

COMBATING PIRACY IN THE GULF OF GUINEA: TAKING A PAGE FROM THE
GULF OF ADEN INTERNATIONAL ANTI-PIRACY OPERATION

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Strategic Studies

by

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ABSTRACT

COMBATING PIRACY IN THE GULF OF GUINEA: TAKING A PAGE FROM THE GULF OF ADEN INTERNATIONAL ANTI-PIRACY OPERATION, by Major Abu Mansaray, 114 pages.

The spate of piracy in the Gulf of Aden drew the attention of the international community for action. It disrupted international trade and affected the economies of East African littoral states. In response, the United Nations Security Council adopted resolutions that authorized nations and the international community with naval capabilities to enter the Gulf of Aden and combat piracy. Consequently, the European Union, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and the Combined Maritime Force Coalition led by the United States intervened in the crisis. They employed the diplomatic, informational, military, and economic instruments of power to counter-piracy on that coast. While the international community has claimed success in the Gulf of Aden, piracy surged on the West African coast of the Gulf of Guinea overwhelming states security apparatus. The volatile situation continues to outstrip states' maritime security and commerce in West Africa. This study focuses on investigating the elements of the international counter-piracy measures that led to the reduction of piracy in the Gulf of Aden, using a qualitative case study methodology. Lessons learned from these international efforts could form the basis for Gulf of Guinea anti-piracy operations.

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ACRONYMS

AO	Area of Operation
AU	African Union
BMP	Best Management Practice
CMF	Combined Maritime Force
CJTF	Combined Joint Task Force
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EEZ	Exclusive Economic Zones
EIMS	ECOWAS Integrated Maritime Strategy
EU	European Union
EUNAVFOR	European Union Naval Force
GoA	Gulf of Aden
GoG	Gulf of Guinea
IC	International Community
IMB	International Maritime Bureau
IMO	International Maritime Organization
IRTC	International Transit Recommended Corridors
MCC	Multilateral Coordination Center
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
SNMG	Standing NATO Maritime Group
TFG	Transitional Federal Government
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNCLOS	United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea

UNSC	United Nations Security Council
UNSCR	United National Security Council Resolution
U.S.	United States
USAFRICOM	United States African Command

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Maritime partnerships and maritime security and safety are increasingly important in the Gulf of Guinea region to combat a variety of challenges including maritime crime, illicit trafficking, and piracy.¹

— General Carter Ham, *Fox News*

Background

The sea is a major source of food and mineral resources. The world depends on it for trade and commerce. Sadly, human quest for wealth and survival continues to overshadow the sea with uncertainty. Historically, piracy, among other threats, stands out as a major insecurity concern plaguing the sea, caused by human desperation to satisfy wants. On the African continent, it has threatened the stability and economic viability of coastal countries. It is an enduring practice, which has become complex and sophisticated over time.

In the past years, piracy in the Gulf of Aden (GoA) dominated global security policy-makers. Random attacks on commercial vessels off the coast of Somalia occurred for quite some time. It increased the cost of global trade and placed additional burden on governments and the maritime industry. It was estimated that over 80 percent of Europe's international sea trade passes through the coast. Initial efforts to avoid marauders by rerouting ships to Saudi Arabia through the Cape of Good Hope added approximately

¹ Associated Press, "US, Allies Consider Anti-Piracy Operations Along Africa's West Coast to Target Insurgents," *Fox News U.S.*, 26 March 2013, accessed 4 September 2016, <http://www.foxnews.com/us/2013/03/26/us-allies-consider-anti-piracy-operations-along-africa-west-coast-to-target.html>.

2,700 miles to a voyage. Despite other overheads, the additional fuel cost was estimated at \$3.5 million. In general, routing from Europe to the Far East incurred an estimated extra cost of \$89 million, which included \$74.4 million in fuel and \$14.6 million in charter expenses. The risk of evading pillage and the cost of alternative routes affected the economies of these countries. It prompted insurance companies to levy high premiums. Both consumers and taxpayers share the increase premium cost levied by the insurance agencies.²

In 2008, following a number of successful hijackings, widened scope, and area of operation, and increase in the money demanded for ransom payments, security concerns about the busy shipping route in the Indian Ocean grew dramatically. The International Community (IC) was left with no option but to intervene and salvage the crisis. Consequently, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) adopted resolution 1816, which encouraged members of the IC with naval capabilities to enter the territorial waters of Somalia and combat piracy.³ The IC responded in a comprehensive manner to stabilize the coast. The members of the IC consists of the United Nations (UN), European Union (EU), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and the Combined Maritime Forces (CMF) coalition led by the United States of America. Other countries that are

² U.S. America Department of Transportation and U.S. Maritime Administration, “Economic Impact of Piracy in the Gulf of Aden on Global Trade,” 2010, 1-2, accessed 26 November 2016, https://www.marad.dot.gov/wp-content/uploads/pdf/Economic_Impact_of_Piracy_2010.pdf.

³ United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1816, accessed 24 October 2016, http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/unsc_resolutions08.htm, 1-4.

independently participating in patrolling the coastline include China, India, Japan, Russia, and Iran.⁴ The IC intervention has drastically reduced piracy threat on the coast.

Inexplicably, while the IC is consolidating success in the GoA, piracy has risen to an alarming proportion in the Gulf of Guinea (GoG). According to the London-based International Maritime Bureau (IMB) April 2016 report, the number of registered attacks on the coast has far exceeded the GoA. The IMB reported fifty-four incidents during the first quarter of 2015 throughout the world, and thirty-seven for the same period in 2016. Out of those figures, ten occurred in the GoG for the year 2015, and eleven in the same region in 2016. No pirate activities were reported in the GoA within that period (see table 1 for details).⁵ The inference of the IMB report shows a stark increase of the scourge in the West African coast and a dramatic fall in the Indian Ocean. Implicitly, this underscores the success of the ICs concerted efforts against pirates in the GoA.

⁴ Michele Vespe, Harm Greidanus, and Marlene Alvarez, "The Declining Impact of Piracy on Maritime Transport in the Indian Ocean: Statistical Analysis of 5-year Vessel Tracking Data," *Marine Policy*, 59 (September 2015) 9, accessed 27 November 2016, <http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0308597X15001001?np=y>.

⁵ International Chamber of Commerce International Maritime Bureau, *Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships Report: Report for the Period 1 January-31 March 2016* (London: International Chamber of Commerce, April 2016), 23, accessed 26 August 2016, <http://www.hellenicshippingnews.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/2016-Q1-IMB-Piracy-Report-ABRIDGED.pdf>.

Table 1. Actual and Attempted Pirate Attacks for January–March 2011–2016						
Locations	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
Benin	1	1	-	-	-	-
Ghana	-	2	-	-	2	-
Guinea	1	-	-	-	-	-
Ivory Coast	1	3	3	-	1	1
Liberia	-	-	-	1	-	-
Nigeria	5	10	11	6	7	10
GoG Sub-total	8	16	14	7	10	11
Somalia	85	28	3	2	-	-
GoA General Coast	10	8	2	2	-	-
Sub-total GoA	95	36	5	4	-	-
World Quarterly Total	142	102	66	49	54	37

Source: International Chamber of Commerce International Maritime Bureau, *Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships Report: Report for the Period 1 January-31 March 2016* (London: International Chamber of Commerce, April 2016), 5, accessed 26 August 2016 2016, <http://www.hellenicshippingnews.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/2016-Q1-IMB-Piracy-Report-ABRIDGED.pdf>.

In the GoG, the increased pirate attacks exposed the existing security vulnerability in the maritime domain of the region, which successive governments have long overlooked. Though some countries in the region have increased maritime spending in their respective domains, little impact has been realized along the coast. In 2011, Nigeria increased spending and intensified patrols in their waters.⁶

Unfortunately, majority of the littoral states in the sub-region save for Nigeria lack equipped navies to handle security at sea. The vast coastal area and large number of ships passing through their coast is too much for any one country to handle. Moreover,

⁶ Adeniyi Adejimi Osinowo, *Combating Piracy in the Gulf of Guinea*, Africa Security Brief No. 30 (Washington, DC: Africa Center for Strategic Studies, 28 February 2015), 3, accessed 28 September 2016, <http://africacenter.org/publication/combating-piracy-gulf-guinea-html/>.

marauders are exploiting the ill-defined maritime borders between states for their operations. They will raid vessels in one country's territorial waters, and swiftly run into a neighboring country's waters to evade arrest.⁷

Individual and bilateral efforts forged by some countries to succumb pirates yielded no dividend. In the past, such efforts have led them to roam from one zone to another along the same coastal area. The collective resolve by states to seek United Nations support to end the crisis led to the adoption of UNSCR 2039 in February 2012. This resolution urged states to counter-piracy at national and regional levels. As a result, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and Gulf of Guinea Commission (GGC) convened joint meetings with the sole objective of drafting a comprehensive counter-piracy strategy. The ECOWAS secretariat has drafted a comprehensive ECOWAS Integrated Maritime Strategy (EIMS), which has still not been fully ratified and resourced.⁸ This research will explore the international anti-piracy operation employed in the GoA and identify viable lessons applicable to the GoG.

Geographically, the GoG sub-region (depicted on the map) has five thousand nautical miles of coastline, stretching from Senegal in the west to Angola in central Africa. It is part of the Atlantic Ocean with numerous natural harbors and no chokepoints.

⁷ United States African Command, "Guarding the Gulf: West African Nations Combat Maritime Crime," *Africa Defense Forum Magazine*, 2015, 12-16.

⁸ Matthew Fiorelli, *Piracy in Africa: The Case of the Gulf of Guinea*, KAIPTC Occasional Paper No. 37 (Accra: Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre, August 2014), 6.

Its serenity, largely due to prevailing good weather condition, offers smooth sailing for ships. An attribute that also provides safe haven for pirates in the region.⁹



Figure 1. Map showing the Gulf of Guinea and Countries.

Source African Security News, “West Africa Map,” accessed 23 September 2016, <http://africasecuritynews.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/08/Africa-African-Security-News-West-Africa-Map.jpg>.

Problem Statement

Piracy in the GoG has become a global concern. It has disrupted shipping lanes, affected international trade, and endangered the lives of seafarers. Pirates have threatened

⁹ Osinowo, 1.

the activities of fishermen, the oil trade, mineral exploration, and the shipment of goods. They have also intensified their activities and networks beyond the borders of the continent. The effect of their activities on any one country resonates across other countries in the region. Unfortunately, the lack of resources is hampering the capability of coastal countries in West Africa to fight the illicit trade.

Most literature about the GoG coast has been limited to single state counter-measures against pirates. The states have not tried the viability of collective maritime security to deal with the threat. Equally, researchers have not explored the prospect of collective anti-piracy efforts that could bring either regional or sub-regional states' navies under one unified command structure. More so, extensive studies on the possibility of replicating some elements of the international anti-piracy strategy have not been explored. Thus, there is an existing gap in the literature, which this study seeks to investigate.

Primary Research Question

The primary research question is, “What elements of international anti-piracy operation in the Gulf of Aden can be applied to combat piracy in the Gulf of Guinea?” To answer this question, the study will examine a comparative analysis of piracy in both sub-regions. The objective of the analysis is to establish similarities and differences on the activities of pirates on the two coasts. The outcome of this analysis will form the basis for an anti-piracy operation suitable for the West African coast. The GoA is deliberately chosen because piracy along that coast occurred in recent history. Prudently, both the GoA and the GoG are coastline regions on the African continent. Countries along these coasts share similar geo-political domain and culture.

Secondary Research Questions

The following questions will aid in the identification of international anti-piracy strategy employed in the GoA:

1. What are the root causes of piracy in the Gulf of Guinea and the Gulf of Aden?
2. What are the differences between piracy in the Gulf of Guinea and the Gulf of Aden?
3. What international anti-piracy measures have led to the decline of pirates in the Gulf of Aden?
4. What elements can be drawn from the lessons learned on the Gulf of Aden international anti-piracy operation?
5. What maritime capabilities exist in the GoG states to fight piracy?

Assumptions

The current state of piracy will continue into the near future, if not contained. Pirates and their cohorts are changing tactics to resist counter-piracy measures employed by state security agencies. In the future, the piracy scourge will likely decrease in state's territorial waters as they evade security operatives, with a corresponding increase at the Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) and high seas. It would also gravitate towards extreme violence as better anti-piracy operations are brought to bear.¹⁰

¹⁰ Freedom C. Onuoha, "Piracy and Maritime Security in the Gulf of Guinea: Trends, Concerns, and Propositions," *The Journal of the Middle East and Africa* 4, no. 3 (20 December 2013): 279-280.

Rampant poverty, bad governance, and poor economies will only continue to fuel the illicit trade and strengthen pirate networks. The capability of most West African countries to securitize their maritime domain is limited to territorial water zones. Few countries may attempt to venture into the EEZ and high seas due to lack of requisite resources. They will continue to focus on oil tankers for the survival of their trade, although attention to other areas of insecurity cannot be ruled out.

Definition of terms

What is Piracy?

Many definitions have been postulated to give a proper meaning of piracy. However, the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), and IMB has posited the most prominent definitions of piracy.

The UNCLOS definition in Article 101 of 1982 specifically states that, piracy consists of any of the following:

(a) Any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation, committed for private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private ship or a private aircraft, and directed:

(i) On the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against persons or property on board such ship or aircraft;

(ii) against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place outside the jurisdiction of any state;

(b) any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship or of an aircraft with knowledge of facts making it a pirate ship or aircraft;

(c) any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described in subparagraph (a) or (b).¹¹

The central idea of UNCLOS definitions is that the act of piracy must be committed on the high seas; it must be violent and exclusively for private ends; and it should involve at least two vessels. This definition failed to consider attacks within a country's sovereignty. For example, in the GoG, most pirate attacks have occurred within states' territorial waters.

To overcome these shortcomings, the IMB defined Piracy and Armed Robbery as:

An act of boarding or attempting to board any vessel with the apparent intent to commit theft or any other crime, and with the apparent intent or capability to use forces in furtherance of that act.¹²

This IMB definition builds on the weaknesses of UNCLOS. Marauders sometimes use extreme violence in countries' EEZ or high seas to extract valuable resources, equipment, or cargo from a vessel and its crew. Tankers carrying oil or other chemical products are hijacked, and the oil siphoned for resale. Therefore, to strike a good balance both definitions will be used together as working definitions of piracy in this thesis.

¹¹ United Nations General Assembly, *United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea* (New York: UN, n.d.), 60-61.

¹² International Chamber of Commerce International Maritime Bureau, *Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships Report: Report for the Period 1 January-31 March 2008* (London: International Chamber of Commerce, April 2008), 4, accessed 21 September 2016, <http://www.intertanko.com/upload/WeeklyNews/2008Q1IMB%20Piracy%20Report.pdf>.

What is an International Anti-Piracy Operation?

In this context, the international anti-piracy operation is defined as an alliance or coalition operation, which involves multilateral partners using the instruments of national power to terminate piracy. It establishes a coherent framework for the comprehensive global and regional efforts to eliminate the threat at sea.

Limitation of Study

A personal survey could have proven worthwhile, but due to time constraints, the research will rely on data from the United Nations, African Union, and the Economic Community of West African States portals, and previous related scholarly researches conducted in the area of study. It would also include data from the IMB, military articles, and academic publications. Often, ship owners do not report all pirate incidents at sea. However, the IMB is regularly reporting a good number of such incidents, which will help overcome that limitation. The IMB is the world-recognized agency for collecting data, making succinct analysis, and providing an updated statistical information relating to piracy and other maritime crimes.

Scope and Delimitation

The GoG stretches from the west to the central part of Africa. Because of constraints beyond the researcher's control, the study will be limited to countries in West Africa, which is the current pirate hot spot on the continent. The West African countries in the GoG are Senegal, Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, Guinea, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Cote d'Ivoire, Ghana, Togo, Benin, and Nigeria. Nonetheless, maximum effort will be made to

do a comparative analysis of the sub-regional coasts. The result of the study will form the basis of efforts to handle piracy on the West African coast of the GoG.

Significance of the Study

The study is significant because it explores the need for a strategy to fight piracy in the GoG. Economically, the sub-region is a major shipping trade route for African commerce. It contains energy and mineral resources that are strategically viable to particular countries along its coast and the world in general. This waterway is home to major global energy producers. Nigeria and Angola are two of the world's top ten crude oil exporters situated along the GoG's coast. At one time, a quarter of European and American crude oil supplies were from this sub-region. Any oil output disruptions in West Africa could affect the global oil prices due to the strong interconnectedness states and the international market. In addition, seafarers are becoming increasingly wary of this sea line of communication as the number of pirate attacks and other related maritime crime rises.¹³

The coastline is rich in fish and other seafood. It is a major source of livelihood for many communities living along the coastline. The West African states earned millions of dollars in revenue from European and Asian fishing fleets operating legally in their waters. The sub-region's coastline is crucial for states to achieve social goals, and project military and economic instruments of power. The security and safe passage of vessels

¹³ Barack Obama, Presidential Policy Directive 18 (PPD-18), "United States Counter-Piracy and Maritime Security Action Plan," June 2014, Annex B, 1-2, accessed 10 November 2016, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/docs/united_states_counter_piracy_and_maritime_security_action_plan_2014.pdf.

from various parts of the world to ports in West Africa are paramount. Additionally, the need to be vigilant on the coast to prevent other maritime security challenges such as drug and human trafficking, and illegal transportation of weapons is essential.

To that end, the results of this study would contribute to the overall security and existing body of knowledge on piracy. The lessons learned from the international anti-piracy operation in the Gulf of Aden (GoA) would contribute to policy reform, by providing insights on constructive anti-piracy operation on the West African coast.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

Introduction

Piracy remains elusive and continues to endanger the lives of seafarers. This enduring practice has been around for centuries. Currently, it has placed security spotlight on the GoG. Frantic efforts made by the states to combat the menace proved evasive. On that premise, this study seeks to investigate elements of counter-piracy measures used in the GoA to fix the growing problem in the GoG.

The chapter will review the literature to identify measures to combat piracy in the GoG. In particular, it will start by examining strategy within the context of the research, review the conceptual framework of piracy, the factors motivating pirates, types of pirate activity, and delimiting the act of piracy. Critical assessment of piracy in the sub-regions will include the root causes, significant commonalities, and differences. It will further examine the possibility of collective security, considering the state, sub-regional, regional, and international levels. It will further discuss the factors that led to the decline of piracy in the GoA. In particular, a focus on the roles played by the United Nations, and the joint international naval forces. It will end by highlighting the current efforts made by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS).

Definition of Strategy

The understanding of strategy has evolved overtime. Most early theorists attributed the concept as a military activity in wartime. For instance, Carl von Clausewitz defined strategy as “the use of the engagement for the purpose of war.” His definition is

operational focus, with little attention paid to the strategic level of war.¹⁴ To bridge the gap in the realm of military and political strata, Clausewitz further regarded war as, “a mere continuation of state’s policy by other means.” Implicitly, war is not just a policy but also a political instrument of national power. In that milieu, strategy is the concept or activities undertaken by the military to achieve the political objectives.¹⁵ However, Clausewitz’s interpretation of strategy limits itself to the military and political instruments of national power, which is not the case in modern societies. The British military historian, Sir Basil H. Liddell Hart, gave a modern definition of strategy as “the art of distributing and applying means to fulfill the ends of policy.” His definition encompassed the application of strategy in both war and peacetime. That notwithstanding, Hart also confined his definition of strategy within the military spectrum and not being comprehensive.¹⁶

Dr. Boone J. Bartholomees, Jr., an instructor at the Department of National Security Strategy, U.S. Army War College, posited that strategy involves the political, economic, information, and military instruments of national power, applicable in both peacetime and war. He argued further that a suitable definition of strategy must incorporate wider national security covering all the instruments of national power. In that regard, Colonel (retired) Arthur F. Lykke gave a more comprehensive definition of

¹⁴ J. Boone Bartholomees Jr., *U.S. Army War College Guide to National Security Issues*, 3rd ed., vol. 1, *Theory of War and Strategy* (Scotts Valley, CA: CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform, 2008), 14.

¹⁵ Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, ed. Peter Paret and Michael Howard (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), 87, 177.

¹⁶ Bartholomees, 14.

strategy.¹⁷ Lykke was an instructor at the Army War College. He described strategy using a three-legged stool. The three-legs represents ends (objectives), ways (strategic concepts and course of action), and means (resources). However, Lykke stressed that the three-legs of the stool if not equal, would tilt to one direction. Hence, a prudential risk should be taken to balance the legs of the stool. Thus, in strategy formulation, there is always an inherent prudential risk, which must be accepted and mitigated against failure. This help to maintain the variables of the strategic model in equilibrium. As such, Lykke's defined strategy as the ends, ways, and means, with a careful judgment and acceptance of a decided risk. His proposition is now a common model for assessing risks in strategy. Though the definitions propounded by the other theorists will be considered, Lykke's strategic model is recommended as the framework for the research.¹⁸

Conceptual Framework of Piracy in the Gulf of Aden and Gulf of Guinea

Piracy has evolved since ancient times, broadening the context of the illegal practice. In their research work on GoA piracy, Professors Anastasia Varsami and Corina Popescu of Constanta Maritime University posited that the new forms of pirate attacks have substantially expanded the meaning of piracy. Pirates have modified and implemented naval style operations. This has led to the characterization of modern forms of piracy as armed robbery at sea, which involves the raiding of vessels and full-scale assaults on ships at static position or in motion. In addition, present day piracy has largely

¹⁷ Bartholomees, 3-15.

¹⁸ Ibid., 3-15.

been executed by individuals, criminal gangs, and organized groups for their own selfish gains. These transformations have broadened previous understandings of the practice to include armed robbery at sea by private actors, occurring largely in areas beyond the reach of states' security forces. This phenomenon depicts piracy in the contemporary maritime domain.¹⁹ It is neither a natural nor divine phenomenon at sea. Pirates conceive their criminal operations on land and implement it at sea. Hence, the root causes of piracy should be traced from offshore.²⁰ Sandra L. Hodgkinson further concurred that the global trend of piracy has shifted from nocturnal attacks to include daytime-armed robbery²¹. They have transformed the traditional ways of ransacking stationary sea vessels to kinetic attacks.²²

Recent studies show no signs of piracy diminishing from the global security spectrum. In Africa, the illicit trade dominates the security agenda of coastal states and media outlets. In the Gulf of Aden, it drew the attention of policy makers in the region

¹⁹ Anastasia Varsami and Corina Popescu, "Piracy in the Gulf of Aden—A Problem of Our Days," *Constanta Maritime University Annals* 13 Year XI (2010): 46-47.

²⁰ Katja Lindskov Jacobson and Johannes Riber Nordy, *Maritime Security in the Gulf of Guinea: Report* (Copenhagen: Royal Danish Defence College, 2015), 14.

²¹ Sandra L. Hodgkinson, "Current Trend in Global Piracy: Can Somalia's Successes Help Combat Piracy in the Gulf of Guinea and Elsewhere?" *Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law* 46, no. 1 (2014): 145. Sandra L. Hodgkinson is Vice President of Planning and Chief of Staff at Finmeccanica North America and DRS Technologies. She previously served as a career member of the Senior Executive Service of the U.S. Government, including positions as Distinguished Visiting Research Fellow at National Defense University.

²² Hodgkinson, 147.

and the international community.²³ According to Adjoa Anyimadu, a research associate with the Africa Program at Chatham House, (who lent expertise to the International Piracy Ransom Payments Taskforce and has appeared as an Expert Witness on the EU's counter-piracy efforts before the House of Lords European Union Committee). Pirate activities first started along the Somali coast and spread deep into the Indian Ocean. It attracted global attention when the international community felt their economic lifeline threatened. Being a viable international busy route, the activities of Somalia pirate disrupted the trade of most countries in Europe, Asia, and the United States of America. This prompted United Nations Security Council Resolution 1816 (2008) authorized countries with naval capability at high seas to work with the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) of Somalia to combat piracy in the region.²⁴ As a result, the EU, NATO, and the CMF coalition conducted combined counter-piracy operations in the GoA. The operations have tremendously reduced piracy in the GoA.²⁵

The nature of piracy in the Gulf of Guinea is similar to that of the GoA. While there is downturn in the GoA, the spate of piracy has reached an alarming proportion in the GoG. The diverse coastal area and inadequate states' maritime security assets have made it impossible to record most of the attacks taking place at high sea. Presently, the

²³ Varsami and Popescu, 45.

²⁴ United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1816, 2 June 2008, accessed 24 October 2016, <https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N08/361/77/PDF/N0836177.pdf?OpenElement>, 1-4.

²⁵ Adjoa Anyimadu, *Maritime Security in the Gulf of Guinea: Lessons Learned from the Indian Ocean* (London: Chatham House, July 2013), 1-6.

number of attacks has overtaken the GoA. As such, many maritime experts have labelled the West African coast as one of the most unsafe water in the world.²⁶

Piracy started gathering momentum on the coast in the early 1990s and lessened towards the mid-90s. Pirate attacks in those years included small-scale armed robberies in territorial waters and EEZs. In 2009, the practice resurged in a large scale with greater intensity. Since that time, the momentum and complexity of marauder attacks continue in full strength and force.²⁷ Freedom C. Onuoha, a research fellow at the African Centre for Strategic Research and Studies at the National Defense College-Nigeria, expressed that the cost of piracy in the GoG is very expensive. It ranges from kidnapping to armed robbery and death. Often crewmembers and their families bear the bulk of the attacks. The security gap at sea makes it difficult to quantify every loss caused by the menace. An estimated cost of \$565 million to \$2 billion is lost to pirates yearly.²⁸

Motivation of Pirates

According to Andreas Graf, a researcher at Swisspeace in Bern, whose research focuses on maritime security, and Swiss foreign, and security policy, asserted that the perpetrators of pirate attacks in the GoG and GoA are motivated to join the trade for different reasons. He espoused two reasons, categorizing them as primary and secondary

²⁶ Sayed M. Hassan and Daud Hassan, “Current Arrangements to Combat Piracy in the Gulf of Guinea: An Evaluation,” *Journal of Maritime Law and Commerce* 47, no. 2 (April 2016): 174-176.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, 174-177.

²⁸ Freedom C. Onuoha, *Piracy and Maritime Security in the Gulf of Guinea: Nigeria as a Microcosm* (London: Al Jazeera Centre for Studies, 2012), 9.

level motivations. The primary motivation of pirates is to enrich themselves by whatever means available, while the secondary motivation is to finance political ambitions of supporting partners in their network groups.²⁹ Onuoha supported the argument that ransom payments for the release of hostages have become a very lucrative business. It is whetting the financial appetite of pirates, thus motivating them to rely on the illicit trade as an occupation. The global cost incurred by piracy is estimated at \$13 to \$16 billion annually.³⁰

Types of Pirate Activity

In their publication, Katja Lindskov Jacobsen, an Assistant Professor at Metropolitan University College, Copenhagen, and Johannes Riber Nordy, Deputy Director at the Institute for Strategy at the Royal Danish Defence College, emphasized that piracy cannot be well addressed without understanding the unique character of pirate attacks. The lack of deeper understanding of the forms of attacks is a major barrier towards finding a workable strategy to eradicate the odd practice in the region. Based on their motivation for the trade, they distinguished four types of pirate activities in the GoG. These are kidnapping for ransom, petroleum-piracy, unreported piracy, and petty piracy.³¹

²⁹ Andreas Graf, *Countering Piracy and Maritime Terrorism in South East Asia and Off the Horn of Africa: Applying the Lessons Learned from the Counter-Measures against Maritime Violence in the Strait of Malacca to Gulf Aden* (Hamburg: PiraT, 5 April 2017), 17-18.

³⁰ Onuoha, “Trends, Concerns, and Propositions,” 284.

³¹ Jacobson and Nordy, 21-23.

One of the types of pirate activity is kidnapping for ransom. This is the primary focus of pirates in the GoA. They hold their captives' hostage for much longer period until their demands for ransom are met. In contrast, most GoG pirates keep their hostages for a longer period under custody. Nonetheless, pirates have varied means of handling hostages according to their levels of demands. While GoA pirates normally demand huge amounts of money, pirates in the GoG will easily settle for any reasonable amount. The majority of reported kidnapping for ransom incidents are targeted at oil company workers. There is no record showing kidnapping for ransom beyond the EEZ in the GoG.³²

Petroleum-piracy is another form of activity of pirates in the GoG. The theft of refined oil product from cargo ships is the most dominant form of pirate activity. Pirates involved in oil theft are often well equipped and organized to attack any vessel. They exhibit expert knowledge in their operations and hauling oil from specialized vessels. This is much prevalent at transshipment points. Usually, pirates receive intelligence tips from offshore collaborators on where oil transshipments have been scheduled to take place. In some cases, pirates may detect oil tankers doing transshipment at sea. The heavily armed pirates temporarily hold crewmembers as hostage until the mission is accomplished. They will siphon oil from tankers and transfer it into smaller vessels for sale on the black market.³³ This type of pirate activity is often marred by violence especially when crews resist. It requires sophisticated equipment and logistics to

³² Jacobson and Nordy, 21.

³³ Anyimadu, 6.

execute.³⁴ In 2013, an estimated 40 percent of oil exports destined for Europe and 30 percent for the United States passed through the GoG. This type of pirate activity poses a greater security threat than all the others and have grave consequence on the economy of the affected states.³⁵

Another type of pirate activity is unreported piracy. Pirates attack smaller ships, illegal, unregulated, and unregistered (IUU) fishing vessels, and interstate transport vessels in the GoG without being reported. The crews might either not aware or ignorant of the IMB reporting chain for pirate attacks. In some instances, pirates counter-attack each other to seize stolen goods. This type of piracy hampers the trade and livelihood of coastal towns.³⁶

Petty piracy is also a type of pirate activity. It is targeted at anchored vessels stationed within states' territorial waters. It is one of the most notorious form of piracy, but less harmful. Organized pirate groups usually carry it out. Petty pirates use smaller boats to board mother vessels and take crews hostage. They will then demand money and valuables from the crews. Like raiding operations, they conduct attacks based on intelligence and return home within hours upon achieving their demands.³⁷

It is important to understand the types of pirate activities in order to enlighten policy makers on their *modus operandi*. The distinction is vital to know the types,

³⁴ Jacobson and Nordy, 21.

³⁵ Anyimadu, 6.

³⁶ Jacobson and Nordy, 22.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, 22-23.

dominance, cost, and danger of pirate activity in the GoA and GoG. This will help identify the type of intervention and resources required to combat the subversive practice.³⁸

Delimiting the Acts of Piracy

Andreas Graf argues that the UNCLOS definition of piracy is limited to attacks against targets at sea. Typically, these types of attacks involve crewmembers of one ship attacking crews of another ship, or pirate attacks on oil platforms at sea. The interpretation excludes pirate attacks on ships anchored in harbor, which is encompassed in the IMO definition of piracy.³⁹ Furthermore, some pirate attacks in the GoG and GoA occurred within state's territorial waters. Most state laws for such attacks falls under the purview of the police and not the navy. Unfortunately, the police are incapable to deal with such tasks.⁴⁰ Pirates are well informed about these loop holes in Article 101 of the 1982 UNCLOS definition of piracy. Article 101 constrains the enforcement of international law beyond state's territorial waters. This is the reason pirates evade security forces from crime scenes into safer zones outside state jurisdiction, where they are not liable for arrest.⁴¹

³⁸ Jacobson and Nordy, 23.

³⁹ Graf, 16.

⁴⁰ Anyimadu, 8.

⁴¹ Eero Tepp, "The Gulf of Guinea: Military and Non-Military Ways of Combatting Piracy," *Baltic Security and Defence Review* 14, no. 1 (2012): 181-204.

Critical Assessment of Piracy in the Gulf of Aden and Gulf of Guinea.

The Root Causes of Piracy

Graf established that the objective of digging out the root causes of piracy is to evaluate the degree of comparability between piracy cases in concert with the environment where it occurs. Accordingly, the root causes showcase the conditions influencing people into piracy, and lays the foundation of countermeasures to stop the practice. The common root causes in the two sub-regions are poverty and state weakness.⁴²

Poverty

Bruce Laughlin, a United States Marine Corps officer and former student at the Marine Corps Command and Staff College, maintained in his research that while the GoG is abundantly rich in oil, ordinary citizens have not realized the benefits. This is responsible for wide spread dissatisfaction among the populace. Proceeds from the sales of natural resources are not evenly distributed. This underscores the abject poverty engulfing the population. The World Bank ranked twenty-three out of twenty-five of the world's poorest countries in Africa. Seven of those countries are in the GoG. The mismanagement of resources has caused lot of resentments against state governments and oil companies. Consequently, the possibility of people turning to piracy and attacking oil tankers for survival is inevitable. A perfect example is Nigeria, where the Royal Dutch and Shell Group oil exploration companies have reported over one thousand deaths a year

⁴² Graf, 27.

resulting from political, piracy, and other violent crimes in the Niger Delta.⁴³ The existing disparity between the rich and poor continues to be a breeding ground for pirates. This is exacerbated by the failure of successive governments to provide basic services like health facilities, education, and job opportunities for their citizens.⁴⁴

State Weakness

Another vulnerability of the GoG is the lack of control over its coastal waters. This has encouraged piracy to flourish. Piracy thrives in areas where there is a weak or unstable government. This is responsible for the rampage of pirates on the coasts of GoA and GoG. Worse still, countries in the GoG have not recorded sustained economic growth in spite of oil exploration. This is due to corruption and bad governance, and weakened state structures. Additionally, the countries in the sub-regions are post-colonial states with weak governments and institutions, underdeveloped economies, and inadequate human capital. States security forces in the regions are not well trained and equipped. They lack the capacity to deal with the looming pirate attacks. Most of the countries' constricted defense budgets are focused on resourcing traditional land-based security, ignoring the maritime space.⁴⁵

⁴³ Bruce W. Laughlin, "Expeditionary Strike Group and the Gulf of Guinea" (master's thesis, Command Staff College Marine Corps University, 2005), 14-16.

⁴⁴ Onuoha, "Trends, Concerns, and Propositions," 283-284.

⁴⁵ Chuks Onwumera Iheme, "Security Challenges in the Gulf of Guinea Sub-Region: Strategy for Nigeria" (master's thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, 2008), 30-33.

Significant Commonalities and Differences between the Gulf of Guinea and Gulf of Aden

Piracy in the two sub-regions share commonalities and differences in their nature. The commonality between piracy in the GoA and GoG shows the shift in piracy paradigm from night attacks to daylight robbery. Pirates have emboldened in their actions, with the ability to attack ships in motion. Moreover, GoG and GoA pirates are located on the African continent and share common culture and standard of living challenges.⁴⁶ The differences between pirates in the two sub-regions are discussed in the succeeding paragraphs.

Firstly, Hassan and Hassan adduced that the GoG piracy unfolds in variety of ways. The majority of attacks carried out in that sub-region occurred in states' territorial waters and EEZs. The attacks focused on siphoning oil from tankers and offshore oil facilities.⁴⁷ Among those believed to engage in piracy on the West African coast are Nigerian gangs, corrupt government officials, and their allied criminal networks from Europe and Asia.⁴⁸ On the other hand, pirate attacks in the GoA started along the Somalia coastline and later extended to high seas. Most of the captured pirates on the East African coast were Somalis. The objective of their attacks was to kidnap crewmembers for ransom. Within the period of 2010 to 2011, losses caused by pirates in the GoA was estimated at \$25 billion.⁴⁹

⁴⁶ Hodgkinson, 148.

⁴⁷ Hassan and Hassan, 179.

⁴⁸ United States Africa Command, "Guarding the Gulf," 12.

⁴⁹ Hodgkinson, 148.

Secondly, pirates in the GoG are well organized, equipped, and specialized in the use of maritime assets. They are armed with AK 47 rifles, and demonstrate military tactics in their attacks as exhibited by the pirates who seized the Singapore-flagged chemical tanker, MT Abu Dhabi Star, near the port of Lagos in September 2012. Usually when pirates board a vessel, the immediate drill is to take control of ship's communication devices.⁵⁰ In contrast, though pirates in the GoA are normally armed with light rifles, which cannot be equated with their counterparts in the GoG. Sometimes those carrying weapon are short of sufficient rounds. The attacks are often carried out by poor juvenile pirate foot soldiers. The pirates do not even know their financial backers at the top of the chain.⁵¹

Thirdly, GoG pirates are engaged in attacking oil tankers, where they violently execute their thefts. Seizing oil cargo is their desired objectives and care less about the lives of crews. Any attempt by crews to resist them is met with excruciating pain. On 13 February 2012, pirates killed the Captain and Chief Engineer of MV Fourseas SAW, flying a Panamanian flag. Conversely, piracy in the GoA is driven by kidnapping for ransom. The attacks are focused on taking crewmembers hostage. However, the pirates are careful not to harm their captives as the end state of their attacks largely depends on the victims' safety. They rarely killed crewmembers under normal circumstances.⁵²

⁵⁰ Hassan and Hassan, 179-180.

⁵¹ Hodgkinson, 148.

⁵² Hassan and Hassan, 180.

Collective Security in the Gulf of Guinea

State Level

Chuks Onwumera Iheme, a captain in the Nigerian Navy and former student of the Naval Postgraduate School-California, asserts that the individual state approach to maritime security has not been explicitly effective. The states' navies lack the capacity to handle foes at sea. Nigeria remains the only country in West Africa with a naval force that has two frigates. Other major equipment in the Nigerian Navy's arsenal includes attack craft, landing ship tanks, river tour boats, and in-shore patrol craft. Côte d'Ivoire's Navy has two fast-attack craft, two patrol craft, and one light transport ship. Most of the naval assets of the other countries, including Côte d'Ivoire, cannot venture into high seas. Even Nigeria does not have the right mix of platforms to fight piracy.⁵³ Onuoha further emphasized that there are fewer than twenty-five maritime craft larger than 25 meters available for interdiction efforts in the GoG.⁵⁴

Another barrier to collective security in the GoG is the unclear, demarcated maritime boundaries. It creates suspicion and impedes cooperation between states, which hampers the collective efforts to fight piracy. The maritime boundary disputes between Nigeria and Cameroon over the Bakassi Peninsula and similar disputes between Guinea-

⁵³ Iheme, 6-7.

⁵⁴ Onuoha, "Trends, Concerns, and Propositions," 285.

Bissau and Guinea are examples.⁵⁵ Gilpin argue that for any strategy to be effective and implemented, strong political commitment by states leadership is *sin qua non*.⁵⁶

Regional and Sub-Regional Level

ECOWAS has previously demonstrated the ability to deal with sub-regional problems. It was ECOWAS, through the Economic Community Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), which intervened during the outbreak of wars in Liberia in 1990 and Sierra Leone in 1991. It is the only institution with the ability to act under collective security strategy effort to combat piracy in the sub-region. The organization can bring member states together under one leadership to resolve the crisis.⁵⁷

ECOWAS could employ similar concerted efforts by the International Community (IC) done on the East African coast to eradicate piracy. In addition, the East African countries have developed Djibouti Code of Conduct to enhance cooperation and fight piracy in their waters.⁵⁸ On 23-24 June 2013, ECOWAS also initiated a Code of Conduct for west and central Africa supported by Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), which was enacted by twenty-five countries in Yaoundé, Cameroon. Unlike the Djibouti declaration that is limited to piracy, the ECOWAS Maritime Code of Conduct comprehensively covered all maritime crime and violence.

⁵⁵ Iheme, 32.

⁵⁶ Raymond Gilpin, “Enhancing Maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea,” *Strategic Insights* 6, no. 1 (July 2007): 9.

⁵⁷ Iheme, 41.

⁵⁸ Jimmie E. Sullivan, “Maritime in the Gulf of Guinea: Regional Challenges and Solutions” (master’s thesis, Naval War College, 2012), 9-14.

However, implementation of this pact remains a challenge, due to the lack of resources.⁵⁹ The effectiveness of individual countries effort has not yielded much dividend. Worst still, bilateral agreement efforts to fight piracy between countries were short-lived and not sustainable. A perfect example was the six months joint patrols undertaken by Nigeria and Benin against pirates in their common waters ended in *sine die*. A unified strategic effort by ECOWAS countries could be more effective and will yield far greater result. ECOWAS could lay out tailored strategic objectives (ends), combined resources (means), and develop a concept (ways) that will maximize all the instruments of national power to eliminate piracy in the sub-region.⁶⁰

West African navies and coast guards are limited in resources. Even if they jointly deployed their platforms under the spirit of ECOWAS and collective security, they cannot sustain patrols at 250 nautical miles (nm) or beyond. Their combined maritime assets will not achieve the desired strategic objectives. Other challenges are interoperability of maritime assets and the aging fleet of vessels. See West African state capacity in *IHS Jane's Fighting Ships 2013-2014*, as edited by Commodore Stephen Saunders, Royal Navy.

⁵⁹ United States Department of State Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, United States Department of Homeland Security, United States Department of Coast Guard and United States Department of Defense and Africa Center for Strategic Studies, *Gulf of Guinea Maritime Security and Criminal Justice Premier*, (July 2011), 15.

⁶⁰ Anne-Yolande Bilala and Francisco Glamaes, "Danger in the Gulf of Guinea," *Diplomatic Courier*, 12 July 2012, accessed 10 September 2016, <http://www.diplomaticcourier.com/danger-in-the-gulf-of-guinea/>, 26-27.

United Nations/International Level

Varsani and Popsecu hypothesize that sustainable means of eliminating pirates is to occupy pirates' base area of operations. They cited the 1830 French invasion of Algeria that completely rooted out the Barbary Corsairs. Further, the option of using international navies can only be successful in the short term, but is not a sustainable solution. It is highly likely for pirates to re-emerge after the international naval forces depart. They opine that the world is concerned about piracy in the GoA because it affects their global trade with an estimated total number of sixteen-thousand ships passing through the GoA annually.⁶¹ Nonetheless, Onuoha points out that the United States AFRICOM has been supportive in raising awareness and increasing the capabilities of navies in the sub-region. Through AFRICOM's African Partnership Station (APS), the United States has conducted a lot of training and exercises on maritime security for countries in the GoG.⁶²

Decline of Piracy in the Gulf of Aden

Significantly, Adjoa asserts four reasons exist behind the decline of piracy in the GoA: international navies, best management practices (BMP), armed security aboard commercial ships, and regional capacity building.⁶³

The first reason is the ongoing international naval operations in the GoA. The combined counter-piracy operations consist of the European Union Naval Forces

⁶¹ Varsami and Popescu, 48.

⁶² Onuoha, *Nigeria as a Microcosm*, 10.

⁶³ Anyimadu, 5-7.

(EUNAVFOR) with code names Operation Atlanta and NATO's Operation Ocean Shield, and the United States Combined Task Force 151. Accordingly, China, India, and Russia also conduct patrols within recommended transit corridors.⁶⁴ The international naval interdiction forces have been successful in combating piracy. Because most pirate activities in the GoA occurred on the high seas, international naval forces had to patrol vast stretches of ocean. The human and materiel resources costs incurred by these patrols are high.⁶⁵

The second reason is the implementation of best management practices (BMP) guidelines. These guidelines were developed by international shipping organizations. The BMP provide guidance to commercial vessels on routes and methods to prevent hijackings. Accordingly, ships using BMP are four times safer from pirate attacks.⁶⁶ Hodgkinson maintains that BMP depends upon reporting and negotiation procedures, re-routing ships, posting lookouts on commercial vessels, evasive maneuvering, closed-circuit television, and speeding at a level of 18 knots. The high speed makes it difficult for pirates to stop ships at sea.⁶⁷

The third reason is carrying private, armed security guards onboard commercial vessels. In 2012, the United States government considered this practice a game changer. Since its implementation, pirates have attacked no ships with private armed guards on

⁶⁴ Anyimadu, 5-7.

⁶⁵ Hodgkinson, 151-152.

⁶⁶ Anyimadu, 5-6.

⁶⁷ Hodgkinson, 152.

board ever since its inception. It has proven effective though marred by controversies. There are concerns by countries for ships flying their flags carrying private armed guards, speculation of escalating violence, and sustaining the high cost of the armed private security guards.⁶⁸

The final reason is regional capacity building, which focuses on building the criminal justice systems of East and South Africa littoral states to effectively prosecute pirates.⁶⁹

Role of United Nations and International Naval Forces in Combating Piracy in Gulf of Aden

The cornerstone of success in the GoA is the role played by the UN, EU, NATO, and CMF. Since 2008 and 2009, the IC led naval missions have been fruitful against pirates. The aim of these operations is to detect, disrupt, and suppress pirate activity launched from Somalia. These operations have adapted to the changing nature of piracy in the regions. This naval force patrols 2.5 million square nautical miles, which requires the employment of helicopters, warships, and other sophisticated naval assets.⁷⁰

The United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC) developed the capacity of the regional countries, through training programs and international legal support, to prosecute arrested pirates. The program has trained judges, prosecutors and other members of the judiciaries, and correctional service staff in some of the east and south

⁶⁸ Hodgkinson, 152-153.

⁶⁹ Anyimadu, 6.

⁷⁰ Ibid., 6.

coastal countries sharing the GoA. The UNODC made further arrangements between countries and the government of Somalia. According to the agreement, captured Somali pirates would be tried by those countries. Upon conviction, the pirates would be transferred to Somalia to serve their jail terms.⁷¹

Current Efforts in the Gulf of Guinea

Notwithstanding the challenges, international partners, regional, sub-regional, and states, are making efforts to fight piracy in the GoG. The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) has adopted resolutions on piracy and armed robbery to deal with the situation in GoG. The resolution urges countries to take comprehensive action at regional and sub-regional levels to counter-piracy and its underlying causes. The IMO has also developed programs contributing to the development of a national maritime security committee in pursuit of the Yaoundé Code of Conduct. This complements the IMO resolution adopted by GoG countries in 2013. The EU, U.S., Brazil, China, India, South Africa, and other international partners to countries in the GoG have set up bilateral programs for policy formulation, coordination, and institutional capacity building.

The African Union (AU) has adopted the African Integrated Maritime Security Strategy (AIMSS) 2050 in June 2014. Though efforts to develop strategies and formulate policies are in progress, resources continue to challenge the process. ECOWAS has developed a comprehensive and integrated maritime strategy, but the lack of resources hampers its implementation. Finally, individual states have begun to increase resources

⁷¹ Hodgkinson, 153-154.

and develop strategies in partnership to address organized crimes.⁷² In January 2012, Nigeria transformed its Joint Task Force Operation Restore Hope to an expanded Operation Pulo Shield to fight piracy in its waters. Ghana and Benin have taken measures to improve their surveillance systems as early warning to detect pirate attacks. According to Onuoha, Nigeria led a joint training exercise that comprised of countries in the GoG, U.S., France, Italy, and Spain. The objective was to enhance naval forces to fight piracy.⁷³

Summary of Chapter

This chapter reviewed bodies of literature to pave the way for a framework of counter-measures against piracy in the GoG. It discussed the conceptual framework, highlighted its broad meaning, noted the paradigm shift of pirate activities, and delineated the types of their activities. Using the existing bodies of the literature, piracy in the GoG and GoA were compared and contrasted. It further examined the motivation beyond piracy in the sub-regions and the need to delimit the acts. It reviewed collective security in the context of state, sub-regional, and international levels. In addition, the chapter delineated factors that led to the decline of piracy in the GoA. It discussed the role of the United Nations and international navies to end piracy in the GoA, which will form the backbone of the case study. The chapter ended by describing the current effort by various actors to eliminate piracy in the GoG.

⁷² Council of the European Union, “EU Strategy on the Gulf of Guinea: Foreign Affairs Council Meeting,” 17 March 2014, accessed 17 November 2016, https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/eu_strategy_on_the_gulf_of_guinea_7.pdf, 5-7.

⁷³ Onuoha, *Nigeria as a Microcosm*, 10.

In this regard, the study will continue to investigate the existing gaps in the literature. As such, its framework model lies within the concept of strategy defined by ends, ways, and means. The variables are going to be operationalized in chapter 3. Chapter 3 will also explore the research methodology to analyze the phenomenon of piracy in the GoG. That framework will be used in chapter 4 to analyze piracy in the GoG with the goal of making recommendations on how current strategies dealing with the problem can be more effective.

CHAPTER 3

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Introduction

The purpose of this research is to propose actions that could help to eradicate piracy in the GoG. It will examine the counter-piracy strategy used to fight piracy in the GoA, and identify feasible lessons to curb piracy in the GoG. The chapter will start by outlining steps taken by the researcher to gather information needed to answer the primary and secondary research questions. It will also look at case selection and research methods, research design, and evaluation criteria for the study. The study will use the qualitative research approach with a case study method. It will conclude by proposing a concept that will set the stage for analysis in the chapter 4.

Information Collection to Answer Research Questions

The main thrust of this study is to answer the primary and secondary research questions. The initial information was collected from diverse sources at the Ike Skelton Combined Arms Research Library (CARL); this library is part of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College (CGSC). The information collected provided the opportunity to review previous research conducted on the GoA and GoG. The research uses primary and secondary sources of information. Initial analysis of the collected information provided the researcher with the opportunity to identify existing omissions in the literature, which laid the framework of this study. The research questions were later designed to fill the existing gap. Steps taken to address the research questions includes the development and collection of additional information, evaluation of the information

collected, writing the literature review, and designing the research method. The researcher used the modified questions to develop and collect the additional information for the research with the support of CARL. The research was evaluated to determine requirement and importance.

A qualitative research methodology was used with a case study method. The approach was used because it enhances the body of knowledge through understanding of the phenomena under study. It provides insight on the causes that led to a problem, prompting the need for an investigation. It is a flexible instrument, which examines different ways of fixing a problem. Qualitative analysis is also useful for research questions based on contemporary matters. It focuses on participants within the context of the study and incorporates diverse views into the research, which makes it suitable to overcome the complexity of a study.⁷⁴

Furthermore, qualitative research chronologically provides guidance for answering research questions. As such, it guides the researcher's approach within a logical framework in answering the questions for the research. This methodology gives enormous meaning by tapping on a variety of sources focusing on the local population

⁷⁴ Beverly Hancock, Elizabeth Ockleford, and Kate Windridge, *An Introduction to Qualitative Research* (Yorkshire: National Institute for Health Research Design Service, 2009), 4-6, accessed 13 January 2017, http://www.rds-yh.nihr.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/5_Introduction-to-qualitative-research-2009.

within the area of study. Its strength lies on the ability to manage diversity of opinions and experience on events in the target area of study.⁷⁵

Specifically, the researcher chose a case study method because it is adaptable and research questions can be modified to fit the context of the study. This can happen during the course of the research, when the preliminary questions are no longer relevant to the study. In addition, it generates sufficient contextual and original interpretation of the phenomena using multiple layers of analysis. Finally, a single case study is much akin and suitable to a study that is extreme and represents a critical situation in a region.⁷⁶ In line with that premise, the case study for the research is the role played by the international community in the GoA to reduce piracy. The international community refers to the United Nations (UN), the European Union (EU), North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and the Combined Maritime Force (CMF) coalition led by the United States.

Case Selection and Method

The case selection and method is centered on the role played by the international community to eliminate piracy in the GoA, specifically, the role played by the joint

⁷⁵ Natasha Mack, Cynthia Woodsong, Kathleen M. MacQueen, Greg Guest, and Emily Namey, *Qualitative Research Methods: A Data Collector's Field Guide* (Durham, SC: Family Health International, 2005), 1, accessed 15 January 2017, <https://www.fhi360.org/sites/default/files/media/documents/Qualitative>.

⁷⁶ Anol Bhattacharjee, *Social Science Research: Principles, Methods, and Practices*, 2nd ed., Open Textbook Library (Tampa, FL: University of South Florida, 2012), 93-95, accessed 15 January 2017, <http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?>.

international navies—EU, NATO, and CMF—to combat piracy in the GoA. The GoA was chosen for reasons of geographic, cultural, scholarly, and policy relevance.

First, the GoA and the GoG share similar geographic characters and culture. Both coasts are busy international sea lanes used for global trade from the African continent. The makeup of people living in the littoral states of GoA and GoG are similar in many regards. Moreover, the two coastal regions share similar motivation of people to engage in piracy.⁷⁷

The second is the scholarly and policy relevance. Because much has not been done on research of this nature, the study will contribute to the scholarship and strategic understanding of the existing body of literature. In addition, piracy is greatly impacting the economies of East, West, and South Africa littoral states. It is also affecting trade and seafarers at the global level.⁷⁸ Therefore, this study will inform policy makers in the sub-region in particular and the international community at large on counter-piracy strategies to eradicate pirates in the GoG. Clearly, it will help regional and sub-regional organizations like the African Union and ECOWAS to carve out counter-piracy strategies to combat pirates in the GoG.

Research Design

To establish the research design, it is best to operationalize the anti-piracy strategy that will be employed to address the existing literature gap in the GoG. It will be defined in terms of ends, ways, and means. In turn, the ends, ways, and means will be

⁷⁷ Graf, 17.

⁷⁸ Iheme, 6.

operationalized by their respective variables for both the GoA and GoG while accepting prudent risk. The ends will be operationalized using the following variables: state, sub-regional, regional, and international objectives. The ways will be operationalized by policies, procedures, and programs variables. The means (resources) variables include naval forces, equipment, capacity, and funding. For all the variables, pirates remain the dependent variable and center of gravity. Risk would be kept in a loop, because it maintains the balance among the three primary variables- ends, ways, and means.

Evaluation Criteria

In continuation to the criteria introduced in the literature review, the evaluation criteria for this study will be based on ends, ways, and means. The measure of these criteria is exemplified by their variables as outlined below:

The ends are defined by the following variables of state, sub-regional, regional, and international objectives. The state represents individual countries in the GoA and GoG. The sub-region defines the existing organizations formed by states in that part of the continent, for collective economic, political, social, and security benefits. For example, in West Africa the sub-regional organization is known as ECOWAS. The region defines the umbrella organization in the continent formed by African states known as the AU. These variables will be assessed by comparatively analyzing them under the GoA and GoG. The essence of the analysis is to determine whether the variables are present or absent in that sub-region. The effects of the variables will form part of the assessment. Precisely, the analysis will capture the strategic objective of each variable about combating piracy.

The ways is represented by policy, procedure, and program variables. Policy is regarded as states or organizational intent statements to combat pirates in either GoA or GoG. The procedure defines the implementation of policies. The programs are operational actions or activities crafted to curb piracy in the sub-regions.

The means (resources) is defined by the following variables: Naval forces, equipment, capacity, and funding. The naval forces define the navies that have engaged or presently involve in curbing piracy. For the GoA, the international navies will be considered for that sub-region, while West African countries' navies in the will be considered in the comparative analysis for the GoG. The equipment defines naval materiel resources required to support the naval forces in deterring or defeating pirates in the sub-regions. It includes war ships, fast patrol vessels, rotary winged aircraft for surveillance and patrols, and other land based surveillance devices. As a variable, capacity defines the existing capability of the capital asset (human resource) of institutions involved in fighting marauders. As such, capacity is anchored on level of training and technical skills acquisition of naval personnel and other stakeholders that form part of the fight against pirates. Funding represents the source of financing the programs rolled out by the Anti-Piracy strategy, especially the financing of the joint naval operations.

As depicted in the table 3, the metric for the variables would be based on an analytical assessment. In particular, it will focus on the availability or existence of a variable, its effectiveness, and broad assessment of that effectiveness. The assessment will start by confirming whether the variable was 'present or absent' within the sub-region for the effective case study (GoA), or is present or absent for the pending case

study (GoG). Dichotomous values “Yes (represented by Y) or No (represented by N)” will indicate a variable’s “presence or absence” respectively. An assessment of the variable being “effective or not effective” will be done to determine its contributions to the achievement of success. Similarly, dichotomous values of “Yes or No” will show whether it is “effective (Y) or not effective (N)” respectively. A collective assessment of the variables under ends, ways, and means, will determine their effects. The GoA case study is presently in effect; it would be mirrored against the GoG, which is the pending case. The deliverables from the GoA case study would be noted as lessons learned for the GoG. At the end, the final product of the analysis will set the stage for the GoG.

Table 2. Summary of Evaluation Criteria					
<u>Variables</u>	Factors	Case Studies			
		Effective GoA		Pending GoG	
		Present (Y or N)	Effectiveness (Y or N)	Present (Y or N)	Effectiveness (Y or N)
Ends (Interests and Objectives)	State (S)				
	Sub-Regional (SR)				
	Regional (R)				
	International (I)				
Ways (Concepts)	Policy (P1)				
	Procedure (P2)				
	Program (P3)				
Means (Resources)	Naval Force (NF)				
	Equipment (E)				
	Capacity (C)				
	Funding (F)				

Source: Created by author.




Figure 2. Hypothetical Model for Combating Piracy

Source: Created by author.

Summary and Conclusion

The chapter dealt with steps taken by the researcher to collect information to answer the research questions. It further discussed the research method and case selection. It highlighted the reasons and relevance for selecting each case study. The case selected for the research is the role played by the international community in the GoA. Additionally, it covered the research design, where strategy will be analyzed through ends, ways and means. The study identified and operationalized variables to measure the ends, ways, and means. The chapter ended by providing evaluation criteria for the research. The evaluation criteria and proposed analytical matrix will provide the basis of analysis in chapter 4.

CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS

Introduction

This chapter will analyze the counter-piracy strategy employed the International Community (IC) in the Horn of Africa to repress and prevent piracy. The IC refers to the United Nations (UN), European Union (EU), Combined Maritime Forces (CMF), and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The analysis will look at the role played by each of the organizations. It will also dissect the current initiatives underway in West Africa. The strategic hierarchical framework and Arthur Lykke's strategic model will be used to compare efforts in the two sub-regions. Lessons learned from the GoA case study will form the basis of the GoG anti-piracy operation.

Combating Piracy in the Gulf of Aden: An Overview

As marauders turned the GoA into a sanctuary, commercial ships and seafarers became increasingly concerned. This led to the designation of this coast as a dangerous zone, because of the vulnerability of pirate attacks. The financial reward from theft enjoyed by pirates emboldened them to continue the practice. The pirates were mostly Somalis that had spent almost all their lives in a war-torn country. Somalia is a country that has been in conflict for decades. The overthrow of late President Mohamed Siad Barre's government in 1991 ended any signs of peace in the country. Since then, and until the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) took over governance, there was no central government in the country. Warlords had partitioned the country and managed all aspects of sovereignty. Those factions with tough military muscles and support had

seceded and declared themselves as self-independent states. Today, there exists the self-proclaimed Republics of Somaliland and Puntland, and the main Somalia. This has left the country's security in limbo. The unpredictable security environment makes the country a suitable sanctuary for pirates. Worse still, neighboring littoral states that were to fill the security gap and suppress piracy in the sub-region, lack the requisite capacity. Equally challenging, the AU took no remedial action to combat the threats in the region. This opened the door for action by international organizations and countries whose interests were in jeopardy. Eventually, the UN Security Council (UNSC) adopted a series of resolutions to repress the illegal trade. A good number of countries and international governmental organizations responded accordingly. Notable among them were, the EU, NATO, and the United States. They deployed navies on operations as part of their counter-piracy strategies to eradicate this threat. Together with the Best Management Practices (BMP), their intervention led to a decline of piracy in the GoA.

Case Study: Responses of the International Community in the Gulf of Aden

As the piracy crisis deteriorated in the GoA, affected states in the sub-region were unable to intervene and minimize the situation. This led to the international community's involvement in the region. The major organizations and coalitions under which international navies intervened in the crisis for the case study were the UN, EU, NATO, and the CMF. The international shipping industry also developed the BMP for implementation by vessels transiting pirate territory. The actions taken by the IC that will be discussed in the succeeding paragraphs were development of policies and programs, capacity building, and counter-piracy operations.

United Nations Responses

The IMO quarterly reports on the dramatic spike in piracy off the coast of Somalia drew the attention of the United Nations. The IMO's views were widely shared by countries plying the GoA sea route and other members of the international community.⁷⁹ In 2008, the illicit trade showed no signs of abating. Eventually, the UNSC, in accordance with Chapter VII of its Charter, adopted five major resolutions to combat the growing crisis; those resolutions were: 1816 (2008), 1838 (2008), 1846 (2008), 1851 (2008), and 1897 (2009).

The first UNSC Resolution (UNSCR), 1816, regarding piracy off the Somali coast, was adopted at its 5,902nd meeting. This resolution noted the rampant hijackings and armed robberies in the Somalia territorial waters and high sea. It urged countries with maritime capability, especially those countries using the coastal waters as a trade route and interested international organizations, to cooperate and end these threats. It also acknowledged and amplified the request of the TFG for international assistance to counter the piracy threats ravaging their coast. The resolution empowered countries to seize any vessels used for piracy.⁸⁰

Despite the EU's establishment of a coordination unit to support the surveillance and protect member states interests, marauders intensified attacks on the coast. They targeted commercial vessels including those hired by the World Food Program (WFP) carrying humanitarian aid to Somalia. This prompted the adoption of UNSCR 1838 on 7

⁷⁹ United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1816, 1.

⁸⁰ Ibid., 1-4.

October 2008. It reaffirmed UN commitment to the deteriorating situation extending deep into the Indian Ocean, which had become a very violent area. It further highlighted plans to engage international navies to deter and defeat pirates.⁸¹

As the pressure of the crisis continued to escalate, the UNSC enacted resolution 1846, which called upon countries with naval vessels and military aircraft to enter the waters off Somalia to fight piracy. It emphasized the lack of the TFG's capacity to deal with the situation. This resolution stressed that "strengthening institutions, economic, and social stability" were vital for a complete erosion of maritime crime on the coast. It encouraged states to replicate or implement the best practices developed by the IMO, in particular, the deployment of naval forces to protect vulnerable ships sailing to Somalia and across the Indian Ocean. The navies operating in GoA included the EU's Operation Atlanta, NATO's Operations Allied Protector, and Ocean Shield, the Combined Maritime Forces Combined Task Force 151 led by the United States, and other states acting to reduce crime at sea.⁸²

Expansion of pirate operations into the high sea precipitated the need for further action. The seizure of M/V Sirus, five hundred nautical miles off the coast of Kenya, exemplified the changing tactics used by pirates. In addition, the challenge to prosecute

⁸¹ United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1838, 7 October 2008, accessed 2 February 2017, <https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N08/538/84/PDF/N0853884.pdf?OpenElement>, 1-3. UN documents on piracy, adopted by the Security Council at its 5987th meeting, on 7 October 2008.

⁸² United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1846, 2 December 2008, accessed 1 February 2017, <https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N08/630/29/PDF/N0863029.pdf?OpenElement>. UN documents on piracy, adopted by the Security Council at its 6026th meeting, on 2 December 2008.

captured pirates became an issue. Most pirates arrested by the international navies were released without facing justice because of the lack of domestic legislation and capacity. As a result, the UNSC adopted resolution 1851 on 16 December 2008, to address that concern. The resolution emphasized unified efforts and information sharing among parties involved in the fight against piracy.⁸³

Implementation of these resolutions has reduced piracy in the GoA. On 30 November 2009, the UNSC adopted Resolution 1897, which commended the international navies and neighboring states for prosecuting pirates. It extended resolutions 1846 and 1851 for another twelve-month period. The UN also welcomed adoption of the Djibouti Code of Conduct, which encouraged neighboring states to take action in dealing with piracy in the Indian Ocean and GoA. Finally, this resolution asked neighboring states such as Kenya, Seychelles, and Yemen, which were prosecuting pirates, to enter into an agreement or arrangement with the TFG. The agreement called for transfer of convicted Somali pirates to serve their jailed terms in Somalia.⁸⁴

European Union Responses

The EU is comprised of twenty-eight countries, with most of its member states relying on the GoA busy route for commerce and international trade. The effects of

⁸³ United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1851, 16 December 2008, accessed 1 February 2017, <https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N08/655/01/PDF/N0865501.pdf?OpenElement>. UN documents on piracy, adopted by the Security Council at its 6046th meeting on 16 December 2008.

⁸⁴ United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1897, 30 November 2009, Accessed 1 February 2017, <https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N09/624/65/PDF/N0962465.pdf?OpenElement>. UN documents on piracy, adopted by the Security Council at its 6226th meeting, on 30 November 2009.

ferocious interdiction and raids in that water against commercial vessels affected the economies of its member countries. The call by the UN against piracy in the GoA was a shining opportunity for those countries to take collective security action under a single EU entity to safeguard their interests. Statistical records shows that 95 percent of EU international trade depended on sea routes and an estimated 20 percent of that figure passed through the GoA.⁸⁵

The EU developed broader policies to protect member states' international trade interests in the GoA. These multifaceted policies were encapsulated in a strategic framework targeting piracy in that sub-region. The policies were focused towards Somalia, because most of the pirates captured were citizens of that country. These policies' goals were to address the looming piracy crisis and its root causes. The policies ranged from instituting a responsible, transparent, and accountable political system to filling the governance void, conflict prevention to mend the security gap, promoting economic growth by tackling poverty, and supporting regional economic integration and prosperity.⁸⁶

As at the time of EU intervention, the piracy problem had surpassed the crisis level. The situation was swinging on a complicated and complex pendulum. Sensing this trend, the EU comprehensively addressed the problem by wielding the instruments of national power. The organization was mindful that the military instrument, being the core

⁸⁵ European Union Naval Force Somalia, *Operation Atalanta Information Booklet* (Middlesex, UK: European Union Operation, 2015), 4, accessed 11 February 2017, http://eunavfor.eu/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/20150112_EU-Naval-Force-Operation-Atalanta-Information-Booklet-EN-hyperlinks.pdf.

⁸⁶ Ibid., 14-15.

means of defeating piracy, could only be effective by complementing it with “diplomatic efforts, legal actions, development assistance, and strong international coordination.”

This differentiated the EU approach to the chaos from others on the coast.⁸⁷

The EU undertook programs to support implementation of its policies. The four principal programs were the establishment of the Maritime Security Center for the Horn of Africa (MSCHOA), formation of the European Union Capacity Building for the Horn of Africa and the Western Indian Ocean (EUCAP Nestor), the European Union Training Mission in Somalia (EUTM Somali), and the European Naval Force (EUNAVFOR). The MSCHOA is stationed at the EUNAVFOR HQ in the UK; it is responsible for conducting reconnaissance and surveillance. It educates maritime industries on the application of Best Management Practices (BMP), which has proven to be effective against pirates. The EUCAP Nestor mission consists of civilian and military personnel working in tandem. It is responsible for the capacity building of the Somalia and other littoral states’ coastguards and police forces in the GoA. EUTM provides military training to the Somali National Armed Forces (SNAF). While EUNAVFOR is conducting piracy operations in the region. All these programs are the nexus within the nucleus of fighting piracy in the GoA.⁸⁸

⁸⁷ European Union Naval Force Somalia, *Operation Atalanta Information Booklet*, 14.

⁸⁸ Ibid., 5-14.

European Union Naval Force – Operation Atlanta

Mandate

The EU Council Joint Action 851, which was born out of UNSCR 1816, 1838, 1846, and 1851, authorized the deployment of EUNAVFOR on Operation Atlanta.

EUNAVFOR mission and mandate includes protecting vessels of the WFP, African Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), and other vulnerable ships. To deter and disrupt piracy and avoid robbery at sea; maintain fishing activities off the Somali coast, support other missions and organizations working to strengthen maritime security and capacity in the region.⁸⁹

Counter-Piracy Operations

The expanded purpose of EUNAVFOR mission was to apprehend pirates and transfer them to the appropriate authorities for conviction in order to end the practice in the region. The EUNAVFOR area of operation (AO) covered about two million square nautical miles, stretching from the GoA to the southern Red Sea and deep parts of the Indian Ocean. Within the confines of the AO, EUNAVFOR conducted escort duties, patrolling Internationally Transit Recommended Corridors (ITRC), interdicting and searching vessels sailing within its AO, and enhancing the implementation of the BMP by merchant vessels. Routinely, it stops and searches vessels to confirm they are not navigating under the direction of pirates.⁹⁰

Equipment

EUNAVFOR possess the right equipment to support its operation. The sophisticated equipment accords them the flexibility to act swiftly on incidents occurring

⁸⁹ European Union Naval Force Somalia, *Operation Atalanta Information Booklet*, 5.

⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, 6.

within the AO. It has also enhanced their capability to react to distress ships at sea. EUNAVFOR combined reconnaissance and surveillance assets have eroded the hideouts of pirates. Marauders were spotted easily at any location within the boundaries. Among the EUNAVFOR equipment were surface combat vessels, auxiliary ships, Seahawk helicopters, surveillance devices, and maritime patrol and reconnaissance aircraft.⁹¹

Troop Contributing Countries

The member states of EUNAVFOR were periodically contributing troops to the mission in fulfillment of its mandate. Troop contribution is not limited to EU member states alone. There are non-EU members like Norway, Ukraine, Montenegro, and Serbia that have contributed troops and equipment to the mission. The composition of the EUNAVFOR varies according to rotation and sizes of the available warships for the operation. The force strength has consisted of one thousand to twelve hundred personnel; four to six surface combat vessels, and two to three Maritime Patrol and Reconnaissance Aircraft (MPRA).⁹²

Political Control, Strategic Direction, and Command Structure

The political architecture exercises overall strategic direction and control of EUNAVFOR. The chain of command flows from the strategic to the operational and cascades down to the tactical level. At the top echelon, the Political and Security Committee (PSC) exercises political control and strategic direction of the EUNAVFOR.

⁹¹ European Union Naval Force Somalia, *Operation Atalanta Information Booklet*, 8.

⁹² Ibid.

The PSC is accountable to the Council of the EU and the High Representative of the Union of Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. The mission Force Commander at the tactical level reports to the Operation Commander, who is responsible to the PSC. The Force Commander exercises command and control over the military forces in the mission area. The Force Commander is housed in the Force Headquarters (FHQ) afloat a warship. The Operation Commander is station at the Operational Headquarters (OHQ) at Northwood, UK. The PSC is made up of ambassadors of member states based at the EU Headquarters in Belgium.⁹³

Funding

Member states and non-EU members contribute troops and equipment for EUNAVFOR operation. The countries contribute maritime assets within their arsenals. They also bear the cost of their personnel and overhead running cost of equipment. The EU only provides an agreed amount of funds annually. The EU provided funds are meant to cover incidentals, such as travel cost sanction by the mission, medical evacuation, information technology and communication costs. The budgeted amount provided for each in 2015 and 2016 was 7.35 million.⁹⁴

Achievements

Since the deployment of EUNAVFOR in December 2008 and up until 2016, the mission has been very successful in repressing piracy. In concert with other navies

⁹³ European Union Naval Force Somalia, *Operation Atalanta Information Booklet*, 10.

⁹⁴ Ibid., 12.

deployed on the coast, EUNAVFOR has contributed to preventing attacks at sea. “At the height of attacks in January 2011, Somali pirates held 736 hostages and thirty-two ships. By December 2014 that number has dropped to thirty hostages and no ships being held.”⁹⁵ The mission has protected 408 WFP vessels and 138 AMISOM vessels. It has also handed over 160 pirates to authorities in Kenya, Mauritius, and Seychelles for prosecution. From that total figure, 145 pirates have been convicted.⁹⁶

Table 3. Showing EUNAVFOR Operational Statistics										
	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	Grand Total
Sub-Total Attacks	24	163	174	176	34	7	2	0	1	581
Of which Pirated	14	46	47	25	4	0	0	0	0	136
Disrupted by EUNAVFOR	0	14	65	28	16	10	1	0	0	134

Source: European Union Naval Force Somalia, “Operation Atlanta Key Facts,” accessed 12 February 2017, <http://eunavfor.eu/key-facts-and-figures>.

From the table above, 581 combined attacks by pirate were reported. Out of the total attack figure, 136 were pirated. The pirated attacks represent the total number of ships “repelled or aborted and those leading to ships being in pirate hands and crews

⁹⁵ European Union Naval Forces Somalia, *Operation Atalanta Information Booklet*, 18.

⁹⁶ European Union Naval Force Somalia, “Operation Atalanta Key Facts and Figures,” accessed 12 February 2017, <http://eunavfor.eu/key-facts-and-figures>.

taken hostage.” The EUNAVFOR disrupted 134 of those pirate attacks. It is worth noting that the mission has drastically reduced attacks in the GoA.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization Responses

As piracy persisted and expanded along the length and breadth of the GoA, the former UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon requested NATO to provide escorts to WFP humanitarian aid meant for the war ravaged people of Somalia. In response, NATO established a temporal mission in the GoA called Operation Provider. The operation was conducted from October to December 2008. In March to August 2009, NATO launched another operation - Operation Protector, which was the organization’s second operation in the GoA. Operation Protector expanded NATO’s operation beyond the coast of Somalia to other parts of the Horn of Africa. With the escalation of piracy in the region, NATO morphed into a more robust operation known as Operation Ocean Shield. Operation Ocean Shield started in August 2009 and terminated on 15 December 2016.⁹⁷

North Atlantic Treaty Organization – Operation Ocean Shield

Mandate and Mission

NATO derived the mandate of Operation Ocean Shield from the UNSCRs. These resolutions urged countries and interested regional organizations to employ every means available to pursue pirates in the GoA. NATO’s mission was to contribute to other international efforts by coordinating with those organizations to deter and disrupt pirate activities on the GoA, Indian Ocean, and Red Sea. This would be pursued by securing the

⁹⁷ NATO, “Counter-Piracy Operation,” 19 December 2016, accessed 8 February 2017, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_48815.htm.

sea lines of communication, building the capacity of littoral states, and protecting the widely used global trade route of the GoA. The busy route is the only gateway into and out of the Suez Canal and connecting the Strait of Hormuz.⁹⁸

Counter-Piracy Operations

In achievement of its mission, NATO troops on Ocean Shield were involved in escorting the United Nations Support Office for AMISOM (UNSOA) supply ships to Mogadishu harbor. NATO was also engaged in escorting commercial vessels and ensuring their adherence to BMP. Operations involved interdicting suspected ships and boarding them to search for pirates' presence. As part of their operations, they detained and transferred suspected pirates to national law enforcement agencies in the neighboring countries having an agreement with the TFG in Somalia. They collected intelligence and surveillance, and conducted reconnaissance tasks within the AO. They also cooperated and shared information with EUNAVFOR and Combined Task Force 151. Finally, NATO was engaged in training and exercises with littoral states in the region in order to strengthen their maritime capabilities in standing up to future piracy threats.⁹⁹

Participating Countries

The participation of NATO is controlled and determined through its command headquarters and structure. Most of the participants on Operation Ocean Shield, save for

⁹⁸ NATO, "Operation Ocean Shield Fact Sheet," November 2014, accessed 8 February 2017, http://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_topics/141202a-Factsheet-OceanShield-en.pdf, 1-2.

⁹⁹ Ibid.

Ukraine and New Zealand, were allied NATO countries. NATO has a standing maritime quick reaction force known as the Standing NATO Maritime Groups (SNMGs). The SNMGs is made up of allied countries. The SNMGs is divided into two groups, SNMG1 and SNMG2. The member countries resourced the SNMGs with personnel on a periodic basis. The NATO high command deployed SNMG1 and SNMG2 on Operation Ocean Shield on a six-month rotational basis.¹⁰⁰

Equipment

Allied NATO countries contribute equipment permanently to the SNMGs. In addition to ships and aircraft that were made available by Ukraine and New Zealand, “three to five NATO warships with embedded helicopters were always deployed in support of the operation. Each SNMG has its own equipment and personnel drawn from member countries.”¹⁰¹

Strategic Direction and Command Structure

Like other NATO missions, Operation Ocean Shield was established by the North Atlantic Council strategic imperative. The mission maintains the traditional NATO chain of command, with the Maritime Command (MARCOM) based in Northwood, United Kingdom, exercising overall command and control. Rear Admirals, answerable to the MARCOM, command each of the SNMGs. In turn, the MARCOM reports to the NATO

¹⁰⁰ NATO, “Counter-Piracy Operation.”

¹⁰¹ Ibid.

Headquarters through the chain of command to the Supreme Allied. The Supreme Allied Commander is responsible to the political tier of the organization.¹⁰²

Funding

NATO was responsible for funding its own mission. The funding for Operation Ocean Shield is no exception. The organization relies upon the contributions from allied countries to support its activities.

Achievements

The NATO led Operation Ocean Shield was a success. It was terminated only when no incidents were reported for over a twelve-month period. As of October 2014, NATO recorded 179 unsuccessful pirate attacks, 64 hijacks in which pirates were able to take control of the vessels, and 133 disruptions in which international military action forced pirates to abort their attacks. Also worth noting are the attacks that were unsuccessful due to the presence of international navies. The organization, though not primarily responsible, helped conduct military training for neighboring states, preparing them to take ownership of the future fights against piracy.¹⁰³

Combined Maritime Force Responses

Following the terrorist attack on 11 September 2001, the Combined Maritime Forces (CMF) was established. The coalition was set up to deal with terrorist threats in

¹⁰² NATO, “Counter-Piracy Operation.”

¹⁰³ Ibid.

the maritime space.¹⁰⁴ However, with other threats emerging from the sea, the CMF has expanded its operations. It is a multinational naval partnership coalition of 31 countries led by the United States. The organization's operations span beyond the GoA, extending into the Indian Ocean and the Red Sea. The coalition AO covers about 3.5 million nautical miles at sea. Its partnership was not bound by a political or military mandate. The headquarters is located in Bahrain.¹⁰⁵

The strategic objectives and interest of the CMF was to “defeat terrorism, prevent piracy, encourage regional cooperation, and promote a safe maritime environment.” The CMF worked with regional organizations especially in the Middle East to fight terror, piracy, and other maritime crimes. It is working to enable regional partners and interested organizations helping to get rid of terrorism and piracy at sea. Moreover, like most coalitions, the CMF member states are concerned with the security threats in the maritime domain. In particular, the states were concerned about the growing threats on the international trade route utilized for their commerce. They were also concerned about the interruption of the freedom of navigation as inscribed by the international law of the sea.¹⁰⁶

¹⁰⁴ Mathew R. MacLeod and William M. Wardrop, “Operational Analysis at Combined Maritime Forces” (paper presented at the 32nd International Symposium of Military Research, Surry, UK, July 2015), 3, accessed 7 February 2017, http://www.lessonsfrompiracy.net/files/2015/12/32ismor_macleod_wardrop_paper.pdf.

¹⁰⁵ Combined Maritime Forces, “A 31 Nation Partnership,” accessed 15 February 2017, <https://combinedmaritimeforces.com/about/>.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid.

The United States, being the architect of the CMF members, shares common interests and policies with other partners in the coalition. The U.S. “National Strategy for Maritime Security and the Policy for Repression of Piracy,” largely resonates across the CMF and CTF151 operations. The strategy recognized and safeguarded the coalition’s tailored interests. The policy depends on the U.S. to lead efforts to suppress piracy. As such, the U.S. brought states together, galvanized international organizations and institutions to combat piracy and other related maritime crimes through an integrated and comprehensive approach.¹⁰⁷

The United States and other CMF members were aware of the effects of piracy on their national interests and international trade. This is the reason the U.S. is leading other nations to focus efforts in “preventing and interrupting piracy, building maritime security and governance capacity in affected states to hold pirates accountable.” These collaborative ventures led to the inception of the CTF151, as an operational organ of the CMF, with a specific mission of combating piracy.¹⁰⁸

On the verge of accomplishing its set objectives and policies, the coalition formed three task forces as part of its programs. These are the Combined Task Force 150 (CTF 150), CTF 151, and CTF 152. CTF 150 was established to deal with terrorism and other maritime security. However, when the threat of piracy escalated in the GoA, the coalition thought it prudent to have another task force to fight piracy. This resulted in the

¹⁰⁷ Obama, 1-2.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid.

formation of CTF151. CTF 151 focus is on countering maritime piracy in the GoA and beyond. Finally, CTF 152 was created to combat maritime security on the Red Sea.¹⁰⁹

Combined Maritime Forces Operation – Combined Task Force 151

Mission and Mandate

The CTF 151 mandate was based on the UNSCRs on piracy off the coast of Somalia. CTF 151's mission is "to disrupt piracy and armed robbery at sea, engage with regional and other partners to build the capacity and improve relevant capabilities in order to protect global maritime commerce and secure freedom of navigation."¹¹⁰

Troops Contribution

The participation of member states as part of the CTF 151 was voluntary, drawn from the CMF. The task force was composed of Australia, Bahrain, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Iraq, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Republic of Korea, Kuwait, Malaysia, The Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, The Philippines, Portugal, Saudi Arabia, Seychelles, Singapore, Spain, Thailand, Turkey, United Arab Emirate, United Kingdom, United States, and Yemen. The contribution of maritime assets by member nations differs from one another. Because coalition countries are not compelled on their level of contributions, each member made available the naval assets they were willing and capable to provide.¹¹¹

¹⁰⁹ Combined Maritime Forces.

¹¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹¹ Ibid.

Counter-Piracy Operation

In coordination with EUNAVFOR, NATO, and independent countries operating in the Horn of Africa coast, CTF 151 has undertaken numerous operations to prevent piracy. The task force is conducting patrols along the International Recognized Corridors (IRTC) and promotes BMP designed by the shipping industry. The task force is also engaging key leaders in the region, establishing strategic communications, wide spread public affairs, and strengthening regional capacity to confront piracy.¹¹² A nascent development by CTF 151 Spatial Analysts as a part of their tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs), was the integration of a designed model in counter-piracy operations. They used historical data to identify high-risk areas, choke points, weather effects, dovetailed them to the IRTC, and developed the model. The essence of the model is to enable a quick reaction to a distress call by ships under emergency or pirate attack. In case of an attack, the standby naval force at base will quickly react to the distress call from a ship by first dispatching a helicopter into the patrol zone it is coming from, while the warship is on its way. A helicopter will fix the ship under attack in position and at the same time give a pre-plan zonal direction to the warship. On arrival, the warship intercepts the ship under suspected pirate attack.¹¹³

Command and Control Structure

CTF 151 command is rotational among coalition members for a period of six months. Since its inception, in January 2009, the command has revolved in the hands of

¹¹² Combined Maritime Forces.

¹¹³ MacLeod and Wardrop, 3.

several coalition navy commanders. The U.S. Navy, followed by the Republic of Korea, and Turkey Navy commanded the coalition. Currently, the Pakistani Navy is commanding the CTF 151. Like any military organization, CTF 151 is responsible to the CMF command. The U.S. Navy Central Command (NAVCENT) is the overall commander of the CMF. CTF 151 coordinates their efforts with independent navies operating in the GoA through a mechanism regarded as the Shared Awareness Area De-confliction (SHADE) at the operational level. The CTF 151 commander or representative usually chairs SHADE meetings. The SHADE chair is to rotate in the future with the independent naval forces; this mechanism has been very vital in getting the support of independent naval forces' countries like China.¹¹⁴

Equipment and Funding

The flexibility of the CMF allows member nations to contribute naval equipment for CTF 151 operations at their own volition. The members are responsible for the overhead running costs of equipment and personnel. That notwithstanding, an average of eight war ships and maritime reconnaissance aircrafts are available at all times. The coalition can also call for naval assets, not assigned to the mission, from member states to provide assistance when and where required.

¹¹⁴ Lauren Ploch et al., *Piracy Off the Horn of Africa* (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, April 2011), 25-26, accessed 12 February 2017, <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R40528.pdf>.

Achievements

Establishment of CJTF 151 relieved CJTF 150 to focus on its primary security responsibility of maritime terrorism. CJTF 151 operations succeeded in suppressing and preventing piracy. The task force arrested many pirates that faced trials and were sentenced to prison. In conjunction with NATO and EUNAVFOR, the task force provided guidance and monitored the adherence of commercial vessels to BMP. They interdicted and rescued suspected vessels that were hijacked by pirates.¹¹⁵

Best Management Practices

The BMP process is another measure that has contributed to the decline of piracy in GoA. The EU and MSCHOA developed BMP with input from international maritime organizations and the shipping industry. It consists of practices and procedures that guide the way ships should navigate corridors to sail along, and the adoption of immediate drills in an instance of pirates approaching their vessels. The IRTC is part of the BMP implementation. More importantly, the carrying of armed bodyguards on board commercial and oil cargo vessels paralyses the intent of pirates to launch attacks. The practice has also led to the reduction and prevention of armed robberies at sea. Nonetheless, some marine experts are wary of putting armed guards on board vessels. They fear that such practice could cause pirates to becoming more violent and aggressive.

¹¹⁵ Dian Cronje, “The Pirates of Somalia: Maritime Bandits or Warlords?” (master’s thesis, Stellenbosch University, March 2010), 83-86, accessed 28 February 2017, https://www.google.com/#q=Achievements+of+CJTF151&*.

The BMP implementation has been widely supported by all the international navies operating the GoA.¹¹⁶

Current Strategy to Combat Piracy in the Gulf of Guinea:

The outbreak of piracy in the GoG, led to numerous responses by states to curb this menace. This portion will seek to analyze the existing measures undertaken by affected states, ECOWAS, AU, the UN, and major international partners to eliminate maritime criminals in the region.

Gulf of Guinea States' Responses

The GoG pirate threat has mutated from a simple issue to a complicated one. The focus on traditional security, inadequate spending, and lack of attention on maritime security has allowed piracy to flourish along the GoG coast. Most countries have recently come to appreciate the sea because of its economic benefits. The domain serves as the major source of funding of states' budgets. While the land-based natural resources that used to be at the forefront of national income for most countries have dwindled. Discovery of minerals and hydrocarbons have diverted governments' interests to territorial waters. This has raised tension between states on common maritime boundaries. The governments are now aware of the security and economic impact piracy poses on their sovereignty and survival. They have responded independently and bilaterally to the threat. Yet, the illegal practice shows no signs of decline. The pirates are taking advantage of these seams between nations' capabilities and boundary disputes.

¹¹⁶ U.S. Africa Command, "Piracy: Maritime Forces Unite against a Common Foe," *African Defense Forum Magazine* 5 (Quarter 3 2012): 16.

More importantly, West African countries are using diplomatic, information, military, and economic instruments to repress piracy. They have built on existing relationships to ensure cooperation, sharing information internally among institutions and externally between neighboring countries. They have enacted anti-piracy legislation, which has enhanced the prosecution and conviction of pirates. They have developed national policies and anti-piracy strategies that were non-existent before the surge. Nonetheless, inadequate resources continue to hinder efforts to achieve decisive a victory over the pirates. Poverty and unemployment are spiraling out of control.

As estimated by the EU, the rate of unemployment is 40 percent in the sub-region, and youth shares 60 percent of that number. The population perceives government and partners' efforts to economic prosperity as more of a dream than reality. The shortage of food and intermittent famine in rural communities has forced migration to urban areas, adding extra strain on the existing, overstretched resources. Consequently, widespread poverty and unemployment is providing a labor supply to the illicit trade.¹¹⁷

On the military front, governments have increased their maritime spending amidst tight budgets. They gradually improving their navies, but are not yet fully equipped to defeat piracy. Some countries have forged bilateral efforts by conducting joint patrols as an alternative means of eliminating bandits. Although the joint patrols are yielding dividends, continuity is a big challenge because of the cost of sustaining these activities. So far, the joint patrols conducted were terminated within weeks due to resources constraints. A typical case was the joint patrol organized by Benin, Nigeria, and Togo.

¹¹⁷ Council of the European Union, 3-5.

On the coast, no one country can sound the trumpet of victory over piracy without the collective efforts and cooperation of its neighbors.¹¹⁸

Analysis of United Nations Responses

As the rate of pirate attacks in the GoG surpassed the GoA, state policy makers' become increasingly concerned about effects on the economy and security of the coast. At the onset, most of the West African states' authorities were sea blind and struggled to contain the threats. By 2011, international sea lines of communication, seafarers, mariners, port traffic and oil export, were under high potential risk. The turmoil caused by the armed bandits ramped up the price of ships' insurance premiums, which affected revenue generation of most countries. As the stark situation intensified, the capacity of states' navies were overstretched. In Benin, the President, Thomas Boni Yayi, requested international assistance.¹¹⁹ President Yayi's request, and the IMB quarterly reports, prompted the UNSC to adopt resolutions on the GoG problem. The two resolutions were UNSCR 2018 (2011) and UNSCR 2039 (2012).¹²⁰

In UNSCR 2018, the concerns of West African states were formally expressed at the international stage. The resolution urged the affected countries to employ measures to repress armed robberies and hijackings. However, states were cautioned by the resolution

¹¹⁸ Tepp, 195-196.

¹¹⁹ Hassan and Hassan, 202-203.

¹²⁰ United Nation Security Council, Resolution 2018, accessed 17 February 2017, [http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2018\(2011\)](http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2018(2011)); United Security Council, Resolution 2039, 29 February 2012, accessed 17 February 2017, [http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2039\(2012\)](http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2039(2012)).

not to take actions that infringes the freedom of navigation on the high seas or innocent passage of lines. The resolution called upon the countries to establish a legal framework to enhanced jurisdiction, prosecution, and extradition of suspected pirates. It emphasized the need for cooperation, information sharing, and coordination mechanisms. It recommended that states develop a comprehensive regional strategy in concert with ECOWAS. Finally, the international partners were requested to render assistance to the countries. On that backdrop, the resolution fell short of the President Yayi and his counterparts' expectations. They were pre-empting the UN to influence similar international naval intervention on the GoA to be replicated on the West African coast.¹²¹

On 29 February 2012, the UNSC adopted resolution 2039. This resolution did not add anything new about the crisis. As usual, it condemned the act of piracy and expressed concerns regarding the increase of transnational crimes. It hailed the steps taken by the countries and ECOWAS to suppress marauding. This resolution reiterated states to demonstrate leadership and support the regional organizations in developing a comprehensive strategy. The only new development was for the UNSG to direct its sub-regional offices—the United Nations Office of West Africa (UNOWA) and United Nations Office of Central Africa (UNOCA)—to assist the member states and ECOWAS in organizing conferences aimed at crafting a strategy.”¹²²

¹²¹ United Nations Security Council, Resolution 2018. UN documents on piracy, adopted by the Security Council at its 6645th meeting, 31 October 2011.

¹²² United Nations Security Council, Resolution 2039. UN documents on piracy, adopted by the Security Council at its 6727th meeting, 29 February 2012.

Economic Community of West African States Response

ECOWAS is a 15-member states organization of West African nations. All the countries save for Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Mali, and Niger, are littoral states. With the exception of Cape Verde Island, the other three are landlocked nations; they rely on neighboring ports for shipment. They equally share the burden caused by piracy. This is the reason ECOWAS is working within a collective security framework. The organization has proved useful in the past in safeguarding member states' interests. ECOWAS has the capability to ensure the states work in synergy to enhance stability in the region.¹²³ ECOWAS has developed a strategic policy framework document known as the ECOWAS Integrated Maritime Strategy (EIMS). The EIMS lays out measures to prevent maritime threats in the sub-region. It broadly highlighted plans to mobilize resources, emphasized bilateral and multilateral cooperation with partners, and enhancement of member states' capacity. This policy document elaborated on mechanisms for monitoring and enforcing set standards and practices for vessels sailing in the GoG waters.

As a means of implementing the EIMS, the organization developed three operational structures known as zones. Each zone is assigned to co-located member states. "The zones will be equipped with their own monitoring and enforcing mechanisms known as the Multilateral Coordination Center (MCC)." The activities of the three MCCs will be coordinated by a Maritime Regional Center (MRC), which will report to the

¹²³ Australia Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade: Institute for Security Studies, "ECOWAS Integrated Maritime Strategy (EIMS) Activity," December 2014, accessed 18 February 2017, http://www.aa-partnerships.org/activity_briefs/activity_brief_0192.pdf.

EIMS unit. The EIMS office will be responsible to and co-located with the Regional Security Division at the ECOWAS Headquarters in Abuja, Nigeria. The MCC will be responsible for joint zonal patrols, training, and other activities relating to the elimination of maritime crimes.¹²⁴ The three zones are Zone E, Zone F, and Zone G. The Zone E is comprised of Benin, Niger, Nigeria, and Togo. Zone F is made up of Burkina Faso, Cote d'Ivoire, Ghana, Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone. Zone G consists of Cape Verde, Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, and Senegal. ECOWAS launched the Zone E MCC as a pilot project on 13 March 2015, in Cotonou, Benin. The regional maritime map architecture is shown below.¹²⁵

¹²⁴ Australia Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade: Institute for Security Studies.

¹²⁵ United States Africa Command, "Guarding the Gulf," 18-19.




Figure 3. Map of Maritime Regional Architecture in the Gulf of Guinea

Source: Vircoulon Thierry and Violette Tournier, “Gulf of Guinea: A Regional Solution to Piracy?” Crisis Group, 4 September 2014, accessed 10 April 2017, <http://blog.crisisgroup.org/africa/nigeria/2014/09/04/gulf-of-guinea-a-regional-solution-to-piracy/>.

The MCC for Zones F and G will be established depending on feedback from Zone E and the availability of resources. In the GoG coast, Zone E is assessed as the most turbulent spot. This is partly responsible for the early inception of the MCC in that area.

The EIMS is nested within the African Union’s 2050 Africa Integrated Maritime Strategy.¹²⁶

¹²⁶ United States Africa Command, “Guarding the Gulf,” 18-19.

African Union Responses

Based on the two UNSCRs, the AU developed a strategic policy document on maritime crime, known as the 2050 Africa's Integrated Maritime (AIM) Strategy. It serves as the bedrock policy document for the sub-regional organization's comprehensive anti-piracy strategy. Its full implementation of AIM Strategy is not expected until 35 years' time. From the onset, the strategic document desires to eradicate piracy in the region. It is composed of "long-term multilayered plans of action to enhance maritime viability for a prosperous Africa." The AU has not considered any short-term strategy to deal with the impending threat. The capability of the organization to mobilize member states in the short or medium terms is doubtful.¹²⁷

Other Members of the International Community Responses

Following the UNSCRs, some international organizations (IOs) and countries have turned attention to the GoG. Most of these countries and IOs have interests in the region. Some of them have existing bilateral relations with countries in the sub-region, while others have established themselves with the AU. However, the major international support to states and ECOWAS comes from the EU and America.

European Union Responses

EU strategic interests predate the piracy crisis because West Africa has vast natural resources including hydrocarbons. It has been a major European trading partner

¹²⁷ Africa Union, "African Union Document: 2050 Africa's Integrated Maritime Strategy," accessed 17 February 2017, <http://cicyaounde.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/2050-AIM-Strategy-Eng.pdf>, 1-11.

for several decades. The existing relations have been symbiotic in nature. EU member states depend on most African states for raw materials, while those states also rely on the EU for consumer goods and services. The bulk of this trade is facilitated through sea lines of communication (SLOCs). The escalation of crime disrupts the existing trade. In the interest of its member states, the EU is providing assistance to the affected countries and sub-regional organization to clear pirates off the coast.¹²⁸

In response to the threat, the EU developed a strategic policy framework for the region. This policy is centered on four major objectives, which broadly outline the organization's assistance. The first objective is to support the countries and ECOWAS through the development and implementation of policies that address the offshore causes of piracy. It also encapsulates data collection and information sharing among the littoral states to counter criminals' activities. The second objective focuses on institutional developments. These range from military, political, judicial, and coast guards. It encompasses oversight bodies such as good governance, a transparency network, and anti-corruption institutions. The policy covered capacity building, which would strengthen the capability of states to take ownership of their maritime domain. The security and defense supports were tailored to stability on land and sea. The third objective is to enhance economic development of states. Most of the countries are at the bottom of the World Health Organization's human development index (HDI). There is widespread poverty and bad governance that needs to be addressed for the counter-piracy strategies to succeed. The last objective is enhancing cooperation and coordination

¹²⁸ Council of the European Union, 1-3.

among states in the GoG. The EU is helping regional organizations to resolve potential maritime border disputes. It is also coordinating with other international organizations and agencies to avoid duplicating effects on the coast.¹²⁹

United States of America Responses

U.S. interest in the GoG focuses mostly on the safety of its citizens, global oil prices and the security of international shipping lanes. America is also concerned about the 70 U.S. flagged offshore supply vessels engaged in oil exploration in Nigeria and Ghana. Additionally, there are U.S. commercial shipping vessels making calls in GoG ports. When the security situation becomes volatile, pirates could target these vessels. The chances of taking U.S. citizens hostage are high. The escalation of pirate activities would also lead to a hike in global oil prices. Considering the network connectivity of international trade, this could have an effect on the United States. Lastly, it is the U.S. policy to prevent marauders from creating safe havens in international waters. This threatens freedom of navigation, which undermines the United Nations Convention on the Laws of the Sea (UNCLOS). Therefore, the U.S. sees it has its national interests to provide assistance to the states and ECOWAS to dismantle the pirate networks.¹³⁰

U.S. assistance lies within three strategic policy objectives as stated in President Obama's Presidential Policy Directive 18 (PPD-18). The objectives focus on the program areas of prevention, response, and governance. Firstly, the prevention approach involved varieties of programs within the continuum of the BMP. The U.S. is sensitizing its

¹²⁹ Council of the European Union, 3-12.

¹³⁰ Obama, 1-2.

citizens that are seafarers or mariners on hot spot areas of the coast. The nation is also engaging flagged ships operating in the sub-region to adhere to best practices, which will help them evade attacks or present a difficult target. The country is pursuing this by working in concert with its departments and agencies in the countries concerned. U.S. is also working with ECOWAS and the shipping industry to develop acceptable best standards and practices for the region. Secondly, in responding to the crisis, the U.S. is supporting partner nations to build their naval capabilities through programs like the Africa Partnership Station (APS). The country has extended training assistance and providing maritime equipment to states' security forces. The U.S. continues to engage in joint naval operations and exercises through USAFRICOM with partner countries. Finally, on governance, the U.S. is helping to enable states' judiciaries to enhance the rule of law. It has further expressed support for the implementation of the EIMS, and urged cooperation and information sharing across the sub-region. The governance support hinges on solving the root causes of piracy, because a transparent and responsive government would be more effective in diminishing the act of piracy.¹³¹

Comparison of Gulf of Aden and Gulf of Guinea Strategies

The combined strategic hierarchy of concept framework and Arthur Lykke's strategic model will be used to comparatively analyze piracy in both regions. Specifically, the lessons learned from the GoA would formed the basis of the GoG's anti-piracy strategy.

¹³¹ Obama, 4-8.

Interests and Objectives (Ends)

State

Most of the pirates in the in the GoA were Somalis, since that territory provided a safe haven for marauders. This was due to the absence of a central government in that country. The interests and objectives of the warlords were anchored on the flourishing of the illicit trade. In addition, neighboring states in the region were concerned about the impact of piracy on their security and economies, but were incapable of dealing with the threat. In that vein, the states were unable to pursue their objectives. With the exception of suspected pirates prosecuted by Kenya, the GoA states played no active role in the international operations that reduced piracy.¹³² In contrast, most of the captured pirates in the GoG were Nigerians.¹³³ Moreover, the affected states are battling to protect their national objectives. They are determine to root out criminals and bring sanity in their maritime domain albeit resources constraints. However, the current strategy employed by states to fight piracy independent or bilaterally has not yielded dividend. Based on the literature, states' efforts to eradicate piracy have so far not been effective.¹³⁴

Sub-Regional

In the GoA, the sub-regional organizations did not mobilize the affected nations nor form a coalition to defend against the security and economic devastation caused by piracy. The inaction demonstrates lack of interest on the part of the organizations to

¹³² Ploch et al., 1.

¹³³ Hassan and Hassan, 176-177.

¹³⁴ Ibid., 215-216.

protect member states' national interests. While in the GoG, ECOWAS has exemplified leadership as the body charged with safeguarding the national interests of its member states. Past records revealed that ECOWAS has restored stability in member countries threatened by war and political turmoil. As the current piracy activity intensifies, the organization is striving to combat it. It has developed a comprehensive strategy to tackle all violence at sea. The attainment of stability on the West African coast will encourage foreign direct investments and bolster economic prosperity of the region. The objectives of ECOWAS open the most feasible strategy against piracy. Based on the literature, the ECOWAS's objective is yet to be realized because of resources challenges. Until such a time the organization's strategic objective is put into action, the Author assessed it as not effective.¹³⁵

Regional

The AU is the regional organization of the continent. As part of its obligation, the AU is responsible to protect the interest of African states. However, in both the GoA and the GoG, the AU has not done much to counter-piracy. The organization has expressed willingness to do so by developing the 2050 Africa's Integrated Maritime Strategy. The strategy will be implemented in 35 years, which is a long way from dealing with contemporary threats. Indirectly, an AU mission (AMISOM) is busy restoring stability in Somalia. This will help address some of the offshore root causes of piracy. To that end,

¹³⁵ Iheme, 32-41.

the AU has not set or implemented any immediate objectives to combat piracy in the region. The organization has not done much towards fending off piracy off the coast.¹³⁶

International

The GoA is a strategic transit point connecting the Suez Canal, Strait of Hurmuz, and the Red Sea. A large percentage of oil from the Middle East passes through the GoA to Europe and some Asian countries. This is even more the reason that the coast is regarded as one of the most attractive international sea routes. The activities of armed robbers on the coast disrupted global trade. It affected the economies of most of the countries in Europe and other parts of the world. The IC also fears that terrorists sponsor their activities using proceeds from piracy. The collective effects of pirate activities on the national interests of countries with naval capabilities prompted them to act. Based on the Author's deductions from the case study and body of literature, the IC intervention was assessed as successful and effective. The coordinated intervention led to the decline of piracy in the GoA.¹³⁷

On the other hand, the GoG is also an international trade route. The IC has similar interests in the sub-region. In addition, countries and multinational companies from Europe and other continents are engaged in exploration of minerals and hydrocarbons along the coast. As supported in the case study and literature, the IC intervention in the GoG has so far been limited and selective. They are only providing support to affected

¹³⁶ Jacobson and Nordy, 27-28.

¹³⁷ Anyimadu, 6-7.

countries with bilateral relations, especially where their national interests are at stake. On a collective scale, the IC counter-piracy support to the GoG is yet to bear fruit.

Effect

In the GoA, the absence of states, sub-regional, and regional organizations to eliminate pirates shows a lack of will. It further demonstrates how little governments in that region value defense of their national interests. Instead of working in concert with the IC's naval forces, where they could have learned better skills to deal with outbreaks, they choose to watch the operations from the sideline. The collective inaction of East African littoral states, organizations, and the AU, further exacerbated the chaotic situation. Nevertheless, the IC, in pursuant of its member states strategic interests and objectives, repressed piracy on the GoA coast. Conversely, in the GoG, despite the numerous challenges, the states and ECOWAS are utilizing the instruments of national power within their capability to defend their national interests.

Lessons Learned from the Gulf of Aden

The passion for countries to intervene in crisis will be high when their national interests are at stake. This assertion depicts the International Community's involvement in the GoA. Sustaining the progress made by the IC squarely lies on the shoulders of states in the region. There is the likelihood of piracy to re-emerge on the coast if the countries and organizations in the GoA fail to take ownership. It was a strategic mistake by those states' failure to participate in the international combined navies' operations. As such, any efforts in the GoG should be owned by the states or the ECOWAS. This will help sustain the stability that can be achieved. The countries should put their collective

national interests at the forefront. The ECOWAS should consider similar ventures undertaken by the IC to protect the interests of member states.

The Design Concepts (Ways)

Policies

The IC, specifically the EU, CMF, and NATO, developed policies to safeguard member states' interests in the GoA. The multilayered approaches embodied everything required to deal a severe blow to the impending threats. In the GoA, the UNSC adopted four resolutions to combat piracy. While in the GoG, the UNSC enacted only two resolutions against piracy. Moreover, the UNSCRs on the GoA went far to authorize countries or international organizations with naval capabilities to enter the waters of Somalia, in particular, and the GoA coast at larger to repress piracy. In the case of the GoG, UNSCRs only requested international assistance for the affected states and regional organizations. This disparity underscores the IC's interests and commitments between the regions. Notwithstanding that, East African littoral states of the GoA failed to establish counter measures to deter piracy. They have only established the Djibouti Code of Conduct recently, with the support of the IC. The successful result achieved on that coast was mainly due to the IC's commitments and intervention, which has proven to be effective.¹³⁸ On the other hand, the IC's support to the GoG falls short of direct military engagement. Most of the assistance was done on bilateral relationship between individual countries. ECOWAS's Integrated Maritime Strategy (EIMS) remains the overall driving force guiding these nations, which implementation is still at the embryonic stage.

¹³⁸ Ploch et al., 17-25.

Although the EIMS is attractive on paper, the effectiveness is yet to be fairly assessed because it has not been adequately resourced or implemented.

Procedures

The EU, NATO, and CMF employed DIME to fight piracy in the GoA. They used diplomacy to build coalitions, embarked on gathering and sharing information, increased economic support and cooperation, and conducted successful military operations against pirates. As part of their approach, they targeted every spectrum leading to piracy. These organizations worked with the affected coastal countries to improve state governance, and developed anti-corruption and poverty reduction institutions. Their approaches were very effective in the Horn of Africa. In contrast, the efforts made by EU and the United States (leading country in the CMF) in the GoG were directed to specific states or ECOWAS, based on bilateral arrangements.

Programs

To implement its policies, the EU, NATO, and CMF, focused on key activities responsible for the rise of piracy. They established a Maritime Security Center for the Horn of Africa (MSCHOA), improving governance and institutional developments, capacity building, contributing to and monitoring adherence of the BMP, and conducting international naval operations. Their programs achieved the desired results against marauders. In the GoG, they are assisting governments with programs to address the root causes of piracy. The EU and the United States have engaged in capacity building through training assistance. The United States African Command (US AFRICOM) often conducts joint naval exercises with the coastal states in the sub-region. Furthermore,

ECOWAS has divided the sub-region into three zones for the implementation of the EIMS. The proposed structures except for the pilot program in Zone E have not been resourced. This leaves the member states with no option but to continue with their traditional ways of fighting piracy, which has not been effective.¹³⁹

Effect

UNSCRs bolstered support for the GoA. Collectively, these resolutions rallied the IC to act in the region. The IC's successes recorded were due to the comprehensive policies, procedures, and programs developed for that coast. Those policies unleashed the combined diplomatic, information, military, and economic instruments against pirates. The IC intervened in the areas of governance, institutions, capacity development, cooperation, information sharing, and military operations to strike, interdict, and disrupt pirates. The policies, procedures, and programs reduced in incidents of piracy in the sub-region. The ECOWAS has also developed the EIMS. However, skepticism surrounds the implementation of the programs because of resource concerns. The traditional states' policies and programs are far from achieving the desired end state.

Lessons Learned from the Gulf of Aden

The IC's policies broadly defined the levels of its intervention. It targeted every aspect of piracy, starting from strengthening states' capacities to addressing poverty, corruption, good governance, job opportunities, skills, and progressive development training. The procedures and programs used to implement these policies cut across

¹³⁹ United States Africa Command, "Guarding the Gulf," 18-19.

national strata. More importantly, the simultaneous execution of the programs was spectacular. They built effective synergies under a collective spirit. The major lesson for the West African countries is the principle of collective security. In the GoG, previous unilateral actions by the states did not change the dangerous operational environment. Worse still, bilateral efforts were marred by logistical deficiencies. Drawing from the GoA, collective and collaborative action remains the most viable means of replicating the IC's policies and programs. The inferences from UNSCRs concerning the GoG should serve as an indicator to the ECOWAS countries not to hope for any large-scale foreign military intervention in their waters. The UN is unlikely to authorize such operations in West Africa.

The Resources (Means)

Naval Forces

As part of the comprehensive response package, the IC deployed its navies on full-scale operations. The navies extended operations beyond the GoA, chasing the criminals in their hideouts. The forces disrupted, interdicted, and aborted several attacks. They destroyed logistics bases owned by the pirates. They provided BMP guidelines to the shipping industry and monitored compliance at sea. As supported by the case study, the naval forces' operations were very effective. However, none of the affected states' navies participated in the operations. Conversely, there is no dedicated international naval operation going on in the GoG. The states' navies are independently conducting routine

patrols. In isolated cases, neighboring countries have conducted joint counter-piracy operations. Overall, these counter-piracy operations have not proved effective.¹⁴⁰

Equipment

The international navies' equipment is more advanced and sophisticated. The equipment was provided by the member states' countries. These arsenals, including surveillance and reconnaissance devices, have proved effective. In contrast, the navies of the GoG are underequipped to contain the prevailing threats. Neither ECOWAS nor the AU has the potential to equip the forces. Equipment remains a major challenge to the states and ECOWAS counter measures. The collective naval equipment in West Africa is far from being able to handle the problem of piracy. Based on the supporting literature, the available equipment in the affected states is not effective beyond territorial waters.¹⁴¹ Currently, the naval capabilities in the sub-region are restricted to frigates, large patrol boats, landing craft, monitoring patrol Aircraft, and small patrol crafts (cutters). Nigeria is the only country with two frigates in West Africa. A total of 30 large patrol boats, most of which are nineteen years old (Nigeria owns ten out of that total, Ghana- eight, Benin – seven, Senegal – three, and Cape Verde – two). Senegal owns the only three landing craft (13 years old). The seven maritime patrol aircrafts are owned by Nigeria, Cape Verde, Senegal, and Ghana (Nigeria has four of that number, Cape Verde – one, Senegal – one, and Ghana – one). All the littoral states have small patrol crafts (cutters, over 13 years),

¹⁴⁰ U.S. Africa Command, 12-13

¹⁴¹ Osinowo, 5-6.

donated to the countries by partners such as the United States, France, China, the United Kingdom, Germany, Italy, Singapore, Israel, the Netherlands, and Portugal.¹⁴²

Capacity

The international navies have the capacity to carry out their tasks. This makes them effective in counter-piracy operations. They have no limitations at sea and operate within territorial waters, EEZ, and high seas. While West African states are challenged by inadequate capacities, they need additional training to put them in a better stead. Occasionally, the USAFRICOM conducts joint training exercises with local allied navies. Currently, the IC is marginally helping states to enable their navies.¹⁴³

Funding

The entire counter-piracy strategies of the IC were self-funded. The international organizations and countries funded their own activities, which was why the programs implemented, as supported by the case study, were very fruitful and effective. Funding is a big challenge for the affected states and ECOWAS. This lack of funds has stalled most of their counter-piracy programs. The ECOWAS depends on member states to finance its activities. EU and United States supported ECOWAS in the past. Until, adequate funding is available, the EIMS will be difficult to implement. Based on the literature, the sources of funding for states and ECOWAS counter measures are not effective.

¹⁴² Stephen Saunders, ed., *IHS Jane's Fighting Ships 2013-14* (London: Jane's Information Group, 2013), 1021.

¹⁴³ Jacobson and Nordy, 45-48.

Effect

International naval operations have reduced banditry in the GoA. However, the tendency for the practice to resurface still exists. The exit of international navies could create a security gap on the coast, as the states' capabilities to fill the void remains doubtful. Moreover, the international navies have both the capacity and equipment to defeat pirates. Thus increasing their flexibility to operate everywhere on the coast, which might not be easily achieved by the local navies. Thus, training and resourcing of the local navies by the IC might be a smart option to sustain the gains; any transition measures short of this could lead to a relapse of piracy in the region.

Lessons Learned from the Gulf of Aden

The EU, NATO, and CMF international combined naval operations in the GoA led to a successful reduction of piracy on that coast. The individual member countries of these organizations provided the equipment and well-trained personnel used for the operations. Additionally, with the exception of the operational command and contract costs provided by the parent organizations, member countries were responsible for the overhead running and maintenance costs of their equipment. At all times, a minimum of twelve warships were available at sea for the operations. Additionally, China, Japan, and Russia, often conducted their own independent anti-piracy operations on the coast.

In summary, the successes of the IC in the GoA were due to their counter-piracy operations. They develop policies and programs that include capacity building, institutional development and reforms, international anti-piracy operations, and the BMP. The countries and regional organizations in West Africa are also making strives to contain the current spate of piracy in spite of resource constraints. Some elements will be

drawn from the lessons learned in the GoA case study that will form the framework of recommendations in chapter 5. This matrix summarizes the assessment of the study.

Table 4. Summary of Assessment Matrix					
Variables	Factors	Case Studies			
		Effective GoA		Pending GoG	
		Present (Y or N)	Effectiveness (Y or N)	Present (Y or N)	Effectiveness (Y or N)
Ends (Interests and Objectives)	State (S)	Y	N	Y	N
	Sub-Regional (SR)	Y	N	Y	N
	Regional (R)	Y	N	Y	N
	International (I)	Y	Y	Y	N
Ways (Concepts)	Policy (P1)	Y	Y	Y	N
	Procedure (P2)	Y	Y	Y	N
	Program (P3)	Y	Y	Y	N
Means (Resources)	Naval Force (NF)	Y	Y	Y	N
	Equipment (E)	Y	Y	Y	N
	Capacity (C)	Y	Y	Y	N
	Funding (F)	Y	Y	N	N

Source: Created by author.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The primary research question that this study seeks to answer is: “what elements of the international anti-piracy strategy in the Gulf of Aden can be applied to combat piracy in the Gulf of Guinea?” From the lessons learned in the Gulf of Aden (GoA), the elements that can best be applied to the Gulf of Guinea (GoG) are development of holistic policies, adherence to Best Management Practices (BMP), and strategic alliances with combined naval operations. Enactment of all, or just some, of these elements could lead to reduction of piracy in the GoG.

Holistic policies should include both inshore and offshore programs to eradicate piracy. It encompasses programs that will minimize corruption, reduce poverty, and improved state governance in the sub-region. Similarly, capacity building and institutional development should be part of the policy package as well. The BMP requires discussions between the states and shipping agencies to come up with standing operating procedures suitable for the GoG. Strategic alliance and combined naval operations should form the cornerstone of elements adopted by West African states. Success in the GoA relied upon well-trained and equipped naval forces; any application of these elements should consider the resource deficiency in the GoG.

In that connection, the root causes of piracy in the sub-region are poverty and state weakness. The sub-region is part of a continent where poverty is rife. Despite the abundant natural resources available in the sub-region, most people live on less than two dollars a day. The quest for food security in rural areas is accelerating migration to urban settlements. Unfortunately, there are limited job opportunities available in the urban

districts. Most of the states in the GoG are at the bottom list of the World Bank annual human development index. Consequently, some of the jobless in the population have turned to illicit trade for their survival. In addition, many government officials have also been accused of being part of piracy networks.¹⁴⁴

Other factors, such as widespread corruption, bad governance, and weak public institutions, have degraded the fabric of societies. The ineptitude of the established state's institutions to fight corruption has impeded measures to reduce poverty in GoG countries. Moreover, the states' navies and coast guards have proved inadequate to their tasks. They are not well trained or equipped to combat threats in their operational environment. Most of the operations conducted by these navies failed to extend beyond the economic exclusion zone (EEZ). Thus, sophisticated criminals have maximum freedom to execute their plans at sea.¹⁴⁵

Furthermore, the differences between pirates in the two sub-regions lies in the zone of attacks, organization and armament, and targeting. Pirates on the East African coast focus their attacks on the high seas. Although they can engage opportunity targets in territorial waters and EEZs, most of their attacks take place in international waters. They are not well organized and usually armed with light weapons. Their attacks were aimed at taking crewmembers and seafarers hostage and holding them for ransom. Conversely, on the West African coast, most of the attacks have occurred in territorial waters and EEZs. Although some pirates engaged in hostage taking, the majority focus

¹⁴⁴ Laughlin, 14-16.

¹⁴⁵ Iheme, 30-33.

their attacks to seize oil cargos. Usually, they will temporarily hold crewmembers hostage and siphoned the oil carried by a seized vessel. These West Africa pirates are generally well armed, connected, and sophisticated.¹⁴⁶

The measures that led to the decline of piracy in the GoA were UN Security Council resolution (UNSCR), the International Community's (IC) comprehensive counter-piracy approach, and BMP. UNSCRs 1816 (2008), 1838 (2008), 1846 (2008), 1851 (2008), and 1897 (2009), which provides the legal authorities for countries and members of the IC having interests in the GoA to intervene, serves as the catalyst for success against pirates. The IC, which is comprised of the EU, NATO, and CMF, intervention package in the GoA, includes policies, procedures, and programs to counter maritime bandits. The IC used policies to address the root causes of the illicit trade by embarking on poverty reduction projects, improved governance, institutional developments, and capacity building of littoral states. The EU, NATO, and CMF employed the diplomatic, informational, military, and economic instruments to implement their programs. The combined international anti-piracy operations, conducted by EUNAVFOR, NATO, and CJT151, reduced piracy in the GoA. Finally, the BMP developed by shipping industries, with contributions and monitoring by the joint navies for compliance, were very effective.

The IC holistically approached piracy on the GoA coast. IC coordination and cooperation gave them the opportunity to realign their collective national interests with the political and strategic objectives in the battle against pirates. Their approach

¹⁴⁶ Hassan and Hassan, 179-180.

addressed the offshore and inshore operations of maritime criminals.¹⁴⁷ Hence the major elements drawn from IC counter-piracy lessons learned were: the strength in strategic alliances or coalitions; development of policies, procedures, and programs for the improvement of weak state institutions; creating projects to cushion the effects of poverty, capacity building, development, and monitoring of BMP; and all the previously mentioned combined naval operations. Moreover, resources - personnel, equipment, capacity, and funding - played a vital role in defeating pirates on the coast.

Finally, the West African coastline of the GoG is 2,925 nm. Current maritime equipment cannot sustain patrols beyond 250 nm. Due to this, the existing maritime capabilities are inadequate to provide appropriate coastal security. This situation has contributed to the GoG becoming a sanctuary for pirates. Littoral West African states requires naval assets, which could be sourced from either from multinational companies operating within the sub-region or through the international community.

Recommendations for the Sub-region

The individual and bilateral efforts applied by the affected countries to combat piracy on the West African coast have yielded few dividends. As such, the more ideal and potent way of dealing with the impending threat is for the states to integrate their collective national interests through ECOWAS. They should combine efforts to strengthen this sub-regional organization as the leading body for development and implementation of a comprehensive anti-piracy strategy. The synergy of member states' assets could be strong enough to bring stability on the coast.

¹⁴⁷ Clausewitz, 87-89.

ECOWAS has developed an integrated maritime strategy (the EIMS) in which piracy is the main theme of the document. However, the EIMS is focused on sea-based concepts of eradicating piracy. It is silent on addressing the land-based causes of illegal trade, in which recruitment, planning, networking, and collaboration are deeply rooted. In that milieu, ECOWAS should review and modify its EIMS. The review process should incorporate policies that address poverty reduction strategies, institutional developments, minimize corruption, and improve state governance. ECOWAS should create a monitoring team and set benchmarks as part of a modified EIMS implementation plan to ensure states' compliance with its recommendations. Any success against piracy can only be sustained if the land-based causes are addressed; otherwise the chances for it to reoccur will be highly likely.

ECOWAS should set up a Joint Naval Task Force (JNTF) to combat piracy. The JNTF should be manned by troops from member states' navies and select civilian experts. The proposed zones in the EIMS should be incorporated into the JNTF structure and the JNTF headquarters should be co-located with the commission in Abuja, Nigeria. The JNTF structure should be placed under the chain of command of the ECOWAS Security Commission. This will enable easy cooperation, integration, and synchronization of JNTF activities with the primary ECOWAS organs. Also, colocation will facilitate command and control. ECOWAS should request the IC for training opportunities to develop JNTF capacity.

The proposed comprehensive anti-piracy strategy, which includes JNTF operations, equipment, and funding, remains critical to the successful eradication of piracy. Unlike East African states, the countries in West Africa collectively acting under

the auspices of the ECOWAS own the fight against piracy. However, funding to resource the implementation of the anti-piracy strategy remains a major challenge. The states should provide financial support, either quarterly or annually, to fund the implementation process. They should also make available some of their naval equipment as part of their contribution to the JNTF operation. Additionally, ECOWAS should request assistance from both the IC and exploration companies operating in the GoG naval force capability. The request should include training assistance for the JNTF.

The BMP implemented in the GoA could not be replicated in the same way on the GoG coast. This is because West African governments may not want private security operatives carrying arms in their waters; they may be apprehensive to such a practice. However, ECOWAS, in concert with maritime experts and the shipping industry, should develop customized best practices for ships plying the coast. As an option, personnel of the JNTF could provide security by boarding ships and providing security to their port anchorage. These personnel can disembark at the point of entering territorial waters.

More importantly, the IC should direct all bilateral support be given to individual countries in West Africa to combat maritime crime under the assistance partnership programs to the ECOWAS Secretariat. This will help provide needed resources for the JNTF. The IC should also replicate the programs designed to alleviate the causes of piracy in the GoA for affected states in the GoG. Additionally, the UNSC should authorized resolutions that will allow members of the IC to provide advisers, training and material support to the ECOWAS JNTF. The advisers will provide leadership guidance and expert knowledge to the JNTF chain of command and help to build capacity.

Lastly, addressing corruption, bad governance, institutional development and poverty demands collective approach by all involved. While it is the responsibility of states to take ownership of the program, ECOWAS, AU, and the IC, should deploy experts from institutions responsible to alleviate poverty and fight corruption to monitor and advise appointed government officials responsible to run similar institutions. Their presence will ensure transparency and judicious use of resources that will be invested to address these problems. ECOWAS and IC should also set benchmarks for the states to improve governance.

Recommendations for Further Research

As part of the research, social factors, which include poverty, rural-urban migration, and unemployment, were found to be largely responsible for the root causes of piracy. Although the IC intervened in the GoA with programs to address these factors, the researcher was not able to confirm their impact due to time constraints. In addition, capacity building and institutional reforms were undertaken by the IC to address bad governance and corruption in the littoral states. The researcher was unable to investigate the effectiveness of that venture and its role to end piracy in that sub-region because of time. Further research is recommended to probe into the impact and effectiveness of those projects to eradicate piracy.

While piracy was reduced in the GoA, it eventually spiked in the GoG. This study did not find any data that would identify or explain the correlation to this development. More so, there was no available data to ascertain whether there is an existing relationship or collaboration between pirates operating in these two sub-region. This possible connection should be explored by future research.

Summary

Intensification of piracy on the West African coast has spurred both regional and global concerns. This issue has spiraled beyond the scope of individual countries to handle independently. Bilateral efforts, forged by some of the states with common territorial waters, have been marred with logistics constraints. This menace impinges the free flow of international commerce and restrains seafarers. Economic insecurity affects the littoral states and their international trading partners. On that note, the recommendations proffered herein may go a long way in addressing the impending crisis in the GoG.

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