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
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December 1971

Israel and the Palestinian
Occupied Territories:
Military-Political Issues
in the Debate

Abraham S. Becker

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<p>10. ABSTRACT</p> <p>A study of Israeli views on the disposition of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Relatively dormant since the conclusion of Israel's war of Independence in 1948-1949, the Palestinian problem as an issue of Israeli policy was revived by the addition in 1967 of one million Arabs to the 400,000 already in Israel. Sharp internal debate produced a wide range of ideas for disposition of the conquered Palestinian territories, from annexation to the return of all areas except Jerusalem to their previous Arab rulers--including creation of a Palestinian state. Due to the lack of a consensus, the government took no official position. The debate concentrated primarily on the extent to which the territories would improve Israel's security, their significance in Jewish history, and their large, nationally conscious Arab population. Opinions were not divided according to political party, socioeconomic background, or age, due to a general agreement on certain basic tenets.</p>		<p>11. KEY WORDS</p> <p>Middle East Israel Palestine International Relations</p>	

PREFACE

Of the four separate pieces of territory that Israel took over during the Six Day War, two have been the subject of relatively little debate. Few voices are heard in Israel urging the return of the Golan Heights to Syria (certainly, not all of the territory) and the Gaza Strip to Egypt. Foreign Minister Abba Eban has said that in 1967 there was a consensus in the cabinet sufficient for Jerusalem to tell the U.S. government that whatever the nature of the settlement, the boundary with Egypt would have to be altered. There would be no return to the pre-existing border -- or more correctly, Armistice line -- established in 1949.¹ On the other hand, it was clear to all, even to the right wing, that part of the Sinai was going to be given up. The future of Sharm el-Sheikh has been the subject of much discussion over the years, with the controversy spreading to cover eastern Sinai. But no other settlement problem has generated as much heat in internal debate as that of the Palestinians and the West Bank. No consensus on the desired disposition of the West Bank was reached in 1967, and so, according to Mr. Eban, the government had to remain mute on the desired boundary with Jordan in response to U.S. inquiry.

It is not surprising that on the problem of the Palestinians and the associated territories the greatest battles of the "Wars of the Jews" should have taken place; this, after all, is the focus of the dispute that lies at the basis of the Middle Eastern conflict. If the location of the borders with Egypt and Syria involves largely issues of military security on the Israeli side and the return of lost territory to the states concerned, the controversy over the Gaza Strip and the West Bank touches Israel's most sensitive nerve -- the legitimacy of its statehood. Much of Israeli opinion has perceived a basic Arab strategy for the liquidation of the Jewish state, capsulated in the two-stage progression of "liquidation of the consequences of the aggression of 1967" and "restoration of the rights of the Palestinian people."

¹Jerusalem Post Magazine, January 23, 1970.

The first merely restores territory lost in the Six Day War; the second is viewed as intending to use the claim of Palestinian self-determination to subvert Israel's legitimacy. The third "War of the Palestinian Succession" (1948, 1956, 1967) has left Israel in control of the whole area that constituted the Palestinian Mandate after Transjordan was separated out in 1922. The outcome of the struggle over Gaza, the West Bank, and their populations will critically affect the probability that the Palestinian succession problem will require yet another war.

This report examines the views of Israelis on the disposition of the West Bank (including East Jerusalem) and the Gaza Strip. It touches only incidentally on the problem of the Golan Heights and the Sinai Peninsula and not at all on Israel's relations with the United States or with other powers on this subject. The focus is on the development of Israeli positions on what to do with the territories and peoples obtained as the legacy of the Six Day War. No attempt is made to reflect the complete spectrum of Israeli opinion, only the major points thereon. This is a study of Israeli views, not the author's, and the moral or political critique of the opinions examined is outside of the scope of the study.

The analysis of Israeli views is based in part on interviews conducted by the author in the United States and in Israel in the first half of 1971, but the study also relies heavily on the Israeli daily press. Readers accustomed to American newspapers would find those in Israel, especially in Hebrew, an unusual concentration of analytical-interpretive material under the byline of journalists, academics, and political figures. This is particularly true of the weekend issues, in which the special columns and features far outweigh the news sections. Israeli journalism thus maintains a traditional link with its European origins. In any case, this characteristic of the Israeli press makes it an irreplaceable source for the assessment of political viewpoints.

This report uses a crude, ad hoc system of transliteration from Hebrew. No distinction is made between the letters alef and ayin,

vet and vav, tet and taf, sin and samech. However, kaf is rendered as "c" and kuf as "k". The letter *hec* is transliterated as "h", compared with "h" for *hei* and "ch" for *chaf*. Yod is rendered as "i" when a vowel and "y" when a consonant. The equivalent of double yod is "ai" if the vowel is *patah* or "ei" if it is *tzeireh*. "Ei" is also used for the *tzeireh* alone or when followed by yod. However, common transliterations of proper names are accepted whether or not they fit the rules described. For example, Moshe, rather than Mosheh; Chaim Weizmann, rather than Hayim Vaitzman; Ben-Gurion, rather than Ben-Guryon.

This report was prepared for the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, International Security Affairs, as part of a research program on the Palestinians in the Arab-Israeli conflict. The Palestinian movement is surveyed in William Quandt, Palestinian Nationalism: Its Political and Military Dimensions, The Rand Corporation, R-782-ISA, forthcoming.

SUMMARY

This is a study of Israeli views on the disposition of the Palestinian occupied territories -- the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. The awakening to the problem of Palestinian resistance to the establishment of a Jewish state, not in the sense of acknowledging the fact of such resistance but in discarding illusions that good will and right behavior would convert resistance to acceptance, was a gradual process in the Zionist movement before the Second World War. Relatively dormant since the conclusion of Israel's War of Independence in 1948-49, the Palestinian problem as an issue of Israeli policy was revived in the wake of the addition in 1967 of one million Arabs to the 400,000 already within Israel's borders.

The profusion of ideas for disposition of the conquered territories that ensued immediately after the Six Day War almost covered the full spectrum of possibilities, from annexation to return of all areas (with the exception of Jerusalem) to their previous Arab rulers and including creation of a Palestinian state as a means to liquidation of the Arab-Israeli conflict. In the face of the sharp internal debate, the government decided not to decide and to conduct a holding operation. Nevertheless and at the same time, settlements were beginning to be established on the Golan Heights, near the city of Hebron, and on the north coast of Sinai.

This temporizing stance was symbolized by the Labor Party's adoption of Dayan's views -- proclaiming the Jordan River as the eastern security border of Israel and demanding retention of the Golan Heights and the Gaza Strip, as well as control of Sharm el-Sheikh by territorial link to Israel -- as the nonbinding "Oral Law." This was to be distinguished from the binding "Written Law," consisting of such vague formulas as "territories in exchange for peace" and "secure and agreed boundaries." The 1969 Knesset elections produced only a slight shift to the right at the expense of the Alignment (the Labor Party and Mapam).

In response to an acute moral-political crisis in the spring of 1970, occasioned by rising casualties and deepening Soviet involvement, the government braved the threat of a Gahal walkout from the coalition and accepted the American initiative, and thereby committed itself to some extent of withdrawal from the conquered territories. However, with attention now riveted on the Canal and after the defeat of the Fedayeen in Jordan, the Palestinian settlement has been pushed out of the limelight.

Three aspects of the captured territories have provided the major issues of the postwar debate -- improvement of Israel's security, significance in Jewish history, and on the negative side, the presence of a large, nationally-conscious Arab population. The war resulted in a dramatic change in Israel's borders, eliminating the hostile salients of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, diminishing the total length of the frontiers, pushing the Arab forces back out of artillery range of Israel's populated areas, and giving Israel the advantage of high-ground positions. The new borders have thus provided Israel with strategic depth, the protection of which is the central concern of Yigal Allon's strategic outlook and the chief objective of the Allon Plan. The Plan calls for the creation of an Arab enclave on the West Bank linked to Jordan by a corridor through Jericho but surrounded by Israel territory, including a strip on the east embracing the lower Jordan Valley and the eastern half of Judea. The Plan was never approved by the cabinet, but its "operational part," the creation of a string of rural paramilitary settlements in the Jordan Valley, was gradually realized. The cease-fire lines have eased Israel's conventional warfare problem on the east and north, and this fact is the most important basis for Israel's reluctance to return to the old frontiers.

Although the strategic advantages of holding on to the territories is an important argument of the annexationists, their polemics emphasize the extensive historical ties of the Jewish people to the

West Bank and the Golan. Since the basis of the State of Israel is the historical desire of Jews to return to Zion, the retention of the West Bank, in which Jewish civilization first developed, was seen to be justified a fortiori. Some of the annexationists may still dream of adding the East Bank, once part of Palestine and also associated with Israel's pre-Christian history, but it is possible that their maximum demands are meant to be negotiating positions. The religious bloc particularly is split in this regard.

The historical argument for annexation has its greatest appeal with respect to East Jerusalem. The symbol and focus of Israeli identity, Jerusalem is the object of Israeli emotional involvement intensified by memories of the bloody battles in 1948 and the violations of Israeli rights by the Jordanians during 1949-1967. Any suspicion of government intention to bargain over the fate of East Jerusalem triggers major political upheavals, such as the "Benvenisti Affair." The two halves of Jerusalem are not yet socially one but they interact in unprecedented ways. The latest and perhaps most daring step in the government's effort to increase the degree of integration in the city is the proposal to compensate East Jerusalem Arabs for property abandoned in Israel in 1948. The demand for a unified Jerusalem under Israeli control seems non-negotiable to most Israeli opinion, but some accommodation could be foreseen with respect to the status of the Holy Places and Arab access thereto. The minimum demands of the Israelis are likely to encompass control of the eastern heights overlooking the city, Israeli sovereignty in the Jewish quarter of the Old City, including the Western Wall, freedom of movement throughout the city for Jews and Arabs, and prevention of outside intervention in the affairs of the city other than the Holy Places.

Opponents of annexation point to two major drawbacks which would result from the incorporation of the million Arabs in the territories -- magnification of the internal security problem and probable transformation of the Jewish and Western character of the state, as their greater natural rate of increase brought the Arabs closer to

majority status. If the Palestinians' national rights were to be respected, Israel would have to become a binationalist society. Binationalism is now generally out of favor in Israel and it is regarded as unworkable. The wholly unpalatable alternative is seen to be a policy of apartheid. The annexationist counterargument rests on confidence in the ability of public policy to influence Jewish birthrates and in the eventual immigration into Israel of large numbers of Jews from the USSR and the Americas.

An alternative to either return or annexation of the West Bank is Dayan's concept of integration. This seems to be a search for new forms -- administrative, governmental, political -- that would allow coexistence of Israelis and Palestinian Arabs in the same area without the national self-effacement of either. Borders between Israel and its neighbors would be permeable and the political forms would be adapted to the developing network of economic and personal ties and to the objective of developing coexistence. Dayan looks upon Israeli settlements in the occupied zones as a means to the creation of political "facts" in the pursuit of integration. Anti-annexationists like Sapir are uneasy about the implications of integration, but they have difficulty suggesting an alternative framework to assure reasonable living standards in the territories.

To some the way out of the dilemma was to transfer authority to a Palestinian state. Confrontation with a million Arabs with a strong and articulated sense of national identity triggered a debate in Israel on the reality and meaning of Palestinian nationalism. Though initially inclined to doubt its validity and genuineness, Israelis increasingly if grudgingly acknowledged the separate and identifiable national consciousness of Palestinians. Agreement with neither Jordan nor Egypt seemed likely, while the Palestinians were at the root of the Arab-Israel conflict and were the only group with whom Israel could negotiate directly. Opposition to a Palestinian "orientation" focused on the irredentism allegedly inherent in Palestinian nationalism, the failure to detect a consensus on the West Bank in support of

any specific political direction, and the improbability of setting up a Palestinian state on the West Bank alone -- i.e., before settlement with Egypt and Jordan -- in view of the close ties of the Palestinians to other parts of the Arab world. The latter argument also lies behind the waning of initial government interest in allowing regional autonomy. Only when Israel and the Palestinians have concluded that there is no possibility of peaceful arrangement with Jordan is it likely that autonomy for the West Bank will be seriously considered in Israel.

The debate on the disposition of the territories showed a wide dispersion of views but it did not neatly mirror standard social-economic cleavages in the community. Moreover, beneath the lack of consensus on issues of government policy lies a profoundly more important foundation of shared perceptions and beliefs. Thus, the theory of a generational split between liberal Sabras and hawkish European Jews must be carefully qualified, since Israeli youth are considerably more hawkish with respect to the demands for direct negotiation and territorial acquisition than the population as a whole. Nor can the debate be easily partitioned by party affiliation -- doves are not confined to the Left nor hawks to the Right. The complexity of these alignments is related to the existence of a general consensus on certain basic tenets. Among these are the political-military value of frontier settlements, the critical importance of secure borders for the survival of Israel, the unreliability of foreign powers and international guarantees, the value of direct negotiations as a litmus test of Arab intentions, and the strategic significance of the creation of "facts" in securing vital national objectives.

Although the years of debate did alter the Israeli image of the Palestinians, the issue of the Palestinians and their fate has receded to the background of public discussion. The reasons include preoccupation with the Egyptian-Soviet problem, success of the occupation, and the liquidation of the Fedayeen movement in Jordan. No substantial pressure on Israel has developed from the side of the

Palestinians under Israeli control either. As Egypt after Nasser seems to be preoccupied with its own demands, prospects for a separate settlement with Jordan would seem to be improved. But Jordan is unlikely to risk intensifying its isolation in the Arab world by making a separate peace with Israel. The Soviet threat is Israel's major concern and if Jerusalem is forced to acquiesce in the return of Egyptian troops to the Sinai, Israeli demands with respect to Gaza and the West Bank are likely to harden.

Indefinite continuation of the military occupation is seen by the military government as the most likely present outcome. Exogenous threats to the stability of the status quo could come from revival of the Arab League threat to boycott West Bank goods, which was considered in the summer of 1971 but not activated, or -- a less likely prospect -- by the revival of terrorism from Syria or Lebanon. The more significant potential challenge can come only from the Palestinians themselves in reaction to their anomalous political status. If such a reaction does appear it could engender the greatest political crisis faced by the coalition since the war. In general, the survival of the coalition government will depend heavily on the ability of the Labor Party to maintain its sensitivity to the structuring of public opinion.

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CONTENTS

PREFACE 111

SUMMARY vii

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS xiii

Section

I. ISRAEL AND THE PALESTINIANS BEFORE THE SIX DAY WAR 1

II. GENERAL SKETCH OF THE POST-JUNE DISCUSSION 6

III. ISSUES IN THE DEBATE 19

 A. Security; The Allon Plan 19

 B. The Historical Connection to the West Bank 36

 C. The Special Case of Jerusalem 42

 D. Annexation and the Character of the State 51

 E. Integration: Dayan's Alternative 57

 F. The Palestinian "Entity" 67

 Appendix:

 Military Government Policy in the Gaza Strip 86

IV. UNITY AND DIVERSITY IN THE DEBATE 89

V. THE CURRENT SITUATION 104




Fig. 1 -- Israel and the occupied territories (excluding Sinai)

I. ISRAEL AND THE PALESTINIANS BEFORE THE SIX DAY WAR

Even among those who are not hostile to its cause, Israel is often accused of having discovered the Palestinians only when they refused to acquiesce in the formation of a Jewish state in 1948. Some even push forward the date of the rude awakening to the aftermath of the Six Day War. This is an extreme oversimplification. The fact is that Zionist attitudes on the "Arab problem" during the first two decades of the 20th century were distinguished by their illusions and not by their disregard of the problem. To be sure, there were elements of the Zionist movement prepared to dismiss the problem as inconsequential, but the dominant view at that stage was the belief -- utopian in retrospect -- that Arabs could eventually be won over to acceptance of a Jewish state in Palestine.

The literature of Zionist thought, speeches, and official pronouncements is replete with expressions of concern on the Arab problem and protestations of Jewish good will. To cite one example, after the Arab riots in 1921, the 12th Zionist Congress passed the following resolution:

It was with sorrow and indignation that the Jewish people have lived through the recent events in Palestine [the 1921 Palestine riots]. The hostile attitude of the Arab population in Palestine incited by unscrupulous elements to commit deeds of violence can neither weaken our resolve for the establishment of the Jewish National Home nor our desire to live with the Arab people on terms of harmony and mutual respect, and together with them to make the common home into a flourishing commonwealth, the upbuilding of which may secure to each of its peoples an undisturbed national development. The two great Semitic peoples, united of yore by the bonds of common creative civilization, will not fail in the hour of their national regeneration to comprehend the need of combining their vital interests in a common endeavour. The Congress calls upon the Executive to redouble its efforts to secure an honourable entente with the Arab people on the basis of this Declaration and in strict accordance with the Balfour Declaration. The Congress emphatically declares that the progress of Jewish colonization will not affect the rights and needs of the working Arab nation.¹

¹Cited in Susan Lee Hattis, The Bi-National Idea in Palestine During Mandatory Times, Haifa, Shikmona Publishing Co., 1970, p. 31.

Such citations can be multiplied easily. Inexperience, ideological pre-conditioning, and perhaps wishful thinking contributed to a widely shared belief that a way to reconciliation existed and needed only good will or right behavior.¹ For the socialist Zionists the key was class understanding: "Our belief is that the Zionist endeavour clashes with the interests of only a small fraction of the Arab nation -- the exploiting class", said Yaakov Hazan of Hashomer Hatzair² in 1930. His words were anticipated by David Ben-Gurion six years earlier: "The short and easy way (to agreement with the Arabs) of the effendis and dictators of the Arab nation -- this is not our way. We must find a longer and more difficult way -- the way to the Arab workers."³

There were Zionist groups who sought a political expression of reconciliation in the form of binationalism. Binationalism was the official goal of Hashomer Hatzair from 1929 until 1948, but it was also supported by more moderate political circles grouped around the Brit Shalom (Covenant of Peace) organization, set up in 1926 at the initiative of Dr. Arthur Ruppin, Head of the Palestine Land Development Company. However, neither Brit Shalom nor any other binationalist sounding found any echo on the Arab side. It was Dr. Ruppin himself who, by 1930, was able to explain why:

There are a number of very serious clashes of interest between the Jews and Arabs, and I see no way at present of settling these differences, in a manner that the Jews will have the possibility for free immigration as well as free economic and

¹The attitude of the Zionists is characterized by the Israeli writer Amos Eilon as "a combination of blindspots and naivete, of wishful thinking, paternalistic benevolence, and that ignorance which is often a factor in international events, and sometimes their cause." Eilon, The Israelis. Founders and Sons, New York, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1971, p. 157. Eilon's treatment of Zionist attitudes to Arabs (Chapter 7 of his book), which is relatively unsympathetic, should be contrasted with that of Ben Halpern, The Idea of the Jewish State, 2nd ed., Cambridge, Massachusetts, Harvard University Press, 1969, pp. 331-343.

²A left-wing socialist group that later formed the basis of the Mapam party.

³Hattis, cited on pp. 71, 77.

cultural development -- which are basic necessities to Zionism -- and that on the other hand the interests of the Arabs will not be damaged.¹

As a socialist-Zionist critic of Brit Shalom noted, no significant problem of peaceful coexistence with the Arabs existed if the issue concerned only those 170,000 Jews already in the country and was not a means to "materialize Zionism and set up the homeland of the Jewish nation in Palestine."²

But the illusions were persistent, even among such outstanding leaders as Chaim Weizmann, long-time president of the World Zionist Organization and the best known Zionist personality of his age, who was prepared at one time (1930) to court great unpopularity by denying that the "Jewish State and Zionism are one and the same thing." While affirming only that "the content of Zionism in my opinion is that in Palestine a set of foundations can be created on which a Jewish national community can be developed," he went on to declare: "We will certainly try to bring the maximum number of persons to Palestine and when we shall be the majority there, we will not dominate Arabs, just as we will not allow ourselves to be dominated while we are the minority."³ It was Arthur Ruppin again who saw the irreconcilability of aims:

What we can obtain [from the Arabs] we do not need, and what we need we shall not be able to obtain. What the Arabs are willing to give us is at most minority rights for the Jews in an Arab state, according to the pattern of minority rights in Eastern Europe. But we have already had sufficient experience from the situation in Eastern Europe to what extent one can force the majority nation, which holds the reins of power, to give the minority real national equality.⁴

¹ Ibid., cited on p. 48.

² Ibid., cited on p. 74.

³ Ibid., cited on p. 89.

⁴ Ibid., cited on p. 57. Because Ruppin's views evolved from criticism of Zionist lack of consideration for Arab national rights to acceptance of the inevitability of Arab-Israel conflict, he has been frequently cited as the personification of the growing disillusionment of the

For a while, Mapai, the major socialist-Zionist party, opposed (the right wing) Revisionist party attempts to make a Jewish state the goal of the Zionist movement. Instead, Mapai espoused binationalism and sought ways to win over prominent Arab leaders. But nothing came of numerous attempts by many leaders from various Zionist groups to devise a solution acceptable to major Arab groups. Ben-Gurion summed up two decades of such effort in the fall of 1939 with clarity and candor: "There is no example in history that a nation opens the gates of its country, not because of necessity...but because the nation which wants to come in has explained its desire."¹

Only the right wing of the Zionist movement seemed to have a consistently clear perception of this fundamental truth. Early in the 1920s revisionist leader Vladimir Jabotinsky declared: "The Arabs love their country as much as we do; their decision to resist us is only natural." Before the Peel Commission of Inquiry in the middle 1930s he acknowledged that "of course the Arabs have a strong case, of course they would prefer Palestine to be the fourth, fifth, or sixth independent Arab state"; it was simply a matter of the greater justice or the lesser injustice to support the Zionist cause.²

The Second World War brought only a temporary halt to the Arab-Jewish conflict. Renewed immediately after VE day, Zionist efforts to bring Jewish "displaced persons," the remnants of the European Jewish community destroyed by the Nazis, to Israel brought the conflict to a fever pitch. In 1947, the Palestinian Arabs rejected the Partition Plan devised at the UN, as they had rejected the British Peel Commission's Plan in 1937, and called in the Arab states to help nullify the

Zionist movement. In a now famous speech to the Command and Staff School on August 1, 1968, Dayan used Ruppin's experience as the counterpart to his own theme of protracted conflict. (See Dayan, A New Map, Other Relations (Hebrew), Tel Aviv and Haifa, Sifriyat Maariv and Shikmona, 1969, pp. 19-29. The speech was translated in the Jerusalem Post Magazine, September 27, 1969.)

¹Cited in Hattis, pp. 223-224. By the outbreak of World War II, Mapai was demanding a Jewish state.

²Cited in "Whose Country is Palestine? The Predicament of the Zionist Left," Times Literary Supplement, November 23, 1970.

proclamation of Israeli statehood in May 1948. There ensued a mass exodus of Palestinian Arabs -- about 550,000 by Israeli count, considerably more in Arab claims -- leaving only 150,000 within the borders of the new Israeli state.

For almost two decades, the Palestinian problem was submerged in the general problem of Arab revanchism. From the Israeli viewpoint, the refugees were seen as mere pawns in the Arab struggle against Israel and indeed even in the internecine Arab conflicts. Rivalries among Egypt, Syria, Jordan, and Iraq, Israelis believed, made for Arab state disinterest in an independent Palestinian national entity that could threaten the interests of one or another of the contending parties.¹ In Israel itself, there appeared little interest in the Palestinians as such. The society's energies were consumed in coping with the tasks of defense, development, and absorption of Jewish immigrants. Arabs who remained in Israel were viewed as presenting a potential internal security threat, but they gave no sign of developing a "national liberation" movement. The Israeli Arabs were predominantly rural, undirected, and disorganized. Their national consciousness was at least dormant.

¹For some Israeli views on the Arab politics of the Palestinian problem, see three articles translated in Shlomo Avineri, ed., Israel and the Palestinians, New York, St. Martin's Press, 1971: Matityahu Peled, "Palestinian or Jordanian Entity" (originally Maariv, April 8, 1969), pp. 31-48; Yehoshafat Harkabi, "The Palestinians in the Israel-Arab Conflict" (originally Maariv, November 21, 1969), pp. 1-21; Attalah Mansour, "Palestine and the Search for a New Golden Age," pp. 85-100. Harkabi and Peled are both reserve major-generals in the IDF, Harkabi having served as Chief of Military Intelligence and Peled as head of the Quartermaster Corps. After completion of graduate studies, both have gone on to academic careers -- Harkabi at the Hebrew University and Peled at Tel Aviv University. Mansour is an Israeli Christian-Arab journalist and novelist.

II. GENERAL SKETCH OF THE POST-JUNE DISCUSSION

As the immediate shock of the victory wore off, the question of what to do with the territories won in the week of June 5, 1967 became of universal concern in Israel. From its inception the debate was heated and the proposals wide-ranging. At one extreme, a body of opinion developed in favor of outright annexation. The Prime Minister himself, Levi Eshkol, foreshadowed the direction in which the country was moving in his victory address to the Knesset on June 12:

The prophesy has been fulfilled. 'There is recompense for thy work, the sons have returned to their borders' [Jeremiah 36:16-17]....To the nations of the world, I say: Be under no illusion that the State of Israel is prepared to return to the situation that prevailed up to a week ago.

In an interview with CBS the day before, Dayan expressed his personal view that the Gaza Strip should not be returned to Egypt and that the West Bank should be given autonomy. By June 21 Dayan seemed to see the West Bank as remaining under Israeli rule (although in September he talked only of Israeli military control over the West Bank). On July 26, Yigal Allon reopened the Latrun section of the Jerusalem-Tel Aviv road and announced: "The Jerusalem Corridor has ceased to exist as of today."¹

Ten weeks after the end of the war, a petition was presented to the Prime Minister bearing 163,000 signatures in opposition to the return of "any part of our country which has been liberated."² On October 28, 1967, the Chief Rabbi of the Sephardic (south European, African and

¹Shiloah Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies, Tel Aviv University, Middle East Record, Volume Three, 1967, Jerusalem, Israel Universities Press, 1971, pp. 273-275. Jordan's Arab Legion had cut the Tel Aviv-Jerusalem Road in the Latrun salient in 1948 and thereby isolated Jewish Jerusalem from the rest of Israel. The efforts made by the Israel Defense Force to dislodge the Jordanians from Latrun were the bloodiest battles of the 1948 war but were unsuccessful. A bypass was built in secrecy and largely at night.

²Davar, August 21 and 22, 1967; mentioned in Middle East Record 1967, p. 376. East Jerusalem, of course, was annexed almost immediately. For Israeli views on the disposition of East Jerusalem, see Section III C below.

Asian Jewish) community, Yitzhak Nissim, ruled that no religious or secular Jewish authority, including the government of Israel, had the right to renounce any of the Land of Israel,¹ the "heritage of every Jew." Presumably, this applied to the West Bank and Gaza, perhaps even to the Golan as well.² By early July, Eshkol was supporting the annexation of the Gaza Strip³ and, in an interview with Joseph Alsop, declared: "The security border of Israel must be the Jordan River,"⁴ a formulation that was to be a renewed focus of debate in the summer of 1969.

On the other extreme, there were those who favored return of all the territories conquered, with the exception of Jerusalem (for which a joint regime was contemplated), in exchange for a "true" peace ending the decades-long Israel-Arab conflict.⁵ Only slightly at variance with this program was that issued by Mapam,⁶ which on August 24 in the session of its Political Committee decided to ask for return of the West Bank to Jordan and demilitarization of the Syrian Heights, but Israeli defense positions on the ridges of the Heights, annexation of the Gaza Strip, and retention of a unified Jerusalem.⁷ The Prime Minister had a plan

¹ Translation of Eretz Yisrael, the Hebrew name for Palestine.

² Jerusalem Post, October 29, 1967. There is also a Chief Rabbi of the Ashkenazic (east and west European) community too. He did not issue such a ruling. The role of the Israeli chief rabbis is in no way similar to that of the Roman Pope. Their authority is local and even in Israel rests on consent of the orthodox communities.

³ Interview in Der Spiegel, July 10, 1967.

⁴ Los Angeles Times, September 14, 1967.

⁵ See the advertisement against annexation signed by 200 intellectuals in Haaretz, December 15, 1967. This was also the position of the (pro-Israel) Israeli Communist Party led by Moshe Sneh and Shmuel Mikunis. It goes without saying that Rakañ (Hebrew acronym for New Communist List), the Moscow-oriented, pro-Arab Communist party, followed the Soviet line faithfully, demanding unconditional, immediate, and complete Israeli withdrawal.

⁶ Israel's Marxist but Zionist and kibbutz-oriented socialist party. Loyal to its image of Soviet socialism until the Six Day War, Mapam is undergoing considerable internal turmoil as the younger generation of the Party seeks to repudiate past allegiances.

⁷ Al Hamishmar, August 25, 1967. The return of the West Bank to Jordan was conditioned on "a number of border changes...in order to guarantee the security of Israel."

of his own, which involved the creation of some sort of

Palestinian unit, having its boundary on the Jordan, and which would include the large urban concentrations, such as Nablus, Jenin, Qalqiliya, and Jericho, which would be endowed with autonomy and have economic, commercial, as well as cultural ties with Israel, to whom we would offer an opening to the Sea, and to whom we could provide whatever assistance is in our capacity and all our experience.¹

Eshkol's was only one of many Israeli examinations of the concept of a Palestinian state as a means to liquidation of the Arab-Israeli conflict. The sudden confrontation with a large and articulate group of Palestinian Arabs, after more than twenty years of mutual isolation, led to numerous discussions during the summer and fall of 1967 between Palestinian and Israeli leaders searching for areas of agreement. However, no consensus was reached, owing both to a division of opinion among the Palestinians and to hesitations on the part of even the anti-annexationist Israelis, many of whom were still hopeful that agreement could be reached with Hussein.²

Despite or perhaps because of the uncertainty, Israeli settlements began to be set up in the occupied territories. The first was established on the Golan Heights in August 1967, although this was less by government authority than with the government's uncertain acquiescence. In September the Prime Minister announced the imminent reestablishment of the kibbutzim near the city of Hebron, known as the Etzion Bloc, which had been wiped out by the Jordanian Arab Legion in 1948. In October a Nahal (military-agricultural) community was set up on the Mediterranean coast in northern Sinai.

¹ Le Monde, July 9, 1967. The omission of Hebron from the list of "large urban concentrations" is conspicuous but of doubtful significance. It does not seem likely that Eshkol at that point was contemplating annexation of the Hebron hills. Later in the Le Monde interview, Eshkol's response to a question on the borders of the entity is: "In broad terms, like that part of the territory [Palestine?] which was annexed by the former Transjordan."

² On the "Palestinian Entity," see Section III F below.

However, these were among the few deviations from immobility. In the face of the sharp internal debate, on one side of which were those who demanded adherence to the policy of "not one inch" and on the other side those who wished return of substantially all, and in the face of the uncertain and difficult international environment, the government decided essentially not to decide. Its policy was embodied in a series of formulas -- "no withdrawal without peace," "territories in exchange for peace," "secure and agreed boundaries," "direct negotiations in the framework of a signed peace treaty"¹ -- that were designed to serve as a holding operation for as long as the Arab side appeared to adhere to an intransigent position. On this basis, the coalition government exercised its mandate until the elections of 1969 and indeed through the first half of 1970.

In the year after the war, the outstanding external development was the growing power of the Fedayeen movement, whose obverse was the growing weakness of King Hussein. At the same time, all of the relevant Arab powers were bound by the negatives established at the summit meeting in Khartoum in August 1967 -- no peace, no negotiation, no recognition, no abandonment of Palestinian rights. The prospects of peace negotiations seemed to be fading. In the meantime, Israel had established a unique system of occupation in the territories, primarily in the West Bank, which relied on minimum visibility and interference by the IDF and the maximum provision of independent action by the local authorities at the municipal level. Although the occupation system provided a promising and surprisingly successful framework, it did not constitute a long range policy. Hence, there began to be increasing pressure on the government to make decisions for the long term.²

¹ Another formula devised to satisfy the cabinet minimalists and the Americans was "maximum security, minimum Arabs" and was loose enough to be accepted by the annexationists.

² For a glimpse of the history of the government's attempts to develop long-run economic and social policies for the territories, see the Jerusalem Post, August 6, 1969, and two articles by Dani Rubinshtein in Davar, June 11 and 13, 1971. Rubinshtein's articles report on the operations of two groups -- the Professor's Committee, set up by Eshkol immediately after the June War, and the Rehovot Group, a study group established outside the

At this point, both Allon¹ and Dayan came forward with their respective plans requiring cabinet action. The Ailon Plan had been submitted virtually on the morrow of the war, but it had not been approved then and now came up again in the fall of 1968 for government decision. Essentially, Allon contemplated the creation of an Arab enclave in the West Bank which was to be connected physically to Jordan by a corridor approximately in the area of Jericho. The lower Jordan Valley itself was to be sprinkled with Israeli military-rural settlements and annexed, becoming Israel's political border on the east. Allon also contemplated some settlements in the area near Hebron and in the southern part of the Gaza Strip.² During the year that followed the Six Day War, Dayan had not formulated any specific plan for a longer term operation. In November 1968, however, he startled the Israeli public by demanding a decision for economic integration of the West Bank areas with Israel.³

These were not the only plans confronting the Prime Minister. There were perhaps half a dozen proposals then circulating in the Cabinet. For example, Menahem Begin, the leading figure in Ga'hal,⁴ proposed retention of all the territories but also Jewish settlements within the major Arab cities of the West Bank.⁵ In respect to

government -- as well as of a government fund for economic development in the territories established in the spring of 1970. None of these efforts seem to have had either wholehearted government backing or any tangible results.

¹Allon, of the Ahdut Haavodah wing of the Israel Labor Party, is Minister of Education and Culture (in 1968, Minister of Immigrant Absorption) and also Deputy Prime Minister. But whatever weight is accorded his views in Israel owes more to his military background and standing in the country than his ministerial titles.

²For further details, see below, pp. 27-28.

³See below, p. 61.

⁴The confederation of the right wing Herut, successor to the Revisionists, and the slightly more moderate Liberals.

⁵According to Aryeh Naor in Hayom (December 22, 1968), Begin urged the creation of Jewish quarters in those West Bank cities that were slated to become part of Israel according to plans like that of Allon -- e.g., Hebron, Jericho, Qalqiliya.

settlements, he differed only slightly from Dayan, whose proposal for integration provided also for Jewish suburbs near the major Arab cities. Another plan then circulating, attributed to Eliyahu Sasson, the Minister of Police,¹ sought to return the West Bank to Jordan -- but excluding Jerusalem and its environs, the Latrun salient, a security strip on the hills near Tulkarm, and perhaps other such strips elsewhere. This was to be done provided that Jordan demilitarized the West Bank, resettled the West Bank and Gaza refugees with Israeli financial help, and signed a peace treaty. Dayan's plan, as well as Begin's, aroused the intense opposition of the influential Secretary-General of the Labor Party, Pinhas Sapir,² whose concerns were primarily the so-called "demographic problem" and the question of the maintenance of the Jewish character of the Israeli state.³ Mapam and Sapir were prepared to support something like the Sasson plan. The centrists in the cabinet for the most part supported Allon, or at least what was then called the "operational part of the Allon plan," involving only the creation of a number of Nahal kibbutzim in the Jordan Valley, because it left various options of settlement with Jordan open. In contrast, Dayan's program seemed to them to presuppose no settlement at all with Jordan.⁴

While the Allon Plan as such had been accepted by the Labor Party (before Mapam came into alignment with it), the discussion within the cabinet in the winter of 1968-1969 produced no consensus, and only the Plan's "operational part" was approved. On December 2, 1968 Israel disclosed intentions to establish 25 settlements of 400-600 settlers

¹Sasson had a distinguished career, prior to the assumption of this portfolio, as Arab expert for the pre-State Jewish Agency and later the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He had been a major figure in the secret negotiations with King Abdallah in 1948. At present he contributes frequently on Arab affairs to the Hebrew press and has been mentioned as a candidate to succeed the current President of Israel, Zalman Shazar.

²Sapir had been Minister of Finance, took over the leadership of the Party from Golda Meir in 1968 while remaining in the cabinet without portfolio, and resumed his Finance post again in 1969 when Meir replaced Eshkol.

³See below, p. 52.

⁴Yosef Harif, in Maariv, December 13, 1968.

each on the Golan Heights. Ten of this group had already been set up.¹ By the spring of 1969 there were some 17 or 18 settlements in the occupied territories, 11 in the Golan Heights, three in the Jordan Valley and three in Sinai. In this development Allon was a major mover and supporter.²

In the meantime the interest in the settlement option known as the Palestinian Entity continued to grow. The great awakening of Arab political discussion in the West Bank after the Six Day War was to a certain degree attenuated by the passage of the Security Council resolution in November 1967, which contemplated agreements between the existing states and the dispatch of a UN mediator to the area. In consequence, some of the Arab West Bank interest in the Palestinian state died down, since it was felt that the ball was in the hands of the Arab government. The division in the ranks of the West Bankers was highlighted by a conference of West Bank mayors in August 1968, held in Nablus, to discuss the possibilities of asking Israel to transfer regional authority to a civilian administration.³ Yet the foremost exponent of the Palestinian entity, the mayor of Hebron, Sheikh Ja'abari, was not present at this meeting. The mayors could not agree, partly for fear that positive action would appear as connivance at annexation, or at least permanent detachment from Jordan.⁴ Nevertheless, in December 1968 a new stimulus was provided to the debate on the Palestinian Entity when King Hussein told Gavin Young of the Observer that the King was prepared to see a Palestinian state in the West Bank after the Israelis left.⁵ The debate in Israel

¹UPI dispatch, Jerusalem, December 2, 1968.

²Yehoshua Tirah, in Haaretz, April 4, 1969.

³See also below, pp. 83-84.

⁴Hezi Carmel, in Maariv, August 15, 1968.

⁵Speculation on the Palestinian state in the Israeli press extended to include the prospective cabinet. Favorite candidates were Anwar Nuseibeh for Prime Minister; Anwar al-Khatib, Defense; Hikmat al-Masri, Foreign Affairs; Kadri Tuqan, Education; and Muhammed Ali Ja'abari, Interior.

received additional impetus in an exchange published in Maariv in May 1969 between Professor Jacob Talmon of the Hebrew University and Minister Yisrael Galili, a major confidant and supporter of Mrs. Meir.

The continuing debate in the Israeli government and in the public at large was brought to a fever pitch at the convention of the Labor Party at the beginning of August 1969 called to draft a platform for the October Knesset election. The debate in the Labor Party was primarily a three-cornered affair between Dayan, Allon, and Eban. Dayan sought approval of his policy of integration in the territories and a general foreign affairs and national security package that included the Jordan River as the eastern security border of Israel, across which no foreign military force could be allowed in a westward direction; retention of the Golan Heights and the Gaza Strip under Israeli control; and guarantee of Israel's freedom of navigation from Eilat southward by means of Israel's own forces, partly through control of the area around Sharm el-Sheikh, connected to Israel by a continuous territorial link. Allon opposed the Dayan package, on varying grounds. He opposed complete integration of the territories, because this would damage Israel itself, but he urged a stronger formulation of the plank dealing with the eastern border. In the Allon Plan, the Jordan River was not merely the security border but also the political frontier. The Foreign Minister was opposed to the entire notion of economic integration and to the application of Israeli law to any part of the captured territories. He favored the continuation of an "open bridges" policy, consultation with the Arabs, perhaps even investment in the West Bank, so long as the policy did not affect the Jewish character of Israel. With respect to the eastern border, he insisted on keeping the subject entirely open.¹

The Israel Labor Party has been dubbed by its opponents "a supermarket of opinions," and the range of views within its ranks almost approximates that in the country as a whole. To avoid precipitating open internal warfare, Eshkol had operated with the "no-plans plan."

¹M. Maizels in Maariv, August 5, 1969.

When Golda Meir took over the office in March 1969 she was faced by exacerbated party controversy, including, as the elections approached, the possibility of the defection of Dayan. Believing that the Arab states were not yet prepared to conclude peace, she was concerned above all to hold her party and the country together. Therefore, at the Labor Party convention she balanced precariously now on the side of the anti-annexationists, now rebuking the veteran Mapam leader, Meir Yaari, for underemphasis on the security of Israel's borders. She upheld Eban on the necessity to avoid Israel's international isolation but also noted dryly that no one was rushing to Israel's aid. The Party followed its leader and adopted her tentative and precarious stance: it failed to vote formally on the foreign affairs and security planks while adopting Dayan's proposal (without "integration") as a committee statement of principles. This came to be known as the "Oral Law," to be distinguished from the "Written Law" of the vague formulas adopted under the Eshkol administration. Party members were free to discuss the "Oral Law" in the light of their own particular views.

The function of the "Oral Law" was to square the circle, to pose preconditions and yet not pose them. But it was certainly not lost on the leaders of the Labor Party that the historical prototype of the "Oral Law" -- developed in ancient Israel almost concurrently with the Pentateuch itself -- was an evolution of the Written Law. It is a tradition in Rabbinic Judaism that the Oral Law was given to Moses on Mt. Sinai together with the Written Law. The Oral became the sole authorized interpretation of the Written Law. This appears to have been the fate of the modern incarnation. In spite of the occasional protests of such people as Sapir, the Oral Law has in fact become the foundation of Labor Party policy. At the Labor Convention in 1969 Eban and Mapam fought vigorously against much of the unofficial interpretation. Today their positions are virtually indistinguishable from those set out in the Oral Law.

The unreconciled difficulties and basic dilemmas in the Israeli approach are mirrored in the very terminology applied to the territories won in 1967. The area West of the Jordan River is called the West Bank and is designated an occupied -- in Hebrew, "held" -- area. Thus, too, Dayan's deputy for military government, Brigadier Shlomo Gazit, is the

Coordinator for Government Activities in the Occupied Territories. But the military governors of the two major regions deal with Judea and Samaria, formalizing the tie to Israel's pre-Diaspora history and implying inextricability of the State of Israel and the occupied territories.

While Jerusalem waited for the Arab world to come to terms with Israel's existence, events in the occupied territories moved with a logic of their own. Sapir had wished to do virtually nothing with the territories but hold them. However, the policy of "sit still and do nothing" appeared impossible to follow. Decisions had to be taken, means had to be found for the livelihood of the subject population, changes were taking place as a consequence of the mere existence of the military government itself. Inevitably there was a slow but perceptible drift. Economic integration was gradually becoming a reality and the number of Israeli settlements mounted. For the anti-annexationists the movement looked ineluctable and threatening. The policy of "no withdrawal without peace" seemed to conceal, wittingly or unwittingly, a movement to entrenchment in the occupied areas which must inevitably affect the possibility or the nature of the peace settlement.¹ By incremental decision-making, the cabinet committee on settlement in the territories has implemented the "operational" part of the Allon plan. As of the end of October 1971 there were 13 Nahal kibbutzim in the lower Jordan Valley and on the north shore of the Dead Sea.² New settlements were to be erected on the Golan and for the first time in the Gaza Strip.³

The election of 1969 left the government in a position to adopt a general umbrella position -- to continue to abstain from "drawing maps," yet with an informal platform that envisioned a generally hard negotiating line. This it perceived to be in keeping with the desires of the electorate. The end result of the intense debate of that summer, the extraordinary collision of personalities and views, was minimal change in the

¹ See, for example, Amnon Rubinshtein in Haaretz, December 19, 1969.

² Jerusalem Post, November 2, 1971; Zeev Schiff, Haaretz, November 4, 1971.

³ Haaretz, June 10, 1971, p. 8; Jerusalem Post, October 20, 1971.

makeup of the Knesset. Nine seats changed hands out of 120. The Alignment, now composed of the Labor Party (the amalgamation of Mapai, Ahdut Haavodah, and Rafi¹) and Mapam, lost seven and the right wing Free Center, two, which were taken up by Gahal (four), the National Religious Party (one), State List² (three), and Uri Avneri's Haolam Hazeh (This World) (one). If the exchange between the Free Center and Gahal is regarded merely as an internal substitution, only seven seats changed hands, from the Alignment to Gahal (two), the National Religious Party (one), State List (three), and Haolam Hazeh (one). The result was generally interpreted as a slight movement to the right.

The immobilist consensus within the cabinet, established under Eshkol and continued with Meir, evaporated in 1970, as the government responded anew to the shift it perceived in public opinion. The spring of 1970 saw the development of an acute moral-political crisis in Israel. The war of attrition proclaimed by Nasser had been going on since the spring of 1969. Israeli casualties on the Canal, from Syrian and Jordanian action, but also from rising Fedayeen violence, had been rising, from 185 people killed in 1968 to 240 killed in 1969, but 33 in the month of April 1970 alone, and 60 in the following month. The deep penetration raids that had been inaugurated in December 1970 seemed to have failed their purpose, as the Russians responded by an acceleration of their involvement in Egyptian military affairs. The popular question, "what will be the end?", to which the establishment's response was always, "there is no alternative," had begun to assume a more challenging tone. The Goldmann affair³ was followed by the shock of a letter to the Prime Minister from a group of Jerusalem high school students, many belonging to the "best" families, about to enter the armed forces, who questioned the peaceful motivation of their government. A well-known columnist

¹The faction led by Ben-Gurion and Dayan that broke off from Mapai in 1965.

²The remnants of Rafi including, for a short while longer, Ben-Gurion.

³Nahum Goldmann, head of the World Jewish Congress and a known dove, was denied authority by the Cabinet to represent Israel at a meeting with Nasser, to which he alleged he had been invited by intermediaries.

reminded his readers that government and nation were not necessarily identical.¹ Another compared May 1970 in Israel to May 1940 in England and hoped that Israel would stand fast while its enemies would lose heart and commit the fatal error.² The popular cartoonist, Dosh, on the third anniversary of the Six Day War, depicted Israel as a crestfallen young girl climbing an endless hill and being offered a drink from a canteen symbolizing remembrance of the victory in 1967 in order to resume the onward struggle. Demoralization in certain sections of the Left reached the point where a journalist could write: "Masadah?"³ There are still some sane people left here who will not allow that to happen. Giving up is preferable to committing suicide."⁴

The crisis of the spring of 1970 had an impact on the debate over the Palestinian Entity, as will be seen. However, one effect of the crisis was to allow the government, despite the threat of a walk-out by Gahal, to respond to the American initiative of June 1970 after it had been accepted by Nasser in July. Thus, the umbrella agreement painfully maintained since 1967 broke down under the impact of an external challenge supported by the fear of a crisis in public opinion. The government committed itself to pronouncing the word "withdrawal" and thereby added another marker to the settlement map which it constantly maintained it would not draw.

In March 1971, Mrs. Meir caused another minor political flap when in her interview with the editor of the London Times she provided clues to the frontiers that Israel would like to see in a peace settlement. But with Gahal already out of the coalition and the sacred word "withdrawal" having been uttered the year before, the scandal could only be of minor proportions. The end of 1971 found the Oral Law still in force. With attention riveted on the Canal and the issues of an interim

¹David Giladi in Maariv, May 1, 1970. Giladi, however, is not a dove.

²Shmuel Shnitzer in Maariv, June 5, 1970.

³The hilltop fortress in the Judean desert where the remnants of the Jewish revolt against Rome committed suicide rather than surrender in 73 C.E.

⁴Amos Keinan in Haaretz, June 17, 1970.

arrangement with Egypt, with the Fedayeen in complete disarray after having their Jordanian base destroyed by King Hussein's tanks, the big battles on the Palestinian settlement per se were yet to come.

III. ISSUES IN THE DEBATE

Three features of the territories captured during the Six Day War have provided the major issues of the debate on disposition under peace: on the positive side, improved security through more favorable borders and significance in Jewish history; on the negative side, the presence of a large, articulate, and nationally conscious Arab population.

A. SECURITY

The differences between Israel's border situation before and after the Six Day War are striking.¹ Before the war the existence of the West Bank salient created a 375-mile frontier between Israel and Jordan, half of which was accounted for along the three sides of the perimeter facing Israel.² The salient posed a constant danger of severing Israel across its narrow waist, where the West Bank was only ten miles from the Mediterranean Sea. Even at other points the distance from the border provided very little comfort. Beersheba is only 13 miles from the West Bank by the Hebron road. From the lower end of the West Bank to the Mediterranean is only about 25 miles. Israel's capital, Jerusalem, was back up against the border itself and was reached from the major centers of Israel through a narrow corridor through the Judean hills, controlled by the Jordanians. Memories of the seige in 1948, when the corridor had been closed by the Arab Legion, remained painful in Israeli minds.

Tel Aviv, only 15 miles from the border, had the experience of having its outskirts shelled from Qalqiliya on June 5, 1967. The Lydda area, as well as other places on the coastal plain, were also shelled on the 5th of June. Even Haifa is no farther than roughly 25 air miles from Arab territory. Perhaps half of the population of Israel was within artillery range from the West Bank alone, excluding

¹ Since this report is concerned with the Palestinians, the border problem in the Sinai is not treated here.

² This salient was chiefly responsible for altering the ratio of frontier length to the total area from 38 km per 1,000 km² under the Mandate to a figure of 60 after the Armistice agreements of 1949.

Haifa from the calculation. It was as if enemy tanks and artillery emplacements were to exist at such points as White Plains, New York or Rockville, Maryland and in comparable locations relative to the centers of ten or twenty of the largest American cities. The heart of Israel -- the Jordan Valley, the Valley of Jezrael, the lower Galilee, the coastal plain -- was within a day's advance of forces from the West Bank. To this would be added the threat from the Gaza Strip, which was only 25 miles distant from the West Bank and posed the potential threat of a link-up cutting off the Negev from the rest of Israel.

These threats implicit in the existence of the West Bank and Gaza Strip salients were enhanced by the terrain advantage enjoyed by the Jordanian forces in the West Bank. Israel occupied the plain and Jordan the heights overlooking the plain, just as Syria on the Golan Heights occupied a strategically valuable position with respect to the Israeli settlements in the Huleh Valley and the upper Galilee.

The length of the borders and the difficulty of the border terrain had made for an unending and only barely controlled problem of terrorist infiltration. Almost from the end of the War of Independence armed bands infiltrated across the Israeli frontier at irregular intervals, causing considerable loss of life and damage to property over the 20 year period. Israel's response to terrorist infiltration consisted mainly of reprisal actions of varying scale and intensity. However, reprisals did not succeed in completely curbing terrorist infiltration, especially when these were being encouraged by one of the Arab governments. Only the 1956 war and the establishment of the UNEF force on the border between Israel and the Gaza Strip succeeded in putting an end to the incursions from Gaza. The encouragement by Syria of terrorism during 1966 and the first half of 1967 was one of the direct causes of the Six Day War. In the latter situation, the terrorists were sponsored by Syria but operated frequently through the West Bank. The problem of sealing the West Bank proved to be, in fact, insuperable under the conditions of the territorial and political-military arrangements that existed before the Six Day War.

The geo-strategic impact of June 1967 was, of course, dramatic. The Jordanian salient was eliminated and the frontier above the Dead Sea reduced to the 65-mile line of the lower Jordan Valley.¹ Israel had obtained a significant increase in geographical depth. Jerusalem was given an additional 20 miles of distance from Jordanian forces, which also no longer menaced Beersheba, the coastal cities, and the middle of the Jezrael Valley. The distance between Tel Aviv and the nearest concentration of Arab artillery and tanks was quadrupled. Israel no longer stood in any danger of having its territory cut in two by a lightning tank thrust. Topographically, too, Israel's gains were sizable. Instead of looking up from the coast to the hills controlled by Jordanian forces, Israel now controlled the heights overlooking all of the eastern approaches to Israel except in the Beisan Valley. Its forces were entrenched on the Golan, protecting the settlements in the Galilee below, and patrolling Samaria and Judea, as well as the entire length of the Jordan Rift.

How, then, have these border changes affected the nature of Israel's security problem? First, with respect to the problem of harassing fire, the geography of newspaper headlines shifted from the upper Galilee and Lake Tiberias, the locale of Syrian harassment before the Six Day War, to the Beisan Valley facing the Gilead Hills in Jordan. Otherwise, the Arab forces are either out of artillery range of Israeli settlements or they affect only Arab territory or generally sparsely settled areas -- for example, the Aravah, below the Dead Sea. In the Aravah, however, the opposite side of the border is virtually uninhabited and provides inhospitable terrain for military operations.²

¹ Apart from the partial natural protection afforded by the Jordan river, the line allows concentration of defense at the heads of only three invasion routes: Beisan and its valley in pre-1967 Israel; the Damiya bridge area and the Faria Valley route to Nablus; Jericho and the roads to Ramallah and Jerusalem.

² The depth provided by the new borders is less impressive with respect to surface-to-surface missiles than it is with regard to field artillery. Thus, Soviet Frog missiles are reputed to have a range of about 30-40 miles and a 1,000 pound warhead. With Frog (or similar)

With respect to the invasion threat, the new borders have provided Israel with increased depth and therefore greater psychological assurance. The military significance of depth is a major emphasis in the doctrine of Yigal Allon, one of the very few of the top military leadership since 1948 to have provided an articulated statement of his views. It is therefore appropriate to attempt a brief summary of Allon's strategic outlook.¹

A principal blot on the otherwise successful record of the Israel Defense Force (IDF) in the War of Independence in 1948-1949, in Allon's view, was the failure to capture the West Bank, a crucial area necessary for Israel's defense against the threats from the outside.² In 1969, therefore, he was adamant: "I take one point to be axiomatic. The Armistice Demarcation Lines laid down in the Armistice Agreement of 1949 cannot serve as permanent borders. These for most of their length are devoid of any strategic value whatever, and a return to them would be tantamount to Israel's returning to a potential strategic death trap."³

Sceptical of peace prospects, except in the very long run, and viewing Israel "as a fortress state organized and dedicated to withstanding siege and bursting through,"⁴ Allon is vitally concerned with optimizing Israel's geo-strategic position. If Israel's "main geo-strategic weakness was in the coastal plain facing Jordan which was the 'soft underbelly' of her posture," there was now an opportunity to

missiles the Arab forces would succeed in regaining an artillery threat -- although of uncertain accuracy -- against a significant section of central Israel.

¹Allon developed his views in Curtain of Sand (Hebrew) published in 1960. A second enlarged edition was issued in 1969, from which an English version was compiled: The Making of Israel's Army, Bantam Books, 1971.

²Ibid., pp. 48-49. This is not hindsight on Allon's part. In 1948 he had felt it within Israel's military capacity to expel the Arab Legion and regarded the decision to hold back as based on erroneous political considerations.

³Ibid., p. 12.

⁴Paraphrasing of Allon by another former general, Elad Peled, in Maariv, April 11, 1969.

create a new set of borders with the required strategic depth based on the topography of the area. Israel was not endowed with natural depth even after the Six Day War, but by the creation of a network of "fortified and well-equipped settlements along borders and in the interior, along expected axes and passages, the country would be provided with strategic depth to compensate for its lack of natural depth." These settlements would serve to hamper any possible enemy invasion and would function for day to day security needs in a manner to relieve the standing army of the necessity to pin down large forces for passive defense. Thus, the IDF would be left free to concentrate its forces at strategic points and with the mobility required to meet any possible strategic threat.¹

Israel's military are frequently asked whether topography is not now an irrelevant strategic consideration with respect to the location of frontiers in the era of missiles and long range bombers. Allon points to the examples of Britain in World War II and North Vietnam recently, which succeeded in withstanding intensive bombardment without capitulating. "Until one side's territory is occupied and the resistance of its people and army broken by land forces, whether they arrive by land, sea or air, no war comes to an end: unless indeed it is brought to an end by peaceful settlement."² Missiles and bombers notwithstanding, strategic depth serves the important purpose of providing the initial barrier against land invasion, which requires the enemy to attack in massive force in order to be able to crush all resistance. He acknowledges the improvements in the technology of anti-static defense weapons and forces, but finds that this only indicates an enhanced need for "integrated counter-deployment."³ Given such a counter-deployment, natural borders providing strategic depth constitute a "defense wall" which is itself a deterrent factor, or at least improves the defense capability. He concludes that there is absolutely no substitute for strategically defensible borders in the Middle Eastern context.⁴

¹ Allon, The Making of Israel's Army, pp. 56-57.

² Ibid., p. 113.

³ Allon's case could be supported by citing development of small, mobile, anti-tank weapons and a new generation of mobile SAMs.

⁴ Ibid., pp. 113-114.

Given the nature of its geo-strategic situation and the danger that surprise attack could be fatal in short order, Israel had to develop an appropriate defensive doctrine. Allon calls it "pre-emptive counter-offensive" or "anticipatory counter-attack," and he defines it as "Israeli operational initiative taken against concentrations of enemy forces, and the occupation on enemy territory of targets having a vital security significance, at a time when the enemy is mustering his forces for an attack but before he has had time actually to start his offensive."¹ To Allon, the right of anticipatory counter-attack was critical under the conditions of the post-Armistice arrangement but does not seem so now. Israel retained that moral right, but in some (unspecified) places preemption no longer seemed a supreme necessity, and it might be better to allow the enemy to attack first. In other areas, reserving the right to preempt still seemed essential -- again Allon is not specific -- while, of course, for the Air Force it remained vital.² But his relaxation of the general necessity for the exercise of preemption suggests one of the reasons why Allon feels the borders that he has suggested will serve Israeli national security purposes so well. This is also the implication of his list of situations under which Israel should feel itself morally entitled to cross the current cease-fire lines: (a) to counter an offensive, an enemy concentration, or enemy preparations to attack; (b) to crush terrorists' bases; (c) to frustrate interference with Israeli navigation; (d) to aid open or covert allies among the Arabs, actual or potential; (e) where change in the status of a neighbor carries the potential for damage to Israel's national security.³ For all of these objectives the current lines are superior to any inside them. Nor does the list suggest that the "pre-emptive counter-offensive" was to be completely abandoned.

The balance of forces has always been such that Israel needed to fear little from the threat of attack by each of its hostile eastern neighbors alone. The major problem confronting Israel's military

¹ Ibid., p. 83.

² Ibid., pp. 111-120.

³ Ibid., p. 120.

planners was and remains the possibility of coordinated threat along its frontiers, involving the augmentation of slim Jordanian forces by the manpower and equipment of Egypt, Iraq, and Syria. Israel's survival has been made possible in part by the inability of its Arab neighbors to mount such a coordinated attack. Nevertheless, that threat remains, if not as severe as it appeared on the eve of the Six Day War. Even though it is now entrenched in good locational and topographical positions, Israel still sees itself surrounded by implacable enemies who still threaten to combine to destroy it. Therefore, it is not likely to want to wait until the coalitions are in being with massed forces already in movement before it attempts to spoil the impending attack. This is particularly true with respect to an Arab first strike from the air.

Therefore, Israel's traditional policy of preemptive action is not likely to be abandoned completely. In the south, on the Suez Canal, preemptive action has so far been both unnecessary and dangerous because of the increasingly massive presence of the Soviet Union. But in Jordan this is not true. The case of Syria is an intermediate one and recalls to mind that Israel exhibited considerable hesitation in the crisis period leading up to June 1967 about striking Syria, even though it was the radical Syrian regime that was sponsoring the wave of Fatah terrorist attacks. The same motivation -- fear of Soviet response -- also underlay Dayan's hesitations during the Six Day War before launching the attack on the Golan Heights and might become even more significant if the ties between Syria and the Soviet Union were to become as deep and as extensive as they are now in Egypt. However, if Israel can be presumed to be reluctant to preempt against Syrian forces, this only suggests a fortiori that she is not likely to give up easily those frontiers that enable her to postpone the moment of decision for preemptive action.

Given the increasing involvement of the superpowers in Middle Eastern affairs, there remains a large premium on timely preemption that promises a brief successful attack, a premium that derives from the great importance to a small nation of terminating and winning a

war within the shortest possible time. This was a major lesson of the Six Day War:

Above all it will be seen how Israel observed a principle which appears in few military textbooks but which armed forces neglect at their peril: the Clausewitzian principle of Political Context, which the British ignored so disastrously in 1956. The Israeli High Command knew that it was not operating in a political vacuum. It worked on the assumption that it would have three days to complete its task before outside pressures compelled a cease-fire. In fact it had four, and needed five. The general disapproval even in the West when Israel ignored the United Nations' cease-fire call and opened its offensive against Syria showed how narrow was the margin on which it had to work. The lesson is clear. So long as there remains a tacit agreement between the super-powers to cooperate in preventing overt conflicts which threaten international peace and security, a nation using open force to resolve a political problem must do so rapidly, if it is to succeed at all. Once it has succeeded, the reluctance of the Great Powers to countenance a second conflict means that it is likely to preserve its gains. The lesson is a sombre one, placing as it does a premium on adventurism and preemption. (Emphasis in original.)¹

The security aspects of Israel's border problem have been looked at solely as a problem of Israel's defense. But Jordan was also vulnerable, particularly in the West Bank, because Israel's location on Jordan's flanks posed the threat of cutting off the salient from Trans-jordan. To counter this threat, Hussein could rely ultimately only on alliance with other Arab states -- Egypt, Syria or Iraq -- in order to provide reinforcements and a multiple deterrent threat. However, out of fear for his own security, the King consistently refused to accept foreign troops on Jordanian soil. Therefore, when he did issue the invitation to Nasser at the end of May 1967, the action was interpreted by Israel as the signal that the Rubicon had been crossed. Paradoxically, then, the conquest of the West Bank removed a significant vulnerability from Jordan's geo-strategic position. Israel sits on the hills overlooking the Jordan Valley, but it faces another set of heights

¹Michael Howard and Robert Hunter, Israel and the Arab World, Adelphi Papers, No. 41, London, The Institute for Strategic Studies, October 1967, pp. 39, 41.

which protect the Jordanian positions on the east bank of the Jordan River.¹

The improved Israeli positions overlooking the lower Jordan Valley and on the Golan plateau contribute to the deterrence of Egypt as well. It has been speculated that the basic Egyptian strategy in May 1967 was a war of attrition after absorbing an Israeli first strike. The alternative to that strategy, and the only one that could have promised some degree of success, was a coordinated first strike launched by Syria, Egypt, and Jordan simultaneously. This seemed to be what Egypt was preparing for when it dispatched General Fawzi to Jordan after the reconciliation with Hussein on May 30, 1967. In any case, the coordinated first strike strategy is the only one now that would hold out any hope of a major defeat for Israel in the near future. The positions Israel holds in the north and in the east provide the locations from which a preemptive spoiling attack is much more feasible, and to that extent the new borders have provided additional security with respect to the threat from Egyptian power as well.

This then is the doctrinal context from which emerged the Allon Plan. The Plan was already before the cabinet in June 1967 and its outlines made public in the middle of August. Unfortunately, no exact and detailed text exists, and it must be reconstructed from accounts provided by various observers, sympathetic or otherwise.² With respect to the West Bank, the Allon Plan suggested the creation of a strategically united Israel embracing an Arab enclave. The Jordan River was to be not only the security but the political boundary of Israel, and the Arab enclave on the West Bank would be connected to Jordan by means of a corridor from the area near Ramallah to the city of Jericho and

¹On the other hand, the major cities of Jordan -- Amman, Salt, Irbid -- are now within 25 miles of Israeli forces on the banks of the Jordan River. Similarly, Damascus is only 30 miles down the road from Israel's dug-in positions on the Syrian cease-fire line.

²The description here relies primarily on Eli Nissan in Devar, December 22, 1968, but also on the New York Times, August 16, 1967; Hagai (Haim Guri) in Lamerhav, December 7, 1968; Yosef Harif in Maariv, November 26, 1968.

the Allenby Bridge. The strip of Israeli territory that would be formally annexed on the eastern border of the Arab enclave would extend from the southern end of the Gilboa Range southward in a line some 12-20 miles west of the Jordan until the Dead Sea. At that point, the prospective border line apparently moves more sharply southwest, and the distance from the Dead Sea appears to be more like 25 miles. The area of the West Bank that would be subtracted for inclusion in this Israeli annexed strip is only about one-quarter of Samaria but perhaps as much as half or more of Judea. Altogether, what Allon calls the Jordan Valley "strip", but which in fact incorporates a good deal of the hills above it, seems to cover something more than one-third of the West Bank. However, Allon emphasizes that the "strip" is sparsely populated.

As indicated, a corridor would link the enclave to Jordan from Ramallah to Jericho and the Allenby Bridge. It is not clear whether the Plan provided for lateral transfer between Judea and Samaria via Jerusalem, given Allon's unquestionable commitment to the retention of the unified Jerusalem and its environs in Israeli hands. The map reproduced here from Davar suggests that in order to secure movement between Israel and the Jordan Valley strip, other than by the northern or southern connections to Israel, a corridor from Jerusalem eastward would be required.

Initial accounts of the Allon Plan as set out in August 1967 suggested that Allon wished to see the Arab enclave set up as a "sovereign political state with close economic and security ties to Israel."¹ A year later, when the Plan came in for renewed discussion in the government, Allon appeared to allow for several possibilities. If the Arab area was to become a Palestinian state, it would be barred by treaty from concluding any alliance with forces hostile to Israel. Allon could also conceive of returning the Arab section to Jordan, but without Jerusalem and with some border modifications in the area of Latrun and the Etzion Bloc, restrictions that would incidentally apply also to a Palestinian state. Hussain would have to recognize

¹New York Times, August 16, 1967.

Legend:

==== Proposed boundary between Arab enclave and Israel-annexed strip

----- Proposed corridor from Jordan

○ Proposed rural settlements

⊗ Proposed urban settlements




Fig. 2 -- The Allon plan: The West Bank

Israel's sovereignty over the Jordan Valley strip, agree to permanent demilitarization of the West Bank¹ and, in advance, to Israel military intervention in the case of any attempts made to breach the demilitarization or if Israel found it necessary to repress terrorist bases. Jordan would have to give up its claims to Jerusalem but would obtain a role in the administration of the Holy Places. Finally, Jordan would have to agree to settling the Gaza refugees on the East Bank; Israel would provide financial and other aid. With this act the refugee problem would have to be declared finally liquidated. The boundaries between the Arab-Israel and other Arab areas would be open for movement across them and Jordan would be given access to the Mediterranean without a land corridor.

The land settlement provisions of the Allon Plan, which came to be known as its "operational part," included military-rural settlements in the Jordan Valley and in the Etzion Bloc, a city southwest of Jericho, which would control the Jerusalem-Jericho and Jerusalem-Abdallah-Bridge roads, and another east of Hebron toward the Dead Sea. The settlements in the Etzion Bloc were to be connected to Jerusalem. Allon also desired settlements in Sinai and on the Golan Heights.

Allon saw his Plan as representing a middle way between the minimalists in the Cabinet, who wished to withdraw to the June 4, 1967 borders with only "minor adjustments," and the maximalists who wished complete annexation.² He thought of it as a practical formula that would keep open options to various political settlements. On one hand,

¹Allon's views on the utility of demilitarization are cool. "Israel rejects categorically this expedient as the sole element in a security settlement," he has said. However, he is not opposed to demilitarization as an auxiliary element in a comprehensive security settlement based largely on the creation of strategic borders. Demilitarization alone tended to be useless because it was always unilaterally violated at the first opportunity or tended to cause renewal of warfare. Allon, The Making of Israel's Army, p. 115, and Lamerhav, January 24, 1969.

²The Jerusalem Post, December 12, 1968.

it might serve as a framework for the retention of all of the West Bank.¹ On the other hand, the Plan might also serve as the context of a settlement involving the return of the Arab area to Jordan or the creation of a Palestinian state. By 1968, he saw its principal advantage as readiness to be put into immediate operation, thus leaving no vacuum of Israeli power and presence in the areas considered strategic to its future security. A Mapam critic observed that Allon was a pragmatic ideologue who saw moral and historical grounds for an annexationist policy but thought this impractical on political grounds and was prepared to trim his sails accordingly.² Allon thought of it as the possibility "to undertake a peace initiative and defense initiative at the same time."³

Allon, like the rest of the Labor Party leaders and the cabinet, operated within the framework of the Israeli formula calling for "secure and recognized" boundaries. "Recognized" implied the agreement of the other side: was that likely for a proposal that cut off a third or more of the West Bank? Allon's reply, reiterated on many occasions, is brief: If the secure borders take the other side's needs into account (and he believes this is true of his Plan), they will sooner or later be agreed to. If they are not agreed to, even after many years of discussion, it seems better that the borders were secure than that they were agreed but insecure.⁴

For a while, at least, the Israeli government seemed to believe that the Allon Plan was not unwelcome abroad. According to one source, the Plan had been outlined by Eban to President Johnson, who described it as very reasonable, though the United States could not support it. George Ball was supposed to have called it a "plan of genius."

¹ According to Eli Nissan in Davar, December 22, 1968, this is what Allon himself favored when he introduced the Plan in the summer of 1967.

² Banko Adar in Al Hamishmar, June 28, 1968.

³ Cited by M. Maizels in Maariv, August 5, 1969.

⁴ Ibid.

But with a change of administration, at the end of 1968 and the beginning of 1969, Ambassador Yitzhak Rabin was told that the Allon Plan was totally unacceptable.¹ Hussein flatly rejected it, to the chorus of "I told you so" from anti-annexationists. Most caustic in this regard was Pinhas Lavon, former Defense Minister and Histadrut² chief, but now the extreme minimalist in the old-line Labor Party leadership: "The Allon Plan is truly brilliant if you are playing chess with yourself. If there is a chessboard before you and you are moving his and your pieces according to your will and your best needs and the bare minimum of the second side's needs, it's a marvelous concept. If Allon and the Foreign Minister and the government will secure the agreement of any Arab government to this plan it will be a revolution. It will be the days of the Messiah."³

The Allon Plan was never approved as such by the cabinet but it served as an informal framework for negotiations with Hussein and with the powers. During the grand debates of 1968-1969 the Plan functioned within the Labor Party as a sort of counterpart UN formula which everyone interpreted in his own light. Thus, on November 15, 1968 Eben indicated that he was a supporter of the Plan,⁴ and some of the maximalist cabinet Ministers, mindful of their inability to secure a more militant government posture, also supported the Plan's "operational part". Perhaps the surviving merit of the Allon Plan was that it first focused attention on the problem of defense in the Jordan Rift, whether from the heights or the Valley. No one could henceforth ignore that problem.

At the time of the second round of the debate on the Plan in the winter of 1968-1969, apart from the revived settlements in the

¹ Eli Nissan in Davar, June 13, 1969.

² Israel's virtually all-encompassing labor federation which is simultaneously a major employer of labor in the economy.

³ Interview in Davar, December 20, 1968.

⁴ Y. Tirah in Haaretz, December 20, 1968.

Etzion Bloc, there were already three settlements in the lower Jordan Valley. Allon, of course, urged additional construction, including the suburb of Hebron and "Upper-Jericho," the city between Jericho and Jerusalem.¹ On the eve of the 1969 Knesset elections, he was able to indicate that four new settlements had been created since Mrs. Meir acceded to the Prime Ministership in March of that year -- in Sinai, the Jordan Valley, and the Etzion Bloc. Two more were planned soon in the Jordan Valley north of Jericho.² At the end of 1970 Allon pointed with pride to the existence of 28 settlements in the territories in addition to the beginnings of an urban settlement in the city of Hebron. Four more agricultural settlements and a semi-urban settlement were to be established.³ Apparently, however, "Upper-Jericho" and an eastern suburb of the city of Hebron had been disapproved.

Unlike Allon, Dayan has not codified his strategic doctrine. In the earliest stages of the discussion immediately after the Six Day War, he was identified with the view that the security of Israel in the West Bank depended upon maintenance of IDF camps on the heights overlooking the Jordan Valley. He has at other times expressed views sympathetic to the notion of establishing paramilitary settlements in the Jordan Valley. But he has not elaborated in print his outlook on the military considerations that should govern Israel's choice with respect to its eastern borders. For the short run, Dayan emphasizes the prevention of westward crossing of the Jordan River by any conventional armed forces, other than police, and unrestricted movement of the IDF in the West Bank. His view of the desired long-run dispositions of forces remains unclear, probably because the key to his thinking in this area is his still evolving conception of the political-economic relations between the West Bank and Israel. Dayan's approach is therefore best considered in a different context.⁴

¹Y. Tirah in Haaretz, December 20, 1968.

²Jerusalem Post, Election Eve Supplement, October 24, 1969.

³Israel Radio, December 2, 1970.

⁴See below, pp. 57 ff.

Dayan made one noteworthy contribution to the debate on security and the occupied territories in 1969 by calling for amendment of the formula "secure and recognized borders" to read "strategic security borders." It is not clear precisely what he had in mind by the proposed substitutions, but the interpretation of Moshe Sneh (of the pro-Israel Communist Party) was that "'secure and recognized borders' is an expression referring to a situation of presumed peace, whereas 'strategic security borders' is an expression referring to a situation of presumed war."¹ Though he denied any content to the amendment,² Allon, as indicated, appeared to share Dayan's view that "agreement" on terms acceptable to Israel was not in the offing.

The argument for paramilitary settlements in the occupied territories cites the experience of half a century to underscore the role of the farmer-soldier in securing and defending advance Israeli positions.³ More recently, the kibbutzim in the north had contributed to the success of the Syrian campaign in the Six Day War. Kibbutz Dan in the upper Galilee finger repelled a Syrian armored probe with its own forces during the Six Day War and thus prevented a serious diversion of Israeli forces from the southern or eastern sectors where they were then employed. Other settlements in the upper Galilee served as jumping off points for the attack on the Golan Heights on June 9-10.

Nevertheless, the doctrine has not been without its critics. Some felt doubtful of the military utility of a relatively thinly held line against armed invasion. So long as that possibility existed, it would seem to require considerable forces to defend the line.⁴ The military correspondent Eli Landau wondered whether the creation of settlements in exposed positions on the frontiers did not create inviting targets for terrorism and harassing artillery fire. Settlements on the Golan,

¹ Kol Haam, August 8, 1969.

² M. Maizels in Maariv, August 5, 1969.

³ See below, p. 93.

⁴ Avraham Shveitzer in Haaretz, December 8, 1968.

for example, in effect created another front and made Israel policy subject to the pulls of emotional nationalism in the defense of women and children coming under fire from Syrian forces. The relatively heavy casualties on the Suez front during the war of attrition had a serious emotional impact on Israeli society, but would this not have presented a much more serious problem had the line been held not just by troops but by settlements with families living there?¹ But the secretary of Kibbutz Mavo Hamah on the Golan Heights insisted that the Golan kibbutzim protected the residents of the Huleh and Jordan Valleys. The front line settlements on the Golan were an additional barrier to the Syrians, putting the major inhabited areas out of range. An army, he noted, can determine military facts. Only the presence of women and children, families working the land, determined the political facts, demonstrating that Israelis were determined to remain on the Golan.²

If the potential for catastrophe inherent in Israel's old frontiers lay in their inadequate provision of depth against invasion, day-to-day problems were posed by the vulnerability of the borders to terrorist incursion. The new borders could be viewed as providing large gains in defense against conventional armed attack and were therefore "strategic" in this sense, but in another they were thought to threaten a degree of strategic insecurity, by virtue of the addition of 1 million Arabs to the 350,000 Israel already had. Thus, the conclusion of the Six Day War suggested that the security characteristics of the borders had enormously improved in one sense only to deteriorate in another.³

¹Maariv, July 5, 1970.

²Interview with Roni Lempel in Maariv, July 9, 1970.

³This was not a consideration that troubled the annexationists, who objected to the Allon Plan on the grounds that it treated the conventional security problem successfully but diminished the prospects of countering terrorism by lengthening the borders with Jordan (or the future Palestinian state), as compared with the cease-fire lines, by a factor of two. E.g., Moshe Shamir in Maariv, June 21, 1968.

The threat that faced Israel was of guerrilla warfare, or as it is variously called, "revolutionary war" or "people's war." "People's war" aims less at the conquest of specific sections of territory by the use of massed forces of soldiers than at undermining the basis of the enemy's power in the disputed region by means of sporadic, small scale, even individual terrorist action. It is directed not at strategic locations, fortresses, bunkers, but at morale, social cohesion, leadership, command and control networks, the confidence of the enemy in his capacity to withstand armed attack. In this context the security of the new frontiers appeared less impressive, because they enclosed behind them a potential sea in which the terrorist fish could swim freely.

In fact, however, the danger did not materialize, at least to the extent foreseen outside of Israel. The reasons have much to do with the nature of the Israeli presence, the sophistication of its counter-terrorist campaign, the character of the enemy and his relations with the population of the West Bank. But they need not detain us here. The point is that the failure of the Fedayeen to pose a serious danger to Israel's security generalizes the finding resulting from the other considerations. The existing cease-fire lines on the Golan Heights, the West Bank, and Gaza have significantly eased Israel's conventional warfare problem with Syria and Jordan on the east and the north, except for the possibility of any drastic change in the balance of forces and weapons resulting from large changes in political alignment and military aid. This is the major reason explaining Israeli reluctance to return to the old frontiers.

B. THE HISTORICAL CONNECTION TO THE WEST BANK

"Enhanced security" is an important argument of the annexationists. However, in their polemics on the disposition of the territories, they have tended to emphasize the argument of historical legitimacy. This camp has a tradition of more ideological thinking with respect to the subject of national security and national identity than its opponents, and Israel's moral and legal right to all of The Land of Israel

has long been its fundamental platform. Those who seek for unconscious motivation may see in such a stance the recognition that the commitment of a beleaguered people to a position encountering almost universal external opposition required a more emotionally satisfying justification than security considerations alone could provide.

The State of Israel represented the culmination of two thousand years of struggle by the Jewish people to return to its historic homeland. The historical foundation of the Jewish claim to Palestine was one of the major reasons for the international acceptance of that claim. However, the locus classicus of Jewish history is not Tel Aviv or Haifa but the cities of Hebron, Shiloh, Bethel, Shechem (Nablus), Bethlehem -- and, of course, Jerusalem. Tel Aviv is Israel's largest city, but it was created in an area that was generally under the control of the Philistines during the Biblical period, as was the whole coastal plain to the south, including what is now the Gaza Strip. Hebrew civilization was created and developed largely in the area that has come to be known as the West Bank of the Jordan River.

When the British government was given authority over Palestine under the League of Nations Mandate after the First World War, the area encompassed Transjordan as well, the western part of which also has extensive associations with the history of the Israelite tribes. In 1922 Transjordan was separated from western Palestine in order to create a territory for Emir Abdullah, Britain's client. The partition, which represented an arbitrary division of an area that had been homogeneous in Biblical times, disappointed the Zionists but was accepted by most of them¹ as still providing adequate scope for the fulfillment of national objectives. Even the recommendations for further partition by the Peale Commission in 1937 and the United Nations in 1947, which reduced the territory available to a Jewish state to a small fraction of the original mandated total, were accepted at those points by a

¹The significant exception was the Revisionist Party, whose slogan was "Both Banks" -- that is, a Jewish state encompassing both East and West Banks of the Jordan. Initially, however, even Jabotinsky, the major Revisionist personality, accepted the partition.

majority -- overwhelming, in the case of the UN partition -- of the Jewish population.

The refusal of the Arabs to accept partition in 1947-1948 and the Arab invasion of Palestine in order to destroy Israel was regarded by the Israelis as freeing them from any obligation to observe the UN-decreed boundaries, and they proceeded to secure as much of Palestine as they could. However, the Armistice lines put East Jerusalem and the West Bank as well as the Gaza Strip outside of Israeli control. There were post-mortems and recriminations among factions of the Israeli government. The failure to "complete" the task and the subsequent debate left a residue of bitterness. Ben-Gurion called that failure a cause for "mourning for generations to come."¹

Thus, the results of the Six Day War seemed to represent almost a heaven-sent gift, the wholly unexpected completion of the tasks of 1948 and the healing of the wound in Israel's collective memory. It was not surprising that there was almost an immediate movement to pressure the government not to yield any of the captured territories -- especially the West Bank, with its profound historical associations. Only against this background can one understand what at first sight appears so surprising and paradoxical, that many in Israel so quickly began to think of the captured territories as intrinsically part of Israel. An example of that position is provided by the economic correspondent of the Jerusalem Post:

Many foreigners think the issue is whether Israel is prepared to give up Arab territories in exchange for peace. Israel's problem is whether she can give up Jewish territory in exchange for peace...for Israel to give up Shechem (which the

¹Ben-Gurion once charged that Nasser was psychotic. Nahum Goldmann turned the accusation against Ben-Gurion himself: "You are the man... who never forgets a defeat, who does not forgive them, for whom a battle lost represents a deep moral wound which can be healed only by victory." (A selection from Goldmann's Autobiographie, Editions Fayard, reprinted in Le Monde, April 20, 1971.) With respect to the loss of East Jerusalem, the characterization may be just, but Ben-Gurion now favors return of the territories, with the major exception of Jerusalem, in exchange for "true" peace.

newcomer Arabs call Nablus) and Jericho and the Jordan River is like Britain giving up East Anglia or France giving up Alsace-Lorraine.¹

The conquest of the West Bank in 1967 provided seed for already fertile ground. Few societies seem to be as imbued as is Israel with the passion to reconnect itself to its historical origins, and it must be emphasized that the historical connection sought is not with the communities of the Diaspora but with the Biblical Kingdoms of Israel and Judea. It is this that helps explain the passion for archeology so peculiar to Israel, symbolized by Dayan's excursion on the eve of the battle of Karameh (March 1968), which almost cost him his life.² The combination of intense search for historical rootedness and the new-found opportunity for access to the very areas in which the roots were to be sought made a good section of the population reluctant to part with the West Bank, on historical grounds alone.

Thus, many Israelis return to the foundations of their national credo. If the basis for the creation of the State of Israel was the history of the Jewish people and its millennial yearning to return to Zion, what greater historical tie could there be than to the West Bank? If Israel was justified by that historical tie, was not the annexation of the West Bank after the Six Day War justified a fortiori by that tie? On this plane, the annexationist argument from history asserts that to deny the validity of the claim to Hebron or Nablus is to subvert the objective claim to Tel Aviv or Haifa. At a second level, reference is to the international agreements leading to Israel's creation, and it is argued that he who denies the claim to the cities of the West Bank can hardly justify the maintenance of Israeli rule in Acre and Nazareth, since these cities were also outside the partition lines established by the United Nations in the abortive plan of 1947. Given the historical

¹David Krivine in the Jerusalem Post, February 19, 1971. To which Allon adds the Golan: "...the Golan hills are no less Israeli, if one refers to the Bible, than Hebron and Nablus." (Le Monde, August 17, 1967). However, Allon would be prepared to yield (most of) the West Bank for pragmatic reasons.

²See the account of Shabtai Teveth, The Cursed Blessing, London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1970, pp. 262-263. On the passion for archeology generally, see Eilon, The Israelis, pp. 279-289.

ties and the pressing security considerations, given also the Arabs' own insistence that the Armistice lines were not to be considered recognized boundaries, this view asserts that the justification of the Six Day War as a war of national defense legitimizes the postwar change of boundaries, despite the strictures of Resolution 242 of the Security Council. "A people does not annex its own homeland," asserts Yisrael Shaib-Eldad, chief ideologue of the Movement for an Integral Land of Israel. "It liberates it!"¹

How far does the reach of the annexationists extend? Before the Six Day War the Herut Party, the core of the annexationist group, continued to maintain a claim on both banks of the Jordan, a platform that dates back to the origins of the Revisionist Party in the 1920s. Does Herut still believe in the slogan of "Both Banks"? Hostile critics answer in the affirmative and cite the continued emphasis on the historical basis of Israeli rights.² Eldad has said that if Jordan signed a peace treaty with Israel, there would be no need for the East Bank, but if Israel was forced into war, it might discard its self-restraint.³

On the other hand, one sometimes feels that the annexationists' maximalism has elements at least of a tactical approach. Perhaps the clearest hint of that was given by Eliezer Livneh in a reaction to President Sadat's acceptance in early 1971 of the necessity to conclude a peace agreement with Israel:

¹Maariv, November 15, 1968. Eldad was the intellectual leader of the terrorist Stern Group in Mandate days.

²See, for example, Yehudah Tuvin in Al Hamishmar, December 20, 1968. Abba Eban once demanded of those who argued for the integrity of the country along historical lines, to what map they were referring. The cease-fire lines outlined a map that had never existed in its entirety at any time in Biblical Israel, while areas that had at one time or another been part of ancient Israel were now outside of the State of Israel's control. There was one map of the Kingdom of David, another of that of Solomon, still another of his successors. Haaretz, February 2, 1968.

³The Jerusalem Post, October 10, 1969.

Sadat understood with his common sense what some Israel politicians have trouble grasping: homeland is not "areas," it is a criterion for "areas." Homeland is diplomatic merchandise available for exchange. If one is forced to forgo some of its territory for lack of any alternative, one knows it and announces: we have forgone ours. A state that proclaims, "I am 'holding' areas not mine for the sake of exchange," undermines its right to hold these areas and in the end will forgo them with nothing in return.¹ (Emphasis in original)

Nor is it entirely clear that the territorial demands of the Herut Party cover all of the occupied territories. Ezer Weizman, who shares the reins of Herut with Menahem Begin, has indicated that he holds no special attachment to the Golan Heights and thinks the Sinai is negotiable, but he considers that the West Bank must be retained on the grounds of both security and history.²

Weizman is thought of as volatile; Begin is seen as solicitous of retaining his more moderate Liberal partners in Gahal.³ Whether for this or other reasons, Begin argues for both the "integrity of the Land of Israel" and a directly negotiated peace treaty. For over three years Gahal remained in a national unity government whose watchword was "a contractual peace treaty through direct negotiations on secure and recognized borders." Begin reaffirmed Herut's acquiescence to this formula at its 10th Conference in November 1970.

Nor is the religious bloc monolithic in this respect. Agudat Yisrael was said to be prepared to follow where Dayan and the Chief of

¹Maariv, January 15, 1971. Once a member of the Mapai elite as a reigning ideologue in the 1940s and 1950s, and a past member of the exclusive Knesset Foreign Affairs and Security Committee, Livneh is now out of favor. He is a cofounder of the Movement for an Integral Land of Israel.

²Maariv, December 12, 1970. Ezer Weizman, who spells his name with one "n" to avoid trading on his namesake's reputation, is a nephew of the late Zionist leader, but clearly unlike him in ideology and personality. Former OC Air Force, he molded the instrument that General Hod led to stunning effect on June 5, 1967. Weizman served briefly as Minister of Transport and Communications before Gahal left the government in the summer of 1970.

³The Jerusalem Post Magazine, March 26, 1971.

Staff, General Bar-Lev, would lead. Poalei Agudat Yisrael have not taken a determined position. The National Religious Party is formally committed to annexation of Judea and Samaria but is in fact split among three rival factions.¹ A writer in the religious press has expressed the moderate religious viewpoint well: There are the present borders and the borders of the Torah and the borders of complete redemption, which are broader still. "There is a limit to all aspiration and that is the capability to attain."²

C. THE SPECIAL CASE OF JERUSALEM

The historical argument for annexation has its greatest appeal with respect to East Jerusalem. Jerusalem is indeed a special case, because it occupies a unique place in the consciousness and emotions of Jews, Christians, and Moslems; and because, as a consequence, the most intense kinds of attachments have been formed to the reality and the mythology of the city. Among Israelis there is far less division of opinion on Jerusalem than on almost any other in the whole gamut of conflict issues. For the anti-annexationist Sapir, the retention of unified Jerusalem by Israel is the only territorial cause to which he is prepared to apply the Talmudic injunction: "Let him be killed rather than violate [the commandment]." Mrs. Tirtzah Braun, sister of General Bar-Lev, agrees. Mrs. Braun is generally a dove on matters of the settlement; not, however, on Jerusalem: "On no account would I return Jerusalem. It's a matter that goes to my very heart. When they ask me what is important to me, I say I am prepared to die for Jerusalem. I am not that brave, but for Jerusalem I am prepared to do battle. For anything else, I'm not so sure."³

Jerusalem, to most Israeli Jews, is the symbol and the focus of Israeli identity and spiritual significance, the center of its historical rootedness and of its centuries-long Messianic expectations. There is no Zionism without Zion, and Jerusalem is by definition and

¹The Jerusalem Post Magazine, March 26, 1971.

²Yehudah Nahshoni in Shearim, October 25, 1968.

³"Three Generations," Yamim Vleilot (weekend magazine of Maariv) January 15, 1971.

history the personification of Zion. Those who would have thought the attachment to Jerusalem was a function only of the city's narrowly religious significance and therefore would only affect the orthodox segment of Israeli society were astonished by the depths of emotion displayed by Israeli troops entering the Old City on June 7, 1967. On the other hand, that phenomenon was no surprise at all to such a man as Ezer Weizman who, although belonging to the non-religious segment of the society, had, throughout his years in the high command of the IDF, educated his troops to the mission of fulfillment of Zionist objectives.

Ezer is not embarrassed by speaking about the Western Wall. He does not say 'I feel, I don't know how to put it....' He knows exactly how to put it. He is not afraid of Zionist words like 'destiny' or 'vision' or 'homeland.' He was not ashamed long before it became the fashion not to be ashamed. At every Air Force course, at every meeting, casual or official, he was not ashamed to use these terms. A secretary entering his room to get his signature on some document would often be asked, 'By the way, Zippi, or Shosh, what does the Western Wall mean to you?'¹

This kind of emotional involvement helps explain the prolonged attempt to hold on to East Jerusalem during the 1948 war, and perhaps also accounts for the tenacious struggle, focusing on the battles of Latrun, to enlarge the Jerusalem corridor. The bloodiness of those battles and the disappointment in their general failure is another factor that heightened the emotion of the IDF when it entered East Jerusalem in June 1967. Yaakov Dori, the IDF Chief of Staff during the first part of the War of Independence, has expressed the sense of personal liberation he experienced on Independence Day, 1968, from the emotional depression that had gripped him on every Independence Day since 1948-1949:

¹ Ceulah Cohen in Maariv, July 14, 1967. Weizman attached (almost) equal importance to Hebron and Nablus, but his audience's receptivity was surely greater with respect to Jerusalem.

Despite all the great efforts that were put into the War of Independence to liberate Jerusalem and despite all the precious blood that was poured out in those attempts and also in the attempts to ensure the approach to Jerusalem, the IDF had not succeeded during the time I was its commander... No attempts to convince myself helped me, and I could not be liberated from the heavy depression, personal in its basis, even when I recounted to myself again and again the events of those days, our poverty and our lack of strength all through the War of Independence, particularly our tremendous lack of heavy weapons. Despite all this logic and the explanations that were involved, I found no rest and all the time I was pursued by the thought that we failed in this decisive battle... A large part of the precious blood that was spilled was spilled over Jerusalem and its approaches, and Jerusalem remained tragically divided.

If at other Independence Day celebrations he felt himself not completely a partner to the nation's joy, the holiday of 1968 was entirely different. In Jerusalem of 1968 a chapter of history was concluded. The final battle of the War of Independence had been fought and concluded victoriously, and the creation of the Jewish state was thereby completed.¹

Another element of the emotions with which the unification of the city was greeted derived from the long-festered sore of Jordanian behavior in East Jerusalem. The Jewish quarter was destroyed, the cemetery on the Mount of Olives desecrated, access to the Western Wall completely denied, and that to the Hebrew University on Mount Scopus severely constrained. This history of Jordanian violation of Jewish rights in East Jerusalem made outside criticism of Israeli rule in reunited Jerusalem all the more resented. To Israelis, the contrast between their treatment of the Holy Places and of national minorities and that by the Jordanians was so blatantly clear that the outside criticism was simply infuriating.

¹Maariv, April 28, 1971.

The contrast was drawn on all conceivable occasions -- such as the opening of an Armenian exhibition at the International Cultural Center for Youth¹ -- and in matters small and large: For nineteen years not a single children's playground had been built by the Jordanian municipality; since 1967, the Israelis had built five parks and playgrounds in the eastern part of the city and were working on a sixth. Mayor Teddy Kollek reported that taxes collected in East Jerusalem in 1970 amounted to one and one-quarter million pounds, representing 10 percent of the total collected from all parts of the city. But east Jerusalem would get five million out of a total of 30 million pounds in the current Jerusalem development budget. "East Jerusalem gets proportionately far more than its contribution in taxes and a little more than its size and population". It was important to raise municipal standards in East Jerusalem so that in a decade or two the line that once divided the city politically would not divide it socially.²

Not surprisingly, the Vatican's frequent expressions of support for internationalization and its explicit criticism of Israeli rule in Jerusalem evoked bitter Israeli reactions. The newspaper Hamodia on March 26, 1971 editorialized that the Vatican's stand in court was impaired because it had never reacted to what was happening in Jerusalem during the twenty years of Jordanian occupation. Even the more moderate Davar (on the same date) accused the Vatican of "conducting a politically inspired campaign against Israel under the guise of an uncalled for concern for the holy places."

This history and general background helps explain the otherwise incredible episode of the "Benvenisti Affair." Meron Benvenisti, Kollek's aide on Arab affairs in East Jerusalem, had been asked by the Foreign Ministry in 1968 to help develop a proposal for a Jerusalem settlement that would "maintain Israeli sovereignty over the city and at the same time satisfy non-Israeli interests (particularly Jordanian)."

¹Weekly Press Review, 16-22, March 1971.

²Jerusalem Post, May 27, 1971.

Benvenisti drew up a rather complex plan that was not accepted and soon forgotten in the government. However, three years later the proposal was leaked to the press and occasioned a political donnybrook. Perhaps the feature of the plan that caused the most irritation was the provision for an access road under Jordanian sovereignty to the Temple Mount. Benvenisti was accused of readiness to redivide the city; the right-wing opposition engaged in a furious campaign not just against the plan, which was no longer relevant, but against Benvenisti himself, Kollek, his mentor, and the Labor Party. There was a full dress debate in the Knesset, and feelings ran so high that the Labor Party was faced by a threat of dissolution of the Jerusalem city coalition. Under these threats the Labor-Mapam Alignment was forced to withdraw its nomination of Benvenisti as Deputy Mayor.¹

This is also the atmosphere that transformed a debate on urban planning, municipal services, and housing esthetics into one on the political consequences of housing construction in East Jerusalem. It was responsible for securing a papered-over agreement where none had existed previously. After criticism by the U.S. State Department spokesman, Robert McCloskey, of the proposed construction near the Hill of Samuel, Mayor Kollek, who had previously opposed the project, asserted, "I am convinced that the unanimous vote the municipal council's building subcommittee gave the plan yesterday was directly the result of the State Department's comment." Whatever his disagreements with Housing Minister Zeev Sharef, Kollek continued, "We are in full agreement that there must be building and that Jerusalem must never again be a divided city." Indeed, Kollek could point out that he had long been on record as urging extensive construction in East Jerusalem. His dispute with Sharef concerned site location, not the fact of construction.²

¹Jerusalem Post Magazine, May 7, 1971; Maariv, May 13, 1971 and June 3, 1971.

²New York Times, February 19, 1971; and Maariv, February 19, 1971.

The government continues its efforts to increase the degree of political, social, and economic integration of the two parts of the city. There is little trace in the atmosphere of Jerusalem today of the euphoria immediately after the reunification. At noon on June 29, 1967 the barriers were removed, and both parts of the city poured over the boundaries in an exultation of rediscovery that astonished even those who had been most optimistic about the experiment. However, the euphoria evaporated in confrontation with the hostility of the Arab world, the growing power of the Fedayeen movements, and the uncertainty about the ultimate settlement prospects.

Nevertheless, considerable changes have taken place. The two halves of Jerusalem are involved w' th each other in ways that had no precedent even before 1948. Almost ten thousand East Jerusalem Arabs voted in the elections for the municipal council in 1969. It was only because of outside pressure that no Arab candidates presented themselves. In February 1970 the city secured the agreement of twelve East Jerusalem Arabs to sit on six municipal committees. Again, only outside pressure caused the experiment to fail. Some 800 Arabs and Jews, members of the Histadrut, attended a meeting at which it was announced that half the Arab wage earners in Jerusalem, 6,500 workers, had joined the federation.¹

No miracles have yet been wrought. As an Israeli Christian Arab observed, there was still no real social contact between East and West Jerusalem, but life in the city had been normalized.² Mayor Kollek's conclusion was similar: "In its heart, Jerusalem is not yet united. We have no illusions about that -- less than they have in New York or Belfast. But we can try to create conditions of equality so that people can live as neighbors in normal circumstances."³

¹ Jerusalem Post, February 9, 1971; Israel Radio, May 12, 1971; Yuval Elitzur in Yamim Vleilot, June 4, 1971.

² Atallah Mansour in Haaretz, February 19, 1971.

³ Jerusalem Post, May 27, 1971.

The government's determination to proceed with its present Jerusalem policy is signified by perhaps its most daring act to date, the proposal to compensate East Jerusalem Arabs for property abandoned in Israel during the War of Independence.¹ Clearly, this measure is a confirmation of the intent to maintain the annexation of East Jerusalem, as noted by The New York Times in an editorial complaint on July 3, 1971:

The most serious problem arising out of the compensation plan, however, is that it extends to the Arab inhabitants of East Jerusalem an opportunity that has been made available so far only to Arabs living inside Israel proper -- not to claimants in other occupied areas or in more distant exile. The compensation offer thus tends to reaffirm Israel's claim to sovereignty over all of Jerusalem, a claim that has been vigorously disputed by the Arabs and by much of the rest of the world, including the United States.

Does all this suggest that the unification of Jerusalem under exclusive Israeli rule is regarded as an absolute value? Do the Israeli views cited mean that they are prepared to trade peace for an Israel-controlled Jerusalem? Several years back under considerably less complex conditions of international negotiation, Allon gave an affirmative answer. "If we accepted the Arab demands on Jerusalem, we could sign a peace treaty with Jordan tomorrow, because they would be willing to compromise on other points as long as they got East Jerusalem or the main part of it back." But this was out of the question, Allon noted, because any government that rescinded the reunification would fall immediately.²

¹The New York Times, June 30, 1971. The proposal had come before the cabinet several times but had previously been supported by only a minority of the ministers. One of the minority was Shlomo Hillel, the Police Minister, who advanced a compensation proposal in a broader framework, even before the Six Day War, for action within a UN context. Interview with Yair Kutler in Haaretz Supplement, January 22, 1971.

²The Jerusalem Post, December 12, 1968.

It is doubtful that many Israelis now see Jerusalem as the sole problem barring lasting peace, hence the tradeoff posed above is thought to be irrelevant. Yet there are differences of view on the desired or feasible future status of Jerusalem. Simple return to the status quo ante is not, however, a frequently voiced alternative. Yaakov Cohen, a columnist for Mapam's Al Hamishmar, and one of the most dovish voices on this matter, is prepared to pay "a rather high price for a true peace, including the return of East Jerusalem to Arab rule." But he hastily adds that he would insist that portions of East Jerusalem, including the Jewish quarter, the Western wall, "etc.," remain under Israeli rule and that there be "a joint council of Jews and Arabs which would oversee particular arrangements with respect to commerce, trade, housing, etc."¹

To most sections of Israeli opinion and certainly for the government, it seems clear that the demand for a unified Jerusalem under Israeli control is non-negotiable. So long as the negotiations with the Egyptians remain generally frozen, Israel is not likely to move beyond those positions. There remains scope for some accommodation even within the general hard line in the form of specific measures to take account of other religious and national interests. Among these

¹ A Chance for Peace (Hebrew), Jerusalem, The Movement for Peace and Security, April 1971, p. 29. A similar position is adopted by A. E. Simon, long-time collaborator of Martin Buber, and Yehoshua Porat, Professor of Middle East Studies in Jerusalem. Ibid., pp. 36, 39. The young novelist, Yitzhak Orpaz, who states that the concept of "let him be killed rather than violate [the commandment]" is irrelevant for him because "I have no idealistic norms," declares: "I cannot imagine Jerusalem redivided. I cannot forgo Jewish political rule in Jerusalem. I am not prepared to tolerate foreign rule in Jerusalem, or in part of it" (referring to internationalization). Ibid., pp. 26-27. Cf. also Yirmiyahu Yovel, young philosophy lecturer at the Hebrew University and an active dove: "Just as the State of Israel could not have arisen in Uganda, so it is difficult to believe that it can maintain for long its connection to Jewish history and the world Jewish community without Jerusalem as its capital." Ibid. p. 26.

are extraterritorial status for the Holy Places (with the Arab places flying Jordanian or Palestinian flags) and some rather fanciful devices, including underground or overground sovereign passages between Arab territory and the Temple Mount. One such scheme was originally suggested by Benvenisti in his now-famous 1968 sketch for the Foreign Ministry. But a similar suggestion has been made by others, among them Professor Leibowitz of the Hebrew University.¹

Not all of these suggestions are acceptable to the government, of course. Whatever the nature of the particular accommodations, there are certain minimum requirements that the Israeli government is likely to demand and for which there is likely to be well-nigh universal support in Israeli public opinion:

1. Security of the city. For this purpose, control over the eastern heights would seem absolutely necessary. The failure of the Jordanians to allow Israeli access to Mount Scopus and the Mount of Olives rankled in Israeli memory not only because of the religious and cultural significance of the areas from which they were barred but also because occupation of those areas gave the Jordanians excellent military vantage points overlooking the heart of Jerusalem to the west. It seems most probable that in any future settlement, the Israeli government will demand sovereignty over those eastern heights, to ensure the safety of Jerusalem from artillery fire and to control westward moving traffic coming up from the Jordan Valley. Perhaps this is one reason why the sociologist Moshe Lisak believes Israel may have less room for maneuver with respect to the military aspects of a Jerusalem settlement than it has in terms of the emotional and symbolic aspects.²

2. Israeli sovereignty in the Jewish quarter of the Old City including the Western Wall. Here the intense emotional dimensions of Israel's attachment to Jerusalem provide the basis for a very hard line.

¹ Ibid., p. 31.

² Ibid., p. 32.

3. Freedom of movement throughout the city for Jews and Arabs.

4. No intervention of outside powers between Jews and Arabs in the administration of the city, with the exception of the Christian Holy Places, which might be administered by representatives of the Christian states.

D. ANNEXATION AND THE CHARACTER OF THE STATE

Israel awakened after the Six Day War to discover that along with the extension of territory the IDF had secured the addition of more than a million Arabs to Israel's rule--64,000 on the Golan Heights, 390,000 in the Gaza Strip and northern Sinai, almost 600,000 in the West Bank, and 66,000 in East Jerusalem in the expanded borders of June 28, 1967.¹ Most Israelis agreed with the late Prime Minister Eshkol's rueful conclusion: "The dowry is gorgeous, but the bride is so homely."

So large an increase in Israel's Arab population gave rise to two concerns: first on the score of security, but second, and of no less weight, with respect to transformation of the character of the Israeli state and society. The basis of the fear for a security threat was clear enough. The Palestinian Arabs who had left Israel during and after the War of Independence in 1948-1949 were already hostile to the Jewish state. For the twenty years thereafter they had threatened the security of the borders, intermittently infiltrating across the borders to carry out terrorist acts. Israel military reprisals had been only partly successful in halting the train of events but had probably deepened, if that were possible, Arab enmity. The fear that enlargement of the Arab population would result in the introduction of a fifth column was the major concern behind the reluctance of the Israeli government to accept the principle of repatriation of Arab refugees in the period between 1948 and 1967. For the same reason, a regime of military government had been instituted in the Arab areas within Israel proper. It had been maintained, to the increasing irritation of the

¹Middle East Record, 1967, pp. 279-280, 292; Statistical Abstract of Israel, 1969, p. 632.

Arabs and under increasingly vocal protests from many sections of Israeli Jewish opinion, until 1965. However, only 150,000 Arabs had remained in Israel after the War of Independence and even by 1967 their numbers had grown to only about 300,000. Therefore, the prospect of adding an Arab population three and a half times the size of that already within the state threatened a serious internal security problem.

The second specter raised by the change in population structure after the Six Day War was radical change in the character of the state. Israel had been founded and developed by east and central European immigrants who looked to create a modern European society, albeit with a socialist-Zionist cast. The influx of Oriental-Jewish immigrants after the War of Independence raised fears among the veteran settlers of possible "levantinization"--gradual erosion of the western, technically progressive character of the state under a tide of economically backward, less educated, culturally distinct elements from predominantly Arab communities. However grudgingly, Oriental Jews had accepted the general cultural mold into which the establishment wished them to fit; Arabs could hardly be expected to accept the rules of the game set by the Jews, even assuming peaceful conditions in the region.

The traditional channels of absorption of Jewish immigrants to Israel have been the Army, the school, and occupational selection. At least two out of three of these would be unavailable to the Arabs. For a while at least, it could not be expected that Arabs would be drafted into the armed forces, and surely they would insist on a school system separate from that of the Jewish population. Israel's twenty year history of absorbing Oriental-Jewish immigrants had demonstrated the difficulty caused when cultural dissimilarity was joined with great occupational inflexibility.¹ The differences in levels of education and skills would tend to polarize the employment patterns and maintain the Arab population as hewers of wood and drawers of water for the more highly skilled Jews. The prospect was anathema

¹S. N. Eisenstadt, Israeli Society, New York, Basic Books, 1967, pp. 196 ff.

to the Labor leadership of the state who had come to Palestine imbued with the ideal of "self-labor" and of the necessity for a "normal profile of Jewish occupational skills." The impact on political and cultural life could only be disastrous.

Looming on the horizon was a "demographic nightmare" that would exacerbate all aspects of the problem of Arab absorption. The differences in culture and basic social structure between the Arab and Jewish communities were reflected in their relative rates of natural increase. The Israeli Arab minority had doubled from 150,000 in 1948 to 300,000 in 1967, an implicit average annual rate of increase of 3.8 percent, whereas the natural rate for Jews had decreased from 2.6 percent in 1951 to 1.5 percent in 1967.¹ On the seemingly reasonable expectation that a similar gap would characterize the relative natural rates of increase of Jews and the West Bank-Gaza Arabs, it seemed clear that the Jewish majority, which was already slim (60 percent), would be turned into a minority in the foreseeable future. The only question appeared to be the exact date of the crossover point. What would then happen to the Jewish character of the state? To the cornerstone of Israel's self-image, the Law of Return (unrestricted entry for Jewish immigrants)? As one writer observed: "It would be one of the great historical absurdities if from the power of the idea of Jewish national sovereignty there was created a Jewish minority subject to the national sovereignty of Arabs."²

The prospect of having to absorb a community of Arabs that promised to maintain mushroom-growth patterns posed the difficult dilemma of "binationalism or Rhodesia." If the Palestinians' national rights were to be respected, Israel would necessarily become a binationalist society. In the past, binationalism had been supported by a number of groups, particularly on the Left, but the concept was no longer very popular. Binationalism had not been conspicuously successful in other

¹ Statistical Abstract of Israel, 1969, p. 58.

² Maariv, November 20, 1970.

countries, even in situations where the two population groups were not burdened by the enmity that poisoned relations between Jews and Arabs. It was feared that this enmity would turn Israel into an ethnic cauldron much like Cyprus. Apart from the intrinsic disadvantages of such a situation, it would attract the intervention of outside powers.¹ On the other hand, the alternative to binationalism seemed to be a policy of apartheid, clearly unacceptable to most Israelis. Those who foresaw the coming of this Hobson's choice also saw no alternative but abstention from annexation: "The fact that we cannot absorb them in the Israeli economy and society and the fact that we do not wish to drive them out turn the principle of partition into the Zionist solution." (Emphasis in original).² Let us therefore dub those who, while recognizing the historical significance of the West Bank to a Jewish state, oppose annexation for the reasons presented as "partitionists."

The leading exponent of the "demographic argument" against annexation is Pinhas Sapir, who fears that within ten to twenty years of the act of annexation there would be a Jewish state in name only.³ Mapam supports him fully, as do elements of the Labor Party, not to speak of the independent partitionists grouped around the Movement for Peace and Security.

In this respect the Allon Plan falls between two stools and seems to satisfy neither camp fully. To the annexationists, Allon looks very much like Sapir. Both seem to want the repartition of the western part of the Land of Israel;⁴ both base their demand for the return of some Arab territory on the "demographic argument."⁵ On the other hand, to the partitionists Allon is distinguishable only in degree from Begin,

¹ Uri Yizhar in Davar, November 8, 1968.

² Yariv Ben-Aharon in Lamerhav, December 6, 1968.

³ Israel Radio, April 29, 1971.

⁴ The separation of Transjordan from Palestine in 1922 was the first partition, followed by the UN action in 1947 that made possible the emergence of the State of Israel.

⁵ Aryeh Naor in Hayom, December 22, 1968.

since the Allon Plan seems to require the annexation of a third or more of the West Bank, apart from sections of the Golan Heights and the Gaza Strip.

The partitionists are not all invulnerable on this score. Their polemics would suggest that they wish to avoid the inclusion of any significant number of Arabs from the occupied territories in the borders of Israel under a peace settlement. However, only a small minority of the partitionists are content to return to the June 4, 1967 borders. Even Mapam, which stands on the Left in Israel society with respect to both social-economic and foreign policy, suggested a settlement plan that included the annexation not only of Jerusalem and its environs but also of Gaza and perhaps some additional pieces of the West Bank. The Mapam plan has been characterized satirically as "a little peace and a little annexation." Annexing Gaza, Jerusalem, Qalqiliya, and Tulkarm adds 400,000 - 500,000 Arabs to the 400,000 currently living within prewar Israel (including Jerusalem). What was the essential difference, asked a friendly critic, between half a million and a million Arabs with respect to the "demographic argument"?¹ What difference did it make, added Begin, if the crossover point came in 32 years or in 40 years? The "demographic argument" was nothing but a "demographic scarecrow."²

The threat of an incipient Arab majority was dismissed by the annexationists because they were confident of two offsetting tendencies: first, the ability of public policy under appropriate conditions to substantially increase the natural rate of population growth among Israeli Jews, and, second, the vast potential of Jewish immigration from the Soviet Union and the Americas. However, Sapir is also among those who have looked forward to growing immigration prospects. In the space of three months in 1971 alone, he twice declared his belief

¹Haim Darin-Drabkin in Al Hamishmar, February 16, 1968. Darin-Drabkin is editor of the English-language monthly, New Outlook.

²Aryeh Naor in Hayom, December 22, 1968.

that Israel would have a population of 5 or 5-1/2 million Jews in the early 1980s, evidently on the assumption of large-scale immigration from the USSR and Latin America.¹ It is interesting to recall that a population of 4 or 5 million Jews was Eshkol's hope for Israel by the end of the twentieth century.²

The "demographic argument" has had a peculiar echo which the annexationists have been quick to utilize. The partitionists argued that predominantly Arab areas should, if possible, not be annexed on the grounds of danger to the character of the state. But what of the predominantly Arab areas on the other side of the "green line," those within the borders of June 4, 1967? The debate stimulated the Arab deputy mayor of Acre to proclaim Acre an Arab city too. If there was to be withdrawal from conquered Arab land because Israel did not want to include more Arabs than was necessary within its territory, then Israel's authority and sovereignty ought to be withdrawn from Acre and Nazareth, too.³

The polemic of some annexationist groups has the virtue of consistency. The argument for annexation is followed by the demand for the complete integration of all Arabs within the state, including their ultimate, if not immediate, full participation in government. Confident of the righteousness of their position, the annexationists condemn the "racism" of the partitionists who refuse to accept large Arab minorities. "Anybody who denies our full rights to Nablus, Jericho, and Hebron," declared Yisrael Shaib-Eldad, "is a colonialist and imperialist, because in this way he admits that this is a foreign land."⁴ On the other hand, the Land of Israel movement and Eldad in particular have hinted openly at the necessity for the departure of a significant group of Arabs from the occupied territories, with the

¹ Bamahaneh, April 6, 1971, and Israel Radio, June 22, 1971.

² Der Spiegel, July 10, 1967. Cf. the Jerusalem Post editorial on February 19, 1971: with peace, one million Russian Jews would come to Israel.

³ Gershom Shoken in Haaretz, December 10, 1968.

⁴ Yisrael Shaib-Eldad in Maariv, November 15, 1968.

justification that if Israel took in a million Jews from Arab countries, the Arab countries should be willing to take in a like number of Arabs. There would, of course, be no pressure, it is asserted, but many Arabs would want to leave anyhow.¹ For this kind of argument the annexationists have been severely attacked in Israel as hypocrites and racists.²

The bedrock case of the partitionists has been expressed in a quasi-philosophical frame. The West Bank and Gaza differ fundamentally from Sinai and the Golan Heights: the former group is densely populated by hostile Arabs, whereas the Sinai and the Golan are virtually uninhabited. Israel is a state dedicated to the preservation of a democratic system, but democratic decisionmaking is applicable only to a relatively homogeneous and harmonious population. Democratic decisionmaking, the rule of the majority, can never apply to relationships between peoples, for which the only just principle is that of the negotiation of equals. For these reasons, the price that Israel must pay for its own national independence and for the maintenance of its democratic system is the repartition of the "integral Land of Israel."³

E. INTEGRATION: DAYAN'S ALTERNATIVE

To this conclusion, there is one major demurral that is not simply annexationist. This is the "integrationist" concept of Moshe Dayan. Because of his position in the society and the impact of his approach on the development of the occupied territories, it is appropriate to devote special consideration to Dayan's views.

Dayan is the mystery man of Israeli politics and much ink has been spilled in attempts to interpret his frequently oracular statements. No claim is made here to have done what is regarded by many in Israel as impossible -- provide a definitive interpretation of his views. They have too often been stated too elliptically and seemingly

¹ Jerusalem Post, October 10, 1969.

² However, even non-annexationists have pointed to the precedent of large emigration from the West Bank when it was under Jordanian control. The incentives then were economic -- the lure of higher wages, particularly in the Persian Gulf region.

³ Shlomo Neeman in Lamerhav, May 22, 1969.

inconsistently to make such pretensions achievable. Dayan, says Shabtai Teveth, is like a cook preparing a dish not according to a cookbook but creating as he goes along, tasting to see what's lacking and what's excessive. He cannot use a recipe because outside forces, the super-powers, largely determine the conditions in the kitchen.¹ One suspects that even if his kitchen were not closely observed, Dayan would have little inclination to go by the cookbook. He is said to have the stereotypical sabra contempt for ideology and, though far more cautious than often depicted abroad, he exhibits a general tendency to trust his instincts.

A second key to understanding Dayan's views on the web of settlement issues would seem to be recognition of the complex mixture of optimism and pessimism in his outlook. It is not clear that these are fully reconciled. As his very well-known speech to the Army's Command and Staff graduating class in August 1968 demonstrated, he believes that little has changed in thirty years to affect the general refusal of the Arab world to accept Israel as a natural part of it.² On another occasion, he said: "It is not 'fear of Israeli expansionism' that prevents them from making peace with us. It is their refusal to accept our existence here as a state."³ In this same vein one must also include his views of Jewish history, in which respect he differs very little, if at all, from the older, European-born leaders of the state.⁴

Dayan's optimism is reflected in his belief in the efficacy of increasing daily contact between Israelis and Arabs on the West Bank. "We must attempt to knock down forcefully -- of course, I do not mean here by force of arms -- the walls that stand between us and them on

¹Haaretz, November 15, 1968.

²Dayan, A New Map, Other Relations, pp. 19-29. See above, p. 3, n. 4.

³Interview with Geulah Cohen, Maariv, September 22, 1968.

⁴To cite only one example, witness his evidently deep feeling for the connection between memories of the Holocaust and the sentiments of Israel Independence Day (A New Map, pp. 81-82). To a passing-out parade of air cadets in the summer of 1968 he declared: "You are the sons of a people whom history has refused to indulge."

the basis of direct contact in day to day affairs."¹ To Dayan it appears that there must be something corrosive to Arab enmity in the impact of sheer physical living together, even if the contacts remain hostile for a long period. Of course, he is aware that the creation of "facts" need not necessarily be decisive, as he reminded his audience in his 1968 Staff and Command School speech. There had been a process of creating "facts" extending over more than thirty years and yet there seemed to be no appreciable change in the climate of enmity. Indeed, because of his appreciation of this fact of life, Dayan appears to foresee protracted Arab-Israel conflict: "Toward the coming era we need not only peace plans, but also the preparation and the readiness to live until peace without peace."²

Dayan goes out of his way to express empathy for Arabs, which he displayed on numerous occasions even before the Six Day War. Eulogizing a Jewish youth who was killed by infiltrators from the Gaza Strip, he said: "Let us not accuse those who killed this lad and let us not complain of their enmity. For eight years they have lived in refugee camps in Gaza, while before their eyes we took to ourselves their land and their villages, in which they had lived, they and their fathers." These remarks were made in 1956.³ He still recognizes the depth of that enmity and knows that this will prove a formidable barrier: "I know well that at this first stage it will be a one-sided contact. Even if we understand them they will not understand us. But even if this contact is one-sided, and even if the understanding is one-sided, we must persist and listen to them in the hope that one day they will listen to us too."⁴

¹ Ibid., p. 137.

² Ibid., p. 41.

³ Haaretz, May 2, 1956, cited by Amnon Kapeliuk in Le Monde, December 12, 1970. It is because of his liberalism in matters of human relations with Arabs that Dayan is admired even by those -- e.g., Shimon Shamir or Shlomo Avineri -- who oppose him politically. For references see note 2 on p. 73 below.

⁴ Dayan, A New Map, p. 133 (from a speech on October 16, 1968). Because the process was so difficult and the way so long, it was important not to lose heart. He warned against allowing terrorist attacks

Dayan is, however, also concerned to maintain the historical tie between Jews and the area of their early history. Anyone who thinks that Dayan is indifferent to such considerations should read his numerous statements on the historic importance of Israel's return to the "cradle of its national life." Asked what Israel was seeking in Hebron, whether the answer was security, Dayan responded tersely: "the homeland."¹ At the same time he is cognizant of the anti-annexationist "demographic argument." Asked whether he preferred a larger binational Israel or a smaller Israel with a Jewish majority, he responded that he preferred the larger Israel on grounds of security. "But if it threatens the essence of our Jewish state, then I prefer a small one with a Jewish majority."²

Nevertheless, there was also an opportunity and a challenge for Israel to develop a new basis of relations with the Palestinian Arabs. Like it or not, Israel now had responsibility for a million more of them, and it had to develop a set of policies for a reasonably harmonious coexistence. Israel was an occupying force in the West Bank and Gaza but it also had to be a government, because the Arabs had no other. Being an occupying force was prerequisite to being an operational government, but the former alone was not enough if prospects for peace in the long term were to be improved.³

From the very beginning, then, Dayan was concerned with developing day to day relationships with the Arabs in the occupied territories. On this basis there gradually came to be erected an occupation policy of minimum interference in Arab affairs with relatively complete self-government at the municipal level.⁴ There was to be no policy of Israelization --

to interrupt the process of developing co-existence with the Arab population. Using the metaphor of a mine field, he urged that the only hope of getting through was to keep walking, and not to stop for fear the way was blocked. Jerusalem Post Supplement, April 22, 1969.

¹ Israel Radio, May 9, 1970.

² Jerusalem Post, November 30, 1970.

³ Maariv, February 13, 1970.

⁴ A detailed narrative description of the opening phases of the occupation policy, especially with respect to the Samaritan region, is contained

no insistence on Israeli citizenship, adoption of Hebrew, Israeli culture, or patterns of living and producing. Indeed, the insistence on maintaining existing ties between the Palestinian Arabs and the Arab world went to extraordinary lengths: not just the literally open bridges bearing heavy commercial and passenger traffic,¹ but even permission for West Bank and Gaza Strip students to study in Arab countries, although this was known often to result in enlistment into the Fedayeen. If Israel was the sole government available to the territories, it had an obligation either to provide higher education locally or to allow Palestinian Arab students to study abroad.

The most controversial aspect of this policy was Dayan's call for economic integration of the areas with Israel, which generated a heated debate in November-December 1968.² By economic integration, Dayan was referring to a set of policies that would tie the transportation and utilities networks of the occupied areas to those of Israel, establish a unified Israel-territories agricultural development plan, permit Arab workers to find employment in Israel, and enable the construction of industrial enterprises in the occupied areas.

His opponents claimed that Dayan was simply aiming at eventual annexation of the occupied areas and that economic integration was nothing but an attempt to push the nose of the bear inside the door. Dayan has, indeed, given occasion to suspect that annexation on a large scale is part of his objectives. It was indicated earlier that he had

in Teveth, The Cursed Blessing. While giving Dayan his full due, Teveth is also careful to point out the important role played by a number of secondary personalities.

¹However, passage to and from Jordan is strictly controlled by the military government.

²He had been quietly mulling over the idea since the end of 1967. In August he presented the government with a memorandum on "Lines of Economic Policy and Services in the Territories, 1969-70," as an input to the preparation for the coming year's budget, embodying the outline of his views on integration. These were publicly, if only partially, unveiled at a speech in Beersheba on November 6, 1968. Teveth, The Cursed Blessing, p. 276; R. Taitelbaum in Kol Haam, December 6, 1968. For the text of the speech, see Dayan, New Map, pp. 150-155. This speech, parenthetically, included possibly the sharpest attack Dayan ever made on Sapir and his minimalism.

announced his preference for annexation of Gaza within a few weeks of the war's end, although in this matter he was soon followed by much of the government establishment, including Mapam. Similarly, the demand to retain the Golan Heights is not unique to him. But Dayan has also said: "This is our homeland, from the Jordan to the Sea (including) Nablus and Jericho."¹ In the fall of 1968, soon after his first public expression of pessimism on the long-term prospects of peace and just before his call for integration, he declared: "When Israel concludes that there is no chance for negotiations with the Arabs, that there is no chance of settlement, Israel will have to ask herself if she should not proclaim the annexation of those parts that will get her the borders desirable for her."² Later that month Dayan revealed that he favored constructing a Jewish city in the region of Biblical Bethel or Anatot (north of Jerusalem) and possibly two more on the ridges between Nablus and Jenin, in addition to transforming the Etzion Bloc into an urban center.³

However, in general, one can find more frequent expressions of Dayan's opposition to than of support for annexation. In January 1969 he suggested that annexation would not change much -- neither the viewpoint of the great powers nor that of the inhabitants of the territories to be annexed.⁴ He often expressed his belief that settlement of an area was more important than its annexation. The establishment of settlements would make the Golan Hebrew more than any formal act of annexation.⁵ On a number of occasions, Dayan stressed the rights of those already living in the occupied territories and denied that he sought in any way to expel them. "I see no obstacle to giving expression to our connection to Anatot and Shiloh by virtue of the fact that Arabs

¹ Jerusalem Post, June 29, 1969.

² Israel Radio, October 16, 1968, cited by Shabtai Teveth in Haaretz, November 1, 1968.

³ Interview with Hagai (Haim Guri) in Lamerhav, October 25, 1968.

⁴ Dayan, A New Map, p. 32.

⁵ Israel Radio, August 3, 1969.

are living in these places, as long as we can visit there, be there, and settle there as if at home."¹ Immediately after the Six Day War it was customary to speak of the "liberated territories" or "liberated Jerusalem." For his part, Dayan averred, he was not ignoring the fact that Arabs lived there who didn't want any part of Israel. In using the term "liberated," he maintained, Israelis speak about themselves, "that we have freed ourselves from the separation of Jerusalem."²

Perhaps not all his listeners were convinced by the somewhat tortured reasoning of Dayan's defense of the term "liberated" as applied to the territories. However, the sincerity of his search for coexistence was compelling. Coexistence is the heart of Dayan's vision of the path to a future peace. "We have to understand what we really desire. We want to attain a coexistence for two peoples with a profound political conflict.... We also want to bring about a common understanding, common life patterns -- not of one side with the other, but side by side; not to become one people or one country, but to live together, to coexist."³

Dayan thus seems to be searching for new forms -- administrative, governmental, political -- that would permit coexistence of two peoples in the same area without the national self-effacement of either. A unique, unprecedented kind of arrangement is needed, which cannot emerge fully formed from the intellect, like Athena from the head of Zeus, but must develop naturally through the process of living together. In this as in so many other matters, he is the compleat pragmatist and prepared to consider a variety of means and forms that seem to fit the general objective.⁴ He seems to have no intellectual commitment to the signed peace treaty. Differentiating between the treaty and the condition of peace -- the former may exist without necessitating the latter -- he notes that treaties have been signed and instantly violated. "But to

¹Dayan, A New Map, p. 31, from a speech on January 15, 1969.

²Ibid., p. 174, from a speech on December 12, 1967.

³Jerusalem Post Supplement, April 22, 1969.

⁴See especially his interview with Lea Ben Dor in the Jerusalem Post Supplement, October 24, 1969, from which most of the rest of this and the next two paragraphs is drawn.

my mind the prime question is whether there is a prospect of reaching conditions of peace, even without formal diplomatic signatures and a stamp." He looked forward to a stage of quiet and peaceful coexistence which precedes peace. "That is more likely than a peace agreement that would only come as the result of agreement on several other points as well."

Israel must look for a way to make possible the coexistence of Jewish and Arab settlements, side by side, for individual Jews to live with the Arabs, and for Arabs to have free access to Israel. At this stage, however, he is not prepared to grant Arabs the rights to settle in Israel, perhaps because of the danger of raising the issue of repatriation for all Palestinian "refugees." At the same time, he recognizes that "you cannot leave a whole community political invalids. Sooner or later they must have the same political rights that we have." Therefore, he is prepared to consider a situation in which Arabs living in an area controlled by Israel would still vote in elections for the parliament in Amman.

It may be seen that Dayan visualizes a situation in which the international borders between Israel and its neighboring Arab states are highly permeable, serving to allow free flow across the borders after a period in which the Arab and Israeli areas have undergone extensive integration and practice in coexistence. Political forms would not be dictated by any manual but would be adapted to the situation and to the objectives of developing coexistence. "This is not a question of voting in Parliament, but it shows that in these matters we must consider the practical alternatives and try to find the lesser evil or the greater good. The questions can be very complex."

Thus, Dayan seems to be aiming at an arrangement in which the issue of territorial sovereignty will be submerged in the web of economic and personal ties that will have been created in the area. Such ties will exist between the Arab areas and other Arab countries, as they will exist between the Arab areas and Israel. In this fluid creation, in the process of integration, or what The Economist has called "osmosis," particular boundaries will assume secondary significance.

Despite consistent emphasis on economic integration and the improvement of living standards of the population in the occupied territories, Dayan has been relatively silent on means for dealing with the refugee problem. In the fall of 1967 he doubted the possibility of resettling refugees in the occupied territories. In an interview with Henry Brandon of the London Sunday Times he cited the Egyptian failures in irrigation schemes at El Arish and the Great Bitter Lake as basis for his own disbelief in the possibilities of resettlement in the Sinai.¹ Massive transfer to the West Bank was beyond Israel's capability. More recently, he has emphasized the necessity to provide services within the refugee camps, improve sanitation, electricity, and water facilities, and to raise the general standard of living in the camps. However, he would oppose absorption of significant numbers of refugees now living outside the cease fire lines after a peace settlement; in this he shares the general viewpoint of the government.

Dayan's integrationist approach includes the creation of settlements -- urban and rural, civilian and military -- throughout the area. Yet, he has been somewhat ambiguous in his reactions to the proposals of the Allon Plan calling for settlements in the lower Jordan Valley. Early after the Six Day War, he was identified as an opponent of the Allon Plan, according to Terence Smith, "on the ground that Israeli settlement in the occupied territory would be considered by the Arabs as an unacceptable provocation and would bring international criticism down on Israel."² Whether or not this version of Dayan's views is to be taken seriously, it is clear that he changed his mind. In a speech on October 20, 1968, he included a number of places in the Jordan Valley as areas that should be settled along with the Golan Heights and East Jerusalem.³ In answer to the direct question of whether it was important to settle in the Jordan Valley, he provided an important clue to his outlook: "I value settlement as the most important matter and as having

¹ Los Angeles Times, September 17, 1967.

² New York Times, September 4, 1967.

³ Jerusalem Post, October 22, 1968.

the greatest weight in the creation of political facts" (emphasis in original). Such settlements obligated Israel much more than a military base.¹ Paramilitary bases could be removed if the peace treaty or settlement required it; on the other hand, permanent agricultural or urban settlement could not be displaced that way and required the Israeli government to take appropriate policy action.

Therefore, apart from any considerations of political rivalry, Dayan's lukewarm response to the Allon Plan should probably be attributed to the belief that rural settlements are of doubtful utility against conventional army attack, and this would be one of the important aspects of location in the Jordan Valley. For this purpose he would rather occupy the Samarian heights overlooking the Valley and control the roads from military bases in the region. However, his main contention is that settlements should be located where political facts are to be created; and for Dayan political facts are the product of interdependence and integration, his basic policy objective. Since the Jordan Valley is sparsely inhabited, it would appear to be an area of lesser interest from that point of view. In this respect he differs sharply from Allon, for whom the relative underpopulation of the Jordan Valley is precisely its most important attribute in recommending the string of settlements there.

A major counterargument by partitionists to the historical and security bases adduced for annexation is the apparent conflict with the requirements for peace with Israel's neighbors. Annexation threatened to perpetuate the hostility and lead to endless war. Arab fears of Israel's expansionist ambitions were real and it was necessary for Israel to try to dispel Arab suspicions. Continuous defeats were not going to bring the Arabs to the peace table; only a generous peace treaty could do that. Annexation would make peace with the Arabs impossible for a generation or more. So ran the argument.

The school of thought that sees Arab fear of Israeli expansionism as a major obstacle to peace is aimed not only at the outright annexationists but also at Dayan as well. To partitionists, integration

¹Speech of December 27, 1968, in Dayan, A New Map, p. 179.

seems hardly likely to satisfy Arab national aspirations either. Carried sufficiently far, integration would effect such changes in the economic and social structure as would make it impossible to sever the two communities and therefore forever doom hopes of peace in the region. Extremist Arab elements would be encouraged, moderates would see no recourse but terrorism. International support, Jewish and non-Jewish, might be forfeited and the morale of Israel's youth seriously damaged.¹

Another factor in the partitionists' dislike of the Dayan approach is the concern for the Jewish character of the state. Sapir has been a leading opponent of integration, which he sees as inviting the "demographic nightmare" almost as much as annexation. Return of the Arab areas after a peace settlement would surrender nothing, he believes. It would only free Israel of an unwanted burden. In the meantime, Israel's policy should be, "sit still and do nothing."²

Sapir's position is intellectually uncomfortable and Dayan has challenged him openly. If Sapir didn't believe in solving the territories' employment problem in Israel proper, it would have to be solved in the territories. Who would provide the employment-creating investment? If Israel, would that not raise the cry of "integration" too? Could Israel then stand by and deny the occupied population the right to decent living standards?³ In Sapir's framework the questions are unanswerable, and while Dayan has lost some government battles, he seems on his way to winning the war.

F. THE PALESTINIAN "ENTITY"

There were some who saw an answer to Dayan's questions in a solution that transcended the conventional framework. The government

¹ See, for example, Shimon Shamir, "The Palestine Challenge," New Outlook, 12:3 (March-April 1969), pp. 12-16.

² Sapir is not opposed to settlements in principle. He was believed to favor certain settlements in sparsely settled unoccupied areas (the Allon Plan). However, he was afraid that once the process began, it became irreversible, leading to settlements in the densely populated areas as well, their retention, and the inevitable nightmarish dilemmas. Eli Nissan, in Davar, November 22, 1968.

³ Speech of April 29, 1969, in Dayan, A New Map, p. 158.

was waiting for King Hussein to come to the negotiating table, and that seemed a dim prospect. In the meantime, "facts" were being created, perhaps unalterably. The realistic and just alternative was to turn the occupied areas over to an independent Palestinian Arab authority.

In contrast to the situation today, when Israel's major concern is the Suez Canal, Egypt, and the USSR, the focus of concentration immediately after the Six Day War was on the Palestinians. Egypt was thought to be too badly beaten to matter very much in the disposition of the conquered territories. On the other hand, the wellsprings of the Arab-Israel conflict were the grievances of Palestinian Arabs. Here was Israel's first opportunity, after two decades of silence and separation, to confront the bulk of the Palestinians. In the first months after the Six Day War and even well into 1968, Israel's energies in search of a settlement of the conflict were directed to contact with the Palestinians and the Jordanians.

Within the year it became clear that the Egyptian part of the problem could not be filed away. The hasty rearmament of Egypt by the Soviet Union, the inauguration of serious incidents along the Canal in the fall and winter of 1967, along with the surprising success of the occupation policy, rendered doubtful the thesis that the Palestinians were the real problem. The center of attention shifted over to Egypt and the Soviet Union. However, the development of the Fedayeen as an independent and irritating force on the eastern borders of Israel and the multiplication of incidents within the occupied territories and to some extent Israel itself brought the Palestinians back again into the foreground of attention. In the spring and summer of 1969 an extensive debate on the subject of the Palestinians and the so-called Palestinian Entity unfolded in the pages of the Israeli press. By the spring of 1970, the Fedayeen had disrupted the political stability of Jordan. They appeared capable of subverting the monarchy and were perhaps even desirous of taking power there. Their increasing cohesion and strength coincided with a crisis of public morale in Israel which was related to

Soviet escalation in response to Israel's deep penetration bombing of Egypt and mounting military and civilian casualties. In that atmosphere the possible role of the Palestinians in helping Israel break out of the vicious circle attracted renewed interest.

The Six Day War changed the nature of the confrontation between Israel and the Palestinian Arabs in fundamental ways. Quantitatively, Israel was now in direct contact with more than half the total number of Palestinian Arabs, compared with one-eighth before the war. Qualitatively, whereas the 1948 war left only broken communities of Palestinian Arabs in Israel, communities whose leadership had fled abroad and whose morale was therefore shattered, the Six Day War brought under Israel's control a population in the West Bank comprising homogeneous communities with seasoned local leadership. Many of the Palestinian elite, who had operated for two decades in regular administrative practice, locally as well as in the Jordanian national leadership -- in the Parliament and in the Cabinet -- remained on the West Bank. The national identity of this community was strong and articulated. The Gaza Strip presented a difficult problem of another form, because of the concentration of more than 200,000 refugees from 1948 in a series of camps within a narrow territorial confinement. They had been prevented by the Egyptians from leaving the area or achieving any kind of national political status.

Confronted by this qualitatively different and quantitatively larger group of Palestinian Arabs, and challenged by a revived Fedayeen movement that claimed exclusive national rights to the territory of Palestine, Israel was forced to reconsider its own views of Palestinians and their aspirations. Was there a Palestinian identity, and if so, what was its nature? Given their experience with the Palestinians before 1948, Israelis were likely to be sceptical. They contended that Palestinian nationalism had not existed before the First World War in any form, and that even afterwards Palestinian spokesmen frequently defined themselves as part of the Arab collectivity exclusively, or as "south Syrians." The Palestinians had the chance to establish an independent national existence in 1947-1949 as before in the late 1930s,

but they refused the opportunity. They turned down the partition recommendation of the United Nations in 1947 and in December 1948 yielded up their potential independence to King Abdallah of Jordan at the conference of Palestinian notables in Jericho. To many Israelis Palestinian nationalism seemed to be nothing but a club with which to beat the Zionists.¹

Even those who tended to be somewhat more sympathetic stressed the relative newness of the phenomenon. Allon, for example, noting the earlier identification of Palestinians with the Arab nation, remarked to an Arab interviewer, "I, as an Israeli Jew, who refuses to be parted from the Jewish people dispersed in many countries of the world, I understood this position and I honored it in my heart."² Allon thereby points to one reason why Israelis who were unmoved by the Palestinian cause were pained by outside criticism of their stand. They could understand and sympathize with identification by Palestinian Arabs with the Arab world as a whole. Given the lack of specific language, religion, or culture among the Palestinian Arabs, the special identification as Palestinians seemed neither real nor logical.³

The irony of Israelis emphasizing the ties of the Palestinian Arabs to the Arab nation has not escaped notice. Shimon Shamir wryly noted at the New Outlook Symposium in 1969 that "the last of the Pan-Arabists are to be found in Israel." Whatever its motivation, the function of "Israeli Pan-Arabism" is evident: It is the stance most compatible with the belief that the Arab refugees should be resettled in Arab countries, because resettlement can take place anywhere in the Arab world without

¹Golda Meir has been a partisan of the view that since the Palestinians had the opportunity but didn't utilize it their demands now were disingenuous. For example, see her interview in L'Express (Paris), December 22-28, 1969.

²Interview with Mahmoud Abasi in February 1970, reprinted in Lamerhav, December 29, 1970.

³For a statement of this view of the reality of Palestinian nationalism, in addition to the Allon interview already cited, see Marie Syrkin, "Who Are the Palestinians?", Midstream, January 1970, reprinted in Michael Curtis, ed., People and Politics in the Middle East, Transaction Books, New Brunswick, New Jersey, 1971. Reference in the following notes is to the article.

violating the principle of national self-determination. A special case of this way of thinking is the Israeli's perplexity at the claim that Palestinian refugees in Jordan were in exile. The idea of Syria as a Diaspora was strange enough, but if refugees were in exile in Jordan, what in fact was Palestine and what was the Palestine nation? It seemed that "only in the case of the Arabs has village-patriotism been raised to a sacred cause."¹

Some Israelis see a Johnny-come-lately quality about Palestinian nationalism which is symbolized in the gulf between the terms used by both nations. The Arabs speak of Falastin, the Jews of Eretz Yisrael. Falastin has no connection with Arab history but is the Arabic version of the Roman term referring to the Philistines, a term coined for the purpose of severing the Jews from their homeland. Eretz Yisrael, the Land of Israel, links Israel by definition with its history. To some Israelis the difference symbolizes both the gap between the respective national aspirations and the rootedness and naturalness of their own national self-identity.

However, others recognize that this strain of thinking is irrelevant. "Supposing it did spring belatedly out of the head of Arab nationalism merely as a hostile response to Israel?" asks Marie Syrkin. "The lad is alive and kicking and calling him bastard will not exorcise him."² Therefore, in acknowledgment of what Hans Kohn has called the "living and active corporate will,"³ Israelis increasingly came around to the somewhat grudging acknowledgment that the Palestinian Arabs were a distinct group with a separate identifiable consciousness. Such was, for example, the position of Allon. He was quick to add that although a distinct group, the Palestinians were not yet a national entity. However, under the right circumstances they could become one. In any

¹ Ibid., p. 11. Yehoshafat Harkabi has reported that Israelis were frequently unwilling to recognize the reality of Palestinian Arab attachment to their native villages. Maariv, November 21, 1969, reprinted in Avineri, ed., Israel and the Palestinians. On Harkabi see above, p. 5, n. 1.

² Syrkin, "Who Are the Palestinians?" p. 5.

³ Cited by Shamir, "The Palestine Challenge," p. 16.

case, if the entity existed, it would undoubtedly make its appearance. If it did not, no declarations or public opinion polls or didactic lectures in the press would make it so.¹ Harkabi felt there was both arrogance and irrelevance in the internal Israeli debate over whether the Palestinian nation existed. It was not for Israel to affirm or deny the Palestinian identity, or to insist that the donation of that gift by Israel was crucial. The debate was also irrelevant in the sense that the major problem of the Palestinians was their relationship to Jordan and the Arab world, and it was up to them to define it on their own.²

By the fall of 1970 the polemics on this particular question had waned. The former opposition of the leadership of the Labor Party and the government to acknowledgment of Palestinian nationalism had relaxed sufficiently that Abba Eban could state: "We have to recognize this reality; we are bordering on a tribe of the Arab nation which considers itself Palestinian. In my opinion, the term 'Palestinian' is deeper and much more rooted than the term 'Jordanian'." But this was not the essential issue, Eban declared. The Palestinians could call themselves whatever they liked. The critical point was where would they organize, in insistence on the liquidation of Israel, or in coexistence with her. Only the Palestinians could decide.³

The question of the import of Palestinian nationalism for the basic national interests of Israel was a major issue in the internal polemic and frequently determined the nature of positions taken on such seemingly academic questions as the reality or existence of a Palestinian nation. The Palestinian Arabs had transformed the question

¹ Interview with Mahmoud Abaai in Lamerhav, December 29, 1970.

² Harkabi in Maariv, January 30, 1970. See also the statement by the former Secretary-General of the Labor Party, Aryeh (Lyova) Elyav: "Our internal debate over whether the Palestine nation exists has little meaning....Self-determination does not mean defining someone else's way of living. We have no authority to define the Palestinians or any other nation. We can define only ourselves." Avineri, ed., Israel and the Palestinians, p. 60.

³ Cited in Avineri, ed., Israel and the Palestinians, p. xx.

of the refugees into one of exile and homecoming, an analog of the powerful Zionist concept of Galut (Diaspora). By the stress laid in Palestinian literature and polemics on the "homelandness" of Palestine and the "foreignness" of other Arab territory, they challenged the Zionist case for Israel as an exclusively Jewish homeland and seemed to be creating an exactly parallel case for an Arab homeland in Palestine.¹ Israeli advocates of the Palestinian solution denied the irreconcilability of Israeli and Palestinian Arab national aspirations. Because Palestinian nationalism had real roots and was not simply a hostile reaction to Zionism and Israeli nationalism, it was possible to arrive at a modus vivendi with it. In any case, Israel really had no choice, if only because a democratic national movement could not possibly deny to others the rights that it allocated to itself. To do so would be to perpetuate Arab enmity. It would leave the Palestinian population with a feeling of hopelessness and provide it with that powerful weapon the Israelis use so well, "no alternative" (ein brerah). In short, the argument here is essentially that levied against annexationism.

Thus, to the pro-Palestinian Entity faction the Israeli-Arab conflict in its origin rested on the Palestinian problem, and this problem had to be resolved in accordance with the new reality that faced Israel after the Six Day War, the existence of a revived, strengthened, independent Palestinian nationalism. No agreement signed with Jordan and Egypt would be worth the paper it was written on if there was no settlement with the Palestinians. Moreover, there seemed to be little prospect of any kind of arrangement with the Egyptians or Jordanians in the near future, whereas the Palestinians were to hand and were the only population with which Israel could negotiate directly.²

¹ Ben Halpern, "Israel and Palestine: The Political Use of Ethics," in Curtis, ed., People and Politics in the Middle East, pp. 13-14.

² Among the outstanding advocates of the Palestinian viewpoint are Uri Avneri, maverick editor and anti-Zionist Member of Knesset (Israel Without Zionists, New York, Macmillan Co., 1968, Chapter 12); Professor Shlomo Avineri of the Hebrew University ("The Palestinians and Israel,"

The focus of the opposition to the Palestinian "orientation" is the problem of Palestinian irredentism. According to Dayan, "the first result of Palestinian self-determination would be a demand for Israel to withdraw from all territory and every region inhabited by Arabs, beyond and on this side of the Armistice Line in force before the Six Day War." Irredentism was inherent in Palestinian nationalism: "One of Hussein's advantages for us was that he never declared Jerusalem as his capital. He had many pretensions regarding Jerusalem, but Amman has always been his capital. That is a major point for us. We must know that the capital of the Palestinians would not be Amman but Jerusalem."¹ Amnon Lin, the former director of the Arab department of the Labor Party, stated it succinctly: The Palestinian state would

Commentary, June 1970, reprinted in Avineri, ed., Israel and the Palestinians (see also Avineri's introduction to this volume); Matityahu Peled (in Maariv, April 8, 1969, reprinted in Avineri, ed., Israel and the Palestinians; Maariv, June 27, 1969, and December 18, 1970); Professor Shimon Shamir of Tel Aviv University (Maariv, June 13, 1969, and the "Palestine Challenge" cited earlier); and Professor Jacob Talmon of the Hebrew University, whose article in Maariv, May 15, 1969, triggered a voluminous debate in the press. Professor Yehoshua Arieli of the Hebrew University and the Movement for Peace and Security, of which he is an outstanding figure, are also partisans of the Palestinian cause.

¹ Agence France Presse, in English, October 19, 1970; interview in The Jerusalem Post, August 2, 1971. Cf. also another Dayan statement: "I am not one bit enthusiastic about a plan to set up a Palestinian State that would include the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Do we really need a corridor cutting across the Negev from the Gaza Strip to the West Bank, bisecting the State of Israel as though she were surrounded by staunch friends whose mind it never entered to destroy her?" Jerusalem Post, May 10, 1970. He told Geulah Cohen (Maariv, September 22, 1968) that right after the war he thought the demographic problem could be solved by the creation of a Palestinian state. By the time of the interview, he had changed his mind and thought the idea no longer realistic. On the other hand, to Lea Ben Dor (Jerusalem Post Election Eve Supplement, October 24, 1969) he denied that he had ever supported the idea of a Palestinian entity. At other times he has tried to parry the question as irrelevant because of Arab opposition. (December 28, 1968 speech, in Dayan, A New Map, pp. 33-35; his Life article, September 1967, reprinted in A New Map, pp. 117-124.)

be "the one address in the world that would have the legitimate right to demand that we be returned to the partition boundaries of 1947."¹

Emphasis has been placed on this point and on the opposition of men like Dayan to the Palestinian Entity approach, because some Entity partisans seem to perceive a generational gap in the leadership of the Labor Party on this issue and an alignment of Dayan, Allon, and Elyav against the late and the incumbent Prime Ministers, Eshkol and Meir. However, Dayan's enthusiasm, as indicated, is minimal. Younger partisans of his are associated with him in this scepticism: for example, Shimon Peres, the present Minister of Transportation-Communication and formerly Dayan's close ally in the Rafi Party; or Gad Yaacobi, now Deputy Minister of Transportation-Communication. Yisrael Galili is only four years older than Dayan and seven years Allon's senior. He has a similar military background, having been the last Commander of the Haganah, the pre-state underground army. Galili is no partisan of the Palestinian Entity either.² Significant sections of the former Ahdut Haavodah Party, to which Allon and Galili belonged, share the same sceptical viewpoint.

her? Jerusalem Post, May 10, 1970. He told Geulah Cohen (Maariv, September 22, 1968) that right after the war he thought the demographic problem could be solved by the creation of a Palestinian state. By the time of the interview, he had changed his mind and thought the idea no longer realistic. On the other hand, to Lea Ben Dor (Jerusalem Post, Election Eve Supplement, October 24, 1969) he denied that he had ever supported the idea of a Palestinian Entity. At other times he has tried to parry the question as irrelevant because of Arab opposition. (December 28, 1968 speech, in Dayan, A New Map, pp. 33-35; his Life article, September 1967, reprinted in A New Map, pp. 117-124.)

¹In a conversation with Hamdi Kana'an, then Mayor of Nablus, in which the latter insisted that no peace was possible until Israel retreated all the way to the 1947 borders, Lin curtly stated: "From the moment that the Palestinian leadership in 1947 transferred the handling of the question of Eretz Yisrael to the hands of leaders of the Arab countries, it liquidated with its own hands forever the Palestinian Entity. From now on, with respect to binding arrangements, only the Arabs stand opposite us." Eliyahu Amikam in Yediot Aharonot, December 13, 1968. It goes without saying that the annexationists were unequivocally opposed to a Palestinian State.

²See Maariv, May 22, 1969.

Mrs. Meir's objections to the Palestinian state option have never been expressed at sufficient length to provide a clear index of her position, but it appears that she has been concerned about irredentism and the viability of a state on the West Bank alone. In her Independence Day, 1971, interview she said: "It is a state that has no chance of survival, from any point of view. It is a good organized base against us. That's all."¹ The meaning of the fear of unviability will be examined in a moment, but apparently the Prime Minister is not to be interpreted as opposing a Palestinian state generally, judging from remarks made by her Foreign Minister:

There is a Palestinian people which built a state and called it Jordan. When there is peace, the Palestinian Arabs to the east of our new frontier of peace can call themselves what they like and build a kingdom, a federation or a republic as they will. In any combination, the Palestinian Arabs will predominate. It is they who gave up their name in 1947-1949.²

This particular formulation is ambiguous in that it suggests a compatibility with partial or considerable Israeli annexation of the West Bank. However, in an Arabic language broadcast to the Arab world on New Year's Day, 1971, Eban's phraseology was more precise: "When the reconciliation is achieved and peace prevails, then there will be east of Israel a state in which the Palestinians will comprise the majority of the population, and the majority of the Palestinians will be citizens of this state."³

It has been indicated that Allon viewed his Plan as compatible with any one of a number of options for the disposition of the Arab

¹Yediot Aharonot, April 25, 1971.

²Jerusalem Post Magazine, January 23, 1970.

³See also the letter circulated to the regional council of the Labor Party of Tel Aviv by its Secretary, Dov Ben-Meir, in Maariv, April 19, 1971. This general approach is shared by Mapam, witness the remark by Victor Shemtov in Al Hamishmar, June 4, 1971.

enclave on the West Bank, including the creation of a Palestinian Entity. Nevertheless, despite the apparent allowance for such an option, his general view on the subject seems to be negative. He has been cited earlier to the effect that Palestinian nationalism might well emerge and depended on the will of the Palestinians themselves. "Modern history," he noted elsewhere, "knows of many instances in which tribes or large groups of immigrants have become new nations. Whether a Palestinian entity exists or not, however, can be decided only by the people concerned." However, he sees no reason why the materialization of that national consciousness should take place west of the Jordan. "If the Palestinian Arabs are fired by the aspiration for national self-determination, it can be realized on the East Bank of the Jordan. This was once an inseparable part of Palestine and was severed from it only by a British government decision at the beginning of the 1920s." Moreover, the East Bank is now inhabited by at least as many Palestinians as non-Palestinians. "A Palestinian nation, if it exists, could therefore be created in Transjordan, either as a monarchy or as a republic, irrespective of its claims upon Israel."¹ Allon seems to be expressing his pragmatic approach: on grounds of national security, he would prefer annexation, but he fears the costs -- foreign reaction, the "demographic" problem, and so forth. Hence his policy seems to be composed of incompatible elements. He sees the Land of Israel as one country but is opposed to the application of Israel law to the occupied territories because of the possible international repercussions. He shunned integration but supported the open bridges policy and full contacts with the Arab population,² and he was a chief supporter of home rule for the West Bank.³

Nevertheless, it is Allon who has been regarded as the man most closely in touch with King Hussein's thinking on the settlement issue. Allon is supposed to have met with Hussein three times in September 1968,

¹Allon, The Making of Israel's Army, pp. 117-118.

²Hagai (Haim Guri) in Lamerhav, December 7, 1968.

³On home rule, see below pp. 83-85.

twice alone and once with Eban present. According to non-Israeli sources, meetings with Hussein continued thereafter at irregular intervals. It is of interest that it is Allon who is supposed to have met with Hussein and not Dayan, who allegedly refused to become involved.

The inclination of the leadership of the Israeli government to return to Jordan whatever sections of the West Bank will be returned seems to suggest an uncommon willingness to forgive King Hussein for multiple sins: for having desecrated Jewish cemeteries and denied Jews access to the Western Wall during the years of Jordanian control over East Jerusalem; for having opened fire on Israel in 1967, despite Prime Minister Eshkol's entreaties to stay out; for having encouraged and fed civic disobedience in the West Bank in 1967-1968; and so on. On the eve of the civil war in Jordan in 1970 Dayan indicated he was rooting for Hussein. He had no objection to seeing Hussein replaced by someone else who wished peace with Israel, but the sole alternative he saw to Hussein at that point was George Habash (the radical Fedayeen leader), and that seemed to him a poor exchange.¹ An apparently similar view was held by other members of the government.

Not all Israeli reactions were favorable to Hussein, especially at the beginning of the civil war. The stories of the atrocities allegedly committed by the Jordanian army revolted many Israelis. "The time has come to shake him off, to distance ourselves from him, from this living corpse who walks among the ruins of his capital with the mark of Cain on his forehead."² In a later reference to a revival of what he called the anti-Hussein "festival," Dayan indicated that he wanted no part of it. Did Israel insist that Hussein give the Fedayeen free rein in Jordan? Was that to Israel's advantage?³ At the zenith of Fedayeen power in Jordan, when they seemed to have the capacity to take over the country, there was in fact some sentiment within Israel

¹ Cited by Uri Dan in Maariv, November 6, 1970.

² Shmuel Shnitzer in Maariv, September 25, 1970.

³ Jerusalem Post, August 2, 1971.

for letting Hussein disappear, so that a Palestinian sovereignty could finally be established in a part of Palestine.¹

There is a simple, attractive logic in the Palestinian Entity argument that emphasizes the substitution of a Palestinian for a Hashemite "orientation." In the first of the three "Wars of the Palestinian Succession" (1948-1949, 1956, 1967) Israel, Jordan, and Egypt all gained territory. However, only Israel had any right in the succession, and the other two justified their territorial acquisitions by claims of trusteeship. But the wards, the Palestinians, lost everything. If there was anything to be returned now, surely it should be to them and not to the avaricious guardians whose rights to begin with were highly dubious.

To this argument in principle, Matityahu Peled has added an argument of experience. Jordan the usurper was also an oppressor whose army needed more camps on the West Bank to subdue the population under Arab rule than were needed under the ostensibly hateful Israeli rule. Return of the West Bank to Jordan would mean going back to a period of terrorism. For twenty years, Hussein had not been able to control the incursions into Israel from his territory. The cycle of incursion and Israeli reprisal had succeeded in alienating the population even further from Hussein but also in embittering it against Israel. Hussein had been able neither to control the infiltrators nor refrain from responding to the Israeli army attacks. If the West Bank were returned to Jordan, there would be a danger of repeating the bitter history of 1964-1967. A conflict between Hussein and the Palestinians was inevitable, and the Fedayeen would both generate that conflict and find protection within it. The consequence for Israel could only be disastrous.²

¹ See Avineri's "Introduction" and remarks by Elad Peled (p. 116) and Ehud Sprinzak (pp. 104-105) in Avineri, ed., Israel and the Palestinians.

² Maariv, April 3, 1969 and March 5, 1971.

As indicated, immediately following the Six Day War, Israelis sought out various Palestinian leaders on the West Bank to determine whether a basis could be found for mutual agreement. Former Major-General Haim Herzog has regretted recently that Israel did not set up self-rule under Israel sovereignty immediately after the war when the Arab leadership on the West Bank seemed willing. It might have caused some problems, he admitted, but it would have "created one Arab focus on which we could exert influence," for this was a period in which Israeli wishes were frequently received as though they were commands.¹ On the other hand, former Major-General Narkiss, who was OC Central Command during the War, believes that an attempt to set up a West Bank government would have been a mistake. Certainly it could have been done right after the war, but it would have settled nothing and it might well have ruined any chances of arriving at an agreement with King Hussein.²

Herzog suggests that Israel would have found West Bank leaders at that time willing to set up a quasi-independent West Bank state. However, it is a basic argument of those who believe the Palestinian "orientation" was mistaken or impossible that no such consensus has ever been present on the West Bank. The contacts with the Palestinians that were conducted from the fall of 1967 by Moshe Sasson, now Assistant Director-General of the Foreign Ministry, and more recently by Shlomo Hillel, at present Minister of Police but formerly of the Foreign Ministry, suggested that the Palestinians were united only on a series of negatives: no war, no partial solution, no return to the pre-1967 situation regarding Jordan and Israel, no continuation of Israeli occupation, no separation from the Arab people. On affirmative courses of action, the diversity of view was and remains broad. Thus, the attempt to develop an option for a Palestinian state that would both live in peace with Israel and be capable of solving the basic

¹ Yamim Vleilot, June 4, 1971. See also Avineri, ed., Israel and the Palestinians, pp. 110-111, 120.

² Yamim Vleilot, June 4, 1971.

Arab-Israel conflict encounters the problem that no Arab state or Palestinian organization wants it, and that the West Bankers are hopelessly divided.

The pro-Palestinian Entity faction, particularly Shamir and Peled, denies that the Palestinians are a "bridge that failed." They have simply never been provided with the opportunity to organize for the purpose of achieving independence, according to this rebuttal. The talks with them were never conducted on the basis of an official Israeli policy clearly indicating intent to support a Palestinian state.¹ It is correct that the division of opinion within the Cabinet prevented the formulation of an approved viewpoint. The fact remains, however, that from their discussions conducted with all the major Palestinian leaders over the course of four years, Israeli officials received no impression of the existence of a ground-swell of Palestinian opinion moving in the direction of self-determination and independence on the West Bank. The criticism voiced by the pro-Palestinian faction in the Israeli polemic is in fact a criticism of Israel for not having fostered Palestinian independence. It is not a charge that the government actively prevented the creation of a Palestinian state.²

Foreign Minister Eban has at times spoken as if the problem with the Palestinian orientation was that it would interfere with peace efforts elsewhere. "The only course is to promote an intimate link with Palestinian Arabs without now closing the probability that they have a future separate from ours...but this is no substitute for the larger vision of peace with the whole Arab world."³ Perhaps it seemed to him that the concept of a Palestinian state required Palestinians to cut their connection to an ongoing general Arab-Israel conflict, which he as well as most other participants in the debate thought impossible. "The Palestinians," said Harkabi, "may want settlement but they also want the agreement of the Arab world to the settlement

¹ Shamir, "The Palestine Challenge," p. 16.

² Except to the extent that restraint of political activity by the military authorities can be held responsible for the continued fragmented state of West Bank opinion.

³ Jerusalem Post Magazine, June 6, 1969.

to prevent ostracism and separation from their families."¹ There were 1,300,000 Palestinians in Israel and the occupied territories but there were at least another 600,000 outside the cease-fire lines.²

The Foreign Ministry views the attempt to set up a Palestinian state before settlement is reached with Jordan and Egypt as likely to result not in solution but only in complication of the problem. There would be enormous technical difficulties to start with: the question of the relationship between Israel and the Palestinian state; who would protect the state, and from whom. There would be the problem of settlement of the refugees from the Gaza Strip. Experience had shown that the willingness of West Bankers to receive the Gazaites was limited. But the major problem was certainly the tie between the Palestinians and their kin in other parts of the Arab world. A state in the West Bank would make sense only if there had already taken place a process that Minister Hillel has called "West Bankification," development of a sense of separate West Bank identification. No such process was visible. Neither did it seem at all likely. Without it a Palestinian solution in the strict sense of the term was possible either on Fedayeen terms, meaning the dissolution of the State of Israel, or by the creation of a Palestine in which the East Bank was an integral part. A state on the West Bank alone by definition would not constitute a Palestinian solution.

The force of these arguments does not go entirely unappreciated in the camp of the Palestinian orientation. Avineri argues only that Israel should clearly state its readiness to accept the Palestinians as partners for negotiations on the same footing as any other Arab government. He does not advocate the outlining of a particular plan and particular governmental institutions.³ Shamir takes a more formal

¹ Avineri, ed., Israel and the Palestinians, p. 13.

² See the estimates of David Krivine in the Jerusalem Post, November 25, 1970, p. 10.

³ Avineri, "The Palestinians and Israel," in Avineri, ed., Israel and the Palestinians, p. 154.

approach and is prepared to think concretely about the nature of such a state and the steps required to set it up. However, he is careful not to preclude the reconnection of the West with the East Bank, and in his program the Israeli government would declare explicitly that it would not dictate the political framework to be adopted by the Palestinians.¹ Matityahu Peled is even more firmly convinced that the West Bankers would be prepared to arrive at an arrangement with Israel that would prevent terrorist activity stemming from Transjordan and operating in the West Bank against Israel.

If the government regarded a Palestinian state as unworkable or unacceptable, could it not agree at least to home rule or regional autonomy on the West Bank?² When the IDF took control, it found a governmental structure in which the West Bank as such was not represented at all. There were three districts -- Hebron, Jerusalem, and Samaria -- each governed by a commissioner directly responsible to the Jordanian government in Amman, but no general West Bank authority existed. To the extent that limited democracy prevailed in the West Bank, it was only up to the level of the municipality. The military government carried over the existing arrangements with minimal change, which Teveth believes was appropriate to the conditions of the time:

Dayan's policy to deal with the mayors as representatives of the public, not creating any higher overall body, was not only a wise governmental innovation but was, in fact, the result of the circumstances. This situation facilitated the setting up of the military government and also explains why national resistance was less violent than expected. It was merely necessary to rub out 'Amman' from the administrative charts and substitute 'Zahal Command on the West Bank.'³

In the course of the year following the Six Day War, the idea arose of creating two independent administrative regions, one with Nablus and the other as Hebron as centers, in order to provide a

¹ Maariv, June 13, 1969. See also his "Palestine Challenge."

² Depopulated Golan and the Sinai desert required nothing more than the military government apparatus. The Gaza Strip presented special problems. See the appendix to this section.

³ Teveth, The Cursed Blessing, pp. 286-287.

maximum degree of self-administration in the West Bank. According to Teveth, it was believed that "these regions might become a nucleus for a Palestinian State and bring about a leadership desiring peace with Israel."¹ The idea had the warm support of the leader of the Hebron region, Sheikh Ja'abari, but aroused considerable opposition on the part of the mayor of Nablus, Hamdi Kana'an.² The government might have gone ahead anyhow, but in addition to whatever other problems were visualized at the time, King Hussein appeared to be adamantly opposed to the idea, seeing it as an attempt to sever the connections between the West Bank and Jordan. Since the Israeli cabinet wished to maintain the Jordanian option, these objections probably carried weight. It seems likely, however, that the government's interest in the project continued to decline for reasons that had more to do with its increasing disinclination to see a Palestinian state erected in the occupied territories alone. Thus, Abba Eban declared:

I understand the need to seek more political expression of Arab life in the administered areas, but we must be clear-headed. If you go in for home rule, you'll want to ask what happened to home rule. Home rule ended up in an independent state of Ireland. Do we want a fragmentation of the Palestine-Arab community into two states, one on each side of the Jordan? Nothing is less just or less helpful.³

After prolonged hesitation, the military government has decided recently to permit new municipal elections on the West Bank. The elections are to take place in stages, with the first scheduled before the end of April 1972 in the towns of Jenin, Qalqiliya, and Tulkarm.⁴ It is noteworthy that the mayors of the privileged towns are unenthusiastic about the prospect.⁵ The mayors' reaction is

¹Ibid., p. 285.

²Ibid., p. 287.

³Jerusalem Post Magazine, January 23, 1970.

⁴New York Times, November 27, 1971.

⁵Jerusalem Post, November 28, 1971.

perhaps another illustration of the uncertainty about the political future and the appropriate direction of political activity that characterizes many leading West Bankers. But municipal elections are far from regional home rule and the latter issue remains frozen. Palestinian requests to convene West Bank-wide political conferences have been consistently denied, although in the past Ja'abari has been allowed to preside over regional meetings in Hebron.¹

Given its fears that home rule creates an ineluctable drive toward complete independence, it seems doubtful that in the near future the Israeli government will reverse its stand on such meetings. Indications are that only when Israel and the Palestinians have concluded that there is no possibility whatsoever of the return to Jordan or of the joining together of the West Bank and the East Bank in a peaceful arrangement with Israel will the question of autonomy for the West Bank be seriously considered in Israel.²

¹Maariv, July 22, 1971.

²See Hillel's interview with Yair Kutler in Haaretz Supplement, January 22, 1971.

APPENDIX: MILITARY GOVERNMENT POLICY
IN THE GAZA STRIP

In administering the Gaza Strip, the military government was faced with special problems. On the West Bank only about 10 percent of the population are refugees from 1948, and most of the refugees do not live in camps. Frequently, moreover, the line of distinction between the camps and the surrounding Arab villages or towns is hazy. However, in the Gaza Strip more than 200,000 of a population of 350,000 are refugees and live in the camps. Whereas the West Bank had been a part of an independent state with institutions of partial representation and a degree of municipal self-government, the Gaza Strip had had no such tradition under Egyptian rule. Its population had not been granted Egyptian citizenship but had existed in a national limbo.

On the West Bank the IDF succeeded in preventing the formation of stable terrorists cells, but in the Gaza Strip terrorism and internal unrest in the camps were unremitting. Gaza Strip terrorism seemed to be largely directed at, or at least largely impacting on, Arabs themselves rather than on the IDF or Israeli civilians. The military government's "hands off" policy, which operated on the whole successfully in the West Bank, was designed in the Gaza Strip to impel the population to cooperate when they felt themselves choking on the consequences of terrorism within the camps. It was believed that when the Gaza Arabs reached the limit of their tolerance of the internal terrorism, they would be willing to move out to the West Bank or Transjordan, or even to the Persian Gulf. However, only 60,000 had left by the end of 1970 (to some extent, these were the wrong elements -- the rich and the educated), and the doors had been quickly closed by the Arab states. If such a policy actually existed, it had to be deemed a failure on other counts, because a major potential stimulus to either cooperation or mass exodus -- economic crisis in Gaza -- had been forestalled by the government itself, by allowing the employment of Arab workers from the Strip in the West Bank and Israel proper.¹

¹Baruch Nadel, Maariv, February 21, 1971.

A renewed wave of violence in the Gaza Strip at the beginning of 1971, which was highlighted by the murder of two Jewish children, was met by more repressive measures and the dispatch of special police forces. The results of this operation were only a mixed success, particularly since reports of police brutality aroused considerable controversy in Israel.¹

Evidently, the lessons of that episode and the years of frustration over Gaza Strip terrorism resulted in a change in government policy. In the summer of 1971 several hundred families were removed from the Jabaliya camp in order to improve its security arrangements. It is conceivable that ultimately the policy will be more far-reaching. Hints of a more extensive change were available earlier in 1971. It was reported in June that Dayan and Sapir were negotiating about an allocation of IL 60 million to develop the refugee economy in the Gaza Strip.² In December 1970 Peres had announced a government development plan for the occupied territories as a whole. The emphasis was to be on creating employment opportunities, vocational training, improvement of social services, and some industrial development. An industrial center was to be created on the old frontier between the Gaza Strip and Israel to be run cooperatively by Jews and Arabs.³

¹Some of the alleged instances of brutality were associated with kibbutz soldiers whose ethical self-searching after the Six Day War in the Conversations of Fighters has been widely read and discussed (see below, p. 90). Amos Eilon expressed the pain of those who thought that "conversation" by a "Dostoyevskian logic" had developed into one of an entirely unexpected type. Nevertheless, Eilon was proud of how quickly the IDF had reacted to public criticism and cleaned its internal house. Eilon in Haaretz, February 2, 1971.

²Dani Rubenshtein in Davar, June 13, 1971. An even earlier indication of plans for a policy involving both more sophisticated repression methods and the build-up of services and living standards is contained in an article by Amos Hadad in Haaretz, April 28, 1971.

³Israel Radio, December 21, 1970.

In the short run, it is unlikely that these government plans, assuming that they were more than just trial balloon or low-level exercises, will be carried out. Rapidly rising international payments deficits and growing inflation at home have forced the cabinet to institute a policy of budget stringency, and the Gaza projects are of doubtful priority. The government has also been reluctant to undertake far-reaching measures with respect to the refugees because of anticipated international reaction.¹ The success of the Jabaliya camp operation in quelling terrorism undoubtedly adds a strong argument for letting matters ride.

¹Rita Hauser, the U.S. representative on the UN Human Rights Committee, recently visited the West Bank refugee camps. Impressed with what she saw, she asked why Israel simply did not do away with the camps altogether, to which an Israeli responded: "Maybe because you will get up as a U.S. representative in the United Nations and accuse us of illegally changing the status quo of the refugees." Yoelah Harshafi in Yediot Aharonot, July 5, 1971.

IV. UNITY AND DIVERSITY IN THE DEBATE

The polemics in Israel on the post-1967 stage of the "Palestinian succession problem" have been examined in terms of the chief issues of contention -- to annex or not to annex, Palestinian Entity or restoration of Jordanian sovereignty, and so forth. A wide variety of views, more or less spanning the spectrum of possibilities has been presented. The debate has been characterized by diversity of outlook on both principles and practical actions, with respect to both readings of the past and expectations for the future. However, as is not always appreciated by outside observers, Israeli political dissension does not neatly mirror standard social-economic cleavages in the community, and beneath the lack of consensus on issues of government policy lies a profoundly more important foundation of shared perceptions and beliefs.

At the height of the debate on the disposition of the territories, the problem of the Palestinians in particular challenged Israeli self-images, leading to acute soul-searching. Israelis tend generally to worry about the deterioration of their national life, and the strains of the post-1967 period intensified the search for telltale signs of demoralization, of garrison state mentality. These concerns are associated particularly with the young, and in a society where the youth are cherished as the bulwark of the present and the hope of the future, many have viewed the depth of the generation gap as the most significant index of Israeli public life.

It is a common belief now that the Sabra youth, in contrast to their history-burdened European fathers, take an unorthodox, even non-Zionist approach to the problem of existence with Israel's Arab neighbors. A major exponent of that idea is Amos Eilon. In particular, he finds strong currents of pacifism and empathy with the enemy in the recent Israeli literature and thinks this illustrative of the basic sensibility of the young. But Eilon himself recognizes that the "moral vertigo" that he finds characteristic of the recent Israeli

literature is not a mass phenomenon: "The malaise is restricted to a sensitive, small, but not uninfluential, minority."¹

Although the general thesis is certainly correct that there are differences in attitudes to settlement options and to the Arabs among different strata of the Israeli population, the pattern and saliency of these differences have been considerably exaggerated. Eilon, for example, cites copiously from The Conversations of Fighters,² a book that became very well known in Israel after the Six Day War, to illustrate the moral discomfort experienced by kibbutz soldiers in their confrontation with the Arab problem. Returning servicemen expressed their horror at the bloodshed and destruction of war, their uneasiness at the meetings with Arab refugees, and their dislike of their role as occupiers. The book had an extraordinary sale in Israel, but not just among the youth. It was a best-seller among the older generation as well, and it was viewed by them with extraordinary pride as a document of Israel's humanity, the preservation of ethical norms under the stress and strain of prolonged conflict. Indeed it is not the older generation but some of the Sabras themselves (for example, Elad Peled) who have dared to take a jaundiced view of the ingenuousness of the moral sentiments expressed there.

Unquestionably, there is a distinct break along ethnic and class lines in Israel on questions of attitudes to Arabs. In the spring of 1969, statistical students at Tel Aviv University polled 500 Tel Aviv citizens, chosen from varying sectors of the city and representing different strata of the population, on various questions of attitudes to Arabs. The results were not surprising. For example, some 64 percent of the whole sample supported joint cultural activities by Israelis and Arabs from the conquered territories, but the level of support was 80 percent in the Tel Aviv University suburb of Ramat Aviv and only 30 percent in the poorer Oriental-Jewish communities of Montefiore

¹Eilon, The Israelis, pp. 261, 267 ff.

²An English translation was published under the title, The Seventh Day. Soldier's Talk About the Six Day War, London, Andre Deutsch, 1970.

and the Railway quarter. Again, some 64 percent of the sample as a whole favored the death penalty for terrorist saboteurs; 77 percent in the lower class Hatikvah quarter of Tel Aviv were in favor but only 32 percent in the upper middle class Zahala and Tel Baruch quarters in the northeast.¹ On questions of relationships with Arabs, Sabras and European Jews evidently take a more liberal viewpoint, while blue collar and Oriental Jews take a far less liberal viewpoint. The Time-Harris poll² revealed a considerable degree of contempt for Arabs among Israeli Jews, but the bias was least among both Sabras and Europeans and largest among recent Oriental-Jewish arrivals, those whose contact with the Arab world derives from a long-standing repressed minority status in countries other than Israel.

The theory of the generation gap must be carefully qualified. The young may be liberal in their attitudes to Arabs, but they appear to be considerably more hawkish with respect to direct negotiations and territorial demands than the population as a whole, as was revealed in the Time-Harris poll. An earlier poll showed that whereas more than 70 percent of all Israeli Jews supported the creation of a Jewish quarter in the city of Hebron, the proportion in favor among Sabras was 78 percent. In the population as a whole 68 percent favored unrestricted Jewish settlement anywhere in the West Bank; the proportion among Sabras was 75 percent.³ Qualification is also necessary for the theory of the fundamentally greater pessimism of the young. At a critical time in the development of the war of attrition and in Israel's response, during the late winter of 1969-1970, a public opinion poll showed that the young Israelis were considerably more optimistic about

¹It is clear that most Israelis, not just in Tel Aviv but elsewhere in the country, believe the death penalty appropriate for terrorists caught in the act (Israel Radio, January 15, 1970). It is of considerable interest and reinforces the general view of the social-political structure of Israel that despite the majority's support for the death penalty, the sharp opposition by Israel's upper middle class maintained the liberal policy in force since the Six Day War.

²Time Magazine, April 12, 1971.

³Maariv, November 27, 1970.

the state's ability to withstand its enemies without U.S. aid than the population as a whole.¹

The fact is that there are more than half a million individuals in the age group 20-34 in Israel. In 1969 they accounted for more than a fifth of the total population. Yet in that year the Peace List failed to muster the one percent of the total vote required to elect one member to the Knesset. Mapam, too, lost strength in the election.

Nor can the Israeli debate since June 1967 be easily partitioned by party affiliation. The central part of the spectrum is upheld by figures from various parties, and important personalities of the major parties are found at opposite poles of the debate. Sapir's differences with Dayan are as large as they are with Begin. A number of members of Mapam wanted to join the Labor Party annexationist group, the Land of Israel Circle, but were denied permission by Mapam's political secretary.² The Liberal Party is less hawkish than its Ga'hal partner, Herut; the late veteran Labor figure, Yitzhak Tabenkin, was considerably more hawkish than the equally veteran Ben-Gurion. The minimalist but anti-Moscow Israel Communist Party is regarded by the extreme doves as an extension of the establishment.³

Indeed, while Israelis have taken over the hawk-dove dichotomy from the American political vocabulary, they are conscious that the image reflected is a distortion of Israeli reality. "Our hawks are emotional and our doves have sharp nails," said Hanah Zemer, editor of Davar.⁴ Haim Schoor of Mapam agreed: "I would define all of us, at least the vast majority, as slightly hawkish doves."⁵ The distinctiveness of Israel's political ornithology is a reflection of a widely

¹ Israel Radio, March 12, 1970.

² The Jerusalem Post, March 4, 1971.

³ "It has been shown once again that if Dr. Moshe Sneh were not alive and kicking in Israeli public life, the Israeli establishment would have to invent him." Amos Keinan in Haaretz, June 21, 1971.

⁴ Davar, March 16, 1971.

⁵ Letter to the Editor, New York Times, June 5, 1971.

shared set of perceptions and beliefs that are in turn intimately connected to the history and evolution of the society over its eventful history. Several of the more striking basic tenets of Israeli public life are considered below.

The Political-Military Value of Frontier Settlements

Israel is a country run largely by an elite nurtured in the labor or kibbutz movements and in the defense establishment (the pre-state Haganah and Palmah, and the post-Independence IDF). In this group the instinct to create rural frontier settlements is inbred. As Dayan expressed himself once, he had been brought up on the credo of "another dunam, another goat." The battle to win Palestine as a Jewish state was conducted in considerable part by extension of the area of Jewish settlement and cultivation. Tilling an additional dunam (a quarter of an acre) and pasturing another flock was a fundamental way of insuring that the land became part of the Jewish community.¹ As Arab opposition to Zionism developed, it became clear that land not physically occupied by Jews would never be granted them by the mandatory authority.

There are profound impressions in the national memory of such episodes as the lightning operation in the Negev on the night of the Day of Atonement, 1946, in which eleven kibbutzim were set up beyond the existing fringe of Jewish settlement in defiance of the British. It is now almost universally accepted that failing that action, Israel would have lost the whole Negev area to the Egyptian Army in 1948. To this generation of leaders it seems natural to insure the retention of an area in the occupied territories that they wish to hold permanently, an area that outside forces would seek to detach from Israel, by implanting therein a network of Jewish settlements.

¹A popular song of the 1930s ran:

A dunam here, a dunam there
Clod after clod
So we redeem the land of our people
From the north to the Negev.

Secure Borders

Since the Six Day War, Israel has insisted on a new map endowed with strategic logic, as contrasted to the strategic absurdities Jerusalem sees in the lines established by the Armistice agreements of 1949. To the outside and uninitiated observer, the demands may seem strange, as if any other country's map had considerably more strategic logic. Even those countries that are islands in the ocean undoubtedly wish they had more space between themselves and unfriendly neighbors, and in the age of intercontinental missiles even ocean distances are insufficient. The observer might insist instead that security can come only through relations of mutual trust.

Unfortunately, mutual trust is precisely what seems unreachable in the Middle East. The seeming unattainability of mutual trust in the foreseeable future makes it imperative, in the view of most Israelis, that a second-best solution be sought in the form of secure borders, or borders that can be made as secure as geography and regional conditions allow. In the formula of "secure and recognized borders," the weight attached to the first far outweighs that given to the second term. It goes almost without saying that this mathematics is based on axioms of profound distrust of the pacific intentions of the Arab states and confidence in Israel's own ability to realize at least major parts of its perceived requirements.

Of course, it is not just mutual trust between Israel and its Arab neighbors that is fundamentally at issue in the security debate. Increasingly since 1967, the question of Arab military potential has been swamped by the threat of Soviet intervention and the necessity for U.S. deterrence. The Left is quick to note that despite the intense desire for freedom of action and the claims to integral power that are made by the Right, Israel is still entirely dependent on the United States in the crucial matter of deterrence of massive Soviet intervention.¹ For those to whom, like Matityahu Peled, the central issue is removing Moscow's military presence from the region, it

¹For a particularly pungent expression of this view, see Amos Keinan in Haaretz, June 17, 1970.

appears that "the subject of territories has become a matter of blind faith, as if a little territory could in magical fashion add security to Israel, which she never had in the past."¹

Thus is created the fundamental dilemma of peace and security in the Israeli mind. To the theme of "peace is impossible without strong defense and secure borders," the counterpoint is "can there be security without peace?" The first principle of Israeli political discourse is that Arab recognition that Israel cannot be physically overwhelmed is a necessary if not sufficient condition for peace. The promise of ever-increasing Soviet involvement threatens to postpone indefinitely the time of that recognition. In this radically changed environment, only agreement with the Arab states can cut off the cycle of escalation. But this seems as far out of reach as ever, in terms of the consideration Israel appears willing to pay. There is nothing to do ("no alternative" - ein brerah) but to hold on to what is concrete and understood -- secure borders.

The Unreliability of Outside Power

There are remarkably few Israelis, even among the minimalists or doves, who have much confidence in the value of foreign guarantees as a substitute for the boundaries regarded as "secure." There are perhaps three strands in this thinking: the first is disbelief that foreign intercession can be counted on to protect Israel in a crisis. For this lesson, Israel seems to have a great many texts, including May 1967, when, as Eban put it, the "inherent fragility of the external factors on which Israel was sometimes urged to rely for her security" was clearly demonstrated. Or, referring to the Security Council debate between May 24 and June 3, Eban declares: "In the history of international institutions there is no more disturbing a document than the record of the Security Council's proceedings during the two weeks before hostilities began."² May 1967 was also a crisis in United States-Israel relations, and the "no-more Vietnams" syndrome

¹ Maariv, July 2, 1971.

² Jerusalem Post Magazine, June 6, 1969.

of American public life is an important element of Israel's distrust of international guarantees.¹

To Israel's Ambassador to the United States, Yitzhak Rabin, the UN General Assembly is an "operetta in that Tower of Babel called the UN."² So long as the United States does not join in hostile actions initiated in the UN, that organization can be regarded contemptuously but simply as a debating society. But it is unmistakable, in Israel's view, that the UN cards are stacked. Three permanent members of the Security Council and at least three to six others can usually be counted on for support of pro-Arab positions.³ In the Assembly a pro-Arab, Afro-Asian-Communist bloc comes close to controlling a reliable majority. Under the circumstances, positive action to protect Israel's interests is out of the question. Whether actions damaging to Israel's interests are undertaken depends largely on the strength of American opposition. For Israel the UN is not only not neutral but actually hostile. Thus, the second element of Israel's distrust of foreign guarantees is the conviction that they are likely to be translated into hostility to Israel's policy and damage to its national interests.

The third element is evoked by the frequently voiced formula of the Foreign Minister, that "peace is an open bridge not a dividing wall." Police forces and neutralizing foreign elements astride borders or in demilitarized zones tend to make a barrier working against peace rather than promoting it. It is an article of faith on the political Right in Israel that one of the major reasons for the escalating enmity with the Arabs in the period before the War of Independence was the interference of the British. This view holds that British interests were to retain control of the region, and to that end they played off one side against the other with disastrous result. It is not just

¹"In the circumstances which exist in our world, there is still no answer to the question: Who is to guarantee that the guarantor will carry out his guarantee?" Yaakov Cariz, cited by David Landau in the Jerusalem Post, February 21, 1971.

²Ibid., July 4, 1971.

³It remains to be seen whether the replacement of the Republic of China by the Chinese People's Republic will make a substantial difference. Taipei consistently voted with the Arabs.

the Right that sees the situation after the Six Day War as presenting the first opportunity for Israel to come directly into contact with the Arab world and to show that coexistence is possible without outside interference.

For all these reasons, in the words of a Jerusalem Post editorial (February 7, 1971), Israel is "most decidedly opposed to the physical presence of big power forces on her frontier under any guise whatever. Bitter experience with international guarantees in the past has crystallized into a security doctrine based on the deterrent value of the balance of power and bilateral alliances alone."

It must also be noted that distrust of the gentiles is a hawk's weapon in battle with the doves. Professor Talmon's query to Yisrael Galili, "What will I say to Professor X abroad" (in regard to the government's indifference to the Palestinians), is turned against him by a senior editor of Maariv as evidence of moral and psychological weakness.¹ The minimalist positions do indeed depend on confidence in the existence of good will outside the boundaries of Israel, on some trust in the fulfillment of obligations undertaken, whether by Arabs or great powers. This confidence is not shared by the governing elite. The chief government decisionmakers, says Dan Bawly, are neither hawks nor doves, but pessimists, although they prefer to think of themselves as realists.²

This pattern of thought strikes some Americans as self-deluding and detrimental to Israel's own interests. "Golda has the Masada complex," Stewart Alsop quotes an American Middle Eastern expert as complaining; Dayan, Sapir, and Rabin, however, are not similarly afflicted.³ It is not a Masada complex that affects Mrs. Meir, and it is not just she who bears the mark. The Prime Minister perhaps has a Holocaust complex, and if she does she shares it with a large segment

¹Maariv, May 15 and May 22, 1969 (articles by Talmon and Shalom Rozenfeld).

²Jerusalem Post, July 2, 1971.

³Newsweek, July 12, 1971.

of the society. It is doubtful that Mrs. Meir longs for martyrdom. She fears instead that Israel will be forced back to positions that will subject her to another catastrophe.

"Much in Jewish history is too terrible to be believed," said Abba Eban, on the second anniversary of the war and recalling the fears of May 1967, "but nothing is too terrible to have happened."¹ Yisrael Galili noted on Holocaust Day 1971 that Israel had been advised to "free itself from the trauma of the Holocaust." On the contrary, he declared: the remembrance of the Holocaust should be, in the Jerusalem Post's paraphrase, "the personal weapon of every Jew, which will argue that never again will a catastrophe be allowed to happen." Dayan reminded Edward Heath that Britain left Palestine in the spring of 1948 believing that the Jews would be slaughtered in the oncoming Arab invasion.² With his characteristic understatement, Dayan noted elsewhere that "this is not a world in which a country backs its fellow without limit."³

As the essence of what moves Israel, Yigal Allon once cited the letter of a kibbutz boy (later killed in the battle for Jerusalem), after a visit to an exhibition on the Holocaust. The boy wrote that he felt a tremendous desire to be strong, "strong to the point of tears; strong and sharp like a knife; quiet and awesome." That strength was necessary so that "they will not look at me again with contemptuous eyes behind electric fences. They won't look at me that way only if I will be strong, if we will all be strong ... never again to be led to the slaughter!"⁴

¹ Jerusalem Post Magazine, June 6, 1969.

² Dayan, A New Map, pp. 80-81.

³ Bamahaneh, April 14, 1970.

⁴ Lamerhav, April 16, 1967. In Eilon, The Israelis, Israel's view of its place in the contemporary world is said to be "above all, a picture of utter loneliness." Eilon speaks of "that pessimism of encirclement and of being entirely alone in the world, which, even today is a chief characteristic of the Israeli mind" (p. 213).

A Contractual Peace Treaty Directly Negotiated

The acceptance of the Rogers initiative in the summer of 1970 and with it the revived Jarring mission has seemed to signify an Israeli abandonment of the insistence on direct negotiation. It is doubtful that this is true. The acceptance suggests only that Israel is prepared to go part of the way with indirect negotiations. The basic rationale of Israeli thinking demands a negotiated peace settlement long before the end is reached. Israelis regard direct negotiations as not just a form of reaching a settlement but in the Middle Eastern context as the only way of insuring "true" peace. The Arab-Israel conflict did not begin in 1967 or even in 1947, they reason. It is not a disagreement over frontiers or over refugees. It is a struggle over the right of Israel to exist. Only if the Arabs are prepared to sit down at the same table with them and to recognize Israel's equal right of existence face-to-face, will it be clear that the decades-long confrontation is coming to an end. Conversely, refusal of direct negotiations is a clear indication of insistence on perpetuating the conflict. So runs the argument. Thus, Abba Eban: "The conception of negotiated peace treaties is mainly important for its effect on Arab ideologies."¹ Or, "the idea behind negotiation without prior conditions is that the willingness of an Arab state to negotiate peace with us would generate an effort of thought and imagination which is quite impossible to conceive in the absence of negotiations."²

The demand for directly negotiated peace treaties has a certain attractive logic to it. Nevertheless, the simplicity of that formula is marred by the apparent simultaneous insistence on certain territorial sine qua nons. A classic example of this difficulty is an interview given by Dayan to Der Stern (September 28, 1969). The interviewer asked Dayan about the contradiction between the alleged willingness of the government to participate in negotiations unconditionally and the rumors of Israel's border demands:

¹ Jerusalem Post Magazine, June 6, 1969.

² Jerusalem Post Supplement, January 23, 1970.

Dayan: Good. This is probably the most important issue in our policy. We are ready to participate in unconditional negotiations. If the Arabs are ready to sit down with us and to discuss all of the issues, including Jerusalem, then I would not propose omitting Jerusalem. I cannot say that the Arabs have no right to make demands with respect to Jerusalem.

Question: Does this mean that there can be negotiations concerning Jerusalem?

Dayan: No, the willingness to discuss Jerusalem does not mean that Israel's chief city is a subject for negotiation. But we are obligated to listen to their proposals and to attempt to meet them half-way.

Question: Can you elaborate on this point?

Dayan: Each side must recognize the vital interests of the other side. We must find a means to achieve coexistence. If they want to set up a Palestinian state in place of Israel, then we must refuse. If they want to set up their capital where ours stands -- no. But to state at the outset that we do not recognize the Al-Aqsa and Omar Mosques and to say that this is our holy mountain is equally impossible, because this site is of historical and religious significance to both sides.

Later in the interview with reference to the Golan Heights and the refusal of the Syrians to take up negotiations, Dayan warned: "Anyone who wants to negotiate must begin with the existing situation, and the longer they wait the more the situation will have changed. If Jordan had negotiated with us right after the war, there would be no Israeli settlements in the Jordan basin at present. But now they exist, and if they negotiate now, they must begin with this fact."

For all the insistence on the treaty-negotiations package, there is an undercurrent of Israeli opinion that does not at all view the peace treaty as a final answer. This view was expressed early in the post-June period, before the disillusionment with peace prospects had begun to set in. On Israel's radio on November 11, 1968, the late Prime Minister Eshkol voiced his own skepticism. "A peace treaty is not the final remedy against war, but it is nevertheless a means of deterrence; not permanently, but for a certain period."¹

¹Cited in Al Hamishmar, November 12, 1968.

Allon was asked why Israel would need secure borders, considering that they seemed to require such extensive surgery on the face of western Palestine, if a peace treaty were signed. His response was: "With all my appreciation of the importance of a peace treaty between Israel and the Arab people, it should be borne in mind that most wars have broken out between states which have such treaties. Effective security arrangements are therefore necessary at the same time."¹ It seems doubtful from these comments that either Allon or Eshkol believed in the reality of the total reconciliation of Arabs and Jews.

The Creation of "Facts"

The Talmud relates that Moses assembled the tribes of Israel at Mount Sinai to receive the Law and the Israelites shouted: "We will do and we will hear." Thus the Israelites demonstrated their unquestioning fealty to God by indicating that they were prepared to accept first and ask for explanations later. There is a strong tradition in Israeli thinking on national security to do as Eshkol once prescribed in a satirical twist on the Rabbinic homiletic -- to advance the "we will do" before the "we will hear," to postpone the discussions and secure the desired objective before unfavorable repercussions stayed their hand. This tradition is rooted in the history of the creation of the State of Israel. The state itself is seen as a living representation of the importance and the possibility of creating "facts" in the teeth of seemingly insuperable opposition. Settlements in hostile Arab areas, illegal immigration, campaigns against British restrictions, the creation of an underground army -- all represent the stubborn insistence of the Jewish community on creating a place for itself in Palestine. Against the advice of some of the Zionists' best friends, the state was set up and the Arab attacks were beaten back. Who now is prepared to dispute the Israeli rights to Nitzanah (El Auja) on the Sinai border, or to the demilitarized zones on the former Syrian frontier? Israel's link to the world of East Africa

¹Jerusalem Post Supplement, October 24, 1969.

and Asia and the opening up of the lower Negev was forged by the IDF's race to the Bay of Aqaba in the early months of 1949. "Facts" have made Israel what it is in extent, in character, and in spirit.¹

Many Israelis are coming to believe that the main battle to create a fact in Jerusalem has been won. Clearly, there is no likelihood of the city being redivided with barriers, mine fields, and walls, as before 1967. At least that much has been accomplished by the reunification of Jerusalem and the four years of its existence under Israeli rule. Lea Ben Dor, Knesset reporter of the Jerusalem Post, is confident also of the retention of a unified Jerusalem under Israeli rule, no matter what the nature of the settlement. "There is no illusion anywhere that today's Israel ... could by any means short of total slaughter be detached from this historic pile of stones. That became real and tangible in 1967." Even the Rogers Plan, she observes, does not include a specific provision for returning East Jerusalem or internationalizing the city, but only for discussion of the fate of the city after other problems have been settled. "Israel's sovereignty has been recognized, by default if not explicitly, by all the powers and others who hold so many views on the other things we should and should not do."²

Mrs. Ben Dor is perhaps confusing a respect for complexity and sensitivity with acquiescence to the Israeli viewpoint, but the experience in Jerusalem does suggest that there is a special problem about the creation of facts. If a unified Jerusalem under Israeli rule is fact, and this is by no means certain, it is a consequence of the evidently sincere and unambiguous, almost monolithic Israeli insistence on the inconceivability of redividing Jerusalem. There is obviously a premium on presenting a facade of immovability, but the task of

¹The Israelis see numerous international lessons in the utility of creation of facts. To look no further than the immediate neighborhood, they ask, what basis is there to the Jordanian claims to the West Bank and Eastern Jerusalem, or the Egyptian to Gaza, if not those arising out of the mere creation of "facts"?

²Jerusalem Post Magazine, May 28, 1971.

creating such a facade, ex nihilo, is not an easy one. In a functioning democracy it is difficult for the leadership to provide the appearance of adamancy on an issue for which the requisite public unanimity cannot be easily secured. Therefore, it seems doubtful that Israel can manage that appearance in order to create facts on most other issues apart from Jerusalem.

Conflict resolutions that seem to be nailed down do not always stay nailed down. Israel would seem to be a "fact" and yet the Arab world has remained as unreconciled now as it was at the very beginning. Israelis are, of course, not about to give up on their national existence because of this, but it may lead them to wonder whether all "facts" can be counted upon to remain so, and whether the cost of creating some "facts" is excessive in the long run. However, the position of the minimalists can only be tentative in this regard, because to their constant search for a response to Israeli concessions there has never been a strong answering voice from the other side. Whether the "facts" are a long-term barrier is not testable, in their view, so long as the acceptance of Israel's rightful place in the Middle East seems always to be in doubt.

V. THE CURRENT SITUATION

The debate on annexation and settlement confronted the participants with a difficult dilemma. On the one side were considerations of security and history which pulled in the direction of annexation of the occupied areas. On the other side were arguments of "demography," the character of the state, and the need for agreement by the Arabs and the powers, which warned of the dangers of annexation. All the compromise proposals are attempts to define a position astride the horns of this dilemma.

In what sense can it be said that the territories are necessary to Israel's survival or national security? There is, of course, the narrow military issue, but the interests of national security need not always require the assumption of sovereignty over territory. The Allon Plan made an explicit attempt to get around the difficulty. Nor can it be said that the territories are necessary for sheer living space. Even realization of the vision of mass immigration into Israel from the Soviet Union and the Americas would not necessitate use of the West Bank as the absorption space. The historical tie is a more subtle matter. The desire to dig deep roots has always meant an effort to connect physically and personally with the soil of the homeland. Having grasped the opportunity anew, it will be difficult to lose it once more. This, again, does not necessarily mean exclusive sovereignty, only the absence of physical restraints at the borders. "We have a right to the integral Land of Israel," said David Rudner, "but a right can be made concrete in various ways."¹

The outstanding notion of how to make that right concrete without claiming exclusive sovereignty is the concept of open borders, which finds wide favor among many sections of public opinion. Over the last four and a half years the territories have been tied to the Israeli economy with multiple cords of employment, investment, and trade. The

¹ Lamerhav, December 6, 1968. See also Israel Kolatt in Avineri, ed., Israel and the Palestinians, pp. 80-82.

developing integration of the various parts of Palestine make it extremely unlikely that any settlement will result in the reerection of the hard and fast borders that divided the country before. Jerusalem will undoubtedly bargain hard for open borders, for relatively free mobility of at least labor and perhaps capital as well. "Experience has shown that division of the country deepened the hatred between the people and created a sick reality. It is not impossible that the future will produce additional action paths that will retain the integrity of the country and respect for the rights of others."¹

If there is a settlement, will it have a Jordanian or a Palestinian cast? The years of intensive discussion on the Palestinians and their rights have left their mark. In a public opinion poll conducted in November-December 1970 by the Institute of Applied Social Research in conjunction with the Hebrew University's Institute of Communication, 68 percent of a broadly based national sample declared that no peace could be reached in the Middle East without taking into account the national aspirations of the Palestinians; only 22 percent of the sample declared in the negative.² Not all of the listeners even within the ranks of the government appear to have been converted, but proponents of the Palestinian "orientation" believe they have made important gains. Avineri is encouraged by a "more open-minded attitude" on the part of the Israeli government as well as by the "fact that Arabs and Israelis have lived with each other for four years even under the shadow of conflict."³

Nonetheless, the question of the Palestinians and their fate has receded to the background of public discussion. Did the very success of the occupation policy, which presumably shows the possibility of coexistence, lessen Israel's interest in the Palestinian Entity? The attention devoted to the problem of the interim settlement with Egypt and the danger of escalated Soviet intervention also played a major

¹ Hagai (Haim Guri) in Lamerhav, November 12, 1968.

² Al Hamishmar, February 14, 1971.

³ Avineri, ed., Israel and the Palestinian, p. xxiv.

role. There is a dilemma in the position of Israeli doves now. On one hand, they argue that a significant change has taken place in the attitude of Egypt since the death of Nasser and the advent of Sadat. They point to evidence suggesting that the Sadat government is less interested in the Palestinian cause and readier to ignore the interests of the Fedayeen than was Nasser and argue that these indications signify the peaceful intent of the Egyptian government. Presumably, Egypt no longer contemplates a two-phase policy involving the use of the Palestinians to destroy the State of Israel. In the past, however, the argument that the Palestinians and the Palestinian Entity problem had to be taken seriously by Israel needed the "support" of an increasing scale of Fedayeen violence. Liquidation of the Fedayeen bases and movement in Jordan, if it means more than temporary diminution of terrorism, can be expected to erode the support for the Palestinian "orientation."

It is the tragedy of the Fedayeen that they have insisted on totalist objectives that can be gained only through war and against a far more powerful and cohesive opponent, Israel. If that struggle had any chance of success it could only be through the creation of a genuine "national liberation" movement. As Israelis view the events in Jordan over the last years, that has not occurred. The defeat of the Fedayeen in Jordan, Avineri declares, is the demonstration of the hollowness of the Palestinian movement's claim to revolutionary status. "When the moment of truth came, all the guerrilla organizations proved to be nothing more than armed bands, not social movements." They had failed to create the broad-base support within the Palestinian society of Jordan for which a real social transformation was prerequisite.¹

Despite four years of Israeli occupation and the impact of Israeli social thought, the process of transformation has not proceeded much further on the West Bank either. Shortly after the Six Day War, a noted Israeli Arab architect and former Mapam member of Knesset expressed the view that the road to peace lay through the revolutionizing of the

¹In Avineri, ed., Israel and the Palestinians, xxi-xxii.

social-cultural life of the Palestinians; there was no shortcut. The Palestinian Entity would have no significance because without that revolution it could have no real independence.¹

Much of the argument in the internal Israeli debate on the Palestinian entity focused on the existence or non-existence of a Palestinian nationalist identity. Whether a state is feasible probably depends much less on the absolute level of national feeling than on the relative strength of different forms of identification -- on the degree of local feeling, of family quarrels, of clan rivalry and the like. So far, not only have the Fedayeen failed to constitute a significant Palestinian "liberation" movement, but the society of the West Bank itself has demonstrated the superior pull of its local identification. It has failed to overcome them sufficiently to press toward regional autonomy, much less toward the creation of an independent state.

In 1968, the then Secretary-General of the Labor Party, Elyav, declared that Israel was responsible for the Palestinian Arabs in the occupied territories, "which means that we owe them, too, the option of self-determination."² The pressure on Israel to allow the Palestinians to exercise that option does not seem to be very great at present.

From the security point of view it does not seem to matter whether the settlement is with Hussein or a Palestinian Entity. Some have expressed fear of the inherent irredentism of a West Bank state. But suppose Jordan were Palest'nized completely. Could it not become irredentist too, so long as parts of Palestine were held by the State of Israel? Perhaps a more important question is that of the military threat, in the sense explored in a previous section. From that point of view neither the Palestinian nor the Jordanian state should constitute a serious threat on its own. Either one is likely to be reluctant to

¹The Jerusalem Post, November 21, 1967.

²Cited in Avineri, ed., Israel and the Palestinians, p. 61.

demilitarize the area west of the Jordan, a condition on which Israel will probably insist; and neither will be happy with an Israeli insistence on a "watch on the Jordan." If there is a substantial military problem, it will be the threat constituted by absorption of Jordan, whether Palestinian or Hashemite, into a larger unit on the eastern front, Syria or Iraq, allied to Egypt or under the powerful protection of the USSR.

All along the discussion of what to do about the West Bank has had to recognize the primacy of the Egyptian problem -- that an agreement would have to be reached with Egypt before it could be extended to cover Jordan, much less Syria. From the fall of 1967 until Nasser's death, it was clear that Hussein could not and would not move far from the position staked out by Nasser. Nasser was the single most charismatic Arab leader, the leader of the largest Arab state, the head of the anti-Israel coalition. Jerusalem tended to view him as the personification of Arab hopes to destroy Israel. Nasser's death in September 1970 seemed to deal a severe blow to those hopes and appeared to be one of the most important events in the history of the Arab-Israel conflict. Unless he could be replaced by an equally strong leader, there was a possibility that the Arab world, characterized by opposing interests only loosely and uncomfortably joined together under the umbrella of their Arabism, would resume its internecine conflict. Israelis tended to link the increasing daring of Hussein in dealing with the terrorist forces in Jordan with the death of Nasser. As General Herzog expressed it, "If Nasser had lived, Wasfi e-Tall would not be at the head of the Jordanian government."¹

From the Israeli point of view, then, the deeper the fissures in the Arab coalition and the more preoccupied Egypt is with the attempt to restore its internal cohesion, the better Jordan begins to look as a candidate for breaking the Arab front to make a separate peace. Hussein would be encouraged to reassert his authority and to rid himself of his terrorist problem; moreover, he would feel free of the Egyptian constraint. However, this is not likely to be true of a situation in

¹Le Soir, November 20, 1970.

which Jordan faces great Egyptian hostility. If the aftermath of the crushing of the Fedayeen revolt results in a general Arab attempt to punish Hussein, Jordan is unlikely to want to intensify its isolation and to solidify the Arab ring around it by engaging in risky negotiations with Israel. It is much less likely that Hussein would then be amenable to any kind of negotiated settlement with Israel.

Egypt's interest in the Palestinian forces and the role Egypt plays with respect to them is affected by the value it places on relations with Jordan. The converse may also be true. During the period when Egypt felt the need for a Jordanian partnership because it sought an informal link to the United States, it was careful to attempt to balance the forces within Jordan to prevent a complete breakdown of Hussein's authority (as well as, of course, the complete dissolution of the Palestinian forces). However, as that need disappears, the Palestinians might be seen to be a convenient tool to subvert the Hashemite throne. Does Egypt have a strong independent interest in the Palestinians other than as a weapon with which to beat Israel and, in certain circumstances, also Jordan? So far Egypt has not seen the Fedayeen as an absolutely necessary weapon in the struggle against Israel. This has been true under Nasser as well as Sadat. Indeed, one of the most significant factors in the relationship between Egypt and the Palestinians has been their mutual distrust.

So long as the Palestinian movement is largely identified with the objective of liquidating the State of Israel, the latter for its part would like to see a de-Palestinization of its conflict with the Arab states. If Egypt's goals, the Israelis argue, could be limited to those of regaining her territory lost in the Six Day War and those of Jordan could be similarly separated from the issue of whose is the legitimate right to the territory that was Israel before 1967, it might be possible to come to separate peace agreements with both Egypt and Jordan. It is the commitment avowed to the Palestinian cause, coexisting at a different but incompatible level with lip service to the Security Council Resolution of 1967, that in Israel's view makes impossible a general settlement of the Middle Eastern conflict. However, de-Palestinization too involves a dilemma for Israel. Its hopes would

mount as Hussein strengthened his hold on Jordan, but on another plane a Hashemite Jordan resisting internal Palestinization continually postpones the ultimate disposition of the conflicting claims to legitimate sovereignty in Palestine.

Security considerations also provide a significant link between disposition of the problems with Egypt and those with Jordan. If Israel is forced by virtue of insupportable big power pressure to acquiesce in the return of Egyptian troops to the Sinai, and as Soviet forces consolidate their positions in Egypt, thus presenting the potential threat of a Soviet force camped on the "green line," Israel is far less likely to be willing to contemplate territorial concessions on the West Bank or linkages, territorial or otherwise, of Gaza and the West Bank. Israel will want most particularly to insure the greatest possible distance between the Arab forces on the eastern front and the Arab and possibly Arab-Soviet forces in the Sinai.

The Soviet threat is, of course, the overriding security concern in Israel, and the impact of increasing Soviet involvement in Palestinian affairs has been of some concern to Israeli observers. The fear that Moscow-attuned forces within the Fedayeen movement would come to the forefront was one of the factors that prevented Israeli policymakers from at least rooting for a Palestinian victory in the Jordanian civil war. Had they been certain of the accession of a moderate faction, they might have seen merit in the argument of such people as Avineri that the coming to power of a Palestinian regime in Jordan could be the first step toward a Palestinian-oriented solution of the Arab-Israel conflict. In any case, Israel is likely to pay particular attention to the evolving relations of Moscow and the Fedayeen. To the extent that they relocate in Syria, the possibility of deeper Soviet involvement becomes greater and will be likely to heighten the Israeli concern.

In reexamining their options after the disaster in Jordan, the Fedayeen may find that the only alternative to going underground is regularizing under the wing of Syria and Egypt. This might also involve

coming out for a Palestinian state in all of prewar Jordan and the Gaza Strip. If the proposal also included recognition of Israel as a fact of life, the Israeli cabinet would be faced with difficult choices.

For the present, there are no Arab partners waiting at the negotiating table. Indefinite continuation of the military occupation is the expectation of the military government, and it regards the prospect with equanimity. Few people believed in 1967 that the occupation would last so long and under such relatively peaceful conditions. In 1967 Dayan thought it could not last more than two to four years, but that would be long enough to make peace.¹ Critics acknowledged that the "open bridges" were an important means of holding on to the territories at minimal cost. "But this policy succeeds so long as we operate through bilateral perception of temporariness."²

However, nothing lasts like the temporary, say the French. General Vr di, governor of the West Bank, declares: "We tell the population that what we are doing here is being done not from a feeling of temporariness but from a feeling of permanency. This is necessary for orderly administration, and not particularly for the political situation."³ After four and a half years of occupation, having experienced heights of feverish resistance and depths of gloomy despair, the West Bank seems calm now. "The heartbeat of the West Bank has lately become rhythmical and its breathing regular, without the excitement that is bound up in expectation and thus also without the depression of disappointment."⁴ Perhaps the crushing of the Fedayeen has been humiliating to many Arabs on the West Bank, but from the point of view of the military government it has had the function of helping to dampen the hopes of revenge, perhaps to extinguish them

¹ Interview with Joseph Alsop, Los Angeles Times, September 12, 1967.

² Baruch Kimerling in Haaretz, September 27, 1968.

³ Eli Eyal, Maariv, February 12, 1971.

⁴ Ibid.

entirely. It allows the space and time for developing the day-to-day ties between Arabs and Jews in the occupied territories. It saves the military government from the distasteful requirements of a repressive policy.¹ In the meantime, restrictions are being relaxed and the process of normalization and peaceful coexistence advances rapidly. The summer vacation program attracted 16,000 visitors in 1968, 24,000 in 1969, 53,000 in 1970 and more than 100,000 in 1971. In 1971 no bonds were required to secure an entry permit, and no pass was necessary to visit Israel.

The military government is seen by Israelis as wearing two hats vis-à-vis the Arabs in the occupied territories and therefore enjoying two different kinds of reception. As a military government, it is still unwelcome, and most Arabs undoubtedly feel that the quicker it goes the better. When on occasion it acts like a military government -- for example, by blowing up houses -- the bitter taste is reawakened. However, as individuals and as civil administrators, it is asserted, the members of the military government are well received and probably have permanently altered the norms of public life, at least in the West Bank.²

In the summer of 1971 it seemed possible that Israel's durable occupation policy would soon be challenged from the outside. The Arab League had apparently decided on a boycott of goods passing from the West Bank across the open bridges to Jordan and farther east; the boycott of West Bank farm products was scheduled to begin in September. In preparation for that possibility Israel indicated that it would abolish all restrictions on sales in Israel.³ Exactly how this was

¹The exception to this may be the Gaza Strip, but there, too, new government policies may be on the way to reducing the gravity of this problem.

²Eli Eyal, Maariv, July 16, 1971.

³The Jerusalem Post, July 28, 1971.

to be done is not clear, since the agricultural market in Israel is much higher priced than that of the West Bank and for that reason the "open bridges" were regarded as benefitting Israel as much as the occupied territories. Fortunately, the Arab states abandoned the boycott project, at least temporarily. But were it taken up again in the near future Israel would face difficult decisions. Would Jerusalem be prepared to complete the integration of the two economies, to absorb all locally unemployed in Israel or provide the investment required to bring full employment to the territories? The Labor Minister, Yosef Almogi, has already expressed his desire to limit the volume of employment in Israel from the territories. In general, Israel has not yet faced up to the difficult problems inherent in integrating regions that stand at very different levels of social-economic development. The process of integration has been fought along the way and the principle is not yet formally accepted. Activation of the Arab League boycott might force a decision on the principle much sooner than expected and require the difficult practical problems to be tackled immediately.

A second potential but less likely problem is the revival of substantial terrorism, through reorganized Fedayeen activities from Lebanon and Syria. The premise of the occupation is that the population of the West Bank is not the armed enemy, but a revival of terrorism would put that premise to a severe test. In the wake of a rocket attack on the city of Petah Tikvah, Yediot Aharonot on July 8, 1971 called for a reexamination of the policy of "open bridges." Haaretz, Davar, and Omer on July 9 opposed additional restrictions in the territories, but Shearim suggested that Israel's relations with the West Bank were too "naive." The Israeli consensus on occupation policy may be firmer in appearance than in reality.

However, the significant threat to the status quo must come from inside the cease-fire lines. The IDF has shown that it can cope with conventional military attack and with armed guerrilla incursion. But the government has not yet had to face an organized and determined Palestinian movement within the territories. Although it would seem

risky to bank on indefinite acceptance by Palestinians of their anomalous political status, perhaps the military government is justified in believing that no such movement will develop in the near future. If it does, however, the existing Israeli consensus on the occupation is likely to disintegrate and the coalition government will face its gravest crisis since the war.

In general, the stability of the present government, allowing for a pacific resolution of the eventual problem of succession to Golda Meir, will depend on its ability to respond to the pressures from inside and outside the country that are likely to be exerted in the next few years. The Labor Party's record with respect to internal Israeli pressures is relatively good:

One of the secrets of success of the dominant elite of the ruling Labor Party has been its sensitivity to the structuring of opinion among the public, its sensing which issues could be introduced into the political system and on which issues decision would best be deferred... It is this quality which makes Labor look more like a pluralistic party of a two-party system than the type of party usually associated with proportional representation.¹

Whether this will continue to be true remains to be seen.

¹Alan Arian, "Stability and Change in Israeli Public Opinion and Politics," Public Opinion Quarterly, 35:1, Spring, 1971, pp. 34-35.