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EVOLUTION OF THE US ARMY INFANTRY BATTALION: 1939 - 1968

by

Virgil Ney

October 1968

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UNITED STATES ARMY COMBAT DEVELOPMENTS COMMAND
FORT BELVOIR, VIRGINIA

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**EVOLUTION OF THE US ARMY
INFANTRY BATTALION: 1939 - 1968**

by


Virgil Ney

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ABSTRACT

The infantry battalion has evolved over a period of several thousand years; its American ancestors may be found in the units organized during the American Revolution. The modern infantry battalion in the United States Army began in the period just prior to World War II. The battalion was forged and tested on the battlefields of Europe and in the Pacific Area. Nuclear weapons, the Korean War, and the Cold War have exerted considerable influence on the size, composition, and weaponry of the present-day infantry battalion. The adaptation of the World War II armored division organization to the ROAD division has given the infantry battalion of the United States Army the highest fire and movement capability it has ever possessed in our military history. The advent of the helicopter and its application to troop carrier and fire support missions enables the infantry battalion to become highly air mobile.



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SUMMARY

The infantry battalion has evolved over a period of several centuries. Prior historical eras produced the ancient equivalents of the military formation which became known as the battalion. In the United States Army, the battalion first emerged in the American Revolutionary Army under the command of General George Washington.

The modern United States infantry battalion may be dated from the period of 1939-1945.

The Korean War period began with the infantry battalion much the same organization it had been in World War II. Heavier weaponry, better small-unit (squad) organization and training were noted in the infantry battalion of 1950-1953. Aside from the missions of conventional warfare, the infantry battalion was faced with operational requirements for possible nuclear warfare. The "flexible response" was a doctrinal approach toward establishment of an infantry unit which could function in response to the requirements of conventional or nuclear war or any other land combat mission. The battle group of the 1960's eliminated the regiment permanently and the battalion temporarily from the Army for a brief period of time. The battle group was abandoned primarily because of its assumed poor capability of response to low-intensity, nonconventional warfare. The infantry battalion was returned to the Army as the basic building block for the Reorganization Objective Army Divisions (ROAD) program of creating streamlined, combat units which would be responsive to all types of 20th century warfare.

In the mid-1960's the trend toward air mobility of the infantry battalion, other than airborne troops, was evidenced in the experimental tests conducted at Fort Benning with a view toward an airmobile division. These tests culminated in the activation of the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) and its deployment to Vietnam where it has already earned a citation for distinguished combat service.

The infantry battalion has evolved, over the years, into an essential element of our combat forces. Vietnam is the proving ground for establishing its efficacy in a limited, low-intensity type of warfare. What it does there will portend what it will be, and what it can do, in the near and distant future.

EVOLUTION OF THE US ARMY

INFANTRY BATTALION: 1939 - 1968

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND - 1775-1940

On the 14th of June 1775, the Continental Congress authorized the formation of ten companies of riflemen which were to be raised in Pennsylvania, Maryland, and Virginia. The six companies from Pennsylvania were organized as William Thompson's Rifle Battalion. Historically, Colonel Thompson's Battalion was the first rifle battalion in the Continental Army and, as such, the lineal ancestor of all infantry rifle battalions of the United States Army. At this early date in American military history, it should be noted that the term "battalion" was often interchangeable with the term "regiment" (Ref 1).

By December 1775 there were forty-nine infantry battalions (or regiments, for the two terms were virtually synonymous) and several unattached companies in the establishment. (Ref 1, p 2)

British and American forces were organized in similar fashion. In the English regiment there were ten companies. Eight of these companies were termed the "battalion companies" and the remaining two the flank or "elite" companies. Of these two flank units, one was designated as the "grenadier company" and only the best men were assigned to it. Often these grenadier companies were detached from their parent regiments and consolidated into provisional grenadier battalions for difficult assignments and dangerous posts on the battle line. Another interesting development in the British Army battalion was the designation also of the tenth company as a "light company." Like the grenadier units, they could be consolidated into battalions for provisional service as scouting, screening, and harassing units with the mission of moving in advance of the regular line of battle. The riflemen, under such skilled commanders as Daniel Morgan, carried out the same missions for the Americans (Ref 1).

The following extract is significant because it shows the first official recognition of the value of "light infantry" in the early American military organization. This recognition has persisted in every war in which the United States has engaged.

At first there was no counterpart to flank companies in the Continental Infantry. Beginning in August 1777, however, General Washington directed that 108 men and 9 officers be drawn from each brigade and formed into a temporary Corps of Light Infantry. When winter came this corps was disbanded; but it had proved so useful that Washington urged Congress to authorize one light company for each battalion to be formed into a separate corps, during every campaign thereafter. It was with the Light Corps, which resulted, that Anthony Wayne stormed Stony Point 15 July 1779, in the most celebrated night attack made by Americans during the Revolution. (Ref 1, p 6)¹

Baron Friedrich Wilhelm von Steuben, as the volunteer Inspector General and Drillmaster of the Continental Army at Valley Forge, exerted great influence upon the organization and tactical training of the Continental Army. His Regulations for the Order and Discipline of the Troops of the United States was such an important contribution to the military art that some of its features may still be seen in the United States Army of today. General von Steuben's reorganization of battalions and companies into standardized units and his instructions for their commanders brought order out of the military chaos at Valley Forge and success to American arms (Ref 2).

It is of further interest to note that, after 1777, regiments in the Continental Army were authorized a strength of 728 officers and men, with each company containing 78 enlisted men. These strengths were greater than the British counterpart units which totalled 477 and 38, respectively. While American unit strengths were greater than the British, General Washington was forced to reorganize and consolidate units after every campaign due to battle losses and the uncertainty of the militia recruiting system then in vogue. At the surrender at Yorktown, 18 October 1781, the Continental Army contained a total of sixty battalions of infantry. With the end of the war and the ratification of the peace terms in 1783, the Army and its battalions was steadily reduced until by 2 June 1784 there were only 80 artillerymen left on duty guarding military stores at West Point and Fort Pitt. At this point in the Army's history there were no battalions in existence! (Ref 1).

In the interim between the American Revolution and the War of 1812, the infantry of the United States Army underwent innumerable crises. The regiment, with its battalions much the same as in the Revolution, proved unwieldy and unsuccessful in its early Indian campaigns (c. 1790) against the Miami Indians in Ohio. The disastrous experience with the Miamis resulted in a drastic reorganization of the minuscule Army.

¹ A brigade generally consisted of two infantry regiments with supporting artillery.

The entire military establishment was converted in 1792 into a legion, that is into a field army in which the three combat branches, infantry, cavalry, and artillery, were combined in the same organization. The element of the Legion in which they were combined was known as a Sublegion, of which there were four. Each sublegion contained infantry, riflemen, cavalry, and artillery; indeed it was the forerunner of the modern regimental combat team.(Ref 1, p 9)

The sublegion was not only the forerunner of the regimental combat team of World War II, but it must be considered an ancestor of the battle group instituted in the post-World War II search for a suitable unit for nuclear and/or conventional combat in the atomic age. In 1796 the legion was legislated out of existence by Congress as it had not proved successful in the field against the Indians. Like the battle group of over a century later, the legion was an experimental search for a flexible combat formation to meet all requirements.

The period before the War of 1812 was a time of drought for the infantry. At one point in 1802 there were only two infantry regiments in service. British aggressive acts caused the Congress in 1808 to increase the Regular Army by five infantry regiments and to reactivate the regiment of riflemen. By 1812, Congress had authorized the largest regiments and battalions seen up to that time in the United States (Ref 1).

Second, it established an organization that was at variance with the seven existing regiments. As a result, in the first six months of 1812, there were three different-sized infantry regiments, besides one of riflemen. The 1st and 2d Regiments made up the infantry of the "military peace establishment," and they had ten companies of seventy-six enlisted men. The 3d through 7th Regiments, authorized in 1808, were called the infantry of the "additional force," and comprised ten companies with two more officers and two more enlisted men than the 1st and 2d had. The 8th through 17th in no way resembled the others, for they had 18 companies of 110 enlisted men, arranged in two battalions.

In June 1812...there...were to be twenty-five regiments of infantry, exclusive of the rifle regiment, each containing ten companies of 102 men. Thus all the infantry regiments were made uniform on paper, and a standard of organization established that persisted throughout the conflict. (Ref 1, pp 10-11)

After the War of 1812 the forty-six infantry regiments and four rifle regiments were reorganized, consolidated, and reduced to eight infantry regiments and one rifle regiment. Each infantry regiment had ten companies, each with a reduced strength of seventy-eight men. In 1821

Congress reduced the size of the companies to 51 enlisted men. At the same time, Congress deactivated the rifle regiment and the 8th Infantry (Ref 1).

The Seminole War (1836-1842) had some effect upon the organization of the infantry of the Regular Army. By 1838, an additional thirty-eight privates and one sergeant were added to each infantry company and another Eighth Infantry Regiment was formed. Threat of war with Mexico brought forth official permission to increase each infantry company to a strength of 100 enlisted men. The regiment comprised ten companies -- with the designations "regiment" and "battalion" interchangeable. The companies were lettered after 1816, instead of being numbered or named after their captains, although the naming practice persisted until after the Civil War (Ref 1).

In the War with Mexico, light battalions of Regulars were often formed for specific missions by temporarily detaching companies -- not necessarily the flank ones -- from different regiments. Composite battalions of this sort usually did not do as well in battle as established ones, in which the men and officers understood each other, and regimental pride was an active stimulant. There was, however, more distinction between flank and line in the volunteer regiments. Two companies out of ten were specifically organized as light and were given a choice between rifles and muskets. The flank rifle companies which resulted were often detached from their regiments and used together for special sharpshooting assignments. (Ref 1, p 15)

Improvements in weapons, notably the invention of the expanding base lead bullet by Captain Minié of the French Army and development of the experimental breech-loaders, increased the accuracy and lethality of infantry shoulder weapons. This factor caused all infantrymen to become light infantrymen or "skirmishers" -- all were required to function as the flank companies of historic fame.

In answer to President Lincoln's call for troops, the War Department on 4 May 1861 prescribed the organization and strength of the regiments to be formed. The volunteer regiments, furnished by the States, were patterned after the Regular Army units of the period. Briefly, each infantry regiment was composed of ten companies. Each company comprised a captain, a first lieutenant, a second lieutenant, a first sergeant, four sergeants, eight corporals, two musicians, one wagoner, and from sixty-four to eighty-two privates. The minimum strength of the regiment was 869 officers and men; maximum strength was 1046. The regimental staff consisted of the colonel, a lieutenant colonel, a major, an adjutant, a quartermaster, a surgeon, two assistant surgeons, a chaplain, three sergeants (sergeant major, quartermaster sergeant, commissary sergeant), a hospital steward, two principal musicians, and a band of twenty-four members. The latter organization was not usually retained by the regiment. Following the old tactical patterns, the regiment could be

handled in combat either as two battalions, commanded by the lieutenant colonel and major, respectively, or as a single battalion. The cavalry regiment consisted of six squadrons (battalions) of two companies (troops) each.

The European influence upon American military organization was particularly strong during the Civil War in the areas of organization and tactical doctrine. Weigley explains this by noting that

In European armies the organization of the regiment into several battalions was growing in favor in the middle nineteenth century, since it made for greater tactical flexibility and permitted the detachment of battalions for recruiting duty. The nine new Regular infantry regiments which were called for on May 4, 1861, reflected this tendency. They were to be composed of two or more battalions each, of eight companies to the battalion. Each of them was to have the three majors appropriate to three battalions. Also reflecting European practice, each of them was assigned to a geographical region from which it was to recruit. But these regiments, the 11th through the 19th, failed to reach full strength, because recruits preferred the looser discipline and higher bounties of the volunteers. At Gettysburg none of the Regular regiments represented had more than eight companies present. When the war ended, the new Regular regiments were reorganized to the conventional one-battalion pattern. (Ref 3, pp 226-227)

It is of interest to note that the Army of The Confederate States followed generally the patterns of organization established by the Federal Army except that all regiments in the Confederate service contained ten companies. Each company was authorized a minimum of 64 and a maximum of 125 private soldiers. Infantry regiments numbered about 642; in addition, there were 9 legions, 163 battalions, and 62 companies unattached to regiments (see Fig. 1).

In 1866, the post-Civil War United States Regular Army was authorized forty-five regiments of infantry. The regiment, now no longer the three-battalion type, was established as the traditional prewar, ten-company unit, with regiment and battalion one and the same (Ref 1).

From 1866 to 1890, the infantry of the Regular Army underwent a number of changes in organization. By 1876, because of an economic depression and government retrenchment, the strength of a company dropped to a low of thirty-seven men. After the Custer massacre in June 1876, the infantry strength was reduced by 5,000 men and the cavalry increased by 2,500. With a lessened need for troops on the western frontier, a further reduction in 1890 eliminated two companies, I and K, from each of the twenty-five authorized regiments. The remaining two hundred companies each contained one sergeant and four corporals less than before and a total of forty-six privates (Ref 1).




Figure 1. Chart of Civil War Army Organization
Source: Civil War Centennial Commission

The improvement of weapons, especially in breechloading small arms and artillery, caused the military thinkers of the 1890's to consider the need for dispersion on the battlefield, and its direct effect upon the control of the troops by the commander. It was believed by these authorities that no man could control ten companies (the regimental organization) in combat. A three-battalion regiment (four companies each) was urged by the Secretary of War in 1890 (Ref 1).

In 1898, the United States entered war with Spain. The three-battalion infantry regiments previously suggested by the professionals of the Regular Army were adopted. Companies were increased from 50 to a total of 106 enlisted men. The battalion contained 424 men, and the regiment, with addition of noncommissioned staff, consisted of 1309 enlisted men. The following extract describes the role of the battalion in the US Army after the Spanish-American War:

The organization of infantry regiments into three battalions of four companies each -- finally brought about by the War with Spain -- persisted as a permanent alteration. With this, it is interesting to note, the Army had returned to the regimental organization used from 1790 to 1792. This 100-year reversion, however, did not arise from a study of the earlier period -- rather it sprang from the experience of the Civil War, coupled with that of the later wars in Europe. As we have seen, this experience had demonstrated that the old regiments were far too big to be effectively controlled in battle. As long as the system in which battalion and regiment were one and the same was followed, the regiment was a fighting subdivision in the line of battle. On the other hand, in the shift to more modern practice which the infantry was making, the battalion was a fighting subdivision while a regiment exercised administrative control over three of them. The fault in the shift was that the American battalion was too small to perform its work. This may be illustrated by comparing the new organization with those in Europe. The French and Prussian infantries both used regiments of three battalions, but the battalions were far larger.. The Prussians had 1,000 enlisted men in theirs, the French had close to 700, while we had no more than 425. (Ref 1, pp 30-31)

The World War I US infantry regiment was organized to include three battalions and a regimental machinegun company. The battalion comprised four companies of 6 officers and 250 men each. The regimental strength was 112 officers and 3,720 enlisted men (Ref 3).

By July 1917, the number of machinegun companies in the regiment had been increased optimistically to one per battalion but this could not be continued, by terms of the National Defense Act of 1916, without eliminating rifle companies from the battalions. The solution was to

create separate machinegun battalions and to leave one machinegun company in the regiment. The machinegun battalions were: brigade (three companies); and division (four companies) which was eventually reduced to two companies and motorized. Under this organization, the machinegun battalion elements could be attached to and detached from attacking or defending units as required.

Major General David W. Gray, Headquarters, United States Continental Army Command has commented, in detail, upon the organization of the infantry at all levels. Of especial interest is his evaluation of the changes wrought in the infantry which is quoted below:

The 1918 organization of the division had undergone considerable change from that of 1914. The three brigades of three regiments each had been reduced to two brigades of two regiments each (the so-called "square division"). Each regiment still had three battalions of four companies each, but the rifle companies now had four platoons instead of two. Each platoon had two sections of three squads each, giving the division 1,132 squads, or about 50 more than the infantry was the addition of a light mortar and 37-mm gun platoon in the regimental headquarters company and a machine-gun battalion in the division.

To support the infantry advance, 37-mm guns, three-inch mortars and machine guns from the regiment and brigade were usually attached to the battalion. Clearly then the basic element of fire support became the battalion. Thus the battalion commander no longer as a normal practice accompanied his battalion in the attack but positioned himself where he could control the use of his supporting fires and of his reserves. This meant that the company had become the basic element of maneuver and the company commander the highest-ranking officer habitually advancing to the assault. As a rule, a rifle company attacking on a normal 250-yard front deployed two platoons in assault and two as reserves. In each platoon one section led and one section followed as a support. These supports provided the additional momentum essential to break into the enemy's position, while the reserve platoons could either outflank or pass through the initial assault platoons to continue the attack. In fifty years we had moved from a division commander's war to one by battalion commanders. (Ref 4, pp 24-25)

The infantry battalion of the United States Army in 1940 was the lineal descendant of those battalions which had served in the wars and expeditions of the past. Essentially, the battalion of 1940 was tried and proven in the maneuvers of 1940 which tested the triangular division concept against the old World War I square infantry division. World War II was a war of

movement and all units, including the division, were pared of excess personnel and equipment to give them greater mobility and flexibility. Table of Organization 7-15 (see App B) of 1 October 1940 prescribed an infantry rifle battalion as follows: a headquarters (T/O 7-16); a headquarters detachment (T/O 7-16); three rifle companies (T/O 7-17); and a heavy weapons company (T/O 7-18). The battalion was commanded by a lieutenant colonel assisted by a major as executive officer. The aggregate strength of the battalion was 932, of which 28 were commissioned officers.

In examining the above unit structure it will be noted that the 1940 infantry battalion was quite dissimilar to the prewar one. The Chief of Infantry, Major General George Lynch contended in his annual report that

in the years from 1937 to 1941 American Infantry had undergone a real revolution. Organizationwise, the foot establishment was arranged along lines that had been more carefully tested than ever before in peacetime. As for weapons, they were turned over completely, except for the .30-caliber heavy machine gun. In other words, the 60-mm mortar (first adopted as standard in 1937, but remaining scarce) had replaced the old Stokes and its successors, while the heavier mortar, 81-mm, had been adopted and the BAR so much improved as to be virtually made over. Finally, the Springfield 1903 shoulder rifle had yielded to the semi-automatic M1. In addition, new small arms such as carbines and submachine guns, had entered infantry armament, together with the larger machine gun, the .50-caliber. (Ref 1, pp 47-48)

An historical summary of the evolution of the infantry battalion and the span of control from 1777 to 1964 is given in Appendix C.

THE WORLD WAR II RIFLE BATTALION

The attack upon Pearl Harbor and the invasion of the Philippines by the Japanese brought all prewar preparation to a climax. There was then a definite purpose to maneuvers and training as the Army faced combat in every type of environment in a global war. The organization of the infantry units prior to Pearl Harbor was to be tested in combat. The phase-out of the horse and horse-drawn equipment was in its final stages. All vehicles in the infantry were motor-propelled and the infantry battalion was furnished transportation for nearly every purpose from command to weapon and supply vehicles. The $\frac{1}{4}$ -ton truck (jeep) became at once the "pet" of the infantryman. Almost immediately, this versatile vehicle gave the infantry a mobility which it had never before experienced. The jeep served as a command vehicle, a gun vehicle, and a hauler of supplies. Other vehicles were assigned to the battalion and by 1 April 1942, T/O 7-15 (see App B) allotted a total of forty-seven vehicles, of which 22 were jeeps; also included were $\frac{3}{4}$ -ton weapons carriers. The enlisted strength of the battalion was set at 884 compared with a total of 904 in the T/O 7-15 of 1 October 1940 -- a reduction of 20 men. These cuts were found principally in the rifle companies and heavy weapons companies. The rationale behind these reductions may be found in the following extract:

General Lesley McNair... had been chief of staff of the provisional division that had tested triangularization in 1937, and he believed in the basic principles of the revision that had resulted. Foremost among these was pooling. Its natural corollary was to keep all units lean, because, when extraordinary needs arose, those units could draw from the pools maintained at the next higher level. Another one of the important principles embraced by McNair was that which gave the best of men and equipment to the offensive portions of units, and cut the other segments to a minimum. The application of these austere principles was sharpened by the urgent need to conserve shipping space; so McNair caused infantry organization to be finely combed for excess personnel and equipment. (Ref 1, p 52)

By 1942, the conversion of the prewar United States Army to a wartime national force was being accomplished slowly but surely. Training, testing, and grading the newly formed units occupied the bulk of the energies and talents of General Headquarters of the Army. However, there were those in command who did not feel that the troops were properly organized and trained for the waging of modern war.

Large unit organization, in March 1942, embodied the outcome of the reforming ideas of the 1930's and the establishment of the Armored Force in July 1940. The March

directive enumerated six types of divisions: infantry, armored, motorized, cavalry, airborne and mountain.

Infantry divisions were barely emerging from a tumult of reorganization. The main features of the new plan -- triangular structure through elimination of the brigade, adaptation to conditions of open warfare, use of motor transportation only -- had been discussed in the Army since the early thirties (had in fact been urged by General Pershing in 1920), and tentatively endorsed by the War Department in 1935 and tested in the field in 1937 and 1939. Not until 1940, after the collapse of France, did these ideas crystallize in an approved table of organization. The Regular Army divisions were then physically reorganized. Not until after Pearl Harbor did it prove feasible to bring the National Guard divisions into conformity with the new system. The purely wartime divisions, which began to be activated in March 1942, followed the new pattern from the start. (Ref 5, p 7)

The War Department took a novel step toward correction of these deficiencies by the establishment of the Army Ground Forces in 2 March 1942. The mission of the Army Ground Forces, as stated in Circular 59, was "to provide ground force units properly organized, trained and equipped for combat operations." The tactical organization which offered the greatest possibility of success in battle became the principal desideratum of all planning and organizational changes (Ref 5).

Tactical organization, which designed for combat, was indispensable to the preparatory effort as well. Tables of organization and equipment were the basic guide to mobilization. T/O units were the blocks out of which the Army was built. The total of all T/O units constituted the major portion of the troop basis. . . The internal character of each unit, as fixed by its tables, dictated the total number of similar units required. (Ref 5, pp 1-2)

The Army Ground Forces, under the command of General Lesley J. McNair (1883-1944), exerted a profound and lasting influence upon the organization of every unit in the United States Army, from the rifle squad to the division. Essentially one of the Army's finest artillerymen, General McNair was a genius at organization and training. Naturally conservative as a professional soldier, he demanded that all units be functional and without excess personnel or materiel. He questioned everything that went into the TOE and especially he cut command and headquarters personnel to the minimum. He believed that all people in a combat unit should be able to function in combat. His ideas were implemented during World War II; today

they survive in the tactical organization of the current Army, and constitute excellent guidelines for the Army of the future. The following paragraph sums up the General's ideas on tactical organization:

General McNair's leading idea in tactical organization was a simple and definite one: to concentrate a maximum of men and materials in offensive striking units capable of destroying the enemy's capacity for resistance. The derivatives of this idea were many. One was to have a minimum of non-combat soldiers, to hold down non-tactical overhead and make tactical staffs small and efficient. Headquarters companies, staffs and administrative personnel could be kept small by elimination of unnecessary links in the chain of command, by reduction of paper work and the use of verbal orders. Combat units should be streamlined for quick decisive action; they should have only such personnel and equipment as were needed always. What a unit needed only occasionally should be held in a reserve pool under higher headquarters. Such pools not only kept personnel and equipment from idleness, but also permitted rapid massing for concentrated use. Transport and impedimenta of all kinds should be assigned sparingly and pooled where possible. Weapons and units primarily defensive in character should absorb as little as possible of the national resources. Special type units and excessively specialized personnel, useful on certain occasions only, should be discouraged. Links in the chains of supply and administration should be cut; divisions and corps should be lightened, with their overhead machinery relegated to armies. (Ref 5, p 6)

From the above extract may be derived the general organizational policy which existed during World War II and has persisted until the present. General McNair was saying, in effect, that "he wanted military units that were lean and mean." Lean to the point of functional numbers and mean as to firepower, striking force, and effect upon the enemy. This ideal strives to be achieved in the tables of organization and equipment published for the United States Army. This is especially true of the combat-type units, such as the infantry, artillery, and armor. (For special type battalions see App B).

The triangular division cut off nearly 13,000 men from the square division's strength. The strength of the new division was about 15,000 men. The overall reduction was achieved by elimination of personnel in the infantry divisions as follows:

The triangular division lopped some 13,000 men from the old square-division strength, emerging with about 15,000. The reduction was achieved by reducing

headquarters and administrative staffs and thinning out support and service troops. Equipment and matériel were cut to the essentials. The result was a lean, tough, more maneuverable division. (Ref 6, p 35)

In the infantry battalion, the 1 April 1942 TOE substituted a headquarters company for the old headquarters detachment as it existed in the 1940 TOE. The strength of the new headquarters company totalled 130 enlisted men and 5 officers compared with the old headquarters detachment of 48 enlisted men. This new organization in the rifle battalion was not well received by General McNair but it and the new regimental cannon company were included over his vigorous objections. Automatic rifles were brought out of the automatic rifle squad (which was dropped) and returned to the rifle squads where they had been before February 1940, that is, one per squad. (App B and Ref 7)

In November 1942, the overseas troop-movement shipping space problem became so critical that another drastic reduction in infantry units was ordered by General McNair. A Reduction Board was established to accomplish this difficult and sometimes painful task. The General was determined to cut the infantry rifle regiment by 400 men and to do this without removing many riflemen from the battalions. These drastic changes were reflected in TOE 7-15 published 1 March 1943. The principal casualty in this reduction within the infantry was the cannon company which was dropped from the table and its howitzers placed in the regimental headquarters and headquarters company. This arrangement did not last long. The Reduction Board finally cut 216 men from headquarters and the heavy weapons companies of the battalions. Appropriate TOE were published on 15 July 1943. (Ref 1)

How these radical cuts in strength were accomplished is shown in the following extract. It is of considerable value to note the rationale used in the removal and addition of men and weapons to the component units of the rifle battalion. The recognition of the "close-in fighters" as the base for the division and its combat units is a most valid one, it was valid then and its validity has not diminished.

...the infantry rifle squad was unchanged. It remained a team of twelve men, armed with ten M1 rifles, one automatic rifle and one M1903. Three such squads formed a rifle platoon. Three rifle platoons were grouped with a weapons platoon to form a rifle company. The weapons platoon was modified slightly. It retained two cal. .30 light machine guns and three 60-mm. mortars as its primary weapons. It lost two automatic rifles, but gained three antitank rocket launchers and one cal. .50 machine gun, the latter for antiaircraft defense. Personnel of the rifle company was virtually untouched, being cut from 198 to 192 through removal of a transportation corporal, a truck driver, a cook's helper, a messenger, an orderly and a basic private. The 27 rifle companies of the division retained a strength of 5,184 --

the close-in fighters around whom the rest of the division was built. Saving 6 men in each company saved 162 in the division, or 16,200 if 100 infantry divisions should be mobilized.

The heavy weapons company, with which three rifle companies were grouped in the infantry battalion, was cut into more deeply than the rifle company, being reduced from 183 to 162 officers and men. Thirteen of the 21 men removed were truck-drivers. Armament was strengthened. To the primary weapons - six 81-mm. mortars and eight cal. .30 heavy machine guns - seven antitank rocket launchers and three cal. .50 machine guns were added. (Ref 5, p 22)

It will be noted in the extract above, that, in the last paragraph, mention is made of the heavy weapons company and how the economies in personnel were achieved. This instance seems to exemplify an axiom which might read, in effect, "whenever unit strength is reduced, weapon strength must be increased." The gaps in the line must, perforce, be closed by additional firepower. Obviously, the type of weapons to be added, or amplified, will depend upon the unit and its mission. It is safe to conclude that in infantry units of all types and sizes, only those weapons that will assist or accelerate the maintenance of fire and movement will be found in this category. The following commentary bears out this great need for continuous support of battalion weapons.

The fire power of a mortar platoon at the immediate call of the battalion commander is needed. Lessons learned from the European Campaign point out that the support of battalion weapons must be continuous and, therefore, they must be capable of being displaced by hand or transported across country. There was a suggestion that the 4.2" mortar replace the 81mm mortar but a clear majority (47 out of 57) preferred the 81mm mortar. (Ref 8, p 8)

The anticipated losses in firepower within the rifle battalion was compensated by the addition of seven caliber .50 machineguns, M1, HB, flexible, to each rifle battalion, that is, one to each rifle company and three to the heavy weapons company. At this time the new 2.36-inch rocket launcher (the Bazooka) appeared in a total issue of 24 to the battalion. These advanced (for the times) antitank weapons were located in the headquarters company, the rifle companies, and the heavy weapons company within the battalion. Thus, the rifle battalion's firepower was increased despite reduction of manpower and in an area where it was anticipated that it would be badly needed-- antitank defense.

It should be noted that the addition of the rocket launchers and the .50 caliber machineguns to the battalion was in keeping with General McNair's basic concept that antitank and antiaircraft defense should be the responsibility of individually fired weapons, not those that were crew-served.

Here again, we find an excellent example of the economy-of-force principle that guided the general in his organizational concepts. He did not like the mine platoon of the antitank company because he considered that it was purely a defensive unit. Although it was dropped in the TOE of 26 May 1943, it was reinstated in the same year in July, with a strength of 31 men. The 37mm guns of the antitank company and the remaining nine guns were divided equally among the headquarters companies of the three battalions. The total enlisted strength of the rifle battalion under TOE 7-15, 1 March 1943 was 818, with 32 officers. (App B)

Not all changes shown on the TOE were actually made, as noted in the following extract:

The headquarters company of the battalion, falling from 135 to 108, was cut proportionately far more than the line companies, on the principle that headquarters overhead should be trimmed. The loss was largely in the antitank platoon, on the principle that defensive personnel should be held to a minimum. Defensive weapons earmarked for the security of headquarters were particularly frowned upon by General McNair. The four 37-mm. antitank guns assigned to the antitank platoon were reduced to three. The 37-mm. gun was retained despite adverse report from North Africa, on the grounds that it was easier to manhandle than the 57-mm. gun proposed in its place, that it was effective when used within its proper range, and that in any case 57's were not yet available to replace it. Three cal. .30 machine guns, one cal. .50 machine gun, and eight antitank rocket launchers were added to the battalion headquarters company, which therefore, although reduced 20 percent in personnel, obtained a net augmentation of armament.

Total reduction of personnel in the infantry battalion was from 916 to 850, a saving of 66, of which only 18 were in the rifle companies. (Ref 5, pp 22-23)

The General Board, European Theater of Operations, was charged with specific study of the battlefield functioning of all units, including the infantry rifle battalion and its component elements. The purpose of the board was to recommend changes in organization with a view toward better combat performance and guidance for more efficient organization in the future. These reports were not theoretical; they were based upon direct interviews with numerous commanders, at all levels of command, and members of the type units concerned. With reference to the battalion headquarters company, the board reported:

The problems encountered by this unit are closely parallel to those of the regimental headquarters company. Communication is the greatest problem and insufficient personnel is presently allotted to insure a continuing and adequate wire and radio net. Experience indicates that an

increase in the personnel of the communication platoon by two wire teams is necessary. No enlisted men are available to perform the functions of command post guards, escorts for prisoners of war and other miscellaneous duties which arise in combat. Provision should be made for personnel to perform these duties without depleting the strength of the ammunition and pioneer platoon or the rifle companies. For this purpose a section, 12 enlisted men, has been added as a military police section. Supply of the battalion is a responsibility of the battalion commander; however, the battalion supply officer (S-4) is not assigned to the battalion and is answerable only indirectly to the battalion commander. It is thought best to assign this officer to the battalion. The inability of the battalion anti-tank platoon to furnish adequate protection against hostile armor, for reasons listed earlier under the heading of the anti-tank company makes it desirable to eliminate this platoon. (Ref 8, p 7)

With reference to the foregoing battaion strength and organizational patterns, the following extract is highly significant:

All the complications...faced by Army Ground Forces during the year from October 1942 to October 1943, and the organization developed for infantry in that year persisted for the duration of the war in Europe. However, when redeployment to the Pacific area became necessary, Ground Forces once more examined the tables of organization and equipment. This time three factors were decisive in the appraisal. The first one was the wealth of combat experience accumulated in Europe; the second, that the scarcity of shipping space had ceased; and the third, the death of General McNair.² These factors resulted in a general enlargement of infantry units. (Ref 1, p 54)

World War II witnessed the first use of armored infantry by the US Army. Essentially, this requirement was caused by the advent of the armored divisions. The best military thought at the time pointed to the need for infantry integral to the armored division for the protection of the tanks and for seizing and holding terrain. Hence, the design of armored infantry battalions and regiments to carry out these vital missions was initiated somewhat over the objections of the Chief, Army Ground Forces. To appreciate this organization problem, it is necessary to review the background. In 1940 the tanks were separated from the infantry and the armored force was established. This solution did not solve the problem of the infantry/tank relationship on the battlefield. The armored divisions, when first organized, did not provide organic infantry for the protection of tanks and ground exploitation

² Lieutenant General Lesley J. McNair was killed in action at St. Lo, France, 25 July 1944, while observing frontline units in combat. He was promoted to General posthumously in 1954.

of armored gains. The initial inception of the armored infantry in the United States Army may be noted in the following extract:

The next type of specialized infantry... was that intended to provide the foot elements of the new armored divisions. It was called "armored infantry." The first of this type in the United States Army came into being when the old 6th Infantry was converted to armored on 15 July 1940. After that, certain numbers which had been inactive on the infantry list since just after the first World War were activated in 1941 and 1942 to become armored infantry. These were the 36th, 41st, 46th, 48th-52nd, 54th-56th, 58th, 59th, and 62d Regiments. Within a few months the new armored infantry regiments were broken up to form separate armored infantry battalions. First and last there were sixty-six of the latter. (Ref 1, p 49)

The armored infantry battalions were essentially copies of the standard infantry rifle battalions. However, they were smaller with less men in the rifle companies. One factor which reduced the number of fighting men available in the armored infantry battalion was the specific battalion requirement for drivers and maintenance personnel. Conversely, the firepower was greater than the standard battalion because of the machineguns mounted on the vehicles (M2 and M3 half-tracks). The training given the armored infantry battalion was essentially dismounted infantry tactics, although some training was given in fighting from the vehicles. This training was seldom employed in combat, as the armored infantry, once deployed from the vehicles, fought dismounted the same as standard infantry (Ref 9).

General McNair was again to exert great influence in the organization of the armored infantry. His attitude toward the armored force and its basic concept is shown in the extract below:

General McNair... had always doubted the invulnerability of the tank. It became clear that tanks would frequently have to be escorted by foot troops sent ahead to locate and destroy antitank defenses. It was recognized that the armored division, internally, required more infantry in proportion to tanks and, externally, would usually operate in closer proximity to infantry divisions than had been supposed. The increasing rapprochement between tanks and infantry raised not only the question of the internal structure of the armored division but also that of the number of armored divisions which ought to be mobilized. (Ref 10, pp 322-323)

The armored infantry battalion, as provided under TOE 7-25, 1 March 1942, contained a battalion headquarters and headquarters company (T/O 7-26) and three rifle companies (T/O 7-27) with a total of 676 enlisted men and 24 officers. This battalion was the smallest infantry battalion in the US Army during World War II. Obviously, there were standard infantry battalion elements, such as the heavy weapons company, which it did not require for the performance of its combat mission. A look at the armament of the armored

infantry battalion shows that it was, at this early period, furnished with organic weapons affording heavy firepower support, that is, antitank guns, assault guns, 60mm mortars, and 81mm mortars. (App B)

It was at this point in the organization of the armored division that the concept that interchangeable battalions of all types were mandatory for that unit appeared. Even before the armored divisions entered combat and

...in view of wide differences of opinion, both the Army Ground Forces and the Armored Force desired as elastic and adaptable a structure as possible... The regimental echelon in the armored division was abolished. The battalion became the basic unit. The division received organizationally three battalions of tanks, three of armored infantry, and three of armored field artillery. Infantry strength in proportion to tanks was thereby doubled. At the same time separate tank battalions, separate armored infantry battalions, and separate armored field artillery battalions were set up in nondivisional pools. These battalions were made identical with the corresponding battalions organic in the armored division. Hence they could readily be attached to the armored division.

(Ref 10, p 327)

The armored infantry regiment was retained within the armored division until 15 September 1943, at which time the regiment was disbanded and separate armored infantry battalions were established. The ratio, based upon combat experience in Africa and Sicily, of armored infantry battalions to tank battalions, was now changed from one-to-two to one-to-one. The rationale for this change was found in the improvement of antitank weapons, such as rocket launchers and the German Panzerfaust, and the extensive use of antitank mines. At El Alamein, in October 1942, General Sir Bernard L. Montgomery of the British Eighth Army used his armored infantry to probe the German lines and to open a gap through which the armored units could advance.

The following extract is of value because it differentiates between the types of armored divisions and explains the employment of the armored infantry battalions:

Both the 1942 type of division and the 1943 type were employed in combat. The 1st, 2nd, and 3rd divisions were employed under the 1942 table of organization, the 1st later being reorganized in Italy to conform to the 1943 table of organization. The 2nd and 3rd ended the war as old type "heavy" divisions. All other divisions were employed as organized under the 1943 table of organization or as "light" divisions. The "heavy" type was capable of longer sustained action than the "light" type. Both types of divisions were successful. Certain weaknesses were found in both. Both were weak in infantry, particularly the "heavy" division with its two armored regiments of six tank battalions and armored infantry regiment of three armored infantry battalions. The

"light" division with three tank battalions and three armored infantry battalions fared better, but needed at least one additional rifle company in each armored infantry battalion in order that tank and infantry battalions could be married up--squad for squad, platoon for platoon, and company for company. (Ref 11, p 34)

TOE 7-15, 15 September 1943, shows the armored infantry battalions of the armored division to contain 35 officers, 3 warrant officers, and 962 enlisted men. The increase in overall strength within the armored infantry battalion was found basically in the inclusion of the additional rifle company.

The organization of the standard infantry rifle battalion as it was in 1943 and 1944 remained fairly stable with minor additions of men and equipment. TOE 7-15, 26 February 1944, was the table establishing the infantry rifle battalion until 1 June 1945, when new tables were published. The 1944 TOE 7-15 carried a total of 825 enlisted men and 35 officers for the battalion. This was "a lean and mean" organization, so lean that many thought that its efficiency in combat had been decreased. The rifle companies were believed to be too small for the type of heavy ground combat encountered in Europe. The strength of the company was increased from an aggregate of 193 to 242 men so that casualties could be absorbed and enough personnel left to function efficiently in a fast-moving combat situation. New members of the battalion were principally in the rifle companies where two new sections were added to the weapons platoons, that is, the assault section (2.36-inch rocket launchers) and the special weapons section (57mm recoilless rifles).

Experience in the European Theater indicates that the major subordinate units of the infantry division were insufficient in strength and general composition to insure the division's ability to conduct offensive and defensive operations independently with maximum efficiency. The absence of tanks in the division organization was especially felt. (Ref 8, p 2)

In the infantry rifle battalion the new 75mm recoilless rifle was added in a new gun platoon in the heavy weapons company. These new weapons gave the infantry rifle battalion a new type of mobile artillery which greatly increased firepower. (See App B for complete TOE 7-15, 26 February 1944 with changes to 30 June 1944.)

The TOE 7-15, 1 June 1945, reflects the influence of US Army infantry combat experience in both Europe and the Pacific. The austerity program of General McNair was replaced by a program of "beefing up" the battalion and its elements to ensure the manpower and firepower to bring the war to a victorious close. With this goal in sight, the planners in the War Department and Army Ground Forces faced toward the Pacific and a new problem: redeployment (App B).

Examination of the TOE noted above reveals that the infantry regiment was increased in personnel from the old 1944 strength of 3,323 enlisted men to a new strength of 3,538 enlisted men. The bulk of these men were assigned to the rifle companies within the battalions. Enlisted strength of the rifle

company rose from 187 to 235. The towed guns (57mm) were eliminated from the regimental antitank company and were replaced by tanks mounting 90mm rifles. The regimental cannon company, equipped with heavy tanks mounting 105mm guns, was, in effect, a tank unit for the direct support of the battalions of the regiments.

Backup for the changes effected above, may be found in the following extract from Report No. 15, European General Board:

The present 57mm towed anti-tank gun is unsatisfactory. Lack of cross-country mobility, coupled with the fact that the penetrating power of the 57mm projectile is insufficient to stop the modern tank, makes it imperative that another weapon be substituted. The majority of experienced combat leaders agree that the present anti-tank weapon should be replaced by a self-propelled tank destroyer or a medium tank... Present recoilless weapons lack the necessary penetrating power demanded in an effective regimental anti-tank weapon and other protection is therefore mandatory. (Ref 8, p 6)


The principle of flexibility in the employment of the infantry regiment and its battalions was noted in the creation of the regimental combat team (RCT) for the accomplishment of specific combat missions. This concept consisted of a planned grouping of certain divisional elements around a standard infantry regiment, that is, a battalion of artillery (105mm), a combat engineer company, a medical collecting company, and a signal corps detachment. These ad hoc organizations were employed with success in both the European and Pacific Theaters during World War II. (Fig. 2) It is of interest, in view of the concepts advanced by General McNair, to note that, even at this early date, military thinking was tending toward "a flexible response" to the requirements of the modern battlefield. Prior to the formation of the regimental combat team, the group and grouping concept with reference to the battalions within a division had been advanced by the Commanding General, Army Ground Forces.

The reorganization of the nondivisional units in the Army ground forces during World War II was to have a salient effect upon the existing wartime Army organization and the formation of the present Army. In 1942, the nondivisional regiments (antiaircraft, field artillery, mechanized cavalry, and combat engineers) were converted to separate battalions. Group headquarters companies (batteries), with a ratio of 1 to 4 battalions (squadrons), were activated. This was a daring and novel experiment in US Army unit organization which made of the group

... a form of organization already employed with certain newer weapons, notably tanks and tank destroyers. It differed from the regiment in that component battalions were self-sufficient for supply and administration (in the manner... of the reorganized armored division), and that the battalions were not assigned organically to the group, but attached to it and detached from it as circumstances

Major General Ralph C. Smith, Commanding
27th Division Task Force at Makin

DIVISION HEADQUARTERS AND HEADQUARTERS COMPANY	
CHIEF OF STAFF	COL A. K. STEBBINS, JR.
G-1 (ACTG)	LT COL CHARLES B. FERRIS
G-2	LT COL W. M. VAN ANTWERP
G-3	MAJOR HENRY F. ROSS
G-4	LT COL CHARLES B. FERRIS



* COMMAND OF THE REGIMENT PASSED TO LT COL KELLEY WHEN COL CONROY DIED

Figure 2. Task Force Organization - Pacific, World War II

dictated. The group was not a T/O unit. It might contain, at a given moment, no battalions or half a dozen battalions, though three or four were considered normal. Group headquarters were supposed to eschew administration, to be tactical only, to control battalions in combat, and to supervise their training. Battalions in principle dealt directly with army on administrative matters, and brought their own supplies from army supply points. (Ref 5, p 51)

The above conversion served General McNair's purposes. It effected a considerable economy in the elimination of the headquarters of the regiments of the cited nondivisional units. It also served as a pattern for the elimination of the regiments in the armored division and the creation of separate armored infantry battalions where there had formerly been armored infantry regiments of three battalions. The same purpose was achieved in the armored division with the establishment of the Combat Commands, A, B, C, which were, in effect, group headquarters. A further benefit of the reorganization was the cutting of the strength of the headquarters companies at all levels (Ref 5, p 52).

The infantry battalions of World War II were the most modern and best-equipped of any infantry units ever fielded by the United States Army, up to that time. Well supplied with the best weapons American ingenuity and industrial knowledge could produce, they were sized and shaped for combat by careful military planning and eventual combat experience. As early as 1938, the infantry battalion of the US Army possessed an aggregate strength of 691. By June 1941, prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor, the battalion had grown to a strength of 932; within one year its strength was slightly less: 916. The proposed strength for the rifle battalion in March 1943 was 850. By July 1944, it had been increased to 871 and by January 1945 it had been reduced to 860. In June 1945, the aggregate strength of the battalion rose to a wartime high of 1,014. During the period of World War II, the average strength of the US Army infantry battalion was 876 men.

During World War II the struggle in many areas of the globe became a battle for air bases. This was especially true in the Pacific and to a lesser extent in Africa. The requirement for the military unit known as an air base security battalion became evident in 1942 while the North African campaign was in full operation. In the United States Army these battalions (in reality infantry) were hastily assembled from a temporary TOE and trained to take over the task of holding the air fields after the regular infantry battalions had conquered the areas in which they were situated (App B).

The air base security battalion was tailored for a very specific task of defense and only a limited number were organized. However, they are worthy of careful consideration in view of current air base protection and security problems in Vietnam. The air base security battalion was commanded by a lieutenant colonel and possessed the usual battalion staff. Organically the battalion included a headquarters company, three rifle companies, and a heavy weapons company. All elements of the battalion were motorized, mounted in half-tracks and armored cars. Heavy machineguns

and cannon were included in the battalion's weaponry. Jeep-mounted machineguns, both light and heavy, were also included in the armament. The general organization of the security battalion stressed high mobility and heavy firepower. A highly efficient system of communication was provided within the battalion and with other combat nets within the battalion's area of air base security responsibility.

The global character of World War II dictated certain tailoring of organizations to special climatic and environmental conditions. The European Theater of Operations functioned in a conventional temperate zone four-seasonal weather pattern. This condition called for troops and organizations capable of operation in hot, dry, wet, cold, and snow-type weather. No particular organizational problems were presented by the European environment. Battalions were not required to be especially organized for combat--except in Italy where infantry mountain divisions were utilized. Mountain units were lightly equipped with motor transport and the troops were trained in mountaineering skills. Ranger battalions were employed in the European Theater, but this was because of the peculiar nature of the mission and had little or nothing to do with the environmental conditions. Special forces, ski troops, and those trained for Arctic service appeared in various highly specialized operations where conventional troops could not be expected to perform efficiently and effectively.

The Southwest Pacific area presented a variety of environmental differences from that encountered by the troops in the European Theater of Operations. Planners in the War Department and individuals in the various training commands and units, were of the opinion that the jungles and tropical areas of the Pacific would require specialized military organizations. Hence, there were light infantry battalions and regiments, especially organized and trained for jungle warfare. The theory behind the light features of these units was that in heavy jungle areas the standard infantry battalion would become "bogged down" with conventional unit organizational patterns and equipment and vehicle transport. But in actuality, these units which were designed and trained for jungle combat in the Pacific never had the opportunity to prove themselves in jungle combat. As the result of training tests these units, the 71st and 89th Infantry Divisions, were reconverted to standard infantry in 1944. Thus, standard infantry battalions were used in jungle combat in the Pacific and proved themselves to be adequate for the task (Ref 1, p 50).

The Rangers were a traditional American military organization dating back to the French and Indian War period of our colonial history. Tough, lean, and functional in organization and personnel, the six Ranger battalions were organized as hard-hitting, light infantry battalions capable of independently conducted commando-type raids deep into enemy territory. These elite units were noted for their high esprit, dash, and physical toughness. These battalions fought with distinction in both Europe and the Southwest Pacific area. In the SWPA and the Philippines, the Sixth Ranger Battalion served with the Sixth US Army under General Walter Krueger. Additionally, General Krueger organized a non-TOE unit of battalion strength which he designated as the "Alamo Scouts." Following closely the ancient Ranger tradition and the scout idea of nineteenth century

western Indian and Philippine campaigns, the Alamo Scouts became one of the most effective intelligence-gathering and raiding units in the Pacific area ³ (Ref 12).

In World War II the requirements of possible special missions, such as operating behind enemy lines during winter under adverse weather conditions, led to the formation of an unusual type of specialized unit, the 1st Special Service Force. Ideally composed of lumberjacks, forest rangers, and game wardens, this unit was an especially elite force. In addition, it had the unusual distinction of being filled with both United States and Canadian soldiers as an experiment in international cooperation. From this viewpoint, it was highly successful and while it operated well, it was eventually deactivated in December 1944 and its members transferred to a standard infantry regiment (Ref 13).

In addition to the foregoing special-type infantry units, including those of company, battalion, and regimental sizes, was another "commando-type" unit, the 5307th Composite Unit (Provisional) which became famous as "Merrill's Marauders." This unit was organized for a specific mission in Burma and in essence, was a carbon copy of the contemporary British "Long Range Penetration Unit" ⁴ which operated in Africa and the Middle East. The unit was filled with jungle-fighting specialists, both officers and men, who were volunteers. The mission was a "behind the enemy lines" type of operation which meant that the "Marauders" had to possess high mobility, flexibility, and independence of action. Obviously such a unit must either live off the country or rely upon air-drop delivery of rations, ammunition, and other essential supplies. Transport was a combination of animal pack trains and essential air-deliverable motor vehicles. Mortars and howitzers were mule-packed and man-carried. After an arduous and bitter campaign against the Japanese in Burma, the 5307th was reorganized as the 475th Infantry Regiment in August 1944 (Ref 14).

World War II battlefield experience from Europe and the Pacific continued to influence the teachings at the Service Schools and its effect was noted in the reorganization of infantry units. In the new tables of organization dated 1 June 1945, the somewhat lean infantry battalions were increased in personnel. With redeployment to the Pacific a fact to be faced when the war in Europe was terminated, infantry regiments were increased from 3,323 enlisted men to 3,538 and additional weapons and vehicles were included. Logically, the greatest increase was in the infantry rifle battalion, with the rifle company increased from 193 to a total of 242 enlisted men.

³ For detailed information on the wartime service of Ranger and Scout battalions and the armored infantry and separate infantry battalions, see The Army Lineage Book, Vol II; Infantry. Washington: Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Military History, 1953.

⁴ See Virginia Cowles, The Phantom Major, New York: Harper and Bros., 1958, for an account of one of these units and its activities.

A considerable number of these additional men were located in the new assault and special weapons sections added to the weapons platoons of the rifle company. The increase from three to six of the 2.36-inch rocket launchers (Bazooka) in the company and the addition of the 57mm recoilless rifle required additional operators in the assault and special weapons sections, respectively.

The novel and highly unorthodox 75mm recoilless rifle appeared in the infantry rifle battalion at this time, operated by a gun platoon which was added to the heavy weapons company. The addition of this recoilless rifle, gave the infantry battalion the heaviest and most accessible weight of fire in our military history up to that time (Ref 1).

A World War II modification of the divisional organization of the infantry was noted in the organization and employment of what were termed "Regimental Combat Teams."⁵ This type organization was temporary and utilized in connection with special missions. Essentially organized around the infantry regimental structure, the typical combat team comprised the following: a regiment of infantry, a battalion of 105mm artillery, a company of combat engineers, a medical collecting company, and a signal detachment. Without lineage or tradition, these RCT were military tactical ad hoc organizations of great flexibility. Usually, when the mission was accomplished, they reverted to their regular divisional unit. These temporary units were of especial value in the Pacific area where they were the answer to the requirement for forces capable of landing and taking an island-based enemy objective (Ref 1).

Conversely, the infantry rifle battalion was capable of being formed into what was designated as a "Battalion Landing Team" which, in effect, was a smaller version of the RCT formed for separate amphibious operations. When the battalions were operating within the RCT structure, it was still possible for certain battalions to be organized and designated as "Battalion Landing Teams" for the accomplishment of special missions. AR 320-5, Dictionary of United States Army Terms, April 1965, has this to say about a Battalion Landing Team:

In an amphibious operation, an infantry battalion normally reinforced by necessary combat and service elements; the basic unit for planning an assault landing.
(Ref 15, p 62)

⁵ The reorganization of the infantry under the ROAD concept has eliminated the regiment from the US Army--the ROAD infantry brigade approximates the WWII and Korean War RCT organization.

With the elimination of the regimental organization under the ROAD concept, the old "Regimental Landing Team" becomes "The Brigade Landing Team" and is defined thus:

An assault landing team. It is a balanced task organization composed of a brigade headquarters, two or more battalion level combat units and the reinforcing combat and service elements required for combat and interim logistical support during the period it conducts independent tactical operations.

(Ref 15, p 73)

In the above-quoted extract it will be noted that considerable flexibility has been built into the concept in that two or more battalions may comprise a brigade landing team, depending upon the mission and the objective assigned. The ROAD concept of the use of the battalions as "building blocks" is employed in this temporary organization--as well as in the permanent organization structure.

THE POST-WORLD WAR II BATTALION AND THE KOREAN WAR

The end of the war in Japan and the surrender of the Imperial Japanese government to the Supreme Commander, Allied Powers, General of the Army Douglas MacArthur marked the end of an era. Gone was the period of exclusively conventional explosives for the waging of war. These had been overshadowed and outranked by a new and terrible force. The detonations at Hiroshima and Nagasaki served to end the war with Japan but more than that they heralded a new age of nuclear war. The absolute lack of experience of any Army in combat under nuclear conditions served to inhibit, frustrate, and puzzle the military profession.

At the same time, a new form of political warfare "the cold war" was mounted by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and its satellites against the Western Allies with whom it had collaborated during World War II. The principal tactic of the Soviet Union was to be difficult and testy in her diplomatic relations with the West. Her ideology and propaganda were employed and her military might displayed as often as possible to upset the status quo in the post-War world. For a few years after World War II, the United States and her Allies were in a somewhat secure position because the United States possessed an atomic monopoly. However, whenever the USSR would achieve a breakthrough in the atomic field, the United States and her Allies must be prepared for nuclear warfare.

The United States Army had just finished the demobilization of the World War II Army and was in the throes of reorganization to meet the prospective challenge of the nuclear age when the United States Army plunged back into combat in the Korean War (1950-1953).

The divisions first committed in Korea were those hastily ordered from occupation duty in Japan. While some attempt had been made to make them war-ready, they were not, as yet, up to the task of facing a tough, aggressive enemy like the North Koreans. The reduced battalion regiments were not large enough and the infantry battalions (reduced by one rifle company) were even weaker when facing a determined foe.

The North Koreans proved to be skillful, tough, and numerous. American troops hastily shuttled to Korea from the occupation army in Japan were unready for them physically, psychologically, and even in equipment. The two-battalion regiments were too thin for sustained resistance on fluid battlefields on which the enemy had captured momentum before they arrived. (Ref 3, p 507)

TOE 7-15, 16 April 1948, established the infantry battalion as having the capabilities of furnishing a base of fire, maneuvering in all types of terrain and climatic conditions, furnishing limited antitank protection, and seizing and holding terrain. These capabilities were not essentially different from those possessed by the World War II infantry battalion under the 1945 TOE. The assigned mission was "to close with the enemy, capture or destroy him by means of fire and maneuver or repel his assault by fire or close combat." There was little new in the assigned mission; it was the

traditional mission of infantry battalions from time immemorial. The battalion still consisted of headquarters and headquarters company (TOE 7-16N); the heavy weapons company (TOE 7-18N); and three rifle companies (TOE 7-19N). The aggregate strength of the battalion was 917 (34 officers and 883 enlisted men). There were three 57mm recoilless rifles in each rifle company, and four 75mm recoilless rifles in the heavy weapons company (see App B).

It is of considerable interest to note the comment upon the postwar Army by Russell F. Weigley:

This Army of 1950 was very much a postwar Army, shaped less by military doctrine looking to a future war, to which this Army so often seemed irrelevant, than by the past, by the last war, of whose massive armies it was the remnant. Under the shadow of atomic power, development of nonatomic weapons had lagged, and procurement had lagged still more, so the weapons of the Army remained those of World War II, developed as long ago as the period from World War I through the mid-1930's, and now often warworn: the M-1 rifle, the Browning Automatic Rifle, .30- and .50-caliber machine guns, 60- and 81-mm and 4.2-inch mortars, 75-mm bazookas, and 105-mm howitzers. Though Pershing tanks had made limited appearances on World War II battlefields, available tanks were still mainly Shermans, despite their shortcomings. With World War I weaponry, the Army was geared for World War II tactics. (Ref 3, p 502)


On 27 June 1949, a Reduction Table No. 7-15-N-20 Infantry Battalions, Active Army, was published by the Department of the Army. This table reduced the 1948 battalion from 917 men (34 officers and 883 enlisted men) to an aggregate strength of 32 officers and 685 enlisted men. This reduction was ordered approximately one year before the outbreak of the Korean War. Its effect was to be tragically felt upon the early battlefields on the Korean Peninsula.

The infantry battalion of the Korean War was essentially that prescribed by TOE 7-15, 15 November 1950. It provided for a headquarters and headquarters company (TOE 7-16); a heavy weapons company (TOE 7-18); and three rifle companies (TOE 7-17). The full strength of the battalion was 919; reduced strength was 722 (see AppB). The combat in Korea called for strengthening of the battalion in both personnel and weapons.

The possession of an "atomic monopoly" after World War II gave the United States a distinct advantage in planning for the organization of the postwar units of the United States Army. This great power, both actual and political, served to preserve the status quo of the existing military units. The infantry divisions which entered the Korean peninsula were much the same as those which had fought across Europe and the Pacific six years before. The only real change organizationally in the infantry division was the addition of a tank battalion and the reduction in strength of the infantry battalions.

In 1955, the Soviet Union exploded its first tactical atomic device and thus marked the end of an era. This historical event signalled the requirement of the United States Army for military units capable of operating on the atomic battlefield. What the future battlefield would demand of units seemed to center about the matter of dispersion and avoidance of the massing of troops. With these qualities in mind, the planners were forced to look toward Army units possessing mobility, rapid and highly efficient communications and, above all, devastating firepower.

The armored division, by virtue of its World War II organization, was almost the ideal atomic warfare combat unit. Inherently, it was dispersed in its three combat commands and small battalions, and it had high mobility, great firepower, and shock action. Thus the armored divisional organization offered a partial solution to the planning for nuclear warfare. The infantry and airborne divisions were not so adaptable in organizational format--they required complete overhauling for use in future warfare, nuclear or conventional. The following extract describing the pentomic division (see Fig. 3) as the new organization was called, explains the radical changes introduced:



Source: Army Information Digest, September 1965.

Figure 3. Pentomic Infantry Division

Except for the armored division, whose strength remained about the same (14,617), the pentomic division was smaller than the triangular division. The infantry division was reduced from its strength of 17,460 to 13,748 and the airborne division from 17,085 to 11,486. The airborne division was lighter with less vehicles and heavy weapons, and was completely air transportable. The infantry division was partially air transportable. The armored division had complete mobility, all elements being mounted on tracked or wheeled vehicles or in army aircraft. (Ref 16, p 61)

General Clyde D. Eddleman, who was Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations, said of the pentomic concept of organization in 1958:

In looking to the future, and in projecting the Pentomic concept beyond its present successful start, we must continue to seek the best balance between selective firepower (atomic and conventional) and new mobility means. The trends in development of future firepower are reasonably evident. In the field of battlefield mobility, we must look largely to new forms of air vehicles for our greatest advances. (Ref 17, p 10)

Major General David W. Gray points out in a most succinct manner the employment of the pentomic concept. As he notes, these changes were far-reaching in that they eliminated the regiment and the battalion:

By the end of the Korean War, planners were hard at work on certain very fundamental changes in the organization of the infantry divisions--changes which ostensibly were designed to better enable the Army to fight a tactical nuclear war. This organization, the pentomic, was adopted as standard in 1956. The three regiments were replaced with five battle groups, each having five companies. Each rifle company had four rifle platoons and one weapons platoon. The regimental 4.2-inch mortar company was retained in the battle group but now it was manned by artillerymen. The three 81-mm mortars were placed in the weapons platoon of the rifle company. (Ref 4, p 26)

The regimental organization which had served the United States Army since the American Revolution was eliminated and the new "battle group" took its place in the order of battle (see Fig. 4). The battle group (1,400) was an unusual unit, larger than a battalion and smaller than a regiment. By July 1958, the divisions of the Army were reorganized according to the pentomic formula. New infantry weapons, the M14 and the M60 were replacing the older M1 rifle, the Browning machinegun, and the automatic rifle. There was a strong trend toward added air mobility for the infantry, and boards such as the Howse Board deliberated, experimented, and recommended.




Figure 4. Infantry Battle Group "Pentomic" Division

The level of command at which "pentomic" planning was conducted is shown in the following extract from a recent (1968) book:

The official theory that future wars would be atomic encouraged at least one change for which the Army could show genuine enthusiasm. That was the reorganization of the combat division to give it smaller, less cumbersome maneuver units, intended to operate independent of the traditional front lines of earlier wars. Westmoreland was closely involved with (General Maxwell D.) Taylor and his operations staff in devising the new commands and giving them a name--the "pentomic" division, made up of five battle groups instead of three regiments. (Ref 18, pp 239-240) (parenthesis added)

The loss of the regimental organization, the substitution of the battle group headquarters, and the phasing out of the battalion puzzled many traditionalists among the military professionals. The regiment and the battalion were units that had served from the very beginning of our Army's history; the creation of the battle group which was neither a regiment nor a battalion presented an enigma. The trend was toward "flexible response" to all types of warfare and the organizational criteria required to achieve this ideal military condition were well-stated in the following comment by Colonel (now Major General) William E. DePuy:

There would seem to be merit in the idea of organizing heavy, perhaps medium and light, combat forces in separate TOE building blocks which could then be assembled in various combinations within non-TOE divisions heavily supported with organic and supporting mobile nuclear weapons systems in order to fit more precisely any set of variants in the enemy or the mission, mode of movement, terrain and climate, and nuclear or conventional operations. (Ref 19, p 40)

Under the pentomic concept the battle group as organized was a most radical departure from traditional US Army unit organization, especially in that it eliminated the regiment as a tactical unit of the infantry division. The regimental organization had been the cornerstone of all US Army organizational structure since the American Revolution (Ref 30). However, the military planners in the Pentagon and at the Service Schools could justify the demise of these ancient and traditional tactical structures by virtue of the possibility of their having to engage in nuclear warfare. The best thinking in the United States Army held to the thesis that nuclear war unit battlefield vulnerability to nuclear weapons could be reduced...

First, by dispersion into formations smaller than those considered to be lucrative atomic targets. Dispersion must be coupled with other passive measures

designed to reduce the susceptibility of our forces to detection, such as concealment and camouflage.

Second, by mobility so that the enemy would be presented only with fleeting targets.

Third, by physical protection against heat, blast and radiation, including the use of armored fighting vehicles and carriers. (Ref 17, p 4)

At this point in the reorganization, the smallest unit within the infantry division was completely reorganized. The infantry rifle squad was divided into two fire teams of five men each. This organization, small as it is, is important because the squad is the forward element of the battalion having close contact with the enemy. Hence, the effectiveness of the battalion in combat is measured in terms of the effectiveness of the rifle squad as it performs its combat mission by fire and maneuver.

General Gray has this to say about the reorganization of the rifle squad:

The most important change in the infantry structure was the division of the squad into two five-man fire teams. This meant that now the basic element of close combat was the five-man fire team of which the company could dispose at most 24--the same number, although they were now smaller, as in World War I. This was a momentous step, for it finally recognized, after many, many years of error, that one man cannot effectively control eight or more fighters in the critical phase of close combat, and that with the defender dispersing in greater depth the attacker needed more rather than fewer basic close combat elements. (Ref 4, pp 26-27)

The battle group has passed into military history but it is worthy of note for certain contributions to flexibility it made during its brief existence. In 1958 Captain Marvin L. Worley, Jr. commented upon the battle group as follows:

The battle group is a self-contained unit consisting of a headquarters and headquarters company, four organic rifle companies and an artillery mortar battery. The battle group will normally be employed as an organic element of the infantry division to which it is assigned. When properly reinforced, the battle group may be assigned independent missions under corps or field army control. The formation of battle group task forces will be accomplished by the attachment of tanks, additional fire support elements, engineers, and transport means allocated by the division commander. The composition of task forces may change frequently to meet the need for flexibility in the organization of the division for combat.

The rifle company consists of a company headquarters, 4 identical rifle platoons, and 1 weapons platoon. Each rifle platoon has 3 rifle squads of 11 men each, organized into 2 fire teams of five men each; and a weapons squad with 2 machineguns and two 3.5 rocket launchers.

The weapons platoon with its three 81mm mortars and two 106mm recoilless rifles provides fire support for the 4 rifle platoons. (Ref 20, p 61)

One of the distinctive features of the battle group was its support by an organic artillery mortar battery. This support was the heaviest ever allocated organically to a United States Army infantry unit smaller than a regiment. The mortar battery was organized and equipped to tie into the division artillery fire support nets in order to call in additional fire support. The battery was also provided with a forward observer section to be with each rifle company. There was also an air control team for communication with the forward air control officer (see App B).

The rifle company of the battle group was compactly organized and supported with organic heavy weapons. There was considerable maneuver built into the rifle squad with the establishment of two fire teams of five men each. The weapons squad was armed with two caliber .30 machineguns and two 3.5-inch rocket launchers. These latter weapons gave the rifle platoon its own antitank capability. The headquarters and headquarters company of the battle group was a most versatile unit. It provided communications, reconnaissance, and antitank support for the group. The communications platoon was equipped to handle communications for the battle group headquarters and to the companies but not within any other elements. The reconnaissance platoon was a basic unit for battlefield surveillance and target acquisition but it also possessed the characteristics of a patrolling and screening force for the battle group commander. The assault gun platoon, with four 106mm recoilless rifles mounted on jeeps, provided the group with an extra heavy antitank fire capability. The eventual plan contemplated equipping the assault gun platoon with the M56 gun or the DART. The counterfire squad was equipped with sound-locating devices for target acquisition. It functioned under the group intelligence officer (Ref 20).

A supply and maintenance platoon and personnel section which provide logistical and administrative support. Additional support will be provided by the division service support units. In normal situations, the division transportation battalion will deliver all supplies, except ammunition to the battle group (unit distribution). When required, vehicles from the transportation battalion may be attached to the battle group so that the battle group can draw and transport its supplies from the division supply points. Unless vehicles from the division transportation battalion are attached, the battle group does not have the capability to effect its own resupply under the supply point distribution system, except for ammunition and emergency food supplies. (Ref 20, p 62)

By 1962, the pentomic concept had lessened somewhat in importance because of the international situation. The Army planners were convinced that there should be only one basic type division for both nuclear and conventional combat. The armored divisions, with their three combat commands under the division headquarters, pointed the way toward the new one-type divisional concept. With the headquarters functioning as the "power handle," the three combat commands were highly interchangeable and flexible. The same concept was applied to the infantry division under the program of Reorganization Objective Army Divisions (ROAD) (see App C). The following extract explains:

For example, an infantry division might have 8 infantry battalions and 2 tank (armor) battalions; an armored division might contain 6 tank battalions and 5 mechanized (infantry) battalions; a mechanized (infantry) division might have 7 mechanized (infantry) battalions and 3 tank battalions; and an airborne division might include 9 airborne (infantry) battalions and 1 tank battalion. The new airmobile division is heavy with cavalry battalions (infantry). Three of these, one brigade, are parachute-qualified. However, there is no fixed normal or standard mix of maneuver battalions for ROAD divisions. The airborne division has a strength of approximately 13,500; the others have a strength in excess of 15,000. (Ref 16, p 63)

Of greatest significance to the Army was the return of the battalion to the infantry division and the elimination of the battle group. The battle group was replaced by the traditional battalion--adjusted to a new age. The regiment was not revived although its protagonists fought a sharp rear-guard action in the pages of the Service Journals in an attempt to restore the ancient and honored unit. However, modern war, hot or cold, nuclear or conventional, seems to have left the regimental colors and traditions to the tender care of the historians and museum curators (see Fig. 5).

The phaseout of the battle group in 1962 and its replacement by the maneuver battalion of the ROAD division did not eliminate some of the better features of the pentomic battle group. The new battalion organization retained the rifle squad and its two fire teams, which gave the infantry the most maneuverable and balanced rifle squads in its long history. The 4.2-inch mortar company, the fifth company in the old battle group, was reduced to platoon strength. Further, the artillerymen who formerly operated the mortars for the battle group were replaced by infantry mortar men. The 81 mm mortars remained with the rifle company in the weapons platoon. Thus the maneuver rifle battalion of the ROAD division was assured of the support fires of organic heavy weapons (Ref 4).

In the Army Information Digest of March 1962, the following comment was made relative to the ROAD concept:

A fundamental concept underlying the new structure is that of tailoring divisions to meet varying requirements. This is done with "building blocks" that are interchangeable within and between divisions.




Figure 5. The Airmobile Division Organization

These building blocks are the COMBAT MANEUVER BATTALIONS that are assigned to a common DIVISION BASE.

The DIVISION BASE contains the elements required for all divisions. It includes the command and control elements; the division artillery, other required combat and combat support units such as the reconnaissance squadron, an aviation battalion, a signal battalion, and an engineer battalion; a support command which provides administrative and logistical support of the division; and three brigade headquarters. The types of units that make up the division base are the same for all divisions; however, their equipment, organization, and methods of operating may vary depending upon the type of division and its mission. (Ref 21, p 4)

The ROAD concept was not new to the United States Army. While it was not so identified, the ROAD concept grew out of the organization of the World War II armored division. The following comment is significant of the ROAD fundamental concept.

All ROAD divisions have a common base. Although there are slight variations in the composition of the base, for all practical purposes it consists of the division headquarters, three subordinate brigade headquarters (thus retaining the triangular armored division's format of three combat commands), the division artillery, an engineer battalion, an aviation battalion, a signal battalion, a cavalry squadron, a military police company, and a support command. The primary mission of the cavalry squadron is reconnaissance; it perpetuates the term "cavalry" because it employs ground vehicles and aircraft in much the same manner as troopers of old employed horses. (Ref 6, p 39)

The support command, a new departure for the United States Army, was charged with provision of medical, administrative, maintenance, and supply service. Artillery support for the ROAD division was contained in three 105mm howitzer battalions. In addition, there was a missile battalion with HONEST JOHN and LITTLE JOHN rockets, and a battalion (composite) of 155mm and 8-inch howitzers. As can be seen from the above, the ROAD division possessed artillery and missile weapons with both conventional and nuclear capabilities.

The ROAD division brought a maximum of flexibility and versatility to the infantry. Essentially, its flexibility rests in the three brigade headquarters and the maneuver battalions; the pentomic battle group was eliminated and a smaller battalion substituted in its place. There were a number of reasons for dropping the battle group, one of which was its unwieldy command structure--there was no intervening authority between the group commander (colonel) and the company commander (captain or lieutenant). The "experience gap" of the commanders in the battle group chain of command was too great for modern warfare with its requirements of dispersion and independent operations. The pentomic concept was one

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which served essentially as an interim measure until a better infantry division structure, such as ROAD, could be conceived, tested, and adopted.

The 4.2-inch mortar survived with distinction the various organizational changes effected by Reorganization of Combat Infantry Division (ROCID) and ROAD. The obvious need for a weapon with artillery capabilities and effects in support of the infantry battalions in all types of foreseeable combat caused the 4.2-inch mortar to be retained. Combat experience of the infantry in Korea with the 4.2-inch mortar had been good. The heavy mortar provided not only a heavier punch but it could, by virtue of its high angle of fire, reach areas that artillery could not.

General George S. Patton, Jr. was essentially an armor commander, yet he was somewhat of a generalist rather than a specialist. His notes and recommendations for the conduct of war throw considerable light upon his military thinking and they are as valid today as when written. The following quotations are significant rationale for retention of the 4.2-inch mortar in the ROAD organization:

A battalion of 4.2-inch chemical mortars, when available should be attached to an infantry division. An infantry regiment in combat should have a 4.2 chemical company attached. (Ref 22, p 407)

In the battalion the heavy weapons company paces the battalion. (Ref 22, p 410)

The 4.2-inch mortar was retained for several cogent reasons. The ROAD divisional organization was established to give the infantry a built-in flexibility for response to a requirement for operations in either conventional or nuclear war. In essence, this response was to be effected by the traditional doctrine of fire and maneuver. But in nuclear war, dispersion of units for combat was indicated. From consequent increased independence of command and maneuver under nuclear warfare arises the requirement for independent and heavy supporting fires for the infantry battalion. The 4.2-inch mortar possessed characteristics similar to field artillery which was authorized in the ROAD reorganization of the infantry division. However, it is well to note the advantages of the heavy mortar over the conventional artillery cannon in the following terms:

Cannon are capable of delivering all types of fires. They are characterized by flexibility in employment, accuracy, the ability to shift fires quickly, a high rate of sustained fire, and the ability to mass large volumes of fire from dispersed positions under all conditions of weather and terrain. Cannons have restricted mobility in difficult terrain, relatively short ranges, and comparatively heavy tonnage requirements for ammunition.

Heavy mortars have capabilities similar to cannon. They differ from cannon primarily in their higher trajectory, shorter minimum and maximum ranges, and greater volume of fire per tube. They are readily moved by air and can be

emplaced in positions inaccessible to ground vehicles. They are useful in providing large volumes of fire in support of close combat forces. (Ref 23, p 37)

A battle group comprised a headquarters company, four rifle companies, and a mortar battery. The mortar battery included a battery headquarters and two mortar platoons. Although the battle group was, in reality, a large battalion, it required the same organic heavy fire support as the eliminated regimental organization. It will be recalled that in World War I, the heavy machinegun was organized into machinegun battalion units which were separate from the infantry rifle battalions and regiments. By this token, the infantry rifle battalion had no heavy machineguns organically assigned. Required machineguns were attached to companies and battalions for specific missions and combat operations. This arrangement was not satisfactory and the planner of ROCID and ROAD organizations had this lesson of history before them. Ergo, the 4.2-inch mortar remained organic to the ROAD battalion, as it was neither desired nor desirable to form a separate divisional heavy mortar unit.

In the infantry rifle battalion, especially in Vietnam, where jungle rice paddy and mountains make the movement of the 4.2-inch mortar and its ammunition a heavy task for the foot soldier, there is a tendency to return to the smaller caliber mortar (the 81mm) as a heavy weapon for the battalion, and employ the 4.2-inch mortar in a more or less semi-fixed fire base along with the artillery.⁶ As has been noted in Evolution of the US Army Infantry Mortar Squad: The Argonne to Pleiku, the Marines have returned the 60mm infantry mortar to combat service. This return of the smaller caliber mortar has not displaced the M79 grenade launcher in the battalion rifle companies. The M79 is still regarded as a fine grenade launcher. The trend toward smaller caliber and lighter mortars may be a particular requirement of the limited war in Vietnam. That the trend would obtain in a conventional conflict cannot be judged with any degree of accuracy, since the doctrine of fire and movement and the need for certain weight fires and certain celerity of movement would still govern. In Vietnam, this doctrine is being tested by combinations of guerrilla war, terror, and conventional war including siege warfare, in the current battle actions.

The principal component of the rifle battalion, the rifle company, was reorganized under ROAD to contain three rifle platoons and a weapons platoon. The rifle platoon contained three ten-man rifle squads and a five-man weapons squad.

The use of the armored personnel carrier (APC) by infantry units has been on the increase since the Korean War. The armored or mechanized infantry rely almost entirely upon the APC for mobility and maneuver to the final assault phase of the combat. Within the past year or so there has been considerable feeling that the soldier mounted in the APC should be firing from the moving vehicle. Experimental firing ports have been installed in a number of APC with the idea of employing the full combat potential of the

⁶These comments are based upon information received from a former Chief of Infantry Section, OCAFF, now G-3, ARPAC.

troops being carried therein in the maneuver phase. There are those who consider this move as one in the wrong direction and they are quick to allege that the APC, thus altered, is a poor tank. The following comment in 1965 is of significance in view of the trend toward fighting from the APC:

Armored infantry are specialized in that they advance mounted in armored personnel carriers and upon dismounting, fight as infantry. They can operate in combat without tanks or they may combine both mounted and dismounted actions in their tactical patterns. Mounted combat from the present armored personnel carriers is difficult if not impossible for the squad personnel within the vehicle. Fires of the carrier-mounted weapons only can be delivered while the vehicle is moving. The addition of numerous gun and rifle ports in the hull would tend to weaken the personnel protection potential of the carrier. The protection afforded by the armored personnel carrier enables the armored infantry squad to get as far forward as possible for the delivery of a decisive blow upon the enemy when he is subjected to or recovering from the heavy fire power of the accompanying tanks. The fires of the carrier-mounted weapons assure the squad close support when it is needed. (Ref 24, p 55)

Here we are presented with a dilemma: the sacrifice of the overall protection of the APC up to the point of close contact with the enemy or engagement while moving by small arms and grenade fires from ports in the hull of the APC. Conversely, there are advantages, psychological and military, to be gained by firing from the interior of the APC while it is in motion. Among these are occupation of the passengers with a combat task prior to disembarkation and closing with the enemy, that is, delivery of aimed fires upon the hostile position and personnel prior to dismounting, thus inhibiting the hostile force from delivering accurate and effective fire against the APC as they advance.

COMMAND, CONTROL, AND COMMUNICATIONS OF THE INFANTRY BATTALION

The span of control may be defined as the number of principal subordinates a commander must direct to insure that the unit he commands is functional in garrison or in the field. Historically, the span of control has been established by the format of military tactical organization which is prescribed by regulations or orders based upon current doctrine. Broadly, the span of control is limited by both human and material factors, that is, the physical and mental abilities of the commander and the state of the art of weaponry and communications, including transport. Specifically, the span of control is limited by the terrain, climate, and general environment of the combat area. Throughout history, the military profession has endeavored to limit the number of individuals in the commander's span of control by constant reorganization of units and redefinition of tactical doctrine and individual functions.

In the Greek phalanx and the Roman Legion, the span of control was measured in terms of the number of subordinates the leader could control in combat with his voice or visual signals. At that period of history, the number was deemed to be in the area of eight to ten men. Prior to this era, the Chinese general, Sun Tzu, had stated:

The control of a large force is the same in principle as the control of a few men. It is merely a question of dividing up their numbers.

Fighting with a large army under your command is no-wise different from fighting with a small one. It is merely a question of instituting signs and signals. (Ref 25, p 55)

Aside from the requirements for mechanical and lethal weaponry there are additional factors involved in the organization and control of the infantry battalion. The size, shape, and interior organization of the battalion has been influenced throughout history by human factors. Inasmuch as war is conducted by humans and not machines, the human qualities of age, experience, education, training, intelligence, bravery, ability, and determination exert significant influence upon the span of control of the commander. How many subordinates can a commander control under the stress of combat? This condition has varied throughout military history and is directly related, not only to the human factors, as cited above, but to the weapons, tactics, and state of the military art. Each period of history has produced outstanding field commanders at all levels of military organization. Assuming that the human factors do cause what the psychologist terms "individual differences," there must be criteria that affect the organization, size, command, and control of the infantry battalion. It is impossible to average these individual differences, but a standard military training and academic education will tend to equalize these differences.

AR 320-5, Dictionary of United States Army Terms, defines command in the following terms: "Command: The authority vested in an individual of the armed forces for the direction, coordination, and control of military forces."

Command is then an expression of the authority of the state in the person of an individual who holds rank for this purpose. The battalion and other military organizations from the field army to the rifle squad of the infantry are subjected to command by an individual assigned solely for that purpose by virtue of his rank and position in the military service. Command of any military unit is exercised by the commander through means of subordinate commanders. The number of principal subordinate commanders serving under a higher commander constitute the "span of control." Over the years and through many campaigns, wars, and battles, the number of subordinates that a commander can control has been found to depend upon the state of communication existing between them. In ancient times, vis-à-vis control was traditional, but with warfare becoming more complex and dispersed due to improved weapon lethality and mobility this was no longer possible. Beginning at the end of the nineteenth century (1890) this fact was recognized by the reorganization of the US infantry regiment into three battalions of four companies, each under the command of a major. Thus the span of control of the battalion was established at four subordinate unit commanders plus a minimal battalion staff of two or three officers and noncommissioned officers. This span of control has survived generally until the present period of 1968.

Examples of command and control situations from history have shown that there is a limit to the number of subordinates a commander can control. Recent advances in communication techniques have afforded the commander instant and effective communication with his unit commanders. Ergo, assumption will be made by some that because of improved communications the span of control may be increased. There is justification for challenging the foregoing statement. Questions relating to the above assertion may be phrased somewhat as follows: (1) Is span of control a direct function of the efficiency of the means of communications available to the commander? (2) When did communications evidence such improvement that the span of control could be increased? (3) What form of improved communications has exerted the most influence upon the span of control? The following extract will shed some light upon the above queries:

From the earliest times through the Napoleonic period, the primary means of transmitting orders on the battlefield was either by runner or by mounted aide; semaphoric and later rudimentary electrical means were employed only between the army in the field and the seat of government. But early in our own Civil War the Union Army took the lead in the adoption both of the mobile field telegraph, connecting armies, corps, and division, and of Major Meyer's visual signalling system which extended to smaller units. While neither of these systems can be compared in efficiency to the electronic methods... they were both vast improvements over the use of runners or horsemen; and by the latter part of the Civil War, they were in common use in both contesting forces. (Ref 26, pp 11-12)

The matter of individual differences establishes the superior from the average or mediocre performer. However, the military structure is based upon approved, established tables of organization and promotion systems. These are career patterns by which certain individuals are posted to specific assignments by rank. These ranks have been attained by prescribed periods of service in grade, seniority, or selection. Assumption is made by all concerned that by the time the individual has reached a certain grade in his specific arm or service, that he is qualified professionally, by experience, training, etc., to command a unit comparable to his rank. Thus, the span of control for each rank, in the military hierarchy, is established by law. Such fact assumes that the incumbent at each level of the command structure is involved in a span of control situation, either as a superior or as a subordinate of a superior commander. It follows that the spans of control of all commanders are established and they must perforce accept them and operate.

In the American Civil War (1861-1865) the tactical organization of the regular Army infantry battalion took the form of an eight- or ten-company unit. The battalion commander's span of control was almost as great as that of the Volunteer (State Troops) of the regimental commander which included ten company commanders in addition to his staff. The number of individuals controlled directly by either the battalion commander, or the regimental commander, under the span of control principle always included the staff of four to eight officers and noncommissioned officers at headquarters, in addition to the eight or ten company commanders. If battalions were formed in the Volunteers, it was possible for the lieutenant colonel and the major to command them, hence, the span of control of the colonel was reduced to his staff and two principal subordinates. It must be remembered that the staff officer of the battalion or regiment possessed the authority by delegation to issue orders in his commander's name (see Fig. 1).

The officers who reported directly to the colonel of the Volunteer regiment were the lieutenant colonel, the adjutant, the major, the quartermaster, the chaplain, and the two assistant surgeons. Administration was accomplished by the adjutant who worked directly under the second-in-command. Training and operations functions were performed by the major when he was not doing duty as a temporary battalion commander. In practice, the regimental commander had only to command his staff in order to implement his span of control over the companies, or battalions, when formed.

Numerically, the number of subordinates a commander can direct successfully in battle has been shown historically to be approximately eight or nine. The span of control of the battalion commander, from the beginning of the US Army, is noted in the Historical Background to this study. Traditionally, it has varied from three to ten subordinate unit commanders less a staff of from three to six battalion headquarters personnel. One of the peculiarities of the chain of command system which is the basic rationale for the span of control is that the commander may, under certain conditions, bypass his staff and issue orders directly to his principal subordinates. Occasions when this is done are in emergencies and usually when

the battalion commander is on the ground away from headquarters or his command post. In the type of combat encountered in Vietnam, this is usually the situation with the command helicopter constituting a highly-mobile command post for the battalion commander. In this instance, the battalion commander must keep his staff fully aware of his location and his actions and to whom he has issued specific orders either verbally or in writing, in full or fragmentary form. Unless he does this, the command and control function of the battalion under the chain of command and span of control system will collapse.

In further clarification of the span of control principle and its operation, the span of control can be discussed as three functions. These are the tactical, the administrative, and the staff functions. The tactical span of control is directly concerned with the command and control of combat troops in operations, whereas the administrative span of control is concerned with noncombat or support units. The staff span of control, exercised by the commander's deputy, second-in-command, or executive officer, is concerned with staff command. On high levels the chief of staff performs the command and control function under the orders, commands, and directives of the unit commander.

In the modern infantry battalion, the commander does possess a tactical span of control of four company commanders. He also possesses a staff and administrative span of control of his executive officer and the S1, S2, S3, and S4. As noted, he usually deals with his staff through his executive officer, hence, the span of control totals five men. Obviously, if the battalion commander does not follow the chain of command principle, his span of control will be increased as he deals directly with his staff and not through the executive officer. If this latter officer is bypassed, as a matter of personal policy or professional ignorance, the commander may find that his span of control has become unwieldy. In this instance, professional education and training will make the difference, that is, "there are no poor battalions, only poor battalion commanders."

The battalion is the largest ground unit which is personally influenced, under "usual" conditions of combat by its commander. A brigade commander, except in an emergency, does not interfere with the operations of one of his battalion commanders. However, a battalion commander often directly controls one of his own companies--for example, when the unit is faltering because of the combat loss of its commander. In the event that all company officers are casualties, the battalion commander would send one of his staff to take command, thus influencing the action indirectly. Within the battalion, the companies are the "building blocks" of the battalion structure, and the battalion commander's primary responsibility is that they are properly emplaced and combat functional.

Under the ROAD concept of organization the battalion commander's staff consists of an executive officer (major); an S3 (major); an adjutant (captain); S1 (captain), and S2 (captain), an S4 (captain), a communications officer (captain); and a sergeant major. This is a typical infantry battalion commander's staff. While the staff does increase the number in the span

of control, it should be noted that in practice the battalion commander deals with his staff through the executive officer who functions as a chief of staff. The battalion staff operates through the elements of the headquarters and headquarters company assigned as integral to the battalion. The headquarters and headquarters company has grown from a battalion headquarters detachment of World War II days to an organization comprising 19 officers, 2 warrant officers, and 269 enlisted men and, as such, is one of the four companies within the span of control of the battalion commander. Theoretically, in 1968 the battalion commander possesses a span of control of one executive officer plus four company commanders. If he does not use his executive officer as he should, his span of control may be enlarged as he controls each staff officer personally. Whether this situation occurs depends mainly upon the professionalism and experience of the battalion commander and the training of his subordinates. As such, the battalion staff officer does not command, he issues orders and directives in the name of the commander on the basis of delegated authority. He is, in a sense, an extension of the commander's authority so that he may cope with the span of control required for control of the battalion. This span of control principle enables the battalion commander to operate with a span of control of six (one staff officer and five company commanders).

Concerning modern tactical communication and its impact upon the span of control, the thinking among professional soldiers is that the dimensions of the battlefield are growing. Today, the battlefield can be national, international, or local, in site and area. This belief is based essentially upon the fact that the past World Wars were global in extent. These latter conflicts involved millions of men and millions of miles of territory. The great distances required a maximum effective performance from the contemporary communication media. These media included radio, both voice and CW (code), telephone, land telegraph, panels, flags, and lights. These were the types of communication available to the air, ground, and naval services of the combatants. World War II, Korea, and Vietnam were especially marked by the advent of the portable, tactical radio-telephone and its assignment down to the infantry rifle platoon and squad. With communication thus assured from the higher to the lower level units a control of combat was achieved to a degree never before attained in the long history of warfare.

In modern warfare, sophisticated communications systems have not enlarged the span of control but have afforded better control by the next higher commander. Captain Roger H. C. Donlon, USA hero of Vietnam, commented thusly: "The key to the whole thing is communications. Without it we had nothing."

The span of control principle is, of course, basic to the organization and operation of the battalion. How many subordinates a commander can control in battle is determined by several conditions. Among these conditions are the period of history involved or the time frame in which the commander finds himself and his unit. Weaponry, and especially communications, available to the commander have significant effect upon the control limitations imposed upon the commander. Historically, the span of control has been

demonstrated as having exerted vital and far-reaching influences upon the successful or unsuccessful exercise of military command. There is a limit to the number of subordinates that a commander can control in garrison or in the field. It should be noted that these circumstances are environmentally and tactically different. Nonbattle or garrison situations are marked by an absence of the pressure engendered by the possibility of combat wounds, deaths, and military failure --that is, surrender.

The span of control in a noncombat situation will be affected by the mission of the unit--training. The maneuver phase, which is employed by the military profession to test proficiency, should reflect a realistic span of control comparable to that employed in combat. Whether or not three or four companies are the maximum that a commander can control in combat is a question that has never been definitely answered. That the battalion organization is centered about the span of control is an acknowledged fact of military life. Theoretically, under the span of control concept, the commander functions by controlling three or four company commanders. For his rank and responsibility this span of control is about all he can operate under combat conditions. With the battalion headquarters personnel of executive S1, S2, S3, S4 (the battalion staff), and various enlisted men as assistants, it will be seen that the span of control of the battalion commander extends much farther than to the three or four company commanders of the battalion organic units.

Colonel Arthur P. Wade, late of the staff and faculty of the United States Military Academy at West Point, had this to say in his previously cited paper on the subject of the span of control:

In recent years a theory has gained circulation that a commander's span of control is directly related to his means of communicating with his subordinate commanders. The theory has now been expressed officially in the directives which led to the reorganization of the infantry division. A basic tenet of the reorganization, for example, was the idea that the new division should optimize a span of control, defined as 'the maximum number of subordinate elements at each echelon which can be controlled effectively.' This theory was expressed, in general terms, by the principle of 'recognition of increased span of control possible through modern signal communications'. (Ref 26, p 11)

The modern means of communication available to the commander enabled the Army to reorganize the infantry division and its component units under the now outmoded and outdated battle group (ROCID) concept. At the time of this concept, 1956, it was noted that:

... the division commander now controls directly 8 subordinate maneuver elements: 5 infantry battle groups (the battalion was eliminated--as well as was the regiment), a reconnaissance squadron, a tank battalion, and under the new concept of employment of atomic fires--the nuclear delivery means of division artillery. This span of control

is contrasted with that of the old triangular division, wherein the division commander controlled directly only three infantry regiments, a tank battalion, and to a lesser degree, a reconnaissance company. (Ref 26 p 11)

The World War I United States Infantry was organized and reorganized along the lines of the French and Allied tables of organization. Eventually the various infantry units were organized as follows:

<u>Organization</u>	<u>Enlisted Men</u>	<u>Officers</u>
Company	250	6
Battalion	1,026	27
Regiment	3,755	100
Brigade	8,210	225
Division	27,152	975

In the World War I United States National Army organization, there were 4 companies of 250 men in each infantry battalion. The infantry regiment consisted of three battalions of approximately 1000 men each. The infantry brigade was comprised of 2 infantry regiments of 3000 men each and the infantry division consisted of 2 brigades with a division rifle strength of about 12,000 riflemen. The span of control of the infantry rifle company commander covered 5 lieutenants and his company first sergeant, mess sergeant, and supply sergeant. On battalion level, the battalion commander, a major, commanded four company commanders and his adjutant, or, second-in-command. The regimental commander's span of control encompassed three battalion commanders and a small regimental staff, the adjutant, the regimental executive officer and S-1 Personnel, S-2 Intelligence, S-3 Operations, S-4 Supply. There was generally a Chaplain assigned plus the necessary medical officers, including veterinarians. (Ref 27, pp 83-84)

The infantry organization of World War II was perhaps the best planned and most tightly organized ground force ever sent into battle by the United States. The battalion was larger, but lean in personnel and mean in its weaponry and capabilities.

Spacing between troops and units as a factor of span of control has always been a minor concern of the commander in the field. Historically, the ancients utilized the order of battle alinement system to help solve this perplexing problem. Weaponry and its employment in battle exerted considerable influence upon the precise, mathematical spacing of the men and the lining up of the units. Weapons wielded by muscular power alone required that the wielders be compactly arranged to give the maximum effect of the cutting edge of the hand-held weapons in the man-to-man struggle.

With the discovery of gun powder, the traumatic power of the weapon was increased since it projected its force at greater distances. The battle thus became more indirect and the soldier only closed with his enemy at the final phase of the battle. But the theory of massed fires of

companies and battalions caused the compact phalanx or square-type formations of the ancients to be retained until weaponry became too accurate and lethal to withstand in formation.

Basically, the spacing of troops in modern war dated from the field manuals of the Civil War which stated "that the comrades in battle were to maintain visual and vocal contact." Essentially, in the United States Army, this has meant a five-pace interval between skirmishers on the line. In the parade formation ranks the distance between ranks is traditionally 40 inches, with the distance between soldiers about 14 inches. The size of the infantry squad (eight to ten men) has been correlated with the number of men the squad leader can control in combat by hand and voice signals. With modern communication devices the distances between soldiers have increased. The factors of environment, terrain, climate, and visibility determine the spacing of the troops and units. Under modern mobile conditions of combat no precise mathematical table, as worked out by the ancients, is applicable. The soldier must adjust himself to the terrain, taking advantage of all cover and concealment. Improved communications permit distances between "his comrades in battle" to be greatly increased.⁷

There has been some doubt raised as to the effect of the state of the communication art upon the span of control exercised by the commander on the battlefield. In terms of contemporary communications before the great discoveries and inventions, the personal and human capabilities of the commander and the commanded are directly involved:

Radio telephone, wire telephone and other less technical means of communication gave the commander of a World War II unit communication above and beyond that ever before available. Units, at all levels, were controlled and directed toward their missions by fragmentary orders. Given over the radio by the voice of the commander, these orders were as pertinent and direct as they were personal and human. This was not the equivalent of the direct, personal, vis a vis leadership of the Civil War combat commander, who waved his sabre and charged. Over the radio, the tone of the voice and the personal contact with the commander, even remote, was, in a modern war-- a good substitute. (Ref 27, p 117)

Span of control must always be correlated with the contemporary state of the art of tactical communication. From the Civil War through World War I, battlefield communication was constantly drawing away from the vis-a-vis command procedures of previous wars. Improved weaponry and updated organization and tactics exerted significant influences upon the span of control.

⁷ The spacing or dispersion of units on future battlefields, especially in event of nuclear war, cannot be predicted accurately. However, comparisons have been made in an interesting and informative article in the Military Review of March 1960, entitled "Interaction of Firepower, Mobility and Dispersion." While this article does not claim to prescribe troop spacing it does furnish invaluable historical comparison with a view toward the future.

Human factors are essential elements in the span of control in the areas of memory, mental concentration, and the specific intelligence quotient of the commander himself. It has been said that the span of control is basically a function of the mind of the commander. Individual mental, physical, and moral factors will positively or negatively influence this function. Wade has said it well in the following extract from his cited paper:

Even with the ultimate in communications -- long-range thought transference -- optimum span of control would still vary with individual commanders. Those blessed with rare flexibility of mind, keen concentration, and a photographic memory might have no difficulty in controlling 8 or 9 subordinate elements; others, probably equally fine tacticians, would find it restrictive to work directly with more than 5 or 6 subordinates. (Ref 26, p 14)

Historically, tactics and organizational concepts will change, and weapons and communications will reach fantastic capabilities. However, these will be subject to the limitations of the military professional intellect which must direct and control their implementation. Justification of increased span of control solely upon the invention and utilization of improved means of communication is neither sound nor wise. As noted, the limited capabilities of the human mind tend to negate the advantages of these technical advances in communications.

In effect, an increase in the span of control wholly based upon improved communications may handicap the average commander. If he is gifted with certain attributes of the great captains such as a photographic memory, a highly-developed intuition, creativity, and supported by a highly competent staff, he will experience little or no difficulty (Ref 26). However, if he does not possess these, the increased span of control may not only be a handicap but a military disaster as well.

In World War II, the addition of the so-called Walkie-Talkie and SCR 300 gave the infantry and other arms instantaneous and generally reliable communication. For the first time in our military history, there was radio communication between the elements of the infantry company. The Army Lineage Book comments:

Five hand radios were included in a company's equipment. These, and telephones, knit companies tighter together than had been the case since the Civil War; but it by no means made them act as one man. Dispersion to avoid the deadly effects of enemy fire threw squads, or fractions of squads, on their own in combat, particularly in dense foliage, in the mountains, and in night operations. (Ref 1, p 57)

Thus, in World War II, the Korean War, and Vietnam, it was and is possible for a commander of an infantry battalion to talk directly with the leaders of the attacking units and direct their efforts. Often this direction is vital because the commander is either airborne or in a terrain or tactical situation remote to the subordinate unit commanders. Supporting

fires of mortars and artillery are also controlled and directed by radio and telephone (airborne or ground) communication in ways which were never thought attainable in past wars.⁸

Beginning with the Korean War, the helicopter began to assert itself as a most important new means of command, control, and transport at all levels. Highly maneuverable and capable of vertical ascent and descent, this air vehicle enabled a commander to reach the troops quickly. Enroute, he was afforded maximum observation of the battle area. Aside from its great command and control potential, the helicopter was an ideal transport vehicle for evacuation of the sick and wounded. Maximum employment of the helicopter in this activity was initiated in Korea. During the Korean War and after, there was some advancement of the idea that helicopters possessed a tactical combat potential.

In the post-Korean development period, the helicopter came into its own as a command, control, fire support, and transport vehicle. With its high speed and vertical ascent and descent characteristics, the helicopter introduced radical changes in the time and space factors of tactical ground operations. The effect of the helicopter upon the span of control at battalion level has been noted primarily from the standpoint of communications. By its inherent speed and mobility, the helicopter has given the battalion commander in Vietnam a high degree of personal contact with and control over his frontline elements. Never in our military history has the infantry battalion commander been able to fly, or hover, above his combat units on site and possess visual and vocal contact with the units and individuals in his span of control. This outstanding contribution of the helicopter is, of course, in addition to its revolutionary effect upon tactical operations in the delivery of troop units to or from the combat area.

⁸ See Army 1967 Green Book, pp 172 and 174, for a condensed review of communication facilities and equipment available to the infantry from squad to division level.

THE ROAD AND AIRMOBILE BATTALIONS IN VIETNAM

In Vietnam, standard infantry battalions of the ROAD concept are engaged in combat. The "building block" employment of the rifle battalions within the brigade and division has functioned well according to reports received from the battle zone. In connection with operations in Vietnam it must be recalled that the US Army is fighting a three-faced type of warfare, that is, conventional war, guerrilla (unconventional war), and nonviolent warfare (civic action). To establish a battalion organization that can operate equally well in all three types of combat has been difficult for US Army planners. The following commentary by a combat-experienced brigade commander in Vietnam is of interest as it defines the role of the battalion in the typical "search and destroy" operations carried out there:

The battalion is the basic operational unit in jungle search-and-destroy operations. Its fighting is done principally by squads and platoons under company commanders' control. The unit that locates the enemy should not be reluctant to break contact and withdraw far enough to permit free, uninhibited employment of supporting fires. After supporting fires have done their damage, the unit can again push forward small units to survey the situation and to bring in new supporting fires, if appropriate, or continue its search.

The brigade commander, once the enemy is located, should see that massive volumes of supporting fires are put on the enemy and simultaneously commit additional battalions to block the enemy's withdrawal and to employ supporting fires to destroy him.

* * * * *

Battalion, brigades, and divisions operate by means of platoon and squad tactics. Therefore, battalion, brigade, and division commanders must know how their platoons and squads operate and insure that they operate soundly and professionally. (Ref 28, p 17)

In Vietnam combat experience has demonstrated many important facts about the battalions of the present-day infantry arm. In both the ROAD standard infantry division and the airmobile 1st Cavalry Division, the battalion is the primary functional unit for supply and combat operations. These battalions possess mobility and celerity never envisioned even in World War II and Korea. Because of these two factors, planning at all levels, including the battalion, must be more closely coordinated than in the days before the helicopter became a vehicle of command and control, supply, and fire support. The infantry battalions depend upon the UH-1D helicopter for logistic support and the artillery and armor battalions look to the CH-47 to deliver the goods to the battle units.

The position of the brigade in the overall chain of command is well established by the tables of organization of the various types of infantry

divisions. How the brigade commander and staff serve the battalions is excellently stated in the following extract:

There are several ways in which the brigade can assist battalions with logistic support of their operations. The brigade provides planning guidance to the battalion and insures a close marriage of operations and logistics during planning and execution. It insures that the division locates logistic elements in the best position to support the brigade's operations. The brigade acquires, allocates, and coordinates the use of helicopters for logistic support of the battalions, and also expedites solutions to the logistic problems with which the battalions need assistance. (Ref 29, p 38)

The brigade and division headquarters are related to the maneuver battalions of the infantry division as the "power handle" is related to the attachable-detachable tools it operates. The transmission of this "power" to the battalions is controlled by the brigade commander.

The brigade commander can assist the battalion commander in several ways. He can insure the availability of adequate supporting fires and airborne artillery observers and forward air controllers constantly overhead. He can place at the battalion commander's full-time disposal at least one and preferably two helicopters. The battalion commander can use one helicopter for command and control purposes and for assisting his units with land navigation. The other he can use for administrative and logistical missions. One OH-13 and one UH-1D will satisfy the battalion commander's minimum needs. The brigade air officer must aim to provide maximum support to battalions. (Ref 28, p 18)

One of the problems envisioned by Army personnel when ROAD displaced the regimental structure and substituted the battalion was the matter of unit spirit. The regiment was, for centuries, the repository of the esprit of the fighting unit. In a sense, the regiment was in the same relation to the officers and men as was the family to its children; the commander was often in loco parentis to his troops. Further, the historical record of the regiment -- its wars, campaigns, battles, and expeditions -- set a pattern of heroic, faithful service which the current personnel by their membership were obliged to try to emulate. The battalion of today has inherited its history and traditions from the old regimental organizations of which the battalions were formerly integral parts. The lineage has not been broken as evidenced by the following:

...one solution to the problems of maintaining unit historical continuity throughout the United States Army, the Combat Arms Regimental System (CARS), was approved by the Secretary of the Army on 24 January 1957. The concept was designed to provide a flexible regimental structure that would permit perpetuation of unit history and tradition in the new tactical

organization of the divisions, without restricting organizational trends of the future.


To accomplish the purpose, famous regiments were selected to serve as parent organizations of all Infantry, Armor, Cavalry, and Artillery tactical units in the Army. (Ref 30, p 17)

With reference to the brigade lineage and tradition authors of the above-cited article point out that brigade histories and traditions will come from

Brigades that were inactivated or disbanded when Regular Army divisions were triangularized in 1939-40. Except for the 1st and 2d Infantry Brigades, which served briefly in World War II as airborne Infantry brigades, and from 1958 to 1962 as Infantry brigades, the Regular Army Infantry brigades have not been used since then. This source will provide two of the three brigades for the 1st through 8th Infantry Divisions. The third brigade in each division will perpetuate the history of the former division headquarters company, which was inactivated when division headquarters was expanded to form the current division headquarters and headquarters company. (Ref 30, p 24)

Colonel Sidney B. Berry, Jr., USA, a brigade commander in Vietnam has furnished a most valuable contemporary commentary upon the function of the brigade commander vis-à-vis the battalions and the division (see Figs. 6 and 7). He points out that unit spirit is an absolute of success in combat operations. This is an old military axiom and has been stated in many ways by as many commanders as there are armies. How to build esprit in the brigade which is in reality a functional "power handle" for the employment of its tools (battalions) constitutes a real challenge to the brigade commander. The battalions are not permanently assigned to the brigade, hence, one might surmise that the spirit of the brigade will be found in the spirit of the battalions it commands, for the time being. This is not essentially so as indicated in the following extract:


...unit esprit is built most effectively around the battalion and the division itself since these have distinctive histories and traditions and a fixed organization. However, the brigade commander has a different problem in building brigade esprit. Being one of three tactical headquarters which, at one time or another, commands every battalion in the division, the brigade should build its own esprit in a manner that disparages no other unit and contributes to the ability of all battalions and brigades to work together smoothly and in wholehearted cooperation. Being recently created and lacking a distinctive history or tradition, the brigade must build its esprit on the present and the future, not the past. (Ref 29, p 46)



Note: This organization is based on TOE 7-15E.

To simplify, company headquarters, and battalion headquarters section of headquarters and headquarters company, and Davy Crockett and chaplain sections augmentations are not shown.

Figure 6. Current Battalion Organization



*This alternative shows combat support element retained in headquarters and headquarters company. A less desirable solution would be to form a separate combat support company. The antitank platoon would be at cadre strength.

Figure 7. Revised Battalion Organization

Deployed to Vietnam in 1965, the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) has already earned the Presidential Unit Citation for distinguished service in combat. For the first time in our military history infantry battalions have gained mobility far beyond even the early thinking expressed by General James M. Gavin in his book Airborne Warfare. The eight infantry battalions, of which three have airborne-qualified personnel, are assigned to the brigade headquarters in much the same manner as tools are attached to a power-handle unit (see Fig. 8 for battalion organization). The high degree of mobility of the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) was succinctly stated by the then Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara on 16 June 1965:

As a result, about one-third of its combat elements can be moved into combat by its own aircraft; the other two-thirds will move simultaneously either in air transport aircraft or by shuttling of the division's own aircraft. (Ref 31, p 34)




Figure 8. The Airmobile Cavalry Division

On brigade and battalion levels, the tactical advantages accruing to the airmobile division are many and varied. Mobility has been a desideratum for all commanders from the beginning of history; the airmobile concept appears to solve the maneuver problem in a positive and dynamic way. The following extract sums it up well:

Airmobility brings to the Army the advantage of permitting the commander to apply decisive firepower and manpower in the most critical area of the battlefield at the most critical time of the battle. (Ref 31, p 35)⁹

⁹ See Army Green Book, October 1967, pp 146-154 for a concise review of Army aircraft and aircraft weapons systems.

With reference to communications (within the airmobile division), the following comment has been made:

The airmobile unit commander need not fret that he is outrunning his line of communications. Supply helicopters can catch up with him wherever he goes. Unlike paratroopers an air infantry assault force can fly out after a raid deep into enemy territory. In pursuit it can be persistent and deadly. Its ability to surprise the enemy is a real advantage. (Ref 32, p 14)

The infantry battalions now in combat in Vietnam are almost completely different from those that fought in World War II and the Korean War.¹⁰ In view of the drastic changes brought to the infantry by ROAD and the airmobile concept, it is interesting to note what effect these changes have had on the commanders of these most modern military formations in such a combat situation as Vietnam. Because of the nature of the war there--a mixture of conventional and unconventional warfare and jungle and urban combat--the battalion commander faces a more proximate relation with combat and combat leadership. The following comment is revealing with reference to the area of human factors:

Comparing the demands and stresses of combat in the jungles of Vietnam with those experienced during the first year of Korean combat, it seems that company commanders in Vietnam are subjected to about the same stresses as platoon leaders in Korea, and battalion commanders to about the same stresses as company commanders in Korea. While there are exceptions, the average company commander in Vietnam seems to burn himself out in five to seven months, and the average battalion commander in six to eight months. This, of course, varies with individuals and with their experiences, brigade commanders should be able to command for a longer time. (Ref 29, p 41)

While it is too early to deal with Vietnam with a proper historical perspective, it is not presumptuous to note that Vietnam is in reality a proving ground for the latest concepts concerning the organization and operation of the US Army infantry battalion. After-action reports indicate that the infantry battalion as constituted, armed, and commanded today is meeting the challenge of combat as well, or better, than its honored ancestors met the challenges of the past. One has only to read the listing of distinguished unit citations to be informed of this fact. These awards, achieved in the stresses of battle, attest to the ability of the newest concepts of military units to wage battle under conditions of modern warfare.

¹⁰ For a factual, on the ground, account of the operations of US infantry battalions and other units in Vietnam see Brig. Gen. S. L. A. Marshall, Battles in The Monsoon, New York: William Morrow and Company, Inc., 1967.

CONCLUSIONS

The present-day infantry battalion has evolved over a period of several hundred years. Its formation and size have varied with the type of weaponry and tactics in use at a particular period of history. Essentially, the battalion evolved out of the necessity for a system of command and control on the battlefield. Initially, this system was one based upon conditions of visual or vocal control. Because of this, the "span of control" was recognized as a determining factor in establishment of the size, shape, and organization of a battalion. The present-day battalion with its self-sufficiency, mobility, and heavy firepower is capable of operating independently in certain type missions. To date, it has not been tested in nuclear war but it has shown its ability to function in conventional and unconventional operations and counter-insurgency campaigns. The battalion organizational structure has been shaped by the requirements of weapons and tactics. Within the battalion, the most important building block is the rifle company.

The battalion is a military unit having both combat and administrative functions. It can maneuver, fight, advance, hold, or defend ground. It can march or ride; be airborne or airmobile. It can travel by water and land on hostile shores; it can land on hostile terrain from the air.

The battalion is an important building block of the current infantry division. It possesses great flexibility and firepower and can adapt to the varied conditions of land combat. It is an organizational military entity the parts of which are interchangeable much in the same way that a type tool is attached to a power handle (the brigade headquarters). The mission assigned to the unit will determine the type of tool (battalion) to be employed.

The company is the basic element of the battalion, which includes one or more such units. The elements of the battalion are controlled by a commander who is assisted in his exercise of command and communication by a staff. This staff consists of officers other than those assigned to the component companies. Usually, the staff officer has no command within the battalion -- he serves primarily as an assistant and advisor to the battalion commander. The staff operates on the basis of delegated authority; the responsibility for what the battalion does, or fails to do, rests upon the battalion commander.

In essence, the rifle company is to the battalion headquarters as the battalion is to the brigade headquarters. Within the rifle company, the platoons are in a like relationship to the company headquarters; within the platoons and between the rifle and weapons squads the same relationship to the platoon headquarters obtains.

When centralized control of communications fails, alternate and decentralized systems of communications must continue to furnish subordinate commanders with intelligence and operational directives and orders.

Less sophisticated and decentralized systems of communications will be required to function on the battlefields of the present and the future.

The span of control and the communications afforded the battalion commander have a critical bearing upon his ability to exercise unit control. In the rifle battalion, the commander possesses a span of control of four, that is, one headquarters and headquarters company commander and three rifle company commanders. The span of control principle has a direct bearing upon the physical size of the infantry rifle battalion. History has shown that there is a limit to the number of subordinates that a commander can control in battle. With advanced communication techniques, the span of control may be increased. Vulnerability of these communication techniques to failure, or to enemy action, will require that the span of control be basically that capable of operation with less sophisticated means of communication.

Centralized control of communications and staff procedures in warfare is one of the results of modern electronic progress. Such control has been sought after and achieved in varying degrees throughout military history. However, in the exercise of unit control, centralized control of communications and staff procedures has its limitations. Mechanical breakdown, or destruction by enemy action, of complex devices and machines which create such controls, is to be expected and planned for under modern operational conditions.

Sophisticated communication equipment may increase the degree of command and control over units of the battalion but it can never completely eliminate the human factor in command. The span of control principle will be assisted by new and now unknown and undeveloped communication equipment, but its operation will continue to be a human function; individual differences between commanders will always determine the quality of the control exercised over men and units. These communication devices will also have the adverse effect of removing the personal element in field leadership at higher echelons of command, including the battalion. There will be some compensation for this situation by the improved organization of the company and the platoon and the squad--those units which actually "close" with the enemy on the ground, and are the "forward" elements of the battalion.

The principle of pooling of equipment is as applicable to the infantry rifle battalion as it is to any other military organization. For years pooling of equipment and weapons has been a controversial subject in the military profession. In combat, the infantry soldier needs his weapons with him and immediately available for operation in the performance of his mission. To pool, or not to pool, weapons and other equipment is a decision governed by the military situation, the terrain, and the combat mission. Weapons, being the soldiers' principal tools of survival, will be less often pooled than vehicles. In current (1968) combat operations in which the infantry battalions of the United States Army are engaged, the pooling of organic vehicles is, for practical purposes, a standing operating procedure. It is concluded that in future operations pooling may become more general because of the success of this most recent combat practice.

For the warfare of the future, the infantry battalion will be required to meet new challenges in combat. A battalion organization can be structured with men and weapons to meet all tests of combat. Improvements and innovations in weaponry will cause distinct changes in combat doctrine affecting the battalion. The battalion may be decreased in strength as organic weapons become more lethal. Crew-served weapons may be found to be more useful and effective in establishment of certain types of infantry formations, as yet unknown to the military profession. The infantry platoon and company, integral parts of the infantry battalion, may likewise be decreased in size for the same reason.

The battalion commander of the future will have much in common with his brother officers of the past. However, with this difference, he will be operating in a context of combat which has become complicated and one wherein personal example and courage will be even more necessary than in the past. He will be required to operate, with his units, often in an independent mission--at remote distances from headquarters. Hence, he must make decisions which will not be those equated normally with his rank and service. He must be able to wage combat, or plan and conduct pacification operations, simultaneously, or separately. He must be able to wage combat with either violence or with nonviolent "civic action." He must be aware of the political connotations of warfare. In essence, he will be the "educated" soldier as envisioned by Milton "skilled in the arts of war and of peace."

APPENDIX A
TASK ASSIGNMENT



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY COMBAT DEVELOPMENTS COMMAND
FORT BELVOIR, VIRGINIA 22060

IN REPLY REFER TO
CDCRE-O

12 September 1967

(CORRECTED COPY)

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director, CORG

SUBJECT: Task Assignment 18-67, "Evolution of the U. S. Army Infantry
Battalion: Valley Forge to Vietnam"

1. The Commanding General requests that you perform a study within the scope of Project 1 of your contract for Calendar Year 1967.

2. Title: Evolution of the U. S. Army Infantry Battalion: Valley Forge to Vietnam.

3. Objective: To show the evolution and development of the U. S. Army infantry battalion from the American Revolution to the present. Included in detail will be the historical perspective of the battalion-type organization -- as noted throughout our military history. The effects of weaponry and tactics upon the organization and function of the infantry battalion will be shown by historical examples. Further, the evolution of the battalion as a tactical unit -- rather than an administrative formation -- will be covered. The direct effect of the emergence of the battalion as an independent unit of maneuver and firepower, upon the command and rank structure of the Army will be noted.

4. Administration:

a. The study will be presented to the Commanding General in the form of a CORG memorandum.

b. Project officer. Mr. Jean Keith, HQ USACDC, 44632.

c. Direct coordination with the USACDC Infantry Agency is authorized.

5. Correlation: This project is assigned Action Control Number 11609.


6. This task must be completed by September 1968.

CDCRE-O

SUBJECT: Task Assignment 18-67, "Evolution of the U. S. Army Infantry
Battalion: Valley Forge to Vietnam"

7. Request that you indicate your acceptance, analyze your resources
and provide the following information:

- a. Estimated technical man months by calendar year.
- b. CORG Project Leader.


JOHN T. PIERCE III
Colonel, GS
Chief, Operations Research
Support Division
Evaluation Directorate

APPENDIX B

SELECTED TABLES OF ORGANIZATION AND EQUIPMENT

To understand in detail the evolution of the infantry battalion, especially in the period from World War I to 1968, it is useful to examine the various tables of organization and equipment which establish the battalion for a certain period of our military history. Many of the tables herein are rare and out of print and not generally available. For this reason they were included as valuable adjuncts to the documentation of this study. Because of the physical impossibility of the inclusion of all tables pertaining to the evolution of the infantry battalion, the author has included those tables which he considered most relevant and pertinent to the evolutionary, historical process involved in the creation of the modern Infantry Battalion. As additional aids to planners of future battalions, these tables should be of considerable value in establishing the "reason why," or the rationale, for the evolutionary changes noted in the long and distinguished history of the United States Army Infantry Battalion.

Washington, D. C., War Department, 1 October 1940

TO 7-15

Infantry Battalion, Rifle

1	2 Specialists' Ratings (Class)	3 Headquarters (T/O 7-16)	4 Headquarters Detachment (T/O 7-16)	5 3 Rifle Companies (T/O 7-17)	6 1 Heavy Weapons Co (T/O 7-18)	7 Total Battalion	8 Enlisted Cadre	9	10 Remarks
1. Lieutenant Colonel		1				1			
2. Major		1				1			
3. Captain				3	1	4			
4. First Lieutenant		2		6	5	13			
5. Second Lieutenant				9		9			
6. Total Commissioned		4		18	6	28			
7. First Sergeant			1	3	1	5			
8. Staff Sergeant			2			2			
9. Sergeant			1	72	16	89			
10. Corporal			6	57	28	91			
11. Private, First Class)			16	210	64	200	16		
12. Private)			22	309	96	427			
13. Specialist	3d			(6)	(3)	(9)			
14. Specialist	4th			(9)	(4)	(13)			
15. Specialist	5th		(6)	(3)	(12)	(21)			
16. Specialist	6th		(6)	(27)	(27)	(60)			
17. Unrated			(22)	(417)	(96)	(535)	16		
18. Basic			(4)	(57)	(18)	(79)			
19. Total Enlisted			48	651	205	904			
20. Aggregate		4	48	669	211	932			

Washington, D. C., War Department, 1 October 1940

Page 2

TO 7-15

Infantry Battalion, Rifle

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
	Specialists' Ratings (Class)	Headquarters (T/O 7-16)	Headquarters Detachment (T/O 7-16)	3 Rifle Companies (T/O 7-17)	1 Heavy Weapons Co (T/O 7-18)	Total Battalion	Enlisted Cadre	Remarks	
21. Gun, Machine, Browning, Cal. .30, M 1917					8	8			
22. Gun, Machine, Browning, Cal. .50, M2 Flexible					4	4			
23. Gun, Machine, Browning, Cal. .30, M 1919 A 4				6		6			
24. Mortar, 60mm				9		9			
25. Mortar, 81mm					4	4			
26. Motorcycle with sidecar		2		2		4			
27. Truck $\frac{1}{2}$ -ton) Command and) Reconnaissance		2		5		7			
28. Truck $\frac{1}{2}$ -ton, Weapon Carrier		2	6	16		24			
29. Pistol, Automatic, Cal. .45	4	19	138	152		313			
30. Rifle, Automatic, Browning, Cal. .30, M 1918 A 2			24	8		32			
31. Rifle, US Cal. .30, M 1		29	513	59		601			
This table supercedes T/07-15 Mar 1, 1940, including C1, April 26, 1940.									
Changes 1 War Department November 6, 1940									
Line 12			13						
Line 13			25						

Washington, D. C., War Department, 1 March 1942

TO 7-15

Armored Infantry Battalion

1	2	3	4	5	6
	Battalion Headquarters and Headquarters Co. T/O 7-26	3 Rifle Companies (each) T/O -27	Total Battalion	Enlisted Cache	Remarks
1. Lieutenant Colonel	1		1		
2. Major	1		1		
3. Captain	1	1	4		
4. First Lieutenant	3	2	9		
5. Second Lieutenant	3	2	9		
6. Total Commission	9	5	24		
7. First Sergeant	1	1	4	4	
8. Technical Sergeant	2		2	2	
9. Staff Sergeant	7	5	22	22	
10. Sergeant	12	18	66	56	
11. Corporal	8	11	41	4	
12. Technician, Grade 4	4	2	10	6	
13. Technician, Grade 5	27	23	96	3	
14. Private, First Class	41	49	188		
15. Private	55	64	247		
16. Basic	(14)	(16)	(62)		
17. Total Enlisted	157	173	676	97	
18. Aggregate	166	178	700	97	
19. Car half-Track, M2, w/armament	8	4	20		
20. Car. half-track, M3, with armament	3	12	39		

Washington, D. C., War Department, 1 March 1942

TO 7-15

Armored Infantry Battalion

Page 2

1	2 Battalion Headquarters and Head- quarters Co. T/O 7-26	3 3 Rifle Companies (each) T/O 2-27	4 Total Battalion	5 Enlisted Cache	6 Remarks
21. Car, half-track, M3, w/armament	1	1	4		
22. Car, half-track, M4, w/armament	3		3		
23. Carbine, cal. .30	58	58	230		
24. Gun, antitank, self-propelled	1	1	4		
25. Gun, antitank, Towed		4	12		
26. Gun, assault, self-propelled	3		3		
27. Gun, machine, cal. .30, light	1	1	4		
28. Gun, machine, cal. .30, light, with ground mount		6	18		
29. Gun, submach. (incl. on ordnance veh.)	19	18	73		
30. Gun, submach. (on $\frac{1}{4}$ -ton truck)	9	1	12		
31. Mortar, 81mm	3		3		
32. Mortar, 60mm		3	9		
33. Pistol, cal. .45	31	13	70		
34. Rifle, Cal. .30	81	88	315		
35. Trailer, 1-ton, ammunition and fuel, armored	3		3		
36. Motorcycle, solo	4		4		
37. Truck, $\frac{1}{4}$ -ton	9	1	12		
38. Truck, $2\frac{1}{2}$ -ton including:	3	2	9		
39. Equipment	(1)	(1)	(4)		
40. Kitchen	(2)	(1)	(5)		

Washington, D. C., War Department, 1 March 1942

TO 7-15

Armored Infantry Battalion

Page 3

1	2	3	4	5	6
	Battalion Headquarters and Head- quarters Co. T/O 7-26	3 Rifle Companies (each) T/O 7-27	Total Battalion	Enlisted Cache	Remarks
41. Radio set	17	4	29		
This table supersedes T/O 7-26, November 15, 1940.					

Washington, D. C., War Department, 1 April 1942

Infantry Battalion

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
Unit	Technician Grade	Headquarters (T/O 7-16)	Headquarters Company (T/O 7-16)	3 Rifle Companies (each) T/O 7-17)	Heavy Weapons Company (T/O 7-18)	Total Battalion Enlisted Cadre		Remarks
1. Lieutenant Colonel		1				1		
2. Major		1				1		
3. Captain		1	1	1	1	6		
4. First Lieutenant		1	1	2	4	12		
5. Second Lieutenant			3	3		12		
6. Total (Commissioned)		4	5	6	5	32		
7. First Sergeant			1	1	1	5	5	
8. Staff Sergeant			6	5	4	25	24	
9. Sergeant			8	16	10	66	17	
10. Corporal			11	16	24	83	5	
11. Technician Grade 4			4	2	3	13	12	
12. Technician Grade 5			7	3	3	19	16	
13. Private First Class			41	66	59	298		
14. Private, including			52	83	74	375		
15. Basic			(12)	(18)	(16)	(82)		
16. Total Enlisted			130	192	178	884	79	
17. Aggregate	4		135	198	183	916	79	
18. Carbine, Cal. .30		2	78	35	105	290		
19. Gun, 37mm, antitank			4			4		
20. Gun, machine, Cal. 30					8	8		
21. Gun, machine, light, cal. .30				2		6		
22. Mortar, 60mm				3		9		
23. Mortar, 81mm					6	6		
24. Pistol, automatic, cal. .45		2		10	28	60		
25. Rifle, automatic, cal. .30			7	11	7	47		
26. Rifle, cal. .30, M1			41	133	29	469		

Washington, D. C. , War Department, 1 April 1942

Infantry Battalion

Page 2

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
Unit	Technician Grade	Headquarters (T/O 7-16)	Headquarters Company (T/O 7-16)	3 Rifle Companies (each) (T/O 7-17)	Heavy Weapons Company (T/O 7-18)	Total Battalion	Enlisted Cadre	Remarks
27. Rifle, Cal. .30, M1903			9	9	14	50		
28. Truck, $\frac{1}{4}$ -ton			15	1	4	22		
29. Truck 3/4-ton, Command & Recon.					1	1		
30. Truck, 3/4-ton, Wpns Carrier			6	1	15	24		

This table supersedes T/O 7-15, October 1, 1940, including C1, November 6, 1940.

Washington, D. C., War Department, 1 March 1943

TO 7-15

Infantry Battalion

1	2 Specialists' Ratings (Class)	3 Headquarters (T/O 7-16)	4 Headquarters Detachment (T/O 7-16)	5 3 Rifle Companies (T/O 7-17)	6 1 Heavy Weapons Co (T/O 7-18)	7 Total Battalion	8 Enlisted Cadre	9	10 Remarks
1. Lieutenant Colonel		1				1			
2. Major		1				1			
4. Captain		1	1	1	1	6			
5. First Lieutenant		1	2	2	4	13			
6. Second Lieutenant			2	3		11			
7. Total Commissioned		4	5	6	5	32			
8. First Sergeant			1	1	1	5	5		
9. Staff Sergeant			7	6	5	30	29		
10. Sergeant			5	15	9	59	11		
11. Corporal			8	15	21	74	5		
12. Technician, Grade 4			4	2	3	13	12		
13. Technician, Grade 5			7	3	4	20	14		
14. Private, First Class			31	64	50	273			
15. Private, including			40	80	64	344			
16. basic			(9)	(17)	(14)	(74)			
17. Total Enlisted			103	186	157	818	76		
18. Aggregate		4	108	192	162	850	76		
19. Carbine, Ca. .30, M1		2	47	28	78	211			
20. Gun, 37mm			3			3			
21. Gun, Machine, Cal. .30					8				

Washington, D. C., War Department, 1 March 1943

TO 7-15

Page 2

Infantry Battalion

1	2 Specialists' Ratings (Class)	3 Headquarters (T/O 7-16)	4 Headquarters Detachment (T/O 7-16)	5 3 Rifle Companies (T/O 7-17)	6 1 Heavy Weapons Co (T/O 7-18)	7 Total Battalion	8 Enlisted Cadre	9	10 Remarks
22. Gun, Machine, Light, Cal. .30 flexible			3	2		9			
23. Gun, Machine, Cal. .50, M2 HB/			1	1	3	7			
24. Launcher, Rocket, AT, M1			8	3	7	24			
25. Mortar, 60mm				3		9			
26. Mortar, 81mm					6	6			
27. Pistol, Automatic, Cal. .45		2	6	10	28	66			
28. Rifle, Automatic, Cal. .30				9		27			
29. Rifle, Cal. .30, M1			47	135	48	500			
30. Rifle, Cal. .30, M1903			8	10	8	46			
31. Trailer, 1-ton			1			1			
32. Truck, 1/4-ton			6		5	11			
33. Truck 1/4-ton, amphibian			1			1			
34. Truck, 3/4-ton, Weapons Carrier			4		1	5			
35. Truck, 1 1/2-ton			2	1	7	12			

This table supersedes T/O 7-15, April 1, 1942, including C1, October 4, 1942.

Washington, D. C., War Department, 26 February 1944

TO 7-15

Infantry Battalion

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
	Headquarters (T/O 7-16)	Headquarters Company (T/O 7-16)	3 Rifle Companies (T/O 7-17)	1 Heavy Weapons Co (T/O 7-18)	Total Battalion	Enlisted Cadre	Remarks	
1. Lieutenant Colonel	1				1			
2. Major	1				1			
3. Captain	1	1	1	1	6			
4. First Lieutenant	1	2	3	3	15			
5. Second Lieutenant		2	2	4	12			
6. Total Commissioned	4	5	6	8	35			
7. First Sergeant		1	1	1	5	5		
8. Technical Sergeant		3	4	3	18	18		
9. Staff Sergeant		9	16	15	72	19		
10. Sergeant		6	15	11	62	3		
11. Corporal		5	1	13	21	5		
12. Technician, Grade 4		6	2	3	15	12		
13. Technician, Grade 5		11	4	2	25	14		
14. Private, First Class		55	104	79	446			
15. Private, Including		21	40	31	172			
16. Basic		(11)	(17)	(14)	(76)			
17. Total Enlisted		117	187	158	836	76		
18. Aggregate	4	122	193	166	871	76		
19. Carbine, Cal. .30	2	51	28	82	219			
20. Gun, Machine, Cal. .30, heavy, flexible				8	8			

Washington, D. C. War Department, 26 February 1944

TO 7-15

Page 2

Infantry Battalion

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
	Headquarters (T/O 7-16)	Headquarters Company (T/O 7-16)	3 Rifle Companies (T/O 7-17)	1 Heavy Weapons Co (T/O 7-18)	Total Battalion	Enlisted Cadre	Remarks	
21. Gun, Machine, Cal. .30, light flexible			2		6			
22. Gun, Machine, HB, Cal. .50, flexible		2	1	1	6			
23. Gun, 59mm, Towed		3			3			
24. Launcher, Rocket, AT, 2.36-inch		8	5	6	29			
25. Mortar, 60mm			3		9			
26. Mortar, 81mm				6	6			
27. Pistol, automatic, cal. .45	2	15	10	34	81			
28. Rifle, automatic, cal. .30			9		27			
29. Rifle, cal. .30, M1		56	143	50	535			
30. Rifle, Cal. .30, M1903, A4			3		9			
31. Trailer, 1/4-ton		2	2	14	22			
32. Trailer, 1-ton		1			1			
33. Truck, 1/4-ton		9	2	19	34			
34. Truck, 3/4-ton, Weapons Carrier		1		1	2			
35. Truck, 1 1/2-ton, cargo		4			4			
This table supersedes T/O&E 7-15, 16 July 1943.								

Washington, D. C., War Department, 30 June 1944

Changes No. 1

TO 7-15
Infantry Battalion

Page 3

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
	Headquarters (T/O 7-16)	Headquarters Company (T/O 7-16)	3 Rifle Companies (T/O 7-17)	1 Heavy Weapons Co (T/O 7-18)	Total Battalion	Enlisted Cadre	Remarks	
Line 14		52	104	76	440			
Line 15		19	40	28	167			
Line 16		(6)	(17)	(8)	(65)			
Line 17		112	187	152	825			
Line 18		117	193	160	860			
Line 21		6	2		12			
Line 22		2	6		20			
Line 28			15		45			
Line 29		51	143	44	524			

TABLE OF ORGANIZATION }
No. 7-415

WAR DEPARTMENT,
WASHINGTON, April 1, 1942.

AIR BASE SECURITY BATTALION

Designation: †----- Air Base Security Battalion

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
Unit	Headquarters and headquarters detachment (T/O 7-416)	Fixed defense company (T/O 7-417)	Striking force company (T/O 7-418)	Total battalion	Attached medical (for details see p. 2)	Aggregate	Enlisted cadre	Remarks
2 Lieutenant colonel.....	1			1		1		† Invert number of battalion. * Substitute: rifle, cal. .30. Warrant officers, basics, and relief crews are not included in this battalion since they will not be required in its normal functions.
3 Major.....	1			1		1		
4 Captain.....	3	1	1	5	1	6		
5 First lieutenant.....	2	3	3	8		5		
6 Second lieutenant.....	2	3	3	8		5	1	
7 Total commissioned.....	5	5	7	17	1	18		
8 Master sergeant.....	1			1		1	1	
9 First sergeant.....	1	1	1	2		2	2	
10 Technical sergeant.....	2			2		2	2	
11 Staff sergeant.....	1	4	6	11	1	12	11	
12 Sergeant.....	1	7	20	28		28	14	
13 Corporal.....	2	19	21	42	1	43	3	
14 Technician, grade 4.....	5	3	3	11		11	2	
15 Technician, grade 5.....	7	3	16	26	2	28	2	
16 Private, first class.....	5	56	83	144	3	147		
17 Private.....	5	57	83	145	3	148		
18 Total enlisted.....	29	150	233	412	10	422	37	
19 Aggregate.....	31	155	240	429	11	440	37	
20 O Car, half-track, M2.....			4	4		4		
21 O Carbine, cal. .30*.....	34	51	120	205		205		
22 O Carrier, half-track, M3.....			12	12		12		
23 O Gun, 75-mm, self-propelled.....			4	4		4		
24 O Gun, machine, heavy, cal. .30.....		12		12		12		
25 O Pistol, cal. .45.....		30	36	66		66		
26 O Rifle, automatic, cal. .30*.....		6		6		6		
27 O Rifle, cal. .30.....		68	84	152		152		
28 Q Truck, 1/4-ton.....	2	1	13	16		16		
29 Q Truck, 1/4-ton, weapon carrier.....		6		6		6		
30 Q Truck, 2 1/4-ton, cargo.....			3	3		3		
31 S Radio.....	4			4		4		

450401°—42

T/O 7-415

MEDICAL DETACHMENT, AIR BASE SECURITY BATTALION

Designation: Medical Detachment, †..... Air Base Security Battalion

	1	2	3	4
	Unit	Technician grade	Total	Remarks
1				
2	Captain.....		1	† Insert number of bat-
3	Total commissioned		1	talion.
4	Staff sergeant, including		1	The serial number sym-
5	Medical (673)		(1)	bol shown in parentheses
6	Corporal, including.....		1	is an inseparable part of
7	Medical (673)		(1)	the specialist designation.
8	Technician, grade 5}		2	A number below 500 refers
9	Private, first class} including		3	to an occupational specialist
10	Private		3	whose qualification analy-
11	Company aid (123)		(4)	sis is found in AR 615-26.
12	Technician, medical (123)	5	(1)	A number above 500 refers
13	Technician, medical (123)		(1)	to a military occupational
14	Technician, surgical (225)	5	(1)	specialist listed in Circu-
15	Technician, surgical (225)		(1)	lars Nos. 14 and 67, War
16	Total enlisted.		10	Department, 1942.
17	Aggregate.		11	

[A. G. 320.2 (4-9-42).]

By ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF WAR:

G. C. MARSHALL.

Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL:

J. A. ULIO,

Major General,

The Adjutant General.

*T/O 7-415

TABLE OF ORGANIZATION
No. 7-415

WAR DEPARTMENT,
WASHINGTON, April 13, 1943.

AIR BASE SECURITY BATTALION

Designation: †----- Air Base Security Battalion

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
Unit	Headquarters and headquarters and service company (T/O 7-416)	2 airborne combat companies (each) (T/O 7-417)	Total battalion	Enlisted cadre	Tank platoon	Transportation section	Remarks
2 Lieutenant colonel.....	1	1	1	1	1	1	†Insert number of battalion. ‡To be activated only when specified on activation order.
3 Major.....	1	1	1	1	1	1	
4 Captain.....	3	3	5	5	1	1	
5 First lieutenant.....	1	3	7	7	1	1	
6 Second lieutenant.....	1	2	4	4	1	1	
7 Total commissioned.....	6	6	18	18	1	1	
8 Warrant officer.....	2	2	2	2	1	1	
9 Master sergeant.....	1	1	1	1	1	1	
10 First sergeant.....	1	1	3	3	1	1	
11 Technical sergeant.....	4	4	4	4	1	1	
12 Staff sergeant.....	3	5	13	13	1	1	
13 Sergeant.....	1	9	19	19	3	3	
14 Corporal.....	1	22	44	44	2	2	
15 Technician, grade 4.....	9	9	9	9	3	3	
16 Technician, grade 5.....	10	1	12	12	6	6	
17 Private, first class.....	11	63	137	137	4	4	
18 Private, including.....	14	78	170	170	5	5	
19 Basic.....	(3)	(16)	(35)	(35)	(2)	(1)	
20 Total enlisted.....	54	179	412	39	22	15	
21 Aggregate.....	62	185	432	39	23	16	
22 O Car, scout, M3A1.....	1	1	1	1	1	1	5
23 O Carbine, cal. .30.....	62	43	148	148	1	1	4
24 O Carrier, personnel, half-track, M3.....	1	1	1	1	1	1	6
25 O Gun, machine, cal. .50, M2, LHB, flexible.....	1	6	12	12	1	1	
26 O Gun, submachine, cal. .45, M3.....	1	1	1	1	1	1	11
27 O Launcher, rocket, AT, M1.....	3	3	3	3	1	1	
28 O Mortar, 60-mm, M2.....	1	6	12	12	1	1	
29 O Pistol, automatic, cal. .45.....	1	12	24	24	23	23	
30 O Rifle, automatic, cal. .30.....	1	9	18	18	1	1	
31 O Rifle, cal. .30.....	1	121	242	242	1	1	
32 O Tank, light.....	1	1	1	1	5	5	
33 O Trailer, 1-ton, 2-wheel, cargo.....	3	3	3	3	1	1	
34 O Truck, 1/4-ton.....	3	1	6	6	1	1	
35 O Truck, 3/4-ton, weapons carrier.....	1	1	2	2	1	1	
36 O Truck, 2 1/4-ton, cargo.....	3	3	3	3	1	1	

[A. O. 320.2 (3-26-43).1]

*This table supersedes T/O 7-416, April 1, 1942.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF WAR:

OFFICIAL:

J. A. ULIO,
Major General,
The Adjutant General.

G. C. MARSHALL,
Chief of Staff.

CORG-M-343

AIR BASE SECURITY BATTALION

CHANGES
No. 1

WAR DEPARTMENT
WASHINGTON 25, D. C., 30 JULY 1945

T/O 7-415, 13 April 1943, is changed as follows:

Line	Column			
	1	3	4	6
18	Private, including.....	71	156	5
19	Basic.....	(9)	(21)	(1)
20	Total enlisted.....	172	398	21
21	Aggregate.....	178	418	22
31	O Rifle, cal. .30.....	114	228	

(AG 320. 3 (24 May 45))

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF WAR:

OFFICIAL:
EDWARD F. WITSELL
Major General
Acting The Adjutant General

G. C. MARSHALL
Chief of Staff

T/O 7-416

TABLE OF ORGANIZATION
No. 7-416

WAR DEPARTMENT,
WASHINGTON, April 1, 1942.

HEADQUARTERS AND HEADQUARTERS DETACHMENT, AIR
BASE SECURITY BATTALION.

Designation: Headquarters, †----- Air Base Security Battalion
Headquarters Detachment, †----- Air Base Security Battalion

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Unit	Technician grade	Battalion headquarters	Headquarters detachment	Communication section	Total	Enlisted cadre	Remarks
1 Lieutenant colonel.....		1			1		†Insert number of battalion.
2 Major.....		1			1		* Executive.
3 Captain.....		2	1		3		* 8-1 and 8-4 (acts as motor officer in addition to duties as 8-4).
4 Total commissioned.....		4	1		5		* Detachment commander.
5 Master sergeant, including.....			1		1	1	* Substitute: rifle, cal. .30.
6 Sergeant major (502).....			(1)		(1)	(1)	Warrant officers, basics, and relief crews are not included in this battalion since they will not be required in its normal operation.
7 Technical sergeant, including.....			2		2	2	The serial number symbol shown in parentheses is an inseparable part of the specialist designation. A number below 500 refers to an occupational specialist whose qualification analysis is found in AR 615-26.
8 Operations (814).....			(1)		(1)	(1)	A number above 500 refers to a military occupational specialist listed in Circulars Nos. 14 and 57, War Department, 1942.
9 Supply (821).....			(1)		(1)	(1)	
10 Staff sergeant, including.....				1	1	1	
11 Communication (542).....				(1)	(1)	(1)	
12 Sergeant, including.....				1	1	1	
13 Communication, assistant (542).....				(1)	(1)	(1)	
14 Corporal, including.....				2	2	2	
15 Clerk (405).....				(1)	(1)	(1)	
16 Supply, motor (348).....				(1)	(1)	(1)	
17 Technician, grade 4.....					5	5	
18 Technician, grade 5.....					7	7	
19 Private, first class.....			6	16	5	5	
20 Private.....					5	5	
21 Chauffeur (345).....			(2)		(2)	(2)	
22 Clerk, operations (405).....		5			(1)	(1)	
23 Clerk, supply (374).....		5		(1)	(1)	(1)	
24 Operator, radio and telephone (776).....		4			(5)	(5)	
25 Operator, radio and telephone (776).....		5			(5)	(5)	
26 Operator, radio and telephone (776).....					(5)	(5)	
27 Orderly (595).....			(2)		(2)	(2)	
28 Total enlisted.....			11	18	29	6	
29 Aggregate.....		4	12	18	34	6	
30 O Carbine, cal. .30 ^a		4	12	18	34		
31 Q Truck, 3-ton.....			2		2		
32 S Radio.....				4	4		

[A. G. 320.2 (4-9-42).]

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF WAR:

G. C. MARSHALL,
Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL:

J. A. ULIO,
Major General,
The Adjutant General.

***T/O 7-416**

TABLE OF ORGANIZATION
No. 7-416

WAR DEPARTMENT,
WASHINGTON, April 13, 1943.

HEADQUARTERS AND HEADQUARTERS AND SERVICE
COMPANY, AIR BASE SECURITY BATTALION

HEADQUARTERS AND HEADQUARTERS AND SERVICE COMPANY, AIR BASE SECURITY BATTALION

Designation: Headquarters, † ----- Air Base Security Battalion
Headquarters Company, † ----- Air Base Security Battalion

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13
Unit	Technician grade	Battalion headquarters	Headquarters company				Total company	Aggregated cadre	Enlisted cadre	Tank platoon	Transportation section	Remarks
			Company headquarters	Administrative section	Supply and mess section	Communications and operations section						
1 Lieutenant colonel		1						1				† Insert number of battalion.
2 Major		• 1						1				• Operates battalion mess.
3 Captain		• 2	1				1	3				• To be activated only when specified on activation orders.
4 First lieutenant			1					1		1		
5												
6 Total commissioned		• 4	• 2				2	6		• 1		
7 Warrant officer				• 1	• 1		2	2				Staff
8 Master sergeant, including				• 1			1	1	1			• Executive and S-1.
9 Sergeant major (502)				(1)			(1)	(1)	(1)			• S-1; S-4.
10 First sergeant (583)			• 1				1	1	1			• Armed with carbine, col. 30.
11 Technical sergeant, including				• 1	• 1	• 2	(1)	4	4			• Transportation and maintenance officer.
12 Communication chief (812)						(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)			• Clerical, general.
13 Operations (814)				(1)			(1)	(1)	(1)			• Supply, general.
14 Personnel (816)							(1)	(1)	(1)			• Drives truck, 1/2-ton.
15 Supply (821)			• 2		• 2		3	3	3	• 1		• Drives truck, 1/2-ton.
16 Staff sergeant, including					(1)		(1)	(1)	(1)			• Assistant tank drivers.
17 Mess (824)												• Also act as telephone operators.
18 Motor (813)					(1)		(1)	(1)	(1)			• Armed with pistol.
19 Platoon (651)			(1)				(1)	(1)	(1)			• Armed with gun, sub-machine.
20 Supply (821)					• 1		1	1	1			
21 Sergeant, including							(2)	(2)	(2)			
22 Dispatcher, motor vehicle (410)										• 3		
23 Mess (824)												
24 Tank commander (795)							(1)	(1)	(1)	(3)		

The serial number symbol shown in parentheses is an inseparable part of the specialist designation. See A R 615-26.

[illegible]

[A. G. 3202 (3-26-43).]

T/O 7-416

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF WAR:

G. C. MARSHALL,
Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL:
J. A. ULIO,
Major General,
The Adjutant General.

T/O 7-416
C1

HEADQUARTERS AND HEADQUARTERS AND SERVICE
COMPANY, AIR BASE SECURITY BATTALION

CHANGES }
No. 1 }

WAR DEPARTMENT
WASHINGTON 25, D. C., 30 JULY 1945

T/O 7-416, 13 April 1943, is changed as follows:

1. Delete 1 basic (521), line 60, column 11 (not included in totals).
2. This results in the following:

Line	Column	
	1	11
28	Private.....	P5
60	Basic (521).....	(1)
61	Total enlisted.....	21
62	Aggregate.....	22
68	0 Pistol, automatic, cal. .45.....	22

(AG 320 .3 (24 May 45))

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF WAR:

OFFICIAL:
EDWARD F. WITSELL
Major General
Acting The Adjutant General

G. C. MARSHALL
Chief of Staff

T/O 7-417

TABLE OF ORGANIZATION
No. 7-417
WAR DEPARTMENT,
WASHINGTON, April 1, 1942.
FIXED DEFENSE COMPANY, AIR BASE SECURITY BATTALION
Designation: Company A, †----- Air Base Security Battalion

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
	Unit	Technician grade	Company headquarters	2 machine-gun platoons (each)		Rifle platoon						Remarks
			Platoon headquarters	6 machine-gun squads (each)		Total platoon	Platoon headquarters	6 rifle squads (each)		Total platoon	Total company	Enlisted cadre
3	Captain.....		1							1		† Insert number of battalion.
3	First lieutenant.....		1	1		1	1			2		* Drives vehicle in addition to other duties.
4	Second lieutenant.....											* Substitute: rifle, cal. .30.
5	Total commissioned.....		* 2	* 1		1	* 1			1	5	* Armed with carbine.
6	First sergeant (685).....		* 1							1	1	* For use of detachments reinforcing nearby air bases or when used as part of the mobile reserve.
7	Staff sergeant, including.....		1	1		1	1			1	4	* Armed with pistol.
8	Mess (824).....		(*) 1							(1)	(1)	* Armed with rifle.
9	Platoon (651).....			(*) 1		(1)	(1)		(1)	(3)	(3)	This company will be used primarily to establish the fixed defenses of an air base and will be supplemented by personnel of the air base.
10	Sergeant, including.....		1					1	9	(1)	(3)	Warrant officers, bases, and relief crews are not included in this battalion since they will not be required in its normal operation.
11	Squad leader (653).....							(1)	(6)	(6)	(3)	The serial number symbol shown in parentheses is an inseparable part of the specialist designation. A number below 500 refers to an occupational specialist whose qualification analysis is found in AR 615-26. A number above 500 refers to a military occupational specialist listed in Circulars Nos. 14 and 67, War Department, 1942.
12	Supply (821).....		(*) 1							(1)	(1)	
13	Corporal, including.....		1		1	6		1	6	19	1	
14	Clerk (405).....		(*) 1							(1)	(1)	
15	Squad leader (653).....				(*) 1	(6)				(12)		
16	Squad leader, assistant (653).....							(1)	(6)	(6)		
17	Technician, grade 4.....									3	1	
18	Technician, grade 5.....									3	1	
19	Private, first class.....		17	2	3	20	2	10	62	66		
20	Private.....									57		
21	Ammunition bearer (604).....				(*) 1	(6)		(1)	(6)	(18)		
22	Armorer (611).....	5	(*) 1							(1)		
23	Chauffeur (345).....		(*) 6							(6)		
24	Cook (000).....	4	(*) 2							(2)	(1)	
25	Cook (000).....	5	(*) 2							(2)	(1)	
26	Cook's helper (621).....		(*) 2							(2)		
27	Gunner (605).....				(*) 1	(6)				(12)		
28	Gunner, assistant (605).....				(*) 1	(6)				(12)		
29	Mechanic, automobile (614).....	4	(*) 1							(1)		
30	Messenger (675).....		(*) 2	(2)		(2)	(2)		(2)	(8)		
31	Orderly (695).....		(*) 1							(1)		
32	Rifleman (745).....							(7)	(42)	(42)		
33	Rifleman, automatic (746).....							(1)	(6)	(6)		
34	Rifleman, automatic, assistant (746).....							(1)	(6)	(6)		
35	Total enlisted.....		21	3	4	27	3	12	75	150	12	
36	Aggregate.....		23	4	4	28	4	12	76	155	12	
37	O Carbine, cal. .30 b.....		23	2	2	14				51		
38	O Gun, machine, heavy, cal. .30.....				1	6				12		
39	O Pistol, cal. .45.....				2	12		1	6	30		
40	O Rifle, automatic, cal. .30 b.....							1	6	6		
41	O Rifle, cal. .30.....			2		2	4	10	64	68		
42	Q Truck, 1/4-ton.....		1							1		
43	Q Truck, 1/4-ton, weapon carrier.....		4	6						6		

T/O 7-417

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF WAR:

OFFICIAL:

J. A. ULIO,
Major General,
The Adjutant General.

G. C. MARSHALL,
Chief of Staff.

T/O 7-417
O 1

FIXED DEFENSE COMPANY, AIR BASE SECURITY BATTALION

CHANGES }
No. 1 }

WAR DEPARTMENT,
WASHINGTON, November 25, 1942.

T/O 7-417, April 1, 1942, is changed as follows:

Line	Column		
	1	8	10
22 1/2 31	Bugler (808) [Delete entire line.]	(* 1)	(1)

[A. G. 320.2 (11-21-42).]

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF WAR:

G. C. MARSHALL,
Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL:

J. A. ULIO,
*Major General,
The Adjutant General.*

***T/O 7-417**

TABLE OF ORGANIZATION
No. 7-417

WAR DEPARTMENT,
WASHINGTON, April 13, 1943.

AIRDROME COMBAT COMPANY, AIR BASE
SECURITY BATTALION

AIRDROME COMBAT COMPANY, AIR BASE SECURITY BATTALION

Designation: Company 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	
Unit	Technician grade	Com-pany head-quarters	Machine gun platoon			3 rifle platoons (each)					Total com-pany	En-listed cadre	Remarks
			Pla-toon head-quarters	6 ma-chine gun squads (each)	Total pla-toon	Pla-toon head-quarters	2 mor-tar squads (each)	3 rifle squads (each)	Total pla-toon				
Captain.....		•1								1		Insert letter of com-pany.	
First lieutenant.....		•1	•1		1	•1			1	3		Insert number of bat-talion.	
Second lieutenant.....					1	1				2			
Total commissioned.....		2	1		1	1			1	6			
First sergeant (585).....		•1								1	1		
Staff sergeant, including.....		•1	•1		1	•1			1	5	4		
Platoon (651).....			(1)		(1)	(1)			(1)	(4)	(4)		
Supply (621).....		(1)								(1)	(1)		
Sergeant, including.....		•1								3	3		
Squad leader (653).....										9	(1)		
Corporal, including.....		•1		•1	5		•1	•1	3	(9)	(3)		
Clerk, company (465).....		(1)							5	(2)	(1)		
Squad leader (653).....				(1)	(6)		(1)	(1)	(2)	(12)	(1)		
Squad leader, assistant (653).....									(3)	(1)			
Technician, grade 5.....										1	1		
Private, first class, including.....		•20	•2	3	20	1	•3	9	34	63	78		
Private.....										1			
Ammunition bearer (504).....				(•1)	(6)		(1)	(•1)	(5)	(21)	(1)		
Armorer (511).....	5	(1)								(1)			
Bugler (503).....		(•1)								(1)			
Gunner (605).....				(•1)	(6)		(1)		(2)	(12)			
Gunner, assistant (605).....				(•1)	(6)		(1)		(2)	(12)			
Messenger (675).....		(3)	(•1) (2)		(2)	(•1)			(18)	(54)			
Rifleman (745).....									(•6)	(3)			
Rifleman, automatic (746).....									(•4)	(9)			
Rifleman, automatic, assistant (746).....									(•3)	(9)			
Basic (521).....		(16)							(•1)	(16)			
Total enlisted.....		23	3	4	27	2	4	11	43	179	11		
Aggregate.....		25	4	4	28	3	4	11	44	185	11		

T/O 7-417
C1

AIRDROME COMBAT COMPANY, AIR BASE SECURITY BATTALION

CHANGES }
No. 1 }

WAR DEPARTMENT
WASHINGTON 25, D. C., 30 JULY 1945

T/O 7-417, 13 April 1943, is changed as follows:

1. Delete 7 basics (521), line 28, column 3 and 11.
2. This results in the following:

Line	Column		
	1	3	11
16	Technician, grade 5	13	$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} 1 \\ 63 \\ 71 \end{array} \right.$
17	Private, first class		
18	Private.....		
28	Basic (521).....	(9)	(9)
29	Total enlisted.....	16	172
30	Aggregate.....	18	178
36	O Rifle, cal. .30, M1.....	13	114

(AG 320.3(24 May. 45))

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF WAR:

OFFICIAL:
EDWARD F. WITSELL
Major General
Acting The Adjutant General

G. C. MARSHALL
Chief of Staff

T/O 7-418

TABLE OF ORGANIZATION}
No. 7-418 }

WAR DEPARTMENT,
WASHINGTON, April 1, 1942.

STRIKING FORCE COMPANY, AIR BASE SECURITY
BATTALION

STRIKING FORCE COMPANY, AIR BASE SECURITY BATTALION

Designation: Company B, 1st Air Base Security Battalion

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12			14	15	16	17				
											3 rifle platoons (each)										
											Machine-gun platoon										
Unit	Technician grade	Company headquarters	Self-propelled gun 76-mm platoon			Platoon head- quarters	2 sections (each)			Total platoon	Platoon head- quarters	3 squads (each)	Total platoon	Total company	Enlisted cadre	Remarks					
			Platoon head- quarters	4 sections (each)	Total platoon		Platoon head- quarters	3 squads (each)	Total section												
Captain.....		1																			
First lieutenant.....		1																			
Second lieutenant.....																					
Total commissioned.....		2																			
First sergeant (385).....		1																			
Staff sergeant, including.....																					
Miss (324).....																					
Platoon (651).....																					
Sergeant, including.....																					
Motor (813).....																					
Section leader (652).....																					
Squad leader (653).....																					
Supply (821).....																					
Corporal, including.....																					
Clerk, company (406).....																					
Gunner (653).....																					
Squad leader (653).....																					
Squad leader, assistant (653).....																					
Technician, grade 4.....																					
Technician, grade 5.....																					
Private, first class.....																					
Private.....																					
Ammunition bearer (304).....		19	4	2	16																
Armorer (511).....																					
Cautioner (531).....		5																			
Cook (560).....		4																			
Cook (560).....		5																			

[illegible]

[A. G. 320.2 (4-9-42).]

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF WAR:

OFFICIAL:

J. A. ULIO,
Major General,
The Adjutant General.

G. C. MARSHALL,
Chief of Staff.

T/O 7-418
O 1

STRIKING FORCE COMPANY, AIR BASE SECURITY BATTALION

CHANGES
No. 1

WAR DEPARTMENT,
WASHINGTON, November 25, 1942.

T/O 7-418, April 1, 1942, is changed as follows:

Line	Column		
	1	2	3
28 1/2	Bugler (208).....	(• 1)	(1)
28	 Delete entire line.....		

[A. G. 320.2 (11-21-42).]

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF WAR:

G. C. MARSHALL,
Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL:

J. A. ULIO,
*Major General,
The Adjutant General.*

T/O & E 7-95

TABLE OF ORGANIZATION
AND EQUIPMENT
No. 7-95

WAR DEPARTMENT,
WASHINGTON 25, D. C., 21 July 1943.

INFANTRY BATTALION, SEPARATE

SECTION I. Organization:	Page
A. Infantry Battalion, Separate.....	2
B. Medical Detachment, Infantry Battalion, Separate....	3
II. Equipment:	
General.....	5
Chemical.....	6
Engineer.....	6
Medical:	
Individual equipment.....	6
Organizational equipment.....	6
Ordnance.....	7
Quartermaster:	
Individual equipment.....	7
Organizational clothing.....	7
Organizational equipment.....	7
Signal.....	8

INFANTRY BATTALION, SEPARATE

SECTION I ORGANIZATION

A. INFANTRY BATTALION, SEPARATE

Designation: †----- Battalion

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11
Unit	Headquarters (T/O & E 7-96)	Headquarters company (T/O & E 7-96)	3 rifle companies (each) (T/O & E 7-17)	Heavy weapons company (T/O & E 7-18)	Total	Attached medical (for details see p. 3)	Attached chaplain	Aggregate	Enlisted cadre *	Remarks
1 Lieutenant colonel.....	1				1			1		†Insert number of battalion. * Infantry only. † To be furnished only as required and available within the continental limits of the United States. Will be furnished prior to departure for overseas duty.
2 Major.....	2				2			2		
3 Captain.....	3	1	1	1	7			7		
4 Captain or first lieutenant.....						8		8		
5 First lieutenant.....	1	2	8	8	15		1	16		
6 Second lieutenant.....	2	2	2	4	12			12		
7										
8 Total commissioned.....	6	6	6	8	37	8	1	41		
9 Warrant officer.....		1			1			1		
10 Master sergeant.....		1			1			1	1	
11 First sergeant.....		1	1	1	3			3	3	
12 Technical sergeant.....		6			6			6	6	
13 Staff sergeant.....		6	6	6	31	1		32	30	
14 Sergeant.....		4	15	10	65			65	8	
15 Corporal.....		9	15	21	75	1		76	5	
16 Technician, grade 3.....						2		2		
17 Technician, grade 4.....		11	2	3	20	8		23	17	
18 Technician, grade 5.....		17	4	2	31	9		40	15	
19 Private, first class.....		37	64	48	277	9		286		
20 Private, including.....		50	80	62	352	11		363		
21 Basic.....		(13)	(17)	(14)	(78)	(3)		(81)		
22 Total enlisted.....		144	187	153	603	86		899	86	
23 Aggregate.....		6	150	193	160	801	39	1	911	86
24 O Carbine, cal. .30.....		8	62	28	88	237		237		
25 O Gun, 57-mm.....			3		3			3		
26 O Gun, machine, cal. .30.....				8	8			8		
27 O Gun, machine, light, cal. .30.....			2		6			6		
28 O Gun, machine, H.B., cal. .50, flexible.....			4	1	8			8		
29 O Launcher, rocket, antitank AT, 2.36".....			12	3	6	27		27		
30 O Mortar, 60-mm.....				3	9			9		
31 O Mortar, 81-mm.....					6	6		6		
32 O Pistol, automatic, cal. .45.....		3	15	10	28	70		70		
33 O Rifle, cal. .30, M1.....			73	143	60	552		552		
34 O Rifle, cal. .30, M1003A4.....				3	9			9		
35 O Rifle, automatic, cal. .30.....				9	27			27		
36 O Trailer, 1 1/2-ton.....			2	2	14	22	2	24		
37 O Trailer, 1-ton.....			6		6			6		
38 O Truck, 1 1/2 ton.....			10	2	19	35	2	37		
39 O Truck, 1 1/2-ton, weapons carrier.....				1	1			1		
40 O Truck, 1 1/2 ton, cargo.....			4		4			4		
41 O Truck, 2 1/2-ton.....			8		8			8		

INFANTRY BATTALION, SEPARATE

B. MEDICAL DETACHMENT, INFANTRY BATTALION, SEPARATE

Designation: Medical Detachment, †----- Infantry Battalion, Separate

	1	2	3	4	5
	Unit	Technician grade	Medical detachment	Enlisted cadre	Remarks
1					
2	Captain or first lieutenant.....		(d 1)3		† Insert number of battalion. * To be furnished only as required and available within the continental limits of the United States. Will be furnished prior to departure for overseas duty. † Also drive trucks. ‡ Includes 12 company aid men - 1 per rifle platoon; heavy weapons platoon. § Dental. For specification serial numbers shown in parentheses, see AR 615-20.
3	Total commissioned.....		* 3		
4	Staff sergeant, including.....		1	1	
5	Medical (673).....		(1)	(1)	
6	Corporal, including.....		1		
7	Medical (673).....		(1)		
8	Technician, grade 3.....		2	1	
9	Technician, grade 4.....		3	1	
10	Technician, grade 5 (including.....		9	1	
11	Private, first class.....		6		
12	Private.....		11		
13	Litter bearer (857).....		(12)		
14	Technician, dental (855).....	5	(1)	(1)	
15	Technician, medical (405).....	4	(1)	(1)	
16	Technician, medical (409).....	5	(1)		
17	Technician, medical (409).....		(b 2)		
18	Technician, surgical (861).....	3	(c 2)	(1)	
19	Technician, surgical (861).....	4	(c 2)		
20	Technician, surgical (861).....	5	(c 5)		
21	Technician, surgical (861).....		(e 5)		
22	Basic (821).....		(3)		
23	Total enlisted.....		36	4	
24	Aggregate.....		39	4	
25	O Trailer, 1/4-ton.....		2		
26	O Truck, 1/4-ton.....		2		

SECTION II
EQUIPMENT

FOR MEDICAL DETACHMENT ONLY

For equipment of other components of this organization, see section II of the Tables of Organization and Equipment shown in column headings under section I of this table.

GENERAL

1. This table is in accordance with AR 310-60, and it will be the authority for requisition in accordance with AR 35-6540, and for the issue of all items of equipment listed herein unless otherwise indicated. This table rescinds all Tables of Basic Allowances and Tables of Equipment heretofore published except T/E 21, Clothing and Individual Equipment, so far as they pertain to the allowances of equipment for the organization and individuals covered by this table.

2. When there appears a discrepancy between the allowances shown in column 2, "Allowances," and column 4, "Basis of distribution and remarks," the amount shown in column 2 will govern.

3. Items of clothing and individual equipment, components of sets and kits, spare parts, accessories, special equipment, special tools, and allowances of expendable items, are contained in the following publications:

Chemical Warfare Service.

Standard Nomenclature and Price List.

Allowances of Expendable Supplies, Circular No. 1, OCofCWS.

Corps of Engineers.

Supply Catalog, Parts 1, 2, and 3.

Allowances of Expendable Supplies, Series A.

Medical Department.

Medical Department Supply Catalog.

Allowances of Expendable Supplies, Circular No. 26, SGO, WD.

Ordnance Department.

Standard Nomenclature Lists SNL, index to which is the Ordnance Publications for Supply Index (OPSI).

T/A for Cleaning, Preserving and Lubricating Materials, Recoil Fluids, Special Oils and Similar Items of Issue.

T/A 23, Targets and Target Equipment.

Quartermaster Corps.

Table of Clothing and Individual Equipment, T/E 21.

Allowances of Expendable Supplies, Circular No. 1-18, OQMG.

Components, Spare Parts, Accessories and Contents of Chests, Kits and Sets and Other Items of Quartermaster Property, Circular No. 4, OQMG.

AR 30-3010, Items and Price Lists of Regular Supplies Controlled by Budget Credits and Price List of Other Miscellaneous Supplies.

Signal Corps.

Signal Corps Catalog (T/BA items).

Circular No. 10-1, OCSigO, Allowances of Spare Parts, Accessories, and Expendable Supplies.

AR 310-200, Military Publications, Allowance and Distribution.

AR 775-10, Qualification in Arms and Ammunition Training Allowances.

INFANTRY BATTALION, SEPARATE

CHEMICAL

1	2	3	4
Item	Allowances	For computation	Basis of distribution and remarks
Apparatus, decontaminating, 1½-qt, M2.	2	-----	1 per trk, in T of Opns only.
Curtain, gas proof, M1-----	2	-----	
Mask, gas, service-----	39	-----	1 per indiv.
Respirator, dust, M2-----	4	-----	2 per trk.

ENGINEER

Compass, wrist, liquid filled, or watch.	6	-----	1 per O; s sgt; techn, med driving trk.
Net, camouflage, cotton, shrimp, 22' x 22'.	4	-----	1 per trk, ¼-ton; tlr, ¼-ton. (Net, cam, cotton, shrimp, will be issued in od or sand, solid clr in T of Opns only when and as authorized by army or T of Opns comdr.)
Templet, map, transparent, M2--	3	-----	1 per O.

MEDICAL

Individual equipment

Brassard, Geneva Convention----	39	-----	1 per indiv in T of Opns.
Kit:			
Dental:			
Officer's-----	1	-----	Per dent O.
Private's-----	1	-----	Per dent techn.
Medical:			
Noncommissioned officer's...	2	-----	1 per s sgt; epi.
Officer's-----	2	-----	1 per med O.
Private's-----	33	-----	1 per litter bearer; med techn; surg techn; basic.

Organizational equipment

Chest:			
MD #4-----	1	-----	
MD #60-----	1	-----	Per dent O.
Gas casualty chest-----	1	-----	In T of Opns.
Kit, suction, snake bite-----	2	-----	
Machine, imprinting-----	2	-----	
Unit medical equipment, pack---	3	-----	Pending availability, the following may be issued in lieu thereof: 1—Case, tent pin. 2—Blanket set, small. 2—Chest, MD #1. 1—Chest, MD #2. 12—Litter, steel pole. 2—Splint set. 12—Splint, litter bar.

INFANTRY BATTALION, SEPARATE

ORDNANCE

1	2	3	4
Item	Allowances	For computation	Basis of distribution and remarks
Binocular, M13.....	1	-----	1 per trk when authorized by army or T of Opns comdr. See SNL G-529. See SNL G-503.
Defroster and deicer, electric windshield.	2	-----	
Trailer, 1/4-ton, 2-wheel, cargo.....	2	-----	
Truck, 1/4-ton, 4 x 4.....	2	-----	

QUARTERMASTER

Individual equipment

Bag, canvas, field, od, M-1936....	3	-----	1 per O.
Belt, pistol or revolver, M-1936....	39	-----	1 per indiv.
Carrier, pack, M-1928.....	36	-----	1 per EM.
Cover, canteen, dismounted, M-1910.	39	-----	1 per indiv.
Haversack, M-1928.....	36	-----	1 per EM.
Strap, carrying, od, bag, canvas, field.	3	-----	1 per bag, canvas, fld.
Suspenders, belt, M-1936.....	3	-----	1 per O.

Organizational clothing

Gloves, protective, impermeable...	1	-----	Per 40 EM outside continental US. (To be stored in nearest available dep for issue as determined by T of Opns comdr.) Do.
Suit, protective, one-piece, impermeable.	1	-----	

Organizational equipment

Axe, intrenching, M-1910, with handle.	4	-----	1 per 10 EM.
Bag, canvas, water sterilizing, complete, with cover and hanger.	1	-----	
Bucket:			
Canvas, water, 18 qt.....	2	-----	1 per trk.
General purpose, galvanized, heavy weight, w/o lip, 14-qt.	2	-----	
Burner, oil, stove, tent, M-1941...	1	-----	Per stove, tent, M-1941 when authorized by WD.
Can, water, 5-gallon.....	8	-----	1 per 5 indiv or fraction thereof.
Carrier:			
Axe, intrenching, M-1910.....	4	-----	1 per axe, intrenching.
Pickmattock, intrenching, M-1910.	7	-----	1 per pickmattock, intrenching.
Shovel, intrenching, M-1910...	25	-----	1 per shovel, intrenching.
Wire cutter, M-1938.....	7	-----	1 per wire cutter, M-1938.

INFANTRY BATTALION, SEPARATE

1	2	3	4
Item	Allowances	For computation	Basis of distribution and remarks
Case, canvas, dispatch.....	2	-----	1 per med O.
Clipper, hair.....	2	-----	1 per 24 indiv operating in extremely cold areas.
Cutter, wire, M-1938.....	7	-----	2 per 10 EM.
Drum, inflammable liquid, (gasoline), w/carrying handle, 5-gallon.	2	-----	1 per trk, ¼-ton.
Flag:			
Geneva Convention, Red Cross, bunting, ambulance and marker.	2	-----	
Guidon, bunting.....	1	-----	
Goggles, M-1943:			
With clear lens.....	2	-----	1 per indiv driving trk.
With green lens.....	37	-----	1 per indiv not otherwise issued goggles, M-1943 with clear or red lens when authorized by CG, Serv C or T of Opns comdr.
Kit, sewing.....	3	-----	1 per 12 indiv.
Lantern:			
Electric, portable, hand.....	2	-----	
Gasoline, two-mantle, commercial.	2	-----	
Pickmattock, intrenching, M-1910, with handle.	7	-----	2 per 10 EM.
Shovel, intrenching, M-1910.....	25	-----	7 per 10 EM.
Stove, tent, M-1941, complete, with grate.	1	-----	Per tent when authorized by army or T of Opns comdr.
Tent, command post, complete (with pins and poles).	1	-----	
Tube, flexible nozzle.....	2	-----	1 per trk.
Whistle, thunderer.....	4	-----	1 per O; s sgt.
SIGNAL			
Flashlight TL-122-().....	7	-----	1 per O; s sgt; cpl; indiv driving trk.

[A G. 320.3 (14 Jul 43).]

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF WAR:

G. C. MARSHALL,
Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL:

J. A. ULIO,
Major General,
The Adjutant General.

*T/O & E 7-85

TABLE OF ORGANIZATION
AND EQUIPMENT
No. 7-85

WAR DEPARTMENT,
WASHINGTON 25, D. C., 29 February 1944.

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*This table supersedes all prior tables and equipment lists on the organization of this unit.

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CORG-M-343

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RANGER INFANTRY BATTALION

SECTION I

ORGANIZATION

A. RANGER INFANTRY BATTALION

Designation: †..... Ranger Infantry Battalion

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Unit	Headquarters and Headquarters Company (T/O & E 7-85)	Ranger companies (each) (T/O & E 7-85)	Total	Attached Medical (for details see p. 3)	Aggregate	Enlisted cadre *	Remarks
1							
2	Lieutenant colonel.....	1	1	1	1	1	† Insert number of bat-
3	Major.....	1	1	1	1	1	talion.
4	Captain.....	3	9	9	9	9	* Infantry only. See
5	Captain or first lieutenant.....	1	1	1	1	1	page 3 for attached med-
6	First lieutenant.....	3	15	15	15	15	ical cadre
7	Total commissioned.....	8	26	1	27	27	† To be furnished only
8	Master sergeant.....	1	1	1	1	1	as required and available
9	First sergeant.....	1	7	7	7	7	within the continental
10	Technical sergeant.....	6	18	18	18	18	limits of the United
11	Staff sergeant.....	2	62	1	63	30	States. Will be furn-
12	Sergeant.....	3	30	30	30	30	ished prior to departure
13	Corporal.....	4	10	1	11	7	for overseas duty.
14	Technician, grade 3.....	17	17	1	18	10	
15	Technician, grade 4.....	27	27	3	30	8	
16	Technician, grade 5.....	27	207	4	301	78	
17	Private, first class.....	27	45	207	4	301	
18	Total enlisted.....	88	65	478	11	489	
19	Aggregate.....	96	68	501	12	516	
20	O Gun, machine, cal. .30, light, flexible.....	4	21	21	21	21	
21	O Gun, submachine, cal. .45.....	20	6	60	56	56	
22	O Launcher, rocket, AT, 2.36-inch.....	2	2	14	14	14	
23	O Mortar, 60-mm.....	6	2	18	18	18	
24	O Mortar, 81-mm.....	6	6	6	6	6	
25	O Motorcycle, solo.....	7	7	7	7	7	
26	O Pistol, automatic, cal. .45.....	16	17	198	198	198	
27	O Rifle, antitank, cal. .56.....	8	2	20	20	20	
28	O Rifle, cal. .30, M1.....	60	46	326	326	326	
29	O Rifle, cal. .30, M1903A4.....	2	12	12	12	12	
30	O Truck, ½-ton.....	0	9	9	9	9	
31	O Truck, ½-ton, command.....	1	1	1	1	1	
32	O Truck, ½-ton, weapons carrier.....	4	4	1	5	5	

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RANGER INFANTRY BATTALION

B. MEDICAL DETACHMENT, RANGER INFANTRY BATTALION

Designation: Medical Detachment, †----- Ranger Infantry Battalion

	1	2	3	4	5	6
	Unit	Spec- fication serial No.	Tech- nician grade	Total	En- listed cadre	Remarks
1						
2	Captain or first lieutenant, in- cluding.....			* 1		†Insert number of bat- talion. * To be furnished only as required and available with- in the continental limits of the United States. Will be furnished prior to departure for overseas duty. * Also drives truck. * Includes 1 aid man per company. For specification serial numbers shown in column 2, for enlisted men, see AR 615-23; and for officers see TM 12-406 and 12-407.
3	Medical officer, general duty.....	3100		(1)		
4	Total commissioned.....			1		
5	Staff sergeant, including.....			1	1	
6	Medical.....	673		(1)	(1)	
7	Corporal, including.....			1		
8	Medical.....	673		(1)		
9	Technician, grade 3.....			1	1	
10	Technician, grade 4 (including.....			1		
11	Technician, grade 5.....			3		
12	Private, first class.....			4		
13	Technician, medical.....	409		(b 1)		
14	Technician, surgical.....	861	3	(1)	(1)	
15	Technician, surgical.....	861	4	(1)		
16	Technician, surgical.....	861	5	(3)		
17	Technician, surgical.....	861		(2)		
18	Total enlisted.....			11	2	
19	Aggregate.....			12	2	
20	O Truck, 3½-ton, weapons carrier.....			1		

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WASHINGTON 25, D. C., 7 AUGUST 1945

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RANGER INFANTRY BATTALION

SECTION I ORGANIZATION
 A. Ranger Infantry Battalion
 Designation: / Ranger Infantry Battalion

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Unit	Headquarters and headquarters company (T/O & E 7-86)	6 ranger companies (each) (T/O & E 7-87)	Total	Attached medical (for details see p)	Aggregate	Enlisted cadre ^a	Remarks
2 Lieutenant colonel.....	1	1	1	1	1	1	/Insert number of battalion. Infantry only. See page 3 for attached cadre. ^b To be furnished only as required and available within the continental limits of the United States. Will be furnished prior to departure for overseas duty.
3 Major.....	1	1	1	1	1	1	
4 Captain.....	4	1	10	6	10	1	
5 Captain or first lieutenant.....	2	2	14	1	14	1	
6 First lieutenant.....	2	2	14	1	14	1	
7 Total commissioned.....	8	3	26	1	27	1	
8 Master sergeant.....	1	1	1	1	1	1	
9 First sergeant.....	1	1	1	1	1	1	
10 Technical sergeant.....	6	2	18	1	18	18	
11 Staff sergeant.....	2	10	62	1	63	31	
12 Sergeant.....	3	6	39	1	39	13	
13 Corporal.....	4	4	28	1	29	13	
14 Technician, grade 3.....	15	15	15	2	17	8	
15 Technician, grade 4.....	23	23	23	3	26	4	
16 Technician, grade 5.....	37	51	343	3	346	4	
17 Private, first class.....	37	51	343	3	346	4	
18 Total enlisted.....	92	74	536	11	547	82	
19 Aggregate.....	100	77	562	12	574	82	
20 0 Carbine, cal. .30.....	20	10	30	10	80	80	
21 0 Gun, Machine, cal. .30 light, flexible.	4	4	24	4	24	24	
22 0 Launcher, rocket, 2.36-inch....	10	4	34	10	34	34	
23 0 Mortar, 60-mm.....	6	2	18	6	18	18	
24 0 Mortar, 81-mm.....	6	6	6	6	6	6	
25 0 Motorcycle, solo.....	7	7	7	7	7	7	
26 0 Pistol, automatic, cal. .45.....	100	21	226	100	226	226	
27 0 Rifle, automatic, cal. .30.....	2	2	12	2	12	12	
28 0 Rifle, cal. .30, M1.....	54	47	336	54	336	336	
29 0 Rifle, cal. .30, M1C (Sniper)...	2	2	12	2	12	12	
30 0 Trailer, 1-Ton, 2W, water tank, 250 gallon.	1	1	1	1	1	1	
31 0 Truck, 1-ton.....	9	9	9	9	9	9	
32 0 Truck, 3/4-ton, command, weapons carrier.	1	1	1	1	1	1	
33 0 Truck, 3/4-ton weapons carrier.	4	4	4	1	5	5	
34 0 Truck, 2-ton, cargo.....	4	4	4	4	4	4	

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RANGER INFANTRY BATTALION

B. Medical Detachment, Ranger Infantry Battalion
 Designation: Medical Detachment, /-----Ranger Infantry Battalion

1	2	3	4	5	6
Unit	Specification serial No	Technician grade	Total	Enlisted cadre	Remarks
2 Captain or first lieutenant.....			1		/Insert number of battalion. ^a To be furnished only as required and available within continental limits of the United States. Will be furnished prior to departure for overseas duty. ^b Drives truck, 3/4-ton. ^c Includes 1 aid man for company. For specification serial numbers for officers see TM 12-406 and 12-407; for enlisted men see TM 12-427.
3 Medical officer, general duty...	3100		(a1)		
4 Total commissioned.....			a1		
5 Staff sergeant.....			1	1	
6 Medical.....	673		(1)	(1)	
7 Corporal.....			1		
8 Medical.....	673		(1)		
9 Technician, grade 3.....			1	1	
10 Technician, grade 4.....			2		
11 Technician, grade 5.....			3		
12 Private, first class.....			3		
13 Technician, medical.....	409		(b1)		
14 Technician, surgical.....	861	3	(1)	(1)	
15 Technician, surgical.....	861	4	(2)		
16 Technician, surgical.....	861	5	(3)		
17 Technician, surgical.....	861		(2)		
18 Total enlisted.....			11	2	
19 Aggregate.....			12	2	
20 0 Truck, 3/4-ton, weapons carrier.....			1		

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TABLE OF ORGANIZATION
AND EQUIPMENT
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WAR DEPARTMENT,
WASHINGTON 25, D. C., 29 February 1944.

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RANGER INFANTRY BATTALION

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HQ AND HQ CO, RANGER INFANTRY BATTALION

SECTION I

ORGANIZATION

Designation: Headquarters, † ——— Ranger Infantry Battalion

Headquarters Company, † ——— Ranger Infantry Battalion

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	
1	Unit	Specification serial No.	Technician grade	Battalion headquarters	Headquarters company					Communication platoon	Total headquarters and headquarters company	Enlisted cadre	Remarks
				Administrative and personnel section	Intelligence and operations section	Supply and transportation section	Total platoon						
2	Lieutenant colonel, including...			1						1		† Insert number of battalion. * Also operations and training, 8-3 (2162). ‡ Battalion pool of weapons. § For messenger service. ¶ British equipment. • 1 for supply and transportation section; 0 for battalion pool of weapons. † 1 per company, 2 spare. ‡ Armed with pistol, automatic, cal. 45. § Armed with rifle, cal. 30, M1. For specification serial numbers shown in column 2, for enlisted men, see AR 615-26; for officers, see TM 12-406 and 12-407.	
3	Battalion commander	1542		(1)						(1)			
4	Major, including...			1						1			
5	Executive	1842		(1)						(1)			
6	Captain, including...			2	1			1		3			
7	Company commander	2900		(1)	(1)			(1)		(1)			
8	Intelligence, 8-2	9301		(1)						(1)			
9	Supply, 8-4	4010		(1)						(1)			
10	First lieutenant, including...			3						3			
11	Communication	0200		(1)						(1)			
12	Operations and training, assistant 8-3	2162		(1)						(1)			
13	Personnel, 8-1	2260		(1)						(1)			
14	Total commissioned			7	1			1		8			
15	Master sergeant, including...				1			1		1	1		
16	Sergeant major	502		(1)				(1)		(1)	(1)		
17	First sergeant	585		1				1		1	1		
18	Technical sergeant, including...			2	2	1	5	1	6	6	6		
19	Battalion mess	824		(1)				(1)		(1)	(1)		
20	Communication chief	542							(1)	(1)	(1)		
21	Intelligence	631			(1)			(1)		(1)	(1)		
22	Operations	814			(1)			(1)		(1)	(1)		
23	Personnel	816		(1)				(1)		(1)	(1)		
24	Supply	821					(1)	(1)		(1)	(1)		
25	Staff sergeant, including...						2	2		2			
26	Motor	813					(1)	(1)		(1)			
27	Supply	821					(1)	(1)		(1)			
28	Sergeant, including...						3	3		3			
29	Motorcycle	679					(1)	(1)		(1)			
30	Supply, ammunition	605					(1)	(1)		(1)			
31	Supply, rations	821					(1)	(1)		(1)			
32	Corporal, including...			1			1	2	2	4	1		
33	Clerk, company	405		(1)				(1)		(1)	(1)		
34	Communication assistant	542							(2)	(2)			
35	Motorcycle	679					(1)	(1)		(1)			
36	Technician, grade 4										17		
37	Technician, grade 5 including				23	5	24	52	19	27	8		
38	Private, first class										27		
39	Armorer artificer	511	5				(1)	(2)	(2)	(2)			
40	Clerk, mail	405	6		(1)		(1)	(2)	(2)	(2)			
41	Clerk, personnel	405	4		(1)			(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)		
42	Clerk, typist	405	4		(2)			(2)	(2)	(2)			
43	Clerk, typist	405	4		(2)	(2)	(1)	(5)	(5)	(5)			
44	Cook	060	4		(5)			(5)	(5)	(5)	(5)		
45	Cook	060	5		(5)			(5)	(5)	(5)	(5)		
46	Cook's helper	521	4		(5)			(5)	(5)	(5)			
47	Draftsman	076	4			(1)		(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)		
48	Driver, truck, light	245	5				(1)	(4)	(4)	(4)			
49	Driver, truck, light	245					(10)	(10)	(10)	(10)			

T/O & E 7-86

HQ AND HQ CO. RANGER INFANTRY BATTALION

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
	Unit	Specification serial No.	Technician grade	Battalion headquarters	Administrative and personnel section	Intelligence and operations section	Supply and transportation section	Total platoon	Communication platoon	Total headquarters and headquarters company	Enlisted cadre	Remarks
	Private, first class—Continued.											
50	Mechanic, automobile.....	014	4			(1)	(1)			(1)	(1)	
51	Messenger.....	675			(2)	(2)		(4)		(4)		
52	Motorcyclist.....	679	5			(2)	(2)			(2)		
53	Motorcyclist.....	679	4			(3)	(3)			(3)		
54	Operator, radio.....	776	4						(6)	(6)	(1)	
55	Operator, radio.....	776	5						(12)	(12)		
56	Repairman, radio.....	648	4						(1)	(1)	(1)	
57	Total enlisted.....				28	7	31	66	22	88	24	
58	Aggregate.....				7	29	7	31	67	96	24	
59	O Gun, submachine, cal. .45.....						20	20		20		
60	O Launcher, rocket, 2.36-inch.....					1	1	2		2		
61	O Mortar, 60-mm.....						6	6		6		
62	O Mortar, 81-mm.....						6	6		6		
63	O Motorcycle, solo.....						7	7		7		
64	O Pistol, automatic, cal. .45.....		7	29	7	31	67	22	96			
65	O Rifle, cal. .30, M1.....			24	4	22	50		50			
66	O Rifle, antitank, cal. .55 ^a				1	7	8		8			
67	O Truck, 1/2-ton.....					9	9		9			
68	O Truck, 1/2-ton, command.....					1	1		1			
69	O Truck 1/2-ton, weapons carrier, including.....						4	4		4		
70	Ammunition and extra weapons.....						(1)	(1)		(1)		
71	Gas and Oil.....						(1)	(1)		(1)		
72	Kitchen.....						(1)	(1)		(1)		
73	Ration.....						(1)	(1)		(1)		

T/O & E 7-86

TABLE OF ORGANIZATION
AND EQUIPMENT
No. 7-86

WAR DEPARTMENT
WASHINGTON 25, D. C., 1 AUGUST 1944

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RANGER INFANTRY BATTALION

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*This table supersedes T/O & E 7-86, 29 February 1944, including C1,
8 July 1944.

ACC 100'XA/1521B--656866-45

HQ AND HQ COMPANY, RANGER INFANTRY BATTALION

SECTION I ORGANIZATION												
Designation: Headquarters, Ranger Infantry Battalion												
Headquarters Company, Ranger Infantry Battalion												
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	
Unit	Specification serial No.	Technician grade	Battalion headquarters	Headquarters company				Communication platoon	Total headquarters and headquarters company	Enlisted cadre	Remarks	
				Administrative and personnel section	Intelligence and operations section	Supply and transportation section	Total platoon					
2 Lieutenant colonel.....	1542		1	1					1	1	Insert number of battalion. Also personnel (2200). Also classification specialist (275) Battalion pool of weapons. do for supply and transportation section; 6 for battalion pool of weapons. For messenger service. 11 per company, 2 spare. 84 are driven by persons designated by company commander. Armed with pistol, automatic, cal. .45. Armed with rifle, cal. .30, M1. For specification serial numbers for officers, see TM 12-406 and 12-407; for enlisted men, see TM 12-427.	
3 Battalion commander.....			1						(1)			
4 Major.....			1						1			
5 Executive.....	1542		3	1			1		4			
6 Captain.....			1	(1)			(1)		1			
7 Company commander.....	2900		1						1			
8 Intelligence, S-2.....	9101		1						1			
9 Operations and training, S-3.....	2162		1						1			
10 Supply, S-4.....	4010		1						1			
11 First lieutenant.....			2						2			
12 Adjutant and S-1.....	2110		(*)						1			
13 Communication.....	0200		1						1			
14 Total commissioned.....			7	1			1		8			
15 Master sergeant.....				1			1		1	1		
16 Sergeant major.....	502			(1)			(1)		1	(1)		
17 First sergeant.....	502			1			1		1	1		
18 Technical sergeant.....				2	2	1	5	1	6	6		
19 Battalion mess.....	824			(1)			(1)		(1)	(1)		
20 Communication chief.....	542								1	1		
21 Intelligence.....	611				(1)		(1)		1	(1)		
22 Operations.....	614				(1)		(1)		1	(1)		
23 Personnel.....	502			(1)			(1)		1	(1)		
24 Supply.....	821					(1)	(1)		2	1		
25 Staff sergeant.....						2	2		2	(1)		
26 Motor.....	014					(1)	(1)		1	(1)		
27 Supply.....	821					(1)	(1)		1	(1)		

HQ AND HQ COMPANY, RANGER INFANTRY BATTALION

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
28	Sergeant.....						3	3		3		
29	Motorcycle.....	378					(1)	(1)		(1)		
30	Supply, ammunition.....	505					(1)	(1)		(1)		
31	Supply, rations.....	821					(1)	(1)		(1)		
32	Corporal.....						1	2	2	4	1	
33	Clerk, company.....	405			(br)			(1)	(2)	(1)	(1)	
34	Communications, assistant.....	542								(2)		
35	Motorcycle.....	378					(1)	(1)		(1)		
36	Technicians, grade 4 } including.....									15	8	
37	Technicians, grade 5 }									23	4	
38	Private, first class }				26	5	25	36	19	37		
39	Armer, artificer.....	511	5				(2)	(2)		(2)		
40	Clerk, mail.....	055	5				(1)	(1)		(1)		
41	Classification specialist.....	275	4				(1)	(1)		(1)		
42	Clerk, typist.....	405	4				(1)	(1)		(1)		
43	Clerk, typist.....	405	4				(1)	(1)		(1)		
44	Cook.....	060	4				(1)	(1)		(1)		
45	Cook.....	060	5				(1)	(1)		(1)		
46	Cook's helper.....	590	4				(1)	(1)		(1)		
47	Draftsman.....	076	4				(1)	(1)		(1)		
48	Driver, truck, light.....	345	5				(1)	(1)		(1)		
49	Driver, truck, light.....	345	5				(1)	(1)		(1)		
50	Mechanic, automotive.....	014	4				(1)	(1)		(1)		
51	Mechanic, automotive.....	014	5				(1)	(1)		(1)		
52	Messenger.....	667					(1)	(1)		(1)		
53	Messenger.....	761					(1)	(1)		(1)		
54	Motorcyclist.....	378	5				(1)	(1)		(1)		
55	Motorcyclist.....	378	4				(1)	(1)		(1)		
56	Operator, radio.....	740	4				(1)	(1)		(1)		
57	Operator, radio.....	740	5				(1)	(1)		(1)		
58	Operator, radio.....	776	4				(1)	(1)		(1)		
59	Operator, radio.....	776	5				(1)	(1)		(1)		
60	Operator, radio telephone.....	745					(1)	(1)		(1)		
61	Repairman, radio.....	648	4				(1)	(1)		(1)		
62	Total enlisted.....				31	7	32	70	22	92	22	
63	Aggregate.....			7	32	7	32	71	22	100	22	
64	Carbine, cal. 30.....						20	20		20		
65	Launcher, rocket, 2.36-inch.....						10	10		10		
66	Mortar, 61-mm.....				2		6	6		6		
67	Mortar, 81-mm.....						6	6		6		
68	Motorcycle, solo.....						7	7		7		
69	Pistol, automatic, cal. .45.....			7	32	7	32	71	22	100		

HQ AND HQ COMPANY, RANGER INFANTRY BATTALION

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
Unit	Specification serial No.	Technician grade	Battalion headquarters	Headquarters company				Communication platoon	Total headquarters and headquarters company	Unlisted cadre	Remarks
				Staff platoon							
				Administrative and personnel section	Intelligence and operations section	Supply and transportation section	Total platoon				
70	0 Rifle, cal. .30, M1.....			27	4	23	54				
71	0 Trailer, 1-ton, 2 wheel, water tank, 250 gallon.....										
72	0 Truck, 1-ton.....										
73	0 Truck, 3/4-ton, command, weapons carrier.....										
74	0 Truck, 3/4-ton weapons carrier, including.....										
75	0 Truck, 3/4-ton weapons carrier, including.....										
76	0 Ammunition and extra weapons.....										
77	0 Gas and oil.....										
78	0 Kitchen.....										
79	0 Ration.....										
	0 Truck, 2 1/2-ton, cargo.....										

***T/O & E 7-87**

**TABLE OF ORGANIZATION
AND EQUIPMENT
No. 7-87**

**WAR DEPARTMENT,
WASHINGTON 25, D. C., 29 February 1944.**

RANGER COMPANY, RANGER INFANTRY BATTALION

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*This table supersedes all prior tables and equipment lists on the organization of this unit.

RANGER COMPANY, RANGER INFANTRY BATTALION

SECTION I
ORGANIZATION
Designation: Company i-., i-., Ranger Infantry Battalion

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14
Unit	Specification serial No.	Technician grade	Company headquarters	Platoon headquarters	Section headquarters	2 assault sections (each)	2 platoons (each)	3 assault sections (each)	Special weapons	Total platoon	Total company	Enlisted cadre	Remarks
						Assault	Light machine gun	Total section					
Captain, including.....			1	1							1		† Insert letter of company.
Company commander.....	1542		(1)								(1)		† Insert number of battalion.
First lieutenant, including.....											2		* Armed with rifle, antitank, cal.
Platoon leader.....	1542			(1)							(2)		45, if required.
Total commissioned.....			1	1						1	3		* Armed with rifle, cal. 30,
													M1903A4.
First sergeant.....	585		1								1		* British equipment.
Technical sergeant, including.....			1								2		* Armed with pistol, automatic, cal.
Platoon.....	651		(1)								1		45.
Staff sergeant, including.....											10		* Armed with rifle, cal. 30, M1.
Section leader.....	652				(1)						(3)		* Armed with gun, submachine,
Squad leader.....	653										(4)		cal. 45.
Sergeant, including.....											6		For specification serial numbers for
Section leader, assistant.....	652										(2)		enlisted men shown in column 2,
Squad leader.....	653										(2)		see TR 815-28. For officers, see
Corporal, including.....			1								(4)		TM 12-408 and 12-407.
Clerk, company.....	405		(1)								(1)		
Private, first class, including.....			1	2							(1)		
Ammunition carrier.....	604									22	(2)		
Gunner, machine gun.....	604									(6)	(12)		
Gunner, machine gun, assistant.....	604									(3)	(4)		
Gunner, mortar.....	607									(1)	(2)		
Gunner, mortar, assistant.....	607									(1)	(2)		
Messenger.....	672		(1)	(1)						(1)	(1)		
Rifleman.....	745									(6)	(16)		

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RANGER COMPANY, RANGER INFANTRY BATTALION

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*T/O & E 7-87

TABLE OF ORGANIZATION
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WAR DEPARTMENT
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RANGER COMPANY, RANGER INFANTRY BATTALION

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RANGER CO, RANGER INFANTRY BN

SECTION I ORGANIZATION Designation: Company / Ranger Infantry Battalion													
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14
Unit	Specification serial No.	Technician grade	Company headquarters	Platoon headquarters	Section headquarters	Assault squad	Light machine gun squad	Total section	Special weapons section	Total platoon	Total company	Enlisted cadre	Remarks
2 Captain.....	1542		Cpl	Cpl							1	1	/Laert letter of company. Insert number of battalion. File, classification special- let (775).
3 Company commander.....			(1)								(1)	2	armed with rifle, automatic, cal. 30.
4 First lieutenant.....	1542			(1)							(1)	1	armed with carbine, cal. 30.
5 Platoon commander.....											(2)	2	armed with rifle, cal. 30 M1C (snipers).
6 Total commissioned.....			1	1						1	3	5	armed with pistol automatic, cal. 45
7 First sergeant.....	1812		Cpl							1	1	1	armed with rifle, cal. 30, M1.
8 Technical sergeant.....	1812			(Cpl)						1	2	2	For specification serial numbers for officers, see TM 12-405 and 12-407; for enlisted men, see TM 12-427.
9 Platoon.....										5	10	5	
10 Staff sergeant.....										(1)	(1)	(1)	
11 Section leader.....	1812				(Fl)					(2)	(4)	(2)	
12 Section leader.....	607									(1)	(2)	(1)	
13 Squad leader.....	1812									(1)	(4)	(2)	
14 Sergeant.....										1	3	6	
15 Section leader, assistant.....	607									(Pl)	(1)	(2)	
16 Squad leader.....	1812									(1)	(2)	(4)	
17 Corporal.....											4	2	
18 Clerk, company.....	405		(Cpl)							1	(1)	(1)	
19 Rifleman, automatic.....	746									(bp1)	(2)	(1)	
20 Supply.....	821		(Pl)							(1)	(1)	(1)	
21 Private, first class.....			1	2						25	51	51	
22 Ammunition bearer.....	604									(2)	(8)	(8)	
23 Ammunition bearer.....	607									(2)	(4)	(4)	
24 Gunner, machine gun.....	604									(Pl)	(4)	(4)	
25 Gunner, machine gun, assistant.....	604									(Pl)	(4)	(4)	
26 Gunner, mortar.....	607									(Pl)	(2)	(2)	
27 Gunner, mortar, assistant.....	607									(Pl)	(1)	(1)	

RANGER 'C, RANGER INFANTRY BN

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14
28 Private, first class--Continued.														
29 Gunner, rocket	596									(P1)	(1)	(2)		
30 Gunner, rocket, assistant	596									(C1)	(1)	(2)		
31 Messenger	745			(P1)	(P1)						(1)	(3)		
32 Rifleman	745						(P4)				(8)	(16)		
33 Rifleman, automatic, assistant	746									(C1)	(1)	(2)		
34 Rifleman, sniper	745				(d1)						(1)	(2)		
35 Total enlisted				4	3	1	5	5	11	10	35	74	10	
Aggregate				5	4	1	5	5	11	10	36	77	10	
36 0 Carbine, cal. .30				2	2					2	4	10		
37 0 Gun, machine, cal. .30, light, flexible								1	1		2	4		
38 0 Launcher, rocket, 2.36-inch										2	2	4		
39 0 Mortar, 60-mm										1	1	2		
40 0 Pistol, automatic, cal. .45				1	1					1	1	2		
41 0 Rifle, automatic, cal. .30								2	2	5	10	21		
42 0 Rifle, cal. .30, M1				3	1	1	5	3	9	1	1	2		
43 0 Rifle, cal. .30, M1C (snipers)					1					3	22	47		

RANGER CO, RANGER INFANTRY BN

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14
28	Private, first class-Continued.													
29	Gunner, rocket	596								(Pl)	(1)	(2)		
30	Gunner, rocket, assistant	596								(Pl)	(1)	(2)		
31	Messenger	745		(Pl)							(1)	(3)		
32	Rifleman	745					(Pl)		(4)		(8)	(16)		
33	Rifleman, automatic, assistant	746								(Pl)	(1)	(2)		
34	Rifleman, sniper	745			(Pl)						(1)	(2)		
35	Total enlisted			4	3	1	5	5	11	10	35	74	10	
	Aggregate			5	4	1	5	5	11	10	36	77	10	
36	Carbine, cal. .30			2	2					2	4	10		
37	Gun, machine, cal. .30, light, flexible							1	1		2	4		
38	Launcher, rocket, 2.36-inch										2	4		
39	Launcher, 60 mm										1	2		
40	Flare			1	1			2	2	5	10	21		
41	Rifle, automatic, cal. .45										1	2		
42	Rifle, automatic, cal. .30			3	1	1	5	3	9	1	22	47		
43	Rifle, cal. .30, M1										1	2		
44	Rifle, cal. .30, M1C (sniper)													

WAR DEPARTMENT, Washington 25, D.C.

Change No. 1

1 July 1945

INFANTRY BATTALION

T/O&E 7-15, 1 June 1945, is changed as follows:

Reorganization to be effected under this table requires specific War Department approval. T/O&E 7-15, 26 February 1944, has been renumbered T/O&E 7-15-OS by Change No. 2, 1 June 1945.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF WAR:

G. C. MARSHALL
Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:

J. A. ULIO
Major General
The Adjutant General

WAR DEPARTMENT Washington 25 D C

1/01 7-15

1 Dec 1945

INFANTRY BATTALION

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
	Headquarters (T/O&F - 7-16-OS)	Headquarters Company (T/O&F - 7-16-OS)	3 Rifle Companies (T/O&F each - 7-17-OS)	Heavy Weapons Co (T/O&F - 7-18-OS)	Total Battalion	Enlisted Cadre	Remarks	
2 Lieutenant Colonel	1				1			
3 Major	1				1			
4 Captain	2	1	1	1	7			
5 First Lieutenant	1	2	3	3	15			
6 Second Lieutenant		1	3	3	11			
7 Total Commissioned	5	4	7	7	37			
8 First Sergeant		1	1	1	5	5		
9 Technical Sergeant		2	4	4	18	18		
10 Staff Sergeant		7	18	19	80	49		
11 Sergeant		6	21	10	79	2		
12 Corporal		2	13	19	60	5		
13 Technician, Grade 4		6	3	3	18	11		
14 Technician, Grade 5		11	4	6	29	11		
15 Private, First Class		36	123	93	498			
16 Private		13	48	33	190			
17 Basic		(4)	(21)	(9)	(76)			
18 Total Enlisted		84	235	188	977	101		
19 Aggregate	5	88	242	195	1014	101		
20 Carbine, Cal 30	3	40	37	95	249			
21 Heavy, Flexible Gun, Machine, Cal 30				8	8			
22 Light, Flexible Gun, Machine, HD, Cal 50			2	8	14			
23 Flexible		1	1	2	6			
24 Launcher, Rocket, 2.36-inch		5	6	9	32			
25 Mortar, 60mm			3		9			
26 Mortar, 81mm				6	6			
27 Pistol, Automatic, Cal 45	2		22	46	114			
28 Rifle, Automatic, Cal 30			15		45			
29 Rifle, Cal 30, M1		48	171	54	615			
30 Rifle, Cal 30, M1 (Snipers)			3		9			
31 Rifle, 57mm, M18			3		9			
32 Rifle, 75mm, M20				6	6			
33 Trailer, 1/4-ton		3	4	14	29			
34 Trailer, 1-ton		1		3	4			
35 Truck, 1/4-ton		9	4	20	41			
36 Truck, 3/4-ton, Weapon Carrier		1		1	2			
37 Truck, 1-1/2-ton, Cargo		1		3	4			

WAR DEPARTMENT, Washington 25, D C

Change 2

T/O&F 7-15

5 September 1945

INFANTRY BATTALION

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
	Headquarters (T/O&F - 7-16-OS)	Headquarters Company (T/O&F - 7-16-OS)	3 Rifle Companies (T/O&F each - 7-17-OS)	Heavy Weapons Co (T/O&F - 7-18-OS)	Total Battalion	Enlisted Cadre	Remarks	
20 Carbine, Cal 30 29 Rifle, Cal 30, M1		50 38			259 605			

T/O & E 7-15N

**TABLE OF ORGANIZATION
AND EQUIPMENT
No. 7-15N**

**DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
WASHINGTON 25, D. C., 16 April 1948**

INFANTRY BATTALION

**Reorganization to be effected under this table requires specific Department of
the Army approval**

	Page
Section I. General.....	1
II. Organization.....	3
III. Equipment.....	6


SECTION I

GENERAL

- 1. Mission.**—To close with the enemy, capture or destroy him by means of fire and maneuver; or to repel his assault by fire or close combat.
- 2. Assignment.**—Organic to Infantry Regiment, T/O & E 7-11N.
- 3. Capabilities.**—
 - a.** Furnishing a base of fire and maneuver.
 - b.** Maneuvering in all types of terrain and climatic conditions.
 - c.** Furnishing limited antitank protection.
 - d.** Seizing and holding terrain.

T/O & E 7-15N

INFANTRY BATTALION



INFANTRY BATTALION

Section II

ORGANIZATION

Designation: 1____, 1____ Infantry

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
	Total battalion	Headquar- ters and headquar- ters com- pany (T/O & E 7-16N)	3 rifle com- panies (each) (T/O & E 7-17N)	Heavy weapons company (T/O & E 7-18N)	Enlisted cadre	Remarks
Lieutenant colonel.....	1	1				{Insert number of battalion. {Insert number of regiment. For specification serial numbers for off- cers see T/M 12-404; for enlisted men see T/M 12-427.
Major.....	2	2				
Captain.....	8	4	1	1		
Lieutenant.....	23	4	3	4		
Total commissioned.....	34	11	6	6		
First sergeant.....	6	1	1	1	5	
Master sergeant.....	1	1			1	
Technical sergeant.....	26	7	5	4	26	
Staff sergeant.....	66	5	18	7	56	
Sergeant.....	81	6	18	11	3	
Corporal.....	19	2	21	15		
Technician, grade 3.....	44	4	5	3	11	
Technician, grade 4.....	63	18	5	11	15	
Technician, grade 5.....	513	17	3	22	6	
Private first class or private.....	127	47	127	85		
Filler personnel.....	(80)	(5)	(20)	(15)		
Total enlisted.....	383	108	205	160	123	
Total commissioned.....	34	11	6	6		
Aggregate.....	917	119	211	165	123	
Carbine, cal. 30.....	253	67	37	75		
Gun, machine, cal. 30, heavy.....	4			4		
Gun, machine, cal. 30, light.....	13			4		
Gun, machine, cal. 50.....	8	3	3	2		
Launcher, rocket, 2.35-inch.....	9		1			
Launcher, rocket, 3.5-inch.....	11	5		6		
Mortar, 60-mm.....	9		3			
Mortar, 81.....						

T/O & E 7-15N

INFANTRY BATTALION

1	1		2	3	4	5	6	7
	Unit		Total battalion	Headquar- ters and headquar- ters com- pany (T/O & E & E 7-16N)	3 rifle com- panies (each) (T/O & E 7-17N)	Heavy weapons company (T/O & E 7-18N)	Enlisted cadre	
29	O	Pistol, automatic, cal. .45	130	3	33	28		
30	O	Rifle, automatic, cal. .30	45		15			
31	O	Rifle, cal. .30	507	49	132	62		
32	O	Rifle, cal. .30, sniper	27		9			
33	O	Rifle, 57-mm	9		3			
34	O	Rifle, 75-mm	4					
35	O	Trailer, 4-ton	27	7		4		
36	O	Trailer, 1-ton	9	1	1	8		
37	O	Truck, 4-ton	37	12	4	13		
38	O	Truck, 4-ton, weapons carrier	5	2		3		
39	O	Truck, 1 1/2-ton, cargo	7	3	1	1		

INFANTRY BATTALION

Recapitulation of SSN

Enlisted SSN	Total SSN	Grade					
		1st	2d	3d	4th	5th	6th and 7th
014.....	7		1				
060.....	30			17	4	2	
082.....	13				13		
343.....	40				10	3	8
405.....	2				1	22	8
502.....	2	1				1	
511.....	9		1				
542.....	5					9	
590.....	11		1		4		
630.....	5						11
631.....	1				6		
641.....	1		1				
648.....	9			1	3	3	2
650.....	3			2	1		
667.....	2			1	1	1	
729.....	11				2		7
740.....	38		1		3		24
761.....	3			1			
776.....	9				3		4
803.....	1					1	
814.....	5					3	
821.....	2	1		1			
824.....	6			3			
1599.....	5						
1745.....	3						3
2745.....	224						224
2812.....	315	3	12	51	45	69	135
3812.....	71						71
	50	1	3	6	11	20	9
Total.....	883	6	26	85	109	144	513

Officer SSN	Total SSN	Grade			
		Lt col	Maj	Capt	Lt
0200.....	1				1
0600.....	1				1
1504.....	1				1
1542.....	26	1	1	1	19
2710.....	1				
2762.....	2		1		1
4015.....	1				
9301.....	1			1	
Total.....	34	1	2	8	23

***T/O & E 7-15N**

**TABLE OF ORGANIZATION
AND EQUIPMENT
No. 7-15N**

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

WASHINGTON 25, D. C., 15 November 1950

INFANTRY BATTALION

Reorganization to be effected under this table requires specific Department of the Army approval

	Page
Section I. General.....	1
II. Organization.....	8
III. Equipment.....	8


SECTION I

GENERAL

- 1. Mission.**—To close with the enemy and capture or destroy him by means of fire and maneuver; or to repel his assault by fire or close combat.
- 2. Assignment.**—Organic to Infantry Regiment, T/O & E 7-11N.
- 3. Capabilities.**—*a.* Furnishing a base of fire and maneuver.
b. Maneuvering in all types of terrain and climatic conditions.
c. Furnishing limited antitank protection.
d. Seizing and holding terrain.

T/O & E 7-15N


INFANTRY BATTALION



SECTION II - ORGANIZATION																			
DESIGNATION: BATTALION, INFANTRY																			
INDEX	DESIGNATION	NO. CODE	FULL STRENGTH	REDUCED STRENGTH	OFFICERS						WO	ENLISTED						ENLISTED CAORE	ENLISTED
PAGE LINE					GEN	COL	LT	MAJ	CAPT	LT		E-7	E-6	E-5	E-4	E-3	E-2		
1	3	4	1	2							15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23
	SRC 07015N8 00-																	4	
03	HQ AND HQ COMPANY																		40
01	T-0-E 7-16N	0	11	9			1	2	4	4	1								
02		M	108	84								6	7	13	25	35	22	26	
03		E	120	94														26	
04	3 RIFLE COMPANIES																		41
01	T-0-E 7-17N	0	18	18							3								
02		M	612	480								15	57	60	162	249	69	78	
03		E	635	501														78	
05	HV WPNS COMPANY																		42
01	T-0-E 7-18N	0	5	5							1								
02		M	160	121								3	7	16	22	94	18	19	
03		E	166	127														19	
	TOTALS		919	722			1	2	8	23	5	24	71	89	209	378	109	123	
	RECAPITULATION																		
	FULL STRENGTH																		
	OFFICERS - WARRANT OFFICERS																		
		OIN	0200	1															
		OIN	0600	1															
		OIN	1504	1															
		OIN	1542	26			1	1	5	19									
		OIN	2110	1															

SECTION II - ORGANIZATION																										
DESIGNATION:																										
INDEX		DESIGNATION		MOS CODE		FULL STRENGTH		REDUCED STRENGTH		OFFICERS						WO		ENLISTED							ENLISTED CADRE	
PARA	LINE									GEN	COL	1ST	MAJ	CAPT	LT		E-7	E-6	E-5	E-4	E-3	E-2	PVT			
1	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23			
ENLISTED																										
						1014		2									1		2							
						1502		1									1									
						1542		5										4								
						1641		1										1								
						1674		1										1								
						1729		1									1									
						1740																				
						1745		103									3	4	5							
						1761		2									1									
						1812		19									1	1								
						1814		1									1									
						1821		14									1									
						1824		5									5									
						3060		37									1	14	13	5	5					
						3174		3									1	1								
						3290		15										2	4	5	4					
						3729		2																		
						4014		5										3	3	2						
						4345		22										1	1	2						
						4405		10										3	6	1						
						4641		12										1	5	5						
						4667		2										2								
						4740		341										144	194	3						
						4745		87										2	1							
						4761		1										16	71							
						4812																				
						5740		685									24	61	84	204	204	18				
ENLISTED CADRE																										
						1014												2					2			
						1502											1						1			
						1542											1						1			
						1641												1					1			
						1674												1					1			
						1729											1						1			

INFANTRY REGIMENT



*TOE 7-15C
Appendix II

TABLE OF ORGANIZATION)
AND EQUIPMENT)
NR. 7-15C (Appendix II))

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
Washington 25, D. C., 13 June 1956

INFANTRY BATTALION
(Mountain Operations)

Designation: _____ Battalion, _____ Infantry

SECTION I

GENERAL

ORGANIZATION

1. When operating under prolonged mountain conditions, units organized under TOE 7-15C, 13 June 1956, may be reorganized under this Appendix when specifically authorized by the Department of the Army. To determine authorized allowances of personnel and equipment for units organized under this Appendix the modifications shown herein will be applied to the authorized allowances in TOE 7-15C and changes thereto.
2. MISSION. That of Infantry Battalion, TOE 7-15C, under prolonged mountain conditions.
3. The Assignment, Capabilities, Basis of Allocation and Category of this unit are as established in TOE 7-15C, 13 June 1956.
4. MOBILITY. For mobility of components of the battalion, see paragraph 4, Section I, General, Organization, of each applicable Appendix and/or paragraph 6, Section I, General, Organization, of each applicable Table of Organization and Equipment.

*This Appendix supersedes TOE 7-15, Appendix II, 20 September 1952.

TOE 7-150, Appendix II

SECTION II - ORGANIZATION

INDEX		DESIGNATION	PRIORITY	STATUS	NOV	STRENGTH				OFFICERS								ENLISTED								
PAR	LINE					FULL (1)	REDUCED (2)	CARR (3)	TYPE (4)	SEN (5)	COL (6)	LT (7)	MAJ (8)	CAPT (9)	LT (10)	WO (11)	S-7 (12)	S-8 (13)	S-9 (14)	S-10 (15)	S-11 (16)	S-12 (17)	S-13 (18)	S-14 (19)	S-15 (20)	S-16 (21)
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24			
		APPENDIX II MOUNTAIN OPERATIONS SRC 07 01SC & 05-				1	2	4	5																	
01		HQ AND HQ COMPANY TOP 7-18C APPENDIX II PAR ADDITIONS				8	7													2	6					
02		3 RIFLE COMPANIES TOE 7-17C APPENDIX II																								
03		HEAVY WEAPONS COMPANY TOE 7-18C																								
		NET ADDITIONS				8	7													2	6					
		RECAPITULATION - ADDITIONS																								
		FULL STRENGTH																								
		OTHER ENLISTED																								
			E		31000	8														2	6					
			E			8														2	6					
		REDUCED STRENGTH																								
		OTHER ENLISTED																								
			E		31000	7														2	4	1				
			E			7														2	4	1				

SECTION III - EQUIPMENT

TOB 7-15C, Appendix II

PAR NO	LINE ITEM NUMBER	ITEM DESCRIPTION	QUANTITY			REMARKS	FOR LOCAL USE
			FULL STRENGTH	REDUCED STRENGTH	TYPE B STRENGTH		
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
		APPENDIX II MOUNTAIN OPERATIONS					
		SRC 07 015C & 05-	1	2	3		
		RECAPITULATION					
		REDUCTIONS					
		ORDNANCE ITEMS					
	460050	TRUCK CARGO 3/4 TON 4X4	1	1			
		ADDITIONS					
		CHEMICAL ITEMS					
	126670	MASK PROTECTIVE FIELD	8	7			
		ENGINEER ITEMS					
	202375	AXE CHOPPING SINGLE BIT HANDLED & LB	2	2			
	204980	BELT LINEMANS SAFETY LEATHER W-70 INCHES SAFETY STRAP SIZE 22	8	6			
	272400	SHOVEL HAND GENERAL PURPOSE ROUND POINT OPEN BACK ROLLED	2	2			
		SHOULDER TUBULAR SHANK SIZE NO 2 D-HANDLE					
		ORDNANCE ITEMS					
	401076	BAYONET KNIFE W/SCABBARD CARBINE	6	6			
	401086	BAYONET KNIFE W/SCABBARD RIFLE	2	1			
	404002	CARBINE CAL #30	6	6			
	409442	CHAIN TOW 7/16 IN X 16 FT	1	1			
	409462	OR GUN MACHINE CAL #50 BRG M2 HEAVY BARREL	1	1			
	417112	LAUNCHER GRENADE RIFLE	1	2			
	420700	MOUNT TRIPOD MACHINE GUN CAL #50 M3	1	1			
	425560	MOUNT TRUCK PEDESTAL FOR 1/4 TON 4X4 TRUCK	1	1			
	436090	RIFLE US CAL #30	7	1			
	492160	TRAILER CARGO 1/4 TON 2M	1	1			
	460110	TRUCK CARGO 2 1/2 TON 6X6 LWB	1	1			
	461790	TRUCK UTILITY 1/4 TON 4X4	2	2			
		QUART MASTER ITEMS					
	914355	CAN GASOLINE 5 GAL CAP	2	2			
	924660	CONTAINER FOOD INSULATED	6	6			
	924671	CONTAINER FUEL 1 QT	57	57			
	938886	GOGGLES M-1944	8	6			
	959471	GIFIT COOKING 1 BURNER	19	19			
	959727	TUBE FLEXIBLE NOZZLE	3	3			
		SIGNAL ITEMS					
	610938	CLIMBERS LC-2407U	8	4			
	616420	FLASHLIGHT MX-791/U	6	7			
	678250	TELEPHONE SET YA-43/DY	21	21			
	668520	TOOL EQUIPMENT TE-3*	8	6			

TOE 7-15C
Appendix II

AG 320.3 (25 May 56)

By Order of Wilber M. Brucker, Secretary of the Army:

OFFICIAL:
JOHN A. KLEIN,
Major General, United States Army,
The Adjutant General.

MAXWELL D. TAYLOR,
General, United States Army,
Chief of Staff.

Distribution:

Active Army:

Gen Staff, DA (5) except
DCSLOG (2)
CNGB (10)
CAROTC (2)
COFCH (2)
CMH (1)
Tec Svc, DA (5) except
CSIGO (21)
Admin & Tec Svc Bd (2)
Hq CONARC (60)
OS Maj Comd (5)
OS Base Comd (5)
Log Comd (3)
Armies (25)
Corps (10)
Div (8)

Instl (3)
Gen & Br Svc Sch (20)
PMST ROTC Units (1)
Trans Terminal Comd (2)
OS Sup Agencies (2)
Mil Dist (3)
MAAG (5)
Mil Msn (5)
Units org under fol TOE:
7-12R, Hq & Hq Co, Inf
Regt (2)
7-16R, Hq & Hq Co, Inf
Bn (2)

NG: State AG (5), TOE 7-1R (2), TOE 7-12R (2), TOE 7-16R (2).

USAR: Same as Active Army.

For explanation of abbreviations used, see SR 320-50-1.

*TOE 7-15C
Appendix III

TABLE OF ORGANIZATION)
AND EQUIPMENT)
NR. 7-15C (Appendix III))

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
Washington 25, D. C., 13 June 1956

INFANTRY BATTALION
(Jungle Operations)

Designation: _____ Battalion, _____ Infantry

SECTION I

GENERAL

ORGANIZATION

1. When operating under prolonged jungle conditions, units organized under TOE 7-15C, 13 June 1956, may be reorganized under this Appendix when specifically authorized by the Department of the Army. To determine authorized allowances of personnel and equipment for units organized under this Appendix the modifications shown herein will be applied to the authorized allowances in TOE 7-15C and changes thereto.
2. MISSION. That of Infantry Battalion, TOE 7-15C, under prolonged jungle conditions.
3. The Assignment, Capabilities, Basis of Allocation and Category of this unit are as established in TOE 7-15C, 13 June 1956.
4. MOBILITY. For mobility of components of the battalion, see paragraph 4, Section I, General, Organization, of each applicable Appendix.

*This Appendix supersedes TOE 7-15, Appendix III, 17 August 1953.

TOE 7-15C, Appendix III

SECTION II - ORGANIZATION

INDEX		DESIGNATION	BRANCH	NO	STRENGTH					OFFICERS										ENLISTED						TOTAL
PAGE	LINE				FULL (1)	REDUCED (2)	CADRE (3)	TYPE (4)	OFM (5)	COL (6)	LT COL (7)	MAJ (8)	CAPT (9)	LT (10)	SGT (11)	SGT (12)	SGT (13)	SGT (14)	SGT (15)	SGT (16)	SGT (17)	SGT (18)	SGT (19)	SGT (20)	SGT (21)	
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25		
		APPENDIX III, JUNGLE SRC 17 115C 6 06-				1	2	4	5																	
01		MO AND HQ COMPANY TOE 7-16C APPENDIX III PAR REDUCTIONS				6	6													1	4					
02		3 RIFLE COMPANIES TOE 7-17C APPENDIX III PAR REDUCTIONS				3																				
03		HEAVY WEAPONS COMPANY TOE 7-18C APPENDIX III PAR REDUCTIONS				3	3																			
		NET REDUCTIONS				12	9													1	11					
		RECAPITULATION - REDUCTIONS																								
		FULL STRENGTH																								
		OTHER ENLISTED																								
			E		11100	6																				
			E		11200	4																				
			E		31000	1																				
			E		63110	1														1	1					
			E			12																				
		REDUCED STRENGTH																								
		OTHER ENLISTED																								
			E		11100	3																				
			E		11200	4																				
			E		31000	1																				
			E		63110	1														1	1					
			E			9																				

SECTION II - EQUIPMENT

TOE 7-19C, Appendix III

PAR NO	LINE ITEM NO./JCN	ITEM DESCRIPTION	QUANTITY			REMARKS	FOR LOCAL USE
			PARL STRENGTH	NOLODER STRENGTH	TYPE "C" STRENGTH		
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
		APPENDIX III JUNGLE OPERATIONS					
		SRC 07 019C & 08-	1	2	9		
		RECAPITULATION					
		REDUCTIONS					
		CHEMICAL ITEMS					
	126800	MASK PROTECTIVE FIELD	12	9			
		ENGINEER ITEMS					
	202373	AXE CHOPPING SINGLE BIT HANDLED 4 LB	17	14			
	251110	MATTOCK PICK HANDLED 3 LB	9	9			
	272400	SHOVEL HAND GENERAL PURPOSE ROUND POINT OPEN BACK ROLLED SHOULDER TUBULAR SHANK SIZE NO 2 D-HANDLE	17	14			
		IMMUNANCE ITEMS					
	401084	BAYONET KNIFE W/SCABBARD RIFLE	12	9			
	409442	CHAIN TOW 7/16 IN X 16 FT	4	4			
	409442	OR	4	4			
	420700	LAUNCHER GRENADE RIFLE	7	4			
	420700	OR	7	4			
	425700	MOUNT TRUCK PEDESTAL FOR 1/4 TON 4X4 TRUCK	1	1			
	426070	RIFLE M7 CAL 30	12	9			
	434810	TOOL SET GENERAL MECHANICS	1	1			
	437160	TRAILER CARGO 1/4 TON 2W	4	3			
	451220	TRAILER CARGO 1 1/2 TON 2W	6	4			
	460110	TRUCK CARGO 2 1/2 TON 4X4 LWB	1	1			
	460141	TRUCK CARGO 2 1/2 TON 4X4 LWB MW	4	4			
	461790	TRUCK UTILITY 1/4 TON 4X4	12	9			
		QUARTERMASTER ITEMS					
	914333	CAN GASOLINE 5 GAL CAP	22	19			
	938884	GOGGLES M-1944	17	14			
	999227	TUBE FLEXIBLE NOZZLE	19	19			
		SIGNAL ITEMS					
	616420	FLASHLIGHT MX-991/U	17	7			
		ADDITIONS					
		ENGINEER ITEMS					
	202373	AXE CHOPPING SINGLE BIT HANDLED 4 LB	23	22			
	230050	MACHETE 18 INCH M-1942 WITH PLASTIC SHEATH	132	108			
	251110	MATTOCK PICK HANDLED 3 LB	10	10			
	272400	SHOVEL HAND GENERAL PURPOSE ROUND POINT OPEN BACK ROLLED SHOULDER TUBULAR SHANK SIZE NO 2 D-HANDLE	23	22			
		QUARTERMASTER ITEMS					
	902990	BAG CANVAS WATER CARRYING 5 GAL COMP	60	46			
	903107	BAG CANVAS WATER STEN PUMPS COMP W/SUSPENSION RINGS AND COVER	19	19			
	914487	CAN WATER 5 GAL	168	146			
	999471	OUTFIT COOKING 1 BURNER	107	83			

TOE 7-15C
Appendix III

[AG 320.3 (25 May 56)]

By Order of Wilber M. Brucker, Secretary of the Army:

OFFICIAL:
JOHN A. KLEIN,
Major General, United States Army,
The Adjutant General.

MAXWELL D. TAYLOR,
General, United States Army,
Chief of Staff.

Distribution:

Active Army:

Gen Staff, DA (5) except
DCSLOG (2)
CNGB (10)
CAROTC (2)
COFCH (2)
CMH (1)
Tec Svc, DA (5) except
CSIGO (21)
Admin & Tec Svc Bd (2)
Hq CONARC (60)
OS Maj Comd (5)
OS Base Comd (5)
Log Comd (3)
Armies (25)
Corps (10)
Div (8)

Instl (3)
Gen & Br Svc Sch (20)
PMST ROTC Units (1)
Trans Terminal Comd (2)
OS Sup Agencies (2)
Mil Dist (3)
MAAG (5)
Mil Men (5)
Units org under fol TOE:
7-12R, Hq & Hq Co, Inf
Regt (2)
7-16R, Hq & Hq Co, Inf
Bn (2)

NG: State AG (5), TOE 7-1R (2), TOE 7-12R (2), TOE 7-16R (2).

USAR: Same as Active Army.

For explanation of abbreviations used, see SR 320-50-1.

TOE 7-11D-PENTOMIC BATTLE GROUP, 1 February 1960

TOE 7-11D																													
TITLE OF ORGANIZATION AND SUBJECT SECTION II - ORGANIZATION																													
INDEX		ORGANIZATION	BRANCH	DOE	STRENGTH				CAPABILITIES							EQUIPMENT												REMARKS	
PAR	LINE				FULL (7)	RE- INSTR (8)	CADRE (9)	TYPE (10)	ONE (11)	COL (12)	LT COL (13)	MAJ (14)	CAPT (15)	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30		
1	1	SRC 07 011D 0 00-			1	2	6	7																					
01		HEADQUARTERS AND HEADQUARTERS COMPANY																											
01	01		O		24	21	8				1	2	6	11	4														
02	02		M		3	3	2																						
03	03		E		210	177	40				1	2	6	11	4	3	1	6	6	11	40	83	63						
					227	201	20																						
02		3 RIFLE COMPANIES																											
01	01	TOE 7-17D	C		30	30	10								2	23													
02	02		E		890	889	145								5	25													
					920	915	152																						
03		COMBAT SUPPORT COMPANY																											
01	01	TOE 7-19D	O		13	12	10								2	13													
02	02		E		186	183	22																						
					199	192	42								2	13													
					1359	1311	247				1	2	6	18	40	3	1	12	29	98	295	399	812	1					
		RECAPITULATION																											
		FULL STRENGTH																											
		OFFICERS																											
			O	AR	1204	1																							
			O	CH	9310	2																							
			O	EN	1531	1																							
			O	IN	0140	1																							
			O	IN	0200	2																							
			O	IN	0400	1																							
			O	IN	1942	30					1	2			8	27													
			O	IN	1943	8									1	7													
			O	IN	2162	1									1														
			O	IN	92182	1									1														
			O	IN	2163	1									1														
			O	IN	2260	1									1														
			O	IN	2900	2									1														
			O	IN	4010	2									1														
			O	IN	9301	1									1														
			O	IN	93301	1									1														
			O	MC	3000	1									1														
			O	MC	3100	1									1														
			O	MS	3906	1									1														
					87										1	2	6	18	40										
		WARRANT OFFICERS																											
			W		0809	1																							
			W		2200	1																							
			W		4000	1																							
					3																								
		NON-COMMISSIONED OFFICERS																											
			E	NC	05160	1																							
			E	NC	09360	2																							
			E	NC	11160	154																							
			E	NC	11170	19																							
			E	NC	11260	44																							
			E	NC	11270	7																							
			E	NC	11360	2																							
			E	NC	11370	2																							
			E	NC	11380	2																							
			E	NC	11980	7																							
			E	NC	11990	1																							
			E	NC	12160	3																							
			E	NC	12170	1																							
			E	NC	13160	1																							
			E	NC	13360	4																							

[illegible]

TOB 7-11B			TABLE OF ORGANIZATION AND EQUIPMENT SECTION II - ORGANIZATION																											
INDEX		ORGANIZATION	COUNTRY	BRANCH	JOB	STAFFS				OFFICERS										ENLISTED										REMARKS
PAGE	LINE					PAI (1)	RE-PAIRED (2)	CARRY (3)	TYPE "B" (4)	GEN (5)	COL (6)	LT COL (7)	MAJ (8)	CAPT (9)	LT (10)	WO (11)	1A (12)	1B (13)	1C (14)	1D (15)	1E (16)	1F (17)	1G (18)	1H (19)	1I (20)	1J (21)	1K (22)	1L (23)	1M (24)	
1	5	5																												
					MC 94180			7																						
								180																						
		OTHER ENLISTED																												
					31110			1																						
					31120			1																						
					63110			4																						
					63220			1																						
					71110			1																						
					71610			11																						
					71620			1																						
					72310			1																						
					76810			1																						
					76820			1																						
					76810			16																						
					76810			37																						

SECTION III - EQUIPMENT

TOE 7-11D

FAB NO	LINE ITEM NUMBER	ITEM DESCRIPTION	QUANTITY			REMARKS	FOR LOCAL USE
			FULL STRENGTH	REDUCED STRENGTH	TYPE B STRENGTH		
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
		SRC 07 0110 0 90-	1	2	5		
		RECAPITULATION					
		CHEMICAL ITEMS					
	108170	DETECTOR KIT CHEMICAL AGENT	8	8			
	132600	RESPIRATOR AIR FILTERING PAINT SPRAY	4	4			
		ENGINEER ITEMS					
	202670	BAG WATER STERILIZING COTTON DUCK POROUS STITCHED SEAMS 36 GA	15	16			
	222752	COMPASS MAGNETIC LENSATIC 1.58 IN DIA CARD	282	282			
	226880	DIVIDERS DRAFT PROPORT 7 3-4 IN LG	1	1			
	226880	DRAFT AND DUPLICAT EQUIP SET SMALL SKETCH NOTES AND ORDERS	1	1			
	232828	FIRE DIRECTION SET ARTY 13000 METER MAX RANGE	3	3			
	232940	FLASHLIGHT RT ANGLE 2-CELL LENS 1.695 IN DIA	199	109			
	235152	GENERATOR SET GAS ENG 1.5 KW 2 WIRE DC 28 V SKID MTD	5	5			
	235156	GENERATOR SET GAS ENG 0.5 KW 60 CY 1 PH 2 WIRE AC 120 V SKID MTD	2	2			
	235163	GENERATOR SET GAS ENG 1.5 KW 60 CY 1 PH 2 WIRE AC 120 V SKID MTD	5	5			
	235205	GENERATOR SET GAS ENG 3 KW AC 120 V 1 AND 3 PH 120/240 V 1 PH					
		120/208 V 3 PH 60 CY SKID MTD	1	1			
	238612	WALLET WOOD HEAD 10 IN LG 8 IN DIA FACE	2	2			
	243860	INTRENCHING OUTFIT INF	1	1			
	249076	LIGHT SET GEN ILLUM 25 OUTLET	7	7			
	249635	LOADER SCOOP TYPE DSL DRVN 4 WHLS 2 1/2 CU YD	1	1			
	250050	MACHETE RIGID HDL 18 IN LG W-SH	65	65			
	250577	MAGNIFIER MONOCULAR READ 3 IN DIA 1.4 PWR	1	1			
	251445	METASCOPE ASSEMBLY IMAGE INFRARED	30	30			
	257355	PLOTTING SET ARTY FIRE CONT	1	1			
	259890	PROTRACTOR SEMICIRC PLASTIC 10 IN DIA GRAD IN MILS YDS AND					
		INCHES 1 - 10000 1 - 20000 1 - 40000	5	5			
	262175	RACK BATTERY CHARGING M2 AND 20000 V SNIPERSCOPE	1	1			
	267620	SAM CHAIN GAS DRVN 36 IN	3	3			
	269345	SCALE PLOT TRIAN 12 IN LG YDS METERS 1 TO 25000 METERS 1 TO					
		50000 1 TO 62500 SCALE IN AND CM	2	2			
	273200	SNIPERSCOPE	16	16			
	274210	SPRAYER INSECT HAND 2 GAL CAP	7	7			
	275600	STEREOSCOPE LENS AERIAL PHOTO INTERPR 2 1-4 PWR 4 1-2 IN FOCAL					
		LG OF LENS	1	1			
	275610	STEREOSCOPE PRISM MIRROR 10 X 14 IN PHOTO 1.5 AND 4.5 PWR MAG	1	1			
	275910	SURVEYING SET ARTY FIRE CONTROL 4TH ORDER	1	1			
	282705	TAPE MEAS STL 3 3/8 IN W FT AND MET 100 FT LG	3	3			
	289850	TOOL KIT CARP ENGR SQD	5	5			
	289950	TOOL KIT PIONEER ENGR SQUAD	3	3			
	289952	TOOL KIT PIONEER ENGR COMBAT PLAT	1	1			
	289954	TOOL OUTFIT PIONEER PORTABLE ELECTRIC TOOLS	1	1			
	290790	TRAILER BASIC UTIL 2 1/2 TON	3	3			
	290879	TRIPOD SURVEY W/HEAD FIX LEGS MTC 39 IN	2	2			
		MEDICAL ITEMS					
	305150	BLANKET SET BED SMALL	10	7			
	325537	FIRST AID KIT GENERAL PURPOSE 12 UNIT	171	102			
	342000	IMMULATOR SINGLE	2	2			
	344710	LATRINE BOX PREFABRICATED PORTABLE W-2	2	2			
	345980	LIGHT SURGICAL BRACKET PORTABLE BATTERY OPERATED	2	2			
	347060	LITTER FOLDING PICO POLE ALUMINUM POLE	54	33			
	349175	MEDICAL INSTRUMENT AND SUPPLY SET DISPENSARY FIELD	2	2			
	349250	MEDICAL SUPPLY SET FIELD SUPPLEMENTAL SUPPLIES	12	12			
	358450	RESUSCITATOR HAND OPERATED HELOWYS TYPE	4	4			
	369400	SPLINT SET TELESCOPIC SPLINTS	8	8			
	373700	STOVE GASOLINE BURNER TWO BURNERS WITH METAL CASE	4	4			
	374750	SUPPORT LITTER FOLDING	2	2			
	374595	SURGICAL INSTRUMENT AND SUPPLY SET COMBAT	7	7			
	374298	SURGICAL INSTRUMENT AND SUPPLY SET INDIVIDUAL	32	25			
		ORDNANCE ITEMS					
	401078	BAYONET KNIFE W/SCARPAUD CARBINE	1301	1270			
	401248	BINOCULAR 6X30 MILITARY RETICLE	155	148			
	401250	BINOCULAR 7X30 MILITARY RETICLE	8	8			
	401258	BIPOD RIFLE 7.62MM	42	42			
	401310	BOARD PLOTTING ARTILLERY	1	1			
	401319	BOARD PLOTTING AZIMUTH RANGING	20	20			
	405225	CARRIER PERSONNEL FULL TRACKED	2	2			
	406580	CIRCLE AIMING	10	10			
	410625	COMPASS MIL GRADUATIONS	73	73			

FORM 7-11b

SECTION III - EQUIPMENT

PAR NO.	LINE ITEM NUMBER	ITEM DESCRIPTION	QUANTITY			REMARKS	FOR LOCAL USE
			FULL STRENGTH	REDUCED STRENGTH	TYPE "B" STRENGTH		
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
	411785	DEMOLITION EQUIPMENT SET EXPLOSIVE INITIATING ELEC-NON-ELEC	8	8			
	411787	DEMOLITION EQUIPMENT SET EXPLOSIVE INITIATING NON-ELEC	5	5			
	417129	GUN MACHINE 7.62-MM LIGHTWEIGHT GENERAL PURPOSE	40	40			
	417247	GUN SUBMACHINE CAL .45	4	4			
	420800	LAUNCHER ROCKET 3.5-INCH	84	84			
	423525	MORTAR 4.2-INCH ON MOUNT	8	8			
	423530	MORTAR 81-MM ON MOUNT	16	16			
	425565	MOUNT TRIPOD MACHINE GUN 7.62-MM	40	40			
	425700	PISTOL TRUCK MESSIAL FOR TRUCK 1/4 TON 4X4	4	4			
	429280	PISTOL CAL .45 SEMIAUTOMATIC	188	188			
	429282	RIFLE 10A-MM ON MOUNT	12	12			
	435965	RIFLE 7.62-MM SEMIAUTOMATIC LT BARREL	1188	1188			
	443750	TABLE GRAPHICAL FIRING	4	4			
	443792	TABLE GRAPHICAL FIRING FOR 4.2-INCH MORTAR	8	8			
	444021	TANK COMBAT FULL TRACKED LIGHT GUN	2	2			
	449760	TELESCOPE DC	1	1			
	449980	TELESCOPE OBSERVATION	2	2			
	453650	TOOL KIT ARMORERS	7	7			
	453800	TOOL KIT GEN MECH	17	17			
	453890	TOOL KIT ORG MAINT NR 1 COMMON	1	1			
	453895	TOOL KIT ORG MAINT NR 2 COMMON	1	1			
	453910	TOOL KIT ORG MAINT NR 2 SUPPLEMENTAL	1	1			
	457040	TRAILER AMMUNITION 2-TON 2-WHEEL	2	2			
	457110	TRAILER AMPHIBIOUS CARGO 1/4 TON 2-WHEEL	31	31			
	457190	TRAILER CARGO 3/4-TON 2-WHEEL	31	31			
	457220	TRAILER CARGO 1 1/2-TON 2-WHEEL	14	14			
	457495	TRAILER TANK WATER 1 1/2-TON 2-WHEEL	7	7			
	459832	TRUCK AMBULANCE FRONT LINE 1/4-TON 4X4	14	14			
	460050	TRUCK CARGO 3/4-TON 4X4	31	31			
	460110	TRUCK CARGO 2 1/2-TON 6X6 LWB	8	8			
	460141	TRUCK CARGO 2 1/2-TON 6X6 LWB W/WN	10	10			
	460320	TRUCK CARGO 3-TON 6X6 LWB	2	2			
	460320	TRUCK CARGO 3-TON 6X6 LWB W/WN	2	2			
	460770	TRUCK DUMP 3-TON 6X6 W/WN	3	3			
	461790	TRUCK UTILITY 1/4-TON 4X4	88	88			
	461793	TRUCK UTILITY 1/4-TON 4X4 CARRIER FOR 108-MM RIFLE	10	10			
	461834	TRUCK VAN SHOP 2 1/2-TON 6X6	1	1			
	461880	TRUCK WRECKER LIGHT 2 1/2-TON 4X6 W/WN	1	1			
	461885	TRUCK WRECKER MEDIUM 3-TON 6X6 W/WN	1	1			
	463530	WATCH STOP TYPE B	1	1			
	465580	WATCH WRIST GRADE II	176	49			
		QUARTERMASTER ITEMS					
	500149	ACCESSORY OUTFIT GASOLINE FIELD RANGE	7	7			
	501485	AX SINGLE BIT 1 TO 1 1/2 LB 3 3/8 IN CUT 14 1/4 IN STEEL HANDLE	8	8			
	501493	AX SINGLE BIT 4 LB 4 3/4 IN CUT 36 IN HANDLE	163	164			
	502153	ATTACHMENT PACKED PLYWOOD CARGO	46	46			
	502784	BAG AMMUNITION M2A1	4	4			
	506981	BOTTLE VACUUM 1 QT WITH MAILING CASE	4	4			
	510126	CABINET SPARE PARTS W/11 DRAWERS 32 9/8 H 28 W 27 DP	2	2			
	510280	CABINET STORAGE ASSEMBLY TOOL 46 3/4 W 38 13/16 H 25 9/16 DP	4	4			
	512826	BURNER OIL STOVE TENT	10	10			
	513495	CASE FLD OFF MACH 16 1/2 X 13 1/4 X 17 IN	7	6			
	513501	CASE FLD OFF MACH 22 1/2 X 13 1/4 X 17 IN	3	3			
	513669	CASE MILITARY WATER CAN 5 GAL	8	6			
	513881	CASH BOX STEEL SINGLE COMPARTMENT 4 3/16 IN W 9 9/16 IN LG	2	2			
	514757	CHAIR FOLDING	17	17			
	525113	CANVAS REPAIR KIT	1	1			
	515648	CHEST HYMN BOOK	1	1			
	520077	COMMISSARY OUTFIT FIELD BREAKDOWN M-1952	1	1			
	520653	COOK SET FIELD	33	33			
	522888	CLOCK MESSAGE CENTER	1	1			
	523789	DESK FIELD PLYWOOD 19 3/8 IN W 11 1/4 IN H 14 5/8 IN DP	3	3			
	523797	DESK FIELD PLYWOOD 22 3/8 IN W 23 7/8 IN H 14 1/2 IN DP	14	12			
	526801	DUPLICATING MACH STENCIL PORTABLE	1	1			
	529709	FLAG SET M-238	2	2			
	530623	FOOD CONTAINER INSULATED RECTANGULAR ALUMINUM 5 GAL	30	30			
	534344	FLAG CHAPLAIN CHRISTIAN-JEWISH	2	2			
	534385	FLAG COLOR ORGANIZATIONAL SILK	1	1			
	534413	HEATER DUCT TYPE PORTABLE GASOLINE 280000 BTU	1	1			
	534427	FLAG GENEVA-CORNFED-CROSS BURNING AMBULANCE AND WARRER	16	7			
	534489	FLAG GUIDON BURNING	7	7			
	534493	HEATER SPACE COAL OR OIL 43000 BTU 16 3/8 IN H	18	18			
	534572	FLAG NATL COLORS SILK	1	1			
	534884	GOGGLES M-1944	200	191			
	541642	HEATER IMMERSION TYPE FOR CAN CORRUGATED	82	82			
	541686	HEATER WATER IMMERSION GAS OPERATED	7	7			
	542030	HATTOCK PICK 3 LB NOMINAL SIZE W-36 IN LG HANDLE	62	62			

SECTION III - EQUIPMENT

TOS 7-118

PAR. NO.	LINE ITEM NUMBER	ITEM DESCRIPTION	QUANTITY			REMARKS	FOR LOGAL VCI
			FULL STRENGTH	REDUCED STRENGTH	TYPE "B" STRENGTH		
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
	847033	KIT BARRIER W/CASE	7	7			
	847153	ORGAN FOLDING MAPLAINS	1	1			
	847403	PACKBOARD PLYWOOD	23	23			
	847923	PAD SHOULDER	44	44			
	848493	PANEL MARKER GROUND SIGNAL TO AIRCRAFT	20	20			
	850828	LOCKER BOX	7	7			
	852189	PAULIN DUCK OD 17 X 12 FT	2	2			
	852197	PAULIN DUCK OD 40 X 20 FT	1	1			
	853813	PERFORATOR PAPER DECK ADJUSTABLE 3 PUNCH 3/4 IN DIA	1	1			
	853823	PERFORATOR PAPER DECK NONADJUSTABLE 2 PUNCHES 2 3/4 IN CTC	1	1			
	858217	RANGE OUTKIT FIELD GASOLINE M-1337	22	21			
	859197	REFLECTOR LIGHT POW GASOLINE LANTERN	4	4			
	859637	OUTFIT OFFICERS MESS	11	11			
	862002	PANEL SET AP-30-C	1	1			
	862003	PANEL SET AP-30-D	1	1			
	862013	RULER WOOD METAL EDGE SINGLE EDGE 18 IN LG	2	2			
	862101	SAFE 28 IN H 17 IN W 17 1/2 IN DP	8	8			
	863405	SCREEN LATRINE DUCK FWHM OLIVE DRAB W/COVER	13	13			
	863596	SEALER STL STRAP HMO DBL CRMP EMO JAN 5/8 IN W 0.020 TO 0.023 THK	1	1			
	864933	SHEARS STRAIGHT TRIMMERS SOLID STEEL 4 5/8 IN CUTTING LG 9 IN LG	1	1			
	866301	SLING FLAGSTAFF WEBBING OLIVE DRAB SHADE NO 7	3	3			
	868801	SMOVEL HAND RD PT OPEN BACK O HANDLE 11 1/2 TO 12 1/2 IN BLADE	169	154			
	870109	STOVE GASOLINE BURNER 1 BURNER 3500 BTU	88	88			
	870461	STRAP QUICK RELEASE PACKED	47	47			
	870788	STRETCHER STL STR HMO RK-CR TAKE-UP 3/4 IN W 0.023 IN THK STRAP	1	1			
	872048	TABLE FOLDING LEGS WOOD SOLID TOP WOOD LEGS 26 L 7 1/2 W 27 28-22 H	20	20			
	874397	TENT COMMAND POST COMP W/PINS AND POLES	10	10			
	874429	TENT GENERAL PURPOSE MEDIUM COMP W/PINS AND POLES	1	1			
	874461	TENT KITCHEN FLYPROOF COMP W/PINS AND POLES	1	1			
	874477	TENT MAINTENANCE SHELTER COMP W/PINS AND POLES	1	1			
	874850	TENT WALL SMALL FWHM OLIVE DRAB COMPLETE W/PINS AND POLES	1	1			
	877422	SCALE WEIGH PLAT FOLDING A AND M TYPE 300 LB CAP	1	1			
	878741	TYPEWRITER PORTABLE ELITE W/CARRYING CASE	12	12			
	881069	WHISTLE THUNDERER	74	74			
	883966	STAPLER PAPER FASTEN OFF TYPE LT DUTY	3	3			
	886443	TYPEWRITER NON PTBL 11 IN CARRIAGE	7	7			
	896604	TYPEWRITER NON PTBL 14-15 IN CARRIAGE	3	3			
		SIGNAL ITEMS					
	603120	ANTENNA AT-335/PRC	8	8			
	603250	ANTENNA EQUIPMENT RC-292	14	14			
	604010	AXLE RL-27	20	20			
	609370	CHANNEL ALIGNMENT INDICATOR ID-292/PRC-8	2	2			
	609620	CHARGER RADIAC DETECTOR PP-1378/PD	21	21			
	609870	CHEST BC-5	7	7			
	610280	CIPHER MACHINE TSEC/KL-7	2	2			
	610284	CIPHER MACHINE TSEC/KW-9	4	4			
	611010	COIL C-161	24	24			
	611110	CONNECTING AND SWITCHING KIT MX-193/ST	2	2			
	611280	CONTROL GROUP AN/GRA-6	31	31			
	612820	CRYSTAL UNIT SET CK-6/PRC-8	18	18			
	613150	DETECTOR SET AN/PPS-9	9	9			
	614378	DYNAMIC LOUDSPEAKER LS-168/U	1	1			
	616820	FREQUENCY METER AN/URM-32	1	1			
	618114	ENGINE GENERATOR SET PU-434/P	10	10			
	619410	HANDSET-HEADSET H-144/U	84	84			
	627310	MODIFICATION KIT MX-828/GR	19	19			
	628133	MULTIMETER AN/PRM-13	1	1			
	628139	MULTIMETER AN/URM-108	2	2			
	628192	MULTIMETER ME-67/USM-98	1	1			
	638863	RADAR SET PORTABLE AN/PPS-A	1	1			
	634475	RADAR SET AN/TPS-22	2	2			
	636670	RADIAC METER IN-93/UD	72	72			
	636673	RADIAC METER IN-108/PD	31	31			
	638648	RADIO SET AN/GRC-7 MTD IN TANK COMBAT FULL TRACKED LIGHT GUN	1	1			
	639748	RADIO SET AN/GRC-8 MTD IN TANK COMBAT FULL TRACKED LIGHT GUN	1	1			
	640704	RADIO SET AN/GRC-19 MTD IN TRK 3/4 TON CARGO	1	1			
	641601	RADIO SET AN/GRR-3 MTD IN TRK 1/4 TON	1	1			
	641604	RADIO SET AN/GRR-8 MTD IN TRK 3/4 TON CARGO	2	2			
	643300	RADIO SET AN/PRC-6	90	90			
	643802	RADIO SET AN/PRC-10	112	112			
	649004	RADIO SET AN/VRC-9 MTD IN TRK 3/4 TON CARGO	2	2			
	649101	RADIO SET AN/VRC-10 MTD IN TRK 1/4 TON	12	12			
	649104	RADIO SET AN/VRC-10 MTD IN TRK 3/4 TON CARGO	3	3			
	649346	RADIO SET AN/VRC-18 MTD IN CARRIER PERSONNEL FULL TRACKED	2	2			
	649801	RADIO SET AN/VRC-18 MTD IN TRK 1/4 TON	9	9			
	649804	RADIO SET AN/VRC-18 MTD IN TRK 3/4 TON CARGO	2	2			

TOS 7-11D

SECTION III EQUIPMENT

PAR NO	LINE ITEM NUMBER	ITEM DESCRIPTION	QUANTITY			REMARKS	FOR LOCAL USE
			FULL STRENGTH	REDUCED STRENGTH	TYPE B STRENGTH		
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
	650101	RADIO SET AN/VRC-3 MTD IN TRK 1/4 TON	21	21			
	650104	RADIO SET AN/VRC-3 MTD IN TRK 1/4 TON CARGO	1	1			
	651201	RADIO SET AN/VRC-24 MTD IN TRK 1/4 TON	1	1			
	657222	RADIO TELETYPEWRITER SET AN/GRC-66	2	2			
	660000	REEL RL-39	27	27			
	660060	REEL EQUIPMENT CE-11	85	85			
	660120	REEL UNIT RL-31	7	7			
	660945	RETRANSMISSION CABLE KIT MK-126/G	12	12			
	663823	SHELTER ELECTRONIC EQUIPMENT S-144/G	3	3			
	663895	SHUNT INSTRUMENT MULTIRANGE MX-1471/U	5	5			
	667000	SOUND RANGING SET AN/TNS-3	1	1			
	669160	SPOOL DR-8	110	110			
	672370	SWITCHBOARD TELEPHONE MANUAL SU-993/GT	12	12			
	672380	SWITCHBOARD TELEPHONE MANUAL SU-22/PT	9	9			
	672390	SWITCHBOARD TELEPHONE MANUAL SB-86/P	2	2			
	676870	TELEPHONE TA-1/PT	79	79			
	678260	TELEPHONE SET TA-312/PT	87	87			
	680750	TELETYPEWRITER SET AN/PGC-1	2	1			
	681690	TERMINAL STRIP TM-184	12	12			
	681715	TERMINAL TELEGRAPH-TELEPHONE AN/TCC-14	2	1			
	685652	TEST SET ELECTRICAL POWER TS-934/U	1	1			
	685665	TEST SET ELECTRON TUBE TV-7/U	3	3			
	688520	TOOL EQUIPMENT TE-33	156	147			
	688600	TOOL EQUIPMENT TE-41	4	4			
	689000	TOOL EQUIPMENT TE-113	1	1			
	694790	VIBRATOR PACK PP-68/U	3	3			
	698350	WIRE WD-1/TT ON SPOOL DR-8 1/4 MI	12	12			
	698390	WIRE WD-1/TT IN WIRE DISPENSER MX-306/G EA	179	179			
	698400	WIRE WD-1/TT RL-159/U	40	40			
	698470	WIRE PIKE MC-123	6	6			
	698522	WIRE REEL RL-159/U	18	18			
	698535	WIRE SPLICING KIT MC-356/G	15	15			
		TRANSPORTATION ITEMS					
	715775	CHAIN ASSY SGL LEG W/PEAR LINKS AND 1 GRAB HOOK 9/8 IN HY 16 FT	4	4			
	715775	OR	12	12			
	747920	LIFE PRESERVER YOKE GAS OR ORAL INFLATION W/NYLON ENVELOPE	17	14			
		DEVELOPMENTAL ITEMS					
	943056	LAUNCHER AND GUIDANCE SET TRUCK MTD ANTITANK/ASSAULT MISSILE	5	5			
	945780	SIMULATOR TRAINING ELECTRONIC S59 ANTITANK/ASSAULT MISSILE	1	1			

TOE 7-11T ROCID INFANTRY BATTALION

[illegible]

SECTION II - ORGANIZATION

TOP SECRET

INDEX		DESIGNATION	IDENTITY	BRANCH	MOB	STRENGTH				OFFICERS								ENLISTED							TOTAL
PAGE	LINE					FULL ST	REDUCED ST	ZADRS ST	TFRS ST	GEN	COL	LT COL	MAJ	CAPT	LT	WO	E-1	E-2	E-3	E-4	E-5	E-6			
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24		
			O AI	1189			4								4										
			O AT	1193			5								1										
			O AI	1199			1								1										
			O CH	5310			2							1	1										
			O EM	1331			1									1									
			O IN	0800			1								1										
			O IN	1942			32				1	1			5	29									
			O IN	2110			1							1											
			O IN	1182			1								1										
			O IN	2900			2								1										
			O IN	4010			1							1	1	1									
			O IN	9301			1								1										
			O MC	3000			1								1										
			O MC	3100			1								1										
			O SC	0210			1								1										
							29				1	1	1	12	29										
			WARRANT OFFICERS																						
			M	0605			1									1									
			M	2200			1									1									
			M	4000			1									1									
							1									1									
			NON-COMMISSIONED OFFICERS																						
			E MC	00180			6										6								
			E MC	00190			1										1								
			E MC	05160			1											1							
			E MC	09360			2												2						
			E MC	11170			164											65	99						
			E MC	11180			10										16								
			E MC	11270			10											2	37						
			E MC	11280			6										8	1							
			E MC	11360			1													1					
			E MC	11380			3										2	1							
			E MC	12160			3																		
			E MC	12170			1										1								
			E MC	13160			1											1							
			E MC	13180			1											2							
			E MC	13370			1										1								
			E MC	14160			1											8							
			E MC	14170			1										2								
			E MC	14560			1											1							
			E MC	14570			1										1								
			E MC	14660			8											2							
			E MC	31160			3											1							
			E MC	31170			8										1								
			E MC	31360			2												2						
			E MC	31370			1												1						
			E MC	33360			1												1						
			E MC	63170			2										1								
			E MC	84360			1													1					
			E MC	72870			1											1							
			E MC	76860			6											8							
			E MC	76870			1										1								
			E MC	91160			4										1		1	1	2				
			E MC	91170			1										1								
			E MC	94160			6											6							
							311										29	192	168	2					
			OTHER ENLISTED																						
			E	09110			3													3					
			E	09310			3													3					
			E	11100			272														272				
			E	11110			311													211					
			E	11200			61														91				
			E	11210			29													29					
			E	11220			12																		
			E	11310			9												12		1	4			
			E	12000			6															6			
			E	12110			6														1				
			E	12120			3														3				

SECTION III - EQUIPMENT

FOR 7-117 R0C10

PAR NO	LINE ITEM NUMBER	ITEM DESCRIPTION	QUANTITY			MISAPES	PDS LOCAL USE
			FULL STRENGTH	PRODUCED STRENGTH	TEST 0 STRENGTH		
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
	649001	RADIO SET AN/VRC-9 MTD IN TRK 1/4 TON	1	1	1		
	649004	RADIO SET AN/VRC-9 MTD IN TRK 3/4 TON CARGO	8	8	8		
	649101	RADIO SET AN/VRC-10 MTD IN TRK 1/4 TON	1	1	1		
	649104	RADIO SET AN/VRC-10 MTD IN TRK 3/4 TON CARGO	1	1	1		
	649566	RADIO SET AN/VRC-15 MTD IN CARRIER PERSONNEL FULL TRACKED	2	2	2		
	649801	RADIO SET AN/VRC-18 MTD IN TRK 1/4 TON	9	9	9		
	650101	RADIO SET AN/VRC-3 MTD IN TRK 1/4 TON	5	5	5		
	650104	RADIO SET AN/VRC-3 MTD IN TRK 3/4 TON CARGO	1	1	1		
	652901	RADIO SET AN/VRC-30 MTD IN TRK 1/4 TON	1	1	1		
	657222	RADIO TELETYPEWRITER SET AN/GRC-46	2	2	2		
	660000	REEL RL-39	13	13	13		
	660040	REEL EQUIPMENT CE-11	36	36	36		
	660120	REEL UNIT RL-31	7	7	7		
	660943	RETRANSMISSION CABLE RTT MK-126/G	2	2	2		
	668810	SOUND LOCATING SET GR-6	1	1	1		
	668820	SPLITTING KIT TELEPHONE CABLE TL-982/U	7	6	7		
	669185	SCOD DS-8	A2	A2	A2		
	672300	SWITCHBOARD TELEPHONE MANUAL SD-22/PY	4	4	4		
	672390	SWITCHBOARD TELEPHONE MANUAL SB-86/P	1	1	1		
	674870	TELEPHONE TA-17/T	50	50	50		
	678226	TELEPHONE SET TA-266/PY	2	2	2		
	678260	TELEPHONE SET TA-312/PY	67	67	67		
	680720	TELETYPEWRITER SET AN/PSC-1	2	1	2		
	681690	TERMINAL STRIP TH-104	4	4	4		
	681723	TERMINAL TELEGRAPH-TELEPHONE AN/TCC-14	2	1	2		
	685665	TEST SET ELECTRON TUBE TV-7/U	1	1	1		
	688820	TOOL EQUIPMENT TE-33	96	86	96		
	688600	TOOL EQUIPMENT TE-41	4	4	4		
	698990	WIRE WD-1/T IN WIRE DISPENSER MK-106/G	122	122	122		
	698400	WIRE WD-1/T ON WIRE REEL RL-159/U	6	6	6		
	698470	WIRE PIKE MC-123	6	6	6		
	698922	WIRE REEL RL-159/U	4	4	4		
		TRANSPORTATION ITEMS					
	747930	LIFEPRESERVER VEST PNEUMATIC SELF-INFLATING TYPE B-5	24	24	24		

NSC 7-117 R0C1D

SECTION III - EQUIPMENT

PAG. NO.	LINE ITEM NUMBER	ITEM DESCRIPTION	QUANTITY			REMARKS	FOR LOCAL USE
			FULL STRENGTH	REDUCED STRENGTH	TYPE "B" STRENGTH		
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
		SRC 07 0117 R0C1D 6 00-	1	2	3		
		RECAPITULATION					
		CHEMICAL ITEMS					
	108170	DETECTOR KIT CHEMICAL AGENT	7	7	7		
	124400	MASK PROTECTIVE FIELD	1427	1427	1412		
	132600	RESPIRATOR AIR FILTERING PAINT SPRAY	4	4	4		
		ENGINEER ITEMS					
	202375	AXE CHOPPING SINGLE BIT HANDLED 4 LB	121	117	121		
	204980	BELT LINEMANS SAFETY LEATHER W-70 INCHES SAFETY STRAP SIZE 22	12	10	12		
	216925	CARPENTER EQUIPMENT SET NO 1 ENGINEER SQUAD	3	3	3		
	222792	COMPASS LENSATIC LUMINOUS DIAL INDUCTION DAMPED 9 DEGREE AND 20 MIL GRADUATIONS WITH SCALE WITH CASE	272	272	272		
	224930	DIVIDER DRAFTSMANS PROPORTIONAL 7 1/2 INCH WITH CASE	1	1	1		
	224880	DRAFTING AND DUPLICATING EQUIPMENT SET NO 1	1	1	1		
	232928	FIRE DIRECTION SET ARTILLERY SET NO 4 14500 YD MAX RANGE	2	2	2		
	233152	GENERATOR SET ELECTRIC PTOL GAS DRVM SKID MTD AIR COOLED DC 78V 2 WIRE EQUIPPED FOR STARTING AT MINIMA AS F 1.2 KW	1	1	1		
	234120	GLASS READING 3 INCH CASE	1	1	1		
	234105	HATCHET AXE PATTERN HANDLED 3 3/8 IN	1	1	1		
	243840	INTRENCING EQUIPMENT SET NO 2 INFANTRY	1	1	1		
	249074	LIGHT SET GENERAL ILLUMINATION SET NO 2 1 1/2 KW COMMAND POST	1	1	1		
	249077	LIGHT SET GENERAL ILLUMINATION SET NO 3 3 KW	1	1	1		
	250050	MACHETE 18 INCH M-1942 WITH PLASTIC SHEATH	62	62	62		
	251110	MATTOCK PICK HANDLED 3 LB	63	63	63		
	256050	PIONEER EQUIPMENT SET NO 1 ENGINEER SQUAD	3	3	3		
	256120	PIONEER EQUIPMENT SET NO 3 ENGINEER COMBAT PLAYDOWN	1	1	1		
	257355	PLOTTING EQUIPMENT SET NO 1 COMMAND POST	1	1	1		
	258890	PROTRACTOR SLICITIRE PLASTIC MACHINE GUN 10 INCH DIA GRADUATED MILS AND YARDS	1	1	1		
	263560	REPRODUCTION EQUIPMENT SET NO 4 GELATIN PROCESS 22 X 33 INCH	1	1	1		
	267820	SAW CHAIN PORTABLE GASOLINE DRIVEN 34 INCH BLADE	1	1	1		
	268840	SCALE COORDINATE ALUMINUM SQUARE 1 TO 25000 AND 1 TO 50000 SCALE GRADUATED METERS YDS	1	1	1		
	269345	SCALE PLOTTING TRIANGULAR BOXWOOD 12 INCH LENGTH GRADUATED YDS AND METERS 1 TO 25000 SCALE METERS 1 TO 50000 AND 1 TO 62500	1	1	1		
	272800	SCALE INCHES AND CENTIMETERS	2	2	2		
	272800	SHOVEL HAND GENERAL PURPOSE BROAD POINT OPEN BACK BOLTER	121	117	121		
	273600	SHOULDER TUBULAR SHANK SIZE NO 2 D-HANDLE	1	1	1		
	275610	STEREOSCOPE MAGNIFYING POCKET WITH LEATHER CASE	1	1	1		
	275610	STEREOSCOPE SCANNING 1-5X AND 4-8X MAGNIFICATION WITH BINOCULARS AND CASE	1	1	1		
	279510	SURVEYING EQUIPMENT SET NO 10 ARTILLERY 4TH ORDER	1	1	1		
	282705	TAPE MEASURING STL METRIC-US 100 FT 3/8 INCH WIDE D-DOOR INCH THICK GRADUATED ONE SIDE METERS DECIMETERS AND CENTIMETERS OTHER SIDE FT 10THS AND 100THS W-CASE	1	1	1		
	286130	TOOL SET CARPENTERS NO 2	2	2	2		
	286170	TOOL SET ELECTRIC PORTABLE 60 CYCLE	1	1	1		
	290379	TRIPPO RANGING POLE	2	2	2		
		MEDICAL ITEMS					
	305130	BLANKET SET BED SMALL	4	3	4		
	342000	INHALATOR SINGLE ONE MASK TYPE	2	2	2		
	344770	LATRINE BOX PREFABRICATED PORTABLE M-2	1	1	1		
	345980	LIGHT SURGICAL BRACKET PORTABLE BATTERY OPERATED	1	1	1		
	347060	LITTER FOLDING RIGID POLE ALUMINUM POLE	18	12	18		
	349175	MEDICAL INSTRUMENT AND SUPPLY SET DISPENSARY FIELD	1	1	1		
	349250	MEDICAL SUPPLY SET FIELD SUPPLEMENTAL SUPPLIES	6	6	6		
	349450	RESUSCITATOR HAND OPERATED BELLONA TYPE	2	2	2		
	349460	SPLINT SET TELESCOPIC SPLINTS	4	4	4		
	372700	STOVE GASOLINE BURNER TWO BURNER WITH METAL CASE	2	2	2		
	374250	SUPPORT LITTER FOLDING	1	1	1		
	374295	SURGICAL INSTRUMENT AND SUPPLY SET COMBAT	1	1	1		
	374298	SURGICAL INSTRUMENT AND SUPPLY SET INDIVIDUAL	31	29	31		
		ORDNANCE ITEMS					
	401074	BAYONET KNIFE W/SCABBARD CARBINE	406	401	406		
	401084	BAYONET KNIFE W/SCABBARD RIFLE	406	401	406		
	401247	BINOCULAR 6X30	120	127	120		
	401372	BINOCULAR 7X20	12	12	12		
	401518	BOARD PLOTTING	31	31	31		
	401821	CARBINE SPARE PARTS 5 TYPE 1 MODEL 1940	1	1	1		
	404062	CARBINE CAL .30	183	140	183		
	405225	CARRIER PERSONNEL FULL TRACKED	2	2	2		
	405437	CHAIN YOW 5/8 IN X 16 FT	8	8	8		
	405487		21	21	21		
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8

SECTION II - ORGANIZATION

TOE 7-117 ACID

INDEX			DESIGNATION	QUANTITY	MOO	STRENGTH				OFFICERS								ENLISTED								REMARKS
PAR	LINE	FULL (1)				REDUCED (2)	CADRE (3)	TYPE (4)	GEN (5)	COL (6)	LT COL (7)	MAJ (8)	CAPT (9)	LT (10)	WO (11)	27 (12)	28 (13)	29 (14)	30 (15)	31 (16)	32 (17)	33 (18)	34 (19)	35 (20)	36 (21)	
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27
				76810					2												2					
				76820					5												5					
				77310					1												1					
				91000					14														14			
				91110					27												22	5				
				91120					1												1					
				94000					5														5			
				94110					30												17	13				
									1036												71	559	504	2		

SECTION III - EQUIPMENT

TOS 7-117 BOC13

P&I NO	LINE ITEM NUMBER	ITEM DESCRIPTION	QUANTITY			REMARKS	FOR LOCAL USE
			PULL STRENGTH	REDUCED STRENGTH	TYPE "D" STRENGTH		
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
	408180	CIRCLE AIMING	1	1	1		
	410626	COMPASS	54	54	54		
	411753	DEMOLITION EQUIPMENT SET NO 9 INDIVIDUAL	13	13	13		
	411755	DEMOLITION EQUIPMENT SET NO 7 ELECTRICAL	3	3	3		
	414940	GAUGE CLIMBERS STEEL 2 1/8 IN WIDE 1 LEG 1 1/16 IN LONG 3 LEG	1	1	1		
	417082	578 IN LONG 3 IN OPND 3 REFERENCE LINE MARKINGS	11	11	11		
	417097	GUN MACHINE CAL 430 BRG M1919A4	34	34	34		
	417112	GUN MACHINE CAL 430 BRG M1 HEAVY BARREL	4	4	4		
	417221	GUN 90MM SELF PROPELLED FULL TRACKED M56	4	4	4		
	417247	GUN SUBMACHINE CAL 443	4	4	4		
	420700	LAUNCHER GRENADE RIFLE	178	178	178		
	420800	LAUNCHER ROCKET 3.5-INCH	64	64	64		
	423223	MORTAR 4.2-INCH ON MOUNT	8	8	8		
	423630	MORTAR 81-MM ON MOUNT	13	13	13		
	423535	MOUNT TRIPOD MACHINE GUN CAL 430 M2	45	45	45		
	423540	MOUNT TRIPOD MACHINE GUN CAL 450 M3	8	8	8		
	423682	MOUNT TRUCK PEDESTAL FOR 3/4 TON 4X4 TRUCK	1	1	1		
	423700	MOUNT TRUCK PEDESTAL FOR 1/4 TON 4X4 TRUCK	8	8	8		
	429280	PISTOL AUTO CAL 443	194	194	194		
	432520	RIFLE 100-MM ON MOUNT	8	8	8		
	433960	RIFLE AUTO CAL 430 BRG M1918A2	110	110	110		
	434090	RIFLE US CAL 30	918	918	918		
	436130	RIFLE US CAL 450 SNIPERS	48	48	48		
	442970	STRAPPING KIT STEEL STRAPPING HAND 3/8 X 9.823 IN STRAPPING	1	1	1		
	443750	TABLE GRAPHICAL FIRING	3	3	3		
	444020	TACK 7A-MM SUN	2	2	2		
	449760	TELESCOPE BC	1	1	1		
	449880	TELESCOPE OBSERVATION	2	2	2		
	454275	TOOL SET ARMORERS	8	8	8		
	454280	TOOL SET ARTILLERY MECHANIC MINOR MAINTENANCE	1	1	1		
	454810	TOOL SET GENERAL MECHANICS	12	12	12		
	455185	TOOL SET ORGN MAINT 2ND ECH NO 1 COMMON	1	1	1		
	455225	TOOL SET ORGN MAINT 2ND ECH NO 2 COMMON	1	1	1		
	455228	TOOL SET ORGN MAINT 2ND ECH NO 2 SUPPLEMENTAL	1	1	1		
	457040	TRAILER AMMUNITION 2-TON 2W	2	2	2		
	457110	TRAILER CARGO 1/4-TON 2W	18	18	18		
	457190	TRAILER CARGO 3/4-TON 2W	41	41	41		
	457220	TRAILER CARGO 1 1/2-TON 2W	12	12	12		
	457705	TRAILER TANK WATER 1 1/2-TON 2W	6	6	6		
	459870	TRUCK AMBULANCE FRONT LINE 1/4 TON-4X4	4	4	4		
	460050	TRUCK CARGO 3/4 TON 4X4	44	44	44		
	460110	TRUCK CARGO 2 1/2 TON 4X4 LWB	8	8	8		
	460141	TRUCK CARGO 2 1/2 TON 4X4 LWB WW	10	10	10		
	460290	TRUCK CARGO 3-TON 4X4 LWB	2	2	2		
	460720	TRUCK CARGO 5-TON 4X4 LWB WW	2	2	2		
	461040	TRUCK LIGHT WRECKER 2 1/2-TON 4X4 WW	1	1	1		
	461280	TRUCK SHOP VAN 2 1/2-TON 4X4	1	1	1		
	461790	TRUCK UTILITY 1/4-TON 4X4	22	22	22		
	465190	WATCH WRIST GRADE 11	161	161	161		
	465220	WATCH STOP TYPE B CLASS 19	2	2	2		
		QUARTERMASTER ITEMS					
	502784	BAG AMMUNITION M241	28	28	28		
	503102	BAG CANVAS WATER STERILIZING POROUS COMPLETE WITH SUSPENSION	13	13	13		
		ROPES AND COVER	4	4	4		
	509510	BOTTLE VACUUM 1 QT CAP YAPER SHAPE W/BAIL ON CUP	1	1	1		
	509949	BOX CASH SMALL	1	1	1		
	512211	BUCKET GEN PURPOSE METAL GALV HV WBT W/6 LI 14 BY	30	30	30		
	512676	BURNER OIL STOVE TENT	13	13	13		
	514208	CAN CORR NEST GALV W/COVER 10 GAL	14	14	14		
	514271	CAN CORR NEST GALV W/COVER 32 GAL	48	48	48		
	514355	CAN GASOLINE 5 GAL CAP	229	229	229		
	514487	CAN WATER 5 GAL	229	229	229		
	515113	CANVAS REPAIR KIT	1	1	1		
	516522	CARRIER WIRE CUTTER	32	32	32		
	516799	CASE FLD OFF MACH 18 1/2 X 13 1/4 X 17 IN	1	1	1		
	516818	CASE FLD OFF MACH 22 1/2 X 13 1/4 X 17 IN	2	2	2		
	517990	CHAIR FOLDING	15	15	15		
	518726	CHEST HYMNAL MUSIC EDITION FIBER	2	2	2		
	522443	CLOCK ALARM	6	6	6		
	522488	CLOCK MESSAGE CENTER	1	1	1		
	524216	COMMISSARY OUTFIT FLD BREA'DOWN	1	1	1		
	524460	CONTAINER FOOD INSULATED	88	88	88		
	525087	COOKSET MOUNTAIN	43	43	43		
	526291	COVER WATER CAN INSULATED 5 GAL CAP OF CAN	4	4	4		
	528038	CUTTER WIRE	55	55	55		
	528592	DESK FIELD EMPTY FIBER COMPANY	2	2	2		
	528615	DESK FIELD M-1445	15	15	15		
	533781	FILE PAPER CLIP BOARD 9 IN WIDE 15 1/2 IN LONG	1	1	1		
	534544	FLAG CHAPLAIN CHRISTIAN-JEWISH	2	2	2		

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SECTION III - EQUIPMENT

PAR NO	LINE ITEM NUMBER	ITEM DESCRIPTION	QUANTITY			REMARKS	FOR LOCAL USE
			FULL STRENGTH	REDUCED STRENGTH	TYPE B STRENGTH		
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
	594385	FLAG COLOR ORGANIZATIONAL SILK	1	1	1		
	594427	FLAG GENEVA-COM-RED-CROSS BUNTING AMBULANCE AND MARKER	5	5	5		
	594489	FLAG GUIDON BUNTING	6	6	6		
	594572	FLAG NATL COLORS SILK	1	1	1		
	594809	FLAG SET M-238	2	2	2		
	594886	GOGGLES M-1944	150	146	150		
	594865	HEATER IMMERSION TYPE FOR CANS CORRUGATED	24	24	24		
	594870	HEATER TENT GASOLINE 250000 BTU	2	2	2		
	594888	HEATER WATER IMMERSION GAS OPERATED	6	6	6		
	594955	KIT BARBER W/CASE	6	6	6		
	594919	LANTERN GASOLINE LEADED FUEL	27	27	27		
	595803	LOCK PAD BRASS 1 3/4 INCH	8	8	8		
	595828	LOCKER BOX	7	7	7		
	595230	MACHINE DUPLICATING STENCIL FIELD KIT	1	1	1		
	595701	ORGAN FOLDING CHAPLAIN W/CASE	2	2	2		
	595637	OUTFIT OFFICER'S MESS	10	10	10		
	595128	PAD SHOULDER	101	101	101		
	594202	PANEL SET AP-30-C	1	1	1		
	594203	PANEL SET AP-30-D	1	1	1		
	594234	PANEL SIGNAL VS-17 GVX	52	20	52		
	594318	PAULIN DUCK OD 40X20 FT	1	1	1		
	594339	PAULIN DUCK OD 17X12 FT	11	11	11		
	595171	PERFORATOR ADJUSTABLE 3 HOLE	1	1	1		
	595191	PERFORATOR NON-ADJUSTABLE 2-HOLE	2	2	2		
	572223	RANGE FIELD A PACK	6	6	6		
	572224	RANGE FIELD B PACK	23	23	23		
	573142	REFLECTING CONE GASOLINE LANTERN	2	2	2		
	575177	RULER MAPLE BRASS EDGE 18 IN	2	2	2		
	575711	SAFE FIELD COMBINATION LOCK	2	2	2		
	577422	SCALE WEIGH PLAT FOLDING A AND M TYPE 300 LB CAP	1	1	1		
	578130	SCREEN LATRINE COMP W/PINS-POLES	11	11	11		
	579815	SHEARS OFFICE BANKERS 9 INCH	2	2	2		
	582227	SLING FLAG WEB OD	2	2	2		
	582966	STAPLER PAPER FASTEN OFF TYPE LT DUTY	3	3	3		
	589225	STENCIL OUTFIT COMP W/FIGURES AND LETTERS 1/2 IN AND 1 IN	1	1	1		
	586908	STOVE COOKING GASOLINE 1-BURNER W/CASE	43	43	43		
	586989	STOVE TENT	13	13	13		
	588897	TABLE CAMP FOLDING	24	23	24		
	590200	TENT COMMAND POST COMP W/PINS-POLES	10	10	10		
	590265	TENT KITCHEN FLY PROOF COMP W/PINS-POLES	6	6	6		
	590275	TENT MAINTENANCE SHELTER W/FRAME AND PINS	6	6	6		
	590635	TENT WALL SMALL COMP W/PINS-POLES	2	2	2		
	595727	TUBE FLEXIBLE NOZZLE	168	163	168		
	596643	TYPEWRITER NON PTBL 11 IN CARRIAGE	7	6	7		
	596684	TYPEWRITER NON PTBL 14-12 IN CARRIAGE	3	5	3		
	596788	TYPEWRITER PTBL W/CARRYING CASE	11	11	11		
	598931	WMISTLE THUNDERER	81	81	81		
		SIGNAL ITEMS					
	603120	ANTENNA AT-339/PRC	4	4	4		
	603250	ANTENNA EQUIPMENT RC-292	3	3	3		
	604010	AXLE RL-27	1	1	1		
	609570	CHANNEL ALIGNMENT INDICATOR ID-292/PRC-8	1	1	1		
	609670	CHE I BC-5	6	6	6		
	610280	CIPHER MACHINE TSEC/RL-7	2	2	2		
	610338	CLIMBERS LC-240/U	12	10	12		
	611010	COIL C-161	4	4	4		
	611130	CONNECTING AND SWITCHING KIT MX-155/GT	3	3	3		
	611280	CONTROL GROUP AN/GRA-6	23	23	23		
	612610	CRYSTAL UNIT SET CR-6/PRC-8	4	4	4		
	613150	DETECTOR SET AN/PPS-3	10	7	10		
	614378	DYNAMIC LOUDSPEAKER LS-146/U	2	2	2		
	614990	EMERGENCY SWITCHBOARD SB-18/GT	10	6	10		
	616420	FLASHLIGHT MX-991/U	202	181	202		
	616620	FREQUENCY METER AN/FURM-32	1	1	1		
	619408	HANDSET-HEADSET M-81/U	1	1	1		
	627510	MODIFICATION KIT MX-898/GC	1	1	1		
	628139	MULTIMETER AN/PRM-12	1	1	1		
	628193	MULTIMETER ME-77	4	4	4		
	634600	RADIAC DETECTOR CHARGER PP-630/PD	12	12	12		
	634630	RADIAC SET AN/PDR-39	8	8	8		
	634670	RADIAC METER IM-92/UD	48	48	48		
	636901	RADIO SET AN/ARC-27 MTD IN TRK 1/4 TON	1	1	1		
	636948	RADIO SET AN/GRC-7 MTD IN TANK 76MM GUN	1	1	1		
	639748	RADIO SET AN/GRC-8 MTD IN TANK 76MM GUN	1	1	1		
	640704	RADIO SET AN/GRC-19 MTD IN TRK 3/4 TON CARGO	1	1	1		
	641601	RADIO SET AN/GRR-5 MTD IN TRK 1/4 TON	1	1	1		
	641604	RADIO SET AN/GRR-5 MTD IN TRK 3/4 TON CARGO	2	2	2		
	643500	RADIO SET AN/PRC-6	40	38	40		
	643701	RADIO SET AN/PRC-9 MTD IN TRK 1/4 TON	3	3	3		
	643800	RADIO SET AN/PRC-10	42	42	42		

SECTION II - ORGANIZATION

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INDEX		DESIGNATION	SERVITY	BRANCH	MOB.	STRENGTH				OFFICERS							ENLISTED						
PAR	LINE					PILA (1)	REBUJOS (2)	CADRE (3)	TYPE (4)	SEN	COL	LT COL	MAJ	CAPT	LT	WO	E-7	E-6	E-5	E-4	E-3	E-2	E-1
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	
			E	MC	13100			1											1				
			E	MC	13360			3											2	1			
			E	MC	13370			1															
			E	MC	14080			8											8				
			E	MC	15170			2											2				
			E	MC	14560			1												1			
			E	MC	14270			1															
			E	MC	14680			2											1		1		
			E	MC	11180			1												1			
			E	MC	11170			1															
			E	MC	11370			1															
			E	MC	63170			2											1				
			E	MC	64340			1															
			E	MC	71670			1															
			E	MC	78840			6															
			E	MC	76870			1															
			E	MC	91160			2															
			E	MC	94160			6															
								179											38	25	28		
		OTHER ENLISTED																					
			E		14110			1															
			E		31000			1															
			E		51110			1															
			E		21120			1															
			E		43110			4															
			E		62270			1															
			E		71110			1															
			E		71610			1															
			E		71629			1															
			E		72210			1															
			E		76816			1															
			E		94116			1															
								11											11	24			
		TYPE B STRENGTH OFFICERS																					
			O	AR	1304			1															
			O	AT	1183			1															
			O	AT	1189			4															
			O	AT	1193			1															
			O	AT	1199			1															
			O	CH	2310			2															
			O	EM	1321			1															
			O	IN	0400			1															
			O	IN	1822			20															
			O	IN	2110			1															
			O	IN	2182			2															
			O	IN	2184			1															
			O	IN	2200			2															
			O	IN	4010			1															
			O	IN	9301			7															
			O	AC	3000			1															
			O	MC	3100			1															
			O	SC	0210			1															
								67															
		WARRANT OFFICERS																					
			W		0509			1															
			W		2200			1															
			W		4003			1															
								2															

TOE 7-111 R010

SECTION II - ORGANIZATION

INDEX		DESIGNATION	OFFICER	I	MOS	STRENGTH				OFFICERS										ENLISTED						REMARKS
PAR	LINE					FULL (1)	REDUCED (2)	LAGER (3)	TYPE (4)	GEN (5)	COL (6)	LT COL (7)	MAJ (8)	CAPT (9)	1LT (10)	WO (11)	1ST (12)	2ND (13)	3RD (14)	4TH (15)	5TH (16)	6TH (17)	7TH (18)	8TH (19)	9TH (20)	
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	
		NON-COMMISSIONED OFFICERS																								
			E	NC	00180				6								6									
			E	NC	00190				1								1									
			E	NC	05160				2								2									
			E	NC	11170				164								164									
			E	NC	11180				14								14									
			E	NC	11270				39								39									
			E	NC	11280				6								6									
			E	NC	11360				1								1									
			E	NC	11380				5								5									
			E	NC	12160				3								3									
			E	NC	12170				1								1									
			E	NC	13160				1								1									
			E	NC	13160				4								4									
			E	NC	13170				1								1									
			E	NC	14160				18								18									
			E	NC	14170				2								2									
			E	NC	14560				1								1									
			E	NC	14570				1								1									
			E	NC	14660				8								8									
			E	NC	31160				4								4									
			E	NC	31170				3								3									
			E	NC	31360				2								2									
			E	NC	31370				1								1									
			E	NC	55160				1								1									
			E	NC	63170				2								2									
			E	NC	64160				1								1									
			E	NC	71679				1								1									
			E	NC	76860				8								8									
			E	NC	76879				1								1									
			E	NC	91160				6								6									
			E	NC	91170				1								1									
			E	NC	94160				319								319									
		OTHER ENLISTED																								
			E		09110				3																	
			E		09110				3																	
			E		11100				290																	
			E		11110				211																	
			E		11200				86																	
			E		11210				29																	
			E		11220				12																	
			E		11310				3																	
			E		12000				11																	
			E		12110				6																	
			E		12120				3																	
			E		13000				7																	
			E		13120				2																	
			E		13310				8																	
			E		14000				55																	
			E		14110				1																	
			E		14140				8																	
			E		14510				2																	
			E		14520				2																	
			E		14610				6																	
			E		14620				4																	
			E		31000				40																	
			E		31110				4																	
			E		31120				1																	
			E		63000				3																	
			E		63110				10																	
			E		63220				2																	
			E		64000				3																	
			E		64210				4																	
			E		71000				2																	
			E		71110				3																	
			E		71610				13																	
			E		71620				1																	
			E		71810				2																	
			E		72310				3																	
			E		74110				1																	
			E		76000				2																	
			E		76710				1																	

SECTION II - ORGANIZATION

FOR 7-117 ROCID

INDEX		DESIGNATION	UNIT	MOB	STRENGTH				OFFICERS								ENLISTED							
PAR	LINE				FULL 111	REDUCED 101	CABIN 101	TYPE 01	SEN 101	COL 101	LT COL 101	MAJ CAPT 101	LT 101	WO 101	101	101	101	101	101	101	101	101	101	101
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	
		SRC OF 0117 ROCID	UD		1	2	4	9																
01		HEADQUARTERS, HEADQUARTERS AND SERVICE COMPANY FOR 7-117 ROCID																						
01			O		23	19	8	23			1	1	6	10	9									
02			M		3	3	2	5								3								
03			E		284	281	55	276			1	1	6	10	5	3	11	19	60	91	103			
					310	273	65	102																
02		4 RIFLE COMPANIES FOR 7-117 ROCID																						
01			O		26	28	8	28							4	24								
02			E		944	920	132	974									24	72	156	240	352			
					972	948	140	972									24	72	156	240	352			
03		MORTAR BATTERY FOR 6-101 ROCID																						
01			O		11	11	4	11							1	10								
02			E		124	122	23	124									4	13	24	32	57	2		
					143	138	27	143							1	10		4	13	24	32	57	2	
					1427	1357	232	1419			1	1	6	15	39	3	39	104	262	465	912	2		
		RECAPITULATION																						
		FULL STRENGTH																						
		OFFICERS																						
			O AR	1204	1																			
			O AT	1183	1																			
			O AT	1189	4																			
			O AT	1193	3																			
			O AT	1199	1																			
			O C	9310	2										1	1								
			O EN	1331	1																			
			O IN	0600	1																			
			O IN	1543	24						1	1				6	26							
			O IN	2170	1										1									
			O IN	2182	2										1									
			O IN	2184	1																			
			O IN	2900	2																			
			O IN	4010	1																			
			O IN	9301	2										1	1								
			O MC	3000	1																			
			O MC	3100	1																			
			O SC	0210	1																			
					62						1	1	6	12	39									
		WARRANT OFFICERS																						
			M	0603	1																			
			M	2200	1																			
			M	4000	1																			
					2																			
		NON-COMMISSIONED OFFICERS																						
			E MC	00180	6																			
			E MC	00190	1																			
			E MC	05180	1																			
			E MC	09360	1																			
			E MC	11170	164																			
			E MC	11180	16																			
			E MC	11270	10																			
			E MC	11280	6																			
			E MC	11360	1																			
			E MC	11360	3																			
			E MC	12160	3																			
			E MC	12170	1																			
			E MC	13160	1																			
			E MC	13360	6																			

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SECTION II - ORGANIZATION

INDEX		DESIGNATION	UNIT	BRANCH	MOB	STRENGTH			OFFICERS										ENLISTED						TOTAL
PAR	LINE					FULL	REDUCED	CADRE	TYPE	GEN	COL	LT	MAJ	CPPT	LT	NO	17	18	19	20	21	22	23		
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24		
			E	NC	13370	1											1								
			E	NC	14160	16												8							
			E	NC	14170	2											2								
			E	NC	14560	1												1							
			E	NC	14570	1																			
			E	NC	14660	8											1								
			E	NC	31160	4												2		6					
			E	NC	31170	5												1		2					
			E	NC	31360	2											1		1		6				
			E	NC	31370	1														1					
			E	NC	55360	1														1					
			E	NC	6317	2											1			1					
			E	NC	64360	1														1					
			E	NC	71670	1														1					
			E	NC	76860	8														2					
			E	NC	76870	1											1								
			E	NC	91160	6														1					
			E	NC	91170	1											1			1		4			
			E	NC	96160	4																			
						318											39	104	171	4					
		OTHER ENLISTED																							
			E		09110	2																			
			E		09310	3																			
			E		11100	292																			
			E		11110	311																			
			E		11200	28																			
			E		11210	29																			
			E		11220	12																			
			E		11310	5																			
			E		12000	11																			
			E		12110	6																			
			E		12120	3																			
			E		13000	7																			
			E		13120	2																			
			E		13310	8																			
			E		14000	22																			
			E		14110	1																			
			E		14120	8																			
			E		14510	2																			
			E		14520	2																			
			E		14610	6																			
			E		14620	4																			
			E		31000	40																			
			E		31110	4																			
			E		31120	1																			
			E		62000	8																			
			E		63110	10																			
			E		63220	2																			
			E		64000	5																			
			E		64210	4																			
			E		71000	2																			
			E		71110	3																			
			E		71610	13																			
			E		71620	1																			
			E		71810	2																			
			E		72310	3																			
			E		74110	1																			
			E		76000	2																			
			E		76710	1																			
			E		76810	2																			
			E		76820	5																			
			E		77310	1																			
			E		91000	14																			
			E		91110	27																			
			E		91120	1																			
			E		94000	8																			
			E		94110	30																			
						1044																			
		REDUCED STRENGTH																							
		OFFICERS																							
			O AR		1204	1																			
			O AT		1183	1																			

INFANTRY BATTALION
INFANTRY DIVISION
OR
INFANTRY BATTALION
SEPARATE INFANTRY BRIGADE




TABLE OF ORGANIZATION AND DEPLOYMENT																				
SECTION II: PERSONNEL ALLOWANCES																				
31 MARCH 1966																				
INDEX		DESCRIPTION	GRADE	NO.	C	STRENGTH LEVELS						REMARKS								
PAMA	LINE					1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9						
						1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9						
01		SRC CTC12650C																		
		PO AND HC COMPANY																		
		TOF 7- 16C																		
01																				
02																				
03																				
02		7 RIFLE COMPANIES																		
		TOF 7- 16C																		
01																				
02																				
03																				
TABLE TOTALS						829	762	679												
RECAPITULATION BY GRADE OFFICERS																				
		LTC 01542 IN				1	1	1												
		MAJ 01542 IN				1	1	1												
		MAJ 02162 IN				1	1	1												
		CPT 00200 IN				1	1	1												
		CPT 00600 IN				1	1	1												
		CPT 01542 IN				3	3	3												
		CPT 02110 IN				1	1	1												
		CPT 02900 IN				1	1	1												
		CPT 03100 IN				1	1	1												
		CPT 04010 IN				1	1	1												
		CPT 52163 IN				1	1	1												
		CPT 59301 IN				1	1	1												
		LT 01204 AR				1	1	1												
		LT 01542 IN				10	17	14												
		LT 01543 IN				1	1	1												
		LT 02900 IN				1	1	1												
		LT 03506 NS				1	1	1												
		LT 04000 IN				1	1	1												
		MC 43160				1	1	1												
		MC 56160				1	2	1												
TOTAL OFFICERS						39	38	33												
ENLISTED																				
		E-4 21650 NC				1	1	1												
		E-8 11F50 NC				2	2	2												
		E-8 12650 NC				4	4	4												
		E-8 43850 NC				1	1	1												
		E-7 11B40 NC				9	9	9												
		E-7 11C40 NC				4	4	4												
		E-7 11D40 NC				1	1	1												
		E-7 11F40 NC				1	1	1												
		E-7 11H4C NC				1	1	1												
		E-7 31F4C NC				1	1	1												
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		E-7 76K40 NC				1	1	1												
		E-7 91B4C NC				1	1	1												
		E-7 91B4C NC				1	1	1												
		E-5 11B40 NC				30	30	30												
		E-6 11C40 NC				3	3	3												
		E-6 11D40 NC				2	2	2												
		E-6 11F40 NC				2	2	2												
		E-6 11H40 NC				4	4	4												
		E-6 31F40 NC				1	1	1												
		E-6 54B40 NC				1	1	1												
		E-6 64C40 NC				1	1	1												
		E-6 76K4C NC				5	5	5												
		E-6 91C20				2	2	2												
		E-6 94B40 NC				4	4	4												
		E-5 09C40 NC				1	1	1												
		E-5 11B40 NC				56	55	56												
		E-5 11C20				8	8	8												
		E-5 11C40 NC				25	25	22												
		E-5 11D40 NC				2	2	2												
		E-5 11F20				4	4	4												
		E-5 11F40 NC				3	2	2												
DA TOTAL 2849																				
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TABLE OF CORRELATION AND DISPERSED

SECTION II: PERSONNEL ALLOWANCES

21 MARCH 1966

INDEX		DESCRIPTION	GRADE	MOB	1	STRENGTH LEVELS						SHARES		
PAGE	NO					1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O
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			E-5	31B20		1	1	1				1		
			E-5	31F40	NC	3	3	3				3		
			E-5	43B20		3	3	3				3		
			E-5	71B90		1	1	1				1		
			E-5	91B20		12	12	0						
			E-5	91B30		2	2	2						
			E-5	91B40	NC	1	1	1						
			E-5	94B20		12	12	12				9		
			E-4	05B20		2	2	2						
			E-4	05C20		2	2	2						
			E-4	11B20		147	147	147						
			E-4	11B2B		4	4	4				1		
			E-4	13C20		13	13	13						
			E-4	11D20		5	5	5				1		
			E-4	11F20		9	7	7						
			E-4	13M20		6	6	6						
			E-4	11M30		3	3	3						
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			E-4	31F20		5	5	5						
			E-4	36A10		4	4	3				1		
			E-4	44C20		1	1	1				1		
			E-4	62B2C		1	1	1				1		
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			E-4	76M2B		2	2	2						
			E-4	76K3B		4	4	4				1		
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			E-4	94B20		3	6	6				4		
			E-3	05B2C		2	2	2						
			E-3	11B10		147	128	85						
			E-3	13B1C		4	4	4						
			E-3	13C10		43	47	38						
			E-3	13D10		4	4							
			E-3	16M10		26	17	19						
			E-3	36A10		18	14	9						
			E-3	62B1C		1	1	1						
			E-3	63A10		7	3	3						
			E-3	64A10		5	5	5						
			E-3	64B20		1	1							
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			E-3	76A1C		2	1	1						
			E-3	94A10		4	4	4						
			E-2	44A10		3								
						610	724	546				145		
			TOTAL ENLISTED											
			TOTALS			645	762	479				142		
			RECAPITULATION BY MOS											
			OFFICERS											
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				00600	IN	2	1					1		
				01204	AR	1	1	1				1		
				01542	IN	22	22	19				8		
				01543	SA	1	1	1				1		
				02110	SM	1	1	1				1		
				02162	IN	1	1	1				1		
				02706	SA	2	2	2				1		
				03109	NC	1	1	1				1		
				03504	NS	1	1	1				1		
				04000	IN	1	1	1						
				04010	SM	1	1	1				1		
				62143	SM	1	1	1						
				59301	IN	1	1	1				1		
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			TOTAL OFFICERS			39	38	33				19		
			ENLISTED											
				05B20		4	4	4						
				05C20		2	2	2						
				05C40	NC	1	1	1				1		
				11B10		147	128	85						
				11B10		4	4	4						
A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O

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REPLACES DA FORM 600, 1 JAN 50, WHICH IS OBSOLETE EFFECTIVE 1 JUL 50.

TABLE OF ORGANIZATION AND EQUIPMENT
SECTION II- PERSONNEL ALLOWANCES


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31 PARCH 1966

GRADE		NO.		1		2		3		4		5		6		7		8		9		10		11		12		13		14		15		16		17		18		19		20		21		22		23		24		25		26		27		28		29		30		31		32		33		34		35		36		37		38		39		40		41		42		43		44		45		46		47		48		49		50		51		52		53		54		55		56		57		58		59		60		61		62		63		64		65		66		67		68		69		70		71		72		73		74		75		76		77		78		79		80		81		82		83		84		85		86		87		88		89		90		91		92		93		94		95		96		97		98		99		100		101		102		103		104		105		106		107		108		109		110		111		112		113		114		115		116		117		118		119		120		121		122		123		124		125		126		127		128		129		130		131		132		133		134		135		136		137		138		139		140		141		142		143		144		145		146		147		148		149		150		151		152		153		154		155		156		157		158		159		160		161		162		163		164		165		166		167		168		169		170		171		172		173		174		175		176		177		178		179		180		181		182		183		184		185		186		187		188		189		190		191		192		193		194		195		196		197		198		199		200		201		202		203		204		205		206		207		208		209		210		211		212		213		214		215		216		217		218		219		220		221		222		223		224		225		226		227		228		229		230		231		232		233		234		235		236		237		238		239		240		241		242		243		244		245		246		247		248		249		250		251		252		253		254		255		256		257		258		259		260		261		262		263		264		265		266		267		268		269		270		271		272		273		274		275		276		277		278		279		280		281		282		283		284		285		286		287		288		289		290		291		292		293		294		295		296		297		298		299		300		301		302		303		304		305		306		307		308		309		310		311		312		313		314		315		316		317		318		319		320		321		322		323		324		325		326		327		328		329		330		331		332		333		334		335		336		337		338		339		340		341		342		343		344		345		346		347		348		349		350		351		352		353		354		355		356		357		358		359		360		361		362		363		364		365		366		367		368		369		370		371		372		373		374		375		376		377		378		379		380		381		382		383		384		385		386		387		388		389		390		391		392		393		394		395		396		397		398		399		400		401		402		403		404		405		406		407		408		409		410		411		412		413		414		415		416		417		418		419		420		421		422		423		424		425		426		427		428		429		430		431		432		433		434		435		436		437		438		439		440		441		442		443		444		445		446		447		448		449		450		451		452		453		454		455		456		457		458		459		460		461		462		463		464		465		466		467		468		469		470		471		472		473		474		475		476		477		478		479		480		481		482		483		484		485		486		487		488		489		490		491		492		493		494		495		496		497		498		499		500		501		502		503		504		505		506		507		508		509		510		511		512		513		514		515		516		517		518		519		520		521		522		523		524		525		526		527		528		529		530		531		532		533		534		535		536		537		538		539		540		541		542		543		544		545		546		547		548		549		550		551		552		553		554		555		556		557		558		559		560		561		562		563		564		565		566		567		568		569		570		571		572		573		574		575		576		577		578		579		580		581		582		583		584		585		586		587		588		589		590		591		592		593		594		595		596		597		598		599		600		601		602		603		604		605		606		607		608		609		610		611		612		613		614		615		616		617		618		619		620		621		622		623		624		625		626		627		628		629		630		631		632		633		634		635		636		637		638		639		640		641		642		643		644		645		646		647		648		649		650		651		652		653		654		655		656		657		658		659		660		661		662		663		664		665		666		667		668		669		670		671		672		673		674		675		676		677		678		679		680		681		682		683		684		685		686		687		688		689		690		691		692		693		694		695		696		697		698		699		700		701		702		703		704		705		706		707		708		709		710		711		712		713		714		715		716		717		718		719		720		721		722		723		724		725		726		727		728		729		730		731		732		733		734		735		736		737		738		739		740		741		742		743		744		745		746		747		748		749		750		751		752		753		754		755		756		757		758		759		760		761		762		763		764		765		766		767		768		769		770		771		772		773		774		775		776		777		778		779		780		781		782		783		784		785		786		787		788		789		790		791		792		793		794		795		796		797		798		799		800		801		802		803		804		805		806		807		808		809		810		811		812		813		814		815		816		817		818		819		820		821		822		823		824		825		826		827		828		829		830		831		832		833		834		835		836		837		838		839		840		841		842		843		844		845		846		847		848		849		850		851		852		853		854		855		856		857		858		859		860		861		862		863		864		865		866		867		868		869		870		871		872		873		874		875		876		877		878		879		880		881		882		883		884		885		886		887		888		889		890		891		892		893		894		895		896		897		898		899		900		901		902		903		904		905		906		907		908		909		910		911		912		913		914		915		916		917		918		919		920		921		922		923		924		925		926		927		928		929		930		931		932		933		934		935		936		937		938		939		940		941		942		943		944		945		946		947		948		949		950		951		952		953		954		955		956		957		958		959		960		961		962		963		964		965		966		967		968		969		970		971		972		973		974		975		976		977		978		979		980		981		982		983		984		985		986		987		988		989		990		991		992		993		994		995		996		997		998		999		1000		1001		1002		1003		1004		1005		1006		1007		1008		1009		1010		1011		1012		1013		1014		1015		1016		1017		1018		1019		1020		1021		1022		1023		1024		1025		1026		1027		1028		1029		1030		1031		1032		1033		1034		1035		1036		1037		1038		1039		1040		1041		1042		1043		1044		1045		1046		1047		1048		1049		1050		1051		1052		1053		1054		1055		1056		1057		1058		1059		1060		1061		1062		1063		1064		1065		1066		1067		1068		1069		1070		1071		1072		1073		1074		1075		1076		1077		1078		1079		1080		1081		1082		1083		1084		1085		1086		1087		1088		1089		1090		1091		1092		1093		1094		1095		1096		1097		1098		1099		1100		1101		1102		1103		1104		1105		1106		1107		1108		1109		1110		1111		1112		1113		1114		1115		1116		1117		1118		1119		1120		1121		1122			
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INFANTRY BATTALION
INFANTRY DIVISION



SECTION II - EQUIPMENT

LINE NO	EQUIP NUMBER	ITEM DESCRIPTION	QUANTITY			REMARKS	FOR LOCAL USE
			NO UNITS	ORIGIN FUNCTION	NO UNITS		
		SRC 07 013E 3 00-	1	2	9		
		RECAPITULATION					
		CHEMICAL ITEMS					
	108080	DECONTAMINATING APPARATUS PORTABLE 1 1/2-27	117	116			
	108171	DETECTOR KIT: CHEMICAL AGENT VGH	24	24			
	115450	FLAME THROWER PORTABLE	2	2			
	117200	DISPENSER RIOT CONTROL AGENT PORTABLE	6	6			
	138403	SERVICE KIT, PORTABLE FLAME THROWER-RIOT CONTROL AGENT DISPENSER	2	2			
		ENGINEER ITEMS					
	202470	BAG WATER STERILIZING COTTON DUCK POROUS STITCHED SEAMS 3A GAL	14	14			
	223732	COMPASS MAGNETIC LENSATIC 1-58 IN DIA CARD	161	161			
	234480	DETECTING SET MINE PTBL METALLIC	1	1			
	235380	DIVIDERS DRAFT PROPORT 7-1/2 IN LG	1	1			
	236880	DRAFT AND DUPLICAT EQUIP SET SMALL SKETCH NOTES AND ORDERS	1	1			
	232940	FLASHLIGHT PLASTIC RIGHT ANGLE 2 CELL MINIATURE FLANGE LAMP WATERPROOF	244	122			
	235133	GENERATOR SET GAS ENG 3 KW DC 28 V SKID SHOCK MTD	2	2			
	235134	GENERATOR SET GAS ENGINE 5 KW 60 CY 1 AND 3 PH 4 WIRE RECONNECTABLE TO 2 WIRE AND 3 WIRE AC 120 120/240 120/208 V AIR COOLED SKID MOUNTED	1	1			
	235152	GENERATOR SET GAS ENG 1.5 KW 2 WIRE DC 28 V SKID MTD	2	2			
	235163	GENERATOR SET GAS ENG 1.5 KW 40 CY 1 PH 2 WIRE AC 120 V SKID MTD	3	3			
	235205	GENERATOR SET GAS ENG 3 KW 60 CY 1 AND 3 PH 4 WIRE AC 120/240 V 120/208 V SKID MTD	1	1			
	249076	LIGHT SET GEN ILLUM 25 OUTLET	6	6			
	251444	METASCOPE ASSEMBLY IMAGE INFRARED TRANSISTORIZED	21	21			
	257355	PLOTTING SET ARTY FIRE CONT	1	1			
	260115	PROTRACTOR SEMICIR PLASTIC 1A IN DIA GRAD UNITS AND METERS	2	2			
	269345	SCALE PLOT TRIAN 12 IN LG YDS METERS 1 TO 25000 METERS 1 TO 50000 1 TO 62500 SCALE IN AND CM	2	2			
	274210	SPRAYER INSECT HAND 2 GAL CAP	4	4			
	273400	STEREOSCOPE LENS AERIAL PHOTO INTERPR 2 1/4 PVA 4 1/2 IN FOCAL LG OF LENS	1	1			
	283108	TEMPLATE AND TRACER PIN MILITARY	1	1			
	285979	TOOL KIT WELDERS	1	1			
	294056	WEAPON SIGHT INFRARED	10	10			
		MEDICAL ITEMS					
	305130	BLANKET SET BED SMALL	8	8			
	342000	INHALATOR SINGLE	2	2			
	345270	LATLINE BOX PREFABRICATED PORTABLE M-2	1	1			
	345980	LIGHT SURGICAL BRACKET PORTABLE BATTERY OPERATED	1	1			
	347060	LITTER FOLDING RIGID POLE ALUMINUM POLE	10	10			
	349175	MEDICAL INSTRUMENT AND SUPPLY SET DISPENSARY FIELD	1	1			
	349250	MEDICAL SUPPLY SET FIELD SUPPLEMENTAL SUPPLIES	6	6			
	369400	SPLINT SET TELESCOPIC SPLINTS	4	4			
	373700	STOVE GASOLINE BURNER 1000G BTU TWO BURNERS WITH METAL CASE	2	2			
	374220	SUPPORT LITTER FOLDING	1	1			
	374291	SURGICAL INSTRUMENT AND SUPPLY SET COMBAT	1	1			
	374298	SURGICAL INSTRUMENT AND SUPPLY SET INDIVIDUAL	21	21			
		ORDNANCE ITEMS					
	400113	ATTING CIRCLE	10	10			
	401088	BAYONET KNIFE V/SCABBARD FOR 7.62MM RIFLE	784	784			
	401248	BINOCULAR 6X30 MILITARY RETICLE	98	98			
	401250	BINOCULAR 7X30 MILITARY RETICLE	17	17			
	401251	BINOCULAR 7X50 W/O RETICLE	1	1			
	401258	BIPOD RIFLE 7.62MM	14	14			
	401919	BOARD PLOTTING AZIMUTH RANGING INFANTRY	19	19			
	410623	COMPASS SUN GRADATIONS	52	52			
	411785	DEMOLITION EQUIPMENT SET EXPLOSIVE INITIATING ELEC-NON-ELEC	3	3			
	411787	DEMOLITION EQUIPMENT SET EXPLOSIVE INITIATING NON-ELEC	1	1			
	414448	FIRE DIRECTION SET ARTILLERY 15000 METERS MAX RANGE	2	2			
	416363	GUIDANCE AND LAUNCHING STATION /FRTAC-1	3	3			
	417112	GUN MACHINE CAL .50 BRG Hvy BARREL FLEX	13	13			
	427125	GUN MACHINE 7.62-MM LIGHTWEIGHT GENERAL PURPOSE	28	28			
	420670	LAUNCHER GRENADE 40-MM	89	89			
	420800	LAUNCHER ROCKET 2.5-INCH	17	17			
	423923	MORTAR 4.2-INCH ON MOUNT	4	4			
	423930	MORTAR 81-MM ON MOUNT	2	2			
	423941	MOUNT TRIPOD MACHINE GUN CAL .50	13	13			

TOE 7-152		SECTION III EQUIPMENT			
ITEM	DESCRIPTION	QTY	UNIT	QTY	UNIT
425565	MOUNT TRIPOD MACHINE GUN 7.62-MM	1		1	
428350	PEDESTAL GUN MOUNT 7.62-MM FOR M151	1		1	
428590	PERISCOPE BATTERY (COMMAND)	1		1	
429280	PISTOL AUTOMATIC CPL .45	1		1	
435810	RIFLE 90-MM	1		1	
435950	RIFLE 106-MM ON MOUNT	1		1	
435965	RIFLE 7.62-MM SEMIAUTOMATIC LT BARREL	1		1	
437250	SCALE GRAPHICAL FIRING FOR 4.2-INCH MORTAR	1		1	
437260	SCALE GRAPHICAL FIRING FOR 105-MM HOWITZER	1		1	
440835	SIGHT BORE MORTAR	1		1	
449980	TELESCOPE OBSERVATION	1		1	
453895	TOOL KIT ORG MAINT NR 2 COMMON	1		1	
457110	TRAILER AMPHIBIOUS CARGO 1/4 TON 2-WHEEL	1		1	
457190	TRAILER CARGO 3/4-TON 2-WHEEL	1		1	
457220	TRAILER CARGO 1 1/2-TON 2-WHEEL	1		1	
457495	TRAILER TANK WATER 1 1/2-TON 2-WHEEL	1		1	
459832	TRUCK AMBULANCE FRONT LINE 1/4-TON 4X4	1		1	
460050	TRUCK CARGO 3/4-TON 4X4	1		1	
460080	TRUCK CARGO 3/4-TON 4X4 W/WN	1		1	
460110	TRUCK CARGO 2 1/2-TON 6X6 LWB	1		1	
460141	TRUCK CARGO 2 1/2-TON 6X6 LWB W/WN	1		1	
460320	TRUCK CARGO 5-TON 6X6 LWB W/WN	1		1	
461790	TRUCK UTILITY 1/4-TON 4X4	1		1	
461792	TRUCK UTILITY 1/4-TON 4X4 CARRIER FOR 106-MM RIFLE	1		1	
461834	TRUCK VAN SHOP 2 1/2-TON 6X6	1		1	
461885	TRUCK WRECKER MEDIUM 5-TON 6X6 W/WN	1		1	
465330	WATCH STOP TYPE H	1		1	
465400	WATCH WRIST GRADE II	1		1	
QUARTERMASTER ITEMS					
500020	ACCESSORY OUTFIT GASOLINE FIELD RANGE	1		1	
503120	BARNER KIT	1		1	
504726	BOTTLE VACUUM 1 QT WITH MAILING CASE	1		1	
505965	HUMMER ASSEMBLY SPACE HEATER	1		1	
507580	CABINET TOOL AND SPARE PARTS 11 DRAWERS 35 1/2 IN H 27 IN D	1		1	
507601	CABINET TOOL AND SPARE PARTS 12 DRAWERS 35 1/2 IN H 20 IN D	1		1	
507681	CABINET TOOL AND SPARE PARTS 39 IN H 46 3/4 W 23 9/16 IN D	1		1	
510320	CASE FIELD OFFICE MACH 18 1/2 22 1/2 26 1/2 OR 34 1/2 1 ID	1		1	
510521	CASE MILITARY WATER CAN 5 GALLON 14 1/2 L 19 1/2 H 6 3/8 W	1		1	
510553	COOK SET FIELD	1		1	
513620	CLOCK MESSAGE CENTER CHELSEA CLOCK M-2	1		1	
518370	DESK FIELD PLYWOOD 22 5/8 IN W 25 7/8 IN H 14 1/2 IN D	1		1	
518800	DUPPLICATING MACH STENCIL HAND AUT FEED	1		1	
524580	FILL VISIBL INDEX CABINET STEEL GRAY ENAMEL 7 8 OR 9 SLIDES	1		1	
525620	FLAG RED CROSS NYLON-WOOL AMBULANCE MARKER	1		1	
526281	FOOD CONTAINER INSULATED RECTANGULAR 5 GAL CAPACITY ALUMINUM	1		1	
526728	FOR TENT FRAME TYPE MED	1		1	
529100	GOGGLES SUN 2 PLASTIC LENS 1 COLORLESS 1 POLARIZED GREEN	1		1	
531120	HEATER IMMERSION LIQUID FUEL FIRED 37 1/4 IN LG	1		1	
531140	HEATER SPACE COAL OR OIL 45000 BTU 18 5/8 IN H	1		1	
532575	HEATER DUCT TYPE PORTABLE GASOLINE ENGINE	1		1	
532610	HEATER IMMERSION LIQUID FUEL FIRED 30 IN LG	1		1	
532940	INTRENCHING OUTFIT INFANTRY ENG SM-5-4-5180-S11	1		1	
534385	FLAG COLOR ORGANIZATIONAL SILEX	1		1	
536197	FLAG NATIONAL USA RAYON WATERING 3 FT HOIST 4 FT FLY	1		1	
540075	PACKBOARD PLYWOOD W/TONGUELES, R/HKLES SHOULDER STRAP 24 LG	1		1	
540240	PAD SHOULDER PACKBOARD FELT W/CTN DRILL 11 3/4 LG 3 W	1		1	
540500	PANEL MARKER AFFIAL LIAISON NYLON 6 FT LG 2 FT WIDE	1		1	
540550	VS-17GVX	1		1	
540550	PANEL MARKER SET AP-30-C	1		1	
540575	PANEL MARKER SET AP-30-D	1		1	
541075	PAULIN CTN DUCK FMWR OD 17 FT LG 12 FT W	1		1	
541175	PAULIN CTN DUCK FMWR OD 40 FT LG 20 FT W	1		1	
544371	GUIDON NYLON AND WOOL BUNTING	1		1	
549225	RANGE OUTFIT FIELD GASOLINE	1		1	
554125	SAFE 2 SHELVES 1 DRAWER 2 COMPARTMENT 26 H 17 W 17 1/2 IN D	1		1	
558125	SLIDE RULE DOUBLE FACE 10 IN L WOODEN METAL OR PLASTIC BODY	1		1	
558175	SLING FLAGSTAFF WEAVING TEXTILE OLIVE DRAB IRON SOCKET	1		1	
558400	SLING UNIVERSAL INDIVIDUAL LOAD CARRYING	1		1	
561291	STRAP QUICK RELEASE PACKBOARD	1		1	
563450	TABLEWARE OUTFIT FIELD 14 COMPONENTS	1		1	
565875	TENT GENERAL PURPOSE MEDIUM WITHOUT WINDOWS FMWR WITH PIN	1		1	
565901	TENT GENERAL PURPOSE SMALL COTTON DUCT FMWR OLIVE DRAB	1		1	
566001	TENT KITCHEN FLYPROOF FMWR OLIVE DRAB WITH COVER PING POLES	1		1	
567880	REPAIR KIT TENTAGL	1		1	
569051	TOOL KIT ARMORERS ORD DRAWING NO 7540440	1		1	
569151	TOOL KIT AUTOMOTIVE MAINTENANCE ORD DRAWING NO 7540641	1		1	
569475	TOOL KIT CARPENTERS ENG SMS-4-5180-504	1		1	

PAG NO	LINE NO	ITEM DESCRIPTION	QUANTITY			REMARKS	FOR LOCAL USE
			PAL STOCK	ORDERS IN PROCESS	IN STOCK		
			1	1			
	269850	TOOL KIT ELECTRICIANS NO 2 ORD DRAWING 7541473	1	1			
	271009	TOOL KIT PIONEER ENGINEER SQUAD ENG SMS-A-5100-517	1	1			
	271553	TOOL KIT SIG PART NO TE-33	1	1			
	272060	STOVE GASOLINE BURNER 1 BURNER 3500 BTU	46	46			
	275533	TRUNK LOCKER METAL-WOOD METAL REINF 31 LG 17 W 13 DEEP	1	1			
	278882	TYPEWRITER NOMPBL 11 IN CARTRIDGE GOIMIC NO 4 TYPE	1	1			
	275910	TYPEWRITER NOMPBL 14 18 19 OR 20 IN ELITE OR PICA TYPE	1	1			
	275922	TYPEWRITER NOMPBL 21 22 OR 24 IN ELITE OR PICA TYPE	1	1			
	275977	TYPEWRITER P1BL UPPER AND LOWER CASE ELITE OR PICA 42 KEYS	9	9			
	276310	TABLE FOLDING LEGS WOOD SOLID TOP WOOD LEGS 36 L 24 W 27 23/32 H	10	10			
	277223	TANK AND PUMP UNIT LIQUID DISPENSING TRUCK MOUNTED	2	2			
	277227	TANK UNIT TRAILER MOUNTED	2	2			
		SIGNAL ITEMS					
	603114	ANTENNA AT-244/G	7	7			
	603119	ANTENNA AT-784/PRC	9	9			
	604010	REELING MACHINE CABLE HAND RL-27D	11	11			
	609423	CHARGER RADIAC DETECTOR PP-1578/PD	19	19			
	609470	CASE RC-3	3	3			
	610280	CIPHER MACHINE TSEC/RL-7	2	2			
	614378	LOUDSPEAKER PERMANENT MAGNET LS-188/U	3	3			
	614913	ELECTRONIC TELETYPEWRITER SECURITY EQUIPMENT TSEC/KW-7	2	2			
	616920	FREQUENCY METER AN/URM-37	1	1			
	618109	GENERATOR SET GASOLINE ENGINE PU 932/PPS	4	4			
	618111	GENERATOR SET GASOLINE ENGINE PU 922/U	2	2			
	619610	HEADSET MICROPHONE H-144/U	20	20			
	628139	MULTIMETER AN/URM-109	5	5			
	634443	RADAR SET AN/PPS-4	4	4			
	634480	RADAR SET AN/TPS-33	2	2			
	634670	RADIACMETER IM-93/UD	49	49			
	634673	RADIACMETER IM-109/PD	27	27			
	640704	RADIO SET AN/GRC-19 MTD IN TRX 3/4 TON CARGO	1	1			
	631809	RADIO SET AN/GRR-5 MTD IN TRX 3/4 TON CARGO	1	1			
	643101	RADIO SET AN/VRC-33 MTD IN TRUCK, 1/4 TON CARGO	2	2			
	643200	RADIO SET AN/GRC-125	2	2			
	643401	RADIO SET AN/GRC 125 MTD IN TRUCK 1/4 TON CARGO	2	2			
	643502	RADIO SET AN/PRC-A	55	55			
	644300	RADIO SET AN/PRC-25	46	46			
	631204	RADIO SET AN/VRC-24 MTD IN TRX 3/4 TON CARGO	1	1			
	633201	RADIO SET AN/VRC-46 MTD IN TRX 1/4 TON	8	7			
	633204	RADIO SET AN/VRC-46 MTD IN TRX 3/4 TON CARGO	2	2			
	635269	RADIO SET AN/VRC-46 MTD IN TRX SHOP VAN	2	2			
	635701	RADIO SET AN/VRC-47 MTD IN TRX 1/4 TON	19	19			
	635704	RADIO SET AN/VRC-47 MTD IN TRX 3/4 TON CARGO	3	3			
	636301	RADIO SET AN/VRC-47 MTD IN TRX 1/4 TON	1	1			
	637124	RADIO SET CONTROL GROUP AN/GRA-39	22	22			
	637222	RADIO TELETYPEWRITER SET AN/GRC-44	1	1			
	640000	REELING MACHINE CABLE HAND RL-39	32	32			
	640060	REEL EQUIPMENT CE-11	24	24			
	640120	REELING MACHINE CABLE HAND RL-31	2	2			
	640130	REELING MACHINE CABLE MOTOR DRIVEN RL-172/G	1	1			
	647863	SPEECH SECURITY EQUIPMENT TSEC/KV-8	2	2			
	648160	REEL CABLE DR-8	21	21			
	672370	SWITCHBOARD TELEPHONE MANUAL SB-903/GT	8	8			
	672382	SWITCHBOARD TELEPHONE MANUAL SB-22/PT	1	1			
	672390	SWITCHBOARD TELEPHONE TERMINAL SC-86/P	1	1			
	674870	TELEPHONE SET TA-1/PT	73	73			
	678260	TELEPHONE SET TA-312/PT	74	74			
	681620	TERMINAL BOARD TM-184	8	8			
	683657	TEST SET AN/UPM-93	1	1			
	683663	TEST SET ELECTRON TUBE TV-7/U	1	1			
	689614	TOOL KIT RADIO REPAIRMAN TK-1151 1/G	3	3			
	689620	TOOL KIT RADAR AND RADIO REPAIRMAN TK-87/U	1	1			
	694790	INVERTER VIBRATOR PP-68/U	1	1			
	697220	TEST SET RADIO FREQUENCY POWER AN/URM-93	1	1			
	698590	WIRE WD-1/TT ON DR-8 1/4 HI	69	69			
	698390	WIRE WD-1/TT MX 10A/G	90	90			
	698400	WIRE WD-1/TT RL-159/U	16	16			
	698322	REEL CABLE RL-159/U	10	10			
	698333	SPLICING KIT TELEPHONE CABLE MK-336/G	19	19			
		TRANSPORTATION ITEMS					
	711740	CHAIN ASSY EOL LEG W/PEAR LINKS AND 1 GRAD HOOK 5/8 IN BT 16 FT	2	2			
	711740	OR	10	10			
		DEVELOPMENTAL ITEMS					
	24	SIMULATOR TRAINING B-88/DA-ORIENTACI	2	2			

SECTION III - EQUIPMENT

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CORG-M-343

APPENDIX C

EVOLUTION OF THE INFANTRY BATTALION AND THE SPAN OF CONTROL

Historical Period	Number of Companies	Span of Control	Strength	Remarks
American Revolution 1777	4 companies each with 40 or more men	4	160	Rifle battalions were formed. When the number of men in the regiment exceeded 160, battalions were formed with the senior captain as commanding officer.
	4 companies each with less than 40 men	4	Less than 160	When the number of men in the regiment was less than 160 it was operated as a battalion with the regimental commander as commanding officer. (von Steuben, "Regulations")
Post-Revolutionary Army Act of September 29, 1789	4 companies, each with 3 officers and 70 men	4 or 8	280 men 12 officers	The infantry regiment was authorized 8 companies, each consisting of 1 captain, 1 lieutenant, 1 ensign, 4 sergeants, 4 corporals, 2 musicians, and 60 privates.
Organization of the Legion of the United States Sections 2 and 3 of the Act of March 5, 1792				In combat the regiment was operated as an 8-company battalion, unless two 4-company battalions were organized. This organization was based upon the Roman Legion and certain theories of Marshal Maurice de Saxe. The legion, commanded by a major general, was composed of four sublegions, each commanded by a brigadier general. Each sublegion was composed of an infantry battalion, a rifle battalion, a company of dragoons, and a company of artillery.
	8 companies, each with 3 officers and 95 men	8	768 men 32 officers	The infantry battalion was composed of 8 companies armed with caliber .69 smooth-bore muskets.
	4 companies, each with 35 officers and 95 men	4	383 men 16 officers	The rifle battalion was composed of 4 companies armed with caliber .54 (or smaller) rifles and was employed as flank support for the infantry.
				The dragoons were mounted troops, trained to fight as cavalry when mounted, or as infantry when dismounted. The legion was dropped in the reorganization of 1796.
Organization of the Army Act of April 30, 1790	4 companies, each with 3 officers and 76 men	4	304 men 13 officers, including 1 major	The regiment was increased to 12 companies (3 battalions) with 3 majors as battalion commanders. This was the largest US regiment to date.
Organization of the Army March 3, 1791	4 companies, each with 3 officers and 76 men	4	304 men 13 officers, including 1 major	
Organization of the Army April 12, 1808	10 companies, each with 4 officers and 78 men	10 or 5	390 men 20 officers	The infantry battalion did not appear as an established unit. If required, 2 battalions of 5 companies each were formed with one battalion commanded by a major and the other by the senior captain. When battalions were not formed, the infantry regiment contained 10 companies (a large battalion) and was commanded by a colonel.
Organization of the Army June 26, 1812	10 companies, each with 4 officers and 102 men	10 or 5	510 men 20 officers	The infantry battalion did not appear as an established unit. If required, 2 battalions of 5 companies each were formed with one battalion commanded by a major and the other by the senior captain. When battalions were not formed, the infantry regiment contained 10 companies (a large battalion) and was commanded by a colonel.

Historical Period	Number of Companies	Span of Control	Strength	Remarks
Organization of the Army March 3, 1815	10 companies, each with 3 officers and 70 men	10 or 5	350 men 15 officers	The infantry battalion did not appear as an established unit. If required, 2 battalions of 5 companies each were formed with one battalion commanded by a major and the other by the senior captain. When battalions were not formed, the infantry regiment contained 10 companies (a large battalion) and was commanded by a colonel. This post-war reduction resulted in a total "peace" establishment of 10,000 men.
Organization of the Army March 2, 1821	10 companies, each with 3 officers and 51 men	10 or 5	255 men 15 officers	The infantry battalion does not appear as an established unit. If required, 2 battalions of 5 companies each were formed with one battalion commanded by a major and the other by the senior captain. When battalions were not formed, the infantry regiment contained 10 companies (a large battalion) and was commanded by a colonel. This reduction decreased company strength to the lowest ever authorized. It remained at this strength for 15 years.
Organization of the Army July 5 - 7, 1838	10 companies, each with 3 officers and 89 men	10 or 5	440 men 15 officers	The infantry battalion does not appear as an established unit. If required, 2 battalions of 5 companies each were formed with one battalion commanded by a major and the other by the senior captain. When battalions were not formed, the infantry regiment contained 10 companies (a large battalion) and was commanded by a colonel. The Seminole War (1836-1842) necessitated the addition of 38 privates and 2 sergeants to each infantry company.
Organization of the Army May 13, 18, 19 and June 18 and 28, 1846	10 companies, each with 3 officers and 106 men	10 or 5	530 men 15 officers	The regiment and battalion were the same. Of the 10 companies, 6 were designated as battalion companies and 2 were assigned as flank companies. Composite battalions were formed for specific missions. During this period companies were designated by letters rather than by their captain's name. Flank companies were designated A and B, the battalion companies C through K. If required 2 battalions of 5 companies each were formed with one battalion commanded by a major and the other by the senior captain. When battalions were not formed, the infantry regiment contained 10 companies (a large battalion) and was commanded by a colonel. This was the infantry organization during the Mexican War (1846-1848). The caliber .69, smoothbore, flintlock musket and the new caliber .54 percussion cap rifle, Model 1841 were the regulation infantry shoulder weapons.
Organization of the Army July 29 and August 3, 1861	8 companies, each with 100 men	8	800 men	This act provided for 10 regiments of infantry in the old army and 9 regiments in the new regular army. The regiments of the new army contained 3 battalions, 2 of which were used in the field and one was used as a depot or training unit.

Historical Period	Number of Companies	Span of Control	Strength	Remarks
Civil War 1861 - 1865	10 companies, each with 3 officers and 98 men	10 or 5	980 men 66 officers	The volunteer infantry regiments were raised by the States. They were organized as 10 company (battalion) regiments because the War Department believed that the new 3-battalion regiment was too complicated for the State-raised units. By the end of the war over 1,700 volunteer regiments had served. Each company contained 1 captain, 1 1st lieutenant, 1 2d lieutenant, 1 1st sergeant, 4 sergeants, 8 corporals, 2 musicians, 1 wagoner, and 64-82 privates. The regiment had a lieutenant colonel and a major in addition to a colonel and it was possible to organize 2 battalions from the 10 companies, but this was, tactically, rarely done. When the war ended the new regular infantry regiments were organized as 10-company (battalion) units.
Organization of the Army June 16 and 23, 1874; March 2 and 3, 1875, and June 26, 1876.	10 companies, each with 3 officers and 48 men	10	484 men 30 officers	This regiment was one of the smallest ever authorized; company strength in the Indian Campaigns fell to as low as 37 men. There were no battalions.
Organization of the Army March 6, 1898 (Spanish-American War)	10 companies,	4	424 men 12 officers	As in the Civil War, the States were requested to furnish volunteer troops. In addition, 10 United States Volunteer (Non-State) regiments were formed--five negro and five white-- each authorized 892 enlisted men. These regiments were composed of men who were immune to tropical diseases. Of the 10 companies authorized for each regiment, 8 were active and were divided into two 4-company battalions. The two inactive companies plus two new companies formed the third battalion. As early as 1890, the Secretary of War recommended adoption of a 3-battalion, 12-company regiment. A similar organization was established in 1790 but it was supplanted by the Organization of the Legion of the United States in 1792. Because of improvements in firearms (dispersion), the proper span of control was thought to be 4 companies for 1 leader (a battalion commander). By March 1, 1899 companies contained 112 men and regiments 1,376. In the Philippines infantry rifle companies were increased to 128 men in the non-regular volunteer units.
The National Defense Act of 1916	12 rifle companies and 1 machine-gun company	5		This act provided for 64 infantry regiments organized into 3 battalions of 4 companies each. A regimental machinegun company was added to the regiment at this time. Four companies in a battalion plus an attached platoon of the machinegun company made one more leader in the span of control.
Tables of Organization, 1917 - 1918	4 rifle companies, each with 6 officers and 260 men	5 3 4	1,026 men 27 officers	These tables were basically the foundation for the rifle battalions of the World War I army, but they required adjustment to French and British combat experience. The brigade machinegun battalion of 3 companies and the division machinegun battalion of 4 companies (later reduced to 2 motorized companies) were formed as separate infantry units to support infantry rifle battalions, companies, and platoons.

Historical Period	Number of Companies	Span of Control	Strength	Remarks
				Automatic rifles (BAR) were introduced at squad level. Because of the introduction of new weapons (the machinegun, trench mortar, hand and rifle grenades) and the defense doctrine of trench warfare with its need for manpower, the infantry rifle company was increased from 150 to 250 men and from 3 officers to 6. The insistence by General Pershing, Commander-in-Chief, American Expeditionary Force, upon open warfare and maneuver brought the battalion and smaller units into fire and movement tactics.
World War II (pre-Pearl Harbor) Table of Organization, 7-15 Infantry Battalion, Rifle 1 October 1940	3 rifle companies, 1 heavy weapons company	4	904 men 28 officers	The battalion commander was now a lieutenant colonel. The traditional commander, the major, was second in command. Machineguns and heavy mortars were now organically assigned to the heavy weapons company of the battalion. The rifle battalion had 24 vehicles.
Table of Organization, 7-25 Armored Infantry Battalion 1 March 1942	3 rifle companies, 1 battalion headquarters and headquarters company	4	878 men 24 officers	This battalion was formed to furnish protection and infantry support for the armored divisions. Although smaller in strength than the rifle battalion, it was a highly mobile unit mounted in half-track cars (M2 and M3) with armament. There were 4 self-propelled antitank guns and 12 towed antitank guns in each battalion. This type of battalion is an example of the specialized units created by the advances in weaponry and tactics.
Table of Organization, 7-15 Infantry Battalion 1 April 1942	3 rifle companies, 1 headquarters company, 1 heavy weapons company	5	884 men 32 officers	This battalion with its greatly increased strength and the addition of the headquarters company reflects the trend toward better control and more personnel to absorb expected combat losses.
Table of Organization, 7-15 Infantry Battalion 1 March 1943	3 rifle companies, 1 heavy weapons company	4	818 men 32 officers	The battalion headquarters company was dropped and the headquarters detachment reinstated by this TO. General McNair's policy of trimming all TO of "excess" units and personnel influenced this change. The detachment, as part of the headquarters, did not increase the span of control of the battalion commander.
Table of Organization, 7-15 Infantry Battalion February 26, 1944	3 rifle companies, 1 heavy weapons company, 1 headquarters company	5	836 men 35 officers	The increase in strength was necessitated by prospective combat losses in the ground combat to be waged in Europe. The new 75mm recoilless rifles were added to the battalion in the new gun platoon of the battalion heavy weapons company.
Table of Organization, 7-15 Infantry Battalion June 1, 1945	3 rifle companies, 1 heavy weapons company, 1 headquarters company	5	977 men 37 officers	With General McNair's death in action, his austerity program was no longer a factor in organizational policy. This organization of the largest infantry battalion during World War II indicates the desire to strengthen the battalion because of the impending victory in Europe and the probable redeployment of units to the Pacific.
Post World War II - Pre-Korean War Period Table of Organization and Equipment, 7015N Infantry Battalion April 16, 1948	3 rifle companies, 1 heavy weapons company, 1 headquarters and headquarters company	5	883 men 34 officers	This post-war battalion reflected a reduction in personnel in an effort to return to peacetime unit strength and at the same time be capable of furnishing a base of fire, maneuver capabilities in all terrain and climates, limited antitank protection, and a force for seizing and holding terrain.
Pre-Korean War Period Reduction Table No. 7-15-N-20, TOE 7-1: Infantry Battalion June 27, 1949	3 rifle companies, 1 heavy weapons company, 1 headquarters and headquarters company	5	685 men 32 officers	This greatly reduced battalion was the result of post-war economies. Unfortunately, the Korean Police Action began in 1950 and these low-strength units were found to be inadequate to meet the demands of combat.

Historical Period	Number of Companies	Span of Control	Strength	Remarks
Korean War Table of Organization, 7-15N, November 15, 1950	3 rifle companies, 1 heavy weapons company, 1 headquarters and headquarters company	5	Full strength 880 men 5 warrant officers 34 officers Reduced strength 685 men 5 warrant officers 32 officers	A full-strength and reduced-strength battalion was provided by this Table. The authorization for rapid expansion to meet combat requirements was a built-in feature of this organization which was at that time engaged in combat in Korea.
The Pentomic Period Table of Organization and Equipment, 7-11D Battle Group 1 February 1960	4 rifle companies, (5 in the Pentomic Airborne Battle Group) 1 headquarters company 1 mortar battery (4.2-in)	6	1286 men 3 warrant officers 67 officers	<u>Reorganization Objective, Current Infantry Division (ROCID)</u> . This organization eliminated the regiment in favor of the battle group. The battle group was smaller than the regiment but larger than the battalion. The commanding officer was a colonel. "It was designed for sustained combat operations either alone or in combination with one or more battle groups. Individual and crew-served weapons were replaced by improved models that increased firepower, decreased weight, and simplified operation and maintenance." (Pizer). Among the weapons replaced were the M-1 and the Browning automatic rifle. The addition of the mortar battery, which was staffed with artillery personnel, made the battle group similar to the regimental combat team of World War II and Korea. The organization of fire teams in the infantry rifle squad was also a feature of the battle group. The battle group was considered "not big enough" (Weigley). For this reason the Army almost returned to the triangular division organization of World War II and Korea.
Table of Organization and Equipment, 7-15E Infantry Battalion, Infantry Division 15 July 1963	1 headquarters company, 3 rifle companies	4	792 men 2 warrant officers 37 officers	<u>The Reorganization Objective Army Division (ROAD)</u> was organized and tested during the 1962 to 1964 period. Four types of divisions were organized under ROAD -- Infantry, armored, airborne, mechanized, and airmobile. These divisions are currently authorized by TOF. The ROAD Infantry battalion (maneuver) was organized as an integral part of the division structure (see Note). The battalion and brigade were restored to the Infantry division, but the regiment was not. The basic structure of the ROAD division is: headquarters and headquarters company aviation battalion engineer battalion armored cavalry squadron support command military police company signal battalion brigade headquarters and headquarters company division artillery tank battalion infantry battalion

Note:

The number of maneuver (infantry) battalions may vary. They are assigned or attached to division headquarters (brigade headquarters structure). Although in practice division structures vary, examples of representative mixture of maneuver battalions can be approximated for each type division. For example, an Infantry division might have eight Infantry battalions and two tank battalions, an armored division might contain six tank battalions and five mechanized (infantry) battalions, a mechanized (infantry) division might have seven mechanized (infantry) battalions and three tank battalions; and an airborne division might include nine airborne (infantry) battalions and one tank battalion.

The new airmobile division is heavy with cavalry battalions (infantry). Three of these -- one brigade -- are parachute-qualified. However, there is no fixed normal or standard mix of maneuver battalions for ROAD divisions.

The airborne division has a strength of approximately 13,500, the other divisions have a strength in excess of 15,000.

SOURCES: See "Sources," p 184.

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APPENDIX D

THE SPAN OF CONTROL: ROCID AND ROAD DIVISIONS

The ROCID division actually added more subordinate units, or commands, to the division commander's span of control. In combat, the divisional brigade provided by ROCID contained a two-battle-group task force commanded by the assistant division commander (ADC). The division commander's span of control consisted of seven units: the brigade, three battle groups, the armor battalion, the cavalry squadron, and the artillery. In practice, the ADC was directly under the division commander. If the brigade was not used, the ADC was relieved of active control of a maneuver unit. Hence, the division commander's span of control, in that case, would be eight units.

The ROAD concept reduced the division commander's span of control from eight to five units. This was an achievement in assuring stronger and more effective unit control. In 1962, the ROAD organization consisted of three brigade headquarters, an armored cavalry squadron, and division artillery.

In 1964, under the provisions of TOE 7E, the ROAD Infantry Division consisted of the following units and personnel:

Officers - 974
Warrant Officers - 132
Enlisted - 14,488

HHC	Engr Bn	MP Co	Avn Bn
0-42	0-44	0-9	0-45
E-95	E-896	E-179	E-250
	W-2	W-1	W-23
 Sig Bn	 Div Arty	 Bde HHC (3)	
0-24	0-191	0-23	
E-547	E-2308	E-94	
W-4	W-17	W-6	
 Armd Cav Sqdn	 Spt Comd**	 Tank Bn	 Inf Bn* (8)
E-749	0-141	0-34	0-37
0-45	E-1778	E-538	E-792
W-22	W-23	W-3	W-2

*Number of battalions shown represent a type division only. Compositions of divisions may vary.

**The support commander's responsibilities to the administration company are limited to tactical, security, and movement aspect.

Principles of Organization

All military organizations are designed to perform an anticipated mission. The requirements of the mission determine the number of men and the type of equipment which the unit must possess. To effectively direct the efforts of the various groupings of men and equipment toward the accomplishment of the mission, a command or control structure is necessary. Essentially then, there are two basic principles which must be considered in developing any organization regardless of the mission. These are the principles of Mission and Control.

Mission

In providing a unit with the necessary means to accomplish its mission, care must be exercised to insure that the following factors are considered:

- Economy. Only the personnel and equipment normally required in performance of the mission should be organic to the unit. Equipment not used on a day-to-day basis should be pooled at the highest echelon practical and requested by the using units as needed.
- Simplicity. The simplest weapon is the fist or a club. An army organized and equipped in this manner however, would be short-lived on the battlefield of today. Simplicity must be tempered with consideration of the other factors affecting organization, such as a weapons system, that will insure success on the battlefield.
- Flexibility. Infantry units must be capable of a wide variety of operations, with or without nuclear weapons support, and in any type of terrain, weather, or situation. Consequently, the organizational structure of these units must be one that will facilitate the formation of combat groupings or task forces containing the necessary elements to accomplish the essential functions of finding, fixing, fighting, and finishing the enemy. Infantry units have this flexibility to a high degree and are capable of receiving and directing the operations of attachments and coordinating the efforts of reinforcing units.

Control

The organization must have an effective command and control system. In developing a control system for a unit, the following factors must be considered:

- Unity of Command. This factor expresses the need within a command structure of having one and only one commander. The commander is responsible for everything which his unit does or fails to do. At each level of command, responsibility must be

matched by corresponding authority which enables the commander to carry out his responsibilities.

- **Span of Control.** By definition, span of control is the number of immediate subordinates one commander or leader can effectively control, supervise, or direct. Maximum and minimum limits of span of control vary with the conditions under which the unit is designed to operate and the complexity of functions performed. In a unit, for example, composed of identical elements each performing the same function, the span of control should be greater than in a similar size unit composed of different type elements each with a different function. Other factors affecting span of control are: freedom of movement, communication facilities, and staff and command assistants available to the commander.
- **Chain of Command.** Chain of command is the succession of commanding officers from a superior to a subordinate through which command is exercised. It is the factor which enables the commander to retain unity of command of all elements of his unit without exceeding the maximum practical span of control. The commander has overall responsibility for the actions of all elements of his unit. If he directly commanded the actions of all elements however, his span of control would be excessive. By using a chain of command he can limit the number of subordinates that he directly supervises. In the Infantry Division Infantry Battalion, for example, the battalion commander assigns tasks to his unit commanders and holds them responsible for the successful execution of such tasks. Unit commanders employ the same procedure with platoon leaders, and platoon leaders with squad and section leaders.

Source: Infantry Reference Data, ROAD, United States Army Infantry School, Fort Benning, Georgia, February 1964.

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13. ABSTRACT ABSTRACT The infantry battalion has evolved over a period of several thousand years; its American ancestors may be found in the units organized during the American Revolution. The modern infantry battalion in the United States Army began in the period just prior to World War II. The battalion was forged and tested on the battlefields of Europe and in the Pacific Area. Nuclear weapons, the Korean War, and the Cold War have exerted considerable influence on the size, composition, and weaponry of the present-day infantry battalion. The adaptation of the World War II armored division organization to the ROAD division has given the infantry battalion of the United States Army the highest fire and movement capability it has ever possessed in our military history. The advent of the helicopter and its application to troop carrier and fire support missions enables the infantry battalion to become highly air mobile.		

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