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THEMES OF NORTH KOREA'S UNIFICATION MESSAGES. A STUDY ON PATTERN SHIFTS, 1948-1968

Sang-Woo Rhee

Hawaii University

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
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THEMES OF NORTH KOREA'S UNIFICATION MESSAGES A STUDY ON PATTERN SHIFTS, 1948-68

Sang-Woo Rhee

February 1973

Prepared for presentation at the 25th Annual Meeting of the Association for Asian Studies, Chicago, March 30 - April 1, 1973.

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13 ABSTRACT	-				

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A sample of forty-nine official messages pertaining to unification sent to South Korea by North Korean decision makers were analyzed through thematic content analysis according to a prepared coding scheme of thirty-six theme categories. To measure the pattern shifts, a new index called the relative deviation (RD) index was designed.

Measured RD index scores of the thirty-six themes were P-factor analyzed and the factor scores were then used to chart the shifts in North Korea's communication themes on unification issues, 1948-1968. A total of ten factor patterns were so delineated and examined in this study.

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University of Hawaii

I. INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this study is to delineate some basic thematic patterns in North Korea's official propaganda messages regarding unification and to describe the chronological shifts of those patterns across a period of twenty-one years, 1948-1968.

Ever since North Korea's independence in 1948, the North Korean regime has continuously used the issue of unification as a major instrument of propaganda. Depending upon the changes in both the domestic political situation in North Korea and the international political setting that surround the Korean peninsula, however, the themes of the propaganda messages have shifted from a belligerent advocacy of military liberation of the South at one time to a peaceful and conciliatory suggestion of establishing a unified confederation of the existing two governments at another time.

The question then is why has the North Korean regime continuously shifted her emphasis from one theme to another? Why have the North Korean

^{*}Prepared for presentation at the 25th Annual Meeting of the Association for Asian Studies, Chicago, March 30 - April 1, 1973. This paper was prepared in connection with the Dimensionality of Nations Project, a research project supported by the Advanced Research Projects Agency of the Department of Defense, and monitored by ONR under Contract No. N00014-67-A-0387-0003, Contract Authority Identification Number NR 177-915. I wish to express my appreciation of the encouragement, and the constructive comments on a draft of this paper, by Professor R. J. Rummel.

decision makers changed their stance on unification propaganda from time to time? In the past, there have been several attempts by Korean experts to answer these questions. Among others, the most significant study is Soon Sung Cho's "The Politics of North Korea's Unification Policies; 1950-1965" published in 1967.

In his study, Cho divided the sixteen-year period (1950-1965) into three phases:

Since the onset of the Korean War, the DPRK (Democratic People's Republic of Korea) unification proposals have passed through three important phases in content and method. In the first phase, during the war, a policy of 'unification by force' was advocated. In the second phase, lasting from the Cease-Fire Agreement of 1953 until the student revolution of April 1960, the DPRK advocated a policy of 'peaceful unification' through free all-Korean elections under the supervision of neutral nations. In the third phase, beginning in 1960, the emphasis has been on immediate economic and cultural exchanges ultimately leading to the formation of an all-Korean confederation by peaceful means. (Cho. 1967, pp. 218-9)

Cho then tried to explain the shift in terms of the internal political situation in North Korea. Though Cho's explanation shows insightful matching between domestic political events in North Korea and the shift in emphases in her unification proposals, the study leaves several points to be clarified.

First, the division of the period (the three phases quoted above) should be subdivided further to show North Korea's year-by-year policy shifts. Second, international political settings should be examined for a

World Politics, Vol. 19, No. 2 (January 1967), pp. 218-241. Other noticeable studies include Byung-Chul Koh, The Foreign Policy of North Korea, New York: Praeger, 1969; Takashi Inoguchi, Kokusai-gankai no Suryo-bunseki: Beiking, Hiejo, Moskuwa 1961-1966, Tokyo, 1970; Benjamin H. Min, "North Korea's Foreign Policy," and Byong-Chul Koh, "North Korea's Unification Strategy: An Assessment," both in Se-Jin Kim and Chang-Hyun Cho (eds.), Government and Politics of Korea, Silver Spring: The Research Institute on Korean Affairs, 1972.

changes and the changes in her unification policy. Although domestic political changes may dictate shifts in a nation's foreign policy, these shifts occur in the context of the international political environment. Especially in a weak nation like North Korea, surrounded by the major Powers -- U.S.A., Japan, China, and Russia --, the foreign policy maker cannot ignore the international political setting created by the interrelated forces exerted by the Powers.

To supplement Cho's study, I designed a research project to measure the effect of the international political setting on North Korea's unification policy changes. Under what circumstances did the phase-by-phase unification policy changes of North Korea occur? For example, when the international political atmosphere was more favorable to North Korea vis-à-vis South Korea, did she choose a more hostile or a more amicable policy? To what changes in the setting (formal diplomatic relations or alliance patterns or trade relations, etc.) were the North Korean policy makers most sensitive? These are the main questions to be answered.

To carry out the above project, the first logical step was to measure exactly how North Korea's unification proposals have shifted in the given time period. The results of this first step are reported here.

In this research, a sample of forty-nine official messages pertaining to unification sent to South Korea by North Korean decision makers were analyzed through thematic content analysis according to a prepared coding scheme of thirty-six theme categories. The list of the messages used in this study is given in the appendix and the thirty-six theme categories are tabulated in Table 1. The scores of each theme were then summed by year and

TABLE 1 LIST OF THEMATIC CATEGORIES

ı.	DESCRIP	TION (propaganda plus denouncement)	Abbr. Code	Ser.
	1-1	US colonization in S. Korea	USIMP	1
	1-1		JPIMP	2
	1-3		DICTA	3
	1-4		DECAY	4
	1-5		ECDIS	5
	1-6		AGGRE	6
	1-7		CHUCH	
	1-8		EQUIT	8
	1-9		PROGR	9
		Peaceful characteristics of N. Korea policy	PEACE	10
II.	DEMAND	(to S. Korean government)		
	2-1	Withdrawal of US forces from S. Korea	WITHD	11
	2-2	Dissolution of UN missions in Korea	UNCUK	12
	2-3		SEVER	13
	2-4	(security treaty, military aid) Give freedom to mass (democratic parties)	FREED	14
	2-5		STHOS	15
	2-3	Stop aggressive behavior toward in Roles	311103	4-'
III.	DETERMI	NATION & OFFER		
	3-1	S. Korea	PREPD	16
	3-2			17
	3-3	Suggestion for economic aid and other help	ECAID	18
IV.	INSTIGA	TION OF REVOLUTION (to people)		
	4-1	Direct agitation of people for revolutionary cause	REVOL	19
	4-2	Inevitability of victory of socialism	VICTO	20
	4-3	Favorable international atmosphere for N. Korea	ATMOS	21
	4-4	Emphasis on national unity	UNITY	22
	4-5	Instigation for anti-foreign movement	ANTIF	23
"V .	PRINCIP	LES OF REUNIFICATION		
	5-1	Liberation of S. Korea by force	LIBER	24
	5-2	Reunification through general election	ELECT	25
		Confederation	CONFD	26

TABLE 2 (CONT'D.)

VI.	METHOD	OF UNIFICATION	Abbr. Code	Ser.
	6-1	Denial of UN authority	UNDEN	27
	6-2		NEUTR	28
	6-3	Self-determination	SELFD	29
VII.	DIRECT	SUGGESTION		
	7-1	North-South talk	TALKS	30
	7-2	Mutual reduction of military forces	REDUC	31
	7-3	Establish joint organization to promote S-N détente	INSTI	32
VIII.	MUTUAL	EXCHANGE		
	8-1	Material exchange	MATEX	33
	8-2	Postal exchange	POSEX	34
	8-3	Family reunion (including free visits)	FAMEX	35
	8-4		CULEX	36

normed by row and column sums.² The resulting indices which are called the relative deviation indices (RD) were factor analyzed to delineate mutually independent patterns. The factor scores were then used to examine the shifts in North Korea's communication themes on unification issues.

An apology to the readers of this report: To meet the panel rule (25 minutes for presentation and 25 pages in length), this paper will have to be unfortunately concise in its technical aspects and brief in verbal explanation. All major findings are either tabulated or plotted geometrically.

II. METHODS OF MASUREMENT: RELATIVE DEVIATION INDICES OF EMPHATIC SCORES OF THEME VALUES

For each message, if it included any of the thirty-six themes given in the list of theme categories (Table 1), "1" was coded for that theme category. If not, "0" was coded. The values were then summed by theme categories by year. Since the number of messages per year was not always the same, the values had to be normed by the number of messages. Also to be considered was the relation among themes: "emphasis" means the strength of a theme in relation to other themes, and thus, the relative strength of a theme had to be measured instead of the absolute strength. To meet these two requirements, a measuring scheme was designed specifically for this study.

The basic underlying idea is similar to that of ordinary χ^2 statistics. That is, comparing actual observed values with the expected values calculated with the assumption that there is no systematic influence on the occurrence of the event (complete randomness). In other words, it

²See the following section for the procedures.

is a scheme to measure the systematic deviation of each observed value from a null model, an ideal situation of complete randomness. Thus, I have called the indices produced with this measurement scheme "Relative Deviation (RD) Indices."

The only significant difference between χ^2 statistics and the RD indices is that the former squares the difference between the observed value and the corresponding expected value, while the latter does not. As I am interested in both the magnitude and direction of the differences between the observed and the expected values I have selected the latter.

The RD model is also very similar to the Relative Acceptance (RA) model designed by Savage and Deutsch for the measurement of the intensity of commitment by one nation to another with transactional communication flow. The major difference between the two models is that the RA model deals with a symmetric matrix while the RD model has no such limitation.

Step by step calculation procedures are given below.

Step 1 Raw Data Matrix

Each of the forty-nine messages coded according to the thirty-six thematic categories, provides the following raw data matrix

³For a detailed discussion of the RA model, see I. Richard Savage and Karl Deutsch, "A Statistical Model of the Gross Analysis of Transaction Flows," <u>Econometrica</u>, Vol. 28, No. 3, July 1960, pp. 551-72. See also Richard W. Chadwick and Karl Deutsch, "International Trade and Economic Integration," unpublished monograph, University of Hawaii, 1972.

	v ₁	v ₂	• • •	ť	•••	V ₃₆	
Y ₁	a 1·1	a _{1·2}	•	^a 1·j	•	a _{1·36}	R ₁
Y ₂		•	•	•	•	•	•
Y	a 1·1	•	•	a i·j	•	•	R _i
•		•	•	•	•	•	•
•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•
Y ₁₉	a _{19·1}	•	•	•	•		R ₁₉
	c ₁	•	•	cj	•	C ₃₆	T

where Y_i is the i-th year, V_j is the j-th theme, a_{ij} is the value for year i for theme j, R_i is the sum of the a_{ij} across the i-th row, C_j is the sum of the a_{ij} across the column j, and T is the grand total. Thus,

Step 2 Matrix of the Expected Value

Suppose that North Korea had not emphasized any particular theme relative to the others, and that there has been no change across the years. Then, the value of the i-th year for the j-th theme will be determined by C_4 and R_4 as follows:

$$E(a_{11}) = R_1 C_1 \frac{1}{T}$$
.

The matrix consisting of these $E(a_{i\,j})$ is then a null model with which the actually measured values are compared to determine their deviation from it.

Step 3 Matrix of Relative Deviation Indices

If we subtract the expected value of a_{ij} (E(a_{ij})) from a_{ij} and divide the result by E(a_{ij}), then we will have an index which will measure

the degree of deviation of the theme value from the null model value. The formula then looks like

$$RD = \frac{a_{ij} - E(a_{ij})}{E(a_{ij})}$$

where RD denotes the relative deviated value.

III. RELATIVE DEVIATION SCORES OF THEMFS IN NORTH KOREA'S MESSAGES ON UNIFICATION ISSUES

The relative deviation (RD) index shows how much North Korean decision makers emphasized a theme relative to the others free from the different numbers of messages used for each year. The RD indices calculated for the thirty-six themes for the twenty-one-year period are given in Table 2. The range of the RD values is -1 to +, with 0 being neutral (no deviation from the expected). Thus, if the values have negative signs, we can interpret them as "de-emphasis," and if positive, "emphasis." The indices are in a somewhat ordinal scale, and thus it is sufficient to know which theme was emphasized more in comparison with the others. The indices also tell us of the changes in emphasis of one theme across the years. Although the figures in Table 2 are self-explanatory, geometrical plottings of the scores along the time axis are given in Figures 1 through 5 to illustrate the shifting patterns of the relative intensities of the themes. For the examples, six themes were plotted.

Figure 1 is the plot of North Korea's denouncements of Japanese and U.S. colonizations of South Korea. North Korea had been silent about Japanese colonization until 1965 (with the exception of 1950). This is

In the sample of forty-nine messages there were no messages issued in 1951 and 1952. Thus, the number of the years studied was nineteen, though they covered a twenty-one-year period.

TABLE 2

RELATIVE DEVIATION (RD) INDICES OF THE 36 THEMES


			1 USIMP	2 JPIMP	3 DICTA	4 DECAY	5 ECDIS	6 AGGRE
1	Y1948	1	C-1521	-1-6196	5.7724	C.5717	C-1521 -C-1652	-1.CCCC
2	Y1949	•	C-2523	-1.CCCC	0.9265	C.1384 C.6365	C.2CC1	C.8CC1
3	Y195 0	1	C-35C1	2.6002	0.3847	1.6193	(.5201	1.8EC2
4	Y1953	1	C-4461 C-0473	-1.0000	-C.1544	-0.5239	-C.3C18	0.5710
5	Y1954	1	C-2523	-1.0000	-1.0000	-1.CCCC	-1-0000	1.5045
6	71955 71956	1	-C.36CC	-1.CCCC	-C.C153	-0.4181	-C.1466	C.92C1
8	Y1957	i	C.1521	-i.cccc	-1.0000	-1.CCCC	C. 5761	-1.6666
5	Y1958	ī	C-3501	-1.0000	-0.3076	0.6365	C.ECO1	-0.0555 -1.0000
10	Y1959	1	-0.6400	-1.CCOC	-1.0CCC	-1.0000	-C.5200 C.C)C6	-0.6568
11	71960	1	-C.5452	-1.CCOC	-0.7668	C.3781 C.571C	0.1521	-G.424C
12	71961	1	-6.1359	-1.0000	C.055C	G.2468	-C.CE57	0.3715
13	¥1962	1	-C.3142 -1.0000	-1.CCCC -1.CCCC	-1.0000	-1.COCO	-1.0000	-1.CCCC
14	Y1963	1	C.6CC1	-1.0000	C.230E	-1.C000	C.C667	-1.CCCC
15 16	71964 71965	î	6.2344	2.2516	C.ZEEC	-1.CCCC	-C-4514	-0.1771
17	¥1966	ī	C-2CC1	8-ECCE	0.8463	-1.0CCC	-1.000	1.4002
18	¥1967	ī	-0.3735	4.0090	C.9265	C.1384	-C-1652	-1.0CCC C.44C1
19	Y1968	1	C-44C1	4-7604	0.1678	C.3C92	-C.C399	007501
			7 CHUCH	8 EQUIT	9 PROGR	10 PEACE	11 WITHD	12 UNCUK
1	Y1948	2	1-3041	1.3041	-C.2C55	-0.64CC	C-C572	2.84C2
2	71949	Ž	C.2523	-1.000	-0.1364	C.5653	C.1526	1.7628
3	¥1950	2	-0.0555	0.2001	-0.3793	0.6876 C.8C^1	-1.CCCC 1.743C	3.0CC2 -1.0CCC
4	¥1953	2	-1.0CCC	-0.3C18	-1.0C00 -0.2777	C.5638	-C.5C13	-1.0CCC
5 6	Y1954	2	-1.0CCC C.2523	0.6697	-0.1364	0.5653	C-1926	-1.GCCC
7	71955 71956	2	-0.3600	-0-1466	-0.5586	C.2CC1	C.2191	-1.0CCC
8	T1957	Ž	-1.0CCC	0.5361	1.3836	C-4401	C.C572	-1.0CCC
9	T1958	2	C-8CC1	-1-0000	0.8622	C-1251	-C-1428	-1-0CCC
10	¥1959	2	-1.0CCC	-1.CCCC	-C.5C34	-1.0000	-1.CCCC	-1.0CCC
11	T1960	2	-C.3526	-0-1515	-G.1636	-0.0526	C.155C C.6458	1.C212 -1.CCCC
12	¥1961	2	C-1521	1.3C41 -1.0CCC	2.1918 ~C.0541	C.08C1 -C.1428	C-3C62	-1.0CCC
13 14	T1962	2	C.3715 -1.0CCC	-1.CC00	-1.0C00	-1.CCCO	-1.CCCC	-1.CCCC
15	71963 71964	2	-1.0000	-1.CCOC	0.1035	-1.C000	C.5235	-1 -0CCC
16	T1965	2	-C-1771	-1.CCOC	0.125C	-5.4857	-C.2163	-1.0COG
17	T1966	2	1.4002	-1.CC00	C-6553	-1.0CCO	-1.CCCC	-1.0000
18	11967	2	1.5045	0.6657	-0.1364	-1.0000	C-1526	-1.0CCC
19	¥1968	2	C.44C1	0.5201	-0.0C6E	-1.CCCC	-1.C000	-1.0CCC
				Control to		16 99 590	17 REBAS	18 ECAID
		- 121	13 SEVER	14 FREED	15 STHOS	16 PREPD	-1.CCCC	-1.0CC0
1	Y1948	3	C.6458	-1.CCCC 0.4732	-1.0000 -1.0000	-1.0000	0.3914	-1.0000
2	Y1949	3	-1.0000 -1.0000	0.0585	-1.0000	-1-0000	C.CC01	-1.0C0C
3	71950 71953	3	-1.0CCC	-1.GCGG	-1.0000	-1.0CCO	-1.COCC	-1.0CCC
5	T1954	3	-1.0000	-1.CCOC	-1.0000	1.8564	C-1637	-1.cccc
6	¥1955	3	-1.CCCC	-1.CCCC	5.2613	1.2768	C-3514	-1.0CCC
7	Y1956	3	2.6574	0.5060	5.4004	-1.0CCO	-1.000	1.1335
	¥1957	3	-1.0COC	-1.0000	-1.0000	-1.0000	1.5602 C.CCO1	2.0002
9	Y1958	3	-1.0000	1.1178	-1.0000	-1.CCCO	-1.0000	C-2CC1
10	¥1959	3	-1.0CCC -0.1338	-1.CCOC 0.4267	-1.0CCC -1.0COO	-1.0000	-C.3263	1.0212
11	¥1960	_	C.645E	1-0331	-1.0COC	-1.0CCO	-C.360C	-0.0355
12	71961 71962	_	-1.0000	0.6135	-1.0C00	-1.CCCC	-1.CCCC	1.2659
14	71963	_	-1.0000	-1.0000	-1.0000	0.7456	C-0667	-1.0CC0
15	T1964	_	-1.0CCC	0.8825	-1.CCOC	1.9093	C.7775	-1.0CCC
16	T1965	3	1.3512	-0.C31c	3.1145	1-9924	C-8287	-1.0000 -1.0000
17	T1966		-1-5000	-1.0000	-1.CCCC	3.3639 1.2768	1.6668 C.3514	-1.0CCC
18	¥1967		2.5775	0.4732	-1.0CCC -1.0CCC	1.6163	C.6G01	-1.0CCC
19	71968	3	-1.0CCC	-1.CCCC	-1.000	1.0103	20001	20000

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TABLE 2 (CONT'D.)

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natural because there has been no Jupanese presence in South Korea during the period. North Korea began to show her concern for the Japanese relations with South Korea in 1965, the same year the Normalization treaty between them was signed.

The denouncement of American imperialism and colonization of South Korea has been the routine opening remark in all of North Korea's messages. The fluctuation of RD scores of anti-American themes has thus shown relatively mild oscillation.


More interesting were findings on the themes related to unification methods, such as "direct agitation of the people of South Korea for revolutionary causes," "liberation by force," and "unification through general election."

As shown in Figure 2, North Korea's agitation levels formed two separate patterns: a mild oscillation between 1948 and 1963, and a sharp increase after 1964. Why has North Korea raised her agitation intensity? Why was 1964 the threshold year? These are some interesting questions to be answered later.


North Korea's advocacy of "liberation of the Southern Half by force" showed a uniquely shaped curve. In Figure 3, we can see that there were two peaks (1954-55 and after 1963) separated by a flat valley of complete silence. The first peak is understandable considering that the Cease-Fire Agreement was signed in 1953 and belligerent gestures made just after a devastating war can be understood as psychological inertia. The second peak, however, should be carefully studied, since it was not an ordinary fluctuation but showed a continuous upward trend.


Figure 4 plots the RD scores of the theme "unification through general election." As we can see, the curve forms a mild wave all through












the period studied, which means that there were no drastic changes in the level of North Korea's insistence on general election across time. Like the anti-American campaigns, "unification through general election" is a common ingredient in North Korea's messages. It should be noticed, however, that the curve oscillated very accurately at intervals of two years, with one exception between 1963 and 1964. The implication of the two-year cycles will be explained in a later study.

In conjuction with the unification methods, "suggestion of economic aid" is plotted in Figure 5 to see if there are any direct relations between North Korea's amicable gestures (offer of aid) and its stance on unification methods (liberation by force or unification through election). Figure 5 shows a mesa-like plateau in the period 1956-1962. This means that it was only between 1956 and 1962 that North Korea offered economic aid to South Korea. Again the question is, why did North Korea offer aid only during that seven-year period? Was it because she thought she was better-off than South Korea during that particular period?

One interesting finding is that when we superimpose Figure 5 (offer of aid) on Figure 3 (liberation by force), the plateau of the former exactly fills the valley of the latter. This implies that the two themes are mutually compensatory (c.f. r = -.47).

IV. TEN MAJOR DIMENSIONS OF THE THEMES APPEARING IN NORTH KOREA'S UNIFICATION MESSAGES

The themes discussed in Section III were mutually interrelated. For example, "direct agitation of people for revolutionary causes" and "instigation for anti-foreign movement" were highly correlated (.89), and so were "liberation of South Korea by force" and "military preparedness of North Korea to liberate South Korea" (.86).



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To study the interdependency among the themes and to find the mutually independent patterns of the thirty-six themes chosen, the RD matrix was factor analyzed. The principal component technique was employed and the factors were rotated orthogonally with varimax criteria. 6

As a result of the factor analysis, ten major basis dimensions were identified. The loadings of the thirty-six themes on the ten rotated factors are given in Table 3. Based on the high loading themes, each factor was then labeled substantially as shown in Table 4.

To show the cross-time pattern shifts in each of the ten thematic dimensions, factor scores were plotted in Figures 6 through 15. A brief interpretation for each of the ten patterns follows.

F1 SUBSTANTIAL TRANSACTION PATTERN. This is the largest dimension among the ten, which accounts for 16.7 percent of the total variance. All themes relating to suggestions of mutual interactions loaded highly on this pattern: postal exchange (.95), cultural exchange (.93), family reunion (.92), and material exchange (.86). Figure 6 shows cross-time shifts of North Korea's emphasis on this issue. Except for two years --

⁵A further purpose for the factor analysis of the RD matrix is to connect in a later study the RD indices to the measurements of international political setting and possibly the changing patterns of North Korea's leadership structure in a mathematical form which requires independence among the variables.

For a technical discussion as well as the theoretical implications of the factor technique and rotation criteria chosen here, see R. J. Rummel, Applied Factor Analysis, Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1970, 5.3 (pp. 112-3) and 7.11 (pp. 170-1).

⁷The basis dimensions of a matrix is a set of mutually independent vectors (variables) that spans the space represented by the matrix. All vectors in the matrix can be expressed in the form of a linear combination of the basis dimensions. Rigorously speaking, those discussed here are the ten major basis dimensions, since smaller dimensions were discarded (90.8 percent of the total original variance is retained with the ten major factors).

TABLE 3


LOADINGS OF THE 36 THEMES
ON 10 ROTATED FACTORS

	F	ACTORS	F ₁ *	F ₂	F ₃	F ₄	F ₅ *	F6*	F ₇	F ₈ *	F ₉ *	F ₁₀
TU	EMES	H ²	6.02	4.56	3.68	3.16	2.92	2.79	2./3	2.29	2.21	2.25
	IFFES											
1	USIME	.86		39		50	44			46		
2	JPIM	.90			42	32		66				
3	DICTA	.95	-48	57				36			32	
4	DECAY	.90	-31	66	-42							31
5	ECDIS	.89		64	-61							
6	AGGRE	.96								90		
7	CHUCF	.86						86				
8	EQUIT	.85		36				-		-35	36	52
9	PROGE	.90				78						
10	PEACE		48	46			-30			38		
11	WITH			<u>78</u>								
12	UNCOR											<u>87</u>
13	SEVER					-53		53		38		_
14	FREED				-62		53				36	
15	STHOS		69			-48				30		
16	PREPI				77 39							-33
17	REBAS					<u>72</u>						
18	ECAIL		38		-84							
19	REVOL					30	89					
20	VICTO					80						
21	ATMOS			47				-60			-38	
22	UNITY			88								
23	ANTIF		-31				85 42					
24	LIBER				61		42	37				
25	ELECT								53		48	32
26	CONFI								<u>91</u> 68			
27	UNDEN								68	-44		
28	NEUTE										<u>83</u>	
29	SELFE			88								
30	TALKS		59								36	53
31	REDUC		<u>75</u>		-36				38			14.4
32	INST								70 41		47	36
33	MATEX		86						41			
34	POSEX		95 92 93									
35	FAME		92									
36	CULEX	.96	93									

TEN MAJOR DIMENSIONS OF NORTH KOREAN COMMUNICATION THEMES

TABLE 4

		DIMENSIONS	Z VARIANCE	HIGH LOADING VARIABLES
	F1	SUBSTANTIAL TRANSACTION	16.7%	Postal exchange (.95), Cultural exchange (.93), Family reunion (.92), Material exchange (.86)
	F2	APPEAL TO NATIONAL SENTIMENT	1,2.7%	Self determination (.88), National Unity (.88), Withdrawal of U.S. Forces (.78)
	F3	MILITARY LIBERATION	10.2%	Suggestion for economic aid (84), Military predaredness for liberation (.77), Give freedom to mass (62), Liberation of S. Korea by force (.61)
	F4	SUPERIORITY OF SOCIALISM	8.8%	Inevitability of victory of socialism (.80), Economic progress in N.K. (.78), revolutionary base for liberation (.72)
1	F5	DIRECT AGITATION TO REVOLT	8.1%	Direct agitation of people to revolt (.89), Instigation for anti-foreign movement (.85)
	F6	THE' CHU-CHE'	7.8%	Political Independence of N. Korea (.86)
	F7	POLITICAL UNIFICATION	7.6%	Confederation (.91), Joint organization (.70), Denial of UN authority (.68)
	F8	ACCUSATION	6.4%	Military Aggressiveness of S. Korea (.90)
	F9	NEUTRAL SUPERVISION	6.3%	Supervision by Neutral Nations (.83)
	F10	DISSOLUTION OF UNITED NATIONS MISSION	6.2%	Dissolution of UN Commission in S. Korea (.87)





1960 and 1965 -- the five-year period that immediately followed the Korean War was the prime time for North Korea's emphasis on North-South transactions.


F2 APPEAL TO NATIONAL SENTIMENT. This dimension consists mainly of self-determination (.88), national unity (.88), and withdrawal of U.S. forces (.78). Accounting for 12.7 percent of the total variance, this pattern represents North Korea's appeal to national sentiment. As we can see in Figure 7, the pattern showed the highest peak in 1953 when the truce agreement was signed, which is followed by fluctuating waves. It seems, thus, that the alternating emphasis and de-emphasis of national sentiment was accidental, not calculated.

F3 MILITARY LIBERATION. This dimension is positively loaded by military preparedness for liberation (.77) and liberation of South Korea by force (.61) and negatively loaded by suggestion for economic aid (-.84) and give freedom to mass (-.62). Thus, the high factor score on this pattern means high belligerency and coolness toward friendly gestures. The plots of the factor scores (Figure 8) shows two interesting peaks separated by a deep valley in the late 1950's. This is the same pattern shown in Figure 3 which plotted RD indices of liberation by force alone.

F4 SUPERIORITY OF SOCIALISM. This dimension represents the clustering of the themes related to typical Marxist propaganda: inevitability of victory of socialism (.80), economic progress in North Korea (-.78), revolutionary base for liberation (.72). Again, the plotted scores across time (Figure 9) show irregular ups and downs implying that it was not programmed.









the highest loading theme direct agitation to revolt (.89). Another high loading variable, instigation for anti-foreign movement (.85), is a different version of the same theme, because the North Korean decision makers' theory defines South Korea as a colony of American imperialism, i.e., revolt against the South Korean government means anti-foreign movement. Prominent in the plotted figure (Figure 10) of the factor scores on this dimension is a very high peak that appeared in 1964.


F6 THE 'CHU-CHE'. The sixth pattern is highly loaded with political independence of North Korea (.86) and denouncement of Japanese colonization (after World War II) of South Korea (.66). The label 'Chu-che' which means roughly "self-respect" in Korean was given to this dimension, because this particular terminology prevailed in their expression of the two themes. Examination of the factor scores on this dimension reveals a unique cross-time pattern since 1961. First the curve dropped drastically and then soared sharply until it reached a peak in 1967 (Figure 11).

F7 POLITICAL UNIFICATION. The highest loading theme on this dimension is "advocacy of confederation as a method to unify the divided nation" (.91). Figure 12, which plots the factor scores, shows that it was between 1960 and 1965 when the North Korean regime emphasized a "confederation" scheme as a unification method. Considering the recent détente (1972) between North and South Korea, it would be interesting to extend the study period to 1972, since it would show the relation between the two phenomena.

The remaining three dimensions -- ACCUSATION (F8), NEUTRAL SUPER-VISION (F9), and DISSOLUTION OF UNITED NATIONS MISSIONS ON KOREA (F10) --










each being loaded with one dominant theme are self-explanatory. Factor scores are plotted in Figures 13, 14, and 15 respectively to show the pattern shifts across time.

One thing, however, should be clarified at this point. The ten patterns of the North Korean communication themes illustrated here are ten mutually independent (zero correlations) basis dimensions that underlie the entire communication themes represented by the selected thirty-six theme categories. These ten patterns cover most of the possible variance (actually 90.8%) of the themes contained in the North Korean messages pertaining to unification policies studied.







APPENDIX

LIST OF UNIFICATION POLICY DOCUMENTS USED FOR THE ANALYSIS

I.D.#	AUTHOR	TITLE	DATE
1	Kim, Il-Sŏng	"To Stand Against the Reactionary Exclusive Election of the Government in the South and Strive for Unification and Autonomous Independence." Address at the 25th meeting of the Central Committee of North Korean People's Democratic Front.*	8/9/48
2	Kim, Il-Sŏng	Report Made by Comrade Kim Il-Song on the Work of the Central Committee of the Worker's Party of Korea at the Second Congress of the W.P.K. (Excerpts)*	
3	Kim, Il-Sŏng	"Political Situation in North Korea." Report at the Joint Meeting of the Representatives of Various Political Parties and Social Organizations of North and South Korea.*	4/21/48
4	Kim, Il-Song	"Political Situation Created in Accordance with Exclusive Election in South Korea and Countermeasures for Unification Campaign in our Fatherland."*	6/29/48
5	The United Democratic Fatherland Front	Declaration of the United Democratic Fatherland Front to all Democratic Political Parties, Social Organizations and the Entire People of Korea.	6/25/49
6	Kim, Il-Sŏng	"In Respect to the Proclamation on the Policy for Peaceful Unification of the Fatherland.' Remarks given at Press Conference.*	
7	Kim, Il-Sŏng	"Korean People's Struggle for Establishing Unified Democratic Independent Nation."*	5/ /50
8	Presidium of the Supreme People's Assembly of DPRK	"On Promoting the Country's Peaceful Unification."	6/19/50
9	Kim, Il-Sŏng	"Every Effort for the Victory of War."*	6/26/50
10	Kim, Il-Sŏng	"All Efforts for the Rehabilitation and Development of People's Post-War Economy." (Excerpt) Report at the 6th Plenary Session of the Central Committee of the Worker's Party of Korea.*	8/5/53

11	Nam, Il.	Proposal by the North Korean Representative at Geneva Conference	4/27/54
12	Nam, II.	Statement by the North Korean Representative at Geneva Conference (Extracts)	5/3/54
13	Nam, Il.	Statement by the North Korean Representative at Geneva Conference	5/22/54
14	SPA of DPRK	Appeal of the Supreme People's Assembly of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea	10/30/54
15	Kim, Il-Sŏng	"On the Party Policy for the Development of Rural Economy Hereafter." (Excerpt) Conclusion at the Plenary Session of CC of WPK*	11/3/54
16	Kim, Il-Söng	"On <u>Cadrization</u> of People's Army and Perspectives of Branches and MOS Development." (Excerpt) Address at the Staff Conference of Political Officers of Korean People's Army.*	12/23/54
17	Kim, Il-Sŏng	"All Efforts for the Unified Independece of the Fatherland and the Establishment of Socialism in the Southern Part of the Republic: Theses on the Characteristics and Tasks of Our Revolution." (Excerpt)	4/ /55
18	Kim, Il-Söng	Report Delivered by Premier Kim Il-Song at the Celebration Heeting of the Tenth Anniversary of the August 15 Liberation by the Great Soviet Army. (Excerpts)	8/14/55
19	Kim, Il-Song	Report Made by Comrade Kim Il-Song on the Work of the C.C. of the WPK at the Third Congress of the WPK. (Excerpts)	4/23/56
20	Third Congress of WPK	"For the Peaceful Unification of the Country." Declaration of the Third Congress of WPK	4/28/56
21	DPRK	Statement of the Government of the DPRK on the Reduction of Armed Forces of the DPRK	5/31/56
22	DPRK	Cabinet Decision No. 43 of the DPRK: "On Supplying 100,000 SUK of Relief Rice Gratis to South Korean Foodless Peasants."	5/7/57
23	Kim, Il-Sŏng	Address at the 1st Graduation Ceremony of Song-Do College of Politics and Economy.*	8/25/57
24	Kim, Il-Sŏng	"On the Immediate Task Confronting People's Regime in Establishing Socialism." Address at the 1st Session of the 2nd Supreme People's Assembly.*	9/20/57

25	Kim, Il-Sŏng	"Korean People's Army is the Successor of Anti-Japanese Warriors." (Excerpts) Address to the Men and Officers of the 324 Unit of Korean People's Army.*	2/8/58
26	DPRK	Cabinet Decision No. 96 of the Democratic Republic of Korea: "On Relieving the Unemployed and the Vagrant Orphans of South Korea Groaning under U.S. Imperialist Occupation."	8/21/58
27	Kim, Il-Sŏng	Report at the 10th Anniversary of Independence of DPRK. (Excerpt)*	9/8/58
28	DPRK	Cabinet Decision No. 60 of the DPRK: "On Relieving the Sufferers in the Southern Part of the Country."	9/23/59
29	WPK	Address to the South Korean People	4/21/60
30	Kim, Il-Song	Address at the 15th Anniversary of Korean People's National Celebration, the Liberation on August 15. (Excerpt)*	8/14/60
31	Ch'oe, Yong-Kón	"For the Further Promotion of Peaceful Unification of the Country." Report Made by Ch'oe Yong-Kön, President of the Presidium of the SPA at the Eighth Session of the Second SPA.	11/19/60
32	SPA of the DPRK	Letter of the SPA of the DPRK Addressed to the Republic of Korea National Assembly and to the Political Parties, Social Organizations and the People in South Korea.	11/22/60
33	SPA of the DPRK	"Recommendations on Realizing Foonomic and Cultural Exchange and Cooperation Between North and South Korea and Promoting Independent Development of National Economy in South Korea."	11/22/60
34	Kim, Il	Speech by Kim II, first Vice-Premier, at the Pyongyang City Mass Rally Denouncing the U.S. Imperialist Aggressors who are Strengthening Military Pascist Dictatorship in South Korea.	5/20/61
35	Kim, Il-Song	Report Made by Comrade Kim Il-Song on the Work of the C.C. of the WPK at the 4th Congress. (Excerpt)	9/11/61

36	WPK	"For the Peaceful Unification of the Country." Declaration of the Fourth Congress.	9/17/61
37	Kim, Il-Sŏ	ng "On the Immediate Tasks Facing the Govern- ment of DPRK." (Excerpt) Address at the lst Session of the 3rd Supreme People's Assembly.	10.23/62
38	Kim, Il-Sŏ	"Our People's Army is the Army of the Worker's Class and for the Revolution. We must continuously reinforce the Project of Class- Conscious Political Socialization." (Excerpt) Address to the high-ranking officers above political regiment executive commanders of People's Army and local party and government officials.*	
39	Kim, Il-Să	"Let's Reinforce the Potentiality for Revolu- tion to Realize the Great Task of the Unification of our Fatherland." Conclusion at the 8th Plenary Session of the 4th Meetis of the C.C. of the MPK.*	
40	Kim, Il-Ső	ng "On the Task of Socialistic Young Worker's Association." (Excerpt) Address at the 5th Congress of the Democratic Youth Association.*	5/15/64
41	Kim, 11-56	ng "On Creating Revolutionary Literary Arts." Address to workers engaged in the field of literary art.*	11/7/64
42	Kim, I1-86	ng A Letter Reply to the Director of the Center of Korean Studies in Washington, D.C.*	1/8/65
43	Kim, Il-So	"On Establishment of Socialism in DPRK and the Revolution in the South." A lecture at Ali Arham Institute of Social Science in Indonesia.*	4/14/65
44	Kim, Il-Sö	"On the 20th Anniversary of the Foundation of the Worker's Party of Korea." (Excerpt) A Report at the 20th Anniversary of the WPK.*	10/10/65
45	Kim, I1-Ső	"Present Situation and the Task of our Party." (Excerpt) A Report at the Representative Conference of WPK.*	10/5/66
46	Kim, Il-Sö	ng A letter reply to the Director of the Center for Korean Studies in Washington, D.C.*	1/4/67

47 Kim, Il-Song "We should more intensively manifest the 12/16/67 Revolutionary spirit of Political Autonomy, Anarchy and Self-Defense in all the Fields of National Enterprises." (Excerpt) Government Platform of DPRK announced at the 1st Session of the 4th SPA. 9/7/68 48 "DPRK is the Symbol of Our People's Kim, Il-Song Freedom and Independence and a Powerful Arm for the Establishment of Socialism and Communism." (Excerpt) A Report at the 20th Anniversary of the Foundation of DPRK.* 49 Kim, Il-Song "The Great Task of Anti-Imperialism of the 10/8/68 Peoples in Asia, Africa, and Latin America Will Never Lose." An article appeared to commemorate the 1st anniversary of Che Guevara's death in action in Tri-Continental, Volume 8.

Note: The English titles given here are the original titles as released by the North Korean authorities, except for those with an asterisk (*) which were translated by Major Sang-jin Choi, Korean Military Academy. Names of persons, however, were respelled to conform with the standard McCune-Reischauer romanization system. Thus, Kim Il Sung became Kim Il-Song.