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14. ABSTRACT America's bilateral security alliances have underwritten Asia-Pacific regional security since WWII. Yet, this exclusivist order-building approach is now subject to an inchoate but promising security community building project led by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) that champions multilateral security cooperation. The simultaneous pursuit of bilateralism and multilateralism within Asia confounds scholars and begs an important research question. How can the United States Pacific Command (PACOM) help reconcile the tension between America's preference for bilateral security alliances and the region's aspiration for multilateralism? The author argues that PACOM can facilitate more accommodating regional security order-building by pursuing a phased approach. First, PACOM can modernize alliances and expand partnerships to foster greater intramural cooperation between PACOM and allied and partnered militaries. Next, PACOM can embed these relationships into key security forums including the ASEAN Defense Ministers' Meeting Plus to sponsor expanded multilateralism. The analysis results in three recommendations regarding how PACOM can sustain America's hierarchy while supporting a broader institutionalization of security politics and identity across Asia.					
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Sponsoring Asia-Pacific Security:

PACOM's Role in Reconciling Bilateral and Multilateral Security Structures

by

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A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

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Abstract

Although America's bilateral security alliances have underwritten Asia-Pacific regional security since WWII, this exclusivist order-building approach is now subject to an inchoate but promising security community building project led by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) that champions multilateral security cooperation. The simultaneous pursuit of bilateralism and multilateralism within Asia confounds scholars and begs an important but heretofore under-addressed research question. How can the United States Pacific Command (PACOM) help reconcile the tension between America's preference for bilateral security alliances and the region's aspiration for multilateralism? The author argues that PACOM can facilitate more accommodating regional security order-building by pursuing a phased approach. First, PACOM can modernize alliances and expand partnerships to foster greater intramural cooperation between PACOM and allied and partnered militaries. Next, PACOM can embed these relationships into key security forums including the ASEAN Defense Ministers' Meeting Plus (ADMM+) to sponsor a broader degree of multilateralism. The analysis points to three recommendations regarding how PACOM can best sustain America's hierarchy while supporting a broader institutionalization of security politics and identity across the region.

Introduction

Regional security order describes a framework through which states maintain stable, predictable, and peaceful relations.¹ Order-building is a contestable process, especially in Asia. Initiated by President Barack Obama in 2011, the ongoing “rebalance” of America’s military to Asia has arguably encouraged Beijing to militarize the South China Sea. The potential clash between these two great powers threatens to disrupt more than fifty years of relative calm enjoyed by regional states.² While a recent article argues that “the concept of order has been co-opted by different camps and used to justify starkly different notions of regional cooperation and power relationships,” scholars usually conceive regional security order according to realist or liberal-institutionalist international relations theory.³ Realists emphasize the deep-seated interest of states to secure “relative gains” even when collaborating. Liberal-institutionalists extol the ability of cooperation to foster collective benefits that encourage states to transcend power balancing.⁴ Whereas in practice states’ actions do not necessarily align to the neat binary established between realist and liberal-institutionalist theories, scholars often privilege one approach over the other based on the explanatory power each is perceived to possess.

These conceptualizations in turn anchor competing approaches to regional security order-building referred to as bilateralism and multilateralism. As opposed to a partnership, which is issue-based and episodic, a bilateral security alliance is a formal or informal contract between two states that governs security cooperation.⁵ America’s defense treaties with Australia, Japan, the Philippines, South Korea, and Thailand, the so-called “hub-and-spokes” system, instantiates bilateralism while underpinning Washington’s regional hierarchy.⁶ Multilateralism, on the other hand, is an institutional form that explains security

cooperation between three or more states based on “‘generalized’ principles of conduct” that are benign.⁷ Founded in 1967 by thirteen original member states, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) typifies multilateralism. Although America’s system of alliances has protected Asia against major inter-state war since WWII, it is now subject to an inchoate but promising security community building project lead by ASEAN.⁸ This multilateral institution has stimulated a greater sense of identity among regional states that is thought to translate into support for common security institutions and practices capable of facilitating peaceful change.⁹ While power transition theorists posit that Sino-US competition will lead to war, the Chinese Communist Party’s interest in improving China’s status or ranking relative to other states has motivated party officials to pursue multilateralism to impress international society with the country’s peaceful rise.¹⁰

The simultaneous pursuit of bilateralism and multilateralism within Asia “amounts to outsourcing of great power management of regional security order in two directions, upwards to the United States and downwards to ASEAN.”¹¹ For instance, ASEAN designed the Manila Declaration on the Peaceful Settlement of International Disputes in 1992 to exercise a greater leadership role in managing territorial disputes in the South China Sea. The lack of an enforcement mechanism, however, has resulted in some states clamoring for maintenance of America’s “hub-and-spokes” system to counterbalance China.¹² This puzzle begs an important research question. How can the United States Pacific Command (PACOM) help reconcile the tension between America’s preference for bilateral security alliances and the region’s aspiration for a more inclusive security architecture? Unlike order, architecture is “an overarching, coherent, and comprehensive security structure for a geographically-defined area, which facilitates the resolution of that region’s policy concerns and achieves its security

objectives.”¹³ Common across regional preferences for either a retrofitted security order or altogether new architecture is a clear desire for multilateralism. The research question introduced above is timely and important because, although scholars acknowledge the need to streamline bilateralism and multilateralism, most studies lack strategy recommendations.¹⁴

The author argues that PACOM can facilitate more accommodating security order-building by first modernizing alliances and expanding partnerships to foster greater “inter-spoke” cooperation, and then embedding these relationships into key security forums such as the ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Meeting Plus (ADMM+) to sponsor a broader degree of multilateralism.¹⁵ Given this thesis, the remainder of this paper unfolds in four parts. First, the author introduces a framework to understand the tension between bilateralism and multilateralism. The author then adopts this framework to determine precisely how, if at all, PACOM has modernized alliances and expanded partnerships to engender greater inter-spoke cooperation. Next, the author addresses how PACOM can capitalize on alliances and partnerships to enable security order-building through a “pooling” of capability that sponsors multilateral security forums. A packaging of capability tailored against regional challenges and operationalized through important security institutions will better enable PACOM to reconcile bilateralism and multilateralism. Prior to the conclusion, the final section provides recommendations regarding how PACOM can best sustain America’s hierarchy while also supporting a broader institutionalization of security politics and identity across the region.¹⁶

Contending Approaches to Regional Security Order-Building

A combination of material and cultural factors explains America’s reticence to establish a supranational institution similar to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in Asia following WWII. Due to a “powerplay,” Victor Cha contends that America designed

asymmetric alliances to exert maximum control over its client states. These alliances, founded on exclusivist and threat-based logics, were leveraged to contain the Soviet Union.¹⁷ To the extent America pursued multilateralism following WWII, reflected through the since disbanded Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, this security model was beleaguered by cultural misidentification.¹⁸ Following a process of decolonization in the 1960s, great powers have thought it necessary to pay equal accord to their status as conferred by lesser states. This now means that “negotiation about order is an endeavor involving not only the great powers but also other key states and actors.”¹⁹ The relative importance accorded to the evolving Sino-US relationship, as opposed to the relationship between these great powers and developing states, is an outstanding question that helps inform this study.²⁰

Of course, security order-building can result from myriad institutional forms including concert arrangements that characterized the so-called “Concert of Europe” between Austria, Britain, Prussia, and Russia following the Napoleonic Wars (1719-1815).²¹ Yet Asia-Pacific states have favored bilateralism or multilateralism since WWII as demonstrated by America’s “hub-and-spokes” system and ASEAN as an indigenous order-building exercise. A diverse landscape of threats and vulnerabilities, epitomized by North Korea’s brinksmanship diplomacy and natural disasters, sets the condition for both order-building approaches to increasingly interact.²² Brendan Taylor has promulgated a typology that accounts for the push, pull, and multiplicative properties between these security models. First, “bilateral *or* multilateral” interprets both approaches as mutually exclusive. Second, “bilateral-multilateral” suggests that bilateralism is a function of multilateralism. Third, “multilateral-bilateral” indicates that bilateralism catalyzes multilateralism. Finally, “bilateral *and* multilateral” contends that the two approaches are complementary and can be

synchronized to achieve further cooperation.²³ While Taylor argues that all four manifestations are likely to persist across Asia for the foreseeable future, others conclude that America's alliances will continue to serve as the backdrop of regional peace and stability.²⁴ Expansion of existing military exercises evidences this position. Cobra Gold, established in 1982 as the premier bilateral exercise between America and Thailand, now constitutes the region's largest multilateral exercise.²⁵

As opposed to the region's strict adherence to either the internal logic of "multilateral-bilateral" or "bilateral *and* multilateral," therefore, it stands to reason that these two modes of interaction can come together to form a new security order-building pathway. Yet a misalignment of security interests between America and even its stalwart allies threatens to desynchronize these two pillars.²⁶ Australia is a notable example. Hugh White argues that Canberra must choose between its security guarantor, America, and its primary economic partner, China. Although White's either/or logic eschews the basic premise of America's defense treaty with Australia, namely that each state is obligated to aid the other in the event of war, Washington's economic maladies have caused White to question whether "we can really be sure the US will underwrite Australia's security."²⁷ The following sections investigate how PACOM can calibrate these two order-building approaches to help reconcile the tension between America's alliances and the region's movement towards multilateralism.

PACOM and the "Multilateral-Bilateral" Security Order-Building Approach

Others have attempted to crystallize the interlocking relationships that frame the "multilateral-bilateral" approach. According to Brian Job, the Soviet Union's collapse has reversed the exclusivist nature of America's alliances and enabled their extension into multilateral security forums.²⁸ It is difficult to determine how exponents of "extended

bilateralism” and similar concepts would operationalize such integration. Aside from Job and others, America’s rebalance has encouraged practitioners to contribute to the discourse as well. “While modernizing alliances and broadening partnerships,” two US military officers recently enjoined, “PACOM should leverage these relationships to achieve greater cooperation among geographically and culturally disparate states.”²⁹ They continued, “[t]rilateral initiatives including the India-Japan-US, Australia-Japan-US, and Korea-Japan-US dialogues promise to institutionalize what has heretofore been episodic cooperation on natural disasters across some if not all of these countries as observed during the India Ocean Tsunami in 2004, Japan Tsunami in 2011, Typhoon Haiyan in 2013, and Nepal earthquake in 2015.”³⁰ This analysis corresponds to three key questions. Since 2011, what alliances and partnerships has PACOM modernized and broadened? What alliances and partnerships should PACOM modernize or broaden, and based on what calculation(s)? How should PACOM institutionalize cooperation among its allies and partners?

Given America’s ongoing rebalance to Asia, Washington has attempted to ensure “that each alliance is ‘nimble and adaptive’ so that it can successfully address new challenges.”³¹ Some critics have criticized these efforts as desultory or lacking a military strategy.³² It is likely that alliance modernization is designed to enable PACOM to better manage and respond to provocations on the Korean Peninsula and in the South China Sea, two of the region’s most intractable threats.³³ Three enhanced defense agreements corroborate this assessment.

Beyond welcoming the deployment of a US Marine Air-Ground Task Force as well as combat and refueling aircraft to Darwin, Australia has allowed US Navy warships to use a key port in Western Australia.³⁴ Similar to Guam, described as the US Air Force’s most

consequential “gas-and-go” facility, expanded basing in Australia allows PACOM to diversify its footprint, more quickly marshal forces, and further project power into the theater.³⁵ Although Japan is consigned as the “cornerstone” of America’s regional hierarchy, only recently did revised alliance guidelines accord Tokyo the domestic political capital required to satisfy its role as a treaty ally.³⁶ A “normalizing” defense posture has already allowed Japan to justify maritime reconnaissance patrols in concert with PACOM near China’s fabricated islands in the South China Sea.³⁷ Finally, PACOM has attempted to redress the atrophy of the Philippines’ armed forces through “excess defense sales, training of elements of their coast guard and navy, and deeper consultations.”³⁸ At the most recent Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation summit, President Obama announced the transfer of additional ships to the Philippines’ Navy including one US Coast Guard cutter envisioned to facilitate longer-range patrols of Manila’s archipelagic waters.³⁹ These activities enable PACOM to improve interoperability in terms of especially maritime security and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR).⁴⁰

Similarly, PACOM has expanded several partnerships apace. President Obama formulated a Comprehensive Partnership with Malaysia in 2014. Consequently, US Navy warships frequently visit Malaysia and the two countries conduct numerous bilateral military exercises.⁴¹ More impressively, maritime reconnaissance patrols now operate from the Malaysia Air Force Base on Lubuan Island within the South China Sea.⁴² Singapore’s partnership with PACOM has experienced some movement as well. The Changi Naval Base and Paya Lebar Airbase now service four US Navy Littoral Combat Ships and P-8 surveillance aircraft, respectively.⁴³ The partnership with Vietnam constitutes perhaps the most significant development given America’s loss of blood, treasure, and magnanimity

during the Vietnam War.⁴⁴ A joint vision statement laid the groundwork for future military-to-military contacts. April 2015 “saw the first visit to Vietnam of a Littoral Combat Ship, the USS Fort Worth, and a joint practice of the Code of Unplanned Encounters at Sea” or CUES.⁴⁵ This relationship augurs well for PACOM’s integration of Vietnam’s combat potential with other American spokes including Japan and South Korea. Notwithstanding these developments, what alliances and partnerships require PACOM’s attention?

America’s alliances with South Korea and Thailand have stalled, and substantially so in the latter’s case. A coup caused PACOM to suspend Thailand’s participation in the forthcoming Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) exercise as well as curtail Cobra Gold towards simply HA/DR training.⁴⁶ Although Pyongyang’s recent nuclear and ballistic missile tests have also reignited negotiations over the placement of America’s Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense system in South Korea to deter future brinksmanship, Seoul continues to balk.⁴⁷ Expanded social, political, and economic ties between South Korea and China may explain Seoul’s hesitancy. China now represents South Korea’s number one trading partner.⁴⁸ Beijing also flouted tradition by conducting an official state visit between President Xi Jinping and South Korea President Geun-Hye in Seoul before engaging its only treaty ally, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.⁴⁹ Given these factors, China characterizes South Korea as the “weakest link” among America’s Northeast Asia allies.⁵⁰ This is alarming. It threatens to frustrate broader inter-spoke cooperation reflected through a recent intelligence sharing agreement between South Korea and the Philippines, as well as movement towards finalizing the Japan-South Korea General Security of Military Information Agreement to foster greater spoke-to-spoke intelligence sharing.⁵¹

Meanwhile, the rebalance has provided PACOM the justification to champion India as a counterweight to China's maritime expansion.⁵² Since the Bandung Conference in 1955, when India formulated a non-aligned foreign policy anchored by the principles of self-determination and non-interference in the internal affairs of states, New Delhi has resisted integration into America's regional hierarchy.⁵³ The decline of the former Soviet Union resulted in the loss of a superpower patron that caused New Delhi to reverse this position in favor of a "Look East" policy. "This multi-pronged initiative sought to create strategic political and economic ties with individual nations in Southeast Asia while simultaneously developing closer ties with" ASEAN.⁵⁴ China's "string of pearls," a series of forward maritime operating bases in Pakistan, Myanmar, and Sri Lanka that are perceived to contain India, has further incentivized New Delhi's strategic refocus.⁵⁵ The evidence indicates that US Admiral Harry Harris, Commander of PACOM, has capitalized on anxieties felt by India and the region to take the bilateral partnership "to the next level."⁵⁶

A fully-fledged partnership seems to derive from several agreements. The most sensitive one governs the sale of advanced combat equipment including Apache attack helicopters, M777 Howitzer artillery pieces, and Chinook transportation helicopters. Although India does conduct most of its military exercises with PACOM, Admiral Harris and others "hope that in the not-too-distant future the United States and Indian navy vessels steaming together will become a common and welcome sight throughout Indo-Pacific water."⁵⁷ This emerging partnership redounds positively on India's relationships with America's allies and partners. India has conducted maritime security training with South Korea since 2000, signed a bilateral defense agreement with Singapore in 2003, completed a similar agreement with the Philippines in 2006, issued a Joint Declaration on Security

Cooperation with Japan in 2008, and conducted training with the militaries of Malaysia, Indonesia, and Thailand.⁵⁸ Set against China's revanchist behavior in the South China Sea, the annual Malabar maritime exercise between America and India will also now include Australia, Japan, and Singapore as permanent members.⁵⁹ Such activities are a cause and effect of enhanced inter-spoke cooperation.⁶⁰ The question in so far as the "multilateral-bilateral" approach is concerned, however, is how can PACOM further institutionalize seemingly ad hoc inter-spoke cooperation?

Pacific Command's Theater Security Cooperation Plan is the roadmap to expand the capacities of allied and partnered militaries.⁶¹ A closer inspection reveals that this plan is less than meets the eye. On the one hand, capacity-building is over-promised and under-delivered in Asia. Capacity-building is a goal of security sector assistance that improves "the military capabilities of our allies and partners to help them transform and optimize their forces to provide regional security, disaster preparedness, and niche capabilities."⁶² Pacific Command's security assistance programs are overshadowed by military assistance provided by the Department of State, most of which is funneled to Europe and the Middle East. The International Military Education and Training Program (IMET) and Foreign Military Financing (FMF) are salient examples. For Fiscal Year 2014, Asia enjoyed merely 21.5% of all IMET expenditures.⁶³ For Fiscal Year 2013, Asia accrued 6% of all FMF spending.⁶⁴

Comparatively underinvested, PACOM has meanwhile struggled to capitalize on innovative training initiatives such as Pacific Pathways and RIMPAC pursuant to the "multilateral-bilateral" approach. Pacific Pathways, a program designed by the United States Army Pacific (USARPAC), deploys battalion-sized forces across the region for upwards of six months to conduct realistic training and expand interoperability with allies and partners.

Yet the program is conducted on strictly a bilateral basis causing one participant to admit the initiative “is minimally achieving what it was briefed to accomplish.”⁶⁵ The United States Navy Pacific (PACFLT) describes RIMPAC as “a premier event and the largest of its kind in the world.” Impressively, last year’s iteration attracted the participation of navies from 22 countries.⁶⁶ Unfortunately, the exercise is more about confidence-building than codifying standard operating procedures for maritime security operations. Exacerbating these problems is the fact that capacity-building is often not coordinated across America and its allies and partners resulting in duplicated and wasted effort. “Unbeknownst to one another,” the author has learned, “the United States and Australia have separately pursued redundant counter-mine training with the Thai Army.”⁶⁷

Minilateralism may better allow PACOM to foster greater cooperation among its allies and partners to underwrite a “multilateral-bilateral” approach. Moises Naim describes this as “a smarter, more targeted approach...bring[ing] to the table the smallest possible number of countries needed to have the largest possible impact on a particular problem.”⁶⁸ Whereas this is a thin form of inter-spoke cooperation, others have identified a thicker variant that “involves up to six states – allies, partners, or otherwise – that meet ‘to discuss issue-areas involving mutual threats to their security or, more often, to go over specific tasks related to building regional stability and order.’”⁶⁹ Examples of this graduated version abound. The Trilateral Coordination and Oversight Group encourages inter-spoke cooperation between PACOM, the Japanese Self-Defense Force, and South Korean military to manage Pyongyang.⁷⁰ Following the India Ocean Tsunami in 2004, Cha notes that a “coalition of the United States, Japan, Australia, and India – known as the Tsunami Core Group – formed within the initial 48 hours of the crisis to bring relief supplies to the area.”⁷¹

Both the thin and thick forms of cooperation are part and parcel to either PACOM or the militaries of allied and partnered nations. By capitalizing on this factor, what analysts refer to as “virtual” or “quasi” alliances, PACOM can foster even greater cooperation among allies and partners in support of a “multilateral-bilateral” security order-building approach. This constitutes an important first step to resolve tension between America’s support of exclusivist alliances and the region’s emerging interest in multilateralism. The paper next discusses how PACOM can translate this burgeoning security pathway into a “bilateral *and* multilateral” approach to definitively resolve the bilateral-multilateral quandary.

PACOM and the “Bilateral *and* Multilateral” Security Order-Building Approach

Whereas Asia’s lack of a coherent security architecture has caused some observers to conceptualize order-building as “tangled webs of interconnectivity,” others have commented favorably on America’s promotion of “an alternative vision of regional development, one that is more inclusive.”⁷² The evidence indicates that this latter characterization best approximates a transformation of regional security order-building designed to realize a “bilateral *and* multilateral” approach. The recent US-ASEAN summit held in Sunnylands, California confirms this trend. Because it represented the first time a president convened such a meeting within the continental US, the US Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs interpreted the event as a “milestone” in Washington’s investment in multilateralism.⁷³ One Singaporean researcher added “the US seeks to expand its network of alliances and friends for the common goal of security.”⁷⁴ These assessments are corroborated by the summit’s resulting joint statement. The declaration championed “[s]hared commitment to enhance collaboration at international and regional fora, especially at existing ASEAN-led mechanisms.”⁷⁵ Of course, America has made similar promises before: it

acceded to ASEAN's Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in 2009 as a precursor to broader collaboration with regional security institutions including the East Asia Summit, and recently appointed an ambassador to ASEAN. Critics brood that such commitments do not actually facilitate movement towards a "bilateral *and* multilateral" approach as much as they compound ASEAN's propensity for "making process, not progress."⁷⁶ How can PACOM help transition from a "multilateral-bilateral" to "bilateral *and* multilateral" security order-building approach?

Sponsorship represents a useful framework through which PACOM can integrate its expanded alliances and partnerships into key security forums to synthesize bilateralism and multilateralism. According to Simon Reich and Richard Ned Lebow, sponsorship "strategies entail the endorsement, support, and enforcement of multilateral initiatives proposed by other state and non-state actors who receive wide...support and become codified in the protocols of supranational...organizations."⁷⁷ This approach provides PACOM at least four advantages. First, sponsorship engenders greater burden-sharing among allies and partners, an assumption prefigured by the rebalance of America's military to the Asia-Pacific region. Second, because this approach enables PACOM to more broadly deputize its allies and partners, it also facilitates a higher degree of stewardship of personnel, equipment, and resources. Amid fiscal austerity and an attendant reduction-in-force, this is not an insignificant dividend for PACOM as it can offset gloomy prognostications of the rebalance's impending failure.⁷⁸ Third, by conferring more agency to regional security institutions, sponsorship buttresses PACOM's own reputation as an "honest broker." Finally, because PACOM will continue to underwrite regional security, sponsorship also enables selectivity in confronting regional threats and vulnerabilities, especially when these challenges result in an alignment between

America's security interests and the region's clamoring for assistance.⁷⁹ Admiral Harris' concerns over China's militarization of the South China Sea were recently echoed by ASEAN, and a terrorist attack in Jakarta, Indonesia in mid-January, inspired by the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), encourages recapitalizing counter-terrorist training indicative of Bush-era defense diplomacy.⁸⁰ Through what forums and operating concepts should PACOM exercise a sponsorship strategy?

Scholars often characterize the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) as the region's preeminent security institution.⁸¹ Yet, the ADMM+ constitutes perhaps the more favorable candidate for PACOM's sponsorship given its refined objectives and results-based achievements. The ADMM+ is designed to "enhance regional peace and stability through cooperation in defense and security" as well as "contribute to the realisation of an ASEAN Security Community."⁸² The ARF, on the other hand, constitutes more of a dialogue venue.⁸³ Whereas the ARF's broad objective has resulted in nebulous performance measures, the ADMM+ has sought to effect change at the tactical and operational levels. Since 2010, it has convened numerous wargames, facilitated maritime security exercises, established a military-to-military contact program, consolidated best practices pertaining to logistical support to maritime security operations, developed a Direct Communication Link to coordinate crisis responses in support of CUES, and recently conducted a counterterrorism exercise involving 3,500 personnel, 18 ships, 25 aircraft, and 40 special operations teams drawn from 18 regional states.⁸⁴ While the effectiveness of these measures is debatable, the gestalt of the ADMM+'s activities constitutes a ripe mouthpiece through which PACOM can "pool" capability in support of "bilateral *and* multilateral" security order-building.

The movement towards blended or federated forces provides “an allied ‘pool’ for force demand and supply, and increasing interoperability and training.”⁸⁵ A packaging of capability, a concept also referred to as capabilities sets, constitutes a form of pooling that “packages individuals and teams with associated equipment against identified mission requirements that span the spectrum of conflict and enable a multi-echelon, joint, and/or multi-national response.”⁸⁶ These constellations, which satisfy the recommendation of several recent studies to enhance multinational interoperability, are also easily distributable across the region, tailorable and scalable to identified missions ranging from counter-proliferation to counter-piracy to HA/DR, and capable of better disciplining capacity-building against regional and sub-regional challenges.⁸⁷ Ballistic missile defense forces may be better suited for Northeast Asia to deter North Korea, for example, whereas HA/DR capabilities may be more relevant in Southeast Asia as demonstrated by a panoply of natural disasters.⁸⁸ The implementation of pooling is challenging given interoperability requirements including especially communications and training. However, both USARPAC and PACFLT have recognized the expected benefits of capabilities sets. A Contingency Reaction Force is designed to facilitate USARPAC’s response to regional security challenges requiring non-combatant evacuation, for instance.⁸⁹ The US Navy’s most recent maritime strategy also supports “employing adaptive force packages, which tailor naval capabilities to specified regional environments.”⁹⁰ Underpinned by U.S. combat potential, capabilities sets are an innovative way that PACOM can capitalize on increased investment in a “multilateral-bilateral” security approach to sponsor the region’s movement towards “bilateral *and* multilateral” security order-building.

Key Recommendations

The evidence indicates that PACOM continues to modernize alliances and partnerships epitomized by the Philippines and India. It is also clear that PACOM can husband an open security architecture by plugging both thin and thick inter-spoke cooperation into regional security forums. Less certain is whether PACOM can overcome concerns that it is outsourcing America's sovereignty, compromising on security interests, and reinforcing ASEAN's "reputation for endless discussions and its refusal to address difficult differences" should military leaders pursue a sponsorship strategy based on a pooling of capability within regional security forums.⁹¹ America's sponsorship of the Libya intervention, for instance, was derided as "leading from behind."⁹² How can PACOM ameliorate these concerns?

First, PACOM must continue to harvest thin and thick inter-spoke security cooperation for the purpose of ultimately shifting from a predominately "multilateral-bilateral" security order-building approach to one that perceives bilateralism and multilateralism as mutually constitutive. While this may appear self-evident, the reactive quality of US strategy-making, coupled with competing security priorities such as ISIL, makes America's continued investment in the Asia-Pacific region easy in theory but difficult in practice. Second, since capacity-building is euphemistically referred to as a high investment and low return activity, PACOM should adopt a more coherent framework through which to tailor such efforts against particular allies, partners, and sub-regional threats and challenges. In a recent *Joint Force Quarterly* article, Thomas W. Ross, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Security Cooperation, promulgated the Capability Package Planning Model that "offers a conceptual framework for how planners and

policymakers should conceive of the critical analytical and programmatic inputs to building partner nation military capabilities.”⁹³ This four-step model represents an intelligible way through which PACOM can refine its sponsorship strategy by designing and integrating the right capabilities into the right security forums at the right times and places. Finally, PACOM must determine the trade-offs between compromise on less serious challenges and threats, where it can sponsor a regional response, and those challenges and threats that demand unequivocal American leadership. Counter-piracy and HA/DR missions are useful proving grounds for the ADMM+’s incipient leadership. China’s militarization of the South China Sea, on the other hand, threatens America’s treaty allies as well as eschews the laws and norms that govern the flow of commerce through international waters that commits PACOM to exercise the special managerial responsibilities that accrue to great powers.⁹⁴

Conclusion

Asia-Pacific security order-building is best conceptualized as the byproduct of countervailing realist and liberal-institutionalist international relations theories. As the institutional manifestations of these competing logics, the degree to which bilateral and multilateral arrangements have coexisted has narrowed dramatically given the intersection of enhanced regional agency, continued mistrust between regional states due to unresolved war memories, and an evolving Sino-US relationship characterized by the concomitant dynamics of China’s reemergence as a viable regional power and America’s declining primacy. The precise form of the region’s security order has therefore become a prominent concern for practitioners and experts as it is taken to represent a barometer for peaceful and stable interstate relations. Still outstanding for regionalists is the question of how PACOM, as the security component of America’s ongoing rebalance to Asia, can best reconcile

Washington's preference for bilateral security alliances with the region's interest in more inclusive – ergo, multilateral – security institutions.

By adopting a typology promulgated by one recognized regional authority, the author has argued that PACOM can help resolve this bilateral-multilateral quandary by pursuing a phased approach. First, PACOM can modernize alliances and expand partnerships to catalyze greater inter-spoke cooperation. Second, notwithstanding the thinness or thickness of such cooperation, PACOM can harness this “multilateral-bilateral” security order-building approach as a springboard to “bilateral *and* multilateral” order-building predicated on a definitive integration of bilateralism and multilateralism. Specifically, PACOM can embed its security relationships into key regional security forums such as the ADMM+.

Sponsorship constitutes a useful strategy through which PACOM can operationalize a novel operating concept, a packaging of capability, to empower heightened regional leadership through the ADMM+ in response to threats and vulnerabilities that are inconsistent with America's national security interests.

Notes

1. Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics* (New York: Palgrave, 2002), 8. Bull defines order as the pattern of activity that maintains the social goals of states including the protection of people, property, and promises. Yet, it is important to note that with over fifty meanings, order is also considered a slippery, imprecise, and therefore highly pliable concept. See Muthian Alagappa, *Asian Security Order: Instrumental and Normative Features* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2003), 34.
2. Barack Obama, "Remarks by President Obama to the Australian Parliament," *The White House*, November 17, 2011, accessed March 4, 2016, <https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/11/17/remarks-president-obama-australian-parliament>. See also Ryo Sahashi, "Japan's vision of the East Asian security order," *East Asia Forum* (February 23, 2016): 1-2. On America's "rebalance" to Asia, see William T. Tow and Douglas Stuart, eds., *The New U.S. Strategy Towards Asia: Adapting to the American Pivot* (New York: Routledge, 2015). On the South China Sea, see Robert D. Kaplan, *Asia's Cauldron: The South China Sea and the End of a Stable Pacific* (New York: Random House, 2014). Of course, some, like Greg Austin from the Australian National University, argue that it is not entirely clear that China's militarization of the South China Sea will result in war much less a disruption of international commerce flows. See Sam Bateman, "Australia's flawed position in the South China Sea," *East Asia Forum* (March 9, 2016): 1-2.
3. Paul Lushenko and John Hardy, "China, the United States, and the Future of Regional Security Order—An Unhappy Coexistence," *Asian Security* 12, no. 1 (2006): 1-28. See also Barry Buzan and Yongjin Zhang, eds., *Contesting International Society in East Asia* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014). See also Evelyn Goh, *The Struggle for Order: Hegemony, Hierarchy, & Transition in Post-Cold War East Asia* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 6. Goh states that order-building incorporates "interactive ideational, discursive, and normative dynamics of change."
4. William T. Tow, "Bilateralism and Multilateral Security in the Asia-Pacific: Key Concepts," in William T. Tow, Russell Trood, and Toshiya Hoshino, eds., *Bilateralism in a Multilateral Era: The Future of the San Francisco Alliance System in the Asia-Pacific* (Queensland: Centre for the Study of Australia-Asia Relations, 1997), 13.
5. Stephen M. Walt, "Why alliances endure or collapse," *Survival* 39, no. 1 (1997): 157. See also William T. Tow and Satu Limaye, "What's China Got to Do With It? U.S. Alliances, Partnerships in the Asia-Pacific," *Asian Politics & Policy* 8, no. 1 (2016): 10.
6. William T. Tow and Satu Limaye, "What's China Got to Do With It? U.S. Alliances, Partnerships in the Asia-Pacific," 7-26. The "hub-and-spokes" system is also referred to as the "Pacific Security System" and "San Francisco System" based on the American city in which Washington officials signed a treaty of non-aggression and alliance with Japan over 70 years ago.
7. John Gerard Ruggie, "Multilateralism: the Anatomy of an Institution," *International Organization* 46, no. 3 (Summer, 1992): 571.

8. The thirteen original member states include Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam. ASEAN's Secretariat is located in Jakarta, the capital of Indonesia.

9. Mary Farrell, "Regionalism from an Historical Perspective," in Mary Farrell, Bjorn Hettne, and Luk Van Langenhove, eds., *Global Politics of Regionalism: Theory and Practice* (London: Pluto Press, 2005), 8. See also Karl Wolfgang Deutsch, Sidney A. Burrell, and Robert A. Khan, *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience* (New York: Greenwood Press, 1957). The authoritative definition for what constitutes a "security community" was offered by Deutsch, Burrell, and Khan. See also Raimo Väyrynen, "Regionalism: Old and New," *International Studies Review* 5, no. 1 (March, 2003): 39. Väyrynen contends that regionalization results in regionalism and represents the process that "fills the region with substance such as...institutional ties, political, and cultural belonging." Christopher Roberts defines regionalization similarly as the "dynamics behind economic, political-security, and socio-cultural integration." See Christopher Roberts, *ASEAN Regionalism – Cooperation, Values, and Institutionalization* (London: Routledge, 2012), 13-14.

10. Aaron Friedberg is a flagbearer of the China threat thesis. See Aaron Friedberg, *A Contest for Supremacy: China, America, and the Struggle for Mastery in Asia* (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 2011). On status, see Deborah W. Larson, T. V. Paul, and William C. Wohlforth, "Status and World Order," in Deborah W. Larson, T. V. Paul, and William C. Wohlforth, eds., *Status and World Politics* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 7. On China's support of multilateralism based on status concerns, see James Jungbok Lee, "Will China's Rise be Peaceful? A Social Psychological Perspective," *Asian Security* 12, no. 1 (2016): 29-52.

11. Barry Buzan and Yongjin Zhang, "Introduction: interrogating regional international society in East Asia," in Barry Buzan and Yongjin Zhang, eds., *Contesting International Society in East Asia* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 19.

12. Paul Lushenko and John Hardy, "China, the United States, and the Future of Regional Security Order—An Unhappy Coexistence," 9.

13. William T. Tow and Brendan Taylor, "What is Asian security architecture?," *Review of International Studies* 36, no. 1 (January 2010): 110.

14. Brendan Taylor, "Conceptualizing the bilateral-multilateral security nexus," in William T. Tow and Brendan Taylor, eds., *Bilateralism, Multilateralism, and Asia-Pacific Security: Contending Cooperation* (New York: Routledge, 2013), 17. One recent study is indicative of this trend. It concludes, "[e]xploring how these modes of security cooperation relate and might optimally interact with one another thus constitutes an exciting and important research endeavor."

15. Taek Goo Kang, "Assessing China's approach to regional multilateral security cooperation," *Australian Journal of International Affairs* 64, no. 4 (August 2010): 406-431. See also Paul Lushenko and Jon Lushenko, "PACOM's Role in Sustaining Indo-Asia-Pacific

Security,” *Asia Pacific Bulletin* 328 (November 4, 2015): 1-2. The inspiration for this paper derives from my recent argument that needs further study.

16. Barry Buzan and Yongjin Zhang, “Introduction: interrogating regional international society in East Asia,” 19-21.

17. Victor D. Cha, “Powerplay: Origins of the U.S. Alliance System in Asia,” *International Security* 34, no. 3 (Winter, 2009/2010): 158.

18. Christopher Hemmer and Peter J. Katzenstein, “Why is There No NATO in Asia? Collective Identity, Regionalism, and the Origins of Multilateralism,” *International Organization* 56, no. 3 (Summer, 2002): 588. According to Hemmer and Katzenstein, “U.S. policymakers did not believe that the Southeast Asian states could be trusted with the increased influence a multilateral institution would offer, nor was there any sense that these states deserved a multilateral structure.”

19. Evelyn Goh, *The Struggle for Order: Hegemony, Hierarchy, & Transition in Post-Cold War East Asia*, 11.

20. David Kang, “An East Asian international society today? The cultural dimension,” in Barry Buzan and Yongjin Zhang, eds., *Contesting International Society in East Asia* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 92. Kang, a renowned Sinologist, argues that how China and America “manage East Asian leadership, the status they accord each other, and how other regional countries come to view them will be central aspects of whether or not the future of East Asian international relations is one of increasing stability.”

21. Ian Clark, *Hegemony in International Society* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011). Clark also dubs the “Concert of Europe” as a form of collective hegemony defined as a peer group of great powers that operates as a unique and legitimate governing body in and of itself. See page 50-71 and 73-97.

22. Bruce E. Bechtol Jr., *North Korea and Regional Security in the Kim Jong-un Era* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014).

23. Brendan Taylor, “Conceptualizing the bilateral-multilateral security nexus,” 9

24. Ibid. See also William T. Tow and Rikki Kersten, “Introduction,” in William T. Tow and Rikki Kersten, eds., *Bilateral Perspectives on Regional Security: Australia, Japan, and the Asia-Pacific Region* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 2. Tow asserts that China’s re-emergence as a regional and global power, coupled with America’s relative decline and heightened agency among regional states, points to “the desirability of enhanced interoperability and coordination between Asia-Pacific nations in general and alliance and security partners of the United States in particular.” On China’s ascent, see, *inter alia*: David C. Kang, *China Rising: Peace, Power, and Order in East Asia* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007); Robert S. Ross and Zhu Feng, eds., *China’s Ascent: Power, Security, and the Future of International Politics* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2008);

Susan Shirk, *China: Fragile Superpower* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007); Rex Li, *A Rising China and Security in East Asia: Identity Construction and Security Discourse* (New York: Routledge, 2009); David M. Lampton, *The Three Faces of Chinese Power: Might, Money, and Minds* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008); Rosemary Foot and Andrew Walter, *China, the United States, and Global Order* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011); and, Lyle J. Goldstein, *Meeting China Halfway: How to Defuse the Emerging US-China Rivalry* (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2015).

25. Chulacheeb Chinwanno, "Thailand's security policy: bilateralism or multilateralism?," in William T. Tow and Brendan Taylor, eds., *Bilateralism, Multilateralism, and Asia-Pacific Security: Contending Cooperation* (New York: Routledge, 2013), 80.

26. Andrew Carr, "Middle Powers and the US Pivot: A Collective Action Problem," *Tamkang Journal of International Affairs* 19, no. 2 (2016): 53-87. Carr demonstrates that although America's "rebalance" to the Pacific is predicated on greater burden-sharing, the interests between America and its allies and partners are not always aligned, and increasingly so. See also CSIS, *Asia-Pacific Re-Balance 2015: Capabilities, Presence and Partnerships* (Washington, D.C.: CSIS, January, 2016), VIII.

27. Hugh White, "Can we really be sure the US will underwrite Australia's security?," *The Age*, February 16, 2016, accessed February 25, 2016, <http://www.theage.com.au/comment/can-we-really-be-sure-the-us-will-underwrite-australias-security-20160214-gmu0za#ixzz40HjkBbBK>.

28. Brian L. Job, "Multilateralism in the Asia-Pacific," in William T. Tow, Russell Trood, and Toshiya Hoshino, eds., *Bilateralism in a Multilateral Era: The Future of the San Francisco Alliance System in the Asia-Pacific* (Queensland: Centre for the Study of Australia-Asia Relations, 1997), 161-162.

29. Paul Lushenko and Jon Lushenko, "PACOM's Role in Sustaining Indo-Asia-Pacific Security," 2.

30. Ibid.

31. William T. Tow and Satu Limaye, "What's China Got to Do With It? U.S. Alliances, Partnerships in the Asia-Pacific," 8.

32. T.X. Hammes, "Offshore Control: A Proposed Strategy," *Infinity Journal* 2, no. 2 (Spring 2012): 12.

33. Paul Lushenko and John Hardy, "China, the United States, and the Future of Regional Security Order—An Unhappy Coexistence," 10. Some also contend that the rebalance "feeds China's aggressiveness, undermines regional stability, and decreases the possibility of cooperation between Beijing and Washington." See Robert S. Ross, "The Problem with the Pivot: Obama's New Asia Policy is Unnecessary and Counterproductive," *Foreign Affairs* 91, no. 6 (November-December 2012): 70-82.

34. Paul Lushenko and John Hardy, "China, the United States, and the Future of Regional Security Order—An Unhappy Coexistence," 16.
35. Robert D. Kaplan, "The Geography of Chinese Power: How Far Can Beijing Reach on Land and Sea?," *Foreign Affairs* 89, no. 3 (May/June, 2010): 39.
36. Rikki Kersten, "Contextualizing Australia-Japan security cooperation: the normative framing of Japanese security policy," *Australia Journal of International Affairs* 70, no. 1 (2016): 6.
37. Gen Nakatani, "Extra press Conference by the Defense Minister Nakatani," January 10, 2016, accessed February 26, 2016, <http://www.mod.go.jp/e/pressconf/2016/01/160110.html>.
38. Kurt Campbell, former Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, quoted in Renato Cruz De Castro, "The US-Philippines alliance: Moving beyond bilateralism," in William T. Tow and Brendan Taylor, eds., *Bilateralism, Multilateralism and Asia-Pacific Security: Contending cooperation* (New York: Routledge, 2013), 58.
39. Prashanth Parameswaran, "US Gives the Philippines 2 New Vessels Amid South China Sea Tensions," *The Diplomat*, November 18, 2015, accessed February 28, 2016, <http://thediplomat.com/2015/11/us-gives-the-philippines-2-new-vessels-amid-south-china-sea-tensions/>. See also Ridzwan Rahmat, "Philippines to receive third USCG Hamilton-class cutter," *IHS Jane's Defense Weekly*, March 13, 2016, accessed March 15, 2016, <http://www.janes.com/article/58752/philippines-to-receive-third-uscg-hamilton-class-cutter/>. The Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation is a twenty-one member organization that links the economies of East Asia to Latin America, North America, and Oceania.
40. "Document: Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement between the Philippines and the United States," April 29, 2014, accessed February 26, 2016, <http://www.gov.ph/2014/04/29/document-enhanced-defense-cooperation-agreement/>. See also Trefor Moss, "U.S. Set to Deploy Troops to Philippines in Rebalancing Act," *The Wall Street Journal*, March 20, 2016, accessed March 21, 2016, <http://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-set-to-deploy-troops-to-philippines-in-rebalancing-act-1458466797>.
41. Marvin Ott and Derek Maseloff, "The U.S.-Malaysia Security Cooperation," *Asia Pacific Bulletin* 335 (February 24, 2016): 3.
42. Ibid.
43. William T. Tow and Satu Limaye, "What's China Got to Do With It? U.S. Alliances, Partnerships in the Asia-Pacific," 16. See also Bates Gill, "The United States and Asia in 2015: Across the Region, US-China Competition Intensifies," *Asian Survey* 56, no. 1 (January/February, 2016): 18.
44. Definitive fictional and non-fictional accounts of the Vietnam War include: Andrew Krepinevich, Jr., *The Army and Vietnam* (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1986); Harry G. Summers, Jr., *On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War* (Novato, CA:

Presidio Press, 1982); H.R. McMaster, *Dereliction of Duty: Lyndon Johnson, Robert McNamara, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Lies that Led to Vietnam* (New York: HarperPerennial, 1997); James Kitfield, *Prodigal Soldiers* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1995); James Webb, *Fields of Fire* (New York: Bantam Books, 1978); and, Lewis B. Puller, Jr., *Fortunate Son: The Autobiography of Lewis B. Puller, Jr.* (New York: Bantam Books, 1991).

45. "The U.S. – Vietnam Military to Military Relationship after Twenty Years of Diplomatic Relations," June 08, 2015, accessed February 28, 2016, <http://www.pacom.mil/Media/News/tabid/5693/Article/599770/the-us-vietnam-military-to-military-relationship-after-twenty-years-of-diplomat.aspx>.

46. William Cole, "China, while criticizing the U.S., says it will participate in RIMPAC," February 25, 2016, accessed February 28, 2016, <http://www.staradvertiser.com/breaking-news/china-while-criticizing-the-us-says-it-will-participate-in-rimpac/>. William Tow also notes that the US force allocation for this flagship exercise has reduced from 8,000 to 3,300 personnel. See William T. Tow, "US Rebalancing: ASEAN and America's Maritime Allies," *ISEAS Perspective* 10 (March 09, 2016): 8.

47. Truth in lending, America also recently stalled signing a bilateral agreement to deploy the THAAD system to South Korea as a political lever to incentivize China to support harsher United Nations Security Council sanctions against North Korea. See Eunjung Lim, "North Korea's Audaciousness Changes the Status-Quo in Northeast Asia," *Asia Pacific Bulletin* 336 (March 8, 2016): 2.

48. "China; South Korea: Landmark Free Trade Agreement Signed," June 11, 2015, accessed February 28, 2016, <http://www.loc.gov/law/foreign-news/article/china-south-korea-landmark-free-trade-agreement-signed/>.

49. Paul Lushenko and John Hardy, "China, the United States, and the Future of Regional Security Order—An Unhappy Coexistence," 13.

50. Woo Jung-Yeop and Eillen Block, "Misinformation Hinders Debate on THAAD Deployment in Korea," *Asia Pacific Bulletin* 319 (August 11, 2015): 2.

51. Prashanth Parameswaran, "South Korea, Philippines Deepen Military Ties," *The Diplomat*, September 14, 2015, accessed February 28, 2016, <http://thediplomat.com/2015/09/south-korea-philippines-deepen-military-ties/>. See also Samuel J. Mun, "Japan-South Korea Defense Ties Need a Boost Amid North Korea's Provocations," *The Diplomat*, February 27, 2016, accessed March 1, 2016, <http://thediplomat.com/2016/02/japan-south-korea-defense-ties-need-a-boost-amid-north-koreas-provocations/>.

52. Walter C. Ladwig III, "Delhi's Pacific Ambition: Naval Power, 'Look East,' and India's Emerging Influence in the Asia-Pacific," *Asian Security* 5, no. 2 (2009): 102. President George W. Bush's pledged to "help India become a major world power in the 21st century."

See also Ashley J. Tellis, "The Evolution of U.S.-India Ties: Missile Defense in an Emerging Strategic Relationship," *International Security* 30, no. 4 (Spring, 2006): 113-151.

53. Ibid., 93-94.

54. Ibid., 93. See also Robert D. Kaplan, *Monsoon: The Indian Ocean & The Battle for Supremacy in the 21st Century* (Collingwood, Australia: Black Inc., 2010), 126.

55. Walter C. Ladwig III, "Delhi's Pacific Ambition: Naval Power, 'Look East,' and India's Emerging Influence in the Asia-Pacific," 89.

56. Quoted in "US Wants Leadership Role for India in Asia-Pacific," February 23, 2016, accessed February 26, 2016, <http://www.irrawaddy.com/asia/us-wants-leadership-role-for-india-in-asia-pacific.html>. Expansion of military ties between PACOM and the Indian military comes on the heels of a Joint Strategic Vision for the Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean Region just negotiated between President Obama and Prime Minister Narendra Modi. See Bates Gill, "The United States and Asia in 2015: Across the Region, US-China Competition Intensifies," 10.

57. Ibid.

58. Quoted in Walter C. Ladwig III, "Delhi's Pacific Ambition: Naval Power, 'Look East,' and India's Emerging Influence in the Asia-Pacific," 100.

59. "India, U.S., Japan to hold naval drills close to China's waters," *Japan Times*, March 03, 2016, accessed March 4, 2016, <http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2016/03/03/national/india-u-s-japan-to-hold-naval-drills-close-to-chinas-waters/>. See also Nina Silove, "The Pivot before the Pivot: U.S. Strategy to Preserve the Power Balance in Asia," *International Security* 40, no. 4 (Spring, 2016): 79.

60. Walter C. Ladwig III, "Delhi's Pacific Ambition: Naval Power, 'Look East,' and India's Emerging Influence in the Asia-Pacific," 106. Ladwig concludes "India recognizes the value of the existing US alliance system in providing stability in the Asia-Pacific region and shares the preferences of many states in East and Southeast Asia for maintaining US preponderance."

61. William J. Fallon, "Statement of Admiral William J. Fallow, U.S. Navy, Commander, U.S. Pacific Command, Before the House Armed Services Committee on U.S. Pacific Command Posture," March 07, 2007, accessed September 13, 2014, www.globalsecurity.org.

62. Derek S. Reveron, *Exporting Security* (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2010), 105.

63. "International Military Education and Training Account Summary," *US Department of State*, accessed February 28, 2016, <http://www.state.gov/t/pm/ppa/sat/c14562.htm>.

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65. Quoted in Paul Lushenko and David Hammerschmidt, "Back to the Future: Managing Training to 'Win in a Complex World,'" *Military Review* 95, no. 1 (February, 2015): 55.
66. William Cole, "China, while criticizing the U.S., says it will participate in RIMPAC."
67. Paul Lushenko, "Rebalancing the US Army Towards Asia," *Asia Pacific Bulletin* 244 (December 5, 2013): 2.
68. Mosies Naim, "Minilateralism: The Magic Number to Get Real International Action," *Foreign Policy*, June 21, 2009, accessed February 28, 2016, <http://foreignpolicy.com/2009/06/21/minilateralism/>.
69. Paul Lushenko and John Hardy, "China, the United States, and the Future of Regional Security Order—An Unhappy Coexistence," 9.
70. Ibid.
71. Victor D. Cha, "Complex Patchworks: U.S. Alliances as Part of Asia's Regional Architecture," *Asia Policy* 11 (January, 2011): 37.
72. William T. Tow, *Tangled Webs: Security Architectures in Asia* (Barton, Australia: Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 2008), 2. Mark Beeson and Shaun Breslin, "Regional and global forces in East Asia's economic engagement with international society," in Barry Buzan and Yongjin Zhang, eds., *Contesting International Society in East Asia* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 115.
73. Ben Otto, "US works ties with ASEAN countries on the doorstep of China," *The Wall Street Journal*, February 12-14, 2016.
74. David Han, "US-ASEAN Relations: Uncertainty and Opportunity," *RSIS Commentary* (March 1, 2016): 1.
75. "Joint Statement of the U.S.-ASEAN Special Leaders' Summit: Sunnylands Declaration," *The White House*, February 16, 2016, accessed February 26, 2016, <https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2016/02/16/joint-statement-us-asean-special-leaders-summit-sunnylands-declaration>.
76. David Martin Jones and Michael L. R. Smith, "Making Process, Not Progress: ASEAN and the Evolving East Asian Regional Order," *International Security* 32, no. 1 (Summer, 2007): 148-184.
77. Simon Reich and Richard Ned Lebow, *Good-Bye Hegemony: Power and Influence in the Global System* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014), 139.

78. Scott W. Harold, "Is the Pivot Doomed? The Resilience of America's Strategic 'Rebalance,'" *The Washington Quarterly* 37, no. 4 (Spring, 2015): 85. According to one well positioned Pentagon official, "owing to budgetary constraints right now the pivot is being looked at again, because, candidly, it can't happen."
79. Simon Reich and Richard Ned Lebow, *Good-Bye Hegemony: Power and Influence in the Global System*, 139-142. These four advantages are the outgrowth of those anticipated by Reich and Lebow should America pursue a sponsorship strategy at the global level.
80. "ASEAN says seriously concerned about rising South China Sea tensions," *Reuters*, February 28, 2016, accessed March 1, 2016, <http://www.reuters.com/article/southchinasea-asean-idUSKCN0W00DN>.
81. Taek Goo Kang, "Assessing China's approach to regional multilateral security cooperation."
82. "About the ASEAN Defense Ministers' Meeting (ADMM-Plus)," January 14, 2015, accessed February 26, 2016, <https://admm.asean.org/index.php/about-admm/about-admm-plus.html>.
83. "About the ASEAN Regional Forum, (2011)," accessed March 10, 2016, <http://aseanregionalforum.asean.org/about.html>.
84. Ibid. See also "China, Asean agree to examine S'pore proposal on South China Sea," *Straits Times*, March 2, 2016, accessed March 2, 2016, <http://www.straitstimes.com/asia/east-asia/china-asean-agree-to-examine-spore-proposal-on-south-china-sea>; and, Ridzwan Rahmat, "ASEAN, regional navies hone counterterrorism capabilities in multilateral maritime exercise," *IHS Jane's Defense Weekly*, May 10, 2016, accessed May 10, 2016, <http://www.janes.com/article/60141/asean-regional-navies-hone-counterterrorism-capabilities-in-multilateral-maritime-exercise>.
85. Chuck Hagel, *Quadrennial Defense Review 2014* (Washington, D.C.: US Department of Defense, March 04, 2014), 61.
86. Paul Lushenko, "Intellectualizing the U.S. Army's Rebalance within Asia," *Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin* (July-September 2014): 54. See also Paul Lushenko, "Capabilities Sets: Refining the U.S. Army's Rebalance to Asia," *Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin* (October-December 2015): 30-35. As I've argued elsewhere, capabilities sets can be designed for functional or issue based use. Issue based capabilities sets may be designed to provide consequence management of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. My experiences indicate that functionally based capabilities sets often revolve around intelligence teams embedded with first responders in the event of natural disasters or other threats and vulnerabilities.
87. Thomas J. Bickford, Lisa Hannett, Edward Skolnick, and Albert S. Willner, *The Role of the US Army in Asia* (Arlington, Virginia: Center for Naval Analysis, May 2015). See also

CSIS, *Asia-Pacific Re-Balance 2015: Capabilities, Presence and Partnerships*; and, Nina Silove, "The Pivot before the Pivot: U.S. Strategy to Preserve the Power Balance in Asia," 65.

88. Ibid., 70.

89. Paul Lushenko, "Rebalancing the US Army Towards Asia," 2.

90. Ray Mabus, *A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower* (Washington, D.C.: US Department of the Navy, March, 2015), 11.

91. Paul Dibb, "What is ASEAN's strategic value?," *East Asian Forum* (March 3, 2016): 1.

92. Roger Cohen, "Leading From Behind," *New York Times*, October 31, 2011, accessed March 4, 2016, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/01/opinion/01iht-edcohen01.html?_r=0.

93. Thomas W. Ross, "Enhancing Security Cooperation Effectiveness: A Model for Capability Package Planning," *Joint Force Quarter* 80 (2016): 33.

94. Mlada Bukovansky, Ian Clark, Robyn Eckersley, Richard Price, Christian Reus-Smit, and Nicolas J. Wheeler, *Special Responsibilities: Global Responsibilities and American Power* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 16. The authors define special responsibilities as a "differentiated set of obligations, the allocation of which is collectively agreed, and they provide a principle of social differentiation for managing collective problems in a world characterized by both formal equality and inequality in material capability."

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