



**NAVAL  
POSTGRADUATE  
SCHOOL**

**MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA**

**THESIS**

**TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME AND NEW  
TERRORISM IN SRI LANKA: A NEXUS?**

by

Ajith Panditha Wickramasekara

December 2017

Thesis Advisor:  
Second Reader:

Carolyn Halladay  
Feroz Khan

**Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited.**

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE			Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188	
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington, DC 20503.				
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank)	2. REPORT DATE December 2017	3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED Master's thesis		
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME AND NEW TERRORISM IN SRI LANKA: A NEXUS?			5. FUNDING NUMBERS	
6. AUTHOR(S) Ajith Panditha Wickramasekara				
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, CA 93943-5000			8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING /MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) N/A			10. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY REPORT NUMBER	
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. IRB number ____N/A____.				
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited.			12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE	
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)  Distinctions between organized crime and new terrorism, as distinguished from old terrorism in cause and effect, have increasingly become blurred. In this context, Sri Lanka has become a vulnerable transshipment hub for transnational organized crime (TOC). This study questions how and why TOC and new terrorism might converge in Sri Lanka and proposes three hypotheses. First, new terrorism often avails itself of the means and methods of organized crime. Second, increasing TOC and the existing ethnic and religious disharmony pose a national security risk in Sri Lanka, increasing its vulnerability to new terrorism. Third, a lack of national strategies have prevented Sri Lanka from harnessing the instruments of national power to the fullest effect. A case study evaluates al Qaeda and Abu Sayyaf Group as potential examples of a TOC-new terrorism nexus. The thesis statistically proves the increasing TOC trends and provides evidence on the emerging roots of Islamic radicalization that might lead to new terrorism. The thesis concludes with several recommendations for the national security of Sri Lanka.				
14. SUBJECT TERMS transnational organized crime, drug trafficking, money laundering, trafficking in persons, illegal arms smuggling, new terrorism, old terrorism, crime-terror nexus			15. NUMBER OF PAGES 139	
			16. PRICE CODE	
17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT Unclassified	18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE Unclassified	19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT Unclassified	20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT UU	

NSN 7540-01-280-5500

Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89)  
Prescribed by ANSI Std. Z39-18

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

**Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited.**

**TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME AND NEW TERRORISM IN SRI  
LANKA: A NEXUS?**

Ajith Panditha Wickramasekara  
Colonel, Sri Lanka Army  
M.A., University of Kelaniya, 2005

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the  
requirements for the degree of

**MASTER OF ARTS IN SECURITY STUDIES  
(COMBATING TERRORISM: POLICY AND STRATEGY)**

from the

**NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL  
December 2017**

Approved by: Carolyn Halladay  
Thesis Advisor

Feroz Khan  
Second Reader

Mohammed M. Hafez  
Chair, Department of National Security Affairs

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

## **ABSTRACT**

Distinctions between organized crime and new terrorism, as distinguished from old terrorism in cause and effect, have increasingly become blurred. In this context, Sri Lanka has become a vulnerable transshipment hub for transnational organized crime (TOC). This study questions how and why TOC and new terrorism might converge in Sri Lanka and proposes three hypotheses. First, new terrorism often avails itself of the means and methods of organized crime. Second, increasing TOC and the existing ethnic and religious disharmony pose a national security risk in Sri Lanka, increasing its vulnerability to new terrorism. Third, a lack of national strategies have prevented Sri Lanka from harnessing the instruments of national power to the fullest effect. A case study evaluates al Qaeda and Abu Sayyaf Group as potential examples of a TOC-new terrorism nexus. The thesis statistically proves the increasing TOC trends and provides evidence on the emerging roots of Islamic radicalization that might lead to new terrorism. The thesis concludes with several recommendations for the national security of Sri Lanka.

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK



# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<b>I.</b>	<b>INTRODUCTION.....</b>	<b>1</b>
<b>A.</b>	<b>MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION.....</b>	<b>2</b>
<b>B.</b>	<b>SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION.....</b>	<b>2</b>
<b>C.</b>	<b>LITERATURE REVIEW .....</b>	<b>7</b>
	<b>1. Transnational Organized Crime .....</b>	<b>7</b>
	<b>2. Terrorism: Traditional and New Terrorism .....</b>	<b>10</b>
	<b>3. Terrorism and Organized Crime .....</b>	<b>18</b>
<b>D.</b>	<b>POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES .....</b>	<b>22</b>
<b>E.</b>	<b>RESEARCH DESIGN .....</b>	<b>22</b>
<b>F.</b>	<b>THESIS OVERVIEW AND CHAPTER OUTLINE.....</b>	<b>23</b>
<b>II.</b>	<b>TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME IN ASIA .....</b>	<b>25</b>
<b>A.</b>	<b>TOC IN ASIA.....</b>	<b>26</b>
<b>B.</b>	<b>TOC IN SOUTH ASIA.....</b>	<b>30</b>
<b>C.</b>	<b>TOC IN SRI LANKA .....</b>	<b>33</b>
	<b>1. Historical Evidence and the LTTE-TOC Nexus .....</b>	<b>34</b>
	<b>2. Drug Trafficking in Sri Lanka.....</b>	<b>37</b>
	<b>3. Human Trafficking .....</b>	<b>42</b>
	<b>4. Money Laundering.....</b>	<b>45</b>
	<b>5. Trafficking of Illegal Arms .....</b>	<b>47</b>
	<b>6. Other Transnational Crime .....</b>	<b>49</b>
<b>D.</b>	<b>CONCLUSION .....</b>	<b>49</b>
<b>III.</b>	<b>NEW TERRORISM: AL QAEDA AND ABU SAYYAF GROUP .....</b>	<b>51</b>
<b>A.</b>	<b>AL QAEDA.....</b>	<b>51</b>
	<b>1. Origin and Background.....</b>	<b>51</b>
	<b>2. Ideology and Popular Discourse .....</b>	<b>52</b>
	<b>3. Al Qaeda’s Hybrid Character.....</b>	<b>56</b>
	<b>4. Al Qaeda’s Global Network .....</b>	<b>57</b>
	<b>5. Asia: Al Qaeda’s New Theater.....</b>	<b>60</b>
	<b>6. Al Qaeda in South Asia.....</b>	<b>62</b>
	<b>7. Al Qaeda Alliances with Transnational Criminal Syndicates .....</b>	<b>65</b>
<b>B.</b>	<b>THE ABU SAYYAF GROUP IN THE PHILIPPINES .....</b>	<b>68</b>
	<b>1. Origin and Background.....</b>	<b>69</b>
	<b>2. Ideology and Popular Discourse .....</b>	<b>71</b>

3.	<b>Leadership Succession and Changing Organizational Structure .....</b>	<b>72</b>
4.	<b>Strengths and Capabilities .....</b>	<b>74</b>
5.	<b>The ASG’s Hybrid Character .....</b>	<b>76</b>
6.	<b>ASG Links to International Terrorism.....</b>	<b>77</b>
C.	<b>ANALYSIS OF THE CASES .....</b>	<b>78</b>
D.	<b>CONCLUSION .....</b>	<b>79</b>
IV.	<b>ANALYSIS OF CRIME-TERROR CONTINUUM IN THE SRI LANKAN CONTEXT .....</b>	<b>81</b>
A.	<b>TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME .....</b>	<b>81</b>
1.	<b>TOC: An Increasing Trend in Sri Lanka .....</b>	<b>81</b>
2.	<b>State Capacity to Combat TOC.....</b>	<b>82</b>
3.	<b>TOC and Economic Implications .....</b>	<b>85</b>
4.	<b>Socio-cultural Impacts and Political Implications .....</b>	<b>85</b>
5.	<b>National Security Implications .....</b>	<b>86</b>
B.	<b>NEW TERRORISM .....</b>	<b>86</b>
1.	<b>The Al Qaeda and ISIS Threat in Sri Lanka and Its Implications .....</b>	<b>87</b>
2.	<b>Inter-Community Distrust Instigates Islamic Radicalization.....</b>	<b>88</b>
3.	<b>Legal Implications.....</b>	<b>88</b>
C.	<b>CRIME-TERROR NEXUS.....</b>	<b>89</b>
1.	<b>Overall State Vulnerability against the Crime-terror Nexus .....</b>	<b>89</b>
2.	<b>Nexus at the Doorstep and Its Implications.....</b>	<b>90</b>
3.	<b>How Might TOC and New Terrorism Converge in Sri Lanka? .....</b>	<b>91</b>
4.	<b>Socio-cultural and Political Implications of the Crime-Terror Nexus .....</b>	<b>91</b>
V.	<b>RECOMMENDATIONS.....</b>	<b>93</b>
A.	<b>DEVISE STRATEGY AND POLICY .....</b>	<b>93</b>
B.	<b>CREATE NEW AGENCIES .....</b>	<b>94</b>
1.	<b>Assign Specific Responsibility and Allocate Resources.....</b>	<b>95</b>
C.	<b>OUTLINE THE RESPONSIBILITY OF EXISTING STATE INSTITUTIONS ON TOC AND NEW TERRORISM.....</b>	<b>97</b>
D.	<b>INTRODUCE LEGISLATIVE AMENDMENTS AND ENACT NEW LAWS .....</b>	<b>98</b>
E.	<b>CREATE EFFICIENT LAW ENFORCEMENT AND OBSERVANCE OF THE RULE OF LAW.....</b>	<b>99</b>

<b>F.</b>	<b>ACQUIRE ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY FOR ENHANCING EFFICIENCY .....</b>	<b>99</b>
<b>G.</b>	<b>ENHANCE INTERAGENCY COOPERATION AND COORDINATION .....</b>	<b>100</b>
<b>H.</b>	<b>ENHANCE INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION AND INTELLIGENCE SHARING .....</b>	<b>100</b>
<b>I.</b>	<b>IMPROVE MARITIME SECURITY.....</b>	<b>101</b>
<b>J.</b>	<b>BUILD THE CAPACITY OF STATE INSTITUTIONS FOR ENHANCING EFFECTIVENESS.....</b>	<b>101</b>
<b>K.</b>	<b>CREATE AN EFFECTIVE INTELLIGENCE MECHANISM.....</b>	<b>102</b>
<b>L.</b>	<b>PROMOTE HARMONIOUS LIVING AMONG DIFFERENT SOCIAL SEGMENTS WHILE ENGAGING VULNERABLE COMMUNITIES TO PREVENT RADICALIZATION.....</b>	<b>102</b>
<b>M.</b>	<b>CREATE A VIBRANT SRI LANKAN CIVIL SOCIETY.....</b>	<b>103</b>
	<b>LIST OF REFERENCES .....</b>	<b>105</b>
	<b>INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST .....</b>	<b>119</b>

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

## LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1.	The Crime-Terror Continuum.....	19
Figure 2.	Operationalization of TOC-New Terrorism Nexus in Sri Lanka.....	23
Figure 3.	Generalized Flows of Criminal Trade in Southeast and East Asia. ....	27
Figure 4.	2010 National Estimates of the Number of Heroin Users in Asia and East Asia. ....	28
Figure 5.	Drug Smuggling Routes, Seizures, and Arrests.....	38
Figure 6.	Drug-Related Arrests in Sri Lanka, 2011–2015. ....	41
Figure 7.	Migrant Smuggling Routes to Australia and Canada. ....	44
Figure 8.	Al Qaeda Global Network. ....	58
Figure 9.	ASG Organization Envisioned by Abubakar Janjalani.....	73
Figure 10.	Overall State Vulnerability in the TOC-New Terrorism Nexus. ....	90
Figure 11.	Creation of New Agencies and Their Placement to Combat the TOC-New Terrorism Nexus.....	95

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

## LIST OF TABLES

Table 1.	New Terrorism versus Traditional Terrorism .....	16
Table 2.	Comparison of Drug Seizures in 2014 and 2015.....	32
Table 3.	Drug Seizures by All the Law Enforcement Agencies in Sri Lanka from 2007 to 2012.....	39
Table 4.	The Overall ML Risk in Each Sector.....	46
Table 5.	Al Qaeda’s Global Presence. ....	59
Table 6.	Responsibilities of New Agencies. ....	96
Table 7.	Responsibilities of Existing Agencies on Countering TOC and New Terrorism.....	97

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK



## LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

AC	Al Qaeda Central
AFP	Armed Forces of the Philippines
AQAP	Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula
AQIM	Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb
AQIS	Al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent
ASG	Abu Sayyaf Group
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
EEZ	Exclusive Economic Zone
FIUCBSL	Financial Intelligence Unit of the Central Bank of Sri Lanka
IMBL	International Maritime Boundary Line
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IMU	Islamic Union of Uzbekistan
INGO/NGO	International Non-Governmental Organization
IOR	Indian Ocean Region
IRA	Irish Republican Army
ISIS	Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
KFR	Kidnapping for Ransom
LTTE	Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
MILF	Moro Islamic Liberation Front
ML	money laundering
MNLF	Moro National Liberation Front
MOD	Ministry of Defense
NDDCB	National Dangerous Drug Control Board
OCDS	Office of the Chief of the Defense Staff
POA	Program of Action
POC	Point of Contact
PTA	Prevention of Terrorism Act
PULO	Pattani United Liberation Organization

SALW	small arms and light weapons
SLC	Sri Lanka Customs
SLCG	Sri Lanka Coast Guard
SLN	Sri Lanka Navy
SLP	Sri Lanka Police
STF	Special Task Force
TOC	Transnational Organized Crime
TEU	twenty-foot equivalent unit
TTP	Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan
UNODC	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
WMD	weapons of mass destruction

## ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

First and foremost, I take this opportunity to thank the Sri Lanka Army for granting this golden opportunity for me to join this esteemed institution. I appreciate the strenuous assistance by the director and staff of the IGPO in making my stay comfortable at NPS.

Special thanks to Professor Carolyn Halladay, my thesis advisor and the Academic Associate of the Department of National Security Affairs, who guided me in approaching, constructing, and evaluating the academic resources to develop my thesis. I also admire the professional guidance extended by Professor Feroz Khan as the second reader. I value their academic expertise, resourcefulness, and kind heart that made my journey successful. I also appreciate the entire faculty of NPS for sharing their knowledge and exposing me to greater academic insights.

I am grateful to Marianne Taflinger, who guided me from day one at NPS, not only in extending language-coaching assistance but also as an empathetic reader who guided me in every aspect of my academic life. I owe gratitude to Greta Marlett who immensely supported me in searching and acquiring academic resources, footnoting, and developing the list of references. I thank Dr. Sandra Leavitt for her assistance in selecting the thesis topic.

I thank my wife, Lalani, for her encouragement and for sustaining the family. In addition, I thank my two sons, Dayan and Kavishka, for keeping my home filled with joy and happiness. I wish to extend my gratitude to my mother, sisters, and brother for giving me wonderful guidance and affection throughout my life.

Mr. Bryant Fernando continuously encouraged me in all the endeavors at NPS. I appreciate the services of retired LTC Anuradha Kularatna for his assistance in proofreading and for his advice. I also wish to thank the company of the Sri Lankan community living in Monterey that made us feel at home all the time. I appreciate the company of Captain Kosala Wijesooriya of the Sri Lanka Navy, my buddying partner, and LTC Chandana Arangalla. The trio joined together and galloped to glory.

**Finally, I wish to dedicate this paper to my late beloved father...**

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

## I. INTRODUCTION

Once-clear distinctions between organized crime and terrorism have increasingly become blurred, according to scholars.<sup>1</sup> Scholars argue a new terrorism, which emerged during the post-Cold War era, has significant differences from traditional (old) terrorism; this new form “promotes an uncompromising view of the world in accordance with religious beliefs” and does not depend on state sponsorship for financing.<sup>2</sup> Furthermore, new terrorism groups do not necessarily have a hierarchical organization with a clear command structure; they consist of loosely connected networks with greater autonomy and do not have a clearly defined political agenda. Motivated by religious ideology, new terrorism groups seek more destruction than old terrorism groups.<sup>3</sup> In addition, new terrorism often avails itself of the means and methods of organized crime. According to Frank J. Cilluffo, al Qaeda and Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) in the Philippines are heavily engaged in drug trade, human trafficking, and kidnapping for ransom to finance their terrorist activities.<sup>4</sup> He warns that this overlap of crime and terrorism presents significant challenges to international and national security.<sup>5</sup>

---

<sup>1</sup> *The Threat Posed from the Convergence of Organized Crime, Drug Trafficking, and Terrorism, Before the House Committee on the Judiciary*, 106th Cong. 1–2 (2000), (statement of Frank Cilluffo, Deputy Director, Global Organized Crime Program), [https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/legacy\\_files/files/attachments/ts001213\\_cilluffo.pdf](https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/legacy_files/files/attachments/ts001213_cilluffo.pdf).

<sup>2</sup> Stuart Gottlieb, *Debating Terrorism and Counterterrorism: Conflicting Perspectives on Causes, Contexts, and Responses* (New York, London: Columbia University Press, 2014), 7.

<sup>3</sup> Walter Laqueur, *The New Terrorism: Fanaticism and the Arms of Mass Destruction* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 4–5.

<sup>4</sup> Cilluffo, testimony on *The Threat Posed from the Convergence of Organized Crime*, 3–5. See also on the PKK, Ulas Yldis, “Combatting Commercial Terrorists: The PKK Case” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2015); on ASG, Allan Jones A. Salem, “Nexus of Crime and Terrorism: The Case of the Abu Sayyaf Group” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2016); on the FARC, Marco A. Millán Sánchez, “Terrorism Outsourced: The FARC’s Criminal Alliances” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2014); and on al-Qaeda, Richard J. DiGiacomo, “Prostitution as a Possible Funding Mechanism for Terrorism” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2010).

<sup>5</sup> Cilluffo, *The Threat Posed from the Convergence of Organized Crime*, 1–2.

## **A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION**

The rate of Transnational Organized Crime (TOC) shows an increasing trend in Sri Lanka.<sup>6</sup> This increase may provide an environment that promotes the possible convergence of TOC and new terrorism in Sri Lanka. Against this backdrop, the author asks: How might transnational organized crime and new terrorism converge in Sri Lanka, and why?

## **B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION**

Sri Lanka occupies a highly influential geo-strategic location in the Indian Ocean.<sup>7</sup> Robert Kaplan views Sri Lanka as an important part of a “new” maritime geography that influences the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) in the global maritime domain.<sup>8</sup> Globalization, reduced shipping costs, and increased demand for fossil energy resources have made Sri Lanka a highly important center for maritime trade, increasing the island’s vulnerability for TOC. On the other hand, although Sri Lanka managed to destroy the military component of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Ealam (LTTE) terrorist movement, in 2009, the country’s vulnerability to a new form of terrorism in the future cannot be ruled out.

Since its civil war ended in 2009, Sri Lanka has faced tremendous challenges in the politico-economic, socio-cultural, and security spheres. In this sense, TOC has become an ongoing threat to Sri Lanka, in terms of economic, social and national security risks, according to Mitchell Sutton and Serge De Silva-Ranasingha.<sup>9</sup> Further, Sayakkarage Prathapa affirms, “Sri Lanka is vulnerable to the forces and potential threats posed by migration such as the resurgence of terrorism, the advent of extremist groups,

---

<sup>6</sup> Mitchell Sutton and Serge De Silva-Ranasingha, *Transnational Crime in Sri Lanka: Future Considerations for International Cooperation* (Canberra: Australian Strategic Policy Institute, October 2016), 5.

<sup>7</sup> Tamara Kunanayakam, “Geostrategic Importance, Present Situation and Challenges Ahead,” The Ministry of Foreign Affairs Sri Lanka, accessed June 3, 2017, [http://www.mfa.gov.lk/index.php?option=com\\_content&task=view&id=2353&Itemid=134](http://www.mfa.gov.lk/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=2353&Itemid=134).

<sup>8</sup> Robert Kaplan, *Monsoon: The Indian Ocean and the Future of American Power* (New York: Random House Inc, 2010), 190–212.

<sup>9</sup> Sutton and De Silva-Ranasingha, *Transnational Crimes in Sri Lanka*, 7.

the rekindling of ethnic divisions and sectarian violence, organized crime, and smuggling.”<sup>10</sup> In addition, several other factors undermine the state’s capacity to combat a nexus between TOC and the new terrorism.

Sri Lanka became an important trans-shipment hub because of its geo-strategic location in the Indian Ocean. Tamara Kunanayakam claims, “The unique geographic position of Sri Lanka makes it a natural aircraft carrier.”<sup>11</sup> Sri Lanka’s land space is 25,332 sq. miles.<sup>12</sup> It has an Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) eight times larger than the land space and a Maritime Search and Rescue region that is 27 times larger than the land space. Furthermore, Sri Lanka submitted a request to expand the EEZ in 2009.<sup>13</sup> According to the Sri Lankan Foreign Ministry, the huge volume of traffic passing through Indian Ocean includes 70 percent of the global oil trade and 50 percent of the global container traffic. At the same time, 36,000 ships, including 4,500 tankers, pass through Hambantota, the southern port of Sri Lanka, annually.<sup>14</sup> The Port of Colombo has the capacity of handling 7.6 million twenty-foot equivalent units (TEU), operates to its full capacity at present, and is expected to increase its capacity by 33 percent to attain 9.6 million TEU in 2018.<sup>15</sup> However, SLC only has the capacity to screen 180 containers out of 24000 containers that arrive a month.<sup>16</sup> Therefore, a majority of the containers, being the main smuggling mode of transport, go unchecked. According to Sri Lanka Customs (SLC), the re-establishment of the Customs Marine Unit was expected to spoil the use of

---

<sup>10</sup> Sayakkarage Subath S. Prathapa, “Immigration and Its Effects on the National Security of Sri Lanka” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2016).

<sup>11</sup> Kunanayakam, “Geostrategic Importance, Present Situation and Challenges Ahead.”

<sup>12</sup> “Geography Statistics of Sri Lanka,” World Atlas, accessed June 17, 2017. <http://www.worldatlas.com/webimage/countrys/asia/srilanka/lklandst.htm>.

<sup>13</sup> Sri Lanka Navy, *Maritime Security Strategy 2025* (Colombo: Sri Lanka Navy Headquarters, 2016) 14–17.

<sup>14</sup> Ibid.

<sup>15</sup> Sameer C. Mohindru, “Sri Lankan Colombo Container Port to Expand Capacity; Emerges as Global Hub,” S&P Global Platts, ed. Irene Tang, accessed June 4, 2017, <https://www.platts.com/latest-news/shipping/singapore/sri-lankan-colombo-container-port-to-expand-capacity-26427770>.

<sup>16</sup> Chamal Weerakkody, “Lack of Staff Allows Drug Syndicates to Open Up Lanka as a Major Transit Route,” *Sunday Times*, May 17, 2015.

sea routes to Sri Lanka for heroin smuggling.<sup>17</sup> However, the governments' inability to provide sufficient funds has hampered the revival of the division.<sup>18</sup>

Moreover, the island is accessible at every point along its 1,340 kilometer (km)-long coastline, which poses a greater vulnerability in the maritime domain.<sup>19</sup> Fernando Del Pozo defines maritime security as “the combination of preventive and responsive measures to protect the maritime domain against threats and intentional unlawful acts.”<sup>20</sup> In this sense, it is worthwhile to assess the capability of the Sri Lankan maritime security agencies to protect the Sri Lankan maritime domain. As it was evident during the conflict period, too, the number of naval assets in the possession of the Sri Lanka Navy (SLN) and Sri Lanka Coast Guards (SLCG) are far too few to ensure the security of this huge maritime domain.<sup>21</sup> The International Maritime Boundary Line (IMBL) defines the India-Sri Lanka maritime frontier, which consists of fertile marine resources. The IMBL bisects the seas between two countries (India and Sri Lanka); this narrow sea stretches for more than 600 nautical miles according to Prasad Kariyapperuma.<sup>22</sup>

The gap between India and Sri Lanka is about 24 nautical miles on each side. At the narrowest point, however, the gap is just 18 nautical miles, making it easier to cross and re-cross within less than an hour. It is a porous sea stretch and a vulnerable frontier for both countries. The frequent poaching by Indian fishermen across the IMBL into Sri Lankan waters attracts further troubles to Sri Lanka. Although fishermen of both countries do continuous poaching, most perpetrators are overwhelmingly Indians.<sup>23</sup> These fishermen also act as carriers of drugs, human cargo, illegal arms, and copyright

---

<sup>17</sup> Ibid.

<sup>18</sup> Ibid.

<sup>19</sup> John Garofano and Andrea J. Dew, *Deep Currents and Rising Tides* (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2013), 85–90.

<sup>20</sup> Fernando Del Pozo et al., “Maritime Surveillance in Support of CSDP,” *The Wise Pen Team Final Report to EDA Steering Board*, April 26, 2010, 45–46.

<sup>21</sup> “Sri Lanka Navy: The First Line of Defence,” Sri Lanka Navy, accessed October 31, 2017, <http://www.navy.lk/>.

<sup>22</sup> Prasad Kariyapperuma, *A View from the International Boundary Line: India-Sri Lanka* (Colombo: S. Godage & Brothers (Pvt) Ltd, 2016), 33–70.

<sup>23</sup> Ibid., 54–79.



material.<sup>24</sup> Therefore, policing the area forms a major challenge for Sri Lankan maritime security agencies.

Corruption, which has become a common phenomenon in Sri Lanka among most of the state apparatus, undermines state capacity to combat TOC. Sri Lanka ranked 79th out of 176 countries with a score of 40 and 85th out of 175 countries with a score of 38 in the Corruption Perception Index, a survey conducted by Transparency International in 2012.<sup>25</sup> The ranking sank further in 2016 when Sri Lanka ranked 95th out of 176 countries, with a score of 36. According to Transparency International, countries that score below 50 suffer serious corruption issues in most sectors. Sri Lanka's drop from 79 to 95 within six years should be a grave concern. Therefore, even after the civil war ended in 2009, Sri Lanka has not been able to fight corruption effectively. According to Claus Schwab, the reliability of police services ranked 100 in the Global Competitive Index 2014–15.<sup>26</sup> Similarly, public trust in politicians ranked 85th, irregular payments and bribes ranked 91st, diversion of public funds ranked 85th, transparency of government policy making 88th, organized crimes 67th, and burden of government regulations 91<sup>st</sup>, ranking among the lower scores.<sup>27</sup> These important criteria with lower scores and higher ratings indicate that Sri Lankan political, bureaucratic, judiciary, and law enforcement sectors suffer from serious issues. Similarly, the GAN Business Portal claims that businesses in Sri Lanka encounter enormous problems due to corruption within public institutions. The solicitation of bribes by the government officials, favoritism in government offerings, and corruption in government procurement are the most common issues.<sup>28</sup>

---

<sup>24</sup> Ibid.

<sup>25</sup> “Corruption Perception Index 2016,” Transparency International, January 25, 2017, [https://www.transparency.org/news/feature/corruption\\_perceptions\\_index\\_2016](https://www.transparency.org/news/feature/corruption_perceptions_index_2016).

<sup>26</sup> Claus Schwab, *The Global Competitiveness Report 2014–15* (Geneva: World Economic Forum, 2014) accessed July 18, 2017, [http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF\\_GlobalCompetitivenessReport\\_2014-15.pdf](http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_GlobalCompetitivenessReport_2014-15.pdf).

<sup>27</sup> Ibid.

<sup>28</sup> “Sri Lanka Corruption Report,” GAN Business Portal, accessed July 18, 2017, <http://www.business-anti-corruption.com/country-profiles/sri-lanka>.

Islamic radicalization and the influence of Islamist extremist groups such as Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) is a growing concern in Sri Lanka. Vicky Nanjappa asserts that India is already facing the ISIS threat, as are Bangladesh, Pakistan, and Afghanistan.<sup>29</sup> According to Nanjappa, a U.S.-led air strike in Raqqa, Syria killed one Sri Lankan national named Mohamed Muhsin Sharfaz Nilam on July 12, 2015, who was alleged to have joined ISIS.<sup>30</sup> Ranga Jayasuriya states that Sri Lankan intelligence services and police, although well aware of the possibility of Sri Lankans joining ISIS or Al-Qaeda, failed to trace the fact until a gossip website published the news.<sup>31</sup> Similarly, the youngest Al-Qaeda affiliate—Al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS), established in 2014—poses a greater threat to India, Myanmar, and Bangladesh, according to Al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri.<sup>32</sup> The *Colombo Gazette* claims that Al-Qaeda is targeting South Indian and Sri Lankan recruits. In fact, Al-Qaeda is now translating its propaganda and publications into south Asian regional languages in an attempt to recruit youth from South India and Sri Lanka.<sup>33</sup> Even more alarming to note is, most of the Indians who joined Al-Qaeda and ISIS were from southern Indian states.<sup>34</sup> Therefore, a clear threat of Islamic radicalization exists in Sri Lanka, and that might be the worst possibility the country faces after suffering a 30-year-long battle against terrorism.

In addition to the growing Al-Qaeda and ISIS threat, recent communal clashes between majority Sinhalese and minority Muslims in Sri Lanka may further Islamic radicalization. Laksiri Fernando warns that ongoing atrocities against Muslims, although geographically isolated at present, may escalate if concentrated together. Only stern

---

<sup>29</sup> Vicky Nanjappa, “Is the ISIS Threat Catching up in Sri Lanka,” *Sri Lanka Guardian*, February 2, 2016, <http://www.oneindia.com/india/is-the-isis-threat-catching-up-to-sri-lanka-2000451.html>.

<sup>30</sup> Ibid.

<sup>31</sup> Ranga Jayasuriya, “Radicalized Sri Lankan Muslims Being Involved with ISIS in Syria Is Cause for Concern,” *Dbsjeyaraj*, July 28, 2015, <http://dbsjeyaraj.com/dbsj/archives/42362>.

<sup>32</sup> “Sri Lanka on Alert as Al-Qaeda Opens South Asia Front,” *Ada Derana*, September 4, 2014, <http://www.adaderana.lk/news/sri-lanka-on-alert-as-al-qaeda-opens-south-asia-front>.

<sup>33</sup> “Al-Qaeda Attempting to Recruit Youth from Sri Lanka,” *Colombo Gazette*, August 27, 2017, <http://colombogazette.com/2016/08/27/al-qaeda-attempting-to-recruit-youth-from-sri-lanka/>.

<sup>34</sup> Ibid.

action can prevent the instigators.<sup>35</sup> Shihar Aneez asserts that many diplomats urged the Sri Lankan government to safeguard minority rights by condemning violence against Muslims. The Sri Lankan government has ordered the police to establish law and order, but the atrocities have not ended.<sup>36</sup> Majority Sinhalese and minority Muslims are both responsible for the communal clashes based on religious identity. Furthermore, the issue of atrocities against Muslims may serve as a cause for extremist Muslims to radicalize, a strategy that looks very much in line with the popular discourse of Al-Qaeda and ISIS.

### **C. LITERATURE REVIEW**

This literature review identifies the theoretical and conceptual frameworks related to TOC, traditional terrorism, new terrorism, and the convergence of TOC and terrorism.

#### **1. Transnational Organized Crime**

Transnational organized crimes are different from other criminal activities. Therefore, it is important to establish a proper definition for TOC in the first place. Former U.S. President Barack Obama, in his strategy, described organized crime:

Organized crime refers to those self-perpetuating associations of individuals who operate transnationally for the purpose of obtaining power, influence, monetary and/or commercial gains, wholly or in part by illegal means, while protecting their activities through a pattern of corruption and/or violence, or while protecting their illegal activities through a transnational organizational structure and the exploitation of transnational commerce or communication mechanism.<sup>37</sup>

The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) defines a TOC group as “a structured group of three or more persons, existing for a period of time and acting in concert with the aim of committing one or more serious crimes or offenses established in

---

<sup>35</sup> Laksiri Fernando, “A New Form of Anti-Muslim Terrorism in Sri Lanka: What Is To Be Done,” *Colombo Telegraph*, May 29, 2017, <https://www.colombotelegraph.com/index.php/a-new-form-of-anti-muslim-terrorism-in-sri-lanka-what-is-to-be-done/>.

<sup>36</sup> Shihar Aneez, “Diplomats in Sri Lanka Urged Government Action Against Anti-Muslim Attacks,” Reuters, June 1, 2017, <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-sri-lanka-violence-muslims/diplomats-in-sri-lanka-urge-government-action-against-anti-muslim-attacks-idUSKBN18S66P>.

<sup>37</sup> William Mendel and Dr. Peter McCabe, *SOF Role in Combating Transnational Organized Crime* (MacDill Air Force Base, FL: The JSOU Press, 2016), 1.

accordance with this convention in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit.”<sup>38</sup> Further, the UNODC defines human trafficking as “the acquisition of people by improper means such as force, fraud or deception, with the aim of exploiting them.”<sup>39</sup> Similarly, according to the UNODC “smuggling of migrants involves the procurement for financial or other material benefit of illegal entry of a person into a State of which that person is not a national or resident.”<sup>40</sup> The UN convention stipulates four criteria that make an offence transnational:

1. It is committed in more than one state.
2. It is committed in one state but substantial part of its preparation, planning, direction, or control takes in another state.
3. It is committed one state but involves an organized criminal group that engages in criminal activities in more than one state.
4. It is committed in one state but has substantial effects in another state.<sup>41</sup>

TOC covers a vast area of illegal activities. Douglas Farah, a TOC analyst contends that as preparing a total list of TOCs is quite challenging, he focuses upon TOC in the areas of human trafficking, money laundering, drug trafficking, and arms trafficking, including weapons of mass destruction (WMD) as the more prominent TOCs.<sup>42</sup> As Colonel (retired) William Mendel posits, 52 activities fall under TOC; drug trafficking is said to be the top of the list that accounts for about \$320 billion a year. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) estimates indicate that narcotic trade amounts to 2 percent of the global economy and, according to the UN, 7 percent of international

---

<sup>38</sup> United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, “United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and the Protocols thereto,” 5, accessed May 19, 2017, <https://www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/UNTOC/Publications/TOC%20Convention/TOCebook-e.pdf> .

<sup>39</sup> United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, “UNODC on Human Trafficking and Migrant Smuggling,” accessed May 13, 2017, <https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/human-trafficking/index.html?ref=menu>side.

<sup>40</sup> Ibid.

<sup>41</sup> United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, “United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and the Protocols Thereto,” 6.

<sup>42</sup> Mendel, *SOF Role in Combating Transnational Organized Crime*, 2.

trade.<sup>43</sup> Colonel Mendel further states the approximate worth of human trafficking is \$32 billion and arms trafficking accounts for around \$300 million annually. “Money laundering accounts for around 2 percent to 5 percent of global GDP [gross domestic product] or \$800 billion to \$2 trillion.”<sup>44</sup>

The excessive profit that TOC generates is only one side of the coin. The most damaging effect, however, as Steven Hutchinson and Pat O’Malley contend, is the human cost and the impact on weak and struggling states.<sup>45</sup> They identify a significant threat to weaker states that emanates from TOC, causing them to become weaker, corrupted, ill governed, and to fail to provide even basic amenities to their constituency.<sup>46</sup> Therefore, in other words, weak states create a conducive environment for criminal groups to establish their roots quite durably to carry out TOCs for longer periods.

Changing the regional and global environments causes changes in the nature of criminal groups involved in TOC. Mark Hanna observes that globalization and technological advancement stimulate the speedy movement of personnel, goods, and information, which allows criminal organizations to decentralize and outsource their activities.<sup>47</sup> According to Hanna, this decentralization and outsourcing create conditions for criminal service providers like financing groups, transportation groups, and computer hackers to rise. These service providers support different criminals with an array of services.<sup>48</sup> Therefore, terrorist groups intending to engage in TOC can easily obtain the services of these service providers. For example, the heroin trade of the Taliban in Afghanistan, the drug trafficking and money laundering by Hezbollah, and the FARC employing drug trafficking, money laundering, kidnapping, and extortion.<sup>49</sup> The LTTE in

---

<sup>43</sup> Steven Hutchinson and Pat O’Malley, “A Crime-Terror Nexus? Thinking on Some of the Links between Terrorism and Criminality” *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 30, no. 12 (2007): 1096, doi: 10.1080/10576100701670870.

<sup>44</sup> Hutchinson and O’Malley, “A Crime-Terror Nexus,” 1096.

<sup>45</sup> *Ibid.*, 1095–1107.

<sup>46</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>47</sup> Mendel, *SOF Role in Combating Transnational Organized Crime*, 41.

<sup>48</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>49</sup> *Ibid.*

Sri Lanka, as a terrorist organization, depended heavily on drug trafficking, human smuggling, money laundering, and arms trafficking to fund their terrorist activities.<sup>50</sup>

## 2. Terrorism: Traditional and New Terrorism

The very nature of terrorism has created disputes in defining the term. The problem becomes the ability to distinguish a terrorist from a freedom fighter, insurgent, or guerilla. Walter Laqueur foresees that a proper definition for terrorism will be hard to find in the near future.<sup>51</sup> In a more recent study, Leonard Weinberg, Ami Pedahzur, and Hirsch Hoefler examined 73 definitions and concluded “terrorism is a politically motivated tactic involving the threat or use of force or violence in which the pursuit of publicity plays a significant role.”<sup>52</sup> This definition treats terrorism as a tactic and falls short as it is missing the targeted audience. The U.S. Department of State advances the definition by saying, “Terrorism means premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents, and is usually intended to influence an audience.”<sup>53</sup> This definition has overcome the problem of target audience by identifying violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets. In the same way, the Department of State defines international terrorism as “terrorism involving citizens or the territory of more than one country.”<sup>54</sup> In this sense, many scholars agree that the type of terrorism prior to 1990 can be referred to as traditional, secular, or old terrorism and can be divided into different types, such as “left-wing, right-wing, ethno-nationalist, and separatist.”<sup>55</sup>

---

<sup>50</sup> Sutton and Ranasingha, *Transnational Crimes in Sri Lanka*, 10.

<sup>51</sup> Laqueur, *The New Terrorism: Fanaticism and the Arms of Mass Destruction*, 5–6.

<sup>52</sup> Leonard Weinberg, Ami Pedahzur, and Sivan Hirsch-Hoefler. “The challenges of conceptualizing terrorism.” *Terrorism and Political Violence* 16, no. 4 (2004): 786, doi: 10.1080/09546590899768.

<sup>53</sup> Brigitte L. Nacos, *Mass-Mediated Terrorism, Mainstream and Digital Media in Terrorism and Counterterrorism*, 3rd ed. (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2016), 5.

<sup>54</sup> Nacos, *Mass-Mediated Terrorism*, 5.

<sup>55</sup> Gottlieb, *Debating Terrorism and Counter Terrorism*, 5.

*a. Old Terrorism*

Terrorism is not a new phenomenon. As Bruce Hoffman notes, the fragile government of post-revolutionary France in 1794 purposefully used the term “terror” in formulating a policy against counterrevolutionaries.<sup>56</sup> According to Alexander Spencer, “traditional terrorist groups possess predominantly secular motives and rational political reasons for their acts of violence.”<sup>57</sup> Independence and separatist claims by ethno-nationalist terrorists and left-wing terrorist groups using violence to persuade working-class masses to agitate against the capitalist system are examples.<sup>58</sup> Therefore, their demands seemed rational most of the time and had room for negotiation. For example, “demanding the release of jailed comrades, payment for releasing hostages,” or even when the demands like “abolishing the capitalist system, the reunification of a divided state, creation of an ethno-national state” were difficult to meet, as Spencer further contends.<sup>59</sup>

In this sense, old terrorist groups perpetrated violence proportionate to their demands. Steven Simon and Daniel Benjamin remark that terrorists did not want to commit violent activities excessively and indiscriminately because they wanted to maintain their legitimacy, recruitment base, and funding.<sup>60</sup> Because of that, old terrorists selected targets quite precisely, while keeping collateral damage as minimal as possible, with the intention of preserving the power to bargain and maintain their eligibility for a successive government according to Spencer.<sup>61</sup> The old terrorists generally targeted key senior bureaucrats, politicians, elites, military, or the economic infrastructure that were clearly identifiable from non-combatants or their infrastructure. However, selective

---

<sup>56</sup> Bruce Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), 15–16.

<sup>57</sup> Gottlieb, *Debating Terrorism and Counterterrorism*, 5–6.

<sup>58</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>59</sup> Kumar Ramakrishna and Andrew Tan, “The New Terrorism: Diagnosis and Prescriptions,” in *The New Terrorism-Anatomy, Trends and Counter-Strategies*, ed. Kumar Ramakrishna and Andrew Tan (Singapore: Eastern University Press, 2002), 6.

<sup>60</sup> Steven Simon and Daniel Benjamin, “America and the New Terrorism” *Survival* 42, no. 1 (Spring 2000): 65.

<sup>61</sup> *Ibid.*, 66.

targeting did not exclude terrorists from inflicting a high rate of damage on their targets like LTTE operations against the Sri Lankan military, as Ersun N. Kutulus believes.<sup>62</sup> Further, old terrorists used conventional tactics like machine guns, explosives, etc., and demonstrated little interest to use new tactics or nonconventional weapons.<sup>63</sup>

Consequently, Alex Schmid and Albert J. Jongman in their attempt in devising a widely accepted definition for terrorism considered that more than killing many people, terrorists demand some kind of political change; thus, terrorist actors aim at inculcating fear in the society.<sup>64</sup> Adam Dolnik and Jason Pate, too, qualify traditional terrorism quoting the Chinese proverb, “kill one frighten ten thousand.”<sup>65</sup> As Brian Jenkins notes, “terrorism is theatre, and that terrorist attacks were often choreographed for the media.”<sup>66</sup> He further notes that to justify the previous “terrorists want a lot of people watching not a lot of people dead.”<sup>67</sup> On the other hand, old terrorists usually released a communique after the attack claiming responsibility and explaining why they selected a particular target.<sup>68</sup> Further, in certain instances old terrorists even went so far as to express their sorrow for the collateral damage incurred by the attack.<sup>69</sup>

At the same time, Spencer further comments, old terrorism has a pyramidal hierarchy and a reasonably structured organization with a clear command element at the top: a large layer of active operatives carries out attacks, bomb making, and surveillance;

---

<sup>62</sup> Ersun N. Kutulus, “The New Terrorism and Its Critics” *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, 34, no. 6 (2011): 476–500, doi:10.1080/1057610X.2011.571194.

<sup>63</sup> Ibid.

<sup>64</sup> Alex P. Schmid and Albert J. Jongman, *Political Terrorism: A New Guide to Actors, Concepts, Data Bases, Theories, & Literature*, 1–2, quoted in Edwin Bakker, *Terrorism and Counterterrorism Studies: Comparing Theory and Practice* (Leiden: Leiden University Press, 2015), 44.

<sup>65</sup> Adam Dolnik and Jason Pate, “Mass-Casualty Terrorism: Understanding the Bioterrorist Threat,” in *The Changing Face of Terrorism*, ed. Rohan Gunaratna (Singapore: Marshall Cavendish Company, 2004), 107.

<sup>66</sup> Bakker, *Terrorism and Counterterrorism Studies: Comparing Theory and Practice*, 44.

<sup>67</sup> Ibid., 107.

<sup>68</sup> Hans J. Horchem, “West Germany’s Red Army Anarchist,” in the *New Terrorism*, ed. William Gutteridge (London: Mansell Publishing, 1986), 199–217.

<sup>69</sup> Ibid.



next, a layer of active supporters provides intelligence, logistics, and finance, etc.<sup>70</sup> Finally, according to Spencer, the lowest level consists of emotional supporters who approve the organization's goals.<sup>71</sup> Therefore, a structured organization is better able to maintain the organization intact in the first place and project its strength towards intended goals. Everything they do at present will be to support their ultimate goal in the future.

The LTTE in Sri Lanka in its later stages possessed most of old terrorism's attributes. Velupillai Prabhakaran headed the organization with a highly autocratic style and with a strong organizational structure.<sup>72</sup> The LTTE used indiscriminate violence against the Sinhalese civilian population, including Buddhist clergy, at the early stages but later settled on more selective targets like politicians, the military, the central bank, etc., which were typical for old terrorism. Moreover, LTTE claimed ownership for all the attacks.<sup>73</sup>

#### ***b. New Terrorism***

Old terrorism had a secular motivation and a political agenda. However, as Mark Juergensmeyer notes, the new terrorism emerging in the early to mid-1990s bore a dogmatic worldview founded on religious principles.<sup>74</sup> Russell Howard describes post-cold war terrorism as being not ideological in a political sense, but driven by religious extremism and ethnic separatism.<sup>75</sup> Similarly, Hoffman believes that this "religious motivation is the defining characteristic of the new terrorism, producing, radically different value systems, mechanisms of legitimization and justification, concepts of morality, and Manichean world-view embraced by the religious terrorist, compared with

---

<sup>70</sup> Gottlieb, *Debating Terrorism and Counterterrorism*, 6–7.

<sup>71</sup> *Ibid.*, 7.

<sup>72</sup> L. M. H. Mendis, *Assignment Peace in the Name of the Motherland* (Colombo: Litrain Print (Pvt.) Ltd, 2009), 113–115.

<sup>73</sup> Mendis, *Assignment Peace in the Name of the Motherland*, 182–191.

<sup>74</sup> Mark Juergensmeyer, *Terror in the Mind of God: The Global Rise of Religious Violence* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003), 4–10.

<sup>75</sup> Russel Howard, "Pre-emptive Military Doctrine: No other Choice," in *The Changing Face of Terrorism*, ed. Rohan Gunarathna (Singapore: Marshall Cavendish Company, 2004), 39.

his secular counterpart.”<sup>76</sup> Therefore, new terrorism differs significantly from old terrorism in its orientation and motivation.

Supporting scholars of new terrorism contend that producing maximum casualties is the desire of new terrorism; therefore, these new terrorists do not hesitate to use excessive violence. For example, Laqueur argues, “the new terrorism is different in character, aiming not at clearly defined political demands but at the destruction of society and the elimination of large sections of the population.”<sup>77</sup> As Hoffman asserts, religious terrorists usually consider that they are accountable only to god, and they themselves are often their own constituency.<sup>78</sup> He further assesses that the absence of constituency allows new terrorists to use unprecedented violence against an unrestricted target audience, meaning all nonmembers of terrorist groups or religious believers.<sup>79</sup> As Peter R. Neumann notes, there were only seven instances when the Irish Republican Army (IRA) killed ten or more people—whereas al Qaeda had 16 fatalities per attack on average. Most significantly, the 9/11 attacks alone resulted in more fatalities than the IRA had caused in three decades.<sup>80</sup> Therefore, new terrorism advocates greater lethality than old terrorism.

In this sense, new terrorists are not reluctant to lose their support base due to their acts and do not usually claim ownership of their own actions; they sometimes deny their own acts of violence, as Spencer notes.<sup>81</sup> The National Commission on Terrorism quoted R. James Woolsey: “today’s terrorists don’t want a seat at the table; they want to destroy the table and everyone sitting at it.”<sup>82</sup> All these scholarly views represent a common conclusion: new terrorism is far more complex and threatening than old terrorism. Thus,

---

<sup>76</sup> Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism*, 94.

<sup>77</sup> Laqueur, *The New Terrorism: Fanaticism and the Arms of Mass Destruction*, 5.

<sup>78</sup> Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism*, 94–95.

<sup>79</sup> *Ibid.*, 95.

<sup>80</sup> Peter R. Neumann, “Old and New Terrorism,” *Social Europe: Politics, Economy and Employment & Labor*, August 3, 2009, <https://www.socialeurope.eu/old-and-new-terrorism>.

<sup>81</sup> Gottlieb, *Debating Terrorism and Counterterrorism*, 7.

<sup>82</sup> Matthew J. Morgan, “The Origins of the New Terrorism” *Parameters* 34, no. 1 (Spring 2004): 31.

national and international counterterrorism strategies need serious revamping to meet these developments.

The characteristics most often highlighted by analysts of new terrorist groups are their loosely formed networks and lack of hierarchical structure. As David Tucker asserts, the new terrorism structure is a network connected through advanced communication technology.<sup>83</sup> He suggests that each group in the network becomes relatively autonomous in the absence of a central commanding authority but linked through advanced communication networks and operates for a common purpose.<sup>84</sup> Hutchinson and O'Malley further explain that the Al-Qaeda groups during the 9/11 attack were distantly operated separate cells. They operated differently from customary top-down architecture.<sup>85</sup> Jean-Charles Brisard confirms that this structure is clearly different from that of terrorist groups in the 1960s and 1970s, and “new terrorist organizations are more a confederation of individuals and entities, than an organized body of procedures and hierarchies.”<sup>86</sup> Therefore, the explicit non-state character of these groups makes them invulnerable to direct backlash by law enforcement, thus allowing them to use excessive violence.<sup>87</sup>

Further, new terrorism does not enjoy state sponsorship for financing; thus, they employ illegal means: drug trafficking, money laundering, human trafficking, arms trafficking, video piracy, credit card fraud, as well as legal business investments and donations.<sup>88</sup> See Table 1.

---

<sup>83</sup> David Tucker, “What Is New about the New Terrorism and How Dangerous Is It?” *Terrorism and Political Violence* 13, no. 3 (2001): 1–14, doi 10.1080/09546550109609688.

<sup>84</sup> Ibid.

<sup>85</sup> Hutchinson and O'Malley, “A Crime-Terror Nexus? Thinking on Some of the Links between Terrorism and Criminality,” 1098–1099.

<sup>86</sup> Jean-Charles Brisard, “Terrorism Financing: Roots and Trends of Saudi Terrorism Financing,” *Report Prepared for the President of the Security Council United Nations* (Paris: JCB Consulting, 2003).

<sup>87</sup> Ibid.

<sup>88</sup> Gottlieb, *Debating Terrorism and Counterterrorism*, 8.

Table 1. New Terrorism versus Traditional Terrorism<sup>89</sup>

<b>Trait</b>	<b>New Terrorism</b>	<b>Traditional Terrorism</b>
Motivation	Religious	Secular
Organization	Networked and ad hoc	Hierarchical and organized
Sponsorship	Autonomous	State
Violence	Extreme	Restrained
Aim	Destruction	Political goal
Personnel	Amateur	Professional
Range of operation	Transnational	Territorial

Table 1 explains the defining characteristics of the new and old terrorism proposed by scholars and practitioners. Evidence proves that new terrorism is on the rise; in 1980, only two out of 64 international terrorist groups had a religious character; however, the number rose to 25 out of 58 in 1995 according to Nadine Gurr and Benjamin Cole.<sup>90</sup>

Interestingly, Rohan Gunaratna identifies al Qaeda as a hybrid terrorist organization as it possesses many of the new terrorism attributes although it has a limited traditional terrorism character, too.<sup>91</sup> As he explains, Al-Qaeda had a hierarchical organization initially, which is a characteristic of old terrorism. Nevertheless, Al-Qaeda created an international network by organizing it and affiliated groups under one umbrella: the World Islamic Front for Jihad against the Jews and Crusaders, acquiring a new terrorism attribute.<sup>92</sup> Similarly, al Qaeda is a network that operates globally. Its groups and cells operate in regions and countries. Al Qaeda has a political agenda of creating a greater Muslim world of jihad but uses religion as a motivation. On the other hand, groups and cells in the network such as the Tehreek-e-Taliban in Pakistan, Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, East Turkestan Islamic Movement, Uighur movement in

<sup>89</sup> Ibid., 17.

<sup>90</sup> Nadine Gurr and Benjamin Cole, *The New Face of Terrorism: Threats from Weapons of Mass Destruction* (London: I. B. Tauris, 2000), 28–29.

<sup>91</sup> Rohan Gunaratna, *The Changing Face of Terrorism* (Singapore: Marshall Cavendish Academic Press, 2004), 14–30. See also Rohan Gunaratna, “Al-Qaeda Is an Example of a New Terrorism,” in Stuart Gottlieb, *Debating Terrorism and Counterterrorism: Conflicting Perspectives on Causes, Contexts, and Responses* (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2014), 15–31.

<sup>92</sup> Ibid.

China, and Libyan Islamic Fighting Groups have political claims.<sup>93</sup> Therefore, it is clear that Al-Qaeda has both new and old terrorism attributes, making it a hybrid terrorist organization.

The notion of new terrorism also has opponent standpoints. Laqueur warns against defining and categorizing terrorism narrowly as there are many types.<sup>94</sup> Morgan claims that despite the warning, Laqueur recognizes the evolving variants of new terrorism like Islamism.<sup>95</sup> Thomas Copeland argues that in spite of certain recent developments, the original nature of terrorism never went away. Therefore, pragmatic reasons exist to challenge the notion of new terrorism.<sup>96</sup> Similarly, Kutulus argues that traditional terrorist organizations like the IRA had a religious identity as well.<sup>97</sup> Similarly, Hoffman argues that the loosely networked organizational structure of new terrorism, cited by other scholars, is debatable.<sup>98</sup> Morgan quotes, “a recent survey of terrorism suggests historical and intellectual links between the fascism of fanatical Islamists terrorism today and the totalitarian movement of the 20th century, further emphasizing continuity rather than change.”<sup>99</sup> Nevertheless, in spite of counter arguments, it is evident that 21st century terrorism displays an extreme use of violence, an anarchic nature of a horizontal network organization structure linked through advanced communication technology and the lack of a political agenda but a religious motivation. These organizations lack state-sponsored funding and rely on transnational illegal businesses to generate funds to a greater extent. Therefore, TOC becomes a lifeline for the sustenance of present day terrorist networks.

---

<sup>93</sup> Gunaratna, *The Changing Face of Terrorism*, 14–30.

<sup>94</sup> Morgan, “The Origins of the New Terrorism,” 31.

<sup>95</sup> Ibid.

<sup>96</sup> Thomas Copeland, “Is the ‘New Terrorism’ Really New? An Analysis of the New Paradigm for Terrorism,” *Journal of Conflict Studies* 21, no. 2 (Winter 2001): 23–25.

<sup>97</sup> Curtulus, “The New Terrorism and Its Critics,” 476–500.

<sup>98</sup> Bruce Hoffman, “Change and Continuity in Terrorism,” *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 24, no. 5 (2001): 426, doi:10.1080/105761001750434268.

<sup>99</sup> Morgan, “The Origins of the New Terrorism,” 31.

### 3. Terrorism and Organized Crime

The decline of state sponsorships for terrorism since the end of the Cold War has prompted an increasing reliance on TOC by contemporary terrorist groups for financing.<sup>100</sup> Tamara Makarenko posits that, although enough literature was produced on the dynamics of the changing nature of terrorism during the post 9/11 period, financing of terrorism attracted limited analytical assessment. Therefore, she believes that adequate studies on the interdependence of TOC and terrorism have yet to be undertaken.<sup>101</sup> As the author further reveals, the upsurge of TOC and changing nature of terrorism in the 1990s made it the decade that established the TOC-terrorism nexus.<sup>102</sup>

Frank Cilluffo, the Deputy Director Global Organized Crime Program in the United States, asserts a clear demarcation that previously existed between terrorism, organized crime, and the drug trade has become complex and blurred. The link between organized crime and terrorist groups is becoming stronger as both entities benefit from the relationship.<sup>103</sup> He claims that in spite of devoting billions of dollars to the drug war, the United States has achieved only marginal success because of bureaucratic lapses and coordination.<sup>104</sup> Hutchinson and O'Malley identify the structural similarity between TOC and new terrorism. They argue that TOC groups like the mafia follow a loosely connected, horizontal rather than hierarchical organization structure, because of its relative ability to operate without easy detection.<sup>105</sup> They further elaborate that the autonomous cell layout feature with distant association with leadership is commonly seen in terrorist groups, too. However, previous terrorist groups had a more solid pyramidal structure with clear command and control flow.<sup>106</sup> Figure 1 illustrates the convergence of TOC and terrorism.

---

<sup>100</sup> Makarenko, "The Crime-Terror Continuum," 129.

<sup>101</sup> Ibid., 130.

<sup>102</sup> Ibid., 129.

<sup>103</sup> Cilluffo, testimony on *The Threat Posed from the Convergence of Organized Crime*, 1–2.

<sup>104</sup> Ibid., 1–2.

<sup>105</sup> Hutchinson and O'Malley, "A Crime-Terror Nexus? Thinking on Some of the Links between Terrorism and Criminality," 1098.

<sup>106</sup> Ibid., 1095–1107.




Figure 1. The Crime-Terror Continuum.<sup>107</sup>

Figure 1 depicts how organized crime and terrorism can theoretically converge at a central point as both lie at the same level. As the figure illustrates, any relationship between TOC and terrorism begins with alliances. The formation of alliances may occur at both corners. Both criminal and terrorist groups pursue alliances with each other. These alliances take different relationships such as long-term, short-term, and one-off.<sup>108</sup> Makarenko claims that beyond the obvious alliances for obtaining and providing different criminal services, complex relationships have developed between the two counterparts.<sup>109</sup> She cites several examples: the Uzbek Islamic movement partnering with the Afghan drug mafia and Central Asian criminal groups to ensure safe passage of heroin shipments; the al Qaeda and Bosnian criminal organization partnership operates on routing Afghan heroin through the Balkans into Europe; and D-Company, a Pakistan-based Indian criminal group, operates with Al-Qaeda, LTTE, and Lashkar e-Tatyana terrorists.<sup>110</sup>

According to Louise Shelly, organized criminal groups themselves are of various kinds. Older groups like to maintain state contacts operating in established states like Italy; on the other hand, newer groups prefer to operate in the absence of a strong state

<sup>107</sup> Makarenko, "The Crime-Terror Continuum," 131.

<sup>108</sup> Ibid.

<sup>109</sup> Ibid., 131.

<sup>110</sup> Ibid., 132.

influence while enduring violence and chaos.<sup>111</sup> Furthermore, Shelley cites, “cooperation with terrorists may have significant benefits for organized criminals by destabilizing the political structure, undermining law enforcement and limiting the possibilities for international cooperation.”<sup>112</sup> Marinko Bobic argues that different terrorist groups develop criminal characteristics in varying degrees, and therefore, we can differentiate between TOC and terrorist groups in temporary, parasitic, and symbiotic relationships.<sup>113</sup> He points out that in certain cases; however, no nexus occurs. As Chris Dishman points out, the Russian Mafia and the Zapatista National Liberation Army (EZLN) operate at two distant ends of the crime-terror continuum but show no willingness for alliance.<sup>114</sup> Bobic suggests adopting a human security approach because whoever perpetrates violence undermines peoples’ physical and non-physical security.<sup>115</sup>

Britt Sloan and James Cockayne suggest an eight-point strategy to counter the organized crime-terrorism-politics nexus:

- Identify the differences among terrorists, criminals, and political actors.
- Concentrate interventions on the nodes where terrorism, crime, and politics overlap.
- Integrate intelligence, law enforcement, and diplomatic approaches.
- Harness the credibility of local structures in building of new institutions of governance.
- Coordinate measures to engage with potential spoilers of peace.
- Restructure economic systems to generate incentives for peace and stability.

---

<sup>111</sup> Louise Shelley, “Identifying, Counting, and Categorizing Transnational Organized Crime,” *Transnational Organized Crime* 5, no. 1 (Spring 1999): 1–18.

<sup>112</sup> Shelley, “Identifying, Counting, and Categorizing Transnational Organized Crime.” 1–18.

<sup>113</sup> Marinko Bobic, “Transnational Organized Crime and Terrorism: Nexus Needing Human Security Framework,” *Global Crime* 15, nos. 3–4 (2014); 247, doi:10.1080/17440572.2014.927327.

<sup>114</sup> Chris Dishman, “Terrorism, Crime, and Transformation,” 51, quoted in Bobic, “Transnational Organized Crime and Terrorism: Nexus Needing Human Security Framework,” 247–258.

<sup>115</sup> Ibid.



- Address cross-border asymmetries that stimulate violent economies.
- Challenge social narratives that fuel violent extremism.<sup>116</sup>

Sloan and Cockayne’s strategy addresses the organized crime-terrorism-politics as a nexus. The two authors believe that addressing crime, terrorism, and politics piecemeal leaves numerous gaps, limiting the effectiveness of the strategy whenever these three distant phenomena form a nexus<sup>117</sup>

Valeria Rosato attempts to understand the relationships between TOC groups and terrorist groups in the Sahel region. His study focuses on identifying the nature of the alliances: parasitic and predominantly temporary or symbiotic and long-term, in order to recognize the region as a “potential Black Hole.”<sup>118</sup> He groups the TOC-terrorism nexus argument into two groups: “the apocalyptic approach, which tends to exaggerate the threat of terrorism and its links with TOC” and “the conspiratorial approach, which reveals how the specter comes to be manipulated by a range of actors for their own particular interests.”<sup>119</sup> Sergei Boeke discusses Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and its offshoots related to terrorism and TOC.<sup>120</sup> However, both the studies basically cover the African region. Allan Jones Salem, on the other hand, identifies ASG in the Philippines as a hybrid organization, which fluctuates from a criminal organization to a terrorist group.<sup>121</sup> Nevertheless, he does not differentiate ASG as representative of new terrorism due to inadequate evidence to prove that ASG possesses attributes of new terrorism other than religious motivation and involvement in TOC. ASG terrorism is confined within the Philippine territory and lacks extended network capability.

---

<sup>116</sup>Britt Sloan and James Cockayne, “Terrorism, Crime, and Conflict: Exploiting the Differences among Transnational Threats?” Policy Brief (Washington, DC: Center on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation, February 2011) 1–11, [https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/126759/BS\\_policybrief\\_117.pdf](https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/126759/BS_policybrief_117.pdf).

<sup>117</sup> Ibid.

<sup>118</sup> Valeria Rosato, “Hybrid Orders between Terrorism and Organized Crime: The Case of Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb,” *African Security* 9, no. 2 (2016):110-135, doi:10.1080/19392206.2016.1175877.

<sup>119</sup> Ibid.

<sup>120</sup> Sergei Boeke, “Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb: Terrorism, Insurgency, or Organized Crime?” *Small Wars & Insurgencies* 27, no. 5 (2016): 914–936, doi:10.1080/9592318.2016.1208280.

<sup>121</sup> Salem, “Nexus of Crime and Terrorism: The Case of the Abu Sayyaf Group,” 29–42.

#### **D. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES**

Scholarly analysis presents the changing nature of terrorism from old terrorism to new terrorism, and claims that new terrorism no longer requires popular causes like state discrimination, separatist sentiments, regime change, etc. Further, new terrorism is transnational in operation, and it could easily expand, as state weaknesses and a conducive environment present the opportunity. In this context, this study focuses on two potential hypotheses in answering the research questions: How might TOC and new terrorism converge in Sri Lanka, and why?

The first hypothesis is that new terrorism often avails itself of the means and methods of organized crime. Terrorist organizations like Al-Qaeda that fall into the category of new terrorism extensively rely on TOC for funding as state sponsorship slowly disappeared after the Cold War. The same avenues and cleavages of state apparatus that TOC utilizes for its operations affirm the creep-through for new terrorism into the state.

The second hypothesis is that, increasing TOC and the existing ethnic and religious disharmony pose a national security risk in Sri Lanka, thus increasing its vulnerability to host new terrorism.

The third hypothesis is that a lack of formal national strategies have prevented Sri Lanka from harnessing the instruments of national power to the best effect, particularly as regards TOC and its potential connection to terrorism.

#### **E. RESEARCH DESIGN**

The research is a single case study of the TOC-new terrorism nexus in Sri Lanka. The in-depth study of the TOC trends and probable roots of new terrorism in Sri Lanka may contribute to the development of national policy and strategy to counter TOC, new terrorism, and a probable TOC-new terrorism nexus.

Figure 2 illustrates the conceptual framework of the research design and how the study operationalizes the conceptual framework. Red text indicates potential causes for the increase of TOC focused on in this study.




Figure 2. Operationalization of TOC-New Terrorism Nexus in Sri Lanka.

## F. THESIS OVERVIEW AND CHAPTER OUTLINE

The research has five chapters. Chapter I introduces the subject, emphasizing the significance of the research problem. The literature review illustrates the scholarly concepts, definitions, and potential explanations of TOC and terrorism while attempting to identify probable knowledge gaps. It also provides a conceptual framework for the research design and outlines the subsequent chapters.

Chapter II discusses the causes, origin, consolidation, patterns, and organizations of TOC in South Asia and Sri Lanka with an attempt to identify the lapses in Sri Lankan law enforcement.

Chapter III explores the new terrorism attributes of Al-Qaeda as a case study and that organization's capacity to expand its network to Sri Lanka along the lines of TOC specifically.

Chapter IV establishes the TOC-new terrorism nexus and critically analyzes the nexus to deduce constraints, guidance, and imperatives of national security in the face of TOC and new terrorism, especially in Sri Lanka. The fifth and final chapter derives recommendations and summarizes the research and its outcome.

## II. TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME IN ASIA

The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime defines a transnational organized crime group as “a structured group of three or more persons, existing for a period of time and acting in concert with the aim of committing one or more serious crimes or offenses established in accordance with this convention in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit.”<sup>122</sup> As detailed in chapter I, UN convention stipulates four criteria to make an offence transnational. Potential criminal enterprises have frequently extended financial and other logistical support for insurgents all over the world. According to the Mackenzie Institute,

Secret societies and underground terrorism networks, initially founded to achieve political or social objectives, are easily redirected towards purely criminal activities. They can easily transpose their organizational structures, methods of operation and ruthlessness towards new objectives. The more commonly recognized groups of this nature include the Triads and Tongs as well as the Sicilian Mafia. These one-time insurgents now involve themselves in sexual slavery, narcotics and systemic extortion, to name a few of their activities.<sup>123</sup>

According to Global Financial Integrity, organized crime businesses generate about US\$1.6 trillion to US\$2.2 trillion a year.<sup>124</sup> As Channing May posits, counterfeiting (\$923 billion to \$1.13 trillion) and drug trafficking (\$426 billion to \$652 billion) generates the highest amounts.<sup>125</sup> Illegal logging amounts to a total of US\$52 billion to US\$157 billion annually and is the most valuable natural resource crime at present.<sup>126</sup> In this sense, TOC has become a global phenomenon, so no region or country has been able

---

<sup>122</sup> United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, “United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crimes and the Protocols thereto,” 5, <https://www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/UNTOC/Publications/TOC%20Convention/TOCebook-e.pdf>.

<sup>123</sup> “Funding Terror: The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam and Their Criminal Activities in Canada and the Western World,” Security Matters, December 25, 1995, <http://mackenzieinstitute.com/funding-terror-the-liberation-tigers-of-tamil-eelam-and-their-criminal-activities-in-canada-and-the-western-world/>.

<sup>124</sup> Channing May, “Transnational Crime and the Developing World,” *Global Financial Integrity*, March 27, 2017, <http://www.gfintegrity.org/report/transnational-crime-and-the-developing-world/>.

<sup>125</sup> Ibid.

<sup>126</sup> Ibid.

to stay safe from this menace. This chapter evaluates the threat perception of TOC in the Asian region and particularly in Sri Lanka.

## A. TOC IN ASIA

Transnational crime has a relatively long history in Asia. However, the start of the new millennium brought TOC in Asia to unprecedented heights.<sup>127</sup> According to Richard H. Ward and Daniel J. Mabrey, new technologies, improved transport infrastructure, the geo-political landscape, international terrorism, and the inability of the state apparatus to combat highly advanced and complex TOC operations contributed to these developments.<sup>128</sup> UNODC estimates in 2003 claimed that between US\$90 billion and US\$100 billion worth of annual criminal trade flow took place in Southeast Asia and the East Asia region.<sup>129</sup> Narcotic production and trafficking in drug precursors topped the list as the most attractive, followed by illegal wildlife and timber trading.<sup>130</sup> The most dangerous organized crimes include human trafficking, illegal electronic waste disposal, and maritime crime ranging from piracy to illegal fishing, counterfeiting of medicines and “high street” products, and underground gambling, according to the UNODC.<sup>131</sup> Figure 3 indicates generalized crime routes of Southeast and East Asia.

---

<sup>127</sup>Richard H Ward and Daniel J. Mabry, “Transnational Organized Crime in Asia and the Middle East,” in *Transnational Organized Crime, Overview from Six Continents*, eds. Jay Albanese and Philip Reichel (Los Angeles: SAGE Publications, 2014), 117.

<sup>128</sup> Ibid.

<sup>129</sup> Roderic Broadhurst, “Transnational Crime Crisis in Asia,” *Sri Lanka Guardian*, December 7, 2016, <https://www.slguardian.org/2016/12/transnational-crime-crisis-in-asia/>.

<sup>130</sup> Ibid.

<sup>131</sup> Ibid.




Figure 3. Generalized Flows of Criminal Trade in Southeast and East Asia.<sup>132</sup>

As depicted in Figure 3, a complex network in Southeast Asia and East Asia is connected to Australia, India, and the West. According to UNODC estimates, US\$86.07 billion worth of criminal trade flow took place in this region, but heroin and methamphetamines alone accounted for US\$31.3 billion.<sup>133</sup> In East and Southeast Asia, heroin and morphine seizures more than doubled from 5.7 tons to 13 tons during 2008–2014.<sup>134</sup> Myanmar and China serve as the originating locations; Thailand and Indonesia, as transshipment hubs.

In China alone, seizures of illegal drugs increased 50 percent in 2015 (102.5 tons) compared to 2014 and drug related arrests rose 15 percent, according to Liu Yuejin, vice commissioner of the China National Narcotics Control Board.<sup>135</sup> Chinese authorities recovered 2.2 tons of solid and liquid methamphetamine in the coastal area of Lufeng

<sup>132</sup> Broadhurst, “Transnational Crime Crisis in Asia.”


<sup>133</sup> UNODC, “Transnational Organized Crime: Let’s Put Them out of Business,” accessed June 14, 2017, <http://www.unodc.org/toc/en/reports/TOCTA-EA-Pacific.html>.

<sup>134</sup> International Narcotic Control Board, “Report 2016,” 72–73. [http://www.incb.org/documents/Publications/AnnualReports/AR2016/English/AR2016\\_E\\_ebook.pdf](http://www.incb.org/documents/Publications/AnnualReports/AR2016/English/AR2016_E_ebook.pdf).

<sup>135</sup> Broadhurst, “Transnational Crime Crisis in Asia.”

City, ready to be transported to Shanghai in January 2015.<sup>136</sup> In the city of Yangjiang, they found another 1.3 tons of ketamine and 2.7 tons of its precursors concealed to look like black tea. Makinen claims that meth, crystal meth, and other amphetamine-type stimulants are becoming increasingly popular among Chinese rural youth.<sup>137</sup> As shown in Figure 4, in 2010 the East Asian region was host to 3.3 million heroin addicts. China has an overwhelmingly superior number of heroin addicts. According to the UNODC, the region consumed 65 tons of pure heroin in 2011, costing approximately US\$16.3 billion. (See Figure 4.)

**National estimates of the number of heroin users in 2010**



Source: UNODC estimates

\* Including Taiwan (Province of China), Hong Kong (China) and Macao (China)

Figure 4. 2010 National Estimates of the Number of Heroin Users in Asia and East Asia.<sup>138</sup>

<sup>136</sup> Julie Makinen, “Drug Seizures Soar in China; Most Suspects Are Farmers and Unemployed,” *Los Angeles Times* February 18, 2016, <http://www.latimes.com/world/asia/la-fg-drugs-china-meth-ice-20160218-story.html>.

<sup>137</sup> Ibid.

<sup>138</sup> “Transnational Organized Crime in East Asia and the Pacific: A Threat Assessment,” UNODC, April 2013, accessed September 9, 2017, 57, [http://www.unodc.org/documents/southeastasiaandpacific/Publications/2013/TOCTA\\_EAP\\_web.pdf](http://www.unodc.org/documents/southeastasiaandpacific/Publications/2013/TOCTA_EAP_web.pdf).



The Lao People’s Democratic Republic and the Shan state in Myanmar continue to lead the illegal cultivation of opium poppy, according to a UN report in 2016.<sup>139</sup> One-fifth of the global opium cultivation of 55,000 hectares took place in Myanmar, the second largest global producer of opium.<sup>140</sup> The Lao People’s Democratic Republic had an area of 5,700 hectares, and the two countries together produced 800 tons of opium in 2015, maintaining the largest supplier status in the East, Southeast Asia, and Oceania.<sup>141</sup> By contrast, opiates originating in or departing from the South Asian region (Afghanistan and Pakistan) constituted only 10 percent of opiates seized in the region in 2014.<sup>142</sup> The trend was perhaps even more noticeable when focusing on China, where the number of seizures of heroin originating from Afghanistan showed a clear-cut reduction from 30 percent in 2010 to less than 10 percent in 2014 and 2015.<sup>143</sup> Therefore, the trend indicates that Pakistan and Afghanistan have lost their market share in the East Asian region to Myanmar.

Ward and Mabrey claim that the Vietnamese Nam Cang Gang is a renowned group in the region that has a huge capacity to carry out TOC on a par with Chinese mafia groups and the Triad group of Hong Kong.<sup>144</sup> He further claims that the Japanese Yakuza, with 80,000 members, has infiltrated banks and financial institutions so deeply that the U.S. Treasury Department froze the assets of the Japanese Yamaguchi-Gumi family, who had the largest share of Yakuza crime proceeds. The U.S. Treasury Department estimates claims that the Yakuza earns billions of dollars from illegal arms business, prostitution, drug trafficking, and human trafficking.<sup>145</sup> Similarly, a number of insurgent groups in Myanmar—the United Wa State Army, the Kokang Chinese, and the

---

<sup>139</sup> Ibid., 53.

<sup>140</sup> Ibid., 52.

<sup>141</sup> Ibid.

<sup>142</sup> Ibid.

<sup>143</sup> Ibid., 54.

<sup>144</sup> Ward and Mabrey, “Transnational Organized Crime in Asia and the Middle East,” 120–129.

<sup>145</sup> Ibid.

Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army—are involved in the drug trade and control most of the cultivation and distribution.<sup>146</sup>

Smuggling migrant workers is another lucrative criminal enterprise in the Southeast and East Asian regions. According to the UNODC, smuggling of migrant workers into Thailand amounts to approximately half a million workers approximately the Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Myanmar, and Cambodia. This business generates around US\$192 million annually.<sup>147</sup> Similarly, smuggling Chinese (nearly 12,000 a year) and Vietnamese (nearly 1,000 a year) migrant workers into the United States generates around US\$650 million a year.<sup>148</sup> The UNODC further states that nearly 6,000 migrant workers from Southeast and East Asia attempt to reach Australia every year, each paying around US\$14,000 that allows smugglers to make a total of US\$85 million annually.<sup>149</sup>

## **B. TOC IN SOUTH ASIA**

The TOC in South Asia covers an array of illegal enterprises involving criminal and terrorist groups. The UNODC claims that South Asia’s vulnerability for trafficking in opiates, heroin, cannabis, synthetic drugs, and new psychoactive substances continued to increase in 2015.<sup>150</sup> Similarly, methamphetamine manufacturing and trafficking, and adopting illegal processes in “pharmaceutical preparations containing narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances” have also increased considerably, according to the UNODC.<sup>151</sup> Mallika Joseph, the director of the Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies in New Delhi asserts that organized crime and terrorism in South Asia involve three main actors: the

---

<sup>146</sup> Ibid.

<sup>147</sup> UNODC, “Transnational Organized Crime in East Asia and the Pacific: A Threat Assessment,” iv.

<sup>148</sup> Ibid.

<sup>149</sup> Ibid.

<sup>150</sup> Ibid.

<sup>151</sup> International Narcotic Control Board, “Report 2016,” 78.

Taliban in Afghanistan and Pakistan, LTTE in Sri Lanka, and the D-Company that operates in the whole of South Asia.<sup>152</sup>

Pakistan acts as the transit hub for Afghan drugs, including heroin, opium, morphine, and hashish intended for Iran, western markets, Africa, Asia, and the Gulf States, according to the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).<sup>153</sup> According to the CIA, Pakistan poppy cultivation was 2,300 hectares in 2007 and national efforts eradicated 600 hectares. On the other hand, Pakistan Army Chief General Raheel Sharif claims that Pakistan is free of poppy cultivation, but he accepts that a drug dealer-terrorist nexus exists in Pakistan.<sup>154</sup> Furthermore, domestic drug consumption has skyrocketed in Pakistan, and the country suffers a staggering annual death toll because of drug addiction; on a daily basis alone, 700 lives are lost to drug addiction in Pakistan.<sup>155</sup>

One contributor to this problem is Afghanistan, the world's largest opium producer. Afghan poppy cultivation increased 7 percent in 2014 to a record 211,000 hectares, up from 198,000 hectares in 2013, according the CIA "World Fact Book."<sup>156</sup> Although Afghanistan lost its market in the Southeast and East Asian regions, it continues to dominate the global supply of opiate from opium poppy illicitly cultivated in the country.<sup>157</sup> Three trans-regional opiate trade routes originate from Afghanistan according to the UNODC: first, the southern route through Pakistan to rest of the world; second, the Balkan route through the Islamic Republic of Iran and Turkey toward Europe; third, the northern route across western Asia through central Asian countries toward the

---

<sup>152</sup> "Organized Crime South Asia," Penn State College of Earth and Mineral Sciences, accessed September 9, 2017, <https://www.e-education.psu.edu/geog571/node/176>.

<sup>153</sup> "The World Fact Book: Pakistan," CIA, accessed September 9, 2017, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2086.html>.

<sup>154</sup> Mateen Haider, "Nexus between Drug Dealers, Terrorists Will Be Broken," DAWN, August 3, 2015, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1198133>.

<sup>155</sup> Dania Ahmed, "Heroin and Extremism in Pakistan," *Foreign Policy*, August 17, 2015, <http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/08/17/heroin-and-jihad-in-pakistan/>.

<sup>156</sup> "The World Fact Book: Afghanistan," CIA, accessed September 9, 2017, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2086.html>.

<sup>157</sup> Ward and Mabrey, "Transnational Organized Crime in Asia and the Middle East," 82–83.

Russian Federation.<sup>158</sup> When Afghan supplies fell short of meeting the demand, Pakistani and Nigerian dealers entered the heroin market, according to the UNODC.<sup>159</sup> Terrorism, political instability, poverty, and corruption prevailing in these countries continue to undermine efforts to control the flow of illicit drugs, according to the UNODC.<sup>160</sup> See Table 2.

Table 2. Comparison of Drug Seizures in 2014 and 2015.<sup>161</sup>

Description	Heroin and opium (kg)		Cannabis/resin (Tons)		Cocaine (kg)		Remarks
	2014	2015	2014	2015	2014	2015	
India	1037	1041	3.3	2.28	15	113	Number of drug related arrests increased by 47 percent in 2015: Cannabis and resin 10,425; Heroin 3,931. Illicit planting of cannabis by area—313 hectares in 2015.
Bangladesh	84.3	108.7	35	41	Nil	507	Seized 860,429 bottles of codeine based preparations in 2014 and 748,730 bottles in 2015.
Nepal	3.8	6.4	6.9	6.6	5.5	11	Arrested 2,636 persons for drug related offenses in 2015.
Bhutan	No data	No data	No data	No data	No data	No data	Drug related arrests dropped from 370 to 296 persons.

At present, as Rollie Lal assesses, the most powerful TOC group operating in South Asia is the D-Company, also called the Dawood Gang, led by Pakistan-based Indian drug lord Dawood Ibrahim.<sup>162</sup> This group consists of approximately 4,000–5,000 members, with the majority from Mumbai. The United States categorized Ibrahim as a

<sup>158</sup> Ibid.

<sup>159</sup> UNODC, “Transnational Organized Crime in East Asia and the Pacific: A Threat Assessment,” IV.

<sup>160</sup> Ward and Mabrey, “Transnational Organized Crime in Asia and the Middle East,” 82–83.

<sup>161</sup> International Narcotic Control Board, “Report 2016,” 78–82.

<sup>162</sup> Rollie Lal, “South Asian Organized Crime and Terrorist Network,” *Orbis*, 49, no. 2 (Spring 2005), 296.

terrorist supporter in 2003 for assisting al Qaeda militants to escape Afghanistan using D-Company smuggling routes. He is also suspected of having assisted the Pakistan-based terrorist group Lakshar-e-Taiba.<sup>163</sup> The Indian government has requested his extradition, but the Pakistan government denies his presence on its soil because he carries a number of passports.<sup>164</sup> Because Ibrahim's influence has spilled far beyond South Asia and he plays a dual role as a criminal leader and a terrorist supporter, the international community has become quite concerned.<sup>165</sup> In this sense, TOC in South Asia has become a serious concern.

### C. TOC IN SRI LANKA

Sri Lanka has been a democracy since its independence in 1948 and is considered as one of the oldest democracies in Asia. Immediately after independence, the country completed its democratic transition within Linz and Stepan's framework.<sup>166</sup> According to Linz and Stepan, as quoted by Siri Gamage, a state needs five interacting and interdependent arenas for its existence. They are:

The availability of an environment conducive to the development of a free and lively civil society, a valued political society, which is relatively autonomous, the effective enforcement of the rule of law that guarantees freedom and independent associational life of the constituency, the existence of an adaptable state bureaucracy to assist the democratic government, and finally an institutionalized economic society.<sup>167</sup>

Yet, Sri Lanka has not attained the status of a consolidated democracy as Linz and Stepan suggested, even almost 70 years after independence. The southern insurgencies in 1971, in 1988–1989, and during the three decades of terrorism have crippled the progress of consolidating its democracy. Similarly, different political ideologies varying

---

<sup>163</sup> Ibid.

<sup>164</sup> Ibid.

<sup>165</sup> Ibid.

<sup>166</sup> Siri Gamage, "Democracy in Sri Lanka: Past, Present, and Future," *Asian Studies Review* 17, no. 1 (July 1993), 107, doi: 10.1080/03147539308712906; Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe* (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), 3.

<sup>167</sup> Linz and Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation*, 7.

priorities, including the lack of political will, and changing long-term strategies of successive regimes since independence prevented the country from attaining significant milestones in consolidating its democracy.<sup>168</sup>

Taking advantage of the gaps in Sri Lanka's process of democratic consolidation, the LTTE extensively used TOC since its inception in the 1980s. It engaged in organized criminal activities all around the world to finance its indiscriminate violence within Sri Lankan sovereign territory. In this sense, the LTTE-TOC relationship can be categorized as symbiotic and long term. Consequently, by 1994, if not sooner, Makarenko's crime-terror continuum established the LTTE-TOC nexus. Thus, before 2009, Sri Lanka counted as a black hole—although did not become a failed state—much more dangerous than the Sahel region, according to Valeria Rosato.<sup>169</sup>

### 1. Historical Evidence and the LTTE-TOC Nexus

Smuggling between South India and Sri Lanka is not a new phenomenon due to their close proximity. The fertile fishing beds in the area prompt the fishermen from both nations to poach frequently, providing an easy mode of transport for smuggling illegal goods.<sup>170</sup> The LTTE—the primary terrorist organization—understood the need to go abroad during the early days of the terrorist movement in the 1980s, realizing that it could never adequately finance its operations within Sri Lanka alone.<sup>171</sup> Therefore, the LTTE cast a comprehensive net, extending from secured territories in northern Sri Lanka to southern India, taking advantage of ethno-cultural and linguistic similarities. Heroin trafficking and extortion of Tamils living in India and the Western world became the most profitable venture for the LTTE.<sup>172</sup> As Narayan Swamy posits, in the Jaffna area,

---

<sup>168</sup> Jagath P. Senarathne, "The Security Establishment in Sri Lanka: A Case for Reform," in *Governing Security*, ed. Gavin Cawthra and Robin Luckham (London: Zed Books, 2003), 181.

<sup>169</sup> Valeria Rosato, "Hybrid Orders between Terrorism and Organized Crime: The Case of Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb," *African Security*, 9, no. 2 (2016): 110–135, doi: 10.1080/19392206.2016.1175877.

<sup>170</sup> Prasad Kariyapperuma, *A View from the International Maritime Boundary Line: India-Sri Lanka* (Colombo: S. Godage & Brothers (Pvt.) Ltd, 2016), 55–100.

<sup>171</sup> Security Matters, "Funding Terror."

<sup>172</sup> Ibid.

the Hindu Caste and fishermen had deep roots in smuggling, and the early LTTE leadership emerged from the same background.<sup>173</sup> The port city of Velvettiturai in the northern tip of Sri Lanka became the most active hub from which the LTTE leader Veluppilai Prabhakaran also came.<sup>174</sup>

In the period before 1970, the smugglers usually carried alcohol, tobacco, films, and jewelry during the initial stages. However, by 1970, the trend started changing. According to the Mackenzie Institute, the smuggled cargo included printed material and films promoting Tamil nationalism, and towards the end of 1970, this cargo included small quantities of heroin. Those shipments were not for Sri Lankan usage but transshipment from Madras to Europe.<sup>175</sup> By 1973, smugglers started carrying explosives and detonators along with drugs, using the same channels. The LTTE's heroin trafficking became established in the 1980s.<sup>176</sup> The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and Khomeini's revolution in Iran in 1979 disrupted the "traditional opium smuggling routes" used by many Pakistani based drug lords.<sup>177</sup> Therefore, these drug lords quickly refined their heroin to make it easier to transport than opium and tried to transport it directly to Europe. However, European authorities quickly blocked these channels, in which resulted in Pakistani traffickers establishing contacts with Tamil insurgents in northern India.<sup>178</sup>

Sri Lankan criminal law imposes the "death penalty or life imprisonment for smuggling more than two grams of heroin," but the LTTE was not deterred in its criminal activity.<sup>179</sup> The Sri Lankan police and other anti-narcotic entities were unsuccessful against the drug smuggling threat; they could only seize 1 percent of the total flow.<sup>180</sup> In

---

<sup>173</sup> M. R. Narayan Swamy, *Tigers of Lanka: from Boys to Guerrillas*. Updated Edition (Colombo: Vijitha Yapa Publications, 1994), 49.

<sup>174</sup> Ibid.

<sup>175</sup> Security Matters, "Funding Terror."

<sup>176</sup> Weis Gordon, *The Cage: The Fight for Sri Lanka and the Last Days of the Tamil Tigers* (London: Bodley Head, 2011), 89.

<sup>177</sup> Security Matters, "Funding Terror."

<sup>178</sup> Ibid.

<sup>179</sup> "Poisons, Opium, and Dangerous Drugs," National Dangerous Drug Control Board, 2015, <http://www.nddcb.gov.lk/Laws.html>.

<sup>180</sup> Security Matters, "Funding Terror."

the international arena, however, LTTE operatives involved in drug trafficking were arrested in Rome in 1983.<sup>181</sup> The Italians arrested 30 members of the LTTE initially and another 174 thereafter, exposing four LTTE drug rings.<sup>182</sup> Clarke reveals that the LTTE expanded its operations into Pakistan, connecting the Pakistan-based, Indian organized, criminal outfit D-Company and its boss Dawood Ibrahim, and became involved in trafficking not only drugs but also human cargo.<sup>183</sup> Similarly, Swiss, Polish, and Canadian authorities detected LTTE drug smuggling networks and arrested more than 200 drug traffickers while seizing 134 kilograms of heroin by mid-1985. Law enforcement agencies of Canada, France, and West Germany apprehended another 200 Tamil drug couriers by early 1987.<sup>184</sup>

Other than the drug business, the LTTE successfully raised funds by smuggling human cargo into Europe and Canada.<sup>185</sup> The Mackenzie Institute revealed that the LTTE charged \$500 for a group of eight being taken out of Sri Lanka during the initial stages of the LTTE's operations. An arrest by the Canadian police in 1986 revealed that the LTTE smuggled 155 Tamils through India to West Germany and from there to Canada in 1986. Another 250 Tamils from West Germany and 700 from Turkey were smuggled into Canada, including a foiled attempt in 1988 to transport another 269 Tamils into Canada.<sup>186</sup> In 1994, Dutch authorities revealed a shipment of 200 Tamils into Netherlands through Russia. By this time, the LTTE easily produced forged travel documents. French authorities detected Tamil-operated offices in France that produced fake identity cards and visas, revealing that the documents were almost original.<sup>187</sup> Beyond these activities, the LTTE became involved in a method of *large-scale credit*

---

<sup>181</sup> Ibid.

<sup>182</sup> Ibid.

<sup>183</sup> Phil Williams, "Terrorist Financing and Organized Crime: Nexus, Appropriation, or Transformation?" in *Countering the Financing of Terrorism* (London: Routledge, 2008), 139.

<sup>184</sup> Security Matters, "Funding Terror."

<sup>185</sup> Gus Martin, "Terrorism and Transnational Organized Crime," in *Transnational Organized Crime: Overview from Six Continents*, ed. Jay Albanese and Philip Reichel (New York: SAGE Publications, 2014), 185–186.

<sup>186</sup> Security Matters, "Funding Terror."

<sup>187</sup> Ibid.



*card fraud* at gas stations in London and a similar rip-off in Toronto as well. Notwithstanding, detections in Europe and Australia revealed that the Tamil terrorists had their hands in counterfeiting U.S. and Sri Lankan currencies.<sup>188</sup>

The demise of the LTTE in 2009 opened the curtain for a peaceful Sri Lanka. In spite of efforts to destabilize the nation by the pro-LTTE Tamil diaspora living all around the world during the post-conflict era,<sup>189</sup> the country has managed to maintain a terrorism-free state to date. Nevertheless, only the trafficking of illegal firearms has decreased, mainly because of the demise of the LTTE; the drug trade has increased to an unprecedented height. Human trafficking also did not decrease significantly. In fact, it has expanded with an influx of illegal immigrants in contrast to the previous trends of trafficking out of Sri Lanka.

## **2. Drug Trafficking in Sri Lanka**

The organized drug trade in Sri Lanka is of three types, according to Sutton and De Silva-Ranasingha:

- The importation of Afghan, Indian, and Pakistani heroin by sea or air from India and Pakistan, for either local consumption or further transshipment.
- The domestic cultivation of cannabis for the local market and importation operations from India.
- The transshipment and local consumption of minor quantities of stimulants, including amphetamine-type stimulants, precursor products, and cocaine.<sup>190</sup>

Figure 5 depicts the drug smuggling routes into Sri Lanka.

---

<sup>188</sup> Ibid.

<sup>189</sup> U. L. J. Sylvester Perera, “The Influence of Tamil Diaspora on the Stability of Sri Lanka” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2016).

<sup>190</sup> Sutton and De Silva-Ranasingha, *Transnational Crimes in Sri Lanka*, 8.




Figure 5. Drug Smuggling Routes, Seizures, and Arrests<sup>191</sup>

According to Figure 5, both the Golden Crescent—Iran Pakistan, Afghanistan—and the Golden Triangle—Vietnam, Myanmar, Laos—supply drugs to Sri Lanka. These South East Asian products reach Karachchi, Kerala, or Andra Pradesh by inland transport and take the sea route to Sri Lankan coastal areas such as Negombo, Kalpitiya, Mannar, and Mullaitivu. According to Athula Lankadewa, the Deputy Director of Customs Narcotic Division Sri Lanka, the majority of the drug consignments smuggled from India to Sri Lanka comes through fishermen or hidden in containers. The dealers provide money and other benefits for fishermen for carrying drugs, as sea and air cargo undergo rigorous checks.<sup>192</sup> As Figure 5 demonstrates, Pakistanis remain at the top among arrested foreigners for drug-related offenses. Similarly, out of 120 arrested during the last five years, more than 60 percent were Muslims. Nevertheless, the Sri Lankan

<sup>191</sup> Weerakkody, “Lack of Staff Allows Drug Syndicates to Open up Lanka as a Major Transit Route.”

<sup>192</sup> Ibid.

authorities have not carried out any detailed study on the arrested individuals to establish a potential relationship with terrorist groups. See Table 3.

Table 3. Drug Seizures by All the Law Enforcement Agencies in Sri Lanka from 2007 to 2012.<sup>193</sup>

<b>Period</b>	<b>Heroin*</b>	<b>Cannabis</b>	<b>Hashish</b>	<b>Opium</b>	<b>Cocaine</b>
War (2007, 2008 & 2009)	81.321	177,610.746	3.09	0.559	0.491
Post war (2010, 2011, & 2012)	215.355	391,763.194	42.26	0.03	21.985
Gross difference	+134.034	+214,152.448	+39.17	-0.0259	+21.494

\* Unit of measurement for all substances is kilograms (kg)

Table 3 demonstrates a clear increase in seizures of heroin, cocaine, and cannabis. Sri Lanka is not an opium-cultivating country, but cannabis cultivation takes place illegally. The gross difference proves a huge increase in all the drug substances other than opium. In 2013, the SLC seized 30 kg of heroin in the custody of a Liberian national who carried a fake diplomatic passport. Later, in June 2016 the SLC seized 85 kg of heroin, worth 680 million Sri Lankan Rupees, and in July 2016 another 93 kg of heroin, worth 656 million Sri Lankan Rupees.<sup>194</sup> The Sri Lankan Police Narcotics Bureau seized 139.194 kg of heroin between January and June 2016 as opposed to 18.394 kg during the same period of 2015, recording a 700-percent increase. A significant increase in cocaine seizures after 2009 is also a serious issue. Cocaine has recorded an approximately 4,300-percent increase.

Sri Lanka is emerging as a transit hub for cocaine smuggling, too. Shihar Aneez and Ranga Sirilal assert that cocaine smugglers use Sri Lanka increasingly as a transshipment hub because of the minimal legal restrictions in place.<sup>195</sup> According to Aneez and Sirilal, “Sri Lankan customs have seized six shipments of high-purity South

<sup>193</sup> Sutton and De Silva-Ranasingha, *Transnational Crimes in Sri Lanka*, 7.

<sup>194</sup> Weerakkody, “Lack of Staff Allows Drug Syndicates to Open Up Lanka as a Major Transit Route.”

<sup>195</sup> Shihar Aneez and Ranga Sirilal, “Sri Lanka Emerging as Transit Hub for Cocaine Smugglers: Officials,” Reuters, August 31, 2017, <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-sri-lanka-drugtrafficking/sri-lanka-emerging-as-transit-hub-for-cocaine-smugglers-officials-idUSKCN1BB1FK>.

American cocaine in 14 months; including Asia's largest-ever haul of the drug in December, at its main port."<sup>196</sup> The total seizure amounted to 1770 kg of cocaine, worth US\$140 million, hidden in sugar containers from Brazil.<sup>197</sup> Aneez and Sirilal quote the Ministry of Law and Order in Sri Lanka Sagala Rathnayaka, who acknowledged, "Sri Lanka is a transit point for mass-scale drug dealers."<sup>198</sup> Although the Sri Lanka Police (SLP) did not have concrete evidence to prove that the shipments arrived for local consumption or were heading elsewhere, the SLP believes that the international smugglers take advantage of inadequate legal and procedural restrictions in Sri Lanka.<sup>199</sup>

Sutton and De Silva-Ranasingha identify three reasons for the increase in smuggled goods passing through Sri Lanka: inadequate security in maritime borders, instability because of 30 years of Tamil terrorism, and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979–1978 and the Iran-Iraq war in 1980–1988, which forced the dealers to search for alternative routes.<sup>200</sup> Admiral Jayanath Colombage, a former Commander of the Sri Lanka Navy posits that the organizational, policy, strategic, and tactical drawbacks of the country by and large, and the SLN, in particular, paved the way for the transformation of the LTTE Sea Tiger Wing into a deadly floating force. It also opened up such avenues for organized crime to engage in drug and human trafficking, arms smuggling, and smuggling of commercial goods.<sup>201</sup> The upward trend in domestic drug consumption is also a reason for the increase in drug smuggling. (See Figure 6.)

---

<sup>196</sup> Ibid.

<sup>197</sup> Ibid.

<sup>198</sup> Ibid.

<sup>199</sup> Ibid.

<sup>200</sup> Sutton and De Silva-Ranasingha, *Transnational Crimes in Sri Lanka*, 7.

<sup>201</sup> Jayanath Colombage, *Asymmetric Warfare at Sea: The Case of Sri Lanka* (Berlin: Lambert Academic Publishing, 2015), 47–50.




Figure 6. Drug-Related Arrests in Sri Lanka, 2011–2015.<sup>202</sup>

Figure 6 depicts the domestic drug situation. Drug-related arrests have increased at a considerable pace since 2010. Colombo and Gampaha districts have seen the greatest number of drug-related arrests. A higher overall population and easy access to drugs explain the trend. According to the National Dangerous Drug Control Board (NDDCB) findings, most arrests represented end users and couriers. In addition, Cannabis can be used legally in manufacturing Sri Lankan indigenous medicine. Nevertheless, even as a psychotropic substance, using cannabis has been a longstanding practice among some Sri Lankans to a varying degree from time to time.<sup>203</sup> Former LTTE-controlled areas in the northern part of the country have had fewer arrests according to Figure 3. The lower arrest rate could either show a failure of state law enforcement, or it could mean that drug-related offenses are genuinely few in those areas after 2010, in spite of the LTTE's involvement in drug dealing. Therefore, the country's South has been more vulnerable to organized crime since 2010. At the same time, as Figure 6 illustrates, the increased use of

<sup>202</sup> *Hand Book of Drug Abuse Information in Sri Lanka 2016*, National Dangerous Drug Control Board, ix, accessed June 3, 2017, <http://www.nddcb.gov.lk/publication.html>.

<sup>203</sup> *Ibid.*

heroin is a concern as the increased market may attract the interest of international criminal groups allied with new terrorist groups.

### **3. Human Trafficking**

The UNODC defines human trafficking as “the acquisition of people by improper means such as force, fraud or deception, with the aim of exploiting them.”<sup>204</sup> Similarly, the “smuggling of migrants involves the procurement for financial or other material benefit of illegal entry of a person into a State of which that person is not a national or resident,” according to the UNODC.<sup>205</sup> Therefore, granting entry to any non-national entering for either legal or illegal purposes, with the intention of gaining a financial or any other material benefit falls within the UNODC stipulated parameters.

The trafficking of human cargo both into and out of Sri Lanka has become a challenge for Sri Lanka. The U.S. State Department has included Sri Lanka on the list of major source countries.<sup>206</sup> Similarly, the UNODC claims that the trafficking of male and female Sri Lankans, including children, is not only for labor but also for sex trade, including “domestic child sex tourism.”<sup>207</sup> Human trafficking takes four main forms in the Sri Lankan context according to Sutton and De Silva-Ranasingha:

- Trafficking of Sri Lankans to locations, including the Middle East, Southeast Asia, Mauritius, Maldives, and the United States, for sex work or indentured labor.
- Trafficking of foreigners to Sri Lanka for the purpose of labor or sexual exploitation.
- Smuggling of asylum seekers and economic migrants from inside Sri Lanka to developed countries or transit locations by international smuggling networks.

---

<sup>204</sup> United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, “UNODC on Human Trafficking and Migrant Smuggling.” accessed June 10, 2017, <https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/human-trafficking/index.html?ref=menuside>.

<sup>205</sup> Ibid.

<sup>206</sup> U.S. Department of State, “Trafficking in Persons Report 2014” (Washington, DC: Office of the Under Secretary for Global Affairs, 2014), <https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/226848.pdf>.

<sup>207</sup> “Responses to Human Trafficking in Bangladesh, India, Nepal, and Sri Lanka,” UNODC, accessed May 23, 2017. [http://www.unodc.org/documents/human-trafficking/2011/Responses\\_to\\_Human\\_Trafficking\\_in\\_Bangladesh\\_India\\_Nepal\\_and\\_Sri\\_Lanka.pdf](http://www.unodc.org/documents/human-trafficking/2011/Responses_to_Human_Trafficking_in_Bangladesh_India_Nepal_and_Sri_Lanka.pdf).

- Smuggling of foreign migrants (including Afghans, Iranians, Pakistanis, and Sri Lankan Tamil expatriates from southern India) into Sri Lanka and then onto third countries.<sup>208</sup>

The major concern of the international community is that the smuggling of asylum seekers consists mostly of Tamils and economic migrants of all ethnicities and nationalities through and from Sri Lanka.<sup>209</sup> This trade is multifaceted—sometimes taking direct journeys to Western countries. Otherwise, the migrants travel to a third country by air with fake travel documents and join the international human trafficking network shipping links for onward movement. (See Figure 7.) The traffickers provide them all necessary travel documents, including passports.<sup>210</sup> Sri Lanka Navy personnel have had some involvement in this trade, according to Sutton and De Silva-Ranasingha; navy personnel were among the 30 people arrested in late 2013 for alleged involvement in an attempt to transport human cargo to Australia.<sup>211</sup>

---

<sup>208</sup>Sutton and De Silva-Ranasingha, *Transnational Crimes in Sri Lanka*, 9.

<sup>209</sup>“The People Smugglers: Is the Tough Application of Canada’s Immigration Laws Justified?” *Al Jazeera*, July 25, 2014; Ben Doherty and Som Patidar, “India Refugee Boat Racket,” *Sydney Morning Herald*, June 15, 2012, <http://www.smh.com.au/federal-politics/political-news/india-refugee-boat-racket-20120614-20d4z.html>.

<sup>210</sup>Cat Barker, “The People Smugglers’ Business Model,” research paper no. 2, 2012–13 (Canberra: Parliament of Australia, Department of Parliamentary Services, 2013), [http://www.aph.gov.au/About\\_Parliament/Parliamentary\\_Departments/Parliamentary\\_Library/pubs/rp/rp1213/13rp02](http://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Library/pubs/rp/rp1213/13rp02).

<sup>211</sup>Sutton and De Silva-Ranasingha, *Transnational Crimes in Sri Lanka*, 10.




Figure 7. Migrant Smuggling Routes to Australia and Canada.<sup>212</sup>

The Sri Lankan constitution contains two provisions against trafficking, but both deal only with the trafficking of children (Articles 12 and 27).<sup>213</sup> The Sri Lankan constitution never mentions human trafficking for forced labor.<sup>214</sup> The convention on Preventing and Combating Trafficking in Women and Children for Prostitution Act, 2005, covers women and children for prostitution, not for forced labor. Therefore, Sri Lanka does not have comprehensive legislation in force regarding human trafficking at present, but miscellaneous acts bear on human trafficking. The Penal Code criminalizes such acts as “procuring, buying, and selling of human beings; importing or exporting human beings; buying and selling of minors; servitude; bondage and unacceptable forms of labor; the illegal adoption of children; and the breach of border control norms and

<sup>212</sup> UNODC, *Transnational Organized Crime in East Asia and the Pacific: A Threat Assessment*, 2013, 13.

<sup>213</sup> UNODC, “Responses to Human Trafficking in Bangladesh, India, Nepal, and Sri Lanka,” 59.

<sup>214</sup> *Ibid.*



procedures.”<sup>215</sup> The UNODC further claims that although traffickers have been arrested and their prosecutions initiated, no significant convictions have taken place.<sup>216</sup>

#### **4. Money Laundering**

Money laundering (ML) is called washing “black money” in layman’s language. Bhanu Wijayaratne defines money laundering as, “the process of hiding the true origin of illegally made money and giving such proceeds a legitimate look.” Similarly, he explains “the risk of non-detection of laundering of money through bank accounts or any products of the bank.”<sup>217</sup> In citing its four purposes, he states that ML

- enables the criminal to distance himself from the activities that generated such funds;
- enables the criminal to distance the funds from the criminal activities;
- enables the criminal to enjoy the benefits of such funds without bringing attention to himself; and
- enables the criminal to re-invest such funds in future criminal activity or legitimate business.<sup>218</sup>

In this sense, ML provides an environment conducive to transnational criminal groups and terrorist groups to hide their illicit gains. The failure to detect ML efforts of organized criminals and terrorist groups can result in the growth of crime and corruption, economic instability and compromise, weakened financial institutions and private sector, and unfair competition, according to Wijayaratne.<sup>219</sup>

The World Bank model defines the ML risk as “a combination of national threat and national vulnerability. The national threat module focuses on understanding the

---

<sup>215</sup>Ibid., 59–60.

<sup>216</sup> Ibid., 58.

<sup>217</sup> Bhanu Wijayaratne, “Money Laundering, Its Impacts and Consequences,” *DailyFT*, accessed June 13, 2017, <http://www.ft.lk/article/564789/Money-laundering--its-impact-and-consequences>.

<sup>218</sup> Ibid.

<sup>219</sup> Ibid.

proceeds of crime in the country.”<sup>220</sup> (See Table 4 for an explanation of ML threat levels by sector.)

Table 4. The Overall ML Risk in Each Sector.<sup>221</sup>

<b>Sector</b>	<b>ML Risk</b>
Banking sector	Medium low
Securities sector	Medium low
Insurance sector	Medium low
Other financial sector	Medium high
Designated non-finance businesses and professions	Medium high

According to the World Bank model, in Sri Lanka the risk levels of ML in different sectors are as depicted in Table 4. Sri Lanka has a “Medium” rating in both overall ML threat and in vulnerability assessment and terrorist financing threat.<sup>222</sup> According to the Financial Intelligence Unit of the Central Bank of Sri Lanka (FIUCBSL), banking, remittances, real estate, and non-bank financing sectors are vulnerable for ML, especially by the drug traffickers due to the unavailability of a proper recording mechanism.<sup>223</sup> The FIUCBSL further declares that a mechanism to monitor international non-governmental and non-governmental organizations accounts does not currently exist in Sri Lanka, resulting in a relatively undisturbed environment for terrorist financing. These reasons contribute to its “Medium” rating in the threat assessment.<sup>224</sup> A “Medium” rating, however, does not mean that Sri Lanka’s threat perception is low. According to the FIUCBSL, Sri Lanka faces a significant threat from external agencies due to its geo-strategic location in South Asia and the Indian Ocean.<sup>225</sup>

---

<sup>220</sup> Financial Intelligence Unit of the Central Bank of Sri Lanka, “National Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Risk Assessment of Sri Lanka 2014” (Colombo: Central Bank of Sri Lanka, 2014), 1. [http://fiusrilanka.gov.lk/docs/Other/Sri\\_Lanka\\_NRA\\_on\\_ML\\_2014\\_-\\_Sanitized\\_Report.pdf](http://fiusrilanka.gov.lk/docs/Other/Sri_Lanka_NRA_on_ML_2014_-_Sanitized_Report.pdf).

<sup>221</sup> Ibid., 2.

<sup>222</sup> Ibid., 1.

<sup>223</sup> Ibid., 3–5.

<sup>224</sup> Ibid., 4–5.

<sup>225</sup> Ibid., 5.

The ML and terrorist financing developments in the international arena after 9/11 prompted Sri Lanka to enact additional laws supplementing the Bribery Act of 1959 to combat ML by terrorist elements. Sri Lanka enacted the Prevention of Money Laundering Act No. 5 in 2006. According to Chethiya Goonasekara, this act covers “the crime and the resultant liability to activities such as transacting, receiving, processing, cancelling or investing property derived directly or otherwise from an unlawful activity with the knowledge that such property had been derived from such unlawful activity.”<sup>226</sup> Subsequently, to assist investigations, parliament enacted the Financial Transactions Reporting Act No. 6 in 2006, which set up the Financial Intelligence Unit that functions under the Central Bank of Sri Lanka.<sup>227</sup>

## 5. Trafficking of Illegal Arms

The demise of LTTE terrorism significantly reduced the magnitude of illegal arms flow to Sri Lanka.<sup>228</sup> Nevertheless, Sri Lankan security forces still recover LTTE arms caches. Because of the destruction of the LTTE’s military arms, no records on the whereabouts of these caches are available. Further, a large number of small arms has been circulating illegally all over the country, and criminals and underworld gangs hold these weapons.<sup>229</sup> Among the most recent cases was the seizure of 3,154 firearms and 770,059 rounds—belonging to a maritime security company that provides armed escorts for ships. The investigation further revealed that 3,322 firearms registered to the company have gone missing.<sup>230</sup> The investigation is still in progress. The volume of trafficking in illegal arms has dropped significantly in recent year. Even so, the arms already in the hands of criminals and the underworld, point to the widespread availability of such illegal firearms as AK 56s, AK 47s, different types of hand grenades, and explosives in the

---

<sup>226</sup> Chethiya Goonasekara, “Challenges in the Legal Regime to Deal with Money Laundering,” in *Resource Materials Series*, no. 83, 146th International Training (Tokyo: United Nations Asia and Far East Institute for the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders (UNAFEI), 2011), 69. <http://www.unafei.or.jp/english/pages/RMS/No83.htm>.

<sup>227</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>228</sup> Sutton and De Silva-Ranasingha, *Transnational Crimes in Sri Lanka*, 9.

<sup>229</sup> Vidya Abhayagunawadena, “The Need to Apprehend Illicit Small Arms.” *Daily Mirror*, February 8, 2015, <http://www.dailymirror.lk/63103/the-need-to-apprehend-illicit-small-arms>.

<sup>230</sup> *Ibid.*

Indian, Pakistani, and Afghan criminal market. These weapons can enter Sri Lanka easily through unprotected maritime corridors and pose a still greater threat.<sup>231</sup>

The firearms Ordinance No. 33 enacted in 1933 during the British colonial period has had a number of amendments over time, with the last amendment passed in 1996. The amended Firearms Ordinance No. 22 of 1996, however, does not match the present-day context, according to Abhayagunawardena.<sup>232</sup> Therefore, he suggests revising the ordinance or enacting a new ordinance that can meet the present-day situation. The Explosives Act No. 33 of 1969, the Offensive Weapons Act No. 18 of 1966, the Army Act, the Air Force Act, and the Police Ordinance No. 16 of 1865 amended in 1984 are the other applicable laws. Abhayagunawardena claims that the Police Ordinance, too, needs revision.<sup>233</sup> Further, according to Abhayagunawardena, the law in Sri Lanka requires that “a record of the acquisition, possession and transfer of privately held firearms be retained in an official register and only licensed gun-owners should lawfully acquire, possess or transfer a firearm or ammunition.”<sup>234</sup> However, in the post war Sri Lanka, the authorities are yet to conduct a proper inspection on such official registers with a comprehensive survey on the availability and legal possession of those firearms.<sup>235</sup> Moreover, the existing law does not specifically regulate the activities of arms brokers and transfer intermediaries.<sup>236</sup>

Sri Lanka has achieved some procedural success in regularizing small arms and light weapons proliferation in spite of lapses in the domestic law and enforcement.<sup>237</sup> Sri Lanka is one of the 44 countries to have established a proper country Point of Contact and a national commission to oversee the implementation of the United Nations

---

<sup>231</sup> Lal, “South Asian Organized Crime and Terrorist Network,” 299–302.

<sup>232</sup> Abhayagunawardena, “The Need to Apprehend Illicit Small Arms.”

<sup>233</sup> Ibid.

<sup>234</sup> Ibid.

<sup>235</sup> Ibid.

<sup>236</sup> Ibid.

<sup>237</sup> The Government of Sri Lanka, “Implementation of the United Nations Program of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in all its Aspects,” 1–5, <http://www.poa-iss.org/CASACountryProfile/PoANationalReports/2005@179@SriLanka.pdf>.

Organization for the Disarmament Program of Action. However, the report claims that due to lack of funds the devised program did not proceed as expected.<sup>238</sup>

## 6. Other Transnational Crime

The largest of the minor TOC includes the smuggling of gold from Sri Lanka to India. India imposed a 10-percent tax on the import of this precious metal in 2013, and Sri Lanka soon became a transit location for illegal smuggling of gold to India as this route avoids the high level of scrutiny given to those traveling from traditional gold smuggling routes, such as from Nepal by air and land.<sup>239</sup> Other minor TOC include large-scale copyright piracy, wildlife smuggling, counterfeiting currencies, and involvement in the Indian human organ trade.<sup>240</sup> Sri Lanka has been a transit location for psychotropics like codeine-based cough syrups. They are smuggled from India to Bhutan, Nepal, and Sri Lanka, and from Sri Lanka to Maldives. Pakistan is also a source country for Sri Lanka.<sup>241</sup>

## D. CONCLUSION

People were created to be loved. Things were created to be used. The reason why the world is in chaos is because things are being loved and people are being used

—Anonymous

This chapter has identified the increasing trend of TOC in Asia, South Asia, and Sri Lanka. The findings suggest that a clear increase in TOC has occurred during the recent past and that it is a part of a global trend, not only a regional or local phenomenon. Drug trafficking, human trafficking, money laundering, and trafficking of illegal arms take precedence over other types of organized crime. The significant profits that these

---

<sup>238</sup> Ibid.

<sup>239</sup> Rajendra Jadav, “India Imposes Gold Sales Tax on Top of Record Import Duty,” Reuters, February 29, 2016, <http://in.reuters.com/article/india-budget-gold-idINKCN0W20PO>.

<sup>240</sup> Sutton and De Silva-Ranasingha, *Transnational Crimes in Sri Lanka*, 10–11.

<sup>241</sup> INCB, “Report of the International Narcotic Control Board for 2012,” 85–86, [http://www.incb.org/documents/Publications/AnnualReports/AR2012/AR\\_2012\\_E\\_Chapter\\_III\\_Asia.pdf](http://www.incb.org/documents/Publications/AnnualReports/AR2012/AR_2012_E_Chapter_III_Asia.pdf).

illegal enterprises generate have made them especially attractive to criminal groups as well as insurgent and terrorist groups.

The author, in broad terms, believes that finding a lasting solution to the global issue of increasing TOC would be quite difficult until the core issues concerning the ultimate survival of the criminal groups are addressed. As these networks and practices are so deeply rooted, highly complex, and advanced, they would not be easy for the state apparatus to combat. Sometimes, the state itself sponsors these activities, as struggling governments may be economically dependent on such criminal enterprises. Sri Lankans, either willingly or unwillingly, have become embroiled in the quandary of contributing to TOC. The country's geo-strategic location, regional mafia, 30-year long battle with terrorism, and the inability of law enforcement, as well as corruption have been the major contributing factors. As Benjamin Franklin once said, "Justice would not be served until those who are unaffected are as outraged as those who are."

### III. NEW TERRORISM: AL QAEDA AND ABU SAYYAF GROUP

This chapter compares the origin, ideology, organization, criminal character, and terrorism of al Qaeda and ASG against new terrorism attributes. Allan Salem Jones identifies ASG as an organization that transformed itself from criminal organization to terrorist outfit over time.<sup>242</sup> Al Qaeda and ASG are two potential terrorist organizations with old and new terrorism characteristics that have varying types of involvement in criminal enterprises.

#### A. AL QAEDA

Al Qaeda is the first multinational terrorist group to emerge in the 21st century, according to Rohan Gunaratna.<sup>243</sup> As a terrorist organization, al Qaeda came to international awareness very recently, even though its leader, Osama Bin Laden, was known beforehand. As Jason Burke notes, a CIA report published in 1996 made the first reference to an organization called al Qaeda, which mentioned that Bin Laden formed a group to assist the Mujahedeen in Afghanistan to fight against the Soviets.<sup>244</sup> The level of secrecy the organization maintained was such that even dealing with similar terrorist organizations, al Qaeda kept its original identity under cover and used a broader umbrella term of Islamic Jihad or Muslim Brotherhood.<sup>245</sup> Al Qaeda virtually redefined terrorism, which had previously been a technique of protesting against an established system or a specific action.

#### 1. Origin and Background

According to Jason Burke, al Qaeda proper was formed after the Afghan war to prevent the number of Islamic extremist groups that fought in the Afghan war from disintegrating and to unify them under one umbrella organization with a common

---

<sup>242</sup> Salem, "Nexus of Crime and Terrorism: The Case of the Abu Sayyaf Group," 29–42.

<sup>243</sup> Rohan Gunaratna, *Inside al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror* (New York: Berkley Publishing Group, 2003), 1.

<sup>244</sup> Jason Burke, *Al Qaeda: The True Story of Radical Islam* (London: Penguin Books Ltd, 2003), 5.

<sup>245</sup> Gunaratna, *Inside al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror*, 4.

purpose: the global Jihad.<sup>246</sup> Al Qaeda saw its birth following two significant events in the central and Southeast Asian regions: the Iranian revolution and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. These two events prompted the emerging of hundreds of Islamic movements in Asia, Western Europe, Africa, the Caucasus, the Balkans, and the Middle East that ultimately toppled the Iranian Shah's regime and drove the Soviet Union out of Afghanistan.<sup>247</sup> Abdullah Azzam, an ideologue of Palestine-Jordan origin, who founded the Maktab al Khidmat lil Mujahideen al-Arab, also known as the Afghan Service Bureau, conceptualized al Qaeda. He was also the mentor of Bin Laden.<sup>248</sup>

Once Bin Laden assumed the leadership of al Qaeda, he quietly started distancing himself from Azzam over mostly ideological differences. After the assassination of Azzam, Dr. Ayman Muhammad Rabi' al-Zawahiri became the spiritual leader of al Qaeda, and Bin Laden had developed mutual respect for him over a period.<sup>249</sup> Further, Zawahiri had been influential in converting Bin Laden from a guerrilla to a terrorist. Thereafter, the Osama Bin Laden-Ayman Muhammad Rabi' al-Zawahiri combination worked well for al Qaeda until the death of Bin Laden in 2011.<sup>250</sup> Zawahiri has led the organization since then.

## **2. Ideology and Popular Discourse**

Al Qaeda's worldview that contributed to the formation of its ideology, according to Gunaratna, is as follows:

- Muslims are under attack by everyone.
- Only al Qaeda and its followers are fighting the oppressors of Islam.

---

<sup>246</sup> Jason Burke, *Al Qaeda: Casting a Shadow of Terror* (London: I..B. Tauris 2003), 8–9.

<sup>247</sup> Gunaratna, *Inside al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror*, 4.

<sup>248</sup> Rohan Gunaratna, "Al Qaeda's Ideology" (Washington, DC: Hudson Institute, May 19, 2005), <https://www.hudson.org/research/9777-al-qaeda-s-ideology>.

<sup>249</sup> *Ibid.*, 21–35.

<sup>250</sup> *Ibid.*



- If you are not supporting al Qaeda, then you are supporting the oppressors.<sup>251</sup>

Al Qaeda perceives its mission to be the pioneer organization that can rally all the agencies against Islamic oppression by the Western powers. Having realized that al Qaeda alone cannot accomplish this mission, it understands the need for a compelling message that can motivate the masses to instigate a revolution. Although al Qaeda's principal grievances are political, like old terrorism, its justification for using violence has been and is always religious, as with new terrorism.<sup>252</sup> As Tom Quiggin posits, the interviews conducted with jihadist detainees and their families after the Singapore Religious Rehabilitation Project uncovered eight main themes.<sup>253</sup> However, the young jihadists' interpretation of these concepts differed notably from those of Islamic scholars. The eight themes are described in the following subsections:<sup>254</sup>

(1) *Jihad or Struggle*

From al Qaeda's perspective, Jihad is war and is an "obligatory act for all Muslims."<sup>255</sup> Al Qaeda considers armed *jihad* as the utmost level of *Jihad* and it should be launched against all the oppressors of Islam.<sup>256</sup> By contrast, *jihad* means "striving for excellence" according to mainstream Islamic scholars.<sup>257</sup>

(2) *Bayat or Pledge*

Al Qaeda views *bayat* as a "pledge of obedience given to the *Emir* or the leader of a group" and once a *bayat* is given, it cannot be broken.<sup>258</sup> Anyone will be guilty of an exceptionally grave sin for breaking the pledge. In the view of Islamic scholars, *bayat*

---

<sup>251</sup> Tom Quiggin, "Understanding Al Qaeda's Ideology for Counter-Narrative Work," *Perspectives on Terrorism*, 3, no 2 (2009), <http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/67/html>.

<sup>252</sup> Burke, *Al Qaeda: Casting a Shadow of Terror*, 25.

<sup>253</sup> Quiggin, "Understanding Al Qaeda' Ideology for Counter-Narrative Work."

<sup>254</sup> Ibid.

<sup>255</sup> Ibid.

<sup>256</sup> Ibid.

<sup>257</sup> Ibid.

<sup>258</sup> Ibid.

becomes valid only with the consent of the majority of scholars and leaders of society.<sup>259</sup> Self-appointed individual leaders of different groups do not have the authority to take a *bayat* from someone, according to Islamic scholars.<sup>260</sup>

(3) *Daru Islam or Islamic State*

Al Qaeda's propaganda constantly uses this theme. It says that an Islamic State should be established in order to establish the religion. Therefore, financial and physical contributions by all Muslims to this end are obligatory.<sup>261</sup> Islamic scholars view that the term *Daru Islam* is a relative term without a precise or exact meaning. Therefore, killing or shedding blood in justification of *Daru Islam* is quite dangerous.<sup>262</sup>

(4) *The Ummah*

Al Qaeda believes that the *Ummah* refers to the Muslims as a whole; thus, those who do not believe or follow the rules become non-believers.<sup>263</sup> Muslim scholars' belief is that in Islam a single authority can make such a declaration. Further, the Medina charter believes in and encourages Muslim, Jewish, and Christian peaceful co-existence.<sup>264</sup>

(5) *Takfir*

According to al Qaeda, *Takfir* is the "action of accusing others of being infidels or non-believers."<sup>265</sup> Muslim scholars believe that the religion of Islam does not permit Muslims to proclaim anyone *Takfir*.<sup>266</sup>

---

<sup>259</sup> Ibid.

<sup>260</sup> Ibid.

<sup>261</sup> Ibid.

<sup>262</sup> Ibid.

<sup>263</sup> Ibid.

<sup>264</sup> Ibid.

<sup>265</sup> Ibid.

<sup>266</sup> Ibid.

(6) *Shaheed or Istisyhad*

Al Qaeda promotes its members committing suicidal acts to qualify them for *hijra* or migration to God, as suicidal acts make them *shaheed* or martyrs.<sup>267</sup> Only the almighty decides when to take back his physical remaining, and no exemptions exist in Islam.<sup>268</sup>

(7) *Al-Wala' Wal Bara'*

Al Qaeda thinks Islam is the only religion and that other religions must be destroyed.<sup>269</sup> Muslim scholars believe that Islam offers its blessings to all mankind because god created them, and they must respect each other.<sup>270</sup>

(8) *Hijrah or Migration*

According to al Qaeda, those who volunteer for *hijra* should abandon their loved ones, employment, physical belongings, and family obligations on behalf of god.<sup>271</sup> Muslim scholars believe in an interpretation of *hijra* very different from that of al Qaeda. In their view, it represents successive development, progress, and success in life.<sup>272</sup>

Al Qaeda has great potential to penetrate the minds of Muslims and to establish its popular discourse: the global Jihad or fight against the oppression of Muslims worldwide. As it reveals, the perception of young Jihadists is particularly extremist and dangerous in all the areas. According to Gunaratna, al Qaeda's persistent threat to humanity emanates not from its global infrastructure and extended membership but from its deeply appealing ideology among the Muslim community worldwide.<sup>273</sup> He further states that the principal aim of al Qaeda at present is to inspire and provoke worldwide Islamist movements to attack those perceived enemies of Islam.<sup>274</sup> Therefore, al Qaeda's

---

<sup>267</sup> Ibid.

<sup>268</sup> Ibid.

<sup>269</sup> Ibid.

<sup>270</sup> Ibid.

<sup>271</sup> Ibid.

<sup>272</sup> Ibid.

<sup>273</sup> Gunaratna, "Al Qaeda's Ideology."

<sup>274</sup> Ibid.

recruitment campaign is likely to attain notable successes not only among the Muslim majority countries but also among the poverty-stricken nations where Muslims are the minority.

### 3. Al Qaeda's Hybrid Character

Al Qaeda possesses both old and new terrorism attributes, making it a hybrid terrorist organization. As Gunaratna describes, al Qaeda has innovatively acquired and developed the best of both the old and new terrorism attributes in six ways:<sup>275</sup>

1. Al Qaeda while maintaining a hierarchical organization structure also operates a transnational network of affiliated groups under the banner of the Islamic Front for Jihad against the Jews and the Crusaders.<sup>276</sup> Consequently, permanent members of al Qaeda and members of its affiliates in conflict zones are professionally trained; it also has many amateur operatives in diaspora communities.<sup>277</sup>
2. Although al Qaeda is a global network, most of its affiliated groups are national or regional. All these groups believe in global Jihad: the umbrella model of al Qaeda.<sup>278</sup> The struggles of these groups are to establish Islamic States in their countries, which are therefore, political claims under religious motivation.<sup>279</sup>
3. Al Qaeda uses numerous sources to finance its operations. It received state support in Afghanistan during the period of 1996–2001 and in Sudan during 1991–1996.<sup>280</sup> Nevertheless, in the present world context, no state is willing to sponsor al Qaeda. Therefore, it invests in an array of business ventures worldwide both legal and illegal, including TOC.<sup>281</sup>
4. Establishing a global Islamic State or a caliphate is al Qaeda's eventual aim, which is clearly a new terrorism aspiration, but it is political in

---

<sup>275</sup> Rohan Gunaratna, "Al Qaeda Is an Example of a New Terrorism," in Stuart Gottlieb, *Debating Terrorism and Counterterrorism: Conflicting Perspectives on Causes, Contexts, and Responses* (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2014), 15–31.

<sup>276</sup> Ibid.

<sup>277</sup> Ibid.

<sup>278</sup> Ibid.

<sup>279</sup> Ibid.

<sup>280</sup> Ibid.

<sup>281</sup> Ibid.

nature.<sup>282</sup> Analysts of new terrorism argue that al Qaeda does not have a political agenda but is purely a religiously motivated organization.<sup>283</sup>

5. Gunaratna reveals that al Qaeda’s patience and delicate planning and execution of attacks makes it unique. Al Qaeda does not react to situations unprepared— “is not event-driven but campaign-driven.”<sup>284</sup> Gunaratna justifies his claim by citing the occasion when the United States fired 70 cruise missiles in Afghanistan following the East African bombing on August 7, 1998; al Qaeda remained patient while planning the 9/11 attack in 2001.<sup>285</sup> Further, Al-Qaeda intends to wage a generational war against those who oppress Muslims worldwide,<sup>286</sup> which is clearly a new terrorism attribute.
6. Al Qaeda, while strengthening its conventional capability to launch traditional style attacks, has also invested heavily in acquiring chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear capability (CBRN).<sup>287</sup> Mass destruction is a new terrorism attack outcome.<sup>288</sup>

Gunaratna continues, “[al Qaeda] is an unpredictable adversary precisely because it draws from both traditional and new terrorism.”<sup>289</sup> Therefore, al Qaeda satisfies the requirements to be recognized as a “hybrid” organization.

#### **4. Al Qaeda’s Global Network**

Al Qaeda is composed of a network of cells, as well as associate terrorists and guerrilla groups, including those different from other affiliated organizations. These diverse groups often exchange resources and expertise, devise strategy, and conduct joint operations, as Gunaratna explains.<sup>290</sup> (See Figure 8 for a depiction of al Qaeda’s global network.)

---

<sup>282</sup> Ibid.

<sup>283</sup> Ibid.

<sup>284</sup> Ibid.

<sup>285</sup> Ibid.

<sup>286</sup> Ibid.

<sup>287</sup> Ibid.

<sup>288</sup> Ibid.

<sup>289</sup> Ibid.

<sup>290</sup> Ibid., 127–128.




Figure 8. Al Qaeda Global Network.<sup>291</sup>

According to Figure 8, al Qaeda’s global network consists of three different kinds of elements: affiliate, associate, and influence. These elements take the forms of groups, cells, or individuals. Groups like al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb a group based in the Sahel region fighting to free North Africa of Western influence, and al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), a group established by merging Yemeni and Saudi branches of , operate in more than one country, sometimes in a whole region.<sup>292</sup> Similarly, groups such as Tehreek-e-Taliban, an alliance of Pakistani groups; the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan and its splinter group, the Islamic Jihad Union, seeking to establish an Islamic state in Uzbekistan; the Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement, a Uighur Chinese group attempting to create an Islamic state in western China; the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group, fighting to establish an Islamic state in Libya; and Abu Sayyaf Group, fighting for

<sup>291</sup> Michael B. Kelley, “Here Is What al Qaeda’s Global Network Looks Like,” *Business Insider - Military & Defense*, September 13, 2013, <http://www.businessinsider.com/chart-of-al-qedas-global-network-2013-9>.

<sup>292</sup> Gunaratna, “Al Qaeda Is an Example of a New Terrorism,” 15–31.

a separate state in the Philippines, operate in their respective countries while connected to al Qaeda’s global network.<sup>293</sup> (See Table 5 for a comparison of various groups’ areas of operation within the Islamist movement.)

Table 5. Al Qaeda’s Global Presence.<sup>294</sup>

Islamist Movement	Regions							
	East Asia	Eurasia	Europe	Latin America	Middle East and North Africa	North America	South Asia	Sub-Saharan Africa
Al Qaeda	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Boko Haram								X
Fetullah Gülen	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Hezbollah	X		X	X	X	X		X
Hizb ut-Tahrir	X	X	X		X	X	X	
Lashkar-e Taiba			X		X		X	
Muslim Brotherhood			X		X	X		X
Tablighi Jama'at	X	X	X		X	X	X	X
Taliban			X		X		X	

*X = Islamist movement operates or has an organized presence in the designated region*

As Table 5 depicts, al Qaeda has its presence in all the considered regions. Al Qaeda is the only Islamist movement with an extremist ideology involving violence that has a global presence other than the Fetullah Gulen organization, which the international community considers as a moderate, nonviolent Islamic movement. Most importantly, a comparison of Figures 1 and 2 suggests that all the violent extremist Islamic movements are al Qaeda affiliates, are associated with Al-Qaeda, or al Qaeda has influence over them. The extent of the al Qaeda network clearly indicates the potential impact it can have on global security.

<sup>293</sup> Ibid.

<sup>294</sup> “World Overview,” The American Foreign Policy Council’s World Almanac of Islamism, accessed August 7, 2017, <http://almanac.afpc.org/overview>.

The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria was an affiliate in Iraq initially known as al Qaeda in the Land of Two Rivers. ISIS, fundamentally composed of Sunni Muslims, was born as an informal insurgency along tribal lines in Iraq after the invasion of the U.S.-led coalition in 2003, according to Burke.<sup>295</sup> Burke further elaborates that the founder of ISIS, Abu Musab al-Zarkawi, initially worked with Bin Laden but broke away subsequently because of ideological differences.<sup>296</sup> Zarkawi folded his in the Land of Two Rivers into a broader coalition of Islamic militant groups, re-designating the organization as Majlis Shura al-Mujahedeen or the Mujahedeen Advisory Council of Iraq.<sup>297</sup> The United States bombed and killed Zarkawi in June 2006. The successive leaders of the 2006–2010 period, too, had to succumb to U.S. bombing when the new chief Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, a young educated Sunni took control of the organization. Baghdadi re-designated the organization as the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) and subsequently expanded to Syria, making ISIS the most dangerous terrorist organization in contemporary history.<sup>298</sup> According to Aryaman Bhatnagar and Wilson John, ISIS strives to strengthen the global *Jihad* movement in order to establish a greater Islamic State, which is exactly al Qaeda’s end state, simultaneously challenging the hegemony.<sup>299</sup> Against this backdrop, the two most powerful and ruthless terrorist organizations having similar aspirations, and although they are opposing each other at present, they might cooperate in the future, posing a greater danger to world security.

## 5. Asia: Al Qaeda’s New Theater

The Asian counterparts of al Qaeda did not have the right motivation, training, and leadership at the outset to put them on par with their Arab allies, according to Gunaratna.<sup>300</sup> Indoctrination, training, and leadership improved them a great deal to

---

<sup>295</sup> Jason Burke, *The New Threat: The Past, Present, and Future of Islamic Militancy* (New York: The New York Press, 2015), 56–104.

<sup>296</sup> Kelley, “Here Is What Al Qaeda’s Global Network Looks Like.”

<sup>297</sup> Ibid.

<sup>298</sup> Ibid.

<sup>299</sup> Aryaman Bhatnagar and Wilson John, *Resurgence of Al Qaeda in South Asia in Post-US Drawdown* (New Delhi: Observer Research Foundation, July 2015).

<sup>300</sup> Gunaratna, *Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror*, 223.



match or even exceed those allies, as Gunaratna further claims.<sup>301</sup> Al Qaeda did not find it difficult to recruit several hundred from Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan mainly because the Muslim communities living in those countries expected that successor states of the USSR would restore Islam as the guiding principle of politics.<sup>302</sup> As the successor regimes in the region remained secular in outlook, however, Islamic movements started revolting against those regimes, leaving an environment conducive for to cultivate its extremist seeds.<sup>303</sup>

Al Qaeda's influence has been embedded in the regions of East Asia and the Asia Pacific. Gunaratna posits that the Mahaz-e Islami party in Myanmar, thought to have links with al Qaeda and hundreds of Muslims from Rohingya province, joined al Qaeda.<sup>304</sup> At the same time, nearly 200,000 Myanmar Muslims fled to Bangladesh in 1992 because of the atrocities, leaving a fertile recruitment base for Islamic extremism.<sup>305</sup> Meanwhile, in Thailand today, the Pattani United Liberation Organization (PULO) and the New PULO are waging a separatist struggle in the southern part of that country. Although intelligence has not revealed any links to al Qaeda, the Islamic character of the separatist movement in Thailand has grown dramatically.<sup>306</sup> Elsewhere, al Qaeda directly supported and trained the ASG and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) in the Philippines.<sup>307</sup> Jemaah Islamiyyah (JI), an al Qaeda affiliate had significant links and training facilities in Singapore, Malaysia, and Indonesia. However, Islamic extremism has not been popular in Singapore because of the greater political freedom and freedom of travel granted to all citizens; thus, foreign nationals ran most of the JI activities.<sup>308</sup>

---

301 Ibid.

302 Ibid., 224–229.

303 Ibid.

304 Ibid., 271–272.

305 Ibid.

306 Ibid., 270–271.

307 Ibid., 232–264.

308 Ibid.

Consequently, al Qaeda has links to the Uighur Movement in Xinjiang province of western China. Hundreds of Uighurs have joined al Qaeda and ISIS, and are fighting in Iraq and Syria.<sup>309</sup> The lack of a sizeable Muslim diaspora community has hindered al Qaeda from having a permanent presence in Japan and South Korea.<sup>310</sup> On the other hand, al Qaeda did establish several fundraising support cells in Sydney, Melbourne, and Adelaide in Australia in the 1990s. Also in the late 1990s, an investigation in Singapore revealed significant JI presence in Australia, opening the possibilities for terrorist attacks.<sup>311</sup> Ultimately, al Qaeda's Asian arm, the JI, aims to establish an Islamic republic unifying Malaysia, Indonesia, Brunei, Southern Thailand, and Mindanao in the Philippines. Thus, al Qaeda established its south Asian branch of al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent, or AQIS, in 2014.<sup>312</sup> Since then, al Qaeda's influence in the Asian region not only remains intact but is growing at a steady pace despite the demise of Bin Laden and the subsequent U.S.-led "war on terror."

## **6. Al Qaeda in South Asia**

South Asia is an epicenter of terrorism in many ways. Especially, since terrorist elements operating in the Pakistan-Afghanistan region acquired a greater expertise to launch deadly attacks, such as the 2008 Mumbai attack, the 2014 Karachi international airport attack, and the 2014 Peshawar attack. According to Bhatnagar and John, Bin Laden had a few reasons to select Afghanistan as his base. Bin Laden's close association with Mujahedeen leaders like Jalaludin Haqqani and Abdul Rassoul Sayyaf; an alliance with the Taliban; and the enabling environment that prevailed at the time were paramount.<sup>313</sup> Consequently, the civil war that overwhelmed Afghanistan with the withdrawal of Soviet troops, too, created a healthy environment and did not attract much attention from the international community, prompting al Qaeda to settle down in Afghanistan as a

---

<sup>309</sup> Ibid., 229–232.

<sup>310</sup> Ibid., 272.

<sup>311</sup> Ibid., 272–274.

<sup>312</sup> Burke, *The New Threat: The Past, Present, and Future of Islamic Militancy*, 128.

<sup>313</sup> Bhatnagar and John, "Resurgence of Al Qaeda in South Asia in Post-US Drawdown."

permanent base.<sup>314</sup> The Bangladeshi Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islam organization was founded in 1992 to recruit volunteers to fight in Kashmir and Afghanistan. Al Qaeda provided arms and training for the organization's members.<sup>315</sup>

Of all the Al-Qaeda affiliates, AQIS is the youngest. The al Qaeda emir Dr. Ayman al Zawahiri released a video on September 4, 2014, announcing the formation of AQIS as the newest regional branch of the global jihadist group.<sup>316</sup> Zawahiri incorporated Pakistani, Afghan, and Indian jihadist groups that have operated for an extended period in forming this new regional branch.<sup>317</sup> Zawahiri noted that

AQIS is the fruit of a blessed effort for more than two years to gather the mujahedeen in the Indian subcontinent into a single entity to be with the main group, Qaedat al-Jihad, from the soldiers of the Islamic Emirate and its triumphant emir, Allah permitting, Emir of the Believers Mullah Muhammad Omar Mujahid.<sup>318</sup>

Al Qaeda leadership appointed Asim Umar—a former Taliban commander in Pakistan—as the emir of AQIS in 2014. This appointment itself demonstrates the regional flavor and the extent of Pakistani jihadists' influence over the new al Qaeda branch.<sup>319</sup> The creation of AQIS proved the close operational affiliation between al Qaeda and other regional jihadist groups that existed for a long time, according to Bill Roggio.<sup>320</sup> The elements likely included in the formation of AQIS, according to Reed are:

- Afghan Taliban (Afghanistan)

---

<sup>314</sup> Ibid.

<sup>315</sup> Gunaratna, *Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror*, 292–293.

<sup>316</sup> Ellen Barry, “Al Qaeda Opens New Branch on Indian Subcontinent,” *New York Times*, September 4, 2014, <https://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/05/world/asia/al-qaeda-announces-new-branch-on-indian-subcontinent.html>.

<sup>317</sup> Bill Roggio, “Al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent Incorporates Regional Jihadist Groups,” *FDD's Long War Journal*, September 5, 2014, [http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2014/09/analysis\\_al\\_qaeda\\_in.php](http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2014/09/analysis_al_qaeda_in.php).

<sup>318</sup> Counter Extremism Project, “Al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent,” accessed August 4, 2017, [https://www.counterextremism.com/sites/default/files/threat\\_pdf/Al-Qaeda%20in%20the%20Indian%20Subcontinent%20%28AQIS%29-09142016.pdf](https://www.counterextremism.com/sites/default/files/threat_pdf/Al-Qaeda%20in%20the%20Indian%20Subcontinent%20%28AQIS%29-09142016.pdf).

<sup>319</sup> Ibid.

<sup>320</sup> Roggio, “Al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent Incorporates Regional Jihadist Groups.”

- Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) (Pakistan)
- Harkat-ul-Jihad al-Islami (HuJI) (Bangladesh and Pakistan)
- Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HuM) (disputed Kashmir region)
- Harkat-ul-Mujahideen al Almi (HuMA) (Pakistan)
- Brigade 313 (Pakistan)
- Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM) (Pakistan)
- Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ) (Pakistan)
- Jundullah (Pakistan)
- Ansar ut-Tawhid wa al Jihad in Kashmir (disputed Kashmir region)
- Ansar al Islam Bangladesh (Bangladesh)
- Ansarullah Bangla Team (ABT) (Bangladesh)
- Indian Mujahideen (IM) (India)
- Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) (Pakistan)
- Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (Pakistan)
- Turkistan Islamic Party (Pakistan)<sup>321</sup>

AQIS recently released a 20-page code of conduct for all Jihadists all over the world to follow.<sup>322</sup> However, Sajid Farid Shapoo claims that the release intends more than what the content carries. The core message is to regain leadership that ISIS had lost, which exploited greater success in Syria. On the other hand, AQIS is the only regional affiliate over which al Qaeda Central (AC) has direct control because of geographic

---

<sup>321</sup> Alastair Reed, "Al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent: A New Frontline in the Global Jihadist Movement," ICCT Policy Brief (Hague: International Centre for Counter-terrorism, May 2015) 1–24, doi: 10.19165/2016.2.02.

<sup>322</sup> As-Sahab Media Subcontinent, "Code of Conduct," Al Qaeda in Subcontinent, accessed August 4, 2017, [https://azelin.files.wordpress.com/2017/06/al-qacc84\\_idah-in-the-indian-subcontinent-22code-of-conduct22-en.pdf](https://azelin.files.wordpress.com/2017/06/al-qacc84_idah-in-the-indian-subcontinent-22code-of-conduct22-en.pdf).

proximity.<sup>323</sup> Therefore, al Qaeda's grand strategy may have had greater hopes in AQIS launching its next wave of actions in the global Jihad. Yet, AQIS, in spite of its vision of fighting a war in the Indian subcontinent, only achieved success in minor terrorist activities, such as killing individual bloggers in Bangladesh and [unsuccessfully] attempting to hijack two Pakistani navy vessels; it has failed to conduct a single major attack since its inception.<sup>324</sup> As Kirit Nair argues, "AQIS is unlikely to gain traction as India's democratic dispensation provides Indian Muslims freedom, liberty and media exposure to a level unheard of in most of the Islamic world."<sup>325</sup> Nevertheless, with 530 million Muslim people living in the region, the U.S. drawdown in Afghanistan, poverty, and political instability in the region, AQIS could gain momentum at any time.

## 7. Al Qaeda Alliances with Transnational Criminal Syndicates

Al Qaeda and its affiliates increasingly cooperate with criminal syndicates to gain benefits for both parties. Rachel Ehrenfield claims that al Qaeda Central supports and inspires its affiliates and many other Islamic organizations through its own resources. The resources come from a range of illegal activities, ranging from drug trafficking to kidnapping for ransom.<sup>326</sup> Nathan Vardi asserts that al Qaeda has resorted to sources of illegal funding as traditional sources, such as donations from billionaires, have dried up after the U.S. crackdown.<sup>327</sup> India confirmed in a UN links questionnaire in 2004 that they have observed links between TOC and terrorist groups in their country, according to

---

<sup>323</sup> Sajid Farid Shapoo, "Al-Qaeda's South Asia Branch Makes a Bid for Global Jihad Leadership: The New Code of Conduct from AQIS is an Attempt to Wrest back Leadership from Islamic State," *The Diplomat*, July 29, 2017.

<sup>324</sup> Reed, "Al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent," 11–12.

<sup>325</sup> Kirit K. Nair, "India's Role in Afghanistan Post 2014 Strategy, Policy and Implementation," Manekshaw Paper no. 55 (New Delhi: Centre for Land Warfare Studies, 2015), [http://www.claws.in/images/publication\\_pdf/1330417563\\_MP55PreintversioninsideKirit.pdf](http://www.claws.in/images/publication_pdf/1330417563_MP55PreintversioninsideKirit.pdf).

<sup>326</sup> Rachel Ehrenfield, "Drug Trafficking, Kidnapping Fund Al Qaeda," CNN, May 4, 2011, <http://www.cnn.com/2011/OPINION/05/03/ehrenfeld.al.qaeda.funding/index.html>.

<sup>327</sup> Nathan Vardi, "Al Qaeda's New Business Model: Cocaine and Human Trafficking," *Forbes*, December 18, 2009, <https://www.forbes.com/2009/12/18/al-qaeda-cocaine-business-beltway-al-qaeda.html>.

Yvon Dandurand and Vivienne Chin.<sup>328</sup> India claimed that terrorist and criminal groups cooperated in operational, logistical, financing, and ideological aspects in India.<sup>329</sup>

Rollie Lal posits that D-Company, one of South Asia's largest criminal groups and designated by the United States as an al Qaeda supporter, allied with al Qaeda and the TTP.<sup>330</sup> Dawood Ibrahim, leader of D-Company, used his criminal group to conduct the 1993 Mumbai bombing. Similarly, the Taliban in Afghanistan controls much of the opiate and heroin market in Afghanistan, probably the largest opiate and heroin producer in the world. Lal furthers his claim to include the involvement of Aftab Ansari, a renowned kidnapper based in Dubai who provides extensive financial assistance to terrorist groups and the Purulia arms-drop case to illustrate the vast scale of organized criminal syndicates' support for terrorist activities.<sup>331</sup>

The northern route, Afghanistan-East Asia-Russia, is a dominant one that strategically connects probably the largest producer of opiates (Afghanistan) and a leading consumer of opiates (Russia).<sup>332</sup> Liana E. Reyes and Shlomi Dinar claim that other than opiates, this route is renowned for smuggling cigarettes, hashish, weapons, and human beings.<sup>333</sup> According to UNODC estimates, "the opiate market alone is worth \$65 billion and Afghanistan produces 80–90 percent of it."<sup>334</sup> The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) originated as an Uzbek insurgent movement that spread to Tajikistan–Kyrgyzstan–Afghanistan. The IMU subsequently acquired a criminal character by becoming a drug trafficking group and entered into a strategic partnership with the

---

<sup>328</sup> Yvon Dandurand and Vivienne Chin, "Links between Terrorism and Other Forms of Crime," (Vancouver: International Centre for Criminal Law Reform and Criminal Justice Policy, December 2004), 9–11.

<sup>329</sup> Ibid.,

<sup>330</sup> Lal, "South Asian Organized Crime and Terrorist Networks," 294.

<sup>331</sup> Ibid.

<sup>332</sup> Liana Eustacia Reyes and Shlomi Dinar, "The Convergence Terrorism and Transnational Crime in Central Asia," *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 38, no. 5 (December 2005): 383, doi: 10.1080/1057610X.2014.995988.

<sup>333</sup> Ibid., 381.

<sup>334</sup> UNODC, "World Drug Report 2010." 48–49, [https://www.unodc.org/documents/wdr/WDR\\_2010/World\\_Drug\\_Report\\_2010\\_lo-res.pdf](https://www.unodc.org/documents/wdr/WDR_2010/World_Drug_Report_2010_lo-res.pdf).

“Afghan drug mafia,” according to Reyes and Dinar.<sup>335</sup> The mixture of ethnicity and insurgencies in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas in Pakistan, Afghanistan and their counterparts in the central Asian region is quite favorable for the heroin trade.<sup>336</sup> Therefore, the Taliban, the IMU, the TTP, the Haqqani Network, the Islamic Jihadi Union, and the Lakshar-e-Islam exploit the drug trade to finance their recruitment and operations, and have strong links to al Qaeda.

Al Qaeda’s involvement in criminal enterprises is clearly visible in the African and Arabian peninsulas. The Sahel region in sub-Saharan Africa, has long offered sanctuary for criminals smuggling persons, automobiles, gasoline, and cigarettes.<sup>337</sup> International drug smugglers easily merge and become intertwined using the same routes. AQIM, an African affiliate of al Qaeda, is cooperating with these criminal syndicates in the drug trade and kidnapping for ransom.<sup>338</sup> Daniella Bove-LaMonica relates that the arrest of AQIM members in 2009 revealed that they worked closely with the Colombian narco-terrorist group FARC to traffic cocaine to Europe through West Africa.<sup>339</sup> Vardi confirms this claim, asserting the statement filed in courts by the Drug Enforcement Administration noted that one out of the three arrested was the head of a criminal group that transported two ton-consignments of hashish to Tunisia and had close connections with al Qaeda affiliates in North Africa.<sup>340</sup> The same group was involved in smuggling human cargo from Bangladesh, Pakistan, and India into Spain.<sup>341</sup> Similarly, as Michael Titus and David H. Gray claim, in the Arabian Peninsula, AQAP is funded through drug trade, bank robberies, running fake charities, and illegal taxes. Further, the organization

---

<sup>335</sup> Ibid., 383–387.

<sup>336</sup> Ibid., 384–385.

<sup>337</sup> Erik Alda and Joseph L. Sala, “Links between Terrorism, Organized Crime, and Crime: The Case of the Sahel Region,” *Stability: International Journal of Security and Development* 3, no. 1 (2014), 5 <http://www.stabilityjournal.org/articles/10.5334/sta.ea/>.

<sup>338</sup> Ibid

<sup>339</sup> Daniella Bove-LaMonica, “Al Qaeda and Drug Trafficking a Dangerous Partnership,” *Mic*, June 4, 2011, <https://mic.com/articles/504/al-qaeda-and-drug-trafficking-a-dangerous-partnership#.30yrdUzkq>.

<sup>340</sup> Vardi, “Al Qaeda’s New Business Model: Cocaine and Human Trafficking.”

<sup>341</sup> Ibid.

has accumulated a large sum of money through hostage ransoms, too, according to U.S. Treasury officials.<sup>342</sup>

Juan Miguel del Cid Gomez claims that al Qaeda and its affiliates have diversified their fundraising activities to sustain global Jihad.<sup>343</sup> These groups have employed organized crime to varying degrees based on the existing situation in their areas of operation.<sup>344</sup> According to Gomez, quite often, distinguishing terrorist groups, insurgents, and organized criminal syndicates has been quite difficult, as the lines are becoming increasingly blurred.<sup>345</sup>

## **B. THE ABU SAYYAF GROUP IN THE PHILIPPINES**

The ASG, although limited to the Philippine territory, possesses most of the new terrorism characteristics. With its increased involvement in TOC, the ASG is a perfect example of the TOC-terrorism nexus. The criminal tactics that ASG membership mastered makes their terrorist activities increasingly fatal, according to Allan Jones A. Salem.<sup>346</sup> The ASG is an al Qaeda affiliate that operates in the Muslim majority province of Mindanao in the Philippines, aiming to establish an Islamic State.<sup>347</sup> In comparison to al Qaeda, ASG has a limited international character, strengths, and weaknesses, as well as frequent fluctuations between terrorism and criminality, depending on its leadership; therefore, this section examining ASG has certain differences from the al Qaeda section.

---

<sup>342</sup> Michael Titus and David H. Gray, “Suppressing the Growth of Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula: An Examination of the Resurgence of AQAP in Yemen and Policies the United States Can Employ to Mitigate the Threat,” *Global Security Studies* 6, No 3 (Summer 2015): 20.

<sup>343</sup> Juan Miguel Del Cid Gomez, “A Financial Profile of the Terrorism of Al Qaeda and Its Affiliates,” *Perspectives on Terrorism* 4, no 4 (2010), accessed August 21, 2017, <http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/113/html>.

<sup>344</sup> Ibid.

<sup>345</sup> Ibid.

<sup>346</sup> Allan Jones A. Salem, “Nexus of Crime and Terrorism: the Case of the Abu Sayyaf Group” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2016). See also Eusaguito A. Manalo, “The Philippine Response to Terrorism: The Abu Sayyaf Group” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2004).

<sup>347</sup> Ibid.



## 1. Origin and Background

The Islamic separatism and secessionist movement in the southern Philippines led by an aggrieved Muslim minority dates back 400 years, according to Zachary Abuza.<sup>348</sup> He contends that western Mindanao, Basilan, Tawi-Tawi, and the Sulu archipelago represent the Muslim dominated territory. Notably, this area of the Philippines has 15 of the country's poorest provinces, with the lowest life expectancy.<sup>349</sup> Quan Li and Drew Schaub state that underdevelopment and poverty provide a "breeding ground for terrorism" and is a primary cause of transnational terrorism.<sup>350</sup> The large Muslim population living in Indonesia and southern Philippines, such as Basilan, Sulawesi, and Maluku, which have extended unpoliced maritime boundaries, provides a sanctuary for breeding international terrorist groups, according to Andrew Tan and Kumar Ramakrishna.<sup>351</sup>

The growth of Islamic fundamentalism in the Philippines was evident in the mid-1970s mainly through the Islamic educational scholarships offered by the Muslims living in Arab world, Libya, and Iran.<sup>352</sup> Islamic clerics living in Mindanao received this education for years and once returned, formed Islamic fundamentalist groups.<sup>353</sup> Similarly, Ustadz Abdurajak Abubakar Janjalani, who founded the ASG, earned a master's degree in Egypt and Syria; upon his return to the Philippines, he joined a Muslim fundamentalist movement called *Al Islamic Tabligh*.<sup>354</sup> Janjalani had visited Islamic countries such as Syria, the Arab

---

<sup>348</sup> Zachary Abuza, *Militant Islam in Southeast Asia: Crucible of Terror* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2003), 35.

<sup>349</sup> *Ibid.*, 34.

<sup>350</sup> Quan Li and Drew Schaub, "Economic Globalization and Transnational Terrorism, A Pooled Time-Series Analysis," *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 48, no. 2 (2004): 235.

<sup>351</sup> Andrew Tan and Kumar Ramakrishna, *The New Terrorism: Anatomy, Trends and Counter-Strategies* (Singapore: Eastern Universities Press, 2002), 12.

<sup>352</sup> "Handout on the Abu Sayyaf Group," Combat Arms School, Training and Doctrine Command, Philippine Army, 2007, quoted in Salem, "Nexus of Crime and Terrorism: the Case of the Abu Sayyaf Group," 31.

<sup>353</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>354</sup> Manalo, "Philippine Response to Terrorism: The Abu Sayyaf Group," 31.

world, and Pakistan meeting many imams. The al Qaeda leader Osama Bin Laden had pledged to assist Janjalani in forming an extremist group.<sup>355</sup>

The teaching of Abdul Rasul Sayyaf, an Afghan resistance leader and Islamic professor, on Wahhabi theology influenced Janjalani to an even greater extent. Janjalani, with his Mujahedeen experience in the Afghan war, formed an unnamed group in 1989.<sup>356</sup> In 1990, the group adapted the name Mujahedeen Commando Freedom Fighters.<sup>357</sup> The group consisted mostly of the breakaway factions of the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and was the origin of ASG.<sup>358</sup> Janjalani designated the organization as the ASG in honor of his mentor professor Abdul Rasul Sayyaf in August 1991, with the vision of establishing an Islamic State in Mindanao based on Wahhabi teaching. In Arabic “Abu Sayyaf” means “Father of the Swordsman,” but some scholars have interpreted the term wrongly as “Bearer of the Sword.”<sup>359</sup> In 1994, Janjalani temporarily re-designated the organization as *Al-Harakatul Al-Islamiyah* (AHAI) to solicit aid from the Middle East while maintaining its original vision of an organization that is “highly organized, systematic, and disciplined.”<sup>360</sup>

The ASG believes that the peace agreement between the MNLF and the Philippine government, signed in 1996, betrayed Muslim peoples’ rights.<sup>361</sup> According to Abuza, the ASG’s attempts to sabotage the peace talks were evident during the early days

---

<sup>355</sup> Rommel Banlaoi, *Al-Harakatul Al-Islamiyah: Essays on the Abu Sayyaf Group*, 3rd ed. (Quezon City: Philippine Institute for Peace, Violence, and Terrorism Research, 2012), 52–53.

<sup>356</sup> Garret Atkinson, “ASG: The Father of the Swordsman” (Washington, DC: American Security Project, March 2012), 1, <https://www.americansecurityproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/03/Abu-Sayyaf-The-Father-of-the-Swordsman.pdf>.

<sup>357</sup> Ibid.

<sup>358</sup> Alfredo Filler, “The Abu Sayyaf Group: A Growing Menace to Civil Society,” *Terrorism and Political Violence* 14, no. 4 (Winter 2002): 131.

<sup>359</sup> Atkinson, “ASG: The Father of the Swordsman.”

<sup>360</sup> Banlaoi, *Al-Harakatul Al-Islamiyah*, 52–53.

<sup>361</sup> Zack Fellman, “Abu Sayyaf Group,” Case Study no. 5 (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic Studies and International Studies, November 2011): 2.

of the MNLF-ASG split.<sup>362</sup> Consequently, ASG believes that the agony of economic marginalization, apparent oppression, and injustices that Filipino Muslims suffer have not diminished because of the peace agreement.<sup>363</sup> The Philippine government labelled the ASG as a terrorist organization after the bombing of the Christian missionary ship, M/V Doulos, docked at the Zamboanga City port in 1991.<sup>364</sup> During 1993–1995, the ASG conducted numerous kidnapping for ransom (KFR) activities, including abducting locals and foreign nationals.<sup>365</sup> Despite its involvement in KFR activities, the ASG continued with the original outlook of Islamic terrorism; Abubakar Janjalani made a genuine effort to return the organization to its original version. The death of Abubakar Janjalani in 1998 marked the next stage of the ASG, with a leadership vacuum that pushed the organization toward factionalization.<sup>366</sup> Rommel Banlaoi claims that the United States’ branding of the ASG as a foreign terrorist organization after 9/11 further pushed the organization toward terrorism.<sup>367</sup>

## 2. Ideology and Popular Discourse

The ASG’s vision since its formation has been to establish an “independent Islamic Theocratic State of Mindanao,” that provides the land for Muslims to “follow Islam in its purest and strictest form,” according to Abubakar Janjalani.<sup>368</sup> Renato Cruz De Castro claims that the ASG attempted to combine both ethno-religious and ethno-nationalistic ideology with criminality.<sup>369</sup> Similarly, the fundamental reason for the

---

<sup>362</sup> Zachary Abuza, *Balik-Terrorism: The Return of the ASG* (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, Army War College, 2005) 2, <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?PubID=625>.

<sup>363</sup> Banlaoi, *Al-Harakatul Al-Islamiyah*, 25.

<sup>364</sup> *Ibid.*, 17.

<sup>365</sup> Luke M. Gerdes, Kristine Ringler, and Barbara Autin, “Assessing the Abu Sayyaf Group’s Strategic and Learning Capacities,” *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 37, no. 3 (2014): 268, doi: 10.1080/1057610X.2014.872021.

<sup>366</sup> Rommel Banlaoi, *Counter Terrorism Measures in Southeast Asia: How Effective Are They?* (Yuchengco Center, De La Salle University, Manila, 2009), 50.

<sup>367</sup> Banlaoi, *Al-Harakatul Al-Islamiyah*, 90.

<sup>368</sup> Renato Cruz De Castro, “Abstract of Counter-Insurgency in the Philippines and the Global War on Terror. Examining the Dynamics of the Twenty-first Century Long Wars,” *European Journal of East Asian Studies* 9 (2010): 144, doi: 10.1163/156805810X517706.

<sup>369</sup> *Ibid.*

ASG's existence, as Atkinson asserts, was to demand, "Justice for all oppressed Muslims living in Mindanao."<sup>370</sup> He further states that Wahhabi Islam motivated Janjalani through religious education and radicalization in the Middle East.<sup>371</sup> Banaloi asserts that the Islamic Republic of Iran's political and social structure, which is "free from infidels or non-believers in Islam," is the model that the ASG intended to apply in its Islamic caliphate of Mindanao.<sup>372</sup> Therefore, the ASG embarked on an extreme radicalization to attain a high degree of dedication and commitment—both political and religious—to maintain the integrity of the organization.<sup>373</sup> However, ASG's criminal identity did not really match this extreme politico-religious identity. The organization fluctuated between a criminal identity and a terrorist identity from time to time.

### **3. Leadership Succession and Changing Organizational Structure**

Abubakar Janjalani established the ASG as an Islamist extremist organization and exercised reasonable control over the entire organization initially. The ASG in practice, more or less, had a horizontal organization with autonomous sub groups. (See Figure 9.)

---

<sup>370</sup> Atkinson, "ASG: The Father of the Swordsman," 4–5.

<sup>371</sup> Ibid.

<sup>372</sup> Banaloi, *Al-Harakatul Al-Islamiyah*, 53.

<sup>373</sup> Ibid.




Figure 9. ASG Organization Envisioned by Abubakar Janjalani.<sup>374</sup>

As Figure 9 depicts, Janjalani envisioned a formal organization with a reasonable hierarchy to conduct its peaceful organizational functions. He established a separate component (the Mujahedeen Al-Sharifullah) to conduct military activities to support peaceful demands. Nevertheless, successful efforts by the Philippine government and the security forces, coupled with intelligence operations, neutralized ASG leadership, its *Amir* Abubakar Janjalani, in 1998.<sup>375</sup> The demise of Janjalani brought a leadership vacuum and factionalized the organization into two groups: one led by Ghalib Adang and the other by Khadaffy Janjalani, Abubakar’s younger brother.<sup>376</sup> Under Adang’s leadership, though factionalized, the ASG moved more toward criminal enterprise. Adang’s death in 2004 made Khadaffy Janjalani the eventual successor to ASG’s leadership, and he managed to control the entire organization with the support of some sub-commanders and redirect the organizational effort toward its original vision.<sup>377</sup>

Banlaoi claims that two major autonomous factions operate in Basilan and Sulu provinces of southern Mindanao and notably the two have factionalized further.<sup>378</sup> The

<sup>374</sup> Ibid., 35.

<sup>375</sup> Banlaoi, *Counter Terrorism Measures in Southeast Asia: How Effective Are They?* 50.

<sup>376</sup> Atkinson, “Abu Sayyaf: The Father of the Swordsman,” 6.

<sup>377</sup> Ibid.

<sup>378</sup> Banlaoi, *Al-Harakatul Al-Islamiyah*, 53.

ASG does not have a central leadership; as a result, different factions carry dissimilar motives from “Islamic extremism to pure banditry.”<sup>379</sup> Luke Gerdes, Kristine Ringler, and Barbara Autin claim the ASG is capable of shifting from criminality to extremism; thus, it poses a greater danger to Southeast Asian security.<sup>380</sup> Yet, at the same time, ASG earned 250 million PHP in 2014 through ransom as opposed to 48 million in 2013 and 139 million in 2012, according to Salem.<sup>381</sup> Therefore, the level of affection ASG members have for criminality suggests that the organization has moved away from its original ideology toward criminal enterprise.

#### **4. Strengths and Capabilities**

The death of ASG leader Abubakar Janjalani and a series of successive leaders have been a major shock to ASG’s effectiveness as a terrorist group. Nevertheless, Ferdinand B. Napuli claims that in spite of the reduction of ASG’s operational strength to approximately 400 combatants in 2016, the groups still can stage concerted acts of terrorism because of its ability to harness huge local support from the Muslim community.<sup>382</sup> The ASG’s support base in the remote mountainous areas in Sulu makes counterterrorist operations of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) harder, according to Burnham and Merrill.<sup>383</sup> Banalaoi contends that the ASG is capable of launching small scale but “high impact terrorist attacks” anywhere in the country and is not confined to Zamboanga Peninsula, Basilan, and Sulu.<sup>384</sup> The ASG is also capable of employing guerilla tactics whenever the situation demands and is capable of taking on a company-sized military element, especially by laying an ambush at a pre-selected locality

---

<sup>379</sup> Banalaoi, *Al-Harakatul Al-Islamiyah*, 38–42.

<sup>380</sup> Gerdes, Ringler, and Autin, “Assessing the Abu Sayyaf Group’s Strategic and Learning Capacities,” 268.

<sup>381</sup> Salem, “Nexus of Crime and Terrorism: the Case of the Abu Sayyaf Group,” 73.

<sup>382</sup> Ferdinand B. Napuli, “Keeping on the Right Track: An Assessment on the Effectiveness of AFP Responses to ASG Threat” (master’s thesis, National Defense College of the Philippines, Quezon City, 2015), 4.

<sup>383</sup> Gracia Burnham and Dean Merrill, *In the Presence of My Enemies* (Wheaton, IL: Tyndale House, 2003), 40. [Author’s note: Gracia Burnham is a former ASG hostage.]

<sup>384</sup> Banalaoi, *Al-Harakatul Al-Islamiyah*, 38–42.

and having a tactical advantage over the attacker.<sup>385</sup> Banlaoi further claims that the ASG earns a huge sum of money through KFR and other criminal activities primarily to strengthen its combat capability by acquiring modern weaponry with a secondary purpose of helping the local community.<sup>386</sup> The local population in return provides safe havens and protection, notwithstanding much-needed logistic support such as firearms, explosives, munitions, etc.<sup>387</sup>

The ASG has been quite successful in operating in its traditional home territories in Basilan and Sulu provinces. The ASG members have the grip on the terrain in these areas where the AFP is weak and unfamiliar.<sup>388</sup> Moreover, the ASG gets quicker reinforcements whenever engagements occur in close proximity to Muslim villages as well as MNLF and MILF camps.<sup>389</sup> Nevertheless, Thomas M. McKenna argues that “ASG may be best viewed as a direct challenge to both the MILF and MNLF, not as an adjunct,” even though some disgruntled elements of the MILF and MNLF probably have joined the ASG.<sup>390</sup> Banlaoi argues that in spite of the absence of direct links with the MILF or MNLF, most ASG members have relatives in other groups.<sup>391</sup> In fact, intelligence reveals that whether or not direct links among the groups exist, “some enterprising Muslims live closer or within the engagement area join the firefight purposely to acquire firearms and munitions left by government troops’ casualties.”<sup>392</sup>

---

<sup>385</sup> Intelligence and Security Group, *Special Report: Assessing ASG’s Capabilities and Vulnerabilities* (Taguig City, Philippines, May 4, 2016), 5.

<sup>386</sup> Banlaoi, *Al-Harakatul Al-Islamiyah*, 43.

<sup>387</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>388</sup> *Ibid.*, 54–55.

<sup>389</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>390</sup> Thomas M. McKenna, *Muslim Rulers and Rebels: Everyday Politics and Armed Separatism in the Southern Philippines* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998), quoted in Rommel Banlaoi, *Al-Harakatul Al-Islamiyah: Essays on the Abu Sayyaf Group*, 3rd ed. (Quezon City: Philippine Institute for Peace, Violence, and Terrorism Research, 2012), 41.

<sup>391</sup> Banlaoi, *Al-Harakatul Al-Islamiyah*, 40–41.

<sup>392</sup> Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, OG2, *Special Report on the ASG Kidnapping Activities* (Taguig City, Philippines: Production Branch, 2014).

## 5. The ASG's Hybrid Character

The demise of Abubakar Janjalani's and Adang's leadership pushed the ASG more toward criminal enterprise. During the 1991—2000 period, the ASG claimed credit for “378 terrorist attacks causing 288 deaths.”<sup>393</sup> Furthermore, the ASG committed “640 kidnappings involving 2,076 victims” during the same period.<sup>394</sup> The ASG also resorted to KFR activities when al Qaeda financial support dried up after the revelation of clandestine operations by Mohammed Jamal Khalifa, Osama Bin Laden's wealthy brother-in-law.<sup>395</sup> Similarly, effective counterterrorism operations conducted by the Philippine government and its regional partners and other allies restricted the financial flow from international terrorist groups.<sup>396</sup> After that, the ASG resorted to KFR activities as the primary means of generating funds. With Adang's death in 2004 and under the new leadership of Khadafy Janjalani, the group underwent a “dramatic re-alignment” from banditry toward its original identity of a “genuine Islamist terrorist organization.”<sup>397</sup> The ASG amply displayed this agenda shift when it conducted the bombing of the super ferry on February 14, 2004, killing 116 people and wounding over 300. Moreover, the ASG coordinated three other simultaneous bombings in the northern Philippine cities of Makati, Davao, and General Santo that together killed ten people and injured 136.<sup>398</sup>

The Philippine government's successful military cum intelligence operations eliminated Khadafy Janjalani along with another sub-commander in Sulu in 2006.<sup>399</sup> This loss of leadership caused serious rifts in the organization when some of the sub-commanders chose pure banditry for financial benefits, moving away from the

---

<sup>393</sup> Atkinson, “Abu Sayyaf: The Father of the Swordsman.”

<sup>394</sup> Ibid.

<sup>395</sup> “Mapping Militant Organizations: Abu Sayyaf Group,” Stanford University, last updated July 20, 2015, <http://web.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/groups/view/152>.

<sup>396</sup> Ibid.,

<sup>397</sup> Atkinson, “Abu Sayyaf: The Father of the Swordsman,” 6.

<sup>398</sup> Rommel C. Banaloi, “Roots and Evolution of Terrorist Movements in the Philippines: The Abu Sayyaf Experience.” (Strategic and Integrated Studies Center, 2006):26.

<sup>399</sup> Stanford University, “Mapping Militant Organizations: Abu Sayyaf Group,” 3.



organization's primary vision.<sup>400</sup> Nevertheless, the ASG reasonably managed to recover from the setback, having launched successful KFR activities during the 2008–2011 period. These successes led the ASG to make huge financial gains on the one hand—and, on the other, attracted Muslim youth to the organization.<sup>401</sup> In this sense, the ASG clearly fluctuated between genuine Islamist terrorism and criminality; the leadership in particular played a significant role in deciding the group's signature.

## 6. ASG Links to International Terrorism

Since its inception, the ASG has had the support of international terrorist groups. For example, al Qaeda materially and ideologically influenced the ASG. Osama Bin Laden personally assisted Abubakar Janjalani in forming the ASG that subsequently led to affiliation with al Qaeda. Al Qaeda used the Philippines as a hub for training and planning its global terrorism campaign and as a hub for financing radical extremist organizations.<sup>402</sup> The al Qaeda–ASG relationship after the mid-1990s remains unclear, according to a Stanford University study group.<sup>403</sup> Similarly, the ASG relationship with al Qaeda may have ended when the ASG pledged its support to ISIS on July 23, 2014. However, most scholars and officials believe that the ASG pledged its allegiance to ISIS to promote its own agenda rather than ISIS's agenda.<sup>404</sup> Notably, Desker and Ramakrishna claim that the U.S. Department of State recently named “the Philippines, Indonesia, and Malaysia as potential al Qaeda hubs.”<sup>405</sup> The ASG has the strongest support from JI, a regional terrorist group, in terms of material support and operational cooperation.<sup>406</sup> Therefore, ASG's links to international terrorism remain consistent, posing a great threat to the Philippines and the region in spite of its reduced size.

---

<sup>400</sup> Salem, “Nexus of Crime and Terrorism: The Case of the Abu Sayyaf Group.” 41.

<sup>401</sup> Ibid.

<sup>402</sup> Barry Desker and Kumar Ramakrishna, “Forging an Indirect Strategy in Southeast Asia,” *Washington Quarterly* 25, no.2 (Spring 2002), 165, <https://muse.jhu.edu/article/36681/pdf>.

<sup>403</sup> Stanford University. “Mapping Militant Organizations: Abu Sayyaf Group,”

<sup>404</sup> Ibid.

<sup>405</sup> Desker and Ramakrishna, “Forging an Indirect Strategy in Southeast Asia.”

<sup>406</sup> Ibid.

### C. ANALYSIS OF THE CASES

An analysis of Al-Qaeda and the ASG in terms of the new terrorism finds both similarities and differences. Both groups emerged to advance political causes but possessed an extremist Islamic religious motivation that they used as the justification for violence. Al Qaeda's cell-based autonomous organization structure is similar to ASG's present organization structure, although its founder Abubakar Janjalani envisioned a hierarchical structure. The ASG has a limited transnational character compared to al Qaeda. While the ASG's influence may have spilled over the Philippines' national boundaries, it certainly remains limited within the Southeast Asian region of the Pacific. However, the open and unpoliced maritime arena in the Pacific Ocean and the ASG's increased thirst for maritime terrorism/crime can easily push the organization's influence beyond regional waters. Both the organizations use excessive violence causing mass casualties, an attribute of new terrorism. Obviously, the ASG's ability to stage a 9/11 scale attack may be limited. In terms of ideology, though, both al Qaeda and the ASG carry the same sentiments of global Jihad against Muslim oppression. Unlike al Qaeda, however, the ASG has a national agenda of establishing an Islamic State in the southern Philippines, which is an old terrorism characteristic. Therefore, and the ASG possess both new and old terrorism attributes, aligning them more with hybrid terrorism.

Al Qaeda and the ASG both conduct criminal activities to finance their organizational activities but in different enterprises. Al Qaeda and its affiliates, such as the Taliban, AQIM, AQAP, and AQIS, have global involvements in the drug trade, trafficking in persons, and ransom through a deeply established terrorist-criminal network. As Ray Takeyh and Nicolas Gvosdev argue, "[al Qaeda] and the symbolic organized-crime networks sustaining terrorist organizations are not confined territorially or ideologically to a particular region but instead are global in orientation."<sup>407</sup> Even so, al Qaeda strongly remains as an Islamic extremist organization in spite of its involvement in criminal enterprises, which are only meant for financing the global Jihad. On the other hand, ASG's criminal enterprises mostly involve KFR activities and are limited to the

---

<sup>407</sup> Ray Takeyh and Nicolas Gvosdev, "Do Terrorist Networks Need a Home?" *Washington Quarterly* 25, no 3 (June 2004): 97-108, doi:10.1162/01636600260046262.

southern Philippines and its peripheral waters. The ASG demonstrates mastery in KFR activities as it has been quite successful in kidnapping different nationals for huge ransoms. The organization has moved back and forth between its original vision of Islamist extremism and pure banditry. The ASG's criminal character surpasses its terrorism character (or vice versa) purely on the personal desires of the leader and sub-commanders.

#### **D. CONCLUSION**

Al Qaeda and the ASG have both old and new terrorism characteristics, suggesting a hybrid identity. This chapter discussed the origins, evolution, leadership, and organization; links to international terrorism; and the criminal and terrorism characteristics of these two organizations. Al Qaeda and the ASG are significantly different in their areas of influence and their organizational size; however, the two organizations carry certain similarities in terms of new terrorism attributes. The terrorism cum criminal character has made the two organizations extremely dangerous in the present day context. Their increased dependency on criminal activities for financing is an indication that hybrid terrorist organizations like al Qaeda might opportunistically extend its footprint to areas that present favorable conditions.

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

## **IV. ANALYSIS OF CRIME-TERROR CONTINUUM IN THE SRI LANKAN CONTEXT**

This chapter analyzes TOC and the new terrorism in the Sri Lankan context. The goal of this analysis is to identify the convergence of TOC and the new terrorism in that nation. The chapter covers TOC trends in Sri Lanka and their implications, the state's capacity to combat TOC, Islamic radicalization and its implications, and finally how TOC and the new terrorism might converge in Sri Lanka.

### **A. TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME**

Chapter II demonstrated a clear increase of TOC in Sri Lanka. Although the LTTE-TOC joint threat ended in 2009, the TOC threat has not dropped or stabilized. Drug trafficking in particular has increased remarkably in terms of Sri Lankan consumption and transshipment to Western markets.

#### **1. TOC: An Increasing Trend in Sri Lanka**

The LTTE-TOC nexus has left its footprints in Sri Lanka, keeping the sources and means open. The LTTE used the narrow maritime corridor between southern India and northern Sri Lanka and Indian fishing boats as its primary means to smuggle all kinds of illegal cargo both ways. The present trend indicates that these smuggling routes, as well as the sources and means associated with this activity, continue to transport illegal cargo.

Sri Lanka's geo-strategic location in the Indian Ocean and the increased maritime trade volume that the IOR hosts promote illegal trade. According to the research, Sri Lanka's geo-strategic location in the Indian Ocean has made it an important transshipment hub. The TOC syndicates show an increasing tendency to use this route. Research found that quite complex and diverse nodes exist in the network as the point of origin and the point of destination. Sometimes these drug shipments originate from Latin America destined for the Pacific region, whereas some follow the reverse route destined for unknown markets.

Increasing domestic drug consumption attracts business to Sri Lanka's doorstep. NDDCB estimates indicate that Sri Lankan domestic drug-related arrests have increased 276 percent during the span of 2010 to 2015, from 29,796 to 82,482.<sup>408</sup> Colombo and Gampaha districts saw the greatest number of arrests.<sup>409</sup> A larger population and easy access to drug markets explain the trend. An increase in domestic drug consumption is a dangerous trend as this situation places a greater demand on the drug supply. The NDDCB monitors the dangers associated with this trend such as numerous societal problems, including an increased number of HIV infection cases, poverty, crime, and family disputes.<sup>410</sup>

## **2. State Capacity to Combat TOC**

Democratic deficiencies and the lack of effectiveness of democratic institutions have contributed to the increase in TOC. Sri Lanka falls far short of democratic consolidation even though 70 years have elapsed since its transition to democracy in 1948. Democratic elections have occurred at regular intervals; however, none of the elected governments to date has strived to ensure freedom of speech, free media, an independent judiciary, rule of law, and independent functioning of government institutions free of unnecessary political fingering.<sup>411</sup> These democratic deficiencies construct a crooked organizational architecture in the state apparatus that becomes vulnerable to penetration by the TOC syndicates.

Law enforcement lapses and corruption in the state apparatus undermine national efforts to combat TOC. The SLP and its Narcotic Bureau, the NDDCB, and the SLC act as the primary institutions responsible for conducting anti-TOC operations in Sri Lanka. The NDDCB mainly conducts information gathering and monitoring missions, leaving the SLP and SLC with the law enforcement role. The SLP has earned the reputation of

---

<sup>408</sup> National Dangerous Drug Control Board, *Handbook of Drug Abuse Information in Sri Lanka 2016*, ix.

<sup>409</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>410</sup> *Ibid.*, ix–xv.

<sup>411</sup> Linz and Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation*, 7.

the most corrupt government agency in Sri Lanka.<sup>412</sup> Internal and external politicization, a lack of effective strategies and resources, and bureaucratic inefficiency and corruption have seriously undermined the effectiveness of these institutions..<sup>413</sup>

Furthermore, the Sri Lankan maritime security and law enforcement agencies possess limited physical assets and lack the sophistication to fight highly complex TOC networks. As a developing nation, Sri Lanka does not have the economic capability to acquire the latest technology and physical assets to protect its 1,340 km-long coast. Sri Lanka possesses a limited interdiction capability because of the availability of limited maritime assets within the Sri Lanka Coast Guard. Moreover, SLC, as the only organization responsible for brown water policing—that is, policing in the near-shore area of Sri Lanka—is quite a new organization. Inaugurated in 2012, it falls far short of having the capacity to combat complex TOC networks. SLC, too, has a limited capacity to screen the huge number of containers that arrive in a month.<sup>414</sup> Therefore, the majority of the inward transit or outward sea cargo passes through SLC unchecked. This limited capacity may be a reason for transnational organized crime syndicates to use Sri Lanka as a transit hub.

Lapses in national policy and strategy create drawbacks in concentrating national resources to combat TOC. Sri Lanka does not have a comprehensive national strategy at present to combat TOC. Individual institutions such as the SLP, SLC, NDDCB, Coast Guard, and SLN conduct their own operations independent of one another. For example, the Coast Guard and SLN function under the Ministry of Defense; the SLP and NDDCB function under the Ministry of Internal Affairs; and SLC is a non-ministerial government institution. They achieve limited success in their respective areas, however, because of the absence of a proper coordinating authority. A national strategy developed according to policy guidelines would certainly bind these organizations together and focus their efforts and resources to achieve optimum results.

---

<sup>412</sup> Transparency International, “Corruption Perception Index 2016.”

<sup>413</sup> Weerakkody, “Lack of Staff Allows Drug Syndicates to Open Up Lanka as a Major Transit Route.”

<sup>414</sup> Ibid.

A lack of inter-agency cooperation and coordination undermines strategy implementation. According to Lynn Davis, Gregory F. Treverton, Daniel Byman, Sara A. Daly, and William Rosenau, “coordination is a word more used than understood in government.”<sup>415</sup> The authors claim that when individual agencies such as ministries, government departments, and other public offices start operating in isolated compartments, they are unlikely to achieve desired strategic outcomes.<sup>416</sup> In the Sri Lankan context, existing organizational culture in most state institutions is enmeshed in internal and external politicizing, cumbersome government administrative procedures, and personality conflicts that restrict inter-agency coordination. As a result, expected efficiency of the anti-TOC operations suffers negative impacts.

Legislative lapses encourage international TOC syndicates to use Sri Lanka as a favorable destination and a transshipment hub that restricts law enforcement efforts. The legislative lapses in the areas of controlling small arms and weapons and light weapons (SALW), human trafficking and illegal immigration, and transshipment of illegal cargo have curtailed law enforcement efforts. Prathapa affirms, “The lack of legislative changes in prosecution has increased many terrorist, extremist, and criminal activities in the country.”<sup>417</sup> According to Vidya Abhaygunawardana, the firearms ordinance, explosive ordinance, and police ordinance do not match the present day demands, and existing laws need to be revised or new laws enacted.<sup>418</sup> Similarly, Aneez and Srilal relate, “Sri Lanka is becoming a hub for cocaine as it is a risk-free location with less legal restrictions, a top Sri Lankan police official who is aware of investigations into the smuggling told Reuters this week.”<sup>419</sup> Therefore, existing legislative gaps promote TOC.

---

<sup>415</sup> Lynn E. Davis, Gregory F. Treverton, Daniel Byman, Sara A. Daly, and William Rosenau, *Coordinating the War on Terrorism* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, March 2004) 2, [https://www.rand.org/pubs/occasional\\_papers/OP110.html](https://www.rand.org/pubs/occasional_papers/OP110.html).

<sup>416</sup> Ibid.

<sup>417</sup> Prathapa, “Immigration and its Effects on the National Security of Sri Lanka,” 81.

<sup>418</sup> Abhaygunawardana, “The Need to Apprehend Illicit Arms.”

<sup>419</sup> Shihar Aneez and Ranga Sri Lal, “Sri Lanka Emerging as Transit Hub for Cocaine Smugglers – Officials,” Reuters, August 31, 2017, <https://uk.reuters.com/article/sri-lanka-drugtrafficking/sri-lanka-emerging-as-transit-hub-for-cocaine-smugglers-officials-idUKL4N1LH351>.



### **3. TOC and Economic Implications**

TOC operations potentially damage legitimate economic activities, creating adverse effects on the national economy. TOC can weaken the already fragile economy of Sri Lanka with huge national debt through subversion, exploitation, and extortion of legitimate markets. The White House online Journal posits, “TOC activities can lead to disruption of the global supply chain, which, in turn, diminishes economic competitiveness.”<sup>420</sup> The journal further elaborates that TOC networks can gain control over key commodities such as gas, oil, gems, etc.<sup>421</sup> The lucrative financial gains the TOC networks offer attract state officials into committing an array of illegal transactions, creating vulnerabilities in most of the state apparatus. The rule of law is easily undermined through acts of bribery by TOC networks that ultimately paralyze the state governing machinery. Before public pressure comes to bear, fragile institutions may collapse as TOC networks penetrate state institutions, such as ministries, the coast guard, police, customs, and even the political parties, to commit malpractice and illegal transactions through bribery. Finally, administrative and economic malpractice does not create a healthy environment for foreign investment. Therefore, the increasing rate of TOC has direct and indirect negative implications on the national economy.

### **4. Socio-cultural Impacts and Political Implications**

The increasing TOC induces social fragmentation. The population centers and economic nerve centers, such as Colombo and Gampaha districts that account for the highest number of drug-related arrests in Sri Lanka, lead to a fragmented society. The legal citizens living in these areas oppose the presence of criminal and drug-addicted communities. The youth in the area become more prone to drug addiction, and the easy money that the TOC generates attracts unemployed segments of the population. The criminal elite penetrate legal and ethical institutions and expand their enterprise beyond their criminal home district. The extensive workforce that travels to Colombo and

---

<sup>420</sup> National Security Council, “Transnational Organized Crime: A Growing Threat to National and International Security,” (Washington, DC: The White House, n.d.) accessed October 6, 2017, <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/administration/eop/nsc/transnational-crime/threat>.

<sup>421</sup> Ibid.

Gampaha districts may become carriers of the criminal enterprise. The political jurisdiction and law enforcement scattered over criminal neighborhoods in these areas becomes ineffective. Human smuggling brings illegal immigrants to these population centers mainly because of the criminal links and ineffectiveness of law enforcement and political jurisdiction. Proliferation of illegal arms is widespread among criminal syndicates popularly known in Sri Lanka as *Under World Gangs*, who have links to TOC syndicates. Therefore, increasing TOC and its interrelated activities create social fragmentation that, in turn, has political implications.

## **5. National Security Implications**

TOC opens up direct and indirect avenues for an array of sensitive security issues. Increasing TOC creates societal rifts and may increase the domestic crime rate. Human trafficking creates an imbalance in the labor market and increases unemployment in domestic society, opening up avenues for domestic crime that ultimately threatens domestic security. Illegal immigrants seek access to the country through TOC networks that are powerful and resourceful enough to avoid immigration regulations. These potential immigrants accompany all kinds of illegal activities and, most dangerously, may introduce the seeds of international terrorism into the country. Smuggling often results in the proliferation of illegal arms among the domestic population, increasing the threat to human security. Especially when TOC reaches the symbiotic stage, the syndicates gain strength under political protection to threaten the society's non-traditional security. Therefore, TOC poses serious direct and indirect implications for the national security of Sri Lanka.

## **B. NEW TERRORISM**

The al Qaeda network, specifically AQIS, has shown its intention to expand. AQIS has already expanded to Bangladesh, and the al Qaeda leader Zawahiri has made an extra effort to appeal to potential recruits from southern India and Sri Lanka. Al Qaeda leadership then employs the new recruits from South Asia for the translation of al Qaeda ideology into regional languages. The primary aim of this endeavor is to accelerate recruitment.

## 1. The Al Qaeda and ISIS Threat in Sri Lanka and Its Implications

Islamic radicalization and the al Qaeda/ISIS threat are booming in Sri Lanka, posing a threat to national security. Disillusioned Muslim individuals increasingly join al Qaeda and ISIS in most parts of the world.<sup>422</sup> According to the *Washington Post*, the foreign fighters joining ISIS exceeded 20,000 in 2015, up from 15,000 in 2014.<sup>423</sup> According to Karunasena Hettiarachchi, the then secretary of the Ministry of Defense, approximately 36 Sri Lankans have traveled to Syria and some (exact figures are yet to be revealed) who joined ISIS and al Qaeda are fighting in Iraq and Syria.<sup>424</sup> A U.S.-led air raid had already killed a Sri Lankan Muslim, Mohamed Muhsin Sharfaz Nilam, in July 2015 in Syria.<sup>425</sup> ISIS-run social media and Internet sources continue to radicalize Sri Lankan Muslims and may result in increasing numbers joining ISIS and al Qaeda. The returning foreign fighters can spread the ideology among Sri Lankan Muslims, furthering recruitment. Counterterrorism expert Bruce Hoffman predicts a possible al Qaeda–ISIS merger by 2020.<sup>426</sup> If they do not merge, at the very least the two organizations will start cooperating, according to Hoffman.<sup>427</sup> Therefore, this trend is going to be extremely dangerous for the national security of Sri Lanka.

---

<sup>422</sup> Gene Thorp and Swati Sharma, “World Foreign Fighters Flow to Syria,” *Washington Post*, January 27, 2015, [https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/foreign-fighters-flow-to-syria/2015/01/27/7fa56b70-a631-11e4-a7c2-03d37af98440\\_graphic.html?utm\\_term=.6d5cde4901b3](https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/foreign-fighters-flow-to-syria/2015/01/27/7fa56b70-a631-11e4-a7c2-03d37af98440_graphic.html?utm_term=.6d5cde4901b3)

<sup>423</sup> Ibid.

<sup>424</sup> “Al Qaeda Operating in Sri Lanka and Bangladesh,” *Ada Derana*, accessed September 30, 2017, <http://www.adaderana.lk/news.php?nid=22368>; See also “First Sri Lankan Killed in Syria with ISIS: Investigate And Punish All – Muslim Council Tells Sirisena,” *Colombo Telegraph*, July 21, 2015, <https://www.colombotelegraph.com/index.php/first-sri-lankan-killed-in-syria-with-isis-investigate-and-punish-all-muslim-council-tells-sirisena/>, and “US Terrorism Report Says Sri Lanka on Alert Against ISIS,” *The Sunday Leader*, accessed October 4, 2017, <http://www.thesundayleader.lk/2017/07/23/us-terrorism-report-says-sri-lanka-on-alert-against-isis/>.

<sup>425</sup> *Colombo Telegraph*, “First Sri Lankan Killed In Syria With ISIS: Investigate And Punish All – Muslim Council Tells Sirisena.”

<sup>426</sup> Bruce Hoffman, “The Coming ISIS-al Qaeda Merger: It’s Time to Take the Threat Seriously,” *Foreign Affairs*, March 29, 2016, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2016-03-29/coming-isis-al-qaeda-merger>.

<sup>427</sup> Ibid.

## 2. Inter-Community Distrust Instigates Islamic Radicalization

The recent disputes between majority Sinhalese and minority Muslims have led to communal clashes, which further shape the narrative for disillusionment among affected minority communities. In the absence of proper government participation, extremist religious groups forcibly intervene in administrative aspects that ultimately provide seeds for Islamic radicalization.<sup>428</sup> Neil De Votta claims “Sri Lankans have paid a heavy price for their politicians’ ethnic malpractice. They should ensure that their leaders do not repeat the mistakes made with the Tamils when dealing with the Muslims.”<sup>429</sup> On the other hand, Sri Lankan Muslims’ attempt to accommodate fleeing Rohingya Muslims without following legitimate procedures is fueling anti-Muslim sentiments in Sri Lanka. The Sri Lankan government’s ill-prepared action on the issue prompted Buddhist monks to intervene and pursue police action.<sup>430</sup> In addition, the recent mob attack against a UN-run Rohingya Muslim safe house reflects the growing tension.<sup>431</sup> Therefore, domestic issues of this nature, especially the communal divide in the face of an existing global trend of disaffected Muslims joining al Qaeda and ISIS, further encourages Sri Lankan Muslims to radicalize and finally follow the path of their counterparts in other countries.

## 3. Legal Implications

The absence of terrorism-related legislation undermines political and law enforcement efforts to prevent terrorism. Sri Lanka has yet to introduce counterterrorism legislation to replace the Prevention of Terrorism Act No. 48 of 1979, which came under tremendous pressure by human rights groups. Sri Lanka lifted the Emergency Law in

---

<sup>428</sup> Shihar Aneez and Ranga Sri Lal, “Sri Lankan Muslim Leader Warns of Radicalization after Clashes,” Reuters, July 11, 2014, <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-sri-lanka-muslims-violence/sri-lankan-muslim-leader-warns-of-radicalization-after-clashes-idUSKBN0FG25L20140711>.

<sup>429</sup> Neil De Votta, “Anti Muslim Extremism and Violence in Sri Lanka,” *IAPS Dialogue*, accessed October 9, 2017, <https://iapsdialogue.org/2017/04/24/anti-muslim-extremism-and-violence-in-sri-lanka/>.

<sup>430</sup> Munza Mushtaq, “Sri Lanka’s Communal Divide Takes Toll on Rohingya Muslims,” *Asia Times*, September 26, 2017, <http://www.atimes.com/sri-lankas-communal-divide-takes-toll-rohingya-refugees/>.

<sup>431</sup> Bharatha Mallawarachchi, “UN Body Alarmed by Attack on Rohingya Refugees in Sri Lanka,” *Washington Post*, September 27, 2017, [https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia\\_pacific/un-body-alarmed-by-attack-on-rohingya-refugees-in-sri-lanka/2017/09/27/5954c90c-a3ea-11e7-b573-8ec86cdfel1ed\\_story.html?utm\\_term=.6dcbd92b8a08](https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/un-body-alarmed-by-attack-on-rohingya-refugees-in-sri-lanka/2017/09/27/5954c90c-a3ea-11e7-b573-8ec86cdfel1ed_story.html?utm_term=.6dcbd92b8a08).

2011. Therefore, the lack of legislative amendments that would authorize law enforcement and the government to investigate and prosecute extremist religious groups or activities that promote radical motivation is a problem at present.

### **C. CRIME-TERROR NEXUS**

Proponents of the crime-terrorism nexus argue that present-day terrorism and organized crime converge at a central point.<sup>432</sup> Britt Sloan and James Cockayne explain, “fragile states, with their ready pools of unemployed labor and populations inured to and traumatized by violence, frequently represent sites of competitive advantage for terrorist organizations, criminal networks, and violent political alike.”<sup>433</sup> They further cite the LTTE’s involvement in cybercrime, such as credit card frauds, drug trafficking, and human smuggling, to fund their operations as an example of a crime-terrorism nexus.<sup>434</sup> In analyzing the LTTE-TOC nexus, the author finds that until the LTTE’s demise in 2009, its criminal networks functioned quite effectively in spite of some successful interdictions by the Sri Lankan state apparatus. Nevertheless, Sri Lanka’s counterterrorism campaign had been quite successful as the country managed to destroy the once most ruthless and powerful terrorist outfit in the world, though it took three decades. Therefore, it is of paramount importance that the state understands the danger of the new terrorism-TOC nexus and revamps its national security architecture with the necessary policy and strategy, institutions, resources, and preparedness and robustly enough to combat the nexus.

#### **1. Overall State Vulnerability against the Crime-terror Nexus**

The Sri Lankan state possesses a greater vulnerability overall. In analyzing Sri Lanka, as a well-situated island state and under present circumstances, the author finds it inherits a number of vulnerabilities. (See Figure 10 for a depiction of Sri Lanka’s vulnerabilities in the TOC-new terrorism nexus.)

---

<sup>432</sup> Makarenko, “The Crime-Terror Continuum: Tracing the Interplay between Transnational Organized Crime and Terrorism,” 129.

<sup>433</sup> Sloan and Cockayne, “Terrorism, Crime, and Conflict,” 1.

<sup>434</sup> Ibid.




Figure 10. Overall State Vulnerability in the TOC-New Terrorism Nexus.

## 2. Nexus at the Doorstep and Its Implications

The established TOC-new terrorism nexus in Afghanistan and Pakistan, along with the contemporary surge in TOC and new terrorism symptoms in Sri Lanka, pose a threat to Sri Lanka's national security. The Taliban and al Qaeda's involvement in the drug trade, KFR activities, money laundering, human trafficking, and gunrunning, which are highly active in the terrorism enterprise, is a growing problem in the South Asian region.<sup>435</sup> Similarly, criminal groups like D-Company have established links with terrorist groups such as al Qaeda, the Taliban, LTTE, and Lashkar e Tayyaba.<sup>436</sup> Increased policing and interdictions by individual states themselves and also through international cooperation have attained success at a certain level, such as seizures of large

<sup>435</sup> Makarenko, "The Crime-Terror Continuum: Tracing the Interplay between Transnational Organized Crime and Terrorism," 131.

<sup>436</sup> *Ibid.*, 132.

drug consignments, intercepting criminal networks, counterterrorist operations, etc. However, the region does not seem to be combating the TOC-new terrorism effectively. Traditional law enforcement approaches in the region, especially in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Bangladesh, fall far short of being highly efficient and advance TOC-new terrorism networks. Crossing the narrow sea corridor between Sri Lanka and the South Asian mainland is possible given the necessary environment in Sri Lanka.

### **3. How Might TOC and New Terrorism Converge in Sri Lanka?**

Where is contemporary Sri Lanka on Makarenko's crime-terror continuum? The LTTE as a criminally and politically motivated terrorist group clearly crossed Makarenko's first level of alliance formation and moved to the second level, the use of criminal and terrorist tactics for operational purposes.<sup>437</sup> Specifically, the LTTE was within the convergence area where they committed political crime and commercial terrorist activities. However, the LTTE could not draw the Sri Lankan state into a "black hole" as the black hole thesis requires the converged terror-criminal groups to take over a failed state.<sup>438</sup> Determining where Sri Lanka is on the continuum is quite complex because no terrorism physically exists within Sri Lanka at present. Yet, the increased rate of TOC and the environment in Sri Lanka keep the continuum open at the terrorism end. At present, it appears that new terrorism groups such as al Qaeda and ISIS operate remotely at the terrorism corner of the continuum. The question is how long the terrorism end of the continuum can remain open in Sri Lanka when the roots and symptoms of new terrorism are already visible.

### **4. Socio-cultural and Political Implications of the Crime-Terror Nexus**

The possibility of a crime-terror nexus in Sri Lanka might disturb the social fabric and have political implications in the face of the state's responsibility to protect its subjects.<sup>439</sup> The increasing rate of TOC opens avenues for social complications such as

---

<sup>437</sup> Ibid.

<sup>438</sup> Ibid., 138

<sup>439</sup> "Social Contract Theory," Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, accessed October 6, 2017, <http://www.iep.utm.edu/soc-cont/>.

increasing drug dependency, the spread of HIV, and increasing domestic crime. Consequently, Islamic radicalization and resultant religious extremism create further distrust among the three already divided major ethnic divisions: the Sinhalese, Tamil, and Muslim communities in Sri Lanka. The present situation with increasing TOC on one hand and Islamic radicalization on the other can easily destabilize the nation if the situation deteriorates further. Against this backdrop, the social contract makes the state extremely vulnerable in the face of these emerging threats. Therefore, policy makers must give due consideration to the Sri Lankan situation and have a proper understanding of the global and regional TOC-new terrorism trends. The next chapter provides a starting point for policy makers by offering recommendations for developing effective strategies, introducing new legal measures, and implementing technology against this backdrop.



## **V. RECOMMENDATIONS**

This study attempted to answer the question of whether TOC and new terrorism might converge in Sri Lanka. In the process, the study identified the expanding size, scope, and influence of TOC on one side and, on the other, the societal rifts along ethnic and religious cleavages promoting Islamic radicalization that open avenues for new terrorism. Thus, the overall vulnerability of Sri Lanka has increased. Although democratic governance, rule of law, and harmonious coexistence would be the dream of the Sri Lankan nation after sustaining three decades of terrorism, an array of emerging challenges obstruct the way forward. The accumulated threats cannot be addressed effectively in isolation. Against this backdrop, this chapter makes several recommendations.

### **A. DEVISE STRATEGY AND POLICY**

A lack of national strategies have prevented Sri Lanka from harnessing the instruments of national power to attain optimum results. Therefore, clear policy direction and comprehensive long-term and short-term strategies to combat a TOC-new terrorism nexus must take priority, specifically:

- National security strategy
- National counterterrorism strategy
- National strategy for prevention of crime
- Anti-drug strategy
- Strategy for detection and prevention of financial crime
- Anti-money laundering strategy
- National strategy for international cooperation against a TOC-new terrorism nexus
- National strategy to eradicate human trafficking and prevent of illegal immigration
- National strategy to counter arms smuggling and proliferation of illegal SALW and explosives

- National maritime security strategy to include blue water and brown water policing to detect, deny, and disrupt illegal trafficking
- National strategy for bridging ethnic gaps and promoting peaceful co-existence of different ethnic and religious communities
- National intelligence strategy to streamline the focus areas of different intelligence agencies and to eradicate organizational monopolies to achieve greater intelligence sharing

These strategies must clearly address the countering TOC and new terrorism aspects robustly enough to withstand emerging threats and contingencies. Therefore, the relevant authorities responsible for devising these strategies must include the aspects of countering TOC and new terrorism with special emphasis in those strategic documents.

## **B. CREATE NEW AGENCIES**

The creation of a dedicated agency to combat TOC and new terrorism developments can pave the way for better interagency coordination, the efficient concentration of national resources, and more effectively focused effort to achieve the desired end state. The Ministry of Defense (MOD) acts as the primary legislative body responsible for the defense and security of Sri Lanka at present. The Sri Lanka Army, the Sri Lanka Navy, the Sri Lanka Air Force, and the Coast Guard function under the MOD. The law enforcement agencies, such as the SLP and the Special Task Force (STF),<sup>440</sup> fall under the purview of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. SLC functions under the Ministry of Finance. The NDDCB functions under the Ministry of Law and Order. State intelligence apparatus—the National Intelligence Bureau (NIB)—operates under the MOD. The Criminal Intelligence Division is a part of Sri Lanka Police. Therefore, command and control, effective law enforcement, and interagency coordination have become difficult; it demands a dedicated agency to handle anti-TOC operations and

---

<sup>440</sup> “History of the Special Task Force,” Sri Lanka Police, accessed Date October 25, 2017, <https://www.police.lk/index.php/special-task-force->.

STF is paramilitary force that functions under SLP; it was initially founded as an offensive group to support the SLP in counterterrorism operations. Since May 2009, the primary mission of the STF is to perform VVIP and VIP protection duties. The author feels that this organization is quite suited for employment combating TOC and new terrorism operations.

countering terrorism business. Figure 11 depicts the suggested agency and its placement in the state hierarchy.




Figure 11. Creation of New Agencies and Their Placement to Combat the TOC-New Terrorism Nexus.

### 1. Assign Specific Responsibility and Allocate Resources

Assigning specific functions and responsibilities with the allocation of adequate resources would enhance the efficiency of different agencies and facilitate the attainment of strategic objectives. The assignment of specific functions and responsibilities is particularly important to avoid duplication and waste of resources. At the same, the assigned functions and responsibilities must include a calculated overlap among agencies

to avoid grey areas that could be exploited by TOC syndicates and terrorist groups. Table 6 outlines the responsibilities of new agencies for combating TOC and new terrorism.

Table 6. Responsibilities of New Agencies.

Agency	Responsibilities
Office for Combating TOC and Terrorism	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>✦ Operationalizing strategy and implementation</li> <li>✦ Command and control of subordinate agencies</li> <li>✦ Coordination and cooperation with other agencies</li> <li>✦ Coordination with international and regional agencies</li> <li>✦ Integration of intelligence and law enforcement approaches</li> <li>✦ Concentrating interventions on the areas where TOC and terrorism converge</li> </ul>
SLP Special Division	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>✦ Conduct of special police duties related to TOC and new terrorism</li> <li>✦ Conduct of anti-narcotic operations</li> <li>✦ Assistance to other new agencies on policing</li> <li>✦ Coordination with international and regional law enforcement agencies</li> </ul>
Special Judicial Body	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>✦ Legal supervision and representation of the Office for Combating TOC and Terrorism and its subordinate elements</li> </ul>
Special Financial Crime Investigation Unit	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>✦ Conduct of prevention, detection, and denial of financial crime relevant to TOC and new terrorism</li> <li>✦ Conduct of anti-money laundering operations in liaison with other financial agencies</li> <li>✦ Monitoring of proliferation of Black money</li> </ul>
Special Intelligence Unit	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>✦ Collection, collation, and dissemination of timely information and intelligence pertaining to TOC and new terrorism</li> <li>✦ Conduct of continuous studies to identify the differences between terrorist elements and organized crime groups</li> <li>✦ Intelligence sharing with other intelligence agencies</li> <li>✦ Intelligence sharing with international agencies</li> </ul>
Special Cyber Security Division	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>✦ Disruption of, espionage, and degradation of criminal and terrorist networks</li> <li>✦ Increasing the resilience, redundancy, and quick reconstitution of own networks</li> <li>✦ Providing advice and preventive measures to other agencies</li> </ul>
Special Media Unit	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>✦ Providing media coverage in liaison with government and private media agencies for the activities of the Office for Combating TOC and Terrorism</li> <li>✦ Providing media advice and inputs</li> </ul>

**C. OUTLINE THE RESPONSIBILITY OF EXISTING STATE INSTITUTIONS ON TOC AND NEW TERRORISM**

Existing state institutions bear a primary responsibility for shaping the national approach in combating TOC and new terrorism. Creating new agencies, assigning responsibilities, and allocating resources demands greater involvement of state institutions as indicated in Figure 11. Therefore, these state institutions may have to undergo restructuring to discharge the responsibilities outlined in Table 7.

Table 7. Responsibilities of Existing Agencies on Countering TOC and New Terrorism

Agency	Responsibilities
Executive	✚ Making policy decisions on TOC and new terrorism
Legislature	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>✚ Allocating resources</li> <li>✚ Providing democratic oversight of agencies</li> <li>✚ Passing new legislation to combat TOC, new terrorism, and the TOC-new terrorism nexus</li> </ul>
Judiciary	✚ Enacting new laws to combat TOC and new terrorism
National Security Council	✚ Devising national security strategies and national end state
MOD	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>✚ Providing command and control of Presidential Task Force to attain national end state</li> <li>✚ Implementing national security and intelligence strategies</li> </ul>
Ministry of Law and Order	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>✚ Devising legal frameworks for newly created agencies and their functions</li> <li>✚ Ensuring effective law enforcement and maintenance of rule of law</li> </ul>
Ministry of Interior Affairs	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>✚ Providing additional resources and assistance on demand</li> <li>✚ Maintaining law and order in the country</li> <li>✚ Engaging potential spoilers of peace</li> </ul>
Ministry of Finance	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>✚ Allocating budgets to the Office for Combating TOC and Terrorism</li> <li>✚ Providing assistance on financial crime prevention</li> <li>✚ Providing procedural assistance on financial aspects</li> </ul>
Office of the Chief of Defense Staff and Three Services	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>✚ Providing resources and operational assistance as requested by the Office for Combating TOC and Terrorism</li> <li>✚ Providing training for STF and Civil Security Department on counterterrorism activities</li> <li>✚ Sharing intelligence</li> </ul>
Department of Immigration and Emigration	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>✚ Sharing information</li> <li>✚ Coordinating immigration issues pertaining to TOC and terrorism with the Office for Combating TOC and Terrorism</li> </ul>

Department for Registration of Persons	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>✚ Sharing information</li> <li>✚ Coordinating registration matters of TOC and terrorism interest with the Office for Combating TOC and Terrorism</li> </ul>
Central Intelligence Directorate of SLC	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>✚ Acquiring necessary technology and labor for enhanced screening of immigrants, sea and air cargo on both arrival and transshipment at air and seaports in Sri Lanka</li> <li>✚ Enhancing the capacity and capability for detection of illegal cargo, including drugs, copyright material, and illegal cargo</li> </ul>
Sri Lanka Coast Guards	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>✚ Providing brown water policing and protecting the Sri Lankan coastline in general</li> <li>✚ Ensuring, in particular, detection, denial, and apprehension of drugs, human cargo, and illegal substances entering and exiting Sri Lanka</li> <li>✚ Preventing illegal immigration and apprehending illegal immigrants</li> </ul>
National Intelligence Bureau	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>✚ Promoting intelligence sharing</li> <li>✚ Assisting the Special Intelligence Unit to enhance efficiency</li> </ul>
Civil Security Department	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>✚ Acting as the eyes of the Office for Combating TOC and New Terrorism on roots, trends, and developments of terrorism</li> <li>✚ Monitoring and engaging vulnerable communities</li> <li>✚ Conducting community relations projects</li> </ul>
NDDCB	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>✚ Providing statistical advice to the Office for Combating TOC and New Terrorism</li> </ul>

#### **D. INTRODUCE LEGISLATIVE AMENDMENTS AND ENACT NEW LAWS**

Bridging legal gaps and imposing new laws can enhance efficiency in law enforcement and prosecution. The research identified a number of legal gaps. Therefore, the legislature must consider introducing necessary legislative amendments and creating new laws covering following areas:

- The Prevention of Terrorism Act No. 48 of 1979 is under serious criticism and pressure; thus, a new counterterrorism law is necessary. The act should address the areas of radicalization, the spread of extremist ideologies, and hate crime.
- TOC groups use Sri Lanka as a transshipment hub for illegal cargo because of the existing gaps in legal procedures. Therefore, passing adequate legislation to prevent and prosecute illegal transshipment is necessary.
- Firearms ordinances and explosives ordinances need revision to counter present-day proliferation of SALW and explosives.

- Sri Lanka's existing legislation on human trafficking protects only women and children. Therefore, the country needs to pass necessary legislation in the areas of trafficking in any persons for forced labor and prostitution, and should include migrant workers.

**E. CREATE EFFICIENT LAW ENFORCEMENT AND OBSERVANCE OF THE RULE OF LAW**

Strict maintenance of law and order demands efficient law enforcement and rule of law that is equally effective around the country. Domestic crime, organized crime, extremism, and terrorism are often law and order issues. During the pre-2009 era, Sri Lanka's law was not effective in LTTE-controlled areas; thus, LTTE conducted organized crime and terrorism quite freely. Therefore, efficient law enforcement and strict rule of law must be applied equally across the country, irrespective of religion, ethnic, social, and class differences in the society. Political and law enforcement agencies must ensure that no ungoverned areas exist in the country.

**F. ACQUIRE ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY FOR ENHANCING EFFICIENCY**

TOC syndicates and terrorist groups use highly advanced technology to maintain their networks against increasing threats by law enforcement agencies with superior technology from developed states. Compared to developed states, technology in the hands of Sri Lankan law enforcement agencies is far inferior, especially in detection. Sri Lanka must acquire effective and current technology, if not superior technology, in coordination with international state and non-state entities. Specifically, scanning TEUs and personnel at the SLC need advanced technology. Similarly, the SLP and Coast Guard rely on primitive technology due to lack of funds, restricting their intervention and detection capability to a bare minimum. Therefore, Sri Lanka must acquire relatively advanced technology for enhancing the efficiency of law enforcement agencies in detection, denial, and disruption of TOC and new terrorism networks.

## **G. ENHANCE INTERAGENCY COOPERATION AND COORDINATION**

Inter-agency cooperation enhances the efficiency of proactive and reactive responses to emerging threats and their indications. Most times, in developing nations like Sri Lanka, different agencies operate in isolated compartments. As a result, extremely important events or information may pass unnoticed, risking a potentially catastrophic outcome. Further, interagency coordination is mandatory in operationalizing national strategies and turning them into meaningful action on the ground. Similarly, to ensure that national resources are concentrated in the right place, in the right amount at the right time, numerous levels of inter-agency coordination is essential. Therefore, enhancing inter-agency cooperation and coordination is vital in combating TOC and new terrorism.

## **H. ENHANCE INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION AND INTELLIGENCE SHARING**

Criminal syndicates and terrorist groups have acquired the capability to operate far beyond national and regional boundaries into the international arena. Cooperation with regional and international agencies enhances national efforts in the areas of intelligence sharing, advanced detection techniques, training, and acquiring advanced technology. Sri Lanka has achieved some procedural success in regularizing SALW proliferation in spite of lapses in domestic law and enforcement.<sup>441</sup> Sri Lanka is one of the 44 countries to have established a proper country Point of Contact (POC) and established a national commission to oversee the implementation of the United Nations Organization for Disarmament Program of Action (POA). Nevertheless, according to a report by the Government of Sri Lanka, due to a lack of funds the devised POA did not proceed as expected.<sup>442</sup> Therefore, exploiting successes and improvements in joint policing, intelligence sharing, and coordination with international and regional agencies such as the UNODC, SAARC, and agencies of neighboring countries is necessary.

---

<sup>441</sup> The Government of Sri Lanka, "Implementation of the United Nations Program of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in all its Aspects," 1–5 <http://www.poa-iss.org/CASACountryProfile/PoANationalReports/2005@179@SriLanka.pdf>.

<sup>442</sup> Ibid.



## **I. IMPROVE MARITIME SECURITY**

Sri Lanka's maritime security agencies potentially lack the capability for policing the vast Sri Lankan maritime domain. The SLN and the Coast Guard, the primary maritime security agencies, do not have adequate capacity at present. Moreover, the high cost of maritime assets might not permit Sri Lanka to acquire an increasing number of assets. However, a long-term strategy with a primary focus on improving brown water capability while enhancing cooperation with naval powers like India to increase policing in the international waters may be a viable solution. One of the main modes of transporting drugs and other illegal substances to Sri Lanka is through Indian and Sri Lankan fishing boats. Similarly, the main mode of transporting human cargo and other illegal substances is also through sea transport. Although existing agencies conduct detection and preventive operations, an increasing amount of drugs reach Sri Lankan shores according to the research. Therefore, the Coast Guard with necessary assistance from the SLN needs to develop a comprehensive mechanism to prevent the influx and the outward movement of such cargo.

## **J. BUILD THE CAPACITY OF STATE INSTITUTIONS FOR ENHANCING EFFECTIVENESS**

The lack of capacity of state institutions because of corruption and internal and external politicizing greatly undermines their effectiveness. State institutions have lost the public's confidence largely because of corruption across the entire state institutional structure, including the judiciary. This is the time to launch a national campaign to eradicate corruption or at least minimize it. Imposing strict laws, best practices, and law enforcement are the only means to minimize corruption and malpractice. After all, efficient state institutions are a requirement to combat threats like TOC and terrorism. Capacity building should also include clear strategies and allocation of resources. Ill-funded state institutions often are buried in day-to-day administration, which seriously undermines their ability to discharge their primary duty and responsibility and can become a liability to the nation. Institutions such as the Coast Guard, SLC, the SLP, and even the armed forces need systemic improvement to face the challenges of asymmetric conflicts such as terrorism and TOC, and must be prepared to combat the non-military

nature of warfare.<sup>443</sup> Therefore, devising short- and long-term plans to increase the capacity of state institutions is necessary to combat the TOC-new terrorism nexus.

#### **K. CREATE AN EFFECTIVE INTELLIGENCE MECHANISM**

An effective intelligence mechanism becomes the most important tool to design counter measures against the TOC-new terrorism nexus. Intelligence agencies must gather contextual intelligence by conducting enhanced human intelligence, signal intelligence, imagery intelligence, and cyber intelligence on TOC and new terrorism trends in Sri Lanka and in probable areas of overlap. The intelligence mechanism must have the capability to reach beyond national boundaries to regional and international spectrums. The state intelligence apparatus needs to acquire the necessary advanced technology to penetrate TOC networks to destabilize the networks' efficiency and to prevent recruitment by international terrorist organizations such as al Qaeda and ISIS on Sri Lankan soil. Intelligence agencies must focus on returning foreign fighters of al Qaeda and ISIS to detect and deny their possible terrorist activities and the further spread of extremist ideology. Further, placing intelligence engineered counter narratives before society will prevent radicalization.

#### **L. PROMOTE HARMONIOUS LIVING AMONG DIFFERENT SOCIAL SEGMENTS WHILE ENGAGING VULNERABLE COMMUNITIES TO PREVENT RADICALIZATION**

Religious and ethnic cleavages exist in every society, but that does not mean that such societies cannot live in harmony. Moreover, radicalization and terrorism do not bring any good to the society. The Government of Sri Lanka must address the causes of distrust among major ethnic segments in Sri Lanka: the Sinhalese, Tamils, and Muslims. The nation as a whole must promote secular living with equal opportunities for all its subjects. Similarly, disgruntled social segments must understand the importance of harmonious living by achieving a collective identity as Sri Lankans and leaving aside disparities on ethnic or religious lines. Islamic society must work together to eradicate probable means of radicalization, especially to re-engage vulnerable individuals who can

---

<sup>443</sup> “Global Trends 2025: A Transformed World,” 71.

become lone wolves. The Sri Lankan government must devise secular social narratives to counter extremists' social narratives. A serious account of the negative use of the Internet and social media and the ability of extremists to exploit existing social cleavages in spreading extremist ideology is important. Scholars have a greater role to play here. Publishing literature on secular societies composed of multiple ethnic groups and religious affiliations—with an emphasis on how to avoid natural rifts embedded in the social fabric—can enhance awareness and knowledge among community leaders and the public.

#### **M. CREATE A VIBRANT SRI LANKAN CIVIL SOCIETY**

A vibrant civil society is an essential element of a democracy. Civil society activities keep a developing democracy moving towards a consolidated democracy. The Sri Lankan civil society, irrespective of race, religion, and class, played a huge role in drawing the curtain on the LTTE-TOC nexus in 2009. Yet, ethnic and religious divisions remain a significant challenge in the Sri Lankan social fabric. The society can play a greater role in curtailing domestic drug consumption, radicalization and religious extremism, and communal clashes. Religious and community leaders must promote harmonious living and engage vulnerable groups and individuals. The Sinhalese majority and Tamil and Muslim minorities must understand the importance of secular living and respect majority and minority sentiments. The society as a whole must be aware of the 21st century challenges posed by the TOC-new terrorism nexus. The danger of the increasing trend of TOC in Sri Lanka and its potential to bring back another wave of horrific terrorism can open the avenue for a TOC-terrorism nexus. Worse yet, a TOC-terrorism nexus could push the struggling democracy of today's Sri Lanka into a fragile state, even to a failed state, like its South Asian counterpart Afghanistan.

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

## LIST OF REFERENCES

- Abhayagunawadana, Vidya. "The Need to Apprehend Illicit Small Arms." *Daily Mirror*, February 8, 2015. <http://www.dailymirror.lk/63103/the-need-to-apprehend-illicit-small-arms>.
- Abuza, Zachary. *Balik-Terrorism: The Return of the ASG*. Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, Army War College, 2005. <https://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/pdffiles/PUB625.pdf>.
- . *Militant Islam in Southeast Asia: Crucible of Terror*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003.
- Ada Derana. "Al Qaeda Operating in Sri Lanka and Bangladesh." April 17, 2013. <http://www.adaderana.lk/news.php?nid=22368>.
- Ahmed, Dania. "Heroin and Extremism in Pakistan," *Foreign Policy*, August 17, 2015, <http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/08/17/heroin-and-jihad-in-pakistan/>.
- Alda, Erik, and Joseph L. Sala. "Links between Terrorism, Organized Crime and Crime: The Case of the Sahel Region." *Stability: International Journal of Security and Development* 3, no. 1 (2014):1–9. <http://doi.org/10.5334/sta.ea>.
- Al Jazeera*. "The People Smugglers: Is the Tough Application of Canada's Immigration Laws Justified?" July 25, 2014. <http://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/peopleandpower/2014/07/people-smugglers-20147239276629601.html>.
- Aneez, Shihar. "Diplomats in Sri Lanka Urged Government Action Against Anti-Muslim Attacks." Reuters, June 1, 2017. <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-sri-lanka-violence-muslims/diplomats-in-sri-lanka-urge-government-action-against-anti-muslim-attacks-idUSKBN18S66P>.
- Aneez, Shihar, and Ranga Sirlal. "Sri Lanka Emerging as Transit Hub for Cocaine Smugglers—Officials." Reuters, August 31, 2017. <https://uk.reuters.com/article/sri-lanka-drugtrafficking/sri-lanka-emerging-as-transit-hub-for-cocaine-smugglers-officials-idUKL4N1LH351>.
- . "Sri Lankan Muslim Leader Warns of Radicalization after Clashes." Reuters, July 11, 2014. <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-sri-lanka-muslims-violence/sri-lankan-muslim-leader-warns-of-radicalization-after-clashes-idUSKBN0FG25L20140711>.
- As-Sahab Media Subcontinent. "Code of Conduct: Al-Qaeda in Subcontinent." Accessed August 4, 2017, [https://azelin.files.wordpress.com/2017/06/al-qacc84\\_idah-in-the-indian-subcontinent-22code-of-conduct22-en.pdf](https://azelin.files.wordpress.com/2017/06/al-qacc84_idah-in-the-indian-subcontinent-22code-of-conduct22-en.pdf).

- Asthana, Vandana. "Cross-Border Terrorism in India: Counterterrorism Strategies and Challenges." ACDIS occasional paper, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, Department of Government and International Affairs, June 2010. <http://hdl.handle.net/2142/27703>.
- Atkinson, Garrett. "ASG: The Father of the Swordsman." Washington, DC: American Security Project, March 2012. <https://www.americansecurityproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/03/Abu-Sayyaf-The-Father-of-the-Swordsman.pdf>.
- Bakker, Edwin. *Terrorism and Counterterrorism Studies: Comparing Theory and Practice*. Leiden, Netherlands: Leiden University Press, 2015.
- Banlaoi, Rommel. *Al-Harakatul Al-Islamiyah: Essays on the Abu Sayyaf Group*, 3rd ed. Quezon City: Philippine Institute for Peace, Violence, and Terrorism Research, 2012.
- . *Counter Terrorism Measures in Southeast Asia: How Effective Are They?* Manila: Yuchengco Center, De La Salle University, 2009.
- . "Roots and Evolution of Terrorist Movements in the Philippines: The Abu Sayyaf Experience." Strategic and Integrated Studies Center, 2006.
- Barker, Cat. "The People Smugglers' Business Model." Research Paper No. 2, 2012–13. Canberra: Parliament of Australia, Department of Parliamentary Services, 2013. [http://www.aph.gov.au/About\\_Parliament/Parliamentary\\_Departments/Parliamentary\\_Library/pubs/rp/rp1213/13rp02](http://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Library/pubs/rp/rp1213/13rp02).
- Barry, Ellen. "Al Qaeda Opens New Branch on Indian Subcontinent." *New York Times*, September 4, 2014. <https://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/05/world/asia/al-qaeda-announces-new-branch-on-indian-subcontinent.html>.
- Bhatnagar, Aryaman, and Wilson John. *Resurgence of Al-Qaeda in South Asia in Post-US Drawdown*. New Delhi: Observer Research Foundation, July 10, 2015. <http://www.orfonline.org/research/resurgence-of-al-qaeda-in-south-asia-post-us-drawdown/>.
- Bobic, Marinko. "Transnational Organised Crime and Terrorism: Nexus Needing a Human Security Framework." *Global Crime* 15, no. 3–4 (2014): 241–258. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17440572.2014.927327>.
- Boeke, Sergei. "Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb: Terrorism, Insurgency, or Organized Crime?" *Small Wars & Insurgencies* 27, no. 5 (2016): 914–936. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09592318.2016.1208280>.
- Bove-LaMonica, Daniella. "Al-Qaeda and Drug Trafficking, a Dangerous Partnership." *Mic*, June 4, 2011. <https://mic.com/articles/504/al-qaeda-and-drug-trafficking-a-dangerous-partnership#.30yrdUzkq>.

- Brisard, Jean-Charles. *Terrorism Financing: Roots and Trends of Saudi Terrorism Financing: Report Prepared for the President of the Security Council, United Nations*. Paris: JCB Consulting, 2003.
- Broadhurst, Roderic. "Transnational Crime Crisis in Asia." *Sri Lanka Guardian*, December 7, 2016. <https://www.slguardian.org/2016/12/transnational-crime-crisis-in-asia/>.
- Burke, Jason. *Al-Qaeda: Casting a Shadow of Terror*. London: I.B Tauris & Co. Ltd, 2003.
- . *Al-Qaeda: The True Story of Radical Islam*. London: Penguin Books Ltd, 2003.
- . *The New Threat: The Past, Present, and Future of Islamic Militancy*. New York: The New York Press, 2015.
- Burnham, Gracia. *In the Presence of My Enemies*. Wheaton, IL: Tyndale House, 2003.
- Clapper, James R. "Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community." Statement for the Record, Senate Armed Services Committee, February 9, 2016. [https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Clapper\\_02-09-16.pdf](https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Clapper_02-09-16.pdf).
- Colombage, Jayanath. *Asymmetric Warfare at Sea: The Case of Sri Lanka*. Berlin: Lambert Academic Publishing, 2015.
- Colombo Gazette*. "Al-Qaeda Attempting to Recruit Youth from Sri Lanka." August 27, 2017, <http://colombogazette.com/2016/08/27/al-qaeda-attempting-to-recruit-youth-from-sri-lanka/>.
- Colombo Telegraph*, "First Sri Lankan Killed in Syria With ISIS: Investigate and Punish All—Muslim Council Tells Sirisena." July 21, 2015. <https://www.colombotelegraph.com/index.php/first-sri-lankan-killed-in-syria-with-isis-investigate-and-punish-all-muslim-council-tells-sirisena/>.
- Copeland, Thomas. "Is the 'New Terrorism' Really New?: An Analysis of the New Paradigm for Terrorism." *Journal of Conflict Studies* 21, no. 2 (2001): 23–25. <https://journals.lib.unb.ca/index.php/JCS/article/view/4265/4834>.
- Counter Extremism Project. "Al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent." Accessed August 4, 2017. [https://www.counterextremism.com/sites/default/files/threat\\_pdf/Al-Qaeda%20in%20the%20Indian%20Subcontinent%20%28AQIS%29-09142016.pdf](https://www.counterextremism.com/sites/default/files/threat_pdf/Al-Qaeda%20in%20the%20Indian%20Subcontinent%20%28AQIS%29-09142016.pdf).
- Dandurand, Yvon, and Vivienne Chin. "Links between Terrorism and Other Forms of Crime." Vancouver: International Centre for Criminal Law Reform and Criminal Justice Policy, December 2004. [https://icclr.law.ubc.ca/sites/icclr.law.ubc.ca/files/publications/pdfs/LinksBetweenTerrorismLatest\\_updated.pdf](https://icclr.law.ubc.ca/sites/icclr.law.ubc.ca/files/publications/pdfs/LinksBetweenTerrorismLatest_updated.pdf).

- Davis, Lynn E., Gregory F. Treverton, Daniel Byman, Sara A. Daly, and William Rosenau. "Coordinating the War on Terrorism." Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2004. [https://www.rand.org/pubs/occasional\\_papers/OP110.html](https://www.rand.org/pubs/occasional_papers/OP110.html).
- De Castro, Renato Cruz. "Abstract of Counter-Insurgency in the Philippines and the Global War on Terror. Examining the Dynamics of the Twenty-first Century Long Wars." *European Journal of East Asian Studies* 9, no. 1 (2010): 135–160. <https://doi.org/10.1163/156805810X517706>.
- Del Cid Gómez, Juan Miguel. "A Financial Profile of the Terrorism of Al-Qaeda and Its Affiliates." *Perspectives on Terrorism* 4, no. 4 (2010). <http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/113/html>.
- Del Pozo, Fernando, Anthony Dymock, Lutz Feldt, Patrick Hebrard, and Ferdinando Sanfelice de Monteforte. "Maritime Surveillance in Support of CSDP: The Wise Pen Team Final Report to EDA Steering Board." Belgium: European Defence Agency, April 26, 2010. [https://www.eda.europa.eu/docs/news/Wise\\_Pen\\_Team\\_report\\_on\\_MARSUR.pdf](https://www.eda.europa.eu/docs/news/Wise_Pen_Team_report_on_MARSUR.pdf).
- Desker, Barry, and Kumar Ramakrishna. "Forging an Indirect Strategy in Southeast Asia." *The Washington Quarterly* 25, no. 2 (Spring 2002): 161–176.
- De Votta, Neil. "Anti Muslim Extremism and Violence in Sri Lanka." *IAPS Dialogue*, April 24, 2017. Accessed October 9, 2017. <https://iapsdialogue.org/2017/04/24/anti-muslim-extremism-and-violence-in-sri-lanka/>.
- DiGiacomo, Richard J. "Prostitution as a Possible Funding Mechanism for Terrorism." Master's thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2010. <http://hdl.handle.net/10945/5326>.
- Doherty, Ben, and Som Patidar. "India Refugee Boat Racket." *Sydney Morning Herald*, June 15, 2012. <http://www.smh.com.au/federal-politics/political-news/india-refugee-boat-racket-20120614-20d4z.html>.
- Dolnik, Adam, and Jason Pate, "Mass-Casualty Terrorism: Understanding the Bioterrorist Threat." In *The Changing Face of Terrorism*, edited by Rohan Gunaratna, 102–116. Singapore: Marshall Cavendish Academic, 2004.
- Ehrenfield, Rachel. "Drug Trafficking, Kidnapping Fund Al-Qaeda." CNN, May 4, 2011. <http://www.cnn.com/2011/OPINION/05/03/ehrenfeld.al.qaeda.funding/index.html>.
- Fellman, Zack. "Abu Sayyaf Group." Case Study no. 5. Washington, DC: Center for Strategic Studies and International Studies, November 2011. <https://www.csis.org/analysis/abu-sayyaf-group>.



- Fernando, Laksiri. "A New Form of Anti-Muslim Terrorism in Sri Lanka: What Is to be Done?" *Colombo Telegraph*, May 29, 2017. <https://www.colombotelegraph.com/index.php/a-new-form-of-anti-muslim-terrorism-in-sri-lanka-what-is-to-be-done/>.
- Filler, Alfredo L. "The Abu Sayyaf Group: A Growing Menace to Civil Society." *Terrorism and Political Violence* 14, no. 4 (Winter 2002): 131–162. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/714005638>.
- Financial Intelligence Unit of the Central Bank of Sri Lanka. "National Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Risk Assessment of Sri Lanka 2014." Colombo, Sri Lanka: Central Bank of Sri Lanka, 2014. [http://fiusrilanka.gov.lk/docs/Other/Sri\\_Lanka\\_NRA\\_on\\_ML\\_2014\\_-\\_Sanitized\\_Report.pdf](http://fiusrilanka.gov.lk/docs/Other/Sri_Lanka_NRA_on_ML_2014_-_Sanitized_Report.pdf).
- Gamage, Siri. "Democracy in Sri Lanka: Past, Present and Future." *Asian Studies Review* 17, no. 1 (July 1993): 107–116. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/03147539308712906>.
- Garofano, John, and Andrea J. Dew, eds. *Deep Currents and Rising Tides: The Indian Ocean and International Security*. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2013.
- Gerdes, Luke M., Kristine Ringler, and Barbara Autin. "Assessing the Abu Sayyaf Group's Strategic and Learning Capacities," *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 37, no. 3 (2014). <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2014.872021>.
- Goonasekera, Chethiya. "Challenges in the Legal Regime to Deal with Money Laundering." In Resource Materials Series, no. 83, 146th International Training, 68–74. Tokyo: United Nations Asia and Far East Institute for the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders (UNAFEI), 2011. <http://www.unafei.or.jp/english/pages/RMS/No83.htm>.
- Gottlieb, Stuart, ed. *Debating Terrorism and Counterterrorism: Conflicting Perspectives on Causes, Contexts, and Responses*. London: CQ Press, 2013.
- Government of Sri Lanka. "Implementation of the United Nations Program of Action to Prevent, Combat, and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects." The Second Biennial Meeting of States to Consider the Implication of the UN Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects, 11–15 July 2005, New York. <http://www.poa-iss.org/CASACountryProfile/PoANationalReports/2005@179@SriLanka.pdf>.
- Gunaratna, Rohan. "Al-Qaeda Is an Example of a 'New Terrorism.'" In *Debating Terrorism and Counterterrorism: Conflicting Perspectives on Causes, Contexts, and Responses*, edited by Stuart Gottlieb, 15–34. Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2014.

- . “Al-Qaeda’s Ideology.” Washington, DC: Hudson Institute, May 19, 2005. <https://www.hudson.org/research/9777-al-qaeda-s-ideology>.
- , ed. *The Changing Face of Terrorism*. Singapore: Marshall Cavendish International, 2004.
- . *Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror*. New York: Berkeley Publishing Group, 2003.
- Gunasekara, Chethiya. “Challenges in the Legal Regime to Deal with Money Laundering.” In *146th International Training Course Participants and Course Counsellors’ Papers*, 68–74. Tokyo: United Nations Asia and Far East Institute, 2010. [http://www.unafei.or.jp/english/pdf/RS\\_No83/No83\\_11PA\\_Chethiya.pdf](http://www.unafei.or.jp/english/pdf/RS_No83/No83_11PA_Chethiya.pdf).
- Gurr, Nadine, and Benjamin Cole. *The New Face of Terrorism: Threats from Weapons of Mass Destruction*. London: I.B. Tauris, 2000.
- Haider, Mateen. “Nexus between Drug Dealers, Terrorists will be Broken.” *DAWN*, August 3, 2015. <https://www.dawn.com/news/1198133>.
- Hoffman, Bruce. “Change and Continuity in Terrorism.” *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 24, no. 5 (2001): 417–428. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/105761001750434268>.
- . “The Coming ISIS-al Qaeda Merger: It’s Time to Take the Threat Seriously.” *Foreign Affairs*, March 29, 2016. <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2016-03-29/coming-isis-al-qaeda-merger>.
- . *Inside Terrorism*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1998.
- Höglund, Kristine, and Camilla Orjuela. “Winning the Peace: Conflict Prevention After a Victor’s Peace in Sri Lanka.” *Contemporary Social Science* 6, no. 1 (February 2011): 19–37. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17450144.2010.534491>.
- Horchem, Hans Josef. “West Germany’s Red Army Anarchist.” In *The New Terrorism*, edited by William Gutteridge, 199–217. London: Mansell Publishing, 1986.
- Howard, Russell. “Pre-emptive Military Doctrine: No Other Choice.” In *The Changing Face of Terrorism*, edited by Rohan Gunaratna, 38–47. Singapore: Marshall Cavendish Academic, 2004.
- Hutchinson, Steven, and Pat O’Malley. “A Crime–Terror Nexus? Thinking on Some of the Links between Terrorism and Criminality.” *Studies in Conflict Terrorism* 30, no. 12 (2007): 1095–1107. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10576100701670870>.
- Intelligence and Security Group. *Special Report: Assessing ASG’s Capabilities and Vulnerabilities*. Taguig City: Philippine Army, May 4, 2016.

- International Narcotic Control Board. *Report of the International Narcotic Control Board for 2012*. New York: United Nations, 2013. <http://www.incb.org/incb/en/publications/annual-reports/annual-report-2012.html>.
- Internet Encyclopaedia of Philosophy. "Social Contract Theory." Accessed October 6, 2017. <http://www.iep.utm.edu/soc-cont/>.
- Jadhav, Rajendra. "India Imposes Gold Sales Tax on Top of Record Import Duty." *Money News*, February 29, 2016. <http://in.reuters.com/article/india-budget-gold-idINKCN0W20PO>.
- Jayasuriya, Ranga. "Radicalized Sri Lankan Muslims Being Involved with ISIS in Syria Is Cause for Concern." *Dbsjeyaraj*, July 28, 2015. <http://dbsjeyaraj.com/dbsj/archives/42362>.
- Juergensmeyer, Mark. *Terror in the Mind of God: The Global Rise of Religious Violence*. 3rd ed. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003.
- Kaplan, Robert. *Monsoon: The Indian Ocean and the Future of American Power*. New York: Random House Inc., 2010.
- Kariyapperuma, Prasad. *A View from the International Maritime Boundary Line: India-Sri Lanka*. Colombo: S. Godage & Brothers (Pvt.) Ltd., 2016.
- Kelley, Michael B. "Here Is What al Qaeda's Global Network Looks Like." *Business Insider - Military & Defense*, September 13, 2013. <http://www.businessinsider.com/chart-of-al-qaedas-global-network-2013-9>.
- Kunanayakam, Tamara. "Geostrategic Importance, Present Situation and Challenges Ahead." The Ministry of Foreign Affairs Sri Lanka. [Ambassador of Sri Lanka in Cuba at Centre for Studies on Asia and Oceania in Havana on March 11, 2010—speech]. Accessed June 3, 2017. [http://www.mfa.gov.lk/index.php?option=com\\_content&task=view&id=2353&Itemid=134](http://www.mfa.gov.lk/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=2353&Itemid=134).
- Kurtulus, Ersun N. "The 'New Terrorism' and Its Critics." *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 34, no. 6 (2011): 476–500. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2011.571194>.
- Lal, Rollie. "South Asian Organized Crime and Terrorist Networks." *Orbis* 49, no. 2 (2005): 293–304. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.orbis.2005.01.003>.
- Laqueur, Walter. *The New Terrorism: Fanaticism and the Arms of Mass Destruction*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1999.
- Li, Quan, and Drew Schaub. "Economic Globalization and Transnational Terrorism: A Pooled Time-series Analysis." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 48, no. 2 (2004): 230–258. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002703262869>.

- Linz, Juan J., and Alfred Stepan. *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe*. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996.
- Makarenko, Tamara. "The Crime-Terror Continuum: Tracing the Interplay between Transnational Organised Crime and Terrorism." *Global Crime* 6, no. 1 (2004): 129–145. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1744057042000297025>.
- Makinen, Julie. "Drug Seizures Soar in China; Most Suspects are Farmers and Unemployed." *Los Angeles Times*, February 18, 2016. Accessed August 25, 2017. <http://www.latimes.com/world/asia/la-fg-drugs-china-meth-ice-20160218-story.html>.
- Mallawarachchi, Bharatha. "UN Body Alarmed by Attack on Rohingya Refugees in Sri Lanka." *Washington Post*, September 27, 2017. [https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia\\_pacific/un-body-alarmed-by-attack-on-rohingya-refugees-in-sri-lanka/2017/09/27/5954c90c-a3ea-11e7-b573-8ec86cdfefed\\_story.html?utm\\_term=.6dcbd92b8a08](https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/un-body-alarmed-by-attack-on-rohingya-refugees-in-sri-lanka/2017/09/27/5954c90c-a3ea-11e7-b573-8ec86cdfefed_story.html?utm_term=.6dcbd92b8a08).
- Manalo, Eusaquito P. "The Philippine Response to Terrorism: the Abu Sayyaf Group." Master's thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2004. <http://hdl.handle.net/10945/1218>.
- Martin, Gus. "Terrorism and Transnational Organized Crime." In *Transnational Organized Crime: Overview from Six Continents*, edited by Jay Albanese and Philip Reichel, 163–208. New York: SAGE Publications, 2014.
- May, Channing. "Transnational Crime and the Developing World." *Global Financial Integrity*, March 27, 2017. <http://www.gfintegrity.org/report/transnational-crime-and-the-developing-world/>.
- McKenna, Thomas M. *Muslim Rulers and Rebels: Everyday Politics and Armed Separatism in the Southern Philippines*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998, quoted in Rommel Banlaoi, *Al-Harakatul Al-Islamiyah: Essays on the Abu Sayyaf Group*, 3rd ed. Quezon City: Philippine Institute for Peace, Violence, and Terrorism Research, 2012.
- Mendel, William, and Peter McCabe, eds. *SOF Role in Combating Transnational Organized Crimes*. MacDill Air Force Base, FL: The JSOU Press, 2016. [https://jsou.libguides.com/ld.php?content\\_id=19301442](https://jsou.libguides.com/ld.php?content_id=19301442).
- Mendis, L. M. H. *Assignment Peace in the Name of the Motherland*. Colombo: Littrain Print Pvt. Ltd., 2009.
- Millán Sánchez, Marco A. "Terrorism Outsourced: The FARC's Criminal Alliances." Master's thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2014. <http://hdl.handle.net/10945/44615>.

- Mohindru, Sameer C. "Sri Lankan Colombo Container Port to Expand Capacity; Emerges as Global Hub." S&P Global Platts. Accessed June 4, 2017. <https://www.platts.com/latest-news/shipping/singapore/sri-lankan-colombo-container-port-to-expand-capacity-26427770>.
- Morgan, J. Matthew. "The Origins of the New Terrorism." *Parameters* 34, no.1 (Spring 2004): 29–43.
- Mushtaq, Munza. "Sri Lanka's Communal Divide Takes Toll on Rohingya Muslims." *Asia Times*, September 26, 2017. <http://www.atimes.com/sri-lankas-communal-divide-takes-toll-rohingya-refugees/>.
- Nacos, Brigitte, L. *Mass-Mediated Terrorism: Mainstream and Digital Media in Terrorism and Counterterrorism*. 3rd Edition. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2016.
- Nair, Kirit K. "India's Role in Afghanistan Post 2014: Strategy, Policy and Implementation." Manekshaw Paper no. 55. New Delhi: Centre for Land Warfare Studies, 2015. [http://www.claws.in/images/publication\\_pdf/1330417563\\_MP55PreintversioninsideKirit.pdf](http://www.claws.in/images/publication_pdf/1330417563_MP55PreintversioninsideKirit.pdf).
- Nanjappa, Vicky. "Is the ISIS Threat Catching up in Sri Lanka." *Sri Lanka Guardian*, February 2, 2016. <http://www.oneindia.com/india/is-the-isis-threat-catching-up-to-sri-lanka-2000451.html>.
- Napuli, Ferdinand B. "Keeping on the Right Track: An Assessment on the Effectiveness of AFP. Responses to ASG Threat." Master's thesis, National Defense College of the Philippines, Quezon City, 2015.
- National Dangerous Drugs Control Board. *Handbook of Drug Abuse Information 2016*. Rajagiriya, Sri Lanka: Ministry of Law and Order & Southern Development. <http://www.nddcb.gov.lk/publication.html>.
- National Intelligence Council (U.S.). *Global Trends 2025: A Transformed World*. Washington, DC: National Intelligence Council, 2008. [https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/94769/2008\\_11\\_Global\\_Trends\\_2025.pdf](https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/94769/2008_11_Global_Trends_2025.pdf).
- National Security Council (U.S.). "Transnational Organized Crime: A Growing Threat to National and International Security." Washington, DC: The White House, n.d. Accessed October 6, 2017. <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/administration/eop/nsc/transnational-crime/threat>.
- Neumann, Peter R. "Old and New Terrorism." *Social Europe: Politics, Economy and Employment & Labor*, August 3, 2009. <https://www.socialeurope.eu/old-and-new-terrorism>.

- Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, OG2. *Special Report on the ASG Kidnapping Activities*. Taguig City: Production Branch, 2014.
- Penn State College of Earth and Mineral Sciences. “Organized Crime South Asia.” Accessed September 9, 2017. <https://www.e-education.psu.edu/geog571/node/176>.
- Perera, U. L. J Sylvester. “The Influence of Tamil Diaspora on Stability of Sri Lanka.” Master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2016. <http://hdl.handle.net/10945/49365>.
- Prathapa, Sayakkarage Subath. S. “Immigration and Its Effects on the National Security of Sri Lanka.” Master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2016. <http://hdl.handle.net/10945/51597>.
- PTI. “Seven South Asian Nations to Share Info on Organized Crime.” *Economic Times*, November 6, 2015. <http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/7-south-asian-nations-to-share-info-on-organised-crime/articleshow/49692519.cms>.
- Quiggin, Tom. “Understanding al-Qaeda’s Ideology for Counter-Narrative Work.” *Perspectives on Terrorism* 3, no. 2 (2009). <http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/67/html>.
- Ramakrishna, Kumar. “‘The Southeast Asian Approach’ to Counter-terrorism: Learning from Indonesia and Malaysia.” *Journal of Conflict Studies* 25, no. 1 (2005): 27–47. <https://journals.lib.unb.ca/index.php/JCS/article/view/189/317>.
- Ramakrishna, Kumar, and Andrew Tan. “The New Terrorism: Diagnosis and Prescriptions.” In *The New Terrorism-Anatomy, Trends and Counter-Strategies*, ed. Kumar Ramakrishna and Andrew Tan, 3–29. Singapore: Eastern University Press, 2002.
- Reed, Alastair. “Al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent: A New Frontline in the Global Jihadist Movement.” ICCT Policy Brief. The Hague: *International Centre for Counter-Terrorism—The Hague*, May 2015. DOI: 10.19165/2016.2.02.
- Rees, Wyn. “Organized Crime, Security and the European Union.” Draft paper for the ESRC Workshop, Grenoble. <https://ecpr.eu/Filestore/PaperProposal/3d3d5ad1-a40c-46aa-b55b-379638e700a5.pdf>.
- Reyes, Liana Eustacia, and Shlomi Dinar. “The Convergence of Terrorism and Transnational Crime in Central Asia.” *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 38, no. 5 (2015): 380–393. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2014.995988>.
- Roggio, Bill. “Al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent Incorporates Regional Jihadist Groups.” *FDD’s Long War Journal*, September 5, 2014. [http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2014/09/analysis\\_al\\_qaeda\\_in.php](http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2014/09/analysis_al_qaeda_in.php).

- Rosato, Valeria. “‘Hybrid Orders’ between Terrorism and Organized Crime: The Case of Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb.” *African Security* 9, no. 2 (2016): 110–135. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/19392206.2016.1175877>.
- Salem, Allan Jones A. “Nexus of Crime and Terrorism: The Case of the Abu Sayyaf Group.” Master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2016. <http://hdl.handle.net/10945/51611>.
- Schmitter, Philippe C., and Terry Lynn Karl. “What Democracy Is and Is Not.” *Journal of Democracy* 2, no. 3 (1991): 75–88. <https://doi.org/10.1353/jod.1991.0033>.
- Schwab, Klaus, ed. *The Global Competitiveness Report 2014–15*. Geneva: World Economic Forum, 2014. [http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF\\_GlobalCompetitivenessReport\\_2014-15.pdf](http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_GlobalCompetitivenessReport_2014-15.pdf).
- Security Matters, “Funding Terror: The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Ealam and Their Criminal Activities in Canada and the Western World.” December 25, 1995. <http://mackenzieinstitute.com/funding-terror-the-liberation-tigers-of-tamil-ealam-and-their-criminal-activities-in-canada-and-the-western-world/>.
- Senarathne, Jagath P. “The Security Establishment in Sri Lanka: A Case for Reform.” In *Governing Insecurity: Democratic Control of Military and Security Establishments in Transitional Democracies*, edited by Gavin Cawthra and Robin Luckham, 181–204. London: Zed Books, 2003.
- Shapoo, Sajid Farid. “Al-Qaeda’s South Asia Branch Makes a Bid for Global Jihad Leadership: The New Code of Conduct from AQIS is an Attempt to Wrest Back Leadership from Islamic State.” *The Diplomat*, July 29, 2017. <http://thediplomat.com/2017/07/al-qaedas-south-asia-branch-makes-a-bid-for-global-jihad-leadership/>.
- Shelley, Louise I. “Identifying, Counting and Categorizing Transnational Organized Crime.” *Transnational Organized Crime* 5, no. 1 (Spring 1999): 1–18.
- . “Transnational Organized Crime: An Imminent Threat to the Nation-state?” *Journal of International Affairs* 48, no. 2 (Winter 1995): 463–489.
- Simon, Steven, and Daniel Benjamin. “America and the New Terrorism.” *Survival* 42, no. 1 (Spring 2000): 59–75. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/survival/42.1.59>.
- Singh, Satyavir. “Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism in South Asia: Challenges and Policy Options.” *India Quarterly* 58, no. 3–4 (July 2002): 145–164. doi:10.1177/097492840205800306.

- Sloan, Britt, and James Cockayne. "Terrorism, Crime, and Conflict: Exploiting the Differences among Transnational Threats?" Policy Brief. Washington, DC: Center on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation, 2011. [http://globalcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/02/BS\\_policybrief\\_117.pdf](http://globalcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/02/BS_policybrief_117.pdf).
- Sri Lanka Navy. *Maritime Security Strategy 2025*. Colombo: Sri Lanka Navy Headquarters, 2016.
- . "Sri Lanka Navy: the First Line of Defence." Accessed October 31, 2017. <http://www.navy.lk/>.
- Stanford University. "Mapping Militant Organizations: Abu Sayyaf Group." Last updated July 20, 2015. <http://web.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/groups/view/152>.
- Sunday Leader*. "US Terrorism Report Says Sri Lanka on Alert Against ISIS." July 23, 2017. <http://www.thesundayleader.lk/2017/07/23/us-terrorism-report-says-sri-lanka-on-alert-against-isis/>.
- Sutton, Mitchell, and Serge De Silva-Ranasingha. *Transnational Crimes in Sri Lanka: Future Considerations for International Cooperation*. Canberra, ACT: Australian Strategic Policy Institute, October 2016. <https://www.aspi.org.au/report/transnational-crime-sri-lanka-future-considerations-international-cooperation>.
- Swamy, M. R. Narayan. *Tigers of Lanka: From Boys to Guerrillas*. Updated Edition. Colombo: Vijitha Yapa Publications, 1994.
- Takeyh, Ray, and Nikolas Gvosdev. "Do Terrorist Networks Need a Home?" *Washington Quarterly* 25, no. 3 (2002): 97–108. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/01636600260046262>.
- Tan, Andrew, and Kumar Ramakrishna. *The New Terrorism: Anatomy, Trends and Counter-Strategies*. Singapore: Eastern Universities Press, 2002.
- Thomas, Sarasu Esther. *Responses to Human Trafficking in Bangladesh, India, Nepal, and Sri Lanka*. Chanakyapuri, New Dehli: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Regional Office for South Asia, 2011. [http://www.unodc.org/documents/human-trafficking/2011/Responses\\_to\\_Human\\_Trafficking\\_in\\_Bangladesh\\_India\\_Nepal\\_and\\_Sri\\_Lanka.pdf](http://www.unodc.org/documents/human-trafficking/2011/Responses_to_Human_Trafficking_in_Bangladesh_India_Nepal_and_Sri_Lanka.pdf).
- Thorp, Gene, and Swati Sharma. "World Foreign Fighters Flow to Syria." *The Washington Post*, January 27, 2015. [https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/foreign-fighters-flow-to-syria/2015/01/27/7fa56b70-a631-11e4-a7c2-03d37af98440\\_graphic.html?utm\\_term=.6d5cde4901b3](https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/foreign-fighters-flow-to-syria/2015/01/27/7fa56b70-a631-11e4-a7c2-03d37af98440_graphic.html?utm_term=.6d5cde4901b3).



- Titus, Michael, and David H. Gray. "Suppressing the Growth of Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula: An Examination of the Resurgence of AQAP in Yemen and Policies the United States Can Employ to Mitigate the Threat." *Global Security Studies* 6, no. 3 (Summer 2015): 19–28. <http://globalsecuritystudies.com/Titus%20AQAP%20-AG.pdf>.
- Transparency International. "Corruption Perceptions Index 2016." January 25, 2017. [https://www.transparency.org/news/feature/corruption\\_perceptions\\_index\\_2016](https://www.transparency.org/news/feature/corruption_perceptions_index_2016).
- Trading Economics. "Sri Lanka Government Budget." Accessed October 6, 2017. <https://tradingeconomics.com/sri-lanka/government-budget>.
- . "Sri Lanka Government Debts to GDP." Accessed October 6, 2017. <https://tradingeconomics.com/sri-lanka/government-debt-to-gdp>.
- Tucker, David. "What Is New about the New Terrorism and How Dangerous Is It?" *Terrorism and Political Violence* 13, no. 3 (2001): 1–14. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09546550109609688>.
- United Nations. Office on Drugs and Crime. "Migrant Smuggling." UNODC, 2017. [http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/human-trafficking/smuggling-of-migrants.html#What\\_is\\_Migrant\\_Smuggling](http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/human-trafficking/smuggling-of-migrants.html#What_is_Migrant_Smuggling).
- . *Responses to Human Trafficking in Bangladesh, India, Nepal and Sri Lanka*. New Delhi: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2011. [http://www.unodc.org/documents/human-trafficking/2011/Responses\\_to\\_Human\\_Trafficking\\_in\\_Bangladesh\\_India\\_Nepal\\_and\\_Sri\\_Lanka.pdf](http://www.unodc.org/documents/human-trafficking/2011/Responses_to_Human_Trafficking_in_Bangladesh_India_Nepal_and_Sri_Lanka.pdf).
- . *Transnational Organized Crime in East Asia and the Pacific: A Threat Assessment*. New York: United Nations, 2013. <https://www.unodc.org/toc/en/reports/TOCTA-EA-Pacific.html>.
- . *United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crimes and the Protocols Thereto*. New York: United Nations, 2004. <https://www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/UNTOC/Publications/TOC%20Convention/TOCebook-e.pdf>.
- . *World Drug Report 2010*. Vienna, Austria: UNODC, 2010. [https://www.unodc.org/documents/wdr/WDR\\_2010/World\\_Drug\\_Report\\_2010\\_lo-res.pdf](https://www.unodc.org/documents/wdr/WDR_2010/World_Drug_Report_2010_lo-res.pdf).
- U.S. Department of Justice. *Asian Transnational Organized Crime and Its Impact on the United States*. Washington, DC: Office of Justice Programs, National Institute of Justice, 2007. <https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/214186.pdf>.

- U.S. Department of State. "Trafficking in Persons Report, 2014." Washington, DC: Office of the Under Secretary for Global Affairs, 2014. <https://www.state.gov/j/tip/rls/tiprpt/2014/>.
- Vardi, Nathan. "Al-Qaeda's New Business Model: Cocaine and Human Trafficking." *Forbes*, December 18, 2009. <https://www.forbes.com/2009/12/18/al-qaeda-cocaine-business-beltway-al-qaeda.html>.
- Ward, H. Richard and Daniel J. Mabry. "Transnational Organized Crime in Asia and the Middle East." in *Transnational Organized Crime, Overview from Six Continents*, edited by Jay Albanese and Philip Reichel, 117–140. Los Angeles: SAGE Publications, 2014.
- Weerakkody, Chamal. "Lack of Staff Allows Drug Syndicates to Open Up Lanka as a Major Transit Route." *The Sunday Times*, May 17, 2015.
- Weinberg, Leonard, Ami Pedahzur, and Sivan Hirsch-Hoefler. "The challenges of conceptualizing terrorism." *Terrorism and Political Violence* 16, no. 4 (2004): 777–794, DOI: 10.1080/095465590899768.
- Weiss, Gordon. *The Cage: The Fight for Sri Lanka and the Last Days of the Tamil Tigers*. London: Bodley Head, 2011.
- Wijayarathne, Bhanu, "Money Laundering, Its Impacts and Consequences." *DailyFT*, August 31, 2016. <http://www.ft.lk/article/564789/Money-laundering--its-impact-and-consequences>.
- Williams, Phil. "Terrorist Financing and Organized Crime: Nexus, Appropriation, or Transformation?" In *Countering the Financing of Terrorism*, edited by Thomas J. Biersteker and Sue E. Eckert, 126–149. London, England: Routledge, 2008.
- . "Transnational Criminal Organizations and International Security." *Survival* 36, no. 1 (1994): 96–113. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00396339408442726>.
- . "Transnational Organized Crime and National and International Security: A Global Assessment." In *Society Under Siege, Volume One. Crime, Violence and Illegal Weapons*, edited by Virginia Gamba, 11–41. Halfway House, South Africa: Institute for Security Studies, 1997. <https://oldsite.issafrica.org/uploads/SWILLIAMS.PDF>.
- Yildiz, Ulas. "Combatting Commercial Terrorists: The PKK Case." Master's thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2015. <http://hdl.handle.net/10945/47898>.

## **INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST**

1. Defense Technical Information Center  
Ft. Belvoir, Virginia
2. Dudley Knox Library  
Naval Postgraduate School  
Monterey, California