receive up to 26 vacation days [2]. There is additional pay for overtime, work on holidays, and work on Sundays within the civilian workforce. There are furthermore many opportunities for student loan repayment as well as recruitment and relocation bonuses for both military and civilians.

#### **9.2.3.1 Federal Employee Health Benefits (FEHB)**

The FEHB allows eligible civilian employees – regardless of age/medical condition – the opportunity to enroll in a health insurance plan [4]. Employees are given the opportunity to choose between approximately 200 different health plans. A substantial part of the cost for health care is subsidized by the government, and the employee’s cost is deducted bi-weekly from his/her pay.

In contrast, military members are provided full medical care and insurance directly as a benefit of military service. Active Duty personnel are automatically enrolled in the TRICARE prime program, while military families may register in a version of TRICARE which has less freedom of choice for providers.

#### **9.2.3.2 Group Life Insurance**

The Federal Employee Group Life Insurance (FEGLI) provides term insurance and consists of basic life insurance coverage with several additional options. An eligible civilian employee is automatically enrolled in the basic version of FEGLI, which covers one’s life for whichever is greater: (1) annual rate of basic pay, rounded up to the next even \$1,000 plus \$2,000; or (2) \$10,000. The government pays one-third of the premium cost for the basic coverage and the employee pays two-thirds [11].

Active Duty personnel are provided with a similar life insurance plan, the Service member Group Life Insurance (SGLI). Military members are automatically signed up for the minimum life insurance and have an option of

raising their coverage in \$50,000 increments up to a maximum of \$400,000. Members of the Ready Reserve are typically also covered by the SGLI so long as they perform a minimum of 12 periods of inactive training each year and are drilling for points rather than pay. However, there are slight variations between services in handling premiums during non-pay periods [13].

### **9.2.3.3 Retirement**

There are three retirement plans for civilian employees. Employees hired before December 31, 1983 are covered under the Civil Service Retirement System (CSRS), while those hired after that day are covered by the Federal Employees Retirement System (FERS). CSRS is a defined benefit, contributory retirement system [6]. Employees share in the expense of the annuities to which they become entitled. CSRS covered employees contribute between 7 – 8 % of pay for CSRS, and while they generally pay no Old-Age Survivor and Disability (OASDI) tax (commonly referred to as Social Security), they must pay the Medicare tax.

Employees under FERS are also covered by Social Security, which is provided to workers and their dependents under the OASDI programs of the Social Security Act. It replaces a portion of earnings lost as a result of retirement, disability, and death. Approximately 7.5% of full-time permanent employees are covered under the CSRS, while 88.9% are covered by FERS [4].

Military retirement policies allow service members to retire after 20 years of service with 50% of their base pay as an immediate and permanent pension. Health care and other benefits continue into retirement. As of this writing (mid-2016), the military retirement system is being modified to reward service members who do not serve for the full 20 years with retirement income [17].

### **9.2.3.4 Student Loan Repayment Program (SLRP)**

“Legislation authorizes agencies to establish loan repayment programs in order to assist in the recruitment and retention of high qualified employees. The DoD’s SLRP is not available for all employees with student loan debt but it is available to those encumbering specific mission critical occupational series positions and Foreign Service employees assigned to extreme hardship and/or danger pay” [4].

The military offers similar incentives upon enlistment into Active Duty; however, these benefits vary dramatically by branch of service. For example, the US Army and US Navy may pay up to \$65,000 of student loans, depending upon the recruit (e.g., entry test scores, occupational specialty of the service member) whereas the USAF will only pay upwards of \$10,000 per recruit [3].

### **9.2.3.5 Thrift Savings Plan (TSP)**

“The TSP is a retirement saving and investment plan for Federal employees and contributions are tax deferred. The purpose of the TSP is to provide supplemental retirement income. TSP offers Federal employees the same type of saving and tax benefits that many private corporations offer their employees under the 401(k) plans. By participating in the TSP an employee has the opportunity to save part of his/her earning before they are taxed. Military personnel also have the opportunity to invest in the TSP” [4].

## **9.2.4 Military and Civilian Cultures**

A number of issues external to the defense organization shape the dynamics of the civilian and military workforce (e.g., the debate on the size of federal government; the overall defense budget; the increasing use of

contractors to limit the growth of costs). Internally, there are such issues as differences between civilian and military cultures (see, e.g., Ref. [14]); military transience caused by rotation; supervision issues (e.g., it is necessary to take a class in order to supervise GS civilians, but not in order to supervise military [4]). There are no unions for military members in the US, but certain categories of civilian defense workers are represented by labor unions.

Overall, it can be said that military members receive compensation, health care, retirement and other benefits, such as educational support, that are very generous. Civilian government workers in the US receive health and retirement benefits that are generous compared to non-government civilian employment.

Overall, military and civilian employees generally seem to work together effectively and harmoniously in the DoD. As suggested above, issues that do sometimes arise in defense workplaces employing both civilian and military members may include differences in work culture, the consequences of frequent turnover of military members, supervision, compensation, and hiring preference.

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## **Chapter 10 – MILITARY-CIVILIAN PERSONNEL DEMOGRAPHICS AND ORGANISATIONAL POLICIES AND PRACTICES: A CROSS-NATIONAL SUMMARY**

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### **10.1 INTRODUCTION**

One of the main objectives of RTG HFM-226 was to conduct a cross-national comparison of the demographic characteristics of the military and civilian workforces, and of the policies, procedures, and best practices relating to civilian and military personnel management, within the defence organisations of the RTG HFM-226 participating nations [7]. Accordingly, Chapters 2 – 9 of this Report feature RTG HFM-226 national reports on military-civilian demographics, policies and programs, based on the existing data sources, databases, and policy and strategic documents available in each country.

This chapter provides a cross-national summary of the major themes that emerged from these national reports of the demographic characteristics of military and civilian workforces, and of the policies, programs, and practices related to military-civilian personnel, in order to understand and compare military and civilian workforces within defence organisations, and the policies and directives that guide their management, from a cross-national perspective.<sup>1</sup>

### **10.2 MILITARY-CIVILIAN PERSONNEL DEMOGRAPHICS**

The national reports reflected a number of common themes regarding personnel demographic characteristics, including:

- The size of the military and civilian personnel workforces.
- The employment categories of military and civilian personnel, including general and specific employment categories, as well as environment or service categories.
- Organisational trends in personnel growth, downsizing, and restructuring, such as the shift to an all-volunteer force, the outsourcing of civilian personnel, and the civilianisation of military functions.

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<sup>1</sup> The focus of this chapter is on the eight national reports discussed in Chapters 2 – 9 (Belgium, Canada, Estonia, Germany, Netherlands, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States). However, information from other countries, and other sources, is also discussed in this chapter. For example, the national representative for Turkey, one of the original RTG HFM-226 countries, provided demographic data and information on personnel policies and practices in the Turkish defence organisation at Meeting 2 of RTG HFM-226, which took place on October 23-25, 2012, in Colorado Springs, Colorado [12]. Information on the Swiss defence organisation (part of RTG HFM-226), and the defence organisations of Australia, New Zealand, and Norway, were obtained through additional sources and contacts (see Chapter 1 of this report, [7], [22] and Stemate's analysis [21] of the military-civilian relationship in Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States, based on information obtained through the Technical Cooperation Program/TTCP).

- The gender, age, and years of service characteristics of military and civilian personnel.

Each one of these themes is elaborated below.

### 10.2.1 Size of Military and Civilian Workforces

As discussed in Chapter 1 of this Report, available personnel databases and organisational documents show that civilian personnel represent a significant proportion of the total defence workforce of most nations [7]. Table 10-1, reproduced from Chapter 1, shows the international proportions of military and civilian personnel in the defence organisations of RTG HFM-226 nations, as well as several other countries (Australia, New Zealand, and Norway) who provided input. As can be seen in Table 10-1, in most cases, civilian personnel represent between one-fifth and one-third of the “total force” personnel, where the total force, for most countries, includes both regular military forces and reserve military forces or their equivalents, along with civilians. This civilian component of the total force reflects a significant proportion of the total defence organisation, and this appears to be the case regardless of the size of the total force.<sup>2</sup>

**Table 10-1: International Proportions of Military and Civilian Personnel in Defence Organisations.**

Nation	Regular Force	Reserve Force	Total Number of Military Personnel	Defence Civilians	Total Force	Civilian Percentage of Total Force <sup>3</sup>
Australia <sup>a</sup>	57,994	22,072	80,066	21,818	101,884	21.4%
Belgium <sup>b</sup>	29,681		29,681 <sup>4</sup>	1,709	31,390	5.4%
Canada <sup>c</sup>	65,890	26,711	92,601	26,220	118,821	22.1%
Estonia <sup>d</sup>	2,752		2,957	1,571	4,528	34.7% <sup>5</sup>
Germany <sup>e</sup>	186,459	36,116	222,575	94,708	317,283	29.8%
Netherlands <sup>f</sup>	41,369	5,249	46,618	15,816	62,434	25.3%
New Zealand <sup>g</sup>	9,006	2,312	11,318	2,771	14,089	19.7%
Norway <sup>h</sup>	11,500		11,500 <sup>6</sup>	5,000	16,500	30.3% <sup>i</sup>
Sweden <sup>j</sup>	13,838	8,113	21,951	6,616	28,567	23.2%
Turkey <sup>k</sup>	457,677	211,381	669,058	49,215	718,273	6.9%

<sup>2</sup> It is important to note that the personnel data presented herein, and throughout this chapter, are derived from somewhat heterogeneous sources, and from different timeframes, and thus may capture slightly different population definitions. As such, although these data provide a useful overview of military and civilian personnel estimates, the personnel data may not be directly comparable in all cases.

<sup>3</sup> Due to rounding, the civilian percentages of the total force presented in Table 10-1, and other percentages cited in tables throughout this chapter, may differ slightly from those reported in the corresponding country report chapters.

<sup>4</sup> This figure includes full-time military personnel only, as data for other military personnel in the Belgian defence organisation were unavailable.

<sup>5</sup> This civilian percentage (34.7%) is derived from a total force (4,528) that includes 1,571 civilian personnel, 2,752 regular military personnel (members of the Estonian Defence Forces) as well as other Estonian military personnel (e.g., from the Ministry of Defence, 9; the Defence Resources Agency, 2; and the Estonian Defence League; 194). For additional details, see Ref. [11].

<sup>6</sup> This figure includes regular force military personnel only.



Nation	Regular Force	Reserve Force	Total Number of Military Personnel	Defence Civilians	Total Force	Civilian Percentage of Total Force <sup>3</sup>
United Kingdom <sup>l</sup>	154,840 <sup>7</sup>	36,910 <sup>8</sup>	194,890 <sup>9</sup>	56,860	251,750	22.6%
United States <sup>m</sup>	1,340,766	839,102	2,179,868	724,782	2,904,650	25.1% <sup>10</sup>

<sup>a</sup> Government of Australia Ref. [9].

<sup>b</sup> Data as of 2015, as cited in Ref. [20].

<sup>c</sup> Data as of 2015, as cited in Ref. [5].

<sup>d</sup> Data as of 2015, as cited in Ref. [11].

<sup>e</sup> Data as of 2013, as cited in Ref. [15].

<sup>f</sup> Data as of 2016, as cited in Ref. [1].

<sup>g</sup> New Zealand Defence Force [16]; P. Kennedy, Manager HR Insights, Organisational Planning & Development, Defence Human Resources for New Zealand Defence Force), personal communication, January 10, 2016.

<sup>h</sup> Norwegian Armed Forces [17] – see <http://mil.no/organisation/personnel/Pages/personnel.aspx>.

<sup>i</sup> Does not include part-time reserves. Norway manages its reservists and Home Guard using conscription and thus does not allow for straightforward comparisons.

<sup>j</sup> Data as of 2011, as cited in Ref. [18].

<sup>k</sup> Data as of 2012, as cited in Ref. [12]. Reserve force includes the Gendarmerie and Coast Guard; the civilians within the Gendarmerie ( $N = 3,766$ ) and Coast Guard ( $N = 886$ ) are not counted in this table.

<sup>l</sup> Data as of 2015, as cited in Ref. [10].

<sup>m</sup> Data as of 2015, as cited in Ref. [19].

When we focus specifically on the RTG HFM-226 nations (Chapters 2 – 9) – and we restrict the definition of “total force” to include only regular military forces along with civilians – we obtain a similar picture of the civilian component as that indicated in Table 10-1, although the percentages of civilians are generally slightly higher using this more restricted definition (see Table 10-2).<sup>11</sup> The percentage of civilians in the national defence establishments ranged from lows of about 5% in Belgium and 7.5% in Turkey to highs of approximately one-third in the United States and Germany (see Table 10-2). Still, based on the RTG HFM-226 national reports, we see once again that, in all the defence organisations examined, the group of military personnel is relatively larger than the group of civilian personnel [1], [5], [10], [11], [15], [18], [19], [20]. Thus, although representing a significant proportion of the total workforce in most nations, the civilian group is clearly a numerical minority in relation to the military majority group in the defence organisations of all participating countries.

<sup>7</sup> This figure includes United Kingdom Regular Force and Gurkha personnel [10].

<sup>8</sup> This figure for the United Kingdom Reserve Forces includes the Volunteer Reserve, Serving Regular Reserve and Sponsored Reserve, excluding Royal Fleet Auxiliary; and excludes University Officer Cadets [10].

<sup>9</sup> This figure includes Additional Army Personnel, including Military Provost Guard Service and Locally Engaged Personnel [10].

<sup>10</sup> The United States, by definition, does not have full-time reservists, except in the National Guard, but these are, according to United States documents, not to be included with Active Duty Service (full-time service).

<sup>11</sup> Once again, it is important to reiterate that the personnel data presented here are derived from different sources and timeframes, and that although, for most of the countries featured in Table 10-2, the total defence organisation here includes regular military forces only (along with civilians), for some countries, other categories of personnel may also be included.

**Table 10-2: Civilian Percentage of Total Defence Organisation (including Regular Force only) for Each RTG HFM-226 Nation.**

Nation	Civilian Percentage of Total Defence Organisation
Belgium	5.4%
Canada	28.5%
Estonia	26.6% <sup>12</sup>
Germany	33.7% <sup>13</sup>
Netherlands	27.7%
Sweden	25.0% <sup>14</sup>
Turkey	7.5%
United Kingdom	26.9% <sup>15</sup>
United States	35.4%

## 10.2.2 Employment Categories of Military and Civilian Personnel

### 10.2.2.1 General and Specific Employment Categories

If we consider both general and specific employment categories, we see that military personnel tend to work in more operational occupational areas (e.g., in the Netherlands and Turkey), whereas civilian personnel tend to work in less operational/more support areas, such as in the materiel organisation (the Netherlands), in medical services (Belgium), or in chief of staff operations and training areas (Belgium) [1], [12], [20]. However, in Canada, the largest proportion of defence civilians work in the Operational employment category (31.1%), though this category is followed closely by the Administrative and Foreign Service category (29.2%) [6]. Thus, in general, and not surprisingly, civilian personnel tend to work in support occupations, and military personnel in operational areas, across nations. It should be pointed out, however, that some of the differences across countries may stem from how the employment categories are defined and the types of occupations they include within the different nations, so direct cross-national comparisons may be limited.

### 10.2.2.2 Environment or Service Categories

If we examine the environment or service in which military and civilian personnel work, we find that the largest groups of military personnel tend to work in the Land environment, or the Army. This is the case for the defence organisations within the Netherlands, Canada, the United Kingdom, Estonia, Sweden, and the

<sup>12</sup> This percentage (26.6%) corresponds to the civilian proportion of the Estonian Defence Forces only. The calculation is based on 998 civilians and 2,752 military personnel for a total defence force of 3,750 (T. Jermalavičius, personal communication, August 29, 2016).

<sup>13</sup> This percentage (33.7%) corresponds to the proportion represented by 94,708 civilians out of a total defence force of 281,167 personnel (186,459 regular force military personnel and 94,708 civilian personnel) [15].

<sup>14</sup> This percentage (25%) is an estimate that assumes approximately 5,000 civilian employees out of a total defence force of about 20,000 full-time military personnel and civilian personnel ([18]; J. Österberg, personal communication, August 29, 2016).

<sup>15</sup> This percentage (26.9%) includes United Kingdom Regular Force, Gurkha, and civilian personnel [10].

United States [1], [5], [10], [11], [18], [19]. For example, the Army represents the largest Environment (i.e., Service) in the Canadian Armed Forces, comprising over one-half, or 53.2%, of Regular Force military personnel, followed by the Air Force (Air; 29.8% of Regular Force personnel), and the Navy (Sea; comprising 17.0% of Regular Force personnel) [5]. Likewise, the overall structure of the Estonian military is land-component heavy [11].

With respect to environment or service, there appears to be greater heterogeneity for civilians, than for military personnel, in terms of the service within which they work. In the United States, the largest groups of civilian personnel work for the Army (as is also the case for military personnel in the United States) [19]. In contrast, in the United Kingdom, the largest percentage of civilians (35%) work in general head office/support functions and are not allocated to a particular service [10]. However, among those civilians in the United Kingdom who are allocated to a particular service, the Royal Air Force has the largest proportion of civilians, at 12%. In comparison, most military personnel in the United Kingdom work in the Army, as noted above. In the Netherlands, civilian personnel work primarily in the Central Staff (55%) and support units (Defence Materiel Organisation, 82%; and Support Command, 66%) [1]. Among the Operational Commands, the Royal Netherlands Navy has the highest percentage of civilian personnel, at 23%. In Canada, the largest percentage of civilians work in Personnel Services (21%), followed by the Army (18.4%) and the Navy (16.5%) [5]. Thus, Canadian civilian personnel do not appear to be concentrated in any one area and, although a substantial proportion of civilian personnel work in the Operational employment category (as noted above), the majority of Canadian defence civilians do not work in the operational areas of the Army, Navy, or Air Force, but are rather more widely distributed.

For some countries (e.g., the Netherlands, Belgium), it was specifically noted that military personnel work in positions requiring military expertise, whereas civilian personnel provide continuity, support functions, and specific non-military expertise (e.g., information technology/IT) [1], [20]. Likewise, the Australian Defence Force (military personnel) has remained in roles that contribute to combat capability or that require specialist military competencies [21]. However, for some countries (e.g., the Netherlands), it was also noted that there are “grey areas” of functions (e.g., staff functions) that can be performed by either civilian or military personnel [1].

### **10.2.3 Growth, Downsizing, Restructuring and Other Organisational Trends**

#### **10.2.3.1 Growth and Downsizing of Military and Civilian Personnel**

An emergent theme from the national reports concerned the growth, or alternatively, the downsizing, of military and civilian personnel in defence organisations. Indeed, several countries have experienced growth or downsizing trends in their defence organisation. Some countries, such as Belgium, Germany, and the United Kingdom, have observed the downsizing of both military and civilian personnel [10], [15], [20]. For instance, in May 2016, the Bundeswehr initiated a “personnel trend change,” which implies a minor decrease in military and civilian personnel [15]. In the United Kingdom, as James-Yates [10] reports, there had been, until recently, decreases in civilian and regular force military personnel, as increases in military reserve forces are being planned (as well as the outsourcing of civilians through industry contracts, as noted by Stemate [21]<sup>16</sup>. Currently, slight increases are being planned for the United Kingdom’s Regular Forces, but about a 30% reduction in civilian personnel. Belgium has seen a reduction of both military and civilian personnel, with a trend towards shifting civilians into

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<sup>16</sup> As Stemate [21] further describes regarding the United Kingdom, although most central controls on civilian and military strengths have been removed, allowing flexibility to vary the civilian/military balance based on needs, some controls have been retained, which have resulted most recently in civilian reductions. The United Kingdom’s Parliament sets minimum strengths for the armed forces, whereas the Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) 2010 set a central reduction target for civilian strength, and the ongoing SDSR 2015 is considering a further reduction in civilian strengths.

contract positions [20]. The United States has also seen a reduction in civilian personnel in its defence organisation over the last decade, and an increase in contractors, in order to limit costs [14], [19]. In the United States, there have been several force reduction movements, the most recent in 2014. Switzerland has seen a reduction in its armed forces since 1990 (from 625,000 to 200,00),<sup>17</sup> as well as a reduction in training hours (“repetition courses”), which reduces the amount of time that the military cadre are required to be absent from their civilian workplaces [22].

The general direction in Estonia has been to increase the number of military personnel, while freezing the number of civilians, and outsourcing more non-military jobs to the private sector [11]. Similarly, Sweden has seen an increase in military personnel within the last few years, but a decrease in civilian personnel, both in absolute numbers and in proportional terms [18]. Canada has seen modest growth, overall, in both its regular force military population and its defence civilian population in the past 10 years, but also periods of downsizing for both workforces [5].

Overall, most defence organisations within the RTG HFM-226 countries have experienced some degree of downsizing in recent years, such as has occurred in Belgium, Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Germany, the United States, Sweden, Canada, and Switzerland, but also growth in some cases (e.g., Sweden, Estonia, Canada). Indeed, some countries, such as Canada and Sweden, have experienced both downsizing and growth. In general, growth has tended to occur for military personnel, and downsizing (or outsourcing) for civilian personnel. Such organisational changes, in either the direction of growth or reduction, can have important impacts on organisational culture and relations. For instance, from a pragmatic perspective, reductions may place additional pressures on remaining personnel and, depending on how they are actualized and for which specific personnel they are applied, can affect perceptions of fairness and morale. In light of such organisational changes and restructuring, particularly those involving cutbacks of personnel, maintenance of a coherent workforce that comprises diverse networks of personnel, both military and civilian, who may have different ethos, culture, and behaviour, will be essential [10].

### **10.2.3.2 Shifts from Conscription/Compulsory Military Service to an All-Volunteer Force**

Other forms of organisational changes or restructuring have also occurred in several RTG HFM-226 defence organisations. Specifically, a major trend in defence reorganisations in the past generation has been the shift away from conscription or compulsory military service towards an all-volunteer force. For example, the Netherlands moved to an all-volunteer force in 1996 [1], and Belgium abolished conscription in 1994 [20]. Similarly, Sweden recently eliminated conscripts in 2010 (to be replaced with contracted personnel) and has shifted to an all-volunteer force consisting of permanent and contracted units [18]<sup>18</sup>. Germany has experienced a restructuring of the Bundeswehr, Federal Ministry of Defence, and German Armed Forces, including the suspension of compulsory military service and the introduction of voluntary military service in 2011 [15]<sup>19</sup>.

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<sup>17</sup> A further reduction to 100,000 will take place with the next army reform by January 1, 2018 (H. Annen, personal communication, September 13, 2016).

<sup>18</sup> The United States abolished conscription in 1973. Canada imposed conscription only twice in its history (during the two world wars).

<sup>19</sup> As noted in Chapter 3, Canada has experienced a similar unification of its military forces and an increased integration of the military and civilian parts of its national defence headquarters as well as its military and civilian workforces – trends that have taken place over several decades [5]. Looking beyond the RTG HFM-226 countries, the Australian defence organisation has operated as a single integrated department since 1973, when the Army, Navy and Air Force were amalgamated with the Department of Defence Coordination and the Department of Information [21]. Similar to countries such as Canada [5], the Australian Department of Defence is jointly led by the Australian Chief of the Defence Force and the Secretary of the Department of Defence, both of whom report to the (civilian) Minister of Defence [21]. However, even prior to this amalgamation of the Australian defence organisation, the departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force each had civilian public servants working alongside their military counterparts [21].

Despite this trend, several countries, such as Estonia, Turkey, and Switzerland, have retained conscription. In Switzerland, for example, there is the concept of the “Swiss citizen in uniform.” Within the context of a “well trained conscription system,” the Swiss citizen in uniform carries the responsibility to live up to the trust placed in him or her by being reliable and dependable, by striving to improve performance, and by showing consideration and care for the people and equipment placed in their trust [22].

### 10.2.3.3 Contracting/Outsourcing of Civilian Personnel

As noted above, the contracting or outsourcing of civilian personnel has also been a trend in the defence organisations of some countries (e.g., Estonia, the United States, the United Kingdom, and Belgium), often in concert with reductions in civilian personnel. Accordingly, the number of private-sector civilian employees working alongside military personnel in defence organisations is likely to increase [10]. Such organisational changes have tended to favour military personnel over civilian personnel (e.g., there have been more reductions of civilian workforces than military workforces as a result of outsourcing). Such outsourcing trends are often used as a cost-reduction strategy, as in most countries, expenditures on personnel represent a significant proportion of the defence budget (see Ref. [11]).

Still, while the larger trend has been for outsourcing (particularly of civilians), there have been some recent examples in the opposite direction [21]. For instance, in the United Kingdom, the Navy has been considering whether certain functions (e.g., engineering support), which had been outsourced, should be brought back “in house” in order to ensure a sustainable internal supply of skills. On the other hand, as Stemate [21] notes, the downsizing of the defence workforce in the United Kingdom has also driven joint working between the military services – as well as between the military and the civil services – as part of an effort to increase efficiency.

### 10.2.3.4 Civilianisation of Military Functions

While many countries have downsized their civilian workforces, others, such as Australia and New Zealand, have engaged in the *civilianisation* of military occupations [3], [21]. That is, some previously military functions that are outside of core military duties have been converted into civilian functions to be performed by civilian personnel. For example, in New Zealand, the *Civilianization Project* was introduced in 2010 for the purpose of getting a higher proportion of military personnel “in front” (that is, into deployable military functions) compared to in direct and indirect support occupations. This entailed converting 1400 military positions “in the middle” (logistics and training) and “back” (such as administrative functions) into civilian positions [3]. In the Australian defence organisation, the civilianization in 201 – 2011 of certain military positions and the conversion of contractor roles to Australian Public Service positions – as a *cost-saving* exercise – initially resulted in an increase in the numbers of civilian employees [21]. Over time, however, some of the services were consolidated and centralized, resulting in a decrease in civilian personnel [21]. Such a trend coincides with the downsizing of civilians experienced in other nations discussed earlier.

### 10.2.3.5 Summary of General Organisational Trends

Overall, in recent years civilian workforces have been downsized more than military workforces, with some exceptions (e.g., Australia and New Zealand have civilianised some military functions). Downsizing of civilians has often coincided with an increase in the use of contractors or, as in the United Kingdom, in an increase in reserve forces. Such reductions and restructuring can impact organisational culture and relations, because reductions can place additional pressure on remaining personnel, and can affect morale, retention, and perceptions of fairness [3], [10].

## 10.2.4 Gender and Age Demographics of Military and Civilian Personnel

### 10.2.4.1 Gender

Based on the available data reported in Chapters 2 – 9, it is evident that, in all RTG HFM-226 nations, the civilian defence workforce, overall, has a higher proportion of women compared to the corresponding percentage of women in the military workforce [1], [5], [10], [11], [15], [18], [19], [20]. Women still tend to be a minority within the civilian workforces in the participating defence organisations, but the relative proportion of women and men tends to be more balanced within the civilian workforces than is the case in the military workforces. Table 10-3 contains the reported percentages of women in the military workforce, and in the civilian workforce, for each of the participating RTG HFM-226 nations, where overall data for military and civilian personnel were available.<sup>20</sup> As shown in Table 10-3, the proportion of women in the military ranged from a high of about 15% in the United States, followed closely by Canada at about 14%, to a low of about 7% in Sweden and just under 8% in Belgium. In contrast, reported percentages of women in the civilian workforce ranged from a high of almost 63% in Estonia, the only country in which women constitute a majority of the civilian workforce, to a low of 25% in the Netherlands. In several countries, including Belgium, the United States, Canada, and Sweden, the percentage of women in the civilian workforce exceeded 40%. These data indicate that although a “critical mass” of women has been observed in the civilian workforces of the RTG HFM-226 nations, this level of representation of women has not been achieved in the respective military workforces (see also Ref. [13]).

**Table 10-3: Percentages of Women in Military and Civilian Workforces in RTG HFM-226 Nations.**

Nation	% Women (Military Workforce)	% Women (Civilian Workforce)
Belgium	7.7%	43.5%
Canada	14.3%	41.8%
Estonia <sup>21</sup>	10.5%	62.6%
Germany	10.1%	36.0%
Netherlands	9.0%	25.0%
Sweden	7.0% <sup>22</sup>	41.0%
United Kingdom	9.8%	37.3%
United States	15.5%	43.5%

<sup>20</sup> The reported percentages of women in the military workforce generally pertain to the regular military force (except for the Netherlands and Sweden, which also include the reserve force, and Estonia, which pertain to the entire defence workforce, but primarily the Estonian Defence Forces and the Estonian Defence League); percentages for the reserve force (or its equivalents), may differ. In general, it should be emphasized that the reported percentages for the different countries may refer to different groups of military and civilian personnel, so may not be directly comparable in all cases.

<sup>21</sup> As noted earlier, the percentages of women in the military and civilian workforces in Estonia pertain to the entire defence workforce [11].

<sup>22</sup> This percentage (7%) excludes the Swedish Home Guard, but includes both regular and reserve forces.

### 10.2.4.2 Age

For all nations providing data on age, the civilian workforce, overall, is older than the military workforce (see Table 10-4).<sup>23</sup> This is the case for the Netherlands, Canada, the United Kingdom, Estonia, Germany, Sweden, the United States, and Belgium [1], [5], [10], [11], [15], [18], [19], [20]. Indeed, the Belgian defence organisation is experiencing an “over-representation” of older workers [20]. The average age of the military workforce in most RTG HFM-226 countries is in the early to mid-30s, except for Belgium (41.21) and the United States (28.6). In contrast, the average age of the civilian workforce in most RTG HFM-226 countries is in the late 40s. The largest military-civilian age gap (about 20 years, roughly equivalent to a generation) is found in Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States. However, one exception to the overall age trend may be found in Estonia, where Ministry of Defence (MOD) civilian officials tend to be younger than MOD military staff [11].

**Table 10-4: Average Ages of Military and Civilian Workforces in RTG HFM-226 Nations.**

Nation	Average Age (Military Workforce)	Average Age (Civilian Workforce)
Belgium	41.21	Majority of Civilians: > 50
Canada	35.3	47.6
Estonia	34	44
Germany	31.8	50.2
Netherlands	34.9	48
Sweden	33	46
United Kingdom	30	Largest Group: 50 – 59
United States	28.6	47.3

### 10.2.4.3 Combined Gender- and Age-Related Patterns in Military and Civilian Personnel

In addition to separate gender- and age-related trends in military and civilian workforces in the RTG HFM-226 nations, a combined gender- and age-related pattern is also evident in these workforces. That is, the civilian workforces tend to include relatively more women, and to be older, than the military workforces, in the RTG HFM-226 nations. This pattern of gender- and age-related differences in the civilian and military workforces raises questions of how well different age cohorts (e.g., millennials vs. older groups) work together, how gender might figure into such inter-generational workplace interactions, and how such patterns of interaction might evolve in the future [10].

### 10.2.5 Years of Service of Military and Civilian Personnel

Within defence organisations, years of service is an important demographic characteristic, as it relates to experience, legitimacy, and organisational commitment, as well as to the continuity potentially offered by civilian personnel, given the military rotational cycle. Within the national RTG HFM-226 reports, two countries

<sup>23</sup> For most countries in Table 10-4, the military workforce refers to the regular force only. However, for the Netherlands and Sweden, the military workforce includes the regular force and the reserve force, and for Estonia, the military workforce includes military personnel across the Estonian defence workforce (primarily the Estonian Defence Forces and the Estonian Defence League).

provided information on years of service for both military and civilian personnel: Canada and Estonia<sup>24</sup>. In Canada, the average length of service for civilians (all tenures) is 12.1 years, which is slightly higher than the average years of service for military personnel (10.8 years) [5]. In contrast, in Estonia, the military workforce, overall, has more work experience, in terms of average years of service in the defence organisation, than the civilian workforce (10.9 years vs. 7.9 years, respectively) [11]. Thus, although a civilian workforce may be older, overall, than a military workforce (as is the case in Estonia), it may nevertheless have fewer years of service than its military counterpart, at least in certain instances.

Further, within Estonia, there are certain groups where the civilian workforce may have considerably less experience than the military workforce, in terms of average years of service in the defence organisation [11]. For example, MOD and Defence Resources Agency (DRA) civilians in Estonia (officials and employees) have, on average, 6 to 7 fewer years of work experience than military officers in the Estonian Defence Force (EDF) and Estonian Defence League (EDL) (who have 15 years on average). However, this comparison is based on civilians' time spent in a civilian capacity, and does not take into account their previous years of experience in the defence organisation, for instance, as military personnel (some civilians are retired military). This limitation may also apply to the overall comparison of civilian and military years of service mentioned above. As Jermalavičius [11] notes in Chapter 4, differences in personnel demographics are especially salient when comparing the MOD and the EDF Headquarters, the two structures having the most frequent interactions. As Jermalavičius [11] further explains, the Estonian MOD is not only more civilian, and not only includes more women, but is also younger and less experienced than the EDF Headquarters. Such age, gender, and experience-related differences could help to explain why the MOD and EDF Headquarters have had challenges in intergroup work relations and cooperation in the past [11].

### **10.3 MILITARY-CIVILIAN ORGANISATIONAL POLICIES AND PRACTICES**

The RTG HFM-226 national reports reflected a number of common themes pertaining to several military-civilian personnel organisational policies and practices, including:

- Terms of employment/conditions of service.
- Policies that serve to enhance military-civilian integration and the management of a mixed workforce, including codes of service, discipline, ethics, or other values-related policies, as well as “whole workforce” concepts and national defence strategies reflecting the partnership of civilian and military workforces.
- Policies pertaining to the management/supervision of military personnel by civilian personnel or vice versa (e.g., training policies).
- Unionization policies.
- Career policies.
- Deployment policies.
- Professional development policies and practices, such as common training and education opportunities for military and civilian personnel.

Each one of these themes, or policy areas, is elaborated below.

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<sup>24</sup> In the United States, the typical length of service for a DoD civilian employee was reported as 13.9 years in 2014 [19]. However, the corresponding data for military personnel were not available. In Sweden, the proportion of employees in the Swedish Armed Forces serving 10 years or more was reportedly 57% [18].



### 10.3.1 Terms of Employment / Conditions of Service

Military and civilian workforces in the RTG HFM-226 nations tend to have distinct, but also, in some cases, common or overlapping, terms of employment or conditions of service. For instance, in Turkey, all personnel, whether military or civilian, are subject to the Turkish Armed Forces Duty and Service Act [12]. In addition, military personnel are subject to the Turkish Armed Forces Personnel Act, and civilian personnel are subject to the Civilian Personnel Act [12]. Similarly, in Estonia, civilian officials and military personnel are both regulated by the Civil Service Act, which includes provisions regarding the “permanent military defence of the state” [11]. However, Estonian military personnel are also governed by the Military Service Act, which places additional constraints on their conditions of service/employment (e.g., prohibitions against political party membership). Military personnel in Estonia are also exempt from certain provisions of the Civil Service Act, such as regarding limits to their work hours during states of emergency [11]. Overall, such differences in terms of employment and conditions of service reflect the complementary roles and responsibilities, and different expertise, of military and civilian workforces, as two distinct, yet overlapping, entities.

### 10.3.2 Policies for Enhancing Military-Civilian Integration and the Management of a Mixed Workforce

Several RTG HFM-226 defence organisations have policies that specifically function to enhance military-civilian integration and the management of a mixed military-civilian workforce. These are policies that serve to “homogenize” or “synchronize” the two workforces. They include codes of service, discipline, ethics, and other values-related policies, as well as “whole workforce” defence concepts and strategies that function to enhance the partnership of military and civilian workforces in defence organisations.

#### 10.3.2.1 Codes of Service, Discipline, Ethics, and Other Values-Related Policies

If we consider the codes of service, discipline, ethics, or other values-related policies in the RTG HFM-226 defence organisations, we see that such policies may differ for military and civilian personnel in some respects, but that there are also key overlaps. For instance, within the Estonian MOD, human resources policy, recruitment and selection procedures, principles of training, attestation (qualification testing) guides, salary guides and internal rules of procedure all comprise a set of policies that pertain to both civilian and military personnel [11]. Similarly, the EDF Personnel Strategy, Code of Ethics, salary guide and internal rules of procedure all apply to both military and civilian personnel [11]. Thus, while each entity in the Estonian defence organisation has its own personnel policy, there are large points of intersection and overlap. Key within these personnel codes and procedures is the idea of values-based management, which emphasizes cooperation, equal treatment, and fair compensation, for both military and civilian personnel [11].

In Germany, a fundamental principle of military service is the “citizen in uniform” [15]. Human resources policies apply to both military and civilian personnel, and are guided by principles of equal treatment, equality of opportunity, and transparency [15]. Likewise, personnel management for both civilian and military personnel is based on principles such as operational capability, cooperation, partnership (the “dialogue principle”), professionalism and personal enhancement through education and training, life-long learning, the consideration of personal and social concerns, and the life situations of women and men, such as regarding work/family balance [15]. One key principle is that of common identity, in the sense of an overarching organisational culture in the Bundeswehr; this principle recognizes the importance of close cooperation between military and civilian personnel [15]. Similarly, in Sweden, the Swedish Armed Forces are guided by a core set of values such as openness, results, and responsibility, which apply to both civilian and military personnel [18].

In Canada, the Department of National Defence (DND) and the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) Code of Values and Ethics (introduced in 2012) applies to both military and civilian personnel (the previous codes applied to one workforce or the other, but not to both) [5]. Indeed, there are important similarities in the core stated values of the Canadian Public Service (including defence/DND civilians) and those of the CAF, such as ethical behaviour, respect for law, and loyalty. However, there are also some key differences, such as the requirement in the CAF for service before self and “unlimited liability” [5]. In the United States, the General Counsel is the official Department of Defense (DoD) Designated Agency Ethics Official (DAEO) [19]. The General Counsel oversees the ethics and standards of conduct programs throughout the DoD (both military and civilian), providing guidance to Army, Navy, Air Force, and DoD agencies [19]. In addition, available to both military and civilian personnel is the ethics counsellor, whose mission is to advise all personnel on accomplishing goals without violating standards of conduct [19]. As noted in Chapter 9, if either a military or civilian employee is uncertain about an appropriate course of action, they may seek the advice of the ethics counsellor before proceeding [19].

### **10.3.2.2 Partnership of Military and Civilian Workforces: “Whole Force” Defence Concepts and Strategies**

Several RTG HFM-226 defence organisations have promoted the development of defence concepts and national defence strategies that reflect the partnership of civilian and military workforces. Thus, some countries have explicitly developed super-ordinate defence concepts to convey a sense of integration or partnership between the two workforces. These include concepts such as the Defence Team in Canada [5], the concept of One Defence Force in Sweden [18], and the Whole Force Concept in the United Kingdom [10]. As Stemate [21] describes, the United Kingdom’s Whole Force approach aims to “ensure that Defence’s outputs are achieved by the most effective balance of high-performing, fully integrated and well led team of appropriately skilled Regular and Reserve Service Personnel, Civil Servants, Ministry of Defence (MOD) civilians and contractors.” Indeed, the Whole Force approach underpins the integration in 2015 of civilian and military human resources functions into a single organisation under the Chief of Defence People [21]. Likewise, beyond RTG HFM-226, the Australian defence organisation uses an “integrated workforce concept” [21]. This concept includes military and civilian employees and contractors on both a full-time and part-time basis, and provides the flexibility needed to adapt the workforce mix between the different elements in order to achieve valued workforce outcomes [21].

Similar to the defence concepts described above, some nations have developed national defence strategies that emphasize cooperation or coordination between civilian and military institutions. These include Estonia’s “National Defence Strategy” (a whole-of-society and whole-of-government approach) [11], and Canada’s “Canada First Defence Strategy” (a whole-of-government approach) [5]. One of the key principles of the Canada First Defence Strategy, for instance, is that of an integrated regular, reserve, and civilian defence force, in which CAF structures are closely interconnected with civilian structures. This principle highlights the importance of an integrated and effective military-civilian defence team or partnership, but also reflects the complementarities of the two workforces comprising the team, in terms of their roles, responsibilities, and expertise [5] (see also Ref. [18]). Importantly, both the Estonian and Canadian defence strategies are also consistent with NATO’s “Comprehensive Approach” to operations. As noted in the Estonian context, this approach involves the common effort of military and civilian actors across organisations, including within and beyond defence organisations [11]. In each one of these defence concepts and strategies, similar themes of military and civilian partnership are reflected.

### **10.3.3 Management/Supervision of Military and Civilian Personnel**

In most RTG HFM-226 nations, military personnel are managed by military personnel, and civilian personnel by civilian personnel. However, in some cases, members of one group may be managed or supervised by members

of the other group. In Germany, for instance, it has become increasingly important that military personnel are administrative superiors to civilian personnel, and vice versa [15]. Most typically in such cases, civilians are managed by military personnel, rather than vice versa (as is reflected in the descriptive results of the Military-Civilian Personnel Survey [5], [6]).

Although civilian and military personnel may be managed by a member of the other workforce within each one of the defence organisations, in only a few of the RTG HFM-226 countries (e.g., the United Kingdom, Canada, and the United States) is there specific training for managing the personnel of the other group. In the United Kingdom, for instance, the Defence Academy runs a short course covering topics such as recruitment, performance management, and development, in order to support military personnel who have management responsibility for civilian personnel [10]. The Defence Academy also runs a course for civilian personnel who are responsible for writing appraisal reports for military personnel [10]. In Canada, several Defence Administrative Orders and Directives (DAODs) apply to both civilian defence (DND) employees, and to all CAF members who are managers of civilian employees, to ensure that both civilian and military managers of civilians are committed to a consistent approach to civilian human resources management [5]. In addition, all civilian managers and supervisors of military personnel must take the Managing Military Personnel Course, and all military and civilian managers and supervisors of civilian DND employees must take the Managing Civilian Human Resources [8]. In the United States, military supervisors must take a class to supervise General Schedule (GS) civilians, but civilians are not required to take a class in order to supervise military personnel [19]. In Estonia, on the other hand, legal advisors of the EDF units, whose usual role is to advise military commanders concerning the application of the laws of armed conflict, are also tasked to advise regarding the application of the civilian workforce regulations, but there is no specific training for the military in this field [11]. However, the EDF does consider seriously the feedback from civilian subordinates about their military superiors [11].

Apart from training policies, other policies are in place, in some RTG HFM-226 nations, regarding the management or supervision of military by civilian personnel or vice versa. For instance, in Turkey, civilian personnel can manage military subordinates, but they cannot appraise the performance of military subordinates or sanction them, whereas military managers can both appraise civilians and sanction them [12]. In Germany, a “military superior” is authorized to give “official instructions” to a civilian employee in their capacity as administrative superior, but is not authorized to issue military orders to a civilian employee [15]. Military superiors may also issue official orders to civilian members of the Bundeswehr, but these orders may not be enforced through the use of coercive force or its threat, contrary to orders issued to military personnel [15]. Apart from this, civil servants in Germany also have “official superiors” (i.e., persons responsible for decisions concerning the personal issues of subordinate civil servants); these official superiors of civilians may be military [15]. Thus, a member of the German military can be the official superior of a German civil servant and take disciplinary measures, if assigned this duty [15].

Overall, common approaches to human resources management may promote synchrony between military and civilian workforces. Certainly, the provision of training for military managers of civilian personnel, and for civilian managers of military personnel, should also promote such synchronization. However, such synchronization between the two workforces may be challenged when different management or supervision policies exist for military and civilian personnel. This may occur, for instance, when training is provided for military supervisors of civilian personnel, but not for civilian supervisors of military personnel; or when military managers can both appraise and sanction civilian subordinates, but civilian managers can only appraise but not sanction military subordinates, and so on.

### **10.3.4 Unionisation Policies**

Several RTG HFM-226 national reports referred to unionization or collective bargaining policies, which vary from country to country. In some countries (e.g., Canada, the United States, Turkey) the pattern is for the military workforce to be non-unionized and for the civilian workforce to be unionized, but policies and practices differ across nations [5], [12], [19]. For example, in the Netherlands, the majority (80%) of military personnel are unionized, but only about 30% of civilian personnel are unionized [1]. In Estonia, both civilian and military personnel can form trade unions, but military personnel have not pursued this in practice [11].

In Germany, as detailed by Klein [15] in Chapter 5, employment law for the tariff employees is divided into individual employment law (the relationship between employees and employers) and collective employment law (the relationship between unions and work councils or staff councils, on the one hand, and employers' associations and employers, on the other). As noted, employee protection is an important element of employment law in Germany. In addition, there are other legal/collective bargaining regulations governing the terms of employment and the employment relationship for employees in the German Federal civil service. The collective bargaining agreement between the federal state and the unions of the civil service is identical in content to a law that regulates the salary for all soldiers and civil servants. The terms of employment for civil servants are specified in the Federal Civil Service Act. These are complemented by a large number of directives (e.g., Working Time Directive and Recreation Leave Directive). Also, the terms of employment for military personnel are specified in laws (e.g., Military Personnel Act), legal regulations (e.g., Military Career Regulation, Ministerial Directive Governing Superior-Subordinate Relations), as well as directives (Joint Service Regulations, instructions, guidelines). When held by both military and civilian personnel in the same defence organisation, such collective bargaining rights may also function to homogenize or synchronize the two workforces.

### **10.3.5 Career Policies**

The available data featured in the RTG HFM-226 national reports suggest that, in some cases, personnel career policies may favour military personnel over civilian personnel. For example, in the Netherlands, military personnel are provided more training and education opportunities, more career planning, and better retirement schemes, than civilian personnel [1]. Similarly, in the United States, compensation, health care, and retirement benefits for military personnel are generally more generous than for civilian personnel [19]. Likewise, in Belgium, military personnel have better salaries, can retire earlier, and have longer annual leave than civilian personnel [20]. In the United Kingdom, military personnel have career managers, whereas civilian personnel are responsible for managing their own careers, but may apply for vacancies internally [21]<sup>25</sup>. In some countries (e.g., Canada and the United States), there is a hiring preference in the federal government for military veterans [5], [19]. Importantly, such policies may lead to tensions and negative social comparisons.

In other respects – such as in senior leadership appointments – civilian *or* military personnel may hold the advantage. For instance, some countries (e.g., Estonia) have appointed military officers to senior civilian positions, such as in the areas of defence planning or investments [11]. However, other countries (e.g., the Netherlands) have shown the opposite trend, that is, the tendency to put civilian personnel into high ranking jobs that are typically the domain of military personnel, such as in the field of finance [1]. As explained in Chapter 4, the preference for appointing civilians to senior leadership positions in such cases may be due to continuity and specialized expertise [1]. In other cases, or concurrently, such civilian appointments at the highest levels of leadership may also be used to ensure democratic control over the armed forces.

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<sup>25</sup> Stemate [21] also points out that the level of internal training and education required for civilian roles is much less than for military roles. On the other hand, military workforce planning teams work closely with their civilian workforce planning team counterparts, and in parts of the organisation, resource planning for military and civilian workforces has been brought together, where this is more efficient than running separate teams.

### 10.3.6 Deployment Policies

As noted in some of the RTG HFM-226 national reports (e.g., the Netherlands, Belgium), civilian personnel are generally not deployable and thus tend to lack operational experience, whereas military personnel are deployable and, in many cases, have been through multiple operational deployments [1], [20]. However, there are some notable trends that suggest that the “operational divide” between civilian and military personnel may be breaking down to a degree. For instance, Turkey is planning to replace some of its military personnel on operations with civilian personnel [12]. In the Netherlands, as in other nations, civilians sometimes go on voluntary short-term working visits, or can be militarized for longer deployments (e.g., issued a uniform, but not a weapon) [1]. In addition, civilians in the Netherlands defence organisation can apply for the Reserve Force and be deployed (e.g., in academic or specialist functions), and can thus benefit from the same training and same length of deployment as the military [1]. Similarly, in Germany, civilian personnel may take part in operations abroad as military-status reserve duty soldiers [15]. In the United States, the DoD has a policy whereby a subset of the civilian workforce is pre-identified for operational requirements. These employees comprise the DoD Civilian Expeditionary Workforce and may be deployed to support combat operations, emergency operations, humanitarian missions, disaster relief, and so on [21]<sup>26</sup>. In the United Kingdom, there is specific training for civilian staff deployed to an operational theatre, which provides them with an overview of military structures [10].

The above examples illustrate some of the operational opportunities that are available to defence civilians in the RTG HFM-226 nations. However, as Jermalavičius [11] points out in the Estonian context, EDF civilians, compared to their counterparts from other defence organisation entities (both within and outside Estonia), may have a slightly more privileged position when involved in international operations. As Jermalavičius [11] explains, all civilians employed by the Estonian government can be deployed to international operations, following the provisions of the Participation in International Civilian Missions Act. The policy regulating the benefits and guarantees of veterans (the Policy Regarding Veterans of the Defence Forces and the Defence League) does not apply to the civilian officials or contract employees deployed in accordance with this Act. Nevertheless, in accordance with the International Military Cooperation Act (the law defining the use of the EDF in collective defence and other operations abroad), civilians who are employed by the EDF and who are accompanying military units to the operations fall into the category of veterans, and are thus entitled to the same privileges related to this status as their military counterparts. Other Estonian civilians can become members of the EDL, an organisation of national defence volunteers, and thus may spend part of their time on military exercises, or be sent to international operations in their military capacity. Those civilians with conscript experience may later serve as defence reservists, and many others may attend and graduate from reserve officer courses [11].

In general, deployment experiences for civilians, or experience with military exercises, may allow civilians to gain familiarity with military culture and to share common experiences with military personnel. Such experiences may also provide opportunities for civilians to earn the respect of military personnel [1]. On a more practical level, such deployment experiences may also make some groups of civilians (e.g., civilians employed by the EDF) eligible for veterans’ benefits. Thus, such deployment policies appear to provide avenues for increasing the familiarity of civilians with the operational world of the military, and may serve to break down some of the operational divide, and related cultural barriers, between military and civilian personnel.

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<sup>26</sup> Although the military and civilian personnel organisations in the United States DoD are separate, and each military department manages its own civilian personnel, in 2015 the DoD proposed a series of reforms relevant to civilian-military integration. These proposals pertain specifically to civilian and military personnel management, talent management, and private sector human resources practices – and some focus primarily on civilian personnel. For instance, the “Civilian Skills in Reserve Component” seeks to “better align individual capabilities with mission requirements by cataloguing civilian skill sets inherent in Reserve component service members” [21].

Furthermore, from an organisational perspective, the deployment of civilians can also help to supplement the personnel and skill requirements of an operation. Nations and organisations take various approaches to the deployment of civilians. Although in-depth consideration of this dimension was outside of the scope of the national reports (Chapters 2 – 9), an analysis of this important component is presented in Chapter 21 [4]. In particular, this research, executed by the RAND Corporation and sponsored by the United States DoD, presents a cross-national analysis of the deployment of civilians, as well as some key considerations that inform the best approaches to deploying civilians in operations.

### **10.3.7 Professional Development Policies**

As noted above, deployment policies may provide opportunities for civilians to enhance their familiarity with military culture. Another example of such familiarization opportunities, in the Canadian context, is offered by the Canadian Armed Forces 101 for Civilians course, which provides DND civilians with basic knowledge of the military culture and environment ([2], p. 2). However, common professional development opportunities, such as training and education courses attended by *both* senior civilian officials and military officers, may increase the familiarity of civilians with military culture *as well as* the familiarity of military personnel with civilian culture. For instance, the Baltic Defence College (BALTDEFCOL) in Estonia, and the Canadian Forces College in Canada, both offer senior leadership courses that are attended by both civilian and military senior leaders. BALTDEFCOL is a joint multinational staff and war college run with Latvia and Lithuania [11]. Its Civil Servants Course, which includes members from not only the MOD but from other ministries and civilian agencies, is integrated with the military Joint Command and General Staff Course. In a similar vein, the war college level Higher Command Studies Course includes both senior civilian officials and military officers [11]. The Canadian Forces College runs courses such as the Canadian Security Studies Program, which is attended by both civilian and military personnel, and the National Security Programme, which is attended by senior civilian and military leaders, both national and international. Beyond RTG HFM-226 nations, Australia's defence organisation provides many opportunities for joint education and training, as well as for military-civilian social interaction, despite the fact that military and civilian personnel work under formally separate structures [21]. Such common professional development opportunities may promote greater familiarity on both sides, and allow both military and civilian workforces to learn more about each other. Such experiences may, in turn, enhance military-civilian working relationships and collaboration, and ultimately, organisational effectiveness.

## **10.4 CONCLUSIONS**

This Chapter provided a cross-national summary of the demographic characteristics of the military and civilian workforces, and of the policies and practices relating to civilian and military personnel management, within the defence organisations of the RTG HFM-226 nations. Regarding demographics, common themes emerged regarding the size of the military and civilian personnel workforces; the employment categories of military and civilian personnel; organisational trends in personnel growth, downsizing, and restructuring; and the gender, age, and years of service characteristics of military and civilian personnel. Such themes indicated, for instance, that the civilian workforce represents a significant portion of the defence organisation but also a minority in relation to the military component. Military personnel tend to work in more operational areas, with the largest groups of military personnel working in the land environment. In comparison, civilian personnel tend to work in more support capacities, and in more diverse service environments. Downsizing, outsourcing, and restructuring trends have tended to favour military personnel rather than civilian personnel. In addition, civilian workforces tend to be more gender-balanced, and to be older, than military workforces.

Regarding policies and practices, trends emerged regarding terms of employment/conditions of service; policies that enhance military-civilian integration and the management of a mixed workforce (including codes of service,

discipline, ethics, or other values-related policies, as well as concepts and national defence strategies reflecting the partnership of civilian and military workforces); policies pertaining to the management/supervision of military personnel by civilian personnel or vice versa (e.g., training policies); unionization policies; career policies; deployment policies; and professional development policies and practices (e.g., common training and education opportunities for military and civilian personnel). For example, the cross-national summary revealed that there exist distinct but overlapping terms of employment and conditions of service for military and civilian personnel, as well as common codes of ethics or other values-related defence concepts and strategies in some nations. Such superordinate concepts have the potential to enhance military-civilian partnership and integration, as do common military-civilian training and education opportunities.

As such, this cross-national summary identified several policies and practices that function to integrate the civilian and military workforces of many defence organisations. However, the summary also revealed that there are relatively few formal policies and/or strategies in place that focus explicitly on enhancing the integration and collaboration between military and personnel, and that there is room for development in this area. For instance, common training and education opportunities may allow military and civilian personnel to gain familiarity with each other, but such opportunities are relatively few. Although the trend towards supervision of one group by the other (most commonly, of civilians by military) may, with the appropriate training, serve to promote military-civilian integration, training for such supervision tends to be lacking. Further, career, deployment, and professional development policies, in some cases, have tended to favour military over civilian personnel.

Given the sizes of the military and civilian workforces, the extent of their interaction and integration, and the key complementary roles that they play in defence missions, military-civilian personnel work culture and relations is an area requiring more targeted attention and advancement in most nations. Future research is needed, thus, to identify more systemic strategies and other approaches for optimizing the working relationships and interaction patterns of military and civilian personnel within defence organisations.

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## **Chapter 11 – MILITARY-CIVILIAN PERSONNEL SURVEY (MCPS): OBJECTIVES AND METHODOLOGY**

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CANADA

### **11.1 PURPOSE**

The Military-Civilian Personnel Survey (MCPS) was designed to examine unique issues central to the partnership between military and civilian personnel in the defence organisations of the participating nations. The survey aimed to assess issues such as quality of communication and collaboration between military and civilian personnel, the unique aspects of working in a mixed military-civilian environment such as effects of the military rotational cycle on civilian employees, and key management issues of consideration for military managers supervising civilian employees, and vice versa.

Existing information sources were not adequate for informing this issue in a comprehensive manner. In part, this is because existing knowledge was largely based on research that was not specifically designed for the purpose of examining military-civilian personnel interaction and collaboration (e.g., general job satisfaction surveys), and thus attitudes and perceptions in this regard were only expressed “incidentally” [4], [6]. Further, existing information on military-civilian interaction has largely stemmed from the reports of civilian employees, and thus did not provide a perspective that includes the views of both the military and civilian personnel [6].

Within the framework of this NATO Research Task Group, the MCPS was designed to validate existing incidental and anecdotal information and to fill the gaps in empirical research in this domain, as well as to examine military-civilian relations and dynamics from the perspectives of both military and civilian personnel, cross-nationally. This information is intended to inform the development of strategies and practices to continue to enhance the quality of collaboration and interaction between these two integral yet distinct workforces within defence organisations.

### **11.2 PROCEDURE**

The MCPS was administered across 11 nations, including most of the nations represented on NATO STO RTG HFM-226, as well as several others. Data were collected between 2013 and 2016 (with the exception of Canada where the survey was piloted in 2012). The countries surveyed included: Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Canada, Estonia, Germany, Netherlands, New Zealand, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The sizes of the military and civilian samples for each participating nation are presented in Table 11-1. The specific sampling and survey administration approaches are presented in subsequent sections.

**Table 11-1: Military-Civilian Personnel Survey: Sample Sizes by Nation.**

Nation	Military	Civilian	Total
Belgium	325	292	617
Bosnia and Herzegovina	12	29	41
Canada	663	1149	1812
Estonia	82	129	211
Germany	333	846	1179
Netherlands	490	444	934
New Zealand	396	274	670
Sweden	213	85	298
Switzerland	724	722	1446
United Kingdom	386	981	1367
United States <sup>1</sup>	46	43	89

### 11.2.1 Sampling and Survey Administration

The sampling approaches and modes of administration were tailored to suit the best practices, population characteristics, and organisational requirements of the participating national defence organisations. A comprehensive review of best practices in cross-national and cross-organisational research was conducted to inform the sampling and survey administration approaches for the MCPS [5]. This review indicated that international survey processes are generally more complex than surveys conducted within a single nation. Organisations vary widely and certain modes of administration that work well in one organisation may not be appropriate or feasible in other organisations. Because of the heterogeneity of target populations in cross-cultural surveys, there is no single approach that is best suited to all nations/organisations, and it is recommended that allowing some flexibility in data collection protocols can reduce costs and error [10].

Although consistency is important, lack of flexibility and strict adherence to identical approaches in sampling and survey design can produce less comparable results than a custom mixed-mode approach. It was suggested that focusing on the same overall goals and methods but adjusting the methodology for regional/organisational/population differences would yield the best results [5], [7]. As such, the methods of administration varied depending on the specifics of the nation and the populations surveyed. For example, in Canada and the Netherlands, electronic surveys were used because these have been found to yield the highest response rates in these nations, whereas paper surveys yield higher response rates in Sweden and Belgium and were therefore the mode of administration in these nations. Mixed-mode approaches using both electronic and paper survey completion options were utilized in Estonia and New Zealand. Similarly, stratification and randomization were used in Canada and the Netherlands as these were most likely to yield findings that could best be generalized to the overall populations (which was also important to meeting the internal project objectives in these nations), whereas using censuses of select subpopulations (units) in the Belgian organisation was more appropriate given the much lower proportion of civilian public servants in Belgium (and thus if random selection of the

<sup>1</sup> The United States sample was based on military and civilian personnel at the United States Air Force Academy, not drawn from the general Department of Defense population.

overall military population were used many military respondents in this nation would have had minimal exposure to civilian co-workers and be less able to respond to the questions in the survey).

## **11.2.2 National Sampling and Survey Administration Approaches**

### **11.2.2.1 Survey Administration and Sampling – Belgium**

In the Belgian Defence Organisation, data were collected by means of paper questionnaires (French and Dutch versions) distributed among the selected units. In order to increase the response rate, points of contact were designated in each specified unit. They were asked to distribute the questionnaires to the respondents and to send them back to the Chair of Sociology of the Royal Military Academy.

With respect to sampling in the Belgium Defence Organisation, questionnaires were sent to the units with relatively high percentages of civilian personnel. This was a deliberate choice because the percentage of civilians in the Belgian defence organisation is very low (5.9% at the time of survey administration in 2013). Thus military personnel in some units do not have any contact with civilian personnel and some units have no civilian personnel to sample. In the selected units, military personnel were from the Army, Air Force, Navy, and Medical Service. The questionnaires were sent to 400 military personnel; 325 were returned, yielding a very good response rate of 81.3%. Similarly, the questionnaires were sent to 400 civilian personnel and 292 were returned, yielding a 73% response rate.

### **11.2.2.2 Survey Administration and Sampling – Bosnia and Herzegovina**

The Bosnia and Herzegovina Ministry of Defence (MoD) sample was selected from a pool of military officers (N = 60) and state civilians (N = 153) working at the MoD. Within the MoD, military and civilian personnel are dispersed across several departments (policy and planning, international cooperation, personnel issues, procurement and logistics, intelligence and security, C4I, finance and budget, general inspectorate and general and common services). Further, each department is subdivided into divisions and/or sections. According to this organisational structure, the sample was stratified based on the different departmental units, as well as rank and category, to reflect a proportionate number of civilian and military members. Departmental chiefs randomly selected personnel from their respective divisions and/or sections, inviting the members to voluntarily participate in the survey. This sampling approach provided a sample of 41 respondents, including 12 military and 29 civilian personnel. All selected members of the organisation completed the survey, yielding a response rate of 100% for both groups (military and civilian). The survey was administered electronically and was completed either in Bosnian, Croatian or Serbian.

### **11.2.2.3 Survey Administration and Sampling – Canada**

The Canadian military sample was based on a stratified random sample of Regular Force Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) personnel. The sample was stratified by rank and service in order to increase the degree to which it was representative of the Regular Force population. In total, 1,483 CAF personnel completed the survey, yielding an initial response rate of 36.0%. Unfortunately, technical difficulties were experienced with the internet survey link for the military sample, with the connection terminating for many respondents at approximately 30% into the survey.<sup>2</sup> A decision was made to use only the completed surveys. As a result, only 663 completed surveys from military personnel were analyzed for this report. The civilian sample of personnel working in the Department of National Defence (DND) was stratified by Years Of Service (YOS) and occupational category. In total, 1,149 civilian personnel completed the survey, representing a response rate of 28.8%.

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<sup>2</sup> Repeated efforts to address this issue while the survey was still in administration were not successful.

The Canadian questionnaire was administered electronically to those from the specified military and civilian populations who had internal e-mail accounts. Participants selected for the survey were notified by e-mail and provided a URL to a survey in their official language of choice (French or English). Three reminders to participate were sent while the survey links were active.

#### **11.2.2.4 Survey Administration and Sampling – Estonia**

Data from the Estonian Defence Force were collected over the course of three rounds of sampling, spanning a period of 14 months (October 2014 to December 2015). Selective and stratified random sampling was employed to target specific structures within the organisation where civilian and military interactions occur on a daily basis (i.e., Ministry of Defence, Defence Resources Agency, Headquarters of the Estonian Defence Forces, Air Force Staff, Navy Staff, Support Command and Headquarters of the Estonian Defence League). The targeted civilian population within these structures represented 42% of the total civilian workforce in the Estonian Defence Force. The survey was administered electronically, using the Google Forms platform and the Integrated Learning, Information and Work Cooperation System (ILIAS – *Integriertes Lern-, Informations-, und Arbeitskoooperationen – System*).

Points of contact were appointed by the various units within the organisation, notifying selected personnel about the survey via email communication. A URL link to the survey, administered in the Estonian language, was provided and paper copies were made available as needed. Overall, 82 military members and 129 civilians completed the surveys, yielding a response rate of 13.2% and 19.6%, respectively.

#### **11.2.2.5 Survey Administration and Sampling – Germany**

In the Bundeswehr or the German Armed Forces, members from two organisational units (Federal Office of Bundeswehr Infrastructure, Environmental Protection and Services [BAIUDBw] and Bundeswehr Planning Office [PlgABw]) were invited to participate in the survey. The recruitment strategy targeted employees working in highly mixed units in order to ascertain interaction behaviours between civilian and military personnel. In the BAIUDBw, the civilian employees constituted the majority, whereas in the PlgABw, the military employees formed a greater proportion of the workforce. Since the BAIUDBw itself is a larger department than the PlgABw and therefore has a larger total number of employees, the civilian employees were overrepresented in the overall sample.

All members within the two organisational units were sent a paper copy of the survey, in the German language. In total, 846 civilians and 333 military personnel completed the survey. Response rates were 36% and 50% for civilian and military personnel, respectively.

#### **11.2.2.6 Survey Administration and Sampling – Netherlands**

In the Netherlands, an invitation to participate in the survey was sent electronically to the work e-mail addresses of employees working in the Netherlands Ministry of Defence. In particular, personnel were randomly selected from all seven organisational departments: Army, Navy, Air Force, Marechaussee, Defence Material Organisation, Support Command, and Central Staff. However, only employees working in the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marechaussee staff were selected within these departments because operational units mainly consist of military personnel.

Those who were selected for the survey received an invitation letter with a URL to the Dutch translation of the English questionnaire. An electronic reminder was sent two weeks after the initial invitation to participate.

In total, 490 surveys were returned by military personnel, yielding a response rate of 39%. A similar response rate was noted for civilian personnel (36%), with 444 completed surveys.

#### **11.2.2.7 Survey Administration and Sampling – New Zealand**

New Zealand Defence Force personnel were contacted through the organisation's intranet email system, and mailers were sent out to groups known to have lower response rates to surveys. The overall sample was obtained through random selection. The electronic survey was administered in English. In total, 396 military and 274 civilian respondents completed the survey, yielding a response rate of 20% and 41%, respectively.

#### **11.2.2.8 Survey Administration and Sampling – Sweden**

In the Swedish Defence Organisation, personnel were selected from two departments from the headquarters, (i.e., the Production and the Operational Staffs) through means of convenience sampling. A paper format of the survey was administered in the Swedish language. In total, 214 military members and 91 civilian personnel completed the survey, representing response rates of 55% and 25% for military and civilian personnel, respectively.

#### **11.2.2.9 Survey Administration and Sampling – Switzerland**

The Swiss sample was selected from four organisational divisions, the Armed Forces Joint Staff, Land Forces, Air Force, and the Armed Forces College. The communication service from the Swiss Armed Forces disseminated the electronic version of the survey (available in either German or French) via email. Military and civilian personnel were eligible to participate only if they worked alongside one another on a regular basis. This selection criterion resulted in a total sample of 725 military survey participants, representing a 38.9% response rate, and 651 civilian members, representing a 42.3% response rate.

#### **11.2.2.10 Survey Administration and Sampling – United Kingdom**

In the United Kingdom MoD, information about the survey was disseminated to employees through the Defence Intranet website, inviting defence personnel to partake in the survey. As such, participation was obtained through self-selection, generating an opportunity sample. The English version of the survey was administered electronically. In total, 981 civilian personnel and 386 military personnel completed the survey. These divergent response rates may be attributed to civilians having easier access to technology.

#### **11.2.2.11 Survey Administration and Sampling – United States**

In the United States, personnel were selected from the United States Air Force Academy (USAFA), representing military and civilian employees in a highly specialized military-civilian work environment. An electronic version of the survey was circulated through email to all USAFA employees. Altogether, 46 military and 43 civilian members completed the survey. This self-selected voluntary participation yielded a 10.8% and 34.4% response rate for military and civilian respondents, respectively.

### **11.2.3 Samples**

Demographic information was obtained from military and civilian respondents across the 11 NATO and Partner nations surveyed (Table 11-2).

**MILITARY-CIVILIAN PERSONNEL SURVEY  
(MCPS): OBJECTIVES AND METHODOLOGY**



**Table 11-2: Military-Civilian Personnel Survey: Sample Characteristics by Nation by Percentage.**

		Belgium		Bosnia and Herzegovina		Canada		Estonia		Germany		Netherlands		New Zealand		Sweden		Switzerland		United Kingdom		United States	
Demographic Information		Mil	Civ	Mil	Civ	Mil	Civ	Mil	Civ	Mil	Civ	Mil	Civ	Mil	Civ	Mil	Civ	Mil	Civ	Mil	Civ	Mil	Civ
Age (years)	16 – 24	0.3	1.6	–	–	2.1	0.3	–	–	1.5	2.5	–	–	22.4	0.8	–	1.2	7.9	3.7	5.2	0.9	36.8	15.2
	25 – 34	9.4	12.8	–	13.8	20.7	8.3	18.6	21.9	22.8	15.8	13.3	10.6	22.9	12.9	1.4	15.5	22.4	17.3	21.1	8.6	26.3	24.2
	35 – 44	56.6	29.8	8.3	20.7	34.4	17.4	50.5	28.1	28.2	23.0	24.2	22.3	28.2	21.3	26.9	28.6	32.3	27.5	31.8	14.8	7.9	33.3
	45+	33.7	55.8	91.7	65.5	42.8	74.0	30.5	50.0	47.4	58.6	62.5	67.0	26.6	65.0	71.6	54.8	37.4	51.5	41.9	75.7	28.9	27.2
Sex	Male	77.7	54.5	75.0	41.4	82.1	57.4	86.2	38.8	97.0	59.6	90.9	74.1	81.6	61.2	96.7	47.6	98.5	79.7	87.5	59.8	78.9	67.6
	Female	22.3	45.5	25.0	58.6	17.9	42.6	13.8	61.2	3.0	40.4	9.1	25.9	18.4	38.8	3.3	52.4	1.5	20.3	12.5	40.2	21.1	32.4
Years of Service	1 – 4	16.3	37.8	0.0	4.9	3.6	20.3	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	1.4	6.0	4.2	8.0	–	24.1	N/A	N/A	7.4	9.6	2.6	20.0
	5 – 14	83.7	62.2	16.7	53.6	27.7	26.5	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	15.6	33.7	21.7	34.6	6.2	34.9	N/A	N/A	21.3	37.1	39.5	17.1
	15 – 24	N/A	N/A	50.0	12.2	30.5	18.2	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	21.2	15.4	37.1	37.6	30.6	12.0	N/A	N/A	31.1	23.4	47.4	22.9
	25+	N/A	N/A	33.3	29.3	38.2	35.0	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	61.7	44.9	20.3	11.8	63.2	28.9	N/A	N/A	40.2	29.9	10.5	40.0
Service	Navy	2.2	–	0.0	–	11.9	–	N/A	–	N/A	N/A	8.4	–	11.4	2.6	36.0	–	N/A	N/A	48.3	–	N/A	–
	Army	69.2	–	83.3	–	52.3	–	N/A	–	N/A	N/A	16.3	–	33.1	17.9	41.2	–	N/A	N/A	44.6	–	N/A	–
	Air	16.2	–	16.7	–	35.7	–	N/A	–	N/A	N/A	12.7	–	30.8	9.9	22.7	–	N/A	N/A	7.1	–	N/A	–
	Other	12.4		0.0								62.6		.3	65.7								



Sample characteristics indicated that most military respondents were 35 years of age or older, with the exception of the USAFA sample. Civilian respondents tended to be older than the military respondents (the largest proportion was 45 years and above), except for those in the USAFA sample who were more equally proportioned across the different age groups. With respect to sex, the military samples were predominantly male, whereas the civilian samples were more evenly distributed across the sexes, with some exceptions (the Netherlands and Switzerland). Years of service varied across organisations, but tended to be longer for military as compared to civilian respondents. The largest proportion of military respondents in most nations came from the Army, with the exception of the United Kingdom where a slightly greater proportion came from the Navy. Of note, the degree with which these samples represented their respective defence organisations varied, depending on the sampling approach. The results herein are a first attempt to conduct cross-national comparisons of military-civilian personnel integration and collaboration, and the generalizability of these results requires replication.

### 11.3 MEASURES

The survey instrument was developed using a variety of consultations and reviews. For the newly created scales, a workshop was held with 6 defence scientists working for Defence Research and Development Canada (DRDC)<sup>3</sup> to help refine the newly proposed items with respect to relevance, item validity, and item clarity. Meetings were held with managers with expertise in civilian human resource areas<sup>4</sup> who provided valuable feedback, and confirmed that the key areas related to civilian personnel working in a military context were covered in the instrument. A draft survey was submitted for review to the DND Social Science Research Review Board, and refined based on the feedback received. Finally, all items/scales were reviewed by a NATO Science and Technology Organisation Human Factors and Medicine Research Task Group-226 (NATO STO RTG HFM-226) focusing on Military Civilian Personnel Work Culture and Relations in Defence Organisations, and refined as per the feedback of the members from this group of international subject-matter experts.

The final survey instrument was comprised of a variety of items and scales used to assess key aspects of military-civilian work culture and relations (e.g., intergroup respect), as well as resulting attitudes and perceptions (e.g., perceptions of fairness) and key outcomes (e.g., organisational commitment). Whenever possible, an effort was made to utilize measures that had been published and validated in the scholarly literature, as opposed to creating new scales/items for the purposes of this survey. However, given the specificity of some of the issues of interest and the lack of existing research in this domain, a number of scales were created for the specific purpose of assessing military and civilian work culture and relations in defence organisations. The measures used in the survey instrument are described below. In cases where national data is not presented, this is because those specific items/scales were not included in the surveys in that nation.

Of note, two versions of the survey were developed – one for military personnel and one for civilian personnel. The two versions are highly similar, but were adapted for use with each of these two respective populations (i.e., the terms “military” and “civilian” were used as necessary; each version included a small proportion of unique items as applicable to each respective population, be it military or civilian). Moreover, all nations adapted questions related to demographics and organisational variables so as to better reflect national organisational and administrative contexts (these adaptations are outside the scope of the present report and are presented in national reports and applications, as required).

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<sup>3</sup> Specifically, the defence scientists were from Director General Military Personnel Research and Analysis (DGMPRA).

<sup>4</sup> Managers were from the Canadian DND organisation Assistant Deputy Minister (Human Resources – Civilian) and included Director Civilian Labour Relations (DCLR), Director Diversity and Well-Being (DDWB), and manager of Stakeholder Engagement in Director of Change Management (DC Mgmt).

### **11.3.1 Measures from the Scholarly Literature**

#### **11.3.1.1 Workplace Respect**

A modified version of the Respect in the Work Group Scale used in the Morale Questionnaire by Defence Services Centre for Behavioural Sciences in the Netherlands [2] was used as a measure of perceived intergroup respect between military and civilian personnel. Participants were asked to indicate their degree of agreement with each item on a 6-point scale ranging from 1 (*strongly disagree*) to 6 (*strongly agree*). An example item (for civilian personnel) is “I have the feeling that military personnel in my workplace respect me for my qualities.”

#### **11.3.1.2 Organisational Justice**

A modified version of Ambrose and Schminke’s [1] 6-item overall organisational justice scale was used to evaluate perceptions of overall organisational fairness or justice. Participants were asked to indicate their degree of agreement with each item on a 7-point scale ranging from 1 (*strongly disagree*) to 7 (*strongly agree*). An example item is “Overall, I’m treated fairly by DND/CAF.”<sup>5</sup>

#### **11.3.1.3 Job Satisfaction**

A global measure of job satisfaction, the Job in General Scale [8], was used to evaluate overall levels of job satisfaction. Respondents indicated their agreement with each item on a 6-point scale ranging from 1 (*strongly disagree*) to 6 (*strongly agree*). An example item is “All in all I am satisfied with my job.”

#### **11.3.1.4 Affective Organisational Commitment**

Affective organisational commitment was measured using the organisational commitment questionnaire designed by Meyer, Allen, and Smith [9]. The original items were tailored to each national defence organisation, such that the term *my organisation* was replaced with the respective name of the relevant defence organisation in each item. The affective commitment subscale was comprised of 6 items intended to measure attachment and emotional ties to one’s organisation (e.g., “DND/CAF has a great deal of personal meaning for me”). Participants were asked to indicate their level of agreement with each statement on a 6-point scale ranging from 1 (*strongly disagree*) to 6 (*strongly agree*).

#### **11.3.1.5 Perceptions of Organisational Support**

Perceived Organisational Support (POS) was measured using nine items from the Perceived Organisational Support Scale [3]. The original items were tailored to each respective national population (e.g., “The DND/CAF tries to make my job as interesting as possible”; “The DND/CAF really cares about my well-being”). Participants were asked to indicate their degree of agreement to each item on a 6-point scale ranging from 1 (*strongly disagree*) to 6 (*strongly agree*).

### **11.3.2 Measures Developed for the Military-Civilian Survey**

#### **11.3.2.1 Extent of Interaction**

To assess the degree of interaction between military and civilian personnel in the samples of interest, respondents were first asked whether there were civilians within their workplaces (*yes* or *no*). Those who answered affirmatively were asked to indicate the frequency of interaction with their civilian co-workers using

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<sup>5</sup> Organisational terms were modified to reflect the names and terminology used for each respective national defence organisation.

the following response options: *daily*; *several times a week*; *about once a week*; *about once every couple of weeks*; *about once a month*; *less than once a month*; *almost never*.

#### **11.3.2.2 Perceptions of Importance of Civilian Personnel**

Survey respondents were asked to indicate how important they believe civilian personnel to be using two items: “Civilian employees are an important component to the success of the CAF<sup>6</sup> mission” and “Civilian employees are a necessary component to the success of the CAF<sup>6</sup> mission.” Participants were asked to indicate their level of agreement with each statement on a 6-point scale ranging from 1 (*strongly disagree*) to 6 (*strongly agree*). They were also provided with the option to select “*not applicable*” or “*don’t know*” responses to each item.

#### **11.3.2.3 Relationship Quality**

A series of items were developed to assess perceived quality of the relationship between military and civilian personnel (e.g., “Civilian and military personnel work together effectively as a team;” “Military and civilians get along well in my workplace”). Participants were asked to indicate their level of agreement with each statement on a 6-point scale ranging from 1 (*strongly disagree*) to 6 (*strongly agree*). They were also provided with the option to select “*not applicable*” or “*don’t know*” responses to each item.

#### **11.3.2.4 Communication**

A series of items were developed to assess perceived quality of communication between military and civilian personnel (e.g., “Military and civilian members communicate effectively with one another;” “Sometimes I feel like military and civilian employees are speaking different languages”). Participants were asked to indicate their level of agreement with each statement on a 6-point scale ranging from 1 (*strongly disagree*) to 6 (*strongly agree*). They were also provided with the option to select “*not applicable*” or “*don’t know*” responses to each item.

#### **11.3.2.5 Inclusion**

A series of items were developed to assess perceived intergroup inclusion between military and civilian personnel (e.g., “military personnel make me feel like part of the team in my work group” for civilian personnel). Participants were asked to indicate their level of agreement with each statement on a 6-point scale ranging from 1 (*strongly disagree*) to 6 (*strongly agree*). They were also provided with the option to select “*not applicable*” or “*don’t know*” responses to each item.

#### **11.3.2.6 Senior Leadership Messages Supporting the Defence Team**

A series of items were developed to assess the extent to which personnel perceive senior leaders to promote the military-civilian collaboration (e.g., “Senior leaders emphasize the importance of military-civilian employee cooperation”; or “Senior leaders make efforts to promote the military-civilian defence team”). Participants were asked to indicate their level of agreement with each statement on a 6-point scale ranging from 1 (*strongly disagree*) to 6 (*strongly agree*). They were also provided with the option to select “*not applicable*” or “*don’t know*” responses to each item.

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<sup>6</sup> Organisational terms were modified to reflect the names and terminology used for each respective national defence organisation.

### **11.3.2.7 Supervision of Civilian Personnel by Military Supervisors / Supervision of Military Personnel by Civilian Supervisors**

Civilian participants who were supervised by a military supervisor or manager were asked a series of questions to assess their views regarding the quality of supervision received using a 6-point scale ranging from 1 (*strongly disagree*) to 6 (*strongly agree*). Example items are “Military managers are often placed in positions of authority over civilians without receiving sufficient training required to manage them” and “Military managers support professional development opportunities for civilian employees.” Similarly, military participants who were supervised by a civilian supervisor or manager were asked a series of questions to assess their views regarding the quality of supervision received by their civilian managers/supervisors.

### **11.3.2.8 Working in a Military Context**

Given that “working in a military context” is a unique dynamic to civilians in defence organisations (with some exceptions, such as police forces), the possible consequences of civilians working in a military context were explored. In particular, civilian respondents were asked to indicate their degree of agreement with items assessing effects on their career development (e.g., “Career progression of civilians is limited in DND<sup>7</sup> because the best positions tend to be given to military personnel”), training opportunities (e.g., “Given our unique roles in DND/CAF<sup>7</sup>, the training given to military and civilian personnel makes sense”), and the effects of the military rotational cycle related to postings and deployments (e.g., “The frequent posting cycle of military personnel disrupts productivity in my workplace”). Participants were asked to indicate their level of agreement with each statement on a 6-point scale ranging from 1 (*strongly disagree*) to 6 (*strongly agree*).

### **11.3.2.9 Retention Intentions**

Respondents were asked three questions regarding their retention intentions. For the military sample these three questions were: “I intend to stay in the CAF as long as I can;” “I intend to leave the CAF within the next two years;” “I intend to leave the CAF as soon as a civilian job becomes available.” For the civilian sample these three questions were: “I intend to stay with DND as long as I can;” “I intend to leave DND within the next two years;” “I intend to leave DND as soon as another job becomes available.”<sup>7</sup> These questions were measured on a 6-point scale ranging from 1 (*strongly agree*) to 6 (*strongly disagree*).

### **11.3.3 Internal Consistency**

Of note, internal consistency analyses were conducted on the survey scales in order to assess their internal reliability (i.e., how well the items on a scale that are proposed to measure the same construct produce similar results). It was particularly important to assess the internal consistency of the scales in this study because many scales were newly developed for the purpose of measuring aspects of military-civilian collaboration. Further, both newly-developed and standardized scales used in the survey battery were translated from English into different languages (French, Dutch, German, Swedish, Estonian, Bosnian/Croatian/Serbian). It is of note that, with few exceptions, the Cronbach’s alpha coefficients were mostly in the moderately high to high range, indicating very good internal consistency across all the nations, as shown in Table 11-3.

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<sup>7</sup> Organisational terms such as CAF/DND were modified to reflect the names and terminology used for each respective national defence organization.

**Table 11-3: Military-Civilian Survey Scales: Internal Consistencies Across Nations.**

Scale	Belgium		Bosnia and Herzegovina		Canada		Germany		Netherlands		New Zealand		Sweden		Switzerland		United States		United Kingdom	
	Reliability Stat ( $\alpha$ )		Reliability Stat ( $\alpha$ )		Reliability Stat ( $\alpha$ )		Reliability Stat ( $\alpha$ )		Reliability Stat ( $\alpha$ )		Reliability Stat ( $\alpha$ )		Reliability Stat ( $\alpha$ )		Reliability Stat ( $\alpha$ )		Reliability Stat ( $\alpha$ )		Reliability Stat ( $\alpha$ )	
	Mil	Civ	Mil	Civ	Mil	Civ	Mil	Civ	Mil	Civ	Mil	Civ	Mil	Civ	Mil	Civ	Mil	Civ	Mil	Civ
Perceptions of Importance of Civs	0.91	0.84	0.74	0.83	0.93	0.89	0.88	0.88	0.89	0.82	0.89	0.82	0.90	0.87	0.88	0.89	0.84	0.76	0.88	0.85
Mil-Civ Relationship Quality	0.94	0.93	0.92	0.86	0.95	0.95	0.93	0.89	0.93	0.94	0.93	0.94	0.95	0.93	0.94	0.93	0.94	0.94	0.96	0.96
Mil-Civ Communication	0.79	0.64	0.27	0.57	0.80	0.71	0.85	0.68	0.76	0.82	0.76	0.70	0.76	0.62	0.81	0.73	0.76	0.60	0.75	0.66
Senior Leader Support of Mil-Civ Integration/ Collaboration	0.93	0.93	0.97	0.97	0.91	0.96	0.89	0.92	0.92	0.96	0.92	0.96	0.94	0.95	0.84	0.91			0.94	0.96
Supervision of Civs by Mil Managers; Supervision of Mil by Civ Managers	0.87	0.93	0.95	0.96	0.94	0.95	0.98	0.87	0.94	0.95	0.95	0.95	0.89	0.93	0.99	0.94	0.47	0.57	0.93	0.95
Civ Work in Military Context: Effects on Professional Development		0.82		0.89		0.92		0.87		0.86		0.68		0.86		0.88		0.80		0.91
Civ Work in Military Context: Effects on Training		0.80		0.31		0.83		0.82		0.79		0.71		0.81		0.83				0.78
Civ Work in Military Context: Effects of Military Rotational Cycle		0.90		0.93		0.82		0.93		0.84		0.84		0.80		0.88		0.87		0.84

**MILITARY-CIVILIAN PERSONNEL SURVEY  
(MCPS): OBJECTIVES AND METHODOLOGY**



Scale	Belgium		Bosnia and Herzegovina		Canada		Germany		Netherlands		New Zealand		Sweden		Switzerland		United States		United Kingdom	
	Reliability Stat ( $\alpha$ )		Reliability Stat ( $\alpha$ )		Reliability Stat ( $\alpha$ )		Reliability Stat ( $\alpha$ )		Reliability Stat ( $\alpha$ )		Reliability Stat ( $\alpha$ )		Reliability Stat ( $\alpha$ )		Reliability Stat ( $\alpha$ )		Reliability Stat ( $\alpha$ )		Reliability Stat ( $\alpha$ )	
	Mil	Civ	Mil	Civ	Mil	Civ	Mil	Civ	Mil	Civ	Mil	Civ	Mil	Civ	Mil	Civ	Mil	Civ	Mil	Civ
<b>Perceptions of Organizational Support</b>	0.89	0.90	0.87	0.91	0.92	0.93	0.91	0.91	0.92	0.90	0.92	0.90	0.90	0.90	0.91	0.92	0.95	0.95		
<b>Organizational Fairness</b>	0.87	0.90	0.89	0.85	0.93	0.92	0.92	0.86	0.92	0.92	0.92	0.92	0.91	0.89	0.88	0.88			0.90	0.92
<b>Job Satisfaction</b>	0.83	0.87	0.95	0.89	0.90	0.85	0.84	0.77	0.84	0.82	0.84	0.82	0.82	0.79	0.80	0.75	0.82	0.86	0.88	0.89
<b>Organizational Affective Commitment</b>	0.82	0.84	0.85	0.81	0.86	0.84	0.83	0.86	0.75	0.79	0.86	0.88	0.82	0.77	0.81	0.84	0.78	0.83	0.84	0.85
<b>Retention Intentions</b>	0.52	0.73	0.78	0.76	0.79	0.75	0.75	0.82	0.71	0.78	0.71	0.78	0.75	0.79	0.72	0.79			0.78	0.85

**11.4 REFERENCES**

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## **Chapter 12 – MILITARY-CIVILIAN PERSONNEL SURVEY (MCPS): DESCRIPTIVE CROSS-NATIONAL RESULTS**

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The Military-Civilian Personnel Survey (MCPS) was designed to examine unique issues central to the partnership between civilian and military personnel in defence organisations, such as quality of relations and communication, issues related to the effects of military supervision of civilian personnel (and vice versa), and effects of the military rotational cycle on civilian employees. Eleven nations administered the MCPS to their military personnel and defence civil servants. The descriptive results are presented in this chapter.

## 12.1 EXTENT OF INTERACTION BETWEEN MILITARY AND CIVILIAN PERSONNEL

The extent to which military and civilian respondents work together and interact in their respective defence organisations was examined. Most military respondents (at least 77.3% or more) across nations indicated that there were civilian personnel in their workplace (see Table 12-1).

**Table 12-1: Are there Civilian Personnel in your Workplace?**

Nation	Response	Percent (%)
Belgium	Yes	86.0
Bosnia and Herzegovina	Yes	100.0
Canada	Yes	89.9
Estonia	Yes	96.3
Germany	Yes	100.0
Netherlands	Yes	94.1
New Zealand	Yes	88.5
Sweden	Yes	95.3
Switzerland	Yes	77.3
United Kingdom	Yes	93.8
United States	Yes	100.0

Similarly, most civilian respondents (at least 87.6% or more) across nations indicated that there were military personnel in their workplace (see Table 12-2).

**Table 12-2: Are there Military Personnel in your Workplace?**

Nation	Response	Percent (%)
Belgium	Yes	92.9
Bosnia and Herzegovina	Yes	93.1
Canada	Yes	90.2
Estonia	Yes	87.6
Germany	Yes	100.0
Netherlands	Yes	91.2
New Zealand	Yes	90.7
Sweden	Yes	100.0
Switzerland	Yes	87.9
United Kingdom	Yes	96.2
United States	Yes	97.2

Military respondents who reported working with civilians indicated that they interacted with these civilians on a regular basis. In fact, a majority of military respondents from across all participating nations reported interacting with their civilian co-workers on a daily basis, as shown in Table 12-3.

**Table 12-3: How much Contact/Interaction do you have with Civilian Personnel in your Workplace?**

Nation	Daily (%)	Several times a week (%)	About once a week (%)	About once every couple of weeks (%)	About once a month (%)	Less than once a month (%)	Almost never (%)
Belgium	89.7	7.4	0.8	2.1	0.0	0.0	0.0
Bosnia and Herzegovina	100.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Canada	82.0	9.6	3.1	2.9	1.0	0.5	0.9
Estonia	91.1	8.9	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Germany	97.3	2.1	0.6	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Netherlands	91.1	6.3	2.0	0.3	0.3	0.0	0.0
New Zealand	80.6	10.4	3.6	3.2	1.0	0.0	1.3
Sweden	91.6	6.9	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.0	0.0
Switzerland	73.3	20.6	4.1	0.8	0.6	0.6	0.0
United Kingdom	84.4	10.4	2.8	1.2	0.6	0.3	0.3
United States	94.7	5.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0

Similarly, the majority of civilian respondents who reported working with military personnel indicated that they interact with their military co-workers on a daily basis, or generally at the least several times a week (as shown in Table 12-4).

**Table 12-4: How much Contact/Interaction do you have with Military Personnel in your Workplace?**

Nation	Daily (%)	Several times a week (%)	About once a week (%)	About once every couple of weeks (%)	About once a month (%)	Less than once a month (%)	Almost never (%)
Belgium	96.1	3.4	0.4	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Bosnia and Herzegovina	85.2	11.1	0.0	3.7	0.0	0.0	0.0
Canada	83.0	8.5	4.1	2.1	0.9	0.8	0.6
Estonia	73.5	8.0	6.2	3.5	5.3	2.7	0.9
Germany	64.4	18.1	5.5	2.9	1.7	7.3	0.0

**MILITARY-CIVILIAN PERSONNEL SURVEY  
(MCPS): DESCRIPTIVE CROSS-NATIONAL RESULTS**



Nation	Daily (%)	Several times a week (%)	About once a week (%)	About once every couple of weeks (%)	About once a month (%)	Less than once a month (%)	Almost never (%)
Netherlands	74.6	14.4	5.3	1.9	0.8	1.9	1.1
New Zealand	85.5	8.1	3.0	1.3	0.9	0.9	0.4
Sweden	94.1	3.5	1.2	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.2
Switzerland	79.1	13.1	4.2	1.9	0.6	1.2	0.0
United Kingdom	83.5	10.4	2.9	1.3	0.8	0.6	0.5
United States	97.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	2.9

Both military and civilian personnel were asked to indicate whether they reported directly to a military or to a civilian supervisor (see Table 12-5). Of note, in many participating defence organisations, large proportions, in some cases the majority, of civilian personnel reported being directly supervised by military personnel. In particular, more than half of civilians in Belgium, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United States (US) were supervised by military members. Further, at least one third or more of civilian personnel in Canada, the Netherlands, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom (UK) were supervised by military members.

**Table 12-5: Do you Report Directly to a Military or Civilian Supervisor?**

Nation	Military Personnel		Civilian Personnel	
	Military Supervisor (%)	Civilian Supervisor (%)	Military Supervisor (%)	Civilian Supervisor (%)
Belgium	78.5	21.5	58.8	41.2
Bosnia and Herzegovina	33.3	66.7	13.8	86.2
Canada	91.4	8.6	42.8	57.2
Estonia	90.2	9.8	28.7	71.3
Germany	51.8	48.2	20.4	79.6
Netherlands	66.8	33.2	34.6	65.4
New Zealand	88.8	11.2	45.7	54.3
Sweden	96.1	3.9	75.0	25.0
Switzerland	97.1	2.9	52.4	47.6
United Kingdom	82.2	17.8	44.7	55.3
United States	87.2	12.8	72.2	27.8

Although, not surprisingly, most military personnel reported being supervised by military supervisors/managers, in some cases large minorities were supervised by civilians – particularly in Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Germany, and the Netherlands.

## 12.2 WORK CULTURE AND RELATIONS BETWEEN MILITARY AND CIVILIAN PERSONNEL


### 12.2.1 Relationship Quality

Military and civilian respondents were asked a series of questions regarding the quality of their relations with one another on a 6-point scale ranging from *strongly disagree* to *strongly agree*. Table 12-6 shows the percentage of military and civilian respondents, across all nations combined, that agreed with each item on the relationship quality scale (i.e., indicated *slightly agree* to *strongly agree*). As shown there, the majority of respondents from both military and civilian workforces across the nations indicated having good relations with one another. Further, military and civilian personnel's perceptions with respect to the quality of their relationships were very similar to one another, although military personnel tended to report slightly better quality relations across most items as compared to their civilian counterparts.

**Table 12-6: Military-Civilian Personnel Relationship Quality Across Nations.**

Items	Mil		Civ	
	Agree (%)	se (%)	Agree (%)	se (%)
1. Military and civilian members treat each other equitably.	74.9	1.4	67.9	1.3
2. Civilian and military employees treat each other fairly in my workgroup.	88.6	1.1	82.3	1.1
3. Civilian and military personnel work together effectively as a team.	86.1	1.1	81.8	1.1
4. There is a productive partnership between military and civilian personnel in my workplace.	88.5	1.1	84.2	1.1
5. Military and civilian personnel have positive working relations.	90.3	1.0	84.9	1.0
6. Military and civilians get along well in my workplace.	92.9	0.8	89.6	0.9
7. Civilian personnel recognize the skills and expertise of military personnel.	74.5	1.4	74.5	1.2
8. Military and civilian personnel in my workgroup feel a responsibility to each other.	83.3	1.2	–	–
9. In my workplace military and civilian personnel get along well with one another.	80.7	1.3	78.7	1.2
10. Military and civilian employees are focused on the same goals and mission.	93.1	1.0	90.0	1.0

Mean relationship quality scores for each nation are presented in Figure 12-1. Higher scores indicate more positive perceptions of military-civilian personnel relations. As shown in the figure, the majority of respondents across all nations, and from both military and civilian workforces, indicated having good relations with one another (i.e., mean ratings were in the *slightly agree* to *strongly agree* range). Moreover, military and civilian personnel's perceptions with respect to the quality of their relationships were very similar to one another within each nation. When differences occurred, they were relatively minor, with military personnel indicating slightly more positive relations (which was the case for Belgium, Estonia, Germany, Netherlands, Sweden, and the UK). On average, perceptions of military-civilian relationship quality did not vary greatly across nations.



1 = strongly disagree, 2 = moderately disagree, 3 =slightly disagree, 4 = slightly agree, 5 = moderately agree, 6 = strongly agree.

**Figure 12-1: Mean Military-Civilian Personnel Relationship Quality by Nation.**

(The SDs for each group are as follows: US military = .72; US civilians = .83; UK military = 1.13; UK civilians = 1.27; Swiss military = .99; Swiss civilians = 1.04; Swedish military = .86; Swedish civilians = .99; New Zealand military = 1.06; New Zealand civilians = 1.05; Netherlands military = .74; Netherlands civilians = .87; German military = .98; German civilians = 1.08; Estonian military = .81; Estonian civilians = .60; Canadian military = 1.03; Canadian civilians = 1.12; Bosnian military = .71; Bosnian civilians = .67; Belgian military = .89; Belgian civilians = .95.)


### 12.2.2 Quality of Communication

Military and civilian respondents were asked several questions regarding their quality of communication with one another on a 6-point scale ranging from *strongly disagree* to *strongly agree*. Table 12-7 shows the percentage of military and civilian respondents, across all nations combined, that agreed with each item on the quality of communication scale (i.e., indicated *slightly agree* to *strongly agree*). As shown in Table 12-7, overall, the majority of respondents from both workforces indicated having good quality of communication with the other group (indicated *slightly agree* to *strongly agree*). However, over half of both military and civilian personnel indicated that they *sometimes feel that military and civilian employees are speaking different languages*. Interestingly, overall, the perceptions of military and civilian personnel with respect to quality of communication were extremely similar to one another.

**Table 12-7: Military-Civilian Personnel Communication Quality Across Nations.**

Items	Mil		Civ	
	Agree (%)	se (%)	Agree (%)	se (%)
1. Military and civilian members have good communication in my workgroup.	89.8	1.0	82.4	1.1
2. Military and civilian members communicate effectively with one another.	85.2	1.2	–	–
3. Sometimes I feel like military and civilian employees are speaking different languages.	56.6	1.6	61.7	1.4
4. Military and civilian personnel feel comfortable expressing different opinions to one another.	84.3	1.2	80.2	1.2

Mean communication quality scores for each nation are presented in Figure 12-2. Higher scores indicate more positive perceptions of military-civilian communication, and negatively-worded items were recoded prior to calculating mean scores. As shown in the figure, the majority of respondents across all nations, and from both military and civilian workforces, indicated having good quality communication with the other group (i.e., mean ratings were in the *slightly agree* to *strongly agree* range). On average, military respondents provided slightly higher ratings than their civilian counterparts (for 10 out of 11 nations).



1 = strongly disagree, 2 = moderately disagree, 3 = slightly disagree, 4 = slightly agree, 5 = moderately agree, 6 = strongly agree.

**Figure 12-2: Mean Military-Civilian Personnel Communication Quality by Nation.**

(The SDs for each group are as follows: US military = .89; US civilians = .98; UK military = .98; UK civilians = 1.10; Swiss military = .91; Swiss civilians = .92; Swedish military = .94; Swedish civilians = 1.20; New Zealand military = .96; New Zealand civilians = 1.02; Netherlands military = .84; Netherlands civilians = .93; German military = .88; German civilians = 1.02; Estonian military = .97; Estonian civilians = .85; Canadian military = 1.06; Canadian civilians = 1.16; Bosnian military = .75; Bosnian civilians = .82; Belgian military = .88; and Belgian civilians = .98.)

**12.2.3 Workplace Respect**


Military respondents were asked to indicate the degree to which civilian personnel respect them in various ways within the workplace using a 6-point scale ranging from *strongly disagree* to *strongly agree*. Similarly, civilian respondents were asked to indicate the degree to which military personnel respect them along these same dimensions. Table 12-8 shows the percentage of military and civilian respondents, across all nations combined, that agreed with each item on the workplace respect scale (i.e., indicated *slightly agree* to *strongly agree*). As shown in Table 12-8, the majority of respondents from both workforces indicated feeling respected by members from the other group (indicated *slightly agree* to *strongly agree*). Although both groups indicated feeling respected by personnel in the other workforce, a slightly higher proportion of military personnel indicated feeling respected by their civilian co-workers across each item on the workplace respect scale.

**Table 12-8: Military-Civilian Personnel Workplace Respect Across Nations.**

Items	Mil		Civ	
	Agree (%)	se (%)	Agree (%)	se (%)
1. I have the feeling that the military/civilian personnel in my workplace respect me for my qualities.	90.5	1.0	84.6	1.0
2. I have the feeling that the military/civilian personnel in my workplace respect me for the results I achieve.	90.2	1.0	87.3	1.0
3. I have the feeling that the military/civilian personnel in my workplace respect me for the way in which I work with them.	92.7	0.9	89.9	0.9
4. I have the feeling that the military/civilian personnel in my workplace respect my values and standards.	89.6	1.0	86.3	1.0

Mean workplace respect scores for each nation are presented in Figure 12-3. Higher scores indicate greater perceptions of military-civilian personnel respect. As shown in the figure, the majority of respondents from both military and civilian workforces across all nations indicated feeling respected by the other group (i.e., mean responses were in the *slightly agree* to *strongly agree* range). Military respondents tended to provide slightly higher ratings in regard to the degree of respect they receive from their civilian colleagues as compared to their civilian counterparts (for 7 out of 11 countries, with the most prominent differences being for Sweden and Bosnia and Herzegovina).





1 = strongly disagree, 2 = moderately disagree, 3 = slightly disagree, 4 = slightly agree, 5 = moderately agree, 6 = strongly agree.

Figure 12-3: Mean Military-Civilian Personnel Workplace Respect by Nation.

(The SDs for each group are as follows: US military = .89; US civilians = 1.13; UK military = 1.08; UK civilians = .97; Swiss military = .85; Swiss civilians = .95; Swedish military = .84; Swedish civilians = 1.10; New Zealand military = 1.08; New Zealand civilians = 1.17; Netherlands military = .80; Netherlands civilians = .86; German military = .93; German civilians = 1.05; Estonian military = .75; Estonian civilians = .74; Canadian military = 1.13; Canadian civilians = 1.25; Bosnian military = .62; Bosnian civilians = 1.08; Belgian military = .84; and Belgian civilians = .89.)

### 12.2.4 Inclusion

Military and civilian respondents were asked a series of questions regarding their perceptions of inclusion between the two workforces on a 6-point scale ranging from *strongly disagree* to *strongly agree*. Table 12-9 shows the percentage of military and civilian respondents, across all nations combined, that agreed with each item on the inclusion scale. As shown there, the majority of both military and civilian personnel indicated good feelings of inclusion by their counterparts in the “other” workforce (in terms of feeling like part of the team and socializing with one another). However, more than half of civilians indicated that they are often treated like “second class citizens” by their military counterparts. Moreover, half or more of both military and civilians indicated that there is greater inter-group as compared to intra-group communication.

Table 12-9: Inclusion Among Military-Civilian Personnel Across Nations.


Items	Mil		Civ	
	Agree (%)	se (%)	Agree (%)	se (%)
1. Civilian personnel are often treated as though they are “second class citizens” by military personnel.	–	–	55.8	1.7
2. Military members tend to communicate more with each other than with civilian employees in my workplace.	49.7	1.7	62.3	1.4

**MILITARY-CIVILIAN PERSONNEL SURVEY  
(MCPS): DESCRIPTIVE CROSS-NATIONAL RESULTS**



Items	Mil		Civ	
	Agree (%)	se (%)	Agree (%)	se (%)
3. Civilian employees tend to communicate more with each other than with military employees in my workplace.	50.1	1.7	49.9	1.5
4. Civilian employees make military personnel feel like part of the team in my workgroup.	92.1	0.9	78.1	1.2
5. Civilians and military members socialize together in my workplace.	82.5	1.3	88.7	0.9
6. Military personnel make civilian employees feel like part of the team in my workgroup.	86.1	1.4	81.6	1.4

Mean inclusion scores for each nation are presented in Figure 12-4. Higher scores indicate more positive perceptions of intergroup inclusion, and negatively-worded items were recoded prior to calculating mean scores. As shown in the figure, the majority of both military and civilian personnel across nations indicated that personnel from the “other group” make them feel like part of the team, with some variability across nations. Military respondents provided slightly higher ratings in regard to the degree with which they felt included by civilian personnel (ratings for 9 out of 11 nations).



1 = strongly disagree, 2 = moderately disagree, 3 = slightly disagree, 4 = slightly agree, 5 = moderately agree, 6 = strongly agree.

**Figure 12-4: Mean Inclusion Among Military-Civilian Personnel by Nation.**

(The SDs for each group are as follows: US military = .99; US civilians = .98; UK military = 1.03; UK civilians = 1.07; Swiss military = 1.03; Swiss civilians = .99; Swedish military = 1.07; Swedish civilians = 1.09; New Zealand military = 1.03; New Zealand civilians = .88; Netherlands military = .88; Netherlands civilians = .85; German military = 1.12; German civilians = 1.25; Estonian military = .85; Estonian civilians = .84; Canadian military = 1.03; Canadian civilians = 1.09; Bosnian military = 1.27; Bosnian civilians = 1.16; Belgian military = .83; and Belgian civilians = .94.)


### 12.2.5 Perception of the Importance of Civilians

The extent to which civilian employees were perceived as being necessary and important to the success of the defence mission were assessed – both from the perspective of military personnel and from the perspective of civilian personnel themselves. Respondents were asked to rate their level of agreement with each statement on a 6-point scale ranging from 1 (*strongly disagree*) to 6 (*strongly agree*). Table 12-10 shows the percentage of military and civilian respondents, across all nations combined, that agreed with each item regarding the importance of civilians (i.e., indicated *slightly agree* to *strongly agree*). As shown there, both groups of personnel indicated that civilian personnel were both necessary and important to the success of the defence organisation. However, civilian personnel were somewhat more likely to evince these perceptions as compared to their military counterparts, and almost unanimously endorsed the importance of their role in this regard.

**Table 12-10: Perceptions of the Importance of Civilian Personnel Across Nations.**

Items	Mil		Civ	
	Agree (%)	se (%)	Agree (%)	se (%)
1. Civilian employees are an important component to the success of the defence organisation.	85.5	1.2	96.8	0.5
2. Civilian employees are a necessary component to the success of the defence organisation.	79.6	1.3	96.4	0.5

Mean perceptions of the importance of civilian personnel for each nation are presented in Figure 12-5. Higher scores indicate more positive perceptions. As shown in the figure, on average, respondents from most nations perceived civilians as playing an important role in their respective defence organisations. Furthermore, civilian respondents across all nations were more likely than military respondents to indicate that civilians are important to the defence organisation and its goals. These differences between military and civilian perceptions were most pronounced for the UK, Switzerland, the Netherlands, Germany, Canada, and Belgium.



1 = strongly disagree, 2 = moderately disagree, 3 = slightly disagree, 4 = slightly agree, 5 = moderately agree, 6 = strongly agree.

**Figure 12-5: Mean Perceptions of the Importance of Civilian Personnel by Nation.**

(The SDs for each group are as follows: US military = .84; US civilians = .38; UK military = 1.16; UK civilians = .65; Swiss military = 1.28; Swiss civilians = .74; Swedish military = .87; Swedish civilians = .59; New Zealand military = 1.20; New Zealand civilians = .73; Netherlands military = 1.15; Netherlands civilians = .64; German military = 1.17; German civilians = 1.00; Estonian military = .77; Estonian civilians = .67; Canadian military = 1.36; Canadian civilians = .62; Bosnian military = .72; Bosnian civilians = .69; Belgian military = 1.22; and Belgian civilians = 1.04.)

### **12.3 SENIOR LEADERSHIP MESSAGES SUPPORTING MILITARY-CIVILIAN PERSONNEL COLLABORATION**


Military and civilian respondents were asked several questions to assess their perceptions regarding senior leadership support and promotion of military-civilian personnel collaboration within their respective organisations using a 6-point scale ranging from *strongly disagree* to *strongly agree*. As shown in Table 12-11, approximately three quarters of military respondents indicated that senior leaders make efforts to promote military-civilian personnel collaboration and emphasize the importance of military-civilian employee cooperation. A somewhat lower proportion (although still the majority) of civilian personnel indicated that this was the case. Further, almost 80% of military personnel and approximately 65% of civilian personnel indicated that senior leaders do a good job of promoting military-civilian personnel cooperation. Overall, civilian personnel were less likely to indicate that senior leaders promote military-civilian personnel collaboration as compared to their military counterparts, and there is some room for improvement in this regard.

**Table 12-11: Senior Leadership Messages Supporting Military-Civilian Personnel Across Nations.**

Items	Mil		Civ	
	Agree (%)	se (%)	Agree (%)	se (%)
1. Senior leaders make efforts to promote the military-civilian defence team.	80.1	1.7	64.0	1.7
2. Senior leaders do a good job at promoting the military-civilian defence team.	72.4	1.9	58.1	1.8
3. Senior leaders emphasize the importance of military-civilian employee cooperation.	79.7	1.7	65.9	1.7

Mean scores on senior leadership messages supporting military-civilian personnel collaboration for each nation are presented in Figure 12-6.<sup>1</sup> Higher scores indicate more positive perceptions of leadership support. As shown in the figure, respondents across all nations generally indicated that senior leaders make efforts to promote the military-civilian partnership and emphasize the importance of military-civilian employee cooperation (i.e., mean ratings were in the *slightly agree* to *strongly agree* range). However, there was a fair degree of variability across nations; for example, UK followed by Dutch civilians were only slightly likely to indicate support from senior leadership in this regard, whereas Canadians, Estonians, and Americans (military) were much more likely to perceive this type of support. Further, military respondents were more likely to indicate that senior leadership support military-civilian personnel collaboration as compared to their civilian respondents for most nations (for 7 out of 9 nations).

<sup>1</sup> Switzerland and Germany did not collect data on Senior Leadership Messages Supporting Military-Civilian Personnel Collaboration.



1 = strongly disagree, 2 = moderately disagree, 3 = slightly disagree, 4 = slightly agree, 5 = moderately agree, 6 = strongly agree.

**Figure 12-6: Mean Senior Leadership Messages Supporting Military-Civilian Personnel by Nation.**

(The SDs for each group are as follows: US military = 1.12; US civilians = 1.29; UK military = 1.27; UK civilians = 1.56; Swedish military = 1.17; Swedish civilians = 1.39; New Zealand military = 1.27; New Zealand civilians = 1.40; Netherlands military = 1.19; Netherlands civilians = 1.29; Estonian military = 1.00; Estonian civilians = 1.06; Canadian military = 1.23; Canadian civilians = 1.48; Bosnian military = 1.17; Bosnian civilians = 1.27; and Belgian military = 1.06; Belgian civilians = 1.13.)

## **12.4 SUPERVISION OF CIVILIAN PERSONNEL BY MILITARY SUPERVISORS AND SUPERVISION OF MILITARY PERSONNEL BY CIVILIAN SUPERVISORS**

As noted above, many civilians indicated that their direct supervisor was military, and a notable although much less frequent proportion of military personnel indicated that their direct supervisor was civilian. As such, perceptions regarding supervision from a member of the “other group” were assessed.

### **12.4.1 Supervision and Leadership of Civilians by Military Supervisors**

Civilian respondents who were supervised by a military member were asked a series of questions to indicate their views regarding the nature and quality of supervision they received using a 6-point scale ranging from *strongly disagree* to *strongly agree*. Table 12-12 shows the percentage of civilian respondents, across all nations combined, that agreed with each item. As shown there, from the perspective of civilian personnel, improvements

can be made with respect to the nature and quality of supervision they receive from military managers and supervisors.

**Table 12-12: Supervision and Leadership of Civilians by  
Military Supervisors and Managers Across Nations.**

Items	Civ	
	Agree (%)	se (%)
1. Military managers are often confused about the role of civilian employees.	62.5	2.2
2. Military managers don't make the most of what civilian employees have to offer.	65.1	2.1
3. Military managers are often placed in positions of authority over civilians without receiving sufficient training required to manage them.	72.6	2.0
4. Military managers are knowledgeable about the use of civilian performance appraisal systems and procedures.	53.9	2.3
5. Military managers support professional development opportunities for civilian employees.	68.3	2.2
6. Military managers support training opportunities for civilian employees.	74.7	2.3
7. Military managers recognize the skills and expertise of civilian personnel.	76.3	1.9
8. Military managers understand civilian terms and conditions of employment.	61.1	2.2
9. Military managers respect civilian terms and conditions of employment.	72.5	2.0
10. Military managers give preferential treatment to military personnel.	59.8	2.2
11. Military managers treat civilian and military personnel with equal fairness.	62.5	2.2
12. Military managers have a good understanding of civilian employees' personal obligations when assigning duties.	65.4	2.6
13. Military management makes me feel like a valued part of the team.	75.6	1.9
14. Military managers are able to manage civilian personnel effectively.	60.5	2.2

Most notably, approximately 73% of civilians supervised by military supervisors indicated that military managers are placed in positions of authority over civilians without receiving sufficient training required to manage them. In the same vein, only about 60% of civilians indicated that military managers are able to manage civilian personnel effectively, and only 53% indicated that they are knowledgeable about the use of civilian performance appraisals. Only approximately 60% of civilians believed that military managers have a good understanding of civilian terms and conditions of employment. Similarly, a large proportion (approximately two-thirds) of civilians agreed that military managers are often confused about the role of civilian employees and do not make the most of what civilian employees have to offer.

On a more positive note, approximately three quarters of civilians supervised by military indicated that military managers recognize civilian personnel's skills and expertise, respect civilian terms and conditions of employment, support training opportunities for civilian employees, and make civilian employees feel like a valued part of the team.

**12.4.2 Supervision and Leadership of Military Personnel by Civilian Managers**

Military respondents who were supervised by a civilian were asked a series of questions to indicate their views regarding the nature and quality of supervision by civilian managers using a 6-point scale ranging from *strongly disagree* to *strongly agree*. Table 12-13 shows the percentage of military respondents, across all nations combined, that agreed with each item.

**Table 12-13: Supervision and Leadership of Military by Civilian Supervisors and Managers Across Nations.**

Items	Mil	
	Agree (%)	se (%)
1. Civilian managers understand military terms of service.	62.1	4.2
2. Civilian managers respect military terms of service.	71.9	3.9
3. Civilian managers recognize the skills and expertise of military personnel.	80.3	3.4
4. Civilian managers support training opportunities for military employees.	73.5	3.8
5. Civilian managers support professional development opportunities for military employees.	74.4	3.8
6. Civilian managers are often placed in positions of authority over military personnel without receiving sufficient training required to manage them.	71.6	3.9
7. Civilian managers don't appreciate important aspects of military culture.	56.6	4.3
8. Civilian managers are often confused about the role of military employees.	53.2	4.3
9. Civilian managers give preferential treatment to civilian personnel.	31.5	4.1
10. Civilian managers are knowledgeable about the use of military performance appraisal systems and procedures.	43.1	4.6
11. Civilian managers treat civilian and military personnel with equal fairness.	75.1	3.7
12. Civilian managers make me feel like a valued part of the team.	78.6	3.5
13. Civilian managers are able to manage military personnel effectively.	55.7	4.2


As shown there, the results from the perspective of military personnel are much more positive in comparison to their civilian counterparts. In particular, most military personnel supervised by civilian managers indicate that civilians respect military terms of service, recognize the skills and expertise of military personnel, support training and professional development of military personnel, and make military personnel feel like a valued part of the team.

That said, there are some notable areas of concern. In particular, similar to their civilian counterparts, approximately three quarters of military personnel indicated that civilian managers are placed in positions of authority over military personnel without receiving sufficient training required to manage them, approximately one-half of military personnel indicated that civilian managers do not appreciate important aspects of military culture and are confused about the role of military employees, and only two-thirds of military personnel believed that civilian managers understand military terms of service. Taken together, improvements can be made in this regard, or at least in regard to perceptions related to this issue. It is of note that the sample sizes for this scale are small in that only a small minority of military personnel from any nation is likely to be supervised by a civilian, as discussed above.



### 12.4.3 Supervision of Civilian Personnel by Military Supervisors and Supervision of Military Personnel by Civilian Supervisors – Mean Scores by Nation

Mean scores for the intergroup supervision scales for each nation are presented in Figure 12-7, for both military and civilian respondents. Higher scores indicate more positive perceptions of supervisors from the “other group,” and negatively-worded items were recoded prior to calculating mean scores. As shown in the figure, there is room for improvement in this regard. Scores across nations are quite similar (with a particularly high score for the US military, although based on extremely small sample sizes).



1 = strongly disagree, 2 = moderately disagree, 3 = slightly disagree, 4 = slightly agree, 5 = moderately agree, 6 = strongly agree.

**Figure 12-7: Mean Intergroup Supervision and Leadership by Nation.<sup>2</sup>**

(The SDs for each group are as follows: US military = 1.09; US civilians = 1.19; UK military = 1.10; UK civilians = 1.21; Swiss military = .45; Swiss civilians = .57; Swedish military = 1.42; Swedish civilians = 1.23; New Zealand military = 1.02; New Zealand civilians = 1.06; Netherlands military = 1.02; Netherlands civilians = .94; German military = 1.16; German civilians = 1.24; Estonian military = 1.21; Estonian civilians = 0.77; Canadian military = 1.10; Canadian civilians = 1.24; Bosnian military = 1.00; = Bosnian civilians = .90; Belgian military = .86; and Belgian civilians = .91.)

## 12.5 WORKING IN A MILITARY CONTEXT

Given that “working in a military context” is an aspect unique to civilians in defence organisations, the possible consequences of civilians working in a military-civilian environment were explored. In particular, civilian respondents were asked to indicate their degree of agreement to items assessing effects of working in a military-civilian environment on their career development and training opportunities, as well as the effects of the military

<sup>2</sup> Please note that the number of military respondents who were supervised by a civilian was very small for Bosnia (n = 8), Estonia (n = 8), and the US (n = 5) and that the number of civilian respondents who were supervised by military personnel was also very small for Bosnia (n = 4).

rotational cycle related to postings and deployments using a 6-point scale ranging from *strongly disagree* to *strongly agree*. Table 12-14 shows the percentage of civilian respondents, across all nations combined, that agreed with each of these items.

**Table 12-14: Effects of Working in a Military Context on Civilian Personnel Across Nations.**

Items	Civ	
	Agree (%)	se (%)
<b><i>Career Development</i></b>		
1. Career opportunities for civilians are not affected by working in an organisation with military personnel.	53.1	1.5
2. Career progression of civilians is limited in the defence organisation because the best positions tend to be given to military personnel.	60.2	1.4
3. The quantity of senior management positions designated for military personnel has limited my ability to progress to more challenging positions.	40.7	1.5
4. Priority hiring of former military members has limited my career progression.	37.7	1.7
5. There are fewer advancement opportunities in the defence organisation as compared to other government departments.	61.6	1.7
6. Careers of civilian personnel are limited because of positions given to former military members.	50.3	1.8
7. The most interesting assignments seem to be given to military personnel.	49.3	1.5
<b><i>Training Opportunities</i></b>		
1. Given our unique roles in the defence organisation, the training given to military and civilian personnel makes sense.	75.9	1.5
2. Given our unique roles, the professional development opportunities given to military and civilian employees make sense.	70.5	1.6
3. Civilian employees receive an adequate amount of training opportunities compared to military members.	53.8	1.5
4. The training military members are given decreases the training opportunities available to civilian employees.	31.3	1.6
<b><i>Effects of the Military Rotational Cycle</i></b>		
1. The frequent posting cycle of military personnel disrupts productivity in my workplace.	68.3	1.4
2. The rotational cycle of military managers and supervisors makes it difficult to do my work.	51.4	1.5


As shown there, a large proportion of civilians indicated that working in a military context has negative effects on their career development. For example, approximately half indicated that career opportunities are affected by working in an organisation with military personnel and three-fifths indicated that career progression is limited because the best positions tend to go to military personnel and that the defence organisation offers fewer advancement opportunities as compared to other government departments.

With respect to training, the majority of civilian personnel indicated that the training and professional development opportunities provided to military personnel make sense given their roles. However, approximately half of civilians indicated that civilian employees do not receive an adequate amount of training opportunities as compared to their military counterparts and a third indicate that training for military members decreases the training available to civilian employees.

With respect to the effects of the military rotational cycle, almost 65% of civilians indicated that the frequent posting cycle of military personnel disrupts productivity in their workplace, and over half indicated that the rotational cycle of military managers and supervisors disrupts their work.

### 12.5.1 Career Development

Civilians’ mean scores for the career development subscale for each nation are presented in Figure 12-8. Higher scores indicate more positive perceptions (i.e., that civilians do not feel that working in a military context has a negative impact on their career development), and negatively-worded items were recoded prior to calculating mean scores. As shown in the figure, the judgments of civilian respondents varied across nations (though for 9 out of 11 nations were, on average, quite neutral – in the *agree* to *disagree* range). Civilians in Switzerland, Belgium, Canada, and the UK were most likely to indicate that working in a military context negatively impacts their career development, whereas those in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Estonia were least likely to evince this concern (although the sample sizes for these nations were quite small).



1 = strongly disagree, 2 = moderately disagree, 3 = slightly disagree, 4 = slightly agree, 5 = moderately agree, 6 = strongly agree.


**Figure 12-8: Mean Effects of Working in a Military Context on Civilians’ Career Development by Nation.**

(The SDs for each group are as follows: US civilians = 1.31; UK civilians = 1.27; Swiss civilians = 1.15; Swedish civilians = 1.25; New Zealand civilians = 1.12; Netherlands civilians = .76; German civilians = 1.49; Estonian civilians = .92; Canadian civilians = 1.40; Bosnian civilians = 1.28; and Belgian civilians = 1.06.)

### 12.5.2 Training Opportunities

Civilian respondents’ mean scores for the training opportunities subscale for each nation are presented in Figure 12-9. Higher scores indicate more positive perceptions (i.e., that civilians do not feel that working in a military context has a negative impact on their training opportunities), and negatively-worded items were recoded prior to calculating mean scores. The figure demonstrates that working in a military context, on average, was not particularly negative, but there is room for improvement in this regard. Responses across nations tended

to be very similar, with the exception of Estonia (which needs to be interpreted with caution due to a small sample size).




1 = strongly disagree, 2 = moderately disagree, 3 = slightly disagree, 4 = slightly agree, 5 = moderately agree, 6 = strongly agree.

**Figure 12-9: Mean Effects of Working in a Military Context on Civilians' Training Opportunities by Nation.**

(The SDs for each group are as follows: US civilians = 1.12; UK civilians = 1.06; Swiss civilians = 1.33; Swedish civilians = 1.17; New Zealand civilians = 1.10; Netherlands civilians = .82; German civilians = 1.54; Estonian civilians = .98; Canadian civilians = 1.15; Bosnian civilians = .77; and Belgian civilians = .91.)

### 12.5.3 Effects of Military Rotational Cycle

Civilians' mean responses regarding the effects of the military rotational cycle for each nation are presented in Figure 12-10. Higher scores indicate more positive perceptions (i.e., that civilians do not feel that the effects of the military rotational cycle is deleterious to their work), and negatively-worded items were recoded prior to calculating mean scores. As shown in the figure, the majority of civilians across nations indicated that the frequent posting cycle of military personnel disrupts productivity in their workplace and that the rotational cycle of military managers and supervisors disrupts their work. Estonian and Swedish civilians were the least likely to indicate that the rotational cycle has a negative impact on their work, whereas respondents from Canada and the UK were most likely to indicate that this was the case.



1 = strongly disagree, 2 = moderately disagree, 3 = slightly disagree, 4 = slightly agree, 5 = moderately agree, 6 = strongly agree.

Figure 12-10: Mean Effects of Military Rotational Cycle on Civilian Work by Nation.

(The SDs for each group are as follows: US civilians = 1.20; UK civilians = 1.36; Swiss civilians = 1.33; Swedish civilians = 1.63; New Zealand civilians = 1.44; Netherlands civilians = 1.28; German civilians = 1.48; Estonian civilians = 1.32; Canadian civilians = 1.41; Bosnian civilians = 1.45; and Belgian civilians = 1.40.)

## 12.6 KEY ORGANISATIONAL VARIABLES AND OUTCOMES

### 12.6.1 Overall Organisational Fairness

Military and civilian respondents were asked a series of questions regarding their perceptions of organisational fairness using a 7-point scale ranging from *strongly disagree* to *strongly agree*. Table 12-15 shows the percentage of military and civilian respondents, across all nations combined, that agreed with each item on the organisational fairness scale (i.e., indicated *slightly agree* to *strongly agree*). As shown there, approximately three quarters of respondents indicated that they are treated fairly in their respective defence organisations in a variety of ways. To note, perceptions of fairness were consistently lower for civilian as compared to military personnel.

Table 12-15: Perceptions of Organisational Fairness Across Nations.


Items	Mil		Civ	
	Agree (%)	se (%)	Agree (%)	se (%)
1. Overall, I'm treated fairly by the defence organisation.	75.0	1.6	67.6	1.4
2. Usually, the way things work in the defence organisation are not fair.	20.7	1.6	26.0	1.5

**MILITARY-CIVILIAN PERSONNEL SURVEY  
(MCPS): DESCRIPTIVE CROSS-NATIONAL RESULTS**



Items	Mil		Civ	
	Agree (%)	se (%)	Agree (%)	se (%)
3. In general, I can count on this organisation to be fair.	68.4	1.7	57.5	1.5
4. In general, the treatment I receive around here is fair.	78.8	1.6	70.9	1.6
5. For the most part, the defence organisation treats its employees fairly.	70.6	1.7	60.3	1.5
6. Most of the people who work here would say they are often treated unfairly.	18.7	1.5	26.7	1.5

Mean perceptions of organisational fairness scores for each nation are presented in Figure 12-11.<sup>3</sup> Higher scores indicate more positive perceptions of fairness. As shown in the figure, on average respondents from both military and civilian workforces perceived the organisation as fair. To note, on average, civilians from across the nations consistently perceived the organisation to be slightly less fair as compared to their military counterparts (except in Estonia).



1 = strongly disagree, 2 = moderately disagree, 3 = slightly disagree, 4 = neutral, 5 = slightly agree, 6 = moderately agree, 7 = strongly agree.

**Figure 12-11: Mean Perceptions of Organisational Fairness by Nation.**

(The SDs for each group are as follows: US military = .85; US civilians = 1.31; UK military = 1.21; UK civilians = 1.50; Swedish military = 1.16; Swedish civilians = 1.37; New Zealand military = 1.23; New Zealand civilians = 1.19; Netherlands military = 1.10; Netherlands civilians = 1.09; German military = 1.33; German civilians = 1.50; Estonian military = .99; Estonian civilians = 0.94; Canadian military = 1.42; Canadian civilians = 1.48; Bosnian military = 1.33; Bosnian civilians = 1.07; Belgian military = .97; and Belgian civilians = 1.10.)

<sup>3</sup> Switzerland did not collect data on Overall Organisational Fairness.

### 12.6.2 Perceived Organisational Support


Respondents were asked a series of questions regarding their perceptions of organisational support using a 7-point scale ranging from *strongly disagree* to *strongly agree*. Table 12-16 shows the percentage of military and civilian respondents, across all nations combined, that agreed with each item this scale (i.e., indicated *slightly agree* to *strongly agree*). As shown there, perceptions of organisational support were moderate and there is clearly room for improvement in this regard. Nevertheless, overall, responses of military and civilian personnel were very similar.

**Table 12-16: Perceptions of Organisational Support Across Nations.**

Items	Mil		Civ	
	Agree (%)	se (%)	Agree (%)	se (%)
1. The defence organisation values my contribution to its well-being.	60.7	2.1	57.6	2.0
2. The defence organisation fails to appreciate any extra effort from me.	33.6	1.7	36.9	1.6
3. The defence organisation would ignore any complaint from me.	30.1	1.6	36.0	1.6
4. The defence organisation really cares about my well-being.	45.1	1.7	42.8	1.6
5. Even if I did the best job possible, the defence organisation would fail to notice.	26.7	1.6	31.3	1.5
6. The defence organisation cares about my general satisfaction at work.	45.7	1.7	44.0	1.6
7. The defence organisation shows very little concern for me.	27.1	1.6	32.4	1.5
8. The defence organisation takes pride in my accomplishments at work.	47.4	1.8	41.8	1.6

Mean perceptions of organisational support for each nation are presented in Figure 12-12.<sup>4</sup> Higher scores indicate more positive perceptions and negatively-worded items were recoded prior to calculating mean scores. As shown in the figure, on average, military and civilian respondents reported moderate perceptions with regard to the amount of support received from the organisation, with room for improvement in this regard. Across the nations, military respondents tended to perceive slightly greater organisational support as compared to civilian respondents (for 8 out of 10 nations).

<sup>4</sup> The United Kingdom did not collect data on Perceived Organisational Support.



1 = strongly disagree, 2 = moderately disagree, 3 = slightly disagree, 4 = neutral, 5 = slightly agree, 6 = moderately agree, 7 = strongly agree.

Figure 12-12: Mean Perceptions of Organisational Fairness by Nation.

(The SDs for each group are as follows: US military = 1.34; US civilians = 1.34; Swiss military = 1.40; Swiss civilians = 1.32; Swedish military = 1.22; Swedish civilians = 1.35; New Zealand military = 1.26; New Zealand civilians = 1.34; Netherlands military = 1.17; Netherlands civilians = 1.09; German military = 1.27; German civilians = 1.44; Estonian military = 1.04; Estonian civilians = 1.00; Canadian military = 1.43; Canadian civilians = 1.47; Bosnian military = 1.13; Bosnian civilians = 1.22; Belgian military = 1.04; and Belgian civilians = 1.11.)

### 12.6.3 Job Satisfaction

Respondents were asked to rate their job satisfaction on a 6-point scale ranging from *strongly disagree* to *strongly agree*. Table 12-17 shows the percentage of military and civilian respondents, across all nations combined, that agreed with each item on the job satisfaction scale (i.e., indicated *slightly agree* to *strongly agree*). As shown there, both military and civilian personnel indicated high degrees of job satisfaction. Scores between the two groups were similar on this important outcome variable.


Table 12-17: Job Satisfaction Across Nations.

Items	Mil		Civ	
	Agree (%)	se (%)	Agree (%)	se (%)
1. All in all I am satisfied with my job.	90.1	1.0	88.0	0.9
2. In general, I don't like my job.	15.0	1.5	14.7	1.3
3. In general, I like working here.	89.7	1.0	89.7	0.9

Mean job satisfaction scores for each nation are presented in Figure 12-13, with higher scores indicating greater job satisfaction and negatively-worded items were recoded prior to calculating mean scores. As shown in the



figure, respondents across nations reported high levels of job satisfaction, and military and civilian respondents evinced similar levels of job satisfaction within most nations (except Bosnia and Herzegovina). The mean ratings for both UK military and civilian respondents were slightly less positive than the rating of other nations.



1 = strongly disagree, 2 = moderately disagree, 3 = slightly disagree, 4 = slightly agree, 5 = moderately agree, 6 = strongly agree.

**Figure 12-13: Mean Job Satisfaction by Nation.**

(The SDs for each group are as follows: US military = .85; US civilians = .65; UK military = 1.20; UK civilian = 1.28; Swiss military = .85; Swiss civilians = .85; Swedish military = .86; Swedish civilians = 1.07; New Zealand military = 1.00; New Zealand civilians = .98; Netherlands military = .77; Netherlands civilians = .82; German military = 1.15; German civilians = 1.08; Estonian military = .87; Estonian civilians = 0.76; Canadian military = 1.24; Canadian civilians = 1.06; Bosnian military = .75; Bosnian civilians = .78; Belgian military = .77; and Belgian civilians = .82.)

### 12.6.4 Affective Organisational Commitment


Military and civilian respondents were asked a series of questions regarding their organisational affective commitment using a 6-point scale ranging from *strongly disagree* to *strongly agree*. Table 12-18 shows the percentage of military and civilian respondents, across all nations combined, that agreed with each item on the organisational affective commitment scale (i.e., indicated *slightly agree* to *strongly agree*). As shown there, overall, military indicated slightly greater affective commitment along most items on the scale; overall, both military and civilian respondents indicated moderate affective commitment.

**Table 12-18: Affective Organisational Commitment Across Nations.**

Items	Mil		Civ	
	Agree (%)	se (%)	Agree (%)	se (%)
1. I would be happy to spend the rest of my career in the defence organisation.	82.7	1.3	82.6	1.1
2. I really feel as if the defence organisation's problems are my own.	54.0	1.7	45.9	1.4

Items	Mil		Civ	
	Agree (%)	se (%)	Agree (%)	se (%)
3. I do not feel like “part of the family” in the defence organisation.	21.1	1.6	36.0	1.7
4. I do not feel “emotionally attached” to the defence organisation.	28.4	1.8	35.9	1.7
5. The defence organisation has a great deal of personal meaning for me.	83.3	1.2	73.4	1.3
6. I do not feel a strong sense of “belonging” to the defence organisation.	18.4	1.3	28.4	1.3

Mean affective commitment scores for each nation are presented in Figure 12-14. Higher scores indicate greater affective commitment and negatively-worded items were recoded prior to calculating mean scores. As shown in the figure, respondents across nations evinced moderately high affective commitment, although there was a fair degree of variability across nations. However, on average, military personnel reported greater affective commitment as compared to civilian personnel across all nations, particularly in Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Estonia, New Zealand, Sweden, and the US.



1 = strongly disagree, 2 = moderately disagree, 3 = slightly disagree, 4 = slightly agree, 5 = moderately agree, 6 = strongly agree.

**Figure 12-14: Mean Affective Organisational Commitment by Nation.**

(The SDs for each group are as follows: US military = .98; US civilians = 1.04; UK military = 1.17; UK civilians = 1.22; Swiss military = .94; Swiss civilians = 1.06; Swedish military = .95; Swedish civilians = 1.20; New Zealand military = 1.02; New Zealand civilians = .99; Netherlands military = .78; Netherlands civilians = .89; German military = 1.08; German civilians = 1.19; Estonian military = .81; Estonian civilians = .88; Canadian military = 1.17; Canadian civilians = 1.17; Bosnian military = .65; Bosnian civilians = .81; Belgian military = .81; and Belgian civilians = .92.)


### 12.6.5 Retention Intentions

Respondents were asked a series of questions regarding their intentions to remain in the organisation using a 6-point scale ranging from *strongly disagree* to *strongly agree*. Table 12-19 shows the percentage of military and civilian respondents, across all nations combined, that agreed with each item on this scale (i.e., indicated *slightly agree* to *strongly agree*). As shown there, the majority of both military and civilian personnel indicated intentions to remain in the defence organisation. In addition, overall, military and civilian personnel indicated very similar retention intentions.

**Table 12-19: Retention Intentions Across Nations.**

Items	Mil		Civ	
	Agree (%)	se (%)	Agree (%)	se (%)
1. I intend to stay with the defence organisation as long as I can.	75.3	1.4	74.8	1.3
2. I intend to leave the defence organisation within the next two years.	23.0	1.7	25.8	1.5
3. I intend to leave the defence organisation as soon as another job becomes available.	18.1	1.5	19.4	1.4

Mean retention intention scores for each nation are presented in Figure 12-15. Higher scores indicate more positive perceptions of fairness, and negatively-worded items were recoded prior to calculating mean scores. As shown in the figure, the majority of both military and civilian respondents across nations indicated intentions to remain in their respective defence organisations. However, military respondents reported slightly higher retention intentions as compared to their civilian counterparts (in 7 out of 11 nations, particularly Sweden, the Netherlands, and Bosnia and Herzegovina).



1 = strongly disagree, 2 = moderately disagree, 3 = slightly disagree, 4 = slightly agree, 5 = moderately agree, 6 = strongly agree.

**Figure 12-15: Retention Intentions by Nation.**

(The SDs for each group are as follows: US military = 1.35; US civilians = 1.21; UK military = 1.39; UK civilians = 1.45; Swiss military = 1.28; Swiss civilians = 1.34; Swedish military = 1.18; Swedish civilians = 1.45; New Zealand military = 1.25; New Zealand civilians = 1.28; Netherlands military = .96; Netherlands civilians = 1.04; German military = 1.77; German civilians = 1.82; Estonia military = 1.04; Estonia civilians = 0.96; Canadian military = 1.43; Canadian civilians = 1.30; Bosnian military = 1.18; Bosnian civilians = 1.18; Belgian military = .83; and Belgian civilians = 1.00.)

## 12.6 SUMMARY

Results of this survey indicate that there is a great degree of interaction between military and civilian personnel in defence organisations. In particular, approximately 90% of civilian personnel indicated that there are military personnel in their workplace, and similar percentages of military personnel indicated that there are civilian personnel in their workplace. In addition, approximately 80% or more of military personnel reported interacting with civilian co-workers on a daily basis, and an even greater proportion of civilians indicated interacting with military co-workers on a daily basis. Further, it is important to note that a third or more of civilians indicated that their direct supervisor was military. The proportion of military personnel supervised by civilians varied a great deal, but was not uncommon in most nations. These findings highlight the high degree of integration between military and civilians in defence organisations across most nations.

The self-report survey results presented in this chapter indicate that military and civilian co-workers have positive inter-group relations at the personnel level. That is, civilian personnel are viewed as being both necessary and important to the success of the defence organisation, both from their own perspective and from that of their military counterparts, and both civilian and military personnel indicated high quality relations, and good communication and perceptions of mutual workplace respect.

However, some areas that could potentially be improved were noted at the supervisory and organisational levels. Of note, many civilians noted negative effects on their work specifically stemming from working in a military context. In particular, many civilian employees across nations indicated that working in a military context has deleterious effects on their career progression and training opportunities, and that their work is disrupted as a result of the military rotational cycle. Moreover, supervision of civilian personnel by military managers (and vice versa, although this occurs much less frequently) was also noted as an area that generally requires improvement. For example, civilian personnel indicated that supervision by military managers and supervisors (and vice versa) may be problematic in that they often do not appreciate their conditions of employment or terms of service and their personnel appraisal systems. They also indicated that military supervisors may not fully appreciate the roles of civilian personnel or fully capitalize on their skills and abilities.

## **Chapter 13 – CONCEPTUAL MODEL OF MILITARY-CIVILIAN PERSONNEL COLLABORATION: CROSS-NATIONAL CORRELATIONAL RESULTS OF THE MILITARY-CIVILIAN PERSONNEL SURVEY (MCPS)**

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## **13.1 INTRODUCTION**

In this section, two proposed conceptual models related to military-civilian personnel collaboration in defence organisations are examined: the Organisational Factors Model and the Work Culture and Relations Model of

military-civilian personnel integration. In particular, this section presents the results of correlational analyses examining how aspects of military-civilian work culture and relations, as well as unique aspects of working in a military-civilian environment, relate to selected personnel and organisational outcomes of interest. This section is organised into three subsections<sup>1</sup>:

- 1) Correlational results between the military-civilian predictor variables in the Organisational Factors Model of Military-Civilian Personnel Integration and the proposed mediators and the proposed outcomes, respectively.
- 2) Correlational results between the military-civilian predictor variables in the Work Culture and Relations Model of Military-Civilian Personnel Integration and the proposed mediators and the proposed outcomes, respectively.
- 3) Correlations between the mediator and outcome variables (these are common across both models).

The magnitude of these correlations may be interpreted as follows:  $r = 0.10$  is a small correlation;  $r = 0.30$  is a medium correlation; and  $r = 0.50$  is considered a large correlation [2]. In cases where correlations for some nations are not presented, this is because these items/variables were not included in the surveys within those nations.

### **13.2 ORGANISATIONAL FACTORS MODEL OF MILITARY-CIVILIAN PERSONNEL INTEGRATION**

The *Organisational Factors Model of Military-Civilian Personnel Integration* proposes that organisational factors, including leadership support of military-civilian relations, intergroup supervision (of civilians by military supervisors and vice-versa), and the effects of working in a mixed military-civilian context on civilians (including effects on training and professional development opportunities and effects of the military rotational cycle) affect outcomes both directly and indirectly (through the mediating variables). The model is presented in Table 13-1 below.

**Table 13-1: Organisational Factors Model of Military-Civilian Personnel Integration.**

<b>Predictors: Organisational Factors</b>	<b>Mediating Factors</b>	<b>Outcomes</b>
Senior leadership support of military-civilian collaboration	Perceived organisational fairness	Job satisfaction
Intergroup leadership and supervision	Perceived organisational support	Affective commitment
Working in a military context: Career development	Perceived importance of civilians	Retention intentions

<sup>1</sup> This organisation of the analyses is based on Baron and Kenny's [1] well-recognized pre-conditions for testing mediational analyses. As such, although the mediation analyses are beyond the scope of this report given the number of variables and potential paths assessed, the preconditions for mediation will be presented. In particular, Baron and Kenny proposed three significant relationships that must exist for mediation to occur: (1) the predictor variable (PV) is significantly related to the dependent variable (DV); (2) the PV is significantly related to the mediating variable (MV); and (3) the MV is significantly related to the DV. To assess these relationships, the zero-order correlations between variables are analyzed.

Predictors: Organisational Factors	Mediating Factors	Outcomes
Working in a military context: Training opportunities		
Working in a military context: Effects of rotational cycle		

### 13.2.1 Correlations Between Predictors and Mediators from the Organisational Factors Model

This section includes information regarding correlations between predictor and mediator variables found in the Organisational Factors Model of Military-Civilian Personnel Integration.

#### 13.2.1.1 Senior Leadership Support of Military-Civilian Personnel Collaboration and Overall Organisational Fairness

Table 13-2 demonstrates that greater perceptions of support toward military-civilian personnel collaboration by senior leaders are related to greater perceptions of overall organisational fairness for both military and civilian respondents. The magnitude of the correlations varies a great deal but tends to be in the medium to large range for both military and civilian personnel across most nations (with the exception of the US military). Correlations tend to be larger for civilian respondents than for military respondents (except in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Estonia).

**Table 13-2: Correlations Between Senior Leadership Support and Overall Organisational Fairness.**

Nation	Mil	Civ
<b>Belgium</b>	0.35	0.52
<b>Bosnia and Herzegovina</b>	0.56	0.45
<b>Canada</b>	0.50	0.64
<b>Estonia</b>	0.51	0.31
<b>Netherlands</b>	0.40	0.49
<b>New Zealand</b>	0.45	0.55
<b>Sweden</b>	0.33	0.43
<b>United Kingdom</b>	0.46	0.46
<b>United States</b>	0.10	0.70

#### 13.2.1.2 Senior Leadership Support of Military-Civilian Personnel Collaboration and Perceived Organisational Support

Table 13-3 shows that the degree to which senior leaders are perceived to support military-civilian personnel collaboration is related to perceptions of organisational support for both military and civilian respondents. More specifically, greater perceptions of leader endorsement of military-civilian personnel collaboration

correspond with greater perceptions of support from the organisation in general. The correlations for military and civilian respondents are similar to one another, and tend to be in the medium to large range (with the exception of the US military, which is near zero).

**Table 13-3: Correlations Between Senior Leader Support and Perceived Organisational Support.**

Nation	Mil	Civ
Belgium	0.45	0.54
Bosnia and Herzegovina	0.75	0.49
Canada	0.53	0.66
Estonia	0.63	0.48
Netherlands	0.39	0.60
New Zealand	0.45	0.58
Sweden	0.32	0.43
United States	-0.01	0.70

**13.2.1.3 Senior Leadership Support of Military-Civilian Collaboration and the Perceived Importance of Civilians**

As shown in Table 13-4, the more senior leaders are perceived to support military-civilian collaboration, the more important military personnel believe civilians to be to the defence organisation and its mission (with correlations generally ranging in the medium range across the nations). However, civilians’ perceptions of their importance to the defence organisation do not seem to be particularly related to support of military-civilian collaboration communicated by leaders. As such, it seems that civilians recognize their importance independent of senior leadership messages, whereas senior leadership messages may be important for communicating the importance of civilians and the roles they play to their military co-workers.

**Table 13-4: Correlations Between Senior Leadership Support of Military-Civilian Collaboration and the Perceived Importance of Civilians.**

Nation	Mil	Civ
Belgium	0.41	0.19
Bosnia and Herzegovina	0.47	-0.05
Canada	0.44	0.11
Estonia	0.30	0.19
Netherlands	0.33	-0.02
New Zealand	0.39	0.04
Sweden	0.10	0.02
United Kingdom	0.40	0.10
United States	0.01	0.00



### 13.2.1.4 Intergroup Supervision and Overall Organisational Fairness<sup>2</sup>

Table 13-5 demonstrates that for military respondents who were supervised by civilian managers, the more positive the perceptions of the quality of this supervision, the more fair they perceived the organisation to be overall. Similarly, for civilian respondents supervised by military managers, the more positive their perceptions of the quality of this supervision, the more fair they perceived the organisation to be overall.

**Table 13-5: Correlations Between Intergroup Supervision and Overall Organisational Fairness.**

Nation	Mil	Civ
Belgium	0.37	0.64
Bosnia and Herzegovina	0.57	0.38
Canada	0.46	0.77
Estonia	0.72	0.54
Germany	0.33	0.52
Netherlands	0.38	0.52
New Zealand	0.25	0.71
Sweden	0.28	0.51
United Kingdom	0.75	0.63
United States	0.08	0.57

Correlations varied a great deal for military respondents (likely in part due to the smaller number of respondents in these cells); the magnitude of the correlations tended to be large for civilian respondents (again, with the exception of Bosnian and Herzegovinian civilians with a very small *n*). As such, it is clear that for civilians supervised by military managers/supervisors, the perceived quality of that supervision is strongly related to their perceptions of organisational fairness overall. This is also the case for military respondents, albeit generally to a lesser extent.

### 13.2.1.5 Intergroup Supervision and Perceived Organisational Support

As shown in Table 13-6, for military respondents who were supervised by civilian managers, the more positive the perception of the quality of this supervision, the more support they perceived receiving from the organisation (except for Belgian military personnel, although the size of this subgroup is very small). Similarly, for civilian respondents supervised by military managers, the more positive the perceptions of the quality of this supervision, the more support they perceived receiving from the organisation. Correlations for military personnel varied a great deal, but tended to be in the medium and large range; correlations for civilian personnel were consistently large.

<sup>2</sup> Please note that for all correlations that include the intergroup supervision variable, the number of military respondents who were supervised by a civilian was very small for Bosnia (*n* = 8), Estonia (*n* = 8), and the US (*n* = 5), as was the number of Bosnian civilians who were supervised by military personnel (*n* = 8).

**Table 13-6: Correlations Between Intergroup Supervision and Perceived Organisational Support.**

Nation	Mil	Civ
Belgium	-0.06	0.59
Bosnia and Herzegovina	0.83	0.56
Canada	0.46	0.76
Estonia	0.72	0.65
Germany	0.40	0.53
Netherlands	0.48	0.62
New Zealand	0.29	0.71
Sweden	0.28	0.54
Switzerland	0.52	0.64
United States	0.11	0.58

**13.2.1.6 Intergroup Supervision and the Perceived Importance of Civilians**

Table 13-7 demonstrates that for military personnel supervised by civilian managers or supervisors, the quality of this supervision is related to their perceptions of the importance of civilians in general (with most correlations in the small to medium range). As such, the more satisfied military members are with the supervision received by their civilian supervisors, the more likely they are to believe that civilians are important to the defence organisation and its mission (except for New Zealand and Bosnian and Herzegovinian civilians, although the size of the latter group was very small). For civilian personnel supervised by military managers, the quality of this supervision is only slightly related to their overall perception of the importance of civilians to the defence organisation (with most correlations in the small range, except Estonia).

**Table 13-7: Correlations Between Intergroup Supervision and the Perceived Importance of Civilians.**

Nation	Mil	Civ
Belgium	0.48	0.10
Bosnia and Herzegovina	0.13	-0.47
Canada	0.40	0.13
Estonia	0.46	0.30
Germany	0.60	0.18
Netherlands	0.44	0.05
New Zealand	0.12	0.12
Sweden	0.58	-0.06
Switzerland	0.30	0.27
United Kingdom	0.51	0.04
United States	0.67	0.11

### 13.2.1.7 Effects of Working in a Military Context on Career Development: Relations with Perceived Organisational Support and Organisational Fairness

The following analysis examined the potential effects of working in a military context on civilians’ career development – as related to perceptions of organisational fairness and of organisational support. This scale was administered only to civilian personnel within the surveys. As shown in Table 13-8, the less working in a military context affected civilians’ career development, the more fair they perceived the organisation to be and the greater support they reported receiving from the organisation. With only a few exceptions, the magnitude of these correlations tended to be large.

**Table 13-8: Correlations Between Working in a Military Context on Career Development and Perceived Organisational Fairness and Organisational Support (Civilians Only).**

Nation	Organisational Fairness	Perceived Organisational Support
<b>Belgium</b>	0.43	0.39
<b>Bosnia and Herzegovina</b>	0.52	0.60
<b>Canada</b>	0.60	0.57
<b>Estonia</b>	0.40	0.58
<b>Germany</b>	0.39	0.34
<b>Netherlands</b>	0.42	0.44
<b>New Zealand</b>	0.47	0.49
<b>Sweden</b>	0.51	0.54
<b>Switzerland</b>	–	0.45
<b>United Kingdom</b>	0.54	–
<b>United States</b>	0.65	0.57

### 13.2.1.8 Effects of Working in a Military Context on Training Opportunities: Relations with Perceived Organisational Fairness and Perceived Organisational Support

The following analysis examined the potential effects of working in a military context on the training opportunities available to civilian personnel – as related to perceptions of organisational fairness and organisational support. This scale was administered only to civilian personnel within the surveys. As shown in Table 13-9, the less working in a military context affected civilians’ training opportunities, the more fair they perceived the organisation to be and the greater support they reported receiving from the organisation. The magnitudes of these correlations were medium or large.

**Table 13-9: Correlations Between Working in a Military Context on Training Opportunities and Perceived Organisational Fairness and Perceived Organisational Support (Civilians Only).**

Nation	Organisational Fairness	Perceived Organisational Support
Belgium	0.48	0.49
Bosnia and Herzegovina	0.31	0.57
Canada	0.60	0.61
Estonia	0.47	0.46
Germany	0.31	0.27
Netherlands	0.43	0.40
New Zealand	0.58	0.59
Sweden	0.41	0.45
Switzerland	–	0.33
United Kingdom	0.51	–
United States	0.74	0.63

**13.2.1.9 Effects of the Military Rotational Cycle: Relations with Perceived Organisational Fairness and Perceived Organisational Support**

As shown in Table 13-10, the more positive (or less negative) the perceived effects of the military rotational cycle, the more fair and the more supportive the organisation was perceived to be, with correlations in the small to medium range (with the exception of Bosnia and Herzegovina). As such, although there may be challenges associated with the effects of the military rotational cycle, these only have moderate potential effects on perceptions of organisational fairness and organisational support – perhaps because this is understood to be a natural and necessary component of employment in a military context and therefore the resulting effects are not perceived as being strongly unfair or strongly unsupportive.

**Table 13-10: Correlations Between Effects of the Military Rotational Cycle and Perceived Organisational Fairness and Perceived Organisational Support (Civilians Only).**

Nation	Organisational Fairness	Perceived Organisational Support
Belgium	0.34	0.35
Bosnia and Herzegovina	0.62	0.54
Canada	0.27	0.30
Estonia	0.28	0.37
Germany	0.17	0.19
Netherlands	0.29	0.37

Nation	Organisational Fairness	Perceived Organisational Support
New Zealand	0.21	0.24
Sweden	0.31	0.30
Switzerland	–	0.24
United Kingdom	0.30	–
United States	0.26	0.27

### 13.2.1.10 Effects of Working in a Military Context for Civilians and the Perceived Importance of Civilians

Table 13-11 includes information about the correlations between the impact of working in a military context on civilians’ work and careers and perceptions of the perceived importance of civilians to the defence organisation and its mission. As shown there, these three potential effects of working in a military context were generally unrelated to how important civilians perceive themselves to be to the success of the defence organisation and its mission.

**Table 13-11: Correlations Between Effects of Working in a Military Context (Civilians Only) and the Perceived Importance of Civilians.**

Nation	Career Development	Training Opportunities	Rotational Cycle
Belgium	-0.01	0.05	-0.02
Bosnia and Herzegovina	0.15	0.25	-0.07
Canada	0.02	0.04	0.03
Estonia	0.21	0.14	0.09
Germany	0.13	0.14	0.07
Netherlands	0.05	0.03	-0.03
New Zealand	0.04	0.04	0.09
Sweden	-0.06	0.12	0.00
Switzerland	0.06	0.13	0.00
United Kingdom	0.03	0.08	-0.04
United States	-0.16	-0.10	-0.08

### 13.2.2 Correlations Between Predictors and Outcomes from the Organisational Factors Model of Military-Civilian Personnel Integration

The following section presents the results of the correlational analyses between predictor and outcome variables found in the Organisational Factors Model of Military-Civilian Personnel Integration.

**13.2.2.1 Senior Leadership Support of Military-Civilian Collaboration and Job Satisfaction**

Table 13-12 shows that the more that senior leaders are perceived to support military-civilian personnel collaboration, the greater the job satisfaction, for both military and civilian respondents. The correlations are larger for civilians (generally in the medium range) than for military respondents (generally in the small range).

**Table 13-12: Correlations Between Senior Leadership Support of Military-Civilian Collaboration and Job Satisfaction.**

Nation	Mil	Civ
Belgium	0.30	0.25
Bosnia and Herzegovina	-0.11	0.46
Canada	0.39	0.42
Estonia	0.22	0.22
Netherlands	0.20	0.34
New Zealand	0.31	0.33
Sweden	0.19	0.20
United Kingdom	0.22	0.36
United States	0.18	0.25

**13.2.2.2 Senior Leadership Support of Military-Civilian Collaboration and Affective Commitment**

Table 13-13 demonstrates that the more senior leaders are perceived to support military-civilian personnel collaboration, the greater the affective commitment to the organisation, for both military and civilian respondents. However, this relation between senior leader support and affective commitment is stronger for civilians (ranging in the medium to large range for most nations) as compared to for military personnel (in which the correlations are generally in the small to medium range). Notable exceptions include the correlation for Bosnian and Herzegovinian military personnel, which is small and negative.

**Table 13-13: Correlations Between Senior Leadership Support of Military-Civilian Collaboration and Affective Commitment.**

Nation	Mil	Civ
Belgium	0.28	0.36
Bosnia and Herzegovina	-0.13	0.36
Canada	0.44	0.55
Estonia	0.24	0.30
Netherlands	0.22	0.34
New Zealand	0.31	0.49
Sweden	0.29	0.31

Nation	Mil	Civ
United Kingdom	0.39	0.35
United States	0.10	0.60

### 13.2.2.3 Senior Leadership Support and Retention Intentions

As shown in Table 13-14, the more that senior leaders are perceived to support military-civilian personnel collaboration, the greater the retention intentions for both military and civilian respondents. The magnitude of the correlations is quite variable across nations, but tends to be similar for military and civilian respondents within most nations.

**Table 13-14: Correlations Between Senior Leadership Support and Retention Intentions.**

Nation	Mil	Civ
Belgium	0.04	0.27
Bosnia and Herzegovina	0.55	0.21
Canada	0.33	0.37
Estonia	0.28	0.35
Netherlands	0.22	0.23
New Zealand	0.26	0.35
Sweden	0.15	0.32
United Kingdom	0.26	0.27
United States	0.29	0.12

### 13.2.2.4 Intergroup Supervision and Job Satisfaction

Table 13-15 presents the correlations between perceived quality of supervision of civilian personnel by military supervisors (and vice versa) and job satisfaction. For military personnel, the results are mixed and difficult to interpret – in part likely stemming from the small numbers of military supervised by civilians, and perhaps also from spurious effects related to potentially different roles that military reporting to civilians may be performing – this requires further inquiry. For civilians supervised by military managers, generally the more satisfied they are with supervision by their military supervisors, the more satisfied they are with their jobs in general, although the magnitude of these correlations varies a great deal.

**Table 13-15: Correlations Between Intergroup Supervision and Job Satisfaction.**

Nation	Mil	Civ
Belgium	0.15	0.22
Bosnia and Herzegovina	0.06	0.98
Canada	0.24	0.50

Nation	Mil	Civ
Estonia	0.30	0.29
Germany	0.36	0.46
Netherlands	0.33	0.05
New Zealand	0.20	0.39
Sweden	-0.41	0.48
Switzerland	0.39	0.37
United Kingdom	0.56	0.49
United States	-0.13	0.19

### 13.2.2.5 Intergroup Supervision and Affective Commitment

Table 13-16 demonstrates that perceived quality of supervision of civilian personnel by military supervisors (and vice versa) is related to levels of affective commitment toward the organisation for both military and civilian respondents. For civilian respondents the pattern is quite clear – the more satisfied they are with supervision by their military supervisors, the more committed they are to the organisation – with correlations generally in the medium to large range (except for German civilians). However, the pattern of correlations is extremely variable and inconsistent for military respondents, and 5 out of 9 correlations are negative (though three of these are very small). This requires greater inquiry, but may be related to the small numbers of respondents (given that only a minority of military are supervised by civilians), and perhaps to other factors that coincide with military being supervised by civilians, related to their particular roles in the organisation.

**Table 13-16: Correlations Between Intergroup Supervision and Affective Commitment.**

Nation	Mil	Civ
Belgium	0.32	0.38
Bosnia and Herzegovina	0.37	0.97
Canada	0.07	0.59
Estonia	-0.02	0.40
Germany	0.23	0.15
Netherlands	0.22	0.29
New Zealand	-0.03	0.51
Sweden	-0.46	0.29
Switzerland	-0.17	0.28
United Kingdom	0.46	0.45
United States	-0.09	0.30



### 13.2.2.6 Intergroup Supervision and Retention Intentions

As shown in Table 13-17, the more satisfied civilians are with supervision by their military supervisors, the more likely they are to intend to remain in the organisation, although the magnitude of the correlations varies a great deal across nations. As with job satisfaction, the pattern is not clear for military personnel and may require follow-up analyses or investigation.

**Table 13-17: Correlations Between Intergroup Supervision and Retention Intentions.**

Nation	Mil	Civ
Belgium	0.12	0.17
Bosnia and Herzegovina	0.31	0.63
Canada	-0.01	0.42
Estonia	0.15	0.32
Germany	0.22	0.30
Netherlands	0.32	0.11
New Zealand	0.24	0.42
Sweden	-0.64	0.35
Switzerland	0.12	0.28
United Kingdom	0.33	0.56
United States	0.06	-0.01

### 13.2.2.7 Effects of Working in a Military Context on Career Development: Relations with Affective Commitment, Job Satisfaction, and Retention Intentions

The following analysis examined the potential effects of working in a military context on civilians' career development – as related to the outcome variables of job satisfaction, affective commitment, and retention intentions. This scale was administered only to civilian personnel within the surveys. As shown in Table 13-18, the more positive the respondents' perceptions regarding effects of working in a military context on their career development, the more satisfied they are with their jobs, the more affectively committed they are to the organisation, and the more they indicate that they intend to remain in the organisation. Generally speaking, correlations between satisfaction with effects on career development stemming from working in a military environment and the three outcome variables tend to be medium, with some exceptions.

**Table 13-18: Correlations Between Working in a Military Context on Career Development and Affective Commitment, Job Satisfaction, and Retention Intentions (Civilians Only).**

Nation	Job Satisfaction	Affective Commitment	Retention Intentions
Belgium	0.21	0.21	0.15
Bosnia and Herzegovina	0.29	0.41	0.33

Nation	Job Satisfaction	Affective Commitment	Retention Intentions
Canada	0.34	0.48	0.32
Estonia	0.19	0.35	0.33
Germany	0.28	0.21	0.22
Netherlands	0.22	0.20	0.25
New Zealand	0.31	0.37	0.36
Sweden	0.38	0.28	0.30
Switzerland	0.26	0.10	0.14
United Kingdom	0.36	0.36	0.36
United States	0.22	0.59	-0.03

**13.2.2.8 Effects of Working in a Military Context on Training Opportunities: Relations with Job Satisfaction, Affective Commitment, and Retention Intentions**

As shown in Table 13-19, the more positive the respondents’ perceptions regarding effects of working in a military context on their training opportunities, the more satisfied they are with their jobs, the more affectively committed they are to the organisation, and the more they indicate that they intend to remain in the organisation. As with satisfaction on career development, generally speaking, correlations between satisfaction with effects on training opportunities stemming from working in a military environment and the three outcome variables tend to be medium, with some exceptions.

**Table 13-19: Correlations Between Working in a Military Context on Training Opportunities and Job Satisfaction, Affective Commitment, and Retention Intentions (Civilians Only).**

Nation	Job Satisfaction	Affective Commitment	Retention Intentions
Belgium	0.23	0.22	0.21
Bosnia and Herzegovina	0.12	0.52	0.47
Canada	0.36	0.49	0.34
Estonia	0.20	0.14	0.11
Germany	0.22	0.21	0.16
Netherlands	0.20	0.14	0.11
New Zealand	0.38	0.43	0.37
Sweden	0.36	0.11	0.13
Switzerland	0.19	0.15	0.15
United Kingdom	0.38	0.35	0.29
United States	0.22	0.52	0.06

### 13.2.2.9 Effects of the Military Rotational Cycle: Relations with Job Satisfaction, Affective Commitment, and Retention Intentions

Table 13-20 shows that the more positive (or less negative) the perceived effects of the military rotational cycle, the more satisfied civilians tend to be with their jobs, affectively committed to the organisation, and likely to remain in their respective organisations. Correlations across all three outcomes tend to be in the small range, perhaps indicating that civilians expect and accept these effects. As such, attitudes along the key outcome variables do not relate to the potential effect of the military cycle to the same degree of other effects when working in a military context (e.g., potential effects on career development or training opportunities).

**Table 13-20: Correlations Between Effects of the Military Rotational Cycle and Job Satisfaction, Affective Commitment, and Retention Intentions (Civilians Only).**

Nation	Job Satisfaction	Affective Commitment	Retention Intentions
Belgium	0.22	0.17	0.13
Bosnia and Herzegovina	0.09	0.19	0.17
Canada	0.19	0.26	0.17
Estonia	0.24	0.14	0.17
Germany	0.15	0.12	0.09
Netherlands	0.24	0.14	0.17
New Zealand	0.11	0.19	0.20
Sweden	0.26	0.07	0.07
Switzerland	0.19	0.00	0.08
United Kingdom	0.27	0.25	0.27
United States	-0.06	0.21	-0.35

## 13.3 WORK CULTURE AND RELATIONS MODEL OF MILITARY-CIVILIAN PERSONNEL INTEGRATION

The *Work Culture and Relations Model of Military-Civilian Personnel Integration* proposes that the quality of working relations between military and civilian personnel (e.g., relationship quality and communication quality) affect outcomes both directly and indirectly (through mediating variables). The model is presented in Table 13-21 below. Note that the mediating and outcome variables are the same as those specified in the Organisational Factors Model.

**Table 13-21: Work Culture and Relations Model of Military-Civilian Personnel Integration.**

Predictors	Mediators	Outcomes
Relationship quality	Organisational fairness	Job satisfaction
Communication quality	Perceived organisational support	Affective commitment
	Perceived importance of civilians	Retention intentions

### 13.3.1 Correlations Between Predictors and Mediators from the Work Culture and Relations Model of Military-Civilian Personnel Integration

This section includes information regarding correlations between predictor and mediator variables in the Work Culture and Relations Model of Military-Civilian Personnel Integration.

#### 13.3.1.1 Military-Civilian Personnel Relationship Quality and Overall Organisational Fairness

As shown in Table 13-22, the better the perceived quality of relations between military and civilian personnel, the more fair the organisation is perceived to be, for both military and civilian personnel. Correlations between these variables tend to be in the medium to large range for military personnel and in the large range for civilian personnel (with the exception of Estonian and German civilians).

**Table 13-22: Correlations Between Relationship Quality and Overall Organisational Fairness.**

Nation	Mil	Civ
Belgium	0.29	0.46
Bosnia and Herzegovina	0.68	0.42
Canada	0.52	0.69
Estonia	0.38	0.14
Germany	0.27	0.37
Netherlands	0.31	0.49
New Zealand	0.41	0.53
Sweden	0.28	0.66
United Kingdom	0.50	0.52
United States	0.39	0.53

#### 13.3.1.2 Relationship Quality and Perceived Organisational Support

As shown in Table 13-23, the better the perceived quality of relations between military and civilian personnel, the greater the perceived organisational support received from the organisation, for both military and civilian respondents. The correlations vary to a fair degree, but tend to be larger for civilian than for military personnel.

**Table 13-23: Correlation Between Relationship Quality and Perceived Organisational Support.**

Nation	Mil	Civ
Belgium	0.23	0.35
Bosnia and Herzegovina	0.65	0.66
Canada	0.44	0.65
Estonia	0.30	0.31
Germany	0.30	0.40

Nation	Mil	Civ
Netherlands	0.30	0.44
New Zealand	0.38	0.47
Sweden	0.15	0.61
Switzerland	0.36	0.55
United States	0.17	0.49

### 13.3.1.3 Military-Civilian Relationship Quality and the Perceived Importance of Civilians

Table 13-24 shows that the better the quality of relations between military and civilian personnel, the more important to the organisation civilians are perceived to be. This is particularly the case for the perceptions held by military personnel (for whom correlations between military-civilian relationship quality and perceptions of importance of civilians tend to be in the medium to large range) than for civilian personnel (for whom correlations tend to be small). These results indicate that quality of relations with their civilian counterparts may influence the extent to which military personnel value civilians' contribution in the defence organisation and its mission, and/or the more they value civilians' contributions the more positive the quality of their relations with civilians. In contrast, civilians' perceptions of their value is more independent of the quality of relations with their military counterparts.

**Table 13-24: Correlations Between the Perceived Importance of Civilians and Military-Civilian Relationship Quality.**

Nation	Mil	Civ
Belgium	0.50	0.15
Bosnia and Herzegovina	0.16	0.07
Canada	0.67	0.20
Estonia	0.25	0.19
Germany	0.57	0.29
Netherlands	0.38	0.17
New Zealand	0.49	0.19
Sweden	0.47	0.21
Switzerland	0.69	0.30
United Kingdom	0.50	0.13
United States	0.23	0.22

### 13.3.1.4 Military-Civilian Communication Quality and Overall Organisational Fairness

Table 13-25 shows that the better the perceived quality of communication between military and civilian personnel, the more fair the organisation is perceived to be by both military and civilian respondents, with medium to strong correlations for both groups across most nations. Although the magnitude of these

correlations is notable for both military and civilian personnel, it is generally larger for the civilians (with the exception of Estonia).

**Table 13-25: Correlations Between Communication Quality and Overall Organisational Fairness.**

Nation	Mil	Civ
Belgium	0.22	0.45
Bosnia and Herzegovina	0.43	0.43
Canada	0.49	0.62
Estonia	0.43	0.22
Germany	0.23	0.35
Netherlands	0.32	0.50
New Zealand	0.33	0.43
Sweden	0.37	0.39
United Kingdom	0.40	0.49
United States	0.19	0.69

### 13.3.1.5 Communication Quality and Perceived Organisational Support

As shown in Table 13-26, the better the perceived quality of communication between military and civilian personnel, the greater the perceived organisational support, for both military and civilian respondents. The correlations between these variables vary a great deal for military respondents, ranging from small to large, but tend to be in the medium or large range for civilians.

**Table 13-26: Correlations Between Communication Quality and Perceived Organisational Support.**

Nation	Mil	Civ
Belgium	0.12	0.39
Bosnia and Herzegovina	0.56	0.51
Canada	0.44	0.60
Estonia	0.37	0.38
Germany	0.25	0.35
Netherlands	0.31	0.39
New Zealand	0.29	0.48
Sweden	0.26	0.39
Switzerland	0.35	0.47
United States	0.02	0.61

### 13.3.1.6 Military-Civilian Communication Quality and the Perceived Importance of Civilians

Table 13-27 shows that the better the quality of communication between military and civilian personnel, the more important to the organisation civilians are perceived to be. This is particularly the case for the perceptions held by military personnel (for whom correlations between military-civilian communication quality and perceptions of importance of civilians tend to be in the medium to large range) than for civilian personnel (for whom correlations tend to be small). These results indicate that military-civilian communication quality may influence the extent to which military personnel value civilians' contribution to the defence organisation and its mission, and/or that the extent to which they value civilians' contributions may influence the quality of their communications with civilians. In contrast, civilians' perception of their importance is more independent of the quality of communication with their military counterparts.

**Table 13-27: Correlations Between the Perceived Importance of Civilians and Military-Civilian Communication Quality.**

Nation	Mil	Civ
Belgium	0.12	0.13
Bosnia and Herzegovina	0.41	0.28
Canada	0.60	0.14
Estonia	0.19	0.15
Germany	0.53	0.20
Netherlands	0.37	0.18
New Zealand	0.40	0.15
Sweden	0.48	0.20
Switzerland	0.64	0.25
United Kingdom	0.46	0.13
United States	0.09	0.09

### 13.3.2 Correlations Between Predictors and Outcomes from the Work Culture and Relations Model of Military-Civilian Personnel Integration

The following section presents the correlations between predictor and outcome variables in the Work Culture and Relations Model of Military-Civilian Personnel Integration (see Table 13-21 above).

#### 13.3.2.1 Military-Civilian Relations Quality and Job Satisfaction

Table 13-28 shows that the better the perceived quality of relations between military and civilian personnel, the more satisfied the personnel tend to be with their jobs – for both military and civilians. This relation is stronger for civilian personnel (with correlations generally in the medium and large range) than for military personnel (where the correlations tend to range from small to medium).

**Table 13-28: Correlations Between Military-Civilian Relationship Quality and Job Satisfaction.**

Nation	Mil	Civ
Belgium	0.14	0.37
Bosnia and Herzegovina	-0.13	0.38
Canada	0.36	0.45
Estonia	0.23	0.13
Germany	0.29	0.36
Netherlands	0.18	0.30
New Zealand	0.29	0.36
Sweden	0.24	0.47
Switzerland	0.26	0.40
United Kingdom	0.33	0.52
United States	0.14	0.25

### 13.3.2.2 Military-Civilian Relationship Quality and Affective Organisational Commitment

As shown in Table 13-29, the better the reported quality of relations between military and civilian personnel, the more affectively committed to the organisation personnel tend to be. This is the case for both military and civilian personnel, although the relation is stronger for civilians (with correlations ranging from medium to large) than for military personnel (for whom the magnitude of the correlations tends to be in the small range). These results indicate that the better the relations among military and civilian co-workers, the more likely personnel are to be affectively committed to the organisation; this is particularly the case for civilian personnel.

**Table 13-29: Correlations Between Military-Civilian Relationship Quality and Affective Organisational Commitment.**

Nation	Mil	Civ
Belgium	0.18	0.32
Bosnia and Herzegovina	0.23	0.35
Canada	0.32	0.61
Estonia	0.17	0.22
Germany	0.12	0.31
Netherlands	0.18	0.28
New Zealand	0.20	0.53
Sweden	0.13	0.36
Switzerland	0.15	0.28
United Kingdom	0.33	0.40
United States	0.23	0.37



### 13.3.2.3 Military-Civilian Relationship Quality and Retention Intentions

Table 13-30 demonstrates that the quality of relationships between military and civilian personnel is related to retention intentions for both military and civilian respondents. Once again, the magnitude of the correlations is larger for civilian respondents (and tends to be in the medium range) as compared to military respondents (for whom the correlations tend to be small). These results indicate that the better the relations among military and civilian co-workers, the more likely personnel are to remain in the organisation; this is particularly the case for civilian personnel.

**Table 13-30: Correlations Between Military-Civilian Relationship Quality and Retention Intentions.**

Nation	Mil	Civ
Belgium	0.09	0.25
Bosnia and Herzegovina	-0.10	0.12
Canada	0.22	0.39
Estonia	0.31	0.16
Germany	0.19	0.26
Netherlands	0.10	0.16
New Zealand	0.09	0.41
Sweden	0.12	0.36
Switzerland	0.22	0.27
United Kingdom	0.19	0.32
United States	0.31	0.09

### 13.3.2.4 Military-Civilian Communication Quality and Job Satisfaction

As shown in Table 13-31, the better the perceived quality of communication between military and civilian personnel, the more likely personnel are to be satisfied with their jobs. This is the case for both military and civilians, but is again stronger for civilian personnel. In particular, the magnitude of the correlation between communication quality and job satisfaction is in the medium range for civilians, and tends to be in the small range for military personnel (although quite variable for military, in particular).

**Table 13-31: Correlations Between Communication Quality and Job Satisfaction.**

Nation	Mil	Civ
Belgium	0.09	0.29
Bosnia and Herzegovina	-0.01	0.42
Canada	0.35	0.44
Estonia	0.23	0.22
Germany	0.25	0.33

Nation	Mil	Civ
Netherlands	0.17	0.31
New Zealand	0.23	0.37
Sweden	0.26	0.40
Switzerland	0.24	0.31
United Kingdom	0.26	0.42
United States	0.07	0.24

### 13.3.2.5 Military-Civilian Communication Quality and Affective Commitment

Table 13-32 shows that the better the perceived quality of communication between military and civilian personnel, the stronger the affective commitment to the organisation. This is the case for both military and civilian respondents, but again is higher for civilians (for whom the magnitude of the correlations tends to be medium to large across most of the nations) than for military (for whom the magnitude of the correlation tends to be small to medium, with negligible correlations for the US military).

**Table 13-32: Correlations Between Military-Civilian Communication Quality and Affective Commitment.**

Nation	Mil	Civ
Belgium	0.14	0.31
Bosnia and Herzegovina	0.30	0.40
Canada	0.29	0.53
Estonia	0.17	0.21
Germany	0.13	0.27
Netherlands	0.10	0.35
New Zealand	0.12	0.47
Sweden	0.16	0.24
Switzerland	0.13	0.24
United Kingdom	0.29	0.38
United States	0.09	0.63

### 13.3.2.6 Military-Civilian Communication Quality and Retention Intentions

Table 13-33 demonstrates that the better the reported quality of communication between military and civilian personnel, the more personnel are likely to intend to remain with the organisation. Again, the magnitude of the correlation is somewhat higher for civilians as compared to the military (and is in the small to medium range across most nations), whereas the magnitude of the correlation is fairly small or non-existent for most military samples. The correlations for Bosnian and Herzegovinian, New Zealand, and Swedish military personnel, and for US civilians, are negligible.

**Table 13-33: Correlations Between Communication Quality and Retention Intentions.**

Nation	Mil	Civ
Belgium	0.12	0.21
Bosnia and Herzegovina	0.03	0.25
Canada	0.22	0.33
Estonia	0.24	0.12
Germany	0.19	0.20
Netherlands	0.12	0.25
New Zealand	0.06	0.36
Sweden	0.06	0.34
Switzerland	0.17	0.22
United Kingdom	0.20	0.28
United States	0.27	0.04

### **13.4 CORRELATIONS BETWEEN MEDIATOR AND OUTCOME VARIABLES ACROSS BOTH THE ORGANISATIONAL FACTOR MODELS AND THE WORK CULTURE AND RELATIONS MODEL OF MILITARY-CIVILIAN PERSONNEL INTEGRATION**

The following section presents the correlations between mediator and outcome variables used in the two conceptual models of military-civilian personnel integration (see Table 13-1 for the Organisational Factors Model and Table 13-21 for the Work Culture and Relations Model). In particular, in both models, perceptions of organisational fairness, perceptions of organisational support, and perceptions of the importance of civilians are considered to be mediators, or intermediate outcomes, and job satisfaction, affective organisational commitment, and retention intentions are considered to be outcomes.

#### **13.4.1 Overall Organisational Fairness and Job Satisfaction**

Table 13-34 demonstrates that the more fair the organisation is perceived to be, the more satisfied personnel are with their jobs. This is the case for both military and civilian personnel across the nations, with generally medium to large correlations between perceptions of fairness and job satisfaction for most nations.

**Table 13-34: Correlations Between Overall Fairness and Job Satisfaction.**

Nation	Mil	Civ
Belgium	0.28	0.44
Bosnia and Herzegovina	0.02	0.54
Canada	0.59	0.59
Estonia	0.25	0.26

Nation	Mil	Civ
Germany	0.35	0.42
Netherlands	0.38	0.53
New Zealand	0.58	0.51
Sweden	0.48	0.47
United Kingdom	0.45	0.51
United States	0.13	0.27

### 13.4.2 Overall Organisational Fairness and Affective Organisational Commitment

As shown in Table 13-35, the more fair the organisation is perceived to be, the stronger the reported affective commitment to the organisation. This is the case for both military and civilian personnel across nations. The correlations are in the medium to large range, with some exceptions.

**Table 13-35: Correlations Between Overall Fairness and Affective Organisational Commitment.**

Nation	Mil	Civ
Belgium	0.42	0.44
Bosnia and Herzegovina	-0.14	0.47
Canada	0.60	0.65
Estonia	0.32	0.25
Germany	0.41	0.42
Netherlands	0.38	0.48
New Zealand	0.61	0.57
Sweden	0.53	0.43
United Kingdom	0.50	0.56
United States	0.27	0.75

### 13.4.3 Overall Organisational Fairness and Retention Intentions

Table 13-36 shows that the more fair the organisation is perceived to be, the more likely personnel are to intend to stay employed in the organisation. Correlations for both military and civilian personnel across nations tend to be in the medium to large range.

**Table 13-36: Correlations Between Overall Fairness and Retention Intentions.**

Nation	Mil	Civ
Belgium	0.16	0.26
Bosnia and Herzegovina	0.04	0.30

<b>Nation</b>	<b>Mil</b>	<b>Civ</b>
<b>Canada</b>	0.45	0.44
<b>Estonia</b>	0.36	0.30
<b>Germany</b>	0.39	0.31
<b>Netherlands</b>	0.26	0.37
<b>New Zealand</b>	0.41	0.50
<b>Sweden</b>	0.42	0.37
<b>United Kingdom</b>	0.36	0.48
<b>United States</b>	0.18	0.16

#### **13.4.4 Perceived Organisational Support and Job Satisfaction**

Table 13-37 shows that the more supportive the organisation is perceived to be, the more satisfied personnel are with their jobs. This is the case for both military and civilian personnel, with correlations generally in the medium to large range for both groups.

**Table 13-37: Correlations Between Perceived Organisational Support and Job Satisfaction.**

<b>Nation</b>	<b>Mil</b>	<b>Civ</b>
<b>Belgium</b>	0.26	0.41
<b>Bosnia and Herzegovina</b>	0.15	0.27
<b>Canada</b>	0.60	0.54
<b>Estonia</b>	0.33	0.39
<b>Germany</b>	0.37	0.44
<b>Netherlands</b>	0.33	0.44
<b>New Zealand</b>	0.53	0.51
<b>Sweden</b>	0.49	0.52
<b>Switzerland</b>	0.51	0.53
<b>United States</b>	0.13	0.18

#### **13.4.5 Perceived Organisational Support and Affective Commitment**

Table 13-38 demonstrates that the more supportive the organisation is perceived to be, the greater the affective commitment to the organisation, for both military and civilian personnel. Correlations vary a great deal, but tend to be medium or large in most nations across both military and civilian workforces.

**Table 13-38: Correlations Between Perceived Organisational Support and Affective Commitment.**

Nation	Mil	Civ
Belgium	0.35	0.51
Bosnia and Herzegovina	0.14	0.58
Canada	0.64	0.65
Estonia	0.30	0.54
Germany	0.45	0.44
Netherlands	0.35	0.41
New Zealand	0.55	0.56
Sweden	0.53	0.30
Switzerland	0.43	0.38
United States	0.45	0.77

### 13.4.6 Perceived Organisational Support and Retention Intentions

Table 13-39 shows that the more supportive the organisation is perceived to be, the greater the intentions to stay with the defence organisation, for both military and civilian personnel. The magnitude of the correlations varies a great deal, but tends to be in the medium range for both military and civilian respondents.

**Table 13-39: Correlations Between Perceived Organisational Support and Retention Intentions.**

Nation	Mil	Civ
Belgium	0.16	0.26
Bosnia and Herzegovina	0.31	0.40
Canada	0.48	0.42
Estonia	0.23	0.49
Germany	0.40	0.39
Netherlands	0.27	0.24
New Zealand	0.42	0.49
Sweden	0.38	0.41
Switzerland	0.40	0.33
United States	-0.03	0.20

### 13.4.7 Perceived Importance of Civilians and Job Satisfaction

Table 13-40 demonstrates that the perception of the importance of civilians is related to civilians' job satisfaction.<sup>3</sup> However, the magnitude of the correlations is small, indicating only a weak relationship between these factors.

<sup>3</sup> This correlation was only assessed for civilians as there was no theoretical rationale for assessing perceptions of civilian personnel importance and military members' job satisfaction.

**Table 13-40: Correlations Between Perceptions of the Importance of Civilians and Job Satisfaction.**

Nation	Civ
Belgium	0.00
Bosnia and Herzegovina	0.15
Canada	0.17
Estonia	0.04
Germany	0.22
Netherlands	0.15
New Zealand	0.11
Sweden	0.10
Switzerland	0.26
United Kingdom	0.17
United States	0.26

#### 13.4.8 Perceived Importance of Civilians and Affective Commitment

Table 13-41 demonstrates that the perception of the importance of civilians is unrelated or only weakly related to civilians' affective commitment to the organisation.<sup>4</sup>

**Table 13-41: Correlations Between the Perceived Importance of Civilians and Affective Commitment.**

Nation	Civ
Belgium	0.15
Bosnia and Herzegovina	0.04
Canada	0.15
Estonia	0.12
Germany	0.20
Netherlands	0.15
New Zealand	0.08
Sweden	0.08
Switzerland	0.23
United Kingdom	0.13

<sup>4</sup> This correlation was only assessed for civilians as there was no theoretical rationale for assessing perceptions of civilian personnel importance and military members' organisational commitment.

### 13.4.9 Perceived Importance of Civilians and Retention Intentions

Table 13-42 demonstrates that the perception of the importance of civilians is unrelated or only weakly related to civilians' retention intentions.<sup>5</sup>

**Table 13-42: Correlations Between the Perceived Importance of Civilians and Retention Intentions.**

Nation	Civ
Belgium	-0.04
Bosnia and Herzegovina	-0.13
Canada	0.17
Estonia	0.09
Germany	0.02
Netherlands	0.14
New Zealand	0.10
Sweden	0.03
Switzerland	0.19
United Kingdom	0.11
United States	0.07

## 13.5 SUMMARY OF CORRELATIONAL ANALYSES

Although strength of relations varies across nations, overall, the correlational results reported in this section are consistent with the proposed conceptual models of military-civilian integration. In particular, these results indicate that the military-civilian organisational factors (i.e., senior leader support of military-civilian personnel collaboration, effects of working in a military context for civilians, and quality of intergroup supervision) proposed in the Organisational Factors Model of Military-Civilian Personnel Integration, are related to the proposed mediators (i.e., perceived organisational fairness and support; perceived importance of civilians) and the proposed outcomes (i.e., job satisfaction, organisational affective commitment, and retention intentions) as expected.

Similarly, these results are consistent with the proposed Work Culture and Relations Model of Military-Civilian Personnel Integration, in that the proposed military civilian work culture and relations factors (i.e., military-civilian relationship and communication quality) are related to the proposed mediators (i.e., perceived organisational fairness and support; perceived importance of civilians) and the proposed outcomes (i.e., job satisfaction, organisational affective commitment, and retention intentions), as expected.

Overall, personnel who view military-civilian personnel integration and collaboration in defence organisations more positively are more likely to be satisfied with their jobs and committed to the organisation as compared to those who have less positive views. Of note, these findings are correlational, meaning that the variables are

<sup>5</sup> This correlation was only assessed for civilians as there was no theoretical rationale for assessing perceptions of civilian personnel importance and military members' retention intentions.



related, but the findings do not necessarily imply that these relations are causal in nature. Initial conceptualization regarding potential mechanisms by which the nature of military-civilian relations may affect employee and organisational outcomes is suggested herein, consistent with Baron and Kenny's [1] conditions for mediation, with inferential analyses to be conducted in the future.

Of note, although the military-civilian integration and collaboration variables across both models were interrelated with key personnel and organisational outcomes such as affective commitment for both military and civilian personnel, these correlations were consistently stronger for civilian personnel. This is not particularly surprising given that civilian personnel are the "minority" in all the defence organisations and that the role of civilian personnel is often understood as *supporting* the military or armed forces organisation. Moreover, a much greater proportion of civilian personnel are directly supervised by military personnel as compared to the proportion of military personnel who are supervised by civilian supervisors, which may also increase the importance of positive military-civilian work culture and relations for the civilian group. Nevertheless, optimal military-civilian interactions, work culture, and relations appear to be related to important employee outcomes for both workforces, and are therefore important considerations for the optimal personnel management of both military and civilian personnel.

## 13.6 REFERENCES

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## **Chapter 14 – MILITARY-CIVILIAN PERSONNEL SURVEY (MCPS): CROSS-NATIONAL QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS**

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Several open-ended questions were included in the Military-Civilian Personnel Survey (MCPS) in order to complement the quantitative information gathered using the closed-ended survey items. These open-ended questions allowed personnel to express their attitudes, perceptions, and experiences related to military-civilian personnel collaboration and integration using their own words. Six of the participating nations administered the open-ended questions, including Canada, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Sweden, Estonia, and New Zealand.

## **14.1 METHODOLOGY**

### **14.1.1 Open-Ended Questions**

Three open-ended questions were included in the MCPS. These questions inquired about the views of personnel with respect to working in an integrated military-civilian environment. More specifically, the questions asked respondents to identify the most important factors for establishing and maintaining positive military-civilian personnel work culture and relations, the challenges they experienced working in a military-civilian environment, and what they viewed to be the main advantages of working in a military-civilian environment. The specific open-ended questions are provided in Table 14-1.

**Table 14-1: Open-Ended Questions Included in the Military-Civilian Personnel Survey.**

Question Number	Question
1	What do you consider to be the most important factors in establishing and maintaining positive military-civilian personnel work culture and relations?
2	What are the main challenges you experience in working in a mixed military-civilian work environment?
3	What are the positive aspects to working in a mixed military-civilian work environment?

### 14.1.2 Qualitative Analyses and Coding Responses

For each of the three open-ended questions, the responses were coded into categories using pre-established coding schemes [1], [2]. The coding scheme for each question had 12 to 14 themes or categories. Complex responses, which pertained to multiple themes, were coded under all pertinent categories. All responses deemed to be unrelated to the initial question were coded as “Not Applicable” (N/A). Comments that were idiosyncratic or unique and could not be aggregated into a single category and that did not clearly fit with the existing categories in the coding scheme were coded as “Other.”

The analysis of responses included the identification of the most common themes for each question, as well as differences in the prevalence of themes for military and civilian personnel. The proportion of responses per theme was based on the number of times each theme was mentioned by survey participants. Responses to each question were complex and contained multiple themes. Because multiple themes were often extracted from each participant’s response, the number of theme categorisations for each question exceeded the number of survey respondents. For each question, the most prevalent themes that captured the majority of open-ended responses across the participating nations are summarised for the military and civilian subgroups, respectively. Following this, the five most prevalent themes that captured the majority of open-ended responses across the nations are discussed in greater detail and example quotes representing each of these themes are provided. **Of note, the proportion of theme categorisations that each identified theme represents refers to the percentage of times this theme was noted in relation to the total number of themes noted in response to the question. It does not represent the proportion of respondents who agreed with that theme.**

Given the significant variability in sample sizes across the nations, the frequency with which the themes for each question were cited were first ranked *within* each nation, followed by estimation of the average ranking across the nations. This approach was taken so that nations with larger numbers of respondents would not influence the ranking of the themes more so than nations with fewer respondents. However, percentages of theme categorisations for all military and all civilian respondents, taken together across all the nations, were also calculated and are presented following the cross-national results.

Given that the top 5 themes identified as being important for maintaining military and civilian relations are similar for military and civilian respondents, these themes will be discussed for military and civilian respondents together so as to avoid repetition. Following this, example quotes expressed by military and civilian respondents will be provided separately to illustrate the types of responses within each theme for each group.


## 14.2 RESULTS: MOST IMPORTANT FACTORS IN ESTABLISHING AND MAINTAINING POSITIVE MILITARY-CIVILIAN WORK RELATIONS

The first open-ended question asked respondents: “What do you consider to be the most important factors in establishing and maintaining positive military-civilian personnel work culture and relations?”

### 14.2.1 Military Respondents

A total of 1,584 military respondents provided answers to this question after accounting for nonresponses and responses that were deemed “Not Applicable.” A total of 2,167 theme categorisations were extracted, which were categorised into a total of 12 themes (excluding the “Other” category). Table 14-2 and Figure 14-1 provide the proportions (%) of each theme categorisation for this question for military respondents in each nation.

As shown in Figure 14-1, there is a fair amount of cross-national variability in the responses. Some of this may stem from differences in the level of importance attributed to the different themes, perhaps based on different cultural and/or organisational factors, while some may be related to differences in sample sizes or other characteristics. Nonetheless, the general decrease in the proportion of endorsements across the 12 themes provides clear evidence of the overall pattern across nations, with the most frequent themes being endorsed most often across the majority of the nations, and with the least frequent themes being endorsed least often across the nations for the most part.



**Figure 14-1: Factors in Establishing and Maintaining Positive Military-Civilian Relations: Military Respondents.**


**MILITARY-CIVILIAN PERSONNEL SURVEY  
(MCPS): CROSS-NATIONAL QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS**



**Table 14-2: Factors in Establishing and Maintaining Positive Military-Civilian Relations: Military Respondents.**

Theme #	Theme Name	Percentage of Theme Categorisations by Country (%)					
		Canada (n = 471)	United Kingdom (n = 212)	Netherlands (n = 342)	Sweden (n = 193)	Estonia (n = 63)	New Zealand (n = 295)
1	Respect	10.6	13.3	21.8	11.4	18.2	8.8
2	Trust and Transparency	3.3	2.2	6.6	5.7	11.4	3.2
3	Understanding/Familiarity	18.1	25.6	24.0	17.1	22.7	21.3
4	Fairness and Equality	14.5	6.8	10.3	20.2	6.8	17.0
5	Effective Leadership	4.5	5.6	2.9	8.8	2.3	5.6
6	Collaboration/Integration	13.5	9.3	6.8	14.0	12.5	13.8
7	Clear Expectations	3.6	8.3	2.5	1.6	4.5	2.7
8	Effective Communication	15.4	13.9	13.8	5.7	4.5	12.2
9	Effective Job Performance	2.0	4.6	5.3	3.1	3.4	1.9
10	Education and Training	3.0	1.2	0.4	8.8	0.0	2.9
11	Recognition/Appreciation	1.4	4.0	2.5	0.0	2.3	2.9
12	Increase Stability of Work Environment	1.0	1.2	0.8	0.0	0.0	1.3
13	Other	8.9	4.0	2.5	4.1	11.4	6.4

Figure 14-2 provides the national proportions (%) of theme categorisations for the five themes cited most commonly by military respondents regarding the most important factors in establishing and maintaining positive military-civilian work relations. The top five themes represent 72.1% of all theme categorisations coded for this question.




**Figure 14-2: Top Five Factors in Establishing and Maintaining Positive Military-Civilian Relations: Military Respondents.**

In particular, military respondents in most nations indicated understanding/familiarity, respect, fairness/equality, collaboration/integration, and effective communication among the most important factors for establishing and maintaining positive military-civilian relations. Respect, although important for military personnel across the nations, was endorsed particularly frequently by Dutch and Estonian military personnel. Further, fairness and equality were emphasised most frequently in Sweden and New Zealand, and much less so by military personnel in the United Kingdom and Estonia in relation to the other nations. In addition, although effective communication represented at least 12% of theme categorisations for most nations, this theme did not appear in the top five most common themes reported nationally for Sweden and Estonia, and only represented 5.7% and 4.5% of theme categorisations in these nations, respectively. Further, Sweden was the only nation in which education and training and effective leadership were reported among the top five most important factors in establishing and maintaining positive military-civilian work culture and relations (each at 8.8% of theme categorisations). Estonia was the only national case where trust and transparency appeared in the top five most common responses (11.4% of theme categorisations).

**14.2.2 Civilian Respondents**

A total of 2,181 civilian respondents provided answers to the first open-ended question after accounting for nonresponses and responses that were deemed “Not Applicable.” A total of 3,266 theme categorisations were extracted, which were categorised into a total of 12 themes (excluding the “Other” category). Table 14-3 and Figure 14-3 provide the proportions (%) of theme categorisations for the most common themes offered by civilian respondents for each nation.



**Figure 14-3: Factors in Establishing and Maintaining Positive Military-Civilian Relations: Civilian Respondents.**


As for military respondents, although there is a fair amount of cross-national variability in the responses, the general decrease in proportion of endorsements across the 12 themes also provides clear evidence of the overall pattern across nations, with the most frequent themes being endorsed most often across the majority of the nations, and with the least frequent themes being endorsed least often across the nations for the most part.



**Table 14-3: Factors in Establishing and Maintaining Positive  
Military-Civilian Relations: Civilian Respondents.**

Theme #	Theme Name	Percentage of Theme Categorisations by Country (%)					
		Canada (n = 866)	United Kingdom (n = 671)	Netherlands (n = 259)	Sweden (n = 74)	Estonia (n = 82)	New Zealand (n = 229)
1	Respect	19.2	16.6	29.2	12.1	18.7	16.1
2	Trust and Transparency	3.6	2.8	8.9	6.8	3.7	4.1
3	Understanding/Familiarity	14.0	11.8	7.1	6.8	27.1	16.1
4	Fairness and Equality	13.8	18.2	19.9	17.6	14.0	15.5
5	Effective Leadership	3.4	4.7	2.1	17.6	0.9	4.7
6	Collaboration/Integration	13.4	8.9	10.7	8.1	13.1	12.9
7	Clear Expectations	2.1	3.2	2.1	0.0	5.6	2.6
8	Effective Communication	14.8	12.2	8.9	5.4	6.5	11.7
9	Effective Job Performance	1.3	1.9	0.9	4.0	1.9	2.0
10	Education and Training	3.0	4.0	0.9	8.1	0.0	2.6
11	Recognition/Appreciation	3.8	9.2	3.0	1.4	1.9	5.3
12	Increase Stability of Work Environment	2.0	2.5	3.9	0.0	0.0	1.5
13	Other	5.6	4.0	2.4	12.1	6.5	5.0

Figure 14-4 provides the proportions (%) of theme categorisations for the five most common themes cited by civilian respondents in each nation related to the most important factors in establishing and maintaining positive military-civilian work relations. The top five themes represent 63.6% of all theme categorisations coded for this question.




**Figure 14-4: Top Five Factors in Establishing and Maintaining Positive Military-Civilian Relations: Civilian Respondents.**

Civilian respondents in most nations indicated respect, fairness and equality, understanding/familiarity, collaboration/integration, and effective communication as the most important factors for establishing and maintaining positive military-civilian relations. A notable exception is Sweden, the only national case in which effective communication was not among the top five most frequently cited factors important for establishing and maintaining positive military-civilian relations (5.4% of theme categorisations). Effective leadership was given a high level of importance in Sweden, at 17.6% of theme categorisations, which, along with fairness and equality, was the most common theme in response to this question (compared to less than 5% of theme categorisations in the remaining nations). Although respect was noted as a key theme by civilian respondents across the nations, this theme was particularly prevalent in the Netherlands (representing 29.2% of theme categorisations in response to this question). Fairness and equality was a key theme for civilian personnel, and was cited with similar frequency across nations. Understanding and familiarity was noted at a much higher rate in Estonia (27.1% of theme categorisations) than in the other nations. In the Netherlands and Sweden, responses relating to understanding and familiarity represented approximately 7% of theme categorisations, and as such this theme was not among their most frequently cited responses, contrary to the overall trend.

### 14.2.3 Most Important Factors in Establishing and Maintaining Positive Military-Civilian Work Relations – Overall Comparison of Military and Civilian Perspectives

Percentages of theme categorisations for all military and all civilian respondents combined across all the nations were also calculated and are presented below.<sup>1</sup> As shown in Figure 14-5, military and civilian personnel identified very similar factors as being important for establishing and maintaining positive military-civilian work relations, with the same five factors emerging as being most important between these two groups of personnel: respect, understanding/familiarity, fairness and equality, effective communication, and collaboration/integration. With that said, civilians were somewhat more likely than military personnel to indicate respect as a key factor (18.9% vs. 13.6% of theme categorisations for civilian and military personnel, respectively), whereas military personnel were much more likely to indicate that understanding/familiarity is a key factor (21.2% vs. 13.1% of theme categorisations for military and civilian personnel, respectively). Civilians were also slightly more likely to identify fairness and equality, although this was an important factor identified by both groups.



**Figure 14-5: Most Important Factors in Establishing and Maintaining Positive Military-Civilian Relations: Comparison of Responses of Military and Civilian Personnel Combined Across all Nations.**

<sup>1</sup> For this analysis responses within each group (military and civilian) were combined across nations. Given the variability in sample sizes among the nations, responses of personnel in some nations were larger than those in other nations. However, these data were not weighted by sample size as this was taken into account in the presentation of results for the cross-national analyses and was well-represented therein.

#### **14.2.4 Top Five Most Important Factors in Establishing and Maintaining Positive Military-Civilian Relations**

Although in slightly differing orders of frequency, generally both military and civilian personnel across the nations indicated the same five most important factors for establishing and maintaining positive military-civilian relations (when considering the order within each nation accounting for sample size, as presented in Figure 14-2 and Figure 14-4 in the previous sections). Each of these themes – respect, understanding/familiarity, effective communication, fairness and equality, and collaboration/integration – is elaborated below, and illustrative examples are provided.

##### **14.2.4.1 Respect**

When respondents were asked to indicate the most important factors for establishing and maintaining positive military-civilian work relations, the most common theme cited by civilians (an average of 18.6% of theme categorisations) and the second most commonly-cited theme by military respondents (an average of 21.5% of theme categorisations) was respect. Respondents reported that mutual respect between military and civilian personnel was important for maintaining positive relations. More specifically, this included respect for group differences, respect for personnel regardless of affiliation or rank, and being respectful of each other's opinions.

The following military responses illustrate this theme:

- *Mutual respect for the differences in vocational culture. (Canada).*
- *Treating each other with respect and not imposing military ethos as the only option. (United Kingdom).*
- *Mutual respect; Respect each other's work. (Netherlands).*
- *Respect for each other's roles and working tasks. (Sweden).*
- *Having respect for each other's competencies. (Estonia).*
- *The most important factor in maintaining positive military-civilian work relations is to create and/or maintain respect and make each of the parties think they are equal to each other. For example the military personnel need to not think that civilians are below them or anything similar and civilians need to not think of military personnel as overpaid young hooligans and as their equals. (New Zealand).*

The following civilian responses illustrate this theme:

- *Respect for individual's/member's job. Respect for individual's position, and respect for the individual. (Canada).*
- *Mutual respect and understanding. Knowing one another as people first, military or civilian second. (United Kingdom).*
- *To accept one another and treat each other with respect; respect and appreciate each other's knowledge and skills. (Netherlands).*
- *Respect for each other as human beings and professionals. (Sweden).*
- *Respect toward one another; the understanding that no one is better than anyone else solely because they wear a uniform or based on their position in the structure. (Estonia).*
- *That all personnel respect that others work differently not only due to rules and regulations but due to life experiences, this is can be cultural as well as general views of life and work. (New Zealand).*

#### 14.2.4.2 Understanding/Familiarity

Another prominent theme that respondents indicated was important for establishing and maintaining positive military-civilian collaboration was understanding and/or familiarity between military and civilian personnel with one's co-workers (an average of 21.5% of theme categorisations for military respondents and 13.8% of theme categorisations for civilian respondents). Responses indicated that a willingness to understand each other's perspectives, roles and tasks, terms and conditions of employment, cultures, and generally getting to know one another were important factors for establishing positive relations between military and civilian personnel.

The following military responses illustrate this theme:

- *Understanding. For civilians, they must understand the stresses that modern military life brings to the members and their families and that sometimes exceptions in normal operating procedures must be made in order to assist those families during times of tumultuous transition. For military members, they must understand the stressors that are affecting their civilian co-workers. From job security to retirement benefits to entitlements to sick leave, most military members have no idea what constraints civilian workers operate under. If more was understood of how each arm actually operated, day to day operations and not national directive driven, then that may open the lines of communication greatly. (Canada).*
- *The military need to understand what the civilians do for it and the civilians need to understand what they should be doing to enable the military to do their job effectively. (United Kingdom).*
- *Knowledge of each other's background and competences. Understanding of each other's motivation to do the job; Understanding of each other's culture and point of view. (Netherlands).*
- *An understanding for differences and a will to improve our mutual function. (Sweden).*
- *Understanding the work environment and the differences between military and civilian personnel. Accepting differences. (Estonia).*
- *A mutual understanding of each other's capabilities and goals. (New Zealand).*

The following civilian responses illustrate this theme:

- *Understanding the different roles each bring to the organization and leveraging the different experiences and background. (Canada).*
- *Understanding of each other's roles, backgrounds, abilities. Mutual respect for each other's abilities capabilities and contribution. (United Kingdom).*
- *Understanding of each other's background; knowledge of each other's tasks and responsibilities. (Netherlands).*
- *To engage civilian personnel to a higher extent in military matters in order to increase the understanding of the SAF. (Sweden).*
- *Understanding of a different workplace culture and understanding (intent/attempt to understand it). (Estonia).*
- *Understanding of how each plays a part in the overall purpose of NZ and how each contributes to those outcomes. (New Zealand).*

#### **14.2.4.3 Effective Communication**

Effective communication was another frequently mentioned theme (an average of 10.9% of theme categorisations for military respondents and 9.9% of theme categorisations for civilian respondents). This theme contains comments related to timely, effective, and/or respectful communication between military and civilian personnel. Others mentioned that frequent communication was important for establishing positive military-civilian work relations.

The following military responses illustrate this theme:

- *Adequate communication between military and civilian supervisors, in order to collectively achieve a common goal.* (Canada).
- *Communication at all levels is essential in developing a positive culture and relationships. Being able to give your opinion prevents a feeling of helplessness.* (United Kingdom).
- *Communication about what you are doing, about the organization's direction. To create mutual objectives; more communication; sufficient communication; good communication.* (Netherlands).
- *To share information and to talk to each other.* (Sweden).
- *Forthright communication.* (Estonia).
- *Communication!! Whether it is setting the tone for the 'work culture', target setting, talking with workers as to how they feel, conflict resolution or pretty much anything else regarding relations it all comes down to communication.* (New Zealand).

The following civilian responses illustrate this theme:

- *Keeping communications open and honest, so there are no personnel who are left out of the loop or feel like they are left out of the loop.* (Canada).
- *Regular communication and exchange of views.* (United Kingdom).
- *Consulting each other; sharing information; open communication.* (Netherlands).
- *Effective communication.* (Sweden).
- *Communication between each other, joint events.* (Estonia).
- *Open lines of Communication at all times - not a need to know basis as often happens.* (New Zealand).

#### **14.2.4.4 Fairness and Equality**

Respondents also cited the theme of fairness and equality with relatively high frequency (an average of 12.6% of theme categorisations for military respondents and 16.5 % of theme categorisations for civilian respondents). This theme encompasses comments pertaining to fairness and/or equal treatment across many aspects of the military-civilian working environment. Examples included fairness in regard to workload, pay, training opportunities, and recognition.

The following military responses illustrate this theme:

- *Equality among pay/benefits, workload, and responsibility.* (Canada).
- *Maintaining equity across the board and ensuring that one group is not being treated differently to the other.* (United Kingdom).

- *Being open to differences. Equal treatment where possible, differences where necessary; uniformity. (Netherlands).*
- *The justice factor, the same pay for the same work. (Sweden).*
- *Equal treatment, if exceptions made for one or another side, there has to be a good reason. Treating each other based on the principle of professionalism, not based on “what uniform they wear. (Estonia).*
- *I think you need to treat people fairly and offer the same opportunities for training/promotion etc. to both groups doing the same job. (New Zealand).*

The following civilian responses illustrate this theme:

- *Equal training, equal treatment when training is offered, equal wages, equal time off, equal medical and dental benefits. (Canada).*
- *Equal treatment and equal opportunities. I have found in the past military line managers are better than civilian line managers, as they manage all staff fairly. (United Kingdom).*
- *Equal opportunities for everyone; equal treatment and regulations. (Netherlands).*
- *Equal treatment regarding work conditions, pay/benefits and career opportunities. (Sweden).*
- *Creating equal opportunity and rights. (Estonia).*
- *Respect for each other’s skills and experience, fair and equitable treatment, remuneration fairly benchmarked against equivalent non-military positions, equal opportunities, promotion on merit. (New Zealand).*

#### **14.2.4.5 Collaboration/Integration**

Another prominent theme was collaboration and/or integration between military and civilian personnel (on average 11.6% of theme categorisations for military respondents and on average 11.2 % of theme categorisations for civilian respondents). Comments under this theme emphasised that establishing positive military-civilian work relations requires opportunities for military and civilian personnel to integrate and interact both professionally and socially.

The following military responses illustrate this theme:

- *The sense of team-work. Everyone working together to achieve set goals. (Canada).*
- *Monthly mil/civ staff co-ord meetings, periodic staff lunches. (United Kingdom).*
- *Joint tasks and activities; teambuilding; working in teams; working together towards one goal; solidarity. (Netherlands).*
- *The HQ great mix of different individuals with different background. Important with different perspectives, and the combination of civ/mil competencies. (Sweden).*
- *Cooperation between military and civilian side. (Estonia).*
- *The two cultures have some necessary differences, but they can collaborate to maximise results. Perhaps encourage more mixing or working together, to understand what the other side offers, and get used to how the other operates. (New Zealand).*

The following civilian responses illustrate this theme:

- *Teamwork in the workplace. Social events, both during and after work hours.* (Canada).
- *I would like to see more mixed opportunities for expeditions to help build mixed relationships.* (United Kingdom).
- *Working together at the same projects with a shared goal; joint social activities and work-related activities.* (Netherlands).
- *Mutual goals and working methods.* (Sweden).
- *Engaging civilian personnel in military topics.* (Estonia).
- *Inclusion of civilians where appropriate – including seminars/symposia, this is happening in Navy.* (New Zealand).

### **14.3 RESULTS: MAIN CHALLENGES OF WORKING IN A MIXED MILITARY-CIVILIAN WORK ENVIRONMENT**

The second open-ended question asked respondents: “What are the main challenges you experience working in a mixed military-civilian work environment?”

#### **14.3.1 Military Respondents**

A total of 1,570 military respondents provided answers to this question after accounting for nonresponses and responses that were deemed “Not Applicable.” A total of 1,880 theme categorisations were extracted, which were categorised into a total of 13 themes (excluding the “Other” category). Table 14-4 and Figure 14-6 provide the proportions (%) of all theme categorisations for military respondents for each nation.

As shown in Figure 14-6, although a general cross-national pattern is evident, there is a fair amount of cross-national variability in the responses – more so than in responses to the previous question. Nonetheless, the most important five themes tend to be amongst the most commonly mentioned across the majority of nations and will be discussed in greater detail below.



**Table 14-4: Main Challenges of Working in a Mixed Military-Civilian Environment: Military Respondents.**

Theme #	Theme Name	Percentage of Theme Categorisations by Country (%)					
		Canada (n = 1,319)	United Kingdom (n = 247)	Netherlands (n = 337)	Sweden (n = 209)	Estonia (n = 145)	New Zealand (n = 284)
1	Unfairness and Inequality	12.5	2.5	9.3	7.0	1.4	13.4
2	Unstable Work Environment	3.6	1.3	5.9	1.3	1.4	2.2
3	Lack of Communication/ Poor Information Flow	4.2	1.9	3.4	4.5	2.9	2.8
4	Lack of Qualifications/Training	3.0	2.2	3.1	5.8	5.7	4.0
5	Lack of Understanding	12.5	15.1	16.1	33.5	20.0	18.4
6	Poor Attitude About Others	10.0	6.3	4.0	12.9	17.1	7.8
7	Conflicting or Changing Priorities	3.6	4.1	2.8	0.0	0.0	1.6
8	Union Policies/Collective Agreement Issues	11.5	2.5	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.6
9	Chain of Command Issues	2.1	3.5	3.4	7.0	2.9	0.0
10	Cultural Differences	6.2	7.5	7.6	15.5	20.0	10.3
11	Problems with work style or ethic	11.0	32.4	17.6	1.3	12.9	14.0
12	Lack of flexibility	3.5	8.8	7.6	1.3	5.7	4.7
13	No Challenges	2.4	6.3	16.7	4.5	7.1	12.5
	Other	13.9	5.7	2.3	5.2	2.9	7.8





Figure 14-6: Main Challenges of Working in a Mixed Military-Civilian Environment: Military Respondents.

Keeping in mind the cross-national variability, Figure 14-7 provides the proportions (%) of theme categorisations that tend to be among the five most common themes cited by military respondents in most nations related to the main challenges of working in a mixed military-civilian environment. The top five themes represent 57.1% of all theme categorisations coded for this question. Military respondents in all nations indicated lack of understanding as either the most, or second-most, significant challenge to working in a mixed military-civilian environment. Additionally, problems with work style or ethic, cultural differences, poor attitude about others, and no challenges were among the top five responses for most nations, with some notable exceptions.

In terms of variability, although lack of understanding was cited as a main challenge across the nations, this factor was identified more frequently by Swedish military personnel as compared to military personnel in the other nations (35% of theme categorisations). Further, contrary to the overall trend, Sweden was the only nation in which problems with work style or ethic were not considered a major challenge relating to working in a mixed military-civilian work environment (1.3% of theme categorisations). Another outlier, Canada was the only nation where union policies/collective agreement issues (11.5% of theme categorisations) were reported among the top five challenges. This theme was nearly non-existent in comments by military respondents in the remaining countries. Conversely, Canada was the only nation where cultural differences between military and civilian personnel were not included among the five most frequently cited themes. Four of the six nations reported unfairness and inequality among the top five challenges of working in a mixed military-civilian work environment. However, this theme was not one of the top five overall themes presented in Figure 14-6 due to

low frequencies with which it was reported in the United Kingdom (2.5% of theme categorisations) and in Estonia (1.4% of theme categorisations), where it was among the least-cited themes among military respondents. In contrast, the United Kingdom reported significantly more comments relating to problems with work style or ethic than any other nation (32.4% of theme categorisations).



**Figure 14-7: Top Five Challenges of Working in a Mixed Military-Civilian Environment: Military Respondents.**

### 14.3.2 Civilian Respondents


A total of 2,175 civilian respondents provided answers to this question after accounting for nonresponses and responses that were deemed “Not Applicable.” A total of 2,918 theme categorisations were extracted, which were categorised into a total of 13 themes (excluding the “Other” category). Table 14-5 and Figure 14-8 provide the proportions (%) of all theme categorisations for civilian respondents for each nation.

**MILITARY-CIVILIAN PERSONNEL SURVEY  
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**Table 14-5: Main Challenges of Working in a Mixed Military-Civilian Environment: Civilian Respondents.**

Theme #	Theme Name	Percentage of Theme Categorisations by Country (%)					
		Canada (n = 482)	United Kingdom (n = 732)	Netherlands (n = 251)	Sweden (n = 155)	Estonia (n = 65)	New Zealand (n = 280)
1	Unfairness and Inequality	9.3	7.8	6.3	14.8	5.8	14.3
2	Unstable Work Environment	20.2	16.0	12.3	0.0	5.8	12.1
3	Lack of Communication/ Poor Information Flow	6.4	5.3	4.5	3.7	1.2	7.1
4	Lack of Qualifications/Training	8.2	1.2	6.3	3.7	2.3	4.6
5	Lack of Understanding	10.3	13.4	8.2	11.1	3.5	13.6
6	Poor Attitude About Others	11.6	20.0	6.7	7.4	11.6	14.6
7	Conflicting or Changing Priorities	3.5	2.0	1.5	0.0	2.3	1.8
8	Union Policies / Collective Agreement Issues	0.8	0.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.4
9	Chain of Command Issues	4.8	1.3	7.1	3.7	8.1	2.5
10	Cultural Differences	5.1	10.8	11.2	25.9	26.7	4.6
11	Problems with work style or ethic	3.1	9.1	9.0	3.7	9.3	4.6
12	Lack of flexibility	2.5	2.3	1.9	3.7	8.1	5.0
13	No Challenges	3.0	3.4	14.6	7.4	9.3	6.8
	Other	11.3	7.0	10.4	14.8	5.8	7.9




**Figure 14-8: Main Challenges of Working in a Mixed Military-Civilian Environment: Civilian Respondents.**

As was the case for military respondents, although a general cross-national pattern is evident, there is a fair amount of cross-national variability in the responses of the civilian personnel in the different national defence organisations. Nonetheless, the most important five themes tended to be amongst the most commonly mentioned across the nations and will be discussed in greater detail below.

Figure 14-9 provides the proportions (%) of theme categorisations of the top five most common themes on average cited by civilian respondents across all six nations relating to the main challenges of working in a mixed military-civilian environment. The top five themes for all nations combined represent 59.8% of all theme categorisations coded for this question.

Similar to military respondents, comments from civilian respondents showed a great deal of cross-national variability. No themes came up among the five most frequently cited themes for all of the nations, but unstable work environment and poor attitude about others were among the top themes reported by five of the six nations in the study. Additionally, unfairness and inequality, lack of understanding, and cultural differences were among the top five responses for most nations, with notable exceptions.




**Figure 14-9: Top Five Challenges of Working in a Mixed Military-Civilian Environment: Civilian Respondents.**

While, on average, cultural differences between military and civilian personnel was the most common challenge cited by civilian respondents, this stemmed from the high frequency with which this theme was cited by Swedish and Estonian defence civilians (25.9% and 26.7% of theme categorisations, respectively), and to a lesser extent, civilians in the United Kingdom and the Netherlands; this theme was not particularly prevalent in Canada and New Zealand (5.1% and 4.6% of theme categorisations, respectively). Poor attitudes about others was identified as another key challenge, but was particularly so in the United Kingdom (20.0% of theme categorisations), followed by New Zealand (14.6% of theme categorisations), and was cited with moderately high frequency in Canada and Estonia, but less so by civilian respondents in the Netherlands and Sweden (6.7% and 7.4% of theme categorisations, respectively). Although unstable work environment came up among the five most common challenges of a military-civilian work environment in five of the six nations, particularly by Canadian respondents (20.2% of theme categorisations), Sweden stood apart as having no responses that fell under this theme. Also contrary to the overall trend, lack of understanding was not among the most frequently occurring themes among civilian responses in the Netherlands (though was still an important theme constituting 8.2% of theme categorisations) and Estonia (3.5% of theme categorisations). Additionally, at 14.8% and 14.3% respectively, Sweden and New Zealand had a noticeably higher frequency of civilian respondents that indicated unfairness and inequality to be a major challenge compared to the other nations.

### 14.3.3 Main Challenges of Working in a Mixed Military-Civilian Context – Overall Comparison of Military and Civilian Perspectives

Percentages of theme categorisations for all military and all civilian respondents combined across all the nations were also calculated and are presented below.<sup>2</sup> As shown in Figure 14-10, there were some notable differences in the responses and perspectives of military and civilian personnel. In particular, military personnel identified lack of understanding and problems (or perhaps differences) with work style and ethic as the key challenges (16.6% and 15.6% of theme categorisations for each of these issues, respectively), whereas these were endorsed less frequently by civilians (11.3% and 6.2% of theme categorisations for these issues, respectively). Conversely, civilians highlighted unstable work environment and poor attitudes about others as the key challenges (16.4% and 14.4% of theme categorisations for each of these issues, respectively), whereas these were indicated much less frequently by military personnel (8.4% and 3.1% of theme categorisations for each of these issues, respectively). Both groups identified unfairness and inequality as well as cultural differences with moderate frequency.



**Figure 14-10: Main Challenges of Working in a Mixed Military-Civilian Context: Comparison of Responses of Military and Civilian Personnel.**

<sup>2</sup> For this analysis responses within each group (military and civilian) were combined across nations. Given the variability in sample sizes among the nations, responses of personnel in some nations were larger than those in other nations. However, these data were not weighted by sample size as this was taken into account in the presentation of results for the cross-national analyses and was well-represented therein.

#### **14.3.4 Top Five Main Challenges of Working in a Mixed Military-Civilian Environment**

Although there is overlap, military and civilian personnel across the nations indicated somewhat different themes as the five main challenges of working in a mixed military-civilian environment. The top five themes among both military and civilian respondents<sup>3</sup>, albeit in differing orders of frequency, included lack of understanding, poor attitude about others, and cultural differences. Among military respondents, work style/ethic and no challenges appeared among the top five most frequent responses. In contrast, unfairness and inequality and unstable work environment appeared among the most frequently cited responses for civilian respondents. Each of these themes is elaborated below and illustrative examples are provided.

##### **14.3.4.1 Lack of Understanding**

When respondents were asked to indicate the main challenges they experienced working in a mixed military-civilian work environment, the most common theme cited by military (an average of 19.6% of total theme categorisations) and the fourth most commonly-cited theme by civilian respondents (an average of 10.0% of total theme categorisations) was lack of understanding. More specifically, respondents indicated that military and/or civilian personnel lacked knowledge or understanding of one or more areas such as: not understanding their own role, not understanding each other's roles, cultures, or perspectives, as well as not understanding organisational policies and procedures.

The following military responses illustrate this theme:

- *Lack of understanding of what each other does and the importance of each other's work.* (Canada).
- *Understanding the needs of others who [have] not been exposed to some of the environments as military and vice versa.* (United Kingdom).
- *Mutual understanding; familiarize with the work of military personnel and the experience of military personnel in their workplace. Civilian personnel often have no idea about the day-to-day practice in which military personnel have to work.* (Netherlands).
- *To get civilians to understand that the SAF is no ordinary corporation, working 9-5. To get them to understand which demands are put to them, international service with the risk of getting hurt or killed.* (Sweden).
- *Lack of understanding of the reference system the personnel comes from. People see things only from their own narrow perspective.* (Estonia).
- *Lack of understanding of how the other approaches work (e.g., military are expected to work to achieve a task even if it dictates long hours versus someone who may be paid for hours worked and therefore unable to simply remain until the task is completed).* (New Zealand).

The following civilian responses illustrate this theme:

- *Misunderstandings of roles and responsibilities. Misunderstandings about the rules and guidelines that military and civilians work within.* (Canada).
- *Lack of understanding of work, home, life relationship.* (United Kingdom).
- *Incomprehension; understanding of each other's situation.* (Netherlands).
- *Some career officers have great difficulties in listening to people who are not in uniform.* (Sweden).

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<sup>3</sup> When considering the order within each nation accounting for sample size, as presented in Figure 14-7 and Figure 14-9 in the previous sections.



- *Understanding one another as the context systems are different. Over time it decreases. (Estonia).*
- *Lack of understanding that civilian personnel don't fall under the Armed Services Act and all that goes with that. (New Zealand).*

#### **14.3.4.2 Poor Attitudes About Others**

Another common theme that respondents indicated represented a major challenge of working in a mixed military-civilian work environment was poor attitude about others (an average of 9.7% of theme categorisations for military respondents and 12.0% of theme categorisations for civilian respondents). Responses classified under this theme indicated that a main challenge of working in a military-civilian environment was having to deal with personnel who possessed feelings of personal entitlement and/or lacked respect for their co-workers. The following military responses illustrate this theme:

- *Too much of an attitude that: 'I'm unionized/Public Servant and I resent military authority telling me I have to perform outside of my Collective Agreement'. The Military members come and go...the Civilian staff just hold out and wait for the 'new batch to come in for indoctrination. (Canada).*
- *In some areas I have seen a jealousy/envy of the time we spend away from the office doing sport, adventure training. We see it as necessary development and reward for the service away that they didn't see. (United Kingdom).*
- *To respect each other; lack of appreciation of each other's customs, experience, and knowledge. (Netherlands).*
- *To reduce the criticism / questioning / disapproval of the military sector and its foundations. (Sweden).*
- *Mutual respect. Both sides often display a disparaging attitude and prejudices. (Estonia).*
- *Lack of respect from Military officers towards civilians. (New Zealand).*

The following civilian responses illustrate this theme:

- *Chain of command butt kissing. Disrespect for the role of public servants. Disrespect for the conditions of service of public servants. Letting the military know that public servants have the same oath of office and serve Her Majesty as well. (Canada).*
- *Civilians are treated as second-class citizens, their work is undermined. Military always take the credit; but moreover, military regardless of rank do not listen or acknowledge their civilian counterparts/seniors authority. (United Kingdom).*
- *Mutual respect; to remove the everlasting prejudices. (Netherlands).*
- *Certain career officers have a hard time listening to people that are not in a uniform or have a certain degree/rank. (Sweden).*
- *Military personnel often consider public servants as being in the way. (Estonia).*
- *Some Military personnel, thankfully a minority in my experience, seem to view Civilian personnel as an inconvenience or Wannabe's filling positions that should be Military, rather than figuring out that Civilian staff are there to enable the Military personnel to concentrate on the Military aspects of the job. (New Zealand).*

#### 14.3.4.3 Cultural Differences

Both military and civilian respondents also cited the theme of cultural differences with a high frequency (an average of 11.2% of theme categorisations for military respondents and 14.1% of theme categorisations for civilian respondents). Comments under this theme emphasised differences between military and civilian workplace cultures and issues that sometimes arise from resulting differences in viewpoints, values, and language, among others.

The following military responses illustrate this theme:

- *The differing cultures and processes that drive civilian and military careers. This creates a cultural divide that must be effectively bridged to ensure that the defence team is all moving in the same direction.* (Canada).
- *The lack of flexibility of some civilians can be immensely frustrating and leads to a divisive them and us culture.* (United Kingdom).
- *Cultural differences; trying to speak the same language.* (Netherlands).
- *Fundamentally different view of why to work in the SAF.* (Sweden).
- *Above all, it is hard for civilian personnel to understand the military lifestyle, thought patterns and culture and for the military world to identify with civilian personnel (although both come from the same environment). Civilian personnel is bothered by “military games” and the military’s constant watching the clock and 8-5 attitude.* (Estonia).
- *Getting the military culture and the civilian cultures to work together. Military personnel are quite loud and happy; Civilians sometimes don’t like the noise when working.* (New Zealand).

The following civilian responses illustrate this theme:

- *The clash of cultures. Unless civilians have served in the military, there are things they will never truly understand, and the military members know this.* (Canada).
- *The military expect everyone to be like them and they struggle to adapt if they aren’t. Not everyone is as assertive and self-confident as they are.* (United Kingdom).
- *Cultural differences; speaking the same language; a good connection between military customs, norms, and values and that of civilian personnel.* (Netherlands).
- *The military culture is built on a buddy spirit that is hard to infract as a civilian.* (Sweden).
- *Difference in workplace cultures: civilian personnel have significantly more independence.* (Estonia).
- *The main challenges I experience are getting used to the military way of doing things from their perspective. Very organised, task-orientated and planned to the last detail.* (New Zealand).

#### 14.3.4.4 Problems with Work Style of Ethic

Problems with work style or ethic was the second most frequent theme relating to the challenges of a mixed military-civilian work environment cited by military respondents (an average of 14.9% of theme categorisations). Responses indicated issues arising from incompatible work styles, particularly approaches that are results-oriented, in contrast to focusing on meeting objectives quickly, as well as incompatible commitment levels.

The following military responses illustrate this theme:

- *Unionized mentality of civilians not conducive to military efficient production. (Canada).*
- *Having to reduce my expectations regarding speed of response. Coming from a can do, get it done front line environment to one that gets there eventually. (United Kingdom).*
- *Different views of job and work perceptions; different views and work ethos; different mentality. (Netherlands).*
- *The demands on civilians regarding to: be in right time right place right equipment, should be developed. (Sweden).*
- *Different attitude to work and service, views of results and goals. (Estonia).*
- *Drive to extra effort from some civilians is lacking – not all. Civilians expecting the same privileges as Military personnel with rank despite not putting in the same effort or unwillingness to stray away from their JD's. (New Zealand).*

#### **14.3.4.5 No Challenges**

A high frequency of military respondents indicated that there are no challenges to working in a mixed military-civilian work environment (an average of 8.3% of theme categorisations).

The following military responses illustrate this theme:

- *None, at least none related to the work environment being mixed. (Canada).*
- *Generally there are no problems with both parties working together. (United Kingdom).*
- *None. (Netherlands).*
- *Never experienced any problems. (Sweden).*
- *No problems, it all comes down to the will to do something. (Estonia).*
- *I find there are no difficulties that specifically relate to a mixed Military and Civilian work environment. (New Zealand).*

#### **14.3.4.6 Unstable Work Environment**

The most common challenge of working in a mixed military-civilian work environment mentioned by civilian respondents was the experience of an unstable work environment (an average of 11.1% of theme categorisations). Sweden was the exception to this trend, with no comments falling under this theme. More specifically, this theme encompassed comments pertaining to frequent turnover due to posting and deployments of military personnel, too many absences by military personnel, and/or poor timing of postings.

The following civilian responses illustrate this theme:

- *The 2 to 3 years cycle for military position rotation is for me the most challenging aspect. I have to retrain mil employee every 2-3 years in a very complex environment. In addition, military colleagues' rotation is often an obstacle to ensure continuity in initiative, core business or projects. The same is applicable to Military Managing Position, civilians have to adjust to new manager, change in command and priority accordingly. (Canada).*

- *The initial engagement can be difficult, especially with the Army (depending on their trade group) and keeping a profitable relationship with someone who will leave in two years or less. (United Kingdom).*
- *Military personnel leaving after 3 years or if they are deployed. Colleagues' competences are lost. Lessons learned are lost. (Netherlands).*
- *Constant rotation of Defence Forces personnel (i.e. low continuity). (Estonia).*
- *Job rotation in senior positions makes decision making and continuity of decisions challenging as new people often want to revisit previous decisions/directions. The speed to make a decision once all relevant information available is slow. (New Zealand).*

#### **14.3.4.7 Unfairness and Inequality**

The fourth most frequently cited challenge of working in a military-civilian work environment reported by civilian respondents was the experience of unfairness and/or inequality in the workplace (an average of 9.7% of theme categorisations). Responses categorised under this theme involved a perceived lack of fairness in terms of working hours, pay, procedures, professional development and career advancement, and other policy-related issues.

The following civilian responses illustrate this theme:

- *Unequal amount of training opportunities. Unequal opportunities for team building activities and rewards. (Canada).*
- *There can also be a sense of unfairness when military personnel enjoy perks and discounts that their civilian counterparts don't get although they are effectively doing a similar job. (United Kingdom).*
- *Differences in regulations; differences in salaries and rights that military personnel have and civilians not. (Netherlands).*
- *Prejudice and the perception of young, civilian women. (Sweden).*
- *A distinction is drawn in remuneration, benefits, and training depending on whether you're military or civilian; it leads to rifts within the organization. If wages are cut, they're cut for everyone according to one standard; but if wages rise, military gets a bigger raise than civilians do, if civilians get a raise at all. (Estonia).*
- *Bias given to military personnel for job opportunities, regardless of merit. (New Zealand).*

### **14.4 POSITIVE ASPECTS OF WORKING IN A MIXED MILITARY-CIVILIAN WORK ENVIRONMENT**


The third open-ended question asked respondents: "What are the most positive aspects to working in a mixed military-civilian work environment?"

#### **14.4.1 Military Respondents**

A total of 1,523 military respondents provided answers to this question after accounting for nonresponses and responses that were deemed "Not Applicable." A total of 1,916 theme categorisations were extracted, which were categorised into a total of 13 themes (excluding the "Other" category). Table 14-6 and Figure 14-11 provide the proportions (%) of theme categorisations for the most common themes offered by military respondents for each nation.

**Table 14-6: Positive Aspects of Working in a Mixed Military-Civilian Environment: Military Respondents.**


Theme #	Theme Name	Percentage of Theme Categorisations by Country (%)					
		Canada (n = 448)	United Kingdom (n = 251)	Netherlands (n = 333)	Sweden (n = 163)	Estonia (n = 64)	New Zealand (n = 277)
1	Diverse Perspectives	29.8	23.0	37.3	34.4	25.4	30.5
2	Learning Opportunities	7.5	5.5	13.5	3.7	1.4	4.8
3	The People in General	1.7	2.3	1.3	0.6	2.8	4.8
4	Positive Culture	1.5	4.7	8.4	9.8	25.4	2.5
5	Stability/Continuity	27.8	19.2	20.1	0.0	0.0	24.6
6	Organisational Identification	1.0	0.0	0.8	3.1	1.4	0.0
7	Efficient/Effective Performance	2.9	4.7	1.8	5.5	7.0	5.4
8	Collaboration	2.7	2.6	2.8	3.1	19.7	1.7
9	Turnover of Difficult Personnel	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.4	0.0
10	Interesting/Variable Work	0.5	0.0	0.8	0.6	1.4	0.6
11	Additional Knowledge and Skills	12.2	22.4	10.7	33.7	8.5	14.1
12	Respect	0.3	0.9	0.5	0.0	1.4	1.1
13	No Benefits	3.1	2.3	1.5	1.2	0.0	4.2
	Other	9.0	12.2	0.8	4.8	4.2	5.6



**Figure 14-11: Positive Aspects of Working in a Mixed Military-Civilian Environment: Military Respondents.**

As shown in Figure 14-11, although a general cross-national pattern is evident, there is a fair amount of cross-national variability in the responses, similar to the previous question. Nonetheless, the most important five themes tended to be endorsed the most often across most of the nations, with a few exceptions, with the least frequent themes being endorsed the least often across most of the nations. The top five themes and significant national outliers will be discussed in greater detail below.

Keeping in mind the cross-national variability, Figure 14-12 provides the proportions (%) of theme categorisations that tended to be among the five most common themes cited by military respondents in most nations related to the main benefits of working in a mixed military-civilian environment. The top 5 themes represented 79.5% of all theme categorisations for this question.



**Figure 14-12: Top Five Most Positive Aspects of Working in a Mixed Military-Civilian Environment: Military Respondents.**


Military respondents in all nations indicated diverse perspectives as among the top five most positive aspects of working in a mixed military-civilian environment. The theme additional knowledge and skills was also one the five most frequently cited by respondents in all six nations. Responses of military respondents on the remaining themes were less consistent across the nations, but on average were ranked among the top five themes: positive culture, stability and continuity, learning opportunities, and responses classified as “Other.” Despite the high amount of cross-national variability, these themes were each among the top five responses for at least three of the six nations included in the study.

The benefit of diverse perspectives was uniformly cited as a key advantage of a mixed military-civilian work environment (23.0% to 37.3% of theme categorisations across the nations). Additional knowledge and skills, while also being one of the most frequently-cited benefits of working in a mixed military-civilian environment in all nations, was cited most frequently as a key benefit by Swedish military respondents (33.7% of theme categorisations), followed by military respondents in the United Kingdom (22.% of theme categorisations), as compared to those of other nations. Stability and continuity, despite being on average the third most common theme, was not reflected in any comments among military respondents in Sweden or Estonia. At 19.7% of theme categorisations, collaboration was the second most frequently cited positive aspect of a mixed military-civilian work environment in Estonia, contrary to the overall trend, in which it did not make up more than 3.1% of

comments in any of the other nations. Military respondents in Estonia also reported positive culture at a much higher frequency (25.4% of theme categorisations) than was the case for the remaining nations, including the Netherlands (8.4% of theme categorisations) and Sweden (9.8% of theme categorisations), who also reported positive culture among their top five most common positive aspects of a mixed military-civilian work environment. Learning opportunities and responses classified as “Other” had an equal frequency (6.1% of theme categorisations) on average across the nations studied. Learning opportunities tended to be cited most often as a benefit of working in a mixed military-civilian context, most frequently by military respondents in the Netherlands (13.5% of theme categorisations). Despite the relatively low frequency of theme categorisations across nations overall (less than 7% on average), efficient and effective performance was still among the top five most frequently cited themes in Sweden, Estonia and New Zealand (5.5%, 7.0% and 5.4% of theme categorisations, respectively).

### 14.4.2 Civilian Respondents

A total of 2,111 civilian respondents provided answers to this question after accounting for nonresponses and responses that were deemed “Not Applicable.” A total of 3,579 theme categorisations were extracted, which were categorised into a total of 13 themes (excluding the “Other” category). Table 14-7 and Figure 14-13 provide the proportions (%) of theme categorisations for the most common themes offered by civilian respondents for each nation.



**Figure 14-13: Most Positive Aspects of Working in a Mixed Military-Civilian Environment: Civilian Respondents.**




**Table 14-7: Most Positive Aspects of Working in a Mixed  
Military-Civilian Environment: Civilian Respondents.**

Theme #	Theme Name	Percentage of Theme Categorisations by Country (%)					
		Canada (n = 786)	United Kingdom (n = 714)	Netherlands (n = 245)	Sweden (n = 54)	Estonia (n = 82)	New Zealand (n = 211)
1	Diverse Perspectives	15.9	23.9	17.8	22.2	24.2	18.6
2	Learning Opportunities	12.7	7.6	23.7	11.1	6.3	9.8
3	The People in General	7.6	7.3	1.9	1.8	1.1	9.1
4	Positive Culture	6.9	11.4	7.4	11.1	24.2	10.6
5	Stability/Continuity	2.8	4.1	4.8	0.0	2.1	7.2
6	Organisational Identification	10.7	5.1	2.2	3.7	6.3	6.1
7	Efficient/Effective Performance	4.9	9.0	4.1	3.7	5.3	4.5
8	Collaboration	5.9	4.6	9.6	11.1	9.5	6.1
9	Turnover of Difficult Personnel	2.2	1.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.1
10	Interesting/Variable Work	4.6	4.0	6.3	1.8	4.2	5.3
11	Additional Knowledge and Skills	11.2	8.4	13.0	24.1	11.6	7.2
12	Respect	2.7	2.7	2.6	1.8	3.2	1.9
13	No Benefits	1.9	3.9	2.2	1.8	0.0	4.5
	Other	9.9	6.9	4.4	5.6	2.1	8.0

As seen in Figure 14-11, although a cross-national pattern is evident, there was a fair amount of cross-national variability in the responses. The most important five themes tended to be endorsed the most often across most of the nations, with some exceptions, and the least frequent themes tended to be endorsed least often across most of the nations. However, this trend is less defined than was the case for the previous questions in that the responses tended to be spread out more evenly across a larger number of themes (which is also reflected in the top 5 themes only accounting for 44.1% of civilians’ theme categorisations for this question, as noted below). The top five themes, as well as significant national outliers, will be discussed in greater detail below.

Keeping in mind the cross-national variability, Figure 14-14 provides the proportions (%) of theme categorisations for the five most common themes cited by civilian respondents in each nation related to the most positive aspects of working in a mixed military-civilian environment. The top 5 themes represent 44.1% of all theme categorisations for this question.



**Figure 14-14: Top Five Most Positive Aspects of Working in a Mixed Military-Civilian Environment: Civilian Respondents.**

Civilian respondents in all nations indicated diverse perspectives and learning opportunities as two of the most prominent positive aspects to working in a mixed military-civilian environment. Additionally, positive culture, collaboration, and additional knowledge and skills were among the top five responses for most nations, with some exceptions.

As was the case for military personnel, the theme of diverse perspectives was uniformly cited as a key benefit of a mixed military-civilian work environment (15.9% to 24.2% of theme categorisations across the nations). Additional knowledge and skills was most frequently endorsed by Swedish defence civilians (24.1% of theme categorisations) but was reported with moderate frequency by civilians across the other nations (7.2% to 13.0% of theme categorisations across the nations). At 7.2% of theme categorisations, additional knowledge and skills was not among the top five theme categorisations in New Zealand. Similarly, positive culture was most frequently endorsed by one nation – Estonia (24.2% of theme categorisations) but was reported with moderate frequency by civilians across the other nations (6.9% to 11.4% of theme categorisations). Canada was the only nation in which positive culture did not appear among the top five positive aspects of working in a mixed military-civilian environment, at 6.9% of theme categorisations. Despite being one of the five most common themes in civilian responses to this question overall, collaboration was cited most frequently by civilian respondents in the Netherlands, Sweden, and Estonia (9.6%, 11.1%, and 9.5% of theme categorisations, respectively), but was not one of the top five themes cited by civilian respondents in Canada, the United Kingdom and New Zealand (reflecting 5.9%, 4.6%, and 6.1% of theme categorisations, respectively).

#### **14.4.3 Most Positive Aspects of Working in a Mixed Military-Civilian Context – Overall Comparison of Military and Civilian Perspectives**

Percentages of theme categorisations for all military and all civilian respondents combined across all the nations were also calculated and are presented below.<sup>4</sup> As shown in Figure 14-15, there were some notable differences in the responses and perspectives of military and civilian personnel. In particular, although military and civilians both identified diverse perspectives as the main benefit of a mixed military-civilian work environment, military personnel were much more likely to endorse this factor (30.5% of theme categorisations) as compared to civilians (19.7% of theme categorisations). Further, military were much more likely than civilians to indicate stability and continuity as being a key benefit (20.7% versus 3.8% of theme categorisations for military and civilian personnel, respectively). This pattern is not particularly surprising given that civilians were much more likely than military personnel to indicate that one of the main challenges is unstable work environment, as discussed in the analyses above.

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<sup>4</sup> For this analysis responses within each group (military and civilian) were combined across nations. Given the variability in sample sizes among the nations, responses of personnel in some nations were larger than those in other nations. However, these data were not weighted by sample size as this was taken into account in the presentation of results for the cross-national analyses and was well-represented therein.




Figure 14-15: Main Positive Aspects of Working in a Mixed Military-Civilian Context: Comparison of Responses of Military and Civilian Personnel.

#### 14.4.4 Top Five Positive Aspects of Working in a Mixed Military-Civilian Environment

Similar to the previous question, despite there being overlap, military and civilian personnel across the nations indicated somewhat different themes as the five most positive aspects of working in a mixed military-civilian work environment. The top five themes among both military and civilian respondents<sup>5</sup>, although differing in order of frequency, included diverse perspectives, positive culture, additional knowledge and skills, and learning opportunities. Among military respondents, stability and continuity also appeared among the top five most frequent responses. Collaboration appeared among the most frequently cited responses for civilian respondents. Each of these themes is elaborated below and illustrative examples are provided.

##### 14.4.4.1 Diverse Perspectives

When respondents were asked to indicate the positive aspects of working in a mixed military-civilian work environment, the most common theme cited by military respondents (an average of 30.1% of total theme categorisations) and civilian respondents (an average of 20.4% of total theme categorisations) was diverse perspectives. This theme specifically pertains to getting exposure to new and/or diverse perspectives from

<sup>5</sup> When considering the order within each nation accounting for sample size, as presented in Figure 14-12 and Figure 14-14 in the previous sections.

individuals with different backgrounds. Respondents also frequently cited the diverse perspectives of personnel as beneficial for making more effective decisions.

The following military responses illustrate this theme:

- *Diversity of thought (no group think), Fresh ideas through military, continuity through Civilian.* (Canada).
- *Develops wider understanding, improves management skills, and offers different perspectives.* (United Kingdom).
- *Exchanging different (new) insights, different points of view, creativity, Different ways of handling problems, no tunnel vision, A different approach to issues, not just on the basis of military operations but also the human side.* (Netherlands).
- *It is good with different backgrounds and perspectives in order to avoid a stereotypical environment.* (Sweden).
- *Difference enriches us. The different experiences of one complement the other and this way it is possible to find the optimum end result.* (Estonia).
- *A broader spectrum of ideas and considerations that helps the organisation agility to adapt and overcome problems better and more quickly.* (New Zealand).

The following civilian responses illustrate this theme:

- *A military-civilian work environment provides a diversified environment, allows for exchanges of ideas, which promotes creativity and affords an environment whereby both entities gain a broader perspective, complement each other and create an integrated approach to the goals of the CF.* (Canada).
- *Opportunities to learn from different approaches and perspectives.* (United Kingdom).
- *If you are open to it, to view things from a different perspective. It keeps you sharp.* (Netherlands).
- *A great variety of different kind of competencies that contributes to something good for the society.* (Sweden).
- *Complementing each other. Different worldviews.* (Estonia).
- *Different cultural ways of thinking that gives you a great variety to get a better outcome.* (New Zealand).

#### **14.4.4.2 Positive Culture**

When respondents were asked to indicate the positive aspects of working in a mixed military-civilian work environment, another frequently cited theme was positive culture (an average of 8.7% of total theme categorisations for military respondents and 11.9% for civilian respondents). Respondents indicated experiencing a sense of belonging to the environment or culture of the organisation as well as an appreciation of the diverse military and civilian cultures, organisational structure and supportive environment.

The following military responses illustrate this theme:

- *The environment is relaxed, perhaps less strict and stringent. Many of my friends at work are civilian.* (Canada).
- *They (civilians) can bring a lighter edge to work as they do not necessarily feel the same pressures placed upon military personnel.* (United Kingdom).

- *Variation in culture and experiences; Making use of differences in culture and approach; gentler manners.* (Netherlands).
- *It becomes a totally different culture that is positively mixed.* (Sweden).
- *More flexible workplace culture, the military side makes concessions in the rigidity stemming from the hierarchy and the work environment is more pleasant.* (Estonia).
- *More laid back, I find management is better if people have to manage civilian staff as well as military.* (New Zealand).

The following civilian responses illustrate this theme:

- *The military has a particular culture and esprit-de-corps that civilians could learn and benefit from.* (Canada).
- *The military have (in my department) a good sense of humour and a very positive morale, the banter is brilliant (never personal).* (United Kingdom).
- *Cross-pollination of cultures. By working in a mixed environment one does get understanding and insight into the process of the Defence organisation and the interrelationships.* (Netherlands).
- *A positive basic view to work and the employer. Less internal opposition and fighting compared to pure civilian workplaces.* (Sweden).
- *Synergy from successfully merging experiences and cultures, better understanding of military national defence throughout the entire spectrum, etc.* (Estonia).
- *Compared with other civilian organisations I believe the values that have grown out of the military context underpin the entire organisation in a very positive way.* (New Zealand).

#### **14.4.4.3 Additional Knowledge and Skills**

Additional knowledge and skills was another theme frequently cited by respondents when asked to indicate the positive aspects of working in a mixed military-civilian work environment (an average of 16.9% of total theme categorisations for military respondents and 12.6% for civilian respondents). Responses involved the experience of working with high performing or skilled individuals who possess unique and valuable skillsets. Another dominant aspect of this theme was the high level of competence of military and civilian personnel and their willingness to pass on corporate knowledge.

The following military responses illustrate this theme:

- *A vast array of knowledge, skills and a broader network of professionalism.* (Canada).
- *Civilian project managers have experience in procurement and do a great deal to support the equipment required.* (United Kingdom).
- *Military and civilian personnel complement each other. The knowledge and experience is more diverse and broader than in a purely military environment.* (Netherlands).
- *The SAF have been professionalized with the influx from civilian competence.* (Sweden).
- *Multifaceted nature. The military side has to be represented at every level in national defence. Civilians are often better specialists in certain fields.* (Estonia).
- *A better range of experience and skills to draw on.* (New Zealand).

The following civilian responses illustrate this theme:

- *Military members bring with them new work experiences and knowledge from other locations that benefit local operations. (Canada).*
- *Supplementing each other's knowledge. Civilian and military personnel complement each other, whereby the civilian component may help better guarantee continuity and military personnel help guarantee the continuing connection with the core tasks. (Netherlands).*
- *From my perspective as a civilian: insight into another world, an understanding for different ways of working. (Sweden).*
- *There are also experts in an area who are committed to the matter at hand. And also a positive, decent end result. (Estonia).*
- *Civilians can definitely lean on the military personnel's experience and knowledge. When I first started with Defence, I knew nothing about military ways, but the military personnel we have here are more than happy to help explain. (New Zealand).*

#### **14.4.4.4 Learning Opportunities**

Another common theme among both military and civilian respondents relating to the positive aspects of working in a mixed military-civilian work environment was learning opportunities (an average of 6.1% of total theme categorisations for military respondents and 11.9% for civilian respondents). For military respondents, this theme had equal frequency with comments that did not fit any of the 13 themes and were labelled as "Other." Responses reflected in learning opportunities often mentioned learning through training and new experiences provided by the mixed military-civilian work environment. This theme also includes comments regarding the opportunity to gain a greater understanding of the nature and/or importance of tasks that are performed by others.

The following military responses illustrate this theme:

- *When you find a civilian employee who is willing, military members can learn a great deal and gain experience with one particular trade. (Canada).*
- *The depth and wealth of experience and knowledge to be gained from each other. (United Kingdom).*
- *You can get the most out of both civilians and military's, stimulating and enriching. (Sweden).*
- *Learning from each other's experiences (general operation experiences vs. specialist knowledge) and learning from each other's culture. (Netherlands).*
- *Learning from each other and developing. (Estonia).*
- *Learning from each other. Respecting each other's skills and knowledge from both a military and civilian perspective. (New Zealand).*

The following civilian responses illustrate this theme:

- *Can't beat the military-civilian environment for supporting continuous learning and professional development. Always results for Canadians that we can be proud of. (Canada).*
- *As a civilian you see how the military works and not just the front line fighting being broadcast on the evening news. (United Kingdom).*
- *We contribute with different mind-sets. (Sweden).*

- *Learning from each other's competences; the opportunity to learn from each other; learning from each other's experiences. (Netherlands).*
- *You learn something new every day (and that's the way it's been for the last 10 years). (Estonia).*
- *Learning from each other is a huge plus as I feel coming from a civilian working background I have contributed a lot of useful ideas to the team and implemented changes. (New Zealand).*

#### **14.4.4.5 Stability and Continuity**

The third most common overall positive aspect of working in a mixed military-civilian work environment mentioned by military respondents was stability and continuity (an average of 15.3% of theme categorisations). Despite no comments falling under this theme in Sweden or Estonia, it had high frequencies in the remaining nations. Comments falling under this theme discussed the benefits associated with civilian personnel maintaining corporate knowledge and continuity. Respondents frequently indicated that the continuity provided by civilian personnel is beneficial because it supplements areas of discontinuity (or instability) resulting from the military rotational cycle associated with military postings and deployments.

The following military responses illustrate this theme:

- *Continuity of civilians in positions increases corporate knowledge. They are often the ones who have the history and background on issues. (Canada).*
- *Due to high tempo, civilians do offer continuity to the section whilst personnel are deployed. (United Kingdom).*
- *Civilian personnel remain longer on function so that continuity is guaranteed. Civilian personnel possess a large part of our organization memory because they often are longer in a certain position. Military personnel can cleverly make use of that. (Netherlands).*
- *Because civilian personnel are not subject to the posting churn, they are able to build corporate knowledge in a position over time which makes them very valuable. (New Zealand).*

#### **14.4.4.6 Collaboration**

Another frequently cited positive aspect of working in a military-civilian work environment reported by civilian respondents was collaboration (an average of 7.8% of theme categorisations). Responses indicated that the mixed military-civilian environment encourages collaboration and teamwork. Others reflected on the positive aspects of working towards a common goal.

The following civilian responses illustrate this theme:

- *Good comradery, sense of humour, can do attitude, working for the mission as one cohesive team. (Canada).*
- *A recognition that we are here to defend the nation together, all parts of the same team. (United Kingdom).*
- *Realizing it all together as a team; to strengthen the 'combined team' of civilian and military personnel together by 'looking in each other's kitchen'. (Netherlands).*
- *The dynamics and mix of civilian and military skills. (Sweden).*
- *Closer communication, cooperation flows better. (Estonia).*



- *Different backgrounds, experiences and knowledge create an awesome environment for collaboration. There is a wealth of knowledge in any given situation for any given topic. It's really great to have.* (New Zealand).

## 14.5 SUMMARY

This Chapter presents an analysis of three open-ended questions contained within the MCPS that examine issues related to working in an integrated military-civilian context. In particular, these three questions pertain to:

- 1) The most important factors for establishing and maintaining positive military-civilian work relations;
- 2) The main challenges experienced when working in a mixed military-civilian work environment; and
- 3) The positive aspects to working in a mixed military-civilian work environment.

Coding schemes were developed for each open-ended question, and these were then used to code each of the responses into appropriate themes. The frequencies of theme categorisations for each question were analysed for each nation and compared cross-nationally, and were then analysed and compared for military and civilian respondents as a whole.

### 14.5.1 Overall Results

With respect to the most important factors for establishing and maintaining positive military-civilian work relations, both military and civilian respondents emphasised understanding/familiarity, respect, fairness/equality, collaboration/integration, and effective communication among the most important factors. Results were fairly consistent across the nations with some notable exceptions. This was evidenced by the fact that the top five themes represented 72.1% and 63.6% of all theme categorisations coded for this question for military and civilian respondents, respectively. Comparisons of military and civilian respondents combined across all the nations indicated that military and civilian personnel identified very similar factors as being important for establishing and maintaining positive military-civilian work relations, with the same five factors emerging as being most important between these two groups of personnel. However, civilians were somewhat more likely than military personnel to indicate respect as a key factor, and were also slightly more likely to identify fairness and equality as important, whereas military personnel were much more likely to indicate that understanding and familiarity with the other group is a key factor.

With respect to the main challenges of working in a military-civilian context, although a general cross-national pattern emerged, there was also a fair amount of cross-national variability in the responses. The main challenges identified by military personnel across the nations included lack of understanding as either the most, or second-most, significant challenge to working in a mixed military-civilian environment, and also indicated problems with work style or ethic, cultural differences, and poor attitude about others (with the top five themes representing 57.1% of all theme categorisations coded for this question across the nations). Similar to military respondents, comments from civilian respondents showed a fair degree of cross-national variability, although the top five themes for all nations combined represented 59.8% of all theme categorisations coded for this question, also indicating a good degree of consistency. Although none of the themes came up among the five most frequently cited themes for all of the nations, unstable work environment and poor attitude about others were among the top themes reported by five of the six nations in the study, and unfairness and inequality, lack of understanding, and cultural differences were also among the top five responses for the civilians of most nations. Further, although military and civilian personnel (combined across nations) identified some common challenges, some notable differences also emerged. In particular, military personnel identified lack of understanding and issues

with work style and work ethic as the key challenges, whereas these factors were endorsed less frequently by civilians. Conversely, civilians highlighted unstable work environment and poor attitudes about others as the key challenges, whereas these themes were indicated much less frequently by military personnel. Both groups identified unfairness and inequality as well as cultural differences with moderate frequency.

In terms of the main benefits of working in a mixed military-civilian environment, despite some cross-national variability, a general cross-national pattern emerged. The main benefits identified by military personnel across the nations included diverse perspectives, additional knowledge and skills, positive culture, stability and continuity, and learning opportunities. These top five themes represented 79.5% of all military respondents' theme categorisations for this question. Civilian respondents in all nations indicated diverse perspectives and learning opportunities as two of the most prominent positive aspects to working in a mixed military-civilian environment. Additionally, positive culture, collaboration, and additional knowledge and skills were among the top five responses for the civilians of most nations. However, the top five themes represented only 44.1% of civilian theme categorisations for this question, indicating a fair degree of cross-national variability. There were also some notable differences between the responses of military and civilian respondents taken together. In particular, although both groups identified diverse perspectives as the main benefit, military personnel were much more likely to endorse this theme as compared to civilians. Further, military were much more likely than civilians to indicate stability and continuity as being a key benefit (20.7% versus 3.8% of theme categorisations for military and civilian personnel, respectively). This pattern is not particularly surprising given that civilians were much more likely than military to indicate that one of their main challenges is unstable work environment.

#### **14.5.1.1 Commonly Cited Themes**

Given that some themes consistently emerged across nations and in the responses of military and civilian personnel across the questions, these themes likely represent some of the most important defining characteristics of working in an integrated military-civilian work environment and are discussed in greater detail below.

#### **14.5.1.2 Stability and Continuity in the Workplace**

One main theme that emerged as a main challenge and also a main benefit of working in a mixed military-civilian work environment was that of stability and continuity. In particular, military personnel tended to highlight stability as a main benefit of working in a mixed military-civilian context, whereas civilians often mentioned instability in the work environment as a challenge of working in such an environment. The nature of these responses indicates that the military operational requirements related to postings and deployments pose a challenge, particularly for civilian personnel. Responses frequently made mention of difficulties associated with retraining new personnel or losing skilled co-workers due to postings, training or deployments. These challenges were further compounded by difficulties associated with the change of priorities or management style experienced by personnel when a new supervisor was posted in. With that said some respondents also cited positive aspects associated with frequent postings such as meeting new personnel with different perspectives. Of note, stability and continuity was also a frequently cited benefit of working in a mixed military-civilian work environment by military personnel. In particular, military personnel emphasised the value of having a stable and knowledgeable force of civilian personnel who were capable of maintaining continuity and corporate knowledge over long periods of time and being prepared to offer support to military operations from home. To summarise the nature of this theme, the comments of civilian personnel indicate that they perceive their work to be affected by the frequent postings and deployments of their military co-workers. That said, military personnel recognise the challenges that may be posed by frequent turnover of positions and value the continuity provided by their civilian counterparts to ameliorate these effects.

### **14.5.1.3 Fairness and Equality**

Fairness and equality was another theme that emerged across the three questions, particularly as a challenge of working in a mixed military-civilian environment and also as an important factor to consider for establishing positive military-civilian personnel work culture and relations. Responses suggest that military and civilian personnel have concerns regarding the fairness of their pay, opportunities for training and development, career advancement, work arrangements, benefits, time off, and other policy-related issues. It is not surprising that this theme was often noted, given that fairness and equality is paramount in any type of diversity, including that inherent to military-civilian personnel differences.

### **14.5.1.4 Respect**

Another theme that is likely to be, and indeed was, evinced across the three questions was that of respect (although it may have been labelled somewhat differently in different themes). In particular, the main factor identified for establishing and maintaining positive military-civilian personnel work relations was mutual respect, including respecting differences in culture, views and opinions of military and civilian personnel.

### **14.5.1.5 Understanding**

Understanding of the “other” group was also a predominant theme across the questions. This included understanding what kind of work military and civilian personnel perform, understanding roles, and understanding divergent work cultures. Overall, it was suggested that to ensure optimal partnership and collaboration among military and civilian personnel working together, there needs to be an understanding on both sides with respect to having a common vision of the mission, and an understanding of each other’s perspectives and experiences.

## **14.5.2 Conclusion**

Overall, the results of the open-ended questions in this cross-national survey highlighted important factors for enhancing collaboration in integrated military-civilian organisations. Furthermore, these results indicate that mixed military-civilian work environments present both unique challenges and advantages. For example, military and civilian personnel frequently cited challenges associated with fair treatment and a lack of understanding of each other’s roles, cultures, and perspectives, and reported experiencing challenges with the stability of their work environment related to the military rotational cycle. By the same token, the respondents also mentioned many ways in which military and civilian personnel complement each other, including by providing complementary knowledge/expertise, diverse perspectives, support, and continuity. Given the general cross-national patterns, these findings provide useful insights for enhancing military and civilian personnel integration and collaboration for many nations. However, some aspects are more prevalent in some nations and less important in others – individual nations should also take these differences into account when applying these findings. Despite some differences, military and civilian personnel revealed similar understandings of the benefits and challenges of working in mixed military-civilian contexts, and the main factors that require consideration to enhance the working relations between their two groups. As such, application of these findings is likely to improve the working environment for both groups and thus enhance military-civilian collaboration in general.

## **14.6 REFERENCES**

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## Chapter 15 – MILITARY EDUCATION: CLASH OF CULTURES?

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The focus of this report has been military-civilian relations in the defence workplace. Given the breadth of our terms of reference, there are occasionally dramatic differences among the defence establishments of the nations participating in the Research Task Group (RTG), and much of the focus has been on identifying the commonalities rather than the differences, among defence workplaces. But such workplaces or employment contexts can vary quite considerably in many significant ways.

There are of course differences in scale: In all countries there is variability in the size of defence-related organisations, with some being quite small and others quite large. There are also cross-national differences in the proportions of civilians and military members, such that some defence organisations may be heavily dominated by either military or civilian personnel, while other organisations may have a relatively more balanced distribution of military and civilian personnel. The mission of these defence organisations may also demand that workers, civilian, military or both, have certain particular characteristics: they may be younger or older than the average for defence organisations, or may be required to have particular training or educational qualifications, for example. There may be gender-specific differences (or exclusions) in the proportion of men and women in some defence organisations as compared to others.

The issues raised elsewhere in this report with respect to relations between civilians and military members are those that have emerged from a process that necessarily favours generality rather than specificity, as we hope to offer recommendations that can be useful to as many nations, organisations, and individuals as possible. Accordingly, we have extracted from the Military-Civilian Personnel Survey (MCPS) data those issues that seem to be of most concern across the defence establishments of the participating nations, which may not sufficiently address a more nuanced understanding of the potential differences that may exist in the importance or prominence of these issues from one workplace to another.

The nomothetic approach we have thus adopted has exposed several areas in which civilians and military members may see things differently in the workplace (see, e.g., Chapters 12 and 14, for a discussion of cross-national themes). The general issues we have identified through our survey research are discussed in concrete and practical terms, as is appropriate to an endeavour intended to provide concrete and practical advice to decision-makers. These workplace concerns, deserving of attention in their own right, may also be indicative of deeper cultural differences between civilians and military members that condition the thinking of both groups. This is not to suggest that the concerns expressed by civilians and military members are in any way superficial: they surely represent their lived experience, and therefore should be the primary target of policy adjustments, educational initiatives, or other attempts to bring these two groups closer together in the workplace. But underlying cultural differences between the civilian and military worlds may be contributing to the tensions that sometimes arise between civilians and military members in the workplace, and yet may fly largely “under the radar,” as such differences often go undiscussed or are simply assumed to be part of a reality that is immutable and therefore uninteresting. Understanding these underlying cultural differences more clearly may offer insights into potential civilian-military issues.

There is one kind of defence workplace in which cultural differences are particularly apparent, however, and sometimes emerge into awareness quite spectacularly: military educational institutions. At least in the

United States, within such institutions, there are arguably specific aspects of civilian academic culture that conflict directly and powerfully with specific aspects of military educational culture, and even with civilian culture more broadly. Civilian universities and colleges are widely seen as significantly more politically liberal than mainstream society, for example.

Education is an area in which the United States and many of the nations participating in this RTG differ substantially. The high personal cost of post-secondary (university-level) education in the United States contrasts with a very low cost (even no cost) in many European countries. Military commissioning programs and professional military education models also vary considerably from country to country in the degree to which civilian and military cultures are integrated. The issues raised in this Chapter may thus be relatively specific to the American model.

Over the last few decades, more civilians have been integrated into American military educational institutions than was the case previously, as a result of deliberate legislative attempts to reform military education. This process has sometimes placed the contours of military and civilian culture in stark relief. The literature now contains several articles, mainly (not always) written by civilian faculty members in military educational establishments, outlining the points of departure between these two educational world-views. (A few representative papers are listed at the end of this chapter.) A closer look at the arguments raised in these articles will serve two purposes: to help us understand more clearly the nature of civilian-military relations in military educational institutions, and also to identify aspects of military and civilian culture that may also be contributing more broadly to civilian-military issues in defence organisations that are outlined in this report.

### 15.1 UNDERGRADUATE OFFICER EDUCATION

The majority of officers in the United States armed services are commissioned through the Reserve Officers Training Corps (ROTC) and Officer Candidate School (OCS). ROTC officer cadets study at civilian colleges and universities, but take military training courses in addition to their normal coursework. ROTC students also attend brief periods of all-military training during summer vacations. Officer candidates commissioned through OCS are service members, enlisted or warrant officers, or civilians who already hold a college degree, who are commissioned after a 12-week (for the Army – other services have slightly different OCS durations) block of training. Officers who enter the armed services through ROTC or OCS experience undergraduate education largely as do other American (civilian) college students.

The service academies (the United States Military Academy at West Point for the Army, the United States Naval Academy at Annapolis for the Navy, and the United States Air Force Academy at Colorado Springs for the Air Force) provide about 20% of commissioned officers for the services. The cost of educating and commissioning these officers is very high: a common estimate is \$400,000 per officer, approximately four times the cost of an ROTC graduate, and eight times that of an OCS graduate [1] [2]. It is generally agreed that there are no significant differences in the performance of officers from different commissioning sources once they enter active duty, though service academy graduates have historically reached flag rank (reserved for general officers) at higher rates than officers from other sources, though this trend may be diminishing [1]. Given the high costs of maintaining the service academies, some have suggested that they be shut down. Others strongly support the service academies as bearers of a unique historical and cultural tradition essential to the maintenance of the institutional values and character of the services. One issue sometimes raised in discussions about the value of the service academies is the quality of the educational experiences of cadets.

Bruce Fleming, a civilian English professor at the United States Naval Academy at Annapolis, Maryland, wrote an article entitled “*The Few, the Proud, the Infantilized*” [2] offering a critical look at the educational experience

of naval midshipmen. Fleming did not directly address the underlying cultural differences between military and civilian culture, but argued that, as currently practiced, situating undergraduate education in the military milieu of the service academies produces poor results. Fleming argues that midshipmen (and by extension cadets at West Point and the Air Force Academy) often lose their excitement about and interest in academics at the academies, seeing education as one more thing being inflicted on them by an institution that often fails to meet the high expectations cadets had before arriving at the academies.

There are many differences in the educational experiences of cadets in the service academies and civilian college students: cadets generally take more credit hours than civilian college students, and have less choice in the courses they take, for example. Civilian college students not only have more freedom in choosing courses, they can also usually choose their professor, something that is generally not the case at the service academies. Cadets and midshipmen have massive demands made on their time by military training and athletic activities, and so may have less time in which to study, discuss, and reflect than would be the case in a civilian college. For some, this can result in a loss of interest in particular topics about which they once were excited, or in the process of education itself. There are, of course, many cadets who thrive educationally and intellectually at the service academies, but Fleming argues that, overall, a great deal of potential is wasted at the service academies because of the attitudes many cadets and midshipmen develop about education.

The faculty and governance of the service academies offer additional contrasts with civilian educational culture. The faculty of the United States Naval Academy has been composed of roughly half civilians and half serving officers since its founding in the mid-19th century. The West Point and the United States Air Force Academy faculties were all-military until 1993, when they were partially civilianized by the United States Congress [4]. Both now include about 25% – 30% civilian faculty members. Civilian faculty members, with rare exceptions, hold terminal degrees (normally doctorates in their field), whereas a substantial proportion of military faculty hold only master's degrees. Many military faculty members serve only one tour as instructors or professors, normally 3 to 4 years, while civilian faculty members normally are professional educators. The service academies have taken steps to ensure that there is a proportion of the military faculty who are sent to earn doctoral degrees, and who remain at the service academies for much longer periods than the rotating junior military faculty.

The authoritarian elements of military culture sometimes coexist uneasily with the more liberal tendencies of civilian academic culture in American service academies. Military control over academic governance is ensured by the appointment of military officers to most positions of authority within the institutions, sometimes officers with little or no experience in education. Military culture in the United States has a distinct anti-intellectual tendency, valuing action over reflection, concrete black-and-white answers over discussion and debate, and in some cases, prioritizing the physical sciences, mathematics, and technology over the humanities and social sciences.

Scholarship and research are also an area where strains between military and civilian educational culture can become evident within military educational institutions. In civilian colleges and universities, most faculty members are expected to contribute to the professional knowledge base of their fields regularly. These contributions generally reflect the personal interests and competence of the professors, and are thought to serve both the goal of advancing knowledge and of improving undergraduate education. The scholarly efforts of professors set an example of commitment to lifelong learning for students as they are integrated into the fabric of teaching.

At the service academies, scholarship on the civilian model may be seen as a kind of hobby, serving no one's interest but that of the person performing it. Research and scholarship can be viewed as valuable only insofar as

they involve cadets, or serve other instrumental purposes within the institution. In general, the importance of research and scholarship may be viewed as less important relative to undergraduate teaching than is the case at many of the top-flight civilian universities to which the service academies like to compare themselves.

### 15.2 PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION

Only a minority of military officers obtain their bachelor's degrees from the military academies, but virtually all who remain in the military for a career will eventually go back to school for a Master's degree. Some attend civilian graduate schools, but many attend service-specific military-run schools, such as the Air Force Institute of Technology, the Naval Postgraduate School, or the Army War College, Naval War College, or Air War College.

These military-run institutions are seen by some as characterized by a significant military-civilian educational gap. Joan Johnson-Freese, in a thorough review of the Professional Military Education (PME) system [3] describes many points of conflict between military and civilian educational culture in these institutions. One way to look at these points of conflict is to view them as relating fundamentally to three classes of concerns, classes which overlap to a degree with the concerns identified more broadly in civilian-military relationships in the defence workplace in this Report (see, e.g., Chapter 9 for a comparison of military and civilian personnel policies in the United States defence establishment). These concerns are competence, continuity, and compensation.

#### 15.2.1 Competence

Military and civilian educational cultures view professional competence in starkly different terms. Military culture is predicated on professional interchangeability: officers are expected to develop broad competence over a wide range of subjects and operational domains. The pinnacle of success in military culture is, after all, to become a “*general*” officer, not a “*specific*” one. The military officers who make up the chain of command at military educational institutions may have had little or no experience in developing and administering educational policy before assuming their posts, and military educators have often not been steeped in their disciplines as have been many civilian professors, nor had the opportunity to hone their classroom teaching skills with years of hands-on experience.

Just as in other defence workplaces, the demands for flexibility and adaptability placed on military members, which surely serve important goals in military culture and operations, may make it difficult for them to develop specialized knowledge in particular areas in the same way that civilians can. Given that the chain of command authority generally flows from military members in defence organisations, military leaders with less domain knowledge often find themselves supervising more experienced and knowledgeable civilians. On the other hand, civilians may be perceived by military officers as lacking the practical, operational experience essential to ensuring that their efforts serve the up-to-date demands of military operations. The training and work experience of military members and civilians equip the two groups with differing competencies within their respective professional jurisdictions.

#### 15.2.2 Continuity

The rotational cycle for military officers, limiting their time at any given job to perhaps a few years, contrasts with the much longer time-scale with which civilians usually view their role in an organisation. There are costs and benefits associated with both short- and long-term employment in an organisation, and these differences come into clear focus in educational institutions. The terms “education” and “training” are sometimes used interchangeably in military culture, but mean something quite different in the civilian world. Professional



educators do not generally see their role as one which can readily be picked up by someone with no previous experience, performed successfully for a few years, and then abandoned for the next posting. Developing effective teaching strategies, testing and refining them, and adapting them as knowledge changes and grows, is a long-term affair: this is what educators do. Military members on short-term assignments as faculty members may, for reasons of sheer practicality, adopt a more training-oriented model, which favours the use of standardized course material and objective assessment and grading. In defence workplaces, the short- and long-term horizons of military members and civilian employees, respectively, may lead to different priorities, different perceptions as to what policies and procedures are best for accomplishing the organisational mission, and perhaps even differing perceptions of what the organisational mission is. These tensions are especially evident in military educational institutions.

### **15.2.3 Compensation/Work Rules**

Military members and civilian employees normally have separate personnel systems, terms of employment, different pay structures and retirement schemes. These differences in the way people are compensated and treated can sometimes lead to perceptions of inequity as groups socially compare themselves to one another. In the civilian academic world, job security is a vital element of one's professional identity. The tenure system that exists in the civilian academic world is changing, but still affords a measure of job security to many.

In the American military educational system, civilian faculty members are employed under Title 10 of the United States Code of Federal Regulations, while most other civil servants are employed under the authority of Title 5. Title 10 gives the institution more local control over hiring and firing employees, and results in a contract model for civilian professors rather than the tenure system still common at the elite civilian academic institutions with which military educational institutions are often compared. Academic freedom, another touchstone in the professional identity of civilian educators, is related to tenure, as are security and freedom more generally. The lack of tenure for civilian faculty at military educational institutions is a clear difference between civilian and military educational institutions.

## **15.3 CONCLUSIONS**

NATO STO RTG HFM-226 has concerned itself with the "defence workplace," though of course there is no single defence workplace: there is a staggering variety of such workplaces. We have adopted this term and this approach in order to make our task manageable, and to take the first step in identifying issues that may arise as civilians and military members work together in such workplaces. We were able to look closely at issues in some specific contexts or settings [such as the operational multinational setting in Kosovo NATO Headquarters (Chapter 18), the strategic multinational setting at NATO Supreme Headquarters Allied Command Europe (Chapter 19), as well as a case study of the logistics branch in the United Kingdom's Ministry of Defence in which, contrary to most defence organizational contexts, civilians were the majority and military personnel were the minority (Chapter 16), and identified some issues particular to those environments. This brief examination of military educational institutions hints at still more issues that may arise in that unique environment. These case studies, though limited in scale and scope, nevertheless suggest that one important by-product of this Report may be its heuristic value in identifying potential areas of concern, and guiding future managers and researchers as they confront the realities of civilian-military interaction in the infinite variety in which such interactions take place.

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AND DO NOT NECESSARILY REFLECT THOSE OF THE US AIR FORCE  
ACADEMY, US AIR FORCE, OR US GOVERNMENT.*

## **Chapter 16 – TENSIONS BETWEEN MILITARY AND CIVILIAN STAFF IN THE UNITED KINGDOM DEFENCE EQUIPMENT AND SUPPORT ORGANISATION: A CASE STUDY**

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### **16.1 INTRODUCTION**

#### **16.1.1 The Organisational Context**

Defence Equipment and Support (DE&S) is an organisation within the Ministry OF Defence (MOD) in the United Kingdom (UK). Employing around 12,500 people and with a budget of £14 billion, DE&S plays a vital role in maintaining military operational capability by acquiring and supporting a wide range of world class equipment and services including: ships, submarines, aircrafts, vehicles and weapons. Approximately 10% of staff employed are military personnel who are posted into DE&S to provide specialist skills and knowledge. DE&S is headquartered at Abbeywood, Filton, Bristol, UK.

### **16.2 METHODOLOGY**

The data that support this case study were derived from a PhD thesis that was a social anthropological study, using 126 interviews and 6 years of observations to investigate factors that affected the organisational culture of DE&S (see also Refs. [4], [5] and [6]) between 2008 and 2014 [10]. The study was an “at home” ethnography. This is described by Alvesson as *“a study and a text in which the researcher-author describes a cultural setting to which s/he has a ‘natural access’ and in which s/he is an active participant, more or less on equal terms with other participants. The researcher works and/or lives in the setting and uses the experiences and knowledge of and access to empirical material for research purposes”*; see, for example, Refs. [1], p. 159, [7] and [15].

Informants were recruited by semi-randomised sampling of the organisation’s internal email directory. This enabled a wide spread of grades and different service’s personnel to be identified to take part in the research.

Demographic data that were collected to aid in the management of the project included: service, length of time in service and also in the research organisation, number of tours within the organisation and also gender. The age of informants was not requested.

The thesis was neither designed nor intended to investigate cultural differences between military and civilian personnel. Therefore not all of the themes that were identified by NATO STO RTG HFM-226 are covered by data that are derived from the thesis. The data that indicate cultural differences between military and civilian personnel are purely coincidental and they are now of interest to NATO STO RTG HFM-226. Those data are therefore used to support a sub-set of the research themes within the main NATO STO RTG HFM-226. They are a small sub-set of the data that are presented within the thesis. These data are anonymised from their presentation but do show whether the participant was military or civilian and their NATO equivalent grade. The data were derived from interviews and observations that were conducted at the headquarters of DE&S, located at Abbeywood, Bristol, UK.

## 16.3 DATA PRESENTATION

The data that are presented are accompanied by a short statement that contextualises the response. The existence and use of these data from a separate thesis study to triangulate on the key themes within the NATO STO RTG HFM-226 affords a higher degree of validity to the results of the thesis, thus by extension meeting Sanger's validity criteria whereby "*analyses of the relationship between events and people achieve greater validity if participants who have been observed in the research, recognise themselves, their motives, their actions and their rationale in the researcher's recordings and reconstructions*" (Ref. [9], p. 40).

### 16.3.1 Cultural Differences Between Military and Civilian Personnel

Military personnel identified very strongly with their service or *the front line*, but could also hold a nuanced view of who they identified with at any one time, and why. This is described by an OF 6 Officer<sup>1</sup> in the Royal Navy:

*That's difficult for civilian colleagues to understand as well, a friend and colleague was heavily criticised for being too loyal to the Royal Navy above DE&S which was always going to be the case. You're never going to get us away from that. In my mind, the two were not in conflict. If I'm here doing a job for DE&S which was of benefit to the Royal Navy there's no conflict in my mind of my loyalty lying with the Royal Navy.* (Ref. [10], p. 202)

Within this conflict of identity the civilian bureaucracy produced tension between the military and some civilian staff, for example as described by an OF 6 Army Officer:

*DHR [Director, Human Resources] came over to criticize the 1\* (OF 6) in the team. The reason? They were late responding to one of his corporate returns, and the reason for that was that they were dealing with an incident in Afghanistan on the front-line.* (Ref. [10], p. 208)


The cultural difference between what was called the ethos of delivering equipment to troops which was described by staff as "*front-line-first*" and the bureaucracy of the civil service organisational culture can be represented through the following model.

The vertical bars in Figure 16-1 show the project and delivery effort that was made to procure, deliver and support equipment to troops and the front-line, wherever that happened to be. This was an ethos that was espoused throughout the organisation, in project teams and by both military and civilian personnel.

The horizontal bar of Figure 16-1 represents the bureaucratic and policy effort that comprised the enabling and governing policy elements of DE&S, which were primarily political and financial constraints. These constraints were mainly attributes of MOD civilian culture and requirements, whereas the delivery and support of equipment was driven by military culture and needs.

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<sup>1</sup> Rank Structure is described in Appendix 16-2.



**Figure 16-1: Conceptual Model of the Ethos and Culture of DE&S.**

This model indicates that groups and individuals were able to create *the other* in DE&S, in terms of who did the work (the military and “project teams”) and who was a corporate overhead (civil servants).

### 16.3.2 Inter-Group Perceptions / Military Views of Civilian Personnel

The most visible difference between military personnel and civilian staff is that of the wearing of the uniform. This led to some explicit expressions of inter-group tension in DE&S Abbeywood, as described here by an OF 4 Military Officer:

*There’s other cultural issues here as well .... you know Fridays, this place looks like a holding zone for the Jeremy Kyle [Jerry Springer] show. I mean I’ve never seen anything like it .... Here, some of these lot look like they’re going on a fight down the pub, it just doesn’t give the ethos of a professional organisation dedicated to providing effect out to theatre .... (Ref. [10], p. 166)*

*As servicemen we were often told not to allow an “us and them” attitude to develop between [Armed] forces personnel and civil servants [CS] – the lax policy on CS clothing was no help to that aim, and threatens to devalue the image of the group to the detriment of those who were not only high calibre individuals but can also be bothered to try to look the part of serious government employees. (Ref. [10], p. 167)*

These manifestations of identity through different military and civilian uniforms enabled the legitimisation of social categorisation between military and civilian groups by DE&S. This embedded categorisation, therefore, formed an element of legitimised group distinctiveness which affected the organisational culture in DE&S Abbeywood during the research period.

Dress and uniform were also used as a proxy to express discontent about changes in terms and conditions in the British Army, with the blame for those changes being attributed to civil servants.

In relation to the context of forced identity changes, the researcher had observed that British Army personnel, who were permanently based in Abbeywood, changed their style of uniforms:

*They came back into the neighbourhood as a group, they had obviously been to a meeting, but they were all smart, wearing a uniform that the researcher had not seen before: smart trousers, a jumper, and stable belt. They were not in Multi Terrain Pattern or Combat 95 uniforms. They were all the same except for one male officer, who instead of shoes, was wearing open-toed sandals and no socks. (Ref. [10], p. 171)*

British Army personnel at DE&S Abbeywood normally wore a Combat 95 (C95) uniform. In the summer of 2013 the British Army personnel who were stationed at Abbeywood started to wear the new Future Army Dress. The imposition of this requirement caused tension between military and civilian personnel as the change in uniform appeared to be unpopular with military personnel.

An OF 4 Officer in the British Army indicated that “it [the old uniform] was more comfortable” and was a “cost saving” even though “you need to iron it more”; he then added that “it was because of a civil servant in the Have Your Say Survey, or asking a broad question, saying they didn’t like the military wearing uniforms in the office, because it was intimidating”. (Ref. [10], p. 172)

A civil servant who worked in a British Army Project Team supported the first response but from a different perspective, that of the civil service, and with the addition “they [the military] always blame the civil servants.”

The comments appear to show a construction of otherness in relation to dress between the British Army and civil servants who worked alongside each other. The British Army appear to view themselves positively and civil servants negatively and according to the OF 4 Officer, the civil service as a whole, rather than simply a specific person, did not like the use of a particular identity signifier, the uniform. That statement was then used by the informant as justification for why the whole Army dress had to change.

The discontent associated with the Future Army Dress Programme had been used as a proxy for the expression of discontent about changes to terms and conditions and redundancies throughout the Army structure. This was also used to “blame” civil servants for the change, because “the civil servants didn’t like the uniform”. (Ref. [10], p. 177)

This indicates that in DE&S, uniform and identity, as attributes of organisational culture, could produce boundaries between military and civilian personnel.

### **16.3.3 Inclusion**

#### **16.3.3.1 Induction and Integration of Military Personnel into DE&S**

Approximately 10% of DE&S Abbeywood staff were military personnel. The entry of military personnel into DE&S Abbeywood differed from the entry of civilians, in that military personnel expected, and normally received, a multi-day handover from the previous incumbent of the post that they were taking up, as described by an OF 4 Australian Military Officer and also and OF 4 Royal Airforce Officer:

*There was no internal [DE&S] induction programme once I’d turned up either. So what I had was a three or four day handover takeover from the previous guy in my role Team, so he ran me through a few presentations specific to the job I was going into. (Ref. [10], p. 297)*

*I mean I did and I didn't [receive an induction]. I had a three or four day handover; we spent a day at the IPT [Integrated Project Team], I did a manager's technical course, but I wouldn't...depends what you mean by induction, there was an arrival procedure [the JSAU (Joint Services Administration Unit) process]. (Ref. [10], p. 298)*

There was a persistent and consistent lack of induction which may have led to military personnel to feel as though they were not really part of DE&S and not welcome there. This may also have been a factor that allowed some elements of military culture to be carried over into the organisational culture of DE&S, as military personnel were not fully integrated into the organisational culture of DE&S Abbeywood.

An OF 3 British Army Officer describes what he expected to find when he joined DE&S Abbeywood:

*...I expected to find an organisation or a bunch of people that I worked with that did the bare minimum, work to rule, were led by the unions, were under the cosh of the unions and weren't really interested about output, weren't really interested about what was going on, it was very much a career to get the pension and off they would go at the end of it. That's what I expected to find from a very naive point of view. (Ref. [10], p. 299)*

He was in his first tour of duty in DE&S at Abbeywood and had negative expectations about the civilian staff and also the organisational culture of DE&S Abbeywood that had developed prior to him joining DE&S Abbeywood. His pre-conceptions of the behaviour and *culture* of civil servants had not been challenged immediately on his arrival in the organisation by any form of induction or integration into the organisation.

He was expecting to find a stereotype of both a civil servant and also of the civilian trade unions. In his response, we see the formation of "us" and "them," an example of social categorisation in action [12], [13].

He also espoused the implied positive and negative stereotype, where "we" (the military) were the only ones interested in "output," whereas "they" (civil servants) were only interested in their pension. In an element of self-reflection, he recognised that this was a "naïve view," with the implication at this early stage of his posting in DE&S that this reaction was incorrect and also embedded in a somewhat negative view of the civil service.

In response to the interviewer's question, "So what have you found?", he stated:

*I've found an organisation [DE&S Abbeywood], and the people I work with are incredibly professional, hardworking individuals who genuinely see the need of what they're doing and would go that extra mile where others perhaps wouldn't. I think they're really a genuinely good bunch of people that I work with here. It comes from our background in the Army. You see, you only ever hear bad stories and the only thing that ever comes out from somewhere like this was how badly they've performed and how they haven't provided equipment and so you automatically.... [see them in a negative way]. (Ref. [10], p. 300)<sup>2</sup>*

His expectations had not been met, but in a positive rather than a negative sense. He described two factors that explicitly led to the development of his view of DE&S Abbeywood and the civil servants there, the organisation, and also the people, referring to both the socio-technical and the socio-cultural elements of DE&S Abbeywood.

His response shows the reality that he had found, and shows the locus of the creation of "the other," which was developed as a result of him being from a different culture, that of the British Field Army. It appears that he had

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<sup>2</sup> An OF 3 British Army Officer.

been affected by something that had not been challenged immediately on his entry to DE&S Abbeywood, because he had not received a formal induction into DE&S, or to his team:

*You're a product of your experience aren't you? So you automatically base your thought processes and what you're going to find, on your experience. (Ref. [10], p. 300)*

The Major acknowledges that his world view had been shaped by his experience in the British Army, and by what he had been told and heard. Therefore his response appears to indicate that he had been affected by pre-socialisation through being influenced by his peers before he came to DE&S Abbeywood, rather than him receiving any formal, organisationally legitimised pre-socialisation such as the Introduction to Acquisition course.<sup>3</sup> He admitted that his experience was no different from that of anyone else within his previous group, his regiment in the British Army.

It could take many months to change these expectations. In extremis, military personnel could leave DE&S having not been formally integrated into the culture of Abbeywood, as shown by Yardley and Neal [14] in their study of military leadership in Defence acquisition.

The un-met expectations and subsequent cultural differences between military and civilian personnel were further shown by an OF 3 grade member of the Royal Air Force:

*My expectations of DE&S? I didn't really know because I have no experience in DE&S in the 12 years I've been in the [Royal] Air Force. I've never worked in this environment [DE&S Abbeywood]. My expectations were I had a lot to learn, which was true, but I also expected to be trained, which had not happened. You feel completely unwanted and it's not just the lack of training, induction. (Ref. [10], p. 301)*

This person expected their new organisation to be like the Royal Air Force (RAF) and to train new members and induct them into the new organisation, but it was not and their initial positive expectation was not met.

A consequence of the lack of induction, and the need to book a desk to work at rather than having one's own desk, combined with un-met expectations, may have been that military personnel were unlikely to be fully integrated emotionally or culturally into their new group, even though they might try to self-integrate into the organisational and social culture of DE&S Abbeywood. This could lead to new group members feeling excluded from groups and *not fitting in*, and as a result, actively dis-identifying with the group of which they were a new member. This apparent lack of cultural integration appeared to affect both civil servants and military personnel and was not helped by the effects of military post-rotation, as shown here by an OF 3 grade member of the Royal Air Force:

*We're made to feel like a nuisance because we move around every 18 months to 24, which I understand is difficult for somebody who's working on a team and they've been here for five years and they understand it and when I get replaced they then have to bring my replacement up to speed, but the reason they come in is that they have the up to date knowledge of operations and how this aircraft is going to be used. So there's a reason for it, but I feel that's kind of glossed over and actually we're just a nuisance. Unless you're going to stay for three or four years. (Ref. [10], p. 302)*

The cultural differences between military and civilian personnel are also shown here, through the experience of a civil servant who observed what appeared to be culturally appropriate behaviour in a military environment, but which was culturally inappropriate behaviour in the civilian environment of DE&S Abbeywood:

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<sup>3</sup> <http://www.da.MOD.uk/Courses/Course-Details/Course/323>.



*Talking about tribalism, something yesterday that I have never heard of before, never seen before and it must be totally an Army thing. The Colonel was walking through the buildings and as he was walking through the buildings, all the soldiers were standing up and saluting him. And I have never seen that before. Never. I was shocked because I couldn't believe that just as he was walking through they were standing and saluting him, sitting down, standing and saluting. Where does that come from? Where does that come from on an MOD site? That does not happen. You know? And it's because he's got his flashes on and that's what I said to you earlier on. That's his behaviour and that's his expectation. (Ref. [10], p. 361)*

### 16.3.3.2 Military-Specific Integration

Even though military personnel expected and received an induction into their new Role Team, they often received no formal induction into Abbeywood. They did, however, experience an arrivals process specific to military personnel. On arrival at Abbeywood, military personnel were directed to go to the Joint Services Administration Unit (JSAU) Support to be booked into the site as described by an OF 4 Royal Air Force Officer:

*...Abbeywood Admin doc produced by the JSAU [Joint Services Administration Unit], a formal "welcome" & "overarching" interview with superior Reporting Officer, Site orientation. (Ref. [10], p. 303)*

The JSAU arrivals process was a geographically specific practice for military personnel who were posted to DE&S, and into Abbeywood. It was a purely *life support* function for military personnel. Military personnel received information about military-specific training and the medical centre. These were facilities that were available to military personnel only, showing a further degree of differentiation that led to tension between military and civilian staff in relation to perks and services that were available to military personnel, but not civilian staff.

The JSAU was not an induction into the organisational or social culture of DE&S Abbeywood because it only enabled military personnel to understand how they could access their military privileges and retain elements of their military culture when in the civilian environment of Abbeywood.

The JSAU process provided primarily socio-cultural continuity for military personnel in Abbeywood, allowing them to access and maintain their service ethos while at Abbeywood. It did not, however, fully integrate them into the socio-cultural life of Abbeywood.

The existence of the JSAU and this promotion of difference between the military and civilian staff was formalised by DE&S Abbeywood and the MOD, and became a contributing factor that perpetuated the persistence of military cultural traits in DE&S Abbeywood. The legitimised and required experience of the JSAU arrivals process reinforced the military identity and culture as opposed to developing or reinforcing a pan-DE&S Abbeywood identity or culture. This indicates that multiple organisational cultures existed in DE&S Abbeywood, the primary ones being the civilian and military cultures.

### 16.3.3.3 Team-Building Tension Between Military Personnel and Civilian Staff

It also appeared that if not well organised, team-building could be divisive, rather than inclusive, as described by a civil servant:

*I think most recently one of the dangers was it can actually highlight the differences and exacerbate them more than actually bring them together. Throughout my career the worst, by far, team-building ones I've been on were the ones which were not inclusive which can actually exclude people. So the*

*classic example of that would be doing something which was very physical, so all the nice young fit people and the soldiers love it and get stuck in and people with, like myself, with dodgy old backs and everything sitting at the side feeling like a tool basically. That just had the completely opposite effect of what you intended of trying to bring people together, you're just making some people feel left out. And I have to say my long experience had told me never allow the military to organise a team-building event because it'll always be some outward bound type activity which was by definition not inclusive to a civilian workforce because there would always be people who can't join in to that. So you have to be really careful what you do and how you design these things. I think there's potentially a lot of damage done by poorly designed team-building events where they haven't thought through what they want from it, they haven't thought through the design of it and it's poorly implemented.*  
(Ref. [10], p. 340)<sup>4</sup>

Boundaries became evident between those who could, those who could not, those that would not, and those who for whatever reason would only grudgingly take part in those activities. Excluded groups might, for example, be characterised by age, military or civilian service, physical ability, and willingness or ability to take part. In those instances, formal team-building activities appeared to be disintegrative rather than integrative.

Military team-building appeared to be perceived as being primarily based around physical activity, while civil servants appeared to prefer more inclusive and intellectual pursuits. This generated teams that fractured, leading to out-group members not feeling that they were part of the larger team but were in some way excluded. These were also characterised by a military/civilian boundary.

It appears that formal team-building had greater risks and fewer benefits for DE&S in terms of developing team cohesion and collaboration. This was because competition, which appeared to be an integral element of formal team-building in DE&S, actually served to create in-groups and out-groups [11], rather than build a unified team. This illustrates a difference between military and civilian cultures of sport, competition and physicality versus collaboration and more intellectual pursuits. These activities could also differentiate groups based on age or gender, in addition to military and civilian status.

#### 16.3.3.4 Cultural Differences – Tribes and Tribalism

Members of DE&S Abbeywood used the metaphor of the tribe and tribalism to describe their groups and how they behaved. There were also legitimised military tribal networks that originally had the remit to maintain a single service ethos in a Joint Service Environment. The genesis of the tribal networks scheme belonged to the armed services; the scheme was originally created in order to “*maintain a single service ethos in a joint service environment.*” The most senior military person in each service in a particular Operating Centre was called the Tribal Chief.

The use of the word tribal was thought by group members and also senior members of these groups to reinforce the cultural differences between military and civilian personnel. The existence of this formalised *tribal network* indicates how *tribal behaviour* of the military was reinforced in this part of DE&S and also in a precursor organisation, the Defence Communications Services Agency, the DCSA.

The first tribal networks were those of the military. The civil service tribal network was created as a reaction to those military tribal networks in order to provide an avenue for civil servants to develop a more corporate identity. The civil service “tribal” scheme was, from an organisational point of view, intended to develop the mentee, implicitly socio-culturally, to enhance their performance as a civil servant in their current position,

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<sup>4</sup> An OF 5 Civil Servant.

and also to prepare them for different, often more senior roles. The informant quote below is the civil service senior mentor:

*The tribe, there's that sense of being a group that's exclusive to others. The Brigadier's [who is the Senior Army Mentor/Tribal Chief] sense was that the Army and the RAF and the Navy have got a sense of identity, but the Civil Service had less so. (Ref. [10], p. 272)*

The existence of the military tribal schemes indicated that there were hard and recognisable identities and cultures for each of the military services, but that the civil service did not have that same sense of identity and distinctiveness, primarily of the military and between the military and the civil servants. This in itself created tensions between military and civilian group members. These military tribes still exist in some DE&S Abbeywood Operating Centres in 2015, with exactly the same aim, of supporting military personnel in the non-military, civilian environment of DE&S.

### 16.3.4 Language Differences Between Military and Civilian Staff

Linguistic difference as jargon and the linguistic divide between military and civilian personnel as an element of their respective cultures was recognised within D&S Abbeywood. Figure 16-2 below shows some of the linguistic differences between military and civilian lexicons [10]. These are indicative and act as examples of the major linguistic differences that were identified within DE&S Abbeywood. The word-cloud that is shown on the left hand side of the page as viewed is derived from the civilian Acquisition Operating Guidance [8]. The word-cloud that is shown on the right hand side of the page is derived from military manuals. There appears to be no overlap in the words that are seen. This lack of overlap indicates the potential for cultural difference between military and civilian personnel to be made worse by each group not understanding the language that the other group uses.



Figure 16-2: An Example of Civilian Military and Linguistic Difference.

Even within the language of *the military* there were dialects. The language of the British Army differed from that of the Royal Navy [2], [3], which differed again from the language of the Royal Air Force. Within these dialects, it was observed that there could exist ambivalence towards the language of other military groups; for example, a civil servant, ex-British Army, was comfortable with using a Royal Navy term “*Runs ashore*” in conjunction with the British Army equivalent, “*pie and pint night*.” While on an Army base the researcher overheard someone asking: “*where were the heads?*” and the response from a uniformed member of the Army: “*we don’t call them that round there, that’s the Navy, we call them the bogs*.” That response was taken by the researcher as an indication that potential offence or embarrassment had been caused by the person asking for a facility by using the name that a different and competing group used for that facility.

## **16.4 CONCLUSION**

The data presented here support and relate to themes of inclusion, commitment and how military view civilians and differences between military and civilian personnel and their respective cultures. They provide insights into why some of the tensions that were reported in the main Survey occurred. They provide the “why it happened” to the “what happened.” The value of the data presented in this chapter is that similar challenges to those identified in the main NATO Survey were found by providing data from a separate study. The data presented here were indicative in relation to the main themes of this study because:

- a) They were collected serendipitously to the main thesis themes, but can be used to inform the UK study themes; and
- b) Limitations of space mean that in order to cover the main themes in the NATO Survey, not all data that were applicable to the themes were presented.

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**Appendix 16-1: TABLE OF PARTICIPANTS BY GRADE,  
SERVICE, OPERATING CENTRE AND LOCATION**

**Table 16A1-1: Table of Participants B=by Grade, Service, Operating Centre and Location.**

Operating Centre	No Of Military Selected	Grade	No of Civilians Selected	Grade	Location	Total
A	1	Major General	14	D/E x 2, C1/C2 x 10, B1/B2 x 2	Abw x 14, Fo x 1	15
B	4	Brigadier x 1, Commodore x 1, Squadron Leader x 2	22	D/E x 8, C1/C2 x 10 B1/B2 x 4	Abw x 3, Co x 18, Cop x 2, Ens x 3	26
C	4	Major x 2, Colonel x 1, Warrant Officer x 1	19	C1/C2 x 11, D/E x 3, B1/B2 x 3, Contractor x 2	Abw x 21, Ens x 2	23
D	2	Major x 2	16	C1/C2 x 8, B1/B2 x 2, D/E x 6	Abw x 17, Gos x 1	18
E	8	Commodore x 1, Captain x 1, WO x 2, Cdr x 2, Lt Cdr x 2,	10	C1/C2 x 4, B1/B2 x 2, D/E x 4	Abw x 18	18
F	2	Captain x 1, Commander x 1	0	0	Abw x 2	2
G	0	N/A	14	C1/C2 x 12, Grade B1/B2 x 2	Abw x 14	14
H	5	Gp Captain x 1, Wing Commander x 1, Squadron Leader x 3	5	C1/C2 x 3, Grade B1/B2 x 1, D/E x 1	Abw x 10	10

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## Appendix 16-2: RANK EQUIVALENCE TABLE

**Table 16A2-1: Rank Equivalence Table.**

Civil Service Pay Band	Army	Navy	Royal Airforce
Senior Civil Service (SCS) Pay band (PB)4	General	Admiral	Air Chief Marshal
SCS PB3	Lieutenant General	Vice Admiral	Air Marshal
SCS PB2	Major General	Rear Admiral	Air Vice Marshal
SCS PB1	Brigadier	Commodore	Air Commodore
B1	Colonel	Captain	Group Captain
B2	Lieutenant Colonel	Commander	Wing Commander
C1	Major	Lieutenant Commander	Squadron Leader
C2	Captain	Lieutenant	Flight Lieutenant
D	2 <sup>nd</sup> Lieutenant	Sub- Lieutenant	Flying Officer
E1	Warrant Officer (WO) 1	WO1	WO1
E2	WO2	WO2	Flight Sergeant

[10] Copyright Cranfield University.





## **Chapter 17 – MILITARY-CIVILIAN PERSONNEL SURVEY (MCPS): A GENDER-BASED ANALYSIS<sup>1</sup>**

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### **17.1 INTRODUCTION**

One of the major trends identified in this report concerns the gender demographics of defence organisations. Within all RTG HFM-226 defence organisations, women constitute a lower percentage of the military workforce than they represent within the civilian workforce [7]. Accordingly, within RTG HFM-226 nations, the highest percentage of women in the military workforce, at about 15% in the United States, is substantially lower than the percentage of women found in the civilian workforce, which, in several cases, exceeds 40%, and reaches a majority, over 60%, in Estonia [7]. Within the civilian component of defence organisations, the ratio of males to females is considerably more balanced than it is within the military component, although in most cases, women constitute a minority of civilian personnel as well.

Although much research exists on gender differences within non-defence civilian organisations, and within the military context, gender-based research within defence organisations is scarce, despite the demographic differences. Given that research findings from non-defence or specifically military organisational contexts do not necessarily generalize to defence organisations in which a mixed military-civilian employee relationship is prevalent, more research in this area is warranted. The Military-Civilian Personnel Survey (MCPS) that was conducted for RTG HFM-226 provides an ideal opportunity, therefore, to conduct a gender-based analysis of military-civilian personnel work culture and relations, and in particular, from a cross-national perspective.

Previous research on gender differences in defence organisations, although limited in quantity and generally specific to the North American context, suggests that the workplace experiences of female civilian and military personnel may differ, in some cases, from those of their male counterparts, and that gender may reveal hidden complexities in the military-civilian relationship (see Ref. [5] for a review). In terms of theory, some analysts have examined military culture from the perspective of how masculinity is constructed in militaries. In the context of the United States military, for instance, Dunivin [4] differentiates between a traditional combat masculine-warrior model of military culture, in which the profession of war, defence, and combat is viewed as “men’s work” and is defined by a “cult of masculinity,” and an evolving model of military culture, in which egalitarianism, inclusiveness, and social diversity, in terms of gender and sexual orientation, is promoted. According to Dunivin [4], some strides have been made towards the evolving model of military culture, in that

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<sup>1</sup> The survey data that provided the basis for this analysis were collected by Irina Goldenberg (Canada); Manon Andres and Joseph Soeters (Netherlands); Hubert Annen (Switzerland); Kenan Dautovic (Bosnia and Herzegovina); Andrea Heiss and René Klein (Germany); Sylvia James-Yates (United Kingdom); Tomas Jermalavičius (Estonia); Eva Johansson and Johan Österberg (Sweden); George Mastroianni (United States); Sarah Overdale (New Zealand); and Delphine Resteigne (Belgium). We would like to acknowledge the contributions of these individuals in terms of the survey administration that they conducted in their respective countries.

the contemporary American military has become more inclusive of women and other social minorities. However, in spite of such changes, Dunivin [4] suggests that the culture of the United States military has remained stuck in the traditional model (see also Ref. [3] for a similar perspective on the Canadian military). Accordingly, within the traditional model of military culture, military women are constructed as outsiders, and this may also apply to civilian women [5].

Hinojosa [13] has made similar theoretical claims, regarding “hegemonic masculinities,” in the American military context. Drawing on in-depth interviews with 43 men planning to enter active duty military service, Hinojosa [13] explored how such men construct a hegemonic masculinity, by symbolically creating masculine hierarchies in which they situate themselves at the top. Through their discourse, the men positioned themselves as more morally oriented, self-disciplined, physically able, emotionally controlled, martially skilled, or intelligent than members of other military branches, different occupational specialties and different ranks, both men and women, and also – importantly – as superior, in these respects, to both men and women civilians.

Other empirical work has suggested the possibility that gender may be at play in the military-civilian relationship. Previous gender analyses of the MCPS for the Canadian sample of respondents, for instance, indicated that female civilian personnel reported lower levels of perceived organisational fairness in Canada’s Department of National Defence (DND) compared to both female and male military personnel [5]. However, female civilian employees also reported higher levels of retention intentions than did military males [5]. In the United States, a survey of military and civilian personnel at a military medical centre found that males generally held a more positive perception of the cultural climate than did females, in terms of perceiving less sexual harassment and discrimination against women and racial minorities, as well as a more positive overall equal opportunity climate [1]. Similarly, a survey of health care personnel in the United States Department of Defense (DoD) found that males, overall, had significantly more positive perceptions of organisational and gender climate than did females [18]. In addition, female military officers in that survey reported more positive perceptions of gender climate compared to female civilian employees [18]. Such findings indicate that perceptions of climate may depend on gender, military-civilian status, or potentially, their combination.

More recent research has also echoed such findings. For instance, a phenomenological study of gender inequality in the United States DoD found that female civilian employees who have experienced gender inequality in career advancement opportunities described their organisation as male-dominated, with more males than females in managerial roles [19]. Half of the female civilian participants in this qualitative study discussed feeling at the bottom of the organisation’s hierarchy, with one participant stating that often males are primed for career advancement whereas females are not [19]. Some of the participants discussed a shift towards a more diverse workplace; however, participants described many of the high-level roles as still being held by males, with a limited number of women in managerial roles [19]. Such research findings are consistent with both Dunivin’s [4] perspective on American military culture, which views such culture as stuck largely in a traditional mode, and Hinojosa’s [13] perspective on hegemonic masculinity in the American military context. Research also suggests that policies such as hiring preferences for veterans decrease women’s opportunities to attain executive, administrative, and managerial roles within the federal civil service, because most veterans are men [16] (see also Ref. [17]). For instance, in the United States, the majority of women who apply for management positions within the federal civil service are non-veterans, and although they may have similar or even more impressive qualifications than their veteran counterparts, they would not be hired under such policies [16].

In contrast to research findings showing gender differences within defence organisations, some research has found gender similarities. For instance, the analysis of Canadian respondents to the MCPS, mentioned earlier, found mainly gender similarities, with only few gender differences, as noted above [5]. Gaze and Oetjen [8] examined receptivity to diversity in civilian and military personnel at an overseas United States Navy hospital and found no significant differences between female and male respondents. Unfortunately, however, civilian and

military personnel were not examined separately, and thus it is unclear whether there were gender differences in receptivity to diversity within either the civilian or military populations. Indeed, the issue of not examining potential gender differences in military and civilian groups within defence organisations is a common limitation of research to date [5].

Other research has examined gender differences in health and well-being within defence organisations. In some research, males seemed to fare worse, in terms of health and well-being, than females. For instance, Civitello [2] found that males were more likely to report burnout and irritability compared to females in a United States Air Force medical facility. However, again, civilian and military personnel were not examined separately. In other research, however, females seemed to fare worse than their male counterparts. Hendrix, Spenser, and Gibson [12], for instance, found that female civilian DoD employees reported more work stress, lower well-being, and higher levels of absenteeism compared to male civilian employees. Additionally, boredom, quantitative workload, and role conflict affected emotional exhaustion in both female and male civilian employees [12].

Still other research, with non-defence female civilian personnel who interact with the military for specific aspects of their work (for instance, on humanitarian or diplomatic missions), indicates that such women often struggle to be viewed as credible and/or to have their voices heard by military personnel [6]. Such female civilian employees have also reported a perception that military males prefer to work with other males over females [6]. However, in comparison to civilian women who work in defence organisations, such civilian women (for instance, who work for non-governmental humanitarian organisations, or other non-defence civilian government organisations), may have relatively little contact with military personnel in the normal course of their duties, for example, outside of specific humanitarian or diplomatic missions.

Given the limitations of previous research, more study is required to investigate possible gender differences among military and civilian personnel within defence organisations. The MCPS provides such an opportunity to conduct a gender-based analysis of defence organisations from a cross-national perspective. Thus, this chapter summarizes the results of a gender-based analysis of military-civilian personnel work culture and relations from a cross-national perspective.

## **17.2 METHOD**

### **17.2.1 Data Collection and Procedure**

As Goldenberg [9] details in Chapter 11 of this report, survey data collection and sampling procedures varied, to some extent, across countries. A review had confirmed that no single approach to data collection and sampling would suit each of the 11 countries taking part in the survey, and thus the methodology was specifically tailored for each individual nation. However, the main themes that were investigated in the survey remained the same across the nations [11]. A more detailed description of the survey methodology and of the measures that were administered is provided by Goldenberg [9], in Chapter 11 of this report.

### **17.2.2 Participants**

Participants included 3469 military personnel and 4721 civilian employees working in departments or ministries of defence<sup>2</sup> across the 11 countries (see Table 17-1 for the gender sample size for each country).<sup>3</sup> The countries

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<sup>2</sup> The only exception to this was the United States. Data were collected at the United States Air Force Academy.

<sup>3</sup> The MCPS was administered to 8664 individuals (3670 military participants and 4994 civilian participants). However, 474 participants did not specify their gender. Thus, the overall sample size for this gender-based analysis was 8190 (see Table 17-1).

included in the data collection were Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Canada, Estonia, Germany, Netherlands, New Zealand, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Thus, the survey included most of the RTG HFM-226 nations (except for Turkey), as well as two additional countries (Bosnia and Herzegovina and New Zealand).

**Table 17-1: Gender Sample Sizes for Military and Civilian Groups Across the 11 Nations.**

Nation	Military			Civilian			Total
	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total	
<b>Belgium</b>	226 (77.7%)	65 (22.3%)	291	140 (54.5%)	117 (45.5%)	257	<b>548</b>
<b>Bosnia and Herzegovina</b>	9 (75.0%)	3 (25.0%)	12	12 (41.4%)	17 (58.6%)	29	<b>41</b>
<b>Canada</b>	540 (82.1%)	118 (17.9%)	658	651 (57.4%)	483 (42.6%)	1134	<b>1792</b>
<b>Estonia</b>	69 (86.3%)	11 (13.8%)	80	50 (38.8%)	79 (61.2%)	129	<b>209</b>
<b>Germany</b>	320 (97.0%)	10 (3.0%)	330	501 (59.6%)	339 (40.4%)	840	<b>1170</b>
<b>Netherlands</b>	330 (90.9%)	33 (9.1%)	363	212 (74.1%)	74 (25.9%)	286	<b>649</b>
<b>New Zealand</b>	310 (81.6%)	70 (18.4%)	380	161 (61.2%)	102 (38.8%)	263	<b>643</b>
<b>Sweden</b>	202 (96.7%)	7 (3.3%)	209	40 (47.6%)	44 (52.4%)	84	<b>293</b>
<b>Switzerland</b>	713 (98.5%)	11 (1.5%)	724	565 (79.7%)	144 (20.3%)	709	<b>1443</b>
<b>United Kingdom</b>	336 (87.5%)	48 (12.5%)	384	572 (59.8%)	384 (40.2%)	956	<b>1340</b>
<b>United States</b>	30 (78.9%)	8 (21.1%)	38	23 (67.6%)	11 (32.4%)	34	<b>72</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>3085 (37.6%)</b>	<b>384 (4.7%)</b>	<b>3469</b>	<b>2927 (35.7%)</b>	<b>1794 (21.9%)</b>	<b>4721</b>	<b>8190</b>

### 17.3 RESULTS

Similar to the approach taken elsewhere in this report, we examined descriptive statistics for each measure in the MCPS to identify possible gender differences between military and civilian personnel cross-nationally. Thus, we report here the findings for the following 16 measures: Relationship Quality, Quality of Communication, Workplace Respect, Inclusion, Overall Organisational Fairness, Perceived Organisational Support, Organisational Affective Commitment, Job Satisfaction, Retention Intentions, Perception of the Importance of Civilians, Senior Leadership Messages Supporting Military-Civilian Personnel Collaboration, Supervision and Leadership of Civilians by Military Supervisors, Supervision and Leadership of Military Personnel by Civilian Supervisors,

Civilian Career Development, Civilian Career Training Opportunities, and the Effects of the Military Rotational Cycle on Civilian Productivity.<sup>4</sup> Except where noted, the response scale for the measures was the following: 1 = *strongly disagree*, 2 = *moderately disagree*, 3 = *slightly disagree*, 4 = *slightly agree*, 5 = *moderately agree*, and 6 = *strongly agree*.<sup>5</sup>

### 17.3.1 Relationship Quality

Overall, across nations, military and civilian personnel of both genders agreed, *slightly* to *moderately*, that the quality of their working relationships was positive. This pattern is consistent with Goldenberg et al. [10], who found that both military and civilian workforces reported good working relationships. However, some variations were found when the results for the military and civilian workforces were broken down further by gender. Overall, male military members reported the highest levels of relationship quality compared to female military members as well as male and female civilian employees (see Table 17-2). In addition, male civilian employees reported slightly lower levels of relationship quality than female military personnel overall, as can be seen most strongly, for instance, in Switzerland. Overall, male civilian employees also reported lower levels of relationship quality compared to female civilians. Additionally, female civilian employees reported lower levels of relationship quality, overall, compared to female military personnel, particularly in the United States. In sum, male and female military members reported higher levels of relationship quality compared to male and female civilian employees across many of the nations, with male military members reporting the highest levels overall.

**Table 17-2: Military-Civilian Personnel Relationship Quality by Gender Across Nations.**

Nation	Military		Civilian	
	Male	Female	Male	Female
	M (SD)	M (SD)	M (SD)	M (SD)
<b>Belgium</b>	4.82 (.84)	4.58 (1.07)	4.60 (.93)	4.66 (.96)
<b>Bosnia and Herzegovina</b>	5.19 (.55)	4.93 (1.22)	5.19 (.56)	4.98 (.74)
<b>Canada</b>	4.69 (1.03)	4.69 (1.06)	4.72 (1.13)	4.68 (1.10)
<b>Estonia</b>	4.67 (.81)	4.66 (.77)	4.50 (.57)	4.47 (.62)
<b>Germany</b>	4.53 (.98)	4.08 (1.02)	4.29 (1.11)	4.39 (1.03)
<b>Netherlands</b>	5.13 (.67)	5.00 (.92)	4.82 (.90)	5.00 (.66)
<b>New Zealand</b>	4.84 (1.07)	4.66 (1.00)	4.92 (1.00)	4.79 (1.08)
<b>Sweden</b>	5.20 (.87)	4.99 (.63)	4.97 (.93)	4.71 (1.04)
<b>Switzerland</b>	4.49 (.99)	4.96 (.81)	4.39 (1.07)	4.67 (.91)
<b>United Kingdom</b>	4.70 (1.12)	4.56 (1.06)	4.43 (1.31)	4.46 (1.20)
<b>United States</b>	5.58 (.50)	5.24 (.61)	5.54 (.59)	4.52 (1.02)
<b>Overall</b>	<b>4.74 (.99)</b>	<b>4.69 (1.02)</b>	<b>4.55 (1.13)</b>	<b>4.59 (1.06)</b>

<sup>4</sup> In a few cases, a particular measure was not included in the survey for a particular country. For instance, Switzerland did not collect data on Overall Organisational Fairness; the United Kingdom did not collect data on Perceived Organisational Support; and Switzerland and Germany did not collect data on Senior Leadership Messages Supporting Military-Civilian Personnel Collaboration.

<sup>5</sup> Consistent with the approach taken elsewhere in this report (see Chapters 12, 13, and 14), the results presented in this chapter are descriptive in nature. Thus, any references to differences that are noted or implied in this chapter would require appropriate inferential testing in order to determine their statistical significance.

**17.3.2 Quality of Communication**

With respect to quality of communication, overall, all four groups of personnel across all nations agreed, *slightly to moderately*, to having positive military-civilian communication. This pattern is consistent with Goldenberg et al. [10], who found that both civilian and military workforces reported good quality communication with the other group, with military workforces reporting slightly higher levels, in most nations, compared to civilian workforces. In terms of gender, overall, male military members reported higher communication quality compared to female military members as well as male and female civilian employees (see Table 17-3). Overall, male military members reported the highest levels, whereas female civilian employees reported the lowest levels. This pattern was especially strong in the United Kingdom. Overall, male civilian employees reported slightly lower communication quality than female military personnel; this pattern occurred particularly in Sweden and Switzerland. In addition, male civilian employees reported slightly higher communication quality, overall, compared to female civilians, and this was especially the case in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Sweden, and the United States. Overall, female civilian employees reported lower levels of communication quality compared to female military personnel. This pattern was strongest in Estonia, New Zealand, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United States. In sum, male and female military members reported higher levels of communication quality compared to male and female civilian employees across most of the nations, with male military members reporting the highest levels in some nations and overall.

**Table 17-3: Military-Civilian Personnel Quality of Communication by Gender Across Nations.**

Nation	Military		Civilian	
	Male	Female	Male	Female
	M (SD)	M (SD)	M (SD)	M (SD)
<b>Belgium</b>	4.46 (.84)	4.26 (.98)	4.05 (.95)	4.00 (1.02)
<b>Bosnia and Herzegovina</b>	4.69 (.62)	4.67 (1.26)	4.94 (.86)	4.60 (.78)
<b>Canada</b>	4.26 (1.06)	4.30 (1.07)	4.19 (1.15)	4.03 (1.15)
<b>Estonia</b>	4.10 (1.00)	4.20 (.78)	4.09 (.92)	3.89 (.79)
<b>Germany</b>	4.17 (.88)	3.83 (.65)	3.93 (1.02)	3.95 (1.02)
<b>Netherlands</b>	4.43 (.84)	4.18 (.98)	4.26 (.93)	4.34 (.82)
<b>New Zealand</b>	4.54 (.95)	4.34 (.96)	4.25 (1.03)	4.02 (.93)
<b>Sweden</b>	4.76 (.95)	5.26 (.67)	4.65 (1.21)	4.30 (1.17)
<b>Switzerland</b>	4.18 (.91)	4.52 (.93)	4.05 (.95)	4.16 (.83)
<b>United Kingdom</b>	4.47 (1.01)	4.16 (.78)	4.06 (1.12)	3.94 (1.06)
<b>United States</b>	5.08 (.69)	4.76 (.46)	5.05 (.82)	3.93 (.86)
<b>Overall</b>	<b>4.35 (.96)</b>	<b>4.29 (.97)</b>	<b>4.11 (1.06)</b>	<b>4.02 (1.03)</b>

Although quality of communication was generally rated positively by survey respondents, the item “*Sometimes I feel like military and civilian employees are speaking different languages*” tended to receive low ratings<sup>6</sup>.

<sup>6</sup> We examined this individual item based on prior research with humanitarian civilian organisations, in which female civilians reported difficulty having their voices heard by military personnel [6].

Interestingly, female civilian employees endorsed this item the most frequently, followed by female military personnel, then male civilian employees, and finally male military members. Within the range of *slightly agree* to *strongly agree*, 64.9% of female civilian employees, 61% of female military members, 60% of male civilian employees, and 56.2% of male military members agreed with the item.

### 17.3.3 Workplace Respect

In Chapter 12, Goldenberg et al. [10] reported that the majority of respondents from both military and civilian workforces across all nations indicated feeling respected by the other group, with military workforces reporting slightly higher ratings than civilian workforces. Interestingly, the highest scores for workplace respect, overall, were reported by military males, followed by military females, civilian females, and civilian males (see Table 17-4). However, there was some variation among countries. In some nations (e.g., Sweden), both military males and military females showed the highest scores. In others (e.g., most prominently in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Switzerland), female military members reported the highest respect scores compared to the three other groups.

**Table 17-4: Military-Civilian Personnel Workplace Respect by Gender Across Nations.**

Nation	Military		Civilian	
	Male	Female	Male	Female
	M (SD)	M (SD)	M (SD)	M (SD)
Belgium	4.69 (.76)	4.48 (1.04)	4.53 (.83)	4.57 (.92)
Bosnia and Herzegovina	5.06 (.63)	5.50 (.50)	4.69 (.92)	4.72 (1.21)
Canada	4.71 (1.10)	4.81 (1.26)	4.75 (1.24)	4.77 (1.24)
Estonia	4.36 (.71)	4.64 (.86)	4.45 (.74)	4.30 (.73)
Germany	4.71 (.93)	4.69 (.95)	4.63 (1.07)	4.77 (1.02)
Netherlands	4.78 (.75)	4.62 (.83)	4.59 (.88)	4.78 (.78)
New Zealand	4.83 (1.10)	4.83 (.97)	4.85 (1.18)	4.66 (1.19)
Sweden	5.27 (.85)	5.29 (.76)	4.94 (1.14)	4.71 (1.04)
Switzerland	4.82 (.85)	5.14 (.74)	4.72 (.94)	4.74 (.98)
United Kingdom	4.76 (1.09)	4.66 (.96)	4.78 (.98)	4.81 (.93)
United States	5.57 (.59)	5.34 (.65)	5.56 (.63)	4.41 (1.19)
<b>Overall</b>	<b>4.80 (.96)</b>	<b>4.75 (1.06)</b>	<b>4.72 (1.05)</b>	<b>4.73 (1.06)</b>

### 17.3.4 Inclusion

As reported by Goldenberg et al. [10], the majority of military and civilian respondents reported feeling included by members of the other group, with military personnel providing slightly higher ratings than civilian personnel on this measure. If we consider the results further in terms of the four subgroups, some variations related to both gender and military-civilian status were found. Overall, male military members reported higher levels of inclusion compared to male and female civilian employees, as well as slightly higher levels compared to female

military members (see Table 17-5). In addition, overall, male civilian employees reported lower inclusion than female military personnel; this pattern was most evident in Belgium and Switzerland. Male and female civilian personnel, overall, reported similar inclusion levels; however, male civilians reported slightly higher inclusion compared to female civilians in some countries, especially in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the United States. Overall, female civilian employees also reported lower levels of inclusion compared to female military personnel. This pattern was strongest in Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Canada, Switzerland, and the United States. In sum, male and female military members reported higher levels of inclusion compared to male and female civilian employees across many of the nations, with military males reporting the highest levels overall.

**Table 17-5: Military-Civilian Personnel Inclusion by Gender Across Nations.**

Nation	Military		Civilian	
	Male	Female	Male	Female
	M (SD)	M (SD)	M (SD)	M (SD)
<b>Belgium</b>	4.75 (.82)	4.66 (.94)	4.16 (.91)	4.31 (.91)
<b>Bosnia and Herzegovina</b>	4.42 (1.29)	4.33 (1.47)	4.79 (.96)	3.96 (1.20)
<b>Canada</b>	3.98 (1.04)	4.19 (1.00)	3.93 (1.11)	3.87 (1.05)
<b>Estonia</b>	4.18 (.84)	4.24 (.88)	4.62 (.92)	4.37 (.78)
<b>Germany</b>	4.26 (1.12)	3.98 (.99)	3.93 (1.26)	4.00 (1.24)
<b>Netherlands</b>	4.64 (.89)	4.64 (.89)	4.39 (.88)	4.47 (.82)
<b>New Zealand</b>	4.18 (1.03)	4.19 (.97)	3.98 (1.00)	3.95 (.99)
<b>Sweden</b>	4.75 (1.07)	4.65 (1.06)	4.68 (1.11)	4.46 (1.06)
<b>Switzerland</b>	4.15 (1.02)	4.68 (1.05)	3.99 (1.00)	4.17 (.93)
<b>United Kingdom</b>	3.86 (1.03)	3.47 (.92)	3.63 (1.12)	3.69 (.99)
<b>United States</b>	4.57 (.90)	4.38 (.74)	4.83 (.69)	3.65 (.87)
<b>Overall</b>	<b>4.22 (1.05)</b>	<b>4.20 (1.01)</b>	<b>3.96 (1.11)</b>	<b>3.97 (1.06)</b>

### 17.3.5 Overall Organisational Fairness<sup>7</sup>

Goldenberg et al. [10] reported in Chapter 12 that respondents from both military and civilian workforces, across nations, perceived their defence organisation as fair, and noted that this perception was slightly more pronounced for military personnel compared to their civilian counterparts. This overall military-civilian pattern is also evident if we disaggregate the military and civilian workforces by gender for each country (see Table 17-6). However, additional patterns are revealed by this gender-based analysis. Overall, male military members reported higher overall organisational fairness compared to female military members as well as male and female civilian employees. This pattern was especially strong in the United Kingdom. Overall, male military members reported the highest levels of organisational fairness, whereas female civilian employees reported the lowest levels. In addition, overall, male civilian employees reported lower organisational fairness than female military

<sup>7</sup> The Overall Organisational Fairness measure and the Perceived Organisational Support measure (to follow) used a 7-point scale: 1 = *strongly disagree*, 2 = *moderately disagree*, 3 = *slightly disagree*, 4 = *neutral*, 5 = *slightly agree*, 6 = *moderately agree*, and 7 = *strongly agree*.



personnel, especially in Germany and the United Kingdom. Male civilian employees also reported higher levels of organisational fairness, overall, compared to female civilians, for instance, in the United States. Furthermore, female civilian employees reported lower levels of organisational fairness compared to female military personnel. This pattern was strongest in Germany and the United States. In sum, male and female military members reported higher levels of overall organisational fairness compared to male and female civilian employees, with male military members reporting the highest levels overall.

**Table 17-6: Military-Civilian Personnel Overall Organisational Fairness by Gender Across Nations.**

Nation	Military		Civilian	
	Male	Female	Male	Female
	M (SD)	M (SD)	M (SD)	M (SD)
<b>Belgium</b>	4.89 (.95)	4.66 (.86)	4.54 (1.11)	4.78 (1.13)
<b>Bosnia and Herzegovina</b>	5.24 (.89)	4.67 (2.48)	4.58 (1.02)	4.90 (1.11)
<b>Canada</b>	5.24 (1.43)	5.12 (1.40)	5.04 (1.47)	4.88 (1.50)
<b>Estonia</b>	4.69 (1.04)	4.95 (.59)	5.50 (.94)	5.29 (.94)
<b>Germany</b>	4.56 (1.34)	4.93 (.99)	4.41 (1.47)	4.21 (1.52)
<b>Netherlands</b>	5.03 (1.11)	4.84 (.91)	4.89 (1.09)	4.67 (1.05)
<b>New Zealand</b>	5.21 (1.23)	5.25 (1.22)	5.10 (1.24)	5.05 (1.16)
<b>Sweden</b>	5.50 (1.16)	5.48 (1.36)	5.39 (1.26)	5.27 (1.45)
<b>United Kingdom</b>	5.35 (1.20)	4.86 (1.23)	4.56 (1.54)	4.76 (1.44)
<b>United States</b>	5.95 (.87)	5.31 (.57)	5.78 (1.14)	4.33 (1.00)
<b>Overall</b>	<b>5.11 (1.27)</b>	<b>5.01 (1.20)</b>	<b>4.77 (1.44)</b>	<b>4.73 (1.43)</b>

### 17.3.6 Perceived Organisational Support

Regarding perceived organisational support, military and civilian respondents tended to be *neutral*, or to *slightly agree* with items on this measure, with military personnel showing higher levels of perceived organisational support than civilian personnel in most nations (see Ref. [10]). In contrast to other measures reported in this chapter, overall, female military members reported higher levels of perceived organisational support compared to male military members as well as male and female civilian employees (see Table 17-7). This pattern was especially strong in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in Germany. Overall, female military members reported the highest levels, whereas female civilian employees reported the lowest levels, particularly in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Germany, Sweden, and the United States. Furthermore, male military members overall reported higher levels of perceived organisational support compared to female civilian members, and this pattern was seen especially in Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Germany, and the United States. Finally, overall, male civilian employees reported higher levels of perceived organisational support compared to female civilian employees, and this occurred most strongly in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in the United States. In sum, the pattern for perceived organisational support differed from the other measures in this chapter in that female military members reported the highest levels compared to male military members, as well as compared to male and female civilian employees.

**Table 17-7: Military-Civilian Personnel Perceived Organisational Support by Gender Across Nations.**

Nation	Military		Civilian	
	Male	Female	Male	Female
	M (SD)	M (SD)	M (SD)	M (SD)
<b>Belgium</b>	4.31 (1.02)	4.03 (1.08)	4.07 (1.12)	4.01 (1.15)
<b>Bosnia and Herzegovina</b>	4.53 (.83)	4.96 (2.01)	4.35 (1.20)	3.76 (1.22)
<b>Canada</b>	4.56 (1.45)	4.73 (1.32)	4.52 (1.47)	4.53 (1.47)
<b>Estonia</b>	4.45 (1.10)	4.51 (.66)	5.08 (1.10)	4.83 (.92)
<b>Germany</b>	3.66 (1.26)	4.17 (1.28)	3.51 (1.42)	3.32 (1.45)
<b>Netherlands</b>	4.44 (1.19)	4.31 (1.32)	4.30 (1.12)	4.38 (1.05)
<b>New Zealand</b>	4.56 (1.28)	4.54 (1.17)	4.44 (1.37)	4.38 (1.32)
<b>Sweden</b>	4.95 (1.23)	5.07 (.87)	4.93 (1.43)	4.74 (1.29)
<b>Switzerland</b>	4.22 (1.40)	4.48 (1.25)	4.50 (1.35)	4.56 (1.21)
<b>United States</b>	4.98 (1.37)	4.05 (.36)	4.99 (1.10)	3.38 (.67)
<b>Overall</b>	<b>4.36 (1.35)</b>	<b>4.47 (1.23)</b>	<b>4.27 (1.44)</b>	<b>4.18 (1.44)</b>

### 17.3.7 Organisational Affective Commitment

In the case of organisational affective commitment, respondents across nations indicated moderately-high levels of affective commitment, with military personnel reporting higher commitment levels than civilian personnel in all countries [10]. More specifically, overall, male military members reported higher organisational affective commitment compared to female military members as well as male and female civilian employees (see Table 17-8). This pattern was particularly strong in Belgium. Overall, male military members reported the highest levels of organisational affective commitment, whereas female civilian employees reported the lowest levels. Overall, in addition, male civilian employees reported lower affective commitment compared to female military personnel and this pattern was especially evident in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Male civilian employees also reported higher levels of affective commitment compared to female civilians, overall, especially in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Estonia, Switzerland, and the United States. Overall, in addition, female civilian employees reported lower levels of organisational affective commitment compared to female military personnel and this pattern was most evident in Bosnia and Herzegovina, New Zealand, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United States. In sum, male and female military members reported higher levels of organisational affective commitment compared to male and female civilian employees, with male military members reporting the highest levels overall.

**Table 17-8: Military-Civilian Personnel Organisational  
Affective Commitment by Gender Across Nations.**

Nation	Military		Civilian	
	Male	Female	Male	Female
	M ( <i>SD</i> )	M ( <i>SD</i> )	M ( <i>SD</i> )	M ( <i>SD</i> )
<b>Belgium</b>	4.44 (.78)	4.02 (.75)	3.99 (.91)	3.94 (.92)
<b>Bosnia and Herzegovina</b>	5.25 (.62)	5.56 (.77)	4.99 (.63)	4.59 (.89)
<b>Canada</b>	4.20 (1.17)	4.33 (1.16)	4.09 (1.19)	4.10 (1.14)
<b>Estonia</b>	4.63 (.78)	4.15 (.91)	4.46 (.92)	4.12 (.84)
<b>Germany</b>	4.20 (1.08)	4.15 (1.09)	4.09 (1.15)	3.87 (1.18)
<b>Netherlands</b>	4.46 (.77)	4.35 (.81)	4.19 (.92)	4.08 (.78)
<b>New Zealand</b>	4.32 (1.02)	4.21 (1.02)	4.03 (1.00)	3.79 (.99)
<b>Sweden</b>	4.67 (.96)	4.57 (.75)	4.34 (1.24)	4.13 (1.15)
<b>Switzerland</b>	4.49 (.94)	4.52 (.81)	4.42 (1.05)	4.09 (1.08)
<b>United Kingdom</b>	3.89 (1.17)	3.80 (1.15)	3.82 (1.22)	3.88 (1.23)
<b>United States</b>	4.45 (1.04)	4.34 (.79)	4.32 (1.03)	3.26 (.71)
<b>Overall</b>	<b>4.34 (1.03)</b>	<b>4.20 (1.03)</b>	<b>4.11 (1.14)</b>	<b>3.98 (1.12)</b>

### 17.3.8 Job Satisfaction

As Goldenberg et al. [10] reported in Chapter 12, respondents in all nations reported high levels of job satisfaction, with military and civilian respondents showing similar levels within most nations. However, in contrast to many of the survey findings reported above, in which military personnel, especially military males, tended to show the most positive results, the results for job satisfaction showed a different pattern. Overall, female civilian employees reported higher levels of job satisfaction compared to male civilian employees as well as male and female military personnel (see Table 17-9). Once again, this is a notable departure from the previous results described in this chapter, in which military results were generally more positive than civilian results – and in which the results for military males tended to be the highest overall of the four groups. Still, male military members reported higher job satisfaction compared to female military members overall, and particularly in Belgium and New Zealand. Male civilian employees also reported higher job satisfaction than female military members overall, especially in New Zealand. For job satisfaction, the results were highest overall for female civilians, and were lowest overall for female military personnel.

**Table 17-9: Military-Civilian Personnel Job Satisfaction by Gender Across Nations.**

Nation	Military		Civilian	
	Male	Female	Male	Female
	M (SD)	M (SD)	M (SD)	M (SD)
<b>Belgium</b>	5.12 (.67)	4.73 (1.02)	4.92 (.79)	4.94 (.81)
<b>Bosnia and Herzegovina</b>	5.07 (.78)	5.78 (.38)	4.61 (.65)	5.10 (.82)
<b>Canada</b>	4.64 (1.26)	4.69 (1.18)	4.98 (1.02)	4.92 (1.10)
<b>Estonia</b>	4.93 (.90)	4.88 (.69)	5.04 (.75)	5.12 (.77)
<b>Germany</b>	4.79 (1.16)	5.25 (.59)	4.84 (1.12)	5.08 (.99)
<b>Netherlands</b>	4.93 (.77)	4.98 (.90)	4.85 (.83)	4.90 (.79)
<b>New Zealand</b>	4.85 (.95)	4.45 (1.17)	4.75 (.98)	4.70 (.99)
<b>Sweden</b>	5.15 (.86)	5.10 (.71)	5.05 (1.01)	4.82 (1.13)
<b>Switzerland</b>	5.07 (.85)	5.27 (.75)	5.13 (.87)	5.25 (.74)
<b>United Kingdom</b>	4.55 (1.17)	4.26 (1.39)	4.41 (1.33)	4.67 (1.20)
<b>United States</b>	5.39 (.87)	5.24 (.88)	5.45 (.64)	5.27 (.71)
<b>Overall</b>	<b>4.88 (1.02)</b>	<b>4.69 (1.13)</b>	<b>4.85 (1.08)</b>	<b>4.92 (1.04)</b>

### 17.3.9 Retention Intentions

Overall, the mean scores for retention intentions were similar across all four groups (see Table 17-10). However, the mean differences varied substantially cross-nationally.

**Table 17-10: Military-Civilian Personnel Retention Intentions by Gender Across Nations.**

Nation	Military		Civilian	
	Male	Female	Male	Female
	M (SD)	M (SD)	M (SD)	M (SD)
<b>Belgium</b>	5.00 (.84)	4.93 (.85)	4.84 (1.01)	4.89 (.98)
<b>Bosnia and Herzegovina</b>	4.78 (1.26)	5.78 (.38)	4.67 (.80)	4.60 (1.42)
<b>Canada</b>	4.31 (1.43)	4.77 (1.37)	4.75 (1.28)	4.68 (1.31)
<b>Estonia</b>	4.49 (1.02)	4.15 (1.18)	4.55 (.95)	4.33 (.97)
<b>Germany</b>	4.40 (1.77)	4.60 (1.84)	4.19 (1.87)	4.61 (1.72)
<b>Netherlands</b>	4.81 (.95)	4.55 (1.01)	4.48 (.99)	4.41 (1.12)
<b>New Zealand</b>	4.26 (1.28)	4.22 (1.19)	4.33 (1.25)	3.81 (1.30)
<b>Sweden</b>	4.76 (1.19)	5.06 (1.04)	4.12 (1.44)	4.36 (1.49)

Nation	Military		Civilian	
	Male	Female	Male	Female
	M (SD)	M (SD)	M (SD)	M (SD)
Switzerland	4.67 (1.28)	4.36 (1.50)	4.56 (1.34)	4.55 (1.36)
United Kingdom	4.20 (1.41)	3.91 (1.28)	4.11 (1.47)	4.48 (1.39)
United States	4.23 (1.42)	4.27 (.89)	4.88 (1.08)	4.48 (1.45)
<b>Overall</b>	<b>4.53 (1.33)</b>	<b>4.53 (1.26)</b>	<b>4.46 (1.39)</b>	<b>4.53 (1.36)</b>

### 17.3.10 Perception of the Importance of Civilians

Overall, respondents from all four groups perceived civilians as an important component of the defence organisation (see also Ref. [10]). Further, and also consistent with Goldenberg et al.'s [10] results, these perceptions were most pronounced among civilians, *both* male and female, compared to military personnel. Particularly in Canada, Germany, Netherlands, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom, male and female civilians reported similarly high perceptions of the importance of civilians, and higher levels than both male and female military personnel (see Table 17-11). Overall, male military members reported higher levels of the importance of civilians compared to female military members. This pattern was especially strong in Belgium, Netherlands, and New Zealand. In sum, male and female civilians perceived higher levels of the importance of civilians than male and female military members; however, male military members in many nations reported higher levels than their female military counterparts.

**Table 17-11: Military-Civilian Personnel Perception of Importance of Civilians by Gender Across Nations.**

Nation	Military		Civilian	
	Male	Female	Male	Female
	M (SD)	M (SD)	M (SD)	M (SD)
Belgium	4.41 (1.13)	3.82 (1.42)	5.16 (1.07)	5.02 (.98)
Bosnia and Herzegovina	5.11 (.74)	5.67 (.58)	5.46 (.81)	5.29 (.61)
Canada	4.82 (1.38)	4.94 (1.23)	5.74 (.63)	5.73 (.61)
Estonia	5.28 (.82)	5.00 (1.00)	5.59 (.71)	5.52 (.65)
Germany	4.40 (1.17)	4.65 (1.23)	5.21 (.99)	5.17 (.98)
Netherlands	4.60 (1.09)	3.94 (1.26)	5.51 (.61)	5.54 (.57)
New Zealand	5.05 (1.20)	4.74 (1.22)	5.66 (.70)	5.58 (.80)
Sweden	5.58 (.85)	5.29 (.99)	5.82 (.42)	5.62 (.65)
Switzerland	4.24 (1.28)	4.95 (.79)	5.33 (.72)	5.17 (.80)
United Kingdom	4.94 (1.15)	4.65 (1.19)	5.72 (.61)	5.69 (.62)
United States	5.53 (.86)	5.44 (.82)	5.82 (.38)	5.78 (.44)
<b>Overall</b>	<b>4.69 (1.26)</b>	<b>4.61 (1.30)</b>	<b>5.52 (.78)</b>	<b>5.50 (.79)</b>

**17.3.11 Senior Leadership Messages Supporting Military-Civilian Personnel Collaboration**

Overall, as reported in Goldenberg et al. [10], respondents across all nations agreed that senior leaders make efforts to promote the military-civilian relationship and emphasize the importance of military-civilian cooperation in their organisation. However, the level of agreement showed some variation when considering gender. Overall, male military members reported the highest agreement with this view, followed by female military members and male and female civilian employees (see Table 17-12). This pattern, of male military members reporting the highest agreement compared to the other three groups, occurred most strongly in Belgium.

**Table 17-12: Military-Civilian Personnel Senior Leadership Messages by Gender Across Nations.**

Nation	Military		Civilian	
	Male	Female	Male	Female
	M (SD)	M (SD)	M (SD)	M (SD)
<b>Belgium</b>	4.58 (.94)	3.91 (1.27)	3.95 (1.14)	4.02 (1.12)
<b>Bosnia and Herzegovina</b>	3.81 (1.13)	4.56 (1.35)	4.44 (1.01)	4.12 (1.45)
<b>Canada</b>	4.69 (1.21)	4.53 (1.28)	4.14 (1.47)	4.09 (1.48)
<b>Estonia</b>	4.59 (.99)	4.15 (1.10)	4.83 (.91)	4.57 (1.15)
<b>Netherlands</b>	3.93 (1.20)	3.53 (1.29)	3.78 (1.29)	3.44 (1.22)
<b>New Zealand</b>	4.32 (1.28)	4.31 (1.17)	3.83 (1.49)	4.02 (1.28)
<b>Sweden</b>	4.44 (1.17)	4.56 (1.26)	3.91 (1.14)	3.68 (1.40)
<b>United Kingdom</b>	4.23 (1.28)	3.98 (1.15)	3.43 (1.55)	3.30 (1.57)
<b>United States</b>	5.09 (1.31)	5.33 (.51)	5.01 (.99)	3.44 (1.33)
<b>Overall</b>	<b>4.39 (1.23)</b>	<b>4.22 (1.26)</b>	<b>3.86 (1.48)</b>	<b>3.82 (1.48)</b>

**17.3.12 Supervision and Leadership of Civilians by Military Supervisors**

Overall, the mean ratings of civilians, both male and female, regarding the supervision and leadership they receive from their military managers, were relatively low, compared to other measures within the MCPS (see also Ref. [10]). The average ratings, in most cases, were below 4 (below *slightly agree*). Overall, the mean ratings of male civilian employees were slightly higher compared to the mean ratings of female civilian employees (see Table 17-13). This pattern was strongest in the United States.

**Table 17-13: Supervision and Leadership of Civilians  
by Military Supervisors by Gender Across Nations.**

Nation	Civilian	
	Male	Female
	M (SD)	M (SD)
Belgium	3.48 (.89)	3.64 (.93)
Bosnia and Herzegovina	3.61 (.66)	3.71 (1.41)
Canada	3.72 (1.21)	3.56 (1.27)
Estonia	4.11 (.69)	4.04 (.87)
Germany	3.53 (1.19)	3.81 (1.15)
Netherlands	3.86 (.99)	4.07 (.82)
New Zealand	3.87 (1.06)	3.74 (1.07)
Sweden	3.93 (1.17)	3.74 (1.29)
Switzerland	3.71 (.57)	3.84 (.56)
United Kingdom	3.24 (1.23)	3.04 (1.16)
United States	4.46 (1.03)	3.07 (1.02)
<b>Overall</b>	<b>3.63 (1.06)</b>	<b>3.54 (1.15)</b>

### 17.3.13 Supervision and Leadership of Military Personnel by Civilian Supervisors

Similar to the above results, the mean ratings for both male and female military personnel regarding the supervision and leadership that they receive from civilian managers were below 4, although they were slightly higher than for the civilian sample (these results are also consistent with Ref. [10]). In addition, as was observed for the civilian respondents, the ratings for male military personnel were slightly higher than for female military personnel (see Table 17-14). This pattern occurred in Belgium, Canada, Netherlands, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom.<sup>8</sup>

**Table 17-14: Supervision and Leadership of Military Personnel  
by Civilian Supervisors by Gender Across Nations.**

Nation	Military	
	Male	Female
	M (SD)	M (SD)
Belgium	4.23 (.85)	3.91 (.93)
Bosnia and Herzegovina	3.88 (.85)	4.81 (1.47)
Canada	4.13 (.95)	3.75 (1.38)

<sup>8</sup> As indicated in Table 17-14, in some countries (Sweden, Switzerland, and the United States), there were no female military respondents with civilian supervisors.

Nation	Military	
	Male	Female
	M (SD)	M (SD)
Estonia	3.71 (1.41)	3.88 (.53)
Germany	3.50 (1.17)	3.66 (1.23)
Netherlands	4.10 (1.04)	3.78 (.79)
New Zealand	4.06 (.97)	3.12 (.89)
Sweden	4.12 (1.42)	–
Switzerland	4.08 (.45)	–
United Kingdom	3.90 (1.07)	3.29 (1.39)
United States	4.87 (1.25)	–
<b>Overall</b>	<b>3.88 (1.09)</b>	<b>3.70 (1.12)</b>

### 17.3.14 Civilian Career Development

As noted in Chapter 12 [10], the perceptions of civilian respondents regarding the effects of working in a military context on their career development varied across nations, although in most countries, the overall mean ratings were described as being in the neutral range. Comparing male and female civilians overall, one can observe the same general pattern, in which mean scores for both males and females were at about the mid-point of the response scale (3.45 and 3.61 out of 6, respectively; see Table 17-15). However, one can also see that, overall, female civilian employees reported slightly more positive scores compared to male civilian employees. This pattern was strongest in Switzerland and the United Kingdom. However, it appears as though some improvements may be needed regarding the career development of civilian employees, both male and female.

**Table 17-15: Civilian Career Development by Gender Across Nations.**

Nation	Civilian	
	Male	Female
	M (SD)	M (SD)
Belgium	3.27 (1.12)	3.48 (1.01)
Bosnia and Herzegovina	4.56 (1.09)	4.00 (1.38)
Canada	3.50 (1.43)	3.39 (1.36)
Estonia	4.51 (.89)	4.32 (.94)
Germany	3.69 (1.47)	3.92 (1.51)
Netherlands	3.71 (.79)	3.71 (.68)
New Zealand	3.40 (1.06)	3.23 (1.18)
Sweden	3.59 (1.17)	3.57 (1.34)



Nation	Civilian	
	Male	Female
	M (SD)	M (SD)
Switzerland	3.06 (1.16)	3.43 (1.07)
United Kingdom	3.39 (1.30)	3.69 (1.21)
United States	4.05 (1.21)	2.74 (1.03)
<b>Overall</b>	<b>3.45 (1.30)</b>	<b>3.61 (1.29)</b>

### 17.3.15 Civilian Training Opportunities

In Chapter 12, Goldenberg et al. [10] reported that working in a military context was not particularly negative for civilian personnel in terms of its effects on training opportunities, but that, similarly to career development, there is room for improvement in this domain. Likewise, overall, male and female civilian employees indicated similar levels of civilian training opportunities, with means of 3.87 and 3.84, respectively, out of 6 (see Table 17-16). Male civilian employees reported higher scores than females in some countries, for instance, in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Sweden, and the United States.

**Table 17-16: Gender Across Nations for Civilian Training Opportunities.**

Nation	Civilian	
	Male	Female
	M (SD)	M (SD)
Belgium	3.88 (.94)	3.83 (.89)
Bosnia and Herzegovina	4.46 (.68)	3.65 (.66)
Canada	4.03 (1.17)	4.01 (1.13)
Estonia	4.48 (1.10)	4.51 (.90)
Germany	3.54 (1.53)	3.30 (1.55)
Netherlands	3.94 (.83)	3.73 (.82)
New Zealand	3.94 (1.11)	3.98 (1.05)
Sweden	3.81 (1.28)	3.30 (1.01)
Switzerland	3.73 (1.35)	3.81 (1.25)
United Kingdom	3.93 (1.06)	3.90 (1.04)
United States	4.51 (.93)	3.37 (1.09)
<b>Overall</b>	<b>3.87 (1.23)</b>	<b>3.84 (1.18)</b>

**17.3.16 Effects of Military Rotational Cycle on Civilian Productivity**

As reported by Goldenberg et al. [10] in Chapter 12, the majority of civilian respondents indicated that the frequent posting cycle of military personnel disrupts their productivity and that the rotational cycle of military managers and supervisors disrupts their work. If we compare male to female civilian respondents, we see that, overall, male civilian employees reported being more affected by the military rotational cycle than female civilian employees (see Table 17-17), in which lower scores indicated higher levels of disruption). This pattern was especially strong in Belgium, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom.

**Table 17-17: Effects of Military Rotational Cycle on Civilian Productivity by Gender Across Nations.**

Nation	Civilian	
	Male	Female
	M (SD)	M (SD)
Belgium	3.00 (1.49)	3.57 (1.29)
Bosnia and Herzegovina	3.58 (1.38)	3.41 (1.53)
Canada	3.04 (1.41)	3.22 (1.42)
Estonia	3.89 (1.36)	3.97 (1.29)
Germany	3.30 (1.44)	3.59 (1.53)
Netherlands	3.26 (1.25)	3.52 (1.36)
New Zealand	3.31 (1.43)	3.13 (1.45)
Sweden	3.87 (1.71)	4.25 (1.55)
Switzerland	3.45 (1.36)	3.93 (1.13)
United Kingdom	2.64 (1.36)	2.97 (1.31)
United States	3.34 (1.05)	2.59 (1.04)
<b>Overall</b>	<b>3.13 (1.42)</b>	<b>3.36 (1.42)</b>

**17.4 DISCUSSION**

This descriptive gender-based analysis of the MCPS indicates that, overall, male military members reported higher levels of relationship quality, quality of communication, workplace respect, inclusion, overall organisational fairness, organisational affective commitment, and senior leadership messages compared to female military members, as well as male and female civilian employees. For each of these measures, this pattern was also evident across some of the nations. In addition, for several of these measures (quality of communication, overall organisational fairness, organisational affective commitment, and senior leadership messages), male military members overall reported the highest levels, whereas female civilian employees reported the lowest levels. In addition, female military members overall reported the lowest level of job satisfaction among the four groups. The results of the current research suggest that there may be multiple advantages for male military personnel navigating through a military-civilian workplace. Such findings are consistent with a traditional masculine model of military culture [3], [4], as well as Hinojosa’s [13] perspective on hegemonic masculinity in the military. Indeed, it may be that male military members construct hierarchies that lead them to view female military members, and civilians, both male and female, as subordinate to

them [13]. For instance, military males may derogate civilians' (and military females') physical strength, self-discipline, emotion regulation abilities, and/or intelligence [13]. The construction of such hierarchies may, in part, explain the common pattern that emerged: male military members reported experiencing a more positive military-civilian workplace environment in several respects compared to female military members and male and female civilian employees. Furthermore, the results also highlight the potential unique challenges that female civilian employees, in particular, may encounter working in a military-civilian context.

Other findings from this analysis suggest that the situation for males within defence organisations, whether military or civilian, is more positive than it is for females. For instance, for supervision and leadership of civilian personnel by a military supervisor, male civilians reported higher scores than female civilians. Similarly, for supervision and leadership of military personnel by a civilian supervisor, male military members reported higher scores than their female military counterparts. This pattern was seen across many nations as well.

Yet, the present findings also suggest that the role of gender within defence organisations may be more complex than a traditional masculine model of military culture would indicate. In contrast to the emergent pattern described above, in which male personnel, particularly male military personnel, seemed to fare the best of all respondents, overall, female military members reported the highest level of perceived organisational support compared to the other three groups, and female civilian employees reported the highest levels of job satisfaction compared to the other three groups. Likewise, female civilian employees reported fewer adverse effects on career development as a result of working in a military context and reported being less affected by the rotational military cycle compared to male civilian employees. Once again, such findings suggest that the role of gender may be more complex than a traditional model of military culture, or more broadly, of defence organisational culture, would indicate. It is possible, for instance, that certain elements of a more evolved model of military (or defence) culture may be emerging, or may coexist with a more traditional model, in various national contexts.

The mixed results that were obtained in this study also suggest that the role of gender in the military-civilian context may reflect other factors not examined in this study. For instance, beyond individual respondent demographics (one's status as male or female), or national categories (one's country), the role of gender may also be related to national *cultural* dimensions, such as Hofstede's [14] masculinity-femininity dimension of national culture. Thus, it may be that gender plays out differently in masculine national cultures – which value assertiveness and competition – compared to feminine national cultures – which value personal relationships and care for the weak. Accordingly, such gender-related national-cultural dynamics may influence military-civilian relationships in defence organisations. Alternatively, in contrast to such broader national-cultural factors, more local workplace dynamics, such as the proportion of women in the local work unit within a defence organisation, may also influence gender dynamics in the military-civilian context. It may be, for instance, that achieving a “critical mass” of women in a specific work unit may influence the gender dynamics within that particular unit [15]. Such possibilities represent potential avenues for future research.

In general, the results of this descriptive gender-based analysis will require validation with future research as well as appropriate inferential tests, taking into account statistical considerations such as sample size and the issue of practical versus statistical significance. In many cases, the magnitude of the gender differences described in this analysis appeared to be relatively small. Nevertheless, given the recurring nature of some of the patterns that were observed, further research on gender in the context of defence organisations seems warranted.

## **17.5 CONCLUSION**

This descriptive gender-based analysis indicates that there are various cross-national variations in gender differences in military-civilian personnel culture and work relations. However, one common pattern emerged

cross-nationally: on several workplace measures, male military members reported experiencing a more positive military-civilian workplace environment compared to female military members as well as male and female civilian employees. Although some of the findings reflect a more varied pattern, notably with respect to the high perceived organisational support of female military members and the high job satisfaction of female civilians, it appears that females, especially civilian females in some respects, may experience challenges working in a military-civilian defence organisational context. Future research should investigate possible explanations for such gender differences as well as identify challenges that are unique to female civilian employees, in particular, working in defence organisations.

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## **Chapter 18 – MILITARY-CIVILIAN PERSONNEL COLLABORATION IN MULTINATIONAL OPERATIONAL HEADQUARTERS: CASE STUDY OF NATO KFOR HQ**

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## **18.1 BACKGROUND AND OBJECTIVES**

In 2012, the NATO Allied Transformation Command (ACT) indicated that RTG HFM-226 may help address some NATO priority capability issues, particularly the NATO Capability Requirement “Optimizing the Human Aspects of Operations.” Focus on this capability requirement stems from increasing primacy placed specifically on effectiveness in operations. ACT indicated to the co-chairs of RTG HFM-226 that this research is particularly important in light of the fact that civilians are increasingly playing various roles on operations. At the same time, some problems with integration of civilians into operational contexts have been observed, which interfere with their work, and with overall operational effectiveness. Such issues include, but are not limited to, cultural advisors not being respected and utilised appropriately and issues with civilians in leadership roles (such as in context of the comprehensive approach) not being viewed as authoritative. As such, it was suggested that an exploratory extension to the original RTG Program of Work be incorporated by collecting data in an operational context.

In light of these recommendations, approval in principle (from the NATO Science and Technology Organization) to conduct data collection at KFOR was granted at the HFM Panel Business Meeting in October 2013, followed by a letter from the NATO Collaborative Support Office Director to the KFOR Commander in January 2014 requesting visit permission. Approval for the data collection visit was granted by KFOR Commander Major General Salvatore Farina in February 2014.

### **18.1.1 About KFOR and the Conflict<sup>1</sup>**

KFOR was established in 1999, when the security situation in the region was very volatile and unstable, with a high likelihood of violence. After NATO’s bombing campaign in the spring of 1999, the Serbians had retreated

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<sup>1</sup> The information in this section was based largely on the general background information provided informally by the hosts of the research team (most notably the J1 Chief of Manpower and the Civilian Human Resources Manager) as well as the interview participants. The intent is to provide some context to the empirical results rather than comprehensive information about the conflict.

leaving the country in a devastated condition, with terrible losses and killings, damage to the infrastructure, and endless streams of refugees going to Albania and other places. As one of the case study respondents described, when he was deployed to the mission for the first time in 2001, there were still signs of the war that had recently ended: burned houses, demolished churches and burned mosques.

KFOR's role at the time was, and continues to be, to provide safety and security as well as freedom of movement to the people, including the protection of the borders and the air space. When KFOR was established during the volatile period in June 1999, KFOR was seen as a liberating force, at least by the majority of Kosovar-Albanians. The night before KFOR entered Pristina (June 12) there had been atrocious violence, at which time the killing by Serbian militias had reached its height and the Russians had occupied the airport. Only gradually had KFOR succeeded in calming down the situation, particularly given that in those first months after KFOR's arrival, the Kosovo Liberation Army, consisting of Kosovar Albanians<sup>2</sup> was still militarized and continued to contribute to the upheaval. During the fall of 1999 there were still massacres on all sides.

The parallel United Nations mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) had none of its own troops. Instead, it focused on:

- a) The rebuilding of the civilian institutions down to the level of small municipalities (e.g., installing international representatives who acted as mayors at the city level); and
- b) Providing policing activities to restore order and public security with the aid of police from all over the world.

KFOR had many working relations with UNMIK at that time, because KFOR was the back-up for the police, and enacted this role by conducting daily patrolling with soft-skin vehicles. Further, for select special projects, such as protecting the orthodox bishops, heavy armoured vehicles were used, because many people would assemble to riot and cause unrest with a potential violence close to the orthodox bishops' domiciles and churches.

In the years thereafter, the role of the military gradually became less prominent, because the security situation improved day by day. The size of KFOR that had started with about 35,000 troops gradually declined to what at the time of this research totaled about 5,000 troops. Moreover, the European Union Rule of Law Mission Kosovo (EULEX), focusing on the judicial system, policing and prison management, was installed. The military focused on civil-military projects such as (re)building schools, kindergartens and the like. They were also involved in demining, even though the major work in this respect was done by Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs).

Thus, by the time of this research the situation had improved considerably, which was clearly evident from the developments in the Pristina infrastructure (e.g., high density of completely newly built highways, the airport in Pristina). Further, civilian democratic institutions had been put in place and were functioning reasonably well in the cities and in the villages and small towns. The most recent national elections had taken place in the beginning of June 2014.

According to the interviewees, the Kosovo Police (KP) was performing rather well. KFOR has become much more inconspicuous or unobtrusive in its actions, which can be seen from the many civilian cars KFOR currently uses in Pristina and surrounding areas (e.g., Volkswagen Touaregs and Passats, Toyota Cruisers, and Mercedes Benz jeeps). Some have sirens like police cars. If there is violence, it is predominantly crime-related and mostly these incidents are handled by the KP or the Kosovo Security Forces (now the Kosovo Armed Forces).

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<sup>2</sup> Called the Ushtria Clirimtare e Kosoves (UCK).



KFOR may be able to leave in its current form, once the remaining political disputes have been resolved. However, in the eyes of some, this is not likely to happen soon; others seem more optimistic. Under the aegis of the European Union (EU), in April 2013 an agreement (“Pristina- Beograd”) was signed, but a final decision has not been reached on all the points; there are still many (technical) issues to be resolved. The wish of both nations (Kosovo and Serbia) to join the EU is the main driver behind these negotiations.

Despite the significant progress that has been made, there are still tensions in the North where Serbs are the majority, Mitrovica being a focal point. In this region, as well as in a number of Serbian enclaves, Dinars instead of Euros are used. As one incident in a sequence of many incidents during the period since 1999 (Serbian blockades of the bridge with rubble), on June 22, 2014, riots occurred at the famous IBAR-bridge (Austerlitz-bridge). This bridge has been a symbolic divide in the conflict similar to the famous bridge in Mostar in Bosnia. Now the rubble has been removed by Serbian Kosovars and replaced by so-called “peace trees”; these create blockades again (hence the riots by protesting Albanian Kosovars), but these blockades are not fully blocking passage. In the North people are reluctant to be controlled. Until not long ago, EULEX officials were not allowed to do their monitoring work during the elections. When KFOR military go into the Northern areas, standard operating procedure is that they carry a small weapon, a long rifle, bulletproof vests and helmets. The Serbian monument of the 1389 battlefield (Gazimestan – close to Kosovo Polje) is fully gated with concertina wire and guarded by the KP. The Orthodox Decani monasteries in the South are still protected by KFOR.

The gradual downsizing or possible ending of KFOR needs to be decided upon by Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) and NATO Headquarters in Brussels.

### **18.1.2 General Overview of Military and Civilian Personnel at KFOR**

At the time of this study, 30 nations were represented at KFOR, although some may have had only one soldier. Of these nations taking part in the mission, 22 were NATO nations and 8 were non-NATO nations.

The overall KFOR mission had approximately 250 civilian positions and approximately 5000 military positions. There were approximately 150 civilian positions in Headquarters (HQ) KFOR (Pristina) and 850 military positions. Hence, civilian personnel represented about 15% of all personnel at KFOR HQ.

At HQ, the 150 civilian personnel positions were divided between 45 international consultants (ICCs) and approximately 100 Local Civilian Hires (LCHs). The ICCs mainly occupy highly specialised fields such as Information and Communication Technology (ICT), engineering, security, and intelligence. In terms of nationality, 10 ICCs were from the United States, 6 were from the United Kingdom, 5 from Romania, 4 from Turkey, 4 from Canada, and 16 from “other” nations. Thirty-nine were male and 6 were female. The average number of years of service for ICC staff was 5.95 years. Often ICCs are former military people, which can blur the line between their civilian and military identity and their past experience.

The LCHs work predominantly as fire guards (about 30-35), interpreters (25), and in administrative jobs such as finance and human resources. By definition, the LCHs are residents from the surrounding region. The average years of service for LCHs is 7.94.

There were an additional 5 civilian positions occupied by NATO International Civilians (NICs). Four of the NICs were in finance positions under the financial comptroller (J5), and one NIC was the head of civilian human resources at KFOR. NICs have better working conditions than ICCs and LCHs, being employees with fixed contracts, pension schemes and other benefits.

To note, tasks such as cooking, cleaning and maintenance of the camp facilities are outsourced to a local company and those workers are not considered employees of KFOR, but, being employed by the contracting company, are supplementary. Information about their specific numbers was not available. This latter category is outside of the scope of this study because they do not typically interact with KFOR’s military and civilian personnel.

### 18.1.3 Method

The methods employed during the study in KFOR HQ included a combination of organisational surveys and interviews, to be presented in the sections below.

## 18.2 MILITARY-CIVILIAN PERSONNEL SURVEY

### 18.2.1 Survey Sample

The survey was completed by 45 military respondents, 33 ICCs, and 28 LCHs. The demographic characteristics of these groups of participants are presented in Table 18-1 below. Of note, most ICCs had previous military service, and a majority of both ICCs and LCHs had more than 5 years of service at KFOR, whereas most military respondents were at KFOR for less than one year.<sup>3</sup>

**Table 18-1: Demographic Characteristics of Survey Respondents.**

	Military		ICC		LCH	
	Number (#)	Percent (%)	Number (#)	Percent (%)	Number (#)	Percent (%)
<b>Rank</b>						
2 <sup>nd</sup> Lieutenant	1	2.3	–	–	–	–
Major/LCdr	11	25.0	–	–	–	–
LCol/Cdr	27	61.4	–	–	–	–
Col	4	9.1	–	–	–	–
<b>Military Service</b>						
Army	33	75.0	–	–	–	–
Air Force	6	13.6	–	–	–	–
Navy	3	6.8	–	–	–	–
Marine (or equivalent)	1	2.3	–	–	–	–
Other	1	2.3	–	–	–	–

<sup>3</sup> Many LCHs did not respond to this question.

	Military		ICC		LCH	
	Number (#)	Percent (%)	Number (#)	Percent (%)	Number (#)	Percent (%)
<b>Years of Service in the Military</b>						
1 – 4	0	0	–	–	–	–
5 – 14	1	2.3	–	–	–	–
15 – 24	22	50.0	–	–	–	–
25+	21	47.7	–	–	–	–
<b>Previous Service in the Military</b>						
Yes	–	–	21	65.6	5	17.9
No	–	–	11	34.4	23	82.1
<b>Age</b>						
16 – 24	0	0	0	0	0	0.0
25 – 34	1	2.3	2	6.1	13	46.4
35 – 44	18	40.9	16	48.5	11	39.3
45+	25	56.8	14	42.4	4	14.3
<b>Gender</b>						
Male	42	95.5	28	84.8	19	67.9
Female	2	4.5	5	15.2	9	32.1
<b>Years at KFOR</b>						
< 1	39	90.7	4	13.3	0	0.0
1 – 2	4	9.3	2	6.7	1	10.0
3 – 5	0	0.0	6	20.0	2	20.0
5+	0	0.0	18	60.0	7	70.0

The military respondents were from across 20 different nations, with the greatest number being from Germany (6), Italy (5), and the United States (4). The ICC respondents were from across 24 different nations, with the greatest number being from the United States (6) and Great Britain (5). The LCH respondents, being local, reported being from Kosovo (23), Albania (4), and Serbia (1).

### 18.2.2 Survey Questions and Results<sup>4</sup>

A variety of organisational dimensions were assessed with the survey instrument, including:

- Quality of relations between military and civilian personnel;
- Quality of communication between military and civilian personnel;
- Perceptions of the importance of civilian personnel at KFOR;
- Senior leaders’ support for military-civilian personnel collaboration;
- Perceptions of organisational fairness at KFOR;
- Mission identification and clarity;
- Job satisfaction; and
- Retention intentions.

Military and Civilian respondents were asked a series of questions regarding the quality of their relations with one another on a 6-point scale ranging from 1 (*strongly disagree*) to 6 (*strongly agree*). As shown in Figure 18-1, an overwhelming majority of respondents from all three employee groups indicated having good relations with one another (indicated *slightly agree* to *strongly agree*).




**Figure 18-1: Quality of Relations Between Military and Civilian Personnel.**

Military and civilian respondents were asked several questions regarding the quality of communication with one another on a 6-point scale ranging from 1 (*strongly disagree*) to 6 (*strongly agree*). As shown in Figure 18-2, the majority of respondents from all three groups indicated having good quality communication between military


<sup>4</sup> These were based on or adapted from the national military-civilian personnel surveys.

and civilian personnel (indicated *slightly agree* to *strongly agree*). The question of greatest concern in this regard was that a majority of ICCs (68.8%) and LCHs (53.6%), as well as a large minority of military personnel (31.8%), believed that sometimes it seems as though military and civilian personnel are speaking different languages. Of note, the same patterns of results have been observed in national surveys of military-civilian personnel relations (e.g., in Belgium, the Netherlands, and Canada), in that overall quality of communication is reported as being positive, but respondents indicate that military and civilian personnel often seem to be speaking different languages. As such, it would seem that the two aspects are not mutually exclusive, and while generally communication is positive, there may be instances in which military and civilians have different styles or mechanisms of communication that are rather divergent (although this does not have an overall negative effect on communication quality between the workforces). LCHs were also less likely than military personnel and ICCs to indicate that military and civilian personnel share information with each other.




**Figure 18-2: Quality of Communication Between Military and Civilian Personnel.**

The extent to which civilian employees were perceived as being necessary and important to the success of the KFOR mission were assessed – both from the perspective of military personnel and from the perspective of civilian personnel themselves. As shown in Figure 18-3, all three groups of personnel indicated that civilian personnel were both necessary and important to the success of the KFOR mission (with military personnel being slightly less likely to endorse this view).



**Figure 18-3: Perception of the Importance of Civilian Personnel.**


Military and civilian respondents were asked several questions to assess their perceptions regarding senior leadership support and promotion of the collaboration between military and civilian personnel using a 6-point scale ranging from 1 (*strongly disagree*) to 6 (*strongly agree*). As shown in Figure 18-4, the majority of respondents in all three groups of personnel indicated that leaders at KFOR promote military-civilian personnel collaboration. However, some group differences were evident, with LCHs being most likely to believe that senior leaders make effort to promote military-civilian personnel collaboration, and ICCs being least likely to feel this way, indicating room for improvement in this regard.



**Figure 18-4: Senior Leader Support of Military-Civilian Personnel Collaboration.**


Military and civilian respondents were asked a series of questions regarding their perceptions of organisational fairness using a 7-point scale ranging from 1 (*strongly disagree*) to 7 (*strongly agree*). As shown in Figure 18-5, most respondents indicated perceiving KFOR to be a fair organisation. There were no systematic differences among the three groups in this regard. However, a quarter of the LCH respondents indicated that most of the

people who work at KFOR would say that they are often treated unfairly. The interview findings of this study (presented in the next section) shed some light on this issue.



**Figure 18-5: Perceptions of Organisational Fairness.**


Military and civilian respondents were asked a series of questions regarding clarity of the mission at KFOR, as well as their identification with the mission, using a 5-point scale ranging from 1 (*strongly disagree*) to 5 (*strongly agree*). As shown in Figure 18-6, scores on mission identification and mission clarity were extremely high for all three groups. Not surprisingly, LCHs were most likely to indicate that the mission has a lot of personal meaning for them, although this attitude was high for all three groups.



**Figure 18-6: Mission Identification and Clarity.**


Respondents were asked to rate their job satisfaction on a 6-point scale ranging from 1 (*strongly disagree*) to 7 (*strongly agree*). As shown in Figure 18-7, personnel from all three groups were highly satisfied with their jobs at KFOR.





**Figure 18-7: Job Satisfaction.**

As indicated in Figure 18-8, both ICCs and LCHs have stronger intentions to stay at KFOR as compared to their military counterparts. This makes sense in light of their true tenures at KFOR and the relatively short time-period normally associated with the military deployment and rotation cycle.



**Figure 18-8: Retention Intentions.**

## 18.3 INTERVIEWS

### 18.3.1 Interview Sample

A total of 18 interviews were conducted. These interviews were conducted with military (n = 10) and civilian (n = 8) personnel in senior/supervisory positions, as well as several others in key positions to inform military-civilian personnel issues (e.g., civilian human resources advisor). The military personnel ranged from NATO ranks of OF3-OF5 (i.e., Major to Col).<sup>5</sup> Five of the civilians interviewed were ICC7 (the highest ICC classification). Two of the civilians interviewed were NICs (NATO grades A3 and A5). The last civilian interviewed was an LCH.

<sup>5</sup> One military personnel at the rank of major was added impromptu as it was believed he could provide useful information and volunteered to participate.

### **18.3.2 Interview Procedure**

The interviews were arranged and scheduled by KFOR representatives prior to the arrival of the RTG research team. Each interview was conducted by two researchers from the RTG – one to ask the questions and follow-ups and the other to document the proceedings and assist in the interview, as required. The interview notes were analysed using basic thematic analysis.

### **18.3.3 Interview Results**

This section provides a general overview of the findings from the interviews and identifies the key themes that were derived. The findings also help to elucidate some of the results based on the survey questions.

#### **18.3.3.1 General Impressions**

Overall, there was unanimous agreement that the working relations between military and civilian personnel at KFOR were extremely positive. In particular, the interviews indicated good quality of communication, trust, respect, and perceptions of commitment among military personnel, ICCs, and LCHs. These findings were consistent with the survey responses regarding relationship and communication quality between the groups. This was illustrated by comments such as the following:<sup>6</sup>

*“Generally the civilians are doing a good professional job. Of course you have good and not so good civilians in much the same manner as military people can be good and not so good. The civilians and the military in the mission work together very well, they are trustful towards each other, and they are cooperative.”* (Military).

*“The civilians and military work together in a quite normal manner... it makes no difference if you wear a uniform or not...”* (Military).

*“There are complaints now and then, but normally – for 95% – the system is running well.”* (Military).

*“Commitment is the same; People understand the mission and are committed to achieve it.”* (Civilian).

#### **18.3.3.2 Authority and Chain of Command**

As might be expected, a variety of comments were made regarding discipline, authority, and related to this, styles of communication. Overall, the military personnel were described as generally being the ones in positions of authority, that military use a more authoritarian style of communication, that civilians ought to be aware of the military approach and chain of command, but that on the other hand, it is necessary for military supervisors to recognise that civilians are not military and require different (less authoritarian) styles of communication. This theme is illustrated by comments such as the following:

*“The military are in power in the mission, but on the other hand they have to rely on, and they have to trust the specialized civilians.”* (Military).

*“As a senior ICC, have to be aware of military chain of command. Every new boss I have I say ‘sir, I give advice, you make decisions.’”* (Civilian).

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<sup>6</sup> There was great variation in the extent to which military interviewees interacted with civilians, some indicating a fair bit of interaction and some indicating interacting with civilians infrequently.

*“In a supervising role one approaches the civilians differently from the military. The military are used to being addressed with few words, the military way. This is not possible with civilians.” (Military).*

*“What I have learned from the military is discipline. I worked for the UN mission too, and see that civilians are less disciplined, have fewer rules and procedures. Also, military have higher regard for the chain of command.” (Military).*

*“Biggest challenge is that higher levels of command forget that you are civilian and start addressing us as if we were military...which would not be acceptable in a totally civilian environment. We are not here to follow military rules as if we were soldiers, but this is sometimes lost by senior officers.” (Civilian).*

An additional noteworthy observation in this regard is that sometimes military personnel are reluctant to have performance evaluations conducted by civilian personnel. This can be problematic if their direct supervisor is indeed civilian, and is therefore the person most familiar with their performance. In some cases, a military supervisor in their chain of command, or the military national representative, conducts the evaluation, even if they have no direct exposure to the employee’s performance. This is illustrated by the following type of comments:

*“Some nations don’t accept a review of evaluation by a civilian supervisor if he is not a military person. Then the national military representative wants to do the evaluation, even though this person is not working with the person who needs to be evaluated.” (Military).*

*“Of course, all this is sensitive because national militaries do not accept comments by a civilian supervisor... The other way around, the position of the military commander is easier... they still follow the standard procedure of “simply follow the orders and rules.” (Military).*

### **18.3.3.3 Effects of the Military Cycle**

The most common remarks in the interviews were related to the military rotational cycle, the effects on continuity, knowledge management, and corporate memory and the role of civilian personnel in mitigating potential problems related to frequent rotations. There were even some suggestions to convert some military positions into civilian ones in order to facilitate continuity, and also an indication that this has happened in some cases. This issue is illustrated by comments such as the following:

*“Civilians have contracts for 3 years, whereas the military are only present for 6 months. This creates a difference in terms of inside-knowledge among the civilians, from which the military can profit. The military can profit from the civilians’ more in-depth and extensive knowledge about mission’s specifics (names, procedures, local and political situation, language), insights and experiences.” (Military).*

*“The advantage of ICCs is their longer stay in the organization, hence constituting an organizational memory.” (Military).*

*“Some of the ICCs are here for 8 or more years – the need for continuity is very key here due to the military rotations. Actually, some civilian positions were created specifically in order to provide additional stability.” (Military).*

*“Biggest benefit from the presence of civilians in the military organization: mitigate the problem with the lack of continuity during the rotations, keeping knowledge, contacts, expertise.” (Civilian).*

*“1) Hire more civilians and 2) convert some positions from military to civilian – both to guarantee continuity.” (Civilian).*

*“The local civilians know more about the Kosovo society and because they have been longer at KFOR giving them more insight knowledge and experience than the military who come and go.” (Military).*

*“Although the military get their briefings about who is who and how things work locally, they rely a lot on us for detailed knowledge.” (Civilian).*

*“Benefit is the same as at home – civilians stay longer so help the military with respect to context specific knowledge, which is key.” (Military).*

*“The long-term perspective provided by civilians is vital – without it the mission couldn’t operate, it would be a new mission each time.” (Military).*

A related notion raised was the dependency on civilian personnel that can be created because they are the ones with the long-term experience and information. This was sometimes seen as negative and sometimes just pointed out in a matter of fact fashion. This theme is illustrated by the following comments:

*“ICCs can exploit the environment because the military staff turns over so much that the military can become very dependent on the ICCs who embed themselves in an environment. It actually becomes a risk to the mission to lose them.” (Civilian).*

*“A weak military leader may depend on the civilian who has been around for a long time, and may run things. OK, if the civilian is good, but can lead to problems too.” (Military).*

*“Some civilians have been here for 15 years – we have a rotational cycle – so they run the ship.” (Military).*

*“If you are a weak military person, you fully rely on your civilian personnel... that is not what you should be doing... you have to take their advice and insights into account for sure, but you should not rely on them...” (Military).*

Another commonly discussed issue associated with military rotations was related to the effects of frequent rotations on the management of civilian personnel in particular. This included the varying approaches of different military supervisors to which the civilian personnel needed to readapt repeatedly, in some cases different priorities of different military supervisors, and the need to re-establish trust with new military supervisors/personnel. In some cases, this also related to substantive ability or qualifications of a military supervisor/colleague in terms of the time required to get to a good working level, often only to be rotated out shortly after this was achieved. This is illustrated by the following types of comments:

*“A significant challenge is adapting and working with different military personnel due to the rotations.” (Civilian).*

*“Criteria are different between nations, so some military personnel don’t have the professional skills for the job they are rotated into. By the time they get up to speed it’s often time for them to leave; once they ‘reach maturity’ it’s time to leave; given this, another effect on civilians in particular is that they may be more knowledgeable than their military supervisor.” (Military).*

*“The biggest challenge is the rotation system: the civilians are here forever... the military come and go, and one of the consequences is that every new supervising military wants to do his or her own things while being in charge... and then it changes again with a new commander...” (Military).*

*“Rotational cycle also a problem because military can’t send their best for each rotation.” (Military).*

*“Even a problem for military-military – rotational cycles have different lengths depending on position, so one’s supervisor may be rotated out at various rates.” (Military).*

*“The biggest challenge is the rotation cycle. Civilians have to adjust to different personalities and priorities. One mil supervisor may say “I want sand bags right here” next one comes in and asks “why are there sandbags here!?” (Military).*

*“Although the civilian may have deep knowledge that would be useful to share, may be hesitant to provide feedback, especially if it is negative. So that period where you are just starting to understand your supervisor and how they work is a challenge – not likely to be as open and provide all the benefit of your feedback.” (Civilian).*

In a related vein, there were some comments related to appropriate supervision and oversight of civilian personnel by military supervisors as a consequence of these supervisors being frequently rotated. This is illustrated by the following type of comments:

*“The ICCs will never lose the contract because the military are only there for six months... by consequence, they will never take disciplinary actions towards the civilians... so the ICCs are not really controlled.” (Civilian).*

*“because of the rotation of military supervisors, basically very little disciplinary action unless there is an extreme case “basically give the person a blank check as long as they contribute in some way” – in this way ineffective employees can be retained; also, the mil person is there for a short time, so if the situation isn’t overly bad can just manage it until it’s time for them to leave rather than executing a more permanent solution.” (Civilian).*

On the other side of the coin, there were some comments indicating that, particularly because they are there for the long-term, civilians are especially likely to perform well and to ensure success.

*“ICCs due to their long-term work, have a longer perspective. Military are much more short-termist in their outlook, focused on limiting damage on their career than focusing on their objectives. If you are messed up in a civilian environment, you are gone, so people are more willing to take necessary decisions and achieve the objectives.” (Civilian).*

*“Because ICCs are pseudo-military and make important decisions, they see a bigger picture. Due to long-term work here, they are very committed to their roles.” (Civilian).*

*“Civilian attitude: I am here and must make sure that things that are required get done. Cannot put this off until the end of duty tour. Military can often put off something that is challenging or difficult.” (Civilian).*

*“The LCHs, Kosovars, are very committed to the mission, more so than the military because they have double interest: they have a relatively well paid job, and they are convinced that KFOR’s presence is good to have a stabile situation in the country. The military, going in and out, are much more indifferent, enjoying today’s calmness of the mission.” (Military).*

#### **18.3.3.4 Benefits of Mixed Military-Civilian Personnel Context**

In addition to the significant benefits provided by the complementary roles of military and civilian personnel in the context of the military rotational cycle, a variety of other benefits were also identified by the interviewees. These included the benefits understood to be provided by having different perspectives, views, experiences, and skills that complement one another and that together contribute to mission success; the option to employ civilian employees that can make up for personnel shortages in some areas; as well as access to local sources, knowledge, people, and institutions that civilians can sometimes provide more readily than military personnel.

Comments that illustrate the benefit of diversity and different perspectives include:

*“Diversity is a good thing; it is an enrichment not a threat to unity.” (Military).*

*“Civilians have a different view; military person probably can’t catch everything and civilians complement their perspective; both because they are civilian and/or because they are local; so sometimes the mil culture may have a certain view and civilians have openness to other perspectives.” (Military).*

*“A distinct benefit is that military focus on things in a certain way, and civilians may see things in a new or perhaps even simpler way. So different viewpoints and perspectives can be beneficial.” (Military).*

*“The benefits of having the two categories working together are as follows... the civilians will see things that you cannot or will not see as a military person... That is good. The civilians will not go against you, which is related to being in a senior commanding position.” (Military).*

Comments that illustrate the specialised or complementary skill sets or availability of civilian personnel include:

*“Sometimes positions were vacant for many months, and that was a reason to turn those vacancies into civilian positions.” (Military).*

*“The civilians often have special qualifications, such as engineers and lawyers.” (Military).*

*“Civilians, particularly ICCs, bring a particular skill set – this skill set(s) generally doesn’t exist in the military personnel available.” (Military).*

*“Civilian engineers bring specific expertise that is not providing by the PME [Professional Military Education]; military engineers can benefit from this additional expertise.” (Civilian).*

*“The LCHs are enablers – they make the mission happen by providing aspects such as support services and translation.” (Civilian).*

*“Some jobs require very specific skills and knowledge that are not part of military education. We need civilians to fill those specific jobs that the military are unable to do.” (Military).*

Comments that illustrate the value of civilians in providing access to local sources include:

*“Civilians can provide value to the mission by providing access to segments not easily open to mil. For example, at senior levels, senior civilian NICs or ICCs can speak to civilian decision makers in NATO much easier –so this can be taken advantage of as it provides greater access by providing opportunity for access on different fronts.” (Civilian).*

*“Some projects have to be coordinated with local community. LCHs can be ‘our extended hand’ to interact with the local companies. LCHs have a local network, maybe even went to school together.” (Military).*

*“Local employees are very important to us. Their daily tasks are dealing with local institutions, companies: they know the language and are selected for the skills that are necessary for KFOR.” (Military).*

### 18.3.3.5 Fairness

Interviewees were asked whether military and civilian personnel were treated with equal fairness. For the most part, responses to this question were positive. Overall, respondents indicated an atmosphere of fairness at KFOR. Some comments related to fairness included:

*“Unlike the situation in UNIFIL there are no considerable differences in payment and material working conditions between civilians and military personnel.”* (Military).

*“There is no discrimination with respect to any of the groups...”* (Military).

*“There are no stereotypes between military and civilians.”* (Civilian).

*“Fairness to civilians also depends on rotational cycle – sometimes things are fair and sometimes less fair depending on the supervisor at the time, and their previous experiences with civilian personnel.”* (Civilian).

*“Generally everyone is treated fairly. However, that doesn’t necessarily mean to be treated the same.”* (Military).

*“Treatment of civilians and military is the same; everybody has social events together, they drink coffee together, socialize together and sometimes they even go downtown and to local people at home... so the atmosphere is very good...”* (Military).

However, there were some notable exceptions with respect to fairness perceptions. In general, these concerns were associated with fairness issues among the civilian groups themselves, rather than between military and civilian personnel. In particular, there were some suggestions that the rights and privileges of LCHs should be extended to better match those of ICCs (e.g., use of facilities, access to post exchange/PX); further, it was suggested that the working conditions and benefits of ICCs should be augmented to better match those of NICs (e.g., job security; pension; leave) or that ICC positions should be converted to NIC positions more readily.

Comments associated with fairness of treatment for LCHs included:

*“The locally hired get better paid than the average wages in Kosovo economy, to an extent that is reasonable and doesn’t put them into poverty... but comparatively to Western standards their wages are relatively low, of course.”* (Military).

*“As to locally hired civilians, they often ask questions about payments, working times... they know their salaries are OK compared to Kosovo society, but compared to the ICCs their wages are much less, and they feel relatively deprived, as they sometimes convey...”* (Civilian).

*“LCHs in particular, cannot have the same privileges. For example, ICCs can purchase at PX, LCHs cannot. That is a national policy. Military get line preference in food lines (assumption that they are busy).”* (Military).

*“Sometimes LCHs complain about professional development. However, it’s not the responsibility of NATO to ensure this; they need to take ownership of their own PD – review your own skill set, go get the necessary requirements.”* (Civilian).

*“LCHs got no rights: have to tread carefully not to be laid off...Not allowed to use a gym. SOPs specify they are not allowed to shop in PXs. Are not entitled to participate in Moral and Welfare Activities. ICCs – allowed to use all amenities and facilities just as military, but not LCHs. To get their loyalty, more should be done for them.”* (Civilian).

*“But our LHC colleagues should be treated with a lot more compassion. They should have the same entitlements as others – using gyms, PXs, etc. Salary differential is already big enough to make them feel inferior.” (Civilian).*

*“NICs and ICCs are more comparable in status and functions; LHCs must be, however, compared in relation to local market conditions, but extending many entitlements to them may show they are really appreciated.” (Civilian).*

*“The locals are still viewed as “second hand citizens” in the mission: they are not allowed to use the gymnasium, the entrance procedures are quite different, they have body checks all the times (with beepers checking their bags). That is for security reasons, but it has been 14 years that ‘shots have been fired in anger here in Kosovo.’ The locals are not complaining about these issues, because they are so afraid of losing their jobs... There is no union to protect them as would have been the case in Western Europe.” (Civilian).*

Comments associated with fairness of treatment for ICCs included:

*“ICC financial regulations are different from those for NATO civilians; there is perception of unfair treatment.” (Civilian).*

*“Serious consideration should be given to converting ICCs to NATO civilians: same fringe benefits, pension, job security, etc. Pensions are particularly a big difference. NIC get special leave and special circumstances special leave, parental leave, education allowances for kids, pensions – ICCs do not get that (their special leave is just 7 days a year). They get longer holidays. They are not required to fill time sheets as ICCs (you require that from people who are not trusted). Do not see why it should differ, while jobs are essentially the same.” (Civilian).*

*“There is an important question though: why don’t the ICCs get the status of NICs at KFOR? ...Most importantly pension schemes and other HR arrangements... We raised this issue with HR specialists and we did not get any response... However, we don’t want to push too hard, because they might say: “if you don’t like it, then you better can go and find another job.” (Civilian).*

*“ICCs complain that they are not treated as NICs. Some ICCs became NICs, but nobody explained why just a select few.” (Civilian).*

### **18.3.3.6 Challenges Associated with Working in a Mixed Military-Civilian Personnel Context**

In addition to the potential difficulties associated with the military rotational cycle (on civilians), a number of other challenges were identified in the unique context of a mixed military-civilian workforce. Some of these related to the different “conditions of service/employment” that apply to different categories of personnel (such as different expectations of working hours), preparedness of military to supervise civilian personnel, as well the need of military supervisors to adapt their style of communication when communicating with civilians (as discussed in the “Authority and Chain of Command” section). Some statements that reflect these potential challenges and unique considerations include:

*“Sometimes the restrictions to civilian working arrangements lead to additional rules, such as need for ‘overtime’ if additional assistance is required, which isn’t the case for military personnel, who are expected to work as required without worrying about these work restrictions.” (Military).*

*“Some military supervisors are not accustomed to civilians and how to manage them – especially if in the country of origin they are not really integrated.” (Civilian).*



*“Working with the civilians gets down to working time issues, outside the working hours you cannot ask them anything.” (Military).*

*“Biggest challenge is that higher levels of command forget that you are civilian and start addressing us as if we were military – even shouting at us ...which would not be acceptable in a totally civilian environment. We are not here to follow military rules as if we were soldiers, but this is sometimes lost by senior officers.” (Civilian).*

*“Biggest challenge: need to address civilians differently. You can order the military at the end of the day to report on an issue at 8am; civilians cannot be demanded or ordered the same. Might be necessary, but then a request has to be polite (“be so kind”). The content might be the same, but the way of communicating it should be different.” (Military).*

### **18.3.3.7 Observations Specific to Working in a Multinational Context**

Although the focus of this research was on diversity from the lens of military-civilian interaction, it is important to note that, given the multinational nature of the mission (with approximately 30 different nations being represented at KFOR at the time of this study), the issue of military-civilian interaction evolves within a multinational diversity context. A number of interviewees spoke to this issue, in some cases indicating that the multinational context did not really affect military-civilian interaction, and in some cases noting that it did have some influence.

Some statements illustrating the positive sentiments include:

*“The multinational influence is usually not an issue for military-civilian, but there are clear cultural differences among countries with respect to rank structure.” (Military).*

*“The often broad international experience of most ICCs helps for better cooperation in multinational context.” (Civilian).*

*“Very wicked place is to be in a one-nation dominated camp. ...These are miserable places: bring national rules and impose them. Biggest benefit of this camp – multinational camp. Everyone has to work together. The mix of LCH, ICC, military is very good.” (Civilian).*

*“Multinational nature is positive, everyone yields to make things work – be it LCHs, ICCs, or military.” (Civilian).*

Some statements revealing potential challenges in this regard include:

*“Organizational and cultural differences are important between nations with different positioning and different roles of the civilian personnel.” (Civilian).*

*“Language does flavour things and so do national differences.” (Military).*

*“Active duty military often are more rigid, do not understand that civilians, for instance, can question the superiors or refuse to comply on legal grounds. In some countries, there is culture of slavish obedience to commanders.” (Civilian).*

## **18.4 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

Overall, both the surveys and the interview findings indicate that the work culture and relations between the military and civilian personnel at KFOR were generally very positive. Military personnel indicated generally

positive attitudes and levels of respect and recognition for their civilian counterparts, and these were reciprocated by civilian employees towards military personnel. Overall, there appeared to be good quality of communication, trust, respect, and perceptions of commitment among military personnel, ICCs, and LCHs.

Despite these generally positive findings, the interviews did highlight a number of challenges unique to working in a military-civilian organisation, and a number of issues that could be ameliorated. From these, the following recommendations are provided:

- Working in a military context entails a variety of aspects and considerations that are not relevant within the civilian workforce. These are generally associated with the unique military culture, department, and leadership styles. As such, civilians working within a military organisational structure are required to appreciate the military system and be aware of military chain of command and styles of communication. Orientation/on-boarding initiatives may be useful in facilitating this understanding at the outset. This is usually less of an issue with ICCs, the majority of whom are retired military personnel.
- Military supervisors may require familiarisation and in some case training on the supervision of civilian personnel, especially if there are few civilian personnel employed in their home defence organisation or they are new to civilian human resource management. Given that civilians are not part of military culture and are not beholden by the same conditions of service as military personnel, military supervisors need to understand and respect civilian employment conditions (e.g., work hours; more consensual style of communication). It was also noted that greater consistency in reading the “Civilian Staff Rules (CSRs) for HQ Balkans” would be helpful, as currently these may rarely be consulted, usually only once a problem has already occurred. Finally, it may be beneficial for military supervisors who manage civilians to be privy to some structured training on the supervision of civilian personnel (which is something that exists in a number of nations for civilian personnel in garrison, such as Canada and the United Kingdom).
- A number of interviewees suggested that military personnel could make greater efforts to explicitly consult with civilians. Given that civilians often have unique perspectives, specialised skills, greater corporate and historical knowledge, and greater familiarity with local conditions, capitalising on the information they can provide can tangibly contribute to mission success. Although this certainly takes place, it can be augmented in some cases (e.g., more consistently across military supervisors; by explicit messages that these views are sought and considered to be important).
- One salient message was related to the comparatively lesser rights and benefits of LCHs. Although there are certainly international guidelines and important reasons (e.g., security) for some of these differences, it may be beneficial to:
  - a) Examine potential areas in which these differences can be minimised without negative operational repercussions; and
  - b) Clearly communicate the rationale for these regulations and differences so that additional substantiation is provided for real differences, and so that potential misperceptions are clarified to the degree possible.
- Many interviewees, both civilian and military, indicated that the employment practices related to ICCs ought to be examined. This may entail potentially considering converting long-term ICC positions to NIC positions (in cases where they seem to be serving the same long-term function, for example), or in other cases, abiding by the guidelines of not employing ICCs for overly long periods (e.g., over 3 years). It is clear that, although there are certainly explicit differences between ICCs and NICs and the ways in which they came to be hired, there are also many similarities in these two employment categories, but nevertheless ICCs receive tangibly lower benefits in the areas of job security, pension, and days of

leave. Once again, it is suggested that greater efforts be made to clearly communicate the rationale for these regulations/differences so that additional substantiation is provided for real differences, and so that potential misperceptions are clarified to the degree possible.

- Various effects related to the military rotational cycle and the associated continuity provided by civilian personnel were discussed. Of course, temporary deployment is the operational reality and requirement for military personnel, one that is not likely to change in the foreseeable future. However, there may be some additional efforts that can be applied to ameliorate the unintended consequences of this rotational cycle.
  - Changes in the military supervisors of civilian personnel are often associated with changes in goals, approaches, management styles, and even working conditions. The handovers among military managers may better include this factor explicitly to ensure continuity in the type of supervision and working styles for civilian employees. Relatedly, any efforts to facilitate communication and trust among new supervisors and their personnel as expediently as possible may also be beneficial.
  - In some cases, there may develop unintended, and perhaps undue, dependence on the knowledge and experience of civilian personnel in given roles. As such, in some instances, greater effort may be required to establish mechanisms for enhancing knowledge management practices and the maintenance of corporate memory, so that dependence on any specific individual, be it military or civilian, is minimised.
  - It was suggested that in some cases, frequent rotations result in insufficient supervision, performance evaluation, or even disciplinary action for civilian personnel as a result of the short-term perspective that some military supervisors have to either observe or to address short-comings. Consideration of supplemental supervision/evaluation may be beneficial to circumvent this unintended effect.
- Most interviews expressed the importance of positive military-civilian interaction and collaboration. A commonly suggested approach for facilitating this was the use of social activities, such as shared meals, joint social functions, as well as “off camp” initiatives. Indeed, many civilian and military personnel currently participate in such social activities at KFOR.



## **Chapter 19 – MILITARY-CIVILIAN ORGANISATIONAL CULTURE WITHIN NATO SHAPE**

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Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE), located in Mons, Belgium, is the strategic level headquarters of NATO's Allied Command Operations. SHAPE's mission is to prepare for, plan and conduct military operations in order to meet Alliance political objectives [8]. SHAPE comprises a multinational staff of at least 28 nations.

In 2014, a study of SHAPE's Organisational Culture was requested by the Chief of Staff<sup>1</sup> to examine topics related to organisational culture and corporate identity, commitment, leadership, trust, job satisfaction, mission identification, working atmosphere, and command climate. The aim of the Organizational Culture Study (OCS) was to provide recommendations to improve the overall working culture, and thereby the effectiveness and efficiency, of the SHAPE organisation [2], [7]. The study was conducted by two collaborating academic institutions, namely the Netherlands Defence Academy, Breda (NLDA), and the Bundeswehr Center for Military History and Social Sciences, Potsdam, (ZMSBw).

In the context of this larger study, there was also an opportunity to explore aspects of military-civilian personnel work culture and relations within a multinational context and within this highest military NATO level. This is because not only do some 28 or more nations contribute to SHAPE, but also because of the relatively large proportion of civilians at SHAPE as compared to other multinational military deployments. As such, representatives from NATO STO RTG HFM-226 collaborated with researchers conducting the OCS to examine SHAPE's integrated military and civilian staff. The present chapter presents the results of this analysis.

### **19.1 METHODOLOGY**

All members of the SHAPE international staff (IS; soldiers and civilians, all ranks, all divisions and organisational units) were invited to participate in the OCS survey. The survey was administered between 15<sup>th</sup> October and 14<sup>th</sup> November 2014. The survey was administered online using a SharePoint platform and was conducted on a voluntary and anonymous basis.

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<sup>1</sup> General Freers.

In total, 795 SHAPE staff were invited to complete the survey via e-mail invitations. Altogether, 353 personnel completed the survey, yielding a 44% response rate. Participants were 286 (82%) military and 64 (18%) civilian personnel. The demographic characteristics of the sample are presented in Table 19-1. As shown there, although both groups were predominantly male, a much greater proportion of the military personnel (95%) were male as compared to the proportion of males in the civilian sample (68%). Moreover, civilian personnel were much more likely to be 51 years of age or older (54%) as compared to their military counterparts (20%). Of note, this mirrors the gender and age patterns of military and civilian personnel within national defence organisations [4]. With respect to tenure at SHAPE, civilians served for a much longer period (an average of 8 years and 7.4 months) than their military counterparts (who served an average of 1 year and 4.7 months). Also of note, a majority of the civilian respondents (70%) had previous military experience. Similar proportions of military (40%) and civilian (41%) personnel indicated that they are responsible for supervising others at SHAPE.

**Table 19-1: Demographic Characteristics of the SHAPE OCS Survey Respondents.**

		All	Civ	Mil
<b>Status</b>			18%	82%
<b>Gender</b>	Female	9%	32%	5%
	Male	91%	68%	95%
<b>Age (Years)</b>	Below 30	4%	8%	3%
	31 – 40	23%	11%	26%
	41 – 50	47%	27%	51%
	Over 51	26%	54%	20%
<b>Average Tenure at SHAPE</b>			8 years and 7.4 months	1 year and 4.7 months
<b>Service</b>	Army			49%
	Air Force			29%
	Navy			19%
	Marines (or equivalent)			1%
	Other			2%
<b>Military Experience?</b>	Yes		70%	
	No		30%	
<b>Are you responsible for supervising others at SHAPE?</b>	Yes	40%	41%	40%
	No	60%	59%	60%


Much of the OCS questionnaire was adapted from standardised scales and previous studies in the field of organisational research on military multi-nationality. In addition, survey items designed to examine military-civilian personnel collaboration in defence organisations as part of the NATO STO RTG HFM-226 [5] were included in the survey to enable the study of military-civilian integration and collaboration in the context of SHAPE.

## 19.2 RESULTS

### 19.2.1 General Perceptions of SHAPE Employment

#### 19.2.1.1 Motivation for Assignment

There were some differences in the factors that motivated military and civilian personnel to work at SHAPE, as shown in Figure 19-1.<sup>2</sup> The biggest differences were that military personnel were significantly more likely to work at SHAPE to represent their nations' interests, as well as to work in a foreign country and to gather experience in a multinational environment. By contrast, civilian personnel were significantly more likely to work at SHAPE to earn more money, to promote their professional careers and to support alliance missions. Nevertheless, the biggest motivators for both groups were related to working in a multinational environment, a top level NATO HQ, and to support alliance missions.



Means of 5-point Likert-Scales (0 = completely unimportant to 4 = completely important); value range [0; 4], \*\* p < 0.01, \*\*\* p < 0.001.

Figure 19-1: Motivation Profiles of Civilian and Military Personnel.

<sup>2</sup> To gather experience in a multinational environment:  $t(347) = 2.66, p < 0.01$ ; To work in a top level NATO HQ:  $t(343) = -0.80, ns$ ; To earn more money:  $t(346) = -3.32, p < 0.01$ ; To represent my nation's interests at SHAPE:  $t(347) = 5.84, p < 0.001$ ; To work and live in a foreign country:  $t(342) = 3.18, p < 0.01$ ; To promote my professional career:  $t(102.08) = -3.43, p < 0.01$ ; To support alliance missions:  $t(345) = -2.84, p < 0.01$ .

**19.2.1.2 Accountability**

When asked to whom respondents feel most accountable in their daily work, the majority of both military and civilian personnel indicated feeling most accountable to SHAPE (89% and 98% for military and civilian personnel, respectively), as shown in Table 19-2. Although only a small proportion of military personnel (7%) indicated feeling most accountable to their national armed forces, this was higher than the proportion of civilians (0%) who noted their national armed forces as their main point of reference. A negligible proportion of either group of personnel indicated the national military representative as their main point of reference for their daily work.<sup>3</sup>

**Table 19-2: Accountability Points of Reference of Civilian and Military Personnel.**

	Item	Status	
		Civ	Mil
<b>Point of Reference</b>	SHAPE	98%	89%
	My National Military Representative (NMR)	2%	4%
	My National Armed Forces	0%	7%

**19.2.1.3 Workload**

Interestingly, when asked to compare their workload at SHAPE to tasks in their previous roles, a significantly higher proportion of civilians indicated that their workload is greater at SHAPE as compared to their previous roles, whereas a significantly higher proportion of military personnel indicated that their workload was smaller than in their previous roles (Table 19-3).<sup>4</sup> The data do not contain any background information on current tasks/roles in contrast to previous employment. The different evaluations may stem from different workloads in previous assignments or jobs of from an uneven distribution of tasks and duties within SHAPE. If the latter is the case, this could affect perceptions of organisational fairness. This explanation is in accordance with the results in section 19.2.1.5 on differences in fairness perceptions between the two groups.

**Table 19-3: Workload Comparisons of Civilian and Military Personnel.**

	Item	Status	
		Civ	Mil
<b>Workload Comparison</b>	At SHAPE my workload is bigger	52%	27%
	The workload is nearly the same	41%	46%
	At SHAPE my workload is smaller	7%	27%

<sup>3</sup>  $Chi^2(2) = 5.55, ns.$

<sup>4</sup>  $Chi^2(2) = 19.10, p < 0.001.$



19.2.1.4 Preparation and Training

As shown in Figure 19-2, civilian personnel were more likely than their military counterparts to indicate having received appropriate training in order to accomplish their duties at SHAPE (63% of civilians and 47% of military *agreed* or *completely agreed* with this statement, whereas only 14% of civilians but 27% of military *disagreed* or *completely disagreed*).<sup>5</sup> Similarly, as shown in Figure 19-3, a far greater proportion of civilians indicated being well prepared for their roles at SHAPE as compared to their military counterparts (86% of civilians and 62% of military *agreed* or *completely agreed* with this statement)<sup>6</sup>. This may stem, in part, from civilians’ longer periods of employment at SHAPE.




Figure 19-2: “I received appropriate training to accomplish my tasks and responsibilities at SHAPE”.

<sup>5</sup>  $M = 3.26$  ( $SD = 1.13$ ) for military personnel and  $M = 3.67$  ( $SD = 1.13$ ) for civilian personnel;  $t(347) = -2.66, p < 0.01$ . value range [1, 5].

<sup>6</sup>  $M = 3.67$  ( $SD = 1.11$ ) for military personnel and  $M = 4.38$  ( $SD = 0.81$ ) for civilian personnel;  $t(123.16) = -5.82, p < 0.001$ . value range [1, 5].




Figure 19-3: “I feel well prepared for performing my role at SHAPE”.

### 19.2.1.5 Perceptions of Fairness

Fairness was assessed using 5 items.<sup>7</sup> Out of these 5 items, an Organisational Fairness-Index was constructed (value range of mean scores: [0, 1]). On average, civilian personnel ( $M = 0.68$ ;  $SD = 0.20$ ) perceived SHAPE to be less fair as compared to military personnel ( $M = 0.77$ ;  $SD = 0.16$ ),  $t(79.69) = 3.32$ ,  $p < 0.01$ , though it should be noted that both groups, on average, perceived the organisation to be relatively fair. The mean level of agreement with each item for military and civilian personnel is presented in Figure 19-4. As shown there, military personnel were more likely to indicate that, for the most part, SHAPE treats its employees fairly,<sup>8</sup> that in general they can count on SHAPE to be fair,<sup>9</sup> and that overall, they are treated fairly at SHAPE.<sup>10</sup> In contrast, SHAPE civilians were more likely than military personnel to indicate that most of the people who work at SHAPE are often treated unfairly,<sup>11</sup> and that usually the way things work at SHAPE is not fair.<sup>12</sup> Nevertheless, overall both military and civilian personnel perceived SHAPE to be a fair organisation.

<sup>7</sup> A modified version of Ambrose and Schminke’s [1] overall organisational justice scale was used to evaluate perceptions of overall organisational fairness or justice. Participants were asked to indicate their degree of agreement with each item on a 7-point scale ranging from 1 (*strongly disagree*) to 7 (*strongly agree*).


<sup>8</sup>  $t(343) = 3.07$ ,  $p < 0.001$ .

<sup>9</sup>  $t(87.18) = 2.42$ ,  $p < 0.05$ .

<sup>10</sup>  $t(344) = 2.52$ ,  $p < 0.01$ .

<sup>11</sup>  $t(85.04) = -2.40$ ,  $p < 0.05$ .

<sup>12</sup>  $t(95.55) = -2.16$ ,  $p < 0.05$ .



Means of 7-point Likert-Scales (1 = completely disagree to 7 = completely agree);  
 \*p < 0.05; \*\* p < 0.01; \*\*\* p < 0.001

Figure 19-4: Perceptions of Organisational Fairness.

### 19.2.1.6 Job Satisfaction

When asked, “All in all, how much are you satisfied with your job at SHAPE?”, military and civilian respondents reported similar levels of overall job satisfaction, ( $M = 4.01$ ;  $SD = 0.89$ ) for military personnel and ( $M = 4.16$ ;  $SD = 0.78$ ) for civilian personnel, respectively,  $t(348) = -1.18$ ,  $ns$ <sup>13</sup>. Moreover, military and civilian personnel were equally likely to report that they would recommend a comrade or colleague to apply to work at SHAPE, ( $M = 1.44$ ;  $SD = 0.58$ ) for military personnel and ( $M = 1.57$ ;  $SD = 0.64$ ) for civilian personnel, respectively,  $t(345) = -1.55$ ,  $ns$ .<sup>14</sup>

### 19.2.1.7 Affective Commitment


Military and civilian respondents were asked several questions assessing their affective commitment (or emotional connection) to SHAPE.<sup>15</sup> The mean level of agreement with each item for military and civilian

<sup>13</sup> Level of job satisfaction was rated on a 5-point scale ranging from *completely unsatisfied* to *completely satisfied*; value range [1; 5] t-tests were  $ns$ .

<sup>14</sup> Likelihood of recommending was rated on a 4-point scale ranging from *yes, without hesitation* to *in no case*; value range [1; 4].

<sup>15</sup> Affective organisational commitment (i.e., emotional ties or connection to an organisation) was measured using 4 adapted items from the organisational commitment questionnaire designed by Meyer, Allen, and Smith [6]. The original items were tailored to the SHAPE population, such that the term *my organisation* was replaced with *SHAPE* in each item. Participants were asked to indicate their level of agreement with each statement on a 5-point scale ranging from 1 (*strongly disagree*) to 5 (*strongly agree*).

personnel is presented in Figure 19-5.<sup>16</sup> There were no significant differences in military and civilian respondents for most of the items, including those related to feeling like part of the family and a sense of belonging at SHAPE, as well as the personal meaning of SHAPE to respondents. However, on average, military respondents felt a higher level of emotional attachment to SHAPE in comparison to their civilian counterparts.



Means of 5-point Likert-Scales (1 = strongly disagree to 5 = strongly agree); \*p < 0.05

**Figure 19-5: Affective Organisational Commitment.**

Out of these 4 items, an Affective Commitment-Index was constructed (value range of the mean was recoded to range between 1 and 0: [0, 1]; Cronbach’s  $\alpha = 0.89$ ). On average, civilian personnel’s affective commitment ( $M = 0.65$ ;  $SD = 0.23$ ) was similar to military personnel’s affective commitment ( $M = 0.62$ ;  $SD = 0.21$ ),  $t(87.33) = -1.03, ns$ .

### 19.2.1.8 Clarity of Mission

On average, military and civilian personnel reported being similarly clear with respect to the purpose of SHAPE and its objectives, as shown in Figure 19-6. In particular, 85% of civilians and 81% of military *agreed* or *completely agreed* that they are sure about the purpose of SHAPE<sup>17</sup>, and 94% of civilians and 85% of military *agreed* or *completely agreed* that they understand the SHAPE objectives.<sup>18</sup>

<sup>16</sup> I feel like “part of the family” in SHAPE:  $t(83.58) = 1.21, ns$ ; SHAPE has a great deal of personal meaning for me:  $t(345) = -1.12, ns$ ; I feel a strong sense of belonging to SHAPE:  $t(347) = -1.47, ns$ ; I feel emotionally attached to SHAPE:  $t(345) = -2.37, p < 0.05$ .

<sup>17</sup>  $M = 4.11$  ( $SD = 0.88$ ) for military personnel and  $M = 4.30$  ( $SD = 0.78$ ) for civilian personnel; value range [1; 5];  $t(346) = -1.61, ns$ .

<sup>18</sup>  $M = 4.18$  ( $SD = 0.80$ ) for military personnel and  $M = 4.31$  ( $SD = 0.59$ ) for civilian personnel; value range [1; 5];  $t(348) = -1.23, ns$ .




Figure 19-6: Mission Clarity.

## 19.2.2 Military-Civilian Work Culture and Relations at SHAPE

### 19.2.2.1 Perceptions of the SHAPE Organisation

Military personnel were more likely than civilians to indicate that SHAPE is a “rather civilian organisation”, although, the majority of personnel in both groups did not view SHAPE as a particularly civilian organisation (with 84% of civilians and 66% of military either *disagreeing* or *completely disagreeing* with this statement; Figure 19-7).<sup>19</sup> Similarly, military personnel were more likely to indicate that a civilian atmosphere is dominant at SHAPE (only approximately half disagreed with this statement) as compared to civilians (of whom 67% disagreed with this statement; see Figure 19-8).<sup>20</sup> This may stem from previous points of reference in terms of employment in previous contexts and organisations, with military personnel likely having a greater likelihood of coming from military and/or operational settings, and viewing SHAPE as having more *civilian* qualities by comparison.

<sup>19</sup>  $M = 2.17$  ( $SD = 1.08$ ) for military personnel and  $M = 1.69$  ( $SD = 0.78$ ) for civilian personnel; value range [1; 5];  $t(118.01) = 4.00, p < 0.01$ .

<sup>20</sup>  $M = 2.59$  ( $SD = 0.98$ ) for military personnel and  $M = 2.13$  ( $SD = 0.99$ ) for civilian personnel; value range [1; 5];  $t(346) = 3.35, p < 0.01$ .




Figure 19-7: “For me this HQ is rather a civilian organisation”.




Figure 19-8: “A civilian working atmosphere is dominant at SHAPE”.

Further, approximately half of respondents, both military and civilian, believed that there is a big difference in their daily work at SHAPE as compared to daily work in a civilian organisation (with 51% of civilians and 49% of military either *disagreeing* or *completely disagreeing* with the statement that there is no big difference in their daily work between SHAPE and a civilian organisation; see Figure 19-9). Military and civilian respondents had similar perceptions of their work in that regard.<sup>21</sup> Further, as shown in Figure 19-10, the majority of respondents indicated that military values play a prominent role at SHAPE, although civilian personnel (76%) were more likely to agree or completely agree with this statement as compared to their military counterparts (63%).<sup>22</sup>




Figure 19-9: “All in all, in my daily work there is no big difference between SHAPE and a civilian organisation”.

<sup>21</sup>  $M = 2.58$  ( $SD = 1.02$ ) for military personnel and  $M = 2.59$  ( $SD = 1.19$ ) for civilian personnel; value range [1; 5];  $t(344) = -0.03$ , *ns*.

<sup>22</sup>  $M = 3.70$  ( $SD = 0.88$ ) for military personnel and  $M = 4.05$  ( $SD = 0.78$ ) for civilian personnel; value range [1; 5];  $t(98.43) = -3.10$ ,  $p < 0.01$ .




Figure 19-10: “Military values play a prominent role at SHAPE”.

### 19.2.2.2 Rotational Cycles of Military and Civilian Personnel

Military and civilian personnel were asked about the functioning and potential effects of military and civilian personnel’s rotational cycles at SHAPE. In this regard, as shown in Figure 19-11, only a minority of both military (27%) and civilian (43%) respondents believed that different rotational cycles of military and civilians reduce performance, although this represented a fairly large minority of civilians and civilians were more likely to believe this to be the case as compared to their military counterparts.<sup>23</sup> Similarly, approximately a quarter of military personnel (28%) and a third of civilian personnel (34%) believed that the different rotation cycles of military and civilians need to be aligned.<sup>24</sup>

<sup>23</sup>  $M = 2.90$  ( $SD = 1.13$ ) for military personnel and  $M = 3.13$  ( $SD = 1.24$ ) for civilian personnel; value range [1; 5];  $t(347) = -1.45$ , *ns*.

<sup>24</sup>  $M = 2.91$  ( $SD = 1.21$ ) for military personnel and  $M = 2.97$  ( $SD = 1.27$ ) for civilian personnel; value range [1; 5];  $t(345) = -0.32$ , *ns*.






Figure 19-11: Rotational Cycles of Military and Civilian Personnel.

### 19.2.2.3 Respect for Military and Civilian Personnel and Superiors/Managers at SHAPE

The majority of both civilian and military personnel indicated that civilian superiors are given due respect (with 65% of civilians and 64% of military either *completely agreeing* or *agreeing* with this statement; see Figure 19-12), with no difference in perceptions between the two groups of personnel in this regard.<sup>25,26</sup> Similarly, the majority of both civilian and military personnel indicated that military superiors are given due respect (with 84% of civilians and 79% of military either *completely agreeing* or *agreeing* with this statement; see Figure 19-13).<sup>27,28</sup> Interestingly, both groups of respondents (military and civilian) were more likely to indicate that military superiors are given due respect than to indicate that civilian superiors are accorded due respect.

<sup>25</sup>  $M = 2.90$  ( $SD = 1.13$ ) for military personnel and  $M = 3.13$  ( $SD = 1.24$ ) for civilian personnel; value range [1; 5];  $t(347) = -1.45$ , *ns*.

<sup>26</sup>  $M = 2.91$  ( $SD = 1.21$ ) for military personnel and  $M = 2.97$  ( $SD = 1.27$ ) for civilian personnel; value range [1; 5];  $t(345) = -0.32$ , *ns*.

<sup>27</sup>  $M = 3.80$  ( $SD = 0.84$ ) for military personnel and  $M = 3.67$  ( $SD = 1.02$ ) for civilian personnel; value range [1; 5];  $t(76.75) = 0.98$  *ns*.

<sup>28</sup>  $M = 4.02$  ( $SD = 0.82$ ) for military personnel and  $M = 4.11$  ( $SD = 0.66$ ) for civilian personnel; value range [1; 5];  $t(344) = -0.82$  *ns*.




Figure 19-12: "Civilian superiors are given due respect".




Figure 19-13: "Military superiors are given due respect".

Military respondents were slightly more satisfied than civilian respondents with military personnel at SHAPE (Figure 19-14), although this difference was very small, with both groups evincing high levels of satisfaction with military personnel at SHAPE.<sup>29</sup> Similarly, both groups of respondents indicated similar levels of satisfaction with civilian personnel at SHAPE (Figure 19-15).<sup>30</sup> However, only approximately two thirds of both military and civilian personnel were satisfied with civilians – a much lower proportion than were satisfied with military personnel. The reason for this is unclear from the available data but is an important area for further exploration.




Figure 19-14: Satisfaction with Military Personnel.




Figure 19-15: Satisfaction with Civilian Personnel.

<sup>29</sup>  $M = 3.90$  ( $SD = 0.69$ ) for military personnel and  $M = 3.68$  ( $SD = 0.78$ ) for civilian personnel; value range [1; 5];  $t(343) = 2.19, p < 0.05$ .

<sup>30</sup>  $M = 3.78$  ( $SD = 0.81$ ) for military personnel and  $M = 3.71$  ( $SD = 0.81$ ) for civilian personnel; value range [1; 5];  $t(343) = 0.61, ns$ .

**19.2.2.4 Correlational Analyses Between Military-Civilian Work Culture Variables and Outcome Variables**

This section presents the results of correlational analyses exploring how the aspects of military-civilian work culture at SHAPE relate to the organisational personnel outcome variables of interest – particularly perceptions of fairness, job satisfaction, and affective organisational commitment. The magnitude of these correlations may be interpreted as follows:  $r = 0.10$  is a small correlation;  $r = 0.30$  is a medium correlation; and  $r = 0.50$  is considered a large correlation [3]. Although results of the significance tests are also presented, Cohen’s guidelines for magnitude of correlations will be used to interpret the results due to the small sample sizes and thus low power to observe notable correlations, particularly in the civilian sample.

There were some notable relations between perceptions of the military-civilian culture variables and personnel outcomes, as presented in Table 19-4. The more military personnel perceived SHAPE to be a rather civilian organisation, the lower their perceptions of organisational fairness, job satisfaction, and affective commitment (with small to moderate correlations in this regard). By contrast, perception of SHAPE as a civilian organisation was unrelated to civilians’ perceptions of organisational fairness, job satisfaction, or organisational commitment. Working atmosphere being perceived as predominantly civilian, however, was not related to personnel outcomes for either military or civilian personnel.

**Table 19-4: Correlational Analyses Between Military-Civilian Work Culture Variables and Outcome Variables.**

Items	Organisational Fairness-Index		Overall Job Satisfaction		Affective Commitment-Index	
	Mil	Civ	Mil	Civ	Mil	Civ
For me, this HQ is a rather civilian organisation.	-.16**	.07	-.17**	-.16	-.21**	-.06
A civilian working atmosphere is dominant at SHAPE.	.01	-.07	-.03	-.11	-.03	-.05
All in all, in my daily work there is no big difference between SHAPE and a civilian organisation.	.01	.04	-.03	.12	-.03	.24
Military values play a prominent role at SHAPE.	.35**	.25	.27**	.28**	.36**	.22
Satisfaction with military personnel at HQ in general.	.41**	.33**	.27**	.36**	.43**	.13
Satisfaction with civilian personnel at HQ in general.	.36**	.24	.21**	.24	.33**	.21

\*\*  $p < 0.01$ .

The extent to which daily work differed between SHAPE and civilian organisations was not related to personnel outcomes for either military or civilian personnel. In stark contrast to this, the extent to which military values played a prominent role at SHAPE was moderately positively correlated with personnel outcomes for both military and civilian personnel. This is an interesting result in that it appears that when working in a military organisation such as SHAPE, military values may be important to enhancing perceptions of fairness, job satisfaction, and affective commitment not only for military staff, but also for the civilians working there.

Finally, the more both military and civilians were satisfied with military co-workers, the greater their perceptions of fairness, job satisfaction, and affective organisational commitment (though the correlation for civilians respondents was modest with respect to organisational commitment). Similarly, the more both military and civilians were satisfied with their civilian co-workers the greater their perceptions of fairness, job satisfaction, and affective organisational commitment. Interestingly, satisfaction with military colleagues tended to be more strongly correlated with personnel outcomes for both military and civilian personnel as compared to satisfaction with civilian colleagues. It is notable that satisfaction of each group (military and civilian) with colleagues from the “other” group was related to personnel outcomes for both. This indicates that maintenance of positive work culture and relations both between and among military and civilian personnel is important. In this regard, both groups of personnel were more satisfied with military co-workers than with civilian co-workers at SHAPE. The reason for this requires greater exploration and perhaps remediation, especially given that military members’ satisfaction with civilian personnel at SHAPE relates to key outcomes such as fairness perceptions, job satisfaction, and commitment.

### **19.3 SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

Motivations for working at SHAPE differed for military and civilian personnel, with military personnel being more likely to report working at SHAPE in order to represent their nation and for international opportunities, and civilians being more likely to be motivated to work at SHAPE for individual reasons such as money and career development, as well as to support alliance missions. Nevertheless, the biggest motivators for both groups were related to working in a multinational environment, a top level NATO HQ, and to support alliance missions. **If personnel selection and/or recruitment are of issue, these specific factors may be important to consider in tailoring efforts to post the best and most well-suited military and civilian personnel to SHAPE.** In terms of accountability, most respondents, both military and civilian, indicated SHAPE as their main point of reference in their daily work, rather than their national armed forces or their national military representative at SHAPE.

Interestingly, civilians were more likely than military personnel to report that their workload at SHAPE was greater than in their previous roles. Perhaps this is why civilian personnel perceived SHAPE to be slightly less fair as compared to their military counterparts. Nevertheless, military and civilian personnel reported similar job satisfaction and commitment to SHAPE. Moreover, despite differences in perceptions of workload, civilian personnel were more likely to indicate having received appropriate training to accomplish their tasks and responsibilities at SHAPE and being well prepared for performing their roles at SHAPE as compared to their military counterparts, possibly stemming from their relatively longer tenures in the organisation. **Reasons for why military personnel feel less well trained and prepared for their duties at SHAPE as compared to civilians warrant further examination. One possibility may stem from their having more differing roles and tasks at SHAPE in comparison to the work they performed in their national defence organisations, whereas the work of civilians may be more similar at SHAPE as in their home nation. Another factor affecting military training and preparedness may be the duration of postings at SHAPE, such as length or timing of postings (as discussed below) or mechanisms for ensuring continuity between incumbents.**

Approximately one quarter of military personnel and a third of civilian personnel believed that different rotational cycles of military and civilians reduce performance and that the different rotation cycles of military and civilians need to be aligned. **Given that these views are held by large minorities of respondents, particularly within the civilian workforce, it is recommended that this factor be taken into explicit consideration in the context of organisational planning.**

Although SHAPE was not viewed as a civilian-type organisation by either group of respondents, military personnel were more likely than civilian personnel to perceive SHAPE HQ as a rather civilian organisation and

as having a predominantly civilian working atmosphere. Again, this may be based on previous points of reference in terms of previous employment contexts, with military personnel having a greater likelihood of coming from military and/or operational settings. This perception was not particularly positive for military personnel in that those who were more likely to perceive SHAPE as a rather civilian organisation indicated lower perceptions of fairness, job satisfaction, and organisational commitment. **In light of this, maintaining the strong image of SHAPE as a military organisation appears to be important.**

Although both groups of personnel, and particularly civilian personnel, believed that military values play a prominent role at SHAPE, only approximately half of either military or civilian personnel indicated that there is a big difference in their daily work between SHAPE and a civilian organisation. These findings should be considered as positive, in that perception of importance of military values at SHAPE is what is important for personnel outcomes, such as commitment, whereas perceptions of difference in daily work between SHAPE and civilian organisations is unrelated to these personnel outcomes. This is the case for both military and civilian personnel. **Given these findings, it is recommended that emphasis and endorsement of military values be maintained by SHAPE leadership.**

Of note, although both military and civilian respondents indicated that both civilian and military superiors were given due respect at SHAPE, both groups of respondents (military and civilian) were more likely to indicate that military superiors were respected than to indicate that civilian superiors were respected. **Examination into this difference may be warranted and may inform efforts to ameliorate this situation, such as training of civilian superiors regarding management of military personnel, support of civilian superiors/managers espoused by senior SHAPE leadership, or other potential follow-on actions based on evidence-based information.** In addition, while both military and civilian personnel were generally satisfied with military personnel at SHAPE, satisfaction with civilian personnel (for both military and civilian counterparts) was somewhat lower, with only approximately two thirds of each group being satisfied with SHAPE civilians. **The reason for this requires greater exploration and perhaps remediation, especially given that military members' satisfaction with civilian personnel at SHAPE relates to key personnel outcomes for this workforce.**

Of note overall, perceptions of military-civilian work culture variables, particularly the importance of military values and the satisfaction between and among military and civilian personnel was related to key personnel outcomes at SHAPE, particularly perceptions of fairness, job satisfaction, and affective organisational commitment. **This points to the importance of fostering military and civilian personnel relations, as well as a culture with common values among all personnel.**

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## **Chapter 20 – EFFECTS OF CIVILIAN INTEGRATION IN MILITARY ORGANIZATIONS: A SYNTHESIS OF BENEFITS AND CHALLENGES**

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### **20.1 INTRODUCTION**

Integrating the work cultures of civilian and military personnel in defence organizations encompasses a wide range of issues, which have taken on a new importance. The number of civilian contractors working for the United States (US) military and the number of civilians participating in operations have both been increasing in recent years, and these trends are likely to continue into the future. Civilian contractors are perceived to provide cost savings and to increase organizational flexibility, efficiency, and effectiveness, a perception which is further reinforced by the widespread belief that the government should not compete with the private sector on work that is not “inherently governmental” [5], [17], [18].

This chapter attempts to contribute to our understanding of these phenomena and to identify ways of ensuring the effectiveness of civilians in these military contexts by looking at a decade of research on civilians working with military units in the U.S. Army and the U.S. Navy. Civilians in the Army and Navy work in one of three categories: civilian contractors, Department of Army (federal) Civilians (DACs), and (federal) civilians working for Military Sealift Command (MSC). Civilian contractors are the focus of much of the research summarized here, though most of the data were collected from military personnel and the federal civilians working for the Army and Navy on their experiences with and attitudes towards civilian contractors.

I begin with the question of who counts as military, followed by a review of numerous studies on the effects of civilian integration into military units. The first series of studies focuses on retention models that account for civilianization effects. The second set of data examines military and DAC attitudes toward the civilian contractors they work with. Third, I briefly discuss the effects of cohesion on the mental health of deployed DACs and the effects of contractor integration on unit cohesion and retention. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the implications of these findings.

### **20.2 WHO COUNTS AS MILITARY?**

A number of scholars have discussed the distinction between soldiers and civilians in the military, because it affects organizational structures, laws and regulations, military ethics, and social support for military organisations, and because it influences the social psychology of military men and women [1], [2], [4]. Weber [23] considered the military to be the institutionalization of the states’ monopoly of violence. Biderman [2] defined the military in terms of the probability of being killed or injured for the common good. Yet another perspective contends that killing people and destroying property in defence of freedom, democracy, and sovereignty are uniquely military acts [4]. Numerous scholars of the military from various disciplines find the integration of civilians into contemporary military organizations problematic (if in many ways beneficial) because it blurs the line between military and civilian [1], [6], [19], [21], [22].

The U.S. Army and Navy officially count civilian contractors as part of the total force (*Quadrennial Defense Review* [20]). Despite their recognition within the organization and the merits upon which they have been enthusiastically and increasingly included in the total force, no studies have provided unequivocal evidence that contractors are having the desired beneficial cost-savings effects [7], [8], [9]. And surprisingly little is known about the effects of civilian integration on the military structure and the social psychology (attitudes and behaviours) of service personnel. The line of research summarized in this chapter is an attempt to better understand the macro- and micro-level effects of contractor (and federal civilian) integration into military units.

### **20.3 COMPARATIVE CASE STUDY OF RETENTION EFFECTS OF CIVILIAN INTEGRATION**

Integrated civilian–military units in the Army and Navy have been assessed on whether and to what degree civilians impact critical outcomes, such as job satisfaction, commitment to the military, and intentions to remain in service beyond one’s current obligation [15]. The comparative nature of this work allowed for variation in the structural aspects related to how civilians are integrated. In both the Army and Navy, the effects of service members’ social comparisons with civilians they work with and their level of contact with these civilians were used as the focal “civilianization” variables to predict retention attitudes. Data were obtained from an Army combat aviation squadron that integrated civilian contractors and from a USS Naval ship that had just returned from a 9-month deployment with crew that was 50% sailor and 50% civilian mariner (CIVMAR; federal civilians employed by Military Sealift Command).<sup>1</sup>

The Navy ship integrated CIVMARs as modular units, meaning that entire functional specialties were outsourced to civilians, including all the engineering, deck maintenance, radar, cooking, and cleaning functions. By contrast, the Army combat aviation squadron integrated contractors at the individual level, where civilian mechanics and technicians would work on the aircraft alongside military personnel doing essentially similar work. Some technical representatives from private companies were present to deal with proprietary equipment, and the staff who operated the flight simulators was entirely civilian. But the vast majority of civilians were integrated into the squadron at an individual level, as described above.

The focal measure of social comparisons was operationalized using a scale that assesses service members’ attitudes toward numerous work-related items to determine whether they think that service members or contractors are relatively advantaged (or deprived) on these items (e.g., pay, benefits, time away from family, leadership support). Descriptive findings indicated that both sailors and soldiers felt that the civilians they worked with were better off than they were across these work-related items. Further, a quarter of sailors and more than a third of soldiers indicated working with civilians on a daily basis. A third of sailors and soldiers reported a desire to remain in service beyond their current enlistment obligation.


Social comparisons that favoured contractors included better pay, less risk (according to soldiers only), greater job autonomy, less employer control of employee, better relations with co-workers, better cared-for by employer, shorter work hours, less time away from family, more freedom to negotiate contracts, and fewer negative effects on family happiness. Neutral social comparison items, or those that did not clearly favour either group, included task variety, quality of leadership in one’s organization, leadership support for completing tasks, feeling of accomplishment, and risk (according to sailors only). The two items that slightly favoured service members were

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<sup>1</sup> USS ships (United States Ships) are U.S. naval ships that are armed with guns and have offensive war capabilities. USNS ships in the U.S. Navy are those that do not carry guns and focus on logistics and missions. While the USNS ships (United States Navy Ships) have historically operated with CIVMARs on board, the ship used in this study is the only USS ship to have deployed with significant numbers of CIVMARs on board.

benefits and feeling that one’s work makes a positive contribution to society. The reason that risk was split between favouring contractors in the Army sample and being neutral in the Navy sample is that all personnel on board the Navy ship recognized that they were literally all in the same boat.

The path-analytic retention models for the Army and Navy units [15] indicated two key findings (Figure 20-1). First, among soldiers, level of contact with civilian contractors did not have a significant relationship with any other model variables. This is not surprising once we recall that soldiers felt relatively deprived compared to contractors. Thus, it did not matter whether soldiers worked with contractors daily or not at all; the presence of contractors in the squadron was enough to motivate these feelings of relative deprivation among service members. Among sailors there was a significant link between level of contact with CIVMARs and social comparisons (but no other variables in the model). The more contact sailors had with CIVMARs the less deprived they felt. The way in which CIVMARs were integrated helps explain this finding. Many of the civilians on board performed either engineering, maintenance, cleaning, or cooking functions. Since there was no structural redundancy, no sailors were trained in these specialties, nor (based on interviews) did they appear interested in performing them. In addition, on most U.S. naval ships, junior enlisted personnel are required to perform many of the menial duties that had been outsourced to civilians. These duties are not only monotonous, but they pull them out of their military specialty for up to 90 days, which affects promotion timelines. Enlisted sailors did not have to do these menial duties during this deployment. Moreover, reports from sailors indicated that the food had been good, the ship had been kept clean, they had not run out of water, and the engines had not broken down. Sailors’ increased knowledge and exposure to what the civilians were contributing had beneficial effects on social comparisons.



**Figure 20-1: Service Members' Retention Model.**

Kelty and Segal’s [15] second major finding from the retention models was that service members’ social comparisons had significant indirect and negative effects on retention attitudes, despite positive reports from service members regarding the professionalism and abilities of civilians they had worked with and their general positive affect toward these civilians. Perceptions of contractors’ greater relative advantages reduced service members’ satisfaction and commitment, which in turn lowered desire to remain in service beyond one’s current

enlistment. Neither level of contact with civilians nor social comparisons were observed to have a direct effect on retention intentions.<sup>2</sup>

Additional analyses using a CIVMAR retention model [10] showed that, like sailors and soldiers, job satisfaction and organizational commitment were significantly and positively related to retention attitudes. However, CIVMARs’ social comparisons (in this case their comparisons with sailors) failed to produce a significant effect on satisfaction, commitment, or retention. This lack of significance was found at the direct, indirect, and total effect levels in the retention model, suggesting that their comparisons with sailors did not translate into positive or negative impacts on the important job-related variables in the retention model.

**20.4 ATTITUDES TOWARD CIVILIAN CONTRACTORS/CIVMARS**

This section summarizes attitudinal data from the service members in the Army combat aviation unit and the Navy ship discussed in the previous section, as well as a combat unit that had recently returned from Iraq on a deployment of over one year [12]. The data cover general attitudes toward contractors, attitudes toward becoming a contractor, views of contractors as part of the total force, level of contact with contractors, and the number of friends who have left the military to work as civilian contractors.

Military personnel were asked to agree or disagree with a number of statements about civilian contractors (or CIVMARs, among sailors) using a Likert response scale ranging from *disagree strongly* (1) to *agree strongly* (6) [14]. Responses are summarized in Table 20-1. Of the 15 items in this scale, only 3 showed negative results: cost effectiveness, work ethic, and number of hours worked per week. On the positive side, service members enjoyed working with contractors and CIVMARs, felt these civilians increased organizational flexibility, efficiency and effectiveness, and valued civilians’ expertise and motivation.<sup>3</sup> The number of items favouring contractors and CIVMARs is encouraging, given that the U.S. has modified its military to rely heavily on civilians. The perception that contractors and CIVMARs were not cost effective and did not work as hard or as long as service members speaks against the fundamental assumptions of outsourcing, a topic discussed in more detail later.

**Table 20-1: Service Members’ Attitudes Towards Civilian Contractors.\***

<b>Positive Attitudes</b>	<b>Negative Attitudes</b>
Soldiers are comfortable working with contractors	Contractors are not cost effective
Soldiers prefer to have contractors as work-mates	Contractors do not work as many hours as soldiers
Increased efficiency	Contractors do not work as hard as soldiers
Increased effectiveness	
They do not negatively impact morale	
They do not lead to soldiers leaving the Army	

<sup>2</sup> Additional analysis of CIVMAR and civilian contractor data from these two case studies suggests that social comparisons did not affect satisfaction, organizational commitment or retention attitudes among civilians integrated in military units. These findings are tentative given limitations of the civilian data and should be confirmed through future studies.

<sup>3</sup> The negative attitude on contractors’ cost effectiveness does not conflict with the positive attitudes regarding the effectiveness and efficiency of contractors because contractors and CIVMARs can be both perceived as good at what they do and as costing too much.

Positive Attitudes	Negative Attitudes
Contractors free soldiers up to focus on core military duties	
Increased flexibility	
At least as committed as soldiers	
Equally motivated as soldiers to do a good job	
Comparable levels of expertise with soldier	
Soldiers are impressed with contractors' abilities	

\*Adapted from Kely and Schnack (Ref. [14], p. 49).

Additional analyses of soldiers in logistics brigades in both Iraq and Afghanistan [13] reported additional negative attitudes toward contractors, beyond the three noted above from the combat arms soldiers and sailors. Among the soldiers working with substantially larger numbers of contractors in these logistics units, contractors were viewed as decreasing efficiency and having negative effects on retention. Further, a significant minority of soldiers (greater than one-third) indicated that contractors integrated into their units had decreased morale, felt that soldiers should be doing those jobs (even if contractors could perform the work just as well), and felt uncomfortable working with contractors.

One question that arises in relation to social comparisons is whether they vary by group within a given organization. An examination of the differences on the social comparison scale by race/ethnicity and gender [16] showed that differences were present by race/ethnicity but not gender. White soldiers were significantly more likely than black soldiers to view contractors as advantaged over service personnel. Hispanic soldiers' attitudes were located between those of whites and blacks, but they did not differ significantly from either.

Predictive models were used to answer questions about what was most important in influencing service members' attitudes toward contractors and what motivated military personnel to become a contractor post-service [14]. Several key variables were identified as predictors of soldiers' attitudes toward those who work as contractors. First, the more friends a soldier had who had left military service to become a contractor, the more positive he or she was toward contractors. Second, those with less time in service were more likely than those with more time in uniform to have favourable attitudes toward contractors. Third, Hispanics, and fourth, older soldiers were more positive about contractors than were non-Hispanics and younger service members.

The predictive model examining which factors motivate service members to desire employment as a contractor themselves identified three key variables [14]. Again, having friends who had left military service to work as contractors was a positive indicator. Second, blacks were more likely than whites to want to work as contractors after leaving the service – no differences were found between Hispanics and non-Hispanics. Finally, and not surprisingly, soldiers who had more positive attitudes toward contractors were more attracted to joining their ranks post-service.

Additional analyses examined desire to work as a contractor among three samples: combat arms soldiers, logistics soldiers, and sailors on the CIVMAR integrated ship [11]. Two thirds of both the combat arms and logistics soldier samples indicated positive attitudes toward working as a contractor; 25% – 30% indicated that this was a “very attractive” option. Less than 10% found the idea of contract work for the military an unattractive option. Conversely, just over a third of sailors reported that working as a civilian on board a Navy ship was as an attractive post-service option and less than 10% indicated that it was “very attractive.” After accounting for

neutral responses, another third of sailors indicated that civilian work with the Navy would be unattractive, and nearly a quarter expressed the most extreme distaste for this option. Recall that CIVMARs were integrated in a way that eliminated redundancy with service personnel (and thus competition between them) and that sailors also had positive perceptions of CIVMAR skills and abilities. The soldiers in the Army units held similar esteem for civilian professional abilities, but lacked the organizational divisions that existed in the Navy sample.

Much has been made of including civilians in America's total force concept. This is evident in informal language as well as formal Department of Defence documents (e.g., *The 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review*). Service members report rather consistent patterns of views toward counting contractors as part of the total force. As with the comparison in the prior paragraph, soldiers in combat arms and logistics units were compared with sailors on this item. A majority (approximately two-thirds) in each of the three groups (combat soldiers, logistics soldiers, and sailors) agreed that contractors are part of the total force [11], [14].

Two additional descriptive results worthy of mention include level of contact with contractors and the number of friends one has who have left the service to work as contractors. For each question, the three groups above were again compared with one another [11], [15]. When asked how much contact they had with contractors, the combat arms soldiers looked the same as the sailors aboard the CIVMAR integrated USS ship. For both, 20% – 25% had worked with civilians daily and the same proportion had not worked with civilians at all. Contact levels between these two extremes ranged from 5% – 15% for “less than once a month” to “several times a week” for each group. The outlying group was the logistics soldiers. For this group, nearly 80% indicated they had worked with contractors on a daily basis, and all soldiers in this group indicated they had worked with contractors at least once a month. This result points to a structural difference as well. The combat arms soldiers and sailors had significant numbers of civilians working within their units – as high as a 1:1 ratio. The logistics soldiers operated in a structural environment where they were outnumbered by civilians by as much as 10:1.

Group differences were also observed in service members' experiences with friends who had left the military to work as contractors or CIVMARs [11]. Two-thirds of sailors reported not having any friends who had left to work as a CIVMAR. Combat arms soldiers reported a lower rate (43%), followed by logistics soldiers at less than 10%. Less than 10% of sailors and combat arms soldiers reported knowing 10 or more friends who had left the service to work as civilians with the military, while fully two-thirds of logistics soldiers indicated this level of exposure to military personnel who had transitioned to civilian contractors.

## **20.5 ORGANIZATIONAL EFFECTS**

Recent research among deployed soldiers and DACs in logistics brigades in Iraq and Afghanistan examined the perceived effect of contractors on several highly salient organizational effectiveness outcomes [13]. These organizational measures focused on the extent to which contractors have an effect on military discipline, clarity of chain of command, morale, confusion about the unit's mission, maintaining good order and discipline, the ability to maintain customs and traditions, and the ability to accomplish the unit's mission. Results revealed a common pattern across the organizational outcomes characterized by large proportions, though less than a majority, who did not see the advantage of having contractors integrated into their units. No significant differences between soldiers and DACs were observed across these organizational outcomes.


Approximately a third of each group agreed that contractors decreased the military's ability to maintain good order and discipline, confused the chain of command, and caused military discipline to be applied less stringently than it would have been in the absence of contractors in these units. A third of military and DAC personnel also reported that contractors do not affect the military's ability to maintain its customs and traditions,

leaving more than 40% indicating a negative impact from contractors. A quarter of the service members and nearly one third of DACs indicated that contractors made identifying the mission of the unit confusing. In addition, more than a third of soldier and DACs reported decreased unit morale as a result of contractor integration. Finally, approximately a fifth of respondents in each group reported that the civilian contractors they worked with had decreased the unit's ability to accomplish its mission. These results suggest both a large degree of ambivalence toward the effectiveness of contractors, with significant minorities in each group indicating negative effects of contractor integration on critical organizational measures, even in the presence of an average perception of beneficial or neutral effects [13].

## 20.6 CIVILIANS AND COHESION IN MILITARY UNITS

Two recent studies have focused on cohesion as a function of civilian integration in military units. Both studies use the datasets obtained from deployed DACs who were, then, currently deployed in either Iraq or Afghanistan (cited earlier). The first study examined cohesion as a mediator and moderator between perceived threats in a conflict zone and negative mental health outcomes. The second assessed the role of cohesion as a function of contact with and attitudes toward civilian contractors within the framework of the retention model presented in Figure 20-1.

Bierman and Kelty [3] focused on DACs deployed with logistics brigades in Iraq and Afghanistan during active hostilities. To explore cohesion as a mediator and moderator of psychological distress associated with perceptions of having one's life threatened in an active warzone, both linear and nonlinear effects of perceived threat on externalizing distress (anger) and internalizing distress (anxiety and depression) were assessed. The main effect for cohesion was a significant predictor of externalizing distress (anger), but not of internalizing distress (anxiety and depression). Further, cohesion was found to moderate the effects of perceived threat on anger, but in a non-linear fashion (Figure 20-2). At low levels of unit cohesion, threat was related to anger. Moderate levels of cohesion buffered against the negative impacts of threat on anger, but these positive benefits were negated at high levels of unit cohesion. Anger increased half a standard deviation across the span of threat from low to high levels of cohesion, whereas the slope for moderate cohesion across levels of threat was flat (i.e., not significant). Perceptions of low unit cohesion had the most pernicious effect on anger.



**Figure 20-2: Moderating Effects on Cohesion for Relationship Between Threat and Anger.**

An examination of the same model used to assess internalizing distress showed a similar pattern (Figure 20-3). As with anger, threat was non-linearly related to internalizing distress at different levels of unit cohesion.

Internalizing distress increased significantly from low to high levels of threat among those who perceived unit cohesion as either low or high. Moderate cohesion again buffered against the deleterious effects of perceived threat on mental health. Though the slopes were less dramatically different than for anger, the low and high cohesion slopes were significant, and the moderate cohesion slope was not significant, indicating no relationship between threat and distress at moderate cohesion.





Figure 20-3: Moderating Effects of Cohesion for Relationship Between Threat and Internalizing Distress.

While cohesion had a main (inverse) effect on anger, its more powerful effect was as a buffer between perceived threats and both externalizing and internalizing distress. Cohesion’s buffering effect was non-linear for both forms of distress. It appears that moderate cohesion provides mental health protective benefits, while low and high cohesion allow for the stress associated with perceived life-threatening situations to produce negative mental health effects.

Kelty [12] also examined the perceived effects of civilian contractors on unit cohesion within the context of a soldier retention model (presented above) among two National Guard units that had just returned from overseas deployments. This extended retention model includes social comparisons with contractors and a scale measure assessing general attitudes toward contractors as predictors of unit cohesion, and cohesion in turn predicting satisfaction and organizational commitment. Figure 20-4 presents the significant pathways of the model.





**Figure 20-4: Soldier Retention Model Including Cohesion as Intervening Variable.**

Social comparisons with contractors had two significant direct effects in the model. First, they reduced perceived unit cohesion. While the relationship between social comparisons and cohesion was positive, since soldiers perceived contractors to be advantaged, its effect on cohesion was negative. Second, social comparisons were also observed to negatively affect soldiers’ attitudes toward contractors. Attitudes with contractors had a significant direct effect only on job satisfaction, such that the more positively soldiers view contractors, the more satisfied they are with their jobs. Perceived unit cohesion had significant direct effects on satisfaction and commitment to the Army, but not on retention.

An examination of the total effects for each independent variable on retention attitudes revealed that all model variables had a significant total effect on retention. For satisfaction and commitment the effects on retention were primarily or wholly a result of direct effects. Conversely, the significant effects of both contractor variables on retention were attributable to their indirect effects, operating through cohesion, satisfaction, and organizational commitment. Cohesion’s effect on retention was also shown to be due to its indirect impact through satisfaction and commitment.

## **20.7 IMPLICATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

The findings presented in this chapter have important implications at both the macro- and micro-levels of military organization. At the macro level, the way in which civilians are integrated with military personnel is important. Findings suggest that integrating civilians at the individual level may have more pernicious effects than civilianizing entire work functions within a given military command. This invites the related issue of the requirement to maintain internal (uniformed personnel) capacity rather than fully civilianizing work functions with no military redundancy. The U.S. military has taken a fairly ad hoc approach to civilianization since its engagements in Afghanistan and Iraq began. A systematic assessment of which duties can (and should) be civilianized is needed to address the current use of civilians, as is clear guidance on how to determine the need for civilians in the future. The current challenges are amplified in international joint operations and in peacekeeping and humanitarian missions.

The social-psychological tendency to compare oneself with others operates in work settings, and this is especially true among service members who work in high-risk, high-demand, high-constraint contexts. Introducing civilians, whether contractors or DACs, creates clear points of structural contrast between military and civilian personnel on highly salient job-related characteristics (i.e., cohesion, job satisfaction, organizational commitment and retention), with some social comparisons favouring civilians over service members and others the reverse.

Findings also indicated numerous positive and negative effects of civilian integration into military units (Table 20-2), demonstrating both the need for including such research in any cost-benefit analysis and organizational assessment of military staffing policy. Future research should focus on identifying the most powerful comparison items, to the end of reducing the negative impact of the structural differences between civilians and service members.

**Table 20-2: Summary of Civilian Contractor Effects.**

<b>Positive Effects</b>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Contractors were perceived to be professional, skilled, and knowledgeable</li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Contractors were viewed as increasing organizational flexibility and effectiveness</li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ A majority of service members reported positive attitudes about working with contractors</li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ A majority of service members viewed contractors as part of the total force</li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ A majority of soldiers saw contractors aiding ability to complete the unit’s mission</li> </ul>
<b>Negative Effects</b>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Social comparisons with contractors (e.g., pay, autonomy, risk, promotion) reduced satisfaction, commitment, and retention</li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Social comparisons with contractors negatively impacted unit cohesion</li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Contractors were viewed as not being cost effective, and not working as hard or as many hours as service members</li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ A significant minority of soldiers indicated contractors have a negative impact on morale</li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Having friends leave military service to work as contractors significantly increased service members’ desire to leave military service</li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Soldiers in logistics units were significantly more likely to have friends (and many more of them) who had left the military to work as contractors</li> </ul>
<b>Varying Effects</b>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Level of contact with contractors had differing effects on service members based on how contractors were integrated into military units</li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Logistics soldiers perceived contractors as reducing unit effectiveness; combat arms soldiers viewed them as have a positive impact on effectiveness</li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ White soldiers were significantly more likely than black soldiers to view contractors as advantaged over military personnel (i.e., to have negative social comparisons)</li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Black soldiers were significantly more likely than white soldiers to desire to work as a contractor</li> </ul>

<b>Varying Effects (cont'd)</b>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Hispanics viewed contractors more positively than non-Hispanics</li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Increased time in service was related to more negative attitudes toward contractors</li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Desire to work as a contractor varied substantially depending on how contractors were integrated in their military units</li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ A significant minority of soldiers and DACs agreed that contractors decreased the military's ability to maintain good order and discipline, decreased morale, confused the chain of command, made identifying the unit's mission confusing, and caused military discipline to be applied less stringently</li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Among DACs, negative mental health outcomes associated with serving in a warzone were mediated and moderated by unit cohesion, but in a non-linear manner</li> </ul>

Unanticipated consequences were observed in several ways. Civilian outsourcing is meant to reduce costs, increase flexibility, effectiveness, and flexibility, and free service members to perform “core military” duties. The data presented here suggest, at best, a mixed result on these anticipated benefits. Perhaps most surprising were the negative impacts on retention and cohesion – two critical variables in military organizations. Moreover, the perception that civilians are more expensive, combined with a lack of clear support in the literature for cost savings from contractors, suggests that the negative impacts on retention and cohesion may not be off-set by the other biggest motivator for civilianizing the military. Cost benefits analyses are an important part of evaluating the effectiveness of the current strategy of a mixed civilian-military total force. Long-term costs as well as short-term economic costs should be considered and the long term costs of the decision to civilianize a large part of the force during Operations Enduring Freedom (in Afghanistan) and Iraqi Freedom are not likely to be known for several decades to come. The data presented in this chapter, though, argue that indirect economic costs resulting from the current staffing strategy must also be considered, though they are in some ways more challenging to capture. For example, there are real indirect costs to failing to retain quality service members if because they feel civilians doing the same work, and/or taking less risk, receive greater rewards. There may also negative economic and/or effectiveness outcomes related to low morale, cohesion, or psychological distress due to civilian-military integration. A systematic analysis of the direct and indirect effects of civilian integration is needed to address this set of issues.

A second unintended consequence is the possibility that some socio-demographic groups of service members disproportionately experience the negative effects of civilian integration. Data indicates race and ethnicity effects in models predicting attitudes toward and desire to be a civilian contractor.<sup>4</sup> Moreover, we know that African Americans and women are disproportionately represented in non-combat arms. More work is needed to understand how civilianization across a broad range of organizational contexts (branches and specializations) affects women and racial minorities. If there are differential effects for these groups, this would have implications for the diversity of our uniformed service members.

Research examining cohesion in the context of civilians working with the military suggests several key implications. First, the presence of contractors negatively affects perceptions of unit cohesion. Given that cohesion has been viewed as so critical to military efficiency, effectiveness, and good order and discipline that it was a primary argument against the integration of social minorities (e.g., women, racial minorities, gays and lesbians) into the U.S. military, this deleterious effect should raise concern. Second, it is important to examine multiple mental health indicators because cohesion may differentially buffer against psychological stressors.

<sup>4</sup> These findings should be viewed with some caution since the case study design of the various data sets limits generalizability.

Moreover, given the numbers of civilians currently employed (and deployed) by the military, providing adequate long-term physical and mental health care is critical.

Third, the non-linear buffering effect of cohesion on psychological distress warrants further investigation to determine whether other factors may be able to alleviate negative mental health outcomes in the presence of either low or high cohesion. Last, larger studies should seek to determine whether and to what extent buffering effects differ between social and task cohesion.

Finally, as a whole, the data presented in this chapter invite questions about the rationalization of military functions. Military organizations are managed by modern rational principles: efficiency, effectiveness, cost savings, predictability, and the ability to quantify inputs and outputs. The move away from a conscripted to an all-volunteer force in nearly all Western nations is an example of this phenomenon. Enlisting soldiers with higher qualifications and who want to be in the organization, combined with lifting age limits and restrictions on women and gays and lesbians, have produced more powerful and reliable militaries. Rationalization can cease to be reasonable, however, when it is pushed too far. Civilian outsourcing assumes that civilianizing “non-core” military functions will free-up the remaining military personnel to perform core military (i.e., war fighting) duties. Yet retention models that include civilianization variables uniformly show that civilians reduce retention. Using civilians may be economically rational, therefore, but it may be pushing the limits of the reasonable with respect to retention, cohesion, morale, satisfaction, and commitment to military service.

Since the U.S. military has always used civilians to accomplish its war and peacetime missions, the question is not whether civilians should be used in military organizations, but how and to what extent. The findings presented here have suggested answers to those questions. Clearly strong leadership from the top down is needed in order to address some of the key aspects driving unintended negative outcomes. In this vein, leaders need to attend to both the macro-level structural differences between service members and civilians (pay and benefits, laws and regulations, chain of command, leave, work schedules, work-family conflict/balance issues, etc.) and the micro-level interactional aspects of military organizations (norms, values, attitudes, interactional patterns, expectations, etc.). While there is room for improvement at both levels of military organization it is recognized that there will always be a necessary divide between these two categories of personnel who work in military organizations. Honouring differences and still finding parity whenever possible is the challenge for military leaders working with an integrated civilian-uniformed personnel military organization.

This Chapter provides a foundation for understanding some of the outcomes of a military-civilian integrated U.S. armed forces. Much more research is needed to assess the generalizability of these findings and to extend the analysis to include additional variables across more military contexts as well as from a cross-national perspective.

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## **Chapter 21 – EXPEDITIONARY CIVILIANS: CREATING A VIABLE PRACTICE OF CIVILIAN DEPLOYMENT WITHIN THE UNITED STATES – INTERAGENCY COMMUNITY AND AMONG FOREIGN DEFENCE ORGANIZATIONS<sup>1</sup>**

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### **21.1 BACKGROUND**

As defence and interagency organizations move toward even slimmer workforces with less capability redundancy, there is a need to look at alternative and sustainable approaches to maintaining access to resources. For some time, defence departments have drawn on internal civilian capabilities to relieve pressure on the uniformed military, with some of these initiatives being formalized into organizational structures. In 2007, civilian leadership in the U.S. Office of the Secretary of Defence determined that the approximately 700,000-person civilian workforce in the U.S. Department of Defence (DoD) could be a viable source of deployable personnel. In 2009, this arrangement was formalized with the establishment of the Civilian Expeditionary Workforce by DoD Directive 1404.10 [16]. Around the same time, the United Kingdom Ministry Of Defence (MOD) set up the Support to Operations (S2O) office to provide sustainable civilian support to operations. Meanwhile, such defence-sector reliance on civilian capabilities increased the need for interagency organizations – such as the U.S. Department of State (DoS), U.S. Department of Homeland Security, and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) – to deploy their personnel in support of defence missions.

There are several known challenges associated with the deployment of civilian capability to operational theaters. For instance, from where should the capability be drawn? How should deployable civilians be selected, prepared, and protected in theater? How can an organization best manage civilians while they are deployed, ensuring that they will have secure jobs upon their return? Moreover, from a recruitment standpoint, how can an organization ensure a steady pipeline of willing volunteers to deploy? How are civilians perceived by and how do they operate among their military colleagues? These are challenges that organizations attempting to deploy civilians will need to address.

RAND conducted research for DoD constituting an end-to-end review of guidance across the civilian deployment process, with the ultimate aim of recommending guidelines for establishing and maintaining a civilian deployment capability for the future. As part of that project, we investigated a number of deployment approaches

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<sup>1</sup> Excerpted from Ref. [24]. The research was sponsored by the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defence for Civilian Personnel Policy. This excerpt is copyrighted by the RAND Corporation and reproduced with permission. RAND publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors.

taken by organizations analogous to DoD, both domestic and foreign. The study identified lessons and promising practices for civilian deployment that could be applied, in general terms, to a broad spectrum of organizations seeking to deploy civilians. The results of that study are available in the companion report, *Expeditionary Civilians: Creating a Viable Practice of Department of Defence Civilian Deployment for the Future*. [5], [24] This report is derived from that larger RAND study, but it focuses solely on the findings from the analysis of alternative civilian deployment models used by non-DoD interagency and by defence organizations in the United States and internationally. The goal of this report is to provide information on the civilian deployment practices and procedures of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and its individual members' defence organizations. This research was conducted in 2014, and the findings were current as of mid-2015.

## **21.2 STRUCTURE OF THIS CHAPTER**

We begin by presenting the methodology used to analyse several distinct cases of civilian deployment across both U.S. and international interagency and defence organizations. We then describe key terms and concepts that are common throughout organizations that deploy civilian personnel, with a focus on authorities, requirements, and mission types. We provide short descriptions of each organization for context. We then present a typology of four deployment models, highlighting the advantages and disadvantages associated with each. The final sections of the report present lessons identified from the research, conclusions, and recommendations.

## **21.3 METHODOLOGY AND CASES**

For the larger study from which this report is derived, we worked with DoD officials to identify the goals of DoD's civilian deployment capability and potential policy and planning gaps. We then reviewed U.S. Combatant Command (CCMD) requirements for expeditionary civilians, as well as the CCMDs' various policies and practices regarding the deployment of civilians.<sup>2</sup> The findings established baseline manpower and personnel management requirements for future requirements to support contingency program management over time. We then drew on relevant lessons from comparative cases of civilian deployment policies and practices from both domestic U.S. government organizations and foreign governments. From these comparative cases, we identified best practices and created a typology of four models of civilian deployment, highlighting the benefits and drawbacks of each. Combining the lessons from this typology with the policy analysis and survey of CCMD needs for expeditionary civilian capabilities, we developed an overall assessment of the viability of the current civilian deployment concept and devised recommendations for establishing and maintaining a civilian deployment capability that could feasibly meet CCMD requirements over the next several decades.

Much of the data for these tasks were collected through interviews with DoD and CCMD officials, as well as a review of relevant policy guidance, analysis and assessments by such organizations as the U.S. Government Accountability Office, and secondary literature. Over the course of the study, we interviewed a total of 83 individuals spanning 45 offices across DoD, other U.S. government agencies, and foreign governments. Interviewees included representatives of multiple directorates under the Office of the Secretary of Defence, the military services, and each of the geographic CCMDs (U.S. Central Command, U.S. Southern Command,

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<sup>2</sup> A combatant command is defined in Joint Publication 1-02 as follows: "A unified or specified command with a broad continuing mission under a single commander established and so designated by the President, through the Secretary of Defence and with the advice and assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff" (U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Department of Defence Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, Joint Publication 1-02, Washington, D.C. [22], as amended through November 15, 2015). There are six geographical commands; U.S. Africa Command, U.S. Central Command, U.S. European Command, U.S. Northern Command, U.S. Pacific Command, and U.S. Southern Command. There are also three functional commands: U.S. Special Operations Command, U.S. Strategic Command, and U.S. Transportation Command.



U.S. European Command, U.S. Africa Command, U.S. Pacific Command, and U.S. Northern Command), in addition to one functional CCMD (U.S. Special Operations Command).<sup>3</sup>

To identify best practices from comparative cases we first conducted a short literature review that provided a general understanding of civilian deployments beyond DoD practices, the requirements that feed those deployments, and how those requirements are sourced. After establishing a baseline understanding of how organizations other than DoD deploy their personnel, we developed a list of U.S. and foreign government agencies that deploy civilians to at least some extent. In selecting cases for inclusion in the analysis, we sought variation in terms of the length of agencies' experiences with civilian deployment practices, the numbers of civilians typically deployed, and the purposes for which civilians are deployed. One of the foremost goals in selecting cases for analysis was that the universe of cases analysed should reflect organizations similar to DoD in at least one of these respects.

As a result of this case selection method, our interviews included discussions with representatives of several DoD Fourth Estate agencies that have their own well-established civilian deployment programs,<sup>4</sup> such as the Defence Logistics Agency, Defence Intelligence Agency, and the Defence Contract Management Agency.<sup>5</sup> Other U.S. interagency organizations with which we conferred included the U.S. Department of State's Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations and Bureau of Diplomatic Security; the U.S. Department of Homeland Security's Office of International Affairs, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, the Drug Enforcement Administration, and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA); and USAID's Office of Crisis Surge Support Staff (CS3) and Office of Transition Initiatives. Outside of the United States, we spoke with officials from MOD's S2O office; the Canadian Department of National Defence; the Australian Defence Science and Technology Organisation (DSTO); and the European Union's European External Action Service (EEAS) Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC), including a representative from CPCC's Civilian Response Teams.

In conducting the research, we found that each organization interviewed had unique missions and challenges; as a result, they used a variety of methods to deploy their personnel. While some organizations had a narrowly focused mission set, others were responsible for a wide-ranging set of missions. To accurately reflect this variation, we ultimately decided to interview a set of organizations representing a diverse workforce covering a variety of missions.

Table 21-1 lists the organizations and types of personnel with whom we conducted interviews. Our data collection sample consisted of interviews with 33 personnel from government agencies both inside and outside the United States.

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<sup>3</sup> These interviews are attributed anonymously throughout this report in compliance with the U.S. Federal Policy for the Protection of Human Subjects (also known as the Common Rule). Both RAND's Institutional Review Board and human-subjects protection reviewers in DoD approved of this research method for this study. Organizational affiliation is included in the citation for each anonymous interviewee to give a sense of the individual's background and experience, but it should be noted that interviewees were not asked to represent their organizations in a confidential way. While interviewees were asked to respond based on their professional experiences, they were, in all cases, speaking for themselves rather than for their organizations in an official capacity.

<sup>4</sup> The "Fourth Estate" is all of the organizational entities in DoD that are not in the military departments (services) or the CCMDs. They include the Office of the Secretary of Defence, the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, DoD's Office of the Inspector General, the defence agencies, and DoD field activities.

<sup>5</sup> Although the focus of this segment of the research was on non-DoD organizations, we included these Fourth Estate agencies in the analysis because each has its own civilian deployment process that is distinct from those of DoD writ large. Therefore, we sought to determine the extent to which these distinct processes employed best practices with the potential to usefully inform other organizations' approaches to civilian deployment.

**Table 21-1: Organizations Interviewed.**

Agency Type		Number of Interviewees
<b>U.S. Government Agencies</b>		
DoS	Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations	1
	Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs	1
	Bureau of Diplomatic Security	1
	Afghanistan and Pakistan Strategic Partnership Office	1
USAID	CS3	1
	Office of Transition Initiatives	1
U.S. Department of Homeland Security	Office of International Affairs	1
	U.S. Customs and Border Protection	2
	FEMA	1
U.S. Department of Justice	Drug Enforcement Administration	2
DoD Fourth Estate	Defence Intelligence Agency	5
	Defence Logistics Agency	1
	Defence Contract Management Agency	3
<b>Foreign Government Agencies</b>		
UK MOD	S2O	2
Canadian Department of National Defence	J1 (Personnel) and Human Resources	2
Australian Department of Defence	DSTO	1
EEAS	CPCC	6
	CPCC Civilian Response Teams	1
<b>Total</b>		<b>33</b>

Throughout the interview process, we accumulated a wealth of knowledge regarding specific civilian deployment experiences including the requirements that generate the need for deployable civilians, the types of missions civilians support, and the methods that organizations use to identify, select, track, and deploy civilians. These findings and promising practices are outlined in subsequent sections of this report.

## **21.4 OVERVIEW OF CASE CHARACTERISTICS**

There are three main concepts that both characterize and influence the deployment approach used by organizations:

- The authority (or authorities) under which civilians deploy;

- The source and content of the requirements for resources; and
- The type of missions that civilians are sourced to support.

In the following sections, we define each of the concepts as applied within the context of this study.

## **21.4.1 Defining Key Terms and Concepts**

### **21.4.1.1 Authorities**

Civilians routinely deploy to support missions through a variety of authorities. The U.S. government agencies included in our analysis deploy civilians who typically operate either under Chief of Mission (COM) authorities derived from Title 22 of the U.S. Code (U.S.C.) or authorities derived from Title 10 U.S.C. through DoD.<sup>6</sup> Under most circumstances, deployed personnel are ultimately the responsibility of either the U.S. ambassador or a military commander.

Most civilian U.S. agencies deploy their personnel to a contingency operation under COM authority. The DoS *Foreign Affairs Manual, Volume 2*, clearly describes COM authority and the processes to exercise that authority over U.S. government staff and personnel for missions abroad:

COMs are the principal officers in charge of U.S. Diplomatic Missions and certain U.S. offices abroad that the Secretary of State designates as diplomatic in nature. The U.S. Ambassador to a foreign country, or the *chargé d'affaires*, is the COM in that country. [23]

A number of documents provide guidance and the legal basis for these authorities, including the President's letter of instruction to COMs, the DoS Basic Authorities Act, the 1980 Foreign Service Act, the 1986 Diplomatic Security Act, and National Security Decision Directive 38.<sup>7</sup> The COM has authority over every executive-branch agency in a host country, with the exception of personnel under the command of a U.S. military commander – typically the combatant commander or geographic combatant commander – and personnel on the staff of an international organization.

The other types of relevant authorities are derived from Title 10 U.S.C. and are inherently military in nature. In selecting forces for various missions, combatant commanders consult such strategic guidance documents as the *Unified Command Plan*, *National Security Strategy*, *National Defence Strategy*, *National Military Strategy*, *the Quadrennial Defence Review*, *Guidance for the Development of the Force*, *Guidance for Employment of the Force*, and *Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan*.<sup>8</sup> The combatant commander then requests forces through the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, which, in turn, makes recommendations to the Secretary of Defence. The Secretary of Defence then assigns military personnel and civilians to CCMDs for mission execution. Typically, civilians are employed under one of these authorities when deployed in support of a contingency operation.

Due to the increased terrorism threat and the need to ensure security responsibility for DoD personnel and facilities in foreign areas, the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defence signed a memorandum of understanding with the effective date of December 16, 1997, to identify security responsibilities. [9] Pursuant to this memorandum, responsibility for security has been clearly delineated between the two departments through a series of individual country agreements, via an individual memorandum of agreement, assigning responsibility

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<sup>6</sup> Title 22 outlines the role of foreign relations and intercourse. It is broken down into more than 86 chapters that cover a wide range of authorities and activities conducted by the U.S. government. Title 10 outlines the role of armed forces and provides the legal basis for the roles, missions and organization of each of the uniformed services (Air Force, Army, Marine Corps, and Navy) and DoD.

<sup>7</sup> For a full review of these documents, see U.S. Department of State [17].

<sup>8</sup> See, for example, Refs. [11], [14], [21], [13] and [15].

for the security of DoD personnel in a given country to either the COM or the combatant commander, depending on the mission. This agreement has served to clarify previous confusion over the security responsibilities of DoD personnel. [17] The COM authority and other Title 10 authorities cover U.S., personnel only. As noted, the COM authority typically covers civilian agencies, and the Title 10 authorities cover personnel assigned to CCMDs.

Other countries have different rules and regulations that govern the employment of civilians. However, while each country has its own legal rules and regulations that must be satisfied to deploy personnel, representatives from most of the organizations consulted for this study did report having a similar framework under which civilians deploy. Similarly, in the context of European Union Common Security and Defence Policy civilian missions, civilians deploy under an EU mandate approved by the Council of the European Union.

#### **21.4.1.2 Requirements**

Requirements drive operational missions. For the purposes of this study, we viewed requirements as the set of activities necessary to develop, consolidate, coordinate, validate, approve, and prioritize the deployment of civilian personnel for contingency operations. Many of the agencies examined here have adapted portions of their organizations, business processes, and deployment models to address requirement requests. Where requirements come from greatly affects the organization and processes that an agency uses to deploy personnel. Therefore, it is critical to understand where requirements are generated and how they are processed. Typically, there are two methods through which a request can come to an agency: top-down or bottom-up.

Top-down requests in the U.S. context originate from the division, bureau, or secretariat/headquarters levels; the National Security Council; or congressional or presidential direction. Top-down requests are primarily directive in nature and compel the organization to react. Bottom-up requests, on the other hand, come to an agency from a variety of sources outside the organizational chain of command and either could require immediate attention or could be staffed through routine procedures. Here, the requesting agent often makes the request through a U.S. embassy, either on behalf of a partner nation or via the COM. Requests can also come through other federal agencies or through NATO, the European Union, the United Nations, or another international entity.

Correctly identifying the origin of the bulk of requirements will guide the type of deployment model an organization uses. Interviewees described a need to balance efficiency and speed with personnel identification. In general, the speed with which a requirement must be filled will determine whether the individual selected for a deployment should come from within the organization or whether he or she can be hired from outside the organization; it also determines whether there should be a preselected pool of candidates prior to requirement identification. The typology of organizational structures is discussed in more detail later in this report.

#### **21.4.1.3 Mission Types**

There are a variety of missions that civilian agencies routinely deploy personnel to support, ranging from relatively benign workshops and technical assistance programs to efforts aimed at countering extremist operations in high-threat environments. The agencies interviewed for this study covered a suitably diverse host of “non-steady-state” operations that require civilian expertise, including humanitarian assistance / disaster relief, stabilization and reconstruction, counterdrug, counterpiracy, capacity building, institution building, election monitoring, intelligence, counter gang, technical assistance, liaison and coordination duties, and security force training.

While military personnel can and do conduct many of these missions, in some cases, specific civilian expertise is desired. The key is discerning when to leverage civilian expertise versus when a generalist will suffice. Many of

the skills required for the mission types listed above center on specific expertise that is found predominantly within the civilian workforce.

## 21.5 CASE SUMMARIES

In this section, we present a brief summary of each of the organizations that we approached for this study. While we mention deployment numbers, which were obtained through the interview process, it is important to note that because our focus was on the *process* of deployment, we did not comprehensively analyse and cross-check the number of personnel deployed by each organization. We did find, however, that the number of civilians deployed by a given organization tended to vary on an annual basis, depending on missions and requirements. Furthermore, not all organizations were in a position to provide us with an exact number of civilians deployed in a given time frame. We include the estimated numbers to give a rough indication of the size and scope of civilian deployments from each organization.

Table 21-2 captures many of the findings from our interviews. The “Deployment Type” column indicates whether requirements are part of steady-state operations or are typically emergent requests. The “Deployment Office” column indicates the structure of the office that deploys civilians; centralized offices maintain more oversight of deployed personnel, and decentralized offices relinquish more control to field offices and the individual. The “Requirement Source” column indicates where most requirements are generated. The “Sourcing” column indicates the source of personnel who fulfill deployable civilian requirements. Finally, the “Volunteers” column indicates whether a force solicits volunteers for a deployment.

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**Table 21-2: Characteristics of Organizations Interviewed.**

Organization Type	Annual Number	Deployment Type	Deployment Office	Requirement Source	Sourcing	Volunteers
<b>U.S. Government Agencies</b>						
<b>DoS</b>						
Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations	30	Both short-notice and planned	Decentralized office	COM, functional bureaus, CCMD	Through embassy or regional or functional bureau; identify need through the Crisis Response Network	Yes
Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs	Declined to comment	Both short-notice and planned	Centralized office	COM, functional bureaus, CCMD	Through embassy or regional or functional bureau	–
Bureau of Diplomatic Security	Declined to comment	Both short-notice and planned	Centralized office	Embassy	Internal to the bureau	Yes
Afghanistan and Pakistan Strategic Partnership Office	50 – 100	Planned	Centralized office	Embassy	Hire externally for most positions	Yes
<b>USAID</b>						
CS3	50	Both short-notice and planned	Decentralized office	Embassy	Bullpen	Part of job
Office of Transition Initiatives	190	Both short-notice and planned	Decentralized office	Embassy	Bullpen	Part of job
<b>U.S. Department of Homeland Security</b>						
Office of International Affairs	?	Both short-notice and planned	Decentralized office	Embassy	Internally for most positions	Yes
U.S. Customs and Border Protection	750	Both short-notice and planned	Centralized office	Embassy	Volunteers and internal staffing	Yes
FEMA	4,000	Short-notice	Centralized office	National Response Coordination Center	Via executive office and a declared emergency	Yes



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Organization Type	Annual Number	Deployment Type	Deployment Office	Requirement Source	Sourcing	Volunteers
<b>U.S. Department of Justice</b>						
Drug Enforcement Administration	800 positions overseas	Both short-notice and planned	Centralized office	Embassy, long-standing offices	Lengthy internal process	Yes
<b>DoD Fourth Estate</b>						
Defence Intelligence Agency	100 – 150	Both short-notice and planned	Centralized office	CCMD, Global Force Management	Through mission managers within each directorate, internally	Part of job
Defence Logistics Agency	200 – 300	Both short-notice and planned	Centralized office	CCMD, Global Force Management	Volunteers and internal staffing	Yes
Defence Contract Management Agency	50 – 100	Planned	Centralized office	CCMD, Global Force Management, joint task force, forward-stationed contract management office	Moving to be a source provider, not an executor; the services will execute their contracts	Yes
<b>Foreign Government Agencies</b>						
<b>UK MOD</b>						
S2O	150	Both short-notice and planned	Centralized office	Theater or permanent joint headquarters or elsewhere	From MOD civil servants; sometimes the wider UK civil service	Yes
<b>Canada</b>						
Department of National Defence (J1)	100	Both short-notice and planned	Centralized office	Theater	Within the pool of existing public servants	Yes
<b>Australia</b>						
DSTO	10	Both short-notice and planned	Centralized office	Operational commanders	Within DSTO or Australian Department of Defence	Yes

Organization Type	Annual Number	Deployment Type	Deployment Office	Requirement Source	Sourcing	Volunteers
EEAS						
CPCC	3,200 currently deployed	Both short-notice and planned	Centralized office	Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management	Within the member state; alternatively, third states if required	Yes
CPCC Civilian Response Teams	–	Short-notice	Centralized office	Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management	Within the member state; alternatively, third states if required	Yes

**21.5.1 Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations, U.S. Department of State**

The Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations “advances U.S. national security by breaking cycles of violent conflict and mitigating crises in priority countries.” [18] It falls under the purview of the Office of the Under Secretary of State for Civilian Security, Democracy, and Human Rights and was created by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton in 2012 to improve the U.S. response to conflicts and crises in other countries. Its missions often require civilian involvement and expertise, and it has historically deployed around 30 personnel a year.<sup>9</sup> The bureau has also created a pool of civilian experts with specific characteristics who can be alerted and deployed on short notice, typically within two weeks.<sup>9</sup>

**21.5.2 Bureau of Diplomatic Security, U.S. Department of State**

The Bureau of Diplomatic Security is responsible for security and law enforcement within DoS. Inside the United States, it is responsible for the protection of the Secretary of State and visiting high-ranking dignitaries and other visiting officials. Overseas, it provides personnel and embassy security in more than 160 foreign countries across 275 U.S. diplomatic missions. It can deploy personnel as individuals or in a variety of teams, including security support teams, tactical support teams, and mobile training teams. It leads international investigations into passport and visa fraud, conducts personnel security investigations, and assists in threat analysis, cyber security, and counterterrorism missions. [19]

<sup>9</sup> Interview with a Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations official, September 18, 2014.



### **21.5.3 Office of Crisis Surge Support Staff and Office of Transition Initiatives, U.S. Agency for International Development**

Both CS3 and the Office of Transition Initiatives deploy U.S. personnel with the necessary skill sets to further U.S. foreign interests with the goal of improving lives and livelihoods in the developing world. One of the distinguishing characteristics of these organizations is the ability to provide a surge capability to U.S. missions through a flexible and quick-reaction deployment mechanism that selects, pre-screens, trains, and holds individuals in a wait status until a requirement emerges. Individuals in this wait status are said to be “on the bench” or “in the bullpen.” Each office deploys between 50 and 190 personnel annually.<sup>10</sup> While CS3 tends to focus directly on short-term U.S. embassy support, the Office of Transition Initiatives works primarily through implementation partners to quickly provide goods and services in crisis situations.<sup>10</sup>

### **21.5.4 U.S. Customs and Border Protection, U.S. Department of Homeland Security**

U.S. Customs and Border Protection is charged with securing more than 7,000 miles of U.S. land borders and 328 ports of entry. It is responsible for protecting U.S. citizens from terrorist threats and preventing the illegal entry of persons and goods. [12] The agency also facilitates the lawful travel and trade of goods and services across U.S. borders. It has more than 42,000 officers and border-control agents who are deployed throughout the United States. Outside the United States, more than 750 agency personnel operate under COM authority in a variety of roles, including as attachés, advisers, representatives, and security personnel in support of specific missions and programs. U.S. Customs and Border Protection requirements are generated through a variety of multiyear initiatives, as well as quick staffing solutions to fulfill short-term, ad hoc needs. [12] To fill these latter requirements, the agency has developed a database of pre-screened personnel, centered on a core group of 22 staff who can conduct short-notice training events.<sup>11</sup>

### **21.5.5 Federal Emergency Management Agency, U.S. Department of Homeland Security**

FEMA’s primary role is to coordinate the response of federal, state, and local authorities in the event of a natural or man-made disaster. The organization has more than 23 different directorates, ten regional operations centers, and an incident management and support staff of more than 17,000 personnel.<sup>12</sup> It has a tiered approach to readiness that allows some disaster response experts to deploy quickly while simultaneously notifying other FEMA employees of the disaster and that they might be required to deploy. For example, the incident management staff are full-time, fully trained FEMA employees who respond immediately in the event of a disaster. Depending on the severity of an event, ancillary support personnel can be called to help augment the incident management staff. Ancillary support can come from local, state, or other directorates within FEMA. The FEMA Corps, a cadre of 18- to 24-year-olds dedicated to disaster response, is one such organization that can be used in a disaster. It consists of a small number of highly skilled disaster assistance operators and is kept in a high state of readiness to deploy on short notice.<sup>12</sup> The U.S. Department of Homeland Security Surge Capacity is another standby force. It consists of 4,000 federal employees who can be called in the event of an emergency to provide additional capability to FEMA.<sup>12</sup>

### **21.5.6 Drug Enforcement Administration, U.S. Department of Justice**

The mission of the Drug Enforcement Administration is “to enforce the controlled substances laws and regulations of the United States and bring to the criminal and civil justice system of the United States, or any

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<sup>10</sup> Interviews with Office of Transition Initiatives and CS3 officials, September 15, 2014.

<sup>11</sup> Interview with U.S. Customs and Border Protection officials, September 18, 2014.

<sup>12</sup> Interview with a FEMA official, September 19, 2014.

other competent jurisdiction, those organizations and . . . members of organizations, involved in the growing, manufacture, or distribution of controlled substances.” [20] The office has roughly 800 positions overseas, representing approximately 10 percent of its workforce, and has been deploying agents and support staff to overseas missions under COM authority for more than 25 years.<sup>13</sup> Deployed personnel support a variety of missions and activities, including the management of a national drug intelligence program, investigation and preparation of cases for prosecution, liaison and coordination duties, training activities, and investigative and strategic intelligence gathering.

### **21.5.7 Defence Intelligence Agency, U.S. Department of Defence**

The Defence Intelligence Agency has deployed a range of operational and support personnel since the Vietnam War, but it was not until 2002 that it began emphasizing the deployment of civilian personnel. Personnel routinely deployed since 2002 include analysis, intelligence collection, IT support, logistics, administrative, finance, and contracting officers. [3] Billets requiring civilian personnel to deploy vary by year, with current requirements hovering around 100 – 150 billets.<sup>14</sup> The agency’s Expeditionary Readiness Center provides training, administrative, and medical support to deploying personnel. The center provides many of the same services to other Intelligence Community organizations through memoranda of understanding or agreement, including the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, the National Reconnaissance Office, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, and the National Security Agency. Like the Defence Logistics Agency and the Defence Contract Management Agency (discussed later), the Defence Intelligence Agency is part of the DoD Fourth Estate.

### **21.5.8 Defence Logistics Agency, U.S. Department of Defence**

“As America’s combat logistics support agency, the Defence Logistics Agency provides the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, other federal agencies, and combined and allied forces with the full spectrum of logistics, acquisition and technical services.” [4] The Defence Logistics Agency employs approximately 27,000 personnel, of whom 1,000 are military and the rest civilian. It has personnel stationed overseas at distribution centers in support of routine missions, but the agency has also deployed up to 300 civilian staff in support of contingency operation requirements.

### **21.5.9 Defence Contract Management Agency, U.S. Department of Defence**

The Defence Contract Management Agency consists of more than 11,900 civilians and military personnel who manage the execution of contracts on behalf of DoD that cover more than 20,000 contractors. [2] Although the agency was established only in 2000, it has undergone significant changes – from a primarily domestic contract oversight role to that of an expeditionary force provider. In that capacity, the agency at one time deployed up to 450 civilian contracting and support personnel, but with the subsequent drawdown of forces, current requirements range from 50 to 100 deployed personnel.<sup>15</sup>

### **21.5.10 UK Ministry of Defence Support-to-Operations Team**

MOD’s S2O office was established in 2006 to enable the generation, deployment, and subsequent redeployment of MOD civilians in support of overseas operations. Its policy and communication team is responsible for

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<sup>13</sup> Interviews with Drug Enforcement Administration officials, September 24, 2014.

<sup>14</sup> Interviews with Defence Intelligence Agency officials, October 10, 2014.

<sup>15</sup> Interviews with Defence Contract Management Agency officials, September 11, 2014.

deployment policy, rules, and guidance, as well as promoting the program and managing information disseminated to the S2O community.<sup>16</sup> The safety and security team is responsible for managing the risks associated with deploying to operational theaters and for the policies concerning safety, security, and visits. Finally, the administrative support team handles the administrative elements of deployments, including booking flights, processing operational allowances, and scheduling individuals for training. The roles that this team supports include policy advisers, civil secretaries, media advisers, and operational analysts.<sup>16</sup> Each role has a designated senior-level official who is responsible for maintaining adequate pools of volunteers for deployment. For some roles, this also includes high-readiness pools; however, these pools are currently in an early stage of development.

### **21.5.11 Canadian Department of National Defence**

Since its involvement in Afghanistan in 2001, the Canadian Department of National Defence has deployed civilian specialists to operational theaters. Personnel deployed include medical specialists, morale and welfare staff, policy advisers, and intelligence analysts.<sup>17</sup> While many individuals deploy under the public service umbrella, some are sourced through the Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development. The civilian requirement varies across missions but has entailed an average of 80 deployed personnel working on the ground in Afghanistan.<sup>17</sup>

### **21.5.12 Australian Defence Science and Technology Organisation**

DSTO (now called the Defence Science and Technology Group) consists of approximately 2,300 civilian staff employed as scientists, engineers, IT specialists, and technicians. [1] It is the part of the Australian Department of Defence and supports scientific analysis and research and development. As part of its mission, the organization deploys scientists in support of military operations to provide immediate, on-the-ground advice and assistance. Personnel deployed in these roles include operational analysts, anthropologists, and cultural advisers.<sup>18</sup> Scientists are paired with military personnel and deploy as a team. This pairing is established during pre-deployment training and continues throughout the deployment. DSTO's requirement for particular civilian skill sets has varied over time, from geospatial specialists to analysts skilled in developing metrics to understand strategic impact.<sup>18</sup>

### **21.5.13 Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability, European External Action Service**

CPCC, part of the EEAS, supports the sourcing of staff for Common Security and Defence Policy missions, among other responsibilities. The first such mission was launched in 2003. Since then, the European Union has launched 24 civilian missions and military operations. [6] In 2013, CPCC supported ten Common Security and Defence Policy civilian missions, including training missions, border and judicial system support, support for security-sector reform, support to authorities in combating terrorism and organized crime, and more general advice or assistance with defence reform. Deployed personnel come from EU member states and third-party states (those outside of the European Union).<sup>19</sup> The missions range in duration, depending on the mission mandate. Missions involve the deployment of roughly 3,200 military personnel, and CPCC had around 3,700 civilians deployed at the time of this research. The Civilian Headline Goal 2010 aimed to improve the European Union's civilian capability to respond effectively to crisis management tasks in the context of the Common Security and Defence Policy. [7] One focus was on improving the capabilities and capacity of civilians,

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<sup>16</sup> Interview with an S2O official, August 2014.

<sup>17</sup> Interviews with Canadian Department of National Defence officials, September 2014.

<sup>18</sup> Interview with a DSTO official, September 25, 2014.

<sup>19</sup> Interview with a CPCC official, October 10, 2014.

for instance through improved pre-deployment training. In 2011, Europe’s New Training Initiative for Civilian Crisis Management (known as ENTRi) was launched to prepare and train crisis management personnel in a rigorous and standardized manner. [8]

## 21.6 TYPOLOGY OF CIVILIAN DEPLOYMENT MODELS

Overall, we identified four models that these organizations have applied to deploy civilians. The models differ along two main dimensions: the extent to which they sourced individuals to deploy from within the organization’s existing civilian ranks (internal sourcing), as opposed to searching for candidates external to the organization (external sourcing), and the extent to which the organizations had a pool of pre-identified individuals prior to the issuance of requirements (proactive sourcing), as opposed to identifying candidates for positions after requirements had been issued (reactive sourcing).<sup>20</sup> Table 21-3 categorizes the 17 analogous organizations into the four deployment sourcing models.

**Table 21-3: Deployment Models – by Agency.**

	<b>Reactive Sourcing</b>	<b>Proactive Sourcing</b>
<b>Internal Sourcing</b>	U.S. Customs and Border Protection	U.S. Defence Contract Management Agency
	U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration	U.S. Defence Logistics Agency
	U.S. Defence Intelligence Agency	FEMA
	Canadian Department of National Defence	DoS Bureau of Diplomatic Security
	DoS Bureau of South and Central Asian	UK MOD S2O
	U.S. Department of Homeland Security	Australian DSTO (now the Defence
<b>External Sourcing</b>	DoS Afghanistan and Pakistan Strategic Partnership Office	USAID Office of Transition Initiatives
	EEAS CPCC	USAID CS3
		DoS Bureau of Conflict and
		EEAS CPCC, Civilian Response

It is important to note that some of these organizations can be classified into more than one category, depending on the office in which it is housed. We therefore categorized each organization based on the predominant sourcing model it used to fill the *majority* of civilian requirements.


### 21.6.1 Reactive Internal Sourcing

We termed the first model *reactive internal sourcing*. In this model, a requirement is identified through either a top-down or bottom-up process (see Figure 21-1).<sup>21</sup> The requirement triggers a recruitment process internal to the

<sup>20</sup> There are benefits and drawbacks to both reactive and proactive sourcing, depending on the situation in question.

<sup>21</sup> The requirement in some instances had to be validated through engagement between theater and home office leadership to ensure that it was valid and that a civilian was best placed to fill it before individuals were sourced (interviews with MOD S2O officials, August 2014).

organization – for instance, within the civil service of a defence department. Individuals are selected to fill the requirement, after which they undertake any required pre-deployment training or preparation (e.g., medical screening and vaccinations, visas, clearances, culture training, hostile environment training) as needed for the specific deployment. Individuals deploy to their posting, and after deployment they return to the post they had occupied prior to deployment.<sup>22</sup> Only a few organizations specifically mentioned decompression as part of the process.<sup>23</sup>



RAND RR1249-1

**Figure 21-1: Reactive Internal Sourcing Model.**

### 21.6.1.1 Benefits and Constraints

The reactive internal sourcing model is beneficial in that it entails (and enables) longer-term organizational ownership of the skills required by deployed civilians. Because it focuses solely on candidates internal to the organization, it ensures that the organization maintains these civilian capabilities within its overall workforce following any particular deployment. Personnel who are deploying complete training and preparation just prior to deployment, such that costs are not incurred well in advance of deployment and the training can be targeted for the specific deployment. In many cases, the deployment training and additional skills that are developed by civilians while deployed have added benefits that can be applied back to the home organization upon return. The individuals involved with the candidate selection process – handled by management or a selection board that is familiar with the requirement – understand the organization, mission, and capabilities and are selected according to the specific requirement.<sup>24</sup>

<sup>22</sup> In some organizations, individuals were given a preview of life during operations to ensure that people’s decisions to volunteer were based on realistic information about the position. In the literature on organization selection reviewed for this study, this practice is often referred to as a “realistic preview,” happening prior to the application process (interviews with MOD S2O officials, August 2014; interview with a DSTO official, September 25, 2014; interviews with Defence Intelligence Agency, Drug Enforcement Administration, and U.S. Customs and Border Protection officials, September and October 2014).

<sup>23</sup> Interviews with MOD S2O officials, August 2014; interviews with a DSTO official, September 25, 2014; interviews with Canadian Department of National Defence officials, September 2014; interviews with Defence Intelligence Agency officials, October 10, 2014.

<sup>24</sup> Interviews with Defence Intelligence Agency officials, October 10, 2014.

However, there are also a number of potential drawbacks associated with this model. The length of the process means that it is not well suited for short-notice, urgent deployments (unless there is a speedy internal process for advertising positions and quickly recruiting staff).<sup>25</sup> Applicants are also already employed in other roles within their organizations, which means that when they deploy, their posts are often left open without backfill. This can lead to a loss of productivity and increased risk to the home office. Additionally, for certain skill sets, the candidate pool may be too shallow under this model, causing a capability shortage if an individual with the necessary qualifications does not apply to fill the requirement.<sup>26</sup> The more complex the expertise needed, the more difficult it is to find suitable candidates.<sup>25</sup>

Other constraints include issues with reintegrating deployed personnel back into the home office. Sometimes, individuals do not want to return to their previous role or position due to their newly acquired experience.<sup>27</sup> Other times, employees are penalized for deploying or there is home office animosity toward the deployed person because his or her position was gapped without backfill. Individuals have returned to find that their former jobs have been filled.

Finally, some interviewees identified issues surrounding traditional Human Resources (HR) functions. Several challenges arose concerning the identification and selection of potential deployed personnel, performance evaluations, and the overall flow of information from the HR office to potential volunteers. Other interviewees raised the issue of unfair promotion practices.<sup>28</sup>

### **21.6.2 Proactive Internal Sourcing**

The second model identified through our analysis is the *proactive internal sourcing model*. Similar to reactive internal sourcing, under this model, deployed civilians are sourced from within an organization's existing civilian employee pool. However, rather than waiting for a specific requirement to be identified, the most probable requirements to emerge are pre-identified. Civilians within the organizations can then apply to be part of a readiness pool that will be used to source the set of emergent requirements. Individuals are identified per internal selection processes and undergo required pre-deployment training and screening. Upon completion, individuals are placed in the readiness pool, as shown in Figure 21-2.


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<sup>25</sup> Interviews with CPCC officials, October 10, 2014.

<sup>26</sup> For instance, since 2006, there have been 43 calls for contributions to Common Security and Defence Policy civilian missions, with a goal of filling 150 posts. Officials reported that 109 of these posts were filled through this process, though only 23 were filled with individuals from the expert pool (interviews with CPCC officials, October 10, 2014). For selected organizations that have maintained a high deployment tempo over multiple years, the candidate pool is sufficiently deep, but candidate availability has been diminished by consecutive deployments.

<sup>27</sup> Interviews with MOD S2O officials, August 2014.

<sup>28</sup> Interview with Defence Intelligence Agency, Drug Enforcement Administration, and U.S. Customs and Border Protection officials, September and October 2014.



RAND RR1249-2

**Figure 21-2: Proactive Internal Sourcing Model.**

### 21.6.2.1 Benefits and Constraints

The primary benefit of the proactive internal sourcing model is the ability to deploy on relatively short notice, because individuals are preselected and prepared for a set of likely missions. These individuals are then put into a readiness pool where they continue to function in their normal capacity until notified of an upcoming deployment. Entrance into the readiness pool typically happens through one or two methods. First, individuals are hired into the organization in a “tagged post,” in which an offer of employment is conditional upon agreement to be called to deploy. Second, an individual with a certain skill set that is valuable to the organization in both deployed and non-deployed environments are identified as “tagged people” and are also placed into the readiness pool.

Similarly to the previous model, ownership of the skills needed for deployments are retained within the organization. Furthermore, there is an opportunity in both internally sourced models for organizations to learn from the experience and retain the expertise of deployed personnel upon their return. As with the previous model, drawbacks associated with proactive internal sourcing include a lack of backfill for (and the requirement to hold open) home office postings, as well as related difficulties as the civilian attempts to reintegrate into the home office after deployment. Individuals in the readiness pool are not guaranteed to deploy. For example, the requirement might never emerge, it might take too long for the requirement to emerge, or there could be an issue with retention of personnel within the pool.<sup>29</sup> Multiple organizations that utilize this model encourage HR staff or the office responsible for deploying personnel to actively monitor the pool to ensure that it is appropriately sized to meet requirements and that personnel are not in the pool so long that they lose interest in deploying.<sup>30</sup> The cost

<sup>29</sup> Interview with a DSTO official, September 24, 2014.


<sup>30</sup> Interviews with MOD S2O officials, August 26, 2014.

of pre-deployment training is also incurred regardless of deployment, and civilians in the readiness pool may need refresher training or new training, depending on how much time has elapsed since their recruitment into the pool.

A final drawback of the proactive internal sourcing approach is that the forecasted requirement against which the individuals were originally recruited may evolve and differ from actual future requirements.<sup>31</sup> Therefore, some process must be established to routinely validate the set of requirements and the appropriateness of the skill sets represented in the readiness pool. For example, some agencies have a quarterly validation panel that looks at current and future requirements; the readiness pool is subsequently adjusted according to these new requirements.<sup>32</sup>

### 21.6.3 Reactive External Sourcing

The third model identified in this comparative analysis is the *reactive external sourcing model*. In this model, individuals are drawn from external sources for deployable civilian positions. That is, a specific requirement is identified, the organization advertises the requirement externally, and an outside expert is hired to fill the requirement, as shown in Figure 21-3. The organization usually covers the costs associated with any necessary training, medical screening, visas, and security clearances for the individual in question. Following deployment, employees hired under this model are no longer affiliated with the organization, often returning to their former posts with other organizations (including universities). The Afghanistan and Pakistan Strategic Partnership Office in DoS is one organization that utilizes this approach.<sup>33</sup> We also categorized CPCC within this category, though the distinction between internal and external sourcing in CPCC is less clear-cut because a call for contributions is sent out to member states, which then look internally to their government departments for candidates. Once a candidate is selected, CPCC will fill the requirement and the candidate will deploy for the mission. If a call for contributions has been sent out twice without enough volunteers, the call is expanded to non-member states.



RAND RR1249-3

**Figure 21-3: Reactive External Sourcing Model.**

<sup>31</sup> Interviews with Canadian Department of National Defence officials, September 2014; interviews with CPCC officials, October 10, 2014.

<sup>32</sup> Interviews with analogous civilian deployment organizations, July–November 2014; interviews with U.S. government officials, 2014.

<sup>33</sup> Interview with an Afghanistan and Pakistan Strategic Partnership Office official, September 10, 2014.



### 21.6.3.1 Benefits and Constraints

The benefits of the reactive external sourcing model are similar to those of the reactive internal sourcing model, particularly with regard to targeting pre-deployment training only to those who will be deployed. The selection procedure is focused on finding the most highly qualified individuals matching the requirement. Because individuals are sourced externally, there is no issue with gapping home office assignments within the organization, and the costs are not incurred unless individuals are actually hired to fulfill a requirement and deploy.

Challenges associated with this model include an ever-present question as to whether the skills needed for any particular requirement will be readily available in the external environment. In our interviews, this was not typically a concern.<sup>34</sup> However, it is possible to have a scenario in which specific requirements are hard to fill because the capability is not readily available outside of the organization. An example could be a technical expert or senior Foreign Service officer. Furthermore, if skills attractive to the home office are developed on deployment, they are not retained after deployment, as individuals return to their pre-deployment work status outside the organization. Often, external recruitment is a lengthy process and does not lend itself to urgent, short-notice deployments because of the U.S. Office of Personnel Management's competitive hiring authorities.<sup>35</sup> Finally, there may be additional training or security requirements associated with deploying external candidates that need to be considered.

### 21.6.4 Proactive External Sourcing


The fourth model identified through our analysis is the *proactive external sourcing model*. Much like the reactive external sourcing model, personnel from outside an organization are identified to fill requirements. The organization uses various planning models to forecast a set of future requirements and then hires personnel to source those requirements. In anticipation of a requirement for civilian deployment, organizations such as the Office of Transition Initiatives and CS3 set up a *bullpen*, a readiness pool of external selectees that is used to fill requirements when needed, as shown in Figure 21-4.<sup>36</sup> A practice commonly seen in organizations utilizing this model involves selectively hiring experts prior to the issuance of actual requirements, conducting pre-deployment training and medical screening, obtaining passports and security clearances, and then placing candidates in the bullpen, where they will wait to be called for a deployment. While in the bullpen, individuals are not paid, nor are they provided benefits. When a requirement is issued that matches the qualifications of a particular individual in the bullpen, he or she is notified for a deployment and then his or her pay and benefits are activated.

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<sup>34</sup> A few interviewees mentioned difficulty finding personnel with the necessary skill sets for highly technical work, such as electricians, rule-of-law specialists, DNA analysts, air traffic controllers, and English-language specialists (interview with a U.S. government official, September 2014; interviews with CPCC officials, October 10, 2014).

<sup>35</sup> Multiple analogous civilian organizations mentioned that the fair hiring practices mandated by the U.S. Office of Personnel Management require a thorough screening of all applicants – a process that lengthens the hiring process (see Ref. [10]).

<sup>36</sup> Interviews with Office of Transition Initiatives and CS3 officials, September 2014.



RAND RR1249-4

Figure 21-4: Proactive External Sourcing Model.

#### 21.6.4.1 Benefits and Constraints

The period between the identified requirement and the actual deployment is likely to be shorter in the proactive external sourcing model because individuals are already pre-identified, have been selected, and have undertaken required pre-deployment readiness preparation. Salary-related costs are incurred only after the individual deploys under this model and, depending on the organization, would be paid by either the home office or the field office. For example, interviewees reported that most salary costs for deployed personnel at one organization were paid by the home office. Other interviewees reported that the salary costs at another organization that uses a bullpen were predominately covered by the embassy that the deployed personnel supported.<sup>37</sup>

Most organizations do not have a need to backfill posts due to the nature and function of the bullpen. Requirements are forecasted such that the necessary qualifications are understood in general terms, and experts with the necessary knowledge and skill sets to meet these qualifications are selected for the bullpen. Many organizations that use this model have stringent authority over the hiring and firing of personnel, and there are few bureaucratic processes associated with relieving personnel who are not a good fit.<sup>37</sup>

Yet, this model also has its share of drawbacks. Although salaries are paid only upon actual deployment, the organization may incur the costs associated with pre-deployment training up front regardless of whether an individual deploys. If the requirement changes from what was originally anticipated, there may be issues with not having the required capability or skill set in the bullpen, and the training and readiness costs are sunk expenses that cannot be retrieved for personnel who no longer meet the qualifications of evolving forecasted

<sup>37</sup> Interviews with officials from analogous civilian deployment organizations, July–November 2014; interviews with U.S. government officials, 2014.

requirements. Finally, as seen in the previous model, the skills developed by the individual during his or her deployment are not retained easily within the organization.

## **21.7 LESSONS FROM THE FOUR DEPLOYMENT MODELS**

The four models highlight the differences in how organizations handle civilian deployments. We believe that organizations can draw on a combination of these models, emphasizing aspects that fit their specific situation and best position the organization to respond to requirements. For example, it was clear that most organizations with a requirement to deploy civilians on relatively short notice to a hostile environment chose to develop a kind of cadre; they had a process for preselecting people who could fill requirements that arose quickly.<sup>38</sup> However, we found that the time it took to fill a requirement for a particular civilian deployment varied greatly. A number of factors affected the speed of deployment, including the organization from which the individuals were sourced, the extent to which the required skill set was readily available, and the generic selection procedures applied within the organization.

Yet, we found it notable that, of the four models we identified, those that involved a proactive sourcing approach allowed organizations to deploy personnel significantly faster than those that involved recruiting qualified personnel after a requirement had been issued.<sup>39</sup> Meanwhile, organizations that relied on external sourcing models spoke to the numerous rules and regulations faced by government agencies. At times, lengthy justifications were needed to select one individual over another to adhere to fair hiring practices.<sup>40</sup> This indicates that, when reactive sourcing is necessary, sourcing officials may need direct or expedited hiring authorities to enhance their ability to source positions quickly. Furthermore, regardless of whether individuals were sourced internally or externally, some type of oversight organization was necessary to ensure the successful deployment of civilians.

Across the analogous organizations, we identified opportunities to pool and share existing capabilities for civilian deployments. For instance, certain agencies within the Intelligence Community share pre-deployment training and medical facilities, such as the Defence Intelligence Agency's Expeditionary Readiness Center.<sup>41</sup> Instead of maintaining individual deployment divisions, organizations could pool those resources, and one agency could provide training on behalf of the others.

There are a number of decisions to be made with regard to the size and scope of a deployable civilian capability. Planning and forecasting will help optimize the timelines associated with deployment. For instance, if the requirement is not urgent, the organization has time to use a reactive sourcing model. Although we did not directly assess the difference in costs between sourcing external candidates versus internal candidates, it is likely that costs will differ and that the cost itself will be a factor in choosing a sourcing model.<sup>42</sup> Furthermore, if a skill set is required within the organization in the future, it is valuable to maintain and sustain the skill set internally rather than externally. However, if a permanent civilian workforce is built to include all necessary expeditionary

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<sup>38</sup> Interview with a FEMA official, September 19, 2014; interview with a CS3 official, September 15, 2014; interview with MOD S2O officials, August 2014; interview with a DSTO official, September 25, 2014.

<sup>39</sup> Experts from the CPCC Civilian Response Team pool have been deployed within five days (interviews with CPCC officials, October 10, 2014; interviews with U.S. government officials, 2014).

<sup>40</sup> Interview with a CPCC official, October 10, 2014; interview with an Afghanistan and Pakistan Strategic Partnership Office official, September 10, 2014.

<sup>41</sup> Interviews with Defence Intelligence Agency officials, September 2014.

<sup>42</sup> Such a comparative cost analysis assessing the relative expense of each of the four deployment models outlined here would be a fruitful area for future research.

civilian capabilities internally, the nature of the entire workforce may change. For some skills, this may be critical if a future surge is required. Other skills, however, may not need to be retained internally in the organization (for example, Ebola/infectious disease specialist physicians). Yet, overutilization of expeditionary civilian personnel sourced from outside the organization will entail challenges in post-deployment tracking, and the skill sets will not be readily available in the future. Each organization must decide which capabilities to retain internally and which to look for outside the organization. If the ability to quickly deploy personnel is of primary concern, pre-identified personnel are recommended. To source and deploy civilians rapidly, our analysis suggests a need to closely examine the speed of the recruitment processes, the possibility of developing a preselected pool, and the possibility of making deployment part of the job description. To that end, the establishment of a pre-identified readiness pool will require the accurate forecasting of future requirements and likely mission sets.

Related to this point, the organizations analysed considered the positions that they were looking to fill with civilians; they also scrutinized the requirements for civilian deployment to ensure that the post was required and that only a civilian could fill it.<sup>43</sup> For instance, the Canadian Department of National Defence, Australian DSTO, UK MOD, and EU CPCC all draw their civilian deployees from volunteers – that is, individuals deploy on a voluntary basis. Interviewees from these organizations noted that, within their workforces, they had capable individuals who were interested in volunteering, and they found that very few people withdrew their offer to deploy.<sup>44</sup>

Meanwhile, among the U.S. agencies examined here, some mandated that specific individuals deploy (Bureau of Diplomatic Security, Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization, Office of Transition Initiatives, Defence Logistics Agency),<sup>45</sup> others requested volunteers (Office of International Affairs, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, Drug Enforcement Agency),<sup>46</sup> and others used a combination of factors to make this decision, including the source of the requirement, the time needed to fill the position, and whether the skill set was internal to the organization or had to be found externally. Organizations within the DoD Fourth Estate typically had a mixed civilian/military workforce. In organizations with a well-defined set of requirements to deploy personnel, there were usually systems in place to facilitate individuals volunteering to fill a requirement. In sum, most of the organizations examined had well-defined policies that clearly articulated duties and procedures surrounding the deployment process. However, other agencies lacked many basic policy documents and consistently handled their deployment procedures on an ad hoc basis.<sup>44</sup>

## **21.8 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

This research points to a number of interesting findings regarding the benefit of a long-term strategy aimed at developing a viable civilian deployment practice that will be sustainable and the specific practices and processes that organizations might usefully employ on a day-to-day basis to ensure effective, efficient civilian deployments. Notably, the findings at both levels are intertwined, with the strategic findings being necessary for the support and establishment of the day-to-day practices. It is useful to consider the management of civilian deployment capabilities as being divided into three categories of activities: policy, planning and strategy,


<sup>43</sup> Interviews with MOD S2O officials, August 2014; interviews with Canadian Department of National Defence officials, September 25, 2014.

<sup>44</sup> Various interviews with officials from analogous organizations, May–November, 2014.

<sup>45</sup> Interview with Bureau of Diplomatic Security officials, August, 14, 2014; interview with CSO, September 18, 2014; interviews with Office of Transition Initiatives officials, September 15, 2014; interviews with Defence Logistics Agency officials, July 19, 2014.

<sup>46</sup> Interview with an Office of International Affairs official, August 25, 2014; interview with U.S. Customs and Border Protection officials, September 18, 2014; interviews with Drug Enforcement Administration officials, September 24, 2014.

and operations. *Policy* responsibilities entail writing policy to determine the guidelines for civilian deployments. *Planning and strategy* responsibilities entail mission-based, scenario-specific forecasting and strategic human capital planning. *Operational* responsibilities entail the assignment of requirements, sourcing, readiness preparation, and during/post deployment tracking of expeditionary civilians. Figure 21-5 illustrates these distinctions.



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**Figure 21-5: Ownership of Relevant Aspects of Civilian Deployment.**


## 21.8.1 Policy

### 21.8.1.1 Championing Expeditionary Civilian Capabilities

The military may be unaware of the benefits of drawing on civilian capabilities for deployed missions, and organizations must make a conscious effort to market civilian capabilities in this regard. This is a relatively day-to-day practice that organizations can employ to ensure that defence leaders and other “customers” of deployable civilian capabilities are aware of the benefits that deployed civilians can bring to an operation. Marketing serves two primary functions. First, it provides those unfamiliar with civilian deployment a better understanding of what it means to be a deployed civilian. This gives applicants a realistic preview of the roles in which they could possibly deploy and helps adjust expectations for both those generating requirements and the civilians who consider volunteering for a deployment. Second, marketing ensures that individuals who request deployed civilians understand both the current and future capabilities that are available. This helps those generating requirements understand where deployed civilians would be most appropriately assigned and how they could be employed. Such initiatives, if supported over time with evidence that the organization in question can effectively deliver the civilian capabilities marketed in a timely manner, thus promote a cultural shift in overcoming potential misconceptions about the availability, deployment process, and usability of civilians in support of military operations.

**21.8.1.2 Balancing Readiness with Cost**

Organizations must craft their own structure for deploying civilians, tailored to their specific needs. The speed of recruitment and the cost of readiness preparation and maintenance must be balanced against the cost of those capabilities. Those capabilities vary to different degrees under different circumstances, and some skills should likely be maintained internally over the long term (while others need not be). To that end, we conceived of a tiered approach to combine internal, external, reactive, and proactive hiring mechanisms to ensure readiness and flexibility in the force across a spectrum of possible future contingencies. Figure 21-6 highlights some of the possible considerations for each organization. There is not one model that is right for every organization, and each should weigh its own requirements to deploy civilians and adopt an appropriate approach.



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**Figure 21-6: A Tiered Approach to Balance Readiness Needs with Cost Constraints.**


**21.8.2 Planning and Strategy**

**21.8.2.1 Speed versus Capability**

Our analysis suggests that there is a need to examine the speed of the recruitment process, the cost of maintaining deployable civilians at a given level of readiness, and the possibility of developing a preselected pool or making deployment part of the job description. Ultimately, the speed of recruitment and cost of readiness preparation and maintenance will matter to different degrees in different circumstances. Clearly, the mission type and the urgency of the deployment will matter, as will the financial resources available to support the deployment process. Furthermore, we found that if a specific skill set is required within an organization for the future, it is valuable to develop and sustain the capability internally rather than externally to be able to deploy individuals with that capability in the future.

### 21.8.2.2 Planning and Forecasting

The extent to which planning actually incorporates considerations of expeditionary civilian requirements is questionable at this point, at least as indicated by our interviews. A failure to effectively integrate expeditionary civilians into planning for various scenarios and missions hinders the development of realistic expectations for the numbers of expeditionary civilians required in any given situation. It also ultimately poses a challenge to the integration of these civilians by decreasing organizations’ ability to plan ahead for backfill needs when one of their civilians deploys. Therefore, organizations need to dedicate resources to the planning and forecasting of future requirements to optimize the organizational design associated with civilian deployments. Figure 21-7 shows an example of such an approach.



RAND RR1249-7

**Figure 21-7: Scenario-Based, Mission-Specific Forecasting  
for the Long-Term Utilization of Deployable Civilians.**

### 21.8.3 Operations

#### 21.8.3.1 Centralized versus Decentralized

Organizations must determine the level at which to manage many of the processes that govern civilian deployments. Should capability and oversight be retained at a headquarters level, or should it be pushed down to the operational agency that deploys personnel? The extent to which an organization centralizes that authority

determines the speed, budget, capability, and resources that it requires. A decentralized recruitment, screening, and selection approach does not necessarily work when an organization must meet several different deployable position requirements. A centralized process may be slow to respond to emergent requirements.

A good example showing the difference between centralized and decentralized process is readiness preparation. It involves training and the processing of any necessary clearances (e.g., medical, security), as well as the provision of visas, passports, and other administrative documentation necessary for deployment. While the headquarters are best resourced to manage readiness preparation for civilian employees tasked with a mission, they may not be prepared to manage readiness preparation for civilians who will conduct missions for another organization or agency.

The tracking of civilians both pre- and post-deployment is another critical function that can highlight the differences of centralized and decentralized approaches. Tracking entails maintaining contact with a deployed civilian both during deployment and for a period of time post-deployment to assist with administrative, HR, or occupational issues and to screen the individual for any deployment-related health problems following his or her return. We recommend that a centralized headquarters-level organization be tasked with oversight and management of the assignment of requirements and the recruitment, screening, and selection of expeditionary civilian candidates.

#### **21.8.3.2 Sharing Resources**

We identified opportunities to pool and share existing enabling capabilities for civilian deployments, including the sharing of training facilities. Consolidating the responsibility to deploy personnel from multiple organizations to one deployment center saves on overhead, personnel, and operational costs.<sup>47</sup> There are several options that could be utilized to deploy civilians through one center. Centers could be established based on geographic location or on a specific function. For instance, organizations that routinely deploy personnel to the same geographic location could conduct joint pre-deployment training, ensure that the same medical procedures are followed, and coordinate on visas, logistics, and other supported activities.

#### **21.8.4 Areas for Future Research**

We found a dearth of studies tallying the costs of different deployment models or, indeed, the costs associated with different utilization of parts of the whole force. A potential avenue for further research could include the development of a costing framework for each of the models that would allow transparency of costs associated with both the deployment process as a whole and different elements of each of the models.

While we found that improved planning and forecasting of requirements for deployable civilian capabilities could be useful in informing civilian deployment processes, it was not within the scope of this study to explore how best to pursue such forecasting. Future research on this topic could therefore usefully examine, compare, and analyse various methods for forecasting deployable civilian requirements and determine the method or methods most likely to accurately forecast such requirements. Other possible research could focus on practical aspects of civilian deployment. For example, safety considerations, operating with military personnel, performance metrics, pre- and post-deployment stress evaluations, and the psychological impact of deployments could all be explored.

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<sup>47</sup> There is one center currently in operation in the DoD that deploys civilians from other agencies. Funding for this center comes primarily through one agency, which typically provides access to the center for other agencies through a memorandum of agreement. This memorandum typically addresses overall responsibilities for each agency, the type of training to be provided, and the transfer of funds between agencies.



Finally, research could be conducted to further elaborate and refine the deployment models. For instance, future analysis could test additional HR management elements (e.g., different recruitment practices, different decompression practices, or different levels of pre-deployment training) with the models and evaluate their impact on deployment outcomes, such as the speed of deployment, quality of performance, or the cost of the deployment process.

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## **Chapter 22 – CONCORDANCE THEORY, DEFENCE PERSONNEL RELATIONS, AND THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERROR**

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The NATO STO RTG HFM-226 project focuses on civilian and military personnel work culture and relations in defence organisations. Defence institutions possess both military and civilian personnel often working closely together in defence headquarters, academic settings, and defence missions. In some areas, civilians are managed by military supervisors; in other areas, civilians are professionally responsible for their military personnel. As such, there are practical outcomes of this project – outcomes that point to both potential successes and challenges among civilian and military work relations. Such outcomes may result in a better understanding of the civil-military relationship gap in defence organisations and the need for professional sensitisation training to bridge gaps and improve individual and organisational effectiveness. While these immediate outcomes affecting defence organisations are important to institutional functionality, this chapter provides a broader theoretical and policy perspective on this largely unexplored topic that affects both a unique professional context and future NATO missions. With the continued onset of global terrorism and other security challenges, the project of RTG HFM-226 – which examines the co-mingling of civilian and military personnel in defence organisations – may also improve NATO's future peacekeeping and state-building efforts. Thus, as will be discussed, this chapter provides a theoretical and policy perspective for a project that embraces institutional civil-military separations while simultaneously benefiting from overlapping boundaries regarding civil-military employee relations. Taking a theoretical approach based in concordance theory, this chapter will demonstrate that separate civil-military boundaries may exist alongside overlapping civilian and military spheres of activity [2]. This chapter further argues that the separation and co-mingling of boundaries would serve to strengthen NATO as it develops a wide spectrum of peacekeeping and state-building strategies.

Arguably, past efforts to rebuild states, such as Iraq, have failed in part due to the superimposition of a Western model of separation and democracy on a nation whose indigenous culture was vastly different from Western society. This NATO project, in contrast, provides fresh insight into Western defence institutions with the aim of gleaning an alternative to the predominant or mainstream Western framework. This alternative framework, which challenges strict notions of civil-military separation, may assist NATO in future missions to guide and advise nations seeking to rebuild their governments and their civil-military relationships.

In this NATO context, concordance theory accomplishes three main goals:

- 1) It predicts the onset or prevention of domestic military intervention in several nations.
- 2) It challenges the simplistic and dichotomous view of civil-military relations.
- 3) It shows how Western overlapping boundaries, in conjunction with separate civil-military institutions, can promote healthy military and society relations in international contexts.

The first goal of concordance theory appears less relevant to this NATO project, since most of the national case studies featured in this report have not experienced domestic military intervention. Yet, many Middle Eastern and African nations affected by global terrorism have experienced domestic military intervention and may benefit from future NATO support in rebuilding their regions. Therefore, the lessons learned from concordance theory and the intermingling of civilian-military employee relations may provide useful tools when helping

failed or challenged states with distressed civil–military relations gradually regain their statehood. As I will elaborate, the Western intermingling of boundaries at the employee level can, potentially, speak to the process of embracing indigenous military and society relations in states with unique cultures.

The implications of this NATO project go beyond the case studies that may assist defence organisations in better understanding their employee relations. The successful interconnections among civilian and military personnel within defence organisations point to the uniqueness of Western contexts that are often not discussed in civil–military relations circles. These are the daily cultural dynamics that exist among personnel who come from distinct backgrounds despite the mainly Western context of this NATO project. The focus on the inner workings of diverse employee relations may serve as an exemplar to improve the way NATO implements and partners its missions in nations with complex cultures.

## **22.1 CONCORDANCE THEORY SUMMARISED**

Concordance is about partnership, not separation, and forwards agreement among three partners regarding the role and function of the armed forces. The concordance partners are the political elites, the military, and the citizenry. To better determine the role and function of the armed forces, agreement takes place among four indicators:

- 1) Officer corps composition;
- 2) Recruitment method;
- 3) Political decision-making process; and
- 4) Military style.

If there is agreement among the three partners regarding the four indicators, domestic military intervention is less likely to occur. Concordance theory is therefore grounded in deductive causation and has been applied to at least five nations, both Western and non-Western, including the United States during the post-revolutionary period, modern India, and Pakistan. The theory’s causal limitation is that concordance “[does] not explain why it is that some nations can or have achieved concordance while others have not” (Ref. [2] [4], p. 13). Why one nation is able to achieve concordance (agreement among the three partners over the four indicators), and another is not, is independent of having separate versus overlapping boundaries; rather, it results from the specific indigenous historical, institutional, and cultural realities of each nation.

To focus on agreement is considered more explanatory and useful to policymakers than focusing on one nation’s specific civil–military relations reality and trying to export that reality to other nations. For instance, the United States’ separationist model works in post-World War II America and can be explained by concordance theory because there is currently strong agreement among the political elites, the military, and the citizenry that institutional and cultural separation between the military and civil society is best. But that separation has not always been the American reality. For example, during the post-revolutionary period and World War II, the three partners agreed on overlapping civil–military boundaries and not separation [2]. Concordance theory frees policymakers and academics from being pigeonholed into the current separationist American model, a model that has not even always applied historically to the United States.

The concordance partnership between military and society is viewed through the lens of an entire nation – the population at large – rather than being constrained by notions of separate, dichotomous institutions. Such concordance occurs when the three partners that embrace the population at large – the political elites, the military, and the citizenry – engage in partnership or agreement on the role and function of the armed forces.

All nations possess these partners in some indigenous form. Regarding three of the indicators, officers corps composition, political decision-making, and recruitment method, all “have been identified by leading scholars of civil-military relations as key determinants of military function and role in most societies” (Ref. [2] , p. 40). As stated by Schiff [2], “the structure and form of these four indicators, which are found in all militaries, are different depending upon the particular political structure and culture of each nation” (p. 40).

Regarding the “military style” indicator, this is unique to the field of civil-military relations because many scholars and policymakers ignore it and it rarely becomes integrated into a cohesive theory or is given explanatory value. As I have written previously, military style refers to the “external manifestations and inner mental constructions associated with the military” (Ref. [2], p. 47). Well known sociologists such as Morris Janowitz, Charles Moskos, and Moshe Lissak understand the importance of dealing “directly with the human and cultural elements of the armed forces – how the military looks, the overt and subtle signals it conveys, the rituals it displays – which are all part of a deep and nuanced relationship among soldiers, citizens, and the polity” (Ref. [2], p. 47). All four indicators and the three partners find unique meanings in most nations and can thereby serve to inform the role and function of the armed forces by reflecting these specificities and without superimposing one nation’s values or culture onto another. Thus, why one nation is able to achieve concordance and another is not, is not, once again, dependent on separate versus overlapping boundaries, but rather results from the indigenous historical, institutional, and cultural realities and specificities of each nation. Separation, therefore, is not inevitable within concordance partnership, but rather reflects and is contingent upon the specificities of particular historical, cultural, and institutional contexts. This opens up the possibility for models *other than* strict separation models to describe civil-military relations within particular nations – models that may include overlapping boundaries between civil society and the military – even within nations characterised by a concordance partnership.

## **22.2 CONCORDANCE IN DEFENCE PERSONNEL RELATIONS**

Among the many nations participating in this NATO project there are positive and challenging outcomes resulting from overlapping civil-military boundaries and domains. These outcomes, reflected in the country-specific results of military-civilian personnel surveys point to relations where employee backgrounds are distinctive. At the workplace, the integrated interactions of civilian and military personnel generally work well within the context of an overarching mission to protect the nation. Specific challenges include skill and expertise recognition of civilian employees versus their military counterparts, particularly on the part of military supervisors of civilian personnel; civilian employees’ perceptions that military personnel receive greater workplace advantages; and the impact of military rotational cycles on the civilian workforce. Moreover, military managers often do not receive adequate training in dealing with civilian employees pertaining to human resource responsibility. For the most part, however, civilian and military personnel interact effectively when carrying out defence organisation objectives and at an individual level have generally positive relations and effective communication, based on the survey results featured in this report.

NATO may learn from these findings in three important ways. First, the results suggest that, while Western militaries uphold the overarching concept of separation theory (or relatedly, civilian institutional control over the military), they are nimble enough to participate in effective overlapping relationships between soldiers, officers, and civilians on a daily basis. Second, these cases show that understanding the “other,” with all of its cultural nuances, moves relationships and partnerships forward. Unlike the field of civil-military relations, which embraces institutional separations and often ignores cultural understanding, this NATO project reflects on case studies where participants live in a daily world of co-mingling boundaries and cultural reciprocity. The project is meant to explore that cultural reciprocity and uniqueness *alongside* the institutional standard of separations. Finally, and perhaps most importantly for NATO, this cross-national study in intra-organisational

cultural partnership may serve as a springboard for crafting and implementing effective peacekeeping and counterinsurgency strategy for its international work. This is not the main goal of the project but may be a positive unintended consequence of it.<sup>1</sup>

### **22.3 HOW CAN EMPLOYEE RELATIONS IN DEFENCE ORGANISATIONS ASSIST NATO WITH PEACEKEEPING AND STATE-BUILDING EFFORTS?**

What happens the day after ISIS<sup>2</sup> and its affiliates are defeated by its adversaries? Either the “victors” will embrace a futile whack-a-mole strategy (that focuses on a current threat target rather than emphasising a longer-term strategy focusing on such targets more generally, including attention to root causes), or NATO, along with Middle Eastern partners, will begin the longer objective of helping nations like Iraq, Syria, and Libya rebuild their nations. The whack-a-mole scenario means that regional peace may exist temporarily, until another terrorist entity fills ISIS’s shoes. The second scenario means that NATO creates a long-term strategy to protect the host nation’s citizenry as they begin to embrace a revamped indigenous military and the new political leaders who will partner with them.

In the latter scenario, NATO will benefit from this project because it will need to protect and support nations with distinctive civil and military cultures and institutions that often vary from nation to nation. This project not only identifies civil–military employees in their work relationships, it reinterprets civil–military relations in a more constructive way than simply reinforcing a dichotomous civilian-military separation or, relatedly, a civilian institutional control over the military that does not consider cultural reciprocity or a co-mingling of boundaries. The reality in many Western states, for instance, is that separation exists alongside the daily overlap of military and civilian relations in defence organisations, many of which carry out national security policy. There is a simultaneous acknowledgment in such states of separation and overlapping boundaries that allow nations to effectively implement national security priorities and to live in a broader society where the military is often largely sequestered from civilian society and its political institutions. Post-ISIS and ISIS affiliate nations like Iraq, Syria and Libya may create a variant form of civil–military relations that differs from the Western model, in accordance with their own unique, indigenous cultures and histories. But the acknowledgment and acceptance of overlapping boundaries alongside separation encourages NATO forces to embrace institutional and cultural diversity when supporting nations undergoing state-building efforts. This approach is very different from superimposing Western democracy and institutional separation at all costs, as previously experienced, for instance, during the Iraq occupation after the fall of Saddam Hussein.

This project looks to a deeper understanding of human interaction often ignored by policymakers and academics. Social cognitive theory, which is a subset of cognitive psychology, is a way by which to explain human behaviour that may offer a viable alternative understanding. The conventional assumption is that humans are logical beings that attempt to make choices that are most logical to them. Social cognitive theory refers to the way in which people learn to model the behaviour of others. The work of Jean Piaget focused on the importance of schemas in cognitive development. A schema is a linked mental representation that people use to understand and respond to situations [1]. For example, a schema might represent how a person orders a meal in a restaurant or how they purchase flowers from a florist. The schema is stored information and activities that may include looking at a menu, ordering food, using certain utensils to eat, and paying the bill. This is an example of a schema that results in a script. Schemas are retrieved from experience and memory and applied to new situations. As people gain more experiences in the world, their scripts become more elaborate. While Piaget

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<sup>1</sup> Other scholars who discuss cultural competence (among military leaders) for operating effectively in the current, highly culturally complex, security environment include Karen Davis (see Ref. [6]).

<sup>2</sup> ISIS refers to the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria.

created universal stages of cognitive development, other theorists, like Lev Vygotsky, considered how social settings, culture, and language may affect cognitive development, and thus offered a perspective on human behaviour that takes context into account [5].

Like all people, civilian and military personnel have unique cognitive schemas and scripts, in accordance with their distinct cultures. The results of this project show that respective cultural and social settings affect how soldiers and civilians create schemas and scripts in their daily work interactions. We know, for example, that military personnel look at civilian responsibilities and roles from their own perspective, and civilians may believe that the military receives preferential treatment from colleagues and superiors. Yet, while civilian-military schemas and scripts may be distinctive, both come together each day in a professional setting to negotiate and integrate those scripts to fulfill professional objectives.

The professional and cultural nimbleness required in national security organisations also offers potentially transferable skills and tools that may support indigenous populations seeking to rebuild their unique civilian and military security and government institutions. In other words, based on their own experiences within culturally diverse defence organisational settings, NATO troops going in to protect civilians in Iraq, Syria, or Libya may assist them in negotiating their own daily civilian–military schemas and cultural differences.

It is important to reinforce that the nation builders are not the NATO troops, but the citizens of Iraq, Syria or Libya in partnership with newly created military and political elites. The NATO troops are there to protect the indigenous process, but their own professional civilian–military workplace experiences and the understanding of diverse schemas may translate into more culturally sensitive assistance by NATO troops in peacekeeping and support efforts. This is a very different mission from previous efforts in Iraq where the goal was to superimpose a democratic state and objective civilian control onto a Middle Eastern nation.

This effort is about support, not superimposition, of government regimes. Soldiers and civilians from NATO nations who experience institutional separation, cultural overlap, and various shades of civilian and military professional nuance have the mindset to observe and support indigenous nations in a very different cultural context. By understanding its own civil–military professional expectations and challenges, NATO is in a better position to protect and guide other nations rather than tell them which type of government is best suited for them.

Concordance theory may also assist nations with a framework for effective civil–military relations without superimposing a particular model. The three partners (political elites, military, and citizenry) in agreement with the four indicators (social composition of the officer corps, political decision-making process, military recruitment method, and military style) allow nations to consider the appropriate role and purpose of a nation's armed forces. In the past, concordance theory has been an explanatory theory. But like NATO, it may also become a useful guide to nations seeking to rebuild their military–society relationships on their own cultural terms. Concordance has been able to explain why, for example, coup existed in Pakistan and not India and why civil–military relations in post-revolutionary America are in fact similar to modern Israeli civil–military relations [2]. These case studies show how nations uniquely synergize their concordance partners with the four indicators. Through historical and cultural unfolding of successes and challenges, they present state-building examples and potential opportunities for other nations.

For example, a nation's new political elites may actively seek agreement among the citizenry and the military regarding the appropriate political decision-making process (a concordance indicator) for determining military budgets, size, and structure. NATO forces, which may have been involved in such daily agreements and modifications in Western nations, for instance, are familiar with the process. As peacekeepers they can now protect indigenous concordance partners seeking agreement, empathise with their challenges, and offer guidance

and support while respecting the deep cultural distinctions. This is quite different from superimposing democracy on another nation.

New schemas and scripts are not only experienced by Western and Middle Eastern civil–military personnel respectively; rather, concordance provides an entirely new schema for looking at civil–military relations in terms of partnership and cultural understanding, not strict separation and institutional superimposition. A group of nations that have experienced successful civil–military relationships can now protect and guide other nations without superimposing a dominant theoretical model. In turn, the three concordance partners in nations like Iraq, Syria, and Libya can agree on the four concordance indicators under their unique institutional and cultural circumstances. This concordance becomes a powerful theoretical predictor as well as a practical policymaking tool for new nations undergoing state-building.

Some may ask: where are the examples for NATO to learn from to implement this new approach to civil–military relations and support state-building without superimposing Western institutional models onto other countries? The examples are sparse. In recent times, the closest success story was General David Petraeus’ Joint Strategic Assessment Team, which created a counterinsurgency strategy that encouraged Shia and Sunni power-sharing and reconciliation in Iraq [3]. I offer Petraeus’ effort as an example of “targeted partnership,” which is a distillate form of concordance that creates a very specific alliance between the military and policymakers regarding military strategy. Similar to this NATO project, targeted partnership involves “the co-mingling of military and political boundaries even when the broader relationship between military and society may be one of separation” (Ref. [3], p. 326). Similar to the project, the co-mingling of civil–military spheres in Iraq during the Petraeus era involved daily interaction between military leadership and government officials, local leaders, both military and civilian, and interagency partners. The daily co-mingling was meant to ground the counterinsurgency and state-building process, as daily civil–military interactions in NATO’s Western defence organisations served to ground the process in order to implement the most effective defence strategy. Petraeus was able to “achieve a targeted partnership based on robust discussion with diverse civilian and military leadership, both among the U.S. decision makers and on the ground in Iraq” (Ref. [3], p. 326). Petraeus understood the overarching goal of superimposing Western democracy on Iraq; but he also had deep experience in state-building and knew that simply superimposing a Western model on indigenous cultures would fail.

NATO might also encourage the best practices of developing nations that may serve as examples to fledgling countries seeking to rebuild their fundamental institutions. Israel, for example, is a civil–military relations success story. Despite the focus on the Israeli–Palestinian conflict by the media, policy makers, and academics, its state-building is successful and the concordance partnership works, even though it is based on overlapping boundaries rather than Post-World War II American and Western European separation models. Israel, under high external threat, maintains an effective military that is in agreement with its political establishment and its citizenry [2].

Another important success story is India. A British legacy exists in India, but it has uniquely developed institutions and partnerships with political elites, the citizenry, and the military that adapt to the multicultural and often conflict-ridden political landscape of South Asian society. The social composition of the officer corps and India’s broad military recruitment policy – two prominent concordance indicators – have greatly contributed to its success, in stark contrast to Pakistani military–society relations [2]. Now that multiple states have failed, state-building role models will eventually become vital in rebuilding the Middle East. Countries like Israel and India with unique cultural and religious mosaics may be more effective role models for Middle Eastern nations than the superimposition of the American separation model.

NATO and the United States will and should continue to provide valuable assistance and advice on civil–military relations through NATO missions. Separation theory works well when nations, like the United States, have the



luxury of a civil–military relations gap – where civilians can admire their military from a distance and not really understand what soldiers do during deployment. Those are not the conditions that Middle Eastern nations are facing; in addition to NATO guidance, they will need role models that have achieved concordance and that resonate with their cultural realities. Israel and India fit that bill.

The vibrant economies of Israel and India give further credence to them as role models for state-building. While both nations are often challenged by internal divisiveness and external conflict, they have managed to build stable governments and successful economies that would add value and partnership to the Middle East. In a region where divisiveness and conflict reign, moving beyond the mantras of separation theory and recognising and aligning with growth nations like Israel and India could help NATO create international partnerships that augment domestic concordance between military and society.

## **22.4 CONCLUSION**

This Chapter offers a theoretical and policy perspective for NATO to move forward with a fresh and more effective approach in its peacekeeping and counterinsurgency efforts to support nations with distinctive institutions and cultures. This NATO project is an opportunity to better understand Western civil–military personnel relations and put that knowledge into policy practice when NATO troops support nations undergoing state-building and rebuilding of civil–military relations. In the past, NATO (with American encouragement) insisted on imposing Western democracy and separation theory on nations with vastly distinctive cultures. The value of concordance theory with respect to this NATO project is that it demonstrates the existence of separate civil–military boundaries alongside overlapping civilian and military spheres of activity. This chapter suggests that separation and co-mingling boundaries serve to strengthen NATO and its efforts to support nations like Iraq, Syria and Libya after ISIS and its affiliates are defeated. NATO troops can go into the theatre of peacekeeping and counterinsurgency embracing and utilising their own experience with civil–military employee relations. Those relationships reflect nuanced schemas and scripts conducive to differences in Western civilian and military cultures; they also reflect a partnership that occurs in a context of broad institutional separations as well as daily overlapping civil–military boundaries. Embracing this unique separate yet overlapping phenomenon is essential.

For too long Western scholars and policymakers ignored the reality of separation and overlap in favour of a simplistic and unrealistic perspective that insists on civil–military institutional separations. This perspective is unrealistic because in order to carry out effective defence policy, overlapping boundaries must take place among civilian and military personnel. That is a phenomenon that cannot be ignored because it is these daily civilian–military interactions to get defence matters done that matter just as much as the overarching ideal of institutional civil–military separation. Similar to the Petraeus’ effort in Iraq and to state-building success stories like Israel and India, nations engaging in state-building will acknowledge that overlapping boundaries are essential to effectively build national institutions and determine the role and function of the armed forces. This NATO project may motivate NATO to adopt a completely new perspective on civil–military relations, peacekeeping, and support for state-building – all critical to regional and world stability and grounded in the daily experiences of military and civilian personnel that reflect both separation and co-mingling.

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## **Chapter 23 – MILITARY-CIVILIAN RELATIONS AT THE STRATEGIC LEVEL: A CASE-STUDY OF TENSIONS BETWEEN MILITARY-PROFESSIONAL AND BUREAUCRATIC LOGICS IN THE NETHERLANDS DEFENCE ORGANISATION**

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### **23.1 INTRODUCTION**

In defence organisations military people and civilians work closely together. Whereas the military constitute the “professional core” of the organisation [12], civilian personnel often conduct either low-skilled jobs in logistics and administration, or they perform highly skilled and highly specialised tasks in areas such as Information and Communication Technology (ICT), weapon systems and construction engineering, Human Resources (HR) management, legal affairs and financial management. In both categories of work, the civilians’ contribution is essential. United States Navy vessels for instance keep on sailing thanks to the cooking and laundry services of civilians on board [7]. Research and Development (R&D) of new weapon systems cannot exist without the specialised input of civilian engineers and scientists.

Moreover, civilians play key roles at the top levels of military and defence organisations. They are closely connected to the democratically elected politicians who – as the supreme commanders of the forces – decide on what objectives will be pursued, which missions will be deployed, and how sizable the available budgets will be. The politicians are the masters (in Max Weber’s terms: “Die Herren”) of the military bureaucracy, and hence, they do not belong to the bureaucracy itself (e.g., Ref. [8]). Their representatives – and protectors of their interests – inside the bureaucracies are the civil servants at the strategic top of the organisation. These civil servants at the apex, close to the politicians, are involved in policy making and strategy development as much as they are involved in strategic budget and management control.

Since the defence organisation, as a true professional public bureaucracy, is a spending organisation, one of the main challenges is to control its expenditures. Military people are more occupied with (learning from) operations than with costs (e.g., Ref. [2]) – no one wants soldiers, sailors and airmen to lose their lives because of financial concerns that become manifest in inappropriate or failing equipment or inadequately trained personnel. With respect to budgets that may be believed never to be sizable enough, the military organisation compares to professional bureaucracies such as educational organisations, institutions in the cultural sector, and particularly in health care (e.g., Ref. [9]).

One of the tasks of the civilians at the top, however, is to make sure that exceeding the budget is kept to a minimum, and preferably to zero. These civil servants guard politicians’ and tax payers’ concerns and display the bureaucratic logic, whereas the military represent the logic of the professionals, at least where budgets are concerned. As has been argued before, there is a conflict between professional values and bureaucratic ones (Ref. [16], p. 56), as much as there may be other value tensions in organisations (e.g., Ref. [13]).

Hence, there are two competing value systems or logics in defence organisations: the military that stresses the importance of being able to do a complex job properly, and the top civilian brass who are tasked with keeping the spending in check. Only under conditions of no budgetary restrictions (which are highly unlikely, if ever existent), will these competing logics not create tensions. In this chapter we aim to analyse how these tensions influence changes in the formation of the governance structure of the defence organisation. This analysis will show that the balance can shift from one side to the other, and then back again. Further, it seems the organisation profits from these shifting dynamics. In fact, these tensions of perspectives and subsequent “battles,” even though sometimes quite uncomfortable, may ultimately result in improvements to the organisation. However, the job is not yet finished; more work needs to be done to ensure that the tensions inherent in defence organisations lead to productive changes. Recognising the different roles and perspectives between the senior military leaders and defence civilian bureaucrats, strategies may be taken to ameliorate these tensions in defence and other public-sector organisations.

## **23.2 THEORY**

Mintzberg [12] was among the first to discern two forms of the basic Weberian bureaucracy. He distinguished so-called *machine bureaucracies* (e.g., production sites) from *professional bureaucracies* such as hospitals and universities. Whereas machine bureaucracies are dominated by the activities that people do in the so-called techno-structure of the organisation, in professional bureaucracies the operational core is the most influential category of personnel. In the former type of organisations, engineers in the techno-structure design the work processes, the legal people translate governmental laws into company rules and draft company guidelines, whereas financial experts are responsible for resource management and the control of expenditures. All of this expertise is used to regulate, standardise, and tighten the activities of all other people in the organisation. In the latter type of organisations, the professionals in the operational core, such as medical doctors in hospitals, judges in courts of law or military officers during operations, are educated and trained to do their complex but routine jobs, preferably without being bothered by organisational rules and regulations other than professional ones, let alone by budget constraints.

Sociologically, professionals deliver services that they profess to know better than their clients (or principals). This professional claim – to know better based on their superior education, training and experience – is the foundation of their license to operate, in the dual sense of legal permission and societal approval. Professionals ask to be trusted: “the client is to trust the professional; he must tell him all the secrets which bear upon the affairs in hand. He must trust his judgment and skills. In return, the professional asks for protection from any unfortunate consequences of professional actions” (Ref. [6], p. 376). The professionals constitute their own communities that socialise new recruits and control the practicing professionals, including punishment for inappropriate attitudes or behaviour [4]. The basic idea that professionals adhere to is: supply us with the money and we will do the job.

This cannot be without consequences for the clients, or in the case of the military, to the principals – the politicians, and their representatives in the civil service workforce. The principals feel the need to have their check on the professionals, both content-wise (in avoiding or minimizing any damage, legal or otherwise, that is related to professional action), and expenditure-wise (that is, in not overspending). This is not a unique situation.

Glynn [3] demonstrated how differing values of the musicians of a symphony orchestra and its managers and board members led to serious tensions and conflict over the organisational identity of the orchestra. The musicians displayed a musical prowess (“we are skilled surgeons”), whereas the managers and board members focused on expenditures and economic utility. Both factions felt ill-understood.

Hence, in the defence as much as in the symphony orchestra or in a hospital, two institutional logics compete with one another inside the organisation. One way or another, these tensions have to be dealt with, which can be done in various ways: by “battling” with subsequent alignments for all [1], by compromising, or by selective coupling [15]. Battling may include employee strikes, the emergence of interest-group action, labour disputes, internal conflicts and/or the replacement of non-cooperative employees. It may also imply decoupling, which means that one pretends to adopt (parts of) the others’ logic without actually doing so; all these processes may lead to the occurrence of brittle coalitions that at some point in time may even collapse. Compromising refers to attempts to reconcile competing demands, which may also lead to internal conflicts because the compromise struck between competing demands may ultimately not satisfy the actors’ enduring expectations [15]. Selective coupling implies cleverly combining elements of the competing logics in such a way that the organisation can profit through the development of new mindsets and solutions.

The way stakeholders are able to participate in such processes of governance formation plays an important role as well [11]. In some ways participation is impeded and in others it is promoted, as we will see.

### **23.3 CONTEXT AND CASE**

This case study is about the formation of the governance structure in the Netherlands Defence Organisation between 2003 and 2013. In the preceding period, the National Court of Audit had criticised the Ministry Of Defence (MOD) and its forces for inappropriately managing their financial and material resources for many consecutive years. A case in point was the United Nations mission in the border area of Ethiopia and Eritrea, where the Netherlands Marine Corps had been in charge (together with the Canadian Armed Forces). In the preparation for this mission the Marine Corps and the Navy had rented vehicles and cranes from the external market for which they had to pay high prices, all while Army Engineering Units had this equipment in stock. The Army Engineers could have provided this material, had they been asked to do so. This was a prime example of inefficient spending of public money that was met with considerable criticism in parliament. The formal warnings of the Court of Audit in connection with a political climate that stressed cost control for all public activities led to initiatives to change the governance structure of the whole defence organisation.

In particular, there was a change to the macro-structure of the organisation: The archipelago of services, units and departments were reduced to four so-called *operational commands* (Army, Navy, Air Force and Military Police), supported by two large *shared service centres*, one for the material resources including R&D and maintenance, and one for remaining units including health services, education and training, HR affairs, language services and the like. The whole was to be governed by a *central administrative staff* department. Altogether seven sizable organisational elements remained (the Army, Navy, Air Force, Military Police, Material Resources and Maintenance, Services Unit, and Central Staff). The original idea of founding one joint headquarters for all four operational commands was abandoned, as it would have been a bridge too far for the four commanders in charge.

The aim was to simplify the structure of the organisation, to have the military commanders concentrate on their core business (i.e., preparing for and conducting operations), and to improve organisational processes by centralising and standardising all commonalities, which – according to economic theory – would lead to learning and production efficiencies. As a result, the military commands lost much of their resources, budget and personnel, because these were transferred to the two shared service centres. Contrary to what the military commands were used to, from then on they were required to ask for the material resources to be delivered in proper condition and on time, as they needed to agree on maintenance and delivery programs. The hierarchal way of steering had led to tedious processes of negotiation. Instead of being independent “kingdoms” the operational commands had been made strongly interdependent with the other organisational units in the total

organisation. A traditional division organisation had quickly changed into a fully integrated division organisation [12].

As a result, the commanders had lost a considerable degree of their autonomy. On top, strategic civil positions, particularly in the field of financial and management control, were staffed with personnel that had relations with the Department of Finance and no previous relations within the Defence organisation. Some would even say that these top civil servants were “parachuted in” by the Department of Finance. Interestingly enough, several of those top positions were staffed with female civil servants, in contrast to the military commander positions, many of which were occupied by males.

Sometime after this governance structure had been implemented, the Netherlands’ contribution to the operations in Afghanistan had stepped up, leading to the deployment of some 2,000 military personnel to the Afghan province of Uruzgan. This was the largest mission for the Netherlands forces since the colonial operations in Asia decades before. As this was a dangerous mission, military core concerns emerged including worries about the safety of personnel and the proper availability of weapon systems and vehicles. In a moment of solidarity, on February 15, 2011, the four commanders of the operational commandos wrote a letter to the Defence minister and parliament, in which they endorsed the new governance structure, but at the same time they saw essential flaws in its elaboration and implementation. In particular, they noted dissatisfaction with the structure’s complexity, the numerous rules, and the lack of effectiveness that the new structure had brought about. They regretted that they could no longer make decisions about the maintenance of their weapon systems, including vessels, vehicles and air craft. They feared that this lack of decision-making authority could lead to dangerous situations in operations, because the required material resources were not, or would not, be available in the required condition at the right time.

As the letter of the commanders had quite an impact, in the organisation as much as in parliament, the then Defence minister felt compelled to adapt the organisation’s governance structure again, and to swing the balance somewhat back to the previous situation wherein the military commanders had more control. In particular, the command-specific maintenance and logistics units were transferred back again to each of the four operational commands, hence providing the commanders with the discretionary power to make decisions about the availability of their own material resources once more. In addition, the Supreme Commander’s position was strengthened and de facto made equal to the level of the highest civil servant’s authority. The number of top civilian positions was reduced.

The civilians’ view of these new changes was that not all had been lost. The improvement of the business processes that had occurred were supported by the introduction of so-called Enterprise Resource Planning systems (ERP) – ICT systems that integrated the registration, planning and control of all business functions [10]. This development was a guarantee that previous “mistakes” – particularly overspending – would be avoided in the future. In addition, they managed to retain some of the efficiency-improving elements, which entailed tasking each of the command-specific maintenance and logistics units with the provision of a standard line of products and services for all commands; for instance, the Air Force maintenance and logistic unit was made responsible for providing and maintaining the electronic devices for all operational commands.

In the next section, we analyse how these developments came about, based on in-depth interviews with the top personnel from both the civilian and military parts of the organisation during this period. There were no refusals to the requests to be interviewed; the interviews included two former ministers [17]. The data analysis was validated with documental evidence and feedback from top and mid-career officers during lectures and other spontaneous interactions.

## 23.4 ANALYSIS

In hindsight, the new governance structure had been forced on the military by civil servants who were hired and instructed by the governing politicians at that time to improve the management of the organisation's processes and expenditures. This was approached by means of what Mantere and Vaara [11] refer to as *disciplining* and *technologisation*, two ways of actually impeding the participation of stakeholders in the process of governance and strategy formation. Disciplining led to enlarging the distance between the top brass civilians and the operational commanders; technologisation, through the introduction and implementation of the new ERP-systems, added to the *mystification* of what was going on. The civilian bureaucrats dominated the military professionals who adhered to the idea of *self-actualisation*.

Such an approach is doomed to create insufficient content-based interaction between management and core operators, which in turn may cause mutual distrust and lack of organisational effectiveness. This is what occurred in the Netherlands Defence organisation in the interaction between civilian and military top decision makers; in as far as there was a coalition between the two factions, it was brittle at best.

Emboldened by the ongoing operations in Afghanistan, which provided legitimacy to their claims of needing more authority with respect to the provision of material resources, the commanders demanded substantial changes to the governance structure that had been implemented only a few years earlier. The politicians responded to these claims, and helped to reinstate the dialogue between the commanders and the civil servants, which in itself can be conducive to the participation of all stakeholders in the formation of a new strategy or governance structure [11].

The politicians did so by shifting some of the balance in terms of taking the perspectives and preferences of the military professionals into greater consideration. Nonetheless, it is of note that the resulting governance structure did not revert back to the original that had existed before the whole process started. The emphasis on proper financial and material resources management had not been reduced, and the ERP-systems would help to monitor the ongoing and future processes. In *concretising* [11] and *selectively* combining elements of the two institutional logics [14], [15], a new governance structure, more efficient than the previous ones, had emerged.

However, the story continues, at least until the time of this writing. The issue of exceeding the total budgets continues to be raised, and recently, the retiring Army commander publicly complained that 50% of the army's vehicles were not operational, suggesting that the budget was too low, and certainly not suggesting that the army maintenance program had room for improvement.<sup>1</sup> Moreover, there have been continuous complaints throughout the organisation that the command-specific maintenance and logistics units – in their task to provide a specific standard line of products and services for all operational commands – give priority to their own operational command. The other operational commands are serviced too late and with too little attention, enthusiasm and specific knowledge, as the criticism goes. As an illustration, the operational command of the Navy does not feel serviced well enough by the Army maintenance and logistics unit for the resources they specifically need but which are allocated to the Army.

This creates the impression that old mental and cultural flaws – “old reflexes” – remain stubbornly present. It also renders urgent the need to create some common understanding and perspective throughout the whole organisation: Commanders and soldiers, sailors and airmen alike need to develop more cost-awareness and better understanding of the notion that nothing is for free, whereas civil servants need to understand military operational concerns without overrating the importance of their rules, procedures and sometimes *Zeitgeist*-related dominance [5].

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<sup>1</sup> The latter has been argued in a report on the MoD that was recently published by the National Audit Organisation (May, 2, 2016).

## **23.5 CONCLUSIONS**

Just as prices continuously fluctuate on the market for commodities, it is unlikely that organisations will ever reach a point of excellence at which they will no longer have to change and adapt their practices, procedures or structures. This is important to realise when studying long-term processes of organisational change. Even though it seems that change is often only the swinging back and forth of central tendencies (e.g., more or less centralisation, greater or fewer rules), the organisation nonetheless often advances in the course of this iterative process due to new approaches, technologies, insights and organisational concepts. Only through careful reflection of these developments may one be able to discern the progress, including the progress in the interaction between “civilian bureaucrats” and “military professionals,” in defence organisations.

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## **Chapter 24 – MILITARY-CIVILIAN PERSONNEL INTEGRATION AND COLLABORATION IN DEFENCE ORGANIZATIONS: SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

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### **24.1 CROSS-NATIONAL ANALYSIS OF MILITARY-CIVILIAN PERSONNEL INTEGRATION AND COLLABORATION**

Defence organisations now recognize the importance of optimizing collaboration between their military and civilian workforces, with many adopting organisational terms implying that the military and civilian workforces form a cohesive whole: the *Defence Team* (Canada), the *Whole Force Concept* (United Kingdom), *One Defence Team* (Sweden), and *Total Defence Workforce* (New Zealand). Because military-civilian personnel integration and collaboration in defence organisations have received little empirical attention, NATO STO RTG HFM-226 was established to conduct cross-national research and analysis, the results of which are presented in this report. These chapters attempt to fill knowledge gaps and inform practices and policy for effectively managing both military and civilian workforces in defence organisations [34].

### **24.2 MILITARY AND CIVILIAN WORKFORCES IN DEFENCE ORGANISATIONS: DEMOGRAPHICS AND POLICY CONSIDERATIONS**

Civilian personnel represent a significant proportion of the total defence workforces in most nations — usually composing between one-fifth and one-third of the personnel.

One objective of this task group was to conduct cross-national comparisons of the demographic characteristics of the military and civilian workforces and of the policies and practices related to civilian and personnel management. Chapters 2 – 9 present the national reports drawn from the databases and policy and strategic documents available in

each country. Personnel databases and organisational documents were examined to compare the proportions of military members and civilian public (or civil) servants across defence organisations. As described in Chapter 1, civilian personnel represent a significant proportion of the total defence workforces in most nations – usually composing between one-fifth and one-third of the personnel, as shown in Table 24-1. Notable exceptions are Belgium and Turkey, where proportions of defence civilians are much lower. Chapter 10 [25] presents a cross-national summary of these national reports. Some of the major themes from that summary are presented here.

**Table 24-1: International Proportions of Military and Civilian Personnel in Defence Organisations.**

Nation	Regular Force	Reserve Force	Total Number of Military Personnel	Defence Civilians	Total Force	Civilian Percentage of Total Force <sup>1</sup>
Australia <sup>a</sup>	57,994	22,072	80,066	21,818	101,884	21.4%
Belgium <sup>b</sup>	29,681		29,681 <sup>2</sup>	1,709	31,390	5.4%
Canada <sup>c</sup>	65,890	26,711	92,601	26,220	118,821	22.1%
Estonia <sup>d</sup>	2,752		2,957	1,571	4,528	34.7% <sup>3</sup>
Germany <sup>e</sup>	186,459	36,116	222,575	94,708	317,283	29.8%
Netherlands <sup>f</sup>	41,369	5,249	46,618	15,816	62,434	25.3%
New Zealand <sup>g</sup>	9,006	2,312	11,318	2,771	14,089	19.7%
Norway <sup>h</sup>	11,500		11,500 <sup>4</sup>	5,000	16,500	30.3% <sup>i</sup>
Sweden <sup>j</sup>	13,838	8,113	21,951	6,616	28,567	23.2%
Turkey <sup>k</sup>	457,677	211,381	669,058	49,215	718,273	6.9%
United Kingdom <sup>l</sup>	154,840 <sup>5</sup>	36,910 <sup>6</sup>	194,890 <sup>7</sup>	56,860	251,750	22.6%
United States <sup>m</sup>	1,340,766	839,102	2,179,868	724,782	2,904,650	25.1% <sup>8</sup>

<sup>a</sup> Government of Australia [40].

<sup>b</sup> Data as of 2015, as cited in Ref. [71].

<sup>c</sup> Data as of 2015, as cited in Ref. [33].

<sup>d</sup> Data as of 2015, as cited in Ref. [49].

<sup>e</sup> Data as of 2013, as cited in Ref. [54].

<sup>f</sup> Data as of 2016, as cited in Ref. [4].

<sup>g</sup> New Zealand Defence Force [60]; P. Kennedy, Manager HR Insights, Organisational Planning & Development, Defence Human Resources for New Zealand Defence Force), personal communication, January 10, 2016.

<sup>h</sup> Norwegian Armed Forces [62] – see <http://mil.no/organisation/personnel/Pages/personnel.aspx>.

<sup>i</sup> Does not include part-time reserves. Norway manages its reservists and Home Guard using conscription and thus does not allow for straightforward comparisons.

<sup>1</sup> Due to rounding, the civilian percentages of the total force presented in Table 24-1 may differ slightly from those reported in the corresponding country report chapters.

<sup>2</sup> This figure includes full-time military personnel only, as data for other military personnel in the Belgian defence organisation were unavailable.

<sup>3</sup> This civilian percentage (34.7%) is derived from a total force (4,528) that includes 1,571 civilian personnel, 2,752 regular military personnel (members of the Estonian Defence Forces) as well as other Estonian military personnel (e.g., from the Ministry of Defence, 9; the Defence Resources Agency, 2; and the Estonian Defence League; 194). For additional details, see Ref. [49].

<sup>4</sup> This figure includes regular force military personnel only.

<sup>5</sup> This figure includes United Kingdom Regular Force and Gurkha personnel [46].

<sup>6</sup> This figure for the United Kingdom Reserve Forces includes the Volunteer Reserve, Serving Regular Reserve and Sponsored Reserve, excluding Royal Fleet Auxiliary; and excludes University Officer Cadets [46].

<sup>7</sup> This figure includes Additional Army Personnel, including Military Provost Guard Service and Locally Engaged Personnel [46].

<sup>8</sup> The United States, by definition, does not have full-time reservists, except in the National Guard, but these are, according to United States documents, not to be included with Active Duty Service (full-time service).

<sup>j</sup>Data as of 2011, as cited in Ref. [64].

<sup>k</sup>Data as of 2012, as cited in Ref. [51]. Reserve force includes the Gendarmerie and Coast Guard; the civilians within the Gendarmerie ( $N = 3,766$ ) and Coast Guard ( $N = 886$ ) are not counted in this table.

<sup>l</sup>Data as of 2015, as cited in Ref. [46].

<sup>m</sup>Data as of 2015, as cited in Ref. [66].

### 24.2.1 Organisational Trends: Growth, Downsizing, Restructuring

Many defence organisations have downsized in recent years, but specific parts of some organisations have grown. Belgium, Germany, and the United Kingdom have downsized both military and civilian personnel. The United Kingdom has decreased its civilian personnel and, until very recently, had decreased its regular force personnel, but is now planning slight increases in its regular forces and more substantial increases to its reserve forces. Sweden has increased its military personnel in the last few years, but decreased its civilian personnel. The United States has downsized its military several times (most recently in 2014), reducing its civilian personnel more than its military personnel over the last decade, and increasing its use of contractors. Similarly, Belgium has reduced both its military and civilian personnel, with a trend toward shifting civilians into contract positions. Estonia has increased its military personnel while freezing its civilian force and outsourcing more non-military jobs to private sector contractors [25].

Civilian workforces have been downsized more than military workforces in recent years.

Overall, civilian workforces have been downsized more than military workforces, with some exceptions (e.g., the Netherlands, Australia, and New Zealand have civilianized some military functions [12], [25], [80]). Downsizing of

civilians has often coincided with an increase in the use of contractors or, as in the United Kingdom, an increase in reserve forces. Reductions and restructuring can have an impact on organisational culture and relations because reductions can place additional pressure on remaining personnel and can affect morale, retention, and perceptions of fairness [12], [25].

### 24.2.2 Employment Areas and Categories

The majority of military personnel work in operational areas and civilians are more likely to be employed in support areas, such as in the materiel organization (the Netherlands), medical services (Belgium), or in chief of staff operations and training (Belgium). In Canada, the largest proportion (almost a third) of defence civilians work in the Operational employment category, followed closely by the Administrative and Foreign Service categories. Direct comparisons can be misleading, however, because some of the differences stem from different nations' human resources nomenclature and the types of occupations included under various categories [25].

The majority of military personnel are employed in operational areas; civilians are more likely to be employed in support areas.

Most military personnel work in armies while civilian employment is much more heterogeneous.

When examined by military service, most military personnel work in armies (e.g., Canada, Estonia, United Kingdom, the Netherlands, United States, and Sweden), while civilian employment is much more heterogeneous. The largest group of civilians (35%) in the United Kingdom work in head office/support functions and are not

allocated to a particular service; in the Netherlands, civilian personnel work primarily in the Central Staff (55%) and support units (e.g., Defence Materiel Organisation; Support Command). In the United States, by contrast, the largest groups of both military and civilian personnel work for the army. In some countries (e.g., the Netherlands, Belgium), it was specifically noted that military personnel work in positions requiring military

expertise, whereas civilians provide continuity, support functions, and specific non-military expertise, such as technology functions [25].

### 24.2.3 Gender and Age

Civilian workforces have much higher proportions of women than military workforces, and are, on average much older.

Important national differences in gender and age were observed. Civilian workforces had higher proportions of women than military workforces (though women still tend to be a minority within the civilian workforces in defence organizations). Further, on average, civilian workforces tended to be older than the military workforces. In addition to the generally recognized differences between military and civilian workforces (discussed below), age and gender differences raise additional questions about how well different age cohorts (e.g., millennials versus older groups) work together, as well as the role of gender in military–civilian workforce relations [25], [24].

### 24.2.4 Unionization

Unionization of military and civilian personnel varies across nations. In Canada, the United States, and Turkey, civilians tend to be unionized while military personnel are not. In the Netherlands, however, the majority of military personnel (80%) are unionized, but most civilians are not unionized (only about 30% are unionized). In Estonia, both civilian and military personnel can form trade unions, but military personnel have not pursued this option [25].

## 24.3 OVERALL FINDINGS FROM THE MILITARY-CIVILIAN PERSONNEL SURVEY (MCPS) AND EMPIRICAL CASE STUDIES

The NATO STO RTG HFM-226 administered the Military–Civilian Personnel Survey (MCPS) in 11 nations to explore a range of issues specific to collaboration between military and civilian personnel working together in defence organisations. This survey was the first systematic examination of large samples of military and civilian respondents and the first to examine military–civilian relations from the perspective of both military and civilian personnel [29].

As discussed in Chapter 12 [30], the survey confirmed a great degree of interaction between military and civilian personnel in defence organisations, with about 90% of civilian personnel indicating that they work beside military personnel and vice versa. Of these, about 80% of military personnel reported interacting with civilian co-workers on a daily basis, and an even greater proportion of civilians interacted with military co-workers on a daily basis. Across the nations, a third or more of civilians reported that their direct supervisor was military; the proportion of military personnel supervised by civilians varied a great deal, but it was not uncommon. These findings confirm the high degree of direct contact between military and civilian personnel in defence organisations.

There is high degree of interaction between military and civilian personnel in defence organisations, with most civilian and military personnel reporting interacting with one another on a daily basis.

A third or more of civilians reported that their direct supervisor was military; the proportion of military personnel supervised by civilians varied a great deal, but is not uncommon.

Overall, military and civilian personnel reported generally positive relations between military and civilian co-workers at the personnel level (e.g., civilian personnel were seen as being both necessary and important to the success of defence organisations, both from their own

perspective and from that of their military counterparts; both civilian and military personnel indicated high quality relations, good communication, and perceptions of mutual workplace respect). Both military and civilian personnel overwhelmingly agreed that civilians are important to mission success (85.5% of military and 96.8% of civilian respondents) and necessary to the success of the mission (79.6% of military and 96.4% of civilian respondents), although civilian personnel were more likely than military personnel to evince these perceptions and did so almost unanimously. The case study of military-civilian personnel in a multinational operational setting – i.e., the NATO KFOR study—indicated very similar findings. The surveys of KFOR personnel and the interviews with its senior leaders showed that the work culture and relations between the military and civilian

The majority of military and civilian personnel across nations and organisational contexts report positive working relations.

personnel at KFOR were generally very positive. Military and civilian personnel respected and held generally positive attitudes about their counterparts. The findings suggested good communication, trust, respect, and perceptions of commitment between military and civilian personnel [38].

Likewise, the Organizational Culture Study at NATO Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE), [37] demonstrated that both military and civilian personnel were generally satisfied with each other in this strategic-level multinational setting. However, satisfaction with civilian personnel (for both military and civilian personnel) was somewhat lower than satisfaction with military personnel, with only about two thirds of each group being satisfied with SHAPE civilians. This finding should be further explored because military members' satisfaction with civilian personnel at SHAPE influences important outcomes for this workforce.

Despite the generally positive relations between military and civilian co-workers, areas for improvement were observed, especially at the supervisory or organisational levels. The following points of concern will be discussed further in subsequent sections:

- Many civilians thought that working for defence affected their career progression and training opportunities and that their work was disrupted by the military rotational cycle. As with the national-level findings, the NATO KFOR case study revealed that civilians in a multinational operation were affected by the military rotational cycle, which caused frequent changes in supervisors and the associated changes in goals, approaches, management styles, and even working conditions, or insufficient supervision/disciplinary action and, in some cases, over-dependence on the knowledge and experience of civilians in certain roles.
- Working in mixed military-civilian context affects civilians' career progression and training opportunities, and the military rotational cycle disrupts their work.
- The MCPS revealed the concerns of civilians being supervised by military managers (and vice versa, though this occurred much less frequently). Civilian personnel indicated that military managers (and military personnel that have civilian managers) often do not fully understand and follow their conditions of employment or terms of service and their personnel appraisal systems. They also indicated that military supervisors do not always appreciate the roles of civilian personnel or fully capitalize on their skills and abilities. The NATO KFOR case study mirrored the national findings.
- Intergroup supervision of civilian personnel by military supervisors and vice versa is often problematic.

Military and civilian personnel who reported more positive military-civilian collaboration in their defence organisation were more likely to be satisfied with their jobs, engaged in their work, and committed to the organisation than those who reported less positive military-civilian collaboration.

A key question is the relationship between these military-civilian collaboration variables and organisational outcomes. Correlational results from the MCPS, presented in Chapter 13 [31], indicate that military-civilian work relations and interaction

are indeed related to important employee and organisational outcomes, including perceptions of organisational fairness, job satisfaction, work engagement, organisational commitment, and retention intentions. Thus, military and civilian personnel who reported more positive military–civilian collaboration in their defence organisation were more likely to be satisfied with their jobs, engaged in their work, and committed to the organisation than those who reported less positive military–civilian collaboration. It is important to note that these correlations were consistently stronger for civilian personnel. This is not particularly surprising given that civilian personnel are minorities in these defence organisations<sup>9</sup> and that the role of civilian personnel is often understood as *supporting* the military. Moreover, a much greater proportion of civilian personnel are directly supervised by military personnel than vice versa, which may also increase the importance of positive military–civilian work culture and relations for the civilian group.

Nevertheless, optimal military–civilian interactions, work culture, and relations appear to be related to important employee outcomes for both workforces, making these important considerations for the optimal personnel management of all personnel working for defence organisations. This supports the general recommendation that military–civilian personnel relations are important to organisational outcomes and thus should be examined and addressed within defence organisations.

Three open-ended questions were included in the MCPS to complement the quantitative information and to allow personnel to express their attitudes, perceptions, and experiences of military–civilian collaboration and integration using their own words. The questions asked respondents to identify the most important factors for establishing and maintaining positive military–civilian work culture and relations, the challenges they had experienced working in a military–civilian environment, and what they saw as the main advantages of working in a military–civilian environment.

These results demonstrated that mixed military–civilian work environments present both unique challenges and advantages. The open-ended comments of military and civilian personnel frequently cited challenges associated with fair treatment and lack of understanding of each other’s roles, personnel management systems, cultures, and perspectives, and civilians often reported that the military rotational cycle affected the stability of their work environment. In light of these issues, both military and civilian personnel across the nations indicated that the most important factors for establishing and maintaining positive military–civilian relations included respect, increasing understanding and familiarity with the other’s roles, cultures, and personnel management systems, enhancing communication and information exchange between personnel within the two workforces, ensuring fairness and equality, and increasing opportunities for collaboration and integration.

There are many positive aspects of working in military–civilian contexts, including complementary roles and expertise, diverse perspectives, and stability and continuity provided by civilians.

The open-ended responses to the MCPS also noted many positive aspects of working in military–civilian contexts, including the complementary knowledge and expertise of co-workers, filling complementary roles, providing diverse perspectives, offering support to one another’s objectives, and the stability and continuity provided by civilians in light of military rotation [32]. Similar benefits of military–civilian personnel integration were identified by the KFOR personnel. Many thought that the continuity in knowledge and procedures provided by civilians who are not part of the rotational cycle and who tend to remain in their positions much longer than military personnel was a significant advantage of complementary roles. Other benefits mirrored those in the national surveys: different perspectives, views, experiences, and skills that complement one another and that together contribute to mission success; civilian employees can make up

<sup>9</sup> Civilians are the minority across defence organisations overall. However, they are sometimes the majority group within specific units or sub-organisations within defence organisations.



for personnel shortages in some areas; as well as access to local sources, knowledge, people, and institutions, which civilians can sometimes provide more readily than military personnel [38].

The concerns identified in the MCPS and approaches for optimizing military–civilian personnel collaboration are discussed below.

## 24.4 KEY CONSIDERATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

A number of observations, considerations, and recommendations emerged from this research, which may enhance military-civilian personnel collaboration and integration by helping to harmonize these different systems operating inside defence organisations. Even though the findings on military-civilian collaboration are presented discretely in the sections below, it is important to recognize their interconnectedness in affecting organisational outcomes.

### 24.4.1 Recognizing and Bridging Cultural Differences Between Military and Civilian Personnel: Increasing Intergroup Interaction and Familiarity

In addition to different functions and personnel management systems, military and civilian personnel working within defence establishments also have different cultures, stemming from their different histories, values, roles, and personnel policies. These cultural differences – expressed in divergent attitudes, perceptions, and behaviours – can have a significant impact on the working relations between these two groups of personnel [35]. Integrating military and civilian cultures can be more challenging, for example, if the military members have spent much of their careers on military bases or on operational training and deployment. Long exposure to this environment can make it challenging to assimilate into the more bureaucratic civilian culture [13].

The effect of cultural differences on relations between military and civilian personnel (and thus on organisational functioning) was a frequent theme across the research examined in this report, as well as in other research in this domain. For instance, an examination of the organisational effectiveness within the Australian Defence Headquarters (ADHQ) showed that a lack of knowledge about the public service culture and administration (e.g., the hierarchical structure of the military versus the negotiation-based culture of the public servants) resulted in management and leadership problems in ADHQ [48]. Similarly, in a study of military professionals and civilian executives in the United States Department of Defense (DoD), Stupak [81] observed that military members belong to a single unified profession, while defence civilian executives were a diverse group belonging to many different professions (e.g., engineer, lawyer, analyst). He argues that civilian and military personnel are ignorant of each other’s personnel, promotion, and pay systems and base their perceptions of each other on myths, prejudices, and folklore. Civilians in this study tended to think that military executives did things too quickly in order to achieve short-term goals, whereas military personnel believed that civilians dragged their feet and were unwilling to work overtime.

Cultural differences between military and civilian personnel were often a barrier to workplace relations.

Our MCPS findings confirm that cultural differences and intergroup familiarity and understanding are particularly important. When survey respondents across the nations were asked to indicate, in their own words, the main challenges they experienced in working in a mixed military–civilian work environment, the most common theme from military personnel (an average of 19.6% of all theme responses across nations) and the fourth most common theme from civilian respondents (an average of 10.0% of all theme responses across nations to this question) was lack of intergroup understanding. Respondents indicated that military or civilian personnel lacked knowledge or understanding of each other’s roles, cultures, or perspectives, as well as

understanding of organisational policies and procedures [32]. Similarly, the fieldwork at KFOR (a multinational operational setting) revealed the importance of the military and civilian dynamic in the KFOR culture, such as the salience of the military culture and department, chain of command, and differing leadership styles, and that civilians working in a military organisation would benefit from a greater appreciation of the military system, chain of command, and style of communication [38].

In Chapter 15, Mastroianni [58] reports that contrasting cultures are also evident in military educational institutions where the more authoritarian elements of military culture held by the military professors' conflict with the more liberal tendencies of civilian academics. Moreover, civilian academics generally hold higher-level degrees (usually doctorates) than military professors (who often hold master's-level degrees) and have more teaching experience and a stronger focus on contributing to knowledge in their fields. Some military professors view these aims as conflicting with the military academy's primary objective of educating cadets. Further, military officers in educational institutions are often new to teaching, with little experience in developing and administering educational policy, and they often lack specialization in specific fields. Civilian professors, in contrast, may be perceived by the military as lacking practical and operational experience, further affecting the dynamics between the two groups. To the degree that these potential cultural divides can be bridged, Mastroianni [58] concludes that the different experiences and competencies of the two groups of professors can be maximally applied to benefit education in military academies.

As one element that can help to bridge the cultural divide, many defence organisations provide guidance on values and ethics that apply to military and civilian personnel alike. The Swedish Armed Forces is guided by a set of core values, such as openness, results, and responsibility, which, according to the Chief of Defence, apply to military and civilian personnel and explicitly support the One Defence Force concept [64]. Similarly, the *Code of Values and Ethics for the Canadian Armed Forces and Department of National Defence* [33] and the United States DoD single source Standards of Conduct Office [66] harmonize the values and ethics of military members and civilians. Although common codes of values and ethics are important for aligning military-civilian cultures, other more concrete practices are required to more fully realize military-civilian integration.

Participants across the research studies presented here frequently asserted that enhancing military and civilian personnel's understanding of one another's cultures and roles was fundamental to enhancing their partnership. When MCPS respondents were asked to describe, in their

Enhancing military and civilian personnel's understanding of one another's cultures and roles is fundamental to enhancing their partnership.

own words, the most important factors for establishing and maintaining positive military-civilian collaboration, the most common theme was understanding and familiarity between military and civilian personnel (an average of 21.5% of all theme responses for military respondents across nations, and an average of 13.8% of all theme responses for civilian respondents across nations in response to this question [32]. More specifically, the survey respondents discussed a need for greater intergroup understanding of the kind of work military and civilian personnel perform with respect to roles, tasks, and occupations, divergent work cultures, understanding of each other's perspectives and experiences, conditions of employment, and cultures, and generally getting to know one another. A number of mechanisms for increasing intergroup understanding are discussed below.

Intergroup contact, such as through joint work and training opportunities, as well as joint social and organisational activities, enhances cultural understanding and relationship quality.

A common recommendation from the MCPS open-ended comments for promoting military-civilian familiarity and understanding was intergroup contact, such as through joint work and training opportunities, as well as joint social and organisational activities. Most interviewees in the KFOR study also suggested that social activities, joint social

functions, and “off camp” initiatives would enhance military and civilian familiarization. Kelty’s [52] study of sailors on U.S. Naval ships and Civilian Mariners (CIVMARs) found that sailors’ greater contact with CIVMARs and increased knowledge of their contributions had beneficial effects on social comparisons with civilians and led to greater perceptions of fairness. Shaw and James-Yates [79] point out, however, that these activities should be tailored to suit all groups, otherwise they can be counterproductive and divisive and serve to exacerbate differences. For example, activities that are geared toward the outdoors or physical activities may be more suited to active and fit military members and may thus make some civilians feel excluded. In Estonia, civilian familiarization with the military is facilitated by the mobilization-based defence model, wherein some civilian officials have a background as conscripts and subsequently serve as reservists or become voluntary members of the Estonian Defence League, and therefore spend part of their time in the military or on military exercises. The benefits of intergroup contact and socialization are supported by the extensive theoretical and empirical literature on intergroup contact theory, which suggests that positive contact between diverse groups can lead to reduced intergroup prejudices and conflict and to enhanced intergroup relations, as well as enhanced performance [42], [65], [67], [68].

One formal way to increase intergroup contact and establish common goals and approaches is through common professional education opportunities. Many defence organisations already offer this type of joint training. The Command and Staff training program in the United Kingdom trains future commanders and staff officers in all three of its armed services as well as among its defence civil servants [16]. Similarly, in Estonia, the Baltic Defence College (BALTDEFCOL), a joint multinational staff and war college run together with Latvia and Lithuania, offers the Civil Servants Course for members of the MOD (as well as civilians from other ministries and civilian agencies), but is integrated with the military Joint Command and General Staff Course. Likewise, the Higher Command Studies Course at the war college is attended by both senior civilian officials and military officers [49]. The Canadian Forces College also offers professional development opportunities, such as the year-long National Security Program attended by senior civilian and military leaders, and the Canadian Security Studies Program attended by mid-level civilian and military leaders [33].

Directly educating military and civilian workforces about each other’s roles, functions, cultures and unique management systems was also highlighted as important for fostering understanding and familiarity between military and civilian personnel. The *Canadian Armed Forces 101 for Civilians*, a course offered in the Canadian Department of National Defence, provides civilian personnel with basic knowledge of the military culture and environment (Ref. [5], p. 2). Other structures for facilitating military–civilian understanding at all levels would also be useful, such as forums focused on military–civilian work culture and relations. In a review of military professionals and civilian executives, Stupak [81] proposed developing a forum and intergroup meetings to provide military and civilian executives an opportunity to discuss similarities and differences in their leadership approaches, ways to enhance their working relations and address stereotypes and misperceptions. Although this review was conducted a number of years ago, the findings in this report suggest the recommendation still has value.

Military and civilian workforces should be educated about each other’s roles, functions, cultures and unique management systems.

The optimal time to begin fostering military-civilian familiarity and understanding among personnel in defence organisations is at the start of employment. Induction or socialization was emphasized across many of the chapters in this Report. In their study of an army logistics unit in the United Kingdom, where military personnel were the minority, Shaw and James-Yates [79] showed that induction promoted better cultural understanding, dispelled initial stereotypes, and enhanced cohesion and feelings of inclusion. A number of military interviewees at KFOR recommended orientation or on-boarding experiences to teach incoming civilians about the military organisational culture, systems, chain of command, and communication styles [38]. As noted above,

the Canadian Department of National Defence provides such an orientation course and guide to all new civilian employees, which includes information about the military culture and the distinct organisational dynamics of employment in a mixed military–civilian setting. The course also explains military terminology, rank structure, chain of command, and the organisation of the Canadian Armed Forces services and commands [5].

#### 24.4.2 Shared Identity as an Enabler of Military-Civilian Personnel Collaboration

Diverse workforces require a common *super-ordinate identity* to foster feelings of equality, identity, and organisational commitment.

Research on group and organizational identity indicates that diverse workforces require a common *super-ordinate identity* (e.g., One Defence Team) that also incorporates strong *unique subgroup identities* (e.g., as military personnel or defence civilians) to foster feelings of equality, identity,

and organisational commitment [1]. Some defence organisations have introduced concepts meant to foster super-ordinate military–civilian identities, such as *Whole Force Concept* (UK) and *One Defence Team* (Sweden). Clearly communicating super-ordinate goals that both groups can share (e.g., the Canadian motto “One vision, one mission, one team”) are also likely to contribute to the formation of a super-ordinate identity.

This report also reveals cases where shared identity is lacking and the negative effects of this lack of shared identity on military–civilian collaboration. In the United Kingdom Defence Equipment and Support (DE&S) organisation, Shaw and James-Yates [79] reported that military personnel were more likely to identify with their service than their position at DE&S, and that this lack of superordinate organisational identity resulted in workplace tension, stereotyping, and the formation of us-and-them attitudes. Within this organisation, newly-arriving military personnel are directed to the Joint Services Administration Unit where they receive information about military-specific training, the medical centre, and the facilities to help them understand how to access their military privileges and retain elements of their military ethos and culture while in the more civilian DE&S environment. Although this is helpful in terms of maintaining their military customs, privileges, and identity, Shaw and James-Yates suggest that the organisation would have been better served if new arrivals had also received induction into the socio-cultural life, or organisational culture, at DE&S.

Creating a sense of shared identity between military and civilian co-workers in defence organisations can be challenging. Military personnel tend to have a strong, salient, and visible collective identity that is clearly distinct from their nonprofessional identities in the civilian world and at the same time is closely aligned with the primary purpose of the defence establishment. Civilians, on the other hand, have less clearly defined and more diffuse identities as defence civilians, and their functions within defence are often characterized as supportive or secondary to military functions. According to social identity theory, the weaker social identity of civilians, especially when operating alongside the stronger and more distinctive identity of their military counterparts, can lead to in-group and out-group stereotypes and conflict. It may therefore be important for defence organisations to foster defence civilian identities that match their military co-workers’ in addition to a super-ordinate organisational identity shared by both. Promoting concepts such as *One Defence Team* is an initial step. Consistently supporting this shared sense of identity through organisational communications that emphasize this common identity and highlight common values and shared objectives will help to support cultural transformation in this regard [28].

#### 24.4.3 Importance of Leadership Emphasis on Effective Military-Civilian Collaboration

Results of the MCPS indicate that the extent to which both military and civilian personnel perceive their senior leaders as endorsing and supporting the military-civilian partnership within defence organisations is related to

Senior leader support of military-civilian partnership is related to important personnel and organisational outcomes.

important outcomes, including job satisfaction, commitment, and retention intentions. As such, it is recommended that senior leaders' play an active role in emphasizing the value and importance of both military and civilian workforces and explicitly endorsing military-civilian collaboration within defence organisations. As discussed above, this includes organisational communications, but should be extended to other mechanisms for integrating this mindset into the organisational culture.

One such set of integrating mechanisms may include leadership approaches and styles. Research and theory on diversity in work groups and organisation demonstrates that leaders provide the social cues, norms, and meanings that shape the organisational culture and its behaviour. Different leadership approaches and styles can enhance or minimize the effects of diversity, and diversity is more likely to lead to positive outcomes when the organisational culture emphasizes integration and inclusion [14], [23], [50]. The role of leaders is recognized as fundamental to creating an organisational culture of inclusion. Research on diversity and leadership highlights the importance of considering the different approaches and styles of leadership among diverse workgroups and how these different ways of leading affect the degree to which personnel feel valued and included in the organisation [6], [9], [10], [72], [85]. Thus, leaders should take proactive steps to build a bridge between team members of various backgrounds, foster inclusivity, and actively ensure a cooperative and supportive environment for all members, which will facilitate positive workplace dynamics that result in better job satisfaction, performance, and retention [45], [56], [61].

The Canadian Department of National Defence (DND) and Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) provide a positive example in this regard. The Canada First Defence Strategy, a high-level strategic document aimed at DND/CAF members at all levels, states that a first-class, modern military depends on its members working “in partnership with the knowledgeable and responsive personnel of the Department of National Defence” (Ref. [17], p. 3). High-level leaders also emphasize the role and value of both military and civilian personnel in their organisational messages to personnel. In 2012, for example, at the end of a particularly challenging year, the Minister and Associate Minister of National Defence wrote in a holiday message to all personnel, “We wish to extend our gratitude to everyone in the Canadian Army, the Royal Canadian Air Force, the Royal Canadian Navy and the Department of National Defence. Each and every member of the Defence family embraced this challenging year with the continued strength and passion that Canadians have come to expect from this outstanding team.” Similarly, the Chief of Defence Staff and Chief Warrant Officer wrote in a note to all DND/CAF personnel that “together, the members of the Defence Team have continued to uphold the finest traditions of service before self and delivering excellence in operations.” Further, they explicitly reached out to say, “To our civilian colleagues, we express our deepest admiration for your tremendous contributions to the successes of the Defence Team. 2012 has been a year marked by uncertainty and change, and through it all you have relentlessly continued the critical work needed for mission success” [36].

#### **24.4.4 Organizational Fairness and Equality**

The differences in military and civilian management and rewards often lead to perceptions of organisational unfairness.

Despite the high degree of integration and interaction among many military and civilian personnel, they are of course governed by separate personnel management systems, and thus have distinct terms of employment, performance appraisal systems, pay structures, and retirement plans.

The differences in military and civilian management and rewards can lead to perceptions of organisational unfairness. Such perceptions of organisational unfairness or relative disadvantage can stem from at least two sources:

- a) Inequality in terms of treatment and rewards between military and civilian co-workers; or

- b) For civilians, the disparity between the benefits and rewards available in defence organisations and those available in non-military contexts or other government departments (e.g., effects on career development and training opportunities).

One of the five most common issues reported in response to the MCPS open-ended survey question regarding the main challenges of working in a mixed military-civilian environment was unfairness or inequality, particularly for civilian respondents across the nations. Issues discussed under this theme included perceived lack of fairness in terms of working hours, pay, procedures, professional development and career advancement, as well as other policy-related issues. Moreover, when survey respondents were asked to indicate the most important factors for establishing and maintaining positive military-civilian work relations, both military and civilian personnel across the nations frequently emphasized the importance of ensuring fairness and equality, including fairness in regard to workload, pay, training opportunities, and recognition.

Similar issues were revealed in this report. Kelty noted in Chapter 20 [52] that United States military personnel's social comparisons with civilian co-workers regarding benefits and costs of employment had significant, albeit indirect, negative effects on retention attitudes (despite service members' overall positive perceptions regarding the professionalism and abilities of the civilians with whom they worked). Mastroianni [58] discussed the significant disadvantages of civilian scholars working within the military educational system when compared with the civilian academy. The tenure system characteristic of most civilian academic institutions, for example, does not apply to civilian faculty employed in military academies; instead, civilian faculty are employed under Title 10 of the U.S. Code of Federal Regulations, which gives the institution more control over hiring and firing employees and results in a contract model for civilian professors. The lack of tenure not only has significant effects on the job security of civilian faculty in military educational institutions, but also affects the sense of professional identity and academic freedom that are fundamentally associated with tenure. Similar issues, with respect to unfairness or inequality regarding retirement, compensation, health care, or other workplace benefits, were also identified for several countries in this report, including Belgium [71], Netherlands [4], and the United States [66].

#### **24.4.4.1 Working in a Military Context on Career Development and Training Opportunities**

The MCPS confirmed that a large proportion of civilians across the nations indicated that working in a military context has negative effects on their career development. About half of civilian survey respondents indicated that career opportunities are affected by working in an organisation with military personnel and three-fifths indicated that career progression is limited because the best positions tend to go to military personnel and that the defence organisation offers fewer advancement opportunities as compared to other government departments.

With respect to training, the majority of civilian personnel across the nations indicated that the training and professional development opportunities provided to military personnel make sense given their roles. However, about half of civilians indicated that civilian employees receive fewer training opportunities than their military counterparts and a third indicated that training for military members decreases the training available to civilian employees.

#### **24.4.4.2 Explicit Focus on Fairness and Transparency**

Military and civilian personnel fall under different human resource policies, but in working closely together they observe each other's benefits and rewards. Further, many civilian employees across nations indicated that they believe that working in a military context may have negative effects on their career progression and training opportunities. These are important employment considerations. Much research indicates that perceptions of

organisational fairness may affect employees' actions and reactions within organisations [57]. Higher perceptions of organisational fairness are related to higher organisational citizenship behaviours, task performance, job satisfaction, commitment and trust in leaders [3], [53], whereas low perceptions of organisational fairness are related to higher turnover intentions, organisational deviance, withdrawal, psychological strain and depression [3], [26], [53], [82], [83]. Indeed, the results of the correlational analyses based on the MCPS results [31] indicate that perceptions of organisational fairness are consistently and strongly related to job satisfaction, organisational commitment, and retention intentions for both military and civilian personnel across the participating nations.

Ensuring equitable treatment, to the degree possible considering different personnel systems and operational requirements, is important.

Ensuring equitable treatment, to the degree possible considering different personnel systems and operational requirements, is important for defence organisations and for managers of both civilian and military personnel. One particularly noteworthy example that focuses explicitly

on organisational fairness is the Estonian Defence Force Strategy covering the period of 2013 – 2017, one of the key tenets of which is value-based management emphasizing cooperation, equal treatment and fair compensation. For example, with respect to remuneration, this strategy calls for equal treatment, transparency and comparability, enabling military and civilian personnel to compare their remuneration within their categories, between different personnel categories in the EDF, and between the EDF personnel and those in other government departments and private sector [49]. Strategies that place primacy on fairness and equitable treatment may be useful not only for improving military-civilian personnel fairness perceptions, also but for improving such perceptions of organizational fairness in general.

In some cases, perceived unfairness is based on hearsay, partial observations, and erroneous assumptions. At times, particularly in the context of military-civilian personnel relations, differences may stem from poor understanding of the different personnel systems and operational requirements of military and civilian members (as discussed above). Given this, clear communication and transparency is beneficial for dispelling misperceptions about organisational fairness. Research on organisational fairness shows that *procedural fairness* (the perceived fairness of the *processes* used to allocate outcomes and resources) is generally more influential than *distributive fairness* (perceived fairness of the *distribution* of outcomes and resources themselves) on employee and organisational outcomes [11]. In light of this, it is suggested that if personnel have insight into how and why military and civilian benefits and rewards differ, stemming from differing personnel systems and operational requirements, this could go a long way in enhancing their perceptions of organizational fairness.

Perceived unfairness in the context of military-civilian personnel relations may stem from poor understanding of the different personnel systems and operational requirements of military and civilian members. Communication and transparency is beneficial for dispelling misperceptions.

#### **24.4.5 The Military Rotational Cycle and Optimizing Continuity**

The military rotational cycle – postings and deployments – is an operational requirement that can have unintended and often negative effects on civilian personnel who are likely to remain in the same positions for longer durations. These effects were observed across a range of settings, including within national defence organisations, as evidenced by the results of the MCPS discussed above, at the multinational operational level (as evidenced in the field research conducted at KFOR HQ in Kosovo), at the strategic multinational level (as evidenced by the results of the Organizational Culture Survey conducted at NATO SHAPE [37], and within other case studies.

Issues related to the military rotational cycle were frequently reported as a challenge associated with working in a military organisation, according to the MCPS. On average, across nations, almost 65% of civilian survey

respondents indicated that the posting cycle disrupted productivity in their workplace, and over half indicated that the rotational cycle of military managers and supervisors had disrupted their work. Civilians also frequently noted this issue in the MCPS's open-ended question asking them to identify the main challenges associated with working in a mixed military-civilian context, noting problems related to frequent turnover of co-workers due to postings, frequent absences, changes in supervisors and styles of supervision, and poor timing of postings. On average, across nations, this issue represented 16.4% of all comments in response to this question for civilians, though only 3.1% of all comments from military personnel.

On the contrary, military personnel frequently noted that one of the main benefits of working in a military-civilian work environment was the stability, continuity, and maintenance of corporate knowledge provided by civilian personnel. In fact, 20.7% of all comments made by military participants in response to the MCPS question asking them to identify the most positive aspects of working in a military-civilian environment was stability and work continuity provided by their civilian co-workers. Conversely, only 3.8% of civilian survey respondents' comments related to this theme.

One of the main benefits of working in a military-civilian work environment was the stability, continuity, and maintenance of corporate knowledge provided by civilian personnel.

Similarly, the military and civilian leaders interviewed at KFOR [38] noted a variety of effects related to the military rotational cycle. The most common were the effects on continuity, knowledge management, and corporate memory and the role of civilian personnel in mitigating potential problems related to frequent rotations. In some cases, the military rotational cycle led to unintended, and perhaps undue, dependence on the knowledge and experience of civilian personnel. Some suggested that greater effort is required to establish mechanisms for enhancing knowledge management practices and the maintenance of corporate memory, so that dependence on any specific individual, be they military or civilian, is minimized. On the other hand, some suggested converting some military positions into civilian ones in order to facilitate continuity and also noted that this has happened in some cases. Interviewees also emphasized that rotations of the military supervisors of civilian personnel are often associated with changes in goals, approaches, management styles, and even working conditions. It is recommended that handovers among military managers may better include this factor explicitly to ensure continuity in the type of supervision and working styles for civilian employees. Efforts to facilitate communication and trust among new supervisors and their personnel as expediently as possible may also be beneficial. Further, interviews noted that frequent rotations can result in insufficient supervision, performance evaluation, or even disciplinary action for civilian personnel as a result of the short-term perspective that some military supervisors have to either observe or to address shortcomings; consideration of supplemental supervision/evaluation may be beneficial to avoid this unintended effect. Conversely, it was also noted that civilians sometimes evince the greatest commitment and strongest performance because they are employed at the HQ for the long term.

At the strategic level, the Organizational Culture Study at NATO SHAPE indicated that relatively large minorities of both military (27%) and civilian (43%) respondents believed that military and civilian rotational cycles reduce performance [37]. Similarly, about a quarter of military personnel (28%) and a third of civilian personnel (34%) believed that the different rotation cycles of military and civilians need to be aligned. As such, it is recommended that alignment of rotational cycles be afforded greater consideration in the context of organisational planning. As in national and multinational operational settings, civilians at SHAPE reported serving for a much longer period of time (an average of almost 9 years) than their military counterparts (who served an average of almost 1.5 years). Interestingly, civilian personnel at SHAPE were also more likely than their military counterparts to indicate having received appropriate training to accomplish their taskings and



responsibilities at SHAPE and being well prepared for performing their roles at SHAPE, possibly stemming from their relatively longer tenures in the organisation.

Mastroianni [58] discussed tenure issues in United States military academies, observing that military faculty members tend to serve as professors for only one tour (usually 3 to 4 years), whereas civilian faculty members are usually professional educators. As a result, the former often take a “training” approach and the latter often take an “education” approach in their role, generally not seeing it as something that can be done successfully by someone without previous experience. Rather, civilian faculty see effective teaching as an endeavour that involves testing and refinement over years. Military members on short-term faculty assignments, in contrast, tend to base their teaching on standardized course material and assessment. Strained relations can grow out of the different tenures of military and civilian faculty and may result in different priorities, differing perceptions of what policies and procedures are optimal for accomplishing the mission of the institutions, and even differing perceptions of the organisational mission, all of which can potentially further strain personnel relations.

Efforts should be made to enhance workplace continuity and knowledge management, optimal handover of tasks/roles, and consistency in management practices.

Taken together, various effects related to the military rotational cycle and the associated continuity provided by civilian personnel were salient findings. Of course, postings and deployments are an operational requirement for military personnel and are not likely to change in the foreseeable future. Nonetheless, some additional efforts might ameliorate

the unintended consequences of rotational cycles: Efforts should be made to enhance workplace continuity and knowledge management, optimal handover of tasks/roles, and consistency in management practices (when it is a supervisor that is rotated). In select instances, it may also be beneficial to “civilianize”<sup>10</sup> some key positions where continuity and longer tenure is particularly important.

#### **24.4.6 Tools and Policies for Supervisors**

It is necessary for senior leaders to emphasize the importance and value of military-civilian collaboration (as discussed above), but this research indicates that the importance of such collaboration has to be emphasized at all levels, including by those in direct supervisory roles.

Resources, such as training and instructional material, should be provided to facilitate the optimal management of civilian personnel by military managers, and vice-versa.

Indeed, as discussed above, the MCPS as well as case study results highlighted concerns about civilian personnel supervised by military managers (and vice versa, although this occurs much less frequently), including understanding and application of appropriate conditions of employment or terms of service and personnel appraisal systems, and full appreciation of roles, skills, and abilities. Further, the different leadership styles of military and civilian managers are well recognized, especially the more command-centric style of military leadership predicated on the expectation of compliance to the chain of command versus the more consensual and participative leadership approach of civilian managers (e.g., Refs. [44] and [84]). Recognizing these issues, some defence organisations provide important resources to facilitate the optimal management of civilian personnel by military managers, and vice-versa.

Some nations provide training courses and materials developed for civilian managers who supervise civilian personnel and vice versa. Civilian supervisors are helped to understand environmental factors pertaining to managing military personnel, issues related to chain of command, the management implications of the military career management cycle and procedures, as well as military terminology. Similarly, some nations offer or mandate that military supervisors of civilians be trained in the range of human resources issues specific to

<sup>10</sup> Such civilianization involves converting previously military functions into civilian positions.

managing civilians (e.g., staffing, classification, labour relations) and a manager's responsibilities in supervising civilians. The United Kingdom Defence Academy provides a course to support military personnel who have line-management over civilian personnel. The course covers topics such as recruitment, performance management, and development [16], [46]. Another course for civilian personnel teaches them to write appraisal reports for military personnel [16]. Likewise, the United States has a mandatory class for military members who supervise GS civilians, but does not require civilians to take a similar one to supervise military personnel [66]. In Canada, all civilian managers and supervisors of military personnel must take the Managing Military Personnel Course, which helps civilian supervisors understand environmental factors pertaining to military personnel, the roles and responsibilities and issues related to chain of command, the management implications of the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) career management cycle and procedures, as well as military terminology. Similarly, the Managing Civilian Human Resources Course is mandatory for all military and civilian managers and supervisors of civilian Department of National Defence (DND) employees, and is aimed at familiarizing these supervisors with the human resources requirements related to civilians [36].

At NATO KFOR, the manual *Civilian Staff Rules (CSRs) for HQ Balkans* was developed to assist military personnel deployed to KFOR to manage civilians under their command. How common such tools are in other multinational operational settings is unknown and the field study at NATO KFOR revealed that this manual was rarely consulted, and usually only once a problem has already occurred. Interviewees at KFOR emphasized that in multinational contexts such tools and training may be especially important for military personnel from defence organisations with few civilians or who are new to civilian human resource management [38]. In Estonia, legal advisors of the EDF units, whose main role is to advise military commanders on the Law of Armed Conflict, are also responsible for advising them on civilian workforce regulations [49].

Some nations have also created policies and directives aimed at military managers of civilians and vice versa.

Some nations have also created policies and directives aimed at military managers of civilians and vice versa. The CAF has issued Defence Administrative Orders and Directives (DAODs) that apply to both military and civilian

managers of civilian employees. In particular, DAOD 5005-0, *Civilian Human Resources Management* [18] applies to all DND and CAF personnel who manage DND employees and must ensure the following: the alignment of civilian human resources management plans, policies and programs with departmental priorities and operational needs; a governance structure that defines civilian human resources management roles, responsibilities and accountabilities in DND and the CAF; functional direction that informs senior managers in the execution of their civilian human resources management responsibilities; coordination mechanisms to ensure appropriate planning and execution of policies and programs; communication mechanisms to promote full consultation on a wide range of civilian human resources management issues to be responsive to the requirements of senior managers and maintain positive labour-management and employee relations; and the measurement of DND and CAF performance in civilian human resources management. The creation of these resources recognizes the potential complexity of managing civilians in a defence organisation. Preliminary results of this RTG support the conclusion that it is beneficial for supervisors and managers to be aware of, and to make use of, these important resources to facilitate the management of civilian (or military) personnel under their supervision.

## **24.5 COLLABORATION OF SENIOR MILITARY AND CIVILIAN LEADERS AT THE STRATEGIC LEVEL**

Democratic nations exercise civilian control of their armed forces, with elected representatives determining the direction of the military. At the organisational level, senior civilian officials, through a variety of functions such

as management of materiel and finance, work within defence organisations, complementing the functions of senior military leaders to assure civilian control of the armed forces [69], [15]. These senior civil servants, working with and on behalf of elected officials, have a central role in decision making, policy development, and strategy.

In Chapter 23, Reijling, Soeters, and van Fenema [70] analyze the interplay and tensions between senior military and civilian leaders in the Netherlands Ministry of Defence that have led to changes in the governance structure of the defence organisation. They demonstrate how shifts in power, or at least in areas of responsibility, while somewhat conflictual as they occurred, were ultimately beneficial, resulting in iterative improvements in the long run. Nonetheless, Reijling et al. [70] note that recognizing the different roles and perspectives of senior military leaders and “defence bureaucrats” is important and can catalyse strategies to ameliorate these tensions. Drawing on business management research, they discuss different approaches for addressing tensions between military and civilian personnel at the top levels of the defence organization, emphasizing the need for examining approaches best suited to specific contexts and situations.

The collaborative dynamics between senior civil servants and military personnel at the strategic level of defence establishments was only lightly touched upon in this RTG and requires further examination. In addition to potentially unique considerations specific to military-civilian collaboration at this level, certainly many of the issues examined at the lower organisational levels, such as cultural and organisational identity and the unique benefits and challenges of working in mixed military–civilian milieus, are likely to apply at the senior level. For example, enhanced understanding of roles and perspectives may be beneficial to reducing stereotypes, such as civilian leaders believing that military leaders do things too quickly in order to achieve short-term goals, and military personnel believing that bureaucrats drag their feet due to a slow, consensus-driven approach [81]. Similarly, senior civilians may believe that commanders need to develop more cost-awareness with respect to allocating military spending, whereas military may believe that civilian leaders need to better appreciate military operational concerns without overrating the importance of bureaucratic rules and procedures [43], [70].

Many of the issues examined at the lower organisational levels, such as cultural and organisational identity and the unique benefits and challenges of working in mixed military–civilian milieus, apply at these senior leadership levels.

Issues at the lower levels of the organisation are also likely to present in unique ways at the strategic level, and are likely to have distinct implications for personnel and the organisation. A main concern may be that civilians at these strategic levels make critical decisions that impact the daily life of military personnel even though they are not

knowledgeable about service life [78], or that functional control of some domains is necessary for military leaders so that they can efficiently control their military forces and carry out their responsibilities [39]. Nonetheless, other than serving the critical role of ensuring civil control of the military, integration and partnership of military and civilian personnel at the senior leadership level provides an array of benefits. As Gregory [41] noted, the operating environment of the military has become increasingly complex and requires military and civilian leaders to work together and with other parties, such as other governmental, non-governmental, and international organisations. The specific benefits, challenges, and enablers of military-civilian integration at the strategic or senior leadership level was generally beyond the scope of this task group’s program of work and requires dedicated examination.

## **24.6 CIVILIANS AS A “FORCE MULTIPLIER”: KEY ROLES AND TRENDS FOR CIVILIANS IN DEFENCE**

Military downsizing and the streamlining of operational functions have resulted in militaries using civilians to complement military capabilities. In-depth analysis of the use of civilians in military roles is outside the scope of

this report. But these trends are likely to influence the demographics, work culture, and the relations between military and civilian personnel and policies and practices related to military-civilian integration in defence organisations, and therefore warrant dedicated attention in their own right.

#### **24.6.1 Contractors: The “Other” Civilians**

Defence organisations have increasingly relied on contractors and private military companies to fill the gap in personnel and skill requirements in domestic and overseas operations [7], [25], [63], [77]. Civilian contractors serve a variety of roles, including training, supply-chain management, and even security and direct action [55]. Most of the research on contractors in defence focuses on their use on operations. Although a comprehensive review related to defence contractors is outside the scope of this report, it is important to consider the potential involvement and contribution of contractors within the context of “total defence workforces”.

Contractors and private military companies are increasingly relied on to fill the gap in personnel and skill requirements.

Using contractors has advantages and drawbacks. The most significant advantage of contractors is the flexibility they provide to address organisational resource constraints, including those related to workforce size and required skill sets, which allows for greater flexibility in meeting organisational and operational requirements. The drawbacks include potential shortfalls in mission success, concerns over the safety of contractors, loss of internal capability as a result of reliance on outsourcing, less control over total force management, and difficulties in monitoring and enforcing compliance with rules and regulations [55] because contractors are not employees of defence organisations, but rather are either self-employed or are the employees of contracting firms. As a result, it cannot be assumed that contractors will hold and adhere to the same values and ethics of military personnel or civil servants employed by defence organisations.

Cost savings is a major reason behind outsourcing. Contractors may be paid less than public servants or military personnel performing similar roles, depending on the function. Contracting locals during operations, for example, can save on wages and benefits and, unlike public servants, contractors are only paid when their services are required [8], [77]. Moreover, contractors are usually not entitled to the same benefits, such as training, professional development, and pensions. On the other hand, it has been noted that a frequent lack of strategic planning, management, and oversight of contractors has contributed to significant wasteful expenditure [8].

More central to this report, the work culture and relations between contractors and military personnel and civilian public servants in defence organisations is likely to introduce another set of issues. Cultural differences, weaker team cohesion, social comparisons between the

Work culture and relations between contractors and military personnel and civilian public servants in defence organisations is likely to introduce a unique set of issues.

different types of personnel in terms of compensation, working conditions, and requirements may impact organisational and operational effectiveness [8], [52]. It is important to better understand and address these integration aspects in light of the current and increasing reliance on contracted personnel. Further, in-depth analysis of the roles/numbers of contractors to meet needs in the context of the overall defence force mix is required [55]. This is a complex issue requiring analysis of both short- and long-term advantages and disadvantages, as well as the right force mix to meet requirements, in any particular case. The line of inquiry presented by Kelly in Chapter 20 [52] summarizes some preliminary findings on the extent to which contractors have had an effect on military discipline, clarity of chain of command, morale, ability to maintain customs and traditions, and the ability to accomplish the unit’s mission. These initial findings indicated numerous positive

and negative effects of civilian contractor integration into military units and pointed to the need for a cost-benefit analysis and an organisational assessment of military staffing policy.

### 24.6.2 Civilian Deployments and Roles on Operations

As reported in a number of the RTG HFM-226 national reports, civilian personnel are generally not deployable, but some trends suggest that the “operational divide” between civilian and military personnel may be becoming more permeable [25]. Turkey has planned to replace some of its military personnel on operations with civilians [51], and in the Netherlands and Canada, civilians sometimes go on voluntary short-term working visits or can be militarized for longer deployments (e.g., issued a uniform, but not a weapon [4]). Likewise, in Germany, civilian personnel may take part in operations as military-status reserve duty soldiers [54], and the United States DoD has a policy whereby a subset of the civilian workforce (comprising the DoD Civilian Expeditionary Workforce) is pre-identified for operational requirements [80].

Although civilian personnel are generally not deployable, some trends suggest that the “operational divide” between civilian and military personnel may be becoming more permeable.

Another approach, based on using civilians to complement military capabilities, sees defence civilians as a viable source of deployable personnel. RAND conducted research for the United States DoD on establishing and maintaining a civilian deployment capability, and identified lessons and best practices for civilian deployment for NATO and its individual members’ defence organisations [19], [20]. In Chapter 21, Dunigan et al. [21] summarize the relevant content from the RAND report. Drawing on extensive document review and subject matter consultation, they identified best practices and created four models of civilian deployment, highlighting the benefits and drawbacks of each model. The chapter includes a wealth of knowledge about civilian deployment experiences, requirements that would generate the need for deployable civilians, the types of missions civilians support, and the methods that organisations use to identify, select, track, and deploy civilians. The report does not speak directly to work culture and relations, but it does delineate factors for civilian deployment capabilities to meet future defence requirements.

An earlier international study that examined the deployment of civilians within the five Technical Cooperation Program (TTCP) nations (Canada, United States, Australia, United Kingdom, and New Zealand) [22] revealed that ambiguity was a common concern with deployed civilians. In particular, the roles, policies, and responsibilities of civilians and military personnel were not clearly defined or communicated. The authors noted

Many of the work-culture and relations factors, such as cultural distinctions and identity, perceptions of fairness, understanding of roles and responsibilities, common training, and appropriate intergroup supervision are not only likely to apply, but are likely to be exacerbated in operational contexts.

that a common code of conduct for military and civilian personnel on operations would be useful, but that national policy makers need to make clear distinctions between civilian and military personnel and their management on operations. Several country report chapters in Part II of this report discuss such policies. Jermalavičius [49] noted that all civilians employed by the Estonian government can be deployed to international operations as part of the *Participation in International Civilian Missions Act*. Although policy regulating benefits of the military and veterans does not apply to these civilians, EDF civilians may also deploy with military units on operations in accordance with the *International Military Cooperation Act* (the law defining the use of the EDF in collective defence and other operations abroad), which does entitle civilians to various privileges provided to their military counterparts. James-Yates [46] discusses training for staff deployed on operations, which includes an overview of military structures and other departments that they might encounter or need to navigate when deployed.

A more general inquiry into the deployment of defence civil servants is warranted, particularly if their use in defence missions is likely to increase. Many of the work-culture and relations factors, such as cultural distinctions and identity, perceptions of fairness, understanding of roles and responsibilities, common training, and appropriate intergroup supervision are not only likely to apply, but are likely to be exacerbated in operational contexts. Deployment experiences or military exercises for civilians may allow them to gain greater familiarity with military culture and provide greater contact and shared experiences with military personnel. Such experiences may also provide opportunities for civilians to earn the respect of military personnel [4].

### **24.6.3 Civilianizing Military Occupations**

Although most defence organisations have downsized in recent years and civilian workforces have been reduced more than military workforces, some defence organisations have civilianized some military functions. The Netherlands [4], Australia [80], New Zealand [12], and the Republic of Korea [47] have determined that some military functions or occupations are outside core military duties and have reassigned them to civilian personnel. Civilianization is another way to use internal civilian capabilities to complement or to augment military capabilities, particularly when military operational functions performed by military personnel require streamlining or in response to military cuts.

One of the main objectives of civilianization is to save costs or to redistribute resources, generally through the rebalancing of the defence workforce such that a higher proportion of military personnel can focus on the delivery of military functions or deployable military capability, while more support-type functions are shifted to civilians. New Zealand's Civilianization Project, introduced in 2010, sought to concentrate military personnel "in front" (i.e., to deployable military functions), converting 1,400 military positions determined to be "in the middle" (e.g., logistics and training) or in the "back" (e.g., administrative functions) into civilian positions [12]. Similarly, in 2010 – 2011, Australian defence converted certain military positions into contractor roles or into Australian Public Service positions to save on costs, which resulted in an increase in the numbers of civilian personnel at the time [80]. The Ministry of National Defence (MND) in the Republic Of Korea (ROK) also developed a plan to increase the ratio of civilian personnel in headquarters by 2009, although it was recommended that the timetable be delayed until more civilian defence experts in the required areas were developed and retired military personnel could be hired to fill some of these functions [47].

Civilianization initiatives require careful planning and execution to avoid negative personnel and organisational outcomes.

Civilianization initiatives require careful planning and execution. The New Zealand Defence Force's civilianization plan moved too quickly, resulting in miscalculations. Some ranks and trades ended up with a surplus of military members and others lacked sufficient numbers (e.g., insufficient staff to sail the inshore patrol vessels). Moreover, civilianization was carried out in a way that led military personnel to feel betrayed, and the consequent drop in morale and increase in attrition reduced capability [12], [69], [86].

The types of positions to be civilianized seem to determine support for civilianization among military personnel, including their perceptions of fairness and organisational support, and the dynamics between military and civilian personnel. Kelty (Chapter 20) observed that negative effects will be minimal so long as civilians are not assigned core specialties that military personnel train for, and as long as the functions are unappealing to military personnel (e.g., menial or monotonous tasks that pull military personnel away from performing their military specialty, and perhaps even affect promotion timelines).

Transferring military functions to civilian public servants may also be an alternative to outsourcing to contractors or private military and security companies. This could be a decisive consideration in areas where maintaining or developing internal capability is critical [80] for security reasons. At the higher strategic levels, civilianization of select functions, such as those related to finance, policy, or procurement, may also contribute to the general objective of civilian control of the armed forces [39], [70]. Given that civilian personnel do not rotate as frequently through positions as military personnel, another driver of civilianization is the requirement for long-term corporate knowledge and continuity in senior posts or in those requiring high levels of expertise [47].

Transferring military functions to civilian public servants may also be an alternative to outsourcing to contractors or private military and security companies, particularly in cases in which maintaining or developing internal capability is critical.

Civilianization initiatives are likely to affect military-civilian demographics, work culture and relations, and policies and practices related to military-civilian integration in defence organisations.

A systematic assessment of which duties can (and should) be civilianized is a complex endeavour, but one that is required to address the optimal use of civilians, as is clear guidance on how to determine the need for civilianizing functions in the future. This analysis should, of course,

include whether it would be less costly for defence civilians to perform functions currently delivered by military personnel [27], [47]. Careful examination of how civilianization should be actualized when it is deemed necessary is also a main consideration. If enacted to meet key organisational requirements, and is actualized prudently, civilianization may benefit both military and civilian workforces and serve as an enabler of military capability [2], [47], [59], [69]. More in-depth analysis of this issue is required, particularly if initiatives to civilianize military functions continue and expand in defence organizations. No doubt such initiatives will impact military-civilian demographics, work culture and relations, and policies and practices related to military-civilian integration in defence organisations.

## 24.7 APPLICATION TO THE BROADER CONTEXT: CONCORDANCE THEORY OF CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS

In Chapter 22, Schiff [75] examines military-civilian personnel relations through the lens of concordance theory, arguing that this approach can be used to benefit future NATO missions. Concordance theory:

- a) Predicts the onset or prevention of domestic military intervention;
- b) Challenges the dichotomous view of civil–military relations; and
- c) Shows how overlapping Western boundaries, in conjunction with separate civil–military institutions, can promote healthy military–society relations in international contexts [73], [74], [76].

Schiff notes that embracing institutional civil–military separations while simultaneously benefiting from overlapping boundaries in civil–military employee relations can be extended to future NATO missions and non-Western contexts. She argues that recognition and emphasis on both the *separation* and the *overlap* in boundaries would serve to strengthen NATO as it develops a wide spectrum of peacekeeping and state-building strategies, and that this alternative framework, which challenges strict notions of civil-military separation, may assist NATO in future missions to guide and advise nations seeking to rebuild their governments and their civil-military relationships more broadly. She notes that the intermingling of boundaries at the employee level, as studied in the Western nations in this RTG, can potentially speak to the process of embracing indigenous military and society relations in states with unique cultures. Although specific application strategies require much more consideration, it is recommended that understanding diverse employee relations in defence

organisations may show how NATO could improve the way it implements missions in nations with complex cultures and military-civil relations.

## **24.8 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS**

Civilian workforces have much higher proportions of women than military workforces, and are, on average much older. These demographic differences may also influence military-civilian personnel work culture and relations.

Many defence organisations have downsized in recent years; overall, civilian workforces have been downsized more than military workforces.

Downsizing of civilians has often coincided with an increase in the use of contractors.

The majority of military personnel are employed in operational areas; civilians are more likely to be employed in support areas. Most military personnel work in armies while civilian employment is much more heterogeneous.

Civilian workforces have much higher proportions of women than military workforces, and are, on average much older. These demographic differences may also influence military-civilian personnel work culture and relations.

Unionization of military and civilian personnel varies across nations.

There is high degree of interaction between military and civilian personnel in defence organisations, with most civilian and military personnel interacting with one another on a daily basis.

A third or more of civilians report directly to a military supervisor; the proportion of military personnel supervised by civilians varies a great deal cross-nationally, but is not uncommon.

Intergroup supervision of civilian personnel by military supervisors and vice versa is often problematic and requires improvement.

There are many positive aspects of working in military–civilian contexts, including the complementary knowledge and expertise of co-workers, filling complementary roles, providing diverse perspectives, offering support to one another’s objectives, and the stability and continuity provided by civilians in light of military rotation.

The majority of military and civilian personnel across nations and organisational contexts report positive working relations with one another.



Civilians reported that working in mixed military-civilian contexts had negative effects on their career progression and training opportunities.

The military rotational cycle often has unintended negative effects on civilian personnel and is disruptive to their work and their management.

Rotations of the military supervisors of civilian personnel, in particular, are often associated with changes in goals, approaches, management styles, and even working conditions.

Frequent rotations can result in insufficient supervision, performance evaluation, or even disciplinary action for civilian personnel as a result of the short-term perspective that some military supervisors have to either observe or to address shortcomings.

One of the main benefits of working in a military-civilian work environment was the stability, continuity, and maintenance of corporate knowledge provided by civilian personnel.

Personnel who reported more positive military-civilian collaboration were more likely to be satisfied with their jobs, engaged in their work, and committed to the organisation than those who reported less positive military-civilian collaboration. This was the case for both military and civilian personnel, but these effects were stronger for civilians than for military.

Cultural differences between military and civilian personnel were often a barrier to workplace relations.

The extent to which both military and civilian personnel perceive their senior leaders as endorsing and supporting the military-civilian partnership within defence organisations is related to important personnel and organisational outcomes.

Differences in military and civilian management and rewards often lead to perceptions of organisational unfairness. Such perceptions of organisational unfairness or relative disadvantage can stem from at least two sources: (a) inequality in terms of treatment and rewards between military and civilian co-workers or, (b) for civilians, the disparity between the benefits and rewards available in defence organisations and those available in non-military contexts or other government departments.

In some cases, perceived unfairness is based on hearsay, partial observations, and erroneous assumptions; particularly in the context of military-civilian personnel relations, differences may stem from poor understanding of the different personnel systems and operational requirements of military and civilian members.

Senior civilian officials, working with and on behalf of elected officials, have a central role in decision making, policy development, and strategy that complement the roles of senior military leaders and help to assure civilian control of the armed forces. In addition to potentially unique considerations specific to military-civilian collaboration at this level, many of the issues examined at the lower organisational levels apply at these senior leadership levels.

Contractors and private military companies are increasingly relied upon to fill the gap in personnel and skill requirements in domestic and overseas operations. Use of contractors has notable advantages and drawbacks. Of note, work culture and relations between contractors and military personnel and civilian public servants in defence organisations is likely to introduce additional considerations, including those similar to and distinct from those applicable to military personnel and civilian public servants.

Although civilian personnel are generally not deployable, some trends suggest that the “operational divide” between civilian and military personnel may be becoming more permeable. While operational experience can help to familiarize civilians with military culture, and therefore to bridge the military-civilian divide, to some degrees, many of the work-culture and relations factors, such as cultural distinctions and identity, perceptions of fairness, understanding of roles and responsibilities, common training, and appropriate intergroup supervision are not only likely to apply, but are likely to be exacerbated, in operational contexts.

Some defence organisations have civilianized previously military functions. While this can help achieve desired outcomes such as increasing the military’s ability to focus on operational roles, in some cases civilianization can result in unintended negative personnel and organisational consequences, such as lowered morale and retention. Civilianization initiatives are likely to affect military-civilian demographics, work culture and relations, and policies and practices related to military-civilian integration in defence organisations.

Transferring military functions to civilian public servants may be an alternative to outsourcing to contractors or private military and security companies, particularly in cases in which maintaining or developing internal capability is critical. Another driver of civilianization is the requirement for long-term corporate knowledge and continuity in senior posts or in those requiring high levels of expertise.

There is a lack of systematic research on managing and facilitating military-civilian personnel issues in defence organisations. However, taken together across the nations and contexts examined, there are a wide variety of tools and some initiatives undertaken to enhance military-civilian personnel integration and collaboration. Appropriately combined, these strategies and practices could be developed into a comprehensive approach to managing military-civilian personnel integration in national and multinational defence organisations.

## **24.9 SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS**

Given that the quality of military-civilian personnel relations is related to important organisational outcomes, this issue should be a priority within defence organisations.

Enhancing military and civilian personnel’s understanding of one another’s cultures and roles is required for enhancing their partnership:

- Intergroup contact, such as through joint work and training opportunities, as well as joint social and organisational activities, should be encouraged.
- Intergroup activities should be tailored to suit all groups, otherwise they can be counterproductive and divisive and serve to exacerbate differences.

- Military and civilian workforces should be educated about each other's roles, functions, cultures and unique management systems.
- Forums for intergroup meetings should be established to provide military and civilian executives an opportunity to discuss similarities and differences in their leadership approaches, as well as ways to enhance their working relations and address stereotypes and misperceptions.
- Initiatives aimed at fostering military-civilian familiarity should be implemented during the early phases of individuals' employment in defence establishments as part of their onboarding.

Focus should be placed on developing super-ordinate identities (e.g., One Defence Team) that emphasize joint military-civilian identification within defence organisations. This should include focus on shared values and common goals:

- Concurrently, it is important to promote unique subgroup identities (e.g., as military personnel or defence civilians).
- Given that civilians are likely to have less salient organisational identities as compared to military personnel, it is important to foster strong defence civilian identities that match those of their military co-workers.
- Superordinate and subgroup identities should be clearly communicated by senior leaders and in organisational messages and materials.

Senior leaders should play an active role in emphasizing the value and importance of both military and civilian workforces and explicitly endorse military-civilian collaboration within defence organisations.

Ensuring equitable treatment, to the degree possible considering different personnel systems and operational requirements, is important:

- Clear communication and transparency in cases of divergent benefits, policies, practices and working conditions is beneficial for dispelling misperceptions about organisational fairness.

Efforts should be made to enhance workplace continuity and knowledge management, optimal handover of tasks/roles, and consistency in management practices (when it is a supervisor that is rotated):

- In select instances, it may also be beneficial to "civilianize" some key positions where continuity and longer tenure is particularly important.
- Handovers among military managers should explicitly focus on ensuring continuity in the approach to supervision for civilian employees. Efforts to facilitate communication and trust among new supervisors and their personnel as expediently as possible may also be beneficial.
- If frequent rotations are likely to result in insufficient supervision or performance evaluation for civilian personnel, consideration of supplemental supervision/evaluation may be beneficial to avoid this unintended effect.
- Some contexts, particularly those in which both military and civilians are rotated, require greater consideration regarding the alignment of rotational cycles in the context of organisational planning.

Military-civilian collaboration should be emphasized at all levels, including by those in direct supervisory roles:

- Resources, such as training, tools, and instructional material, should be provided to facilitate the optimal management of civilian personnel by military managers, and vice-versa.
- Policies and directives should be developed to provide direction to military managers of civilians and vice versa.
- In multinational contexts such training and tools may be especially important for military personnel from defence organisations with few civilians or who are new to civilian human resource management.
- Legal advisors can in some cases assist in advising military managers in regard to civilian workforce regulations.

Recognizing the different roles and perspectives of senior military leaders and “defence bureaucrats” is important and is a precondition for the development of strategies to ameliorate these tensions.

In light of the increasing reliance on contractors, it is important to better understand and address work culture and relations as they relate to both military personnel and defence civil servants, as well as to conduct cost-benefit analyses of contractor integration, and apply these to organisational, human resources and staffing policies.

Greater examination regarding the deployment of defence civil servants is warranted, particularly if their participation in defence missions is likely to increase, and given that many of the work-culture and relations factors are likely to be exacerbated in operational contexts.

Civilianization initiatives require careful planning and execution to avoid negative personnel and organisational outcomes:

- Transferring military functions to civilian public servants rather than contractors should be selected in cases in which maintaining or developing internal capability is critical.
- Civilianization of military occupations/functions should be considered in cases where long-term corporate knowledge and continuity is required, such as in select senior posts or in those requiring high levels of expertise.

Defence organisations should examine how best to combine the practices, tools, and strategies discussed in this report to develop a comprehensive approach to managing military-civilian personnel integration.

Issues related to the management of military-civilian personnel integration and collaboration should be considered in the formulation of general personnel strategies in defence establishments and missions.

## 24.10 CONCLUSION

Civilian and military personnel work side by side in most defence organisations, creating a unique group dynamic that allows defence organisations to draw on the expertise of both military and civilian personnel. Nonetheless, military–civilian integration in defence organisations presents a very unique type of diversity: although they often work closely together, military and civilian personnel differ from one another in ways that may affect collaboration between them. As such, NATO STO RTG HFM-226 was established to examine unique issues in the partnership between civilian and military personnel in defence organisations. This research indicates that defence personnel (both military and civilian) who engage in more positive military-civilian personnel collaboration in their defence organisations are more likely to be satisfied with their jobs, engaged in their work, and committed to the organisation. These outcomes are highly consequential for organisational effectiveness. Appropriate sensitivity to, and management of, military-civilian personnel collaboration can turn different personnel systems and organisational cultures into complementary ones that work effectively together in contributing to the defence mission. As noted by Allen et al. [2] in an independent review of the structure and management of the United Kingdom’s MOD, “We believe that an effective MOD is one which builds on the strengths of the individual Services and the Civil Service, and does so within a single Defence framework that ensures the whole is more than the sum of its parts.”

The research undertaken by this Task Group has focused on military and civilian personnel integration and collaboration in “defence organizations.” However, it is important to note that there is great diversity in the nature of such workplaces – this research is a first step to identifying and examining this domain, which has hitherto been relatively unexplored and often not explicitly considered as a key personnel issue affecting both military members and defence civilians. In the course of this program of work, we were able to examine more closely military-civilian personnel relations in the home organisations of the participating nations through the MCPS, as well as in specific contexts or settings (such as the operational multinational setting in Kosovo NATO Headquarters, the strategic multinational setting at NATO SHAPE, the military educational institution setting in the United States, and a case study of the logistics branch in the United Kingdom’s MOD, which, contrary to most defence organisational contexts, employed a majority of civilians and a minority of military personnel). Of note, although this research represents a significant initial foray into the systematic analysis of military-civilian personnel collaboration, greater inquiry into this complex area is required.

Nonetheless, this research does reveal a paucity of systematic research on managing and facilitating military-civilian personnel issues in defence organisations. Most nations simply do not focus on this key human resources matter, and those that do, often do so in piecemeal ways. Relatively few formal policies have been implemented to enhance integration and collaboration between military and civilian personnel. With that said, taken together

There are a wide variety of tools and some initiatives undertaken to enhance military-civilian personnel integration and collaboration. Appropriately combined, these can be developed into a comprehensive approach to managing military-civilian personnel integration in national and multinational defence organisations.

across the nations and contexts examined, there are a wide variety of tools and some initiatives undertaken to enhance military-civilian personnel integration and collaboration. Collectively, these initiatives align with the findings presented here in supporting intergroup familiarity and understanding, common goal and identity formation, effective intergroup management and supervision, equitable treatment, and workplace continuity. Appropriately combined, these strategies and practices could be developed into a comprehensive approach to managing military-civilian personnel integration in national and even multinational defence organisations. The work of this RTG indicates that such an approach is vital and that its development and implementation would improve personnel outcomes, such as organisational commitment, cohesion, and retention, as well as organisational outcomes, such as optimal workforce mix. Indeed, these findings suggest that military-civilian

personnel management should be considered in the formulation of general personnel strategies in defence establishments and missions (e.g., personnel retention strategies and diversity strategies).

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<b>14. Abstract</b>	<p>Defence organisations consist of military and civilian workforces that are integrated yet highly distinct in culture and governed by very different personnel management systems. Such factors are likely to affect important outcomes in military organisations, including employee engagement, commitment, cohesion, performance, and retention. Although an important human resources issue, the topic of civilian-military working relationships and work culture in defence organisations has been largely unexplored. Thus, the NATO Science and Technology Organization (STO) Human Factors and Medicine (HFM) Research Task Group (RTG) 226 was established to extend understanding of military and civilian personnel work culture and relations in defence organisations through theoretical and empirical analyses. The RTG examined existing data sources and policy/strategic documents across RTG nations in order to understand and compare military and civilian workforce demographics within defence organisations, and the policies and directives that guide their management. A cross-national survey, administered to nearly 8,000 civilian and military personnel in 11 nations, was developed to understand key aspects of military-civilian working relations and dynamics. In addition, a number of select topics were addressed, including empirical examination of military-civilian personnel integration in operational and/or multinational settings; theoretical/conceptual examinations of military-civilian integration; and analyses of military-civilian collaboration and integration in specific contexts through case studies. Finally, recommendations regarding strategies and approaches for effective personnel management of military and civilian workforces in defence organisations were generated.</p>														





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