

AIR WAR COLLEGE

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IMPLICATIONS OF THE
MILITARIZATION OF US FOREIGN POLICY
THROUGH SECURITY ASSISTANCE

by

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
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Biography

Lieutenant Colonel Billie S. Early is a student at Air War College, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. Prior to this assignment she was the Deputy Director, Commander's Action Group, Headquarters Air Force Space Command, Peterson Air Force Base, Colorado, where she provided direct support to the Commander and Vice Commander of Air Force Space Command.

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Introduction

After the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001 (9/11), the United States embarked on a global effort to fight terrorism. Lessons learned from the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq taught the US military the critical importance of enabling other countries to protect themselves from terrorist networks, preventing problems from becoming crises or escalating into conflicts requiring greater US involvement.¹ While US foreign policy supports building the capacity of foreign military forces through State Department security assistance programs, the Department of Defense (DOD) views these traditional avenues as too inflexible and slow to respond to the rapidly changing global threat environment, and too poorly funded to meet the growing security requirements.² DOD asked Congress to grant it the authority to train and equip foreign military forces in countries around the world where US military leaders saw urgent or emerging threats that could potentially harm US national interests. In 2006 Congress granted the DOD the authority to build the capacity of foreign military forces to conduct counterterrorism and stability operations, making DOD the lead for a State Department foreign policy responsibility. Critics charge that this new authority, known as Global Train and Equip, militarizes US foreign policy.

Using the US military to build the capacity of foreign military forces can militarize US foreign policy and possibly harm State Department efforts to advance American interests. This paper analyses DOD's Global Train and Equip authority using three indicators to determine if the militarization of foreign policy exists: (1) use of military force, (2) rates of growth in military versus diplomatic budgets, and (3) shifts of foreign policy functions to the military. Indications of militarization of US foreign policy are then considered against their overall effects on US foreign policy roles and responsibilities to determine if US interests are harmed.

The Global Train and Equip authority militarizes US foreign policy by giving DOD a greater diplomatic role in policy determination, but does not weaken the State Department's ability to implement foreign policy or Congress's oversight responsibilities. Furthermore, increased DOD involvement in security assistance is a more responsive whole of government approach and a proactive military strategy to respond to emerging threats and shape the global security environment.

Militarization of Foreign Policy

Militarization occurs when a state relies on the military to pursue national security objectives better achieved by other means.³ The DOD is criticized as having militarized US foreign policy through its new authority to build the capacity for foreign military forces to counter terrorism and support US military and stability operations. The controversy stems from the direct funding and authority now given to DOD, not the State Department which is responsible for US foreign assistance programs. The continuation of this authority, going on its sixth year and already costing more than \$1.2 billion, shifts responsibility away from the State Department. Secretary of Defense Gates even warns of a "creeping militarization" of some aspects of American's foreign policy when discussing the US military's increased involvement in activities previously done by civilian agencies, and cautions against an overreliance on military combat operations.⁴ DOD involvement in foreign policy may undermine US foreign policy objectives.

A shift in the core functions away from the State Department may have undesirable effects for several reasons. First, it may weaken the State Department's role in implementing foreign policy. The State Department advances US interests in foreign countries and its authority may be weakened if DOD is also making decisions that impact US foreign policy.

Second, it may weaken congressional oversight, particularly human rights protections, a large concern in many developing countries around the world. Congress authorizes and funds State Department-managed military assistance programs. State Department support that goes through the regular foreign assistance budget process is subject to conditions and closely scrutinized. In contrast, support that goes through the defense budget may receive far less review by foreign oversight committees. Third, it gives the Pentagon a greater diplomatic role and significant autonomy over support to foreign military forces, which has the potential to cause stronger military-to-military ties with a country than existing diplomatic ties.⁵ These effects may harm US foreign policy objectives. However, DOD involvement in US foreign assistance efforts is not without precedence.

Foreign Assistance Policy

The United States uses foreign assistance to further US policy objectives and protect US security interests. DOD engagement in US foreign assistance activities is longstanding with the US military playing an important role in disaster assistance since at least the nineteenth century. More routine engagement such as humanitarian assistance, training exercises, and military operations abroad date back to the turn of the twentieth century.⁶ However, in 1961 when economic and development assistance became the US government's preferred tool for countering Soviet influence in the developing world, Congress passed the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) which assigned the State Department the leadership role for foreign assistance.⁷ The FAA appoints the Secretary of State, under the direction of the President, the responsibility for economic assistance, military assistance, and military education and training programs in foreign countries. DOD supports US foreign policy by conducting disaster response, emergency relief, and humanitarian assistance when directed by the President or authorized by Congress.⁸ These

roles and responsibilities are intentionally assigned to ensure that foreign assistance is aligned with US foreign policy objectives.⁹

For many years DOD had little interest in foreign assistance activities, which were regarded as neither a military mission nor an activity of more than marginal value to ensuring national security.¹⁰ This position changed after the Cold War when the United States was suddenly faced with a new security environment, replete with weak and failing states, non-state actors, terrorists, and asymmetric threats. DOD became increasingly engaged with foreign countries to protect US interests.

Security Cooperation

The US military shapes the global security environment and safeguards US interests through military engagement with foreign militaries. Since the fall of the Soviet Union, threats to US security have shifted from a two-power major theater war to regional, ethnic, and religious conflicts. To counter these threats, the US military found it necessary to interact with foreign militaries using special operations forces which are best suited to handle these new relations-building efforts.¹¹ Therefore, in 1991 Congress granted DOD direct authority for special operations forces to train with foreign militaries.¹² Seeing benefit from building these relationships, the US military continued to promote its engagement strategy which shifted towards working with new and emerging democracies. In 1998 DOD institutionalized planning for military engagements by requiring geographic combatant commanders to publish Theater Engagement Plans.¹³ Military engagement maintained a narrow, regional focus until former Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld introduced Security Cooperation Guidance in 2003 to unify guidance and prioritize department efforts. Today's DOD guidance reflects changes since 2005 requiring all combatant commanders to publish engagement plans and outlining a broad range of

peacetime activities that fall under DOD security cooperation efforts. These include all DOD-funded engagements with foreign militaries such as combined exercises, training, and education, military-to-military contacts, humanitarian assistance, and information operations. Security cooperation also includes security assistance programs which fall under State Department funding and policy direction, namely Foreign Military Sales and Foreign Military Financing (FMS/FMF) and International Military Education and Training (IMET).¹⁴ After 9/11 security cooperation efforts grew rapidly mostly due to DOD activities in Iraq and Afghanistan, but threats from global terrorism necessitated significant changes be made to US security assistance efforts.

Security Assistance: Global Train and Equip

The US military requires a flexible and responsive method to build the capacity of foreign military forces to stabilize regions of the world and defeat terrorists where they live. The Bush Administration proposed legislation to build the capacity of foreign military forces to disrupt or destroy terrorist networks, close safe havens, and support US military and stability operations.¹⁵ In response Congress granted a new partnership capacity-building authority in the 2006 National Defense Authorization Act, Section 1206 legislation, referred to as Global Train and Equip.¹⁶ Section 1206 authority parallels the FMF and IMET programs. FMF and IMET programs are too slow and cumbersome to meet the urgent and emerging threats facing combatant commanders.¹⁷ These programs take three to four years to implement and require prior approval from receiving nations,¹⁸ where Section 1206 programs take as little as six months to implement.¹⁹ DOD's new major authority is a vital tool for US military commanders.

Section 1206 authorizes the US military to build the capacity of foreign military forces to conduct counterterrorism operations and to support stability operations, and it is an essential

military tool to meet US security requirements. Secretary of Defense Gates stated in his April 2008 House Armed Services Committee testimony that after 9/11 “building partner capacity is a vital and enduring military requirement” for DOD to fulfill its national security mission, and that Section 1206 is a preventive tool to fight terrorism and global instability.²⁰ Combatant commanders agree and regard this program as “the single most important tool for the Department [of Defense] to shape the environment and counter terrorism” and to solve problems before they become crises.²¹ However, this program is not without criticism, and critics charge that it harms US foreign interests by militarizing US foreign policy. Does DOD’s new Section 1206 authority militarize US foreign policy?

Measuring Security Assistance

DOD’s new authority to build the capacity of foreign military forces is often criticized as militarizing US foreign policy. This section analyzes DOD’s Global Train and Equip authority using three indicators of the militarization of foreign policy using the concept framework developed by Eric M. French, a PhD candidate at Indiana University, based on the work of Dr. Gary Goertz in *Social Science Concepts: A User’s Guide*.²² These indicators are as follows:

1. Increase in the frequency of the use of military force.
2. Relatively higher rates of growth in military budgets than in diplomatic ones.
3. Shifts of foreign policy functions to the military.²³

Applying these indicators to DOD’s Global Train and Equip authority and comparable State Department security assistance programs finds evidence that DOD’s new authority is indicative of a militarized US foreign policy, but the careful implementation of the new authority mitigates the risks that may weaken State Department and congressional responsibilities.

Use of Force

The first measure of militarization involves evaluating trends in operational indicators. French asserts that a state that uses force increasingly over time or engages in threats or shows of force can be said to have a militarized foreign policy.²⁴ DOD uses US military presence as a deterrent force and combatant commanders consider presence approaches to be an important aspect of US national security and military strategy.²⁵ DOD uses security cooperation and assistance programs to engage foreign militaries and these presence approaches in peacetime operations are useful force indicators to measure militarization.

DOD's security cooperation activities grew from 3.5 percent in 1998 to nearly 22 percent in 2005 of the overall US overseas development assistance funding; and DOD's share was 85 percent of the total expenditures for DOD, State Department, and US Agency for International Development activities combined.²⁶ While much of the effort in later years comes from rebuilding efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq, DOD uses security cooperation to strengthen relationship across the globe. A few examples can portray the extent to which DOD uses the US military to shape the global security environment.

DOD engages in military exercises, training, and humanitarian efforts to build long-term relations with partner nations and advance US interests. The US European Command's Caspian Basin initiative successfully uses maritime and border training exercises and equipment to integrate counterproliferation, counterterrorism, and illegal trafficking efforts to help secure the Caspian Basin from transnational threats. In another effort to build long-term relations, DOD's Regional Security Centers for Security Studies create more stable security environments with partner nations through education programs on global security challenges. These centers advance democratic institutions and foster relationships with promising foreign civil and military

leaders. Lastly, DOD's responsive humanitarian assistance efforts promote stability and demonstrate American values. Regardless of the situation or location, the US military is one of the first to respond to crises. Indonesia tsunami relief in 2004, Pakistani earthquake relief in 2005 and flood relief in 2010, and Haiti earthquake response in 2010 are but a few examples demonstrating DOD's commitment to advancing US interests through peacetime operations.²⁷ Another example where the US military uses its presence to build long-term relations is found in the newest combatant command, US Africa Command (USAFRICOM).

USAFRICOM is the most recent example where the US military engages in a proactive peacetime engagement strategy to shape the global security environment. The African continent is fast rising in strategic importance to the United States. Recognizing this, the Bush Administration created USAFRICOM which focuses on building relations with regional allies on the continent. USAFRICOM emphasizes development and war-prevention in lieu of warfighting and takes a very nontraditional approach working with the State Department and other agencies to build both indigenous African security capacities and US interagency collaboration.²⁸ Operationally, DOD is using AFRICOM to extend US military presence in an unstable region to prevent conflict by building the capacity of foreign military forces using both DOD security cooperation and assistance resources.

DOD's security assistance authority to train and equip foreign military forces also allows the US military to increase its presence and use of force in other parts of the world. As in USAFRICOM, DOD recognizes that US military interaction with foreign military forces provides valuable opportunities to expand partner capacity, as well as to establish trust and build relationships.²⁹ Using its Section 1206 authority, DOD supported 24 bilateral programs and 13 multilateral programs around the world between 2006-2009, with the majority of effort going

toward counterterrorism training and related equipment; all of this over and above the war efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq.³⁰ As of June 2010, DOD expects to implement 14 programs totaling \$238 million of the \$350 million Section 1206 limit, with the majority of the programs going toward training coalition partners to support military and stability operations.³¹ Looking closer at Africa shows the difference between DOD and State efforts.

Aside from the Middle East, Africa is DOD's largest recipient of Section 1206 funds. The US military's effort in Africa focuses on counterterrorist training and equipment and maritime border support.³² From 2006-2009, DOD supported seven separate African states and nine multilateral efforts totaling \$162 million. In contrast, the State Department expended \$45.7 million in Foreign Military Financing across the entire continent during this same time period.³³ Africa is one of the largest and most unstable and underdeveloped regions of the world. DOD protects US interests by building relations with and capacity of foreign military forces, and these efforts are gaining support.

The Obama Administration and Congress continue to support DOD's Section 1206 authority which further indicates that the United States is increasingly likely to resort to using US military forces to conduct security assistance activities. Congress funded \$345 million for DOD's Section 1206 authority in FY 2010,³⁴ and again in FY 2011.³⁵ Additionally, the House Armed Services Committee supports Section 1206 as a new type of authority to meet a perceived need and build capacities in partner nations and maintains their support of the program.³⁶

In review, DOD increasingly uses its military presence to conduct security cooperation and assistance programs to advance US interests. Such programs provide DOD a unique opportunity to influence US foreign policy, but not necessarily at the expense of State Department efforts, and US leadership remains engaged and supportive of these efforts.

Military and Diplomatic Funding

The second indicator of militarization comes from analyzing military and diplomatic budgets. French claims that relatively higher rates of growth in military versus diplomatic budgets indicate militarization of foreign policy.³⁷ The concern for a militarized foreign policy leads one to expect a trend of increasing military budgets compared to decreasing diplomatic budgets, but surprisingly, this is not the case. During the first four years of its new authority to build partner capacity, DOD has yet to maximize its funded authorization, let alone ask for additional funds. Meanwhile, the State Department continues to have a significantly greater ability to influence foreign policy through its traditional security assistance activities.

The first budgetary measure, a simple comparison of annual Section 1206, FMF, and IMET budgets during the first four years of DOD's new authority shows increases in security assistance funding. However, what is most significant is how much diplomatic funding significantly dwarfs the US military's Section 1206 program funding (see Table 1). Even when one factors in the number of countries involved, 66 through the State Department and 16 through DOD, diplomatic efforts outspend military efforts by more than 10:1. The State Department has a significant advantage over DOD in its ability to influence overall security assistance efforts through the traditional security assistance programs.

Table 1. Building partner capacity funds (\$M)

	FY 2006	FY 2007	FY 2008	FY 2009
Section 1206 ³⁸	100.0	273.6	272.4	339.9
FMF ³⁹	4465.0	4561.0	4668.2	5006.5
IMET ⁴⁰	86.7	85.9	85.9	93.0

Note: IMET budgets, which deal with foreign student training, are relatively constant and will not be compared.

The second budgetary measure, a comparison between overall Defense and State Department security cooperation efforts, also indicates that the State Department has a

significantly greater ability to influence US foreign policy than DOD. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) administers DOD's security cooperation portfolio, which includes security assistance, counternarcotics, and stability operations. When compared to the State Department's Peace and Security Sector, which funds comparable activities, DOD's security cooperation efforts are significantly smaller than US diplomatic efforts (see Table 2). Also, rates of growth show increases in both departments in FY 2007, decreases in FY 2008, but a 28 percent growth in State Department programs in FY 2009 vice a 21 percent decrease in DOD security cooperation efforts. Budgetary trends for military security cooperation efforts compared to diplomatic efforts do not support an increasingly militarized foreign policy landscape.

Table 2. Security cooperation comparison (\$M)

	FY 2006	FY 2007	FY 2008	FY 2009
DSCA ⁴¹	1323.0	1944.2	1821.0	1443.5
Peace & Security ⁴²	7317.1	8684.6	7522.6	9599.6

Statistical evidence regarding the use of the military to conduct security assistance shows a mixed message in terms of militarization of US foreign policy. The US government is growing more supportive of using the military to conduct security assistance but not at the expense of diplomatic efforts, which continue to be well funded at increasing rates. However, French's final indicator to measure militarization may be the most evident of how US foreign policy is being influenced by the military.

Shifts of Functions to the Military

The last indicator of a militarized foreign policy evaluates shifts of foreign policy functions to the military. French explains that the expansion of the military's role, to include functions other than war, indicates that military approaches to foreign policy challenges are gaining favor over non-military ones.⁴³ DOD adopts an expanded foreign policy role by influencing the security assistance process, increasing its diplomatic influence in foreign

assistance efforts, and building the capacity of foreign military forces, but not without considerable State Department involvement and congressional oversight. Furthermore, the US military conducts stability operations to promote the development of foreign countries as part of its core mission, despite the fact that the State Department is the lead for US foreign development efforts.⁴⁴

DOD's ability to influence the security assistance process is considerable. The 1961 Foreign Assistance Act designates the State Department as the lead for planning and budgeting foreign security assistance programs, but in actuality DOD largely implements them.⁴⁵ The military has the expertise, in-country regional presence and contacts, and significantly larger administrative capabilities than its State Department counterparts. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) administers all Defense security assistance programs and describes DOD's input as "extensive." DOD provides policy input, determines equipment sales, recommends funding levels, and implements State Department Foreign Military Sales, Foreign Military Financing, and International Military Education and Training programs, which are parallel to DOD's Global Train and Equip program.⁴⁶ The State Department relies on regional bureaus, ambassadors, and country teams to coordinate security assistance activities, but in reality, planning and execution depends heavily on collaboration between State and DSCA's security assistance organizations and the combatant commands.⁴⁷

Combatant commands also play a large role in US security assistance by developing regional plans for the traditional security assistance programs, coordinating with the embassies on country requirements, and evaluating foreign government requests for military equipment and training. Security assistance recommendations become part of embassy country plans and the combatant command theater security cooperation plans. The US military has considerable say

over global security assistance efforts and relies heavily on combatant commanders, who also wield considerable diplomatic influence.

DOD relies heavily on combatant commands to shape the US security environment abroad. The 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act elevated the status of US combatant commanders and gave them a greater ability to exercise influence over foreign policy matters in their regions.⁴⁸ The commanders have considerable resources and vision to influence foreign leaders—often more so than their State Department counterparts. According to Dana Priest, a *Washington Post* correspondent who traveled with a number of combatant commanders to observe their missions, the combined annual budgets for regional command headquarters doubled from 1990 to 2000, reaching over \$400 million, and command headquarters are “huge.” For example, the smallest command, US Southern Command, has a staff of about 1,100—more than the people who work Latin American issues in the departments of State, Commerce, Treasury, and Agriculture, the Pentagon’s Joint Staff, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense combined.⁴⁹ During the same time period, State Department overseas staff size reduced significantly due to a nearly 30 percent reduction in US international affairs spending but opened 20 new embassies as a result of the collapse of the Soviet Union. By 9/11, the State Department had a 20 percent overseas staffing deficit, and the need for foreign assistance expertise continues to grow.⁵⁰ The ability of combatant commanders to influence regional affairs coupled with State Department resource challenges affords the US military a larger diplomatic role in foreign policy. Combatant commands also favor Section 1206 to ensure regional stability.

DOD’s authority to build the capacity of foreign military forces expands its role in foreign policy, but does not abdicate the State Department’s responsibility for US security assistance. DOD implements Section 1206 as a joint program with the State Department to

ensure close ties with overall US foreign policy. Combatant commands and ambassadors jointly formulate proposals for funding. Each proposal requires extensive justification that stipulates why Section 1206 funds are appropriate and provides information on threats, capability shortfalls, and sustainment requirements.⁵¹ Proposals are then carefully vetted.

The Office of the Secretary of Defense, Joint Staff, and the State Department conduct political-military reviews on all proposals, and the Secretary of Defense and the Deputy Secretary of State, acting on behalf of the Secretary of State, give final approval for funding. Also, current law requires the State Department to verify that foreign militaries meet standards of rights and democracy before receiving assistance and such programs are in line with overall US foreign policy objectives.⁵² DSCA also continuously updates program guidance to incorporate lessons learned to address Congress and public concerns. For example, new guidance addresses adding sustainment into Foreign Military Financing programs to ensure foreign military capabilities are sustainable beyond the two years required under Section 1206. These actions require close coordination between DOD and State Department teams.⁵³ Section 1206 represents a new way of doing business and integrates Defense and State Department priorities from the ground level up—almost impossible using traditional security assistance programs.⁵⁴ Congress also gets involved in Section 1206, not allowing it to “get lost” in the enormous Defense budget.

Congress maintains close oversight of DOD’s Section 1206 authority. Congressional armed service committees remain hesitant about permanently conceding Section 1206 authority to DOD and review it closely during the yearly defense authorization debate. Congress maintains a high degree of oversight on the Section 1206 program because of its controversial nature and it also influences program implementation guidance.⁵⁵ For FY 2010 DSCA guidance prohibits the use of Section 1206 authority when Foreign Military Financing or DOD counter-

narcotics programs are more appropriate avenues for funding—this direction is a result of concerns from Congress on the validity of proposals for Mexico and Latin America.⁵⁶ Also, DSCA notifies Congress before any program is implemented under Section 1206.⁵⁷ Strict congressional oversight coupled with the joint nature of the Section 1206 program provides insurance over DOD's ability to influence US foreign policy, but still signifies a shift toward using the US military to address foreign policy challenges. A recent change in how the DOD conducts overseas stability operations is also important to the discussion of the militarization of US foreign policy.

DOD conducts stability operations because threats to the United States demand swift engagement and the State Department lacks the necessary resources for stabilization efforts. From its experience in Iraq, DOD recognizes that stability operations are critical to countering terrorism and places them “on par” with major combat operations.⁵⁸ DOD directs the US military to conduct stability operations for such services as civil security, civil control, essential services, and humanitarian assistance until they can feasibility transition to other US government agencies or foreign governments.⁵⁹ The State Department is currently not able to meet the pre- and post-conflict stabilization efforts in many parts of the world and DOD assumes most of the responsibility for on-going efforts.⁶⁰ Secretary of Gates supports efforts to increase State Department resources to assume US foreign development responsibilities and maintains that military action should be subordinate to political and economic efforts to protect US interest.⁶¹ Secretary of State Clinton also supports increases to State Department resources and understands that the two departments must be better partners.⁶² DOD will continue to shape the global security environment with all its resources until it is prudent to do otherwise.

Implications

When the three indicators of militarization are applied to DOD's security assistance efforts, results indicate that the United States relies heavily on DOD to pursue foreign policy objectives, but not at the expense of State Department responsibilities. DOD uses security cooperation to build relationships with partner nations and respond to humanitarian efforts, and uses security assistance as a flexible tool to build the capacity of foreign military forces so they can respond to threats in their regions before conditions require a greater US military response. Whenever possible, DOD proactively shapes the global security environment promoting US interests. DOD has the option to use its new Section 1206 authority to respond to urgent and emerging threats based on regional command priorities, or to influence longer-term State Department programs in support of country requirements. Also, DOD's considerable force presence and commander influence can sway security assistance decisions favorably toward US interests. However, the State Department maintains a high degree of direct involvement and oversight in all security assistance decisions.

The State Department maintains the majority of resources and the ability to directly influence all US security assistance decisions except military stability operations. The State Department maintains a growing portfolio of programs and resources to implement long-term foreign policy decisions. DOD cannot implement Section 1206 programs without State Department approval, and congressional oversight remains high. However, the State Department's capacity to conduct stability operations is lacking and threatens the militarization of US foreign policy. State Department resources must grow to meet the demands for overseas stability operations or the US military will continue to perform these missions, possibly to the

detriment of US foreign development objectives or worse yet, to the detriment of combat operations.

Conclusion

Building the capacity of foreign military forces to counter terrorism and conduct stability operations is DOD's strategy to promote the security of the United States.⁶³ DOD's direct authority to train and equip military partners promotes US national security, but it risks moving the United States toward a more militarized US foreign policy. Risks are mitigated because the State Department's ability to implement US foreign policy remains strong through its close relationship with DOD and direct involvement in security assistance programs. Congress also remains engaged with yearly debate over the appropriate whole of government approach to promoting US security interests. Militarization of US foreign policy through security assistance exists but is managed through the continuous interaction and teamwork between DOD, the State Department, and Congress.

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End Notes

(All notes appear in shortened form. For full details, see the appropriate entry in the bibliography.)

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12. *Title 10, US Code, Special Operations Forces: Training with Friendly Foreign Forces*, sec 2011 (1991), <http://uscode.house.gov>.
13. COL Gregory J. Dykeman, *Security Cooperation: A Key to the Challenges of the 21st Century* (November 2007), 1, <http://www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.mil/>.
14. Lt Col Robert D. Reighard, *Security Cooperation: Integrating Strategies to Secure National Goals* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army War College), 15 March 2006, 4.
15. Serafino, *Security Assistance Reform*, 32.
16. *National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006*, Public Law 109-163. 109th Cong., 2d sess. (6 January 2006). This authority, also known as the Global Train and Equip Act, provides DOD with a new authority to train and equip foreign military forces and foreign maritime security forces for two purposes: to enable foreign military forces/maritime forces to perform counterterrorism operations and to enable foreign military forces to participate in or to support military and stability operations in which US armed forces are participating.
17. Serafino, *Security Assistance Reform*, 4.
18. *Ibid.*, 3. Equipment is provided to foreign governments through DOS Foreign Military Sales/Foreign Military Financing programs. According to DOD, traditional security assistance takes three to four years from concept to execution. Also, these programs require approval from

the foreign government receiving the support and are prioritized against other security assistance projects.

19. Department of Defense, *Fiscal Year 2009 Budget Request Summary Justification* (Washington DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense, February 2008), 103.

20. Serafino, *Security Assistance Reform*, 4.

21. Department of Defense, *Fiscal Year 2010 Budget Request Summary Justification* (Washington DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense, May 2009), 1-13.

22. Eric M. French, "Analyzing the Militarization of U.S. Foreign Policy" (May 2008), 33. French is a PhD student in Political Science at Indiana University. In his Master's thesis at the University of Nebraska, French constructs a framework using the theory of concept formation developed by Dr. Gary Goertz (see *Social Science Concepts: A User's Guide* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005)). French's framework provides three indicators to assess the militarization of foreign policy. These indicators are used to compare DOD and State Department security assistance programs.

23. Ibid., 33-35.

24. Ibid., 36.

25. *Overseas Presence* (Washington, DC: General Accounting Office, June 1997), 4.

26. Williams and Adams, *Strengthening Statecraft and Security*, 59.

27. Dykeman, *Security Cooperation*, 5.

28. Dennis R. Penn, "USAFRICOM: The Militarization of U.S. Foreign Policy?" *Joint Forces Quarterly*, issue 51 (4th quarter 2008): 75.

29. *Quadrennial Defense Review Report* (Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense, 6 February 2006), 17.

30. Serafino, *Security Assistance Reform*, 5.

31. Ibid., 11. Figures are based on Congressional notifications as of June 2010.

32. Ibid., 24-26.

33. Department of State, *Foreign Military Financing Account Summary* (Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of State, 23 June 2010), <http://www.state.gov/t/pm/ppa/sat/c14560.htm>.

34. Serafino, *Security Assistance Reform*, 36.

35. *National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011*, Public Law 111-383. 111th Cong., 2d sess. (7 January 2011), 251.

36. Serafino, *Security Assistance Reform*, 37.

37. French, "Analyzing the Militarization of U.S. Foreign Policy," 34.

38. Serafino, *Security Assistance Reform*, 31.

39. Department of State, *Foreign Military Financing Account Summary*.

40. Department of State, *International Military Education and Training Account Summary*" (Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of State, 23 June 2010), <http://www.state.gov/t/pm/ppa/sat/c14562.htm>.

41. Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), *Defense Budget Materials*. http://comptroller.defense.gov/defbudget/fy2011/budget_justification/.

42. ForeignAssistance.gov, <http://foreignassistance.gov/ObjectiveView.aspx>. State Department and United States Agency for International Development foreign assistance data from 2006 is provided on the ForeignAssistance.gov website. Data is divided out by sector. Peace & Security, Democracy, Human Rights & Governance, Health, Education and Social Services, Economic Development, Environment, and Humanitarian Assistance.

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43. French, "Analyzing the Militarization of Foreign Policy," 34.
44. The Secretary of State is responsible for the US Agency for International Development which administers and operates all US efforts for foreign development. For simplicity this paper uses State Department to refer to all areas under the Secretary of States' areas of responsibility.
45. Williams and Adams, *Strengthening Statecraft and Security*, 60.
46. Ibid., 63.
47. Ibid., 62.
48. French, "Analyzing the Militarization of Foreign Policy," 45. The Goldwater-Nichols Act gave combatant commanders authority over the heads of the various military branches and allowed them greater influence in their assigned areas of responsibility.
49. Priest, Dana, "The Mission." In *Analyzing the Militarization of US Foreign Policy*, Eric M. French (University of Nebraska, May 2008). 46.
50. *A Foreign Affairs Budget for the Future: Fixing the Crisis in Diplomatic Readiness*, The Henry L. Stimson Center (Washington, DC: American Academy of Diplomacy, October 2008), 1.
51. Jeanne L. Farmer, Defense Security Cooperation Agency, to Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Combating Terrorism (multiple addresses), memorandum (23 December 2009). DSCA guidance contains detailed instructions for DOD and DOS to submit proposals for Section 1206 funding. Section 1206 Proposal worksheets are required for all submissions requesting funding. Proposals for counterterrorism programs and military and stability operations programs are submitted separately. Each proposal must answer detailed questions about the desired program (threat, benefit to the United States, etc.), capability assessment, resourcing (existing or partner contribution), sustainment (Section 1206 requires two years with transition to Foreign Military Funding following), and coordination.
52. Editorial, *New York Times*, 12 June 2006. http://www.nytimes.com/2006/06/12/opinion/12mon3.html?_r=1&pagewanted=print.
53. Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA), *Guidance and Lessons Learned: Global Train and Equip: Section 1206 of the Fiscal Year 2010 National Defense Authorization Act* (1 August 2010), 8.
54. DSCA, *Guidance and Lessons Learned* (1 August 2010), 7.
55. Serafino, *Security Assistance Reform*, 4.
56. Farmer, Defense Security Cooperation Agency, 8.
57. Ibid., 1.
58. *Quadrennial Defense Review Report* (6 February 2006), 86.
59. Department of Defense Instruction 3000.05, *Stability Operations* (16 September 2009).
60. *A Foreign Affairs Budget for the Future*, 4.
61. Tyson, "Gates Warns of Militarized Policy."
62. Department of State, *The Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review: Fact Sheet* (Washington, DC: 2010), <http://www.state.gov/s/dmr/qddr/>.
63. Department of Defense, *National Defense Strategy* (Washington DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense, June 2008), 9.