

AIR COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE

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BUILDING PARTNER CAPACITY (BPC): ANALYZING
HISTORICAL CASE STUDIES

by

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Abstract

From 2006 to 2016, Building Partner Capacity (BPC) has increased in strategic importance as a key way for the United States to maintain national security. The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) outlined a road map for employing BPC, but to date, the United States has achieved mixed results. To determine best practices for future BPC employment, this research looked at two recent case studies of marginal BPC attempts: Iraq and Afghanistan. These were juxtaposed against two successful BPC efforts: the post-World War II occupation of Japan and Germany. With minimal investment, the United States improved the stability of Japan and Germany. Comparatively, the United States invested more time and money in Afghanistan and Iraq with less beneficial results. This research determined factors that led to the discrepancy and if the United States could apply these factors to future BPC efforts. This research found that the culture of the nation has the most significance when employing BPC efforts. Next, this research determined that a significant number of troops in the initial stages of a BPC effort to establish security, particularly related to an occupation, greatly increases the chances of successful BPC employment. Lastly, an external security threat gives focus to the BPC efforts and increases the likelihood BPC efforts will have the desired effect. American leaders continue to emphasize BPC through the QDR, NSS, and policy speeches. Determining best practices to maximize the effectiveness of BPC makes strategic sense to maximize time and financial investments.

Introduction

The United States (US) maintains national security through multiple methodologies: deterrence, economic sanctions, military strength/intervention, cyberspace aggression and other methods. Building partner capacity (BPC), or leveraging US resources to strengthen another country, can potentially help America increase national security. Reconstruction comprises only a small component of BPC. An example of a BPC effort by the US State Department is the Africa Contingency Operations Training & Assistance (ACOTA) program. The mission of the ACOTA is to “enhance the capacities and capabilities of its African Partner Countries” so that the peacekeeping resources in Africa can plan, train and deploy enough “professionally competent peacekeepers to meet conflict transformation requirements with minimal non-African assistance.”¹ This program has increased the capacity of 25 African partner nations (PNs) and provided training and non-lethal equipment to 254,228 peacekeepers.² These African nations have then deployed these peacekeepers on varied missions throughout Africa to conduct humanitarian relief efforts.³

ACOTA illustrates the complexities and diverse nature of BPC efforts. Even though ACOTA has effectively trained over 200,000 peacekeepers, Africa remains unstable with some of the poorest nations in the world. ACOTA stands as one example of numerous BPC efforts conducted by the United States have had varied results and degrees of effectiveness. Some efforts, such as post World War II (WWII) Japan and Germany, are widely regarded as success stories. Conversely, BPC efforts in Mexico, Columbia, Iraq and post-2001 Afghanistan have

¹ US Department of State, “Africa Contingency Operations Training & Assistance,” Washington D.C., 2015, <http://www.state.gov/p/af/rt/acota/index.htm> accessed on 20 February 2016.

² US Department of State accessed at <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2013/02/203841.htm> accessed on 20 February 2016.

³ Ibid.

obtained lower degrees of success. Concluding what works and what does not work when America conducts BPC is challenging; the reasons for the success or failure of BPC efforts are difficult to ascertain. Due to the finite resources of time and money, determining ways to maximize BPC efforts may help increase American national security. Sometimes, BPC efforts do not help accomplish the desired objectives and the best course of action might be to abstain. This research project will provide the answer for two questions: when to employ BPC and how to employ BPC.

This research will examine what lessons America can glean from historical BPC cases that will enhance the future strategic effectiveness of BPC. This research will use specific data from BPC case studies to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of future BPC efforts. Utilizing the case study method, this research project will analyze the following case studies: Post WWII Japan, post WWII Germany, Iraq 2003–2014, and Afghanistan 2001–2014. This research will analyze each case study against three criteria perceived to impact BPC operations:

1. Cultural factors affect the ability of BPC efforts to make an impact.
2. External security threats of the target country increase the impact of BPC efforts.
3. Security established in the target country maximizes BPC effects.

An analysis of these case studies against these three criteria will show how these criteria affected the outcome of BPC efforts.

BPC Background

The United States initially experienced the BPC concept during the Revolutionary War when France and America signed the Treaty of Alliance and the Treaty of Amity and Commerce

in 1778.⁴ These treaties provided weapons, indirect assistance, and favorable commerce terms to America for the duration of the war.⁵ As a country helped by foreign aid, it is logical that once Americans gained independence, they would reciprocate the foreign aid practice that benefited them. Indeed, once a country, America conducted the BPC concept around the world, sending advisors and over \$2.2 trillion (2009 dollars) of foreign aid abroad from 1900 to 2016.⁶

Leaders of the United States have continued to focus on BPC because of the desire for it to deter conflict through spreading good will and eliminating causes of conflict before they arise. The 2015 National Security Strategy (NSS) stated the need to “focus on building the capacity of others to prevent the causes and consequences of conflict.”⁷ America’s focus on eliminating the root cause of conflicts before they occur seems logical, but efforts to utilize BPC as a way of preventing the cause of conflict are not always successful. BPC gained national prominence as a term when introduced in the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). The QDR outlines the Secretary of Defense’s (SecDef’s) guidance to the DoD, and the 2006 QDR included the term BPC for the first time.⁸ Due to the strategic focus the SecDef placed on BPC, the DoD published a QDR Execution Roadmap titled *Building Partner Capacity*. The QDR Execution Roadmap defined BPC as: “Targeted efforts to improve the collective capabilities and performance of the Department of Defense and its partners.”⁹ While the term BPC gained recognition in 2006,

⁴ U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian, Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State <https://history.state.gov/milestones/1776-1783/french-alliance> accessed on 21 January 2016.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ U.S. Government Spending, USGovernmentSpending.com, compiled by Christopher Chantrell, http://www.usgovernmentspending.com/spending_chart_1900_2016USk_17s2li011tcn_34f35f_Foreign_Aid_In_The_20th_Century accessed on 21 January 2016.

⁷ Barack H. Obama, *National Security Strategy*, (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2010), 7.

⁸ U.S. Department of Defense. Quadrennial Defense Review Report. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, February 2006. 92pp.

⁹ U.S. Department of Defense. QDR [Quadrennial Defense Review] *Execution Roadmap: Building Partnership Capacity*. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, May 22, 2006, 4.

America has conducted the QDR definition of BPC under various other names (security assistance, reconstruction, etc.) since the creation of the nation.

The United States employed BPC at least two times that appeared successful: post-WWII Japan and Germany. Both of these efforts did two things: they improved the PN's capacity and created a strategically significant national security partner for America. By accomplishing these two goals with these PN's, America accomplished the primary goals of BPC. Conversely, efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan from 2001–2014 appear less effective. The Taliban in Afghanistan and the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in Iraq both increased in size in conjunction with the drawdown of America forces in both countries.¹⁰ These drawdowns occurred after America spent approximately \$181 billion dollars on security force assistance and reconstruction efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan between 2001 and 2014.¹¹ In comparison, the Marshall plan spent \$103.4 billion (2014 dollars) on the reconstruction efforts of 16 Western European countries.¹² In spite of these BPC efforts by America in time and money, neither Afghanistan nor Iraq have become the same security partners as Germany and Japan, in which significantly less investment led to much greater partnerships.

For example, Germany and Japan both had thriving automotive industries within a decade of WWII's end, to include Japan producing the most cars in the world by the 1980s.¹³ Additionally, America established strategic bases in both of these countries that facilitated regional security

¹⁰ Missy Ryan and Greg Jaffe, "Obama may alter drawdown timetable but is determined to end Afghan war," *The Washington Post*, www.washingtonpost.com, March 22, 2015, accessed at https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/obama-may-alter-the-drawdown-but-is-still-determined-to-end-the-afghan-war/2015/03/22/a54aa958-cf26-11e4-a2a7-9517a3a70506_story.html

¹¹ Congress of the United States Congressional Budget Office, "The Budget and Economic Outlook: 2015-2025", January 2015, <http://www.cbo.gov/publication/49892>, 80.

¹² Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, "Quarterly Report to the United States Congress," July 30, 2014, Arlington, VA, 5.

¹³ Encyclopedia Britannica Online, "Automotive Industry", accessed January 22, 2016, <http://www.britannica.com/topic/automotive-industry>.

and national security for America. This level of economic strength indicated by the exporting of manufactured goods did not come to fruition in Afghanistan or Iraq; instead, ISIS and the Taliban have increased in numbers. These disparities in the results of BPC efforts by America require further investigation to determine root causes.

Case Study 1: Post WWII Japan Occupation

When Emperor Hirohito told the Japanese people of their surrender, close to 9 million were homeless and 6.5 million were stranded outside of Japan.¹⁴ The American occupying force that came to Japan helped lead 80 million Japanese through a transition of governments while meeting the goals of the Potsdam Declaration.¹⁵ The reconstruction effort found Japanese “crowded into dugouts and flimsy shacks or, in some cases, were trying to sleep in hallways, on subway platforms, or on sidewalks. Employees slept in their offices; teachers, in their schoolrooms.”¹⁶ In this challenging situation, the American reconstruction team figured out ways to fulfill the Initial Postsurrender Policy.¹⁷ This policy outlined the objectives of the occupation to “ensure Japan will not again become a menace to the United States or to the peace and security of the world,” and establish a government freely supported by the will of the people that respects the rights of other states and supports the objectives of the United States.¹⁸ Over time, Japan did establish a government supported by the people that contributed to peace in the region and experienced economic revival. Several decisions by leaders throughout the reconstruction effort led to these improvements for the Japanese.

¹⁴ John W. Dower, *Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II*, W. W. Norton and Company, 2000, 47-48.

¹⁵ Ray A. Moore and Donald L. Robinson, *Partners for Democracy: Crafting the New Japanese State under MacArthur*, Oxford University Press, 2002, 12.

¹⁶ John W. Dower, *Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II*, 47-48.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 77.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 77.

The United States focused on Japan's reconstruction between 1945 and 1952, with General Douglas A. MacArthur implementing broad political, economic, military and social changes in Japan.¹⁹ There were three phases of reconstruction of Japan during this timeframe: initial trials and reforms, economic revitalization and final peace treaty and alliance.²⁰ During all three phases, General MacArthur ruled Japan similarly to the previous militaristic regime had ruled Japan within his own "rigidly layered ranks."²¹ He also relied heavily on Emperor Hirohito, praising him as the leader of the new democracy while not dwelling on the Emperor's role in WWII.²² The US State Department's committee on the postwar policy for Japan argued that the emperor should issue the surrender and this would help the occupation.²³ General MacArthur took this advice and did not indict the emperor or other members of the imperial family, while the military International Military Tribunal for the Far East (IMTFE) sentenced nine of the senior political leaders and 18 of the senior military leaders to death or life in prison.²⁴

During the occupation, Gen MacArthur intentionally never had meaningful contact with the Japanese, but instead relied on approximately 1,500 military and civilian bureaucrats who went to Japan in 1946—a number that would peak at 3,200 in 1948.²⁵ These bureaucrats governed Japan through existing government entities because of a lack of cultural and linguistic awareness.²⁶ During this time, the Japanese began to see Americans not as conquerors, but as a

¹⁹ U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian, Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State <https://history.state.gov/milestones/1945-1952/japan-reconstruction> accessed on 21 January 2016.

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ John W. Dower, *Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II*, 2000, 27.

²² Ibid.

²³ Ray A. Moore and Donald L. Robinson, *Partners for Democracy: Crafting the New Japanese State under MacArthur*, Oxford University Press, 2002, 23

²⁴ U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian, Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State <https://history.state.gov/milestones/1945-1952/nuremberg> accessed on 27 January 2016.

²⁵ Ibid., 205.

²⁶ Ibid., 27.

nation wanting to help them recover and move past the war. By not disbanding the Japanese government, day-to-day operations continued in spite of the destruction WWII had caused on the Japanese mainland. In addition to these military and civilian bureaucrats, 500,000 Americans from the Eighth and Sixth Armies military patrolled Japan to help provide security.²⁷ There was not a need to provide security for the Japanese because the Japanese police force remained in place and could maintain security.

The reconstruction period began to end when Japan signed the San Francisco Peace Treaty with the Allies in 1951 that ended the occupation of Japan and allowed the United States to maintain a permanent presence on Japan.²⁸ Under this treaty, the United States would defend Japan from external attack and stop internal unrest.²⁹ However, the 1954 Self-Defense Law allowed Japan to create a 150,000-man Self-Defense Force that also helped increase local security.³⁰ This enabled Japan to go from spending 60 percent of its gross national product on military purposes to less than one percent, which allowed Japan to invest in its national resources and economic development.³¹ Meanwhile, the Japanese economy continued to grow, and by 1974, Japan ranked with the top industrial nations of the world.³² These reconstruction efforts helped America's security and economy increase, leading to a more secure world.

Case Study 2: Post WWII Germany Occupation

²⁷ "Reports of General MacArthur," Prepared by his General Staff, Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 66-60006, Reprint 1994, 56.

²⁸ John Swenson-Wright, *Unequal Allies? United States Security and Alliance Policy Toward Japan, 1945-1960*, Stanford University Press, Stanford, CA, 2005, 1.

²⁹ Gary D. Allinson, *Japan's Postwar History*, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, New York, 2004, 77

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ Ibid.

³² Ibid., 83.

When Germany surrendered in the spring of 1945, the United States faced multiple challenges to rebuild the war-torn country. Germany had approximately 1.5 million civilians killed and 3.5 million houses destroyed, approximately 20% of German houses, during the course of WW II.³³ Unlike in Japan, in which surrender occurred before Americans occupied Japan's mainland, Americans already occupied Germany. These occupiers found millions of Jews in concentration camps and approximately 7.5 million homeless Germans.³⁴ German towns and factories lay in tatters from a long Allied bombing campaign that limited job prospects and economic rehabilitation opportunities. The American military was not alone in Germany; the four major Allied powers—France, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States—all occupied large portions of Germany. The Soviet Union controlled the eastern half of Germany, which led to mounting tensions between the Allies occupying the western half due to differing ideologies and the perceived threat of communism. In spite of these challenges, the United States pursued a policy of changing German ideologies and stabilizing its infrastructure through policies of denazification, decartelization, demilitarization and democratization—policies referred to as the 4-Ds.³⁵

Prior to the occupation at the Potsdam conference, the Allied leaders discussed the eventual occupation of Germany and decided to divide the country, and Berlin, into multiple quadrants. The United States issued a Directive to the Commander in Chief of the US Occupation Forces in 1945 called Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) 1067.³⁶ This document laid out specific objectives and

³³ Gerhard Ziemer, *Deutsche Exodus*, Stuttgart 1973, 94.

³⁴ Ibid.

³⁵ Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) 1067, "Directive to the Commander in Chief of the U.S. Occupation Forces," April 1945.

³⁶ Ibid.

operating rules for General Eisenhower to follow as he ran the American zone in Germany. Specifically, it expanded on how to implement the 4-Ds in German society.

The Americans and Allies initially pursued justice and denazification by eliminating all numerous Nazi laws enacted since 1933.³⁷ After this, elimination of Nazi organizations occurred as Control Law #2, Article 1 stated, “National Socialist German Labour Party, its formations, affiliated associations and supervised agencies, including para-military organizations and all other Nazi institutions established as instruments of party domination are hereby abolished and declared illegal.”³⁸ Next, the Allies pursued justice by conducting the Nuremberg trials. The Allies set up the International Military Tribunal (IMT) in Nuremberg, Germany, to prosecute and punish “the major war criminals of the European Axis.”³⁹ The IMT had judges from each Allied power who presided over initial hearings of 22 major Nazi political and military leaders, with 12 sentenced to death.⁴⁰

Gen Eisenhower received guidance to disband and demilitarize almost every aspect of German infrastructure. Schools, courthouses and police shut down immediately, and Allied forces seized all military equipment with the goal of preventing any militarized act by the Germans. The one exception, the Reichshriminalpolizei or Criminal Police, remained in place and kept law and order, but even this organization had to have all Nazi personnel purged

³⁷ “Documents on Germany under Occupation, 1945-1954.” Contributor: Beate Ruhm Von Oppen, Oxford University Press, London, 1955, 9.

³⁸ Ibid., 79.

³⁹ U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian, Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State <https://history.state.gov/milestones/1945-1952/nuremberg> accessed on 31 January 2016.

⁴⁰ United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, “Holocaust Encyclopedia,” <http://www.ushmm.org/outreach/en/article.php?ModuleId=10007722> accessed on 6 February 2016

immediately. The Allies closed schools and courthouses to remove all Nazi personnel and products, once removed; they reopened to provide basic infrastructure services.⁴¹

The German culture wanted to move past the war and saw the Allies efforts as an opportunity to rebuild.⁴⁰ Initially, the majority of Germans welcomed the Americans as liberators who could free Germany from the National Socialist prison they had created. Conversely, the Nazi party feared the Allied occupation and numerous Germans did not want any sort of occupation. The Nazi party in Germany promised that Nazi guerrillas, called Werewolves, would conduct a robust insurgent campaign in Allied occupied territory if an occupation occurred. Nevertheless, there was almost no sign of this once the occupation began, because the vast majority of Germans were ready to move past the war. This level of support, coupled with a secure environment, enabled democratization to take hold and economic development to occur quickly after the war ended.⁴²

The initial cooperation between the four main Allied powers began to fade as the Soviet Union pursued communist policies in its occupation zone.⁴³ This created the perceived threat of communism by the three other Allied powers and eventually led to the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1949 to provide for the security of Western Europe.⁴⁴ Prior to the creation of NATO, Secretary of State Marshall called for a program of economic stimulation to rebuild Europe and Germany in 1947.⁴⁵ Congress approved \$12 billion for the

⁴¹ Whole Paragraph: Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) 1067, "Directive to the Commander in Chief of the U.S. Occupation Forces," April 1945.

⁴² Giles MacDonogh, *After the Reich: The Brutal History of the Allied Occupation*, Basic Books, 2007, 2.

⁴³ U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian, Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State <https://history.state.gov/milestones/1945-1952/nato> accessed on 6 February 2016 2016.

⁴⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁵ U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian, Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State <https://history.state.gov/milestones/1945-1952/marshall-plan> accessed on 6 February 2016 2016.

Marshall Plan that led to an industrialization resurgence in Europe and significant investment from America while stimulating the market for American goods.⁴⁶ Both NATO and the Marshall Plan contributed to the reconstruction of Germany and strategically benefitted America.

The occupation of Germany transformed the country from a militarized state focused on global domination to a secure and prosperous nation with global influence. In 2015, the United States became Germany's largest export market with over \$157 billion of exports and importing over \$77 billion from the United States.⁴⁷ This makes Germany the fifth largest trading partner of the United States and the top trading partner in the European Union.⁴⁸ These milestones mark a significant transition from the end of WWII and indicate the level of success the United States had during the occupation of Germany.

Case Study 3: 2003–2014 Iraq

On March 19, 2003, an American-led invasion entered Iraq, and three weeks later on April 9, 2003, the US Army entered Baghdad and toppled Saddam Hussein's statue.⁴⁹ On May 1, 2003, President George W. Bush declared victory over the Ba'ath Party government led by Saddam Hussein.⁵⁰ The American-led coalition employed an efficient campaign to defeat Iraq in only a few weeks losing only 138 American troops.⁵¹ After this rapid victory, the US-led coalition occupied Iraq, and BPC operations began. In this case, the United States faced a new situation; Iraq's infrastructure and housing remained largely intact due to precision bombing that eliminated only the necessary structures to secure defeat. The speed of the campaign combined

⁴⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁷ U.S. Department of State accessed at <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/3997.htm>

⁴⁸ U.S. Department of State accessed at <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/3997.htm>

⁴⁹ Ali A. Allawi, *The Occupation of Iraq: Winning the War, Losing the Peace*, Yale University Press, 2007, 89.

⁵⁰ Anthony H. Cordesman, *The Iraq War: Strategy, Tactics, and Military Lessons*, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington DC, 2003, 238.

⁵¹ Ibid.

with the targeting efforts led to some of the lowest military and civilian casualty rates in history with best estimates putting civilian deaths at 2,500 and military deaths at 2,320.⁵² When the coalition took control of Iraq, over a fifth of the population and territory had been outside of government control for over a decade.⁵³ Conversely, the Iraqi military had few casualties and was largely intact, but most did not surrender; instead, they kept their weapons and equipment and just walked home.⁵⁴ Coalition intelligence predicted entire Iraqi units would switch sides and form the core of a future loyal military force that would cooperate with the occupation.⁵⁵ Instead of mass surrenders by Iraqi military forces, to include the elite Republican Guard, most walked back to their homes with their weapons in tow.⁵⁶ This forced the coalition to provide security for Iraq while attempting to establish a government capable of providing security and basic daily infrastructure necessities.

After arriving in Baghdad, the American-led coalition established the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) to run the country before establishing a government.⁵⁷ From May 2003 to June 2004, when the CPA shut down, the CPA spent two percent of the \$18.6 billion dollars appropriated for reconstruction.⁵⁸ In June 2004, the CPA helped establish the Iraqi Interim Governing Council and held elections in 2005 to elect the Iraq Interim Government.⁵⁹ United Nations Security Council Resolution 1546 looked to end the occupation and transfer authority to

⁵² Ibid., 248.

⁵³ Allawi, *The Occupation of Iraq: Winning the War, Losing the Peace*, 114.

⁵⁴ Ibid.

⁵⁵ Ali A. Allawi, *The Occupation of Iraq: Winning the War, Losing the Peace*, 89.

⁵⁶ Ibid.

⁵⁷ James Dobbins, *Occupying Iraq: A History of the Coalition Provisional Authority*, RAND Cooperation, Santa Monica California, 2009, 11.

⁵⁸ Ibid., 257.

⁵⁹ Ibid., 323.

a sovereign Interim Government of Iraq.⁶⁰ During this time, the members of the military who had not surrendered and walked away began forming insurgent groups to fight the coalition, making the occupation more challenging. Shortly after arriving in Baghdad, looting became a serious problem, with some Iraqis stealing thousands of vehicles and construction equipment while others ransacked and burned down hotels and palaces of the elite.⁶¹ The local police force of 40,000 disappeared with the fall of the government, and the coalition forces did not have guidance for how to handle the looting, nor did they have the numbers needed to maintain security without some sort of local police force.⁶²

Unfortunately, no planning occurred on how to provide for basic administrative functions in Iraq after the invasion—only plans on the type of government and how to create this new government existed.⁶¹ General McKiernan commanded the land forces and became the effective ruler of the country after the fall of Baghdad, but he only had guidance to provide security, and no effort went into running day-to-day functions of Iraq. The US State Department organized a conference in Nasiriya in April 2003, after the occupation of Baghdad, to determine the plan for Iraq. This conference adopted a thirteen point agenda with the key goals of dissolving the Ba’ath Party, establishing a respect for the rule of law and establishing a democratic state. The contested issues, such as the role of religion in the state, did not achieve resolution, with the conference deciding to address them later. During these early discussions, Iraqis were told they would take control of an interim government, but the United States reconsidered and instead created the CPA and placed Paul Bremer in charge. In his second order, CPA Order 2, he ordered the

⁶⁰ UN Security Council, *Security Council resolution 1546 (2004) [on formation of a sovereign Interim Government of Iraq]*, 8 June 2004, S/RES/1546 (2004), available at: <http://www.refworld.org/docid/411340244d.html> [accessed 6 February 2016]

⁶¹ Ali A. Allawi, *The Occupation of Iraq: Winning the War, Losing the Peace*, 94.

⁶² Ibid.

dissolution of all Iraqi armed forces, security forces, Republican Guard units, and intelligence units—approximately 400,000 personnel. As the situation deteriorated, Mr. Bremer demanded nearly \$20 billion to help reconstruct the Iraqi economy in August 2003. Mr. Bremer and the coalition continued to struggle to achieve impacts in Iraq. Several of the decisions may have led to the worse outcome that was to come.⁶³

The situation in Iraq continued to deteriorate until the surge began at the end of 2006. The increase of American military forces and the initiation of counterinsurgency doctrine improved the security and infrastructure in Iraq. In 2011, the United States officially pulled all combat brigades out of Iraq and shifted to large-scale infrastructure projects with a focus on building capacity and security in Iraq.⁶⁴ Security assistance to Iraq continued through 2014 with the goal of continuing to train Iraqis to defend Iraq unilaterally.⁶⁵ The Iraq economy grew in 2011, importing 46% more goods from America at \$2.6 billion and exporting \$19.3 billion, mostly oil, to the United States. However, in 2014 President Obama announced another coalition to defeat the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), a group that “dramatically undermined the stability in Iraq.”⁶⁶ The occupation and BPC efforts of the United States in Iraq between 2003 and 2014 did not lead to the stated goals of BPC. The economic relationship saw some improvement, but imported goods from America did not compare to the cost of reconstruction invested. The coalition struggled throughout the occupation, and the efforts designed to increase security led to continued instability in the region with the rise of the insurgency early in the occupation and eventually the rise of ISIL after combat troops departed.

Case Study 4: 2001–2014 Afghanistan

⁶³ Ali A. Allawi, *The Occupation of Iraq: Winning the War, Losing the Peace*, Yale University Press, 2007, 89, 98, 155.

⁶⁴ U.S. Department of State accessed at: <http://www.state.gov/p/nea/ci/iz/>

⁶⁵ U.S. Department of State accessed at: <http://www.state.gov/p/nea/ci/iz/>

⁶⁶ U.S. Department of State accessed at: <http://www.state.gov/s/seci/index.htm>

After terrorists destroyed the World Trade Center towers on September 11, 2001, the United States quickly looked for ways to bring them to justice. In less than a month, the United States determined the attacks had come from the terrorist group Al Qaeda operating in Afghanistan. The Taliban governed Afghanistan and owned about 90% of the land and all the provincial capitals, governed Afghanistan but was engaged in a civil war with Northern Alliance.⁶⁷ The United States demanded that the Taliban hand over Osama bin Laden, the mastermind of the attacks, but the Taliban refused. President Bush decided to overthrow the Taliban and institute a friendly regime to search out and destroy the Al Qaeda terrorist network. President Bush decided to invade Afghanistan and SecDef Donald Rumsfeld tasked the US Central Command (CENTCOM) Commander, General Tommy Franks with two primary objectives: to destroy the Taliban and Al Qaeda and to build the Afghan National Army (ANA) so the United States could withdraw as quickly as possible.⁶⁸

Initially, Gen Franks recommended a larger, conventional force to invade Afghanistan after several months of planning but the SecDef wanted troops on the ground faster.⁶⁷ On 7 October 2001 combat operations officially started when Special Operations forces began supporting the Northern Alliance. Operation Enduring Freedom began and by December 2001, the United States had defeated the Taliban and taken control of Kabul, the capital of Afghanistan, with the Northern Alliance. Later in December 2001, the United Nations (UN) stood up the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), to provide immediate security for Afghanistan. In 2003, the North Atlantic Trade Organization (NATO) took control of ISAF with troops from a 43-nation coalition. The newly named Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (IRA) elected its first president in

⁶⁷ Griff Witte, "Afghanistan War: 2001-2014," Encyclopedia Britannica, [www.britannica.com](http://www.britannica.com/event/Afghanistan-War) accessed at: <http://www.britannica.com/event/Afghanistan-War> on 20 February 2015.

⁶⁸ David P. Auerswald and Stephen M. Saideman, "NATO in Afghanistan: Fighting Together, Fighting Alone," Princeton University Press, 2014, 89.

democratic elections in 2004. Throughout this period, the United States and ISAF focused on developing the ANA to maintain security for IRA by investing billions of dollars towards this effort. Beginning in mid-2006 violence increased significantly for two reasons: a lack of security in the rural areas and incredible corruption in the government leading to civil unrest. The Taliban seized on these factors and fought back, developing an insurgent campaign against ISAF that increased in strength through 2008.⁶⁹

Beginning in 2008 gains made by the Taliban prevented the Afghan government from securing their country.⁶⁸ Gen David McKiernan, the commander in Afghanistan, said he needed 30,000 troops to turn back the Taliban resurgence. President Bush decided to wait until the new president took office to make the decision. President Obama replaced President Bush in early 2009 and Gen Stanley McChrystal replaced General McKiernan in May of 2009 and assessed that he needed 44,000 additional troops. On Dec 1, 2009 in a speech to WestPoint President Obama announced the United States would send a surge of 30,000 troops to Afghanistan to reverse the Taliban's momentum, this brought total troop strength to almost 100,000. President Obama set a timeline for the drawdown of forces to begin in 2011 with Afghanistan taking control of their own security. This drawdown of American forces was contingent on the ability of the Afghan government to maintain security. Over the next few years, the ANA took lead on conducting operations, and the United States began drawing down its forces.⁷⁰

⁶⁹ Griff Witte, "Afghanistan War: 2001-2014," Encyclopedia Britannica, [www.britannica.com](http://www.britannica.com/event/Afghanistan-War) accessed at: <http://www.britannica.com/event/Afghanistan-War> on 20 February 2015.

⁷⁰ Kenneth Katzman, "Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy," Congressional Research Service, January 17, 2014

The United States ended combat operations in Afghanistan on December 31, 2014, but not before signing a Bilateral Security Agreement on September 30, 2014.⁷¹ In this agreement, the United States pledged to continue to train the Afghan National Security Force (ANSF), consisting primarily of the ANA and Afghan National Police (ANP).⁷² The United States had already spent \$56 billion to train and equip the ANSF between 2002 and 2014 and an additional \$37 billion on the war effort.⁷³ The ANSF shrank to 228,000 in 2014 but still required \$4.1 billion annually to sustain this force; the United States pledged \$2.3 billion annually and the rest of the allies pledged \$1.3 billion to support the ANSF.⁷⁴

The United States fought in Afghanistan from 2001 to 2014, ousted the Taliban from power and reduced the number of Al Qaeda operating in Afghanistan to somewhere between 50 and 100.⁷⁵ During this time, approximately 5.8 million Afghan refugees returned home, about 20% of Afghanistan's population.⁷⁶ The large amount of refugees that returned home indicated the increased security Afghanistan experienced due to the removal of Al Qaeda and the Taliban. Meanwhile exports from the United States to Afghanistan went from \$6 million in 2001 to a peak of \$2.9 billion in 2011 but imports from Afghanistan averaged less than \$50 million.⁷⁷ The amount the United States invested in Afghanistan pales in comparison with the amount of trade the United States gained with Afghanistan. The continued cost of outfitting the ANSF alone exceeds the \$499 million the United States exported to Afghanistan in 2015.⁷⁸ While security in

⁷¹ U.S. Department of State, "U.S. Relations with Afghanistan," 29 October 2015, <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5380.htm> accessed on 10 February 2016.

⁷² Ibid.

⁷³ Ibid., Summary.

⁷⁴ Kenneth Katzman, "Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy," 29.

⁷⁵ Kenneth Katzman, "Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy," 14.

⁷⁶ The United Nations Refugee Agency, "2015 UNHCR country operations profile – Afghanistan" <http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/page?page=49e486eb6> accessed on 10 February 2016.

⁷⁷ The United States Census Bureau, "Trade in Goods with Afghanistan" <http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/balance/c5310.html> accessed on 10 February 2016.

⁷⁸ Ibid.

Afghanistan improved from 2001 to 2014, as evident by the return of millions of refugees, the Taliban continued to conduct an insurgent campaign after 13 years of fighting and the United States continued to need to contribute billions of dollars of support to the Afghan government.

Analysis Criteria 1: Culture Factors and BPC Effectiveness

Japanese Cultural Considerations

Japan had a culture of bushido, literally translated military, knight and ways.⁷⁹ Bushido culture affects the Japanese people in profound ways. Bushido culture emphasizes a warrior culture of honor, loyalty, courage and an incredible work ethic.⁸⁰ These character traits in part led to the militarization of Japan and the Japanese attempt to conquer the region because the holistic culture valued the collective over the individual. The loyalty and honor aspect of bushido led to a Japanese collective fierce loyalty to the emperor of Japan that would play a role in the Japanese surrender and future occupation.

Because of the unified loyalty to the emperor, many in the State Department argued the Japanese would not surrender unless they knew the emperor would stay in place.⁸¹ Even the wording of the Potsdam Declaration allowed the emperor to stay in power by saying Japanese people must freely support the new government of Japan, whatever the government looked like.⁸² Employing these techniques in a culture of honor, royalism and loyalty allowed the Japanese population to accept defeat more readily and focus on reestablishing the peace. Bushido culture encouraged valuing the collective over the individual and the entire society valued the decision to leave the emperor in place.

⁷⁹ Inazo Nitobe, *Bushido: The Soul of Japan*, BiblioBazaar, LLC., 4.

⁸⁰ Ibid.

⁸¹ Ray A. Moore and Donald L. Robinson, *Partners for Democracy: Crafting the New Japanese State under MacArthur*, Oxford University Press, 2002, 31

⁸² Ibid.

Gen MacArthur made several key decisions that appealed to the bushido culture. For example, Gen MacArthur waited for the Emperor to schedule an appointment with him. When the Emperor arrived, he expected to have to capitulate to Gen MacArthur; instead, Gen MacArthur treated him as an equal, honoring him. Gen MacArthur did insist they take a picture together and put the picture in newspapers across Japan.⁸³ The larger size of Gen MacArthur, his older age, and his casual nature compared to the Emperor symbolically showed the Japanese that the Americans were now in charge and appealed to the warrior aspect of bushido.⁸⁴ The state-run press did not want to publish the picture because of how dominant he looked, but Gen MacArthur mandated a free press—another key component of democracy—and the picture went out.⁸⁵ Because Gen MacArthur treated the Emperor as an equal, had the picture taken, and published, the Japanese came to respect Gen MacArthur and the Americans even more; this picture became the defining picture of the reconstruction period.⁸⁶ The culture of bushido began to respect MacArthur and the American occupation, even becoming loyal to the new leadership.

Gen MacArthur was convinced the “Oriental Mind” was predisposed to love winners, another aspect of bushido culture, so he assumed democracy would take hold if the Japanese believed him when he said it should.⁸⁷ He even issued a directive that dissolved restraints on political expression, leading to the release of hundreds of Japanese communists from prison.⁸⁸ This created an environment in Japan in which even the communist party spoke of the occupying forces as an “army of liberation.”⁸⁹ Again, this appealed to the bushido culture of honor and

⁸³ Ibid., 293.

⁸⁴ Ibid.

⁸⁵ Ibid.

⁸⁶ Ibid., 293.

⁸⁷ Ibid., 205.

⁸⁸ Ibid., 81.

⁸⁹ Ibid., 26.

loyalty and showed the Japanese how fair and honorable Americans were, even against a potential adversary. The cultural aspect of Japanese culture, bushido, led to a successful reconstruction effort where the Japanese collective supported the efforts of the Americans.

German Cultural Considerations

Germany had different cultural aspects of Japan but some common threads emerged. The German culture identified with two main ideas: holism and nationalism. Germans identified with the imagery of a machine operating in wholeness and every German was a part of that machine. They also had pride in their national heritage and a very strong sense of nationalism. German national pride existed during WWI but in the crises that followed WWI the idea of holism became “a blueprint for visualizing a more authentic vision for Germany.”⁹⁰

The German culture of holism came from a stoic, military society that valued rigidity and operating in harmony as one machine. Adolf Hitler seized on these cultural themes, came to power in 1933, and ruled Germany to his suicide in 1945. By embracing these two cultural ideals, which in part led to WWII and the holocaust Hitler created a focused war machine that almost took over Europe. Hitler not only demanded total obedience and subordination of the individual to the group but an ideological monopoly of all ideas taught to Germans.⁹¹

Conversely, holism, nationalism and operating as one machine enabled the Allies to reconstruct Germany much faster than anticipated. The German culture had pride in who they were and a strong sense of working together as one machine to move past WWII. Interestingly, the four zones of the occupation broke up the nationalism of the Germans but this actually helped the reconstruction. German citizens recognized that a blinding sense of nationalism led to the rise of

⁹⁰ Anne Harrington, “Reenchanted Science: Holism in German Culture from Wilhelm II to Hitler,” Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 1996, xx.

⁹¹ Peter Pulzer, “The Cambridge Companion to Modern German Culture,” Cambridge University Press, 34.

the Nazi party, not wanting this to occur again, Germans appreciated that the new zones prevented another nationalistic situation from occurring.⁹²

While these cultural archetypes led to the Germans entering into WWII, similar to how Japanese bushido culture created a ripe environment for reconstruction, the culture of holism and nationalism facilitated a rapid reconstruction period and enhanced the effects of BPC by the Allies. German culture continued to play a factor throughout the reconstruction, the increase in industrial output, the auto industry and the stable security situation all came in part from a culture that valued holistic thought.

Iraq Cultural Considerations

Iraq's culture is a culture divided. Iraq became a nation-state in 1921, shortly after WWI the British drawing the lines of the new country that would be Iraq.⁹³ These borders encompassed three different Ottoman provinces: Basra, Baghdad and Mosul.⁹⁴ Inside these provinces, different cultures and religions abounded. The Kurdish population existed to the North and Arab population to the South. Within the Arab population, two primary religions existed: Shi'a (60-65%) and Sunni (32-37%).⁹⁵ Within these frameworks, numerous tribes and family dynamics existed that all added to the complexity of the Iraq culture.

This created a culture in Iraq where national pride existed but generally, the Iraqis focused on family and tribal connections before the country of Iraq. This tribal focus led to a fragmented society that struggled to find a national identity after the British drew the boundaries.

⁹² Ibid., 35.

⁹³ Amatzia Baram, "Culture, History and Ideology in the Formation of Ba'hist Iraq, 1968-89," MacMillan Academic and Professional, LTD, 1991, 1.

⁹⁴ Ibid.

⁹⁵ Central Intelligence Agency, *The World Factbook*, www.cia.gov, accessed at <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/iz.html> on March 1, 2016

American leaders harnessed this tribal culture during the surge to create two “awakenings” across Iraq. The Anbar Awakening was an Iraq led initiative that started in 2005 when members from the Albu Mahal tribe fought against al Qaeda and sought US help.⁹⁶ Initially, the Sunni tribes thought the Americans would come to them to help run the government as the Shi’a and Kurds both had connections to the Iranians (enemies of America) and the Sunnis had experience running the government.⁹⁷ However, the opposite happened when the Interim Governing Council announced in July 2003, five months after the invasion, that the United States planned to de-Sunnify Iraq.⁹⁸ This led to the numerous Sunni tribes to begin a robust insurgency compounded by Al Qaeda support.

Islamic thought permeates Iraqi culture and thinking. Iraq does not practice the separation of church and state but incorporates elements of Islamic law into their judicial system.⁹⁹ This leads to even more tension with the large numbers of both Islamic sects and their diverse views on Islamic law. To complicate this dynamic further, Iraq’s most recent election results involved at least 16 different parties obtaining seats on the Council of Representatives.¹⁰⁰ Of these parties many express their political views directly from Shi’a and Sunni law and run and are elected because of their religious beliefs.¹⁰¹ A culture this diverse, and with religious overtones embedded in the fabric of society creates a complex environment to navigate.

A Baghdad girl summed up the culture of Iraq in one sentence when she said, “Baghdad did not fall, it was occupied.”¹⁰² The Iraqis had a sense that they never surrendered to the

⁹⁶ Najim Abed Al-Jabouri and Sterling Jensen, *The Iraqi and AQI Roles in the Sunni Awakening*, Prism 2, No. 1, pg 3.

⁹⁷ Ibid.

⁹⁸ Ibid., 8.

⁹⁹ The World Fact Book accessed at <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/iz.html>

¹⁰⁰ Ibid.

¹⁰¹ Ibid.

¹⁰² Muhsin Jasim Musawi, “Reading Iraq: Culture and Power in Conflict,” I.B. Tauris, 2006, 1.

coalition, a city that had been around as long as Baghdad would never fall and occupations were nothing new. To the Iraqi people the coalition occupied Baghdad like numerous other outside people had for many years previously. In this political vacuum each religious group, tribe and various ethnic groups strove to create the most from the situation and look out for their best interest as is evident from the 16 different parties occupying the Council of Representatives. This attitude differs from Germany and Japan where both cultures admitted defeat, unconditionally surrendered, and in turn wanted to move on.

Afghanistan Cultural Considerations

While Iraq tends to focus on tribal relations, Afghanistan focuses even more on warlords and tribal leaders in a culture highlighted by its fragmented nature. Afghanistan's most recent stable period occurred during the Musahiban dynasty from 1929 to 1978 relied on local communities establishing security in rural areas.¹⁰³ The Afghan War from 1978 to 1998 fragmented the culture of Afghanistan, uprooted ethnic groups and moved numerous ethnic groups to refugee camps while it destroyed physical infrastructure.¹⁰⁴ The Taliban took charge at the end of the war and implemented more changes including a much higher focus on the Islamization of the society.¹⁰⁵

The Islamization of Afghanistan continued after the coalition removed the Taliban from power. Afghanistan, similar to Iraq, also has a legal system based in part on Islamic law.¹⁰⁶ The Afghan flag displays a Mosque, the expression Takbir that means God is great in Arabic, and the

¹⁰³ Seth G. Jones, *It Takes the Villages: Bringing Change From Below in Afghanistan*, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 89, No. 3 (May/June 2010) 125.

¹⁰⁴ Larry Goodson, *The Fragmentation of Culture in Afghanistan*, American University in Cairo Press, Journal of Comparative Poetics, No. 18. 1998, 269.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid.

¹⁰⁶ The World Fact Book accessed at <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/af.html>

post-Taliban government required the national anthem contain the phrase Allah Akbar that also means God is great.¹⁰⁷ The Islamic culture permeates Afghanistan culture and the nation stands on Islamic principles. However, due to the historic trade and invasion routes cutting through Afghanistan religion did not create a unified culture as Afghans identify with their ethnic group over religion.

The 2004 Afghan constitution officially recognizes 14 ethnic groups that all play a significant role in politics.¹⁰⁸ Unlike in Iraq, where religion heavily influences political parties, in Afghanistan ethnic groups create the parties.¹⁰⁹ While the constitution officially recognizes 14 ethnic groups, Afghanistan had 84 political parties register with the Ministry of Justice in 2012 largely based on ethnic group affiliations.¹¹⁰ Pashtuns typically are the only people group that will refer to themselves as Afghans while the remaining groups will refer to themselves by their ethnic or tribal affiliation instead. Afghanistan's government divides along ethnic lines, but over 99% of the population practices Islam and even in religion Afghanistan is a country divided with approximately 80% Sunni Muslims and 19% Shi'a Muslims.¹¹¹

The culture of Afghanistan is rich and diverse and the diverseness shaped the insurgent campaign fought by the coalition. Adding to the complexities of the diverse culture of Afghanistan is the emergence of drug trafficking, based on opium, as a primary source of income. Drug trafficking created a major revenue stream for many poor Afghans and created a criminal culture that some of the tribes embraced to make a living. Not understanding the Afghanistan culture means not understanding that in some areas of the Helmand province

¹⁰⁷ Ibid.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid.

¹¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹¹ Ibid.

(located in in Southern Afghanistan) the insurgents include Taliban fighters, Ishaqzai tribal leaders, and poppy traffickers.¹¹² All three of these entities, have different cultures and different reasons for fighting an insurgent campaign. The fragmented, ethnically based, nature of the culture of Afghanistan cannot be overstated.

Analysis Criteria 2: External Security and BPC Effectiveness

Japan External Security Considerations

At the end of World War II Japan had limited threats. Historically, tension with China existed but the unconditional surrender to the Allies limited this threat. The main threat that developed came from North Korea and Communism. During the occupation, Gen MacArthur recognized that communism presented a threat to democracy. However, as part of the occupation and implementing democratic ideals, he had released the communists from prison camps.

North Korea became a communist threat to South Korea and disrupted the stability of the region. The start of the Korean War led to the focus shifting away from the occupation and towards defeating the threat in North Korea. This had several effects on the occupation. First, the Korean War generated an economic boom for Japan, as America needed numerous resources that Japan could supply to facilitate the war effort. The Japanese stock market rose 80 percent from the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950 and December 1951.¹¹³ Steel exports tripled, the Japanese automobile industry boosted production by 40 percent to meet demand for military vehicles in Korea.¹¹⁴ The economic effects from the war with Korea were profound.

Second, the Korean War allowed the Japanese people to focus on something apart from rebuilding Japan and instead focus on another threat. The president of Toyota recalled, “I felt a

¹¹² Seth G. Jones, *It Takes the Villages: Bringing Change From Below in Afghanistan*, 124.

¹¹³ “John W. Dower, *Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II*, 542.

¹¹⁴ Ibid.

mingling of joy for my company and a sense of guilt that I was rejoicing over another country's war." Since the end of WWII, the primary focus had been on rebuilding and surviving. Millions of Japanese were homeless and starving during this time but now with an outside threat the Japanese began to prosper and have something else to focus on the, the rebuilding period was gradually leaving them behind. The ability to focus on an external security threat rapidly increased the effects of the reconstruction efforts both psychologically and economically.

German External Security Considerations

The United States and the Allies occupied West Germany when the threat of communism was growing. During the course of the occupation of West Germany, the United States became more concerned with the communist threat than internal threats. "Due to this outside threat, the United States employed multiple members of the SS (Schutzstaffel-Secret Police) and Nazi regime. The United States convicted 800 German war criminals compared to the 5000 the USSR convicted. It appears this discrepancy was in large part due to the desire to the outside security threat the USSR posed to America and West Germany."¹¹⁵ The United States wanted to de-Nazify as much as possible but the fear of communism to the East prevented this from happening fully.

An analyst for the Army Counterintelligence Corp noted, "They say, '[Why] did you use Nazis?' That is a stupid question. It would have been impossible for us to operate in southern Germany without using Nazis.... [W]ho knew Germany better than anyone else? Who were the most organized? Who were the most anti-Communist? Former Nazis. Not to use them would mean complete emasculation."¹¹⁶ The threat of communism in the minds of the Allies during the

¹¹⁵ Christopher Simpson, *Blowback* (New York: Weidenfield and Nicolson, 1988), 70.

¹¹⁶ Ibid.

occupation played a huge role in the decisions made. These decisions were much different from in Iraq and Afghanistan where such an external threat did not exist.

Iraq External Security Considerations

Iraq largely faced a regional rivalry with Iran prior to the invasion by the United States. However, the Sunnis thought that because the United States also had a rivalry with Iran they would continue to side with the Sunnis and give them prominent government positions to continue running the country. Instead, the United States sided with the Shi'a majority who also sided with Iran. This created a conundrum for the Sunnis and eventually for the United States.

Once the United States occupied Iraq and began BPC efforts Iran focused efforts on destabilizing Iraq to prevent these efforts from being successful. This occurred even though the United States supported the Shi'a majority who the Iranians also supported. It took the decaying of Iraq's internal security to prompt the Sunni Awakening that led to the effective counterinsurgency campaign under Gen David Petraeus. Oddly, the external threat of Iran proved of minimal impact throughout the Iraq occupation and unlike in Germany, where the United States used Nazis to help in the reconstruction, the United States removed the Ba'ath party and did not use their capabilities and infrastructure.

Afghanistan External Security Considerations

Some have called Afghanistan the "graveyard of empires" due to numerous empires targeting its strategic location. At the time of the occupation by the United States, Afghanistan had no external threat but was engaged in a civil war. The Taliban lost the civil war due to intervention by the United States. When the United States occupied Afghanistan and began BPC efforts the threat came from the Taliban operating within Afghanistan not from a near peer external threat.

Throughout the occupation, this research did not determine any significant threats to Afghanistan's security apart from the internal security threat the Taliban and other jihadist organizations poised. With the fall of the Taliban this research did determine some of these entities left Afghanistan and went to Eastern Pakistan, Iraq and Syria but they were not supported by these countries and would not be classified as an external threat to Afghanistan or regional instability.

Analysis Criteria 3: Internal Security and BPC Effectiveness

Japan Internal Security Considerations

When Japan unconditionally surrendered to the Allies the internal security of Japan remained intact. The Japanese as a collective submitted to the surrender declaration and awaited the occupying force. The United States initially occupied Japan with the Sixth and Eighth Armies, a force totaling almost 500,000 service members.¹¹⁷ The population of Japan in 1945 approximated 72 million Japanese; this created a ratio of one American troop for every 144 Japanese.¹¹⁸ However, the Japanese received the initial occupation so well that in September of 1945, a few weeks after the surrender, Gen MacArthur announced that a force of 200,000 would be adequate.¹¹⁹

The Japanese had numerous struggles during the early days of the occupation, starvation, homelessness and exhaustion. Nevertheless, internal security did not become a problem, which enabled the United States to reduce the original force provided to Gen MacArthur. American soldiers quickly won the hearts and minds of the Japanese by treating them with respect and

¹¹⁷ "Reports of General MacArthur," Prepared by his General Staff, Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 66-60006, Reprint 1994, 56.

¹¹⁸ Statistics Bureau of Japan, "2010 Japan Census," October 26, 2011, www.stat.go.jp/english/ accessed on 19 February 2016.

¹¹⁹ "Reports of General MacArthur," 47.

appealing to their bushido culture; whether knowingly or not, the level of respect shown to the Japanese appealed so much to the bushido culture that minimal security issues arose. Within two days of the surrender, American forces handed out numerous supplies across the country and numerous stories of good will by American Soldiers began circulating Japan.¹²⁰ These factors coupled with the large number of troops on the ground prevent instability from becoming an issue as the Japanese began to look forward to rebuilding as opposed to rebelling.

Germany Internal Security Considerations

When Germany surrendered in 1945, Gen Dwight Eisenhower commanded 61 US divisions containing 1.6 million soldiers inside West Germany's borders.¹²¹ The troops became the occupation troops when the shooting ended and deployed across the American zone of West Germany to maintain security. West Germany's population in 1945 stood at approximately 46 million. This puts the ratio of American troops to Germans at 1:29. This initial surge of security minimized the ability for Germans to mount an insurgency. However, leaving all 61 divisions in place was not feasible so Gen Eisenhower originally came up with a long-term plan to utilize nine divisions, later reduced to five divisions per War Department guidance.¹²²

The Allies chose to leave the local police and law enforcement in place while removing remnants of the Nazi regime. By doing this, the United States was able to create the US Constabulary program where each constabulary had a district of roughly 450 Germans. The United States, and allies, left local law enforcement in place, this enabled the constabularies to conduct basic patrols and maintain over-watch of the Germans. To increase the effectiveness of

¹²⁰ Ibid., 48.

¹²¹ Earl F. Ziemke, "THE U.S. ARMY IN THE OCCUPATION OF GERMANY 1944-1946," Center of Military History, United States Army, Washington D. C., 1990, 320

¹²² Ibid., 339.

the program, leader's handpicked members for the program and gave them special uniforms of jump boots and polished helmets so they stood out while performing their duties.¹²³

The constabulary program existed in tandem with the five US divisions occupying the US zone. The German population continued to remain docile through 1948 so the United States continued to reduce their numbers to approximately 20,000 in 1948.¹²⁴ With the rise of Russia in the East, the United States began to focus on increasing the number of tactical divisions in West Germany and became less concerned with local security.¹²⁵

Iraq Internal Security Considerations

The United States and 37 additional nations formed the "coalition of the willing" and occupied Iraq with approximately 150,000 troops from 2003 to 2009 prior to troop strength drawdowns.¹²⁶ However, the initial occupation was much lower with the United States contributing 67,700 troops in 2003.¹²⁷ The Iraq population stood at 24.9 million in 2003 so using the initial occupation numbers creates a ratio one-coalition troop for every 368 Iraqis.¹²⁸ Unlike in Japan and Afghanistan, there was no initial bolus of troops, instead troops gradually increased during the course of the occupation with American troops on the ground increasing from 67,700 in 2003 to 187,000 in 2008.¹²⁹ Even at peak occupation, the ratio of troops to citizens was 1 to

¹²³ Ibid., 341.

¹²⁴ Ibid., 37.

¹²⁵ Ibid., 38.

¹²⁶ Stephen A. Carney, "Allied Participation in Operation Iraqi Freedom," Center of Military History, United States Army, Washington, D.C., 2011, vii.

¹²⁷ Amy Belasco, "Troop Levels in the Afghan and Iraq Wars, FY2001-FY2012: Cost and Other Potential Issues," Congressional Research Service, July 2, 2009, 9.

¹²⁸ Google Public Data,

http://www.google.com/publicdata/explore?ds=d5bncppjof8f9_&met_y=sp_pop_totl&idim=country:JPN:RUS:CAN&hl=en&dl=en#lctype=l&strail=false&bcs=d&nselm=h&met_y=sp_pop_totl&scale_y=lin&ind_y=false&rdim=region&idim=country:JPN:RUS:CAN:IRQ:AFG&ifdim=region&tstart=-311353200000&tend=1392800400000&hl=en_US&dl=en&ind=false accessed on 19 February 2016.

¹²⁹ Amy Belasco, "Troop Levels in the Afghan and Iraq Wars, FY2001-FY2012: Cost and Other Potential Issues," 9.

178. The United States and coalition continually tried to send the minimal level of troops to Iraq to solve the security problem and never occupied with overwhelming force.

Several additional factors led to weakened internal security. First, the decision to disband the Ba'ath party and the infrastructure they provided, reduced the security profile of Iraq. When Paul Bremer took over his first two orders were to disband all Iraqi security services and remove any Ba'ath laws from the books.¹³⁰ Second, the Iraqi Army did not surrender in most instances but just walked home. This created a situation where looting and petty crime increased and Al Qaeda and militant jihadist groups were amount the few who could offer protection; the United States simply did not have enough boots on the ground to maintain security unilaterally.¹³¹

Afghanistan Internal Security Considerations

The United States occupied Afghanistan with 5,200 troops in 2002, increasing to 50,700 in 2009.¹³² Even when the United States began “surge” operations in Afghanistan in 2009, the population was 27.2 million creating a ratio one American troop for every 536 Afghanis in 2009.¹³³ At the surges peak in 2010, including all coalition members, 130,000 troops occupied Afghanistan, bringing the ratio to one troop per 209 citizens. The United States relied on such a small force to conduct the initial occupation of Afghanistan that establishing security with this force was not physically possible. The small force coupled with the mountainous terrain of Afghanistan and the warlord culture created an environment ripe for instability.

For additional internal security in Afghanistan, the United States relied on building the capacity of the ANSF. However, challenges with training and resourcing the ANSF led to

¹³⁰ Najim Abed Al-Jabouri, *The Iraqi and AQI Roles in the Sunni Awakening*, 5.

¹³¹ *Ibid.*, 8.

¹³² Amy Belasco, “Troop Levels in the Afghan and Iraq Wars, FY2001-FY2012: Cost and Other Potential Issues,” 9.

¹³³ Google Public Data, same link as above.

minimal security benefit from these forces for years. In 2009, ISAF established the Village Stability Operations (VSO) program that employed special operations teams to build local security in villages throughout Afghanistan.¹³⁴ This program had limited success and internal security throughout Afghanistan continued to be elusive.¹³⁵ Security in Afghanistan continued to elude the coalition throughout the occupation. The ability to implement BPC efforts struggled as a result.

Results and Recommendations

This research determined that several factors enhance BPC efforts. The most important factor as determined by this research is the culture of the country targeted for BPC. Prior to future BPC efforts, this research recommends determining the level of collectivism the targeted country's culture displays. A country with a high degree of collectivism will have a higher chance of reaping the benefits of BPC.

After reviewing cultural factors from all four case studies, two cultural characteristics emerged as important to increasing the effectiveness of BPC efforts. Holistic, or collective, cultures responded to BPC efforts more effectively than tribal, or sectarian, cultures. Both Germany and Japan had a culture that valued the whole over the individual. They also unified behind an emperor and a dictator immediately preceding the BPC efforts. While the outcome of the intensely nationalistic and holistic cultures was negative and led to WWII, it also created a positive environment for BPC. Conversely, the fragmented cultures of Iraq and Afghanistan did not facilitate BPC efforts but both allowed an insurgency to develop. Future planners should note

¹³⁴ Walter L. Perry and David Kassing, *Toppling the Taliban: Air-Ground Operations in Afghanistan, October 2001-June 2002*, RAND Cooperation, Santa Monica, California, 2015.

¹³⁵ Ibid.

the whether a culture trends towards collectivism or individualism prior to investing BPC resources.

Critics might argue that countries should attempt to employ BPC efforts in fragmented cultures because they still might have a marginal effect. While this research was limited to four case studies, the research found conclusive evidence that these cultures simply do not receive BPC efforts as well as holistic cultures. If money and time are limited, the research recommends investing both resources into more fertile cultural environments.

External security factors are the most unpredictable and least conclusive factor on BPC as determined by this research. External security threats in the case of Japan and Germany sped up economic recovery and infrastructure development. However, in Iraq, the threat of Iran did not affect the occupation plans as much as the external threats facing Germany and Japan. This research hypothesizes this is because the threat of Iran was not perceived as significantly as the threat of communism in both Germany and Japan. Therefore, leaders did not make decisions based on the external threat, such as leaving the Ba'ath party in place that could have enhanced the effectiveness of BPC. However, in Germany, leaders chose to use members of the Nazi party, which increased the effectiveness of BPC efforts, because of the perceived threat of communism.

Overall, external threats will not always exist, world events remain unpredictable, but when BPC efforts occur where an external threat exists, the likelihood of the people to respond favorably increases significantly. If a country targeted for BPC has a significant security threat from a neighboring country, this research determined the culture would possibly respond more favorably to the BPC efforts.

Internal security will play a critical role in future BPC efforts. This research determined that in unstable environments an initial, overwhelming influx of troops is critical to establish and

maintain security. This research concluded that, based on both Japan and Germany, an initial ratio of one troop per 150 citizens is the minimum number required to establish security at the beginning of an occupation. Conversely, starting with a small footprint of a ratio of one troop per 350 or more citizens leads to a weakened security state that increases the likelihood of insurgencies to occur. This research recommends establishing security with overwhelming force prior to pursuing additional BPC efforts. This research determined the optimum ratio for BPC effectiveness at 1:150.

Critics might argue that the ratio simplifies a complex problem. Other factors do exist such as the urbanization of the society, the over area of the nation, and the effectiveness of the country's infrastructure to maintain basic law and order. This research looked at these factors but determined the overall ratio is more important coupled with the country's infrastructure. This is because the ratio seems consistent across all four case studies. The surge in Afghanistan and Iraq brought the ratio in each country to closer to one to 150, which is when the United States partially gained effective security at each location. This leads the research to conclude that the ratio of security troops to civilian has a profound effect on establishing security, and BPC will not be effective until security is established. Critics might also argue that the research focuses on BPC conducted by an occupying force. While true, in countries where BPC efforts are not conducted by an occupying force, such as African countries, the BPC entity should analyze the crime rate and overall stability first prior to committing BPC resources. If stability and security of a country are in question, the ratio of one to 150 should be a guiding factor when deciding to commit resources, which should be additional security personnel first.

Conclusion

In conclusion, this research has determined some factors that enhance BPC effectiveness. While the complexities of the world prevent the United States from knowing how effective BPC efforts will be prior to implementing them, future leaders should consider these factors first. Fragmented cultures do not receive the benefits of BPC as much as holistic cultures. Additionally, a holistic culture enhances the ability to establish internal security culture, which this research also determined as critical to establishing prior to BPC efforts. Leaders should not commit the minimum number of troops to establish security but should send overwhelming force to ensure security first, prior to conducting the next phase of operations. If an external security threat exists, it may or may not affect the outcome of BPC operations; leaders should consider external security factors but not base decisions on them.

The intent of this research was not to solve every aspect of BPC or determine the perfect method for providing support. The intent of this research was to help future leaders employ best practices prior to investing time and money on BPC endeavors. The complexities of the world prevent anyone from every fully knowing the outcome of each decision.

In a 2014 speech to WestPoint, President Barack Obama stated, “For the foreseeable future, the most direct threat to America at home and abroad remains terrorism. But a strategy that involves invading every country that harbors terrorist networks is naïve and unsustainable. I believe we must shift our counterterrorism strategy—drawing on the successes and shortcomings of our experience in Iraq and Afghanistan—to more effectively partner with countries where terrorist networks seek a foothold.”¹³⁶ As BPC continues to define America’s counterterrorism strategy, leaders need to assess best practices to maximize limited resources.

¹³⁶ President Barak Obama, “Remarks by the President at the United States Military Academy Commencement Ceremony,” US Military Academy, West Point, New York, 28 May 2014, <https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/05/28/remarks-president-united-states-military-academy-commencement-ceremony> accessed on 20 February 2016.



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