

# MILLENNIAL WARFARE

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army  
Command and General Staff College in partial  
fulfillment of the requirements for the  
degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE  
Irregular Warfare Scholars

by

SAMUEL SCOTT GILSTRAP, MAJOR, U.S. ARMY  
B.S., Presbyterian College, Clinton, South Carolina, 2006

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas  
2017

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. Fair use determination or copyright permission has been obtained for the inclusion of pictures, maps, graphics, and any other works incorporated into this manuscript. A work of the United States Government is not subject to copyright, however further publication or sale of copyrighted images is not permissible.

<b>REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE</b>			<i>Form Approved</i> <i>OMB No. 0704-0188</i>		
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing this collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden to Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports (0704-0188), 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to any penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. <b>PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR FORM TO THE ABOVE ADDRESS.</b>					
<b>1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY)</b> 9-06-2017		<b>2. REPORT TYPE</b> Master's Thesis		<b>3. DATES COVERED (From - To)</b> AUG 2016 – JUN 2017	
<b>4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE</b>  Millennial Warfare			<b>5a. CONTRACT NUMBER</b>		
			<b>5b. GRANT NUMBER</b>		
			<b>5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER</b>		
<b>6. AUTHOR(S)</b>  MAJ Samuel S. Gilstrap			<b>5d. PROJECT NUMBER</b>		
			<b>5e. TASK NUMBER</b>		
			<b>5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER</b>		
<b>7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)</b> U.S. Army Command and General Staff College ATTN: ATZL-SWD-GD Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-2301			<b>8. PERFORMING ORG REPORT NUMBER</b>		
<b>9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)</b>			<b>10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)</b>		
			<b>11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)</b>		
<b>12. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT</b> Approved for Public Release; Distribution is Unlimited					
<b>13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES</b>					
<b>14. ABSTRACT</b>  The Global Millennial Generation has changed Irregular Warfare through their digital nativity, opportunity for mobilization, and global networking capacity. Millennials across the globe are being mobilized in support of the global ISIL cause. The millennials within ISILs global insurgency are the drivers of these changes. The current Irregular Warfare literature does not account for these adaptations. Although the fundamentals are not changed, the global Millennial Generation has expanded them. They are traveling to Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan, and North Africa in support, as well as remaining a significant threat in their home nation. They are acting in roles from fighters to technical experts in social media and cyber warfare. Millennials are the first “Global Generation”, the internet and social media have removed barriers that separate the world and have given them access to the world, as well as all the good and bad that comes with that access.					
<b>15. SUBJECT TERMS</b>  Irregular Warfare, Millennials, ISIL, Insurgency					
<b>16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:</b>			<b>17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT</b>	<b>18. NUMBER OF PAGES</b>	<b>19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON</b>
<b>a. REPORT</b>	<b>b. ABSTRACT</b>	<b>c. THIS PAGE</b>			<b>19b. PHONE NUMBER (include area code)</b>
(U)	(U)	(U)	(U)	84	

Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98)  
Prescribed by ANSI Std. Z39.18

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

THESIS APPROVAL PAGE

Name of Candidate: MAJ Samuel S. Gilstrap

Thesis Title: Millennial Warfare

Approved by:

\_\_\_\_\_, Thesis Committee Chair  
LTC Brian S. Manus, M.S.

\_\_\_\_\_, Member  
Wade R. Elmore, Ph.D.

\_\_\_\_\_, Member  
LTC Alijone D. Lopes, M.A.

Accepted this 9th day of June 2017 by:

\_\_\_\_\_, Director, Graduate Degree Programs  
Prisco R. Hernandez, Ph.D.

The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

## ABSTRACT

MILLENNIAL WARFARE, by MAJ Samuel S. Gilstrap, 84 pages.

The Global Millennial Generation has changed Irregular Warfare through their digital nativity, opportunity for mobilization, and global networking capacity. Millennials across the globe are being mobilized in support of the global Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) cause. The millennials within ISIL's global insurgency are the drivers of these changes. The current Irregular Warfare literature does not account for these adaptations. Although the fundamentals are not changed, the Global Millennial Generation has expanded them. They are traveling to Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan, and North Africa in support, as well as remaining a significant threat in their home nation. They are acting in roles from fighters to technical experts in social media and cyber warfare. Millennials are the first global generation; the internet and social media have removed barriers that separate the world and have given them access to the world, as well as all the good and bad that comes with that access.

## ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like to thank the members of my research committee: Dr. Wade Elmore, LTC Brian Manus, and LTC Dave Lopes for their support, mentorship, and guidance during this process. I would also like to thank the members of the Irregular Warfare Scholars Program, and in particular, LTC Jerry Moon, for helping to shape my thoughts and ideas on Irregular Warfare, forcing me to defend my views on a daily basis, and serving as a sounding board for my thesis.

Finally, I would like to thank my beautiful wife, Brittany, and our two children, Truett and Adair, for their understanding, patience, and support, without which this would not have been possible.

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE THESIS APPROVAL PAGE .....	iii
ABSTRACT.....	iv
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS .....	v
TABLE OF CONTENTS.....	vi
ACRONYMS.....	viii
ILLUSTRATIONS .....	ix
CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION .....	1
Background.....	1
Problem Statement.....	8
Research Questions.....	9
Assumptions.....	9
Limitations .....	10
Scope and Delimitations .....	10
Significance of Study.....	11
Conclusion .....	11
CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW .....	14
Introduction.....	14
Irregular Warfare .....	15
Millennials .....	25
ISIL .....	33
Conclusion .....	39
CHAPTER 3 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY .....	45
Introduction.....	45
Data Collection and Analysis Methods .....	46
Conclusion .....	49
CHAPTER 4 ANALYSIS AND RESULTS .....	50
Introduction.....	50
Findings .....	50
Summary and Conclusion.....	57

CHAPTER 5 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS .....	59
Introduction.....	59
Conclusions.....	59
Recommendations.....	62
GLOSSARY .....	66
BIBLIOGRAPHY.....	69

## ACRONYMS

COG	Center of Gravity
COIN	Counterinsurgency
DOD	Department of Defense
DODD	Department of Defense Directive
ISIL	Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant
IW JOC	Irregular Warfare Joint Operating Concept
SWOT	Strength, Weakness, Opportunity, Threat

## ILLUSTRATIONS

	Page
Figure 1. Irregular Warfare JOC Logic .....	5
Figure 2. Global Distribution of Millennials.....	30
Figure 3. Generational Trends with Technology.....	32
Figure 4. Fighter Records by Residence Response .....	35
Figure 5. Global Millennial Generation SWOT Analysis: ISIL Perspective .....	55
Figure 6. Global Millennial Generation COG Analysis.....	55

## CHAPTER 1

### INTRODUCTION

Our adversaries will continue to wage Irregular Warfare against us until we demonstrate the same competency in Irregular Warfare that we demonstrate in conventional warfighting.

— Department of Defense, *Irregular Warfare Joint Operating Concept*

What makes a terrorist effective is unpredictability, surprise, and the exploitation of things that are common to us, but which we often take for granted.

— Joseph Votel, “Understanding Terrorism Today and Tomorrow”

#### Background

Department of Defense Directive (DODD) 3000.07, Subject: Irregular Warfare (IW) states, “Irregular Warfare is as strategically important as traditional warfare and the DoD must be equally capable in both.”<sup>1</sup> Irregular Warfare is, “A violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant populations. Irregular Warfare favors indirect and asymmetric approaches, though it may employ the full range of military and other capabilities, in order to erode an adversary’s power, influence, and will.”<sup>2</sup> This document, along with a myriad of other documents, speeches, and government policies, too numerous to mention, highlight the need for the DOD to understand and be proficient in the conduct of Irregular Warfare. Based on the mandate provided by DOD Directive 3000.07 that the DOD must be as proficient in the conduct of Irregular Warfare as it is in traditional warfare, one must first understand the context and frameworks that support Irregular Warfare. Knowing the context and frameworks that support Irregular Warfare will allow the U.S. Government to identify when irregular adversaries are adapting their tactics and exploiting new lines of operation. As an

adversary of the United States, the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) has utilized evolutionary Irregular Warfare tactics, made possible by the digital nativity, global networking capacity, and opportunity for mobilization found in the Global Millennial Generation.

The Combatting Terrorism Center, in an examination of 4,600 ISIL personnel records found that the average age of fighters is 26-27 years old.<sup>3</sup> These 26-27 year olds, having an average birth year of 1987, are in the heart of the Global Millennial Generation. Global Millennials are joining the ranks of ISIL, leaving behind what they know, in search of ISIL's self-described Muslim utopia in the Middle East, as well as carrying out attacks in their home country.<sup>4</sup>

Additionally, a faster and more powerful internet and the wide proliferation of mobile cellular devices have fundamentally and profoundly transformed the way people communicate and share information. As a result, the information landscape of today is radically different from that of five or ten years ago.<sup>5</sup> ISIL has aggressively leveraged the Millennial Generation and their expertise with emerging technologies to disseminate their ideology, recruit supporters, and solicit funding.<sup>6</sup> This makes the Millennial Generation essential to ISIL. They are tech savvy, growing up with PCs, the internet, social media, and smartphones. They also embrace emerging technology rather than resist it, they are interconnected with the world and are able to collaborate well with others, they are committed to social causes and fixing what they perceive as the world's ills, they want recognition, and they want to be taken seriously.<sup>7</sup>

The above-mentioned traits of the Millennial Generation provide ISIL with a workforce that is able to connect across the globe via the internet and social media.

Language, culture, and distance are no longer barriers to interaction. The global Millennial Generation is using the technology that has put a smartphone in every pocket and a laptop in every backpack, as a medium to project ISIL's hateful message. Without the social media and information technology expertise of the Millennial Generation, there is no way that ISIL could have been as prolific with their propaganda efforts. ISIL supporters sent over 6.4 million tweets from July 2014 to May 2015.<sup>8</sup> The Millennial Generation provides not only ISIL, but also any force with the flexibility and adaptability to share emerging technology, recruit, command and control, and lead globally, if they can be harnessed.

Why should the DOD care about Irregular Warfare? The answer to that question is in the history of warfare. Irregular Warfare is both a reality of the past and future and irregular tactics will remain as long as there is a militarily weaker opponent. This is the very concept that produced the U.S. Army. The Continental Army was not strong enough to meet the British Army on the field in the regular fashion. To defeat the British, the United States used irregular tactics to shift the military balance of power in their favor.<sup>9</sup> The decision to use Irregular Warfare by the Continental Army of the 1770s is the same decision made by today's military or militant leaders when faced with a superior foe. This is a decision made by ISIL as they use irregular tactics to strike their more powerful adversaries.

The 2016 *National Security Strategy* contains references to the irregular threats facing the United States and its allies. To combat these threats the *National Security Strategy* states that the United States will employ a variety of Irregular Warfare tasks to combat the enemies of the United States. To ensure that the DOD is prepared to conduct

and defend against Irregular Warfare, the DOD issued DODD 3000.07 “to establish policy and assign responsibilities for DoD conduct of Irregular Warfare and development of capabilities to address irregular challenges or threats to national security.”<sup>10</sup> The directive breaks down the responsibilities of each of the undersecretaries of defense, military service chiefs, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the combatant commanders.<sup>11</sup> The Joint Staff refines these requirements in the *Irregular Warfare Joint Operating Concept (IW JOC)*.

The IW JOC details how the Joint Force should conduct Irregular Warfare. The purpose of this document is:

The purpose of the Irregular Warfare (IW) Joint Operating Concept (JOC) is to describe how future joint force commanders (JFCs) could conduct protracted IW to accomplish national strategic objectives in the 2014-2026 timeframe. The JOC will guide the development and integration of Department of Defense (DOD) military concepts and capabilities for waging protracted IW on a global or regional scale against hostile states and armed groups. The JOC will provide a basis for further IW discussion, debate, and experimentation intended to influence subsequent IW concept and capability development. It will also influence joint and Service combat development processes by helping the joint force gain a better appreciation for IW challenges that will result in doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF) changes. JFCs and their Interagency (IA) and multinational partners will use this JOC to assess potential integration challenges and opportunities. The overall desired end state is a joint force with enhanced capability for IW and a balanced approach to warfighting that allows the joint force to be as compelling in IW as it is in conventional warfare.<sup>12</sup>

The IW JOC provides the foundation for military planning, strategy, and operations for the Joint Force, by providing shared understanding and consolidation of the concepts, ideas, and terminology needed to conduct Irregular Warfare. Figure 1, an excerpt from the IW JOC illustrates framework for the logic behind the IW JOC.




Figure 1. Irregular Warfare JOC Logic

Source: Department of Defense, *Irregular Warfare (IW) Joint Operating Concept (JOC)*, version 1.0. (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2007), 2.

In addition to a robust definition of Irregular Warfare as previously provided, the IW JOC also defines Irregular Warfare at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war. At the strategic level, Irregular Warfare focuses on control and influence over a relevant population. At the operational level, Irregular Warfare focuses on indirect approaches for planning and conducting operations and campaigns. Finally, at the tactical level, Irregular Warfare focuses on asymmetric applications of tactics, techniques, and procedures that may be applied differently in Irregular Warfare than they would in conventional operations. There is friction among these three perspectives. There is friction because Irregular Warfare should have a different emphasis at each level of war

and viewed differently by those operating at each level.<sup>13</sup> Often, military leaders that are successful at one of these levels, normally the tactical level, think that practices that made them successful will hold true at every level, and all that is needed is scale. In Irregular Warfare, this is not the case. In Irregular Warfare, scaling up a program or policy that worked in one area at the tactical level, may not meet the operational or strategic goals defined in the campaign. This is highlighted by the Sons of Iraq program that was a byproduct of the Anbar Awakening, during the surge in Iraq. This program worked at the tactical level to defeat Al Qaida in Iraq, but did not have the operational and strategic effect of increasing the legitimacy of the Iraqi Government.<sup>14</sup>

Some additional concepts detailed in the IW JOC are defining the Joint Force problem in relation to Irregular Warfare. The problem is: how can the Joint Force commanders employ conventional and nonconventional military capabilities in support of integrated U.S. Government and partner Irregular Warfare efforts to gain or maintain control or influence over a relevant population?<sup>15</sup> To solve this problem the Joint Force must be able to conduct protracted campaigns to defeat adversary states through indirect methods and means, conduct protracted campaigns on a global scale to defeat non-state irregular threats, and defeat Irregular Warfare threats independently of and in coordination with conventional operations.<sup>16</sup>

The IW JOC provides six factors that will compound the Irregular Warfare problem for the Joint Force in the future. The first factor is the expanding scale of Irregular Warfare. The threat of Irregular Warfare will become increasingly global in scale due to its interconnectedness made possible through technological advances. Next is the unbounded scope of Irregular Warfare. Future Irregular Warfare adversaries are

unlikely to operate under the same legal or moral restrictions under which the Joint Force will be obligated to operate; for instance, indiscriminately and intentionally targeting civilians. Next is the protracted nature of Irregular Warfare.<sup>17</sup> The protracted nature of Irregular Warfare often favors the adversary, as highlighted by David Galula in *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice*. This protractedness is generally undesirable and problematic from a U.S. domestic and international political perspective. As the length and cost of conflicts increase, the will of the American people to accept those costs will wane. Next is the expansion of the operational area to non-belligerent states. Adversaries are likely to operate within and from non-belligerent states to limit or restrict Joint Force access. Next is the inherent political nature of Irregular Warfare.<sup>18</sup> As stated by Carl von Clausewitz, “War is merely the continuation of policy by other means.”<sup>19</sup> Although all wars are for political purposes, the political element of Irregular Warfare pervades down to the lowest tactical level, where the leader on patrol may be asked to help support governance one minute and be in a gunfight the next. Finally, will be that the direct applications of military power is often counterproductive in Irregular Warfare.<sup>20</sup> Galula’s *Counterinsurgency Warfare* also highlights that the use of direct military power or military intervention frequently detracts from the legitimacy of the host nation and can play into the adversary’s narrative.<sup>21</sup> While external forces can suppress instability, and attain a level of security, they often do so at the expense of host nation legitimacy and authority.<sup>22</sup> Understanding these six compounding factors will help U.S. commanders understand the complexity of the Irregular Warfare environment.

The above-described template seems to accurately depict the complexity found in a contemporary foe like ISIL, who highlights for the Joint Force the complexity of

Irregular Warfare. To fully understand the complexity of Irregular Warfare, this study looks to the Global Millennial Generation for factors that contribute to Irregular Warfare's complexity. The purpose of the study is to determine how the Millennial Generation has changed Irregular Warfare, using a qualitative analysis of the available literature on Irregular Warfare, the Millennial Generation, and ISIL to identify the changes in Irregular Warfare. It also uses a strength, weakness, opportunity, threat (SWOT)<sup>23</sup> assessment as a tool to evaluate ISIL's millennial target audience. It also uses a center of gravity (COG)<sup>24</sup> analysis to further understand the potential vulnerabilities with ISIL's use of millennials. Finally, it offers recommendations for future research on the subject of the Millennial Generation and Irregular Warfare.

### Problem Statement

The Global Millennial Generation has changed Irregular Warfare through their digital nativity, opportunity for mobilization, and global networking capacity. Millennials across the globe are being mobilized in support of the global ISIL cause.<sup>25</sup> The millennials within ISIL's global insurgency exemplify these changes. The current Irregular Warfare literature does not account for these adaptations. Although the fundamentals are not changed, the Global Millennial Generation has expanded them. They are traveling to Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan, and North Africa in support, as well as remaining a significant threat in their home nation. They are acting in roles from fighters to technical experts in social media and cyber warfare.<sup>26</sup> Millennials are the first "Global Generation,"<sup>27</sup> the internet and social media have removed barriers that separate the world and have given them access to the world, as well as all the good and bad that comes with that access.

## Research Questions

The hypothesis for the research is ISIL's global insurgency has provided the vehicle that has allowed the unique attributes found in the Global Millennial Generation to change Irregular Warfare. The primary research question is: how has the Millennial Generation changed Irregular Warfare? There are two secondary research questions to help provide the detailed analysis to further understand how the Millennial Generation is being targeted and how they are using technology to change Irregular Warfare. The secondary questions are: (1) what are the common factors associated with millennial ISIL recruits; and (2) why is the Millennial Generation attracted to the ISIL cause?

To test this hypothesis, available research is analyzed to examine how ISIL has leveraged the Millennial Generation to meet their organizational needs. A qualitative analysis is conducted of research and writing by experts on Irregular Warfare, Millennial Studies, and ISIL. To answer the secondary research questions, this report uses a SWOT<sup>28</sup> assessment and a COG<sup>29</sup> to identify the necessary factors that are unique to the Global Millennial Generation.

## Assumptions

This paper contains four fundamental assumptions. These assumptions are believed to be true and provide a foundation for analysis of the information, as well as contribute to the relevance of this research project. These assumptions are:

1. Significant information is available on the subject to make a relevant case for studying the generational impact on Irregular Warfare.

2. The use of social media and the internet allow ISIL to have an outsized impact on the world. These mediums allow ISIL to have global reach for command and control and recruitment.
3. The Millennial Generation will continue to be the target audience for ISIL recruitment.
4. There is a benefit to building a profile on the key attributes for cohort susceptible to ISIL recruitment.

### Limitations

This research is limited to examination of English language sources only. There is no translation of primary source material available for this thesis. In the case of ISIL generated content, this thesis must rely on existing English translations or the paraphrasing (characterization) by third party observers and reporters.

Additionally, no information currently labeled as classified by the U.S. Government is in this research. This study restricts research to those sources that are open source. This research specifically excludes information available on open source that remains classified by the U.S. Government, i.e. leaked information.

### Scope and Delimitations

This study solely focuses on how the skills, mobilization, and the global networking of the Global Millennial Generation have change Irregular Warfare. It focuses on the how the Global Millennials within ISIL have used the attributes unique to their cohort to change Irregular Warfare. The scope of the changes to Irregular Warfare are limited to the Irregular Warfare activity of insurgency.

This study does not describe or develop a detailed plan for dealing with the radicalization of Western millennials, or look at the impact that ISIL ideology will have on unrecruited populations that have had to live under ISIL rule in Iraq and Syria. Nor will this study discuss operations to defeat ISIL or their future, but only to identify the changes in Irregular Warfare made possible by the Global Millennial Generation.

### Significance of Study

The results of this study will help understand the current and future Irregular Warfare environment in several ways. It will also help identify vulnerable populations that are currently targets of ISIL and could be targets of other state or non-state actors in the future. The results will help provide senior leaders with a means to understand the effect that millennials are having on the future of Irregular Warfare through their utilization of technology, ability to network, and opportunity to mobilize globally. Finally, this study could help to understand how the Global Millennial Generation changed Irregular Warfare to give state like parody to a non-state actor. Leaders will be able to use this study to identify future initiatives to target the vulnerable populations as well as assess the threat of those returning home from fighting in Syria. This will help to focus limited resources on areas where they will have a real impact.

### Conclusion

Irregular Warfare has changed and the Millennial Generation is at the forefront of that change. In the Millennial Generation, ISIL has found a target cohort that has the required tech skills, is susceptible to the ISIL message, and is willing to act. The capabilities of the Millennial Generation have given ISIL, a non-state actor, global reach

to recruit, finance, and command and control. Understanding how the skills of the Millennial Generation are leveraged is instrumental in shaping future Irregular Warfare tactics and policy.

---

<sup>1</sup> Deputy Secretary of Defense, Department of Defense Directive (DODD) 3000.07, *Irregular Warfare (IW)* (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, August 28, 2014, incorporating Change 1, May 12, 2017).

<sup>2</sup> Department of Defense (DOD), *Irregular Warfare (IW) Joint Operating Concept (JOC)*, version 1.0 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, September 11, 2007).

<sup>3</sup> Brian Dodwell, Daniel Milton, and Don Rassler, *The Caliphate's Global Workforce: An Inside Look at the Islamic State's Foreign Fighter Paper Trail* (West Point, NY: Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, 2016), 12.

<sup>4</sup> Jessica Stern and J. M. Berger, *ISIS The State of Terror* (New York: Harper Collins, 2015), 85.

<sup>5</sup> Kristin Purcell, Lee Rainie, Tom Rosenstiel, and Amy Mitchell, "How Mobile Devices are Changing Community Information Environments," Pew Research Center, March 14, 2011, accessed January 15, 2017, <http://www.pewinternet.org/2011/03/14/how-mobile-devices-are-changing-community-information-environments>.

<sup>6</sup> Dodwell, Milton, and Rassler, 18-24.

<sup>7</sup> Ronald Riggio, "How to Lead the Millennial Generation," *Psychology Today*, May 6, 2010, accessed December 15, 2016, <https://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/cutting-edge-leadership/201005/how-lead-the-millennial-generation>.

<sup>8</sup> Elizabeth Bodine-Barron, Todd C. Helmus, Madeline Mangunson, and Zev Winklemen, *Examining ISIS Support and Opposition Networks on Twitter* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2016).

<sup>9</sup> Robert B. Scaife, "The Regularity of Irregular Warfare," *Small Wars Journal* (October 16, 2012).

<sup>10</sup> Deputy Secretary of Defense, DODD 3000.07.

<sup>11</sup> Ibid.

<sup>12</sup> DOD, *IW JOC*, 5.

<sup>13</sup> Ibid., 6.

- <sup>14</sup> Austin Long, “The Anbar Awakening,” *Survival* (2008): 67-94.
- <sup>15</sup> DOD, *IW JOC*, 17-18.
- <sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*, 19.
- <sup>17</sup> *Ibid.*, 20.
- <sup>18</sup> *Ibid.*, 21.
- <sup>19</sup> Carl von Clausewitz, *On War* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984), 87.
- <sup>20</sup> DOD, *IW JOC*, 18.
- <sup>21</sup> David Galula, *Counterinsurgent Warfare: Theory and Practice* (New York: Praeger, 1964), 8-11.
- <sup>22</sup> DOD, *IW JOC*, 18.
- <sup>23</sup> Marilyn Helms and Judy Nixon, “Exploring SWOT Analysis – Where are we Now?: A Review of Academic Research from the Last Decade,” *Journal of Strategy and Management* 3, no. 3 (2008): 215-251.
- <sup>24</sup> Celestino Perez, *Addressing the Fog of COG: Perspectives on the Center of Gravity in US Military Doctrine* (Ft. Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, 2012).
- <sup>25</sup> Dodwell, Milton, and Rassler.
- <sup>26</sup> *Ibid.*, 23-24.
- <sup>27</sup> Akela Lacy, The “‘First Globals’: Millennials and Foreign Policy,” *Diplomatic Courier*, October 17, 2013, accessed December 16, 2016, <http://www.diplomaticcourier.com/the-first-globals-millennials-and-foreign-policy>.
- <sup>28</sup> Helms and Nixon.
- <sup>29</sup> Perez.

## CHAPTER 2

### LITERATURE REVIEW

Tis best to weigh the enemy more mighty than he seems.

— William Shakespeare, *Henry V*

#### Introduction

The purpose of the study is to determine how the Millennial Generation has changed Irregular Warfare. The purpose of this chapter is to provide an analysis of available literature, in order to provide a framework for understanding the changes made possible by the Global Millennial Generation. This chapter surveys the literature relevant to Irregular Warfare and the global Millennial Generation and is broken down into three distinct parts. There will be one section focusing on the literature available on Irregular Warfare, one section describing the literature available on millennials, and one section analyzing the literature on ISIL.

To begin, this study discusses the foundational information regarding Irregular Warfare. The Irregular Warfare section highlights the theories, operations, and activities that comprise Irregular Warfare. This section also provides the basis for the analysis of how the Millennial Generation has changed Irregular Warfare. Next, the millennial section identifies the characteristics of the Millennial Generation, providing the relevant information about the millennial generation. This information identifies the traits that make this cohort valuable to a group like ISIL. The final section is about ISIL. This section of the chapter provides a linkage of the Global Millennial Generation to ISIL, and describes why millennials are so essential to ISIL. This section provides contemporary

evidence that will help answer the research questions. This chapter concludes by summarizing the key points from each section.

### Irregular Warfare

What exactly is Irregular Warfare? The IWJOC defines it as, “A violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant populations. Irregular Warfare favors indirect and asymmetric approaches, though it may employ the full range of military and other capabilities, in order to erode an adversary’s power, influence, and will. Irregular Warfare is a complex, ‘messy,’ and ambiguous social phenomenon that does not lend itself to clean, neat, concise, or precise definition.”<sup>1</sup> It also describes all of the activities associated with Irregular Warfare, Insurgency, Counterinsurgency (COIN), Unconventional Warfare, Terrorism, Counterterrorism, Foreign Internal Defense, Stabilization, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction Operations, Strategic Communications, Psychological Operations, Information Operations, Civil-Military Operations, Intelligence and Counterintelligence Activities, Transnational Criminal Activities (including narco-trafficking, illicit arms dealing, and illegal financial transactions) that support or sustain Irregular Warfare, and law enforcement activities focused on countering irregular adversaries.<sup>2</sup> This definition, coupled with the list of activities that make up Irregular Warfare leads one to believe that anything that is not combined arms maneuver is Irregular Warfare.

Though all of the activities that fall under Irregular Warfare are important, to accurately understand the effect the Millennial Generation has had on Irregular Warfare and to limit the scope of analysis, this study focuses on the Irregular Warfare activity of

insurgency. Understanding what each of these activities is and how they support one another is essential to linking the Millennial Generation to a shift in Irregular Warfare.

Insurgency is, “an organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through use of subversion and armed conflict.”<sup>3</sup> Terrorism, an important sub-component of insurgency, is defined as “the calculated use of unlawful violence or threat of unlawful violence to inculcate fear; intended to coerce or to intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, or ideological.”<sup>4</sup> These two Irregular Warfare activities are important to understand in the context of millennials and Irregular Warfare, because they are the fundamental means by which ISIL is able to act. In his book, *Insurgency and Terrorism: From Revolution to Apocalypse*, Bard O’neill says that an insurgency will have three types of warfare: gorilla, terrorism, and conventional.<sup>5</sup> O’neill contends that though the insurgent may use all three forms of warfare even at the same time, they will always start with guerilla and terrorism because they are acting from a weaker position.<sup>6</sup> This leaves the question: if insurgents will always employ guerilla and terrorist tactics, then what are the fundamentals of insurgency?

One of the places to begin understanding insurgent behavior is the Galula’s seminal text, *Counterinsurgency Warfare*. Galula’s work was the basis for the Army Field Manual 3-24, *Counterinsurgency*. This work provides background on the needs, strengths, and weaknesses of the insurgent group. This work is also essential to understanding the foundations of ISIL as a global insurgency. The ideas of the importance of a cause, the spread of propaganda, and the patterns of insurgency correlate directly to the expansions of scale made possible by the Global Millennial Generation.

In his book, Galula describes the importance of the insurgent cause. Galula notes the primacy of the cause in any insurgency arguing, “The first basic need for an insurgent who aims at more than simply making trouble is an attractive cause.”<sup>7</sup> The insurgent also has an inherent strength in propagating the cause through propaganda as insurgents can more easily lie than counterinsurgents. If the counterinsurgent government is caught in a lie, then it feeds into the insurgent narrative, while the reverse is not true.<sup>8</sup> Galula states:

The counterinsurgent is tied to his responsibilities and to his past, and for him, facts speak louder than words. He is judged on what he does, not on what he says. If he lies, cheats, exaggerates, and does not prove, he may achieve some temporary successes, but at the price of being discredited for good. And he cannot cheat much unless his political structures are monolithic, for the legitimate opposition in his own camp would soon disclose his every psychological maneuver. For him, propaganda can be no more than a secondary weapon, valuable only if intended to inform and not to fool. A counterinsurgent can seldom cover bad or nonexistent policy with propaganda.<sup>9</sup>

This tells us that the counterinsurgent is usually his own worst enemy when it comes to the propaganda war and that they usually fail because they either communicate passively through actions, are confined by the democratic institutions, or both. They also tend to discount the efficacy of the enemy’s ability to communicate.

The Taliban a group that once outlawed television, now has a vast social media presence, global internet footprint, and the ability to manipulate foreign media. As noted in a 2009 *Time* magazine article, the Taliban know how to influence Western media outlets. For instance, the Taliban sent pictures from an attack on a French patrol outside of Kabul where they flaunted the weapons, uniforms, and personal effects of ten dead French soldiers, to the French magazine *Paris-Match*. *Paris-Match* used those photos for an eight-page article highlighting the attack. Subsequently, French support for the war dropped to an all-time low. Then Defense Minister Hervé Morin was quoted as saying

that Taliban, “understood that public opinion is probably the Achilles’ heel” of the international community.<sup>10</sup> Though much more technologically advanced than the Taliban, Western nations are not able to have the same effect on Taliban supporters using the same kinds of tactics. This is a similar reality for the anti-ISIL coalition.

The above-mentioned information is important and useful to understand how ISIL has used the internet and social media to its advantage in spreading its propaganda and cause. The Western powers have been slow to counter ISIL in this regard and this has added legitimacy to ISIL’s claim that there is nothing the West can do to stop them. As noted in the book *ISIS The State of Terror* by Jessica Stern and J. M. Berger, ISIL spokesman, Abu Muhammad al Adnani, said in a 2010 speech, “The Islamic State will remain.” He goes on to say, “The Islamic State will survive despite your (the west and allies in the middle east) sects, alliances, armies, and weapons . . . It will survive your plots and conspiracies.” From this speech, ISIL developed the Slogan of Baqiyah, Arabic for Survive.<sup>11</sup> This message and the poor response to ISIL propaganda efforts have been essential for ISIL to build support and legitimacy. ISIL’s propaganda effort has been directly contingent on the mobilization, digital nativity, and networking of the Global Millennial Generation.

In addition to discussing the insurgent cause as a necessity and propaganda as a tool, Galula also offers his theory regarding two paths an insurgency can take. One is the “orthodox pattern” for a communist insurgency. It involves five steps: (1) the establishment of a party and an attractive cause; (2) creating a united front; (3) engaging in guerilla warfare; (4) transitioning to movement warfare defined as allowing the insurgent to exploit his

fluidity, his better in

country logistical facilities a

ffunded by the organized population

remaining opposition and consolidating power.<sup>12</sup>

This process is anticipated to take a long time to develop, and necessitates determination and stamina on the part of the insurgents for insurgency to succeed through each stage. Though Galula uses this pattern to explain a communist insurgency, he also goes on to say this consists not merely of overthrowing the existing order but also in carrying out a complete transformation of the country.<sup>13</sup> In this way, one can use the process described by Galula to understand not just communist insurgencies, but also contemporary Islamic insurgencies, where Islamists are trying to disrupt the current political structure, and in the case of ISIL, establish a new Islamic nation, or Caliphate.

Galula recognizes a second insurgency type as a “shortcut pattern.” This begins with an insurgent cause, but immediately launches into what he terms “blind terrorism.” The purpose of blind terrorism “is to get publicity for the movement and its cause, and by focusing attention on it, to attract latent supporters . . . by random terrorism, bombings, arson, assassinations, conducted in as spectacular a fashion as possible, by concentrated, coordinated, and synchronized waves.”<sup>14</sup> The goal for the insurgent is to cause as much fear as possible in the public in order to create a crisis of legitimacy for the central government. If the people begin to feel the government cannot protect them, then the insurgents will have an easier time propagating some of their other claims of government ineptness. Once this phase is complete, the insurgent transitions to selective terrorism by targeting low-ranking government officials, to further separate the government from the people. After this, the pattern merges and follows the normal orthodox steps starting at guerilla warfare.<sup>15</sup>

Galula also argues that all types of insurgencies are vulnerable early on. When the insurgency is just beginning, and attempting to gather strength around a developing cause, it is weakest. At this point, the counterinsurgent can step in aggressively to destabilize the leadership, dissuade membership, and disrupt communications, which will all but ensure that it cannot develop into a full-blown insurgency.<sup>16</sup>

Galula's description of the phases of insurgency does not necessarily match what is seen with ISIL. Their global insurgency shows traditional patterns in some of the areas where they have control and the shortcut patterns in areas of the West where they use blind terror. Dr. Stathis Kalyvas would call this "indiscriminate violence." They use this indiscriminate violence to strike their adversaries and gain support for their cause, while using selective violence in areas where they either control or are attempting to control.<sup>17</sup>

In his book, *The Logic of Violence in Civil War*, Dr. Kalyvas provides some defining factors surrounding Irregular Warfare and insurgency. It also provides a framework for breaking down and better understanding the operating environment. These ideas are essential to understanding the issues confronting the counterinsurgent. They also provide context to the connection that the insurgent and counterinsurgent or incumbent have with their populations.

According to Kalyvas, the factors that define irregular war are the twin processes of segmentation and fragmentation, and sovereignty. Segmentation is accomplished through dividing the terrain into zones of monopolistic control and zones where the insurgent's and incumbent's control overlaps causing fragmentation of the population. These overlapping areas are areas of conflict with political actors trying to shape support and collaborations for their side and trying to limit collaboration and support for their

opponents.<sup>18</sup> Sovereignty refers to the type of control that prevails in a given region, which affects the strategies employed by political actors.<sup>19</sup> This means that an actor will employ different approaches in ungoverned spaces than they will in areas where they have the monopoly on control. Kalyvas is referring to the incumbent's and insurgent's ability to influence populations within his area to support him and to turn against his rivals.

Kalyvas also asserts that insurgents and incumbents are generally tied to specific terrain. Incumbents usually control cities and urban centers, even when those areas are of religious, social, or cultural importance to their rivals. On the other hand, insurgents are usually found in rural areas, even when the population of those areas is hostile to them.<sup>20</sup> These are the two ends of the spectrum and they are tied to the previously discussed idea of segmentation, and form the foundation for Kalyvas' idea of zones. He breaks down the area of operations into five zones, each with distinct characteristics.<sup>21</sup>

Zone one and zone five are mirror images of one another. Zone one is an area where the incumbent has complete control and the insurgent has no control. Zone five is an area where the insurgent has complete control and the incumbent has no control. Insurgent and incumbent parties may be found in each other's zones, but they understand as Kalyvas states, "travel is difficult and fraught with dangers and locals may never come in contact with the non-sovereign."<sup>22</sup> Kalyvas also asserts that these are areas where indiscriminate violence by the opposition occurs. He cites examples from the Vietnam Conflict where an Air Force major points out that anything seen moving in the mountains is considered to be Viet Cong and the way that Malayan insurgents indiscriminately targeted the people staying in resettlement centers and towns controlled by the British.<sup>23</sup>

Zones two and four are also mirror images of one another. Zone two is an area where the incumbent has influence and zone four is where the insurgent has influence. Kalyvas asserts that this is the area for fence sitters and hedging, the same people working for both sides. It is also the area for those looking to be neutral in the conflict. This neutrality is often seen as passive collaboration with the enemy and is usually the target of selective violence by the insurgent or incumbent within their respective zones of influence. This selective violence sends messages to all those who live within these zones that any act deemed as unfaithful will be dealt with severely, in order to maintain control.<sup>24</sup> Contrary to zones one and five where the violence is directed at a zone controlled by an opponent, in zones two and four, the violence is internally focused on the areas that are under the control or influence of the incumbent or insurgent.<sup>25</sup>

Zone three is described as violence under parity. In this zone, there is equal control by the insurgent and the incumbent. There is also very little selective violence in these areas due to the equal vulnerabilities on either side. In these areas, there are also local village leaders being able to broker deals with insurgents and incumbents to veto violence.<sup>26</sup> These areas are important for both sides and it is essential that they have passive support here so they can access their zones of control and have mobility to conduct attacks on their opponent's zones. These areas are also logistically vital to both sides. The importance of these areas shows a pattern of relatively low levels of violence.

Kalyvas' concept of zones, coupled with Galula's theories on the patterns of insurgencies does not seem to explain the ISIL insurgency. Kalyvas and Galula looked at insurgencies as local or at least localized to a specific region. However, they may have support zones and sanctuaries outside their national borders, these support zones and

sanctuaries were contiguous to the nation with the insurgency. The Global Millennial Generation has given ISIL the tools to expand those zones to a global scale. They have also facilitated the command and control, or inspiration for acts of blind terrorism and selective violence, not just in the areas where they control and their peripheral areas, but also in the seemingly most secure areas in the world, Western Europe and the United States.

Galula also points to vulnerabilities in both of his paths to insurgency. The shortcut path is most vulnerable early on, especially when transitioning to selective terrorism, but experiences a sharp decline in vulnerability through the guerilla and movement phases, because of the identification problem that is discussed later. The orthodox insurgency path is most vulnerable in the transitioning phases from guerilla to movement. This is because when the orthodox insurgents transition from guerilla tactics they become visible targets.<sup>27</sup> This has been evident by the ease with which the anti-ISIL coalition has been able to use air power to target ISIL when they have acted in a conventional fashion. Advanced technology helps find, fix, and finish them with relative ease. Though ISIL uses the orthodox pattern in areas where they are trying to exert control, they are also using portions of the shortcut pattern, especially targeting the West. The evolution of the use of these patterns is possible with the previously mentioned attributes of the Global Millennial Generation.

Galula also emphasizes the importance of people in COIN warfare, though people matter in any form of warfare, they are especially important in COIN because the people allow the insurgent to survive providing him a means to survive and build capacity.<sup>28</sup> Furthermore, attracting more people to the cause is essential to expansion, and because

insurgents seek to blend in with the population, this presents the counter insurgent with what Kalyvas describes as the Identification Problem. This problem is that irregular combatants, and the spies and agents of both sides are able to hide among the civilian population. The identification problem hurts the incumbent because the insurgent is able to blend in with the civilian population while the incumbent is easily identifiable by his positions or uniform. On the other hand, the insurgent is not immune from the identification problem, as he must live within a population that may turn him in, while the spies and agents hide among the population that may identify him.<sup>29</sup>

A contemporary example of insurgent group analysis is in David Kilcullen's book *The Accidental Guerrilla*. In this work, Kilcullen describes what he calls the "Accidental Guerrilla Syndrome."<sup>30</sup> This is a four-step process starting with an insurgent establishing a presence in a remote ungoverned or conflict-affected area. The next step is where the insurgent uses this safe haven to spread violence and ideology to other regions. In the next step, the counter insurgent reacts, attempts to deal with the insurgent, and disrupts his safe haven. This reaction will inevitably cause some hardship or loss to the native population, which leads to the last step where the local populace reacts negatively, rejecting the counterinsurgent, and allying with the insurgent. This model was derived from his study of Al Qaida in the Afghanistan and Pakistan border areas.<sup>31</sup> He cites an example from his time in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan, working with the Pakistani Army's Kyber Rifles. The commanding officer of this unit said, "You know, we Punjabis are the foreigners here on the frontier. Al Qaida has been here for 25 years, their leaders have married into the tribes, they have children and businesses here, they've become part of local society. It is almost impossible for outsiders to tell the

terrorist apart from anybody else in the tribal areas, except by accident.”<sup>32</sup> This quotation not only highlights the identification problem acknowledged by Kalyvas but also helps to explain the motivation for what Kilcullen calls the Accidental Guerrilla. Those populations who live among the insurgents and have relationships with them are susceptible to unifying with the insurgent based on being collaterally targeted by the incumbent government. This becomes even trickier with the global expansion of ISIL’s insurgency, where steps taken to target populations in the West may have the adverse effect of galvanizing support for ISIL.

The previously mentioned ideas are facilitated on a global scale by the Millennial Generation. The Global Millennial Generation gives ISIL freedom to reach a global audience; it also provides vulnerability. In the global context, the use of the internet and social media have offered an ability to blend in with the white noise of online communication, providing some anonymity, and a large primed audience. It also leaves them vulnerable due to the digital footprints that they are leaving behind, allowing them to be targeted by those willing to put forth the effort.

The next section discusses the literature about the Millennial Generation to identify the characteristics that define this generation. This will help to understand why they are so essential to ISIL’s efforts and in turn changing the way that irregular warfare is conducted.

### Millennials

Why is understanding millennials important for understandings changes in Irregular Warfare? This is important because they are going to be the ones fighting these wars and will soon be leading these wars. Millennials make up 27 percent of the global

population or about two billion people. Millennials are becoming the world's most important generational cohort for consumer spending growth, sourcing of employees, and overall economic prospects, and they will only become more important as they age into leadership positions around the globe.<sup>33</sup> The Millennial Generation is a diverse cohort regarded as the first global generation. This generation is highlighted by a decline of nationalism, a disdain for the traditional accepted bureaucratic gridlock, and a global empathy that urges reconstruction of the ideals of citizenship and policy making that rise above purely national interests.<sup>34</sup> This section looks at the most current and relevant information on the Millennial Generation and attempts to first define the generation, then describes the characteristics that make up the generation, explains the linkage that this generation has to technology, and explains how that technology has allowed them access to the world in unprecedented ways.

There are several different interpretations of what period exactly encompasses the Millennial Generation, but they are all within a few years of each other. Generally, this range is those born between 1979 and 2000. For common reference, this study uses the Pew Research Center definition of millennials: those born after 1980 and the first generation to come of age in the new millennium.<sup>35</sup> This definition does not define the top end of the age range because the generation subsequent to the millennials has not been defined yet. The Millennial Generation is an echo of the baby boomer generation and is sometimes even referred to as the echo boomers.<sup>36</sup> They are an echo of the baby boomer generation because they are the genetic offspring of that generation. This generation is also significantly larger than the previous generation, Generation X, already making up a larger portion of the workforce. The size of this generation is key because as

efficiency, technology, and automation advances to make up capacity for the smaller workforce found in Generation X the following generation now faces a rise in unemployment.<sup>37</sup> The jobs are just not moving to another part of the world, they are going away completely, leaving behind a cohort largely looking for their place in this new paradigm. This type of population bulge has also been positively correlated with increased levels of political violence.<sup>38</sup> This youth bulge is most prevalent in the sub-Saharan Africa, southern Asia, the Middle East, and the Pacific Islands.<sup>39</sup> This potential for mobilization in the Global Millennial Generation has been vital for ISIL's recruitment and continued expansion via the internet and social media.

The Millennial Generation is generally constructed in a negative light. In her book, *Generation Me*, Dr. Jean Twenge uncovers why the young people she calls Generation Me are tolerant, confident, open-minded, and ambitious but also disengaged, narcissistic, distrustful, and anxious. She argues that socio-cultural changes over the last decades such as the rise of the culture of self-worth, a decline in social connectedness, and an increase in perceptions of danger have combined to create a relatively unique generation of young people. She also contends that millennials seem to have a heightened sense of egotism, self-esteem, and expectations for their future as well as exhibiting elevated levels of misery and other symptoms of psychological distress.<sup>40</sup> This negative view of the Millennial Generation carries over into the media.

In 2007, *60 Minutes* ran a story about members of the "Millennial" generation in the workplace and declared, "A new breed of American worker is about to attack everything you hold sacred: from giving orders, to your starched white shirt and tie." They are characterized as not trusting anyone over 30 years old, not knowing how to

work, and being too fragile to be critiqued because their “childhoods filled with trophies and adulation didn’t prepare them for the cold realities of work.”<sup>41</sup> Indeed, there seems to be a fairly widespread belief that members of the Millennial Generation are significantly dissimilar to previous generations and typically regarded in undesirable ways.

Based on a 2010 study, “Rethinking Generation Me,” by Kali H. Trzesniewski and M. Brent Donnellan that looked analytically at the survey data from 477,380 high school seniors from 1976 to 2006, there may be just this negative perception of millennials and no real fact to substantiate it. Trzeniewski and Donnellan found in general, that the average millennial is not dramatically different from members of previous generations. Millennials are no more egotistical than previous generations, and they appear to be just as happy and satisfied as previous generations. In fact, Millennials seem to have psychological profiles that are remarkably similar to youth from the past thirty years, but have higher expectations for their educational careers. Additionally, millennials seem to be more cynical and distrusting than previous generations.<sup>42</sup> If there is just a prevailing negative perception of millennials that is not backed up by research, do millennials have any positive attributes?

According to a 2010 Pew Research Center report, some of the positive aspects of the Millennial Generation are: they are confident, self-expressive, liberal, upbeat, open to change, and extremely connected to each other.<sup>43</sup> Additionally, a 2016 report in *The Economist* by Robert Guest argues that millennials are more wealthy and likely to live longer than any previous generation. All the information in the world is at their fingertips via their smartphones. They enjoy freedoms that their predecessors could barely have imagined, and are smarter than any previous generation (based on IQ test results).

Though there are noted advantages for the Millennial Generation, in most regions of the world they are much more likely to be unemployed than previous generations.<sup>44</sup> This coupled with the heavy education debt that many in the Millennial Generation have incurred with the expectation that it would lead to a good job has also created an opportunity for friction.

Also of importance to this study is full understanding of where millennials are around the globe. This is important in the context of Irregular Warfare because millennials will be at the forefront of revolution for the foreseeable future. Figure 2 is a representation of the Millennial Generation population around the globe. Analysis of this millennial data by AT Kearney Consulting shows that about 58 percent of Global Millennials live in Asia, with 19 percent in India alone. The next largest regional concentration is in Sub-Saharan Africa, which accounts for about 13 percent of all millennials. These two regions also have the greatest overall populations. The millennial population in Europe and Asia varies more than a percentage point from their respective proportion of the global population. Asian millennials account for 58 percent of Global Millennials versus 56 percent of total global population. European millennials account for 8 percent of Global Millennials versus 10 percent of total global population. India, China, the United States, Indonesia, and Brazil have the world's largest millennial populations, accounting for nearly half of the world's millennials.<sup>45</sup> This means that countries with growing populations will have disproportionate Millennial Generation representation.

**Global Millennials are located in the world's largest countries, with the greatest concentration in Asia**




Figure 2. Global Distribution of Millennials

*Source:* Erik Patterson, Courtney McCaffery, and Ari Sillman, “Where are the Global Millennials,” AT Kearney, July 2016, accessed November 12, 2016, [https://www.atkearney.com/ideas-insights/issue-papers-perspectives/-/asset\\_publisher/dVxv4Hz2h8bS/content/id/8693136](https://www.atkearney.com/ideas-insights/issue-papers-perspectives/-/asset_publisher/dVxv4Hz2h8bS/content/id/8693136).

Now that there is an understanding of where millennials are around the globe, the term global generation can be revisited. In their book, *First Globals: Understanding, Managing, and Unleashing our Millennial Generation*, John Zogby and Joan Kuhl say that nationalist ideas do not resonate as much with millennials and they see themselves as much more of a global citizen. This is in large part due to technology and information sharing that allow for millennials to build a global social network that is uninhibited by

time zones or borders. This is also fueled by their need to be connected to something much larger than themselves substantiated by Zogby and Khul in their poll that showed 71 percent of respondents said that it is important to them to do something to better the world.<sup>46</sup>

Finally, this study examines why the Millennial Generation is more connected than previous generations. According to a 2010 Pew Research Study, millennials self-identify most with technology. Throughout this 2010 Pew study, the links of the Millennial Generation and technology are well recorded. It is not just the fact that they have more devices; they report higher in every category concerning the use of technology. For example, 75 percent have social media profiles, compared to the next highest reporting category, 50 percent of Generation X. This same generational correlation holds true throughout with questions asked by Pew in their survey. The results are below in table 1.<sup>47</sup> These positive technological attributes have been identified by ISIL. The digital nativity, global network, and the opportunity for mobilization, because of their generational bulge have given ISIL, and any other organization that wants to seize it, the prospect of rapid expansion in the current information environment.

<b>Millennials Outpace Older Americans in Technology Use</b>				
	<b>Millennial (18-29)</b>	<b>Gen X (30-45)</b>	<b>Boomer (46-64)</b>	<b>Silent (65+)</b>
<b>Internet behaviors</b>				
Created social networking profile	75	50	30	6
Wireless internet away from home	62	48	35	11
Posted video of themselves online	20	6	2	1
Use Twitter	14	10	6	1
<b>Cell phones and texting</b>				
Use cell to text	88	77	51	9
Texted in past 24 hours	80	63	35	4
Texted while driving	64	46	21	1
Have a cell phone/no landline	41	24	13	5
Median # texts in past 24 hours	20	12	5	--
Note: Median number of texts based on those who texted in past 24 hours.				

Figure 3. Generational Trends with Technology

Source: Pew Research Center, *PEW Millennials: Confident. Connected. Open to Change* (Washington, DC: Pew Research Center, 2010), 25.

Does this data hold true when expanded out of the U.S. context to the globe? Though most of the previously discussed research on connectedness focused on an American audience, the results seem to translate globally as well. The correlation is in a 2013 Telefónica and Financial Time analysis done by President Chief Operating Officer of Colliers International, Dylan Taylor. The survey looked at more than 12,000 millennials from twenty-seven countries and six regions around the globe. Of those surveyed, 76 percent said that they have a smartphone, including 71 percent in North America, 68 percent in Latin America, 60 percent in Central and Eastern Europe, 72 percent in Africa and the Middle East, and 83 percent in Asia.<sup>48</sup> Additionally, the survey

showed that on average all respondents spent six hours online daily. Across regions, there was similar internet usage: seven hours in North America; six hours in Asia and Central and Eastern Europe; and five hours in Western Europe, the Middle East, and Africa. Additionally, the report stated that technology allowed them to bridge language barriers and create opportunities for all users.<sup>49</sup> Drawing on the knowledge in these previous sections, the next section analyzes the literature available on ISIL and identifies the changes to Irregular Warfare made possible by the Global Millennial Generation.

### ISIL

ISIL is a new type of threat facing the global international political establishment. Never in history has the world faced a non-state actor that was willing to take and hold ground and take on the functions of a legitimate state, all while continuing to sponsor and endorse attacks on the geopolitical status quo. ISIL has changed the military and political game by leveraging technology through the Global Millennial Generation to recruit globally, spread propaganda, and command and control globally.

Generally, poverty and education are thought to be the main factors in political violence.<sup>50</sup> Former President George W. Bush said in 2002, “we fight against poverty because hope is an answer to terror,”<sup>51</sup> The researchers have largely argued against this school of thought, saying that terrorism and political violence are unrelated to poverty across countries or among individuals.<sup>52</sup> This is evident in a case study analysis of the Bengal insurrection of 1907-1908. In this case, there is evidence that the highest risk group to become insurgents was from those who are in the upper part of society, but not at the top. These members have an education, but are the poorest members of the

politically aware and this agrees with the wide spread observations that extremist parties and ideologies are most strongly associated with the lower middle class.<sup>53</sup>

This also seems to hold true for an assessment of over 4,600 Islamic State personnel records conducted by the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point. Based on the analysis of education and employment of the fighters coming to the ISIL the Combating Terrorism Center found:

The fighters in the dataset came from a wide range of educational backgrounds, but as a whole, the group appears to be relatively well-educated when compared to educational levels in their home countries. The second most populated education category was those with some college-level education. The range of occupational experience was equally broad. But the most populated categories were those comprising lower skilled positions. This is an interesting juxtaposition to the educational profile and raises intriguing questions about the possibility that some fighters in this dataset may have been motivated by frustration over failure to achieve expected success in the job market following their education.<sup>54</sup>

This analysis also provided the age breakdown of the ISIL fighters, showing the average age as 26-27 year olds, and an average birth year of 1987. These records also provided information for analysis of the origin of their global workforce.<sup>55</sup> When comparing figures 3 and 2, there is some correlation between countries with a large millennial population and the country of origin of foreign fighters.




Figure 4. Fighter Records by Residence Response

*Source:* Brian Dodwell, Daniel Milton, and Don Rassler, *The Caliphate's Global Workforce: An Inside Look at the Islamic State's Foreign Fighter Paper Trail* (West Point, NY: Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, 2016), 10.

Additional analysis on Syrian foreign fighters by Richard Barrett of the Sufan Group, found that beyond age and gender, there are few consistent or reliable patterns of who becomes a foreign fighter, but among Western recruits, new converts make up a disproportionately large population. These recruits are especially vulnerable to fundamentalist ideology because of their generally wild enthusiasm coupled with their lack of knowledge about their new religion.<sup>56</sup> Based on this analysis and what was previously stated about the millennial generations, they are committed to social causes and fixing what they perceive as the world's ills; they want recognition, and they want to be taken seriously,<sup>57</sup> it is easy to connect this generation to the results of the findings, from the Sufan group study. ISIL recruiters are leveraging the traits of the Global Millennial Generation to mobilize in support of their cause and based on their

inexperience with Islam, are able to indoctrinate them with their ideology without having to worry about it being tainted by moderating voices.

Additional analysis about ISIL's global insurgency was done by Jessica Stern and J. M. Berger in their book, *ISIS: State of Terror*. They break it down into to a combination of external and internal motives for individuals joining ISIL. For external motives, they cite that extremists themselves point to the specific examples of military conflict or a genocidal campaign, sometimes but not always involving a potential recruit's identity group.<sup>58</sup> These external motivations have been used with great effect throughout the years by Jihadists, often telling these young vulnerable recruits, who are inexperienced that it is their duty and obligation to individual jihad when some or all of the Muslim nation, is threatened.<sup>59</sup>

This is anecdotally expressed in a *New York Times* piece by Rukmini Callimacchi, "ISIS and the Lonely American." This piece tells the story of the online recruitment of a young girl from Washington State, who if not intervened on by her family would have gone to Syria to join ISIL. The ISIL recruiter even discouraged her from going to a local Mosque, because he said that it was not safe, though it is assumed that he only wanted her to know what he told her about Islam.<sup>60</sup> Not only did that article highlight the external motives for her recruitment, but it also talked about some of the internal motivations. She was a loner throughout high school and really had no one else, so when the recruiter paid attention to her it made her feel like she belonged.

This leads to Stern's and Berger's description of internal motivations. They assess that the internal motives are those that stem from an individual's wants or need for themselves, such as feelings of belonging, escape, adventure, or money.<sup>61</sup> To look

specifically at the Western recruits, a study done by Scott Atran at the University of Michigan, states that recruits are usually at transition points in their lives. They are often immigrants, recently unemployed or separated from a partner, or students, that are looking for new groups to join.<sup>62</sup>

Now that there is an understanding of why they join, the study examines what they do within the organization of ISIL and how their involvement has changed and continues to change Irregular warfare. The Global Millennial Generation provides ISIL information technology expertise that facilitates their propaganda efforts as well as their global command and control architecture. Additionally, they offer a global network for ISIL to exploit that is inextricably linked to the digital environment.

ISIL has taken the message boards and blog post of the 1990s and jumped in with both feet to the modern digital environment. They push content on every available outlet, from YouTube to secure encrypted messaging applications such as Telegram and Whatsapp.<sup>63</sup> They even use online bots, applications linked to Twitter to exponentially increase their exposure on the social media forum, as well as coordinated hashtag campaigns, where they enlist a global network of thousands of activists to repeatedly tweet at certain times of the day, also increasing exposure. All of these activities increase ISIL's presence on social as well as traditional media.<sup>64</sup> Additionally, these activities combine to focus group messaging and group branding<sup>65</sup> and in effect using traditional news media to report what is trending on social media, increasing the impact of their messaging.<sup>66</sup> This sophisticated online media arm would not be possible without the technical expertise native to the Millennial Generation as well as their network globally, spreading their message as far as they can.

This global network gives ISIL the capacity and capability to recruit foreign fighters to defend its territory, raise funds, and direct or inspire attacks abroad. An estimated 27,000-31,000 foreign fighters have gone to Iraq and Syria since 2011 to join the fight for extremist groups. Though the numbers are not exact, it is assessed that a large majority of them are there to join ISIL.<sup>67</sup>

ISIL concentrates its efforts around an effective marketing campaign to target millennials. Its campaign focuses on cultural, linguistic, religious, and economic narratives that “provoke feelings that stirred a warrior’s heart and sense of belonging to the global Umma.”<sup>68</sup> They do this using a sophisticated peer-to-peer network that couples flashy propaganda with online recruiters that are able to individually provide evidence to support their narrative, course correct if recruits start to stray, and create a sense of urgency that takes recruits from moderate to extremist in a short period.<sup>69</sup> This merges ISIL’s use of technology with psychology, sociology, and anthropology,<sup>70</sup> using the skills and networks of the Global Millennial Generation to mobilize their peers around the globe to join the cause.

They have also used these global networks to raise funds through online crowdfunding sites and internet fraud.<sup>71</sup> It can also be assumed that the millennial generation is behind ISIL’s recent advances in the use of drones.<sup>72</sup> This information provides significant evidence of what role the millennial generation plays in current ISIL operations.

This perpetual cycle of identification, recruitment, radicalization, and mobilization within the Global Millennial Generation gives ISIL the opportunity for exponential growth, but the digital environment tracks everything. This idea is

highlighted in a work by Dr. Zeeshan Usmani, in which he says big data can be used to identify those who are susceptible to radicalization, or as he terms them “Jillennials”. He says that the Jillennials cohort can be identified per country by the percentage of youth population, their education, income, lifestyle, religious affiliations, political engagements, previous criminal records, percentage of youth in jails, and those convicted of crimes.<sup>73</sup> Though this type of analysis is still immature and does not offer complete explanatory power, the use of the internet, especially social media, has already made group analysis possible.<sup>74</sup> This may be the one major weakness in this new form of global insurgency. It is so reliant on the digital communication environment that traces of the network are available to anyone who has the skills and resources to look for them, and it can be done from anywhere on the globe.

### Conclusion

This chapter provided the relevant information in order to provide a framework for understanding the Millennial Generation’s effect on Irregular Warfare. This chapter was broken down into three parts to help provide a base of knowledge about the foundations of Irregular Warfare, to understand the characteristics of the Millennial Generation, and analyze how ISIL uses the Millennial Generation and how these Global Millennials have changed Irregular Warfare. They have expanded the ideas brought forth by insurgency theorists like Gallulla, Kalvas, and Kilcullen from a local or regional scale to a global context. This expansion was possible with the digital nativity, global networking capacity, and opportunity for mobilization found in the Global Millennial Generation. ISIL’s global insurgency is the vehicle that allowed this study to extrapolate

the impact of the Global Millennial Generation. This chapter establishes the foundation for analysis, in order to answer the research questions.

---

<sup>1</sup> DOD, *IW JOC*.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, 9-10.

<sup>3</sup> Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), Joint Publication (JP) 1-02, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2016), 113.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, 241.

<sup>5</sup> Bard Oneil, *Insurgency and Terrorism: From Revolution to Apocalypse* (Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2005), 88.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, 91.

<sup>7</sup> Galula, 13.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, 11.

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>10</sup> Jason Motlagh, “Why the Taliban Is Winning the Propaganda War,” *Time*, May 3, 2009, accessed March 14, 2017, <http://content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1895496,00.html>.

<sup>11</sup> Stern and Berger, 105.

<sup>12</sup> Galula, 33-42.

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*, 33.

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*, 43.

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.*, 44.

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*, 44-46.

<sup>17</sup> Stathis Kalyvas, *The Logic of Violence in Civil War* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 12-13, 146-148.

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.*, 12, 87-145.

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.*, 87-88.

- <sup>20</sup> Ibid., 12, 132-133.
- <sup>21</sup> Ibid., 210-245.
- <sup>22</sup> Ibid., 222.
- <sup>23</sup> Ibid., 223.
- <sup>24</sup> Ibid., 224-232.
- <sup>25</sup> Ibid., 232-240.
- <sup>26</sup> Ibid., 240-243.
- <sup>27</sup> Galula, 44-46.
- <sup>28</sup> Ibid., 6.
- <sup>29</sup> Kalyvas, 89.
- <sup>30</sup> David Kilcullen, *The Accidental Guerrilla* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 35.
- <sup>31</sup> Ibid., 29-35.
- <sup>32</sup> Ibid., 34.
- <sup>33</sup> Erik Patterson, Courtney McCaffery, and Ari Sillman, “Where are the Global Millennials,” AT Kearney, July 2016, accessed November 12, 2016, [https://www.atkearney.com/ideas-insights/issue-papers-perspectives/-/asset\\_publisher/dVxv4Hz2h8bS/content/id/8693136](https://www.atkearney.com/ideas-insights/issue-papers-perspectives/-/asset_publisher/dVxv4Hz2h8bS/content/id/8693136).
- <sup>34</sup> Lacy.
- <sup>35</sup> Pew Research Center, “Millennials,” accessed January 1, 2017, <http://www.pewresearch.org/topics/millennials>.
- <sup>36</sup> Steve Kroft, “The Echo Boomers,” *CBS News*, October 1, 2004, accessed December 14, 2016, <http://www.cbsnews.com/news/the-echo-boomers-01-10-2004>.
- <sup>37</sup> Andrew Hanna, “The Global Youth Unemployment Crisis: Exploring Successful Initiatives and Partnering with Youths” (Honors Thesis, Sanford School of Public Policy Duke University, Durham, NC, 2014).
- <sup>38</sup> Henrik Urdal, “A Clash of Generations? Youth Bulges and Political Violence,” *International Studies Quarterly* 50, no. 3 (September 2006): 607-629.

<sup>39</sup> Lionel Beehner, “The Effects of ‘Youth Bulge’ on Civil Conflicts,” *Council on Foreign Affairs*, April 13, 2007, accessed April 30, 2017, <http://www.cfr.org/world/effects-youth-bulge-civil-conflicts/p13093#p3>.

<sup>40</sup> Gene Twinge, *Generation Me* (New York: Atria Books, 2014), 25-48.

<sup>41</sup> Morley Safer, “The Millennials are Coming,” *CBS News*, November 7, 2008, accessed December 17, 2016, <http://www.cbsnews.com/news/the-millennials-are-coming>.

<sup>42</sup> Kali H. Trzesniewski and M. Brent Donnell, “Rethinking ‘Generation Me’: A Study of Cohort Effects From 1976–2006,” *Perspectives on Psychological Science* (2010): 58-75.

<sup>43</sup> Pew Research Center, *PEW Millennials: Confident. Connected. Open to Change* (Washington, DC: Pew Research Center, 2010).

<sup>44</sup> The Economist, “The Young: Generation Uphill,” January 23, 2016, accessed January 5, 2017, <http://www.economist.com/news/special-report/21688591-millennials-are-brainiest-best-educated-generation-ever-yet-their-elders-often>.

<sup>45</sup> Patterson, McCaffery, and Sillman.

<sup>46</sup> John Zogby and Joan Khul, *The First Globals: Understanding, Managing, and Unleashing the Potential of our Millennial Generation* (Amazon Digital Services: John Zogby and Joan Khul, June 2013), accessed January 6, 2017, <https://www.amazon.com/Understanding-Unleashing-Potential-Millennial-Generation-ebook/dp/B00DE3N19W>, 37-60.

<sup>47</sup> Pew Research Center, *PEW Millennials*.

<sup>48</sup> Dylan Taylor, “From Developed to Developing Cultures: How Millennials Are Influencing Our World,” *Colliers*, June 6, 2016, accessed January 15, 2017, <http://knowledge-leader.colliers.com/dylan-taylor/from-developed-to-developing-cultures-how-millennials-are-influencing-our-world/>.

<sup>49</sup> Telefónica, *Telefónica Global Millennial Survey: Global Results*, 2013, accessed January 6, 2017, <http://survey.telefonica.com/globalreports/assets/Telefonica%20-%20Global%20Millennial%20Survey.pdf>.

<sup>50</sup> Jessica Stern, “Pakistan’s Jihad Culture,” *Foreign Affairs* (November-December 2000): 115-126.

<sup>51</sup> George W. Bush, “Remarks by the President of the United States at the United Nations Financing for Development Conference, Monterrey, Mexico, March 22, 2002,” accessed March 27, 2017, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=63268>.

<sup>52</sup> Allen Kruger and David Laitin, “Kto Kogo? A Cross-Country Study of the Origins and Targets of Terrorism” (Russell Sage Foundation, New York, NY, January 18, 2007); Claude Berrebi, “Evidence about the Link between Education, Poverty, and Terrorism Among Palestinians” (Working Paper No. 477, Princeton University Industrial Relations Sections, Princeton, NJ, 2003).

<sup>53</sup> Alexander Lee, “Who Becomes a Terrorist? Poverty, Education, and the Origins of Political Violence,” *World Politics* 63, no. 2 (April 2011): 203-245.

<sup>54</sup> Dodwell, Milton, and Rassler, IV.

<sup>55</sup> *Ibid.*, 12.

<sup>56</sup> Richard Barrett, *Foreign Fighters in Syria* (New York: The Soufan Group, 2015).

<sup>57</sup> Riggio.

<sup>58</sup> Stern and Berger, 81-84.

<sup>59</sup> Anwar Alawlaki, “The State of Ummah,” *Anwar Alawaki Blog*, April 23, 2009, accessed March 15, 2017, <http://anwar-alawlaki.blogspot.com/2009/04/state-of-ummah.html>.

<sup>60</sup> Rumini Callimachi, “ISIS and the Lonely Young American,” *The New York Times*, June 27, 2015.

<sup>61</sup> Stern and Berger, 82.

<sup>62</sup> Scott Atran, *The Devoted Actor, Sacred Values, and the Willingness to Fight* (Oxford, UK: The Center for the Resolution of Intractable Conflict, 2014).

<sup>63</sup> Stern and Berger, 128-144.

<sup>64</sup> J. M. Berger and Jonathan Morgan, “The ISIS Twitter Census” (Analysis Paper, The Brookings Institute, Washington, DC, 2015); Bodine-Barron et al.; J. M. Berger, “How ISIS Games Twitter,” *The Atlantic*, June 16, 2014, accessed March 21, 2017, <https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2014/06/isis-iraq-twitter-social-media-strategy/372856/>.

<sup>65</sup> Berger, “How ISIS Games Twitter.”

<sup>66</sup> Berger and Morgan.

<sup>67</sup> Barrett.

<sup>68</sup> Nicole Matejic, “Content Wars: Daesh’s Sophisticated Use of Communications,” *NATO Review Magazine* (2016).

<sup>69</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>70</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>71</sup> Magnus Ranstorp, “Microfinancing the Caliphate: How the Islamic State is Unlocking the Assets of European Recruits,” *CTC Sentinel* 9, no. 5 (May 2016): 11-15.

<sup>72</sup> Ben Watson, “The Drones of ISIS,” *Defense One*, January 12, 2017, accessed March 23, 2017, <http://www.defenseone.com/technology/2017/01/drones-isis/134542>.

<sup>73</sup> Zeeshaun Usmani, “Data Sciences, ISIS and Predictions for 2016,” Data Science Central, January 5, 2016, accessed November 12, 2016, <http://www.datasciencecentral.com/profiles/blog/show?id=6448529%3ABlogPost%3A369643>.

<sup>74</sup> Berger and Morgan; Usmani; J. M. Berger, “Tailored Online Interventions: The Islamic State’s Recruitment Strategy,” *CTC Sentinel* 8, no. 10 (October 2015): 19-23.

## CHAPTER 3

### RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

To know your Enemy, you must become your Enemy.  
— Sun Tzu, *Published Source The Art of War*

#### Introduction

This chapter describes the methodology used to answer the research questions in chapter 4. An analysis of the available literature was conducted. This analysis breaks down the available literature from the field of Irregular Warfare, looking specifically at the frameworks and methodologies that characterize insurgencies and insurgent groups. Next, this analysis looks at the literature on the Millennial Generation to detail the characteristics and traits synonymous with this generation. Lastly, this literary analysis evaluates how ISIL and the millennial generation are linked, and describes how the Global Millennial Generation is key for their organizational expansion. It concludes by tying together the pertinent information to describe the effect that the Global Millennial Generation is having on Irregular Warfare.

Additionally, a SWOT and COG analysis is conducted in this chapter to understand the variables and components that identify the Global Millennial Generation in relation to ISIL. The data extrapolated from the literary examination and the two analytical tools provides power to explain answers to the research questions in the chapter 4.

## Data Collection and Analysis Methods

Data obtained for this thesis came from a variety of sources. The information derived from the study of ISIL and the multilayer analysis of the Global Millennial Generation, provides a robust examination of the ways in which the Global Millennials are changing Irregular Warfare. Using a variety of sources to include books, academic journals, periodicals, business research and academic writing, Irregular Warfare, ISIL, and the Global Millennial Generation. These works were selected based on their relevance to each of the above-mentioned topics. The sources were compiled with the help of the Combined Arms Research Library research librarians, web searches, and material suggested by the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point. Through a qualitative analysis of the literature as well as the use of the analytical tools described below, this thesis thoroughly analyzes the relevant information available to understand how the Global Millennial Generation has changed Irregular Warfare. This analysis is essential, not only for answering the research questions found in this paper, but also for providing a foundation for future research on this topic. Future expansion of this research could include original quantitative studies that could more precisely answer the research questions, built on coding of the ISIL personnel data discussed in the previous chapter. However, based on the time constraints and other requirements during this research period, this type of study was not possible.

An analysis of ISIL's recruiting and operations that focus on the use of the Millennial Generation from 2010 to 2016 is used to offer insights into the recruitment, mobilization, and utilization of the Global Millennial Generation. The analysis is structured to understand how the Global Millennial Generation changed Irregular

Warfare, and looks at technology, the internet, and social media to understand how ISIL leverages the unique skills of the Millennial Generation to conduct Irregular Warfare.

The common factors associated with millennials that ISIL recruits into their organization is analyzed, to see if there are factors common to those Millennials attracted to the ISIL cause.

A SWOT analysis will be conducted to explain the linkage of the Global Millennial Generation to the insurgency. A SWOT analysis is a business tool often used by corporations to evaluate their environment and formulate strategy. This business tool will be adapted to evaluate the Global Millennial Generation from a social science perspective. This tool offers a lens of analysis, providing a broad and objective understanding of the Millennial Generation's characteristics that are beneficial to ISIL and facilitate the changes in Irregular Warfare. This analysis method allows users to find gaps and matches between competencies and resources within an environment, based on the subject of analysis' strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats.<sup>1</sup> The SWOT has five key advantages: it is simple to do and practical, it is easily understandable, it identifies the key internal and external factors affecting the group or organization, it helps to identify future opportunity, and helps focus future research and analysis. Though SWOT is a good tool, it has some limitations and criticisms. Some of those are that it can be just excessive lists with no prioritization, descriptions can be too broad, the factors can be composed of opinions and not facts, and there are not recognized methods to distinguish between the SWOT variables from one another.<sup>2</sup> Even with these limitations and criticisms, SWOT is still a valuable tool to help begin to examine the effect that the

global Millennial Generation is having on Irregular Warfare, by helping define the unique characteristics associated with the Millennial Generation that are relevant to ISIL.

Conducting a SWOT assessment only takes two steps. First, list the group's key strengths and weaknesses. Second, identify any opportunities and threats. Strengths and weaknesses are aspects of the group's internal environment. Strengths identify places where one group has an advantage over other groups. Weaknesses are areas where one group could improve relative to other groups. Opportunities and threats are the external uncontrollable factors. These are usually the result of changes in the macro environment, or another group's action. Opportunities present an advantage to one group if seized. Threats present a risk to a group if not avoided.<sup>3</sup> Though the SWOT is a useful tool for understanding the Millennial Generation, it is not the only tool available, and based on the limitations should be used with other tools to provide an accurate picture.

To add to the robustness of the examination of the ISIL's use of the Global Millennial Generation, a COG analysis is used. This is a tool used by the military to understand the operational environment during mission analysis. COG analysis helps the user identify the elements, components, and relationships that make up an organization or group and provides an additional investigative view of the Millennial Generation. A COG analysis starts by identifying the organization's desired endstates or objectives. Then it identifies the possible ways or actions that can achieve the desired ends. After identification, the results are analyzed and only the most essential or elemental actions are selected. Those most essential elements or actions are the ways that the target group will be able to reach the desired endstate; ways equals critical capabilities. The next step is to evaluate the targets, means, or resources available or needed to execute that critical

capability. These may be actors or nodes, such as an organization, person, or network. From that list, the tangible agent that possesses the critical capability will be selected, and will become the COG. This is the key actor or node. Next, the links between actors and nodes will be identified. These will be the critical requirements. Finally, the analysis will be completed by identifying the critical requirements that are vulnerable to action, critical vulnerabilities.<sup>4</sup>

### Conclusion

The information derived from this study of ISIL and the multilayer analysis of the Global Millennial Generation, provide a comprehensive analysis of the impact of the Global Millennials on Irregular Warfare. Using a variety of sources to include books, academic journals, periodicals, business research, and academic writing, Irregular Warfare, ISIL, and the Global Millennial Generation, as well as the use of the analytical tools described above, allow this thesis to thoroughly analyze the relevant information available on ISIL and the global Millennial Generation. This analysis is crucial to the findings explained in the subsequent chapter.

---

<sup>1</sup> Helms and Nixon.

<sup>2</sup> Ovidijus Jurevicius, "SWOT Analysis - Do It Properly!" Strategic Management Insight, February 13, 2013, accessed December 15, 2016, <https://www.strategicmanagementinsight.com/tools/swot-analysis-how-to-do-it.html>Ibid.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid.

<sup>4</sup> Perez., 146-149.

## CHAPTER 4

### ANALYSIS AND RESULTS

No one starts a war—or rather, no one in his senses ought to do so—without first being clear in his mind what he intends to achieve by that war and how he intends to conduct it.

— Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*

#### Introduction

The purpose of this research is to determine how the Global Millennial Generation has changed Irregular Warfare. This research uses an analysis of the available literature on ISIL, Irregular Warfare, and the Global Millennial Generation to explain the changes. It also identifies the factors that have made these changes possible.

This chapter provides an analysis of the literature on Irregular Warfare, the Millennial Generation, and ISIL, as well as the two analytical methods that dissect the Millennial Generation. The results are organized in sections that sequentially answer the research questions provided earlier in this paper. The analysis found in this chapter should provide better context for the expansion of Irregular Warfare literature by the Global Millennial Generation and set the stage for future research.

#### Findings

The hypothesis for this research is that the Millennial Generation has changed Irregular Warfare. The primary research question is: how has the Millennial Generation changed Irregular Warfare? The secondary research questions are: (1) what are the common factors associated with millennial ISIL recruits; and (2) why is the Millennial

Generation attracted to the ISIL cause? These questions are answered in this chapter built on the research that described in the preceding chapters.

Based on an analysis of the available literature, the hypothesis that the millennial generation has changed Irregular Warfare, is supported. Though there may be other facets of Irregular Warfare that have changed, this research focused on the changes only in the facet of insurgency. How has the Millennial Generation changed Irregular Warfare? Grounded in the fundamentals of insurgency identified by the works of Galula, Kalyvas, and Kilcullen, the most marked change is an expansion of most of their principals from the local, or at most, regional situation to a global context. The Global Millennial Generation's ability to be mobilized, paired with the global networking presented by the internet and social media, facilitated by the digital nativity resident in the generation, is the catalyst for this global expansion. These changes are highlighted by an expansion of the recruiting base, financing, messaging or ability to spread the cause, sanctuaries, safe havens, and support zones to a global phenomenon. The frameworks brought forth by the previously mentioned authors, for insurgent organizational behavior, fail to address the patterns seen with ISIL.<sup>1</sup>

Galula's ideas about the cause being essential for the insurgent have been expanded by the Global Millennial Generation. Galula's thoughts on cause focused on the population internal or peripheral to the nation where the insurgency was taking place,<sup>2</sup> the Global Millennial Generation has facilitated the expansion of this cause to a global audience. This is evident by ISIL's use of the technical skills and global networking ability of the Millennial Generation, that leverage the internet and social media to globally market, recruit, spread propaganda, and influence adversary nation

state involvement in their conflict in the Middle East. This expansion has provided state like parody and even domination in the influence arena to a non-state actor. This is evident in ISIL's ability to leverage its 46,000-70,000 Twitter supporters to send out a daily average of 130, 422 Tweets in 2014-2015 when Twitter started shutting down affiliated accounts.<sup>3</sup>

The next expansion is in Galula's concepts of the orthodox and shortcut patterns for insurgency.<sup>4</sup> These patterns have seen an evolution in terms of how ISIL has adapted to the global environment. ISIL uses parts of both approaches. In the areas such as Iraq and Syria, where they own and hold territory, they use the orthodox pattern. In the areas where they are influencing and inspiring attacks against the West and its allies, such as the Brussels or France attacks of 2016, they use portions of the shortcut pattern. This is possibly the evolution to a new pattern of insurgency where the global digital environment allows for an insurgent organization, using the orthodox pattern, to build support and capacity within an area they are attempting to control, while also drawing support from external populations as well as negatively influencing third party support for the incumbent or counter insurgent force. At the same time, using blind terrorism from the shortcut method, the insurgent organization may launch or inspire offensive terrorist attacks against their perceived adversaries to influence their behavior or gain support for their cause. This use of blind terrorism also may not ever transition into selective terrorism in these areas because they are outside of the zone of control for the insurgent. This model could explain ISIL's approach to Insurgency, building support in Syria and Iraq, while inspiring and executing attacks against the West and their allies.

There is also evidence that the Global Millennial Generation expanded Kalyvas' concept of zones. The global networks and potential for mobilization of the Global Millennials have expanded these zones outside of the nation in conflict to nations that are at risk or ready to radicalize.<sup>5</sup>

Zone one is now anywhere on the globe where an opponent of the insurgent is found. Zone five is now anywhere that ISIL holds ground: Iraq, Syria, Afghanistan, Libya, etc. The digital expertise and global connectivity provided by the Global Millennial Generation allow ISIL to command and control operations these satellites zone fives.

Zones two and four have been similarly expanded, but have become somewhat merged. Look at an area like Molenbeek, Belgium. There is plenty of evidence to support that even though the nation of Belgium is an ally in the fight against ISIL and is under no threat of being taken over, ISIL is able to find a support zone here. This zone is at the same time under threat of internal prosecution by the Belgium Government to support internal security and at the same time offers a means to project attacks against the West. Zone three is also expanded outside the nation in conflict. In the example of ISIL, trafficking corridors in nations like Turkey are essential for facilitating traffic of these mobilized millennials and the influx of technology that keeps ISIL's millennial workforce engaged.<sup>6</sup> These three zones are now outside areas that are in conflict and essential to trafficking of personnel and materials necessary to support conflict on both sides, but now have relatively low levels of violence.

These above-mentioned zones are based on Kalyvas' and Galula's ideas about the importance of the people in insurgency. This expansion of the zones to a global scale

only exacerbates the identification problem because the Global Millennial Generation is the target audience for recruitment, now anyone anywhere that has an internet connection can be recruited, radicalized, and mobilized.<sup>7</sup> If support for the cause can be found anywhere, this presents a resource problem for those who are trying to counter a group like ISIL. How do opponents find ways to prioritize and allocate resources against the threats when the threat can be anywhere?

The identification problem and the inadvertent alienation of religious groups or immigrant population expand the Accidental Guerrilla concept offered by Kilcullen.<sup>8</sup> Because the Global Millennial Generation is a mobile cohort that is digitally connected and is able to self and peer radicalize and recruit globally. It has offered exponential increases in the contact ISIL has with the external world. Additionally, their ability to expeditiously exploit the deeds and words of the West, gives them opportunities to target and organize populations for support, even in areas that are not directly affected by those words or deeds. An example of this could be the collateral damage of the police action to go after the perpetrators of the 2016 attacks in France and Belgium causing the Muslim populations to feel alienated and attacked because of who they are. These targeted populations can now be organized and mobilized to become the “Accidental Guerrilla” because they now feel digitally and physically connected to the cause.

## Global Millennial Generation SWOT Analysis: ISIL Perspective

	Positive Factors	Negative Factors
Internal Factors	<p style="text-align: center;"><b><u>Strength</u></b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>27% of Global Population</li> <li>Ability to be Mobilized</li> <li>Technical Expertise</li> <li>Globally Networked</li> </ul>	<p style="text-align: center;"><b><u>Weakness</u></b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Digital Footprint</li> <li>“Generation Me” mentality</li> <li>Independent thinking</li> </ul>
External Factors	<p style="text-align: center;"><b><u>Opportunity</u></b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Want to make an impact</li> <li>Innovative</li> <li>Openness to migrate</li> <li>Need to belong</li> </ul>	<p style="text-align: center;"><b><u>Threat</u></b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Identification of infiltrators</li> <li>Targeting Opportunities presented by the digital age</li> </ul>

Figure 5. Global Millennial Generation SWOT Analysis: ISIL Perspective

Source: Created by author.

## Global Millennial Generation COG Analysis

Endstate: ISIL is able to expand its operational reach and recruiting base through the use of vulnerability of the Global Millennial Generation




Figure 6. Global Millennial Generation COG Analysis

Source: Created by author.

Knowing that the Global Millennial Generation has been essential for ISIL's expansion as well as the changes in Irregular Warfare, this study will try to extrapolate the common factors associated with millennial ISIL recruits and the Global Millennial Generation's attraction to the ISIL cause. This is essential for future targeting and policy efforts. The most important factor common to the Global Millennial Generation is the global network. This global networking capacity was identified during the COG analysis. This is a platform agnostic global networking capacity that is able to rapidly adapt to changes in the digital environment and maintain connections that bridge language and culture, a "Global Generation."<sup>9</sup> As previously discussed, this global networking has been essential for ISIL in the spread of their propaganda as well as their recruiting effort. The use of the global network facilitates the next common factor of the Global Millennial Generation, opportunity for mobilization.

The Global Millennial Generation is able to mobilize, because of several factors. They generally are not tied down with the responsibilities of a career or family, they are facing very poor future job prospects than previous generations, and they want to make a difference.<sup>10</sup> This generational cohort is mobile and primed for action, and this characteristic has been seized by ISIL to facilitate the expansion of their organization and cause.<sup>11</sup> Though the global network and opportunity of mobility are essential for understanding the effect that the Global Millennial Generation has had on Irregular Warfare, they would not have even been possible without the last common factor of the millennial generation, digital nativity; they were born with technology and comfortable with change and innovation.

The global networking capacity and mobilization of the Global Millennial Generation was made possible because of the technical expertise, or digital nativity, generally found in the Global Millennial Generation. Other generations have expertise with technology, but no generation is as closely tied to technology as the Global Millennial Generation.<sup>12</sup> This connection to technology has been the essential element that facilitates the continued expansion of the network and mobilization efforts of ISIL. It may sound like this research is saying that technology is the factor that is having the greatest effect on Irregular Warfare, but this research argues that without the expertise and imagination of the Global Millennial Generation, ISIL would not have been nearly as prolific as they have been in their propaganda, recruiting, and influencing efforts. An example of this type of innovation is, ISIL releasing their very own smartphone application for android to continue to spread their propaganda even when it is taken down from Twitter and YouTube.<sup>13</sup>

### Summary and Conclusion

The Global Millennial Generation's, nativity with technology, opportunity for mobilization, and global network have changed the Irregular Warfare landscape. These changes are resident in the expansion and adaptation of the fundamentals of insurgency to a global environment put forth by the works of Galula, Kalyvas, and Kilcullen. These works as well as contemporary COIN thought fail to address these changes. Incorporating these changes into the future operation and policy to combat groups like ISIL will be essential to holistic solutions to the problem of a global insurgency, instead of regional or by country solutions to the symptoms. The following chapter provides an interpretation of the findings from this chapter and discusses future policy, strategy, and research ideas.

---

<sup>1</sup> Barrett; Berger and Morgan; Callimachi; Stern and Berger; Galula; Kilcullen; Kalyvas.

<sup>2</sup> Galula, 13-19.

<sup>3</sup> Berger and Morgan.

<sup>4</sup> Galula, 32-46.

<sup>5</sup> Kalyvas, 210-243.

<sup>6</sup> Stephen Starr, "A Deeper Look at Syria Related Jihadist Activity in Turkey," *CTC Sentinel* 7, no. 8 (August 2014): 7-10; Muhammad al-'Ubaydi, "Stories of Foreign Fighter Migration to Syria," *CTC Sentinel* 7, no. 8 (August 2014): 11-13.

<sup>7</sup> Callimachi; Dodwell, Milton, and Ressler; Kalyvas, 89.

<sup>8</sup> Kilcullen, 35.

<sup>9</sup> Patterson, MacCaffery, and Sillman; Lacy; Zogby, and Khul.

<sup>10</sup> The Economist; Riggio.

<sup>11</sup> The Economist; Taylor; Trzesniewski and Donnelly.

<sup>12</sup> Pew Research Center, *PEW Millennials: Confident. Connected. Open to Change*; Telefonica; Taylor.

<sup>13</sup> James Titcomb, "Islamic State Releases its Own Smartphone App," *The Telegraph*, December 12, 2015, accessed April 1, 2017, <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/news/12036736/Islamic-State-releases-its-own-smartphone-app.html>.

## CHAPTER 5

### CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The laws of war—this is a problem that anyone directing a war must study and solve.

The laws of revolutionary war—this is a problem that anyone directing a revolutionary war must study and solve.

The laws of China’s revolutionary war—this is a problem that anyone directing a revolutionary war in China must study and solve.

— Mao Tse-tung, “Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung”

#### Introduction

The purpose of the study is to determine how the Global Millennial Generation has changed Irregular Warfare. ISIL’s global insurgency was the vehicle used to identify the changes to Irregular Warfare made possible by the Global Millennial Generation.

This chapter is broken down into two sections: a conclusion section, which summarizes what was learned about the link between Irregular Warfare and the Global Millennial Generation; and a recommendation section, which discusses future research and changes to policy and doctrine.

#### Conclusions

ISIL is a new type of threat facing the global international political establishment. Never in history has the world faced a non-state actor willing to take and hold ground and take on the functions of a legitimate state, while continuing to sponsor and endorse attacks on the geopolitical status quo. ISIL changed the military and political game by leveraging the Global Millennial Generation to recruit, spread propaganda, and command

and control globally. The Global Millennial Generation's digital nativity, global network, and opportunity for mobilization have been essential to ISIL's efforts.

This research explored the works of David Gallula, Stathais Kalyvas, and David Kilcullen, considered the foundational documents of Irregular Warfare, and more specifically, insurgency literature. These works are the basis for U.S. COIN doctrine. These works focus on insurgency at the local or regional context, but the above-described attributes of the Global Millennial Generation have expanded their ideas to a global scale.

To summarize these expansions, this study begins with Galula's thoughts on the cause. Galula's thoughts focused on the population internal or peripheral to the nation where the insurgency was taking place.<sup>1</sup> The Global Millennial Generation has facilitated the expansion of this cause to a global audience, leveraging the internet and social media to globally market, recruit, spread propaganda, and influence.

The next expansion is in Galula's concepts of the orthodox and shortcut patterns for insurgency.<sup>2</sup> These patterns have evolved in how ISIL has adapted to the global environment. ISIL uses parts of both approaches, creating an evolution in patterns of insurgency. ISIL used the orthodox pattern to build support and capacity within an area they are attempting to control. At the same time, using blind terrorism from the shortcut method, the insurgent organization may launch or inspire offensive terrorist attacks against their perceived adversaries to influence their behavior or gain support for their cause. This use of blind terrorism also may not ever transition into selective terrorism in these areas because they are outside of the zone of control for the insurgent. This new model explains ISIL's approach to insurgency, building support in Syria and Iraq, while inspiring and executing attacks against the west and its allies.

There is also evidence that Kalyvas' concept of Zones has been expanded by the Global Millennial Generation.<sup>3</sup> The global networks and potential for mobilization of the Global Millennials have expanded these zones outside of the nation in conflict, to nations that are at risk or ready to radicalize and act to support the ISIL cause. Zone one is now anywhere on the globe where an opponent of the insurgent is found. Zone five is now anywhere that ISIL holds ground: Iraq, Syria, Afghanistan, Libya, etc. Zones two and four have been similarly expanded, but are somewhat merged. These zones are under threat of internal prosecution by the incumbent government to support internal security, and at the same time offer a means to project attacks by the insurgent against the incumbent. Zone three is also expanded outside the nation in conflict to areas that are essential to trafficking of personnel and materials necessary to support conflict on both sides, but no have relatively low levels of violence.

The expansion of these zones to a global scale only exacerbates the identification problem for the counterinsurgent, because with the Global Millennial Generation, now anyone anywhere that has an internet connection can be recruited, radicalized, and mobilized.<sup>4</sup> If support for the cause can be found anywhere, this presents a resource problem for those who are trying to counter a group like ISIL.

The identification problem and the inadvertent alienation of religious groups or immigrant populations expand the Accidental Guerrilla concept offered by Kilcullen.<sup>5</sup> The Global Millennial Generation is a mobile cohort that is digitally connected and is able to self and peer radicalize and recruit globally. It has offered exponential increases in the contact ISIL or any other group can have with the world. Additionally, they also have the ability to expeditiously exploit the deeds and words of the West, giving them

opportunities to target and organize populations for support, even in areas that are not directly affected by those words or deeds. These targeted populations can now be organized and mobilized to become the Accidental Guerrilla because they now feel digitally and physically connected to the cause.

These expansions are no accident and not a phenomenon that is going away. As the world becomes more digitally integrated and connected by the internet and social media, the Global Millennial Generation and their digital nativity, global networking capacity, and opportunity for mobilization is essential in understanding changes in framework and anticipating future changes. The Global Millennial Generation is not the end of the study of the generational changes to conflict. Subsequent generations will likely continue to expand contemporary theories and possibly break new ground in future conflicts.

### Recommendations

The current COIN doctrine and literature fails to appropriately address the tactics demonstrated by ISIL's global insurgency, because it focuses on insurgency inside a country or region and not at the global scale. Though ISIL is just one case, it can be expected that future movements will utilize their blueprint. No longer can an insurgency be considered localized to a country or even a region. The digital nativity, global network, and ability to mobilize that is found within the Global Millennial Generation allows any group with a seemingly nascent cause to find supporters willing to act. The threats posed from these groups continue to be real and significant challenges for the world, and may even increase as ISIL goes back into the shadows, as the coalition dislodges them from the ground that they currently hold. Additionally, just the exposure

to the unadulterated violence of ISIL propaganda may desensitize the global audience to similar acts in the future.

What does this mean for the future of Irregular Warfare? First, to address these changes the COIN framework should be opened up to address the actual nature of the current conflict. This new global COIN model addresses the support found through the digital nativity, opportunity for mobilization, and global networks established by the Millennial Generation. Current and future military commanders may have to look to the U.S. or the West for cues to actions on the battlefield, and at the same time government leaders and law enforcement officials may have to look to the battlefields to understand policy shortfalls and emerging threats at home.

Future research should look to expand upon this work by identifying other elements of Irregular Warfare that may be changing as well. Furthermore, researchers should study the future effects of the involvement in and exposure to conflict by the members of the Global Millennial Generation who return home. How has this experience changed them? Have they moderated their views once they have been part of the violence, or are they more extreme? What other aspects of Irregular Warfare are changing due to the Global Millennial Generation? Research should also look at what happens after this conflict ends. Where are these large numbers of foreign fighters going to go, and what are they going to do? Should and will they be arrested? What steps should be taken to demobilize these individuals? These will be important questions in the coming months and years as ISIL loses its ability to hold ground inside Syria and Iraq. These fighters have to go somewhere, and will possibly try to find ways to go home. Additionally, these Global Millennials, involved in conflict or not, are the future leaders of every facet of the

world, from criminal and terrorist organizations to corporations and governments. These future leaders' views and actions will certainly be shaped by the events taking place today. The role of a generational cohort in conflict is wide open for study. Additionally, unprecedented amounts of data are available via the digital environment for collection and analysis for those willing to do the work.

The Global Millennial Generation changed Irregular Warfare. Their global network, ability to mobilize, and nativity with technology made these changes possible. Though technology is a key factor that helped facilitate the changing Irregular Warfare environment, warfare in human endeavor and no amount of technology will remove that from the equation. These changes seem to be elemental, but that is because technology now touches every aspect of one's lives, and it is only expected to become more engrained. This research focused on the narrow scope of the changes in Irregular Warfare and even more narrowly, insurgency, caused by the Global Millennial Generation. If the changes described here are possible with the Global Millennial Generation, who knows what future changes will be made by this generation, not to mention what will be made possible by future generations. Understanding these changes to the context of Irregular Warfare literature and doctrine is essential to addressing the global insurgency of ISIL and future insurgencies. Failure to understand these changes and look for ways to exploit the vulnerabilities of the Global Millennial Generation, ensures that the anti-ISIL coalition is perpetually playing catch up. Additionally, understanding these dynamic changes allows opponents to leverage some of the things that give ISIL the ability to be as prolific as they are, and build a new COIN framework.

---

<sup>1</sup> Galula, 13-19.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid., 32-46.

<sup>3</sup> Kalyvas, 210-243.

<sup>4</sup> Ibid., 89.

<sup>5</sup> Kilcullen, 35.

## GLOSSARY

Caliphate. The original Caliphate was established in the year 632 in the Arabian Peninsula, and the title of Caliph, or Khalifa, was given to Abu Bakr as-Siddiq who became the first leader, after the death of the Prophet Muhammad. The word ‘Caliph’ means successor, and designates the political leader of the Islamic community, or ummah. By using the language of Caliph and Caliphate, ISIL is attempting to establish itself as the leader of a worldwide Muslim movement and mobilize a broad coalition of support by erasing national boundaries.<sup>1</sup>

Department of Defense. The mission of the Department of Defense is to provide the military forces needed to deter war and to protect the security of our country.<sup>2</sup>

Insurgency. An organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through use of subversion and armed conflict.<sup>3</sup>

Irregular Warfare. A violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant populations. Irregular Warfare favors indirect and asymmetric approaches, though it may employ the full range of military and other capabilities, in order to erode an adversary’s power, influence, and will.<sup>4</sup>

ISIL. The Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant. The self-proclaimed Islamic State is a militant Sunni movement that has conquered territory in western Iraq, eastern Syria, and Libya, from which it has tried to establish the caliphate, claiming exclusive political and theological authority over the world’s Muslims. Its state-building project, however, has been characterized more by extreme violence than institution building.<sup>5</sup> (Sometimes referred to as Islamic State, IS, or ISIS)

Islamism. Refers to the broad range of political movements and parties that share the belief that principles drawn from the Islamic tradition should have substantial influence on the public sphere and on the manner in which a society conducts or organizes its political life.<sup>6</sup>

Islamist. Members of Islam who reject the notion of a separation between religion and public life. Islamists believe that ideals, values, or principles rooted in Islam are relevant to the modern world, and that they provide useful guidance on contemporary political and public-policy issues.<sup>7</sup>

Jihad. Jihadists define jihad as individual duty for all Muslims. Because Islam is under attack, all must respond. Jihad cannot be a communal duty, a matter of state, until a legitimate Islamist state exists. First, believers must fight off attackers and then they can switch to offense.<sup>8</sup>

Jillennials. Jihadis who are Millennials.<sup>9</sup>

Levant. The name applied widely to the eastern Mediterranean coastal lands of Asia Minor and Phoenicia (modern-day Turkey, Syria, and Lebanon). In a wider sense, the term can be used to encompass the entire coastline from Greece to Egypt. The Levant is part of the Fertile Crescent and was home to some of the ancient Mediterranean trade centers, such as Ugarit, Tyre, and Sidon. It is the homeland of the Phoenician civilization.<sup>10</sup>

Message. A narrowly focused communication directed at a specific audience to support a specific theme.<sup>11</sup>

Millennials. Those born after 1980 and the first generation to come of age in the new millennium.<sup>12</sup>

Revolutionary Warfare. Specific version of an insurgency, designed to use guerrilla warfare combined with political action to further an ideology in place of the incumbent government.<sup>13</sup>

Social Media. A countless array of internet based tools and platforms that increase and enhance the sharing of information. This new form of media makes the transfer of text, photos, audio, video, and information in general increasingly fluid among internet users. Social Media has relevance not only for regular internet users, but business as well. Platforms like Twitter, Facebook, and LinkedIn have created online communities where people can share as much or as little personal information as they desire with other members. The result is an enormous amount of information that can be easily shared, searched, promoted, disputed, and created.<sup>14</sup>

Terrorism. The calculated use of unlawful violence or threat of unlawful violence to inculcate fear; intended to coerce or to intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, or ideological.<sup>15</sup>

Traditional Warfare. A form of warfare between the regulated militaries of states, or alliances of states, in which the objective is to defeat an adversary's armed forces, destroy an adversary's war-making capacity, or seize or retain territory in order to force a change in an adversary's government or policies.<sup>16</sup>

Umma. Arabic word meaning 'community', more specifically the Muslim community.<sup>17</sup>

---

<sup>1</sup> Yasmine Hafiz, "What Is A Caliphate? ISIS Declaration Raises Questions," *The Huffington Post*, June 30, 2014, accessed December 16, 2016, [http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/06/30/what-is-a-caliphate-meaning\\_n\\_5543538.html](http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/06/30/what-is-a-caliphate-meaning_n_5543538.html).

<sup>2</sup> U.S. Department of Defense, "About the Department of Defense (DOD)," January 27, 2017, accessed February 1, 2017, <https://www.defense.gov/About>.

<sup>3</sup> JCS, JP1-02, 117.

<sup>4</sup> DOD, *IW JOC*, 6.

<sup>5</sup> Zachary Laub and Jonathan Masters, “CRF Backgrounders,” Council on Foreign Relations, May 15, 2015, last updated August 10, 2016, accessed November 14, 2016, <http://www.cfr.org/iraq/islamic-state/p14811>.

<sup>6</sup> Guilain Denoeux and Lynn Carter, *Guide to the Drivers of Violent Extremism* (Washington, DC: U.S. Agency for International Development, 2009), 86.

<sup>7</sup> Ibid.

<sup>8</sup> Mary Habeck, “Knowing the Enemy: Jihadist Ideology and the War on Terror,” Security Studies Program Seminar, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA, February 15, 2006, accessed December 14, 2016, [http://web.mit.edu/SSP/seminars/wed\\_archives06spring/habeck.html](http://web.mit.edu/SSP/seminars/wed_archives06spring/habeck.html).

<sup>9</sup> Usmani.

<sup>10</sup> Jan van der Crabben, “Levant Definition,” Ancient History Encyclopedia, April 28, 2011, accessed December 14, 2017, <http://www.ancient.eu/levant>.

<sup>11</sup> JCS, JP 1-02, 154.

<sup>12</sup> Pew Research Center, *PEW Millennials: Confident. Connected. Open to Change*.

<sup>13</sup> Bernard Fall, “The Theory and Practice of Insurgency and Counterinsurgency,” *Naval War College Review* 51, no. 1 (Winter 1998): 47.

<sup>14</sup> Social Media Defined, “What is Social Media?” June 4, 2014, accessed December 14, 2016, <http://www.socialmediadefined.com/what-is-social-media>.

<sup>15</sup> JCS, JP 1-02, 238.

<sup>16</sup> DOD, DODD 3000.07.

<sup>17</sup> Matejic.

## BIBLIOGRAPHY

### Books

- Barrett, Richard. *Foreign Fighters in Syria*. New York: The Soufan Group, 2015.
- Galula, David. *Counterinsurgent Warfare: Theory and Practice*. New York: Praeger, 1964.
- Kalyvas, Stathis. *The Logic of Violence in Civil War*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2006.
- Kilcullen, David. *The Accidental Guerrilla*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2009.
- Oneil, Bard. *Insurgency and Terrorism: From Revolution to Apocalypse*. Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2005.
- Perez, Celestino. *Addressing the Fog of COG: Perspectives on the Center of Gravity in US Military Doctrine*. Ft. Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, 2012.
- Stern, Jessica, and J. M. Berger. *ISIS The State of Terror*. New York: Harper Collins, 2015.
- Twinge, Gene. *Generation Me*. New York: Atria Books, 2014.
- von Clausewitz, Carl. *On War*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984.

### Government Documents

- Department of Defense. *Irregular Warfare (IW) Joint Operating Concept (JOC)*. Version 1.0. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2007.
- Deputy Secretary of Defense. Department of Defense Directive 3000.07, *Irregular Warfare (IW)*. Washington, DC: Department of Defense, August 2014 (incorporating Change 1, May 12, 2017).
- Joint Chiefs of Staff. Joint Publication 1-02, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2016.
- \_\_\_\_\_. Joint Publication 3-0, *Joint Operations*. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2017.

### Journals/Periodicals

- al-'Ubaydi, Muhammad. "Stories of Foreign Fighter Migration to Syria." *CTC Sentinel* 7, no. 8 (August 2014): 11-13.
- Berger, J. M. "How ISIS Games Twitter." *The Atlantic*, June 16, 2014. Accessed March 21, 2017. <https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2014/06/isis-iraq-twitter-social-media-strategy/372856/>.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "Tailored Online Interventions: The Islamic State's Recruitment Strategy." *CTC Sentinel* 8, no. 10 (October 2015): 19-23.
- Callimachi, Rumini. "ISIS and the Lonely Young American." *The New York Times*, June 27, 2015.
- The Economist. "The Young: Generation Uphill," January 23, 2016. Accessed January 5, 2017. <http://www.economist.com/news/special-report/21688591-millennials-are-brainiest-best-educated-generation-ever-yet-their-elders-often>.
- Fall, Bernard. "The Theory and Practice of Insurgency and Counterinsurgency." *Naval War College Review* 51, no. 1 (Winter 1998): 47.
- Favat, Pete, and Bryan Price. "The Truth Campaign and the War of Ideas." *CTC Sentinel* 8, no. 7 (July 2015): 9-12.
- Hafiz, Yasmine. "What Is A Caliphate? ISIS Declaration Raises Questions." *The Huffington Post*, June 30, 2014. Accessed December 16, 2016. [http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/06/30/what-is-a-caliphate-meaning\\_n\\_5543538.html](http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/06/30/what-is-a-caliphate-meaning_n_5543538.html).
- Helms, Marilyn, and Judy Nixon. "Exploring SWOT Analysis – Where are we Now?: A Review of Academic Research from the Last Decade." *Journal of Strategy and Management* 3, no. 3 (2008): 215-251.
- Lacy, Akela. The "'First Globals': Millennials and Foreign Policy." *Diplomatic Courier*, October 17, 2013. Accessed December 16, 2016. <http://www.diplomaticcourier.com/the-first-globals-millennials-and-foreign-policy/>.
- Lahoud, Nelly, and Robert Person. "In Search of New Approaches." *CTC Sentinel* 8, no. 7 (July 2015): 6-8.
- Lee, Alexander. "Who Becomes a Terrorist? Poverty, Education, and the Origins of Political Violence." *World Politics* 63, no. 2 (April 2011): 203-245.
- Lee, Doowan. "A Social Movement Approach to UW." *Special Warfare* 26, no. 3 (July-September 2013): 27-32.

- Lee, Doowan, and Glenn W. Johnson. "Revisiting the Social Movement Approach to Unconventional Warfare." *Small Wars Journal* (December 1, 2014).
- Long, Austin. "The Anbar Awakening." *Survival* (2008): 67-94.
- Matejic, Nicole. "Content Wars: Daesh's Sophisticated Use of Communications." *NATO Review Magazine* (2016).
- Motlagh, Jason. "Why the Taliban Is Winning the Propaganda War." *Time*, May 3, 2009. Accessed March 14, 2017. <http://content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1895496,00.html>.
- Nichols, Laura, Lindsay Stein, and Chris Daniels. "Waging War against Extremists on the Internet." *PR Week*, February 24, 2015. Accessed November 12, 2016. <http://www.prweek.com/article/1335178/waging-war-against-extremists-internet>.
- Ranstorp, Magnus. "Microfinancing the Caliphate: How the Islamic State is Unlocking the Assets of European Recruits." *CTC Sentinel* 9, no. 5 (May 2016): 11-15.
- Riggio, Ronald. "How to Lead the Millennial Generation." *Psychology Today*, May 6, 2010. Accessed December 15, 2016. <https://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/cutting-edge-leadership/201005/how-lead-the-millennial-generation>.
- Roul, Animesh. "How Bangladesh Became Fertile Ground for al-Qa`ida and the Islamic State." *CTC Sentinel* 9, no. 5 (May 2016): 27-34.
- Scaife, Robert B. "The Regularity of Irregular Warfare." *Small Wars Journal* (October 16, 2012).
- Starr, Stephen. "A Deeper Look at Syria Related Jihadist Activity in Turkey." *CTC Sentinel* 7, no. 8 (August 2014): 7-10.
- Stern, Jessica. "Pakistan's Jihad Culture." *Foreign Affairs* (November-December 2000): 115-126.
- Tadjeh, Yasmin. "U.S. Government Trying to Counter ISIL's Twitter Consensus'." *National Defense* (April 2015): 32.
- Taylor, Dylan. "From Developed to Developing Cultures: How Millennials Are Influencing Our World." *Colliers*, June 6, 2016. Accessed January 15, 2017. <http://knowledge-leader.colliers.com/dylan-taylor/from-developed-to-developing-cultures-how-millennials-are-influencing-our-world/>.
- Titcomb, James. "Islamic State Releases its Own Smartphone App." *The Telegraph*, December 12, 2015. Accessed April 1, 2017. <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/news/12036736/Islamic-State-releases-its-own-smartphone-app.html>.

- Trzesniewski, Kali H., and M. Brent Donnell. "Rethinking 'Generation Me': A Study of Cohort Effects From 1976–2006." *Perspectives on Psychological Science* (2010): 58-75.
- Urdal, Henrik. "A Clash of Generations? Youth Bulges and Political Violence." *International Studies Quarterly* 50, no. 3 (September 2006): 607-629.
- Votel, Joseph. "Understanding Terrorism Today and Tomorrow." *CTC Sentinel* 8, no. 7 (July 2015): 2-5.
- Watson, Ben. "The Drones of ISIS." *Defense One*, January 12, 2017. Accessed March 23, 2017. <http://www.defenseone.com/technology/2017/01/drones-isis/134542/>.
- Whiteside, Craig. "The Islamic State and the Return of Revolutionary Warfare." *Small Wars and Insurgencies* 27, no. 5 (2016): 743-776.

#### Online Sources

- Alawlaki, Anwar. "The State of Ummah." *Anwar Alawlaki Blog*, April 23, 2009. Accessed March 15, 2017. <http://anwar-alawlaki.blogspot.com/2009/04/state-of-ummah.html>.
- Beehner, Lionel. "The Effects of 'Youth Bulge' on Civil Conflicts." Council on Foreign Affairs, April 13, 2007. Accessed April 30, 2017. <http://www.cfr.org/world/effects-youth-bulge-civil-conflicts/p13093#p3>.
- Bush, George W. "Remarks by the President of the United States at the United Nations Financing for Development Conference, Monterrey, Mexico, March 22, 2002." Accessed March 27, 2017. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=63268><http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=63268>.
- Jurevicius, Ovidijus. "SWOT Analysis - Do It Properly!" Strategic Management Insight, February 13, 2013. Accessed December 15, 2016. <https://www.strategicmanagementinsight.com/tools/swot-analysis-how-to-do-it.html>.
- Kroft, Steve. "The Echo Boomers." *CBS News*, October 1, 2004. Accessed December 14, 2016. <http://www.cbsnews.com/news/the-echo-boomers-01-10-2004/>.
- Mind Tools. "SWOT Analysis: Discover New Opportunities, Manage and Eliminate Threats." Accessed November 14, 2016. [https://www.mindtools.com/pages/article/newTMC\\_05.htm](https://www.mindtools.com/pages/article/newTMC_05.htm).
- Patterson, Erik, Courtney McCaffery, and Ari Sillman. "Where are the Global Millennials?" AT Kearney, July 2016. Accessed November 12, 2016. [https://www.atkearney.com/ideas-insights/issue-papers-perspectives/-/asset\\_publisher/dVxv4Hz2h8bS/content/id/8693136](https://www.atkearney.com/ideas-insights/issue-papers-perspectives/-/asset_publisher/dVxv4Hz2h8bS/content/id/8693136).

- Pew Research Center. "Millennials." Accessed January 1, 2017. <http://www.pewresearch.org/topics/millennials/>.
- Purcell, Kristin, Lee Rainie, Tom Rosenstiel, and Amy Mitchell. "How Mobile Devices are Changing Community Information Environments." Pew Research Center, March 14, 2011. Accessed January 15, 2017. <http://www.pewinternet.org/2011/03/14/how-mobile-devices-are-changing-community-information-environments/>.
- Ruffini, Christina. "Molenbeek: Terror Recruiting Ground." *CBS News*, March 18, 2016. Accessed March 30, 2017. <http://www.cbsnews.com/news/molenbeek-brussels-belgium-isis-terror-recruiting-ground/>.
- Safer, Morley. "The Millennials are Coming." *CBS News*, November 7, 2008. Accessed December 17, 2016. <http://www.cbsnews.com/news/the-millennials-are-coming/>.
- Shakespeare, William. *Henry V*. 1599. Electronic Series Classic Publication. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania, 1998-2013. Accessed April 12, 2017. <https://www.ucm.es/data/cont/docs/119-2014-02-19-4.%20Henry%20V.pdf>.
- Social Media Defined. "What is Social Media?" June 4, 2014. Accessed December 14, 2016. <http://www.socialmediadefined.com/what-is-social-media/>.
- Tse-tung, Mao. "Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung: Problems of Strategy in China's Revolutionary War, December 1936." Marxist Internet Archive. Accessed April 10, 2017. [https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/selected-works/volume-1/mswv1\\_12.htm](https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/selected-works/volume-1/mswv1_12.htm).
- U.S. Department of Defense. "About the Department of Defense (DOD)." January 27, 2017. Accessed February 1, 2017. <https://www.defense.gov/About>.
- Usmani, Zeeshaun. "Data Sciences, ISIS and Predictions for 2016." Data Science Central, January 5, 2016. Accessed November 12, 2016. <http://www.data-sciencecentral.com/profiles/blog/show?id=6448529%3ABlogPost%3A369643>.
- van der Crabben, Jan. "Levant Definition." Ancient History Encyclopedia. April 28, 2011. Accessed December 14, 2017. <http://www.ancient.eu/levant/>.

### Papers/Reports

- Atran, Scott. *The Devoted Actor, Sacred Values, and the Willingness to Fight*. Oxford, UK: The Center for the Resolution of Intractable Conflict, 2014.
- Baker, Jonathan S. "Harbingers of the Caliphate: Islamic State Revolutionary Actions 2011-2014." Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, 2016.

- Berger, J. M., and Jonathan Morgan. "The ISIS Twitter Census." Analysis Paper, The Brookings Institute, Washington, DC, 2015.
- Berrebi, Claude. "Evidence about the Link between Education, Poverty, and Terrorism Among Palestinians." Working Paper No. 477. Princeton University Industrial Relations Sections, Princeton, NJ, 2003.
- Bodine-Barron, Elizabeth, Todd C. Helmus, Madeline Mangunson, and Zev Winklemen. *Examining ISIS Support and Opposition Networks on Twitter*. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2016.
- Deloitte. *The 2016 Deloitte Millennial Survey Winning over the Next Generation of Leaders*. New York: Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu, 2016.
- Denooux, Guilain, and Lynn Carter. *Guide to the Drivers of Violent Extremism*. Washington, DC: U.S. Agency for International Development, 2009.
- Dodwell, Brian, Daniel Milton, and Don Rassler. *The Caliphate's Global Workforce: An Inside Look at the Islamic State's Foreign Fighter Paper Trail*. West Point, NY: Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, 2016.
- Habeck, Mary. "Knowing the Enemy: Jihadist Ideology and the War on Terror." Security Studies Program Seminar, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA, February 15, 2006. Accessed December 14, 2016. [http://web.mit.edu/SSP/seminars/wed\\_archives06spring/habeck.html](http://web.mit.edu/SSP/seminars/wed_archives06spring/habeck.html)
- Hanna, Andrew. "The Global Youth Unemployment Crisis: Exploring Successful Initiatives and Partnering with Youths." Honors Thesis, Sanford School of Public Policy Duke University, Durham, NC, 2014.
- Kruger, Allen, and David Laitin. "Kto Kogo? A Cross-Country Study of the Origins and Targets of Terrorism." Russell Sage Foundation, New York, NY, January 18, 2007.
- Laub, Zachary, and Jonathan Masters. "CRF Backgrounders." Council on Foreign Relations, May 15, 2015, last updated August 10, 2016. Accessed November 14, 2016. <http://www.cfr.org/iraq/islamic-state/p14811>.
- Milton, Daniel. *Communication Breakdown: Unraveling the Islamic State's Media E* ~~ffices~~ Point, NY: Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, 2016.
- Pew Research Center. *PEW Millennials: Confident. Connected. Open to Change*. Washington, DC: Pew Research Center, 2010.
- Raymond, Derek J. "Combating Daesh: A Socially Unconventional Strategy." Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, 2015.

Telefónica. *Telefónica Global Millennial Survey: Global Results*, 2013. Accessed January 6, 2017. <http://survey.telefonica.com/globalreports/assets/Telefonica%20-%20Global%20Millennial%20Survey.pdf>.

Zogby, John, and Joan Khul. *The First Globals: Understanding, Managing, and Unleashing the Potential of our Millennial Generation*. Amazon Digital Services: John Zogby and Joan Khul, June 2013. Accessed January 6, 2017. <https://www.amazon.com/Understanding-Unleashing-Potential-Millennial-Generation-ebook/dp/B00DE3N19W>.