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ARMY ROLES, MISSIONS, AND DOCTRINE IN LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT (ARMLIC)

PRECONFLICT CASE STUDY 1--PHILIPPINES

15 JUNE 1969

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
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PREFATORY NOTE TO USERS OF THIS MATERIAL

1. This case study of the preconflict period in the Philippines is one of a series undertaken by the Carlisle Research Office of Operations Research Incorporated for the US Army Combat Developments Command Institute of Advanced Studies (USACDCIAS), Carlisle Barracks, Pa. (now designated Institute of Land Combat (USACDCILC). The purpose is to develop a better understanding of the political, economic, social, psychological, public health, scientific-technological, and military factors conducive to low intensity conflict and change of indigenous governmental control. A total of seven such studies has been completed and have been placed on file at the Defense Documentation Center (DDC) for authorized users.

2. This and the other case studies were used in support of the USACDCIAS project entitled Army Roles, Missions, and Doctrine in Low Intensity Conflict (ARMLIC). However, no assumptions are made as to whether Army actions are desirable or necessary in connection with any given conflict. Rather, it is recognized that Army capabilities, both military and for civilian assistance, are among many means of US Government action available to be used or withheld in furtherance of US policy and national interest; and that these capabilities should be so designed and maintained to best serve the purposes which national authorities may require with the greatest effectiveness and the least cost.

3. The data in this case study have been drawn from open sources, published and unpublished, available through public institutions and Government agencies. No field work is involved, and no policy recommendations are made. The data have been checked against selected classified sources and with knowledgeable individuals. The method used is a modified systems analysis aimed at determining points of tension (or dysfunction) conducive to low intensity conflict. Basic assumptions and methodology, common to all aspects of the ARMLIC study, are on file in USACDCILC.

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5. Questions and comments may be directed to the Deputy Commanding General, US Army Combat Developments Command Institute of Land Combat, Carlisle Barracks, Pa. 17013.

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

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1916	Jones Law declares American intention to withdraw as soon as stable government established.
1930	Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) organized; outlawed 1932.
1934	Tydings-McDuffie Act sets independence ten years after establishment of Commonwealth.
1935	Philippine Commonwealth established after general election. Increasing US support for independence.
1935	General MacArthur assigned as military adviser to Philippines, commences organization of Army.
1935	Sakdalista (pro-independence) revolt in central Luzon.
1937	Strikes in Arayat, Pampanga provinces; mass arrests of peasant leaders.
1938	Ban on Communist Party lifted; Communists form United Front with Socialists.
1938	Government conference on law and order.
1942	Japanese invasion and occupation. Vargas remains behind on Quezon's instruction to form puppet government.
1942	Hukbong Magpalayan Bayan (HUK), "People's Army of Liberation," established.
1943	Japanese declare Philippines independent; Laurel becomes president.
1944-45	Liberation of Philippines. Guerrillas absorbed into Philippine Army or disbanded.
1946	Philippines become independent. Roxas elected president.

1946	Roxas refuses seats to nine Democratic Alliance representatives newly elected to legislature.
1948	Communist Party outlawed second time; active preparation for conflict commences.
1948	Quirino orders action against Huks at termination of 20-day amnesty period.

SYNTHESIS AND CONCLUSIONS: FACTORS CONDUCIVE TO CONFLICT

1. Overview.

a. The preconflict period runs from 1935, when the Philippine Commonwealth became autonomous, to 1948, when the Hukbalahap insurrection erupted.

b. Study of this period shows that from 1935 to 1948, most of the rural population of the Philippines was effectively alienated--politically, socially, and economically--from the government. Full independence was a generally shared US and Philippine goal, and the Philippine Government gave lip-service to US-style freedom and economic and social justice, but in practice there was little popular participation in Government. The dominant elite controlled the country for its own interests, and only the Communists and Socialists tried to represent the poor.

c. The agrarian rural economy was separate from the modern economy of Manila and largely undeveloped. Land reform increased rather than decreased land tenancy. Population growth aggravated pressure on the land. Failure of social and public health programs to reach the rural masses augmented frustration. Malnutrition grew worse, particularly in central Luzon.

d. Filipino social life and culture stressed personalism and family loyalties rather than responsibility to the State, leading to favoritism and nepotism. Traditional culture was reinforced by the church.

e. The Philippine military establishment was soundly conceived and built systematically by General Douglas MacArthur and President Manuel Quezon. The military forces were civilian-oriented, and capable of preserving the security prior to World War II, and a tremendous asset to the United States at the outset of war. But US postwar policies lacked the insights of prewar programs in military and other fields. Moreover, the military and security forces after the war were ineffective, politics-ridden, and disliked by the people.

f. The Communists (Hukbalahap Movement) capitalized upon rural discontent and upon US and Philippine Government failure to solve postwar problems. They had organization and had successfully survived the war. However, the Communists could not develop a national leader or fully overcome the weaknesses in Philippine society and culture.

g. The Communists did, however, succeed in establishing control of the swampy area north of Manila. Here there was terrain that impeded development of Government forces, an exploited and resentful populace, current peasant unrest, local sufficiency of food, and, finally, some capability to produce and repair weapons.

h. Political findings included the importance of independence as a goal; lack of real political participation by the populace; personalities, rather than institutions, as the controlling factor; and the elite domination of the two-party system.

i. Economic findings included dualism between Manila and rural areas; the inefficiency of the agrarian economy; inequities of land ownership;

the pressure of population growth (result of public health measures among other factors), combined with continuing disease and malnutrition.

j. Among sociological findings were the importance of family loyalties, orientation toward basic groups with hierarchial patterns, the social power of the church and its reinforcement of tradition, and a class system reinforcing elite dominance and self-interest.

k. Military factors included a sound initial US and Philippine advisory relationship, a civil-military organization concept, awareness of economic limitations, the social impact of military service, psychological errors in postwar US policies, and, finally, a weak postwar military and security organization.

2. Background.

a. The possession of the Philippines made the United States an Asiatic power with considerable responsibility both in Asian affairs and the internal defense and development of the Philippines. Although US guidance in the Philippines lasted 46 years, the preconflict period selected by the study group was 1935 through 1948.

b. The rationale for selecting this period centers on creation of the Commonwealth in 1935, following a succession of able US governors who established good relations between the two countries, coupled with increasing support for independence developed in the US Congress. As far as the study group could determine, it was the closest situation to the beginning of an independent nation.

c. The United States during the transition of the Philippines from a Commonwealth status to an independent nation was responsible for the establishment of a defense system. This tremendous undertaking, beginning in 1935, was unique--particularly since the Philippines lacked a fully developed nationalism and military tradition. Finally, a major consideration was the internal threat of Communist subversive insurgency, especially when the Communists elected to proceed from parliamentary tactics to open insurrection in 1948. Hence, the closing date of the preconflict period.

d. The tentative underlying conditions making the internal threat formidable during the preconflict period are described in the following paragraphs.

3. Political factors.

a. From the beginning of the US occupation of the Philippines, many Americans and Filipinos looked forward to independence for the islands (a common objective). The Commonwealth Government subscribed to the basic US freedoms plus broad statements about social and economic justice (created in the US image).

b. As the Commonwealth Government and republic developed, however, there was little provision for grass roots democracy, and it was personality rather than party that dominated Philippine political life. Even though a two-party system was created after independence in 1946, both parties really represented the establishment (the old political leadership of pre-World War II days).

c. For example, in the election of 1946, the democratic alliance including the Communists and Socialists elected a block of representatives who were refused seats by the establishment. This is a good example of an arbitrary political action which, at the time and in retrospect, appeared as a significant divisive factor. The Communist Party until 1938 attempted to provide representation for the poor of the rural and urban areas as well as for discontented intellectuals.

4. Economic factors.

a. The Philippine Islands developed a dual economy--Manila and the rural areas. Despite the growth of commerce and industry in the urban centers, primarily Manila, agriculture still provided the bulk of the national income. Labor unions were organized for both urban and rural workers, and the Communists and Socialists were successful in linking them.

b. The decline of the landlord-tenant relationship began before 1900. US administration and land reform legislation increased rather than decreased the percentage of tenant farmers, particularly in the central Luzon area. Public health measures, insufficient as they were, still contributed to the population growth which, along with the lack of a provision for the practice of leaving the land to the first born, resulted in not only the economic loss of land but also the psychological effect of the loss of land as a status symbol in the mind of the average rural Filipino.

c. These economic and psychological effects were further aggravated by the failure of public health programs to reach the rural areas. In 1948, most Filipino peasants had little more knowledge about sanitation, health, and nutrition than the previous generation. This lack of awareness was not shared by the Huk leaders. However, the failure of social and public health programs to reach the rural masses reinforced the frustration produced by the economic and psychological loss of land. Inadequate health measures were augmented by a decline in nutrition. Probably the average Filipino's diet before 1941 was better than at any time up to 1960. In fact, malnutrition was chronic in the islands, and the people of central Luzon suffered from poorer nutrition and health than the average Filipino.

d. Landlords had moved to the urban areas, leaving the tenants at the mercy of overseers and destroying the personal patron-client relationship of previous centuries.

e. Thus, from 1935 to 1948, most of the rural population of the Islands was effectively alienated socially and economically from the Government of the period.

5. Sociocultural factors.

a. The role of the family and basic kinship group led to personalism, family loyalties, and a personal rather than an institutional approach to Government, economic, and social problems. Individual independence, freedom of choice, and the generation gap were subordinate to such ideals as reciprocity of obligations and goodwill within the basic

group. These attitudes were further strengthened by the role of the church in the religious and social life of each community.

b. Such an outlook led to the common feeling that individuals were unequal before the group, and that leniency and favoritism (whether political, economic, or social) were acceptable norms if they contributed to the bond between client and patron and between follower and leader. Thus, Philippine progress in this period varied with the success or failure of personal leadership at the national level.

6. Military factors.

a. When Commonwealth status was granted to the Philippines, one of the provisions envisaged the creation of an islands defense establishment. The relationship between President Manuel Quezon and General Douglas MacArthur, their mutual agreement about the roles and missions of the Philippine Armed Forces, Quezon's domination of the National Assembly, and the excellent Manila-Washington relationship expedited creation of a Philippine Military establishment to defend the Islands. These armed forces were created to meet the combined external threat of Japanese invasion and the internal threat of domestic disturbance; but their organization, tactics, materiel, and manpower were based on the Philippine ability to pay, the island terrain, and their defensive role.

b. Basically, the Army was civilian by the nature of the Constitution and the National Defense Plan. This fact is emphasized in Frederic Marquardt's "Before Bataan and After":

> No favoritism was shown in the draft and the sons of sugar barons drilled under the tropical sun along with

> the boys who had never worn a pair of shoes before. Each received 5 centavos per day (about 2-1/2 cents US money). Illiterates were taught to read and write. Brief courses in American and Philippine history were given. Respect for government and democratic principles was indoctrinated in the trainee. And when they had finished their training period, they were placed in the Army reserves and returned to civilian life.[1]

c. Call it an example of socialization by the Armed Forces--but when the emergency came in 1941, 150,000 trained reserves were inducted into the US Army Forces Far East (USAFFE), all trained at the expense of the Philippine Government and representing one of the largest military windfalls the US had ever received.

d. General MacArthur's success in creating as much of the Philippine defense establishment before December 1941 as he did was due in large measure to his understanding and skillful use of psychological, economic, political, and social Philippine and US assets.

e. US postwar policies toward the Commonwealth and Republic of the Philippines lacked this approach. For example, the failure of the US Armed Forces to disarm all guerrilla fighters during the liberation of the Philippines, as well as the subsequent refusal to grant veterans benefits, contributed to alienation of many Filipinos from the democratic process.

7. Communism.

a. Communist Party activity during the period represented a competing value system as well as an organization that was more capable than any other political group of taking advantage of the preconflict conditions just described.

b. The Communist movement began in the middle 1920's with the help of Communist International agents and representatives of the Communist Party of the United States of America (CPUSA). The creation of the party in 1930 and of the Socialist Front Party in 1932 established the organizational base. Although the party was outlawed in 1932, the ban was lifted in 1938, when a united front from above was formed with the Socialists.

c. The Party followed normal Communist guidelines based on the strategy and tactics of ultimately seizing power in a nation in order to transform the political, economic, social, and cultural life of that society into a future Communist state. Every action and every word was motivated by this ultimate Communist goal. The Comintern tactical approach from 1935 to 1943 emphasized the united front from above and below at different times, preservation of national independence against fascism, and creation of a new democracy. However, any direct attempts to seize power in either the capitalist or the colonial world were to be abandoned during this period. War was the most likely national crisis that would provide the opportunity for seizing power, but a national Communist party needed to be well-organized, well-trained, and in control of key mass organizations before the party could seize power. These were the important theoretical guidelines that each national Communist Party was urged to put into practice.

d. By 1930 the Comintern had succeeded in the "bolshevization" of all national Communist parties, which meant that certain organizational

standards and principles (such as democratic centralism, labor duty production cells, and a combination of legal and illegal work) were incorporated into the CPP daily life. In addition to detailed Comintern guidance on certain steps to prepare for illegal work, the CPP also received advice, based on the Chinese experience, about seizing power in colonial areas.

e. Although the CPP lacked the Chinese remote area, the Philippine Communists had other natural assets that served the same purpose as distance. In the four central Luzon provinces of Bulacau, Nueva Ecija, Pampanga, and Tarlac (Huklandia) there was terrain that impeded deployment of enemy troops; an exploited and resentful populace; a current peasant unrest; a self-sufficient locally produced food supply; and finally, some capability to produce and repair weapons.

f. The Communist Party was the only organization able to harness the periodic peasant rebellions which dated back to the 17th century in the area of central Luzon. They accomplished this with the intellectual leadership of Manila and the labor unions. This peasantry was and still is the most formidable of the social classes. The Communists were able to change the character of peasant protest. During the war they managed to set up an organization which defined the traditional value system in a sector of Philippine society which is the most difficult to change. The Huks cut across ethnolinguistic groups, demanded institutional loyalty, and linked themselves to national and international purposes. It was the only group capable of going underground during the Japanese occupation.

The militant organization that evolved offered a philosophical and activist approach to life in terms that appealed to the broad mass of society, especially after June 1941.

g. Few Filipinos outside the Communist Party cadre were motivated by Marxism-Leninism; the vast majority were attracted to the Party and its fronts because of their stand on land reform, economic and social justice, imperialism, and fascism. Relying on legal and illegal party apparatuses, ideological and organizational discipline, and the use of guerrilla tactics, the Communist Party was able to survive World War II and, in the process, eliminate opposition and consolidate its political and military base.

h. Even though the US and Philippine Governments failed in the immediate post-World War II period to provide viable alternative political, economic, and social solutions to the island's problems, the Communists also failed in the final analysis to develop a national leader, lacked a consistent ideological purpose, and were unable to overcome weaknesses inherent in Filipino social customs. The Communist Party adhered to Comintern instructions about delaying attempts to seize power during the war but prepared to respond to postwar instructions issued from Calcutta in February 1948 to resort to insurrectionary tactics.

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY

8. Nature of the study. This document is a case study of the political, economic, sociological, psychological, scientific-technological, and military aspects of the Philippines prior to the occurrence of the low intensity conflict and loss of control by the Government of the Republic in 1948. It is one of seven substudies of representative countries conducted to determine the factors that lead to low intensity conflict. The years 1935-48 were selected for examination as the preconflict period. Definitions, assumptions, and study method, which are common to all the substudies, are described in the main report.

a. Data were drawn from published and unpublished sources and, where possible, were checked for validity against classified Government sources. The results of the examination and analysis are summarized in this chapter and presented in more detail in following chapters.

b. A brief history and background of the Islands is provided in 9 below, and more complete data are available in the US Army Area Handbook for the Philippines and other cited sources (references annex).

9. Background and history. The Philippine Islands probably were first inhabited by Negritos, but Malay tribes arrived about the same time, and Muslim Moros settled in the south in the 15th century. Magellan, credited with discovering the Islands for the Western world, landed on Cebu on 16 March 1521 and was killed on the nearby island of Mactan on 17 April by

a local chieftain. Ruy de Villaloes named the Islands for King Philip II of Spain when he led an expedition to them in 1543.

a. The Republic of the Philippines occupies 7,100 islands covering 115,600 square miles (114,830 of land area) in the northern Malay Archipelago southeast of Asia. The main islands are Luzon in the north (40,420 sq. mi.), Mindanao in the south (36,527 sq. mi.), the Visayan Islands and Mindoro in the center, and Palawan and the Sulu Archipelago in the southwest. They are bordered by the Philippine Sea on the east, the South China Sea on the west, and the Celebes Sea on the south. North Borneo is just southwest of Palawan and the Sulu Archipelago, and the 92-mile-wide Bashi Channel separates the Batan Islands from Taiwan on the north. The islands (only 462 have an area of 1 square mile or more, and only 11 have an area of more than 1,200 square miles) are linked by interisland seas; and the irregular coastlines form many bays and fine harbors, providing easy access by ship. All the islands are mountainous (there are about 20 volcanic peaks), but the chief ranges are in northern Luzon and southeast Mindanao. They have plenty of rainfall, most of them are interlaced with small streams, and there are several good-sized lakes on Luzon, Mindanao, and Mindoro; but only Luzon and Mindanao have any large streams. The fertile volcanic soil and tropical climate sustain many agricultural crops and extensive hardwood forests; fishing and weaving are important industries; and the far-ranging mountain areas are a source of gold, silver, coal, chromite, petroleum, and the more important base metals, such as iron, manganese, copper, and lead.

b. The indigenous Filipinos were the Christian Tagalog, Visayan, Bicol, and Ilokano tribes; the pagan Igorot, Ifugao, Tinggian, Bukidnon, and Bagabo tribes; Negritos; and Muslim Moros. They live mainly on farms or in rural settlements, but there are more than a dozen chartered cities, and emigration to the cities is normal. Children born of intermarriages of natives and the Spanish and Chinese immigrants created a small group of Spanish-Malay and a much larger group of Chinese-Malay mestizos in the 16th and 17th centuries. Continued intermixtures of races since then have given the Filipinos a largely conglomerate ancestry, although relatively pure strains still exist. There were 117,000 Chinese (the largest foreign group) and nearly 30,000 Japanese nationals on the Islands in 1941.

(1) More than 65 native dialects are spoken in the Philippines. Tagalog, the language of the wealthy and influential residents of central Luzon, was chosen as the basis for a national language called Pilipino in 1937, although twice as many people spoke the Visayan dialect. Although the many dialects have many similarities, it is difficult for residents of different parts of the archipelago to understand each other.

(2) Schools were started for Spanish children in 1601. Education of all children between 7 and 12 became compulsory in 1863, when the Spanish attempted to establish a complete educational system for all the people of the Islands. The United States continued supporting education of the masses when it took control and managed to raise the literacy level, albeit not as high as was desired.

c. Spanish colonizers, who followed closely behind Magellan, succeeded in establishing settlements by 1565 and founded Manila in 1571. They were plagued with conflicts with the Muslims and had some trouble with the Chinese during the 16th and 17th centuries. They generally strengthened their control during the 18th and 19th centuries and finally subjugated the Muslims in the latter half of the 19th. The Filipino peoples have revolted many times since the first occidentals arrived; the most serious was the Revolution of 1896-99. They rebelled again from 1899 to 1901 after the United States acquired the Islands as a dependency at the end of the Spanish-American War. The United States established the first civil Government in 1903 and, in 1935, established an interim Commonwealth Government and announced it would give the Philippines their independence in 10 years.

d. The Spanish originally relied on village headmen (datos) to assist in governing rural areas but rapidly concentrated all governmental functions in Manila under the Governor-General. Despite shortcomings of their administration, the Spanish inculcated the Filipinos with the basic principles of Western political methods and governments. The United States further westernized political and governmental processes. The three major advances in westernization under the United States were the result of passage of the Jones Act of 1916, which replaced the appointed governing Commission with an elected Senate and declared US intent to withdraw; passage of the Hare-Hawes-Cutting independence bill in 1933; and passage of the Tydings-McDuffie Act in 1934 which established the

date for withdrawal of all US sovereignty as 4 July of the year 10 years after inauguration of the interim Commonwealth Government.

e. Agricultural output dominated the economy, and most crops were heavily concentrated (e.g., Luzon grew most of the rice and sugar). About 60 percent of all employment was based on agriculture, and many productive services fluctuated with the annual crop levels. Manufacturing (which was primarily foreign owned) and trade were concentrated in Manila, where the Chinese controlled most of the retail business. Agriculture was dominated by large landholdings with high tenancy rates--from 50 to as high as 90 percent--which may be a primary reason that Philippine agricultural productivity was much lower than that of other Asian nations, and rural incomes remained marginal. Most goods moved by rail or carabao-drawn cart despite the inadequate highway system in central Luzon. Crop patterns, land ownership, and topography varied widely from one area to another. The topography also militated against travel, and the variances in ethnic traditions and languages militated against integration of individuals or families into new rural areas. The land tenure system and almost serflike conditions under which tenant farmers worked created minimal opportunity for mobility in the early centuries.

f. After 1899, US free-trade policies were applied stringently to Philippine traders, many American businessmen saw the Islands primarily as a welcome entree to Asian markets, and Philippine foreign trade was concentrated in raw materials exports. The United States continued to be a major market for exports, as it had been for 40 years before the

Spanish-American War. Exports flourished under a free trade and tariff exemption "special relationship" with the United States (net Philippine earnings from the US market offset net losses from other markets in 1930-31). Sugar, coconut oil, lumber, ores, hemp, and embroidery were exported primarily to US markets or were controlled by US investments, which tied the Philippine economy closely to fluctuations in the US economy.

g. As a Spanish colony and then a US dependency, the Islands had no foreign relations per se prior to the preconflict period. They had a very close relationship with the United States from the time President McKinley instructed his Civil Administrator for the Philippines, William H. Taft, to change gradually from military to civilian control, once pacification and security were achieved. An even closer relationship developed, however, after General MacArthur and Philippine President Manuel Quezon started working together to create a defense establishment, and the Commonwealth Government and the US Congress worked together as closely as did MacArthur and Quezon.

10. Political factors.

a. Political structure. The Spanish period in the Philippines was characterized by governmental confusion and overlap of State and church control. Prior to the arrival of the Spanish, the inhabitants of the Islands lived in small family-oriented communities, primarily along the coasts, which were governed by chieftains or headmen called datos. The Spaniards first ruled indirectly through the datus; then Spanish churchmen

started abrogating the datos' authority; the Crown inserted "overlords" by grouping formerly self-governing villages into "estates" (encomiendas) and making grants of them to Spanish aristocrats and war heroes; and, eventually, the local Spanish rulers concentrated all government in Manila. As each level of the hierarchy was added, more of the authority of the natives was usurped, until they finally had practically no part in the governing process. Besides the attrition of their authority, they were suppressed and subjugated by the encomienderos so completely that many of them were working in conditions not unlike those of medieval serfdom. Centralization of political power in the Governor-General and duplication of responsibilities among boards and commissions effectively deprived the individual Filipino of any say in government or of opportunity to express his needs or desires, fragmented responsibility for action, increased costs of government, and fostered corruption. Even so, the Spaniards bequeathed to the Filipinos some concept of nationalism and some familiarity with Western forms of government.

(1) Late in the 19th century, there were many uprisings among the peasants to protest agricultural working conditions, and the intellectuals demanded greater roles for Filipinos in the economic, political, and social life of the Islands. Emilio Aguinaldo was one leader of the Philippine Insurrection of 1899-1901 whose objectives included establishing a viable independent republic with a written constitution which contained many of the concepts incorporated in the Commonwealth Constitution of 1936. US officials recognized the necessity for and desirability

of establishing self-government in the Philippines and inaugurated civil government as soon as the insurrection was put down. US administration and government of the Islands for the next 45 years was directed toward speeding up the transition to Philippine independence.

(2) The Tydings-McDuffie Act of 1934 provided for Philippine independence in 10 years. The Commonwealth was established as the interim government for the transition period and was based on a Constitutional Convention that drew up the fundamental law for the nation. This document contained many of the basic freedoms found in the US Constitution and its amendments in addition to broad statements about social and economic justice for all. In the enumeration and description of powers allotted to the three branches of Government, the executive branch reflects the Filipino concept of leadership, with broad powers concentrated in one man who uses them in a highly personal way from the capital to the village. The Executive also benefited from centralization of the National Government in Manila, which permitted him to develop a highly successful patronage system. The patronage system was reflected at the provincial level in negotiations and deals among the wealthy and educated elite who controlled local and national political elections. This feature again illustrates the personal rather than institutional character of Filipino leadership. The legislative branch sacrificed long-term goals throughout this period to concentrate on the practical politics of winning elections through patronage and political dealing. The judiciary, consisting of a Supreme Court and statutory courts, was probably the best of the three branches,

but most of the courts were overloaded with litigation which left the poor at the mercy of the lawyers and their wealthy clients.

b. Political parties. All during this period there was only one real political party, the Nacionalistas, but there was a continuous struggle between Sergio Osmena and Manuel Quezon for party leadership from the capital to the village. At the local level, there was little provision for the exercise of grass-roots democracy. Political education and careers were found only in Manila, at the seat of the Government. The national civil service was one of the most successful results of US political tutelage in the Philippines during this period. Changes in suffrage requirements expanded the electorate in the pre-World War II period, so that a genuine two-party system was created by the end of the conflict and the formal establishment of independence. Yet both parties really represented the establishment and failed to provide a platform for social and economic grievances. Once independence was achieved, this goal no longer held all Filipinos to a common purpose. In this era, too, the Spanish heritage of personal leadership and the US example of the separation of powers that inspired a strong Executive worked well or badly depending upon the leader. If the leader were to fail to meet the political, economic, and social challenges of change in the post-World War II period, the Philippines would be unable to solve their domestic problems until a strong leader emerged to rescue the nation.

c. The Communist Party. The Communist movement began in the Philippines in the middle 1920's with the help of Communist International

(Comintern) agents and representatives of the Communist Party of the United States of America (CPUSA). Creation of the CPP in 1930 and the Socialist Party in 1932 established the organizational base. The CPP was outlawed in 1932, but the ban was lifted in 1938 when it joined with the Socialists to form a "united front from above." The CPP followed normal Communist guidelines based on the strategy and tactics needed for ultimate seizure of power in a nation which would permit changing it into a future Communist state.

(1) In addition to detailed guidance on preparing for illegal work, the CPP also received Comintern advice, based on experience in China, about seizing power in colonial areas. Although the CPP did not have the advantage of working in a remote area as the Chinese did, the swampy area north of Manila (in Huklandia) provided the Philippine Communists with other natural obstacles that served the same purpose. Here there was terrain that impeded deployment of troops; an exploited, resentful, and currently insurgent populace; a self-sufficient locally produced food supply; and some capability to produce and repair weapons.

(2) The CPUSA furnished the early tactical and organizational guidance for the CPP, but the Communist Party of China (CPC) was the source of much information, guidance, and textbooks on guerrilla warfare during the war. The cadre of the CPP were the only members who were ideologically motivated in the Marxist-Leninist tradition. The vast majority of members and sympathizers were attracted by such issues as land reform, anti-imperialism, and social justice. The popular front

from above, created in 1938 between the CPP and the Socialist Party expanded rapidly, particularly after June 1941. The party's front organizations used church and university facilities to rally Filipinos to the cause of opposition to Japan.

(3) The CPP issued a public manifesto through the united front on 10 December 1941 that pledged support for the United States and the Commonwealth, called on all Filipinos to prepare for guerrilla warfare, and urged expansion of the united front along broad lines against Japan. By the time the Japanese invaded the Philippines, the Communists had an organization capable of going underground with plans for political and military actions against the invaders, leaders who appealed to all walks of Philippine life, and a mass following of laborers and tenant farmers in central Luzon.

(4) The CPP and remnants of the Socialist Party formed a Provisional National Committee of the United Front (PNCUF) in February 1942 which functioned essentially as a state within a state. The Military Committee of the PNCUF formed the Hukbong Bayan Laban sa Hapon (People's Army Against Japan), from which the acronym Hukbalahap was taken, and dominated the Hukbalahap (Huk) movement. During the war years, the Huk leadership successfully weeded out all pro-American Filipinos and tried to eliminate all US military personnel behind the Japanese lines. Despite the 1938-45 assistance from CPC and CPUSA, the CPP failed to develop a leader during the war, lacked ideological strength, and was

unable tc overcome the inherent Filipino social customs that inhibited development of working class leaders.

(5) US and Philippine officials who returned to the devastation left by the Japanese defeat failed to work out satisfactory liberation and reconstruction policies. The Democratic Alliance established in 1945 was a reincarnation of the united front from above. Independence brought no political or economic solutions. The Huk hoped early in the postwar years to achieve its aims by parliamentary tactics, but it changed its name to Hukbong Mapagpalayang Bayan or People's Liberation Army (HMB) in 1946. This action would make it seem fairly obvious that it had changed its aim to overthrowing the Government by other than parliamentary tactics, and its leaders continued their political and military organizing activities until March 1948. The Calcutta Youth Congress sent out a call to all Communists parties to switch to insurrectionary tactics in February 1948, and within 6 months every Asian Communist party had attempted insurrection against the established Government. Although the CPP again was outlawed in March 1948, negotiations between the Philippine Government and the HMB leadership dragged on until August 1948. In mid-August the negotiations broke down, and both sides actively prepared for armed conflict.

11. Economic factors. The contrast between the subsistence level of existence in the rural areas and the affluence of urban commercial and industrial life, particularly around Manila, points up the dual nature of the island economy.

a. The Philippine economy has been predominantly agricultural since before the Spanish arrived. Imposition of successive economic levels over the Filipinos and arrogation of their lands by the Spaniards gradually lowered native incomes. In many cases, the sharecropping system forced tenant farmers successively deeper in debt from one generation to the next and reduced them to the serf level. The situation did not improve too rapidly after the United States took control. US free trade policies were imposed harshly on Filipino interests and more temperately on others, and US and Chinese businessmen became the economic powers. They were forced out of the picture by the World War II Japanese occupation but returned or surfaced at the end of the war to resume their accustomed positions of privilege.

b. The high tenancy rate created problems throughout the agricultural sector, but it was worst in Huklandia on the large sugar and rice plantations. This area had been subjected to sporadic armed uprisings since the beginning of the century and was the breeding place for strong peasant unions, largely Socialist or Communist controlled. Many landlords who spent the war years in Manila were faced with conflict from their tenants and charges of collaboration when they tried to reclaim their land. The political, military, and economic factors which disrupted the entire nation from 1935 to 1948 were especially prevalent in the Huklandia provinces, where the social and economic alienation of the populace cannot be readily measured or explained by explicit trends.

c. The war disrupted the economy all over the Islands, but the disruption was most apparent and costly in Manila. Despite the industrial gains made prior to the war, the national income still came primarily from agricultural and service output, which slowed recovery. Disproportionate amounts of large US welfare and investment funds went to individuals or were diverted to trade channels in which propensities to consume were high and investment was nonmultiplying. Continuation of the prewar emigration to urban centers further complicated the problems of reconstruction. Despite the advances made in Manila and even in some rural areas, the traditional Filipino "family" concept of political, economic, and social leadership remained firmly entrenched. The xenophobia common to all Filipinos makes their leaders prone to govern their actions by ethnic, linguistic, and provincial loyalties and limits their commitment to national programs.

d. Officials seemed to concentrate postwar reconstruction on Manila and to ignore the nature and extent of rural problems. As the capital grew in economic importance, it became the key to political and economic power, even though problems in the rural areas (especially Huklandia in central Luzon) were just as important as those of Manila. Postwar administrations appeared to be unable or unwilling to solve the agricultural problems and to take positive steps for reconstruction and rehabilitation of the whole country. The gap between Government intentions and claims became very evident, and the Huk started reorganizing trade union activities in Manila. Under such conditions, postwar leaders had little choice

but to assume responsibility at the national level to try to maintain the economy at no lower than subsistence levels.

12. Sociological factors. The Spanish found a scattered but socially homogeneous populace in the Philippines. The class system brought by the original Malay tribes contained aristocrats, commoners, and slaves. Village chieftains and their families were at the top, and landowning freemen were just below them; next were the serfs or peasants who worked as tenant farmers and were considered commoners, and the slaves were at the bottom. The Malays considered the Muslims and Negritos to be inferior races. Most of the inhabitants of the Islands, regardless of source, lived in scattered villages surrounded by farmlands along the coast and engaged in practically no industry other than fishing.

a. The Spanish added a common religion, provided a potential for native leadership, and defined the national boundaries. The Catholic Church was responsible for elementary education until 1863, when the colonial administration attempted to create a complete education system, through the college level, for all inhabitants. The schooling was free, and instruction was supposed to be in Spanish.

(1) The priests objected to teaching the Filipinos Spanish for fear that a common language would lead to stirrings of nationalism or other "radical" ideas. About 30 percent of the total population was attending elementary schools by 1898. The population growth rate was less than 1 percent until the 19th century, when it increased to about 1.6 percent. Manila was the only urban community and was the center of

trade, finance, and transportation as well as the political hub. Protest movements developed early, in resistance to the new religion, and continued, later acquiring overtones of agrarian unrest and dissatisfaction with high taxation and lack of voice in government. Despite the opposition of the Spanish churchmen and the colonial administration, Filipino nationalism developed into a movement strong enough to make Spanish rule precarious by the 1890's and to topple it easily during the Spanish-American War.

(2) The family normally lives and works as a unit, and this family unit has dominated the social, economic, and political scene at every level since before the Spanish arrived. Slavery was abolished by the end of the 17th century, making the tenant farmers the lowest social class among Malay Filipinos, but the Spanish had added levels at the top. Spaniards (peninsulares born in Spain and criollos born in the Islands) were the elite. Children of intermarriages of the Spaniards and the wealthy Malay aristocracy (mestizos) became an intermediate aristocracy between the pure Spaniards and the pure Malays.

(3) The Crown had established a system known as encomienda for rewarding favored Spaniards. The one to be rewarded (encomiendero) was given the right to collect taxes for the Crown from large landholdings (the encomienda) often encompassing several villages. Natives who could not pay their taxes in cash were permitted to substitute labor, native chiefs who assisted the encomenderos often were opportunistic in their management, and debts increased from one generation to the next. Many

native landowning families found themselves forced into tenant farming after a few generations.

(4) The Spanish system permitted local Filipino leaders to gain political power as they amassed wealth, and the Spaniards gave them privileges which made them more wealthy and politically influential. Thus, a sociopolitical system known as caciquism (from the Spanish word for Indian chief) developed within the Filipino population based on hereditary control of land in an agrarian economy. The caciques lived on the encomiendas and developed strong patron/client relationships with the workers. It was into these cacique families that the Spanish married. As Spanish administrative policies solidified the social structure, the Filipinos became more dependent economically and psychologically, but social distinctions were part of the natural order of life to them. By the latter part of the 19th century, caciques had created a pattern of emigration to the cities and to absentee landlordism, which caused hardships for their tenant farmers who no longer could go to the patron when they were in trouble. The educated offspring of the caciques evolved into a class of intelligentsia with growing feelings of nationalism and desires to challenge the Spanish supremacy.

b. When the United States took control, it started concerted efforts to raise educational, economic, social, and health levels in the Islands. Literacy increased until almost 40 percent of school age children were attending school in 1939, and nearly half the total population was literate in some language. Literacy levels in Huklandia were even higher, but

they still were far below the objectives. The population of the Islands increased 109 percent between 1903 and 1939. Manila became a truly urban center, with all the problems attendant on rapid growth, overcrowding, and poor housing.

(1) Inhabitants emigrated from most of the more populous rural areas to the cities or sparsely settled areas, particularly on the southern islands. Nevertheless, the tenancy ratio continued to increase until 1939, especially in Huklandia, the agricultural keys to the Philippine economy. The land ownership rate among Filipinos dropped from approximately 81 percent in 1903 to only 49 percent in 1939, despite US efforts at land reform. Corruption and poor administration of the landed gentry combined with the ignorance and poverty of the peasant class to defeat all the effort made through 1946 to ameliorate the tenancy problem.

(2) The Roman Catholic Church remained the main religion, although numerous offshoots developed over the years, and 2.3 percent of the people had become Protestants by 1948. The number of Muslims, mostly in the southern island, remained fairly constant at 4.1 percent.

(3) Labor unions appeared on the scene in Manila with its growth to an urban center with industry and port facilities. Some of the unions were founded by Communists, both before and after the creation of the CPP in 1930. There also were attempts to develop agricultural unions, generally near Manila, and landlords tried to force them to disband or tried to create rival groups more favorable to themselves. Many of these organizations were reconstituted after World War II to play important

roles in the postliberation struggle between the Philippine Government and the CPP.

(4) Despite the history of nationalism, attempts to unify the people of the Islands with a common language (English and then Tagalog) and a common religion (including substitution of Filipino for Spanish clergy) into a cohesive entity had failed by 1948. The Filipino still identified with his particular ethnolinguistic group and his family, community, and province much more than with the Philippine nation. He was a member of his family and its environs first and a Philippine national second. When the people and their local leaders thought the Government was accomplishing something in political, economic, and social fields, they would support the Government; when they began to have doubts about national progress, they created disturbances in rural areas and strikes in Manila.

(5) Independence, freedom of choice, and the generation gap were subordinate to family solidarity and mutual support embodying ideals of reciprocity of obligations and good will within the basic group. This emphasis on the group rather than the individual institutionalized nepotism and created law enforcement problems. It also bolstered the common Filipino idea that individuals are unequal and that leniency and favoritism (political, economic, or social) are acceptable as long as they strengthened the bonds between client and patron or between leader and follower. Although the Filipinos had developed the trappings of

nationalism in the years under Spanish and US control, their basic values still were family-oriented.

(6) US attempts at land reform unintentionally put more power in the hands of the caciques, as the tenancy rate increased; tariff policies favored economic concentration on selected export crops, which forced land values and prices out of reach of the tenant farmers; and better health and sanitation created a population explosion. The population increase and the nonexistence of primogeniture in Filipino families caused lands to be subdivided into plots too small to support a man and his family. The importance to Filipinos of owning land as a status symbol caused deep psychological reactions when simple economics forced them to give up their land and become laborers or tenant farmers. This situation contributed significantly to rural unrest. Other contributory factors were granting of religious liberty, Filipinization of the Catholic Church, and emphasis on quality and quantity of educational opportunities for all (which made it possible for Filipinos to achieve social mobility and political power).

(7) Growth of the group of intellectuals, teachers, civil servants, and business and professional people formed the basis for a true middle class by the end of 1941. Prewar economic, political, and social life was dominated by the Euro-American "whites" allied with the wealthy mestizo landowners and, on a lower plane, the influential Chinese merchants and bankers. Laborers and tenant farmers were at the bottom of the structure. In between, mestizo and Filipino-Chinese whose social

standing depended on wealth and education were an adjunct to the upper class. Most wealthy families had left the rural areas, there was little formal class structure there, and the distinctions that remained were based on family prestige and reputation. The increase in absentee landlordism, development of a Filipino (as distinct from a Spanish-mestizo aristocracy) landholding class; a decrease in numbers of owners of small landholdings and a like increase in tenant farmers; improved educational opportunities; increased reliance on a money economy in an essentially agricultural area; and an expanded Government presence that appeared to side with the landlords and money lenders against the tenant and free farmers were contributing factors to this social change in the rural areas. At the same time, the urban elite remained strong and strengthened its position in relation to prewar society despite charges of collaboration that were made against it.

(8) US efforts to improve the health and sanitation of the islanders bettered the situation slowly but not adequately prior to the war. Food and medicine became difficult to procure after the Japanese invasion, diseases spread as the populace moved about to avoid the Japanese, and preventive measures ceased. The last vestiges of health and sanitation facilities disappeared with the levelling of hospitals and laboratories as the Japanese were driven out. The US Public Health Service started a 4-year program to help the Philippines rehabilitate their medical and sanitation facilities, immunization and quarantine services were restored to prewar levels by 1950. However, rural

inhabitants knew little more about sanitation, health, and nutrition in 1948 than their fathers had known a generation earlier, and folk medicine thrived as it had for centuries. The best effort of US and Philippine health officials and programs brought about little change in the public health in 40 years. The inferior diet and lack of food supplies also contributed to poor health. The nutrition and diet of the people varied according to terrain, religious beliefs, geography, and local preparation preferences. Rice was the staple in the diet of more than 75 percent of the people; sweet potatoes, cassava, and tropical fruits and vegetables supplemented the diet. Pork and poultry were the most easily available meats, fish consumption varied with the proximity of the sea, fats generally were coconut oil and lard, and a very small amount of dairy products was consumed. The average Filipino's diet was better before the war than during or after until 1960. Public health statistics indicate that chronic malnutrition existed throughout the Islands during 1935-48 and was more prevalent in Huklandia than elsewhere.

13. Military factors. The US Government was to provide the Islands with the foundations for a viable independent nation and defend it during the 10 years of its commonwealth status, but the US Army and Navy no longer would be responsible for defense of the Islands once independence had been achieved.

a. General Douglas MacArthur was given the express mission as Military Adviser to aid in establishing and developing a system for Philippine national defense. From 1935 to 1942, General MacArthur and

Philippine President Manuel Quezon achieved a relationship, unique among political-military leaders, which enabled them to provide for and develop a national defense structure. MacArthur was authorized to deal directly with the Secretary of War and the Chief of Staff of the US Army. He had with him a small advisory staff for joint operations (land, sea, and air) and was provided officially with all possible assistance from the Philippine Department of the US Army. In addition, the political supremacy of Quezon made it possible to have enacted such laws as were considered essential by both leaders to provide a legal basis for the national defense system.

b. With the aid of a special committee from the US Army War College, MacArthur conceived a plan which emphasized the concept of combined operations, using a small regular army, an organized reserve, a small air force, and a small fleet of motor torpedo boats. This force structure was designed for passive defense of the Islands and was based on a gradual buildup of forces as the Commonwealth could afford it. Equipment for the new military services was designed for use by the small divisions to be formed, with their minimum supporting units, and was tailored to the economy and terrain of the Islands. The one serious drawback to this contingency plan was the failure to provide any adequate naval protection for a country which consists of isolated, widely separated island groups. The necessity for dependence on motor torpedo boats to meet the threat of a vastly superior naval force was a major weakness of the plan. These

craft were unsuited for use on the high seas and were no longer available after war began in Europe in 1939.

c. The combined-arms approach was directed against both the external Japanese threat, discernible by 1935, and the internal threat of domestic disorders, a distinct possibility based on a history of uprisings and banditry and on the increasingly effective Communist activities, which had begun as early as 1930. The Philippine Constabulary, established in 1901, was designed to maintain law and order on a national scale, but it was likely that the Philippine Army would have to intervene to handle civil strife.

d. Aside from the Constabulary, the Philippines had no military tradition on which to erect a national army, and, except for church and family, the military was the only institution which could inspire loyalty and demand conformance to a code of honor. MacArthur's success in creating as much of the Philippine defense establishment as he did prior to 8 December 1941 was due to his understanding of the psychological, economic, political, and social factors involved and to his use of those factors to win acceptance from Manila and Washington, as well as from the great mass of the Filipino people.

e. Psychologically, acceptance of the military defense program was based on the belief that it would reduce illiteracy, increase the physical stamina of Filipino youth, and foster patriotism and democracy. Creation of the officer corps and the military services did help break down some class barriers, change some of the emphasis on old values,

give a sense of national direction, and combat the general attitude of defeatism and insecurity.

f. Economically, the Commonwealth government adhered to a very conservative financial defense policy until war was imminent. In the late 1930's, some doubts were expressed that the islands could afford such a defense establishment after independence or could survive a serious economic crisis. Should a degree of prosperity follow independence in 1946, Philippine financial problems could be solved. However, unless the Islands were given preferential treatment by the United States, economic disaster might result, to be followed by serious social and political consequences. This argument merely emphasized the need for a loyal, well-paid army to enable the new republic to control domestic violence and provide for defense against external threat.

g. Politically, the Filipinos feared a possible military dictatorship. Within the governmental and military framework, this fear was groundless. However, the Japanese occupation and defeat of the Islands did create a situation favorable to the aims of the armed faction of the Communist group (HUK), which was eager and ready to seize power. Although a military dictatorship failed to emerge from the formation of a defense system, the HUK threat was a serious one. From 1938 to 1941, the Communist Party succeeded in organizing various groups under several guises, and many Filipinos joined the armed faction of the Communist Party, to resist the Japanese during the occupation, without understanding the real purpose of the HUK. Even after the threat was recognized and HUK leaders were confined, the rank and file of the Party continued to terrorize the

Philippine countryside until 1946. The 1946-50 campaign of the Philippine Government to eradicate the menace of the People's Liberation Party (HBM) placed too much emphasis on military operations and failed to provide answers to the socioeconomic, political, and psychological aspects of the problem. This error allowed the Communist Party and its armed HBM to capitalize on these governmental failures, and, as foreseen, the undermanned, lightly armed Constabulary was unable to check the successes of the Party and the HBM.

h. While US troops were stationed in the Philippines, the HUK could be contained, and even after the troops were withdrawn, the passage of the Military Assistance Act in 1946 by the US Congress meant that the ties between the US and Philippine military would continue to be close. Unfortunately, by 1946, the United States was concerned with devastation in other parts of the world. The strategic importance of the Philippines had changed, and it was in the best interests of the United States to provide means for the Islands to achieve economic stability and to restore law and order. During World War II, the primary interest lay in winning the war and granting independence to the Philippines as soon as possible. US policy toward their postwar future was not clear-cut. There was little understanding of the political, economic, and social problems. Instead of having long-range plans for reconstruction and rehabilitation, US military and civilian officials merely reacted to each crisis as it occurred. To aggravate the situation, US Government and business interest sought to retain special privileges in the islands without providing proper

safeguards for Philippine national pride and well-being. The Philippine Government and its army could not defeat the well-armed, well-directed subversive Communist machine, and open rebellion began in 1948.

CHAPTER 2

POLITICAL FACTORS

by Eugene H. Miller, PhD

14. Pre-Spanish period. When Europeans arrived in the Philippine Islands in the 16th century, a Malay population was living in small colonies along the seacoast and in adjacent river valleys under chiefs known as "datus." These communities, called "barangays" after the craft in which the Malays had arrived, were organized as armed camps to provide security against attacks by predatory neighbors on land and pirates from the sea. There probably were some confederations, but the essential pattern was one of small isolated communities made up of a hundred or more families linked together by complex kinship patterns.[1] This pre-Spanish social organization lives on in contemporary villages and in the continued importance of the family as the basic social institution.

15. Spanish period. The Spanish at first adopted a policy of indirect rule and appointed the datus as petty governors. However, the Spanish friars soon established religious orders in the countryside and usurped the authority of the datus in the individual villages.[2] Further, the Crown divided the rural areas into units of jurisdiction known as encomienda in which the inhabitants of several villages were "entrusted" to a conquistador who was responsible for protecting and Christianizing the people. In return, the encomendero had the right to levy tribute and exact labor. In time, the religious orders became more influential than the encomenderos.

a. By the 19th century, small towns developed, organized around the church and the central plaza, and an upper class of town leaders had come into existence. They provided native leadership for town and province under the direct control of the local priest.[3] This situation was criticized by the report of the First Philippine Commission which condemned the confusion between the functions of the state, the church, and the religious orders.[4] The Commission found other prominent defects in the Spanish administration:

> (1) The boundless and autocratic powers of the governor-general; (2) the centralization of all governmental functions in Manila; (3) the absence of representative institutions in which the Filipinos might make their needs and desires known; (4) a pernicious system of taxation; (5) a plethora of officials who lived on the country and by their very number obstructed, like a circumlocution office, the public business they professed to transact; (6) division of minor responsibilities through the establishment of rival boards and offices; (7) the costliness of the system and the corruption it bred.[5]

b. Although Spain's rule was far from perfect, it did present the people with a priceless gift--the concept of a Philippine nation. President Manuel Quezon gave eloquent recognition to this historical fact in a speech in January 1936:

> . . . But above all, we owe to Spain the preservation for the benefit of our own people, of the soil of our country, as well as the laying down, by means of religion and education, of the foundations of our national unity. It is, thus, that the Archipelago, composed of numerous and isolated islands, which in 1521 was discovered by Magellan and was but a geographical expression apparently without any common interest or aspiration, is today a compact and solid nation, with its own history, its heroes, its martyrs and its own flag, a

> people uplifted by a consciousness of its own personality, feeling a deep sense of worth and inspired by a high vision of its great destiny.[6]

In addition to bringing the concept of nationhood to the archipelago, the Spaniards, despite their shortcomings in government and administration, did give the people a familiarity with the forms of Western government in their three centuries of rule. The board of officers (principalia) of every municipality gained practical experience in the operation of Western political institutions, even though they may have been perverted at times in actual use,[7] and the masses became accustomed to these same governmental forms.

c. Finally, although the Spanish administration was in many respects corrupt and demoralizing, in theory it was fine and uplifting. There could be no better evidence that these standards did make an impression upon the Filipino mind than their ultimate rebellion against Spanish rule.[8]

16. Rebellion. One idea Spain brought from the Western world--nationalism--was slow to develop in the Islands. An early 19th century statement advancing the thesis that Filipinos had something in common as Filipinos--a grievance against their Spanish masters--was made by an anonymous writer of 1821 who signed himself simply as "El Indio Agravido." He asked what does it mean "to be one of the same family, one and the same nation, one and the same monarchy embracing East and West?" Is the law "observed which enjoins 'most strictly that no one constituted in authority, whether ecclesiastical, civil or military, should, under any pretext whatsoever, however reasonable it may appear, commit any injury against the person of

the Indian?' Or is it not rather oppression, despotism, arbitrary rule and egoism?"[9]

a. When other Filipinos actively took up the torch of nationalism, the Spaniards reacted harshly. In Tayabas a lay associate of the Brothers of St. John of God, Apolinario de la Cruz, organized a pious society called the Confraternity of St. Joseph. The ecclesiastical authorities ordered it to disband. Instead, the leaders called a kind of revival meeting. Troops were then dispatched from Manila who put the people to the sword without distinction of age or sex. Apolinario was captured and shot.[10] It seems clear that the Spanish authorities overreacted in this instance. The soldiers of the Tayabas Regiment felt so; the next year they mutinied. After a short battle with loyal troops they were either killed or taken prisoner. However, at the height of the conflict, they cried out to their countrymen to rise in arms and fight for independence, the first use of the word "independence" as a rallying cry in the Philippines.[11]

b. Dissatisfaction continued. Uprisings against conditions in the provinces occurred from time to time, and intellectuals demanded a broader role for Filipinos in economic, social, and political life. The Government in the Islands, dominated by the landlords and the friars, did not respond to the demands for change. On 20 January 1872, the growing unrest culminated in the Cavite revolt among more than 200 Filipino workers in the naval shipbuilding yards. The uprising was crushed. Three Filipino priests who were executed became a cause celebre to Filipino students

residing in Spain. However, the acquisition of martyrs did not accelerate the independence movement to the degree expected. Middle-class Filipinos at home drew back from further violence, and Jose Rizal, the leading intellectual, refused to support an 1893 revolt on the ground that his compatriots were not yet ready for self-government.[12]

c. Rizal had organized a society called "Liga Filipina." It pursued a moderate program based on peaceful and legal means. The Liga was superceded by the more dynamic "Katipunan." Under the leadership of Andres Bonifacio, this secret organization aimed at uniting the Filipinos to win independence through military action. The peasantry of Luzon, who had reached the breaking point in their agrarian sufferings, rallied to the Katipunan.[13]

d. In August 1896 the Katipunan was prematurely discovered by the Spanish authorities and on the 26th, Bonifacio, who had escaped capture, raised the flag of revolt. Rizal, who had opposed the 1892 uprisings as premature, issued a manifesto decrying the 1896 uprisings on the same grounds. The Spanish authorities took the stand that he had not renounced the revolt per se but only its timing and executed him on 30 December 1896.[14] Bonifacio proved to be a poor military leader, and Emilio Aguinaldo, a schoolteacher, gained in popularity after winning several battles. In the power struggle between the two, Aguinaldo gained control of the revolutionary movement and executed Bonifacio and his brother. This event dampened popular enthusiasm for the revolution, and many from Manila, Laguna, and Batangas went home in disgust.[15] Aguinaldo transferred his

headquarters to the mountains of Bulacan, and signed a peace pact with Spain at Biak-na-bato in 1897. In return for a money payment, the rebels were to lay down their arms and the leaders were to leave the Philippines.[16]

e. Aguinaldo was in exile in Hong Kong when war broke out between Spain and the United States. Admiral Dewey transported the revolutionary leader to the Philippines and, within 2 weeks of the US naval victory in Manila Bay, Aguinaldo landed at Cavite, organized an army, and surrounded Manila. However, he was not permitted to enter the capital when the Americans received its surrender. He then turned to acquiring control over the rest of the country and transferred his capital to Malolos in Bulacan province.

f. Aguinaldo did not recognize the cession of the Philippines to the United States by the Treaty of Paris (10 December 1898). Instead he went ahead with plans to establish an independent republic, convened a constituent assembly, and promulgated a constitution on 20 January 1899. The Malolos Constitution foreshadowed the form that the basic law was to take when the Commonwealth was established in 1936. It provided for a system of separation of powers with checks and balances and guaranteed civil liberties.[17] Washington refused to recognize Aguinaldo's Philippine Republic and demanded acceptance of US occupation of the entire archipelago. The Philippine Government, in turn, refused to recognize US sovereignty, and hostilities broke out on 4 February 1899. Even though Aguinaldo lost his capital when Malolos fell at the end of March,

he fought on. Two years later, in March 1901, he was captured in the remote town of Palanan. Facing the inevitable, the Philippine leader accepted US sovereignty in a proclamation to his people on 19 April.[18]

g. Dewey's victory at Manila Bay and the subsequent capture of the capital did not settle the Philippine question so far as the American people were concerned. Rather, it kicked off a great debate between the proponents of the large or expansionist policy and those who opposed overseas territorial acquisitions as imperialistic aberrations ill-befitting a nation, itself born in conflict against an imperial power. The decision, however, was made by the US Senate. On 6 February 1899, those who wanted to carry the burden prevailed. By a vote of 57-27 they ratified the Treaty of Paris which ceded the whole archipelago to the United States.[19]

h. Certainly some of the leaders who wanted to plant the US flag in the far western Pacific were motivated by more than a sheer drive for power. John Hay was one. He wrote to a critic, W. A. Croffert, "I cannot for the life of me see any contradiction between desiring liberty and peace here and desiring to establish them in the Philippines."[20] Similarly, on 16 February 1899, 10 days after the ratification of the Treaty, President McKinley described to a Boston audience his vision of what the United States could accomplish in the Philippines. He predicted that with US help they could become

> . . . a land of plenty and of increasing possibilities;
> (with) a people redeemed from savage and indolent habits,

> devoted to the arts of peace, in touch with the commerce and trade of all nations, enjoying the blessings of freedom, of civil and religious liberty, of education, and of homes and whose children and children's children shall for ages hence bless the American republic because it emancipated their fatherland and set them on the pathway of the world's best civilization.[21]

The President's rhetoric was not hollow. He appointed a Philippine Commission under the chairmanship of Jacob Gould Schurman to report on conditions in the Islands. It recommended the establishment of a civil government. McKinley then delegated this task to a second commission headed by William Howard Taft. The instructions to this body, drafted by Secretary of State Elihu Root, set forth the principles for American rule in the archipelago--a series of guidelines that again affirmed the McKinley administration's commitment to the creation of a Philippines in the American image. The author paid due respect to the local culture and institutions but then went on to declare that

> . . . the people of the Islands should be made plainly to understand, that there are certain great principles of government . . . which we deem essential to the rule of law and the maintenance of individual freedom, and of which they have, unfortunately been denied the experience possessed by us . . . .

Secretary Root defined these experiences in detail--the Bill of Rights in the US Constitution. He charged the Commission to conduct a Land Reform Program without violating the right to private property and to set up a primary system of education "which shall be free to all, and which shall tend to fit the people for the duties of citizenship.[22]

i. As instructed, the second Philippine Commission took over the government from the military authorities on 4 July 1901. Taft, as civil

governor, became the chief executive, and the commission exercised legislative power. The following year saw the first elections of provincial governors, the enactment by Congress of an Organic Act for Civil Government, and the official recognition of the end of the Philippine insurrection and termination of military government (4 July 1902).

17. The US period. With the establishment of civil Government, the Philippines began a second cycle of westernization that was to lead them to self-government in 35 years and to independence in 46 years. The early US commitment to self-government and essential independence was expressed by Jacob Gould Schurman in a paper commenting on the Organic Act of 1902:

> If, as I believe, the people of the United States stand ready to grant independence to the Filipinos when they may safely be entrusted with the use of it, and if, as I further believe, the great majority of Filipinos will agitate to procure it immediately, the only issue that can arise between them will be with reference to the time for the establishment of the Philippine Republic which both parties agree is some day to be set up.[23]

a. Washington's timetable for self-government was one of progressive acceleration. As an initial step, William Howard Taft's first civilian administrators were told to establish municipal governments "in which the natives of the islands should be afforded the opportunity to manage their own local affairs to the fullest extent of which they were capable . . ." In line with these instructions, successful elections were held for municipal officers in December 1905 and for provincial governors in February 1906. At the national level, progress in

assimilating Filipinos in government was marked by the appointment to the Philippine commission of three distinguished men who had at first supported the revolutionary government. The Philippine Commission became an appointive upper house, and elections were called for a National Assembly to serve as the lower house in a bicameral legislature. Executive power continued to be vested in the Governor-General.[24]

b. Just as the calling of Assembly elections demonstrated the validity of Jacob Gould Schurman's belief that the United States intended eventually to grant self-government, the outcome of the elections supported his second point, that the Filipinos wanted independence. The Nacionalista, which openly demanded independence, won a decisive victory over the Partido Progresista, made up primarily of candidates who were holding appointive offices. From 1907 to 1946, the Nacionalista was the only significant political party in the Philippines.[25]

c. Within what amounted to a one-party system, there were two levels in the struggle for power: an internal struggle between Sergio Osmena and Manuel L. Quezon for control of the party, and the struggle of the Assembly (which they controlled) for more power in relation to the appointed Commission and the Governor-General. The Assembly achieved a significant victory in 1916 when the United States Congress passed the Jones Act, which established an elected Senate as the upper house of the legislature, in place of the appointed Commission, and declared the intention of the US Government to withdraw from sovereignty as soon as a stable government could be established.[26]

d. The Jones Act gave the Philippines representative government but not self-government. Certain laws and acts--any that amended tariff, immigration, currency and coinage, public domain, and timber and mining--did not become operative until approved by the President of the United States. Furthermore Congress had the power to annul any measure passed by the Philippine legislature. The Governor-General, who had supreme executive power, and the members of the Supreme Court were appointed by the President with the consent of the US Senate. Although there were limitations on the power of the legislature, it did provide a forum for the nationalist politicians to exert pressure on the Governor-General.

e. These pressures were kept within bounds during the Wilson administration. Governor-General Francis Burton Harrison (1913-21) rapidly replaced Americans in the Philippine civil service with Filipinos and took Osmena and Quezon, the recognized leaders of the legislature, into almost equal partnership with him in the government of the Islands. However, when the Republicans returned to the White House, marked tensions developed between the Filipinos and the administration in Washington. President Harding sent General Leonard Wood and a former Governor-General, W. Cameron Forbes, to the Philippines to assess the results of the Democratic Party's policy of Filipinization. The Wood-Forbes report indicated that the Filipinos had not achieved the capacity for stable government required by the Jones Act as a condition for independence and "that the present general status of the Philippine Islands continue until the people have had time to absorb and thoroughly master the powers already in their hands." [27]

f. Governor-General Harrison criticized the Wood-Forbes mission's definition of "stable government." The Wood-Forbes recommendation was unacceptable to Osmena and Quezon, as was the further argument against independence put forward by the Coolidge and Hoover administrations. This argument, based on Colonel Curmi Thompson's report to Coolidge in 1926 stated, "the granting of complete and immediate independence would end the free-trade relationship between the United States and the Philippines and . . . would bring about economic disaster . . . ."[28] Despite the warnings of economic problems involved in independence, the Democrats, who were traditionally sympathetic to Filipino aspirations and who were in control of the 72nd Congress, passed an independence act, the Hare-Hawes-Cutting Bill, over President Hoover's veto on 17 January 1933.[29]

g. A factional fight between Sergio Osmena (who had headed the Commission that negotiated the terms of the bill) and Quezon prevented Manila's acceptance of the first Philippine Independence Act.[30] Quezon played an important role in the formulation of a new bill, the Tydings-McDuffie Act, which became law on 24 March 1934. The second Philippine Independence Bill attempted to solve the economic problems (of how to help the Filipinos to readjust their economy and at the same time satisfy the protectionist demands of domestic US sugar interests) by providing for continuation of existing trade relationships for 5 years followed by gradual imposition of tariff duties at 5 percent annually for 5 years.

h. Under the Tydings-McDuffie Act, the United States did what no other imperial power had done in Asia. It set a definite date for independence. US sovereignty over the Islands was to be completely withdrawn on 4 July, 10 years from the date of the inauguration of the Commonwealth Government. The latter was to be based on a constitution drawn up by a convention held within one year of the passage of the independence act. During the 10-year transitional period, the United States was to be represented in the Philippines by a High Commissioner, and a Philippine Resident Commissioner was to represent the Commonwealth Government in Washington.[31]

18. The Commonwealth Constitution. The Tydings-McDuffie Act imposed few requirements on the Constitutional Convention, other than a republican form of government, absolute religious tolerance, and a Bill of Rights. Beyond these specifics, the Filipinos were free to draw up their own Commonwealth Constitution. With few changes, it became the basic law of the Republic of the Philippines.

a. There was a trend in the 20th century toward incorporating social and economic as well as political articles in the Bill of Rights (as the Constitutions of the Weimar Republic, the Fourth Republic in France, and the Federal Republic of Germany). The Commonwealth Constitution required the Government "to aid and support the natural right and duty of parents in rearing youth for 'civic efficiency' and to take as its direct concern the promotion of social justice" to ensure "the well-being and economic security of all the people." In addition, the rigid land laws that had

been established by the Philippine Commission were incorporated into the Constitution, and natural resources were regulated to assure Filipino control. The Government was given broad power to limit property rights, to engage in business, and to protect labor.[32]

b. These social and economic provisions were adaptable to Philippine conditions, according to Mr. Justice Laurel. Although they go far beyond anything in the US Constitution, they do have an American genesis. Hayden argues in his book, The Philippines, that "the safeguards thrown around the natural resources and franchises were an extension to the Philippines of American movements inspired by the first Roosevelt and . . . the constitutional provisions seeking to foster 'social justice' were a reflex of the second Roosevelt's 'New Deal'." Hayden also speculated that enormous power over the economic life of the people was entrusted to the Government to make possible the sweeping action necessary to prevent social and political unrest and to cushion the economic shock caused by separation from the United States.[33]

c. At the same time that the Constitution shows concern for the rights and welfare of the individual, it insists on the complementary obligation of the citizen "to render personal military or civil service" (italics added) in defense of the state. Hayden makes much of the requirement for compulsory civil service as having come from Soviet, German, and Bulgarian models. Compulsory civil service is not a theoretical idea. It has been in force all these years in Soviet Russia where individualism has been reduced to the minimum and labor of the states as well as

of the social unit is carried out on a communal basis. It is the secret of the success of the five-year plan. General Alejandrino also justified the clause as being in harmony with Philippine mores.

> Command labor in the Philippines dates back to the dim beginnings of our people . . . . Despite the layers and layers of Western influences that have settled upon the original native traits of our people, I am quite convinced that certain of our beautiful traditions such as this one of loving cooperation with a fellow in need, will never die out. On this fundamental trait of our people may be erected, as a structure, the institution of compulsory labor for the state.[34]

To the criticism that the General's view did not represent that of contemporary Filipino leaders, Hayden replies that there were 20 members on the committee and that its recommendation was adopted by the full body without question. He asks, "Could such a thing have happened in the convention which drafted the Constitution of the United States? Could it happen in an American Constitutional Convention today?"

d. President Quezon, himself, emphasized the distinction between the Philippine and the US Constitution. Speaking to the New York Foreign Policy Association on 3 April 1937, he said:

> Under our constitution it is provided that one of the main duties of the State is to look after the interest of the largest number . . . . The philosophy of laissez faire in our government is dead. It has been substituted by the philosophy of government intervention whenever the needs of the country require it.[35]

In the previous year he had told a meeting of teachers at Baguio:

> . . . although ours is a republican government, I dare say that the political philosophy underlying the Constitution of the United States is quite different from the basic philosophy of the Philippine Constitution . . .[the former]

> philosophy places the individual above every other consideration . . . . The Constitution of the Philippines entirely reverses this political philosophy. Under our constitution what is paramount is "not individuals," it is the good of the State, not the good of the individual that must prevail.[36]

Nevertheless, although a certain basic difference in emphasis in political philosophy is granted, the Philippine Constitution demonstrated a definite concern for the individual in its guarantee of a broad spectrum of civil liberties. Likewise, a study of the structure and functioning of the two constitutions reveals both similarities and differences.

e. The Philippine Constitution separates power into three branches: the executive, the legislature, and the judiciary. However, there is not the same degree of check and balance as in the United States. The Filipino idea of leadership by one man endowed with broad powers which he exercises in a highly personal manner is reflected in provisions that strongly overbalance the executive vis a vis the legislature. For example, he has the right to certify measures for immediate congressional action; to call a special session and designate its agenda; and to veto items in revenue and tariff bills.[37]

f. The power of appointment is traditionally a strong executive power. The unitary form of the Philippine Government makes it more important than in a federal structure, for it gives the President an extraordinary number of offices to fill on the local level. This patronage is a tool through which he can ensure political loyalty from local government officials. Thus the municipal mayor cannot control local health officials and agricultural workers, since they work directly for national

administrative offices. In any event, the mayors as well as the police chiefs of chartered cities were appointed by the President during 1935-48. Skillful use of such patronage combined with control of a majority in Congress made it possible for the President to influence the Commission on Appointments. This body, designed to check his appointment power, usually confirmed his actions.[38]

(1) As Chief Administrator, the President has the customary power to issue executive orders. However, the personal, as opposed to institutional, character of leadership in the Philippines is reflected in the fact that the President stamps such orders with his own ideas and character and by the extent to which he is involved in details of administration. The most rudimentary administrative matters are apt to be sent to him for decision, and he is likely to become involved in administration at all levels.

(2) As Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces, the President has the authority to suspend the writ of habeas corpus and to place the whole nation or any part of it under martial law. In addition, in case of a threat to law and order which the police cannot handle, the President can order the Philippine Constabulary to take over.[39]

(3) The President's power to veto items in tariff and revenue bills has already been noted. His general authority over financial matters is much broader than that of the US executive. Of particular interest is the public works budget. It is not included in the executive budget but is worked out by Congress and includes recommendations from the Department of Public Works and "pork barrel" sums for each member to be used in his own

constituency. Although passed by Congress, the appropriations are controlled by the President through his direct control of the budget commission which certifies the availability of funds and releases the money. In addition, the executive has large contingent funds at his disposal. His use of budgetary powers for political purposes is summed up in one congressman's statement: "The President can, by pouring money into a province and through his pork barrel funds, defeat a candidate he doesn't like. So you really have to stay in good with the President."[40]

g. During the Commonwealth period a sufficient number of Congressmen did want "to stay in good with the President," so Quezon, for the most part, was able to control the legislature. Nevertheless, Congress did play a role as a separate branch of the Government with the power to amend or to refuse to pass administration bills and to override a presidential veto by a two-thirds vote of all members of each house.

(1) One significant change in the structure of Congress was made in 1940. The original document provided for a unicameral body. In the Constitutional Convention it was agreed that experience with the two-chamber legislature under the Jones Act had not demonstrated that the existence of an upper house had any usefulness. Rather, the unicameralists held that economies would be effected through a reduction of expenses, that a simpler legislative machine would function more efficiently, and that one chamber could be more easily held responsible than two. President Recto declared that the Filipinos, by opting for unicameralism, had placed themselves ahead of many progressive nations "which in this

respect have not yet emerged from the field of speculation and controversy."[41]

(2) The unicameral legislature really did not have a chance to prove its worth. It performed satisfactorily during the first 3 years of the Commonwealth. However, Quezon had been opposed to it from the beginning. He led the campaign to institute a Senate. In an address to an assembly of educators and judges at a Teachers' Camp in Baguio, he gave his primary reason for advocating a change: the fear of a presidential-legislative conflict that would lead to the establishment of either a dictatorship or an oligarchy inside of 15 years. To support this dire prediction, he referred to the existing power of the Assembly both to indict and to try an executive officer:

> Supposing the assembly impeaches the President and the President is convinced he has been unjustly impeached and refuses to abide by the decision. Then he would have the assembly dismissed and dictatorship established. If the President abides by the decision, then the supremacy of the assembly is established and the country has an oligarchy.[42]

General Aguinaldo, on the other hand, argued that, rather than preventing establishment of an oligarchy, a Senate might become one. He maintained that election of Senators by the whole nation would result in only wealthy candidates standing for the office, a situation that would "undermine democracy."[43]

(3) President Quezon prevailed, and a Senate composed of 24 members elected at large was established in 1940. Whether or not the members of the upper house constitute an oligarchy is a moot question. However,

their choice on a nationwide basis rather than from provincial constituencies has emphasized the high degree to which the Philippine Government is centralized and the importance given to national rather than local government.[44]

(4) In action, the bicameral Congress, like its unicameral Assembly predecessor, has not put heavy emphasis on policy as such. Rather, Congressmen concentrate on the necessities of electoral success--public works projects and patronage. On policy questions, in fact, the legislators have been a negative force, successfully opposing land reform and labor legislation.[45]

h. The third branch of the government, the judiciary, consists of a Supreme Court and statutory courts. The Supreme Court cannot be abolished by an Act of Congress. All judges are appointed by the President with the approval of the Commission on Appointments. The right of judicial review in specified cases is written into the Constitution and was made explicit in the Judiciary Act of 1948. Reflecting a peculiarly Philippine situation, the Supreme Court has original and concurrent jurisdiction with the Courts of first instance in actions between the Roman Catholic Church and municipalities and towns, and in Government actions against the Church in disputes over titles to lands used for hospitals and convents.[46]

(1) In evaluating the role of the courts in Philippine government, Jean Grossholtz is ambivalent. On the one hand she writes that in such a highly political society, it is inevitable that justice will have a political cast, but then she avers that by and large, the courts have

been free of politics and judges and proceedings remain neutral in the current political context. She gives high marks to the Supreme Court--undoubtedly the most respected body in the Philippines--and refers to the "respect given the judiciary, resulting from interest in and respect for the law." This positive statement is qualified by the observation that respect does not obscure the Filipino attitude that "laws will never replace men," that it is "the individual leader who ensures justice, not the law."[47]

(2) As in some other societies, the courts have been a conservative force, protecting property rights and the privileges of the upper class. Special Courts of Agrarian Reform and Industrial Relations are designed to guarantee justice to the farmers and workers, but, as in other statutory courts, the volume of litigation is so great that years may go by before cases are settled.[48]

19. Administration. Local government is mainly an extension of the National Government. Six executive departments or agencies--Finance, Health, Agriculture, Education, Public Works, and the Office of Local Government--perform functions at the provincial, city, and municipal levels. The appointment of judges at all levels by the President orients the court system toward the center. Similarly, a very important function, the audit of expenditures, is performed on the provincial and local levels by the same officer, the Auditor General, who checks the National Government's accounts.

a. Only three local government bodies--the provincial board, the municipal council, and the village council--are "independent" of Manila. However, of the three, only the municipal council, with a limited authority to levy taxes, has any legislative authority. In practice, the main power wielded by local governments is mostly advisory in nature, and the administrative power rests in the hands of nationally appointed officials.[49]

b. Grossholtz maintains that this lack of local autonomy has had a debilitating effect on the quality of government at the grass roots. Young men in search of political careers have been drawn off to Manila. Not only has the best local leadership been siphoned off but the possibility of direct experience in the problems of self-government has been reduced for the majority of the population. This situation, which encourages rural Filipino's apathy and attitude of dependence has been a barrier to political development.[50]

20. Civil Service. A fundamental requirement for successful functioning of 20th century government is a corps of trained, efficient administrators. Writing in 1941, midway through the Commonwealth period, Hayden regarded the Philippine Civil Service as "one of the most successful products of American-Filipino collaboration in the building of the Philippine state." He expressed his belief that

> This body of permanent public servants . . . is entirely capable of administering the Philippine Government in a manner which will contribute to its future stability and progress . . . . It is doubtful whether in any other sphere of political action the men who control the destinies of the Commonwealth have more convincingly demonstrated a grasp of the principles of sound government and a determination to apply them . . ."

Hayden did warn that the civil service in any country governed through the forms of democracy can hardly be expected to remain permanently on a plane high above that of the masses of the people.[51] Grossholtz confirms Hayden's prognosis by her observation that in the Philippines, "the civil service is, like the rest of the society, highly political." By 1948, the greatly increased number of educationally qualified applicants for the civil service, the use of public office for private gain, and the demand of citizens for satisfaction of their claims for back pay and for other favors, such as foreign exchange permits, had led to the corruption of the entire structure of government administration.[52] Demands for reform were not to crystalize until after the 1949 election.

21. Political parties.

a. In the Spanish period, secret societies constituted a form of political organization, but the first true political parties were established under US rule. The Partido Federalista came into existence in December 1900. It was made up of upper class Filipinos who had become convinced of the futility of further armed resistance and were willing to cooperate with the new rulers. Setting statehood rather than independence as their goal, they enjoyed a monopoly in the party field until the election for the first Philippine Assembly in 1907. At that time, the tacit prohibition on proindependence parties was lifted and a new party, the Nacionalista, contested the Federalista, renamed the Progresista, at the polls. Untainted by an earlier record of collaboration with the Americans and openingly advocating independence, the Nacionalista won 72 percent of the Assembly seats in this crucial first election.[53]

b. The Nacionalista victory made it clear that a stand for independence was a sine qua non for political success. No longer confronted by a Government fiat against advocating such freedom, virtually all politicians, regardless of party, advocated immediate or early independence. In the post-1907 years, there was little difference between Nacionalistas and Progresistas on this prime issue. Nor were there basic divisions on other policies. Why two parties, if there were no real confrontations or principles? Both Lande and Grossholtz explain the bifurcation as the result of the interaction of personalities, social classes, and local interests. Lande believed that the factions and personal following which mobilize support for and in many other respects act as the local agents of the two national political parties in the Philippines differ markedly from the local branches of national parties found in most of the modern democracies in the West.[54] Grossholtz summarizes it well:

> Elections were controlled by the wealthy and educated families, who chose municipal officials from among their own number, who in turn represented them at the provincial level. These early local elections began the domination of the parties by the big provincial families who, in time, controlled whole provinces. When it came time to elect a National Assembly, it was these families who coalesced to form the Nacionalistas and delivered the votes of their provinces to the party's candidates. Political campaigns were not mass appeals for votes but negotiations between provincial elites and national political personalities, party leaders and members constituted a small elite group of wealthy landowners . . . . These were men who understood one another, shared the same values, and lived the same kind of life. Disagreement on issues of policy was unlikely; instead, conflict arose over which personality was to lead. The party became a "national" organization made up of prominent local families who gave their support to one of their own, who served as their representative on

the national level and bargained his provincial support to those aspiring to national leadership, in return for policies and patronage for his constituents.[55]

c. The persistence of a two-party pattern in a situation in which the Nacionalista was dominant is illustrated by the election of 1922. Sergio Osmena had been Speaker of the House since its inauguration in 1907 and was recognized as the leader of the Nacionalista Party. Manuel L. Quezon worked closely with Osmena but, when an elective Senate was established, Quezon ran for and won the Senate presidency. This gave him a power base from which to challenge Osmena for leadership. He charged the Speaker with "unipersonalism" and demanded a collective leadership. The election became a three-way contest between Quezon's Colectivista, Osmena's Unipersonalista, and the Partido Democrata, successor of the Progresista. Quezon's forces came in first with 32 seats, the Democrats won 26, and Osmena's faction 21. In this divisive situation, the Nacionalista closed ranks and reconstituted itself with Quezon as President and Osmena as Vice-President. The Democrats maintained their role as an opposition party. However, they weakened this position when they joined with the Nacionalistas effort to form a National Supreme Council to oppose Governor General Leonard Wood's program of reversing the Filipinization of the Government. They lost control of Manila in the 1928 elections and dissolved as a party in 1933.[56]

d. Lande maintains that events which followed the disappearance of the Partido Democrata again suggest that bifurcation is the normal pattern of Philippine politics. Faced with the dissolution of their party, the

provincial and local leaders who had been Democratas simply joined the ranks of the Nacionalista, ranging themselves behind either Manuel Quezon or Sergio Osmena. Thereafter rival local and provincial leaders, now all styling themselves Nacionalistas, could continue to compete in elections for supremacy in their respective towns and provinces, much as do leaders in some of the bifactional states of the one-party US South.[57]

e. The fight over the independence bill during 1933-34 split the Nacionalista top leadership, but Quezon's faction was overwelmingly victorious in the elections of 1934. Osmena's group won only 3 of 11 Senate seats and 19 of 89 House seats.

f. A significant development was the evidence of a new opposition with its base in central Luzon. For some time, the Sakdalista Party had been gaining strength in rural areas with high tenancy rates. The Sakdalista demanded immediate independence, reduction of taxes, and a program of economic reform that would end rural poverty.[58] Many of them did not possess the qualifications to vote but the number that voted in 1934 was sufficient to elect three members to the House of Representatives; one provincial governor; and a large number of presidents, vice-presidents, and councillors.[59] This electoral success of the Sakdalista created apprehension in Manila, since it was evidence of the existence of a significant number of people who felt their interests were being ignored while a socioeconomic oligarchy struggled for personal power and status. Upper- and middle-class Filipinos resented the class character of the Sakdalista, and the oligarchy closed ranks in face of the Sakdalista challenge. The

leadership of the two Nacionalista factions formed a coalition to support Quezon for President and Osmena for Vice-President of the new Commonwealth, and they were elected in September 1935.[60]

g. Political leadership in the Commonwealth remained in the hands of the same group of men up to the outbreak of World War II. The Constitution's provisions for a strong executive weakened party activity, and Quezon and Osmena, as the giants who had led the struggle for independence, held the voters' allegiance. However, the basis for eventual change in the political status quo was laid in the Commonwealth period by the expansion of suffrage: the property qualification for voting was removed, the literacy requirement was changed to either Spanish or English, and women gained the franchise. The expanded electorate increased the interest of rural people in politics, and they came to Manila with their problems and demands for help. After the war, a group of younger men with quite different backgrounds and resources began to enter political life. Some of these candidates were buy-and-sell operators who had grown rich during the war and liberation periods and could finance their own political careers. Others were authentic local heroes, guerrilla leaders who had proved their leadership qualities in chaotic wartime conditions. In the fluid situation brought about by Liberation and the formal establishment of independence, a true two-party system emerged.[61]

h. President Quezon had died in the United States while the war was in progress, and Sergio Osmena succeeded him on 1 August 1944. The loss of the dynamic, charismatic Quezon left a vacuum that the aging President

was unable to fill. Osmena returned to Manila with General MacArthur to assume control of the Commonwealth Government and of the Partido Nacionalista. Manuel Roxas, even though he had originally been a protege of Osmena rather than of Quezon, entered the 1946 presidential race.

i. Grossholtz disagrees with Lande on the Roxas-Osmena-Quezon relationship. She pictures Roxas as a supporter of Quezon. Whatever the truth in this matter may be, it is clear that Roxas was a protege of General MacArthur, a relationship that was to prove extremely helpful to him in the immediate Liberation period. Roxas had been Speaker of the Commonwealth Assembly and had served as a Brigadier General on MacArthur's staff. He escaped from Bataan and joined the resistance groups on Mindanao. In April 1942 he was captured by the Japanese and put in prison. Fourteen months later he was released from jail and was named to the Preparatory Commission to help write a constitution for the puppet government. He was also named Food Director of the Japanese-sponsored regime. When MacArthur returned, Roxas fled to Baguio with the rest of the collaborators. In April 1945 he was "liberated" by the US Army while the rest of the collaborators were "captured." MacArthur not only welcomed him with an embrazo when he 'reported' for duty but restored his military rank and assigned him to the intelligence branch of his own headquarters. He gave Roxas a further boost by reconvening the Senate and encouraging that body to elect Roxas as its President. In contrast, Commonwealth President Osmena's relations with MacArthur were strained. Unable to get clarification from MacArthur on the collaboration issue, he appointed a cabinet, each member of which was

identified with guerrilla or noncollaborationist activities. Roxas and his Senate colleagues refused to confirm them.

j. In the presidential campaign that followed, Roxas ran on a platform that stressed the three C's: collaboration, communism, and change. He charged that Osmena was unfair to men who had taken office during the occupation, that the Democratic Alliance (a combination of the prewar Civil Liberties Union, remnants of the Democratista Party, and Huks) which offered him support was Communist-controlled, and that, as an old man and veteran leader of the Nacionalista establishment, Osmena could not bring about needed change.[62]

k. Lande agrees with the thesis that a two-party system was permanently reestablished in 1946 but does not agree that the alignment can be explained in terms of such issues as economic relations with the United States and collaboration. He maintains that Roxas received "substantial electoral support both from ex-collaborators who hoped for lenient treatment at his hands and from ex-guerrillas who regarded him as one of their own. On the other hand, some of the most prominent figures who had held office under the Japanese ended up in the Nacionalista party . . ." Likewise, "the relative pro-Americanism or pro-Filipinism of the two parties since 1946 has not been consistent."[63] Lande sees party alignment under the Republic, as in earlier years, simply as an extension of the traditional rivalries of provincial and town factions. When a particular leader in a province sided with either Rozas or Osmena for reasons of friendship, gratitude, or strategy, a particular leader in a province

sided with either Roxas or Osmena most of his followers did the same. As a matter of course, then, the opposing provincial leader and his factional followers joined the party of the other great national leader. The remarkable stability of the two-party system since 1946 is largely attributable to the stability of the provincial factional loyalties and alignments and the rivalries on which they were based.[64]

l. Whatever the reason, the important point is that, both under the Commonwealth and in the first years of independence, Philippine politics were characterized by a two-party system, with one group exercising power and the other acting as a loyal opposition--a situation that classical political scientists say is conducive to the efficient functioning of a representative democracy. Yet in a few short years, Manila was confronted with a serious rebellion in the heartland of central Luzon.

m. Taking the long view, it might be postulated that although there were two political parties (or at times a strong faction opposing a dominant faction within a one-party environment), they both represented the Establishment. The dispossessed, the underprivileged, and the uninfluential were excluded from decisionmaking and from access to machinery to redress their grievances. So long as attention was focused on the political question of independence, consensus on national goals was maintained. However, once freedom became a reality, the door was open for polarization of discontent around economic questions. This tendency was stimulated, even accelerated, by experience gained by the masses in the Resistance Movement during World War II.

n. The Philippines Spanish heritage placed emphasis on personal leadership; its US heritage encouraged separation of powers and an independent executive. In the Philippine culture, the President became a very strong individual with authority extending from Manila to the villages. So long as he performed well, the Republic was safe. However, if his leadership did not bring the needed changes in time, the Republic was in danger. In the Roxas administration, the executive failed to meet the challenge, and the Huk Rebellion threatened to destroy the Democratic institutions that had survived the war. However, that the President possessed the basic power to face and overcome armed opposition was demonstrated in the administration of Ramon Magsaysay--a situation to be analyzed in the conflict stage of this study.

22. The Communist Party. The Communist Party of the Philippines was established in Manila on 7 November 1930, but Filipinos had been exposed to Communist influences since the early 1920's. The Philippine Labor Congress sent delegates to a meeting of the International Labor Union in Canton in 1925. Later that year, the famous Indonesian Communist Tan Malaka spent some time in Manila. Within the next few years, several prominent Philippine labor leaders went to Moscow for training and conferences. A continuous flow of Filipinos followed these leaders abroad to China, Germany, Belgium, and the Soviet Union. A Marxist labor party (Partido Obrero) had been organized in 1924 but had failed to grow. It was revived in 1928, and its platform was incorporated in the CPP's platform and program 2 years later. It was in this period

that the Communist Party of the United States of America (CPUSA) began to furnish guidance and financial support to the Philippine Communist movement, following the Comintern practice of having the metropolitan party assist the colonial branch. Earl Browder, Harrison George (his brother-in-law), Eugene Dennis, and Agnes Smedley were active in the Islands and in writing articles for CPUSA or Comintern publications.[65]

23. Early activities. The CPP began an active political campaign in 1930 to recruit members and expand its organization. Following a disturbance on May Day 1931, the Philippine Supreme Court outlawed the party in 1932. During December 1931 the CPP received rather extensive guidance in Comintern publications about operating as an outlawed party. First the CPP was told to establish strict party discipline over all members, whether they were fractions in mass organizations or directly involved in the party structure. The Comintern articles also pointed up the necessity of combining legal and illegal methods of struggle and of establishing the clandestine apparatus. Establishing a clandestine apparatus required certain basic actions, such as withdrawing a small number of party cadre from overt mass activity to function covertly, organizing a secret CPP headquarters and printing plant, creating a clandestine distribution net for Communist literature, arranging for safe houses, letter drops, and other similar arrangements for the clandestine apparatus, and assigning codes and pseudonyms for membership files. These instructions were followed in 1931 and 1932 and again immediately after World War II.[66]

a. Meanwhile, a Socialist Party was formed which grew very rapidly after 1932. Between 1930 and 1936, the CPP was successful in creating a party organization, in implementing the united front policy from below of the 6th Comintern Congress, and in gaining experience in clandestine activity. However, the united front from below tactics and its ramifications tended to alienate many potential supporters.

b. When the Philippines were granted Commonwealth status in 1935, pressure was brought to bear on the Filipino leaders to reverse the ban on Communist Party activities. Sol Auerbach, alian James Allen (CPUSA), negotiated during 1936-38 for the release of the CPP leaders with Quezon and remained in Manila to guide the merger of the CPP with the Socialist Party and prevailed on the CPP leadership to hold an open party convention. The CPP changed the organizational nomenclature to conform to democratic political parties. The Central Committee became the National Committee; the Politburo, the Political Committee; and the Agitation-Propaganda Section, the National Educational Department. The CPP reverted to the original titles again in 1942 for all except the National Educational Department. This change in terminology made the CPP 1938 meeting a convention, not a Congress.[67] The imprisoned party leaders were released in 1938 in time to form a united front with the Socialist party leaders.[68]

c. By 1938, with the legalization of the Communist Party of the Philippines and its merger with the Socialist Party, there was a thoroughly trained cadre of Filipinos who could implement the program of the 7th Congress of the Communist International held in 1935. This

program called for a united front from above with other political parties which were willing to accept the condition of a common struggle against fascism by exploiting the symbols of patriotism, defending independence against imperialism, and creating "new democracy" in the colonial areas after establishing people's front governments. At the same time, any direct attempts to seize power were to be postponed, not abandoned, in the capitalist as well as colonial world.[69]

24. Preparation to seize power.

a. Theoretical guidelines. After World War I, the Comintern developed a body of doctrine and directions that required that three conditions exist before a national Communist Party attempted to seize power. First, a serious crisis should have threatened the political, economic, and social stability of the country. Second, the national party should be well organized and have developed sophisticated tactics for use in revolution. Finally, the national party should have organized mass support from large segments of the discontented populace. Warfare was the condition most likely to bring about the crisis the Comintern considered most desirable for an attempted seizure of power in any country. Economic and natural disasters also could produce crisis situations, but war was the ideal climate for revolutionary seizure of power. However, the threat to the Soviet Union from 1935 until 1941 by Germany, Italy, and Japan dictated that the defense of the USSR and defeat of the Soviet enemies would take precedence over revolutionary efforts in the colonies of the Western imperialists.

(1) By the time the Communist Party of the Philippines was established, the Comintern had succeeded in "Bolshevizing" all national Communist Parties to a greater or lesser degree, depending on the level of cadre training and Communist sophistication. Certain Comintern standards and principles applied to all parties, such as democratic centralism, labor duty, production cells, and a combination of legal with clandestine work. Democratic centralism was the organizational principle for all Communist parties and mass organizations. It was essentially democratic in form but totalitarian in substance, as the party leadership exercised a tightly centralized control from the top down rather than power flowing from the bottom of the party to the top. Labor duty meant that each party member had to demonstrate his faith daily by Communist works. The insistence upon production cells as the best form of organization typified the impact of the Russian Revolutionary influence on the Comintern. The combination of legal and clandestine work by each Communist Party was designed to ensure the viability of every party under any circumstances and to hold up the banner of "revolutionary legality" as higher than "bourgeois" legality.[70]

(2) In addition to the prerequisites already discussed, the Comintern developed some other factors that could influence an attempt to seize power. The size of the country was looked upon as an important factor that could give a Communist Party many advantages, if power were established in remote regions first. A Comintern article in 1935 suggested that the experience of the Communist Party of China could be

applied to future colonial revolutions. The article discussed in detail the criteria for such a region: terrain which impeded the deployment of enemy troops, an exploited and resentful populace, a current peasant insurgency, a self-sufficient, locally produced food supply, and, finally, some capability to produce and repair weapons.[71]

(3) The Comintern also emphasized the experience that each Communist Party gained in the continuous struggle with the class enemy. Revolutionary experience was considered necessary before the successful attempt of seizure of power could be made. The Russian Revolution of 1905 was held up as an example of revolutionary experience that was a testing ground for the successful one 12 years later. National Communist Parties were ordered to study and learn from the experience of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, so that the International could absorb the Russian experience.

(4) Since the Communists believed it was necessary to seize power forcibly, the Comintern urged all party members to accept military service to learn how to fight. Pacifism was discouraged, because there were greater benefits for the movement if everyone acquired a familiarity with weapons and tactics. Closely related to the question of military service was the larger one of the advantages to communism of a war situation rather than peace to bring about a revolutionary seizure of power.

(5) A final factor was the actual aid a national Communist Party might receive from the Soviet Union and its party. Certainly there would be no difficulty in providing ideological and propagandistic support

for the national party through the Comintern or directly from the USSR. The rendering of more tangible aid would depend on the enlightened self-interest of the Soviet Union if it were not involved in war. On the other hand, if the Soviet Union were at war and a revolutionary situation developed in the attacking nation, the Soviet Union would give all possible assistance to the revolutionary Communist movement to overthrow the existing capitalist society.[72]

(6) The guidelines the Comintern laid down were based on the strategy and tactics of ultimately seizing power in a country to transform the political, economic, social, and cultural life of that society into a future Communist nation. All that a national Communist party did in every sphere of activity was governed by the ultimate goal, even if achievement might be postponed by Comintern directive. The tactical approach from 1935 until the Comintern was disbanded in 1943 emphasized the united front from above and below at different times, preservation of national independence against fascism, and creation of a new democracy. All aspects of national life had to be brought under Communist control or enough elements neutralized so that the party could seize power. These were the theoretical guidelines which each national Communist party was urged to put into practice.

b. Practical application. Although the Communist Party of the Philippines followed the strategic guidelines of the Comintern, it was influenced directly and indirectly by the Communist Party of China. The

Overseas Chinese living throughout the islands and concentrated in and around Manila were represented in the CPP from its inception.

(1) The Chinese Party was also the source of much of the information and most of the textbooks on guerrilla warfare that influenced the Huk during and after the war years.[73] Problems of distance and environment also created closer ties between the Chinese and Filipino parties. For a time in the late thirties and early forties there was a Chinese party representative with the Philippine party. The CPUSA also furnished tactical guidance to the Philippine party. The cadre of the CPP were an elite corps ideologically motivated in the Marxist-Leninist tradition, while the vast majority of the membership and sympathizers were attracted by various issues such as land reforms, anti-imperialism, and social justice. It was the cadre that kept the Philippine Party following the Comintern Communist line despite temptations to dilute party strength by embracing side issues.[74]

(2) The overall tactic followed by the CPP from 1938 to 1948 was either the united front from above or the united front from below. The creation of the new Communist party in 1938 and its merger with the Socialist Party established the basis for the united front that was to last throughout this decade. Although the two parties merged, the National Peasants' Union (KPMP) and the Socialist Party's Workers and Peasants Union (AMT) remained separate. The Socialist Party's rapid expansion after 1932 apparently offered a home for the outlawed Communist Party members who reciprocated by helping the Socialists to structure

their organization better. In the 1938 election the new Communist party created a popular front which elected two candidates to the National Assembly. The united front from above tactic enabled the CPP, particularly after the 1941 German invasion of the Soviet Union, to operate and expand its front organizations on church and university property and to utilize the YMCA, student, and Chinese YMCA facilities to rally large numbers of people that never would have been attracted by the CPP acting alone. At the same time, the CPUSA retained an interest in the CPP's activities and financial problems. The Soviet Union also engaged in some intelligence work in the Philippines directed toward Japan. Although the CPP lost some adherents between September 1939 and June 1941, when the Comintern policy was the united front from below, the CPP had recouped its losses beginning in June 1941.[75]

(3) Despite some defections in 1940, the Communist party was the best organized political group in the Philippines when Japan struck in December 1941. In October of that year, the Communist party used the publications of two labor unions to circularize labor unions, peasant organizations, and various anti-Japanese groups to prepare the public for the coming Japanese invasion. On 10 December 1941, the party issued a public manifesto that pledged support for the United States and the Commonwealth, urged all Filipinos to prepare for guerrilla warfare, and called for a united front along broad lines against Japan. Thus, by the time the Japanese invaded the Philippines, the Communists had created an organized political party capable of going underground, with plans for

political and military action to fight the Japanese invader, leaders who had an appeal to all walks of Philippine society, plus a mass following of peasants and workers in central Luzon.[76]

(4) In January 1942, the Japanese military forces in the Philippines began organizing the Barrio United Defense Corps (BUDC). The Communists infiltrated these organizations at the local level, using the tactics of the united front from below. The Japanese organized the BUDC to perform police and security functions, but the Communists reversed its role. The Communists were able to develop a warning net through the BUDC to promote anti-Japanese feeling among the populace indirectly and to have the corps provide food for the Huk guerrilla bands. The chain of communication and command from the villages to Manila worked for the Huks in reverse.[77]

(5) The CPP and remnants of the Socialist Party and the two peasant organizations held a meeting one month later at which it was decided to continue the tactic of the united front instead of moving onto a "peoples republic." At this time a "Provisional National Committee of the United Front" (PNCUF) was established. This committee was composed of 12 men and was essentially a state within a state. As the guerrilla operations developed during the war, the Military Committee of the PNCUF came to dominate the Huk movement. At the same time the Huks consolidated control of the guerrilla bands by eliminating individuals and groups who were hostile or refused to remain neutral in the Huk bid for power. In the beginning of the war, the Huks paid lip-service to the

common aims of the United States and the Philippines but began to eliminate all American military survivors behind the Japanese lines by 1943, just as it had removed all pro-American Filipinos from the guerrilla bands in the preceding year. The Huk also deliberately moved away from the united front tactic from 1944 until the return of US forces, in an effort to expand its political and military base. The Huk admit to having killed more Filipino opponents than Japanese and to fighting the US Army Forces Far East (USAFFE) units over control of areas, regardless of the Japanese threat. One of the organizational weapons the Huk employed in this period was the further development of the BUDC to tighten Huk political and military hold on Central Luzon--the key to the Philippines.[78]

(6) As a result of World War II and the isolation of CPP leadership from Manila by the Japanese, the CPP was more firmly tied to the peasant base in central Luzon. Although this area was and is the key to the Philippines, the CPP made little effort in the war years to expand beyond its Luzon base. The guidance and advice of the Chinese Communists were always present during the guerrilla phase of CPP activities. The "Func mental Spirit of the Hukbalahap" was lifted almost verbatim from a similar Chinese Communist document. The Chinese Communists also provided military and party training through instructors, including a colonel from the 8th Route Army. The Philippine Chinese also fielded a Guerrilla Squadron Number 48, named after the 4th and 8th Route Armies in Communist China. Despite the assistance from the CPP and CPUSA from 1938 to 1945,

the CPP failed to develop a leader, lacked ideological strength, and was unable to overcome the factors inherent in Filipino social customs that inhibited development of national leaders.

(7) The Japanese defeat in 1945 left the Philippines devastated. In addition, the returning US forces followed conflicting policies in dealing with the Huk, in handling the liberation and postliberation policies for the Philippines, and in providing for reconstruction of the islands. Many of these issues (such as Japanese collaboration; return of the prewar economic, social, and political leaders; corruption; relief and rehabilitation; and guerrilla recognition and back pay) still color Philippine politics. In July 1946, Democratic alliance was established to which the Huk leadership belonged without ever exercising control. The Democratic Alliance served the Huks as a reincarnation of the united front from above. Independence in the following year brought no solutions to the political confrontation between the Huk and the Philippine Government. Still the Huk hoped to achieve their goals by political means while continuing to build up a mass base. During the postwar years, an aptitude for ineptitude characterized the political and military leadership of the Filipino Government, whose officials promised amnesty one minute with meaningful land reforms and reverted to crude, indiscriminate military operations the next--alienating the populace and keeping the Huk cause alive and growing.[79]

(8) From March 1947 until March 1948, the central Luzon region experienced little political change as the Huk leaders continued their

organizing activities both politically and militarily, reconstructing the wartime regional commands, and renaming the Huk the People's Liberation Army (HMB). A month earlier representatives of the Asian Communist parties met in India at the Calcutta Youth Conference. From here the word went out to all Asian parties to change from parliamentary to insurrectionary tactics. Within the next 6 months, every Communist Party in Asia had attempted insurrectionary action against the established authority. Despite Roxas' formal decree outlawing the CPP in March 1948, negotiations between the Government and party leaders dragged on until August of 1948. In mid-August, the government and the Huk reached an impasse, and both sides began to prepare for armed conflict.[80]

(9) The united front from below and above tactic also was used among labor and peasant organizations in the Philippines by the Communist Party. The KPMP and the AMT sought to bring all laboring people into line with Communist political front aims. During World War II, the differences were blurred between these two unions, so that by July 1945 the Communist party leadership created a new organization known as the National Peasants' Union (PKM). At the same time, prewar labor unions that were Socialist or Communist-controlled in Manila were brought together again in the Congress of Labor Organizations (CLO). During the war the BUDC units illustrated this united front tactic at the local level, and after liberation from the Japanese, were easily reconstructed as grass roots Communist political control units.[81]

(10) Before the war, the CPP established numerous front organizations, such as the League for the Defense of Democracy, the Friends of China Youth Congress, the Congress for Democracy and Collective Security, Civil Liberties Union, and the Student Union. Each one of these organizations appealed to one or more economic, political, or social groups who often had no idea that the organizations were manipulated by Communists to further the Party's aims. All these organizations were used as recruiting grounds for the Communist Party, while the Congress for Democracy and Collective Security echoed the Soviet Union's appeal in the League of Nations for united action against fascist aggression. Organization of the Friends of China Youth Congress indicates clearly the important role the CPP reserved for the largest non-Filipino ethnic group.[82]

(11) The themes of the agitation-propaganda campaigns conducted by the CPP between 1935 and 1948 also indicate the tactical shifts in the Party line. From 1935 until 1939, the general themes highlighted the call for a united front tactic aimed at creation of a popular front with the widest mass base directed against fascist aggression. During the first few years of World War II, the Huk adhered to the patriotic theme of US and Philippine unity to defeat the Japanese. Beginning in 1943, the Huk concentrated on Philippine independence and preparations for a Communist mass political and military following when the Islands were liberated. During the actual US campaigns to free the Islands, the Huk played down its anti-imperialism and anti-Americanism; but, with the failure of the returning US and the Filipino officials to work out any

viable solution that would have disarmed and reduced the Huk threat, the Huk resumed its agitation and propaganda directed now toward independence and creation of a new type of government through parliamentary tactics.

(12) Despite the emphasis on parliamentary tactics within the CPP, there was a divided leadership on the question until 1948. At the same time, the Communist Party of Soviet Union (CPSU) was negligent in providing guidance for the national Communist parties until September 1947. The shift in overall tactics was relayed from the Calcutta Youth Conference in February 1948, and the Huk began to prepare in earnest for insurrectionary tactics. At the same time, the promises and half-hearted attempts by the Philippine Government to settle the Huk problem failed, further reinforcing the Huk leadership's determination to resort to insurrection. Huk propaganda was published in the newspaper, "Titis"(Flame); a magazine called"Kalayaan"(Freedom); and specially produced posters, pamphlets, and leaflets designed to appeal to different groups for individual themes. Agitation was carried on by the Huk school system and by the agitators attached to each party organizational unit.[83]

(13) During the war years the Military Committee became the general headquarters and controlling body of the Huk movement, exercising the powers of a state within a state. By 1945 the Huk Military Committee consisted of a Commanding Officer, Political Commissar, Deputy Commander, Civil Affairs Officer, and a Chinese Liaison Officer. This form of organization was maintained in a skeleton structure during the early liberation period. However, in the fall of 1946, the Huk began to reactivate this

wartime clandestine organization and expanded it during 1947 and early 1948 by reestablishing the Regional Commands in preparation for protracted insurrectionary action.[84]

CHAPTER 3

ECONOMIC FACTORS

by Harley M. Roberts

25. Introduction. This chapter describes and analyzes the economic factors and elements that were important to the rise of the Hukbong ng Bayan Laban sa Hapon (Hukbalahap or Huk) insurgent movement in the Philippines during 1935-48. During these years, a wholly native upsurge of nationalist-reformist spirit created a strong well-organized movement under the Huk which was amazingly successful and, later, amazingly unable to withstand Government suppression. As is evident from the Huk resurgence in the 1960s, this domestic insurgency has continued to live and to threaten new outbreaks.[1]

a. Despite the tremendous amount of statistical data available on the Philippines, lack of agreement among sources, both official and independent, makes it unwise to assign absolute values. Trends from year to year must be considered, especially since later statistics and amended definitions necessitate revision of formerly accepted data. However, historical decisions were made and actions were taken based on the available and currently accepted data and the interpretations which seemed valid at the time.

b. The Philippine economy and society is not typically Asian. It has been described as being almost Latin American in nature, closer to Mexico than to Asia.[2] Conditions are not similar to those in Asia: land pressure is not intense in the Islands as a whole; starvation is

not a common danger, and weather vagaries are not all-important in agriculture; democratic political institutions appear to be firmly established; and near-universal education exists in the Philippines of the 1960s. Living standards, per capita product and levels of modernization suggest that the Islands rank near the very top of the developing nations. Adelman and Morris show the Philippines at the top of a 21-nation intermediate sample in socioeconomic development, especially respecting social indexes.[3]

c. Today's Philippine society continues to show many or most of the same economic features often labeled as determining causes of violence and organized unrest. It requires little imagination to foresee unjust conditions of land tenure, economic concentration, poor public administration, and corruption followed by physical violence, organized subversion, and internal revolt in the future of the Islands. It is easy to foretell a rebirth of the massive Huk attacks on provincial capitals and municipalities for a specific year, say 1985, and since US programs, goals, and standards were so prominent in Huk history, it seems most natural to examine carefully how well these worked and how far they need careful redefinition to work in 1970. If there are any generalizations possible about the Islands' experience with planned social change and programs of counterinsurgency, the fact that the Philippine society contains both Asian and Latin-American elements will surely make broader generalizations just so much more valuable.

d. The analysis which follows does not claim to lay bare any unidirectional economic casualty for political rebellion or insurgency.

No specific economic causes can be identified directly with the end-product of economic growth itself, although, as Kindleberger remarks in Economic Growth in France and Britain, "singly-valued theories abound in a world of multiple causation."[4] Political and social conditions are so closely interwoven with economic factors that the economic causes of subversion cannot be completely isolated. The analyst must know the list of economic correlates to political and social conditions and test facts against them, instead of blindly adhering to some generalized ideological association of goals, intentions, conditions, and policy acts. The social costs of any action, difficult as they may be to calculate, still will lack all meaning if they cannot be compared to the social costs of inaction.

26. The social and political inheritance. In evaluating the social factors which constrain and condition Philippine economic life, it is necessary to recognize the dual nature of the economy, the primacy of Manila as a modernizing center, and the economic motivations caused by the close-knit nature of the Filipino family.

a. The Philippine nation is a congeries of islands, lineages, and languages. The 100-mile railroad from Manila to Lingayen passes through Huklandia and through three main language blocks (Tagalog, Pampamgeno, Pangansinan). A man can walk across these units in 2 days, yet travel is sharply limited by rugged mountain chains on Luzon and by the wide dispersion of the islands in the archipelago, and the separate languages prevent easy communication. The cosmopolitan modern atmosphere of Manila, where almost half of all Philippine manufacturing is concentrated,

differs sharply from that of the countryside, where 18,500 villages provide the rural contrast to Manila. No single rural settlement can be taken as typical of such a varied society, even though they all share similar features, are close to the land, and operate at subsistence level. Each village family may be related to one-third of the other households, may have one member who has visited the nearest city, and will have its own family tradition and past history of local alliances and conflicts. Family loyalties are intense, and Filipino women are active economic decisionmakers within the family. As a consequence, nepotism and conservatism are both approved attitudes.

b. The major divisions and social classes for most of the Philippines date from the days of Spanish rule. At the top are the Manila-oriented, well-born families; their close supporters are the caciques, or local chiefs, and leaders. Outside of major cities, there are few in the middle class. Best qualified for this category are local small businessmen (often Chinese by descent or name) and the largest farm owner-operators, including the unpaid village leader. At the bottom is the farmer, some 45 percent of whom are sharecroppers. This class structure is most clearcut in rural areas.

c. Social mobility did exist in 1938 and was important in the Philippines. It was encouraged by providing religious godparents, the use of migrant labor for sugarcane and other harvests, and the need for travel outside the immediate region for higher education. Still, social tensions based on linguistic divisions, family obligations, economic competition, and issues of personal prestige coexisted with this mobility.

Success still is measured all too often by personal wealth, conspicuous consumption, the purchase of land, and the discharging of duties to those dependent on the individual.

i. What appears to foreign observers as outright corruption or selfish traditionalism can be traced to Filipino beliefs and values. Family and ethnic traditions may vary from region to region; individuals may move from rural classes into modern city life. Yet an interwoven network of family and personal ties still continues to condition the mind of the modern Filipino, making him more sensitive to personal ties than national ones. His duties and his loyalty belong to the family rather than to abstract principles of justice or of economic efficiency.[5]

e. Recent studies have suggested that economic events and trends owe far less to political factors and events than was previously imagined.[6] It has been traditional to emphasize the constraints placed on trends in foreign trade, investment, currency expansion, and price controls by political interaction and policies. There can be no doubt that, in most underdeveloped countries, political considerations are believed to be all-important by both entrepreneurs and by consumers; whether their actions are conditioned by their beliefs, however, is hard to determine. Traditional economic analysis therefore requires some examination of the political-economic interrelationship.

f. During 300 years of Spanish rule, the Spanish tradition of unitary, highly-centralized government was firmly established and a considerable bureaucracy built up in Manila. Higher education was likewise concentrated and closely supervised. However, Spanish dependence on the regional

influence of landed aristocracy went far toward making each region or province quite independent in its daily affairs. Class distinctions between Spanish and Filipino families, as well as the independent hierarchy and estates created by the Catholic Church, also reinforced this localism.

g. US influence during 1901-40 made fewer changes in political relationships than might have been expected. Many political trends during this period further strengthened local, (particularly municipal), administrative bodies. US traditions and concepts of local elections and local authority added strength to the influence of provincial politicians. However, the central powers of the US Commissioner to override legislation remained very great. When Filipino independence arrived in 1946, the President retained most of these central powers and continued to hold strong control over the bureaucracy.

h. A prime result of US colonial administration was the special position assigned to non-Filipino residents, particularly to US citizens and Chinese. US firms exerted a disproportionate influence on the Government, and US free-trade policies were applied rigorously to Filipino interests but were tempered for others. Sugar production for the US market was placed under quota early, and the Philippines were viewed by American businessmen as an open door to Asian markets for all types of American goods. Essentially, the Philippine economy was directed into raw materials export lines, while domestic laissez faire policies and an unmanaged economy were encouraged.

i. The economic importance of Manila as the seat of Government and the commercial center was firmly established during the 20th century. The Spanish municipalities continued as basic units, with local politics dominated by personal cliques and family ties. The political parties which were formed were based on local and provincial alliances that shifted and reformed for specific elections or specific issues. There has been little party loyalty or discipline, because it has been difficult to enforce sanctions on party members.[7]

j. Law and order enforcement represented a typical issue for the Philippines as a whole, and for central Luzon in particular. The Philippine Constabulary was established by the United States to provide nationwide security under central direction. Until 1936, only US troops, with subordinate Philippine Scouts, provided actual military strength.[8] Each municipality also was empowered to develop its own police force--the Civil Guard (Guardia Civil)--for local control. It also was customary for larger landowners to recruit their own private armed bodyguard. A further US legacy is that of respect for legal procedures. Many Filipinos became lawyers, a field where their abilities were high, and Philippine courts have been very active, with long backlogs. The major counterweight to this legalistic tradition has been the early development of a free Filipino press.

k. Governmental development projects and investment have many characteristics similar to US practices. Omnibus field and harbor types of bills are frequent and express the Parliamentary preferences for local impact projects, nepotism, and personal prestige. Again, the almost-excessive

press freedom which exists helps to restrain this somewhat, and a number of Filipino legislators have been happy to establish personal reputations as "fiscalizers" or muck-raking reformers, by exposing favoritism and nepotism wherever possible. "Fiscalizer" is a term unique to Philippine political life, and such reformists are most influential within the current ruling party. The Philippine word for flagrant acts of nepotism or corruption is "anomalies "[9]

l. In summary, there can be little doubt that there is a distinctive Filipino identity or national consciousness. There is an amazing continuity in politics--seen in the family traditions of political leadership. Against foreigners, including those non-Filipino Chinese who resist assimilation, all Filipinos are easily united. But ethnic, linguistic, and local loyalties are very strong, and these tend to divide the elites of the nation and to dilute the commitment of political leaders to national programs, national growth, or nationwide goals.

27. Economic conditions, 1938-48. In the 1930s, the relations between the US and Philippine economies were very close. This was not purely because of US colonial administration, for the United States was the major export market during the 40 years prior to 1900, taking some 29 percent of all exports and nearly 70 percent of sugar exports.[10] Philippine net export earnings from the United States offset its net trade deficit with other countries in 1900-31. Exports grew rapidly under the US "special relationship" of free trade and tariff exemption.

a. Nevertheless, it is a fact that US investment and business played a dominant role in the Philippine economy. By 1941, total US

investments were estimated at P537 million, of an estimated foreign investment of P1.087 billion.[11] About 20 percent of this represented Philippine bonds; the rest was direct investment. Much US investment was concentrated in sugar, coconut oil, and lumber and mining activities, however, and there is little doubt that it was highly visible to Filipinos. In sugar processing, for instance, about 33 percent of the P185 million capital of sugar "centrals" refineries, in 1935, and nearly half the capital invested in coconut mills and refineries and 53 percent of the abaca (Manila hemp) cordage spindle capacity were US-owned. Even the household industry of embroidery, established through Government encouragement and public school instruction, was aimed at American tastes, and 90 percent of such exports (nearly $5 million yearly) was sold to the United States.[12]

b. Inevitably, the Philippine economy reacted swiftly to US trade fluctuations. During the depression years of 1930-35, average annual Philippine exports dropped nearly 28 percent below the previous 5-year level. For an economy with much of its nonagricultural services and a large part of its cash crop output directed to foreign export trade, this loss represented a real blow. During the 1935-40 period, the US economy recovered slowly, and Philippine exports also improved.

c. Comparative national economic data are available only for 1938, 1948, and 1956 (table I). Agricultural output was dominant, and many productive services also depended on the annual level of crop production. Manufacturing was based primarily on foreign ownership, which had provided up to half the total capital (estimated at about P3 billion in

Table III. Philippine "Real Product" 1938-56
(in millions of 1948 pesos)

	1938	1948	1956
Population	15,849	19,085	24,512
Total real product	4,674	5,177	8,596
Official estimates	na	5,511	8,414
Imports (IMF)	na	1,287	1,137
Product distribution			
Domestic investment	655	782	901
Exports	800	507	1,101
Government consumption	253	618	647
Private consumption	2,966	3,270	5,947
Industrial origin			
Agriculture	1,358	1,365	2,598
Manufacturing	775	620	1,482
Mining	118	35	139
Construction	360	452	420
Transport, utilities	187	297	460
Services	725	1,174	1,490
Commerce	718	796	1,321
Dwelling services	326	322	491
Other (NEC)	66	73	121

Sources: M. F. Goodstein, 1962 pp 8-24,30; F. H. Golay, 1961, pp 101,109; International Financial Statistics, Sup. 1966-67.

a year when domestic product reached P1,163 million).[13] Both manufacturing and trade were heavily concentrated in Manila, while mean incomes in the rural districts remained very low. Since per capita income was low, a mass market did not exist for domestic products. Internal savings were low and difficult to mobilize, since rural financial institutions were lacking, and the major savers were landlords and retailsmen. Since economic data are scanty and quite unsystematic, the year of 1938 has been selected as a year for analysis.

d. In the Philippine countryside, especially in central Luzon, large landholdings were common. Migrant workers usually were employed in central Luzon's canefields during harvest, and the plains' tenancy rates were far higher than the national rates, varying between 60 and 80 percent. The Government's influence was rarely felt in rural areas; President Quezon's effort to enforce a tenancy law to assure farmer tenants a minimum share of 30 percent of the crop generally was considered to be inadequate and meaningless. The Government rice corporation (NARIC) was established to assure food supplies for the cities, but this helped to keep farm incomes low and prices fixed.

e. Philippine agricultural productivity was very low, even when compared with that of other Asian nations. An adequate system of highways existed in central Luzon, but most goods traffic continued to move by rail or by carabao cart. Government investment programs were few, and the 4-year plan developed by Quezon in 1936 remained largely unimplemented. Meanwhile, Philippine mining grew steadily throughout the 1930s. Gold mining, especially, flourished and helped to peg the Philippine peso at an unchanging two per US dollar--a deflationary policy which kept both living costs and business activity lower than was appropriate.

f. The Japanese occupation of the Philippines, from early 1942 through 1944, caused a number of changes in the nation's economy. Most important was the active Japanese opposition to both American and Chinese in trade and ownership. US firms were taken over, Chinese firms were hampered in numerous ways, and the Japanese-directed Philippine Government avowed its intention to Philippinize the economy. There were also

continued efforts by the Japanese Military Administration (JMA) to centralize and to regulate the economy from Manila. The rice-buying corporation was continued (NARIC, later BIBA), and strict price controls were established in the cities. Japanese orders to sugarcane plantations were designed to convert these rapidly into cotton producers to serve the Japanese textile industry. Finally, the JMA was often in opposition to the Japanese civilian directors of the Philippine Government, and local Japanese Army commanders often confiscated stocks of rice or goods, wherever found, and transferred them directly to Japan.[14]

g. The Philippine Government under Japanese rule was a continuation of the previous Commonwealth Government through the person of Jorge Vargas, who remained behind at President Quezon's instructions. In 1943, the Japanese declared an independent Philippines, with Jose Laurel as President. A number of Commonwealth Congressional leaders continued in office, and leading prewar political figures, including Roxas, Laurel, Recto, Yulo, and others, were coopted into the Japanese administration. Meanwhile, Philippine resistance bands continued to operate in and control the mountains or countryside. Economic loyalties and political allegiances thus became thoroughly confused. After the war's end, this confusion was the basis for the highly emotional issue of wartime collaboration which was judged primarily by US standards. The Japanese formed numerous "associations" in every economic and social sphere. Best known were the "Neighborhood Associations" and the Kalibapi political group.

h. During wartime, food rationing and shortages of all kinds of goods led to much investment in hidden stocks of goods and to disregard of price controls, with resulting wartime profiteering. An early Japanese policy arbitrarily cut wages by half, basic rations were set absurdly low, and almost all goods were tightly controlled. At the same time, the Japanese introduced special currency, good only with the Philippines, in evergrowing amounts to cover JMA operations and official purposes. This currency earned the title of "Mickey Mouse money" and led to a growing inflation which made most Japanese price controls wholly meaningless. By 1945, the cost of living in Manila was believed to have risen to 9,000 percent of prewar and 1942 levels; expressed in US terms, overall price appreciation peaked in 1945 and then fell, to reach 350 percent over prewar, by 1947 and 1948. Postwar indexes are highly impressionistic and unreliable.[15]

i. Most Filipinos traced the corruption of Philippine moral and social standards directly to the period of wartime shortages, black markets, profiteering, and influence-peddling. During the early postwar years, these trends were reconfirmed. As prewar business attempted to reopen, as governmental controls were loosened, as Government and US Army welfare and other programs expanded, the economy was left largely without direction. The charge of collaboration with the Japanese remained a primary, intense political issue until January 1948, when Roxas declared final amnesty for all accused collaborators.

j. The Commonwealth Government was reestablished in Manila in February 1945 after violent street fighting. The first congressional session

opened in June. US Army administration ended on 1 September, and Philippine elections in April 1946 led to the declaration of full Philippine independence in July. During much of this interim period, primary economic responsibility rested with the US Army which occupied the largest city buildings, ran most public services, and was responsible for relief and welfare through its Philippine Civil Affairs Unit (PCAU). Elsewhere in the Islands, fighting continued through 9 months of 1945.

k. Wartime shortages continued through 1945; civilians found goods scarce, while the US Army took the entire output of Manila's ice, beer, and distillery firms.[16] Almost all Government revenue was provided from US Government transfers, out of Commonwealth tariff and currency trust accounts, during 1945-46. These shortages of State funds, goods, and housing caused a 20- to 25-percent inflation during 1945, which continued at a slower pace during 1946. The US Commercial Corporation, founded to purchase wartime raw materials abroad, continued to operate in the Philippines until May 1946. Its purchases of copra and abaca were financed by imports of miscellaneous (often cheap) goods, which provided the main import supply during this interim period. Pent-up wartime demands were thus directed into useless consumption or housing investments; the needed capital goods to replace wartime destruction were imported very slowly.

l. Soon after Roxas became President of the independent Philippines in July 1946, he founded a new Philippine Reconstruction Finance Corporation (RFC), which later was the major channel for the reconstruction of

Philippine manufacturing. Various other Government corporations included the Philippine Relief and Trade Corporation (PRATRA) and the relief functions of UNRRA's Philippine counterpart in September 1947. During 1947 appeared the major reports which set the pattern for Filipino reconstruction up to the 1950s. The Joint Finance Commission reported on economic and policy needs in taxation and finance; also in June the "Beyster Report" appeared on industrial rehabilitation policy. In October, a Westinghouse Electric Power Program Report proposed five major projects and a 22-year power expansion program. All this activity, however, took place at a high Government level, abstracted from real economic activity. The beneficial consequences of these steps were felt only much later, in 1949 and 1950.[17]

m. Philippine national recovery still lagged badly in 1948. According to the Bell Report of 1950, national output totaled only 85 percent of that in 1938.[18] Manufacturing recovered slightly faster than agriculture in terms of physical volume, while mining production remained low, only 36 percent of the prewar level. The output of basic foodstuffs, particularly rice and corn, was near the 1937 levels, but the Philippine population had grown by 25 percent. Wartime policies and destruction had hit particularly hard at rural sugar refining capacity and farm livestock and had cut the crop area under cultivation by some 20 percent.[19] In the cities, private housing and public facilities were in short supply or still unrestored. Through the US War Damages Commission, about $110 million for damaged Government properties and $80 million (at P2 per US$) for private property claims was disbursed against

claims that totaled nearly three times as much.[20] A later survey of Philippine investment through 1949 suggests that residential housing and buildings plus rebuilding of commercial inventories absorbed 33 percent of all investment, more than was invested in agriculture and manufacturing combined.[21]

n. During 1945 and 1946, Philippine Government expenditures remained relatively low; a notable reason was the rapid demobilization of the armed forces or guerrilla bands who had been absorbed into a Philippine Army through 1945. But Government costs nearly doubled in 1947 and remained at about P360 million in 1948. Expenses for national defense and for law and order totaled P88 million in 1948, more than 25 percent above the previous year.[22]

o. The following trends appear most important:

(1) The sharp division between agricultural life and city commercial life (especially in Manila) continued throughout the period.

(2) The important economic functions of foreign residents, Chinese and American, were sharply curtailed during the wartime period, but were reestablished soon thereafter.

(3) The 1941-45 Japanese occupation caused violent economic disruption and much physical destruction, bringing both social and political upheaval and dissolving old connections.

(4) The predominance of agricultural and services output before the War continued through 1948 and later, limiting the speed with which prewar trading and manufacturing flows could be reestablished under an undirected postwar economy.

(5) Farm tenancy rates were high before the War, and ownership claims were rapidly reaffirmed after the War, even though most landlords had abandoned control during wartime and appeared to have been collaborators.

(6) Large amounts of US welfare and investment funds and goods flowed into the Philippine postwar economy, but these were largely directed to individuals or diverted into trade channels, where propensities to consume were high. Investment was largely nonmultiplying, taking the forms of inventories and construction.

(7) By 1958, the Philippines had established a rather good record for economic growth over half a decade and were well on the way to economic self-sufficiency. However, some of the basic structural conditions for the economy remained still unchanged in the 1950s. The difference was that the Huk had been thoroughly scattered and suppressed by 1956.

28. Urban conditions, employment, and industry. The political importance and primacy of Manila is matched closely by its economic and commercial importance. Manila was an important center for Huk organization and intelligence during 1942-50, as well as a recruitment point for many Huk leaders. The gap between Government intentions and claims and the reality of performance was most evident in the city.

a. No matter how difficult Philippine population statistics may be to interpret, the broad outlines are remarkably consistent. From 1903 to 1939, population growth maintained an average annual rate just under 2 percent, rising from about 7.6 million to 16.3 million. Even

over the difficult wartime period, this growth rate continued, with 1948 population reaching 19.2 million. Only during the 1950s did growth accelerate to over 3 percent, one of Asia's highest rates. This long-sustained steady growth occurred without causing dramatic changes in age distribution with the result that children under 15 constituted nearly half the total population throughout the 1903-48 period. This is a high dependency level by Asian standards.[23] Calculations of the Philippine labor force suggest that the percentages of males economically active fell between 1903 and 1938 and that the 52 percent in the labor force in 1938 was cut further to 46 percent in 1948. The long-term fall in economic participation of males aged under 20 or over 55 probably was connected with the expansion of educational opportunities and the added trends of urbanization and nonagricultural growth.

b. During the century, there has been a steady and rapid movement of Filipino population into the cities, which have grown at rates double that of the general population. The Philippines have the highest urbanized share of any Asian population since 1903, and much of this urbanized group is heavily concentrated in a few major cities. Manila alone has accounted for between 15 and 20 percent of urban population during the 1930s and 1940s. Up to 1948, Manila's growth was due mainly to immigration from agricultural areas and after 1948 to migration from smaller urban areas.[24]

c. This high degree of urban concentration coincided with the rapid growth in manufacturing and commercial activities in a few city

centers, primarily Manila. The 1938 census reported some 139,000 manufacturing establishments which employed 398,000; but these figures include many self-employed artisans and have been adjusted to show only 78,000 in manufacturing and mechanical industries proper.[25] On average, there were 17 employees per establishment in Manila, and only 2.5 employees for each outside Manila. By 1948, Philippinewide manufacturing employment was placed at 90,100.[26] Because of the heavy wartime destruction within Manila and the drastic reduction in sugar manufacturing output, 1946 manufacturing was only one-fifth of prewar levels, and by the end of 1948, it represented only about 90 percent of the 1937 and 1939 levels, by volume.[27]

d. Commercial activities in Manila have been concentrated in the hands of Chinese-descent residents ever since the major immigration waves of the latter 19th century. Under US colonial administration, a significant US business community also developed in Manila. The strength of these foreign communities and the ever-available supply of unskilled Filipino labor from the countryside greatly inhibited the growth of the Filipino city labor movement. In 1950, according to the US Economic Missions Report, trade unionism still was confused, haphazard, and chaotic--subject to domination by the Government, interference by management, or racketeering by labor leaders.[28] Yet certain trade unions have a long history in the Philippines. One of the earliest, the Printers' Union, was founded by the Huk Mariano Balgos in 1918.

e. The Communist Party of the Philippines was formed much later, in 1930; its base within the labor movement in Manila has never been

solid enough to allow it to ignore the vigorous peasant union movements in central Luzon or the student movements within Manila. Many rural protest movements flourished during the 1930s and rapidly reappeared after the war.[29] During 1945-48, many issues provided grounds for their strength: the punishment of wartime collaborators and wartime profiteers; the high cost of living in Manila, caused by wartime inflation and shortages; distribution of US war indemnity payments of P500 per person; and establishment of an independent Philippine Government which supported the return to economic prominence of prewar Americans, Chinese, and Filipino entrepreneurs and managers.

f. Large inflows of US capital and Government funds helped to fuel an atmosphere of graft and corruption in Manila during the postwar period. At the same time, energetic efforts to cut back the inflation by allowing liberal imports resulted in a slower growth of domestic productive output, along with a very rapid reestablishment of commerce and exchange. The unskilled, undercapitalized workers of Manila suffered heavily from these trends. Under such postwar conditions, Filipino innovators and entrepreneurs found their chief occupation in trade and in maneuvering to reestablish former claims to lands or buildings. Import controls were established under a licensing system which permitted much graft and corruption; not until January 1949, when the new Central Bank introduced stricter exchange controls, were import procedures regularized. An increased domestic production then became more profitable. Although US direct investment was considerable during this period, only 2-3 percent of all workers were employed in such firms. Filipino investments

during the postwar period were concentrated in land and buildings, and savings incentives were low. Central Bank estimates show that 25 percent of all 1945-49 net investments went into agriculture, 13 percent was for nonbusiness construction, and inventory rebuilding took a further 22 percent of all investment.[30]

g. Under postwar conditions, the Government had little choice but to assume much responsibility for maintaining mass consumption at a subsistence minimum. A succession of Government agencies assumed authority from US relief administrations by 1946. The National Trading Company was responsible for controls on flour, rice, and sugar; in 1948, a successor, PRATRA, took over these and other regulatory authorities. While such operations helped to assure basic supplies of foodstuffs for the cities, they offered major opportunities for favoritism and corruption. The many scandals of this period testify to Philippine liberalism and journalistic freedom; they also created a widespread conviction of Government incapacity, incompetence, and unwillingness to reform.

29. Land tenure and agriculture. Philippine economy is heavily agricultural. Data for 1938 show that nearly half of gross domestic output and at least 60 percent of all employment stems directly from agriculture. In addition, most crops are heavily concentrated; central Luzon provides the largest agricultural surplus in rice and sugar, while corn is the staple cereal in the Visayan Islands, supplemented by coconuts and pineapple crops. Patterns of farming also vary sharply among the various regions and provinces of the Philippines; highland rice is grown once a year on the mountains, while two crops of monsoon and irrigated rice

are common in the lowlands. Large plantation-type farming is typical for sugarcane and pineapple, and use of migrant workers, primarily Ilocanos, is common. Yet in the same province, a small group of owner-operators may be raising rice and harvesting it jointly through the cooperative labor of the entire village.

a. Despite these contrasts and the linguistic divisions which seem to separate every Filipino island along some natural mountain or river boundary, there is a great deal of statistical uniformity in Philippine rural life. Farm tenancy, which has apparently grown steadily since 1903, has become the normal condition, with some 50 percent of all farmers being tenants or part-tenants. The agricultural population has expanded steadily, despite the more rapid growth of major cities and poblaciones. As population has increased, Filipino agricultural productivity has risen slowly to provide the needed basic subsistence. Particularly are these trends marked in the four central Luzon provinces often called Huklandia. In these four provinces, two Tagalog- and two Pampangeno-speaking, rice and sugar are the main crops. Here, farm tenancy rates are double those for the nation as a whole, and large plantations are frequent. Since 1901 this area has maintained a tradition both of armed resistance to the Government in Manila and of vigorous local peasant unions. Most of the rice surpluses to feed Manila and other provinces are grown within this narrow area; likewise, the exportable sugar surplus to fill US quotas (some 920,000 tons) during 1938 and 1948 originated here. Yet crop patterns, land ownership, and even topography vary widely from one municipality to the next. Generalizations must be made with caution.

b. Huklandia was not entirely without industry--various fair-sized towns in 1938 provided market and transshipment centers. Most prominent of these were Angeles (near the US air base at Clark Field) and San Fernando in Pampanga Province; Malolos in Bulacan; Gapan and Cabanatuan in Nueva Ecija; and Tarlac and Bamban in Tarlac. A total of nearly 40 sugar centrals provided daywork in the area in 1938. Flour mills, quarries, and a few mines represented the remaining modern industries. Nevertheless, the area was and is predominantly rural.

c. Tenancy rates in Huklandia varied between 60 percent and 90 percent. At the same time, large plantations (especially in Tarlac) employed seasonal migrant workers. The larger landlords often controlled local credit facilities, providing seed, food during bad crop years, fertilizer, or new tools as needed. Some local shopkeepers were likely to be Chinese; cash transactions were limited; and an uneducated worker could easily become heavily indebted by the arbitrary scaling-up of his past debts or the price of new necessities. The village headman, known as barrio teniente, was the unpaid local Government representative; often he would be the wealthiest local farmer. Yet he did his best to serve local interests, since he too was responsible to a municipal administration which controlled its own civil police force (Guardia Civil) and applied its own local taxes.[31]

d. A historic survey of peasant movements in central Luzon during the 1920s and 1930s cannot be detailed here; however, a succession of strong peasant unions had their central bases in San Fernando and Arayat. Pedro Abad Santos and Luis Taruc were prominent in this movement from

1930 and 1936. After 1942 such associations continued informally in support to the Huk anti-Japanese campaign; in addition Huk encouragement led to the spread of Barrio United Defense Council (BUDC) groups in local villages across the entire area.

e. It was natural that these peasant unions were rapidly re-formed after the war. By April 1945, an overall peasant union, the Confederation of Peasants (PKM) had been revived and was merged for political action with the Democratic Alliance, a pro-Osmena group which included many non-Communist and noncollaborationist Manila intellectuals. When all six Democratic Alliance legislators elected in April 1946 were denied Congressional seats on charges of fraud, it became clear that President Roxas had no intention of using his broad presidential powers to support social or economic changes in Huklandia. These political events, combined with the wartime economic disruption of sugar-processing and rice-selling channels and the controls imposed by the postwar NARIC, resulted in a social and economic alienation of central Luzon from Government goals, which cannot be readily qualified or measured by explicit trends between 1938 and 1948.

30. Summary. A summary of the major economic influences on Philippine life during the 1938-48 period must take special note of wartime events. The Japanese occupation caused a drastic interruption of previous conditions and trends and also provided a social solvent which destroyed previous interconnections and heirarchies, so that they could not easily be returned to a prewar status. In rural areas, both landlords and plantation managers had escaped to the relative safety of

Japanese-controlled cities, crops and taxes went unpaid, and crops were unshared. There could be no easy return to the prewar tenancy relationships which permitted the landlord to receive over 70 percent of the crop. In the major cities, destruction of machinery and buildings required energetic investment and labor that was only slowly forthcoming after the War. In Manila, a Government administration which was accustomed to issuing unenforceable orders for a foreign power was faced with the duty of applying its powers to almost all parts of the economy without violating US legality or stifling individual economic enterprise.

a. At the same time, due to massive US aid for individual indemnity payments, Government operations, and economic rehabilitation, there was little nationalistic spirit supporting an energetic domestic investment plan, local self-sufficiency, savings, or self-denial. Political maneuvering for independence in 1946 and then for shares in the Government's bounty became by far the most profitable and most productive employment. At the same time, US traditions of free enterprise, legal rights of property owners, and an unmanaged economy with open access to foreign capital all worked to prolong the Government's indecision and vacillation over public works, direct or financial controls, and law enforcement. Defense costs absorbed some 20 percent of the budget, but Philippine Armed Forces either left the primary responsibility for internal order to the less effective Constabulary or entered the anti-Huk field only sporadically, confining their efforts to shelling villages and mountains from a distance.[33]

b. The concentration of trade and manufacturing in Manila continued and grew during the immediate postwar period. This concentration of activity helped to blind officials to the nature and extent of rural problems and emphasized the division of Philippine economic life between cash-crop agriculture and modern commercial growth. The economic primacy of Manila grew more marked after the war; this made it seem probable that anyone who could seize political power in Manila could control all the Philippine Islands.

c. The attempt to reestablish prewar land tenure arrangements and prewar crop patterns in central Luzon led to local conflicts which the Government was unable and unwilling to control. Instead, prewar landlords found it to their immediate advantage to enlist private bodyguards and local armies to enforce their own rights. Logically, the correlation between local violence and land tenure discrimination is unlikely to be high; one is a short-time event and the other a slowly-changing long-term condition. However, the high frequency of tenancy in the central Luzon provinces undoubtely contributed to Huk successes in this area, and every breakdown in local law and order made the local farmers hopeful of short-term benefits.

d. Finally, it must be emphasized that both Pampanga and Bulacan are centers of an agricultural cash-crop economy which is highly specialized in rice and sugar. Both these are export crops, for both had their major markets outside the area--in Manila or in the United States. Since about half the prewar capital of the 45 sugar centrals was American, foreign controls over prices and labor practice were clear

and evident through Huklandia. In Manila, the Chinese control of retail business was equally evident. Such outside economic domination, given the long Philippine tradition of a nationalist spirit, surely was more important as a unifying program than local traditions of revolt or any innate predisposition among Pampangeno-speaking persons to conduct rebellions against the national Government. This factor of foreign influence in the economy continues to arouse Philippine political passions up to the present time.

CHAPTER 4

SOCIOLOGICAL FACTORS

Section I. Demography, Education, Communication, and Culture

by Donald S. Bloch

31. Pre-Spanish period. The people who first immigrated to the Philippine Islands shared a common racial ancestry. They settled in small dispersed units in the coastal lowlands, a pattern that continued to exist despite Spanish attempts to concentrate them. Easy access to water transportation and trade with Arab and Asian groups helped to diffuse some common culture traits throughout the settlements. Thus, even though there are many ethnolinguistic groups among the Filipinos, the populace had become somewhat homogeneous by the time the Spaniards arrived in the 16th century.

a. The early unit of settlement was called a "barangay" after the rather large boat that brought early settlers to the islands. The people in one boat made up a settlement and probably consisted of one extended family. The settlement developed a hierarchical structure which consisted of a dato or chief, freemen, serfs, and slaves. The chief, who acceded to his position primarily by heredity, was advised by a group of village elders made up of former chiefs and elderly freemen, but who could be bypassed by the chief. The freemen (whose status was gained by heredity or wealth) owed military and other services and tribute to the chief. The chief and the freemen held the land worked by the serfs, or

peasants, who were considered commoners. The serfs were required to give 50 percent of their crops to the dato or freemen who held the land they worked and were expected to provide labor for the freemen and the community. However, they owned their houses and personal property, and their children inherited the houses and personal property. The slaves were either war captives, criminals, or debtors. They were house servants for the chiefs and freemen and also provided menial labor in the fields and in the community. Women had equal rights in marriage and equal rights to property. Intermarriage occurred between members of the different levels of society, and there was some social mobility based on accumulation of wealth or on heroism in battle. Thus the community tended to become a hemogeneous extended family. Marriages were arranged by the families of the prospective couples after the couple indicated that they wished to marry. Courtship was formal and part of the courtship consisted of the prospective groom working for the father of the prospective bride so that the bride's father could judge whether or not he was worthy to become a member of the family. The economy was land-based, or agricultural. It operated at the subsistence level, and a type of slash-and-burn agriculture was practiced.

b. The religion of the early settlers consisted primarily of spirit and ancestor worship. Good spirits, or gods, were propitiated, as were the spirits of ancestors. Spirits were believed to reside in unusual natural objects, such as a large rock, a very large or grotesque tree, and other unique forms of nature. A person would ask permission of the

spirit before passing such an object. Misfortune, including sickness and death, was believed to befall an individual or the community because of the evil spirits, and various activities were engaged in to ward off the evil spirits.

32. Spanish. Although the Spanish made contributions to the Philippine culture, the basic indigenous culture patterns persisted throughout the 300 years of Spanish colonialism.

a. Under the Spanish, the inhabitants of the many Philippine Islands were brought into a centralized political structure. For greater control, the Spanish wanted to concentrate the population, a move that was resisted by the Filipinos. The indigenous settlement pattern, even today, continues to be one of rather small dispersed units. However, towns were established as religious and administrative centers. The town included several villages called barrios which were, and are, composed of one or more sitios. The sitio consisted of one or more extended family units and was, therefore, the smallest social unit.

b. Under the system, the land was divided among Spaniards who were to govern and protect the natives and these officials. Since there were not enough Spanish officials to control and administer the dispersed areas, the datos, whom the Spanish called caciques, actually carried out the functions of collection and administration in their areas. A hierarchy of caciques, peasant proprietors, and tenants arose which was similar to the indigenous hierarchy of chiefs, freemen, and serfs.

c. The Spanish gave the Filipinos a common religion. By 1605 most Filipinos had been converted to Roman Catholicism and baptized.[1] Religion itself and the clergy were used as a means of social and administrative control over the Filipinos. Church-owned lands were administered by the clergy or by caciques for the clergy. The clergy expected labor to be supplied by the parishioners for church and personal projects. The life of the Filipino centered around the family and the church; from baptism through confirmation, marriage, and various Holy Days and periods, to death, the church became a pervasive factor in the life of the parishioner. Although there were never enough clergy to service every barrio, there were very few Filipinos ordained during the Spanish period, and those that were ordained were not given parishes. The Spanish nobility who subsidized the church felt that the institution of Filipino clergy as parish priests would subvert Spanish control over the population. Services were held in the vernacular because the friars believed that, if the general populace learned Spanish, there was a good probability that possession of a common language could lead to stirrings of nationalism and to radical ideas. Thus, even though the highly centralized political system imposed by the Spanish did tend to weld the dispersed settlements into a common political unit, the continued use of the vernacular by the priests perpetuated and reinforced the many ethnolinguistic differences among the people. There was resistance to the Roman Catholic Church, as will be discussed below, but even where it appeared that Christianity was well entrenched, belief in spirits, especially evil

spirits, continued[1] and various acts to propitiate the spirits and ward off evil spirits, continued.

d. Education of Filipinos under the Spanish was primarily education in and for religion. Priests or curates were responsible for elementary education until 1863. The course of study consisted of reading, learning sacred songs and music, some arithmetic and some writing for advanced students.[2] The students learned by rote, reinforced by corporal punishment. Secondary schools and colleges were established for Spanish children. The Colegio Real de San Jose was established in 1601, the Colegio de Santo Thomas in 1811 and a secondary school, San Juan de Letran, was established in 1630.[3] Sometime later, the mestizo children of Spanish-Filipino marriages and the children of wealthy caciques were admitted to the secondary schools and colleges, and some were also afforded the opportunity of gaining an education in Spain. Vocational and specialized schools were established starting in the middle of the 18th century.

(1) Spain was influenced by the general European movement for free elementary education in the latter part of the 18th century, and, in 1863, a reform measure was passed in an attempt to establish a complete elementary, secondary, and collegiate educational system in the Philippines,[4] under governmental supervision and control. Schools of arts and trades were established in Manila and Iloilo and a nautical school in Manila, and teacher training schools were also provided. Education was made compulsory for children between the ages of 7 and 12. No fees were charged in elementary schools; and textbooks, copybooks, paper, pen and

ink were furnished free. The Spanish language was to be used for instruction at all levels. Another provision stated that no person could hold any salaried post after 1868 if he could not speak Spanish. In addition, anyone who could not read, write, and speak Spanish at the end of 15 years would be barred from belonging to the principalia or upper class, unless by right of inheritance. Persons who could not speak, read, and write Spanish would be barred from civil service.[5] Actually, the reform program was never adequately enforced. The priests were still opposed to teaching Spanish to the Filipinos and believed that the natives should not receive the same education as did the Spaniards. Lack of financial support, materials, equipment, and teachers also inhibited development of the program.

(2) Even with this resistance and lack of support, some progress was made. In 1867, there were 25 Government-supported elementary schools with an enrollment of 1,940. By 1898, out of a total population of about 7 million, some 200,000 pupils were attending 2,167 elementary schools. The program did bring about some social mobility for Filipinos, for Filipino graduates of normal schools were granted upper class status as principalia.

(3) The first estimate of the population indicated a total of 667,612 in 1691.[6] The population increased at a rate of about 0.6 percent per year until 1799 when the estimate was 1,502,574. From 1799 to 1896, the average annual rate of increase was about 1.6 percent, producing a population of 6,621,339 in 1896.[7] This represents a rather nominal population growth over a 300-year period. There are no indications that such

growth created a pressure on the land, nor would such growth produce pressure on such services as education, if the services were supported to a nominal degree.

(4) The city of Manila was the only population concentration that could be called urban in the Western sense. The population of Manila grew slowly from 33,900 in 1591 to 50,800 in 1738. From 1738 to 1855 the population increased to approximately 150,000.[8] This growth was probably occasioned by the increase in trade and by the fact that Manila became the center of trade, finance, and transportation for the Philippines as well as the political hub.

e. Protest movements developed early and continued throughout the Spanish occupation. These movements started as resistance to the new religion, later gathered overtones of agrarian unrest and protest against the excessive tribute or rent exacted by the Spanish nobles, and finally developed strong nationalistic overtones.

Table IV. Revolts, Uprisings, and Incidents[9]
(prior to 1900)

Year	Province or Island
1589	Pampanga and Cagayan
1622	Bohol and Leyte
1645	Pampanga
1663	Panay Island
1739	Batangas
1743	Batangas and Cavite
1745	Batangas and Cavite
1872	Cavite
1896-99	Central Luzon

f. Magical nativistic movements were one form of protest. Small groups of Filipinos went into the hills to escape the Western codes imposed by the Spanish. Sometimes a larger organization would develop, usually around one or two charismatic leaders. An early protest developed in 1622, when two Filipinos on the island of Bohol reported that they had talked to demons in the hills, led a group back into the hills, and organized a community which reverted to spirit worship. Others joined the original group and the movement spread to Leyte. The Spaniards dispatched soldiers against the communities, and although the Filipinos resisted, they were quickly brought under control.[10] Some of the small groups that went into the hills, primarily in central Luzon and the Viscayan provinces, became bandits and preyed on both the Spaniards and the caciques. Some of the bandit groups led uprisings against the Spanish in 1743 and 1745.[11]

g. In 1841, a religious society with nationalist overtones, the Confradice de San Jose, was organized. It banned Spanish and mestizo members and drew its membership from Tayabas (now Quezon), Laguna, and Batangas provinces west and south of Manila. The society wanted specific recognition by the church, which was not forthcoming. A later conflict with civil authorities brought the Spanish colonial army against it, scattering the membership. Sometime after 1850, survivors of the original group reorganized as the Colorum Society and developed new religious practices. This Society is considered to be the parent of uprisings which took place during 1920.[12] Another society formed the

basis for the uprisings of 1896-99. In 1892, Jose Rizal, who did much to stimulate nationalism among his fellows, returned to the Philippines from Europe and organized a society called Liga Filipina. Rizal was deported, and the society was disbanded, only to be revived by Andres Bonifacio and others. The aims of the group were to encourage nationalism and land reform by peaceful means. The society again disbanded, then reorganized as the Katipunan ng mgo Anak vg Bayan (Society of the Sons of the People). Better known as the Katipunan, this society had definite revolutionary aims. In 1896 the Katipunan was able to attract many recruits from central Luzon. Locusts had destroyed the rice fields, and the peasants were desperate, because the landlords were increasing their rents in spite of this disaster. Fighting between the Katipunan and the Spanish started during the late summer of 1896. The Katipunan continued to fight, helped the United States defeat the Spanish, and then later resisted US occupation. During the brief period of independence during 1898 and 1899, between Spanish possession and US occupation, the head of the Katipunan, Don Emilio Aguinaldo, was elected President, and the Constitution of Malolos was promulgated.[13]

h. Sturtevant has summed up the period of Spanish occupation as follows:

> Thus, to the social homogenity of the indigenous population the Spanish added physical boundaries, a common religion, and a pool of potential leadership. All that was needed to fuse the above elements was the catalyst of nationalistic ideas. In spite of determined Spanish efforts to prevent their entrance, ideas filtered through the wall of censorship and led to a poorly organized but

> dedicated attempt to throw off the Spanish yoke. Philippine nationalism [was the child of Spanish imperialism, and illegitimate] and unwanted offspring, perhaps, but nevertheless, the direct descendent of its Iberian parent . . . .
>
> Three hundred years of Spanish domination, therefore, had modified but not eradicated the indigenous culture. The villagers continued to dwell in houses identical to those occupied by their forefathers. The rhythm of rural life still revolved around the planting and harvesting of crops. The old customs of courtship and marriage persisted. Religious life had been changed but the ancient beliefs lingered on under a veneer of Christianity. Even the amusements of the rural area corresponded in most respects to those of pre-Spanish society. Last but not least, the erstwhile divisions of society had survived. Spanish statistics cannot be trusted but official figures for 1875 indicate that over 60 percent of the rural population occupied a dependent socio-economic status.[14]

33. US period. In contrast to the Spanish philosophy of continued domination, exploitation, and Christianization of the Philippines, the aim of the United States was to bring the Filipino people along the road toward independence. To do this, the US Philippine Commission developed policies and undertook programs of education, agricultural reform, general economic development, and public health.

a. The population of the Philippines almost tripled during the 43-year period, 1896-1939, increasing from 6,261,339 to 16,000,303. This growth represents an average annual increase of about 2.3 percent during this period as compared with a 1.6 percent average annual increase from 1799 to 1896.

(1) The city of Manila increased in population from 150,000 in 1855 to 623,492 in 1939. The increase was largest from 1918 (285,306) to

1939. By 1939 Manila had become urban in the Western sense and was the political, financial, commercial, industrial, and social center of the country. The cities of Cebu and Iloilo, on the islands of Cebu and Panay, respectively, were developing into urban areas even though each city included a good deal of farm land. Their populations were 146,817 and 90,480, respectively, by 1939. The rural character of the Philippines can best be understood by comparing the average populations of the towns and the villages. In 1939 the average population of the towns was 3,170, and that of the villages was 724.[15]

(2) The population of the Philippines increased 109.6 percent between 1903 and 1939. The variation in population growth in the different provinces indicates that internal migration had been taking place since 1903. Migration was primarily from areas of high population density to areas of lower density (with more farm land available) and to Manila and its suburban areas in Rizal and Quezon provinces. Twenty-four of the fifty-one provinces in the Islands increased population more than the average. Ten of them were on Mindanao, and eight were on the Sulu Archipelago, Palawan, Leyte, Negro, Masbate, and Mindoro. Rixal and Quezon Provinces and three provinces in northern Luzon and one on the south peninsula had large increases. Neuva Ecija was the only province in central Luzon (and in Huklandia) to increase its population more than 109.6 percent. The other provinces in central Luzon, including the Huklandia provinces of Balacan, Pampanga, and Tarlac, apparently decreased their population between 1903 and 1939.[16]

b. During the 1896-99 revolt against Spain, most of the public schools were used as prisons, hospitals, and barracks. Starting in 1899, US troops repaired schools in the towns they occupied, and the Army Chaplain reopened them with US soldiers as teachers.[17] In 1901, the Philippine Commission created a Department of Public Instruction to assure the development of a system of free public education. The civil authorities took control of the schools, and provisions were made to create school districts and open public schools in each municipality. English was the language of instruction, 1,000 trained US teachers were appointed, and optional religious instruction was provided. The Philippine Normal School was established in 1901 to train native teachers. By 1907, it had a 4-year primary course, a 3-year intermediate course, and a 4-year secondary school program. The University of the Philippines was founded in 1918, rounding out the system of public education.[18]

(1) From 1910 to 1918, emphasis was placed on improvement of teachers and on industrial and vocational education. Intermediate schools offered teaching, farming, agricultural management, and trade and business curricula, as well as the general curriculum. A few provincial normal schools were established. Enough money was appropriated in 1918 to spur another period of expansion of the public school system which continued until 1924. During this period, textbooks were improved and made more relevant to Philippine conditions. Consolidation of the expanded system took place from 1924 to 1935, when the Commonwealth was established. Emphasis was placed on improving methods and techniques of

teaching, intensifying teacher training, and revising the curriculum to better meet the educational requirements of the Filipinos.

(2) Private schools continued in operation throughout the period of US occupation. At first the only change required was that instruction be in English, but the Government did not control or regulate the private schools. In 1910 an Office of the Superintendent of Private Schools was established under the Department of Public Instruction to supervise all private schools, and a law was passed about 1921 which obligated the Government to set standards for private schools and to withhold recognition from schools which did not meet the standards.

(3) There were 227,600 children enrolled in elementary school in 1903. Secondary schools opened in academic year (AY) 1905, and 617,448 were enrolled in school in AY 1918. College enrollments started in AY 1920 and 1,746,452 students were enrolled in the three levels by 1939. School enrollment increased much faster than the population; students constituted 3, 6, and 11 percent of the population in the three school periods cited above. However, after almost 40 years of emphasis on education, intensive development of the school system, and a motivation toward education suffuciently high that Filipino parents would go in debt to provide their children with schooling, less than 40 percent of the school age (7-17) population actually was attending school. As of the January 1939 census, total enrollment in public and private schools was 1,668,557, only 39.2 percent of the 4,260,046 in the school age group. This number breaks down by ages

to 41.4 percent of the 7-10 group, 54.3 percent of the 11-13 group, and 24.5 of the 14-17 group.[19]

(4) In 1939, 48.8 percent of the Philippine population 10 years of age or older were literate; i.e., they could read and write some language. For the most part, the provinces in central Luzon and those close to Manila had a higher percentage of literacy than the country as a whole. The Huklandia provinces, Neuva Ecija, Pampanga, Tarlac, and Bulacan had literacy rates of more than 50 percent. Even though English had been the language of instruction for more than 30 years, only 15 percent of the total population could speak English. About 3 percent of the population could speak Spanish in 1939.[20]

c. Increased population can exert pressure on the land, and the population increase from 1903 to 1939 did contribute to the agrarian problem. The most obvious problem was that the rate of tenancy increased throughout this period in spite of attempts to reduce it. The census for 1903 indicates that 81 percent of the farmers were farm owners, whereas in 1939, only 49.1 percent were listed as owners, with an additional 15.6 percent listed as part owners.[21] Full ownership had decreased from 1 million in 1918 to 0.8 million in 1939.[22] The tenancy rate for the Philippines as a whole was 35 percent in 1939. Six provinces had tenancy rates of more than 50 percent. The Huklandia provinces, Cavite, and Negros Occidental had tenancy rates of 53 to 71 percent.[23]

d. The extension of the tenancy system in spite of attempts at land reform is the product of several conditions. Ignorance, illiteracy, and

lack of money prevented many from gaining title to lands they thought they owned under the Spanish. Purchase of the friar lands by the US Government by 1907 for distribution to the landless on easy terms benefited a comparatively small number of tenants: here again, ignorance forestalled many. Some tenants who bought land rented it to other tenants, and wealthy landholders were able to buy some of the land which they put out to rent.[24] New lands were opened to homesteading, and Filipinos who migrated to Mindanao or Mindoro were able to take advantage of this practice. However, the Tagalog ethnolinguistic group was not prone to migrate from central Luzon, so that pressure on the land grew in the central Luzon provinces. Usurious interest on loans and the low return for their crop denied many tenants the capital required for title fees or for transportation. Finally, the caciques (an elite landowning group under the Spanish) became the local government officials during the early US occupation and were delegated authority to administer Government programs, and many took advantage of their positions. Later, as the United States turned more and more responsibility and authority over to the Filipinos the caciques gained national power and they could and did submit proposals for land reform.[25]

e. The overwhelming majority of Filipinos were Roman Catholic. Although the US introduced the concepts of separation of church and state and of freedom of religion to the Philippines and provided an atmosphere conducive to Protestant missionary activity, the Philippines remained predominantly Roman Catholic. In fact, their majority increased between 1918 and 1939. The solidarity of the family and the community, strengthened

by the common religion, was further reinforced by the religious celebrations of the Roman Catholic Church.

Table V. Population by Religious Groups
(based on census data)

	1918		1939	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Roman Catholic	7,790,937	75.5	12,603,365	78.8
Aglipayan	1,414,448	13.7	1,573,608	9.8
Protestant	124,575	1.2	378,361	2.4
Moslem	443,037	4.3	677,903	4.2
Pagan	508,596	4.9	626,008	3.9
Other	29,717	0.4	144,058	0.9
Total	10,314,310	100.0	16,000,303	100.0

(1) Each town and most villages have patron saints who are honored annually with fiestas which involves the whole community. Committees, usually headed by prominent citizens, arrange for finance and collection, for the ball, and for decorations. Other activities include entertainment, fireworks, programs, dances, and lighting and loudspeakers. In small communities, a few people supervise all the arrangements, but in larger towns, separate committees handle the arrangements for each of these varied activities. The entire community is expected to contribute money or labor or both to assure the success of the fiesta, and so, through contributions, committee work, or menial labor, every member of the community is involved in planning the fiesta. The only exception are those who are too young to contribute, but all, young and old, participate in the fiesta itself, and all work hard to make their fiesta more lavish

and extravagant than those of neighboring towns, thus raising the status of the community.

(2) Wealthy families reinforce their status in the community and publicize their wealth by making large monetary contributions to the fiesta or by sponsoring (which means completely financing) an activity. Since the wealthier families sponsor and finance activities and the poorer families contribute their labor, and all participate in the celebrations, religion appears to validate the class system and the patron-client relationship between levels in the system.

(3) The fiesta also functions to reinforce family ties. Members of the immediate or extended family who have migrated from the town are expected to return for a visit during fiesta time. Each family prepares well in advance to be able to feed and entertain its visiting relatives in a style that most of them do not enjoy all year round. There are 34 major and minor holy days and holy weeks in the religious cycle that begins about 30 November and ends about 2 November of the next year. Four of these are especially strong factors in reinforcing family solidarity: the town fiesta, Christmas, Holy Week, and All Soul's Day. During these four major religious occasions, the family is involved in preparations as a family, and it is traditional for relatives to visit on these occasions. The custom of remembering and honoring the dead on All Soul's Day further provides for family solidarity and continuity with the past.

(4) The fiesta also functions to bring the outside world into the community and acts as a major diffuser of culture. Merchants from

nearby larger communities set up stalls in and around the plaza. The merchandise sold may be new and foreign to the townspeople, and the conversations and the customs of the merchants may introduce new ideas and customs to the villagers. Also, the fiesta is a time when provincial and national politicians visit the villages, and many speeches are made which implicitly or explicitly link the town to the province and to the nation.

(5) The Filipino Catholic believes in a God of mercy and pity. He believes that God punishes an individual or community to caution it to change its ways and relates individual and collective calamities and catastrophes to God's punishment. The men identify with a "suffering" Christ, and the women identify with the Virgin, characterized as a kind and understanding mother. The Filipino has confidence that the saints can intercede with God on his behalf. He has great reverence toward the clergy, who he believes can do no wrong. Conversely, some practices which are related to indigenous animistic beliefs (such as placating spirits) continue as part of some Catholic rituals.

f. Next in size to the Roman Catholic group in the Philippines is Aglipayanism, the cult of the Philippine Independent Church, founded by Gregorio Aglipay y Labayan in 1902. Aglipay was ordained a priest in 1889 and was assigned to Indang, Cavite, where he met Emilio Aguinaldo (who was to become the leader of the revolution against Spain). He was later assigned to posts in Nueva Ecija and in Tarlac provinces. In 1887, after a pact was signed between the revolutionary leaders and the

Spanish which involved the exile of the revolutionary leaders, Aglipay was asked to mediate a settlement between the Spanish and a recalcitrant leader named Makabulos. Aglipay was successful but, because ecclesiastical circles in Tarlac suspected him of having liberal tendencies, he went to Manila to avoid arrest. Sometime before May 1898, Aglipay was sent to northern Luzon by the Archbishop to persuade his fellow Ilokenos to help Spain repel US troops. He was captured by the insurgents, sent back to Manila, and became the regular intermediary between the Archbishop and the insurgents. During one of Aglipay's visit to the insurgents, the United States took Manila and Aglipay sought refuge with the insurgents. General Aquinaldo appointed him Military Chaplain of the insurgent army, and he used his title to try to influence and gain control of the clergy. Aquinaldo then appointed him vicar general of the Philippines, but the Church had given Aglipay no ecclesiastical jurisdiction over the clergy or the insurgents, and, when he issued messages of guidance to the clergy, he incurred excommunication for usurpation of powers (April 1899). It appears that Aglipay first wished to gain independence from the Spanish clergy but not to break with Rome. He started a short-lived movement to Filipinize the Philippine Church. He asked Isabelo de Los Reyes, a fellow Ilokano and a radical, to negotiate with Spain to grant recognition to the Filipino clergy under Aglipay in exchange for the return of Spanish priests held by the insurgents. He later considered breaking with Rome under the urging of Reyes and had a

discussion with several American Protestant missionaries in 1901 which was inconclusive.

(1) Isabelo de los Reyes had organized the Union Obrera Democratica, one of the first labor unions in the Philippines, in Manila in 1901. In the summer of 1902 he called a meeting of the union and proposed founding a Filipino church that would be independent of Rome. He listed Aglipay as head of the church and a number of prominent men as honorary presidents and members. Aglipay took over as head of the Philippine Independent Church in October 1902. The membership consisted of the members of 8 labor unions, 14 priests, and a few prominent officials.

(2) Aglipayanism attempted to be more nationalistic than Catholicism. It preached that there was no original sin, and it did not accept the divinity of Christ or the existence of heaven, hell, or purgatory. Some changes were made in the meaning of the seven sacraments, but they were retained, and much of the ritual remained. The organization of the Philippine Church followed the Catholic pattern. The vernacular was used for services. The nationalistic emphasis was probably the major influence in its rapid growth.

(3) The church spread rapidly within the Iloko provinces, through central Luzon, into Manila and the Islands of Negros and Cebu. Roman Catholic priests and entire congregations adopted the new religion, and the new Church appropriated parish churches. The expansion was so rapid that ten seminaries were opened to provide priests. Membership in

the Philippine Independent Church had reached about 2 million in 1904, or about 25 percent of the total population.[26]

(4) The decline in membership was also dramatic. The membership had declined to 13.7 percent of the population in 1918 and to 9.8 percent in 1939. A number of factors appear to have influenced the decline in membership and influence of this church. The controversy over ownership of church properties was resolved in favor of the Roman Catholic Church in 1908. As a result, the Philippine Church congregations either lacked edifices or were forced to conduct worship services in less impressive surroundings. There were not enough priests to care for the rapidly expanded membership. Many parishioners had just followed their pastors and did not really see a difference between the religions, and when the Filipino clergy were recognized by the Catholic Church and educational programs developed, priests and parishioners returned to Catholicism. For those who still wanted to continue the break with Rome, there were Protestant denominations that may have had more attraction than Aglipayanism. The Philippine Independent Church split into two groups in 1938, and this may have negative effects in the future.

g. The Iglesia ni Kristo (Church of Christ) was founded in 1914 in Manila by Felix Manalo. Manalo had been baptized a Catholic but joined several churches, one after the other, starting in 1904. The church drew most of its members from the Tagalog area of central and southern Luzon. There are no good estimates of early membership, but in 1936 it was

estimated to have 85,000 members, about 0.5 percent of the population.[27] The number of ordained ministers is reported to have reached 223 by 1933.

(1) The Iglesia has three categories of lay membership: active, ordinary, and children. Active members attend all Church activities, actively proselytize, and may head a unit of the Church. The ordinary members are similar to ordinary members of other churches in that they attend some services and participate in a nominal number of Church activities. The children are in a class by themselves, and evidently little is expected of them.

(2) The organization is a tight hierarchy, with information and orders flowing from the top. The basic unit is a small social unit or cell which is headed by an unpaid volunteer active member. A deacon or deaconess, supervised by a pastor, is responsible for a number of cells. Each pastor is responsible for a unit similar to a parish. Evangelists supervise a number of parishes which form a district. All the evangelists meet regularly as a group with Manalo, who is the fount of knowledge for doctrine, practice, and topics for Sunday sermons.

(3) Manalo was the head of the Church, and his book The Torch to Throw Light Upon the True Nature of the Roman Catholic Apostolic Church is the bible. This book is a polemic against Roman Catholicism and a justification that Manalo is the messiah. He conceives himself as the fifth angel sent to earth by God. The trinity is denied, Christ is regarded as human, the daily mass is not performed, and there is no veneration of saints.

h. Although Protestants made efforts to distribute the Protestant Bible in Manila in 1838 and 1853, Protestantism was introduced into the Philippines when the United States took control of Manila in 1898. Presbyterians, Methodists, Northern Baptists, United Brethern, Episcopalians, Disciples of Christ, Congregationalists, Christian and Missionary Alliance, and Seventh Day Adventists sent missionaries to the Philippines during the initial years of US domination.

(1) Because of the multiplicity of Protestant groups and the possibility that they would be working at cross purposes, an attempt was made in 1915 to unify the work of the various denominations. The plan was not successful, but some unity was achieved in 1929 when the Presbyterians, United Brethern, and Congregationalists united and formed the United Evangelical Church of the Philippines. By another merger in 1948, the United Church of Christ in the Philippines was established, and the United Evangelical Church was absorbed in the new merger.

(2) The Protestant Churches that were established in the Philippines have had many Philippine offshoots, probably a result of the increased feelings of nationalism and concern for independence. In 1932, 11 of these offshoots combined to form the United Evangelical Church of Christ in the Philippine Islands.

(3) Membership in Protestant demonimations increased rapidly from 1903 to 1918, slowed up between 1918 and 1928, and spurted again after 1928. The number of houses of worship kept pace with the growth of membership. In 1903, there were 45 churches for the 4,000 church

members. By 1939, there were 1,090 for the 378,361 members, and by 1948 there were 1,237 churches for 595,000 Protestants. Since 1932, there have been about 16 denominations with over 1,000 members and several more with a membership of less than 1,000.

i. The Muslims are concentrated in Mindanao, Palawan, and the Sulu Islands. Arabian traders introduced Islam into the islands prior to the Spanish conquest. Sources used for this paper do not treat the Moros in any detail, but it is assumed that the religion was and is identical with or closely similar to traditional Muslim doctrine and practices. Membership has remained almost constant as a percentage of the total population, indicating that strong ties to the religion exist for its members and their children and that there have been few, if any, conversions. The small number of conversions to Islam may be caused by lack of missionary zeal or by strong inhibitions on the part of a primarily Christian community to embrace a non-Christian religion.

j. Protest movements seem to have abated immediately after the United States gained control of the Philippines. Credit for reduction of overt manifestations of unrest may belong to US policies and programs in economics and, especially, agrarian reform, along with the provision for political freedom. However, the caciques continued to gain power under US domination, tenancy rates continued to increase, nationalism continued to grow and became a political issue, and a successful party developed around the issue of "independence now." Thus, overt manifestations of unrest with overtones of nationalism per se, nationalistic

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religion, and agrarian reform in some combination reappeared in the 1920's.

k. In 1924 an offshoot of the Colorum Society organized a small army and attacked Constabulary and other Government personnel on Cebu. They surrendered rather quickly when confronted by US troops. Also in 1924, a secret society which had been organized in Nueva Ecija, the Association of Worthy Kabola, attacked the town of San Jose as a first step in a revolutionary movement to oust caciques and Americans. They evidently had expected the peasants to rally to their side spontaneously with the attack, but this did not occur, and the uprising was quickly quelled. An organization had developed around a self-proclaimed prophet who predicted that he would take the throne of an independent Philippines. There were 20,000 dues-paying members on Panay and Negros Islands. Although the prophet's charisma was undoubtedly responsible for some of the recruitment, the fact that the organization was fighting the levy of a personal tax was also influential in gaining membership. The prophet was charged with sedition, tried, and sentenced to a hospital in Manila for mental treatment. On 13 May 1927, the day that officials came to his "palace" in Iloilo province, Panay Island, his guards refused to permit him to leave, and violence broke out, both on Panay and on Negros. However, the prophet surrendered that day rather than continue the bloodshed. The Colorum Society, which had organized the Tangulan Society in Pangasinan and Nueva Ecija in 1928, siezed the town of Tayug in 1931. They planned to destroy the records of land ownership

and redistribute the land. The initial foray was successful, but they could hold the town for only one day.

l. The Sakdalista wanted independence rather than commonwealth status for the Philippines. In 1935, a Sakdalista uprising followed an unsuccessful political attempt to thwart the movement to commonwealth status. The strength of the movement was in Central Luzon, and, after the election of members to a constitutional convention was held and it appeared certain that commonwealth states would be voted in on 14 May 1935, the Sakdalistas decided on violent tactics. They hit towns in Bulacan, Rizal, Laguna, and Cavite Provinces in central Luzon on 2 May, but on 3 May the Constabulary scattered the demoralized movement.

m. Labor organizations had been established in and around Manila, and peasant unions had also been organized in the provinces. Some of these organizations were the product of the Communist Party of the Philippines, others preceded the CPP. Landlord organizations sprang up to oppose the peasant unions and violent clashes occurred. Attempts by landlords to disband peasant organizations stimulated the development of secret and mutual aid societies. By 1939, 351 labor organizations were registered with the Department of Labor. Almost 50 percent (157) of these were in Manila, and more than 56 percent were in the greater Manila area. Slightly over 10 percent (39 unions), were registered in six of the central Luzon provinces.

34. Preconflict period. Between 1935 and 1948, the Philippines saw a number of changes. They were raised to Commonwealth status in May 1935

and were given more responsibility and authority to develop their own policies and programs. They also could look forward to complete political independence in 1946. World War II, with the Japanese occupation and the reconquest of the Philippines, disrupted progress in all areas. The situation provided an environment in which the Communists were able to expand their organization and to develop a military capability which was used against the Japanese and the Filipino "traitors" (as defined by the party) during World War II, but which also was to pose a grave threat to the Government of the Republic of the Philippines after 1948.

a. During the 10-year period of 1939 to 1948, the population of the Philippines increased from 16,000,303 to 19,234,182, an average increase of 1.91 percent. This average rate of increase probably would have exceeded the previous one if it had not been for the casualities caused by World War II. The median age of the population has decreased continually since 1903, which results in a higher dependency ratio (i.e., ratio of the productive to the nonproductive population) and an increase in the pressure on educational and health facilities. The number of children from age 5 through 19 increased from 5.9 million in 1938 to 7.5 million in 1948, or from 37.2 percent of the total population in 1938 to 39.3 percent in 1948.

b. Sixteen provinces had population increases above the average for the Philippines as a whole. Seven of these were in Mindanao and two were adjacent to Manila. Of the others, two were in northern Luzon, two in central Luzon, one in the southern Peninsula of Luzon, one on

Negros Island, and one on Samar. Population grew in two of the Huklandia provinces, Bulacan and Tarlac, at a greater rate than in the country as a whole. The population of Manila rose from 623,500 in 1939 to 983,900 in 1948, an increase of over 50 percent. It still may be considered the only urban area in the Philippines. The median size of the towns increased from 1,700 to 2,200 in the same period, evidence that the country remains predominantly rural.

c. That pressure on the land was caused by population increase can be seen from the data on density of population and from tenancy rates. In the Philippines as a whole, the population per 1,000 hectares of cultivated land rose from 4,047 in 1939 to 5,182 in 1948, an increase of 22 percent. Nine provinces had increases larger than 22 percent, and only two were not in central Luzon. The Huklandia provinces showed increases in density of 25-45 percent.[29] Tenancy rates for the Philippines increased from 35 percent in 1939 to 37.4 percent in 1948. Tenancy rates increased more sharply in central Luzon and especially among the Huklandia provinces. Between 1939 and 1948, the tenancy rates in Nueva Ecija increased from 66.4 percent to 75.3 percent and in Pampanga from 70.4 percent to 88 percent. By 1948 only one province outside central Luzon had a tenancy rate higher than 65 percent.[30]

d. In four provinces in central Luzon, either economic constraints or lack of motivation kept school attendance of the 14-17 age group below the national average for both 1939 and 1948, whereas attendance of the 7-13 age group was above the national average. Two of these provinces

are the Huklandia provinces of Bulacan and Nueva Ecija. Even with the interruption of World War II and the destruction of many schools, a much larger proportion of the school-age population was attending school in 1948 than in 1939. The increased enrollment is a reflection of the continuing Philippine emphasis on education. Although this is difficult to measure, some indication is given by the proportion of the national budget allocated for education. In 1913, 13.3 percent of the budget went to education; in 1940 the allocation had increased to 26.4 percent, and by 1948 to 37.8 percent.

e. The literacy rates did not make as dramatic a climb between 1939 and 1948 as did school enrollment. Literacy of the population 10 years of age or older increased from 48.8 percent in 1939 to 59.8 percent in 1948. In 1948, as in 1939, the Huklandia provinces had literacy rates well above the average. In 1940 the Commonwealth Government decreed that Tagalog would become the national language and the language of instruction; however, World War II interrupted the changeover, and English was the language of instruction in the public and private schools until 1945. By 1948, 37.2 percent of the Filipinos could speak English, as opposed to only 15 percent in 1939. Similarly, 37.1 percent could speak Tagalog in 1948. Whereas 3 percent of the population spoke Spanish in 1939, only 1.8 percent could speak Spanish in 1948. For the most part, the percentages of English-speaking people in the provinces in central Luzon were higher than the national average.

f. By 1948, membership in the Roman Catholic Church had increased numerically and as a percentage of the total population. The other religious groups declined as a percentage of the population, with very little change for the Muslims and the Protestants.

Table VI. Number and Percent of Population by Religious Groups for 1948[1]

Religious group	Number	Percent of population
Roman Catholic	15,941,422	82.9
Aglipayanism	1,456,114	7.6
Protestant	444,491	2.3
Iglesia ni Kristo	88,125	0.5
Muslim	791,817	4.1
Pagan	353,842	1.8
Other	158,371	0.8

[1]University of Chicago, 1956, vol. II, p 472.

g. Agrarian reform policies were enacted by the Commonwealth Government in 1936. However, the policies proposed by Quezon were diluted by the legislature, and the implementation of the programs was slowed because of lack of appropriations or complicated procedures, or both. Peasant unions and mutual aid societies continued to develop as did landlord organizations, especially in central Luzon. Clashes between these groups were serious enough for the Government to call a conference on law and order in 1938,[31] but the clashes continued until World War II. Many of the peasant organizations were influenced, sponsored, or dominated by the Socialist and Communists. By 1941 there were 438 labor unions registered

with the Department of Labor, an increase of 81 since 1939. These organizations tended to dissolve during the war, and only 19 were registered in 1945. By 1946, however, 148 unions were registered, and only four were agricultural.

35. Summary.

a. Emphasis on national development and a sense of nationalism had not progressed too far by 1948 in spite of the influence of liberals like Rizal, the religious movements that had strong overtones of nationalism, and the teaching of a common language in the schools. Most of the people continued to identify themselves with their ethnolinguistic group and with their province before they identified as Filipinos.

b. The drive toward nationalism and independence, which it was believed to be the means of relieving the agrarian problem, instead seems to have provided the major bases of appeal to the general populace for supporting dissident movements. Certainly, the strongest source of dissidence (including the Huk) was to be found among the people of central Luzon, where the tenant-landlord relationship was deteriorating rapidly. This is also the Tagalog area, and much of the liberal, nationalistic, and dissident literature, starting with the novels of Rizal, were either written in Tagalog or translated into this language, enhancing the spread of the ideas.

c. It also appears that when the populace, or more properly in this case, its leaders felt that there was hope for something better and that the powers-that-be were sincerely working in their behalf, overt

manifestations of violent dissidence abated. This was true during the initial 20 years of US control of the Philippines, from 1931 until the Sakdalista uprising in May 1935, and from 1945 to the resurgence of Huk violence in 1948.

d. The predominant religion, Roman Catholicism, tends to be a stabilizing influence in the society and supports the traditional family values and class relationships. Dissension within the church by Filipino clergy and offshoots such as Aglipayanism and the Iglesia ni Kristo tended to support nationalistic dissidence and, perhaps, violence, among the general population. For the most part, however, there is no evidence that the major religious groups caused serious schisms within the Philippine society.

Section II. The Family.

by Jessie A. Miller, PhD

36. Scope of analysis. History and geography have combined to create great diversity among the cultures and peoples of the Philippines. The following analysis makes no attempt to consider the specific family patterns of the Moros, Negritos, and the other minority groups but is concerned with the Malaysian-Spanish-Christian culture of the majority. For a study of low intensity conflict, four aspects of family life are significant: its structure, reciprocity of obligations, dyadic relationship, and the dominance of the family in the social, economic, and political life of the nation.

37. Structure. The basic units of family organization are the "elementary" family, consisting of the father, mother, and children, and the "bilateral-extended" family, which encompasses with equal emphasis all the relatives of both the father and the mother.[32]

a. In addition to the blood relatives, the Spanish social institution of compadrazgo or ritual coparenthood has extended the concept of kinship beyond the family and into the community. Parents, in accordance with Roman Catholic Church law, choose godparents to sponsor the baptism of their children. The Filipinos, in addition, select sponsors for confirmation and marriage. In each of these ceremonies, the child theoretically establishes three new sets of relationships: first, with the godfather and the godmother, second with the children of the godparents (kinakapatid or sibling) who have a quasi brother-sister tie, and finally

with the parents of the godparents who are now addressed and treated as grandparents. Actually, the only one of these bonds which involves a formal and continuing relationship is between the godchild and godparents, and even this may be amorphous.

b. Basically there are two types of compadre relationships. In the first, the parent selects one of his friends to be the godparent. Here, although in theory each compadre relationship is a spiritual bond between a godparent and a godchild, in actual practice it is the fraternal tie between parents and godparents that is stressed. The horizontal rather than the vertical relationship is important. The friendship of two adults is brought within the framework of kinship by one acting as the sponsor of the other's child. Moreover, in this case, included in the kinship concept as coparents are all the brothers and sisters of each cosponsor. When to the blood relatives of the bilateral kinship group are added the compadre relationships of several children, the net of kinship is spread wide indeed. It is probably that in small villages most people are linked by real or fictive kinship.

c. In a second type of compadre relationship, parents select godparents on the basis of their social and financial status either to take advantage of the potential aid which may be given the child or to stabilize their own relationship with a superior. A tenant may ask his landlord, or a man may ask his employer or his immediate superior in an office, to be the baptismal godfather. In this case as in the other, ritual kinship is used to systematize and normalize relationships and to

extend the emotionally secure patterns of kinship. Where there is a marked difference between the social class of parents and of the child and that of the godparents, the usual coparenthood or fraternal bond does not exist. The custom is used to structure the relationship between superior and inferior and is paternal rather than fraternal. All compadre relationships, however, stress the fact that the basic organizational principle of Philippine society is kinship.[33]

38. Reciprocity of obligations. To the Filipino the family bond is strong and irrevocable. Divorce is not permitted, and neither distance nor change in social status is expected to weaken one's ties or lessen one's duty to shoulder family responsibilities. In general, the interests of the individual are secondary to those of the family. Marriage, though not arranged, is seen as an alliance of two families, not simply of two individuals. It is taken for granted that children will support parents in their old age and that, if the parents die, the eldest child will assume the care of the younger brothers and sisters. A successful individual, even if he has moved to a foreign country, probably will continue to contribute to the family's financial well-being, and an educated member of the lower class returning to the village or town, either to live or visit, continues to identify with his lower class kinship group. Responsibility is felt for distant cousins, who are given help if needed. To refuse or to ignore relatives reflects unfavorably on the entire family.

a. Property is a trust to be carefully guarded and maintained for the children. Debts likewise are inherited, and to repudiate the debts of one's parents is unthinkable. The individual who followed such a course would suffer the scorn of the entire village and possibly would be ostracized by his neighbors. The personal involvement and responsibility of family members is such that an offense against one is considered an offense against all. Similarly, a socially disapproved act committed by one is a disgrace to all. However, even though his misdeed is not condoned, the family will protect the transgressor against all outsiders.

b. The importance of family solidarity and mutual support can hardly be overemphasized. Instead of stressing independence--freedom from restraint and freedom to make choice--emphasis is placed on reciprocity of obligations, goodwill within the basic group, and protection of that group against outsiders. It is the group--family and kinship--that matters, not the individual. This fact is basic in understanding the political system and economic organization. It institutionalizes nepotism and creates problems of law enforcement. It is perhaps best described by the term "utang no loob," which means a reciprocal sense of gratitude and obligation.[34]

39. Dyadic relationships. In addition to his identification with the bilateral extended family and the compadre kinship, the child in a typical Filipino family early acquires attitudes of generational respect, dependency, and leniency and distrust of outsiders. In combination,

these contribute to a pattern of dyadic relationships, a significant feature of Philippine life.[35]

a. One of the first lessons a child must learn is that of generational respect; i.e., showing deference to all individuals older than one's self. Grandparents are expected to be consulted by all members of the family on important questions. The oldest brother and sister have authority over the younger children, including the right to punish them. Respect is reinforced by ritual. For example, the ringing of the Angelus brings the children to kneel and kiss the hands of their parents. Filipino children are taught to depend on their parents and older brothers and sisters more completely and until a later age than is expected, for example, in the United States. As a result, they learn that dependency entails giving deference and unquestioning obedience to one's benefactor in exchange for material support.[36]

b. At the same time, special relationships, dyadic in nature, between a child and a particular parent or other family member are taken for granted and encouraged by obvious displays of favoritism and leniency.[37] It seems to be far more common in the Philippines than in the United States for a parent to display open favoritism for a particular child. The older family members frequently encourage children to compete for their affection by implied promises or favored treatment in the distribution of tangible rewards. Similarly, leniency is obtained and comes to be expected when older persons--often grandparents--intervene in the parental disciplining of a favorite child. Whereas the American child is

taught to obey impersonal rules, in the Filipino family the waiving of rules is often used as an incentive for the development of special relationships.[38] As his kinship is structured, so is his world.

c. Distrust of strangers also is inculcated within the family. Children are warned to associate primarily with siblings and cousins. The distinction between the "we" and "you" group is emphasized, and the feeling that one cannot trust outsiders is marked. Differential treatment of those with whom one has a personal relationship and "the others" is taken for granted.

d. Thus it is that the Filipino child comes to see life as a series of personal relationships. In times of crisis or when he wishes to advance his interests, he will go to those with whom he has established a special tie for help. In return, he expects to help them achieve their private aims. Such dyadic relationships are most fruitful between persons of unequal status, such as landowners and tenants, employers and employees, political leaders and followers. There is no feeling that all individuals should be treated equally. Leniency and favoritism in political advancement, economic privilege, and law enforcement are taken for granted and used to strengthen the bond between client and patron, leaders and followers. Personalism, like strong family loyalties, is a key factor in understanding the Filipino.[39]

40. Family dominance. The Filipinos are a nationalistic and patriotic people. Nonetheless, the prevailing values emphasize loyalty and support of the family and do not grant priority to any other level of social

organization.[40] The family dominates the social, economic, and political scene at every level of Philippine society. In rural areas, it is the basic unit of production for agriculture, cottage industries, and fishing. Even paid agriculture workers commonly will be found working in family units.

a. In the city, most business, industry, and finance is proprietary in nature. The few incorporated firms are generally family holdings, and stock is not sold outside the kinship group. Management personnel are limited to these groups, and technical skills are taught and handed down from one generation to another. Powerful lobbies, such as the sugar bloc, are primarily organizations of wealthy and influencial families.

b. Religious responsibility also tends to be a family rather than an individual affair, and is family- rather than church-centered. Each home has its own shrine, and the large images carried in community processions during Holy Week are owned and cared for by individual families. Fiestas, likewise, are family-centered. In fact, in the rural areas, few if any social activities take place outside the cohesive family unit.

c. In political life one of the primary determinants of leadership, whether in the village or towns or at the national level, is the prestige and size of a man's family and kinship group. This factor contributes much to a local leader's influence at the national level. In all areas of government, the deeply imbedded rivalries between prominent families are not infrequently the clue to the shifting political scene.

Section III. Class Systems.

by Jessie A. Miller, PhD

41. Early background. The roots of the Philippine class system lie in the social customs of the original Malay settlers. They have been modified by the juxtaposition of several Australasian races and cultures, three centuries of Spanish colonial rule, the short but significant period of US control, and the differential development of urban and rural areas.

a. Among the early Malay settlers there were, in each village or barangay, four classes of people.[41] The "dato" or chieftan, whose status was based on his comparative wealth, landholdings, and hereditary position; the freemen, sometimes described as nobility, who also were landowners; the commoners who worked as sharecroppers, had some inherited rights in the lands they tilled, and, like medieval serfs, were tied to the land; and slaves, individuals who had been captured in war or sentenced to servitude for crimes or for failure to pay debts. Classes were not, however, rigidly stratified into castes. Freemen might marry slaves, and elaborate rules were developed to determine the status of such offspring.

b. After the Spanish conquest, social classes were explicitly defined in the "laws of the Indies." Spaniards born in Spain (peninsulares) formed an elite group and retained most of the lucrative posts in both the state and the church. Spanish born in the Philippines (criolles)

were legally the equals of the peninsulares but often were discriminated against in church and state appointments. The creoles, however, retained an elite status, and intermarriages between the peninsulares and creoles were frequent. Both peninsulares and creoles did intermarry with various indigenous Christian groups. Their children were mestizos and formed a distinct class.[42]

c. The native Filipinos were governed by a separate set of rules. Three classes were recognized in the early Spanish laws: the town and village officials, primarily datos (cabezas de barangay in the Spanish) and their families, freemen, and slaves. By the end of the 17th century, slavery had been abolished in the Christian areas, and in those regions the freemen now occupied the lowest rung of the social ladder. In social status, if not in law, the latter were divided into small landowners and tenant farmers. By this time also, patterns of discrimination had placed the Moros, Negritos, and non-Christian ethnic groups in a definitely inferior position outside the main social hierarchy.

d. In the early years of their control, the Spaniards introduced into the Islands a system by which "Indians" and lands were assigned to worthy conqueror-explorers as large estates (encomiendas). The number of encomiendas reached the high mark of 267 in 1591.[43] The system, which led to numerous abuses of forced labor and tribute imposed on the natives, was finally abolished in the 17th century. It was ordered abolished in 1574, but the decree was not carried out until half a century later. However, before its demise, it laid the basis for the great estates which

became a major factor in the economic and class structure of the Philippines.

e. Spanish impact on the class system also was important in that the colonial Government found it convenient to exercise control through the hereditary chieftains. The latter often took advantage of their delegated supervisory authority to exact tribute from the freemen and to extend and consolidate their private holdings. Thus, the legal and economic position of the datos and their families was greatly enhanced.* The Spanish estate owners (encomenderos) and provincial officials often married daughters of the caciques. The descendants of such unions, blessed with comparative wealth and the prestige of Spanish blood, took on many of the prerogatives of the ruling class, and a small group of rural aristocratic mestizos emerged. Over the years, reinforced by Spanish administrative policies, the social structure became increasingly rigid. There was little opportunity for interclass mobility. The caciques steadily strengthened their hold on the land, and the peasants became more and more dependent both economically and psychologically.[44]

f. Gradually, two vastly different patterns of life developed. The peasants continued to live, in the meager manner of their ancestors, in caneshacks, dependent on those above them for a piece of land to cultivate, for money advances needed to till it, and for food during much

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*The Spanish called the wealthy and influential hereditary chiefs caciques and gave many of them permission to use the title "Don."

of the year. The caciques on the other hand (not more than two or three families in a small community, or 12 out of 10,000[45]) enjoyed a life of affluence and sophistication, with beautiful homes and brilliant social events. Some writers have suggested that the position and power of the caciques can best be understood by visualizing the role of the US political boss, the schoolmaster in Goldsmith's deserted village, and an old landlord (leader of the local 400) all rolled into one[46], or a Simon Legree and loan shark.[47]

g. Most writers insist that there was no deep antagonism between the two classes in spite of the vast differences in their wealth. Social distinctions were looked upon as the natural order of things. The peasants worked hard to produce the wealth the cacique enjoyed. He in return regarded them as his children and considered it his duty to come to their assistance in times of need. Most of the owners lived on their haciendas or in nearby towns; usually they knew their tenants; often they were godfathers of tenant children. The personal relationship between patron and client, the inherent paternalism of the system, was said to give the villagers a sense of security. Though poor, they had enough to satisfy their meager expectations and felt they had in the cacique a friend and protector. This conclusion is based on the fact that there were frequent outbursts of agrarian unrest on special lands and on the estates of absentee landlords, but peace reigned where the landlord lived in his hacienda.[48] However, the illiterate peasant was not in a

position to record his feelings. A study of Philippine legend and folk music might give a different picture.

h. This relationship of mutual dependence had begun to change by the latter part of the 19th century. Increasingly, the wealthy landowner moved from his hacienda to the city. Frequently, the move took him entirely outside of the municipality or province. The old personal relationship could no longer exist. At the same time that their bonds with the peasants were loosening, the caciques were developing a new role in the cities. Wealth enabled them to send their sons to a university, either at home or abroad. Thus, there evolved a class of young intelligensia with growing national sentiments ready to challenge the Spanish position of supremacy. This group, however, continued to identify with the traditional Spanish values: the class system and the strong pro-family orientation.

42. Effect of US occupation. The impact of the US occupation on the class system was double-edged: several policies entered upon in good faith to improve the conditions of the Filipino unexpectedly strengthened the existing class system and further weakened the economic and social position of the peasantry; other policies challenged the existing social order.

a. The reinforcement of the class structure resulted from a number of factors. First, although the United States wished to introduce democratic institutions, it also wished to turn the Government over to the Filipinos as soon as possible. Since the existing aristocratic order

was firmly entrenched, the Americans soon found themselves relying on the only native group with influence and political experience. Thus, the caciques were able to extend their influence from the villages and towns to the national level. They soon controlled the legislative machinery and were able to perpetuate their privileges at the expense of the peasantry.[49] Their entrenched position made early reform impossible.

b. Second, the United States administration tried in a number of ways to bring about land reform. In 1903, some 165,000 hectares purchased from Catholic religious orders were broken into 51,000 lots which it was hoped would be bought by landless peasants. Unfortunately, credit facilities which would have enabled the peasant to take advantage of the plan were not provided, and, in the end, the program benefitted only the wealthy caciques. Other land reform programs were equally unsuccessful.[50]

c. Third, the US tariff policy encouraged production of a few export crops, such as sugar and coconut. These could be most efficiently produced on large estates. At the same time, agricultural prices, land values, and prices in general increased rapidly under the tariff umbrella. The result was that many once independent farmers lost their land and, with it, the social status that accompanied land ownership.

d. Fourth, population growth led to an increased pressure on the land. Since there were no provisions for primogeniture, family farms were subdivided into untenably small plots and inevitably lost because of the impossibility of earning a living on such small holdings.

e. Finally, low agricultural prices during the depression of the 1930's accelerated the processes already begun. The impact on the social structure of these events is indicated by census statistics. In 1903 the number of sharecroppers was estimated at 132,444.[51] By 1918 the number had risen to 256,500.[52] Similarly, the number of farms operated by owners decreased from 1,520,000 in 1918 to 805,000 in 1939.[53]

f. If these changes seemed for the moment to strengthen the position of the aristocracy, religious and educational innovations were at the same time producing cracks in the long static social order. In the Treaty of Paris, for the first time in Philippine history, religious liberty was specifically guaranteed. This did not lessen the barriers against the social mobility of pagans, nor did it remove the prejudice and suspicion felt by many Christians toward the Muslims. But the Muslim leaders, although not fully integrated, were now able, at least in their official capacity, to move in upper class circles in Manila.

g. Social class barriers also were affected by changes within the Catholic Church. Under the Spanish, positions in the church were held primarily by the peninsulares, creoles, and mestizos. After 1900, under the aegis of the US Catholics, a rapid Filipinization of the church took place, giving the native Filipinos a new role and higher status in the community.

h. Education, like religion, provided an opening wedge for change. In the schools the emphasis on democracy and individual rights contributed to a greater awareness by both urban and rural lower classes of

their disadvantaged position. This awareness added to the strong sense of unrest.

i. Increased educational opportunities were also making it possible for Filipinos to enter the professions. Many young Filipinos studied law with an eye to a political career. "Education, thus, became the primary means of social mobility."[54] Education, through training of personnel, also laid the groundwork for Filipinization of the Government.

j. In brief, although it could not be said that a generation of US rule had led to a reorganization of Philippine society, some basis for change had been laid by 1938.

43. The Philippine class system, 1935-48. Broadly speaking, Philippine society was divided into three major elements: the dominant Malay-Euro-American Christian groups; other natives both pagan and Muslim; and the Asian (Chinese and Indian) minorities. Each possessed its own distinct hierarchy, yet all were linked in an overall Philippine pattern. The various indigenous groups that were not converted to Christianity (i.e., pagans and Moros) had been relegated by the Spanish to the bottom of the social ladder and have remained in this low social position. Chinese and other Asian minorities constitute important subcultures with great economic influence. Wealthy Chinese often married Filipino women. Their offspring have usually identified with the Filipinos and constitute an important element of the mestizos group.[55] It is, however, the Malay-Euro-American Christian group that is of primary concern. An analysis of its class system falls into two parts; the urban and the rural.

44. Urban class pattern. At the top of the social ladder were the Euro-American elite "whites" who numbered about 19,000 in 1938.[56] Closely associated with them and moving in the same social circles were the wealthy landowning mestizos. These groups formed a distinct class and enjoyed marked advantages in the business world. With the Chinese (who had first immigrated seven centuries earlier), many of whom had acquired great wealth, but whose social status remained lower, they controlled most of the banking, manufacturing, public utilities, transportation, communication services, and foreign and domestic trade.[57] For them the principal index of class position continued to be land and family prestige bolstered by wealth and education.

a. Not all Euro-Americans or mestizos had the wealth and family background necessary for inclusion among the elite. They had, however, the advantage of "white" traits, spoke either English or Spanish, and were oriented toward the Western cultures. For these reasons, they were more apt to enjoy favorable relations with the upper class business interests and greater economic opportunity than did the "pure" Filipino. They also played an important role in political life. For example, beginning with Quezon and Osmena, Philippine politicians have come largely from mestizo families.[58] Mestizos at this time numbered about 200,000.

b. Separated from these groups by the racial barrier was the Filipino upper class, an indigenous social type with some Chinese blend. In this relatively new segment of society, wealth and education were the

primary criteria for social position. As is true of most upwardly mobile groups, they tended to identify with the class above them and to accept their values[59]--in this case, emphasis on the ownership of land, avoidance of manual labor as demeaning, and an acceptance of the wide gap between the landed-commercial aristocracy and the peasants. Many of the rising Filipinos entered the professions and university life. They were particularly inclined to study law and to enter politics as a technique of securing power and improving their social positions.

c. At the time under study there was no true middle class, but a small group of Filipino intellectuals, teachers, and civil servants, with a few small businessmen and small-scale property owners, were beginning to emerge as a separate entity. They were largely subordinate to the upper class, although some still tended to identify with the common people. The value system of this still amorphous group was not yet fixed but was greatly influenced by the American pattern of life.

d. At the bottom of the urban social structure were the great masses of the city dwellers: the laborers, transportation workers, holders of minor clerical jobs, and others. Among the more unskilled were recent immigrants from rural areas, a highly mobile subgroup within the Filipino lower class.

45. Rural class structure. Few families of wealth were living in the villages by the mid-1940's. Hence in the typical rural area there was little economic and social differentiation, little formal class structure. Status distinctions were based on the prestige of an individual's family

and his reputation in terms of the local values. Land ownership, even in a small amount, enhanced his position. Higher status was also assigned to school teachers, minor Government employees, midwives, and herbalists.

a. Only when the village was considered in its relationship to nearby towns did a two-class structure become apparent. Then it was seen that the rural dweller was linked through the tenant-landlord relationship with the town-dwelling aristocracy.

b. The rural people were also linked by bonds of kinship with the lower class in the towns. Though the latter tended to look down on their country cousins or rustics, family ties prevented the development of distinct class lines. That these ties were not limitless, however, is shown by the evidence that the rising Filipino gentry was often coldly exploitative toward tenants with whom it was related.[60]

c. The most significant aspect of the rural Philippine class structure of the period was the changing landlord-tenant relationship. The traditional pattern was stabilized by clearcut role definitions and mutual obligations. Social distance was maintained by rigid rules of etiquette, but harshness was ameliorated by paternalistic considerations. Feelings, generally, were friendly and mutually supportative.

d. By 1948 the old patterns were rapidly ceasing to exist. Causative factors of primary importance were the great increase in absentee landlordism, the growth of a Filipino (as distinct from the Spanish-Mestizo aristocracy) landholding class, a decrease in the number of small

landowners and a corresponding increase in farm tenants, new attitudes instilled through education and a greater contact with the outside world, increased reliance on a money economy, sharpened class lines developed by World War II animosities, and expanded government activities.

e. With the great increase in the number of absentee landlords, estate management tended to be entrusted to local overseers. The highly personalized bond that had made the landlord-tenant relationship bearable was replaced by an impersonal, often hostile, economic system. There was less inclination to overlook indebtedness and harsher enforcement of landlord rights. Under conditions of low productivity and lack of credit, this system worked great hardship in the tenant farmer. Among the many common complaints were long hours of work with no laws limiting the number, low wages, woman and child labor, eviction of peasants, cheating the peasant by illegal measures and the use of governmental machinery against him, forcing the peasant to buy at the landlord's store at high prices, swindling the peasants when dividing the crop, discharging peasants after they had improved the land, extorting tribute in addition to contract stipulations, and confiscating peasants' work animals bought from the landlord on the installment plan. Perhaps the greatest hostility was aroused by the exorbitant interest rates which resulted in permanent indebtedness and loss of land.[61]

f. A second factor contributing to changed relations was the fact that, under the traditional patterns, the upper and lower classes were set apart by differences of race, language, and culture. These differences



Figure 2. Schematic structure of Philippine social class.

buttressed the social structure and helped create the illusion that inequality was a natural thing. These distinctions were lost with the growth of a native Filipino land-owning class. The tenants' feeling that the nouveau riche Filipinos did not have the same sense of noblesse oblige that characterized the old gentry further increased the animosities between the classes.

g. Also of great importance was the increasing number of small landowners who lost their holdings and were forced into the tenant class. Men like Luis Taruc, whose father had been an independent farmer, keenly resented their landless state. Land to the Filipino was more than a tool for earning a living. It was the most basic symbol of status, its loss a psychological as well as an economic blow. It is difficult to estimate the degree to which these relatively independent "little people" were a stabilizing influence, but, without doubt, every loss of land by a farmer added to the general unease.

h. Particularly significant is the fact that the people of central Luzon perceived no alternatives to a life of tenancy. The Iloconos did not hesitate to move into unoccupied territories or, to emigrate to more distant places, such as Hawaii. The Tagalogs, however, appeared to be tied to the land.

> People living in the utmost poverty in Tarlac, Central Luzon--in the tin and wood shacks, with no toilet facilities, no water facilities, no sewer facilities, with conception, birth, life and death in one room--when asked whether they would move to the Cagayan Valley, a less populated area on the same Island of Luzon, stated

"I would be afraid of that strange place" and "I would die on the way."[63]

A lack of perceived opportunity for change leaves only the traditional ways for meeting frustrations--in this case the perceived way was the traditional pattern of peasant revolt.

i. Unrest among the peasants was magnified by the greater awareness of the outside world. Improved transportation and communication, increased education, and a greater mobility between country and city introduced new attitudes and ideologies which made the old relationships less tenable. Increasingly, too, the Filipinos were becoming involved in a money economy. Throughout the Spanish period, the peasant had been largely self-sufficient. Now he was aware of and desired many types of machine-produced goods--tools, clothing, and luxury items. "The grievances of the peasant were made more galling by new knowledge of the 'Cadillac Society' of the Philippines alongside the utmost poverty . . ."[64] The Socialist and Communist parties shrewdly played on all the injustices and hardships suffered by the peasant.[65]

j. Even the various social programs established by the Government--the land tenure and tenancy acts, usury acts, courts of agricultural disputes--weakened the position of the landlord, for the Government was injected as a third party into the landlord-tenant relationship. Regardless of the effectiveness of Government reform programs, the tenant is now conscious of new mechanisms for settling grievances. In the past, appeals were made to the landlord or to the church when friar lands were

involved, but at present appeals are to a theoretically impartial Government.[66]

k. Finally, World War II further sharpened the lines of cleavage and class animosities. Many of the wealthy, through force or by choice, actively collaborated with the Japanese. Pitted against them were the Hukbalahap (The People's Army To Fight Japan) led by Luis Taruc. This militant peasant organization combined the element of patriotism with a long-standing resentment of tenants against landlords in its guerrilla activities.[67]

46. Conclusion. It is difficult to determine the extent to which the Huk successes were an example of patriotism, a measure of the skill and techniques of the Huk leaders, or an expression of class feelings.

a. If war and rapid social change had greatly weakened the traditional rural class structures, it was clear in 1948 that the power of the urban elite had not been measurably shaken. Of 5603 cases filed before the Peoples Court to try collaborators, there were only 156 convictions. Most public criticism of the collaborators disappeared. Why? In Steinberg's study on Philippine collaboration, the author concludes:

> . . . all segments of the nation began to realize that to maintain the gap between the elite and the people would be to destroy the most potent institution within the society. Confronted with the prospect of purging the elite . . . the nation became conscious of the hitherto tacit role of the elite within the society. Although this was articulated less bluntly, people acknowledged that to purge the elite was to decapitate the society. Dazed by the incredible destruction and social dislocation of the country caused by the war and frightened by the risk of further unrest caused by the

> Hukbalahap threat, many could not conceive of a Philippine without the establishment . . . . They served as an anchor of continuity and prevented social drift. Filipinos wanted to preserve the social structure which had emerged during the colonial eras . . . . Together with ties of kinship, compadrazgo, ecclesiastical and religious affinities, and nationalism, Filipinos became consciously aware of this additional allegiance. Unlike Chinese society, which during these same years was repudiating its traditional social structure and its established elite, Philippine society expressed a conservative society by moving instinctively toward the elite's concept of proper wartime activity.[68]

b. Whether or not this analysis of attitudes is correct, it seems clear that the position of the urban elite remained strong in 1948. Its composition, to be sure, was changing to include a larger segment of the Filipino upper class, but, in essence, its role, its status, and its power were surprisingly unchanged.

Section IV. Health.

by Thora W. Halstead, PhD

47. Pre-Spanish period. Before the arrival of the Spanish, the Filipino people relied on folk medicine to cure their ills. They believed that mental and physical disorders and diseases were a form of punishment meted out by displeased or disobeyed evil spirits and gods, and that witches or sorcerers possessed the power to evoke these supernatural powers and produce illness at their discretion. To protect and cure themselves, the Filipinos prayed, and made offerings and sacrifices. Disease was driven off by physically punishing the sick body, and ailments were treated with medicines made by the folk doctors from local plant and animal materials.

48. Spanish period. In the 16th century, scientific medicine was introduced by the Spaniards. Although a few hospitals were built, a water system was developed in Manila, and a smallpox vacination program was initiated,[69] the total effect of over 300 years of Spanish rule on Philippine health was negligible.[70] The old folk beliefs, methods, and treatments persisted with only minor modifications. Folk doctors invoked the Christian saints to help them heal the sick, while sorcerers invoked the age-old evil spirits to afflict their subjects.[71]

49. US period 1900-35. When the United States took control, it found that there was practically nothing known in the Philippines of hospitals or physicians except in a few principal cities. William H. Taft reported

to President Theodore Roosevelt in 1908 that the Spanish regime in the Philippines apparently gave little if any attention to sanitation according to modern methods.[72] This was sadly borne out by the vital statistics. Crude death rates ranged from 40 per 1000 of the population from 1876 to 1898 to about 50 during the years between 1898 and 1903.[73] In Manila, 80 percent of all infants born in 1900 died before they were one year old.[74] Smallpox was endemic, and cholera and bubonic plague epidemics repeatedly swept the islands.[75] Cholera alone killed 400,000 in 1879, raising the death rate to 106.3 per thousand. In 1889 and 1890 it destroyed 260,000 lives, and the mortality rates again rose to 58.2 and 48.1 respectively.[76]

a. In 1902 and 1903, the last great cholera epidemic swept the islands, killing 109,000 people. The sanitary measures implemented by the Board of Health proved effective, but public response was less than enthusiastic. The people were unaccustomed to any sanitary restrictions and resented the burning or disinfection of their houses and effects. The fact that the number of cholera cases in Manila was reduced to a level never before dreamed of did not prevent an increasingly bitter feeling of hostility toward the Board of Health and its programs.[77] By 1904 not only had a Board of Health been established, but laws had been enacted regulating the practice of medicine, an efficient quarantine service was maintained at all entry ports in the Philippine Islands, and smallpox vaccination was made compulsory.[78] Even so, in 1908, when Taft reviewed the accomplishments in the field of public health, he lamented:

> The introduction of sanitary methods by law among the people has given rise to more dissatisfaction and greater criticism of the government than any other one cause. The truth is that the people have to be educated in the effectiveness of such methods before they can become reconciled to them, and the work of the health department since the beginning of the civil government in 1901 has been obstructed; first by the inertia and indifference of the people in respect to the matter, and second, by their active resistance to affirmative restraints upon them necessary to prevent disease.[79]

b. Greater advances had been made in public health by 1913, especially in the fields of environmental sanitation and the control of epidemics. A new water supply and sewerage system had been installed in Manila, and a program was implemented to bore artesian wells throughout the archipelago. More than 300 boards of health were organized in various communities; hospitals were built in Manila and the provinces of Cebu, Mountain, and Agusan; and 10 dispensaries were opened in Manila and the provinces.[80] The Government established a public medical school in 1905 which grew into the College of Medicine of the University of the Philippines. The Bureau of Science, established in 1905, became the central agency for fundamental research and laboratory work.[81] The public school system was used to disseminate modern health knowledge throughout the islands.[82] The accomplishments resulting from these endeavors were summarized in the report of the 1913 US Bureau of Insular Affairs (War Department):

> Smallpox has been eradicated; bubonic plague and Asiatic cholera have been suppressed; a remedy has been found for beriberi; and lepers that formerly roamed almost at will have been segregated . . . . And the cost of all

> this, and of much more that have been similarly done for the health of the people, has been borne by the Filipino people themselves. More than that the people have been brought to the point where they appreciate the benefits of sanitation to an extent that a few years ago would have seemed incredible.
>
> Yet with all the progress made, this work has just commenced. With all the remarkable achievements in sanitation, half of the children born in Manila still die in infancy, and the masses of the people in the provinces have but faint conception of the meaning of sanitary principles and are still opposed, by habit, to their introduction.[83]

c. In 1921, a Special Mission chaired by MG Leonard Wood was sent to examine conditions in the Philippines and to report on the feasibility of granting independence to the Islands. It found every aspect of health and sanitation had deteriorated since 1914. The University of the Philippines College of Medicine was scholastically below par, the esteemed School of Tropical Medicine no longer was in existence, and the Bureau of Science which had attained a position of eminence through its scientific research had deteriorated appreciably. Statistics showed that there had been a steady increase in the number of cases of smallpox, typhoid, malaria, beriberi, and tuberculosis. The mission reported a great shortage of hospitals and dispensaries (so few as to be almost negligible, except in the larger towns) of doctors, nurses, and trained sanitary personnel; and of monetary appropriations for sanitary work and medicines. There were only 930 nurses for the 10.5 million people, and the care of the insane was medieval. The leper colony was overcrowded, and the children born there who were free of the disease were forced to remain in the

colony for want of facilities elsewhere to care for them. Of the total number of deaf, dumb, or blind children (from 5,000 to 10,000) the Government had provided care for only 65. As a result of its study, the mission did not recommend independence, and independence was not granted to the Philippines at this time.

d. When the United States assumed sovereignty over the Philippines in 1899, there were five general hospitals, four hospitals for contagious disease, and four military hospitals in the whole of the Islands. During the next few years, the Government built public hospitals in nine provinces and established the Philippine General Hospital in Manila. In 1923 the Philippine Legislature passed Act No. 3114, which set aside appropriations to aid provinces to construct and equip hospitals. This led to a rapid expansion in the number of hospitals in the provinces and there were 45 Government hospitals by 1926. The first provinces that used this aid to build their own hospitals were Albay, Tarlac, Negros, Occidental, Pampanga, and Nueva Ecija. These hospitals were partially supported by national funds during the 10 years following construction, and thereafter their total operating costs came from provincial and municipal funds.[84]

e. Ten experimental Community Health and Social Centers were established during 1934 and 1935 to provide free medical care and advice in the cities of Manila, Hoilo, Cebu, and Zamboanga, and in the province of Negros Occidental. These combined the work of maternal and infant welfare centers, dental centers, tuberculosis dispensaries, general clinics, and case work centers.[85]

50. Preconflict period.

a. There still were 45 Government hospitals in 1936; 36 general, six emergency, two contagious disease, and one for psycopathic illnesses. They had a total bed capacity of 4,308, of which 1,600 were in the National Psycopathic Hospital, and 769 and 500 respectively in the two hospitals for contagious disease, San Lazaro and Culion Leper Colony. There also were 1,021 public dispensaries, seven fewer than existed in 1926.[86] By 1936, although 494 general cultural centers had been established with the help of women's clubs, only 233 were in actual operation throughout the Islands. In these centers a trained nurse or midwife examined mothers, prospective mothers, and children; gave instruction in child care, nutrition, and sanitation; and delivered babies. The local health officer supervised the center and was available for consultation. Although these centers made a significant contribution to the Philippine health program, they did not serve the village people as well as one would expect, because they were located in the towns instead of the villages, were understaffed, and required private support to meet their expenses.[87] Three-fourths of the municipalities were without cultural centers, and for these about 150 municipal maternity and charity clinics rendered similar services.[88]

b. The main activities of the Public Health Service in the provinces consisted of operating and supervising pericultural centers, community health-social centers, maternity hospitals and schools of midwifery; providing public health nursing; and establishing school health

programs. The service also carried out extensive and systematic immunization against smallpox, cholera, typhoid, and dysentery.[89]

Table VII. Number of Government Hospitals and Periculture Centers in the Philippines

	1936	1940	1946	1948
Hospitals	45	61	59	76
Beds	4,308	8,154	6,405	6,750
Periculture centers	233			488

Annual Report of the Bureau of Health, 1936, Manila, 1937.
Yearbook of Philippine Statistics, 1946.
Yearbook of Philippine Statistics, 1957.

c. Although improvements were made in water supplies, rural sanitation, maternal and child care, public dispensaries, and malaria eradication programs, lack of funds limited progress. According to the 1936 Bureau of Health report, the Bureau's established policies again were observed during the year: in institutions where the estimated income has proven to be much less than the actual collections, personnel had been alternately placed on forced leave, only absolutely necessary equipment and supplies were purchased, and only cases needing immediate hospitalization were admitted. Although tuberculosis was recognized as the leading cause of death, only four public health physicians were assigned to control the disease throughout the Islands; four other physicians were responsible for the entire malaria control program. The general shortage of the facilities was most aptly stated in the Bureau's

statement that two additional wards were constructed at the National Psycopathic Hospital, which doubled the total bed capacity from 800 to 1,600 and brought a substantial relief to the 2,021 patients.[90] Beginning in 1937, 900 national charity dispensaries were established for patients unable to pay for medical treatment. They were supported by combined national and municipal funds.[91] In 1940, there were about 300 periculture centers and 61 Government hospitals containing 8,154 beds;[92] this number included the specialized hospitals for leprosy and psychopathic cases. Only one institution existed for mentally handicapped children with room for 100 and one psychopathic hospital for adults containing 1,800 beds.[93]

d. The leprosy colony on the island of Culion contained a 500-bed hospital, and a number of smaller provincial leprosaria were in operation. For a number of years, the care of segregated leprosy cases had required about one-third of the total annual appropriation public health activities. Despite the costs and efforts expended, no more than 8,000 of the estimated 30,000 to 35,000 lepers ever had been segregated at one time, and prior to 1941 no reduction in the incidence of this disease had been recorded for 50 years. Further, aside from the reduction caused by increased deaths during World War II, there was no reported decrease in the incidence of the disease during the period from 1941 to 1950; except for a token group of 50, children born of leprous parents remained in the leprosarium as they had 30 years before.[94]

e. Prior to the Japanese invasion, the total public and private tuberculosis control program consisted of a 200-bed tuberculosis ward, a

750-bed semiprivate hospital, and an outpatient clinic in Manila and 10 dispensaries and two mobile fluoroscopic clinics for the rest of the Philippines. Only the facilities in Manila were in operation during the occupation period.[95]

51. Japanese occupation. Most of the public health services were continued during the Japanese occupation though with less efficiency.[96] The highly successful immunization program against smallpox, typhoid, dysentery, and cholera, however, was practically discontinued from December 1941 to early 1945.[97] During the final era of enemy occupation and the period immediately following liberation, most of the public health facilities were destroyed by the combined action of military operations and looting. The US Public Health Service surveyed the general public health conditions and public health and quarantine facilities and reported in July 1945 that the incidence of malaria, tuberculosis, and veneral disease had reached new highs; the previously segregated lepers had dispersed throughout the general population; malnutrition and beriberi were widespread; quarantine installations had been completely destroyed; few public health and laboratory facilities had escaped destruction; and the state of general sanitation, including water supplies and sewage disposal, constituted a national hazard.[98]

52. Postwar rehabilitation. Postwar rehabilitation of the Philippine public health services was initiated by the US Public Health Service (USPHS) in 1946 with an approximation of $1 million for the rest of the fiscal year. Congress later voted an additional $5 million to the USPHS

to continue the health project until 30 June 1950.[99] Under this program, problems of tuberculosis, malaria, and leprosy control; veneral disease; maternal and child health; and nutrition were given special attention. Laboratories were rebuilt, and some 80 city and town water purification plants were reequipped.[100]

a. After surveying the malaria problem, the USPHS concluded that no adequate national program to eradicate malaria from the Islands, as a measure to improve the national economy, had ever been projected. During the occupation, shortages of food, medicine, and hospital facilities and the movement of people to the foothills and mountainous areas to escape the enemy had increased both the incidence of the disease and the area of infection. As a result, vast fields were lying idle and forests and mineral deposits were undeveloped, not primarily because of the lack of available operating capital, but primarily because of the recognized hazards of malaria in such areas. As of 1948, less than 30 percent of the total agricultural land had been reestablished under cultivation following liberation in 1944-45. It also was estimated that 25 percent of the total national labor supply was incapacitated by malaria from 5 to 10 days per year. When conservatively placing each manday loss at P1 (US$0.50), the estimated national loss in manpower amounted to from $5 million to $10 million a year. The scope of the problem was too great to be controlled with the limited USPHS funds and time, so a pilot program was conducted on the island of Negros from 1946 to 1949. Under the program, school absenteeism dropped from between 40 and 50 percent to 3 percent; labor

absenteeism dropped from 35 percent to between 2 and 4 percent; and labor effectiveness improved so that 75 to 80 laborers accomplished the same amount of work formerly performed by 100 laborers.[101] Unfortunately, the Philippine Government did little to continue or extend the malarial control program.[102]

b. Probably the most noteworthy contribution of the US program was the use of thiamine (Vitamin B_1) enriched rice in Bataan Province to prevent beriberi. As a result of the Bataan experiment, an expanded program for the extension of enriched rice to endemic beriberi areas was initiated as a National project in June 1950.[103]

c. The US tuberculosis control program furnished supplies and equipment to reactivate the clinics and other tuberculosis control activities in early 1946. A study then was made to determine the incidence of tuberculosis and the means available to cope with the problem. It was found that tuberculosis existed in epidemic form throughout the Philippines, was the leading cause of death, and posed the most serious health problem. It was thought that the annual mortality from tuberculosis for years had actually been closer to between 50,000 and 60,000 than the 30,000 to 40,000 generally reported in the health statistics. Since tuberculosis hospital and dispensary facilities were hopelessly inadequate, it suggested that widespread BCG vaccination was the best means available to control the disease, a program which had been advocated unsuccessfully by Filipino physicians as early as 1936. This BCG vacinnation program was not implemented until 1949, and then only on a limited scale.[104]

d. The program implemented by the USPHS from 1946 to 1950 restored some of the health facilities destroyed during the war and improved conditions in a few selected areas (notably Bataan, Negros Island, and Manila) but in general did not raise the health conditions in the provinces above those existing before the war. This is not surprising since the US goal had been to establish long-range projects that could and would be taken over by the Philippine Government.

e. Rehabilitation of the war-damaged hospitals was an extensive project that still was in process in 1955. There were 59 Government hospitals with 6,405 beds operating in 1946; by 1948 the number of hospitals had grown to 76, although the number of beds had increased only to 6,750. In 1948, reports showed that there were 488 periculture centers, but it is not known if this number indicates the total number of structures or the number of these facilities in operation. If the former is true, then the improvement was less than the number would imply.

f. Private hospitals existed in the Philippines during the entire American period until 1946, most of them in Manila and other big cities and population centers. No statistics were kept, however, of either their number or bed capacities.[105] Later statistics from the 1957 Yearbook reported 55 private hospitals, with a total bed capacity of 2,712 for the 1948 calendar year.[106]

53. General sanitation. The effect of lack of medical facilities was compounded by poor water supplies and negligible sewage-disposal systems. In 1939 there were 3,000 functioning deep wells and 400 piped provincial

water supplies that served 21.80 percent of the population. The Manila Water District supplied another 6.09 percent of the population, and the remaining 74.11 percent obtained its water supply from family wells, most of which were of the shallow dug type, from springs, and from rivers, all without benefit of treatment. Where deep wells were available, cues of people waited in line. It was estimated that a family with five workers used approximately 20 percent of its earning power fetching water from the community well.[107] In 1948, 15.8 percent of the total Philippine population received water from a piped stream, 16.0 percent from artesian wells, and the remaining 68.2 percent continued to obtain water wherever they could. The 1948 census blamed the great numbers of deaths from dysentery, typhoid fever, and other diseases of the alimentary canal and the intestine every year primarily on the lack of potable water suppliers. Only 20.8 percent of the total families listed in the 1948 census reported using any sanitary system of toilet, such as flush, antipolo, or bored-hole latrine.[108]

54. Medical personnel and teaching facilities. Table VI lists the number and ratio of physicians, midwives, nurses, and dentists per 10,000 of the population in 1938 and 1948. The numbers are of those persons who reported the profession as their usual occupation in the 1939 and 1948 censuses. The number of physicians varies strikingly from one report to another but the figures shown convey the limited change that transpired in the ratio of medical personnel to population during the 10-year period.

Table VIII. Medical Personnel in the Philippines, 1938 and 1948

	1938		1948	
	Number	Number per 10,000 persons	Number	Number per 10,000 persons
Physicians[1]	3,629	2.29	4,919	2.55
Midwives	1,358	.86	1,866	.97
Nurses	3,039	1.92	4,176	2.17
Dentists	2,277	1.44	1,605	.83

[1]The Yearbook of Philippine Statistics reports 2,051 physicians in 1939, and the Bureau of Census and Statistics reports 3,478 licensed physicians in 1948. It is possible that the larger census figures include herb doctors who practiced folk rather than modern medicine.

a. Medical education has been available in the Philippines for a long time. The University of Santo Tomas has conferred degrees in medicine and pharmacy, albeit intermittently, since 1875.[109] The University of the Philippines Medical School, established in 1905, opened its doors in 1907; later, schools of Pharmacy, Hygiene and Public Health, Dentistry, and Public Health Nursing were added. Except for the School of Medicine, which more than doubled its enrollment, the enrollment in each of these schools remained relatively constant between its opening date 1924 and 1940.

b. In the years between 1936 and 1940, there were 550 to 600 students enrolled in the medicine, 170 to 260 in pharmacy, 20 to 25 in hygiene and public health, 50 to 85 in dentistry, and 30 to 50 in public health nursing.[110] Nurses were trained in the Manila School of Nursing and in several hospitals including Baguio, Southern Islands, and Zamboanga

General.[111] The schools were closed during the war years, but the University of the Philippines Schools of Medicine, Dentistry, and Pharmacy were reopened in August 1945. The School of Public Health Nursing was not continued after the war, but the University established a College of Nursing in 1948.[112]

55. Summary. Accomplishments in the field of public health in the Philippines in the 1900's are reflected in the demographic data of the time. Because official Philippine data through 1948 are neither accurate nor complete, the figures presented in this report are not to be construed as absolute but rather as recorded numbers that only approximate the unknown correct information. They have been provided only to permit comparisons of conditions existing at different times and in different areas of the Philippines and to convey a picture of the general level of health and sanitation existing prior to 1948. Table VII lists the registered vital rates per 1,000 population in selected years from 1903 to 1948, while the mortality rates of the eight most prevalent diseases in the Philippines from 1927 to 1952 are listed for selected years from 1907 to 1952 in table VIII. This data plus the preceding survey of the policies and programs implemented before 1948 suggests the following picture of public health in the Philippines during that time.

a. During the first few years of occupation, the United States created a Philippine Board of Health, built water systems in Manila and Cebu City, drilled artesian wells, and established an immunization program and quarantine service. The effects of these acts were immediate

and the results are reflected in the lowered death rates of 1907. A policy of slow improvement followed for the next 6-8 years. Indifference and stagnation then began to affect the health program, causing a breakdown of the immunization program followed by epidemics of cholera, smallpox, and influenza in 1918 and 1919. The 1922 Wood Mission report to Congress on the conditions in the Philippines and the 1923 Philippine legislation to subsidize hospital construction in the provinces mark another turning point in the Islands' public health history. Immunization and quarantine laws were again enforced with immediate dramatic results. Lack of funds however, limited hospital construction and artesian well drilling and allowed only meager long-term improvements.

Table IX. Registered Vital Rates for Selected Years: 1903-48[a]

Year	Births (per 1,000 population)	Deaths (per 1,000 population)	Deaths under 1 year (per 1,000 live births)
1903	37.30	43.18[b]	1,157.55
1907	31.41	16.86	536.66
1911	34.28	21.33	622.12
1915	34.43	18.55	538.84
1919	29.80	31.73[c]	--
1923	35.16	18.52	--
1927	33.93	18.04	152.54
1931	32.83	17.97	155.15
1935	31.32	17.46	153.43
1936	32.16	15.85	133.98
1940	32.28	16.50	135.76
1946	28.93	15.11	125.45
1948	31.47	12.72	114.37

[a]Philippine Bureau of the Census and Statistics, Statistical Handbook of the Philippines 1903-1953, p 359.
[b]High rate caused by cholera epidemic.
[c]High rate caused by cholera and smallpox epidemics.

Table X. Mortality Rates per 100,000 for Selected Diseases[a]

	1907	1927	1936	1940	1946	1948	1952
Tuberculosis (all forms)	200.	247.65	225.3	226.96	174.7	172.14	153.15
Beriberi (all ages)	26.	139.82	98.3	111.9	192.6	139.9	124.26
Broncho-pneumonia		89.5	132.9[b]		144.56	100.26	105.07
Bronchitis		183.7	161.1[b]		129.41	104.54	103.00
Diarrhea & Enteritis		96.3	76.8[b]	72.7	58.6		74.64
Pneumonia			47.0[b]		53.40		36.53
Malaria	293.3	159.85	59.0	54.5	90.9	55.1	35.0
Influenza		58.00	67.2	57.32	51.4	33.46	30.27

[a] Statistical Handbook of the Philippines 1903-1953, Bureau of the Census and Statistics, Manila, 1954; Philippine Public Health 1946-1950 (by U.S.); Midyear Population, Bureau of the Census and Statistics, Manila, 1954, HRAF III, p 1238.

[b] Corrected for higher total population of Bureau of Census.

b. The statistics on both the total and selected mortality rates for the period between 1927 and 1940 remained almost unchanged. Increases in medical facilities and personnel were nullified by increases in the population. The people in the provinces had little access to modern medicine or pure water and were generally indifferent to both. Malaria had been controlled slightly, but the death rate from beriberi steadily increased from 1906 and the death rate from tuberculosis remained almost stationary from 1906.[113] These diseases indicate the prevalance of poor nutrition

and poor, crowded living conditions. The almost unchanged diarrhea and enteritis mortality rates reflect the low socioeconomic status, limited education, and poor hygenic habits. Bronchitis, bronchopneumonia, pneumonia, and diarrhea kill mostly the very young, and, therefore, played a major role in the continued high rates of infant mortality.

c. With the Japanese invasion in December 1941, food and medicine became increasingly scarce, malaria spread as people moved about to escape the enemy, and the immunization program stopped almost completely. During and immediately following the period of liberation in 1945, the last vestiges of health and sanitation were destroyed when practically all the hospitals and public health laboratories were damaged or destroyed by the combined effect of direct military operations, looting, and burning by the retreating Japanese. The originally scant sanitary waste disposal facilities were disrupted, various natural water supplies were contaminated, and general sanitation was almost nonexistent.

d. Early in 1946, the US Public Health Service initiated a 4-year program to assist the Philippines in rehabilitating their medical and sanitation facilities. Immunization activities were inaugurated immediately, and the quarantine service had been restored by 1950 to an operational level superior to that which existed prior to 1942.[114] In addition, the US War Damage Commission alloted P9.2 million for damage to Government hospitals and dispensaries. The first postwar mortality statistics in 1946 probably were little affected by these programs, however.

In that year the death rate was higher than the 1936 level for four of the eight most prevalent diseases.

e. The war did not change the Philippine Government's miserly attitude toward public health. Although the Division of Hospitals and Dispensaries and the Section of Rural Sanitation alone had spent P2.58 million in 1936,[115] the total public health appropriations for the fiscal year 1946 were P1,752,442; for FY 1947, P3,114,937; and for FY 1948, P6,801,352. Only 7.3 percent of the total Government expenditures for the 10 fiscal years from 1945 to 1954 was devoted to social welfare, which included not only public health and sanitation, but charity and social services, social and economic welfare of workers, pensions and gratuities, and the correction of offenders.

f. During the first whole fiscal year of the Magsaysay administration, 1954-55, public health appropriations were P26.6 millions, and social welfare appropriations were P70.2 million--more than double the yearly average of the preceding 10 fiscal years. So it was, in 1948, that health conditions were approximately what they had been before the war, and improvements were being made by the Government at the slow pre-war pace, scarcely adequate to keep up with the increasing population.

g. Because Government funds always were limited, medical facilities seldom were available to the village people in the provinces, and they knew little more about sanitation, health, or nutrition in 1948 than their fathers had known before them. In these surroundings, folk medicine thrived, just as it had a century earlier. A 1954-55 study of

a village in Leyte showed that parents of young adults used modern health personnel only 1.5 percent of the time but used folk health personnel (medicine) 99 percent of the time, indicating that modern medicine was used only to augment folk medicine or to "cover all bets" to assist the ill or wounded to recover.[116] Nearly parallel situations were found on Negros Island in 1958-59 and in Cebu City in 1962-63.[117]

56. Population growth. Corrected vital rates for the intercensal periods 1903-18, 1918-39, and 1939-48 show 50 births/1,000 in all periods; 29.8, 26.8 and 29.9 deaths/1,000, respectively; 1.9, 2.2, and 1.9 per cent average annual increase, respectively; and live expectations of 30-35 years in all periods. These data place the Philippines in the group of countries with high fertility and high mortality. In such countries, the populace is young, having a larger proportion of children and a low ratio of aged persons.[118] These figures not only reinforce the opinion that negligible change was wrought in the health of the average Filipino in the 45 years between 1903 and 1948 but are especially significant, since the average future livetime at birth is one of the priority indicators of the health component of levels of living.[119] Although the death rate fluctuated as much as 10 percent in a year, the change is not observable when viewed in 15- to 20-year increments. The birth rate, as calculated by the United Nations, using the 1903, 1918, 1939, 1948, and 1960 census figures, remained both high and consistent. The population growth of the Philippines, consequently, was determined by the death rate, since immigration to and emigration from the Philippines was insignificant.

Since death rates are seriously affected by changes in social, economic, and health conditions, these figures show not only the lack of change before 1948 but also the potential impact any real improvement in conditions could have on the population growth of the country.

Table XI. Corrected Vital Rates

Intercensal Period	Births/1000	Deaths/1000	Rate of Increase	Expectation of Life at Birth (years)
1903-18	50	29.8	1.9	30-35
1918-39	50	26.8	2.2	30-35
1939-48	50	29.9	1.9	32.5

Population Growth and Manpower in the Philippines, United Nations, New York, 1960; Basilio B. Aromin, "The Trend of Mortality in the Philippines: 1903 to 1960," The Statistical Reporter, Vol. V, No. 3, July 1961. Manila; Report on the World Social Situation, United Nations, New York, 1957.

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57. Huklandia. The 1936, 1940, and 1947 crude birth, death, and infant mortality rates for the four Huklandia provinces (Bulacan, Nueva Ecija, Pampanga, and Tarlac) are listed in table XII. Although the birth rates in these provinces did not always exceed the national averages, the death rates were well above the average. Deaths of infants under one year of age were noticeably high in these provinces. Since general mortality and infant mortality rates are both indicators of the health component of levels of living,[120] these figures would indicate that the state of health in Huklandia was below the national Philippine average in those years.

Table XII. Estimated Crude Rates of Births, Deaths, and Infant Mortality Rates in Huklandia

	Births/1,000			Deaths/1,000			Deaths under 1 year		
	1936	1940	1947	1936	1940	1947	1936	1940	1947
Philippines	36.57	32.28	30.46	18.02	16.5	12.69	133.98	135.76	--
Bulacan	37.12	30.16	28.2	21.47	19.27	19.6	184.45	208.82	--
Nueva Ecija	39.04	34.20	25.0	23.74	21.57	21.0	231.56	249.63	--
Pampanga	49.59	40.52	33.5	21.47	18.30	16.4	146.73	147.70	--
Tarlac	52.26	43.89	53.8	24.30	22.49	22.2	162.51	190.04	--

1936--Annual Report of the Bureau of Health, 1936; 1940--Yearbook of Philippine Statistics; 1947--Facts and Figures about Economic and Social Conditions of the Philippines 1946-1947.

a. In 1947 there were twice as many physicians and half as many hospital beds per 10,000 of the population in Huklandia as there were on the average in the Philippines.[121] The ratios of physicians and hospital beds per unit of population are, however, considered to be unsuitable as indicators of the health of the population because they do not indicate the distribution and utilization of these facilities.[122] It is possible that if fewer physicians were available, the people's awareness of an unfulfilled need and, likewise, their discontent would both increase.

b. Taruc wrote of life in Pampanga in the early 1930's

> In the barrios the people died without medication, died slowly, and with agony. The herb doctor and the witch doctor were the rule, muttering incantations over tuberculosis and beriberi . . . . If a child died the people bowed and said 'It is the will of God,' as they had been taught. It was not my will to accept it that way.[123]

By 1952 conditions had changed little in Pampanga. An American artist, writing of a town in that province, said:

> There is no doctor nearer than Arayat, where there is only one to care for its 15,000 people. There is no clinic available, and the nearest hospital is at San Fernando, a 10-hour trip by bull cart from San Mateo.
>
> There are two privately owned pumps in San Mateo, but in a town of this size, this water supply is neither adequate nor convenient, so the families near the river obtain their water from the river. After all, the pump water may be no better for drinking. No one knows. It has never been tested.[124]

58. Nutrition. The nutrition and diet of the Philippine people vary from region to region, influenced by religious beliefs, availability of different foods due to geographic location, and local methods of food preparation. An estimated 76.8 percent of the total population are rice eaters. Rice is supplemented with sweet potatoes, corn, pulse, cassava, and a number of fruits and vegetables. Pork and poultry are the most available meats, while the consumption of fish is determined by the geographic location. The fats in general use are coconut oil and lard; very little fresh milk, butter, or cheese is consumed.

a. In 1951-54 and 1957-60, rough statistical surveys were made based on nutritional food balance sheets. These data compared the estimated average per capita food calories available for human consumption at the national level with the per capita caloric requirements of the Philippine people. The caloric requirement per person was estimated to be 2,200. It was estimated that 1,690 calories were available daily per person in 1951-54; 1,760 calories, including 43.8 grams of protein, in 1957-60.[125] Although food consumption and food supply surveys are not

comparable, as a group they show that the average Filipino's diet was better before 1941 than either during World War II or in 1951-60. In the latter years, the diet was low in quality (protein intake) as well as quantity (calories). In addition, two-thirds to three-fourths of the calories were derived from cereals or tubers, and 70 percent of the protein was of vegetable origin; these plant proteins are nutritionally inferior to proteins of animal origin.

b. A US Department of Agriculture survey of world food production showed that food production per person in east Asia was less in 1952-54 than in 1935-39 and is not expected to return to the 1935-39 level until after 1970.[126]

c. Vitamin, rather than protein or calorie, deficiency, however, has been the obvious bane of the Philippines. Deaths in 1936, attributed to nutritional deficiencies included 14,822 caused by beriberi; 1,612 by rickets; and 64 by scurvy. Berrberi is caused by a deficiency of vitamin B_1 (thiamine), is prevelant in rice eaters, and was a leading killer in the Philippines for years. It increased steadily from 1906 to 1946 and was exceeded in 1947 only by tuberculosis as a cause of death. Rickets usually is caused by a lack of vitamin D, but such other factors as calcium deficiency, low Ca/P ratio, intestinal infestations, and recurrent diarrhea contribute to the prevalence of the disease in tropical and subtropical areas.[127] Since the average Filipino consumes little or no milk or cheese, his sources of calcium are vegetables and fish bones,

and frequently his diet is calcium-deficient.[128] Scurvy results from a lack of sufficient vitamin C (ascorbic acid).

d. The Philippine diet was deficient in calcium and in vitamins A, B_1, B_2, and C in 1960. As a result of these dietary deficiencies, a large segment of the Philippine populace was undernourished, and thus more susceptible to infection. Conversely, infection is known to precipitate acute nutritional disease in chronically undernourished people. Studies have shown that a large proportion of the deaths of children under 5 years of age that were attributed to diarrhea or to parasitic infections actually were caused by malnutrition. It is well known that children in the lower income groups of developing countries begin to be undernourished as soon as they are weaned. During this period, diarrheal disease is exceedingly common and is a major cause of death. It has been suggested that a high mortality rate in the 1- to 4-year age group indicates widespread malnutrition and that the death rate of this age group can be used as an index of the nutritional status of the population of any country.[129] During 1947, the deaths of infants and children from birth to four years of age comprised more than 50 percent of the total deaths in Manila.[130]

e. There is considerable epidemiological, clinical, and experimental evidence that malnutrition may be an important factor in the high morbidity and mortality from tuberculosis in populations subjected to food shortage. Tuberculosis killed more Filipinos in the 1925-52 period than any other single disease.

f. Chronic malnutrition appears to have existed in the Philippines throughout the years between 1935 and 1948 and to have become progressively worse. The higher-than-average infant mortality rates in 1936 and 1940 in Huklandia further indicate that this area was less well nourished than most.

CHAPTER 5

MILITARY FACTORS

by Colonel R. T. Tierno, Jr.

59. Introduction. Possession of the Philippines made the United States an Asian power with a considerable amount of responsibility in Asian affairs. This analysis is concerned only with those military factors essential to overall US strategy in Asia and emphasizes the internal defense and development of the Philippines.

a. The Philippine Commonwealth was created in 1935, after a succession of able US governors had established a happy relationship between the two countries, and increasing support for Philippine independence had been generated in the United States Congress. The primary problem facing the fledgling Philippine Commonwealth was establishment of a national defense system. The situation was unique in that the Philippines lacked a fully developed nationalist attitude and had never had a military tradition, partly because the United States had assumed all obligations for defense of the Philippines and had maintained forces in the Islands for that purpose since 1898.

b. Although the Japanese conquest of the Islands during World War II was an event of major importance, it has been accepted as an interruption (however significant) to the preconflict phase of the study. Occupation by the Japanese expedited the full breakdown of the Philippine defense system and of Philippine institutions and the formation of the Communist Military Group (Huk) in 1942, ostensibly to fight the Japanese. Actually, the activities of the Huk indicate that its real objective was to install

the usual Communist apparatus in position to seize control when the war came to an end. One other important date was 1946, the year in which the United States granted full independence to the Philippines. The United States retained defense bases in the Islands and also, in 1947, provided for advisory assistance.

60. Background factors.

a. The President's instructions to the Taft Commission in 1901, clarifying US civil and military policies toward the Philippines, emphasized that the military arm must be supreme as long as insurrection continued. However, these instructions specified that, as fast as US troops acquired and held territory, forms of popular government could be inaugurated and authority transferred to civil authorities over a reasonable length of time. To maintain order and facilitate transfer of authority, perfect coordination was essential between civil and military officials, who were to work under the direction of the War Department. By 1914, civil control of governmental functions had been transferred from US to Filipino officials. The gradual move to autonomy resulted in the launching of the Commonwealth (1935), with full independence to be granted in 10 years.

b. An internal threat of rebellion existed during that decade in addition to the possibility of a breakdown of law and order. The Communists were functioning effectively as early as 1930, and there were numerous incidents of insurrection, banditry, and uprisings, some Communist-inspired. A discernible external problem also existed in 1935, as the Japanese began to cloud the Far East with a very real threat. The control and security

of the Islands depended on the Philippine Constabulary, formed in 1901 to maintain law and order, and on the US Army Forces (Philippine Department) established in 1914 to maintain the security of the territory. In addition, the United States provided a Philippine garrison for defense, with more than half of its personnel being Filipino scouts.

61. Defense plan. One of the first problems the Commonwealth Government had to face in 1935 was to make provision for the defense of the archipelago. The Philippines had no actual military tradition, other than that of the Constabulary, on which to build a national Army, and no individual of proven military and executive ability was available in the Philippines to direct the effort, and so President Manuel L. Quezon turned to the United States for help.

a. Following a 4-year tour of duty as Chief of Staff of the US Army, General Douglas MacArthur was induced to become the "Military Adviser to the Commonwealtn Government" to help establish and develop a system of national defense. The authority given him was unusually broad. He was authorized to deal directly with the Secretary of War and the Chief of Staff and to use his own judgment in small matters not otherwise specifically covered. A TAG Letter of Instruction to MacArthur (18 September 1935) made him solely responsible for discovering ways and means to accomplish his mission. Although no official connection existed between the US Army Command in the Islands and MacArthur's Office of the Military Adviser, the Commanding General of the Philippine Department, Major General Lucius R. Holbrook, was informed (by another TAG letter of the

same date) that assistance to General MacArthur was "the most important peacetime mission of his command." MacArthur's Advisory Staff was always small. It included air, naval, and land representatives. Engineers and antiaircraft personnel were chosen specifically as members of the land group. Most of the individuals remained with MacArthur throughout the War years. General MacArthur selected Majors Dwight D. Eisenhower and James B. Ord as his principal assistants. With the aid of a special committee from the US Army War College, this group devised a plan to provide the Philippine Commonwealth with a system of national security by 1946, the date the Islands would become independent.

b. The plan provided for the establishment of a small regular Army to be based on a system of conscription; a reserve force built on a 10-year training program which would provide two trained classes each year; a small Air Force, primarily for coastal defense; and, in lieu of a Navy, an Army offshore patrol consisting of a fleet of small motor torpedo boats to repel enemy landings. The tactical organization was to be based on a division of approximately 7,500 men. Armament and equipment for the new Army were to be suited to the economy and the terrain of the Philippines.

62. The Philippine Army. The first legislative measure of the Philippine National Assembly was the National Defense Act, passed on 21 December 1935. This bill embodied the plan proposed by MacArthur, and, in explaining the bill to the Assembly, President Quezon emphasized that the defense program must be carried out economically and should be "passively defensive."

a. The National Defense Act provided for a regular force of 10,000 men and a reserve force which was expected to reach a strength of 40,000

men by the middle of 1946. The Philippine Constabulary, then consisting of about 6,000 men, was to be part of the regular establishment, so that, from its inception, more than half the regular Army consisted of partially trained men. All Filipino males between the ages of 21 and 50 were liable for military service. Two classes, each consisting of 20,000 men, were to be conscripted and trained each year. After a 5.5-month training period, these men would become members of the reserve force. Regular Army personnel would serve as training cadres. For the training of junior officers, a military academy patterned after West Point was to be established at Baguio on Luzon to graduate about 100 officers a year.

b. The defense of the coastline, longer than that of the United States, posed an extremely difficult problem. The National Defense Act had made no provision for a Navy, but did establish within the Army an "Off Shore Patrol," to be equipped with fast motor torpedo boats of British design. Contracts were placed with British shipbuilders to build 36 boats, each 65 feet long, with a 13-foot beam, three 12-cylinder engines, and a speed of 41 knots, by 1946. Armament was to consist of two torpedo tubes, depth charges, and light antiaircraft guns. "A relatively small fleet of vessels," said General MacArthur, " . . . will have a distinct effect in compelling any hostile force to approach cautiously and by small detachments."

c. The National Defense Act also made provision for an Army Air Force to be used primarily for coast defense. By 1946, the Commonwealth expected to have a fleet of approximately 100 fast bombers, supported by tactical aircraft. This force would be used with the Off Shore Patrol to keep hostile craft away from the Philippine coast.

63. Paramilitary forces. Although its task was of a police nature, the Philippine Constabulary was a semimilitary organization. Its history dates back to 1901 when, after the United States had acquired the Islands, the Philippine Commission provided for organization of the Constabulary as a national police force. It was composed of Filipino enlisted men and was administered by US officers who later were replaced by Filipino officers. The strength of the Constabulary developed to around 6,000. The National Defense Act made the Constabulary part of the newly created Army in 1935. Realization that the exercise of police functions by an organization under the Army as inappropriate prompted creation of the State Police Force by Commonwealth Act No. 88, 26 October 1936. By this Act, all police forces of the country were nationalized and became a separate organization, but the Constabulary continued to be an integral part of the Army during this period. The new State Police Force proved to be unsatisfactory, and President Quezon recommended to the National Assembly that it be abolished and that the Constabulary be reconstituted as an organization separate from the Army.

a. The close relationship to be retained even with the separation was indicated in President Quezon's message to the Assembly. Quezon proposed that the Constabulary be completely separated from the military control sections of the Army and be used to carry out, under the President's supervision, the police functions that devolve on the Government. Even though the Constabulary would be separated, both theoretically and practically, from the defense forces of the nation, the officers and men would be identified with the Army. They would receive basic disciplinary

training from the Army and would be indoctrinated in the military traditions and customs that place a premium on personal integrity and hold performance of duty above personal gain. The separation was accomplished by Commonwealth Act No. 343, 23 June 1938, and Executive Order No. 153, issued by President Quezon on the same date.

b. In 1941, a statute was enacted authorizing the President to abolish the Department of the Interior and to transfer the Constabulary to the Department of National Defense by Executive Order. This action was not carried out, however. When the national emergency developed, the Constabulary personnel were transferred to the Army, becoming Constabulary Units of the Philippine Army. Inasmuch as Constabulary officers were assigned from Army rosters and all enlisted personnel were reservists in the Army, the transfer of the Constabulary to the Army was accomplished simply by assignment or induction of all individuals into the Army.

64. Military districts. The Commonwealth was divided into 10 military districts with functions comparable to those of prewar corps areas in the United States. Each district had a population approximately equal in size, and each was to provide initially one reserve division, and ultimately three. Luzon and the islands of Mindoro, Palawan, and Masbate had five military districts; Mindanao and Sulu Archipelago together constituted another; and the Visayas, four more. In each district, the military commander was responsible for peacetime training and for the preparation of war plans for the defense of his district. The provincial Governor was responsible for enforcing the recruitment and mobilization laws. Although the district commanders were responsible for defense plans,

the Office of the Military Adviser drew up plans for all the major islands (Luzon, Cebu, Negros, Panay, Leyte, Mindanao, Bohol, and Mindoro) as well as for many of the smaller ones. Plans of the Military Adviser also called for establishment of seacoast defenses along the seven straits which give access to the inland waters of the Philippine Islands. Since the plans were to be used by the Philippine Government after the nation had received its independence, they were based on the assumption that there would be no US Army forces in the Islands and that all forces would come from the Philippine Army.

65. Defense policies. The national defense policy was embodied in National Defense Act No. 1. A program was needed to carry out this policy and bring the MacArthur-Quezon plan to fruition.

a. General MacArthur and President Quezon were able to capitalize on a unique situation, an opportunity rarely afforded to political and military leaders of a modern state. MacArthur nad direct access to the Secretary of War and the US Army Chief of Staff, and Quezon's political supremacy enabled them to secure passage of the laws they desired without substantial change. Both the principles on which the defense program rested and the program itself represented the free professional judgment of a great solider of recognized ability and the political wisdom of the leading Philippine statesman of that era. The mutual aims of these leaders and their agreement about military matters further strengthened the efforts.

b. In his first message to the new National Assembly (November 1935), President Quezon explained the underlying principles which formed the basis for the program for implementing the national defense policy.

(1) The first of these principles stated that every citizen is obligated to contribute to the Nation's defense and that the State has the right to use all individual and national resources in the interests of self-preservation. This principle recognized no limitation of time or condition and was applied by the National Defense Act in its provision for peacetime training and wartime governmental control over all the human and material resources of the nation. The law also contains the significant provision that "no profit incident to war shall accrue to any individual, corporation, association or partnership."

(2) The second principle is that the national defense system must provide actual security. In his message, Quezon expressed his ideas on the minimum degree of security to be furnished by his defense plans. He stated that the program of national defense was to serve notice on the world that Philippine citizens were not to be subjugated, that the nation could be conquered only by its utter destruction, and that the aggressor would pay so dearly in blood and gold to accomplish this destruction that even the boldest would recognize the folly of such an attempt.

(3) The third principle applied to current and future economy. This principle precluded "for the present at least" the development of a battle fleet and emphasized the passively defensive character of the Philippine military program.

(4) Another fundamental principle was that the growth of the required defense establishment must be gradual, rather than sudden. The creation of the defense structure had to begin at the very foundations,

and there were only 10 years in which to complete its development before the beneficent protection of the United States was to be withdrawn. It was necessary to start at once, and the development had to be carried out economically, gradually, and steadily to provide the most efficient system at the lowest possible cost.

(5) Finally, President Quezon emphasized the need for the skillful molding of the Commonwealth's security arrangements to fit the particular needs of the Philippines. This purpose could be accomplished only if the Chief Executive were given wide administrative authority in carrying out the expressed purposes of the National Assembly. Nevertheless, the Assembly was to retain the responsibility for assuring the soundess of the foundations of national defense and for evolving and prescribing the broad policies that would control the development of the defense system.

66. Defense strategy. The overwhelming strategy on which the defense was to be established can best be described in General MacArthur's words:

> To create a defensive force of such strength as to make an invasion so costly in lives and money as that no chancellory in the World, if it accepts the opinions of the military and naval staffs, will ever willingly make an attempt to willfully attack the Philippines. . . . The Islands have enormous defensive advantages in their geographical separation from possible enemies, mountainous character, heavy forests and jungles, narrow beaches and limited communications. Luzon the probable objective of an enemy has only two areas in which a hostile enemy of any size could land. Each of these is broken by strong defense positions, which if properly manned and prepared would present to any attacking force a practically impossible problem of penetration.

a. This strategy caused disagreements. The discussions took the form of a question: Would the Armed Forces be adequate to accomplish their avowed military purpose? Many military experts disagreed with the MacArthur approach. Shortly after a tour of duty as Commanding General of the Philippine Department, Major General Johnson Hagood reported that it would be almost impossible to raise or maintain in the Philippine Islands a force that would be adequate.

b. In addition, the defense plan seemed to ignore the strategic consequences of the Philippines being a far-flung archipelago. The program's greatest weakness as a system of truly national defense lay in a failure to provide any naval protection worthy of consideration for a country which consists of isolated groups of islands scattered through a thousand miles of ocean. If a reasonable determination of the likely source of a major external threat for that day were to be attempted, Japan would be the logical choice. Hayden, in his book, "The Philippines--A Study in National Development," described it this way:

> Critics in that day who questioned its adequacy in general terms failed to attack the "System" and its weakest point, the provision for substantial naval protection for a country with a coastline longer than that of the United States. The Filipino people seemed to have accepted at face value General MacArthur's assurance that motor boat patrol and Army bombers would be able to deny the use of territorial waters to hostile surface craft.

The idea that a relatively small fleet of torpedo boats would present a serious problem for the Japanese Navy was almost certainly an erroneous assumption. The Japanese could match every Filipino torpedo

boat with a seagoing destroyer--possibly even two. Other drawbacks of using PT boats to perform such a difficult mission included the necessity for operation in moderately rough weather, their limited radius of action, and the lack of fortified home ports (safe havens). Even the problem posed by the lack of safe havens was magnified by the high cost of constructing this kind of complex. Although small powers do use such craft today, it appears that the torpedo boats should have been mere adjuncts to a well-rounded fleet and a highly developed system of fortified ports and naval bases.

c. As a protection against military invasion, the Philippine Army Air Force could have been taken more seriously than the Off Shore Patrol. It is obvious that this air force was no match for the superior squadrons brought against it from air bases such as Taiwan and the Japanese mandated islands, among others. The combined operations of the plan could not provide reasonable security for Luzon and the city of Manila while, at the same time, defending the outlying islands and unfortified cities. This was especially true, because the proposed air force was necessarily limited in planes, materiel, experienced personnel, and supplies of gasoline.

d. The Philippine defense plan might have been successful from its outset, if the United States had stated that it would use the US Navy and the Army air arm as major deterrent forces against aggression and had so deployed these forces. However, President Quezon undoubtedly realized that the Philippines must be prepared to help themselves. Nevertheless, the defense plan, in spite of its weaknesses, enabled the

Philippines to strike that blow, and it took a considerable task force to subjugate the Filipinos.

67. Internal threat. Critics of the defense plan charged that the new Philippine Army might facilitate the creation of a military dictatorship and could contribute ultimately to the kind of governmental instability which existed in certain "republics" of the Western Hemisphere. It is true that if the Philippines, as an independent nation, were to sink below a certain economic level, it would become a submarginal state both socially and economically. This situation would make it possible for the Army to assume a role similar to that of the military in other states of that period. If, however, fundamental conditions should remain favorable for sound government, it would appear unlikely that the Philippine military forces would give rise to either aristocracy or instability.

a. Even with the wide administrative control over the defense system which President Quezon held (and which he deemed necessary for rapid development of that system), there is no evidence that he used this power for political purposes. Instead, as Hayden remarked in his study of Philippine national development, positive efforts were made to "keep the army out of politics and politics out of the army." Filipinos had been indoctrinated with the idea that the Army was nonpolitical, and because they had to make individual and collective sacrifices for the defense of their country, they would resent any use of their Army for political purposes. In reply to the charge of militarizing the country, President Quezon stated that the very fact

that most Filipino citizens were being trained to use rifles would provide a guarantee that the small regular Army being organized could not ride roughshod over these trained citizens, as it might over an inert people untrained in the use of arms. In fact, these trained citizens could become extremely troublesome if they did not receive fair treatment from their Government. Actually, up to the time of the Japanese attack, it appears that the Army did not contribute to the rise of a dictatorship. Certainly, it did not weaken such democracy as existed at that time; the experience of observing the sons of both rich and poor marching side by side in the ranks of a citizen defense force probably had precisely the opposite effect.

b. Both MacArthur and Quezon were aware that an internal threat to the Filipino people's independence was implicit in the defense plan. The fact that domestic rebellion would present a greater danger than would a foreign invasion gave rise to the wisdom of the political-military combination seeking passage of the Defense Act. The Act appeared to be psychologically sound, and many patriotic Filipinos urged adoption of the measure on the ground that it not only would make their country defensible but would contribute to the development of a self-respecting, intelligent, and vigorous citizenry. A defeatist attitude appeared to prevail in about 90 percent of the people, who were convinced that they would be helpless if a first-class power were to challenge their country after independence. This attitude was seen as possibly the greatest obstacle to Philippine national progress; and the National Defense Act was expected to erase the defeatism, instill life and hope into the people,

and help them to realize that they had the potential of becoming a great nation if they could defend themselves. Even more, it was stated that the Defense Act would reduce illiteracy, increase the physical stamina of the people, and stimulate both patriotism and democracy. These viewpoints have been expressed frequently and have had a peculiar influence in the making of a nation.

68. National defense system. The system of defense developed for the Philippines was as effective a system as the country could afford. It did not provide a stepping stone to an unconstitutional autocracy. Also, if the degree of self-confidence for the Filipinos had been developed as planned, it would have been--and still would be--difficult to make them vulnerable to the subversion and terror which are prominent in modern warfare.

a. As originally enacted and applied, the National Defense Act provided for two major elements of manpower: a regular military establishment of approximately 10,000 men, including the Philippine Constabulary of about 7,000; and a reserve force that would be augmented each year by about 40,000 men who had completed one of the 5.5-month semiannual courses of intensive training. Although 5.5 months of training was considered short, it was to be made more effective by provision of elementary training as a byproduct of public school education, beginning in the fourth grade. Young men not attending regular military training courses would receive instruction on Sundays and holidays. Proficiency of the reservists was to be maintained by annual refresher courses given mainly on weekends. At the end of 1937, some 37,000 men, selected from the

21-year-old group and trained in the regular semiannual classes, were transferred to the Reserve. During 1938, 33,000 additional reserves were trained. In January 1940, MacArthur stated that 30,000 recruits per year would be trained so that by 1946 the Army would include some 30 divisions (the basic division consisted of 7,500 men), and by 1960 it would reach its maximum strength of 90 divisions of almost one million men. The small advisory staff, augmented by Philippine Department personnel, managed, through excellent planning, superb execution, and proper inspection techniques, to have 400,000 reservists available when President Roosevelt declared a national emergency in the summer of 1941.

b. The Army organization included the staff and line units regarded as being essential to a military establishment with a strictly defensive function. The greatest need was for an effective officer corps. Some of the best officers were in the Constabulary, even if their interests lay in law enforcement rather than in military training, and in the Philippine Scouts. These men rapidly became senior officers in the Philippine Army. However, there were no junior officers to command the training camps and reserve units once they were formed. Officers would not be available from the military academy at Baguio for at least 4 years after its establishment. Noncommissioned officers were provided by providing an additional 6 months' training for the most promising men in each semiannual class of reservists. Then the best of these were selected for officer training and became 3d Lieutenants after graduation from officer candidate school. Senior ROTC units in colleges and universities were established to provide additional junior reserve officers.

c. The air program apparently met with few obstacles. By the time the first Philippine Army Airfield was completed and the first runway ready for use, three trainers were available for pilot training. This program was supplemented by courses in military training given in the United States for selected students. By 1940, the Philippine Army Air Corps had 40 planes and 100 trained pilots.

d. The program for building the fleet of torpedo boats did not progress well. Only two were delivered by 1939, and the British source was cut off with the advent of war in Europe. An effort to build the boats locally by purchasing engines and the right to build from the British design produced only one boat by October 1941. Meanwhile, with the assistance of the US Navy, the training of boatmen and mechanics continued.

69. Philippine-US relations. In addition to performing strictly military functions, the US Army rendered other services of importance to the Philippines throughout the period of US sovereignty. The official and personal relationships between US Army and Navy officers and the officials of the Philippine Government were so cordial that the result was an increased friendly feeling of the Filipino people as a whole for the United States. MacArthur was able to meet the test of using indigenous resources to meet the postulated threats. A pool of some 150,000 Filipinos trained by MacArthur at the expense of the Philippine Government was one of the largest military windfalls any nation had ever received.

70. Physical environment. The Philippine Archipelago lies approximately 500 miles off the Asian mainland and extends 1,150 miles almost due north and south from Formosa to Borneo. Strategically situated in

the geographic heart of the Far East, the Islands are centrally located in relation to Japan, China, Burma, Vietnam, Thailand, Malaya, and Indonesia. They lie athwart the trade routes from Japan and China through the South China Sea to southeast Asia, over which the rich supplies of oil and minerals of Indonesia are transported. Vital areas in Japan and along the Chinese coast are within quick striking distance of the Philippines by air and sea. Although Manila, the chief city and capital of the Islands, is over 5,000 miles from Honolulu and 7,000 miles from San Francisco, it is only 1,800 miles from Tokyo. Formosa and Hong Kong are less than 700 miles away; Singapore, 1,500 miles; and Truk, in the Caroline Islands, 2,000 miles. The Carolines, the Marianas, and the Marshall Islands, stretching across the Central Pacific, lie along the US lines of communications with the Philippines.

a. The climate of the Islands is tropical, with an average yearly temperature between 78° and 80°F. The year may be divided generally into dry and wet seasons, which come at different times on the east and the west coasts because of shifts in the seasonal winds or monsoons. From June to September, when the monsoon blows from the southwest, the weather offers little difficulty to the landing of a hostile military force on the favorable beaches along the east coasts. The best time for landings along the western China Sea coasts is the period of the northeast monsoons, from October through April. Most of Mindanao, a portion of the Visayas, and southern Luzon have neither a dry season nor a pronounced maximum rainy season.

b. The Philippine Islands are largely mountainous, with elevations as high as 10,000 feet. Most of the islands have narrow coastal plains, but there are few large plains areas. Every island has sand beaches, some of them extensive, but few of these beaches open on lowlands where there is space for military maneuver. There are numerous short, swift-running streams, but few navigable rivers.

c. Luzon, with one-tenth of its total area a large plain, and with another 5,000 square miles forming a magnificent river valley, is the one island in the Philippines whose terrain permits military operations on a large scale. In the north, closed in by mountains on the east and west, is a valley extending southward for over 120 miles, with an average width of 40 miles. The Cagayan River flows north through the valley. A narrow plain along the west coast offers only limited opportunities for military operations. A road runs along this coast from the tip of Luzon toward Manila. Southern Luzon is a volcanic region, part plain and part mountain, with numerous deep indentations forming bays and gulfs and with many beaches suitable for military landing. The central portion of Luzon is composed of a plain extending north about 120 miles from Manila Bay to the Lingayen Gulf. With mountains to the east and west, this plain is well protected from invasion except at its two extremities. It is the most highly developed economic area in the Philippines and the one best suited for mobile warfare.

(1) The southern entrance to the central plain from the South China Sea is through Manila Bay, one of the finest natural harbors in the Far East. Opening out from a 12-mile-wide entrance between high

headlands, the bay expands toward the low-lying plain to a width of 30 miles. Thirty miles from the entrance lies Manila, and to the north and south are other harbors large enough to shelter seagoing vessels. Marivales, just inside the northern entrance, is an excellent and easily reached anchorage; and the headland of Sangley Point, where Cavite Naval Base was located, has always been recognized as one of the finest ports in the bay.

(2) On either side of the entrance to Manila Bay are high volcanic peaks covered with luxuriant tropical foliage. North of the entrance is the Bataan Peninsula, a rocky extension of the Zambales Mountain range which separates the central plain of Luzon from the South China Sea. From a military point of view, Bataan Peninsula is the more important and more easily defended of the headlands. Several small islands lie across the entrance to Manila Bay. The largest and most important, Corregidor, separates the entrance into north and south channels. Shaped like a tadpole, with its tail to the east, Corregidor is 3.5 miles long and 1.5 miles across at its widest point. One mile south of the tip of the tail is Caballo, less than one-third the size of Corregidor. In the south channel, about a mile from the southern headland, El Fraile, a rock measuring 200 by 100 yards, juts up into the entrance of Manila Bay. Just outside and to the south of the entrance is Carabao, the fourth of the small islands whose location in the Bay gives them a strategic importance all out of proportion to their size. In the history of US plans for defense of the Philippines, these islands loomed large.

71. Technological factors. The Philippines are predominantly agricultural. The fishing banks off Manila Bay and the Salu Archipelago supplement the Filipino diet and are the basis of one of the most important industries in the Island. Even after many years of US occupation, there was little manufacturing in the Philippines, most of the inhabitants being engaged in home industries or in processing agricultural products such as sugar, hemp, and coconuts.

a. With interisland and coastal shipping carrying the bulk of Philippine products, there was little need for roads and railroads. Only on Luzon was there a road and rail net adequate to support large-scale military operations. More than half the 14,270 miles of highway in the archipelago in 1940 were in central and southern Luzon. The three most important military highways on Luzon are Routes 1, 3, and 5. Each is a two-lane all-weather road, enters the capital, and has numerous access roads linking Manila with all parts of the island. There were only 50,000 motor vehicles in the Islands. The Filipinos relied on the powerful carabao, the water buffalo, for transportation as well as labor. The two railway systems in the Islands, the Government-owned Manila Railway Company on Luzon and the American-owned Philippine Railway Company on Panay and Cebu, had a total of 840 miles of narrow-gage track. Of the 704 miles of railroad on Luzon in 1941, about half were in the central plain, which also contained 250 miles of private railway lines. All the railroad, with the exception of a short stretch above Manila, was single track.

b. Most of the principal towns and cities were linked by telephone, telegraph, or radio, and all parts of the archipelago were served by the Government Postal System. The American-owned Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company connected Manila with the most important towns on Luzon and the principal population centers on Panay, Negros, Cebu, and Mindanao. In addition, 40 provincial governments operated their own telephone systems, so that many small towns and villages had at least one telephone system joining them with Manila. Cable connected Manila with Guam, Shanghai, and Hong Kong, and four transoceanic radio stations provided additional communication lines with the outside world.

72. Social factors. The people of the Philippines are mostly of Malayan stock and numbered 17 million in 1941. Cebu and central Luzon were the most heavily populated areas, and Manila, with 684,000 inhabitants, was the largest city. There were nearly 30,000 Japanese nationals in the Islands, more than two-thirds of whom were concentrated in Davao, the chief port of Mindanao. The 117,000 Chinese constituted the largest foreign group in the Islands. On Luzon there were almost 9,000 US civilians.

a. When the United States acquired the Islands, a small percentage of the people spoke Spanish; after 40 years of US occupation, about 27 percent spoke English and 3 percent Spanish. More than 65 native dialects are spoken in the Islands. Of these, Tagalog, the language of the wealthy, influential residents of central Luzon, was chosen as the basis for a national language in 1937, even though twice as many people spoke the Visayan dialect. Although the many dialects have certain similarities,

it is difficult for natives from different parts of the Islands to understand each other. This fact made recruitment of Filipinos on a national scale for military service difficult. Troops recruited from one island often could not understand their American or Tagalog officers or troops from other islands.

b. The political potential of old and new social classes, the place of politics in the Filipino value system, the nature and extent of nationalism, and the political role of the military are important factors in the development of the nationalist movement. There was little in Philippine social values conducive to a democractic way of life, and the tension between the traditional values system and democratic institutions presented a real problem. Democracy is the result of an intellectual attitude, a tradition which must be accepted by a society. The imposition of democractic institutions of an acceptable form and at a propitious time can speed the process of acceptance, but democracy as a way of life is slower to develop than a set of political institutions.

c. Writers of the Philippine Constitution had committed the oligarchy to support a constitutional form of government, but the old traditional social values had little in common with those of a democratic society. Much depends on how traditional values change under the impact of events, and the changes in social values and political ideology are difficult to measure. The depth of the impact can be seen clearly in the public commitment to political democracy and the measure of success in its practice, the continued separation of church and state, the

peaceful transfer of power and an orderly process of election, the freedom of the press, the widespread demand for education and the Government's efforts to provide public instruction, and a deepening sense of national unity. Changes in magnitude offer an insight into shifts in the Filipino's way of life.

d. The four major Philippine class levels were the peasantry, the workers, the middle class, and the oligarchy. The political and military potential of the Philippine social classes is a highly controversial and subjective matter. Of the four classes, the intellectuals, as part of the middle class, probably provided the greatest impetus to the Philippine nationalist movement. Military leadership was drawn from the two classes. The system of public education, for several generations, had not really divorced the educated Filipino from the mass culture. Prior to the war with Japan, a modest amount of education had been available to the majority of the population. This situation provided impetus toward closing any cultural gap, for education is one of the mainstreams which provides upward mobility for society. The social conformity of the intellectual will be increased as long as society is able to provide adequate reward for his talents. If it cannot do this, then the explosive qualities in the combination of radical intellectuals and organized peasants and workers become evident.

e. To modernize a country, there must be an elite group to guide the progress of changes, following the formation of new values. Although the evolution of new technological achievements will cause change, the acceptance of these changes for the betterment of society depends on the

performance of the elite. They are the carriers of the new, as opposed to the old traditional values. When the Commonwealth was launched, the Philippines had an elite group capable of playing an intermediary role between the intellectuals of the United States and those of lesser developed Asian countries. This situation was, in part, due to the fact that the United States had imposed the ethos of an advanced industrialized democracy on the Philippines despite the absence of the essential industrial component. These Philippine intellectuals formed a distinct class, with a social force of great potential. They were not quite divorced from the culture of the masses, yet they were culturally separated from the masses, having been educated in Western schools either abroad or at home. It was this group, relatively free to express opinions, which overshadowed the other intellectuals in Asia and which could provide the direction of government. The strength of the Filipino elite lay in the fact that it formed a group large enough to staff the fields of education, Government services, law, politics, journalism, and religion. One thing is certain: the intellectual was influenced by or dominated in his outlook by American culture, for there appear to have been no pre-Western intellectual traditions.

f. In certain other respects, the Filipinos were ahead of their Asian neighbors. Their entire society was based on the family units, and, even today, the family unit still is powerful. The solidarity of the family is supported by laws which codify the validity and the indissolubility of marriage (marriages are considered family alliances, and divorce is not recognized by law); the legitimacy of children, the

division of wealth among children, the authority of parents over children, and the family hierarchy of obedience; the validity of defense for any member of the family against unlawful aggression; and the socioeconomic well-being of members of the family. Problems that are met in the United States by devices like old-age insurance, unemployment compensation, and rehabilitation of the wrongdoer are taken care of in the Philippines by the family. This socioeconomic system, built on family, casts doubt on the practice of politics in the Philippines even today.

g. Filipinos tend to bring outside relationships into the web of kinship through the compadre system, which establishes reciprocal duties and obligations. Obviously, these bilateral kinship relationships have many political, social, and economic implications. Group loyalty is given to the small bilateral kinship unit. Within the group, personal honor is paramount. That a member of the group will steal from the public treasury for the good of his group is expected, approved, and regarded as a natural course of action. There is little possiblity of devising a formula to retain the kinship group within a larger community developed for economic and political purposes, because the larger community would regard the private virtues of the group as public vices. In one sense, kinship systems favor democracy in that they encourage industry, freedom of religious belief, and political dynamism. However, the attitude of suspicion toward any outgroup, the feeling of insecurity, and the importance of personal dignity make it difficult to deal with the capitalist entrepreneur and specifically restrict gainful participation in the large-scale enterprises characteristic of a modern economy. On the other

hand, the unilateral kinship system would not lead to the kind of poverty and backwardness which can develop and is tolerated under an authoritarian government.

h. Corruption in political life is almost inescapable under the family system, and this system may bear the blame for the character of Philippine political life, including the corruption. Reciprocal obligations between kinsmen can be both exacting and expensive. Filipino politics resemble the "Boss Hague," "Tammany Hall," and "Prendergast" mechanizations of politics in the United States. Viable political groups tend to become personal machines based on kinship, favors, and the relationship of followers and leaders. Politics in this sense is a major industry, if not a way of life, for the Filipino people. It is the route to wealth, for those in power can evade taxes and customs fees, block investigations, break competitors, and discredit political opponents. More money can be made by political influence than by any other means, and this is one explanation of the neglect of agricultural improvements by landlords and the avoidance of risks by businessmen. Also, in this kind of situation, local bosses can maintain power by economic influence, immobility of labor, control of information, and access to the outside world. Political dynamics of class conflict and nationalism can be held accountable in the never-ending struggle for democratizing the Philippines.

i. The character of the military establishment influences the quality of nationalism, the working of political institutions, the growth of the economy, and the mood and direction of foreign policy. Only two institutions, the church and the military, were able to command loyalties

and enforce a code of honor; and it was only through these institutions that the difficult task of resolving conflicts between kinship and institutional values could be resolved in favor of the family. Both Spain and the United States had controlled the military affairs of the Islands, and the Philippines had no indigenous pre-Western military traditions. Philippine leaders came from the intellectuals and the aristocrats. It was natural that the Philippine intellectual class tended to be strongly civilian in outlook. This did not mean, however, that this class was opposed to the use of violence or adverse to participating in violent actions, facts which may explain why there was a class war, with the Philippine Government and old political leaders on one side in opposition to the peasants and workers under Communist and Socialist leadership on the other.

j. The spirit of nationalism is a sense of tradition, of common purposes and values for which men are willing to make great sacrifices. Those who write history do much to shape the future, for it is they who help define traditions and values. Since the intellectual is deeply concerned with the problem of nationalism, it is he who will decide its character and content. From the early stages of the Commonwealth, the Filipino had this working for him, only to have the process interrupted by the Japanese invasion. The Japanese occupation of the Philippines wrecked middleclass leadership and fostered Communist leadership of the peasantry. As a result, the Huk organization was able to defy the traditional values system even in that sector of Philippine society whose mores are supposed to be the most difficult to change.

k. Of the many US contributions to the Filipino's sense of values, that of the military establishment was to prove the most decisive. US military influence was instrumental in rebuilding the Philippine Army by incorporating former guerrilla units--a quarter of a million men--in it, after the Japanese were ejected. Plans had been made to use some of these units in the projected invasion of Japan, but they were not consummated. Following the surrender of Japan, the United States demobilized the force to a strength of 35,000 and transferred 12,000 men from the Army to the reactivated Philippine Constabulary. The Constabulary was incorporated as the Military Police Command of the Army, instead of being returned to the Department of the Interior, and was given the task of restoring law and order. By early 1948, its strength had increased to 20,000 men.

l. The foregoing social determinants indicate the magnitude of the difficulty of creating a satisfactory officer corps for the Army at the time it was created. The best officers were in the Philippine Scouts and the Constabulary, but the interests of the latter lay in law enforcement rather than in military training. However, officers drawn from these sources became senior officers in the Army, and the greatest problem was to develop junior officers for the training camps and reserve units once they were formed. No graduates could be expected from the newly established military academy at Baguio for at least 4 years. To build an officer corps, the most promising men in each semiannual class of reservists were given an additional 6 months' training as noncommissioned officers. The best of these were selected for officer training and

became 3d lieutenants when they graduated from Officer Candidate School. Senior ROTC units were established in colleges and universities as a source of additional junior (Reserve) officers. Since the Army was being drawn from all facets of Philippine society, an officer corps was being developed from a cross section of that society. The rich and the poor drilled alike, making it unlikely that a military aristocracy would develop. While visiting newspapermen poked fun at the "Napoleon of Luzon" and his "two-for-a-nickel" soldiers, General MacArthur mastered the task of convincing the Filipinos that they were getting an Army of which they could be proud. The resulting boost in national morale and the inculcation of a feeling of racial solidarity and preparedness in the people as a whole were invaluable byproducts of the defense plan itself. There must have been a struggle within the officer corps between old and new values. This group was the most likely to produce leaders and programs for the Philippines. With this type of Armed Forces development, considerable lateral mobility between politics, the Army, and business was to prevent the officer corps from being a caste apart. Officers and men of the Philippine Armed Forces were drawn from the general population, to which they returned. The officers trained at the military academy are brought up in the tradition of supremacy of civilian authority. The problem in the Philippines is not so much one of the military taking over the Government by coup but of keeping the Armed Forces free of gross political interference by the Congress. Political interference affecting assignments, promotions and petitions of the compadre system can only serve to destroy that which the officer corps had founded. With the advent

of the Huk open conflict, one of the first problems facing the Armed Forces was to clear up the inefficiency created by such a situation.

73. Threats to order. The major ills were centered in the agrarian problem. This basic "cause," with its threat of uprisings, coupled with brigandage, unlawful assemblies, breaches of the peace, and lack of law and order, formed part of the turbulence which the new Commonwealth was to face. The situation favored the Communist technique for gathering support.

a. The Communist Party was driven underground in 1932 when the Supreme Court of the Philippines declared it illegal and found its leaders guilty of illegal association. A year later a strongly leftist Socialist Party was organized. The CPP merged with the Socialist Party in 1938, and the new CPP succeeded in organizing various social, political, cultural, and economic groups under a variety of fronts from 1938 to 1941. At the outset of the war, the party fronts also went underground. It was at this time that many Filipinos who wanted to resist the Japanese joined the Hukbalahap, the armed faction of the CPP, without knowing either its Communist relationship or its actual aims.

b. Until liberation, the Huk had the largest, best-trained, and best-equipped army in the country, estimated at 10,000 men and some 100,000 militia. Huk strategy was to secure and occupy a position by the end of the war from which to challenge the legitimate Government and take control. It claimed allegiance to both the Commonwealth and the United States, asserting that it was part of a united worldwide front against fascism. It tried to prevent the Japanese from gaining access

to food supplies, but its main objective was to harass the Japanese troops, rather than to drive them out, as a means of training its own Huk troops for later fighting. Of the estimated 25,000 casualties the Huk caused, only 5,000 were Japanese; the others appear to have been victims of the "class war."

c. The Huk threat from within was a serious one. It tried to achieve in the Philippines what Mao Tse-tung had achieved in China. Its objective was to set up a guerrilla base in central Luzon completely under Communist control for purposes of administration, taxation, and military deployment. The US forces did not suspect the Huk of wishing to foment a full-scale Communist revolution, and their carelessness in distributing arms and ammunition resulted in the Huk securing much that was airdropped or given to the guerrillas. Some GI's traded their new weapons for old (souvenirs) or for fresh fruits and poultry, and thefts from poorly guarded ammunition dumps were common. While the newly reactivated Philippine Army was supplied with old war-worn weapons in 1946, at the time of independence, the Huk was able to obtain modern equipment and plenty of ammunition. Even after the US forces recognized the threat and confined the top Huk leaders, the rank and file continued to terrorize the countryside.

d. The new Republic initiated a drive in 1946 to return the Nation to normalcy. The top Huk leaders were released to help in the campaign by finding their dissident followers and encouraging them to surrender themselves and their firearms. While these leaders ostensibly were engaged in the pacification program, the Hukbalahap was redesignated

the People's Liberation Army (HMB). All armed units were reorganized during this period under a GHQ and prepared for all prescribed forms of struggle. The Republic subsequently declared the HMB and its affiliated organizations illegal.

e. The aim of the CPP was to establish "the new democracy," the People's Democratic Republic. The prescribed party line for Asia was to liberate the masses from colonialism. Since it could not very well "liberate from colonialism" the people of the independent Republic of the Philippines, the party substituted "overthrow of American imperialism," to be accomplished by isolating the "bourgeois" elements of this "imperialism" and winning over the masses. The main revolutionary forces were to be the "proletarians" and the landless peasants, backed up by reserves made up from the middle class and the rice peasants, with support from the Soviet Union and other Communist states. The revolution was to be divided into two phases: strategic defense (a period of preparation and a battle for the reserves) and strategic offense (seizure of national power by military offensive).

f. From the very beginning, the Communists had prepared themselves for the drive to power. The HMB carried out the plan in the central and southern provinces of Luzon; its finance department levied stiff cash and crop contributions to support the military drive, and units harvested the crops of absentee landlords. Loot from highway robberies was divided between the party headquarters and the unit conducting the robbery. There were widespread depradations in the rich rice, sugar, and coconut lands of central and southern Luzon. All this aggravated the already serious

economic crisis in the new Republic, which was attempting to recover from the effects of World War II and the Japanese occupation and exploitation.

g. From 1946 to 1948, the HMB was forced to place more stress on its military activities as a result of the punitive drives by the Philippine Constabulary. However, the Government forces had made an error in regarding the campaign as an extension of its antibanditry drive and in using quasi-military methods to stamp out the menace. The undermanned and lightly armed Constabulary soon found itself unable to check the worsening situation. The Communists more than held their own militarily, which enabled them to progress rapidly in their political drive and propaganda efforts, as well as in other forms of proselyting. The divisions of the CPP continued to be active in carrying out the political conversion of the masses.

h. The propaganda campaign had as its theme the failure of the Government to provide and intensity relief for the masses. The Government campaign from 1946 to 1950 overemphasized military operations and paid little heed to the socioeconomic, political, and psychological aspects of the problem. Socioeconomic problems had been endemic to the Philippines for centuries. In consequence, the CPP and its armed HMB were able to capitalize on this failure to make the needed improvements.

i. By 1950, emboldened by the successes of the HMB forces, the HMB command attacked towns adjacent to the city of Manila. The attacking

force of about 10,000 armed men was supplemented by fifth-column forces in each city district. The plan of attack called for each city to be burned by underground elements to allow the armed HMB forces to slip into the city. Armed Forces of the Philippines were called to defend the cities, and the HMB plan failed.

74. Legal basis for internal defense. Recognizing the very real threat to the new Commonwealth of domestic uprisings, Quezon and MacArthur had carefully provided a legal basis for establishment of the National Defense System. The Philippine Constitution adopted in 1935 enunciates clearly the right of the Government to conscript its citizens for the new Army and the duty of all citizens to render military or civil service. The National Defense Act (Commonwealth Act No. 1, December 21, 1935) at once provided for a conscriptive service which would permit a gradual buildup of a force of trained reserves.

a. By Constitutional authority, the Philippine President is the Commander-in-Chief of all military forces. The Army was directly under the President's command until 1939; in that year, a separate Department of National Defense headed by a Secretary of National Defense, was instituted. The National Defense Act also provided for a Council of National Defense, to consist of the President (Chairman of the Council), the Vice President, the head of each executive department, the Chief of Staff, and an Army officer who was the permanent secretary. In addition, six other Council members were to be designated by the President, with the consent of the "commission on appointments" of the Congress of the Philippines. This Council was to "advise the President on all matters

of national defense." The President also was given authority to appoint and maintain technical advisers obtained from the US Army for as long as necessary, within the period of his term of office.

b. The civil-military relationship is the key feature of the National Defense Act:

> The civil authority shall always be supreme. The President of the Philippines, as Commander-in-Chief of all military forces, shall be responsible that mobilization measures are prepared at all times.

This feature obviously was directed at the external threat. On establishment of the system of national defense, the Philippine Constabulary was disbanded in favor of a national police force to handle maintenance of law and order. This proved unsuccessful, and the Constabulary was reorganized in 1938 as a national police force independent of Philippine Army echelons. By 1939, the Constabulary was separately supported and administered. The Chief of Constabulary was made directly responsible to the President in the execution of his police duties, functions, and responsibilities. He was responsible for suppression of brigandage, unlawful assemblies, and breaches of the peace; for bringing offenders to justice; and for maintaining law and order. Relationship with the local police was clearly established, but the Constabulary was to be in control in cases of conflict. In emergencies, if the Army was needed to help maintain law and order, the military unit could be assigned temporarily to the command of an appropriate Constabulary official. Emergencies were to be declared by the President, who could call for mobilization on approval of the Congress.

75. Economic factors. The ability of the fledgling Philippine Government to pay for a defense system without impairing the availability of funds for other requirements posed a critical question for the Commonwealth's defense program. Most authors would agree that the Philippine Government could afford such a system for the period preceding 1946 (disregarding world events in the 1939-41 period). Prior to 1941, the Commonwealth had managed to keep expenditures lower than income, while maintaining an ever-improving essential service and meeting the new military costs. The national debt was low, and the fiscal position technically good. No very positive assurance, however, could be given for the years following 1946. Barring unforeseen circumstances, the Commonwealth probably could have met its financial obligations (including those for its military defense program) throughout its existence. If, however, conditions prior to independence in 1946 had precipitated the flight of capital, business would then have been paralyzed, and economic collapse would have followed independence. Should an economic collapse occur within a few years after 1946, or even were the Republic to be faced with the loss of its foreign commerce at the same time revenues from the United States were discontinued, a serious curtailment of national revenues and consequently of national expenditures would follow. This, in itself, would threaten the stability of an independent Philippine Republic.

a. There was widespread belief that the whole economic structure of the Philippines would be threatened unless the United States continued its preferential trade relations for a period of time after independence.

Should this happen and an economic disaster result, serious social and political consequences might result, and the Government of the Republic would need a well-paid, loyal Army for defense against domestic violence, as well as against external attack.

b. The general appropriation act for 1939 provided for planned defense expenditures which would be only about 21.7 percent of the total amount for ordinary needs. These were not unreasonably high. Included in the Army appropriation of P16 million were more than P7 million previously spent on the Constabulary (before the Commonwealth had been inaugurated). The President's budget for the fiscal year 1940-41 called for a defense appropriation even less than that of the preceding year, and the budgetary request for 1941 was for approximately the same amount. However, until this time, most of the Army appropriations had been for current operational expenses, and sizable investments of capital for materiel and plants would have to be made if the Philippines were to be prepared for national defense in a practical sense. Bills already had been introduced in the Congress to appropriate funds for purchase of materiel, construction of a drydock, construction of an airplane factory, improvement of the Army flying school at Camp Murphy, and training of additional personnel. The cost of equipment required for use in modern mechanized warfare and the cost of materiel needed for adequate defense of a country with the area and geographical characteristics of the Philippines would be staggering, considering the financial resources of the Filipino people, even though the United States might provide the initial equipment. Thus, defense expenditures constituted

part of the total financial problem. Obviously the military-economic analysis was valid, for the Japanese left the Philippines in chaos. The situation was further complicated by destruction of life in general and the overwilling attitude of the United States to release the Philippines just when it felt the United States should assist it economically.

c. The Japanese coprosperity sphere had not worked any better in the Philippines than it had elsewhere, partly because the Japanese military controlled economic planning and partly because the fortunes of war did not permit time for long-range planning, either good or bad. In addition, the Japanese Army looted and expropriated Philippine property, circulated Japanese military script in inflationary quantities, and killed an estimated one million Filipinos. Philippine President Roxas, in his state of the nation address in 1948, described the country as prostrate and totally devastated. Nearly all the tractors and over half the work animals were gone because of the war, more than half the sugar mills had been destroyed, and the gold mines were flooded. Transportation had been disrupted. Public health and sanitation were barely maintained on a low level, with epidemic a constant threat and famine a strong possibility. More than 300,000 firearms were believed to be held illegally in the Islands, and fear, rather than law, prevailed in the wave of violence which followed the war.

d. When the Philippines assumed sovereignty, they continued to depend on the United States for military, as well as economic, assistance. No country can be independent if its army cannot combat subversion. The Philippine Government was in no position to disarm the sizable forces of

soundness with which the United States had established and built a system of national defense for the Philippines gave way to more compelling political concerns. The prospects of continuing the program as MacArthur had initiated it had to be considered in the light of what would happen if economic common sense were to be set aside in favor of other apparently compelling political needs.

f. Because of the economic and military dependence of the Philippines on the United States, no Philippine Government other than a Communist regime could have broken the ties with the United States. The internal threat to the Philippines, implicit in this analysis and foreseen by a number of authors, was to culminate in the form of a well-armed, well-directed, subversive movement, the Hukbalahaps, and this in the midst of an economic chaos caused by the Japanese occupation and the later return of US troops to the United States. Finally, in 1948, open rebellion began.

76. Findings.

a. The foremost problem faced by the Philippine Commonwealth after its establishment in 1935 was the provision of a system of defense for the Islands. The plan did provide a maximum amount of defense within the economic restrictions of the Islands' resources. The major weakness was the failure to provide adequate naval protection. The plan also might have been more successful had the United States made it clear that US Navy and Army Air Corps would be used as major deterrents to aggression. However, the entire program was based on the provision for Philippine independence by 1946, and, in spite of its weaknesses, the defense system

did enable the Commonwealth to strike a blow in its own defense. A strong, well-equipped task force was required to subjugate the Filipinos.

b. One of the most difficult problems faced by the Commonwealth in providing a defense system was the creation of a satisfactory officer corps. The discussion of environmental factors; the social, legal, and political problems; and the economic considerations indicate the magnitude of the problem. The means used to obtain a solution resulted in some achievements, some failures, and some additional problems.

c. General MacArthur was able to convince the Filipino people that they were getting an Army of which they could be proud. The resulting boost in national morale and the inculcation of a feeling of racial solidarity and national preparedness in the Filipino people were invaluable byproducts of the defense plan itself.

d. The Army was drawn from all levels of Philippine society. Within the officer corps, there must have been a struggle between old and new values. This was the group most likely to produce the leaders and develop the programs for the Philippine nation. However, officers and men of the Philippine Armed Forces all returned to the general population from which they had been drawn, and considerable lateral mobility within the political-Army-business community acted to prevent the officer corps from becoming a caste apart.

e. Fears that the creation of a military service would lead to a dictatorship were groundless. The wide powers of the Philippine President were not abused. The problem was not that the military might take over the Government by coup; it was a question of keeping the Armed Forces

free of gross political influence on the part of the Congress, a natural outgrowth of the family-kinship system indigenous to Philippine culture. Political interference in such matters as assignments, promotions, and petitions under the compadre system could serve only to destroy what the officer corps was able to accomplish. With the advent of the Huk open conflict, one of the first problems facing the Armed Forces was the need to eliminate the inefficiency resulting from the compadre system, political influence, and the lack of a truly professional officer corps.

f. When the Philippines achieved independence, they were in no position to disarm the Huk forces, and they still were dependent on the United States for economic and military aid. The Military Assistance Act passed by the US Congress in 1946 signified that the close ties between the two nations would continue. However, the United States was concerned with devastation in other parts of the world, and US special economic interests had to be considered in a changed world situation. The Huk was able to take advantage of the failure of the Philippine Government to remedy social problems as well as the weakness of the political system. With the removal of US troops, and in a period of economic chaos resulting from Japanese occupation of the Islands, the Huk was able to conduct a well-armed, well-directed subversive movement, which led to open rebellion in 1948.

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