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THESIS

**WHY IRREGULARS WIN: ASYMMETRY OF
MOTIVATIONS AND THE OUTCOMES OF
IRREGULAR WARFARE**

by

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December 2016

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OUTCOMES OF IRREGULAR WARFARE**

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ABSTRACT

The U.S. military is first-rate, yet it struggles to fight and win irregular wars. Surprisingly, throughout the course of history great powers have had difficulty with small wars. One must ask then, *why* and *how* do irregulars win as often as they do? The answer to this question will enable the United States to support irregulars more effectively, and defeat irregulars more efficiently.

This thesis considers seventeen irregular conflicts between WWII and the present day to determine why irregulars win when they do, and how asymmetries of motivation can affect the outcome of irregular wars. A mixed methodology, including heuristics, process tracing, and comparison of case studies is used to evaluate irregular wars and the motivations of the combatants. The findings suggest that asymmetries of motivation only partially explain why irregulars succeed. Irregulars can succeed when motivations are symmetric as well as asymmetric. Internal conflicts that exhibited symmetrical motivation were often long, bloody, and costly affairs resolved primarily by negotiations. Alternatively, when asymmetries of motivation have existed, the weak were able to influence intrinsic and extrinsic motivations to coerce their adversaries to quit.

Ultimately, the findings from this thesis indicate that opinion and public support significantly influence an actor's motivation and will to fight. In light of this, this thesis suggests that SOF should focus on advising irregulars to shape opinions and perceptions to undermine their opponents' will to fight. Furthermore, the U.S. government should focus more on the application of political and psychological warfare to enable U.S. SOF operations in support of both counterinsurgency and unconventional warfare operations.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

ALN	Armée de Libération Nationale
AQI	al-Qaeda in Iraq
ARVN	Army of the Republic of Vietnam
AUC	Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CGSB	Coordinadora Guerrillera Simón Bolívar
CISPES	The Committee in Solidarity with the People of El Salvador
COIN	Counterinsurgency
CRUA	Comité Révolutionnaire d'Unité et d'Action
CT	Counterterrorism
DRV	Democratic Republic of North Vietnam
ELN	Ejército de Liberación Nacional
EPL	Ejército Popular de Liberación
FM	Field Manual
FARC	Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia
FARC-EP	FARC-Ejército del Pueblo
FID	Foreign Internal Defense
FLN	Front de Liberation Nationale
FMLN	Farabundo Marti-National Liberation Front
GVN	Government of South Vietnam
IDF	Israeli Defense Force
IED	Improvised Explosive Device
IRA	Irish Republican Army
IW	Irregular Warfare
JOC	Joint Operational Concept
KCA	Kikuyu Central Association
M-19	Movimiento 19 de Abril
MRLA	Malayan Race Liberation Army
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NLF	National Liberation Front

NVA	North Vietnamese Army
OAS	Organisation de l'Armée Secrète
PA	Palestinian National Authority
PIRA	Provisional Irish Republican Army
PLO	Palestine Liberation Organization
POW	Prisoner of War
PPA	Algerian People's Party
PX	Post Exchange
RENAMO	Resistência Nacional Moçambicana
SOCOM	U.S. Special Operations Command
SOE	Special Operations Executive
SOF	Special Operations Forces
UN	United Nations
UP	Unión Patriótica
U.S.	United States
WWI	World War One
WWII	World War Two
ZANLA	Zimbabwean African National Liberation Army
ZANU	Zimbabwe African National Union
ZAPU	Zimbabwe African Peoples Union
ZIPRA	Zimbabwean African Peoples Revolutionary Army

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I. INTRODUCTION

In any war, the readiness to suffer and die, as well as to kill, represents the single most important factor. Take it away, and even the most numerous, best organized, best trained, best equipped army in the world will turn out to be a brittle instrument. This applies to all wars regardless of time, place, and circumstance.¹

—Martin van Creveld

War is one of the most ancient and elemental facets of human and societal interaction. It is like chess, a game of strategy in which the players try to outsmart and outmaneuver their opponents. In a contest such as this, a player has several paths to victory; annihilating the opponent in battle, skillful diplomacy, or use of coercion or deterrence. All of these paths are open and available to the strong. The weak have fewer options, due to their inferior size, strength, capability, and technology. And yet, as recent history demonstrates, superior conventional military strength is becoming less effective against the weak and less likely to produce a quick and decisive victory—or victory at all. In fact, as evident in Algeria, Vietnam, and Afghanistan, the strong often struggle to fight and win irregular wars against weaker opponents.² The weak have been increasingly able to coerce, disrupt, and in some cases, overthrow stronger adversaries.³ One must ask then, why and how do irregulars win as often as they do?

Motivation is an important factor in war. Fundamentally, “Motivation may be the intersection between irregular and conventional war.”⁴ In fact, many strategists such as Clausewitz, Heydte, Mao, Galula, Schelling, Huth, and George, as well as Petraeus, and Kilcullen, have attempted to understand the strategic interaction of motivations in general

¹ Martin van Creveld, *The Transformation of War* (New York : Toronto : New York: Free Press ; Collier Macmillan Canada ; Maxwell Macmillan International, 1991), 160.

² Max Boot, *Invisible Armies: An Epic History of Guerrilla Warfare from Ancient Times to the Present*, 1st ed. (New York, NY: Norton, 2013), 559. Boot’s database of 443 irregular conflicts dating back to 1775 finds that irregulars win 25.5 percent of the time and force a draw an additional 10.8 percent of the time. However, since 1945 Boot finds that irregulars are winning more often, or 40.3 percent of the time.

³ *Ibid.*, xxvi.

⁴ Doowan Lee, Operationalizing Asymmetries of Motivation, Meeting, March 8, 2016.

war, irregular war, and limited war.⁵ Although, beyond acknowledging the importance of motivation and identifying factors that impact motivation in war, these strategists have not fully considered the multiple dimensions of motivation and how they influence the outcome of irregular warfare.

This chapter will first identify the problem and question at hand. Then, it will review the theories of irregular warfare, and explore what success means for the weak. This chapter will then review existing arguments that attempt to explain why irregulars win when they do. And finally, this chapter will explain how motivation is evaluated in the subsequent chapters.

A. THE PROBLEM

Understanding of irregulars, and their success, has been impeded by conventional mindsets and organizational structures. Often, the strong approach irregular wars with poorly defined goals and an unreasonable expectation of a short and decisive victory.⁶ In doing so, we fail to understand the true nature of irregular war and how success is achieved in such conflicts. We must consider and evaluate irregular warfare and success

⁵ Carl von Clausewitz, Michael Eliot Howard, and Peter Paret, *On War*, First paperback printing (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989); Friedrich August von der Heydte, *Modern Irregular Warfare: In Defense Policy and as a Military Phenomenon*, 1st English ed. (New York, NY: New Benjamin Franklin House, 1986); Zedong Mao, *On Guerrilla Warfare* (Mineola, NY: Dover Publications, 2005); David Galula and John A. Nagl, *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice, PSI Classics of the Counterinsurgency Era* (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2006); Thomas C. Schelling, *Arms and Influence* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1976); Paul K Huth, *Extended Deterrence and the Prevention of War* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989); Alexander L. George, *Forceful Persuasion: Coercive Diplomacy as an Alternative to War* (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1991); Department of the Army, *Counterinsurgency* (FM 3–24), 2006; David Kilcullen, “Countering Global Insurgency,” *Small Wars Journal*, November 30, 2004.

⁶ Andrew P. N. Erdmann, “The U.S. Presumption of Quick, Costless Wars,” *Orbis* 43, no. 3 (June 1999): 363–81, doi:10.1016/S0030-4387(99)80077-5. 48–49. Erdmann argues that the notion of a quick, cheap, and decisive victory has become dogma. In reality, as he argues, most contemporary irregular conflicts are protracted, expensive, and not decisive. Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense. Remarks Prepared For Delivery By The Honorable Caspar W. Weinberger, Secretary of Defense. “*The Uses of Military Power*.” National Press Club, Washington, DC: November 28, 1984. Weinberger explains that the decision to commit forces to hostilities overseas is less clear and more difficult than in the past. Robert Mandel, *The Meaning of Military Victory* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2006). 4. Mandel also points out that uncertainty often surrounds what states are pursuing or protecting in irregular wars. He argues that this is the result of ambiguous policies and shifting and vague national security interests.

from the perspective of the weak; and more fundamentally, why people or individuals fight—and how to make them stop fighting.

The success of irregular actors is explained in many ways; though, the actual *cause* of irregular success is often confused with factors that only contribute to irregular success. For example, scholars in accord with Jeffery Record claim that success in irregular war is the result of external support provided by a third party, which enables irregular actors to overcome a disadvantage against a stronger adversary.⁷ Other scholars, such as Connable and Libicki, believe that irregular success is determined by access to safe havens that shield irregular actors from their adversaries.⁸ Alternatively, some individuals such as Ivan Arreguín-Toft suggest that success is due to superior strategy.⁹ Still, other authors such as Lewis Gann contend that the answer is more complex—irregulars' success is a combination of their ability to overcome organizational weaknesses and their ability to break the will of their opponent.¹⁰ While these explanations identify several factors that contribute to irregular success, they do not fully account for why the weak win or why the strong sometimes quit and leave on their own.

B. THE QUESTION

To understand how motivation explains why the weak sometimes prevail, this thesis poses the following question: Why and how do irregulars win when they do and how does asymmetries of motivation affect the outcomes of irregular wars? Only a few authors, such as Gann, Mack, and Mandel have considered the will to win as the cause

⁷ Jeffrey Record, *Beating Goliath: Why Insurgencies Win* (Washington, DC: Poole: 2009), 22–24.

⁸ Ben Connable and Martin C. Libicki, *How Insurgencies End* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2010), xvii, 34–40.

⁹ Ivan M. Arreguín-Toft, *How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict*, Cambridge Studies in International Relations 99 (NY: Cambridge University Press, 2005).

¹⁰ Lewis H. Gann, *Guerrillas in History*, Hoover Institution Studies 28 (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1971), 69, 84, 91. Gann contends that irregular actors require support from foreign *regular* forces, and a *regular* and *secure* source of supplies to succeed. Also, Gann emphasizes that irregular success hinges on the will to win and the human factor. Ultimately, Gann concludes that irregulars can succeed if the struggle is protracted, they maintain a united front in the eyes of the world, the enemy is disunited, and the enemy's goals are not worth the effort.

for success in irregular war.¹¹ Therefore, this thesis will examine how the dynamics of motivation affect the outcomes of irregular conflicts. In addition, this thesis will attempt to reveal how irregulars manipulate and shape motivations to exploit asymmetry of motivations in order to increase their likelihood of success.

C. IRREGULAR WARFARE AND IRREGULARS

This is another type of war, new in its intensity, ancient in its origin—war by guerrillas, subversives, insurgents, assassins; war by ambush instead of by combat, by infiltration instead of aggression, seeking victory by eroding and exhausting the enemy instead of engaging him.¹²

—President John F. Kennedy

Irregular warfare is a concept that has been debated and conceptualized in many ways. This is because “IW is a complex, ‘messy,’ and ambiguous social phenomenon that does not lend itself to clean, neat, concise, or precise definition.”¹³ Terms such as “small wars,” “asymmetric wars,” “gray zone conflicts,” “low-intensity conflicts,” “military operations other than war,” “guerrilla war,” and “unconventional war” have been developed to fill the void left in the wake of our understanding of the oldest form of warfare—irregular war.¹⁴ Currently, the U.S. military defines irregular war as:

A violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant populations(s). Irregular warfare favors indirect and asymmetric approaches, though it may employ the full range

¹¹ Ibid.; Andrew Mack, “Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars: The Politics of Asymmetric Conflict,” *World Politics* 27, no. 02 (January 1975): 175–200, doi:10.2307/2009880. 177–179; Mandel, *The Meaning of Military Victory*.127.

¹² John F. Kennedy, “Address to the Graduating Class, U.S. Military Academy, 6 June 1962” (Speech, West Point Military Academy, June 6, 1962), <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=8695>.

¹³ Department of the Defense, *Irregular Warfare (IW) Joint Operating Concept (JOC)*, Version 1, 1007, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/concepts/joint_concepts/joc_iw_v1.pdf. 6.

¹⁴ Jeffrey B. White, “A Different Kind of Threat: Some Thoughts on Irregular Warfare,” *Studies in Intelligence* 39, no. 5 (1996), <https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/96unclass/irregular.htm>; Boot, *Invisible Armies*, xxiv.

of military and other capacities, in order to erode an adversary's power, influence, and will.¹⁵

This definition is problematic as it fails to encapsulate the essence of irregular warfare.¹⁶ Therefore, it is useful to consider other definitions. John Arquilla explains that irregular war can be defined in three different ways based on the size of the force involved and the tactics they use.¹⁷ In the first case, Arquilla finds that small units wage irregular wars, typically against larger adversaries, using innovative means. Second, irregular wars are waged by guerrillas against an occupying force or invading power, using hit and run tactics and the popular resistance typified by Ho Chi Minh and Mao Zedong. And finally, Professor Arquilla explains that irregulars often use terrorism to compel or coerce their adversary into compliance.

Similarly, Friedrich August von der Heydte finds that irregular warfare is often waged by small units and won through a multitude of small individual operations.¹⁸ Heydte concludes that irregular war is waged “outside the conventions” and “laws and norms” created for conventional war.¹⁹ He also notes that it can transpire internally or

¹⁵ U.S. Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, “*Joint Publication 1–02: Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*” (Department of Defense, February 25, 2016), http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp1_02.pdf.

¹⁶ Ultimately, this definition fails to address some of the important defining characteristics of irregular warfare and references some questionable terms and general features. The use of “violence” as a descriptive feature of irregular warfare is problematic as violence is not only relative, but also a common feature of warfare in general. Secondly, it may be argued whether irregular actors are fighting for legitimacy and influence—or for some other reason such as control over relevant populations or independence from illegitimate governors and invaders. Further, “asymmetric approaches” is a colloquial term that has little meaning or descriptive value in military doctrine and strategy. Eric V. Larson, Brian Nichiporuk, and Thomas Szayna, “*Assessing Irregular Warfare: A Framework for Intelligence Analysis*” (RAND, 2008). Larson, Nichiporuk, and Szayna point out that current irregular warfare definition is problematic as irregular warfare is a general term used to describe and classify a diverse set of actors, multiple forms of conflict, and a long list of operations and activities. Arquilla, *Insurgents, Raiders, and Bandits How Masters of Irregular Warfare Have Shaped Our World*, 67, notes that this military definition fails to address the fact that both strong and weak actors use special operations techniques in irregular warfare, such as insurgency, terrorism, and small-unit operations. Further, Arquilla notes that irregular warfare activities, operations, and techniques can be used in conventional conflicts or in general warfare as well.

¹⁷ Arquilla, *Insurgents, Raiders, and Bandits How Masters of Irregular Warfare Have Shaped Our World*, 4–5.

¹⁸ Heydte, *Modern Irregular Warfare*, 3.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 9.

internationally, it can occur before, during or after conventional war, and it is typified by the blurring of lines between war and peace, or, as he claims, “war in peace.”²⁰ Finally, Heydte notes that irregular war is fundamentally a “*war of attrition*” and “[A]n act of violence to force the adversary to submit to our will.”²¹

Finally, irregular warfare is often considered a “weapon of the weak.”²² Because the weak lack the resources and capabilities to engage their adversary conventionally, they are forced to use unconventional and indirect ways and means to fight and win. Though as Colin Gray concludes—the notion of the irregular is an ambiguous concept: “That can mean enemies of any genus who choose to fight in an irregular mode; or it may refer to foes who are deemed to be irregular by definition because they are not the licensed sword arms of officially recognized polities.”²³ Thus, irregular warfare is also a “tool of the strong.”²⁴ Apart from the nature of irregular war and irregular actors, irregular warfare is also delineated from conventional warfare due to the asymmetry that exists between belligerents.

Asymmetry is a defining factor in irregular war because of the extreme inequality that exists between adversaries.²⁵ Asymmetries occur in many forms: between force size; capability; technology; interests; will, etc. In fact, because asymmetries exist in every war, and the term has been used to describe various disparities in war, the “Asymmetric” label has lost its value.²⁶ Therefore, for the sake of clarity, asymmetry is only used to describe the difference in relative motivation that exists between belligerents in this

²⁰ Ibid., 9–11, 83.

²¹ Ibid., 38, 93.

²² Gann, *Guerrillas in History*, 91.

²³ Colin S. Gray, *Irregular Enemies and the Essence of Strategy: Can the American Way of War Adapt?* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2006), 8.

²⁴ Heydte, *Modern Irregular Warfare*, 91.

²⁵ Arquilla, *Insurgents, Raiders, and Bandits How Masters of Irregular Warfare Have Shaped Our World*. 8. Many scholars and military professionals define wars between small units and larger forces as asymmetric wars. However, as Professor Arquilla notes, this label is problematic because all wars are fundamentally asymmetric for the simple fact that a fair fight defies the principles of war.

²⁶ Robert M. Cassidy, “Why Great Powers Fight Small Wars Badly,” *Military Review* (September-October 2008): 41–53. 43.

thesis. Within this context, asymmetry of motivation is conceptualized as the difference between total or limited commitment to a conflict.

1. Total versus Limited Commitment

Commitment is a reflection of the actor's motivation, means, or goals and it is referred to in this thesis as total or limited. According to Robert Osgood, "Limited wars were to be fought for ends far short of the complete subordination of one state's will to another's, using means that involve far less than the total military resources of the belligerents."²⁷ In contrast to this, Mandel argues that total war implies that "all human and material resources of the belligerents are mobilized and employed against the total national life of the enemy."²⁸ Thus, within the context of irregular warfare, the strong rarely, if ever, leverage all of their resources against the weak, while the weak must use every resource at their disposal to succeed.

In most cases, the threat is existential for the weak; their struggle is one of survival. As a result, the weak typically exhibit a high threshold of pain and are willing to suffer any cost because they have nothing to lose.²⁹ In comparison, the strong are typically not willing to pay any price, as the weak do not pose an immediate threat to their vital interests.³⁰ Cassidy notes, "[F]or the great power in an asymmetric situation, full military mobilization is neither politically prudent nor militarily necessary."³¹ Finally, because the conflict may only be one of several major foreign or domestic political affairs that the strong is juggling, it cannot afford to be totally invested or engaged militarily, economically, or politically in a limited irregular war.

²⁷ Robert Endicott Osgood, *Limited War Revisited*, A Westview Special Study (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1979), 2.

²⁸ Robert Endicott Osgood, *Limited War: The Challenge to American Strategy* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970), 3, 5.

²⁹ Cassidy, "Why Great Powers Fight Small Wars Badly," 47.

³⁰ Record, *Beating Goliath*, 3. Record notes that the strong exhibit a "lower political tolerance of blood and treasure losses" in irregular war.

³¹ *Ibid.*, 44.

Ultimately, one's political goal is critical in determining their level of commitment in irregular warfare. As Clausewitz argued, war is an extension of politics; "The political object—the original motive for war—will thus determine both the military objective to be reached and the amount of effort it requires."³² Furthermore, because war is a rational act, "[T]he value of the object must determine the sacrifices to be made for it in *magnitude and duration*. Once the expenditure of effort exceeds the value of the political object, the object must be renounced and peace must follow."³³ Put differently, an actor's level of commitment is directly related to the value they place on their political goal. This is the crux of the matter: The political end must be worth the effort, or the motivation to pursue the end will crumble.

By virtue of their nature, the strong generally exhibit limited commitment while the weak exhibit total commitment in irregular warfare. Although, this is not a hard and fast rule for the strong or the weak; motivation and commitment fluctuate over the duration of a conflict as belligerents achieve battlefield gains and losses, as external support and access to safe havens fluctuates, and as current events shape domestic and international sentiments. It bears asking then, *why* and *how* motivation and commitment shifts, and whether it accounts for irregular success. First, it is necessary to consider the definition of success or victory in irregular war.

2. Defining Success in Irregular Warfare

Success in irregular warfare is subject to debate, and, in reality, seldom appears as initially envisioned.³⁴ Muddying our understanding of success is the fact that "victory has had dissimilar and often unclear and contradictory meanings for winners and

³² Clausewitz, Howard, and Paret, *On War*, 81.

³³ *Ibid.*, 92.

³⁴ Of note, I am not attempting to demonstrate, or make the claim, that irregulars can only win through the attrition of the will or motivation of the strong alone. Irregulars must first overcome organizational hurdles and resource shortages to simply survive. They must recruit and mobilize personnel and persuade friendly, enemy, and neutral parties that their cause is just. Furthermore, in many instances, the irregulars are simply outmatched, in size, capability, or skill and are forced to quit. But every now and then, irregulars succeed in destroying their opponents will and convincing them that their goals are not worth pursuing. In such cases, the necessary and sufficient conditions are met and victory ensues.

losers.”³⁵ Additionally, as Mandel points out, “victory in limited war is trickier to demarcate—and often to achieve—than in total war.”³⁶ As a result, it is often said that the irregular wins as long as he does not lose, and the strong lose as long as they do not win.³⁷ Put differently, the irregular wins by merely surviving. While there may be some truth to this, it is overly simplified and of limited use.

Success for the weak can be defined as complete victory or negotiated peace. Within the context of complete victory, irregulars must completely remove the external influence or occupiers from their sphere of influence. The irregular is fundamentally weaker than the strong and are less likely to defeat their adversary militarily. Though, the weak can succeed in the face of military defeat.³⁸ Stalemates or draws often lead to negotiations that result in political compromises. Consequently, success is also defined as any negotiated settlement that achieves even the slightest political end that results in a better peace for the irregulars.³⁹ In this sense, irregulars can win in various ways—by overthrowing the “government, successful annexation of independent territory, recognition of minority rights, or dramatic political success.”⁴⁰ Thus, irregulars can succeed militarily by defeating their adversary’s forces, politically by compelling or coercing the strong to quit, or by securing political advantages through negotiations.

3. Explaining Why Irregulars Succeed

Several scholars have attempted to explain the success of irregulars, and in doing so, have attributed it to various factors. Although these explanations are useful in describing the factors that contribute to irregular success, they often fail to explain adequately *how* and *why* irregulars succeed. This is not in any way to discount the

³⁵ Mandel, *The Meaning of Military Victory*, 1.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, 37.

³⁷ Cassidy, “Why Great Powers Fight Small Wars Badly,” 43.

³⁸ Mack, “Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars,” 177.

³⁹ Basil Henry Liddell Hart, *Strategy*, 2nd rev.ed. (New York, NY: Meridian, 1991), 357. Liddell Hart reminds us that wars are waged for one reason—a better peace. “Victory in the true sense implies that the state of peace, and of one’s people, is better after the war than before.”

⁴⁰ Connable and Libicki, *How Insurgencies End*, 14, 20. Libicki notes that peace is rarely permanent.

relevance and importance of their arguments or explanations. If any one of these factors is found absent or lacking, irregular success is highly unlikely. Furthermore, these factors and their impact on irregulars fluctuate across the spectrum and duration of irregular warfare. Also, irregulars rarely benefit from all factors simultaneously or to the fullest extent possible. Therefore, none of these factors alone can explain the success of the weak against the strong. Nonetheless, it is important to review the dominant arguments made for why the weak succeed over the strong in irregular war.

a. Asymmetry of Interest

The theory of “superior will” is an age-old concept that has been discussed in depth by great thinkers from Sun Tzu to Clausewitz, to Galula. Though, more recently, Andrew Mack’s seminal article, “Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars: The Politics of Asymmetric Conflict,” published in *World Politics* in 1975 continued the debate over the role of motivation, or the will to win, in irregular warfare. Mack claims that irregular success is not found through military might, but rather, “from a progressive attrition of their opponents political capability to wage war.”⁴¹ According to Mack, irregulars can win by imposing continued and unreasonable psychological and political costs on their adversary.⁴² This, he claims, will destroy the state’s political will to continue the struggle, making the state’s “military capability—no matter how powerful”—totally irrelevant.⁴³ As Mack argues, because the state’s security is not directly at risk, the costs outweigh the benefits of continued war, and thus, the irregular will succeed.⁴⁴ Though, beyond this, Mack does not fully elaborate on *how* irregulars create or impose political and psychological costs. For this, we look further, to Arreguín-Toft’s theory of strategic interaction.

⁴¹ Mack, “Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars,” 177.

⁴² *Ibid.*, 185.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, 179.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 181.

b. Asymmetry of Strategy

Ivan Arreguín-Toft considers strategy and finds that irregulars succeed when the strong choose the wrong strategy, or the opposite approach as the weak. Arreguín-Toft argues that relative power matters, but the strategic interaction between actors matters more.⁴⁵ Therefore, he set off to illuminate the strategies and counter-strategies that would enable success or failure in irregular war.⁴⁶ Arreguín-Toft concludes that irregulars inevitably lose if they match their adversaries' strategy; if they employ a direct strategy against their opponent's direct strategy, or an indirect strategy against their indirect strategy.⁴⁷ Alternatively, the weak win when they choose the opposite strategy as the strong; the weak win if they use an indirect strategy against their adversary's direct strategy or a direct strategy against their opponent's indirect strategy.⁴⁸ Also, because Arreguín-Toft found that time favors the weak, he concludes that the strong will ultimately abandon the fight to avoid increasing costs—"such as declaring war, mobilizing reserves, raising taxes, or sustaining additional casualties."⁴⁹ Based on this, Arreguín-Toft argues that the indirect strategy is the best option for the irregulars because it is the most difficult to defeat. From his argument, it is clear that strategy is a significant factor that contributes to the success of the irregulars. Though, more importantly, Arreguín-Toft's theory again links motivation to costs. This speaks to a more significant psychological catalyst of success than strategy alone.

⁴⁵ Arreguín-Toft, *How the Weak Win Wars*, 18.

⁴⁶ Ivan M. Arreguín-Toft, "How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict," 105. Ivan Arreguín-Toft defines direct approaches as those that target an adversary's armed forces in order to destroy that adversary's capacity to fight. The direct approach for the strong is the attack while the direct approach for the weak is the defense. Conversely, he defines indirect approaches as those that seek to destroy an adversary's will to fight. The indirect approach for the strong is barbarism while the indirect approach for the weak is guerrilla warfare or terrorism.

⁴⁷ Arreguín-Toft, *How the Weak Win Wars*, 39.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 39, 122–123.

⁴⁹ Ivan Arreguín-Toft, "How the Weak Win Wars A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict," *International Security* 26, no. 1 (2001): 105.

c. Asymmetry of Resources

Jeffery Record takes Arreguín-Toft's theory one-step further in considering what other factors contribute to the success of irregulars. Record notes that the weak sometimes win because the strong "appear to suffer from some combination of inferior political will, inferior war strategy, and an inability to isolate insurgent forces from external support."⁵⁰ Though, Record argues that external assistance is particularly important because it enables "the weak to impose considerable military and political pain on the strong," which he believes, compels the strong to quit.⁵¹ Thus, as Record, argues, external support is not only necessary, but must be sufficient for irregulars to succeed. Though, while external assistance can help irregulars overcome resource shortfalls, it typically does not fully close this gap, nor is it reliable or constant. Therefore, we must consider Gil Merom's analysis of the cost-benefit calculus that impacts the strong's will to fight irregulars.

d. Asymmetry of Violence

Merom focuses his analysis on the cost of war, the level of violence, and the will to win. Merom argues, "democracies fail in small wars because they find it extremely difficult to escalate the level of violence and brutality to that which can secure victory."⁵² He asserts that the strong lose when the center of gravity shifts from the battlefield to the domestic market place of ideas by the educated elite, number of casualties, level of violence, and international conditions.⁵³ Therefore, Merom concludes that the strong lose due to the normative difference equation that is influenced by the free market place of

⁵⁰ Record, *Beating Goliath*, x, 23.

⁵¹ Ibid., vii, 24, 130. "External assistance can take many forms; from political support, to provision of money, to supply of arms, military advice and territorial sanctuaries and the introduction of foreign military forces."

⁵² Ibid., 15, 78–79. When it comes to normalizing brutality, Merom notes that Western powers compartmentalize small wars and dehumanize insurgents and delegitimize their cause to "free themselves from the moral restraints that prevent the use of excessive brutality." He also notes that states can resort to brutality and barbarism to destroy an insurgent or revolutionary if they can "monopolize the supply of information" and "isolate the battlefield" to prevent their actions from souring the will of their domestic constituency.

⁵³ Ibid., 75. 230–231.

ideas.⁵⁴ Conversely, he concludes that the weak win because they are more motivated, and will sacrifice more because they have more at stake if they lose.⁵⁵ This statement is tautological though. Therefore, it is necessary to consider *how* irregulars affect the “free marketplace” to enable their success.

4. Evaluating *Why* and *How* Irregulars Succeed in Irregular Warfare

Each of these authors provides useful insight into the factors that influence the outcomes of irregular wars. At the center of each argument is the claim that irregular success is realized through their ability to exact high costs on their opponent’s will to win. Though, other than Andrew Mack, few have considered whether success is the result of the asymmetry of motivations in irregular warfare. Furthermore, Mack only briefly considers this theory without fully developing how the asymmetry of motivations affects the outcome of irregular warfare or how irregulars manipulate or exploit their adversary’s motivation to enable success. This may be because motivation is vague; it is subjective, less tangible, hard to quantify and other explanations are more fungible.

Here lies a gap in our understanding of why irregulars win. This begs the question, is it possible that the weak succeed because they can generate and sustain more internal motivation while decreasing their opponent’s motivation, or resolve to persist? Furthermore, how is motivation manipulated and how might it change our current approach and strategy in irregular war?

This thesis will attempt to understand why irregulars succeed and how motivation influences the outcome of irregular warfare. This thesis is separated into two parts to evaluate the impact of motivation on the outcome of irregular warfare. Part One of this thesis consists of Chapters II through VI. Chapter II establishes the methodology and framework that will be used in this thesis to evaluate why and how irregulars win and

⁵⁴ Ibid., 20, 22. Merom defines the “normative difference” as the difference between the cost of war and what objectives and methods are morally acceptable.

⁵⁵ Gil Merom, *How Democracies Lose Small Wars: State, Society, and the Failures of France in Algeria, Israel in Lebanon, and the United States in Vietnam* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 11.

how their success relates to motivation. Chapters III, IV, and V then consider fifteen irregular conflicts to illuminate why irregulars win when they do. Then, Chapter VI summarizes the lessons learned across the three periods in Chapters III, IV, and V to reveal why irregulars succeed when they do. Part Two then evaluates how commitment and motivation fluctuate in irregular warfare, how irregulars manipulate motivation, and how asymmetry of motivations affects the outcome of irregular warfare. Part Two consists of Chapters VII, VIII, and XI. Chapters VII and VIII first trace motivations in two specific conflicts to assess how irregulars manipulate motivation to influence the outcome of irregular warfare. Finally, Chapter XI will tie all of these chapters together to illuminate *why* and *how* the weak prevail against the strong when they do.

II. METHODOLOGY

This thesis seeks to understand how irregulars succeed when they do, and specifically, how motivation influences the outcome of irregular warfare—an onerous task, as motivation is conceptually complex and multifaceted. In fact, Merom fittingly asks, “How is one supposed to measure the relative intensity of “will” independently, and without falling into the tautological trap of inferring it from the results of war?”⁵⁶ To avoid this pitfall, and to account for alternative explanations, this chapter establishes the methodology that will be used to structure the analysis of motivation, and illuminate the ways and means irregulars use to win.⁵⁷

This thesis uses a mixed-methodology to explore the role of motivation in irregular warfare. This chapter will first discuss how heuristics is used in Part One, to look broadly at the evolution of irregular warfare since World War II, to determine if motivation is a constant factor, or more or less significant based on the nature of the conflict.⁵⁸ Next, this chapter will elaborate on how the process tracing method is used in Part Two to look at specific cases in greater detail, to explore how motivation fluctuates, and how this relates to irregulars’ success. And finally, this chapter will establish the framework that will be used to identify and evaluate asymmetry of motivations in Part Two of this thesis.

A. PART ONE: ASSESSING WHY IRREGULARS WIN

Lewis Gann’s formative work, *Guerrillas in History*, provides a concise but comprehensive review of guerrillas and guerrilla warfare throughout four periods of time:

⁵⁶ Merom, *How Democracies Lose Small Wars*, 12.

⁵⁷ Stephen Van Evera, *Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997), 11. The dependent variable being assessed is the success of the weak in irregular warfare. The independent variable is motivation. Van Evera defines the independent variable as “A variable framing the causal phenomenon of a causal theory or hypothesis;” and the dependent variable as “A variable framing the caused phenomenon of a causal theory or hypothesis.” Also, he defines conditional variables as “A variable framing an antecedent condition. The values of condition variables govern the size of the impact that independent variables have on dependent variables.”

⁵⁸ Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*, BCSIA Studies in International Security (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 2005), 94.

the preindustrial age; the industrial revolution and the age of imperialism; the early twentieth century; and the period leading up to World War II.⁵⁹ Like Gann's work, Part One of this thesis will look broadly at irregular conflicts to "[I]nductively identify new variables, hypotheses, causal mechanisms, and causal paths."⁶⁰ In doing so, irregular warfare will be evaluated heuristically across the next three distinct periods of time: the post-World War II period; the mid-to-late Cold War period; and the post-Cold War contemporary period of irregular warfare.⁶¹

This thesis will first consider the anti-colonial irregular wars and internal irregular conflicts that embody the struggle for self-determination and independence of the post-World War II era, between 1945 and 1962. Although, these irregular conflicts are not unique to the period, these types of irregular wars are prevalent throughout history—from the Maccabean Revolt to the American Revolution, to the Boxer Rebellion, and the Algerian War of Independence.⁶² This thesis will focus on the irregular conflicts that occurred in the wake of World War II, such as the First Indochina War, the Mau Mau Rebellion, and the Malayan Emergency, to discover how motivation influenced nationalist struggles in the post-colonial world. Additionally, this period will consider the rise of leftist guerrillas, as in the Huk Rebellion, to examine how motivation influenced early communist struggles during the post-WWII and early Cold War periods.

Next, this thesis will consider the irregular wars of the mid-to-late Cold War era that occurred between 1963 and 1991. Some of the classic Cold War era irregular conflicts include the Vietnam War, the Colombian Crisis, the Irish Troubles, and the

⁵⁹ Gann, *Guerrillas in History*.

⁶⁰ George and Bennett, *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*, 94.

⁶¹ Robert J Bunker et al., *Old and New Insurgency Forms*, 2016, <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/download.cfm?q=1313>. 17–20. Although this thesis parses irregular conflicts in distinct periods, it does so on the premise that the basic characteristics and features of irregular warfare are not exclusive to one period. More importantly, these three periods are not strictly bound in time as periods may, and often do overlap.

⁶² Jon Brunberg, "Colonial Wars," Wars Since 1900, The Polynational War Memorial (2004-2013): http://www.war-memorial.net/wars_all.asp?tags=Colonial+Wars&submit=Find&q=3; Max Boot, "Invisible Armies Insurgency Tracker," Council on Foreign Relations, 18 April 2013: <http://www.cfr.org/wars-and-warfare/invisible-armies-insurgency-tracker/p29917>.

Soviet-Afghan War.⁶³ These conflicts are defined by the struggle between leftist expansion and Western ideals, and the competition between the United States and the Soviet Union. These wars were also predominantly fought by rural peasant-guerrillas under the banner of socialism, inspired by the teachings and leadership of Mao Tse-Tung, Ho Chi Minh, Fidel Castro and Che Guevara.⁶⁴ Finally, these irregular conflicts were shaped and characterized by external support and influence and demonstrated the growing impact of the media.

Irregular warfare evolved with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the disintegration of leftist economics and ideology. Internal-crisis and instability characterize the third period of irregular warfare, as nations splintered under ethnic, racial, religious, or tribal friction.⁶⁵ Additionally, the prevalence of non-state actors and the use of proxies and surrogates by shadowy strongmen (Russia, China, Iran, etc.) in gray zones also define this period.⁶⁶ Furthermore, this period is uniquely influenced and shaped by several major global trends: the use and availability of new technologies; resource competition due to expanding populations; a shift in demographics toward urbanization and littoralization; and the global diffusion of power due to expanding

⁶³ Jon Brunberg, "Communist Guerrilla Wars," Wars Since 1900, The Polynational War Memorial (2004-2013): http://www.war-memorial.net/wars_all.asp?tags=Colonial+Wars&submit=Find&q=3; Max Boot, "Invisible Armies Insurgency Tracker," Council on Foreign Relations, 18 April 2013: <http://www.cfr.org/wars-and-warfare/invisible-armies-insurgency-tracker/p29917>.

⁶⁴ Max Boot, "The Evolution of Irregular War," *Foreign Affairs* March/April 2013, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2013-02-05/evolution-irregular-war>.

⁶⁵ Charles Krulak, "From the Seal," *Joint Force Quarterly*, no. Spring 1999, <http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a525526.pdf>.79; Scott Gates, Havard Mogleiv Nygard, and Havard Strand, "Trends in Armed Conflict 1946–2014" (Oslo, Norway: Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO), January 2016), [http://file.prio.no/publication_files/prio/Gates %20Nygård,%20Strand,%20Urdal%20-%20Trends%20in%20Armed%20Conflict,%20Conflict%20Trends%201-2016.pdf](http://file.prio.no/publication_files/prio/Gates%20Nygård,%20Strand,%20Urdal%20-%20Trends%20in%20Armed%20Conflict,%20Conflict%20Trends%201-2016.pdf). Internal irregular conflicts were the most predominant form of conflict in the post-Cold War era.

⁶⁶ United States Special Operations Command, "White Paper—The Gray Zone," September 9, 2015, <https://cle.nps.edu/access/content/group/4d4da4c3-67ad-4e59-8a9a-5d457ee1c663/1%20Intro/Gray%20Zones%20-%20USSOCOM%20White%20Paper%209%20Sep%202015.pdf>.1. By definition, the gray zone has come to represent conflicts that are characterized by ambiguity about the nature of the conflict, the parties involved, the policy being pursued, and the legality of actions, activities, and operations employed.

economic growth worldwide.⁶⁷ Finally, while many of these irregular wars are brief, they often are only one chapter of a larger conflict—such as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the Colombian Crisis. Ultimately, the post-Cold War period will expose how new technology, tactics, and tools influence the outcome of contemporary irregular conflicts.

Part One of this thesis will attempt to answer why the weak sometimes prevail against the strong. On top of this, Part One will identify the factors that impacted irregular warfare the most over the last seventy years to determine the significance of motivation as a causal factor for irregular success. Then, to evaluate how irregulars exploit asymmetry of motivations by influencing intrinsic and extrinsic motivation, and to take a more in-depth look at the cause-effect relationship between motivation and success, this thesis will use the process tracing method in Part Two of this thesis.⁶⁸

B. PART TWO: ASSESSING HOW IRREGULARS WIN

Motivation is a physiological and psychological process and the impetus of human behavior.⁶⁹ Motives can be understood as one's wants and needs; the magnitude of which are defined by how far one is willing to go to achieve them, and how they react to positive and negative stimuli. The intent of Part Two is to trace the belligerent's commitment over the duration of the conflict to identify asymmetries of motivation and to demonstrate how motivation ebbs and flows over the course of a conflict. This process will ensure motivation is assessed and accounted for without inferring the impact of motivation from the proximate results of these activities alone

⁶⁷ Kimberly Amerson and Spencer B. Meredith, "The Future Operating Environment 2050: Chaos, Complexity and Competition," *Small Wars Journal*, July 31, 2016, <http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/the-future-operating-environment-2050-chaos-complexity-and-competition>.

⁶⁸ Van Evera, *Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science*, 64.

⁶⁹ Xiaoyan Xu et al., "Motivation and Social Contexts: A Cross national Pilot Study of Achievement, Power, and Affiliation Motives," *International Journal of Psychology* 47, no. 2 (April 2012): 111–17, doi:10.1080/00207594.2011.590493. Xu et al. note, "Motivation is one of the most important determinants of human behaviors; it produces inner forces that guide and direct human behaviors." Daniel Katz, "Obituary: Floyd H. Allport (1890-1978)," *American Psychologist* 34, no. 4 (1979): 351–53, doi:10.1037/h0078276. Floyd Allport is considered "[T]he father of experimental social psychology.;" Floyd Henry Allport, "The Physiological Basis of Human Behavior," *Social Psychology*, 1924, 17–41. Allport argues that human behavior is the result of electrical and chemical neural reactions transmitted through the spinal cord, from the brain, as a result of stimuli (a physiological need or cognitive desire)

Assessing motivation in irregular warfare is a three-step process. First, an initial assessment is conducted to determine whether an actor's commitment is total or limited at the very beginning of each conflict. Then, commitments are traced from this motivational baseline to identify fluctuations in motivation over time. Significant fluctuations will be analyzed to identify asymmetry of motivations.

Then, any asymmetries of motivations are evaluated and assessed to explore the antecedent conditions to each change, to isolate the actions, activities and operations that shape and modify motivation. This will serve to unpack the ways in which motivation is manipulated and exploited. To this end, each case study will be evaluated to determine how irregulars shape their opponents' motivations, and thus, their behavior. Also, each case study will be evaluated to determine how irregulars shape their motivation, and how this contributed to their success.

Finally, a controlled comparison will be conducted to evaluate the significance of asymmetries of motivations in irregular warfare. Also, the controlled comparison will highlight common ways and means irregulars use to influence intrinsic and extrinsic motivation.⁷⁰ Furthermore, this comparison will enable this theory of motivation to be compared to the competing theories offered by Mack, Arreguín-Toft, Record, and Merom.⁷¹

This methodology and framework will accomplish three ends; it will identify asymmetries of motivation, evaluate the relationship between success and motivation, and reveal antecedent conditions of motivational exploitation and manipulation that result in behavioral changes.⁷² Though, motivation must first be understood and a framework must be established before we can assess asymmetry of motivations in irregular warfare.

⁷⁰ Ibid., 56.

⁷¹ Mack, "Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars;" Arreguín-Toft, *How the Weak Win Wars*; Record, *Beating Goliath*; Merom, *How Democracies Lose Small Wars*.

⁷² Van Evera, *Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science*, 74.

C. ASSESSING MOTIVATION IN IRREGULAR WARFARE

Motivation (mo·ti·va·tion/mōdə'vāSH(ə)n): *Noun*, the process of starting, directing, and maintaining physical and psychological activities; includes mechanisms involved in preferences for one activity over another and the vigor and persistence of responses.⁷³

—American Psychological Association

Motivation in conflict is dynamic; it waxes and wanes as a result of a multitude of factors—the irregular, the population, their adversary, and their adversary's population and military, international politics, time, proximity, cost, etc. Therefore, to assess motivation, it is necessary to make several assumptions.

First, one's motivation cannot be conclusively known or defined in absolute terms, as researchers must rely on observations, interviews, and reports subject to one's perspective and memory.⁷⁴ Second, motivation is evaluated best in relative terms by comparing and contrasting indicators of motivation between periods of time.⁷⁵ Third, motivation is a spectrum, with no motivation on one end of the spectrum and total motivation on the other. Fourth, behavior is often motivated by more than one need or want; multiple requirements or needs may motivate a single behavior at any one point in time.⁷⁶ And finally, one's actions to influence the motivation and behavior of an opponent may produce a relative change in their motivation.⁷⁷ Given these assumptions,

⁷³ "Glossary of Psychological Terms," *American Psychological Association*, <http://www.apa.org/research/action/glossary.aspx?tab=13>.

⁷⁴ Maferima Touré-Tillery and Ayelet Fishbach, "How to Measure Motivation: A Guide for the Experimental Social Psychologist," *Social and Personality Psychology Compass* 8, no. 7 (July 2, 2014), doi:10.1111/spc3.12110, 328. "[M]otivation is a psychological construct that cannot be observed or recorded directly."

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, 328.

⁷⁶ Abraham H. Maslow, "A Theory of Human Motivation," *Psychological Review* 50 (1943), 370–396, 391.

⁷⁷ Doug McAdam, "Tactical Innovation and the Pace of Insurgency," *American Sociological Review* 48, no. 6 (1983), 736. Doug McAdam's *tactical interaction* theory explains that actions taken by one actor produce counter-actions by their opponent to keep pace with and outmatch each other. Herwig Kressler, *Motivate and Reward* (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire ; New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 25. Expectancy theory states: Motivation = Expectancy x Instrumentality x Valence. Thus, according to expectancy theory, one's motivation is influenced by their ability to translate effort and performance into success.

the first step in establishing an assessment framework is to unpack the theoretical foundations of motivation.

Motivation is generally examined from three perspectives: needs-based motivation (the why, or the reason for human behavior); process-based motivation (the how, or the strategies used to manipulate motivation); and reinforcement-based motivation (the what, or the stimuli that conditions behavior).⁷⁸ From this, four markers can be used to indicate the temporal variation of motivation in irregular wars. These markers will then be used to construct a framework from which motivation can be evaluated.

1. Needs-Based Motivation Markers

Individual motivations are best understood within the framework of needs-based theories of motivation developed first by Abraham Maslow. This theory focuses on the most basic factors, the intrinsic, or internal factors that drive people to behave a certain way.⁷⁹ Fundamentally, individuals seek to fulfill basic needs first to sustain biological function and to ensure safety and security before they seek out lesser needs associated with a sense of belonging, self-esteem, and self-actualization.⁸⁰ Similarly, Henriksen and Vinci's combat motivation theory suggests that there are five reasons why people engage in war; three are reasonable motives; economic, communitarian, and existential; and two are "senseless" motives; coercion and barbarism.⁸¹ These two explanations help explain

⁷⁸ Steven Lattimore McShane and Mary Ann Young Von Glinow, *Organizational Behavior: Essentials*, 1st ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2007), 24.

⁷⁹ Maslow, "A Theory of Human Motivation," 391. Abraham Maslow believed that "[s]ome behavior is highly motivated, other behavior is only weakly motivated" and "[s]ome is not motivated at all (but all behavior is determined)."

⁸⁰ Steve Roesler, "All Things Workplace," *Talent & "Misunderstanding Maslow" Factor*, February 13, 2010, <http://www.allthingsworkplace.com/2010/02/talent-the-misunderstanding-maslow-factor.html>; Maslow, "A Theory of Human Motivation," 372–382; Maslow, "A Theory of Human Motivation," 386. This hierarchy is not rigid or absolute between individuals, particularly between individuals of different nationalities; John R Schermerhorn, Richard Osborn, and James G Hunt, *Organizational Behavior* (Phoenix); New York: University of Phoenix ; Wiley, 2002), 148. Preferences often vary because "Individual values and attitudes—both important aspects of motivation—have strong cultural foundations."

⁸¹ Rune Henriksen and Anthony Vinci, "Combat Motivation in Non-State Armed Groups," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 20, no. 1 (December 28, 2007): 87–109, doi:10.1080/09546550701677623, 93–94.

what moves individuals towards collective action but they fall short in explaining how irregular groups mobilize individuals and foster collective action.

Collective action is paramount to the success of movements, groups, and irregulars in particular. Irregulars must consciously work to mobilize individuals to participate, either actively or passively, to create favorable conditions that enable them to survive and succeed. To mobilize individuals toward a purposeful end, irregulars, and movements in general, use diagnostic, prognostic, and motivational frames to structure their narrative.⁸² These three frames ultimately determine how well groups mobilize individuals to foster collective action.

Narratives can be skewed, fabricated or overstated for internal or external consumption for a multitude of reasons. Though, false narratives are often short-lived, transparent, and fail to mobilize individuals over the long-term. Therefore, narratives can generally be used to gain “valuable insights into the mental landscape of its creators and those who embrace them; it offers a glimpse into the dreams and aspirations of how they believe the world ought to be and their paths for realizing that new world order.”⁸³ As a result, a group’s narrative, and changes to it, can be used to assess their commitment and motivation over time. Furthermore, an actor’s narrative may also reveal the strength of these motives and how far they are willing to go to achieve their goals. Thus, any changes to a group’s narrative or stated goals are the first indicators or markers of an actor’s commitment.

⁸² David A. Snow and Robert D. Benford. “Ideology, frame resonance, and participant mobilization.” *International Social Movement Research* 1, no. 1 (1988), 199. In other words, it reveals their grievances; to what or whom they attribute their problems to; what they believe the solution to be; and why individuals should participate. As Snow and Benford argue, “the success of participant mobilization, both within and across movements, depends upon the degree to which these three tasks are attended to.”

⁸³ Heather S. Gregg, “Fighting the Jihad of the Pen: Countering Revolutionary Islam’s Ideology,” *Terrorism and Political Violence* 22, no. 2 (March 11, 2010): 292–314, doi:10.1080/09546551003597584, 294.

2. Process-Based Motivation Markers

Process-based theories of motivation focus on the cognitive process of motivating and mobilizing individuals and groups through activated or deprived needs.⁸⁴ Expectancy theory suggests that individuals and groups act to the extent that they believe “their effort (Expectancy) will lead to acceptable performance and that their performance will be rewarded (Instrumentality), and the value of the rewards is highly positive (Valence).”⁸⁵ In other words, if individuals and groups believe they are capable, that their goals are within reach, and worth dying for, they are more likely to participate. Conversely, if there is doubt, or if the goals are not worth the effort, their participation will suffer.

Expectancy theory informs collective action in the sense that expectancy, valence, and instrumentality directly correlate with group commitment and force size.⁸⁶ This is to say, when expectancy, valence, and instrumentality are high, individuals are more likely to view collective action as beneficial and will participate to a greater extent. In other words, force size will grow. Similarly, it is reasonable to assume that commitment and mobilization decrease when expectancy, valence, and instrumentality are low, resulting in a decrease in force size.

It logically follows; changes in force size may indicate changes in a group’s commitment and motivation.⁸⁷ As an actor’s force size grows, so too does the actor’s commitment and motivation. In much the same fashion, when an actor’s force size decreases, as a result of combat attrition or otherwise, commitment and motivation suffer.

⁸⁴ C. N Cofer and M. H Appley, *Motivation: Theory and Research* (New York: John Wiley, 1964). 159.

⁸⁵ Fred C. Lunenburg, “Expectancy Theory of Motivation: Motivating by Altering Expectations,” *International Journal of Management, Business, and Administration* 15, no. 1 (2011), <http://www.nationalforum.com/Electronic%20Journal%20Volumes/Luneneburg,%20Fred%20C%20Expectancy%20Theory%20%20Altering%20Expectations%20IJMBA%20V15%20N1%202011.pdf>, 2; Kressler, *Motivate and Reward*, 25. Or put differently: Motivation = Expectancy x Instrumentality x Valence. Process-based motivation strategies have been developed within the business and marketing field to improve overall performance—which often translates into productivity and earnings—the ultimate goal within the business sector.

⁸⁶ Lunenburg, “*Expectancy Theory of Motivation: Motivating by Altering Expectations*,” 1–5.

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*

Therefore, the second motivation marker in a conflict is any change in force size between periods of time.

Building on this, an actor's commitment and motivation are also directly related to the size of their operational area and the complexity and frequency of their attacks. Aggression is a learned behavior that fluctuates in response to rewards and punishment.⁸⁸ Therefore, as with expectancy and valence, as commitment and motivation increase, so too does the frequency and intensity of aggressive behavior.

An increase in the size and intensity of a group's operations generally reveals an increase in their commitment and motivation. For example, actors that resort to extreme forms of violence or execute massive swarming operations may indicate that they are more committed than those that conducted sporadic attacks or use limited force.⁸⁹ Conversely, a sign of decreased commitment and motivation, and decreased expectancy and valence, is a decline in the frequency or intensity of operations, or a decrease in the size of their operational area. As a result, changes to the breadth and depth of an actor's actions, activities, and operations between periods of time form the third indicator of motivation.

3. Reinforcement-Based Motivation Markers

Reinforcement-based motivation is primarily concerned with extrinsic forces that drive behavior. For example, external actuation of specific stimuli will manipulate motivation, thereby shaping behavior. This classical conditioning technique is "a form of learning through association," whereby introducing the desired stimulus elicits a specific

⁸⁸ C. N Cofer and M. H Appley, *Motivation: Theory and Research* (New York: John Wiley, 1964), 740–447. Cofer and Appley explain that aggression, and the prevalence of aggression is not only explained by instinctive reaction to frustrations, but also, by an acquired drive that is a learned behavior. In addition, aggression is determined by: the frequency and intensity with which frustrations and annoyers are experienced; the extent to which aggressive or attacking behavior is reinforced or punished; the amount of social facilitation present; and temperament.

⁸⁹ John Arquilla and David F. Ronfeldt, *Swarming & the Future of Conflict* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2000), vii. Arquilla and Ronfeldt note, "Swarming is seemingly amorphous, but it is a deliberately structured, coordinated, strategic way to strike from all directions, by means of a sustainable pulsing of force and/or fire, close-in as well as from stand-off positions."

behavioral outcome.⁹⁰ Similarly, operant conditioning can be used to modify behavior by manipulating its consequences.⁹¹ This process is explained by the law of effect, which states: “[B]ehavior that results in a pleasing outcome is likely to be repeated; behavior that results in an unpleasant outcome is not likely to be repeated.”⁹² Thus, a reinforcement technique, such as positive or negative rewards, or punishment, can be introduced to modify behavior.⁹³ In essence, these two strategies are primarily concerned with manipulating stimuli to produce a desired outcome.

New behaviors can be created and old behaviors can be extinguished. For example, new behavior can be shaped by continuously rewarding precursors to the desired behavior.⁹⁴ On the other hand, fear and the desire to avoid pain or undesirable situations are also strong stimuli. In fact, “Fear is one of the strongest natural emotions in man” that motivates behavior.⁹⁵ Consequently, punishment can be used to induce fear to ultimately curb or extinguish certain behaviors.⁹⁶ Therefore, one’s tolerance of punishment, willingness to suffer repeated pain, and rising costs of blood and treasure are indications of motivation.

A change to an actor’s willingness to endure the cost of war is the fourth and final motivation indicator. Costs can be assessed in several ways—economic, political, social, or material costs—and measured in relative terms between two periods of time. Thus, a

⁹⁰ Schermerhorn, Osborn, and Hunt, *Organizational Behavior*, 148.

⁹¹ *Ibid.*, 149.

⁹² *Ibid.*, 149.

⁹³ *Ibid.*, 150–153. Positive reinforcement is the administration of positive rewards to increase the likelihood of repeating the behavior. Negative reinforcement, or avoidance, is the withdrawal of negative consequences to increase the likelihood of repeating a certain behavior. Punishment is the administration of negative consequences to discourage an unwanted behavior.

⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, 150. “Shaping” is the process of creating new behavior through positive reinforcement. “Modifying” behavior is the process of conditioning and reinforcing existing behaviors that you desire more or less of.

⁹⁵ Department of the Navy United States Marine Corps, *Small Wars Manual, United States Marine Corps, 1940* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1940), <http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/swm/ch01.pdf>, 23.

⁹⁶ Daniel H. Pink, *Drive: The Surprising Truth about What Motivates Us*, Reprint (New York: Riverhead Trade, 2011), 34.

willingness to tolerate higher costs, and a willingness to accept risks and endure pain is a sign of high motivation. Furthermore, an actor that is willing to engage in immoral or barbaric practices, unconstrained by collateral damage or human rights, or willing to act in the face of growing domestic or international condemnation is likely to be more motivated. Also, changes to an actor's risk or pain tolerance indicate a negative change in motivation. Therefore, an actor's motivation is directly related to any changes in cost-benefit or risk-reward calculations.

4. Motivation Assessment Framework

To identify asymmetry and to evaluate motivations over time, this thesis will use the following markers: changes in narrative and goals; changes in force size; changes in breadth and depth of activities, actions, and operations; and changes in willingness to accept the costs of war. By themselves, these markers are only observations. Though, by comparing and contrasting changes between each marker over space and time, it is possible to assess motivation.

Ultimately, these markers will help determine the relative difference in motivation between periods of time and between belligerents in Part Two of this thesis. In the end, this process will illuminate asymmetry of motivations, which can then be further studied and evaluated to understand how motivation is shaped and exploited. First, Part One of this thesis and the following chapters will consider the significance of motivation compared to other factors influencing the success of the weak in irregular warfare. This first part will begin to establish the link between motivation and success in irregular warfare.

III. IRREGULAR WARFARE IN THE POST-WWII PERIOD

The seeds of many revolutions were sown well before the end of the Second World War. Twentieth-century Western ideology championed the rights of liberty, equality, and political freedom and renounced the virtues of colonialism.⁹⁷ As a result, irregulars of this time period often enjoyed the support of the newly structured international community. Additionally, leftist ideals began to gain traction as the disenfranchised latched on to common grievances such as government corruption and abuse, social exploitation, and land distribution inequities. As these principles took root, the weak often found solace in pro-communist and socialist movements. Thus, these conflicts, such as the Huk Rebellion, are best defined as internal irregular conflicts fought under the banner of communism between a leftist irregular force and a legitimate government.

Although this became a dominant trend, particularly during the Cold War, the post WWII era is also defined by nationalism and anti-colonialism. Indigenous irregulars of this period were mostly competing to remove the remnants of colonial influence from their lands to gain freedom and independence.⁹⁸ In some instances, the weak met little resistance in gaining their independence.⁹⁹ Colonial powers such as France and Great Britain were financially, militarily, and politically weakened as a result of World War II and were less willing to engage in messy conflicts.¹⁰⁰ Although, when colonies were of

⁹⁷ Woodrow Wilson, “*President Wilson’s Fourteen Points*,” January 8, 1918. <https://cle.nps.edu/access/content/group/a7ccddab-0631-4ea2-82ed-71c9d3bed7b7/Course%20Documents/Wilson%2014.pdf>, 4. “The principle of justice to all peoples and nationalities, and their right to live on equal terms of liberty and safety with one another, whether they be strong or weak.” “*President Wilson’s Declaration of War Message to Congress*,” April 2, 1917: “To fight thus for the ultimate peace of the world and for the liberation its peoples...for the rights of nations great and small and the privilege of men everywhere to choose their way of life and of obedience...”

⁹⁸ Laqueur, *Guerrilla Warfare*, 384.

⁹⁹ Boot, *Invisible Armies*, 322–325.

¹⁰⁰ Laqueur, *Guerrilla Warfare*, 383. “The European colonial powers, gravely weakened as a result of the war, lacked the financial and military resources and the political will to retain their overseas possessions against the rising tide of independence movements.” Also, the issues spurring wars of national liberation and independence were mostly socio-economical grievances such as land reform. These issues enjoyed popular support among indigenous subjects that suffered colonial exploitation for several generations.

strategic or economic significance or retaining them became a matter of pride, irregulars found themselves engaged in brutal and costly struggles with foreign powers.¹⁰¹

A. **INDONESIAN NATIONAL REVOLUTION: 1945–1949**

The Indonesian National Revolution was one of the earliest wars of liberation after World War II. The Indonesian people were fully committed; they had “[A] national will to independence, the military means to achieve it, and the administrative ability to sustain it.”¹⁰² Conversely, the Dutch were limitedly committed, although, they believed that it was their “divine right” to rule Indonesia.¹⁰³ Indonesian Nationalists engaged the Dutch in an irregular war that lasted nearly four years. Although the Dutch were better equipped and capable, they struggled to pacify the Indonesians and lost international support for their cause as a result of the brutality of their actions.¹⁰⁴

By 1949, the Dutch folded under international pressure and conceded politically to the Indonesian Republic.¹⁰⁵ For their part, Indonesia did not achieve independence as a result of the irregulars’ actions alone. Indonesian Nationalists struggled to make any

¹⁰¹ Boot, *Invisible Armies*, 325–326. Britain only fought to hold on to a few colonies; either because they were deemed of strategic significance or to prevent the Communists from taking over. However, France was often less inclined to hand over colonies. They wanted to hold on to their empire in order to “resurrect lost glory and erase the humiliation of defeat.”

¹⁰² Robert B. Asprey, *War in the Shadows: The Guerrilla in History* (New York: W. Morrow, 1994), 760, 765. Although the Japanese left the Indonesians postured and capable of assuming their own destiny, the Dutch were not of the same mind and they were able to hold on to their colony initially due to the political and financial support of the United States and Great Britain. At the same time, the Dutch could not afford to hold on to Indonesia without this funding, nor did they have the forces or resources to secure their interests in the region.

¹⁰³ *Ibid.*, 762–3.

¹⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, 766. The Dutch were struggling financially after World War II and could not afford to return to Indonesia to administer peace without American aid; by 1947 the Netherlands had spent \$400 million and they were failing to prevail against the Nationalist forces. Asprey notes that 145,000 Dutch troops were mostly defending from strongpoints and on the defensive by January 1948. Laqueur, *Guerrilla Warfare*, 287. The Dutch also lacked a force large enough to secure their interests in Indonesian. As Laqueur notes, “The Dutch army was, in the words of one observer, incapable of occupying an overcrowded area of fifty million people, short perhaps of an outright campaign of terror, for which the Dutch were “temperamentally unsuited.” Factor in an economy in ruin, the prospect of general turmoil, the condemnation of the United Nations, facing the strong disapproval of the United States and their other allies, the Dutch opted for withdrawal and Indonesia became a sovereign republic.”

¹⁰⁵ Asprey, *War in the Shadows*, 766. In 1949, the Dutch folded under international pressure after the United Nations Security Council called for an immediate ceasefire, governments around the world protested Netherlands actions at The Hague, and the United States withheld Marshall Plan aid.

significant headway against the Dutch; strategically they floundered, and resources became scarce without the aid of external support. Also, the Indonesians were unable to impose significant political and psychological costs on the Dutch or shift the focus of the war on to their domestic situation. Despite their shortcomings, the Indonesians benefited from the recent shift in political ideals and morals; colonialism had lost favor in the new world order, and nations were less willing to support colonial enterprises.

The Indonesians benefitted from the presence of an asymmetry of motivations. Though, the Dutch ultimately quit fighting due to financial strain, and most importantly, external pressure placed upon them by the international community. Ultimately, the Indonesians achieved their independence in 1949 and the Dutch lost their motivation to prevail because the Dutch were compelled to quit by the international community. In effect, an asymmetry of motivations may explain why the Indonesians prevailed in this case.

B. HUK REBELLION: 1945–1952

The Hukbalahaps rebels were not as lucky as the Indonesian Nationalists. The Huks and the Philippine Government were equally committed to winning this war. Though, after nine long years of guerrilla operations, the Huks failed to defeat their adversary.¹⁰⁶ Early in the war, the communist Huks achieved moderate success against the corrupt Philippine government. At first, the Huks were able to foster significant support for their cause; their goals to curb government corruption and address land reform appealed widely to the poor and the middle class. Also, their guerrilla strategy proved effective against the inept, ill-equipped, and poorly led Philippine military and police. While they lacked any external support, they benefitted from the protection of

¹⁰⁶ Kenneth Hammer, "Huks in the Philippines," In *Modern Guerrilla Warfare, Fighting Communist Guerrilla Movements, 1941-1961*, ed. Franklin M. Osanka (New York: The Free Press, 1962), 171–181. Led by Luis Taruc, the Huks were a peasant militant movement formed in 1941. The group was mostly comprised of intellectuals, politicians and army personnel that were organized during WWII to harass the enemy rear and make the island intolerable for the Japanese. They were well trained and experienced, by 1945 they had fought over 1200 engagements and had at least 5000 men, 10,000 reserves, and 35,000 auxiliary personnel. But after WWII, the Huks were marginalized and changed their name to the Peoples Liberation Army (Jukbo Ng Mapagpalaya Sa Bayan), or the HMB, and won popular support under the guise of land reform. By 1950, the HMB numbered over 20,000 and controlled most of Luzon.

thick jungle sanctuaries throughout the Philippines. Though, the Huks lost the initiative following the rise of Ramon Magsaysay in 1950.¹⁰⁷

In the end, the Huks proved to be no match for the United States-backed Philippine forces or the political prowess of Magsaysay.¹⁰⁸ While both sides used psychological warfare, the Philippine government prevailed by countering the Huks messaging with a political strategy that deflated the Huks cause and won support of the local population. Finally, the government brought the war to an end by offering the Huks amnesty and positive incentives to disengage, while also offering the local population rewards for information leading to the kill or capture of the remaining Huk fighters.

The demise of the Huks is mostly due to the competence, capability, and overall strategy of Magsaysay and his forces.¹⁰⁹ For their part, the Huks failed in many respects to adapt and overcome as their goals became irrelevant over time and their strategy proved to be futile. The eventual surrender of Taruc and his Huks in 1954 is the result of their physical isolation, their lack of external support, and their failure to expand their narrative to recruit more fighters and build more support. Despite their lack of success, the Huks remained committed to the end, which accounts for the length of the rebellion. Unfortunately, time was not on their side; the protracted nature of this war only served to increase the Huks' suffering as support for their cause deteriorated.

The Huks' failure can be distilled to two time periods: before 1950 and after 1950. In both of these periods, the Huks failed to engender significant domestic and

¹⁰⁷ Boot, *Invisible Armies*, 405; Asprey, *War in the Shadows*, 749.

¹⁰⁸ Boyd Bashore, "Dual Strategy for Limited War," *In Modern Guerrilla Warfare, Fighting Communist Guerrilla Movements, 1941–1961*, ed. Osanka, 187–200; Boot, *Invisible Armies*, 48, 403–404. Magsaysay was advised and heavily influenced by an American Advisor, Edward Lansdale. Lansdale was instrumental in Magsaysay's rise to prominence and for the effectiveness of this counter-Huk strategy and political reforms.

¹⁰⁹ Boot, *Invisible Armies*, 403–405. Magsaysay's motto was "All-Out Friendship or All-Out Force." Magsaysay reorganized the military and brought an end to corruption within the military. With the aid of Colonel Lansdale, Magsaysay trained the military to respect the people and personally inspected their operations and conduct to ensure they were behaving. He also encouraged the people to report bad behavior to build better civil-military relations and improve popular support for his efforts. Overall, Magsaysay was responsible for devising political reforms that deflated the Huks cause by addressing land reform issues and by instituting free and fair balloting during the 1951 and 1953 elections.

international support—their cause never resonated beyond the jungles of the Sierra Madre Mountains or the Candaba Swamp.¹¹⁰ Specifically, before 1950, the Huks failed to build widespread support for their cause and failed to turn the people against their government.¹¹¹ After 1950, the Huks failed to address their organizational weaknesses and adapt to Magsaysay’s strategic shift. As a result, the Philippine government prevailed because they were able to isolate the irregulars and win the support of the population. Ultimately, this irregular conflict lacks a clear asymmetry of motivations, as both sides were equally committed. Though, this conflict, and specifically, Magsaysay and Lansdale do demonstrate the importance of popular support, strategy and external influence in irregular warfare.

C. FIRST INDOCHINA WAR: 1946–1954

As the Huks struggled against the Philippine government, the Viet Minh fought to expel the French from Indochina. The Viet Minh pursued a total goal of independence while the French were only seeking a strategic “backdoor” into Asia.¹¹² In other words, the Viet Minh were completely committed while French were only limitedly committed.

The Viet Minh were successful for many reasons, which can be explained by the arguments made by Arreguín-Toft, Merom, Record, and Mack.¹¹³ First, the Viet Minh

¹¹⁰ Osanka, *Modern Guerrilla Warfare, Fighting Communist Guerrilla Movements, 1941–1961*.

¹¹¹ Asprey, *War in the Shadows*, 749–753. The Huks had the advantage over the Philippine government after the Japanese surrendered. The Huks were experienced, well organized, and had access to their weapons that had been stashed away after the end of WWII. In addition, the government forces were in no position to counter the Huks; the police force was small and the military was still recovering from the war. Both forces were not well trained and their heavy-handed methods resulted in more recruits for the Huks. In addition, Roxas failed to enact proper reforms and allowed corruption to run rampant.

¹¹² *Ibid.*, 801. Asprey notes that despite France’s insistence on the strategic nature of Vietnam, French Indochina was not a strategic key but more of a strategic convenience as it was a way into China. Paul Linebarger, “Indochina: The Bleeding War,” in *Modern Guerrilla Warfare, Fighting Communist Guerrilla Movements, 1941–1961*, ed. Osanka, 245. The French ruled in Indochina for about 55 years; from 1885 until 1940 when they pulled the majority of their forces out to focus on the war in Europe. Before WWII, Indochina was a “weird colonial composite within the French empire.” It was actually five countries that included Cochin China, Annam, Tonkin, Cambodia, and Laos. By 1951, three countries were officially recognized: French Indochina, Cambodia, and Laos with Viet Nam emerging as a fourth emerging country under Ho’s communist movement under the auspices of the Viet Minh.

¹¹³ Mack, “Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars;” Arreguín-Toft, *How the Weak Win Wars*; Record, *Beating Goliath*; Merom, *How Democracies Lose Small Wars*.

adjusted and adapted their military strategy several times based on their success and failures against the French Expeditionary Forces. As the Viet Minh learned, matching France's direct warfare strategy most often proved disastrous.¹¹⁴ After several strategic blunders, Ho Chi Minh and Giap recognized that their only hope of beating the French was to use guerrilla tactics and a Maoist strategy.¹¹⁵ Beyond this, the Viet Minh also succeeded because they were able to shift the focus to the domestic French population, thereby decreasing France's overall motivation to persist in Indochina.¹¹⁶ This was mostly the byproduct of rising financial costs and mounting casualties incurred by the French, which ultimately called their goals and strategic interests in the region into question.¹¹⁷ Although, the Viet Minh also benefited from extensive third-party assistance

¹¹⁴ Bernard Fall, "Indochina: The Seven-Year Dilemma," In *Modern Guerrilla Warfare, Fighting Communist Guerrilla Movements, 1941–1961*, ed. Osanka, 258.

¹¹⁵ Ngo Van Chieu, "Journal of a Vietminh Combatant," In *Guerrilla Strategies: An Historical Anthology from the Long March to Afghanistan*, ed. Gérard Chaliand (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982), 108–119. Chieu reminisces, "[W]e would not be able to fight and win by using conventional modern tactics" so they reorganized into guerrilla units and focused on cognitively liberating the masses through propaganda and education to ensure widespread popular support. The Viet Minh's success can be explained by the way they framed their narrative through the lens of independence and land reform. Chieu notes that it was often said that it was "Better to die fighting for independence than to live like a slave." Bernard B. Fall, "Street without Joy," In *Guerrilla Strategies: An Historical Anthology from the Long March to Afghanistan*, ed. Gérard Chaliand, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982), 132. Ho and Giap learned to use the terrain to their advantage to disadvantage the French conventional strategy and their superior vehicles and weapons. By drawing the French off the roads and out of the cities and into the swamps and the jungles, the Viet Minh were able to defeat the French army and demoralize French troops.

¹¹⁶ Asprey, *War in the Shadows*, 711. Inspired by the communist Viet Minh, the French communists executed a domestic subversive campaign targeting the movement of soldiers and material to Indochina. In addition, as French cost and casualties continued to grow, the war in Indochina became known as *la sale guerre* and even non-communists French citizens called for the withdraw of French expeditionary forces.

¹¹⁷ Boot, *Invisible Armies*, 362. The eight-year war, fought immediately after WWII, cost the French an additional 92,000 men, an inconceivable number for a nation struggling to rebuild. Bernard Fall, "Indochina: The Seven-Year Dilemma," In *Modern Guerrilla Warfare, Fighting Communist Guerrilla Movements, 1941–1961*, ed. Osanka, 258. They had over 250,000 Soldiers committed in Indochina at a time when the strategic need for forces was in Western Europe and they expended a great amount of capital, effort, and manpower in constructing, and then securing the De Lattre line (A fortified line of 10,000 forts, bunkers and concrete emplacements supplemented by centrally located heavy and medium artillery positions, covering the entire delta river basin). Asprey, *War in the Shadows*, 818. The French soldiers often could not explain why they were fighting in Indochina; for the most part, France did not have a comprehensive strategy and could not articulate what was strategic about its colonial claim there. Ultimately, the French Expeditionary Forces lost 170,000 casualties, 75,000 missing soldiers, and it cost France \$7.5 billion with an additional cost of \$4 billion in United States aid.

in the form of external political, material, and moral support from the Chinese.¹¹⁸ Furthermore, several political opportunities enabled the Viet Minh's success. First, the Viet Minh exploited the disruption of French rule in Indochina during the outbreak of WWII, and the collapse of Japan after the war, to cement their influence in Vietnam and declare independence. Second, the Soviet Union and Communist China officially recognized Ho and his government in 1949, lending the Viet Minh legitimacy and increased credibility and support for their cause.¹¹⁹ Third, the Viet Minh benefited from the United States' frustration in Korea and the international communities desire to end both wars.¹²⁰ Despite this, the French remained fully committed until their losses at Dien Bien Phu persuaded them to leave.

The success of the weak in this irregular conflict is explained by the presence of asymmetry of motivations. The Viet Minh ultimately defeated the French, militarily and politically, by employing a flexible strategy; by bleeding the French dry physically and financially; and by targeting their adversary's will to fight by influencing the French domestic population. Of these factors, the Viet Minh's true success was due to their use of political and psychological warfare. The Viet Minh not only focused these efforts outward toward their adversary, but also inwardly toward their mass base to ensure

¹¹⁸ Bernard Fall, "Indochina: The Seven-Year Dilemma," In *Modern Guerrilla Warfare, Fighting Communist Guerrilla Movements, 1941–1961*, ed. Osanka, 255. As Fall notes the Viet Minh was the byproduct of Ho Chi Minh's relationship with the OSS during WWII. Ho's guerrilla force grew as a result of this relationship as they were provided with weapons, training, and radios that enabled them to increase in size and strength. Boot, *Invisible Armies*, 355. The Viet Minh benefited greatly from the Chinese Communists defeat of the Nationalists in 1949; after this, the Viet Minh had access to Chinese training camps and advisors. Paul Linebarger, "Indochina: The Bleeding War," In *Modern Guerrilla Warfare, Fighting Communist Guerrilla Movements, 1941–1961* ed. Osanka. The Viet Minh also benefited from the Chinese and Soviet industrial complexes that funneled weapons and materials to their guerrillas and conventional forces throughout Vietnam. Conversely, a long logistical tail that hindered their operations and capabilities in Indochina plagued the French.

¹¹⁹ Asprey, *War in the Shadows*, 694.

¹²⁰ *Ibid.*, 797.

continued support in the face of rising costs, repeated setbacks, and the barbaric and brutal French counterinsurgency tactics.¹²¹

In the end, the French were compelled to leave Indochina as a result of increased domestic and international pressure that arose in the wake of defeat at Dien Bien Phu.¹²² In other words, the Viet Minh won because the French lost the will to fight. This case not only highlights the relevance of asymmetry of motivations, but also, the role of motivation in collective action. Furthermore, this case demonstrates the influence of popular support on motivation and how irregulars can manipulate opinions and perceptions to defeat their adversary.

D. MALAYAN EMERGENCY: 1948–1960

The Malayan Race Liberation Army (MRLA) was armed, trained, and employed against the Japanese by the British SOE Forces during WWII.¹²³ After the war, the MRLA tried to contest British control and were totally committed to achieving their independence. Though, the British were committed to maintaining their colony in Malaya. First, the British were not willing to give up Malaya because it was the largest exporter of natural rubber at the time, and second, to prevent the spread of communism in South East Asia.¹²⁴ Nevertheless, as important as Malaya was, the British were only

¹²¹ Ibid., 701–705. Ho and Giap divided the country up into zones, provinces, districts, inter-villages and villages. They also recognized the need for popular support so they emphasized the historical grievance of land reform and used trained agitation-propaganda teams to focus on the issue of *Doc-Lap*—independence. In addition, they used the *Cong An*, a special secret police, and *Trinh Sat*, a special military intelligence force, and *Dich-Van*, a special terrorist organization to maintain social control over the population.

¹²² Asprey, *War in the Shadows*, 711, 818. The French army's defeat at Dien Bien Phu was a major psychological blow to the French people and their government. This battle was a turning point and was instrumental in convincing the French government to seek a way out of the war. The expeditionary forces lost several thousand soldiers and many more were missing or captured. As the casualties mounted and the cost of the war surpassed three billion francs, the French leftist claim that the *la sale guerre* should be abandoned found increasing support. Laqueur, *Guerrilla Warfare*, 267. Ultimately, French domestic war weariness made continuing the war impossible.

¹²³ Boot, *Invisible Armies*, 379. Malaya had a guerrilla army supported by the Allies in WWII, specifically, SOE Force 136.

¹²⁴ Ibid., 381.

limitedly committed to defeating the MRLA. Therefore, an asymmetry of motivations existed between the belligerents in this case.

Nonetheless, the predominant ethnic Chinese communist MRLA failed to defeat the British. This was primarily because MRLA did not recognize the lack of anti-British sentiment, nationalist leanings, or grievances among the Malays.¹²⁵ As a result, under the skilled leadership of Generals Briggs and Templer, the British isolated the MRLA from their support network, won the support of the Malay population, and starved the “bandits” out.¹²⁶

The MRLA’s failure is due to a multitude of factors; such as strategy, resources, and external support.¹²⁷ Furthermore, despite the length of the insurgency, the MRLA failed to exact any real political and psychological cost on the British.¹²⁸ Instead, the MRLA’s subversion and sabotage efforts only served to damage critical economic infrastructure; further alienating the Malay population. Aside from the MRLA’s actions, their downfall is the result of Britain’s brilliant counterinsurgency campaign, which

¹²⁵ Julian Paget, “Emergency in Malaya,” In *Guerrilla Strategies*, ed. Chaliand, 270.

¹²⁶ Asprey, *War in the Shadows*, 790–794. The Malayan Emergency only cost the British about \$21.5 million to resettle over 250,000 people, establish a police force of 84,000, a military 55,000 strong, and a home guard of 60,000 ethnic Chinese. As Asprey notes, superior technology and resources played a minor role in the Malayan counterinsurgency campaign. Leadership, intelligence, and special operations blended with political and psychological warfare was the key to defeating the MRLA.

¹²⁷ Laqueur, *Guerrilla Warfare*. 288–291. The Chinese guerrillas in Malaya had no active sanctuary, no secure line of supply and they failed to secure popular support. They survived by extorting locals and relied on the Chinese shanty towns for material support and sanctuary. Julian Paget, “Emergency in Malaya,” In *Guerrilla Strategies*, ed. Chaliand, 270–271. Paget notes that the MRLA communists never aroused world opinion or garnered international support for their cause. They also lacked a friendly base outside Malaya or a friendly border to use as a safe-haven (Thailand was not friendly toward communists and the royal navy controlled the coast). In addition, the MRLA three-phased Maoist strategy failed to move beyond the first phase.

¹²⁸ Asprey, *War in the Shadows*, 794. Overall, the twelve year war only cost the British security forces about 2000 lives while the guerrillas killed or kidnapped nearly 3,283 civilians and lost roughly 6,000 MRLA fighters.

focused on political and psychological measures rather than on brutal military tactics.¹²⁹ Ultimately, the MRLA failed to develop a narrative that resonated with the larger Malay population; they failed to secure international support; and more importantly, they failed to persuade, coerce, or compel the British to leave Malaya.

This is an interesting case because the irregulars lost although an asymmetry of motivations existed between the belligerents. This is undoubtedly because the irregular force was almost as foreign to the local population as the British were. Furthermore, the MRLA's narrative failed to resonate with the Malays. Thus, although the MRLA were highly committed, the local population was not. Like the First Indochina War, this case highlights the relationship between motivations, popular support, and collective action. Furthermore, this case highlights the importance of political and psychological warfare in wars fought for limited goals.

E. MAU MAU UPRISING: 1952–1960

The Mau Mau Uprising was an irregular war between the Kikuyu Central Association (KCA), known as “The Movement,” or by the locals as the Gikuyu and Mumbi, and the British between 1952 and 1960.¹³⁰ Within Kenya, the KCA's commitment and motivation grew as “The Movement” became more popular among the local population. In contrast to this, the British were only limitedly committed and were not overly concerned with the uprising at first.

The rebels were able to secure popular support over time because of the nature of their cause, existing tribal networks, their focus on educating the masses, and local

¹²⁹ James Dougherty, “The Guerrilla War In Malaya,” In *Modern Guerrilla Warfare, Fighting Communist Guerrilla Movements, 1941–1961* ed. Osanka, 299–305. The British instituted a resettlement program that physically, psychologically, and politically isolated the guerrillas from their base of support. It also offered would-be MRLA supporters' clean drinking water, electricity, and housing, which increased support for the British. Boot, *Invisible Armies*. 392. The British instituted a massive psychological warfare campaign that included a rewards program for turning in MRLA personnel and they dropped millions of leaflets that offered guerrillas a safe way to surrender.

¹³⁰ Donald Barnett and Karari Njama, “Mau Mau From Within,” In *Guerrilla Strategies*, ed. Chaliand, 141–162; Asprey, *War in the Shadows*, 873. The Mau Mau Uprising was mostly defeated by 1956 however pockets of resistance continued to rebel against the British until 1960.

religious practices.¹³¹ Unlike most irregular wars of the time, the Mau Mau Uprising was fueled more by tribalism and competition over resources than by communism or nationalism.¹³² Early on, the Mau Mau achieved moderate success with hit and run tactics and their ability to avoid detection in the Aberdare Range. The Mau Mau rebel operations also cost the British an astounding 130 million pounds and stretched the British even further (they were still attending to insurrections in Indonesia and Malaya and recovering from WWII). Though, the success of the Mau Mau rebels was fleeting as their increased activity raised British concerns in Kenya. Initially the rebels were only a minor threat to the British, but as violence escalated, the British were forced to deploy additional soldiers and resources to contain the rebellion.¹³³ Therefore, although British commitment increased, it still remained limited compared to the Mau Mau's total commitment.

Despite their limited success, the Mau Mau were eventually exhausted and defeated by the British forces in Kenya. Ultimately, the Mau Mau were completely focused internally; they failed to bring attention to their cause outside of Kenya. In addition, the Mau Mau framed their narrative around narrow grievances such as land reform and religious freedom, but they never addressed wider concerns such as the legitimacy of Britain's claim to Kenya. As a result, the Mau Mau failed to achieve

¹³¹ Ibid., 873; Frank Kitson, *Low Intensity Operations: Subversion, Insurgency and Peacekeeping* (London: Faber and Faber, 2010), 33; Donald Barnett and Karari Njama, "Mau Mau From Within," In *Guerrilla Strategies*, ed. Chaliand, 141–162; Asprey, *War in the Shadows*, 144–145. The Mau Mau spent four years educating Kenyans on the virtue of rebelling on the basis of land reform, freedom of religion, and independence from British rule. They used ritualistic oaths to indoctrinate new followers and to promote people within the organization. The oaths resembled aspects of the Kikuyu religious practices that included animal sacrifice and witchcraft. These practices were used to induce membership and feelings of belonging, responsibility, respect and fear, and a sense of duty. Violations of the oath resulted in harsh punishments and death.

¹³² Asprey, *War in the Shadows*, 862.

¹³³ Asprey, *War in the Shadows*, 871–883. The KCA membership grew to 250,000 by 1952 and they organized themselves according to seven district committees, each with a division, location and sub-location to coordinate their activities against the British. They also started using terrorism to intimidate the colonial government and white settlers. By 1953, the British had deployed over 10,000 soldiers, expanded the police force to 15,000 with 6,000 auxiliaries, and a home guard of 20,000 Kenyans. They also expanded their operations into the Mau Mau jungle safe-havens and increased their aerial bombing campaign. Within one year, the British had arrested 150,000 suspects, killed over 11,000 Mau Mau guerrillas, and captured 2,500 more. The Mau Mau morale plummeted, the leadership became fractured, and their operations dissipated until the uprising was effectively crushed by 1956.

widespread domestic and international support for their cause. This may indicate that their commitment and motivations were out of synch from the Kenyan majority. Finally, like the Malaysians, the Mau Mau fell victim to the experience and success of the British; the British crushed the uprising by isolating the irregulars and penetrating the rebel groups with pseudo-gangs.¹³⁴

Ultimately, although an asymmetry of motivations existed between the Mau Mau and the British, the irregulars failed to coerce or persuade the British to leave. In the end, the British succeeded because they were able to isolate the irregulars, preventing them from threatening Britain's political, economic, or military interests. As a result, the Mau Mau Uprising was defeated and the British continued to govern Kenya Colony until they chose to grant Kenya its independence in 1963.¹³⁵

This case again not only highlights the relationship between motivation and popular support, but also highlights how the strong can prevail when asymmetry of motivations exist. Within the context of limited warfare, this case highlights the importance of special operations and limited use of force by external forces, combined with political and psychological warfare, to defeat a totally motivated irregular group. As this case reveals, isolating the irregulars, building and maintaining local support, and retaining moral authority for the presence and actions of a counterinsurgency force is paramount to overcome asymmetry of motivations.

F. CUBAN REVOLUTION: 1953–1959

Fidel Castro and his 26th of July Movement's struggle against the Batista Government in Cuba is a unique and curious irregular war. Both Castro and Batista were

¹³⁴ Frank Kitson, "Counterinsurrection in Kenya," In *Guerrilla Strategies*, ed. Chaliand, 164–165; Asprey, *War in the Shadows*, 884. The British rounded up Nairobi's Africans in 1954 for screening and successfully broke the Mau Mau support network by sending thousands of Mau Mau suspects to detention camps. The British also started a resettlement campaign and moved over a million natives into villages that could be more easily secured. Frank Kitson's pseudo gangs and the *cordon sanitiare* proved to be a major obstacle for the Mau Mau. By 1955, British Special Forces tracked down the remaining 2,000 Mau Mau in the Aberdare forest and captured the last Mau Mau leader—Kimathi—and in effect, the Mau Mau resistance ended.

¹³⁵ Even though the Mau Mau lost, the Kenyans were granted independence by the British in the early 1960s.

completely committed throughout the duration of the revolt. Though, Castro's forces remained wholly inferior—poorly trained, equipped, and led—compared to Batista's American-backed army.¹³⁶ Also, Castro was disadvantaged by very modest amounts of external support compared to the large amounts of resources and assistance the United States provided to Batista.¹³⁷ Furthermore, Castro's force was not sufficiently trained, equipped, or experienced enough to take on the Cuban police and military, resulting in multiple strategic blunders for the 26th of July Movement. Fortunately for Castro though, Batista suspended civil liberties, censored the Cuban press, and his government was increasingly viewed as corrupt.¹³⁸ As a result, fractures developed within Cuban society. By exploiting this, Castro was able to defeat the Batista government politically with little actual fighting.

Castro was not much of a military strategist, nor was anyone else in the 26th of July Movement. Although Castro did understand the importance of popular support; he ultimately succeeded against the Batista regime as a result of his political strategy. Castro used propaganda extensively to exploit the cruel and harsh tactics of the Batista regime and to build domestic and international support for his cause. In fact Castro's stroke of genius, and what ultimately won the revolution, was his use of the media to politicize and internationalize his cause in 1957 by inviting Herbert Mathews to interview and profile him for the *New York Times*.¹³⁹ Virtually overnight, Castro became an international sensation and the savior of the Cuban people. In turn, the 26th of July Movement was

¹³⁶ Asprey, *War in the Shadows*, 934.

¹³⁷ *Ibid.*, 948–950. Castro enjoyed limited external support initially; his forces were able to seek refuge in Mexico and received small amounts of support and aid from Batista's former adversary, Prio Socarras.

¹³⁸ *Ibid.*, 946.

¹³⁹ *Ibid.*, 953.

able to expand its narrative and gain widespread international support for its cause, particularly within Washington.¹⁴⁰

This conflict lacked asymmetry of motivations; both Batista and Castro were equally motivated and employed all of their resources against each other. Castro and the 26th of July Movement prevailed because they won support from the majority of the domestic and international community.

In the end, Castro's strategic defeat of the Cuban military in 1958, and his political campaign to win the support of the domestic population and the international community destroyed Batista's motivation and compelled him to leave the country in 1959.¹⁴¹ Thus, unlike the Huks, and despite symmetrical motivations, Castro prevailed because he had swayed popular support and persuaded the Cuban population, and the American government, that Batista was corrupt and needed to be removed from power. This enabled Castro to coerce and compel Batista to leave the country.

This case reveals several factors that influence the outcome of irregular warfare. Notably, this case demonstrates that irregulars can succeed in the absence of an asymmetry of motivations. Furthermore, this case demonstrates that irregulars can prevail solely with the aid of popular support. Ultimately, this case indicates that popular support may serve as a driving force on motivation and the will to win.

G. DOMINANT TRENDS IN THE POST-WORLD WAR II ERA

The irregulars of the post-WWII era had two significant advantages. First, in most circumstances, the irregulars were fighting weakened colonial powers that were recovering politically, economically, and socially from the devastation of WWII. Second, the establishment of the United Nations reaffirmed the international communities'

¹⁴⁰ Ibid., 964–967. Castro's 26th of July Movement established several clubs in American cities to disseminate propaganda and he used a clandestine radio broadcast, named *Radio Rebelde*, to push his propaganda domestically. Che Guevara, "Reminiscences of the Cuban Revolution," In *Guerrilla Strategies*, ed. Chaliand, 185 "When we began to broadcast from our own transmitter, the existence of our troops and their fighting determination became known throughout the Republic; our links began to become more extensive and complicated." Boot, *Invisible Armies*, 437–438. Castro also brought in other reporters such as Bob Taber from CBS to report on his activities and to bolster his domestic and international support.

¹⁴¹ Asprey, *War in the Shadows*, 965–970.

commitment to ensuring liberty, justice, and freedom for all. This second development signaled a shift in international norms; in this new age, colonialism and the exploitation of native peoples by the strong were abhorrent and intolerable.

1. Irregular Success in the Post-WWII Period

Of the six cases reviewed in this chapter, irregulars succeeded in three instances—the Indonesian National Revolution, the First Indochina War, and the Cuban Revolution.¹⁴² Furthermore, in the case of the Malayan Emergency and the Mau Mau Uprising, independence was granted within two years of the war ending. Thus, while irregulars do not always succeed at first, these cases suggest that irregulars may prevail over time if an asymmetry of motivations is present.

Each of these irregular wars is unique, and each of the six irregulars achieved varying levels of success. Nevertheless, these cases indicate that the weak must overcome a basic threshold to have any chance of succeeding against the strong. Irregulars cannot survive without the basics: popular support; a reliable logistical source; and most importantly, commitment and motivation.

2. Factors Influencing Irregular Success

The cases in this period all indicate that strategy is an important factor, although they suggest that it does not sufficiently explain why irregulars succeed. Instead, these six cases demonstrate that successful irregulars adjust their strategy according to their capabilities, and as required by their adversary and their environment. The Viet Minh for example, employed various strategies against the French. When conventional tactics failed, the Viet Minh switched to guerrilla tactics, and when the enemy and the terrain dictated, such as at Dien Bien Phu, they revert to more conventional, or positional warfare. In fact, sometimes irregular success has less to do with their own strategy or

¹⁴² Boot, *Invisible Armies*, 559. While this is only a small sample of irregular wars fought during this time period, this is very close to Max Boot's finding. Boot notes that since 1945, irregulars are winning more often, or 40.3 percent of the time.

capabilities than the competence and capability of their adversary, as was the case of the Indonesian National Revolution and the 26th of July Movement.

Looking broadly at all of the actors in this period, it becomes evident that strategy matters in a more general sense. Beyond direct and indirect strategic interaction, successful irregulars and successful states in this period invariably won through political and psychological strategies. Looking at the successful states in this period (the Huk Rebellion; the Malayan Emergency; and the Mau Mau Uprising), the strong prevailed by focusing on political solutions to isolate the irregulars and deflate their cause rather than just annihilating them. Similarly, when irregulars succeeded (The Indonesians, the Viet Minh, and the Cubans), it was most often the result of a political strategy that focused on gaining international support and legitimacy while targeting their opponent's cause, raising the political and psychological cost of the war, to increase fractures in their opponent's domestic situation. This suggests that popular opinion and support is more significant in explaining why irregulars win than strategy alone.

The three cases in which these irregulars succeeded outright—the Indonesian National Revolution, the First Indochina War, and the Cuban Revolution—suggest that irregular success correlates with their adversaries' ability to generate and sustain favorable domestic and international support. When the international community is persuaded that the irregular's cause is legitimate while their adversaries' actions are unjust, immoral, and repugnant—success follows for the weak. This may be related to the actions of the irregulars, or the result of their adversary's actions alone. Regardless, these cases indicate that popular opinion and support is a significant factor influencing irregular success. Additionally, as the Viet Minh demonstrated, shifting the focus from the battlefield to an adversary's domestic situation can lower their opponent's political will and popular support to compel them to quit.

The Indonesian National Revolution, the First Indochina War, and the Cuban Revolution indicate that irregulars have a better chance of succeeding when social or political fractures exist, or can be created, within their adversary's organization and society. In the case of the First Indochina War, France suffered and was plagued by financial, political, and social fractures that later contributed to their downfall. Similarly,

financial issues evolved into political fractures when the Dutch lost Marshall Aid and international support for their actions in Indonesia. Similarly, although the Cubans were markedly better off than most, the irregulars exploited the social and political fractures that developed between Batista, his military, and his American support network.¹⁴³ In effect, irregulars can force their opponent to choose between continuing the war and risking the welfare of their nation. These cases also demonstrate that exporting the war to an adversaries' domestic population takes finesse. There is a fine line between persuading a population that their government's goals are unjust or unworthy of their effort, and bolstering their adversaries' cause and vilifying themselves. In addition to raising political and psychological costs, and in addition to exploiting existing fractures, this period indicates that internationalization is a significant mechanism irregulars use to influence popular support and reduce their adversary's commitment and motivation.

Internationalization appears to be the most significant factor or mechanism irregulars used in this period to influence popular support and shape and manipulate their opponents will to fight in the period between 1945 and 1962. Of the three instances of irregular success, the irregulars were defeated militarily, but prevailed politically.¹⁴⁴ The irregulars accomplished this by petitioning the international community on their own or were assisted by external sympathizers that petitioned on their behalf. In some cases, such as in Indonesia, the international community refused to stand by while the strong exploited the weak, so they intervened on behalf of the weak. Thus, as these cases suggest, international support is a significant equalizer for the weak and a contributing factor to their success. It just goes to show that the strong may overpower the weak, until the international community overpowers the strong. Castro, Ho, and the Indonesian nationalists proved that internationally backed irregulars are capable of persuading, politically coercing, and compelling the strong to quit.

¹⁴³ Merom, *How Democracies Lose Small Wars*.

¹⁴⁴ Asprey, *War in the Shadows*, 958–970. Castro's forces were the exception. Although they were not overly successful against Batista's inept military forces, Castro's guerrillas were also not defeated militarily. The Cuban military was trained and armed by the United States based on their experience in Korea. As a result, the Cuban military was not equipped or trained to fight a war against guerrillas in mountainous terrain. Thus, Castro's forces were able to evade capture or attrition while their political strategy eroded Batista's legitimacy and power in Cuba.

3. Explaining Why Irregulars Won

The cases in this chapter suggest that irregulars could compel or coerce their opponent to quit and prevailed most often when asymmetries of motivation existed. The irregulars accomplished this by increasing the cost of the war through indirect means, by shifting the focus of the war to their adversaries' domestic situation, by exploiting existing political and social fractures, and most importantly, by internationalizing their cause. In other words, irregulars manipulated popular support to exploit asymmetry of motivations to convince or compel their adversary to quit.

Alternatively, when motivations were symmetrical, as in the case of the Cuban Revolution, irregulars succeeded by surviving in safe havens while politicizing and internationalizing their cause to build domestic and international support to erode their opponent's will to fight. Batista failed because he lost popular support of the Cuban masses to Castro. Additionally, Batista also eventually lost international support and the assistance of the United States. Based on this evidence, and the case of the Huk Rebellion, internal wars during this time period were often decided by popular support; whichever side convinced the domestic population and the international community that their cause was just and worthy of their support eventually prevailed.¹⁴⁵ In effect, this suggests that irregular conflicts after World War II were decided by popular support.

This chapter reveals that irregulars won by influencing popular support. This conclusion suggests that there is an undeniable link between motivation and popular support. As the Indonesian National Revolution, the First Indochina War, and the Cuban Revolution indicate, asymmetry of motivations may not be as significant as the strategic interaction and the relationship between popular support and motivation. Whether there is a reciprocal relationship between the two, or one has a larger effect on the other, is unclear. Nonetheless, it is evident that there is a direct relationship between popular support and motivation.

¹⁴⁵ It bears mentioning, when both the irregular and the state are foreign entities, such as in Malaya, whoever commanded respect of the domestic population won the war.

The nature of irregular warfare changes over time and whether these factors remain relevant in later periods is yet to be determined. As colonialism fell by the wayside, the competition between the East and the West gained momentum. The next chapter will review irregular warfare in the mid-to late-Cold War era between 1963 and 1991. This analysis will be used to determine if the conclusions from this chapter are carried forward, and to reveal new explanations for how and why irregulars succeed.

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IV. IRREGULAR WARFARE IN THE MID- TO LATE-COLD WAR PERIOD

Irregular conflicts in the mid- to late-Cold War era were peculiar and complex. In general, many of these conflicts were ideological-leftist struggles against government establishments and Western ideals. As such, these conflicts typically evolved into shadowy proxy struggles between the United States on one side and the Soviet Union on the other, in which both injected support and resources to further their causes.

Unlike wars of national liberation, the mid-to late-Cold War era irregular conflicts were largely internal wars that arose due to weak governance and unequal distribution of wealth and resources. For the most part, these irregular conflicts tended to be protracted, lasting many years. As a result, the Cold War era irregular conflicts ebbed and flowed between periods of extreme violence and more muted stalemates. This makes it difficult to determine who the clear winner was.

Analytically, Cold War era irregular conflicts lack a definitive typology. The last vestiges of colonialism were fading by the late 1970s and with them the notion of old-style evil empires vulnerable to the international community's moral and ethical principles. In some cases, these Cold War era irregular conflicts were fought over territory and fueled by ethnicity, race or religion. At other times, these wars were strictly domestic struggles for control between a state and an irregular force. Regardless, international intervention and terrorism pervade Cold War era irregular conflicts.

The next section will review several of the most important irregular conflicts from this period. In doing so, this chapter will consider the belligerent's commitment and the dominant factors that shaped each war. Ultimately, this chapter will evaluate how asymmetry of motivations affected irregular warfare during this period. Additionally, this chapter will reveal how some irregulars succeeded or failed. Finally, this chapter will evaluate several factors to determine which shaped the nature of irregular warfare the most during the mid to late Cold War era.

A. THE SECOND CHIMURENGA WAR: 1964–1979

The Second Chimurenga, also known as the Rhodesian Bush War, was a by-product of British colonialism in Africa. As a self-governing colony, the white minority Rhodesian government was totally committed to maintaining control over the indigenous African majority, to preserve their way of life and prosperity.¹⁴⁶ Conversely, the indigenous African majority was equally committed to establishing majority rule, to bring about social and economic reforms, and to end government exploitation and oppression. For the first twelve years, the white Rhodesians dominated the weak and fractured Zimbabwean African National Liberation Army (ZANLA) and the Zimbabwean African Peoples Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA) forces by applying counterinsurgency tactics learned in Malaya and Kenya.¹⁴⁷ The Rhodesian Defense Forces and the Black African Rifles also benefitted from the assistance of South African Selous Scouts and the British Special Air Service.¹⁴⁸ These forces were instrumental in locating, isolating, and defeating irregulars hiding in game reserves and cross-border sanctuaries.

¹⁴⁶ Herbert M. Howe, “The Rhodesian Conflict 1966–79,” In *Prolonged Wars: A Post-Nuclear Challenge*, ed. Karl P. Magyar and Constantine P. Danopoulos (University Press of the Pacific, 2002), 195–197. After the British government had announced its intention to grant their remaining colonies independence after majority rule was established, in November 1965, the minority Rhodesian colonial administration, led by Ian Smith, declared their independence from Great Britain. The irregulars were split into two groups: the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) and the Zimbabwe African Peoples Union (ZAPU). Both political groups established militant wings: the Zimbabwean African National Liberation Army (ZANLA) and the Zimbabwean African Peoples Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA), respectively. The ZANU focused on a Maoist strategy and drew most of its support from the Shona people while the ZAPU employed a conventional approach and drew their support from the Ndebele Population.

¹⁴⁷ Michael Raeburn, “On the Move,” In *Guerrilla Strategies: An Historical Anthology from the Long March to Afghanistan*, ed. Gérard Chaliand (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982), 226–233. The irregulars were fractured organizationally. “The men who made up the platoon had all received military training. But they had been taught in different countries: Joseph...had gone to Cuba, Fireworks and two others had been in Algeria, the commander and three others went to Moscow, the young boy in Cairo. In all these countries the men had been taught how to shoot, but they all had varying concepts of how the war should be waged, and they all had different political attitudes.” Additionally, the ZANU and ZAPU often fought each other as much as they did the Rhodesian government.

¹⁴⁸ Herbert M. Howe, “The Rhodesian Conflict 1966–79,” In *Prolonged Wars: A Post-Nuclear Challenge*, ed. Karl P. Magyar and Constantine P. Danopoulos (University Press of the Pacific, 2002), 199, 207. Smith’s government used population control measures, pseudo operations, propaganda, and psychological operations to defeat the irregulars. The Rhodesian African Regiment (RAR) also was successful using pseudo operations; they often went into villages dressed as guerrillas to try to catch sympathizers and deter the population from interacting with the guerrillas.

To avoid the Rhodesian Defense Forces, the Patriotic Front relied on safe havens in neighboring Zambia and Angola.¹⁴⁹ Using these sanctuaries, ZANLA and ZIPRA forces grew in size and strength with material aid and advisory support from the Soviet Union, China, and Cuba.¹⁵⁰ By the mid-1970s, support for their cause and Zimbabwean nationalism exploded after Angola and Mozambique achieved majority rule and independence from Portugal. Mozambique's independence further enabled the ZANU and ZAPU when it closed its borders to the white minority government, weakening Rhodesia's economy. Though in the end, it was the loss of military aid and support from South Africa and the United States that destroyed Smith's white minority government's motivation to continue. Smith recognized that delaying elections and denying majority rule was futile without the external support.¹⁵¹ Under the close watch of Britain, the Rhodesian government and the African Nationalists signed the Lancaster House Agreement, ending the conflict and paving the way for elections.¹⁵² In 1979, the irregulars succeeded in establishing majority rule; Robert Mugabe was elected Prime Minister, and by 1980, Zimbabwe officially gained independence from the British.

The irregulars succeeded in Rhodesia because the Rhodesian government was unable to isolate ZANLA and ZIPRA forces, and they failed to control the narrative. Despite a tireless effort to censor the press and paint the irregulars in a negative light, the government failed to legitimize their actions and eventually lost international support. Additionally, fear of communist encroachment in Angola and Mozambique compelled the West to intervene. The United States pushed the Rhodesian government to reform and hold elections before leftist groups co-opted the indigenous African nationalist majority.

¹⁴⁹ Ibid., 196.

¹⁵⁰ Michael Raeburn, "On the Move," In *Guerrilla Strategies: An Historical Anthology from the Long March to Afghanistan*, ed. Gérard Chaliand (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982), 230.; Herbert M. Howe, "The Rhodesian Conflict 1966–79," In *Prolonged Wars: A Post-Nuclear Challenge*, ed. Karl P. Magyar and Constantine P. Danopoulos, (University Press of the Pacific, 2002), 211.

¹⁵¹ Herbert M. Howe, "The Rhodesian Conflict 1966–79," In *Prolonged Wars: A Post-Nuclear Challenge*, ed. Karl P. Magyar and Constantine P. Danopoulos (University Press of the Pacific, 2002), 214–222.

¹⁵² Ibid., 195.

By all accounts, the international community pressured the white Rhodesian government to consider majority rule as a result of its' illegitimate actions against the African majority.¹⁵³ Additionally, several external factors enabled the irregulars to prevail over the white minority government: the perceived injustice of the white minority government's cause; a fear of communism spreading to Rhodesia, and ultimately, the Rhodesian government's loss of external aid and support.¹⁵⁴ Therefore, because motivations between the belligerents were symmetrical, this was a war of attrition.

The irregulars succeeded in this conflict because their support was more durable, enabling them to outlast and outpace the white minority government. In conclusion, this case demonstrates the significance of external support and the effect of asymmetry of resources in irregular warfare, particularly as it relates to internal conflicts defined by symmetrical motivations.

B. ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN CONFLICT: 1967–1991

The Palestinian-Israeli conflict is a complex, continual irregular war fought over land and fueled by religion, nationalism, and social and economic inequalities. The Palestinians have stayed fully committed and motivated since they were displaced from Palestine in 1948. Similarly, Israel has maintained full commitment and motivation to ensure their survival since their inception. Thus, the Israel-Palestinian conflict was born as both the Palestinians and the Israelis refused to acknowledge each other's right to exist and each other's claim to Jerusalem.

This conflict was also influenced by conventional contests between Israel and neighboring Arab states and by external events such as the 1980 Iran-Iraq war, and more importantly, the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union.¹⁵⁵ Nevertheless, Palestinian nationalism and motivation surged as Israel expanded settlements in the West Bank and Gaza in the 1960s. Additionally, their commitment

¹⁵³ Ibid., 220–222.

¹⁵⁴ Ibid., 196, 212–214.

¹⁵⁵ Boot, *Invisible Armies*, 461. This conflict was shaped by the Six Day War in 1967, the 1973 Yom Kippur War, and the 1982 Lebanon War, among others.

grew after the 1967 War, resulting in the formation of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO).¹⁵⁶ Regardless, as the Fatah retaliated against the Israeli occupation force with small-scale attacks, the Israeli Likud party continued to encourage settlement of Palestinian lands.¹⁵⁷ Both sides were equally motivated, and decades of hostility and perceived injustice fueled enmity between Jews and Palestinians alike.

Initially, Palestinian motivation suffered because they were too disorganized and lacked the resources and experience required to resist the professional, capable, and well-armed Israeli Defense Forces.¹⁵⁸ Therefore, Arafat politicized and internationalized the Palestinians cause by appealing to the UN. This effort convinced the UN to affirm the Palestinian's right to self-determination and independence and granted them observer status in the UN.¹⁵⁹ Additionally, the UN adopted Resolution 3379, declaring Zionism a form of racial discrimination.¹⁶⁰ Much to Israeli's disappointment, these three resolutions were major political wins for the PLO; it boosted Palestinian motivation and legitimized their cause.

Unfortunately, these measures failed to restrain Israeli expansion, convince Israel to grant the Palestinians a homeland or address the conditions of the occupied territories. Thus, after twenty years of Israeli occupation, a mass movement in 1988 developed into

¹⁵⁶ Gregory Harms, *The Palestine-Israel Conflict: A Basic Introduction*, 2nd ed. (London: Pluto, 2008), 118–147. Israeli hard-liners and the Likud party, in particular, desired to retain Gaza and the West Bank because they believed it was part of Eretz-Israel (biblical Israel). Colonial settlements expanded after the formation of Israel, but the Likud Party made a focused effort to expand them. This conflict was generational; Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza grew up only knowing Israeli occupation and persecution.

¹⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, 127.

¹⁵⁸ Abu Iyad, "Al Fatah's Autocriticisms," In *Guerrilla Strategies: An Historical Anthology from the Long March to Afghanistan*, ed. Gérard Chaliand (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1982), 327. "We lead a movement that, by its very nature, cannot enjoy a coherent base of support. The people we seek to mobilize and lead are geographically dispersed, psychologically heterogeneous, and of varying political beliefs." Boot, *Invisible Armies*, 461.

¹⁵⁹ Harms, *The Palestine-Israel Conflict*, 130. UN Resolutions 3236 and 3237.

¹⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, 131. UN Resolution 3379 was later repealed in 1991.

the First Intifada.¹⁶¹ Israel's commitment remained total as they responded with an iron fist and overwhelming force to quell the uprising.¹⁶² In turn, Palestinian commitment rose as the Israelis instituted harsh population control measures, such as cutting electricity and telephone lines, imposing curfews, destroying crops, and arresting thousands of people.¹⁶³ This motivated the PLO to initiate a new diplomatic effort in 1988 to end Israeli occupation.¹⁶⁴ At the same time, Hamas emerged as an alternative to the PLO, appealing to Palestinians that wanted to take a harder stance against Israel occupation.¹⁶⁵ By 1991, the First Intifada began to lose momentum as war weariness set in. As a result, both sides met for the first time face to face at the Madrid Conference to discuss peace.¹⁶⁶ This marked the beginning of the second phase of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

As the Cold War came to an end, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict remained undecided. The Israelis had failed to contain the PLO and Hamas, and the Palestinians had failed to carve out a homeland. As leaders from both sides continued to seek political solutions to the conflict, commitment and motivation remained high among radicals on both sides of the conflict; right wing Israelis continued to push settlements into Palestinian territories, and bitter young Palestinians retaliated with a new fervor.

¹⁶¹ Ian J Bickerton, *The Arab-Israeli Conflict: A History* (London: Reaktion Books, 2009), http://www.123library.org/book_details/?id=114239, 150–169. The First Intifada began very slowly but appealed to widely to the Palestinian population due to continued exploitation by the Israelis. Additionally, Israel's continued expansionist policies made them appear like colonial occupiers in Gaza and the West Bank. This recruited the young and the old to resist Israeli occupation. Palestinians turned out to the streets to protest and demonstrate. Younger Palestinians threw rocks at Israeli soldiers and set up barricades with burning tires to limit their freedom of maneuver in Gaza and the West Bank.

¹⁶² *Ibid.*, 160.

¹⁶³ Bickerton, *The Arab-Israeli Conflict*, 150–169, 161.

¹⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, 161–163. At the same time, Arafat attempted to proclaim a Palestinian state and took a major step forward in denouncing terrorism, and stated that the PLO was ready for negotiations.

¹⁶⁵ Bickerton, *The Arab-Israeli Conflict*, 161–163. Hamas was born out of the Muslim Brotherhood, and its' goal was to establish a Palestinian state founded in Islamic law. Harms, *The Palestine-Israel Conflict*, 146. Although Hamas was more militant, they also appealed to the Palestinian people by opening schools, mosques, and clinics to establish legitimacy and credibility.

¹⁶⁶ Bickerton, *The Arab-Israeli Conflict*, 166. This conflict is significant because it was the first time that Israeli's and Palestinians met face to face to discuss peace.

Ultimately, continued clashes and violence undermined the peace process, propelling this conflict into the post-Cold War era. In the end, regardless of their government's efforts, motivations remained symmetrical between the Israeli and the Palestinian people. Nonetheless, the first period of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict suggests that political strategies are more effective in achieving success when motivations are symmetrical. Furthermore, this first period reveals the importance of safe havens for irregulars, as well as, the influence of international organizations and nation states in internal irregular conflicts.

C. COLOMBIAN CONFLICT: 1964–1991

The Colombian conflict began as a communist struggle against a weak and corrupt Colombian government in the 1960s and 1970s. Several guerrilla groups first emerged to contest government abuse and corruption and gained popularity as a result of economic and social hardship among Colombia's poor and rural populations. These groups, the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC), Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN), Ejército Popular de Liberación (EPL), Movimiento 19 de Abril (M-19), were heavily influenced by leftist ideologies and received external support from the Soviet Union, Cuba, and Venezuela.¹⁶⁷ As these groups gained power and influence, the Colombian government became more committed and motivated to defeat and neutralize them. Ultimately, the Colombian conflict became a convoluted internal conflict characterized by periods of intense violence between the Colombian military, right-wing paramilitaries, left-wing irregulars, and drug cartels.

By the 1980s, the FARC had gained control throughout southern and eastern Colombia and the central highlands.¹⁶⁸ Furthermore, the FARC acted as a de facto government in rural areas that lacked government representation. As a result, the FARC's influence over the Colombian population grew, as did their wealth (from taxing legal and

¹⁶⁷ Stephen Phillips, "FUERZAS ARMADAS REVOLUCIONARIAS DE COLOMBIA - FARC" (Johns Hopkins University, Applied Physics Laboratory/National Security Analysis Department, 2010), 2–18.

¹⁶⁸ Garry M. Leech, *The FARC: The Longest Insurgency* (Rebels) (New York, NY: Fernwood; Zed Books Ltd; Distributed in the USA exclusively by Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 25.

illegals businesses, such as the coca trade) and military experience and capability (from fighting drug traffickers who contested their control in the region).¹⁶⁹ Additionally, the FARC's commitment and motivation increased after their Seventh Conference in 1982, in which it rebranded itself as the FARC-Ejército del Pueblo (FARC-EP), and instituted a new strategy to increase their political influence in Colombia.¹⁷⁰ As a result of this, the FARC convinced President Betancur's government to sign the Uribe Accords in 1984; setting conditions for a cease-fire and peace talks.¹⁷¹ For a brief period, violence subsided between the FARC and the Columbia government as both sides became more committed to ending the war than to continuing it.

During this period of calm, the FARC joined forces with the Colombian Communist Party to establish the Unión Patriótica (UP).¹⁷² Although, the UP's political success in the 1986 elections threatened the newly elected President Barco's control in Colombian politics. In effect, the prospects for peace were leader dependent—as one Colombian president proved willing to negotiate and end the conflict, subsequent Colombian leaders refused. As a result, the peace process collapsed in 1987 as the Colombian military and paramilitary forces assassinated UP leadership, fueling a new war between the government and the guerrillas.¹⁷³ In turn, the FARC joined the Coordinadora Guerrillera Simón Bolívar (CGSB) in 1987, to unite political and military efforts with M-19 and the EPL.¹⁷⁴ This enabled the CGSB to force the government back to the negotiating table in 1991 to discuss a formal peace process.

The government's and the irregular's commitment and motivation fluctuated throughout this period. The growing influence of drug Cartels, which absorbed several right-wing paramilitary groups (whose actions were as violent, if not more so than the

¹⁶⁹ Garry M. Leech, *The FARC: The Longest Insurgency* (Rebels) (New York, NY: Fernwood; Zed Books Ltd; Distributed in the USA exclusively by Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 62.

¹⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, 25.

¹⁷¹ *Ibid.*, 26.

¹⁷² *Ibid.*, 27.

¹⁷³ *Ibid.*, 28–30.

¹⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, 33.

irregulars), further complicated this conflict.¹⁷⁵ Frustration and war weariness set in as violence continued, driving the Colombian population to push the government to seek a political solution to end the conflict. Nevertheless, negotiations were problematic, as both sides remained fully committed and refused to compromise. Colombia's President Gaviria did not want to agree to anything other than demobilization while the FARC refused to accept any deal unless it addressed economic, political, and military reforms and human rights.¹⁷⁶ Thus, by 1991, both actors remained equally motivated, and neither could agree on terms of peace. As a result, the Colombian conflict continued into the post-Cold War era.

D. THE IRISH TROUBLES: 1969–1991

Lasting decades, The Irish Troubles were an internal conflict in Northern Ireland between the Catholic Republicans and the Protestant Loyalists. This irregular conflict arose from the social, political, and economic oppression of the Catholic minority by the Protestant majority in Northern Ireland. In 1969, in the wake of increased social unrest, the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) split off from the Original Irish Republican Army (IRA), to protect the Catholic population and to unite Northern Ireland

¹⁷⁵ Phillips, "FUERZAS ARMADAS REVOLUCIONARIAS DE COLOMBIA – FARC," 20–21. Colombia's right-wing paramilitaries were often referred to as *autodefensas*. These groups formed organically and with the aid of the government to counter the left-wing irregulars. Over the years, several groups united under a single organization, the *Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia* (AUC) or "United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia. The AUC mainly relied on the same tactics as the irregulars, using assassinations and terrorism to collect intelligence and to disrupt irregular support networks. Unlike the irregulars, the AUC had free reign; they lived and worked among the population. As a result, they are blamed for the majority of the casualties surrounding this conflict. Anonymous, "Journal of a Colombian Guerrillero," In *Guerrilla Strategies: An Historical Anthology from the Long March to Afghanistan*, ed. Gérard Chaliand, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982), 223. The Colombian Government used a criminal network to confuse the population and delegitimize the irregulars' cause. "They chose perverts, drug pushers, thieves who would steal from the devil and sell their own mother in the bargain. Many were ex-guerrillas who had become bandoleros. They got all this rabble together and formed the Barbados. ... The military authorities told them to let their beards and hair grown, in order to besmirch the symbol of the heroes of the Sierra: *los Barbudos*. ... And now they roam the region, sowing confusion by passing themselves off as guerrilleros."

¹⁷⁶ Leech, *The FARC*, 34.

with the Republican of Ireland.¹⁷⁷ Although the Protestant majority in Northern Ireland was equally motivated to resist the PIRA, as they desired to remain English subjects. Additionally, because Northern Ireland was a member of the United Kingdom, Britain was compelled to intervene to contain the violence and end the conflict. Accordingly, because the Catholics and Protestants were all equally committed and motivated to prevail, what resulted was a long, complex, and costly political and military struggle. Nevertheless, the British were only limitedly committed, which created an asymmetry of motivation between the PIRA and the British.

What began as a limited conflict with low-level violence between the PIRA and the Ulster Defense Forces, evolved into a larger struggle after the introduction of direct rule and British forces in 1972.¹⁷⁸ That same year, British soldiers killed thirteen unarmed men during a civil rights rally in Derry on Bloody Sunday, changing the dynamic of the conflict, swelling the ranks of the PIRA, and uniting the Irish Republic against the British.¹⁷⁹ As a result, the PIRA increased their guerrilla attacks in Northern Ireland and began a “prolonged and spectacular bombing campaign in England,” destroying pubs and government buildings.¹⁸⁰ As the PIRA continued to escalate their armed struggle throughout the 1970s, Sinn Fein began a complementary effort to resolve the conflict politically in Northern Ireland.¹⁸¹

¹⁷⁷ Louise Richardson, “Britain and the IRA,” In *Democracy and Counterterrorism: Lessons from the Past*, ed. Robert J. Art (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2007), 67; Laqueur, *Guerrilla Warfare*, 178–179. The irregular struggle between the Irish Republicans and the Ulster Loyalists can be traced back to a struggle between the Irish and the British lasting several hundreds of years. William R. Polk, *Violent Politics: A History of Insurgency, Terrorism, and Guerrilla Warfare, from the American Revolution to Iraq* (New York, NY: Harper Perennial, 2008), 55–58. This conflict evolved from old land disputes, a rejection of British colonialism, Irish nationalism, and a struggle between Catholics and Protestants.

¹⁷⁸ Polk, *Violent Politics: A History of Insurgency, Terrorism, and Guerrilla Warfare, from the American Revolution to Iraq*, 67–68. The PIRA only had about 1,000 people compared to the British and Loyalist who numbered close to 30,000 soldiers, police, and auxiliary forces. The PIRA attempted to negotiate with the British between 1971 and 1972 to no avail.

¹⁷⁹ Paul Bew, *Ireland: The Politics of Enmity, 1789–2006* (Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 506–508.

¹⁸⁰ Polk, *Violent Politics: A History of Insurgency, Terrorism, and Guerrilla Warfare, from the American Revolution to Iraq*, 69.

¹⁸¹ Bew, *Ireland*, 519.

The 1980s saw an increase in violence as the PIRA clashed with British and Loyalists forces. During this period, the Irish Republicans gained legitimacy and support for their cause as British policies, such as “shoot to kill” directives and the use of Diplock courts further marginalized Catholics.¹⁸² Additionally, the 1980s prisoner hunger strikes mobilized the masses and “fixed the image of the IRA as the national liberation movement.”¹⁸³ On top of this, throughout the 1980s, the PIRA enjoyed increased support from the Libyan government and sections of the U.S. population.¹⁸⁴ As a result, the PIRA became more committed, while the British government’s motivation wavered due to rising political and psychological costs.¹⁸⁵

The British came to realize in the early 1980s that their military effort was futile.¹⁸⁶ In turn, Margaret Thatcher renewed Britain’s political effort with the Irish government, resulting in the 1985 Anglo-Irish agreement.¹⁸⁷ This opened up a role for the Irish government in Northern Ireland’s affairs and put the option of a united Ireland back on the table.¹⁸⁸ Still the Unionists and Loyalists, as well as Sinn Fein and the PIRA, opposed this agreement.¹⁸⁹ Thus, although the British and Irish governments were motivated to end the conflict, parties on both sides refused to compromise and continued violence stalled further progress.

¹⁸² Ibid., 69–70; Marie-Therese Fay, Mike Morrissey, and Marie Smyth, *Northern Ireland’s Troubles: The Human Costs*, Contemporary Irish Studies (London ; Sterling, VA: Pluto Press in association with The Cost of the Troubles Study, 1999), 61.

¹⁸³ Polk, *Violent Politics: A History of Insurgency, Terrorism, and Guerrilla Warfare, from the American Revolution to Iraq*, 70.

¹⁸⁴ Ibid., 74. The PIRA extended their networks into the United States and established official offices and unofficial fund raising campaigns, particularly in Irish pubs in the North East of the United States. They also received arms from Libya and benefitted from the support of Muammar Gaddafi.

¹⁸⁵ Richardson, *Democracy and Counterterrorism*, 72. The PIRA also avoided further international criticism for their terrorist activity by attacking only British military and Unionist forces, instead of attacking pubs and other civilian targets indiscriminately.

¹⁸⁶ Polk, *Violent Politics: A History of Insurgency, Terrorism, and Guerrilla Warfare, from the American Revolution to Iraq*, 69; T. G. Fraser, *Ireland in Conflict, 1922–1998*, Lancaster Pamphlets (London ; New York: Routledge, 2000), 70.

¹⁸⁷ Bew, *Ireland*, 531.

¹⁸⁸ Ibid., 532; Fay, Morrissey, and Smyth, *Northern Ireland’s Troubles*. 63.

¹⁸⁹ Bew, *Ireland*, 531.

By 1990, the conflict was again locked in a stalemate as the British negotiated with Sinn Fein leadership.¹⁹⁰ Unfortunately, the dialogue ended in 1991 after it failed to reach a mutually agreeable solution.¹⁹¹ Nonetheless, the British government maintained secret discussions with Sinn Fein as their desire to end the conflict increased. Thus, the PIRA continued to resist as the Cold War came to an end and any further hope of ending the conflict rested on Sinn Fein's ability to persuade them to put down their weapons.

Despite the desire for peace, commitment and motivation remained symmetrical as suspicions grew between the Irish Republicans and the Ulster Loyalists.¹⁹² This suggests that divisions can exist within irregular groups and states whose commitment and motivations run counter to the rest. This explains why both sides can push for conflict resolution to no avail. Furthermore, this conflict, and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, indicates that popular support is less of a factor in sectarian driven irregular conflicts that are characterized by symmetrical motivations.

E. THE SOVIET-AFGHAN WAR: 1980–1989

The Soviet-Afghan War shares many similarities with the American experience in Vietnam. Both countries intervened on behalf of a friendly regime. Also, both countries became entangled in messy conflicts fueled by external powers. In this context, the Soviet Union was only limitedly committed to ensuring the political survival of the Communist-Afghan government.¹⁹³ Conversely, the Afghans were totally committed to expelling the Soviet Union, whom they saw as a foreign occupier.¹⁹⁴ Thus, while the Soviet-Afghan War only lasted nine years, it was one of the most destructive irregular

¹⁹⁰ Fraser, *Ireland in Conflict, 1922–1998*, 69.

¹⁹¹ *Ibid.*, 69–71; Fay, Morrissey, and Smyth, *Northern Ireland's Troubles*. 64.

¹⁹² Fraser, *Ireland in Conflict, 1922–1998*, 71.

¹⁹³ Boot, *Invisible Armies*, 486.

¹⁹⁴ Polk, *Violent Politics: A History of Insurgency, Terrorism, and Guerrilla Warfare, from the American Revolution to Iraq*, 197.

conflicts within the past fifty years. Over one million Afghans were killed, many more were wounded, and millions were displaced into neighboring Pakistan and Iran.¹⁹⁵

Afghans lack a general sense of nationalism or unity, but their history is a testament to their overwhelming collective aversion to foreign occupation.¹⁹⁶ Regardless of tribe, religious sect, or nationality, Afghans and Muslim volunteers alike were fully committed and highly motivated to drive the Soviet Union out of Afghanistan.¹⁹⁷ This is not to say the Afghan resistance was organized; the Mujahedeen remained disjointed, and loyalties seldom extended beyond the boundaries of the tribal villages. Rather, the Afghan resistance's commitment was total, as this became a religious war against a foreign invader and a fight for honor and freedom guided by the Pashtunwali moral code.¹⁹⁸

Afghan Mujahedeen, fighting on horseback with WWI Enfield rifles and cheap copies of Kalashnikovs, were no match for the superior and technologically enabled Soviet military.¹⁹⁹ The Red Army quickly secured the urban areas, although the mountainous terrain, disease, and logistical issues plagued Soviet progress in rural Mujahedeen safe havens.²⁰⁰ As a result, the Soviet's implemented a massive bombing campaign to neutralize and isolate the Afghan irregulars. This failed to destroy the Afghan's commitment to fight. The Afghan irregulars retaliated against the Soviets by

¹⁹⁵ Boot, *Invisible Armies*, 493.

¹⁹⁶ Polk, *Violent Politics: A History of Insurgency, Terrorism, and Guerrilla Warfare, from the American Revolution to Iraq*, 197.

¹⁹⁷ Gerard Chaliand, "The Bargain War in Afghanistan," In *Guerrilla Strategies*, ed. Chaliand, 329–330.

¹⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, 330.

¹⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, 333.

²⁰⁰ Boot, *Invisible Armies*, 494–495. Before to deploying, the Soviets often deceived their own soldiers, telling them that they were "being sent to help a fraternal ally" to resist "U.S. imperialism and Peking hegemonism." "However, once they arrived and became disillusioned by fighting ghosts, their discipline and morals went out the window, and alcoholism and drug use became systemic. The Soviets also lacked proper warm clothing and heating oil. Additionally, food and medicine were rationed due to supply delays and shortages. As a result, seventy percent of the Soviet army in Afghanistan was hospitalized with a serious illness and disease.

ambushing convoys and attacking isolated outposts.²⁰¹ On top of this, the introduction of stinger missiles into Afghanistan by the United States enabled the irregulars to reduce the Soviet Union's air superiority, and eventually their motivation.²⁰²

Conversely, the Mujahedeen's motivation increased substantially due to political support and military aid from the United States and Saudi Arabia and the sanctuaries provided by Pakistan and Iran.²⁰³ Additionally, the Mujahedeen benefited from the Soviet Union's barbaric military strategy.²⁰⁴ The Soviet Union not only managed to alienate the Afghans with their indiscriminate bombing, widespread use of landmines, and war crimes, but they also aroused international attention, which led to widespread criticism of the Red Army and increased support for the Mujahedeen.

In the end, the Soviet Union's barbaric strategy widened political and economic fractures, eroded their commitment to the Communist-Afghan government, and decreased their motivation to fight the Mujahedeen. As a result, Mikhail Gorbachev charted a new political course to preserve the Soviet Union.²⁰⁵ Thus, the Soviet Union eventually lost the will to fight while Mujahedeen remained fully committed and motivated to the end.

The Mujahedeen exploited the asymmetry of motivations between them and the Soviet Union by using the Afghan terrain and guerrilla warfare strategy to increase political and psychological costs for the Soviets. Ultimately though, critical external aid and support, such as stinger missiles, enabled the Mujahedeen to prevail against the superior Red Army. Therefore, this case demonstrates how a small, but significant new

²⁰¹ Gerard Chaliand, "The Bargain War in Afghanistan," In *Guerrilla Strategies*, ed. Chaliand, 333; Boot, *Invisible Armies*, 489–492.

²⁰² Boot, *Invisible Armies*, 497–498; Polk, *Violent Politics: A History of Insurgency, Terrorism, and Guerrilla Warfare, from the American Revolution to Iraq*, 200. "The Russians virtually stopped flying, and lacking air cover that had tied down and discovered guerrilla forces, Russian ground forces were more vulnerable to ambush and tended to pull back to the cities. As a result, for most of the war, they occupied only about a fifth of the country."

²⁰³ Boot, *Invisible Armies*, 496.

²⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, 498.

²⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, 498.

technology, can alter the dynamics of irregular conflicts. Furthermore, this conflict demonstrates that terrain is a significant factor in irregular warfare; as long as the irregular cannot be contained, and as long as they have resources, the fight will continue.

F. CIVIL WAR IN EL SALVADOR: 1980–1992

The Salvadoran Civil War, like many of the other Cold War era irregular conflicts, was a classic struggle between a weak national government and a leftist group with external parties enabling both sides.²⁰⁶ This was a total war for the Farabundo Marti-National Liberation Front (FMLN), which sought political and economic reforms. Similarly, because the Salvadoran government's existence was threatened, they were equally motivated and committed to defeating the irregulars. As a result, this conflict lasted for over a decade as both sides refused to quit in the face of rising costs and casualties. Were it not for external international pressure and intervention, this conflict would have continued to rage until one side ran out of men or material.

The Salvadoran Civil War began as a popular movement; angry at government corruption and abuse, and disenfranchised by economic hardship, several groups emerged fully committed in the late 1970s to pursue government reforms.²⁰⁷ As protests turned violent, the military deposed the president and assumed control of the country. This only led to increased instability and violence, particularly by the Salvadoran National Guard and their "death squads."²⁰⁸ As a result, resistance groups united and formed the FMLN in 1980.²⁰⁹

The FMLN was extremely weak compared to their adversary; relying on modest military aid from Cuba and the Soviet Union, the FMLN's small arms and guerrilla

²⁰⁶ Steffen W. Schmidt, "El Salvador's Prolonged Civil War," In *Prolonged Wars: A Post-Nuclear Challenge*. ed. Magyar and Danopoulos, 335.

²⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, 318–324.

²⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, 315.

²⁰⁹ Edwin G. Corr and Kimbra L Fishel, "The United Nations Involvement in the Salvadoran Peace Process," *World Affairs* 160, no. 4 (1998), 202.

strategy had little effect on the Salvadoran military.²¹⁰ While the FMLN's tactics included terrorism, kidnapping, political assassinations, and bombings, the extent of their violence and brutality was nothing like that of the government forces.²¹¹ With limited, but unyielding American aid, the Salvadoran government isolated the FMLN using slash and burn tactics that included destroying entire communities to sever the irregular's lines of support.²¹² Eventually, the FMLN recognized that armed resistance was futile; their only option was to pursue negotiations with the military Junta. Unfortunately, the FMLN's hopes and motivation were crushed as the newly elected President Reagan opted to support elections in El Salvador instead of brokering a peace deal between them and the Salvadoran government.²¹³ Therefore, the FMLN and the Salvadoran forces both remained committed throughout the late 1980s as violence continued to plague the Salvadoran people.

This conflict would have continued well beyond 1992 were it not for the efforts of several human rights organizations and United Nations intervention. As early as 1982, human rights groups, such as the Committee in Solidarity with the People of El Salvador, Amnesty International, the Human Rights Commission of El Salvador, and the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, worked to end human rights abuses in El

²¹⁰ Ibid., 203.

²¹¹ Steffen W. Schmidt, "El Salvador's Prolonged Civil War," In *Prolonged Wars: A Post-Nuclear Challenge*. ed. Magyar and Danopoulos, 333–334. The FMLN violence can be characterized in three ways: 1) Direct confrontations between the troops and the Guerrillas- This resulted in thousands of civilian casualties as they were caught in the crossfire. 2) Terrorism- Guerrillas focused on blowing up civilian and military infrastructure. 3) Crime of opportunity- Theft, kidnapping for ransom, torture, and mutilation of government supporters. They also used violence to force people to fight and as a means of justice and control.

²¹² "Amnesty International Report 1982" (London, England: Amnesty International Publications, 1982), <https://www.amnesty.org/.../POL1000041982ENGLISH.PDF>, 133–138.

²¹³ Russell Crandall, *The Salvador Option: The United States in El Salvador, 1977–1992* (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2016), 261–264; Steffen W. Schmidt, "El Salvador's Prolonged Civil War," In *Prolonged Wars: A Post-Nuclear Challenge*. ed. Magyar and Danopoulos, 323–328. The Carter Administration had previously backed the Junta, hoping to prevent them from sliding left. However, Reagan decided that El Salvador was the natural place to draw a red line in the sand against the spread of communism in South America. President Regan was concerned that if El Salvador fell to communism, Guatemala and Honduras would follow. As a result, this policy produced a political stalemate and zero-sum game that pushed the FMLN and the Government back into a bloody contest for control.

Salvador.²¹⁴ Although it was not until 1987 when violence peaked, that the United Nations Secretary-General, Javier Perez de Cuellar, became personally invested in the peace process and succeeded in bringing both sides to the negotiating table.²¹⁵ With United Nations oversight, El Salvador adopted the FMLN into the political process and worked toward reintegration and reform.

This conflict is characterized by a symmetry of motivations; both sides were equally committed throughout the duration of the conflict. As a result, this was a long, bloody, and costly affair in which neither side can claim victory, and both the FMLN and the Salvadoran government share responsibility for atrocities committed during the war. Though, the FMLN did benefit from international intervention. The FMLN gained political concessions—the Salvadoran government enacted reforms to curb government corruption, a truth commission was established to address atrocities committed by both sides, and the FMLN emerged as a legitimate political party.²¹⁶

Thus, although no asymmetries of motivation existed, the FMLN succeeded politically as a result of a stalemate. Like the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, this case suggests that international organizations, non-governmental organizations, and states may intervene in the interest of human rights and on the behalf of the local population. Additionally, this conflict suggests that symmetrically motivated irregular conflicts are costly and bloody affairs that have the potential to continue in perpetuity unless an external party intervenes.

G. DOMINANT TRENDS IN THE MID- TO LATE-COLD WAR PERIOD

The conflicts reviewed in this chapter are but a small sample of irregular wars that occurred during the mid to late Cold War era; over one hundred irregular conflicts

²¹⁴ Mayra Gómez, *Human Rights in Cuba, El Salvador, and 2003*, 113; Russell Crandall, *The Salvador Option: The United States in El Salvador, 1977–1992* (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2016), 242–243. The Committee in Solidarity with the People of El Salvador (CISPES), an activist organization, worked to publicize the Salvadoran people’s plight and the FMLN’s cause as a result of continued violence and continued U.S. aid to the corrupt Salvadoran government.

²¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 120.

²¹⁶ Steffen W. Schmidt, “El Salvador’s Prolonged Civil War,” In *Prolonged Wars: A Post-Nuclear Challenge*. ed. Magyar and Danopoulos, 343.

occurred between 1963 and 1991.²¹⁷ Several other significant irregular conflicts were won by the weak; such as the partisan's success in the North Yemen Civil War and the National Liberation Front's success in Southern Yemen. Also during this period, Hezbollah prevailed in Lebanon in 1982 and the Slovenians won their 1991 War of Independence.²¹⁸ Alternatively, sometimes the irregulars lost, as when the Thai government defeated the Communists or when the German government neutralized the Baader Meinhof group.²¹⁹ Furthermore, a few other irregular conflicts ended in a draw, such as the war between the Contras and the Nicaraguan government or the Tuareg irregulars' struggle against the government of Mali.²²⁰ Finally, like the Colombian conflict, several other conflicts continued beyond this period, such as the Shining Path's struggle in Peru that began in 1980 or the Moro National Liberation Front's struggle in the Philippines beginning in the early 1970s.²²¹

In the end, this chapter addressed six of the most important irregular conflicts that dominated and defined this period. These six conflicts are unique and distinct; they occurred on six different continents between vastly different actors with different goals, resources, and capabilities. Additionally, these six conflicts represent various types of irregular conflicts that dominated the period. Also, these conflicts were shaped by many of the dominant factors that permeated irregular warfare during the period; they were costly, bloody, protracted conflicts influenced by external powers and events, in which some did, and some did not exhibit asymmetry of motivations.

Max Boot refers to this period of irregular warfare as “Radical Chic,” or “The Romance of the Leftist Revolutionaries.”²²² This may be a misnomer. Communist influence began to shape the modern era well before the end of World War II. Although

²¹⁷ Max Boot, *Invisible Armies: An Epic History of Guerrilla Warfare from Ancient Times to the Present*, 1st ed. (New York, NY: Norton, 2013), 582.

²¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 584–586.

²¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 582–583.

²²⁰ *Ibid.*, 584–585.

²²¹ *Ibid.*, 584.

²²² Boot, *Invisible Armies*, 397–399.

leftist movements and competition between the United States and the Soviet Union are defining features of the Cold War, several of the most important irregular wars of this period have long and complex historical narratives. In fact, many of these irregular conflicts, such as the Israel-Palestinian Conflict, the Irish Troubles, and even the Soviet-Afghan war are not defined by leftist revolutionaries as much as they are by nationalism or by sectarian, ethnic, and tribal friction or weak governance. Thus, it is insufficient to define this period by the leftist revolutionaries alone.

1. Irregular Success in the Mid- to Late-Cold War Period

Of the six irregular wars reviewed in this period, three were internal civil wars (Salvadoran Civil War, Rhodesian Bush War, and Colombian conflict), one was an irregular war involving an occupying power (Soviet-Afghan War), and two were sectarian insurgencies (Israeli-Palestinian conflict and The Irish Troubles). The irregulars succeeded in three of the six cases (Rhodesia, Afghanistan, and El Salvador).

Of these three cases, the irregulars prevailed in Rhodesia and Afghanistan largely as a result of external support and sanctuaries while the irregulars in El Salvador benefitted politically as a result of international intervention. Alternatively, the three other conflicts continued unresolved into the post-Cold War era (Israeli-Palestinian conflict, The Colombian conflict, and The Irish Troubles). Remarkably, the irregulars were not defeated outright in any of the cases reviewed during this period. These last three cases reveal that Cold War era struggles continuously evolve from one decade and crisis to the next.

Three of the six conflicts (the Colombian conflict, the Rhodesian Bush War, and the Salvadoran Civil War) were internal conflicts that emerged as a result of weak or corrupt governance. Additionally, only two of the six conflicts were influenced by existing political, social, and economic fractures. The Rhodesian government eventually succumbed to manpower shortages and economic hardship while the Soviet Union was compelled to leave Afghanistan on account of their struggling economy. Instead of existing fractures, external support, negotiations, and terrorism appear to be the most important factors driving irregular success during the Cold War era.

2. Factors Influencing Irregular Success

Commitment and motivation were more symmetrical during this period. In fact, five of the six irregular wars in this chapter are characterized by equal commitment and motivation. The Rhodesian Bush War, the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, the Colombian conflict, the Irish Troubles, and the Salvadoran Civil War were all fought for political and physical survival. In each case, a victory for one side meant the end for their adversary in one form or another. Thus, these cases demonstrate that the theory of asymmetry of motivations is severely limited, particularly in internal irregular conflicts. Likewise, political and psychological costs are not as influential when commitments and motivations are symmetrical either. In other words, when the irregular's motivation and commitment is equal to their adversary's, external support is more important and decisive in determining the outcome of the war.

External support is a significant factor in each of these six cases. In fact, based on these cases, external support may best explain why irregulars prevailed during the mid-to-late-Cold War period. This is not to mean that external support guarantees success, as the PLO and the FARC demonstrate, no amount of wealth, external support, or sanctuary ensures victory. Rather, external support only serves to shape a conflict—often prolonging it and increasing costs in blood and treasure. Put differently, external support, provided to the weak or the strong, is an equalizing factor that enables the conflict to continue until one side's will is eroded or destroyed. The longer a conflict continues, the more external support becomes a deciding factor in the belligerent's ability to persist.

These cases also reveal that external support is particularly important when the terrain is unsuitable, as was the case in Rhodesia and Israel. In these circumstances, sanctuaries and safe havens became necessary for survival and enabled the weak to evade the strong. Furthermore, even when the terrain is favorable, as it was in the other four cases, sanctuaries and safe-havens still serve an important role; they enable the irregular to train, plan, prepare, and avoid general repression and attrition.

As long as irregulars can evade their adversaries, either in jungle safe havens or behind friendly borders, irregulars can prolong the conflict and wear down their

adversary, as did the Mujahedeen. If nothing else, the conflict will continue until rising costs and war weariness compel the strong to grant the weak space, time, or political concessions. In other words, if the state cannot isolate the irregular, as is the case in Israel and Columbia, then the war is not likely to be won outright militarily. Thus, when a military solution is futile, it is necessary to look at political options to avoid further costs.

As the Rhodesians, the Colombians, the British, and the Israelis can attest to; it may not be “operationally possible, politically feasible, or financially affordable” to destroy irregulars completely.²²³ When commitments are equal, and motivations run high, negotiating may be the only practical or rational way to gain a favorable position to end a protracted conflict.²²⁴ Arafat and the PLO demonstrated that irregulars succeed by pursuing political strategies that lead to open dialogue and negotiation. In these cases, negotiations were the result of two key factors—rising political and psychological costs, and the influence of key leaders. Although the Palestinians failed to gain statehood, they did achieve political and social progress. Though, sometimes irregulars cannot force negotiations, as in Rhodesian and El Salvador. Such circumstances require international intervention.

When irregulars cannot force their adversaries to negotiate, they must rely on the international community to compel or coerce them to the table. In these situations, irregulars must carefully bring attention to their cause without demonizing themselves. Essentially, to win the battle of the narrative, the irregular must challenge their adversary’s legitimacy without exceeding the threshold of violence set by their adversary.

²²³ Mitchell Reiss, *Negotiating with Evil: When to Talk to Terrorists* (New York: Open Road Integrated Media, 2010), 222.

²²⁴ *Ibid.*, 233–239. Reiss argues that negotiating presents several challenges—governments need to ensure they have the requisite support from their military, their police forces, and from domestic political parties before entering into negotiations or divergent factions will sabotage any proposed deal. The same is true for the irregular; if all parties are not in agreement, the deal will not be honored, and it may cause a split in the group with the emergence of a more radical faction. Additionally, Negotiations are often loathed; doing so is thought to be a slippery slope and rewarding bad behavior. And when commitment is high, the strong and the weak both tend to pursue total goals that preclude them from considering negotiations in the first place. Because of this, Reiss notes that a strong leader is a prerequisite. Negotiations require a “Gerry Adams,” or someone “who can imagine an end to the armed struggle, who has the physical and moral courage to pursue that path, who has won the respect of this comrades in the movement, who can speak with authority and act with discretion, and perhaps most important, who can bring his people along, whether by persuasion, intimidation, or force.”

As in El Salvador, the FMLN and the government were equally brutal, so the international community intervened in the interest of human rights. Although neither side won or lost definitively, the irregulars were successful in bringing about political and social reforms. Thus, this becomes a perception issue for the irregulars; with modern technology and increased access to information, irregulars can succeed by controlling the narrative to create international pressure on their adversary.

The late Cold War era also witnessed the rise of terrorism as more than a control mechanism. Terrorism is not a new tool; it has been used for millennia to induce fear and subjugate the weak. During this period though, irregulars learned to employ it as a strategy to defeat the strong. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the Colombian conflict, the Irish Troubles, and the Salvadoran Civil War are all cases in which irregulars employed terrorism as a strategy to avoid their opponents strengths and compensate for their capability and resource shortfalls. The Palestinians successfully bombed buses and used suicide vests to reduce their exposure to Israeli Defense Forces while simultaneously wearing down the Israeli populations' will to fight. Similarly, the PIRA used terrorist attacks and car bombs in Northern Ireland and London to raise the political and psychological costs of the war. Although, as the FARC and FMLN demonstrate, terrorism is limiting; it can undermine an actor's legitimacy and reduced support for their cause.

3. Explaining Why Irregulars Won

Asymmetry of motivations existed in only two of the six conflicts reviewed in the mid-to late-Cold War period. As these cases reveal, the majority of the irregular wars during this period were internal conflicts defined by symmetrical motivations. Irregulars only prevailed as a result of asymmetrical motivations in one of the six conflicts reviewed during this period. Conversely, irregulars succeeded twice when motivations were symmetrical. Ultimately, these cases indicate that the irregulars that prevailed during this period were able to evade their adversaries, increase the costs of the war, and prolong the conflict to erode their opponent's will to fight. As a result, external support was not only

necessary but had to be sufficient for irregulars to survive before they could compel and convince their adversaries to negotiate.

The cases in this period indicate that irregulars require sufficient external support and access to safe havens to evade their adversaries and prolong the conflict. Additionally, the irregulars that ultimately succeeded during this period often employed a political strategy to coerce or compel their adversary or gained international support or assistance to do so. Put differently, irregulars that persisted politically when it was unreasonable or impossible to persist militarily convinced enough adversarial and neutral parties to shift their support in favor of ending the conflict. In other words, the irregulars wore down their opponent's political will to fight or gained social or political concessions from negotiations.

Several Cold War era conflicts, such as the Colombian conflict, Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and the Irish Troubles, continued on after the fall of the Soviet Union. These conflicts evolved with the changes in the geopolitical landscape. Additionally, a new threat, which will define the post-Cold War period, emerged from the ashes of the Soviet-Afghan War. Al-Qaeda and global jihad are a product of the Cold War period and altered the nature of irregular warfare between the West and religiously motivated terrorists and irregulars. Additionally, significant changes in the way information is disseminated and received began to alter the dynamics of irregular warfare. Therefore, the next chapter will assess irregular conflicts in the post-Cold War period to assess these emerging trends and their impact on motivations and the outcomes of irregular warfare.

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V. IRREGULAR WARFARE IN THE POST-COLD WAR PERIOD

The end of the Cold War in 1991 dramatically changed the geopolitical landscape. Just as the damage wrought by WWII helped usher in an era of anti-colonial irregular warfare after 1945, the end of the Cold War and the breakup of the Soviet Union dramatically influenced the rise of a fresh wave of irregular warfare, particularly in the former Soviet States.²²⁵ Furthermore, although leftist ideology continued to inspire the weak, the post-Cold War era has been mostly influenced by ethnic, racial, and religious tensions between, and within civilizations.²²⁶ In other words, convergence and complexity define this period as globalization promotes and enables increased flows of information and ideas, and population levels and density continue to increase amid more competition for resources.²²⁷

The post-Cold War era has also been heavily influenced by the United States. Furthermore, the rise and influence of international and regional institutions also characterized this period.²²⁸ These two factors have changed the manner in which states compete with each other, and the way states employ or influence irregular conflicts to further their interests. Put differently, as the costs and risks of conventional warfare have increased, states are more reliant on indirect means and more nuanced uses of force to

²²⁵ Richard H. Shultz and Andrea J. Dew, *Insurgents, Terrorists, and Militias: The Warriors of Contemporary Combat* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006), 259. “The cold war gave way to a decade of bloody internal wars, with transnational dimensions, that pitted non-state armed groups against the military forces of modern nation states. Insurgents, terrorists, militias, and criminal organizations, in large measure, were the product of weak and failing states.”

²²⁶ Max Boot, “The Evolution of Irregular War,” *Foreign Affairs* March/April 2013, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2013-02-05/evolution-irregular-war>.

²²⁷ Frank G. Hoffman, “Hybrid Warfare and Challenges,” *Joint Force Quarterly* 52, no. 1st Quarter (2009): 34. “Complexity has been extended by globalization, the proliferation of advanced technology, violent transnational extremists, and resurgent powers.” Contemporary irregular conflicts are “best characterized by convergence. This includes the convergence of the physical and psychological, the kinetic and non-kinetic, and combatants and noncombatants. So, too, we see the convergence of military force and the interagency community, of states and non-state actors, and of the capabilities they are armed with. Of greatest relevance are the converging modes of war. What once might have been distinct operational types or categorizations among terrorism and conventional, criminal, and irregular warfare have less utility today.”

²²⁸ Richard H. Shultz and Andrea J. Dew, *Insurgents, Terrorists, and Militias*, 11.

achieve their goals. As a result, irregular warfare is occurring more frequently as states increasingly use proxies to compete with one another in a multi-polar world without placing all of their resources and political capital on the line, and to avoid escalation or third-party intervention.²²⁹

Irregular conflicts are now more often multidimensional chess matches between non-state actors, criminal organizations, states, surrogate forces, proto-states, states, and regional and international forces.²³⁰ In particular, revolutionary jihadi groups define this period; after the collapse of the Soviet Union, many of these groups took up arms and found their way into regional conflicts such as the Chechen Wars and the 2003 Iraq war.²³¹ These organizations have proved more difficult to defeat as they are often decentralized, networked, not confined by borders nor loyal to any one state, and unconstrained by international law or any moral or ethical standard.²³² What is more, the Internet has enabled irregulars more than any other technological development in recent history, perhaps not since the AK-47 nearly seventy years ago.²³³ Irregulars can now influence and shape the opinions of larger audiences, recruit among wider populations, raise funds anonymously, and engage in cyber warfare. Finally, many contemporary

²²⁹ Yelena Biberman and Orr Genish, “The Problem with Proxies: Ideology Is No Substitute for Operational Control,” *Small Wars Journal*, September 27, 2015, http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/the-problem-with-proxies-ideology-is-no-substitute-for-operational-control?utm_source=twitterfeed&utm_medium=twitter. xiv. Proxies, surrogates, and mercenaries are a common feature of irregular warfare throughout history, especially during the Cold War era. Andrew Mumford, “Proxy Warfare and the Future of Conflict,” *The RUSI Journal* 158, no. 2 (April 2013): 40–46, doi:10.1080/03071847.2013.787733, 40.

²³⁰ Richard H. Shultz and Andrea J. Dew, *Insurgents, Terrorists, and Militias*, 261-263.

²³¹ Max Boot, “The Evolution of Irregular War,” *Foreign Affairs* March/April 2013, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2013-02-05/evolution-irregular-war>. The period after 2001 is defined by the rise of radical religiously motivated insurgencies. Though radical Islam’s roots can actually be traced back to the 1916 Sykes-Picot agreement, and later, the 1979 Iranian revolution. Over the last twenty to thirty years, Sufism, Wahhabism, and Salafi Jihadism have spread amongst the marginalized, disenfranchised, and oppressed. But, not all Muslims subscribe to this ideology and many Muslims fall victim to radical Islamic violence as much as Westerners and “apostates” do. More importantly, the 2011 Arab Spring and Color Revolutions indicate that Social Movements can exact more constructive and lasting change without having to resort to terrorism and sectarian violence.

²³² Richard H. Shultz and Andrea J. Dew, *Insurgents, Terrorists, and Militias*, 263.

²³³ Ibid., 268–9. M. Kalb and C. Saivetz, “The Israeli--Hezbollah War of 2006: The Media as a Weapon in Asymmetrical Conflict,” *The Harvard International Journal of Press/Politics* 12, no. 3 (July 1, 2007): 43–66, doi:10.1177/1081180X07303934, 44.

irregulars are no longer limited to the tools or strategies of the weak.²³⁴ As technology becomes more accessible and modern weapons more available, irregulars are increasingly blending conventional and irregular warfare, confounding the nature of the conflict, the actors involved, and their goals and intentions.²³⁵ In effect, this phenomenon has fundamentally changed “asymmetries” in irregular warfare; the weak are less disadvantaged and better able to compete against the strong in this contemporary period.

This chapter evaluates several irregular conflicts from the post-Cold War era. The chapter assesses the irregular’s commitment to determine the presence and influence of asymmetric motivations. Additionally, this chapter considers what factors have most influenced each conflict and how and why irregulars have succeeded or failed.

A. THE FINAL PERIOD OF THE IRISH TROUBLES: 1991–1998

As the Berlin Wall fell, asymmetries of motivation remained between the PIRA who were totally committed and the British, who were limitedly committed to fighting over Northern Ireland. The PIRA’s commitment increased, along with their terrorist activity, after the Republicans failed to make progress in brokering a deal with the British and the Loyalists. As evidence of this, the PIRA detonated several bombs, weighing two hundred to one thousand pounds, throughout Belfast.²³⁶ The PIRA also continued their terror campaign in London, causing over eight hundred million pounds (approximately \$1.2 billion dollars in 1994) in damage to the Baltic Exchange in London’s Financial District with one bomb alone.²³⁷

²³⁴ Ibid., 264–266.

²³⁵ Ibid., 36–37. Frank G. Hoffman defines Hybrid Threats as those that “incorporate the full range of modes of warfare, including conventional capabilities, irregular tactics, and formations, terrorist acts that include indiscriminate violence and coercion, and criminal disorder.” In contrast to this, compound war “Occurs when a significant degree of strategic coordination takes place between separate regular and irregular forces in conflicts.” An example of a compound war is Vietnam while a Hezbollah best defines a Hybrid threat.

²³⁶ Marie-Therese Fay, Mike Morrissey, and Marie Smyth, *Northern Ireland’s Troubles: The Human Costs, Contemporary Irish Studies* (Sterling, VA: Pluto Press in association with The Cost of the Troubles Study, 1999), 41.

²³⁷ T. G. Fraser, *Ireland in Conflict, 1922–1998*, Lancaster Pamphlets (New York: Routledge, 2000), 69.

Britain's commitment declined in the wake of these bombings. Recognizing this, Gerry Adams' renewed Sinn Fein's effort to seek a political solution. In a July 1993 press release, Adams stated that the Republicans: would be open to joint authority in Ireland; desired a peaceful resolution; and called on the PIRA to end their violence.²³⁸ This prompted the British government to issue the Downing Street Declaration later that fall, affirming that they had no strategic or economic interests in Northern Ireland and would support self-determination in Northern Ireland based on the will of the majority.²³⁹ In other words, as a result of PIRA's terrorist activity, Sinn Fein was able to move the British back to the negotiating table; the Troubles had become too politically and psychologically costly, decreasing Britain's commitment and will to continue the fight.

Under significant pressure from the Irish-American lobby and Irish-allies within his campaign, Bill Clinton made several promises during his campaign to address the conflict in Northern Ireland.²⁴⁰ As a result, his election in 1992 brought increased pressure on the British and the Loyalists to negotiate with the Republicans.²⁴¹ Eventually, as the Clinton administration became more involved, and as the British acknowledged Northern Ireland's right to self-determination, the PIRA's prospects of uniting Ireland

²³⁸ Paul Bew, *Ireland: The Politics of Enmity, 1789–2006* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 540.

²³⁹ Fay, Morrissey, and Smyth, *Northern Ireland's Troubles*, 64; Fraser, *Ireland in Conflict, 1922–1998*, 71.

²⁴⁰ Roger MacGinty, "American Influences on the Northern Ireland Peace Process," *The Journal of Conflict Studies* XVII, no. 2 (Fall 1997), <https://journals.lib.unb.ca/index.php/JCS/article/view/11750/12521>. "A Cold War driven 'special relationship' with Britain meant that successive US administrations were happy to regard Northern Ireland as an internal affair for the United Kingdom. This was a view which British governments, and Northern Ireland's unionists, whole-heartedly supported. Nor did the Republic of Ireland, a communist free zone, require much attention. Ireland had tried to encourage the United States to mediate on the Irish partition issue in return for neutral Ireland joining NATO in 1949. The United States flatly rejected the offer." "In April 1992, when contesting the New York primaries, he promised he would grant a US entry-visa to Gerry Adams and appoint a peace envoy to Northern Ireland." Clinton eventually honored this promise, granting Adams a special visa in 1993. Beyond honoring his commitment and appeasing the Irish-American lobby, Clinton also had economic reasons to get involved and a desire to attach himself of a notable foreign policy issue in the wake of historic collapse of the Berlin Wall.

²⁴¹ Fay, Morrissey, and Smyth, *Northern Ireland's Troubles*, 64. Clinton appointed Jean Kennedy-Smith (President John F. Kennedy's sister) as the U.S. Ambassador to the Republic of Ireland in 1993.

increased thereby decreasing their overall commitment and motivation to fight. Thus, the PIRA announced a widespread historical cease-fire in 1994 to facilitate negotiations.²⁴²

The PIRA's commitment and motivation continued to decline as the Clinton administration increased their efforts to negotiate peace.²⁴³ In turn, Britain released their 1995 Framework for the Future.²⁴⁴ These documents set an agenda for political discussions and suggested a political structure for a new government in Northern Ireland.²⁴⁵ Still, three issues plagued further progress: the PIRA saw disarming as "tantamount to surrender"; the British refused to allow Sinn Fein to participate in negotiations; and the Loyalists refused to stop inciting Protestant-Catholic tensions with their parades in Northern Ireland.²⁴⁶ As a result, in 1996, bombs exploded in London and Manchester, ending the ceasefire between the PIRA and the British.²⁴⁷

Internal fractures began to emerge within the PIRA, and the organization split between those that wanted to pursue a political solution and those that remained committed to the armed struggle. This resulted in the formation of the Real IRA by a small faction that remained committed to the fight.²⁴⁸ Meanwhile, the rest of the parties involved had lost the will to fight. With the aid of U.S. Senator George Mitchell, the British and Irish governments, and the Loyalists and the Republicans brokered a deal on Good Friday, 17 April 1998, paving the way for a long reconciliation process that would

²⁴² Ibid., 64.

²⁴³ Ibid., 43–46, 64. President Clinton invited Gerry Adams to the White House as a guest of the President for Saint Patrick's Day in 1995. President Clinton followed this up with a trip to Northern Ireland; making a historical first visit to Northern Ireland by a sitting U.S. president.

²⁴⁴ Ibid., 64.

²⁴⁵ Fraser, *Ireland in Conflict, 1922–1998*, 73.

²⁴⁶ Ibid., 73.

²⁴⁷ Fay, Morrissey, and Smyth, *Northern Ireland's Troubles*, 46–47.

²⁴⁸ Ibid., 48.

often be marred by low level PIRA and RIRA paramilitary activity and sporadic bombings.²⁴⁹

The PIRA helped bring the British back to the negotiating table by increasing the political and psychological cost of the war for the British. Although it was the political efforts of Sinn Fein and the United States that convinced the PIRA to stop fighting which enabled the negotiations to succeed. Therefore, this conflict ended in a draw. The Republicans failed to unite Ireland, but they did gain significant political concessions that led to less persecution and more inclusion of Catholics in Northern Ireland's government and security forces.²⁵⁰ Similarly, Loyalists lost some control in Northern Ireland but were afforded the opportunity to choose their future, and the majority voted to remain part of the United Kingdom.

The lessons from this are three-fold. First, even though the majority of the PIRA lost the will to fight, some members remained committed and chose to continue the struggle. Thus, some participants may continue the fight on their own or form a new organization altogether if their parent organization demobilizes or agrees to stop fighting. Second, as is often the case for irregulars, success can be achieved from a stalemate. Finally, as long as an asymmetry of motivations existed, the PIRA would have kept fighting the British until they ran out of resources or the British left on their volition. Though, once commitment and motivations became symmetric, negotiations and a political solution were possible. This indicates that symmetry may be more important in explaining irregular success than asymmetry of motivations when conflicts are stalled.

²⁴⁹ Ibid., 65; Polk, *Violent Politics: A History of Insurgency, Terrorism, and Guerrilla Warfare, from the American Revolution to Iraq*, 70. Senator George Mitchell was instrumental in convincing the United Kingdom to negotiate with Sinn Fein. At the same time, Sinn Fein's political leadership, namely Gerry Adams, was responsible for bringing the PIRA to adhere to the ceasefire and negotiate with the Loyalists and the British. Bew, *Ireland*, 547. The parties agreed that the Republic of Ireland would withdraw their territorial claim to Northern Ireland, to the establishment of cross-border bodies with executive powers, and a Northern Ireland assembly with power sharing and the early release of paramilitary prisoners.

²⁵⁰ Ibid., 564.

B. THE FIRST AND SECOND CHECHEN WARS: 1994–1996 AND 1999–2009

Inspired by the policies of Russian President Mikhail Gorbachev, Chechnya emerged from the Cold War with hope for peace and self-determination. More specifically, after two centuries of Moscow's rule, the Chechens had become totally committed and motivated to achieve their independence.²⁵¹ Therefore, as the Soviet Union dissolved in 1991, Chechnya declared its independence and elected Jokhar Dudayev as the Chechen Republic's first president.²⁵²

Unfortunately, Gorbachev's successor, President Boris Yeltsin, was not as inclined to let Chechnya secede from the Russian Federation. To deter other former Soviet states from following suit, Yeltsin tried to bring Chechnya back under Moscow's control with a limited covert action program.²⁵³ When this failed, in 1994 Yeltsin authorized a minimal deployment of soldiers with air and artillery support to retake Grozny, Chechnya's capital.²⁵⁴ Therefore an asymmetry of motivations existed—Russia was limitedly committed while the Chechens were totally committed.

Conflict, criminal violence, and economic hardship define post-Cold War Chechnya.²⁵⁵ The Chechen Wars are often distinguished between three time periods: the First Chechen war between 1994 and 1996, the Second Chechen War between 1999 and 2000, and the insurgency in Chechnya that continued until 2009, with isolated events still

²⁵¹ Ibid., 106. Chechens have a lot of hatred for Russia “as a result of two hundred years of dogged resistance to Moscow's rule.”

²⁵² Shultz and Dew, *Insurgents, Terrorists, and Militias*, 122–123.

²⁵³ Ibid., 103, 123. Russia's goal was to “bring the breakaway region of Chechnya back under Moscow's authority.” John Arquilla, *Insurgents, Raiders, and Bandits How Masters of Irregular Warfare Have Shaped Our World* (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2011), <http://public.eblib.com/choice/publicfullrecord.aspx?p=680361>, 255. “If Chechnya ever escaped Moscow's gravitational pull, other non-Russian republics within the federation were sure to follow.”

²⁵⁴ Ibid., 103; Olga Oliker, *Russia's Chechen Wars, 1994-2000: Lessons from Urban Combat* (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 2001), 47. “Russian commanders instructed their subordinates not to expect a fight.” “General Grachev personally briefed the plan for the capture of Grozny. It consisted of three stages: Stage I would begin on November 29, 1994, and be over by December 6 (eight days)”

²⁵⁵ Shultz and Dew, *Insurgents, Terrorists, and Militias*, 123. By 1994, Chechnya was falling apart—it had become a “gangster state” controlled by the Mafiosi.

taking place today. Throughout all of these periods, the Chechens have lived up to their reputation as fiercely capable and committed irregular mountain warriors.²⁵⁶

First, in 1994, the Chechens' total commitment and motivation were evident as they fiercely defended their capital from the Russian invaders and made quick work of the unprepared and ill-trained Russian armor units.²⁵⁷ Russia responded with relentless artillery and air bombardments, but they failed to reduce the Chechen rebels' commitment and motivation.²⁵⁸ As Grozny was reduced to rubble, the Chechen rebels returned to the countryside and the surrounding mountains where the urban fight became a village war.²⁵⁹ Although, Russia's casualties in Grozny had an inverse effect on their commitment; as Russia's military suffered more losses, the Russian government became more committed and motivated to fight.

Throughout 1995 and 1996, the Chechen rebels slowly chipped away at Russia's commitment and motivation on two fronts. Fueled by Wahhabism, Shamil Basayev's rebels conducted several high-profile terrorist attacks deep in Russian territory.²⁶⁰ Opposite Basayev, Maskhadov's guerrillas, inspired mostly by nationalism and tribalism,

²⁵⁶ Ibid., 106. Dew and Shultz argue that the Chechens had a warrior culture and were fierce mountain guerrillas with social, ethnic, and religious foundations bound through clan loyalties, deep-seated family ties, and Sufi Islamic principles. Arquilla, *Insurgents, Raiders, and Bandits How Masters of Irregular Warfare Have Shaped Our World*, 254. [The Chechens] "were among the best natural fighters in the world."

²⁵⁷ Ibid., 103. The Russian army was made up of conscripts and had no concept of urban warfare or counterinsurgency operations.

²⁵⁸ Ibid., 104–105. The Russians responded to their 1994 defeat in Grozny with a massive artillery barrage; 27,000 noncombatants were killed.

²⁵⁹ Ibid., 107, 126. The Chechen warrior culture was centered on the traditional village organization. When the irregulars were forced out of Grozny, they naturally reconsolidated and reorganized around familiar village defense groups. This enabled them to attack the Russians behind their lines and sustain themselves in the midst of Russian occupation. Unfortunately, the Russians did not understand Chechen culture or the way the villages were organized and how this structure was enabling them to survive and continue the fight against the superior Russian force.

²⁶⁰ Ibid., 127–128. Afghan-Soviet war veterans and Arabs came to help their Muslim brothers defeat the Russians. Arquilla, *Insurgents, Raiders, and Bandits How Masters of Irregular Warfare Have Shaped Our World*, 259–261. Basayev started a trend of hostage taking, terrorism, and spectacular attacks in Russian territory. His first attack in Budennovsk was a blunder-turned success. Later efforts to replicate this success failed in Dagestan, though the rebels did go on to seize the ferry *Eurasia* and hijack a Turkish Cypriot airliner.

set out to retake Grozny with a swarm of small-unit strikes.²⁶¹ After Maskhadov succeeded in holding Grozny in 1996, Russian motivation and commitment collapsed as the political and psychological costs became too great for President Yeltsin.²⁶² Although, as the Russian Army withdrew in 1996, any semblance of peace in Chechnya was lost as rebel leaders vied for power.²⁶³

Ultimately, the Russians lost the first Chechen war as a result of asymmetry of motivations. Specifically, the Russians lost the will to fight and became less committed than the Chechens who remained totally committed through the end. The Chechens accomplished this by extending their terrorist attacks into Russia to increase fractures between the Russian population and their government. Additionally, the media also had a significant influence on shaping Russian perceptions on the war. These two factors raised the political and psychological costs for President Yeltsin and compelled him to pull the Russian army out of Chechnya. Though, this was only temporary; the Russians had not completely lost the will to fight and remained limitedly committed to taking back Chechnya.

²⁶¹ Ibid., 130. The Chechen rebels recaptured Grozny on August 6, 1996. Arquilla, *Insurgents, Raiders, and Bandits How Masters of Irregular Warfare Have Shaped Our World*, 258, 261. “An invading army comprised of big, balky formations was beaten by forces just over a tenth their size—and with no air support—because the defenders had broken themselves into small teams of no more than a dozen or so each, fanned out across the city, and swarmed the enemy in a series of simultaneous attacks from all directions.” “Maskhadov launched a campaign that looked much like Vo Nguyen Giap’s Tet 1968 Tet offensive, in that he ordered attacks throughout the country, from the mountains to the plains, from rural to urban areas. It was a strategic swarm.”

²⁶² Ibid., 131. While running for reelection, President Yeltsin had told the Russian people that Moscow was winning the war in Chechnya. When Grozny fell to the rebels and the Russians failed to retake it, Yeltsin was forced to look for a way out. Negotiations occurred in October through November of, resulting in the withdrawal of Russian troops. As the war ended, an estimated 100,000 Chechens had died, 240,000 were injured, and 500,000 Chechens were displaced.

²⁶³ Oliker, *Russia’s Chechen Wars, 1994-2000*, 6–7. “The three years of quasi independence in Chechnya from September 1996 to September 1999 were marred by warlordism, rampant criminality, hostage-takings, chaotic violence, grisly attacks on foreign aid workers, and general lawlessness.” “Maskhadov was unable to suppress Basayev’s and Hattab’s forces, and the power of warlords, criminal gangs, and Islamic extremists (including foreign terrorists) increased. The Islamic fundamentalists set up terrorist training camps in Chechnya and recruited aspiring jihadists (holy warriors) from all over southern Russia and Central Asia, giving them military training as well as political and religious indoctrination.” Shultz and Dew, *Insurgents, Terrorists, and Militias*, 132. After 1996, Chechnya fell apart as Chechen commanders competed for control, Wahhabism spread, and organized crime and corruption destabilized Chechnya’s government and economy.

Basayev's terror campaign and the growth of Islamic fundamentalism gave Putin the justification he needed to bring Chechnya back into the fold and retake Grozny.²⁶⁴ The Russian army returned with renewed commitment and new tactics based on the lessons they learned from their previous failures in Chechnya.²⁶⁵ As a result, Grozny quickly fell and Russia established direct rule over Chechnya in 2000. Still, Basayev and Maskhadov remained committed and each continued their operations; Basayev and his Muslim warriors conducted terrorist attacks and suicide bombings while Maskhadov adopted new guerrilla warfare tactics, using IED's, snipers, and helicopter traps to contest Russian control in Chechnya.²⁶⁶ It was only after Maskhadov's death in 2005 and Basayev's death a year later that the rebels' commitment decreased and many rebels lost the will to fight.²⁶⁷

In the end, Russia defeated the Chechen rebels in the Second Chechen War politically and militarily despite an asymmetry of motivations. The Russians accomplished this in part, by restricting and censoring the media to isolate the Russian

²⁶⁴ John Arquilla, *Insurgents, Raiders, and Bandits How Masters of Irregular Warfare Have Shaped Our World*, 262–263. Moscow never lost their desire to retake Chechnya and rising Muslim militancy gave the justification to renew the struggle—this time a “war on terror” that had widespread support of the Russian population. Shultz and Dew, *Insurgents, Terrorists, and Militias*, 132–134. Basayev and 500 Chechen rebels infiltrated Dagestan to establish an Islamic state on August 7, 1999. Moscow responded with a massive bombing campaign and the deployment of 50,000 soldiers that had focused on training urban and counterinsurgency warfare. The Russians operated in small teams and used Special Forces to draw the rebels out so they Russian army could call in airstrikes and artillery on their positions. The Russians also established free-fire zones as the British did in Malaya and the French did in Algeria.

²⁶⁵ Max Boot, *Invisible Armies: An Epic History of Guerrilla Warfare from Ancient Times to the Present*, 1st ed. (New York, NY: Norton, 2013), 514.

²⁶⁶ Arquilla, *Insurgents, Raiders, and Bandits How Masters of Irregular Warfare Have Shaped Our World*, 264. Basayev used Black Widows, female suicide bombers whose husbands had been killed by Russian soldiers during the fighting in Grozny. These terrorist raids into Russia galvanized Russian popular support for Moscow's war in Chechnya.

²⁶⁷ John Arquilla, *Insurgents, Raiders, and Bandits How Masters of Irregular Warfare Have Shaped Our World*, 265. “[T]he impact of his [Maskhadov's] death “cut deeply into the Chechens' morale and weakened the spirit of resistance.”

people from the conflict.²⁶⁸ This indicates that the Russians were keenly aware of the impact of popular opinion and the need to insulate the Russian population from the realities of war. In turn, the Russians were able to control the flow of information and convince the Russian people that the Chechen Rebels were merely radical Islamic terrorists intent on killing Russian citizens. This provided the Russians with great freedom of action, enabling them to apply a level of brutality, violence, and destruction seldom seen in the modern age—with the exception of few destructive and devastating conflicts such as the Second Congo War.²⁶⁹ Thus, although they were limitedly committed, Russia’s willingness to use excessive force enabled them to isolate and exterminate the rebels by reducing the country to rubble.²⁷⁰ Nonetheless, sporadic fighting continues, as some Chechen mountain guerrillas remain committed to one day driving the Russians out of Chechnya once and for all.²⁷¹

C. THE COLOMBIAN CONFLICT: 1991 TO PRESENT

As the Colombian conflict emerged from the Cold War, the possibility of peace in Colombia remained dark and distant. Simply put, the irregulars and the Colombian Government each remained fully committed and failed to agree on a path toward peace.

²⁶⁸ Oliker, *Russia’s Chechen Wars, 1994-2000*, 128. “Whereas in 1994–1996 journalists had enjoyed unimpeded access to the soldiers, the front lines, and especially to the Chechen resistance, in 1999–2000 the Russian government implemented a strict system of accreditation and escorts. At times there was a complete ban on reporters in Grozny or anywhere near Russian military forces. Furthermore, while in the previous campaign there had been little effort by the Russians to “spin” the story that emerged from the conflict (in sharp contrast to the effective information campaign of the guerrillas), this time the situation was reversed. Instead of interviews with rebel leaders occupying Russia’s front pages, Russian commanders and soldiers told what was largely a positive story of their success against a “terrorist” enemy.”

²⁶⁹ Ibid., 10. “Russian troops have engaged in widespread torture, rape, forced disappearances, mass arrest operations, kidnapping, and summary executions. Far from seeking to rectify these abuses, commanding officers frequently have condoned them or turned a blind eye.,” Boot, *Invisible Armies*. 514. An estimated 100,000 Chechens were killed out of a population of one million. This showed that a “brutal approach could work as long as the counterinsurgents did not care about world opinion and were operating on their home soil, where they enjoyed a de facto level of legitimacy.”

²⁷⁰ Oliker, *Russia’s Chechen Wars, 1994-2000*, 6. “Huge swaths of Chechnya were destroyed during the 1994–96 war, and promises of large-scale reconstruction aid from Moscow never materialized...Further destruction occurred in 1999–2000, rendering many towns, including Grozny, almost uninhabitable.”

²⁷¹ John Arquilla, *Insurgents, Raiders, and Bandits How Masters of Irregular Warfare Have Shaped Our World*, 266.

The CGSB demanded political and economic reform, while the Colombian Government refused any conditions on top of guerrillas' demobilization. Consequently, the FARC resumed their political and military efforts with renewed vigor following the eighth FARC conference and the dissolution of the CGSB in 1993.²⁷²

This period of the Colombian conflict was also shaped by the United States' War on Drugs, the rise of the AUC, and Plan Colombia.²⁷³ As the FARC continued to struggle for control, they became increasingly reliant on the drug trade to fund and sustain the fight against the Colombian military and the AUC. As a result, by the 1990s, the FARC's motivation and commitment had increased significantly as their numbers swelled to over 18,000 fighters and their control extended to over half of the municipalities in Colombia.²⁷⁴ Although, the FARC's commitment and motivation decreased as they became increasingly disconnected from the population; the FARC became viewed more as criminals and narco-traffickers and less as an irregular group fighting for political and social change.²⁷⁵ On top of this, the U.S. government's Plan Colombia injected tens of millions of dollars into the Colombian government to boost its economy, neutralize the FARC, and counter the drug trade.²⁷⁶ This increased the Colombian government and military's commitment and motivation while decreasing the FARC's commitment and freedom of maneuver.

The September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks had a significant impact on the Colombian conflict. Within several months of al-Qaeda's attack in New York City, the

²⁷² Garry M. Leech, *The FARC: The Longest Insurgency, Rebels* (New York: NY: Fernwood; Zed Books Ltd.; Distributed in the USA exclusively by Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 35.

²⁷³ Phillips, "Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias De Colombia – FARC," 20–21. Colombia's right-wing paramilitaries were often referred to as autodefensas. These groups formed organically and with the aid of the government to counter the left-wing irregulars. Over the years, several groups united under a single organization, the Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC) or "United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia.

²⁷⁴ Leech, *The FARC*, 62–63.

²⁷⁵ Boot, *Invisible Armies*, 449.

²⁷⁶ Leech, *The FARC*, 80–84.

Bush administration moved to label the FARC as a terrorist group.²⁷⁷ This allowed the United States to increase its commitment to the Colombian government.²⁷⁸ In turn, this added support enabled President Alvaro Uribe's government to gain the initiative, forcing the irregulars to change their strategy from the offensive to the defensive.²⁷⁹ Though, internal government corruption and human rights abuses decreased the Colombian government's legitimacy and popular support.²⁸⁰ The Colombian military and the AUC's actions were as violent, if not more so, than the irregulars.²⁸¹ Over the years, this blurred the legitimacy of the government's cause and advanced the irregulars' recruitment and popular support in rural areas outside of government control. As a result, the Colombian government's commitment and motivation decreased while the FARC's increased.

The FARC have survived years of oppression as a result of favorable terrain and the financial benefits of the drug trade. Similarly, the U.S. equipped, trained, and advised

²⁷⁷ Leech, *The FARC*, 86,100. Secretary of State Colin Powell reported to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that the "FARC belonged to the same category as al-Qaeda." The Colombian government used the "terrorist label is a political weapon." This enabled the Colombian government to win the war of ideas and the battle of the narrative; they convinced the international community that the FARC were terrorists despite the fact that the Colombian military and the AUC used terrorism and violence.

²⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, 97. The U.S. government increased counterterrorism funding for Colombia and increased military aid and support. In particular, the U.S. Special Forces were sent to Colombia to train the Colombian military in counterinsurgency warfare.

²⁷⁹ Renwick, "Colombia's Civil Conflict;" Leech, *The FARC*, 139.

²⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, 90, 142–150. Human rights abuses worsened under President Uribe because he used indiscriminate military operations to achieve social control. An internal investigation also found that several senior Military Officers and Congressional politicians were in collusion with AUC and implicated in the murder of political opponents and opposition leaders. Additionally, several multinational corporations that conducted business in Colombia, such as Coca-Cola, Occidental Petroleum, and Drummond Mining paid the AUC to protect their infrastructure and business assets, resulting in several civilian deaths.

²⁸¹ Phillips, "*Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias De Colombia – FARC*," 20–21. The AUC mainly relied on the same tactics as the irregulars, using assassinations and terrorism to collect intelligence and to disrupt irregular support networks. Unlike the irregulars, the AUC had free reign; they lived and worked among the population. As a result, they are blamed for the majority of the casualties surrounding this conflict. Anonymous, "Journal of a Colombian Guerrillero," In *Guerrilla Strategies: An Historical Anthology from the Long March to Afghanistan*, ed. Gérard Chaliand, (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1982), 223. The Colombian Government used a criminal network to confuse the population and delegitimize the irregulars' cause. "They chose perverts, drug pushers, thieves who would steal from the devil and sell their own mother in the bargain. Many were ex-guerrillas who had become bandoleros. They got all this rabble together and formed the Barbados. ... The military authorities told them to let their beards and hair grown, in order to besmirch the symbol of the heroes of the Sierra: los Barbudos... And now they roam the region, sowing confusion by passing themselves off as guerrilleros."

Colombian military has become a capable and professional counterinsurgency force.²⁸² After fifty years of violence, war weariness has set in throughout Colombia, compelling Colombia's current President, Juan Manuel Santos to negotiate with the FARC.

This conflict spanned fifty-two years because the FARC and the Colombian government's commitment and motivation remained mostly symmetrical. Both the FARC and the Colombian government remained totally committed and motivated for the majority of the conflict. Now, after fifty-two years, the Colombian government and the FARC's commitment and will to fight have decreased and both are ready and willing to negotiate.

This case reinforces the importance of transformational leadership, like Gerry Adams, President Santos' is in a unique and historical position to establish peace in Colombia once and for all. Although, any mutually acceptable agreement is plagued by enmity that has built up over decades between the Colombian military, the AUC, the Colombian people, and the FARC.²⁸³ Despite this, the Colombian Government and the FARC have agreed to a new peace agreement in November 2016 after four years of negotiations.²⁸⁴ However, whether the Colombian Congress ratifies this agreement after

²⁸² Julia E. Sweig, "What Kind of War for Colombia?," *Foreign Affairs* September/October, no. 2002, <http://www.cfr.org/colombia/kind-war-colombia/p4737>.

²⁸³ Phillips, "*Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias De Colombia – FARC*," 48. Millions of people continue to protest against the FARC's violence. Boot, *Invisible Armies*, 447; Julia S. Cobb and Nicholas Casey, "Colombia Peace Deal Is Defeated, Leaving a Nation in Shock," *The New York Times*, October 2, 2016, Digital edition, http://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/03/world/colombia-peace-deal-defeat.html?_r=0. Over 50% of the Colombian population voted against the Colombian peace deal in a referendum in October 2016. "Too many Colombians who had endured years of kidnappings and killings by the rebels, the agreement was too lenient. It would have allowed most rank-and-file fighters to start lives as normal citizens, and rebel leaders to receive reduced sentences for war crimes." The majority of Colombians saw the agreement as too lenient because it would likely grant guerrilla fighters amnesty and those involved in war crimes would be granted trial by special tribunals "with reduced sentences, many of which were expected to involve years of community service work, like removing land mines once planted by the FARC." An estimated 220,000 people were killed during the Colombian conflict and six million were displaced.

²⁸⁴ "Colombian Peace Deal: Government and FARC Reach New Agreement," *BBC News*, November 13, 2016, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-37965392>. The terms of the new deal have not been made public. But both sides stated that the Colombian people's concerns were addressed and some of their demands were met.

the Colombian people rejected the last deal in October of 2016 is yet to be seen.²⁸⁵ Thus, this conflict remains unresolved as low-level violence continues to threaten the prospects of peace in Colombia.

D. ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN CONFLICT: 1991 TO PRESENT

The end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union changed the dynamics of the Middle East “superpower” rivalry.²⁸⁶ The United States facilitated peace talks in Washington, resulting in the 1993 Israel-PLO Peace Accord.²⁸⁷ This effectively ended the First Intifada, but it failed to address Palestinian statehood, the expansion of Israeli settlements, or the Palestinian refugee crisis.²⁸⁸ Regardless, these negotiations improved Palestinian commitment and motivation. Specifically, the 1993 Peace Accord led to the formation of the Palestinian Authority in 1994 and the end of twenty-seven years of Israeli occupation of Gaza and the Jericho pass.²⁸⁹ This increased the Palestinians motivation and commitment while signaling a decrease in Israel’s commitment and willingness, resulting in an asymmetry of motivation in the fight over the occupied territories.

Peace was fleeting in the Middle East as unresolved core grievances inflamed tensions in 2000, resulting in the Second Intifada. Unlike the First Intifada, this phase of the conflict was more violent. The Palestinian irregulars attacked Israelis and civilian

²⁸⁵ Ibid. Over fifty percent of the Colombian people voted against the deal made by President Santo and the FARC in the October 2, 2016 referendum. The Colombian people were angry that the deal was too lenient on the FARC.

²⁸⁶ Ian J Bickerton, *The Arab-Israeli Conflict: A History* (London: Reaktion Books, 2009), http://www.123library.org/book_details/?id=114239, 166.

²⁸⁷ Ibid., 169; Gregory Harms, *The Palestine-Israel Conflict: A Basic Introduction*, 2nd ed. (London: Pluto, 2008), 153–159. Harms and Ferry note that the Madrid Conference’s “symbolic significance outweighed its accomplishments.” Regardless, as the sole superpower, the Clinton Administration attempted to broker peace between Israel and the Palestinians throughout the 1990s. After the 1993 Oslo accords, Oslo II was held in 1996, the Hebron Agreement was made in 1997, and finally, the Why River Accord took place in 1998. President Bush continued this tradition with the Camp David Accords in the 2000s.

²⁸⁸ Bickerton, *The Arab-Israeli Conflict*, 170–172.

²⁸⁹ Ibid., 172–173.

infrastructure with small arms, rockets, and suicide attacks.²⁹⁰ Conversely, the IDF's response to the Second Intifada was more measured than the first; they focused on targeting terrorist leadership, isolating militants with a massive wall, and disrupting terrorist cells through intelligence operations and precision strikes.²⁹¹ The Second Intifada ended five years later in 2005 as internal friction intensified between Hamas and Fatah following Arafat's death.²⁹² This friction was the result of differences in commitment and motivation; while the PA desired to establish a secular political state, Hamas was intent on establishing Sharia Law and refused to recognize Israel.²⁹³ This friction eventually caused Hamas to split from Fatah in 2007, with Hamas in Gaza and Fatah in the West Bank.

Since the mid-2000s the Palestinian Authority has prevailed by engaging Israel politically. The PA has evolved from a social movement and militant organization to a full-fledged pseudo-government with non-member observer status in the UN and bureaucratic institutions that provide social services to the Palestinian people.²⁹⁴ As a result, the PA have separated themselves from terrorist activities, built international support for their cause, and boosted their credibility as the protector of the Palestinian people. Nevertheless, some hardliners, particularly in Hamas, remain highly motivated and committed to its struggle against Israel. As a result, periodic fighting has occurred, particularly in 2008 and 2014 as more rocket attacks were launched from the Gaza Strip into Israel.

The PA's success can be traced to their ability to adapt organizationally. As a result of Israel's superior resources and capabilities, the PA has learned how to exploit its external support networks to avoid repression and confrontation with Israel's defense forces. Additionally, the PA has succeeded in combining complex operations with

²⁹⁰ Harms, *The Palestine-Israel Conflict*, 171–173.

²⁹¹ *Ibid.*, 173–200.

²⁹² *Ibid.*, 201.

²⁹³ *Ibid.*, 206–207.

²⁹⁴ Boot, *Invisible Armies*, 476.

propaganda and psychological warfare for maximum effect.²⁹⁵ Finally, the PA has succeeded by politicizing and internationalizing their cause. This not only generated significant support for the Palestinian people but has also restrained Israel's use of force.

Despite the continued suffering and rising costs, both the Israelis and the Palestinians remain entrenched in their beliefs. As a result, this conflict endures; Israel continues to target irregular terrorist networks, leadership, and infrastructure to secure its' territory, while Hamas strives to counter Israel and reconcile with the PA and Fatah. In other words, this conflict is far from over. Though, Israel's war-weariness and their willingness to negotiate with the PA indicate that a solution may only be a few years off. Additionally, the international concern and support for peace in the Middle East continues to grow.²⁹⁶ Moving forward, though, it is unclear how this new dynamic will shape Israeli and Palestinian commitment and motivation to war and peace.

E. THE LEBANON WAR: JULY–AUGUST 2006

The 2006 Lebanon war was a unique irregular war between Israel and Hezbollah, particularly because Hezbollah is not a typical irregular or non-state actor. Hezbollah is a “state within a state” and a “transnational military and political organization receiving direction from external powers such as Iran and Syria.”²⁹⁷ In other words, Hezbollah provides services to the Lebanese population and serves as a de facto government in Southern Lebanon, but is not bound by international law, conventions, or state borders. Additionally, its fighters are trained in Iranian-based training camps and Lebanon by

²⁹⁵ Ibid., 462.

²⁹⁶ Emile Simpson, “Vladimir of Arabia: It's Not Just Syria: Russia Has Been Quietly Building Power throughout the Middle East – and Challenging America's Superpower Status,” *Foreign Policy*, November 2, 2016, Online edition, <http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/11/02/vladimir-of-arabia-putin-russia-middle-east/>. Since 2014, Russia has reemerged as an influential actor in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

²⁹⁷ George Emile Irani, “*Irregular Warfare and Non-State Combatants: Israel and Hezbollah*” (FRIDE, A European Think Tank for Global Action, October 26, 2007), <http://fride.org/publication/276/irregular-warfare-and-non-state-combatants:-israel-and-hezbollah, 2>; Kalb and Saivetz, “*The Israeli—Hezbollah War of 2006*,” 43. Hezbollah means “Party of God.” Paul Salem, “The Future of Lebanon,” *Council on Foreign Relations* 85, no. 6 (December 2009), 14-16. Hezbollah is a Shia group that was founded in the wake of the 1979 Iranian Islamic Revolution and Israel's 1982 invasion of Lebanon.

Iranian military trainers and advisors.²⁹⁸ Therefore, Hezbollah is much more capable than other regional irregulars such as Hamas; they can, and have employed conventional as well as unconventional strategy and tactics, and state of the art weapons against Israel.

Hezbollah launched Operation Waad al-Sadeq, or Honest Promise, to free Hezbollah members from an Israeli jail in July of 2006.²⁹⁹ In effect, Hezbollah was pursuing limited goals, so, their commitment and motivation was limited at first. Though, Hezbollah's commitment became total after the IDF's retaliatory airstrikes and incursion into Southern Lebanon. This change in Hezbollah's commitment is evident by the numbers of soldiers they lost and the number of rockets they fired; they employed everything they had against Israel.³⁰⁰ Furthermore, there is evidence that Nasrallah, Hezbollah's political, military, and spiritual leader, had planned and prepared for such an opportunity following Israel's initial withdrawal from Southern Lebanon in 2000.³⁰¹ This indicates that Hezbollah, a political organization within Lebanon, and a militant proxy of Iran, was totally motivated to defeat Israel.

²⁹⁸ Ron Schleifer, "Psyoping Hezbollah: The Israeli Psychological Warfare Campaign During the 2006 Lebanon War," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 21, no. 2 (March 31, 2009): 221–38, doi:10.1080/09546550802544847, 222.

²⁹⁹ Irani, "Irregular Warfare and Non-State Combatants: Israel and Hezbollah," 1; Kalb and Saivetz, "The Israeli—Hezbollah War of 2006," 46. Hezbollah's initial raid on 12 July resulted in three IDF killed and two captured.

³⁰⁰ Kalb and Saivetz, "The Israeli—Hezbollah War of 2006," 48. Hezbollah fired 3,970 Katyusha rockets and missiles at Israeli military and civilian targets in Northern Israel over the course of the 34-day war. Schleifer, "Psyoping Hezbollah," 221. Hezbollah was left with a military in shambles.; Stephen D. Biddle and Jeffrey Allan Friedman, *The 2006 Lebanon Campaign and the Future of Warfare: Implications for Army and Defense Policy* (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2008), 33. In 34 days of fighting, Israel lost 119 soldiers while Hezbollah had lost over six hundred of their 15,000 fighters.

³⁰¹ Irani, "Irregular Warfare and Non-State Combatants: Israel and Hezbollah," 1; Avi Kober, "The Israel Defense Forces in the Second Lebanon War: Why the Poor Performance?," *Journal of Strategic Studies* 31, no. 1 (February 2008): 3–40, doi:10.1080/01402390701785211. 46. Israel had withdrawn from southern Lebanon in 2000 after the United Nations mandated that Hezbollah would disarm. Hezbollah claimed victory when Israel left southern Lebanon but did not disarm and continued to receive support from Syria.

Israel responded to Hezbollah's initial rocket attack and raid with a large air campaign followed by a ground offensive into Southern Lebanon.³⁰² Though, this response was tempered by Israel's recent struggle against Hamas in Gaza; the Israeli military was exhausted, and the Israeli population was fearful of another protracted war.³⁰³ Furthermore, Israel's actions were restrained by the relationship between Lebanon and the United States, and because they wanted to avoid confrontation with Syria and Iran.³⁰⁴ Furthermore, despite the massive destruction of the Israeli airstrikes and artillery, the IDF mobilized a fraction of their forces and the Israeli government was careful to avoid escalation with the Lebanese. For these reasons, the Israelis were limitedly committed. Therefore, an asymmetry of motivations existed between Hezbollah and the Israelis' during the 2006 Lebanon War.

This conflict came on the heels of the Second Intifada and the IDF responded and fought Hezbollah as they did Hamas. Although, Hezbollah was not behaving as typical irregulars; they fought from prepared positions, defended ground, and used advanced weaponry and technology, such as anti-tank guided missiles and unmanned aerial vehicles.³⁰⁵ In other words, Hezbollah was fighting conventionally at times and unconventionally at others; there was a "blurring of conventional systems with irregular

³⁰² Boot, *Invisible Armies*, 510. The Israeli air force dropped over 12,000 bombs and missiles and the army and navy fired over 150,000 rockets and artillery into Lebanon. Israel also sent over 15,000 soldiers into Southern Lebanon to neutralize the Hezbollah rocket threat.

³⁰³ Efraim Inbar, "How Israel Bungled the Second Lebanon War," *The Middle East Quarterly*, no. Summer 2007, 57–65, 58.

³⁰⁴ Kober, "The Israel Defense Forces in the Second Lebanon War," 4.

³⁰⁵ Biddle and Friedman, *The 2006 Lebanon Campaign and the Future of Warfare*, xiii-5; Hoffman, "Hybrid Warfare and Challenges," 37. Hezbollah did not just conduct hit and run raids; they often held ground for several hours or days and had prepared defensive positions. Additionally, many wore uniforms, were well trained, demonstrated fire discipline, used prepared indirect fires and obstacles, and employed state of the art weaponry such as anti-tank guided missiles, night vision, and encrypted radios. At the same time though, Hezbollah was not acting like a purely like a conventional force; Boot, *Invisible Armies*. 511. Hezbollah fired a C-802 anti-ship missile that they acquired from Iran enabling them to strike an Israeli missile ship that was ten miles off the Lebanese coastline.

forces and nontraditional tactics.”³⁰⁶ This enabled Hezbollah to destroy several Israeli tanks and restrict the IDF’s freedom of maneuver with mined obstacles while they engaged from concealed positions within civilian buildings. Ultimately, this reduced Israel’s technical advantage, frustrated the Israeli government and military, and prevented the Israelis from achieving a decisive victory against the irregulars as they had in the past. Though, it did not reduce Israel’s commitment and motivation or compel them to quit.

By design, Hezbollah integrated its fighters into the civilian terrain and infrastructure, persuading domestic and international audiences that Israel bombed civilians and committed war crimes.³⁰⁷ To this end, Hezbollah used their media, the al-Manar TV station and al-Nour radio to shape domestic and regional perceptions of the war to maintain intrinsic motivation and commitment among the Lebanese people and the surrounding Arab community.³⁰⁸ Hezbollah also exploited new media to reach the international community; this became the first “live war” streamed or “broadcast via broadband.”³⁰⁹ This new media enabled Hezbollah to reinforce the narrative that Israel’s actions were “disproportionate,” unjustified, and immoral.³¹⁰ In effect, Hezbollah won the battle of the narrative and reduced Israel’s commitment and motivation by exploiting

³⁰⁶ Hoffman, “Hybrid Warfare and Challenges,” 36-37. Several authors such as Hoffman have made the claim that Hezbollah’s actions constitute a new form of warfare: Hybrid warfare. Hoffman argues that hybrid threats “incorporate the full range of modes of warfare, including conventional capabilities, irregular tactics and formations, terrorist acts that include indiscriminate violence and coercion, and criminal disorder.”

³⁰⁷ Kalb and Saivetz, “The Israeli--Hezbollah War of 2006,” 47; Biddle and Friedman, *The 2006 Lebanon Campaign and the Future of Warfare*, 43-44. Hezbollah used civilian infrastructure, but there is little evidence that they used civilians as shields during the war. Most civilians were evacuated before Hezbollah used civilian built up centers for cover and concealment. Nonetheless, Nasrallah spread rumors of civilian casualties and exaggerated damage reports to civilian infrastructure to reduce Israel’s legitimacy and build support for their cause. Boot, *Invisible Armies*, 511. “The turning point of the war was the July 30 Israel air strike on suspected Hezbollah positions in the town of Qana.” An apartment building was hit, killing several civilians. Hezbollah used this as propaganda to delegitimize Israel actions and increase international pressure to defeat them.

³⁰⁸ Thomas Rid and Marc Hecker, *War 2.0: Irregular Warfare in the Information Age* (Westport, CN: Praeger Security International, 2009), 155-157.

³⁰⁹ Kalb and Saivetz, “The Israeli--Hezbollah War of 2006,” 44, 56. Camera and computer are now weapons of war.

³¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 45.

their open society and the Internet to sow uncertainty, chaos, disorder, and frustration.³¹¹ Therefore, Hezbollah defeated Israel politically by destroying their legitimacy and by convincing the international community to compel and coerce Israel to leave Lebanon.

As is typical in irregular warfare, the Lebanese population in Southern Lebanon suffered the most as a result of this war.³¹² Hezbollah also suffered military setbacks.³¹³ Nonetheless, Nasrallah was quick to claim the 2006 Lebanon War a “divine victory.”³¹⁴ Hezbollah continued to advance this narrative to legitimize their cause, boost popular support, and increase their credibility as the defender of the Lebanese people against Israeli aggression.³¹⁵ Alternatively, this was a major political and psychological blow to Israel. They were humiliated; the IDF had failed to defeat Hezbollah, the Israeli air force was accused of war crimes, the Israeli population was discouraged, and the Israeli government was compelled by the international community to leave Lebanon for the second time.³¹⁶

In effect, Israel’s morale was low, but they remained committed and motivated and would have persisted were it not for the United Nations and international pressure from the United States and France. Therefore, Israel was not defeated militarily, but rather politically as a result of Hezbollah’s political and psychological warfare strategy

³¹¹ Ibid., 45–47, 56–7. The “convergence of high-tech gadgetry and populist journalism enriched by millions of bloggers...offering their opinions, influencing policy and public opinion, questioning decisions by officials, doubting the credibility of journalists, presenting commentaries as well as photographic evidence—in a nutshell, scrambling opinion with fact and affecting the course and conduct of a war.”

³¹² Salem, “The Future of Lebanon,” 18. Roughly 1,200 Lebanese civilians were killed, 4,000 were wounded, and over 150,000 Lebanese structures were destroyed.

³¹³ Kalb and Saivetz, “The Israeli--Hezbollah War of 2006,” 48; Schleifer, “Psyoping Hezbollah,” 221; Biddle and Friedman, *The 2006 Lebanon Campaign and the Future of Warfare*, 33; Salem, “The Future of Lebanon,” 18. Hezbollah also suffered militarily; “It had given up control of the area south of the Litani River to the Lebanese army and the UN force, and it has agreed to grant the Lebanese military control of Lebanese-Syrian border points—both very significant concessions.”

³¹⁴ Kalb and Saivetz, “The Israeli--Hezbollah War of 2006,” 48.

³¹⁵ Boot, *Invisible Armies*, 512. “Hezbollah emerged stronger from the second Lebanon war.” After the war, Hezbollah replenished their stockpile of missiles (40,000 compared to the 13,000 before the war) and repaired damage to civilian infrastructure to retain popular support. All of this was made possible by the Syrian and Iranian military and financial aid.

³¹⁶ Inbar, “How Israel Bungled the Second Lebanon War,” 62; Schleifer, “Psyoping Hezbollah,” 221; Kalb and Saivetz, “The Israeli--Hezbollah War of 2006,” 48. Lebanon, the United States, and France petitioned the UN to intervene and implement a ceasefire.

and their use of the media. In other words, Hezbollah remained committed and motivated through to the end while Israel lost the will to persist and was compelled to quit. Ultimately, Hezbollah prevailed as a result of the asymmetry of motivation that existed between them and the Israelis.

F. AL-QAEDA’S WAR AGAINST THE WEST: 1996–PRESENT

Al-Qaeda’s War against the West, the “far enemy,” began well before September 11, 2001. The departure of the Red Army from Afghanistan and the collapse of the Soviet Union left al-Qaeda without an enemy.³¹⁷ The 1990–1991 Gulf War and continued U.S. troop presence in and around the Arabian Peninsula provided al-Qaeda with a cause that resonated throughout the Muslim World. Osama bin-Laden issued his first fatwa and declaration of war in 1996, indicating his total commitment and motivation to remove the “Americans Occupying the Land of the Two Holy Places.”³¹⁸ Unfortunately, the significance of the fatwa resonated only slightly with the Clinton Administration and barely with the America public.

Al-Qaeda’s slow rise to stardom emanated from Afghanistan, growing with sporadic, but deliberate, terrorist attacks on American, Israeli, and *takfir* or apostate Arab regimes. Osama bin-Laden oversaw the planning, preparation, and execution of several al-Qaeda attacks throughout the early 1990s.³¹⁹ First, in 1991, al-Qaeda attacked the King of Afghanistan in Italy, then, a year later, al-Qaeda bombed two Aden hotels targeting U.S. troops, which was followed by an attack on the Saudi National Guard in Riyadh in 1995, and the bombing of the Egyptian Embassy in Pakistan.³²⁰

The son of a successful Saudi construction tycoon, Osama bin-Laden was an entrepreneur who latched on to the notion of a global jihad and the importance of a

³¹⁷ Rid and Hecker, *War 2.0*, 186; Boot, *Invisible Armies*, 515–516. Osama bin-Laden officially formed al-Qaeda in 1988.

³¹⁸ Rid and Hecker, *War 2.0*, 185–187. Al-Qaeda’s ideological origins can be found in Egypt’s prisons in the 1960s, and its militant roots are from the mountains of Afghanistan, while and its structure was the product of Osama bin-Laden’s upbringing in Saudi Arabia.

³¹⁹ Boot, *Invisible Armies*, 521.

³²⁰ *Ibid.*, 516-521.

unified ummah.³²¹ To these ends, Osama bin-Laden set out to establish an international terrorist conglomerate that was unified in attacking the West without tying themselves to one geographic region or benefactor as Hezbollah or Hamas did. Osama bin-Laden ran his organization as a corporation with managerial and administrative functions; he established an organizational culture and identity through formal Islamic education and military training.³²² Further, he established a formal hiring and vetting system to expand his affiliate network around the globe.³²³ Aside from advancing global jihad, al-Qaeda was one of the first terrorist groups to establish a robust media production and propaganda arm, Al-Sahab, and exploited new media and Internet technology to expand their influence.³²⁴ Furthermore, al-Qaeda differed from other terrorist groups because they attempted to break the Shia-Sunni divide by cutting across historical and sectarian barriers and drawing on membership from all levels of Muslim society.³²⁵

Still, the enormity of the threat al-Qaeda imposed only became more apparent after the 1998 U.S. Embassy bombings in Tanzania and Kenya, and the attack on the *USS Cole* in 2000.³²⁶ United States commitment and motivation grew steadily as a result of these attacks, but remained only limitedly committed to defeating al-Qaeda.³²⁷

³²¹ Boot, *Invisible Armies*, 518; Rid and Hecker, *War 2.0*, 187.

³²² *Ibid.*, 522.

³²³ *Ibid.*, 523.

³²⁴ *Ibid.*, 523.

³²⁵ *Ibid.*, 518-525; Rohan Gunaratna, *Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002), 9–17. Al-Qaeda and its affiliates “have sought to radicalize and mobilize the Islamic diaspora. The carefully crafted Islamist propaganda disseminated by some Islamic associations and societies has exploited the political impotence felt by some Muslim migrants and left them vulnerable to al-Qaeda indoctrination.”

³²⁶ Boot, *Invisible Armies*, 516.

³²⁷ George W. Bush, “State of the Union Address,” *The Washington Post*, January 29, 2002, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/onpolitics/transcripts/sou012902.htm>. “America will lead by defending liberty and justice because they are right and true and unchanging for all people everywhere. No nation owns these aspirations, and no nation is exempt from them. We have no intention of imposing our culture, but America will always stand firm for the non-negotiable demands of human dignity: the rule of law, limits on the power of the state, respect for women, private property, free speech, equal justice and religious tolerance.”

The United States became more committed and motivated after al-Qaeda's September 11, 2001, attacks on the World Trade Center. Rather than mobilizing all of the U.S. military and its resources, the "Global War On Terror" was to be a limited response; relying on U.S. and allied Special Forces and air power to neutralize al-Qaeda and the Taliban. To accomplish this, the Bush administration enacted Article Five for the first time in the NATO's history. Within months, the United States and coalition forces had broken the Taliban's hold on Afghanistan and displaced al-Qaeda's leadership into neighboring safe havens in Pakistan and Iran.³²⁸ This was a temporary setback for al-Qaeda that forced them to adapt organizationally, but their commitment and motivation remained absolute.³²⁹

As the war in Afghanistan raged on, Osama bin-Laden went public and used his newly minted terrorist fame to franchise al-Qaeda; expanding his network and operational reach throughout the Middle East, Africa, and Asia. Conversely, U.S. commitment and motivation continued to expand to a new front as the Bush Administration investigated links—which turned out to be illusory—between the "Axis of Evil" (Iraq, Iran, and the DPRK) and al-Qaeda.³³⁰ With the invasion of Iraq in 2003, American forces became engaged in a limited war on two fronts—Afghanistan and Iraq. This two-front war is arguably the closest the United States has been to being totally committed since WWII. Concurrently, Osama bin-Laden's network, and al-Qaeda, as a whole, became exponentially stronger and more committed as new terrorist groups

³²⁸ Boot, *Invisible Armies*, 526. Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda were crushed after the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan by United States Special Forces and Northern Alliance, forcing Bin Laden into exile in Pakistan.

³²⁹ Rid and Hecker, *War 2.0*, 188–192.

³³⁰ Bush, "State of the Union Address." President Bush stated that America has two goals: first, to stamp out terrorism worldwide, and second, to prevent regimes that support terrorist and threaten America from acquiring, possessing, and using WMDs. He referred to these regimes as the "Axis of Evil," which includes Iran, Iraq, and North Korea.

pledged their allegiance to them and new recruits and resources joined up in response the U.S. invasion of Iraq.³³¹

Al-Qaeda in Iraq arose in the wake of the U.S. invasion of Iraq. Although, this official affiliate, formerly known as Jama'at al-Tawhid wal-Jihad, began to diverge from Osama bin-Laden's ideology and goal of global jihad.³³² While al-Qaeda Central was playing the long game to reestablish the caliphate for the entire umma, Zarqawi's AQI was more committed and motivated to protecting the Sunni population from Nouri al-Maliki's Shia-dominated government and the more immediate establishment of an Islamic State in Iraq.³³³ The emergence of this Sunni threat and the growing insurgency in Iraq prompted an increase in U.S. commitment, resulting in the 2007 surge and the creation of the Sahwa movement.³³⁴ Regardless of this increased U.S. commitment, and the death of Osama bin Laden in 2011, al-Qaeda continued to expand, as did their commitment and motivation.³³⁵

After a decade of limited war, the United States had only achieved moderate success against al-Qaeda; bin-Laden's death was symbolic for the United States but inconsequential for al-Qaeda at large. As costs increased and public support for the war

³³¹ Peter L Bergen, *The Longest War: The Enduring Conflict between America and Al-Qaeda* (New York: Free Press, 2011), 211; Boot, *Invisible Armies*, 523; Gunaratna, *Inside Al Qaeda*, xix. al-Qaeda Central carefully vetted and full membered affiliates such as al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, al-Qaeda in the Levant, and al-Qaeda in Iraq. Also, al-Qaeda accepted more loosely affiliated organizations such as Abu Sayyaf in the Philippines, Jemaah Islamiyah in Indonesia, Harakat ul-Mujahideen in Kashmir, and the Armed Islamic Group in Algeria. Further, al-Qaeda openly coordinated and trained with non-affiliated groups such as al-Shabaab in Somalia.

³³² Zachary Laub and Johathan Masters, "The Islamic State," *Council on Foreign Relations*, November 16, 2015, <http://www.cfr.org/iraq/islamic-state/p14811>.

³³³ Thomas F. Lynch, "*The Islamic State as Icarus: A Critical Assessment of an Untenable Threat*" (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, October 2015), <https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/the-islamic-state-icarus-critical-assessment-untenable-threat>.

³³⁴ Craig A. Whiteside, *Behind The Revival Of The Islamic State in Iraq*, Interview with Naval War College Prof Craig Whiteside, interview by Joel Wing, June 22, 2015, <http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2015/06/behind-revival-of-islamic-state-in-iraq.html>. The Sahwa movement is also known as the Sunni-awakening and the Sons of Iraq.

³³⁵ Ibid. "They have built on a doctrine that stresses patience, a factor that has allowed them to carefully build a pseudo-state that produces order, controls territory, and administers services (with some skill in certain areas) to a population that identifies culturally with them and maintains significant blood ties to the members of the Islamic State. The only thing that keeps them from being a full-fledged state is the lack of international recognition."

against al-Qaeda waned, President Obama kept his promise to extricate the U.S. military from Iraq in 2011 and reduce U.S. forces in Afghanistan by 2014, effectively reducing U.S. commitment and motivation to a new low.³³⁶ Though, as U.S. commitment and presence decreased, al-Qaeda's affiliates grew in number and size throughout the Middle East, Africa, and Asia. On top of this, Maliki's oppression of the Sunni population after the departure of U.S. forces, and the outbreak of the Syrian Civil War provided Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi's force with an opportunity to exploit sectarian tensions to mobilize the Sunni population in support of the Islamic State.³³⁷

What began for al-Qaeda as a global jihad against the West, the "far enemy," has devolved into mostly local and regional struggles fueled by sectarian, ethnic, and tribal tensions in weakly governed and failing states.³³⁸ Nevertheless, Salafi Jihadism prevails even in al-Qaeda's absence, particularly in Syria where the Islamic State's commitment and motivation continue to grow, even as they lose territory and meet increasing opposition.³³⁹ As a result, since 2014 U.S. commitment and motivation has increased to defeat terrorism and the Islamic State. Currently, the U.S. military, and Special Operations Forces in particular, remain in Afghanistan, are back in Iraq, and deployed throughout the Middle East and Africa to defeat the remaining global terrorist threat.³⁴⁰

Al-Qaeda did not defeat the United States militarily or politically, but neither has the United States defeated al-Qaeda's ideology and its influence on terrorist groups around the world. The United States has achieved varying levels of success in disrupting and defeating al-Qaeda and its affiliates in Southeast Asia, the Middle East, and

³³⁶ Robert Michael Gates, *Duty: Memoirs of a Secretary at War*, First Vintage Books edition (New York: Vintage Books, a division of Penguin Random House LLC, 2015), 567.

³³⁷ Lynch, "*The Islamic State as Icarus: A Critical Assessment of an Untenable Threat.*"

³³⁸ Ibid., 1–9; Whiteside, *Behind The Revival Of The Islamic State in Iraq*, Interview With Naval War College Prof Craig Whiteside.

³³⁹ Lynch, "*The Islamic State as Icarus: A Critical Assessment of an Untenable Threat.*" 9.

³⁴⁰ Laub and Masters, "The Islamic State." "U.S. President Barack Obama's administration has assembled a coalition of some sixty countries to Islamic State (ISIS) "degrade and ultimately defeat" the Islamic State. The U.S.-led coalition includes the European Union and several Sunni Arab states. As of mid-May 2015, the coalition had carried out nearly four thousand airstrikes, four-fifths of them by U.S. forces."

Africa.³⁴¹ Unfortunately, though, the United States has spent trillions of dollars and thousands of lives to do so, and as a whole has lost a significant amount of soft power, credibility and influence in the Middle East largely due to the controversial invasion of Iraq in 2003.³⁴²

While the Islamic State's future remains uncertain and al-Qaeda affiliates continue their jihad against the West, the United States remains limitedly committed, though much less than in the past. To date, the Islamic State has emerged, more or less, as a proto-state and their commitment and motivation remains total as their regional influence grows.³⁴³ As a result, there continues to be an asymmetry of motivations between the Islamic State and the United States. Thus, this chapter of the war will continue until the Islamic State is defeated or the United States quits. Unfortunately, Salafi Jihadism and global Islamic jihad will likely remain a problem for the West well into the future, particularly in ungoverned corners and failed states, but at home too as digital media enables angry and marginalized individuals to self-radicalize and join the fight.

G. DOMINANT TRENDS IN THE POST-COLD WAR PERIOD

The collapse of the Soviet Union ushered in a new era of irregular warfare. The incidence of armed conflict and warfare, in general, dropped significantly after the Cold War.³⁴⁴ The 1990s were relatively calm, except for the prevalence of ethnic, racial, and religious violence, particularly in the former Soviet States that were evolving and undergoing nation building. The Chechen Wars were chosen for this chapter because of this dynamic change. The post-Cold War diffusion of power shaped the Irish Troubles, Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and the Colombian conflict. Additionally, because these

³⁴¹ Dominic Tierney, "The Twenty Years' War," *The Atlantic*, August 23, 2016, <http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2016/08/twenty-years-war/496736/>.

³⁴² Steven Brill, "Is America Any Safer?," *The Atlantic*, September 2016, <http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2016/09/are-we-any-safer/492761/>.

³⁴³ Whiteside, Behind the Revival of the Islamic State in Iraq, Interview with Naval War College Prof Craig Whiteside.

³⁴⁴ Monty Marshall, "*Global Report 2014: Conflict, Governance, and State Fragility*" (Vienna, VA: Center for Systemic Peace, July 23, 2014), www.systemicpeace.org.

irregular conflicts crossed into the current era, this chapter has continued the analysis to determine how post-Cold War dynamics impacted motivations and irregular warfare in general.

Al-Qaeda's 2001 terrorist attacks marked a growing trend of increased non-state violence in the twenty-first century.³⁴⁵ Therefore, this chapter reviewed the rise of al-Qaeda to evaluate how the rise of global terrorism influenced conflict dynamics in the Middle East, Africa, and Eastern Europe. Additionally, this era saw the rise of interstate competition through proxy warfare. To reflect this trend, this chapter also reviewed Hezbollah's war with Israel in 2006. These conflicts were not isolated events or anomalies, but were representative of the time and of post-Cold War irregular conflicts. There are numerous other irregular warfare examples that are worth studying. For example, the Somali Civil War has plagued the Horn of Africa for nearly three decades, and has evolved from a nationalist and tribal struggle to a revolutionary Islamic war waged by al-Shabaab. Additionally, numerous state, regional, and international forces have participated in the conflict as well—to no avail. Similarly, several irregular conflicts, from RENAMO's reemergence in Mozambique to the Libyan Civil War and the Tuareg Rebellion, have occurred throughout Africa since the end of the Cold War. These conflicts are significant in their own right and deserve their own analysis in the future.

The Color Revolutions and the Arab Spring, in particular, have had significant political and social influence in several countries throughout Africa, Europe and the Middle East. This chapter did not review these conflicts though because they are better analyzed separately as they are distinctly different from the cases analyzed in this thesis and deserve their own consideration within the context of asymmetry of motivations in social movements. Having said this, they are not totally unrelated, just unique enough to warrant separate consideration.

³⁴⁵ Erik Melander, *Organized Violence in the World 2015* (Uppsala: Uppsala Universitet, 2015), http://www.pcr.uu.se/digitalAssets/61/61335_1brochure2.pdf.

Finally, the ongoing War in Donbass is worth noting too as it is a complex irregular war with between the Ukrainian government and the Donetsk People's Republic, the Luhansk People's Republic, and covert and clandestine Russian forces. In addition to these conflicts, dozens more have shaped the geopolitical landscape throughout the world. Nevertheless, this chapter focused on six of the most significant conflicts that have had the largest impact on or best define current trends in irregular warfare. This period of irregular warfare is mostly defined by the rise of hybrid warfare, religiously motivated terrorism, the influence of networks, the importance of popular opinion and transformational leaders, and the influence of the United States.

1. Irregular Success in the Post-Cold War Period

Irregular success is less obvious in the post-Cold War era than in the two previous periods. Irregular wins are easily identified when the strong quit and leave altogether. Though in this period, the strong only left (temporarily) two of the six conflicts reviewed in this chapter—the 2006 Lebanon War and the First Chechen War. Beyond this, the Irish Troubles ended in a draw; the Russians nearly annihilated the Chechens in the Second Chechen War. The Colombian conflict, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and al Qaeda's War Against the West continue to this day.

These six conflicts demonstrate that peace is only a temporary feature in the post-Cold War era. When one side quits or moves to negotiate, hardliners split off and continue the armed struggle anew. Thus, post-Cold War conflicts are continuously evolving and reigniting; the Real IRA has picked up where the PIRA left off. Chechen rebels still act out from time to time; and the Islamic State has emerged from al-Qaeda. Nevertheless, irregulars did succeed to some degree, just not in the sense of a complete or decisive, political or military victory over their opponents.

If the definition of success and victory is expanded beyond simply driving the strong out, irregular success is more prevalent during this period. By expanding the definition of success to any measure that results in a better peace, irregulars prevail in

four out of the six cases in this chapter.³⁴⁶ First, the Irish Republicans secured political concessions in negotiations with the British, ending the Irish Troubles and improving Catholic-Protestant relations in Northern Ireland. Second, The Chechen rebels raised the political and psychological costs for Yeltsin, compelling him to pull the Russian Army out in 1996, ending the First Chechen War. Then, Hezbollah exploited the media and the international community to compel Israel to pull out of Southern Lebanon in 2006. Additionally, al-Qaeda, and now the Islamic State, have tied up U.S. resources and left the U.S. government significantly weakened after fifteen years of counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations.

2. Factors Influencing Irregular Success

The United States played an important role in five of the six conflicts. The U.S. government sometimes has power to help move conflicts closer toward peace, as in the Troubles, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and the 2006 Lebanon Crisis. Conversely, the United States can also fuel conflicts when it is in their interests, such as the “War on Drugs” in Colombia and wars involving al-Qaeda and their affiliates. As history can attest, United States interventionism is episodic and highly dependent on an Administration’s desire to get involved in overseas entanglements. Whether the United States continues to engage terrorists worldwide, or mediate conflicts into the next period of irregular warfare is yet to be determined.

The Cold War and post-Cold War chapters reveal that conflicts often continue for several decades when motivations are symmetrical. Put differently, when both sides are totally committed, the war will likely continue, albeit not at the same pace or ferocity, but sporadic fighting and violence will persist. This is until a leader emerges to break the stalemate with negotiations. As this chapter demonstrates, transformational leadership is another defining feature of conflict resolution during the post-Cold War period. Leaders

³⁴⁶ Basil Henry Liddell Hart, *Strategy*, 2nd rev. ed. (New York, NY: Meridian, 1991), 357. Liddell Hart reminds us that wars are waged for one reason—a better peace. “Victory in the true sense implies that the state of peace, and of one’s people, is better after the war than before.”

such as Gerry Adams, President Clinton, Yitzhak Rabin, and President Santos among others, attempted to bring parties together to establish a lasting peace.

Public opinion has also become a significant factor affecting motivations and the outcomes of irregular wars. Specifically, communications technology is advancing at increasing pace, disseminating information more quickly and broadly. As a result, irregulars can reach wider audiences in real-time to shape perceptions and wage psychological and information warfare for the cost of a cellphone, laptop, and network connection or satellite uplink. Hezbollah and al Qaeda in particular are adept at recruiting, fundraising, and disseminating propaganda and, more importantly, using the Internet for political and psychological warfare purposes. On top of this, the Internet has enabled irregulars to skip several procedural steps and allowed them to reduce tactical and organizational risks. Irregulars no longer need to rely on traditional agents, movement entrepreneur, and brokers as they had in the past, to reach larger audiences and appeal to the sympathetic audiences for support.

Networks also are a defining feature of this period. This is not to say that traditional and hierarchical organizations have fallen by the wayside. Several of the most networked irregulars still have some hierarchy at the top to synchronize, coordinate, and drive the organization forward. Networks are not uncommon in irregular warfare; the weak repeatedly have learned to compartmentalize and work in cellular structures to avoid government repression and extermination. Though al-Qaeda did revolutionize the concept of network-structured irregular warfare. Osama bin-Laden's notion of global jihad expanded relationships and membership worldwide, enabling him to grow a network that can act independently, or swarm, with broad guidance. In effect, this serves to overextend, frustrate, and demoralize their adversaries while limiting costs, risks, and exposure to their core groups.

Religiously motivated terrorism has also become a defining feature of the contemporary operating environment. Previously, terrorism was used as a form of control or a tool of persuasion within a state. This period witnessed the rise of global jihad and the use of terrorism to coerce or compel "far" and "near" enemies. al-Qaeda's narrative and ideology spread out of Afghanistan in the early 1990s and into Chechnya where it

mixed with Wahhabi conservatism, then into Iraq in the early 2000s where it evolved into Salafi Jihadism. What is remarkable about this factor is that it is becoming more frequent and more concentrated. Ironically, this conflicts with al-Qaeda's original intent for global jihad, which focused purely on destroying the West and its allies. Now, more so than ever before, terrorism is being used in irregular intrastate conflicts against civilian targets, most of whom are Muslims residing in Iraq, Nigeria, Syria, Afghanistan, or Pakistan.³⁴⁷ Still, religiously motivated terrorism has proved difficult to defeat or deter; a comprehensive and effective strategy to counter ideologically motivated warfare has evaded the greatest conventional minds and strategists of the twenty-first century.

Finally, this period is defined by complexity and convergence in the sense that technology and interconnectedness are complicating isolated conflicts, and irregular warfare methods are increasingly mixed with conventional warfare strategy and tactics.³⁴⁸ To this point, in the Lebanon War of 2006, Hezbollah used live-stream media to influence public perception and shape opinions while Iran provided state of the art anti-tank missiles, signals intelligence equipment, and unmanned aerial vehicles to use against the IDF. This enabled Hezbollah to expand beyond their typical strategic and tactical guerrilla repertoire and, to some extent, fight like a state. The same can be said about the Islamic State and other irregulars around the world who have learned to harness technology and external support, and learned to employ both in new ways.

3. Explaining Why Irregulars Won

Asymmetry of motivations existed in four of the six conflicts (the Irish Troubles, the Chechen Wars, the 2006 Lebanon Crisis, and al-Qaeda's War Against the West). But,

³⁴⁷ "Global Terrorism Index 2015," National Consortium For The Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (New York: Institute For Economics and Peace, November 2015), <http://economicsandpeace.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/Global-Terrorism-Index-2015.pdf>.

³⁴⁸ Frank G. Hoffman, "Hybrid Warfare and Challenges," *Joint Force Quarterly* 52, no. 1st Quarter (2009), 34–47; Max Boot, *War Made New: Weapons, Warriors, and the Making of the Modern World*, First trade paperback printing, August 2007, A Council on Foreign Relations Book (New York, NY: Gotham Books, 2007), 472. "The boundaries between "regular" and "irregular" warfare are blurring. Even non-state groups are increasingly gaining access to the kinds of weapons that were once the exclusive preserve of states. And even states will increasingly turn to unconventional strategies to blunt the impact of American power."

with the exception of the 2006 Lebanon Crisis, irregulars did not prevail in these conflicts as a result of an asymmetry of motivations. Instead, irregulars mostly benefitted when motivations were symmetrical, as they have been in the Colombian conflict and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. With the addition of the Troubles, these conflicts are three of the longer, more costly irregular wars that have continued in a cyclic fashion; generation after generation has known only anger and enmity and continued the conflict because grievances remain unresolved. Although, as these conflicts demonstrate, political and psychological costs eventually erode the will to persist over time, enabling transformational leaders to move the parties closer to peace through negotiations. When irregulars can endure and survive long-term, they may not defeat their opponent, but as these three cases suggest, they can prevail politically.

This period also suggests that irregulars succeed more often when they remain a relevant long-term threat to the strong, forcing the strong to choose to negotiate or grant them concessions. To accomplish this, these cases reveal that irregulars need external support and safe havens to survive, and international support to help move their adversary towards the negotiating table. All six cases show that external support helped the irregulars sustain themselves, and impose costs on their adversary year after year. Though, even with external support, the Chechen's were unable to defeat the Russians.

The Irish Troubles, the Chechen Wars, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the Colombian conflict, and al Qaeda's war against the West indicate that asymmetry of motivations may not fully explain irregular success in the post-Cold War era. Though these cases do indicate that motivation and the will to win are relevant causal factors of irregular success or failure. When asymmetry of motivations exists irregulars have succeeded by coercing or compelling their adversary to quit by influencing public opinion and perceptions.

This chapter reveals that this is accomplished by raising the political and psychological cost of the war; winning the battle of the narrative; securing popular support; and by provoking international intervention and mediation. Conversely, when motivations are symmetrical, irregulars first had to adapt and rely on safe havens and external support to survive. Only then could the irregulars demonstrate continued resolve

and commitment to the armed struggle while pursuing political and psychological warfare strategies to persuade their adversary to negotiate.

The next chapter will compare and contrast Chapters III, IV, and V to reveal the similarities and difference between each period of irregular warfare. Furthermore, the following chapter will reveal which factors influenced irregular warfare the most. Additionally, Chapter VI will serve to explain why the weak prevail in irregular conflicts when they do. Finally, the theory of asymmetry of motivations will be compared to alternative theories, such as asymmetry of interests, asymmetry of violence, asymmetry of strategy, and asymmetry of resources.

VI. IRREGULAR WARFARE AND IRREGULAR SUCCESS

Part One reviewed fifteen irregular conflicts that occurred in three separate periods: post-WWII, 1945 to 1962; mid-to late-Cold War, 1963 to 1991; and post-Cold War, 1992 to 2016. The conflicts in each of these periods demonstrated how major geopolitical events shaped irregular warfare. These cases also revealed the evolution of irregular warfare and irregular actors, as well as, the dynamics that shaped each period. This helped illuminate general conditions that enabled irregulars to succeed and revealed the best explanation for why irregulars win. This chapter will compare and contrast the three time periods in Chapter III, IV, and V to define why irregulars win and to identify which factors enable their success the most.

The irregular conflicts in the first period were first shaped by the results of WWII and the decisions that were made during the war termination process. This period demonstrated how new beliefs and international organizations shape irregular warfare. Specifically, the new world order under the UN opened the door of opportunity to nationalist and leftist revolutionaries alike. As this period revealed, irregular conflicts were mostly asymmetrical as exemplified by totally motivated indigenous irregulars, and limitedly motivated external powers. Two exceptions were found: the Huk Rebellion and the Cuban Revolution. These two conflicts revealed not only that internal conflicts are symmetrically motivated, but also that irregulars can win when motivations are both symmetrical and asymmetrical.

This period revealed that irregulars might succeed more as a result of international dynamics, and the competence and capability of their adversaries, than because of their efforts and actions. Additionally, the cases in this period demonstrate that irregulars might fail at first, but succeed over time if their opponent's goals or commitment change going forward. Finally, the seven cases reviewed in this period reveal that perceptions of legitimacy and popular opinion influence support and the will to win.

Irregular warfare evolved from the post-WWII period as early as 1948; Western ideals clashed with Marxist-Leninist thought, igniting new tensions and irregular

conflicts around the world. Max Boot refers to this period of irregular warfare as “Radical Chic” due to the rise of leftist revolutionaries.³⁴⁹ Though, the cases in this chapter revealed that the irregular’s motivations were not all that different from their predecessors. The conflicts in this era often arose due to weak or corrupt governance and the desire for political, economic, and social change.

Again, like the previous period, internal irregular conflicts in this era were symmetrically motivated. This revealed that political and psychological costs are not as influential when commitments and motivations are symmetrical. In other words, when the irregular’s motivation and commitment is equal to their adversary’s, the conflict will likely be long, bloody, and expensive.

Unlike the previous era, though, external actors provided more pronounced support and influence in the internal irregular conflicts in this era. The cases in this thesis revealed that the weak succeeded during this period either because external support was provided to them, because their adversary lost external support, or because the international community intervened in the interest of human rights. Beyond this, though, popular opinion and support remained significant factors driving motivation and the will to fight in these irregular conflicts.

This second period of irregular warfare illuminated three important points. First, external support is crucial for the weak, but it does not explain their success. Second, “silver bullets” may not exist, but the introduction of specific technology into irregular warfare may enable irregulars to change conflict dynamics enough to enable their success. Finally, this period demonstrates that the fight will invariably continue as long as grievances exist, the irregulars stay motivated, and can evade their opponent.

The collapse of the Soviet Union and the fall of the Berlin Wall shaped the context and conduct of irregular warfare once again. The prevalence of ethnic, racial, and religious tensions and violence shaped irregular warfare throughout the 1990s. Several significant trends emerged during this period such as the rise of religiously motivated

³⁴⁹ Boot, *Invisible Armies*, 397–399.

global terrorism and the growth of communications technology. This period evolved again after al-Qaeda's 2001 terrorist attacks, the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan, and the 2003 invasion of Iraq. This most-recent period of irregular warfare is mostly defined by the influence of networks and the importance of popular opinion.

The most recent cases, such as the 2006 Lebanon War and al-Qaeda's war against the West, are defined by complexity and convergence. In particular, the way people communicate and consume information has changed, providing irregulars greater access to wider audiences. Furthermore, this period revealed that states, such as Iran and Syria, are increasingly using proxies like Hezbollah, to deter, disrupt, and defeat other states.³⁵⁰ This suggests that irregulars are increasingly capable of competing with, defeating, and coercing the strong in a multi-polar world.

The evidence from the third period of irregular warfare revealed that motivation could be divided between internal irregular conflicts that are symmetrically motivated and irregular conflicts with external powers characterized by asymmetric motivations. Though, explaining why the weak won during this period was difficult to conclude; three conflicts remain unresolved, one ended in a draw, irregulars prevailed in one, and the strong prevailed in the other. Nevertheless, the six cases reviewed in this period suggest that conflicts do not have to end, and the weak do not have to win, for irregulars to succeed.

This period also demonstrated that modern nation states could still employ brutal and violent methods as long as they can control the narrative and the flow of information. Additionally, this period revealed that peace is temporary when grievances are not fully addressed. Finally, the evidence from this period suggests that the Internet, narratives, and ideas may be the most effective weapons enabling irregular success.

³⁵⁰ Frank G. Hoffman, "Hybrid Warfare and Challenges," *Joint Force Quarterly* 52, no. 1st Quarter (2009), 34–47; Max Boot, *War Made New: Weapons, Warriors, and the Making of the Modern World*, First trade paperback printing, August 2007, A Council on Foreign Relations Book (New York, NY: Gotham Books, 2007), 472.

A. FACTORS ENABLING IRREGULAR SUCCESS

The cases reviewed in this thesis also reveal several mechanisms that enabled irregular success. These mechanisms are not significant enough to explain fully why irregulars win when they do. Instead, they are best considered as accelerators that create better conditions for irregulars to achieve success. These accelerators are the Internet, international organizations, movement brokers or entrepreneurs, and existing social and political fractures.

The Internet has significantly altered the practice of irregular warfare. Technology and the Internet have enabled irregulars, to reach larger and more distant audiences, at a faster rate. As the cases in this thesis demonstrate, irregulars can use the Internet for propaganda purposes, to wage political warfare, to recruit members and build popular support, to raise funds, to plan and coordinate operations and activities, to collect intelligence, and to deceive their opponents. Never before have singular actors and minor groups had access to diverse audiences and the ability to shape the perceptions and opinions of millions of people worldwide. Clay Shirky notes, “As the communications landscape gets denser, more complex, and more participatory, the networked population is gaining even greater access to information, more opportunities to engage in public speech, and an enhanced ability to undertake collective action.”³⁵¹ In other words, we are just beginning to fully appreciate the impact communications technology and the Internet will have on the future of irregular warfare.

The strong no longer have a monopoly on information; neither can they isolate their populations from the reality of war or the ideas and influence of radicals and fringe groups. This makes the strong more susceptible to the irregulars’ propaganda and subjects their cause and actions to greater scrutiny. In effect, these cases demonstrate that irregulars are increasingly able to exploit their opponent’s actions against them, specifically by challenging the legitimacy of their actions and the justice of their cause. Thus, as Hezbollah and al-Qaeda’s use of the media demonstrate, irregular warfare may

³⁵¹ Clay Shirky, “The Political Power of Social Media,” *Foreign Affairs*, no. January/February 2011 (December 20, 2010), <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2010-12-20/political-power-social-media>.

be becoming less of a political exercise and more of a social practice.³⁵² Additionally, as the Cuban Revolution, the Vietnam War, and the 2006 Lebanon War demonstrate, traditional media such as television and radio have a significant impact on shaping international perceptions of irregular conflicts. In other words, irregulars do not necessarily need to coerce or compel their adversary's government or military leadership. Irregulars can manipulate the Internet and the media to shape perceptions of the war to influence their adversary's mass base to affect change. Unquestionably then, as recent evidence suggests, the media, the Internet, and communications technology are increasingly contributing to the success of irregular actors.

Chapters III, IV, and V indicate that international and regional organizations with state-like powers have become increasingly powerful in enabling irregular success. These cases demonstrate that a strategy of internationalizing a conflict or engaging the wider global community in internal and regional affairs can be used to balance asymmetries in resources, capabilities, power, and even technology. Though, internationalizing a conflict is not a standalone strategy, as these intergovernmental organizations often have limited authority, resources, and will to intervene.³⁵³ Nevertheless, international organizations are willing to get involved when it is in their interests, as in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict; when collective security is threatened, as in the War with al-Qaeda; or when atrocities are committed on a grand scale, as in El Salvador.³⁵⁴ Non-state actors used to rely on state-sponsors and brokers to elicit help and support from international and regional organizations. Now, though, as technology becomes increasingly smaller, cheaper, and easier to use, irregulars are not at the mercy of traditional journalists, change agents, and movement entrepreneurs to reach larger audiences and generate increased domestic and international support. Nonetheless, the cases in this thesis suggest that

³⁵² Thomas Rid and Marc Hecker, *War 2.0: Irregular Warfare in the Information Age* (Westport, CN: Praeger Security International, 2009), 208-209.

³⁵³ Albrecht Schnabel, "Insurgencies, Security Governance and the International Community," in *Private Actors and Security Governance*, ed. Alan Bryden and Marina Caparini, Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (Münster : London: Lit ; Global [distributor], 2007), 65–85.

³⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, 72. Schnabel explains that international organizations can apply diplomatic pressure, publically voice concerns, publically condemn the actions of immoral, unethical, and illegal actors; impose economic sanctions; and hold criminal tribunals to prosecute perpetrators of humanitarian crimes.

sponsors and brokers are still important in enabling irregular success by building relationships, particularly between irregular groups and their adversary's population.

The irregular conflicts reviewed in this thesis reveal that sponsors and brokers such as Edward Lansdale or Charlie Wilson often serve as the catalyst of change and can mean the difference between success and failure for the weak. Just as strong-ties are important within networks—weak ties are important between networks. Weak ties are significant because they cross group boundaries and bridge or connect members of different groups.³⁵⁵ Traditionally, irregulars were forced to rely on individuals with crosscutting ties between groups—such as journalists, college professors, businessmen, and civilian-soldiers or reservists, to link disparate groups. Though, technology and the Internet have reduced the significance of some of these brokers in spreading ideas and narratives. Nonetheless, the cases in this thesis demonstrate that brokers, change agents, and mobilization entrepreneurs still enable irregulars to mobilize greater resources that exist outside of their control. Put differently—in the absence of organic political and psychological warfare capabilities, non-state actors and weaker powers can employ brokers to coerce and compel their opponent, expand their tactical and organizational capabilities, spread their narrative and expand awareness, and bridge the gap between their organic capabilities and those of the wider international community.

Brokers also help irregulars widen and increase existing fractures in their adversary's government, society, and military. Several cases in this thesis reveal the significance of existing fractures in the government or society of the strong. Specifically, cases such as the Soviet-Afghan War reveal how fractures within existing political and socioeconomic processes can create organic opportunities for the weak.³⁵⁶ In other

³⁵⁵ Shin-Kap Han, "The Other Ride of Paul Revere: The Brokerage Role In the Making of the American Revolution," *Mobilization* 14, no. 2 (2009): 143–62, 144; Peter Marsden, "Brokerage Behavior in Restricted Exchange Networks." in *Social Structure and Network Analysis*, 1982, CA: Sage, 201–18. Marsden defines brokerage as a process "by which intermediary actors facilitate transactions between other actors lacking access to or trust in one another."

³⁵⁶ Doug McAdam, *Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency, 1930–1970*, 2nd ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999), 40–51.

words, the weak have a clear advantage when the strong already suffer from political or social domestic unrest.

Fractures can be created to change the dynamics. The Indonesian National Revolution, the First Indochina War, and the Cuban Revolution demonstrate that irregulars can create fractures with propaganda, by exploiting the media, and by increasing political and psychological costs for their adversary. Similarly, irregulars can provoke the strong into overreacting to exploit the injustice of their cause and actions. As in the First Indochina War, this serves to create fractures and widen the divide between their opponent and their government, and their people. In effect, these fractures enable the irregulars to force their opponent to choose between continuing the war and risking the welfare of their nation.

B. EXPLAINING IRREGULAR SUCCESS: 1945–2016

The three periods indicate that there is no definitive typology of irregular warfare or singular answer for why irregulars succeed. Chapters III, IV, and V indicate that local culture and environment and regional and international dynamics uniquely shape each irregular conflict and actor. Thus, these cases, and the periods in which they occur, did not reveal any single reason why irregulars succeed, nor did it find any correlation between the irregular's ideology, strategy, environment or capabilities to their success in irregular warfare. Though, these cases suggest that irregulars do not typically succeed militarily, only politically.³⁵⁷ Furthermore, the analysis of Part One indicates that four significant points or trends relate to irregular success.

First, the evidence from Chapters III, IV, and V, as well as from comprehensive databases, shows that the weak have become increasingly more successful.³⁵⁸

³⁵⁷ Mandel, *The Meaning of Military Victory*, 14. In fact, “[A] classic error in warfare is to mistake military victory for political victory.”

³⁵⁸ Jon Brunberg, “Colonial Wars,” Wars Since 1900, The Polynational War Memorial (2004-2013): http://www.war-memorial.net/wars_all.asp?tags=Colonial+Wars&submit=Find&q=3; Max Boot, “Invisible Armies Insurgency Tracker,” Council on Foreign Relations, 18 April 2013: <http://www.cfr.org/wars-and-warfare/invisible-armies-insurgency-tracker/p29917>; Max Boot, *Invisible Armies: An Epic History of Guerrilla Warfare from Ancient Times to the Present*, 1st ed. (New York, NY: Norton, 2013), 559. Boot's database of 443 irregular conflicts dating back to 1775 finds that irregulars are winning more frequently.

Specifically, irregulars prevailed when asymmetric motivations existed by coercing and compelling their adversaries to quit. Irregulars, for the most part, accomplished this by raising the political and psychological costs of the war. Though, these cases also demonstrated that political coercion was more effective when irregulars petitioned and gained the support of other states, as well as, regional and international organizations. In these terms, the irregulars co-opted the coercive power of these actors to force their adversary to leave.

Second, these cases reveal that irregulars can succeed politically, and gain a better peace, even from a draw, after suffering military defeat or while locked in a stalemate.³⁵⁹ For example, the FLN were defeated militarily but won politically, as did Hezbollah. Similarly, the PA achieved political success throughout the years during successive rounds of negotiations. They may not have achieved statehood, and the conflict is not over, but they have succeed politically and gained international recognition, credibility, and legitimacy. Finally, the PIRA demonstrated that irregulars could still prevail politically from a draw as long as they achieve a better peace.

Third, the evidence from these cases reveals that states that are totally motivated or committed, as in internal irregular conflicts, are not easily compelled or coerced to quit, even by other states and international organizations. In these situations, irregulars must find a way to survive repression and attrition, while eroding their opponent's will to fight. To accomplish this, as these cases demonstrate, irregulars must consciously and relentlessly work towards political solutions such as negotiations. Though, they also reveal that it is a difficult process because negotiating presents several challenges for both the weak and the strong. All parties need to be in agreement or the deal will not be honored, and it may cause a split in the group with the emergence of a more radical faction.

³⁵⁹ Basil Henry Liddell Hart, *Strategy*, 2nd rev. ed. (New York, NY: Meridian, 1991), 357. This brings us back to Liddell Hart's argument. "Victory in the true sense implies that the state of peace, and of one's people, is better after the war than before."

Negotiations often require a transformational leader such as Gerry Adams or Arafat; someone “who can imagine an end to the armed struggle, who has the physical and moral courage to pursue that path, who has won the respect of their comrades in the movement, who can speak with authority and act with discretion, and perhaps most important, who can bring his people along, whether by persuasion, intimidation, or force.”³⁶⁰ This is because states view negotiations as a slippery slope that rewards bad behavior.³⁶¹ The Colombian conflict and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict reinforce this concept. Therefore, when irregulars cannot coerce or compel their adversary to quit, their success hinges on their ability to persuade and convince their adversary to negotiate.

Finally, these periods demonstrate that irregulars succeed when motivations are both symmetrical and asymmetrical. When motivations are asymmetrical, irregular success hinges more on external perceptions and opinions. Conversely, when motivations are symmetrical, irregular success is more dependent upon domestic opinion and support. Ultimately then, the analysis from Chapters III, IV, and V indicates that irregular success and motivation appears related to public opinion and popular support. Nevertheless, this conclusion must be compared and contrasted with the arguments made by Andrew Mack, Ivan Arreguín-Toft, Jeffery Record, and Gil Merom.³⁶²

1. Asymmetry of Strategy

Arreguín-Toft claims that the weak win when the strong employ the opposite strategy of their opponent.³⁶³ More specifically, Arreguín-Toft argues that the weak win if they use an indirect strategy against their opponent’s direct strategy or a direct strategy against their indirect strategy.³⁶⁴ Ivan Arreguín-Toft defines the direct approach for the weak as the defense because it targets their adversary’s armed forces to destroy their

³⁶⁰ Ibid., 233–239.

³⁶¹ Ibid., 233–239.

³⁶² Mack, “Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars;” Arreguín-Toft, *How the Weak Win Wars*; Record, *Beating Goliath*; Merom, *How Democracies Lose Small Wars*.

³⁶³ Arreguín-Toft, *How the Weak Win Wars*, 105–123.

³⁶⁴ Ibid., 39, 122–123.

capacity to fight.³⁶⁵ Conversely, the weak can win with an indirect approach, defined as guerrilla warfare or terrorism, which seek to destroy an adversary's will to fight.³⁶⁶ Ultimately, Arreguín-Toft asserts that these strategies will enable the weak to force their adversary to abandon the fight to avoid increasing costs.³⁶⁷ The evidence in this thesis supports Arreguín-Toft's theory, but it also reveals some flaws and shortcomings.

The Mau Mau Uprising, the Malayan Emergency, the Soviet-Afghan War, and the First Chechen War support Arreguín-Toft's strategic asymmetry theory. In the case of the Mau Mau Uprising and the Malayan Emergency, the irregulars lost because the British successfully used an indirect approach that was not overly barbaric. The British isolated the irregulars, hunted them down, and infiltrated their ranks with pseudo-gangs to defeat the irregulars. In these cases, the weak were not capable of establishing an effective defense against the British. Alternatively, the Mujahedeen and the Chechen Rebels demonstrated that they could defeat their adversary when they used an indirect approach against their opponents' direct approach. Though, Russia also used mixed strategies that included barbarism in both cases. Therefore, it is very difficult to attribute irregular success to strategy alone when multiple strategies are employed in the same conflict. In fact, the strong and the weak used mixed strategies in most conflicts reviewed in this thesis.

Furthermore, the evidence presented indicates that the strong are not limited to barbarism as an indirect strategy alone; the strong can use other indirect strategies, such as COIN, to effect victory. Similarly, the weak can apply direct strategies other than the defense; strategic swarms, leadership targeting, ambushes, raids, and indirect fire can all be applied offensively against their opponent's forces. Arreguín-Toft's theory also does not account for political and psychological warfare strategies, nor does it address what

³⁶⁵ Ibid., 105. Ivan Arreguín-Toft defines direct approaches as those that target an adversary's armed forces in order to destroy that adversary's capacity to fight. The direct approach for the strong is the attack. He defines indirect approaches as those that seek to destroy an adversary's will to fight. The indirect approach for the strong is barbarism.

³⁶⁶ Ibid., 105.

³⁶⁷ Ibid., 105.

happens when multiple strategies are used sequentially or simultaneously as in the 2006 Lebanon War. Ultimately, Arreguín-Toft's theory remains important, but it needs to be expanded and updated to account for additional types of strategic interaction such as political warfare and the application of mixed strategy.

2. Asymmetry of Resources

Jeffery Record looks at this topic from the opposite lens. Rather than asking why irregulars win, Record asks why states lose. Record suggests that the strong lose when irregulars impose military and political costs on them, thereby coercing them to quit.³⁶⁸ He goes on to suggest that the strong lose when they suffer from a combination of poor strategic choice, a lack of political will or the inability to isolate the weak.³⁶⁹ Record concludes that external assistance enables the weak the most to succeed. Ultimately, the irregular conflicts reviewed in this thesis support this theory.

It is very hard to distill reasons for irregular success across the three periods of time reviewed in this thesis. Nonetheless, there were a few factors that stood out in every case—external support and access to safe havens. In fact, Chapters III, IV, and V demonstrated that external support and access to safe havens is a necessary requirement for irregulars to succeed. Though, these cases also indicate that external support and access to safe havens are not uniformly important in every case, or in every period for that matter. During the first period reviewed, the post-WWII era, irregulars, did not benefit as much from external support or safe havens. In contrast to this, external support, and safe havens, in particular, was critical to the success of the weak during the mid-to late-Cold War era. This second period revealed, quite intuitively, that external support and safe havens are more important and critical to the irregular in internal

³⁶⁸ Record, *Beating Goliath*, vii.

³⁶⁹ Record, *Beating Goliath*, xii. 24, 130. "External assistance can take many forms; from political support, to provision of money, to supply of arms, military advice and territorial sanctuaries and the introduction of foreign military forces;" Ben Connable and Martin C. Libicki, *How Insurgencies End* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2010), xvii, 34–40. Similar to Record, Connable and Libicki argue that irregular success is determined by access to safe havens that shield irregular actors from their adversaries.

irregular conflicts. On top of this, the cases in this thesis also suggest that significance of external support and assistance is dependent upon the nature of the environment.

The jungles of Vietnam and the mountains of Afghanistan made safe havens less critical than in the Middle Eastern or Rhodesia. Additionally, these cases demonstrate that quality, rather than quantity matters in relation to external support provided to the irregulars. For example, the ZANU and ZAPU received a great deal of support and training from Cuba, the Soviet Union, and the Chinese. Though, this support achieved little more than increasing ideological fractures and capabilities amongst the rebels. Conversely, the United States provided some financial aid and advisory support to Magsaysay and modest aid and advisory support to the Mujahedeen. In both cases, even this limited support had a tremendous effect on the Huks and the Soviet Union.

3. Asymmetry of Violence

Merom's asymmetry of violence theory suggests that the state cannot match the irregular's level of violence without inciting moral outrage.³⁷⁰ Specifically, Merom asserts that members of the educated elite, students, and citizen-soldiers are responsible for shifting focus from the war to the "free marketplace of ideas."³⁷¹ Therefore, Merom concludes that the weak win because they can afford to be more violent as they have more at stake if they lose.³⁷² In other words, the weak win because the strong surpass their population's violence threshold and lose domestic support for the war against the weak.

Several cases reviewed in this thesis support Merom's argument. Specifically, the First Indochina War, the Algerian War of Independence, and the Vietnam War were irregular conflicts in which the strong lost domestic support for their brutality against the weak. In each of these cases, educated elite, students, and military reservists were

³⁷⁰ Gil Merom, *How Democracies Lose Small Wars: State, Society, and the Failures of France in Algeria, Israel in Lebanon, and the United States in Vietnam* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 75, 230–231.

³⁷¹ *Ibid.*, 20, 22. Merom defines the "normative difference" as the difference between the cost of war and what objectives and methods are morally acceptable.

³⁷² *Ibid.*, 11.

responsible for shifting the focus away from the war to the “free marketplace of ideas.” Similarly, this was also used to legitimize violence against the weak.

The Russians demonized the Chechen rebels as terrorists to ensure domestic support for their campaign to reclaim Chechnya. Also, the United States uses the label of terrorism to shape perceptions of ongoing operations, to continue overseas contingency operations fifteen years after invading Afghanistan. As these two examples prove, and Andrew Erdmann suggests, nations can often continue to fight when costs are perceived as proportional to the interests at stake.³⁷³ Therefore, Merom’s argument is only significant when the domestic population determines that the costs are not worth the benefits.

Similarly, this thesis found that Merom’s argument is limited when commitment and motivation are symmetrical between adversaries and when wars are internal to a state.³⁷⁴ In effect, costs will continue to mount unrestrained when both sides are totally motivated. These again suggest that popular support and opinion matter more than the actual costs incurred; costs are relative to interests and their perceived importance—not by the government, but by the domestic population.

4. Asymmetry of Interest

Andrew Mack argued in *Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars* that victory in irregular warfare boils down to political will. Essentially, if the will to fight is destroyed, “then its military capacity—no matter how powerful—is totally irrelevant.”³⁷⁵ Mack went on to claim that the weak have more to lose and are therefore more politically determined to win than the strong whose survival or sovereignty is not threatened.³⁷⁶ Mack concluded that irregulars must win by imposing a steady accumulation of political and psychological “costs” on their opponent to destroy their opponent’s will to fight.³⁷⁷

³⁷³ Erdmann, “The U.S. Presumption of Quick, Costless Wars,” 64.

³⁷⁴ Merom, *How Democracies Lose Small Wars*, 11, 75.

³⁷⁵ Mack, “Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars,” 179.

³⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, 181–182.

³⁷⁷ Mack, “Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars,” 185.

Furthermore, Mack adds that rising costs produce internal dissent and moral outrage, which drive motivation down. Though, this cases reviewed in this thesis indicate that this is not always true, particularly in the Salvadoran Civil War and Colombia conflict.

This thesis found that irregulars only defeated their opponents' will by imposing political and psychological costs in three of the nine conflicts won by the weak. The Viet Minh, the FLN, and the DRV (of note, this includes Ho Chi Minh's forces twice and the FLN, many of whom fought with the French in Indochina and learned from the Viet Minh) compelled their adversaries to quit as a result of rising costs. In addition to these three conflicts, the Netherlands, the British, and the Israelis were affected by rising political and psychological costs. Though in these cases, the costs were not imposed directly by the weak, but by external third parties such as the United States, and international organizations such as the United Nations, or regional organizations such as the NATO or the Arab League.

Therefore, the irregular conflicts presented in this thesis indicate that Mack may have hit on something significant without fully developing how irregulars manipulate motivation and the will to win. Mack's argument for rising costs and moral outrage suggest that other forces are directly responsible for driving political will. Specifically, the evidence in this thesis suggests that there is more to be said about political and psychological costs and their impact on motivation.

5. Asymmetry of Motivations

The theory of asymmetric motivation suggests that success is related to the importance of an actor's goals and their commitment to achieving them compared to that of their adversary. In other words, the weak win when their goals and commitment are total, and their opponents are both limited. This theory parallels Andrew Mack's theory of interest asymmetry in that actors are more committed and willing to endure high costs when they face existential threats. It logically follows, as a general rule, that the strong pursue limited goals in irregular warfare, as the threat to them is by definition not existential. Thus, this theory suggests that weak most often succeed politically because the strong cannot fully mobilize the resources or the political will to exterminate the

weak. Furthermore, the strong eventually quit irregular conflicts because they cannot politically, economically, and socially afford to fight protracted wars against elusive irregulars that refuse to fight according to international laws and conventional norms. In other words, the weak win unless they are completely annihilated by the strong.

This theory suggests that irregulars are most successful when they can compel or coerce their adversary to negotiate terms for peace, abandon their cause, or at the very least, delay or deter further aggression.³⁷⁸ Furthermore, because few options are available to the characteristically weaker irregular—they are forced to pursue indirect strategies that result in protracted conflicts. Therefore, the goal of the irregular is “to destroy not the capacity, but the will” of the adversary.³⁷⁹ This is achieved by employing indirect strategies against their adversary’s forces, their government, and their population. This, in turn, raises the costs of the war, widens existing fractures, and convinces domestic audiences that the war is undesirable to erode their motivation and will to fight.

The cases in this thesis demonstrate that irregulars have a significant advantage when their adversary is limitedly committed. Eleven of the seventeen cases of irregular warfare reviewed in this thesis exhibited asymmetric motivations. Within these eleven conflicts, irregulars succeeded seven times. Though, the cases in this thesis also revealed that irregulars prevail when motivations are symmetrical. Six of the seventeen cases reviewed in this thesis exhibited symmetrical motivation. Irregulars prevailed in three of these six instances—the Cuban Revolution, the Rhodesian Bush War, and the Salvadoran Civil War. Furthermore, irregulars achieved measurable political success in the Israeli-

³⁷⁸ Patrick C. Bratton, “When Is Coercion Successful? And Why Can’t We Agree on It?,” *Naval War College Review* 58, no. 3 (Summer 2005), 100–102; John Arquilla, *Insurgents, Raiders, and Bandits How Masters of Irregular Warfare Have Shaped Our World* (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2011), <http://public.eblib.com/choice/publicfullrecord.aspx?p=680361>, 4–5. Similarly, John Arquilla explains that terrorism is often a successful irregular warfare strategy that is used to coerce others into compliance.

³⁷⁹ S. Kalyanaraman, “Conceptualisations of Guerrilla Warfare,” *Strategic Analysis* 27, no. 2 (June 2003): 172–85, 173.

Palestinian conflict and the Irish Troubles.³⁸⁰ Therefore, irregular success is not dependent on asymmetric motivations alone, but motivation in general.

6. Why Irregulars Succeed When They Do

Irregulars can succeed politically by negotiating or by coercing or compelling their adversary to quit—even when they are locked in a stalemate or after suffering a military defeat. The evidence presented in Chapters III, IV, and V indicates that several conditions contribute to the success of irregulars: major geopolitical events; regional and local political and social dynamics; and their adversary’s capabilities. These chapters also suggest that several factors enable irregulars to succeed: the Internet, international and regional organizations; movement brokers; and existing social and political fractures. Furthermore, Chapters III, IV, and V also found that Andrew Mack’s, Ivan Arreguín-Toft’s, Jeffery Record’s, and Gil Merom’s arguments are compelling and explain why irregulars win when they do to a limited extent.³⁸¹ Similarly, the success of irregulars is not always explained by asymmetric motivations. Ultimately then, this chapter concludes that no single condition, factor or explanation fully explains why irregulars win when they do. This is not to say that motivation is irrelevant or of little explanatory value.

The cases reviewed in Chapters III, IV, and V, and the analysis presented in this chapter, suggest that the will to win remains central in understanding irregular success. Irregulars can prevail when motivations are symmetrical and when they are asymmetrical. Their success appears to hinge on their ability to erode their opponent’s will to fight by swaying opinions and shaping popular support. Therefore, this thesis suggests that the centrality of motivation to irregular success is relative to, and dependent upon public opinion and popular support. In other words, public opinion and popular

³⁸⁰ The PIRA succeeded political despite the Troubles concluding in a draw. Similarly, although the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is still unresolved, the irregulars have succeeded political to some degree over the years. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is included here as an internal conflict. The West Bank is still partly under Israel’s control and Gaza is still contested by many Israelis. Furthermore, neither the West Bank nor Gaza is fully autonomous or officially a recognized sovereign state.

³⁸¹ Mack, “Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars;” Arreguín-Toft, *How the Weak Win Wars*; Record, *Beating Goliath*; Merom, *How Democracies Lose Small Wars*.

support determine one's motivation and will to fight. Perhaps then, asymmetry of opinion best explains why irregulars win when they do.

This concludes Part One of this thesis. Part Two will consider two classic irregular wars in greater detail: the Algerian War of Independence and the Vietnam War. The second part of this thesis will trace motivations over the duration of each conflict to show how motivations fluctuate and to reveal the antecedent conditions that influence motivations. Then this thesis will evaluate these conditions, to determine how the irregulars influenced intrinsic motivations, as well as, extrinsic motivations. This will serve to explain how the weak prevail in irregular conflicts when they do.

C. NOTES ON CASE SELECTION FOR PART TWO

The Algerian War of Independence and the Vietnam War are chosen for the analysis of motivation in Part Two of this thesis. These conflicts are chosen because clear asymmetry of motivations existed between the weak and the strong and because the weak won in both instances. These conflicts are also chosen based on the characteristics of the strong and the weak. The United States and France are both wealthy republics with open societies. Additionally, both countries have similar socioeconomic dynamics with highly educated middle classes and professional militaries. These similarities are important as they reduce the number of variables that may obscure the significance of motivation or the other factors considered. Still, there is variation between the two cases; the conflicts took place in different geographic areas amongst different cultures for different reasons; France was trying to subjugate Algeria while the United States was trying to keep South Vietnam free.

It could be argued that more relevant conflicts exist and should take precedence in this analysis. In fact, there are; the war with al Qaeda and the War in Donbass are two irregular conflicts that best represent current trends in irregular warfare. Although, tracing motivations in these conflicts and trying to extrapolate how and why irregulars win is too premature at this juncture in time as both conflicts continue to this day. To the point, the Algerian War of Independence and the Vietnam War are extensively

researched and documented and offer the clearest contemporary examples of asymmetry of motivations in irregular warfare.

Finally, most of the factors influencing irregular warfare since 1945 are found in these conflicts. Both conflicts were protracted struggles that started slowly, years before violence broke out. The weak were also totally motivated, while the strong were limitedly committed in both conflicts. Additionally, external support and safe havens were significant factors that shaped both conflicts. Further, various strategies were used by both sides in each war; direct attack, defense, barbarism, terrorism, guerrilla warfare, psychological warfare, and political warfare were used by the strong and the weak at different points of time in each conflict with drastically different results. These conflicts were also influenced by the media and shaped by domestic events. Although both conflicts predate the Internet and social media, both do highlight the significance of popular support and its relationship to motivation and war termination.

Ultimately, these conflicts and the lessons they contain remain relevant today. There is little “new” about irregular warfare in the post-Cold War Era. The advances in technology and the changes within the Human Domain only serve to exacerbate existing conditions, factors, and effects. In other words, the Internet may make it easier to recruit and influence opinions, and irregulars may be able to destroy a tank easier with an anti-tank guided missile, but these are not true revolutions in military affairs. These advances in technology merely make it easier for the irregulars to operate at a faster rate in larger spaces at greater distances. Therefore, the Algerian War of Independence and the Vietnam War are evaluated in Part Two to determine how motivations fluctuate and how irregulars influence intrinsic and extrinsic motivation to enable their success.

VII. THE ALGERIAN WAR OF INDEPENDENCE

The Algerian War of Independence is a classic irregular war fueled by nationalism, religion, and ethnicity. Like many irregular conflicts, the Algerian War of Independence was fueled by the desire for self-determination and independence. Furthermore, communist sentiments clashed with nationalist ideals, and great disparities existed between the belligerents' size, capability, and strength. Additionally, like several other irregular conflicts, such as the Indonesian National Revolution and the First Indochina War, clear asymmetries existed between the limited goals and motivation of the French and the total goals and motivation of the FLN. Also, as in these previous wars, the weak won politically; they compelled and coerced the French to leave Algeria. Finally, several significant factors that shaped irregular warfare during this period are found in this conflict: external support, the media, and political and psychological costs, are present in this case.

The war between the French and the Algerians began in 1954 and concluded in 1962. Initially, the Front de Liberation Nationale (FLN) was totally committed while France was limitedly committed during the eight-year conflict.³⁸² Outnumbered, ill-equipped, and untrained, the Algerian irregulars initially conducted hit and run attacks against the French.³⁸³ They recognized early though, that they could not defeat France militarily, so the FLN focused their efforts indirectly on France's critical vulnerabilities—its' war-weary populace and its' legitimacy in Algeria. In the end, despite nearly being annihilated in 1959, the FLN succeeded in politically defeating France.

³⁸² Alexander and Keiger, "*France and the Algerian War.*" The French were initially only limitedly committed to defeating the Algerian nationalists as they were still in the process of recovering politically and economically from nearly two decades of conflict. However, between 1955 and 1956 France flooded Algeria with close to half a million soldiers, supported by a large air contingent and naval fleet. In addition, the French recruited close to 120,000 *harkis* auxiliary forces (Algerian Muslims) to support their operations throughout the countryside. By 1957, both sides were fully committed to preserving what they perceived to be rightfully theirs—Algeria.

³⁸³ Michael Burleigh, *Small Wars, Faraway Places: Global Insurrection and the Making of the Modern World, 1945–1965* (New York, NY: Viking, 2013), 326.

The FLN accomplished this by internationalizing and politicizing their cause, to bring international pressure on France, and to delegitimize France's claim to Algeria. Second, the FLN expanded their propaganda campaign to draw attention to the French military's brutality and atrocities. Next, the FLN used terrorism against European Algerians and domestic French citizens to widen the fractures between the Fourth French Republic, the French army, and the French population. As a result, the FLN successfully undermined France's motivation and persuaded them that their goals were not worth the effort. Ultimately, after a bloody and protracted six-year-long conflict, the FLN compelled the French to leave Algeria altogether in 1962.³⁸⁴ In effect, the FLN were able to shape their adversary's behavior by manipulating their motivation, while also sustaining their intrinsic motivation throughout the war.

This chapter will trace the FLN's and France's commitment and motivation throughout the Algerian War of Independence to discover how the asymmetry of motivations affected the outcome of the war. To this end, the motivation assessment framework from Chapter II will be applied to this case. By looking at changes to the actor's narrative and goals, changes in their force size, changes in the breadth and depth of their operations, and changes in their willingness to accept costs and risk, it becomes apparent that motivations fluctuated for both the French and the Algerians during the war (see Figure 1). Finally, the FLN's actions will be considered in greater detail to illuminate the ways and means irregulars used to shape intrinsic and extrinsic motivation.

³⁸⁴ Alexander and Keiger, "France and the Algerian War;" Martha Crenshaw Hutchinson, *Revolutionary Terrorism: The FLN in Algeria, 1954–1962*, Hoover Institution Publication ; 196 (Stanford, Calif: Hoover Institution Press, Stanford University, 1978), xiv. The "FLN employed a broad range of terrorist tactics in combination with mass organization, propaganda, guerrilla warfare, and diplomacy." Record, *Beating Goliath*, 115. "The protracted war in Algeria finally brought Paris to a painful choice: French prestige, the natural wealth of Algeria, and the political weight of a million *colons* on the one hand; political turmoil, continued frustration, and a deadly drain on the national economy on the other."




Figure 1. Motivation in the Algerian War of Independence

A. EVALUATING MOTIVATION IN THE WAR

The Algerian Nationalists' commitment and motivation grew significantly in 1937 after Messali Hadj organized the Parti du Peuple Algerien (PPA, Algerian People's Party).³⁸⁵ Additionally, the Algerian Nationalists' commitment and motivation continued to climb following World War II, particularly after the Sétif massacre.³⁸⁶ Eventually the FLN formed in 1954, after France failed to institute economic and political reforms or grant basic rights to the Algerians.³⁸⁷

The Algerian War of Independence officially began on All Saints Day, November 1, 1954. It was on this day that the FLN first demonstrated their commitment and resolve by issuing a list of demands and declaring their right to self-determination. As the

³⁸⁵ Alistair Boddy-Evans, "Timeline of the Algerian War of Independence," Education, *African History*, <http://africanhistory.about.com/od/algeria/l/BI-Algeria-War-Independence-Timeline-1.htm>.

³⁸⁶ Martha Crenshaw Hutchinson, *Revolutionary Terrorism: The FLN in Algeria, 1954–1962*, Hoover Institution Publication; 196 (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, Stanford University, 1978), 4–5. The Sétif massacre occurred in 1945 when Algerians rioted and killed one hundred Europeans. The French retaliated by killing thousands (estimates range between six and eight thousand) of Algerians by aerial and naval bombardment.

³⁸⁷ Alistair, Boddy-Evans, "Timeline of the Algerian War of Independence." The Front de Libération Nationale (FLN, National Liberation Front) was born out of the Comité Révolutionnaire d'Unité et d'Action (CRUA, Revolutionary Committee for Unity and Action, which evolved out of the PPA).

Proclamation was issued, the Armée de Libération Nationale (ALN, the militant wing of the FLN), executed seventy pre-planned terrorist attacks throughout Algeria.³⁸⁸ Based on this, the FLN's commitment at the beginning of the war was total; they were fully committed to their pursuit of independence.

In contrast to this, France was only limitedly committed to preserving Algérie française in 1954.³⁸⁹ The French were overextended at the time; they were dealing with nationalist uprisings in Morocco and Tunisia and the French army was withdrawing from Indochina after a crushing defeat. Additionally, as Galula recounts, the “[M]ajority of French people hated to contemplate the prospect of another long, drawn out war, in Algeria or anywhere else.”³⁹⁰ For this reason, the French began the war with limited commitment toward Algeria. Although, France's commitment and motivation toward the Algerian War of Independence grew rapidly in the following months.

For the French, Algeria was a domestic issue; as Laqueur notes, “Algeria was not a colony but part of metropolitan France, the distance from Algiers to Marseille was no greater than from Marseille to Lille.”³⁹¹ Thus, by 1955, French and Algerian commitment significantly shifted as French motivation increased rapidly and FLN motivation began to waver. The FLN suffered from internal division and disagreement

³⁸⁸ Bruce Fetter, “Colonial Rule in Africa: Readings from Primary Sources,” teachwar, *Proclamation of the National Liberation Front, 1 November 1954*, (1979), <https://teachwar.wordpress.com/resources/war-justifications-archive/algerian-revolution-1954/>. The FLN's total size at the time was estimate to be about eight hundred strong. The decree issued by the FLN laid out their ideology; it stated their desire for independence and the establishment of an Algerian state, free from French rule and internal corruption through political and military action within Algeria and aboard. Also, it offered the French the possibility of maintaining their economic interests in Algeria, it guaranteed the European Algerians basic rights and security, and offered favorable relations between Algeria and France. Also, gave the French the opportunity to grant independence politically, in which case Europeans would retain their rights.

³⁸⁹ Algérie française to the French meant maintaining their colonial rights, protecting European Algerians, and preserving their oil and economic interests in North Africa.

³⁹⁰ David Galula, *Pacification in Algeria, 1956–1958* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2006), 10.

³⁹¹ Laqueur, *Guerrilla Warfare*, 294; Thomas E. Miller, “The Efficacy of Urban Insurgency In The Modern Era” (U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 2002), www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA406965, 6. “Unlike the rest of the French North African colonies, Algeria was made part of metropolitan France in 1848.”

between its leadership; there was a general lack of political direction for the country.³⁹² More specifically, there were problems within the FLN between the “external and internal delegations, problems with tribalism and cohesion, and problems between the old leadership (like Ben Bella) and new leaders who had moved up due to combat losses.”³⁹³ In addition to being fractured, the FLN also remained relatively small, ill-equipped, and incapable. Also, the FLN’s initial attacks were largely ineffective, and the French were able to quell the violence relatively quickly.³⁹⁴ Nevertheless, these attacks also caught the French garrison troops in Algeria off guard. Alexander and Kieger note that as “FLN-ALN raids and ambushes became more frequent and widespread in 1955, the inadequacy of the quality and quantity of forces available to counter them was starkly exposed.”³⁹⁵ As a result, the French responded by increasing troop levels in 1955 and ultimately committed up to half a million French soldiers to the counterterror effort in Algeria.³⁹⁶

By 1956, France’s commitment and motivation soared as they succeeded in isolating the FLN. The French largely cut the FLN off from internal and exterior support, established a home guard to protect outlying villages, and used air superiority to destroy FLN safe havens in the desert and mountain regions within Algeria.³⁹⁷ As a result, the FLN’s commitment and motivation declined.³⁹⁸ This did not last long; the FLN’s motivation began to recover from their initial losses in August of 1956 after their leadership met in the Soummam Valley. The “two key outcomes of this meeting were, first, the decision to internationalize the war and, second, the decision to launch an all-out

³⁹² Record, *Beating Goliath*, 58.

³⁹³ Miller, “*The Efficacy of Urban Insurgency In The Modern Era*,” 32.

³⁹⁴ Galula and Nagl, *Counterinsurgency Warfare*, 44.

³⁹⁵ Alexander and Keiger, “*France and the Algerian War*,” 8.

³⁹⁶ Burleigh, *Small Wars, Faraway Places*, 348; Martin S. Alexander and John F. V. Keiger, eds., *France and the Algerian War, 1954–62: Strategy, Operations and Diplomacy* (London ; Portland, Or: Frank Cass Publishers, 2002), 54–62. In January 1955 the French only had 80,000 troops in Algeria; by June 100,000 more regular troops arrived and within a year 390,000 reserves were activated and sent to Algeria. In the same time period, the FLN grew from only 800 guerrillas to between 25,000 and 40,000 irregulars.

³⁹⁷ Alexander and Keiger, “*France and the Algerian War*,” 9–15.

³⁹⁸ Hutchinson, *Revolutionary Terrorism*, 12.

campaign in Algiers in the winter of 1956–57 to put European civilians, officials, police and gendarmes in constant fear for their lives.”³⁹⁹ This conference served to strengthen the FLN’s commitment and motivation as it solidified their goals and unified their leadership and operating procedures.

In the fall of 1956, the French demonstrated increased commitment and motivation in the months following the Suez Crisis to regain their glory once more. By January 28, 1957, the French had initiated the Battle of Algiers.⁴⁰⁰ French motivation climbed with each success during the battle, particularly after annihilating the FLN organization and leadership in Algiers.⁴⁰¹ Although the French military’s use of torture and accusations of war crimes began to sour French society, decreasing their will to persist in Algeria. In addition, the French Fourth Republic’s motivation suffered after their decision to mobilize thousands of reservists, which “[s]ent shock-waves through the body of French society.”⁴⁰² The FLN’s motivation also suffered throughout 1957 as a result of France’s counterinsurgency campaign.

The FLN bounced back later that year as their campaign to internationalize their cause began to take root. The FLN’s newspaper, the *El Moudjahid*, and an external broadcasting service, the *Voix de l’Algerie*, publicized the brutality of the French campaign in Algeria.⁴⁰³ The FLN also benefited from multiple publications that were

³⁹⁹ Alexander and Keiger, “*France and the Algerian War*,” 37.

⁴⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, 54–62.

⁴⁰¹ *Ibid.*, 8. 24,000 suspected FLN members were arrested and 3,000 FLN fighters were killed or arrested as a result of the French Paras, the Foreign Legion, and other French forces actions in Algiers.

⁴⁰² Merom, *How Democracies Lose Small Wars*, 102. The mobilization of Reserve troops became a major friction point within France. For the most part, the French populace was exhausted from WWII and Indochina.

⁴⁰³ Burleigh, *Small Wars, Faraway Places*, 326.

distributed to the French domestic population and the international community as well.⁴⁰⁴ Additionally, the FLN continued to increase the political and psychological costs for the French government by exporting terrorism to France to demoralize the French public. As a result, France's social and political will began to decrease.

Despite swelling costs, the French military continued to be highly committed and motivated as they expanded counter-FLN operations throughout Algeria and into neighboring Tunisia and Morocco.⁴⁰⁵ Also, the French military began to take more risks with indiscriminate reprisal attacks, widespread use of torture, and massive air strikes on suspected FLN safe havens.⁴⁰⁶ This led to increased international pressure, particularly after then-Senator John F. Kennedy's epic speech to the United States Senate in 1957 titled *Imperialism—The Enemy of Freedom*, in which he denounced France's actions in Algeria.⁴⁰⁷ Also, repeated hearings at the United Nations addressing the situation in Algeria were clear signals to the French government that the international community would not tolerate the war in Algeria much longer.

⁴⁰⁴ Gillo Pontecorvo, *The Battle of Algiers*, DVD (Criterion Collection, 2013). Pierre Henri Simon's *Contra la Torture*, Henri Alleg's *la Question*, and the French paper, *l'Express*, publicized first-hand accounts of French brutality and barbarism. This served to inflame members of the French elite within the church, academia, and government, leading to increased condemnation for the war. John E. Talbott, *The War without a Name: France in Algeria, 1954–1962*, 1st ed. (New York: Knopf : distributed by Random House, 1980), 90–97. After 1957, publications started flowing from disenfranchised French Reserve troops who were appalled by the army's conduct in Algeria. For example, *Le Dossier Jean Muller* was written after Muller was called back to duty in 1956. He wrote a summary of the executions of prisoners and widespread use of torture. Also, General Jacques Paris de Bollardiere asked to be relieved of his command during this time period. His request brought attention to the issues of French war crimes, as he was the first and only general officer to protest the army's tactics. Even more damning, the *Catholic Comité de Résistance Spirituelle* published *Des Rappelles Temoignent*, a collection of reservist's letters critiquing the conduct of the war. Two of the most famous and widely read were: *Contre la Torture* published by Pierre Henri Simon and *Lieutenant en Algérie* by Servan Schreiber.

⁴⁰⁵ Alexander and Keiger, "France and the Algerian War," 15. The French completed the construction of the Morice Line in 1958, preventing the FLN and ALN from operating in safe havens in Morocco and Tunisia. Soon after its completion, the Battle of the Morice Line resulted in 10,000 ALN being confined to Tunisia and 12,000 ALN casualties. A severe blow to the FLN.

⁴⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, xii. France's bombing of Sakiet Sidi Youssef in Tunisia, which killed hundreds of women and children, brought international outrage against the French.

⁴⁰⁷ John F. Kennedy, "Imperialism-The Enemy of Freedom" (United States Senate, Washington, DC, July 2, 1957), http://www.jfklibrary.org/Research/Research-Aids/JFK-Speeches/United-States-Senate-Imperialism_19570702.aspx.

The *Gouvernement Provisoire de la Republique Algerienne* was established in Cairo in 1958 with the support of the Arab League and the Soviet Union.⁴⁰⁸ This government in exile succeeded in bringing about more condemnation by the international community, particularly within the United Nations and the United States.⁴⁰⁹ Thus, by the end of 1958, France's political will and domestic motivation began a steady downward spiral. Capitalizing on this, the FLN exported their terrorism and violence to mainland France, spreading fear throughout Paris with a campaign known as the Café Wars.⁴¹⁰ This led to the collapse of France's Fourth Republic, and with it, France's motivation to continue the fight in Algeria.

In 1959, France's motivation and commitment rose slightly after Charles de Gaulle and General Challe instituted a new policy and strategy that led to the military defeat of the FLN. Although, it was also during this time de Gaulle realized that "Algeria is costing us—to say the least—more than she is worth to us."⁴¹¹ Soon thereafter, in September of 1960, 121 French intellectuals published an open letter (*Manifeste des 121*), denouncing the French army's actions and acknowledging the legitimacy of the Algerians' cause. Thus, de Gaulle soon recognized that his people were no longer willing to tolerate the war in Algeria on moral

⁴⁰⁸ Peter Harclerode, *Fighting Dirty: The inside Story of Covert Operations from Ho Chi Minh to Osama Bin Laden* (London: Cassell, 2001), 254.

⁴⁰⁹ Alexander and Keiger, *France and the Algerian War, 1954–62*. 19.

⁴¹⁰ Hutchinson, *Revolutionary Terrorism*, xvi, 101. The Café Wars campaign was an FLN terrorist campaign consisting of cigarette-pack-size improved explosive devices deployed and detonated in cafes throughout Paris. The intent was to terrorize and instill fear in the French domestic population to convince them to pressure the French government and military to leave Algeria. It was also retribution for French military abuses in Algeria.

⁴¹¹ Charles de Gaulle, *Memoirs of Hope: Renewal and Endeavor* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1971), 90, 95, 104. Charles de Gaulle took stock of the domestic and international sentiment and recognized that "if the situation dragged on our country could expect nothing but trouble and perhaps misfortune; in short, it was time to put an end to it." He also noted that "[T]he bitterness which marked the budget discussions in France for the first time since 1958 was an indication of the intense impatience and anxiety of the French people." Lee Whitfield, "Algeria in France: French Citizens, the War, and Right-Wing Populism in the Reckoning of the Republic in Languedoc, 1954–1962," *Proceedings of The Western Society for French History* 33 (2005), <http://quod.lib.umich.edu/w/wsfh/0642292.0033.025/--algeria-in-france-french-citizens-the-war-and-right-wing?rgn=main;view=fulltext>. The cost to deploy French troops, and keep them deployed, was more than the French could continue to bear. The French military spending grew from 650 billion francs per year at the beginning of the conflict, to well over 925 billion a year by 1956.

grounds and that negotiating with the FLN was necessary to spare France from spiraling further into chaos.⁴¹²

The French government's decreasing commitment to the war in Algeria became evident with Charles de Gaulle's 1959 radio broadcast, in which he offered the Algerians self-determination, mass amnesty for nationalists' prisoners, and the commutation of all death sentences.⁴¹³ As a result, a new divide emerged between the government, the *colons*, and General Challe's loyal officers.⁴¹⁴ A conspiracy coalesced, "it consisted of disgruntled professional soldiers, soured by Indochina and Suez, Gaullist (and Petainist) war veterans, supporters of Pujade and those whose persuasion was even further to the Fascist and anti-Semitic right."⁴¹⁵ Many of the French special units (particularly the Paras and the Legion) and the *pieds noirs* remained highly motivated to maintain Algérie Française—to restore their honor and protect the remaining Europeans residing in Algeria. Thus, with the outbreak of the second putsch in 1961, de Gaulle's government faced a possible coup and civil war.⁴¹⁶

Amid escalating OAS violence in France and Algeria, the French government and the French populace began to lose their motivation and interests in maintaining Algérie française. With the exception of the OAS, and elements within the French Foreign

⁴¹² Merom, *How Democracies Lose Small Wars*, 129.

⁴¹³ Michael Burleigh, *Small Wars, Faraway Places: Global Insurrection and the Making of the Modern World, 1945–1965* (New York, New York, USA: Viking, 2013), 347.

⁴¹⁴ Alexander and Keiger, *France and the Algerian War, 1954–62*, xii.

⁴¹⁵ Burleigh, *Small Wars, Faraway Places*, 340; Alexander and Keiger, *France and the Algerian War, 1954–62*, xii, xvi. The Organisation de l'Armée Secrète was formed in January 1961 by former French officers and soldiers who felt betrayed by de Gaulle and were resolute on winning the war in Algeria. In April, a Putsch attempt by Challe, Salan and others resulted in widespread violence and the arrest of over 200 French officers. OAS sympathizers were also responsible for violence and attacks in France; in October of 1961, 200 peaceful Algerian War protesters were massacre in Paris by French police.

⁴¹⁶ Eliot A. Cohen, *Commandos and Politicians: Elite Military Units in Modern Democracies*, Harvard Studies in International Affairs, no. 40 (Cambridge, Mass.: Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, 1978), 65–70. Cohen notes that several theories exist as to why the army rebelled against the government. The first theory is that the French army was politicized once it was assigned the role of securing and administering Algeria. Second, the French army's defeat in Indochina and later in the Suez Canal was disillusioning and led to general contempt for the French government. However, Cohen argues that the putsch is mostly attributed to France's reliance on elite troops. The use of elite troops "created an embittered, introspective, and hostile military sect that finally turned on its civilian masters."

Legion and the Paras, by 1961, France's commitment and motivation had totally collapsed. Conversely, the FLN's motivation and commitment continued to grow as French soldiers began to depart Algeria, and the FLN gained formal recognition from the United Nations.⁴¹⁷ Following the Evian Accords in 1962, the Algerians gained their independence.

B. EFFECTS OF MOTIVATION ON THE OUTCOME OF THE WAR

The asymmetry of motivations presented in Figure 1 reveals how commitment fluctuated over the course of the Algerian War of Independence. The FLN began the war completely committed to their goal of independence from France. Although, the FLN's motivation and commitment wavered early in the conflict as they suffered heavy losses and setbacks. The FLN's motivation and commitment recovered after they solidified their organizational structure, goals, and strategy during the 1956 Soummam Valley meeting. This was short lived as the FLN's motivation and commitment suffered another devastating blow in 1957 during the Battle of Algiers, and later after the completion of the Morice line in 1958. Still, the Algerian nationalists remained largely motivated and committed and continued to motivate the Algerian populace and petition the international community. This effort was aided by the situation in France, Charles de Gaulle's rise to power, and his public decision to grant the Algerian's their independence.

The French entered the war in Algeria with limited goals, and thus, were only limitedly committed. The French were incapable of fully committing to Algeria in 1954 as they were still withdrawing and recovering politically and economically from the First Indochina War. Nevertheless, the French reacted quickly to suppress the rising FLN violence and became very committed to protecting the *pieds noirs* and to preserving their political and economic interests in Algeria. By 1957, France had become very committed and their motivation soared with each victory over the FLN, particularly after the Battle of Algiers. The French domestic population's commitment and motivation began to decrease during this period too with the publication of French brutality and torture in Algeria. This widened the

⁴¹⁷ Alexander and Keiger, *France and the Algerian War, 1954–62*, xv.

political and social fractures in France, and with increased economic strain, the Fourth French Republic collapsed in 1958.

This brought the French government's commitment and motivation to a new low. In contrast to this, the French military, particularly the French Foreign Legion and the Para's, remained highly committed and motivated in Algeria. Though, after the second putsch, France's motivation plummeted again. By the end of the war, the FLN's motivation continued to grow while France's commitment to Algeria dissipated. The next section of this chapter will examine the actions that influenced the FLN's and France's commitment and motivation.

C. MANIPULATING INTRINSIC AND EXTRINSIC MOTIVATION

The Algerian War of Independence is a significant case study as it relates to asymmetries of motivation. By all accounts, France defeated the FLN militarily, and at times, was fully capable of defeating them politically. The FLN eventually prevailed because France's domestic situation deteriorated to the point that de Gaulle had to choose between continuing the war and risking the welfare of the Fifth French Republic. In other words, the French lost the war because the French populace and their government lost the motivation and the will to fight. The question is then, what did the FLN do to influence the motivation of the French public, their government, and their military to speed France's departure from Algeria? Furthermore, what did the FLN do to sustain their intrinsic motivation over the course of the conflict?

1. Manipulating Extrinsic Motivation

Externally, the FLN employed several strategies and exploited several fractures and political opportunities to destroy their adversary's motivation. Overall, the FLN's decision to pursue their independence politically and psychologically enabled them to erode France's political will to fight. In general, their decision in 1956 to internationalize their cause enabled them to bring the weight of the United States, the Arab League, and the United Nations to bear on France in support of their cause. Also, by appealing to the international community and gaining their approval, the FLN increased their credibility, legitimacy, and opened new opportunities for political and material support.

Second, the FLN's decision to export the war to mainland France contributed significantly to changing the average French citizens' perspective on the war. Also, by using terrorism and psychological warfare in France, the FLN succeeded in diverting the French government's attention away from Algeria to their domestic situation instead. This strategy further decreased France's motivation to continue the war in Algeria and drove the wedge deeper between the French populace and their government.

Third, the FLN structured their narrative on the principle of "justice" instead of on land reform or "control" over resources or territory. It is a widely acknowledged fact that the FLN were equally as brutal and barbaric as the French military was. Nevertheless, the FLN won the information war by demonizing the French military and publicizing their war crimes while downplaying their own terrorist acts and branding their cause as righteous and legitimate. In effect, the FLN played on the morality of the French and the legitimacy of colonialism to defeat France's political cause. In doing so, the FLN brought attention to the Algerian War and successfully modified the international community's perspective regarding the situation in Algeria. Multiple external contributing factors led to the FLN's success and the downfall of France in Algeria also. While the FLN influenced external motivations, in many regard, they also benefited from existing circumstances and political opportunities, and the actions of key brokers that bridged the gap between the FLN and other larger populations.

Even before 1954, France was not in a position to wage a protracted war. Additionally, France weakened their political claim to Algeria and their national image by relying on overwhelming force to pacify their colonial subjects. In turn, the French population's tolerance for their military's brutality increasingly eroded on moral grounds. Despite the French government's attempt to suppress news and information coming out of Algeria, French journalists, clergy, and disgruntled soldiers continued to expose the violence in Algeria and publicized the true nature of the war. As a result, by 1958, many individuals worldwide also began to take a stand against France's actions in Algeria, placing additional pressure on the French government to find a way out of the war.

The FLN also benefited and capitalized on two main political opportunities: the first putsch and the collapse of the Fourth French Republic, and the second putsch and the

political crisis that ensued. Ultimately, the internal political and economic fissures that first became a factor for France in 1954 only widened with growing financial costs and increased concern over France's conduct in Algeria. By 1959, with the formation of the OAS, de Gaulle was forced to commit his full attention to regaining control of his country instead of on the war in Algeria. Though, the FLN also had to sustain their motivation.

2. Manipulating Intrinsic Motivation

The FLN took four deliberate steps that enabled them to sustain and improve their internal motivation over the course of the war. First, the FLN laid out clear goals and a vision for Algeria in their 1954 Proclamation; this stated their intentions, their end state, and offered the French a diplomatic solution. By doing this, the FLN built instant credibility and legitimacy, thereby increasing popular support for their cause.

Second, the FLN addressed problems with its organizational design and internal structure during the 1956 Soummam Valley Conference. This conference succeeded in consolidating FLN leadership and restructured its network to increase security and survivability.⁴¹⁸ This redesign also formalized the FNL's organizational structure, roles, and areas of responsibility, which enable the group to improve their internal communication, coordination, and operational effectiveness.

Third, the FLN used propaganda to convince Algerians, the French, and the international community of their resolve and the legitimacy of their cause. Finally, when the FLN recognized that they could not secure their independence from within Algeria, they formalized their external network and gained recognition and support from nation-states, regional organizations, and international bodies. Of note, several movement entrepreneurs or brokers, such as journalists, educated elite, religious leaders, and former soldiers worked to shed light on Frances misdeeds and the plight of the Algerians. Their work significantly shaped the nature of the conflict, enabling the FLN to defeat the French politically.

⁴¹⁸ Miller, "*The Efficacy of Urban Insurgency In The Modern Era*," 33-40.

Finally, the FLN succeeded in bringing the weight of the international community down on the French to persuade them that it would be better to quit than to continue their fight in Algeria. The FLN accomplished this with a political and psychological warfare strategy that increased their legitimacy and boosted international support for their cause, while simultaneously attacking and discrediting France's colonial claim. Thus, the FLN succeeded in manipulating their adversary's commitment and motivation by exploiting key political opportunities and existing fractures in French society. The next chapter will evaluate the asymmetry of motivations in the Vietnam War to determine how the Vietnamese Communists influenced intrinsic and extrinsic motivations.

VIII. THE VIETNAM WAR

The Vietnam War is a timeless example of an irregular conflict characterized by asymmetric motivations and international intervention. Lasting more than a decade, the American portion of the Vietnam War was the “most brutal and most destructive guerrilla war in modern history.”⁴¹⁹ Fundamentally, this was a protracted internal war between Hanoi and Saigon.⁴²⁰ Like several other irregular conflicts, the Vietnam War evolved into a regional conflict and a larger struggle between Communism and the West.⁴²¹

The Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese Communists exploited many of the same grievances found in other irregular conflicts, such as government corruption and abuse, as well as, land and economic reforms.⁴²² Additionally, the outcome of this war was significantly influenced and shaped by several factors such as external support and access to safe havens.⁴²³ Furthermore, the various direct and indirect strategies used in this conflict will reveal the effect of strategic interaction on commitment and motivation.⁴²⁴ Finally, this case will demonstrate how the media influences popular sentiment, and how this factor influences commitment and motivation in irregular warfare.⁴²⁵

⁴¹⁹ William R. Polk, *Violent Politics: A History of Insurgency, Terrorism, and Guerrilla Warfare, from the American Revolution to Iraq* (New York, NY: Harper Perennial, 2008), 180.

⁴²⁰ William R. Polk, *Violent Politics: A History of Insurgency, Terrorism, and Guerrilla Warfare, from the American Revolution to Iraq* (New York, NY: Harper Perennial, 2008), 176–177.

⁴²¹ Lewis Sorley, *A Better War: The Unexamined Victories and Final Tragedy of America's Last Years in Vietnam* (New York: Harcourt Brace & Co, 1999). Sorley also notes that the Vietnam War was “a limited war within the larger Cold War within a global cultural revolution, and ultimately a failed endeavor.” xi.

⁴²² Polk, *Violent Politics: A History of Insurgency, Terrorism, and Guerrilla Warfare, from the American Revolution to Iraq*, 173. “In Vietnam, Ho Chi Minh did not achieve popular recognition as the leader of the Communist Party (the Lao Dong) but as a nationalist, an opponent of the foreigners who dominated his country. In effect, he carried the Lao Dong on his coattails rather than the reverse.”

⁴²³ Summers, *On Strategy*, 165.

⁴²⁴ Max Boot, *Invisible Armies: An Epic History of Guerrilla Warfare from Ancient Times to the Present*, 1st ed. (New York, NY: Norton, 2013), 295–298.

⁴²⁵ Sorley, *A Better War*, 287–304; Max Boot, *Invisible Armies: An Epic History of Guerrilla Warfare from Ancient Times to the Present*, 1st ed. (New York, NY: Norton, 2013), 316.

The Vietnam War was an irregular struggle with significant conventional interludes. This chapter will consider the Vietnam War as both an irregular conflict between the U.S. military and the Viet Cong (VC), and as a conventional war between the United States and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV). Additionally, this chapter will study the Vietnam War within the context of the larger Cold War, between the United States and the People's Republic of China and the Soviet Union.⁴²⁶ In doing so, it will be shown that asymmetry of motivations existed between the United States and the Vietnamese Communists.⁴²⁷ It will then be shown that the weak won by influencing intrinsic and extrinsic motivation. Furthermore, this chapter will reveal how the weak shaped and manipulated motivation.

To understand how the Vietnamese communists defeated the United States, the motivational framework from Chapter II is applied to the American experience in the Vietnam War between 1963 and 1973. By looking at changes to the actor's narratives and goals; changes in their force size; changes in the breadth and depth of their operations; and changes in their willingness to accept costs and risk, it will be shown that North Vietnam's and the Viet Cong's motivation remained high while United States commitment and motivation started very low, peaked in 1968, then declined and faded by 1973 (see Figure 2). The next section of this chapter will evaluate the commitment and motivation of the Viet Cong and the United States over the course of the war.

⁴²⁶ Womack, *China and Vietnam*, 177–181. China did not need to get involved in Vietnam, but they wanted to stay involved because they were at odds with the Soviet Union as a result of the Sino-Soviet split.

⁴²⁷ “Vietnamese Communist” is an all-encompassing term used to refer to the weak in this case study. In general, this label is used to refer to the Democratic Republic of Vietnam in Hanoi, the North Vietnamese Army, the Lao Dong (North Vietnamese Communist Party), the Viet Cong, and the NLF (National Liberation Front).




Figure 2. Motivation in the Vietnam War

A. EVALUATING MOTIVATION IN THE WAR

The struggle between the Vietnamese Communists and the United States was marked by great asymmetries of motivation. For many Vietnamese Communists, and the Viet Cong in particular, this was a protracted struggle that slowly began to take shape after the defeat and departure of the French, and Diem’s refusal to participate in nationwide elections.⁴²⁸ Thus, the North Vietnamese Communists and the Viet Cong’s (former Viet Minh) commitment and motivation to defeat Diem, to unify North and South Vietnam, began to grow as early as 1955. By 1960, the Viet Cong and NLF political cadre had heavily infiltrated South Vietnam.⁴²⁹ By 1962, the Viet Cong and the

⁴²⁸ Walter Laqueur, *Guerrilla Warfare: A Historical & Critical Study* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1998), 269, 273. The communists infiltrated the South and began to establish shadow governments at the village level and started an assassination campaign to remove key government officials in the South, between 1957 and 1958. Polk, *Violent Politics: A History of Insurgency, Terrorism, and Guerrilla Warfare, from the American Revolution to Iraq*, 176–177. For many Vietnamese, “the War of Resistance against the French-Bao Dai rule never ended; France was merely replaced by the U.S. and Bao Dai’s mantle was transferred to Ngo Dinh Diem.”

⁴²⁹ Laqueur, *Guerrilla Warfare*, 274. The Communists had a foothold in the South before the war, about 6,000 armed Viet Minh had stayed behind after the ceasefire, as “stay-behind cadres” and large-scale infiltration of South Vietnam began in 1960 (3,500 in 1960, 10,000 in 1961, 50,000 total between 1960 and 1965).; Boot, *Invisible Armies*, 416. North Vietnam formed the National Liberation Front (NLF) in 1960 to wage war in the South. By 1961, the Viet Cong had heavily infiltrated the South.

National Liberation Front's political cadre actively prepared the environment by co-opting organic social and political networks; harassing ARVN units; preaching to the peasants, and assimilating into local villages.⁴³⁰ Thus, by 1963, the Viet Cong's commitment and motivation were very high as their control throughout the South continued to expand.

Vietnam hardly registered with the American public until 1961.⁴³¹ Although President Kennedy became increasingly concerned and committed to supporting Diem, he remained wary of his advisors and the experts who were pushing for more intervention in Vietnam, particularly after the Bay of Pigs fiasco.⁴³² As a result, the United States' military's role remained limited to providing aid and advisory support to the GVN and the ARVN.⁴³³ Thus, the U.S. commitment and motivation in Vietnam was almost non-existent in the early 1960s. As the Administration's interest and concern grew, so too did its' commitment and motivation.⁴³⁴

Nineteen sixty-three proved to be a pivotal year. The Viet Cong launched their first significant attack against the ARVN during the Battle of Ap Bac.⁴³⁵ This battle was not only a military defeat for the ARVN but also, a political and psychological blow to Diem's government. In response, Diem instituted strict population control measures, which alienated the local population and incited unrest and protest, particularly among

⁴³⁰ Robert B. Asprey, *War in the Shadows: The Guerrilla in History* (New York: W. Morrow, 1994), 998–1000.

⁴³¹ Robert B. Asprey, *War in the Shadows: The Guerrilla in History* (New York: W. Morrow, 1994), 978. Vietnam was not a significant issue during the 1960 presidential election; Polk, *Violent Politics: A History of Insurgency, Terrorism, and Guerrilla Warfare, from the American Revolution to Iraq*. 175. The United States first realized that the Diem regime was in jeopardy in 1960 and it was not until 1961 that President Kennedy discussed a counterinsurgency campaign.

⁴³² Asprey, *War in the Shadows*, 988.

⁴³³ *Ibid.*, 933–1003, 1011–1012. By 1962, the United States was funding the South Vietnamese armed forces and providing military advisory and aviation support. 6,000 American advisors were sent in 1962 alone. The Military Assistance Advisory Group was changed to Military Assistance Command, Vietnam. By 1963, the U.S. military had close to 15,000 advisors in Vietnam and Administration was confident that the war had turned the corner and would be won within a year.

⁴³⁴ Laqueur, *Guerrilla Warfare*, 271. After Diem reached out to the United States for help in 1961, President Kennedy addressed the issue publically in his 1961 State of the Union.

⁴³⁵ *Ibid.*, 274. Battle of Ap Bac showed that the ARVN Soldiers were incapable, badly led, and unmotivated.

Buddhist Monks, several of whom resorted to public immolation.⁴³⁶ As Diem's government grew unstable and his control more tenuous, President Kennedy adopted a neutral position toward Vietnam and moved to withhold further aid from Diem.⁴³⁷ Unfortunately, with the assassination of President Kennedy later that year, the ascension of Lyndon Johnson brought increased United States involvement and commitment to South Vietnam.⁴³⁸ Still, the United States remained only partially committed to the war, despite President Johnson's desire to contain the spread of communism in South Vietnam.⁴³⁹

United States commitment and motivation changed significantly in 1964. At first, President Johnson's policy was to "wait and see," but the President became more committed to expanding operations in Vietnam after hostilities increased between American advisors and Communist forces.⁴⁴⁰ The Gulf of Tonkin "incident" provided President Johnson with the required justification he was looking for.⁴⁴¹ The President not only received Congressional approval to expand operations, but Gallup polls show that the majority of the American public supported him as well.⁴⁴² At the same time, the Viet

⁴³⁶ Asprey, *War in the Shadows*, 1011–1012; Polk, *Violent Politics: A History of Insurgency, Terrorism, and Guerrilla Warfare, from the American Revolution to Iraq*, 178. Diem instituted martial law and relocated 67% of the rural population into 6,800 "barbed-wire-encircled" hamlets.

⁴³⁷ Asprey, *War in the Shadows*, 1013.

⁴³⁸ Sorley, *A Better War*, xi. The United States' role in Vietnam between 1960 and 1964 was limited to advisory support.

⁴³⁹ Jeffrey Record, *Beating Goliath: Why Insurgencies Win* (Washington, DC; Poole: Potomac ; Chris Lloyd [distributor], 2009), 4. "Nothing that happened in Vietnam could or did threaten core overseas U.S. security interests, much less the survival of the United States... official rationales proffered for intervention and subsequently staying the course were abstractions—containing Communism, maintaining the credibility of the U.S. commitments worldwide, achieving peace with honor." Gil Merom, *How Democracies Lose Small Wars: State, Society, and the Failures of France in Algeria, Israel in Lebanon, and the United States in Vietnam* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 6. The "war in Vietnam was limited (and therefore lost) because the United States had other foreign policy goals, competing for resources, attention, and effort."

⁴⁴⁰ Asprey, *War in the Shadows*, 1058–1062.

⁴⁴¹ Asprey, *War in the Shadows*, 1050–54. U.S. spending increased to \$500 million a year and Johnson approved troop increases to fight openly in the South and covertly in the North.

⁴⁴² Joseph Carroll, "The Iraq-Vietnam Comparison" (Gallup, June 15, 2005), <http://www.gallup.com/poll/11998/iraqvietnam-comparison.aspx?version=print>; Summers, *On Strategy*, 98. "Even in the area of national security the primary concern was not Vietnam per se but the larger issue of containment of Soviet and Chinese communism."

Cong and NLF cadre continued to exert increased control over Southern hamlets, enabling them to expand their guerrilla operations against the U.S. military and the ARVN.

The Republic of Vietnam continued to suffer internal political divisions throughout 1965, and the U.S. government grew concerned after a second coup deposed Khanh for General Minh.⁴⁴³ To make up for this political and military weakness in South Vietnam, U.S. commitment increased significantly as the U.S. military assumed more operational responsibility in 1965.⁴⁴⁴ The U.S. military increased its footprint from just over fifteen thousand advisors to 184,000 combat troops.⁴⁴⁵ President Johnson also authorized and launched a massive bombing campaign in North Vietnam: Operation Rolling Thunder.⁴⁴⁶ In response, the Viet Cong increased their attacks and infiltrated additional guerrillas and resources into the South.⁴⁴⁷ Furthermore, Giap moved large conventional army divisions into South Vietnam, to force the U.S. military and the ARVN to fight a two front war—an insurgency throughout the South and a conventional war against the NVA.⁴⁴⁸ On top of this, fractures began to emerge in the United States

⁴⁴³ Ibid., 1083–4.

⁴⁴⁴ Don Oberdorfer, *Tet!* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday and Company, 1971), 181. “Throughout the war, the internal political weakness of the Saigon government was the Achilles’ heel of the United States and allied effort.”

⁴⁴⁵ Boot, *Invisible Armies*, 417.

⁴⁴⁶ Ibid., 417; Asprey, *War in the Shadows*, 1092–1104. U.S. spending increased in 1965 to \$700 million, and Johnson approved U.S. forces to engage in offensive combat operations. The U.S. military began to search and destroy operations, and by the end of 1965, 55,000 sorties were flown and 22,000 tons of bombs had been dropped.

⁴⁴⁷ Boot, *Invisible Armies*, 420. By the end of 1965, there were over 134,000 Communist regulars and guerrillas in the South. Asprey, *War in the Shadows*. 1143. Soviet aid to the communist movement in the South increased in 1965 to \$500 million. The Viet Cong also mounted large-scale attacks throughout the South, particularly around Binh Gai, Saigon, Song Be, Danang, Dong Xai, Chu Lai, Plei Mei, and in the Ia Drang Valley.

⁴⁴⁸ Robert B. Asprey, *War in the Shadows: Guerrillas in History* (New York: W. Morrow, 1994), 1100; Vo Nguyen Giap, *People’s War People’s Army-The Viet Cong Insurrection Manual for Underdeveloped Countries* (New York, NY: Frederick A. Praeger, 1967), xix. Guerrillas usually are effective “when the main body of their enemy is otherwise engaged, and, two, when they operate in a country of isolated communities—as in Southeast Asia today.”

due to the U.S. military's expanded role in Vietnam, the inequitable implementation of the draft, and the Civil Rights Movement.⁴⁴⁹

By 1966, General Westmoreland's "search and destroy" strategy and President Johnson's "Rolling Thunder" had failed to destroy the Viet Cong and the communist influence in South. In fact, this strategy only served to destroy civilian infrastructure, increase human suffering and loss of life, and boosted internal and external support for the Communists.⁴⁵⁰ As a result, the U.S. began to adopt a more robust pacification strategy and implemented the Chieu Hoi amnesty program.⁴⁵¹ Domestically though, public support decreased significantly as a result of continued instability in the Government of South Vietnam, the Fulbright hearings, and the Buddhist protests in 1966.⁴⁵² Specifically, the Fulbright hearings exposed the American public to Congressional and elite criticism of the war.⁴⁵³ Furthermore, the Buddhist revolts changed American perceptions of the war and challenged the justification of the Administration's containment policy.⁴⁵⁴ Regardless, the Johnson administration continued to press forward, committing more troops and resources despite growing domestic dissent.

⁴⁴⁹ Mary Susannah Robbins, ed., *Against the Vietnam War: Writings by Activists* (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1999), 20. "Some of the first signs of opposition in the United States to the Vietnam War came out of the civil rights movement—perhaps because the experience of the black people with the government led them to distrust any claim that it was fighting for freedom." The day Johnson was telling the nation about the Gulf of Tonkin incident and announcing his campaign to bomb North Vietnam, black and white activists were gathering in Mississippi at a memorial service when "One of the speakers pointed bitterly to Johnson's use of force in Asia, comparing it with the violence used against Blacks in Mississippi.;" Merom, *How Democracies Lose Small Wars*, 234. "President Johnson relied on draftees and enlistees, sharply limited the call-up of reservists and National Guardsmen, and (unlike Korea) used both sparingly because of his fears of consequences of acting otherwise...a system of deferments and exemptions protected the sons of the educated middle-class."

⁴⁵⁰ Boot, *Invisible Armies*, 417–420; Asprey, *War in the Shadows*, 1143. Soviet aid increased to almost one billion dollars in 1966.

⁴⁵¹ Asprey, *War in the Shadows*, 1127.

⁴⁵² Eric V. Larson, *Casualties and Consensus: The Historical Role of Casualties in Domestic Support for U.S. Military Operations* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1996), 24.

⁴⁵³ Sheldon Appleton, "The Public, the Polls, and the War," *Vietnam Perspectives* 1, no. 4 (May 1966), 7.

⁴⁵⁴ Asprey, *War in the Shadows*, 1171; Merom, *How Democracies Lose Small Wars*, 235. "By early 1966, the Vietnam War had become a dominant public issue."

By 1967, the United States had spent twenty-five billion dollars on the war effort, and over five hundred thousand soldiers had deployed to Vietnam.⁴⁵⁵ The U.S. Administration reported to the American public at the time that the Communists were losing and the end was in sight.⁴⁵⁶ Unfortunately, these claims served to reduce the Administration's credibility, as the war raged on and costs continued to climb without achieving any real progress.⁴⁵⁷ Additionally, the American public's support for the war began to decrease as the country became more divided due to the anti-war movement.⁴⁵⁸ Furthermore, the growing Chinese presence in North Vietnam deterred the U.S. government and restrained the U.S. military's ability to cut the Communists off from external support and access to safe havens.⁴⁵⁹ The Viet Cong during this time received reinforcements to make up for their losses, enabling them to continue to resist and disrupt the U.S. military and the ARVN.⁴⁶⁰ Therefore, U.S. commitment was beginning to reach its limits as internal fractures began to emerge, while the Viet Cong's commitment and motivation continued to soar despite battlefield losses.

⁴⁵⁵ Asprey, *War in the Shadows*, 1178.

⁴⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, 1189–1193. In 1967, U.S. forces had 9,000 killed in action, suffered 60,000 wounded, and had lost 1,822 planes and 1,416 helicopters. Westmoreland was reporting that the Viet Cong's casualty rate was nearly 1700 a week, infiltration from the North was down to 12,000, and Viet Cong recruitment in the South was down from 7,000 to 3,500 a month.

⁴⁵⁷ Carroll, "*The Iraq-Vietnam Comparison.*" Gallup polls found that President Johnson's approval rating fell from 57% in January 1966 to 27% in August of 1967.

⁴⁵⁸ Larson, *Casualties and Consensus*, 59–60. Escalation sentiments peaked in 1966 and began to decline by 1967. Furthermore, withdraw sentiment among the American public increased from 1966 to 1970; Robbins, *Against the Vietnam War*, 20–24. Student organizations around the country turned out against the war in protest. Additionally, the Catholic Church became outspoken critics of the war in 1967. Specifically, Father Philip Berrigan joined artist Tom Lewis and committed acts of civil disobedience in the United States.

⁴⁵⁹ Boot, *Invisible Armies*, 425. China's presence kept the U.S. from invading the North or Laos to either defeat the North Vietnamese regime outright or at least cut the Viet Cong off from their line of support. By 1967 the Chinese had 170,00 troops in the North. Summers, *On Strategy*, 57. "The Chinese exploded their first nuclear device on 16 October 1964, just as our involvement in Vietnam began to escalate." This changed the nature of the conflict and made the U.S. government more concerned about Chinese intervention and confrontation with a nuclear power.

⁴⁶⁰ Boot, *Invisible Armies*. By the end of 1967, there were over 280,000 Vietnamese Communist, to include NVA regulars and Viet Cong guerrillas in the south.

Both Viet Cong and American commitment peaked in 1968 during the Tet Offensive.⁴⁶¹ Tet was a tactical defeat for the Communists; it nearly wiped out the Viet Cong and damaged their intrinsic motivation.⁴⁶² At the same time, Tet was also a strategic win for the North Vietnamese Communists. The size of Tet shocked the U.S. and convinced the American public that the Administration was not honest about U.S. progress in Vietnam; increasing doubt that the war could be won militarily.⁴⁶³ As a result, political tension increased to the extent that President Johnson decided that he would not run for a second term, and General Abrams was chosen to replace General Westmoreland.⁴⁶⁴ While Tet brought the war to the forefront of U.S. domestic concern, it had failed to evoke a widespread communist uprising in the South.⁴⁶⁵ As the United States grew increasingly divided over Vietnam, the Vietnamese Communists also found themselves trying to reassure the NVA and the Viet Cong to have patience and not to be discouraged by their losses from the Tet Offensive.⁴⁶⁶ Thus, both the Vietnamese

⁴⁶¹ Ibid., 423. Giap launched a surprise attack with 84,000 fighters. This was another costly defeat for Giap: 37,000 communists were killed, and 5,800 were captured, while only 1,001 American and 2,082 South Vietnamese troops were killed. But this was a major political and psychological win for the Communists.

⁴⁶² Oberdorfer, *Tet!*, 329. A wave of dismay was swept over the Communists. "The Viet Cong lost the best of a generation of resistance fighters, and after Tet increasing numbers of North Vietnamese had to be sent south to fill the ranks. The war became increasingly a conventional battle and less an insurgency." Sorley, *A Better War*, 14. Roughly 45,000 Communists were killed during the Tet and the Viet Cong never fully recovered from these losses.

⁴⁶³ Larson, *Casualties and Consensus*, 27. 63. "Tet seems to have affected the willingness to support further escalation of the war." Polling data shows that most Americans wanted to continue the war after Tet until peace negotiations could take place and a withdrawal plan could be made. Oberdorfer, *Tet!*, 174. "The Tet Offensive made two immediate and important contributions toward legitimizing the war was a political issue. First it provided dramatic evidence that the Johnson administration had been misleading the public...Second, Tet liberated politicians, journalists and ordinary citizens from the restraining influence of their earlier positions on the war."

⁴⁶⁴ Asprey, *War in the Shadows*, 1313; W. Scott Thompson and Donaldson D. Frizzell, eds., *The Lessons of Vietnam* (New York: Crane, Russak, 1977), 108. "The extent of North Vietnam's psychological victory in the United States became apparent on March 31, 1968, when the President of the United States announced that he would sacrifice his political future in exchange for peace talks. The stock market reached a new high. The stage was set for American withdrawal from the war."

⁴⁶⁵ Ibid., 251. The Vietnamese Communists could not understand why the "revolutionary masses did not rise up against the foreigners" and the ARVN. Asprey, *War in the Shadows*. 1220.

⁴⁶⁶ Oberdorfer, *Tet!*, 225. The Ho Chi Minh and his political cadre used propaganda to refocus the NVA and the Viet Cong after losing thousands of fighters during Tet. They had to convince the Vietnamese Communists that the strategic offensive could not be accomplished in one operation, patience was required as it would take months to accomplish.

Communists' and United States' commitment and motivation decreased slightly in 1968 following Tet.

In 1969, under General Abrams' leadership, renewed pacification efforts and a new strategy of Vietnamization was adopted, further eroding Viet Cong influence in the South.⁴⁶⁷ Combined with focused efforts to deny the Viet Cong access to safe havens and cut them off from external support, the U.S. military and the ARVN largely neutralized the Viet Cong.⁴⁶⁸ Though, the larger war effort was constrained by the presence of over 300,000 Chinese military personnel in North Vietnam.⁴⁶⁹ Additionally, American perceptions of the war had fully changed in the wake of Tet; by 1969 the majority of Americans no longer believed the war was worth continuing to contain communism.⁴⁷⁰ Most Americans believed the costs outweighed the benefits of staying in Vietnam.⁴⁷¹ Still, the American public remained mostly committed due to the number of POW's held by the Communists, and because the U.S. had already invested too much in South Vietnam to let them fail.⁴⁷² Still, the U.S. commitment and motivation suffered another setback after the New York Times broke the news of CIA and U.S. Special Forces' operations in Laos.⁴⁷³

The war was fundamentally different in 1970; before Tet, the North Vietnamese Communists used the Viet Cong to wear down the U.S. military and erode U.S.

⁴⁶⁷ Sorley, *A Better War*, xi, 169. U.S. military presence also peaked in 1969 with 543,300 Americans in South Vietnam.

⁴⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, xii; Asprey, *War in the Shadows*, 1317. The Communist also suffered the loss of Ho Chi Minh in 1969. However, President Nixon's decision to halt B-52 air strikes and his decision and public announcement to withdraw forces from Vietnam emboldened the Communists.

⁴⁶⁹ Brantly Womack, *China and Vietnam: The Politics of Asymmetry* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 176. On top of this, China spent nearly 20 billion on military aid (anti-aircraft, transportation construction, provided 5 million tons of food by 1969.

⁴⁷⁰ Larson, *Casualties and Consensus*, 26. By 1969, the American public mostly did not believe containment was a valid justification for the war.

⁴⁷¹ *Ibid.*, 26–29. “[I]nvestment of U.S. prestige, blood, and treasure may have actually *increased* the perceived equities in the outcome for many.”

⁴⁷² *Ibid.*, 61–66. The number that wanted to stay, versus the number that wanted to withdraw was roughly equal. But when the issue of POWs was brought into the debate, most people favored staying in Vietnam until the U.S. government could negotiate with the DRV to bring them home.

⁴⁷³ Asprey, *War in the Shadows*, 1316.

government resolve.⁴⁷⁴ After Ho's death and the Viet Cong's defeat in 1969, the Vietnam War had become more of a conventional duel between the NVA and the U.S. military.⁴⁷⁵ The NVA Communist forces remained fully committed; the Communists continued to disrupt U.S. forces and raise the cost of the war, materially, politically, and psychologically for the United States. This divided the American public; 54% of Americans polled by Gallup reported that they approved of Nixon's handling of the war in 1970, but 57% of Americans also believed that Vietnam was a mistake.⁴⁷⁶ Additionally, several domestic issues overshadowed the U.S. military effort in Vietnam.⁴⁷⁷ As a result, the U.S. government began to look for a way out of Vietnam to achieve "peace with honor," to avoid incurring further costs and to stall the growing domestic crisis in the United States.⁴⁷⁸ This led to the redeployment of soldiers and the first major reduction in American commitment since Tet.⁴⁷⁹

With the publication of the Pentagon Papers amid the PX scandals and Lt. Calley's conviction for the Mai Lai massacre, the domestic crisis in 1971 rocked the Nixon Administration and plagued the U.S. military effort in Vietnam.⁴⁸⁰ The U.S. was no longer willing to "pay any price" to assure the survival and success of liberty in

⁴⁷⁴ Harry G Summers, *On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War* (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1995), 76–88. The Viet Cong guerrillas distracted, harassed, and slowly eroded American will for the North Vietnamese regulars to achieve decisive results in conventional battles. Their guerrilla war was an "economy of force" operation by the North Vietnamese to soften the U.S. military.

⁴⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, xiii. The United States won the guerrilla war in South Vietnam. After Tet, the war was conventional; the "later phase had almost nothing to do with counterinsurgency or guerrilla war. The threat came from the North Vietnamese regular forces in the hinterlands."

⁴⁷⁶ Carroll, "The Iraq-Vietnam Comparison."

⁴⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, 6; Sorley, *A Better War*, 175. By 1970, budget pressures started to take a toll on the Pentagon. Asprey, *War in the Shadows*, 1329–1341. The United States was suffering, on average 750 casualties a day and it was costing the American people \$70 million dollars a day. Nixon's refusal to acknowledge U.S. activity in Cambodia increased divisions between the Administration, Congress and the American public as well. Colleges and university protests exploded on almost 800 campuses, and students were shot and killed at Kent State and Mississippi. By now, the war had raged ten years, 35,000 U.S. service members were killed in action, it had cost over \$100 billion, and the U.S. had failed to make any progress in Vietnam.

⁴⁷⁸ Record, *Beating Goliath*, 4.

⁴⁷⁹ Asprey, *War in the Shadows*, 1330. President Nixon kept to withdrawing troops, 115,500 by 1970 and another 150,000 by 1971.

⁴⁸⁰ Asprey, *War in the Shadows*, 1343–1359.

Southeast Asia.”⁴⁸¹ Conversely, Giap’s regular forces demonstrated increased capability and heightened resolve during the 1972 Easter Offensive. The ARVN held off the offensive with the aid of American air support, killing an estimated 100,000 NVA regulars.⁴⁸² This was a massive military defeat for the Communists; they were forced to go on the defensive to recover and reconsolidate until conditions improved in 1975.⁴⁸³ Therefore, the Vietnamese Communists’ commitment and motivation suffered as it had in 1968 following the Tet Offensive.

The United States’ will to continue the war in Vietnam decreased significantly in 1973 after the Paris Peace Accords were signed and several POWs were released. With an approval rating of 75%, more Americans approved of Nixon’s conduct of the war than ever before.⁴⁸⁴ Regardless, Congress attempted to cut funding for the war as Nixon continued to advocate for passive assistance to the GVN to prevent the North from invading.⁴⁸⁵ The Communists used this opportunity, as they had during previous negotiations, to reinforce the NVA in the South.⁴⁸⁶ With the NVA in position and the departure of U.S. forces, the Communists invaded South Vietnam. In the end, Saigon fell to the NVA and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam in 1975.⁴⁸⁷ Thus, the United States had lost the will to fight by 1973, and by 1975, had effectively lost the war.

⁴⁸¹ Laqueur, *Guerrilla Warfare*, 276.

⁴⁸² Summers, *On Strategy*, 112–113.

⁴⁸³ Asprey, *War in the Shadows*, 1508. Reinforcements and material continued to pour from the North down the Ho Chi Minh trail, and the Communists employed new Soviet and Chinese arms against the U.S. and ARVN forces, to include radar-guided anti-aircraft guns, MIG-21 fighters, and heat-seeking missiles.

⁴⁸⁴ Carroll, “*The Iraq-Vietnam Comparison*.”

⁴⁸⁵ Sorley, *A Better War*, 364.

⁴⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, 365.

⁴⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, 356, 364. The U.S. could have negotiated from a position of strength in 1972, but domestic political factors undermined the military’s ability to win the war. Congress cut funding for the war in Vietnam in 1973, forcing the Administration to order the military to withdraw combat forces from Vietnam. Summers, *On Strategy*, 76, xiii. “The guerrillas in Vietnam did *not* achieve decisive results on their own. Even at the end there was no popular mass uprising to overthrow the Saigon government.” “Saigon did not fall to barefoot black-pajama-clad guerrillas. It fell to a 130,000-man 18-division invasion force supported by tank and artillery.”

B. EFFECTS OF MOTIVATION ON THE OUTCOME OF THE WAR

The relative commitment and motivation of the United States and the Communists during the Vietnam War is shown in Figure 2. This estimate is a composite based on changes to the actors' narratives, force sizes, changes to the depth and breadth of their operations, and changes in their willingness to accept costs. This figure shows that the Viet Cong began this conflict highly committed and motivated to succeed. Conversely, the United States entered the war with the limited goal of preserving the Government of South Vietnam as part of its containment strategy.

U.S. commitment and motivation also shifted significantly on three occasions (see Figure 2). First, U.S. commitment decreased in 1963 as a result of turmoil in the GVN and Kennedy's assassination. Then the U.S. commitment and motivation dropped briefly in 1968 after Tet as domestic unrest increased in the United States. Finally, U.S. commitment and motivation decreased significantly in 1969 after President Nixon decided to decrease the number of forces in Vietnam. Though, in general, U.S. commitment and motivation increased steadily under the Johnson administration and peaked in 1968. From this point, U.S. commitment and motivation declined progressively as President Nixon moved to extricate the United States from Vietnam in 1969. This was a turning point for the United States as fractures continued to widen in America.

U.S. commitment and motivation rose slightly in 1970 under General Abrams' leadership with his shift in strategy and its effect on the Viet Cong remnants. Though, President Nixon had already made the decision to reduce combat forces. Still, the U.S. remained highly committed as bombing continued in the North while the U.S. administration pushed for negotiations to resume. In the end, President Nixon caved to increased domestic political pressure, and by 1973 U.S. commitment and motivation was exhausted. In other words, the U.S. lost the war because it lost the motivation to fight due to domestic political and social fractures.

At the same time, the Vietnamese Communists' motivation continued to rise despite their occasional costly battlefield defeats (see Figure 2). In fact, their commitment and motivation only suffered two major setbacks, requiring them to change their strategy

to recover and reconsolidate: the 1968 Tet Offensive and the 1972 Eastertide Offensive. Ultimately, although the communist forces were wholly inferior to the U.S. military in size and capability, and had suffered significantly more casualties and setbacks, they remained fully committed and motivated. This demonstrates that the Communist's total goal of uniting Vietnam carried their commitment and motivation through to the end.

This case demonstrates the significance of asymmetry of motivation and its effect on the outcome of irregular warfare. The next section of this chapter will evaluate internal and external factors that affected the belligerent's motivation, to understand how the Communists maintained resolve while they eroded the United States' commitment.

C. MANIPULATING EXTRINSIC AND INTRINSIC MOTIVATION

The Communists slowly eroded the United States' commitment and motivation by increasing the cost of the war. It was ultimately domestic political and social pressure that brought about the exit of U.S. forces in Vietnam. The 1968 Tet Offensive, combined with several other events, served to drive the wedge deeper between the United States government, its' military, and its' population. Ultimately, the Tet Offensive exacerbated an existing budget crisis, a growing domestic social movement, President Nixon's deception of the American people, and the inequality of the draft.⁴⁸⁸ In effect, these factors eroded America's commitment to South Vietnam and its' motivation to continue the war. But this only explains why the United States' ultimately left Vietnam; it fails to address how the Communists manipulated U.S. commitment and motivation. More

⁴⁸⁸ Richard M. Nixon, *The Memoirs of Richard Nixon, with a New Introduction*, 1st Touchstone ed, The Richard Nixon Library Edition (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1990), 499. March 29, 1971, 1LT William Calley was found guilty by an Army court-martial of the premeditated murder of 22 South Vietnamese civilians at Mai Lai. Sorley, *A Better War*, 175. The 1970 budget crisis began to take a toll on the Pentagon. Asprey, *War in the Shadows*, 1329–1343. By 1970, the United States was suffering, on average 750 casualties a day, and it was costing the American people \$70 million a day. Nixon's refusal to acknowledge U.S. activity in Laos angered Congress and the American people. The Pentagon Papers, published in 1971, publicizing the Administrations' deception of the American people, driving the wedge further between them and the American government. Additionally, stories of widespread drug use among U.S. service members became public knowledge in 1971. Laqueur, *Guerrilla Warfare*, 276. By 1971, the U.S. was no longer willing to "pay any price" in order to assure the survival and success of liberty in Southeast Asia." Robbins, *Against the Vietnam War*, 26. Finally, Vietnam War protests climaxed in 1970 when Nixon's activities in Cambodia were publicized, and when Kent State and Ohio students were shot by the National Guard while protesting.

importantly, it does not explain how the Communists prevailed despite being defeated militarily.

1. Manipulating Extrinsic Motivation

The North Vietnamese Communist's success is ultimately the result of their strategy against the United States. This is not to say that their success is the result of failed U.S. policy or strategy. Rather, the Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese Communists employed a three-pronged strategy that externally shaped the United States' motivation and its commitment to South Vietnam.⁴⁸⁹ First, the Communists implemented a political warfare strategy to cement their influence and control within South Vietnam, to erode the South Vietnamese government's control, and to reduce the United States' commitment to the war. Second, the Communists used psychological warfare to exploit existing grievances, such as Buddhist and Christian tensions and land rights among poor farmers in South Vietnam, to gain popular support and to widen fractures between the U.S. government, its military, and its population. Finally, the Communists used the Viet Cong's guerrilla warfare strategy to disrupt and wear down the U.S. military in preparation for the North Vietnamese Army's conventional offensive.

Beyond this, several external factors aided the Viet Cong and contributed to their success. First, existing political and social fractures in South Vietnam and the United States affected the commitment and motivation of both belligerents. Additionally, numerous political opportunities influenced their commitment and motivation. Finally, although the Communists did not direct the media outright, the media's coverage of this war had a significant impact on the American domestic population and the international community at large.

⁴⁸⁹ Asprey, *War in the Shadows*, 977. The Communists launched a two-pronged strategy- a political struggle and military struggle. The political struggle called for a three-pronged program that first focused on consolidation of areas already controlled by the VC, re-organization of the villages under Diem's control, reeducation of the South Vietnamese population and co-opting civil services. The military struggle was subservient to the political struggle.

The Communists' success began with a political warfare campaign that was initiated well before the United States became heavily involved in Vietnam.⁴⁹⁰ Ho Chi Minh's political efforts in the South were initiated following Diem's refusal to participate in the final declaration of the Geneva Convention in 1956.⁴⁹¹ By 1957, the Communist began a concerted effort to co-opt the peasant majority, by usurping the South, village by village.⁴⁹² This deliberate effort was carefully planned and executed to ensure full support and cooperation of the local population. The Communists first assessed and surveyed each village covertly, then they elevated common grievances and removed existing government institutions and administrators to re-organize village networks. Central to this strategy, were targeted assassinations of key administrators and "prophylactic executions" of potential adversaries and opponents.⁴⁹³ This ultimately allowed the Viet Cong to assume administrative control over the local Vietnamese population, bolstering their control in the South, enabling them to "swim like fish in the sea" while operating against U.S. and South Vietnamese forces.⁴⁹⁴ The Viet Cong's political warfare effort was dependent upon a psychological warfare campaign that enabled them to expand their support and mobilize the masses against the GVN.

The Viet Cong's psychological effort was vital in "cognitively liberating" the South Vietnamese. As the Communists saw it, their first task was to win the battle of the minds in South Vietnam.⁴⁹⁵ This is easier said than done because Vietnam is not a

⁴⁹⁰ William R. Andrews, *The Village War: Vietnamese Communist Revolutionary Activities in Dinh Tuong Province, 1960–1964* (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1973), 45. Many of the Viet Cong's early operations were clandestine and took place well before U.S. troops arrived.

⁴⁹¹ *Ibid.*, 20.

⁴⁹² Polk, *Violent Politics: A History of Insurgency, Terrorism, and Guerrilla Warfare, from the American Revolution to Iraq*, 173.

⁴⁹³ Lewis H. Gann, *Guerrillas in History*, Hoover Institution Studies 28 (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1971), 86. "Planned murders, including preemptive liquidations, serve the three fold purpose of removing potential leaders of the opposition, disrupting the enemy administration, and terrorizing the waverers. As the Viet Cong have shown, prophylactic assassination is a formidable weapon in the insurrectionary's armor." Andrews, *The Village War*, 51. The Viet Cong called this the Destruction of the Oppression, and by 1959 it was in full swing. This operation eliminated anyone who may challenge their cause. Ultimately, the Viet Cong sought to destroy existing organic social bonds in the villages, capitalize on discontent, and magnify grievances.

⁴⁹⁴ Andrews, *The Village War*, 26.

⁴⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, 27.

homogeneous society; several ethnicities, religions, and social classes are found throughout South Vietnam.⁴⁹⁶ As a result, the Viet Cong had to meld the peasant majority's grievances with the problems of the working class, minorities, and religious groups to create a cohesive narrative to unify the South Vietnamese against their government. To achieve this, charismatic political cadre used propaganda, political education, and intense indoctrination to reeducate the South Vietnamese population.⁴⁹⁷ Additionally, the Communists used psychological warfare as a means of population control also. In particular, they employed village spies and security organizations, *mat hoi vein*, to ensure cooperation with the Viet Cong and the communist party.⁴⁹⁸ Though, what started out as a battle for the minds in South Vietnam became "a struggle for American public opinion."⁴⁹⁹ The Communists tailored their psychological warfare campaign and propaganda to exploit the U.S. domestic situation by encouraging antiwar

⁴⁹⁶ Nguyen Van Thieu, Our Strategy for Guerrilla War, In *Guerrilla Strategies: An Historical Anthology from the Long March to Afghanistan*, ed. Gérard Chaliand (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1982), 315. There are several subcultures, religions, and dialects spoken throughout Vietnam. The Communist would assimilate into the village culture and society. This took extensive knowledge of the people and their cultures. In villages dominated by minorities, the political cadre would first become fluent in the language and learn to think, dress, and behave as they do before the engaging them politically and recruiting them for the war effort. Some of this groundwork was five to ten years in the making and began even before the French left Vietnam in 1954.

⁴⁹⁷ Ibid., 314.

⁴⁹⁸ Andrews, *The Village War*, 109.

⁴⁹⁹ Laqueur, *Guerrilla Warfare*, 269.

activities and troop misconduct.⁵⁰⁰ Ultimately, the Communists' psychological warfare strategy increased their survivability and freedom of maneuver while also eroding the U.S. military's morale and the American people's will.

Finally, the Viet Cong's guerrilla warfare strategy was fundamental in manipulating U.S. motivations. This strategy exploited the U.S. military's "big-unit war" and enabled them to prevail over the long term by raising the costs of the war for the United States.⁵⁰¹ Instead of engaging the U.S. militarily head on, the Viet Cong fought from the shadows using hit and run tactics to keep the U.S. military off balance.⁵⁰² By choosing when and where to hit the U.S. military, the Viet Cong dictated the pace of the war and attacked only when it was advantageous to them. Additionally, when the U.S. military succeeded in isolating them, the Viet Cong simply faded back into the villages, underground tunnels, and jungles to re-emerge another day.⁵⁰³ Though in the end, it was not the Viet Cong that defeated the United States, but the North Vietnamese

⁵⁰⁰ Boot, *Invisible Armies*, 420. Radio Hanoi's Hanoi Hannah attempted to breed discontent within the U.S. military by broadcasting updates to the civil rights and antiwar movement in the United States. She also played on the treatment of African American soldiers and tried to attack the justice of the U.S. cause in Vietnam. Ho Chi Minh, *Ho Chi Minh, Selected Writings 1920–1969* (Hanoi: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1977), 305–6. Similarity. Ho Chi Minh regularly released public statements, condemning the United States' actions and appealing to the U.S. public to demand the withdrawal of American troops from Vietnam. "To the American people who are courageously opposing the aggressive war waged by the U.S. government, I convey my greetings on behalf of the Vietnamese people... Let them intensify their opposition to the U.S. government's aggressive war in Viet Nam so as to prevent their sons and brothers from being used as cannon-fodder for the private interests of their oppressors and exploiters... Officers and soldiers of the United States and its satellites, who had been driven into this criminal war, listen to reason! There I no enmity between you and the Vietnamese people. The U.S. imperialists are forcing you to serve as cannon-fodder and die in their place. They are doomed to defeat. Demand your repatriation so that you can be re-united with your parents, wives, and children! The Vietnamese people will support your struggle." Record, *Beating Goliath*, 20. "[The U.S. antiwar movement] was essential to our strategy. The American rear was vulnerable. Every day our leadership would listen to the world news over the radio to follow the growth of the American antiwar movement...it gave us confidence that we should go on in the face of battlefield reverses."

⁵⁰¹ Sorley, *A Better War*, 5.

⁵⁰² Vo Nguyen Giap, *People's War People's Army-The Viet Cong Insurrection Manual for Underdeveloped Countries* (New York, NY: Frederick A. Praeger, 1967).

⁵⁰³ *Ibid.*, 56.

Communist's overall plan to "make the war so costly for the United States that it would tire and withdraw."⁵⁰⁴

In addition to the Communists' multi-pronged strategy, existing fractures in government and civil society, both in South Vietnam and the United States, eroded America's motivation. First, Diem and his brother Ngo Dinh Nhu's actions and policies served to undermine their control within South Vietnam and put them at odds with the Kennedy administration.⁵⁰⁵ Diem and his brother failed to address popular grievances, oppressed minorities and the poor, censored the press, and forced people into strategic hamlets that turned into nothing more than "concentration camps full of unwilling guests."⁵⁰⁶ In addition to government corruption and oppression, the ARVN and Diem's secret police were particularly brutal in suppressing protesters and government opponents.⁵⁰⁷ Furthermore, when the ARVN came face to face with the Viet Cong, their poor training, lack of leadership, and low morale became evident.⁵⁰⁸ Unfortunately, while the ARVN's performance eventually improved under U.S. advisory support, the Republic of Vietnam's government remained weak and fractured for the duration of the war. After Diem was deposed and later murdered, General Khanh assumed control of the government for a few months until General Minh deposed him. The Government of South Vietnam splintered twice more before the end of the war. This placed more of a

⁵⁰⁴ Laqueur, *Guerrilla Warfare*, 269. 276. The Viet Cong succeeded as a result of guerrilla attacks that disrupted American attempts to establish base areas, lines of communication, supply depots and thwarted their pacification efforts.

⁵⁰⁵ Asprey, *War in the Shadows*, 1005. Diem ran his military down to the tactical level and behaved like a "warlord."

⁵⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, 993–1012, 1008.

⁵⁰⁷ Boot, *Invisible Armies*, 416.

⁵⁰⁸ Asprey, *War in the Shadows*, 1004; Polk, *Violent Politics: A History of Insurgency, Terrorism, and Guerrilla Warfare, from the American Revolution to Iraq*, 177; Asprey, *War in the Shadows*, 1005. 1140. The ARVN suffered because they lacked proper training and had poor leadership. The U.S. military trained them conventionally, so they made the same mistakes as the French, staying on the roads, using heavy vehicles. "By end of 1966, it was becoming clear that American troops had undertaken a task for which they were neither organized nor trained, a task that they did not understand—indeed, a task that could only have been accomplished by the South Vietnamese themselves." Nguyen Van Thieu, *Our Strategy for Guerrilla War*, In *Guerrilla Strategies: An Historical Anthology from the Long March to Afghanistan*, ed. Gérard Chaliand (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1982), 299. The South Vietnamese and the U.S. governments failed because they did not understand the rural situation and the actual grievances held by the poor.

burden on the U.S. military and increased political stress between the U.S. government and the GVN.

United States' motivation and commitment suffered from fractures in domestic politics and society. From Bay of Pigs and the Cuban Missile Crisis to the assassination of President Kennedy; from President Johnson's micromanagement of the war to Nixon's deception of the American people and the Watergate scandal; the United States government suffered one internal crisis to the next.⁵⁰⁹ On top of this, Westmoreland's failure to understand the nature of the war, and his reliance on casualty counts as a metric of success, ultimately misled the U.S. administration and the American public into thinking victory would be around the next corner.⁵¹⁰ Additionally, the way the draft was implemented was widely unpopular and corroded the military from within, leading to a class and race war and widespread drug and alcohol use within the military, particularly in Vietnam.⁵¹¹ This served to amplify the Civil Rights Movement, creating an antiwar movement that became so contentious and at times violent, that it bred suspicion, wariness, and increased the divide between the American people and the Administration.⁵¹² Finally, the coup de grace: the war became prohibitively costly for the United States. Thus, Congress attempted to cut funding against the wishes of the Administration in 1973.

⁵⁰⁹ Asprey, *War in the Shadows*, 998; Boot, *Invisible Armies*, 420–424; Robert S. McNamara and Brian VanDeMark, *In Retrospect: The Tragedy and Lessons of Vietnam*, 1st ed. (New York: Vintage Books, 1996), 247. 106. 108. 109. There was great animosity between President Johnson and the Kennedys. MacNamara notes that the U.S. mission lacked leadership under President Johnson; the Joint Chiefs were poorly informed and not working toward a unified plan. On top of this, the Joint chiefs were frustrated by Johnson's handling of the war and self-imposed restrictions. They also failed to estimate China's willingness to put troops into North Vietnam.

⁵¹⁰ Asprey, *War in the Shadows*, 1120. Command ignorance was a problem in Vietnam. Westmoreland fought the war conventionally, and the military did not understand the nature of the conflict or have sufficient intelligence on the Viet Cong or the NVA. Ultimately, the General Westmoreland and President Johnson alienated the Vietnamese population with their search and destroy tactics and indiscriminate bombing; Boot, *Invisible Armies*. 418. Westmoreland measured progress in body counts, and he did not care about collateral damage or civilian casualties. And the U.S. were so busy chasing the Communists militarily that they forgot to address the political and social needs of the people of South Vietnam. Asprey, *War in the Shadows*, 1322. "American bombing had long since given the North Vietnamese people a genuine stake in the war."

⁵¹¹ Merom, *How Democracies Lose Small Wars*, 324; Boot, *Invisible Armies*, 417.

⁵¹² Robbins, *Against the Vietnam War*, 20.

Beyond this, dozens of specific political opportunities had an effect on the belligerents' commitment and motivation. For example, the Viet Cong and the NLF's commitment and motivation soared as a result of the power vacuum left in the wake of Diem's government; enabling them to put the ARVN on the run and expand their control throughout the South.⁵¹³ Additionally, the Buddhist protest of the war in 1966 added fuel to the anti-war movement and raised concern among the American public.⁵¹⁴ And finally, Lt. Calley's actions, along with the Kent State incident, campus uprisings, and massive protests in Washington and around the country in the early 1970s served to draw the U.S. government's attention and commitment away from the war.⁵¹⁵ These events boosted the Communists' motivation and reinforced their narrative while eroding U.S. credibility and legitimacy in South Vietnam. In addition to political opportunities, the media played a significant role in shaping behavior and motivations during the Vietnam War.

The Vietnam War was the subject of open, often bitter debate on television, radio, and in the newspapers. The media openly reported on rising losses, setbacks, and high-level debate and dissent among public officials, soldiers, and community leaders.⁵¹⁶ Additionally, in breaking with prior journalistic practices, the media began to speculate on U.S. policy and strategy and publicized covert and clandestine military operations

⁵¹³ Asprey, *War in the Shadows*, 1046.

⁵¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 1171.

⁵¹⁵ Robbins, *Against the Vietnam War*, 26.

⁵¹⁶ Asprey, *War in the Shadows*, 1166–7, 1338, 1316. In 1966, Ambassador Kennan challenged the Administration's argument that South Vietnam was a strategic interest. So did Retired General David Shoup who was a Medal of Honor winner and former Commandant of the Marine Corps and member of the Joint Chiefs. Additionally, in 1966, *Harper's Magazine* published a letter from Retired General James Gavin "Challenging the logic of escalation." That same year, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee initiated the Vietnam hearings, which were televised to the U.S. public. Further, in 1969, the *New York Times* broke the story on the CIA's covert war in Laos, and in 1970, *Life Magazine* published an article in which Clark Clifford (who was President Johnson's Secretary of Defense) very publically, questioning President Nixon's actions and openly disagreed with his conduct of the war. Robbins, *Against the Vietnam War*, 21. 31. In 1967, Martin Luther King openly spoke out against the war. "Wallace Terry, a Black American reporter for *Time* magazine, taped conversations with hundreds of Black soldiers; he found bitterness against army racism, disgust with the war, generally low morale. More and more cases of "fragging" were reported in Vietnam—incidents in which service men rolled fragmentation bombs under tents of officers who were ordering them into combat or against whom they had other grievances. The Pentagon reported 209 fraggings in Vietnam in 1970 alone." Asprey, *War in the Shadows*, 1343. In 1971, the media publicized stories of widespread drug use amongst U.S. troops in Vietnam.

before they were acknowledged by the Administration.⁵¹⁷ Finally, “More than ever before, television showed the terrible human suffering and sacrifice of war.”⁵¹⁸ As a result, the Administration was not capable of isolating the American public from the disturbing realities of the war, nor were they able to operate freely without betraying the trust of the American people. Ultimately, the media’s coverage of the war served to raise awareness and heighten American concern.⁵¹⁹ Although the media’s coverage of the war fueled the anti-war movement and increased existing political tensions—it did not overly decrease American popular support for the war.⁵²⁰ Therefore, the Viet Cong’s three-pronged strategy, in conjunction with existing fractures and political opportunities, externally shaped the United States’ motivation to fight and its’ commitment to South Vietnam. Nevertheless, as important as this is, the Viet Cong also had to sustain internal motivation to endure against the U.S. military.

2. Manipulating Intrinsic Motivation

Critical to the Communist’s success was their ability to exist and fight in South Vietnam despite the overwhelming size and capability of the U.S. forces and the ARVN. Several factors enabled the Communists to persist for over a decade. First and foremost, the Communists received substantial military aid and support from China and the Soviet

⁵¹⁷ Nixon and Nixon, *RN*, 404. Nixon had not decided on what to do with the bombing moratorium or the future of the war when the *Boston Globe* announced that Nixon planned to withdraw 300,000 men during 1970. Soon after that, Dan Rather, reporting for CBS, announced that Nixon was considering increasing troop withdraws, fewer B52 raids, and a reduction in fighting and possible ceasefire before the end of the year. This was all reported in advance of Nixon’s decision or any announcement regarding the future of the war. Walter Cronkite, “*CBS News Special Report*” (CBS News, February 27, 1968), <http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=106775685>.) “Both in Vietnam and Washington to have faith any longer in the silver linings they find in the darkest clouds. For it seems now more certain than ever, that the bloody experience of Vietnam is to end in a stalemate. To say that we are closer to victory today is to believe in the face of the evidence, the optimists who have been wrong in the past. To say that we are mired in stalemate seems the only realistic, if unsatisfactory conclusion... But it is increasingly clear to this reporter that the only rational way out then will be to negotiate, not as victors, but as an honorable people who lived up to their pledge to defend democracy, and did the best they could.”

⁵¹⁸ Nixon and Nixon, *RN*, 350.

⁵¹⁹ Summers, *On Strategy*, 39. “[T]he majority of on scene reporting from Vietnam was factual—that is the reporters honestly reported what they had seen firsthand.”

⁵²⁰ Larson, *Casualties and Consensus*, 61.

Union.⁵²¹ China's presence in North Vietnam, in particular, was extremely influential in deterring U.S. military operations outside of South Vietnam.⁵²² Additionally, military industrial complexes in Communist China and the Soviet Union enabled supplies to flow unabated down the Ho Chi Minh Trail, enabling the Communists to escalate the number and size of their guerrilla attacks against American and ARVN patrols and outposts.⁵²³ Furthermore, the Communists continued to evade U.S. forces and the ARVN by melting into the dense triple canopy jungles of Vietnam and neighboring sanctuaries in Cambodia and Laos.⁵²⁴ On top of external support, North Vietnam was greatly aided by the structure and organizational design of their forces.

Organizationally, the Viet Cong assimilated into South Vietnam; the U.S. military lacked sufficient enemy intelligence because the enemy could not be separated from the population. The Viet Cong achieved this with a political campaign that ultimately enhanced their control and reinforced their survivability.⁵²⁵ Central to this was the deliberate and painstaking effort of the political cadre that worked "village by village" to educate, indoctrinate, and "cognitively liberate" the populace.⁵²⁶ By living among their people, the political cadre began by co-opting organic family and kinship networks and

⁵²¹ Womack, *China and Vietnam*, 177–181. China did not need to get involved in Vietnam, but they wanted to stay involved because they were at odds with the Soviet Union.

⁵²² *Ibid.*, 174. "From 1965 to 1975 China remained the most important source of foreign aid and support for the Democratic Republic of Vietnam in its continuing struggles with the United States and the Saigon regime." Despite the cultural revolutions and a food shortage, China continued to support Vietnam, even after Kissinger's visit in 1971. China even increased its aid after Nixon's visit in 1972. Ultimately, China's aid was essential to the Communist North Vietnamese victory.

⁵²³ Sorley, *A Better War*, 373; Asprey, *War in the Shadows*, 1193. The Communists had ample supplies of ammo and resources as a result of open supply lines from Russia and the Soviet Union. Polk, *Violent Politics: A History of Insurgency, Terrorism, and Guerrilla Warfare, from the American Revolution to Iraq*, 179. "Despite constant bombardment, there was an "undiminished flow of men and supplies."

⁵²⁴ Sorley, *A Better War*, 218.

⁵²⁵ Andrews, *The Village War*, 25; Nguyen Van Thieu, Our Strategy for Guerrilla War, In *Guerrilla Strategies: An Historical Anthology from the Long March to Afghanistan*, ed. Gérard Chaliand, (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1982), 315. Nguyen Van Thieu was an NLF leader and a member of the NLF's central committee. "[P]olitical work must follow the armed struggle very closely. The armed struggle helps break the regime's grip and opens the way for propaganda and political work. But political work is always necessary. Without it, there can be no victory."

⁵²⁶ Polk, *Violent Politics: A History of Insurgency, Terrorism, and Guerrilla Warfare, from the American Revolution to Iraq*, 173; Laqueur, *Guerrilla Warfare*, 271.

then worked clandestinely to expand and project their influence to neighboring hamlets.⁵²⁷ Additionally, the cadre succeeded in building support for their cause by presenting their goals and ideologies within the framework of existing grievances and narratives, such as nationalism and land reform, rather than communist or Marxist ideals outright.⁵²⁸ As a result, they were able to breed discontent and recruit the population to rise up against the local government and the U.S. military.

To sustain their control over the population, the Viet Cong, and the political cadre had to adapt and overcome the growing success of the U.S. pacification efforts. To these ends, the Communists used population control measures such as truth councils, *kiem thao*, to encourage people to self-report to ensure loyalty to the resistance and the party.⁵²⁹ Furthermore, the Communists often resorted to physical coercion; reinforcing their control over the local population with brutality, terror, and torture.⁵³⁰ Ultimately, this provided the Viet Cong with freedom of maneuver, enabled them to disrupt U.S. and ARVN forces, and chipped away at U.S. morale by increasing the duration and the costs of the war. The next chapter will compare and contrast Chapters VII and VIII to determine how the weak often defeat the strong. It will then summarize the lessons learned in this thesis to explain why and how irregulars succeed when they do. Additionally, the following chapter will offer recommendations for future research, and it will suggest alternative ways to support and defeat irregulars.

⁵²⁷ Nguyen Van Thieu, Our Strategy for Guerrilla War, In *Guerrilla Strategies: An Historical Anthology from the Long March to Afghanistan*, ed. Gérard Chaliand (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1982), 314.

⁵²⁸ Laqueur, *Guerrilla Warfare*, 273; Andrews, *The Village War*, 20–67; Nguyen Van Thieu, Our Strategy for Guerrilla War, In *Guerrilla Strategies: An Historical Anthology from the Long March to Afghanistan*, ed. Gérard Chaliand (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1982), 316. “You should never impose conditions on the peasantry; they must be helped to understand for themselves why armed struggle is necessary: they are already aware of their own interests. Above all, you should help elevate their political consciousness and their level of organization.”

⁵²⁹ Andrews, *The Village War*, 117.

⁵³⁰ *Ibid.*, 115.

IX. CONCLUSION

This thesis sought to explain why and how irregulars win when they do for two main reasons. First, this thesis sought to understand how the U.S. government, and SOF in general, could support the weak more effectively to achieve limited goals in irregular warfare. Additionally, the purpose of this thesis was to reveal how the United States can defeat irregulars more efficiently when they threaten U.S. interests.

The intent of Part Two was to understand how irregulars manipulate extrinsic and intrinsic motivation and to demonstrate how asymmetry of motivations enables irregulars to succeed. Thus far however, this thesis has argued that asymmetries of motivation do not fully explain irregulars' successes. Alternatively the analysis of Chapters III, IV and V in Chapter VI revealed that popular opinion and support explain why motivation fluctuates in irregular warfare. Therefore, the lessons from Chapters VII and VIII are still relevant and useful. Chapter VII and VIII from Part Two traced motivation in the Algerian War of Independence and the Vietnam War to gain insights into how motivation fluctuates over the course of a conflict, and to reveal how irregulars shape motivation intrinsically and extrinsically to enable their success.

This final chapter will compare and contrast Chapter VII and VIII to reveal how motivations are influenced and shaped to enable irregulars to succeed. Finally, recommendations for further areas of study to expand on these lessons and to account for emerging threats and strategic trends in irregular warfare will be discussed. This discussion will also propose ways to defeat irregulars, and how the United States military can enable irregulars to succeed in pursuit of U.S. political goals.

A. SHAPING MOTIVATION AS A MEANS OF MODIFYING BEHAVIOR

“Motivation” and “will” are intrinsically biological and psychological; they are the catalyst for human action found in every individual or group action and interaction. It is why we get out of bed in the morning and go to work every day. It is why we save for retirement and wear helmets when we ride a bike. It is also why we go to war—and it is why we stop fighting. At the most basic level, motives are “[T]he forces within a person

that affect his or her direction, intensity, and persistence of voluntary behavior.”⁵³¹ Motives are multidimensional; they are both intrinsic and extrinsic. In other words, irregulars must first foster intrinsic motivation, which are forces that drive participation and sustain collective action.⁵³² Then, irregulars must shape and manipulate their opponents’ extrinsic motivation. This means that irregulars must condition and reinforce behavior either with punishment or positive and negative rewards to compel their adversary to negotiate or quit.⁵³³ Therefore, to understand how to make people fight harder, or stop fighting altogether, it is critical to understand how intrinsic and extrinsic motivations are shaped and manipulated.

1. Shaping Intrinsic Motivation in Irregular Warfare

The Algerian War of Independence demonstrated that intrinsic motivation is critical to the success and survival of the irregular. If the irregular neglects intrinsic motivation, it will likely fail to mobilize the necessary support required to survive or flounder due to organizational fractures and inefficiencies. Additionally, as this first case demonstrates, intrinsic motivation enables irregulars to adapt and evolve, but also, to improve public opinion and popular support to increase collective action and freedom of maneuver.

⁵³¹ Steven Lattimore McShane and Mary Ann Young Von Glinow, *Organizational Behavior: Essentials*, 1st ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2007), 24.

⁵³² Richard M. Ryan and Edward L. Deci, “Intrinsic and Extrinsic Motivations: Classic Definitions and New Directions,” *Contemporary Educational Psychology* 25, no. 1 (January 2000): 54–67, doi:10.1006/ceps.1999.1020. Ryan and Deci explain that intrinsic motivated behavior is performed out of interest, and derived from the satisfaction of the activity itself. This is critical for the weak as the rewards, often being freedom or autonomy from the strong, seem beyond reach. Therefore, the weak must continuously work to foster and improve internal motivation to ensure their combatants continue the fight and resist despite being outnumbered and equipped. Intrinsic motivation is often associated with free will, or determined behavior that does not require any stimulus to produce. Intrinsic motivation is often shaped and modified through the principles of organizational theory and design. Huber, G. P. & Glick, W.H. eds. 1993. *Organizational Change and Redesign*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 10, 228. Organizational design is the [A]ggregate configuration of an organization’s technologies, processes, and structures.” Schermerhorn, Osborn, and Hunt, *Organizational Behavior*. Organizational design is the process of choosing a structure best suited to ensure success given its size, processes, technology, environment, strategy and goals.

⁵³³ Ryan and Deci, “Intrinsic and Extrinsic Motivations.” Extrinsic or external motivation is modified through force, political, psychological or social pressure, persuasion, or full assimilation of the idea as their own or just.

The FLN improved intrinsic motivation in four different ways. First, the FLN laid out clear goals and a vision for Algeria in a clear public proclamation. This not only increased domestic and international visibility and concern but also, built credibility and legitimacy for their actions. Second, the FLN readdressed their organizational structure and design after suffering major losses. This maintained intrinsic motivation and enable the irregulars to continue to fight amid leadership targeting and repression. Furthermore, this increased the FLN's overall security and survivability, and formalized their organizational structure, roles, and areas of responsibility. In effect, this improved their internal communication, coordination, and operational efficiency and effectiveness. Furthermore, the FLN used propaganda internally to foster collective action and to increase popular support. Finally, the FLN formalized and expanded their external networks to gain recognition and support from other nation-states, regional organizations, and international bodies.

Alternatively, the Vietnamese Communists' intrinsic motivation and their organizational effectiveness and security benefited from significant Chinese and Soviet military aid and support. Specifically, China's presence in North Vietnam not only deterred the U.S. military but also improved the Vietnamese Communists' intrinsic motivation. On top of this, the NVA and Viet Cong's access to external safe havens improved their internal motivation and aided their ability to recoup and recover from major setbacks.

More significantly, though, the North Vietnamese conducted nearly a decade of advanced force operations to prepare the environment before the Vietnam War. The Communists used political warfare, indoctrination, and political cadre to co-opt organic networks and organizations to ensure their organizational effectiveness and survival. This strategy enabled the irregulars and the NVA to hide among the population while disrupting U.S. military operations. This also enabled them to fully understand and appreciate friendly, enemy, and neutral populations to expand their support networks and improve their narrative to increase collective action. The Communists achieved this with a mix of political and physical coercion, terrorism, brutality, and torture. Though, doing

so increased their intrinsic motivation by improving their organizational effectiveness, security, and freedom of maneuver.

These two chapters and the two conflicts they profile reveal that commitment and motivation are not fixed. They fluctuate over the duration of a conflict in response to internal and external forces. To win, irregulars should focus their efforts on maintaining their motivation while decreasing their opponents. Interestingly, both of these cases reveal that it was the French and American people, not their military, which ultimately lost the will to fight and pressured their respective governments to quit and withdraw. Thus, these two chapters indicate that irregulars are likely to prevail when they can reduce their opponent's popular and political will to fight. To this end, these cases reveal several common practices irregulars used to influence intrinsic motivation.

Irregulars manipulate and shape intrinsic motivation by addressing their organizational design and effectiveness. In particular, irregulars should improve intrinsic motivation after operational failures, as a result of external pressures, and to expand capabilities.⁵³⁴ As these cases indicate, efforts to improve intrinsic motivation should focus on mobilizing support and encouraging collective action by focusing on three causal forces—purpose, people, and the environment.⁵³⁵

Intrinsic motivation is influenced and driven primarily by organizational leadership. Charismatic leaders such as Castro and Nasrallah set a direction, developed a vision and strategy, aligned, motivated, and inspired people.⁵³⁶ Moreover, leaders foster and develop an organizational culture that defines boundaries, conveys a sense of identity, generates commitment beyond oneself, and enhances stability and control within the organization.⁵³⁷ In effect, leaders connect the needs of individuals with the needs of

⁵³⁴ Barry R. Posen, *The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany between the World Wars*, 1st ed. (Cornell University Press, 1984), <http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7591/j.ctt1287fp3>, 47.

⁵³⁵ *Ibid.*, 39-42. Posen also notes that organizational factors are subject to the constraints and opportunities present in the international political system.

⁵³⁶ John P. Kotter, "What Leaders Really Do," *Harvard Business Review Best of HBR*, no. Breakthrough Leadership (December 2001): 85-96.

⁵³⁷ Deborah Gibbons, "Organizational Principles" (Lecture, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, April 12, 2016).

the group. As Deborah Gibbons explains: “If we understand how these needs influence people’s desires and actions, we can do a better job of motivating them.” Ultimately, then, leaders motivate others by “taking advantage of structural opportunities, to articulate cultural themes, and to manipulate incentives for action.”⁵³⁸ Leaders also enable and shape another dimension of intrinsic motivation too—purpose.

Action without purpose can lead to decreased motivation, and thus, lesser amounts of action. Therefore, to build and sustain motivation, leaders and organizations, such as the ALN and the Viet Cong, used goals to drive individuals toward a common, purposeful end. Gibbons notes that “with clearly defined and challenging goals, commitment from participants, objective and timely feedback, and confidence in one’s ability to perform, goal setting can lead to dramatic improvements in performance.”⁵³⁹ Clarifying roles and establishing clear and specific performance objectives further enables this.⁵⁴⁰ This is exactly what the FLN leadership did during the Soummam Valley Conference.⁵⁴¹ Beyond this, organizations typically evolve from and are products of their environment.

The Algerian War of Independence and the Vietnam War also indicate that irregular organizations improve intrinsic motivation by responding and adjusting to environmental constraints and opportunities.⁵⁴² More to the point, internal motivation, one’s desire to participate out of free will, is a product of social ties, a perception of

⁵³⁸ Ron Aminzade, Jack A. Goldstone, and Elizabeth J. Perry, “Leadership Dynamics And Dynamics Of Contention,” in *Silence and Voice in the Study of Contentious Politics*, ed. Ronald R. Aminzade et al. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 126–54, <http://ebooks.cambridge.org/ref/id/CBO9780511815331A016>, 128.

⁵³⁹ Gibbons, “Organizational Principles.”

⁵⁴⁰ McShane and Von Glinow, *Organizational Behavior*.

⁵⁴¹ Alexander and Keiger, “*France and the Algerian War*,” 37.

⁵⁴² David Tucker, “*Terrorism, Networks, and Strategy: Why the Conventional Wisdom Is Wrong*,” *Homeland Security Affairs* 4, no. 2 (June 2008), <https://www.hsaj.org/articles/122>, 7. Tucker notes that “the important issue is not whether an organization is a hierarchy or centralized, or a network or decentralized, but how well its structure is adapted to the activities the organization carries out and the environment in which it carries them out.”

organizational effectiveness, and interests in the political issue.⁵⁴³ For example, the Vietnamese Communists adjusted their narrative to address local grievances such as government and land reform rather than on larger communist issues. Therefore, irregulars must consider how they craft their narrative and how they are structured and governed to align with local environments and populations.⁵⁴⁴

Similarly, irregular groups, such as the Mujahedeen and the Chechen Rebels, often emerge and develop from informal, organic social networks that are composed of strong ties between tight-knit members of the community who share similar political beliefs, desire common goals, and trust each other.⁵⁴⁵ These networks are particularly important in mobilizing people during the latent and incipient phase of irregular warfare—by socializing potential members to the group’s *raison d’être*, cognitively liberating them from the confines of inaction, and providing opportunities to participate.⁵⁴⁶ This explains why the Viet Cong were so successful in South Vietnam before 1967. However, networks evolve over time as organizations move beyond

⁵⁴³ Mario Diani, Doug McAdam, and Florence Passy, eds., “Social Movements Matter,” in *Social Movements and Networks* (Oxford University Press, 2003), <http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/view/10.1093/0199251789.001.0001/acprof-9780199251780>, 40.

⁵⁴⁴ Nancy Roberts, “*Network Design Continuum: Moving Beyond the Fault Lines in Social Network Theory and Research*,” March 1, 2013, [https://cle.nps.edu/access/content/group/fde0329f-f502-4c76-9f4d-059fcd318755/Course_Documents/Roberts %20Network%20Design%20Continuum%2C%20Moving%20Beyond%20the%20Fault%20Lines.pdf](https://cle.nps.edu/access/content/group/fde0329f-f502-4c76-9f4d-059fcd318755/Course_Documents/Roberts%20Network%20Design%20Continuum%2C%20Moving%20Beyond%20the%20Fault%20Lines.pdf). 10-20. Roberts explains that network structure “describes the overall pattern or shape of the network” while “Network governance describes the authority relationships among the network members specifying how goals are established, decisions made, actions coordinated and controlled, re-resources allocated, and disputes arbitrated and resolved, all in the pursuit of network outcomes, legitimacy and accountability.” Further, “Informal networks are spontaneous, ad hoc and voluntary interactions that emerge organically, serendipitously, and opportunistically,” while formal networks “have a purpose or goal that guides collective action. These types of networks exist to get something done such as the production of goods or services, or the development of new ideas and innovations.”

⁵⁴⁵ Tucker, “Terrorism, Networks, and Strategy: Why the Conventional Wisdom Is Wrong,” 8-9; Mohammed M. Hafez, “The Ties That Bind: How Terrorists Exploit Family Bonds,” *CTC Sentinel* 9, no. 2 (February 2016): 15–17.

⁵⁴⁶ Diani, McAdam, and Passy, “*Social Movements Matter*,” 23–25. The author notes that networks “[I]ntervene in the early stage of the participation process” by providing three core functions—a socialization function, a structural connection function, and a decision shaping function. McAdam, *Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency, 1930–1970*, 48–51. McAdam explains that cognitive liberation is a “[T]ransformation of consciousness within a significant segment of the aggrieved population.” “[P]eople must collectively define their situations as unjust and subject to change through group action.” McAdams also notes that cognitive liberation is dependent on fluctuation political conditions and presence of cognitive cues.

recruitment and become more focused on a cohesive strategy, overall security, and long-term survival.⁵⁴⁷ As a result, networks may become more formalized and more centrally governed at higher echelons as goals and leadership are solidified.⁵⁴⁸ This was the case for some groups such as the PA, but it is not true in all cases, particularly amongst contemporary irregulars and networked terrorist groups such as al-Qaeda. Ultimately, to maintain and improve upon intrinsic motivation and one's willingness to participate, organizations must constantly reassess their needs and capabilities in relation to their internal structure and the environment.

2. Shaping Extrinsic Motivation in Irregular Warfare

The FLN shaped and manipulated extrinsic motivation by first politicizing and internationalizing their cause to bring the weight of the United States, the Arab League, and the United Nations to bear on France in support of their cause. This also increased the FLN's credibility, legitimacy, and opened new opportunities for political and material support. The FLN also exported the war to mainland France to raise political and psychological costs, and shift the focus of the war from Algeria to France's domestic marketplace of ideas. This decreased France's motivation to continue the war in Algeria and drove the wedge deeper between the French populace and their government. Additionally, the FLN structured their narrative on higher level needs such as the principle of "justice" instead of on lesser or local needs such as land reform or "control" over resources or territory. This enabled the FLN to win the war of ideas and battle of the narrative. In effect, the FLN played on the morality of the French and the legitimacy of colonialism to defeat France's political cause. Beyond this, the FLN also benefited from existing social and political fractures in France.

In contrast to this, the North Vietnamese Communists employed a three-pronged strategy to shape U.S. motivation and its' commitment to South Vietnam. First, the Communists implemented a political warfare strategy to reduce the United States'

⁵⁴⁷ Tucker, "Terrorism, Networks, and Strategy: Why the Conventional Wisdom Is Wrong," 12.

⁵⁴⁸ Roberts, "*Network Design Continuum: Moving Beyond the Fault Lines in Social Network Theory and Research*," 26.

commitment to the war. The Communists first used this strategy and leveraged their relationship with China and the Soviet Union to frustrate and complicate the war for the U.S. government. The Communists also used psychological warfare to widen fractures between the GVN and the U.S. government. This exploited the U.S. domestic situation by encouraging dissent, and increasing tensions and doubt amongst Americans and U.S. troops. Finally, the Communists used guerrilla warfare to disrupt the U.S. military while they employed conventional warfare to increase political and psychological costs for the United States. This dual strategy exploited the American Way of War and the U.S. military's propensity for large conventional military operations.⁵⁴⁹ Ultimately, the NVA's and Viet Cong's mixed strategy raised the cost of the war and widened existing social and political fractures within the United States.

These two cases indicate that shaping and manipulating external motivations are a matter of strategy. On the surface, war appears to be a contest of strength, but at the core, war is a contest of wills.⁵⁵⁰ This battle for the minds can be conducted directly through conventional brute force—or indirectly through political and psychological finesse. As the cases in this thesis demonstrate, brute force is not always an option—either because of internal organizational weaknesses, a desire to avoid repression, or because it is politically unfeasible.⁵⁵¹ As a result, the North Vietnamese and the Algerian Nationalists reveal that political and psychological warfare may be more suitable to winning the contest of wills and battle for the minds by sowing dissent within an enemy's camp,

⁵⁴⁹ Russell Frank Weigley, *The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy*, Indiana University Press paperback ed, *The Wars of the United States* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1977). Russell Weigley notes that Americans tend to focus on large maneuver based attrition warfare.

⁵⁵⁰ Clausewitz, Howard, and Paret, *On War*, 69, 75, 91. “War can be of two kinds, in the sense that either the objective is to overthrow the enemy – to render him politically helpless or militarily impotent...” “War is... an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will.” “Not every war need be fought until one side collapses. When the motives and tensions of war are slight we can imagine that even the faintest prospect of defeat might be enough to cause one side to yield. If from the start the other side feels that this is probable, it will obviously concentrate on bringing about this probability rather than take the long way around and totally defeat the enemy.”

⁵⁵¹ Posen, *The Sources of Military Doctrine*, 45. Posen also adds that “Organizations resort to political strategies when material ones are too expensive or are proscribed...”

persuading an opponent to quit, or persuading everyone else that their opponent's cause is immoral and unjust.

The irregular conflicts defined by asymmetric motivation reviewed in this thesis reveal that irregulars often prevail by coercing and compelling their opponent to quit. Coercive diplomacy and compellence are strategies that target the motivation of state leaders and elites.⁵⁵² However, for coercion to be effective, the irregular must not only have a credible capability but must also be willing to follow through on threats of force.⁵⁵³ While coercion is most often associated with nuclear weapons and deterrence—the FLN, PIRA, FARC, Hezbollah, Chechen rebels, and al-Qaeda have proven that terrorism and guerrilla warfare can also be used by the weak to coerce, compel and bargain with the strong.⁵⁵⁴ Notably, the primary factors favoring the success of coercive diplomacy are the same that often exist in irregular conflicts—an asymmetry of motivations favoring the coercer, a sense of time urgency on the part of the target, and the target's fear of unacceptable escalation.⁵⁵⁵ By design then, this suggests that irregulars should employ coercive diplomacy as a strategy to shape an opponent's motivation and thus, their will to fight. Complementing this is the use of psychological warfare to persuade enemy, friendly and neutral parties to win the battle of the narrative and the war of ideas.⁵⁵⁶

⁵⁵² Carnes Lord, "The Psychological Dimension in National Strategy," in *Political Warfare and Psychological Operations*, ed. Frank R. Barnett and Carnes Lord (Washington DC: National Defense University Press, 1989), 13–36, https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/139664/1989-01_Political_Warfare_8-Chap.pdf, 18. Lord explains that political action may include "multilateral diplomacy, support for foreign political parties or forces, and support for or working with international associations of various kinds." Coercive diplomacy is defined as "diplomacy presupposing the use or threatened use of military force to achieve political objectives." And covert political warfare is defined as "active measures, and includes support for insurgencies, operations against enemy alliances, influence operations, and black propaganda."

⁵⁵³ Huth, *Extended Deterrence and the Prevention of War*; Thomas C. Schelling, *Arms and Influence* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1976), 7.

⁵⁵⁴ Andrew H. Kydd and Barbara F. Walter, "The Strategies of Terrorism," *International Security* 31, no. 1 (Summer 2006): 49–80.

⁵⁵⁵ Jack S. Levy, "Deterrence and Coercive Diplomacy: The Contributions of Alexander George," *Political Psychology* 29, no. 4 (August 2008): 537–52, doi:10.1111/j.1467-9221.2008.00648.540.

⁵⁵⁶ Lord, "The Psychological Dimension in National Strategy," 16; Frank L. Goldstein and Daniel W. Jacobowitz, "Psychological Operations, An Introduction," in *Psychological Operations: Principles and Case Studies* (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University Press, 1996), 9.

As of late, irregulars such as al-Qaeda have demonstrated that psychological warfare is a cheap tool and an effective strategy that can be used to persuade relevant populations to alter what they think and believe, to influence how they act and behave.⁵⁵⁷ As this thesis has illuminated, irregulars accomplish this by reducing an opponent's morale and combat efficiency; creating dissent and dissatisfaction; promoting civil resistance and disobedience within a populace; or enhancing the legitimacy of one's cause through any communication means.⁵⁵⁸ In essence, irregulars have become increasingly adept at using psychological warfare to win the battle of the narrative. The FLN and Hezbollah proved that victory in irregular warfare is not "only about whose military wins but whose story wins."⁵⁵⁹ In effect, narratives have significant influence and can shape perceptions, opinions, and support for or against belligerents. Furthermore, as Nasrallah and al-Qaeda demonstrate, irregulars have a significant advantage in the battle of the narrative as they are bound less by the truth and subject to less scrutiny than the strong, particularly amongst local and regional audiences. Though, to extrinsically shape motivation, irregulars must not only change perceptions, but also, what people believe. In other words, they must win the war of ideas.

To win the war of ideas, irregulars must target all of the relevant populations—to include friendly, enemy, and neutral parties that have the ability to influence internal and external opinions driving motivation.⁵⁶⁰ The Algerian Nationalists demonstrated that

⁵⁵⁷ Ron Schleifer, "Psyoping Hezbollah: The Israeli Psychological Warfare Campaign During the 2006 Lebanon War," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 21, no. 2 (March 31, 2009): 221–38, doi:10.1080/09546550802544847, 232; Richard G. Stilwell, "Political-Psychological Dimensions of Counterinsurgency," in *Psychological Operations: Principles and Case Studies*, ed. Frank L. Goldstein and Benjamin F. Findley (Air University, Maxwell AFB AL, 1996), 319–29, 319. Stilwell notes that psychological warfare is a viable option when military force is unavailable or inappropriate, and is best used in conjunction with military force to minimize costs and maximize effects. Goldstein and Jacobowitz, "Psychological Operations, An Introduction," 9. The ultimate purpose of psychological warfare is to persuade an opponent to act in a manner favorable to one's own position.

⁵⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, 5.

⁵⁵⁹ Isabelle Duyvesteyn, "Escalation and De-Escalation of Irregular War: Some Observations and Conclusions," *Journal of Strategic Studies* 35, no. 5 (October 2012): doi:10.1080/01402390.2012.706973, 740.

⁵⁶⁰ Angelo Codevilla, "Political Warfare: A Set of Means for Achieving Political Ends." In *Strategic Influence: Public Diplomacy, Counterpropaganda, and Political Warfare*, ed. Michael J. Waller, (Washington, DC: Institute of World Politics Press, 2008), 109.

irregulars win the war of ideas by persuading neutral and adversarial populations that their cause is just and their actions legitimate. Even more important, the irregulars must work to convince these populations that their adversary's cause is unjust, immoral and illegitimate.⁵⁶¹ The cases in this thesis demonstrate that the strong might be compelled to quit when relevant populations believe that their cause and actions violate "jus ad bellum" and "jus in bello," particularly when asymmetry of motivations exist. Convincing international populations that the strong are in violation of either of these two principles can induce them to intervene on behalf of the irregulars or constrain the strong politically. Similarly, when irregulars can persuade their adversary's population of the same, existing political and social fractures often increase and domestic pressure builds, compelling the adversarial government to quit and withdraw. The Vietnamese Communists demonstrated that this strategy serves to reduce the will of the strong by fracturing the proverbial Clausewitzian triangle by driving a wedge between their adversary and their adversary's population and government.⁵⁶²

Because instruments of statecraft hinge on state powers, it is often misunderstood that political and psychological warfare strategies are exclusive to states alone. However, as several of the conflicts in this thesis demonstrate, irregulars can employ political and psychological warfare as well. While irregulars lack the required political tools to conduct diplomacy, political action, or impose economic sanctions, they can access state powers and the instruments of statecraft through state sponsors, as Hezbollah did through

⁵⁶¹ Robert R. Reilly, "No Substitute for Substance," *The Journal of International Security Affairs* 0, no. 17 (Fall 2009), <https://www.ciaonet.org/catalog/18666>; Ruth Linn, "Terrorism, Morality and Soldiers' Motivation to fight—An Example from the Israeli Experience in Lebanon," *Terrorism* 11, no. 2 (January 1988): 139–49, doi:10.1080/10576108808435705, 140. Linn explains that "There are two ways in which war can and should be judged: first, in regard to the justice of the war's objectives ("jus ad bellum"); and second in regard to the conduct of the war ("jus in bello"). A war is just if it is aimed at protecting fundamental values such as national independence, communal freedom and people's lives, when all other means of protecting them are not sufficient. Justice in war refers mainly to [the proportionality and] discrimination between combatant and non-combatant, and the prevention of unnecessary damage."

⁵⁶² Ron Schleifer, "Psychological Operations: A New Variation on an Age Old Art: Hezbollah versus Israel," *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 29, no. 1 (January 2006): 1–19, doi:10.1080/10576100500351185, 228. Schleifer argues that the driving a wedge is akin to the principle of divide and rule; "[D]riving a wedge targets enemy's social cohesion by inflaming communal tensions, widening preexisting divisions, and creating new ones. This can be achieved in several ways: by creating friction between the political and military sectors, or by targeting the army itself and stirring up resentment within the ranks."

Lebanon and Iran.⁵⁶³ Though, states and state sponsors are not the only entities that irregulars can use to coerce, compel, and convince adversaries to bend to their will. Irregulars can, and have often appealed to international and regional organizations for support. By doing so, the irregulars can co-opt the coercive power of these institutions to extrinsically reduce their adversary's will to fight.

The success of these strategies also depends on the judicious application of force, at the right time, and at the right place, and against the right target. Several of the irregulars profiled in this thesis demonstrated that too much violence, terrorism, and barbarism could produce significant negative results. Though, the PIRA and several others have demonstrated that used judiciously, terrorism and small unit attacks, particularly used in swarms, can enable the irregulars to succeed. In fact, swarm tactics can be found in several of the cases reviewed in this thesis—the FLN conducted seventy-preplanned and dispersed IED attacks against the French; the Viet Cong and the NVA launched simultaneous strikes throughout South Vietnam during the TET Offensive in 1968; and swarming was also observed in Northern Ireland, Chechnya, Afghanistan, and Iraq. As these examples demonstrate, swarming can produce significant effects on an opponent's psychological and political will to fight. Furthermore, the rise of network warfare and networked irregulars such as al-Qaeda, and the increased availability of communications technology, suggest that irregulars will be more capable and effective in using swarm tactics in future irregular conflicts.⁵⁶⁴

Ultimately, the irregular conflicts reviewed in this thesis reveal that the irregulars' ability to succeed depends upon their ability to maintain intrinsic motivations while shaping and influencing their opponent's extrinsic motivations. Thus, the irregular's ability to do so though depends on their ability to survive, adapt, and grow by improving

⁵⁶³ Daniel L. Byman et al., "Chapter Six: Assessing the Impact of External Support," in *Trends in Outside Support for Insurgent Movements* (RAND Corporation, 2001), http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monograph_reports/2007/MR1405.pdf.

⁵⁶⁴ John Arquilla and David F. Ronfeldt, *Swarming & the Future of Conflict* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2000), vii, 60. Arquilla and Ronfeldt argue that "the rise of advanced information operations will bring swarming to the fore" and that "a concept related to swarming, namely "network-centric warfare," rests on an important doctrinal notion: Victory in future battles will depend more on who has the best 'networks' than on who has the strongest 'platforms.'"

support and collective action, and by structuring their organization according to their environment and their adversary. Furthermore, their ability to shape their opponent's motivation is determined by their ability to choose and employ the right indirect strategies—such as guerrilla warfare, terrorism, psychological warfare, and coercive diplomacy. Fundamentally then, if irregulars heed these lessons or sponsors and enablers such as U.S. SOF can instruct, advise, and assist based on the principles outlined in this chapter, irregulars will likely succeed in irregular warfare.

B. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

In the dialectic of will...the stronger will wins out. It is not enough to *weaken* the adversary's will while not either winning over all those who waver or believe, that they can be neutral, or *at least* intimidating them, but it is also crucial, instead, to keep the will of the fighters, and also the sympathizers, *strong*. More than half the conduct of irregular war is psychological warfare, psychological assault, as well as psychological defense and psychological armament.⁵⁶⁵

— Friedrich August Frhr. Von der Heydte

1. Recommendations for Future Areas of Study and Research

As people become increasingly connected through technology, and as individuals are more able to express their opinions, the strong (and open democratic societies, in particular) must accommodate the opinion and will of the masses. Therefore, irregulars will be increasingly successful as communications technology (e.g., social media) enables them to persuade, convince, and influence friendly, neutral, and adversarial audiences. This theory warrants further consideration and analysis, particularly in light of Russia's recent success in Crimea and the Islamic States' ability to influence ideas and support worldwide. As we move further into the digital age and irregulars learn to exploit the Internet of things, understanding how to shape and influence ideas and opinions may prove vital to winning irregular conflicts.

⁵⁶⁵ Heydte, *Modern Irregular Warfare*, 38–9.

Furthermore, the Arab Spring, the Color Revolutions, and the War in Donbass indicate that we may be moving towards a new period of irregular warfare. This new period is defined by the importance of domestic and international opinion and characterized by the irregular's ability to influence political and social change without taking up arms. In other words, public opinion and support has become a weapon for the weak to affect change. Therefore, future study and research should be dedicated to understanding how social movements intersect with irregular warfare, and how these movements begin and are sustained. Additionally, additional research should be conducted to identify ways and means to counteract social movements, or enable them to effect change.

2. Recommendations for Enabling and Countering Irregulars

U.S. Special Operations Command is the proponent for surgical strike and special warfare within the Department Of Defense. The individuals and forces that comprise U.S. SOCOM are specially selected, trained, and equipped to conduct irregular warfare in support of U.S. national policy objectives during peace and times of war. As a result, SOF conduct a number of activities that fall under the IW umbrella, not only to support the weak but also to defeat irregulars. Specifically, SOF help defeat irregulars by conducting FID, COIN, and CT, among other operations, to unilaterally, bilaterally, and multilaterally defeat adversarial irregulars that threaten U.S. strategic interests. All too often, though, the U.S. directs its efforts towards the visible threat—the irregular. To date, the U.S. government and military have occasionally succeeded in disrupting and defeating terrorism and dangerous irregulars around the world using this technique. However, doing so has come at significant cost in blood, treasure, and soft power. The lessons revealed in this thesis indicate that the United States could improve its ability to defeat irregulars more often. Instead of pursuing the current strategy of annihilation and attrition, the U.S. should adopt a long-term sustainable strategy that is compatible with its limited goals.

a. *General Recommendations*

First, the evidence in this thesis suggests several broad lessons apply to both U.S. sponsored and supported irregular operations and counter-irregular operations. First, the United States should not become entangled overseas if the conflict does not meet the criteria of “jus ad bellum” and cannot be fought by “jus in bello.” The lessons in this thesis suggest that the key to success for the United States in limited conflicts is to maintain legitimacy, to limit the involvement of U.S. conventional forces, and to maintain favorable public opinion and support. Furthermore, the U.S. should continue its current policy of relying on SOF in limited warfare to reduce exposure and the impact on the U.S. population. This, in turn, will limit war weariness, maintain flexibility and control, and will likely shield government policy from wavering public opinion. Additionally, this thesis suggests that the U.S. should reinvest in a political and psychological warfare department or office at the strategic and national level—an organization that has not existed since WWII—to administer, coordinate, and implement “influence” operations and activities to win the war of ideas. Also, the U.S. government should be wary of the pitfalls of the American Way of War and recognize that “In a limited war, there is no victory, only achievement of policy objectives.”⁵⁶⁶ Additionally, as the cases in this thesis suggest, the United States government should not draw a red line against negotiating, and should be more willing to consider political solutions that are not bound by unconditional defeat or surrender.

b. *Countering Irregulars*

In countering irregulars, the U.S. should adopt the lessons learned from the British in Malaya and Kenya. First, successful COIN begins and ends with focused efforts to stand up a legitimate, organic, and sizeable home guard. Second, successful counter irregular operations are driven by solid intelligence. In particular, human intelligence operations should be the priority before, during, and after irregular engagements. Third, U.S. SOF and other government agencies should not focus their

⁵⁶⁶ Kalev Sepp, “Session 7: Cold War” (Lecture, Undeclared Wars, Naval Postgraduate School, April 18, 2016).

efforts solely on the tactical employment of indigenous forces to counter irregulars. Instead, the U.S. should focus on infiltrating irregular organizations to co-opt and degrade them from within. Fourth, the U.S. should focus its efforts on embedding SOF leaders into the partner force hierarchy, as Lansdale was in the Philippines. His example reveals that mid-to-senior level SOF leaders can be effectively employed and leveraged to enable our partners to disrupt, demobilize, and defeat irregulars by advising them on their organizational design, organic employment of political and psychological warfare capabilities, as well as, advising and assisting with indigenous COIN and CT operations. Finally, the U.S. government should work to counteract the psychological efforts of irregulars using the Internet and social media to win the war of ideas and the battle of the narrative.

c. Supporting Irregulars

Alternatively, there are several lessons for SOF and U.S. sponsorship of irregulars. The easiest and most passive way to enable irregulars is to provide financial aid or limited military arms and ammunition. Specifically, the U.S. should inject specific technology to enable irregulars to live-stream events to shape opinion and support by exploiting their adversaries' brutality and violence.⁵⁶⁷ Additionally, instead of supplying small arms or throwing money at irregulars, the U.S. should inject specific modern tools or weapons to aid irregulars in defeating their adversary's technological advantages.

Strategically, the U.S. government can assist irregulars in waging political and psychological warfare against their opponents from in their country, in Washington, and from the seats of U.S. representatives in international and regional institutions. Operationally, U.S. SOF should assist and advise irregulars on how to improve collective action and how to design their organization to more effectively and efficiently defeat their opponent based on the resources available and their environment. Tactically, the

⁵⁶⁷ For a more comprehensive discussion on how modern communications technology can be used to enable irregulars and U.S. sponsored UW, see, "CYBER-Harnessing Cyber Technology's Human Potential" by LTC Duggan, in *Special Warfare Journal's* "Gray Zone" issue.

U.S. SOF should instruct irregulars on how to take advantage of accelerators such as the Internet to exploit their adversary's existing social and political fractures. Ultimately, U.S. SOF should continue to enable the irregular's tactical and operational activities, but more should be done to focus their strategic efforts on raising political and psychological costs for their opponent. To this end, U.S. SOF should become more proficient in advising irregulars to employ political and psychological warfare to win the war of ideas and to widen existing political and social fractures in their adversary's camp to convince, compel or coerce them to stop fighting.

3. Conclusion

This thesis sought to explain why and how irregulars win when they do and how asymmetries of motivation affected the outcome of irregular warfare over the last seventy years. The purpose of this study was four-fold. The main intent of this research was to understand how United States Special Forces and the U.S. government could better support irregulars to further our interests. Additionally, this question was also designed to identify alternative approaches towards countering irregular actors. Furthermore, this thesis sought to reveal the importance of motivation in irregular warfare and attempted to illuminate the ways and means motivation can be manipulated and shaped to enable success in irregular warfare. Finally, this study was conducted to reveal the evolution of irregular warfare and the factors that have enabled irregulars the most in recent history.

In the end, the theory of asymmetries of motivation did not fully explain why irregulars succeed. Similarly, as several cases in this thesis demonstrate, Andrew Mack, Ivan Arreguín-Toft, Jeffery Record, and Gil Merom equally failed to explain thoroughly why the weak win.⁵⁶⁸ Nevertheless, the lessons that were brought forward in this thesis reveal that irregulars succeed by eroding or destroying their adversary's motivation or will. In other words, motivation is dynamic and subject to change based on internal and external forces. This thesis demonstrated that "will" is not a fixed variable, but one that is subject to frequent change as motivations are manipulated intrinsically and

⁵⁶⁸ Mack, "Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars;" Arreguín-Toft, *How the Weak Win Wars*; Record, *Beating Goliath*; Merom, *How Democracies Lose Small Wars*.

extrinsically over time.⁵⁶⁹ Thus, motivation or will is paramount in explaining and understanding why irregulars win when they do; irregulars prevail by creating asymmetries of motivation when they do not exist and exploiting them when they do. Therefore, regardless of motivations at the beginning of a conflict, the key to success in irregular warfare is to reduce an opponent's motivation or will to fight. This conclusion not only explains why irregulars often prevail but also illuminates an alternative approach towards enabling and defeating irregulars.

The evidence in this thesis indicates that popular support might drive motivation and the will to fight. This presumes that the will to fight will be high when opinion and support are high. Conversely, when popular support or opinion declines, so too does motivation and the will to persist in irregular conflicts. This is similar to one of Max Boot's findings in *Invisible Armies*.⁵⁷⁰ Boot found in his study of irregular conflicts between AD 66 and 2008 that the rise of public opinion has been the most important development in irregular warfare.⁵⁷¹ Boot attributes this rise to the spread of democracy, improved access to education, the spread of communications technology, and the influence of international organizations.⁵⁷² The evidence in this thesis supports this claim and Boot's argument affirms the notion that will and motivation is the key to success in irregular warfare. Specifically, the strong can no longer afford to enact and follow policy without concern for popular opinion and support. Therefore, the strong are more vulnerable to domestic and international opinion, which are increasingly accessibly and influenced by the weak.

⁵⁶⁹ Merom, *How Democracies Lose Small Wars*, 12. "How is one supposed to measure the relative intensity of "will" independently, and without falling into the tautological trap of inferring it from the results of war?" This thesis argues that irregulars win because they reduce or destroy their opponent's will to fight. This argument does not claim that irregulars win because they have more to lose or are more motivated. Rather, this conclusion is made based on the evidence revealed by the motivation assessment framework, which demonstrated that motivation is dynamic and can be manipulated to reduce an opponent's will to persist. Therefore this conclusion avoids the tautological trap of inferring the significance of "will" from the results of the war.

⁵⁷⁰ Boot, *Invisible Armies*.

⁵⁷¹ *Ibid.*, 559.

⁵⁷² *Ibid.*, 559.

This thesis concludes that irregulars reduce their opponent's will to fight by shaping opinions and perceptions to influence support and collective action. Additionally, several factors, accelerators, and strategies were identified that enable irregulars to shape intrinsic and extrinsic motivations. Irregulars succeed, in most cases, by increasing the cost of the war through indirect means; by arousing international attention and provoking intervention; by shifting the focus of the war to their adversaries' domestic situation; by exploiting existing political and social fractures; and most importantly, by winning the battle of the narrative and the war of ideas. Ultimately, this thesis found that irregulars reduce their adversary's will to fight and eventually win, by shaping opinions and perceptions to create asymmetries of motivation and exploit existing ones. Finally, this thesis presented some recommendations for future research and some suggestions for the U.S. government and the Special Forces Regiment. These lessons are worth considering, as irregular warfare is ever changing along with shifts in geopolitical dynamics, technology, and the way we communicate and process information.

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