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AGO D/A ltr, 29 Apr 1980

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

IN REPLY REFER TO

AGDA (M) (26 Nov 69) FOR OT UT 693336

5 December 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 4th Psychological Operations Group, Period Ending 31 July 1969

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2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

KENNETH G. WICKHAM
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

1 Incl
as

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(ARMY) ATTN FOR OT UT, WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 4TH PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS GROUP
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96243

AVGM-C

30 August 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, 4th Psychological Operations
Group for Period Ending 31 July 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R-1)

Commanding General
United States Army, Vietnam
ATTN: AVHGC-DST
APO 96375

Section I: Headquarters 4th Group

1. General:

a. SP5 William C. Gearing Jr and SP4 Jeremiah June, both of the 7th PSYOP Battalion died of wounds received when the unit of the Americal Division they were supporting came under hostile mortar attack in I Corps Tactical Zone. SP4 John E. Lynch, of the 6th PSYOP Battalion was killed in Long Khanh Province, III Corps Tactical Zone, when the helicopter he was riding in crashed during a PSYOP mission. SP4 Gary L. Taylor, of the 7th PSYOP Battalion, died of gun shot wounds when the element of the 11th Light Infantry Brigade he was supporting, was ambushed in Quang Ngai Province in I Corps Tactical Zone.

b. During the last Quarter, 67 new officers reported into Group. The education level of newly assigned officers continues to be high. Of the 67 assigned, 46 have baccalaureate degrees, 5 have masters degrees, and 2 have doctorates.

c. During the reporting quarter, the "freeze" placed on the hiring of Vietnamese nationals by USARV continued. Because of the Group's inherent need for highly-skilled Vietnamese personnel for effective propaganda production, the imposed "freeze" created a potentially disastrous situation for the 4th Group. The subsequent approach to the problem has been to apply for exceptions to policy on a specific case-by-case basis where sufficient justification exists. Such a request was submitted during July for the hiring of a sociologist.

FOR OT UT
693338

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2. PSYOP Development:

a. A special Color Study report indicating the relationship which the Vietnamese people make between various colors and concepts such as love, hate and homeland was disseminated to the battalions & MACJ3-11.

b. The Psychological Vulnerabilities of NVA Soldiers was studied using a compilation of leaflet propaganda appeals used to entice NVA soldiers to surrender. The report assessed the accomplishments of these appeals so far, cited problem areas and suggested areas for improvement in future appeals.

c. Four leaflets were developed in conjunction with a contingency plan for a possible VC May offensive. Leaflet 4-22-69, previously developed to exploit VC failures during the Post-Tet Offensive, was revised to make it suitable for use with the contingency plan. Negatives of the leaflet were sent to each battalion.

d. Four leaflets were developed targeting NVA troops who have recently arrived in the South. The objective of the leaflets is to induce the enemy troops to compare the actual combat situation and living conditions in the South with the combat situation and living conditions as described in North Vietnamese preinfiltration indoctrination. The leaflets were pretested with favorable results and negatives of the leaflets were sent to the 7th and 8th PSYOP Battalions to be disseminated in I and II CTZs.

e. The GVN Land Reform Program was exploited in cooperation with the Ministry of Agriculture. A total of five leaflets were developed with the themes "Land to the Tiller" and "We Till Our Own Land." Development of materials was coordinated with the Ministry of Agriculture through bi-weekly meetings attended by the Chief, PDS.

f. A number of items were developed based on speeches and policy statements of President Thieu. Two leaflets with photographs of President Thieu and texts built around excerpts from his speeches were approved by JUSPAO and selected for off-shore printing. A poster and a leaflet with the theme "President Thieu's Six Points for Peace" were developed and approved by MACJ3-11 and JUSPAO. Group Headquarters printed 100,000 copies of the poster and 5,000,000 copies of the leaflet for each battalion.

g. Captured enemy weapons were photographed at the Combined Material Exploitation Center and prints furnished each battalion for use on materials in support of the Voluntary Informant Program.

Inclosure

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h. Layouts of two posters in the "Poster-At-A-Glance" series were forwarded to MACJ3-11 for approval. The posters, patterned after the "Leaflet-At-A-Glance," are printed in bold type with messages brief enough to be read at a glance and employ GVN nation-building themes.

i. A tape summarizing the results of the Midway Conference and a leaflet exploiting the redeployment of US troops was developed. Both items were forwarded to battalions for dissemination after being approved by JUSPAO. A poster exploiting the Midway Conference was also developed and printed at Group Headquarters. In conjunction with the troop redeployment announced at the Midway Conference, eight leaflets and two posters were developed stressing the increase in both firepower and numerical strength of the RVNAF. The materials target the civilian population and have the objective of convincing the target audience that the RVNAF is capable of replacing the US troops being redeployed. The poster layouts have been approved by MACJ3-11.

j. The 4th PSYOP Group submitted eight proposed Vietnamese Pledges of Allegiance to MACJ3-11 for review and further coordination with MOI.

k. Layouts of two posters, one dealing with President Thieu's concern for the rural population and the other demonstrating the positive aspects of the GVN versus the negative aspects of the VC, were forwarded to MACJ3-11 for approval.

l. Two tapes were developed in support of the Nguyen Trai II Campaign and copies sent to each battalion. The tapes employ Chieu Hoi themes and each tape has three cuts: Cut 1 was recorded by a male with a Northern accent; Cut 2 by a female with a Southern accent; and, Cut 3 by a male with a Southern accent. The message is identical on all three of the cuts and the tapes are intended for dissemination by serial loudspeaker.

m. Final layouts for four "mini-posters" are nearing completion. The "mini-poster" was initially developed by the 7th PSYOP Battalion and is 5x16" rather than the normal 10x16". The reduced size of the "mini-poster" makes it possible to place them on telephone poles, tree trunks, etc., where full sized posters could not be used. The four posters developed by the Group PDS all have pro-GVN themes and target both the civilian population and Communist troops.

n. Initial arrangements were made to utilize Hoi Chanh personnel or the 4th PSYOP Group Propaganda Evaluation Panel. A request will be made, 24 hours in advance, outlining the specific areas in which the Hoi Chanh will be utilized, i.e., evaluate propaganda to be used against specific

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units, in specific areas or relative to specific GVN/ARVN programs. Based on this information, the Center will choose a Hoi Chanh capable of serving on the panel.

o. A paper proposing the formation of a National PSYOP Watch Committee and National PSYOP Development Center was forwarded to MACJ3-11. The objective of the National PSYOP Watch Committee would be to unify those agencies responsible for psychological operations at the command level, while the National PSYOP Development Center would be responsible for the planning and implementation of those psychological operations aimed at nationwide audiences.

3. Operations: Group Headquarters.

a. Headquarters & Headquarters Company printed a total of 456,298,500 6" x 3" leaflet equivalents during the reporting quarter. Leaflets were distributed as follows:

6th PSYOP Bn	81,603,000
7th PSYOP Bn	136,684,500
8th PSYOP Bn	84,899,500
10th PSYOP Bn	64,232,000
MACJ3-11	28,000,000
4th PSYOP Group Hqs	9,200,000
NAVFORV	2,500,000
JUSPAO	4,480,000

o. The semi-annual training inspection was conducted during June.

c. Pleiku Radio Detachment: The radio team broadcast during the quarter per schedule, from 0530 to 0800 & 1825 to 2400 hours on a daily basis, in Vietnamese and Montagnard dialects. The Vietnamese General Political Warfare Department is responsible for content of the scheduled programs. During the past quarter water seepage into the transmitter bunker forced the discontinuing of regular scheduled broadcasting on two occasions. Leakage has averaged between 300-400 gallons per day. The 20th Engr Bn began work on repairing the bunker on 5 July 1969. During the period from 5-31 July, the engineers removed the earth fill around the ventilation shafts and started removing all dirt from the top and front of transmitter bunker. Plans are, once the earth fill is removed, to repair the present waterproof covering and then build a false roof on the bunker which will be sloped to drain water toward the forward edge. A new entrance to the bunker will be constructed, approximate dimensions, 8 feet high by 10 feet wide. The old exit will be sealed off at the bunker and the entrance tunnel removed. Additional drainage ditches will be constructed to channel ground and surface water away from the bunker. The POL storage

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area was relocated to allow easier access to site generators for maintenance. As part of the POL storage relocation, a parking area for site vehicles and storage space for site supplies were constructed. Work was accomplished by D Co, 20th Engr Bn and site personnel. 50% of the perimeter light fixtures have been checked for defects in wiring or in installation, and plastic covers over the fixtures installed. This has resulted in the number of lights burning out to decrease from an average of 10 per day to an average of 2 per day. Some of the projects which have been started or are under consideration are relocation of the site latrine, relocation of large PLL items to new storage areas, construction of new defensive positions (to be initiated upon completion of bunker repair) and construction of a vehicle maintenance area. Due to technical difficulties, programming was transmitted at low power (15 KW) during most of the quarter, rather than the maximum output of 50 KW. Technical representatives and radio team members are presently awaiting arrival of a directional coupler that will enable them to transmit at high power (50 KW). The directional coupler is scheduled to be shipped from Sacramento Army Depot on 8 August 1969 to 4th PSYOP Group, Saigon. All generators are operational with the exception of one 75KW and one 20KW generator. The non-operational 75KW requires an AC generator. This item was shipped from Saigon on 2 August 1969 and will be installed upon arrival. The 20KW generator needs a new starter gear assembly. This part is being requested through supply channels. A continuous effort to improve the physical security of the Radio Site is being made by all personnel involved, to include ARVN Popular Force/Regional Force Company assigned to provide security to the site. The 120th RF Company of the 2/15th ARVN Bn is tasked with providing site security, but is also required to provide personnel for patrols and outposts. This additional requirement is constantly cited as the reason the 120th cannot improve its security of the radio site. While there is a requirement that 50 RF personnel will be present for site security, informal headcounts conducted by the Radio Team have disclosed not less than 14, nor more than 22 RF personnel present between the hours of 1900-0700 within the outer perimeter. On the 19th of July, 90 claymore mines were delivered by the Radio Team to the 120th RF Company for strengthening the perimeter defense. These mines have not yet been installed.

4. Logistics:

- a. The rebuild contract for the 1250 multilith presses used by the battalions was canceled.
- b. A 2700-line-item ASL has been prepared to support the Pleiku radio station.
- c. Problems caused during the quarter by the lack of 3M"R" Process Plates have been resolved by receipt of 150 packages of plates. Needed chemicals are currently available for the production of these plates.

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d. Critical Supplies Received:

- (1) Rubber cement for layup production.
- (2) Varispray for varnish per output protection.
- (3) Gevacopy negative slow paper and developer used in the production of line copy leaflets.
- (4) Gum arabic solution for use in web fountain.
- (5) Blankets for use on Hess and Barker presses.

e. Critical Supplies (PSYOP Peculiar) on requisition.

- (1) Alcohol, denatured, Grade 3. Several hundred gallons are on MILSTRIP requisition at Long Binh Depot.
- (2) Recording Tape: 1500 reels are on requisition at Long Binh and 100 more are on QRP 9209-9001.
- (3) Kodalith Autoscreen Photomechanical film.
- (4) Repair parts for Challenge 370E Paper Cutters.
- (5) Repair parts for Multilith 1250W presses.

f. Tape Recorders: Procurement action was taken to augment TOE tape recorders in the 4th PSYOP Group with Sony TC 300 tape recorders.

g. A/M Platemaking Equipment Model 706Q: A model 706Q platemaker and photo duplicator are under procurement for use in the 4th PSYOP Group Headquarters. This machine will vastly improve the platemaking capability of the 4th PSYOP Group while allowing the rapid and inexpensive production of litho plates. This equipment has the capability of functioning as a duplicator, enlarger and reducer.

h. Copy Cameras: Procurement action was initiated on two Robertson Meteorite copy cameras by the 4th PSYOP Group. The cameras will be used by the 6th and 8th PSYOP Battalions to replace the present 4x5 copy cameras.

i. Addressograph/Multigraph Model 1250 Duplicating Machines: Eight 1250W duplicating machines were requisitioned to replace worn 1250W's presently in use.

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j. The problem posed by the lack of experienced press repairmen was eased during the quarter, with the arrival of two (2) EM trained in this area. Parts requested on QRP for the 1250W have been received and were distributed on a required basis during the reporting period.

k. During the quarter Group continued the Addressograph/Multigraph refresher course in Japan at the rate of 2 men per month. The course lasts approximately 2 weeks and has been a large factor in improving the performance of the 1250W presses in the Battalions.

l. A 157-line PLL was requested for the challenge paper cutter model 370E. The receipt of these parts will materially decrease downtime for the paper cutters.

m. A 42 $\frac{1}{2}$ inch Morris-Seybold Paper Cutter is being shipped to the 8th Battalion. The arrival of this paper cutter will allow the 8th Battalion to cut paper up to 42 inches. Inability to do so in the past has prevented the 8th Battalion from utilizing certain sizes and grades of substitute paper shipped to them.

5. Maintenance: Army Standard Items

a. During the last quarter the type vehicles which required the most maintenance support were 5 Ton Tractors, 3/4 Ton Cargo Trucks and $\frac{1}{4}$ Ton Trucks. The main problem area was the lack of repair parts. At the close of the quarter repair parts for 5 Ton Tractors are no longer a problem. However, the overall availability of 3/4 ton repair parts is a problem. Our direct support unit, 536th HEM Company, has stated that repair parts for 3/4 Ton Trucks are in short supply to them, consequently they are unable to issue the parts required.

b. The Maintenance Section has been sending repair parts to the Battalions on a weekly basis in response to the deadline report submitted each week. On an emergency basis the section will send any repair part in stock on the premise that it is more important for a battalion vehicle to be operational than one at Group. During the quarter, the Maintenance Section painted all $\frac{1}{4}$ Ton Trucks and started painting 2 $\frac{1}{2}$ Ton Trucks. The painting of the latter was delayed when all 2 $\frac{1}{2}$ Ton Trucks became deadlined for clutches. All trucks have been returned from or programmed into the 536th HEM Company for repair. The vans utilized by the Printing Plant were also repainted to prevent further deterioration of the exterior of the vans. Repainting of all vehicles will continue when the current maintenance backlog is completed.

6. Civic Action. Group Headquarters continues to emphasize civic action by the battalions, providing assistance whenever possible. Vietnamese

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Flags were procured and distributed by SA to the Battalions. School kits and other civic action supplies have been procured here in Saigon at a more reasonable rate than is possible in the outlying provinces. The supplies have then been sent to the appropriate Battalion. Scrap lumber and a limited amount of food and clothing were donated to the Salvation Army and a local orphanage.

7. Battalion Operations (As Inclosures):

Incl 1 - 6th Psychological Operations Battalion

Incl 2 - 7th Psychological Operations Battalion

Incl 3 - 8th Psychological Operations Battalion

Incl 4 - 10th Psychological Operations Battalion

Section II: Commander's Observations, Evaluations and Recommendations

1. Small Roll Press Evaluation

a. OBSERVATIONS: Trained printing personnel and untrained personnel agreed that the operation manual was comprehensive enough to enable anyone to operate the press. The manual is well illustrated and describes every basic step necessary for operation of the press.

b. EVALUATIONS: The Small Roll Press performed satisfactorily throughout the testing period and will accomplish the mission for which it is designed. It is simple and sturdy, requiring very little maintenance. The press was designed for minimal maintenance requirements. It has met this requirement adequately. The press is not affected by temperature nor humidity and requires only post-operation cleaning.

c. RECOMMENDATIONS:

(1) The carrying case should be decreased in size and reinforced to lessen damage when air dropped. A separate case for basic supplies should be designed which can be attached to the press case or detached and carried separately.

(2) Cutting blades are inadequate and require independent adjustment. It is recommended that they be modified to permit one blade adjustment.

(3) The roll-fed construction of the press permits printing on one side of the paper only. This means that only one-half of the available printing surface is used. The only way to alleviate this problem would be to redesign the press and allow for a reroll capability, or the use of sheet paper. The press must be capable of printing messages on both sides of the paper.

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(4) The hand crank is located too near the bottom of the press and should be moved up.

(5) The gap between printing support presently available at PSYOP Battalion level and the individual field team requirements is not critical enough to warrant a high volume press in the hands of these teams. In the event PSYOP field teams are designed and tasked to operate in isolated areas for long periods of time a small, back-pack type press will be required. Development of a compact, dependable press, which fulfills this role, should be considered for the eventuality. No further effort should be expended designing or modifying presses for the field teams, as now employed. Although the press functions well and is adequate for the purpose it was designed, it is not needed by Psychological Operations units in Vietnam. The present system of fixed printing installations coupled with the air mobility available enables even the most remote field team to receive leaflets in sufficient time.

2. MSQ-85 Evaluation:

a. OBSERVATIONS: The following is a final report on the MSQ-85 audio-visual van based on the findings of PSYOP field teams in all four (4) CTZs throughout the Republic of Vietnam.

(1) Shelter: Extensive use of the van has shown the shelter to be durable and free of cracks and distortions. However, the door hinges become loose after extended use and the generator hoist mounting bracket becomes separated from the shelter body due to the excessive weight of the generator. The shelter size is adequate for operations of one week or less in duration. Longer operations require more space for personal items. Operators have reported the shelter causes the vehicle to be extremely top heavy. The battery charger functions properly, but continually burns out fuses. The internal lighting system has proved adequate but fragile. Extreme shock causes covers and bulbs to break. The external lighting system is adequate. The storage racks do not hold securely over rough terrain. The rubber straps pull out of their wall sockets. A hold-down is needed for the generator. The shelter is too heavy for the truck. The results of this have been extensive damage to springs, broken axles and worn clutches. The paint on the shelter is baked on, prohibiting support units from repainting.

(2) Generator: The engine is not difficult to start. Adjustments in the voltage are not difficult to make and maintenance does not consume an excessive amount of time. Audiences have not been bothered by the engine noise or by fumes. The generator can be handled easily with the equipment provided, but the hoist mounting bracket becomes separated from the shelter frame due to the generator's weight. The generator's weight prohibits removal by hand.

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(3) Public Address Set: The amplifier is located conveniently and the set can be dismounted for field use, however, the set isn't effective because it is only audible in one direction. The nickel cadmium battery for the set is useless since it must be charged for 10 hours in order to provide 6 hours of operation.

(4) Motion Picture Projector Set: Extensive field use has shown operators have no trouble threading film or operating the controls. Projector speed has not varied excessively. The projector has proved itself too delicate: a transistorized system would be more durable. The speaker system is continually out of operation and the sprocket wheels tend to cut film.

(5) Camera: The camera has shown itself to be sufficiently rugged, though a more versatile camera with a better lens is needed to produce a quality print. The flash attachment is superfluous for our needs. How long film can be stored before becoming defective is unknown. Film has been stored in the van for as long as six months without damage.

(6) Printing Kit: Three of our battalions report that they never use the kit because of the proximity of printing support. The 10th Battalion in IV Corps reports that the kit is very useful. It is our opinion that the kit is very useful when printing support is not readily available and should be retained. From development to production, it takes 30 minutes to produce a leaflet. Production is approximately 1,000 per hour. The printing surface is adequate.

(7) Recorder/Reproducer: The current tape recorder seems inadequate in several areas. Frequency response is extremely poor: the unit is too heavy: controls are difficult to manipulate: and the lead wire from the recorder to the loudspeaker is weak and breaks easily.

b. EVALUATION AND RECOMMENDATION: The MSQ-85 concept is good but certain modifications and changes are desirable. The MSQ-85 system should be modified as follows:

- (1) Put stronger hinges on the shelter door.
- (2) Install a stronger hoist mounting bracket for handling the generator.
- (3) Design a hold-down for the generator during movement over rough terrain.
- (4) Replace the nickel cadmium battery with a lighter, longer life battery.

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SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, 4th Psychological Operations Group for Period Ending 31 July 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R-1)

- (5) Modify the public address set to make it audible multi-directionally.
- (6) Replace the Polaroid 250 camera with a more versatile camera with a better lens.
- (7) The major deficiency, noted by every field team, is the design and weight of the shelter. The present design makes the vehicle extremely top heavy. It is not necessary to have standing room within the shelter. The weight causes damage to the suspension system, rear axle and clutch.
- (8) Replace generator with one of lighter weight. It is possible that a 1.5 or 2 KW generator would be sufficient to power the van's equipment.
- (9) A lighter weight tape recorder with better frequency response should be provided.

REFERENCES:

1. USARV Reg 525-15, dated April 1968.
2. 4th PSYOP Gp Reg 335-3, dated December 1968.

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as


IRVING O. BARKER
LTC, Inf
Acting Commander

AVHGC-DST (30 Aug 69) 1st Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, 4th Psychological Operations
Group for Period Ending 31 July 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY, VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375 12 OCT 1969

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT,
APO 96558

Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army,
Washington, D. C. 20310

1. This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 July 1969 from Headquarters, 4th Psychological Operations Group.

2. Comments follow:

a. Reference item concerning "Small Roll Press Evaluation", section II, page 3, paragraph 1; concur. Adequate responsive printing facilities are available within the 4th PSYOP Group to provide propaganda leaflets in a timely manner. The evaluation of this equipment was previously reported to the CO, ACTIV, in an undated 4th PSYOP Group letter, subject: Small Roll Press Evaluation. No further action is recommended.

b. Reference item concerning "MSQ-85 Evaluation", section II, page 9, paragraph 2; concur. These observations, evaluations and recommendations were previously reported to CG, US Army Materiel Command, in a 4th PSYOP Group letter, 3 Jun 69, subject: Mobile Audio Visual Unit AN/MSQ-85. No further action is recommended.

c. Reference item concerning "The Lottery Used as an Entertainment Device", section II, page 4, paragraph 2a, 6th PSYOP Bn ORLL, Inclosure 1; concur. Gaining the attention of a target audience is essential. Persons moved from their homes in cordon-and-search operations often suffer from fear, uncertainty and even resentment at having their daily routine interrupted. A scheme such as the one recommended not only provides a means of distracting the villagers, but can be used to effectively extend a PSYOP message.

d. Reference item concerning "Audio Visual Teams Under Operational Control of Provinces", section II, page 5, paragraph 2e, 6th PSYOP Bn ORLL, Inclosure 1; nonconcur. The advantage of area orientation is recognized; however, placing a team OPCON to the province senior advisor reduces the

AVHGC-DST (30 Aug 69) 1st Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, 4th Psychological Operations
Group for Period Ending 31 July 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

12 OCT 1969

PSYOP battalion commander's flexibility of employing teams. A more flexible means of employing teams is for the battalion commanders to retain control and employ the teams in a support role.

FOR THE COMMANDER:



RICHARD V. FULP

CPT, AGC

Assistant Adjutant General

Cy furn:
4th PSYOP Gp

GPOP-DT (30 Aug 69) 2d Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 4th Psychological
Operations Group for Period Ending 31 July 1969,
RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 29 OCT 69

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department
of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:



C. L. SHORTT
CPT, AGC
Asst AG

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 6TH PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS BATTALION
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96227

AVGM-6C

13 August 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report of Lessons Learned for the Quarterly Period
Ending 31 July 1969

Commanding Officer
4th PSYOP Group
ATTN: AVGM-C
APO San Francisco 96243

SECTION I - SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITIES

1. General: During this quarterly operations period the 6th PSYOP Battalion continued its mission of systematic psychological operations support to the Free World Military Assistance Forces in the III Corps Tactical Zone. 228 new leaflets were researched and produced; 111 of these were Quick-Reaction leaflets. Approximately three hundred aerial missions were completed, a great number of which utilized the Early Word process. A constant emphasis has been accorded the nationwide "Nguyen Trai II" and Chieu Hoi campaigns and the III CTZ "Exploiter" and "Family Tree" campaigns.

2. Personnel and Administration:

a. Promotions: During this reporting period the 6th PSYOP Battalion has promoted a total of fifty-one individuals. The breakdown of promotions is as follows:

To CPT:	7	To E4:	18
To 1LT:	4	To E3:	5
To E6:	4	To E2:	2
To E5:	11		

b. Awards: During this same period the following awards were presented to Battalion personnel:

Bronze Star Medal	5
Army Commendation Medal	5
Air Medal	5
Purple Heart	1
Vietnamese Honor Medal	3
Aircraft Crewman Badge	9

Incl 1

AVGM-6C

13 August 1969

SUBJECT: Quarterly Operations Report (1 May 1969 to 31 July 1969)

3. Operations:

a. Quarterly Production Totals:

- (1) Leaflets printed: 51,625,622
- (2) Leaflets disseminated: 455,623,000
- (3) Aerial loudspeaker hours: 1,352
- (4) Aerial missions flown: 1,239

b. The multi-purpose Leaflet Catalogue of the 6th PSYOP Battalion has been printed and widely distributed (high demand for this item has since necessitated a reprint). In order to improve future propaganda development, the Combined Military Intelligence Center (CMIC) in Saigon has been invited to analyze the Catalogue. This will be effected through the efforts of a number of high-level Hoi Chans (including an ex-Special Region political cadre member). Selected samples of the most highly effective leaflets will receive worldwide distribution through intelligence channels. CMIC has also assisted the 6th PSYOP Battalion in the design of a new debriefing sheet for field teams (attached as Incl 1).

c. Particular emphasis has been given to the doctrine and use of psychological operations in the Royal Thai Volunteer Force. A propaganda operations team from the 6th PSYOP Battalion is currently attached to advise the Thais on the support capabilities of a US Army-type PSYOP Battalion. Thai response has been excellent; their printing requests have increased 600% to 6,757,000 leaflets dropped during this reporting period, and aerial support missions flown in conjunction with Thai military operations have increased 350%. Furthermore, the 6th PSYOP Battalion has developed a radio PSYWAR campaign for the Thais. The Thai Division operates a radio station at Bear Cat for their own troops' entertainment and information. They have now offered station time for psychological operations against local populace within receiving distance. A close monitor is being kept on the Thais' efforts, for it is hoped that a PSYOP awareness may be developed in the Thai armed forces over a period of time.

d. In order to meet the problems caused by replacement of experienced field team personnel, the 6th PSYOP Battalion has researched and drafted a Field Team Information Packet. Currently being circulated among the teams for their final comments, the packet is intended to be a comprehensive reference document, aiding both non-PSYOP trained field commanders and field team personnel alike to obtain maximum PSYOP use out of a given tactical situation. It is anticipated that, over a period of time, this packet will become a most valuable tool for both field teams and sponsoring PSYOP units.

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e. It has been noted in the past that FVMAF troops are completely unfamiliar with the nature of tactical/strategic psychological operations as used by United States PSYOP units. The 6th PSYOP Battalion has therefore designed a series of six informative posters, "targeting" American troops, to explain the value of PSYOP and its related programs. Three of these posters have already been completed and distributed; the remaining three are in various production stages. Hopefully this project will impart at least a basic PSYOP sensitivity to the soldier in the field.

f. The frequent fluctuations in weather and field conditions have made it extremely judicious to explore all possible means for the tactical delivery of PSYOP. The 6th PSYOP Battalion is laying considerable emphasis upon the perfection of leaflet-filled artillery round. Recently four inert rounds were acquired from the Long Binh Ammunition Depot for use as training aids in a class given to all HA field team leaders. Each leader was also given a round to use in presenting the same instruction to various field teams and field units. Two leaflet-packaging machines were also distributed. This project will be closely monitored to determine its overall effectiveness.

g. The III Corps Tactical Zone province area studies and demographic data updating has been completed by the 6th PSYOP Battalion. This updating is a continuous process, necessary both to field teams and Battalion propaganda development. The study consists of an area analysis of each province to include population, ethnic origin and religion. Basic documents are obtained from Civic Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) and updated by the 6th Battalion.

h. An analysis of the North Vietnamese Army's pay procedures and financial policies has been completed by the 6th Battalion. Included are sections on amounts of pay, allotments, holiday bonuses and special/incentive pay. Consequently it has been possible to develop and distribute leaflets capitalizing on the shortcomings of the system.

i. A Guide to Color Interpretation has been compiled and employed by the 6th Battalion in order to exploit the color-associations of the Vietnamese. All propaganda from the 6th Battalion is now conforming to this Guide.

4. Training:

a. Of the 31 officers presently assigned to the 6th PSYOP Battalion, 21 have had formal PSYOP training. This represents 67% of the total number of officers.

b. During the last scheduled semester, 7 individuals were enrolled in after-hour study courses.

c. The unit conducted training operations for 92 days during this reporting period.

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SECTION II - LESSONS LEARNED

1. Personnel: None

2. Operations:

a. Item: The Lottery Used as an Entertainment Device

(1) Observation: On large cordon-and-search operations where the populace is detained for an undetermined amount of time, it was found that there are certain difficulties in appeasing the detainees. The employment of a lottery with household items as prizes serves to reduce antagonism. Leaflets supporting specific themes can be marked with numbers and distributed to the detainees. Once the populace realizes that the leaflet is also a lottery ticket, they are more apt to read and retain the message while awaiting the prize distributions.

(2) Evaluation: The use of the lottery and the leaflet/ticket as an attention-getting device is a subtle system for the establishment of rapport through face-to-face operations.

(3) Recommendation: Such attention-getting devices should be employed as frequently as possible when dealing with the local population.

b. Item: Use of 250-Watt Loudspeaker to Divert Children during MEDCAPS

(1) Observation: During the conduct of MEDCAPS various stations, particularly the medical aid facility, are hampered by the congestion of curious and enthusiastic children. In addition to the usual attention-getting techniques, it has been noted by several field teams that Vietnamese children enjoy talking and singing into the loudspeaker system as well as listening to the amplified voices of their friends.

(2) Evaluation: Allowing children to broadcast their voices and songs over the loudspeaker system is both an amusement device and an effective method for reducing congestion at MEDCAP stations.

(3) Recommendation: Allowing children to broadcast over the loudspeaker system should be added to the inventory of attention-getting techniques. Care must be exercised, however, to insure that the equipment is not abused.

c. Item: "Quick-Tape" Recording of Early Word Broadcasts

(1) Observation: In some instances of Early Word use, the target area is beyond the range of the available transmitter, making the broadcast of poor quality.

(2) Evaluation: All aircraft of B Flight, 5th Special Operations Squadron, have the capability to record Early Word broadcasts. This is done by plugging the Early Word device into the input of the tape recorder and setting the recorder on "record". Thus a recording is made as the message is broadcast. A further advantage of this procedure is that the

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pre-amp of the recorder modulates the input from the Early Word and causes the broadcast to be of better quality and volume.

(3) Recommendation: Having the aircraft orbit near the transmitter and record the broadcast will enable the aircraft to rebroadcast the message at a distant location. This should be done only when it is inconvenient or impossible for the aircraft to land to pick up a tape.

d. Item: Slide Catalogue of Hamlets

(1) Observation: The 6th PSYOP Battalion is compiling a slide catalogue of all hamlets in the 1st Australian Task Force area of operations in Phuc Tuy Province. This catalogue is for the use of the audio-visual team supporting the Australians.

(2) Evaluation: The slides depict the local populace and their villages in daily life and aid the team in establishing rapport with the people.

(3) Recommendation: Compiling slide catalogues for all audio-visual teams which have a sufficiently permanent area of operations would be a significant aid to pacification efforts.

e. Item: Audio-Visual Teams Under Operational Control of Provinces

(1) Observation: The audio-visual teams attached to highly mobile tactical units are at a disadvantage in their pacification efforts because they are forced to change location frequently. The 6th PSYOP Battalion has achieved more success when teams are located in fixed areas under Provincial control. (Attached as Incl 2)

(2) Evaluation: A team which is permitted to remain in a given area is able to develop a significant expertise in that area. The people become familiar with that team, and the problem of establishing rapport with each visit to a village is lessened. The team is often able to work closely with the province/district chief, the cultural-drama teams and the Vietnamese Information Service personnel in the area.

(3) Recommendation: Serious consideration should be given to the concept of audio-visual teams being assigned to specific provinces. Pacification might be more practical if the teams were identified with the provinces rather than with tactical units.

f. Item: Maximum Utilization of Printing Plant Paper Supplies

(1) Observation: A significant amount of the paper normally cut as surplus from regular printing orders may be utilized either for additional PSYOP production or as normal office notepaper.

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(2) Evaluation: On the usual "7-up" layout of a 3X6 leaflet order, a small bland area is usually left on the sheet's upper corner after printing. This space remains of consistent size from order to order. The 6th Battalion has filled this space with a standard, small-sized Chieu-Hoi leaflet, a large number of which can be accumulated with the completion of a number of regular orders. These extra Chieu-Hoi leaflets can subsequently be employed as necessary.

(3) Recommendation: That notice be taken of usable areas of paper which appear constantly from order to order. Proper utilization of this space will both increase the overall printing production and minimize the periodic waste of paper supplies.

g. Item: Messages Written by a Rallier for Use on an Exploitation Leaflet

(1) Observation: Many ralliers who desire to write a message for a leaflet produce poor quality messages because they do not know how the message should best be written. The 6th PSYOP Battalion has experimented with the showing of sample messages to a rallier before asking him to write his own message. The result was a message of high quality.

(2) Evaluation: Allowing a rallier to read sample messages before composing his own will increase the quality of the final product.

(3) Recommendation: The construction of small kits for use by teams and PSYOP personnel of supported units, FWMAF and ARVN, could raise the quality of ralliers' messages. Such kits would include samples of both good format and good content. (The 6th PSYOP Battalion is including such a kit in its experimental field team packets.)

1. Training and Organization: None

5. Intelligence: None

6. Logistics: None

7. Organization: None

FOR THE COMMANDER:

GEORGE M. COSTA
CPT, ADA
Adjutant

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 6TH PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS BATTALION
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96227

AVGM-6B

DATE: _____

SUBJECT: FIELD TEAM DEBRIEFING REPORT

TO: S-2, 6th PSYOP BN

1. Name of Team Leader:
2. Unit Supporting:
3. Area of Operations (Prov/District):
4. Mission (Tactical/Pacification)
5. Type of Team:
6. Major or Specific Operations Participated in:
 - a. What role did PSYOP play-
 - b. How successful was the effort and why-
7. Significant Terrorist Activities:
 - a. Target-
 - b. Where-
 - c. When-
 - d. Results-
 - e. Friendly countermeasures or method of exploitation-

8. Enemy Propaganda Activities:
 - a. Type (leaflet/broadcast)-
 - b. Where-
 - c. Theme-
 - d. Target-
 - e. Degree of Success-
 - f. Friendly Countermeasures-
 - g. Degree of Success-
9. Vulnerable Enemy Units in AO:
 - a. Why (KIA, med; Low)-
 - b. Source of Information-
10. Information Pertinent to Enemy Forces:
 - a. Friction existing between VC and NVA-
 1. VC and their own villages-
 2. NVA Party member and non-party members-
 - b. Disillusion with indoctrination attempts:
 - c. Logistics, supply, munitions, equipment problems:
 - d. Medical care-
11. Target Audience:
 - a. Morale, superstitions, aspirations, weakness-
 - b. Religious, cultural, family, economic structure-
 - c. Rumors circulated-
 - d. Attitude towards:
 - 1-Division of VN, free elections and patriotism-
 - 2-Negotiations between the GVN and the Government of North Vietnam-
 - 3-United States and FWMF
12. What type of acceptability does Pacification Teams get from Local Populace?
13. What support does your team receive from the populars?

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SUBJECT: Field Team Feeder Report HE Team 6E5 (26 Jun-25 Jul 69) 26 Jul 69

Summary of Activities

During this reporting period our team has been operating in the Anloc area of Binh Long Province under operational control of Province JUSPAC and Anloc District as agreed to by the 1st Air Cav. I have in turn had control of the province Van Tac Vu (Cultural Drama Team). We have been working together this month along a schedule set down by the District Chief and Advisors to best implement the '69 Pacification Program for that area and to key in particularly the Phase II Hamlets in the HFS rating.

On 26 June, we attended a dinner in our honor at the village of Tan Loi. The dinner was initiated by the hamlet chiefs of Tan Loi's two hamlets along with the district VIS and National Police chiefs, to welcome us back to the area after a long absence. That afternoon our team accompanied by VIS, supported a Special Forces MEDCAP at the Montagnard hamlet of Thu Bon. Thirty minutes of loudspeaker time was utilized and two hours of movies were shown.

On 2 July our team began working with the Drama Team. That morning we visited the hamlet of Phuoc Thanh and the afternoon was spent supporting a MEDCAP in Minh Duc. When operating this way, the Drama Team was set up first. They put on a show geared in the day-time mostly toward the children. They sing and in turn got the children to sing with them. While performing in such a way they are able to distribute material such as magazines and booklets in a subtle manner, explaining their content and value as they are handed out. Following their performance, we began to show movies. During this time the Drama Team disappears throughout the village with magazines and newspapers etc., and visits the people in their homes to include especially VC families. An entire day can be spent doing this. It is part of a program of cultural seed planting which is of utmost significance in a face to face grass roots PSYOP program.

In cases where we have been requested to support a MEDCAP, we have found it most worthwhile to precede the MEDCAP into the hamlet by at least 2 or 3 hours. In that way we can set about our program without the distraction of the MEDCAP as well as build up to the MEDCAP, obtain a motivated crowd, learn who especially needs medical attention and in general make everything ready for the MEDCAP when it arrives. The actual MEDCAP may spend only two hours in the village. We have spent the whole day.

In addition to the Cultural Drama Team we have been accompanied by the District VIS Chief. Having worked with him before, our friendship is very close and his importance to our mission is immeasurable. Since he is known and respected by hamlet officials in the entire district, he makes our introduction into the hamlet much easier. We are immediately accepted in areas where otherwise it would have taken months to gain rapport. He has accompanied us to every hamlet this month and we have

NOT REPRODUCIBLE

Incl 2 to Incl 1

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SUBJECT: Field Team Feeder Report HE Team 6E5 (26Jun-25Jul 69)

consequently been well received. Without exception the people of every hamlet have invited us into their homes for dinner and conversation. Our team is especially fortunate to have worked Anloc District before with this man and this makes our visits to the hamlets seem like a home-coming.

On the 5th of July a meeting was held in the District Chief's office in Anloc. Present were the District Chief, the District Senior Advisor, the Province JUSPAO Advisor, the District VIS Chief, the Drama Team leader and myself. The purpose of the meeting was to explain our program for the coming month which would be a complete PSYOP Package to include VIS, the Cultural Drama Team and my team operating together under operational control of District and Province JUSPAO. Also we met to work out a schedule for the month to be initiated and approved by the District Chief to concentrate on hamlets of specific importance. It was agreed that better coordination between District and US units in the area would result if all MEDCAPS be integrated into our schedule through JUSPAO and District if they desired PSYOP support. A schedule was drawn up and became effective 7 July. Operation orders were sent down to PF and RF units to provide security for us on the particular days we visited their area.

This month has proven to be the most well coordinated, worthwhile PSYOP venture our team has participated in since last working in Anloc in March, and for the following reasons we feel every HE team should be employed in the same fashion.

1. By being attached to a particular province a team is not only able to obtain and integrate into all the resources available through the province but is able to remain in one area for a length of time. This is the only way to evaluate our worth when we are able to see feedback, which is possible to obtain only over several months.

2. By working in coordination with local VIS, District, Drama Team, etc we are placing emphasis on the fact that only the Vietnamese understand the Vietnamese - we are only observers. The Vietnamese run the show and take the credit. Our team merely adds to their resources and perhaps our presence adds a little dignity to their mission.

3. By living and working with MACV personnel we are working with the people who best understand the true impact and importance of the Pacification Program as well as the importance we must play as advisors only. We find US units to be preoccupied with give-away programs and situation reports. They fail to understand the true meaning of helping the Vietnamese do it themselves.

4. By working with MACV we are able to get first hand knowledge of the hamlet which we are visiting, thus be better able to estimate the security if we wish to stay overnight. This month our team has spent overnight visits to 3 different hamlets. We had terrific support from MACV and District in providing us security and possible artillery if the situation calls for it. It's no secret that the best time to contact the

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SUBJECT: Field Team Feeder Report HE Team 6E5 (26Jun-25Jul69) 25 Jul 69


people is in the evening when they finish work. We have spent very worthwhile overnights in contested villages this month and plan to increase such operations next month.

5. We have found that by operating under District and JUSPAO we have been able to support MLDAPS originating from every source. US units have had to coordinate more closely with District to get our support and have therefore offered a better informed program in which everyone knows who is operating where and is coordinated with one unified program.

6. The HE team is indeed a true propaganda team not a movie truck. I have operated with little or no equipment, and yet our mission has been extremely effective. We have acted as PSYOP advisors showing the Vietnamese how to produce posters and leaflets, how to fly air missions, etc., through their own channels and efforts. Our HE teams are professionals in their field and our capabilities are unlimited. However, the opportunities to exercise these capabilities has been stifled in many cases.

To summarize, our team has had a most successful month. I foresee the coming month to bring results of immeasurable impact. Only if we are permitted to remain in the area for some time will we be able to later bear the fruits of intelligence gathering. Now the 1st Air Cav. has presented us with the possibility of moving again and this will make the events of the last month fruitless in the attempt to gain any long range results. (This team was relocated by the 1st Air Cav Div in early August-Ed.)

6TH BATTALION ORGANIZATION



Incl 3 to Incl 1

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 7TH PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS BATTALION
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96349

AVGM-7C

15 August 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1969,
Reports Control Symbol CSFOR-65(R-1) (U)

THRU: Commanding General
III Marine Amphibious Force
ATTN: Force PSYOP Officer
FPO 96602

TO: Commanding Officer
4th PSYOP Group
ATTN: AVGM-C
APO 96243

1. References:

- a. USARV Regulation 520-15, dated April 1968.
- b. 4th PSYOP Group Reg 335-3, dated December 1968.

2. Submitted herewith is the Quarterly Operational Report, Lessons Learned, for the period 1 May 1969 to 31 July 1969, prepared in accordance with the above listed references.

- 7 Incl to Incl 2
- 1. Org Chart
 - 2. Field Detachments
 - ~~3. KIA & WIA Incidents~~
 - ~~4. Ltr, LTC Nickerson~~
 - 5. Small Roll Press Eval
 - 6. Photo of Tape Room
 - 7. AN/PRC 25 Report, NAG
- Incls 3 and 4 wd HQ, DA

Michael R. Fortini
MICHAEL R. FORTINI
MAJOR, ARMOR
Commanding

Incl 2

Section I: Operations - Significant Activities

1. The 7th PSYOP Battalion engaged in 28 hours of mandatory training during the reporting period. The training included weapons familiarization and CBR refresher training, which were administered to newly assigned personnel as part of the replacement training program. In addition, a briefing was given each new arrival to give him a basic working knowledge of the unit's organization, mission, capabilities, and support role in I Corps Tactical Zone (ICTZ) psychological operations effort. During the quarter, the battalion was engaged in 92 days of continuous operations. The unit participated in no troop movements other than the normal flow of replacements and supplies being sent to the various field detachments. No major operations arose where the entire unit was responsible for overall support. A current organization chart is attached as Inclosure #1, and a list of the current field detachments is at Inclosure #2.

2. On 21 May 1969, this battalion successfully passed the USARV Command Management and Maintenance Inspection (CMMI) with the following overall scores:

Material - 81%

Maintenance Operations - 70%

This was the first time that the unit had been inspected by a CMMI team since its activation in December 1967. Of particular note was the fact that none of the five (5) presses (1250W) that were inspected received any short-comings or deficiencies, thus earning an unadjusted score of 100%.

3. On 19 May through 21 May 1969, Major Fortini, Commanding Officer, 7th PSYOP Battalion, attended the USARPAC PSYOP conference in Hawaii. The primary purpose for his attendance at this conference was to present the proposed MTOE 33-500 (TYPE) that the battalion has developed. The presentation was informational in nature and was generally well received by the conference participants.

4. With the announcement, on 9 June 1969, of the replacement of 25,000 U.S. troops by Presidents Nixon and Thieu at the Midway conference, the battalion implemented its troop replacement plan. This plan was written in general terms and intended to support any type or size troop replacement. On 10 June, the text and negatives for leaflet 1-16-69 were received from 7th PSYOP Group and immediately prepared for printing. An initial production run of one million leaflets was printed by the following day and dissemination of the leaflet commenced on 12 June. Local production of the leaflet continued and an additional ten (10) million copies of 1-16-69 were requested and received from 7th PSYOP Group. One modification was made to the layout received from 7th PSYOP Group in that the US flag was deleted from the background of the photo of President Thieu. This change was directed by the III Marine Amphibious Force PSYOP Officer. As the American units are replaced, ceremonies are being conducted by GVN and ARVN leaders to demonstrate their appreciation to the departing US troops.

Exploitation of those events was accomplished through the use of Psychological Operations Exploitation Teams (POET's) provided by this unit. Each POET consisted of a writer, photographer and interpreter, who visited all of the departure ceremonies and gathered material for their exploitation. In addition, the Propaganda Development Center (PDC) has developed fact sheets that explain the US and GVN position on the troop replacement. These fact sheets have been prepared in both English and Vietnamese and are intended to keep field personnel abreast of the current policy on troop replacement.

5. During the reporting period, this unit experienced three (3) KIA's and one (1) WIA. Details concerning these incidents are at Inclosure #3.

6. This unit continues to have problems with the maintenance of PSYOP peculiar equipment such as 1250W presses, tape recorders, projectors, etc.. US Army Support Command Da Nang, is responsible for maintenance support of USARV units in the I Corps Tactical Zone, but does not have the capability of maintaining PSYOP peculiar items. Force Logistics Command, III Marine Amphibious Force, has the capability of maintaining most of this type of equipment, but no inter-service support agreement exists to allow them to do so, and US Army Support Command Da Nang refuses to initiate such an agreement. At the present time, all PSYOP peculiar equipment is being sent to 7th PSYOP Group in Saigon for repair. This arrangement is unsatisfactory in that the man-hours required to escort the items to Saigon are excessive (no such requirement would exist if the repair could be effected by III Marine Amphibious Force Logistics Command in Da Nang), and repair by Saigon is slow. The average down time for items sent to Saigon for repair is four (4) to six (6) weeks.

7. During the quarter, the battalion recommended personnel serving with this unit for the following awards:

One (1) Legion of Merit; twelve (12) Bronze Stars; seven (7) Army Commendation Medals; two (2) Air Medals; fifty-five (55) Good Conduct Medals; three (3) USARV Certificates of Achievement; forty (40) 7th PSYOP Battalion Certificates of Achievement.

8. Printing production and development figures for this reporting period are up significantly from the same period in 1968.

	1 May 68 To <u>31 Jul 68</u>	1 May 69 To <u>31 Jul 69</u>	Percent Increase
Newly Developed Items	130	260	105%

The loss of one (1) printing press being deadlined all quarter and then being salvaged, brought the total presses belonging to this unit to seven (7). However, because of the three-shift workday and the institution of a 1/8 hour standdown for maintenance, coupled with the volume of support constantly imposed on the unit, high production figures resulted. Total impressions, by month, were as follows:

<u>MONTH</u>	<u>IMPRESSIONS</u>
MAY	13,434,268
JUNE	14,169,369
JULY	12,572,717

8. The battalion's reproduction platoon produced 14,169,369 impressions in June. At Inclosure #4 is a letter received from LTG Nickerson, Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force, commending the unit for this production record.

9. During May, the battalion's Propaganda Development Center (PDC) completed the review of the items that will be used to support the Rice Denial Program in I Corps. A review of items used in prior Rice Denial Programs revealed seven (7) items which were acceptable for use again this season. However, six (6) items were leaflets that were designed for air drop, and they are to be redone to the standard 3" x 6" size. Ten (10) additional items which emphasized the following points were developed to support the campaign:

a. Farmers should be able to keep the rice that they grow. They work many long, hard hours to grow their rice, and they should be able to benefit from their efforts.

b. The Viet Cong are worthless leeches and are parasites on society. They expect to be fed or given food which they have not worked for.

c. The GVN provides safe havens for the farmers where they may safely store their rice. At any time, the farmers can withdraw rice to fulfill their personal needs.

d. Farmers should harvest their crops as effectively and as quickly as possible. They should take their rice and store it in the government warehouses before the Viet Cong can come and take it away from them.

e. The Viet Cong are very short of food, especially rice. By denying the Viet Cong the needed rice, they will be defeated due to the lack of nutrition.

10. The month long test of the small roll press was completed in May, and an evaluation of the test results were forwarded to CO, 4th PSYOP Group. The press was developed by the U.S. Army Limited Warfare Laboratory for use in relatively remote areas, and the test revealed that it will accomplish this mission. At Inclosure #5 is a copy of the complete evaluation of the small roll press.

11. On 29 May, COL Rosner, I Corps Phoenix Coordinator, visited the 7th PSYOP Battalion and presented his ideas for the increased use of PSYOP in support of the Phoenix program. Based on his request, this unit's propaganda Development Center developed a plan for the increased use of all available PSYOP media in support of the Phoenix Program.

12. On 2 May 69 at 0400 hours, Audio-Visual Team #15, 1st Marine Division, began supporting Marine counterintelligence Team #5 in a cordon and search operations in the Da Nang area. They erected a general purpose tent in which they were to show movies while the cordon was set. The National Police used the team's broadcast equipment for one hour and thirty minutes to broadcast announcements and instructions to the villagers. When the people were assembled, the team showed eight movies in the tent. 300 reward leaflets were disseminated. The results of the cordon and search were: 9 Vietnamese "blacklist" caught and 65 detainees taken, 46 of which were illegal residents in the area. The team's broadcast capabilities helped the Marines conduct the operation and the entertainment helped change the populace's attitude toward operations of this type.

13. On 9 May 69, a 5th Marine air observer spotted what was believed to be several enemy troops in the open at coordinates AT 8855. Air strikes were called in as well as artillery, resulting in 100 enemy dead from the 2d Battalion, 141st NVA Regiment. The surviving troops scattered in all directions. Detachment #1 (1st Marine Division) responded to this situation by requesting three aerial broadcasts for 10 May 69, along with two leaflet drops utilizing the Chieu Hoi theme and rally instructions. Combat Loudspeaker Team #13 was attached to 2d Battalion, 5th Marine Regiment and dispatched to the area. The remaining troops were reported retreating to the Ong Thu area. On 12 May, it was reported that 221 enemy dead were found, 14 PW's captured, and 31 individual weapons recovered. A special leaflet request was submitted on the 12th of May 69, exploiting the situation using the firepower theme and leaving an outlet to either surrender or Chieu Hoi.

14. Early in May 1969, the most wanted guerrilla leader in Quang Tri Province was killed approximately eight (8) miles southwest of Quang Tri City when he walked into an ambush set up by elements of the 1st Brigade, 5th Inf Div (Mech). The guerrilla leader, Nguyen Quyet, had operated with his unit in the province for almost six (6) years. His ruthless activities had made him notorious with the local civilians and allied forces. As soon as the body was positively identified, the 3d Marine Division G5 PSYOP officer

requested a quick reaction leaflet to exploit the incident. The leaflet was developed by the 7th PSYOP Battalion and air dropped into the area in which Nguyen Quyet had operated.

15. Combat Loudspeaker Team #33, while on a five day operation with A Co, 3/1, 196th LIB, Americal Division, received two Hoi Chanhs as a direct result of their ground broadcasts. The two returnees provided valuable intelligence information and broadcast to their former comrades to rally as they had done. This team is also credited with the retention of three PW's who would have otherwise been killed, causing the loss of much valuable information. The Team Leader, SGT Gearing, and his team broadcasted to NVA sappers who had penetrated the perimeter at LZ Baldy. The enemy's position was known and even though they were surrounded, they refused to surrender. There were LRP's and Dog Team personnel at the location who wouldn't go into the holes and get them out. The team did so on two separate occasions; one NVA and his AK-47 being captured on the 12th and 2 NVA being captured on the 13th with their AK-47's, assorted grenades, and satchel charges. The S5, 196th LIB, reported that he was initiating recommendations for the award of the Bronze Star for Valor to the members of the team.

16. The Da Nang - Huc train route was mined and five (5) of its cars were derailed by a local Force VC battalion on 26 June 1969. Eight (8) passengers were killed and twenty-two (22) were seriously wounded. G5 PSYOP, XXIV Corps dispatched a Psychological Operations Exploitation Team (POET) to the scene of the wreck and secured photo coverage of the damaged cars and casualties. This unit developed two (2) leaflets to exploit this incident; one directed at the local populace along the railroad right of way, and the other to the VC in the surrounding areas.

17. For the past three (3) months the integration of ARVN Audio-Visual and MEDCAP teams into the pacification program has been taking place at Detachment #1 (1st Marine Division). With the assistance and advice of the Detachment's Audio-Visual Teams the ARVN teams are becoming more capable of carrying out the program without US assistance.

18. With the conclusion of the Post-Tet Offensive Campaign, the 7th PSYOP Battalion PDC considered that such a campaign should be prepared for any offensive which the communists begin. Usually the communists launch 3 offensives each year. The next offensive to be considered was the summer campaign, which intelligence indicated might start on or about Ho Chi Minh's birthday, since it is a common practice of the communists to launch offensives on recurring significant dates. The 7th PSYOP Battalion PDC began to plan a campaign as great in scope as the Post-Tet Offensive Campaign. However, intelligence reports began to indicate that a full scale offensive would not be initiated. There remained a possibility of some activity at this time, possibly limited to ground attacks or rocketing of the cities. At a conference with the III MAF PSYOP Operations Officer, it was decided only to develop three leaflets - one directed to the leaders of the communist forces and two directed to the men in ranks. The theme used on all three was that the men in the ranks would be expected to rashly throw away their lives for

the sole purpose of showing their loyalty on Ho Chi Minh's birthday. The objective of the leaflets was to plant the idea in the minds of the communist troops that they were being wasted for emotional rather than rational reasons, and also to induce fear. The idea that he is being wasted can be used by the individual to justify to himself his malingering or desertion in order to avoid a fearful situation. These leaflets were prepared for printing as a mix and were air dropped on 17 May 69.

19. In response to a quick reaction request by Naval Beach Jumper Team #12, a tape, T7-12-69, was produced and played 27-28 June in the barrier reef area (BT 1750-2352-2246-2547). This was in support of a U.S. Marine amphibious operation "Bold Pursuit". Vietnamese civilians on the ground heard the evacuate the area message and as a direct result of the broadcast 307 detainees were processed.

20. On 29 June, a quick reaction Earlyword and aerial tape mission was flown in support of the 1st ARVN Division in Thua Thien Province (vic YD 9021). As a direct result of the broadcast the supported unit received 4 Hoi Chanhs and 1 PW from the K-41 NVA Battalion.

21. A U.S. Marine Corps movie team is in the process of producing a film on the role of PSYOP in the I Corps Tactical Zone. The scenario calls for the film to trace the development of a leaflet from receipt of the request by the 7th PSYOP Battalion to its final dissemination by "A" Flight, 9th Special Operations Squadron. The film will be a twenty (20) minute color, sound production and will be distributed through Marine POC channels. Scenes have been filmed of the following 7th PSYOP Battalion activities: field team operations; receipt, development, production, and dissemination of a quick reaction leaflet.

22. This unit continues to conduct day-long PSYOP orientation seminars on a monthly basis, at the 7th PSYOP Battalion's BOQ. The purpose of the seminar is to orient newly assigned I Corps tactical Zone personnel in the role of PSYOP, the mission and capabilities of the 7th PSYOP Battalion and "A" Flight 9th SOS. Invitations to attend the seminars are extended to all supported units in I Corps. The program is conducted as a seminar, rather than a lecture-type class, to allow and encourage a free exchange of ideas between the participants. Critiques turned in by the participants indicate that the seminars are extremely worthwhile.

NOT REPRODUCIBLE

23. The G5, 3d Marine Division, has initiated a campaign to publicize the nation building activities of the GVN and US agencies in Quang Tri Province. A series of 16 posters and handbills have been developed to support this campaign.

24. As an addition to the graphics facility, this unit has completed construction of a soundproof tape reproduction center. See photo at Inclosure #6. The tape center has the capability of producing, in its current configuration, eight reproductions from one master tape per hour. Additionally, the facility is capable of producing a master tape from live voice and, simultaneously, produce an additional copy. In the future, as the facility is expanded, it is expected that tape production capabilities will be doubled.

Section II: Commander's Observations and Recommendations

Part I: Observations (Lessons Learned)

A. Personnel

None

B. Operations

1. Field Team Operations

a. OBSERVATION: On 9 June 1969, a Montagnard member of the NLF rallied to the GVN at Ba Ph District Headquarters as a direct result of an Earlyword broadcast by the Montagnard District Chief. This H I Chann stated there were many others in the region who would rally. However, they did not since they cannot understand the materials being presented to them.

b. EVALUATION: There is a definite need for a PSYOP campaign directed against the Montagnard NLF elements. This program if handled properly could reap definite tangible results.

c. RECOMMENDATION: That efforts be made to develop movies and leaflet mixes to describe the Chieu H I program, its benefits and a clear understanding and method of rallying to the GVN.

2. Cutting of Oversized Paper

a. **OBSERVATION:** Due to the lack of standard size (10 1/2"x16 inch) paper in the supply system, this unit has been forced to use 36"x7 inch paper and cut it to fit the unit's presses. This additional cutting requirement taxed the capacity of the cutter to handle the increased workload, and methods of reducing the number of cuts required per sheet were investigated. It was found that by cutting the paper to 9"x14-3/4", one (1) cut per seven (7) up leaflet sheet could be eliminated.

b. **EVALUATION:** Since the paper had to be cut to fit the unit's presses, by cutting it under size (9" wide as opposed to the standard 10 1/2") a seven up leaflet layout (3"x6" leaflets) would require only four (4) cuts as opposed to five (5) cuts with the standard size paper. A bonus effect from this method of cutting 36"x7" paper is the 6"x7" waste that is left. Although unusable for printing, local Civil Affairs Units have further cut the paper to tablet size and used it in support of their CA projects. The only disadvantage of using this under size paper is that it cannot be used for standard size handbills, which require the standard 10 1/2"x16" paper.

c. **RECOMMENDATION:** That PSYOP units forced to cut oversized paper to fit the 1250W press consider under-cutting the stock to 9"x15-3/4" for printing standard 3"x6" leaflets. This is especially true if a cutting backlog has developed.

3. Enemy Activities During Helicopter Landings

a. **OBSERVATION:** Two (2) of this unit's personnel were killed by a single 82mm mortar round which hit their position just as a helicopter was landing about 10 meters from them.

b. **EVALUATION:** From conversations with Kit Carson scouts, it was learned that the enemy often fires mortars when a helicopter is landing, their reasoning being that the sound of the incoming round will be drowned out by the noise of the aircraft, thus increasing the chance of casualties as well as damage to the aircraft.

c. **RECOMMENDATION:** That field teams be informed of this tactic and be advised to stay away from helicopter landing zones except when required to be in that area.

4. Substitute Power Supply for AM/UIH-5

a. **OBSERVATION:** The issued power source for the AM/UIH-5 Combat Loudspeaker System when it is used dismounted from a vehicle is a nickel cadmium battery. This battery is very heavy, requires a 24 volt source to recharge the battery, and charging time is two to three times the recharged battery life. All of these factors contributed to a search for an alternate power source. The most readily available battery that will provide the necessary power is the dry cell used with the AM/FRC 25 radio.

b. **EVALUATION:** The AN/PRC 25 battery has been previously utilized successfully as an alternate power source for the AN/UIH 3 Combat Loud-speaker System. The S5, I Corps Naval Advisory Group (NAG) has developed a method to adapt the AN/PRC 25 battery to power the AN/GIE-5 loudspeaker system. A detailed paper prepared by NAG that explains the system wiring and construction is at Inclosure #7. The system output when the AN/PRC 25 battery is used is reduced slightly but its power output is sufficient for field broadcasting.

c. **RECOMMENDATION:** That copies of Inclosure #7 be given the widest possible dissemination so that units that still employ the AN/UIH-5 loud-speaker set might take advantage of this battery power system.

C. Training and Organization

None

D. Intelligence

None


E. Logistics

None

Incl

as

Incl 3 and 4 wd HQ, DA



Incl 1 to Incl 2

FIELD TEAM LOCATIONS

1. Detachment #1 (1st Marine Division)
 - 2 - Audio-Visual Teams
 - 3 - Combat Loudspeaker Teams
2. Detachment #2 (3d Marine Division)
 - 2 - Audio-Visual Teams
 - 3 - Combat Loudspeaker Teams
3. Detachment #3 (Americal Division)
 - 2 - Audio-Visual Teams
 - 3 - Combat Loudspeaker Teams
4. Detachment #4 (101st Airborne Division)
 - 2 - Audio-Visual Teams
 - 3 - Combat Loudspeaker Teams

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 7TH PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS BATTALION
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96319

AVGM-7C

11 May 1969

SUBJECT: Test of Small Roll Press

Commanding Officer
4th PSYOP Group
ATTN: AVGM-C
APO 96307

1. Reference, letter, your headquarters, subject as above, 21 Mar 69.
2. In compliance with reference above, this unit has conducted an evaluation of the small roll press. The operators questionnaires are attached as Inclosure #1.
3. The testing program utilized to evaluate the operation of the press included operator personnel who had prior printing experience and others who had never operated any type of press. In all tests, the press functioned satisfactorily and achieved the objective for which the unit was designed. A detailed discussion of problems encountered with the press is at Inclosure #2.
4. On 9 May 1969, the small roll press was forwarded to the Commanding Officer, 8th PSYOP Battalion, for further evaluation.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

WILLIAM J. MCLURKIN
CPT, Armor
Adjutant

Incl 5 to Incl 2

TEST OF THE SMALL ROLL PRESS

COMMANDERS EVALUATION

I. GENERAL

The small roll press performed satisfactorily during the test, and will accomplish the mission for which it was designed. It could serve as a replacement for the printing kit presently authorized as a component of the LSQ - 85. The design and construction of the press is simple and sturdy, and requires only minimal maintenance. Detailed comments concerning the press are below:

1. Problem Area: This press prints only on one side of the paper.


DISCUSSION: The roll feed construction of the press permits printing on one side of the paper only. This means that only one-half of the available printing surface is used. The only way to alleviate this problem would be to redesign the press and allow for a reroll capability, or the use of sheet paper. Both alternatives would require a complicated and delicate paper feed system. Although nice to have, the complexity of this additional equipment would outweigh any advantages to be gained from having a two-sided print capability.

RECOMMENDATION: The disadvantages of having only a one side print capability be accepted so that the simple design of the press can be maintained.

2. Problem Area: Availability of roll paper for the press.

DISCUSSION: Roll paper in the size required for the press was not available through normal supply channels. Single-ply teletype paper, that was cut down to the required width, was used as a substitute. If this press is to be used in forward combat areas, the proper size roll paper must be readily available through the supply system. If the paper is not available, the press will be useless.

RECOMMENDATION: That action be taken to stock the proper type roll paper prior to fielding the press to TOE units.



NOT REPRODUCIBLE

**MODIFICATION TO PORTABLE PSYOPS BROADCAST
SYSTEM FOR USE OF AN/PRC-25 BATTERIES**

This report describes a modification to the Amplifier/Battery rack of the AN/UIH-5 Portable PSYOPS Broadcast System. This unit includes a 350 watt amplifier (AEM-DE-1492C) and a 32 volt nickel cadmium battery with carrying rack.

The modification has solved some of our problems and this report is submitted for the information of other PSYOPS units who may experience similar problems.

Several of our units had battery chargers malfunction, thereby completely disabling their systems as there was no convenient way available to recharge the batteries and the necessary repair parts could not be obtained.

We learned from the Army 7th PSYOPS Battalion that one or two AN/PRC-25 batteries could be used to power the system. We ran a test using two of these batteries, playing music through the system and after four continuous hours there was still sufficient usable output. Note that music creates a higher average current drain than plain voice operation.

This prompted the building of a special rack to accommodate both the amplifier and one or two batteries in order to more easily facilitate use of AN/PRC-25 batteries. The rack is made of aluminum, is very compact and can be back carried. These features greatly decrease the difficulty of carrying this system on operations such as MEDCAPS and Civic Action projects. Also the use of batteries eliminates the need for recharging thus allowing continuous use, and two AN/PRC-25 batteries last longer than a fully charged Nickel Cadmium battery.

One drawback in the use of AN/PRC-25 batteries is that Vietnamese units may have difficulty in allowing their batteries to be used for this purpose. It is also noted that while using AN/PRC-25 batteries, the unit will not put out the full amount of power but its power output is more than sufficient for use.

The aluminum rack can be fabricated at any sheet metal shop. The necessary parts can be acquired from electronics supply (figure 1). The amplifier must be removed from its original rack and mounted to the new one by drilling four holes (the bottom plate must first be removed from the amplifier). One hole must be drilled to fasten one end of the M-16 strap used to secure the batteries to the rack. A new interconnecting cable must be made (figure 2). One end of the cable connects to the amplifier and one end connects to the speaker cable. The ends of the battery wires can be prepared for plugging into the batteries by coating the ends with solder. One or two batteries can be used. When two are used, use a jumper wire to put them in series. Holes are provided in the rack to enable hand carrying, or back carrying with the use of two M-16 straps.

Refer to the enclosed pictures for visual identification of the original unit and its modification.

Incl 7 to Incl 2

<u>NO.</u>	<u>ITEM</u>
5	1/8" x 1/2" Flathead screws with nuts and washers
3	M-16 straps
1	MS3101A16-11S connector
1	MS3106A18-11S connector
3ft	speaker wire

FIGURE-1 Parts List

To
 Amplifier
 (MS3106A18-11S)

To Speaker Cable
 (MS3101A16-11S)

One or Two
 AN/PRC-25
 Batteries

FIGURE-2 Wiring Diagram




FIGURE-3 Drawing of Amplifier Rack




FIGURE 4 Original amplifier rack
assembly




FIGURE 5 Modified amplifier rack
assembly



FIGURE 6 View of Amplifier rack assembly
being back carried



FIGURE 7 View of complete portable
broadcast system

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 8TH PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS BATTALION
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96240

AVGM-8A

8 August 1969

SUBJECT: Operations Report of 8th Psychological Operations Battalion
for Period Ending 31 July 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. Section I - Operations, Significant Activities:

a. Personnel. Officer rotation for the 8th PSYOP Battalion recorded an unusually high 47 % of total strength since the last reporting period. During this same time frame, enlisted losses reflected 27% of MTOE authorizations for this unit. In most cases, satisfactory replacements have been received for projected officer shortages; however, critical vacancies have been created among the enlisted ranks due to the delay in receiving qualified replacements.

b. Intelligence. The 4th Infantry Division G2 requested assistance in an intelligence gathering mission to ascertain infiltration routes of various units by questioning prisoners. The Regional PSYOP Coordinating Center at Pleiku suggested the use of the leaflet at a glance. The concept being to drop one color within a defined area and then by questioning PCWs as to the color of leaflet he had seen, determine what areas he had moved through. The Regional PSYOP Coordinating Center at Nha Trang developed seven leaflets with short messages targeted for NVA troops and the 4th PSYOP Group printed twenty-one million for use in the program. The second use of this type mission was in the coastal region of II Corps. The leaflets, six altogether, were designed for use in VC areas in support of the Chiou Hoi Program.

The Vietnamese sociologist assigned to the 8th PSYOP Battalion Intelligence Section assisted by target analysts completed PSYOP area assessments of 3 provinces (Kontum, Tuyen Duc, and Binh Dinh). The assessments were compiled from data available in 8th PSYOP Battalion files and information gathered during field trips to the provinces.

Detailed analyst workbooks were initiated to supplement the workbooks

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8 August 1969

SUBJECT: Operations Report for 8th Psychological Operations Battalion
for Period Ending 31 July 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

kept on enemy activities and now contain significant allied combat, pacification, and PSYOP efforts. Activities in each of these areas is recorded so that information concerning enemy PSYOP can be interpreted according to the allied activity in that area which could influence the enemy activity. The workbooks contain maps, charts, and information on the following programs: Location where Hoi Chanhs rally; location of Volunteer Informant Program incidents; location of People Self Defense Forces; maps of daily friendly operations; locations of self-help projects; location of resettlement hamlets; location of Third Party Inducement incidents; map of MEICAP operations; map of Armed Propaganda Team operations; map of 8th PSYOP field team operations; Hamlet Evaluation System evaluation by allied areas of operations; and a map of population densities.

c. Operations. The Regional PSYOP Coordinating Center at Nha Trang developed two multi-colored posters to promote a provincial recruitment program for the Public Safety Division, Khanh Hoa Province. One poster depicted a National Policeman assisting a woman and a small child; the other showed a National Policeman in battle dress. The text of both posters advertised the country's need for National Policemen and present pay scales. Feed back from the Public Safety Advisor revealed a very favorable response which has resulted in 540 recruits to date, largely attributed to the posters displayed throughout Khanh Hoa Province.

At the request of Mil/PSYOP Division, IFFV, the Regional PSYOP Coordinating Center, Nha Trang, developed two tapes to be used in support of the Third Party Inducement Program. This tape was twenty to thirty minutes in length with a structure weighted heavily to the entertainment aspect. This was done by spacing the message between fairly long sections of Vietnamese music. The script for the tape was prepared by the Regional PSYOP Coordinating Center, Nha Trang, with the actual recording and duplication done by the 4th PSYOP Group. The second tape was an aerial tape encouraging the civilian population to participate in the program. Again the recording and duplication was done by 4th PSYOP Group from a script prepared at Nha Trang.

At the request of the Assistant Province Advisor/PSYOP, Darlac Province, the Regional PSYOP Coordinating Center, Nha Trang, produced picture ballots used in three Montagnard village elections. The ballots consisted of the name of the candidate with his symbol bordered in yellow and red. The project was divided into three separate parts with seven, twelve and thirteen separate ballots for each village. The artwork and layout were completed in 24 hours and the printing, in three colors, 24 hours later. Delivery, to include transportation, was within the time frame requested by Darlac Province.

The Chief of the Nha Trang Regional PSYOP Coordinating Center devel-

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8 August 1969

SUBJECT: Operations Report for 8th Psychological Operations Battalion
for Period Ending 31 July 1969, RGS CSFOR-65 (R1)

NOT REPRODUCIBLE

oped a plan to produce a $\frac{1}{2}$ hour radio show once a week for broadcast on Radio Nha Trang. The plan was submitted to the Commanding General, II Corps on 15 June and approved 22 June. U.S. monetary support was provided by ITSV and necessary equipment was purchased. The program has a Chieu Hoi theme and a format of news, editorials, sentimental appeals, and entertainment. It is directed at VC within the Radio Nha Trang broadcast radius. The first broadcast was made on 17 July and the program has been on the air each subsequent Thursday evening. From translations of scripts and comments from Vietnamese who listened to the programs, it has been determined that the format is well conceived and production quality is high. The program's principle asset is timeliness. Information on Hoi Chanh has been broadcast a few days after they rallied and GVN announcements, such as President Thieu's election proposal, can be aired when the information is current. Weekly enemy losses can be tabulated by area and broadcast when they are still fresh in the enemy mind.

Staff coordination between the S2, Propaganda Development Center, and S3 Air, 8th PSYOP Battalion, has resulted in a campaign to counter VC rice confiscation. Intelligence on rice growing areas, harvest dates, and VC confiscation activities has been sufficiently developed for central targeting. A series of three leaflets directed at the rural farm population and one leaflet directed against the VC involved in confiscation have been developed and pre-tested. The leaflets directed at farmer were designed to reinforce resentment against being victimized by the VC and encourage cooperation with GVN to protect the crops. The leaflet directed against the VC is a Chieu Hoi appeal pointing out that stealing from farmers is neither honorable nor an effective way to win over the rural population. The leaflets supporting this program will be dropped in mid-August.

A project was initiated on 12 July to publicize President Thieu's election speech of the previous day. This was a combined media campaign wherein leaflets, posters, ground and aerial recording tapes, and Nha Trang Radio was used. A total of seven printed items were produced. Except for incidental exposure to Radio Nha Trang, the urban population was not targeted, but both friendly and enemy personnel in the rural areas were exposed to multiple media. All material announcing the election proposal and explaining the six conditions for elections has been produced and the majority has been disseminated. The election proposal will continue to be used in related propaganda and the enemy failure to respond to it will be publicized to show communist bad faith in making no attempt to end the conflict.

To develop RVNAF image propaganda necessitated by U.S. Troop withdrawals, it was determined that the 8th PSYOP Battalion's photo files

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SUBJECT: Operations Report for 8th Psychological Operations Battalion
for Period Ending 31 July 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

required considerable expansion. To aid in the accomplishment, a letter was sent to HQ, IFFV on 22 July requesting permission to make direct liaison with U.S. Advisors to RVNAF training centers and installations. A letter of introduction was also requested. After receiving approval from HQ, IFFV, the Propaganda Development Center sent a photographer to the Special Forces Training Center at Dong Ba Thin. The trip to Dong Ba Thin resulted in some usable photographs, but its principle value was to establish a basis for allocating time and determining coordination and support requirements. Procedures have been refined and photo gathering visits have been planned to all major Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces installations and training centers in II Corps. The photo file will be used to produce a variety of materials to show that Vietnamese forces are strong enough and well enough trained to assume the responsibilities from departing U.S. Troops.

Section II: Lessons Learned

Item: Movies with English Sound Track

OBSERVATION: Audiences, particularly Montagnard tribesmen, enjoy American western and war films.

EVALUATION: The audience appears appreciative and more receptive to propaganda when an interpreter explains the general theme of the film prior to the start of the movies, and makes appropriate additional remarks during the movies, utilizing the public address system.

RECOMMENDATION: Recommend that audio-visual teams consider this technique when American films are used in the conduct of audio-visual missions.

Item: 1.5 KW Generator

OBSERVATION: Audio-visual teams within II Corps Tactical Zone have been utilizing 1.5 KW Generators borrowed from JUSPAO in lieu of 3 KW generators organic to the MSQ-85 van.

EVALUATION: The ONAN Generator, model number 102 AK51P/6674C used as a substitute for the 3 KW generator has proven to be fully capable of providing the power required by PSYOP audio-visual teams conducting field operations. Its weight alone makes it preferable to the 3 KW generator which requires block and tackle equipment to mount and/or dismount from the MSQ-85 audio-visual van. The ONAN 1.5 can also be heli-borne with projector equipment to areas inaccessible to a 3/4 ton truck.

RECOMMENDATION: Recommend that audio-visual teams approach Provincial JUSPAO representatives as to the possibility of temporary loan of ONAN

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8 August 1969

SUBJECT: Operations Report for 8th Psychological Operations Battalion
for Period Ending 31 July 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

1.5 generators.

Item: Hoi Chanh Quick Reaction Questionnaire

OBSERVATION: Because speed is of the utmost importance on the battle-field, the 4th Infantry Division felt it needed a faster and more concise method for exploiting Hoi Chanh. As a result, the bilingual Hoi Chanh Quick Reaction Questionnaire has been developed and serves as guidance for debriefing Hoi Chanh on the spot. It is currently being used by all field units in the 4th Division.

EVALUATION: The effect of the Questionnaire appears to be good. Based on information obtained during an interrogation using this questionnaire, the 4th Division was able to induce 3 members of K6 24th Regiment to return to the Government of Vietnam.

RECOMMENDATION: Recommend that a questionnaire be adopted by all field units as a universal method for Hoi Chanh interrogation on a quick reaction basis.

Section III - DA Survey Information: None


FOR *Art Bull (by MAJ)*
WILLIAM J. JACOBS
LTC, FA
Commanding

Added / INCL
1. Org Chart

DISTRIBUTION:

- 8 - IFFV, ATTN: G3 O&T
- 2 - CINCSARPAC, ATTN: GPOC-DT
- 3 - USARV, ATTN: AVHGC-DST
- 20 - 4TH PSYOP GP, ATTN: AVGM-C
- 2 - CO, 6th PSYOP Battalion
- 2 - CO, 7th PSYOP Battalion
- 2 - CO, 10th PSYOP Battalion

8th PSYOP BATTALION ORGANIZATION



Incl 1 to Incl 3

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 10TH PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS BATTALION
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96215

AVGM-10C

15 August 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 10th Psychological Operations Battalion
For Period Ending 31 July 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (RI)

1. DISTRIBUTION

1. Section I - Operations: Significant Activities

a. Personnel:

During the period 1 May 1969 through 31 July 1969, the Battalion received 16 officers and 29 enlisted men. During the same period 12 officers and 40 enlisted men departed.

b. Intelligence: None

c. Operations:

(1) This report covers a period of 92 days, 15 of which were devoted to training.

(2) During this period the Battalion relocated its entire leaflet stockage from Binh Thuy, VNAF, to a new storage area approximately three (3) miles by road from Binh Thuy. The movement involved over 200 conexes and some 225 million leaflets in addition to 2,250 reams of blank paper.

(3) On 8 May 1969 the Battalion received a request from IV CTZ TOC to lend psychological operations support to the S-5 of the B-55 Mike Force (Special Forces) battalion planning an operation on Phu Quoc Island. Initial requirements were for a saturation program of leaflets, bilingual Cambodian and Vietnamese, and loudspeaker missions to be flown by the 5th SOS. Direct contact with the S-5 of the Mike Force plus reference to our Area Studies proved the former requirement to be non-productive. The percentage of Cambodians on the island was so small that it was negligible and the literacy rate, though not statistically confirmed, was also estimated as quite low. The second requirement, loudspeaker missions by the 5th SOS, presented inherent difficulties in that the U-10 aircraft were prohibited from flying to the island. All missions would therefore, have to be carried out by C-47's at great loss of loudspeaker hours versus flight hours. In order to provide some initial support to the operation, in view of the lack of S-5 planning and short reaction time, the Battalion provided a Combat Loudspeaker (HB) Team to the Force which departed for Phu Quoc on 11 May. Base camp was established at Duong Dong. The HB Team was briefed by the Audience Analysis Section, S-3, and S-2 in addition to 5th Special Forces before their departure. They were also provided with

AVGM-10C

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 10th Psychological Operations Battalion
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seven (7) standard pre-cut Chieu Hoi tapes, a tape recorder, and several blank tapes. Quick reaction propaganda analysis had revealed heavy VC taxation and fear of removal from the island to be major themes to be exploited. Upon arrival, the Battalion HB Team cut three (3) tapes utilizing these themes as well as two (2) tapes used to explain the presence and purpose of the Mike Force to the islanders. On 12 May the S-5 of Company D, 5th Special Forces Group, took over as S-5 for the operation. During briefings with the new S-5 it was agreed to contact CTF 116 (Navy) to obtain a Navy Beach Jumper Team and their loudspeaker unit for mounting in one of the Special Forces helicopters. This was accomplished on or about 16 May and greatly facilitated the loudspeaker broadcasts as well as relieving the 5th SOS of a severe flight-hour burden. Due to lack of contact with VC elements and operational necessities elsewhere, the Phu Quoc Island operation was closed out on 21 May. Observations by our HB Team were that the islanders responded well and were extremely interested in the material presented to them. This was due in great measure to the previous lack of PSYOP effort on this island. The Navy is now directing psychological operations out of An Thoi where our HB Team is collocated and is coordinating with this Battalion on campaign plans.

(4) On 21 May 1969, Company D, 5th Special Forces Group, requested the Battalion to provide one (1) Combat Loudspeaker (HB) Team with selected tapes for a military operation at Nui Cot Mountain in the Seven Mountain Region of Chau Doc. The HB Team just returned from Phu Quoc (See para 1c (3), above) was briefed and flown to the area on 24 May. Seven (7) 10th PSYOP Battalion tapes and three (3) JUSPAO tapes were supplied the S-5 of the operation for his use. The HB Team was returned to Battalion on 28 May having successfully completed their mission of circling the mountain advising villagers as to the presence and purpose of the Mike Force and GVN troops in the area. The Navy Beach Jumper Team with their loudspeaker unit was again successfully utilized on the Special Forces helicopters. Through the last week of May the Battalion, in coordination with 5th SOS, flew eight (8) loudspeaker missions (three of which were at night, one being a Spooky/Gabby) and five (5) leaflet missions in support of the GVN force that remained in Chau Doc Province. Four (4) leaflets and four (4) tapes developed by CG, IV CTZ were also produced. Dissemination was made by ARVN forces.

(5) Graphic XI Camera System: In May, two (2) of the Battalion's combat loudspeaker teams tested the Graphic XI Camera System. Test results showed the camera system to be unsuitable and the following recommendations made:

(a) The equipment needs of PSYOP field teams revolves around the mission of the particular team. The HB (Combat Loudspeaker Team) as deployed in IV CTZ could not use any bulky camera system due to the tactical aspect of their employment. The GRAFLEX XI is not light, compact or durable. The HE (Audio/Visual) Team equipped with MSQ-85 can carry heavier equipment and provide greater protection for that equipment.

(b) Almost any camera system will work effectively. Problems encountered

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with camera systems have not been whether the system was good or bad. The tendency in providing new PSYOP equipment seems rather to be concentrated on testing the most expensive instead of the most practical items. Simplicity of operation, ruggedness and compactness should be the selection criteria for a camera system. A Kodak "Instamatic" with a permanent flash cube might be a better camera selection. It's rugged, dependable, simple and if film supplies break down the PX will serve as back up. A Polaroid "Swinger" would be another good choice for instant photos on MEDCAPs, etc. Both of the mentioned systems would be adequate for field use, if properly supplied, and the overall cost would be considerably less. Training would be less and repair requirements would be less also. Systems used should be small enough to be carried in the team member's packet or pack, thus making it highly mobile and reducing theft.

(6) In June the Battalion began conducting a monthly MEDCAP at both the Regional and Provincial Chieu Hoi Centers. Response has been favorable and to date over 700 Hoi Chanh have been treated at both centers.

(7) The Battalion compiled, printed and distributed a PSYOP Guidebook/Media Catalog designed to assist field PSYOP requesting agencies and create an awareness of the PSYOP support available in IV CTZ.

(8) The Area Assessment Team completed studies in An Xuyen, Bac Lieu and Ba Xuyen Provinces. To date, fourteen (14) out of sixteen (16) Province Area Assessments have been completed.

(9) To support the US troop redeployment through the use of psychological operations, the Battalion developed three (3) aerial tapes, four (4) leaflets and one (1) poster. In addition, copies of the Midway Leaflet were aerielly disseminated and previously developed GVN Image posters utilized.

(10) In support of the Upper Delta Accelerated Chieu Hoi Month the Battalion produced three (3) million leaflets and 50,000 posters to supplement our normal stockage. A total of 72 loudspeaker missions and thirty (30) C-47 leaflet drop missions (dropping 40,872,000 leaflets) were conducted.

(11) The following After Action Report was turned in by 1Lt (AF) James C. Hohlt upon the completion of his U-10 mission to Kien Giang Province the morning of 30 July 1969.

Torchy Silo Papa requested that I play Early Word over the mountain at VS 961225. The theme was about a woman who was killed by a VC booby trap. While I was playing over target, Silo Papa told me that I was receiving heavy ground fire (small arms). While orbiting target I saw four people moving on the mountain. Silo Papa decided to put in some artillery and requested that I continue to play the message. I used 39S (Chieu Hoi or Die) tape. A forward Air Controller (FAC), David 63, came over the target to adjust the artillery.

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He received ground fire so he decided to put in an airstrike. The FAC requested that I stay over the target while the airstrike took place, pausing the tape. The aircraft was a B-57 Royal Australian Air Force type (Magpie 41). It dropped 6 each 750 pound bombs. Bomb Damage Assessment was 3 structures destroyed, 1 structure damaged, 1 large secondary explosion and 3 killed by aircraft. (Time for airstrike TOT 0945 - 1010, VS 961225)"

d. Logistics: None

2. Section II - Lessons Learned

a. Personnel: None

b. Operations:

(1) Hoi Chanh:

A 16mm film with sound "The Life of a Hoi Chanh" is being produced. The film story is one depicting the life of a Hoi Chanh and his family at the Regional Chieu Hoi Center here in Can Tho. The film will be distributed to Battalion Field Teams, Armed Propaganda Teams, Vietnamese Information Service, and other requesting agencies. It is hoped that these agencies will utilize the film as a means to induce Viet Cong to rally to the GVN. It may also be used as a general information film. The film is being produced in Vietnamese, Cambodian, and English with a running time of fifteen minutes. The film will be completed the last of the August.

It has long been recognized that a lack of knowledge exists as to what actually happens to the Hoi Chanh once they depart the Chieu Hoi Center. Since the Chieu Hoi Center maintains locator files on all ex-Hoi Chanh, the feasibility of tasking the Battalion Area Study and Field Teams with preparing a study as to the events that effect the "new life" that the Hoi Chanh has chosen to pursue, is being examined. If sufficient information could be made available, then positive steps can be taken to assure the "fence-riding" Viet Cong that opportunity for a new life actually does exist for a Hoi Chanh and is continued beyond the graduation exercises at the Chieu Hoi Centers. The study will take approximately three (3) months to complete and will cover a one (1) year period in the life of an ex-Hoi Chanh.

(2) PSYOP Exploitation Team

The utilization of a PSYOP exploitation team composed of personnel assigned to the Propaganda Development Section has been helpful in obtaining on-the-spot information during specific situations. In addition to the information procured, it affords section personnel with practical experience in areas outside the limits of Can Tho.

(3) Early Word

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Several new ways to use Early Word are proving to be very effective. An outbreak of Cholera in a district was announced and instructions relayed to local inhabitants. Elections in Sa Dec were publicized by both tape and Early Word broadcasts with slightly larger turn out than usual. A sample message follows:

"Dear people,

Today is election of the village council and hamlets belong to these villages consists of Hoa Tan, An Khanh, An Phu Thuan and Phu Long (Duc Ton District). People will actively go to vote for select the outstanding man as representative for the people in this village council and hamlet. To vote is directly contributing to build the village and hamlet.

The people who are living at Phu Long Hamlet must go to vote from Phu Binh Village.

Participation of the election because that is your duty and interest"

A Hoi Chanh in Kien Tuong Province was placed in a helicopter and transmitted via the helicopter's FM set through the U-10 to his unit. Mobility, range, and reaction time were greatly increased in this instance.

Between 28 and 30 July 1969, Tien Can District Advisors, in coordination with the S-5 Advisor, Vinh Binh Province (Advisory Team 72), requested three C-47 Early Word PSYOP air missions. These missions were flown on a quick reaction basis to exploit Hoi Chanh and the latest intelligence on enemy unit locations.

Due to the lack of time available to respond to the requests, it was impractical to prepare a tape in advance or land for a locally prepared tape. In addition, certain difficulties prevented the Hoi Chanh from broadcasting directly by Early Word to their former comrades. In each case the aircraft were provided blank tapes, along with the standard preout tapes carried by all IV CTZ PSYOP aircraft, which enabled them to orbit the Province TOC and record the Chieu Hoi message.

While the "Quick Tape" method is not as desirable, from a practical point of view, as the standard Early Word, it was effective from the PSYOP standpoint. The results of the three missions were six (6) Hoi Chanh, two weapons, and fourteen (14) grenades. During interrogation all six (6) Hoi Chanh stated they had heard the aircraft's message.

(4) Pacification

On 21 June 1969 a combined pacification PSYOP operation was conducted at AP Tuong Tri (2) Hamlet in Tam Binh District. The operation was combined with ARVN and US PSYOP elements and given security by local RF and NIFF soldiers.

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The PSYOP elements consisted of the District Chief, ARVN S-5, V13 representative, POLWAR MEDCAP Team, Local Public Health Service, Local Agricultural Service, a visiting cultural drama team, and US field team 10-E-6. A U-10 "Speak" aircraft, equipped with Early Word, was used to gather the people in from the outskirts of the hamlet. The aircraft was controlled by team 10-E-6 (Audio/Visual) while the ARVN S-5 did the Early Word broadcast.

This operation was of a pacification and information type. In the past months enemy propaganda has been captured that depicted the US as tyrants and invaders, and the GVN as puppets of the US. The people are being told that when the US and ARVN soldiers enter their village, they come only to destroy and conquer. This operation was designed to counter this VC propaganda. By bringing medicine and entertainment to the people, we hoped to destroy the credibility of the VC. We also added our own propaganda through the speeches of the District Chief, S-5, and other PSYOP agencies. There are some basic techniques employed in this type operation that make it effective. First, it is an intense operation utilizing as many PSYOP assets as possible. Operations of this configuration leave a lasting impression on the people. For many months they will remember the day when PSYOPS visited the village. Also the presence of the District Chief and other officials vividly shows the people that their government really does care about them. It also makes them feel important to be visited by so big a government official. Therefore this operation is very effective in building the GVN image. The presence of the US PSYOP teams in turn destroys the bad image of the United States that the Viet Cong have so avidly tried to instill in them. They see for themselves that the United States is here to help them, not destroy or conquer them. In short, the operation put its emphasis on face-to-face communication, conducted by indigenous Vietnamese and enhanced by the presence of the US PSYOP team.

c. Training and Organization:

During this period the Battalion initiated a training program for Officers and Pressmen drawn from the POLWAR Bloc and the 40th POLWAR Battalion. To date, ten (10) ARVN printers have completed the instruction and ten (10) more are currently being trained.

d. Intelligence: None

e. Logistics: None

f. Organization: None

g. Psychological Operations Development: None

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LTC, Inf
Commanding

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Added 1 Incl

1. Organizational Chart

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