

THE EMPLOYMENT OF PERSONNEL AT THE
TUCSON BORDER PATROL STATION

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fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE
Homeland Security Studies

by

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ABSTRACT

THE EMPLOYMENT OF PERSONNEL AT THE TUCSON BORDER PATROL STATION, by Robert W. Edwards, 88 pages.

The Tucson Border Patrol Station runs its daily operations on the U.S. and Mexico border over a span of 20 miles between Nogales, Arizona and Sells, Arizona. Tucson Station Border Patrol Agents (BPAs) drive to the border to perform their duties each day and night in different forms of personnel employment once arriving at the border. There are small teams at the Tucson Station that have been successful at performing the duties of the Border Patrol. Examples of small teams are the Tucson Station Horse Patrol Unit (HPU), all-terrain vehicle (ATV) unit, disrupt unit, and a Tucson Station mountain team. Drug Trafficking Organizations (DTOs), and Alien Smuggling Organizations (ASOs) have made the border more complex providing guides with deterrence equipment, like carpet booties and camouflage gear. Combatting the DTO/ASO complexity, while working within both a rural environment and an urban one with the heightened scrutiny of small teams is an effective method of personnel employment in the Tucson Station's area of responsibility (AOR).

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ACRONYMS

ACTT	Alliance to Combat Transnational Threats
AMO	Air and Marine Operations
AOR	Area of Responsibility
ASO	Alien Smuggling Organizations
ATV	All-Terrain Vehicle
BP	Border Patrol
BPA	Border Patrol Agent
BORSTAR	Border Patrol Search, Trauma and Rescue Unit
BORTAC	Border Patrol Tactical Unit
CBP	Customs and Border Protection
DHS	Department of Homeland Security
DOTMLPF-P	Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel, Facilities and Policy
DTO	Drug Trafficking Organizations
HPU	Horse Patrol Unit
ICE	Immigration and Customs Enforcement
NBPC	National Border Patrol Council
SBPA	Supervisory Border Patrol Agent
SOF	Special Operations Forces (U.S. Army)
SOG	Special Operations Group
TUS	Tucson Station
U.S.	United States
WC	Watch Commander

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The United States (U.S.) Border Patrol is a component of Customs and Border Protection (CBP) of the Department of Homeland Security. Its mission, per the *2012-2016 Border Patrol Strategic Plan; The Mission: Protect America*, is twofold: “Secure the Border and Strengthen the Border Patrol.”¹ The Tucson Sector is one of 20 sectors in the U.S. Border Patrol and is comprised of eight stations responsible for 262 linear miles of border from the New Mexico and Arizona border in the east to Yuma County, Arizona to the west. About 4,200 Border Patrol Agents (BPAs) work within Tucson Sector.²

Within Tucson Sector is Tucson Station (TUS), the largest station in the Border Patrol, as of 2014.³ Tucson Station has acquired a sub-station in 2011 under the same management, the Three Points Station. Tucson Station sits 70-miles north of the border, while Three Points Station is only 24 miles north. Together, the two stations are responsible for over 30 U.S. and Mexico border miles and most of Pima County.⁴

¹ U.S. Customs and Border Protection, *Border Patrol 2012-2016 Strategic Plan*, accessed December 20, 2016, https://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/documents/bp_strategic_plan.pdf.

² U.S. Customs and Border Protection, “Tucson Sector Arizona,” accessed January 23, 2017, <https://www.cbp.gov/border-security/along-us-borders/border-patrol-sectors/tucson-sector-arizona>.

³ U.S. Customs and Border Protection, “Tucson Station,” accessed January 23, 2017, <https://www.cbp.gov/border-security/along-us-borders/border-patrol-sectors/tucson-sector-arizona/tucson-station>.

⁴ Ibid.

Since 1924, when the U.S. Border Patrol was first organized,⁵ agents employ to the border from their respective stations. Agents of the Tucson Station work each day tracking groups of illegal aliens, interdicting smuggling loads of narcotics and illegal contraband, patrolling the border and performing checkpoint duties. Agents may receive active, or real time intelligence, from a local citizen or respond to traffic in real time, from agents manning a camera. Agents work on foot, in vehicles, horse, on all-terrain vehicles (ATVs), or on board an aircraft throughout the Sector's area of responsibility (AOR).

Characteristics of Tucson Sector's AOR

Tucson Sector AOR is comprised of rugged mountainous terrain, desert, mesquite trees and cactus, black-top unlit highways and unpaved county roads. There are several prominent ranches to the east and west of Sasabe, Arizona that Tucson agents routinely patrol and conduct operations to interdict illegal aliens, narcotics and illegal contraband. North of the town of Sasabe, up to the community of Three Points, there are several areas consisting of deep washes, canyons, mountains to the east and west along large stretches of desert. Likewise, to the east and west of the city of Nogales, where Tucson Station and Nogales Station agents patrol in search of illegal alien activity, there are several inaccessible areas by vehicle which increases vulnerabilities to illegal alien traffic.

⁵ U.S. Customs and Border Protection, "Border Patrol Overview," accessed May 20, 2017, <https://www.cbp.gov/border-security/along-us-borders/overview>.

Line Unit

The bulk of personnel employment at the Tucson Station are line units, or shifts. The agents of the Tucson Station work hourly shifts to cover the 24-hour patrol of Tucson Station's AOR. Assignments may vary daily, weekly, or monthly, but rarely are agents accountable for the same duties for more than a month, unless assigned to a small team. Supervisors work on the line unit and report to a watch commander (WC) assigned to each unit. Additionally, a Tactical Operations Center Supervisor will assist in relaying information to supervisors in the field, to include command requirements of the WC. Line units are how the Tucson Border Patrol Station employs its agents to the Tucson AOR. This is in contrast to small teams, which will be discussed next.

The Team Approach at Tucson Station

Small teams already exist in the U.S. Border Patrol. In the Tucson Sector, and at the Tucson Station, teams may come in the form of the Tucson Station Horse Patrol Unit (HPU). Small teams can be fillers to address the area where in most cases, shift, or regular line agent units are unable to respond sufficiently due to their time spent along the border patrolling. Currently Tucson Station has teams working consistently in their AOR. The HPU works on shifts with line agents and patrols the Tucson's AOR, specifically in those areas where it is difficult for line agents to get to, either due to time constraints, or manpower. Additionally, an ATV unit responds similarly to how the HPU does, focusing in areas where line agents are most sparse. Tucson has a small team that focuses in the mountainous areas of the AOR, where it is less feasible for line agents to respond expeditiously, as it requires a great deal of physical fitness and knowledge of the area. The Tucson Station disrupt unit is a team of agents performing criminal organization

disruption operations consisting of plain-clothes agents utilizing intelligence gathered by line agents and supervisors to include other agencies, such as Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and Pima County Sheriff's Department. Disrupt investigates and interdicts criminal smuggling activities along the border, and in the Tucson AOR, while focusing on alien smuggling organizations (ASOs) and drug trafficking organizations (DTOs). In addition, there are flex units that are comprised of agents per shift, that work areas that are difficult for line shift agents to respond to within the designated shift times. Lastly, a sensor unit works in conjunction with all the small teams in Tucson Station's AOR, and monitors vehicle and human sensors in locations travelled by illegal aliens and drug smugglers. Tucson fields an air-mobile unit that is comprised of agents and air interdiction agents and utilized to cover the areas in and between Tucson's AOR and its neighboring stations.

Agents request to work on teams at the Tucson Border Patrol Station through requests to management, and like the San Diego Sector Horse Patrol, agents are anxious to work with unique line watch capabilities, such as horseback.⁶ More about that later. Lastly, agents may work at a forward operating base to address areas that are becoming more traversed by illegal aliens and drug smugglers to allow for an increase of agents in the area during a shift. These forward operating bases have been in place at the Tucson Station and throughout the Border Patrol for years at a time.

⁶ Erin Siegel, "U.S. Border Patrol: More Agents, More Fences, More Technology, More Horses?" *ABC News*, March 28, 2013, accessed December 28, 2016, https://abcnews.go.com/ABC_Univision/borderpatrol-horses-secure-border/story?id=18733100.

During the years, Tucson Station has fielded an air mobile unit (AMU). Initially, the unit worked a specific area of vulnerability in the Tucson Station AOR. Over the ensuing years, it grew with more agents, and incorporating “the whole-of-government approach”⁷ as outlined in the *2012-2016 Border Patrol Strategic Plan; The Mission: Protect America*, as Air and Marine Operations (AMO) assets, such as Blackhawk helicopters, worked with these units daily in support. An AMU agent would accompany the Blackhawk crew, which contains a pilot, co-pilot and a Border Patrol Search, Trauma and Rescue Unit (BORSTAR) agent. The AMU agent provided his or her experience in the field and an additional set of eyes in the sky, aside from the other crew members. This agent’s role was to relay coordinates from team members on the ground to pilots and co-pilots, and give the crew some familiarity with the team’s mission.

The AMU resulted in a number of apprehensions, seizures and prosecutions. Eventually, supervisors and agents rotated back to line shifts. “Deterrence strategies,” like Operation Gatekeeper and Operation Hold the Line,⁸ worked to deter entries of illegal aliens by “concentrating Border Patrol Agents (BPAs) and technology in specific areas at the border.”⁹ Similarly, by working an area over a year to two-year span, areas that funneled into a specific area, created a deterrence as well. Smuggling guides would

⁷ U.S. Customs and Border Protection, *Border Patrol 2012-2016 Strategic Plan*, 8.

⁸ U.S. Customs and Border Protection, *National Border Patrol Strategy: Office of Border Patrol*, accessed May 9, 2017, http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/dhs/national_bp_strategy.pdf, 4.

⁹ U.S. Customs and Border Protection, “Border Patrol History,” accessed May 9, 2017, <https://www.cbp.gov/border-security/along-us-borders/history>.

lead groups of illegal aliens into areas believed to be more difficult for line agents to respond to, thus creating a funnel. If a team arrests a group of illegal aliens in a specific area the illegal aliens will return to their countries and warn guides, smugglers, and other potential illegal entrants of the area a team works, so they can avoid detection. This was the presumption of the team, as the number of entries lessened, as did subsequent apprehensions.

The AMU would reorganize when entries would increase into an area, only to disband again due to lower apprehension rates, once AMU agents worked the area for a time. The purpose was to deter and likewise prevent illegal entries in an area exploited by illegal aliens and drug smugglers. If the need arose, the unit could organize again in the future.

Assumptions

By mimicking the Operation Hold the Line, and Operation Gatekeeper deterrence strategies¹⁰ with small teams working together, between the ports of entry throughout Tucson's AOR, the station can reduce illegal traffic. In addition, small teams assigned to the same location, in a grid or multi-grid area over the course of a year will become more familiar with the terrain and are able to better respond to active daily intelligence. The result should be increased productivity in illegal activity apprehensions and deterrence of illegal activity, increasing effectiveness, bolstering agent morale. Each member of the team will have an assignment or specified duty, encouraging ownership of the area

¹⁰ U.S. Customs and Border Protection, *National Border Patrol Strategy: Office of Border Patrol*, 4.

worked, and unity of effort.¹¹ All members, to include the supervisor or supervisors, will be responsible for the conditions of their assigned grid or area, providing accountability to higher level management.

Primary Thesis Question

How should the Tucson Border Patrol Station optimally employ agents in the field thereby leveraging their skills?

Hypothesis

Small teams have proven to be effective at the Tucson Station. As an over-arching method of agent employment at the Tucson Station, small teams should replace line units. The change in personnel employment would improve morale, trust in management, response times, and accountability.

Secondary Thesis Questions

If the current method of employment of personnel along the international border in the AOR of Tucson Station is successful, why would a small teams approach be necessary? What measurement tools would determine whether a small teams approach would be more productive than the current method?

¹¹ Department of the Army, Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 3-05, *Special Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2012), 14, accessed April 23, 2017, http://www.apd.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/pdf/web/adp3_05.pdf.

The Art and the Science

The Border Patrol Pay Reform Act (BPPRA) took effect in 2015. Enacted in December 2014,¹² the Act “restructured”¹³ the pay for the Border Patrol, but also it has designated the number of personnel performing operational duties in each sector and headquarters. Each agent picks from three pay categories, the first category covers 90 percent of each station in the Border Patrol’s personnel, agents in this category work two hours of overtime daily, over a five-day work week. The other two categories cover the remaining 10 percent. Agents either work one hour of overtime or a basic shift of eight hours.¹⁴

The Border Patrol began to employ video technology with the Secure Border Initiative Network (SBI-net) in 2005.¹⁵ The project, began by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS),¹⁶ made it more difficult for illegal traffic to evade detection by the Border Patrol along the U.S. and Mexico border. In 2011, the Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan improved upon the initial measure adding sensors, and

¹² Government Accountability Office, GAO-16-606R, *Review of the Staffing Analysis Report under the Border Patrol Agent Pay Reform Act of 2014* (Washington, DC: Government Accountability Office, 2016), 10, accessed January 22, 2017, <http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-16-606R>.

¹³ Ibid., 10.

¹⁴ Ibid., 11.

¹⁵ Government Accountability Office, GAO-16-671 T, *DHS Surveillance Technology, Unmanned Aerial Assets and Other Assets* (Washington, DC: Government Accountability Office, 2016), 1, accessed January 22, 2017, <http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-16-671T>.

¹⁶ Ibid.

added vigilance with improved technological resources.¹⁷ Eventually the Common Operating Picture, (COP) with COP operators, added a “whole-of-government approach”¹⁸ and shared a common picture of the AOR with ground assets (Scope truck operators, sensors, etc.), agents in the field, air assets AMO, and other agencies. These internal (CBP, AMO) and external entities (Sherriff’s, ICE) working together creates a “collaborative effort.”¹⁹ This network that leveraged Tucson Sector’s technology and the “collaboration with other Federal, state, local and tribal partners”²⁰ became a strategy changer, enabling “Effective response times, mobility, and manpower efficiencies,”²¹ as outlined in the *2012-2016 Border Patrol Strategic Plan; The Mission: Protect America*.

Alliance to Combat Transnational Threats

The Alliance to Combat Transnational Threats (ACTT) is a “collaborative mechanism”²² designed for interoperability of law enforcement efforts on the border. “ACTT launched in September 2009, with a goal to utilize a collaborative, cooperative

¹⁷ Ibid., 2.

¹⁸ U.S. Customs and Border Protection, *Border Patrol 2012-2016 Strategic Plan*, 28.

¹⁹ Ibid., 9.

²⁰ Ibid., 16.

²¹ U.S. Customs and Border Protection, *Border Patrol 2012-2016 Strategic Plan*, 28.

²² Government Accountability Office, GAO-17-495T, *Testimony before the Subcommittee on Border and Maritime Security, Committee on Homeland Security, House of Representatives, Border Security: DHS Could Strengthen Efforts to Establish Collaborative Mechanisms and Assess Use of Resources*, Statement by Rebecca Gambler (Washington, DC: Government Accountability Office, 2017), 4, accessed April 23, 2017, <http://www.gao.gov/assets/690/683904.pdf>.

enforcement approach that leverages the capabilities and resources of Department of Homeland Security agencies in selected sectors in partnership with other federal, state, local, tribal governments and the government of Mexico against criminal organizations that pose a threat to the United States.”²³ This provides a “whole-of-government approach”²⁴ within the local area of a Border Patrol station or sector. Multiplying efforts to support the Border Patrol in the enforcement of immigration laws provides greater situational understanding²⁵ of the area in which different agencies contribute their assistance.

Border Patrol Training

Prospective BPAs must attend the U.S. Border Patrol Academy for a 58-day training course consisting of five subjects: Nationality Law, Statutory Law, Applied Authority, and Operations 1 and 2.²⁶ If a Border Patrol Agent trainee is not fluent in Spanish then he or she will also attend a “40-day Task-based Language Training Program.”²⁷ In addition to these courses trainees will receive physical fitness instruction,

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ U.S. Customs and Border Protection, *Border Patrol 2012-2016 Strategic Plan*, 18.

²⁵ Department of the Army, Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 6-0 C-2, *Mission Command* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2014), 3, accessed April 23, 2017, http://www.apd.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/pdf/web/adp6_0.pdf.

²⁶ U.S. Customs and Border Protection, “CBP Border Patrol Academy,” accessed February 7, 2017, <https://www.cbp.gov/careers/join-cbp/which-cbp-career/border-patrol-agent/cbp-bp-academy>.

²⁷ Ibid.

firearms and driving training. As an example of a course description, posted on the cbp.gov website: “Immigration Law teaches the basic trainee to verify the classification of aliens, determine the legality of status, recognize violations, and initiate the appropriate action.”²⁸

All CBP employees, to include Border Patrol Agents, “are required to demonstrate their proficiency in the use of each of the firearms that they are issued four times per year”²⁹ In addition, if necessary, and “based on operational needs” agents “are required to maintain and demonstrate proficiency with additional firearms (e.g., a rifle, shotgun, etc.).”³⁰ Agents or officials who are Use of Force Center of Excellence certified are authorized to carry a less lethal device, “such as Oleoresin Capsicum (OC) Spray, or a Collapsible Straight Baton (CSB)” with recertification at least once a year.³¹

Leveraging Skills and Assets

“Leverage means multiplying effort.”³² Multiple teams along the border working together, collaboratively with one another and with AMO, other agencies, CBP resources,

²⁸ Ibid.

²⁹ U.S. Customs and Border Protection, Office of Training and Development: HB 4500-O1C, *Use of Force Policy, Guidelines and Procedures Handbook* (Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, May 2014), 44, accessed May 9, 2017, <https://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/documents/UseofForcePolicyHandbook.pdf>.

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ Ibid., 46.

³² Michael M. Beyerlein et al., *Beyond Teams: Building the Collaborative Organization* (San Francisco, CA: John Wiley and Sons, 2003), 28.

etc. provides a unity of effort.³³ Sustained vigilance on the border does not solely rely on teams of agents, with months of familiarity with areas of operations. In addition, “cameras, sensors, and radar”³⁴ provide a deterrent. BPAs hone their skills experientially through years of working on the border and making hundreds of arrests. Following their probationary periods, agents often seek challenges, to include team details, like the HPU or ATV unit to test their skills. When agents move to other units or teams, it depletes the line shifts.

Supervisors rotate to small teams or alternate units as well and the loss of supervision on line units likewise depletes the shifts of experienced supervisors whose skills leverage the unit’s ability to contribute to the station’s mission of securing their section of the border. In addition, supervisors on the small teams work with the line shifts, providing a holistic approach to the operational environment.³⁵ Small team’s supervisors work “autonomously”³⁶ in the field, as the direct contact for the other team members. While both the small team supervisor and the line unit supervisors report to the

³³ Department of the Army, Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 3-0, *Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2016), 2, accessed April 23, 2017, http://www.apd.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/pdf/web/ADP%203-0%20FINAL%20WEB.pdf.

³⁴ Government Accountability Office, GAO-16-671T, *Border Security: DHS Surveillance Technology, Unmanned Aerial Systems and Other Assets* (Washington, DC: Government Accountability Office, May 2016), 2, accessed February 13, 2017, <http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-16-671T>.

³⁵ Department of the Army, ADP 6-0 C-2 (2014), 3.

³⁶ Department of the Army, ADP 3-05, 13.

watch commander, the team remains autonomous³⁷ in their specific mission set. This can be another positive factor to decentralizing a command structure, as in mission command,³⁸ and reducing larger units, like the Army's Special Operation Forces (SOF), who are "expected to operate autonomously."³⁹

Delimitations

Delimiting potential bias of the author, having worked on small teams at the Tucson Station, required the discussion of small teams at Tucson Station, holistically, and comparing their common characteristics: Rapid response, mobility and maneuverability, with those of the SOF and conventional forces (CF) of the U.S. Army.

In the use of Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel, Facilities and Policy (DOTMLPF-P),⁴⁰ one of the Army's methods of identifying capability gaps⁴¹ are principles of the methodology tool that may not translate similarly to the military reference U.S. Border Patrol's capabilities. Facilities⁴² for instance, is the last characteristic of the methodology that is irrelevant to the discussion of employment of personnel at the Tucson Border Patrol Station. The physical

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ Department of the Army, ADP 6-0 C-2 (2014), 9.

³⁹ Department of the Army, ADP 3-05.

⁴⁰ U.S. Army War College, *How the Army Runs: A Senior Leader Reference Book* (Carlisle PA: U.S. Army War College, 2015), 1-2, accessed May 16, 2017, http://www.g8.army.mil/references/HTAR_How_the_Army_Runs.pdf.

⁴¹ Ibid., 3-17.

⁴² Ibid., 1-2.

structure of the station should not change based on the employment of personnel, other than large rooms to accommodate the different teams, and a conference room setting for musters and briefs. The delimitation of this missing piece, along with the future development of doctrine through the U.S. Border Patrol Headquarters, provides room for detail of the other characteristics of DOTMLPF-P, primarily the organization, personnel, leadership and training characteristics.⁴³ In addition, the study will center on the employment of U.S. Border Patrol personnel in the field, on the border in the Tucson Station AOR. Further, there may be capability gaps with the U.S. Border Patrol that the author does not have the time to research.

Limitations

Due to official use only concerns, this research did not include specific apprehension numbers of the small teams at Tucson Station. This paper was absent the number of team members on each team, based on the official use only constraint. The research did not include a quantitative study to compare the number of agents on small teams to line units. Finally, the research included only the general characteristics described in the methodology about Border Patrol team data of Tucson teams in comparison to U.S. Border Patrol Special Operations Group (SOG) units. Further, outside of the Border Patrol, chapter four entails an analysis of the team characteristics and similarities to the teams at the Tucson Station with those of the U.S. Army conventional and SOF. Tucson Station teams were the sole variant for discussing the teams structure in Border Patrol operations, as the research questions centered on Tucson Station.

⁴³ Ibid.

Additionally, DOTMLPF-P⁴⁴ is the primary methodology tool used to measure the suitability of a team's concept put in place at the Tucson Border Patrol Station. The limits of the methodology had some components that lacked the structure for analysis. For instance, in the case of doctrine,⁴⁵ the U.S. Border Patrol (USBP) does not have a specific personnel employment doctrine, as personnel employment may differ by Sector. It is up to the Chief of each Sector in the USBP to employ his or her agents to the field along the stretch of border their Sector is responsible for in the manner that nests within the strategy of the USBP, currently a risk-based approach.⁴⁶ The risk-based approach "focuses enhanced capabilities against the highest threats and responding rapidly along the border."⁴⁷ In addition, the materiel component of DOTMLPF-P⁴⁸ does not apply with the USBP as the resources provided to Border Patrol Sectors and Stations do not support or have relevance to the research questions the research examines and analyzes.

There were interviews conducted via email with some members or former members of the Tucson Station, about the current use of teams and their effectiveness. Only peer and above personnel interviewed and the questions limited to specific experience and weight of effectiveness. Emails of the five questions asked of the

⁴⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁶ U.S. Customs and Border Protection, *2012-2016 Border Patrol Strategic Plan; The Mission: Protect America*, accessed December 20, 2016, https://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/documents/bp_strategic_plan.pdf, 14.

⁴⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁸ U.S. Army War College, *How the Army Runs*, 1-2.

personnel interviewed came back with limited responses. Not all participants provided responses.

Summary

There are currently two approaches to the employment of personnel at the Tucson Station, teams and line units. There is plenty of research that supports the team approach to personnel employment and there is some literature that highlights teams flaws as well. There are common themes in the literature and the research of current teams at the Tucson Station. The next chapter discusses those themes and provides some initial discussion to begin the methodology of personnel employment analysis at the Tucson Station.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

Introduction

To research how Tucson Station employs its personnel in its AOR, so follows a literature review on small teams. This review provides an argument to the question: What is the most effective method of employment of personnel at the Tucson Station? There are two options in use today: Line unit approach or small teams approach. The study of the two, while drawing similarities from the Army provides an overview of the characteristics of each. The literature review will provide some common themes found in the research. There is no literature to support or defend the other method of personnel employment in the Tucson Station AOR, line units.

The review begins with a correlation of Army doctrine⁴⁹ to the U.S. Border Patrol's mission and purpose. This is a common theme that is explored in more detail. Like two of the five elements of Mission Command in the U.S. Army, "building cohesive teams through mutual trust, and a shared understanding,"⁵⁰ are common themes found in the research. It continues with an observation of the teams at Tucson Station. There are characteristics that are common amongst the teams, to include their response rate, mobility and specificity of task, which provides a less ad hoc approach in the field. Unity

⁴⁹ Department of the Army, Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 1-01, *Doctrine Primer* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, September 2014), v.

⁵⁰ Department of the Army, Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 6-0, *Mission Command* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2012), 2, accessed April 23, 2017, http://www.apd.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/pdf/web/adp6_0.pdf.

of effort⁵¹ in the field approach to Border Patrol's duties is evident in the "whole-of-government approach"⁵² taken by the agency itself, with assistance from AMO and other DHS agencies, like U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement.

Programs and Laws Affecting Border Patrol
Personnel's Effectiveness

The Consequence Delivery System (CDS), in the U.S. Border Patrol, is the method, following an illegal alien's apprehension, to "identify the ideal consequence to break the smuggling cycle,"⁵³ and mitigating the threat posed by "transnational criminal organizations (TCO's)."⁵⁴ This procedure is to deter any future criminal activity. There are several consequences, one of which, the Operation Against Smugglers Initiative on Safety and Security Program was a deterrence strategy developed in 2005.⁵⁵ The program was a "bilateral agreement between the U.S. and Mexico that allows CBP to transfer selected alien smugglers that a U.S. Attorney's Office has declined to prosecute to Mexico for prosecution."⁵⁶ Between 2013 and 2015 Tucson Sector presented four cases

⁵¹ Department of the Army, ADP 3-0, 2.

⁵² U.S. Customs and Border Protection, *Border Patrol 2012-2016 Strategic Plan*, 18.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, 17.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, 16.

⁵⁵ Government Accountability Office, GAO-10-328, *Alien Smuggling: DHS Needs to Better Leverage Investigative Resources and Measure Program Performance Along the Southwest Border* (Washington, DC: Government Accountability Office, May 2010), 11, accessed May 9, 2017, <http://www.gao.gov/assets/310/304610.pdf>.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, 11.

for Operation Against Smugglers Initiative on Safety and Security prosecution.⁵⁷ The decision to prosecute for criminal charges is based on Title 9: Criminal code 27.300, whereby an “individualized assessment is conducted regarding the defendant’s criminal history and conduct” by the attorney, with supervisory approval.⁵⁸ A prosecutable guide or smuggler could receive up to 180 days with Operation Streamline, another consequence for prosecution.⁵⁹

The Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA) of 2010 mandates the Border Patrol, and all government agencies, provide a five-year strategy every three years. The GPRA Modernization Act (GPRAMA) of 2010 amended the previous Act of 1993.⁶⁰ The purpose of the GPRA is to measure the effectiveness of governmental programs and agencies’ strategies,⁶¹ of which the Border Patrol utilized the apprehension data compiled for each to measure its border security measures. However, the deterrence factor is the gap in the measurement analysis. Deterrence is difficult an intangible to measure, but Operation Hold the Line and Operation Gatekeeper were relied on by agents

⁵⁷ Government Accountability Office, GAO-17-66, *Border Patrol: Actions Needed to Improve Oversight of Post-Apprehension Consequences* (Washington, DC: Government Accountability Office, January 2017), 44, accessed January 21, 2017, <http://www.gao.gov/assets/690/682074.pdf>.

⁵⁸ United States Department of Justice, Offices of the United States Attorneys, 9-27.300–*Selecting Charges–Charging Most Serious Offenses*, accessed April 22, 2017, <https://www.justice.gov/usam/usam-9-27000-principles-federal-prosecution#9-27.300>.

⁵⁹ Government Accountability Office, GAO-10-328, 11.

⁶⁰ Public Law 111-352-Jan. 4, 2011, *GPRA Modernization Act of 2010*, accessed January 27, 2017, <https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-111publ352/pdf/PLAW-111publ352.pdf>.

⁶¹ Ibid.

holding specific posts on the border, which intended to deter illegal entry.⁶² GPRAMA also states that the Border Patrol will seek Congressional review of its strategy and allocation of money and resources every two years.⁶³

The Government Accounting Office has done recent studies on the Border Patrol. Recently, in 2014, the Government Accounting Office did a study on the effects of the Border Patrol Pay Reform Act (BPPRA). It found that the Border Patrol is effective with 90 percent of its workforce at tier one, or base pay times 25 percent, equal to a 10-hour work day, five days a week. Tier two amounted to base pay, plus 20 percent. And tier three is base pay, eight hours a day.⁶⁴ The Government Accounting Office study found that the Border Patrol, in its current capacity, or number of personnel, is most effective in current agents performing overtime, as compared to hiring and training more agents and all personnel to work eight hour days.⁶⁵ Additionally, 3,500 agents are required to augment the current 20,000 agents that work overtime, to reduce the agents working day to eight hours.⁶⁶ This would, according to the Manpower Requirements Determination

⁶² Office of the Inspector General, *Special Report, Operation Gatekeeper: An Investigation into Allegations of Fraud and Misconduct (July 1998)*, accessed January 17, 2017, <https://oig.justice.gov/special/9807/exec.htm>.

⁶³ Public Law 111-352-Jan. 4, 2011, *GPRA Modernization Act of 2010*, 2.

⁶⁴ Government Accountability Office, GAO-16-606R, 11.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, 28.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*

provided by DHS, be the most cost-savings method of employment of personnel in the Border Patrol.⁶⁷

Teams Approach

The literature praising small teams is abundant. The Army has had notable success with small teams. General (ret.) Stanley A. McChrystal describes military teams in his book *Team of Teams: New Rules of Engagement for a Complex World*. This book details interdependence of other teams within an area of operations, a theater of war. His examples are numerous and varied, and include both the military and private industry. He provides insight into the dynamic of a small team within a large organization, and how the team concept emboldens the organization with a more dynamic workforce. One of his points is how teams remain resilient in the military and a civilian organization, like a hospital, as they remain tight knit, even during a trauma crisis.⁶⁸ This same effect is commonplace in the Border Patrol as the BORSTAR exemplifies this daily in its mission. Since 1998, when the unit began in El Paso, Texas, BORSTAR's objective is "to respond to Border Patrol Agent injuries and illegal migrant deaths."⁶⁹

⁶⁷ Ibid., 5.

⁶⁸ General Stanley McChrystal, U.S. Army, Retired, *Team of Teams: New Rules of Engagement for a Complex World* (New York: Penguin Publishing Group, 2015), 124.

⁶⁹ U.S. Customs and Border Protection, "Border Patrol Search, Trauma and Rescue (BORSTAR)," May 2, 2014, accessed January 27, 2017, <https://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Border%20Patrol%20Search%2C%20Trauma%2C%20and%20Rescue.pdf>.

McChrystal discusses the importance of “O and I,” “Operations and Intelligence,”⁷⁰ as it allows many partners to engage with leadership. This is an example of novelty meets common-sense. The novelty of sharing information with stakeholders coupled with the common-sense approach of the more ears privy to operations means more scrutiny applied and shared understanding gained.⁷¹ This same concept works at the Tucson Station, and in the Border Patrol, with our ACTT counterparts. Tucson’s ACTT works with a multitude of partners, to include the Pima County Sheriff’s Department and the Bureau of Land Management, as in Operation Silver Bell.⁷²

Operation Silver Bell was a 14-day operation conducted with the Bureau of Land Management, different Tucson Sector Border Patrol Stations and several local police departments. Silver Bell’s focus was in a specific area west of I-10 in the Sawtooth Mountains. The participating agencies worked to “degrade, disrupt, and dismantle smuggling organizations and transnational criminal organizations working in that area.”⁷³ The collaboration of the agencies made more than 200 arrests and over 3,500 pounds of marijuana seizures.⁷⁴

⁷⁰ McChrystal, *Team of Teams*, 227.

⁷¹ Ibid.

⁷² U.S. Customs and Border Protection, “ACTT Partners Participate in 14-Day Silver Bell Operation during an Outbound Enforcement Operation,” February 13, 2012, last published September 14, 2106, accessed February 2, 2017, <https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/local-media-release/actt-partners-participate-14-day-silver-bell-operation-during-outbound>.

⁷³ Ibid.

⁷⁴ Ibid.

In *Tips for Teams*, Tip 220 discusses the value of “diversity” on a team.⁷⁵ It is important not to “isolate” or discredit a member of the team, as different opinions and ideas help to prevent a stagnant, or generic approach.⁷⁶ Tip 221 states conflicts help people to care and remain encouraged, as it helps to examine different ideas.⁷⁷ Tip 30 declares that a team leader should admit “when things are wrong or don’t feel right.” Problems may persist without asking the team members what’s wrong and some of those areas affected are “communication, trust and team purpose,”⁷⁸ which the authors then refer to in their chapter on “Building a Collaborative Team Environment.”⁷⁹ *Tips for Teams* is an encyclopedia of the dynamics inside and out of a team. An excellent quick reference book for beginning and sustaining a team and fielding its crucial characteristics. There are many facets to a team that are characteristic of a small group vs. a large one. People on a team are more aware of member’s personality and cultural differences, which provides different approaches and decisions by their leaders.⁸⁰ In *Tips for Teams*, it is suggested that descriptions of characteristics and traits or problems on a team can likewise either not be identified and cause a team to fail, or the problems on a team

⁷⁵ William Belgard, Kimball Fisher, and Steven Rayner, *Tips for Teams: A Ready Reference for Solving Common Team Problems* (Columbus, OH: McGraw Hill, 1995), 88.

⁷⁶ Ibid.

⁷⁷ Ibid., 89.

⁷⁸ Ibid., 20.

⁷⁹ Ibid.

⁸⁰ Ibid., 89.

misabeled and again fail. A team leader can try not to have favorites on a team,⁸¹ or delegate authority to a few members.⁸²

In “8 Reasons Teams Work Better,” Rich Kalgaard gives good reason for the reduction of teams. With an eight to twelve-person team, “a two-pizza rule,”⁸³ there’s more trust vs. larger teams, where distrust occurs in a larger team with less unity.⁸⁴ Kalgaard discusses small team’s accountability, where all members take the brunt of blame or accolade, which fosters a stronger sense of unity as blame isn’t on one person or group, it’s the whole team’s responsibility.⁸⁵ Also, similar in design for a military or law enforcement team, an organizational small team are swifter and “build consensus faster,” because there’s less to please, and “everyone’s up to speed.”⁸⁶

“A Review and Annotated Bibliography of the Literature Pertaining to Team and Small Group Performance” from 1989 to 1999 is insightful about team dynamics and how certain factors internally within the organization, and externally from outside

⁸¹ Ibid., 91.

⁸² Ibid., 90.

⁸³ Rich Kalgaard, “8 Reasons Teams Work Better,” Government Executive, April 18, 2014, accessed December 17, 2016, <http://www.govexec.com/excellence/promising-practices/2014/04/8-reasons-small-teams-work-better/82804/>. In Kalgaard’s article Jeff Bezo’s theory that a team fed with two pizzas is the right size.

⁸⁴ Ibid.

⁸⁵ Ibid.

⁸⁶ Ibid.

influences, affect the team's performance.⁸⁷ The primary message in the report is how a team has the most unity when they are mission-oriented or focused on the same goal.

In the Army, the commander must have “span of control”⁸⁸ of his or her unit. This may mean that their subordinates have the freedom to make decisions in a decentralized command structure so that they “can adapt to changing situations.”⁸⁹ Additionally, a risk-based mission command,⁹⁰ like the Border Patrol, depends on the situation, or a centralized or decentralized command structure. The example provided in Army Doctrine Reference Publication 6-0, *Mission Command*, describes the mission command control of an aviation element, and the need for direct command.⁹¹ However, in the Border Patrol, like theatre operations for the U.S. Army, a centralized command structure is unrealistic, especially by obstructed lines of communication (LOCs)⁹² by terrain obstacles (mountains, lack of infrastructure) or relays (additional troops, additional agents).

⁸⁷ Andrew S. LaJoie and Bruce S. Sterling, “A Review and Annotated Bibliography of the Literature Pertaining to Team and Small Group Performance” (Research, Armed Forces Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences, Fort Knox, KY, December 1999), i, accessed November 2, 2016, file:///C:/Users/jjj/Downloads/ADA371864.pdf.

⁸⁸ Department of the Army, Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 6-0, *Mission Command* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, May 2012), 2-15.

⁸⁹ Ibid.

⁹⁰ Ibid., 5.

⁹¹ Ibid.

⁹² Department of the Army, Army Techniques Publication (ATP), 4-0.1, *Army Theater Distribution* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, October 2014), 2-3.

“Leading Teams: Why Teams Don’t Work” author, Diane Coutu argues that teams are often dysfunctional because of a confused purpose, distracted by the “competitiveness” of another team, etc.⁹³ Ms. Coutu does further argue that based on her experience with teams, “no double digits” is her prescription for a good team.⁹⁴ Per Diane Coutu, teams can constrain its members to remain silent, and go along, for the sake of the team, which stifles creativity.⁹⁵ Without an open forum style mode of communicating amongst the team, its members will lose trust in discussing alternate points of view. She also points out that a “deviant” on a team provokes innovation and that a team may try to “knock a deviant off a team,” which may leave the team “mediocre.”⁹⁶

An interesting discussion of managers of teams, in “Teams in Organizations: Recent Research on Performance and Effectiveness,” discusses the outcome of two of the teams and their managers influence and interactions with the players on the teams.⁹⁷ The effectiveness of a team is evidenced by the “excellent tactical skills” of a “superior leader” and “improving the players performance.”⁹⁸ In the Border Patrol the first-line

⁹³ Diane Coutu, “Leading Teams: Why Teams Don’t Work,” *Harvard Business Review* (May 2009), accessed February 5, 2017, <https://hbr.org/2009/05/why-teams-dont-work>.

⁹⁴ Ibid.

⁹⁵ Ibid.

⁹⁶ Ibid.

⁹⁷ Richard A. Guzzo and Marcus W. Dickson, “Teams in Organizations: Recent Research on Performance and Effectiveness,” *Annual Review Psychology* 47 (February 1996): 313.

⁹⁸ Ibid.

supervisor is the first tier manager of the agent in the field, contributing policy direction and if necessary, training advice and morale support. Or, in other situations the first-line supervisor may be a participant, an active partner on the team, and provide situational awareness and administrative duties.

Small teams, especially ad hoc ones, are prone to the “newness liability,”⁹⁹ like those crews first working together in the airline industry, “73% of the incidents in its database occurred on crews first day of flying together.”¹⁰⁰ This is a liability that can affect lives, and in the research done by the author of the article, “Why Teams Don’t Work”, the Strategic Air Command (SAC) was most successful because the members of the group had worked together for years.¹⁰¹ In addition, reference the airline industry, the author and her research staff found that in a specific airline company the crews would not work together again for over five years.¹⁰² The inference from this article is that a team must have worked together for some time before less mistakes occur, unlike that of a larger group, where mistakes can be mitigated with more resources.¹⁰³ In the case of the Border Patrol or the U.S. Army this may not be feasible due to lack of manpower, or a time to plan. Reactions in a firefight or response to a critical situation is based on training and prior experience.

⁹⁹ Coutu, “Leading Teams.”

¹⁰⁰ Ibid.

¹⁰¹ Ibid.

¹⁰² Ibid.

¹⁰³ Ibid.

Special Operations Forces utilize a team approach conducting operations with the “smallest footprint”¹⁰⁴ where leaders can array forces, and manage their force.

Assignments of personnel to areas of terroristic exploitation in the world by the U.S. and allied nations are appropriate to ebbing violence without commitment of a nation’s entire force. Also, the mission’s goals are straight-forward and mission-specific: Stop the terrorist violence. Goals for a specific mission might be to arrest 15 of the 20 known terrorist leaders in a city within six months of arrival, or prosecute twenty cases in a two-week span. Both goals have unintended consequences foreseen by the team’s leaders prior to goal setting. The 15 arrests of terrorist leaders may drive the remaining five into hiding, exposing their supporters, and the 20 prosecutions could dissuade others whose motives were to disrupt, not kill. Either way, clear objectives of the team’s priorities are understood through a shared vision between the leader, those he or she leads, and other “whole-of-government”¹⁰⁵ components, creating a unity of action and effort in support.¹⁰⁶

Specificity of task determines the leader’s adaptability to the operational environment¹⁰⁷ he or she has led their team into.¹⁰⁸ Without a clear mission understood by the team, idleness and lack of effort will occur as members will begin seeking

¹⁰⁴ Department of the Army, ADP 3-05, 6.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid., iii.

¹⁰⁶ Department of the Army, ADRP 6-0, 1-2.

¹⁰⁷ Department of the Army, ADP 6-0 C-2 (2014), 3.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid.

different solutions to a problem. Trust will also break down if the team members are not clear on the specific mission, as the leader, or supervisor will lose credibility.¹⁰⁹

Trust is both an output of teams and a shared interest amongst its members. Without trust a team is only a roster of participants. Trust is the intangible glue that holds the team together and what provides connectivity between subordinates and supervisors. The shared purpose, and mission of the teams and the organization should mesh, therefore the “end state” is the same.¹¹⁰ The supervisors provide direction of the team, while the team drives the how in completion of the mission, or “disciplined initiative.”¹¹¹ This initiative is the desire of team members to complete the mission without prompts from supervision.

Teams that are absent of trust, according to Patrick Lencioni, as described in *The Five Dysfunctions of a Team*, have the following five dysfunctions:

1. Absence of trust among team members.
2. Fear of conflict.
3. Lack of commitment.
4. Avoidance of accountability.
5. Inattention to results.¹¹²

¹⁰⁹ Ibid., 1-4.

¹¹⁰ Ibid., 1-2.

¹¹¹ Ibid.

¹¹² Patrick M. Lencioni, *The Five Dysfunctions of a Team: A Leadership Fable* (San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass, 2002), 187-188.

A New Plan for Border Security

By Executive Order, President Donald J. Trump has decreed measures to improve border security. Under “Section 8. Additional Border Patrol Agents: . . . hire 5,000 additional Border Patrol Agents, . . . and Section 2. Policy: Secure the southern border of the United States through the immediate construction of a physical wall on the southern border, monitored and supported by adequate personnel so as to prevent illegal immigration, drug and human trafficking, and acts of terrorism.”¹¹³ Under this new plan the construction of a wall will potentially mean additional Border Patrol agents deployed to the border. Strategies and operations for employment of personnel on the border will call for more supervision and continued vigilance by U.S. Border Patrol Agents.

The U.S. Army describes their concept of Unified Land Operations as “How the Army seizes, retains, and exploits the initiative to gain and maintain a position of relative advantage”¹¹⁴ in a wartime situation. This concept provides a correlation to the proposed capability gaps¹¹⁵ in the U.S. Border Patrol. The Border Patrol’s effectiveness on the border in the employment of its personnel is as important as the use of its technology resources. The significance of personnel maneuverability supports small team personnel employment on the border in the Tucson Station AOR.

¹¹³ The White House, *Executive Order, Border Security and Immigration Enforcement Improvements* (Washington, DC: The White House, January 2017), accessed January 28, 2017, <https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/01/25/executive-order-border-security-and-immigration-enforcement-improvements>.

¹¹⁴ Department of the Army, ADRP 6-0, 1-3.

¹¹⁵ U.S. Army War College, *How the Army Runs*, 3-10.

The U.S. Army has downsized and moved from Division-centric, to brigade-centric, and may eventually down-size to battalions-centric.¹¹⁶ The Border Patrol has made improvements in infrastructure and technology, but the personnel maneuverability in the field has remained stagnant. Border Patrol's strategies are dependent upon its technology, which are more apt to fail than the personnel employed to the field daily. On January 22, 2017, United Airlines had to ground its flights due to computer problems.¹¹⁷ Maneuverability of personnel assets in the field has the most impactful effect on illegal immigration. The responding agents to unmanned aerial vehicles, video camera and scope sightings, etc. have grid coordinates of the group's whereabouts, and can locate a group of illegal's sign on the ground and track it to their location. What can be the greatest challenge in the field for supervisors is gathering the necessary number of agents that can apprehend the group.

The brigade-centric force the Army has today deploys to anywhere in the world, with its own equipment and resources, i.e. tanks, trucks, munitions, etc.¹¹⁸ A small team

¹¹⁶ Michelle Tan, "Army Lays Out Plan to Cut 40,000 Soldiers," *Army Times*, July 9, 2015, accessed April 11, 2017, <https://www.armytimes.com/story/military/pentagon/2015/07/09/army-outlines-40000-cuts/29923339/>.

¹¹⁷ CNN, "United Airlines Grounds Domestic Flights because of IT Issue," January 22, 2017, accessed January 22, 2017, <http://www.cnn.com/2017/01/22/travel/united-grounds-domestic-flights-because-of-it-issue/>.

¹¹⁸ Stuart A. Johnson et al., *A Review of the Army's Modular Force Structure* (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 2012), 9, accessed January 22, 2017, http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/technical_reports/2012/RAND_TR927-2.pdf.

in the U.S. Border Patrol, like a modular Army brigade,¹¹⁹ can deploy with its own resources as well, and the specificity of those resources would provide greater use of what's available. Teams assigned to Tucson Station are, like the Army's brigade, "flexible and adaptable,"¹²⁰ able to respond to traffic rapidly and efficiently.

Employment of personnel in the field along the border is a tactical decision made at the Station level. The methods of the "whole-of-government approach,"¹²¹ incorporating AMO assets, along with Border Patrol and local law enforcement assets, depends on terrain, urban or rural environments, technological resources, etc. Operationally, from the sector's standpoint, the stations focus on the mission locally within the sector. The 2012-2016 Border Patrol Strategy comes from Office of Border Patrol Headquarters in Washington, DC.¹²² The U.S. Border Patrol's strategy uses a "risk-based approach to securing the border."¹²³ "Shared communities" are partnerships with other law enforcement agencies the Border Patrol works with to "prevent terrorism and transnational threats at the earliest opportunity in a unity of effort."¹²⁴ Local community members assist in the effort as well. Telephone calls to the Border Patrol

¹¹⁹ Department of the Army, Field Manual Interim (FMI) 3-01, *The Modular Force* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, January 2008), 1-21, accessed May 18, 2017, <https://fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fmi3-0-1.pdf>.

¹²⁰ Ibid. 1.

¹²¹ U.S. Customs and Border Protection, *Border Patrol 2012-2016 Strategic Plan*, 18.

¹²² Ibid. 7.

¹²³ Ibid.

¹²⁴ Ibid., 19.

stations from citizens along the border who have witnessed individuals they believe to be illegal aliens, or crimes related to immigration, like human smuggling, are common efforts by the community throughout a sector's AOR.

Both SOF and conventional forces work to achieve its mission and that of the U.S. Army, and the nation. SOF takes a “whole-of-government approach”¹²⁵ when working in an operational environment,¹²⁶ “providing strategic options to geographic combatant commanders, joint task force commanders, and ambassadors.”¹²⁷ “Army Special Operations Forces normally deploy as part of a joint special operations task force whose mission is to achieve desired operational- or strategic-level outcomes.”¹²⁸ And in addition, “The employment of Army Special Operations Forces by the joint force commander will depend upon the desired outcome, the determination of acceptable risk, the potential opportunities created by the employment of Special Operations Forces, and the role that the indigenous population must play in the operation or campaign.”¹²⁹ Some of these capability strengths that SOF is used for mirror the civilian tasks of the Border Patrol. The Border Patrol personnel applies the “whole-of-government approach”¹³⁰ when it works with internal support elements like AMO of CBP, and Office of Field

¹²⁵ Department of the Army, ADP 3-05, iii.

¹²⁶ Ibid., 2.

¹²⁷ Ibid., iii.

¹²⁸ Ibid., 2.

¹²⁹ Ibid.

¹³⁰ U.S. Customs and Border Protection, *Border Patrol 2012-2016 Strategic Plan*, 18.

Operations, but also with the outside resources of the Pima Sheriff's Department. Also, the "risk-based method" as described in the *2012-2016 Border Patrol Strategic Plan; The Mission: Protect America*,¹³¹ determine the response of Border Patrol elements and resources to pressing situations along the border and in Tucson Station's AOR.

"The Army's ability to expand rapidly depends on four structural factors."¹³² The second entails "conventional and special operations units to work as a team."¹³³ Similarly, on a smaller scale with the U.S. Border Patrol, agents on line units work with SOG units to fulfill the mission. Like the Army, agents in the Patrol must be "flexible and agile"¹³⁴ and adapt to an ever-changing operational environment. The principle of the U.S. Army to "prevent conflict"¹³⁵ is similar, again on a smaller, non-lethal, scale to the U.S. Border Patrol's deterrence strategy. A "credible force,"¹³⁶ Army or Border Patrol, must deter, or prevent first. For the Border Patrol, if deterrence fails, then it may call for a tactical operation or a humanitarian strategy, like the endeavor in 2014, where a wave of

¹³¹ Robert D., Schroeder, "Holding the Line in the 21st Century," U.S. Customs and Border Protection, accessed January 18, 2017, <https://www.cbp.gov/document/publications/holding-line-21st-century-0>, 10.

¹³² Department of the Army, Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 1, *The Army* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, September 2012), 4-2.

¹³³ Ibid.

¹³⁴ Ibid., 4-4.

¹³⁵ Ibid., 4-3.

¹³⁶ Ibid., 1-5.

undocumented children crossed the southwest border into the U.S. from Mexico.¹³⁷ The Border Patrol met this challenge by rapidly employing agents along the southwest border through increased presence and detailed agents to the region where the plight was most severe.

Conclusion

The literature review provides some positive and negative aspects of teams, dynamics, and most advantageous team size. There are common themes found throughout the literature on teams: Collaboration, trust, rapid mobility, learning environment, etc. Small teams are in existence currently in the Border Patrol and throughout Tucson Station's AOR, so the idea is not a new one, but the concept of teams throughout the AOR, replacing line units, would be new. Mitigating difficulties in implementation of a small team concept, begins with collaboration amongst supporting agencies to the Tucson Border Patrol Station.

The Tucson Border Patrol Station's "whole-of-government approach"¹³⁸ is like the U.S. Army's, on a much smaller, civilian, scale. In the Army, the interoperability of personnel in a unified action with multi-national and coalition forces, other service branch partners, and interagency support provides a holistic view of the battlefield.¹³⁹ In

¹³⁷ U.S. Customs and Border Protection. "CBP Addresses Humanitarian Challenges of Unaccompanied Child Migrants," November 3, 2016, accessed February 14, 2017, <https://www.cbp.gov/border-security/humanitarian-challenges>.

¹³⁸ U.S. Customs and Border Protection, *Border Patrol 2012-2016 Strategic Plan*, 18.

¹³⁹ Department of the Army, ATP 4-0.1, 5-7.

the Border Patrol, and Tucson Station, using a “whole-of-government approach”¹⁴⁰ toward the mission of deterrence and interdiction of terroristic activity and illegal immigrant criminals, applies to the AOR in a law enforcement and civil community. Interagency support to the Tucson Station comes from the AMO community, and ICE of DHS.

¹⁴⁰ U.S. Customs and Border Protection, *Border Patrol 2012-2016 Strategic Plan*, 18.

CHAPTER 3

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

How should the Tucson Border Patrol Station optimally employ personnel? Using a case study research methodology¹⁴¹ provided an analysis of current Tucson Station teams, and U.S. Army conventional and Special Operations Forces. My case study included “interviews, documents, direct observations, and participative observations.”¹⁴² In my first two chapters I provided an argument for the use of teams throughout the Tucson AOR. Without using quantitative data to support the argument for teams employed throughout Tucson Station’s AOR, I have provided supportive case analysis data, or documents, from the Army and teams in employment currently at the Tucson Station. In my case analysis of employing U.S. Border Patrol personnel in small teams and line units I will use the Army’s Force Management measurement tool of Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Information, Leadership and Education, Facilities and Policy (DOTMLPF-P).¹⁴³ DOTMLPF-P provided capability gap analysis¹⁴⁴ of how best to employ agents to the border from Tucson Station. The Joint Capabilities Integration Development System process in the military, begins with a “Capabilities-based

¹⁴¹ John W. Creswell, *Qualitative Inquiry and Research Design: Choosing Among Five Approaches*, 3rd ed. (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 2013), 97.

¹⁴² Ibid., 100.

¹⁴³ U.S. Army War College, *How the Army Runs*, 4-3.

¹⁴⁴ Ibid., A-8.

Assessment (CBA).”¹⁴⁵ which includes the second step, “functional needs analysis, which identifies gaps in the military’s current ability to perform capabilities at an acceptable risk.”¹⁴⁶ The military assesses where it is going, what it has and what is it missing, “in terms of the risk to mission.”¹⁴⁷ A discussion of the pros and cons of a small team concept at the Tucson Station provides a gap analysis in four distinct areas of the Joint Capabilities Integration Development System process: Doctrine, Organization, Training and Education, and Leadership.¹⁴⁸ These characteristics are in the military and in some cases, the Border Patrol. Line units and small teams share different characteristics. A line unit at the Tucson Station works with “command and control (C2)”¹⁴⁹ leadership, and mission command¹⁵⁰ leads teams at the Tucson Station. The decentralized mission command element,¹⁵¹ as discussed in chapter 2, allows agents to

¹⁴⁵ Department of the Army, TRADOC Regulation 71-20, *Force Development: Concept Development, Capabilities Determination, and Capabilities Integration* (Fort Eustis, VA: Government Printing Office, June 2013), 58, accessed May 9, 2017, <http://www.tradoc.army.mil/tpubs/regs/tr71-20.pdf>.

¹⁴⁶ Ibid., 58.

¹⁴⁷ Department of Defense, *Manual for the Operation of the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System*, A-B-4.

¹⁴⁸ Ibid.

¹⁴⁹ Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication (JP) 3-0, *Joint Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, January 2017), III-2, accessed May 9, 2017, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_0.pdf.

¹⁵⁰ Ibid., xi.

¹⁵¹ Ibid.

work “autonomously”¹⁵² within the team, carrying out their Border Patrol duties, without “micro-management”¹⁵³ from a centralized leadership system.

In addition, the case study, shared “the same phenomenon, or instance of deterrence”¹⁵⁴ and trust. The study consisted of U.S. Army conventional and Special Operations Forces and the U.S. Border Patrol’s teams and units. The Border Patrol line units reveal gaps in leadership, specifically Tucson Station’s, as assessed in chapter 4. Small teams of Tucson and SOG units–Border Patrol Tactical Unit (BORTAC) and BORSTAR provide better capabilities to respond and greater mobility in risk management.¹⁵⁵

The methodologies of case study comparatives include the discussion of supervisor to agent ratio, and the affect it has on the operational environment. Words, such as trust, cohesion, shared understanding,¹⁵⁶ agility, adaptability, and innovation, are all common in texts and literature about small teams. I will determine if these words are tenets of small teams, or only desired outcomes. The common themes and Army research methodology, DOTMLPF-P,¹⁵⁷ provide evidence to support small teams.

¹⁵² Department of the Army, ADP 3-05, 13.

¹⁵³ Department of the Army, ADP-1, 2-4.

¹⁵⁴ Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005), 69 of 334.

¹⁵⁵ U.S. Customs and Border Protection, *Border Patrol 2012-2016 Strategic Plan*, 4.

¹⁵⁶ Department of the Army, ADP 6-0 (2012), 2.

¹⁵⁷ U.S. Army War College, *How the Army Runs*, 4-3.

The Tucson Sector apprehended over 63,000 illegal aliens in 2015, less than half the number of apprehensions made in 2011.¹⁵⁸ The small teams at Tucson Station (HPU, ATV's, mountain team, disrupt unit, and the AMU) and in the Patrol, is less than the number of agents on line units in the field. The SOG teams with national mobility, BORTAC and BORSTAR, are a small composite of the population of BPAs throughout the United States. The SOG unit has a variety of goals and missions, they are highly mobile and responsive, with a more direct chain of command than line shifts, as they report to fewer mission command¹⁵⁹ personnel.

Implementation of Small Teams

The apprehension ratios of small teams at the Tucson Station, and in the Border Patrol implies agents on small teams contribute to the mission like agents on the line units, as evidenced by small teams' continued existence. In 1993 San Diego Sector and El Paso Sector contributed to two thirds of the southwest border's illegal alien apprehensions, 1.2 million.¹⁶⁰ The reaction to this were efforts to increase the manpower of BPAs in these Sectors and devise operational strategies like Operation Hold-the-Line

¹⁵⁸ U.S. Customs and Border Protection, "US Border Patrol Statistics," accessed February 15, 2017, <https://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/assets/documents/2016-Oct/BP%20Total%20Monthly%20Apps%20by%20Sector%20and%20Area%2C%20FY2000-FY2016.pdf>.

¹⁵⁹ Department of the Army, ADP 6-0 (2012), 2.

¹⁶⁰ General Accounting Office, GAO T-GGD-95-92, *Testimony before the Subcommittee on Immigration and Claims, Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives, Border Control: Revised Strategy is Showing Some Positive Results* (Washington, DC: General Accounting Office, March 1995), Preface, accessed February 11, 2017, <http://www.gao.gov/assets/110/105884.pdf>.

in El Paso, Texas and Operation Gatekeeper in San Diego, California.¹⁶¹ Although Border Patrol Chiefs in San Diego and El Paso Sectors have recommended more efforts toward preventing entry into the U.S. illegally rather than focusing on apprehensions, a Sandia study from 1993 concluded “containment measures” such as checkpoints and surveillance technology to secure the nation’s borders should be put in place, and “consequence programs.”¹⁶² The study, *Border Control Revised Strategy Is Showing Some Positive Results*,¹⁶³ was conducted by Sandia National Laboratories, a Federally Funded Research and Development Center.¹⁶⁴ The study, according to a Government Accountability Office report from 1994, had claimed the Border Patrol should focus on “preventing illegal entry with effective barriers,”¹⁶⁵ versus apprehension of illegal entrants.¹⁶⁶ A Reuters article in the Business Insider section, dated November 16, 2016,

¹⁶¹ General Accounting Office, GAO 01-842, *INS’ Southwest Border Strategy: Resource and Impact Issues Remain After 7 Years* (Washington, DC: General Accounting Office, August 2001), 5, accessed April 16, 2017, <http://www.gao.gov/assets/240/231964.pdf>.

¹⁶² Office of Inspector General, OIG-17-39, *CBP’s Border Security Efforts—An Analysis of Southwest Border Security between the Ports of Entry* (Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, February 2017), 2, accessed May 9, 2017, <https://www.oig.dhs.gov/assets/Mgmt/2017/OIG-17-39-Feb17.pdf>.

¹⁶³ General Accounting Office, GAO/GGD-95-30, *Border Control Revised Strategy Is Showing Some Positive Results* (Washington, DC: General Accounting Office, December 1994) 2, accessed May 11, 2017, <http://www.gao.gov/archive/1995/gg9530.pdf>.

¹⁶⁴ Sandia National Laboratories, “About Sandia,” accessed May 11, 2017, <http://www.sandia.gov/about/index.html>.

¹⁶⁵ General Accounting Office, GAO/GGD-95-30, 12.

¹⁶⁶ *Ibid.*

stated “The United States Customs and Border Protection agency plans to send an additional 150 agents to the southern border region of Texas to combat a recent rise in apprehensions, mostly of children and families crossing illegally.”¹⁶⁷

Effectiveness of the employment of personnel may depend upon the supervision as well. The current ratio of supervisors, according to Brandon Judd, President of the National Border Patrol Council, in a testimony to the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, in September 2015, was 4 agents to 1 supervisor. Based on Judd’s comparison to “most large police departments” the ratio should be 10 to 1, allowing for more “attrition in the supervisory ranks and more agents in the field.”¹⁶⁸ This ratio is relative to the common number of personnel assigned to an ad hoc team in U.S. Army Special Operations Forces. The author of this research paper recommends a team of no more than 10 to 12 agents; however, the supervisor to agent ratio would be 2:10—supervisors to agents, as this would allow for better situational understanding¹⁶⁹ and awareness of the AOR for the team. Agents would continue to work

¹⁶⁷ Jon Herskovitz, “U.S. Border Patrol Sends More Agents to Texas as Apprehensions Rise,” *Reuters*, November 12, 2016, accessed February 12, 2017, <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-immigration-patrol-idUSKBN1370OI>.

¹⁶⁸ House of Representatives, *Testimony of Brandon Judd on behalf of the National Border Patrol Council in front of U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Oversight and Government Reform*, September 9, 2015, accessed April 16, 2017, <https://oversight.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/9-9-2015-Full-Committee-Hearing-on-US-Personnel-Safety-in-Mexico-Judd-NBPC-Testimony.pdf>.

¹⁶⁹ Department of the Army, ADP 6-0 C-2 (2014), 3.

“autonomously”¹⁷⁰ without direct supervisory oversight in the field, while assigned to a team, and two supervisors provides a checks and balance system of decision-making.

Implementation of small teams within the largest station in the U.S. Border Patrol¹⁷¹ is an undertaking that should be a limitation, but also begins with a breakdown of personnel deployed to the field. Should senior agents represent an equal portion amongst more than 40 teams? Should two supervisors work on each team or one supervisor with a back-up? How much control should a watch commander have in the teams dynamic? Based on the *2012-2016 Border Patrol Strategic Plan* of an “improved situational awareness,”¹⁷² would a smaller group of agents working together provide greater field vigilance? And finally given the number of supervisors to agents in the Border Patrol are there enough supervisors to go around for a small team concept to work effectively?

DOTMLPF-P

The methodology of DOTMLPF-P¹⁷³ provides the U.S. Army an analysis tool to identify “gaps, opportunities, and solutions; and deliver integrated solutions to the

¹⁷⁰ Department of the Army, ADP 3-05, 13.

¹⁷¹ U.S. Customs and Border Patrol Protection, “Tucson Station.”

¹⁷² U.S. Customs and Border Protection, *2012-2016 Border Patrol Strategic Plan; The Mission: Protect America*, 28.

¹⁷³ U.S. Army War College, *How the Army Runs*, 4-3.

force.”¹⁷⁴ It originates from the Army’s Joint Capabilities Integration Development System. This joint system functions to provide all branches of the military an assessment of future force necessities in resources and personnel.¹⁷⁵ Like the Army, the U.S. Border Patrol carries out a specific mission for the U.S. Government, not to fight America’s wars, but to protect America’s borders.

The concept of DOTMLPF-P¹⁷⁶ provides the Army a series of lenses to view and compare the current capabilities and gaps in the Army’s preparedness with the future Army’s preparedness. Doctrine, the first letter in the acronym, deals with a set of principles and guidelines¹⁷⁷ that the U.S. Army applies to its force. It outlines how the current Army runs. Doctrine in the Army is produced for distribution by booklets and documents, updated and edited to include new approaches to win our nation’s wars.¹⁷⁸ These new approaches and procedures develop through lessons learned in battle,¹⁷⁹ planning or discussed and analyzed in classrooms and in war gaming situations. This analysis phase begins the development of capabilities.¹⁸⁰ The second goal of the 2012-

¹⁷⁴ Department of the Army, TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1, *The US Army Operating Concept: Win in a Complex World: 2020-2040* (Fort Eustis, VA: Government Printing Office, 2010), 43.

¹⁷⁵ U.S. Army War College, *How the Army Runs*, 3-19.

¹⁷⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷⁷ Department of the Army, ADP 1-01, 3-4.

¹⁷⁸ Department of the Army, ADP 1, 2-9.

¹⁷⁹ Department of the Army, ADP 1-01, v.

¹⁸⁰ U.S. Army War College, *How the Army Runs*, 3-8.

2016 Border Patrol Strategic Plan entails incorporating doctrine into the U.S. Border Patrol strategy.¹⁸¹ This strategy enhancement by the Border Patrol Headquarters is with the intent of doctrine institutionalization within the organization, “as a process to seamlessly link the operating force to emerging tactics, techniques, and procedures as best practices, while additionally, focusing on enduring principles and techniques.”¹⁸²

Organizations are those delivery systems that can provide the construct for the Army’s resources, like branches, or components of the Army, such as armor, infantry, etc.¹⁸³ The Army will look at the current organizations and determine modification to suit its needs, through changes to its doctrine.¹⁸⁴ Organizations in the Border Patrol, specifically the Tucson Border Patrol Station, employs agents to the field and in Tucson Sector and station offices, in line units, teams, shifts, etc. and they all contribute to field operations. Above the agent level, Supervisory Border Patrol Agents (SBPAs) have charge of the units, shifts, and teams, with the WC in the management tier above, providing guidance, situational understanding,¹⁸⁵ and awareness of the AOR and field operations.

¹⁸¹ U.S. Customs and Border Protection, *2012-2016 Border Patrol Strategic Plan; The Mission: Protect America*, 22.

¹⁸² *Ibid.*, 26.

¹⁸³ U.S. Army War College, *How the Army Runs*, 1-2.

¹⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, 2-23.

¹⁸⁵ Department of the Army, ADP 1-01, 4-5.

Training and leadership, the third and fifth phase of DOTMLPF-P¹⁸⁶ analysis, provides the agent situational awareness and understanding.¹⁸⁷ As the Army stresses, how should the future force look like?¹⁸⁸ As it relates to the Border Patrol, using the risk-based approach, how can the Tucson Border Patrol Station secure the border in the most effective way possible now and in the future? Leadership and training provide the skills and mentorship to agents. Agents and supervisors must qualify with their weapons, train for a use of force incident quarterly. Supervisors receive training upon their acceptance of the supervisory role and must continue to develop their leadership intelligence quotient (IQ) throughout their career with leadership literature and-or leadership media.

Conclusion

Interviews, personal experience with current teams at the Tucson Station and a methodology analysis provide the capability gap¹⁸⁹ in personnel employment at the Tucson Station. To bridge the gap, or supply the missing elements to the existing employment method at Tucson Station, an analysis of all variants, to include themes discussed in chapter 2, discussion is necessary in the next chapter, Analysis. Literature of the Army and the Border Patrol provide common themes and allow for an adequate comparative study. Teams in existence currently at the Tucson Station provide relevant

¹⁸⁶ U.S. Army War College, *How the Army Runs*, 1-2.

¹⁸⁷ U.S. Customs and Border Protection, *2012-2016 Border Patrol Strategic Plan; The Mission: Protect America*, 28.

¹⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, 10-38.

¹⁸⁹ U.S. Army War College, *How the Army Runs*, 3-10.

personal experience of the authors for analysis. A small quotient of interviews provides a shifting of the balance between the two methods of personnel employment at Tucson Station in place currently to the argument of small teams as an alternative.

CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS

Introduction

How should the Tucson Station optimally employ personnel to the Tucson AOR?

The DOTMLPF-P methodology of analysis revealed capability gaps¹⁹⁰ in the Border Patrol's attention to leadership and doctrine,¹⁹¹ both found to be capability requirements in the Army conventional forces and SOF; however, the Border Patrol's SOG units do have some doctrine, documented on the CBP website, but likewise are absent education requirements in the agent leadership roles.¹⁹² Despite the differences, or capability gaps,¹⁹³ the Border Patrol continues to perform their mission, and meeting their objectives. The capabilities of a line unit are sufficient for mission accomplishment, but with less risk management¹⁹⁴ effectiveness than small teams in the Tucson Station AOR, evident in mission command.¹⁹⁵

¹⁹⁰ U.S. Army War College, *How the Army Runs*, 10-2.

¹⁹¹ Ibid.

¹⁹² Julio C. Pena, "Education Requirements of Command Positions in the U.S. Border Patrol" (Master's thesis, Command and General Staff College, Ft Leavenworth, June 2015), 93, accessed May 7, 2017, <http://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/singleitem/collection/p4013coll2/id/3303/rec/40>.

¹⁹³ U.S. Army War College, *How the Army Runs*, 3-10.

¹⁹⁴ U.S. Customs and Border Protection, *Border Patrol 2012-2016 Strategic Plan*, 4.

¹⁹⁵ Department of the Army, ADP 6-0 C-2 (2014), 1.

Tactics for small teams at the Tucson Station vary, because the resources, or personnel skills may differ. Horse patrol are on horseback, which brings a different set of maneuverability factors to a small team, than a mountain team, primarily on foot. Mission command,¹⁹⁶ like the Army, allows Tucson agents to work “autonomously,”¹⁹⁷ without direct supervision. Agents on small teams at the Tucson Station also rely upon the same intelligence that the line units rely upon. Agents on all units will acquire intelligence in real time once they begin working in their AOR.

Doctrine, Organization, Training, Leadership and Education Analysis

There have been four groups discussed and analyzed throughout the research, conventional Army forces, SOF, Tucson Border Patrol Station teams, and Border Patrol SOG units: BORTAC and BORSTAR. I will discuss their attributes in relation to the Army’s DOTMLPF-P¹⁹⁸ capability gap analysis,¹⁹⁹ As mentioned in a prior chapter, I will not discuss Materiel,²⁰⁰ or equipment and resources, from the Army’s methodology, as the Border Patrol provides the same equipment and resources to all agents, with few

¹⁹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁹⁷ Department of the Army, ADP 3-05, 13.

¹⁹⁸ U.S. Army War College, *How the Army Runs*, 10-2.

¹⁹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰⁰ Ibid., 3-2.

exceptions.²⁰¹ In addition, I will not analyze the four group's Personnel or Facilities,²⁰² as previously mentioned in chapter 1.

Table 1. Methodology Chart

	Army	TSU Teams	Army SOF	BP SOG	TUS Line Unit
Doctrine	+	-	+	+	-
Organization	+	+	+	+	
Training	+		+	+	
L and E	+	+	+	+	+

Source: Created by author. L and E = Leadership and Education.

Note: + = Exists without variance.

- = Absent without variance.

Blank = Some variance, therefore neither (+) with or without (-).

Table 1 illustrates the different characteristics of doctrine, organization, training, leadership and education²⁰³ analyzed and discussed. The pluses and minuses represent what capabilities each component has (plus) and what each component lacks (minuses), or “capability gap.”²⁰⁴ The Army's doctrine are its core competencies, “values, guidance forward.”²⁰⁵ The definitions of their core elements, mission variables, purpose and tasks

²⁰¹ Border Patrol Special Operations Group (SOG) units: BORTAC and BORSTAR, carry some operationally-specific resources, unlike a field agent at a station.

²⁰² U.S. Army War College, *How the Army Runs*, 10-2.

²⁰³ Department of the Army, ADP 3-05, 5.

²⁰⁴ U.S. Army War College, *How the Army Runs*, 10-2.

²⁰⁵ Department of the Army, ADP 1, Foreword.

are in one document.²⁰⁶ The U.S. Border Patrol does not have one document to turn to reference its tasks and purpose. Some training documents provide an overview of specific duties: Vehicle pursuits, criminal alien prosecutions, etc., but there is not one document to turn to that describes the tasks and purpose of a BPA. The BPA Academy had provided a journeyman handbook when agents began their initial training, but the handbook became outdated.

Army's SOF have doctrine that describes their mission and objectives.²⁰⁷ and the Border Patrol SOG have a page on the internet describing their duty-set.²⁰⁸ Specialized units have mission-specific tasks and purpose; however, documents provide their general purpose and tasks. Without these documents, seamless interconnectivity with other agencies, to include military units, does not exist in a joint mission. Other agencies seek the task and purpose of supporting agencies before seeking them out in a concurrent mission.

Organizationally, all agencies and departments, Army and U.S. Border Patrol, employs their agents and forces to situations and environments in some manner of uniformity, with some measure of consistency. The Army begins with the squad and ends with the theater army.²⁰⁹ The Tucson Station Border Patrol Station employs line units and

²⁰⁶ Ibid.

²⁰⁷ Department of the Army, ADP 3-05, Preface ii.

²⁰⁸ U.S. Customs and Border Protection, "Border Patrol Special Operations Group," accessed April 21, 2017, <https://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Border%20Patrol%20Special%20Operations%20Group.pdf>.

²⁰⁹ Department of the Army, ADP 1-01, 4-2.

teams. SOF and SOG units employ teams. All branches and agency employment methods serve the purpose intended; however, in the case of the Tucson Border Patrol Station, small teams are the most effective as they provide connectivity to leadership and training. The Army and SOF forces are both “regionally aligned,”²¹⁰ trained to work in specific regions, like the SOG units in the Border Patrol, and what I recommend with teams throughout the Tucson AOR.

All agents train throughout the year in the Border Patrol, and at the Tucson Station, members of teams together and line units separately, while SOG unit members train together, like teams. Army forces are trained and prepared to employ in war. Education is also a staple of the Army, with “certifications of individual and organizational competence.”²¹¹ The Border Patrol has a body of knowledge that agents become familiar with and train to receive certifications specific to the job. Education, to include examples in history or case references, would benefit agents and supervisors alike. Education for BPA’s would be in the form of on-line or schoolhouse courses benefitting agents on the job, along with agents acquiring college credit.

Special Operations Forces does not “replace conventional forces (CF)” in the Army, but instead “blends with the conventional force,”²¹² and similarly teams in the Border Patrol augment the line units. This concept applies to large organizations, to include Congress, where committees form of experts for mission-specific purposes, to

²¹⁰ Department of the Army, ADP 1, 3-5.

²¹¹ Ibid., 2-4.

²¹² Department of the Army, ADP 3-05, ii.

engage conversation and examine facts about new programs. Or, a surgeon, nurse, and anesthesiologist create a team for a surgery, to include their assistants.²¹³ In both cases, the specific skills, or knowledge set, is exclusive and interdependent of the others, but necessary. Likewise, their skills produce a single product, an output, and if too many players, or experts, collide then the objective becomes less clear as the number of players cloud the main effort. In Special Operations Forces of the Army, the SOF soldier is trained to “operate autonomously” in their mission.²¹⁴

Tucson Teams

The Tucson HPU consists of a team of Tucson Border Patrol Agents (BPAs) on horseback. The logistics for the unit is challenging as the horses need transport to the field daily. Horse maintenance, to include shoe replacement and cleaning, is a daily to weekly requirement, and entails an increased workload for agents. HPU works outstanding traffic in the field that is pressing, and finds time before and after to handle the feed and care of the animals.

Horse patrol has been ongoing at the Tucson Station since its inception when Tucson Station became a Station in 1924.²¹⁵ Horseback patrols began along the border in

²¹³ Aris Anagnostopoulos et al., “Power in Unity: Forming Teams in Large-Scale Community Systems” (19th International Conference on Information and Knowledge Management, Toronto, ON, Canada, January 2010), 2, accessed January 29, 2017, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/221615577_Power_in_Unity_Forming_Teams_in_Large-Scale_Community_Systems.

²¹⁴ Department of the Army, ADP 3-05, 13.

²¹⁵ U.S. Customs and Border Protection, “Tucson Station.”

1904.²¹⁶ Apprehensions, seizures, prosecutions and incidents performed by Tucson's HPU is critical to its existence. HPU is a difficult team to join, due to the requirements of maintenance and horseback riding skill. Additional manpower added to the line units adds to its additional necessity. The apprehension numbers and niche approach HPU brings to Tucson Station in working illegal alien and narcotics traffic has kept the unit a priority.

The horse patrol as a team in the U.S. Border Patrol began in San Diego, California in 1979,²¹⁷ and its purpose, like a Border Patrol HPU anywhere in the country, is simple: Respond to illegal alien traffic in areas difficult to traverse by agents in vehicles or on foot. Also, HPU is a functional alternative to vehicle traffic on ranches. Horses provide a swifter approach to field work, with a less pronounced footprint, unlike vehicles coming on and off a ranch. HPU agents can ride their horses into the ranch, responding with ease to the dynamic shifts in criminal traffic, unlike a vehicle restricted to roads and pull-outs. This also applies to the doctrine of SOF in the Army. SOF's "effects are disproportionate to its small footprint."²¹⁸

The all-terrain vehicle (ATV) unit at the TUS is another unit like HPU and its response to traffic alleviates the gap in rapid response to apprehensions that are time-sensitive. The likelihood of a group of illegal aliens getting away depends on swift

²¹⁶ Siegel, "U.S. Border Patrol."

²¹⁷ U.S. Customs and Border Protection, "San Diego Sector California," accessed May 18, 2017, <https://www.cbp.gov/border-security/along-us-borders/border-patrol-sectors/san-diego-sector-california>.

²¹⁸ Department of the Army, ADP 3-05, 6.

response. Like all the other specialty units, HPU, the disrupt team, the mountain team and AMU, Tucson (TUS) all-terrain vehicles (ATV's) work areas difficult to access by TUS agents on line shifts or are time sensitive. TUS Agents on line shifts have limited amount of shift time available and the necessity to respond to traffic that requires significant amount of time for response and subsequent processing is difficult.

If spotted by a Tucson Station camera or by an agent with binoculars or a scope truck in an access-limited area, ATV agents respond rapidly. They can traverse jeep trails at a higher rate than a vehicle, or with less caution as an agent on horseback, and thus the group is apprehended quickly. An agent on an ATV can also maneuver faster on blacktop and in the brush as their mode of travel is less cumbersome and like a horse, the ATV is stealthier than a vehicle. Additionally, the ATV moves faster than an agent on foot. The Tucson ATV unit focuses on areas within the AOR that are most vulnerable, as an ad hoc small team would. A trailer of two ATV's pulled by a truck in the field will respond to traffic on the radio that requires a quick response. In addition, ATV units are a force multiplier in the field. TUS Supervisory Border Patrol Agents (SBPA's) assigned to the TUS ATV unit are responsible for administrative duties, such as keeping track of personal safety equipment worn by agents on ATV's, and resources to keep up the maintenance of the Tucson ATV's. These duties are in addition to the management of the ATV teams in the field.

The disrupt unit at the Tucson Station is a special-purpose team that targets DTOs and ASOs. Based on intelligence gathered and apprehension data, that are comprised of the DTOs and ASOs, agents work criminal traffic related to recent arrests and apprehensions. ASOs and DTOs are families and criminal gangs within Tucson's AOR.

Most of the targets have been ongoing, but in some cases new intelligence derived from a seizure or arrest of a DTO or ASO member will lead to a new DTO or ASO.

Additionally, disrupt agents are plain-clothed and the vehicles are unmarked. The covert nature of the unit is a vulnerability to criminal element counterattacks, and misperceptions of identification by the public. The strategy of disrupting DTOs and ASOs may not reduce or end their activity, but it is a realistic approach as the prosecution of members of the two criminal organizations remains high.²¹⁹ Smugglers will often move to an area with less law enforcement pressure.²²⁰

Tucson has a unit that works primarily illegal alien and narcotic smuggling traffic in the mountain ranges of Tucson's AOR. An agent each day accompanies the crew of an Air and Marine Unit (AMU) Blackhawk helicopter, whose primary purpose is to locate traffic along the mountain trails and assist agents working traffic. Agents on the line shifts cannot respond to the mountain traffic at the response rate of a mountain team with greater situational understanding²²¹ of the area. The team is new and prior to its formation agents worked at a forward operating base (FOB) along the border for a week or more to address the mountain traffic. The FOB agents would typically work the traffic

²¹⁹ U.S. Customs and Border Protection, "United States Border Patrol-Sector Profile," accessed April 20, 2017, <https://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/documents/USBP%20Stats%20FY2015%20sector%20profile.pdf>.

²²⁰ Department of Justice, "Drug Movement into and in the United States," accessed April 20, 2017, <https://www.justice.gov/archive/ndic/pubs38/38661/movement.htm>.

²²¹ Department of the Army, Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 5-0, *The Operations Process* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, May 2012), v.

along the border before it began to ascend into the mountain passes that wind north into the border ranches, stretching north to nearby towns.

A team's priority of the mountains may require helicopter assistance and agents assigned to an AMO element, forming an air mobile unit (AMU). AMU members also may use ATV units, to "make cuts," a phrase taken from sign-cutting, where BPAs look for disturbances in the ground, and footprints, and foot sign of illegal alien traffic.²²² Once footprints detected and traffic located on ATV units or by members of the AMU, on foot or in a vehicle, the Blackhawk assists with a tracking operation. A tracking operation would entail hours of traversing the rugged terrain, with limited vehicle access, on trails. Once located, a group of illegal aliens or drug smugglers are surveilled overhead by the Blackhawk until the agents on the ground can make the apprehension. After arrest, the guide, or person who led the illegal aliens through the desert, is separated from the group of illegal aliens, after identification by at least a member of the smuggled group, and then he is set up for prosecution through Operation Against Smugglers Initiative on Safety and Security.²²³

The air mobile unit (AMU) at Tucson Station, as a small team element, was a novel concept. To field a station agent or agents, aside from the SOG units, that worked in conjunction with AMO units was not new, but a small team, like ATV's and the HPU, was novel. Management, or above line supervision, had direct oversight without

²²² Government Accountability Office, GAO-13-330 T, *Goals and Measures Not Yet in Place to Inform Security Status and Resource Needs* (Washington, DC: Government Accountability Office, February 2013), 11, assessed January 28, 2017, <http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-13-330T>.

²²³ Government Accountability Office, GAO-17-66, iii.

visibility, as the unit worked in the field and provided feedback to a Special Operations Supervisor (SOS), and the only gap to the unit's strength or design was the air mobile unit's purpose, specifically the AMU. Its mission changes daily to adjust to illegal alien traffic patterns, assist with pressing situations in the field that required a subject matter expert in the air and AMU agents on the ground to assist. Its "whole-of-government approach,"²²⁴ along with deputies from local sheriff's departments continues with teams today. Alternately, the Tucson Station disrupt unit performed duties ranging from intelligence collection to making arrests of criminal aliens and U.S. citizens, with innumerable challenges. However, managers and stakeholders, understood the necessity and purpose of the unit, but also the vulnerabilities of small teams having limited assets.

Supervisory School and Training the Agent

Border Patrol Agents selected for supervisor positions must attend supervisory schools within their probationary period. These training sessions provide SBPAs with the basic principles of leadership for line supervision. A facet of the basic academy that is missing in supervisory training is role playing. Role playing provides a realistic training environment. Scenarios, portrayed by participating supervisors and agents, can provide the development of some experiential knowledge for new supervisors prior to leading agents in the field. Loss of communication is something that happens often during supervisory operations and a decentralized command structure will often transpire, which can elevate the risk factors relevant to the situation. As General McChrystal points out in

²²⁴ U.S. Customs and Border Protection, *Border Patrol 2012-2016 Strategic Plan*, 18.

Teams, Ritz-Carlton professed the need for “good judgment.”²²⁵ Whereby his empowered employees strayed from their usual duties if a guest required something or made a complaint to see to their needs. “Autonomously”²²⁶ decentralized, but controlled by management, an arrangement was allowed where the Ritz-Carlton employee could make a decision that benefited the company and the customer, without managerial restraint, within a \$2,000.00 limit.²²⁷

Strengths and Weaknesses

E-mail interviews with two BPAs provided feedback regarding small teams. The two agent’s identities are BPA (1) and BPA (2). BPA (1) leading teams at the Tucson Station expressed positive feedback toward the use of teams, primarily in the internal nature of the team: Unity and motivation. The strengths that both BPA (1) and BPA (2) believed were common amongst teams in the Border Patrol were the unity of effort²²⁸ piece. From BPA (2)’s perspective, the team creates unity and motivation spurred from the unified aspect of working together toward specialization of an area.²²⁹ BPA (1)’s belief was that while working in a team environment, agents are “scrutinized by their

²²⁵ McChrystal, *Team of Teams*, 209.

²²⁶ Department of the Army, ADP 3-05, 13.

²²⁷ McChrystal, *Team of Teams*, 210.

²²⁸ Department of the Army, ADP 6-0 (2012), 11.

²²⁹ BPA (2), e-mail interview, March 15, 2017. Interviews were confidential, the name of interviewee was withheld by mutual agreement.

peers,”²³⁰ therefore they are more apt to completing the mission as not to “let your buddy down.”²³¹ In addition, BPA (1) saw a psychological effect occur when agents worked on teams, as the name of the team, or just the word “unit,” prompts more effective work done, than a line unit.²³²

An interesting con to small teams at Tucson Station seen through the eyes of BPA (2) is the idea of “diminished processing skills.”²³³ Processing skills are those skills agents acquire from conducting interviews of the arrestees and gathering their information, to include biographical data, current and past residences, and fingerprints of the individuals. These events take place in Spanish. Therefore, if agents working on teams are less apt to process the subjects they arrest, then BPA (2) is inferring that their Spanish language aptitude will lessen, as will their ability to conduct interviews, and investigations.²³⁴

Both BPA (1) and BPA (2) agreed over the number of agents they recommend per team. BPA (2) suggested 6-8 agents per team, with one supervisor. This make-up would enhance efficiency, per BPA (2).²³⁵ BPA (1) also believed 8 to 10 would be an adequate

²³⁰ BPA (1), e-mail interview, March 20, 2017. Interviews were confidential, the name of interviewee was withheld by mutual agreement.

²³¹ Ibid.

²³² Ibid.

²³³ BPA (2), e-mail interview, March 15, 2017.

²³⁴ Ibid.

²³⁵ Ibid.

size team, with a team per shift.²³⁶ BPA (2) had also mentioned if two teams were necessary to overlap, then another team of 6 to 8 with an additional supervisor would be the recommendation.²³⁷

Adapting to a New Culture

The concept of small teams as an over-arching framework of employing personnel, or agents, to the Tucson Station's AOR will require a cultural change, as the replacement of shifts, or line units for teams would upset the norm. Discomfort may be the initial reaction. Over time trust would grow amongst the agents, if the "shared belief"²³⁸ in the small team concept became the new norm. A cultural shift toward small team employment of personnel at the Tucson Station will spur new ideas. Agents working in teams will build trust in leadership through less micro-management,²³⁹ and from more autonomous decision-making.²⁴⁰

Conclusion

Tucson Station line units, small teams and Border Patrol SOG units, are dissimilar to Army conventional forces and Army SOF in the missing variables of doctrine, organization and education.²⁴¹ SOG and TUS teams have leadership qualities that are like

²³⁶ BPA (1), e-mail interview, March 20, 2017.

²³⁷ BPA (2), e-mail interview, March 15, 2017.

²³⁸ Department of the Army, ADRP 6-22, 5-4.

²³⁹ Department of the Army, ADP-1, 2-4.

²⁴⁰ Department of the Army, ADP 3-05, 13.

²⁴¹ U.S. Army War College, *How the Army Runs*, 3-10.

the mission command²⁴² element found in both Army conventional and SOF units. The ability of a team leader to make decisions without the necessity of approval from a WC in a chaotic situation is an important element to risk management.²⁴³ High-risk maneuvers in the field by TUS small teams and SOG units require rapid response decisions made with limited communication to the Tactical Operations Center or to the WC at the TUS. Training for small teams at TUS often entails the entire team, as the importance of synchronization of the agent's skill set is both purposeful and prudent. A disrupt team at the TUS may need training in surveillance operations, and a team member who is evasive-driving trained partnered with an agent on the team who is not, or a team member with prior intelligence gathering training partnered with a less experienced or novice-in-the-intelligence world agent, to include the supervisor.

Teams learn from each other, internally and externally. The members of teams learn from other members of the teams, and their weaknesses and strengths identified and exploited to help the team reach its goals, or complete the mission. As the Army calls for adaptability of their leaders²⁴⁴ the Border Patrol (BP) likewise requires adaptability of its leaders and agents in the field to successfully fulfill the duties of a BP agent. Adaptive employment of personnel is in current use in the U.S. Border Patrol, with SOG units, and

²⁴² Department of the Army, ADP 6-0 C-2 (2014), 2.

²⁴³ U.S. Customs and Border Protection, *Border Patrol 2012-2016 Strategic Plan*, 4.

²⁴⁴ Department of the Army, Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 7-0, *Training Units and Developing Leaders* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, August 2012), 10.

at the Tucson Station, with small teams, however, teams should become less ad hoc and more the mainstay, if not the norm.

The complexity of patrolling the border, where ASOs and drug-trafficking organizations (DTOs) aid illegal aliens by providing camouflage gear, and coaching them to run when spotted by Immigration Officers, exacerbates the need for an adaptive workforce, that like the Army “thrive”²⁴⁵ in the chaos and confusion. Response of personnel should be rapid to the threat, and the team concept at the Tucson Station is the most suitable method. Once situational understanding (SU)²⁴⁶ of an operational environment (OE) provides context to a team’s response needs (resources, technology, unified effort with other law enforcement (LE) assets), then determines the rapid mobility to the threat. Risk management²⁴⁷ follows with appropriate resources to respond.

²⁴⁵ Ibid., 12.

²⁴⁶ Department of the Army, ADP 6-0 C-2 (2014), 3.

²⁴⁷ U.S. Customs and Border Protection, *Border Patrol 2012-2016 Strategic Plan*, 4.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Introduction

Ad hoc teams serve a purpose, a specific one, either to plug a hole in an area of egress or assist line units that are busy working the line (border) to respond to activity north of the border, or in areas of more diverse terrain, like the mountains, or urban areas, in time during their shift. This leads to the primary research question: How should the Tucson Border Patrol Station optimally employ agents? The hypothesis of employing small teams throughout the Tucson AOR, as the over-arching method versus line unit employment, is substantiated in the research. Static teams, discussed throughout the paper are the optimum measure of employing agents at the Tucson Station, put in place for an extended time, or with longevity in mind, create not only a trust amongst the team's members, but also trust from the station of rapid response, contrary to the less responsive line units. Over time, the inclusion of teams at the Tucson Station could become the norm, rather than the novelty and create a more robust and responsive workforce along the border in Tucson Station's AOR.

Conclusions

The BORTAC and BORSTAR, as examples of small teams, in conjunction with the current small teams at the Tucson Station, have the same basic characteristics of rapid

response, mobility, and task specificity, or purpose.²⁴⁸ Relearning an area every day takes up time versus having baseline knowledge ahead of time. A baseline knowledge of an area creates an environment for adaptability and innovation. An all-terrain vehicle (ATV) may work an area with difficult access for agents in a vehicle one day, and given their smaller profile than a vehicle, lay-in for criminal traffic another day. An all team approach throughout Tucson's AOR provides the best alternative to line units. The dynamic of working on the U.S./Mexican border in Tucson Station's AOR is a challenge and the team approach to employing its personnel is a mitigating factor to its effectiveness.

Tucson teams and line units are both effective in the Tucson AOR; however, small teams are more rapidly employable, agile, and autonomous.²⁴⁹ Line units have their strengths in command and control with multiple supervisors, a Tactical Operations Center and WC on duty to provide authoritative oversight. SOG units respond adeptly to assist with risk management²⁵⁰ in the field, augmenting small teams and line units in the Tucson AOR. These approaches are similar in design to "the optimal force composition of Army special operations, conventional forces, and joint forces."²⁵¹

²⁴⁸ U.S. Customs and Border Protection, "Border Patrol Special Operations Group," accessed April 21, 2017, <https://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Border%20Patrol%20Special%20Operations%20Group.pdf>.

²⁴⁹ Department of the Army, ADP 3-05, 13.

²⁵⁰ U.S. Customs and Border Protection, *Border Patrol 2012-2016 Strategic Plan*, 4.

²⁵¹ *Ibid.*, 7.

Recommendations

Divide personnel into teams. Teams are the most effective method of employing personnel in the field of BP operations, as it provides the most rapid response to illegal alien traffic in a cohesive manner, suitable for appropriate applicability in all environments. Place teams everywhere to reduce attrition. Teams of supervisors are currently in place on shifts, like teams of recruiters—another BP mainstay, and teams of agents without direct supervision, participating with a supervisor to meet the mission of the BP.

The U.S. Border Patrol has continued striving to tackle the effort of lessening attrition, through the agreements with the National Border Patrol Council, to the recent Border Patrol Pay Reform Act (BAPRA), and further with President Trump's recent announcement of hiring 5,000 more Border Patrol Agents. The recruitment of former military personnel has increased the likelihood of preparing a prospective Border Patrol Agent trainee with the maneuverability tactics utilized along the border to increase vigilance of the nation's border. The Border Patrol continues with diversity of hiring future BPAs from all walks of life through varied recruitment efforts throughout the U.S. Focusing on diversity of employing Border Patrol personnel may harness morale at Tucson Station with a break from complacency, as discussed in chapter 2, and ease in training in a complex work environment. Working in different areas and unfamiliarity with the AOR is difficult enough for a new Border Patrol Agent trainee. Small teams would mitigate this potential risk on the job.

Per a *Stars and Stripes* article from July 2016, "the U.S. Army is looking to cut all nine of its Long-Range Surveillance Companies this year as part of a plan to restructure

its force.”²⁵² Long Range Surveillance Companies (LRS) existed in the U.S. Army “for 15 years”²⁵³ and prior, as in the Vietnam War.²⁵⁴ Like SOG agents in the Border Patrol whose skills maximize their opportunities to seek alternate positions throughout the Border Patrol, “[LRS soldiers] are generally able to move on to higher levels of responsibility faster than peers outside of LRS companies.”²⁵⁵ Correspondingly, the Patrol’s newest Chief is a member of the BORTAC, of SOG, and many of the 20 Chiefs of Border Patrol Sectors are members of BORTAC. In addition, the disbanding or reintegration of LRS into the main force mirrors agents working an ad hoc small team mission to address an area of egress. Once the team’s deterrence and apprehensions have reduced the flow of illegal immigrants in a specific area agents will typically return to the line shifts until which time the team is necessary for reemployment to address a capability gap²⁵⁶ either due to restricted terrain or reduced manpower in an area of concern. In some cases SOG units will employ to an area as there may be a risk factor that limits the specialties of a line agent as compared to a SOG agent with a more advanced skill set in areas of higher risk. SOG agents on BORSTAR and BORTAC work

²⁵² Alex Horton, “Army Looks to Deactivate Long Range Surveillance Companies,” *Stars and Stripes*, July 15, 2016, accessed February 11, 2017, https://www.stripes.com/army-looks-to-deactivate-long-range-surveillance-companies-1.419337#.WQ_VmOXytPY.

²⁵³ Ibid.

²⁵⁴ Alex Horton, “The History of Long Range Surveillance Companies.” *Stars and Stripes*, July 15, 2016, accessed May 18, 2017, <https://www.stripes.com/the-history-of-long-range-surveillance-companies-1.419335#.WR5bGGgrJEY>.

²⁵⁵ Ibid.

²⁵⁶ U.S. Army War College, *How the Army Runs*, 3-10.

with station agents to fill capability gaps²⁵⁷ in the field, i.e. areas of difficult terrain, like mountainous and deep wash areas.

The small team concept is already underway at Tucson Station. Its methodology and future improvements, consensus and embrace by management and agents in the field will depend upon lessons learned, through a similar construct to the Army's Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL), which "archives lessons and best practices."²⁵⁸ An increase of small team's utilization by the Tucson Border Patrol Station will depend upon mitigation of vulnerabilities like Border Patrol Union constraints, or continuity of information.

The Border Patrol union is The National Border Patrol Council (NBPC), a component of American Federation of Government Employees. The American Federation of Government Employees is comprised of "35 separate councils, to include the Veteran's Administration Council (VAC) and the NBPC."²⁵⁹ According to the NBPC, councils can exist if "they comply with the AFGE's constitution."²⁶⁰ The NBPC provides support to the Border Patrol's labor force below line supervisors. On the NBPC website, under "The NBPC Mission," it states "We safeguard conditions of employment,

²⁵⁷ Ibid.

²⁵⁸ Combined Arms Center, "Center for Army Lessons Learned," accessed May 20, 2017, <http://usacac.army.mil/organizations/mccoe/call>.

²⁵⁹ National Border Patrol Council, "NBPC Response to New Yorker Article," accessed February 18, 2017, <http://www.bpunion.org/index.php/newsroom/press-releases/1866-nbpc-response-to-new-yorker-article>.

²⁶⁰ Ibid.

agreements, practices, employee rights, and the labor laws of the United States.”²⁶¹ By this measure the NBPC has leverage with management over the personnel employment at the Tucson Station if the employment of personnel is based on selection criteria of personnel for specific details or missions. In this context, the use of small teams should be a mainstay at the Tucson Station, not an ad hoc, or temporary detail. Even then, if personnel selected for a team, as they are for HPU and Canine Handler selection, then the NBPC would have a say in its procedure. The employment of personnel in the field at the Tucson Station has a current Union agreement to allow agents to select the shifts they prefer, in a tiered selection of their choices, the first being their most desired. Management officials and union stewards from the Tucson Station divide the units, based on seniority of staff. This allows for an unbiased process of dividing shifts into feasible units, in a near even number of agents on each shift, or line unit. Supervisors (SBPA’s) and WCs likewise provide their desired shifts; however, higher management will augment them to shifts based on manpower needs and management objectives.

Communication prior to employment of personnel into the field comes from multiple sources, the Sector’s Chief, Assistant Chiefs, the Patrol Agent in Charge, the WCs, and finally the SBPAs. All pertinent information from headquarters in Washington DC passes through Sector, then the Station level, beginning with the Patrol Agent in Charge and finally to the shifts, through the WCs. WCs provide information to the supervisors who disseminate policy changes, updates, security issues, safety bulletins, training opportunities, and current field updates, to the agents at muster. A muster begins

²⁶¹ Ibid.

the shift and allows the units to provide agents their assignments, special duties, and have face time with the agents as both a morale and safety issue. The physical check of an agent's whereabouts is essential to management's accountability of the field coverage and a daily assessment of morale and agent issues discussed openly in the forum-like manner of shift muster. These specific attributes of musters would be less macro in delivery and synthesis, whereby the synchronization of a larger unit would provide management with a wider gage of the agent's understanding of a recent policy or updates to a recent agent assault case would have less chance of falling through the cracks in communication. A small team environment, where the SBPA's would be the sole link in the command and control structure to the agents, and the information provided to shifts passed through a WC, could lose continuity.

Further Development and Research

The research on employment of personnel to the field at the Tucson Station focused on the Tucson Station and the use of small teams as the alternative to shifts or line units. Further research is necessary on other methods of employing resources and personnel to the border. Alternate employment methods not researched are: The use of Unmanned Aircraft Systems;²⁶² An increase of ACTT assets to the border; and unity of effort²⁶³ approaches, working internationally with Mexico.

²⁶² Federal Aviation Administration, "Unmanned Aerial Systems," accessed February 20, 2017, <https://www.faa.gov/uas/>.

²⁶³ Department of the Army, ADP 6-0 C-2 (2014), 3.

Training the line agents, like the small team, requires long periods of employment amongst a sustained unit. To build trust, fundamental to small teams, on a line unit, would require greater connectivity between the agents and supervisors, which may require increased training together. This concept would entail further research and analysis. Additionally, training of a line unit may prepare educational brochures and standards, further creating doctrine.

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