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MASSIVE RETALIATION

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
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
USAWC RESEARCH PAPER

MASSIVE RETALIATION

A MONOGRAPH

by

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Clear understanding of the strategy of "massive retaliation" has been obfuscated by semantics and controversy. Detailed study reveals a strategy much different from that implied by those emotional words. Such a study demonstrates the strategy was not new. Instead it was a period of time in the logical evolution of the strategy of "realistic deterrence," a strategy which has been developing since 1945. The nuances of the Eisenhower strategy were the consequences of increased emphasis on economy. As a result critics complained that deterrence was achieved by strategic nuclear forces at the expense of general purpose forces. However, analyses of numerous cold war crises not only proves the efficacy of both forces during the years 1953-61 but demonstrates the strategy as a highly sophisticated blend of diplomacy and selective response.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT	Page 11
SECTION A. Genesis of Massive Retaliation	1
The Truman Administration	1
The Eisenhower Years	10
SECTION B. The Effectiveness of Massive Retaliation	31
Korea 1950	32
Indochina 1954	37
Quemoy-Matsu 1954, 1958	39
Suez 1956.	43
Hungary 1956	46
Lebanon 1958	47
Criticism of Massive Retaliation	52
Arms Control	54
Conclusion	56
FOOTNOTES	58
SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY	64

SECTION A: THE GENESIS OF MASSIVE RETALIATION

Our way toward security lies not in any sudden burst of activity, but in the steady unwavering, purposeful application of energy, over a long period of years We are in for a long pull.

Bradley¹

It has long been customary and convenient for strategy and policy commentators to tag their subjects with various appellations such as "Containment," "The New Look," "Flexible Response," "Sufficiency," thus placing those strategies and policies irrevocably within neat, well ordered periods of time, which usually coincide with the tenure of a particular president. Such was the case with the so called strategy of "Massive Retaliation" supposedly formulated under the Eisenhower Administration and allegedly formally articulated by John Foster Dulles on 12 January 1954 in his famous and controversial speech to the Council on Foreign Relations in New York City. Because of the speech, a continuing barrage of public criticism forced the Administration into numerous rebuttals, "reformulations and explanations of the doctrine. . ." ² through-out the Eisenhower incumbency.

A careful look at that speech, however, demonstrates a strategy far different from that implied by the emotive words "massive retaliation," which Dulles never used. Instead in his speech he talked about "massive retaliation" as part of a far more complex strategy when he said, "Local defenses must be reinforced by the further deterrent of massive retaliatory power." ³ In the speech one can discern ten cardinal points:

1. Acknowledged Threat
2. Long Haul
3. Economy
4. Deterrence
5. Collective Security
6. Flexibility
7. Strategic Reserve
8. Foreign Aid
9. Local Defense
10. Initiative

In order to evaluate the Eisenhower strategy it is necessary to study how it differed from the strategy of the Truman years; to analyse its development and implementation and to discuss failures and weaknesses.

Most of the precursors to Dulles' ten points can be found in the evolution of the Truman Administration's strategy. Similarly, as will be seen in the next chapter, threads of Maxwell Taylor's strategy of "Flexible Response" are found in both the Eisenhower strategy and the Truman strategy.

The advent of nuclear weapons at the close of World War II made traditional strategic thought obsolete overnight. The search for new strategic concepts includes the story of "Massive Retaliation." As this chapter will demonstrate about "Massive Retaliation," worldwide military strategy is evolutionary with variances occurring in emphasis as priorities are altered both by cycles of war and peace as well as by continuously changing

national and international environments. It will be seen that this strategy, which has been with the U.S. since World War II, was essentially a strategy of deterrence. It included the full range of power options from massive retaliation to a show of force.

The first thread to carry over from the Truman Administration was the common recognition of the threat which had been alluded to by Averell Harriman in April 1945 but was first articulated by George Kennan in 1946. He said, the Soviet Union is:

. . . a political force committed fanatically to the belief that with the US there can be no permanent modus vivendi, that it is desirable and necessary that the internal harmony of our society be disrupted, our traditional way of life be destroyed, the international authority of our state be broken, if Soviet power is to be secure. This political force has complete power of disposition over the energies of one of the world's greatest peoples and the resources of the world's richest national territory The problem of how to cope with this force is undoubtedly the greatest task our diplomacy has ever faced and probably the greatest it will ever have to face.⁴

Because he recognized the long term nature of the threat, Kennan formulated in early 1947 the foreign policy, which was to counter the threat over the long haul. Although he focussed the policy on Europe,⁵ it was a worldwide policy of containing Soviet expansion wherever it occurred. "Containment" became the keystone of the Truman Doctrine.

In part, Kennan wrote:

. . . United States policy toward the Soviet Union must be that of a long-term patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies. . . Soviet pressure against the free

institutions of the Western world is something that can be contained by the adroit and vigilant application of counter-force at a series of constantly shifting geographical and political points, corresponding to the shifts and maneuvers of Soviet policy⁶

Recognizing the need to articulate a sound military strategy to support such a foreign policy, Secretary of State General George C. Marshall implemented under State Department auspices an analysis which recognized: war as a continuing possibility; the role of strength in support of politics; the deterrent effect of forces in being; the need for readiness; and the need for adequate forces over the long haul.⁷ Samuel Huntington points out, the analysis "was a landmark in the evolution of American Strategic thought from the old strategy of mobilization for general war to a new strategy of deterrence."⁸ Particularly significant was the fact that President Truman recognized the two fold direction in which strategy was evolving. First he noted the deterrent effect of atomic weapons in 1946, when he said, they "can be used as an overriding influence against aggression and reckless war."⁹ Second he realized worldwide US responsibilities when he said, "it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugations by armed minorities or by outside pressure."¹⁰

Partially as a result of difficulties during the Berlin Blockade of 1948, Kennan recognized that the United States had no flexibility to meet the Soviet ground threat.¹¹ In essence, the United States could either do nothing or use the atomic bomb.

Consequently, he recommended the establishment of a General Reserve of "two specialized divisions," trained and ready "for limited wars along the Soviet periphery".¹² Unfortunately the political climate in the US at the time would not permit the formation of those forces.

The Truman Administration, having faced a demobilization after WW II, a continuous decline in revenue, and a public unawareness of the threat, was "determined not to spend more than it took in taxes."¹³ Combined with a definite ceiling on Federal expenditures was the antiquated outlook of military planners, particularly Army planners, who looked to preparedness as being prepared to fight in the same manner as during the closing days of World War II.¹⁴ In spite of recognition by the armed services for increased readiness because of the probable suddenness of the next war, Marshall insisted on improving mobilization and industrial capacity, programs which were almost dictated because of a lack of national will and available revenue to establish large forces in being.¹⁵

In sum, from the close of World War II to the first Soviet atomic explosion in September 1949 the Truman Administration, although aware of defense needs, had failed to achieve a viable military strategy or the balanced forces to support its foreign policy of "containment". Moreover, the nuances of mobilization, nuclear power, and limited war were never defined.¹⁶ The United States failed in spite of the fact that parameters supporting such a strategy had been described in the State Department analysis previously discussed.

As seen in preceeding sections, the explosion of the Soviet atomic bomb and the fall of China to communism prompted the United States to develop a thermonuclear bomb and to make a new strategic appraisal.¹⁷ This appraisal, the first paper to define a comprehensive statement of an overall national strategy and supporting military program became known as NSC-68.¹⁸ It predicted the Soviet threat reaching its peak in what was to become known as the "danger year" and defined the threat as the 1954 Russian capability to execute an all out atomic attack on the United States. The paper recommended an immediate military buildup of both the U.S. and her allies, and it suggested increasing US capabilities for both limited war and general war. It said that all this could be accomplished without economic fear since the U.S. could easily afford to spend as much as 20 percent of its GNP.¹⁹ Thus in the spring of 1950, the U.S. recognized an overall strategy responding to Cold War realities instead of an antiquated strategy based on WW II thinking.

The budget ceiling for FY 51 had already been established at \$13 billion. Moreover, elections were in the offing and Congress was in a tax reduction mood, not a production mood. Harry Truman realized the difficulties in making "a great military effort in time of peace. It meant doubling or tripling the budget, increasing taxes heavily, and imposing various kinds of economic controls,"²⁰ none of which were feasible without war.

The answer to the budget issue came with the Communist invasion of Korea removed the recommendations of NSC-68 from the

realm of theory and made them immediate budget issues."²¹

With such a clear and present threat, Congress lifted ceilings on military expenditures and approved the last increase in revenue during the 1950's.

On July 4, 1950 President Truman went before Congress and listed his priorities for the expenditure of funds. They were, "first to meet the immediate situation in Korea, and second to provide for an early, but orderly, buildup of our military forces to a state of readiness designed to deter further acts of aggression. . .",²² and finally to help ready the mobilization base. Here, then, was the funding answer to the requirements of NSC-68. The people with a new will would support taxes for the immediate threat and the administration would use tax revenues in part to counter the future threat. And expenditures for FY 51 soared to \$22 billion.²³

Even though NSC-68 implicitly recommended forces in being for deterrence, Secretary of Defense General Marshal also recognized the economic impossibility of maintaining large standing military forces over the long haul. He, therefore continued to stress preparedness by "increasing the readiness of American industry and manpower for full mobilization."²⁴

Nevertheless, with the entry of the Chinese into the war in November 1950, the American people and Congress clamored for total mobilization while the Administration moved the danger year forward from 1954 to 1952. The requirements of Korea answered the requirements of NSC-68 by expanding the armed forces. The

strategic air capability was strengthened in order that the US might retaliate against any surprise attacks by the Soviets. Because the Administration believed that the invasion of Korea was but a feint for a major attack in Europe, the ground forces in Europe were strengthened to deter Soviet encroachment. And the expansion of retaliatory forces and ground forces in Europe increased U.S. reliance on allies for base rights and manpower. Moreover, because of the aggressiveness of communism in the Far East and the Soviet military capability in Europe, NATO was strengthened, 7th Army was created and SHAPE was established.

In the period FY 1950-FY 1953 Army Divisions were expanded from 10 divisions and 11 regimental combat teams to 20 divisions and 18 regimental combat teams. The Navy's war ships expanded from 200 to 400. Two Marine Divisions grew to three Division Wing Teams. The Air Force soared from 48 wings to 95 "on its way to a goal of 143 wings." Total military personnel increased 1,460,000 to 3,636,000. Nearly one million had been brought into the service during the last six months of 1950.²⁵ In addition, from 1950 to 1953, US retaliatory capability multiplied dramatically to include development of the H-bomb, stockpiling of nuclear weapons, procurement of increased numbers of delivery systems and an increase in the alert status of SAC.

Because of U.S. rearmament, the possibility of general war receded in the summer of 1951, and the danger year date was reestablished as 1954.

During 1951 and 1952 the war in Korea became unpopular with the American people, and pressures increased on the Administration to ease the burden of war. Typical of this was the long steel strike in early 1952. Even the attitude of Congress changed when \$4.3 billion was cut from the Administration's defense budget request of \$50.9 for FY 1953.

This general feeling reflecting a diminishing sense of urgency, was also felt in NATO. The North Atlantic Council drastically reduced force goals on which there had been agreement ten months before. The British, in an attempt to cut costs and as a prelude to what was to come in 1953 in the US and in 1955 in Russia cut back their troop strength and increased their reliance on nuclear weapons.

During the election year of 1952 the Truman Administration continued to expand U.S. strategic capability and maintained armed forces of 3 $\frac{1}{2}$ million men. The cost of defense together with the disenchantment with the war in Korea, and the general cooling off of the international situation served to frustrate the Administration's attempts to strengthen its forces for the critical year 1954. Moreover, emphasis on the defense establishment conflicted with domestic issues. The time now was ripe for a change in national leadership.

However before the Democratic Administration left office in 1952, it had responded to the communist threat in the following ways:

1. Increased armed service force levels.
2. Placed greater emphasis on conventional forces in Europe.
3. Established a Far Eastern Defensive Perimeter and security system.
4. Increased aid to French Forces in Indochina and Chinese Nationalists in Formosa.
5. Increased aid to countries on the periphery of the CPR and USSR.

These also became a part of the Truman legacy to Eisenhower.

- The Eisenhower Years -

During the election year campaign speeches were often brutal. Acheson alleged that Dulles called the "Containment" policy "negative, immoral and futile," and Eisenhower was quoted as calling Marshall's efforts "a purgatory of improvisation."²⁶ But in spite of the allegations "Containment" was also part of the Truman legacy, which Eisenhower not only inherited but used. The inheritance consisted of a greatly expanded Strategic Air Command, an elaborate system of worldwide alliances, a near monopoly of the atomic bomb, and a "program of economic, technical and developmental assistance to friendly countries . . ."²⁷ Eisenhower had also inherited from Truman a special document assessing the overall national security. Known as NSC-141, it took into cognizance the Soviet threat and urged increased defense spending to maintain military buildup goals, buildup continental air defense, and increase economic and military aid to the Far East and Middle East. However, early in his campaign Eisenhower had put forth the major ideas which would form his "New Look." Chief among these

were an economic-military balance and the "Long Haul." He visualized the threat to the U.S. as twofold; the U.S. could be defeated militarily, and just as important, the U.S. could be destroyed economically. A balanced defense had to be maintained to meet both these threats over a long period of time. One was as dangerous as the other. Having his own concept for a strategy, he therefore, set aside the recommendations of the outgoing administration and called together a special committee to study possible politico-military alternatives for his incumbancy.

Although Eisenhower was to continue Truman's tradition of seeking arms controls throughout his presidency, his advisers were told to consider three strategic options only: continuation of "containment" in its entirety; adoption of "drawing the line;" and the possible implementation of "roll back" or "liberation."

Each of these policies had certain military implications. Containment, if pursued, required large general purpose forces to react to Communist initiatives. "Drawing a line" relied on a strategic nuclear capability to deter the enemy from making initiatives in the first place. "Roll back" implies encouraging and supporting insurgency within the Soviet sphere of influence. Once these alternatives were fully analyzed, they would serve as background material for regular governmental agencies to make policy determinations.²⁸

In July 1953 the completed reports were turned over to the Planning Board of the National Security Council for consolidation into one statement of policy. The Board resolved the issues in

October with NSC-162, recommending a continuation of "containment" modified by "drawing the line." Implementation of this policy would not only halt Communist expansion once it started but would deter it from starting in the first place. As in NSC-68, the Soviet threat was described as severe and long-term although not immediate. Perhaps prompted by the Soviet thermonuclear test in August of 1953, the drafters of NSC-162 recognized Soviet retaliatory capability and strongly recommended maintenance of current ground forces and enlargement of air defense to counter the Soviet threat to America's heartland. In addition, the board recognized the need for free world economic stability. With such a serious economic economy in defense expenditures would prove difficult.²⁹

Thus, the problem facing the Eisenhower Administration was one of balance, how to devise a new "long term" strategy cognizant of military needs as well as being economically feasible. "For the first time in the Cold War a long-term military policy was to be consciously and directly related to other governmental ends."³⁰

To Eisenhower an economic-military balance was an essential prerequisite to a "long haul" strategy. He recognized the Soviet threat as being both military and economic with the latter more serious. He said that the Russian military threat could force on the U.S. "an unbearable security burden leading to economic disaster. . . ." In essence, "Communist guns, . . . were aiming at an economic target no less than a military target." Therefore, U.S. security rested "not upon the military establishment alone

but rather on two pillars--military strength in being and economic strength based on a flourishing economy."³¹

With the Korean War over, the adoption of the economic threat as well as the military threat allowed Eisenhower to strengthen his political hand by reducing military expenditures to prevent inflation. Stability over the long haul would avoid inflation and depression. A balanced budget and lower taxes would also help stabilize the economy. "Economic strength was needed to sustain the indefinite and relatively constant military burden."³²

As the Eisenhower Administration tackled the job of countering the economic threat during the first year of Administration, its initial resolve was to revise Truman's FY 54 budget and start to draft a new FY 55 budget. Moreover, Eisenhower's Director of the Budget set the pace for the Administration by announcing on 3 February 1953 that:

The first and most important tasks of our new administration is to proceed toward the accomplishment of a balanced budget. . .to reduce budgetary obligational authority; reduce the level of expenditures, critically examine existing programs, restrain commitments for new programs and generally to drive for greater efficiency and reduced costs. . .as well as initiate an immediate review within each department or agency calling for recommendations on the downward adjustment of program levels. . . .³³

The Democratic FY 54 Budget had been submitted to Congress in January 1953. It estimated total revenues of \$68.7 billion with expenditures of \$78.6 billion. \$46.3 billion was military. The deficit of \$9.9 billion was the initial target of the new Administration. In March a tentative expenditure limitation was

placed on the FY 1954 military budget, \$5.1 billion less than the Democratic estimate. When asked to report on the impact of such ceilings, the service chiefs reported such ceilings would threaten national security. When asked what would not affect national security, the chiefs replied any reduction would threaten it.³⁴ Thus a dilemma occurred between the economy goals of the Administration and the force level goals of the old Chiefs of Staff who were still directing military buildup toward the year of danger, 1954.

In spite of the clamor of the chiefs, the civilian leadership in the Pentagon pared \$2.3 billion out of Truman's expenditure estimate and \$5.2 billion from his appropriations request by cutting support activities, finding discrepancies and reducing unobligated carry over funds. The largest portion of the reductions, some \$5.1 billion, came out of Air Force appropriations. Thus the target of 143 wings by 1956 was reduced to 114 in FY 1954, although an increase of six wings was scheduled for 1955. The recalcitrance of the old Chiefs of Staff prompted the Administration to replace them. When the new chiefs took office on August 16, they were required to recommend force levels for use in preparing the FY 55 budget. Secretary Wilson give them a deadline of 2 October to complete their recommendations.³⁵

To the chiefs who had already seen NSC-162, the threat loomed large. It appeared that commitments were increasing. The explosion of the first Soviet H bomb in August of 1953, earlier than anticipated, argued against reductions. Moreover, no firm

decision had been made as to the use of nuclear weapons. Would the next war be fought entirely with conventional weapons? Without the answer, a meaningful military strategy to accompany the "new look" could not be made, and further reductions in stockpiles and ground forces would be sheer folly.

Another Truman recommendation from NSC-141 caught on: air defense would be enhanced. On this point an altercation developed concerning roles and missions among the three services. In spite of the disagreement and because of the growth of the Soviet long range air capability, the services were told to recommend expansion of air defense when they calculated force levels for FY 55.³⁶

Once again after considering the situation, and to the chagrin of the Administration, the chiefs concluded they could not recommend reductions for 1955. Moreover they were not ready to produce a well developed "New Look" strategy until after US commitments were clearly established. In addition, it was reported that the Joint Chiefs felt that there was not sufficient availability of atomic weapons to support a dramatic change in strategy.³⁷ Such a strategy could not be defined until the middle of 1954, much too late to affect the 1955 budget. Both the chairman of the JCS, Admiral Arthur W. Radford, and Secretary of Defense, Charles E. Wilson "agreed that the best defense plans and programs would come through evolution. . . ."³⁸

In spite of large areas of agreement the chiefs were caught in an imbroglio over Air Force insistence about early agreement on a long range goal of 137 wings by FY 57. Twining hoped to get

approval so that long lead time items could be accounted for in the 55 budget. This request was smaller than the 143 wing program asked for earlier. It accounted for increases in air defense wings at the expense of troop carrier strength, which naturally reinforced Army opposition. Moreover, in submission of the Air Force minority view, the Air Force claimed the 137 wing figure to be the absolute minimum requirement to carry out its mission.

The other services, looking at the manpower strength ceilings issued by the NSC, stated that their requirements were well below those necessary to meet national objectives. They would have insufficient forces to:

1. Fight a limited war without using forces from Korea or Europe.
2. Win another decision in Korea without troops from Europe.
3. Meet NATO commitments in general war.

Moreover, the Army stated that, unless some highlevel decisions were forthcoming for reducing Army responsibilities and deployments, Army troop strength would have to be raised substantially above 1,423,000 men by the close of FY 54.³⁹

In spite of the debate among the services, an agreement paper was forwarded to the Secretary of Defense on 2 October by the chiefs in which they recommended moderate increases in continental defense forces with no change in other areas. The chiefs saw no change in the threat, no change in commitments, no change in the need for reliable authority to plan on the use of atomic weapons. Consequently they could not cut manpower. Their recommendations included:

1. Maintaining the Army at 20 divisions augmented with increased air defense units for a total strength of some 1.5 million men.

2. Increasing the continental defense capability of the Navy by augmenting its 1,130 ships with 33 destroyer escorts and mine-sweepers. Additionally, they recommended start of a new aircraft carrier.

3. Changing nothing in the Marine Corps of 3 divisions and 3 air wings.

4. Raising the 114 Air Force wings programmed for FY 1954 to 120 by FY 1955.

In effect, by not reducing force levels and expenditures according to NSC guidance, the chiefs were forcing a decision from their civilian leaders on the use of atomic weapons and a reduction in U.S. foreign commitments.

Naturally such a program would cost more than the Administration desired, particularly in view of its economy objectives. The total expenditures would amount to \$42 billion and require an additional \$35 billion in new obligational authority. This was \$500 million more than Congress had approved for FY 1954. The increase was due to continental defense.

With the drive on efficiency, reduction of support structures and the end of the Korean War, these figures dismayed Secretary of the Treasury George M. Humphrey and Director of the Bureau of the Budget Joseph M. Dodge. They had counted on figures \$6 billion

to \$7 billion less in order to balance the budget for FY 1955, or as a minimum to have a budget below that of 1954.⁴⁰

Unable to gain approval or disapproval from the NSC or to force the policy decisions required for a revamped strategy, the JCS was given the program once again to refine for inclusion in the FY 55 budget with the fairly obvious task of reducing expenditures.

While the separate services worked out their budgets, the JCS reviewed strategy and force levels for the "Long Haul". Inclusions for the budget were to be resubmitted by 5 December and the "Long Haul" report was due on 1 December.

New guidance for the budget included the same force levels submitted earlier and the same budgetary assumptions. The budget objective was:

To provide strong military forces while at the same time fully recognizing the urgent necessity for assuring the maintenance for an indefinite period of a strong economy.

The JCS was to take into account:

1. A "floating D-Day" rather than a specific crisis date.
2. A recognition of the end of the Korean War.
3. An availability of stocks in Korea for D-Day.

And, "economies and increased efficiency would be contemplated and costs projected accordingly on a somewhat lower basis" ⁴¹ than 1954.

Meanwhile the JCS established a special committee under Air Force General Frank F. Everest to continue the "long haul" review. Its specific mission was to recommend a strategy in consonance with

both NSC guidance and a broad force outline for the next 3 years. The total manpower was to be less than 3 million men. No fiscal guidance was given, but the committee was directed to establish its own fiscal limits.⁴²

The role of the Chiefs of Staffs had altered considerably from the Truman Administration. Prior to Korea, the chiefs had been given a budgetary ceiling under which they had to find the best defense. During the Korean War they were permitted to state their requirements which subsequently were cut on economic or fiscal grounds by civilian leadership. At no time was the military asked to acknowledge the economic or political factors involved in meeting national strategy or commitments; whereas, under Eisenhower, the threat was perceived as both economic and military. Therefore, he desired that both threats be considered in military planning.

With the exception of Ridgway, the new directions were heartily accepted. Ridgway believed that over-reliance on estimates of how much the economy could support would dilute objective professional military judgments.

In spite of being allowed to seek their own solutions, the JCS and the Everest committee received on-going guidance that the budget would be \$35 billion and that large deficits would accrue in the next two years. Therefore, military requirements should reflect such constraints.⁴³

Nevertheless, the JCS could not resolve the basic dilemma between economy and the threat as they perceived it without knowing how atomic weapons would be used and if commitments would be

decreased. The US could not continue to try to do everything at once and it was impossible to be ready for the full spectrum of conflict and still be economy minded.⁴⁴

Gradually the civilian hierarchy came to recognize the problem. Yet even though Eisenhower, Humphrey, Dulles and the Deputy Secretary of Defense, Roger M. Kyes had come to recognize the need for a single strategy, the service secretaries failed to share their view. The Secretary of the Navy continued to emphasize conventional capability,⁴⁵ while the Army Secretary stressed what was later to be known as "flexible response". He said, "as long as the initiative remains with the enemy, he is likely to attempt to avoid our strength and exploit our weakness."⁴⁶ Moreover, Ridgway and Carney refused to accept the substitution of atomic weapons for manpower, something Radford had done on 13 October.

In an attempt to resolve the debate between military threat and economic threat the NSC produced NSC-162/2 which was approved by the President on 30 October. The chiefs' dilemma concerning nuclear weapons and commitments was clarified. Henceforth, the services were to plan to use both tactical and strategic nuclear weapons in any war larger than a "brush fire." Atomic power was substituted for manpower in an effort to reduce overall costs. The reality of a doctrine of "Massive Retaliation" was established when the major effort of United States security policy was defined as deterrence of Communist expansion. While the paper was being formulated, a great debate centered on whether or not the massive retaliatory power of the United States should be "the

major deterrent" or "a major deterrent." Certainly the choice of words implied a priority for resources, particularly if the were used. Objections to the had come from the Army and Navy. The won out and "Massive Retaliation" received the Administration's emphasis.⁴⁷

The role of US and allied ground forces in deterring local aggression was stressed. The allies, in the event of general war, were to have initial responsibility. Allied ground forces consisting of over 200 divisions or division equivalents would be relied on heavily. These would provide the real substitute for U.S. manpower. The major US contribution would be its nuclear arm. In addition, the NSC approved increased continental defense as well as economy in military expenditures and stresses viability of conventional forces over the long haul. This was the decision the Joint Chiefs had been awaiting, but its impact was not what they had been anticipated.

The guidance in NSC-162/2 constrained the services from basing large requirements for manpower and equipment on the possibility of a large scale conventional war. Consequently, the services would be forced to reduce requirements for mobilization reserves of equipment. Meanwhile, the Army and Navy Chiefs of Staff failing to take into account formidable free world divisions continued to object about the substitution of nuclear weapons for men.

In spite of disagreement and after a solid year of debate the Joints Chief finally presented a unanimously approved paper to

Secretary Wilson outlining plans for implementing the "new look" over the long haul. Their assumptions were:

1. International tension would remain the same.
2. Present power ratio between US and USSR would remain the same.
3. Massive retaliatory capacity was "the major deterrent" to both limited and general war.
4. Nuclear weapons would be used as required.
5. And finally, military fiscal requirements should be maintained for the long haul at \$33-34 billion annually,⁴⁸ the same figures required earlier to balance the cash budget.

Recommendations included the diplomatically sensitive issues of withdrawing all US troops from Korea and a reduction of US strength committed to NATO. Forces brought back to the US would be reconstituted into a strategic reserve. Rearmament of former enemies, Japan and Germany, and increased participation of allies in providing their own local defense were urged as well. The military aid program was to be revitalized with more effective use of funds for stimulating the development of forces in countries which could best complement US defense efforts. Continental defense was to be pushed and a mobilization base for general war provided. The latter belied US thoughts that no future general war of long duration would be fought and showed how the Joint Chiefs were influenced by the strategy and experience of WW II.

The chiefs even agreed on manpower reductions. The Army would lose 481,000 men before June 1957, the Navy 115,000, the Marine Corps 54,000. Only the Air Force would expand and that by 62,000.

These figures meant the Army would lose 6 divisions. The Navy would drop from 1126 to 1030 ships. And the Marine Corps would stay pat but at reduced strength with 3 divisions and 3 air wings. Reflecting increased emphasis by the JCS on strategic capability would increase the Air Force from 110 to 137 air wings.

In January 1955 the President declared "the largest tax reduction in. . .history."⁴⁹ Many said it was made at the expense of National Security. In a deliberate attempt to balance the budget in 1956, reductions in manpower planned for 1957 were moved to FY 55. And by June 1956 they were an accomplished fact. The Eisenhower Administration achieved its goal of a balanced budget with a surplus of \$1.6 billion; and defense spending stayed at about the 1955 level.

The force structure supporting the "New Look" changed markedly from that of the Korean War. As a result of the war's end, technological development, recognition of free world conventional capability, and increased numbers of nuclear weapons, manpower was cut drastically.

The greatest change was in the area of continental defense because it shared with strategic air power a high priority as one of the two key elements in a credible deterrent force. The strategic air arm received no buildup, and Secretary Dulles announced that the United States would "not attempt to match the Soviet bloc man for man and gun for gun"⁵⁰ in ground forces. Instead conventional ground forces would contract. The slack would be taken up by SAC, ready reserves and tactical nuclear

weapons. The Army reorganizing Pentomic divisions by 1957, shrank to one million men organized into 18 divisions and 10 Rcts. Shrinking the budget had had dramatic results.⁵¹

Another feature of the "New Look" was the increased dependence on tactical and strategic nuclear weapons. Dulles looked on them as conventional weapons. Naturally the decisions forced a shift in the NATO strategy. In what was said to have been the "biggest diplomatic achievement since World War II,"⁵² NATO based its planning on use of nuclear weapons.

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, over Ridgway's protests about reduced conventional ground forces, said that the problem would be alleviated by an improved state of Reserve Forces' readiness.⁵³ As a result, the number of drill pay reservists nearly doubled to one million men. At the same time, reserve expenditures more than doubled to \$879.8 million in FY 57. Great savings would accrue from this increased reliance on reserves:

The cost of one man on active duty, the administration estimated, equaled the cost of ten reservists. The substitution of the latter for the former, of course, rested on the assumption that an equal or greater number of reserves could meet the same needs as the active duty forces they were to replace. It presupposed an extremely high state of readiness for the reserves if they were to be capable of participating either in a limited war, in which nuclear weapons would probably be used, or in a general thermonuclear holocaust.⁵⁴

Another shift from the Truman Administration's defense program was an increased reliance on the strategy of deterrence. Rather than relying totally on a war waging capability with

conventional forces, emphasis was placed on deterring war as first priority. This would permit tremendous savings in maintaining forces in being while at the same time gearing both the nation's economy and military for the long haul.

Interestingly enough, with all the emphasis on nuclear deterrence in the "New Look," there were only 137 wings "compared to the prior 143 wing program of the Truman Administration."⁵⁵ The difference, much to the chagrin of the Army, had been six less wings of troop carriers. When compared to the Truman Program even further, the "New Look" provided an increase of five air defense wings while SAC was reduced by three and TAC by two wings. Thus, while there was no increase in wings, there was increased emphasis on combat aircraft at the expense of the other services. Moreover, Air Force receipt of a larger share of a reduced budget added to the emphasis.

As was seen during the Truman Administration, nuclear weapons would be used only in strategic retaliation in the event of a major attack on Western Europe or on the North American continent. Dulles' famous speech altered this considerably and made it possible that the US might retaliate in the gray areas of the world as well.

In the fall of 1955, although few of the basic assumptions on which NSC-162/2 was based obtained and Ridgway still argued against the substitution of nuclear weapons for men, "security, harmony, economy, and stability all seemed within reach."⁵⁶ However, this was only a momentary illusion. In two years, the illusion transposed itself into a nightmare as the US believed the

Soviet Union had developed considerable numbers of missiles, aircraft and nuclear weapons, enough to make "massive retaliation" a "balance of terror" between the US and the USSR. In 1955 at the Moscow air show the Soviets demonstrated that they were ahead of the US in long range bomber technology. Shortly thereafter, the US found evidence that Russia possessed numerous MRBM's. In 1957 they fired their first ICBM and a few months later launched the first earth satellite--Sputnik. These accomplishments together with numerous thermonuclear weapons prompted Churchill to say that this was an era "where safety will be the sturdy child of terror, and survival the twin brother of annihilation."

According to Dulles this mutual fear brought about considerable diminution of international tensions. Even Khrushchev announced that wars were no longer inevitable.⁵⁷ But at the same time, mutual retaliatory capability had brought about mutual deterrence. Thus the "New Look" strategy suddenly appeared less viable in the gray areas where there were less possibilities for direct USSR/US confrontations. Without an overwhelming preponderance of power in favor of the US nuclear retaliation would be ineffective in small wars unless the US felt it in her vital interest to risk escalation to thermonuclear war. Suddenly, the Administration became aware, as Ridgway had been all along, of the need for other forces to supplement the strategic forces. Thus, as Huntington so succinctly put it, for "deterrence there was a maximum strength beyond which strategic retaliatory forces need not go and a minimum strength below which limited war forces should not be

allowed to go."⁵⁸ Thus acting within domestic-economic constraints the Administration developed a "New New Look."

In the President's 1957 budget message, he stated the need to expand domestic programs for promoting economic growth. As a result over the next five years there was a 50% rise in spending on domestic programs. In addition, continuing inflation and a weakened international dollar put restraints on all types of foreign and domestic spending. Hence, there were even more pressures to keep the military spending to a minimum.

Economy and mutual deterrence were the key ingredients of the "New New Look," which soon became known as the strategy of "Sufficiency." This strategy was spelled out in August 1956 by Air Force Secretary Quarles. He said that to continue an air power arms race was sheer madness and "to continue a buildup of atomic power on both sides. . .makes total war an unthinkable catastrophe. . . ."⁵⁹ He said that "there comes a time in the course of increasing our air power when we must make a determination of sufficiency," and sufficiency "must be determined period by period on the basis of the force required to accomplish the mission assigned." He went on to say that beyond a certain point, ". . .it is not a question of relative strength" between "the two opposed forces," but rather, "it is the absolute power in the hands of each and in the substantial invulnerability of this power to interdiction." He said it is "mission capability" which must be maintained. But he was careful to add that this capability must be continuously evaluated vis a vis increased enemy air defense capability. In

other words, the US would no longer compare forces in an arms race but rather analyze her capability to strike Russia in retaliation. No longer was it necessary to have strategic superiority; sufficient strategic capability was enough. In Quarles' judgment it was "neither necessary nor desirable. . .to maintain strength above that level."⁶⁰

For the next four years the "New New Look" was pursued by the Eisenhower Administration, but it was not without its critics. In the ensuing debates different concepts came into being such as strategies of counter-force, counter-city, infinite or minimum deterrent. A detailed discussion of these will be found in the following sections. The Air Force pursued the counter-force strategy designed to deter aggressions other than those directed against the continental United States. Such a strategy minimized the need for general purpose forces. Naturally the Army and Navy took the opposite point of view. The Administration, committed to "sufficiency", took a middle road and limited the resources needed for a strategic deterrent. In the fall of 1957, the Gaither committee reported that US strategic forces were highly vulnerable. This was the time of the so called "missile gap" to which the Administration carefully avoided reacting. In spite of severe criticism the Administration continued to seek economy and stability.

There was still the problem of limited war, the other side of the mutual deterrent equation - the side requiring "versatile, ready forces to cope with limited aggression."⁶¹ The paradox of "sufficiency" was that while the Administration recognized the need

for a limited war capability, it again substituted nuclear weapons for manpower. This time it was tactical nuclear weapons. Again it was over the objections of Ridgway and over the recommendations of the Gaither committee report to expand conventional and limited war capabilities in addition to increasing the capabilities of the overall defense establishment. The dominant parameter in the "New New Look" continued to be economy. So long as recommendations supported the general outline of the "New New Look," the Administration went along; if otherwise, it deferred.

New programs, other than those which implemented the Defense Reorganization Act of 1958, supported the Administration's emphasis on strategic nuclear forces. Emphasis included: dispersal and increased alert for SAC; improved early warning; production of IRBM's; and requests for more funds to boost the ICBM and Polaris programs. The Administration's estimate of \$41 billion for FY 1961 fell short of the Gaither target of approximately \$48 billion.⁶²

It is interesting to note that during the formulation of the Eisenhower strategy there was a definite absence of military initiatives and policy proposals other than by Admiral Radford. As Huntington states in his book The Common Defense, the military were the draftsmen of "massive retaliation;" civil leaders were its architects. On evidence, "Massive Retaliation" was nothing but a means to an end. It was the major deterrent in an overall strategy of deterrence.

Eisenhower succeeded in getting a strategy for the long haul while meeting the economic threat. He continued other programs to

support his overall strategy. He expanded the US collective security system and sent aid to selected countries. An essential part of his strategy necessitated his having general purpose forces for deterrence on the lower end of the escalatory scale. His strategy, although he did not emphasize it, had the capability of flexible response so that he could maintain the initiative. Many critics said that the conventional force levels of the Eisenhower years were too low to be effective. Yet, if the so called strategy of "Massive Retaliation" was effective, in retrospect it is now possible to argue the viability of Eisenhower's general purpose forces.

SECTION B: THE EFFECTIVENESS OF MASSIVE RETALIATION 1953-61

I cannot remember a day that has not brought
its major or minor crisis.⁶³

-Eisenhower

The question now logically follows, how effective was the strategy of "Massive Retaliation?" Before this question can be answered, it must be kept in mind that the major criterion for measuring effectiveness is how well it met its stated objectives of deterring, and if that failed, halting Communist expansion.

The fear of massive retaliation has been with the USSR since 1945. Churchill observed this when he said, "it is certain that Europe would have been communized and London under bombardment. . . but for the deterrent of the atomic bomb in the hands of the United States."⁶⁴ Without doubt, intimidation by the US nuclear monopoly kept local aggression and general war absent from the world scene during the period 1945-49. This was the first success of "Massive Retaliation." It was not by choice, but rather by accident. It was an overwhelming fear of what happened to Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

From 1950 to 1960 the success of "Massive Retaliation" varied. Except for Korea, Hungary, Tibet and the shelling of Quemoy and Matsu, neither Communist China, nor Communist Russia engaged in direct aggression against another non-Communist sovereign nation. Suez, Lebanon and Indochina were gray areas against which theoretically the doctrine of "Massive Retaliation" was not directed.

Although not commencing during the Eisenhower Administration, the Korean War illustrates much of the philosophy of "Massive Retaliation."

- Korea 1950 -

Russia, having been rebuffed in Europe and in the Middle East during the late 40's, appeared resolved to test the containment policy of the United States in Asia. Korea was an inconvenient place for the US to fight and it was possibly not covered by US commitment to the containment policy. In 1947 the JCS had said in a memo to the Secretary of State that "from the standpoint of military security, the US has little strategic interest in maintaining the present troops and bases in Korea."⁶⁵ Acheson had failed to include it within the primary line of US defense in his address to the National Press Club on 13 January 1950 and MacArthur had voiced similar opinions. Moreover in the early summer of 1949 two of the US Army's 10 divisions had been withdrawn and a small military advisory group was left behind to train the newly developing South Korean Army of 98,000 men. US "Forces in Japan had been cut to a shadow."⁶⁶ The Soviet Union was well aware of the weakened US force structure since 1946.

On August 5th and 8th 1950, general elections were to be held through both North and South Korea to determine a new government for a reunified Korea. This was announced in Izvestia in early June of 1950, and yet on 25 June 1950 the North Korean Army attacked south in force. By the 28th Seoul had fallen and the South Korean Army was fleeing.

During the six months preceeding the invasion, the North Korean forces had been carefully built up to nearly 150,000 well trained men by both the Soviet Union and Communist China. As early as mid March, MacArthur reported rumors of an invasion to commence in June; and the CIA in June 1950 acknowledged that the preponderance of North Korean forces were concentrated north of the 38th parallel. Despite the buildup, the Administration thought that the most danger to South Korea stemmed from possible internal subversion. Since mid 1949 there had been numerous false rumors concerning the possibility of invasion. For the US to react to every likely threat would have been impossible because the threat was "the same for every point of contact between East and West, from Norway through Berlin and Trieste to Greece, Turkey and Iran; from the Kuriles to Indochina and Malaya."⁶⁷ Even though the US had recently reasserted the US policy of nonintervention in the affairs of Nationalist China,⁶⁸ the US was concerned about the threat to Formosa.

The North Korean invasion achieved complete tactical surprise. Some seven and a half hours after the attack, at 9:26 p.m. est. 24 June 1950, the US State Department received the news.⁶⁹ Five and one half hours after the attack Trygve Lie received notification that the United States was calling a meeting of the UN Security Council.

Meanwhile, the US view of Soviet intentions were obscure. Military planners pondered, was this the beginning of World War III?

Was this a ruse de guerre to commit the preponderance of US forces in a remote area while Europe was invaded? It was decided that the US would halt the invasion by relying initially on South Korean forces. In any event, the US would remain flexible so as not to foreclose US ability to react in Europe should the need arise.

On 25 June 1950 as part of a plan to introduce US forces into the area of operations and to reduce the likelihood of World War III, President Truman abruptly changed the policy of the US toward Formosa. He:

Announced a policy intended to seal off Formosa from the conflict. He interposed the Seventh Fleet to prevent any attack from either Chinese side upon the other, the purpose being to quarantine the fighting within Korea, not to encourage extension.⁷⁰

Movement of the fleet, started on 27 June. SAC was notified to increase its alert level and within a few hours B-50's were on their way to bases in Europe.

The movement of the Seventh Fleet to the Formosa Straits and SAC to Europe served notice of US intentions on the Soviets. This demonstration of massive retaliatory capability and the direct blocking of sea lanes early in the war preempted early Soviet or Communist Chinese intervention or expansion of the Korean War.

On 25 June the UN branded North Korea an aggressor and ordered an immediate cease-fire. On the 26th MacArthur reported collapse of South Korea was imminent unless direct aid was given immediately.⁷¹

That same day MacArthur was given orders to commence naval and air action against North Korea. This prompted, on the 27th, the US to ask for a stronger resolution than a cease-fire from the UN. Within seven hours after the request, US intervention received UN sanction. This same day Truman obtained bipartisan agreement from congressional leaders on his policy and action. It is interesting to note that the US sent a message on this date to the Soviet Union requesting them to halt the North Korean aggression. The Soviets responded that they would not personally intervene. This made the decision for US ground intervention easier.

On the 29th MacArthur personally visited the front lines and promptly dispatched a message to Washington stating that Korean casualties were near 50%, and in spite of US air and naval interdiction the North Koreans were moving south. To the JCS he wired, "The South Korean forces are in confusion, have not seriously fought, and lack leadership. . . . They are incapable of gaining the initiative. . . ."72

MacArthur requested from Washington the immediate introduction of a Regimental Combat Team into the Pusan perimeter to be followed by two US divisions from Japan. MacArthur's request was approved. In addition, a naval blockade of all Korea was decided on. A request by Nationalist China to introduce combat forces was politely declined.

On 1 July, two rifle companies of the 29th Infantry Division pushed north from Pusan toward Taejon. In retrospect, the US was now irrevocably committed to the Korean War for the next four years.

It is astonishing that in spite of the weaknesses in flexibility brought about by disarmament and a weakened force structure since WW II, the US did respond. The response was flexible as evidenced by the movements of SAC and the Seventh Fleet. But, the successful introduction of US ground forces was entirely dependent on US beliefs in non intervention by Russia or China. US "massive retaliatory power," although minimal, had been enough to guarantee it. In view of US fears concerning Europe, the US could not have intervened in Asia without the assurance that her near nuclear monopoly gave. US strategic nuclear power was the prerequisite to any US response.

Operation Killer, Ridgway's attempt to inflict "maximum damage on the enemy with minimum to ourselves,"⁷³ proved successful, and the enemy was thoroughly defeated. It was this operation and those that followed which caused the Communists to first sue for negotiations to terminate the war at almost the same place it had started, the 38th parallel.

The Korean War proved the need for the US to possess a limited war capability and to develop the necessary plans for the use of nuclear weapons in limited war. But more than that, both sides recognized "that the escalation of tension through crisis into war meant sooner or later the stark choice between stalemate and nuclear Catharsis."⁷⁴ This premise was to be a starting point for the "Doctrine of Massive Retaliation."

As a result of the US commitment to intervene in Korea, her policy toward Formosa was reversed; aid to Indochina was increased

dramatically, and the US fought her first limited war in the nuclear age. Again the strategy of containment had been realized.

The first and what has been called the only true test of "Massive Retaliation" to deter aggression in the gray areas came in Indochina in 1954. It was a clear indication of the limited military posture of the "New Look."

- Indochina 1954 -

During FY 1954, the United States supplied one third of \$800 million of the French costs in Indochina. As the situation deteriorated, the French urgently requested intervention by air. This the United States was reluctant to do, but did send 25 B-26 bombers along with some 200 maintenance personnel.

During this period the President also considered cancellation of his two division force reduction.⁷⁵ To do this he had the support of Senator John F. Kennedy who attempted to increase Army funds for general purpose forces. In addition, the US voiced its intentions loud and clear and warned the Chinese Communists not to interfere in Indochina because "grave consequences" could occur "which might not be confined to Indochina."⁷⁶ Other warnings were made by Eisenhower and members of his Administration. In order to save Dien Bien Phu, in the spring of 1954 the French made several desperate appeals to the US for succor. The last of these requests occurred in the latter part of April. Off shore in the Gulf of Tonkin lay two US carriers loaded with nuclear armed aircraft. While Radford attempted to get approval to strike with these aircraft using nuclear weapons, Dulles attempted to secure

political support from the British for⁷⁷ US actions in Indochina. According to Congressional Leaders, such support would permit the Congress to approve intervention and allow the US to meet French requests with a united front.

Finally, both Dulles and Eisenhower backed off - Eisenhower because Ridgway convincingly rebutted Radford and the other service chiefs in their support of US intervention in Indochina,⁷⁸ and Dulles reneged because undue pressure on Great Britain might jeopardize British approval of the Southeast Asia security pact. Humphrey also refrained from supporting intervention because of "the prospective cost in conventional forces that rescue of the French in Indochina now seemed to require."⁷⁹ Thus in spite of French pleas and US threats, the US never intervened. On 7 May Dien Bien Phu fell. The US missed its opportunity for optimum intervention. The Geneva Partition temporarily resolved the crisis.

The US failed to intervene in Indochina for at least four reasons. First, it was really not in US vital national interest to support a colonial power against an indirect threat. Dulles' warnings had been retaliation against direct intervention by China and thereby "ruled out" the applicability of "Massive Retaliation" in meeting the "challenge in Asia."⁸⁰ Second, the failure of Dulles to reach a united action with the British deprived the US of leverage which would have halted the Communists without US military intervention. The US realized that effective military involvement could not be limited to air power alone. Third, only Radford among the chiefs supported intervention, and he could not

assure the President that air strikes alone would stop the Communists. Fourth, after careful analysis, the Army recommended against intervention. In Ridgway's words, the Army argument "presented to higher authority played a considerable, perhaps a decisive part in persuading our government not to embark on that tragic adventure."⁸¹

The crisis in Indochina served to underline the difference between military power per se and viable military power restrained by politics. In Paul Hammond's words:

The "New Look" and the new strategy that went with it had reduced our military expenditures but had not ensured US the capacity to act without incurring heavy costs. Our doctrines had become more flexible but our military capabilities had not.⁸²

- Quemoy Matsu: 1954-1958 -

No sooner had the fate of Indochina been turned back to the politicians than in September 1954, the Chinese Communists started to bombard Quemoy and Matsu. Perhaps they did so because the US had withdrawn the Seventh Fleet from the Formosa Straits. When taken in conjunction with their seizure in January of Yikiang, an island near the bombardment appeared but a prelude to the actual invasion of Formosa.⁸³ In response to the invasion of Yikiang, Eisenhower secured Congressional support to employ US armed forces to defend both Taiwan and the Pescadores.

Perhaps because of the existence of a defense treaty between the CPR and USSR, Dulles was as reluctant as Acheson before him to sign an offensive-defensive alliance with Formosa. No clear commitment was made to the defense of the offshore islands. Instead,

the Formosa Resolution "substituted calculated ambiguity for clarity of intent."⁸⁴ This vagueness in conjunction with the "Massive Retaliation" speech of 12 January helped dampen the crisis.

While the US congress made the resolution, US diplomats acting behind the scenes, the British were pressuring Chaing to give up the Pescadores in return for a peaceful settlement of the Formosa question. Dulles, feeling that this would mean a Munich - like appeasement all over again, prevented it.

The crisis subsided after US threats were made and after the Russians, who were in the midst of political upheaval, urged the Chinese to acquiesce. By April 1955, Mao backed down, and the crisis abated. It erupted again on 23 August 1958 during the US election campaign and after the USSR launched its first ICBM and Sputnik. Perhaps the CPR believed the strategic balance of power had shifted to the Communist world,⁸⁵ and that she was now under a Soviet nuclear umbrella which would deter US nuclear escalation even if it didn't prevent US intervention.

In response to the challenge, the US took a tough, rigid stance. In the President's name, Dulles announced on 4 September that the United States was ready to defend the offshore islands with US armed forces if necessary.⁸⁶ There was no doubt about Chinese intentions when the bombardment continued unabated, and the CPR voiced intentions "to liberate Taiwan, a territory of the fatherland, as well as the offshore islands. . . ."⁸⁷

The day after the first shelling, the US began to upgrade her Far East forces. On the 24th of August, the Seventh Fleet was

alerted. By the 30th four DD's and two aircraft carriers from the Sixth Fleet had been attached. In addition, USAF interceptor squadrons had been dispatched to Formosa. US forces helped the Nationalists reinforce and resupply the islands as well as evacuate the noncombatants. The Chinese Communists, without control of the straits were unable to make an amphibious assault.⁸⁸ Throughout the early weeks of September the US continued to increase its military commitment to Formosa to include air defense missiles.

Up to this time with the exception of a statement on 31 August to provide Peking "'moral and material aid,'"⁸⁹ Russia had remained silent.

On 6 September the US accepted a CPR suggestion to open ambassadorial talks in Warsaw. Thus, the diplomatic arena was opened and the Soviet Union began to participate in earnest. On the 7th Khrushchev wrote Eisenhower that "an attack on the CPR would be, not just a threat to, but an attack on the Soviet Union."⁹⁰ The same day the US began to cover Nationalist resupply convoys.

In a letter to Eisenhower, on September 19 Khrushchev declared that:

Atomic blackmail directed at the CPR will scare neither us nor the Chinese People's Republic. Those who carry out plans of atomic attack on the CPR should not forget that not only the US but the other side possesses not only atomic but hydrogen weapons and also the corresponding means of delivery, and should such an attack be delivered on the CPR, then the aggressor will receive a fitting rebuff by the same means.⁹¹

This was brinksmanship in its finest form. Eisenhower coolly rejected Russian threats. On 27 September the Secretary of the Air Force announced that the US would use nuclear weapons if need be to defend Quemoy. On the 1st of October the US emplaced 8" howitzers on Quemoy. With nuclear warheads they could halt not only the bombardment from the mainland but an amphibious assault as well.

Significantly, on 5 October the Soviet Union announced that it would not interfere unless the CPR was attacked. On the 6th, Communist shelling ceased, and the Communists offered a one week cease-fire provided the US halted its convoy escort for the Nationalists. The terms were accepted, and except for a brief resumption of the firing the crisis died. The Chinese Communists without control of the straits or Soviet guarantees, were unable to make an amphibious assault.⁹² Throughout the entire crisis, the CPR never once challenged US forces in combat. The Communist Chinese shelling of Quemoy and a few minor engagements with Nationalist Chinese air and naval units were the only overt acts of combat. Moreover, the Soviets were limited to a verbal response only.

In analyzing the effectiveness of the Eisenhower strategy concerning the Quemoy-Matsu crisis, it should be noted that the Soviets acted with extreme caution and did not commit themselves until after the United States had accepted Chou En Lai's offer to negotiate. Furthermore the crisis severely tested Sino-Soviet

Solidarity. It destroyed Mao's belief that "the east wind prevails over the west wind."

Without doubt this crisis, like the Korean crisis, demonstrated the deterrent effectiveness of US nuclear superiority. The value of the strategy of "Massive Retaliation" was affirmed. In spite of a so called weakened conventional capability, the US applied "measured response"⁹³ with the Seventh Fleet and elements of the US Air Force. Without the deterrent effect of the "A bomb" these capabilities would not have obtained.

- Suez 1956 -

Between the first and second crises of the offshore islands came the Suez Crisis of 1956.

The Suez Crisis of 1956 had its beginning with the international convention of 1888 which declared the canal a neutral zone in war as well as peace and open to all nations. The canal was operated by the British who controlled it from a small military base at Suez. Through the years, Egyptian sovereignty was respected, and Egyptians were on the canal board of directors. In 1950 the Egyptians denied Israel use of the canal, and in defiance a 1951 UN Security Council resolution to the contrary Egypt continued to refuse Israeli use of the canal.

In a vain hope to get Egypt to honor the 1888 convention, the US in 1954 pressured the British into leaving its Suez base in 1956. The bait to keep Nasser in line after British withdrawal was American-British financing of the Aswan Dam. But, because Nasser in violation of the 1888 convention mortgaged Egyptian cotton for Czech weapons and because Egypt made overtures for Russian

financing of the Aswan Dam, Dulles abruptly cancelled the US offer on 19 July 1956. The British followed suit. Seven days later, Nasser retaliated by nationalizing the Suez Canal Company.

Dulles immediately called for conferences of the principal user nations. They offered reasonable schemes for negotiation, all of which were refused by Nasser. The British and French warned the US that if negotiation failed an anglo-french force must seize the canal by military might. At the same time many leaders in Israel were urging preventive war.⁹⁴ Dulles, who had a personal dislike for Prime Minister Eden failed to commit himself, and at the very moment that Australia persuaded Nasser to negotiate, Eisenhower in a news conference on 31 August said, "We are committed to a peaceful settlement of this dispute, nothing else."⁹⁵

Meanwhile the British and French began to make military preparations. On 29 October 1956, Israel, suffering from Arab guerrilla raids, launched a drive into the Sinai, defeated 45,000 Egyptian soldiers, and arrived at the canal four days later. And Anthony Eden astonished Eisenhower by informing him that the British and French were going to support Israel.

Nasser blocked the canal, and Communist countries denounced the "imperialist aggressors," Unless there was a cease-fire, the Communist bloc threatened to join Egypt. Moreover, the Russians hinted at nuclear retaliation against England and France.⁹⁶

Rejecting a Russian proposal for combined Soviet-American intervention, the US supported an Afro-Asian resolution in the UN for a cease-fire. The resolution was approved, but the French and

British vetoed it. Meanwhile, British invasion forces were being harrassed by US Naval and Air Forces in the Mediterranean. Moreover, British and French invasion forces were late and unprepared.⁹⁷ Facing Russian nuclear might alone and without US backing, Britain and France announced a cease-fire on 6 November, promptly withdrawing their forces from the zone. Israel withdrew a year later.

Although the Eisenhower Administration proclaimed that it had prevented World War III, no one dared call Russia's bluff on "the eve of a US presidential election."⁹⁸ There had also been a colossal British misunderstanding concerning US intentions. And British and French failures in execution gave both the US and Russia an additional week in which to stop the attack.⁹⁹

On 5 November Bulganin threatened nuclear attack of Britain and France unless they ceased their aggression. During the same week, Russia and the CPR threatened to send volunteers to Egypt. On the 6th President Eisenhower phoned Eden and asked for a cease-fire. According to General Curtis Lemay, "It was knowledge of Soviet IRBM's that caused Britain and France to fold their tents. . ."

The US failure to embrace the Anglo-Frence-Israeli effort affected the unity of NATO, made the Baghdad Pact a farce, and raised the popularity of Nasser. Because the aggressors had apparently knuckled under to the Russian nuclear threat, Russia gained prestige and there was a resultant loss of faith in the US nuclear shield.¹⁰⁰

In any analysis the Suez Crisis, the weakening of US credibility in defending her allies through threat of "Massive

Retaliation" is evident. Nevertheless, throughout the crisis US strategic superiority was clear. Although few were deployed, Air Force and Army units were alerted in CONUS. The US had the reinforced Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean.

At the same time, the Soviets were busy in Hungary and Poland and could do little else other than threaten two nonnuclear powers, Britain and France, with devastation. There is little doubt that had the US supported the Anglo-French-Israeli invasion that she could have called the Soviet bluff. Although this was not a true test of "Massive Retaliation", because of the absence of a confrontation between US and Soviet intentions, restraints imposed on the Soviets by US strategic superiority were obvious.

- Hungary 1956 -

In the same election fall of 1956, while the Suez Crisis was occurring, a revolution occurred in Hungary, possibly in reaction to Khrushchev's destalinization policy. For a brief period, a new Hungarian government broke the bonds of Russian hegemony. Here was a unique opportunity to support freedom, and yet the UN and the West failed to lend succor. The UN protested, and Eisenhower said "the heart of America goes out to the people of Hungary."¹⁰¹ A heart without blood was useless. The Russian Army reentered Hungary on 4 November 1956, crushed the revolt and reestablished a Communist regime.

The failure of the US to bring pressure to bear on the Soviet Union points out the weakness of the "New Look" conventional capability for a high risk area. Without the ability to deploy a

large military force swiftly to Hungary and without the will to risk war with Russia, the US could do little more than it did. The US inaction in Hungary marked the complete abandonment of the Dulles "liberation" policy for east Europe.

- Lebanon 1958 -

In the early spring of 1957 US Middle Eastern policy was based on four aspects:

1. Saudi Arabia was the lynchpin of an anti-Nasser coalition.
2. The Baghdad Pact was becoming viable because a combined military staff had been instituted in January 1957.
3. The Arab Union of Iraq and Jordan would counter-balance Nasserism.
4. The "Eisenhower Doctrine" Middle East Resolution of 1957, to which both Iraq and Lebanon were signatories and Jordan was associated, served to demonstrate US intentions in the area to Russia.

In opposition to a stable US policy in the Middle East was the rise of Arab Nationalism which was sparked by Nasser after his successes in the Suez Crisis of 1956. It was Nasser in the spring of 1957 who pressured Jordan into not adhering to the "Eisenhower Doctrine." Throughout 1957 Nasser gained influence with his neighbors, and in February 1958 he proclaimed the United Arab Republic which consisted initially of Egypt and Syria. Later, in March 1958, Yemen also became associated with the UAR.

Toward the end of March the first major erosions of US policy occurred. King Saud stepped aside for his half brother Crown Prince

Faisal to govern Saudi Arabia. And Faisal destroyed major US hopes for Saudi Arabian leadership in the Arab world when he adopted a conciliatory attitude toward Nasser.

Meanwhile, Lebanon, the only middle eastern state with a Christian president, was having problems. Internally Lebanon faced religious division. Moslems were discriminated against and hero-worshipped Nasser. Widespread rumors stated he was seeking an unconstitutional second term by getting the constitution amended. He denied it, but in April 1958 an amendment that would permit him to succeed himself was introduced in the Chamber of Deputies. This was seen as an open bid for power. Lebanon was also besieged with external problems. Her close relations with the West, particularly through the Eisenhower Doctrine had come under attack from inside Lebanon and from Arab neighbors. Nasser was actively smuggling weapons and ammunition into Lebanon. UAR broadcasts saturated Lebanon. Advocating rebellion against Chamoun.

The time was ripe for rebellion. On 8 May the editor of one of the opposition newspapers in Lebanon was murdered. The following day a nationwide strike was called and rioting broke out in Tripolis. During the ensuing few days the entire country was in turmoil. On the 13th "the beleaguered president summoned the ambassadors of the United States, the United Kingdom and France. He indicated his strife torn country might have to ask for military assistance. . ."102

The US acted promptly, and on the 14th of May the US ambassador communicated to Chamoun that the US would intervene on request, provided he meet four stipulations:

- (1) ". . .Lebanon would file a complaint with the United Nations Security Council against external interference in its internal affairs. . . ."
- (2) ". . .at least some Arab states would be prepared publicly to support Lebanon in its appeal for aid. . . ."
- (3) ". . .if the United States assisted it would not be on the issue of the internal question of the Lebanese presidential election. . . ."
- (4) It would be done "upon request both from the President and Government of Lebanon. . . ."103

Soon after the ambassador made his intentions known, the US resupplied the Lebanese police, doubled the Marine contingent of the Sixth Fleet, and commenced joint planning with the British.

On the 16th and 17th the British reinforced Navy units in the Eastern Mediterranean, while the US alerted SAC, moved transport aircraft to West Germany, and ordered the aircraft carrier Saratoga into position off Lebanon. At the same time the US announced to the world the possibility of sending troops to Lebanon to protect US civilians in the area. Joint US, British planning continued for the next two months.

By 16 June, Chamoun had met the four US prerequisites to intervention. On 1 July, the Chairman of the JCS announced that the US was "prepared for. . .all out or limited war, right now."104

Meanwhile, there was information that the UAR was inciting turmoil in neighboring states. Jordan and Sudan reported coup plots, and it looked as if a coup attempt might be developing in Iraq when Cairo radio broadcasts stated that Jordan and Lebanon were about to join the Baghdad Pact.

On 14 July, Brigadier General Abdel Karim al-Kassem in a bloody revolt overthrew Faisal. "The royal family were all

murdered, the crown prince. . .dragged through the streets. . .
and dismembered. . . ."105 On the same day King Hussein thwarted
a coup in Jordan.

Thus, with the Iraqi revolt, all of the bases for US middle
east policy were thrown to the winds. It appeared as if the entire
middle east with its oil and vital canal would fall into UAR control.

The governments of Jordan and Lebanon requested immediate help
from the West on the morning of 14 July. Eisenhower reacted
swiftly, probably from frustrations resulting from his inactivity
in the recent Hungarian crisis. By the close of the day, the
Marine amphibious force of the Sixth Fleet received orders to land
in Lebanon; a troop carrier wing was on its way to Germany; two
French aircraft carriers were on their way to the eastern
Mediterranean; British troops were alerted; SAC increased alertness;
and Iran mobilized its Army.

The following day, two battalions of Marines landed, and a
composite air strike force began moving to Incirlik, Turkey; a
US airborne battle group from Germany was ordered to Adana.
British troops reinforced Cyprus, Yemen and Bahrein while British
Naval forces reinforced the eastern Mediterranean and the Persian
Gulf. During the initial US landings, the US Ambassador and Robert
Murphy attempted to dissuade pro Nasser forces from firing on US
troops.¹⁰⁶

At this time, the Soviets warned the US that the USSR reserved
the right to preserve peace. Russia recognized the new government
of Iraq. And in an effort to intimidate both Iran and Turkey

from intervening in Iraq, she announced large scale maneuvers on the Turkish border.

On the 17th the British landed two battalions in Jordan as 50 US jet aircraft demonstrated overhead. From this day on the situation stabilized as the US and Russia came to realize that a new status quo, made by allied intervention and the coup in Iraq, existed. The tensions quickly abated as both the UAR and the US gave guarantees of no further extension of the crisis.

On the 28 July, the possibility that Chamoun would run for a second term disappeared when General Chehab announced that he would run for office. The US ambassador, Robert Murphy, had been instrumental in uniting two opposing Lebanese factions behind Chehab as a national conciliatory candidate.¹⁰⁷ Except for a period of rioting by pro-Chamoun forces after Chehab took office on 23 September, the Lebanon internal situation quickly quieted.

On 25 October 1958, the last of the American forces which had landed in Lebanon voluntarily departed. . . . Although no guns were fired in anger and no casualties were inflicted upon the indigenous population, this was in fact, an exercise in limited war.¹⁰⁸

Swift US reaction with a flexible response that utilized superior general purpose forces, underscored by the massive retaliatory power of SAC, had prevented Soviet interference, saved Lebanon, and restored a period of quasi tranquility in the Middle East.

General LeMay describes US actions as "another classic example of what you can do if you have strategic superiority and then are able to exploit any situation with your conventional forces without

interference. . . for without nuclear and strategic superiority,
I do not think we would have dared go into Lebanon."¹⁰⁹

- Crises Summary -

Many of the parameters discovered in each of the crises thus far described found their genesis in the first crisis of the Cold War which was described in the last section, the Berlin Blockade of 1948.

In that crisis and those here discussed, the following conditions were observed to exist:

- (1) A careful avoidance of direct confrontation between the superpowers.
- (2) Realization of the limits of confrontation based on will, capability, and competing interests.
- (3) Acknowledged vital interests as reflected by a will to see a satisfactory solution to the crisis.
- (4) Complications made by other competing interests.
- (5) Geographical localization of the problem area.
- (6) Prohibition on the use of atomic weapons because of limited supply, moral restraint, or insufficient desire to escalate.
- (7) Recognition of the need for adequate conventional forces to deter or act if necessary.
- (8) The need for a massive retaliatory capability to limit the crisis geographically and in terms of escalation.

- Criticism of Massive Retaliation -

Arguments against the effectiveness of a strategy of "Massive Retaliation" have been made since 1945. During the atomic monopoly

years arguments ranged from complete abhorrance of nuclear blackmail to Radford's temporary early position statement that "the threat of instant retaliation will not prevent war and may even invite it."¹¹⁰ After the US atomic monopoly was broken by the Russians, Hanson Baldwin was prompted to say:

There is no doubt that the A-bomb was a real deterrent to Russian armed aggression during the series of crises in the past year (1948-49). It is quite clear that our A-bombs will have much less effect in this respect now. . . .¹¹¹

Baldwin's statement was supported by the Communist invasion of South Korea. Similarly, Chinese intervention some months later has been touted as another real failure of the US atomic deterrent because the Chinese noticed for six months the US reluctance to use nuclear weapons. Had the US used atomic weapons early in that war it might have prevented later Chinese intervention and would have lent considerable credibility to current deterrence.

The Korean War also served as an argument against the deterrent effect of atomic weapons for limited war but maintained the possibility that deterrence would hold for general war. Korea gave birth to the idea that deterrence was more than A bombs. Credible deterrence required conventional forces also.

Another argument against the deterrent effect of "Massive Retaliation" has been the fact that a nuclear deterrent must be credible. "Credibility" in relation to US nuclear deterrence requires the capability and the will to employ nuclear weapons. To have the capability without the will is pure bluff. And any

democratic society has a limited capacity for such deception except where obvious vital national interests are at stake.

In an address in March 1954, Mr. Adlai Stevenson, while criticizing "Massive Retaliation" asked, "'Are we leaving ourselves the grim choice of inaction or a thermonuclear holocaust? Are we indeed inviting Moscow to nibble us to death?'" In essence he said that the US was taking a great risk. If the US was bluffing and did not possess the will to retaliate, it would be defeated.¹¹² In answer Paul Peters reverses an old saying by implying that it is better to be dead than red.

Albert Wohlstetter published in 1959 his famous expose of the vulnerability of SAC to surprise attack. And Maxwell Taylor's arguments in The Uncertain Trumpet also cried out concerning the dangers of the Eisenhower strategy and pointed out the need for more long range missile as well as conventional forces.¹¹³

There is much truth in The Uncertain Trumpet. Criticisms of "Massive Retaliation" stated that deterrence is not just strategic but is also tactical. Unless tactical nuclear weapons are used, tactical deterrence must come from general purpose forces in being.

Credible arguments were not against massive retaliation per se but only against the emphasis placed on it as a deterrent at the sacrifice of limited war capabilities.

- Arms Control -

In answer to critics who claimed that "Massive Retaliation" was immoral it must be noted that throughout his two terms,

Eisenhower sought international controls on nuclear weapons. This too was a carry over from the Truman Administration's Baruch Plan which:

Had it been accepted there would have been no arms race--and mankind today would not have to worry about the possibility of a holocaust which in a few hours could wipe out much of the civilized world and perhaps endanger the human species. . . .¹¹⁴

Although the Baruch Plan failed to gain acceptance by 1948 and Russia detonated atomic weapons in 1949 and Britain in 1952, Eisenhower proposed his "Atoms for Peace"¹¹⁵ plan in which an International Atomic Energy Agency was to be given the task of putting nuclear energy to use. "Atoms for Peace provided safeguards against using peaceful nuclear energy sources as stepping stones to nuclear weapons systems. From 1953 to 1955 Eisenhower's Administration continued to seek international controls on proliferation. However, there were no acceptable means of verification, and "hidden weapons might remain--perhaps not large numbers--but sufficient to create a disastrous strategic imbalance."¹¹⁶ In 1955 President Eisenhower outlined a possible solution in his "Open Skies Plan." It consisted of reciprocal aerial inspection by both super powers, and military blue prints were to be exchanged. This plan proved unacceptable to the Soviets.¹¹⁷

Following this failure, the Administration shifted its objective from seeking complete disarmament to one of accepting partial controls while at the same time continuing to build a vast nuclear stockpile. In 1956, the US offered its "cut off" and

"transfer" proposals. "Cut off" attempted to verify the cut off in production of fissionable material. And "transfer" sought to have the military nuclear material converted to peaceful purposes. Again both were found unacceptable by the USSR. In 1959 a breakthrough was achieved with the signing of the "Antarctic Treaty" this provided for placing the Antarctic off limits for military purposes, nuclear weapons, and disposal of radioactive materials. Subsequently, in 1960 France became nuclear. And experience was gained which was used later by the Kennedy Administration in international arms control negotiation and the limited test ban treaty for nuclear weapons.

- Conclusion -


The emotional words "Massive Retaliation" obfuscated the real evolving strategy of the Eisenhower Administration. Initial emphasis in the early years of Eisenhower's incumbancy was placed on strategic nuclear forces to the detriment of conventional forces. As a result, it has been argued that US general purpose force levels were inadequate. A close analysis of the crises, with the exception of Korea, demonstrated that if the US was willing to accept risks, the force levels were more than enough to give the United States tactical superiority wherever she chose to impose her will. The management of the various crises demonstrated the flexibility inherent in the Eisenhower strategy. Throughout the crises wherever the US had the will, she was able to seize the initiative. There is clear recognition in the Eisenhower strategy of the implausibility of relying primarily on a single deterrent

to deter all possible contingencies. Time and again US general purpose forces deterred or halted conflict.

"Massive Retaliation" deterred Communist use of nuclear weapons and Communist encroachment into areas vital to US national interests. Because US deterrence in vital areas was successful, Russia and China were forced to test US strategy in areas of lesser strategic and economic value, the so called "gray areas" where again they were halted.

Considering the strategy to be two fold-first, to deter and if that failed to halt Communist expansion-one can only say that the strategy was successful in areas where the US had the will to act.

KEITH A. BARLOW
LTC Inf

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Keith A. Barlow".

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